UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Master´s Thesis

Peeter Einbaum

Common Security and Defence Policy and Common Armed Forces/European Army in European Union official documentation 2009 - 2015

Supervisor: René Värk, Dr. Iur

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I have written this master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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ABSTRACT

The current thesis concentrates on two aspects of the idea of creating EU Common Armed Forces/European army. The first part of the thesis clarifies the necessity of having its own credible military capabilities within the EU. Also in general terms it provides an overview of classical and modern armed forces created in the framework of international organisations. In addition, an overview of the progress made in the EU on this field and an assessment based on different authors is given.

The second part of the thesis covers the description of procedure and outcomes of the conducted quantitative documents survey. The survey was designed on publicly available internet based database Eur Lex, which includes unclassified documents created by different EU institutions. The main outcome of the survey is that ongoing crises in Ukraine and refugee crises have not significantly affected the dynamics and content of created documents. Despite the temporary raise of the number of documents concerning the Ukraine crises, no evidence was found indicating the increase of interest from the EU supranational institutions of deepening EU military cooperation in the framework of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

From the thesis it can be concluded that it is not likely that in the near future there will be any significant progress made towards creation of common armed forces/European army.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	Allied Command of Operations
ACT	Allied Command of Transformation
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
COIN	Counter Insurgency
C2	Command and Control
HQ	Headquarters
EC	European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EDC	European Defence Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
CFSDP	Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
MNC-NE	Multinational Corps North-East
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NFIU	NATO Force Integration Unit
NRF	NATO Response Force
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force
WEAG	Western European Armament Group

INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) has been from the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950´s, a unique international project attracting many scholars and scientists to study its developments and possible future perspectives. From the initial fragmented forms of cross-border (economic) cooperation, Europe has turned to the complicated organization with its supranational institution. It is a paradox that at the time of the domination of the idea of National Republics and the rally of remarkably big ethnic groups like basks, kurds etc. towards their independence, a significant number of States in Europe has decided to give up domains which are traditionally considered to be in States' sovereignty (Ojanen 2006: 58-60).[1] Monetary policy; partial European laws superiority over National laws; laws and regulations made by the European Parliament and the European Commission and which are mandatory to be followed by the Member States are just some samples of it. One may ask, whether there is a limit and if continuation of this process leads to the creation of the European Federation with its institutions and components common to the federal state.

The current thesis narrows this questions down and focuses on the possibility of the creation of European Common Armed Forces/European Army as a permanent EU military force in the frameworks of EU as the next step in the federalization process. Classically the States are keeping the monopoly over the legitimate use of (military) force (Cross 2007: 80).[2] Worldwide and historically, the existence of a federal army is considered to be essential for the functioning of a federal state. From this point of view creation of the European Army seems to be logical step forward.

Extra reasoning for further deepening of military cooperation is provided by the changing security architecture of Europe and its close neighbourhood on the Eastern frontier and the Middle East; ongoing EU military and security operations in the framework of EU Common Security and Defence Policy and raising threat of international terrorism.

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[1] Ojanen, H. (2006). The EU and NATO: two competing models for a common defence policy. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,* 44(1), 57-76.

[2] Cross, M.D.K. (2007), An EU Homeland Security? Sovereignty vs. Supranational Order, *European Security,* 16:1, 79-97.

One significant factor is the United States of America, as the main contributor to NATO, with its highest expenditures on their armed forces. During the Cold War it was considered a standard in Western Europe, that in the NATO framework the USA have been the main contributor of military capabilities balancing the Warssaw Pact block military might and keeping peace in Europe. As a result, since the Cold War in Western Europe there has been a number of "freeriding" States who have saved on their defence for decades. Even while being members of NATO, they have not fulfilled the aim of spending the recommended 2% of GDP on the defence. According to the World Bank, in 2014 only United Kingdom, Poland, Greece and Estonia were close to this goal.[3] The rest of the EU NATO countries have been spending less. It has caused the situation where most of the defence budget in EU countries is spent on salaries and on the militaries' social guarantees. It does not leave resources for upgrading and developing forces and causes shortfalls in military key capabilities.

After the collapse of the USSR and before 2014 the trends and the role of NATO in the global arena were changing from the conventional warfare to the peace establishing and -supporting/assisting role. It has provided some EU Member States justification for further cutting of defence budgets. At the same time, US military presence in Europe is not something to be taken as granted – it may change in the future (Shepherd 2003: 39).[4]

Also the USA has been facing cuts which has forced Washington to overlook its priorities. In the light of a relatively constructive format of NATO - Russia Council and at the same time China's increasing military might and expansive activities in the East and South China Sea[5] and North Korea nuclear ambitions combined with the confrontation with the USA ally South Korea, the USA was reducing its contingency in Europe (Hyde-Price 2013: 26-27)[6]. 2014 and Russia's aggressive foreign policy has been turning NATO back to its traditional role in Europe, but the future of the EU defence remains unclear. The

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[3] The World Bank. *Military expenditure (% of GDP)*. [online] Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS [Accessed 30 Apr.2016].
[4] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without substance?, *European Security, 12:1, 39-63.*
[5] Council on Foreign Relations. *China´s Maritime Disputes.* [online] Available at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=ppc-Google-grant-infoguide-chinas_maritime_disputes-map#!%2F%23historical-context [Accessed 30 Apr.2016].
[6] Hyde-Price, A. (2013), Realism: a dissident voice. In S. Biscop and R.G. Whitman, ed, *The Routledge Handbook of European Security, London*: Routledge, 2013, pp. 18-27.

ongoing presidential rally in the USA and Mr. Donald Trump´s sayings about the US possible exit from NATO[7] are adding some uncertainty (Curtis 2016).

There has been an idea that lack of EU ability to show military force may potentially attract neighbouring countries to take challenge and endanger territorial integrity of any EU Member State (Salmon 2003:4).[8] Due to the changing security environment security vacuum in Europe emerges and if EU wants to be able to face future challenges it has to put more effort to the independent defence capabilities. Still, EU is not ready to fill this military vacuum and the dependence from USA has increased instead of going down.[9] (Techau 2015: 1, 4, 6). It leads to the understanding that exit of the USA from Europe may have severe consequences, because without USA presence in Europe there are no balance with Russia in order to re-play Cold War model (Rynning 2015: 539-540).[10]

It is important to stress that due to the change of NATO –Russia relations starting from 2014 the situation has changed. As Simon has stated, NATO and USA as lead nation are coming back instead of retreating from Europe but still adding pressure to the European partners and calling them to do more in order to keep peace in Europe while facing Russia´s aggressive foreign policy and military activities on its borders (Simón 2014: 69-70)[11]

The above mentioned aspects of ongoing events may raise a question if and how the EU will be able to react in the circumstances if the USA left its role as the main contributor in NATO and the EU has to take care of the EU common defence by itself? How would it be possible to fill the security vacuum while Russia is behaving aggressively on the EU eastern borders and EU Member States have reduced defence budgets? Declaratively, with the Treaty of European Union (TEU) Article 42 (7) EU Member States have taken

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[7] Curtis, M. (2016). *Donald Trump and NATO*. [online] Available at: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/03/donald_trump_and_nato.html [Accessed 30 Apr.2016].

[8] Salmon, T-C. (2003), *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

[9] Techau, J. (2015), The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe, *Carnegie Europe.*

[10] Rynning, S. (2015), The false promise of continental concert: Russia, the West and the necessary balance of power, *International Affairs,* vol.91, issue 3, 539-552, May 2015.

[11] Simón, L. (2014), NATO´s Rebirth. Assessing NATO´s Eastern European "Flank", *Parameters* 44(3) Autumn 2014.

obligation to provide help and assistance "by all means in their power" in accordance with the UN charter in a case of any Member State(s) is/are attacked. Still, in the author's opinion, there is not a clear model of how the procedure of initiating current formats of the EU military cooperation and pooling additional capabilities should take place? Such situation would put EU NATO Member States in a dilemma, what the priorities are and where States should use the limited capabilities they have, whether to its own defence, to NATO in order to defend collectively or to the EU in accordance to the Treaties?

Another field of challenges of the EU Member States is related to the desired role of the EU in the international arena. With Petersberg Tasks first agreed in 1992, Member States have agreed to become a global security provider with some achieved success. From the creation of the EU common military capabilities more than 30 military operations have been conducted in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, limited availability of critical military capacities endangers credibility and the image of the EU and may harm CFSP in general.

Last but not least, justification for deepening military cooperation and clearing up procedures of initiation of the existing EU military formats is related to the time factor. The procedure of reaching common decisions and taking real actions has been shown to be slow. Long lasting problem solving in the case of Greece monetary crisis and slow progress of responding to the migration crises are illustrating the tendency of being some steps behind the ongoing events. While Russia has been training and practicing large scale activation and movement of its military contingencies, there is a threat that in case of a military attack against any EU Member State the EU will not to be able to react timely adequately.

All these factors have raised a public discussion about a possible need to establish permanent common armed forces/European Army. For example, the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker said in his interview to the Reuters on March 08, 2015 that NATO is not enough in order to face Russia and other threats. Creation of the European Army would create basics for credible and timely response to the threat to

peace in any EU Member State or in neighbouring country.[12] In his speech he stressed the symbolic importance of the creation European Army while /… there have been talk about unified European army for decades…/ (Winkfield 2015:7).[13] Also German and Italian foreign ministers have called for the establishment of European Army (Major and Mölling 2010: 27).[14] Such sayings got answered by the politicians from other EU Member States. Security adviser to the President of Poland General Stanislaw Koziej has told that this idea is unrealistic dream.[15] Similar reflection came from Finnish Parliament Eduskund.[16] Even if the mentioned officials from the EU institutions are not in a position to make it happen, spreading of such ideas may indicate that in the EU and its Member States, high officials are concerned about the state of the EU self-defence capabilities and there is the need to take actions in order to be credible for the partners and at the same time intimidating possible opponents.

Such situation created a number of questions for the author of the thesis. As far as the field of CSDP is wide and theoretical background of it is controversial, the narrowed focus for the thesis had to be set. It was decided that even if the defence and military domain are classically considered to be part of the "high politics" which tends to remain in the sovereignty of Member States, there could be some indications of developments on the field of the EU common defence visible. Even though it can be considered just as indirect evidence of the existence of political will on the EU level to deepen common military cooperation, the possible rise of the number of EU official documents related to the CSDP, could be observed. In order to assess if the changing situation has initiated

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[12] EurActive.com, (2015). *Juncker: NATO is not enough, EU needs an army*. [online] Available at: http://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/juncker-nato-is-not-enough-eu-needs-an-army/ [Accessed 23 Feb.2016].

[13] Winkfield, E. L.(2015), A European Army. Has the Time Come?, *The Real Truth June 1, 2015.*

[14] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

[15] Postimees, (2015). *Poola suhtub ELi relvajõudude ideesse skeptiliselt*.[online] Available at: http://maailm.postimees.ee/3118291/poola-suhtub-eli-relvajoudude-ideesse-skeptiliselt [Accessed 17 Oct.2015].

[16] Postimees, (2015). *Eduskund ELi ühisarmeest: ebarealistlik idee*.[online] Available at: http://maailm.postimees.ee/3117751/eduskund-eli-uhisarmeest-ebarealistlik-idee.[Accessed 17 Oct.2015].

more active CSDP related information exchange within EU official documentation, the survey of this documentation was planned.

In order to provide a comprehensive picture of CSDP, the current status of it and to assess if the new security environment of Europe is reflected in EU official documentation, the following study questions were set:

- What progress has been made in the field of common defence/creation of European Army so far?

- Has the changing security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood caused the rise of the number of documents concerning the CSDP?

- Does the most used CSDP related official terminology, covered by the EU official documentation, indicate support to the idea of deepening military cooperation and/or creating Common Armed Forces/European Army?

The first study question has an explanative role while the main focus is on the EU documentation analyses. Conducted survey included analyses of documents found in the EU official database EUR Lex. It covered 2291 defence domain related original documents created by the European Commission and its sub-organizations, the European Parliament and its members, the Council of the European Union, the Court of Justice, the Court of Auditors, Member States etc. The suggestion of the author was that if the change of dynamics in CSDP related documentation occurs, it can be visible starting from 2014 when Russia initiated events in the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine. Another key event theoretically influencing the dynamics of documentation and having a direct impact on the EU security, is the migration crisis which reached large scales in 2015. In order to provide comparative material and illustrate the dynamics of documentation before the crisis, the timeframes set to the survey are from January 01, 2009 till December 31, 2015. The reason behind setting such starting date is the fact that from this date Lisbon Treaty entered into force. CSDP in a format as it is known now, is established with Lisbon Treaty.

The main outcome from the analyses is that despite the changing security environment within the EU and beyond its borders, it has not impacted the dynamics of EU official

documentation. Annual figures of security and defence related documents have remained relatively stable despite the Ukrainian crisis, changing relationships with Russia and the ongoing refugee crisis which have been influencing EU security and defence domains in recent years. Most used CSDP related terms are not indicating support to the deepening military cooperation within the EU and/or progressing towards Common Armed Forces/European Army. From the results of the conducted survey and academic discourse, provided in the theoretical overview, it can be concluded that despite some progress made in the framework of CSDP, it is not likely that in the near future there will be any significant progress made towards creation of common armed forces/European army.

The outcomes of the survey are leading to the suggestion that even though with Treaties the EU Member States have delegated the field of common security and defence issues to the EU supranational institutions, in real life these institutions do not have a strong influence on the field of security and defence, while in the case of real life emergencies intergovernmental exchange of information is likely to have a more significant role. Another suggestion is that as far as EU Member States have delegated CFSP to the EU, surveyed EU official documentation may exist but it is classified. In both described cases such kind of information exchange is not visible for common citizens, which may explain the results of the current survey.

Despite discouraging conclusions, according to the author's opinion, it is worthwhile to monitor the dynamics of the EU public official documentation also in the future. The reasoning for further studies is rooted in the democracy practiced in the EU. The creation of the permanent common armed forces/European Army can be assessed to be a fundamental change, influencing all people living in the EU. In order to make it happen, support of the domestic electorates to the decision makers has to be guaranteed. It means that if it is wanted by the political elite, the idea has to be discussed publicly. From this point of view the current sayings of the EU and National high level officials can be assessed as a test of public opinion which indicates the possible presence of political will of creating Common armed Forces/European Army in the future. If true, it may mean that in the future the topic of common defence can be reflected in Eur Lex published documentation with significant rise of the topic related documents.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The destruction caused by World War II and opposition with the Soviet Union with its allies forced the Western European leaders think about keeping military balance in Europe and take actions in order to avoid any armed conflict on the soil of Europe. The first active steps took place in 1950ies when European Communities (EC) were established. Even though initially such communities covered just some economic aspects in Western Europe, Altiero Spinelli was already then promoting the idea of united Europe. He proposed to use the US Constitution as an example and to develop similar architecture of institutions in Europe (Glencross 2009: 287).[17] He believed that the future of Europe is a federal state with federal armed forces included. Thus, the European Defence Community was meant to become a supranational organisation with common institutions, armed forces and budget and acting in the framework of NATO. Units were supposed to be formed by the nationality (Salmon 2003: 22).[18]

On the contrary, David Mitrany, as a representative of functionalistic thinking, saw common military defence as a combination of different forms of military cooperation in Europe. Each format was supposed to meet a specific challenge. He did not see the need for permanent common military structures (Anderson 1998).[19] Such a multi-layered approach characterizes the status of the EU common defence also nowadays. With the failure of EDC in 1954, initial opportunity to create common military forces was lost (Binder 2007: 575).[20] Yugoslavian wars in the early 1990 brought up again the need for military cooperation within the EU. Since then the EU has gone through the process of building up legal framework and setting the functioning principles of common defence structures.

From the viewpoint of theorists such development has been complicated to explain. Different theories have not managed to agree upon the reasoning, nature and significance

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[17] Glencross A., (2009), Altiero Spinelli and the Idea of the US Constitution as a Model for Europe: The Promises and Pitfalls of an Analogy, *Journal of Common Market Studies; Mar2009, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p287-307.*

[18] Salmon, T-C. (2003), *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

[19] Anderson, D. (1998), David Mitrany (1888-1975): an appreciation of his life and work, *Review of International Studies; Oct1998, Vol. 24 Issue: Number 4, pp. 577-592.*

[20] Binder, J. (2007), Altiero Spinelli's European Federal Odyssey, *International Spectator; Dec 2007, Vol. 42 Issue: Number 4, pp. 571-588.*

of the creation and evolution of CSDP with its military component included. Generally saying, there are two overarching controversial disciplinary approaches. International Relations and European Integration theories try to cover this subject. They include a variety of different theoretical viewpoints to the CSDP. Namely, neo-realism suggests that CSDP is dominated by some influential lead nations within the EU. Liberal intergovernmentalism does not see the process of European military integration taking place at all. Neo functionalism does not see continuation of "spillover" into domain of foreign and security policy as to the ground of "high politics". Supranationalism admits the creation of supranational institutions on different fields but excludes security and defence area from this process. Institutionalism with its rational choice theory hopes with the help of CSDP to improve the decision making process in the EU, still with the condition of keeping most of the control in the hands of member states. Constructivism tries to find out how CSDP reflects and generates the European normative approach. It believes that international relations are historically and socially constructed not rationally created (Howorth 2007: 192 – 211).[21] And it is not a full spectrum of theories trying to explain ongoing processes.

As demonstrated, a number of theories have different approaches to the nature of CSDP while stressing different aspects of it. There is one part most of theories agree upon. It is likely that there is a long way to go before real integration of European national military forces could take place. Still, commonly conducted military operations are a reality and progress on the field of deepening military cooperation is made. With the goal to clarify the functioning of EU commonly ran military activities, evolvement of CSDP throughout different Treaties and legal framework of EU military cooperation is explained.

Yugoslav Wars, which forced the EU to take new initiatives on the field of security and defence, started in 1991 with a war in Slovenia. As a response to such dramatic events taking place on European soil, in 1992 the Petersberg Tasks were called to life. It was the first attempt of the EU to set up framework for common military activities. Initially tasks outlined the following three purposes for which military units could be deployed:

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[21] Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union. *New York*. pp. 190 – 215.

humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping; tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.[22]

1993 Maastricht Treaty created a pillar system with the aim to extend EU authority in some policy areas including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was set under pillar two. In 1997 EU member states agreed with the Amsterdam Treaty upon the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a major element of CFSP. The next milestone of building up EU independent military capacity was the Cologne European Council in 1999. It widened the fields of Petersberg tasks (Cutler&Von Lingen 2003: 10).[23] In relations to Kosovo War and with the plan of EU military involvement there, the Council declared that the EU must have an independent military capacity, backed up by credible military forces.

With the latest treaty - Treaty of Lisbon (TEU) 2009 ESDP was renamed to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the pillar system was merged into one. TEU Article 42 expanded Petersberg tasks to include: humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilisation tasks.[24] Additionally, the basis of military cooperation originated from the TEU Article 42 VII which contains the principle of "one for all, all for one".[25] If one or more member state(s) is/are attacked, the other member states have an obligation to provide help and assistance "by all means in their power" in accordance with the UN charter. Such principle covers also the member states which do not belong to NATO (Brinkmann 2013).[26] Another aspect of solidarity concerns common actions in

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[22] EEAS. [online] Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/petersberg/index_en.htm / [Accessed 26 Apr.2016].

[23] Cutler, R. and Von Lingen, A. (2003), The European Parliament and European Union Security and Defence Policy, *European Security, 12:2, 1-20.*

[24] Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. [online] Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN [Accessed 26 Apr.2016].

[25] Treaty on European Union [online]. Available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf [Accessed 30 Mar. 2016].

[26] Brinkmann, M. (2013), First Steps to a European Union Army, *Embassy, May15, 2013-14.*

cases of terrorist attacks and man-made disasters. It is stated in TFEU Article 222.[27] Listed up clauses are legally binding for the member states and they should provide reasoning to work towards deeper military cooperation.

From the progress described above the development towards delegating more jurisdiction from the member states to the EU and at least declaratively contributing more military capabilities can be observed. In order to back up security and defence related goals taken by member states with Treaties, the European Council has set military capability targets with headline goals. The goals related to the military portion of the ESDP have been ambitious. Initially, during Helsinki meeting 1999 there was a political will to create a European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) by 2003 consisting of a force of 60,000 troops which would be deployable anywhere in the world within 60 days, capable of fulfilling the Petersberg tasks and which is to be sustainable for a year (Youngs 2002: 102).[28] The EU has not stopped at setting such goals. In 2008 the EU Council agreed on Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities which set goals to be able to run simultaneously two stabilisation and reconstruction operations with the involvement of 10,000 troops plus civilians; two rapid response operations with the use of EU Battle Groups; CIMIC humanitarian assistance operation and one major civilian mission (up to 3,000 personnel) plus some smaller ones.[29] Consequently, such a set of goals is widening the gap between ambitions and real capabilities (Major and Mölling 2010: 19).[30] It is problematic that as a result the EU is having some capabilities just on paper (Gordon 2000: 12).[31]

Still, from this brief overview the process of deepening the EU influence in the domain of "high politics" is visible. It theoretically indicates the existence of political will and readiness from member states to partly delegate the field of security and defence to the

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[27] The Treaty of Functioning of the European Union [online]. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT [Accessed 30 Mar. 2016].

[28] Youngs, R. (2002), The European Security and Defence Policy: what impact on the EU's approach to security challenges*, European Security 11/2, pp.101–124.*

[29] Declaration of Strengthening Capabilities (2008). [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/104676.pdf [Accessed 15 May.2016].

[30] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

[31] Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, *Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17* .

EU. Still, one may have doubts if common armed forces are required at all? There are some practical needs and benefits supporting the necessity of common armed forces. Namely rational calculus of pooling capabilities, because National wide-range defence is too expensive, while common defence would provide possibilities to specialize and to develop niche capabilities. Thus, it would save resources and provide more force (Major & Mölling: 2010: 22 - 24).[32] In addition, optional benefits from creating credible military force are: freeing US troops from Europe, making EU more capable partner and player in global level; providing tools for dealing any major security crisis with or without US involvement (Gordon 2000:12 – 13).[33] Also, CSDP can be considered as a tool for the EU on becoming more credible and coherent foreign policy actor (Saviolo 2015: 36).[34]

While comparing progress made on the field of common military framework with the practical need of helping the EU to become a more credible player in the global arena and helping to save limited resources, it may look like the creation of permanent common armed forces/European Army is just a matter of time. Real life does not support such optimism. Even though member states have declaratively partly already delegated such field of "high politics" to the supranational institutions, there is the ambition to avoid CSDP of becoming too influential and effective. There are few aspects of it. For example, most sceptical countries like UK, Denmark, Finland and Sweden are critical concerning the security and defence integration and not willing to invest in it (Peters 2014: 398).[35] Also, most of NATO-EU members are not able to fulfil 2% criteria spending on their national defence and they are not keen to invest additionally to the EU common armed forces. It may be concluded that lack of resources is crucial factor undermining development of CSDP.

Additionally, member states have retained control over the field of common defence. It is because more authority is delegated to the Council than to the EU institutions (Howorth

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[32] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

[33] Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, *Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17* .

[34] Saviolo, A. (2015), From EDC to CSDP – Do the Europeans need a common defence policy, *EU Diplomacy Paper* 5/2015, pp. 31-38.

[35] Peters, D. (2014), European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy", *European Security, 23:4, 388-408.*

2007: 206 - 207).[36] Intergovernmental nature of CSDP through the format of Foreign Affairs Council leaves to the Member States opportunity to dictate to the EU mission mandate, objectives, scope, duration, chain of command, national contributions (Comelli 2010: 81).[37] On the one hand it guarantees for the Member States that EU institutions will not become too influential to take a lead over common defence. On the other hand, such situation makes decision making process slow and complicated and reduces credibility of EU in total.

Summing up the theoretical overview it may be concluded that there is progress made on a field of CSDP´s military portion: legal framework and goals are set; real life operations are conducted and still ongoing; the system of pooling capabilities is established. All mentioned fragments would not be possible to be introduced without having political will and readiness of member states to act commonly. Despite that theorists have not managed to agree upon the phenomenon of CSDP. At a glance, the development made may be interpreted as a permanently ongoing progress toward creation of (federal) common armed forces/European army. At the same time in reality CSDP appears to be a complicated fragmented and multi-layered construct including a controversial combination of economic, political and national ambitions and conflicts. In the light of such complicated background framework, in the next chapter an overview of traditional and new forms of modern armed forces will be provided. Also an assessment about the status and the progress made within CSDP.

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[36] Howorth, J. (2007). Security and defence policy in the European Union. *New York*. pp.190 – 215.
[37] Comelli, M. (2010), The democratic accountability of the CSDP and the role of the European Parliament. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., 79 – 99.

2. TRADITIONAL- AND COMMON ARMED FORCES NOWADAYS

As seen in the previous chapter, despite significant criticism made by the different authors, there have been some developments on the field of EU common defence. The current chapter provides a brief overview of modern armed forces. The focus is on general build-up and subordination of the forces. The first part of the chapter explains the functioning of armed forces in classical states while the next part describes modern armed forces in the framework of international organisations like UN and NATO. It covers the manning, funding and legal status of the combined armed forces.

The main part of the chapter describes in a more detailed manner the status and the forms of military cooperation within CSDP. Some authors are used in order to give an assessment about the progress made. While comparing "classical" armed forces with the common armed forces within international organisations, it can be said that permanent military bodies on the level of EU combined with temporary rotation based Battle Groups remind more other international organisations than traditional armies.

The author of the thesis goes further and in the discussion part of the chapter proposes an alternate build-up of EU military structures. It would be the size of a military structure which would not endanger any EU Member States even if subordinated directly to the EU supranational organisations. At the same time it would guarantee the quicker response of the EU to any crisis with the need of military involvement. Such readiness of quick response would add credibility to the EU in general. Also, such an additional military asset would help to win some extra time for the Member States in order to reach agreements about further common actions required in solving the crisis.

2.1 Traditional armed forces in national- and federal states

Nowadays countries can be divided into unitary states, federal states and confederations. According to the *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, the components of different forms of States are: territory, citizenship, allocation of competences to the central (federal) authorities.[38] In case of unitary states the status of armed forces is

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[38] Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. [online] Available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com [Accessed 09 Oct.2015].

obvious. The highest commander of the armed forces may vary, but basically in all cases, army is subordinated to central authorities.

The samples of confederations are Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. In Belgium and Canada the Commander in Chief respectively are King Philipp and Queen Elizabeth II. These persons are on these posts symbolically while real life leadership belongs to the Chiefs of Defence (CHOD). In Switzerland the Chief of the Armed Forces is Lieutenant General André Blattmann. In all described cases the armed forces are funded by State budget and led by central governments.

While describing federal states, as of 2016 there are ca 25 federal countries in the world. They are geographically spread to all continents. Some significant samples of federations are: Germany, Spain and Russia in Europe; India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates in Asia; Mexico, Canada, the United States of America (US) in America; Nigeria, South Africa in Africa, Australia Micronesia.[39]

In the United States of America, which is considered to be world´s oldest continuing federal democracy with the country's second Federal Constitution from 1789 /… raise an army and navy …/ was given to the federal government.[40] On the other hand, in the United States of America, the states may have their own army and air force units, subordinating to the governors.[41] Still, these units are only for use within the state in case of emergencies while the US federal armed forces are used worldwide. In other cases also in federal states armed forces are subordinated to the central government.

Depending on the size, geography, number of population, level of nation's welfare of a country, the structure of armed forces may differ, but the basic build up remains the same. For effective functioning of armed forces the main pillars are: the components of

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[39] Forum of Federations web-page. [online] Available at:
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/federalismbycountry.php [Accessed 24 Feb.2016].
[40] Tarr, G. A, United States of America. [online] Available at:
http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Global_Dialogue/Book_1/BK1-C12-us-Tarr-en.htm [Accessed 24 Feb.2016].
[41] Kincaid, J., Comparative Observations. [online] Available at:
http://www.forumfed.org/libdocs/Global_Dialogue/Book_1/BK1-C13-co-Kincaid-en.pdf [Accessed 24 Feb.2016].

command and control (C2); logistics, including combat support and logistic support elements; and combat units are essentially required.

While summarizing "classical" states' armed forces build-up, it can be concluded that in unitary- and federal states the common trait is that armed forces are financed and guided by the central governments. At the same time, as mentioned above, after World War II, a new type of common armed forces were established. Next, armed forces in the framework of an international organisation are explained.

2.2 Common armed forces in framework of international organizations NATO and United Nations

In the late 20th and the beginning of 21 century in conditions of globalisation and the raise of big international organisation, a new type of common armed forces was required. It is caused by the change of the character of modern armed conflicts. Nowadays, an armed conflict does not necessarily mean a military conflict with the use of conventional forces between two or more countries. Now it may include an armed confrontation with militant groups with a big scale of collateral damage to the infrastructure and population living in the conflict area. Such new methods of asymmetrical- and hybrid warfare have been challenging traditional military forces. A solution is found through international organisations. As far as international organisations have taken bigger roles of peace establishment, peace enforcement, crisis management and assistance, new forms of common armed forces are created.

In essence the idea of common armed forces is not new. At Medieval Age vassals provided troops and equipment to the ruler for certain periods and military campaigns. Similar principle is adopted nowadays in the framework of international organizations like UN and NATO.

UN, consisting of 193 states, is trying to address all crises taking place in the world. In order to act, the mandate from the UN Security Council is required. The legal basis originates from Chapter VII of the Charter and the active measures taken are aimed at maintaining or restoring international peace and security, facilitating political processes, protecting civilians, assisting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; supporting constitutional processes and the

organization of elections, protecting and promoting human rights and assisting in restoring the rule of law and extending legitimate state authority. If the risk is assessed to be relatively low, Security Council in coordination with the General Assembly establishes peacekeeping operations ran by the UN. As of April 2016, since 1948 there are 69 peacekeeping missions deployed worldwide.[42]

Since the UN does not have its own armed forces, the force generation is based on the UN Member States volunteer contributions. Participating nations agree upon the lead nation which carries the main burden. Normally, this state contributes most of the troops and capabilities and therefore has the leading/key positions of the force structure. After reaching this agreement, force generation conferences are initiated where participating nations agree upon their share. All UN military operations are managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and supported by the Department of Field Support. Which mean that the UN has two permanent pillars out of three. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations represents C2 and the Department of Field Support is equivalent to the logistic support pillar. Combat units are pooled for each mission separately.

If the UN assesses some specific crisis to be more dangerous and stronger military intervention from outside is required for establishing peace, the UN mandate is provided to NATO.

NATO functions basically in the same way as explained with the UN. One difference is that NATO has a complicated permanent structure of Headquarters (HQ), which are divided hierarchically into the political NATO HQ; Strategical (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command of Transformation (ACT)); Operational (Allied Command of Operations (ACO)) and to the Tactical levels with numerous lower level HQs. It is important to note that NATO owns a number of capabilities like strategical air lift and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) assets. Another difference from the UN is that NATO keeps some units in permanent readiness. An example of it is the Multinational Corps North-East (MNC-NE) which is stationed in Poland and which is responsible for maintaining a stable situation in Eastern

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[42] UN web-page. [online] Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml [Accessed 12 Apr.2016].

Europe. Also NATO has the system of NATO Response Force (NRF) which is currently in the phase of being transformed to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) format. NRF is based on rotation-based contributions of NATO Member States which provide troops and capabilities in order to keep up a credible military force. Decision for deployments is taken by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) consisting of high-level representatives of each member country.[43]

In a case of having a UN mandate and NAC decision, NATO Member States and partnering nations are providing additional troops and assets required for running the operation. To sum-up, when comparing to the UN, NATO is more capable in military means and able to run simultaneously more than one large scale operation worldwide.

Since the foundation, NATO has been responding to the changing security environment. After the end of Cold War and the raise of need for the peace support operations, NATO changed its focus from conventional warfare to smaller contingencies running Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) worldwide. With the rise of Russia's aggressive foreign politics in Eastern Europe and in the Middle East in recent years, NATO is turning back to conventional warfare. Also new forms of NATO cooperation are initiated. For example, British-led seven-nation Joint Expeditionary Force, which also includes Nordic and Baltic countries adding extra credibility in the Baltic Sea region. Simón has found that if Ukraine falls under the influence of Russia, "security buffer" between Russia and Central Europe will be lost, thus it is crucial to deepen the links with non-NATO countries Finland and Sweden (Simón 2014: 72).[44] For this purpose traditionally neutral Scandinavian countries are more and more involved in common military exercises with NATO. Also, it has to be noted that these countries are contributing more to NATO led operations.

Another example of adapting to the change of security environment in Central- and Eastern Europe is the decision made during Wales Summit 2014. Some counter measures in order to keep high alert readiness were taken. It includes creation of new staff elements

[43] NATO web-page. [online] Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm#MS [Accessed 12 Apr.2016].

[44] Simón, L. (2014), NATO´s Rebirth. Assessing NATO´s Eastern European "Flank", *Parameters* 44(3) Autumn 2014

(NATO Force Integration Units – NFIU) in Eastern European countries and calling up the above mentioned Very High Readiness Force (VJTF) in order to respond quicker to hostile activities on EU borders.[45] In addition, NATO is pooling more conventional armed forces in order to keep balance with Russia.

These steps within NATO and with the partner nations are indicating that NATO is in constant change and their will to adapt to the new challenges is serving as a positive example for the EU with its formats of military cooperation. Next an overview about the current state of the EU´s military cooperation will be given.

2.3 Current state of military cooperation within EU

This sub-chapter provides an overview of progress made so far on the field of CSDP. It explains some positive sides and weaknesses brought up by different authors. In addition to it, the information got from home pages of the EU military institutions is used in order to give a comprehensive overview of the topic. CSDP in its different forms have been developing already more than twenty years. The time is enough to make some significant progress. Some positive aspects of the CSDP will follow.

2.3.1 Positive aspects of the CSDP

An important aspect of the success of ESDP/CSDP is the existence of the support of the EU electorate. From the survey conducted in 2014 can be concluded that people tend to hand over legitimacy of the CFSDP (including CSDP) to the EU level. In other words, people are in favour of giving this domain to the jurisdiction of EU supranational institutions. Another outcome is that Euro-sceptics and Euro-supporters saw equally European army roles in territorial defence and keeping peace in Europe. In this meaning the expectations of citizens differ from political agreements between member states. For the member states Petersberg Tasks and EU Battle groups within it, are meant for operations abroad while surveyed citizens are not keen to support EU military operations overseas and having expectations for territorial defence of the EU (Peters 2014: 389 – 403).[46]

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[45] Wales Summit Declaration, Issued on September 5, 2015. [online] Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm [Accessed 09 Mar.2016].
[46] Peters, D. (2014), European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy, *European Security, 23:4, 388-408.*

In 2009 another survey was conducted among military personnel and Member States officials. They interviewed military personnel and state officials. Even though National defence was considered to be a core attribute of state sovereignty, there was wide support among the ESDP actors to the conducted operations and initiatives in place. Expectations of ESDP actors included also purely military roles (out from Petersberg Tasks). Namely defending territorial integrity (48%) and peace (45%) in the EU. 85% of diplomats and 92% of interviewed military personnel saw creation of EU Battle Groups as step forward towards European Army (Mérand and others 2009: 338 – 339).[47]

It is worthwhile to mention that some progress is made on a ground of building up common military culture. Whilst training and serving together, militaries from different Member states are creating common understandings and procedures which simplifies deepening of future cooperation. Creation of EU institutions as European Union Military Staff, European Defence Agency, EUROCORPS and EU (regional) Battle Groups have established basis for developing more complex and wide-range forms of military cooperation. The same idea is also supported by the commonly conducted real-life operations in frames of CSDP. In this way, the progress on field of CSDP can be considered as next step of federalisation. Moreover, according to King, creation of military culture deepens interdependence between militaries and simplifies creation of common army in the future (King 2006: 273 – 274).[48] Still, the further progress on a field of creating military culture could be done (Moustakis & Violakis 2008: 432).[49]

Important is to stress that as of 2016 already the number of EU military structures established and missions accomplished and in process are indicating political will of building up credible capabilities. In more practical means, the main success is ability to keep up two Battle Groups in time. Operations Headquarters are also operational (Major & Mölling: 2010: 16).[50]

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[47] Mérand, F., Bonneu, M. and Faure, S. (2009), What do ESDP actors want? An exploratory analysis, *European Security, 18:3, 327-344.*

[48] King, A. (2006), Towards a European Military Culture?, *Defence Studies, 6:3, 257-277.*

[49] Moustakis, F. and Violakis, P. (2008), European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy, *European Security, 17:4, 421-433.*

[50] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

From the arguments above it can be concluded that there are positive sides of CSDP and establishing the framework for military cooperation between EU Member States. These steps have been interpreted by the officials, militaries and regular citizens as positive step forward. But not all authors are in favour of CSDP. Overview of shortfalls on this field will follow.

2.3.2 Criticism on CSDP and military cooperation within it

Some scholars have assessed EU military cooperation so far not to be success story to be proud of. Since the creation it has been facing wide variety of challenges which may lead to the controversial results.

It appeared that EU was helpless during Yugoslavian war and depending on NATO, mainly US military capabilities. Kosovo events have demonstrated that US was dominating in Europe while Europeans did not have proper framework and capabilities to deal with challenges (Gordon 2000: 12).[51] Even though Europe had at these days more than 2 million troops, EU was not able to pool it (Major & Mölling: 2010: 12).[52] Positive side of Yugoslavian war was that it brought up weaknesses and shortfalls of the European militaries. It leaded to the creation of its own military framework.

After Lisbon Treaty and 9/11 were was an expectation that the EU would adapt its defence policy to changing needs. Initially there was a hope that on mid-2003 EU military framework will reach its full operational capability (FOC) with 60 000 troops included. The next timeframe for this goal was set to 2008-2010 (Dempsey &White 2001).[53] (Moustakis & Violakis 2008: 429) [54] and (Biscop & Coelmont 2010: 7 - 8)[55] have interpreted it as a lack of strategy and vision within CSDP. And as of 2016 this goal is still not achieved. Also there are no readiness and will to make CSDP properly working.

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[51] Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, *Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17* .
[52] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.
[53] Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering Plans for an EU Defence Force, *Financial Times, 19 November 2001.*
[54] Moustakis, F. and Violakis, P. (2008), European Security and Defence Policy Deceleration: An Assessment of the ESDP Strategy, *European Security, 17:4, 421-433.*
[55] Biscop, S. and Coelmont, J. (2010), A Strategy for CSDP Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider*, (Egmont Papers 37), Egmont - The Royal Institute for International Relations, Academia Press.*

Another serious field of challenges concerns finances and pooling resources. Even though there has been some development on National level on pooling forces, it is not reflecting improvement of European Army (Major and Mölling 2010: 15).[56] Additionally it has been stated, that the member states are lacking means (Gordon 2000: 13).[57] Shepherd has named it as shortfall of capabilities (Shepherd 2003: 40).[58] Winn has listed up following shortfalls: lack of sharing intelligence, lack of heavy lift capabilities, precision-guided missiles, anti-air defence and forces projections. Also he sees the challenge in interoperability of troops. In his opinion, standardisation of equipment and procedures are limited (Winn 2003:.49)[59].

Pooling agreed resources has one more aspect what is not widely discussed. If member states set a goal to create 60 000 troops strong military force, it covers only 1/3 of the real need (Dempsey &White 2001).[60] As far as the Battle Groups system is functioning on rotational bases, there should be three rotations made available for the EU. One is on active duty with high readiness, another one on preparation and training phase. And the third rotation is off duty, dealing with their national tasks. From this it can be calculated that the real need of fully manned common forces is 180 thousand troops.

Separate serious issue is a lack of funding (Salmon 2003: 2, 12-13).[61] Also the matter of funding the EU Rapid Reaction Force has been raised– how the costs should be shared and how big is supposed to be the burden for individual Member States (Dempsey &White 2001).[62] Matter of fair division of costs on common armed forces is boosted by the fact that not all member states are full members of NATO. Due to that, some member states have to invest to national defence and to the both organisations while some are

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[56] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

[57] Gordon, B. H. (2000), Their Own Army?, *Foreign Affairs, New York, 79(4) July/August 2000, pp 12-17 .*

[58] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without substance?, *European Security, 12:1, 39-63.*

[59] Winn, N. (2003), Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy? The Debate on NATO, the European Army and Transatlantic Security, *Geopolitics, 8:2, 47-68.*

[60] Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering Plans for an EU Defence Force, *Financial Times, 19 November 2001.*

[61] Salmon, T-C. (2003), *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

[62] Dempsey, J. and White, D. (2001), Not Rapid Enough: Lack of Money and Clear Goals is Hampering Plans for an EU Defence Force, *Financial Times, 19 November 2001.*

privileged to stay out from investing in NATO and they pay only to CSDP. On top of that some EU member states are contributing also to UN peace-keeping operations which makes it even more unequal. The matter of funding can be explained with a lack of political will (Bickerton and others 2011: 14)[63]

Some criticism is caused by the fact that NATO and EU are having overlapping parts of their goals when it comes to crisis management. For example, EU Battle Groups created on 2007 are a smaller and less capable alternate to the NATO Response Force (NRF) created on 2003. Duplication of efforts can be seen also on Red Sea there EU Operation Atalanta and NATO´s Ocean Shield are addressing piracy in Somalia (Duke & Vanhoonacker 2015: 10 – 11).[64] At the same time such duplication provides a potential field for saving resources if better coordinated.

Another domain of duplication of efforts and resources, is the division between CSDP military- and civil components. The basis of CSDP and Petersberg Tasks is the understanding that EU is not willing to be seen with a use of military "hard power" in international arena. Also European Council has been determined, EU to focus to the non-military crisis management and post war reconstruction (Winn 2003:.49).[65] It explains why in a case of crisis management operations, planning is separated for military- and civil intervention, instead of doing it together (Major and Mölling 2010: 18).[66] It leads to the low level of coordination and to the waist of limited resources.

Separate reason of having inefficient common forces is due to individual interests and expectations of Member States. In order to highlight different views to the EU security and defence integration UK, Denmark, Finland, Sweden can be mentioned as the most

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[63] Bickerton, C. J., Irondelle, B., & Menon, A. (2011). Security Co-operation beyond the Nation-State: The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.JCMS: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, *49*(1), 1-21.
[64] Duke, S. and Vanhoonacker, S. (2015), EU-NATO Relations: Top-down strategic paralysis, bottom-up cooperation, *Paper prepared for the UACES 45th Annual Conference at the University of Deusto, 7-9 September 2015.*
[65] Winn, N. (2003), Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy? The Debate on NATO, the European Army and Transatlantic Security, *Geopolitics, 8:2, 47-68..*
[66] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 - 28

sceptical Member States (Peters 2014: 404).[67] In the author's opinion, the stance of Finland may be caused by their historical experience while fighting successfully alone against the USSR during Winter War. At the same time while being in alliance with Nazi Germany Finland lost its territory of Karelia to the USSR. As a result nowadays Finland does not belong to NATO and people believe that country should be able to defend itself independently. Sweden politics are rooted in the long lasting tradition of being a neutral country. UK is traditionally one of the strongest armed forces in the world and it is not ready to give up any capabilities it currently has. Denmark has had strong influence of domestic electorate. As a result it has opted out from CSDP.

To be more precise, federal countries headed by France and Benelux countries are looking forward of taking bigger role in EU and to exclude US from being such important part of EU security and defence (Winn 2003:.49).[68] In addition, at the same time France and UK are willing to transform EU to the more credible crisis management actor (Howorth &Menon 2009: 734).[69] Germany looks to deepening military cooperation within the EU as a tool for strengthening NATO. Also they consider it as another step of EU integration. On the contrary, Poland is not willing to duplicate resources and effort between NATO and EU military portion (Lang 2002: 107 – 108).[70]

An interesting viewpoint is provided by Saviolo. In his opinion CSDP is not for strengthening EU position in international arena. It is a tool for EU Member States to avoid re-unified Germany of becoming regional hegemon. (Saviolo 1999: 34).[71]

Such controversial interests of EU member states are explaining why it is so difficult to proceed with the idea of Common Armed Forces/ European Army. Still, there are

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[67] Peters, D. (2014), European security policy for the people? Public opinion and the EU's Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy, *European Security, 23:4, 388-408.*

[68] Winn, N. (2003), Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy? The Debate on NATO, the European Army and Transatlantic Security, *Geopolitics, 8:2, 47-68.*

[69] Howorth, J. and Menon, A., (2009). Still not pushing back: why the European Union is not balancing the United States. *Journal of conflict resolution, 53 (5), 727-744.*

[70] Lang, K. O. (2002), The German-Polish security partnership within the transatlantic context - convergence or divergence*?" Defence Studies, 2:2, 105-122.*

[71] Saviolo, A. (1999). From EDC to CSDP–Do the Europeans need a common defence policy?. *Prospects for Security on the European Continent, 8(4), 31.*

different military institutions/structures established in frames of CSDP. Next a brief overview of them is provided.

2.3.3 Forms of military cooperation within EU

As of 2015 in the framework of CSDP functioning forms of military co-operation are European Military Committee, European Union Military Staff, European Defence Agency, EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups. Political Guidance is provided by the Political and Security Committee (Brinkmann 2013).[72]

EU Military Staff is providing Command and Control assets and military advice to the EU institutions. It is to define defence capability requirements for the EU military structures. Currently EUMS is not leading EU military operations and there is no link between strategic - and operational level planning (Quille 2010:70).[73] Operational level planning is conducted by the headquarters called to life for specific EU military operations. Still, in the author's opinion EUMS can be considered as a permanent military planning component which can be developed further if the member states agree upon the creation of the European Army or deepening common military cooperation.

European Defence Agency (EDA) was created from the unification of The Western European Armament Group (WEAG) and The Western European Armament Organization (WEAO). The mission of EDA includes: /… developing defence capabilities; promoting defence research and technology; promoting armaments cooperation and creating a competitive European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base…/ As seen, ambition goals are set while since 2010 the budget of EDA has remained ca 30,5 million euros.[74] Which means that EDA is limited by the member States which are not willing to make it capable, and by the small budget (Major and Mölling 2010: 16).[75] Due to financial

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[72]Brinkmann, M. (2013), First Steps to a European Union Army, *Embassy, May15, 2013-14.*

[73] Quille, G. (2010), The European External Action Service and The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., 55 – 78.

[74] EDA. [online] Available at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/Aboutus/Missionandfunctions [Accessed 09 May.2016].

[75] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 - 28

limitations, in real life EDA is mainly concentrated on coordinating and assisting the member states common military procurements. The rest of the goals are getting limited attention. Consequently it means that EDA is acting as component of logistic pillar of armed forces build up.

EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups are physical components of military forces able to be deployed and to be self-sustainable for limited period. EUROCORPS is unique concept currently consisting of five framework nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain. The size of the unit is up to 1,500 troops. Along the European Member- and associated nations there are two participating countries from outside the EU. Canada and Turkey have also been part of it, which raises some questions. For example, what would happen if the EU is willing to use EUROCORPS as a stabilizing force in Cyprus? How would Turkey as an associated nation act? As of 2016, Austria, Canada and Finland have quit this format for different reasons.[76] In the case of Austria and Finland it may be suggested that as far as EUROCORPS has been used for operations conducted under the command of NATO, these countries as non-NATO members decided not to participate, because for such nations there are significant security and operational limitations in place.

EU Battle Groups system consists of 18 Battle Groups with ca 1,500 troops each. Full operational capabilities were achieved 2007. The readiness includes half a year stand by period for two Battle Groups at a time in rotational bases. Battle Groups have framework nations providing most of the troops and resources while other member states can contribute with niche capabilities and assets. As a result most Battle Groups are multinational. It is important to note that so far Battle Groups have acted in accordance with Petersberg Tasks which means that they are used outside the EU territory.

The difference between EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups is that EUROCORPS is focused on NATO operations while EU Battle Groups serve the interests of the EU. Problematic is that EU has two military structures which are able to respond to the crisis taking place outside of the EU. At the same time EU does not have an agreed procedure

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[76] EUROCORPS. [online] Available at: http://www.eurocorps.org/pdf/eng/History_of_the_Eurocorps.pdf [Accessed 26 Oct.2015].

and/or common military force which could take action in case of a crisis taking place in a territory of any EU Member State.

2.4 Discussion

As demonstrated in this chapter, the essence of armed forces has been changing. Historically (federal) army has been a permanent military body subordinated to the central government. 20th and 21st century have turned this model to the creation of temporary acting military forces in the framework of international organizations like NATO and the United Nations. From this point of view, the idea of having multinational combined forces is not unique and theoretically should be feasible for the EU.

While concentrating to the EU common military framework, CSDP was called to life with a purpose to make EU to more credible player in international arena. If policy is failing it may act *vice versa*. Bentinck (2014: 5-6) has assessed that EU is losing its influence in global arena instead of gaining it.[77] With an aim to defend current state of EU military cooperation, one may say that military field is similar to any other wide range challenge Europe is facing. Geography, national interests, historical and cultural backgrounds, and – priorities are so controversial that it is complicated to find common ground and to take coordinated well planned effective resource using efforts towards creation of the credible military force.

Also, one may argue that there is no need for common military structures within the EU at all. The answer for external military threats is NATO which provides self-defence for the EU and EU would do the crisis management in order to support more secure world order (Bentinck 2014: 11).[78] Such statement has some shortfalls. First of all, NATO collective defence does not cover all EU member states. Namely Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are left out from NATO article 5 operation. Currently there is no direct military threat to Austria and Mediterranean member states, because they are not bordering with Russia. At the same time Sweden and especially Finland should consider the theoretical threat from the East. And Nordic countries have realized

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[77] Bentinck, M. (2014), The European Union and the World: Force for Good or Spent Force? A Review Essay, *Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.*
[78] *Ibid.*

it. As evidence to that is the fact that the traditionally neutral country Sweden, has re-assessed the status of Russian Federation from neutral- to the potentially aggressive country.

Secondly, annexation of Crimea and military support from the Russian Federation to the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists has changed security architecture in Europe. The use of new type of hybrid warfare has again raised the questions about the need for common European military force/European army which is required for demonstrating to the world the ability to react quickly to the aggressive actions of neighbouring countries (with military involvement included) against any EU Member State which is not able to defend itself or/and is not member of NATO.

The ability to react quickly is additionally boosted by Russia which is regularly conducting big scale military control exercises which are also testing the ability of the units to move quickly for long distances. It may be suggested that if there is a crises with military involvement between any EU member state and Russia, the situation may potentially escalate very rapidly. In order to prevent or respond such escalation of crisis, EU own military capabilities may play a crucial role. At the same time, CSDP has been focussed to the crises taking place abroad. As a result, the procedure of activation and agreement on using EUROCORPS and Battle Groups in a case of security or defence crisis hitting EU Member States is missing. Consequently, this framework of cooperation is likely to fail in a case crises will take place within EU.

Another domain of the problem is that the current format of the EU Battle Groups is based on temporary contributions provided by member states. In case of a real-life crisis and activation of NATO article 5 operation, it may occur that EU NATO members will not be able to send promised troops to the EU Battle Groups, because they are required to keep armed forces in homeland combat ready; at the same time, they need to contribute to NATO operation and additionally they should send troops to Battle Groups. In conditions of limited and reduced defence budgets in EU member states it is possible that member states assess state defence and NATO contribution to have higher priority than EU Battle Groups. As a result, it may lead to the loss of international credibility of EU military capabilities, because EU is demonstrating to the world that they are not able to pool agreed and promised 60,000 troops.

In order to overcome such problems of duplication of efforts and resources, the solution would be to increase the investments to national and common defence. Winn (2003: 50) has assessed it to be unrealistic.[79] The reasoning behind it may be that EU military cooperation has stayed purely political project and there are no readiness from Member States to invest in it enough (Tardy 2015:43 – 45).[80]

In the author's opinion member states see funding but more importantly legal procedure of creating and activation the forces, as problematic area. The main obstacle of moving towards EU federal army is traditional understanding that National Army/Defence Forces is one of the most important pillar of any national state. Due to that the Member States efforts made on the military side of CSFP are not aimed towards single European Army (Shepherd 2000: 17).[81]

As explained, EU member states are not indicating readiness to give up another piece of sovereignty. Still, the need for widening military cooperation within the EU is in place. In the author's opinion it is necessary to find new forms of military cooperation. One may ask what could be a way ahead for the EU military cooperation. There may be several solutions. One could be in developing EU military headquarters and EDA. Also, in order to overcome lack of coordination and efforts, EDA should be certification authority for the common forces and create white paper European Defence (Major and Mölling 2010: 22).[82] It would clear priorities and goals what is essential in order to be more effective. Also it is suggested that dual use capabilities between civil and military parts of CSDP and common funding of both components would avoid doubling efforts (Ioannides 2010: 46-47).[83] Alternately, effect of saving resources could be achieved though the concentration of specific clusters of military industry to few countries. In addition it

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[79] Winn, N. (2003), Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy? The Debate on NATO, the European Army and Transatlantic Security, *Geopolitics, 8:2, 47-68*

[80] Tardy, T. (2015). 8. CSDP in Action. What contribution to international security. *EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper,* (134), 12.

[81] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2000), Top-down or bottom-up: Is security and defence policy in the EU a question of political will or military capability?, *European Security, 9:2, 13-30*

[82] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making,* Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 - 28

[83] Ioannides, I. (2010), EU Civilian capabilities and cooperation with the military sector. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making,* Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 46,47.

would provide autonomy to the EU army (Salmon 2003: 12-13).[84] Last but not least, there is a need for changing mind- set of post neutral countries, which should switch their attitudes from neutral to active stance and start actively to contribute to the development of common military capabilities (Shepherd 2003: 55-56).[85]

Still, in the author's opinion it would not solve the problems with hiring and equipping personnel and activating units quickly enough. Due to that, the author of the thesis proposes an alternate solution.

The logic of the proposal is following. If member states are not willing to deepen EU military cooperation and creation common armed forces/European Army for different reasons, but the need for credible rapid reaction unit is in place, the new format of the EU military unit could be formed. The difference from the currently existing common armed forces is, that personnel hired to the unit, is subordinated directly to the supranational institutions. In other words, personnel in this unit is applying into it according to similar principles as civilians apply to the EU posts in different institutions. In this way the status of hired militaries is as citizens of the EU not as citizen of any member state. Currently, in case of a crisis member states which are contributing to the Battle Groups and EUROCORPS have to approve the activation of the troops while the new format could be activated quicker. Also, currently any participating nation may enforce different caveats for the use of their troops, which makes it challenging for the commanders to plan and lead the units consisting of national contributions. New type of units would have synchronized rules for all troops without exceptions.

In order to respond to the threats of member states that EU supranational institutions could become too strong and in case they have their own military troops, they may endanger the sovereignty of member states, the size of described hypothetical unit would stay on the same scale as the currently existing Battle Groups. It is ca 1,500 troops. Except Luxembourg, all of EU countries have a bigger force than that.

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[84] Salmon, T-C. (2003), *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

[85] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without substance?, *European Security, 12:1, 39-63.*

The benefit of such format of military cooperation is the time gained. If in any region of the EU the crisis would start to develop, this unit could be very quickly deployed to the area. The signal to the global audience is that EU is capable to react rapidly. The unit is small enough not to endanger the host nation and most importantly, the use of such unit would provide extra time for the EU Member States to define the appropriate measures and to agree upon the use of larger military contingencies in order to fulfil solidarity clause taken with Treaties. Even if the follow up force will be in the framework of NATO, the initial entry force would come from the EU.

There is a good starting platform for starting the unit because C2 and logistic elements already exist and common military culture is created through Battle Groups cooperation. The main challenges to be solved are related to legal bases of the unit and to its use. The funding could be solved with the use of EU budget with civil control provided by the European Parliament. The command line has to be established from the strategical level down to the tactical one. If political will is present, all of these fields could be covered.

To sum it up, it could be said that the current format of EU military cooperation belongs to the modern forms of military cooperation seen in the framework of international organisations. From the creation in 1990´s the EU has achieved significant success and has managed to create a functioning system tested in real life operations in different crises areas. Still, the cooperation suffers from different shortfalls which are rooted in the lack of political will to make EU military cooperation effective. But new geopolitical situation provides new challenges. In the author's opinion there is the need for reforming the current military cooperation in order to fulfil obligations taken by member states and to guarantee credibility of the EU in international arena. Last but not least, reform is needed for deterring hypothetical opponents. If demonstrated ability to react rapidly it may keep away armed confrontations in the future.

3. QUANTITATIVE ANALYZE ON EU OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION REGARDING COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

As seen in previous chapter, there are numerous reasons for deepening military cooperation within EU. In this chapter overview about conducted survey of the EU official documentation and its results is given. The aim of studying EU official documentation was to find an answer for following study questions:

- Has the changing security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood caused the rise of the number of documents concerning the CSDP?

- Does the most used CSDP related official terminology, covered by the EU official documentation, indicate support to the idea of deepening military cooperation and/or creating Common Armed Forces/European Army?

In order to study it, quantitative analyse of EU official documents represented in web-based public database EUR Lex was conducted.[86] After sorting out CSDP related documents, they were analysed with the use of EU official terminology represented in EUROVOC web-site were carried out.[87]

The assumption was that if the number of documents concerning CSDP military part is raised, it may indicate that progress on a field of widening cooperation at the common armed forces is made and it may be still ongoing. At the same time, it needs to be noticed, how these documents are divided between CSDP security- and defence domains. Big and/or increasing number of CSDP documents is not necessarily alluding to EU movement towards deepening military cooperation, because security portion of the CSDP is covering additionally aspects of internal security and guarding EU external borders. Still, as far as current thesis concentrating to the military portion of the CSDP, the main focus is on military issues.

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[86] Eur Lex database [online]. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html [Accessed 30 Mar. 2016].

[87] EUROVOC database [online]. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/eurovoc.html?params=08,0821,2464,2499 [Accessed 30 Mar. 2016].

Before moving to explanation of methodology, characteristics of collected data and the outcomes of the survey some basics which have influenced the procedure of survey have to be explained.

Firstly, it is important to keep in mind the mechanism of EU decision making procedure. From the point of ordinary legislative procedure the documents represented in Eur Lex are having different weight. The Council of the European Union, European Commission and European Parliament are having bigger importance while written questions to the EU institutions by the Members of European Parliament (MEPs) cannot be taken as significant documents from the point of EU legislative activities and policy making. Still, author of the thesis kept MEPs questions also within the database of processed documents. Justification is that author was looking for indirect indications of hypothetically progressing towards deeper common military cooperation or common armed forces. The topics covered by the MEPs as representatives of national electorates may indicate interest to the surveyed field of CSDP. From the point of interpreting the results conducted document survey functioning of ordinary legislative procedure has to be explained. In principle this procedure is providing equal opportunities to the citizens, Member States and EU institutions to come up with legislative initiatives on all possible fields of functioning of the EU. Ordinary legislative procedure origins from codecision procedure which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and extended by the Amsterdam Treaty 1999. The Treaty of Lisbon named it to ordinary legislative procedure based on TFEU Article 289. Initiatives are handled by European Commission which prepares draft legislative proposals for the European Parliament.

Secondly, the essence of conducted documents analyse has to be clarified. In addition to the headlines of official documents, the search engine in Eur Lex environment provides opportunity to search within all range of documents. In this way search results normally included the short explanation of the document. It stated by which EU institution documents are initiated, what kind of legislative acts they are. Also what is the main idea of the document? In this way, author had change to understand the content of the documents. The difference was with around 200 written questions of MEPs. Response of the search engine did not explain the subjects of the questions. For these documents author

did additional search and went through full original documents in order to make clear into which established domain certain documents are belonging to.

3.1 Methodology

In order to conduct the analyses, the proper and trustful sources had to be identified, range of studied documentation decided and principles of analysis set up. Reasoning and description of conducted procedure, also limitations of survey are following.

EU has done some efforts in order to make its documentation available for the citizens. For this purpose, internet based environment EUR Lex is created. It includes documents from EU institutions like Council of the European Union, European Parliament and its Committees, European Commission etc. These institutions are playing significant role in setting EU goals and development targets and their actions are influencing EU citizens' daily life. From this point of view EUR Lex can be considered as valuable and trustful source of documentation. Furthermore, as stated on its home-page, it includes "EU law and other public EU documents, authentic electronic Official Journal of the EU – in 24 languages." It means that Eur Lex environment is playing harmonizing role of EU documentation while all citizens can have access to the content of documents in all EU official languages.

EUR Lex search engine provides different options for searches. With the purpose to simplify searching process and to harmonize terminology in all official EU languages EUROVOC terms-vocabulary has been created and linked to the EUR-Lex environment. Author used the option which has grouped official terms to the bigger domains in functioning of the EU. Defence can be found under the 08 International relations as sub group 0821. As it can be seen, the area of "defence" includes 156 words and expressions officially used in EU documentation (Appendix 1).

The next step was to select from the list the terms which are characterising CSDP as Policy. The words and expressions which are on tactical level and not covering general meaning of the field of common defence in military means were left out. As a result, from initial 156 words 25 were selected as valid for further searches (Appendix 2). It narrowed the focus of EUR Lex searches.

Another dimension to be decided was timeframes for searches. As far as Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimea took place in 2014 – 2015, this is the timeframe which theoretically could indicate change of dynamics on EU documentation concerning to the military domain. As far as longer period for comparison was needed and the creation of current set-up of CSDP took place in 2009 when Lisbon Treaty was enforced, the timeframe for searches was set as from 01.01.2009 till 31.12.2015.

After setting up such search parameters, all of selected 25 words and expressions were used for searching. Initial number of responses was 2992. This figure was not number of separate original documents. Part of the documents were given repeatedly as a response for different searches. After filtering out the files which responded to different search words/expressions the number went down to 2290. The authors of the documents were Members of the European Parliament; Council of the European Union; High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy; European Commission and its Committees; European Parliaments and its Committees; Court of Justice of the European Union, Court of Auditors of the European Union and EU Member States.

After downloading the metadata of original 2290 documents to the single database, they had to be grouped in order to divide their topics between CSDP different domains. For this purpose, analyse of all documents had to be conducted. It included creation of coding system and coding of all documents. For the coding, following groups were created:

- Defence: Documents which are directly linked to the military defence of the Member States;

- EU Security: protection of information, neighbouring countries activities, Frontex, usage and development of underwater and air drones, control over firearms, combating terrorism, personal protective equipment of the citizens, harmonizing legislative acts related to the explosives and pyrotechnic articles for civil use; Schengen Borders Code; disarmament and arms control; restrictive measures against certain persons and entities; fighting illegal trafficking of firearms and its components;

- International affairs: These documents are dealing with trade, diplomatic and economic cooperation, free movement of people, sanctions against people and entities, related to the events taking place worldwide. All of these documents are having text which includes also one or few words or expressions relating them to the search words;

- Military abroad: These documents are covering EU military operations in frames of CSDP (outside from the territory of the EU);

- Security abroad: CSDP includes components of non-military operations. They can be law enforcement-, monitoring-, police- or border guard missions. Documents in this group are linked to these missions;

- Other: Documents which are dealing with other aspects of the functioning of the EU. They are not linked to any of domains directly related to the CSDP.

Group "Other" with 984 responses was excluded from later studies because it did not have direct links to the Military and Security aspects of the CSDP. As a result the number of processed documents came down to the 1257. This was the final number of documents which was studied more closely. Before providing the outcomes of survey, the technical procedure of conducted searches step by step is explained.

3.2 Technical process of EUR-Lex searches

At EUR-Lex home page "advanced search" option was used. Earlier chosen search words and abbreviations (Annex 2) were entered one by one to the first section "Search by text" in-between of quotation marks. The search included searching "In title" and "In text". This procedure provides responses of exact phrases and helps to keep searches focussed. "AND", "OR", "NOT" conditionals were not used. Document reference and sector "Author of the document" were left by default to "All". CELEX number was left blank. Search parameters were set to the sector "Search by date". From drop down menu named "Type of date" option "Date of document" was selected. Date range was set to 01.01.2009 - 31.12.2015.

Finally, with sector "Published in the Official Journal" two different approaches were used. During initial searches this part of the set-up was left blank. Later on extra searches

had to be completed, because description of almost 200 files was limited to the "Written questions by Members of the European Parliament and their answers given by a European Union institution" without specifying the content of these questions. To clarify it, all parameters were set exactly as it was explained above with the exception that to the sector "Published in the Official Journal" sub-part "OJ series" "C – information and notices" or "CE - supplement E" was chosen; to the field "Number" number of the Official Journal entered and the year of specific Member of Parliament question was entered. In this way it was possible to see original documents and to complete the coding of the created database.

For the analyses the Microsoft Excel 2013 was used.

During the processing collected data, additional need for extra coding raised. Initially there was a mess with describing authors of the documents. The list of authors and the essence of documents included: Members of the European Parliament and answers by a European Union institutions; Council Regulations; Directives; Agreements; Commission recommendations; Commission reports to the European Parliament and to the Council of the European Union; Positions of the Council of the European Union; Decisions of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy; Opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee on the European Civic Service; Common Military Lists of the European Union; Annual Reports of the Council of the European Union; European Parliaments and its Committees resolutions; colegislative communication between European Commission and European Parliament; Judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union. As demonstrated in *Table 1* the number of authors went down to 12.

Table 1. Coding key by the author of the documents

Name	Remarks
European Union	International agreements signed by the EU in frames of CFSP
EU Member States	Agreements dealing with EU Treaties and International agreements between Member States with other States
Council of the European Union	
Council of the European Union, European Parliament	Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents initiated by the Council of the European Union
European Parliament, Council of the European Union	Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents initiated by the European Parliament
European Parliament	
European Commission	
European Commission, High Representative of the Union	Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents initiated by the European Commission
High Representative of the Union	
High Representative of the Union, European Commission	Ordinary legislative procedure. Documents initiated by the High Representative of the Union
Court of Justice	Opinions and judgements
European Court of Auditors	Reports on EU missions in frameworks of CSDP

3.3 Characteristics of the collected data. Findings

As described before, the collected documents were divided into 6 different domains. Next, closer look to the content of the coded domains without "Other" and the findings are provided.

Defence: 100 responses. Documents which are directly linked to the military defence of Member States and movement of military equipment within EU;

EU Security: 176 responses. Documents addressing terrorism, organized crime, arms control, data protection, sanctions against individuals and entities, border guard, Schengen Borders Code, civil use of pyrotechnics, arms and explosives, movement of military goods, military and security personnel, judicial cooperation, EU military industry and the use of modern technologies, civil defence, trafficking of weapons and people,

security of public services, migration crisis, cyber-crimes and – defence, harmonisation of legislation;

Military abroad. 62 responses. Covering EU military operations in Atalanta Somalia, Mali, Lebanon, Libya, Central African Republic;

Security abroad: 53 responses. Content of these documents is related to the EU security missions in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Kosovo, Libya, Mali, Palestine, Republic of Niger and Ukraine;

International affairs: 914 responses. These documents are dealing with trade, diplomatic and economic cooperation, free movement of people, sanctions against people and entities, related to the events taking place in (Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, Central African Republic, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea, Iran, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine). EULEX missions (Rule of Law) abroad. EU Monitoring Missions (Georgia). Maritime safety. European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership Program working papers. Pre-accession reports about Balkan countries. Court of Justice judgements.

In order to figure out how the dynamics have changed in chosen five domains *Diagram 1* provides general overview by quarters. As seen, "International affairs" has been dominating over other surveyed domains. Also it can be noticed that the trend line on "International affairs" has been constantly increasing. While counting military and security domains within EU and abroad together, security aspects of the EU have had more attention. 2009 - 2015 number of security related documents was 219 and defence related documents 162. The biggest number of security and defence documents was in 2013 and 2014. In 2015 the number went down again to the pre-crisis level.

Taken by the domains, slight fluctuations can be observed, but average level remained approximately the same. For the EU security related documents one peak was on a fourth quarter of the 2012 while for the military abroad and defence domains the peak was the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014. Still, while taking into the consideration the beginning of Crimean crisis, suggested rapid rise of number on defence related documents did not occur.

Diagram 1. Trends on the numbers of documents 2009 – 2015 by domains.

From *Diagram 2* domain "International relations" is left out. In a chart number of documents by quarters is represented. Also diagram indicates the balance between domains. Throughout the period domain "EU security" has been given the most of the documents. Despite of that, the quarterly figures of this domain remains between 10 documents in 2009 and 36 documents in 2014, which cannot be assessed to be significant number.

According to the diagram, the trend on the numbers of military concerned documents stayed stable. Still, first quarter of 2014 indicated a raise of defence related documents from three to thirteen. On the other hand, the same figure went down again on second quarter 2014 to one document and stayed stable till the end of surveyed period.

|	2009				2010				2011				2012				2013				2014				2015			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Security abroad		2	1	2	1	2	1			1	2	1	1		2		1	1	2			2	6	5	2	3	2	2
Military abroad	1			3	1		1				2		2		1		5	5	4	11	7	3	3	7	1	3		2
EU security	5	4	1	4	3	6	5	5	5	2	3	10	6	4	4	16	5	7	12	9	11	8	10	7	5	7	4	9
Defence	4	1	3	8	3		1	3	5	2	1	2	4	3	6	6	3	3	7	3	13	1	5	1	3	1	3	5

YEAR   Quarter

Diagram 2. Trends on the numbers of documents 2009 – 2015 by domains (with International affairs excluded).

Consequently it can be said, that in accordance to the data provided in *Diagram 1* and *Diagram 2* ongoing crisis in Ukraine and Russia's aggressive foreign politics did not influence EU stance towards Common Military Defence from the aspect of EU public documentation. As far as domain "EU security" remained also at the same level, the refugees-crises and massive illegal immigration to the EU have had limited impact to the documentation.

Diagrams 3 and *4* are giving information from the point of originating authority/institution of surveyed documents. *Diagram 3* is indicating additionally the initiators of the documents created in frames of ordinary legislative procedure with involvement of several EU institutions. The main contributors of documents were Council of the European Union (51%); European Commission (19%) and European Parliament (21%). European Parliament was contributing in different context: as an institution in general; as MEP´s asking the questions from different EU institutions and as different EP working groups and -commissions.


Diagram 3. Percentage of the created documents by author.

Diagram 4 adds in addition to the authors also time factor. From the three main contributors, the portion of European Commission remains roughly to the same level throughout surveyed period. Significantly, the beginning of Ukraine crises in 2014 is reflected in EU official documents creation with a raise of documents originated by the Council of the European Union from 88 documents in 2013 to 136 in 2014 (raise ca 55%). In 2015 this number went down to 125 documents, which is still higher than it had been before Ukraine crisis. As far as Council of the European Union is representing Member States, it may be interpreted as raise of public intergovernmental information exchange.

Another interesting point is, that in 2015 number of surveyed documents created by the European Parliament went down from 76 documents in 2014 to 8 documents in 2015 (drop ca 89 %). Due to the fact that there is no comparison with a year 2016, it cannot be said if it was just one year anomaly or it was the beginning of trend that sensitive topic of common security and defence is not discussed in European Parliament and it is left for the Member States in format of Council of the European Union.

|	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
High Representative of the Union, European Commission			6	6	9	2	9
High Representative of the Union			1				
European Union	1	1	1	2	2	3	
European Parliament, Council of the European Union	2	2	2	2	6	6	2
European Parliament	22	18	26	31	75	70	6
European Economic and Social Committee				1			
European Court of Auditors				3	3	1	2
European Commission, High Representative of the Union				2	5	4	5
European Commission	18	35	32	31	32	49	36
EU Member States	4	4	1	12		7	3
Court of Justice						1	
Court of Justice	6	2	2	5	3	8	3
Council of the European Union, European Parliament	3	1		3	6	1	1
Council of the European Union	60	51	116	90	82	135	124

Diagram 4. Number of documents by the authors and years

In the context of current thesis the most important domains out from six are "Defence", "EU Security", "Security abroad" and "Military abroad". *Table 2* provides information about the correlations between these domains. It appears that observed domains are interrelated. Strong correlation can be observed between "Defence" and "EU security" and "Military abroad" with "EU security". The rest of correlations remain at the moderate level while the only weak correlation between different domains appears between "EU security" and "Security abroad". It means that if number of documents in certain period of time is raising in one domain, it causes also increase in number of documents in positively correlated domains. In this specific case the only difference is the moderate correlation between "Defence" and "Security abroad". If number of documents in one of them is raising, it is likely to cause the reduction in number of documents in other domain.

Table 2. Correlations between domains

	EU security	Military abroad	Security abroad
Defence	0,40057493	0,248125669	-0,239049625
EU security		0,350696719	0,066160597
Military abroad			0,266494067

The last component of authors´ interest concerned to the change of official terminology within domain in all surveyed documents and in domain "Defence" as directly linked to the EU common armed forces and to the idea of creation European Army. *Table 3* provides information in timeframes before Ukraine crises (2009 – 2013) and *Table 4* explains the use of EUROVOC descriptors during the crises (2014-2015). Both tables are providing 20 most used terms.

While comparing the use of official terminology in all processed documents, it can be concluded that most of the used terms remained the same. The difference is that in 2014 – 2015 terms Ukraine, Russia, territorial dispute and political reform appeared to the documentation. If counted together, in this period these terms gave the biggest share of surveyed documents. Analyses indicated, that official public documents touching Ukraine crisis are not covering CSDP or EU common armed forces in this context.

At the same time in domain "Defence" only minor change in terminology can be observed. Top 20 of most used terms 2014-2015 included only 50 documents, which is not enough for making conclusions about the possible change of use of terms. Still, new terms to highlight in top 20 are: arms trade and European Defence Agency.

Table 3. Most used EUROVOC descriptors 2009 – 2013. From all documents and from domain "Defence"

EUROVOC descriptor	Total no of documents 2009-2013	EUROVOC descriptor	No of documents 2009-2013 (Defence)
international sanctions	100	military equipment	17
economic sanctions	91	CFSP	11
human rights	87	defence expenditure	8
Member of the European Parliament	74	export monitoring	8
written question	74	armed forces	7
CFSP	69	European security	6
European Parliament	47	Member of the European Parliament	6
European neighbourhood policy	45	research and development	6
the EU's international role	41	technology	6
EU Member State	40	United States	6
terrorism	40	written question	6
cooperation policy	37	arms control	5
natural person	37	code of conduct	5
European Commission	36	data protection	5
trade restriction	35	EU Member State	5
job vacancy	34	civil defence	4
accession criteria	32	defence policy	4
military equipment	32	directory	4
administrator	31	EU-NATO cooperation	4
servant (EU)	31	European defence policy	4

Table 4. Most used EUROVOC descriptors 2014 – 2015. From all documents and from domain "Defence"

EUROVOC descriptor	Total no of documents 2014-2015	EUROVOC descriptor	No of documents 2014-2015 (Defence)
international sanctions	72	military equipment	6
economic sanctions	65	export monitoring	4
Member of the European Parliament	45	technology	4
written question	45	Member of the European Parliament	3
Ukraine	39	written question	3
human rights	38	arms trade	2
European neighbourhood policy	37	CFSP	2
terrorism	31	defence policy	2
administrator	30	directory	2
competition (EU)	26	EC conformity marking	2
Russia	25	European Defence Agency	2
territorial dispute	22	European standard	2
corruption	21	free movement of goods	2
political reform	21	information transfer	2
visa policy	20	interpretation of the law	2
deportation	19	intra-EU trade	2
natural person	19	marketing standard	2
EU military mission	18	protective equipment	2
job vacancy	18	public awareness campaign	2
trade restriction	18	single market	2

To sum up, the results of conducted quantitative analyse of the published EU official defence related documents, it may be concluded that comparison of pre-crisis (2009 – 2013) and crisis time (2014 – 2015) periods do not indicate remarkable change the dynamics of document creation and the change in use of official EUROVOC terms. The number of published documents has stayed relatively stable with a trend of slight increase. There can raise in number of CSDP related documents observed in the end of 2013 and first half of 2014, but in 2015 the number went down to pre-crisis level.

Another aspect it that from the point of initiator of documents, during the crisis the importance of the Council of the European Union increased while in 2015 number of CSDP related documents initiated by the European Parliament fell rapidly. The balance between documents related to the security and defence aspects of the CSDP has been for security domain. Annual figures indicate exceptions in 2009 and 2013 then there were few more defence- than security related documents

3.4 Discussion

In a phase of preparation to the survey, the authors´ assumption was that as outcome the survey provides some indications of having impact from events taking place in Ukraine, EU confrontation with Russia and massive scale illegal immigration to the EU. It would have meant that number of public documents concerning to the security and defence components of CSDP demonstrated rapid raise in dynamics. Conducted survey did not support this expectation. Also, unexpectedly the use of terminology did not change due to the changing security environment. Even though the topic of Ukraine, Russia, EU relations appeared to the documentation, it was not involving military aspect of the CSDP.

There may be few explanations to it. It may be suggested that, despite to the declarative handover of CSDP to the EU jurisdiction, in a case of real life emergencies EU institutions are not having such influence in the field of security and defence, while intergovernmental exchange of information is likely to have more significant role. Another option is that respective EU official documentation exist but it is classified due to its sensitive character. In both described cases such kind of information exchange is not visible for regular citizens, which may explain the outcomes of current survey.

Described model has also some limitations. Despite to the fact that documents data downloaded from Eur Lex environment included list of used descriptors and separate field explaining essence of the documents, it is not enough to conduct deeper analyse. For this purpose another methodology has to be set up.

Another limitation is related to the initiators of the published documents. Although separately Members of the European Parliament are not having influence over decision making, author took calculated risk and left into the selected data also written questions of MEPs to the EU institutions and the answers to them. This form of information

exchange reflects the possible change in MEPs interest to the CSDP and at the same time EU institutions official statements about CSDP are represented. Additionally, as long as number of directly defence- and common armed forces related documents remained modest, author did not conduct deep analyses from the aspect of ordinary legislative procedure. While keeping MEP´s questions included, it provided wider overview about the public discourse concerning to the surveyed topic.

CONCLUSION

The current thesis has evaluated the status of the European Union military cooperation in the framework of Common Security and Defence policy. Specifically the focus was on the possibility of creation of European Common Armed Forces/European Army as permanent military force in the framework of CSDP as the next step of federalization. The author finds there are several reasons why current formats of cooperation should be extended and made more efficient. Two main components of the thesis were set up.

Firstly, from the point of theorists and from the practical aspects, the current state of EU military cooperation was explained and assessed. The aim of this supportive part of the thesis was to provide background information about CSDP. Secondly, survey of the EU official publicly available documentation was conducted with the aim to find out if due to the worsening security situation within the EU and its neighbourhood the number of CSDP related documents has changed significantly. The idea of conducting such a survey originates from the public discourse about the possible need to create the European Army. Several high level EU and member states' officials have expressed their opinions for and against this idea. The author's assumption was that if such an exchange of thoughts is taking place publicly, the same tendency may occur also in the EU public official documentation. Even though the changing dynamics within EU official documentation cannot be interpreted as a direct proof of progressing towards deepening cooperation between member states, it may be considered as indirect evidence of the existence of political will on the EU level.

Based on the theoretical overview it can be concluded that there is no common understanding among scholars, about the reasoning, the nature and significance of the creation and evolution of CSDP with its military component included. According to different authors, the main obstacles for moving further are: lack of political will to make military aspect of CSDP act effectively; lack of coordination between participating member states; insufficient availability of critical assets and unequal contribution to the defense. In addition, the diversity of national interests and priorities makes it challenging to put current forms of cooperation to work more efficiently. Also scholars agree that there are no significant indications of having plans for deepening military cooperation or progressing towards a standing European Army.

Despite the criticism from scholars, one cannot deny the fact that progress on the field of common defence and common armed forces is made. Creation of EU institutions like European Union Military Staff, European Defence Agency, EUROCORPS and EU Battle Groups have created the basis for developing more complex and wide-range forms of military cooperation. Also common military culture is created and such cooperation is constantly ongoing on real life operations overseas and in the format of Battle Groups. It provides a theoretical platform for further enlargement of military cooperation.

The main component of the thesis was the presentation of the conducted document analyses. With the purpose to have a closer look at the security and defence aspects of the CSDP, a survey of the EU official publicly available documentation was accomplished. It covered timeframes 2009 – 2015 and included 2290 original documents published in Eur Lex web-database. As the main outcome, the analyses did not indicate a significant change of dynamics throughout the surveyed period. There was a raise in the number documents in the end of 2013 and the first half of 2014, but in 2015 the number went down almost to the pre-crisis level.

From this it can be concluded that the changing security environment in the EU and its neighborhood has not caused a significant raise in the numbers of the topic related documents. The analysis of the use of official terms indicated that most of the used terms remained the same. The difference is that in 2014 – 2015 terms "Ukraine", "Russia", "territorial dispute" and "political reform" appeared to the documentation. At the same time it is important to note that the documents consisting these terms, belonged to the domain "International affairs" and were not linked to the military aspect of the CSDP.

In the author's opinion, possible explanations to such outcomes of the survey could be related to the domination of the intergovernmentalism and/or to the fact that security and defence, as sensitive domains of the functioning of the EU and its member states, is kept classified by the EU institutions and EU member states. The idea of ruling intergovernmentalism is supported by the practice used during the Greek financial crisis. Solutions were created by the more influential and capable member states and the role of EU institutions remained modest. Parallely, it could be suggested that the aspects of military cooperation largely depend on Germany, France, UK and Poland and they are not eager to make the details publicly known.

Still, in the author's personal opinion in order to proceed with the idea of common armed forces, at first the idea has to be "sold" to the internal electorates in EU member states. Which means that conclusions made on the results of analyses of public EU documentations are likely to reflect the real situation in short term perspective. In long term there is the possibility that ideas, plans and agreements concerning the European Army, which are currently classified, will appear to public discourse and documentation in the future.

Based on conclusions of the conducted survey and academic discourse, it can be summed up that despite some progress made in the framework of CSDP, it is not likely that in the near future there will be any significant progress made towards creation of common armed forces/European army.

While taking into consideration the federalization process of the EU; progress made in the framework of CSDP; increased power of supranational institutions; changed security architecture of the continental Europe and raised speculations about the need to introduce EU federal armed forces, further studies about the EU common military co-operation and perspectives of having the European Army are required. Albeit current study of EU official documentation is not indicating a significant change in creation of the European Army, it would be worthwhile to study further the changes in public rhetoric in the future.

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APPENDICES

EUROVOC full list of Official Defence related vocabulary

TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE	TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE
air base	military base	chemical weapon	
aircraft carrier		civilian personnel	
air force		combat aircraft	fighter aircraft
alternative service		combat helicopter	
anti-missile defence		combat plane	fighter aircraft
anti-missile missile	anti-missile defence	combat vehicle	
anti-personnel landmine	anti-personnel weapon	conscientious objection	
anti-personnel mine	anti-personnel weapon	conscientious objector	conscientious objection
anti-personnel weapon		conventional weapon	
anti-satellite system	space-based weapons	defence budget	
APL	anti-personnel weapon	defence expenditure	
armed forces		defence policy	
armed services	armed forces	defence programme	defence policy
armoured vehicle	combat vehicle	defence statistics	
arms	military equipment	department of intelligence	secret service
arms delivery	arms supply	desertion	military discipline
arms industry		deterrent	
arms policy		deterrent force	deterrent
arms sales	arms trade	Echelon	espionage
arms supply		espionage	
arms trade		European armaments cooperation	European arms policy
arms trafficking	arms trade	European arms policy	
artillery	conventional weapon	European defence policy	
art of war	military science	failure to report for duty	
atom bomb	nuclear weapon	fighter aircraft	
atomic bomb	nuclear weapon	fighter plane	fighter aircraft
atomic weapon	nuclear weapon	firearms and munitions	
bacteriological weapon	biological weapon	first-strike capacity	deterrent
ballistic missile		fleet air arm	warships
banned weapon	prohibited weapon	forces abroad	
battle fleet	warships	foreign base	military base
battleship	warships	ground forces	land forces
biological weapon		guided missile	
bomber		harmonisation of weapons	
border police	paramilitary force	harmonization of weapons	harmonisation of weapons

TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE	TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE
hydrogen bomb	nuclear weapon	naval base	military base
incendiary weapon		navy	
intercontinental missile		neutron bomb	nuclear weapon
IRBM	ballistic missile	non-lethal weapon	
JOAC	European arms policy	nuclear bomb	nuclear weapon
Joint Organisation for Armaments Cooperation	European arms policy	nuclear device	nuclear weapon
land forces		nuclear missile	missile
land mine	anti-personnel weapon	nuclear weapon	
laser weapon		OCCAR	European arms policy
legion	armed forces	paramilitary force	
martial law	military law	professional army	
mercenary		prohibited weapon	
military	armed forces	rapid reaction force	
military adviser	forces abroad	rearmament	
military aeronautics	military aircraft	reserve army	
military aircraft		Royal Air Force	air force
military base		Royal Navy	navy
military base abroad	military base	scout plane	military aircraft
military budget	defence budget	SDI	strategic defence
military discipline		secret service	
military equipment		security forces	paramilitary force
military expenditure	defence expenditure	space-based weapons	
military law		star wars	strategic defence
military manoeuvres		stationing of forces	
military material	military equipment	stockpiling of weapons	
military personnel		strategic defence	
military police	paramilitary force	Strategic Defence Initiative	strategic defence
military programme	defence policy	strategic nuclear arms system	strategic nuclear weapon
military science		strategic nuclear weapon	
military secret		submarine	
military service	national service	subsurface-to-surface missile	guided missile
military training		surface-to-surface missile	guided missile
militia	armed forces	tactical nuclear weapon	
MIRV	guided missile	tactical weapon	tactical nuclear weapon
missile		tank	combat vehicle
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle	guided missile	TNW	tactical nuclear weapon
napalm	incendiary weapon	troop transport plane	military aircraft
national defence	defence policy	voluntary military service	
national service		volunteer	voluntary military service
naval air forces	warships	war aviation	military aircraft

TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE
war material	military equipment
warships	
weapon	military equipment
weapon of mass destruction	
women's military service	

EUROVOC selected list of Official Defence related vocabulary

TERMS (PT-NPT)	ALTERNATE
armed forces	
armed services	armed forces
arms policy	
defence budget	
defence expenditure	
defence policy	
defence programme	defence policy
European armaments cooperation	European arms policy
European arms policy	
European defence policy	
ground forces	land forces
land forces	
military budget	defence budget
military expenditure	defence expenditure
military law	
military programme	defence policy
military service	national service
military training	
national defence	defence policy
national service	
OCCAR	European arms policy
professional army	
rapid reaction force	
rearmament	
strategic defence	

ÜHTNE JULGEOLEKU- JA KAITSEPOLIITIKA NING ÜHISRELVAJÕUD/ EUROOPA ARMEE EUROOPA LIIDU AMETLIKUS DOKUMENTATSIOONIS 2009 – 2015

Peeter Einbaum

Kokkuvõte

Alates Euroopa ühenduste loomisest 1950´ndatel aastatel, on võimaliku riikide ühiskaitse teema mitut puhku esile kerkinud. Altiero Spinelli nägi juba toona ühiseid relvajõude rahvusülese eraldiseisva organisatsioonina, mis koosnenuks rahvuste baasil loodud väeüksustes ning omanuks eraldiseisvat rahastust (Salmon 2003: 22).[88] Koos Euroopa Kaitseühenduse ebaõnnestumisega 1954 anti käest esimene võimalus ühisrelvajõudude loomiseks.

Idee kerkis esile uuesti 1990´ndatel, kui Jugoslaavias puhkes sõda. Sel ajal oli EL liikmeriikidel kokku enam kui 2,000 000 sõdurit, kuid puudus raamistik nende ühiseks kasutamiseks (Major and Mölling 2010: 12).[89] Sellest alates on Euroopa Ühiskaitse idee teinud läbi märkimisväärse arengu. Seda nii läbi raamlepingutega võetud solidaarsuskohustuse, Petersberg´i ülesannete kui ka reaalselt EL poolt läbi viidud sõjaliste operatsioonide. Oluline on märkida, et EL liikmesriigid on läbi Euroopa Välis- ja Julgeoleku poliitika formaadi delegeerinud osaliselt EL tasandile ka kaitse- ja julgeoleku valdkonna, mida traditsiooniliselt on peetud riikide suveräänsuse alustalaks ning osaks „kõrgpoliitikast".

Magistritöö autor näeb täiendavat vajadust laiendada olemasolevat sõjalise koostöö formaati. Selle põhjuseks on muutunud julgeoleku arhitektuur Euroopas tervikuna, esile kerkinud uued asümmeetrilised ohud terrorismi näol ning ka käimasolev rändekriis. Täiendavaks ajendiks võib pidada teatavat ebakindlust, mis on seotud USA, kui NATO suurima reaalse sõjalise jõu, võimaliku poliitikamuutusega ning raskuspunkti võimaliku kandumisega Indo Hiina regiooni tasakaalustamaks Hiina kasvavat ekspansiivset ambitsiooni. Hetkel käimasolevate USA presidendivalimiste kampaania lõpptulemina ei

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[88] Salmon, T-C. (2003), *Toward a European army: a military power in the making?*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2003.

[89] Major, C. and Mölling, C. (2010), EU Military capabilities – some European troops, but not yet a European Army. In: E. Greco, N. Pirozzi and S. Silvestri, ed. *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali., pp. 11 – 28.

ole välistatud riigi poliitika ülalmainitud suunamuutus. Nii on väidetud, et USA sõjaline kohalolek Euroopas ei ole vääramatult garanteeritud.[90]

Lisaks ülalmainitud põhjustele lisab ühiste relvajõudude efektiivsuse tõstmiseks vajadust Vene Föderatsiooni agressiivne käitumine. Kui Vene Föderatsioon on demonstreerinud maailmale läbi õppuste ja reaalse sõjalise sekkumise, oma võimet kiiresti suuri väeüksuseid pikkade vahemaade taha liigutada, siis samaaegselt on EL näidanud avalikkusele oma aeglast otsuseprotsessi. Nii on olnud reageerimine Kreeka võlakriisile ja ka rändekriisile aeglane ning ebaefektiivne. Samaaegselt nimetatud ebaefektiivsusele on EL seadnud endale eesmärgiks saada usaldusväärseks rahu tagajaks (ka sõjaliste meetmetega) globaalses mastaabis. Selles valguses oleks vaja tõsta ühisrelvajõudude varustatust ning erinevaid võimekusi ning lihtsustada nende esmast rakendamist ka kriisi puhkemisel EL territooriumil. Sarnast loogikat on oma ettepanekutes esitanud ka rida kõrgeid EL ja ka liikmesriikide ametnikke, eesotsas Euroopa Komisjoni Presidendi Jean Claude Juncker´iga, kes tõstatas avalikkuses vajaduse luua Euroopa armee.

Võttes aluseks kirjeldatud taustinformatsiooni, seadis magistritöö autor eesmärgi uurida lähemalt senist EL koostööd Ühtse Kaitse- ja Julgeolekupoliitika raames. Lisaks sellele viidi läbi EL ametlike avalikult kättesaadavate dokumentide analüüs, eesmärgiga tuvastada võimalik dünaamika muutus dokumentides, mis on seotud Ühtse Kaitse- ja Julgeolekupoliitikaga perioodil 2009 - 2015. Samuti uuriti, kuidas on muutunud dokumentides kasutatav ametlik terminoloogia eelkõige Ukraina kriisi mõjul.

Iseloomustamaks senist sõjalise koostöö arengut EL Ühtse Kaitse- ja Julgeolekupoliitika raames, on võimalik esile tuua mitmeid aspekte. Positiivsena arenguna võib nimetada juriidilise raamistiku loomist rahuotstarbeliste sõjaliste missioonide läbiviimiseks ning ühise militaarkultuuri tekkimist läbi reaalsete ühiste sõjaliste operatsioonide ning -ühisõppuste EL Lahingugruppide formaadis. Kriitikud on aga rõhutanud probleemseid valdkondi, mis puudutavad eelkõige üksuste kättesaadavust, nende varustatust ning kriitiliste väevõimete puudujääke, mis on muutnud EL liikmesriikide poolt püstitatud eesmärgid sõjalised eesmärgid ebarealistlikuks. Üldistatuna on võimalik väita, et

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[90] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2003), The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: a policy without substance?, *European Security, 12:1, 39-63.*

erinevad liikmesriigid näevad Ühtset Julgeoleku- ka Kaitsepoliitika (ÜJKP) eesmärke erinevalt ning puudub üldine poliitiline tahe panna see efektiivselt toimima. Selle tulemina on küll olemas võimekus läbi viia väikese mastaabiga sõjalisi missioone, kuid nii nende varustatus kui ka mandaat ei toeta piisavalt Ühtse Välis- ja Julgeoleku Poliitika eesmärkide täitmist.

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