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Narratives of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization in Canada: a discourse analysis.

Master (MA) Thesis

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Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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Abstract

The largest Ukrainian diaspora is in Canada, however, after the start of massive Russian aggression in 2022, the figures for Canadian assistance to Ukraine cannot compete even with the five countries supplying assistance to Ukraine in the current situation. It is still unclear why the potential opportunity to influence Canada's domestic and foreign policy was lost on the part of the Ukrainian diaspora, but in this thesis, we will look at how the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora took place in the light of unfavorable events in their native state. The purpose of this study is to find out how the Ukrainian diaspora mobilized its supporters in the period from 2014 to 2022. This study conducts a critical discourse analysis of the narratives that shaped the discourse of the presidents of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and contributed to the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. The thesis analyzes text and video reports of the presidents of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress and focuses on 3 narratives: "Struggle for Freedom and Dignity" narrative, "Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations" narrative, and "Ethnic and Organizational Cohesion" narrative. Thus, during the period under study, the participants of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress mainly used the "Struggle for freedom and dignity" narrative and the "Ethnic and organizational cohesion" narrative; they can rightfully be considered the dominant and formative narratives for the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora. The "Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations" narrative was practically not used in the discourse to mobilize diaspora supporters.

Keywords: Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, diaspora mobilization, Ukrainian Canadian Congress, diaspora mobilization narratives.

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Introduction

The history of migration of Ukrainians to Canada goes far back in history and it can be divided into several waves. However, it should be emphasized that in the 21st century, the migration of Ukrainians to Canada has intensified compared to previous decades (Nedashkivska, 2018). This is due to several factors, but first, it is worth talking about the total number of Ukrainians in Canada. According to the surveys conducted in 2016, the number of Ukrainians in Canada represented approximately 1.36 million people, or about 4% of the Canadian population, these are people who declared their Ukrainian roots and ethnicity (Stick & Hou, 2022).

Certainly, this is a relatively large number of people, and accordingly, after the outbreak of a large-scale war in Ukraine in 2022, the Ukrainian community in Canada began to be proactive in drawing attention to the war and supporting compatriots in Ukraine. In this context, it makes sense to pay attention to the measures taken by Canada to support Ukraine and Ukrainians in the context of Russia's large-scale aggression. For this purpose, we need to divide Canadian actions into 2 main types: support of Ukraine as a state and support of Ukrainians as citizens in trouble.

The issue of support for Ukrainians as citizens in difficult circumstances in the context of the war after 2022 has to be analyzed first and it is essential to mention the Canada-Ukraine authorization for emergency travel (hereinafter - CUAET) program. The Canadian government, in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine, introduced the CUAET program to help thousands of Ukrainians find safety in Canada. Between March 2022 and February 2024, a total of about 1.2 million applications were received, of which about one million were approved (*Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel: Key Figures*, 2024). During this period, about 250 thousand Ukrainians have already come to Canada for a new life. Secondly, the Government of Canada has also approved the eligibility of Ukrainians to receive financial assistance to newly arrived Ukrainians. Thus, all Ukrainians who arrived under the CUAET program are entitled to a one-time payment from the Government of Canada (*Ukraine immigration measures: Financial assistance*, 2023).

On the other hand, concerning military aid and the statistics, as of February 2024, Canada has allocated 4 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine since February 2022 (*Canadian Military Support to Ukraine*, 2024). By comparison, for example, Germany sent military aid to Ukraine totaling 5 billion euros in 2023 (*The Arms and Military Equipment Germany Is Sending to Ukraine*,

2024). So, we can see that the Canadian government has done quite a lot in the context of assisting Ukraine, but what remains to be seen is whether this support is substantial in comparative terms, is this support more inherently greater than originally expected? Obviously, it is quite difficult to measure expectations of realization of certain intentions, but the answer to this question can be rather negative because the largest Ukrainian diaspora is in Canada (not counting the number of Ukrainians in Russia), but we also see quite substantial support from other states. Speaking about assistance at the level of people, the EU has issued a directive that Ukrainians can receive protection status in any EU country and enjoy work rights, social benefits (it depends more on the country), i.e., these measures are similar to the Canadian ones (Barigazzi, 2022).

Thus, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker from the Kiel Institute, the top five countries assisting Ukraine (financial, military, and humanitarian aid were taken into account) are the USA, Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, and Norway. Canada is in 8th place among the countries providing support to Ukraine (Trebesch, n.d.). This only confirms our assumption that Canada is still doing less than might be expected. This raises the question of why Canada's support for Ukraine is less than one could expect or than one could assume based on the age and size of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, this question is extremely important and quite interesting to analyze, it's puzzling for this research.

In this context, it is important for the current research puzzle to understand why the quantity of emigrants of one nationality in the receiving state does not always convert into quality in the context of wagging and lobbying the interests of the home state. Moreover, in this context it is crucial to examine the issue of diaspora mobilization and, consequently, if diaspora mobilization has taken place, why the size and scope of assistance to the home state does not correlate with the age, conditional authority and influence of the diaspora in matters of assistance to the home state. In other words, based on this example, it is important to understand why the potential of diasporas does not represent a competitive advantage in terms of material and financial support to the home state.

Next, the relevance of this study should be clarified. It was Canada that was the first to recognize Ukraine's independence on December 2, 1991, and since that time close and friendly relations have been maintained between the states (*Canada-Ukraine relations*, 2023). The ethnic Ukrainians who are part of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada are quite actively involved in the political activities of the state. For instance, for the last 50 years, quite a lot of politicians in Canada

had Ukrainian roots. Moreover, Ray Hnatyshyn was Governor General of Canada (representative of the Queen of Great Britain, who is recognized as Canada's head of state) from 1990 to 1995. Another notable example is Chrystia Freeland, who has been the Deputy Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, since 2019. It is therefore important to identify the narratives that have led to the mobilization of the diaspora, whose members can influence Canadian politics through positions of power.

The Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has obviously undergone some positive organizational and functional changes since 2014. This thesis will identify which narratives have been used in order to mobilize the Ukrainian population in Canada to build and strengthen Ukrainian civil society and mobilize the diaspora. Specifically, it will analyze the narratives that shaped the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora during the period under consideration.

However, all existing studies cannot answer the question this study poses, since no one has previously analyzed the narratives through which the Ukrainian diaspora tried to achieve mobilization. Moreover, no one has used discourse analysis to analyze diaspora mobilization not only in the specific case of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada but also the mobilization of the diaspora in general. With the findings of this study, we will be able to compare this case study with other cases of either Ukrainian diasporas or diasporas of other states in other countries, which will be able to shed light on the study of various issues related to diaspora mobilization. Moreover, this study aims to highlight the significance of the narratives used by diasporas to mobilize their supporters in a foreign country.

The content of this thesis is as follows. The first section introduces us to the issue of aid to Ukraine from various states, namely the correlation and relationship between the size and influence of the diaspora and the amount of aid provided to Ukraine in the context of the war against Russia. This section also emphasizes the importance and relevance of this work. The first chapter of this paper will be devoted to the consideration of the theoretical basis of the research, existing concepts in diaspora issues, diaspora mobilization, as well as other nuances of interaction between the diaspora and the host state. The first section will concentrate on how diasporas mobilize support, while the second section focuses on diaspora mobilization mechanisms. The second chapter clarifies and completes the research picture with the methodological approach that will be used in this thesis and explains why it was decided to conduct a single case study. It will also focus on discourse analysis as the main method for this research. Along with this, this chapter will mention

the method of information gathering and the choice of narratives for the study itself. This chapter will be followed by a chapter dedicated to the historical features of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, the chapter will focus on the key features of the formation and existence of the diaspora, which act as an important context within the analysis of narratives for the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. This chapter will also reveal details of the organizational structure of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. The final chapter is devoted to the empirical analysis of the selected material. This section will examine three selected narratives that contribute to the mobilization of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada. First, the study will focus on the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative, then research will move on to analyze the “Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations” narrative, and it will also examine the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative. This will be followed by a section that will be devoted to general thoughts after the analysis that has been done, which deals with the sources and the nature of the material but does not refer to any of the narratives analyzed however, it speaks to the properties of the materials that contain the narratives that form the discourse, this section will also contribute significantly to the conclusions of the current study. Accordingly, based on the analysis, it will be possible to draw conclusions and summarize the narratives used to mobilize the diaspora of Ukrainians in Canada. At the end of the thesis, the main thoughts will be summarized in the conclusion.

Conceptualization and Theoretical Framework

How diaspora mobilizes support

First of all, the term diaspora should be defined. Diasporas are often seen as communities that are ethnic minorities with a sense of their own identity in the host society; in other words, such communities resist full assimilation to some extent and try to maintain a connection to the homeland, but in such societies, there is usually a constant interaction with cultures and identities (Androutsopoulos, 2006). Diaspora includes a diverse set of groups: refugees, foreigners, guest workers, immigrants, ethnic and racial minorities, and overseas communities that in one way or another maintain a connection with the former homeland (Shuval, 2000). Today, thanks to worldwide technological advances, masses of dispersed populations in a foreign country can participate in transnational politics in real-time, and this allows them to influence political events and attract the attention of governments, non-sovereign actors, and so on (Adamson, 2016). It is worth emphasizing that the Internet plays a significant role in maintaining transnational diaspora ties and engaging in political activism both at home and in foreign countries (Brinkerhoff, 2009, as cited in Koinova, 2021).

The generalized considerations that diasporas are non-state actors or are managed directly by states wishing to control their populations abroad are only partially correct, as we need to consider the level of autonomy of each diaspora, as each enjoys varying degrees of autonomy from its original homeland (Koinova, 2012). It is also important to note that diasporas often have a hybrid characteristic, namely in the process of mixing cultures, some diaspora arrivals adopt features of the host culture and partially reformulate and modify them, resulting in hybrid cultures and hybrid identities (Karla et al, 2005). Diaspora institutions may arise in order to utilize diasporas in conflict and diplomacy, to obtain resources important for the development and security of the state of origin through the diaspora, and to achieve domestic political goals (Gamlen et al, 2021). In this study, the diaspora is considered as a hybrid community of migrants in which members of this community reconstruct their own identity using features acquired from the host culture.

Moreover, it is essential to pay attention to the time that the diaspora exists, as the history of diaspora existence and activities can go back decades, and in some cases, it can go back hundreds of years. As a rule, the more time has passed since the first wave of emigration, the stronger the ties with the homeland and the more organizations exist in the host state (Kopchick et

al, 2022). This is supported by the activities of Irish Americans who actively lobbied for the Irish Republican Army (Cochrane, 2007, as cited in Kopchick et al, 2022). This topic is particularly important because we know that Ukrainian emigration to Canada dates back quite a long time, so it is also important to keep this factor in mind when analyzing diaspora mobilization.

Moving to the question of diaspora mobilization, the question of how diasporas were most often formed should be clarified. According to Koinova (2021), there are “conflict-generated” diasporas and those that arose for natural reasons as a result of economic migration. We would like to pay some attention to diasporas formed based on conflict in the home country, which was the reason for immigration. Some researchers believe that diasporas that were formed as a result of conflict in the home country are more likely to contribute to the exacerbation of these conflicts (buying weapons, recruiting combatants, etc.) than those diasporas that were formed through economic migration (Bayman et al, 2001; Schein, 2002; Hokkenos, 2003, as cited in Koinova, 2013) It is important to emphasize here that the home state often views the diaspora as a resource to turn to for financial assistance (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000; Kaldor, 2001, as cited in Koinova, 2013). Notably, diasporas may oppose conflict resolution in the home country because the ongoing conflict helps them to preserve and maintain their own identity in another state (Shain, 2002, as cited in Koinova, 2013). It can also be assumed here that this helps to maintain the level of diaspora mobilization for the survival of the diaspora itself.

Nevertheless, while it is a common belief among most researchers that the diaspora often mobilizes in response to conflict and hardship in the home country, this has not been confirmed in one study, and conflict in the home country itself can bring both opportunities and constraints for political entrepreneurs trying to mobilize diaspora (Kopchick et al, 2022). Accordingly, it must be accepted that the plight of compatriots at home is not the cause or contributing factor to diaspora mobilization (Ibid). However, there are quite interesting statistics regarding the different degrees of diaspora mobilization depending on the type of migration. Based on the fact that the researchers examined 5 factors related to the identity preservation hypothesis within the diaspora mobilization study, they concluded that the chance of the highest level of diaspora mobilization is 24% in the case of voluntary emigration compared to 14% in the case of involuntary migration (the latter usually occurs as a result of conflict) (Ibid). This is probably due to the fact that voluntary emigration, which refers to the economic type of emigration, most often implies emigrants who

have certain resources and still have a connection to the homeland, as well as a willingness to help this homeland.

Moreover, the details related to the process of diaspora mobilization should be revealed. Diaspora mobilization means the realization of desires and demands regarding the homeland in the host state through various means ranging from institutional (any institutional ways of influencing the host government through lobbying within the parliament, activism of non-profit diaspora organizations, etc.) to activism (Koinova, 2017). Diaspora mobilization involves the mobilization of resources that are aimed at achieving certain goals related to the homeland through influencing institutional policies, e.g., lobbying governments, and international organizations, it can also be manifested in the politics of mass protests, fundraising, petitions, boycotts, and even the recruitment of soldiers to fight in the homeland (Ibid). Generally, the process of diaspora mobilization should carry a number of distinctive external features. For example, diaspora mobilization is manifested when national anniversaries are celebrated, open discussions are held, books, films, etc. are produced, hence diaspora mobilization is not just the presence of and participation in such events, but the active involvement of others in all these processes (Ibid). According to a number of researchers (Kopchick et al, 2022), the main beneficiaries of diaspora mobilization are fundamentally those living in the diaspora's home country, meaning that diaspora members in a foreign country have potentially much less to gain from diaspora mobilization than those in the home country, as any changes in the home country have material benefits for them. People living outside of their home country will not benefit materially from political change in that country, so they may be acting in the interests of their relatives back home, and therefore their main goal is to preserve their identities in order to avoid complete assimilation (Ibid).

Speaking about diaspora mobilization, it will also be crucial to define diaspora entrepreneurs, as they are directly related to the process of diaspora mobilization. Accordingly, according to Koinova (2021), diaspora entrepreneurs are “formal and informal leaders in a diaspora community, associated with migrant, religious, and other identity-based institutions, but also those acting autonomously as activists, businessmen, politicians, and others who actively make public claims with a homeland-oriented goal”. Although some of them may be business-related, they are essentially political and social entrepreneurs because the unifying factor for them is the homeland to which they remain committed while in exile (Ibid). In other words, they are the main actors in the diaspora, influencing decision-making in one way or another. Moreover, a

parallel can be drawn between these people and classical entrepreneurs, who can exert normative pressure to achieve their goals and any change by appealing to human rights and other modern democratic values (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, as cited in Koinova, 2021).

It is also important to define socio-spatial linkages, as this phenomenon relates to the concept of diaspora entrepreneur and is useful for our study in general, and as it denotes diaspora entrepreneurs' connections to people and places in different global contexts. Accordingly, Koinova (2021) divides this concept into two logical parts: the dimension of social linkages and spatial linkages. First, the concept of social linkages should be revealed. Diaspora entrepreneurs have quite strong social linkages, socializing with people (most often diplomats, bureaucrats, politicians, etc.) who may have relative power and play an important role in achieving goals that concern the homeland (Ibid). On the contrary, relatively weak social ties can be described as those ties that diaspora entrepreneurs have with relatives or friends, but through which they cannot achieve any political goals through concrete actions (Ibid). The spatial dimension reveals people's interaction with a particular locality or place (which can be beneficial for diaspora mobilization), as there is a widespread belief that places can wiggle or shape the behavior of the people who live there. (Massey, 1994, Brenner et al, 2003, Diani et al, 2010, as cited in Koinova, 2021). This linkage to place can be either strong or weak: if certain characteristics of a place can enhance activism, then the linkage is strong, and if this context of place is unfavorable in the context of their mobilization, then this linkage can be considered weak (Koinova, 2021). Thus, we can understand how these two dimensions influenced the mobilization of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada.

Back to the issue of diaspora mobilization, we should also say that it can be defined as either contentious and non-contentious, or dual-pronged contentious (combined) (Koinova, 2013). Consideration of these types is crucial for our study in order to build a complete picture of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization in Canada. As Koinova (2013) argues, non-contentious actions for diaspora mobilization are those that could be called "established" in the context of achieving goals, such as lobbying; contentious, on the other hand, are actions that involve the use of relatively new collective actions that may either be unprecedented or prohibited; the combined type involves the use of elements from the contentious and non-contentious types simultaneously.

The scholars (Kopchick et al, 2022) provide important insights for our study on diaspora mobilization that bring more understanding to the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in

Canada. For example, it has been shown that diasporas that are similar to the population of a foreign country (the study considered Caucasians as European race) are more likely to mobilize because religion and race correlate (e.g., racially similar groups have about a 40% probability of achieving the highest level of mobilization, while racially dissimilar groups have a 23% probability) with mobilization, while language differences do not (Ibid).

It is also crucial to talk about diaspora concentration and settlement because the geographical factor of emigrant settlement will affect diaspora mobilization. A good example is the concentration of Cuban Americans in South Florida, which enabled diaspora lobbyists to gain favor with local politicians and form a powerful voting bloc (Perez, 2014, as cited in Kopchick et al, 2022). Based on a study by a group of scholars (Kopchick et al, 2022), the concentration of diaspora settlement is positively correlated and directly affects the likelihood of diaspora mobilization, so the more concentrated groups tend to face fewer obstacles to organizing, as people have more opportunities to communicate, however, it is also important to understand that depending on the electoral rules of the host state, concentrated diaspora groups may have more political weight, as their votes can gain significant influence.

Mechanisms and tools of diaspora mobilization

It is equally important to examine the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization, how this has been considered and studied by other researchers, and how our study can benefit from these reflections. Sökefeld (2006) sees diaspora as a transnational imagined community and makes the assumption that the discursive imagination of the community is not a direct result of migration movements, hence he asks why and how diasporic discourse emerges and how people are forced to adopt and participate in a particular discourse, which leads him to the conclusion that the process of diaspora mobilization is a matter of social mobilization. Since the field of social science is fundamentally concerned with how and why people mobilize for collective goals and actions, we see an obvious parallel with diasporas, but we should not equate them with each other (Ibid). It is important to note that the thesis is not intended to explore, examine, and compare social movement mobilization and diaspora mobilization. However, a word about social movements is necessary to point out that these distinctive features are also present in the phenomenon of diasporas. Most often these are collective actions that do not agree with existing social and political structures or

practices, in other words, they demand change by putting forward new ideas, demands or taking new actions (Sökefeld, 2006). The same can be observed in any diaspora activity, when disagreement with the existing order of things is expressed, there is a motivation to make some changes, influencing local politics to achieve some changes related to the homeland. As already described, diaspora mobilization occurs due to the presence of common motivating interests among emigrants in the host state. Apart from internal interests (self-survival of the diaspora through the preservation of their own identity), and now it is necessary to look at different groups of these interests about their homeland.

First is identity, and here it is important to make a small clarification: identity may not always determine interests but rather is an interest (Shain & Barth, 2003). As already clarified earlier, the issue of identity plays a huge role in diaspora, but in the context of our study, it is also worth looking at this phenomenon from a slightly different angle. Thus, the interest may lie in influencing the foreign policy of the homeland in such a way as to obtain the desired version of kinship and national identity (Ibid). Secondly, what may matter more to the diaspora is how the homeland affects the future in the context of its existence, its well-being, etc., i.e., it is important from the point of view that diasporas may view the politics within the homeland state differently and pursue some policies based on that (Ibid). In other words, diasporas try to regulate or more correctly control the government of the homeland by any means possible while in exile. Third, according to diasporas, the foreign policy of the homeland may affect the interests of a certain community, and if this indirectly affects the security and position of the diaspora, then certainly the diaspora will try to influence the policy of the home state in every possible way (Ibid). Consequently, the diaspora may take a different foreign policy stance than the home state while still having a certain level of autonomy, again indicating a high level of diaspora mobilization. Finally, some of the home state's foreign policy may be perceived by the diaspora as infringing on its interests, in other words, it means that the state's foreign policy is claiming to do things that the diaspora has previously done (Ibid). Accordingly, this raises the question of the necessity of the existence of the diaspora. It is important to emphasize that we can see how all of the above-mentioned interest groups are closely interconnected and in the case of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, we are likely to see a combination of all of these interests and motives.

Also, in the context of diaspora mobilization mechanisms, we should mention one important aspect. Adamson (2013) suggests a “strategic framing” approach in describing diaspora

mobilization because diaspora mobilization is directly dependent on key actors constructing a framework that aligns with the aspirations of diaspora members, e.g., this can manifest itself in notions of nationality, kinship, etc. which is a good example of framing strategies. Also, diaspora entrepreneurs can use frames that emphasize guilt or obligation to bind diaspora members to the home country, e.g., the obligation to send remittances to family members, etc. (Ibid). Through the lens of this mechanism, we can understand how the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada has attempted to emphasize and support Ukrainian identity and what frameworks have been used to do so.

Essential to talk about the mechanism of ethnical outbidding, which is more often used in analyzing domestic politics but can also be effective in the context of this paper. Accordingly, ethnical outbidding basically refers to the politicization of ethnic differences by elites and political parties in such a way that they try to outdo each other, and it involves the use of violence both as a means of demonstrating strength and determination and as a means of marginalizing moderate alternative groups (competitors), in other words, it is a means of increasing bargaining leverage (Ibid). The main purpose of occupying an extreme position can, under certain conditions, mobilize public support to increase power and legitimacy (Ibid). In the context of this paper, important to note that diasporas can act similarly to political parties that inevitably work with ethnicity. The likelihood of using the ethnical outbidding mechanism is higher if there is instability or conflict in the home state, and eventually, the diaspora ceases to exist if it is unable to mobilize and if its identity is not promoted (Ibid). There is also a pattern in which diaspora entrepreneurs are more likely to act radically during escalation rather than during conflict prevention phases; diasporas are more likely to act as peacemakers if it benefits them and strengthens their identity and coincides with the interests of the homeland (Koinova, 2013).

According to Koinova (2016, as cited in Kopchick et al, 2022), traumatic experiences such as those that occurred with the Bosnian massacre in Srebrenica play a greater role in maintaining mobilization between diaspora and homeland compared to diasporas that do not have such events. However, in this study, the factor of the existence of conflict (which some researchers believe has no significant impact on the likelihood of diaspora mobilization) and the presence of traumatic experiences are considered separately. In other words, traumatic experiences related to the homeland, and events about the homeland will be considered as a factor for diaspora cohesion and mobilization. In this context, the historical past is extremely important for any diaspora, and collective trauma for the diaspora is a factor that plays into the strengthening of its own identity,

as well as contributing to the mobilization of the diaspora (Volkan, 1991, as cited in Orjuela, 2022). For example, the role of the Holocaust in the formation, mobilization, and overall existence of the Jewish diaspora plays a significant role (Orjuela, 2022). Thus, diasporas often resort to the phenomenon of victimization for their own mobilization as a tool (Ibid). Thus, victimization can be used to construct an identity based on certain harms that have been inflicted on an ethnic group (Jacoby, 2014, as cited in Orjuela, 2022). In the context of our study, this is also important because there is a period in history called Holodomor, and accordingly, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada actively uses recourse to discourses (commemorative practices, other events of remembrance) related to the victimization of Ukrainians as a result of those tragic events. Necessary to emphasize the importance of advocacy work in political bodies, social media campaigns, and memorialization efforts as important mechanisms or concrete steps for the political mobilization of the diaspora, which, for example, can be traced in the process of political mobilization of the diaspora victims of the Rwandan genocide (Ibid).

Notably, the view of conflict and its image is modified and entails the development of new paradigms and narratives in the diaspora milieu, which then interpret events in the homeland both in the host country and beyond, especially noticeable when newly emerged diaspora groups can articulate more universal issues related to conflict, but also related to them in the context of the host country (Féron & Voytiv, 2021). In other words, the narratives in the discourse of newly formed diaspora groups may be strikingly different from those of established diaspora groups, which are very similar to those of political actors in the homeland (Senay, 2013, as cited in Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Of course, the information agenda can also be influenced by other international organizations, non-governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, journalists, etc., but since migrants in the host country are, for obvious reasons, seen as more "natural" sources of information and interpretation about what is actually happening in their home country, they therefore have a significant role and influence in shaping narratives in the discourse (Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Therefore, likely that due to the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada expanded the list of discourses used due to the new wave of emigration and the activation of new diaspora actors. In the current study, we will explore what narratives the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada used to mobilize all diaspora actors in the post-2014 circumstances.

By continuing to talk about the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization, inevitable to talk about diaspora mobilization through mass media. Also worth mentioning that in situations of diaspora mobilization, when there is a conflict in the homeland, the means of transmission and exchange of information and media resources play an important role, which allows the broadcasting of traumatic events from the homeland, as a result of which the events taking place in the homeland can be gradually incorporated into the daily life and memory of diaspora activists, as regular viewing of information and, in particular, video recordings from the homeland can contribute to strengthening the sense of connection with the home state and form a conditional belonging (Hemmingway & Van Loon, 2011, as cited in Féron & Voytiv, 2021). In this context, debates and other events related to the homeland can often be created, which in essence suggests additional attention to the conflict in the homeland and a certain degree of diaspora mobilization, and the foreign policy of the host state plays a significant role here, as it can have a beneficial or detrimental effect on this process depending on the foreign policy stance of the state (as it may even be involved in diaspora mobilization itself) (Ibid). Thus, for example, it is difficult to imagine a mobilized diaspora of Ukrainians in Russia after the outbreak of a large-scale war in 2022. Accordingly, based on this, we can say that the broadcasting of information through media or private channels is in some way a tool for diaspora mobilization.

However, there are some countries (for instance, China, and Russia) where migrants live and where Internet access is restricted and the Internet itself is used as repression and surveillance (Baser & Ozturk, 2020, as cited in Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Consequently, the researchers emphasize that the Internet and the media on diaspora mobilization do affect diaspora mobilization in a situational way, depending on the country in question (Féron & Voytiv, 2021). However, in the current study, when considering the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, no such limitations will be encountered.

As a result of the conflict in the home country, at the local level in the host state, diaspora actors have a desire to participate in some way, which may eventually lead to the creation of new diaspora organizations or participation in existing ones, which leads to diaspora mobilization and the participation in activism of people who have not been active before (Voytiv, 2019, as cited in Féron & Voytiv, 2021). Organizations that have been established recently, namely since the start of the conflict, and pre-existing diaspora organizations will differ when it comes to mobilization, as the former is more about forming a diaspora in response to the conflict in the homeland, while

the latter is about mobilizing with existing diaspora actors and identities in response to the conflict in the homeland (Ibid). In our particular case of this paper, we can speak of the second type, diaspora mobilization, because the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada existed long before 2014 and the emergence of the conflict in Ukraine itself. However, even if there are existing diaspora organizations that have an appropriate level of authority and dominance in the field, there is a possibility of the emergence of new diaspora organizations that can easily be marginalized by existing organizations in the host country (Ibid).

Speaking more specifically about the situation around the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, it should be emphasized that most researchers have paid attention to this topic from different perspectives. For instance, some researchers have studied the Ukrainian diaspora as such and its characteristics (Satzewich, 2003; Poliakova & Wolowyna, 2019), compared the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada with diasporas in other countries (Lalande, 2006). A large section of scientific work belongs to the topic of the role of the Ukrainian diaspora and its influence on Canadian politics (Andreevna, 2019; Igorevna, 2020), other researchers analyzed diaspora-homeland relations (Weinfeld & Troper, 1990; Tatar, 2020), and considered the issue of the identity of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Nedashkivska, 2018; Kim, 2018; Kindrachuk, 2023). Scholars have also analyzed historical and political narratives within the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Nikolko, 2017; Pabst, 2017). Moreover, considerable importance was given to the analysis of the activities of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada in the context of the political crisis of 2014 (Cipko, 2016; Tatar, 2020; Nikolko & Şahin, 2020) Along with this, researchers also studied the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada (Boichak, 2019; Tatar, 2020; Carment et al, 2021; Boichak & Kumar, 2022). However, it should be noted that none of the researchers have yet paid attention to how the Ukrainian diaspora was mobilized and what specific mechanisms could have been used for this purpose. This is the area that this study aims to cover.

Research design

This is going to be a **single case study**. What follows here are some features that are typical to the single case study. Furthermore, to answer the research question and determine by what means the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada achieved the mobilization of ethnic Ukrainians and analyze what narratives shaped the discourse, we need to focus on the case of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and resort to the single case study. This method provides a holistic view of the state of play in the use of narratives by the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada to mobilize their supporters. This topic is highly intriguing and problematic in terms of the aforementioned theoretical advances since it poses a question that has not previously been explored in this particular case in the scientific community with the above-mentioned methods, which allows us to bring novelty to the topic at hand.

Research question and research expectations

To begin with, the current thesis will analyze the narratives of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada from 2014 to 2022. During this period, it is necessary to determine how the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada tried to mobilize supporters after 2014 and what narratives were used for this purpose. This is the main research question of the study. The sub-question of the research focuses on how these messages (of diaspora mobilization) were delivered to the target audience. Next, the expectations from the current thesis should be considered along with how and why these particular narratives were chosen. This study will focus on 3 basic narratives that laid the foundation for the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and that had the potential to increase the level of actionism among the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. Also, at this stage, we would like to provide necessary explanations as to why these particular narratives were chosen for the current thesis.

There is sufficient awareness of which narratives shape the dominant discourse on national identity and Ukrainian statehood. In this regard, important to note that this study projects those narratives that were aimed at nation-building in Ukraine after 1991, namely after Ukraine gained independence after the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, we will consider those narratives that were used by the Ukrainian authorities directly in Ukraine to mobilize, preserve and maintain Ukrainian identity (Shulga, 2015; Kuczyńska-Zonik & Kowalczyk, 2016; Kulyk, 2016; Terzyan,

2020; Pryshchepa, 2021). As already clarified in the theoretical chapter, the process of diaspora mobilization is a matter of social mobilization (Sökefeld, 2006). As was mentioned, diaspora mobilization common motivating interests among emigrants in the host state plays a crucial role in the diaspora mobilization. The study can then be expected to suggest that the events of 2014 entailed the need to use narratives related to these events in the home state and to mobilize the public in the host state. Thus, the first narrative the current study highlights is the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative, which is based on the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression that started in 2014.

The second narrative will relate more to historical events and features of Ukrainian history, which are actively used to strengthen Ukrainian national identity and statehood. The policy of historical memory started to be quite actively applied by the Ukrainian government after independence, and against this background, we can observe active and diligent work on the preservation of this narrative in Ukrainian domestic political discourse to strengthen the national idea, and this is evidenced by numerous works of researchers (Dönmez, 2015; Coulson, 2021). This narrative will also include another memorable historical event for the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada that deserves similar attention, namely Canada's First National Internment Operations, which will be discussed later. As already clarified in the theoretical chapter, identity plays a huge role in the diasporas because it not only determines the interests but it can be the interest itself (Shain & Barth, 2003). And since identity issues related to the home state will also concern the diaspora on the grounds of common history and common heritage, accordingly, this paper will look at the “Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations” narrative as a whole.

The third narrative for the current thesis will be the narrative concerning the cohesion of Ukrainians. Further, also necessary to duplicate the importance of the meaning of the concept of identity for the diaspora, and this contributes to the construction of certain expectations of the current study. Thus, it is assumed that against the backdrop of a series of crisis events in the home country, the discourse of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada will include a narrative related to the maintenance of this very identity, but through rapprochement and cohesion at the individual and organizational level. If the first narrative deals with the military conflict and homeland and its consequence, the current narrative will take as a basis those patterns that began to be traced in Ukrainian society directly within Ukraine, which were aimed at preserving ethnic unity and cohesion (Kulyk, 2016; Terzyan, 2020; Wilson, 2024). Similarly, it also makes sense to talk about

organizational cohesion within Canada, given the specificity of the large number of diasporic organizations. In this sense, the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative seems the most appropriate final narrative within the framework of describing and explaining the mobilization of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada in the current thesis.

It is expected that in the process of mobilizing the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, there were certain narratives that stood out from the rest. At a certain point, some narratives became dominant and played a role in the framing of the diaspora discourse. First, likely, the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative will also prove to be dominant in the discourse mobilizing the diaspora since 2014. This applies not only to the Revolution of Dignity but also to Russia's aggression against Ukraine because the presence of a common external enemy also played a significant role in diaspora mobilization. Second, it is suggested that the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada used a narrative related to the politics of historical memory or memory politics that refers to the events of the Holodomor. It is likely that this narrative was used to maintain a level of connection within the diaspora and also helped to mobilize supporters. Finally, it is likely that UCC actively used the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative within Canada to further unite Ukrainians within the Ukrainian community to fulfill common organizational goals of helping the homeland.

Generally speaking, the narratives are expected to reveal their role in the context of material assistance to the homeland by diaspora supporters. This thesis is also expected to identify how the UCC reached out to Ukrainians in Canada, how it received support, and how it communicated its messages to its primary audience - Ukrainians in Canada.

Methodology

This research will use critical discourse analysis (hereafter, CDA) because it will help us identify the underlying assumptions, values, and other power relations in the diaspora mobilization issue (Schiffrin et al., 2003). This is how we can analyze which narratives were used to mobilize Ukrainians in Canada, and also identify the interaction with the dominant discourse in Canada on selected issues related to Ukraine. Fairclough proposed his three-dimensional method of analyzing discourse in his book “Language and Power” (which analysis model consists of description, interpretation, and explanation); this three-dimensional structure is extremely important and

meaningful for our work because it allows us to provide a more general and thorough analysis of discourse; it "highlights" the speaker's explicit and implicit meanings and makes them understandable to us (Fairclough, 2001). Equally important to note that all three dimensions are closely interconnected and allow us to present a complete picture of what narratives were used in the struggle to mobilize the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

Finally, after creating a sample of data, we will analyze the data using discourse analysis to determine through which narratives the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada sought to mobilize. Consequently, we want to pay attention to how the Ukrainian community constructed various issues and what meaning was attached to these issues. Important to note that discourses in this research refer to systems of meaning production that capture this meaning and allow us to make sense of the situation (Dunn & Neumann, 2016). That is, of course, we will mainly pay attention to language, who is speaking, how and about what, what contexts are used, and what meaning is put into certain things because language not only explains the world but also creates it (Ibid).

Sources

This study will involve public outreach activities in the form of constructed narratives in the discourse by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. The Ukrainian Canadian Congress (hereinafter - UCC) is the main organization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. It was formed as the main organization with a mission to represent the Ukrainian population in Canada and is classified as an institutional diaspora player (Tatar, 2020). In general, the UCC, based on its size, experience, and organizational and fundraising capacity, has the greatest ability to work as an official lobbyist for Ukraine, which means methodological involvement in both political and social advocacy for the country, while other smaller organizations of Ukrainian Canadians are usually members of this umbrella organization and pursue their interests through the UCC (Ibid). Accordingly, we can say that the UCC is largely authoritative and dominant in the formation and maintenance of Ukrainian diaspora narratives in Canada. That is why this organization was chosen rather than dozens and hundreds of other existing Ukrainian organizations functioning in Canada for many years. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the public addresses and statements of its leaders from 2014 to 2022.

First, it is intended to analyze the existing public statements of Alexandra Chyczij and Paul M. Grod (the study requires the period of his presidency, that is from 2014 to 2018), Presidents of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. There are a total of 4 video reports on the UCC website, however, 2 of them are of no value in the context of diaspora mobilization and are purely informational videos for 3 minutes with no UCC President Alexandra Chyczij. The other two videos have significant potential in the context of the current study and they will be used.

To begin with, these 2 videos of Alexandra Chyczij's public speeches will be transcribed and then the study will proceed to discourse analysis. Only Alexandra appears in the current videos Paul Grod will only be analyzed in text format, as it only appears in text triannual reports. These persons were chosen because firstly, they are authoritative in their own right and presidential speeches are an important aspect of an organization's communication strategy. These speeches should be analyzed to find out how the organization communicates with its internal and external audiences. Second, presidential speeches often serve as a guide to the essence of an organization's goals, beliefs, and mission. By analyzing these speeches in depth, one can better understand what the organization stands for and what messages it seeks to convey to the audiences. Thirdly, such speeches can have a significant impact on the perceptions of their supporters by constructing some specific meanings. Analyzing these speeches allows us to assess how they influence and shape audience perceptions. Finally, from a scientific standpoint, these speeches can give insights into how ideology is constructed and transmitted in an organizational and diasporic context.

Along with this, 3 official textual reports of the UCC will be analyzed. These will be the triennial reports issued by UCC, namely: 2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report, 2019 - 2016 UCC Triennial Report, 2022 - 2019 UCC Triennial Report. Each report is approximately 40 pages in length and all the reports are available on the official website of the Congress. The reports are presented in English and partly in French and Ukrainian. Secondly, Video reports (a total 2 video reports) also posted on the website will also be analyzed. These reports will also help to build a detailed picture of how the UCC has tried to mobilize its supporters as well as identify the narratives used by the diaspora. Video reports will complete this picture. The duration of each video report varies from 20 to 26 minutes. The total length of the video reports is 45 minutes. Almost all video reports are presented in English (some partially in Ukrainian), and they will be transcribed into text and further analyzed using critical discourse analysis similar to other textual sources.

Textual reports contain official addresses by the president of the congress to Ukrainians living in Canada, up-to-date data on the structure and positions held in the congress, geographic distribution of congress branches, highlights of activities and accomplishments, plans and priorities of the congress in response to current and topical issues, as well as statistics on funding and fundraising. Video reports are videos presenting a description of congressional activity, priorities, and current goals, and some video reports also include conferences and official meetings of UCC members. In the case of textual reports, the information is conveyed in English, French, and Ukrainian, but in the case of video reports, only English and Ukrainian have been used (mostly English). Generally speaking, the information is duplicated in three languages at the same time, accordingly, for this study English-language materials will be used, as they are equivalent to Ukrainian materials. As the study works with the official data, it should have no problem with the reliability of the data obtained, since it is all public and available to everyone online, and the source generally makes the data reliable. All required materials are located and available on the official UCC website on the organization's reports page.

Ukrainian diaspora in Canada

Initially, the presence of Ukrainians in Canada has long roots. The first wave of Ukrainians appeared in Canada in the late 19th century, namely from the late 1890s until 1914, when the first Ukrainians from Western Ukraine (which at that time was still a part of Austria-Hungary) began their migration because of the tempting offers of cheap unpopulated land from the Canadian government (Hryniuk & Luciuk, 1991). Additionally, worth mentioning that during the first wave of immigration Ukrainians were already showing interest in political life in Canada, for example, in 1903 several political parties of Ukrainians were held in Winnipeg concerning provincial elections (Borovyk, 1991).

According to Lalande (2006), Ukrainians from the first wave were already working to preserve their identity: “The first wave established itself in Canada, juggling to keep a balance between the adaptation to the new environment and the preservation of at least part of their heritage. Awareness of their Ukrainian identity that had been triggered back in Europe often blossomed on the Prairies, and language and traditions such as dancing were considered to be very vital components” (Lalande, 2006).

The second wave covers the period between the two World Wars, from 1919 to 1939, and the emigrating Ukrainians were predominantly from Western Ukraine, parts of which belonged to Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and were predominantly engaged in agriculture, but also began to settle in cities and become part of industrial and non-agricultural enterprises in Canada, something that was not seen in the first wave of migration (Hryniuk & Luciuk, 1991).

The third wave covers the period from 1946 to 1961, the people who migrated had a variety of occupations and many were part of the intelligentsia (Ibid). According to Lalande (2006), by 1971, as a result of the three waves of migration, the number of Ukrainians in Canada totaled 581,000: “Although it never received as many Ukrainian immigrants as its neighbor down south, Ukrainians have made an impact on the country due to their proportion in the host society and their geographical distribution. Ukrainians came mostly from Bukovina and Galicia, two provinces in the Habsburg Empire; only a few came from regions within the Russian Empire” (Lalande, 2006).

Accordingly, the third wave of migration contributed greatly to the building of the Ukrainian community in Canada, as it was during this period that a ‘linguistic rejuvenation’ of the Ukrainian population took place, as few of these immigrants spoke English or French, so they were

more likely to seek ways and options to communicate in Ukrainian, which had a positive impact on the Ukrainian community as a whole (Nedashkivska, 2018).

The fourth wave of immigrants to Canada mainly consisted of people who came not from Ukraine but from the Eastern Bloc (Poland, Yugoslavia, etc.) in the 1980s and 1990s (Nedashkivska, 2018). The fifth wave of emigration can be distinguished from the early 1990s to 2014, and in this period, we can note the emigration of people who differ in their essence from the first waves of emigration first of all by their worldview, attitude towards freedom, identity and independence of their home state in general (Ibid).

There is no certainty in the academic community about the allocation of further waves of emigration of Ukrainians to Canada, but according to Nedashkivska (2018), it is possible to conditionally consider the sixth wave of emigration after the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and the events that followed from Russia, which became a serious driver for Ukrainian emigration. Notably, as part of the sixth migration wave, many Ukrainians were from Eastern Ukraine and Crimea (Ibid). In general, this is quite obvious, given the political situation in these regions and the temporary occupation by Russia. Moreover, it is also reasonable to conditionally delineate the end of the sixth wave in 2022, namely when the large-scale war with Russia began, when migration flows from Ukraine intensified many times over, and likely that in the future some researchers will identify the significant influx of Ukrainian population in Canada after 2022 as the seventh wave of emigration.

Organizations and institutional set-ups

During the life of Ukrainians in Canada a huge number of public and religious organizations, dance groups, Ukrainian choirs, financial institutions, sports clubs, and other organizations have been created, and in general today in Canada there are more than 1000 different Ukrainian organizations located in many provinces, but the highest coordinating and representative body of Canadian Ukrainians is the Congress of Ukrainians of Canada (Cultural and Humanitarian Cooperation, 2023).

During the Second World War, for wartime consolidation, diaspora civic leaders began to think about consolidating the civic life of Ukrainians in Canada, even though in the late 1930s quite a few local diaspora organizations were established in the main cities where Ukrainians lived

(Winnipeg, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa Montreal) (Borovyk, 1991). The tendency to create a unified Ukrainian organization had been brewing for quite a long time, as since the first wave of emigration of Ukrainians to Canada there had already existed some attempts and prototypes of creating an organization consolidating all Ukrainians in Canada (e.g. Ukrainian-Canadian Civic Committee-League), but the initiative to create a Committee of Ukrainians of Canada in 1940 was now supported by the federal government of Canada and the first universal Ukrainian organization was created (Ibid). Thus, during the war, it was advantageous for the Canadian government to unite the hitherto fragmented Ukrainian society to serve common goals and support Canada's war effort, and they succeeded in doing so (Lalande, 2006). Notably, the first congress of the committee in Winnipeg began to popularize the idea of a free Ukraine through the recently adopted Atlantic Charter (Ibid). According to Borovyk (1991), the CUC as a single central body of the diaspora was established in 1940 in Winnipeg and had the following objectives:

- “1. Strengthening the military efforts of Ukrainians as Canadian citizens.
2. Coordination of labor in all the common affairs of the Ukrainian people.
3. To preserve, cherish and strengthen the cultural identity of Ukrainians in Canada and outside Canada.
4. To preserve and develop the Ukrainian language and culture as integral components of the Canadian multicultural mosaic.
5. Encourage Canadian Ukrainians to participate in the cultural, social, economic and political life of Canada.
6. Actively enact better communication and respect between Canadian Ukrainians and other ethno-cultural communities.
7. To foster a sense of unity and cooperation among member-organizations” (Borovyk, 1991).

The newly created organization brought together the various religious organizations and political factions that existed in the Canadian Ukrainian community: the Ukrainian National Federation, the Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics, the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League, the Ukrainian Hetman Organization and the League of Ukrainian Organizations (Lalande, 2006). Although at first glance the unification of the disparate Ukrainian diaspora groups in Canada appears to be a success, there are still skeptical assessments of this historical event, arguing that interference in the internal affairs of the Ukrainian community in Canada and the creation of the

committee imposed a restrictive and inflexible organizational structure that has remained largely unchanged to this day (Lalande, 2006). In this sense, the organizational structure has a rather controversial appearance, as the UCC constitution suggests that positions on the executive committee, which is divided into a presidium and an executive council, are filled by appointed members from different affiliates, which essentially means that they had veto power (Ibid). This organizational structure was intended to avoid the emergence of blocs within the Ukrainian community in Canada, but in the 1960s there were already opinions that the way leadership positions were obtained was not democratic because there was no rotation within the organization, and instead leadership positions were assigned to a single affiliate organization (Ibid). The Committee of Ukrainians in Canada at its Congress in 1989 changed its previous name to the Congress of Ukrainians in Canada (Borovyk, 1991).

Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations

In the context of examining the “Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations” narrative, it will be critical for us to understand exactly what we will be talking about. First, we need to start with the Holodomor. The comprehensive man-made famine that occurred in the Ukrainian SSR between 1932 and 1933 is called the Holodomor, which is estimated to have killed between 5 and 10 million people (either directly from starvation or starvation leading to other deadly diseases) and first we need to understand the definition (Serbyn, 2006; Conquest, 1986; Dalrymple, 1966; Livi-Bacci, 1993; Marcus, 2003; Zakharov, 2008, as cited in Stark, 2010). The term includes two words ‘hunger’ and ‘to starve’, literally to make starve (Dönmez, 2015). Ukrainian fertile soil has always been famous among neighboring countries, which constituted an important part of the economy and made agriculture in the region extremely profitable, thus, the Ukrainian SSR accounted for more than a quarter of the entire agricultural production of the USSR (Stark, 2010). As a result of absolutely unfortunate and highly exploitative decisions of the USSR government and the forced export of agricultural products from the territory of Ukraine, an artificially created famine occurred there (Ibid).

Moreover, absolutely unprecedented measures against the local population were taken by the USSR government: it was forbidden to deliver products to the territory of Ukraine; it was forbidden to leave the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in search of food; theft of products to be

exported was punishable by terrible penalties up to the death penalty (Marcus, 2003, as cited in Stark, 2010). At the same time, serious repression began to quell unrest and prevent the rise of Ukrainian nationalism in the face of the catastrophe (Stark, 2010). According to the available literature and analyzed historical data, there were still food reserves on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR during the most famine years, but they were strictly guarded by armed soldiers and there was a strict ban on the use of these reserves for the needs of the population (Ibid). It is noteworthy that nothing like this (except for some parts of the Kuban, where agriculture was also highly developed) existed throughout the USSR (Ibid). Based on all available evidence, it can be argued that the Holodomor was a series of deliberate actions against one cultural group to destroy and eradicate Ukrainian culture, memory, and heritage and can be classified as genocide (Ibid).

The history of the internment of Ukrainians goes back to the beginning of the 20th century, bringing us back to the first wave of Ukrainian migration to Canada, the internment of Ukrainians in Canada dates back to the First World War. In 1914, the Canadian government decreed that all foreigners who belonged to "hostile nationalities" should be registered and interned, which included Ukrainians, as a significant number of Ukrainians belonged to territories that were part of Austria-Hungary at the time (Kojolianko & Kojolianko, 2016). Accordingly, during this period, many Ukrainians were subjected to harassment, the need to report to the police about their place of permanent residence, as well as suspensions and internment. As a result, just by coincidence, Ukrainians suffered not because they had done anything illegal against Canada, but only because they were from Austrian lands (Ibid).

According to some researchers, a total of 8,579 people were interned in connection with these events, and 5,954 of them were from Austria-Hungary (most of them from Ukrainian Zakarpattia) (Kojolianko & Kojolianko, 2016). Internees were used for compulsory labor, for example, they participated in the construction of roads, railway bridges, logging, etc. (Luciuk, 2006). In 2005, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin recognized the internment of Ukrainians during World War I as a tragically flawed event, and in 2008, the Canadian WWI Internment Recognition Assistance Fund was established, with 10 million dollars allocated for internment-related commemorative activities (Kojolianko & Kojolianko, 2016).

Empirical part. Critical discourse analysis of reports.

Narrative 1. Struggle for Freedom and Dignity

In the first place, the narrative of the war that began in 2014 in Ukraine and how the diaspora used it to rally and mobilize its supporters should be analyzed. Speaking about the events of 2014, which are related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, also worth mentioning that just before that, the Revolution of Dignity took place in Kyiv, which resulted in the authoritarian regime of Viktor Yanukovich ending with his flight to Russia. This is an important point because somehow the Ukrainian diaspora periodically returns to it in its discourse.

Analyzing the message itself from the UCC president, worth saying that he emphasizes the merit of Ukrainians in their struggle for their dignity and defense of their rights and freedoms, referring us to the Revolution of Dignity in 2014: “First in early 2014 as they fought for their human dignity against the authoritarian regime of Victor Yanukovich, and over the past two-and-a-half years as they defended their lives and freedoms against Russia's war against Ukraine” (2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report, 2016). It should also be emphasized that Paul Grod's position as president of the UCC on the Russian aggression against Ukraine is quite unambiguous and corresponds to the assessment of events by the Ukrainian current government. This is probably to some extent aimed at newly arrived Ukrainians after the war broke out in 2014 to activate and attract new supporters in the diaspora, in other words, to mobilize the diaspora.

Further, the UCC president emphasizes the efforts of the organization, which were aimed at helping the homeland: “Over the past three years, the UCC together with our member organizations have been providing tremendous assistance to the people of Ukraine” (Ibid). In the context of the current situation, this is an extremely important statement, which can not only celebrate its own merits but also become a unifying organization for people who want to provide some kind of assistance to their native country. Paul Grod in his address also mentions statistics related to the war, thus emphasizing the importance of Ukraine's losses and the scale of the damage caused, drawing additional concern about the conflict: “This ongoing war has to-date cost the lives of over 9,000 people, tens of thousands of wounded and over 1.5M displaced people, in addition to inflicting enormous psychological, economic and territorial damage” (Ibid).

Speaking about the war from 2014 Paul God also mentions several international actions taken by the diaspora: “UCC was at the forefront of ensuring the international community

ostracized and punished Russia for its murderous and illegal actions by ensuring they were excluded from international organizations like the G8 and its financiers suffered sanctions and visa restrictions” (2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report, 2016). Accordingly, this, firstly, indicates that the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada played a significant role in shaping the opinions of not only residents of Canada but also emigrated Ukrainians, as well as the interpretation of events that took place there, took an active position lobbying Ukrainian interests in international organizations. Accordingly, this shows that in fact, the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada stood as a united front against Russia's illegal actions against Ukraine. The Ukrainian community in Canada also took part in coordinating the Canadian government's actions to assist Ukraine: “At the same time our community together with the Canadian government were providing Ukraine with military, humanitarian, and economic assistance” (Ibid). This undoubtedly indicates that UCC has considerable credibility as a diaspora organization within Canada to mobilize its supporters in difficult times for the homeland. In other words, it demonstrates the effectiveness and efficiency of the UCC within its homeland objectives. All of this is significantly more likely to contribute to the mobilization of diaspora supporters.

Based on the analyzed message of the UCC President, certain conclusions can be drawn. First, the UCC is positioned as an authoritative, trustworthy, proactive organization aimed at mobilizing international support and providing assistance to Ukraine in a difficult time of crisis: “The UCC was at the forefront of ensuring the international community ostracized and punished Russia for its murderous and illegal actions by ensuring they were excluded from international organizations like the G8 and its financiers suffered sanctions and visa restrictions” (Ibid). Second, there is a certain narrative in the President's discourse that emphasizes the power dynamics in the conflict, namely emphasizes Russia's aggression and emphasizes Ukraine's role as a victim under the circumstances. Thus, there is a clear and structured position in which Ukraine is a victim of aggression and injustice. This generally corresponds to the concept of victimization, one of the mechanisms of diaspora mobilization described in the first part of this paper.

Here, the UCC president emphasizes his commitment to the Canadian government in the sense that they are working in clear cooperation and coordination with the host nation for the benefit of Ukraine: “At the same time our community together with the Canadian government have been providing Ukraine with military, humanitarian, and economic assistance” (2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report, 2016). In general, it is quite expected that the diaspora maintains its role as a

mediator, a kind of bridge, an intermediary between the home state and the host state and helps to facilitate coordination. It also underscores, first of all, the preeminent role of the UCC among other diaspora organizations and also allows new supporters and newly arrived Ukrainians to keep the focus on this organization as the preeminent functioning structure of the diaspora. Moreover, in this context Paul Grod is quite blunt about it: “Our efforts to assist Ukraine have reinvigorated our community, and brought many new, talented, and imaginative volunteers to our organizations” (Ibid). In other words, he emphasizes the fact that diaspora activities aimed at helping the home country attract new supporters, which indicates diaspora mobilization.

Also in his address, expressing optimism about the war and the future situation in Ukraine, the president of the UCC also resorts to an appeal to religion: “We will continue our persistent and resolute efforts to support the Ukrainian people until, God willing, peace returns to Ukraine” (Ibid). In general, this is noteworthy, because historically, so many small organizations of the Ukrainian diaspora have had to do with religion as a factor for unification, in other words, some of the first Ukrainian organizations in the XX century were various religious organizations, which still has a certain influence, and the words of the UCC president not only confirm this fact, but also indicate that he is trying to reach out to as many different groups of the Ukrainian population in Canada as possible in this way.

Moreover, the credibility of the UCC as one of the most important bridges between Ukraine and the Canadian government is confirmed by the following words of Paul Grod: “I would like to sincerely thank and recognize former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, his Cabinet and all Parliamentarians for their service to our country and their strong support of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Canadian community. The leadership of Prime Minister Harper during the Maidan Revolution of Human Dignity and Russia's invasion of Ukraine was recently recognized by Ukraine's President Poroshenko by awarding him with the Order of Liberty (the highest award of Ukraine) as well as Orders of Merit to Hon. Jason Kenney and Hon. John Baird” (Ibid).

Originally, it speaks of the inseparable connection between the Diaspora and the host state, as Paul Grod's words show sincere gratitude and warmth towards the previous government of Canada for the proper response in light of the current events. Moreover, as a sign of gratitude, he also mentions the awarding of the highest award in Ukraine to the former Prime Minister of Canada by the current President of Ukraine. This fact is extremely important in the context of our work because it also tells the audience of Ukrainians in Canada that the UCC is a crucial link between

the homeland and Canada, thus drawing additional attention of Ukrainians to the activism and activities of the organization.

Besides, the second report for 2016-2019 should be analyzed. Speaking about Ukraine's war with Russia despite the change of the organization's president the UCC narrative about the struggle for freedom and dignity has not changed, Alexandra Chyczij adheres to similar practices used by Paul Grod: "Almost six years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine. The war has cost Ukraine 14,000 lives, left tens of thousands wounded and displaced over 1.5 million Ukrainian citizens" (*2019 - 2016 Triennial Report*, 2019).

Firstly, there is an emphasis on the period of the war, and Alexandra Chyczij resorts to listing statistics that have had a detrimental effect on Ukraine, trying to summarize the negative effect the homeland is experiencing as a consequence of Russia's aggressive actions. Second, Alexandra Chyczij places considerable emphasis on the duty and heroism of Ukraine's defenders: "The Ukrainian people responded to the call to defend their homeland and their freedom with bravery, perseverance and unity of purpose. They continue to persevere" (Ibid).

Most likely, the emphasis on the heroism of the defenders of Ukraine was made to evoke deep emotional feelings related to their native home in their compatriots who are in Canada. Probably, this technique is used precisely to unify Ukrainians in Canada for a sense of unity in empathizing with the defenders of Ukraine and to increase the activity of diaspora supporters. Moreover, this report is made 6 years after the beginning of the war in Ukraine, and accordingly, during this time a relatively large number of Ukrainians have arrived in Canada, who understand and understand the situation in their native country and have seen all the negative consequences of Russian aggression with their own eyes. So, these words of the UCC president were probably used to once again gain the support of newly arrived Ukrainians in Canada. It is more likely that this contributes to the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

And based on Alexandra Chyczij's words, UCC has been able to mobilize the diaspora in the context of war relief in the home country: "For six years, volunteers in our community have provided a wide range of support. Their efforts have inspired others to become involved" (Ibid). These words can be interpreted in two ways. The first option is that perhaps the active experience of participation of some diaspora participants gradually led other Ukrainians, who were probably not activists and were not actively involved in diaspora life, to become involved. The second option could be that through his words, the UCC president is trying to broadcast and describe a good

example for potential diaspora supporters in the future, to boost their activism and mobilize the diaspora. important to note that these two options are not mutually exclusive, but can exist simultaneously.

Of course, the president of the UCC tries to express his unwavering commitment to the audience about the unchanged course of the diaspora policy concerning the war in his native country: “We will continue to assist the Ukrainian people until the day when peace finally returns to Ukraine” (2019 - 2016 Triennial Report, 2019). Alexandra Chyczij also emphasizes the existence of the main goal - peace is a universal ‘good’ that can be appealed to and it is difficult to find opponents of peace among the audience of Ukrainians, therefore, with this technique Alexandra Chyczij tries to affect different groups and categories of supporters and awaken in them the desire to make efforts to help the native state in a difficult moment.

Equally important to emphasize the importance of Alexandra Chyczij's words regarding the close interaction of the Ukrainian diaspora with the Canadian government in light of the current war in the homeland: “The UCC will also ensure that the Canadian government continues its strong support of Ukraine. We can take great pride in knowing that because of our efforts, support for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people transcends party lines. In Canada, Ukraine is a non-partisan issue, and we will continue to work hard to keep it that way” (Ibid). Once again, the role of UCC as the main actor and link between the homeland and Canada is emphasized here, as well as Canada's unwavering loyalty to Ukraine and the organization's enormous contribution to lobbying for Ukraine. This can probably contribute to a favorable portrayal of the role and activities of the organization as a whole in the eyes of the main audience to mobilize Ukrainians in Canada. In this way, the UCC president emphasizes the authority, influence, and scope of the organization's capabilities, which could impress potential activists. Along with this, Alexandra Chyczij suggests that it is a work that requires effort, which the organization continues to work on. Consequently, one of the main goals of the diaspora is emphasized, which is to achieve an absolute disposition towards the home state without regard to the ruling forces and parties in Canada.

Along with this, the president of UCC resorts to listing the merits of the organization in the context of helping the homeland, or to be more precise - countering Russia: “In recent years, Russian officials responsible for the war against Ukraine and human rights abuses have been added to Canada's sanctions list. The ban on selling defensive weapons from Canada to Ukraine was lifted. Canada's military training mission in Ukraine, Operation Unifier, was extended until 2022.

Canada announced new funding, totaling tens of millions of dollars, to support Ukraine's democratic development. None of these accomplishments would have been possible without the strength of a community speaking loudly with a strong, united voice” (2019 - 2016 Triennial Report, 2019).

This is an appeal to the Ukrainian community in Canada, without which it would have been impossible to carry out such actions. Moreover, Alexandra Chyczij once again speaks of a strong united voice while representing the UCC, which leaves no doubt about the importance of this organization in the context of an activist in Canada. The current words are also meant to rally the organization and its supporters. Important to say that in the current report, the topic of Ukraine's war with Russia was touched upon at the beginning of the message from the president of the organization (as in the first analyzed report for 2013-2016), which suggests that the UCC president thus gives special and primary importance to this issue in comparison to other existing narratives of the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

At last, the third report (2019-2022) has to be analyzed to complete the picture of the current narrative. For obvious reasons, the UCC president begins his address with the highly topical issue of Ukraine's large-scale war against Russia: “On February 24, 2022, our lives and our world changed forever. Russia launched a full-scale assault on our sisters and brothers in Ukraine. The war that Russia brought to Ukraine some eight years ago became - with Russian airplanes and bombs and rockets and missiles raining down from the sky on Ukrainian cities - a war that Russia is waging against freedom itself” (2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report, 2022).

The descriptive language used is intended to give a certain coloring and aims to make the audience empathize with what is happening in Ukraine. Moreover, there is an appeal to the fact that Russia is attacking one of the inviolable pillars of today's liberal human values - freedom. In other words, it is a good technique to appeal to universal values that will not leave anyone indifferent and will rather evoke empathy in the audience, which in the end is likely to have a positive effect on the mobilization of diaspora supporters. Moreover, it should be emphasized that, as in all previous reports, the topic of war with Russia is raised first, which highlights the importance of the current narrative compared to other existing narratives for the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. It also indicates the UCC's unchanged position on the war in the homeland.

Further, it should also be noted that Alexandra Chyczij uses a parallel emotional comparison, comparing good and evil and Ukraine and Russia respectively: “The world has witnessed the horror and wanton brutality of Russian aggression - but the Ukrainian people have responded to this evil with a unity of purpose, bravery and resolve seldom seen” (2019 - 2022 *UCC Triennial Report*, 2022). Essential to emphasize that such emotional coloring of the UCC president's words can attract special attention and potentially attract new supporters, who, given the current circumstances, are likely to be more active than they were before.

According to the UCC president, the support for Ukraine after Russia's full-scale aggression was absolute and unconditional: “Drive through a city anywhere in Canada and you will see Ukrainian flags on porches, in windows, on office buildings, in front of City Halls and government buildings” (Ibid). However, there are several important points to take into account in this context. First, if we can see this as a result, consequence or sign of diaspora mobilization, it is only indirectly, since such support for Ukraine was characteristic of most of the countries of the collective West that condemned the Russian invasion and came out in support of Ukraine and even Alexandra herself says: “The courage of the Ukrainian people has inspired Canada and the world” (Ibid). The UCC president also recognizes that it is a direct result of the actions of the Ukrainians who defended their land that has inspired this degree of public support for Ukraine in the world. On the other hand, in this context, it is still worth recognizing that without the long-standing activities of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, it would hardly have been possible to achieve such support among the local population of the host country.

However, in her message to the audience, Aleksandra Chyczij does attribute the dominant role of the UCC in this level of support for Ukraine in Canada: “That the Canadian people strongly stand with Ukraine is due in no small measure to the tireless efforts of our community” (Ibid). On the other hand, this is obvious and it would be strange to argue otherwise under the circumstances, given the enormous scale of the work that the UCC is doing in Ukrainian-Canadian cooperation. Most importantly, what message does this send to Ukrainian audiences in Canada. It goes without saying. UCC acts as an authoritative nucleus for mobilizing supporters, the organization is active and essentially tries to unite isolated groups of people who may have remained passive in the context of diaspora activities.

Alexandra Chyczij also uses in her address a list of those important deeds, accomplishments, and achievements that have laid the foundation of Canada's and Canadians'

strong support for Ukraine: “From coast to coast to coast, you have organized, led and attended countless rallies and demonstrations, collected money for humanitarian support, spread our message in the media, written op-eds and letters to editors, sent letters and emails, made phone calls, held meetings with Members of Parliament and government officials, and worked to welcome Ukrainian refugees to Canada. Thousands of people working on hundreds of projects have come together to support Ukraine in its time of need” (2019 - 2022 *UCC Triennial Report*, 2022). Moreover, in this context, the UCC president uses specific vocabulary to emphasize the large amount of work done and also focuses on the scale of the organization itself as the main Ukrainian diaspora structure in Canada. Alexandra Chyczij also uses the technique of listing the achievements of the organization, which smoothly leads to the assistance to Ukrainian refugees, thus the president of UCC tries to emphasize the importance and significance of the organization for every Ukrainian in Canada. This rhetoric and the techniques used to present information can to a certain extent contribute to the mobilization of the diaspora, and probably especially affect the Ukrainians newly arrived because of the war to activate them. It is also important to note that Aleksandra Chyczij uses the address ‘you’, which emphasizes the involvement of every Ukrainian in the war in their homeland. Essentially important to note that Alexandra Chyczij says that all these efforts were aimed at mobilizing broad masses, different groups of people united by one goal - the problem in the homeland.

Consequently, it should be said that the narrative related to Russia's war against Ukraine, which started in 2014 after the Revolution of Dignity, is quite active, frequently used and quite effective in the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada and contributes to the mobilization of new supporters and activation of existing ones. In this context, it should be said that based on the analysis conducted, this narrative is more dominant, as the topic of war with Russia is mentioned as a rule at the very beginning of the messages of UCC presidents, and it should also be said that quite a significant amount of time and space is devoted to the discussion of this topic and its details. This indicates a focus of attention that is not just concentrated on the war in the homeland, but also a focus of attention that is concentrated on activating supporters and activities within the diaspora and as a consequence helping the homeland in difficult times. Thus, it can be concluded that this narrative is an important component of the mobilization of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada in the context of the war in Ukraine. It should also be noted that the current narrative

did not appear in any way in the organization's video reports for 2019 and 2020, which is a very odd occurrence, but it speaks for itself.

Narrative 2. Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations

Worth starting with the first UCC report for 2013-2016. In his address to the Ukrainian diaspora in the UCC Triennial Report, President Paul Grod emphasizes the importance of continuing to recognize and commemorate the Holodomor, which suggests that for the diaspora, as well as in Ukraine itself, the Holodomor is an important unifying narrative (*2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report*, 2016). While in the context of Ukraine (within the country) this narrative is used as a policy of historical memory, aimed more at nation-building (Dönmez, 2015), for the diaspora the use of this narrative in the discourse can lead not only to support Ukraine from Canada and draw attention (lobbying) to these events abroad, but also to rally and unite the diaspora, to emphasize the national identity of Ukrainians in Canada through commemorative practices, which generally corresponds to the main strategies of diaspora mobilization. Worth noting that Paul Grod does not speak about the Holodomor and other commemorative practices that are actively practiced by Ukrainians in Canada in the first place and gives very little space for mentioning these historical events in his address to the audience. This first of all tells us that this narrative is not dominant in the context of mobilization during the period in question. Second, we can assume that Canadian Ukrainians' awareness of the Holodomor is high enough to give more attention to this event. Third, it is likely that this narrative cannot compete in terms of effectiveness in the context of diaspora mobilization compared to the narrative related to Russia's war against Ukraine.

Furthermore, worth paying attention to the initiatives listed by the UCC president: “We have also continued our work on many important initiatives of importance to our community here at home - the continued recognition and commemoration of the Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations (1914-1920), our Ukrainian language schools, cultural programs, youth engagement, community development, the Tribute to Liberty Memorial to the Victims of Communism and the Canadian Museum for Human Rights, to name but a few” (Ibid). If we pay attention to which initiatives Paul Grod equates with the Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations, it suggests that, in general, appealing to these narratives is not a key diasporic goal. There is mention, but without a deep dive into the context, without mentioning the details of what happened, etc. In other words, it can hardly be said that this narrative was used to mobilize the diaspora.

Next, the second report for 2016-2019 has to be analyzed. Essentially to note at once that the narrative related to the Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations was given rather mediocre attention: “While support of the Ukrainian people was important to us, we also worked on many issues of importance to our community here at home - Holodomor awareness and commemoration; education about Canada's First National Internment Operations; our Ukrainian schools; cultural programs; seniors' homes - to name just a few” (*2019 - 2016 Triennial Report*, 2019). Most likely, this narrative was not the dominant one in the reports and period under consideration. This is probably because it could have been used earlier, before 2014, to strengthen and unite the diaspora for further mobilization. However, after 2014, after the Revolution of Dignity and the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the need and importance of using this narrative decreased, as we can see from the previous section how much attention is given to the war in Ukraine and the level of activity of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. This may suggest that in the current period, it was more effective for the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada to appeal to narratives related to the war in their home country to mobilize the diaspora. Moreover, the reference to the narrative is unchanged from the previous report; in fact, the events are mentioned identically, as if they were simply copied. This leads us to question whether this narrative played any role at all in diaspora mobilization, in other words, whether this narrative was used at all. Developing the current thought and analyzing the data, it can be intermediately concluded that this narrative was hardly used to mobilize the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

Also, the 2019-2022 report should be analyzed. Once again, the UCC does not pay much attention to the Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations, neither are they high on the agenda, and therefore are not mentioned first and foremost in the appeal process: “Though we have rightly been focused on supporting Ukraine, in the last three years the UCC undertook numerous other initiatives that are important to our community - the Community Engagement Project; Survey of Canada's Party Leaders ahead of the 2021 election; Holodomor awareness and commemoration; education about Canada's First National Internment Operations; support for our Ukrainian schools; promotion of cultural programs; support for seniors' homes - to name just a few” (*2019 - 2022 UCC Triennial Report*, 2022). Moreover, it should be noted that the very fact of listing the UCC initiatives, in which the place of Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations was left from the first plan also speaks volumes. It can be assumed that appealing to this narrative in the discourse of the UCC president is no longer of primary

importance, probably the effectiveness and potential for diaspora mobilization of this topic is rather low or it has simply exhausted itself, as we see rather weak dynamics in this context since 2014.

Concerning video resources, it should be noted that in the video report for 2019, the current narrative does not appear in any way, so we will go straight to the video report for 2020. The president of the UCC talks about the importance of the Holodomor theme and the activity related to commemorative practices: “We, of course, have also been advancing our Ukrainian Canadian identity, most notably through Holodomor commemoration and education. This year, we are also going to be participating in the commemoration of the Holodomor by the Chicago Holocaust Museum, and that is an extremely important and strategic recognition of the Holodomor” (Ukrainian Canadian Congress, 2020). However, it should be noted that all this happens at the level of a statement of fact without any specifics or distinctive features that would make the current narrative used and indispensable for the mobilization of diaspora Ukrainians in Canada. Canada's First National Internment Operations is similarly referenced: “We also commemorated an important centenary, and that is the end of Canada's first national internment operations. We thank Boris Sudhruk for his leadership in coordinating a series of online events to build awareness and education about the internment operations, culminating in the online ceremony on June 20th” (Ibid). In other words, we see that the current narrative does not play a significant role in shaping the discourse, there are no signs indicating attempts to actively engage and attract the attention of the audience through the current narrative, etc.

Accordingly, we must ask ourselves whether such references to these events can be called a narrative, and that it was used to mobilize the diaspora. In other words, such a conclusion cannot be drawn from their analysis. This narrative was in fact not used at all. Most likely, the main competition to this narrative is the more topical and urgent topic of war with Russia since 2014, which has received considerably more attention.

Narrative 3. Ethnic and Organizational Cohesion

It was decided to combine the ethnic issue and the issue related to organizational cohesion within the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada into one narrative, which will be discussed in this section. At the outset, the 2013-2016 report should be analyzed. Paul Grod begins his address with a seminal event for the diaspora, the official anniversary of the organization's functioning: "For 75 years, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC) has been the voice of the 1.3 million-strong Ukrainian community in Canada. It has provided outstanding leadership, coordination, and advocacy on behalf of our community organizations and all Ukrainian Canadians. By focusing on grass-roots capacity building and engagement, UCC has helped keep the community strong and united" (2016 - 2013 UCC Triennial Report, 2016). It should be emphasized how the president of UCC stresses the uniqueness of the organization, as well as the merits that contribute to the unification of Ukrainians in Canada. In other words, he emphasizes the importance of the existence of the UCC as an organization that has contributed more to the formation, strengthening, and unification of the Ukrainian community in Canada. These words are definitely aimed at increasing the level of cohesion among Ukrainians in Canada, and they may also help to mobilize the diaspora or maintain the activism of the organization's supporters.

Next, worth paying attention to some details, namely the way the UCC president speaks about the role of the organization as a whole. First, he uses vocabulary aimed at enhancing the role of the organization and its activities in the context of assistance to Ukraine: "Over the past three years, the UCC together with our member organizations have been providing tremendous assistance to the people of Ukraine" (Ibid). Here it should be emphasized how Paul Grod focuses his attention on the amount of assistance, and most likely this greatly enhances the role of the organization in the eyes of the audience. Then he continues to speak in the same high key about the merits of the organization: "UCC was at the forefront of ensuring..." (Ibid). Worth emphasizing that the lexical techniques and constructions undertaken by the UCC president are obviously aimed at increasing cohesion not only within the organization but also within the entire Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

At the same time, special attention is paid to the Ukrainian community within Canada: "At the same time, our community together with the Canadian government were providing Ukraine with military, humanitarian, and economic assistance" (Ibid). Thus, Paul Grod is probably trying

to support and strengthen Ukrainian cohesion within the diaspora in the context of the discussed events. Along with this, it should also be noted that in addition to paying close attention to the conflict in Ukraine and increasing the level of cohesion of people as a consequence, the UCC president also tries to maintain focus on the internal agenda of the diaspora and the organization: “We have also continued our work on many important initiatives of importance to our community here at home...” (Ibid). This may suggest several things. First, beyond the excitement at home, most Ukrainians in Canada continue to care about the internal affairs of Ukrainian life within Canada. Second, it may suggest that Paul Grod is approaching the issue of diaspora cohesion from two planes simultaneously: from the outside (drawing attention to the conflict at home and thus increasing cohesion) and from the inside (talking about the internal affairs of the diaspora also increasing cohesion). In other words, we can see a comprehensive approach to preserving and maintaining a high level of cohesion among Ukrainians in Canada.

A significant part of Paul Grod's address is devoted to the new government of Justin Trudeau, the interaction of the organization with the new government, as well as about the joint visit of Justin Trudeau and UCC representatives to Ukraine: “We are pleased that Prime Minister Trudeau has committed to a new chapter of continued cooperation between Canada and Ukraine, which was demonstrated by his recent visit to Ukraine with the participation of a sizeable UCC delegation. We were invited by the Prime Minister to witness the signing of the historic Canada Ukraine Free Trade Agreement by Minister Chrystia Freeland and First Deputy Prime Minister Stepan Kubiw, and to ensure it becomes mutually beneficial for both our countries” (Ibid). The way UCC president speaks about it, in a highly respectful and grateful way, but at the same time emphasizes the importance of the organization in these events and circumstances. This can contribute greatly to organizational cohesion, as it was UCC members who were given the opportunity to be part of this visit and to mediate between the governments of Ukraine and Canada. The way Paul Grod speaks about the visit is likely to raise the prestige and credibility of the organization within the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada.

Moreover, it significantly connects the Ukrainian community not only to the Canadian government but also to the homeland, which is likely to strengthen ties within the diaspora by encompassing all of these variables. Accordingly, we can assume that through the use of this narrative, not only organizational cohesion is emphasized, but also the overall cohesion among ordinary Ukrainians in Canada, which to a certain extent is more likely to influence diaspora

mobilization in the long run. Additional confirmation of the above can be seen here: “I would like to sincerely thank and recognize former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, his Cabinet and all Parliamentarians for their service to our country and their strong support of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Canadian community. The leadership of Prime Minister Harper during the Maidan Revolution of Human Dignity and Russia's invasion of Ukraine was recently recognized by Ukraine's President Poroshenko by awarding him with the Order of Liberty (the highest award of Ukraine) as well as Orders of Merit to Hon. Jason Kenney and Hon. John Baird” (Ibid). Accordingly, we can see that Paul Grod is most likely trying to support and improve the structure of interaction of the diaspora with the host state and homeland, respectively, which most likely has a positive impact on the cohesion of both the organizational structure and Ukrainians in Canada.

As mentioned earlier, Paul Grod in his address does not neglect the participants of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, he focuses on bringing all supporters closer to each other: “This year, the UCC celebrates its 75th anniversary. Visiting our communities across Canada for these celebrations, I am continually inspired by the dedication and hard work of our many volunteers and organizations. It is thanks to their tireless efforts and commitment to unity that the UCC is able to succeed in its mandate of serving our community” (Ibid). Important to pay attention to the way Paul Grod speaks about the work of volunteers and diaspora participants, he emphasizes the many efforts, summing up the significant results for the organization. It should be said that this probably makes a great contribution to the cohesion at the lowest level, cohesion among Ukrainians, and diaspora supporters, and as a consequence, it is likely to have a positive impact on diaspora mobilization. Moreover, the UCC president also talks about the importance of youth for the organization: “Looking to the future, we must continue to focus on youth development and engagement. Focusing on our youth ensures the sustainability and future success of both the UCC and our community for coming generations” (Ibid). This shows that Paul Grod by mentioning emphasizes the importance of youth not only for organizational cohesion but also for the cohesion of the Ukrainian community in Canada.

Speaking of the close relationship between cohesion at the organizational and individual level, we should refer to the following words of Paul Grod: “In order to support all the important initiatives undertaken by the UCC's National Committees, Councils and Branches, we must significantly increase our donations and build an endowment to support our community for future generations” (Ibid). Here we should pay attention to the way he speaks about future generations

with due importance and the need for attention to this issue. Accordingly, we can assume that more likely that these words, in addition to direct fundraising, are aimed at rallying Ukrainians in Canada.

Moreover, if we talk about how grateful Paul Grod speaks about the work of all those involved in the organization and the diaspora as a whole, we should pay attention to the following words: “Thank you to our member organizations for their cooperation and hard work providing valuable services to our community; to the thousands of volunteers who contribute countless hours serving the interests of our community; and to our donors, whose generous contributions support the work we do” (Ibid). The way the UCC president talks about providing services to all stakeholders and the vocabulary he uses may speak to the importance of the current narrative. This emphasizes the importance to some extent and most likely indicates that he is also appealing to individual cohesion here.

Also, worth paying attention to how Paul Grod talks about effort and gratitude at the organizational level: “I sincerely thank our Board of Directors, the Committees responsible for much of our programming, and our Executive Committee, all of whom have demonstrated boundless energy, patience and devotion, and for whose service I am truly grateful” (Ibid). While these words may seem like a standard formality of saying a standard form of thanks to all concerned, it is very much about organizational cohesion. In other words, it can be assumed that with these words, the UCC president is also trying to maintain cohesion within the organization, which will ultimately have an impact on diaspora mobilization.

Besides, video materials should also be analyzed as it was discussed before. Speaking about the 2019 Report of UCC President Alexandra Chyczij, worth saying that her speech starts by emphasizing the importance of common efforts and merits of the participants of the Ukrainian community: “I present this report on behalf of all of those who have made the work of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress possible. This includes our hard-working executive members of our Board of Directors, the presidents of our provincial councils and branches, and the chairs of our National Committees, as well as the members” (Ukrainian Canadian Congress, 2019). With these words, the UCC president begins his speech, and these opening words are most likely aimed at rapprochement within the Ukrainian community, namely the recognition of the authority of the organizational structure within the diaspora.

Speaking about more specific things, worth paying attention to the way Alexandra Chyczij talks about the main key points of the organization's activity: "So now, on to the serious business. I know that all of you, because you read our newsletters, daily emails, and social media posts, know that the Ukrainian Canadian Congress work is structured around the work of three pillars: celebrating and advancing our Ukrainian Canadian identity, growing our community, and supporting Ukraine" (Ibid). Firstly, it should be noted that at the very beginning of saying "So now, on to the serious business" she uses a certain rhetorical device to attract additional attention and importance to what follows these words. Accordingly, she is thus emphasizing the main activities of the organization, drawing the attention of the listeners and the audience to this point. Looking at the order in which the UCC president lists these areas of the organization's activity, one can tentatively assume the priority and degree of importance of each of the things mentioned to the organization. For example, celebrating and advancing Ukrainian Canadian identity comes first and is extremely important in the context of the narrative discussed in this section. In other words, we see that ethnic and organizational cohesion is given quite a bit more attention and an important place in the discourse of the organization in the context of mobilizing supporters. If we follow the same logic, the next priority is the growth of the Ukrainian community, which is very similar to the priority of the organization, and again, it has the character of internal cohesion of the Ukrainian community within Canada. Finally, the third and final priority is Ukraine. Consequently, based on the passage under review, we can more than likely assume that the discourse of UCC President Alexandra Chyczij is dominated by a narrative that focuses on the internal and organizational cohesion of Ukrainians within the community.

In support of the above, the following words of the president of the UCC: "The Ukrainian Canadian Arts Network, a committee of the Congress, supports a vibrant Ukrainian arts community that inspires creativity and innovation and ensures that our Ukrainian culture continues to be an integral and leading component of the multicultural fabric of Canada" (Ibid). In other words, we can see the importance that the organization attaches to the preservation and maintenance of Ukrainian culture and identity within Canada. Of course, this is obvious to a certain extent, but we see that this is what is emphasized in the context of the organization's work.

We also need to pay attention to how the organization's achievement in increasing the implementation of its activities within Canada is mentioned: "Since the last triennial Congress, two new branches of the UCC have opened in Victoria and Halifax, allowing us to claim that we

represent Ukrainian Canadians from sea to sea” (Ibid). By using such a metaphor at the end of the sentence, the listener is given a sense of the magnitude and grandeur of the achievement, thus, most likely, this technique was used to emphasize the significance of the merit of the Congress in carrying out its activities throughout Canada. At the same time, another significant point in this context is the emphasis on the confidence that the Ukrainian community will continue to develop at the same pace: “We will focus on integrating even more Ukrainian communities by strategically opening new branches” (Ibid). Thus, we can most likely say that these rhetorical devices were used in order to draw the special attention of the listeners to how the organization is actively developing. This may ultimately also have an indirect effect on diaspora mobilization, as it directly refers to the expansion of the organization's membership and the creation of new organizational branches at the pan-Canadian level, as the capitals of two Canadian provinces are mentioned.

Additionally, important to pay attention to the way in which the work of engaging with the local Canadian government is mentioned: “In addition to continuously informing parliamentarians and government officials on issues of importance to our community, our national office led to important initiatives this year to ensure a strong United Ukrainian voice before the federal government” (Ibid). In other words, we see how the organization tries to emphasize the ‘points’ earned in the eyes of the Ukrainian community by demonstrating its authority and importance, as well as its legitimacy in the eyes of the host government. We should pay additional attention to the way the UCC president speaks about the representation of Ukrainian interests “to ensure a strong United Ukrainian voice”. This was most likely said to maintain the level of cohesion of the Ukrainian community around an organization that can defend and ensure the interests of local Ukrainians.

Next, the second video report, which was made in 2020, should be analyzed. Also important to pay attention to the following words of the UCC president: “We've also advocated for our community and our organizations. We've worked with the federal government to ensure support for non-profits and our groups that are engaged in cultural programming, and of course our charitable organizations” (Ukrainian Canadian Congress, 2020). Once again, we must draw attention to the close work and integration of UCC in interaction with the Canadian government, as well as with other non-profit organizations. This again confirms the interest in commitment to the key priorities of the organization, namely advancing the Ukrainian Canadian identity and growing the Ukrainian community.

Alexandra Chyczij says this more explicitly some moments later: “The regular day-to-day work of the UCC continues along the three pillars of growing our community, advancing our Ukrainian Canadian identity, and of course supporting Ukraine” (Ibid). Once again, we would like to draw attention to the fact that in this list of priorities of the organization's activities, support for Ukraine is at the very end. Most likely, this indicates that the organization's first priority is to support the Ukrainian community in Canada and preserve the vitality of the Ukrainian diaspora. We can more likely say that these words are meaningful to the organization, but they are unlikely to carry any significant potential in the mobilization context of the narrative in question. It seems more like a reassuring statement and a statement of the organization's priorities without any rhetorical devices aimed at increasing the level of diaspora mobilization. Here we can only speak of an indirect increase in cohesion by emphasizing the importance and credibility of the organization, but this can only have an indirect effect.

Once again, the following words are the most likely evidence of the organization's increased importance in the eyes of the mainstream audience: “We have engaged with the government and all the political parties and various members of parliament” (Ibid). This speaks to how deeply integrated the UCC is into Canadian domestic politics, but it is hardly an indication that it can contribute to diaspora mobilization in one way or another. Once again Alexandra Chyczij emphasizes the significance of the involvement of the UCC and the Ukrainian community in local politics: “We launched a pilot seminar, "Politics 101," with Anna Bodner, our former intern, about how Canada's political and legislative systems work. It is essential that for us to have a voice in the Canadian polity, we need to be active participants in it” (Ibid).

Another indication of UCC's interest in local Canadian politics is the following: “The Parliamentary Internship Program continues. This is an extremely important program for engaging our youth in our country's civic life, and we thank our committee and its chair, Alex Ilchenko, for overseeing and stewarding this program” (Ibid). From this, we can understand several important points. We should pay attention to the way the UCC president speaks about this initiative, giving significant importance to the internship program. Second, we can also assume that Alexandra Chyczij is most likely emphasizing the importance of organizational convergence within the existing Ukrainian community. This is likely to emphasize the potential for young supporters and participants in the organization, and is therefore more likely to contribute to diaspora mobilization,

attracting the attention of, for example, inactive supporters or members of the Ukrainian community in Canada.

Moreover, within the framework of ethnic and organizational cohesion, it is important to note that UCC tries to go beyond these boundaries and work also within audiences that share common concerns but are not directly related to Ukraine or the Ukrainian community in Canada: “The UCC annually participates in recognition of genocides, and in this, we are joined by the Armenian, Jewish, Roma, Rwandan, Ukrainian, and Yazidi citizens of Canada. This is an annual event that we will continue to participate in. And of course, Black Ribbon Day, which is observed on August 23rd” (Ibid). On this basis, we can assume that by joining forces the organization is trying to maintain the international level of its activity, to raise awareness of the Holodomor issue, which is also related to the genocide. Therefore, if we look at the way Alexandra Chyczij talks about it, including other notorious events, it seems as if she is trying to raise not only organizational cohesion but also to raise the level of cohesion between other nationalities that have similar notorious events, which is most likely an extremely effective tool in the context of diaspora mobilization. Moreover, the UCC also tries to get involved in events that are not at first glance related to Canada, Ukrainians in Canada, or Ukraine itself: “We are also mindful of what is happening in neighboring countries, most notably in Belarus. Together with partners of the Belarusian-Canadian Alliance and the Central and East European Council, we wrote to Minister Champagne in the first days of the crisis urging a strong response from Canada to the falsification of election results in Belarus and of course subsequent state-led violence against demonstrators” (Ibid). It also suggests that by doing so Alexandra Chyczij wants to emphasize that the UCC's activities are much broader than we at first glance might imagine, and ultimately it is also more likely to mobilize diaspora supporters, but probably not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also other nationalities that may be less represented in Canada.

Based on the analyzed material, we can conclude that the organization and the presidents of UCC in their addresses to the audience quite a lot and actively appealed to ethnic and organizational cohesion, respectively, actively used this narrative. It is also worth saying that this narrative in most cases preceded other topics addressed and mentioned by the presidents of the organization, which makes it stand out and adds to its special significance against the background of the others. Here we should also say that since this narrative was used very actively in the addresses of UCC presidents, this narrative most likely indirectly influenced the mobilization of

the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. Moreover, the analysis revealed that the UCC presidents tried to attract supporters who, at first glance, have no relation to the Ukrainian community in Canada. On the other hand, attempts to expand the base of supporters in this way once again confirm our assumption about the use of this narrative to enthrone support for the organization and the diaspora as a whole.

General remarks on the analyzed reports

In addition to what has been said separately about the three specific narratives, it is also necessary to form a general conclusion about the sources analyzed. All textual narratives are presented in three languages: Ukrainian, English, and French. Firstly, this most likely suggests that it is of some importance for UCC to be visible (to actively demonstrate its activity), to be an open organization within Canada and to be available to the local community at any time (so that anyone can join the initiatives carried out by the organization), rather than to be preserved purely for the Ukrainian community. This also tells us to a certain extent that the organization seems to have decided to work for all possible audiences, not only Ukrainians but also all those who are not indifferent to the Ukrainian issue in Canada. Along with the above, audiences can be divided into 3 conventional categories: native speakers of Ukrainian, native speakers of English, and native speakers of French. Each of these categories is targeted separately by UCC reports, as all information is duplicated in three languages and has essentially the same potential to mobilize audiences and supporters within Canada. Moreover, it should be noted here that based on the historical characteristics of Ukrainian migration to Canada, the country has second and third-generation Ukrainians who may no longer know Ukrainian, but still associate themselves with ethnic Ukrainians. To some extent, this can explain the constant use of English and French in both text reports and video reports (it is important to note that the organization's video reports use only English, probably due to the fact that Ukrainians are predominantly settled in English-speaking provinces of Canada). Accordingly, we can conclude that the organization is most likely trying to maintain its influence and continue to mobilize those Ukrainians who, as they adapt and assimilate, forget their native language and feel less connected to their homeland and the Ukrainian community within Canada, using English or French (or both) in their daily lives. All video reports are mostly in English and Ukrainian (English is more dominant and takes up most of the time of the UCC President's video address).

In addition to the breakdown of the analyzed materials into narratives, in general, it is essential to note the form of the official reports of the organization. It is worth noting right away that they have a very formal format in the sense that they look like formal and "dry" reports, devoid of many rhetorical devices that could be used to retain or win an audience, it seems as if the reports are more like a report to a higher authority. On the other hand, this is not surprising, since to some

extent these reports are important to both the host and home governments in the context of confirming diaspora activism. However, it may seem as if through text and video reports the organization is not trying to draw as much attention to itself as it could potentially do, but is rather speaking in bureaucratic, “dry language” about its activities without pursuing certain goals directly through these appeals. It can also be assumed that this is due to the tradition of forming a report on the results of the Congress of Ukrainian diaspora organizations since the middle of the XX century, but it is also likely that these reports do not have the main purpose to attract supporters and mobilize the diaspora, but rather summarize the work done, which also has a certain meaning.

Conclusion

The current study analyzed the narratives in the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada from 2014 to 2022. Based on the analysis we can draw several necessary conclusions to answer the research question and reveal all the nuances of the current topic. According to our expectations, we were able to identify the main narratives for diaspora mobilization present in the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. At a certain point, some narratives turned out to be dominant and played a role in framing the discourse for diaspora mobilization. During this period, the Ukrainian diaspora used 3 main narratives to mobilize the diaspora in Canada, which have been carefully examined: the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative, the “Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations” narrative and the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative. Each should be discussed in detail.

Firstly, the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative, based on the results of the current analysis, can be called the dominant, frequently used in framing the discourse for the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. As a rule, in all textual reports, the issue of war in the home country and Russian aggression was raised in the first place (however, in the UCC video reports examined, this narrative did not appear in any way), it was given considerable attention, the text was rich in various rhetorical devices, and many details were revealed and mentioned by the UCC presidents. In other words, this suggests that the focus of attention in the textual accounts was not just on the war in Ukraine. Still, it was also dominant and aimed at activating and mobilizing supporters within the diaspora as a reaction to the military events in the homeland. On this basis, it is necessary to summarize and emphasize that the current narrative was an important component in the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada during the period under review.

Secondly, when speaking about the “Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations” narrative, it is difficult to state that the expectations set before the beginning of the research were met. Based on our analysis, the current narrative was hardly used at all in the sources under consideration, which allows us to say that it hardly played any role in the mobilization of the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada. Moreover, it should be said that after 2014 the current narrative was displaced by the use of a more relevant narrative in connection with the Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression.

Finally, based on the research, the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative proved to be quite a popular narrative among UCC presidents, which is in line with the expectations set before the study, it was addressed quite regularly, and it definitely played a significant role in shaping the discourse of the Ukrainian diaspora. If we pay attention to how this narrative was addressed by UCC presidents, it becomes clear that this discourse can rightfully be considered one of the dominant discourses in shaping the discourse for diaspora mobilization in Canada. It is worth saying that the current discourse appeared more frequently in the video reports and was used more actively and more extensively than in the textual reports. Moreover, the current discourse tried to go beyond its boundaries (beyond the boundaries of ethnic Ukrainians' problems only) and to expand its audience. This had the potential to grow the number of supporters even outside of the Ukrainian community in Canada. Of course, it can also be said with a higher degree of probability that the current narrative contributed to diaspora mobilization based on the above-mentioned details.

Also, critically important to talk about the specifics of the materials under consideration as such. Given the fact that all text sources broadcast information in three languages, we can conclude that they are aimed at three different audiences: speakers of Ukrainian, English, and French. This is most likely done to expand the diaspora audience, which correlates with the mobilization of the diaspora, and which ultimately increases the potential and cumulative ability of the diaspora to exert some kind of influence. It should also be said that Ukrainian migration to Canada is a little more than a century old, so we are talking about generations from the first waves of migration who do not speak Ukrainian at all. Most likely it was for this purpose that the decision was made to use all the above-mentioned languages. It is also very important to say a few words about the resources themselves; textual reports were more formal and “dry”, unlike video reports, which had a relatively large number of rhetorical devices. The text reports most often had rather “dry” language and sometimes there was an impression that the UCC president simply did not have the task to captivate the audience with his speech.

Based on our analysis it can be concluded that the “Struggle for freedom and dignity” narrative and the “Ethnic and organizational cohesion” narrative have played a significant role in framing the context for mobilizing supporters, uniting Ukrainians within the Ukrainian community to achieve organizational goals. It is important to note that UCC presidents, as the main authoritative representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora, often referred to these narratives in their

addresses, forming a special discourse to mobilize supporters in the three linguistic audiences. Also, it can be concluded that the "Holodomor and Canada's First National Internment Operations" narrative hardly played any role in framing the discourse of Ukrainian diaspora mobilization.

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