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Case Studies of Recent Russian Aggressive Actions in Ukraine, Russian Security-related Acts in Estonia, and a Discourse Analysis of the Effects Russian Aggression in Ukraine Have Had on Estonian Discourses and Policy.

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Thesis Supervisors

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Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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Abstract

This master's thesis explores gaps in research regarding the effects Russian aggression in Ukraine have had on high-level Estonian political and security discourses, and in effect, policy. Furthermore, the recent full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its effects on Estonia were examined in detail. One of the striking discoveries of this thesis was that Estonia, even though it is a small country, is particularly assertive regarding its neighbour Russia when it comes to security issues, as Estonia is fully aware that they could lose their democratic society if they are Russia's next target after Ukraine. The aim of the thesis was not only to evaluate Russian aggression in Ukraine, and Russian-Estonian security problems, but also to understand the effects Russian aggression in Ukraine have had on Estonia. These effects were found in publicly available discourse of high level Estonian political figures and Estonian defence documents, that others have not yet analysed, and a direct correlation was seen between Russian aggression in Ukraine and changes to Estonian security policy. Furthermore, these events sparked debate in Estonia on how to deter Russian aggression. While exploring George F. Kennan's famous theory of containment, striking similarities were found between the political culture of Soviet Russia and Putin's regime. Furthermore, Kennan's containment theory was found to remain relevant, as Estonia today has also encouraged a policy of containing Russia by encouraging cooperation with allies, the applying of sanctions to deter negative behaviour by Russia, adjusting Estonian security policies, and inviting NATO contingents on Estonian soil.

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Acknowledgements: (Differing use of font intentional to keep to one page.)

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandfather, Charles Franklin Klihr, (1930-2020) the man who first introduced me to security issues. He was a Texan who served his country in numerous capacities, including as a soldier, airman, and skilled engineer; He was in short, a true American. He was also the one who encouraged me to see as much of the world as I could while young, something he himself had done.

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A note from the evening of February 24th, 2022- During a stunning pink sunrise on February 24th, 2022, Estonia's Independence Day, I walked in the town hall area of Tartu, just after reading about the horrific events that transpired during the early morning in Ukraine. Breathing fresh air on empty streets, I realized how precious freedom is. Tartu slept before the events of this holiday because Estonia was safe, which is not the situation for millions of Ukrainians who suffer the horrors of war. **I would like to recognize the incredible heroism of Ukrainians, which will enter history alongside Thermopylae, London during the Blitz, and in short, every example of extreme bravery in the face of great evil.**

This thesis is written in a personal capacity and the author's views shall not be attributed to anyone else.

"The peace we seek and need means much more than mere absence of war. It means the acceptance of law, and the fostering of justice, in **all** the world." (President Eisenhower, 1956. Emphasis on "all" my own)

Graph 1- An outline of Russia's various forms of aggressive or hostile behaviour



(Graph is 226 words)

Gvineria's power point (2021) that inspired graph above is in Appendix A.

Research Question- What lessons has Estonia learned from Russian aggressive acts in Ukraine; and how has the war in Ukraine affected Estonian security and political discourses, and eventually policy?"

Research Puzzle-

Why is Estonia, a small, and on its own, a militarily weak country, willing to use harsher discourse toward its larger neighbour Russia, and encourage its allies to contain Russia through deterrence? Smaller sub-questions could include: Why is Estonia more keen to point out the perceived threat posed to European security by the Russian Federation, especially as it shares a border with Russia and has a history of being occupied by Russia? Is Estonia's rejection of appeasement toward Russia influenced by Russia's aggression in Ukraine?

Objectives of research-

To understand how events in Ukraine have affected Estonian political discourse and eventually policy. This will be done through analysing through case studies of Russian aggression in Ukraine, and their effects on discourses, and as a result, policy in Estonia, as well as Russian security-related actions toward Estonia. Furthermore, to understand Ukrainian interpretations of Russian aggression and their responses in Ukraine as well, in addition to countermeasures that have been employed. Lastly, to understand how Estonia has pushed for Russia to be contained and deterred.

Introduction and Relevance of Research-

We live today in a world in which the power of non-democratic autocracies or totalitarian states is rising again. Vladimir Putin's Russia is widely recognized as one of the greatest threats to global democracies, and Putin's regime has engaged in numerous aggressive actions that

destabilize democracy around the world. These acts manifest in various forms which will be explained in detail below. An understanding of Putin's measures against democracy and function of normal society can be found through case studies of two countries who have been the direct focus of Putin's authoritarian government. They are Estonia and Ukraine. Some may question the importance to the wider world of understanding Russian aggression in Ukraine, and their implications for Estonia, a small state, though what is done to the least of us, can be done to all of us, and to understand the cases of Russian hostilities in Ukraine and their effects on Estonian discourses and policy is to have a better understanding of the security issues of our world today. The objectives of my research are in short, to show how events in Ukraine have distinctly influenced Estonian political and security discourses and as a result, Estonian government action, which includes further cooperation with Ukraine. Furthermore, my hypothesis is that Estonia, although a small state, is acutely aware of the capabilities of the Putin regime, and Russian aggression in Ukraine has only increased this awareness in Estonian political circles. Thus, due to this sense in Estonia of a genuine threat from Russia, despite its small size, Estonia has encouraged a containment policy on Putin's Regime, very similar to the containment theory proposed and outlined by George F. Kennan in his 1947 paper "On the Sources of Soviet Conduct." Kennan's containment theory will be discussed in detail in the theoretical chapter, and I will outline how his theory is still relevant today. I also hope to fill in the gaps in academic research concerning its relevance to Estonia's policies and high-level political discourse. Furthermore, there are distinct lessons to be learned regarding maintaining European security from Russian aggression. Lastly, through careful exploration of various historical perspectives,

the author aims to elaborate on how similarities in historical understanding of relations with Russia affect Estonian and Ukrainian discourses on Russia, and relations with Russia today.

Furthermore, I argue that Estonia is far less vulnerable than Ukraine to Russian hostile measures due to its membership in NATO, which is acknowledged in Estonian political discourses. However, I also argue that Ukraine is not a passive victim as some may believe. This has been proven since the early morning hours of February 24th, 2022, in which while Estonians celebrated their day of Independence, Ukraine ferociously resisted a full invasion from the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Not only was this invasion condemned around the world, (especially in the Baltics who fear that they could be next) but well documented instances of targeting of civilian areas, have pushed even the most pro-Russian, (or cautious toward Russia) European states to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation and its highest representatives. As recently as March 1st, 2022, numerous diplomats walked out of a speech by Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, (*The Guardian* on YouTube) in protest to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Furthermore, Ukraine has shown forward thinking in the information warfare front, as its page directed toward the families of Russian servicemen *Look for your Own*,¹ which is easily found online by Russian speakers but will not be listed with a link here due to its extremely graphic nature, shows not only interviews of Russian POW's, but also corpses of Russian war dead in various states of decomposition. As of March 1st, 2022 it had over 502,000 subscribers.² This site, as Radio Liberty did note in a February 27th 2022 article, pointed out the psychological warfare and propaganda value of this service,

¹ Translated into English using OpenRussian Dictionary. Available at;

<https://en.openrussian.org/ru/%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C>

² For more information, please refer to the following article by Radio Liberty "Mama, I Didn't Want To Come': Ukraine Asks Russians To ID Their Killed, Captured Relatives"- <https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-pows-prisoners-identification-dead/31726619.html>

though these were also noted by the author of this thesis who was aware of the site and its value before his reading of the Radio Liberty Article. It is understandable that most human beings would fear for their close relatives or spouses serving in a combat zone, and an app that is updated in real time with the graphic photos and videos of Russian war dead would naturally have a severe demoralizing effect on Russian citizens. Furthermore, interrogations of their loved ones answering questions related to who they are, what unit they're from, where they were captured, and what they wish to say to their parents, may provide some respite to Russian citizens wondering of the status of their deployed relatives. I note that a concern of Ukrainian officers as listed by interviews conducted in a NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence report included Russian psychological warfare tactics, which involved use of media or cell phone texts to intimidate Ukrainian soldiers, (NATO SCCE report, 2016, pp 105-106, 108-111) showing Ukraine's Armed Forces learned how to adapt to these threats and respond in turn. Or that Ukraine followed the advice to NATO in this report that stated:

“NATO must continuously pay attention to non-military actions that may have military co-objectives, especially those trying to circumvent NATO Article 5. This includes all operations related to information warfare, which have an increasing importance in contemporary conflicts, especially those with the Russian involvement.” (Ibid, p. 7,)

Recent events in Ukraine, which as of the 24th of February, 2022 escalated to full-scale war, have inspired not only further cooperation between Estonia and Ukraine, but also have directly affected Estonian views on security. We must also note that Estonia, due to its small size and relative power is overlooked when it comes to European security issues, yet an attack on Estonia could trigger NATO's article five. Furthermore, this is vital to explore, as extremely little has been

written on Ukraine's effects in Estonian Security discourse, especially recent discourses relevant to the lead up and actual full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and high-level political perceptions and discourses to these events in Estonia.

Introduction Part Two: material to be covered in research and data used.

As outlined in Graph 1, Russia's aggressive or hostile actions manifest themselves in various ways, ranging from cyber-attacks or misinformation campaigns to actual use of military force, which has resulted in the deaths of thousands in Ukraine. In a case study of Russian direct aggressive actions in Ukraine, and cyber-attacks or misinformation campaigns in Estonia, I will analyse these various events and then analyse local perceptions and reactions to them. I would like to note that the focus on both Estonia and Ukraine specifically is deliberate. Estonia and Ukraine are both post-Soviet states with sizeable Russian speaking minorities which took different paths. Estonia is a successful nation in a state of peace; Ukraine is in a state of war with Russia. Yet both states share a border with the Russia and political discourse from both states displays that they view Russia as their greatest security threat. Their significant differences yet sharing some similarities make for compelling case studies and cross-comparison. The fact that Estonia is a member of NATO and Ukraine is not, is worth noting, as this can affect the options Russia has against either country. As research for this thesis progressed, the links between events in Ukraine and Estonian responses were made clearer. Estonian and Ukrainian English language or translated political discourse will be evaluated, in how Russian aggression is perceived, and how this discourse relates to responses of the Estonian and Ukrainian states regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine and preventing the same from occurring in Estonia. Furthermore, a small focus will be on the discourse of Russian figures regarding their treatment of these states, as

understanding Russian motivations is crucial to obtaining a wider picture of events involved. Data used in this thesis will include: English language publications, or recorded speeches or interviews of senior figures of the Estonian, Ukrainian, or Russian state. Academic texts, journals, peer-reviewed articles, and think tank or NATO defence reports will also be analysed.

Chapter 1. Methodology: On Case Studies and Discourse Analysis-

A major source of inspiration to the case study approach in this thesis is from the work of Robert K. Yin, a respected scholar on case studies (Mills, A. J., Durepos, G., and Wiebe, E. 2010, p. 2) who, while referring to Schramm 1971, described:

“The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result. (Schramm, 1971, 13-14) (Robert K. Yin 2018, p. 14)

In other words, I will examine the cases of Russian aggression in Ukraine and actions below the threshold of aggression in Estonia, then evaluate the results of these actions including Estonian and Ukrainian discourses and policy changes due to them. Furthermore, Yin says of the uses of case studies:

“The most important is to explain the presumed causal links in real-world interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental methods. A second application is to describe an intervention and the real-world context in which it occurred. Third, a case study can illustrate certain topics within an evaluation, again in a descriptive mode.” (Yin, 2018, p. 18.)

Regarding cross-case synthesis (As I am approaching Estonia *and* Ukraine, not merely Estonia *or* Ukraine) Yin states the following:

“...Therefore, helpful if not essential will be a discussion of how the individual cases were sufficiently comparable along important dimensions (e.g., their cultural or institutional settings) to warrant a presumed common finding between them.... An overall and important caveat in conducting cross-case syntheses is that the cross-case patterns will rely strongly on argumentative interpretation, *not* (emphasis my own) numeric tallies. A challenge you must be prepared to meet in doing a cross-case synthesis is therefore to

know how to develop strong, plausible, and fair arguments that are supported by your data.” (Yin 2018, pp 198-199)

The distinct similarities between Ukrainian and Estonian defence discourses will be discussed below, as well as the effect the situation in Ukraine has on Estonian defence discourses, thus as the thesis continues, the causal links will become clearer.

Chapter 1.1; On Discourse Analysis-

Dunn and Neumann, referencing Hansen and his studies of the Balkans, state that “foreign policy discourses have historical depth.” (Dunn and Neumann 2016 quoting Hansen 107-108) For example, the Estonian discourses regarding Russia are shaped by history. As Mälksoo stated, states often feel the need to use military metaphors to defend their ideas of history, and by militarizing these ideas by using such terms as “information warfare” (Mälksoo, 225) states are defending their ideas of history. It is noteworthy, that the 2021 review of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service mentions “Russian disinformation and psychological warfare campaigns” to “change local views to match Russian interests.” (60-61) In their descriptions of methodologies for discourse analysis, Dunn and Neumann discussed how texts require a descriptive reading, then a dialogical reading (Dunn and Neumann, p. 110) to evaluate the text then see what may have been implied but not said directly. (ibid.) Furthermore they approached the method of “presupposition” in which one already has some basic knowledge of that discussed in a discourse, such as when one says “Scratch the Russian and a Tatar will emerge” (Dunn and Neumann , 110 discussing research of Iver Neumann and Doty) implying people know what both terms are and the relation between them is. (111.) For

example, for one to study Estonian responses to Russian aggression in Ukraine, one must already have ideas of what constitute Ukraine, Estonia, Russia, aggression, and the relation between them. (Ibid.)

Other methodology of discourse analysis as noted by Dunn and Neumann include noting the “verbs, adjectives, and adverbs” attached to nouns. (111) In examples relevant to Estonia, the example of the Estonian Language Act comes to mind. For example, Estonian is the only official language of Estonia, and as the Estonian Language Act Chapter Two states that “The Official Language of Estonia is Estonian,” and that “Any language other than Estonian or Estonian sign language, is a foreign language.” It furthermore states that minorities in Estonia that speak another language due to their history, are “different from Estonians” by language. (Riiga Teataja, Language Act, 2011) One might interpret this to the uses of the words “foreign” and “different from Estonians” as implying that non-Estonian speakers in Estonia are foreigners or some form of an “other.” Another Estonian example is found in the use of words such as “vulnerability” to describe NATO’s weaknesses, especially regarding the Baltic states, to new Russian missile systems. (Vseviiov, 2021 8-9) Furthermore, actions are supported, by mentioning the necessity of “deterrence,” due to “imbalances,” and ways in which these imbalances can be “addressed” (Ibid, 8). As Dunn and Neumann stated, different interpretations of events can “enable different actions.” (Dunn and Neumann 2016, p. 113) By treating the Baltic States and NATO as “vulnerable,” (Vseviiov, 8) or stating that there is an “imbalance” of power or capabilities, (8-9) one can justify action to protect them.³ Or as Fairclough stated, values explain actions we take and justify them. (47) As Fairclough continues, “social institutional reality is created and

³ A similar point is made in Beall 2021, p. 5 quoting Weldes, 1996 p. 281 and later in this thesis.

reproduced through language, with the purpose of creating and regulating relations of power.”
(Fairclough, 74)

Chapter 1.2; The relevance of discourse analysis to events in Ukraine and their impact on Estonia-

Much has indeed been written about Russian use of political technology or other forms of Russian hostile measures below the threshold of war in the Baltics, (Wilson, 2011) and that the Baltics have had more time than most to prepare to combat it. (Kelemen, 2018, Thompson, 2019). Much has also been written about Russian military aggression in Ukraine, especially after the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine. However, very little research has been conducted on the discourse of the Estonian and Ukrainian security services, high-ranking political figures, foreign ministries, or other political bodies, concerning the effects Russian aggression Ukraine has had on Estonian discourses and policy. These local responses are often revealed in interviews and official statements by senior political figures to various media organizations or at public events. Examples of perceptions and eventual responses to Russian aggression are seen in the discourses of both Estonia and Ukraine. For example, the State Security Service of Ukraine reports that Russian “propaganda” to “destabilize Ukraine” was halted by the Security Services. (SBU, 2020) This use of the word “destabilize” displays a Ukrainian belief in Russian intent to disrupt the social fabric of Ukraine. (ibid.) Furthermore, Ukraine calls its operations against Russian backed rebels in the East “anti-terror operations” implying that Russian backed rebels are terrorists and deserve the harsh treatment one typically associates with terrorists. Lastly, to return to Estonia such language was used by the Estonian Internal Security Service 2021 Annual Review that labelled Russian espionage as a “Continuous and Permanent Threat” (2) The use of

the word “threat” requires action, and the “continuous” and “permanent” nature of the threat shows that it is, has been, and will continue to be relevant. A similar situation was reported by Weldes, in that the U.S. called the Cuban Missile Crisis, a “crisis,” as another term such as “nuisance” would not have demanded action. (Beall 2021, p. 5 quoting Weldes, 1996 p. 281) Needless to say, if Russia is constituted as a threat, as is mentioned many times in numerous official documents and publications by the Estonian security services, and in the current 2021 reports, then this threat is seen as not only existing but existing in the present, or indeed as mentioned above, in the *future* by being a “permanent threat.” Lastly, in 2015, the then Estonian Foreign Minister, Keit Pentus-Rossimannus, stated that “Russia continues to act as an *aggressor*. [emphasis my own] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, 2015) By describing Russia as such, Estonia is implying that Russia is a hostile power. Indeed, some have recognized the implications of Russian actions in Ukraine to potential scenarios in Estonia, as did McCrory in his article *Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine*. In this article, he displayed that there are concerns Russian methods of electronic warfare used in Ukraine could also be used in the Baltics, while recognizing that some of this has already occurred, such as in Russian propaganda used with the intent of sowing divisions in the Baltics. (McCrory 2020, pp.38-39) Indeed, Russia’s actions in Ukraine were often cited by various media and military sources in the years following the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbass, as potentially being something that could happen in the Baltic States,⁴ under the excuse of “defending Russian

⁴ Note, McCrory, in his article, cited the following article for the statement regarding concerns tactics in Ukraine could be used in the Baltic region; Andrew Radin, *Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), p. 1., However, I do not believe this deserves a citation as this has been constantly covered in the media since 2014, and anyone with basic knowledge of European and North Atlantic security discussions would easily share concerns over potential Russian aggression also manifesting in the Baltics as it has already throughout history.

minorities.” This led to many multinational NATO drills in the Baltic region which are ongoing, to prevent such “hybrid-warfare scenarios”.⁵ Russian aggressive acts have been headlines in mainstream media, academic journals, defence papers, and discussed by spokespersons of organizations such as NATO states, or representatives of governments, showing the socially constructed view that Russian aggressive actions are of paramount political import. This viewpoint is shown in the discourse of publications by the Estonian security services, and foreign ministry, Ukrainian security services and foreign ministry and NATO. As stated by Fairclough & Fairclough in their book *Political Discourse Analysis*, it is recognized that language is a form of action (Fairclough 2012, p. 24) and is related to policy debate, and later implementation. (Fairclough pp 26-30) Argumentation is also a “complex speech act” (36) and “action by means of language” (37). This is supported by Van Dijk, who stated that “language users” engage in discussion, as “members of social groups” and these groups then “act,” and these acts can include “legislation.” (Van Dijk, 2001)⁶ Thus discourse regarding Russian aggression often leads to responses to Russian aggression. Thus, not only is Russian aggression held in great importance in Estonia and Ukrainian political circles, but also understanding Russian aggression is a paramount goal of all studying the political or security issues of Eastern Europe as well as the public.

I would like to support my decision to use audio-visual sources for discourse analysis, such as public statements by senior Estonian and Ukrainian political figures. First, much of these audio-visual sources are very recent, and date from late 2021 to early 2022 and beyond, aiding

⁵ The use of the term “Hybrid-warfare scenarios” may have been inadvertently inspired by the RAND Corporation Report, Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics Available at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf I often aim to be overly-cautious with citations rather than under cautious.

⁶ Similar points using these political discourse expert books were made in my cited, *Wounded Eagle* paper, however, in relation to US discourse during the Vietnam War. Please refer to Beall, pp. 3-5

in the high degree of originality found in my analysis of much of this data, which I have not yet seen produced elsewhere. Second, we live in a digital age, and governments around the world are aware of this, publishing their views and papers online for others to see. Third, if a politician says something to a camera, it goes around the world instantly, and thus they're highly aware that their words are seen as either literal opinions on policy or plans for policy. Fourth, the data I have used are from official government or international organisation media channels and are often devoid of preliminary analysis. Thus, the analysis of such videos is my own and highly original. Furthermore, there are other written sources from the government that are used in tandem with audio-visual materials, as well as academic papers or research reports that I use with the audiovisual discourse analysed. Lastly, I would like to make the point that during the Second World War, Winston Churchill famously led the British people and made official statements of great import over radio, and no one would argue that Churchill's words over radio were any less important than what discourses were distributed by the British government in written form.

Chapter 2: Kennan's 1947 Theory of Containment and its relevance today; events in Ukraine and the resulting increased cooperation between Ukraine and Estonia, and the return of a desire for a Russia contained through deterrence -

My hypothesis is that Estonia, although a small state, is acutely aware of the capabilities of the Putin regime, and Russian aggression in Ukraine has only increased this awareness in Estonian political circles; thus, due to the sense in Estonia of a genuine threat from Russia, despite its small size, Estonia has encouraged a containment through deterrence policy on Putin's regime. This is very similar to the containment theory proposed and outlined by George F. Kennan in his paper "On the Sources of Soviet Conduct." Furthermore, Estonian high-level figures and Kennan share similarities in their viewpoints on the conduct and nature of the Russian regime, and how best to combat it. Kennan outlined core points about the Soviet regime and its philosophies, and methods for dealing with it effectively on the international stage. In short, Kennan believed that the Soviet regime's conduct, views, and goals, were incompatible with Western states, and that there could be no naïve appeasement, but instead, the Soviet Union must be contained by free nations. (Kennan 1947, pp. 5-7, 9) While Kennan was clearly writing about Soviet leaders such as Lenin and Stalin, the philosophies followed by Soviet Leadership and their mistrust of others, and their unwillingness to distribute power, (Kennan 1947, pp. 3, 5) bear striking similarities to Putin and his inner circle today. We should also note that Vladimir Putin was a KGB officer, and even if he did not personally truly believe in Soviet ideology, was fully aware of its inner political workings. We should remember that Vladimir Putin described the fall of the Soviet Union as the "greatest catastrophe of the 20th century." Kennan discusses the mistrust of the Soviet leadership by stating:

“Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin’s position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great.” (Kennan 1947, p.3)

Kennan continued that Soviet leaders did not believe in “peaceful coexistence of rival forces,” (ibid.) Such conduct bears great resemblance to Vladimir Putin’s regime which has invaded its neighbours who have pursued goals of independence from Russian influence, jailed opposition members, and even murdered or attempted to murder figures who challenge the regime, showing a complete lack of tolerance for rival political forces both domestically and abroad. Any resemblance of democratic government forces in Russia, such as the Duma, still ultimately reports to the top, or as Kennan said:

“The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of “the word.” (3)

This description again bears similarities to Putin’s Russia, as it is well documented that there have been great challenges to any candidates trying to challenge those supported by Putin, such as the challenges faced by those who assisted in Navalny’s “smart vote” system, which tried to rid Putin’s monopoly on power by having anti-Putin candidates win local elections. (Beall, 2021 for UCL, p. 4, referencing Anon *The Economist*, 2020 and Hartog, 2020.)

Chapter 2.1: Incompatibility of Western and Russian forms of government, fears of “naivety” by some toward Russia as seen in Kennan’s 1947 paper and present-day Estonian discourses on Russia, and how to achieve “containment.”

Kennan continued that Soviet leaders did not seek “absolutism for its own sake” but firmly believed that they truly knew what was best for their people: “But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods.” (3) This not only echoes an interview with Putin for Russian state media in which Putin stressed he represented the interests of the Russian people,⁷ but if one uses discourse analysis, they will realise that Kennan is stressing that the Soviet leadership did not care about morality, and those who do not care for morality cannot be dealt with softly by those who do, something Kennan himself echoed:

“When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that “the Russians have changed,” and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such “changes.” But we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres. These characteristics of Soviet policy, [regarding already mentioned suspicion of the outside world and a “siege mentality”] like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.” (Kennan, 5)

This echoes a statement by PM Kaja Kallas in her interview with *The Financial Times* in which Kallas said⁸:

⁷ While I have been successful numerous times in digging up old interviews of various leaders, YouTube and other western sites have removed Russian state media channels, thus I could not locate this interview which was posted by Russian state media.

⁸ I stress that every time I refer to a “Kallas” or “PM Kallas” in this thesis, I refer to current Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, not her father, who was also Prime Minister of Estonia.

“There seems to be a certain type of naivety towards Russia. I was trying to explain this to President Macron as well: you’re seeing this through the prism of a democratic country. You say that’s it’s going to be super-expensive for Russia to have a war . . . Putin doesn’t care. He’s not up for elections.” (Milne, R. for *The Financial Times*. February 18th, 2022)

These words by Kallas show that Estonia understands something about Russia that other European powers do not. As Milne said, Estonia’s unique history enables it to recognize the threat Russia poses, such as Kallas does through her own family’s history of oppression, (ibid) something that Western European powers have never directly experienced. (ibid.) I would like to note as well that Kallas’s words in this above quote were made before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, showing that Estonia was aware of the possibilities of invasion, even if some Western powers saw such a level of aggression as unlikely. Furthermore, in explaining the Russian political mentality, Kennan explains that the history of wide-open steppes provided a vulnerability to foreign powers in the minds of the Russian elite, (Kennan, p. 6) and that “For ideology, as we have seen, taught them [Soviet leaders] that the outside world was hostile and that is was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders.” (Kennan, 3) Thus, Kennan explained well the siege mentality in Soviet leadership, that still is prevalent in Putin’s Russia today. Nevertheless, he noted that the Soviet leadership was aware of their own weakness in comparison to Western powers, thus the Western powers are at an advantage. This was even acknowledged by Vladimir Putin who admitted that “NATO’s united potential and that of Russia are incomparable.” (*Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on YouTube February 8th, 2022.) This reiterates Kennan’s Point that:

“Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party... This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.” (Kennan 1947, Page 9)

Putin’s Russia today remains the weaker party, and this was admitted by Putin himself, as noted above, and Estonian and Ukrainian political discourses echo one another in that allies are stronger together, and a unified front is crucial in deterring Russian aggression, which is detailed fully through discourse analysis in later chapters. Or as PM Kallas stated in an interview “Russia only goes as far as we let them.” (CBC News, on YouTube, 2021) Furthermore, in the sense of Kennan’s need for Western powers to “confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” (Kennan 1947, p. 9) this is echoed in Ukrainian and Estonian discourses in that deterring Putin requires allies standing strong together and pushing back. Thus, containment is not just sitting back and hoping that Russia remains within its borders and does not conduct aggression against its neighbours, but that nations with common goals and beliefs push back when they see this aggression of any kind, or deter it through unity, a strategy seen repeatedly in Estonian and Ukrainian discourses which will be discussed in later chapters. Furthermore, both Estonian and Ukrainian figures realise that the goals of Western Democracies and Putin’s Russia are incompatible, and deterrence requires understanding that fact. This echoes Kennan’s statement that:

“It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a

permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.” (Kennan 1947, p. 9)

Although there is no longer a battle between Russia and the Western states over economic systems, there remains a moral battle, a battle of conflicting philosophies, a world in which civilized opposition is encouraged, and a world in which all opposition is crushed. Estonia and Ukraine know this all too well from their respective histories. The author of this thesis argues that not only does Kennan’s containment theory remain relevant today, but that also my focus on Estonian discourses regarding Ukraine can provide new lessons for this theory, and fills a gap in the literature, for little if any academic literature exists on how containment of Putin’s Russia through various forms of deterrence is a relevant goal for Estonia. Furthermore, my research brought the surprising find that although Estonia is arguably the most vulnerable country in NATO to potential new Russian aggression, Estonia is not afraid to use harsher rhetoric in encouraging allied cooperation to deter Russian aggression, whether real such as against Ukraine, or hypothetical, such as toward a NATO member like Estonia. This strategy is outlined in Kennan’s language above, in that Russia must be countered by free states. The author of this thesis believes and outlines in more detail in subsequent chapters that Estonia feels that it has can potentially lose its successful, democratic, society, and is aware that if Putin meets his goals in Ukraine, Estonia could be very well next, which was mentioned not only by Prime Minister Kallas, but also numerous Estonian intelligence reports. I would like to note that although Kennan’s theory often mentions United States policy toward the Soviet Union, he also mentions that all democratic nations must apply “counter-force at every point where they [the Russians] show of encroaching

upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world” (Kennan 1947, p. 9) and thus these same goals can be pursued by all free or aspiring free nations, such as Estonia and Ukraine. Estonia’s discourse shows that Russia can be contained only by deterrence through allied cooperation and displays of strength, such as the deployment of NATO troops in Estonia, and supporting Ukraine. It is worth noting that the nature of the Russian regime matters, as does its culture, as Kennan pointed out, the loss of power in an authoritarian system can lead to a dangerous imbalance such as the transition of power between Lenin and Stalin. (Kennan 1947, p. 8) My graph below will attempt to explain that outright Russian aggression in Ukraine leads to high-level political discourse in Estonia that recognizes the threat Russia poses to European security, and in turn this leads to increased Estonian-Ukrainian Cooperation, and furthermore, policy changes in attempting to deter Russia from further aggression. A literature review will follow the graph in which noted authors on similar topics and their views will be acknowledged.

Graph 2 – (42 words)



Chapter 2.2; Literature Review on Russian aggression in Ukraine and its relation to the Baltics, especially Estonia-

It is well documented in Estonian political discourses that events in Ukraine have been viewed as relevant to Estonia's security situation. While the bulk of this thesis discusses my own findings through extensive discourse analysis of high level Estonian political figures and Estonian security related documents, I do acknowledge that other authors have discussed the relevance of the security situation in Ukraine to Estonia. Furthermore, others have mentioned that containment may be a valid strategy toward Putin's Russia, though not in the same heavy focus I have applied to Estonia and Ukraine in particular. Their views and findings will be outlined in the paragraph below before entering the empirical sections of this thesis.

Much has been written about Russian aggression in Ukraine, and smaller scale issues between Russia and the Baltics in recent memory, and various authors have come to different findings on this matter. Their differences lie chiefly in how the Baltic states are vulnerable, and in which ways they are more vulnerable than others. Furthermore, many authors acknowledged Russian attempts to paint Estonians as neo-Nazis, and lastly, the Bronze Statue Case in Estonia and the 2007 Cyberattacks are perhaps the most famous and well documented case of Russian-Estonian security issues. While Grigas in her report for Chatham House, as well as her own book *The Politics of Energy and Memory Between the Baltic States and Russia* (Grigas for Chatham House 2012, pp. 3-4 and Grigas 2012 p. 69) outlined the energy related vulnerabilities of the Baltics including Estonia, and Russia's energy related threats, Stoicescu writing for CEPA, was less worried about the energy impact on Estonia, and was more focused on Russia's attempts to manipulate the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia, and attempts by the Russian state to paint

Estonians as fascists and neo-Nazis. This echoes the report by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence and Estonia's Internal Security Service, which I outline in greater detail in later chapters, but in short, show how Russia accuses both Ukraine and Estonia of encouraging far-right extremism. (NATO SCCE report 2016, pp. 4, 49, and Estonian Internal Security Service, 2010 annual review pp. 10-13) Furthermore, both Grigas and Stoicescu acknowledged the Cyber-attacks Russia has orchestrated as well as their support of the riots in Tallinn over the relocation of the Bronze Statue of a Soviet Soldier. (Grigas 2012, p. 71 and Stoicescu 2021) Maili Vilson in her article *Baltic Perspectives on the Ukraine Crisis: Europeanization in the Shadow of Insecurity*, in discussing the Ukraine Crisis's perceptions in the Baltics, outlined the importance of the Bronze Statue removal and Russian Cyber Attacks on Estonia as countless others have done, though her article also mentioned that Ukraine was a "wake up call for Europe" and that the Baltic states felt they were proven right in having cautioned their Western European neighbours to not be naïve in regards to Russia's capabilities of being a threat to European Security. (Vilson 2017, pp.12-14) Furthermore she outlined that the Baltic States were among Ukraine's most ardent supporters after the fleeing of Yanukovich, (15) which is also a finding of my thesis, that Estonia is highly supportive of Ukraine in both words and action. Furthermore, Vilson pointed out that the justification used for illegal action by Russia in Crimea were recognized as applicable to the Baltic states as well, and that Russian aggression in Ukraine aided in the perception of a Russian threat in the Baltics. (Pp. 15-16) The threat to the Baltic States in light of events in Ukraine were also outlined by Duncan McCrory in his 2020 article for RUSI, *Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine*, who cited Andrew Radin in his article, *Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses* (McCrory 2020 for RUSI, and Radin for RAND, 2017 pp.

1, 5, 6) Radin, much like Stoicescu, acknowledged that Russia may operate using so called “hybrid warfare” as Russia has ways to affect Estonia without triggering NATO’S article five, and thus deterring threats may require different “responses” such as “for example, placing a greater priority on increasing the resilience of the targeted societies to political subversion.” (Stoicescu 2021, and Radin 2017, pp. 5-6) Thus, as has been displayed by numerous authors, Russia often accuses Ukraine and Estonia of supporting the far right, and frequent fights between the three states occur in the information realm over accepted versions of history. Furthermore, some acknowledge the relevance of the situation in Ukraine to the Baltic Region, though a highly specific focus on Estonia is rarer, and both McCrory and Vilson deserve credit for having done so. Though most discourse I have analysed in the main body of my thesis has not been analysed elsewhere as of March 2022. I would like to note that the Estonian government on the 21st of February 2022, acknowledged that it had checked its military preparedness due to events in Ukraine, prior to the full-scale invasion, and this article mentioned that ministers discussed the importance of everything from food security to local government action, and the cyber field for being areas of threat to prepare for. (Government of Estonia, February 21st, 2022) Regarding Kennan’s theory of containment, which was discussed in the section preceding the literature review, some have appealed for such a policy to be applied to Russia today. Henrik Larsen, writing for the Swiss Center for Security Studies, outlined that Russia much like the Soviet Union did, is not only weaker than the Western powers that oppose it and recognizes this, but as a response, attempts to divide the West at its own weak points. (Larsen January 2022, pp. 1, 2, 4) Furthermore, Deborah Larson writing for *Foreign Policy Magazine* mentions that containment can be applied to Russia today, (though she wrote in 2021) but recommended a softer approach

than the harsher containment of the cold war, which involves recognizing the importance Russia plays on energy markets. (Larson for *Foreign Policy*, 2021.) Both Larsen and Larson however acknowledged Russia's military and hybrid activities on its neighbours. (Larson for FP, 2021, and Larsen, 2020 p. 2.) Furthermore, Larsen mentioned the fact that Russia's operations in Ukraine's Donbass were costly, which echoes Kennan's point that Russia is indeed the weaker power. In conclusion, while various authors have recommended a new containment for Russia, Kennan's 1947 document is still relevant today; especially in its descriptions of Russian power in Soviet times which still apply to Putin's Russia. Furthermore, the differences in culture between Russian and Western political systems are still relevant. However, there is a great gap in research when it comes to containment and containment through deterrence as recommended in Estonian and Ukrainian discourses especially regarding the recent full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The modern authors above brought their own perspectives and disagreements on the areas in which they believed the Baltics were more or less vulnerable to Russia, and as the Baltic states adjust their government policies, further analysis of the effects of these changes will be enabled.

Chapter 3: Modern Russian Cyber and misinformation campaigns in Estonia, Estonian interpretations of events in Ukraine, and Estonian Discourses on deterring potential Russian aggression, as well as historical mistreatment of Estonia by Russia-

Estonia, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO) lies in North-eastern Europe, and shares a border with Russia. Estonia is a former Soviet republic with a sizeable Russian minority, especially in its capital city of Tallinn and Eastern city of Narva, which is on the border with Russia. Estonia has historically suffered greatly at the hands of Russia, and recently has been the victim of cyber-attacks, “energy politics,” and misinformation campaigns. As a result, common themes have been seen in Estonian political discourse of high-ranking figures regarding containing and deterring Russia. These themes which will be outlined in more detail below include: Strong cooperation with allies, a firm focus on the benefits of Estonian NATO membership, and a view that Estonia’s security is directly tied to cooperation with NATO allies and NATO membership. (Prime Minister Kallas interviewed for CBC News 2021, BBC HARDtalk 2021, and NATO News on YouTube, 2022) Furthermore, Estonia has displayed a desire to use those prior-mentioned policies to engage in a more proactive rhetoric regarding the threat Russia provides to European security, while stating that allies working together can deter Russia, (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) and Estonia has led the way among NATO states in warning of the threat Russia poses. Many of Estonia’s discourses that Russia still poses a danger were proven during the recent invasion of Ukraine, as Estonia due to its unique history is aware of the threat Russia poses and takes the Russian threat more seriously.

Chapter 3.1; The 2007 Unrest in Tallin and competing Estonian and Russian historical narratives and political discourses-

In 2007, Estonia's capital, Tallinn, was home to a period of civil unrest, due to tensions between Estonians and segments of its Russian population, which were at times reported to be aided by the Russian government. (Grigas 2012, p. 71) This unrest followed the removal of a bronze statue commemorating Soviet soldiers in Tallinn. (Grigas 2012, p. 69) To understand why this was so controversial, we must first briefly examine the competing narratives between the Estonian and Russian governments over the Soviet presence in Estonia after the Second World War. In July 2020, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published an article in which it mentioned the Russian ambassador was summoned over "recent attempts to depict the occupation and annexation of Estonia by the Soviet Union as legitimate." (Through the social media account of the Russian embassy in Tallinn.) Furthermore, it mentions that foreign minister Urmas Reinsalu said that Estonia "condemns any and all attempts to falsify history." (Republic of Estonia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23rd of July, 2020) These attempts at Russian disinformation which were condemned by senior figures of the Estonian government are an example of Russia attempting to shape public opinion or "sow discord." (McCrary 2020, referring to Estonian internal security service annual review 2018 p. 6 though I found this mentioned on p. 3 as well) The political discourse shows that clearly, Estonia views such disinformation as a threat.

Indeed, the Estonian government mentioned statement concluded that the "half century" of *occupation* had numerous consequences on the Estonian people, and that the Baltic States alongside the U.S.A. confirmed "their staunch opposition to any attempts by Russia to rewrite history." (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23rd of July, 2020) The strong wording by Estonia

including the word “occupation” as well as listed background information to the non-consensual nature of Estonia’s membership in the Soviet Union and oppression that followed clearly displays the Estonian view on the Soviet presence. In contrast, it is worth noting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia calls the Soviet advance into the Baltics a liberation. Below is a screenshot of a twitter statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Image One- (Russian MFA Statement, and an example of Russian disinformation, 73 words)



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⁹ (Russian MFA Twitter screenshot taken from https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1305407820117020673 .)

Given that the above publication not only calls the Soviet occupation of the Baltics (including Estonia) a liberative measure, it also pictures triumphant Soviet troops being greeted happily by ecstatic locals, ignoring Soviet repression of locals that is well documented and has been mentioned numerous times by official ministries in the Baltic States.

Chapter 3.2; Further notes regarding Russian discourses on Estonia-

It is worth noting that Russian Duma member and Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs, Leonid Slutskiy, stated “the vassal loyalty of the Baltic States to the U.S. course has never been in question,” in response to Baltic states including Estonia, expelling Russian diplomats. (The State Duma, 2021)¹⁰ Furthermore, this publication in English by the Russian State Duma shows that in the opinion of senior Russian figures, the Estonian government is subservient to U.S. interests. Such language by the Russians shows that in their view, the Estonian government is not capable of independent action. Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “Estonia has been seeking to heroize the Nazi criminals since mid-1990s, thus officially trying to write the outcomes of World War 2 anew.” In reference to the events of 2007, Russia’s Foreign ministry accused Estonia of not properly investigating the murder of a Russian citizen during the riots in Tallinn, and that trade and “cargo transit through Estonian ports dwindled sharply,” as well as that Estonia had placed visa restrictions on “Russian students” who had protested the removal of the statue in Tallinn. In addition to this, it accused Estonia’s government of a “discriminatory policy towards Russian speakers of the country. [“the

¹⁰ For more information, please refer to the following links: <http://duma.gov.ru/en/news/51342/> and <https://news.err.ee/1608188617/baltics-to-expel-russian-diplomats-in-solidarity-with-czech-republic> As noted in the latter link, these expulsions were in response to the discovery of Russian special services sabotage of a factory in Czech Republic in 2014 that “killed two people.”

country” being Estonia]” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation Survey, 2009 pp. 61-62) Similar sentiments were echoed by Russia in a “human rights” report from 2012 which placed the removal of the Soviet Soldier Bronze Statue in Tallinn alongside accusations of the Estonian government glorifying Nazis, and “mass unemployment” of Russians in Estonia, concerns over Russian language rights, and calls Russian speakers living in Northeast Estonia as “compatriots,” which implies that regardless of the fact these Russian speakers are Estonian residents, in the eyes of Russians, they are Russia’s responsibility. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia 2012) This is especially dangerous as a common justification of Russia’s government for military action in foreign states, is the protection of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians.

Chapter 3.3; The results of the 2007 Tallinn statue row-

To return to the cause and effect of the removal of the statue of the Soviet soldier in Tallinn in 2007, it is well documented this quickly resulted in the halting of gas imports into Estonia from Moscow, alongside other displays of hostility, such as the attack on the Estonian embassy in Moscow by a far-right youth group with connections to the Russian government. (Grigas 2012, p. 69) Furthermore, Estonia was hit by a series of Cyber-attacks, (ibid.) which coincided with the other mentioned assaults against Estonia, and these attacks are considered the first major form of Cyber Warfare. (Aday et al for NATO, 2019 pp 52-53) It is worth noting that Urmas Paet the former Estonian Foreign minister stated that “..the future of ethnic Russians in the Republic of Estonia is only a rhetorical excuse for "active measures," (BBC Monitoring, 2007 using text of report by Estonian Newspaper Eesti Päevaleht, 2007) Thus, in the view of senior Estonian figures, Russia used “concerns” over the rights of Russian-speaking minorities as a justification for conducting actions against the well-being of Estonia, or dividing the local

population on ethnic lines. Furthermore, the Estonian Prime Minister of the time, Andrus Ansip stated “All these events confirm that here we have Russia's coordinated and brazen interference in the affairs of the Estonian state.” (BBC Monitoring quoting Estonian radio, 2007) This statement shows that Estonia viewed such events as Russian interference in its internal affairs.

Chapter 3.4: Estonian discourses in the leadup to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Estonian discourses regarding its Russian-speaking minority, and Estonian discourses regarding both NATO and Russia-

To return to more recent events, Estonia had noted the security situation in Ukraine and fears over a Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, prior to the full-scale invasion itself and had called for NATO to reinforce the Eastern flank. (Estonian Public Broadcasting, ERR, 2021) According to the Estonian parliament, Foreign Affairs Committee webpage, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Estonia’s parliament, Marko Mihkelson “underlined” that “no concessions should be made on the sanctions imposed on Russia, because the aggression against Ukraine has not abated in the slightest.” (Foreign Affairs Committee of Estonian Parliament Press Release, 2022) ¹¹ I note that the previous statements were made *prior* to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Those statements, alongside a mention of meetings on security and defence in relation to Russia (and China) between the three Baltic States by the Estonian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee display that Russia is a paramount security concern for Estonia. (Foreign Affairs Committee of Estonian Parliament 2021 Press Release.) Furthermore, in

¹¹ This article was brought to my attention by <https://news.err.ee/1608458615/estonian-mps-call-for-immediate-reinforcement-on-nato-s-eastern-flank> which also used this quote, but only in reporting what had been discussed at the meeting, the article as accessed on January 7th, 2021 and last viewing did not contain any detailed analysis.

reference to Russian support of Belarus, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, in an interview stated that “Russia only goes as far as we let them.” (CBC News, on YouTube, 2021) Prime Minister Kallas also claimed that Estonia is directly protected by NATO membership through deterrence of Russia and mentioned that Estonia is grateful for its allies. (Ibid.) She concludes with “Being part of this NATO family is a big part of our [Estonia’s] independence,” and “Putin is doing everything to prevent this [Baltic countries slipping away from Russia]” (Ibid) Regarding language rights and other issues regarding Russians in Estonia, Prime Minister Kallas gave informative answers in response to questioning in an interview on this and other topics with the BBC. First off, Prime Minister Kallas stated that due to “history” Estonia is aware of the threat Russia poses, and “geography” is the reason “Russia’s acts always influence us.” (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) Such language focusing on both history and geography, show that Estonia is more than aware of its historical vulnerability to Russia, (one should note that Estonia was occupied by Russia for centuries) which comes with Estonia’s obvious geography of sharing a border with Russia. Furthermore, she stated that Russia is always looking for “cracks in unity” of NATO. (Ibid) In response to the BBC interviewer’s question’s regarding Russian speaking people in Estonia without citizenship being “second-class” citizens, a complaint often filed by Russia as noted above, Prime Minister Kallas had the following response.

“Globally in the world, there are one million people speaking Estonian.... In the world, Russian speakers are about 173 million... So, we really have to protect our language. The only thing we ask of these people who have lived here for even like fifty years is to learn our language. It is not much to ask to get the citizenship. There are many Russians, and majority of them who have done the lessons, who have done the exams, and reached out and applied for the citizenship and also got the citizenship. But there are people who actually want to travel more freely by Russian borders to Russia, and that’s why they don’t want to give up their Russian citizenship. That’s actually the real purpose. They have all the rights that Estonian

citizens have, except for one right, and this is elect a parliament...” (BBC HARDtalk, 2021)

To analyse Prime Minister Kallas’s statement, we must first look at her comparison to the vastly disproportionate number of Russian to Estonian speakers, implying heavily that Estonia is a very small country, with a small population that speaks its native language. This is in comparison to the vast number of Russian speakers. She also mentions the need to “protect” the Estonian language as quoted above, showing her view that the Estonian language is something that must be defended from the influence of much larger number of speakers of Russian language. (Of which, over a hundred million are next door.) In mentioning “these people” who have “lived here for even fifty years” whose only requirement for full citizenship is to learn “our language” (ibid) Prime Minister Kallas is mentioning the Russian speakers in Estonia, who are often Russian citizens, who have been in Estonia for half a century (starting from the Soviet presence or occupation) yet have not bothered to learn the Estonian language. This “our” implies that the language of Estonia is Estonian, which is reinforced by the Estonian Language Act which states, “The Official Language of Estonia is Estonian,” and that “Any language other than Estonian or Estonian Sign Language, is a foreign language,” (Riigi Teataja Language Act, 2011.) Thus, this “foreignness” in other languages makes those who speak them an “other” which I outlined earlier in the methodology paragraph regarding discourse analysis and the Language Act of Estonia. Thus, there is a strong component of Estonian identity that revolves around language, and the importance Prime Minister Kallas places on defending the Estonian language reinforces this, for as she states, those who learn Estonian to obtain full citizenship have done so and been given

this citizenship. (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) Furthermore, this mention of the “real purpose” of Russian speakers in Estonia being unable to obtain citizenship is attributed to the desire of some Russian citizens in Estonia to easily travel to Russia, reinforcing this idea of this Russian “other” that has the opportunity to assimilate, but has been unwilling to do so.

Chapter 3.5: Estonian Discourses on NATO’s importance to Estonian security regarding the Russian threat, cyber threats, and NATO membership as a deterrence to Russian hostile acts-

When the BBC interviewer asked Prime Minister Kallas about “how vulnerable” Estonia feels to Russia, the Estonian PM replied, “Our defence is based on our independent defence forces as well as the allied forces. NATO is strong... There is the biggest deployment of UK troops outside UK in Estonia... We feel strong as we have strong friends.” (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) Thus, as PM Kallas clearly stated, much of Estonia’s sense of security depends on its powerful allies in NATO, the most obvious examples that come to mind being the United States and United Kingdom, the latter she mentions directly. In a response to Kallas’s statement, the BBC journalist mentioned Estonian intelligence reports that stated Russia had distinct advantages over Estonia militarily in the region, to which Kallas mentioned collective defence as a “deterrence” to Russian military action. (Ibid) The BBC interviewer mentioned both that NATO would not be able to respond on time as stated by some former NATO officers, and that there are serious doubts as to whether or not NATO allies would support Estonia in such an event, to which Kallas replied both that articles four and five of NATO’s charter would make such action by Russia “very expensive” and that the way to achieve greater NATO cooperation and trust is to understand the various threats facing different members of NATO which may differ. (ibid) In response to questions regarding various priorities states within NATO may have, including different views on

the threat Vladimir Putin can pose, PM Kallas mentioned the Salisbury poisonings in the UK, as well as Russian acts in Germany, (she did not state further but likely refers to Russian state sponsored assassinations conducted in Germany) and the sabotage in the Czech Republic, which notably killed two people. (ibid) PM Kallas in her statements is stating that Russia is a threat to various members of NATO, and they should recognize Russia as such. Lastly, the interview approached the topic of Cyber Warfare, to which Kallas replied that “Everyone should be worried about this [cyber-warfare]” (Ibid) and mentioned the importance of cooperation between allies, as well as the NATO Cybersecurity Centre which is in Tallinn, Estonia. The reoccurring themes of Estonia’s importance placed on allies show vulnerability, as well as vested interest by Estonia in cooperating with more powerful states with common interests. Lastly, as stated by Aday et al for NATO in their 2019 report, NATO’s founding of a Cybersecurity Centre in Tallinn was no coincidence, (Aday et al for NATO 2019, p. 67.) Kallas’s mentioning of its location in Estonia, the home of a major cyber-attack on a NATO member, reaffirms her focus on cooperation, especially in regard to Cyber, and the importance of Cybersecurity for Estonia and other states, as Kallas stated that “Everyone should be worried [about cyber-warfare.]” (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) Furthermore, in the opening remarks to NATO’s 2021 Cyber Pledge, (NATO Cyber Defense Pledge Conference, 2021 on YouTube) PM Kallas said: “We should also continue cooperating with our Eastern Partners, especially Georgia and Ukraine,” and that “Of course, our support to Ukraine today should extend far beyond the cyber domain. Russian military activities threatening Ukraine are of grave concern and we are closely monitoring the situation.” (Ibid.) The language of the Estonian Prime Minister including the repeated use of the word “cooperation” shows that inter-ally cohesion is held to be in Estonia’s national interest. Furthermore, the mentioning of Cyber

threats and defence repeat themes seen since the 2007 Cyber Attacks on Estonia's government. It is notable that Jonatan Vsevirov, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Estonia stated: "It was almost exactly 13 years ago, [in 2007] when Estonia became a target of a relatively significant wave of cyber-attacks. We think that is what made Cyber famous. Since 2007 Estonia started speaking up on Cybersecurity and we started to legitimize cyber as a mainstream security topic... It is now conventional knowledge that cybersecurity requires close international cooperation." (Kaitseministeerium/Estonian Defence Ministry, Cyber Pledge, 2021)

These remarks by Minister Vsevirov display again the themes of Estonian concern over the 2007 Cyber-attacks as well as Estonia's focus on cooperating with allies as echoed by other politicians above. These political discourses have continued in recent events. As stated in a 2022 NATO conference by Estonia's president, "NATO is and will be the foundation of Estonia's defence," and that "We saw it [joining NATO] was the best guarantee for our security." (President of Estonia Alar Karis on NATO News, YouTube, 2022.) Thus, Estonia sees Russia as a threat, (as Russia was mentioned as a threat to security earlier in the previously cited video of Estonia's president) and sees NATO membership as a priority for Estonian security. Furthermore, Estonian's Prime Minister mentioned Russian "military escalation on Ukraine's border" and "emphasised" Estonia's "strong support" of Ukraine "not just in words but in actions". (Ibid) This echoes earlier statements that show Estonia was aware of Russian aggression in Ukraine prior to the events of February 2022.

Chapter 3.6; Energy threats to Estonia and associated discourses on energy-

Another vulnerability of Estonia is its dependence on Russia for energy. As stated by Grigas in her report for Chatham House, *Legacies, Coercion and Soft Power: Russian Influence in the Baltic States*, much of Estonia's energy infrastructure is of Soviet design and is dependent on its links to Russia. (Grigas for Chatham House 2012, pp. 3-4) It is clear this vulnerability is well known in senior political circles in Estonia: A recent statement on December 8th, 2021 by Prime Minister Kallas outlined this in which after discussing matters of security in the Baltic States and Ukraine due to Russian aggression in Ukraine, she elaborated that energy collaboration between the Baltic States is vital to regional security. (Vabariigi Valitsus, PM Kallas Statement, 8th of December, 2021) This goes in tandem with Kallas's statement that "Energy prices are currently high because the European Union does not invest enough in alternative renewable energy sources and relies too much on fossil fuel imports," alongside that EU leaders recently met to find a "solution" "to reduce [energy] dependence on third countries." (Vabariigi Valitsus, PM Kallas statement, 22nd October, 2021) Given that the December 2021 statement on energy and Baltic cooperation started with mentions of the ongoing situation in Ukraine, it is shown that the Baltic States are aware of their vulnerabilities to coercion through energy as well documented by Grigas, (Grigas for Chatham House 2012, p.2 and Grigas 2012) and are attempting to amend these vulnerabilities appropriately.

**Chapter 4:- Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine and implications for Estonia from the lead up-
to the current war in Ukraine due to Russia’s full-scale invasion.**

“Свиснув козак на коня:
"Оставайся здорова!
Як не згину, то вернуся
через три года!"”
English text (From Ukrainian)-
“A cossack called his horse by whistling
[And said,]
"Stay healthy here!
If I am not killed, I'll return,
in three years!"
12

Ukraine, the largest country after Russia in Eastern Europe, shares a border with Russia, Belarus, and Poland, among others, and is currently involved in a state of war with Russia, which has been ongoing since 2014 but was escalated even further by the ongoing full-scale Russian invasion. Ukraine, much like Estonia, has a long history of occupation by Russia in which it endured numerous atrocities including the infamous Holodomor that resulted in the death by starvation of a significant portion of Ukraine’s population. Furthermore, one must keep in mind that Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union and is another example of a post-Soviet republic that has recently moved Westward and suffered consequences from Russia as a result. Russia has engaged in various forms of aggressive action against Ukraine. As stated in a 2016 combined analysis report by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (Henceforth known

¹²(Ukrainian Lyrics from Wikipedia, referring to a famous Ukrainian folk song about a Cossack reassuring his beloved before riding off into battle.”¹² The Ukrainian lyrics are from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ikhav_Kozak_za_Dunaj and the translation into English is provided by my dear friend, Dmytro Kyvan..” I do not capitalize the word “cossack” in English, to keep to both Ukrainian and Russian grammar rules.

as NATO SCCE) at the Estonian National Defence College in Tartu, it is highly likely that Russia tested its 2013 military doctrine in Ukraine. (NATO SCCE 2016, pp. 53-54) The main points as outlined by the NATO Strategic Communications report are that the Russian doctrine is the “key to understand Russian official views on modern war and fighting.” (NATO SCCE 2016 p. 54) Furthermore, this doctrine is summarized by NATO as containing very key aspects regarding the aspects of Russian warfare, many of which manifested themselves in Ukraine. As stated by the NATO report citing Chekhinov and Bogdanov,

“Warfare as understood by Russian military leaders is not ‘... the continuation of politics by other (military) means...’ but an integral part of politics. For Russians modern wars will be fought on all levels of an adversary’s territory—on land, at sea, in the air and in space, as well as in the global information space. The latter being especially important, according to the new Russian doctrine, information superiority is essential for achieving victory on the battlefield in a modern war.” (NATO SCCE, p. 55)

Thus, as stated by the NATO strategic report mentioned above, Russia conducts warfare by incorporating varying aspects of traditional and non-traditional aspects of conflict, and furthermore, uses special forces, local militias, and other unconventional forms of support to achieve operational objectives. (Ibid pp, 54, 56) Although I could not locate an exact 2013 military doctrine available in English, (I note that the Russian doctrine was brought to my attention by the SCCE report) the Russian defence doctrine document mentioned in the NATO strategic communications report bears extreme similarities to and is potentially the same as a 2014 doctrine published in English on the webpage of the Russian Embassy in London. The report mentions doctrine aspects directly quoted in the NATO report such as the features of:

“The establishment of a permanent zone of military operations in the territories of conflicting sides; participation in military operations of irregular military formations and private military companies; use of indirect and asymmetric methods of operations;”¹³ (Russian Embassy in UK, 2015 and NATO SCCE 2016, p.54)

As noted below, this has been argued by the NATO Strategic Communications Report as representing the Russian worldview on the waging of modern warfare. If this is indeed the case, then there are two further lines of interest, especially regarding Russian action in Ukraine. If Russia’s domestic military concerns over “foreign threats” indeed reflect Russia’s views and potential acts on modern warfare, it is worth noting what is in the document reflects more what Russia thinks, even if Russia claims these threats are used against Russia itself by the West.¹⁴

“Activities aimed at changing by force the constitutional system of the Russian Federation; destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country; disrupting the functioning of state administration bodies, important state and military facilities, and information infrastructure of the Russian Federation;” (Russian Embassy in UK, 2015)

It is notable that all the above lines to which the Russians claim to be worried about as a threat to Russia were undertaken by Russia to Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the events prior to it. Recent media reports from January 2022 acknowledged concerns over attempts to launch a coup in Kiev, (BBC News, 2022) alongside cyber-attacks with threats to

¹³ Though this is mentioned as the military risks and threats faced by the Russian Federation, as stated by the NATO SCCE, these aspects even if interpreted by the Russians as a threat to them, represent the Russian view of conflict. For more information, please refer to page 54 of the NATO Strategic Communications Report on Russian Disinformation Activities in Ukraine in the bibliography.

¹⁴ This point if memory is correct was made by Professor Andrew Wilson of UCL in a publication I am unable to locate, but to my memory essentially said what actions Russia accuses the west of conducting says more about Russia than it does the West. However, others have made similar arguments, examples of which can be seen in page 94 of Zdzisław Śliwa, Viljar Veebel, and Maxime Lebrun’s article *Russian Ambitions and Hybrid Modes of Warfare* who stated that as much as Russia calls Hybrid Warfare a threat to Russian security, Russia spends more on offensive rather than defensive military capabilities. (Śliwa,, Veebel, and Lebrun, p. 94) A similar point on how perception of hybrid war threats reflects Russian fears and military goals can be found at https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-introduction/#footnote_5_7492

Ukrainians displayed on webpages of the Ukrainian government. (BBC News, 2022) “Participation in military operations of irregular military formations and private military companies” as well as “asymmetric operations” (Russian Embassy in UK, 2015 and NATO SCCE 2016, p.54) were seen in Ukraine during the seizure by Russian special forces of Crimea, the prominent military aid given to “rebels” in Ukraine’s East, in addition to widespread use of private military contractors such as the Wagner group. What are all the acts mentioned in the above paragraph if not aggression aimed at “changing by the force the constitutional system...” or “Destabilizing domestic political and social situation in the country... [as well as] disrupting the functioning of state administration bodies” and “important state and military facilities, and information infrastructure”? However in this case, Russia is conducting these actions toward Ukraine and is not suffering them personally. Lastly, the creation of a “permanent” front line in Ukraine’s east is notable, as Ukraine has since 2014 had a front line on its own borders or as some would argue *within* its own borders, though with the 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine, these problems have only increased, as numerous Ukrainian cities remain occupied, under attack, or under siege by Russian forces, including as of April 8th, 2022. The question herein lines, what of this is of concern to the Estonian government, and what evidence is there that Estonia is aware of the varied threats Russia can pose to its neighbours?

Chapter 4.1; Estonian Discourses and Policy regarding Security in the face of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine-

Estonia’s government is acutely aware of the danger Russia poses not only to Ukraine, but the tactics it uses in various forms of aggression against its neighbours are also acknowledged to potentially threaten Estonia as well. There are numerous examples in publicly available

Estonian government discourse of concerns that arise due to Russia's actions in Ukraine. While Ukraine or Russia are not always mentioned directly in name, security concerns regarding either country are obviously discussed even if the countries aren't named outright. Documents of interest for the purpose of analysis of Estonian discourse regarding Ukraine, and actions Russia has taken in Ukraine and could take or have taken in Estonia include the Estonian Ministry of Defence's *National Security Concept 2017*, the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service's *International Security and Estonia 2021* report, in which Ukraine is a heavy focus of this report,¹⁵ and various press releases or statements by senior Estonian defence officials.

It is worth noting, that the annual Estonian intelligence reports *International Security and Estonia*, which are publicly available in the English Language, started in 2016, (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 17 February 2021) a mere two years after Russian military aggression in Ukraine.¹⁶

Indeed the 2016 report states directly:

“The idea for preparing a document describing international security environment which surrounds Estonia, and is orientated to the Estonian and foreign public, first occurred as a response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine” (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service 2016, p.5)

This is an outright admission that in the view of Estonia's defence and intelligence officials, Russian aggression in Ukraine and its implications for Estonia are a primary concern of Estonian

¹⁵ Please note, that my idea of accessing Estonian intelligence reports was first brought to my attention by McCrory, Duncan who used Estonian *internal* intelligence reviews as a source in his 2020 article for RUSI, *Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine*. *The RUSI Journal*, 165(7), pp.34–44. I have since expanded my search of Estonian documents greatly and have conducted a large amount of original analysis and have discovered other reports or statements that I have not noticed others using.

¹⁶ The Idea to access older reports was due to my desire to discover further Estonian discourse on Ukraine and to determine the origin of these reports, and in looking for a 2014 Foreign Intel Service report discovered they started in 2016, and later came across lines that outright mentioned such reports were published due to the events in Ukraine.

security and has inspired the publication of public defence reports raising awareness to matters that were formally in reports used to inform a “privileged” few Estonian officials. (ibid.) Furthermore, the document states “Not a day went by in the wake of annexation of Crimea and conflict escalation in eastern Ukraine without Estonian or foreign press asking: ‘Is Narva next?’” (ibid) Thus, the events that occurred in Ukraine caused concern in Estonia. It is worth noting that the city of Narva, in Estonia’s Northeast, is a majority Russian-speaking city, of which there are common fears of annexation by Russian military forces. Russia has often used manufactured oppression of Russian speakers as justification for actions to “defend” them, as was seen in Georgia and Ukraine. Furthermore, many fear, such tactics could be used in Estonia eventually as well, such as noted in the previous chapter when Urmas Paet the former Estonian Foreign minister stated that: “..the future of ethnic Russians in the Republic of Estonia is only a rhetorical excuse for "active measures," (BBC Monitoring, 2007 using text of report by Estonian Newspaper Eesti Paevaleht, 2007) Russian tactics used in Ukraine include the use of disinformation, which was even at times used to demoralize and terrorize members of the Ukrainian military. (NATO SCCE report pp. 104-106) It is worth noting that one of the primary concerns as outlined in numerous Estonian intelligence documents, including the Estonian Internal Security Service 2020-2021 annual review are attempts by Russia to influence Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia, and sow division (7) including through the spreading of disinformation. (Estonian Internal Security Service Annual Review 2020-2021, pp. 5-8, 16 and 2019-2020 Annual Review, pp. 15-16, and 2014 Annual review, p. 6) However it is also worth noting that these same reports stated that Russian efforts (including the use of disinformation, such as Covid-19 virus related disinformation) to divide Russian speaking Estonians from other Estonians were often

unsuccessful, (Estonian Internal Security Service 2020-2021 Annual Review, pp. 5, 2019-2020 review p. 16 and 2014 report p. 7.) The Estonian Internal Security Service itself admits that it learned many lessons from the 2007 combination of cyber-attacks and protests orchestrated by the Russian state. (2019-2020 review p. 16) Furthermore, as stated by the Estonian Internal Security Service in their 2014 review, Russian rhetoric must be taken seriously, (p. 7) as myths surrounding oppression of Russians, including abroad, have been used by the Russian state to justify military interventions in other states. (ibid) Lastly, I would like to note that a prevalent example of Russian disinformation in these reports is the spreading of historical lies regarding the occupation of the Baltic States, including Estonia,¹⁷ which is also a point of contention as outlined above in other Estonian political discourses. The 2014 review also mentions how Russia is challenging history in Ukraine, and the Baltics (pp. 10-11) and that “historical propaganda” is used to “justify” the worst of Russia’s recent actions against Ukraine and other states. (ibid.) The most provocative examples of this include the insinuation by Russia that Ukraine and the Baltic countries were collaborators of Nazi Germany, (ibid and NATO SCCE report 2016, p.83) or that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people.” On these claims, I quote Professor Andrew Wilson of University College London who stated the following in his article for RUSI *Russia and Ukraine, ‘One People’ as Putin Claims?:*

“Nowhere in his writings [regarding Putin’s speech labelling Russians and Ukrainians as “one nation”] does Putin allow for Ukrainian subjectivity – for the possibility that Ukrainians might have their own opinion about who they are” (Wilson, 2021 for Royal United Services Institute/RUSI)

¹⁷ More information on Russian manipulation of history in regards to Estonia and other states can be found in the Estonian Internal Security Service reports of the years 2014, 2019-2020, and 2020-2021.

It is a dangerous road for the Russian state to treat the internal affairs of other states as domestic concerns (Estonian Internal Security Service Review 2014, p. 10 and 2020-2021 review p. 10) as by doing so through highly selective historical analysis, Putin is treating foreign concerns as domestic concerns, for if these foreigners are indeed “Russians” or are the “same people” then they could be treated as such, and the oppression used in Russia on Russian citizens can be applied to foreigners as well for other reasons. Not to mention by labelling the invasion as having a goal to “demilitarize and de-Nazify Ukraine” then any harsh forms of attack can be justified, as to label Ukrainians as Nazis is to justify any action against them, as there is no more hated enemy in Russian history than the Nazis.¹⁸ Such use of history does not only effect Ukraine, but Estonia as well, as noted by the Estonian authorities which brought attention to the claim by the Russian Orthodox Church, that Estonia was an “ancient Russian Orthodox territory” (Estonian Internal Security Service 2020-2021 review, p. 5) Thus, Russia’s inability to recognize the independence of its neighbours sets a dangerous precedent for treating them inhumanely in the event of invasion, and is often used to justify their “special military operations” to begin with, as these territories are in some stretched reality “Russian.”

Chapter 4.2: The effects on Estonian-Ukrainian security cooperation due to events in Ukraine, and Ukraine’s influence on Estonian political/defence discourses and policy-

There has been strong evidence of increased Estonian-Ukrainian military cooperation, especially due to concerns from December 2021, and January 2022 regarding what was then seen as potential further Russian military aggression in Ukraine. Estonia’s defence minister, Kalle

¹⁸ Point also made by unlocated others, but common knowledge/common sense.

Laanet, reaffirmed Estonia's support to Ukraine, and part of this support was US approval for American made anti-tank weapons to be supplied to Ukraine via Estonia. (Estonian Public Broadcasting, 22nd January, 2022) Furthermore, ERR's own analysis made the point that the Estonian Defence minister sees Ukraine as a buffer between Russian aggression and the rest of Europe. (Ibid.) Furthermore, it is noted that Germany initially did not approve Estonia's desire to supply heavy artillery to Ukraine. (ibid.) The article refers to and quotes a full statement which can be found on the website of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, on a page titled "Baltic Defence Ministers issue a joint statement on sending weapons to Ukraine." (Estonian Ministry of Defence 21 January, 2022) ¹⁹ While ERR conducted their own analysis focusing on Estonia's Defence Minister describing Ukraine as a buffer between Russia and the Western Europe (Estonian Public Broadcasting January 22nd, 2022) I would like to point out key points in the wording of this defence ministry statement. To start, the title itself shows that the decision to send weapons to Ukraine was a "joint" venture, showing unity by the Baltic states, all of whom were once victims of Russian occupation, much like Ukraine. Furthermore, this unity in a more aggressive response toward Russia contrasts with the then refusal by Germany to allow Estonia to send heavy artillery to Ukraine which was reported by ERR as well as many other news outlets. Furthermore, to analyse the following statement.

"Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania stand united in our commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity in face of continued Russian aggression... Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and their Allies are working together expeditiously to hand over the security assistance to Ukraine," (Estonian Defence Ministry, 21 January, 2022)

¹⁹ While ERR news did report on this statement by the Estonian Defence Ministry, I was aware of the statement before I discovered the ERR article with its basic analysis.

The above wording reaffirms the emphasis in Estonian political discourse over the importance of cooperation between allies in deterring Russian aggression as discussed extensively in this thesis. Furthermore, Russia alone is blamed for the unrest, and the Russian states' "aggression" alone is mentioned, ignoring an at times popular view that NATO is to blame for Russian aggression in Ukraine, perhaps most famously in Mearsheimer's paper, *Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's fault*,²⁰ which shows the Baltic states, including Estonia, support the right of the people of Ukraine to choose their own fate. Prime Minister Kallas made a firm statement of this in an interview with *The Washington Post*, on February 1st, 2022, in which she stated the following:

"The other thing that we are doing is helping Ukraine in all possible means that we can... We try to do what we can, as we clearly understand what it means to lose your independence, and, for Ukraine, there is a clear threat for that, and we want to help them with military capabilities that we can but also political tools, communication, all the tools that a small country can really give to Ukraine." (Washington Post Live on YouTube, 2022)

The above statement is a clear demonstration by the Estonian Prime PM, that Estonians sympathize with Ukraine due to understanding of history, and the oppression that comes with the loss of independence due to foreign occupation, something both Estonia and Ukraine have endured due to Russia. Furthermore, PM Kallas directly tied the events in Ukraine to security concerns in Estonia, and what Estonia would do if Ukraine were invaded by Russia, replying that "We are thinking of our own defence as well," eventually mentioning the decision to increase

²⁰ For more information, please refer to Mearsheimer, John J. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483306>.

defence spending in Estonia, and that Estonia spends “more than 2.4% our GDP on defence.” It is noteworthy that many NATO members do not meet the expected two percent of GDP spending on defence, yet Estonia is one of the few members that does meet this expectation, showing that Estonia does see a clear threat by Russia, otherwise it would not spend so much money in combatting threats it does not perceive to be there to begin with. An example of this is seen in Germany recently reversing its decision to provide lethal aid to Ukraine due to the Russian invasion of February 2022, and that Germany, a state that was famous for its resistance to taking a tough stance on Russia, is also now spending more than 2% of its GDP on defence. The Russian threat being countered by cooperation is reiterated in the 2017 Estonian National Defence Concept, which reaffirms the desire to work closely with allies (p.11) Furthermore, the 2017 National Defence Concept refers to Russian “aggression” over the past ten years, which would obviously refer to Russian military aggression in Ukraine and Georgia, and the doctrine reiterates the desire for unified NATO policy to deter Russia. (National Defence Concept 2017 p.10) Furthermore, the concept states the following:

“Drawing on its own experience, Estonia will support the integration of states that would like to join NATO and the European Union, and help them to carry out required reforms and develop civil society.” (10)

Thus, once again, even if Ukraine and Georgia are not mentioned by name, it is clear these are the states that wish to join NATO and the EU and have faced opposition from Russia for attempting to do so.

Chapter 4.3: Similarities between Estonian and Ukrainian discourse on the Russian security threat, and further notes on Estonian-Ukrainian Cooperation-

Estonian defence doctrine bears some distinct similarities in language to Ukrainian political discourses. The Estonian national security concept refers to “organized resistance” in a “territory” in which “the state temporarily loses control” (National Defence Concept 2017 p. 3) This is made in reference to an attack by an “overwhelming” (ibid) enemy, which would refer to Russia even if not by name, as clearly, Estonia is not fearing an invasion from Sweden, Finland, or Latvia. Furthermore, one of the most vulnerable parts of Estonia that could easily be meant by a “temporarily” lost territory, could be a city such as Narva, with a large Russian-speaking population, including Russian citizens, which shares a border with Russia, and thus could quickly become occupied by a Russian invasion force. The use of the wording of “temporary” lost territories is no coincidence as it bears strong resemblance to Ukraine’s “Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporary Occupied Territories,” created in 2016 (Ministry for Reintegration homepage, 2022) and a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (MFA UA) titled *Temporary Occupation of Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions*. (2021) Thus, as stated above, the key point is that these territories are “temporarily occupied” implying their eventual and desired return. Furthermore, to reinforce my above link in the similar wording between Estonia and Ukraine, I highlight that the Estonian Foreign Ministry also referred to their statement at the UN General Assembly on “temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020) In addition to these examples, increased cooperation between Estonia and Ukraine is seen in the cyber field, as stated by the Estonian Ministry of Defence in January 2022, though this was also confirmed by PM Kallas during her

interview with *The Washington Post* in February 2022. The Estonian Ministry of Defence stated that they, alongside Estonian Cyber Commands, and NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, "made a joint visit to Ukraine." (Estonian Ministry of Defence, January 2022) They discussed "recent large-scale cyber-attacks against Ukraine" and exchanged defence expertise and strategies. (ibid.) Furthermore, Margus Matt, the Estonian undersecretary for Cyber-Defence stated that "By supporting Ukraine, we are also strengthening our own defence posture." (ibid.) This statement shows that Estonia views Ukrainian security as relevant to Estonian security, and this is reinforced by the point made that Estonia supports "Ukraine's accession" to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). (ibid.) To again quote undersecretary Matt, "Estonia is ready to send cyber specialists to Ukraine to further develop this exchange ["cooperation" on Cyber matters] "(ibid.) Furthermore, the director of the NATO CCDCOE, stated that "Ukraine has unique experience in combating hybrid threats." (Ibid.) This again reiterates that Ukraine while dealing with its ongoing security threats can share its unique experience with other NATO members, which Estonia recognizes. The increased cyber-cooperation was emphasized by PM Kallas who stated: "We are helping Ukraine with all the tools that we can get, and we have very many good connections and expertise that we share with the Ukrainians on every level"²¹ (Washington Post Live on YouTube, 2022) As of the 4th of March, 2022, Estonia and other NATO members voted unanimously for increased cyber cooperation with Ukraine, and to allow Ukraine to join the NATO Cyber Cooperative Defence Centre of Excellence, (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, as a "Contributing

²¹ This was in response to a Washington Post Interviewer Question regarding whether or not Estonia's cyber-specialists were assisting Ukraine.

Participant.” In addition to this, recent events in Ukraine were acknowledged, as Estonia’s minister of defence stated, “Capability and knowledge comes from experience, and Ukraine definitely has valuable experience from previous cyber-attacks to provide significant value to the NATO CCDCOE.” Defence Minister Laanet reiterated that Estonia has long supported Ukrainian membership of this organization. (Estonian Ministry of Defence 4th of March, 2022) Thus, Ukraine and Estonia both share a history of suffering numerous Russian cyber-attacks, and recognize the capabilities one another have. Furthermore, the timing in this admission is soon after Ukraine started the process of EU membership, and by allowing Ukraine to enter a NATO related organization it is a symbolic gesture of solidarity with Ukraine during this ongoing war.

Chapter 4.4; Further effects of the lead up to and the February 24th full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on Estonian political and defence discourses-

Events in Ukraine have been a core focus of the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service 2022 annual review, “International Security and Estonia.” While I outlined that events in Ukraine were a core focus of the Estonian foreign intelligence in previous years, this is clearly still the case as the 2022 document states:

“As of the beginning of 2022, our focus remains on the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine, which has led to the sharpest confrontation with the West in decades and could also lead to Russia exerting pressure elsewhere in the coming months. Although a direct military offensive against Estonia and the other Baltic states is unlikely this year, various types of hybrid crises are probable” (4)

As clearly stated, the *focus* of Estonia’s security services remains on Russian aggression against Ukraine, tying directly current events in Ukraine of the winter period of 2021-2022 to security

concerns in Estonia, and although it is admitted that invasion of Estonia is at present not a major fear, there are concerns regarding the potential use of hybrid tactics against Estonia as well, the page specifically mentions the fear of refugees being used as a weapon, such as was done by Belarus to its European neighbours. (ibid.) Furthermore, the 2022 document states that:

“The escalation taking place on Ukraine’s borders deteriorates the security of Europe as a whole and demonstrates how the threat of military action has become the primary tool in Russia’s foreign policy toolbox. Estonia must prepare for sustained military pressure from Russia” (6)

This shows that not only does Estonia view the events of Ukraine as a regional threat to security, but it also shows that Estonia recognizes the Russian use of its military in conducting aggressive actions abroad, and states outright that Estonia must be prepared to deal with Russian military threats. Furthermore, the document states that Russia feels threatened by “Ukraine’s success in building a national identity” (ibid) which echoes the common theme of states that were once under Russia’s influence (which includes Estonia) building their own independent path which is unliked by Russia. Furthermore, even though the report earlier stated that a direct attack on Estonia is “unlikely” it does acknowledge that “Should Russia achieve its goals in Ukraine, political and military pressure on the Baltic states could increase.” (9) This was echoed by PM Kallas in an interview for the Sunday Times in which she stated “...if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, of course, there's a question of what he does next. Maybe he would want to test the unity of NATO.” (The Sunday Times, 2022)²² These are valid arguments, as Estonia would be among the more vulnerable NATO members for Putin to test. Furthermore, as stated in the 2022 Estonian Foreign

²² A more detailed analysis of this quote is in a later chapter.

Intelligence report, “direct threats of war” are a core component of Russian foreign policy. (10) This is something that must be watched, as for Putin to regularly threaten Western states with nuclear weapons²³ is an example of the Kremlin’s hostile rhetoric, for what can be more intimidating than the threat of the most destructive form of warfare yet known to man?

Chapter 4.5: Sanctions as deterrence to Russian aggression, and a “new containment”-

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service 2022 document outlines the importance of sanctions on deterring Russian aggression, and states, “It is likely the situation with violations of international law by Russia and other countries would be significantly different without sanctions regimes.” (52) Furthermore, it states, “The sanctions have a divisive effect among Russia’s elite and provide a tool for internal power struggles beyond the possibilities of the local instruments used so far” (ibid.) The document states that sanctions target elites who often have financial interests in the West, and this in turn creates problems for the Russian elites who wish to have easy access to travel and investments abroad. (ibid.) These are interesting conclusions by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, as many would assume that sanctions typically have the largest effect on ordinary members of the population, such as when in retaliation foreign embassies and their related services are closed, and the ability to grant visas to Russian citizens, or for ordinary Russians to go abroad, options become limited. However, the focus on sanctions has been echoed in other Estonian communications, such as when the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (EMFA) recently stated that their Secretary General Jonatan Vsevirov, was headed to Brussels to meet NATO and EU officials on the topic of using methods including “economic

²³ For an example of this, please refer to the following video “Putin says Ukraine joining NATO would make nuclear war more likely” available at ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjXwLzll278> (Accessed on 16th February 2022)

sanctions” as a “deterrence” measure against Russia in light of recent actions against Ukraine. (EMFA 2022) One should note that the idea of using sanctions as a counterweight to Russian policies against Ukraine is not only an Estonian position but is also a Ukrainian position. On February 12th 2022, the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry (MFA UA) published a statement on “Measures to counter aggressive actions of the Russian Federation,” and the Ukrainian statement bore similarities to discourses seen in Estonia during the crisis on Ukraine’s border of winter 2021-2022, in which an emphasis was placed on allied cooperation, especially with the United States, and measures such as “tough economic sanctions [on Russia] [and] arms supplies [to Ukraine.]” (MFA UA, 2022) Similar sentiments were echoed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Dmytro Kuleba, in Paris, who also mentioned the necessity of sanctions as a deterrent, stating: “Together, we are pursuing a powerful policy of deterring Russia from a new wave of aggression. It includes active diplomacy, tough sanctions in the event of further escalation, and enhanced defense assistance to Ukraine.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, February 10th, 2022) This displays a common theme of Ukrainian discourse is the desire to have the ability through the aid of allies in arms supplies to defend itself, “Ukraine is fighting and will fight for itself,” (ibid) and the desire for sanctions to act as a deterrent against Russia. Lastly, sanctions were discussed again in a conversation between Kuleba and the Swedish foreign minister in January 2022. (MFA UA) This allied cooperation in deterring Russia through forms of unified punishment echoes those suggested by Kennan in the earlier theoretical chapter. It is worth noting that due to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia has been punished with extraordinary sanctions by most of the world. ²⁴

²⁴ I remind the reader that the bulk of this thesis was written prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

Chapter 4.6: Estonia, Ukraine, and NATO- Looking toward the Euro-Atlantic for security in Ukrainian and Estonian Discourses, and NATO as a force for deterrence and containment of Russian aggression-

As was outlined in chapter three, Estonia's senior political figures regularly praise NATO, and see NATO as a positive influence on not only European, but also Estonian security. Estonia has been a member of NATO since 2004 and has regularly willingly hosted foreign contingents on its soil, and in fact has encouraged NATO to do so. On the 11th of February, 2022 Estonia's Defence Ministry mentioned that Defence Minister Laanet, "welcomed UK's decision to significantly strengthen NATO's deterrence in Estonia" and mentioned that an increase in foreign troops in the Baltic region strengthens Estonia's security. (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2022) This echoes the statement by PM Kallas mentioned in Chapter 1, "We feel strong as we have strong friends," in which she also mentioned that the largest contingent of British troops outside the United Kingdom is located in Estonia. (BBC HARDtalk, 2021) Furthermore, the 2017 Estonian National Security Concept, states that:

"Estonian security is guaranteed by the membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union, as well as close cooperation with allies and other international partners." (3)

This statement clearly displays that Estonia considers its NATO membership as a core component of its security, which is "guaranteed" by NATO membership, and that working with allies is a core component of this, which is obvious, given that Estonia is a small state with a small population. Furthermore, regarding Estonia's primary threat, the National Security Concept states;

“European security is affected by Russia’s increased military activity and aggressive behaviour.”

(4) Thus, the greatest threat to Estonia, as viewed and echoed by all levels of the Estonian political, diplomatic, and security leadership is the Russian Federation. Lastly, the National Defence Concept States that “In order to maintain credible deterrence and defence of the Baltic region, combat-ready units must be stationed in the Alliance’s territory, including Estonia... The allied military presence must be permanent and involve several allied countries.” (2017 National Security Concept, p. 12) This is an outright statement that Estonia desires hosting allied troops on its soil, which shows an invitation by Estonia for NATO allies to be hosted in the country. Furthermore, this shows that this hosting is seen as a form of *deterrence*, and thus protects Estonia outright. Positive views of NATO are not exclusive to Estonia and are found easily in Ukrainian political discourse as well. When interviewed by the BBC, on the 17th of February, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky when asked if Ukraine was willing to “drop its ambitions of joining NATO” replied “The question about NATO, it’s not about membership in NATO, if we are speaking about NATO about EU, if about temporary occupied territories, we just speaking about our independence, that we are deciding what we want, we are deciding what we’ll do...” (BBC News, 2022) Thus, it appears that Zelensky is echoing other statements that the future of Ukraine and its relationships to major international organizations or regarding its lost territories are exclusively a sovereign Ukrainian matter. Furthermore, as reported by the BBC, when asked about NATO Zelensky stated, “[NATO] is not just four letters. For us NATO is a guarantee of security.” (BBC News, February 18th, 2022) However, Zelensky has displayed a willingness to negotiate on the matter of NATO after the full-scale Russian invasion, though this has yet to be finally determined. Furthermore, Deputy PM Stefanishy stated in a meeting with NATO’s

Secretary General that Ukraine “strongly relies on our allies and their unity in assertiveness in protecting security and stability in Europe.” (Deputy PM of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, for NATO News on YouTube 2022) Furthermore, she stated: “The most principled position for Ukraine is that we have inherent sovereign right to choose our own security arrangements including treaties and alliances. The Euro-Atlantic integration is enshrined in our constitution and supported by the majority of Ukrainian citizens. It’s not a subject to a negotiation or bargaining chip. We also expect that NATO would consider all the regional threats, both military and hybrid in its entirety and will demonstrate a strong unity over addressing them in the next NATO summit.” (Ibid) These words by Deputy PM of Euro-Atlantic integration Stefaniushko raise several important points. First off, it is clear from her words that Ukraine’s intention is to join NATO as outlined in Ukraine’s constitution, and widely reported public polls.²⁵ Furthermore, it is clear that at this time, Ukraine was fully aware of the potential escalated Russian military actions due to troop buildups on Ukraine’s border and wished to work with NATO to deter this. Furthermore, given the recent invasion, Ukraine clearly understands the multi-pronged nature of the Russian threat better than most, and wishes NATO to be aware of this and to cooperate on deterring such threats. This is likely because Ukraine is pressured by Russia in all forms from outright military action (such as the current invasion) to cyber-warfare and other so called “grey measures” that constitute aggressive actions against Ukraine. I would like to note that stating that NATO “guarantees security” as Ukrainian officials have, directly echoes official Estonian statements. Furthermore, it is clear that when Russia has directly attacked Ukraine

²⁵ I again note that Ukraine’s rhetoric regarding joining NATO has softened since the invasion, though it is highly unlikely any final policy will be solidified before the time this thesis must be submitted for the defense.

militarily, Estonia is thankful for being a member of the alliance, and when Russia opposed NATO troops being in the Baltic States and held this as a negotiation demand during the diplomatic talks regarding the Ukrainian crisis of 2021-2022, Estonia was firmly opposed to any demands that compromised its security found in partner deployments in the Baltics. When interviewed by *The Financial Times*, PM Kallas stated directly that although being a member of NATO offers Estonia some protection, she added, “But, still, if he [Putin] gets away with Ukraine, they’re just pushing the boundaries even further.” (Mile for *The Financial Times* 18th of February, 2022.) Furthermore, Kallas noted the vulnerabilities Estonia has, saying “What do we do when there’s no electricity? What do we do when there’s no internet? How do these things function? How do we pay out the pensions?” and that Estonia’s “mantra” is to “Prepare for Everything” (*The Financial Times*.) Furthermore, when asked about the Russian threat to Estonia, *The Financial Times* quotes Kallas in stating: “Yes. This is what I sometimes feel around the European Council discussions. For some of those people, it is a theoretical discussion. Whereas for us, it’s an everyday worry, a real worry. I would love to invest all this money that we invest in defence, in education, but being an independent country and the things that we have to do for this, we don’t really have an option.” (*Financial Times*, February 18th, 2022) Thus, to the Estonians, Russia is a very real threat, and it is obvious that events in Ukraine only unnerve Estonia further, for as Kallas herself stated, Russia will see what it can accomplish in Ukraine, then may very well try to do the same, or similar things in Estonia. When it comes to direct threats to Estonia, the February 18th article mentions that Kallas and her cabinet had meetings to discuss confronting potential threats to Estonia, and as *The Financial Times* and many others noted, there is a direct link between Russian military activity on Ukraine’s borders, and increased military preparation in the Baltic

states. Estonian President Karis as quoted by *The Financial Times* stated: “We need to be ready . . . hybrid attacks, cyber attacks: these things can happen,” and furthermore stated the Russian demand for NATO’s borders to return to their 1997 status (which precluded the time in which Estonia among others were in NATO) as “unimaginable.” (Milne for *The Financial Times*, February 12th, 2022) It is worth noting that these above-mentioned threats are and were interpreted as very real by the Estonians, as even before Russia launched its full-scale ground invasion of Ukraine, it harassed Ukraine in other ways. Prior to the invasion these methods Russia used included attacking Ukraine with regular troops in the Eastern regions, using special forces to seize Crimea, and arming and training rebels in the East. Furthermore, Russia launched numerous documented cyberattacks on the Ukrainian political and economic sectors. (Beall William, 2021 p.6 quoting RAND 2017 pp. XII-XIII, [written in RAND doc in roman numerals] Wilson 2016, pp. 644, 648-649, Sutyagin for RUSI, and Bellingcat, August 31st, 2016) Thus when Russia wishes to attack a country, it does so using means that one could argue are relatively discrete. Thus, the Estonians easily view similar scenarios playing out in their area, as Russia does not need to capture Tallinn with ground troops to threaten Estonia’s sovereignty or democracy.

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²⁶ For more on this point, refer to (Stoicescu 2021, and Radin 2017)

Chapter 5; Common Themes between Ukrainian and Estonian Discourse on memory and nation building, independent of Moscow-

It is impossible to understand the willingness of Estonians and Ukrainians to fight and die to defend their land²⁷ and their tenacity in improving defence cooperation with allies and deterring Russian aggression without understanding the distinct and core cultural reasons for doing so. The Estonian and Ukrainian experiences of Russian occupation occupy a large part of memory in both countries. The pain of these memories, which still exist in many Estonians alive today, and are refreshed constantly due to current events in the minds of Ukrainians, are the core motivation for investing so much in defence and strong language used in favour of deterring Russian aggression. We must remember however, the aggression against Ukraine is current, whereas Estonia's memory is historical, and Estonians wish to deter Russia from potentially again occupying Estonian land and oppressing Estonian people. I note that Estonian PM Kallas when interviewed about Russia, stated of her grandparents generation that when the Soviets came "everything was taken from them." (Milne for the *Financial Times*, February 18th, 2022.) While many Russians have different views on the Soviet occupation of both states, Estonian and Ukrainian discourse show another story. While we have examined Estonian discourses earlier, we will examine Ukrainian discourse on Soviet occupation as well. To return to the words of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba in Paris,

"For many decades, Russia's military and non-military methods have succeeded in absorbing Ukrainian territories and depriving the Ukrainian people of their own state. But we have never lost hope that we will have our own state. For more than two and a half centuries, Ukrainians against their will were under the rule of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The only break was the attempt to create a Ukrainian

²⁷ Though for Estonians, this is historical, not current.

state in the early 20th century, after the First World War. But the Bolsheviks, Communists, drowned it in blood, and Ukraine remained part of the USSR for another seventy years.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine, February 10th, 2022)

The above Ukrainian statement shows that Ukraine historically has had a drive for independence that has been stifled repeatedly by the Russian leaders, mentioning not only that Ukrainians “against their will” were ruled by the new capital of Russia, Moscow, but also by the old capital, Saint Petersburg, displaying historic continuation of Russian rule over the Ukrainian people without the consent of Ukrainians. Furthermore, they mention that the Bolsheviks “drowned [Ukraine] in blood” in what is a likely reference to the infamous Holodomor and heavy Russian influence in Ukraine during the 20th century. However, foreign minister Kuleba mentions that Ukrainians have “never lost hope, that they will have their own state” displaying the perseverance of many peoples in Eastern Europe who have been dominated by Moscow but eventually gained their independence, such as Estonia and Ukraine both in the early 1990s.

Chapter 5.1; Russian understanding of Ukrainian history and its implications for Estonia-

However, to turn to the events of late February 2022, we look at Vladimir Putin’s “recognition” of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, (President of Russia, February 21st, 2022) ²⁸ which coincided with a strongly-worded speech by President Putin that accused modern Ukraine of being a Russian invention, and denied wholly as he had done in other speeches the unique history of Ukraine which also existed outside of Russia. (Wilson for RUSI, 2021)²⁹ In Putin’s statement

²⁸ Note, there are at least two publications by the Kremlin on this date, the one cited here, is titled *Signing of Documents recognizing Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics*.

²⁹ For more information on the Uniqueness of Ukraine’s history and problems with Putin’s arguments against Ukrainian sovereignty, please refer to Professor Andrew Wilson of University College London’s 2021 article for RUSI titled *Russia and Ukraine, ‘One People’ as Putin Claims?*

from 21st of February (just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine) he stated: “I would like to emphasise again that Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our own history, culture and spiritual space.” (Address by the President of Russia, 21st of February 2022) Thus Putin is reiterating points he has made before in which he claims that Russians and Ukrainians have common origins, (in which there is some truth) but is also showing that Ukraine in essence is a part of *Russian* culture, which as many have noted denies Ukrainian independence, or to again quote Professor Wilson “Nowhere in his writings does Putin allow for Ukrainian subjectivity – for the possibility that Ukrainians might have their own opinion about who they are.” (Wilson for RUSI 2021) Putin continues:

“So, I will start with the fact that modern Ukraine was entirely created by Russia or, to be more precise, by Bolshevik, Communist Russia. This process started practically right after the 1917 revolution, and Lenin and his associates did it in a way that was extremely harsh on Russia – by separating, severing what is historically Russian land” (Address by the President of Russia, 21st, of February 2022.)

By stating that Ukraine was “created by Russia” it is laying claim to Ukraine, and in essence is turning Ukraine into a Russian affair, and thus a Russian property, for do people and governments not often own what they create? Furthermore, Putin returns to an old concept of irredentism in politics, the old process in which governments say land that currently belongs to others and is currently inhabited by those others, in fact belongs to some old “rightful owner” or “master,” which in this case Putin claims to be Russia. He reinforces this by stating that “Russian land” was “separated” in a way that was “extremely harsh,” and also described these processes as “injustices” and “outright pillage of Russia.” (Address by President of Russia, February 21st, 2022) Lastly, by specifying his view that the communist government in Russia was responsible

for creating Ukraine, Putin readies for his argument that if Ukrainians want to rid themselves of communist practices, he will rid the communist practices that he believed created Ukraine in the first place. I quote:

“And today the “grateful progeny” has overturned monuments to Lenin in Ukraine. They call it decommunization. You want decommunization? Very well, this suits us just fine. But why stop halfway? We are ready to show what real decommunizations would mean for Ukraine. (ibid)

Thus, in essence, Putin is stating that the creation of Ukraine was a communist process, which he also mentions was a decision made without consulting the “millions” he says lived in the “Russian” land that was robbed to create a Ukraine. (ibid) Thus, he is stating that if Ukrainians wish to undo communist processes, then he will do even more, in a clear threat that he will undo what he implies is the territorial creation of Ukraine which he views as unjust. Putin then continued to accuse Ukraine of “far-right nationalism” and “neo-Nazism” which was reinforced by “external forces” blaming specifically “NGO’s” and “special services.” One should note that this has been well documented as a common Russian tactic to accuse its adversaries of neo-Nazism which includes accusations directed toward Ukraine and the Baltics, particularly Estonia. (NATO SCCE report 2016, pp. 4, 49, and Estonian Internal Security Service, 2010 annual review pp. 10-13) This strong Russian interest in Ukrainian and Estonian internal affairs is reminiscent of what the NATO SCCE noted with their report on Russian disinformation in Ukraine, in which they stated Russia’s government embraces the concept of a “Russian World” which “reaches beyond the borders of Russia” and thus Russia uses the idea that Russian interests lie beyond the Russian Federation, and thus are Russia’s business whether or not foreign states such as Estonia and Ukraine are against this interference in their own territories. (NATO SCCE report pp. 17-18) Lastly,

Russia is often documented as assuming all former Soviet states who turn Westward only do so at the manipulation of or pressure of Western intelligence services.

Chapter 5.2; Estonian and Ukrainian fears in response to such Russian rhetoric-

Given the similarities between rhetoric used by Russia toward both Ukraine and Estonia, including accusations of Nazism, it is no surprise that Estonians and Ukrainians both consider Russia to be their greatest security threat. When Russia accused a far-right group of extremists aided by foreign “special services” of overthrowing the former Ukrainian government that was pro-Russian, and constantly expresses concerns for manufactured human rights abuses against Russian speakers, such rhetoric may be used to justify actions against Estonia whether or not they fully constitute invasion. I note “Stories of crucified children and women who have been raped and killed were created and replicated in order to discredit the Ukrainian army personnel and volunteers.” (NATO SCCE Report 2016, p. 108) If Russia organized “resistance” among a minority of Russian speakers by arming sympathetic citizens in Narva, gave them orders and support to target infrastructure in the city, then made a propaganda campaign after Estonian security forces understandably respond, displaying “abuse of force” by Estonian security forces, made public complaints, and then decided to move troops into Narva to “protect” Russian citizens, this would not be anything that was not completed in the Ukraine playbook.³⁰ However, the problem herein lies that Estonia is a member of NATO, and this would likely trigger NATO’s article five, though this of course depends on NATO members agreeing to respond militarily.

³⁰ While I would argue this entire scenario is not only common knowledge, but common sense, I would like to reiterate that I have read reports I could not locate again regarding Russian criticism of Estonian “heavy handed” policing tactics against the Russian minority, potentially being used to provoke a Russian response. Nevertheless, I reiterate that this is an example of something anyone with basic security understanding in the Baltics would be able to predict. I add this note to err on the side of being overly cautious for citations.

Regardless, this type of situation is one that has been feared by Estonian security forces.

Furthermore, as stated in Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service 2022 document

“One of the national security indicators used by Russia is the extent of institutional control over its neighbouring countries. For the neighbours, this inevitably implies relinquishing some of their sovereignty, especially in foreign and security policy.”
(26)

Russian attempts to control or influence Estonian actions has been famously documented in various events, such as the 2007 crisis over the Bronze Soldier State in Tallinn. This is also an example of Estonian-Russian battles over history. In regard to the 2007 relocation of the statue of a Soviet soldier in Tallinn, Professor Pääbo of the University of Tartu stated in part, that this relocation decision was undertaken by Estonians due to the fact that

“The aim of the Estonian government was to demonstrate that Estonia is a sovereign nation and that no other country, particularly Russia as the former occupant nation, should prescribe the policies for Estonia.” (Pääbo 2008, p. 21)

Thus, for a small, formerly occupied nation such as Estonia, asserting independence is of extreme importance, which can conflict with Russia's desire to have influence over its neighbours, as discussed in the Estonian intelligence report above, no matter how unwelcome this attempted influence may be. Furthermore, as Professor Pääbo pointed out in his 2008 Baltic Security and Defence Review article, Russian and Estonian perspectives on history differ as well. I quote: “The Estonian government's policy towards the Memorial of Tallinn Liberation (“The Bronze Soldier”) was perceived as a denial [in the eyes of Russians] of the sacrifice of the Russian people and an equalization of the Soviet regime with the Nazi one, almost as criminal as the latter regime itself.”

(12.) Furthermore, much of Russian pride in recent times has depended on its narrative of being a victor of the Second World War. (Ibid p. 19, Pääbo citing Pavlovskiy 2008) In addition to this, the Second World War is viewed by Russian speakers as a fight for survival, not for communist leaders or ideology, and in their minds, Estonians should be grateful for their “liberation” by the Soviets. (Ibid, p. 11) Thus, the varying perspectives of history between Ukrainians, Estonians, and Russians do matter, as has been well documented, and the Russian perspective is vital for understanding the greater picture.

Chapter 6: The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and its implications for Estonia-

In the start of this chapter, I wish to quote Ukrainian president Zelensky, who has displayed great courage to remain in a city under siege, in his appeal to Russian citizens, in Russian, prior to the Russian invasion. In the opinion of this author, this speech will be remembered as one of the greatest political speeches of the 21st century.

“They tell you that we’re Nazis. But how can a people that lost 8 million lives to defeat the Nazis support Nazism? How can I be a Nazi? Say it to my grandfather, who fought in World War II as a Soviet infantryman and died a colonel in an independent Ukraine. They tell you that we hate Russian culture. How can one hate a culture? Any culture? Neighbors always enrich each other’s cultures. However, we are not part of one whole. You cannot swallow us up. We are different. But this difference is not a reason for enmity. We want to determine our own course and build our own history: peacefully, calmly, and honestly.

They told you that I would order an attack on Donbass, order indiscriminate shootings and bombings. This leads to some questions, some very simple ones. Who are we shooting at? What are we bombing? Donetsk, which I have visited dozens of times? Where I looked in people’s faces, in their eyes? Artyoma Street, where I strolled with friends? The Donbass Arena, where I rooted for our boys together with Ukrainian lads at the European Championships? Shcherbakov Park, where I drank with friends when our boys lost? Luhansk, where the mother of my best friend is buried? Where his father also rests? Take note that I am speaking to you all in Russian now, but no one in Russia knows the meaning of these places, these streets, these names, these events. These are all alien to you, unfamiliar.

This is our land, and this is our history. What will you fight for and with whom?”
(Zelensky, Volodymyr, 2022, translated by Foreign Policy editors)³¹

President Zelensky’s speech above raises key points that are relevant for most if not all post-Soviet independent nations. Not only does he speak in fluent Russian as many post-Soviet citizens of his generation can, as it was a language forced on locals by an occupying foreign

³¹ I understand as the author that this is easily the longest quote in this Master’s thesis. However after multiple reviews of this speech I could not justify cutting more than what was cut.

power,³² but he systematically retorts to every Russian propaganda point about the war in Ukraine. First, Zelensky, a Jew, himself the descendant of Holocaust survivors points out that the accusation he may be a fascist sympathizer is absurd, and his own family fought to defend Ukraine from fascism. Second, he relates to the common history many Ukrainians and Russians both share, which is fighting the Nazis in the Second World War. Furthermore, the common accusation by Russia, that Ukraine oppresses its Russian-speaking East, is approached by Zelensky in which he personally displays his own connections to the Donbass region, in which he has strong personal memories and connections of friendship, and memories of time spent in this region. Furthermore, he notes, that although he speaks in Russian, these places are alien to most Russians, who have never been there, and that this is Ukraine's land, and in asking the Russians why they would fight Ukraine, and for what, he poses the question of "What is this violence worth?" The Russian invasion of Ukraine has seen well documented shelling of civilian areas, war crimes committed by Russian forces including the bombing of civilians including women and children, rape, execution of civilians, and brutal fighting Europe has not seen since the Second World War. Ukrainians currently fight furiously to defend their homeland, and most governments around the world, have condemned the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty by the armed forces of the Russian Federation. Among the states to quickly condemn Russia and point out the security implications for Europe (and in the opinion of this author, the world,) is Estonia, another neighbour of Russia who suffered under Russian occupation in its past. PM Kallas while in Brussels stated regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine: "We woke up to a completely

³² The author does note that Zelensky is a native Russian speaker, though the point of Russian as an imperial language in the region remains.

different world yesterday. The rules-based world order has been called into question by the Kremlin and we must oppose it by all means,” (PM Kallas/Vabariigi Valitsus February 25th, 2022) This shows that Estonia considers a previous norm established by the international society as having been attacked by the Kremlin, and that it must be opposed in every possible way. If one breaks rules that are commonly accepted, then this must be worthy of punishment. Furthermore, she stated:

“Estonia and the European Union unequivocally and completely condemn the attack on Ukraine, and therefore we will punish the aggressor with severe sanctions. We stand and act in unison: the imposing of sanctions to companies, politicians, and their relatives is intended to punish, discourage new attacks, and weaken attackers,” (Ibid.)

It is especially noteworthy that PM Kallas states that such measures are intended to “discourage new attacks,” as new attacks on sovereign states could include the Baltics which is why NATO has reportedly moved troops to the Baltics, (Reuters) and will likely only increase doing so since events in Ukraine. As previously stated, Estonia is arguably the member of NATO that is most directly threatened by Russia. Furthermore, the *Financial Times* reports the Baltics are requesting a greater NATO presence. (*The Financial Times*, February 24th, 2022) While the President of Estonia stated there was “No immediate threat” to Estonia from events in Ukraine, (though I expect greater discourse regarding the potential threats Russia poses to Estonia as events in Ukraine unfold further.) Estonia’s President stated that Estonia “must be prepared for cyberattacks, as well as to receive refugees.” (President of Estonia, 24th February, 2022) Thus, it is clear that Estonia does at least right now view at least some threat from Russia, in the form of cyber-attacks, and is fully aware of the refugee crisis from the war in Ukraine that is likely to

affect Estonia as well. I would like to note that these statements were reiterated on the 27th and 26th of February 2022 by Foreign Minister Liimets of Estonia.

“What is happening in Ukraine immediately affects many people in Estonia, their families and friends. This was evident yesterday at the largest peaceful demonstration in Estonia since the restoration of independence.” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27th February, 2022.)

The above statement by Foreign Minister clearly displays that not only is the direct link between the events in Ukraine and Estonia public perception, but also reality, especially as the full statement also mentioned that Estonia continues to “support” Ukraine with both “humanitarian” and military lethal aid. (ibid.) Furthermore, on the 26th of February, Liimets stated “Many are trying to leave Ukraine and flee to the west, and it is the duty of us all to support Poland and other border countries deal with the refugees.” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) This reiterates the above points that Estonia is aware of the ongoing refugee crisis, and will respond accordingly, and that current events in Ukraine have a direct affect on Estonia.

Chapter 6.1: Further notes on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and their influence on Estonian Security Policy and Discourses-

Prime Minister Kallas of Estonia recently welcomed NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg to Estonia, and alongside labelling Russia as a “Pariah State” the following was said:

“Prime Minister Kallas stressed that living alongside a pariah state also demands rapid changes to Estonia’s own defence and that NATO adapt quickly to the reality of the new situation. “The United Kingdom, France, the United States and Denmark have taken significant steps to increase their presence here in Estonia,” she said. “However, even weightier decisions need to be made to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank so as to permanently boost the alliance’s presence.”

(Republic of Estonia Government, March 1st, 2022. interpreting and quoting words of PM Kallas)

This again shows not only that Estonia's firm commitment to NATO, and desire to have a *permanent*, NATO presence as part of Estonia's defence, but that events in Ukraine have directly affected the moves Estonia makes in terms of Defence. When bombs fall on countries that border Russia consistently over the past decade, it is easily understood why modern, successful states such as Estonia who historically were a victim of Russia are concerned that they could soon face a repeat of the past. Or as stated in Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service 2016 report "Not a day went by in the wake of annexation of Crimea and conflict escalation in eastern Ukraine without Estonian or foreign press asking: 'Is Narva next?'" (p. 5) Furthermore, by labelling Russia as a "Pariah State" and requesting that "Our aim is for there to be a permanent and more sizeable NATO military presence in our country," PM Kallas is displaying that Estonia believes at this point, it has a great amount to lose, and must act accordingly. Russia has already threatened various states, stating that those who interfere "will face consequences they have never seen" (PBS News, 2022) Thus, by not only actively encouraging the type of behaviour that Russia has threatened to respond to, but also using rhetoric some could interpret as offensive to Russia, Estonia is showing that it believes its defence is best guarded by NATO, and is not afraid to escalate its use of language, or encourage further NATO presence within its borders, something Russia has stated is against its desires before. These are the actions of a state that do perceive threats and see their allies as their best defence. Lastly, Estonia is showing its desire for international cooperation in its recent joint condemnation with multiple Baltic Sea states of

Russian actions in Ukraine at the Council of the Baltic Sea States, in which in a joint statement it was said that:

“These fundamental principles and aims [outlined in a prior mentioned number of treaties that emphasize the protection of peace and democracy] have now been dramatically violated by the unprovoked and illegal military attack and aggression committed by the Russian Federation against sovereign and democratic Ukraine.”
(Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4th of March, 2022)

This discourse explains that Estonia, (among other states) views certain norms as being acceptable forms of behaviour in the international system, and Russia has clearly violated these, in an *unprovoked* and *aggressive* attack against a sovereign and democratic country. And by condemning Russia’s actions with multiple allied states, Estonia adds more credence to its statement as when many states condemn something together, it displays unity in opinion, and more importantly, in condemnation. Furthermore, regarding giving ground to Putin, PM Kallas stated that “The appetite grows while eating, and he [Putin] will definitely take more bites.” (Channel 4 interview with PM Kallas 28 February 2022) Thus, Kallas is heavily implying that Estonia could be next on Russia’s list, as she had already done. As I quote from an earlier chapter: “But, still, if he [Putin] gets away with Ukraine, they’re just pushing the boundaries even further.” (Milne for *The Financial Times* 18th February, 2022.) Thus, Kallas is acutely aware that if Putin accomplishes his goals in Ukraine, he may even approach NATO states in the future, and which states are better to test aggression on than the smaller, possibly “weaker” states such as Estonia? This is reinforced by the statement of Kallas during an interview with The Sunday Times in which she said “...if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, of course, there's a question of what he does next.

Maybe he would want to test the unity of Nato.” (The Sunday Times, 2022)³³ Thus Estonia cautiously eyes events in Ukraine, due to the concern that if Putin succeeds in accomplishing his goals in Ukraine, Estonia is at the top of the list of his next targets. Furthermore, as a smaller state, Estonia can get away with using harsher rhetoric than others, and perhaps can afford to be less diplomatic than say Germany or the United States, as Estonia would be perceived as less of a direct threat to Russia, even if Russia has hostile intentions toward Estonia. It is easier to ignore the harsher discourses of one you perceive as weaker than it is to avoid the words of someone you view as an actual threat. Furthermore, as outlined previously, due to experience, Estonia has living citizens with memories of the brutal Russian/Soviet occupation, and countries such as France have not been occupied by Russian troops since the Napoleonic Wars, and thus Estonia can recommend an agenda that other states in NATO cannot. This is due to Estonia’s greater understanding of the threat Russia can pose. As stated by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service 2022 report, Russia feels threatened by democracy and will respond to its neighbours who have more democratic leanings. I quote:

“Russia is more and more willing to test the principled resolve and unity of Western democracies, as democratic values represent both an enemy and a threat to the Russian leadership. Russia itself tends to suffer from a deficit of these values – the rule of law, human rights, fair elections, free media. The fears of the Russian leadership are justified, as these principles can become contagious if left unchecked among the population. The reason is simple enough: unlike an actual virus, they tend to enhance citizens’ quality of life and dignity significantly and are therefore attractive to people.” (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service p. 25)

³³ I note that the title of the article itself which is itself the quote listed by PM Kallas in a way, could be argued to be “analysis” though the article itself does not actually analyse the idea of Putin attacking Estonia next, but instead discusses ethnic relations in Estonia and the history of Estonian occupation by Russia.

Furthermore, as stated by the same report, neighbouring democracies which are less corrupt, are harder for Russia to manipulate or control, and thus counterbalance Russia's geopolitical desires in Eurasia. (Ibid, pp. 26, 28, and 30) Furthermore, as implied in the above Estonian Intelligence Service quote, democratic values are contagious to the Russian population and thus are a direct threat to authoritarian leaders and their inner circle.³⁴ Furthermore, a democratic Ukraine free of Russian influence is seen by Russia as a problem to be solved. (Ibid, pp. 26, 29) The above quotes shed more light on Russian motives, which may at times appear unclear.

Chapter 6.2: Estonian Defence Policy and Political debates in the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine and a "New Containment" –

A 2019 Economist Article titled 'The enemy within' discussed in interviewing a former Lithuanian intelligence official, that the Baltic states were "scrambling" to locate and fix security "weaknesses" as well as deal with individuals who may potentially act as a Russian fifth column. (The Economist.) These concerns remain and are reinforced by recent events in Ukraine, as the Estonian parliament "In connection with the Russian-Belarusian military attack on Ukraine" decided to ban all who live in the "territory of Estonia," as well as Estonian citizens, including "Estonian citizens abroad," from "joining" or "assisting" the Russian or Belarussian armed forces. (Government of Estonia, March 3rd, 2022.) The wording of this legislation shows that there is a direct cause and effect between events in Ukraine, and this new legislation by Estonia's government. Furthermore, Estonia's government stated:

"The purpose of the government sanction imposed by the regulation is to protect Estonian security and to support international security and the restoration of

³⁴ This same point was made elsewhere, including in possibly another Estonian report I could not locate. Nevertheless, I would argue that this point is clear in the paragraph quoted in the 2022 report.

peace by preventing the recruitment of new people to the aggressors of the conflict or providing them with any form of assistance.” (ibid.)

By not only stating that the intent of the law is to “support the restoration of peace” and prevent “the recruitment of new people to the aggressors of the conflict,” but also to “protect Estonian security,” the Estonian government makes several key points. These are that not only by preventing people from joining or assisting these militaries, does this help deescalate the conflict, but also that Belarus and Russia directly, are the *aggressors* of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Lastly, this legislation is aimed primarily at ensuring *Estonian* security, and thus is addressing the potential of a fifth column of some citizens or residents of Estonia who may be motivated to serve or assist the Russian or Belarussian militaries and could potentially engage in the so called “Narva scenarios” discussed above. Thus, Estonia is responding directly to events in Ukraine, and is taking further precautions due to the ongoing war there to legislate and ensure Estonian security. Furthermore, I note that recent Estonian political discussions have taken place in which proposals were discussed to either heavily regulate or even ban May 9th parades, (parades commemorating the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, which are extraordinarily important to Russians, and their narratives of history) and to ban Russian citizens in Estonia from obtaining firearms. (ERR News, Estonian Public Broadcasting, 27th of March 2022, and 19th of March 2022.) This is further evidence of increased fears of “Narva Scenarios” and as ERR stated, recent events in Ukraine shaped these political debates directly. (Ibid.) Lastly, all the Baltic states have expelled Russian diplomats and closed Russian diplomatic missions, and in the case of Estonia, Russian consular services were suspended in Tartu and Narva, showing increased pressure on Russia. (ERR News, 5th of April, 2022.) The examples of debates over firearm permits for Russian citizens in Estonia,

May 9th parades and the expulsion of Russian diplomats show an increased desire for a new containment on Russia. This is reinforced even more by the banning of Estonian residents or citizens from assisting the armed forces of Russia or Belarus, showing the desire to keep Russian hostile measures outside of Estonia, using direct lessons from events in Ukraine. However, the difference between this new containment, and the cold-war containment, is back then there were not tens of thousands of Russian citizens, or those who are potentially sympathetic to Russia forming sizeable political blocks in free states, the leftover residents of a Russian colonial past.³⁵

³⁵ The author is not trying to claim that all of those who are Russian-speaking in the Baltics or those of Russian descent in the Baltic states are Putin supporters and would condemn any attribution of collective guilt toward any group, the dangers of which Viktor Frankl warned us of all to well.

Conclusion-

With the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022, the free world once again realised it was under threat. Russia has engaged in numerous aggressive actions against Ukraine, and this has shaped Estonian discourses and policy greatly. Due to this Russian aggression in Ukraine, both Estonia and Ukraine are acutely aware of the threat that the Kremlin poses, and their discourse reflects this. Furthermore, Estonian and Ukrainian discourses reflect irreconcilable differences between their own and Russian understanding of history. I reiterate that the research puzzle asked: “Why is Estonia, a small, and on its own, a militarily weak country, willing to use harsher discourse toward its larger neighbour, Russia, and encourage its allies to contain Russia through deterrence? Why is Estonia more keen to point out the perceived threat posed to European security by the Russian Federation, especially as it shares a border with Russia and has a history of being occupied by Russia? I will explore my findings below. The objective of this thesis was to understand how events in Ukraine have affected Estonian political discourse and eventually policy. Exploring the theoretical framework of Kennan’s containment theory from his 1947 essay has shown striking similarities between the nature of the Russian political system today and in the past, and the strategy to contain the threat Russia poses through several methods, including allied cooperation between free states, and pushing back, are echoed in Estonian politics today. Russian aggression toward Ukraine both ranged from cyber-warfare to all out invasion, and Estonians historically, if not undergoing aggression now, are aware of the threat that large foreign powers can pose, in a way many Western European states are not. As was discovered in this thesis, events in Ukraine have had direct impact on security and political

discourse in Estonia, though the author was admittedly surprised by how direct Estonia often was regarding their view of the Russian security threat, reiterating that Estonia, especially in light of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sees that it has much to lose, like PM Kallas said when stating her grandmother's generation had "everything taken from them", (Milne for *The Financial Times*, February 18th, 2022.) and many in Estonia view themselves as the next target. In addition to this, high-level members of the Estonian government have acknowledged the threat Russia can pose, have monitored events in Ukraine, and have not only displayed in discourse the clear connections they see between Russian aggression in Ukraine, and potential situations that could emerge in Estonia, but also created policy to deter potential aggression. This has been shown in legislation conducted by the Estonian state due to recent events in Ukraine as written above, or even as outlined in national defence policy documents. Furthermore, Ukraine has fiercely resisted the Russian invasion, by some accounts even capturing, killing, or wounding tens of thousands of Russian troops, and has destroyed countless air, land, and sea-based military vehicles. Furthermore, Ukraine has shown a willingness to adapt on the information warfare front, with its campaign to post collections of photos of captured and killed Russians to encourage Russian citizens to oppose the war.

By not only resisting various forms of Russian interference in their countries, but also adjusting and adapting policy to deal with potential future threats, Estonians and Ukrainians both are showing that they value their independence, as states that have been occupied at various times by Russia, but have fought for and won their independence, and more than once. While as of April 17th, 2022, the future in Ukraine appears to be uncertain, there is no doubt the war in Ukraine will continue to impact Estonian policy to come, and this has been shown not only by

increased Estonian and Ukrainian military cooperation, and arms shipments from Estonia to Ukraine, but also in Estonia's continued support for Ukrainian integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. As Kallas stated, successful reform by Ukraine is the "best response" to Russian aggression. (Republic of Estonia Government, 17th of May 2021) Thus, in the future, a rebuilt, democratic, successful, economically strong, and secure Ukraine, would serve as a model to its neighbour Russia. And perhaps as a standard bearer as a modern, Slavic, successful European state, integrated in the North-Atlantic community of democracies, and yet still with its own unique people and values who should be protected. The author would like to conclude this master's thesis with a quote by Ronald Reagan, which provides a lesson that the Estonians and Ukrainians both know all too well: "Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. It has to be fought for and defended by each generation." (President Ronald Reagan. July 6th, 1987.) By standing for the freedom of those in Estonia and Ukraine, and by recognizing that freedom must be protected at all costs, the Western, democratic, world shows that it remains relevant, and its heroes of the past such as Churchill, Eisenhower, and others still exist today. If the West cannot defend its own neighbours, then it will not be able to oppose more powerful future adversaries, and if it cannot defend freedom, than the ideals it claims to hold to be self-evident³⁶ are worthless, as no undefended ideal can be considered precious.

³⁶ US, 1776

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Appendix A-

Chart used in Gvineria's lecture that inspired Graph 1

