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Securitizing Russia in the European Parliament: a case of Poland's PiS and Hungary's Fidesz

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Abstract

This master's thesis seeks to understand the framing construction of Russia as a security threat (securitization) by Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) and Hungary's Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz) in the European Parliament. By doing so, it contributes to discussions around the securitization of Russia at the European level. Central to this investigation is the War in Ukraine, an event that reshaped the European security landscape (Fiott, 2023). The war's significance is further underlined by its importance in the plenaries of European Parliament, illustrating its importance on the European agenda. Within the European Parliamentary plenaries, debates offer a chance to observe members' positions, providing a platform where security discourses can either amplify or minimize security responses.

This study's main framework is "securitization as the work of framing", is pivotal in examining the narratives around what is threatened (referent objects), the nature of the threat, the actors advocating for securitization, who securitizes (subject) and the proposed remedial actions. By integrating securitization theory with a framing approach, this research aims to identify explicit and implicit frames concerning securitization of Russia.

The research finds that Poland's PiS and Hungary's Fidesz members of the European Parliament both condemn Russian aggression in Ukraine and address securitization of Russia, but diverge in their approaches: PiS members view Russia as an existential threat, while Fidesz frame Russia as the initiator of the War. Fidesz members emphasize on the implications of the War, consequently employing desecuritization frames. Both parties prioritize human security, but criticize the EU's response, suggesting a strategic use of Russia's securitization in their populist discourses.

Despite growing interest in the implications of the War in Ukraine, few studies address securitization of Russia within this context. As the war introduces new security challenges, from energy to human security, this thesis aims to uncover emerging security frames, offering a fresh perspective on the region's evolving dynamics.

Keywords: Securitization theory, discourses, Russia, Law and Justice, Fidesz, the European Parliament

Streszczenie

Niniejsza praca magisterska ma na celu zrozumienie ram dla sekurytyzacji Rosji przez polską partię Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) i węgierski Sojusz Obywatelski (Fidesz) w Parlamencie Europejskim. W ten sposób przyczynia się do dyskusji na temat sekurytyzacji Rosji na poziomie europejskim. Centralnym punktem tego badania jest wojna na Ukrainie, wydarzenie, które zmieniło europejski krajobraz bezpieczeństwa (Fiott, 2023). Znaczenie wojny jest dodatkowo podkreślane przez jej znaczenie na posiedzeniach plenarnych Parlamentu Europejskiego, co ilustruje jej znaczenie w agendzie europejskiej. Debaty na posiedzeniach plenarnych Parlamentu Europejskiego dają możliwość obserwowania stanowisk posłów, zapewniając platformę, na której dyskusje na temat bezpieczeństwa mogą wzmacniać lub minimalizować reakcje w zakresie bezpieczeństwa.

Główny obszar tego badania to "sekurytyzacja jako praca nad ramami", która jest kluczowa w badaniu narracji wokół tego, co jest zagrożone, charakteru zagrożenia, podmiotów opowiadających się za sekurytyzacją i proponowanych odpowiedzi. Niniejsze badanie, poprzez integrację teorii sekurytyzacji z podejściem ramowym, ma na celu zidentyfikowanie jawnych i ukrytych ram dotyczących sekurytyzacji Rosji.

Badanie wykazało, że polscy posłowie PiS i węgierscy posłowie Fideszu w Parlamencie Europejskim potępiają rosyjską agresję w Ukrainie i zajmują się sekurytyzacją Rosji, ale różnią się w swoich podejściach: Członkowie PiS postrzegają Rosję jako zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa egzystencjalnego, podczas gdy Fidesz przedstawia Rosję jako inicjatora wojny. Członkowie Fideszu podkreślają konsekwencje wojny, konsekwentnie sięgając po ramy desekurytyzacji. Obie partie priorytetowo traktują bezpieczeństwo ludzi w Ukrainie, jednocześnie krytykując reakcję EU, sugerując wykorzystanie rosyjskiej sekurytyzacji w swojej populistycznej retoryce.

Pomimo rosnącego zainteresowania konsekwencjami/następstwami wojny na Ukrainie, niewiele badań podejmuje kwestię sekurytyzacji Rosji w tym kontekście. Ponieważ wojna wprowadza nowe wyzwania w zakresie bezpieczeństwa, od energii po bezpieczeństwo ludzkie, niniejsza praca ma na celu odkrycie pojawiających się dyskursów bezpieczeństwa, oferując świeże spojrzenie na zmieniającą się dynamikę regionu.

Słowa kluczowe: Teoria sekurytyzacji, dyskursy, Rosja, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Fidesz, Parlament Europejski

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ACRONYMS

PiS - Law and Justice Party

CARE - Cohesion's Action for Refugees in Europe

EU - European Union

EP - European Parliament

CS - Copenhagen School

CEE - Central Eastern Europe

LNG - Liquefied Natural Gas

1.Introduction

The EU by itself is a security actor with its definitions of threats that can result in collective securitization of an issue. However, recently, the EU has faced many challenges to its function as the security actor. They are: increased intra-EU contestation (Dijkstra, 2022) and fragmented security priorities among Member states (Genshel, 2022).

Security discourses regarding Russia and the Russian threat were present even after the Cold War, especially in the Eastern European countries (Schimmelfennig, 1998). However, the War in Ukraine only intensified these security discourses in the European arena, facilitating new security perceptions and interpretation of the security. Before the 2014 Ukraine crisis, a diverse stance towards Russia caused “the overt anti-Russian discourse of the CEE member states has perpetuated the deep division within the EU as to how to respond to Russia” (Nitoiu, 2016, p. 380). The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not only tested the resilience of the European Union in unprecedented ways but has also ignited a cascade of interconnected crises spanning security, asylum, energy, and economic domains. These challenges are not confined to the immediate conflict zone; rather, they ripple across the EU's eastern partners and reverberate through the very core of the Union itself. “For Europe, the war in Ukraine is a first-order economic shock. While the direct fiscal implications of taking care of refugees, increasing military spending and strengthening energy autonomy remain limited, the impact of elevated energy and food prices on national income and its distribution is potentially significant” (Bruegel, 2022). Tichy and Dubsy (2022), examining changing energy security discourses in the relationship between Russia and the EU they identified the sub-discourse of securitization which entails increasing Russian threat as security threat. Within the European context, the ongoing war made it “obvious” the perception of Russia as a major threat (Ibid, 2022). This heightened sense of threat is evident as every facet of the European-Russian relationship now carries security implications, with Russia being viewed as the primary threat to peace and stability in the region (Meister, 2022). The EU strongly condemned Russia’s brutal War of aggression against Ukraine and showed its support to Ukraine (European Council, 2022). The Russian invasion also served as a test of the European Union’s resilience referring to its ability to withstand and respond effectively to challenges and crises. The EU faced the task of addressing this crisis and its aftermath, which required strong and coordinated efforts among its member states (Kaunert, 2023). The EU’s reaction in the aftermath of invasion was the surprising in a sense that measures taken against Russia were cooperated (Bosse, 2022). From the starting of the War the EU has imposed several sanctions on individuals, companies and economic, diplomatic measures. (The European Council, 2023) “As of June 23, 2023, 1,544 Russian individuals and 240 entities were sanctioned by the European Union (EU) for undermining or threatening Ukraine's

territorial integrity” (Statista, 2023). Starting from the 23th of February 2023 there were 35 EU restrictive measures taken against Russia (The European Council, 2023). Other measures taken by the EU was humanitarian aid, acceptance of refugees as well as weapon delivery. “In February and March, the member states agreed on generous humanitarian aid packages for Ukraine, an unusually welcoming approach to Ukrainian refugees, arms deliveries, and four tough packages of economic sanctions on Russia. Yet, they avoided controversial issues including the delivery of heavy weapons and sanctions on fossil fuels.” However, later on the EU agreed on RepowerEU plan to diversify fossil fuels in order to make energy more secure and independent from Russia (Conti, 2022) Amidst increased financial support for Ukraine's military efforts, including a new EUR 500 million package and discussions on an additional EUR 1 billion for ammunition procurement, divergent political goals among EU Member States remain apparent, reflecting lukewarm commitment despite the expansion of aid and training missions. (CEPS, 2023) From the latest reports, the European Union has begun developing plans for a 20-billion-euro (\$22bn) fund aimed at supplying Ukraine with weaponry, ammunition, and military support to aid its resistance against Russia's ongoing invasion (Aljazeera, 2023). Genschel(2022) who examined, integration of the European Union’s integration amid the War in Ukraine, argues that despite the war gave push towards the EU’s political development, it still triggered little capacity-building. The centralization didn’t happen, but more of cooperation at the member-states level happened, due to the geopolitical location, trading relations (energy imports), foreign policy orientation (Genschel, 2022, p.1888). This differed framing of the threat can create distributive conflict, distrust and moral hazard. Although the War is happening on the neighboring state to the EU, it is still “a more plausible trigger of loss-aversion (prefer avoiding the losses) in the EU” (Genschel, 2022,). At the same time, the War didn’t change the cooperation of radical right-wing parties, instead assertiveness of parties such as Fidesz towards Russia of parties such as Fidesz only increased (Holesch&Zagórski, 2022).

Since the beginning of the War the European Parliament has also condemned Russian invasion and has implemented several motions to resolution and Debates regarding Russian invasion to Ukraine. Its call for assessing and preventing the threats coming from Russia encompassed several areas such as cybersecurity, the issue of enlargement and the European Neighborhood. The speeches and resolutions by officials of the EU might be considered as a speech acts and security practices such as arm delivery, sanctions and other measures taken against the Russian threat to stop in Ukraine can be considered as the measures that ‘locked in’ the securitization of Russia. Further, these security practices are through security discourses can be legitimized and institutionalized.

1.1 The Research problem and Objectives

The objective of this thesis is to explain how Russia is securitized by populist ruling parties/regimes amid of the War in Ukraine. Owing to diverse interpretations of threats and differing security priorities, actors may perceive and frame the same threat differently. Therefore, it seeks to enhance comprehension of how threats are constructed in the securitization process, in identification of a framing of a threat, referent objects, proposing exceptional measures and the subject(provider of security) in the securitization process. The research questions are composed of the main research question and subsequent sub-questions derived from that main question:

How do Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Fidesz securitize Russia and Russian's aggression against Ukraine within the context of European Parliament?

1. How does Law and Justice Party (PiS) securitize Russia and Russian aggression against Ukraine in the context of the European Parliament?
2. How does Fidesz securitize Russia and Russian aggression against Ukraine in the context of the European Parliament?
3. How do PiS and Fidesz converge and diverge in their approach to securitizing Russia in the War in Ukraine?

Here is a cautionary remark of the definition of the "Russian aggression towards Ukraine". It is used in the research question as the European parliament's resolution and official statements define it so.

1.2 Theoretical foundations

New security threats evolve over time due to the changes in global politics and in geopolitics. Those security threats are eventually securitized depending on the severity of the threat and its importance to the particular actor and can be shaped into the various sectors of security, such as military, environmental, economic, political and societal security that the Copenhagen School introduced in order to move beyond traditional/military security (Buzan et al., 1998). However, state-centrism is still present in the securitization theory, giving less attention to the international actors such the EU, NATO. The securitization theory's main explanation is that an issue is defined as a threat by a securitizing actor when it possesses a danger to the survival of the referent object. Thus, stating that the referent object has the right to survive, which allows the securitizing actor to resort extraordinary measures outside of normal politics. Securitization, thus comes to the existence through the process of securitization, which can be evident from the speech act. Defining the issue and calling for actions can be considered as utterances, an act. These utterances or speech acts are usually made by actors(usually elites) and further it should be accepted by the audience.

Wæver(1995) states that “something is securitized when the elites say so”. At the same time, in the collective securitization political leaders (such as ruling party members previously holding power) obtain authority and influence because “they occupy the government office and can thus claim to act on behalf of the state; the actions that leaders authorize or instigate in response to a crisis are intended to protect the populations and territories over which they govern” (Lucarelli et al., 2021) As the power of the elites was the main in the designation of threats, it can enable some elites to increase their power as a consequence of being granted special privileges in dealing with a security issue. (Balzacq et al., 2016, p. 501) It can be especially observed from authoritarian and populists’ governments. As “populists derive their capacity to ‘speak security’ exactly from their status as an (alleged) political underdog who is not part of the ‘corrupt’ and ‘powerful’ establishment and does not ‘play by the rules’ but speaks from ‘below’ in the language of the ‘common’ people” (Wojczewski, 2020, p. 15) However, populists tend to use anti-elite security rhetoric, which confronts elitist nature of securitization. For them, the audience is their primary referent objects, addressing the struggling people, who are voiceless and powerless (Kurylo, 2022). Populists through discursive practices and making people as referent objects propagate a politics of fear, urgency and exceptionality.

Context in which securitization occur was initially divided in two by Buzan: it might be security sectors, where security issues are commonly addressed or historical contexts that might be linked to the security threats (Balzacq et al., 2016). Balzacq, on the other hand, drawing from Schegloff introduces proximate and a distal context: former includes specific circumstances, communication and actors that contribute to the securitization process, whereas latter is things like social class, regional, cultural settings (Balzacq, 2016, p.502).

The basic characteristics that Balzacq et al (2016) lists in the different approaches to securitization are power relations, context and agency. Thus, the securitization process is always influenced by the interplay of influence, authority, and control among various actors or entities, the context in which they occur and the agency or capability of the actors involved.

As the European Parliament is one of the European Union’s institutions that has enormous functions and one of the bodies which is directly elected through citizens and the European parliamentary plenaries being an open debate where MEPs can argue and speak on the matter of European issues and on behalf of their parties. The European Union as the “security governance” (Lucarelli et al., 2021) serve as platform for aggregating preferences and reaching mutual solutions, generating legitimacy and acceptance for policies through consent. The concept of collective securitization highlights the institutional framing and legitimization of threats. Meanwhile, the EU's role is shaped by member states' collaborative discussions on defining threats and formulating

corresponding security policies. In this context the question of “who secures” was neglected in the methodology of securitization, as the main questions are “who securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions” (Buzan et al., 1998, p.32).

Combining framing and securitization provides valuable insights into the aforementioned questions. By discussing securitization in a more ‘all-inclusive’ manner, we can better understand and address overarching securitization processes. (Watson, 2012; Pinto, 2014). It can also help to understand issues such as audience acceptance and desecuritization, which are contested nowadays. Therefore, through the qualitative content analysis and the integration of framing analysis in the framework of “securitization as the work of framing,” this thesis is going to identify frames present in the securitization of Russia, Russian aggression by PiS and Fidesz in the European Parliament. Furthermore, it will reveal divergences and convergences of security frames employed by those parties.

The choice of examining PiS and Fidesz as case studies is justified, given that both parties, often labeled as undergoing 'democratic backsliding', experienced strains in their relationships due to the Ukraine conflict and their positions on Russia. While it was anticipated that this would be an opportune moment for the European institutions to foster better relations with PiS, the voting behavior and cooperation in the European parliament indicates that such a big change in the cooperation of PiS and Fidesz didn't happen. Instead, the voting behavior of two parties became converged due to “Fidesz's assertiveness” (Adam Holesch & Piotr Zagórski, 2023). Moreover, despite expectations of “the end of “Budapest-Warsaw axis” both parties have maintained similar voting patterns in the Rule of Law (RoL) conflict, and still support each other” (Ibid, p.1180).

According to (Lucarelli et al.,) the interaction in the international organization such as the EU can be considered as “recursive interaction – repeated bargaining substantive exchanges between a security actor and its audience(member states) over the content and form of threats as well as the policy responses appropriate to mitigating them”(Lucarelli et al., 2020. p.40). Sometimes, the audience with their interpretations can shape the actor itself. As the international organizations such as the EU can establish their own legal structures and communication tools. The European Parliament Plenaries can be considered as such a tool for discussions on different topics, including security. States can still partake in collective securitization by delegating authority to international organizations, allowing designated agencies to handle securitization practices. Meanwhile, entities within these organizations, like the European Parliament, play a crucial role in legitimizing and shaping foreign and security agendas. Considering the relationship between the two countries and

the dynamic nature of European Parliamentary Debates, the thesis primarily focuses on the speeches of MEPs of these parties and their framings of Russia and the Russian aggression. However, factors like power dynamics and party politics might limit the research's ability to capture the complete essence of framing in a broader context.

1.3 Research contributions

The research contributes to the broader field of securitization research in a way that this research incorporated framing and securitization theory. Its empirical value stands in the identification of frames and subsequent comparison between them. Additionally, it contributes to the understanding of desecuritization frames, framing of the subject (guarantor of the security), and to a lesser extent to the securitization by populist. Moreover, recency and the continuing state of the War in Ukraine, the research also offers insights into evolving security perceptions within the shifting European landscape. According to McDonald (2008), the Copenhagen School's Securitization Theory is limited in its focus solely on the moment of intervention, neglecting the eventual construction of threats. While this study doesn't delve into specific timeframes, it can highlight potential shifts in security framings during the chosen timeframe. Study shows that designation of threats is not the most important, rather showing the nuances of how these threats are perceived, responded to, and even how they transform over time can help to understand the securitization acts securitization process .

1.4 Thesis outline

The thesis has seven chapters. The first chapter is an introduction. In the second chapter, there's a review of literature that first explains the Securitization theory in general and then dives into the concept of "Securitization as the work of framing" which is a key idea in this work. This chapter also covers European security topics, especially regarding relations between Russia and Poland-PiS, and Hungary-Fidesz. The next section of the literature review touches on the methodology, discussing the main techniques and how information was gathered. The fourth chapter presents the results, dividing them into two main categories and stages of framing. Before concluding the thesis, there's a discussion chapter that sheds light on the primary frames of securitization and desecuritization.

2. Literature Review

2.1 The Securitization Theory and beyond: Overview

Security studies evolving eventually from “strategic studies” and peace studies have undergone significant changes. After the Cold War era, due to the emergence of threats from a variety of sources the security studies were expanded. It was changed from a traditional security understanding of a state-centric perspective to assessing the threats of other dimensions like individual and non-state actors (Huysmans, 1998, p.479-505) Emphasizing the central role of the speech act, act Buzan and Wæver developed a theory of securitization, the so-called Copenhagen School of Security.

The Copenhagen School constructs the securitization framework from a constructivist viewpoint, which explains that language not only represents the real world but can also create the social reality it strives to depict (Stepka, 2020, p.18). The Copenhagen School looked at security from the perspective of social construct, which is created through the securitization process. Moreover, “using a constructivist operational method it tries to distinguish the process of securitization from that of politicization.” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 5). Thus, by employing a constructivist operational method, the school aims to differentiate securitization from politicization. One crucial aspect highlighted by the Copenhagen School is the intersubjective nature of securitization. It emphasizes that threats and security are not objectively defined but rather is subject to negotiation and agreement among relevant actors “Securitization theory’s intersubjective nature – the idea that threats and security are defined ‘among the subjects’ (Buzan et al., 1998 p.31) – which stands in sharp contrast to other security theories” (Côté, 2016, p. 541).

The securitization field inspired much security research; Different sectors of the security have their specific actors, things they consider as threats, and vulnerabilities (ways they can be harmed). However, despite these differences, they all follow a similar process when it comes to defining what is a security issue. The securitization theory was applied to various publications working in the scope of securitization, such as "The Global War on Terror" by Buzan (2006), on migration studies (Huysmans, 2000; Bourbeau, 2011), and to minority rights (Roe, 2004; Jutila, 2006). Additionally, its scope included a variety of fields, such as the environment (Trombetta, 2006; 2010;), migration, and health.

2.1.2 Criticisms of the School

Although it inspired research in different domains, it has faced numerous criticisms of the School, one of which is McDonald(2008) who researched the narrowness of the securitization framework, he states that “the framework is narrow in three senses that 1) the narrowness of the definition of the construction of security by focusing on the speech acts by powerful actors; 2); the context of the act: focus on the time of intervention only: the construction of it over time is not theorized; 3) the nature of the act is defined only in terms of designation of threats” (McDonald, 2008, p. 563). Another criticism of limitations was related to the gender issues aspects and audience (Balzacq, 2010; Hansen, 2000). Balzacq and Guzzini, in their study, examine numerous interpretations of securitization. They list the Copenhagen School with its emphasis on intersubjectivity and the role of speech act; the role of practices versus language in securitization; the limited social mechanism of securitization; and debates regarding the proper treatment of contextual factors in securitization theory (Balzacq et al.,2014, p.96-98).

2.1.3 The process of securitization

According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is the process by which an issue is presented as an existential threat, which requires emergency measures and priority over all other issues. Once a securitization actor makes a securitizing move by articulating a security issue as an existential threat, it can be accepted or rejected by the audience. If accepted, it can be considered successful, which means a special right to handle it using extraordinary measures. Therefore, an issue being securitized goes through the process of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998).

Overall, securitization raises the issue of "who securitizes what, from whom, why, and under what circumstances?" (Buzan, Wæver&Wilde, 1998, p. 32). Consequently, it incorporates the concepts of speech acts, exceptionality, extraordinary measures, threats, and referent object. The securitization process itself consists of three main components to understand the process of securitization: a speech act, the logic of exception, and actor-audience interaction. Thus it uses language as a form of action, creates exceptions to normal politics, making it existential, and the interaction between makers of security claims and who receives them (Stepka, 2020). While this perspective is comprehensive, P. Bourbeau’s examination introduces a nuanced layer. He identifies two logics of the securitization process: “1) the logic of exception which requires exceptional measures in times of existential threats, 2) the logics of routine which entails dealing with threat through routinized and patterned practices, carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals” (Bourbeau, 2014). He reveals that both logics are present in empirical studies with two essential

commonalities that are incomplete in isolation: security performance (a process of doing something) and path dependence (previous decisions, historical events that have occurred in the past) (Bourbeau, 2014).

2.1.4 A speech act

A speech act theory was invented by Austin(1955) and J.Searle; the theory is based on the idea that “language can serve performative act and also it can change the social reality in the context of which the speech is delivered” (Austin, 1989). Wæver prioritizes language, characterizing it in such a way that language itself constitutes a security. “in his initial articulations of the concept, Wæver defined security as a ‘speech act’, with securitization referring to that form of linguistic representation that positioned a particular issue as an existential threat ” (McDonald, 2008, p. 566). Buzan (1998, 26-33) defines speech acts as ‘securitizing moves’ that became securitizations through audience consent. However, McDonald disagrees with this idea of the centrality of language, explaining it with two arguments: 1) the importance of images; 2) the importance of bureaucratic practices or physical acts (McDonald, 2008). Later contributions to the theory emphasized the speech act not as the sole source of the securitization process but as a component of intersubjective security construction. A speech act itself does not produce security, but it is considered a securitizing move (Stepka, 2022; p.29). Criticizing a speech act Hansen also argues that sometimes those parties that are in danger choose to remain silent, therefore emphasizing that focusing only on speech act makes the CS is not critical enough .(Hansen, 2000). Although, other practices than language can be important, the importance of language in the intersubjective environments as the EU is vital. It remains a crucial tool through language shared understanding, communication, decision-making takes place. Contrary to the speech act, S.Guzzini (Guzzini, 2015) asserts, "security can mean de/mobilization of the inherent logic, grammar, and discourses of security ." He places history at the center of the discourse. Therefore, the securitization process necessitates a historical analysis of the central concept and inherent grammar logic in the security discourse.

2.1.5 Referent objects

According to Buzan's perspective, referent objects are entities that face a real threat to their existence and have a valid reason to safeguard their survival. In other words, these are things that are genuinely at risk and have a legitimate basis for taking measures to ensure their continued presence. (Buzan et al., 1998) According to McDonald, in the securitization framework, security is closely tied to threat designation. (McDonald, 2008, p.567) As a result, the security issue can be

framed as a threat to a state, culture, human rights, value, or to a specific process, etc. In addition, different security sectors can have different referent objects depending on the context. The issue of “us” versus “them” also arises here. Spreling and Webber’s collective securitization challenges state’s role as the referent object and its neglect of processes by which states collectively engage in securitization around common concerns (Bengtsson, Rhinard, 2019). Although state can be the major example that act as an actor and referent object, in collective securitization, which is also considered as “middle scale” can also “obtain the status of referent object”. “In the EU framework the referent object can be the EU itself or goals in the European Neighbourhood,, the European constellation of norms and rules governing and shaping the preferred international order”(Sperling&Webber, 2020, p.43). Therefore, in the EU framework “a distinction between EU and national referent objects gives rise to political divisions among actors, dividing the securitizing audience” (Hoffman&Staeger, 2019) They explain that because of the holding a different frame or prioritization of national referent objects will contest the securitization process after it was implemented.

2.1.6 Contextual factors

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the securitization process it is necessary to consider factors beyond the discursive approach such as historical context, power relations, etc. The securitization theory fails to explain why certain threat representations resonate with particular communities and how power dynamics, including history, power, and other factors, influence the process of "speaking security" (McDonald, 2008, p. 2). Contextual factors can play an important role in order to understand how security works in different contexts, this may include the factors such as history, culture, and identity. Therefore, he states that “ultimately, those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security (even those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of threat) become possible” (McDonald, 2008, p. 573). In addition, Guzzini(Guzinni, 2015, p.17) highlights “the importance of history in a way that securitization can be seen in the unintended and unconscious effects of the discourse of security”. Therefore, securitization process due to its emphasis on speech acts and intersubjectivity cannot not be fully grasped outside history and culture.

2.1.7 Securitizing actor

There are many debates on the idea that securitizing actor should be only political elites and who should be the voices of construction of security. Wæver argues that as the securitization itself is about states, then the securitization itself can be made by institutional power (Wæver,1995; Buzan,1998). The Copenhagen School (CS) focuses almost exclusively on sovereign and elite politics(Bourbeau, 2014). Later on, defining the limitations of the Copenhagen School's description of the securitization process in relation to security actors as the possibility of additional actors, such as external actors (Léonard& Kaunert, 2022); functional actors (R.Floyd, 2021)). Political actors can be securitizing actor as they have authority to speak on behalf of people; state representatives in the international organizations “delegate their authority”, further they may engage with the organization’s entities in the practice of securitization(Sperling&Webber, p. 39). Although, the EU can securitize the issues on the European level, it’s actorness still “derived from the participation of member states in a generative process of interaction” (Ibid., p.28).

2.1.8 Audience

The connectivity of a speaker and audience was emphasized on the later collaborative of works by Buzan in the context of intersubjective conceptualization of security and the role of the audience and a speaker in negotiating the implementation of security measures. (Stritzel, 2014, p. 13) The role of the audience in securitization theory is unclear, as it was left out at the start of presenting the framework of securitization, while the securitizing actor acquired prominence. By focusing on the interaction and communication tools it helps to better understand how groups define an issue. By further, during the communicative process deciding on a collective interpretation can produce different interpretations and conflicting views on what constitutes a security (Stritzel, 2014, p.30). The interaction the actor and audience may involve different perspectives and ideas about security, therefore not leaving the question of “what is the security threat” to only one actor (Côté, 2016). Vuori(2008) suggests that the audience can be whoever that can contribute to the security actor’s security agenda in the securitization process: as a support or legitimize policies, exceptional measures, and provide resources. On the other hand, in collective securitization an audience and securitizing actor’s distinction is blurred as by Sperling and Webber(2018) “the audience collectively is the securitizing actor”(Floyd, 2020, p.204). Moreover, Floyd (2020, P.204) state that in the collective securitization audience does not involve external actors, instead the audience is “constitutive” of the securitizing actor. However, it can be argued that the audience in the face of member states can have their own audience, even if it’s recursive interaction. In some cases, as

populist, authoritarian regimes trying to shape the common EU security discourses refer to the people.

2.1.9 Desecuritization

The securitization theory itself started with the concept of desecuritisation, with the “the analysis of desecuriting practices which would undermine the inherent bias of security discourses” (Guzzini, 2015, p.7). Desecuritization refers to the process of removing an issue from the realm of security or reducing its salience as a security concern. Wæver (1995) also suggests that “it is possible to intentionally de-securitize issues by reframing them in non-security terms, or by promoting alternative approaches to addressing them. Similarly, he suggests that de-securitization involves challenging established narratives and promoting alternative discourses that emphasize cooperation, dialogue, and non-violent conflict resolution. By paying close attention to the language used to describe security issues, Wæver suggests that it is possible to identify opportunities for promoting more peaceful and constructive approaches to international relations” (Wæver, 1995). Thus, he points out that sometimes critics see the only way of dealing with a problem is to maximize security, however there can be other ways of dealing with a problem, not in security ways. They can put peace and economic development as a treatment to that problem, thus broadening the security problem to other areas as economic and social issues, therefore desecuritizing them.

2.2 “Securitization as the work of framing”

Framing-centered reading of security theory opens the framework to a more political understanding of security, as there can be multiple security interpretations that are negotiated and contested by relevant actors (Stępką, 2020). The concept of the securitization process is central to this study, but its multiple interpretations make it difficult to completely grasp it. The concept of "securitization as the work of framing" will therefore be fundamental to this study.

The Copenhagen School's application to empirical research was hardened by its initial reading. It is made it problematic to apply because of the interdependent ways of making sense of information and events in the highly politicized environment. Thus, it refers to the idea that sense-making is a dynamic process influenced by various actors. (Stępką, 2020, p.34) In response, Stępką, In his book “Identifying Security Logics in the EU Policy Discourse” proposes to view securitization as a process of framing. Thus, it'll show various ways of interpreting of the problem from a security perspective. (Stępką, 2020) Using the securitization framework along with framing, Rychnovska

(2014, p.17)emphasizes the intersubjective element of securitization by defining framing as an active, subjective, and dynamic process within securitization. Indeed, security problem securitization and framing are both subjective. Framing is a dynamic process that is also linked to agency: it also determines how a security issue is understood, which in turn influences actions and policies.

The key base of the framework of “securitization as the work of framing” approach of the securitization framework is 1) it is aimed at combining all of the security-related perceptions into one common set of interpretations; 2) instead of focusing only on exceptionalism, he proposes to consider of multiple logics of security and interpretations; 3) dynamic negotiations between and within the groups of relevant agents involved in the process, engaging in iterative dialogue and response; 4) the broader perspective of acceptance with the concepts of discourse structuration(certain interpretations become dominant), institutionalization (incorporation of discourses in the practices and policies) (Stępką, 2020, p. 93-121). The European Parliamentary Debates are a useful resource for understanding how certain parties frame security issues, further contributing to the particular securitization process. From the interpretation of the author’s understanding of the connection between framing and securitization, both securitization theory and framing theory acknowledge that societal actors construct problems or threats through their use of language and discourse. However, securitization theory specifically focuses on the dynamics of security construction and the implications that arise from framing a particular issue as a security concern. It also illustrates how parties participate in the 'discourse structuration' and 'institutionalization ' that can contribute to a shared understanding of the securitization process. 5) Embedded security: the context in which securitization takes place is very important. As different parties have varied ideas about security, they take their unique interpretations in the securitization process. Therefore, when we think about how words are used, we also have to think about how different parties, actors interpret security. Overall, "securitization as the work of framing" emphasizes the importance of different actors, ideas, and interests being involved in "policy framing," multiple framings of security (how different sides see what they want to protect, what is being protected, and the threats they face), discussions and negotiations between actors and audiences, the politics of acceptance, and embedded security.

“The diagnosis and evaluation processes are crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of how a security issue is identified and addressed.” (Stępką, 2020, p. 94) Diagnosis is the process of naming and identifying the problem, its origin, and what makes it dangerous. Evaluation, on the other hand, refers to how the threat affects the referent object, as well as the threat's consequences and who should be held accountable and blamed. (Stępką, 2020, p.94) The final aspect of the approach

is the concept of remedial action. It consists of the procedures and measures necessary to counter the threat.

Using the concept of "securitization as framing work," this work will investigate how Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Fidesz frame Russian threat in the context of the War in Ukraine. Both countries are members of the European Union and are classified as Central and Eastern European countries; in addition, they are both the main ruling parties of their countries. Both countries are well-known for their Euroscepticism, and they share a similar history in relation to Russia. However, both have a different perception of the Russian threat and approach to Russia, which became clear starting from the annexation of Crimea. However, the War in Ukraine made both parties separate their path and distance from each other due to different approaches to the situation. As the war in Ukraine is one of the most important issues on the European Union's agenda, it will be interesting to examine how parties like PiS and Fidesz, which take different approaches to the securitization of Russia and the war in Ukraine, frame those issues, thus securitizing Russia in the European Parliament. Thus, answering to my main question, 1) How do PiS and Fidesz securitize Russia and the Russian aggression in the context of the European Parliament? It will be assessed by understanding how they diagnose the problem (what the threat is), whom they blame, the impact of specific categories of threats on security referent objects, and what remedial actions they propose to address the issue. It will assist in understanding where both parties' divergences and convergences are and how they affect the common European securitization process.

2.3 From Past to Present: Understanding the Progression of Relations with Russia as a contextual factor

To understand how PiS and Fidesz securitize Russia in the context of the European Parliament, first, it is necessary to understand the place of Russia in European security. Therefore, this section is going to explore the evaluation of Russian and EU relations starting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union till nowadays. First, it will explain the evolution of European security, the EU-Russia relationship as well as the evolution of the securitization of Russia in the EU. Further, it'll move to the individual cases of Poland and Hungary, eventually narrowing the scope of securitization of Russia by PiS and Fidesz.

2.3.1 The Evolution of EU-Russia Relations and the Securitization of Russia in the European Union

2.3.1.1 Dynamics and Fluctuations: A History of Russia-EU Relations, 1992-2014

Haukkala divides EU-Russia relations into three phases. "First phase is described in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War from 1992 to 1994, which was characterized by relative optimism and setting up of cooperative structures" (Haukkala, 2015, p.27). "The second phase, from 1994 to 2000, was a much more strained era that will be labeled as 'the time of troubles'" (Haukkala, 2015, p.27). According to Smith (2014), during the first Chechen War, the EU still considered Russia as a country in transition and took a softer stance. However, the War showed also that there is a gap in the matter of common values with Russia. Thus it was obvious that the integration and cooperation process would be complicated. Eventually, the second Chechen War showed that this gap is real, and Putin's presidency only supported this argument" (Smith, 2014, p. 172). "The third period from 2000 onwards, the Putin era(s), is a hybrid era beginning with a more optimistic note but one that did not result in a genuine partnership" (Haukkala, 2015, p. 27). During 2000s the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine and the Georgian War in 2008 happened. "The Kremlin became hostile towards the involvement of the EU in the revolution in Ukraine, further the Georgian War made the EU enhance its security in the Eastern Neighborhood through the EaP. All of this has significantly strained the EU-Russia relations" (David et al., 2011). Overall, before the Ukraine crisis, there were up and downs in the relationship between the EU and Russia, at first, the EU was willing to create great cooperation, but Russia refused to compromise with the EU's conditions.

2.3.1.2 The Ukraine Crisis

The crisis in Ukraine, which started in 2014, led to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's military involvement in Eastern Ukraine in the Donbas War, which began in April 2014. Haukkala defines the crisis in Ukraine "as a culmination of the negative trends in the relationship of the EU and Russia." (Haukkala, 2015, p. 33) There were many reasons which led to this crisis. However, the focal point was the signing of Association Agreements. During the crisis, the EU took measures in the framework of the European strategy. "It focused on the period between February 2014 and December 2015. The European strategy during the Ukraine crisis aimed at coercing Russia into leaving Ukraine without escalating the conflict or overtly damaging relations with Russia." However, it gave limited success of the European strategy in Ukraine, because of "fundamental asymmetry of interests" (Scazierrri, 2017, p.23). Response from the EU was freezing Russia from International meetings, three-tier sanctions, and signing of the Association Agreement AA in order to support the new Ukrainian government. Brussels also tried to facilitate dialogue between Ukraine and Russia (Haukkala, 2015, p. 33).

The reasons why Russia started all of those activities many scholars as a means for Russia to defend its sphere of influence from Western encroachments (Haukkala, 2015; Casier, 2016).

2.3.1.3 The War in Ukraine: ‘defining moment’ of the Securitization of Russia

“On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Although there was previous aggression from the Russian side, the scale and brutality of this invasion is huge. The war in Ukraine is ongoing and may last for years; therefore, drawing definitive conclusions is premature, and the security implications of the war will have long-term global consequences.”(H, Dijkstra, 2022, p.464) The starting of the War has been questioned by many scholars, there were several explanations of the war. Some of the researchers identified NATO’s enlargement (Mearsheimer, 2022; Walt, 2022); Gotz and Staun found out that Ukraine’s drift toward NATO was seen as a threat by Russia; some of them related it to the individual Putin’s worldviews (Torbakov, 2022).

Amidst the maelstrom, the European Union didn’t remain silent. A month after the War, The EU unveiled the Security Strategic Compass for security and defence. It highlighted ”the responsibility of the Russian government for aggressive and revisionist actions that directly threatened the European security order and the safety of European citizens” (European Council, 2022b cited in Bosse, 2022, p.535).

Bosse examining the EU’s response to the War, states “that the War had a significant reformulation of security interest among EU members, especially, there was a need to reassess their stance towards Russia”(Bosse, 2022, p.535). Regarding measures taken by member-states, there was unexpected agreement among member states, although there were structural changes and reformulation of security preferences following the invasion. The analysis by Bosse(2022) utilized a norms-based approach to understand the unexpected agreement among member states, considering the context of structural external change and reformulation of security preferences following the invasion. Examining this approach, Bosse states that “discussions on rights-based norms were intertwined with values-based norms of European solidarity, identity, and moral obligations toward fellow Europeans” (Bosse, 2022, p.542). It can show that connection between rights-based norms and values-based obligations was crucial in generating agreement among member states, as arguments based solely on rights may not have been as persuasive without the reference to shared values and a sense of responsibility towards fellow Europeans. “This event made countries in the EU rethink what they consider important for their safety and adjust their stances accordingly”(Bosse, 2022, p. 540).

One of the recent researches on the matters of the EU and Ukraine War was conducted by Daniel Fiott. Fiott(2023) analyzes the theoretical perspectives of neo-functionalism and new intergovernmentalism in understanding EU defense integration and explores how the war in Ukraine has influenced the dynamics between supranational and intergovernmental institutions. It highlights that the EU defense policy stays intergovernmental, where EU Member States control security and defense matters. This means that decisions related to defense policy are still primarily made at the national level (Fiott, 2023, 457). Another research also made in the field of EU integration and the War in Ukraine examines the bellicist theories of integration. It found out that the War didn't prove Bellicist theory. Instead, it has a trend toward a central alliance. He states that "functional" and "political" conditions didn't happen due to the diverse interests and complexity of integrating defense, energy, and fiscal policies and due to the differing perceptions of threats, priorities, and the role of the EU in security matters (Genschel et al., 2023, p. 356). Questioning the EU's actorness in the War, Costa& Barbe(2023) explaining the fragmented nature of the EU, they categorize six worldviews: nationalism, Atlanticism, Europeanism, embracers, and resisters of fragmentation. The conflict in Ukraine has revealed divisions between Eastern and Western member states within the European Union (EU)(Gaida, 2020). European security cooperation and cohesion are affected by the divergent perspectives and approaches of EU member states, especially the second-guessing of decisions made by larger EU member states.

Russia's behavior in the war against Ukraine has exposed previously unknown aspects of how security is maintained in Europe. Specifically, it has shown that nuclear deterrence and the intentional targeting of cities play a role in the European security framework. Additionally, "Support for national nuclear-weapons programs among citizens in Central and Eastern European countries is also higher than expected for states putatively protected by the US nuclear umbrella" (Bollfrass, Herzog, 2022, p.22).

"In the case of energy security, the War in Ukraine has had a big impact on it (J.Osicka, 2022) and forced the EU to reconsider its energy security fully (McWilliams et al., 2023). According to Virgos and Marin (2022), the EU started renegotiating energy agreements with non-democratic regimes. They explain this step, believing that "the EU answer has been framed by political realism. It is true that they have asserted the need to cooperate within institutional channels, as well as respect a rules-based world order in their response (Way, 2022), but the intra and extra-bloc actions speak about a different course."

2.3.2 Poland and the Russian Threat

Today, major political events in the international arena pose a significant threat to the European Union, including Poland, which sees Russia as a threat. Poland was a huge country in the 16th-17th century creating a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, in the result of War and partitions its territory was decreased (Zięba, 2020). This part of the history is crucial for understanding the roots of the Russian threat in Poland as Poland's aims of bringing civilization to the East was stopped by Russia. "The image of Russia in Polish national identity can be explained as negative. In Polish politics and culture, Russia is often presented as a country of lower civilization and a threat to Poland" (Zarycki, 2004, p. 595). Further, this negative perception of Russia was exacerbated by deportations of the Polish population during the Second World War (Zięba, 2020, p. 16). The interwar period of Polish-Russian relations can be described as mistrust and invasion and partition of Poland by USSR and Nazi Germany further deepened this negative perception of Russia. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, signed by USSR and Nazi Germany in 1939, was a secret protocol with the aim of invading and dividing its territory. Further, it was revealed that in 1940 NKVD had murdered about 22000 war prisoners. It was called Katyn Massacres. "In the 1990s, Poland demanded an accounting in the Katyn massacre. However, it was left only in the framework of Polish - Russian dialogue" (Zięba, 2020, p. 61).

This historical backdrop helps to explain why today's current government has a complex relations with Russia and sees it as a threat, despite PiS's Euroscepticism and critical stance towards the EU. Expanding on this historical context, Zarycki(2004) explains this negative approach to Russia not in history but from the perspective of Polish national identity. First and foremost, he contends that it can be described as the manifestation of two peripheral regions in relation to the broadly defined West. Secondly, images of Russia at the sub-national (social groups), national, and supranational levels. He claims that at the subnational level, leftist groups are less radical toward Russia. Concentrating on Poland's "uses of Russia," he indicates five negative images of Russia and among them: European identity(Europe-Asia divide, "othering" silencing the Russian influence); unifying threat(the image of Russia as a threat and Poland as unity); as an area of exclusive expertise of Poles(expertise and understanding of "the nature of Russia") (Zarycki, 2004, p. 599). The main historical narratives, such as "Poland as the bulwark of Europe" depicts Poland as a defender of the West against the perceived barbarism of the East. What's more, Mayblin(2016), examining Poland through a postcolonial lens, argues that there is a triple relationship becomes apparent in Polish axes. One of them is a complex relationship with Russia, which cannot be reduced to a simple case of colonialism. Secondly, there is a countervailing relation to "the West" as an alternative ideological hegemon. Despite of othering Russia, Polish

attitudes towards Eastern European countries such as Ukraine and Belarus are also complex, positioning them “lower” in relation to the West. “The narrative on the Borderlands is also reflected in the feeling of responsibility, emotional attachments (‘lost homeland’) and, in turn, a paternalistic approach towards these regions which could be taught by Poland how to become European (especially Ukraine)” (Mayblin et al., 2016, p. 68). Zarycki's analysis of negative images of Russia in Polish national identity aligns with Mayblin's observation of the complex relationship between Poland and Russia, as well as the countervailing relation to "the West."

2.3.3 The Poland-Russia relationship after 1989

In 1989, the Round Table Talks between the ruling party and the opposition led to the development of democracy. After the events of 1989, as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Poland found itself in a new environment, sharing borders with different countries. The geopolitical location of Poland between East and West made it “an advanced defense post of the Atlantic community” and a “bridge between East and West economic cooperation” (Zięba, 2020, page 17). The Katyn massacre was one of the most controversial topics in Polish society, and Poland demanded accountability from Russia but was met with indifference. Moreover, according to Zięba (2020), “The repeated abuse of the memory of tragic episodes and processes allows politicians to pillory Russia in international public opinion.» (Zięba, 2020, p. 61). This kind of involvement in memory politics and other issues soured already weak relationship between Russia and Poland.

Although PiS came to power in 2005, it had been advocating for a harsher policy toward Russia since 1991. They chose a strategic policy with the United States while straining their relationship with Russia. However, when the Civic Platform came to power in 2007, the tense relations were softened by building pragmatic relations with Moscow: several events by the Russian side, such as admitting historical injustices, have helped to soften the relationship between Russia and Poland. However, the 2010 Smolensk plane crash created a significant impact on the relationship between Poland and Russia. The crash led to expressions of support from the Russian side, which initially seemed to provide an opportunity for cooperation. Following Donald Tusk's cabinet several events were held to foster understanding between the two countries. However, internal dynamics in Poland, including criticism of the population and PIS, both criticized, hindered the efforts to establish cooperation. The election of Andrzej Duda in 2015 gave wings to PiS, with the de facto power laying in the hands of PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński (Zięba, 2020, p. 34). Its second term in power was accompanied by nationalistic, populist, and Euro-skeptic foreign policies: “The most important new phenomena in the foreign policy of the PiS government are: (a) the bi-lateralization and militarization of security policy based on the strategic partnership with

the US; (b) Euroskepticism: anti-Brussels posturing and disputes with Germany and France; (c) Poland's nationalistic and great-power approach to Russia; and (d) Three Seas Initiative as a dream of Poland's greatness» Zięba(2021, 11) defines a difference between Polish illiberalism from others with its combination with nationalism. They have focused on bilateral ties with the US, leading to increased militarization and criticism from European countries. PiS also criticized the previous government's relations with Germany and Russia, seeing them as a "German-Russian condominium." Along with criticism of the European Union, Zięba(2020) highlights that in addition to criticizing the European Union, PiS has made efforts to shift the political system towards authoritarianism and nationalism.

2.3.4 European Security and Poland

As one of the largest countries among Eastern European countries, Poland takes a huge place in shaping and safeguarding European security, especially in the case of the Eastern Europe. Poland's strategic documents as the Political- Strategic Directive, the Defense Doctrine, Assumptions of the Polish Security Policy, and the Polish Security and Defense Strategy, recognized a link between international and national security, highlighting participation in European security processes.

Poland's foreign policy has always concentrated on the importance of national security due to historical events of the past. This makes Poland a keen to understand the importance of security. Poland's strategic culture can be described as "solely focusing on the Russian military intervention, a focus on territorial defense, less experience with coalitions of the willing, a somewhat flexible approach to international law, and the United States as its key strategic partner" (Doeser&Eidenfalk, 2019, p. 6). Although for years it's challenging to compete with larger states in the European security realm, Poland has always strived to assume leadership among the Eastern European countries. The country's historical context, geographical proximity, and membership in the EU and NATO make Poland an important player in ensuring European security, especially now during the War in Ukraine (Garnett, 2016). Although it could be a leader of Eastern European security, in the initial steps of joining the EU role of Poland was critical; lacking a clear policy towards the East, it mostly concentrated on the idea of "return to Europe" (Garnett, 2016).

The ruling party of Poland Law and Justice (PiS) considers "nation is the fundamental organizing principle... According to PiS, the two most important features of a fully-fledged nation are sovereignty and empowerment" (Balcer et al., 2016) PiS's emphasis on national sovereignty and empowerment has created conflicts with the European Commission and other Western partners. For instance, in its electoral campaign, PiS used the migration crisis framing as a matter of national

and cultural security. It incorporated some policies that securitized the immigration and asylum issue. (Witold, 2017) The populist practices of PiS have also influenced its foreign policy. According to Cadier(2021), the foreign policy of populist parties, to some extent, can be created through "'politics of representation,' defined both in terms of meaning production and theatrical performance." He claims that populist policies were implemented less frequently toward US and Russia, resulting in securitization and viewing the EU as a threat. Overall, PiS's approach to Russia is rooted in countering Russian assertiveness, but at the same time, it perceives the EU as another threat to its sovereignty.

In the context of European security, Uzewicz et al. (2021) explore PiS's skepticism towards the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) only underscores the idea of criticism of the EU; they argue that Poland's engagement in the CSDP has consistently fallen short due to the weakness of the CSDP itself and Poland emphasizes on guarantees by NATO.

Regarding energy security, Poland was less dependent on Russian gas than other European countries."2015 -2017, Poland was dependent on gas imported from Russia for about 7.2–5.6% of its energy needs" (Zięba, 2020, p. 76) Poland always had an idea of diversifying its energy in order to be independent of Russian energy. Polish governments considered Russian energy policy in Europe as a source of Russian blackmailing and referred to it as a "gas weapon" (Zięba, 2020, p. 77)

2.3.5 Ukraine crisis and PiS

"In 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and attacked Donbas, Poland's narrative about Russia as the most direct threat to Europe's security gained traction across Europe" (Buras и Balcer, 2030, p. 6). Although PiS criticized the previous government for lacking coherent policies towards Russia and Ukraine, by 2016, it didn't have its own policy on this matter (Balcer et al., 2016). "...despite the routine assurances of the continuation of the eastern policy, there has been up to now a lack of any initiatives from the PiS government on the matter of policy relation" (Przybylski, 2018, p. 59).

On the other hand, starting from the Ukraine crisis Poland put significant effort into helping Ukraine since Ukraine was very crucial for its Eastern territory; therefore, it advocated for Ukraine's acceptance to the EU. In 2015 Ukraine crisis was an object of election, further, Poland reclaimed an active role in Ukraine policy. However, it opposed the EU. The reaction was immediately, almost instinctively, to interpret the war as an existential threat—for Ukraine, for Poland, for Central and Eastern Europe, and Europe as a whole. In PiS's assessment, the threat

emanating from Russia was multi-faceted (a direct military threat, an energy security crisis, and potential long-lasting economic consequences and further political destabilization of the region) and to some extent, hybrid warfare, which came as a strategic surprise for the Polish leadership, reinforced the belief in further Russian aggression and that Poland should prioritize territorial defense (Koziej, 2014). In addition, it was considered as medium- and long-term, devastating for their rule and prospects in parliamentary elections in 2023. (Kopper et al., 2023)

2.3.6 Hungary's foreign policy and Russia

Hungary, along with the rest of the post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe, has a troublesome history with Russia, as well as a connection to Russia in terms of economic and energy relations and in terms of diverged party stances toward Moscow. (Deák, 2023) From a historical point of view, it is reasonable to assume that Hungarians, like the population of many other Central and Eastern European countries will likely have a negative attitude toward Russia. “A string of Russian military actions against Hungary’s autonomy struggles (1849, 1956), communist dictatorships in the 20th century (the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the Rákosi system, and later the Kádár system), and the experience of decades-long Soviet occupation obviously worked against a deepening of positive feelings towards Russia» (Györi et al., 2015, p.52). During the 19th century, Hungary had particular concerns about Russian influence due to the rise of Pan-Slavism and Russia's influence on Slavic minorities. This further fueled Hungary’s fears of Russian influence as a potential encroachment to their independence (Györi et al., 2015, p.52). Later in 1920, The Treaty of Trianon was signed, which had significant implications for Hungary as it led to the creation of the country's modern territorial borders. Another crucial element that might influence Hungary’s fears and perception of the Russian threat was the Soviet occupation in 1944-1945. “..... After World War II, Hungary fell under Soviet occupation and became a satellite state within the Soviet sphere of influence. The Red Army did have a significant presence in Hungary, and Soviet troops were stationed in the country. » This emphasized the Soviet dominance over Hungarian affairs and the extent of Soviet control (*Sükösd*, 2022, p. 168). In 1956 Hungary witnessed a national uprising that holds a significant place in its history. It was met with brutal force as Soviet troops crushed the rebellion resulting in the deaths and injuries of thousands. Later, instead of fostering national unity, these events became a source of political polarization. “After 1989, political actors used 1956 to set out and decode and expose opponents’ motivation. Therefore, they made out of historical data on national unity into a source of political polarization. It led to the fractured understanding of the 1989 transition and weakening Hungarian democracy” (Seleny, 2014). One of these parties was Fidesz, which at the time, opposed communists and made use of the events of 1956 for political purposes. This resulted in the fragmentation of historical

understanding of the past and the polarization of parties. The fragmented understanding of the past, stemming from the events of 1956, contributed to the fracturing of Hungarian historical memory.

2.3.7 Hungary – Russia relations after 1989

In the mid-2000s, the relationship between Russia and Hungary was limited and cautious, with reservations on both sides (Feledy, 2015). The 2008 Foreign Relations Strategy emphasizes that NATO guarantees the country's security, while the EU plays a significant role in broader security terms. Although Hungarian Former Foreign Minister Kovacz justified Hungary's decision to join NATO by explaining that it is driven by the need for security and stability, some scholars argued that the Russian threat played a role in shaping the security concerns of Central and Eastern European countries, including Hungary (Varga, 2009; Schimmelfenning, 1998; Valki, 1998). One of the salient issues of national security was the Hungarian minorities residing outside, which raised concerns of potential conflicts with neighboring countries in their efforts to protect its minority rights" (Cottey, 1995).

Even today's pro-Russian Fidesz tried to be distanced from Russia in 1998-2002. "In the opposition between 2002 and 2010, the party's programs seem to have cast Russia's geopolitical significance as an unimportant part of history; any Eastern foreign policy, if mentioned, always displayed an element of the common European or NATO foreign policy» (Györi, 2015). Starting his journey in the 1980s on the liberal side Viktor Orban now became a leader of is one of the few politicians of Eastern and Central Europe that has been in power for already 13 years. (Sükösd, 2022, p. 165) In the early 2000s, he was opposed to establishing good relations with Russia and criticized the previous government's policies toward Russia. "Fidesz, then in opposition, and Viktor Orbán himself strongly criticized the Gyurcsány government for the South Stream gas pipeline agreement signed by Hungary and Russia in 2008, and for the potential of growing Russian influence due to the Paks expansion project" (Györi et al., 2015, p.53). However, after coming to power for the second time, it started establishing good ties with Russia. In addition, the vacuum created after accessing NATO and EU in foreign policy Fidesz filled with new initiatives: energy policy, "Hungarians as a nation" and "Eastern Opening", which meant opening the country for investments and foreign trade" (Feledy, 2015). Another reason for the change of direction was Hungary's visit to Russia in 2009 and talks with Putin; Orban changed his direction and, from that time, started building good relations with Russia.

At the same time, in 2010, Fidesz in power started implementing controversial policies, which went against EU policies. Hungary started to avoid coming to an agreement with Brussels; this

populist drift was explained as referendocracy. (Musiał-Karg, 2018) Further, it took anti-EU rhetoric taking a closer stance with authoritarian states praising “illiberal democracy”. Some scholars connected this turn to called Hungarian version of “Putinism”, some scholars named Hungary “the Trojan horse of Russia in the EU and NATO”(Buzogány, 2017, p. 1310). Orban’s discourses for the past 20 years encompassed four themes: fear, enemies of the People(Soros, Brussels, migrants), national sovereinism, and militarization (*Sükösd*, 2022, p. 176).

Thus, Györi explains this shift in the attitude towards Russia and fostering cooperation by Orban’s distancing from the West (Györi, 2015). Already in 2011 in a foreign policy strategy, Russia was placed as “a prominent partner”.(Feledy, 2015) The relationship between Russia and Hungary can be described as a business relationship on the political level, with energy being a major issue. “Hungary is one of the most vulnerable countries in Europe from Russian energy exports. Over 80% of the gas import comes from Russia, through one county, Ukraine, and through one pipeline” (Varga, 2009).

After a meeting in 2013 in Moscow, they expanded their economic relationship: the South Stream Pipeline, Paks II Nuclear Power Plant. Although Hungary found a favourable terms on the payment of debt to Russia, Paks II’s article 5 put Hungary in a precarious financial positions, outlining possible penalties in the case of failing to repay.(Feledy, 2015) The Paks II project is still ongoing and in May 2023 the European Commission approved amendments on the project, Commission highlighted that the project doesn’t align with overall EU’s aim on energy dependency (WNN, 2023). Hungary’s energy policy and actions in the past have contributed to a situation where its energy market is more defenseless against the Russian energy industry (Ámon&Deák, p. 95). As for 2020 Hungary’s dependence on Russian gas was 54,2 %(Eurostat, 2022), “In 2021, Hungary’s overall import dependency stood at 87%. Hungary is heavily dependent on the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline for its crude oil imports. Russia accounted for 64% of crude oil imports and 95% of gas imports.” (Aniko et al., 2023) In general, Hungary relies on imported energy sources such as oil, natural gas, and nuclear fuel, which raises concerns regarding security and price stability. (Ámon&Deák, 2015) in addition, Hungary also wants to consolidate its role in European regional energy landscape. “Hungary has been striving to turn itself into a regional energy trading, which is predicated on its cross border capacities with neighbouring countries and its geographical location, being wedged between Russia and Western Europe.” (Szabo and Fabok, 2020) Overall, it is obvious that Hungary is enourmously dependent on Russian energy supply and it stands as an important element of the relationship of Russia and Hungary “the backbone of Hungary’s bilateral relations both with Russia and Ukraine is trade.” (Ámon and Deák, 2015) Although Hungary attempted to diversify its energy sources, it has only focused on changing supply routes rather than

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reducing reliance on Russia, which remains its main supplier. Furthermore, the country's dependence on Russia is reinforced by Russia-financed projects as Paks II. Nevertheless, Hungary tries to strategically utilize energy issues as a tool for domestic political re-nationalization and aims to consolidate its energy role within the regional context.

One of the Fidesz's policies include kin-state activism, which means that actions by Hungarian state can affect Hungarian minorities in the territory of other state. It can affect their security and also can be securitization of minority issues. This matter originates from the treaty of Trianon after which Hungary lost its three-fifths of its territory and Hungarian minority were dispersed across seven neighboring countries. (Liebich, 2019, p. 672) At the European level, Hungary tries to bring this issue to "Europeanize the issue". Additionally, Scott (2018) asserts that Hungary's Eurosceptic border politics, driven by populist nationalism and a cultural perspective on national identity, both challenge the European Union and potentially jeopardize European security. Scholars have offered various explanations for the shift in Orban's Fidesz party's stance towards Moscow. Györi(2015) explains close ties with Russia as mentioned before in order to distance itself from the West: "Hungary's will to counterbalance center and periphery" (Varga и Buzogány, 2021, p. 1455) and from the perspective of contacts among Russian and Hungarian paramilitary forces and uncritical attitude towards Russia by ultra-rights. Buzogány (2017) examining 'authoritarian diffusion' theory between Russia and Hungary found out there is a little ideological influence, instead Hungary's authoritarian tendencies connected to the domestic and EU-level developments: diversifying its foreign policy as well as balancing its financial dependency (Buzogány, 2017). Feledy examining Hungarian foreign policy and Ukraine crisis highlights strongly influence of domestic politics in the foreign policy of Hungary. He gives an example of creating an image of Fidesz during 2010 national rally, it eventually had its implication on foreign affairs creating misunderstandings within and outside of Europe (Feledy, 2015). Although it can be said that Hungary generally was inspired by global illiberalism and not particularly Russian authoritarianism, as well as the idea that Hungarian and Russian cooperation is interest-driven, Russian propaganda in Hungary and some authoritarian policies in Russia, as well as Kremlin influence of far-right parties could influence the establishment of authoritarianism among the population (Hegedus, 2016; Juhász, 2015). Increased Russian propaganda and influence in Hungary resulted in some level of dependence on Hungary during the Ukraine and Georgian Wars. ((Györi, 2015)) Additionally, Hungary's dependence on Russian gas and nuclear energy adds another dimension of cooperation with Russia.

2.3.8 Fidesz and Ukraine Crisis

During the Ukraine crisis Fidesz supported Ukraine and its integration into the EU while simultaneously strongly advocating for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. “When the EU Foreign Affairs Council met in February 2014, Hungary was represented by Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Zsolt Németh, a strong pro-Atlantic member of Fidesz. He “confirmed that both the beginning of political dialogue and restarting Ukraine’s process of integration with the European Union [were] also of utmost importance” (Hungarian position on..., 2014 cited in Feledy, 2015). However, Hungary's position also drew criticism as it resisted imposing sanctions on Russia, citing it as against Hungarian interests. Ukraine crisis impacted newly developed Fidesz’s foreign policy initiatives of Eastern opening, energy, and Hungarian minorities policies. According to Feledy, Hungary’s approach to the Ukraine crisis can be understood in the context of “Eastern opening”. “The Eastern Opening (EO) foreign policy drive, created to forge stronger ties with countries located to ‘the East’” (Rogers, 2019). Hungary’s approach to the crisis in Ukraine continued “in the framework of its pragmatic relations to Russia, it supported EU-Russia partnerships and NATO dialogues, as well as he voted for peaceful measures and didn’t support arms delivery emphasizing on the security of Hungarian minority”. (Feledy, 2015, p. 73) During the first years of the crisis, Orbán aligned with the measures taken by NATO and the EU, however, it also tried to maintain good interaction with Moscow. Hungary criticized sanctions stating that those measures only go against European nations' interests, but it didn’t take any strong measures to oppose the sanctions. Hungary considered sanctions as “just a temporary tool forced by a negative confluence of circumstances” (Buras и Balcer, 2030, p. 6). Feledy argues that during the Ukraine crisis, Hungary’s domestic politics and foreign policies didn’t align, as Hungary supported measures taken by the EU and NATO, but at the same time it promoted its “freedom fighter“ approach in domestic politics. In addition, Hungary’s foreign minister’s and Orbán’s speeches regarding the Ukraine crisis were most of the times differed, as Martonyi spoke on the behalf of EU interests, whereas Orbán spoke more openly, sometimes differing from EU line. Orbán placed, Hungarian minority rights, peaceful negotiations, separating economic cooperation from political. During Ukraine crisis Hungary’s engagement in the collective security and contribution to Ukraine was huge in the framework of NATO, which shows Hungary’s support of NATO activities. At the same time, Hungarian NGOs were active to provide Humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis raised the question of Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, Hungary kin-state politics of providing citizenship went along the Hungary’s policies increasing workforce from Hungary (Erőss et al., 2016). Overall, during the crisis in

Ukraine, Hungary was concerned with its energy security and the security of Hungarian minorities. Although it condemned sanctions against Russia by the EU, it still didn't veto the EU decisions.

2.3.9 Hungary and Poland's Foreign Policies Towards Russia and the War in Ukraine

In conclusion, works based on a comparative analysis of Hungary and Poland's foreign policies and stances towards Russia will be examined, particularly in the context of the War in Ukraine. Poland and Hungarian camaraderie (Kopper et al.,2023), with their ruling parties that share populist stances and anti-EU rhetorics, might have certain similarities. Despite potential shared security concerns and interests at the EU level, their perspectives differ due to the opposing attitudes toward Russia. Varga and Buzogany examining PiS and Fidesz's foreign policies state that reorientation of foreign policies in Hungary and Poland under the populist parties of PiS and Fidesz depends on the ideas and beliefs of the broader conservative movements. "The intense preoccupation with national history leads to two further common themes: the problematization of the relationship between CEE and the West, including a critique of the "West" as not taking seriously the region's need to deal with Russia on its own terms; and an insistence on the necessity of a moral value turn in Europe" (Varga&Buzogany. 2020, p.1452) These populist parties have always been criticizing the EU and its policies towards Russia; they emphasized on dealing with Russia on their own terms. Although both parties' foreign policy orientation is based on a moral understanding of international context, they put forward the importance of distinguishing between moral-based and pragmatic approaches. However, in spite of pragmatic approaches, both countries' stances towards Russia are diverged due to various factors. "While divided over the issue of relationships with Russia, Poland, and Hungary share one major area to align their policies, namely their relations to the European Union" (Varga и Buzogány, 2021, p. 1455). Andras Racz (2014) examines the division of the Visegrad countries over Russia putting domestic and foreign policy interests as a factor influencing in shaping Visegrad-Russia relations, but in terms of hard security(energy), the author identifies convergence. Poland advocated for Atlanticist foreign policy, whereas Hungary was cautious about confronting Russian interests and promoted "Eastern Opening"(Racz, 2014, p.76). Before the War, PiS and Fidesz had a converged stance regarding migration, the Rule of Law, and EU funds, and opposed energy transition. (Virgos and Marin, 2022). From the beginning of the War, PiS was very supportive of Ukraine, Hungary showed a "more inconsistent stance with a varied position towards the War within the government, along with the confrontation of EU institutions" (Virgos and Marin, 2022, 61). According to Madlovicz and Magyar Orban's regime before and after the War can be described as initiative(wealth accumulation) and reactive(anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian populist narrative among the population), which can be explained by the "regime's rationality is focused on survival and regime

interests rather than the well-being and interests of the country as a whole. (Madlovics, Magyar, 2023) Hungary's inconsistency can "create serious repercussions as deep divisions among member states undermining European unity". (NEE, 2023) According to authors "although there is a hope that Poland can be trusted ally of the EU, there are still concerns about the move towards illiberal democracy. On the other hand, Hungary's pro-Kremlin stance complicates overall EU foreign policy stance" (Virgos and Marin, 2022, 61). The recent work from Kopper et al.,(2023) examining populist foreign policies identifies the differences in foreign policies of the two countries attributed to the nature of the two populist regimes - Poland being more ideological and Hungary more opportunistic.

3. Methodology

According to the European Parliament's Organization and Rules, the Plenary Sessions are "The high point of the European Parliament's political activity; plenary sittings represent the culmination of the legislative work done in committee and the political groups. The plenary sitting is also the forum in which the representatives of the citizens of the European Union - the Members of the European Parliament or MEPs - take part in the EU's decision-making and express their standpoint vis-à-vis the Commission and Council" (How plenary works, n.d.). Participating in EU decision-making and expressing their stance is achieved through engaging in debates conducted within the framework of the Plenary. According to Eemeren and Garssen (2012, p.1) "A parliamentary debate is a distinct argumentative activity type". They highlight the communicative activity type of plenary debates, especially the role of argumentation and strategic maneuvering employed by MEPs to advocate for their positions and influence their positions in the decision-making process.

The nature and the extent of connections between national parties and political groups, speaking on behalf of EU perspectives analyzed by several researchers. Lord (2013), examining EP Debates' justificatory functions, states that while substantive discussions may take place in committees, plenary debates are crucial in providing public justification for the decisions made by the Parliament. Lord(2013) also argues that due to the divergent interests of actors, they try to justify their preferences in the debates; thus, they engage in constructive dialogue. This indicates that plenary debates can serve as a platform for deliberation, where different perspectives can be presented and evaluated. Members of the European Parliament are grouped to the Political groups. These groups are formed by MEPs from different EU countries who are from the same party or share the same ideology. Ahrens et al., (2022) state that MEPs speaking on behalf of their political groups can be influenced by their national parties on the issues of cultural and religious grounds. While there may be some interlinks between political groups and national parties, it is essential to

recognize the individual agency of MEPs and the potential for divergence from the official party line.

This research focuses on the European Parliamentary Debates and examines positions and perspectives of two political parties, PiS and Fidesz. PiS represents the European Parliament group The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament, whereas Fidesz was suspended from its group in 2019. Although research specifically focusing on the debates involving PiS and Fidesz might be limited, examining these two parties offers an insightful perspective on their security postures and positions on Russia within the European Parliament.

3.1 Research design

This study is structured as a qualitative case analysis, drawing upon the concepts of securitization theory and the framing method, as elaborated in the Literature Review. The objective of this study is to understand how the two ruling parties PiS (Poland) and Fidesz (Hungary) construct securitization/desecuritization frames of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine in the European Parliamentary Debates context. The selection of these parties is grounded in several reasons. First, after the Ukraine War, both parties encountered potential shifts in their cooperative dynamics due to their Eurosceptic and populist leanings. Poland and Hungary, particularly the main parties in power, PiS and Fidesz, are well known for their cooperative opposition against the European Union and the growing trend of Euroscepticism. However, this time it seems they went distant from each other, as in April of 2022, Jaroslaw Kaczynski of the Law and Justice Party called Orban's stance on Ukraine "disappointing"(Radulska, 2022). The cooperation of two countries within the Visegrad Groups has been suspended as Hungary did not allow transiting weapons through its territory. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there were differences in how the two states approached their relationship with Moscow. However, following the invasion due to Hungary's close relationship with Russia, Poland's ruling party (PiS) has become very critical of Hungary. In the European Parliamentary context, due to their Eurosceptic and populist ideologies, PiS and Fidesz always support each other on the matters of the Rule of Law and Article 7. The case mentioned above can be the possible crack of their relationship, particularly from their diverged stances towards Russia and diverged, sometimes converged discourses in the European Parliamentary Debates. According to Agenda Publica (2023), "Hungary's Fidesz party was the most assertive of Russia within the group of less assertive parties, also falling in the middle." Although Fidesz was expected to be less assertive in Russia, its assertiveness doubled. This case presents an interesting dynamic between Fidesz and PiS regarding their assertiveness towards Russia, both within and outside the European Parliament (EP). The party's assertiveness increased

despite expectations that Fidesz would display less assertiveness towards Russia. Second, given the recent nature of the Ukraine War, there's a gap in research addressing the securitization of Russia and related issues. Third, integrating securitization with a framing approach assists in pinpointing (de)securitization narratives. This synthesis underscores that the Securitization Theory's queries can be more profoundly grasped via framing, as varying discourses on securitization/deseuritization arise from distinct security perceptions. The main inquiry revolves around parties' role in the securitization of Russia within the European Parliament. This is instrumental in understanding the broader narrative of Russia's positioning within European security—a process often complicated by the diverse threat perceptions of member states. While collective security's fragmented nature is not the core focus, it's highlighted because this research offers insights into varied security constructs by influential parties, especially when they helm some of Central and Eastern Europe's major nations. Furthermore, this analysis can uncover the narratives of parties that, prior to the war, maintained close ties with Russia but had to adjust their discourse post-conflict to remain relevant.

3.2 The method selection

This is qualitative content analysis whose objective is explore and identify the presence, characteristics, and variations of securitization/deseuritization frames within the speeches of PiS and Fidesz MEPs in the European Parliamentary Debates from the start of the War in Ukraine, with the aim of understanding how specific issues or actors are constructed as existential security threats, referent objects and subjects(who should securitize) and existential measures that should be taken to counteract the threat.

According to Hsieh&Shannon (2005) Qualitative content analysis is a method “for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). M.Goplerud&Smith (2021) introducing various methods of analyzing Parliamentary Debates states that with the growing software there are different methods to analyze Debates such as “speech-as-content”. Parliamentary debates are very diverse and can encompass wide arrays of topics, therefore extraction of the content from those debates can be complicated as well. Some can narrow the debates to the particular topic of the debates. Using computational methods and keywords it's possible to extract relevant topics from the text. Regardless, of the method used it's crucial to be transparent on choosing the methods (Goplerud, 2021). Therefore, this research used more topical debates on Russia and to some extent debates that contained keyword 'Russia', 'Russian aggression' in it. Moreover, Hsieh & Shannon (2005) suggest a directed method for qualitative content analysis, rooted in existing theory. This

strategy can be either inductive or deductive, pinpointing crucial concepts or variables derived from established theories or research. Nevertheless, potential downsides of this theory-driven content analysis could be a pronounced bias, and if the theory contains ambiguous terms, creating operational definitions might pose challenges.

The framework this study adopts is termed “securitization as the work of framing.” Drawing on the foundational work in framing research, particularly from Entman, Riebling, and Wense (2019) assert that “a frame can be conceptualized and operationalized as being both situated within a broader social context and embedded within the semantics of pre-existing discourses.” In the context of the War in Ukraine, the discourses surrounding security and Russia underwent shifts at the European level; thus, discourses incorporate previous, established narratives. Goffman's perspective further elucidates this process. He posits that frames are pivotal to our perceptions of the world, playing a vital role in our everyday interactions and communications, “focusing attention—what “is in frame” they prioritize it and “out of frame” they underscore the importance of it.(Lindekilde, 2014)

Therefore, here comes the help of securitization theory where the theory itself has its own question of Additionally, identifying securitization components such as a threat, referent objects, extraordinary measures and in the context of the collective securitization who should securitize can help to extract needed discourses. In order to justify selected frames the thesis will justify and support by textual evidence. Previous literature review helped to decide which themes can be located under the securitization of Russia framework. For instance, energy security related to Russia were securitized before by some countries and even were brought to the European stage by Poland the European Commission in order to securitize it.

Thus, the securitization theory becomes instrumental, as it inherently poses questions about who securitizes what, for whom and under what circumstances. Recognizing key components of securitization – like identifying threats, pinpointing referent objects, specifying extraordinary measures, and in a collective securitization context, determining the key actors – aids in sifting through the pertinent discourses. This thesis will lean on textual evidence to validate the chosen frames, ensuring a rigorous analysis. The preceding literature review provided a foundational understanding, allowing the categorization of various themes under the Russia securitization umbrella. For example, the securitization of energy matters linked to Russia has been previously flagged by certain countries and even elevated to the European platform, notably by Poland and the European Commission, emphasizing its security implications.

3.3 Data Collection

To identify how PiS and Fidesz discursively construct Russia securitizing it, the data was drawn from the original database of the European Parliamentary Debates. The primary dataset for the research was retrieved from the debates related to Russia and the War in Ukraine, however, it also included non-Russia related topics that mentioned Russia/War in it due to its impact on various fields of the topics discussed in the European Parliament. Complete transcriptions of the Debates were retrieved from the European Parliamentary website, due to the extensive browse and search facilities. Possibility to combine in one query the time and topic of the debate, the spoken words – in any available translation – and information about the speaker uttering these, such as affiliations to countries, parties, and committees” it was easier to access and find the data from the open database (van Agellen et al., 2017). Topics of the Debates were possible to find by keyword “Russia” in the English language, however, the transcriptions of the speeches of MEPs were in their native language, but videos of the speeches included English translations. To be able to code them in the written format, it was translated with the help of Google translator and Deepl machine translators at the same time comparing the preciseness of translations with the exact speech in video format. The written speeches from MEPs were translated using a machine translator and then the content was compared to other speeches using patterns from those speeches. Knowledge of Polish also helped to understand the overall meaning.

Using MAXQDA it was possible “to support the transformation of these content into frames by providing the tools for a deductive and inductive process.” As the research is being done in the framework of the War in Ukraine, timeframe started from 23.02.2022, particularly the 1st Debate started in 01.03.2022 – till nowadays, the last one was 14.06.2023. Overall, there were 119 Debates for the PiS and 64 Debates for Fidesz. The number of the Debates on Fidesz’s side is low due to the lack of speeches in several Debates attributed to the War in Ukraine. Each debate set was grouped into the dataset system. The coding system was divided into three: Diagnosis, Evaluation and proposed remedial actions. The analytical approach to examining the securitization of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine by PiS and Fidesz involved analyzing the different stages of framing the war, specifically focusing on securitization Russia. Entman calls such an approach functional frames ““To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”(Entman, 1993 Building on this Stępką(2022) uses diagnosis, evaluation, and the proposed remedial actions or responses to the crisis in the framework “securitization as the work of framing”. By studying the diagnosis and evaluation stages, we can understand the security

frames that shape the understanding and framing of Russia's involvement in the conflict. This analysis will shed light on how PiS and Fidesz perceive and frame the security implications of Russia's actions. The outcomes of the diagnosis and evaluation stages will then lead to proposed remedial actions or responses to address the crisis. Examining these proposed actions will provide insights into the security framings present in the framing of both parties.

The text can contain frame, which are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases that provide thematically reinforcing facts or judgements. Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of communication and also add more salience by repetition and associating them with culturally important symbols. Using discourse analysis in the approach of securitization as the work of framing it can be easier to have a more realistic and contextualized interpretative look in order not to miss the elements that might contain symbolic content or cultural resonance. Additionally, the two parties examination of security frames can show what was said and what was downgraded (silenced) through identifying frame competition.

Using the "Word Cloud" it was easier to identify framings for the first stage of Diagnosis: how they frame the War caused by Russia or Russia itself. Each stage included various sub-codes. These sub-codes were then explained in the context of the main parent code. Writing memos were used to take notes for the future analysis. Further, it could be possible to identify code frequencies of mentioning Russia and the War in Ukraine in each Debate, which showed that for both parties the War in Ukraine and Russia are on a high alert across various topics (Gizzi & Reddiker, 2021, p. 127).

3.4 Limitations of the research

It is essential to acknowledge that focusing only on the debates in the European Parliament may result in an incomplete understanding of the perspectives and the party politics can be broad. Language is also an issue, as in translating speeches there might be limitations in the accuracy and nuances of translation. Interpretations can sometimes be affected by translators as well, as sometimes they can deliver broader EU meaning, therefore it was at some point good to translate using machine translation and compare. (Beaton, 2014) As mentioned before, this research thesis focuses not on the finding that the War in Ukraine affected the two parties' cooperation in the European Parliament. It is aimed to understand the discourses and framings of Russia by conducting discourse analysis. The research aims to contribute to the understanding of these parties' perspectives on securitization and their assertive stance towards Russia within the European Parliament. Additionally, discourse analysis involves interpretation and subjective judgment: the author can interpret discourses from her point of view, which may influence the

coding process, however, literature review and established frameworks were helpful to mitigate bias.

4.1 FINDINGS

This chapter presents findings and analysis from the collected data explained in the previous methodological chapter.

According to the European Parliament's Resolution from 2023, 16th February, on "One Year of Russia's invasion and war of aggression against Ukraine" it condemns "Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine," emphasizing Russia's actions as deliberate and condemnable. The resolution highlights Russia's "violations of sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" Besides Ukraine, the resolution highlights the threat Russia poses to European values, the threat to European Neighbourhood, and Russia's disinformation threat to European unity. Therefore, it calls for unity in condemning Russia's War of aggression in Ukraine and calls for "the establishment of accountability for the crimes against humanity and aggression." Supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression calls for Support and Solidarity with Ukraine, mainly through measures like humanitarian aid. Underlining the geopolitical change caused by the Russian War of aggression underlines the need for military aid to Ukraine, calls for increased and accelerated military support to enable Ukraine to defend itself and regain control over its territory. To cut off financing for Russia's war efforts, it calls for implementing sanctions, especially in the economic and energy sectors. In addition, it highlights the prohibition of Russian fossil fuels, uranium, and diamonds, including abandoning the Nord Stream 1 and 2 projects. (EP Resolution from 16.02.2023) Thus, the European Parliament frames Russian actions as deliberate and condemnable, calling it "Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine ."It recognizes the Russian threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, highlighting its broader implications to European security, European values, and Europeans.

Further, it calls for unified condemnation of Russia's aggression and urges support and solidarity (humanitarian aid), military assistance, and sanctions. This resolution shows the overall content of discourses that Russia is discussed starting from the beginning of the War in Ukraine. The resolutions of the European Parliament are directly connected to European Parliamentary, as it encompasses all of the concerns made or will be made in the Debates. Overall, after the War in Ukraine, with the increasing issues in 2019-2023, 560 Debates now mention Russia (how many are related to Russia exactly starting from the War).

The European Parliament debates have prominently focused on the topic of Russian aggression in Ukraine since its beginning. While the primary aim of these discussions was to address the discourses of PiS and Fidesz, it is evident that most MEPs were inclined to condemn Russia, though some members, particularly from right-wing parties, condemned the war itself rather than singling out Russia. Both PiS and Fidesz members expressed condemnation of the Russian War, but the framing of Russia as a threat was more prevalent within PiS's discourse. In nearly every speech, PiS members referenced Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine. Notably, both parties utilized the topic of Russia and the War to condemn the country, reflecting their status as Eurosceptic parties within the EU. The discourses of PiS regarding Russia predominantly portrayed the country in a negative light, often employing harsh and critical terms. Certain discourse patterns recurred, indicating a saturation of similar themes in both parties' speeches. Russia was mentioned in relation to "Russia's War of aggression against Ukraine," "During the war times," and "Putin's Russia," among other terms. While discussions occasionally dedicated to other topics, Russia remained a common focal point. Within the debates, PiS members from various political groups displayed higher levels of activity, particularly in discussions pertaining to Russia and the War in Ukraine. In analyzing discourses, I will rely on the framework of "securitization as the work of framing." The analysis will first show the security discourses within the parties, particularly their framings of Russia in the context of security. Identifying framings in the 3 different stages of diagnosis, evaluation, and remedial actions will help to explore the framings of Russia on each stages: what is the threatening, who is threatened, and what should be done to address those issues. These are the main questions that should be answered identifying framings for each stage. Framings can help to understand upon which security perceptions those framings are made. Since it's about identifying security discourses within the EP .

4.1 Findings on Diagnosis stage of Law and Justice (PiS) MEPs' Speeches of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine

The diagnosis part in the context of the securitization identifies the root cause and sources of the security problem. (Stępką, 2020) The securitization of Russia by the MEPs of the Law and Justice (PiS) party can be attributed to their perception of Russia as a threat, driven by a combination of historical experiences, Russia's perceived expansionistic nature, and Western countries' perceived naivety and enabling behavior in the face of this threat.

4.1.1 Seizing the Security Threat: Russia as the Instigator

Although, the conflict in Ukraine, which had been ongoing since 2014, escalated into a full-scale war starting on February 24th, this significant development acted as a primary catalyst for increased

security concerns and prompted a reassessment of Russia's actions and motivations. The conflict was characterized by various labels, such as "the full-scale War," "the first War after World War II," "hybrid war," "war on borders," "a brutal war," and "the tragic war next door." These labels reflected the severity and tragic nature of the conflict, highlighting the urgency and seriousness with which it was perceived. According to MEP Anna Fotyga (2022) *“Russia's perceived threat is attributed to its consistent desire to provoke and instigate conflicts while seeking to benefit from the resulting escalation.”*¹

PiS members draw upon historical experiences of Soviet rule to emphasize the root cause of the conflict and highlight Russia's expansionistic tendencies. They view Russia as an "enemy" that once again launched an attack from the East, reflecting their concerns about its aggressive actions. *“On February 24, 2022, Russian troops attacked Ukraine. It is another tragic day that will forever be recorded in the history of Europe, which has been an area of numerous wars and conflicts for centuries. This time the enemy attacked again from the East, just like in 1920, when the people of Poland, fighting against the Bolsheviks, showed heroism for the independence of Europe.”*²(Jurgiel, 2022) In addition, they tend to refer to expansionistic nature of Russia and Putin often making parallels between Soviet Union and today's Russia, stating that *“Central and Eastern European countries know the experience of being under Soviet Union's rule and being under the threat of Russia's revisionism and its “desire for territorial expansion”.*³ By referencing the Soviet era, PiS members imply that Russia today exhibits similar characteristics to the Soviet Union's actions, reinforcing their belief that Russia poses a significant threat in its will to restore the Soviet Union. For instance, Tarczynski(2022) speaking to Czech Presidency makes parallels with Soviet Union and today's Russia *“We do remember 1968, when the Soviets invaded your country. And I can assure you now you have our full support – because we do know how it is to be a slave of the Soviet Union and Russia. I can assure you, Poland will never be a slave of the Soviets. Poland will never be a slave of the Soviet Union and Russia.”* Thus, they emphasize on the experiences that Central and Eastern Europe have in relation to Russia *“listen to the voice of reason that know much better what Russia smells like”*, they note how it was and it is important to listen to those countries in the East that warned about the risk of Russian aggression.⁴ By emphasizing the understanding that Eastern European countries have of Russia's nature, PiS members condemn Western countries for their perceived naivety and failure to listen to the warnings of Eastern European nations. Here,

¹ Destruction of cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh (10.03.2022)

² Russian aggression against Ukraine (continuation of debate) (01.03.2022)

³ The Three Seas Initiative: challenges and opportunities (topical debate), 06.07.2022 (Brudzinski, 2022)

⁴ Presentation of the programme of activities of the Czech Presidency (continuation of debate)(06.07.2022)

comes the question of the East-West divide condemning Western countries in their close relationship to Russia. They state the money that comes from Western countries financed Russia, weapons that were sold to Russia made it possible for Russia to enhance its military. Therefore, they state that beside warnings about Russia's expansionistic nature which stems from historical experience, Western countries played to the hands of Russia by financing future War and strengthening Russia's ideas of its expansionism. *"Putin attacked Ukraine because he got the green light. You were repeatedly warned here against depending on energy supplies from Russia."* (Kruk, 2022⁵) The claim is that the decision of Germany's leadership to engage in energy projects with Gazprom and strengthen energy relations with Russia increased Europe's reliance on Russia. This, in turn, gave Putin the leverage to influence European policies. The evaluation of the Putin's actions and West's condemnation will be further explained in the evaluation part as they are main "the main key actors and culprits responsible for the instigation of threats and security problem" (Stepka, 2020, p.8)

However, the EU's failure to manage those risks and see a true Russian face was attributed as the root cause that led to the War. Another part of the speech serves as a call to acknowledge the historical context and be vigilant against potential threats posed by Russia *"We, the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe, must today, in this House, recall the voices of realism coming from countries that have centuries of difficult experience of neighborly relations with Russia. It doesn't matter if it was Bolshevik Russia or today it is Putin's Russia. It has always sought to subjugate our countries."* ⁶(Brudzinski, 2022)

Human security narratives can be observed from the PiS members mentioning previous Russian attacks on neighboring countries and cited speeches by Kaczynski, who had been warning about Russia's aggressive attitude since 2008, who warned about Russia's aggressive attitude already in 2008. As from the speech it's seen that they have always been calling Russia as a threat, cautioning its possible move towards the West, particularly "to Poland". They state that another threat that is present in the Russia's Hybrid War is disinformation, propaganda and Russian agents who serve for Russia to influence energy security and the European policies. Russia has been waging a war in cyberspace against the European Union for many years. The aggression against Ukraine was preceded by hacker attacks on public institutions, government officials and critical infrastructure in many Member States, including Poland. Thus, PiS members highlight that Russia for a long

⁵ The Power of the EU – Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (debate) (24.03.2022)

⁶ Debate with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas - The EU's role in a changing world and the security situation of Europe following the Russian aggression and invasion of Ukraine (debate) (09.03.2022)

time was preparing this kind of aggression through disinformation campaigns on European citizens and increasing dependency of countries in Europe on Russian energy.

*“You didn't listen, and now people are dying in Ukraine. You thought the Russians would capture Kiev in three days and it would be over. You would criticize a little, give a few euros to refugees and you could go back to business with Moscow - continue business as usual. This is not the first time you have been wrong.”*⁷(Kruk, 2022)

“We appealed for security for our part of Europe. We were answered even a few days before the war, like Commissioner Borrell, that the Union was not dealing with security problems, or we were told: if you want more security, involve Russia even more in your cooperation”. (Waszczykowski, 2022) PiS members state that the war would not have happened if it had not been for Nord Stream 1 and 2, if it had not been for the dependence on energy supplies from Russia. From the framings that is evident from the discourses is that “Western leaders must condemn past mistakes, prioritize supporting Ukraine, and consider its EU membership for a more secure future.”⁸ The West, particularly Europe, is criticized for enabling the situation. While the European Union is also held accountable, it's mainly for not acknowledging Russia's aggressive stance.

4.2 Findings on Evaluation stage of Law and Justice (PiS) MEPs' Speeches of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine

In the evaluation stage, members of PiS identify several key aspects of the Russian threat. These include: the Russian invasion and aggression towards Ukraine, the use of disinformation campaigns to manipulate public opinion, and the leverage gained through energy dependency and economic influence. Referent objects from the discourses can be Ukraine in the context of War and the European Union (as an entity affected by the war and as having responsibility to respond and support Ukraine), at the same time, the referent objects are Europeans and Ukrainians (refugees and Ukrainians in Ukraine). They don't mention Polish people separately as referent objects, rather they mention Polish people's role in the ongoing War and helping Ukrainians and Europe against Russian assertive actions. Throughout the debates Russian actions in Ukraine had different labels by members of the Law and Justice Party. Right afterwards the invasion in the discourses of Law and Justice Party the War was labelled as “Russian invasion to Ukraine”. Other

⁷ The Power of the EU – Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (debate) (24.03.2022)

⁸ EU Protection of children and young people fleeing the war against Ukraine (debate) (05.04, 2022)

narratives were “Russian troops attacked Ukraine” or “Russian assault of Ukraine” placing Russia as the main instigator and showing strong condemnation of Russian actions.

During the War there were several moments which were considered as genocide and War Crimes by International Community. The framings of Russia were presented as Russia’s “questioning Ukraine's right to independence: “the Russian Federation, led by President Vladimir Putin, challenges Ukraine's sovereignty and disregards previous assurances regarding the inviolability of its borders.” With these statements they show that Russian actions are inhumane and brutal which requires “exceptionalist security” driven by humanitarian narratives. *“Their bodies bear traces of actions that clearly indicate crimes against humanity. Evil must be called evil. It is our duty, our legal duty under international law, to do everything we can to stop this evil as soon as possible through massive total sanctions, tight, imposed in solidarity and implemented in solidarity. Also, through the supply of weapons, because Ukrainians are fighting in a just war.”*⁹(Fotyga, 2022)They underscore the intensity of Russian assaults by referencing major cities that witnessed the most significant war casualties and transgressions: Bucha, Irpin, and Mariupol. This underscores the humanitarian aspect of the war, indicating that Russia's offensives target not only military objectives but also civilian infrastructures and individuals not directly involved in the conflict. The mention of shelling hospitals, schools, and medical convoys emphasizes the brutality of these actions. This framing depicts Russia as a perpetrator of indiscriminate violence against innocent Ukrainians. “Each of us, active politicians, will one day hear the question: *“What did you do to stop Russia? What did you do when the beasts murdered Ukrainians, women, children, old people? Their bodies bear traces of actions that clearly indicate crimes against humanity”*¹⁰(Fotyga, 2023). Indicating Russia’s actions as “crime against humanity” characterized as humanitarian crisis they call for more sanctions and weapon delivery.

Ukrainians and Ukraine in the speeches of MEPs was referred as referent objects that need support and solidarity. Additionally, their speeches show that placing Ukrainians and Ukraine as referent objects that need to be protected against Russia goes beyond European Union’s internal security. Support and solidarity discourses aimed in providing weapons, ammunities and humanitarian aid to those who are in Ukraine and those who fled their homes to find shelter in the European Union. The last ones were referred as war refugees who fled their homes. As the main sufferers of the War Ukrainians in the speeches of MEPs portrayed as heroic people fighting against Russia and at the same time as innocent people, who are being killed by brutal Russians. *“Today, the Ukrainian*

⁹ Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 24-25 March 2022: including the latest developments of the war against Ukraine and the EU sanctions against Russia and their implementation (debate) (06.04.2022)

¹⁰ The establishment of a tribunal on the crime of aggression against Ukraine (debate) (17.01.2023)

nation, showing great courage and heroism, just like the Poles in the past, is fighting not only for its own future, but also for the future of Europe."¹¹ (K.Jurgiel. 2020) The intention behind this narrative is to present Ukraine as a country fighting for the values and interests of Europe, just as Poland did in the past. By emphasizing the defense of "Europe's future," those promoting this narrative aim to appeal to a sense of unity and shared historical struggles. For instance, another speech highlights Ukrainians as the European security fighters. *"Ukraine is fighting for its freedom, is fighting for the security of Europe also – a security which we built for the last 30 years. In this sense it is also our role to protect our security."*¹² (Waszczykowski, 2022) The speeches also emphasized the geographical proximity of Ukraine to Europe and MEPs stressed the urgency of providing real and thoughtful assistance to the people who are suffering and in need. Another part of human security dimension is shown from the statements made after the events on the Polish border as Poland were accused of treating non-Ukrainian people of War in discriminatory way. However, MEPs criticized this move stating that there is no discrimination and Poland is helping everyone. *"Poland is helping not only Ukrainians, but also other students from different continents. At this point, I would like to strongly deny the reports of alleged discrimination of Polish services against citizens of certain countries. Polish institutions operate in such a way as to secure the well-being of refugees of all nationalities."*¹³(Mazurek, 2022)

Human security-oriented framing of the War can be observed from the identifying the "war" refugees or "true" refugees as one of the salient issues which Europe should assist amid the War in Ukraine. As mentioned before Ukrainian refugees were framed as "war" or "true" refugees. As in the beginning of the War repeated number of Ukrainians were 1,2 million, later it increased to possible number of 5-7 million, in June of 2023 estimating 12,5 million only in Poland. MEPs frame humanitarian aspect from attributing it to the actions of Russia that these people have to "flee their houses from Russian bombs". PiS representatives emphasize on the Poland's role in this refugee crisis highlighting its importance in safeguarding of Eastern borders, as well as not letting refugee, humanitarian crisis to happen. On the other hand, speeches are in mix with refugees who already found shelter in Poland and the need for finances from the European Union to support them and for Poland to help in sustaining those humanitarian efforts. Referring to the refugee influx they emphasize on the need for finances to help refugees in Poland and in other European countries and the need for education. Referring to the Humanitarian Aid and accepting Refugees members always highlighted the need for finance which were blocked by the EU due to the issue

¹¹ Russian aggression against Ukraine (continuation of debate) (01.03.2022)

¹² The deterioration of the situation of refugees as a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (debate) (08.03.2022)

¹³ The deterioration of the situation of refugees as a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (debate) (Refugees - 08.03, Pos. 2)

of Rule of Law. *“Poland is Ukraine's most important resource: logistical, military, food, economic. Without Poland, Ukraine would not be able to cope.”* ¹⁴(Jaki, 2022)

Advocating for the more humanitarian aid they highlight Russia's deliberate actions in destroying and devastating infrastructure, stating that Russia must be thinking of weakening Ukraine and the European Union in providing Humanitarian assistance. *“We should continue to be an arsenal of democracy and peace, supporting the functioning of Ukraine's public institutions, which face a growing humanitarian crisis. Russia is deliberately destroying and devastating infrastructure, schools or hospitals, hoping that the next wave of refugees will weaken our resolve. Financial support for Kiev will be the best proof that such a scenario will never become a reality.”* ¹⁵(Tarczynski, 2022) Therefore, Humanitarian Aid itself is framed as against Russian threat and it's some kind of resistance in itself. Humanitarian aid was not merely a means of care, but also an effective form of violence, a mode of warfighting (Channell-Justice 2023; Knight 2021; Rachok 2022). Thus, they put importance of the support of Ukraine in the face of the Russian threat. The emphasis on the concluding part is that Ukraine must win this War and West should do everything that could be done in a way to support this for the sake of the whole European nation and for the security of all Europe.

As the main blame should be attributed to the President of Russian Federation and its allies(oligarchs) on power Putin is framed as the one who started the invasion and one who is determined to subdue Ukraine. The most prevailing framing of Putin is “Putin is a criminal” and “Russia's tyrant”, “barbarism of Putin”, often referring to Russia as Putin's Russia. Putin is portrayed as an aggressor and a threat to Ukraine and Europe. He is framed as responsible for war crimes and human rights abuses. Criticizing the European Union for its perceived lack of firmness against the Putin regime and its continued economic ties with Russia, such as the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, PiS MEPs blame elites in creating relations with Putin. President of Belarus Lukashenko is placed along with Putin referring to him as a “usurper” who should be “also treated as a war criminal”.¹⁶(Waszczykowski, 2022) PiS members blamed Putin and Lukashenko for deliberately sending migrants to the Polish borders and spreading disinformation about the actions of Polish border guards towards migrants. Thus, they attributed that kinds of actions to Russian

¹⁴ Impact of Russian invasion of Ukraine on migration flows to the EU (debate) (18.10.2022)

¹⁵ Amending Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 - Amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 as regards the establishment of a diversified funding strategy as a general borrowing method - 'Macro-Financial Assistance+' instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023 (debate) (23.11.2023 - Macro financial ass, Ukraine support, Pos. 2)

¹⁶ Lukashenka regime's active role in the war against Ukraine (debate) (19.10. 2022)

propaganda and called for the reinforcement of the border management with the assistance of FRONTEX to prevent from the threat by Russia and Belarus, since they want “to storm the Eastern borders of the EU”. They mention that the Russian population is subjected to propaganda orchestrated by Putin's government, thus presenting Russians as engaged in a deliberate campaign of misinformation and paints Putin as the orchestrator of these destructive actions. Using words such as “barbarians” they refer to Putin’s army employing to convey strong sense of condemnation along with emphasizing their cruelty and inhumanity which is characterized by “the use of atrocities, rape, torture and genocide as a weapon against the civilian population, particularly affecting women and children.”¹⁷(Kruk, 2022) Referring to the connection between Putin’s oligarchs and their relationship with Western countries, they acquire “golden passports” which are obtained by Putin’s Russian oligarchs, through those passports have obtained privileged status and benefits through these passports. (Berzina et al, 2019) This can be attributed to the broader potential for money laundering and the influence of foreign authoritarian regimes within the EU.

At the start of my thesis, I anticipated finding more discussions about Russia and the likelihood of Poland's ruling party, PiS, aligning with the European Union. In addition to condemnation of Russia the debates portrayed Western countries, particularly Germany and France, as accountable for the war due to their perceived naivety in dealing with Russia and prioritizing economic cooperation and political persuasion over addressing the concerns raised by their Eastern counterparts. Mostly, criticism was regarding to energy security, humanitarian assistance (sanctions and weapons to Ukraine), the Rule of Law in Poland and Hungary and not dealing with the War implications on the economy and energy. Measures taken in the aftermath of the War as SWIFT and the ban on the hydrocarbons were also criticized. Most of the criticisms referred to Germany, France as Trojan horses in the EU. They say that Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II were the reason of the War.

The PiS members state that the War in Ukraine was a turning point for the EU to understand its weaknesses and its mistakes, especially given the fact blame was also given to the European Commission which was blamed for making EU countries dependent on Russian energy. “The highest price that Ukraine pays today is, after all, a consequence of concessions and the procrastinating policy of the West, the policy of playing with the devil.” (Kruk, 2022) Although, other European countries were dependent on Russia and kept receiving gas, Germany and France were the ones that PiS representatives attacked the most. The EU institutions were also on the radar for becoming dependent on Russia. Framings of the relationships with Russia over the interests

¹⁷ The impact of the war against Ukraine on women (debate) (05.05.2022)

they call for changes in EU policies, and accountability for financing Putin's War by Western countries. Another framing evolves around Nord Stream I and Nord Stream II, the project which was created by Germany and other countries to deliver energy from Russia, however both of the projects were shut down. Money taken from Russia and weapons that were sold to Russia was also another part of criticism, blaming Russia in financing this War and using allegories along with oil and gas there is blood of innocent children and women. "...despite the fact that it came to light that even after the annexation of Crimea, you sold weapons to the butcher Putin, who today commits genocide with them. It's not right!"¹⁸(Mazurek, 2022) This can be referred to human security dimension of attributing blame, as it means that innocent individuals as Ukrainians suffering and overlook and disregard from the Western countries, while European countries benefit. Mentioning energy deals that are still ongoing they push on humanitarian appeal that Western countries valued their convenience over Ukrainians. Populistic discourses were also present in the discourses of the MEPs as they deliberated Europeans and those of Elites who established cooperation with Russia, financing Russian oligarchs and the War itself. "Today, more than two months have passed since Putin's attack. At that time, we witnessed the heroism of Europeans and the discredit of European elites. (Brudzinski, 2022)

Economic security and food security were also mentioned as challenges the EU and Europeans faced because of the War in Ukraine. "Putin's war against the civilized world is a huge social and economic cost for us, record inflation in EU countries, energy prices rising at an alarming rate."¹⁹(Zalewska, 2022) The food security is placed at the same level as energy and economic ones, giving it external significance. To prevent food crisis there were several proposals as opening new corridors to deliver grain to the countries outside of Europe and agriculture management and funding. On the topical Debates related to the Eastern Partnership MEPs highlighted importance of the strengthened security cooperation including Eastern Partnership countries, as spreading Russian disinformation and influence can be potential threat as the destabilization on the borders. Another important dimension of threat coming from Russia is energy threat, which is present among many countries of the European Union who are dependent on Russian energy supplies. Despite PiS members statements that energy crisis started before the War, the Russian aggression intensified it. As mentioned before, PiS sees Russia's energy policies in the European Union as Russia's strategic aim to make countries of the European union dependent on Russian energy.

¹⁸ Ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Poland and Hungary (debate) (06.04.2022)

¹⁹ Keep the bills down: social and economic consequences of the war in Ukraine and the introduction of a windfall tax (debate) (18.10, Pos. 2)

Condemning Western countries on not diversifying energy sources, they refer to the energy crisis, happened in the result of the War. In order to manage these issues

The EU introduced a program called RePowerEU (A plan to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels and fast forward the green transition), which became topic of several Debates in the European Parliament. (European Commission, 2022) Although PiS members were not fully in favor of renewable energy in the current situation, they stressed the importance of not letting individual member states become too dependent on easily accessible and cheap raw materials. They supported the idea of storing gas as a way to ensure energy security and reduce the risks that come with relying too heavily on specific resources. “The REPowerEU programme should make our ambitions realistic, it should focus on rebuilding Europe's raw material supply chains to ensure Europe's energy security.”²⁰(Brudzinski, 2022)

Interestingly, in most of the issues to which party opposed on the European level like measures taken by the European Climate Policies “people-centric” discourses emphasized importance of the War in Ukraine and need first on those issues related to War. “We need to take care of the climate, we need to introduce changes in the European energy sector, but, there is a war in Ukraine and we must take care of Europe's security, including energy security.” (Szydło, 2022) or “the Fit for 55 projects becomes uncompetitive and the lives of Europeans become very expensive.” (Szydło, 2022) In the aftermath of the War the New Geopolitical reality was emphasized, therefore it needed redefining energy security, energy security is referred as guarantor of security.

The debate discourses acknowledged the significant role of European security in addressing the Ukrainian crisis. They emphasized the potential threats to European safety, particularly, violence and destabilization reaching European borders. “Murders, rapes, the sound of rockets being fired, and bomb alerts have once again beckoned to Europe's borders. This is a huge challenge for us Europeans. The war in Ukraine is a test for the European Union, for European values, i.e. solidarity, brotherhood, readiness to help each other.”²¹(Zalewska. 2022) The discourses in the debates highlighted the need for decisive action and support to ensure the security and well-being of European nations in the face of these challenges. “This is not the time, and above all, we must adapt our tools to the possibilities of Europeans. Now, first of all, there is a war in Ukraine and we must take care of Europe's security, including energy security;..... this is what Europeans need.

²⁰ The REPowerEU Plan: European solidarity and energy security in face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including the recent cuts of gas supply to Poland and Bulgaria (debate) (19.05.2022)

²¹ Keep the bills down: social and economic consequences of the war in Ukraine and the introduction of a windfall tax (debate (18.10.2022)

This is what we all need in order to survive, in order to defeat Putin and finally solve this crisis. Europeans need support today. ²²(Szydło, 2022) As a result, they frame Russia in the War in Ukraine as a significant threat to European security, including energy security. The discourses suggests that Europe must adapt its tools and strategies to effectively respond to the challenges posed by Russia and protect the security and survival of European nations.

The mention of defeating Putin and solving the crisis indicates that Russia is seen as a central actor contributing to the security threats faced by Europe. By framing the situation in terms of survival and the need for support, the discourse portrays Russia's actions as a significant risk to European well-being. The securitization of Russia implies that the conflict in Ukraine is not only a local issue but also a matter of European security and stability.

4.3 Remedial actions stage of Law and Justice (PiS) MEPs' Speeches of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine

Remedial actions based on the combination of human security and the logic of “exceptionality” put importance of sanctions, military support to Ukraine, at the same time call for remedial actions in the different security sectors to ensure Europeans well-being.

Another EU response in the context of “hard security” policies were implementation of sanctions. Initially, Poland supported the sanctions imposed by the EU, which targeted Russian elites and included measures such as switching off the SWIFT system for banks to paralyze Russian finances. There was also an emphasis on freezing the finances of Russian oligarchs. In the energy sector, the importance of reducing dependency on Russian energy was highlighted due to its strategic implications for EU security. However, over time, members of PiS (Law and Justice Party) expressed the view that these sanctions were not sufficient. They called for even stronger measures and emphasized the need to fully disengage from dependency on Russian energy. On the other hand, they also called for more weapon delivery were emphasized as the main tools to deter Russian aggression in the battlefield, particularly, need for ammunition, tanks and aircraft, where the fate of European security was decided. Rearm of the individual countries were emphasized as individual countries must buy arms to defend themselves. They emphasized on Polish proposal to not include defense spending in the deficit calculation. By doing so, they aim to ensure that defense expenditures are exempted from the budget rules set by the European Union.

Further human security narratives can be traced from the emphasize on the Humanitarian Aid programs as in the framework of the EU refugee programs as CARE and European Peace

²² Preparation of the European Council meeting of 20-21 October 2022 (debate) (19.10.2022)

Resilience. Emphasizing on the need of Humanitarian Aid Poland placed itself as the main supporter of Ukraine as well as the biggest provider of Humanitarian Aid. They also condemned Russia's attack of Humanitarian corridors considering it as genocide and crimes. Emphasizing on humanitarian dimension of security PiS members always emphasized that sanctions against Russia doesn't work: in the first phase of the War, when sanctions were implemented, they emphasized on the unity in implementing it and advocating for harsh sanctions, later they criticized for the ineffectiveness of sanctions.

Evaluating on the energy security along with condemnation of Western countries and opposing European Climate Policies MEPs of Polish ruling Party called for reconsidering energy policies towards coal and gas, nuclear. Independence from Russian gas was the main priority. In order to achieve independence party members called for diversification and promotion its own renewable energy, utilizing available raw materials. "Invasion of Ukraine allowed some to take a sober look at the situation. Independence from Russian energy supplies is now an absolute priority. Short-term - to increase economic pressure on Russia, and long-term - to ensure Europe's energy security." Being an example of cutting energy ties with Russia calls for cutting off gas and other energy ties with Russia. It calls for policy changes in energy field with ensuring low energy prices, and LNG is put as important tool to ensure this. ETS was also criticized for not being good enough. The evaluation of the humanitarian assistance provided to Ukrainians within the framework of the European Peace Facility by the Council was mentioned due to its its positive impact in deterring Russian aggression. "there are a lot of instruments and sanctions to stop Russian aggression: penalties, weapons for Ukraine and for the security of our eastern front. Sometimes it is not possible to immediately implement this instrument, but the hot issue right now is humanitarian assistance."²³(Waszczykowski, 2022) Another dimension that was made in the context of remedial actions was called by PiS to implement were International Criminal Tribunal for Russian officials who are responsible for the crimes that they carried out in Ukraine. It shows the human security side of the actions that are needed to implement against Russian threat, here the face of Russian threat are people who implemented military decisions which targeted civilian targets. Moreover, it's propagandists and political officers that spread disinformation and "call for the extermination of Ukrainians as a group". (Petryna, 2023)

Another proposal related to Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) state that RDC should be complementary to NATO forces, allowing to avoid duplication. On this note they put more

²³ **The deterioration of the situation of refugees as a consequence of the Russian aggression against Ukraine (debate) (08.03.2022)**

importance to NATO “And here it is worth emphasising that NATO is and will long remain the main actor in any military response.” (Brudzinski, 2023)²⁴ Thus, ruling party of Poland considers alliance with NATO and Ukraine’s acceptance to the EU and NATO as the main priority. As the vision of “An independent and Western-oriented Ukraine is regarded by Polish foreign policy elites as a necessary geopolitical buffer against Russia’s power in the region and as being vital for Poland’s own security”. (Cadier&Szulecki, 2022, p. 1014) Shevchuk and Tykhonenko (2023, p.7) confirm this by stating that “With the War in Ukraine US cooperation with Poland has gained more significance and Poland’s role in ensuring Euro-Atlantic security and the format of US cooperation with European NATO partner countries increased”. In addition, they emphasize on the “reconstruction and expansion of the defence industry of European countries in long-term strategy.”²⁵(Krasnodębski, 2023) Another problem that they put on the agenda is creating common strategic culture in order to build a genuine common security policy. In the security field importance was also put on the cybersecurity in the military and civil context. To facilitate these measures AI Act was supported by PiS members, as it provides protection against cyberattacks. “Building resilience to online conflict is fundamental to our security. It is worth using the potential of advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence, for this purpose.” The 3SI (Three Seas Initiative) was also proposed as an initiative aimed at countering cyber and hybrid threats. The project was instigated by Poland under the PiS government. Researchers suggest that Poland's involvement in the initiative reflects its aspirations to establish itself as a leader in Central and Eastern Europe, operating strategically between the Baltic and Black Seas. This positioning allows Poland to exert influence and play a significant role in addressing security challenges in the region. In the Debates the 3SI was proposed as a platform for collaboration among the participating countries to enhance cybersecurity and resilience against hybrid threats, promoting a collective response to the security in Eastern flank. (Hajko&J.Hloušek, 2023) Neighborhood part was also not neglected as it is important to provide security in the Eastern borders and against Russian influence in the countries like Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, Western Balkans.

4.4 Findings on Diagnosis and Evaluation in Fidesz MEPs' Speeches of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine

The analysis of discourses presented by Fidesz's MEPs reveals a relatively lower level of participation compared to members from the PiS party, resulting in a lesser amount of content

²⁴ EU Rapid Enforcement

²⁵ Strengthening the EU Defence in the context of the war in Ukraine: speeding up production and deliveries to Ukraine of weapons and ammunitions (debate) (15.03.2023)

generated in the debates. Moreover, the discourses made by Fidesz members often exhibited repetitive patterns, indicating a consistent messaging approach employed by the party. However, despite the repetitive nature of their discourses, it is important to note that they still hold significance as they contribute to both converging and diverging discourses with PiS members regarding the securitization of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine. Throughout the European parliamentary speeches, members of Hungary's ruling party consistently expressed their condemnation of Russian aggression against Ukraine since the beginning of the War. They have publicly affirmed their respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Through their official statements, they characterize the conflict as "the War that erupted as a result of Russian aggression", "the War between Russia and Ukraine," or "Russian military aggression". Furthermore, they used strong language such as "disgraceful" and "unjust" to describe the nature of the War. "We fully condemn the Russian military aggression. The war caused incalculable security threats, humanitarian losses, and further deepened the European energy crisis." ²⁶(András Gyürk, 2022) This condemnation by the party indicates their recognition and acknowledgement of the actions taken by Russia in Ukraine. Through an analysis of word frequencies in the speeches of Fidesz members, it became evident that there is a notable disparity in the prominence given to certain terms. The words "Russia" and "Putin" appeared a total of 36 times, while "War" appeared a much higher number of times, specifically 140. This frequency distribution suggests that Fidesz members place greater emphasis on the threats posed by the ongoing war, which is occurring in close proximity to Hungary. Debates on the various topic in the EP they frequently incorporate phrases such as "amid the war" or "during wartime," underscoring the significance they attribute to the conflict. This observation indicates that Fidesz members prioritize the discussion of the war itself and its associated implications, rather than solely focusing on the role of Russia or its leader, Putin. Although, it does acknowledge the Russia's aggression as the main root cause, when it comes to referent objects that must be protected it emphasize on the consequences of the War and escalation of the War. In evaluating the war, Fidesz frames it as "terrible times for the Ukrainian population", indicating their recognition of the hardships faced by Ukrainians as a result of the Russian aggression. During the Debates related to the War in Ukraine, Fidesz members focus on the implications and consequences of the war on the European economy and the well-being of its citizens. They express concerns about the impact of the conflict on Europe as a whole. Furthermore, Fidesz supports the acceptance of refugees from Ukraine and condemns the war crimes committed against Ukrainians. Particularly, their discourses reveal a particular emphasis on the well-being of Hungarians in Transcarpathia, where the biggest Hungarian minority is

²⁶ Rising energy prices and market manipulation on the gas market (debate) (08.03.2022)

populated. Clearly, emphasizing on the risk of the War spreading outside of Ukraine PiS members concerned about Hungarian citizens and hardships that they face in the outcome of the War.

“The Fidesz Group in the European Parliament has condemned and condemns Russian aggression, the annexation of Ukrainian territory and war crimes. From the outset, we have stood by Ukraine, we support Ukraine's territorial integrity.” (Bocksor, 2022) It highlights the responsibility of Russia for initiating and perpetuating the violence. Fidesz members define the humanitarian crisis stemming from the war as a crisis where millions of people become “stateless” and “forcibly displaced”. They highlight the immense suffering endured by the Ukrainian population, with a particular emphasis on vulnerable groups such as children, women, and the elderly, who have fallen victim to acts of violence. Additionally, they advocate for thorough investigations, transparency, and the punishment of war crimes committed during the War. By focusing on the plight of those affected by the war and emphasizing the need for accountability, Fidesz members stress their commitment to addressing the humanitarian consequences of the crisis. “In Ukraine, millions became stateless and were forced to leave their homes, but what is even more terrible is that thousands of people lost their lives, were injured, and became victims of violence, including children, women, and the elderly. Bucha, Irpin, Hostomel, Ivankiv and many other Ukrainian settlements hide such terrible human tragedies that must be shed light on as soon as possible! The war crimes committed there cannot go unpunished, their immediate investigation and disclosure must be urged, and proven war crimes must be punished in the most severe manner! I most strongly condemn the Russian military aggression launched against Ukraine and all actions that caused human suffering as a result!”²⁷(Bocksor, 2022) In their speeches, Fidesz members draw attention to the significant humanitarian assistance provided to refugees, particularly putting emphasize on the current level of assistance as the largest in Hungarian history. They state that the support extended to Ukrainians is not only driven by the voluntary efforts of Hungarian citizens but also aided by government-led humanitarian aid initiatives. Their stance contradicts any opposition to providing assistance and instead emphasizes the willingness to offer aid to those in need. Moreover, Fidesz members expand the discussion beyond accepting refugees within Hungary, bringing attention to the situation in Subcarpathia, western part of Ukraine. By mentioning the Hungarian minority residing in Subcarpathia, they highlight the additional responsibility of aiding Ukrainians seeking refuge from the war. “In Hungary, we are devotedly helping the Ukrainian refugees arriving by the tens of thousands every day, and we are providing Ukraine with the largest humanitarian support in our history, and we will continue to do so as long as necessary. We

²⁷ The fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (debate) (19.05.2022)

condemn Russian aggression and demand an investigation into war crimes.... 380 000 internal refugees have arrived in Transcarpathia, the westernmost region of Ukraine”²⁸(Bocksor, 2022) According to PiS representatives, in order to help internally displaced persons in Transcarpathia, Hungary provided HUF 1 billion 350 million under the Hungary Helps Programme. These discourses align with the government’s statements of “we will do everything for Ukrainian refugees” (Korkut&Fazekas, 2023)

Referring to the Hungarians living in Subcarpathia Fidesz highlights the importance of safeguarding the interests and safety of Hungarian communities in Ukraine. Fidesz highlight on the well-being of the Hungarians in Transcarpathia concerned by the War and threats to the security of the Hungarian minority living in the westernmost region of the country. Additionally, they express concerns regarding Hungarian minorities’ human rights as it is under the threat of policies taken by the Ukrainian government. Additionally, they express concerns regarding the disinformation campaigns that are held against Hungary and Subcarpathian Hungarians. Hungary has had a complex relationship with Ukraine, particularly concerning issues related to minority rights. Hungary's approach to minority issues has been criticized for displaying revisionistic tendencies similar to those observed in Russian policies. Within the European Parliament, Hungarian representatives have consistently raised concerns about minority rights, indicating their ongoing focus on this matter. Despite these tensions, it is not surprising that Hungary supports Ukraine's accession to the European Union. This stance aligns with Hungary's broader commitment to European integration and its belief in the benefits of EU membership. However, fidesz members also emphasize the need to ensure the security and well-being of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine before the accession.

Hungarian people’s safety was highlighted as it can be endangered from being drawn into the War, therefore they advocated for not escalation of the War and not spreading of the War beyond Ukraine’s borders. They refer to the geographical proximity of the War as “taking place next door” and any “steps that would drag our country to war” highlight the Hungarian aim to protect its national security and avoid being directly involved in the War. “We are firmly of the view that Hungary must stay out of this war.”²⁹ (Hidveghi, 2022) These narratives were dominant before the

²⁸ Conclusions of the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022 (debate)(08.06.2022)

²⁹ Debriefing of the European Council meeting in Paris on 10 March 2022 - Preparation of the European Council meeting 24-25 March 2022 (debate) (23.03.2022)

April 2022 elections, as Fidesz members sought to garner more support by attributing the potential involvement in the war to the country's leftists.

Fidesz members have expressed limited support for sanctions and weapons delivery to Ukraine, emphasizing that such measures have had counterproductive effects on the European economy instead they stress on Hungary's commitment to peace and a ceasefire in the region. While acknowledging the significant challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, they state that Hungary does not advocate for expanding EU's "misguided" sanctions to include the energy sector. "More damage on us than to Russia" that is the way how members justify their negative attitude to sanctions. Sanctions, according to them, harm Europeans more than Russian aggressor. According to Fidesz members, imposing energy sanctions on Russia would hinder European unity and place an excessive burden on Hungary and other EU countries. They prioritize the security of energy supply and emphasize that the well-being and security of the Hungarian people are of utmost importance. For them ensuring energy security and safeguard all European citizens from the negative impacts of escalating energy prices is their primary concern. They state that it is deemed unacceptable for individuals to bear the cost of war. The viability of our societies and economies must be preserved, necessitating the utilization of all reliable energy sources in Europe, including nuclear energy. Energy sanctions, according to Fidesz members, can result in institutionalization of hypocrisy and highlight regional and world implications of such economic sanctions.

They also highlight institutional dimension of the EU as a test of maturity for the European Union (EU) and its institutions. They call for leaving behind divisive ideological debates like right-left and implement unified decisions. However, at the same time they criticize the leftist in the European Parliament for their ideological attacks to countries like Poland and Hungary. For instance, on the debate related to the right-wing parties and their connections to Russia MEPs from Fidesz state that there should be self-reflection within the European left-wing parties regarding their alliances and positions, particularly in relation to Russia, giving an example of party Jobbik. They also appeal to stop withholding funds to Hungary and Poland, arguing that these countries are making significant efforts to assist millions of Ukrainian refugees.

4.5 Remedial actions stage of Fidesz MEPs' Speeches of Russia in the context of the War in Ukraine

In the remedial actions part, which presents discourses regarding what measures should be taken in order to tackle security threats in the process of securitization or in other words security practices. Fidesz members employ a humanitarian narrative to justify their plea for peace and a

ceasefire in the conflict and priority of the well-being and safety of individuals. Additionally, they urge the European Union to prevent the spread of the war beyond Ukrainian borders, highlighting the importance of maintaining stability and managing potential security risks.

In order to strengthen border security and the security in the neighbourhood party representatives call for the acceptance of countries in the Neighbourhood, particularly countries of the Eastern Partnership to the EU. “The EU's Eastern Partnership program is one of the best tools for strengthening the Union, and the past three months have also shown that if there is no peace and security in one of the partner countries, the security and stability of the EU is also at risk.”

³⁰(Bocksor, 2022)

In discussions surrounding energy security, there's a prominent emphasis on ensuring that European citizens do not bear the "price of war" through economic repercussions. This sentiment particularly resonates with concerns over potential sanctions and economic measures, such as banning Russian oil and gas, which could lead to skyrocketing energy prices. Advocates argue for maintaining stable industrial production in Europe and stress the importance of ensuring that these measures don't inadvertently hurt the European population. Furthermore, when it comes to assisting Ukraine during these challenging times, it's highlighted that support will primarily be channeled through bilateral agreements between Hungary and Ukraine. Another emphasis is put on the nuclear energy, they state that all reliable energy sources are important in this energy crisis, therefore it is needed to (find on nuclear). Identifying on the “irresponsible decisions of left-liberal governments” they emphasize on the common security field, particularly straightening of military capability and showed their readiness to play an active in the area of defense and implementing military force developments in the Central and eastern Europe. They also focus on the expansion of the European defense policy and civil security capabilities as well as rapid deployment capacity. On one of the Debates regarding Czech Republic's presidency from 07.07.2022 there were put several proposals from the Fidesz member: they put forward the post-war recovery of Ukraine and refugee issue referring to it as “crisis”; energy security; Europe's defense and cyberspace security; strategic flexibility of the European economy and coordinated actions of EU institutions. Furthermore, they advocated for the well-being of Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and Roma people in Europe.

Lastly, peace and ceasefire were prioritized by the members of Fidesz. They stated that ceasefire is needed to avoid further destruction. Additionally, they emphasized on the need of peace

³⁰ Security in the Eastern Partnership area and the role of the common security and defence policy (debate)
(Security - 07.06, Pos. 2)

negotiations, placing a stability of Ukraine is also put as the main priority. Concerned with the increase in intensity and geographical scope of the war, Hungary's ruling party called for unified decisions and urged two confronted sides to reach a decision to protect human lives. "This war cannot claim more innocent victims, we must encourage the parties to immediately sit down at the negotiating table, conclude a ceasefire and start peace negotiations! Hungary and the Hungarian people are interested in peace as soon as possible, so it is ready to facilitate the process of peace negotiations and the independent investigation of war crimes and the recording of crimes!³¹" (Bocksor, 2022)

Overall, Hungarian Fidesz condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine, however was reluctant to support sanctions and weapon delivery explaining these decisions by adverse effects that economic sanctions and energy sanctions might have. On the other hand, emphasizing on the humanitarian aspect of the outcomes such as human lives the discourses opposed weapon and arms delivery, instead highlighting Central and Eastern European countries' role in the Humanitarian aid and emphasizing on more assistance for refugees and Ukrainians, Hungarian minority. It is seen that fidesz members advocate themselves as representatives of the Hungarian minority in the Western part of Ukraine. It is well-known that Fidesz is dependent on Russian energy, therefore Fidesz members criticized European institutions for "irresponsible" proposals and called Europe to provide reliable, affordable, safe energy supply.

5. Discussion

First, the convergences between those parties will be discussed: both parties, PiS and Fidesz, condemn Russian aggression and view Russia as the instigator of the War in Ukraine. This can be observed from their namigs of the Russian actions as "Russian aggression", "Russian unjust War", "Russian disgraceful War". The choice of words, such as "unjust" and "disgraceful," is likely aimed at emphasizing the moral dimension of the conflict and positioning Russia as an aggressor on the international stage.

As for the moral and humanitarian dimension they both recognize War crimes, although on a different level, they acknowledge the tragic consequences of the war on civilians, demonstrating a common understanding of the human toll of the conflict and a commitment to addressing these violations.

³¹ The fight against impunity for war crimes in Ukraine (debate) (19.05.2022)

In terms of blame attribution, both PiS and Fidesz members not only criticize Russia's role in the War in Ukraine but also identify the European Union (EU) as a key actor that ensures economic resilience of the Union and the European security. However, their perspectives differ on how they criticize the EU's actions. PiS members condemn the EU's past and its current cooperation with Russia and management of the crisis, particularly in terms of energy dependency. As was mentioned before, the EU's failure to decrease its energy dependency on Russia has exacerbated the Russian threat and negatively impacted the situation. They hold the EU accountable for its actions and view them as a contributing factor to the crisis. On the other hand, Fidesz members predominantly blame the EU and its institutions for their “misguided” policies in dealing with the current crisis. They perceive the EU's approach to the crisis as flawed and criticize its sanction policies and high energy prices. These convergences might be due to the differed perception of threats and referent objects, whereas PiS sees Russia as the main threat and highlights Ukrainians and Europeans (Central and Eastern Europeans) as the main referent objects, from the discourses of Fidesz it's seen that Hungary, Hungarians(minorities) come first and then Ukrainians and Europeans. The discourses of PiS do not specifically emphasize the well-being of the Polish people; instead, they highlight the role of the Polish people as the foremost contributors in the ongoing war effort. PiS criticizes Europe's naivety in dealing with Russia and its “protracted policy of the West” which led to an invasion. According to PiS members, the energy deals with Russia are identified as one of the causes of the Russian threat, which has been exacerbated by the War in Ukraine.

Both parties use populist “crisis talk”, “war rhetoric” using metaphors such as “amid the War” or “during the War times”, finding enemies and threat to fight against (Kopper et al., 2023). These rhetorical devices was helpful them to portray themselves as protectors of people. Moreover, in their discourses it can be seen that both use populist discourses as Brussels “elite” and Europeans. If Fidesz members emphasized more on peace, ceasefire as being “freedom fighters” and criticized Europe's ‘misguided’ sanctions, PiS members highlighted Poland's place in ensuring stability on Eastern borders, preventing refugee crisis, dealing with Russia energy dependency and so on. It can be observed from their criticism of projects on renewable energies, highlighting that it's not the time for such measures. On the security cooperation they both support NATO's activities and improvement of European defense field. However, PiS prioritize NATO in deterring Russian threat and as the main guarantor of security. Answering to the question “who secures?” mostly the European Union is the key subject as the European Union that enables support for Eastern Neighbors accession to EU in order to provide security in the region.

PiS members, as revealed in their framings, immediately recognized Russia as a threat and associated "Russian expansionism" with an imperialistic nature (Kopper et al., 2023). They perceive the multi-faceted Russian threat, which encompasses human security. On the other hand, Fidesz stressed on peace and negotiations, thus showing risk management logic with some elements of desecuritization. Although both of them in their diagnosis to evaluation emphasized on human security part as murdering of the in the neighboring country highlighting tragic humanitarian side of the War, Fidesz mostly emphasized on negative consequences of the War that affects people's everyday lives of Europe and risk management to prevent these difficulties. Since they are not willing to be dragged into the War and pay "price of the War", Fidesz members framed the EU elites and opposition at home were framed as warmongers.

Framing analysis is also about what is being silences or downgraded. While PiS frames Russia's actions as "genocide", Fidesz does not explicitly use this term in their discourses, instead as other countries it calls for investigations of War crimes. PiS members and Fidesz members interacting with each other don't explicitly attribute blame to each other.

When it comes to refugees both frame them as "fleeing the War refugees" and highlight their countries' contributions and the need for more support to them and finances. However, their contexts are different, as PiS condemns the EU for energy dependency from Russia, when Fidesz in contrast condemns EU's energy and economic sanctions that was hit harder than Russia. Also, from the discourses it can observed their solidarity within the Central and Eastern European countries, as both highly support Eastern Neighbors accession to the EU and support each other when it comes to the Rule of Law issues in Poland and Hungary. According to PiS, although they condemn Hungarian attitude in relation to Russia, they still support Hungary in the context of the European Parliament and advocate for the availability of funds to Hungary and Poland that the EU cut dur to the Rule of disputes in those countries.

There is a very visible divergence in their relation measures to tackle Russian threat, whereas PiS perceiving Russia as "existential threat" pushes for more sanctions and weapon delivery, Fidesz opposes it justifying it as a threat to common European economy and stability. Instead, it proposes peace talks and ceasefire in order it to end to the War. In the energy security field PiS calls for energy diversification, whereas Fidesz highlights importance of energy supplies from Russia and the increase of energy prices. However, they both oppose renewable energy plans in the context of RePowerEU. In terms of security cooperation, they both highlight increasing defense in the NATO framework and in the framework of the EU. However, PiS emphasize more on cooperation with NATO, thus putting more importance to Atlanticist cooperation.

This study offers potential advancements to the wider field of securitization research by integrating a framing approach, especially concerning threat formulation in a collective securitization setting. The dissertation might also enhance studies on populism, emphasizing research on populist securitization. Moreover, it could provide deeper insights into research concerning the war in Ukraine. For subsequent studies, employing critical Discourse Analysis and Populist Frame analysis might be beneficial to understand how domestic politics influences European politics. In essence, investigations regarding War and Securitization could be explored in a more expansive context.

6. CONCLUSION

The thesis studied the security frames of Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Fidesz in the securitization of Russia from the debates in the European Parliament. The thesis included a combination of framing and securitization theory, using the framework of “securitization as the work of framing”. The analysis of frames embedded in discourses was implemented in order to identify the security framings present in the securitization of Russia by two parties.

The research incorporated framing approach to identify and assess “the diversity of perspectives on how security is understood and enacted” (Stepka, 2020, p.16). The “securitization as the work of framing” can show various ways of interpreting of the problem from a security perspective. Due to the complicated nature of securitization theory, it’s difficult to examine how the securitization process evolves, especially in an environment where various security interpretations are met, as in the European Union. Therefore, framing can help to identify the main security discourses and press them into narrower meaning from the security and threat perception perspective. Further, contributes to identifying competing framings; thus, it is easier to understand the securitization process in identifying the threat, referent objects, existential measures, and to some extent, audiences.

The findings indicate that despite both PiS and Fidesz engaging in the securitization of Russia, their approaches show some divergence. PiS frames Russia as an existential threat that necessitates the implementation of exceptional measures to address the perceived threat. On the other hand, Fidesz views Russia as a threat that played a role in instigating the crisis, affecting the security of the EU and Hungary. This perspective implies a partial desecuritization of the issue, indicating that while security concerns persist, the urgency for extraordinary measures may be relatively reduced. This was revealed from security narratives that were identified through discursive interpretations, where for PiS, existential and Human security narratives were prevalent, whereas Fidesz’s

framings revealed more desecuritization frames emphasizing mostly peace, ceasefire, thus showing some desecuritization elements in its approach to the securitization of Russia. However, there were still convergences in the human security approach, where they both emphasized on lives of Ukrainians: accepting refugees, the necessity of humanitarian aid, investigation of War crimes, and the well-being of Europeans, which can be applied to Bosse's(2023) right-based moral obligation perspective. However, this logic still showed some levels of differences. Nevertheless, results showed that the War didn't affect their each other's support in the European Parliament. Not uncovering broader party politics makes it hard to understand the reason behind this support in the European Parliament. Either it can be attributed to mutual protection against EU's sanctions (Holesch&Kyriazi, 2021) or Central and Eastern European solidarity, or their anti-EU illiberal, populist cooperation.

The discourses brought to light a shared sentiment of both countries, condemning the European Union in relation to the Russian threat, reflecting their tendency for "anti-EU cooperation" and echoing their prior criticisms of the EU. (Góra, 2023). Despite the varying contexts of their criticisms, both parties emphasized the inefficacy and misguided nature of the European Union's institutions and policies. The discourses conveyed populist narratives targeting "elite Brussels" and "Europeans." Criticism of Western European countries and expressing support towards Central and Eastern European countries shows some extent of contested "East-West" divide in the EU. Despite condemnation of the EU, both parties used Europe, Europeans and European values as referent objects and called for unity to be protected from Russian threat and War implications. Even though the Russian threat is perceived as a credible threat, both parties don't see the EU as a guarantor of security, either relying on NATO or themselves. Therefore, it can be assumed that the securitization of Russia by these populist parties was used in their populist discourses for maneuvering, criticizing the EU, and for domestic politics. (Kopper et al., 2023)

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