

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU

Faculty of Social Sciences

Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Jan Terentjev

**GREEN DEAL, CLEAN BREAK:
ASSESSING SECURITIZATION OF CLEAN ENERGY TRANSITION IN EUROPE IN
THE PROCESS OF ENERGY DECOUPLING FROM RUSSIA**

Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Prof Andrey Makarychev, PhD

Tartu 2024

Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Word count of the thesis: 22356.

Jan Terentjev, 20.05.2024.

Abstract

The weaponisation of energy by Russia before and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has underscored the vulnerability of Europe's dependence on imported fossil fuels. This has catalysed a growing demand for a transition towards green energy, characterised by local sustainable energy productive and reduced vulnerability to energy market manipulation by external actors. Central to this transition is the European Green Deal, a comprehensive set of policy measures aimed at enabling the European Union to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This thesis investigated the impact of Russia's energy weaponisation and the war in Ukraine on the EU's policy regarding the transition to clean and renewable energy sources, employing a conceptual framework of securitization using discourse analysis as the analytical framework. The primary objective was to assess whether the weaponisation of energy by Russia following the invasion of Ukraine has elevated the transition to clean energy from a climate sustainability issue to a security imperative for the European Union. Through a comprehensive analysis of European Commission's policy proposals, this paper determined that the European Commission has successfully securitised the issue by framing Russian weaponisation of energy supply as an existential threat to be resolved with extraordinary measures aimed at expansion of clean energy transition initiatives in the EU. The continued securitisation of the European Green Deal may thus be crucial to ensuring the success of the clean energy transition in the European Union.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
1. LITERATURE REVIEW	8
1.1. Energy security.....	8
1.2. European policymaking.....	10
1.3. Green transition.....	13
2. SECURITIZATION THEORY	15
2.1. Copenhagen School.....	17
2.2. Securitising actors	19
2.3. Collective securitization.....	22
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA.....	24
3.1. Research design.....	24
3.2. Data collection.....	28
3.3. Analytical framework.....	33
3.4. Limitations	35
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS	37
4.1. Proposals prior to the invasion of Ukraine.....	37
4.1.1. Securitisation of climate change.....	37
4.1.2. Securitisation of the Covid-19 pandemic	39
4.2. Proposals following the invasion of Ukraine.	41
4.2.1. Securitisation of climate change.....	41
4.2.2. Securitisation of Russian state aggression.....	42
4.3. Data evaluation.....	48
4.3.1. Degree of securitization	50
4.3.2. Categories of securitization.....	52
4.3.3. Proportionality and extraordinariness	53
4.3.4. Audience acceptance.....	55
4.4. Discussion	58
4.4.1. Effect of the war on contextualisation of energy security	58
4.4.2. Securitisation of the European Green Deal.....	59
4.4.3. Energy weaponisation and de-securitization.....	61
CONCLUSION	64
BIBLIOGRAPHY	67
DOCUMENTS USED.....	70
APPENDICES	73

INTRODUCTION

Energy weaponisation by Russia immediately preceding and following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the critical weakness of Europe's reliance on imported fossil fuels, while further incentivising a green energy transition to localised renewable energy sources. Key to this green energy transition is the European Green Deal – a package of policy initiatives aiming to allow the European Union to reach climate neutrality by 2050, through a transition to sustainable energy sources (Consilium Europa, 2023). However, the European Green Deal has initially largely been presented through its ecological dimension, emphasising its well-warranted importance for combatting global climate change. Energy security aspects on the other hand were often seen as either tangential or even at odds with sustainability aspects of the program, with the European Green Deal perceived as a matter of environmental sustainability rather than security of energy supply. The war in Ukraine produced a new paradigm, and new research demonstrates that prioritisation of energy security over sustainability or climate policy has been supplanted by coherence of goals between the two (Giuli & Oberthür, 2023).

The topic of this research is thus the impact of Russia's weaponisation of energy and Russia's war against Ukraine on European Union's policy regarding the transition to clean energy and renewable energy sources, examined through the conceptual framework of securitization.

The relevance of this research is underscored by the shifting public attitudes towards renewable energy and the political dynamics within the European Union. As the 2024 European Parliament elections approach, there is a palpable increase in sentiment opposing clean energy transition initiatives, further boosted by rising concerns over cost of living and energy insecurity. This growing scepticism poses a significant threat to the European Green Deal's objectives and to the European Union's consistent lack of sustainable local energy resources to fulfil growing energy demand, making the matter of the transition to renewable sustainable energy sources a matter of economic survival for the European Union under the conditions of chronic energy insecurity.

The survival of the European Green Deal thus hinges on its ability to adapt to changing attitudes and geopolitical realities. By investigating whether securitization strategies can effectively bolster public and political support for renewable energy adoption, this paper aims to contribute to the formulation of robust policies that can withstand both internal dissent and external threats.

The objective of this paper is to provide a detailed analysis of how energy weaponisation by the Russian Federation has redefined the discourse on energy security and influenced the EU's clean energy policies. By doing so, it aims to highlight the critical importance of securitization in driving the demand for renewable energy adoption, thereby ensuring the continuity and success of the European Green Deal in the long term.

While some existing research on the securitization of Europe's green transition already exists (e.g. Giuli & Oberthür, 2023), the majority of it predates the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the radical shift that followed, with the European Union taking a decisive course for decoupling from its reliance on Russian energy supply. This "clean break" in itself is an unprecedented shift in European Union's energy policy and encapsulates the emergence of a common energy security policy – a response which has not emerged in the previous crises relating to Russia in 2008 and 2014 (Adomeit, 2016). While the vulnerabilities addressed by decoupling from Russian energy supplies have been present in Europe's energy architecture for decades, up until the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine these issues have been largely consigned to the field of governance rather than security. But the events of the war and the connected energy crisis have pushed the economic matter of energy transition into the field of security politics and deserve investigation.

The objective of this thesis is to examine whether Russian energy weaponisation in the wake of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in clean energy transition becoming a security matter for the European Union, as opposed to a matter of sustainability and climate action.

RQ: How has the discourse on energy security been affected by Russia's energy weaponisation in the context of the European Green Deal and clean energy transition?

Hypothesis: Weaponization of conventional energy sources by Russia triggers greater securitization of renewable energy sources by the European Union.

This thesis consists of four main chapters. The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework for examining the securitisation of the European Green Deal and its effects on energy security under European policymaking processes. The second chapter will examine the theory of securitisation, which will be applied for the discourse analysis in the empirical analysis section of this thesis, focusing on the influence of the Copenhagen School framework of securitisation, as well as the collective securitisation theory framework which will be utilised in the empirical analysis. The third chapter details the research methodology, the principles for evaluating the degree of securitisation throughout the discourse analysis, detailing data collection methods for assembling a corpus of policy proposal documents and describing the limitations of this methodological approach. Finally the fourth chapter consists of the empirical analysis, divided into three parts: discourse analysis of documents presented prior to the invasion of Ukraine, discourses analysis following the invasion of Ukraine, data evaluation of the empirical data assembled using the discourse analyses, and finally a discussion of how this evaluated data can be applied to answer the main research question of the paper, utilising the principles for assessing the extent and success of securitisation in the studied policy proposals. The thesis will then present its conclusions, contributions, and recommendations for future research.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

In the theoretical section, this research paper examines three primary interconnected themes: energy security, European policymaking, and the green transition, in order to provide a background on the concepts utilised in this paper.

1.1. Energy security

One of the primary concepts utilised in this research is “energy security”, commonly defined as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price (International Energy Agency, 2023). In the course of this research, I examine the discourse surrounding the concept of energy security in European Union’s policy proposals vis-à-vis the European Green Deal before and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and assess the degree and manner of the European Green Deal’s clean energy segment’s “securitization” as a result of it.

Historically, energy security in Europe has been primarily focused on ensuring a sufficient supply of oil and natural gas. Given the limited domestic resources, the EU had to import 87% of its oil and 74% of its natural gas consumption prior to 2022. The heavy dependence on a small number of suppliers, with Russia being the primary supplier, has sparked concerns about over-reliance (Leonard et al., 2021). Although in 2022 the European Union itself was not directly attacked like Ukraine, its dependence on Russian oil and gas, along with the subsequent economic and political fallout from the invasion, required the European Union’s top-down involvement. However, this is not the first time a threat to energy security on the global stage has prompted governmental action.

The renewed focus on achieving energy independence during the energy security crises of the 1970s also drove a resurgence in nuclear and renewable energy. Similarly, the energy crises of the 2000s led to a re-evaluation of renewables as a distinctly domestic energy source (Kuzemko et al., 2022). From this an important observation can be made - energy security becomes particularly important following periods where concerns about safety and security had diminished in political discourse. Such instances of shock often serve as a catalyst for recognising energy insecurity – as the European Union has painfully experienced following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the energy crisis which engulfed European energy markets.

As a precursor to the current energy security threats faced by the European Union, in 2006, Russia halted its gas supply to Ukraine, citing evidence that Ukraine had diverted gas designated for Western Europe. Between 2006 and 2009, the geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine influenced EU energy policy, as Ukraine serves as a crucial transit route for Russian energy to the EU. The peak of Russia's aggressive approach towards Ukraine occurred in January 2009, when the flow of Russian gas to Ukraine, and subsequently to a significant portion of Europe, was completely halted. This interruption left several countries in Eastern and Central Europe without gas reserves (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020). However, rather than pivoting from an unreliable supplier to other energy suppliers or alternative energy sources, the solution pursued by certain Member States at the time was to bypass the Ukrainian energy infrastructure entirely instead. This project culminated in the infamous Nord Stream undersea gas pipeline, which has arguably worsened energy insecurity of the European Union in the long term (Adomeit, 2016).

One of the most common definitions of energy security can be found in the formulation of energy policy as the need to address diverse societal needs, which are embodied in the “energy trilemma”: energy security, environmental sustainability, and energy equity (Kuzemko et al., 2022). While the accessibility of energy resources can be interpreted from an economic perspective, it can also be construed as a matter of security. Entities may depict diminished or interrupted access to energy resources as a menace to their well-being, to political equilibrium, or to the operation of entrenched norms and governance rules (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020).

The energy trilemma itself, as defined by the International Energy Agency (2023), describes these three fundamental dimensions of energy policy as follows:

1. **Energy security:** Initially focused on safeguarding energy supply and avoiding shocks from scarcity or geopolitical tensions, this dimension now also encompasses the reliability of renewables, availability and accessibility of critical minerals, and resilience in the face of physical and cyber threats to energy infrastructure.
2. **Energy equity:** Originally dealing with the key questions of energy access and affordability, this dimension has deepened to include new demands for justice, fairer access to and equitable distribution of clean energy benefits, and the impact of energy transitions on vulnerable communities.

3. **Environmental sustainability:** This dimension has broadened from advocating for practices that would reduce the carbon footprint and preserve the planet for future generations, to a holistic concern for planetary health. It embraces circular economy principles, the interconnectedness of water, food, and energy systems, and the better alignment of decarbonisation efforts with the planet's ecological limits.

If energy security is the uninterrupted available supply of affordable energy, then energy insecurity can stem from either disruption in energy supply or sudden price fluctuations that may make supply unaffordable (Christou, 2021). Energy insecurity can be triggered by either disruptions in energy supply or abrupt changes in prices that could make the supply unaffordable. It primarily exhibits two key features: (1) a concentrated emphasis on the security of oil and gas supply, which are the two main energy sources, and (2) the use of this understanding of energy security in the context of geopolitical and foreign policy decisions (ibid). This paper largely focuses on the second aspect, although the (in)security of oil and gas supply has been one of the primary factors driving the clean energy transition in documents evaluated in this paper, as well as its “practical” application in the form of energy weaponisation.

Energy weaponisation itself can be roughly defined as the use of energy as an economic and political weapon, including but not limited to the disruption of energy supplies or threatening the secure operation of critical energy infrastructure (Boute, 2022). It should be noted that while the Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a catalyst for escalating energy weaponisation, Russia's use of energy as a weapon predates the war and is already evident starting from as late as 2021, when Russia began to intentionally limit the volume of gas stored in Gazprom-owned gas storage in the European Union (Hartvig et al., 2024). A significant body of scholarly work has been dedicated to investigating the implications of the war in Ukraine on energy policy, an area that is intricately interwoven with the persistent struggle (Kuzemko et al., 2022), and has led to a dramatic change in European Union policy on energy supply and energy security.

1.2. European policymaking

As an international political body with a legislative authority, the European Union has the capacity for forming policy for both the Union as a whole and its Member States, through the involvement of the three main EU bodies: European Commission, Parliament, and Council of the European Union (referred to as “Council” from this point onwards in this paper).

European Union's policy instruments are typically adopted through the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), previously known as the co-decision procedure before the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Under Article 294 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the Commission proposes legislation, which is then negotiated and amended by the Parliament and the Council. Due to the application of qualified majority voting rules, no single member state can veto the adoption of a policy measure. These policy measures are subsequently implemented by member states under the supervision of the Commission. Therefore, member state acceptance of policy measures based on securitization moves is crucial for effective implementation.

European Union's legislation is largely implemented through the three primary categories of legislation in the form of Regulations, Directives, and Proposals, each serving a different purpose and used in different contexts, depending on the objectives (European Union, 2020):

- **Regulations:** These are binding legislative acts that apply in their entirety across all EU member states. Once a regulation is passed by the EU, it becomes immediately enforceable as law in all member states simultaneously. Regulations are used to implement uniform laws throughout the EU that are directly applicable to all EU citizens.
- **Directives:** These are legislative acts that set out a goal that all EU member states must achieve. However, it is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals. In other words, a directive is a sort of "instruction manual" that sets out the objectives to be achieved but leaves member states the freedom to choose how to implement these objectives in their laws.
- **Decisions:** These are legislative acts that are fully binding on those to whom they are addressed. Decisions may be addressed to member states or individuals. The authority to make decisions is vested in all EU institutions. When a decision is addressed to a member state, it must take the necessary measures to comply with the decision.

The Commission is the only EU institution empowered to initiate EU legal acts. It submits proposals for EU legal acts on its own initiative, at the request of other EU institutions or following a citizens' initiative. The Council (by a simple majority of its members) may request the Commission to carry out studies and submit any appropriate legislative proposals. The Parliament (by a majority of its component members) may also ask the Commission to submit legislative proposals (Consilium Europa, 2024).

The two most common forms of procedure for the adoption of legislative proposals are the Ordinary Legislative Procedures and Non-Legislative Procedures. The **ordinary legislative procedure**, formerly known as the co-decision procedure, is the main decision-making procedure used for adopting EU legislation (Consilium Europa, 2024):

1. **Legislative proposal:** The procedure is launched when the European Commission submits a legislative proposal to the Council and the European Parliament. The Commission is the only EU institution empowered to initiate EU legal acts.
2. **First reading:** The Council and the European Parliament either approve or amend the proposal. If they reach an agreement at this stage, the legislative proposal is adopted.
3. **Second reading:** If no agreement is reached in the first reading, both the Council and the Parliament can amend the proposal a second time. If they reach an agreement at this stage, the legislative proposal is adopted.
4. **Conciliation and third reading:** If the two institutions do not reach an agreement after the second reading, a conciliation committee is convened. If the text agreed by the conciliation committee is acceptable to both institutions at the third reading, the legislative act is adopted.
5. **End of procedure:** If a legislative proposal is rejected at any stage of the procedure, or the Parliament and Council cannot reach a compromise, the proposal is not adopted and the procedure ends.

Non-legislative procedure, often given the acronym ‘NLE’ (non-legislative enactment), refers to any interinstitutional lawmaking procedure that is not a legislative one, within the meaning of the European Union (EU) treaties, normally divided into two categories (EUR-Lex, 2023):

- **Delegated acts:** These are legal acts adopted by the European Commission or the Council of the European Union, where they have been empowered to supplement or amend non-essential parts of the legislative act. The legislative acts define the objectives, content, scope, and duration of such delegations of power.
- **Implementing acts:** These are legal acts where, as a general rule, having consulted a committee in which every EU Member State is represented, the Commission can adopt

uniform conditions for the implementation of a legislative act¹. Implementing and delegated acts may not, however, exceed the framework established in the basic act.

Simply put, the ordinary legislative procedure is a comprehensive process used for making new laws and involves multiple stages of approval, while non-legislative procedure is used for implementing or explaining existing laws and policies and is faster and less resource intensive.

The EU's capacity to function as a climate policymaker is rooted in the Treaties, and the 2009 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) designates 'climate change' as an area of shared competence (Article 191), which resulted in the European Commission's legislative responsibility for implementing clean energy and the green transition in the European Union.

1.3. Green transition

The 1970s energy crisis had a profound impact on the development of renewable energy. During this period, the world faced fuel shortages and soaring oil prices due to unprecedented geopolitical crises in the Middle East. As a result, policymakers and researchers began exploring alternative energy sources such as solar, sea and wind power. The crisis served as a wake-up call, emphasising the need to reduce dependence on fossil fuels and transition to cleaner, more sustainable energy systems. Efforts were made to stimulate domestic energy production and invest in renewable energy technologies. Countries with smaller local oil supplies took radical steps toward alternative energy solutions (Kuzemko et al., 2022). The crisis remains a pivotal moment in energy history – but it took decades for its influence on renewable energy to be felt.

Finally, after years of gradual advances in international climate policy the European Union's member states agreed on the adoption of the European Green Deal - a comprehensive plan initiated by the European Commission aimed at transforming the European Union into a sustainable and climate-neutral economy by 2050 (European Commission, 2019). At its core, the Green Deal encompasses a wide range of policies and initiatives across various sectors to address climate change, protect biodiversity, and promote sustainability while ensuring a just transition for all citizens (Consilium Europa, 2020). However, security in its traditional understanding was not originally one of the central dimensions of the European Green Deal. The initial focus has been on environmental sustainability and economic growth, with less emphasis on how these

changes would impact the security of the EU and its member states. This includes energy supply, geopolitical stability, and concerns over effects of climate change (Consilium Europa, 2020).

The section of the European Green Deal examined in this thesis is its energy dimension, connecting to the concepts of energy security and securitization. Energy dimension of the EGD outlines ambitious goals and strategies to accelerate the transition to clean, renewable energy sources, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and increase energy efficiency (European Commission, 2019). Key objectives within the energy section include achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, increasing the share of renewable energy in the EU's energy mix, and improving energy efficiency through measures such as renovating buildings to meet higher energy performance standards.

When the European Green Deal's implementation happened to align with the worldwide spread of the Covid-19 pandemic, it presented the difficult task of aligning the EGD's goals with need for crisis management, further complicated by the need to coordinate efforts across multiple policy areas. This raised scepticism over the future of the European Green Deal and the green transition as a whole. However, the EU maintained its dedication to the EGD, ultimately endorsing and pushing forward its implementation in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic's uncertainties (Bongardt & Torres, 2022). In spite of the hurdles brought about by the pandemic, however, the Commission reiterated its commitment to the European Green Deal and its goals.

The European Green Deal's ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, investing in green technologies, and preserving Europe's natural habitats underscore the EU's determination to lead the global fight against climate change. However, the European Green Deal ended up being utilised as a programme for a different purpose –to ensure the energy security of the European Union as the invasion of Ukraine prompted the EGD's securitization.

2. SECURITIZATION THEORY

This chapter introduces the theory of securitization, a pivotal concept in contemporary security studies. The chapter first provides an overview of the Copenhagen School, a foundational framework that has significantly shaped the understanding of securitization. The middle part of the chapter concerns securitising actors, including their roles within the securitization process. The chapter culminates with a discussion on collective securitization, the model of securitization utilised in this thesis. Through this comprehensive overview, the chapter aims to provide an introduction to securitization theory, necessary for the analytical sections of this thesis.

Securitisation theory, itself pioneered by scholars involved with the development of the Copenhagen School framework, offers a model for analysing the process by which certain issues are framed as existential threats requiring extraordinary measures beyond normal politics. At its core, securitization theory challenges conventional understandings of security, which tend to focus narrowly on military threats, by broadening the scope to include non-traditional security issues such as environmental degradation, migration, and resources (Balzacq et al., 2016).

Overall, the theory of securitization is situated at the confluence of three theoretical currents – realism, poststructuralism, and constructivism (Balzacq et al., 2016). It is crucial to note that the development of securitization theory has been shaped by a diverse range of academic contributions. In parallel, scholars who investigate the processes of securitization have adopted various stances in relation to these theoretical influences. Primarily, there is a strong correlation between securitization theory and social constructivism, especially those works that scrutinise the function of language, the significance of practice, and the influence of argumentation in global politics. Furthermore, securitization theory intersects with several other theoretical frameworks, including speech act theory, Schmitt's political realism, Bourdieu's sociology, and Foucault's theory of governmentality (ibid). But the practical base on which the theory of securitization is based on is indisputably the speech act theory.

The fundamental premise of the speech act theory is simple - certain declarations transcend mere description of an existing reality and, consequently, cannot be evaluated as false or true. Rather, these expressions actualise a specific action; they perform functions - they are 'performatives' in contrast to 'constatives' that merely report conditions and are thus susceptible to tests of truth

and falsity (Balzacq, 2005). Similarly, securitization transcends descriptions of factual reality and can manifest in both discursive and non-discursive forms; it can be intentional or non-intentional. In short, issues of security can either be deliberately constructed or they can spontaneously arise from various practices, the original intent of which (if there was any) was not necessarily to define a security problem (Balzacq, 2011). When a matter is identified as a security problem, it empowers the entity securing it to demand measures within an “extraordinary domain”, justifying them with terms like ‘immediacy’ and ‘existential dangers’ (Eroukhmanoff, 2017). Eroukhmanoff further elucidates this procedure, asserting that security issues are not inherently present but must be framed as such by securitising actors – but how are they conceptualised?

Thierry Balzacq, one of the pre-eminent scholars within the field of securitization, conceptualises securitization as a complex constellation of practices: in his framework, heuristic artifacts - such as metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions - are strategically deployed by a securitising actor within a specific context. The aim of this mobilisation is to stimulate an audience to construct a cohesive network of implications, encompassing feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions, about the critical vulnerability of a referent object (Balzacq, 2011). Upon the invocation of securitization, a distinct security grammar is set into motion. This is particularly marked by the termination of political alternatives, the concentration of decision-making power, and limitations imposed on public discourse. These characteristics emerge as a consequence of a community’s collective acknowledgment of a phenomenon as a threat (Balzacq et al., 2016).

Additionally, it is important to note that just as an issue can be successfully securitised, by definition it should also be capable of being de-securitised, thereby returning the issue to the dimension of regular politics (Dupont, 2020). As a matter of fact, the very fact of an issue being securitised is considered a negative development by Ole Wæver, who introduced the very concept of securitization, and was described by him as a failure of normal politics (Buzan et al., 1998). De-securitization is thus the ideal outcome, where issues are no longer perceived or presented as threats and normal political action can take place. But how common is this position?

Most of the aforementioned scholars represent the so-called Copenhagen School, the most recognised framework for studying securitization. However, prior to proceeding, it is important to recognise that there are ongoing debates regarding the various methodologies employed in security studies, as well as their degree of compatibility. Some scholars categorise these methodologies into 'schools', differentiating among the 'Aberystwyth School', the 'Paris School', and finally the 'Copenhagen School' within security studies (Balzacq et al., 2016).

2.1. Copenhagen School

The theoretical framework of security politics, termed "securitization," was initially introduced in the 1989 working paper "Security the Speech Act: Analysing the Politics of the World" by Ole Wæver (1989). Operating from the Copenhagen Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Wæver collaborated with colleagues such as Buzan and de Wilde to cultivate a constructivist perspective on security. This team produced a series of scholarly works with the objective of broadening both the conceptual comprehension of securitization and its practical implementation.

According to the Copenhagen School, the act of securitization involves portraying a referent object as a threat, which is the entity perceived as being at risk and requiring protection. The actual process of securitization is theorised to occur through the rhetorical structure employed by decision-makers when defining an issue (Eroukhanoff, 2017), which determines its success.

However, the success of attempted securitization is a subject debated even within the Copenhagen School. Barry Buzan, another eminent researcher of the securitization theory considered to be a scholar of the Copenhagen School, defines two prerequisites for a speech or a securitization move to be successful and accepted by an audience. The first prerequisite is that the discourse must construct a narrative that encompasses existential threats, a point of no return, and a potential solution. The second prerequisite is external and pertains to the speaker's authority - a speaker with appropriate authority can influence the probability of public acceptance of the speech and its implications. Consequently, a successful speech is a synthesis of language and society (Buzan, 1998). This definition however is far from universal even within the Copenhagen School itself.

Other scholars within the school believe the defining actor in “successful securitization” is the audience rather than the speaker. The theory posits that an issue is only fully securitised when the audience collectively concurs on the threat’s nature and endorses the implementation of exceptional measures. Therefore, if the audience does not accept the securitising actor’s speech act, the securitization process is deemed unsuccessful (Eroukhmanoff, 2017).

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School presents the concept that security is a socially constructed concept rather than an objective reality. According to this perspective, security threats are not inherent in the nature of things but are instead constructed through speech acts by authoritative actors who have the power to define what constitutes a security concern. These authoritative actors, often political elite or institutions, engage in a process of securitization whereby they present a particular issue as an existential threat to a referent object (e.g., the state, society, or specific groups), thereby justifying extraordinary measures to address it (Balzacq, 2005). Therefore, security does not arise from objective real-world situations, but rather because a certain authoritative figure has taken steps to label an issue as such. (Sperling & Webber, 2020), not unlike Buzan’s (1998) concept of an authoritative speaker as the primary actor.

However, the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization has also faced significant criticism from other scholars. While Copenhagen School scholars generally hold that securitization should emphasise the speech act, other scholars have challenged this position. Some have proposed practice-oriented approaches in opposition to linguistic and discursive ones, while others proposed explanatory approaches in favour or normative ones (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015)

Balzacq (2011) classifies the Copenhagen school as a “philosophical” entity, where language is the fundamental concept, and the mere articulation of something is sufficient to bring it into existence, thereby rendering security a speech act. Sperling & Webber (2020) claim that Copenhagen School’s central assertion - that threats are socially constructed - is excessively emphasised. They argue that a threat is not merely manifested through a speech act; it pre-exists in a context that is external to the actor. Another criticism of the Copenhagen School by Lipschutz (1995) is its overemphasis on pinpointing the exact moment an issue becomes

significant for securitization, whether it is when a speech act occurs, when the audience accepts the issue as a threat, or even when exceptional actions are implemented.

Despite the relatively late initiation of efforts to securitise environmental degradation and climate change compared to other policy areas, these endeavours have still sparked considerable interest, thereby establishing the environment and climate change as a significant field of inquiry within securitization studies. However, according to Thierry Balzacq, the otherwise extensive body of literature on energy security lacks a comprehensive analysis through the prism of securitization theory. This gap is indicative of the minimal conceptual focus that energy security has garnered thus far, as noted by Balzacq et al. (2016), and is a significant research gap to be addressed.

2.2. Securitising actors

The fundamental elements of the theory encompass the securitising actor (the entity that frames an issue as a threat via a securitising move), the referent subject (the entity that poses the threat), the referent object (the entity that is under threat), the audience (whose consensus is required to bestow an intersubjective status upon the threat), the context, and the implementation of unique policies, whether “exceptional” or not (Balzacq et al., 2016).

The process of securitization unfolds in several stages: first, an issue is identified and framed as an existential threat (i.e. referent subject) by a securitising actor who seeks to persuade an audience to accept their interpretation of the issue, which involves portraying the issue as posing an imminent danger to the referent object's survival or vital interests. Second, the securitising actor must convince the audience that traditional political mechanisms are inadequate to address the threat, thus legitimising the use of exceptional measures that may bypass normal democratic processes or infringe upon individual rights. Finally, if successful, the securitization process leads to the issue being temporarily removed from the realm of ordinary politics and subjected to emergency measures aimed at neutralising the perceived threat (Balzacq et al., 2016).

Referent subject

As securitization theory was originally designed with the intention of adding dimensions of economics, health, and environment to the traditional perception of security as an interaction between state actors, the concept of a specific actor as the source of a threat has proven

controversial. However, the concept is used by some scholars (e.g. Balzacq et al., 2016) as a reference for expressing the vulnerability of a referent object, with the referent subject embodying a threat significant enough that a policy must be immediately undertaken to “survive” it. “Survival” as a frame assigns a high degree of importance to an issue, leading into securitization theory’s application of “extraordinary means”. However, the fundamental nature of existence and the type of existential threats vary across sectors (ibid).

Referent object

In accordance with securitization theory, the entity under threat, termed the “referent object”, is confronted with a challenge to its survival. It is crucial to elaborate on how a threat affects a referent object of securitization. This process is not confined to military concerns but extends to various social dimensions. Securitisation theory posits that an issue does not need to possess specific characteristics to become a referent object in the securitization process. Instead, it emerges from interactions between the securitising actor and the audience (Balzacq et al., 2016).

Furthermore, the securitising actor might opt for political strategies instead of extraordinary measures. However, this does not imply that the securitization process has been unsuccessful or that the issue at hand is less threatening (Collins, 2005).

Notably for the purpose of this paper, the significance of energy strategy allows securitising entities, such as the Commission, to connect the efficient operation of the market with the endurance of the European project and/or the norms and regulations of the EU. In a similar vein, national actors can perceive a dependable energy market as crucial to the economic and political stability that underpins their own assertions of legitimacy and authority. Both the member states the EU can thus be interpreted as referent objects (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020).

Securitising actor

In line with both Balzacq’s and Wæver’s perspectives, the securitising actor is identified as the entity that presents an argument about a potential risk to the object of reference. The characteristic of being an actor is merely a trait that can be inferred from the act of speech (Webber, 2019). Typically, politicians possess this authority due to their roles within the government, granting them the power to represent the state. According to Wæver, the

securitising actor is characterised as the actor that articulates a threat towards the referent object. The attribute of being an actor is a quality that can be derived from the speech act (ibid).

The Copenhagen School is well-known for its stance that securitization is a process of securitising actor moving aside from the dimension of normal politics (Balzacq, 2015). Eroukhmanoff (2017) explains this process further, writing that security issues must be articulated as problems by securitising actors, as the mere existence of an issue does not equal its securitization as a referent subject.

Audience

The audience is surprisingly one of the least developed concepts in traditional securitization theory. The Copenhagen School in particular presents the audience as actors targeted by the act of securitization in order to persuade them to accept extraordinary measures, justified by the specific security nature of certain issues (Balzacq et al., 2016), but does not go beyond that.

However, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, according to Eroukhmanoff (2017), an issue can only be fully securitised once the audience accepts it as such and permits extraordinary measures. However, there are rarely clear examples in the literature that explain whether an audience has approved of securitization (Balzacq, 2015). The intricacy of discerning the audience's agreement is further complicated by the fact that, in many cases, there isn't just one audience, but multiple audiences, including by some interpretations popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific audiences (Balzacq et al., 2016).

However, within the framework of this paper the choice of an identifiable active audience in the form of the European Parliament and the Council is clear enough due to EU's legislative procedures. As such, for the purposes of this thesis, the European Council and European Parliament can be considered the legislative audience for the securitising policy proposals presented by the European Commission, consistently with assertions made by Hofmann & Staeger (2020), who state that multilateral energy policy engages governments and energy companies, rather than broad audiences.

2.3. Collective securitization

In the context of this proposal, the form of securitization to be studied and utilised for analysis is collective securitization, defined as a process of actors (or an actor acting on behalf of other actors) collectively identifying a threat in order to justify extraordinary measures to address it (Sperling & Webber, 2020). The examined actor is the European Union and its institutions, contextualised down to the European Commission and its Directorates-Generals, securitising the transition to clean energy sources (as implemented through the clean energy segment of the European Green Deal policy framework) in response to the weaponisation of conventional energy supplies by an external actor serving as the referent subject - the Russian Federation.

As mentioned previously in the preceding subchapter, securitization is a process where an actor recognizes a potential threat, assigns it a unique significance, and as a result, can implement immediate and extraordinary actions in response. Collective securitization involves the actor in question performing tasks for other actors, each of whom may have their own individual securitization needs. This process involves consolidating these numerous securitizations and providing them with authoritative expression, which is most commonly carried out by international organizations such as the European Union (Sperling & Webber, 2020).

Under the context of collective securitization theory, Sperling and Webber (2020) suggest that there are two types of collective securitization which can be roughly divided into the categories of thin and thick collective securitization:

- **Thin collective securitization:** a state, or a handful of states, presents its security issues to an international organization. This leads to a supportive reaction from other member states, which in turn enables the international organization to publicly address the highlighted security issue and implement relevant policy actions. As a result, the international organization gains a semblance of actorness, meaning actions are taken and statements are made in its name. However, this does not imply that the organization has gained autonomy or agency.
- **Thick collective securitization:** actorness remains a collective act, but the international organization possesses autonomy and a distinct status apart from its member states. In other words, it can be viewed as a security actor with its own agency.

Overall, the European Union and its institutions conduct securitization under the category of thick collective securitization, with EU institutions such as the European Commission possessing legal autonomy from Member State governments and intended to operate and introduce policy to the benefit of the European Union as a whole. This has not been an immediate development, but rather a gradual evolution of the EU becoming a collective actor. Starting from the 1990s and early 2000s the Commission's policy initiative played an important role in advancing European climate policy, with the body gradually involving the Council and Parliament more in its collective securitization of climate change to justify ambitious policy proposals (Dupont, 2020)

According to Hofmann and Staeger (2020), EU legislative actors involved in securitization can take advantage of the conceptual uncertainty in security frameworks. As a result, they can portray EU rules and norms as referent objects under threat, meaning that EU energy policy is a possible subject for collective securitization under the same conceptual uncertainty. Therefore, as energy supply is at least partially rooted in the economic realm, the main operative area of the Commission (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020), the Commission can act as the leading legislative force in collective securitization by the European Union.

With this theoretical base in place, further analysis of European Union's energy security policy in relation to the European Green Deal and the green transition can be conducted by examining problem area issues which emerged over the course of EGD's implementation. Based on the collective securitization theoretical framework, it can be assumed that the Commission utilised its unique legislative position to conduct securitising framing in order to pass extraordinary measures to ensure the advancement of the green transition and the European Green Deal. This assumption will be examined further in the empirical analysis chapter, following the application of the theoretical base towards a research methodology.

3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The purpose of this chapter is to apply the collective securitization framework using the critical discourse analysis method in order to answer the main research question:

How has the discourse on energy security been affected by Russia's energy weaponisation in the context of the European Green Deal and clean energy transition?

In order to do so, this chapter will describe the general research design, data collection methods, list of examined documents following the data collection process, analytical framework for the qualitative analysis sections, keywords utilised for the analysis, as well as the limitations.

3.1. Research design

The period covered by this paper covers the period from fall 2020 to spring 2023, lasting from the adoption of the European Green Deal into policy (Consilium Europa, 2023), the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and to the aftermath of European Union's first winter following the beginning of decoupling from Russia's energy supply in 2023, once the effect of energy decoupling policies could first be fully evaluated in European Union's policy statements.

The analysis will utilise a longitudinal qualitative design, combining qualitative discourse analysis and data evaluation utilising the data collected from the conducted discourse analysis, in order to evaluate elements of securitization. This will allow to assess the data to provide limited conclusions about the effects of the weaponisation of energy supply by Russia, on the European Green Deal and the contextualisation of the clean energy transition by the European Union.

The primary method used for this research is discourse analysis (as detailed in chapter 2) through the evaluation of the explanatory memoranda of European Commission's policy proposals to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Thus, the research primarily relies on a qualitative approach, utilising discourse analysis of the explanatory memoranda of European Commission proposals, which as the sole entity within the EU authorised to formally introduce specific legislation serves as a key securitising subject for examination when considering policies. As an additional deciding factor in the choice of Commission proposals for analysis, it was the Commission that originally authored the initial European Green Deal strategy (European Commission, 2019) and is empowered to oversee its operation and implementation.

Discourse analysis will examine the language use present in policy proposal texts, relating to the description of securitization by Balzacq et al. (2016), as a complex system of practices, where language artefacts - including metaphors, policy instruments, analogies, stereotypes, and emotions - are employed by a securitising actor within a specific context to stimulate an audience to construct a cohesive network of implications, encompassing feelings, sensations, thoughts, and intuitions, about the critical vulnerability of a referent object.

In the realm of law and policy, language is used performatively to create legal effects and consequences. The publication of a proposal is not simply an act of presentation, it is the action of delivering a proposal. This is known as a *legislative speech act*. Legislation, including policy proposals, often involves the use of performative utterances, which are statements that perform an action simply by being said. The connection between speech acts and legislation is that the language used in legislation is not merely descriptive but performative (Wagner et al., 2007).

Following Balzacq's (2005) securitization operationalisation methods, the main emphasis will be on examining the utilisation of speech acts by the Commission to achieve securitization.

Utilising Balzacq's definition of securitization theory (Balzacq et al., 2016), securitization can be described as a means to explain politics which attempt to 1. establish the security character of a public problem, 2. ensure the social commitments necessary to address the problem, and 3. to produce the possibility of a specific policy to be implemented to resolve the problem. These three core elements of securitization as presented by Balzacq, can thus be conceptualised as policy **subject framing** (by identifying the referent subject or threat), establishment of the **extraordinary** nature of the issue (by framing the issue as exceeding the capacity to be resolved by normal means), and **audience acceptance** of policy adoption (by accepting the framing of an issue as a security threat to be resolved by adoption of extraordinary policy) .

The empirical analysis section will thus determine the extent of securitization by the European Commission over the period of the examined timeframe and collect necessary data to examine these three key elements of securitization: subject framing, extraordinariness, and audience acceptance. The data from the discourse analysis as well as the documents themselves will be evaluated to examine the change in key securitization elements over the course of the study's timeframe, to be used to enrich the results, and attempt to answer the research question.

The data collected utilising qualitative analysis methods in the form of general textual analysis and critical discourse analysis will then be applied to a of the dynamics of the three selected elements of securitization, to draw some conclusions about the dynamics of securitization of the European Green Deal and energy security before and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, which disrupted the previous status quo both in energy security and European policy.

Subject framing

Analysis of the subjects included in policy proposal speech acts (i.e. referent subjects which threaten referent objects) is a necessary part of this thesis. It demonstrates not only which subject is framed as a threat in any given policy proposal, but on a longitudinal frame it presents the changing dynamics of the presentation of threats by the securitising object (i.e. the European Commission), reflecting the overall policy framing of the European Green Deal and energy security by European legislators. For the purposes of this thesis, subjects will be divided into general categories such as “climate change” and “Russian state aggression”.

As per discourse analysis framework, it is expected that securitised speech acts will feature these specific threats as the referent subjects in the qualitative section of this thesis. The results of the qualitative assessment will then be evaluated to visualise the trends of subject framing by the European Commission over the period of European Green Deal’s implementation into force.

Extraordinariness

Due to the dynamic and transformative nature of the European Union as a political entity, and the intricate role of the Commission, the designation of measures as ‘extraordinary’ necessitates surpassing a significant benchmark (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020). However, Article 194.2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) maintains the principle that the selection of energy mix and sources is a sovereign decision of each member state. As such, some researchers have argued that “extraordinary” measures could be considered to be any measures that exceed the assumptions of Article 194.2 by advocating for the centralisation of energy policy mechanisms with the Commission as the principal actor in crisis management (ibid.).

Therefore, for the purposes of discourse analysis within the empirical section of this paper, it is assumed that speech acts advocating for the Commission’s need to secure a leading role in

energy policy or receive additional tasks or role relating to its management, can be considered an example of extraordinariness in politicised speech acts.

Additionally, the degree of extraordinariness in proposed policies will be demonstrated through data evaluation, by inspecting the dynamics of the length of proportionality sections of policy proposal documents. Proportionality itself is a principle enshrined in the European Union's treaties and is meant to justify the extent of the measures proposed by policies to address an issue, as well as to affirm that the proposed policy does not exceed normative limits. As such, proportionality makes an excellent match for Securitisation theory's extraordinariness element.

Audience acceptance

The Copenhagen School's conventional stance posits that the success of securitization is determined not by the securitising actor, but by the audience (Buzan et al., 1998). Indeed, as previously noted, the primary objective lies in persuading the audience, rather than in the implementation of extraordinary measures themselves. Under the collective securitization framework, the examined audience addressed by securitization rhetoric are primarily the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union as co-legislators and evaluators of policy proposals issued by the European Commission. Additional contextual audiences are national governments, energy operators, and local communities, whose interests are addressed in policy proposals to the co-legislators.

In order to determine the successful securitization of a particular issue, it is necessary to conduct an analysis on two distinct fronts. The initial aspect necessitates the articulation of elite speech acts that categorise the issue as a threat of existential magnitude to a specified referent object, thereby warranting the deployment of exceptional measures to address it (Buzan et al., 1998). However, the audience must show signs of acceptance, and scholarly literature rarely provides examples of a specific defined audience accepting securitising claims (Balzacq, 2015).

As audience acceptance cannot be evaluated solely based on policy proposal texts, which contain only textual material provided by the securitising subject (i.e. the European Commission), the analysis will present data acquired during the qualitative analysis combined with available data on the state of the policy proposals and the duration of their adoption period, if adopted into

policy, in order to estimate the “acceptance” of securitising justification for rapid implementation of policy by the legislative audience.

3.2. Data collection

When considering potential data sources for this research, it is crucial to select information that either directly pertains to or accurately represents the European Green Deal, which is the central focus of this research. Furthermore, the policy documents for analysis must be collected from both prior to and after the onset of the war, enabling a comprehensive longitudinal comparison.

In the process of data selection for this research, it is crucial to prioritise data that is a representative component of the European Green Deal, given that it constitutes the central focus of the problem formulation. Subsequently, the data selected must be intrinsically linked to an energy policy. Furthermore, particular emphasis should be placed on references to the conflict in Ukraine, as the focal event which impacted the green transition and energy policy. In addition, the policy area under consideration should possess policy documents, from both pre- and post-conflict periods, that are suitable for analysis, thereby facilitating a longitudinal comparison.

The EU, perceived as a legitimate and authoritative actor, can define threats and security issues – in short, perform securitising moves – and try to convince European audience that EU norms, rules or referents are threatened (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020)

In the context of the European Union, the European Commission is perceived as the principal entity in the process of agenda setting. The Commission’s distinctive capacity to introduce legislation positions it as an optimal subject for examining the EU’s agenda, that is to say, the priorities and ambitions of the EU (Dupont, 2020). Furthermore, given that the Commission is the sole entity within the EU permitted to officially initiate specific legislation and policies, it constitutes a more appropriate subject for analysis in the context of policy examination.

As such, the primary empirical data sources to used are the European Commission’s policy proposals to the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union in the form of regulations, directives, and decisions, as the three most important forms of legislation under the EU treaties, on the topic of energy transition within the framework of the European Green Deal. It should be noted that on proposal stage, there is functionally no difference between the three

types of legislation for the purposes of this analysis, as all three forms of legislation feature explanatory memoranda utilising the same general structure and speech act mechanisms.

As policy proposals consist largely of the texts of the proposed or amended regulations, decisions, and directives, intended as neutral legal texts, the data collection process focuses on the explanatory memoranda which preface European Commission's policy proposals and substitute the first introductory half of the policy proposal documents. While the explanatory memoranda are not included in the text of the adopted policy, they constitute the primary speech act for the European Commission, by providing the reasoning and justification for the adoption of proposed policies, including by utilising emotionally charged terminology intended to influence the audience (European Parliament and the Council) to adopt the proposal.

The unit of analysis is the speech act in the form of segments within the explanatory memoranda of the policy proposals where the topic of energy or energy security is discussed within the planning of the European Green Deal. The total timeframe for data collection ranges from January 1st 2020 to December 31st 2023, then further subdivided in two for data examination purposes using February 24th 2022 as the reference point for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The European Commission policy proposal documents will be accessed through European Union's EUR-Lex legislative database that provides access to all treaties, legislative acts, and proposed legislation, utilising the English language versions of the documents for consistency. The search engine of the database will be used for collecting relevant documents before further manual filtering. Among the data accessed through EUR-Lex will be the policy proposal documents, the date of proposal publication and adoption into policy, the specific directorate which submitted the proposal, the legislative procedure used for the deliberation on the policy proposal, as well as other minor data elements.

For purposes of data collection, the following search prompts were used in the following order:

1. In order to narrow the search to legislative proposals relating to the European Green Deal and specifically relating to its energy section, the search query for the EUR-Lex search engine consists of the keywords "European Green Deal" and "energy".
2. The query is then refined to specify the European Commission as the author of the document, to filter out unrelated document results from other institutions.

3. The possible years of the legislative proposal's publication are then limited to the years 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2023, as per the conditions of the research timeframe.
4. Finally, the search query is narrowed to the form of the proposal, by selecting "proposal for a directive", "proposal for a decision", or "proposal for a regulation" respectively.

Following these prompts yields 34 results for directive proposals, 21 results for decision proposals and 84 results for regulation proposals respectively, or 139 in total. While in terms of the number of data entries evaluated this pushes the accepted limits of qualitative research, it should be noted that a large number of documents covered under these search prompts refer to the European Green Deal's energy section's objectives and the energy security element of their implementation only in passing or have an incidental use of the terms, requiring further filtering.

This continued sorting of search query results in order to determine legislative proposal documents relevant to the topic and research question is conducted in the following order:

1. English-language text versions of the legislative proposals are searched for primary keywords such as "energy", "energy policy", "energy security", in order to assess the relevance of the proposals to the field of energy.
2. Documents which do not include the keywords in a context where their relevance to this work's analytical framework is evident, are moved to the low relevance list for possible later re-evaluation.
3. Documents which are re-cast versions of previously presented policy proposals are removed, with priority given to the earlier submitted version.
4. Documents which have not been filtered out are then categorised based on time of publication (before or after February 24th, 2022), the topic of the proposal (e.g. electricity production, gas supply, decarbonisation, etc.), the body which submitted the proposal (e.g. Directorate-General for Energy) and the status of the policy proposal.

After completing this additional filtering, the final result is 34 policy proposal documents (Table 1) in total, including 23 regulation proposals, 8 directive proposals, and 3 decision proposals:

Code	Date	Name
	14/01/20	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Just Transition Fund
COM/2020/80	04/03/20	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)
COM/2020/320	16/07/20	COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2008/376/EC on the adoption of the Research Programme of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel and on the multiannual technical guidelines for this programme
COM/2020/403	29/05/20	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the InvestEU Programme
COM/2020/408	02/06/20	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility
COM/2020/824	15/12/20	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013
COM/2021/551	14/07/21	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757
COM/2021/555	14/07/21	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement
COM/2021/557	14/07/21	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652
COM/2021/558	14/07/21	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on energy efficiency (recast)
COM/2021/563	14/07/21	COUNCIL DIRECTIVE restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast)
COM/2021/564	14/07/21	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism
COM/2021/568	14/07/21	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Social Climate Fund
COM/2021/571	14/07/21	DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards the amount of allowances to be placed in the market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme until 2030
COM/2021/802	15/12/21	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the energy performance of buildings (recast)

COM/2021/803	15/12/21	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen
COM/2021/804	15/12/21	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast)
COM/2021/805	15/12/21	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942
Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022		
COM/2022/135	23/03/22	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) n°715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks
COM/2022/222	18/05/22	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency
COM/2022/473	14/09/22	COUNCIL REGULATION on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices
COM/2022/542	26/10/22	DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (recast)
COM/2022/549	18/10/22	COUNCIL REGULATION Enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks
COM/2022/591	09/11/22	COUNCIL REGULATION laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy
COM/2022/668	22/11/22	COUNCIL REGULATION Establishing a market correction mechanism to protect citizens and the economy against excessively high prices
COM/2023/147	14/03/23	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union's protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market
COM/2023/148	14/03/23	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union's electricity market design
COM/2023/160	16/03/23	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020
COM/2023/161	16/03/23	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act)

COM/2023/335	20/06/23	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform ('STEP') and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241
COM/2023/761	28/11/23	COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2578 as regards the prolongation of its period of application
COM/2023/762	28/11/23	COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 as regards the prolongation of its period of application
COM/2023/763	28/11/23	COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy
COM/2023/794	13/12/23	COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community

Table 1. European Commission policy proposals selected for analysis.

The final result of the data collection is a dataset of European Commission's legislative proposals for EU directives, decisions, and regulations on the topic of the European Green Deal's energy section covering the period of 2020 to 2023, following the adoption of the European Green Deal legislation and roughly two years prior to and two years following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, categorised according to the topic of each legislative proposal.

3.3. Analytical framework

According to Balzacq (2011), although multiple methodologies exist for analysing the securitization of an issue, discourse analysis is the most common approach. In turn, Critical Discourse Analysis, first conceptualised by Norman Fairclough, is the most prevalent type of discourse analysis. It emphasises the relationship between discourse and other societal elements like power dynamics, ideologies, or institutions. This approach advances the concept that language influences reality and establishes a form of "normative critique" that doesn't just depict existing realities but also assesses them (Fairclough, 2012). Therefore, the manual discourse analysis of the collected documents depends on Critical Discourse Analysis guidelines.

The discourse analysis will examine the acts and contexts levels within the data, as outlined by Balzacq (2011). The acts level's empirical elements to be scrutinised include the language's grammatical and syntactical rules, the heuristic artifacts employed, such as analogies, metaphors, metonymies, emotions, or stereotypes, and the policies produced by securitization (Balzacq,

2011). The contexts level adheres to the principles of critical discourse analysis to position the analysed discourse within its context, influenced by factors such as the institutions or locations where the discourse takes place (Balzacq, 2011). Balzacq also highlights that these two levels, particularly the first one, are fundamentally trying to determine the frames being constructed (ibid). This forms a framing analysis, providing empirical indicators for conducting the analysis.

In order to ensure a rigorous data analysis, I intend to use a set of criteria to examine security connotations in legislation relating to energy-related topics and the European Green Deal. I propose the following framework, based on categorisation of securitization theory by Eroukhmanoff (2017) as “lying on a spectrum ranging from non-politicised to politicised to securitised”, for evaluating the level of politicisation and securitization of studied issues when assessing their contextual use within policy proposal documents. According to Eroukhmanoff, a security issue can be positioned on a continuum from non-politicised, where it has not entered public discourse, to politicised, where it has elicited public concern and has been placed on the political agenda, to securitised, where it is construed as an existential threat. When an issue reaches the securitised stage, actions are frequently justified by invoking terms such as 'urgency' and 'existential threats,' leading to measures that might be considered undemocratic under ordinary circumstances.

As this work examines the legislative proposals by the European Commission intended to alter the policy of the European Union and its member states, the speech act discourse within the policy proposals is expected to be politicised by default, and as such the following categorisation is proposed to serve the purpose of answering the research question and the aims of this research:

1. **Politicised:** Handling of the issue is contested in public debate between representatives of various political groups, including representatives of the European Commission, but without being presented as an existential concern requiring extraordinary measures.
2. **Partly securitised:** Handling of the issue utilises references to issues framed as threats to justify the adoption of the proposed measure, but the actors involved are not clearly defined and/or the handling does not consistently utilise issue framing.
3. **Fully securitised:** Handling of the issue is presented as a matter of survival and is framed as standing above political discussion, with clearly defined actors involved in the issue.

Although, there are numerous methods available for analysing the securitization of an issue, as outlined by Balzacq (2005), discourse analysis stands out as the most prevalent approach, which is what this research will utilise to apply the analytical framework. In practical terms, the discourse analysis will examine the speech acts and context within the data, as described by Balzacq: focusing on elements such as the utilisation of analogies, metaphors, as well as critical discourse analysis to contextualise the analysed discourse within its broader setting, encompassing factors like institutional settings and cultural contexts.

Once collected through the EUR-Lex database, the policy proposal documents were then coded using MAXQDA, a software program for qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research, utilising it as an instrument to conduct the coding of securitised segments of explanatory memoranda of policy proposal documents. Following the coding process, the resulting coded text segments were exported in the form of Microsoft Excel files (.csv) for use in visual representation of collected data in the data evaluation section of the analysis chapter.

The produced dataset of coded securitised passages corresponding to respective policy proposal documents is included in the Annexes 1,2 and 3, for the securitization coding for climate change, Covid-19, and Russian state aggression respectively, as the main three referent subjects detected during analysis. The qualitative analysis is then followed by data evaluation, utilising the data acquired in the discourse analysis section. Data evaluation consists of the levels of securitization, the categorisation of subject framing, relation of proportionality and extraordinariness, and finally the evaluation of audience adoption of securitised framing.

The analysis chapter will be concluded with a discussion subchapter, providing an overview of the conducted analyses and the observations made using evaluated data, as well as their implications for the application of the key elements of securitization present in the texts.

3.4. Limitations

While by design intended to provide an expansive overview of the effects of securitization on the European Green Deal and the energy transition within the context of current geopolitical turbulence, this paper has limitations that require acknowledgement. The analysis is based on a specific subset of data, utilising policy proposals on their deliberation stage, thereby excluding

information from other stages of the policy cycle. This selective approach may limit the comprehensiveness of the findings and potentially overlook some aspects of the policy process. It should also be noted that this paper investigates the legislative dimension of discourse analysis and securitisation, and is not a sociological study that could include elements of public opinion and acceptance of energy securitisation and weaponisation framing by authorities.

Moreover, the paper's scope is confined to a particular set of actors within the European Union legal system. Notably, it does not consider the roles and influences of other key actors, such as the European Parliament or the Council of Europe, aside from their role as the receptive audience that provides audience approval metrics. These entities play crucial roles in policymaking and their exclusion may result in an incomplete understanding of the policy landscape. The absence of these actors in the analysis could lead to a skewed representation of the EU ecosystem and its dynamics. Therefore, while the paper offers important contributions to the field, these limitations should be considered when interpreting its findings and conclusions. However, in regard to European legislative processes, the European Commission is the default choice, as the primary legislative force according to the Treaties. Another limitation of this study pertains to the scope of the documents analysed. Specifically, the research was confined to the examination of explanatory memoranda accompanying policy proposals, rather than the full legal texts of the policy proposals themselves. This restriction may have resulted in a narrower perspective, potentially overlooking crucial aspects of the policy proposals that were not included in the memoranda. The memoranda, while providing valuable insights into the rationale and objectives of the proposals, do not encompass the entirety of the content and nuances present in the full policy proposal texts. However, they represent the sections of policy proposals most likely to utilise speech acts to frame threats and actors, and as such should be the most essential for discourse analysis.

The final significant limitation of this study lies in the fact that it does not examine the practical effectiveness of securitised policies post-adoption. While the research provides valuable insights into the process of securitization and the discourse surrounding policy proposals, it does not extend to an evaluation of the implemented policies in practice. This omission potentially overlooks the real-world impacts and effectiveness of these policies, which could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the securitization process.

4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

After addressing essential theoretical and methodological considerations, this chapter will proceed with the analysis as outlined in the methodology. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first section focuses on analysing securitization in the data from before the invasion of Ukraine, the second section examines the data from after the invasion, and the third section evaluates the data collected through qualitative discourse analysis in the first two sections.

Due to the nature of the legislative process employed by the European Union for policy proposals for directives, regulations, and decisions, it is assumed by default that the securitising actor is the European Commission through one of its Directorate-Generals. Under the same logic, the audience reached by the message are the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. As such, the first and second section of this chapter will examine the framing of **referent subjects** and **referent objects** by the European Commission as the securitising actor.

4.1. Proposals prior to the invasion of Ukraine

Out of the 18 policy proposals presented by various Directorates-General of the European Commission in the period between the adoption of the European Green Deal in early 2020 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022, the majority of documents express some form of securitised speech acts, whether briefly in passing over formulated in more explicit terms. Due to the general programme intentions of the European Green Deal and the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the cases of securitization of the green transition and energy security in the examined documents are divided between the framing of climate change and the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic as referent subjects.

4.1.1. Securitisation of climate change

Considering the stated purpose of the European Green Deal to counteract the effects of global climate change, it is unsurprising that one of the referent subjects utilised by the European Commission as a referent subject for framing the green transition as a security issue has been climate change itself.

Securitisation of the green transition using climate change as a referent subject can be observed at the very start of the implementation of the European Green Deal, with the proposed regulation establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality (COM-2020-80) immediately

framing climate change as an “urgent challenge” and framing it as a threat not just to the environment, but also to human health and food systems (pp. 2). The framing utilised in this proposal is emblematic of how climate change is presented as a security issue by the European Commission, with such notable features as the use of securitised jargon (e.g. “urgent” and derivatives) . However, by presenting the issue as one impacting the European Union and “EU’s environment, citizens and economy”, it can be observed that there is no clear precise referent object that is subject to the threat, nor even a precise category of referent objects. Nevertheless, this proposal can be considered fully securitised due to the clear intent present in the speech act.

However, as the legislative process progresses from 2020 onwards, it becomes evident that the European Commission either found the emphasis on mitigating the effects of climate change self-explanatory or redundant. Explanatory memoranda of most policy proposals relating to the energy dimension of the European Green Deal either mention the security issues presented by climate change in passing using formulaic templates (e.g. “tackling climate change is an urgent challenge”, as featured in COM-2020-824, COM-2021-551, COM-2021-555, COM-2021-571) or focus solely on the practical legislative and economic matters of the proposed policies, with climate issues mentioned in a non-descript neutral manner in line with the politicised stage of policy discourse. However, climate change remains the primary referent subject in practice.

The consequent policy proposals follow this trend of brief urgency framing, with such proposals as guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure (COM-2020-824), amendments to greenhouse gas emission allowances (COM-2021-551), binding greenhouse gas emission reduction plans (COM-2021-555), and energy efficiency legislation (COM-2021-558) all dedicating a single brief mention of the urgency of the issues addressed by the policy proposals.

A notable feature, displayed even by the more explicitly securitised policy proposals in this category such as the proposal for establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism (COM-2021-564), is the lack of strong emphasis on reaching the audience. Under collective securitization framework, as applied to the European Union, a more explicit reference to the audience groups (i.e. Member States) could be expected to frame the referent subject as a direct threat to the audiences. However, even the more strongly worded proposals such as COM-2021-564 emphasise the crisis and challenges faced by “the world” (pp. 2) at large, with the potential failure of EU emission mitigation policies jeopardising “the world’s” average temperature (pp.

3). The topic of emissions reduction, while objectively a global issue, is thus left without the sharp focus afforded by a proper designation of a specific referent object – quick unprecedented action is urged, but the audiences focus is superficial addressing everyone and no one, continuing the same performance in the remaining examples of pre-invasion securitization of climate change (COM-2021-571, COM-2021-805).

These findings are largely consistent with pre-war observations made by Balzacq et al. (2016), who observed that attempts at securitization in the environmental sector largely resulted in politicisation, due to most of the threats being too conceptually distant to lead to securitization.

4.1.2. Securitisation of the Covid-19 pandemic

The timing of the final implementation of the European Green Deal coincided with the global outbreak of the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic, raising the challenge of reconciling its ambitions with the means available for implementation, compounded by the complexity of coordinating actions across various policy domains. However, contrary to expectations, the pandemic did not derail the EGD's momentum as a policy agenda and the EU continued its commitment to the EGD, ultimately approving and advancing its implementation amidst the uncertainty of the Covid-19 pandemic (Bongardt & Torres, 2022). But this is not in itself the evidence of securitization of the Covid-19 issue, nor evidence of it being employed as a meaningful referent subject by the Commission.

The Commission proceeded largely according to its pre-established plans, albeit encountering some unavoidable delays. It had introduced several initiatives in the early months of 2020, prior to the full onset of the crisis. These initiatives included proposals for the InvestEU Programme (COM-2020-403) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM-2020-408). Both proposals directly identify the Covid-19 epidemic and its economic fallout as the referent subject, while presenting the European Union's economy as the referent object – framing which is markedly more specific compared to the framing of climate change and its respective referent objects. Thus, despite the challenges posed by the pandemic, the Commission swiftly reaffirmed its dedication to the European Green Deal and its climate-related objectives. Throughout the Covid-19 crisis, the Commission leveraged its capacity for setting agendas and building coalitions, drawing on its expertise and networks of Member State representatives and stakeholders. This approach enabled not only the preparation and submission of legislative proposals and the

continued implementation of the EGD but also the exploitation of the window of opportunity presented by the Covid-19 crisis to elevate the EGD as a central component of the crisis response (Dupont et al., 2020). The involvement of stakeholders is notable here, as it relates directly to the economic focus of referent object framing within the context of the securitization of Covid-19.

The InvestEU Programme proposal (COM-2020-403) is the first relevant policy proposal to securitise the Covid-19 pandemic, emphasising it as a “shock” to the EU’s economy (pp. 3) and the cause of an economic crisis (pp. 6). The proposal emphasises the urgency of the need for an implemented solution to address the damage caused by the pandemic (pp. 7, 9, 10) and to provide immediate support through a “crisis measure” (pp. 14), indicating a decree of extraordinary legislative initiative. The European Union’s economy is strongly identified as the referent object under threat. InvestEU Programme proposal was followed by a policy proposal for the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM-2020-408), similarly urging to mitigate the economic damage (pp. 5) and societal impact (pp. 6) caused by the pandemic.

Thus, despite the effects of the pandemic on the EGD, the Commission largely proceeded as scheduled, despite some delays. Nonetheless, it quickly reaffirmed its dedication to the European Green Deal and its climate initiatives, including the proposed Climate Law (Dupont et al., 2020). At this point the seemingly progressing securitization of Covid-19 as a referent subject could be presented as a beneficial factor, or at the very least a non-impeding factor for the EGD.

However, after the proposal of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, the framing of Covid-19 as the referent subject once more becomes formulaic in the relevant European Green Deal documents, utilising the template of “the necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the Union’s citizens” (COM-2021-551, COM-2021-555, COM-2021-563, COM-2021-568, COM-2021-571). The issue of the referent object was one again muddled, scattering the focus across various categories of entities subjected to threats and affording only a partial degree of securitization to the framing of Covid-19 as a threat. Additionally, the expression of a need for extraordinary measures quickly decreased as well.

Functioning as an agenda-setter, the Commission capitalised on the pandemic crisis to position its Green Deal as an exit strategy while securing funding to expedite the transition, earmarking a considerable portion for advancing 'green' objectives within the pandemic recovery efforts

(Bongardt & Torres, 2022). The Commission also used this as an opportunity to demonstrate its climate policy expertise and commitment to the green transition (Dupont et al., 2020), instilling a degree of institutional confidence in the continued efforts towards green transition. Indeed, the convergence of efforts to tackle both the climate and pandemic crises has enabled the EU, under the Commission's leadership, to leverage the Covid-19 pandemic crisis as an opportunity to bridge the gap between long-term goals and immediate policies and actions for a sustainable transition (Bongardt & Torres, 2022). However, despite that, the actual level of securitization of the European Green Deal utilising the Covid-19 pandemic as the referent subject is somewhat limited, despite being comparable in frequency to climate change framing.

4.2. Proposals following the invasion of Ukraine

Out of the 16 policy proposals presented by various Directorates-General of the European Commission (dominated largely by the Directorate-General for Energy) in the period between the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 and December 2023, the vast majority of documents are fully securitised, differing largely in the securitization intensity and degrees of urgency expressed within the texts. Due to the rippling effects of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, cases of securitization of the green transition and energy security in examined documents are dominated by the framing of Russian state aggression as the referent subject, with some retained securitization of climate change itself present alongside it.

4.2.1. Securitisation of climate change

While as demonstrated in the previous subchapter, the securitising framing of global climate change as a referent subject was rather limited, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has served as a catalyst which largely displaced the securitization of climate as the primary framed threat.

Ironically enough, despite the European Green Deal having been devised as a project to address the climate change risks faced by the European Union, the threat of climate change is now framed as a secondary compounding referent subject, serving “in tandem” with the effects of Russian state aggression on the European energy markets. In fact, the framing of climate change as the referent subject both before and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is limited both in frequency across the span of the documents as well as intensity of application within them.

As an example, a policy proposal for emergency intervention to address high energy prices resulting from the energy market disruption caused by the invasion of Ukraine (COM-2022-473), establishes how “record-breaking” temperatures which increase energy demand for cooling are contributing to the energy scarcity and price spikes resulting from Russian state aggression – a security risk which previously could have been sufficient enough to be framed as a threat to EU’s wellbeing by itself is now merely a compounding factor for Russia as the referent subject.

It should be noted however, that some specialised European Green Deal policy proposals can be seen continuing the previously set trend of ecological framing focus, particularly in cases where the subject of the proposal is not closely connected to disruptions resulting from Russian state aggression, such as a policy proposal on ambient air quality (COM-2022-542), which instead emphasises threats to the natural environment (pp. 2) and human health (pp. 3) as the referent objects. Pollution in particular, as a subset referent subject, is presented as an energy-adjacent sector of the European Green Deal which on the level of threat and risk framing remains largely unaffected by the effects of Russian state aggression, with several policy proposals for the deployment of renewable energy framing both climate change and pollution as “threats” to public health and safety (COM-2023-161, COM-2022-591, COM-2023-763) as referent objects.

Despite that, threats to the European energy supply (exemplified by Russian state activity) overtake the securitization of climate change as the European Green Deal’s *raison d’etre*.

4.2.2. Securitisation of Russian state aggression

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered an unprecedented energy crisis within the European Union, prompting a radical re-evaluation of the region's reliance on Russian energy resources. The conflict heightened concerns over energy security, as Europe grappled with the risk of supply disruptions and geopolitical uncertainties, as detailed in the policy proposal texts below. In response, the EU accelerated efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce dependency on Russian gas and oil. This crisis served as a catalyst for the EU's transition towards renewable energy and the development of alternative energy infrastructure, such as liquefied natural gas terminals and interconnectors. Additionally, the conflict underscored the importance of solidarity among EU member states in addressing energy challenges collectively and fostering greater cohesion in energy policy - as a result, the invasion of Ukraine spurred

efforts within the EU to reduce dependency on Russian energy resources, with the European Commission taking initiative to lead the transition, as can be seen in the following documents.

Less than a month following the invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, the European Commission published a policy proposal concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (COM-2022-135) in response to what is described in the document as “international tensions”, “dependence on third countries” or “ongoing geopolitical developments” (pp.2). Although not directly identifying the referent subject or any other possible causes of the “geopolitical situation” (pp. 3), the language used in the explanatory memorandum of the proposal can be identified as a speech act framing a threat that would be identifiable to the audience the speech act is addressed to, in this case EU institutions and Member States. Notably, the language of the proposal urges immediate action and the advancement of long-term green transition plans for the reduction of dependency on imported fossil fuels and price hikes (pp. 2), presenting the need for immediate extraordinary legislative acts to address the critical risks – but curiously enough, without identifying the referent subject and employing euphemisms instead.

Additionally, COM-2022-135 presents a set of securitising jargon that will remain largely consistent for the next two years of European Commission speech act communication, with such security-framing terms as “threats”, “urgent”, “unprecedented”, as well as the euphemistic term “geopolitical” from this point on commonly used to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian interference with the European Union’s energy supply in the Commission’s proposals. This jargon will be examined further in the data evaluation section (see part 4.3).

Thematically, this proposal presents the extraordinary legislative procedures proposed for the management of critical facilities such as gas storage (described in text as “strategic assets”, pp. 3) and justifying the expropriation of European energy storage facilities controlled by “third countries” to avoid undermining the “strategic autonomy” of the EU. The application of terms such as “geopolitical” and “strategic” underscores the shift towards speech indicating international confrontation, despite the lack of a stated referent subject.

This ambiguity is shortly after negated by the proposal for a directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (COM-2022-222), which immediately identifies Russia as the referent subject, establishing the Russian invasion of Ukraine as the geopolitical context for the “current international tensions” (pp. 2). The vague reference to “third countries” in COM-

2022-135 is replaced with an explicit call for a phase-out of Russian energy imports (pp. 3) and the resulting necessity for an increased pace of renewable energy adoption in the EU, as well as presenting energy efficiency as a means of counteracting the threat (pp. 4). The proposal further elaborates on the need for immediate coordinate EU-level “urgent” action, proposing an extraordinary measure to address the threat of energy insecurity. (pp. 5-7), presented later.

The resulting policy proposal for emergency intervention to address high energy prices (COM-2022-473) directly connects the economic issues resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic compounding with the consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The proposal immediately accents the extraordinary nature of the proposed measures (pp. 3, 14, 17), their temporary and exceptional nature, as well as emphasising the unprecedented nature of the threat presented by the referent subject (pp. 3, 12, 17, 19). It is therefore possible to conclude that there is a direct call for extraordinary measures to be adopted to mitigate the clearly identified threat – most clearly defined under the formulation of “no other, less intrusive measures can be envisaged that would as effectively achieve that objective” (pp.19). The proposal can be confidently described as fully securitised, with the European energy markets identified as the referent object, with spiking energy prices framed as the resulting consequences.

This policy proposal (COM-2022-473) is additionally notable as the first example of direct acknowledge of the weaponisation of energy by the referent subject in the form of the Russian Federation, with the text utilising the terms “weaponisation” (pp. 7, 17) and directly accusing the referent subject of “deliberately attempting to use energy as a political weapon” (pp. 2) as the explanation for the gas supply disruptions.

From this point on the identification of Russia as the referent subject becomes the accepted definition in policy proposal texts, even in only partly securitised texts (COM-2022-542) from the Directorate-General for the Environment, which utilise securitization as a framing device to justify the urgency of proposed measures and the threat from the referent subject that justifies their extraordinary adoption.

Continued attempts to provide solutions for the energy crisis led to further examples of the adoption of extraordinary measures, with an excellent example in the proposed regulation on better coordination of gas purchases (COM-2022-549), a document particularly rich in securitised framing and emphasis on implementation of extraordinary measures in response. This

can be seen as an establishment of consensus on the identification of actors under the new circumstances following the disruption of the previous status quo by the Russian state aggression against Ukraine. The text not only actively frames Russia as the referent subject (pp. 2, 3, 11, 14, 16, 17), but specifies the activities pursued by the referent subject to threaten the well-being of the referent object – namely through the weaponisation of energy supplies (pp. 2) and market manipulation through intentional disruption of gas supply (pp. 2, 3, 9). The use of urgency language remains consistent, with securitised terms such as “threat”, “unprecedented”, and “urgent/urgency” generously distributed throughout the text. The framing of Russia as an overarching threat, further emphasised by language use focusing on the severity of the threat, presents this and the following proposals as examples of full securitization.

However, despite the increased focus on energy sectors most vulnerable to what is framed as “Russian state manipulation” such as imported fossil fuels and gas supply, the same speech act application and language use can be observed in policy proposals focusing on the green transition, such as the proposal for a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy (COM-2022-591). The proposal displays the same framing of Russia as the referent subject (pp. 2, 3, 5), the same urgency language, and the same demand for extraordinary measures (pp. 3-5), signifying full securitization as per the used framework. This is notable, as it displays the aim to preserve the green transition as a securitised issue and could be considered an indicator that the securitising actor considers the securitization of Russian state aggression for justifying the green transition as a framing accepted by the targeted audience.

This intent is then directly demonstrated by deferring to the European Green Deal as the authoritative programme, referring to its objectives for “speeding up the reduction in dependency on Russian fossil fuels by deploying renewable energy at a large scale as an alternative source” (pp. 4). It is then followed by a call for collective securitization through a “coordinated European approach” for the deployment of renewable energy in order to both reach EU’s climate goals, as well as “phase out its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and reduce energy prices” (pp. 5).

These two segments serve as an exemplary demonstration of the thesis presented by Kuzemko et al. (2022), that Russian state aggression and energy led to the framing of clean energy supply as force capable of negating the risks of weaponisation of fossil fuels by hostile actors.

This advancement of collective securitization and conscious framing of Russian state aggression as a primary referent subject endangering the European Union and its energy market also carries over to regulative proposals, such as the proposal for a market correction mechanism to protect citizens and the economy against excessively high prices (COM-2022-668). Although regulative in nature, the proposal maintains the explicit framing of the Russian Federation as a referent subject (pp. 2, 3, 5, 6, 11) present in previous proposals, as well as further emphasising the weaponisation of energy by Russian state actors (pp. 5, 6). Weaponisation of energy is also used as the framing for the drastic reduction of Russian pipeline gas supply to the European Union, from 40% to 9% during the course of a single year (pp. 5). This framing of gas supply reduction as weaponisation is in turn used to justify extraordinary measures for Commission-led market intervention, which is then further emphasised by the description of the measures as a “unprecedented mechanism”, which by including such tasks as the functioning of commodity markets and security of supply, assumes new tasks which are explicitly stated to “**not currently** [be a] **part of the Commission’s role**” (pp.12). This is an exemplary demonstration of Commission’s speech acts following the Copenhagen School’s general framework of securitization, as detailed in the second chapter of this paper (see part 2.1).

By this point in the longitudinal study, policy proposals presented are published over a year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It is at this point that a relative decrease in securitising speech acts in energy-related policy proposals can be observed, with the frequency of securitised sections decreasing along with a general decrease in the use of urgency language. Several such examples are policy proposals for improving the Union’s protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market (COM-2023-147) and improving the Union’s electricity market design (COM-2023-148), which lack keywords emphasising the urgency of securitised measures. While it could be argued that the topic of the proposals, focusing on market regulation, is the reason for a generally low level of securitization, several of the previously covered policy proposals focused on the same policy field. As such, I would argue that this is rather a display of a form of routinisation, with identical formulations such as “Russia’s war against Ukraine and the weaponisation of energy” (pp. 2, pp. 2) and “unprecedented nature of the energy price crisis has shone a spotlight on EU electricity markets” (pp. 9, pp. 9) being used in both documents. Nevertheless, these proposals still display intentional securitization, with clearly identified

referent subjects and objects in the form of Russian weaponisation of energy and the European energy market.

This routinisation of the new securitised status quo is further reaffirmed by the three following policy proposals (COM-2023-160, COM-2023-161, COM-2023-335), which reduce the frequency of securitised segments to one per proposal. Although all three proposals reaffirm the status of Russia as the referent subject for the European Union's energy security, these proposals notably lack not only the urgency language, but also any emphasis on the extraordinariness of these proposals nor request any extraordinary additional competence for the Commission as an executive body. As such, these proposals can only be considered partly securitised, relegating securitising speech acts to passing reference.

One possibility to be considered, is that by this point the audience may have demonstrated their acceptance of securitization, leading to a decrease in the explicit repetition of securitising speech acts out of a lack of necessity. This possibility will be more closely inspected in the evaluation of audience acceptance in the data evaluation section (see part 4.3). The likelier possibility, however, is that the relative lack of securitization in the previous three policy proposals is due to the fact that they originate from financial bodies of the European Commission, namely the Directorate-General for Budget and Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs and are only partially connected to the topic of energy security.

This possibility is given further credence by the following three proposals from the Directorate-General for Energy, which once again display full securitization of Russian state aggression for the advancement of energy security goals. Although all three proposals (COM/2023/761, COM/2023/762, COM/2023/763) are amending previous regulation, they fully employ the various elements of securitization. The first two proposals largely utilise the same formulations, emphasising Russian state aggression as the referent subject and European energy markets as the referent objects, as well as hinting at the possibility of weaponisation of energy supply by the complete halt of continuing Russian gas supply, with both texts actively using references to Russia in a securitised context present Russia and Russian energy supply as a threat. However, despite heavily utilising the framing of Russia as a security threat, the measures proposed are not in themselves extraordinary, but rather potential mechanisms for extraordinary scenarios in the future. Furthermore, the texts lack the presence of urgency language – perhaps unsurprisingly,

considering the future focus of these proposals. Nevertheless, in function the proposals continue the trend of the Commission assuming more tasks which were not intended to be a part of the Commission's role (as previously referred to in COM-2022-668), therefore requesting extraordinary measures without explicitly describing them as such and thus being yet another example of full securitization in practice.

Finally, the last fully securitised document is the proposal for laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy (COM-2023-763), in line with the energy section of the European Green Deal. The proposal actively frames Russia as the reference subject (pp. 2, 4, 5, 9), with European energy market as the referent object (pp. 2). The proposal actively utilises urgency language (pp. 2, 8, 9) to emphasise the haste needed to address the threat by adopting the extraordinary measure at first opportunity. However, similarly to the previous two proposals, the emphasis is on securing a legal mechanism for future emergencies – but still applying full securitization to justify an immediate extraordinary adoption of the measure, through hinted references to the possibility of energy supply weaponisation by Russia (pp. 2, 4, 5)

The diversity of topics and measures covered by the policy proposals, while continuously utilising a near-identical framework of securitising speech acts over a period of two years, indicates that the securitization of the European Green Deal within the context of Russian weaponisation of the energy supply may have been accepted by the audience in the form of European institutions and Member States represented in them. But in order to further evaluate the degree of securitization of the European Green Deal, the extraordinariness of proposed policies, and their acceptance by the audience, the data collected during qualitative analysis will be evaluated as part of the data evaluation section.

4.3. Data evaluation

Following the discourse analysis of data in the securitised passages in 34 examined documents, the content of these passages will be evaluated in combination with other data accessed through the EUR-Lex database and provided documents. As such, this subchapter is intended to assess the degree of securitization, the categorisation of securitization, the extraordinariness of securitization proposals, and audience acceptance using available qualitative data.

For the brief initial evaluation, I utilised a word frequency analysis using MAXQDA’s built-in tools to examine the most common securitising terminology in the policy proposals, focusing on descriptive adjectives meant to evoke the concepts of threats and security in the target audience.

It should be noted that terms such as “energy crisis” and “energy supply crisis” are not identified as instances of securitising speech acts in this framework, due to the generally neutral wording of “crisis” which, while emphasising the abnormality of the situation avoids framing the issue as a threat nor identifies any referent subject. An exception to this is phrasing where the term “energy crisis” or “supply crisis” immediately follows a direct mention of Russian weaponisation of energy or disruptions caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as contextual material.

After filtering out non-descriptive adjectives, most commonly used as part of compound terms (e.g. renewable (energy), natural (gas), European (Union/Commission), etc), I was left with the following list of descriptive adjectives used to contextually indicate securitization:

- Russian (59 instances)
- Urgent/Urgency (21 instances)
- Unprecedented (24 instances)
- Extraordinary (6 instances)
- Geopolitical (23 instances)
- Exceptional (4 instances)

The word frequency analysis also demonstrated a frequent use of securitising nouns, represented overwhelmingly by post-war documents, with the list including such nouns as Russia (43 instances), Ukraine (36 instances), invasion (18 instances), aggression (10 instances), threat (9 instances), war (8 instances), weaponisation (8 instances), and manipulation (6 instances).

Excluding securitising terms directly related to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russian state aggression (e.g. Russian, Russia, Ukraine, geopolitical, invasion, aggression, weaponisation, war), I was left with the following keywords:

Threat, urgent, exceptional, extraordinary, unprecedented.

These keywords were then converted into a graph to represent their incidence over the examined timeframe of 2020 to 2023, marking the two years before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The resulting graph (Figure 1) demonstrates statistical patterns of securitised term use.




Figure 1. Prevalence of framing keywords across the 34 examined documents.

The statistical results are consistent with the intensification of the use of securitising speech acts by the European Commission as the securitising actor following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as demonstrated by the qualitative analysis of policy proposal documents. Additionally, it can be observed that the use of securitising terms precedes the Russian invasion, signifying that securitization was already implemented to a degree before the current conflict, as demonstrated in the qualitative analysis of the securitization of climate change and Covid-19.

4.3.1. Degree of securitization

While conducting the qualitative analysis of speech acts within explanatory memoranda of policy proposals, the relative degree of securitization was evaluated based on the categorisation proposed in the methodology chapter (see part 3). The policy proposals were then assigned a degree of securitization, based on a modified version of the triple categorisation of securitization by Eroukmanoff (2017): politicised, partly securitised, and fully securitised proposals.

2020						2021											
22	80	320	403	408	824	551	555	557	558	563	564	568	571	802	803	804	805
2022						2023											
135	222	473	542	549	591	668	147	148	160	161	335	761	762	763	794		

Politicised
 Partly securitised
 Fully securitised

Table 2. Securitisation degree of policy proposal documents.

This categorisation, largely detailed in the previous subchapter, resulted in the distribution of policy proposal securitization as seen on Table 2. It can be immediately observed that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine left a markable impact on the securitization of proposals relating to energy policy within the European Green Deal. While some degree of securitising speech acts is in majority of examined documents even before 2022, the majority are passing references provided for contextual purposes, with only a few policy proposals taking full advantage of securitised framing to justify extraordinary measures. However, this changes completely following the full invasion of Ukraine and intensified weaponisation of energy supply by the Russian Federation, with the majority of policy proposals utilising fully securitised speech acts to justify the adoption of extraordinary measures.

An additional factor that should be addressed is the identity of the securitising actor, i.e. the author of the speech acts within the policy proposals. Although all proposals are published by the European Commission, the composition of individual proposals is conducted by specific Directorates-General within the European Commission. Due to the focus of this research paper being the energy section of the European Green Deal, the Directorate-General for Energy takes a major role in the volume of contributions. However, as the fields of competence covered by Directorate-Generals may sometimes overlap (e.g., the coverage of energy-themed policy proposals by Directorate-Generals for Climate Action, Taxation and Customs, Budget, etc) , not all energy-related proposals are submitted by the body dedicated to energy policy. Inspecting the distribution of proposals submitted by the Directorate-General for Energy among the 34 documents examined for this paper, it becomes evident that the role of the Directorate-General has increased significantly starting from 2022: while before the full-scale invasion only roughly 39% of proposals were submitted by the Directorate-General for Energy, this proportion has more than doubled to 75% after it (Table 3).

2020						2021											
22	80	320	403	408	824	551	555	557	558	563	564	568	571	802	803	804	805
2022						2023											
135	222	473	542	549	591	668	147	148	160	161	335	761	762	763	794		

Table 3. Proposals submitted by the Directorate-General for Energy.

Curiously, the policy proposals presented by the Directorate-General for Energy before the full-scale invasion in 2022 are politicised but not securitised, with the proposed policies and challenges justifying their adoption in the explanatory memoranda composed in a neutral factual manner. Out of the pre-invasion proposals analysed in this paper, only the proposals presented by Directorate-Generals other than the Directorate-General for Energy can be seen framing Covid-19 and climate change as security threats requiring the adoption of extraordinary measures.

This trend is however radically reversed following the invasion, with all but one policy proposal by the Directorate-General for Energy displaying securitising framing of the Russian weaponisation of energy supplies in the context of the invasion of Ukraine, and not a single proposal by other Directorate-Generals being securitised in format.

4.3.2. Categories of securitization

In the course of the qualitative analysis, securitised segments were coded according to the category of referent subject they were addressing, divided into three categories as detailed earlier in the qualitative analysis sections: climate change, Covid-19, and Russian state aggression. The resulting data can be seen in Figure 2, providing a visual demonstration of the radical shift in the levels of securitising speech acts contained in the explanatory memoranda of policy proposals.

Initially following the adoption of the European Green Deal, the Commission can be observed utilising the pandemic crisis to frame the Green Deal as an exit strategy and to secure funds for accelerating the green transition under recovery funds, using its position as an agenda-setter (Bongardt & Torres, 2022). However, the framing of the effects of climate change and consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have then been largely supplanted by the framing of Russian state aggression as a referent subject. Additionally, the intensity and volume of securitization of Russian state aggression as the referent subject far exceeds the levels of attempted securitization of the European Green Deal's energy section before February 2022.

The energy sector of the European Green Deal has similarly shifted focus from a strategy package addressing climate change, to a climate strategy package addressing energy insecurity caused by Russian state manipulation, as previously observed in the assessment of qualitative




Figure 2. Categorisation of referent subject framing across the 34 examined documents.

data. The demonstrable impact of this shift in presentation has been so wide-reaching, that it is possible to speak of a policy re-framing of the very program of the energy sector of the European Green Deal to an energy security policy centred around the management of external threats.

4.3.3. Proportionality and extraordinariness

The principle of proportionality seeks to keep the actions taken by the European Union’s institutions within specified bounds, to avoid the possibility of policy proposals exceeding the legal limits and competences prescribed by the founding treaties of the European Union. Therefore, the concept of proportionality can be logically connected to the securitization theory’s own concept of “extraordinary” measures required to address existential threats. Furthermore, as it was established earlier that some scholars (e.g. Hofmann & Staeger) consider that “extraordinary” measures could be any measures that exceed the European Union treaty principles of the selection of energy sources being a sovereign decision of each Member State.

However, it should be noted that the format of proportionality sections of European Commission policy proposals is by default intended to explain the complete adherence of the proposals to EU treaties. This means that while proportionality section texts will attempt to normalise any attempt at extraordinary measures by justifying their adherence to the word of law, the volume of legal text required to justify it will be likely to increase to reflect it. And the assessment of the

proportionality sections of exploratory memoranda revealed a significant change in the volume of the sections before and after February 2022.




Figure 3. Length of proportionality sections across the 34 examined documents.

While the increased length of proportionality sections in policy proposals after February 2022 could theoretically be attributed to the growing volume of text in policy proposals, an examination of the text length of all 34 documents has demonstrated the opposite: the average length of a policy proposal was 62 pages before February 2022, and an average of 49 pages after it. Therefore, proportionality sections have more than doubled in size on average, despite a 20% reduction in the volume of an average policy proposal following February 2022.

Additionally, the examination of proportionality section texts demonstrates the use of urgency language and appeal to extraordinary threat faced by the referent object, including such formulation as “no other, less intrusive measures can be envisaged that would as effectively achieve that objective” (COM-2022-473) which attempts to downplay the stated intrusiveness of the measures, and “there is a demonstrable added value in acting at the Union level due to the scale, urgency and scope of the efforts needed” (COM-2023-160), emphasising the EU-spanning scope of the threat faced the referent object(s).

Although this method of measuring the dynamics of extraordinariness in policy proposals through statistical estimations is inevitably a form of circumstantial evidence, it nonetheless demonstrates the shifting dynamics in the justification of proportionality over the course of this

paper’s research timeframe and the increasing difficulty of justifying the proportionality of selected measures under the standard European legislative procedures.

4.3.4. Audience acceptance

The manner of assessing the fourth element of securitization, the acceptance of securitization framing by the audience, is left largely undetermined in securitization theory and there is no consensus among Copenhagen School scholars or any other practitioners of securitization theory on how a “successful” securitization can be empirically determined. However, this paper’s use of European Commission policy proposals, which utilise the EU’s standard legislative processes, provides a unique opportunity for a novel method for estimating audience acceptance of securitization through a longitudinal comparison of the length of the deliberation and adoption period, with consensus of both reviewing legislating bodies, before and after February 2022.




Figure 4. Period between proposal presentation and adoption into policy (in days).

Audience acceptance of securitization includes the expectation that the audience is persuaded by the sense of urgency motivated by “survival needs” (Balzacq et al., 2016), which applied to European policy proposal, deliberation, and adoption mechanisms could be expressed through the speed at which the standard legislative processes are conducted. As European legislative processes do not have a set time limit for the first reading of a policy proposal (Consilium Europa, 2024), the speed at which a proposal is adopted into policy could be considered an indicator of the audience’s conviction of the essential need to adopt a proposal into use.

The data on the specific dates of policy proposal presentation and their adoption into policy was accessed through the EUR-Lex database and then collected and formatted manually (Table 4).

The total duration of the adoption period per proposal has been compiled as a graph (Figure 4).

Code	Proposal	Status	Adoption	Duration (days)	Procedure
COM/2020/22	14/01/2020	Adopted	24/06/2021	527	OLP
COM/2020/80	04/03/2020	Adopted	30/06/2021	483	OLP
COM/2020/320	16/07/2020	Adopted	28/06/2021	347	NLP
COM/2020/403	29/05/2020	Adopted	24/03/2021	299	OLP
COM/2020/408	02/06/2020	Adopted	12/02/2021	255	OLP
COM/2020/824	15/12/2020	Adopted	30/05/2022	531	OLP
COM/2021/551	14/07/2021	Adopted	10/05/2023	665	OLP
COM/2021/555	14/07/2021	Adopted	19/04/2023	644	OLP
COM/2021/557	14/07/2021	Adopted	18/10/2023	826	OLP
COM/2021/558	14/07/2021	Adopted	13/09/2023	791	OLP
COM/2021/563	14/07/2021	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2021/564	14/07/2021	Adopted	10/05/2023	665	OLP
COM/2021/568	14/07/2021	Adopted	10/05/2023	665	OLP
COM/2021/571	14/07/2021	Adopted	19/04/2023	644	OLP
COM/2021/802	15/12/2021	Adopted	24/04/2024	861	OLP
COM/2021/803	15/12/2021	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2021/804	15/12/2021	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2021/805	15/12/2021	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2022/135	23/03/2022	Adopted	29/06/2022	98	OLP
COM/2022/222	18/05/2022	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2022/473	14/09/2022	Adopted	06/10/2022	22	NLP
COM/2022/542	26/10/2022	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2022/549	18/10/2022	Adopted	19/12/2022	62	NLP
COM/2022/591	09/11/2022	Adopted	22/12/2022	43	NLP
COM/2022/668	22/11/2022	Adopted	22/12/2022	30	NLP
COM/2023/147	14/03/2023	Adopted	11/04/2024	394	OLP
COM/2023/148	14/03/2023	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2023/160	16/03/2023	Adopted	11/04/2024	392	OLP
COM/2023/161	16/03/2023	Ongoing			OLP
COM/2023/335	20/06/2023	Adopted	29/02/2024	254	OLP
COM/2023/761	28/11/2023	Adopted	21/12/2023	23	NLP
COM/2023/762	28/11/2023	Adopted	21/12/2023	23	NLP
COM/2023/763	28/11/2023	Adopted	22/12/2023	24	NLP
COM/2023/794	13/12/2023	Adopted	05/02/2024	54	NLP

Table 4. Proposal dates, adoption dates, and spent duration per proposal (in days).

It can be immediately observed that the difference in adoption period duration before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine is drastic, with the pre-war adoption duration average being 585 days and the post-war adoption average being a mere 118 days, a reduction of nearly five times.

As previously stated, there is no consensus amongst the scholars of securitization theory about what could constitute a “successful” securitization. However, the demonstrably surged haste of policy deliberation and adoption compared to the standard European legislative duration in the pre-war period, could be considered a quantifiable metric of policy acceptance by the audience.

While it can be argued that this is an inevitable outcome of the energy crisis caused by Russian state aggression and the aftereffects of the Covid-19 pandemic, a continued intensified focus on the green transition and the European Green Deal should not be seen as the default option. The European Union has previously scaled down or abolished ambitious plans in response to various crises (Kuzemko et al., 2022), while many Member States could have secured more favourable deals in the short-term by turning back from the green transition to fossil fuel usage. Therefore, the administrative and legislative authority of the European Commission should not be discounted, and their capacity as a securitising actor may well be considered the deciding factor in the continued adoption of EGD goals. With this in mind, the securitising speech acts employed by the European Commission to justify the hastened adoption of new renewable energy policies under the aegis of the European Green Deal could be credited with what can be considered the securitization of the green energy transition in Europe.

However, is it also necessary to note the legislative procedures used for policy proposals over the course of the research timeframe, which as established in the literature review on European policy (see part 1.2) are divided into ordinary legislative procedures (OLP) and non-legislative procedures (NLP). Utilising the proposal data gathered through EUR-Lex, it is possible to observe the distribution of legislative procedures as seen on Table 4.

While only a single pre-invasion policy proposal utilised the non-legislative procedure (NLP), exactly half of the post-invasion proposals utilise NLP for their legislative process. Additionally, out of the post-invasion proposals examined in the analysis, two thirds of the proposals adopted by the time of this paper’s writing utilised NLP, while the three adopted proposals with the longest proposal periods (COM/2023/147, COM/2023/160, COM/2023/335) all utilise OLP.

This discrepancy is clarified by the intended uses of the procedures, with the ordinary legislative procedure used for making new laws and involving multiple stages of approval (Consilium Europa, 2024), and non-legislative procedures used for implementing or explaining existing laws and policies thus being generally faster and less resource-intensive (EUR-Lex, 2023).

However, I would argue that the choice for the expanded usage of the non-legislative procedure is in itself an act of increased audience acceptance of securitization. In fact, the process could be described as the European Commission (as the securitising actor) assuming greater authority over the management of the EU's energy resources and markets (as the referent objects) with the audience (European Parliament and Council) accepting this securitization and assumption of additional authority by the securitising actor. Therefore, the use of NLP is in itself an extraordinary act allowing for expedited adoption of securitised policy by the audience.

With that accounted for, it is clear that the effect of securitised legislation manifests in significant haste compared to pre-invasion deliberation duration for proposals concerning energy and the European Green Deal. This is despite the fact that European energy markets and energy supply have largely stabilised, though remaining considerably more turbulent than pre-invasion. Additionally, the novel method for the evaluation of audience acceptance has proved its efficacy within context of evaluating acceptance of extraordinary measures by the European Commission.

4.4. Discussion

With the empirical data collected from the discourse analysis and data evaluation, it is possible to apply this data towards answering the research question presented by this paper, namely how has the discourse on energy security been affected by Russia's energy weaponisation in the context of the European Green Deal and clean energy transition.

4.4.1. Effect of the war on contextualisation of energy security

The distinctive feature of securitization procedures in the environmental field is that according to Balzacq et al. (2016), efforts to securitise the environment most commonly result in politicisation instead of securitization, as environmental threats are too remote for the audience. And initially, the European Green Deal was contextualised around the need for addressing climate change, together with the contemporary issue of the Covid-19 pandemic. The European Commission

used the pandemic crisis as an opportunity to frame the Green Deal as an exit strategy and secure funds for accelerating the green transition under recovery funds, but the primary framing was that of an environmental agenda intended to achieve climate neutrality for the continent.

However, after February 2022, the framing of the effects of climate change and consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic have been largely supplanted by Russian state aggression as a referent subject. The energy sector of the European Green Deal has shifted its focus from addressing climate change to managing energy insecurity caused by Russian state manipulation of energy supplies. This shift is so significant that it can be seen as a policy re-framing of the energy sector of the European Green Deal into an energy security programme.

This implies that the promotion of clean energy supply is now explicitly positioned as a pathway towards energy systems that minimise the risks associated with fossil fuel weaponisation by external actors, namely Russia (Kuzemko et al., 2022). The war has thus served as the primary catalyst for a re-contextualisation of energy security in the European Union, shifting the focus from advantages of combatting climate change to energy insecurity and external threats.

As such, in practice, the concept of the clean energy transition has become detached from the issue of climate change and re-contextualised as mutually connected with energy security, driven by the recognition that renewable energy sources, unlike traditional fossil fuels, are not subject to external shocks. As a result, it can be argued that the shift towards renewable energy under the European Green Deal is now justified by the enhancement of energy security through the reduction of dependence on imported energy sources and increased resilience.

4.4.2. Securitisation of the European Green Deal

Prior to the 2022 Russian incursion into Ukraine, the conceptual vagueness of the EU's energy policy, capable of encompassing multiple frames and referent objects simultaneously, was unsuccessful in formulating policies that align directly with the realm of robust collective securitization. The speech acts of securitising actors have not broadly connected with their audience but have somewhat aided in the rejuvenation of the market integration of the EU's energy policy (Hofmann & Staeger, 2020). Furthermore, in the past, a renewed emphasis on the objectives of supply security has often been associated with a comparative downgrading of environmental and energy equity goals (Kuzemko et al., 2022).

However, as can be seen from both the discourse analysis and the data evaluation, the various crises faced by the European Union in recent years have not only not downgraded the advancement of clean energy transition policies under the European Green Deal but have been actively co-opted by the Commission as part of the securitised framing to justify elements of the EGD programme. While the partial securitization of the European Green Deal can be observed immediately from its adoption in the framing context of climate change and global pandemic crises, the seismic shift caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has established the security component of the EGD as its primary goal in ensuring the European Union's energy security.

This geopolitical securitization of the European Green Deal may greatly benefit the European Union's ambition to achieve climate neutrality and transition towards clean sustainable energy sources, considering the experiences of previous attempts at wide-scale climate related reforms. Referring to the decrease in climate initiatives immediately following the 2008 financial crisis, Dupont (2020) points out that simply maintaining a certain level of legislative ambition becomes insufficient, eventually leading to a new status quo – which could then be disrupted by a new precipitating event causing a new cycle of collective securitization, as per Dupont's interpretation of Sperling and Webber's collective securitization framework.

This interpretation was proven correct by the invasion of Ukraine and the resulting escalation of legislative ambition, as can be ascertained both from existing literature as well as the data provided in this chapter, with ambitious policy proposals being matched with extraordinarily short adoption periods. Furthermore, the legislative response to the weaponisation of energy by Russia has far exceeded the previous securitising attempts utilising climate change and pandemic as the referent subjects. It can thus be inferred that the securitization of the green energy transition for the sake of ensuring energy security is more effective at securing long-term policy adoption and implementation, with a specific tangible referent subject being a better representation of a threat for various audiences than more abstract threats more typical for securitization theory.

Main concerns at European level	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
Rising prices/inflation/cost of living	18%	9%	12%	24%	34%	32%	27%	20%
Environment and climate change	20%	20%	25%	26%	20%	20%	22%	16%
Energy supply	3%	3%	5%	16%	28%	26%	16%	11%

Table 5. Eurobarometer survey results on cost of living, climate, and energy supply (2020-2023).

Moreover, there is a variety of evidence to the decreasing relative importance of climate change to European Union’s population, compared to the more pressing threats which emerged in recent years, as can be gauged from Eurobarometer survey results (European Commission, 2020;2021; 2023). While climate change and environment consistently remain among what Europeans consider as “the main concerns for the EU”, their relative importance has consistently decreased relative to the combined concerns over cost of living and energy supply (Table 5). This is a cause for concern for the future of the European Green Deal under the continued emphasis on the environmental dimension of the programme, as changes in the composition of the European Parliament following the upcoming 2024 EP election combined with changes in the Council following national elections in Member States may follow public disinterest in climate change.

Securitisation of the European Green Deal as a solution to the continued weaponisation of energy by the Russian Federation may thus serve as a potent counteraction to this shift in public opinion and ensure the continuation of the clean energy transition under the European Green Deal.

4.4.3. Energy weaponisation and de-securitization

Finally, in order to assess the accuracy of the working hypothesis of this paper, it is necessary to examine the developing trends in the concepts of weaponisation and de-securitization, as observed in policy proposals over the course of the research timeframe.

The working hypothesis of this thesis was that the weaponisation of conventional energy sources by Russia triggers greater securitization of renewable energy sources by the European Union. Energy weaponisation is defined earlier in this paper (see part 1.1) as the use of energy as an economic and political weapon, including but not limited to the disruption of energy supplies or threatening the secure operation of critical energy infrastructure. The theme of the use of energy as a weapon is prevalent in policy proposals presented after February 2022, explicitly framing

Russia as the referent subject conducting the act of weaponisation against the European Union. The active widespread use of the concept of weaponisation also indicates its high degree of influence on legislative discourse by the European Commission, as the clearest possible demonstration of the framing of Russia as the referent subject threatening the European Union.

Furthermore, the contextual importance of the European Green Deal and clean energy transition in the energy security discourse by the Commission can be observed in a shifting of focus in the framing of what exactly Russia weaponised. While weaponisation is explicitly tied to gas supply disruptions in earlier policy proposals presented after February 2022 (e.g. COM-2022-473), as the securitization of European Union's energy security policy and European Green Deal develops, the terminology progresses to the manipulation of the markets (COM-2022-473, COM-2022-549, COM-2022-591) and finally culminates in the generalised formulation of the 'weaponisation of energy' (COM-2022-668, COM-2023-147, COM-2023-148, COM-2023-761, COM-2023-762). This can be interpreted as the shifting of the concept of energy weaponisation from being framed solely as a threat to gas supplies, to being used as for securitising other sources of energy – a necessary framing to justify the securitization of energy sources promoted by the European Green Deal's clean energy transition plans (e.g. wind, solar).

This, in combination with the explicit framing of renewable energy as a necessary tool for securing EU's energy independence from Russian fuel exports in policy proposals, can be seen as the confirmation of this paper's hypothesis that the weaponisation of conventional energy sources by Russia triggers greater securitization of renewable energy sources by the EU.

Curiously enough, the relative success which the European Union has experienced in transitioning away from reliance on the Russian energy supply has resulted in more than just the general acknowledgement of energy supply being weaponised against the European Union by a foreign fossil fuel producing actor. Successful transition process and phasing-out of Russian energy imports led to the inversion of the weaponisation concept to imply that energy transition towards independence can itself be weaponised against the former exporter (Kuzemko et al., 2022), which can be evidenced in policy proposal texts through justifications of energy transition as a necessary means for depriving the Russian Federation of export fees to finance its continued war of aggression against Ukraine.

These elements serve as indicators of the general level of confidence in the energy transition process – which leads to the inclusion of segments concerning the potential future de-securitization. While it is emphasised throughout policy proposals presented after February 2022 that the extraordinary regulatory measures are intended for the duration of emergency conditions, policy proposals advocating for the implementation of the clean energy transition under the European Green Deal include limited references to potential de-securitization, with the transition to clean energy sources presented as a means for ensuring long-term energy security.

It is notable that there are no instances in any of the studied documents where it would be explicitly stated that the cessation of the war in Ukraine by the Russian Federation would result in the restoration of the status quo in regard to Russian fossil fuel imports or the restoration of the Russian Federation as the EU's main supplier of fossil fuels. Rather, any mentions relating to the concept of de-securitization of the supply of fossil fuels relates to diversification of alternate suppliers, with many proposals explicitly stating the intention to permanently de-couple from Russian exports (e.g. COM-2022-549, COM-2022-591, COM-2022-668, COM-2023-161).

It is also notable that the frequency of the term “temporary” used to describe measures enacted by the policy proposals together with other terms (e.g. “exceptional and temporary”, “urgent and temporary”) stagnates over the course of the two years following February 2022. The use of the term “temporary” peaks in September 2022 (COM-2022-473) at 48 mentions in a single policy proposal, to oscillating between 10 and 5 mentions throughout the entirety of the year 2023.

It could thus be argued, that not only has the concept of energy weaponisation become generalised to justify the continued energy transition programme, but that it has become an enduring justification for the absence of a de-securitization strategy for Russian fossil fuel exports, with de-securitization entailing no return to status quo ante bellum with Russia.

CONCLUSION

In this turbulent age of geopolitical tensions, deteriorating climate conditions, and growing scepticism towards political measures aimed to address those issues, energy security becomes a cornerstone for a safe sustainable future for the European Union and its member states. While we can no longer depend on the threat of climate change to motivate our societies to strive towards climate neutrality and clean renewable energy sources, the bane of geopolitical risks served as an unexpected boon – the fear of energy supply weaponisation by Europe’s enemies became a much-needed source of consensus on the need to reduce Europe’s reliance on fossil fuels.

This thesis set out to explore the impact of Russia’s energy weaponisation on the discourse surrounding energy security within the context of the European Green Deal and the clean energy transition, based upon the hypothesis that posited that Russia's weaponisation of conventional energy sources would trigger greater securitization of renewable energy sources by the EU.

The theoretical and methodological basis of this thesis relied on the theory of collective securitization to evaluate European Commission’s policy proposal documents, analysed through a comprehensive discourse analysis and data evaluation of European Commission policy proposals for the energy section of the European Green Deal. The coded segments of these documents were then compiled and evaluated to determine longitudinal changes over the period of four years covered by the thesis, revealing evidence of securitization in the proposal text composition, extraordinariness of the proposed measures, and proposal approval by the audience in the form of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union.

As a result of the analysis, I have confirmed the hypothesis and developed several key findings which shed light on the evolving changing nature of the European Union’s energy policy.

Initially, the European Green Deal was framed predominantly as an environmental initiative aimed at combating climate change, with additional emphasis on recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. However, following the events of February 2022, the European Green Deal underwent a significant shift. The aggressive actions of Russia in Ukraine have re-contextualised the energy dimension of the European Green Deal, transforming its primary focus from climate change mitigation to addressing energy insecurity. This shift underscores the role of Russian

state aggression as a catalyst for redefining energy security in the EU, moving the narrative towards energy independence and resilience against external threats.

As a result, the securitization of the energy dimension of the European Green Deal has evolved significantly in response to the geopolitical landscape. Prior to 2022, EU energy policies struggled to achieve robust collective securitization, as evidenced by largely neutral wording of policy proposals. Post-invasion, however, there has been a pronounced shift. The European Commission has actively leveraged the crises to frame renewable energy not just as a moral and environmental imperative, but as a crucial element of energy security for the European Union as a whole. This has led to rapid policy development and adoption, as evidenced by the legislative ambition and short adoption periods for new measures aimed to adjust to the energy crisis.

The concept of energy weaponisation by Russia in itself has become integral to the EU's legislative response to Russian state aggression. Initially tied largely to gas supply disruptions, this concept has broadened to encompass the manipulation of energy markets and general energy weaponization by foreign actors. This shift has been critical in justifying the securitization of various renewable energy sources under the EGD. As a result, the transition towards renewable energy is now framed as a strategic move to diminish reliance on fossil fuels and enhance energy security from foreign threats and global energy crises.

Curiously, the success of the EU's transition away from Russian energy has introduced a nuanced dimension to the concept of energy weaponisation itself. The EU's strategy has not only been reactive but also pre-emptive, aiming to undercut Russia's economic leverage by reducing dependence on its fossil fuels and deprive it of funds for waging its war against Ukraine. Despite the declared temporary nature of the emergency measures, there is little indication that the EU intends to revert to pre-war energy supplier relations with Russia. Instead, long-term policies focus on diversifying energy sources and solidifying the transition to renewable energy as a permanent feature of EU energy policy, to avoid repeating the same disastrous over-reliance.

Therefore, to answer the main research question, I conclude that Russia's energy weaponisation has significantly impacted the discourse on energy security in the European Union, reinforcing the securitization of renewable energy sources and causing a shift from the previous

understanding of energy security as a stable supply of fossil fuels, as opposed to the ‘promotional’ development of renewable energy sources. The European Green Deal, initially an environmental initiative, has been reframed as a strategic energy security programme in response to these geopolitical challenges. This transformation highlights the EU’s commitment to reducing dependence on external energy sources and underscores the critical role of renewable energy in achieving long-term security and sustainability objectives, as well as the assumption of extraordinary degree of authority over energy policy by the European Commission, signifying further consolidation of the European Union as a governance actor in its own right.

The findings of this research thus not only validate the initial hypothesis but also provide valuable contributions to the understanding of the rapidly evolving landscape of European energy policy in the face of global challenges, as well as applications of collective securitisation.

Additionally, this research contributes a novel approach to measuring audience approval for extraordinary measures within the securitisation framework, achieved through the longitudinal study of the speed of policy proposal adoption process by legislative consensus (see part 4.3.4).

However, while the findings of this thesis indicate that securitization of a foreign actor as the external threat is an effective way to ensure the adoption of policy proposals to ensure strategic autonomy, the objective evaluation of the findings is complicated by certain differences in legislation published before and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, such as the choice of legislative procedure for proposed policies. Additionally, while the adoption of securitised policy proposals is tracked within the framework of this thesis, their effectiveness after adoption and the policies operation in practice is beyond the scope of this paper. As such it remains unclear whether policies passed under securitised framework can maintain their support after adoption and to what degree their implementation is followed through by Member States.

Therefore, based on both the conclusions and limitations of this thesis paper, I would suggest that further research utilise a similar method of longitudinal evaluation of securitised policy proposals, but with the main focus on evaluating practical implementation of adopted energy policies, in order to track their efficacy and recognition by European institutions and Member States following adoption by the European Commission and the Council of the European Union.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adomeit, H. (2016). Germany, the EU, and Russia: The Conflict over Nord Stream 2. *Centre for European Studies Policy Brief, 1*, 1-12.
- Balzacq, T. (2005). The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience and Context. *European Journal of International Relations, 11*(2), 171-201.
- Balzacq, T. (2011). Securitisation theory. *How security problems emerge and dissolve*.
- Balzacq, T. (2015). The 'Essence' of Securitisation: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological science of security. *International relations, 29*(1), 103-113.
- Balzacq, T., & Guzzini, S. (2015). Introduction: 'What kind of theory – if any – is securitization?'. *International Relations, 29*(1).
- Balzacq, T., Léonard, S., & Ruzicka, J. (2016). 'Securitisation' revisited: theory and cases. *International Relations, 30*(4), 494-531.
- Bongardt, A., & Torres, F. (2022). The European green deal: More than an exit strategy to the pandemic crisis, a building block of a sustainable European economic model. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 60*(1), 170-185.
- Boute, A. (2022). Weaponising energy: energy, trade, and investment law in the new geopolitical reality. *American Journal of International Law, 116* (4), 740-742.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Christou, O. (2021). Energy security in turbulent times towards the European Green Deal. *Politics and Governance, 9*(3), 360-369.
- Collins, A. (2005). Securitisation, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian Education. *The Pacific Review*.
- Consilium Europa (2020). *European Green Deal*. Retrieved: 09.05.2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/>
- Consilium Europa (2023). *Timeline - European Green Deal and Fit for 55*. Retrieved: 23.10.2023. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/green-deal/timeline-european-green-deal-and-fit-for-55/>
- Consilium Europa (2024). *The ordinary legislative procedure*. Retrieved: 12.05.2024. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ordinary-legislative-procedure/>
- EUR-Lex (2023). *Non-legislative procedures*. Retrieved: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/non-legislative-procedures.html>
- EUR-Lex (2024). *Principle of proportionality*. Retrieved: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/glossary/principle-of-proportionality.html>

- European Commission (2019). *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Green Deal*. Retrieved: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2019:640:FIN>
- European Commission (2020). *Standard Eurobarometer 93 Summer 2020*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2262>
- European Commission (2021). *Standard Eurobarometer 94 Winter 2020 – 2021*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2355>
- European Commission (2021). *Standard Eurobarometer 95 Spring 2021*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2532>
- European Commission (2022). *Standard Eurobarometer 96 Winter 2021-2022*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2553>
- European Commission (2022). *Standard Eurobarometer 97 Summer 2022*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2693>
- European Commission (2023). *Standard Eurobarometer 98 Winter 2022-2023*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2693>
- European Commission (2023). *Standard Eurobarometer 99 Spring 2023*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3052>
- European Commission (2023). *Standard Eurobarometer 100 Autumn 2023*. Retrieved: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3053>
- European Union (2020). *Types of legislation*. Retrieved: https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/law/types-legislation_en
- Dupont, C. (2020). The EU's collective securitization of climate change. In *Collective Securitisation and Security Governance in the European Union* (pp. 143-164). Routledge.
- Dupont, C., Oberthür, S., & Von Homeyer, I. (2020). The Covid-19 crisis: a critical juncture for EU climate policy development?. *Journal of European Integration*, 42(8), 1095-1110.
- Eroukhmanoff, C. (2017). Securitisation theory. *E-International Relations*, pp. 104-109
- Fairclough, N. (2012). Critical discourse analysis. In *The Routledge handbook of discourse analysis*. Routledge.
- Giuli, M., & Oberthür, S. (2023). Third time lucky? Reconciling EU climate and external energy policy during energy security crises. *Journal of European Integration*, 45(3), 395-412.
- Hartvig, Á. D., Kiss-Dobronyi, B., Kotek, P., Tóth, B. T., Gutzianas, I., & Zareczky, A. Z. (2024). The economic and energy security implications of the Russian energy weapon. *Energy*, 294.
- Hofmann, S. C., & Staeger, U. (2020). Frame contestation and collective securitization: the case of EU energy policy. In *Collective Securitisation and Security Governance in the European Union* (pp. 97-119). Routledge.

- International Energy Agency (2023). *Emergency response and energy security: Ensuring the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price*. Retrieved: 23.10.2023. <https://www.iea.org/about/emergency-response-and-energy-security>
- Kuzemko, C., Blondeel, M., Dupont, C., & Brisbois, M. C. (2022). Russia's war on Ukraine, European energy policy responses & implications for sustainable transformations. *Energy Research & Social Science*, 93, 102842.
- Leonard, M., Pisani-Ferry, J., Shapiro, J., Tagliapietra, S., & Wolff, G. B. (2021). *The geopolitics of the European green deal* (No. 04/2021).
- Lipschutz, R. D. (Ed.). (1995). *On Security*. Columbia University Press.
- Sperling, J., & Webber, M. (2020). The European Union: security governance and collective securitization. In *Collective Securitisation and Security Governance in the European Union* (pp. 2-34). Routledge.
- Wæver, O. (1989). Security, the speech act: Analysing the politics of a word. In *Research Training Seminar, Sostrup Manor* (pp. 25-26).
- Wagner, A., Werner, W., Cao, D., & Cao, D. (2007). Legal speech acts as intersubjective communicative action. *Interpretation, Law and the Construction of Meaning: Collected Papers on Legal Interpretation in Theory, Adjudication and Political Practice*, 65-82.
- Webber, J. S. (2019). *The European Union: security governance and collective securitization*. *West European Politics*, Volume 42

DOCUMENTS USED

COM/2020/22. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Just Transition Fund.

COM/2020/80. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law).

COM/2020/320. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION amending Decision 2008/376/EC on the adoption of the Research Programme of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel and on the multiannual technical guidelines for this programme.

COM/2020/403. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the InvestEU Programme.

COM/2020/408. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Recovery and Resilience Facility.

COM/2020/824. European Commission (2020). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013.

COM/2021/551. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757.

COM/2021/555. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on binding annual greenhouse gas emission reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 contributing to climate action to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement.

COM/2021/557. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 98/70/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652.

COM/2021/558. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on energy efficiency (recast).

COM/2021/563. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity (recast).

COM/2021/564. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism.

COM/2021/568. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a Social Climate Fund.

COM/2021/571. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards the amount of allowances to be placed in the market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme until 2030.

COM/2021/802. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the energy performance of buildings (recast).

COM/2021/803. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common rules for the internal markets in renewable and natural gases and in hydrogen.

COM/2021/804. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the internal markets for renewable and natural gases and for hydrogen (recast).

COM/2021/805. European Commission (2021). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on methane emissions reduction in the energy sector and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/942.

COM/2022/135. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and Regulation (EC) n°715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to natural gas transmission networks.

COM/2022/222. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy performance of buildings and Directive 2012/27/EU on energy efficiency.

COM/2022/473. European Commission (2022). European Commission (2022). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on an emergency intervention to address high energy prices.

COM/2022/542. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (recast).

COM/2022/549. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION Enhancing solidarity through better coordination of gas purchases, exchanges of gas across borders and reliable price benchmarks.

COM/2022/591. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.

COM/2022/668. European Commission (2022). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION Establishing a market correction mechanism to protect citizens and the economy against excessively high prices.

COM/2023/147. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) No 1227/2011 and (EU) 2019/942 to improve the Union's protection against market manipulation in the wholesale energy market.

COM/2023/148. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Regulations (EU) 2019/943 and (EU) 2019/942 as well as Directives (EU) 2018/2001 and (EU) 2019/944 to improve the Union's electricity market design.

COM/2023/160. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020.

COM/2023/161. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's net-zero technology products manufacturing ecosystem (Net Zero Industry Act).

COM/2023/335. European Commission (2023). REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform ('STEP') and amending Directive 2003/87/EC, Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241.

COM/2023/761. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2578 as regards the prolongation of its period of application.

COM/2023/762. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 as regards the prolongation of its period of application.

COM/2023/763. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION amending Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 laying down a framework to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.

COM/2023/794. European Commission (2023). Proposal for a COUNCIL DECISION on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community.

APPENDICES

Annex 1. Coded securitization discourse, climate change

Document	Coded Segments
COM-2020-80, p. 2	Tackling climate change is an urgent challenge. The atmosphere is warming, and <i>this is affecting citizens</i> already now. European citizens see climate change as a serious problem and want to see increased action. Climate Change is having an <i>increasingly severe impact</i> on our planet's eco-systems and biodiversity, in addition to our health and food systems.
COM-2020-80, p. 2	This urgent challenge calls for the EU to step up its action to show global leadership by becoming climate-neutral by 2050, covering all sectors of the economy and compensating, by 2050, not only any remaining CO2 but also any other remaining greenhouse gas emissions.
COM-2020-80, p. 3	In spite of efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, climate change is already having and will continue to have <i>impacts on the EU's environment, citizens and economy</i> .
COM-2020-80, p. 8	In spite of mitigation efforts, climate change is already <i>creating and will continue to create significant stress</i> in Europe and strengthening the efforts to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and <i>reduce vulnerability</i> is crucial, building on Union legislation which already addresses specific climate adaptation objectives. The development and implementation of adaptation strategies and plans is essential in this regard.
COM-2020-80, p. 10	It confirms that greenhouse gas emissions need to be urgently reduced, and that climate change needs to be limited to 1.5 °C, in particular to reduce the likelihood of extreme weather events.
COM-2020-824, p. 2	The Green Deal further emphasises that unavoidable climate change <i>will create significant impacts in Europe in spite of the mitigation efforts</i> . Hence, strengthening the efforts on climate proofing, resilience building, disaster prevention and preparedness is crucial.
COM-2021-551, p. 2	Tackling climate change is an urgent challenge. In line with the scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report, global net-zero CO2 emissions need to be achieved around 2050, and neutrality for all other greenhouse gases as soon as possible later in the century. This urgent challenge requires the EU to step up its action and demonstrate global leadership by becoming climate neutral by 2050.
COM-2021-555, p. 2	Tackling climate change is an urgent challenge. In line with the scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report, global net-zero CO2 emissions need to be achieved around 2050, and neutrality for all other greenhouse gases later in the century. This urgent challenge requires the EU

to step up its action and demonstrate global leadership by becoming climate neutral by 2050.

COM-2021-557,
p. 2 This revision of REDII is essential to achieve the increased climate target as well as to *protect our environment and health, reduce our energy dependency*, and contribute to the EU's technological and industrial leadership along with the creation of jobs and economic growth.

COM-2021-558,
p. 3 Addressing the water energy nexus is particularly important, due to increasing water and energy needs, or *increasing pressure on water resources due to climate change*.

COM-2021-564,
p. 2 The world is *facing a profound climate crisis and the challenges of climate change require a global response*. Strong international cooperation will strengthen the joint climate action needed by all the Parties of the Paris Agreement to meet the goal.

COM-2021-564,
p. 3 That would risk undermining the effectiveness of the EU's emission mitigation policies, and could also lead to an increase in their total emissions globally, thus jeopardising the reduction of GHG emissions that is **urgently** needed if the world is to keep the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.

COM-2021-571,
p. 2 Tackling climate change is an **urgent** challenge. In line with the scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report, global net-zero CO₂ emissions need to be achieved around 2050, and neutrality for all other greenhouse gases as soon as possible later in the century. This **urgent** challenge requires the EU to step up its action and demonstrate global leadership by becoming climate neutral by 2050.

COM-2021-805,
p. 2 There is thus a *need for a sharp, rapid and sustained reduction in methane emissions to slow down global warming* and improve air quality.

COM-2022-473,
p. 2 In parallel, record-breaking temperatures this summer have pushed up energy demand for cooling and have added pressure on electricity generation. The *extreme weather conditions have thus contributed to energy scarcity and high energy prices, constituting a burden for consumers and industry* and dampening the economic recovery.

COM-2022-542,
p. 2 In addition, air pollution **threatens** the environment through acidification, eutrophication, and ozone damage, *causing damage to forests, ecosystems and crops*.

COM-2022-542, p. 3	In addition, 2030 targets were introduced, two of them on air: to <i>reduce the health impacts of air pollution (premature deaths)</i> by more than 55%, and the share of EU ecosystems where air pollution threatens biodiversity by 25%.
COM-2022-591, p. 4	The proposal is in line with environmental objectives, as accelerated deployment of renewable energy is key to mitigate the impacts of both climate change and pollution, which are driving biodiversity loss and threaten <i>public health and safety</i> .
COM-2023-161, p. 2	The Net-Zero Industry Act is part of the actions announced in that context, aiming at simplifying the regulatory framework, and improving the investment environment for the Union’s manufacturing capacity of technologies that are key to meet the Union’s climate neutrality goals and ensure that our decarbonised energy system is resilient whilst contributing to reducing pollution, <i>to the benefit of public health and planetary environmental wellbeing</i> .
COM-2023-763, p. 7	The proposal is in line with environmental objectives, as accelerated deployment of renewable energy is key to mitigate the impacts of both climate change and pollution, which are driving biodiversity loss and threaten <i>public health and safety</i> .

Annex 2. Coded securitization discourse, Covid-19 pandemic

Document	Coded Segments
COM-2020-403, p. 3	The Covid-19 <i>pandemic is a major shock</i> to the global and Union economy.
COM-2020-403, p. 6	The InvestEU Programme should have the capacity to shape an EU strategy in tackling the still subdued investment activity in the Union accentuated by <i>the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic</i> .
COM-2020-403, p. 7	The proposal is complementary to the Solvency Support Instrument under the EFSI. The Solvency Support Instrument is intended to provide support for the near-term solvency needs arising from the <i>immediate fallout from the Covid-19 induced economic contraction</i> .
COM-2020-403, p. 9	The <i>economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic calls for a response at European level</i> to underpin a swift recovery of the Union economy by supporting companies and preserving Union value chains.
COM-2020-403, p. 10	The proposal envisages support to companies, value chains and ecosystems that are of strategic importance and it <i>reacts to vulnerabilities exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic</i> .
COM-2020-403, p. 14	The proposal is part of the package to counter the <i>negative economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and is a crisis measure</i> .

COM-2020-408, p. 5	Action at the Union level is needed to coordinate a powerful response to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and for the <i>mitigation of the huge economic fallout</i> .
COM-2020-408, p. 6	Such support would contribute to also mitigate the <i>societal impact caused by the present COVID-19 crisis</i> .
COM-2021-551, p. 2	The necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the <i>very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health, living and working conditions and well-being of the Union's citizens</i> .
COM-2021-555, p. 2	The necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the <i>very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the Union's citizens</i> .
COM-2021-555, p. 5	The combination of these policies and EU financial support will address the <i>economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic</i> and accelerate the shift to a clean and sustainable economy.
COM-2021-563, p. 2	The necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the <i>very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health and economic well-being of the Union's citizens</i> .
COM-2021-564, p. 12	The instrument will provide the EU with <i>necessary means to address the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic</i> and, therein, support investment in the green and digital transitions.
COM-2021-568, p. 2	The necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the <i>very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health, social and economic well-being of the Union's citizens</i> .
COM-2021-571, p. 2	The necessity and value of the European Green Deal have only grown in light of the very severe effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health, living and working conditions and well-being of the Union's citizens.

Annex 3. Coded securitization discourse, Russian aggression

Document	Coded Segments
COM-2022-135, p. 2	The potential threats to the security of gas supply of the EU, mainly linked to its dependence for primary energy from third countries, have already triggered preparations to deal with additional challenges.

COM-2022-135, p. 2	The <i>international tensions</i> have underlined the need of advancing plans and actions with the objective to become more independent from third countries. Accelerating the green transition will reduce emissions, reduce dependency on imported fossil fuels, and protect against price hikes. However, the current geopolitical situation requires additional <i>short term measures to deal with the market imbalances for energy and for securing supplies in the years ahead</i> . As supply disruptions of pipeline gas may occur anytime, measures introducing an insurance policy regarding the filling level of EU storage facilities are introduced.
COM-2022-135, p. 2	Given the ongoing geopolitical developments and high energy prices , an estimate of the foreseeable summer/winter spread is very unreliable. The situation is expected to be <i>particularly problematic ahead of next winter, as prices may be higher in summer than in winter</i> .
COM-2022-135, p. 3	Storage facilities are strategic assets and critical for the security of supply of the Union and its Member States. The control and use of storage facilities by third countries entities may create security of supply risks, impacting on other essential security interests, and <i>undermine further the strategic autonomy of the EU</i> .
COM-2022-135, p. 3	This proposal aims at addressing the <i>very significant risks for security of supply</i> and the Union's economy resulting from the <i>dramatically changed geopolitical situation</i> .
COM-2022-135, p. 3	It builds on the existing framework for gas security of supply and internal gas market rules, adding further measures needed to ensure security of supply of natural gas in the Union <i>in the context of the severe energy crisis caused by recent changes of the geopolitical situation</i> .
COM-2022-135, p. 3	However, since the geopolitical situation has significantly changed since December 2021 , enhanced measures to ensure security of supply have become crucial.
COM-2022-135, p. 4	Following the <i>recent geopolitical developments</i> , in March 2022, the Commission issued the 'REPowerEU' Communication for a Joint European Action for more affordable, <i>secure</i> and sustainable energy.
COM-2022-135, p. 4	The Communication <i>stressed not only the urgent need to full storage facilities</i> in the Union, but clarified also that it is possible to use state aid for financial support to the filling of storages.
COM-2022-135, p. 5	Because of <i>the risk and the significant effect of possible gas supply interruption on the entire Union</i> , there is a need for an EU level action.
COM-2022-135, p. 5	Given the unprecedented nature of the gas supply crisis and its transboundary effects , and the fact that EU countries are connected through a joint gas network, action at Union level is warranted, as <i>Member States alone cannot sufficiently effectively address the risk of serious economic difficulties resulting from significant supply disruptions in a coordinated manner</i> . Only EU action motivated by a spirit of solidarity between Member States can ensure an effective preparedness <i>against a supply disruption, which would lead to lasting harm for citizens and the economy</i> .

COM-2022-135, p. 5	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation and the significant threat for consumers and the EU economy in the event of gas supply disruptions , there is a clear need for coordinated and urgent action. Despite the urgency , the proposal takes into account that Member States will need some time to set up the necessary measures to ensure storage filling.
COM-2022-135, p. 5	Based on these consultations, the proposed 90% filling rate is a necessary and appropriate level in order to ensure security of supply over the winter in case of serious supply disruptions , without putting an excessive burden on Member States, energy companies or citizens.
COM-2022-135, p. 5	Due to the urgency of the proposal, <i>which is made in reaction to an unexpected geopolitical crisis and needs to be urgently</i> adopted to ensure filled storages ahead of the heating season, stakeholder consultations had to be kept less formal.
COM-2022-222, p. 2	The <i>current international tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the overall geopolitical context and the very high energy prices have exacerbated the need to accelerate energy efficiency and the deployment of renewable energy in the Union with the objective to have an energy system that is more independent from third countries</i> . Accelerating the green transition towards renewable energy and increased energy efficiency will reduce emissions, reduce dependency on imported fossil fuels and provide affordable energy prices to European citizens and businesses across all sectors of the economy.
COM-2022-222, p. 3	However, in the context of the <i>current geopolitical situation</i> additional measures are needed to further increase the supply of renewable energy in the Union. In particular, enhanced measures to accelerate permitting procedures for new renewable energy plants, or for adaption of existing installations, are required.
COM-2022-222, p. 3	However, given a <i>radical change in the market conditions for fossil fuels</i> used in power, heating and transport since, including as concerns increased prices and <i>the need for the EU to phase-out its dependence on energy imports from Russia</i> , it is necessary to raise the 2030 target for renewables to 45% so that they better contribute to this objective as well as to having competitive energy prices.
COM-2022-222, p. 4	However, given the <i>high energy prices and a radical change in market conditions</i> leading to an increased cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency measures and the need for the Union to <i>overcome its dependence on fossil fuels and energy imports from Russia</i> , it is necessary to further raise the 2030 target for energy efficiency to 13% to ensure that this objective and the decarbonisation targets are achieved fast and in a cost-effective way.
COM-2022-222, p. 4	Following the <i>recent geopolitical developments</i> , in March 2022 the Commission issued the REPowerEU Communication. In accordance with the REPowerEU Communication, the Commission has published a recommendation on speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects, accompanied by guidance to help the Member States speed up permitting for renewable energy plants. This will give Member States the tools to already start reducing the time taken to approve applications for renewable energy plants, and so to quickly respond to the unprecedented energy crisis caused by the current geopolitical situation .

COM-2022-222, p. 5	While Member States can take action to address those barriers which exist at national level, a coordinated European approach to shortening and simplifying permit-granting procedures and administrative processes is needed in order to speed up the necessary deployment of renewable energies. This is in turn necessary for the EU to reach its climate and energy 2030 targets and its long-term objective of climate neutrality as well as <i>phase out its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and reduce energy prices.</i>
COM-2022-222, p. 5 - 6	In view of the urgency to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment across all Member States, action at EU level is more likely to achieve the required objectives than national or local action alone.
COM-2022-222, p. 6	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the high energy prices , there is a clear need for coordinated and urgent action to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources.
COM-2022-222, p. 6	[This is] considered appropriate given the imperative of meeting the 2030 climate and energy targets and the objective of climate neutrality laid down in the European Climate Law as well as the urgency to reduce both Union's energy dependency and energy prices.
COM-2022-222, p. 6	This revision of Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Directive 2012/27/EU and Directive 2010/31/EU is limited to what is considered necessary to have renewable energy and energy efficiency targets that are consistent with <i>the current pressing context</i> and to increase solar installations on buildings and streamline permit-granting procedures in order to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy.
COM-2022-222, p. 7	Due to the urgency of the proposal, which is put forward in <i>reaction to the crisis triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine</i> and the resulting need to urgently accelerate the deployment of renewable energy, the Commission builds on the results of these consultations.
COM-2022-473, p. 2	<i>Gas and electricity prices have reached record levels in 2022 and hit all-time highs following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.</i> Over the past year, electricity prices in Europe have <i>rapidly risen to level much higher than in recent decades.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 2	Prices started rising rapidly last summer when the world economy picked up after COVID-19 restrictions were eased. Subsequently, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated this situation.
COM-2022-473, p. 2	<i>Energy prices are expected to remain high due to uncertainty in the market following a series of gas supply disruptions that can only be explained by a deliberate attempt by Russia to use energy as a political weapon.</i> Further disruptions of Russian gas supplies to the EU in the forthcoming weeks or months may result in even higher levels of gas prices with knock-on effects for the price of electricity, the level of inflation and its <i>impact on citizens as well as the overall financial and macroeconomic stability of the EU.</i>

COM-2022-473, p. 3	The Union is thus faced with an extraordinary situation. The <i>current unprecedented challenges</i> call for putting in place appropriate, proportionate and temporary measures, to be taken in a spirit of solidarity, in order to address the severe difficulties arising in the area of energy and overcome the energy crisis by acting together.
COM-2022-473, p. 4	The very high energy prices currently faced by consumers generate exceedingly large financial gains not only for electricity generators with lower marginal costs, but also for companies in the oil, gas, coal and refinery sectors. <i>These gains are primarily due to favourable external market factors caused by the Russian war</i> and not by companies' own additional efforts or investment.
COM-2022-473, p. 4	By reducing the revenues of electricity producers, the measure proposed in the Regulation aims to mimic the market outcome that producers could have expected if global supply chains would function normally, <i>in the absence of the gas supply disruptions that have taken place since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 7	It mimics the market outcomes for these technologies that could be expected <i>were global supply chains functioning normally and not subject to the weaponisation of energy through gas supply disruptions.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 7	To avoid undermining the assessment of profitability when investment decisions were made, the cap should therefore not be set below the expectations of market participants as to the average level of electricity prices in the hours during which the demand for electricity was at its highest, before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.
COM-2022-473, p. 9	Since the invasion of Ukraine , <i>the prices of natural gas and hard coal have increased sharply</i> , leading to break-even generation price above the cap level. If gas-fired and coal-fired power plants were subject to the revenue cap, they would not be able to cover their operating costs and would be pushed out of activity.
COM-2022-473, p. 12	EU leaders and the Commission have therefore <i>identified an urgent need for additional measures</i> to mitigate the impact of these events on EU citizens and economic operators, and <i>to stave off an even more acute crisis.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 12	This solidarity contribution is an exceptional and temporary measure appropriate to the current situation that Member States would take in a spirit of solidarity to mitigate the direct economic effects of the soaring energy prices for public authorities' budgets, consumers and businesses across the Union.
COM-2022-473, p. 14	The proposed initiative responds to the increased retail price burden being felt by all electricity consumers and <i>the need to reduce demand and save gas this winter as a result of Russia's war against Ukraine.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 14	The proposal is an extraordinary measure , to be applied for a limited time, that is consistent with a broader set of initiatives to enhance the Union's energy resilience and <i>to mitigate the risk or impact of possible emergency situations.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 17	Because of the significant uncertainty in the Union electricity market and the resulting extraordinary high prices caused by the weaponisation of gas supply by Russia , there is a need for action at Union level. A coordinated approach

	through Union-wide electricity demand reduction, in the spirit of solidarity, is necessary to <i>minimise the risk of potential major disruptions during the winter months</i> when electricity consumption and electricity production from gas will be higher.
COM-2022-473, p. 17	Given the unprecedented nature of the gas supply crisis and the role of gas as a key technology to meet electricity demand, action at Union level regarding electricity markets is also warranted.
COM-2022-473, p. 19	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation and the significant threat for citizens' livelihood and the EU economy , there is a clear need for coordinated action.
COM-2022-473, p. 19	At the same time, <i>no other, less intrusive measures can be envisaged that would as effectively achieve that objective.</i>
COM-2022-473, p. 20	The solidarity contribution is also of a temporary nature and limited to those surplus profits made in the fiscal year 2022, and is applied only to surplus profits of the oil, gas, coal and refinery sectors, taking into consideration the <i>unexpected profits earned as a result of unpredictable circumstances.</i>
COM-2022-542, p. 3	The Russian military aggression against Ukraine , which started in February 2022, led EU leaders to agree on the need to urgently accelerate the transition to clean energy production, with a view to reducing the EU's dependence on gas and other fossil fuels imported from Russia . On 18 May 2022 an ambitious RePowerEU package of measures was adopted, aimed amongst others at assisting Member States in speeding up the deployment of renewable energy production.
COM-2022-549, p. 2	Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine and its weaponisation of energy supplies has exposed the Union's dependency on Russian fossil fuels, tested our tools to ensure security of supply, and driven energy prices to unprecedented levels.
COM-2022-549, p. 2	At the same time, the weaponisation of gas supply and the Russian Federation's manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have led to skyrocketing energy prices in the Union, endangering not only the economy in the Union, but also seriously undermining security of supply . A coordinated and swift reply from the EU is therefore needed. Russian gas supplies decreased significantly, down to 9% of our pipeline gas supply in September 2022 and 14% when including LNG, compared to a 41% share of Russian pipeline gas and 45% when including LNG in 2021. <i>The apparent sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline increases the need to substitute Russian gas volumes quickly.</i>
COM-2022-549, p. 3	First, it is <i>highly probable that less and most likely no pipeline gas will arrive in the EU from Russia given the current political situation.</i>
COM-2022-549, p. 3	Therefore, the Commission proposes this emergency regulation, which aims at <i>mitigating the impact on the price for gas by addressing demand and supply,</i>

ensuring **security** of supply across the entire European Union, and enhancing solidarity.

COM-2022-549,
p. 3

The current proposal provides certainty as to the price to be used in a context of gas scarcity, when an emergency situation is declared. It also proposes a complementary benchmark on liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies to *ensure a representative benchmark for LNG imports not influenced by **Russia's manipulation***.

COM-2022-549,
p. 5

The objective of joint purchasing is to support EU undertakings in their efforts to obtain additional gas and help to ensure more equal access to new or additional gas sources in the face of the *current acute **threat to the security of supplies***.

COM-2022-549,
p. 9

The EU's LNG market is still emerging, and hub indexed pricing remains highly influenced by pipeline supplies and therefore by the **Russian manipulation of natural gas supplies to the EU**, as well as by existing infrastructure bottlenecks.

COM-2022-549,
p. 9

There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are indispensable to replace the supply *shortfalls caused by the likely halt of Russian gas imports*.

COM-2022-549,
p. 11

In addition, the recently adopted Gas Storage Regulation (EU) 2022/103211 *introduced storage obligations in response to the **Russian invasion of Ukraine***.

COM-2022-549,
p. 11

*Following the **Russian invasion of Ukraine**, the EU has set out the REPowerEU Plan with the aim to end the EU's dependency on **Russian fossil fuels**, as soon as possible and at the latest by 2027.*

COM-2022-549,
p. 11

The proposal also fully reflects the goal of the Demand Reduction Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 to *pro-actively reduce gas demand to mitigate potential supply disruptions due to **Russia's invasion of Ukraine***. Demand reduction remains a *key pillar of our **security of supply response*** and the proposal strengthens this pillar by allowing Member States to undertake savings from non-essential consumption, while still protecting vulnerable and other protected customers.

COM-2022-549,
p. 11

Moreover it is also consistent with the requirements of the recently adopted Gas Storage Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 *introducing storage obligations in response to the **Russian invasion of Ukraine***.

COM-2022-549,
p. 14

The *current shortage of gas supplies from the **Russian Federation** constitutes a severe difficulty in the supply of an energy product* within the meaning of Article 122. EU leaders and Commission have identified the **urgent need for additional measures** for more coordinated action, on a temporary basis, *in order to be better prepared for possible further gas disruptions in the coming two winters*.

COM-2022-549,
p. 15

The **urgency situation** fully justifies the use of Article 122 TFEU in order to establish an entity as soon as possible by contracting the necessary services from existing entities.

COM-2022-549,
p. 16

The planned measures of the present initiative are fully in line with the subsidiarity principle. *Because of the scale and the significant effect of further cuts in gas supply on the part of the **Russian Federation***, there is a need for EU level action.

COM-2022-549, p. 16	Given the unprecedented <i>nature of the gas supply crisis</i> and its cross-border effects, as well as the level of integration of the EU internal energy market, action at Union level is warranted as <i>Member States alone cannot effectively address the risk of serious economic difficulties resulting from price hikes or significant supply disruptions in a coordinated manner.</i>
COM-2022-549, p. 17	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical <i>situation and the significant threat for citizens and the EU economy</i> , there is a clear need for coordinated action.
COM-2022-549, p. 17	<i>Natural gas arriving through the entry points from the Russian Federation is excluded from participating in the mechanism as its inclusion would contradict the objective of the proposed Regulation which seeks to ensure sources alternative to Russian supplies. Moreover, undertakings controlled by the Russian Government or any Russian natural or legal person; or undertakings controlled by any other natural or legal person, listed in the sanctions of the Union established on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, are excluded from participating in joint purchasing as well as in participating in the service provider operating joint purchasing.</i>
COM-2022-591, p. 2	The European Green Deal put renewable energy at the heart of the clean energy transition. <i>The current international tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the overall geopolitical context and the very high energy prices have exacerbated the need to accelerate energy efficiency and the deployment of renewable energy in the Union with the objective to phase out EU’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels.</i>
COM-2022-591, p. 2	Since the publication of the REPowerEU plan on 18 May 2022, <i>the situation of the energy crisis has worsened, calling for urgent action.</i>
COM-2022-591, p. 2	In that context, <i>the ongoing crisis calls for temporary but immediate action to achieve some of its objectives faster</i> , including accelerating Europe’s clean energy transition.
COM-2022-591, p. 3	The proposed instrument sets out <i>temporary, proportionate and extraordinary measures</i> . It complements existing relevant EU initiatives and legislation and is complementary to the initiatives already taken by the Commission to respond to the current crisis in energy markets. It builds upon the “REPowerEU” Plan of 18 May 2022 which puts the massive speed-up and scale-up in renewable energy in power generation, industry, buildings and transport <i>at the core of the strategy to accelerate the phasing out of Russian fossil fuels.</i>
COM-2022-591, p. 3	The proposed regulation reflects the need to take urgent <i>action in response to the energy crisis</i> , as called for by the above-mentioned European Council conclusions. It aims to address the current energy crisis through focused immediate action that accelerates the deployment of renewable energy projects which have high potential of rapid and effective impact.
COM-2022-591, p. 4	The proposal is an extraordinary <i>measure, to be applied for a limited time</i> , which is consistent with a broader set of initiatives to enhance the Union’s energy resilience and <i>to mitigate the impact of high energy prices and potential disruptions of the energy supplies.</i>

COM-2022-591, p. 4	The proposal is fully in line with the Commission's European Green Deal ambition for faster decarbonisation, and roll-out of renewable energy projects and builds upon the objectives <i>for speeding up the reduction in dependency on Russian fossil fuels</i> by deploying renewable energy at a large scale as an alternative source.
COM-2022-591, p. 4	The weaponisation of gas supply and the Russian Federation's manipulation of the markets through intentional disruptions of gas flows have led not only to <i>skyrocketing energy prices, but also to endangering security of supply</i> . Soaring electricity prices are putting a significant burden on consumers and businesses, and if no action is taken, <i>they risk reaching unsustainable levels, which could have significant wider social and economic implications</i> .
COM-2022-591, p. 4	EU leaders and the Commission have identified the urgent need for additional measures to help increase access to renewable energy to mitigate the impact on EU citizens, improve security of supply and be better prepared for the coming winter.
COM-2022-591, p. 5	A coordinated European approach to shortening and simplifying permit-granting procedures and administrative processes is needed to speed up the necessary deployment of renewable energies. This is in turn necessary for the EU to reach its climate and energy 2030 targets, its long-term objectives of climate neutrality and zero pollution as well as phase out its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and reduce energy prices.
COM-2022-591, p. 5	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine , the continuous highly volatile energy prices and the need to ensure Europe's energy security of supply for the upcoming winter season and throughout next year, there is a clear need for coordinated and urgent action to immediately accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources in addition to the actions proposed by the Commission as part of the REPowerEU plan of 18 May 2022.
COM-2022-591, p. 5	Taking into account the urgent need to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy projects to replace gas and <i>given the scale of the energy crisis, the potential of its social, economic and financial impacts and the urgency to mitigate them</i> , the Commission deems it suitable to act by way of a regulation which is of general scope and directly and immediately applicable.
COM-2022-668, p. 2	Ukraine crisis leading to unprecedented price hikes and severe economic harm. Russia's unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and its weaponisation of energy have provoked an unprecedented energy crisis , particularly affecting the Union. This has led to a sharp rise in energy prices, driving inflation and <i>compromising our security of energy supply</i> . Russia has engaged in intentional disruptions and supply manipulations, affecting European natural gas prices and the equilibrium of price formation in energy markets. Russia's decision to cut-off supply through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline and disrupt supplies to several EU Member States, the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, and the necessity to find new supply sources and routes on short notice has brought this crisis to a new stage. The EU is committed to phasing-out completely its dependence on Russian fossil fuels , as set out in the Commission's

	Communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ by reducing demand, <i>accelerating the roll-out of renewables and replacing Russian gas by alternative supplies from trusted partners</i> via the Energy Platform.
COM-2022-668, p. 2	While markets had already reacted with a significant increase of gas prices since the start of the Russian aggression towards Ukraine , natural gas prices have seen unprecedented price peaks, reaching all-time highs in the whole second half of August 2022.
COM-2022-668, p. 3	Russia's aggression against Ukraine <i>continues to negatively affect the entire Union economy, setting it on a path of lower growth and higher inflation</i> compared to the Commission Spring Forecast.
COM-2022-668, p. 3	With the <i>current low levels of Russian natural gas flows to Europe, already reduced to 9% of the EU total gas pipeline imports, and the perspective that they will not rise to pre-war levels, the situation on gas and financial markets remains challenging in the EU. The unprecedented change of gas supply and transport routes, combined with market and price formation instruments that were not tailored to a situation of a supply shock, exposes European consumers and business to a manifest risk of further potential episodes of economically damaging gas price spikes.</i>
COM-2022-668, p. 5	Russia’s unprovoked aggression against Ukraine and the weaponisation of energy by Russia <i>are having a profound structural impact on the natural gas markets in Europe, fundamentally changing the origin of supplies in Europe and the way gas flows inside the EU. Supply disruptions from Russia have brought the proportion of Russian pipeline gas out of total pipeline imports in the EU from 40% to 9% during the course of this year. The infrastructure needed to accommodate the necessary flows from other sources is not yet available.</i>
COM-2022-668, p. 6	<i>Market tools serving the European markets were not tailored and developed to tackle the current market situation, characterised by a massive supply shock and driven by the ‘weaponisation’ of energy by Russia, that results in the EU paying a premium for its gas. Likewise, the European electricity market design was not prepared for <i>such a crisis situation</i> but the extraordinary high gas prices have led to high electricity prices and unprecedented revenues to inframarginal production technologies.</i>
COM-2022-668, p. 6	The instances of abnormally high TTF prices, and their reverberation on the general level of natural gas prices in Europe, has prompted <i>numerous calls at political level for urgent and temporary intervention.</i>
COM-2022-668, p. 11	<i>Following the Russian aggression against Ukraine, gas prices have reached unforeseen levels with extreme hikes</i> in particular in August 2022. The volatility of gas markets, the unseen increases in gas prices, and the exceptional hikes have impacted different Member States in unequal ways.
COM-2022-668, p. 11	Given the unprecedented <i>nature of the gas supply crisis</i> and its transboundary effects, action at Union level is warranted as Member States alone cannot sufficiently effectively address the <i>risk of serious economic difficulties resulting from sharp rise in energy prices and significant supply disruptions.</i>

COM-2022-668, p. 12	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation and the significant threat for citizens and the EU economy, there is a clear need for coordinated action.
COM-2022-668, p. 13	This unprecedented mechanism entails tasks – including on the functioning of commodity markets and security of supply – that are not currently part of the Commission’s role.
COM-2023-147, p. 2	Energy prices significantly increased throughout 2021 and 2022. This resulted from reductions in gas supply, particularly after the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the weaponisation of energy as well as from domestic shortfalls in hydropower and nuclear power.
COM-2023-147, p. 3	However, the crisis also showed <i>how exposed consumers and industries are and our lack of resilience to energy price spikes.</i>
COM-2023-147, p. 4	Finally, in the Report on the final outcome of the Conference on the Future of Europe, citizens asked the EU institutions to take measures to “Enhance European energy security , and achieve the EU’s energy independence” and to ‘Reduce dependency of EU from foreign actors in economically strategic sectors’, including energy
COM-2023-147, p. 9	The unprecedented nature of the energy price crisis has shone a spotlight on EU electricity markets. Despite the growing shares of low-cost renewables electricity across the EU, there is a continuing influence of fossil-fuel generated electricity on overall energy bills. Households and businesses across the EU have experienced skyrocketing energy prices during the crisis.
COM-2023-148, p. 2	Energy prices significantly increased throughout 2021 and 2022. This resulted from reductions in gas supply, particularly after the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the weaponisation of energy as well as from domestic shortfalls in hydropower and nuclear power.
COM-2023-148, p. 2	As well as the REPowerEU plan with further measures and funding to boost energy efficiency and renewable energy <i>in order to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels.</i>
COM-2023-148, p. 4	Ultimately, it will mean that less fossil fuel generation is needed and will lead to lower prices for consumers <i>during future fossil fuel crisis</i> due to the low operational costs of renewable and low carbon energy.
COM-2023-148, p. 9	The unprecedented nature of the energy price crisis has shone a spotlight on EU electricity markets. Despite the growing shares of low-cost renewables electricity across the EU, there is a continuing influence of fossil-fuel generated electricity on overall energy bills. Households and businesses across the EU have experienced skyrocketing energy prices during the crisis.
COM-2023-160, p. 2	<i>Disruption in the supply of essential goods during the COVID-19 crisis and the energy crisis sparked by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have highlighted the EU’s structural supply dependencies and their potentially</i>

damaging effects in times of crisis. The central importance of critical raw materials for the green and digital transitions, and for defence and space applications, means that a disruption in their supply would have significant adverse effects for industry in the EU. This would jeopardise the functioning of the single market and damage the EU's competitiveness, while putting at stake jobs and job creation and affecting working conditions and wages.

COM-2023-161,
p. 19

*The higher energy prices after the **unjustified and unlawful military aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine**, gave a strong impetus to accelerate the implementation of the European Green Deal and reinforce the resilience of the Energy Union by speeding up the clean energy transition and ending any dependence on fossil fuels exported from the **Russian Federation**. The REPowerEU plan plays a key role in responding to the hardships and global energy market disruption caused by the **invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation**.*

COM-2023-335,
p. 4

*The Recovery and Resilience Facility and REPowerEU, the EU's plan to make Europe independent from **Russian fossil fuels**, offer **unprecedented opportunities to Member States** to finance green and digital investments and reforms.*

COM-2023-761,
p. 2

*Since **Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine**, supplies of gas to the EU by **Russia** have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political **weapon**. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia was less than 10% of the EU's gas imports in the first half of 2023.*

COM-2023-761,
p. 2

*The supply shock caused by **Russia** had significant impacts on gas price level in the EU.*

COM-2023-761,
p. 3

*Due to the significant decrease in **Russian** pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis. With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, if these unreliable imports are not disrupted altogether. This would be approximately 110 bcm less than in 2021.*

COM-2023-761,
p. 4

*Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, **in addition to Ukraine** (Azerbaijan, Middle East) and this is deteriorating the **threat** landscape.*

COM-2023-761,
p. 8

*Moreover, the mechanism is not meant to intervene into the normal interplay of demand and supply or to "cap" ordinary price setting. It may only be triggered under very **exceptional** circumstances when the price increases at the TTF are unrelated to the evolution of international prices, momentarily putting its*

	suitability as a reference price into doubt. The market correction mechanism will only be triggered under exceptional circumstances for a strictly limited time.
COM-2023-761, p. 8	Therefore, the market correction mechanism does not go beyond what is necessary for attaining the policy objective pursued and is proportionate of <i>achieving the objective of mitigating the impact of abnormally high gas prices</i> . The prolongation by one year is necessary due to the persistent nature of the severe difficulties for energy supply and the resulting risks for prices and security of supply which are expected to continue at least during the whole of 2024, as more structural changes of the market conditions are only expected in the course of 2025 .
COM-2023-761, p. 12	<i>Market volatility is also a consequence of the market tightness resulting from</i> geopolitical risks, and represents an additional risk for the Union economy.
COM-2023-762, p. 2	<i>Since</i> Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of Ukraine , <i>supplies of gas to the EU by</i> Russia <i>have been disrupted as a deliberate attempt to use energy as a political weapon. Russia has been for many years the main gas supplier of the EU. Historically, the EU relied on Russia for more than 40% of its gas supplies. The supply of gas has continuously decreased since February 2022. The pipeline flows of gas from Russia had been less than 10% of the EU's gas imports in the first half of 2023.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 2	The Union's response under REPowerEU and following initiatives, including the measures set out in Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, <i>contributed to mitigating the effects of</i> Russia's invasion of Ukraine <i>on the supplies of gas, and its subsequent impacts on price levels, inflation, financial and macroeconomic stability, and on all citizens.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 3	Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and <i>would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of</i> Russian imports .
COM-2023-762, p. 3	<i>To prevent that the objective of diversification from the gas supplied from the</i> Russian Federation <i>is put at risk, Regulation (EU) 2022/2576 provides that participation of undertakings or other bodies controlled by</i> Russian <i>natural or legal persons or undertakings established in the</i> Russian Federation <i>is excluded. In addition, natural gas originating in the</i> Russian Federation <i>is excluded from the demand aggregation and joint purchasing mechanism, including natural gas supplies entering the Member States or Energy Community Contracting Parties through a list of entry points.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 4	Also, as Russian gas still represents a non-negligible – though decreasing – part of EU imports , increasingly concentrated in some areas, <i>gas markets remain vulnerable to</i> Russian gas supplies manipulation .
COM-2023-762, p. 4	There is a need to provide for stable and predictable pricing for LNG imports, which are <i>indispensable to replace the supply shortfalls caused by the likely halt of</i> Russian gas imports .

COM-2023-762, p. 7	However, as of the date of adoption of this proposal, severe difficulties in gas supplies to the Union persist. <i>Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year, availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to pre-crisis.</i> With the current pipeline gas import levels, the Union is expected to receive approximately 20 bcm of Russian pipeline imports in 2023, and these unreliable imports may be further reduced or stopped.
COM-2023-762, p. 8	<i>Further possible gas supply disruptions, including a complete halt of gas imports from Russia or a disruption of existing critical gas infrastructure.</i> Furthermore, since the adoption of the Report on the main findings of the review of Regulation (EU) 2022/2576, the threat landscape has deteriorated. Armed conflicts of high intensity are now hitting several of the key EU supply regions, <i>in addition to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine (Azerbaijan, Middle East).</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 9	ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, <i>additional measures may be needed in case of a full Russian supply disruption.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 9	Should the relevant Union measures cease to apply, this would alter the stabilised but fragile situation the Union has achieved so far and <i>would deteriorate the resilience to likely future developments such as a complete halt of Russian imports.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 12	The proposal also fully reflects the objective of Regulation (EU) 2022/1369 on <i>coordinated demand-reduction measures for gas to pro-actively reduce gas demand to mitigate potential supply disruptions due to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 12	<i>Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU has set out the REPowerEU Plan with the aim to end the EU's dependency on Russian fossil fuels, as soon as possible and at the latest by 2027.</i>
COM-2023-762, p. 14	Given the unprecedented nature of the gas supply crisis and its cross-border effects, as well as the level of integration of the EU internal energy market, action at Union level is warranted as Member States alone cannot effectively address the risk of serious economic difficulties resulting from price hikes or significant supply disruptions.
COM-2023-762, p. 15	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation and the significant threat for citizens and the EU economy , there is a clear need for coordinated action. The measures set out in the proposal do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve their objectives and are proportionate to those objectives.
COM-2023-762, p. 15	The duration of the prolongation is proportionate due to the <i>persistent nature of the severe difficulties for energy supply and the resulting risks for prices and security of supply</i> which are expected to continue at least during the whole of 2024 as more structural changes of the market conditions are only expected in the course of 2025.
COM-2023-763, p. 2	In 2022, <i>the international tensions following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the overall geopolitical context and the very high energy prices exacerbated the need</i>

	<i>to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy in the Union with the objective to phase out EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels.</i>
COM-2023-763, p. 2	In particular in the second half of 2022, the <i>situation of the energy crisis had worsened</i> , calling for urgent action.
COM-2023-763, p. 2	At the date of adoption of this proposal, <i>significant risks associated with the volatility of gas and electricity prices and the security of supply in the Union persist</i> . They stem from the difficult situation in the energy markets, <i>exacerbated by tense geopolitical environment</i> .
COM-2023-763, p. 2	<i>Due to the significant decrease in Russian pipeline gas imports over the past year</i> , availability of gas supplies to the Union is considerably reduced compared to the pre-crisis situation.
COM-2023-763, p. 4	ENTSOG concluded that although the general security of supply situation in the EU has significantly improved, <i>additional measures may be needed if the risk of a full Russian supply disruption is realised</i> .
COM-2023-763, p. 5	Should Regulation (EU) 2022/2577 cease to apply, while the significant risks persist, this would <i>undermine the achieved improvement as well as the EU's resilience against potential developments as a complete halt of Russian imports</i> .
COM-2023-763, p. 8	The urgent and still unstable situation in the energy market and the urgent need to immediately accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources as an instrument <i>to mitigate the existing risks to the security of energy supply and volatility of energy prices</i> call for such emergency and temporary measures.
COM-2023-763, p. 9	In view of the unprecedented geopolitical situation created by Russia's invasion of Ukraine , <i>the continuous highly volatile energy prices and the need to ensure Europe's energy security of supply</i> for the upcoming winter season and throughout next year, there is a clear need for coordinated and urgent action.

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Jan Terentjev, (personal code: 39405260874) herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created by me “Green Deal, Clean Break:

Assessing securitization of clean energy transition in Europe in the process of energy decoupling from Russia”, supervisor Andrey Makarychev,

- reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1;
- I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.