

MATTHEW L. KALKMAN

Enlightened Sovereignty:  
A Postsecular Semiotic 'Image of God'





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A Postsecular Semiotic 'Image of God'



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Supervisors: Assoc Prof Thomas-Andreas Põder (University of Tartu)  
Assoc Prof Valerio Fabbrizi (University of Rome ‘Tor Vergata’)

Reviewers: Prof Andrzej Wiercinski (University of Warsaw)  
Prof Mario Ricca (Roma Tre University)

Opponent: Prof Andrzej Wiercinski (University of Warsaw)

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND PREFACE

I would like to begin with – and not leave until the end – the thanking of the person who truly made this work possible, my wife and holy grail, Marie Kalkman. It was only with her love, guidance, and support that I have been able to devote the time and resources to this project. During this process she has given birth and nurtured new life not just once, but twice in the last few years that these words were being put down on paper. Through the manifestation of that love and care, I would like to thank our three children who have made every day a grand adventure: Victoria, William and Ian. I would also like to thank my parents and siblings who have provided me with so much opportunity and so many cherished memories that it is ultimately a debt I will only be able to pay forward.

This genesis of this work came about all at once, and yet through a lifetime of questions seeking answers. In many ways its beginning can be traced to the time when I was a child listening to my grandfather tell me in Anne Frank's house about how his own parents hid a woman of Jewish descent (whom they did not know previously) in their home in World War II. My grandfather recounted that he only had the ability of a nervous laugh – to withhold from lying – when the Gestapo came into his house to ask if they were hiding anyone. His newly adopted 'Aunt' Ina (real name Catharina Kuijper) only stood feet away. Fortunately for him they interpreted this to mean they had asked such an absurd question, or I might not exist, and these words never written. My own existence then in a way depended entirely on the key ethical question at university – whether lying is acceptable to save a life in the context of WWII.

While my grandfather was the son of a Reformed Reverend he made sure to let us know that during the hardest part of the war – while the Netherlands was experiencing a famine – the Catholic Priest in his village provided his family with food, and he would never forget that act of humanity in the most difficult of circumstances. My own mother's interest in culture, language and religion around the world only deepened this respect for diverse experiences and beliefs. Watching her complete her master's in psychology by undertaking a study on meaning in life and life satisfaction in India introduced me to the Indic religions. To counter-balance those diverse religious perspectives, certainly the scientific rationalism read through this work comes straight from my father and his large humanitarian heart and secular leaning. As with all motivations then, they are guided at their deepest roots from the foundational interactions of family and childhood environments.

This lingering question of human dignity has been the background motivation throughout my education. These questions are what led me to law school. While in final year of law school, the more practical harm caused from the financial crisis of 2008 was engulfing the world, and so I went to the London School of Economics to understand our global financial system and what changes could be in place for a system to function not only for the sovereignty of individuals now, but sustainably over time. This effort led to writing a book on New Liberalism that sought to extend sovereignty across time with its concept of timeless freedom.

Both in my personal life and globally then, the 21st century seemed secure in Francis Fukuyama's vision of The End of History. Scientific materialism and

deductive logic seemed to have answered life's deepest questions. However, hidden underneath this success, there were gnawing problems that started to appear in disparate fields: from Gödel's Incompleteness; to the Linguistic Turn; to post-modern discourse. The dominion of reason and science was under threat. This is when I recognized a fundamental contradiction at the heart of western Enlightenment thinking which could be read through the work of John Locke. The west was meant to only trust knowledge that could be seen, tasted and touched; yet its entire political system was built on a notion of sovereignty and human rights that drew its foundation from that which is invisible: humanity's reflection in the Image of God. Far from being an abstract contradiction, its very answer dictates whether power alone can remove this dignity, or if there is a moral foundation that runs deeper.

While I did not yet have a solution, I knew that a possible answer seemed to lay within the field of religion and semiotics. This drew me naturally to the global headquarters of semiotics: Tartu. Fortunately there was a scholar at this leading semiotics institution who recognized that religion and semiotics was a field needing development and for the last several years I have gained a great friendship with my supervisor Thomas-Andreas Pöder. Together we would co-chair three panels at Juri Lotman's centennial conference, and co-edit the first special edition of Sign Systems Studies focused on religion. As the home of the singing revolution, one of the most secular populations, and its intriguing history being one of the last states to be converted to Christianity in Europe through the efforts of crusaders Tartu has been a fertile ground for postsecular thinking. Further, as a city that has found itself at the periphery of several major empires, it has lived Juri Lotman's theories of cultural translation.

While Tartu gained its strength from its position at the periphery, Rome conversely gained its strength from being right at the center of religion and politics. Italy has produced several key authors cited in this work, from Giambattista Vico to Umberto Eco to Alessandro Ferrara. Here, Alessandro Ferrara's work on authenticity and exemplarity has proven particularly important. The University of Rome Tor Vergata is in fact home to The Center for the Study of Religion and Politics in Postsecular Society. I would especially like to thank my supervisor Valerio Fabbrizi, whose support has made this dream possible. This is an auspicious year in Rome to complete my PhD, for it is the Jubilee, the year of the Holy Door.

I would like to thank my two reviewers – Andrzej Wiercinski and Mario Ricca – for devoting their time and energy to reading through and providing the support to this monograph. I would also like to thank Terrence Deacon at UC Berkeley, who invited me to teach the History of Semiotics in his class, who co-authored an article 'Evolution as Inference' set to be published by MIT Press, and invited me to his private seminars with great colleagues I am ever indebted to.

Thank you finally to you, the reader, for providing my temporal dialogue partner in this journey of making sense of this shared reality we all inhabit.

*- Matthew Kalkman*

## ABSTRACT

The Age of Enlightenment was born out of a contradiction stemming from the work of one of its leading figures; John Locke. On the one hand, Locke argued forcefully for the position that acceptable social knowledge should only be confined to what is visible; what can be sensed and experienced in day-to-day life. This is the school of empiricism. Yet, at the very same time, John Locke devised a political philosophy around the notion that individual sovereignty and human rights proceeds from something invisible – the notion that all people are created in the ‘Image of God’. This tension of the visible and invisible found through his work echoes into this postsecular age.

The reason for this monograph is therefore to help ease this tension. This work seeks to fill the gap in literature by trying to understand what elements of the ‘Image of God’ – viewed symbolically – can still help to ground sovereignty and human rights even where church and state are by definition separated. This research question, which is focused on symbolism, therefore requires the use of a methodology stemming from the field studying signs and symbols – semiotics. More specifically an embodied semiotics that incorporates teleodynamics and ideal eternal history.

Ultimately, it will be shown that there is in fact a dynamic and hierarchical process of semiosis and knowledge formation that can help illuminate the underlying process that can ground sovereignty and human rights in this postsecular age. Key terms to describe this underlying process of theosemiosis include: the eye of justice; altricial gaze; transformative authenticity; recursive ‘Self’; emergent exemplarity; zeroness; golden eternity clause; and, anaduction.

## KOKKUVÕTE

Valgustusajastu sündis vastuolust, mis tulenes ühe selle juhtiva mõtleja John Locke'i töödest. Ühelt poolt väitis Locke jõuliselt, et vastuvõetav sotsiaalne teadmine peaks piirduma vaid nähtavaga – sellega, mida saab tajuda ja kogeda igapäevaelus. See on empirismi koolkond. Samas töötas Locke välja poliitfilosoofia, mis tugineb arusaamale, et üksikisiku suveräänsus ja inimõigused tulenevad millestki nähtamatust – ideest, et kõik inimesed on loodud „jumalanäolisena“ (*imago Dei*). See nähtava ja nähtamatu pinge, mis läbib tema loomingut, kajab edasi ka praegusel postsekulaarsel ajastul.

Käesoleva monograafia eesmärk on aidata seda pinget leevendada. See uurimus täidab teaduskirjanduses esinevat lünka, püüdes mõista, millised – sümbolina tõlgendatud – „jumalanäolisuse“ elemendid võivad jätkuvalt aidata põhjendada suveräänsust ja inimõigusi isegi olukorras, kus kirik ja riik on definitsiooni järgi lahutatud. Et uurimisküsimus keskendub sümbolile, läheb vaja metodoloogiat kasutamist, mis pärineb märkide ja sümbolite uurimise valdkonnast – semiootikast. Täpsemalt rakendab uurimus kehapõhist semiootikat, mis hõlmab teleodünaamikat ja ideaalset igavest ajalugu.

Lõppkokkuvõttes näitab uurimus, et semioosi ja teadmise kujunemine on dünaamiline ja hierarhiline protsess, mis aitab selgitada seda aluseks olevat protsessi, millele saab rajada suveräänsuse ja inimõigused postsekulaarsel ajastul. Selle aluseks oleva protsessi – teosemioosi – kirjeldamiseks kasutatakse mõisteid nagu õigluse silm, altrisiaalne (abivajav) pilk, transformeeriv autentsus, rekursiivne „mina“, emergeeruv eeskujulikkus, nullsus, kuldse igaviku klausel ning anaduktsioon.

## RIASSUNTO

L'età dei Lumi nasce da una contraddizione interna al pensiero di uno dei suoi principali protagonisti: John Locke. Da un lato, Locke sostenne con forza che la conoscenza sociale legittima dovesse limitarsi a ciò che è visibile, a ciò che può essere percepito ed esperito nella vita quotidiana – il principio fondativo dell'empirismo. Dall'altro lato, egli elaborò una filosofia politica basata sull'idea che la sovranità individuale e i diritti umani derivino da qualcosa di invisibile: il presupposto che tutti gli esseri umani siano creati “a immagine di Dio”. Questa tensione fra visibile e invisibile, inscritta nel suo pensiero, risuona potentemente anche in questa epoca post-secolare.

Lo scopo della presente monografia è contribuire ad alleviare tale tensione. Il vuoto teorico che essa intende colmare riguarda la comprensione di quali elementi dell'“Imago Dei” – considerata in senso simbolico – possano ancora offrire un fondamento concettuale alla sovranità e ai diritti umani anche laddove Chiesa e Stato risultano, per definizione, separati. La questione di ricerca, centrata sulla dimensione simbolica, richiede pertanto una metodologia derivata dallo studio dei segni e dei simboli: la semiotica. Più precisamente, si adotta un approccio di semiotica incarnata, che integra i concetti di teleodinamica e di storia ideale eterna.

Si dimostrerà, in ultima analisi, che esiste un processo dinamico e gerarchico di semiosi e di formazione della conoscenza capace di illuminare il meccanismo sottostante che può fornire un nuovo fondamento alla sovranità e ai diritti umani nell'epoca post-secolare. I termini-chiave che descrivono tale processo di teo-semiosi comprendono: l'occhio della giustizia, lo sguardo altriciale, l'autenticità trasformativa, il Sé ricorsivo, l'esemplarità emergente, la nullità (zeroness) e l'anaduzione.

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# INTRODUCTION

Imaginative universals [from Giambattista Vico work on the *Imago Dei*] may well prove to be an essential concept in creating a theoretical model of the primary level of human thought – and semiotics the discipline that is able to integrate it most usefully into current research mediating between the philosophical and cognitive scientific perspectives.

- Tuuli Pern<sup>1</sup>

Every ‘great mystery’ begins with a death...

In 1882 the most devastating death of all was reported. One that would unalterably rattle the world and continue to shake it to this day. ‘We have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?’<sup>2</sup> We have killed none other than God himself. His death was revealed to the world by the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche who noticed growing disbelief in those traditions that once served as the bedrock of culture. Nietzsche’s thesis was that God’s death would lead to a creeping meaninglessness and nihilism in society. Its citizens uprooted without objective moral values to live by. A meaninglessness that has now arguably called into question the very notions of human rights and individual sovereignty that are formalized at the bedrock of international law. For in a meaningless universe with relative values, how can human life universally be considered sacred – with inherent dignity and value? Due to this fact, “good reasons might appear for cultural semiotics to revisit the sign ‘God’ and to pay careful and critical attention to its occurrences and uses.”<sup>3</sup>

Legal philosopher Michael Perry sees it as a threat to the very future of the moral foundation of rights themselves for “The growing marginalization of religious belief in many societies ... may leave those societies bereft of the intellectual resources to sustain the morality of human rights”.<sup>4</sup> To go further, Yale Professor Nicholas Wolterstorff has said that “It is impossible to develop a secular account of human dignity adequate for grounding human rights. Or to speak more cautiously: given that, after many attempts, no one has succeeded in developing such an account, it seems unlikely that it can be done”.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Tuuli Pern, “Vico’s Potential in Semiotics: The Imaginative Universal and Its Bodily Roots,” *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 9 (2013): 7, <https://doi.org/10.1515/css-2013-0120>.

<sup>2</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Book III, Section 125

<sup>3</sup> Thomas-Andreas Pöder, “Reflections on Religion and the Status of ‘The Outside’ in the Lotmanian Understanding of Culture,” *Sign Systems Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 249.

<sup>4</sup> Michael J. Perry, “The Morality of Human Rights: A Problem for Nonbelievers?” *Commonweal*, July 14, 2006, 25.

<sup>5</sup> Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Justice: Rights and Wrongs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 325.

Regina Ammicht-Quinn believes it is already too late as “the predominantly religious structures which provided the foundation of the concept of dignity, creatureliness and being in the image of God are no longer compellingly binding or even illuminating in the secular world”.<sup>6</sup> Further, that “the postulate that all human life is holy no longer exists.”<sup>7</sup> Without a viable foundation Jeremy Bentham would feel justified in his belief that natural rights are ‘nonsense upon stilts’.<sup>8</sup> A critical question then becomes how the religious foundation of human rights can survive in this ‘meaningless universe’ and secular and post-secular socio-political era.

This is no trivial question, as the twentieth century showed with devastating consequences the power of the state to terrorize and mass murder its own citizens by dehumanizing and degrading its chosen scapegoats. The victims of Auschwitz, Rwanda, Bosnia and the millions of others murdered in genocides this past century all have a story to tell. Its solution must lay upon a moral foundation. The alternative is to accept that human rights and human value have no moral basis, persisting merely as political-legal constructions. In the language of John Rawls, this political construction would be based on mere prudence, pragmatism and what he termed a *modus vivendi*. These are constructions that have no greater weight and authority than whoever is in power at the time. Which would mean that it can be swept aside by anyone with their hands on the lever, no matter how inhumane or unjust.

A twisted dictator’s dream could then become the nightmare of untold millions. It could be argued that the dreams of political theologians and philosophers have caused and advanced the greatest ways of life, and conversely the worst horrors ever produced. The totalitarianism that can be read through the works of Plato, Thomas Hobbes, Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt and Karl Marx all hid behind a veil of intellectual inquiry. The Philosopher King, the Divine Monarch, the *Übermensch*, the Dictator, and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In fact, political theology that becomes rationalized as political philosophy and hardened into political ideology is seemingly the cause of the worst nightmares of the 21st century.

A moral foundation is therefore necessary for human rights to persist as viable legal instruments. The original moral foundation stemmed directly from the works of John Locke who brought in the fact that God created humans to survive

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<sup>6</sup> Regina Ammicht-Quinn, “Whose Dignity Is Inviolable? Human Beings, Machines and the Discourse of Dignity,” in *Concilium 2003/2: The Discourse of Human Dignity*, ed. Regina Ammicht-Quinn, Maureen Junkwer-Kerry, and Elsa Tamez, 40 (2003).

<sup>7</sup> Regina Ammicht-Quinn, “Whose Dignity Is Inviolable? Human Beings, Machines, and the Discourse of Dignity,” in *Concilium 2003/2: The Discourse of Human Dignity*, ed. Regina Ammicht-Quinn, Maureen Junkwer-Kerry, and Elsa Tamez, 40 (2003). The quote that “the postulate that all human life is holy no longer exists” was made by Peter Singer, quoted in *Der Spiegel*, Nov. 25, 2001.

<sup>8</sup> William Sweet, “Bentham, Jeremy,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed June 11, 2018, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham/>.

and thrive. Requiring at the very minimum a freedom over life, liberty and property that were natural rights which could never be handed over to the government. Within these claims was an argument of humanity that stems from John Locke's declared religious belief that all humans were created in the Image of God. As the father of Liberalism, and the school of Empiricism John Locke interestingly laid the framework for a political and epistemological system that has increased the argument for a secular society removed from religion, and yet the very foundations of this moral society stem from the religious notion of humanity's divine spark.

The fundamental issue for human rights is that society is now entering the postsecular age whereby the rational foundations of the Enlightenment no longer hold in relation to postmodernist, and resurgent religious narratives. Further, the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein has cemented the linguistic turn, whereby the universality of language is questioned in the face of its relativistic frames of games of reference. Without a religious, or a secular foundation for human rights then, how do they survive in the 21st century?

As Alessandro Ferrara notes, the focus in this era has shifted "from the classical question 'How is it generally possible that from the chaotic interweaving of individual actions a social order emerges, stabilizes and reproduces itself over the subsequent generations?'"<sup>9</sup> Now it has moved on "to the new and more specific question: 'How can post-traditional societies, no longer cemented by a homogenous horizon of shared meanings, avoid the fate of disintegrating in a kind of ceaseless confrontation that gradually reverts back to the war of all against all?'"<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the issue of grounding has an even further complexity in that in a post-secular age the foundation can not only appeal to a secular vision, but must find an overlapping consensus with all other reasonable comprehensive views – be they religious, economic or political.

The current work will seek to sketch out a proposal to this issue utilizing a model of theosemiosis that extends the work of Thomas-Andreas Pöder and Claudia Welz as it is applied to a framework of political philosophy constructed by John Locke, John Rawls, Alessandro Ferrara, Valerio Fabbrizi, and Matteo Bianchin. It will ground the model in biology and physics through the biosemiotic frame of Terrence Deacon and Kalevi Kull, *il lume naturale* of Charles Peirce and Galileo Galilei, and the text of Pythagoras, Carl Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, and Juri Lotman. It will further be rooted in the imaginative universal of Giambattista Vico, and Tuuli Pern/Raudla and the tropes of Agrippa and Kenneth Burke.

In the journal *Sign Systems Studies* a special edition was produced that focused on Religion in the Semiosphere. Within that specific publication a model of theosemiosis was proposed that suggested how an omniscient perspective is needed in situations of novelty to extract new pragmatic actions that could help a praxis continue and evolve. This model sought to show the connection between systems of logic, epistemology, ontology, and the coincidence of opposites. The

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<sup>9</sup> A. Ferrara, "The Idea of a Social Philosophy," *Constellations* 9 (2002): 422.

<sup>10</sup> Ferrara, "The Idea of a Social Philosophy," 422.

aim was to show how a single process is involved in extracting meaning in novel contexts. This is akin to the distinction between accommodation and assimilation in the Piagetian model. In the current work, the aim is to show how political philosophy itself can best be seen to model itself around this process. This will be done by overlapping theosemiosis with Alessandro Ferrara's judgment view of justice.

Further, the work 'New Liberalism' by the present author sought to explore the key question of how to ensure that freedom is protected for future generations.<sup>11</sup> This has found its equivalent in Rawlsian literature through the work of Alessandro Ferrara in his model of Sovereignty Across Generations that aims to develop a theory of vertical reciprocity ensuring freedom and equality for 'the People' who live not only today but in the future as well. The incorporation of time is leading to a need for a model of liberalism that goes beyond the political and towards the dynamic; a dynamic liberalism. Further, in the work on the Responsibility to Protect, the present author has sought to show how questions of sovereignty have dramatically shifted over the last hundred years to the point where individual sovereignty is recognized over and above that of the state.<sup>12</sup> Each of these works have exposed the need for exploring sovereignty across generations and state borders in a way that human value is grounded – both as a symbolic and natural species.

## **Overview, Positioning and Formulation: Imaginary Reason and Omni Science Perspective**

Francis Fukuyama famously stated that liberalism had proven so successful that it was now the End of History.<sup>13</sup> However, the linguistic turn, and the collapse of formal logic as a foundation of knowledge due to Godel's Incompleteness Theorem have all led to the questioning of reason and science being the only pillars of the enlightenment. By unpacking the symbol involved in the notion of the 'Image of God' – as it has been interpreted by Philo and utilized by Giambattista Vico – this work will shed light on how imagination and perspective can aim to be restored to the Enlightenment alongside reason and science. The outcome will be an ethics that is no longer centered around an autonomous, disconnected and disembodied rationality. Instead, it will reground an ethics and political philosophy that properly reincorporates the physical and mental reality of an interconnected and embodied society that have adapted and evolved to the gaze of their caregivers and have been primed to live amongst strangers in large scale societies.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Matthew Kalkman, *New Liberalism* (Granville Island Publishing, 2011)

<sup>12</sup> Matthew Kalkman, "Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow," *Cambridge Student Law Review* 5 (2009): 75–92.

<sup>13</sup> Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 4.

<sup>14</sup> Ara Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

The fault of Enlightenment 1.0 can perhaps be seen most clearly by one logical error that was legendarily discussed in a car ride between: Albert Einstein; the father of game theory in social sciences and strategic decision making, Oskar Morgenstern; and the individual who developed what has become known as Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, Kurt Gödel. The context of this car ride is that Gödel was set to become a US Citizen, but he was worried about taking the citizenship test. This is not because he was ill prepared, it is because he felt that he noticed a fundamental flaw in the United States Constitution. This fundamental flaw is called Gödel's Loophole and it could be argued to be the symbolic death of Enlightenment 1.0.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem spelled the end of formal logic as a discipline that can be both consistent and complete at the same time. Gödel's Loophole in the constitutional sense applies the same logic of this paradox of formal logic. What Gödel had noticed is the possibility for the US to transform from a liberal democracy into a dictatorship through the United States Constitution itself. This is due to applying his famous theorem and its paradoxical and dynamic feedback loop of formal logic to the constitution directly in what is known as self-amendment. While it was never confirmed the exact method Gödel had in mind – which is why F. E. Guerra-Pujol called it “one of the great unsolved problems of constitutional law”<sup>15</sup> – Guerra-Pujol argues that it has to do with Article V. This article deals with how the constitution can be amended. The amendment loophole is the Amendment Loop. Article V can be used to apply to Article V itself. This self-referential loop has often been captured in history by the symbol of the snake eating its own tail – the ouroboros.

This means that instead of changing the United States Constitution to end liberal democracy, all one has to do is amend the amendment power to make it easier to amend the constitution. This would enable a power hungry individual to weaken the constitution without having to formally alter the constitution with that stated objective in mind. Within this one little loophole first expressed in a car ride of the most successful scholars in the world at that period of time the first phase of the Enlightenment can be argued to have met its end. It is important to note this story as it highlights the key aspects of grounding an Enlightenment philosophy in the twenty first century that is consistent with physics, biology, and logic and that has been built on a consistent model of interpretation from Philo and Giambattista Vico to unpack the Imago Dei for the postsecular era. A pathway to grounding sovereignty and human rights.

While the ouroboros as a symbol in one sense might mean the end of formal logic as a basis for liberal democracy, on the other end of the tail it also represents rebirth as it opens the door for a dynamic liberalism that is based on the introduction of time and oscillation as expressed in the metaphysics of incompleteness

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<sup>15</sup> F. E. Guerra-Pujol, “Gödel's Loophole,” *Capital University Law Review* 41 (2013): 637–673, retrieved January 20, 2022, via SSRN.

project begun by Terrence Deacon.<sup>16</sup> Self-Amendment is therefore both the end and the beginning of a reborn constitutional order based on liberal democracy that extends beyond static formal logic. It requires grounding constitutionalism in semiosis itself and the relationship of the individual within that process.

Reincorporating time is essential to the next phase of the Enlightenment. This is highlighted in the work of Alessandro Ferrara in *Sovereignty Across Generations*<sup>17</sup> which illuminates the fact that Rawls' key question already highlighted the requirement of the incorporation of 'time' for a constitution to exist beyond a single generation. Here, Rawls' key political question in *Political Liberalism* was "how is it possible that there may exist 'over time' a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?"<sup>18</sup> 'Over time' will prove to be the vital terminology of this question.

Key ingredients that must be added to the mix of reason and science will therefore be shown to be imagination and perspective that can incorporate creative and novel knowledge overtime. The sovereignty of the individual will be shown to be grounded in these physical and dynamical processes that cannot be captured by a static political constitution alone. Most importantly for this work, it will be the intersection where these ideas meet at the level of the imaginative universal, the omni science perspective, and the eye of justice. This will be shown to be the location that the symbol of the Imago Dei points to, and is backed by the latest research of cognitive science of religion scholars to be the foundation for large scale moral political structures.<sup>19</sup> The research in fact suggests the near impossibility of having large scale political structures without the ability of humans to take the omniscient perspective – in terms of the Theory of Mind, not in terms of the theological reality or nonexistence of God (which is not the focus of this work).<sup>20</sup> This location is where Charles Peirce's *Il Lume Naturale* (ur-abduction/creative abductions) connects his vision of semiosis with the broader theme of this work. Ultimately, with a little imagination and a slight change of perspective Gödel's Loophole can serve not only as the end of the Enlightenment, but it's renaissance.

In order to go beyond formal logic, what is 'absent' is what needs to be reincorporated. The fact that a system can be consistent at all is what has led Terrence Deacon to argue the innate incompleteness of nature itself.<sup>21</sup> An incompleteness that can be closely approximated by three dimensions of space-time, but that has

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<sup>16</sup> T. W. Deacon and T. Cashman, "Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness," *Theology and Science* 14, no. 4 (2016): 401–429, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14746700.2016.1231977>.

<sup>17</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Sovereignty Across Generations: Constituent Power and Political Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2023)

<sup>18</sup> John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), XVIII.

<sup>19</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

<sup>20</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

<sup>21</sup> Terrence W. Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012).

been shown by math to more fully require imaginary numbers to express all the near infinite dimensions in which the relationship between what is present and what is absent can interact in the process of geometric and thermodynamic change through time.<sup>22</sup> Calculus itself has required zero and infinity to reincorporate change and dynamism to static numerical units.

This is due to the fact that absence has physical extension. Meaning that it is distinct from nothingness. Where nothingness by definition cannot be described through the use of ‘things’, absence is by definition a thing that is simply currently not present. This distinction means that absence is a semiotic layer of information that can ‘possibly’ be described in the field of Peirce’s secondness – the state of reaction. It also means that it has physical effects even though not material. Absence and nothingness are ultimately distinct concepts that have distinct physical effects. Absence is also key to representation. As Marina Calloni notes, “What does representation mean and what is representation? ... It refers to an image, an individual or an object that provides presence to what is absent.”<sup>23</sup>

Terrence Deacon has shown a pathway to conceptualizing absence as constraints in such a way that the notion of entropy from three distinct fields can start to piece together a dynamic process of semiosis through hierarchical and dynamic process of constraint propagation: Shannon Entropy; Boltzmann Entropy; and Darwin Entropy.<sup>24</sup> The current work builds off of this model by relying upon the fact that dynamic mutual information is physically possible. Deacon has termed this information absential and ententional. This is where a present physical piece of information contains mutual information – over time – that another event will occur whereby what was once absent is now present. Mutual information here is the amount of information that can be gained about one variable by simply knowing information about another variable.

In the context of the current work that absent feature that serves as the foundation for knowledge creation is ‘the Self’. The Self is a recursive identity that has at its core ‘dynamic mutual information’ with a work program that commences when it is not its complete self. The Self is therefore an absential piece of information behind all human action. In semiotic terms, it is a teleodynamic identity.<sup>25</sup> The completion of a self is recursive where the physical work ceases once the boundary of the Self has again been achieved. In honor of this historical development a new form of entropy will be utilized and referred to as Deacon Entropy. It will be shown that whereas Darwinian entropy applies to third-order mutual information that is recursive, contrarily, Deacon entropy is related with third-order mutual information that is not recursive. However, Shannonian

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<sup>22</sup> Deacon and Cashman, “Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness,” 401–429.

<sup>23</sup> Marina Calloni, “Women and the Italian Television: The End of an Alliance,” paper presented at the conference *The East and the West: Women in the Eyes of the Media*, organized by Resetdoc, Doha, April 19, 2009, September 21, 2009.

<sup>24</sup> Terrence Deacon, “Shannon – Boltzmann – Darwin: Redefining Information (Part I),” *Cognition & Semiotics* (Bern) 2007, no. 15: 123–148.

<sup>25</sup> Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter*.

redundancy enables its survival over time and complementarity allows for novel recursion through an emergent unit. In this direct sense sovereignty is grounded in Deacon entropy.

Through static mutual information connecting the Self to homeostasis it therefore becomes possible to combine the key insights from Charles Peirce and his categories of Being, with information theory, thermodynamics and evolution. However, the process of novelty takes each of these fields one step further in producing a hierarchical and dynamic process of semiosis due to the fact that in the case of novelty, noise and not signal becomes key for information theory. In a hierarchical and dynamic semiosis physical constraints and not just physical work becomes key. Lastly, in regards to evolution it is not simply natural selection, but novel symbiosis that is key to emergence. Here it is adaptation as its own category separate from firstness that needs to be distinguished from fitness. Adaptation as a category seen as one relating to environmental change and fitness to environmental stability.

Ultimately, it is absence that makes room for the physical effects of imagination. It further allows the process of constraints that enables what will be known as the ‘altricial gaze’ – the notion that humans evolve to their parents gaze – to serve as a layer of constraint on imagination. A layer of constraint that becomes a physical and biological catalyst which can make the improbable highly probable. What is highly improbable? The fact that humans can treat strangers as neighbours. However, priming the ‘altricial gaze’ – the Eye of Justice – acts as a catalyst for such a feat.<sup>26</sup> It must be remembered that catalysts do not perform a physically impossible task – only improbable – and this is the space that allows for the distinct path of human evolution.

This is what allows for a form of emergence that is key for political institutions to harness, the core of a functioning political society, the pathway for continual progress through what will be termed ‘emergent exemplarity’. This combines a key political philosophy concept of the modern era with the scientific notion of emergence, and that incorporates a post secular omniscient perspective grounded in the ‘altricial gaze’. It is ‘emergent exemplarity’ that Giambattista Vico described in his work as that of divine providence. This notion that human history follows an ideal and eternal path towards the *aequum bonum*. Within this postsecular version the epistemological claim is distinguished from the theological claim in order to remain agnostic within the frame required by postsecularism. It does, however, suggest by the very existence of the Theory of Mind and the altricial gaze that humanity does have a projected fate over time as human relations can be primed to evolve in specific ways. Namely, openness to ‘the Other’.

In order to start building this pathway for grounding constitutionalism and liberal democracy in semiosis a starting point can be seeing that at its core, ‘humanity is by nature a cosmic animal’. This is a twist of Philo on the classic

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<sup>26</sup> For instance: Benjamin Grant Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” *Cognition* 129, no. 1 (2013): 163–179, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.010>.

phrase of Aristotle's suggestion that humans are by nature political animals. For Philo noted that humans first began to understand the inner workings of their own mind, by utilizing the metaphor of 'knowing is seeing' to project out their highest intuitions onto the 'mind' of the universe (which will be discussed in more detail in chapters three and four). For this he referred to humans as the celestial animal. This projected map in Philo's interpretation two thousand years ago describes the highest level of intuition – where the greatest ethical calling is found. In the modern era this space is laid out in the work of semiotician Charles Peirce, who called it *Il Lume Naturale*, the natural light, after taking that phrase coined by Galileo Galilei.

This natural light that serves as the core mechanism for all scientific hypotheses, as well as the evolution of all ethics is central to understanding the continuing role the symbol of the *Imago Dei* plays even in a postsecular society that separates religion from the state. In fact, Peirce went so far to say that “Modern science has been builded after the model of Galileo, who founded it, on *il lume naturale*.”<sup>27</sup> In this space science, ethics and religion all converge.

It is this *Il Lume Naturale* that has led humans to continually make the hypothesis that a stranger can be treated as a neighbour under the ever watchful eye of a parental minded universe. A universally shared trait that stems from the altruistic nature of the human species that has sought firstly in its history to grasp through poetic logic an embodied understanding of its environment, and that has over time built a human community around this embodied imaginative universal of the Eye of Justice that scholars in the Cognitive Science of Religion to show as key to large scale political structures based on shared morality amongst strangers.<sup>28</sup> This “single horizon of human understanding, which makes speakers of various languages members of a human community.”<sup>29</sup>

Key to this process is looking at history and human political and social institutions to understand how the human mind has led to this postsecular society, and what it means for sovereignty and human rights moving forward with a societal model that does not allow any God of a particular religion to serve as its political foundation. Here is where Giambattista Vico's astute model of history will come into play. It is the way one interprets the signs that present themselves that dictate the flow of history and the course of events. Whether or not one sees a “Divine legislative mind”<sup>30</sup> human institutions can point to information about the human mind, for as Vico says, “Since men made it, men could come to know it.”<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, *A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* (1908), quoted in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 6, §477.

<sup>28</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

<sup>29</sup> Andrew Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World* (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2019), 9.

<sup>30</sup> Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, ed. Tullio Gregory, trans. David Marsh, [1744] 2000, paragraph 133.

<sup>31</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 331.

A key aspect of the novel information core to this work – and its relationship to logic – is that it relies more on the enthymeme than on the syllogism. An enthymeme is an argument with a hidden premise. In this moment common sense and ur-abductions bordering on faith are required so as to act upon their advice. These enthymemes rely more on imagination and a combination of topics than on critiques and necessity. Enthymemes are key to this work as they are about reasoning from uncertain truths. They are non-syllogistic and utilize linking metaphors of images as the basis of this reasoning. Imagination and fantasy are key here, and can be seen with a history extending back to Aristotle’s *koine aisthesis* – common sense. This is not only individual metaphors, but also the metaphors of the community, what Schaeffer terms a cultural “fund”.<sup>32</sup> This is a cultural store of metaphors understandable by and accessible to its members. They are developed from common sense. This notion will be explored furthest in chapter two.

Ultimately, John Locke produced the two theories that produced a conflict in the heart of western society. One was the notion that society should build its knowledge bank only on what can be perceived: empiricism. However, John Locke also built a model of human rights on individual sovereignty on the religious notion of the invisible God. Within the problem lies the solution. The current work will utilize the key theories that John Locke utilized: semiotics; social contract; natural law; the *Imago Dei* and will. It will update them with the work of current scholars in these fields to show a pathway for these two models to converge on a political theory that can still ground sovereignty and human rights in a postsecular world.

It will require inverting Locke’s focus on presence, as opposed to absence, and the logic of the twenty-first century that has focused on signal, work and selection in information theory; thermodynamics; and evolution theory respectively. This means the focus will instead be on constraints, the symbiotic relations formed in environments of excess energy; and the role of redundancy in allowing neutralized mutations to grow, as opposed to removing them. This follows a tradition of teaching from Henry James to Charles Peirce, to William James; James Royce; Norbert Wiener; Gregory Bateson and down to Terrence Deacon.

## Eye of Justice

As an altricial species with a cooperative gaze, humans begin life completely dependent upon caregivers and adapt not to a natural environment, but a social one. It is the gaze of the parents and the prediction of their rules that lead to successful feedback loops for a child. It is this universal foundation for the human species that lays the groundwork for a theory of mind that develops from joint attention, cooperative eye gaze and ultimately language that develops from interacting with and constraining the babble of an infant. First at an iconic level, then

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<sup>32</sup> John Schaeffer, *Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), chapter 3.

at an indexical level, and finally at the symbolic level of thought that has been captured in the work of Terrence Deacon.<sup>33</sup> As Giambattista Vico notes in his work, as well as George Lakoff in more recent times, human models first begin with the metaphor, poetic logic and other rhetorical tropes utilizing the body and natural environmental markers to tell their first stories.

By necessity then, the first primary model of morality stems from that altricial gaze of one's caregivers. This Eye of Justice is what recent scholarship in the field of cognitive science of religion has been shown to form a fundamental building block of large scale societies. It is an existential universal that is deeply correlated with morality<sup>34</sup>, and what has been termed common sense. Religion has been shown to be a method of priming this gaze, meaning that the Eye of Justice precedes organized religion.<sup>35</sup> It is also tied in with a justification model of human development. The need to justify one's actions to society then is biological and precedes rational thought, abstract thought – as can be seen for instance in the work of Jean Piaget.<sup>36</sup> A political philosophy for the postsecular age must take that into account in restoring the role of imagination and perspective alongside reason and science that has driven the first half of the Enlightenment project.

It is important to recognize that “Human infants are altricial, born relatively helpless and dependent on parental care for an extended period of time.”<sup>37</sup> Humans in this way “begin life relatively helpless, with limited motor control, poor visual acuity, and the inability to effectively thermoregulate or feed ourselves. We cannot sit up until 6 months, or take our first steps for a year.”<sup>38</sup> This is because “Rather than requiring hardwired, innate knowledge of social abilities, evolution has outsourced the necessary information to parents.”<sup>39</sup>

Eye of Justice in a physical and biological analogy is functionally a catalyst. In physics and biology a catalyst is what makes probable something that at first seemed improbable. In this sense, the altricial gaze makes cooperation between strangers more likely than if the omniscient perspective were not found within humans. A counterintuitive notion to the natural propensity to treat a stranger as

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<sup>33</sup> Terrence W. Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language and the Brain* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).

<sup>34</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

<sup>35</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 49–61.

<sup>36</sup> Jean Piaget, *The Construction of Reality in the Child*, trans. Margaret Cook (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955).

<sup>37</sup> Katerina M. Faust, Samantha Carouso-Peck, Mary R. Elson, and Michael H. Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” *Annual Review of Developmental Psychology* 2 (2020): 225–246, in abstract <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-devpsych-051820-121446>.

<sup>38</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 225.

<sup>39</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 225–246, in abstract.

a stranger. Again, the Eye of Justice is importantly a biological and physical catalyst. Catalysts do not perform the impossible, only the improbable.

The eye of justice is highlighted prominently in the work of Giambattista Vico in relation to natural law, political philosophy and universal history. Vico's work is grounded in what he terms the Imaginative Universal. In particular, that of the eye of providence that he sees originating in culture with the of Jove – Jupiter. Max Muller wrote that Zeus, Deus Pater, Jupiter means 'shining' and 'radiance'.<sup>40</sup> As Vico states about Jove, "our treatment of natural law begins with the idea of divine providence, in the same birth with which was born the idea of law."<sup>41</sup> Therefore, "law began naturally to be observed .. by the founders of the gentes properly so called, those of the most ancient order, which were called gentes maiores, whose first god was Jove."<sup>42</sup> Jean Paul Sartre himself argued that freedom stems from the imagination. It is 'possibility' that is key. It is the perception of absence, and non-existence that matters. Imagination stems from intentionality. Therefore, reality is constructed from its interaction with our intentions.

A key differentiating aspect of *il lume naturale* from traditional abductive logic is the presence of novelty. As Juri Lotman wrote, "There are periods when reflecting upon general ideas and the paths of human history becomes especially vital. These are critical periods when one has reached the end of old paths while new paths have yet to be determined. These are periods of choice and freedom – and simultaneously of doubt and uncertainty."<sup>43</sup> It is at these moments that justifications extend beyond the purely deductive and human choice becomes involved. Here is where consciousness is most engaged, and where humans must transcend the cultural morals that once fit, but do no longer.

This is where the hero's journey commences, and where novel information can be retrieved that is useful for the community. It is novel information and its relationship then with the Eye of Justice, the imaginative universal, and the natural light that will help lay the foundations for retrieving the key insights that have been stored within the symbol of the *Imago Dei* that can be unpacked and utilized to continue to ground sovereignty and human rights in a postecular era. Lotman again correctly notes "In such times a clearly formulated question or even a profoundly experienced doubt turns out to be more productive than customary answers reiterating customary truths."<sup>44</sup>

It is due to the fact that the environment is ever changing due to the impacts of the second law of thermodynamics, the wobble of the earth, and shifting weather patterns that all serve as modes of entropy that humanity must continuously extend itself beyond the models in place in order to harmonize with these

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<sup>40</sup> Max Müller, *Contributions to the Science of Mythology*, vol. 2 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897), 497–503.

<sup>41</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 398.

<sup>42</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 389.

<sup>43</sup> Juri Lotman, *The Unpredictable Workings of Culture* (Tallinn: Tallinn University Press, 2013), 1.

<sup>44</sup> Lotman, *The Unpredictable Workings of Culture*, 1.

changes. This is due to the fact that “We are what we are not: continually, intrinsically, necessarily incomplete in our very nature”<sup>45</sup> This oscillation between work and constraints that enables both presence and absence to play a role in humanity’s collective journey. For where present constraints are future work, the relaxation of constraints performs work on its surrounding environment.

Powerfully however, “just as the truth of this incomplete universe is not what it is, but what is emerging, so the root being of the universe is not ontological permanence but emerging creativity, the coming to be of what was not.”<sup>46</sup> Not only nature, but culture is also involved as, “According to my understanding, culture is not a passive storage... but a generator, a machine that constantly reproduces itself, thus competing with life itself.”<sup>47</sup> To extend beyond what one knows means utilizing what is known in the cognitive science of religion as counter-intuition.

This cyclicity finds its way into the political model of Vico’s *ricorsi*<sup>48</sup> and in Agrippa’s tropes<sup>49</sup> of action and dissent. The hopeful aspect of this nature is that arguments must be invented before they can be critique. Philology in this sense precedes philosophy. Human choice comes prior to rational abstract thought. Human choice has been the key to the political evolution of societies, not simply reason and logic that once served to move away from traditional, hierarchical modes of being. Again, it is imagination and perspective that must be returned to the fold. This is also the space that Vico has highlighted to be the cornerstone of natural law, and the space of an ideal eternal history moving ever persistently towards an *aequum bonum*. Whether one climbs the mountain of Vico’s divine providence, or Deacon’s teleological emergence from matter, political truth can be found for the natural light.

The poetic metaphor of utilizing this gaze as a mirror to reflect our ‘higher selves’ through the metaphor of ascent is again put into these words, “But then we complete our ascent and reach the summit, and an enormous expanse opens up before us. At the cost of back-breaking labour, exertion, and losses, we have achieved a broad horizon. But now many roads lie before us. We must make a choice. And that choice is at the intersection of doubt and knowledge.”<sup>50</sup> At the top of the mountain will be found a model built from *Fantasia*; combined through *Ingegno*; stored in *Memoria*; coming to terms with *Reflezione* leading to *Barbarism*; and finally the *Recorso*. In the terms of Karl Jaspers: *Dasein*, consciousness in general, spirit and *existenz* that flow through transcendence.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter*, 535.

<sup>46</sup> Deacon and Cashman, “Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness,” 401–429.

<sup>47</sup> Juri Lotman, “Tartu as a Cultural Sign,” *Tartu University Press*, 1987, 51.

<sup>48</sup> Giambattista Vico, *New Science*, trans. David Marsh (New York: Penguin Books, 1999).

<sup>49</sup> Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>50</sup> Lotman, *The Unpredictable Workings of Culture*, 2.

<sup>51</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Richard F. Grabau, ed. John Silber (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).

Together, with Aristotle, Vico, and Ricoeur amongst so many others it will be seen that a key goal underlying it all is this “aiming at the good life with and for others, in just institutions”<sup>52</sup> With that end goal in mind it will try to see if” our new science must therefore be a demonstration, so to speak, of the historical fact of providence, for it must be a history of the institutions by which, without human discernment or intent, and often against the designs of men, providence has given to this great city of the human race<sup>53</sup>. This will require going deeper than materialism and idealism towards exemplarity. Then it will have to dig even deeper to look at the source of novel morality – emergent exemplarity.

Ferrara noted in the work of Habermas that he recognized Rousseau’s key contribution was secularizing ‘the gaze’, and it is this connection with authenticity that enables 21st century political philosophy to reconnect with the Imago Dei.:

“According to Habermas... Rousseau’s Confessions achieved the unprecedented result of retrieving, and enabling us to make sense now in secularized terms of, a central human experience which the Judeo-Christian metaphysical and theological tradition had powerfully articulated: namely, the experience of anticipating, in foro interno, “the individuating gaze of that transcendent God, simultaneously judging and merciful, before whom every individual, alone and irreplaceable, must answer for his life as a whole”<sup>54</sup>. Rousseau’s unique and ground-breaking achievement, despite a tradition of autobiography that reaches back to Augustine and Montaigne, was – according to Habermas – to have secularized the “individuating power of the consciousness of sin” in the guise of a “literary form of expression in the autobiographical revelation of one’s life story, as the published documentation of an existence that has always to answer for itself”.<sup>55</sup> The originally religious self-justification before God now gives way, according to Habermas’s interpretation, to a self-expressive narrative motivated by the desire to be recognized by the public of one’s fellow human beings as “as the one who one is and who one wants to be”,<sup>56</sup> namely as an authentic self.”<sup>57</sup>

It is language that helps to hold this process of justification. Both understanding and justification are combined in and through language. This is for instance why, “Habermas links meaning and validity by defining ‘understanding a sentence’ as ‘knowing how to justify its truth’ and ‘knowing what obligations follow from one’s accepting it as true’.”<sup>58</sup> It is “the ability of discursively reached insights to

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<sup>52</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 172.

<sup>53</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 342.

<sup>54</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 127, trans. by W. M. Hohengarten, 127.

<sup>55</sup> Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 128.

<sup>56</sup> Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 167.

<sup>57</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Language After the Linguistic Turn* (London: Routledge, 2003), 17.

<sup>58</sup> Ferrara, *Language After the Linguistic Turn*, 17.

transcend the boundaries of locally accepted interpretive frameworks.”<sup>59</sup> Transcending the Self through a constraint of imagination towards the altricial gaze is therefore a key step to the progressive evolution of human society. To justify one’s actions to the omniscient perspective, the eye of justice that comes from a species raised so long in their caregivers’ gaze.

## The Metaphor, the Perspective and the Proposition

Perhaps the foundations of philosophy, science and religion themselves hold the key to bridging the divide to present a pathway to grounding human rights in the secular era. The central metaphor of all political philosophy stems from light shining outside of a cave, causing the shadows of what is inside to be projected on the walls. These shadows are the perceived reality of our human experience. Only those souls equipped with the right set of eyes can leave the cave to see the light. Plato’s philosopher kings. This refers, of course, to Plato’s ‘allegory of the cave’.<sup>60</sup>

Plato extended an entire model of knowledge out of this metaphor. The two foundational words of this model are doxa and episteme. Doxa represents opinions, and episteme represents theoretical knowledge. For Plato, the philosopher kings ruled through their unique access to episteme, as opposed to the doxa accessed by the common population. Episteme being outside the cave, and doxa inside. For Plato, “the idea that true knowledge, which precedes intersubjective deliberation and sets the standard for sorting out good and bad deliberation, provides the foundations for the legitimate use of coercive power, for political obligation and for all the normative concepts found in politics.”<sup>61</sup>

What is doxa? “Doxa grasps the perceptible realm”.<sup>62</sup> In that sense “Those who contemplate the many [perceptible] beautifuls...have doxa...while those who contemplate the things that are always the same in every way [viz., the Forms] have knowledge but do not have doxa.”<sup>63</sup> Further, “Doxa is about becoming, knowledge [episteme] is about being. Whenever the soul is fixed on that on which truth and being shine, it understands and knows it, ...but whenever it [is fixed on] that which is mixed with darkness, that which comes to be and passes away, it has doxa and is weak-sighted, shifting its doxai up and down.”<sup>64</sup> Whereas for Episteme, “What is that which always is, having no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming, never being? The former is grasped by knowledge

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<sup>59</sup> Ferrara, *Language After the Linguistic Turn*, 17.

<sup>60</sup> Christopher Rowe, *Plato: Republic* (London: Penguin, 2012).

<sup>61</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 45, no. 4 (2019): 395.

<sup>62</sup> Jessica Moss, “Plato’s Doxa,” penultimate draft, forthcoming in *Analytic Philosophy* (2020), Tim. 37b, 52a.

<sup>63</sup> Moss, “Plato’s Doxa,” Rep. 479d-e 5

<sup>64</sup> Moss, “Plato’s Doxa,” Rep. 534a Rep. 508d

with an account, always being the same; the latter in turn is the object of doxa through doxa with unreasoned perception.”<sup>65</sup>

However, Plato’s model of knowledge broke these two categories themselves into two further categories each. Doxa is composed of eikasia and pistis, Whereas episteme is composed of dianoia and noesis. Eikasia is the hypothetical starting point of the imagination and pistis is the fixed belief based upon an object being encountered. Dianoia is the “thinking exemplified by mathematicians, which uses perceptible things as images of intelligibles, and relies on hypotheses.”<sup>66</sup> The category of noesis are those ideas illuminated only by the Good. These four categories are what is represented by the analogy of the divided line. The illuminating light of the sun in Plato’s metaphor was the ‘Idea of the good’.

According to Alfred North Whitehead, all of philosophy is but a ‘footnote to Plato’.<sup>67</sup> In *The Republic* Plato extended this model of the cave to in fact represent the foundation of his entire political philosophy whereby the city and the soul are analogous to one another. The structure of the soul and the city had three tiers. One represented the physical body and was the military force. One represented the heart of the city, and the top represented the intellectual strata best represented by his philosopher kings. Eros, thymos, Logos. Desire, spirit and reason.

Far from being simply a theory of knowledge, this metaphor became central to Plato’s entire theory of justice and of power. It was a metaphor that came to support the foundation of a specific form of authoritarianism: the epistocracy – an epistemological autocracy. In other words, a system of authority based around privileged members of society that uniquely hold knowledge that others classes do not have access to. The privileged class known as the Philosopher Kings. This is because the fundamental question of political philosophy is how individuals can be governed ‘within the cave’.

Hannah Arendt showed how this model of politics ultimately leads to a form of tyranny and dictatorship. Further, the ‘linguistic turn’ started by Wittgenstein and extended by Heidegger has shown how far from there being a solid world of forms that language can capture in a universal sense, language is in fact dictated more by the the rules of the game in which they are contextually situated. A new model of political philosophy and foundation of human rights is therefore needed.

Political philosopher Alessandro Ferrara has extended this very metaphor of Plato to the work of John Rawls in showing how an alternative political philosophy can retrieve its legitimacy not from outside the cave – from episteme – but ‘sideways at the entrance of the cave’.<sup>68</sup> From this new vantage point, not tyranny, but political liberalism can be found. The current work would like to extend the metaphor even further to show where a dynamic liberalism can be uncovered, and why this once again requires going ‘beyond the cave’.

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<sup>65</sup> Moss, “Plato’s Doxa,” *Timaeus* 27d-28a

<sup>66</sup> Moss, “Plato’s Doxa,” 510b-e

<sup>67</sup> Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), 39.

<sup>68</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 390–402.

The model presented will counter the epistocratic version of Plato, with an epistocracy centered on the fallibility of seeing the light in its wholeness, and the constant need to update knowledge categories for society to be integrated with its dynamic environment. This epistocratic model will be based on what will be termed ‘transformative authenticity’ that seeks the ‘most reasonable’ in the face of a lack of propositions that have assuredly worked in the past. This model will also seek to extend beyond that presented by Rawls foundation based upon a society that achieves its ‘legitimation by constitution’. This model seeks to show the legitimacy not only by a constitution, but the legitimacy ‘of’ a constitution. The deeper source whereupon it receives its authority and legitimacy. This model will further confront the paradox presented by Rousseau of how a people constitutes itself out of nothingness. It will also not be caught in the limitations of the metaphysics of pluralism set by Isaiah Berlin, or Larmore’s equal respect. Models that require one comprehensive view holding permanent universality over all others.

Far from being a simple metaphor, this work will take seriously the implications of what the metaphor is communicating at its deepest levels through the utilization of embodied cognition and semiotics. The extraction of its fundamental meaning will be argued to show how human rights are grounded at a deeper level than social or political agreement alone. It will be shown that the metaphor of light and darkness is equated with the model of the center and periphery through the embodied metaphor of ‘knowing is seeing’. A form of light that the Book of Genesis makes clear to be distinct from the great luminaries of the sun and the moon that were made several days later.

Interestingly, across all major religions stories of light and darkness serve as markers of origins and battles of good versus evil. Ultimately seeking to grasp the light in the darkness. Embodied cognition shows that language around internal systems can only be constructed around external and embodied metaphors. For instance a good feeling is ‘feeling warm’. When things are starting to get better, they are starting to ‘look up’. In essence, feelings can only be expressed through equating them with experiences that are embodied. Throughout this work there is one embodied metaphor that combines epistemology with perception. It is the metaphor of ‘knowing is seeing’. The bedrock of how society speaks of knowledge. If one had ‘but eyes to see’. This is also the basis not only of the metaphors contrasting light and darkness but the center and periphery.

Unpacking this metaphor allows theories of logic and proposition to be brought together with the interpretive mechanisms of religious doctrines: exegesis; PRDS; kalachakra; and the tetramorph. Also with literary theory of literalism; allegory; morality; and anagogy and logic of induction; abduction; deduction and analogy. It also allows the model of the center and periphery that is found in science models of Lakatos; brain hemisphere model of Dr. Iain McGilchrist; cultural model of Juri Lotman; and religion model of Mireia Eliade to be brought into the same model. Ultimately it is all about the light outside of the cave, outside of the foveal center that can lead to equilibration between the models of memory and the environment upon which it is embedded. In fact, ‘to see’ is ‘to know’.

For example, “Someone who is ignorant is in the dark, while someone who is incapable of knowing is blind. To enable people to know something is to shed light on the matter. Something that enables you to know something is enlightening; it is something that enables you to see. New facts that have come to light are facts that have become known (to those who are looking).”<sup>69</sup> Ultimately, “three ways in which the mind is conceptualized in bodily terms. In these, thinking is seen as bodily functioning-as moving, perceiving, and manipulating objects. The central concerns of those metaphors were gaining knowledge, reasoning, comprehending, and communicating.”<sup>70</sup> In fact, “The Knowing Is Seeing metaphor is so firmly rooted in the role of vision in human knowing and is so central to our conception of knowledge that we are seldom aware of the way it works powerfully to structure our sense of what it is to know something.”<sup>71</sup>

From this unpacking, it will be shown how the model connects to the smallest atom of knowledge – the proposition. Where a proposition is a fundamental truth claim based upon two components, a subject and a predicate. The work of philosopher, logician and semiotician Charles Peirce, will show how science is grounded in logic based upon the proposition and its two components of subject and predicate. The semiotic model can then be equated with the work on the semiotic *Imago Dei* extracted by Claudia Welz. The work of Alessandro Ferrara will be able to show how the proposition connects with a model of political philosophy centered around authenticity, exemplarity and the judgment view of justice. This foundation will open the possibility for a dialogue around a transformative view of authenticity that is grounded in reflective disclosure.

The proposition is important in this case not as a self-standing principle, but as a process of truth extraction, and symbolization. Meaning-making through semiosis and theosemiosis. A core component to this layering is understanding physical, thermodynamic entropy as one form of equilibrium, biological homeostasis as a second form of equilibrium, and justice as a social form of reflective equilibrium. Equilibrium is what combines normativity with realism. This is a realistic position pursued by normativity through memory. A synergistic equilibrium is the equilibrium of both the memory system itself, and its interaction with the world external to itself. Synergistic equilibrium means both intrinsic and extrinsic coherence. Extrinsically referred to as correspondence in at least a constructive and pragmatic sense. Intrinsic therefore to cultural codes and extrinsically through contextual experience.

John Locke was the first who proposed semiotics as a model of human knowledge that this work seeks to overlay with the smallest atom of the proposition. He caused the collapse of the *Imago Dei* even while basing his philosophy of human

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<sup>69</sup> George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 239.

<sup>70</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 217.

<sup>71</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 354.

rights on them due to his also establishing the philosophical school of empiricism that says one can only trust the senses and sensory experience. No knowledge in Locke's model precedes experience. John Locke's work on highlighting human rights as a foundational element of natural rights extending from the image of God can be reintroduced into this model by utilizing the framework of Claudia Welz in seeking to extract the meaning of the imago dei in the context of semiotics. Again, the ultimate foundation of this work is to highlight the connection between the metaphor of light, the Imago Dei, of the center and periphery, and the proposition – known in semiotics as the symbol. This foundation will enable a model of political philosophy that can ground human rights. The method of this work is to build a shared model of how propositions/symbols are created and the role of sovereignty and human rights within that social order.

## **Universe of the Mind – Text; Image; Word; Tropes**

Juri Lotman has expressed a pathway towards comprehending the tetramorph and tetractys in the twenty first century by noting how novel information is generated by the mind. This requires the continual effort to translate knowledge between two ultimately untranslatable worlds: that of the image; and that of the word. The world of 'said', and the world of 'saw'. The friction, and the untranslatability of the continuous and discontinuous aspects of the mind's interpretation of the universe – filtered through cultural learning – produce the major tropes. As Lotman noted, "A minimal thinking apparatus must include at least two differently constructed systems to exchange the information they each have worked out."<sup>72</sup> In this way, Lotman was able to note that, "Studies carried out on the specific functioning of the large hemispheres of the human brain have revealed a profound analogy between it and the organization of culture as a collective intellect."<sup>73</sup> Here then, "within one consciousness there are as it were two consciousnesses."<sup>74</sup>

It is the interaction of these two untranslatable (and incompatible) worlds that produced the creative engine of the mind – the rhetorical tropes, as "when we are dealing with discrete and non-discrete texts, translation is in principle impossible."<sup>75</sup> Lotman highlights the fact that there is always a tension between the discrete and the continuous and this "kind of 'illegitimate', imprecise, but approximate translation is one of the most important features of any creative thinking. For these 'illegitimate' associations provoke new semantic connections and give rise to texts that are in principle new ones."<sup>76</sup> This engine of creative thinking is the trope, as a "trope is a figure born at the point of contact between

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<sup>72</sup> Juri Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), 36.

<sup>73</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>74</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>75</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>76</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

two languages, and its structure is therefore identical to that of the creative consciousness itself.”<sup>77</sup> “A pair of mutually non-juxtaposable signifying elements, between which, thanks to the context they share, a relationship of adequacy is established, form a semantic trope.”<sup>78</sup> To be very specific, “Tropes are not, ... external ornaments... they constitute the essence of creative thinking”<sup>79</sup>

This model allows one to bring into conversation Agrippa and his skeptical tropes; Kenneth Burke and his rhetorical tropes; and Giambattista Vico and his tropes focused on eternal ideal history. Semiotics further enables one to bring into the conversation hermeneutics, exegesis, and phenomenology along the way – including Paul Ricouer; Andrew Wiercinski; and Karl Jaspers. This will enable these key voices to be heard within the semiosphere.

Just as language begins as a whole that starts to differentiate through confrontation of the indexical world. So too, “If we put together many branches and a great quantity of leaves, we still cannot understand the forest.”<sup>80</sup> Should we in fact, “know how to walk through the forest of culture with our eyes open, confidently following the numerous paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we be able to understand better the vastness and complexity of the forest, but we shall also be able to discover the nature of the leaves and branches of every single tree....”<sup>81</sup> Here it comes back to this developing notion of the dynamic and recursive self. The key aspect of the model being presented is that time enables a dynamic model of mutual information through recursion, which allows an icon of a self to share dynamic mutual information with a work program to produce that icon. This is what happens to the body that performs work to return it to a state of homeostasis. Recursion here then becomes key. As Thomas-Andreas Pöder has noted about Lotman’s work, “Lotman’s cultural theory is realistic and helpful in highlighting the importance of boundaries between the internal and the external as a structural condition of meaning-making and perceiving.”<sup>82</sup> The boundary ultimately of the ‘Self’. Further, it is self-referential encoding within one’s memory that helps interpret the information that presents itself contextually.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>78</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>79</sup> Lotman, *The Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, 36.

<sup>80</sup> Umberto Eco, “Introduction,” in *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, by Yuri M. Lotman (London: I. B. Tauris, 1990), xiii.

<sup>81</sup> Eco, “Introduction,” in *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, by Yuri M. Lotman, xiii.

<sup>82</sup> Pöder, “Reflections on Religion and the Status of ‘The Outside’ in the Lotmanian Understanding of Culture,” 249.

<sup>83</sup> T. B. Rogers, N. A. Kuiper, and W. S. Kirker, “Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 35, no. 9 (1977): 677–688, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.677>.

## Dynamic Identity

The heart of this work comes down to Agrippa's trilemma. The central notion being that a deductive system can never reveal its underlying axioms that must come from beyond itself. This is captured in modern terms through Kurt Godel's theorem of incompleteness, Tarski's undefinability theorem, and Deacon's metaphysics of incompleteness. The central idea is that a deductive system is always caught between being consistent or being complete. This is important as it shows the primacy of the world that transcends symbols over the world of symbols themselves. Ontology over epistemology. With that said, it is the process of extracting symbols that is at the heart of self-constitution and identity.

Further, these deductive systems are competing with one another as comprehensive views, and also are limited to the 'game rules' that organize them. This is the foundation of the linguistic turn started by Wittgenstein and Heidegger. The question then becomes how to hold onto universality in this pluralistic world, or noting if relativism is the only game in town. If that is the case, then universal human rights cannot exist. What will be shown here is that human rights is grounded in social science, as well as the image of god, as self-constituting beings through symbolization, by choosing to act – by judgment of the 'most reasonable', and where that does not exist 'the most revitalizing'.

The next chapter will be based upon materialism as the ground of error, it is ontological and transcends epistemology. Only by error can this world be grasped. This is the world that biological creatures feel as natural selection. The second chapter is focused on pragmatism whereby a hypothesis is formed to be tested against the world of objects discussed in the chapter previous. The third chapter will look at the deductive world of propositions and symbols to see how maps are created, and how they can in turn lose their connection with the world beyond the symbols. The 'territory' that the 'map' is meant to refer to. A key aspect of this work will be showing that political liberalism cannot rest on the laurels of legitimation by constitution alone, as the constitution itself must first be legitimized. This is why this work will argue that ground is legitimation by the golden eternity clause. Further, it will be shown throughout this work that all linguistic systems are built around a constitution in the broadest sense of the term, as they all require a constraint on governance based upon how objects are meant to be interpreted within the confines of a social community.

Identity is also a big part of the equation, as the counterweight to authenticity. A collective identity is really a shared personal identity. This identity is the realm of moral autonomy, as opposed to moral authenticity. Where identity is formed at a propositional level, authenticity is rooted at a layer of experience deeper than the propositional. It is rooted in the vitality beyond identity. This vital source is at its base identity destroying and not identity preserving (unless discussing a form of 'counterfactual identity' that is discussed in this work in chapter four). As it is only called for in situations where that vital spark is no longer being felt. It is therefore a transformative authenticity, an incoherent authenticity. An incoherent vitality.

The reason that this social structure becomes important is truly due to the difficulty in expressing how social codes can be transmitted across time, through several generations, while still preserving their core. The key is recognizing that inheritance requires both abstract symbolic learning, but also the biological energetic needs. This transmission of social culture is known as vertical reciprocity. A social contract exposed to time will ultimately lead to this dual nature of humanity to be exposed. Updating the code is therefore not about objectivity, but about subjectivity and therefore requires oriented reflective judgment, and not simply application of an existing code.

This transmission over time must also include stable judgments and stability for the right reasons. Human rights are rooted in this epistemic evolution. It calls for a new model of epistocracy. Indexicality discussed in the next chapter can't contain legal or moral rights. Political justice is rooted in iconism, but this cannot contain the justification for human rights either, as some individuals are capable of finding the 'most reasonable' responses – and being the most exemplary – thereby leading back to Plato's philosopher king problem. Theory of Justice is rooted in the proposition, but this is a realm always supporting sovereignty of the intellectual elite. Contrary to all of these models, human rights and sovereignty will be rooted in novel iconicity and indexicality. This fourth realm is the key to human rights and sovereignty, and is based on novelty, analogy, and the propositionless predicate. From another vantage point it can be viewed as a higher order realm of firstness.

The key tension is between the world of physical laws and the world of symbols. This battleground can lead to greater integration through justice grounded in authenticity and greater disintegration through ideology grounded in alienation. The fitness is between anchoring and grounding relations, between background and political culture, between the periphery and the center, the indirect and foveal vision. Two forms of ideological critique exist as tools: imminent and reflective disclosure.<sup>84</sup> Justice is based in reflective and transformative authenticity.<sup>85</sup> Reflective authenticity judgment and immanent critique for propositional predicates. Whereas, one needs transformative authenticity and reflective disclosure for imagining what has not yet been. This form of authenticity provides a constraint on world disclosure through its interpretive lens. It requires 'receptive agency' and predicate Simulation. At this level, it is not the individual level where identity is constructed, but identity comes with punishments and rewards at the level of the group to form culture.

This world of symbols is truly a world of categories. A fundamental aspect of this work is understanding how social categories are constructed and how they relate to natural categories. This requires understanding the distinction between numbers and letters and their distinct and interconnected ways in which they

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<sup>84</sup> Nicholas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

<sup>85</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

produce categories. Two key category processes will be repeated throughout this work, they are the propositionless predicate and the propositional predicate. It will be shown that all of science is based upon the propositional predicate, and yet human rights and sovereignty draws its value from the propositionless predicate.

## The Quaternity

The primary objective of this work is breaking down each of the key areas that traditionally grounded human rights into their ultimate atom of the proposition. This way it will be shown that each of the models are far closer than at first they appear on a purely literalist reading. In fact, the structure stems from the components of the proposition itself, and how it seeks to capture its underlying objects in words and symbols.

The aim of this quaternary model is to establish a more compressed account of a process at the heart of the models used by scholars in several disparate fields. The aim is “a theory that provides a compressed account of a given phenomena is to be preferred over one that provides a complex account.”<sup>86</sup> A form of Occam’s razor, but more explicit, as “a good theory contains less redundant information than a bad one. It is therefore more efficient – more easily applied and remembered.”<sup>87</sup> What this means is that, “A good theory therefore states: “these apparently varied phenomena may be considered members of the following single class (at least under particular specified circumstances). Then the class itself may be utilized and remembered, instead of each individual element.”<sup>88</sup> Due to this method, “It appears to be a combination of consilience and algorithmic simplicity that underlies the sense of “understanding” produced by a good theory: when a simple solution to a complex problem can be applied, and engenders precisely the results desired, then the problem has been understood.”<sup>89</sup>

Time and again it will be shown that the model is composed of four key parts: the object; the propositional predicate; the proposition; and the propositionless predicate. In political terms this can be seen by how the governmental rules as propositions interact with physical objects. Where there are no propositions, pure objects and subjects this would be close to libertarianism. Where the political culture is formed around rules that would be selected through overlapping consensus it is the realm of the propositional predicate. Where there are propositions they can either be mathematical that sees all objects as equal in a numerical sense and binary in a verbal sense it comes out as either communism or conservatism. The overturning of the binary is postmodernism. The fourth area of the propositionless predicate will serve as the cornerstone of dynamic liberalism.

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<sup>86</sup> J. Peterson, *The Pragmatics of Meaning*, in *The Semiotic Frontline* (1999), 2.

<sup>87</sup> Peterson, *The Pragmatics of Meaning*, 2.

<sup>88</sup> Peterson, *The Pragmatics of Meaning*, 2.

<sup>89</sup> Peterson, *The Pragmatics of Meaning*, 2.

Libertarianism, Political Liberalism, Communism (Math)/Conservatism(Language), Dynamic Liberalism.

It is useful to utilize an updated version of Maria's Axiom in order to understand that this fourth realm is not a distinct fourth mode of inference statically, but in fact a dynamic meta-inference. Maria's axiom famously stated that out of the one comes the two, out of the two the three, and out of the third comes the one as the fourth. A recursive model of Charles Peirce's semiotics could reframe this statement as: Out of firstness comes secondness, out of secondness comes thirdness, and out of thirdness comes the higher order firstness as zeroness. In logical terms it would be stated: Abductions lead to inductions, inductions to deductions, and deductions lead to higher order abductions. This recursive element means a meta-inference is an inference that does not merely draw from its premises, but in fact draws its premises from prior inferences. In such a way, higher order abductions can be drawn from prior deductions that include referential and pragmatic information. A directionality toward complexity therefore is found within this metainferential position of the fourth as the first of the higher order.

Theories of ethics would run counter to this. A pure ethics would mean that no rules are necessary and would then be based on virtue ethics. Where rules are needed to produce a pragmatic outcome this is the school of consequentialism. Where the rules themselves should dictate the ethics, without regard to their pragmatism this is deontological. Again the ethics of this work will be centered on dynamic consequentialism (which is equivalent to equilibration and the equilibrium of justice as overlaid on homeostasis and physical equilibrium).

In Piagetian terms the four aspects of knowledge creation are: the object of information; assimilation where a model is in place; the model; and accommodation is where there is no working model in place. In Carl Jung's model this is the quaternity composed of sensing; feeling; thinking; and intuition. Carl Jung further tied these categories to the alchemical process of the magnum opus – the creation of the philosopher's stone. This is a four stage process known as Nigredo; Albedo; Citrinitas; and Rubedo. In Jungian terms these are: the Shadow; the anima/animus; wise old man; and the Self beyond the coincidence of opposites.

These four levels are guided by a correspondence theory of truth; a pragmatic theory of truth; competition between constructivist and coherence theories of truth; finally an enactive theory of truth. The proposition is captured in literary theory by the second person perspective; the first person perspective; the third person perspective and the omniscient perspective. For Kenneth Burke these are captured in the four tropes of: metonymy; metaphor; synecdoche; and irony. They are also captured by Terrence Deacon's model connecting semiotics with linguistics as: syntax; pragmatics; semantics. Pragmatics here will be distinguished between assimilatory and accommodative pragmatics in relation to novel information requiring the production of novel meanings that either can or cannot rely upon prior established semantics. Syntax is not built into the level of human cognition in the way that Noam Chomsky suggested, but is instead built through constraining linguistic syntax to model itself isomorphically after physical syntax. Physical syntax is built from physical objects interacting with actions that

are categorized as predicates. Semantics are alternatively built around necessary meanings, necessary definitions. These are successfully working categories extracted in the past, and are not pragmatic meanings that confront a changing and contextualized reality. This is why semantics exists in the propositional world where pragmatic meanings exist in the predicate world, and syntax is constructed out of the physical reality of objects in space-time.

Plato's model is mapped as Pistis; Eikasia; Dianoia; Noesis. This is the fact that the second world of objects is where beliefs are tested; but the pragmatic world starts with the imagination; the world of dianoia is where there is propositional truth; the final layer is where propositions have not yet been extracted. In the semiotic model of Charles Peirce it is the structure of categories as : secondness; firstness; thirdness; and a category he never differentiated from firstness. This is the zeroness rooted in his *Il Lume Naturale*. In philosophical terms, when looking at the pure objects it is ontology and metaphysics. When looking at predicates it is the realm of epistemology. When looking at the realm of propositions it is logic. When looking at the realm of value creation is the propositionless predicate; axiology. In Aristotle's view, sophia is a combination of nous and episteme. Nous involves an intuitive grasp of necessary first principles. Episteme involves the theoretical. For Carl Jung it is the distinction of: sensing; feeling; thinking; intuition.

The current work will look at it through the lens of Alessandro Ferrara's project on judgment: Object; reflective judgment (reflective authenticity); deontological judgment (autonomy); and in this work the addition of a new category of transformative judgment (transformative authenticity). The current work will also analyze the layers through the *The four Rome's*: Ancient Rome; the Vatican; Eos; and Tor Vergata. Psychoanalysis describes four dimensions of authenticity or fulfillment of an individual identity: coherence, vitality, depth, and maturity. "Coherence of an individual identity is meant as cohesion versus fragmentation, continuity versus discontinuity, and demarcation versus indistinctness. Vitality, on its part, refers to the experience of joyful empowerment which results from the fulfilment of one's central needs. Thirdly, depth designates a person's capacity to have access to his or her own psyche without falling into the trap of complete transparency of the self. Finally, a fulfilled identity possesses a quality of maturity, which is described as the ability and willingness to come to terms with the facticity of the natural, the social, and the internal world – without losing one's coherence or vitality."<sup>90</sup>

Randall Collins argues that the four main theoretical schools are: functionalism, symbolic interactionism; utilitarianism; and conflict.<sup>91</sup> Functionalism is highlighted by Durkheim. Symbolic interactionism with Mead. Bentham for utilitarianism. Conflict by Weber and Marx. For Heidegger, phronesis is prior to

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<sup>90</sup> Willem Martens, "A Theoretical Model of Fragile Authenticity Structure," *International Journal of Philosophical Practice*, 2005, 3.

<sup>91</sup> Randall Collins, *Four Sociological Traditions: Selected Readings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

sophia, practical over theoretical.<sup>92</sup> Poiesis, praxis and theoria. Dispositions: techne, phronesis and sophia and nous. Craft, prudence, theoretical science and wisdom. Heidegger sees Nicomachean Ethics as an ontology.

Claudia Welz in her work on the semiotic Imago Dei exposes four layers of the Image of God: Substantive; Relational; Functional; Mode of Action. The substantive approach locates the Image of God within a human being. Not the exterior body. The key relationship then is in the characteristics mirrored in humanity. The leading scholar for this view is Augustine who related the Trinity found within the human mind to be a reflection of the Trinity of God. The Image then being: memory; intellect; and, will. The key to a relational understanding of the Imago Dei extends from Genesis 5:1-2 where it shows the uniqueness of human relations is that they do not end with physical relations, but extend to spiritual relations. The same form of relationship that can connect one with God. It is this spiritual relationship that is representative of the Imago Dei. Theologians holding this view include Karl Barth and Emil Brunner.

The functional approach sees the Image as being a handing off of the baton of leadership on a local level in a sense. Whereby the idea of the Kingship of God is handed down to humans to have dominion over the animals of the sea, air and land. This work extends from comparison with similar Mesopotamian works referring to Kings as “images” of their deities. The difference then is that all of humanity is extended this functional role. Understanding this role in a more responsible manner has led modern theologians to argue for a responsible ecological role. Heike Baranzke has argued using exegetical analysis that the Imago Dei is not a static concept, but is actually a mode of action.<sup>93</sup>

The three major legal schools of human rights follow this in the following sense: Positivism; Functionalism; Foundationalism. A fourth school will need to be added – the new school of Emergent Exemplarity. This will place its authority on the basis of emergence, whereas for a functionalist political argument from the works of such academics as John Rawls<sup>94</sup> and Charles Beitz<sup>95</sup> It is argued that human rights are not grounded in questions of morality or legislation, but simply in the political limitation of state sovereignty in relation to its citizens. This relationship between state sovereignty and human rights took its most powerful form in the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect which I have written on previously<sup>96</sup>. In The Law of Peoples Rawls states, “Human rights are a class of rights that play a special role ... they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to [a] regime’s internal autonomy.”<sup>97</sup> That morally absent definition is their role.

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<sup>92</sup> Günter Figal, *Martin Heidegger zur Einführung* (Hamburg, 2003), 58.

<sup>93</sup> Heike Baranzke, “‘Sanctity-of-Life’ – A Bioethical Principle for a Right to Life?,” *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 15 (2013): 295–308, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9369-0>.

<sup>94</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*.

<sup>95</sup> Charles R. Beitz, *The Idea of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>96</sup> Kalkman, “Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow,” 75–92.

<sup>97</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 79.

On the other hand Jeremy Bentham<sup>98</sup> and H.L.A. Hart<sup>99</sup> do not accept any moral rights existing unless explicitly codified in law. This is legal positivism. For the legal positivists no grounded foundation of meaning is required. Human rights law is simply composed of those pieces of legislation that have actually been implemented, without regard to their morality or political necessity. Example documents include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR and ICCPR.

Ultimately, even the base definition of epistemology, that of knowledge as “justified true belief” exposes this pattern. Except, it will be shown that knowledge doesn’t depend on belief, but on judgment (which is the decision between competing and conflicting beliefs). Justification represents the realm of experience, maturity and induction. Truth represents a propositional world, and judgment here represents the pragmatic world. This work will further grasp these four realms through the model of identity constructed by Alessandro Ferrara that sees self-congruence as being shaped by maturity, depth, coherence, and vitality.

Each of the four perspectives of the proposition lead to unique systems of logic, as noted by Charles Peirce. He revealed that a proposition interacted with the object through inductive logic. A proposition interacts with a predicate through abductive logic. A proposition interacts with another proposition through deductive logic. It is important to understand that memory is propositional. It is a necessary action. In general, multiple conflicting memories compete against one another, with the ‘most reasonable’ being chosen. The three tiers of propositions are procedural; episodic; and semantic. These tiers are the ‘soul’ grasped in Plato’s political philosophy.

A brief synopsis of logic is necessary to grasp the distinctions applied to the proposition throughout this work. Charles Peirce discovered that science was not based upon direct observation of objects, but by a hypothesis connecting a proposition to objects. This required a distinction between three logical systems. Inductive logic that sought to apply prior propositions to an object to see if an inference could be made. Abduction is a probable hypothesis given certain information. A deduction on the other hand is a necessary inference given the information. An example of each should elucidate how a general rule applies to particular facts in order to draw the level of inference for each of the three systems:

Deduction.

*Rule:* All the books from this bag are green.

*Case:* These books are from this bag.

*Result:* These books are green.

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<sup>98</sup> Ross Harrison, “Jeremy Bentham,” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 85–88.

<sup>99</sup> H. L. A. Hart, “Legal Responsibility and Excuses,” in *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science*, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1958), 80–93.

Induction.

*Case:* These books are taken out from this bag.

*Result:* These books are green.

*Rule:* All the books from this bag are green.

Hypothesis.

*Rule:* All the books from this bag are green.

*Result:* These books are green.

*Case:* These books are from this bag.

There is one system of logic that is missing from these three, and that is the analogy. The extraction of a particular response to a particular situation, not yet a general law. Only after this analogy proves to be the ‘most reasonable’ and exemplary does it move towards generalization. This fourth system is key to the current work.

The metaphor of ‘knowing is seeing’ shows how society equates conscious knowledge to the foveal center. The fovea being the area of the eye that produces the most developed and processed vision, but is less than one percent of the image. This is the center upon which the periphery is judged against. It is the start of the literal interpretation of the Exegesis model: PRDS. It is the four part structure of Claudia Welz’ model of the Semiotic Image of God. In epistemology it is the Justified true judgments that guide most of our lives. In opposition to the unjustified judgment that extends beyond the constitutional order into the ‘state of exception’. The grounding of human rights and the garantismo of Ferrajoli. It is Unjustified Judgment. The propositionless self at the level of semantic memory.

In addition to all of this, Kenneth Burke showed a pathway for explaining this four part structure, and it all comes down to how one asks questions. The interrogatives. In this sense, three questions relate completely to objects in space-time. What, where, when. This is how objects are identified in the world of secondness. He sees them as creating two key separable aspects: the act, and the scene. ‘What’ describes the act, and ‘when and where’ collectively describes the scene. These produce the base of realism and materialism, respectively. From here, there are three further questions: How, Who and Why. Here is the key to the next layers of experience. The instrumentality of the body (Self), which is the how, the agency, the school of pragmatism; the semantic identity of the self (the Who), the agent, the school of philosophical idealism; and ultimately the driving motivation at the deepest level of self-congruence (the Why), the purpose, the school of mysticism. These questions show the importance of context and uniqueness to the level of information. Kenneth Burke argues that each of these vantage points produces a different philosophy: realism; materialism; pragmatism; idealism; mysticism. Based on the act, scene, agency, agent and purpose.<sup>100</sup> Here then is the quaternity of the magnus opus, the great work.

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<sup>100</sup> Kenneth Burke, “A Grammar of Motives,” in *The Rhetorical Tradition*, 1298 (2001).

This quaternity is further developed in the Four Modes of Persuasion. These are: Kairos; Pathos; Logos; and Ethos. Respectively, Contextual Persuasion; Emotional Persuasion; Rational Persuasion; and Persuasion from Authority. Here experience itself ties with the second person perspective, emotions the first, reason the third person limited; and ethos the omniscient perspective. This four part model is further found in Aristotle's Rhetoric.

The four part model is further reflected in the work of Josiah Royce who argues for four separate conceptions of being: Realism; Mysticism; Critical Rationalism and what he termed the Fourth Conception of Being. Here it will also be referred to as Theosemiosis. This conception of being sees the unique position of each individual in relation to the whole. In other words, "to be is to be uniquely related to a whole".<sup>101</sup> The whole, the individual, and the relation between them is what captures all conceptions of being in one. Where realism intends that an object exists separate from an idea, and mysticism sees that underlying an idea and an object is a oneness, and critical rationalism sees an idea and an object ultimately reflecting a general category. Alternatively, this fourth conception of being sees an idea as not only referring to a possible experience, but something unique and actual in the world-as-such.

Here is where the pattern of Schopenhauer's On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Becoming, Being, Knowing, Acting can be found. This is also the model that has been worked out by the 'Four Authors of Vico that capture these differing notions of logic: Francis Bacon; Hugo Grotius; Tacitus; and Plato. From a metahistorical lens, Hayden White has continued the work of Vico in showing that history itself is written through the lens of these four tropes and four great emplotments.<sup>102</sup> Here secondness is represented as tragedy; firstness as romance; thirdness as comedy; and zeroness as satire. What this means as a dynamic and hierarchic process that – in the face of contradiction – the Self confronts a tragedy of its logical system no longer being in line with its environment. However, through the collapse of the binary and the omniscient perspective that collapses contradiction through irony the story is transformed into a romance that continues until logic is again found to be in balance with its environment, a divine comedy. This work differs from Hayden White in noting that firstness represents an organicist argument, and thirdness the formist argument. In this way, firstness is also represented by integrative logic, and thirdness by representational – in terms of White's work.

In this way secondness is tragic, reductive, and mechanist. Firstness is romantic, integrative, and organistic. Thirdness is comedic, representational and formist. Comedic in the sense of divine comedy that the representation 'fits' the environment, as opposed to the tragedy that stems from a system of logic being in discord with what presents itself. Zeroness here is then satirical, negational, and

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<sup>101</sup> Randall E. Auxier, *Time, Will, and Purpose: Living Ideas from the Philosophy of Josiah Royce* (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2013), 46.

<sup>102</sup> Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

contextual. This zeroness only works however if the contradiction isn't static and paradoxical, but dynamic and therefore transformed into an oscillation. The oscillation through time enables the 'coincidence of opposites' to not conflict in static moments and therefore to find a greater unity as one dynamic whole, temporally. Each of these realms themselves represented by the core branch of the sciences: Natural Science; Life Science (including as a broader term the social sciences); Formal Science; and the Omni Science Perspective that is focused on Dei's Law. Dei's Law = from a limited third person perspective, it is the abductive hypothesis that there is an omniscient perspective through which the deductive logic can be applied to that which is perceived generally as being that 'the Light is Good'.

## **Method, Course of Proof, and Summary**

John Locke's thinking lay at the crossroads of a great transition. On the one hand, as a father of the Enlightenment and empiricism his work sought to overthrow the 'outdated' ideas and ideals of a Europe that were once guided by Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian visions. On the other hand, his very political philosophy and personally held beliefs still relied upon the presuppositions built within this time period. At the heart of the implosive dilemma in John Locke's work is that his Enlightenment ideals would call into question his religious and rationalistic background. The visible world of objects would trump the invisible world of the spiritual. This current work will be modeled completely after the structure of Locke's *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, as a modern model of knowledge is required to ground human value. Therefore the next four chapters each represent and respond respectively to the four books of the aforementioned volume. The fifth chapter of the book looks at the key thread running throughout the work, and the ultimate foundation for a renewed political theology that grounds human value.

The methodology of the current work will come from the field of semiotics, the science of signs. The notion of the Image of God was previously treated under a semiotic lens through the work of Claudia Welz who summarized the four key interpretations of the *Imago Dei* as: representative; resemblance; relational; and dynamic.<sup>103</sup> That humans represent God's dominion; that there are mimetic connections to God; that through the possibilities of language and speech God could be uniquely understood by humans; and that humans are capable of ethical progress are respectively the four fundamental connections between man and God. These will be explained within this work, but at this stage it is important to note that Claudia Welz connected each of these major interpretations with one of the three signs serving as the foundation of a semiotic taxonomy first put forward by American Philosopher, Charles Peirce. The three signs are the icon, the index,

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<sup>103</sup> Claudia Welz, *Humanity in God's Image: An Interdisciplinary Exploration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

and the symbol. An icon is a sign that resembles an object. An index is a sign that is connected with the object either in space, time or through causation. A symbol is a sign that is only connected with the object to which it refers by convention. In Welz' own words:

“If humanity in God’s image contains a resemblance to God, as the mimetic model demands, the *imago Dei* needs to be defined as an icon; yet, if the functional aspect of representation is to be included, the icon also needs to be indexical. Furthermore, the aspect of a reference beyond oneself, which is emphasized in the relational and dynamic models, demands that the image of God also be understood symbolically. Thus, the *imago Dei* is to be construed as a complex sign that is iconic, indexical, and symbolic. This implies not just an integration of the aspects that are prominent in the respective models of interpretation, but also a critique of reductionist tendencies where one specific model is advocated while another model is excluded... Although it is an iconic sign, it has difficulties seeing its semblance with God; although it is – as an indexical sign – capable of semiotic self-localization ‘before God,’ it tends to dislocate itself in relation to its origin, ground, and destination; although it symbolically refers to what cannot be ‘read off’ itself, it remains insecure about the meaning of this reference to the invisible. To call the human being ‘God’s image,’ and to understand this image as a sign, is itself the sign of limited self-knowledge.”<sup>104</sup>

In addition to responding to John Locke’s model of knowledge with current research, this work will also be adopting the perspective of cultural semiotician Juri Lotman that life itself is a text that can be read by perception. This means that life is not only discrete and verbal, but iconic and continuous. This semiotic viewpoint of life opens up the ability to use a tool of interpretation from hermeneutics and exegesis traditionally utilized in relationship with sacred scriptures instead as a tool to interpret an aspect of life itself.

This will prove fruitful because if God is not allowed into the equation, then it is also impossible to analyze the Image of God directly. What can be analyzed however in Genesis 1 is the first contradiction God is argued to have brought into fruition. A literal interpretation of the Bible begins with the question of how the first creation that God’s speech brought into existence, light, preceded the creation of the sun and the moon. Therefore, this work will use the exegetical technique of PRDS and apply it to sunlight itself in order to extract the interpretant that can explain what the Image of God means, and how it can still serve as the foundation for human value and human rights even without God as traditionally defined. Again, this is necessary because the use of a particular religion cannot be used to justify political philosophy in the public secular sphere – by definition – anymore.

What is PRDS? A more full name would be *Pardes* – the Hebrew word of paradise meaning orchard – but in itself is an acronym representing four pathways to interpreting a text. The letters stand for *peshat*, *remez*, *drash/din*, and *sod* respectively. A literal interpretation, allegorical/typological, moral/tropological

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<sup>104</sup> Welz, *Humanity in God’s Image: An Interdisciplinary Exploration*, 44.

and secret/esoteric/mystical/anagogical interpretation of a text. While this is traditionally a Jewish exegetical technique derived from Kabbalah, it is in essence equivalent with the Four Senses of Scripture found in Christian exegetical analysis. The tetramorph. In Japan there is a temple known as Zenkoji that is said to hold the key to paradise. In order to find it the visitors must walk downstairs into a dark corridor, without any light and move their way through the hall until they come upon it, and yet when it is found all that appears is actually a doorknob. Where is the key in the dark? Each of these tools will be applied to sunlight in order to extract a key to unlocking the Image of God in the face of the demise of God in the public secular sphere. As a short example of the four senses, the renowned Paradiso author Dante explained it thus:

“it may be called “polysemous”, that is, of many senses. A first sense derives from the letters themselves, and a second from the things signified by the letters. We call the first sense “literal” sense, the second the “allegorical”, or “moral” or “anagogical”. To clarify this method of treatment, consider this verse: When Israel went out of Egypt, the house of Jacob from a barbarous people: Judea was made his sanctuary, Israel his dominion (Psalm 113). Now if we examine the letters alone, the exodus of the children of Israel from Egypt in the time of Moses is signified; in the allegory, our redemption accomplished through Christ; in the moral sense, the conversion of the soul from the grief and misery of sin to the state of grace; in the anagogical sense, the exodus of the holy soul from slavery of this corruption to the freedom of eternal glory.”<sup>105</sup>

Here then the guiding principle of this work will be to perform an exegesis of light itself. Each chapter will align with a book of John Locke and John Rawls that align with the theme. The first half of each chapter will show how sovereignty and logic relate in terms of political philosophy. The second half of each chapter will provide a walkthrough of the exegesis of light utilizing the model contained within that chapter to bring together in the end of a cohesive story of light and its relationship with sovereignty in a deeply embodied and interconnected level.

In chapter one it will be utilizing induction, empiricism and that of the indexical relations of the iconic self to the objects surrounding that icon. This is a higher order of mutual information as it requires work to have not only been connected with a sense of Self, but then requires the mutual information about the objects indexically and continuously connected with that self in its environment in space-time. Chapter two will look at light allegorically. The hidden meaning behind light as knowledge. For ‘knowing is seeing’. Here is the primary dynamical mutual information between work and the iconic recursive self. This chapter is focused on abductive logic. Chapter three is going to be looking at the light of reason, the Enlightenment in the traditional sense of the word. This is the third order of mutual information as the proposition contains necessary indexical and iconic relations. This is deductive logic.

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<sup>105</sup> Dante Alighieri, *Epistle to Cangrande della Scala*, in *Divine Comedy, Hell*, trans. Dorothy Sayers (Penguin Classics, 1949), 14.

After these three traditional modes of Peircian thinking chapter four will seek to bring back Peirce's notion of the 'natural light'. This will happen by going deeper into the notion of 'emergent exemplarity' to see how one acts in the face of paradox through collapsing the binary and by acting on the belief that the 'light is good'. This is where the analogy begins to be formulated. With that the tetramorph at the foundations of exegesis, hermeneutics and phenomenology will be complete in Lotmanian and Peircian semiotics. Chapter five will round out this tetramorph by showing how it all revolves around time, and within this space lies the foundation for sovereignty and human rights that lie beyond the static state and are required for imagination, perspective and embodied poetics beyond reason alone. Here then is the foundation for an Enlightenment 2.0 in a postsecular society. Here the creative dynamism of translating between the image and the word will reveal the space for human sovereignty. Here with the tools of: mutual information; the recursive self; teleodynamics; the eye of justice/altricial gaze/omni science perspective; transformative authenticity and emergent exemplarity a roadmap to unpacking a semiotic Imago Dei for a postsecular age rests. It is time now to 'see the light'.

## Statements of Defence

1. There is a metainference that is uncovered through a recursive understanding of semiosis. This is a form of inference that is built on top of – but distinguished from – abduction, induction and deduction. This form of metainference is here termed anaduction. Ducere means to lead, and ab, in, and de mean away, toward, and from, respectively. Anaduction therefore means to lead upwards.
2. This mode of inference is related to the omniscient perspective that cognitive science highlights to be related to socially strategic information.
3. This omniscient perspective is the root source of the Imaginative Universal.
4. This mode of inference and perspective is a core factor in the symbol of the Image of God.
5. Political philosophy theories focused on authenticity, reflective judgment and exemplarity must be extended to to incorporate this mode of inference in the confrontation of novel uncategorized situations. In this way highlighting transformative authenticity and emergent exemplarity.
6. Imaginary universals are based on a model of eternal ideal history that utilize rhetorical tropes as a model of knowledge generation. Therefore, anaduction will itself play this central position in human societal evolution in inferential terms.
7. The 'Other' – including the stranger – is a paradoxical category that represents the possibility for both opportunity and threat. Overcoming paradox requires logical type thinking that utilizes anaduction.



# **PART ONE**

Doxa



## CHAPTER 1

### **Secondness: Nigredo Subject** (The Justified Indexical Law of the Peoples)

#### **Section A: Pistis/Peshat/Induction**

##### *Center and Periphery*

Galileo famously said the laws of nature are mathematics. In his words, “Philosophy is written in this grand book, the universe ... is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric figures”<sup>1</sup> While the introductory chapter has noted the difficulty in grounding knowledge in formal logic, Charles Peirce highlighted Galileo’s deeper solution to interpreting the universe. As Peirce emphasised, it was the natural light of reason – preceding inductive reason – that was key to scientific insight, for “science has been builded after the model of Galileo, who founded it, on *il lume naturale*”<sup>2</sup>. With that said, this first chapter will begin with the traditional focus of science on the empirical, natural, indexical and inductive world. Only after peeling back a few more layers of logic will ‘*il lume naturale*’ be explored in depth in Chapter 4.

In this first chapter it will be important to begin to lay out the convergence of the logic of induction found throughout the disparate models of knowledge noted in the introduction. Plato’s model of knowledge begins with *Doxa*. Here is opinion formed by the general populace based not on timeless absolute truths, but temporary and fleeting projections onto contextualized objects. *Doxa* itself in the analogy of the divided line is shown to be divided between imagination and belief. *Eikasia* and *pistis*. A belief (*pistis*) being formed once the imagination is connected with an object. In the terms of semiotics these are the two dimensions of firstness and secondness, respectively. Importantly, when looking purely at the object, it is known as the world of secondness, Plato’s dimension of belief (*pistis*), and based on indexical relations between the object and the Self.

Combining this model with the semiotic model of Charles Peirce allows the underlying system of logic to be exposed. The realm of the object for Charles Peirce could be compared against an extracted prior law (proposition) to produce an inductive prediction. The world of objects is therefore within the logical realm of induction. This is opposed to the other forms of logic that will be discussed in later chapters (Abduction: Chapter 2; Deduction: Chapter 3; Analogy: Chapter 4). In literary theory and exegesis it is the literal interpretation. The world of *Peshat*; empiricism; materialism; and ‘*a posteriori*’ knowledge.

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<sup>1</sup> Stillman Drake, *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1957), 237.

<sup>2</sup> Peirce, *A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God*, 6.477.

This is the world of inductive logic. In other words, this is the world of the physical object and the linguistic subject; the world of things; and the world of Kenneth Burke's metonymy. This is the world of Carl Jung's dimension of sensing; of the second-person perspective; of secondness in the framework of Charles Peirce. This is the world of indexicals; of belief in Plato's model after imagination has fixed on an object. In linguistics it is that world of physical syntax that Terrence Deacon's work has shown to constrain linguistic syntax through a process of constructing isomorphic propositions.<sup>3</sup> Where physical objects are tested against physical predicates. It is the world of justification and maturity when applied to science and Alessandro Ferrara's model of authenticity and identity, respectively. This is because it is the world of errors upon which the hypothetico-deductive system is applied against. This is the emplotment of tragedy in the metahistorical model of Hayden White. In Agrippa's tropes, this is the 'relation' between subject and objects.

What maturity means for an identity is that its encounter with reality deflates in a certain sense its own self-image as it runs up against limitations. This level of maturity brings a greater degree of correspondence between identity and its effects in the world. Ferrara relies on Weber to say that the development of "a more mature cultural identity – that is, to a collective identity more disenchanting and, as such, more capable of resisting the illusion of its own magical omnipotence."<sup>4</sup> Each of the chapters will highlight an aspect of Rome most in line with the interpretive lens. In this first instance, it is looking at Rome through a literal lens. In this case, when looking at Rome directly one sees the layers of history starting with its monuments signifying ancient Rome where it was capito mundi, capital of the world.

In alchemical terms the beginning of the process is nigredo. The blackening phase. For analytical psychology this is a metaphor for the "dark night of the soul, when an individual confronts the shadow within."<sup>5</sup> The matrix of experience where an individual sees a mirror reflection of that which they try not to see. The key to alchemy was ultimately about individuation, a properly developed self. Here, Jung "compared the 'black work' of the alchemists (the nigredo) with the often highly critical involvement experienced by the ego, until it accepts the new equilibrium brought about by the creation of the self."<sup>6</sup> Nigredo in a psychological sense is experienced as chaos, anxiety and despair. This is the experience where there are no error-proof propositions ready to confront the experience at hand. Chaos, which in psychological terms is anxiety, and in Peircean terms is

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<sup>3</sup> Thomas Schilhab, Frederik Stjernfelt, and Terrence Deacon, eds., *The Symbolic Species Evolved*, Biosemiotics Vol. 6 (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 124.

<sup>5</sup> Robert H. Hopeke, *A Guided Tour of the Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Boston: Shambhala, 1989), 165.

<sup>6</sup> Hans Dieckmann, "Shadow (Analytical Psychology)," *International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis*, *Encyclopedia.com*, accessed January 11, 2025, <https://www.encyclopedia.com>.

the ‘irritation of doubt’ that initiates the inference process. The shadow that initiates an individuation process in Jungian terms.

Anxiety is the running thread throughout this work. In Peircean terms it is the ‘irritation of doubt’ that begins the inference process. In psychological terms it is the experience that occurs where there is an unmapped object against memory. Its valence is therefore unknown. Paul Tillich showed that the three key anxieties facing humanity are: death, guilt; and meaninglessness. This indexical world is the world of secondness where systems have a greater statistical likelihood of becoming uncorrelated over time due to the second law of thermodynamics.

In the system presented by Franz Rosenzweig this is the world of particulars. The action of logos and not its substance. It is that aspect of time which runs counter to thermodynamics, meaning that time is entwined with action, the propitious moment. This is known in the four modes of persuasion as Kairos. Time with a purpose. Kairos is opposed to that of Kronos, which is time as entropy. A key question is how Kairos emerges out of Kronos. This is contextual and local space-time.

In political philosophy this is the realm that John Rawls starts to extend his work into in the Law of the Peoples, when the limitations of ideal theory are matched by the incorporation of more and greater population size. In the PRDS key this is the realm of Peshat, meaning literal interpretation of perception. In Plato’s analogy of the divided line this is the Pistis. The illusion of an object. The shadow of the true form. The particular of a general.

This first chapter will lay out how John Rawls’ work finds its limits as it is implemented in this world of social objects, the world-as-it-is when ‘the Peoples’ is stretched across space and time to include all the reasonable people of the world. Rawls’ himself showed that at the limits of his theory lies the ultimate foundation of decent peoples, which is shown to be rooted in human rights. Without letting human rights be left as simply prudential, pragmatic and based upon *modus vivendi*, this first section of this work will show that human rights are neither legal nor moral. These fundamental rights will be shown to precede the government and the constitutional order. This empirical world will be shown to be centered on social and natural ontology and the social and natural objects that compose the human experience. Far from science capturing these objects, it will be shown that science is truly a correspondence theory between mathematical models and reality that can make predictions. What this really means is exposing the regularity of objects and their relations over time after their unique predicates have been stripped. In other words, the regularities and habits that are central to the work of one of the fathers of semiotics: Charles Peirce.

With all of that said, this first section is set to explore the state of exception; the law of the peoples; and sovereignty’s relationship with law and morality. The second half of the chapter will explore induction; empiricism; imagination; the natural light; the psychophysical theories of Carl Jung and Wolfgang Pauli; and culminate in looking at a correspondence theory of truth. This ‘real’ world will already be shown to be related to a second order of mutual information based on contiguity in space-time and that through experimentation serves as the space of

justification and maturity of evidence. All of this will be placed within the frame disclosed through consilience, that of the center and periphery utilized across broad disciplines to capture the notion of certain versus uncertain information.

As will be seen throughout, the metaphor of the center and periphery captures a deep relationship between predicates and objects as they are processed in either the foveal or peripheral vision. This is itself captured in the metaphor of light and darkness, understanding and ignorance. This metaphor is universal and ubiquitous as noted in the introduction, for 'Knowing is Seeing'. This is a model captured in Exegesis: PRDS, the tetramorph, the kalachakra, and Claudia Welz' model of the Semiotic Image of God, for instance. In philosophy through the models of Plato, Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger; and political philosophy through Alessandro Ferrara. It is further captured by the definition of knowledge itself as 'justified true belief', or as will be shown in corrected form: Justified (chapter one) True (chapter three) Judgment (chapter two). This leaves the space for novel information creation as unjustified judgment, and uncritical common sense illuminated by the 'natural light' noted by Peirce and Galileo.

Throughout this work each of the four dimensions of inference will be highlighted by a leading scholar from the traditional center of the western world (Italy), a leading scholar from the eastern periphery of the western world (Estonia) and a leading scholar from the western periphery (California). The four scholars of the center will be: Machievelli; Alessandro Ferrara; Umberto Eco; and Pico Della Mirandola, respectively. The four scholars representing semiotics from the eastern periphery will be Wilhelm Otswald for physical semiotics; Jacob von Uexkull for biosemiotics; Juri Lotman for cultural semiotics and Thomas-Andreas Pöder for theosemiotics. The four western scholars will be Josiah Royce; Terrence Deacon; Thomas Kuhn and George Lakoff. Each section will be represented by one of the four Rome's: Ancient Rome; the Vatican; EUR; and Tor Vergata. Each of these chapters also tries to grasp through the four works of John Locke's Human Understanding; the four tropes of Kenneth Burke; the four emplotments of Hayden White; the four personality dimensions of Carl Jung; the four dimensional model of Plato. Known as the tetractys; tree of life; tetramorph. Each of these four chapters will also interact with one of John Rawls' works, respectively: Law of the Peoples; Political Liberalism; Theory of Justice; and The Meaning of Sin and Faith.

Again, in this first chapter the focus is on what Josiah Royce sees as the world of realism. A conception of being that sees an objective reality beyond the mind. This realm is proven in Josiah Royce's theory by the fact that it is in this space that error arises. The reality of error shows that there is a ground of reality beyond intrinsic knowledge. In Kenneth Burke's theory on rhetoric, this is the realm of metonymy. For Peirce it is the realm of indexicality, where there is contiguity in space-time. In logical terms this is therefore the realm of induction and observation of objects. This is the material world. In mythological terms it is represented by the Great Mother. This is the realm that gives life and also threatens non-being. The anxiety of death and suffering. This realm is firmly in the darkness of the cave in Plato's allegory. It is the subject of a sentence, which will be

shown to be a higher order of mutual information than that found within the predicate that will be explored in the next chapter. In theories of epistemology this is the ‘justification’ stage of justified true belief. As will be explored later in the chapter, in identity theory it is the maturity stage of an identity as it is tested against reality.

### ***State of Exception and Political Theology***

A key aspect of this work is showing how sovereignty is fundamental to the discussion of theosemiosis and grounding human rights and political philosophy. In fact, in the work of the leading political philosophers this question of sovereignty has been equated with theology as it is in many ways it is the continuation of the question of how the existential structure of human relations are grounded. Carl Schmitt famously stated, “significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”<sup>7</sup>

The theory of sovereignty is in Schmitt’s view akin to a theology of God. Schmitt saw this sovereignty as stemming from ultimately a sovereign defending the law, when he said “the leader defends the law” – *der Führer schützt das recht*.<sup>8</sup> This is because “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”<sup>9</sup> Schmitt tried to show that even democracies could be dictatorships: “If the constitution of a state is democratic, then every exceptional negation of democratic principles, every exercise of state power independent of the approval of the majority, can be called dictatorship.”<sup>10</sup> For Schmitt, dictatorship in times of exception showed their priority over the slower legislative process. Schmitt first introduced this concept in the 1921 short essay *On Dictatorship*. As an emergency “shakes up the accepted order of things...the sovereign steps forward and institutes new, extra-legal rules.”<sup>11</sup>

Here then is a recurring theme of the political philosophers throughout this work, how does the Image of God collide with sovereignty. For Carl Schmitt, the Führer in charge of ‘the People’ and his sovereignty was akin to God. Alternatively, for John Locke individual sovereignty stemmed from this principle that all humans are born as God’s creation. Twentieth century political philosopher John

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<sup>7</sup> Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 36, 48, 65.

<sup>8</sup> Carl Schmitt, “The Führer Protects Justice,” in *Carl Schmitt’s Ultimate Emergency: The Night of the Long Knives*, ed. Detlev Vagts, 203, 87(2) *The Germanic Review* (2012), originally published in *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, 1934, 38.

<sup>9</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. George Schwab (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 7.

<sup>10</sup> Carl Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (1921), 11.

<sup>11</sup> Masha Gessen, *Surviving Autocracy*, chapter 2: “Waiting for the Reichstag Fire” (New York: Riverhead Books, 2020).

Rawls himself first wrote his dissertation trying to show how all communities were at their very foundations built in the 'Image of God'.<sup>12</sup>

For Carl Schmitt the basis of all sovereignty and all political theology could be grasped by one key power. The power to declare a 'state of exception'. Traditionally, this has often been taken to be equivalent to the state of emergency. Schmitt's own work is heavily controversial as he purposely gave the cover for Adolf Hitler to suspend constitutional rights from before the start of World War II, and all the way through to his end. In fact, Schmitt supported the idea of dictatorship as being the ideal structure of society for the very reason that they would be best positioned to deal with 'states of exception'. For Schmitt, "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception."<sup>13</sup> A state of exception entails executive powers, a suspension of the rule of law and derogation of the constitution.<sup>14</sup>

The major example was Hindenburg's Reichstag Fire Decree, the suspension of constitutional rights, followed by The Enabling Act. This Enabling Act was supported through Schmitt's theory and was used by Hitler all the way through to 1945. Even so, it took six years after the Reichstag fire for the war to begin. "The entire Third Reich can be considered a state of exception that lasted twelve years."<sup>15</sup> Modern totalitarianism can then "be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system."<sup>16</sup>

Politics is at the base of all existentialism because it is the binary that dictates what is allowed to exist, all through the simple categorization as either friend or enemy. Politics is existential and therefore has a deeper grounding than other domains as once there is a distinction between friend and enemy it becomes political and existential. An enemy is "in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."<sup>17</sup> For Schmitt, "The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly... But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger..."<sup>18</sup> Here Schmitt leaves no room to synthesize in the Hegelian sense. To incorporate 'the Other', or the 'shadow' in the Jungian sense.

Strauss explained Schmitt's political theology, "[B]ecause man is by nature evil, he therefore needs dominion. But dominion can be established, that is, men can be unified only in a unity against – against other men. Every association of

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<sup>12</sup> John Rawls, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin & Faith* (with "On My Religion"), ed. Thomas Nagel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

<sup>13</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Head, *Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice: The Long Shadow of Carl Schmitt* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 14.

<sup>15</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 2.

<sup>16</sup> Agamben, *State of Exception*, 2.

<sup>17</sup> C. Frye, "Carl Schmitt's Concept of the Political," *The Journal of Politics* 28, no. 4 (1966): 818, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>18</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, 27.

men is necessarily a separation from other men.”<sup>19</sup> Therefore, “the political thus understood is not the constitutive principle of the state, of order, but a condition of the state.”<sup>20</sup> Here for Schmitt, “All political concepts, images, and terms have a polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; the result (which manifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend–enemy grouping, and they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when this situation disappears.”<sup>21</sup> Therefore, “Words such as state, republic, society, class, as well as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, economic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incomprehensible if one does not know exactly who is to be affected, combated, refuted or negated by such a term.”<sup>22</sup>

This present work would like to start with the agreement that ‘the state of exception’ is fundamental to sovereignty, but unlike Schmitt disagrees that the power to declare the state of exception stems from the leader, instead the state of exception will be shown to begin beyond the state, the state’s constitutional order and the state’s epistemology – and that this requires human rights and sovereignty to ultimately confront states of exception that go beyond what the current legal model can deal with. The Leader as the head of the state is not meant to declare an emergency, but is called to react to an emergency that began beyond their control. Any other declaration is an illegal abrogation of law.

The traditional dichotomy between leader and citizens for Schmitt was that the sovereign holds an exceptional position that lies beyond the law. The sovereign “stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it”.<sup>23</sup> Giorgio Agamben tries to show how a mirror image of the sovereign in Ancient Rome was a person known as a *Homo Sacer*. For Agamben the Roman law producing the *homo sacer*, the sacred man, showed how law extends itself extra-positively through stripping ‘the Other’ of their rights. The law then is not by this definition primarily a protective force, but a force of destruction of ‘the Other’.

The *homo sacer* from this vantage point is equivalent to the ‘other’ of the sovereign who also is under and above the law simultaneously.<sup>24</sup> In “*Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*” Agamben says that the state of exception is then also representative of this extra-positive space, as the executive powers extend beyond the law.<sup>25</sup> Agamben “identifies the state of exception with the power of

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<sup>19</sup> Hans Meier, *Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 125.

<sup>20</sup> Meier, *Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue*, 125.

<sup>21</sup> Mathias Thaler, *Naming Violence: A Critical Theory of Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 4.

<sup>22</sup> Thaler, *Naming Violence: A Critical Theory of Genocide, Torture, and Terrorism*, 4.

<sup>23</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, 7.

<sup>24</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8.

<sup>25</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*.

decision over life.”<sup>26</sup> Here, “The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious.”<sup>27</sup>

The law therefore ultimately regulates both ‘bare life’ and ‘citizens’. This is Aristotle’s separation of biological life from the good life achieved through society and through symbolic living.<sup>28</sup> It is because exception is fundamental to sovereignty that biopower is at the heart of political life. Who is brought into bios (culture) and who is left in zoe (nature). Agamben sees the state of exception, the *ausnahmezustand* as related to Roman *justitium* and *auctoritas*. A ‘state of exception’ is where constitutional rights are restricted in some sense. In this period, “In every case, the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an enunciation without any real reference.”<sup>29</sup>

In “The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the Modern”, Agamben says “The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule.”<sup>30</sup> Agamben says that “What happened in the camps so exceeds (is outside of) the juridical concept of crime that the specific juridico-political structure in which those events took place is often simply omitted from consideration.”<sup>31</sup> The ontology of the state of exception is taken here to be true, that there are moments that exceed the constitutional order, but they do not stem from sovereignty, instead they are where authority receives its sovereignty from. They are also far more ubiquitous than those few moments where a leader declares a state of emergency. They are in fact all moments where novel information does not adequately fit within the social order, but which ‘the People’ must equilibrate with in order for ‘the People’ to survive and reproduce. It is from this source that amendments to the constitutions draw their authority.

It is due to their biological and physical nature that their solution can ultimately only be resolved by individuals confronting the ‘state of exception’. For this reason it will be shown that the ‘the state of exception’ is actually the source of individual sovereignty, not the foundation for dictatorship. The State of exception is where the social epistemology has not correctly mapped out the dynamic social ontology and requires human interaction to bring equilibrium back to ‘the Peoples’. This is further the source of amendment power of the constitution where human rights in the United States Constitutional realm for instance were first

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<sup>26</sup> Jacques Rancière, “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 103, no. 2–3 (2004): 300.

<sup>27</sup> Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 115.

<sup>28</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 66.

<sup>29</sup> Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, 40.

<sup>30</sup> Giorgio Agamben, “The Camp as the Nomos of the Modern,” in *Violence, Identity, and Self-Determination*, ed. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber, 106–118 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), Part III, section 7

<sup>31</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Omnibus Homo Sacer* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2017), 137.

recognized. Due to the difference between anchoring and grounding relations this sovereignty should correctly be termed the: 'Sovereignty of Relations'.

Alessandro Ferrara's work on Sovereignty Across Generations has started to map out the distinction between constituent and amendment power that he has shown hold two distinct standards of legitimacy. This is because there is an unamendable aspect of the constitution rooted in constituent power. This is a power that is 'always under the law' according to Frank Michelman's interpretation of John Rawls.<sup>32</sup> This is ultimately a power that is purely symbolic in nature and doesn't contain the biological element of humanity. It is created through the constitution itself, and does not precede it. Alternatively amendment power transforms a constitution, and if it has legitimacy beyond the legal order itself it must therefore be rooted not in constituent power, but in sovereignty itself. Sovereignty of relations in the case of this work. Sovereignty therefore must contain both the symbolic elements and natural elements of humanity.

It must contain the demos that constituent power composes, as well as the ethnos that is used to term the aspects of communities that extend beyond the constitutional order itself. Therefore, inclusive of that aspect of the human species transcending its symbolic nature in the Deaconian semiotic sense into those aspects of humans in interaction with the environment and transforming anchoring relations themselves. This sovereign power will be shown to precede any constitution, and is in fact the source of legitimacy. It is the sovereign individual and her/his relations that can extend beyond the constitutional order in 'states of exception' that require a response not yet in place. This is not to dispose of the constitution, but to preserve it at the most fundamental level. The self-congruence of the global constitution of human life itself that began with the advent of humanity as a 'symbolic species'.<sup>33</sup>

This entire philosophy boils down to two key themes that will be seen throughout this work: 1) the distinction between center and periphery; and 2) the dual nature of humans as symbolic and biological species. These themes are important because they get to the heart of the point that 'the Other' is ultimately a political affair at the level of existence whereby binary collapses these distinctions to friend and enemy. Friend is anyone closer to the center of culture, and enemies are the codified 'Other'. The law in this case isn't neutral towards the extra-positive space, but in fact contains negative rights in the extreme sense of homo sacer in showing that 'others' have no right to life. The second theme of humanity's dual nature will be shown to be fundamentally important when considering that constitutional and social orders seek to reproduce over time. This means that the order cannot only aim to be a static order of logic that accords with the laws of nature, but must find itself re-equilibrated over time with the nature outside of culture, the periphery outside of the center. It requires incorporating new and novel biological and physical facts into the social order over time.

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<sup>32</sup> Frank Michelman, "Always Under Law?" *Constitutional Commentary* 12 (1995): 227.

<sup>33</sup> Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*.

## *Law of the Peoples*

John Rawls started his career with the aim of being a theologian and writing a political philosophy framework extended from the Image of God. This led him to see 'community' as built around the notion of the trinity. At the root of society are its relations, which the triune relationship is emblematic of. However, after having served in world war II Rawls started to turn away from God and toward seeking to ground human society on human existence alone. His first opponents were utilitarian philosophers. In *The Theory of Justice* John Rawls sought to bring back a social contract theory of liberalism that didn't try to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number, but instead sought to find the optimal position individuals would take if they had to be shrouded in a 'veil of ignorance' in their original position.

A key difference that Rawls took from the principle of the current work is that Rawls extracts justice from a model of fairness centered around free and equal citizens. However, due to Agrippa's trilemma, Godel Theory of Incompleteness, and Tarski's undefinability it isn't possible to extract axioms from a deductive system. The current work will show alternatively how there is a 'veil of ignorance', but it requires a 'continuous', and not 'original position' for reasons that will be explained. This means that as opposed to fairness preceding justice, in the model that will be shown it is justice that precedes fairness.

John Rawls also came to question his own views on the Theory of Justice. He came back to question if a rational theory alone would work, as there were several rational models that were equally as comprehensive and valid. This led John Rawls to introduce his next work on Political Liberalism that sought to show how in the face of multiple equally rational theories, there could still be a best choice based not on rationality, but on reasonableness. The most reasonable choice could be implemented. John "Rawls sees overlapping consensus as the possibility of overcoming the conflict between Lockean and Rousseauian versions of liberal democratic political culture."<sup>34</sup> In Hypothetico-deductivism evidence is the observation of the hypothesis in action.

Rawls' next major issue came from when he sought to extend his model across Space to incorporate more people in the Law of the Peoples. However, this weakened the foundations of free and equal citizenry that would be marked out within nations. The difficulties have grown even larger when his theory is exposed to time as they reincorporate the biological animal beneath the abstract symbol level of society. This spot will be noted in this work as being the location of the eternity clause. Where the state of exception can be confronted. The directionality of Rawls' work therefore, has been a weakening normative position in his model as it extends to global society.

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<sup>34</sup> L. Baccelli, "Inside the Rawlsian Horizon?" *Jura Gentium. Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale / Journal of Philosophy of International Law and Global Politics* XIV, no. 1 (2017): 36.

A further difficulty of the work is that law ultimately is coercive, it is ultimately a form of political power if not outright violence. Rights ultimately must exist as a principle without coercion if they are meant to signify something deeper than a physically imposed concept. According to Ferrara, “the received view of political liberalism”<sup>35</sup> has to be amended because of the “high degree of normative idealization that is still present”<sup>36</sup> ... [and the] element of contingency that Rawls associated with normativity”<sup>37</sup>.

At the extremity of Rawls theory as found in the Law of the Peoples is the stated foundational axiom of decent peoples which is just given as human rights without any reasons given for the foundation. It is therefore important to see beyond the theory of Rawls how and why human rights are actually the fundamental axiom of decent peoples. An important point that will be made is that this axiom stems neither from law nor morality in the current work.

The core question in John Rawls’ Political Liberalism asks “how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”<sup>38</sup> In Rawls’ words, “the cornerstone of political liberalism lies on the liberal principle of legitimacy”.<sup>39</sup> This principle states that “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”<sup>40</sup>

Seeking to find the basis for human rights Rawls argued that “they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally.”<sup>41</sup> This means that, “the political (moral) force [of these rights] extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states.”<sup>42</sup> However, if that is the case they cannot be simply matters of prudence or *modus vivendi*, but come from a deeper source.

The difficulty for Rawls is that “human rights appear to be beyond the contractualist framework of the Law of Peoples in at least three senses.”<sup>43</sup> The first is “in the sense that the eight principles approved of in the original position do include

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<sup>35</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 89.

<sup>36</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 89.

<sup>37</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 89.

<sup>38</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, XVIII.

<sup>39</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137.

<sup>40</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137

<sup>41</sup> John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), 81.

<sup>42</sup> Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” 81.

<sup>43</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 124.

the duty to protect human rights, but do not contain a specification of which rights are to be considered human rights.”<sup>44</sup> The second is that “the parties thus appear to be approving of a principle whose content remains totally unspecified.”<sup>45</sup> Finally, the third is “because rights are declared to be binding also for those states which do not and cannot have representatives in the original position and thus cannot be said to have subscribed to them, their bindingness appears to be evidently of a non-contractarian nature.”<sup>46</sup> Human rights are then “moral rights, independently grounded, which set external limits to the sovereign will of peoples... Rawls does not offer any argument for grounding these moral rights, but merely invites us to presuppose their being justified.”<sup>47</sup>

### ***Neither Law Nor Morality***

Traditionally, the moral foundation for human rights was sought through either legal or moral grounds. Allen Buchanan for example sees human rights as morally justified legal rights, and Samantha Besson sees them as both legal and moral rights. However, as law is based upon coercion by those in power and if morality is seen in the postsecular age is particular and relative to different communities the foundation of human rights cannot be drawn from either of these sources. Law as a form of coercive power has been discussed by the political philosophers Alessandro Ferrara, Christoph Menke, Walter Benjamin, Hannah Arendt, and Machiavelli to name a handful.

Traditionally, human rights were meant to be grounded in either a legal or moral foundation. However, the first section of this work will show human rights to not be grounded in either law or morality. The first section in its two distinct chapters will together also show the entirety of what doxa refers to in the model of the proposition. The deeper source will be shown to be rooted in fundamental rights that are pre-constitutional and are actually granted because of their impact on social ontology in the “State of Exception”. Therefore, as opposed to John Rawls’ legitimation by constitution, this is the legitimation of the constitution rooted in the State of Exception to the current constitutional order. This first chapter in particular will be rooted in the justification of knowledge, and the maturity of experience. If there were no rules applied to individuals in the realm of human experience it would equate with a morality based upon virtue ethics, and be termed philosophical libertarianism. This places ethics in the hands of individuals with no governmental rules, philosophical libertarianism. The legitimacy stems from the legitimacy of amendability.

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<sup>44</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>45</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>46</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” *Political Theory* 31, no. 3 (2003): 395, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3595681>

<sup>47</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 395.

To start the discussion then “political power is always coercive power backed by the government’s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws”.<sup>48</sup> Law only extends its grasp over the individual through violence. As, “Faced with one who stands outside, and is alien to the law, the judgment of the judges can rule only by fear. That is why violence is part not just of the manifestation of the law but of its essence: the violence of the law flows from its political-procedural form of judgment.”<sup>49</sup>

Far from violence being separate from legitimate political power, Machiavelli was the first to say that violence in the right measure was actually necessary for all political power. It was in “the beginning of the 16th Century, Niccolò Machiavelli – one of the most influential thinkers in the history of political thought – argued that violence was one of the ways in which the Prince could establish and hold his political power.”<sup>50</sup> For Machiavelli, the “political use of violence” was connected to those regimes which he defined “per scelera” – namely those regimes obtained by means of “criminal virtues” or “violent actions”.<sup>51</sup> Further, “in the light of the Machiavellian conception of politics – violence is “well used” just when it is the result of an immediate action, limited to the only seizure of power.”<sup>52</sup>

Valerio Fabbrizi has performed a thorough task of highlighting the key views of scholars discussing the relationship of violence and the law, and this section of the chapter will lean on that effort. Two key authors within that discussion are Ferrara and Menke. In this regard, Ferrara comments on Menke that, “Menke emphasizes that law bears not simply an instrumental relation with violence, in those unfortunate cases when persuasion, deterrence or all other means fail, but also a “structural”, permanent and ineliminable relation to violence.”<sup>53</sup> Further, “Law does not discover a previously existent lawlessness, as though the state of nature really existed, but it creates areas of lawlessness to be violently subjected to lawful regulation. This is what Menke understands as “the fate of law.”<sup>54</sup> In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes said “covenants, without the sword, are but words”.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 136.

<sup>49</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” *Philosophy Kitchen* 4, no. 7 (2017): 42. Quoting Christoph Menke

<sup>50</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 42.

<sup>51</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 42

<sup>52</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 43

<sup>53</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 43, quoting Alessandro Ferrara.

<sup>54</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 43.

<sup>55</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, revised ed., ed. A. P. Martinich and Brian Battiste (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2010), Book II, Chapter 17.

Arguably, what distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate use of force is “that political power is ultimately the power of the public, that is, the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body.”<sup>56</sup> This distinction is what separates the legitimacy of a government of ‘the people’ from the need to justify it. “The distinction between power and violence also relates to the two main concepts of “justification” and “legitimacy”. On the one hand, power does not need justification due to its deep relevance in politics, but, on the other hand, power first of all needs legitimacy.”<sup>57</sup> Further, “Power belongs to people and draws its legitimacy from this democratic and popular sharing of sovereignty.”<sup>58</sup> In the work of Hannah Arendt, she “specifies that violence can be justifiable, but never legitimated. Violence can be justified in private affairs when it concerns self-defence and when one’s own personal life or safety is in danger, but it cannot be legitimated in politics as an instrument for political conflict.”<sup>59</sup> This is what leads Arendt to see that “power and violence are intrinsically opposite: as Arendt underlines, «when the one rules absolutely, the other is absent»<sup>60</sup>. So, violence rises when power is unstable and jeopardized, but when it takes its own course it ends in power’s disappearance.”<sup>61</sup>

With that said, Ferrara “asks why the maintenance of political and legal order should count as violence. At the same time, this also represents a controversial issue because it is not clear the reason why we should equate the defence of certain political and juridical practices – such as legislation, judiciary claims, judicial review, etc. – to violence.”<sup>62</sup> An additional question that arises at this point is whether “a moral culture, an ethos, commit[s] violence when it tries to preserve its own integrity as a system of principles and values aimed at orienting conduct? According to Ferrara, we cannot reduce law and violence in the tendency of law to maintain and protect itself against global social changes which affects the contemporary society.”<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 53.

<sup>57</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 45.

<sup>58</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 45.

<sup>59</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 45.

<sup>60</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 45. Quoting Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), 56.

<sup>61</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 45.

<sup>62</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 47.

<sup>63</sup> Fabbrizi, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 47.

Walter Benjamin in this regard held that, “lawmaking is power making and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence”.<sup>64</sup> He further stated that, “lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as its means, what is to be established as law”.<sup>65</sup> For Carl Schmitt, legitimacy and sovereignty were the basis of the “power to suspend the rule of law declaring the so-called “state of exception.”<sup>66</sup> Power therefore extended beyond the law. Here is then what enables Ferrara to state that “the originary founding of a legal system requires a moment of belief or [...] a moment of recognition that naked power cannot impose”.<sup>67</sup> This means that violence can not be confused with the legitimate use of power through the law.

Should human rights be purely legal instruments, it would mean that they would not have extra positive validity. One scholar that sees an exception to this is Habermas who says that human rights also contain an extra positive validity as they make the claim to also incorporate non-citizens – as humans – even though their authority only extends from within the law itself. International human rights are in a certain sense ambiguous because they have no legal foundation and only may become that if adopted by legal systems goes the argument.

Law is therefore about protecting and preserving itself. As, “the law is purely about power, yet not about the power of the ruling class or the victor; it is about its own power, the power of the law. The “fateful” violence of the law is the violence of its pure self-preservation”.<sup>68</sup> Law in this sense “operates purely for its own sake, for the sake of the preservation of its order, the establishment of its categories, perspective, and language – for the sake of its pure power.”<sup>69</sup> In that way law “is inextricably bound up with a paradoxical relation to violence: aimed at curbing violent action taking place in the legal area that it regulates, law performs its function through directives backed up by a violence which is always lurking in the background and is sometimes manifestly applied.”<sup>70</sup> For Menke, “law bears not simply an instrumental relation to violence, in those unfortunate

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<sup>64</sup> Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. P. Demetz (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 295.

<sup>65</sup> Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, ed. P. Demetz, 295.

<sup>66</sup> Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*.

<sup>67</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 12.

<sup>68</sup> Christoph Menke, “Law and Violence,” *Law and Literature* 22, no. 1 (2010): 28.

<sup>69</sup> Christoph Menke, Alessandro Ferrara, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Andreas G. Düttmann, David Loick, Benjamin Morgan, and M. del Rosario Acosta López, *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 31.

<sup>70</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 113.

cases when persuasion, deterrence, or all other means fail, but also a “structural,” permanent, and ineliminable relation to violence.”<sup>71</sup>

Here Schmitt’s work and Menke’s work agrees that ‘the Other’ is very much a part of the metalegal system. For “Law generates its own Other: that is, domains of human experience that are identified as in need of regulation and then subjected to its “rule,” always backed up by the threat of violence.”<sup>72</sup> This means that, “law does not discover an antecedently existent lawlessness, as though the state of nature really existed, but it creates areas of lawlessness (e.g., the state of nature qua mental experiment) to be violently subjected to lawful regulation.”<sup>73</sup> This is Menke’s “fate of law.”<sup>74</sup>

Here then is the recurrent theme of subjugating ‘the Other’. For “in every act of enforcement – or, in Benjamin’s terms, ‘preservation’ of the law – a ‘repetition’ occurs of the original lawmaking, namely the law’s forceful and violent suppression of ‘nonlaw’ or ‘mere life’ or ‘life in the state of nature’.”<sup>75</sup> For Menke then, “law can never be purely preservative, proceeding in accordance with its normative logic; it must again and again oppose its power to the extra-legal in acts divorced from all normativity”<sup>76</sup>. It is that “The violence ultimately bound up with the law consists of its compulsion to repeat this original violent scene over and over. Mysteriously, the legal order is said to impose itself over what preceded it ‘not by force of persuasion and justification’.”<sup>77</sup> This force is an argument opposed to the “three centuries of contract theories, from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau and on to Rawls have argued.”<sup>78</sup> Ultimately, “justice of law is therefore due to the political union of the citizens, which, as a created union, maintains its difference from what is not part of it.”<sup>79</sup>

With that said, John Locke disagreed that legitimate law could be founded in the use of force. For “Locke the imposition of a legal order or even of a single provision through the use of force puts the lawgiver in no different position than

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<sup>71</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 113.

<sup>72</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 113.

<sup>73</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 113.

<sup>74</sup> Menke, “Law and Violence,” 1–17.

<sup>75</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 121.

<sup>76</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 121.

<sup>77</sup> Ferrara, *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, 32..

<sup>78</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 121.

<sup>79</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 121.

that of a highway bandit who forces me to surrender my purse to them.”<sup>80</sup> In Locke’s argument, “Even the “Conqueror in a lawful War,” cannot impose a form of government by force and violence: He that forces my Horse from me, ought presently to restore.”<sup>81</sup> Rousseau also confronts the issue of violence, where “Even in the unlikely case that a violent imposition of the law – the archetypal “mythical violence of the law” – should succeed in winning the consensus of the subjects, as in La Boétie’s and Grotius’ patterns of voluntary enslavement, still we could not call the ensuing rule a legitimate one.”<sup>82</sup> This is because, “if an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and become the slave of a master, why should not a whole people be able to alienate theirs, and become subject to a king?”<sup>83</sup>

The solution again here is time itself, “Even if each person could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children; they are born free men; their liberty belongs to them, and no one has a right to dispose of it except themselves.”<sup>84</sup> For “In order, then, that an arbitrary government might be legitimate, it would be necessary that the people in each generation should have the option of accepting and rejecting it; but in that case such a government would no longer be arbitrary.”<sup>85</sup>

This view on violence is further opposed by both Rawls and Habermas as “Among contemporary authors, Rawls and Habermas can certainly be mentioned as critics.”<sup>86</sup> In Rawls’ case, this is “through his principle of liberal legitimacy and Habermas through his “co-originality thesis” – of the realist premise that legitimate forms of rule are the product of the stabilization and legitimation over time of what was once an exercise of naked power.”<sup>87</sup>

For Rawls, power is legitimate when “in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”<sup>88</sup> However, a realist political interpreter “such as Richard Bellamy –

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<sup>80</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 121.

<sup>81</sup> John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), Chapter 6 Paragraph 186.

<sup>82</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 125.

<sup>83</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract” (1762), in *The Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, ed. L. G. Crocker (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), I, 4, 11.

<sup>84</sup> Rousseau, “The Social Contract” (1762), in *The Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, ed. L. G. Crocker, I, 4, 11.

<sup>85</sup> Rousseau, “The Social Contract” (1762), in *The Social Contract and the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, ed. L. G. Crocker, I, 4, 11.

<sup>86</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 124.

<sup>87</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s ‘Law and Violence,’” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 124.

<sup>88</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137.

defends the idea according to which the legitimate exercise of power and the legitimacy of laws – and of the constitution itself – are just related to the will of a majority as expressed in the last electoral turn or in a legislative and parliamentary vote.”<sup>89</sup>

Thus far, the first half of this chapter has aimed to show that sovereignty cannot be grounded directly in John Rawls’ theory of the Law of the Peoples. Neither can it be grounded in law or morality in the traditional deductive and formal sense of the words. It alternatively finds its solution in the state of the exception, yet not the exception of Schmitt that depends on a dictator. It is this state that requires understanding of the role of time and novel information play in resolving uncertainty and doubt. It was seen that John Rawls’ theory finds great difficulty when extending to all Peoples around the world. He is left by saying that human rights are simply a brute fact that ground international dialogue, but does not suggest where they themselves receive their legitimacy. This grounding can neither be found in law nor morality, but must be rooted in a deeper source. This upcoming section will look at this world of Secondness, of induction and tell the story of light in a literal sense.

## **Section B: Maturity**

### ***Empiricism, Inductive Logic and the Fragmentation of Knowledge***

The literal interpretation of reality depends upon perceiving objects that lie beyond the self. Even though this can seem to be a fundamental level to thought, Charles Peirce showed how it is actually a world of secondness. This means that it is actually a higher order of mutual information required to document objects. Firstly the mind must be able to equate its own work program with its own iconic, dynamic and recursive Self. It is only the errors that occur with this work program that suggest a second order of mutual information between error/anxiety/the exceptional/doubt with contiguity of the Self in an environment in space-time. These higher order objects are the objects of empiricism. Inductive logic in this sense is the method of logic that seeks to test a general law against contextual, particular, reality in order to gain evidence for its truth claim through correspondence with ‘objective’ reality.

With that said, empirical objects are created in the physical world because of the mean free path, decoupling and recombination. The mean free path is the distance a particle can move before a collision occurs. This means the fewer the collisions the greater the distance. As the universe expands fewer collisions occur and photons can travel away to farther distances. This removal of energy obeys the laws of thermodynamics and enables the slower moving matter to hold a

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<sup>89</sup> Fabbri, “On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis,” 49.

stable form. This combination of matter is known as recombination and includes electrons and protons becoming bound into atoms. This is how information is formed. Matter that holds a stable shape in space-time. Mathematics can capture the static and non-dynamic aspects of nature that hold to their regularities. Calculus seeks to go beyond itself by utilizing infinity and zero to approximate change as close as possible. The difficulty is that dynamic objects are both ones and zeroes at different times. This is why imaginary numbers have proven so effective at capturing their greater potential than real numbers alone. This ability to capture the greater relations between what is present and what is absent.

The problem of relying upon mathematical information as evidence runs again headlong into David Hume's issue that no information discovered today can actually predict that it will happen tomorrow. Even if these problems are pushed to the side up to this day science has not been able to provide a consistent theory at all levels of analysis. The macro scale seems to be modeled by the General Theory of Relativity and the quantum level by Quantum Mechanics. As to date there has been no successful explanation of Quantum Gravity. On the one hand are those who see the models as mere approximate instruments, and on the other are those that argue the model grasps a deep reality. Whether science measures reality, or is more akin to a coarse grained statistical model of probabilities. On the one hand it has successfully found regularities in nature. On the other hand, theories have been exceedingly wrong in the past, and have been replaced by equally replaced theories. This is known as pessimistic induction.

The problems only become even greater when looking at the challenges to scientific knowledge that come from outside of itself as shown most dramatically in the Science Wars of the 1990's between Scientific Objectivity and Postmodernism. The key to postmodernism is understanding that there is no such thing as a fact that isn't value laden, and for postmodernists no reality beyond perception in their model. This means that there is never a fully 'objective' truth, with Thomas Nagel's 'view from nowhere'. There are also no value free searches for truth. There are hidden motivations. The fundamental motivation extending from the work of Nietzsche and expounded upon by Critical Theory is the 'will to power'. From that point then "science is power" (*scientia potentia est*) "power produces knowledge" and "knowledge constitute[s] power."<sup>90</sup> The mixture of science and government produces, 'politicized' science. "The claim that what authorities claim as "scientific knowledge" is really just a means of social control."<sup>91</sup> The Science Wars most famously hit their head with an article adopting the voice of a postmodernist even though they secretly opposed this view. This is known as the "Sokal Affair" of 1996.

One of the most cited individuals for postmodernism is the work of Thomas Kuhn, who popularized the term 'paradigm shifts'. Ultimately, Kuhn argued that

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<sup>90</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1977), 27.

<sup>91</sup> L. Bergkamp, "Postmodernism's Troubled Relationship with Science," *Areo Magazine*, 2016, <https://areomagazine.com>.

far from being in search of truth, science was in fact held up with a value structure known as a paradigm that the majority of scientists in a specific time period were under the sway of. This system would be held onto even in the face of errors up until a revolution in scientific thinking occurred, a paradigm shift. The greatest example is when Copernicus decentered humanity and earth from being the center of the universe. From the fact that even within our solar system the earth orbits the sun and not the other way around. This drastically altered the vision set by Ptolemy and Aristotle. Kepler would then seek to explain this orbit with the interpretive lens of the Christian trinity in discovering not circular orbits, but ellipses.

Thomas Kuhn's innovations in science coincided with and contrasted with that of Karl Popper. Popper himself wanted to challenge the verificationist approach of logical positivism, but came to the conclusion that the only true science would be that which is falsifiable. However, at their core there were two opposing models. Kuhn says that people hold onto a system even in the face of errors. Popper on the other hand declared that any error makes something unscientific. It took a third person named Lakatos from the London School of Economics to overcome this divide and present a model of science that could account for both these luminaries.

Lakatos' model became known as the 'research programme'.<sup>92</sup> For Lakatos the research programme had a hard core that was untouchable. In a certain sense it could be called sacred in a different context. This part of the programme could not be replaced without abandoning the whole programme. On the periphery were auxiliary hypotheses that were expendable and whose aim was to reach the standard of falsification. The difference in whether a programme is progressive or degenerative is whether the incoming errors create a model with greater explanatory and predictive power or whether the errors are left little explained and unattended to. As Lakatos said, "It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather, we propose a maze of theories, and nature may shout INCONSISTENT".<sup>93</sup>

An example Lakatos uses is that of Newton's three laws of motions which were the hard core of a research programme. The hard core can then be known as the first principles, the axioms of research. The difference with Kuhn's model is that Lakatos wanted to preserve Popper's logic of discovery in contrast to Kuhn's psychology of discovery. Lakatos referred to his theory as 'sophisticated methodological falsificationism'. Its methodology was to abandon worse theories for better theories as evidence bumped up against falsification. This ran counter to a dogmatic falsification theory that would throw out any theory based upon an error of fact. The true mark of a success of a research programme then is whether it is progressive or degenerative. Negative heuristics set research methods to avoid

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<sup>92</sup> Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, ed. John W. N. (Musgrave, 1970), 91–195.

<sup>93</sup> Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 130.

and protect the hard core. Positive heuristics discusses what methods to use and this helps modify the hard core and auxiliary in the intended manner.<sup>94</sup>

The problem then at this point shifts to correcting the auxiliary errors, which come in two types. One explains anomalies, the other can produce new facts, explanations and predictions from the error.<sup>95</sup> Any adjustments made simply to protect the hard core are degenerative. A research programme should therefore not be thrown out due to errors, but have those errors recognized so as to be more receptive to a theory that can provide an answer to more of the results. There is therefore no falsification until there is a better theory. A better research programme. This also means that while revolutions happen they are rational, and not a form of 'leap of faith'. The strength of Lakatos model then is that it states the core purpose is its predictive power. Evidence doesn't falsify theory, only a better theory does.

Several figures in science have sought to ground reality even within these critiques. Post Positivists for instance argue that human conjectures can still match reality even if not based upon an a priori model with an objective stance. This means the knowledge of reality is imperfect, yet still existent. Postpositivists also accept that it is impossible to be completely value free in research, but it is possible to uncover biases and temper them. In a similar vein Bas van Fraassen has tried to argue for constructive empiricism. This is composed of three parts, an epistemological claim, a semantic claim, and a normative claim. The claim is that science is only seeking to be empirically adequate. It does this by building a model that must be necessarily true, but only adequate empirically. This means it only has something meaningful to say about observable entities.

Science is only the latest aspect of knowledge to come under attack from post-modernism. It first began with language itself, starting in the humanities. It started through an intermediate stage known as post-structuralism. However, in order to understand post-structuralism it is important to grasp the structuralism that it was seeking to transcend. This goes back to the founding of modern linguistics. One of the fathers of semiotics known as Ferdinand de Saussure never wrote a book on the subject, but he did provide a course on his version of linguistics. Fortunately for history two of his students took that class and they turned their notes into a book. This book would upend the humanities and its effects are still being deeply felt to this day.

Ferdinand de Saussure sought to draw a stark distinction between his philosophy of language and what had come before, in order to make it more scientific. Up until this point language had been studied as a comparative and historical affair in the form of grammar and philology. Ferdinand de Saussure sought to extract its current structure. This required three key concepts. Firstly, it requires separating language as it is from language as it has changed through history. This

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<sup>94</sup> Scott O. Lilienfeld and William T. O'Donohue, *Great Readings in Clinical Science: Essential Selections for Mental Health Professionals* (1st ed.; Pearson, 2012).

<sup>95</sup> Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," 118.

is called either synchronic or diachronic, respectively. Synchronic then represents only language as it exists as a current structure.

Next comes the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, that there is a difference between the word as it is defined within the structure itself, and the word as it is used in speech. The latter is its pragmatic context. A true science of language should only concern itself with the structure of language, and not its natural use. The third key concept of structuralism is that it recognizes that words inherently have a value structure as the law of contradiction assures that they always contain their opposites in terms of identifying themselves. This means good can't be understood without contrasting it with evil for instance. The term used for this concept is binary opposition. The value part comes in because one of the two concepts is argued to be culturally preferred against the other. These three concepts became integral to the humanities of Europe in the twentieth century.

Overlaying this whole structure was that of the sign, which Saussure argued was composed of two pieces: the signifier such as the perceived sound, and the signified – the concept that comes to mind from the sound. For Saussure the connection between the two was arbitrary. Signs only gain their meanings from contrasts with other signs. For, “in language, there are only differences ‘without positive terms.’”<sup>96</sup> The focus then went deeper than simply looking at the relationship of the word to the thing it represents, to include the structure that ties the words as signs together. It spawned the Prague, Moscow and Copenhagen schools of linguistics. It made stars out of Claude Levi-Strauss, Roman Jakobson and psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Roman Jakobson brought structuralism outside of linguistics to culture as a whole. Claude Levi-Strauss brought it into the social sciences and mythology. Jacques Lacan into the mind. Roland Barthes into literature.

Just as importantly this structure is what laid the groundwork for its opposition that arose in the form of post-structuralism and deconstructionism. Key to understanding this phase is the work of Jacques Derrida, Michael Foucault and Roland Barthes. Derrida recognized that structuralism always contained a value structure, but it left out the notion of free-play from linguistics. The idea of freedom to play with this value structure. Michael Foucault read more deeply into it that this value structure also held into place the current power structure of the culture and all the pains and pleasures that entitled depending on where one fit within the structure. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” was a lecture presented at Johns Hopkins University on 21 October 1966 by philosopher Jacques Derrida.

In a certain sense language is handed down to the current generation and is at the same time as a freeing structure, a limiting structure. It calls upon the current generations to be what Derrida terms *Bricoleurs*. To take the language one has been handed and to play with it and stretch its meaning to better fit the current times. It is far easier to extend a word already in use than to create an entirely

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<sup>96</sup> Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. W. Baskin ([1916] 1959; New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 120.

new and unrelated one from scratch. In a certain sense what play means is playing around with one law of logic, the law of excluded middle. This law of contradiction states that in a contradictory proposition only one can be true at one time, where the excluded middle says that something is or is not the case. This playing with the structure of language is known as deconstruction.

The 'structurality of structure' is built around a fixed and stabilizing center that allows the rest of the structure to play. This stabilizing structure is governed by presence: "eidos, archè, telos, energia, ousia (essence, existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, or conscience, God, man, and so forth."<sup>97</sup> Kenneth Burke in a separate field would give this concept the name of the God-term of the structure. However, what is incredible to Derrida about this central term is that it is the only term according to him that isn't defined relationally. Its meaning then doesn't come from within the structure itself, and is only replaced arbitrarily at a time by a new center. This is why Derrida argues that the center "is not the center."<sup>98</sup> Further, "...the whole history of the concept of structure, before the rupture I spoke of, must be thought of as a series of substitutions of center for center, as a linked chain of determinations of the center."<sup>99</sup> In this way, "in a regulated fashion, the center receives different forms or names. The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the history of these metaphors and metonymies."<sup>100</sup>

It is the meaninglessness of the center then that opens up the ability to question the structurality of structure. Freeplay is then the opening up of the entire structure to reinterpretation. No more center. It is disrupting presence to open up what is absent, as "Freeplay is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Freeplay is always an interplay of absence and presence."<sup>101</sup> However, "if it is to be radically conceived, freeplay must be

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<sup>97</sup> Richard Macksey and Eugene Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2007), 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play" (1966), 249.

<sup>98</sup> Macksey and Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play" (1966), 248.

<sup>99</sup> Macksey and Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play" (1966), 249.

<sup>100</sup> Macksey and Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play" (1966), 249.

<sup>101</sup> Macksey and Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of*

conceived before the alternative of presence and absence; being must be conceived of as presence or absence beginning with the possibility of freeplay and not the other way around.”<sup>102</sup>

In addition to the difficulties in internal problems of science as an incomplete or inconsistent reified model are the external problems, where science truly has a difficulty is in the fact that it can't explain what is central to all human experience. Experience itself. Consciousness. So difficult has been this subject, that cracking it has become known as the hard problem of consciousness. The even more difficult notion is how consciousness fits into the experience of time, in what Lee Smolin terms the Hard Problem of Time. Even deeper than an aboutness within the definition of an object, is the conscious subject that is only focused on aboutness.

The traditional scientific, materialist approach is best represented by Daniel Dennett who went so far to argue that there is no such thing as free will and that consciousness is merely an epiphenomenon. Fields outside of science such as phenomenology and existentialism have sought to ground knowledge in different ways, but they would not be regarded as scientific. Even more troubling has been that consciousness seemingly impacts energy and matter without any physical interaction through the simple act of observation. Galen Strawson has argued that anyone who believes that all can fundamentally be boiled down to its physical properties would then have to include experience as a physical property.<sup>103</sup>

All of these broader debates haven't even touched upon the specific limitations of the standard model of physics found today. Its inability to account properly for dark matter and energy, why there is an imbalance between matter and anti-matter, why neutrinos have mass. Why it does not fit with General Relativity, even while it successfully describes three of the four known fundamental forces. That is the gravity of the current situation. On the one hand science seemed to be moving to a place of certainty. Its core being that knowledge is physical and counterfactual possibilities are fundamental. Lakatos explained how the center- and periphery model held for scientific knowledge. Then the decentering happened. Postmodernists argue that there was no objective, value-free reality. No center that had the meaning being sought to explain all else. Math faces criticism of the tautological lie, the paradox of substance, reification, and the lack of tense.

However, it is communication theory that can lead the way to a more adequate map that connects the symbolic and physical reality.. Communication is a social

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*Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play” (1966), 263.

<sup>102</sup> Macksey and Donato, *The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* 249, originally published as *The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), containing Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play” (1966), 263.

<sup>103</sup> Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 13 (2009). 3–31 doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267422.003.0003.

and cultural tool that utilizes signs and symbols, and is therefore a semiotic discipline. The founder of Cultural Semiotics, Juri Lotman, would describe three key roles for communication: transmission of information, creativity, and memory. For reasons that will be described the present work takes memory to be primary, and transmission and creation of novel information the tools for expanding memory. With that being said, there are then two forms of communication that take place. The regular communication between two individuals, but then there is autocommunication. The best example is a diary that one writes oneself only to be read at a later time. This seemingly should not create novel information, and yet because a person lives and adopts new codes of interpretation, these codes will then produce novel information when the diary is reread. There is therefore information that fits within the structured code of individuals. Then there is a code that is dynamic and transforms the communication. The importance is understanding the difference between structuralism and dynamic semiotics. Post-modernism collapses the two into one.

Language and math aren't then so dissimilar. Both are actually static structures. It is the code of interpreting them that evolves. Math, language, and in fact all symbols, therefore all forms of reduction are static symbols and alphanumerics do not capture dynamic information in signs. This is why the etymology and meaning of a sign has to change through the interpretant and not through the sign itself. Numbers and letters then are the tools of static decontextualization of information. Structuralism is based upon set axioms. Means and ends. After the axioms collapse is chaos, habits are disrupted, dissolution of order occurs and is felt and experienced as anxiety as the next chapter will explore.

The difficulty in ascribing math total explanatory power however comes from key proofs of the twentieth century, By Kurt Godel, Turing and Church among others. This work is in a sense a modern consideration of an ancient theme as Agrippa's trilemma showed the difficulty of finding the foundations of axioms from within a deductive system itself. The key word here is paradox, although it is also described as self-reference, strange loops, and visualized as the ouroboros. Namely, mathematics itself will always provide an incomplete or inconsistent system depending on which parameter is chosen. There were further questions as to whether every mathematical problem was in fact simply computable under the Church-Turing thesis.

This would have been resolved with what became known as the Universal Turing Machine, named by the same person who helped crack Enigma in World War II. The problem it turns out is that there is the undecidability problem, known as the halting problem, that shows within itself an answer can never be put forward whether a computation will be completed. "Any mechanical procedure for generating formulas is essentially a Turing machine. Any formal system, therefore, must have undecidable propositions. Mathematics is not decidable. Incompleteness follows from uncomputability. Finally, Gregory Chaitin uncovered the inherent randomness in mathematics by introducing uncomputable

numbers and extending the legacy yet again.”<sup>104</sup> While the twentieth century has seen the collapse of stable, universally grounded axioms, it also produced two individuals that sought a universal structure of knowledge that could explain the layer of reality out of which both physical and psychological phenomena arose. The joint work of these two individuals will be explored in the next section.

### *Unus Mundus*

One of the greatest minds in physics met with one of the greatest minds in the study of the unconscious. The connecting figures throughout this narrative are Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung. Pauli faced a series of dilemmas in 1930 that robbed his life of meaning. Even though he had just discovered the postulation of the neutrino his mother had committed suicide and he had a divorce. This crisis led him away from the external world of the cosmos to the internal reflections of the soul. It led him to seek out the psychotherapist Carl Jung. This led to archetypal dream analysis. Together they forged some of the most powerful models of the relationship between physical reality and the psychic contents of the mind. The relationship between being and consciousness was established through the notion of the Unus Mundus and became known as the Pauli-Jung Conjecture of dual-aspect monism. This is the notion that there is only one underlying source which is only perceived as consciousness or as matter depending on the vantage point taken. A more complete theory will require explaining how the human mind emerges out of this unitary foundation. The other central idea that developed is the relationship between consciousness and being that is established through meaningful, acausal coincidences, synchronicity. True alchemy then – for these two – was not about the material world or the psychic world, but the relationship between the two.

From a physical standpoint the material and energetic worlds are composed of the law of conservation, whereas the laws of thermodynamics are emergent properties that revolve around the oscillations between work and constraints in an environment given its geometry. It is this higher layered emergent motion based on geometry that lays the potential for how matter and energy at one level can present a temporal structure at another level of interaction. Synchronicity relates to events that do not have a causal connection but feel meaningful. “Unus Mundus” means one world in Latin and came from Duns Scotus and taken up again by Gerhard Dorn in the 1700’s. He was a student of alchemist Paracelsus. At its most compressed, it is the idea that observer and observed stem from the same source. The choice of scientific equipment comes from the psyche and therefore limits what will be seen in the first instance.

One of the core terms Pauli felt was useful to describe the Imago Dei in modern terms is the radioactive nucleus. In 1935 Wolfgang Pauli sent a list of

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<sup>104</sup> J.B. Glattfelder, “A Universe Built of Information,” in *Information – Consciousness – Reality: The Frontiers Collection*, ed. Christian de Quincey (Cham: Springer, 2019), 477.

such terms to C.G. Jung, “Radioactive Nucleus = self. It is clear that “nucleus” means the same as the individual center. But what does “radioactivity” mean in psychological terms? On the one hand it seems to indicate a gradual transformation of the center, and on the other hand an effect radiating outwards (rays!)<sup>105</sup>” In this way, “electromagnetic fields and the rays emitted by radioactive substances are invisible; it is only their mechanical or chemical effects on material bodies that are visible.”<sup>106</sup> Jung considered the analogy Pauli had proposed between the atomic nucleus and the self and responded in the autumn of 1935. Jung describes his opinion of the radioactive nucleus in the following way:

The radioactive nucleus is an excellent symbol for the source of energy of the collective unconscious, the ultimate external stratum of which appears an individual consciousness. As a symbol, it indicates that consciousness does not grow out of any activity that is inherent to it; rather, it is constantly being produced by an energy that comes from the depths of the unconscious and has thus been depicted in the form of rays since time immemorial.

[...]

The center, or the nucleus, has always been for me a symbol of the totality of the psychic, as the conscious plus the unconscious, the center of which does not coincide with the ego as the center of consciousness, and consequently has always been perceived as being external.<sup>107</sup>

For Pauli, his discovery of the four quantum numbers aligned with his and Jung’s conviction of turning from the three to the four psychologically as well as physically. Jung and Pauli felt that this number potentially held a key to connecting the physical and the psychological worlds. It is a number that signifies wholeness and integration. The four directions of space, the four seasons of a calendar year.

Jung delved deeply into this symbol, and it is important to explore his words in some depth as he saw the radioactive nucleus as the modern symbol for the Imago Dei. Another way to write this in terms of the Self and the notion of radiance that is the basis of the word Deus for instance, or the Book of Radiance in Kabbalistic literature, and stainless radiance in Tibetan literature would be: autoradiance. Here Jung and Pauli shared in their correspondence:

“illustrative concepts are always based on causal interpretation, even when acausal connections are meant. Invisible reality can thus be the collective unconscious, visible manifestations can also be conscious concepts [they are “visible” to the subject conceiving], and the causal connection “conveyed” can be a synchronistic one ... As we now move on to the concept of radioactivity, we are struck forcibly by the process of chemical transmutation of the radioactive nucleus as the feature that distinguishes radioactivity from the {static} field theory.”

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<sup>105</sup> C. G. Jung, Wolfgang Pauli, and C. A. Meyer, *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters 1932–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 11.

<sup>106</sup> Jung, Pauli, and Meyer, *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters 1932–1958*, 11.

<sup>107</sup> Jung, Pauli, and Meyer, *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters 1932–1958*, 14.

The nucleus is the center of the atom; the radioactive rays generally produce new radioactive centers where they encounter matter... So let us test the following expression for “radioactivity” in the neutral language: A process of transmutation of an active center, ultimately leading to a stable state, is accompanied by self-duplicating {“multiplying”} and expanding phenomena, associated with further transmutations that are brought about through an invisible reality. ...

And now one does not have to look far for the psychological interpretation of this neutral expression.... [the] ‘active nucleus’ ... familiar to me as a dream symbol, has a close relationship to the lapis of the alchemists, and thus in your terminology is a symbol of the “Self.” The transformation process as a psychic process is still the same today as that represented in the alchemical opus and consists of the transition of the “Self” into a more conscious state. This process (at certain stages at least) is accompanied by the “multiplication” – i.e., by multiple outward manifestation of an archetype (this being the “invisible reality”), which again is the same as the “breaking of barriers through contingency” or “transgressivity” of the archetype type that you talk about in your letter... The transformation process is the missing item in your letter when you talk of the psychological correspondence to radioactivity. The psychic process is the same as with the alchemists, but in the physical process of radioactivity not only has the transmutation of the chemical element become reality, but acausality has now appeared on the scene in our conscious scientific ideas. This symbolism, in contrast to that of the alchemists, seems to be more differentiated and more highly developed. ...

Here it can be seen that Jung and Pauli would speak of the same goal as the alchemists which was to raise Matter to heaven unio mentalis. Then went back to the intermediary stage unio corporalis. The unity was unus mundus. Pauli called it the psychophysical reality, called the lapis, alchemical gold, and seal of solomon, the double triadic star. Meaningful coincidence here = synchronicity and is connected as a symbol with the acausality of radioactive decay.<sup>108</sup>

Here then is the 20th and 21st century symbolic equivalent of the Imago Dei in psychophysical terms stemming from two of the leaders in their respective fields of physics and psychology. This idea of a special form of radiation that is not destructive, but life giving in a way that amplifies over time through bringing back stable states is a crucial image for combining several of these disparate worldviews that have continued to drift apart in the post-secular era. Here is a concept of the Imago Dei that the leading psychologists and physicists of even the twentieth century have rooted this principle in the Pythagorean tetractys and the axiom of Mary the Jewess.

A key expression Carl Jung believed revealed the transcendent function was the Axiom of Maria Prophetissa: One becomes two, two becomes three, and out of the third comes the One as the fourth. This way the two become one.” The Axiom of Maria is the story of individuation from the many to the one, from chaotic separation of consciousness and unconsciousness to undivided wholeness. Where one represents an unconscious wholeness Kabbalah refers to as

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<sup>108</sup> Jung, Pauli, and Meyer, *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters 1932–1958*.

Chockmah. Two represents the conflict of opposites that arise with the binah consciousness. The third represents the unconscious solution to wholeness between one and two. It is a “psychic function that arises from the tension between consciousness and the unconscious and supports their union”<sup>109</sup> This is Keter. The one as the fourth is when you bring that solution into conscious knowledge. That is da’at. This is a state of wholeness and peace.

In “The Psychology of the Transference”:

“It begins with the four separate elements, the state of chaos, and ascends by degrees to the three manifestations of Mercurius in the inorganic, organic, and spiritual worlds; and, after attaining the form of Sol and Luna (i.e., the precious metal gold and silver, but also the radiance of the gods who can overcome the strife of the elements by love), it culminates in the one and indivisible (incorruptible, ethereal, eternal) nature of the *anima*, the *quinta essentia*, *aqua permanens*, tincture, or *lapis philosophorum*. This progression from the number 4 to 3 to 2 to 1 is the ‘axiom of Maria’...”<sup>110</sup>

This section on the work of Jung and Pauli has sought to show how even two thousand years later the imago dei is shown to point to the same map of the human mind as Philo and Mary the Copt felt all those years ago. This map of the mind equated the material world with solidity and the number four. By chance, that happens to be the number that Pauli found to be the secret of matter through the Pauli exclusionary principle. One key aspect that Pauli and Jung further both extracted from their discussions on connecting the psychological and physical worlds was this focus on acausality. Together they realised that it was not mechanistic causation, but at the very least chance if not something more directed was a more solid foundation to their vision of the Imago Dei. Time is based on that very acausality, the acausality of radioactive decay.

Here again, life imitates dreams, and/or the other way around. In fact, the arrow of time does seem to be heavily correlated with the thermodynamic laws – specifically the second law and the growth of entropy. This arrow towards greater entropy follows a path that connects with the direction of time. From physicists that argue that information is physical, it is only when a computation is irreversible (where information is forgotten) that entropy and/or angular momentum is created. One more specific starting point of the birth of time then is the relationship of light, matter and angular momentum. This is because it is only probabilistic but indeterminate as to when light is absorbed and emitted by matter.

What each of these moments does transfer however is a conserved quantity in the universe known as angular momentum. The conserved rotation in the universe. This created an irreversible process the moment heat is produced leaving

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<sup>109</sup> Daryl Sharp, *Jung Lexicon: A Primer of Terms and Concepts* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 1991), 135.

<sup>110</sup> C. G. Jung, *The Psychology of the Transference*, in *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, vol. 16, ed. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955), 207, par. 404.

it unavailable for reversing the computation. It is also erasure of information which dissipates as heat that makes it irreversible. The chance of matter and light interacting through either absorption or emission again turns out to be Pauli's magical number of 137.

What this moment then produces – if greater entropy is produced in the process – is a form that has radiated out energy in order to remain stable. Radiation is a spontaneous acausal emission of excess energy in the form of high speed particles and rays. The production of stability of forms would only be possible if there were a sink for the excess entropy radiated outwards. The argument by Layzer is that as space is expanding faster than entropy is growing there is a large sink to enable more and more complex forms, ie. novel information to be created in the universe. Forms from the simple atom to galactic solar systems and complex human life in between.

Here then is argued to be the location of time, the creation of irreversible information through collisions between matter and light. This notion can even be traced back to Albert Einstein himself:

“When a molecule absorbs or emits the energy  $\varepsilon$  in the form of radiation during the transition between quantum theoretically possible states, then this elementary process can be viewed either as a completely or partially directed one in space, or also as a symmetrical (nondirected) one. It turns out that we arrive at a theory that is free of contradictions, only if we interpret those elementary processes as completely directed processes.<sup>111</sup>

In only the past five years the authors of constructal theory again see this as the key generator of time. Umberto Lucia wrote,

“In the environment, there exists a continuous interaction between electromagnetic radiation and matter. So, atoms continuously interact with the photons of the environmental electromagnetic fields. This electromagnetic interaction is the consequence of the continuous and universal thermal non-equilibrium, that introduces an element of randomness to atomic and molecular motion. Consequently, a decreasing of path probability required for microscopic reversibility of evolution occurs. Recently, an energy footprint has been theoretically proven in the atomic electron-photon interaction, related to the well known spectroscopic phase shift effect, and the results on the irreversibility of the electromagnetic interaction with atoms and molecules, experimentally obtained in the late sixties. Here, we want to show how this quantum footprint is the “origin of time”. Last, the result obtained represents also a response to the question introduced by Einstein on the analysis of the interaction between radiation and molecules when thermal radiation is considered; he highlighted that in general one restricts oneself to a discussion of the energy exchange, without taking the momentum exchange into account. Our

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<sup>111</sup> A. Einstein, “On the Quantum Theory of Radiation,” *Physikalische Zeitschrift* 18 (1917): 65

result has been obtained just introducing the momentum into the quantum analysis.”<sup>112</sup>

Both Jung and Pauli felt that there was something deeply connected within the tetractys of Pythagoras and their theories. They felt that it still held deep truths at a physical and psychological level. Perhaps even the foundation of the unity of those two distinct realms that have ever befuddled philosophers. One of the areas of physics that Pauli is most known for is the Pauli Exclusion Principle that says why electrons cannot occupy the same space even though light can. The distinction for Pauli was discovering that a fourth quantum number was needed to describe the quantum state of an electron. This is because electrons have negative electrical charges and repulsion is therefore involved.

“Once (in Hamburg) my path to the Exclusion Principle had to do precisely with the difficult transition from 3 to 4, namely with the necessity to attribute to the electron a fourth degree of freedom (soon explained as “spin”) beyond the three translations.... That was really the main work.” Bohr and Heisenberg had asserted firmly that there could only be three quantum numbers for an electron. But Pauli, almost despite himself, realized there had to be four. A few years later he was to come across the same numbers again in Carl Jung’s psychology, based as it was in alchemy. He was adamant that “in neither case was it by any means Mr. C. G. Jung who suggested it to me, nor was there an advance conscious intention for me to grapple with figuring out the problem of three and four. Consequently I am rather certain that objectively there is an important psychological and, perhaps, natural philosophical problem connected with these numbers.”<sup>113</sup>... “Apostle of fourness Pauli traced the origins of Kepler’s thinking back to the Greek scientist and priest Pythagoras, who lived around 500 B.C. It was Pythagoras who pioneered the quest for a link between numbers and the cosmos. Pondering the hidden meanings of the world around him as he played on his lyre he began to wonder whether the laws of harmony depended on numbers. ... His striking conclusion was that the numerals 1, 2, 3, and 4 represented all known objects: 1 represents a point; 2 points can be connected by a line; 3 points make a triangle, in particular a perfect equilateral triangle; and 4 points make a tetrahedron, a pyramid of three perfect triangles. ... Represented as dots, 1, 2, 3, and 4 form an equilateral triangle set out in four rows, known as the tetraktys (tetras is Greek for “four”):<sup>114</sup>

Not only was the tetractys an idea that drew in both Pauli and Jung, but so was the number 137. Leon Lederman describes the significance of the number in the following way “. . . this one number, 137, contains the crux of electromagnetism (the electron), relativity (the velocity of light), and quantum theory (Planck’s constant). It would be less unsettling if the relationship between all of these

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<sup>112</sup> U. Lucia, and G. Grisolia, “Time: A Constructal Viewpoint & Its Consequences,” *Scientific Reports* 9, no. 1 (2019): 10454, in abstract <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-46980-5>.

<sup>113</sup> Arthur Miller, *137: Jung, Pauli, and the Pursuit of a Scientific Obsession* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 71.

<sup>114</sup> Miller, *137: Jung, Pauli, and the Pursuit of a Scientific Obsession*, 71

important concepts turned out to be one or three or maybe a multiple of pi. But 137?”<sup>115</sup>. Lederman’s home while he was the director of Fermilab was a 150-year-old farm house located at 137 Eola Road. In Hebrew the gematria of this word is said to represent Kabbalah, which means to receive the light. In fact, the very acausal structure of light being absorbed and emitted by matter is roughly one in one hundred and thirty seven. Pauli himself died in room 137.<sup>116</sup>

It is beyond the scope or purpose of this work to base any final conclusions on whether psychological acausality is in a fundamental way connected with the acausality in the relationship of light and matter, just as it is beyond the scope of this work to make any declaration about God. It is also beyond the scope to prove a necessary link between solidity and the number four, or the number one hundred and thirty seven – but within the context of discussing the Imago Dei in the 21st century, it is important to understand that leaders in their respective fields believed there was something deeper to these connections in bridging the mental, physical and spiritual world. What is important to take away however, is that all agree that at the very least humans project their mind and motivations onto the universe around them through the embodied cognition of the literary tropes. The Imago Dei finds itself resonant most strongly with one of those tropes that will be discussed in chapter four.

### ***Imagination, Gedanken Experiments and Il Lume Naturale***

A key aspect of the work of Vico has been in seeking to reincorporate imagination into the way humans model reality. It is important then to appreciate that even when speaking of science it begins not through induction, but through the imagination. Its most famous ambassadors in the form of Galileo and Einstein for instance placed the foundation of their achievements not through observation, but through the gedanken experiment, the ‘thought experiment’. Carl Gustav Hempel referred to them as theoretical “intuitive experiments-in-imagination”.<sup>117</sup> Einstein imagined himself chasing a ray of light when crafting the special theory of relativity, and he was the one who referred to them as gedanken experiments. Charles Peirce would utilize a phrase from Galileo to call the source of these novel insights as ‘Il Lume Naturale’ – the natural light. This is what Cicero refers to as our Mentis Oculi, our mind’s eye.

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<sup>115</sup> Leon M. Lederman, *The God Particle: If the Universe Is the Answer, What Is the Question?* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1993), 28.

<sup>116</sup> Charles P. Enz, *Of Mind and Spirit: Selected Essays of Charles Enz* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009), 95; Charles P. Enz, “In Memoriam: Wolfgang Pauli (1900–1958),” *Helvetica Physica Acta*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1958): 238.

<sup>117</sup> C. G. Hempel, “Typological Methods in the Natural and Social Sciences,” in *Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. C. G. Hempel (New York: The Free Press, 1965), 164.

The word Gedanken Experiment arguably stems from Ernst Mach in 1883.<sup>118</sup> Similarly the term thought experiment in English came from Mach's work translated into English.<sup>119</sup> As Einstein noted "Imagination... is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world."<sup>120</sup> Galileo's famous Leaning Tower of Pisa experiment was itself actually in fact a thought experiment first. The thought experiment has also been used extensively in political philosophy: John Rawls' veil of ignorance, Locke's state of nature, and Plato's allegory of the Cave, for example.

The Imagination Age was coined by Charlie Magee in 1993 in "The Age of Imagination".<sup>121</sup> Whereas automated work based on logic and reason can be outsourced, economies based on intuition and creativity cannot.<sup>122</sup> Imagination is fundamentally different from inductive or deductive logic as it goes beyond what is currently in place. For Tesla, "When I get an idea I start at once building it up in my imagination. I change the construction, make improvements and operate the device in my mind."<sup>123</sup> This is because Tesla felt that from his vantage point, "It is absolutely immaterial to me whether I run my turbine in thought or test it in my shop. I even note if it is out of balance. There is no difference whatever, the results are the same. In this way I am able to rapidly develop and perfect a conception without touching anything."<sup>124</sup>

Imagination then is key to an emergent exemplarity of action that extends beyond a static structure of governance. In fact, consciousness itself cannot be reduced to inductive, or deductive logic alone as human understanding extends beyond formal logical systems. Roger Penrose puts it this way: "The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth."<sup>125</sup> In other words, "We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians

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<sup>118</sup> Ernst Mach, *The Science of Mechanics*, 6th ed., trans. Thomas J. McCormack (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1960), 32–41, 159–62.

<sup>119</sup> Ernst Mach, "On Thought Experiments," in *Knowledge and Error*, trans. Thomas J. McCormack and Paul Foulkes (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1976), 134–47.

<sup>120</sup> George Sylvester Viereck, "What Life Means to Einstein: An Interview," *The Saturday Evening Post*, October 26, 1929.

<sup>121</sup> C. Magee, "The Age of Imagination: Coming Soon to a Civilization Near You," in *Second International Symposium: National Security & National Competitiveness: Open Source Solutions*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Shoreham, 1993),

<sup>122</sup> Geoffrey Colvin, "The Imagination Economy," *Fortune Magazine*, July 5, 2006, reproduced in *CNN Money*, [https://money.cnn.com/2006/07/05/news/economy/imagination\\_economy.fortune/](https://money.cnn.com/2006/07/05/news/economy/imagination_economy.fortune/).

<sup>123</sup> Nikola Tesla and Ben Johnston, *My Inventions: The Autobiography of Nikola Tesla* (Williston, VT: Hart Bros, 1982), 10.

<sup>124</sup> Tesla, *My Inventions: The Autobiography of Nikola Tesla*.

<sup>125</sup> Roger Penrose, *The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and The Laws of Physics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 480.

arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation!”<sup>126</sup>

As Penrose further noted, in order to understand Godel’s Theorem, understanding itself cannot be based on Godel’s theorem. Another way to approach this is to think in terms of Turing machines with Peano arithmetic, or Tarski’s undefinability theorem. Alfred Tarski once said that “arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic”.<sup>127</sup> Therefore, understanding must be distinct.<sup>128</sup> Each language must therefore also carry a metalanguage. A dynamical model of semiosis akin to that used by Terrence Deacon shows that a symbol<sup>129</sup> that forms the basis of language is a third order of mutual information enabling it to be recursive, but novelty extends beyond the recursion that has already been fit to the environment by natural selection. From a philosophical lens, Jean Paul Sartre himself has noted this connection between imagination and consciousness in *The Imaginary*.<sup>130</sup> “Where there is New Being there is creation into eternity of every moment of time.”<sup>131</sup>

Imagination has not only proven fundamental to scientific experiments, but to the very foundation of mathematics. Terrence Deacon has started to lay a foundation for seeing a relationship between absence and imagination, and in that way how imaginary numbers can be physical while not material. Physical in the same way that constraints are physical, but not material. A metaphysical exploration of these numbers can even lay out the possibility of the triadic nature of math posited by Charles Peirce to enable a near infinite possibility of absences to be captured largely by three dimensions of possibility.<sup>132</sup> Stephen Hawking himself has utilized imaginary numbers as key to his model of cosmology and has said,

“One might think this means that imaginary numbers are just a mathematical game having nothing to do with the real world. From the viewpoint of positivist philosophy, however, one cannot determine what is real. All one can do is find which mathematical models describe the universe we live in. It turns out that a mathematical model involving imaginary time predicts not only effects we have already observed but also effects we have not been able to measure yet nevertheless

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<sup>126</sup> Penrose, *The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and The Laws of Physics*, 480.

<sup>127</sup> Cezary Cieśliński, “How Tarski Defined the Undefinable,” *European Review* 23, no. 1 (2015): 149.

<sup>128</sup> Penrose, *The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and The Laws of Physics*, 480.

<sup>129</sup> Deacon and Cashman, “Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness,” 401–429.

<sup>130</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of the Imagination* (London: Psychology Press, 1972) [1940].

<sup>131</sup> Paul Tillich, *The New Being* (New York: Charles Scribner’s & Sons, 1955), 23.

<sup>132</sup> Deacon and Cashman, “Steps to a Metaphysics of Incompleteness,” 401–429.

believe in for other reasons. So what is real and what is imaginary? Is the distinction just in our minds?”<sup>133</sup>

Returning again to Pauli’s dreams it is now possible to start to draw a map between the imaginary and the material worlds. Another set of Pauli’s dreams would focus on the key theme of imagination in his correspondence with Jung. For Jung the enlargement of consciousness by embracing the unconscious created a new center called the ‘self’. This was symbolized as the mandala and the rotating movement. Known in China as the ‘circulation of light’. This concept was also captured in the rotational symmetry in mandalas. Here, with the concept of rotation, Pauli’s dream highlighted this oscillating process of imagination to objectification that is connected through a rotation (oscillation) in such a way that one part of the oscillation is personified by males and half by females.

A blond man serving as a kind of teacher or guide is standing next to me, and I am reading an ancient book about the Inquisition and its trials against the disciples of Copernicus (Galileo and Giordano Bruno). The blond man now exclaims: “The men whose wives have objectified rotation are being tried.” I am upset by these words and next find myself in a courtroom on trial with the others. My wife is not on the scene but I manage to have a note sent to her telling her the situation and asking her to come at once. Soon she turns up and says: “You forgot to say good night to me.” With this, the scene lightens and I am no longer in the courtroom among the accused but back where I was at the outset of the dream, the difference being that my wife is now present. Once again I am reading the old book, with the blond man at my side. Referring to the book, he comments that “the judges do not know what rotation or revolution is, and that is why they cannot understand the men...But you know what rotation is!” “Of course,” I reply, it is the “circulation of the blood and the circulation of light – all that is part of the basic rudiments.” (This seemed to be a reference to psychology, but the word is never mentioned.) The blond man responds to me by saying, “Now you understand the men whose wives have objectified their rotation for them.” At this point I kiss my wife, say good night to her, and express sadness at what these poor people who have been charged are going through. Overcome by emotion, I begin to weep. But the blond man says with a smile: “Now you’ve got the first key in your hand.”<sup>134</sup>

Turning to another one of Pauli’s dreams, he himself had a dream about imaginary numbers connecting absence and presence. The imaginary here is non-dual. Here Pauli shows the *i* as spatializing time. Imaginary Time is the marriage of what is present and what is absent. He perceived himself as having a conversation with a female who was meant to represent the sacred feminine.

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<sup>133</sup> Stephen W. Hawking, *The Universe in a Nutshell* (United States & Canada: Bantam Books, November 2001), 59.

<sup>134</sup> Steven M. Rosen, “Pauli’s Dream: Jung, Modern Physics, and Alchemy,” *The Journal of Analytical Psychology* 44, no. 4 (1999): 465. This paraphrases the original account in C.A. Meier, *Atom and Archetype: The Pauli/Jung Letters 1932–1958* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 30–32.

“I: The i makes the void and the unit into a couple. At the same time it is the operation of rotating a quarter of the whole ring.’

She: ‘It makes the instinctive or impulsive, the intellectual or rational, the spiritual or supernatural, of which you spoke, into the unified or monadic whole that the numbers without the i cannot represent.’

I: ‘The ring with the i is the unity beyond particle and wave, and at the same time the operation that generates either of these.’

She: ‘It is the atom, the indivisible, in Latin...’ When I spoke these words she gave me a significant look, but it seemed to me not necessary to say Cicero’s word for the atom aloud.

I: ‘It turns time into a static image.’

She: ‘It is the marriage and at the same time the realm of the middle, which you can never reach alone but only in pairs.’<sup>135</sup>

The Wick rotation present within this dream is the oscillation between the infinite possibility and finite reality. Wick was a professor at Berkeley, but would not perform an oath during the McCarthy Era and was therefore fired.<sup>136</sup> It could be argued that the wick rotation commences at the moment of the irritation of doubt, where a present error runs into conflict with the predicted imagination. According to Peirce, “the irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain belief”. It is “with the doubt ... the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends”<sup>137</sup>. Further, “The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle inquiry....”<sup>138</sup> and “With the doubt, ... the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it ends.”<sup>139</sup> The mind then is not searching for truths, but beliefs that satisfy doubts. As long as our doubts are satisfied then we act. Therefore, the mind searches in its final analysis for faith more than truth, for the relaxation of doubt in order to act, rather than for an objective truth that always holds. As Peirce says, “as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be true or false.”<sup>140</sup> This point is important to understand as it means that an object is never the true focus of one’s attention, for “it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the mind can be the motive for mental effort. The most that can be maintained is, that we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true.”<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Wolfgang Pauli, “The Piano Lesson,” *Harvest: Journal for Jungian Studies* 48, no. 2 (2002): trans. Frederik W. Wiegel, Herbert van Erkelens, and Jos van Meurs, 134.

<sup>136</sup> J. Hardman, *The Loyalty Oath Controversy 1949–51* (UC Berkeley, 1951).

<sup>137</sup> Charles S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” *Popular Science Monthly* 12 (November 1877): section 4.

<sup>138</sup> Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” section 4.

<sup>139</sup> Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” section 4.

<sup>140</sup> Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” section 4.

<sup>141</sup> Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” section 4.

Imaginary numbers could themselves also be pointing to a quantum solution. Speculative comments of Federico Faggin say that consciousness must be a quantum phenomena. This is because of the no-cloning theorem and Holevo's theorem. No-cloning says that a quantum state can't be reproduced. The second says that at most one classical bit can be used to describe each qubit of a state. A pure state is private knowledge that is only completely known within itself. Faggin was the inventor of the first commercial microprocessor – the Intel 4004. The Silicon Gate Technology.

### ***Correspondence Theory of Truth and Inductive Logic***

Literal interpretation of the world started arguably with the period of disenchantment. For religion this has proven to be difficult for, “if literal truth is correspondence, and the purported referents of religious claims do not exist, then either religious claims are false or religious truth is non-literal.”<sup>142</sup> From there, “The alternative to castigating all religious discourse as ‘nonsense’, it would seem, would be to embrace a robustly conventionalist and subjectivist interpretation. With this, the other adjectives seem to naturally fall into place.”<sup>143</sup> A correspondence theory of truth means that the concepts one has, that are captured in words, correspond to the physical object for which they reference. The only truth claims are those that accurately describe objects as they are without bias or personal subjective interference.

Science seeks to be a correspondence theory of truth in its enlightened ideals. “In common parlance, the object of scientific investigation is ‘material reality’. Science is characterized by such terms as objective, modern, knowledge-generating, rational, factual, realistic, about the natural world, literal, truth-seeking, progressive.”<sup>144</sup> In this way, “Its chief interests are both metaphysical (postulating an underlying ontology) and epistemological (seeking explanations through a particular methodology).”<sup>145</sup>

Wittgenstein begins *Philosophical Investigations* with a quote from Augustine's *Confessions*, which represents the view that language serves to point out objects in the world: “The individual words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.”<sup>146</sup> As Aristotle states in *Metaphysics*: “To say that that which is, is not, and that which is not, is, is a falsehood; therefore, to say that which is, is, and that which is not, is not, is

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<sup>142</sup> Mark Q. Gardiner and Steven Engler, “Charting the Map Metaphor in Theories of Religion,” *Religion* 40, no. 4 (2010): 238.

<sup>143</sup> Gardiner and Engler, “Charting the Map Metaphor in Theories of Religion,” 238.

<sup>144</sup> Gardiner and Engler, “Charting the Map Metaphor in Theories of Religion,” 8

<sup>145</sup> Gardiner and Engler, “Charting the Map Metaphor in Theories of Religion,” 8.

<sup>146</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English Translation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), 1.

true”.<sup>147</sup> Or Thomas Aquinas, Truth is the adequation of things and intellect – veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.”<sup>148</sup> J. L. Austin’s version of correspondence only demands a correlation between language and actuality.<sup>149</sup> Of course, correspondence also runs directly into the traditional debates between realism, and idealism of whether external concepts can even be registered by the mind and whether in fact they even exist. Another key issue with correspondence theory is that its logic is circular as it can only offer new information by referring to actual facts and so all logic can only stem from the facts.

However, with all of that said, science ultimately aims to have the empirical world match with mathematics – a system of logic. It is logical coherence that is then the aim of science as the mathematical model itself becomes the gateway to the truth claim. This means from a numerical perspective science is actually more akin to the coherence theory of truth. This would go along with the work of Thomas Kuhn that a system seeks to hold onto its center. Its coherent foothold, and will even ignore correspondence errors in order to stand. A constructivist would go further and argue that science plays a linguistic game that is also focused on power dynamics and hierarchies as all other facets of society and so science is nothing more than another language game, another constructivist form of truth. While science has as its claim the idea that it is a correspondence theory of truth, its actual structure is more akin to a system of logic. The formal logic of math. A true correspondence to the field of potential would need to capture the unique and ineffable in a way that symbols never can. The prima materia slips through the hands of formalized symbolization of historic data.

A way to see this then is looking at logic itself. Science purports to look at facts in the world. Through observation. From those observations generalizations are meant to be extracted. An inductive argument can never present a necessary conclusion, only a probable one. Correspondence to reality is more important than the coherence of the theory itself. The argument tries to extract from a sample a conclusion about the entire population. A simplified formula for induction is as follows.

Of course, several fallacies extend from this form of reasoning, such as biased samples and hasty generalization. However, with that being said, the hierarchy of science is based upon what is necessarily true, not what is probable. This is what is known again as deductive reasoning. This means a general law isn’t probably true, but necessarily. How this relates to science, is that one is looking to create sound arguments. A sound argument is when the premises are true, and also the premises are valid. This model of truth ties it all back to the work of Claudia Welz

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<sup>147</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1011b26, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1557.

<sup>148</sup> D. Marian, “The Correspondence Theory of Truth,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2022 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/truth-correspondence/>.

<sup>149</sup> J. L. Austin, “Truth,” reprinted in *Philosophical Papers*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 117–33.

on the semiotic image of God. Specifically, this literal, correspondence theory of truth sees human beings as God's representative on earth.

Modes of becoming are immanent and transcendent. Imminent include Dasein, which is the empirical self in the world within time. Karl Jaspers extends Heidegger's work because he says that while Dasein is rooted in the world, it can also transcend its own knowledge of reality. A non-empirical aspect. This is why Dasein and Existenz are distinguished for Jaspers in a way they aren't for Heidegger.

Here then the world of secondness, the world of errors is where propositions are tested against experience. Therefore, the properties of justification extend from this realm. The more that propositions hold consistent across time, the more justification they obtain. In terms of translating this directly into the discussion on identity and self-congruence, the term here that applies is maturity of identity; this is where an identity holds consistent across time, and is tested against experience. The more tests, the greater the maturity.

### ***Conclusion***

A secular society was founded on the enlightenment principles of reason and science. A post-secular age has lost this universalistic grounding. Even without the post-secular turn, science – and the technologies that stem from its discoveries – has ushered in an age where humans are now an existential risk to themselves, but it provides no existential meaning to counteract that threat. The symbolism of death and apocalyptic visions has provided no outlet for this growing anxiety. No longer is there certainty in this unknown world. Just as important is the realization that science provides no great distinction between humans and animals, and at its very deepest levels, humans too are simply a collection of particles moving deterministically through space. A fundamental issue then is how a scientific worldview can then provide a meaning to human rights? Human value is an ought, and not an is after all. The scientific method at its core is a critical method focused on doubt and skepticism as its authority figures. Moreover, the only proposed alternative in the postmodern world is one of moral relativism that again strips the universal out of humanity.

Humanity lives in a universe of death, destruction and loss: of information structures. These anxieties have been most poetically stated in the apocalypse literature found throughout all regions and times of human history. This is because at the heart of the natural, physical, material world is transformation. Transformation is the motion of energy and matter through space and time based upon geometry and thermodynamics. Throughout these transformations there are still invariances: symmetries of energy and momentum. However, there is also change. The change comes in the form of the information. It is information that is created and it is information that can go extinct. The psychophysical death is purely one of information, not of matter and energy. Semiosis as a process enables a pathway to showing how information can be seen connected to a second order of mutual information through its interaction with the background

thermodynamical work based on geometry. A third order of mutual information occurs when that process is recursive over time. This enables natural selection to serve as a constraint of third order recursive and dynamic mutual information.

The dissolution of forms is not a neutral affair. Formlessness and extinction brings with it great fear, pain and anxiety. Attached with this great terror of death, is an equally painful question of meaninglessness, or where there is meaning, guilt for not living up to its full potential. This is why forms have been at the heart of philosophical questions ever since deductive logic was applied to the objects and concepts we perceive. The thread moving through all of philosophy is whether what presents itself to the visuo-spatial senses are the starting point – iconic and indexical forms, or whether in fact the world of symbols expresses the truth. The Platonic world of forms. This division between empirical, material, a posteriori knowledge and idealistic, rational, a priori knowledge. The third way known as pragmatism will be explored in the next chapter connecting the two.

As Charles Peirce has shown through his irritation of doubt, the problem is a potential route to the solution. It is here that the irritation of doubt commences a calculation of logical relations commences through the hypothesis-logic-experimentation loop and that only ceases once the irritation of doubt has disappeared. This irritation of doubt does not arise from a constitution, but from an individual's relationship with their society and their environment. It is not the universalised justice and equality of Rawls that grounds this doubt, but the contextualized injustice and inequalities that present themselves within time that call forth for active human engagement at a level far more localised than could ever be provided by a dictator. The solution to this irritation of doubt lies not only out of the grasp of dictators, but lies even beyond positive law and deductive morality.

The interaction of matter and light has produced an arrow of time. An arrow of creation and destruction, force and mass continually in motion. By simple rotation a difference is constructed between matter and light, imagination and reality. The Pauli Exclusionary Principle is at the heart of this dynamic. Matter now resists change. However, the interaction of matter and light creates an arrow of time which ensures both destruction of forms and memory of that destruction. For a participant in this world this destruction is painful and chaotic. Meaninglessness also robs the meaning of action itself.

Science is a magnificent tool that has grasped at a deep level the homogeneities of the world. The structures of stability that seemingly progress in stable formations. Yet, it does this by eradicating the heterogeneous from the world. It has adopted a static model as if it is dynamic. Life is not static however, it is dynamic and includes freedom within its structure. The thick moment where potential is actualised. From a world of possibilities one must actualize. Science has been a history of possibilities and actuality. Far from being deterministic, where consciousness is epiphenomenal, there actually exists indeterminism, possibilities for actualizing potential. With that said, even science itself has ultimately been shown not to be rooted in inductive logic, but in the imagination of thought experiments. It begins not with external objects read literally through correspondent truth, but with Galileo's 'natural light' within.

All of this ties into the fact that humans are a symbolic species. For, “We might call this existential paradox the condition of individuality within finitude. Man has a symbolic identity that brings him sharply out of nature.”<sup>150</sup> Man is a “symbolic self, a creature with a name, a life history. He is a creator with a mind that soars, out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who can place himself imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet.”<sup>151</sup> It is this “immense expansion, this dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives to man literally the status of a small god in nature, as the Renaissance thinkers knew.”<sup>152</sup> Yet, ““at the same time, as the Eastern sages also knew, man is a worm and food for worms. This is the paradox: he is out of nature and hopelessly in it; he is dual, up in the stars and yet housed in a heart-pumping, breath-gasping body that once belonged to a fish and still carries the gill-marks to prove it.”<sup>153</sup>

The last time that God is mentioned in the Bible as having eradicated the vast majority of mankind he is said to have made a covenant with humanity. A covenant signed by the rainbow that conveyed he would never again be the cause of such an event. This is when he passed on the first law before Moses that it was up to humanity not to kill one another. ‘Whoever sheds man’s blood, By man his blood shall be shed, For in the image of God He made man. – What is the meaning of Genesis 9:6. It is the Image of God that would serve as the foundation of the covenant that would preserve the blood and the flesh of humanity. A distinction separating from the beast of the field. This concept of the Imago Dei. The Image of God would serve as the foundation for natural rights theory that was adopted and implemented by liberal democracies in the Enlightenment Era, and is therefore essential to explore in this postsecular age. In a modern rendition, this symbol would serve at the heart of two individuals at the top of their respective fields seeking to bridge the divide between the physical and the psychological – Wolfgang Pauli and Carl Jung.

The radioactive nucleus is both at once the cause of existential anxiety in the postmodernist age, but also as a symbol, and possibly the source of its cure, as the 21st century psychophysical equivalent of the Image of God. The difference being that it is not the energy of decaying matter, but the energy of a radiating Human that is at hand. Through the dark night of the soul comes eternal spring. Out of chaos and disorder transformation. Radioactive decay and radiation. The true prima materia is chaos, pure potentiality. Acausal physics that is still predictive in areas of redundancy. Symbolized by the Oroborous, theorized by Thomas Kuhn, realized by Copernicus and his apostles Kepler and Galileo. From alchemy to modern science. As Theodor Herzl said, “I believe that electric light was not invented for the purpose of illuminating the drawing rooms of a few

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<sup>150</sup> Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press, 1973), 26.

<sup>151</sup> Becker, *The Denial of Death*, 26.

<sup>152</sup> Becker, *The Denial of Death*, 26.

<sup>153</sup> Becker, *The Denial of Death*, 26.

snobs, but rather for the purpose of throwing light on some of the dark problems of humanity.”<sup>154</sup>

Alongside the symbol is the notion that knowledge is actually physical. This is according to constructor theory. It enables information theory and indeterminism to be brought into a modern look at physics. Information is now statistical and centered on the law of averages. While there is a desire to grasp certain knowledge, it is in ‘possibilities’ that new information is created. It is this new information that enables life to evolve even through environmental changes and extinction events. The multiplication of possibilities then mutation and selection, that is the noise and redundancy that nature then selected from.

Traditional science has really been a form of mathism. Utilizing discrete and continuous math to mark out the trajectory of energy and momentum through space-time. What Information Theory has retrieved is novelty. Information can only be created where there are possibilities, as well as an interpreter of the message. This information exists in the universe because space is expanding faster than light and matter. This means that the quarks can hold onto gluons as the photons, through entropy, leave to more empty parts of space. This is also seen with the recombination and decoupling process, as well as the release of neutrinos. All leading to more stable information structures over time in an expanding universe.

The direction of the universe is towards a minimization of Free energy and a maximization of entropy. The word energy comes from *energon* – at work. Which in turn came from *wergon* = work. Entropy means to transform. Transformation produces heat and irreversibility. Indeterminism is then an ontological property of the universe. The indeterminism discovered in the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Born Rule. Chance is therefore necessary for new information to be created.

The issue is that science and postmodernism are not truly empirical, but Bayesian. They are both built on a priori models utilizing third order mutual information. These a priori models contain a static structure that holds time-bound parts to represent the whole. Transformation, conservation laws, entropy and novel information point to an open future. In contrast to the view that sees mechanistic determinism as fundamental, where free will and consciousness are epiphenomenal illusions, and math is more real than experience.

Where science has focused largely on physical free energy minimization, there is a deep connection with the mind that is also seeking free energy minimization, and it is easier to minimize through mental energy than physical energy. The key is then revitalizing mental energy. In the space between is information. It turns out that semiotics is the bridge between humanities and the sciences. Counterfactuals, and possibilities provide the space for transformations. Physics now is about deciding the boundaries of transformations that are possible. Not simple cause-effect spontaneous relations, but what transformations are possible with catalysts, constructors, the markov blankets and the autogens.

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<sup>154</sup> Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat* [The Jewish State], trans. Sylvie d’Avigdor (New York: Courier Dover, 1988 [1896]), 1.

In chapter three the fundamental tool of science – mathematics – will be looked at. There it will be seen that math is undecidable, uncomputable, unpredictable. All key terms from the literature. This is because mathematics contains within it the tautological lie; reification; the paradox of substance; and the paradox itself that will all be explored. Linguistically postmodernism has challenged language structures by focusing on Victimary thinking. Peripheral victims versus utopian centers. In the next several chapters the voyage is set to look beyond these apparent divides by incorporating: Tartu University's Teichmüller perspectivism of von Baer; Uexküll's Umwelt; and Lotman's semiosphere to ultimately an omni science perspective. To look from the God's eye view that serves as the basis of most works of literature. What the world of secondness has shown, however, is that the greatest proof of an objective reality is not the predictive power of science, it is the fact that one can't predict new information.

This first chapter has aimed to show that the world of objects can only be cognized when a category is overlaid on top of it. This category can be numerical and predictive, therefore scientific, or it can be a verbal category, which means binary in creation. This ground can only be inferred by the justification of the propositions over time. In terms of self-congruence and identity, it is the maturity of the identity as it is tested against reality that shows the effect of ontology on the self. In terms of epistemology it is justification, and science as experimentation. In this sense, human rights are not grounded in the world of objects. Bertrand Russell once said, "Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover."<sup>155</sup>

This has ultimately been a journey into the first steps of a model of hierarchical mutual information. Whereas science traditionally has seen itself large as a logic based structure stemming from induction, in fact it has been seen to be a hypothetical deductive system that in its most ideal state limits itself to quantification. However, numbers as symbols are already third order mutual information and so do not 'pierce the veil' of the world as it presents itself, the territory and not the map. The positive news is that a political theory could have still based itself on a deductive system if Gödel had not thrown a wrench into the machine. For that reason, the upcoming chapters will be building towards a model of logic and semiosis that can ground sovereignty and human rights in the twenty-first century. Mutual information of this higher order is not rooted directly in the action of the individual, but the reaction. The consistency of predictability of a hypothesis over time and its relied upon propositions is what allows this information to be 'justified'. In the terminology of Ferrara in relation to identity, it gives the identity 'maturity'. By that very definition it now becomes important to step a little deeper. Especially given that John Rawls' work has left human rights as a brute fact at the global level in Law of Peoples, it is important to delve a little deeper.

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<sup>155</sup> Bertrand Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927; reprint, New York: Routledge, 1970), 163.

## CHAPTER 2

### Firstness: Albedo Predicate

(The Judgmental Iconic Political Liberalism)

#### Section A: Eikasia-Phronesis/Remez/Abduction

##### *Center and Periphery*

Where the prior chapter laid out the world of observation and perception, it showed that no perception comes without a hypothesis. This is where the second chapter turns toward. The world of abductive logic, and not simply inductive logic. This is the mutual information between mental work and the recursive self. As per the themes mentioned in the introduction, here is where Schopenhauer mentions the notion of Being in his fourfold model. Here too is Lati in Kalachakra meaning to receive, and Remez in PRDS Model of Kabbalah – with Kabbalah meaning to receive. It is the reception of the light that is key to this chapter, through perception and through knowing. It is the space of the allegory and the communal metaphors. It is the techne for Pyrrhonist skeptics, and the trope of assumption for Agrippa. In Hayden White's theory of metahistory it is the emplotment of romance. In Karl Jaspers' existential model this is the 'spirit'. An imminent mode of Being that is related to the totality of feelings, thought and action. Jaspers' 'spirit' is the synthesis of dasein and the abstract consciousness in general. This mode of being is both particular and universal. There is an innate drive to wholeness.<sup>156</sup> In short, it is the firstness of Charles Peirce, and the mutual information of work and Iconic Self. Here lies the propositional predicate.

Thus far the story presented has been one of chaos, formlessness and darkness. Now it is time to see the light within the dark. Where it has previously been explored how the electromagnetic spectrum impacts matter, it is important to know that the word light is purely an embodied concept. It is time to look at the allegorical aspect of light. This is where light is taken, not as the object directly, but as a medium containing an altogether different form of truth, as will be seen. The Remez of PRDS, the allegory.

Light only has meaning as that part of the spectrum that is visible to the eye. This light controls the sleep-wake cycle of the circadian rhythm, and controls visual perception. Intimately related to color and the subjective experience referred to as the semiotic Umwelt, as well as the first stage of consciousness. For the most part life forms are truly blind – even the human species – who have half of a brain devoted solely to visual perception. What blind means in this context and in its full sense is the inability to see the full spectrum of electromagnetic

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<sup>156</sup> Jaspers, *Philosophy of Existence*.

waves. Less than 1% of all of the light that hits a human's eyes is even interpreted. Humans for example cannot see radio waves, ultraviolet radiation, X-rays, or gamma-rays.

Light also relates to the second Book of John Locke's *On Human Understanding*. Where Book 1 dealt with the idea of empiricism, Book 2 focused on what sensation means. In this regard Locke divided up objects into their substances and qualities. Substances are the unknown support of qualities and qualities have the ability to produce ideas within the mind. They are meant to be the support of qualities, what hold qualities together. Qualities themselves come in two forms, primary and secondary. Only the former come from actual experience. Secondary qualities in contrast are produced by the mind to help reflect upon that actual lived experience. At least according to the schema organized by John Locke. As Leibniz noted, "Nothing is in the mind without being first in the senses, except for the mind itself."<sup>157</sup>

This is the world of the predicate. The world of praxis and phronesis and firstness. The world of Kenneth Burke's metaphor. The place of literary allegory. The world of Carl Jung's dimension of feeling. The center of the pragmatic world is captured politically in the work of Alessandro Ferrara. This is the world of the hypothesis, of exemplarity, authenticity, most reasonableness. It is marked on the eastern periphery by the biosemiotic school of Jacob von Uexkull and Kalevi Kull. It is marked on the western periphery by biosemiotician Terrence Deacon.

This realm relates to the depth aspect of Alessandro Ferrara's model of authenticity. Depth here signifies the "fulfillment of an individual identity"<sup>158</sup> This is through the layers of self-constitution built around extracted propositions and the utilization of judgment to draw out 'the most reasonable' over time such that the greatest level of self-congruence is achieved. It is the "acquisition of ever-increasing levels of reflexivity"<sup>159</sup> It also alters a traditional view of knowledge construction as one of belief, to that as one of judgment. The difference is that a judgment must be acted upon. It is the arena for justice, and against ideology. For authenticity and against alienation. It is the aspect of the story where social and natural signs collide. This is the realm of the 'most reasonable'.

Judgment contains beliefs that are coordinated with one another. This leads to justified true judgments. It is phronesis and not pistis alone. This is the authenticity from Rousseau's *Julie* or the *New Heloise*. It is the realm of deliberative reason, of choice and responsibility. It is in the realm of doxa where imagination constrained by episteme is applied in action. Exemplarity is represented here as it is where a justified action can be added to the repertoire. The key takeaway from this section is that the 'most reasonable' is not merely an intellectual exercise, but revolves around the 'permanence of the people'. The permanence of the

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<sup>157</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding*, 2nd ed., trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Book II, Ch. 1, §2.

<sup>158</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 121.

<sup>159</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 123.

constitutional project. In terms of looking at and interpreting the center of Rome, this world is represented by the Vatican.

In the Magnum Opus albedo means the whitening. It is the second stage and takes place after chaos. It is the ‘first light’ so to speak. For Jung it is “an enantiodromia; the *nigredo* gives way to the *albedo* ... the ever deepening descent into the unconscious suddenly becomes illumination from above.”<sup>160</sup> Here it is about “bringing light and clarity to the prima materia (the First Matter)”.<sup>161</sup> In Jungian psychology it is represented by the Eros, and the Anima. The feminine characteristic in the sense that it is related to emotionality and feelings. Opposed to the cold mechanics of the Logos, Animus and the Wise Old Man that will be explored in the next chapter. In logical terms this is abductive logic, meaning the hypothesis formation stage. This is important to understand in relation to the scientific method as Charles Peirce revealed the true foundations of science to be hypothetico-deductions, and not pure inductions as once thought. In modes of persuasion this is the world of Pathos. The world of emotions and feelings. For Kenneth Burke this is a metaphor in his four tropes.

It is the world of geometry, and isomorphism. It is ‘Inverse Boltzmann-Shannon Entropy’ in regard to the iconic recursive self and its mutual information with internally driven work. The psychological aspect of generative work. For Josiah Royce this is the path of mysticism that sees an underlying oneness between an idea and what it intends. His second conception of Being. This is the pragmatic meaning of a sentence in the epistemological sense, as well as the Platonic sense. Pistis and Eikasia together compose the Doxa that is found within the cave. In theological terms this sense of subjective movement is captured by the Holy Spirit. For Aristotle this position went further than pure belief into the realm of action based on that belief, termed Phronesis. In the PRDS key of exegesis this is the Remez, meaning the allegorical interpretation. The stable, recursive and dynamic Self is an icon towards which work and energy is directed in moments of incomplete self. The oscillation between absence and presence contained in mutual dynamic information. Ultimately in terms of logic it is the hypothesis from the abduction.

### ***Political Liberalism: Authenticity, Judgement and Exemplarity***

As discussed previously, John Rawls’ work best represents the realm of the political, the deliberative and the pragmatic. This is where the standard is not the rational, but the ‘most reasonable’, which takes place when there are competing and equally applicable rational and comprehensive worldviews. The work of Rawls gained greater teeth in grounding its principles in judgment, authenticity and exemplarity through the work of Alessandro Ferrara.

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<sup>160</sup> Jung, *Psychology of the Transference*, Collected Works vol. 16, 279.

<sup>161</sup> Thea Euryphaessa, *Running Into Myself* (Leicester: Troubador Publishing Ltd, 2010), 39.

Rawls' model again is a dualist model offset against current trends in literature back towards a monist model. In Ackerman's words "a dualist constitution seeks to distinguish between two different kinds of decisions that may be made in a democracy. The first is a decision by the American People; the second, by their government".<sup>162</sup>

A fundamental concern for Rawls is how to build a society with divergent views on the fundamental goods of society. For "we happen to live in societies in which whatever conflicts may arise between competing interests or rival values are not likely to be solved by appealing to a shared conception of the human good."<sup>163</sup> Due to this fact we "are therefore in need of a method or a procedure for adjudicating these conflicts in a way acceptable to parties that adopt diverse and often conflicting evaluative standpoints."<sup>164</sup> With this in mind "in both books Rawls wishes that such method or procedure for resolving conflicts be acceptable to all the parties involved as a matter of principle or for its reflecting justice, not out of reasons of prudence or because it is convenient, as in a Hobbesian contract.<sup>165</sup> In this way 'Justice as fairness' "is the proper name by which Rawls designates the conception of justice that in his opinion can best perform this function."<sup>166</sup>

The political goal here being to increase the amount of people who are 'reasonable' in the realm of public discourse. Who are reasonable people? "Reasonable persons are those who are willing to accept fair terms of cooperation and, at the same time, to propose such terms and principles to create a system of social and political equality in a context of reciprocity."<sup>167</sup> In this way, "Reasonable persons are not inclined to pursue general good as such, but they aim to follow the principle of fair cooperation on terms that all can accept. Conversely, rational individuals accept to participate into social cooperation only on the basis of their personal advantage or benefit"<sup>168</sup>. In Rawls' words, "they are ready to violate such terms as suits their interests when circumstances allow."<sup>169</sup> For Larmore, "we honor public reason when we bring our own reason into accord with the

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<sup>162</sup> Bruce Ackerman, "Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law," *The Yale Law Journal* 99, no. 3 (1989): 461.

<sup>163</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, "The Revolution of 'The Most Reasonable': Rawls's Legacy in the 21st Century," in *Sambashan*, special issue on John Rawls (1921–2021), 21–39 (2021), 23.

<sup>164</sup> Ferrara, "The Revolution of 'The Most Reasonable': Rawls's Legacy in the 21st Century," 23.

<sup>165</sup> Ferrara, "The Revolution of 'The Most Reasonable': Rawls's Legacy in the 21st Century," 23.

<sup>166</sup> Ferrara, "The Revolution of 'The Most Reasonable': Rawls's Legacy in the 21st Century," 23.

<sup>167</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, "Political Discourse and Reasonable Disagreement – What Constitutionalism Suggests," in *Diskurs I Politika – Discourse and Politics*, ed. Dejana M. Vukasovic & Petar Matic (Belgrado, Serbia, 2019): 103.

<sup>168</sup> Fabbrizi, "Political Discourse and Reasonable Disagreement – What Constitutionalism Suggests," 103.

<sup>169</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 50.

reason of others, espousing a common point of view for settling the terms of our political life”.<sup>170</sup>

These then are the two dispositions at the center of Rawls’ model, “Rationality and reasonableness are two complementary characteristics of human being, though they are two distinct ideas”.<sup>171</sup> This is in the sense that “the reasonable has the disposition and the willingness to cooperate with others for the common good, while the rational pursues only his/her own personal aspirations and goals.”<sup>172</sup> The point of strongest alignment between Rawls’ model and Ferrara’s model of judgment comes from his line, “what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us”.<sup>173</sup> The political conception of justice then is ““most reasonable for us”, given “its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves.”<sup>174</sup>

Whereas Ferrara has focused on those moments where the imagination is set in motion by a particular striking example as a basis of reflective judgment, there are also those moments where imagination must be set in motion and where no examples are in place to begin the process of thinking through the correct action. This is the basis of reflective disclosure that will be discussed in chapter four. A key aspect of Ferrara’s work on hyperpluralism has been showing how to ground reflexive pluralism; how to ground a democratic ethos of openness; how to build conjectural arguments to bring in more ‘reasonable’ people and how to build a multivariate democratic polity. In Ferrara’s words, “without this moment of discourse – broadly understood as a dialogical exchange under conditions of good faith, equality and reciprocity – politics would just be based on arbitrary force, the contingencies of power or the oscillation of popular sentiment”.<sup>175</sup>

The central focus of this pragmatic arena is about bringing more and more visions into political alignment around the political culture while leaving the background culture to evolve. As Sebastiano Maffettone notes, “In Rawls’s vision, an overlapping consensus consists in a situation in which citizens who adhere to different comprehensive doctrines progressively accept (the

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<sup>170</sup> Charles Larmore, “Public Reason,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*, ed. Samuel Freeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 368.

<sup>171</sup> Fabbrizi, “Political Discourse and Reasonable Disagreement – What Constitutionalism Suggests,” 103.

<sup>172</sup> Fabbrizi, “Political Discourse and Reasonable Disagreement – What Constitutionalism Suggests,” 103.

<sup>173</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 306.

<sup>174</sup> John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 9 (1980): 519.

<sup>175</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 32.

fundamental of) the same liberal-democratic political outlook in a well-ordered society.”<sup>176</sup> This means that, “Every citizen, regardless of whether her basic comprehensive doctrine is Muslim or Catholic, secular or Buddhist, utilitarian or Kantian, skeptical or pluralistic, should find she agrees on the liberal and egalitarian essentials of political justice.”<sup>177</sup>

An overlapping consensus is fundamentally different from being pragmatic itself; however, it is based upon a deeper source of conviction. For, “According to Rawls, the resulting consensus is not superficial or prudential, but is of a strictly moral nature. We are not dealing with a compromise, with what Rawls calls a mere “modus vivendi”. The overlapping consensus does not depend on any balance of power that might be achieved at any time between rival world-views.”<sup>178</sup> Another way of saying this is that “Rawls focuses on the relation between overlapping consensus and modus vivendi; if, on one hand, overlapping consensus is a broad, deep, specific (and stable) consensus, on the other hand, modus vivendi is a more limited and prudential consensus, which is related to the idea that the parties involved, think profitable for them to reach this agreement.”<sup>179</sup>

This all ties back to equilibrium because modus vivendi is in a state of political organization that is far more likely to disengage from homeostasis and require extra energy and work to bring it back, whereas an overlapping consensus holds onto equilibrium over time with less energy demand. Here the “idea that consensus as a modus vivendi is related to the particular interest means that it’s very unstable, subjected to a fragile equilibrium between the parties and supported only by personal and contingent reasons, which could change at any time.”<sup>180</sup> The reflective equilibrium model of Rawls sees theory measured against the consequences of considered judgment. Here physical energy demands are therefore a key part of the equation.

However, the difficulty with this model is when stretched to the edges of spaces and through time. When incorporating more and more people it is difficult to show how a system can start or end from the principle of free and equal citizens. John Rawls encountered this difficulty in his own work on the Law of the Peoples. Alessandro Ferrara has discussed these issues even within the context of domestic politics through the term hyperpluralism. Stretched through time Rawls’ work encounters the challenge of a system granting vertical reciprocity to all future generations empowered with the title of ‘the People’ attached to the constitution. This requires understanding people not simply as symbolic species,

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<sup>176</sup> S. Maffettone, *Rawls: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 262.

<sup>177</sup> Maffettone, *Rawls: An Introduction*, 262.

<sup>178</sup> Maffettone, *Rawls: An Introduction*, 262.

<sup>179</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, “Overlapping Consensus and Constitutional Consensus. Another (Possible) Interpretation,” paper presented at the conference *Philosophy and Social Sciences*, Prague, 2015, 3.

<sup>180</sup> Fabbrizi, “Overlapping Consensus and Constitutional Consensus. Another (Possible) Interpretation,” 3.

but incorporating an underlying biological nature that is in constant touch with physical reality. There must then be a principle that transcends space and time in terms of grounding a constitution that has certain aspects that aren't amendable, and certain aspects that are. For amendments not simply to be ordinary law, they must have a deeper source. In this sense this work will expose the 'eternity clause' as the foundation for fundamental rights.

Normative and realistic notions of legitimacy lead in two different directions. For example, in a normative model power is legitimated when "in accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason"<sup>181</sup>. This is the model of Rawls. Richard Bellamy on the other hand in the realist camp "defends the idea according to which the legitimate exercise of power and the legitimacy of laws – and of the constitution itself – are just related to the will of a majority as expressed in the last electoral turn or in a legislative and parliamentary vote."<sup>182</sup>

In the debate between realism and normativity, "By presupposing a Hobbesian priority of stability, *modus vivendi* and realist liberals foreground the alignment of the authorities' conduct with the moral views of the powerful, more influential or majority sectors of the population."<sup>183</sup> Whereas, in the alternative "political liberalism offers a notion of legitimacy premised on the alignment of authority's conduct with the views not just of the more powerful, influential or numerous sectors but of each and every member of the society."<sup>184</sup>

According to Ferrara, "the received view of political liberalism"<sup>185</sup> has to be amended because of the "high degree of normative idealization that is still present"<sup>186</sup> in it and the "element of contingency that Rawls associated with normativity".<sup>187</sup> For Rawls, overlapping consensus can resolve the differences between Locke and Rousseau. This means seeing 'the reasonable' through "to its aesthetic sources – exemplarity, judgment, identity and the imagination".<sup>188</sup> Ferrara says

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<sup>181</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137.

<sup>182</sup> Fabbrizi, "On Law, Power and Violence: From Christoph Menke to Hannah Arendt. A Critical Analysis," 49.

<sup>183</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, "How to Accommodate *Modus Vivendi* Within Normative Political Theory," *Biblioteca della libertà* (2018), 25.

<sup>184</sup> Ferrara, "How to Accommodate *Modus Vivendi* Within Normative Political Theory," 25.

<sup>185</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 89.

<sup>186</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 89.

<sup>187</sup> Baccelli, "Inside the Rawlsian Horizon?," 36.

<sup>188</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 219

that “politics at its best is the prioritization of ends in the light of good reasons that can move our imagination”<sup>189</sup>

This space is where the work of Alessandro Ferrara fills out the political edges. Starting with his work on modernity and authenticity, he was able to show how the thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau could open the doors beyond a morality based on autonomy, to one based on authenticity. The difference being that autonomous codes are propositionally fully developed. He delved deeper into this specific form of authenticity in pursuing its nature as reflective authenticity, which fit within the broader paradigm of the Judgement view of Justice that stemmed from going beyond Kant’s deontological judgment towards a broader aesthetic judgment. The Force of the Example laid out how exemplarity fits within this framework of authenticity. His work Rousseau and Critical Theory extends this work. His other three most recent works seek to show that breadth and limits of John Rawls work in ... relation to legitimation by constitution and the weakness of Rawls when extended to incorporate greater and greater people in the Democratic Horizon, and when extended across time in Sovereignty Across Generations.

Ferrara is able to tie judgment of the most reasonable to decision making itself, and his “originality lies in implying ‘a moment of judgment’ in order to make decisions, the very dimension of recognition and “the moment of gift giving”<sup>190</sup> as constitutive elements of politics.”<sup>191</sup> This moment is found at the intersection of imagination and reality, “the same originality is shown in the attempt to define politics at its best as “the weaving of vision into the texture of what is possible”<sup>192</sup>. For example, “the prioritization of ends in the light of good reasons that can move our imagination”.<sup>193</sup> From our imagination it enables the “potential for disclosing a new political world for us, in which we recognize the reflection of our freedom”.<sup>194</sup> In other words, “Ferrara’s project is more intimately related to the strand of thinking about political judgment inspired by Kant’s Critique of Judgment, from which core notions of reflective judgment, exemplarity and sensus

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<sup>189</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>190</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 35

<sup>191</sup> Baccelli, “Inside the Rawlsian Horizon?”, 33.

<sup>192</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 37.

<sup>193</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>194</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 40.

communis derive, and which was given an influential political elaboration by Hannah Arendt.”<sup>195</sup>

The two key innovations again of John Rawls have been his focus on ‘the most reasonable’, and legitimation by constitution. The most reasonable is centered on the notion that, “what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us.”<sup>196</sup> In this sense, “The normative standard of correctness for this conception is not truth but reasonableness.”<sup>197</sup> The most reasonable has been extended into the realm of exemplarity through the work of Ferrara. For, “Ferrara the normativity of the reasonable consists in the exemplary character of a policy, institution, statute, a judicial verdict, which is disclosed through the art of judgment.”<sup>198</sup>

This exemplarity is said to have four key aspects: “First, it consists in the congruence of the exemplar with the collective or shared identity of those for whom it has normative force. This claim to exemplarity is not a claim that this policy is congruent with just how we think we are now but with “our shared sense of who we could be at our best”.<sup>199</sup> So, the exemplarity of political liberalism consists in its “congruence with a concrete modern identity premised on the notion of fairness and equal respect among free and equal citizens”.<sup>200</sup> The most reasonable is equivalent to the most exemplar, as a “claim to be the most reasonable is a claim that a policy or institution commands our consent because it fits in the most exemplary way with this shared sense of who we are at our best.”<sup>201</sup> Further, “The normative force of an exemplary policy or institution follows from its being a part of and cohering with the “singular normativity of a symbolic whole.”<sup>202</sup>

Second, “exemplarity also consists in a policy or institution itself having what is referred to as “exceptional self-congruency”, a “law unto itself”, expressive of a particular moral tradition but not confined to it.”<sup>203</sup> Third, “exemplarity has an

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<sup>195</sup> Matthew Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” *Jura Gentium: Rivista di filosofia del diritto internazionale e della politica globale*, XIV, no. 1 (2017): 19.

<sup>196</sup> Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 518–19.

<sup>197</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 21.

<sup>198</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 22.

<sup>199</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 22.

<sup>200</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 78.

<sup>201</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 22.

<sup>202</sup> Quoting Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 65.

<sup>203</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 64.

affective component and “sets the public imagination in motion”.<sup>204</sup> Fourth, “exemplarity is context-transcending. The claim for exemplarity derives its validity from an appeal to a *sensus communis* and a concept of the furtherance of life that should be viewed as a universal capacity to sense what promotes human flourishing.”<sup>205</sup> Ferrara’s vision has been argued to stem from a compilation of several key models:

“(a) the Montesquieuan “political sentiment of virtue [...] that includes an orientation towards the common good”<sup>206</sup>, revived in the “reciprocity” of Rawls and constitutive of democracy according the deliberative theory; (b) The Tocquevillean passion for equality which includes freedom and re- surfaces today in the theory of recognition elaborated by Axel Honneth, Charles Taylor, Avishai Margalit; and (c) individualism, interpreted in the peculiarly American version expressed by authors such as Thoreau, Emerson and Whitman.”<sup>207</sup>

Exemplarity is seen as “an exceptional self-congruency that should not be understood [...] along merely coherentistic lines”.<sup>208</sup> This means the very foundation of authenticity is centered on self-congruence. A key issue in the current work is differentiating whether there is a propositional self or not. In other words, a dynamic recursive self that contains mutual information between its represented actions and its represented self.

Conjectural argument is a key technique that Ferrara highlights to suggest an alternative to simply existing *modus vivendi* and overlapping consensus as tools for resolving differences between comprehensive views. This technique requires that, “we argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide a basis for public reasons.”<sup>209</sup>

Judicial review in this model is necessary to ensure the pragmatic efficiency of the constitution, so that it can be interpreted in the face of novel events, experiences and information. Judicial power is about “censorship and not transformative power; a preservation and not innovation power”.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 23.

<sup>205</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 23.

<sup>206</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 45.

<sup>207</sup> Baccelli, “Inside the Rawlsian Horizon?”, 33.

<sup>208</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 65.

<sup>209</sup> Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 594.

<sup>210</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, “Do Social Rights Deserve a Special Constitutional Protection? On Luigi Ferrajoli’s and Frank Michelman’s Democratic Theory,” *Jura Gentium* XV (2018): 59.

## *Rousseau's Legislator*

The innovation that Rousseau brought to political philosophy, and that varied from other philosophers was his introduction of 'the legislator'. The legislator "offers or frames the laws to the people-to-be."<sup>211</sup> This goes some way in addressing Rousseau's paradox of how a people constitute itself, "But this does not solve the problem: for how is the people to know they are not being deceived and the legislator is not a charlatan?"<sup>212</sup>

To resolve this, "Rather than leading his readers into an infinite regress, however, Honig suggests that Rousseau is shifting the problem to a slightly different register."<sup>213</sup> In the sense that, "The offer made by the legislator may be appropriate or not, but at this level, this is no longer what matters. What matters is that a choice is forced upon the people, which inaugurates collective responsibility in that this forces a decision and hence a response is demanded."<sup>214</sup> It is this "very fact of being put before a decision, then, propels a collection of agents into collective willing and as such first reveals the contours of 'the people' which is exercising its constituent power."<sup>215</sup> In this way "It is the concrete structure of this decisioning, then, in which I identify the locus of the people."<sup>216</sup> The People rely not on truth, but belief that seeks justification. This means it is not analytical, but pragmatic truth that undergirds the decision making and guidance of 'the People'.

What is the basis of judgment theory? The "art of judgment is the art of extending as far as possible this area of overlap while continuing to keep the normative relevance of what lies within the area of overlapping consensus still undiminishedly capable of exemplarily reflecting the superordinate identity, which includes the conflicting parties."<sup>217</sup> It is this "exemplary relation between what is shared and who we are, which constitutes the only source from which the reasonable draws its distinctive normative force once we distinguish public reason from practical reason, provides the basis for everyone – no matter whether concurring or dissenting, majority or minority – to accept the full legitimacy of a politically binding, yet nonunanimous, decision."<sup>218</sup> The key to judgment then is imagination, as "Once again, the normative force of exemplarity presupposes the capacity of our imagination to represent what is not immediately in front of us and to

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<sup>211</sup> M. van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 48, no. 3 (2022): 373.

<sup>212</sup> van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," 373.

<sup>213</sup> van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," 373.

<sup>214</sup> van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," 373.

<sup>215</sup> van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," 373.

<sup>216</sup> van Asseldonk, "Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis," 373.

<sup>217</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 34.

<sup>218</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 34.

foster an enlarged mentality.”<sup>219</sup> Politics at its best is “the prioritization of ends on the basis of good reasons that move our imagination.”<sup>220</sup>

Additionally, it can be said that, “Political innovation... draws on a “fundamental source – exemplarity and its force, which proceeds from the radical self-congruence of an identity and appears to reconcile ‘is’ and ‘ought’, ‘facts’ and ‘norms’.”<sup>221</sup> The reason that decision making is like politics is because, “Like the work of art, so the outstanding political deed arouses a sense of “enhancement of life”, the enriching and enhancement of a life lived in common, and commands our consent by virtue of its exemplary ability to reconcile what exists and what we value.”<sup>222</sup>

Ferrara has further tied imagination with a focus on openness that will show to be fundamental to transformative authenticity. A passion for openness “that orients opinion in the public sphere in the direction of favoring unconventional solutions”.<sup>223</sup> So “we can understand ‘openness’ as the property of those elements that set the imagination in motion, create a space of possibilities, allow for the space of reasons (and of judgment) to work and constitute a standard of political desirability”.<sup>224</sup> With that said, it has been argued that Ferrara’s notion of openness comes close to producing the same issue that Rawls initially sought to overcome, the hierarchy of one comprehensive view over others: “This conception of openness is familiar from the kind of liberalism articulated by Mill and Dewey, who, as have seen, are usually viewed by political liberals as “comprehensive” liberals whose conception of political value rests on a particular controversial moral account and therefore falls beyond the pale of the free-standing political doctrine.”<sup>225</sup> Here we “see this contrast in Ferrara’s searching criticisms of other recent attempts to articulate a democratic ethos, particularly agape (as it appears in the work of Charles Taylor), hospitality (Jacques Derrida) and presumptive generosity (William Connolly and Stephen White).”<sup>226</sup>

It is in Rousseau’s work the *New Heloise* where he truly unveils a basis for political philosophy that is not about autonomy, but authenticity. Where autonomous represents a moral code that is defined by the individual, but still

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<sup>219</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 33.

<sup>220</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>221</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>222</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>223</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 48.

<sup>224</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 65.

<sup>225</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 27.

<sup>226</sup> Festenstein, “The Normative and the Transformative in Ferrara’s Exemplary Politics,” 27.

deductive, an authentic model is still learning towards the abductive. As Ferrara notes, “One predecessor of this exemplary, uniqueness-affirming normativity is Rousseau’s account of the legislator’s function in *The Social Contract*. In Chapter 8 of Book II of *The Social Contract*, the legislator who advises the deliberating citizens should not aim at having them adopt “laws good in themselves”<sup>227</sup>, but rather laws fit for the people eventually subject to them.”<sup>228</sup>

Ultimately, Rousseau has said “Do not author laws that you’re not fit to be respectful of.”<sup>229</sup> What Rousseau does not mean here is that the “basic structure is unprincipled, prudential or a projection of the constitution-maker’s preferences.”<sup>230</sup> It in fact “means that the citizens should balance principle-optimality... by the point of the social contract, to protect the person and property of each associate while leaving her as free as before.”<sup>231</sup>

### ***Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave***

The key transformation between Plato’s model and a model of judgment grounded in the political mold of Rawls is that it recognizes homeostasis as a deeper ground of truth for living beings than perception. For “It is against the foil of this epistemic understanding of normative validity and legitimacy – right things are right ultimately because they reflect truth – that we can assess the magnitude of the revolutionary innovation introduced by Rawls”.<sup>232</sup> It is the moment “when he qualifies justice as fairness as being binding for us not because ‘it is true to an order of things antecedent to and given to us’ – as the world of objects outside Plato’s cave – but because it is congruent ‘with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations’ and, in light of our history and traditions, it is ‘the most reasonable for us’.”<sup>233</sup>

Another way of saying this is that, “We would have to concede that the philosophers, during their conversation sideways at the entrance of the cave, associate their pro-pluralism stance neither with doxa nor with episteme, but simply with the most reasonable thing for them to do – what Rawls would call the most reasonable principle for ruling the cave available to them through their common public reason.”<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (London: Penguin Books, 2004), Chapter 8 of Book II.

<sup>228</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity* (Turin: Centro Einaudi, 2022), 88.

<sup>229</sup> Quoted in Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 88.

<sup>230</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 88.

<sup>231</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 88.

<sup>232</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 73.

<sup>233</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 73.

<sup>234</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 87.

As opposed to the underlying forms that were meant to be universal, the ‘most reasonable’ is found within reflection, “the normativity of what is “most reasonable for us”, be it a political conception of justice or a legislative proposal, or whatever, rests not on epistemic grounds, as though its merits were “discovered” outside the cave, but on the judgment that the deliberating subjects form, upon reflection.”<sup>235</sup> This is why Ferrara notes that it is, “The location, sideways at the entrance of the cave, symbolizes that “the most reasonable” somehow partakes of two worlds – the imperfect nature of the subject of justice and the ideal quality of justice – and combines them in the best mix “for one singular case”.”<sup>236</sup>

The ‘most reasonable’ again is that “the normativity that can bind us in a democratic horizon marked by pluralism is the normativity of what is reasonable for us, where what is reasonable for us cannot be determined independently of who we want to be [...] without at that very moment collapsing the specificity of public reason into some form of theoretical or practical reason.”<sup>237</sup> Ferrara clarifies that, “the normativity of what is “most reasonable for us”, be it a political conception of justice or a legislative proposal, or whatever, rests not on epistemic grounds, as though its merits were “discovered” outside the cave, but on the judgment that the deliberating subjects form, upon reflection.”<sup>238</sup>

It is therefore at the borderlands that the interior and exterior meld into one. This location itself becomes the metaphor for this unity. This “location, sideways at the entrance of the cave, symbolizes that “the most reasonable” somehow partakes of two worlds – the imperfect nature of the subject of justice and the ideal quality of justice – and combines them in the best mix “for one singular case”.”<sup>239</sup> Here then is the map of the cave that “can translate the Rawlsian notion of reasonable pluralism into Platonic parlance.”<sup>240</sup> In the first case “a just polis is premised on the primacy of episteme over doxa.”<sup>241</sup> However, the latter vision produces an if/then statement: IF “we allow for a plurality of fugitive-philosophers venturing out of the cave and returning possessed not of a monolithic form of episteme, but of a plurality of partially diverging epistemai”<sup>242</sup> THEN “it follows that a polis where one controversial kind of episteme is imposed, through legal and institutional coercion, not over doxa, but over rival versions of episteme, is not in the least a just polis.”<sup>243</sup>

The pragmatics of the real world demand decisions to be made without full propositions being extracted from the world as, “life in the cave must be somehow

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<sup>235</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘the Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 37.

<sup>236</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘the Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 37.

<sup>237</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 219.

<sup>238</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 87.

<sup>239</sup> Ferrara, *The “Most Reasonable”, or Rawls’s Post-foundationalist Normativity*, 87.

<sup>240</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 398.

<sup>241</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 398.

<sup>242</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 398.

<sup>243</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 398.

regulated before the controversy concerning which of the full accounts truly matches the outside world is over.”<sup>244</sup> In this sense, “The predicate ‘reasonable’ applies to all positions that embed an awareness of this predicament and of their own validity as something other than full scale mirroring of the order of the outside world.”<sup>245</sup> Therefore, as opposed to grounding pluralism in the realm of the comprehensive, it is simply grounded in the reasonable, “Among these positions, the protection and respect of pluralism and ‘justice and fairness’, qua political conception of justice equally endorseable by the supporters of all the complete accounts of the external world, can aspire to the status of ‘most reasonable for us’.”<sup>246</sup>

Here then is the Ferrara model of the cave, “Glaucón would have to concede that the philosophers, during their en route conversation, standing sideways at the entrance of the cave, saw in this pro-pluralism argument neither doxa nor episteme, but simply the most reasonable thing for them to do.”<sup>247</sup> What would be the victory? The “philosophers have discovered public reason and its standard, the reasonable. The simile of the cave can still speak to us if we are prepared to filter away its epistocratic implications, and to add another footnote to Plato.”<sup>248</sup> What this means ultimately is that, “We would have to concede that the philosophers, during their conversation sideways at the entrance of the cave, associate their pro-pluralism stance neither with doxa nor with episteme, but simply with the most reasonable thing for them to do... through their common public reason.”<sup>249</sup>

### ***Universalism versus Pluralism***

The key paradox that is sought to be overcome by the judgment view of justice is the bridge between universalism and pluralism for, “The judgment view of justice is meant as a response, in the realm of political philosophy, to a predicament brought into being by the critique of foundationalism embedded in the Linguistic Turn of the first half of the 20th century and not yet overcome.”<sup>250</sup> Again, the opportunity always finds itself lying within the problem. For interpretation is both the downfall causing linguistic turn, and its return. It was the “Wittgensteins and Heideggers different but converging versions of the Linguistic Turn many of us have become convinced that it is impossible to grasp any segment of reality independently of the filter of some interpretive framework (a language-game, a tradition, a paradigm, a conceptual scheme, a vocabulary)”<sup>251</sup> This in turn meant

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<sup>244</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 400.

<sup>245</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 400.

<sup>246</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 400.

<sup>247</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 401.

<sup>248</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 401.

<sup>249</sup> Ferrara, “Sideways at the Entrance of the Cave: A Pluralist Footnote to Plato,” 401.

<sup>250</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 128–129.

<sup>251</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 17.

that “the plurality of existing frameworks cannot be reduced to unity without some significant loss of meaning.”<sup>252</sup> Due to these facts, “we live in a philosophical world where our longing for universalism, theoretical and normative, is not easy to reconcile with a genuine acceptance of the pluralism of interpretive frameworks.”<sup>253</sup>

The judgment view of justice “hinges on the idea that the kind of universalism compatible with our pluralistic intuitions and our belief in the constitutive role played by lifeforms is the exemplary universalism of a self-congruent symbolic whole.”<sup>254</sup> This is “the sort of universalism best attributable to the exemplary self-congruence of a life well lived or of a well formed work of art.”<sup>255</sup> This judgment view is deeply entwined with exemplarity, as, “The notion of exemplary validity is capable of bringing together what no contemporary philosophical doctrine seems able to fully reconcile: universalism (for the aesthetic validity of a masterpiece transcends the local prominence of its style and poetics) and pluralism (for aesthetics has no use for the notion of an ultimate framework of validity, the one right poetics).”<sup>256</sup>

A key difference in this model therefore is the reassertion of context, “What emerges from within a historical and cultural context – be it a view of justice, liberty or political justification, a constellation of political values, a political institution, etc. is now to be thought of as capable of exerting a cogency outside its original context.”<sup>257</sup> Therefore, it is “no longer by virtue of its reflecting some kind of context-transcending principle, antecedently and independently established as valid, but rather by virtue of its exceptional congruency with the subjectivity, individual or collective, that brought it into being.”<sup>258</sup> This is what Ferrara terms authenticity.<sup>259</sup>

This produces a key advantage for exemplary universalism, “the problem of translating across contexts (with its inherent dilemma of either trivializing difference, by postulating perfect commensuration and translatability in a neutral language, or jeopardizing universalism, by failing to reunify the plurality of local contexts) simply fades away.”<sup>260</sup> This is due to the fact that “the cogency of the example, as opposed to the cogency of a law or principle, is entirely self-referential, immanent; and in its being apprehended *juxta propria principia* requires no translation.”<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 17.

<sup>253</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 17.

<sup>254</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 31.

<sup>255</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 31.

<sup>256</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 400.

<sup>257</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 129.

<sup>258</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 401.

<sup>259</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 401.

<sup>260</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 401.

<sup>261</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 401.

The key difference here then is that universalism is not principles based, but exemplary based. This means turning the view of resolving conflicts inside out. Whereas traditionally conflicts were resolved by seeking a context transcending standard. Now conflict can be resolved by returning to the fold of the subjective and perceiving “the flourishing of the new communal identity formed at the intersection of the conflicting ones.”<sup>262</sup> There always must be an underlying possibility for a shared identity in any conflict as “[w]e know from Davidson, Gadamer, Putnam and Bernard Williams that the notion of total incommensurability makes no sense: for two cultures, identities or traditions to perceive themselves as being in conflict they have to have some point in common.”<sup>263</sup>

A key aim of the first half of this chapter is to lay out how to ground John Rawls’ political liberalism with Alessandro Ferrara’s Judgement Theory of Justice. In turn, this will enable overlapping this logic with that of Charles Peirce’s theory of pragmatism and abductive logic. Where ‘the most reasonable’ finds its home. With that set out, the second half of this chapter will seek to ground this logic within cognition, memory and deeper biology to show a continuity of semiosis and life that has built increasing hierarchy around judgements. Firstly though, it is time to look at this foundation in the ‘common sense’.

### *Common Sense*

This form of ethics is rooted more deeply than that found in static morality as it goes to the base categories of common sense itself. What is common sense? For Giambattista Vico common sense “is an unreflecting judgement shared by an entire social order, people, nation or even all humankind.”<sup>264</sup> Vico brought together the Greek and Roman meanings of common sense.<sup>265</sup>

This served as the foundation of knowledge in the same way that Ricoeur and Gadamer believed that hermeneutics is a “basic kind of knowing on which others rest”.<sup>266</sup> In certain schools of thought these basis categories have been known as Folk biology, folk physics and folk psychology, as basic categories<sup>267</sup>, and naive physics.

The importance of folk categories is that they speed up the process of habituation.<sup>268</sup> The more there is conflict, the longer the habituation process takes in the

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<sup>262</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 401–402.

<sup>263</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 39.

<sup>264</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 79.

<sup>265</sup> Schaeffer, *Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism*, 3.

<sup>266</sup> Dan Stiver, *Theology After Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 149.

<sup>267</sup> Douglas L. Medin and Atran Scott, *Folkbiology* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).

<sup>268</sup> Usha Goswami, *Cognitive Development: The Learning Brain* (New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2008).

process of knowledge acquisition.<sup>269</sup> This basic knowledge opposes the idea of only learning through experience. Paolo Bozzi played a key role in early experiments. Solidity, object permanence. Folk psychology, also known as common sense psychology, is directly tied to theory of mind.<sup>270</sup> Common sense as stated earlier allows one to bring into the conversation the work of Giambattista Vico.

Vico grounded language as stemming from this deeply particular level of the embodied experience within a context. For Vico “The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to understand itself by means of reflection.”<sup>271</sup> It is from this axiom that is derived “the universal principle of etymology in all languages: words are carried over from bodies and from the properties of bodies to signify the institutions of the mind and spirit.”<sup>272</sup> This right here is the “universal principle of etymology in all languages.”<sup>273</sup> It is this intersection of language and ethics that grounds political society and natural law. Vico felt it important to note that, “In my *New Science*, I shall show that this social nature is the true civil nature of humankind, and that law exists in nature.”<sup>274</sup> What Vico called a “Rational civil theology of divine providence.”<sup>275</sup>

Humanity’s conceptualization of its own mind began with seeing its reflection in the actions of one’s own body within a context. However, “By its nature, the human mind is indeterminate; hence, when man is sunk in ignorance, he makes himself the measure of the universe.”<sup>276</sup> In this sense a “property of the human mind is that, when people can form no idea of distant and unfamiliar things, they judge them by what is present and familiar.”<sup>277</sup> It is due to the fact that the mind “is buried deep within a body, the human mind naturally tends to notice what is corporeal, and must make a great and laborious effort to understand itself, just as the eye sees all external objects, but needs a mirror to see itself.”<sup>278</sup> Here the embodied nature of the mind that requires the use of metaphors to first begin to perceive itself is fundamental to unpacking the symbol of the *Imago Dei*.

This is why understanding knowledge itself – for Vico – should follow the trajectory of philology more closely than philosophy. Topics more than critiques. Imagination more than debate. This is because “Philosophy contemplates reason,

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<sup>269</sup> A. Alzahrani and A. Whitehead, “Preprocessing Realistic Video for Contactless Heart Rate Monitoring Using Video Magnification,” in *Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Computer and Robot Vision*, 2015, 261–268, doi:10.1109/CRV.2015.41.

<sup>270</sup> “Folk Psychology as a Theory,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, last modified February 1, 2013, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/folk-psychology/>.

<sup>271</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 236.

<sup>272</sup> Vico, *New Science*, S.N. 405.

<sup>273</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 236.

<sup>274</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 2.

<sup>275</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 385.

<sup>276</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 75.

<sup>277</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 76.

<sup>278</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 331.

from which we derive our abstract knowledge of what is true. Philology observes the creative authorship and authority of human volition, from which we derive our common knowledge of what is certain.”<sup>279</sup>

Due to the fact that “human judgement is by nature uncertain, it gains certainty from our common sense about what is necessary and useful to humankind; and necessity and utility are the two sources of the natural law of nations.”<sup>280</sup> Therefore Vico felt that it would be possible to understand this natural law by looking across nations, as “when uniform ideas arise in entire nations which are unknown to each other, they must have a common basis in truth.”<sup>281</sup> This particular axiom is important to Vico, “For it establishes that mankind’s common sense is a criterion which divine providence teaches peoples to aid them in defining what is certain in the natural law of nations.”<sup>282</sup>

Here Vico’s methodology was to use an early model of consilience particularly within this one subdiscipline. From his method one can “arrive at this certainty by looking beyond local variations in this law to recognize its essential unities, on which they all agree. From these unities we may derive a conceptual dictionary which traces the origins of all the various articulate languages.”<sup>283</sup> This methodology would in itself, Vico argued, unlock the potential to see the patterns of universal history itself, as “using this dictionary we may conceive the ideal eternal history which describes the histories of all nations through time.”<sup>284</sup>

In fact, more than any other knowledge the one that humanity could be most certain of is in fact this very pattern of the ideal eternal history. This is due to the simple fact that even “in the dense and dark night which envelops remotest antiquity, there shines an eternal and inextinguishable light. It is a truth which cannot be doubted: The civil world is certainly the creation of humankind.”<sup>285</sup> Consequently, “the principles of the civil world can and must be discovered within the modifications of the human mind.”<sup>286</sup>

With those foundational ideas just discussed, “since the world of nations is the creation of humankind, let us see in what institutions all the human race agrees and has always agreed.”<sup>287</sup> It is here where “we may derive principles, which like those of every science are universal and eternal, and on which all nations are founded and maintain themselves.”<sup>288</sup> The universal foundation of humanity then exposes itself to Vico for, “we observe that the barbarous and civilized nations of

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<sup>279</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 79.

<sup>280</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 79.

<sup>281</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 144.

<sup>282</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 80.

<sup>283</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 35

<sup>284</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 80.

<sup>285</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 119.

<sup>286</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 331.

<sup>287</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 332.

<sup>288</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 368.

the world, despite their great separation in space and time and their separate foundations, all share these three human customs: all have some religion, all contract solemn marriages and all bury their dead.”<sup>289</sup> These three ‘eternal and universal customs’ therefore serve as “the three first principles of my [Vico’s] New Science.”<sup>290</sup>

### ***Critical Common Sense as First Light***

Unlike chapter 1 that has focused on induction, and the upcoming chapter 3 focused on deductive logic, chapter 2 is focused on abduction. A theory propounded most strongly by Charles Peirce. This chapter is further distinguished from chapter 4 through a key distinction that Peirce himself grasped, a distinction between critical common sense, and what he referred to as being based on Galileo’s words as *Il Lume Naturale*. As Berkeley once argued, it is time for a “revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common sense”.<sup>291</sup> Here common sense in general builds upon those Roman legal traditions and the work of Roman law and Quintilian of a communal sense, as well as the common sense that extends from the work of Thomas Reid. Charles Peirce utilizes this foundation to build a model of critical common sense that is key to his theory of abduction.

Fundamental to the semiosis of Charles Peirce is the notion of pragmatic truth. For Peirce, he considered this as extending from what he termed a ‘critical common sensism’, bringing into his philosophy a long line of thinkers who follow the school of common sense realism. However, he made sure to distinguish two forms of common sense that are not equivalent through his focus on the critical aspect of testing common sense against reality. In other words, the scientific method. Far from leaving no role for uncritical common sense, Charles Peirce has – as described previously – labelled this ‘*Il Lume Naturale*’. The Natural Light. Only in Chapter 4 will this particular form of common sense be looked at. Until then, it is important to see that he was not the only major scholar in the field of ‘common sense realism’ to argue that there is a major distinction between that common sense that has been tested against reality, and that which has not.

The other major proponent of this distinction was seen to be 18th century Italian scholar Giambattista Vico. Here, Vico argued that Hugo Grotius only uncovered one of the two pieces of common sense in his theory of natural law. However, it was missing a second version of common sense related to providence. This distinction will again be further explored in Chapter 4. For the moment, it is firstly important to lay out the notion of common sense. The work of Quintilian, Grotius, Thomas Reid and Vico in laying out this notion.

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<sup>289</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 333.

<sup>290</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 120.

<sup>291</sup> Longxi Zhang, *The Concept of Humanity in an Age of Globalization* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 131.

Common sense is clearly defined as the “knowledge, judgement, and taste which is more or less universal and which is held more or less without reflection or argument”.<sup>292</sup> This means, “Those plain, self-evident truths or conventional wisdom that one needed no sophistication to grasp and no proof to accept precisely because they accorded so well with the basic (common sense) intellectual capacities and experiences of the whole social body.”<sup>293</sup>

Alvin Goldman would make the argument that reliabilism is a form of common sense.<sup>294</sup> Aristotle defined common sense as that sense of an object that takes place when the information from the five distinct senses are combined.<sup>295</sup> Here the common sense is consciousness, “for it makes us aware of having sensations at all”.<sup>296</sup> Aristotle also argues in *Rhetoric* that common beliefs are: “our proofs and arguments must rest on generally accepted principles, [...] when speaking of converse with the multitude”.<sup>297</sup>

C.S. Lewis highlighted the important role of Quintilian in this field. Especially where “Quintilian says it is better to send a boy to school than to have a private tutor for him at home; for if he is kept away from the herd (congressus) how will he ever learn that *sensus* which we call *communis*? (I, ii, 20). On the lowest level it means *tact*. In Horace the man who talks to you when you obviously don’t want to talk lacks *communis sensus*.”<sup>298</sup> In recent times the most famous name attached to a theory of common sense has been Thomas Reid. Reid has argued, “If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them – these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.”<sup>299</sup>

This means that for Reid, “we have a tendency or disposition to believe, in the appropriate circumstances, that there is an external world, that we have a mind or self, that there are other persons; and we tend to believe inductively supported

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<sup>292</sup> van Holthoorn, “The Common Sense of Rousseau,” in *Common Sense: The Foundations for Social Science*, ed. van Holthoorn and Olson (University Press of America, 1987), 9.

<sup>293</sup> Sophia Rosenfeld, *Common Sense: A Political History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), 23.

<sup>294</sup> Alvin I. Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

<sup>295</sup> Aristotle, *De Anima* 3.1, 425a27, trans. W. S. Hett, in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. W. D. Ross (London: William Heinemann, 1931), 314.

<sup>296</sup> Eva Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), 43.

<sup>297</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.1.12, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 11, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 1340b.

<sup>298</sup> C. S. Lewis, *Studies in Words* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 146.

<sup>299</sup> Terence Cuneo and René van Woudenberg, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 85.

statements, what we remember, what we sense.”<sup>300</sup> Reid further said that, “What is significant about these cognitive faculties is that, with the exception of the reasoning faculty, they produce their effects immediately, without the evidential support of other beliefs. For example, belief in an enduring mind and belief in sensate knowledge.”<sup>301</sup>

Clark and Barrett note that Reid sees the basic forms of knowledge “‘immediately inspired by our constitution’<sup>302</sup>. And, as with senses and memory, these cognitive faculties do not need to be justified by reasoning.”<sup>303</sup> Ultimately, “Reid also recognizes – a psychological point of some philosophical significance – that the vast majority of our beliefs are produced in us by our cognitive faculties, by our natural tendencies or dispositions to believe in an immediate, noninferential manner.”<sup>304</sup> This means that “we do not reason to such beliefs; if anything, we simply trust our faculties and use them to comprehend the world and live our lives.”<sup>305</sup>

The system of logic used changes political philosophy. Where John Locke used empiricism, Thomas Hobbes and Spinoza for instance sought to use Cartesian methods. However, Giambattista Vico and Shaftesbury sought to ground political philosophy in common sense. This is important both in the sense of grounding ethics back in community, but also in not reducing relations solely to simplified axioms. Thomas Paine in his way sought to use the simplest argument of common sense for individual sovereignty. Paine said, “In the following pages I offer nothing more than simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense”<sup>306</sup>. This means “Common sense will tell us, that the power which hath endeavored to subdue us, is of all others the most improper to defend us.”<sup>307</sup>

While chapters one sought to discuss empiricism, this cannot be the starting point of knowledge. As Peirce writes, “we cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for

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<sup>300</sup> Kelly James Clark and Justin L. Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 8, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfr008>.

<sup>301</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 8.

<sup>302</sup> Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense* (1764; repr., Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1815), 23.

<sup>303</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 8.

<sup>304</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 8.

<sup>305</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 8.

<sup>306</sup> Thomas Paine, *Common Sense*, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin Classics, 1986), 1.

<sup>307</sup> Paine, *Common Sense*, ed. Isaac Kramnick, 1.

they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned”.<sup>308</sup> Thus, “this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt”<sup>309</sup> so do “not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts”.<sup>310</sup> Wittgenstein had similar considerations as Peirce as to why methodological doubt as a foundation is flawed. By doubting something the doubter is acknowledging the existence of something. As Wittgenstein phrases it “doubt presupposes certainty”.<sup>311</sup>

With all of that said, it becomes possible to note that the, “mark of commonsensism is essentially a faith in oneself – a conviction that a human being, by proceeding cautiously, is capable of knowing the world in which it finds itself.”<sup>312</sup> In this way, “Any inquiry must set out with some beliefs. If you had no beliefs at all, you could not even begin to inquire. Hence any set of beliefs is better than none.”<sup>313</sup> In addition to that, “the beliefs that we do find ourselves with at any given time have so far survived previous inquiry and experience. And it is psychologically impossible to reject everything that you believe.”<sup>314</sup> In the words of Reid “[t]here is no searching for evidence, no weighing of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another.”<sup>315</sup> Reid further noted, “all knowledge got by reasoning must be built upon first principles. This is as certain as that every house must have a foundation.”<sup>316</sup>

Wolterstorff argued that there was a lack of clarity in Thomas Reid’s work whether “He thinks of the principles of Common Sense both as shared first principles and as things we all take for granted”<sup>317</sup>. This distinction is important as it shows that there is a line between a common sense that arises in the individual, and a common sense that is akin to Peirce’s critical common sense that is

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<sup>308</sup> Charles S. Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 213.

<sup>309</sup> Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” 213.

<sup>310</sup> Peirce, “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” 213.

<sup>311</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §§ 114–115 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).

<sup>312</sup> Roderick M. Chisholm, “Commonsensism,” *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Taylor and Francis, 1998, abstract, <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/commonsensism/v-1>, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-P007-1>.

<sup>313</sup> Chisholm, “Commonsensism,” *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Taylor and Francis, 1998, abstract.

<sup>314</sup> Chisholm, “Commonsensism,” *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Taylor and Francis, 1998, abstract.

<sup>315</sup> Thomas Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), Essay VI, IV: 434.

<sup>316</sup> Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed. Derek R. Brookes, 435.

<sup>317</sup> Nicholas Wolterstorff, *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 220.

shared. Stephen Boulter connects Reid's common sense with evolutionary epistemology.<sup>318</sup>

### *Interpretation: Semiotics, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Exegesis*

The world of interpretation has fragmented itself around different fields of study with slightly different areas of interest, but in reality share a strong fundamental grounding. Together, the fields of phenomenology; semiosis; hermeneutics; exegesis and radical empiricism highlight the relationship between interpretation, action, meaning and self-understanding. In each of these fields the leading figures have stumbled upon the major tropes that drive rhetorical situations. It is for this reason that a model can be extracted in a sense through consilience.

The core to meaning production is that understanding is itself a mode of being, what has been referred to as an 'existential hermeneutic', more specifically, self-understanding through the 'other'. As Paul Ricoeur noted in a manner that could point out that there is an existential hermeneutic that precedes the recursive self when he notes, "Existence becomes a self – human and adult – only by appropriating this meaning, which first resides "outside," in works, institutions, and cultural movements in which the life of the spirit is justified."<sup>319</sup> This 'Self' then is only constituted after a hypothetical counterfactual 'Self' is tested against reality and 'justified'.

As shown previously when discussing the work of Vico, hermeneutics itself offers the opportunity for interpretation to either seek to bring disparate topics together, or utilize criticism to drive them apart. The latter hermeneutics of suspicion has been represented by Karl Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud for example. This "invites us to think about how we read and to what end."<sup>320</sup> On the other hand is the hermeneutics of faith.<sup>321</sup> Both forms of reading are necessary for knowledge to evolve.<sup>322</sup> Gadamer says that one must read a text from the perspective of one or the other.<sup>323</sup> Ruthellen Josselson said it this way, "Ricoeur distinguishes between two forms of hermeneutics: a hermeneutics of faith, which aims to restore meaning to a text, and a hermeneutics of suspicion, which attempts to decode meanings

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<sup>318</sup> Stephen J. Boulter, "The 'Evolutionary Argument' and the Metaphilosophy of Common-sense," *Biology and Philosophy* 22, no. 3 (2007): 369–382.

<sup>319</sup> Paul Ricoeur, Charles E. Reagan, and David Stewart, "Existence and Hermeneutics," in *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 101, 106.

<sup>320</sup> Rita Felski, *The Limits of Critique* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), 6.

<sup>321</sup> D. A. Carson and J. D. Woodbridge, *God and Culture: Essays in Honor of C. F. H. Henry* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster Press, 1993), 27.

<sup>322</sup> T. Lindvall and M. Melton, "Toward a Postmodern Animated Discourse: Bakhtin, Intertextuality and the Cartoon Carnival," in *Animation: Art and Industry*, ed. M. Furniss (New Barnet: John Libbey Publishing, 2012), 64.

<sup>323</sup> D. Jasper, *A Short Introduction to Hermeneutics* (Louisville/London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 106–107.

that are disguised.”<sup>324</sup> A scholar of Postcritique, Rita Felski, notes that post-structuralism aligns more closely to a hermeneutics of suspicion than to faith,<sup>325</sup> and it is the latter that is missing from current discourse.

An *existential hermeneutica* is no mere intellectual exercise, “Given this goal, hermeneutics is an extension of reflection, but for Ricoeur, self-understanding is not merely intellectual but also ethical, insofar as it aims at the transformation of the self.”<sup>326</sup> Reflexive philosophy “seeks to have understanding of self, based on ‘the text which its actions have constituted’ . . . coincide with ‘a regeneration of its being.’ For Ricoeur, this means the regeneration of our fundamental capabilities as human beings.”<sup>327</sup>

Transcending the world of prior interpretation has often utilized poetry and religious discourse. For “[r]eligion accomplishes this through the power of poetic discourse . . . poetic discourse is productive: it makes, it creates, and it assists in becoming.”<sup>328</sup> It is this “productive power [that] works through the imagination to mobilize our desire to be. Poetic discourse is revelatory insofar as it discloses new possibilities for understanding ourselves and the world.”<sup>329</sup> This “transformative power is especially present in religious discourse, with its symbols, myths, and narratives exerting a transformative power to liberate the will that is bound by sin, evil, or fault.”<sup>330</sup>

Ricoeur himself noted, just as Lotman had the ‘ordeal of translation’. It is here that “Hermeneutics is not only the practice of opening up the world of the text; it is also the practice of opening ourselves to the world of the other.”<sup>331</sup> As Ricoeur noted “existential character is its decisive aspect for us: It demands the maximum of ethical sensitivity from us, and a radical response to that which confronts us in our concrete lives.”<sup>332</sup> The essence of this experience is “openness to a new experience. We can even say that hermeneutic experience is fulfilled in openness to what is new, different, and other. In this context, we can also grasp the essence of the truth in the hermeneutic experience. This truth implies an opening to a new experience.”<sup>333</sup>

It is for this fact that “the hermeneutic experience is not about reaching absolute or logically proven knowledge, but it is about the grasping of the processual

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<sup>324</sup> R. Josselson, “The Hermeneutics of Faith and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” *Narrative Inquiry* 14 (July 2004): 1–28. In abstract

<sup>325</sup> J. Lydon, *Imperial Emotions: The Politics of Empathy across the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 21.

<sup>326</sup> Brian Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 4.

<sup>327</sup> Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self*, 4.

<sup>328</sup> Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self*, 6.

<sup>329</sup> Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self*, 6.

<sup>330</sup> Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self*, 6.

<sup>331</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 10.

<sup>332</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 35.

<sup>333</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 50.

character of understanding. The hermeneutic experience itself enables one to open oneself to a new experience, which is a condition for all understanding.”<sup>334</sup> It is ultimately open also to the ‘other’, as “Aggiornamento is, after all, nothing else than the reciprocal opening toward each other... which sensitizes us to the reality that if we want to understand at all, we need to open ourselves tirelessly to the infinite constellations of otherness.”<sup>335</sup>

Hermeneutics is not a process in which an interpreter finds a particular meaning, but “a philosophical effort to account for understanding as an ontological – the ontological – process of man.”<sup>336</sup> This is why “Ricoeur’s ethics is teleological. He argues that human life has an ethical aim, and that aim is self-esteem.”<sup>337</sup> As Ricoeur makes clear “the interpretation of ourselves mediated by the ethical evaluation of our actions. Self-esteem is itself an evaluation process indirectly applied to ourselves as selves”.<sup>338</sup>

This ethical basis however is different from static morality, this is a pursuit of the ‘good’ that requires taking in broader and broader identity. In this way “self-esteem means being able to attest to oneself as being the worthy subject of a good life, where “good” is an evaluation informed not simply by one’s own subjective criteria, but rather by intersubjective criteria to which one attests.”<sup>339</sup> Here what becomes key is imputation, “as the subject of my actions, I am responsible for what I do; I am the subject to whom my actions can be imputed and whose character is to be interpreted in the light of those actions.”<sup>340</sup>

At this juncture it can be seen that an important goal for individuals and their institutions is “aiming at the good life with and for others, in just institutions”<sup>341</sup> It must also include the ethics of authenticity to one’s own greater possible identity. It is further affirmed in the words of Martin Luther that Alessandro utilizes to ground the authenticity and exemplarity in political philosophy, “Here I stand, I can do no other.”<sup>342</sup> The paradox of the neighbour stranger has been captured within the etymology of language itself, “In Greek, ξένιος denotes a stranger, a guest, who enters into our life. Similarly, Latin Hospes describes both

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<sup>334</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 50.

<sup>335</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 24.

<sup>336</sup> Richard Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 163.

<sup>337</sup> Jack Reynolds, “Paul Ricoeur,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<sup>338</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *The Narrative Path: Essays on Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 99.

<sup>339</sup> Reynolds, “Paul Ricoeur,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<sup>340</sup> Reynolds, “Paul Ricoeur,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<sup>341</sup> Reynolds, “Paul Ricoeur,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Quoting Paul Ricoeur, *One-self as Another*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 172.

<sup>342</sup> Martin Luther, *Speech at the Diet of Worms*, in *Luther’s Works*, vol. 32, *Career of the Reformer I*, ed. Helmut Lehmann (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1958), 112–113.

a guest and a host, and hostis can refer to guest or enemy.”<sup>343</sup> This is what led Wierciński to state that “In everyday life it is not always easy to make a distinction between hostile and hospitable strangers. But everybody who is coming into our life calls for hospitality, care, and compassion.”<sup>344</sup>

Not only are ethical responsibility and interpretation therefore deeply interconnected, but Gadamer even argued that the mode of Being itself was hermeneutics. He famously wrote:

“Heidegger’s temporal analytics of Dasein has, I think, shown convincingly that understanding is not just one of the various possible behaviors of the subject but the mode of being of Dasein itself.... The term “hermeneutics”... denotes the basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude and historicity, and hence embraces the whole of its experience of the world. Not caprice, or even an elaboration of a single aspect, but the nature of the thing itself makes the movement of understanding comprehensive and universal.”<sup>345</sup>

This mode of Being signifies that the very “experience of truth happens as an experience of interpretation. Hermeneutics is fulfilled in action, yet not so much by interpreting again and again but as the very event of interpreting.”<sup>346</sup> For this reason it becomes possible for hermeneutics to realize “itself in the concrete being-in-the-world of Dasein. Therefore, one can speak not only of the closeness between hermeneutics and ethics but of their identity.”<sup>347</sup> This means that “An experience of truth is not a theoretical-cognitive addition discovered during the interpretative process: It defines the way of being a human being in the world, which I call *existentia hermeneutica*. In this horizon, hermeneutic existence is an ethical existence.”<sup>348</sup>

Should hermeneutics as the act of interpretation and ethical responsibility be recognized as sharing identity, then there is in fact a “hermeneutic virtue (hermeneutische Tugend).”<sup>349</sup> In this sense it is, “in the first place, about an understanding of the duty of hermeneutics. For Gadamer, the point of departure and the goal are both needed for understanding: Both are impossible without self-understanding (since every understanding is self-understanding) and without an opening to the Other.”<sup>350</sup> It is therefore, “fundamental opening to the Other. In this, Gadamer sees a chance for hermeneutics as such, and also a chance that hermeneutics may

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<sup>343</sup> Andrzej Wierciński, *We Must Interpret: The Hermeneutic Retrieval of the Philosophical Tradition*, in conversation with Boyd Blundell (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2020), 1.

<sup>344</sup> Wierciński, *We Must Interpret: The Hermeneutic Retrieval of the Philosophical Tradition*, 1.

<sup>345</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd rev. ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2000), xxx.

<sup>346</sup> Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 37.

<sup>347</sup> Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 37.

<sup>348</sup> Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 37.

<sup>349</sup> Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 51

<sup>350</sup> Wierciński, *Existentia Hermeneutica: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 51.

be understood as the hope we can entertain for humanity.”<sup>351</sup> Ethics and interpretation are therefore the primary substrates of conscious reality. This is however an ethics that transcends cultural codes of morality – which are static.

As Wittgenstein and Taylor ultimately show, the ethics of interpretation precedes that of rules. Just as habit formation precedes the practice of habits. In this sense there must be a moment of practical following before abstract following. Akin to the direction of development proposed by Jean Piaget. This is what Wittgenstein refers to as the “forms of life”, what Taylor speaks of as a tacit background. Wittgenstein says that “obeying a rule is a practice”.<sup>352</sup> It is the form of ethical responsibility that lies at the heart of the notion of authenticity discussed throughout this work, as “authenticity, understood as ‘exemplary congruency of an individual, collective or symbolic identity with itself’”<sup>353</sup>

Here is the heart of exemplary universalism as it “provides us with a ‘new ideal of universal validity’ that shifts the emphasis away from the generalizable toward the exemplary and that is therefore better suited for pluralist societies like ours.”<sup>354</sup> That ethical choice behind every moment, “Here we stand we can do no other”.<sup>355</sup> It is for this reason that the “the judgment model leads to an almost successful combination of radical hermeneuticism and a situated contextual understanding of universalism.”<sup>356</sup> Justice itself therefore becomes situated in this mode of interpretation as “the idea that the meaning of justice cannot be understood apart from the meaning of the self-realization of a collective identity”.<sup>357</sup>

Ultimately then politics, ethics, responsibility, and justice all blend into the moment of interpretation within a context. It is therefore the case that in “this contextual perspective, a political decision involving conflicting claims can only be said to be just if it does not affect the chances of the political community to lead its identity to a ‘fully fledged fulfillment’, conceived along the lines of

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<sup>351</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 51.

<sup>352</sup> Charles Taylor, “To Follow a Rule,” in *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953; repr., Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). § 202

<sup>353</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 70.

<sup>354</sup> H. Kunneman and F. Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” *Sociology* 35, no. 1 (2001): 229. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42856266>.

<sup>355</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 229.

<sup>356</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 229.

<sup>357</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, “The Judgment View of Justice,” in *Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, 178–201, *Philosophy & Social Criticism* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 1999), 80.

coherence, vitality, depth and maturity.”<sup>358</sup> This renewed focus on emergent identity is key for exemplarity to serve as a foundation for political philosophy. This is a model not constrained to the material or the idea, but the emergent exemplars. It is novelty that has fitness which is the holy grail, “the example of an individual gaining a better insight into its own life history and deciding to pursue a new course of action, based on a new, more adequate self-understanding.”<sup>359</sup>

Turning from this broad outlook of interpretation to what it interprets to be exemplars asks firstly what is exemplar in this context. For the judgement view of justice, it “claims validity as the conception of justice whose rejection by us would cause us to become less ‘we’ than we would be by accepting it.”<sup>360</sup> Language itself is defined by these parameters fundamentally as the “context-transcending function of language is best accounted for in terms of the capacity of language to help us to interpret exemplarity and to be the vehicle of exemplarity.”<sup>361</sup> In fact, “Habermas links meaning and validity by defining ‘understanding a sentence’ as ‘knowing how to justify its truth’ and ‘knowing what obligations follow from one’s accepting it as true’.”<sup>362</sup> Therefore, even the act of speech revolves around this ethical duty in connection with the altricial gaze. Again what is “[e]mbedded in their moral notion of authenticity is a new form of universalism – exemplary universalism – different and in some respects opposed to generalizing universalism.”<sup>363</sup>

It is for this reason that it can even be stated that “All ethics of authenticity somehow is based on the distinction between succeeding in being oneself or failing at it, and the judgment that leads us to the conclusion that our identity is flourishing or stagnating”<sup>364</sup> It is “being fulfilled or on the contrary is being betrayed, is a kind of judgment – a reflective judgment.”<sup>365</sup> Due to that fact it is “not a determinant [judgment], to use Kant’s terminology – in which the object of evaluation is the optimal self congruence of a symbolic whole in its own terms, *juxta propria principia*.”<sup>366</sup>

Justice in this way “conceived along judgment lines is as contextual and particular as the good, because humankind is not immutable in the characteristics

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<sup>358</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 230.

<sup>359</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 230.

<sup>360</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 25.

<sup>361</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 26.

<sup>362</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 17.

<sup>363</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 22.

<sup>364</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 22.

<sup>365</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 22.

<sup>366</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 22.

that are relevant for justice.”<sup>367</sup> However, it is still “at the same time this notion of justice also has the power – as the theorists who lean toward the model of generalizing universalism like to emphasize – to ‘transcend’ the particularity of all local contexts.”<sup>368</sup> This is “not because a judgment based notion of justice can be disentangled from context dependency but because the context wherefrom it arises and within which it is operative is the largest imaginable context, which includes all other human contexts.”<sup>369</sup>

This pragmatic map of language allows the works of political philosophy to be tied in with that of Juri Lotman. This is due to the fact that it is Lotman who noted strongly that culture is composed of signs that are more akin to a medium upon which humanity is enmeshed – a semiosphere. In this way it provides an ideal model in the same way that Habermas believed Humboldt was onto a solution that Wittgenstein’s analytic philosophy and Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics did not capture. This early precursor of the semiosphere in Humboldt’s work is seen in the fact that “each language draws a circle around the nation to which it belongs, a circle the leaving of which is possible only to the extent of one’s moving, at the same time, into the circle of another language”<sup>370</sup> Humboldt therefore produced a holistic conception of language that couldn’t be reduced to its parts. He further opposed Plato and Locke in thinking that language represented objects. As noted in this work, the realm of objects is already second order mutual information embedded in third order language.

In this way language starts with recursive thirdness (where there is a space for double conventionality that is dynamic and static) and then overtime is categorized into components from secondness down to firstness where sound for instance can liken its indexical relations between sentence components to the indexical relations found in space time. Action and language move in opposite directions. Here, “language is not as a tool that we make use of, but a medium in which we are immersed.”<sup>371</sup> In other words, a semiosphere. For Humboldt, “language is never the private property of an individual speaker, but generates intersubjectively shared meanings”.<sup>372</sup> As Habermas puts it: “The encounter of strangers learning to understand each other over the linguistic distances takes place, from the start, in formal anticipation of a ‘third’ point of view [the point of convergence of an objective world].”<sup>373</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 24.

<sup>368</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 24.

<sup>369</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 24.

<sup>370</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?” in *German Philosophy since Kant*, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 415.

<sup>371</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 11–26, 13.

<sup>372</sup> Habermas, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?” in *German Philosophy since Kant*, ed. Anthony O’Hear, 416.

<sup>373</sup> Habermas, “Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of the Linguistic Turn?” in *German Philosophy since Kant*, ed. Anthony O’Hear, 419.

Ultimately, at this juncture the aim has been to show that there are multiple areas of study that have focused on interpretation and meaning generation. This work has sought to show that these disparate fields are actually all capturing a dynamic flow of logic that is best understood through the four tropes and the semiotic lens of Juri Lotman and Charles Peirce. In fact, this interpretive lens has shown the identity of ethics and interpretation, showing them to be fundamental to conscious choice. An ethics that transcends a static memory through the encounter with ‘the Other’. This is the same narrative whether interpreted through phenomenology, hermeneutics, radical empiricism, or semiotics. There is one further feature that must be mentioned whose fundamental goal is to constrain that interpretation towards that which is most moral. This is the altricial gaze rooted in the Eye of Justice.

### *Eye of Justice*

With the current model of interpretation in place it is important to bring this research in line with the work of Giambattista Vico. While Vico will prove to serve a more fundamental role to chapter four of this work – as he believes there to be a clear distinction between the common sense that served as the core vision of Hugo Grotius for instance – this section will still lay the framework for his vision of common sense that needs to ultimately be grounded in the Eye of Justice. Humans did not start by building a community, but by amplifying the catalyst of the omniscient perspective. This is why the second half of this chapter will explore perception.

In the way Giambattista Vico saw it, “We must seek that terrifying thought of a deity which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of these lost men and made them human passions. Such a thought must have given rise to the moral effort, or *conatus*, which is proper to the human will and which restrains the impulses that the body urges on the mind.”<sup>374</sup> In contemplating “the providential aspect of God, they confirmed its existence through the physician order of nature, which they observed in the motions of physical bodies like the spheres and the elements, as well as in the final cause revealed in lesser natural phenomena.”<sup>375</sup>

What makes Vico’s work fundamentally exceptional is that he is one of the few thinkers who believes that humanity has been interpreting the universe incorrectly by seeking for a notion of teleology and providence through observing nature alone. He recognized instead that teleology is an aspect of the human mind, and the mind can know itself through what actions the body takes. This is why Vico makes the claim that philosophers have wasted their efforts searching for providence through physics. For Vico, “the philosopher should have discussed providence as revealed in the economy of civil institutions.”<sup>376</sup> These scholars,

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<sup>374</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 349.

<sup>375</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 342.

<sup>376</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 342.

Vico says, should not have “begun with metaphysics, since it finds its proofs not in the external world, but within the modifications of the reflective mind.”<sup>377</sup> As Vico notes, “philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the true; philology observes that of which human choice is author, whence comes consciousness of the certain”<sup>378</sup> Here it “comes to be a civil theology reasoned from divine providence”.<sup>379</sup>

Again, this form of providence could only be studied in a fundamentally different way, “This is clear from the proper meaning of the word ‘divinity’, which was applied to providence. This noun derives from the Latin verb *divinari*, to divine: in other words, to understand either what is hidden from men, meaning the future, or what is hidden within them, meaning their conscience.”<sup>380</sup> For Vico then, “My New Science is therefore a demonstration, as it were, of providence as historical fact.”<sup>381</sup> This form of providence could only be studied through the teleology of social institutions themselves. Meaning political philosophy now in its very nature became the toolkit for studying what is meant by the *Imago Dei*, the Image of God. It is because “the world of nations was clearly a human creation, and hence its principles should have been sought within the human mind. And to the extent that human nature coincides with that of animals, it must rely on the senses as the sole means of knowing things.”<sup>382</sup>

The first governments depended upon this notion of the imaginative universal that will be more closely discussed in chapter 4. This is where Jove (Jupiter) – the imaginative universal – helped form the first large scale governments. Here Vico’s “New Science has shown in detail how providence caused the world’s first governments to base themselves on religion.”<sup>383</sup> Contemporary cognitive science of religion scholars confirm this deep relationship between large scale political structures and the omniscient perspective. This is labelled Big Gods in the literature.<sup>384</sup> Jupiter was the first imaginative universal. This word stems from *Deus Pater*, the father of radiance. It is the light that shines brightly that guides our ethical actions and that serves as a constraint on one’s actions that should actually serve as the foundation of common sense.

Just as Philo noted two thousand years ago when stating that the *Imago Dei* only utilized the reflection of the universe to peer into the human mind. Philo’s work specifically will be discussed in chapter three. This foundational basis of morality and government is tied together as “A publick Spirit can come only from

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<sup>377</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 374.

<sup>378</sup> Vico, *New Science*, section 138.

<sup>379</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 342.

<sup>380</sup> Vico, *New Science*, 127.

<sup>381</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 342.

<sup>382</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 374.

<sup>383</sup> Vico, *New Science*, §1109; 490.

<sup>384</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

a social Feeling or Sense of Partnership with Human Kind.”<sup>385</sup> From the fact that “there are none so far from being Partners in this Sense, or sharers in this common Affection, as they who scarcely know an Equal, nor consider themselves as subject to any law of Fellowship or Community. And thus Morality and good Government go together.”<sup>386</sup>

The first half of this chapter has sought to look at a political philosophy rooted closer to the source of common sense and pragmatic thought. Alessandro Ferrara has pushed political philosophy in this direction through his innovative thought on authenticity, judgment and exemplarity. A form of thought that can be traced back through the work of Rousseau’s Legislator and onwards towards John Rawls’ Political Liberalism. It is by seeing the power of these ideas extended not from within, nor without the cave, but directly at its entrance. Here is the realm of abductive logic that is the core basis of those fields of study related to meaning formation and extraction through interpretation: hermeneutics; semiotics; phenomenology for example. Here is the realm where the story of the Eye of Justice can begin to be told. Where the light is no longer about the physical energy spectrum, but about the metaphor of sight of that light as a form of knowing. In the next half of this chapter the focus will be on expressing how perception captures this light, and how that relates to abduction and the altricial gaze.

## Section B: Depth

### *Squaring the Circle and the Altricial Gaze*

Now that the political philosophy component of abductive logic has been laid out, it is important to continue with the exegesis of light that began in chapter 1. However, this time the light will be read through the allegorical lens, the deeper meaning hidden within the metaphor. The fact that it speaks to knowledge itself. In fact, it will be shown to be equated with one form of knowledge more than all others. This has been known as socially strategic information, but has also been defined as moral knowledge itself. As shown in the introduction this knowledge all begins with a gaze.

Humans are an altricial species who have adapted to the joint attention of their caregivers. Altriciality stems from the Latin root ‘alere’ meaning ‘to nourish’. Human infants are directly reliant upon their parents protecting and nourishing them. “Children are weaned and no longer dependent on their mother for food by about 3 years of age, but unlike other mammalian species, including other primates, they continue to depend on adults for care and provisioning for many years

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<sup>385</sup> Discussing Francis Hutcheson: Anthony Ashley Cooper, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), Vol. 1, Part III, section 1.

<sup>386</sup> Anthony Ashley Cooper, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), Vol. 1, Part III, section 1.

after weaning.”<sup>387</sup> However, they excel at one skill and that is the social domain, for “Babies under 1 week old can visually distinguish human faces from other stimuli, and by 4 months of age they preferentially look at faces.”<sup>388</sup> They also “have a bias for looking at faces or facelike stimuli, as well as the ability to learn a preference for the face of their mother shortly after birth”.<sup>389</sup> This increases if their parents have their eyes open<sup>390</sup> and if they are directly gazing at them<sup>391</sup>. This social capacity includes distinguishing between language and other background noise early in development.<sup>392</sup> This extended period of development has likely involved social learning.<sup>393</sup>

Ultimately, “altriciality, is not an unfortunate by-product of our evolution but instead a highly adaptive trait of our species, which has enabled human infants to efficiently organize attention to social agents and learn efficiently from social input.”<sup>394</sup> Simon Baron-Cohen says that the ability for infants to understand their caregivers intentions is necessary for the development of theory of mind.<sup>395</sup> Theory of mind is itself strongly correlated with language.<sup>396</sup> Connected with this web of social learning, and language is the cooperative eye gaze hypothesis. Here it is argued that humans have evolved eyes that allow one another to follow each other’s gaze. This is unique amongst related species as it removes a level of

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<sup>387</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 225.

<sup>388</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 225.

<sup>389</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 225.

<sup>390</sup> A. Batki, Simon Baron-Cohen, Sally Wheelwright, Jon Connellan, and Jaswinder Ahluwalia. “Is There an Innate Gaze Module? Evidence from Human Neonates.” *Infant Behavior and Development* 23 (2000): 223–29.

<sup>391</sup> T. Farroni, G. Csibra, F. Simion, and M. H. Johnson, “Eye Contact Detection in Humans from Birth,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99, no. 14 (2002): 9602–5.

<sup>392</sup> A. Vouloumanos and J. F. Werker, “Listening to Language at Birth: Evidence for a Bias for Speech in Neonates,” *Developmental Science* 10, no. 2 (2007): 159–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00534.x>.

<sup>393</sup> N. Uomini, J. Fairlie, R. D. Gray, and M. Griesser, “Extended Parenting and the Evolution of Cognition,” *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B* 375 (2020): 20190495, <https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0495>.

<sup>394</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 229.

<sup>395</sup> Simon Baron-Cohen, “Precursors to a Theory of Mind: Understanding Attention in Others,” in *Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development, and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading*, ed. Andrew Whiten (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991), 233–251.

<sup>396</sup> Kevin Milligan, Jennifer W. Astington, and Lucy A. Dack, “Language and Theory of Mind: Meta-Analysis of the Relation Between Language Ability and False-Belief Understanding,” *Child Development* 78, no. 2 (March–April 2007): 622–646, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x>.

deception in communication.<sup>397</sup> These skills are the basis of joint attention. It is important to note that gaze alone is not the basis of social learning, it is also the fact that infant behavior alters that of their caregivers. For instance, babbling<sup>398</sup> can “cause parents to change their behavior in structured and predictable ways.”<sup>399</sup> The basis of social learning is the outsourcing of information. This means that humans have become dependent upon the social environment for their survival and have become adapted to its structure over and above nature alone. This allows a relationship based upon positive feedback. Here “Parents provide appropriate and predictable feedback to their developing infant, and, in turn, infants use their perceptual biases for statistically reliable events to gather information.”<sup>400</sup> Again, it is the gaze of the parents that serves as a key foundation.<sup>401</sup>

A large portion of this week will be used to show that there is increasing empirical evidence in support of the theories first proposed by Giambattista Vico several hundred years ago. This begins with his first page showing a picture that he says to guide the entire work. This is the Eye of Providence, also known as the all-seeing eye. It is an eye in a triangle surrounded by rays of light. Vico proposed early in his writings, in contradiction to the prevalent Cartesian philosophy of that time period that it was more important to find connections between disparate fields through the use of imagination, then to utilize critique in order to find the flaws within arguments as the initial mode of interpretation. He referred to this as topics versus critiques, and ancient versus modern methods. In more recent times this has found a similar vision in what has become known as interpretation based on a hermeneutics of faith as opposed to a hermeneutics of suspicion.

Vico believed that the education of children should follow the same method of all learning, to begin with topics before critiques. Ethics is a key area where critique can't apply as well as topics. The best course of action often requires imagination and not critique. This is because it is usually in situations of uncertainty. Verene “regards Vico as a rebel against the entire western philosophical tradition which he characterises as concerned with abstract reasoning and focused upon the logical concept.”<sup>402</sup> Whereas, “Vico is contended to be asserting that it

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<sup>397</sup> Michael Tomasello, Brian Hare, Hagen Lehmann, and Josep Call, “Reliance on Head Versus Eyes in the Gaze Following of Great Apes and Human Infants: The Cooperative Eye Hypothesis,” *Journal of Human Evolution* 52 (2007): 314–320.

<sup>398</sup> S. L. Elmlinger, J. A. Schwade, and M. H. Goldstein, “The Ecology of Prelinguistic Vocal Learning: Parents Simplify the Structure of Their Speech in Response to Babbling,” *Journal of Child Language* 46, no. 5 (2019): 998–1011, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305000918000286>.

<sup>399</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 239.

<sup>400</sup> Faust, Carouso-Peck, Elson, and Goldstein, “The Origins of Social Knowledge in Altricial Species,” 241.

<sup>401</sup> G. O. Deák, A. M. Krasno, J. Triesch, J. Lewis, and L. Sepeta, “Watch the Hands: Infants Can Learn to Follow Gaze by Seeing Adults Manipulate Objects,” *Developmental Science* 17, no. 2 (2014): 270–81, <https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.12116>.

<sup>402</sup> John Milbank, “Vico’s Science of Imagination: D.P. Verene,” *History of European Ideas* 4, no. 3 (1983): 337.

is the imagination which provides us with real, fundamental knowledge – true science – by operating not with the concept but with the image, myth or narrative.”<sup>403</sup> This “knowledge is ‘first’ both historically and epistemologically.”<sup>404</sup> It must be remembered that “The invention of arguments is prior by nature in the judgement of truth”<sup>405</sup>

Vico proposed in this line of thinking that “the first men, the children as it were of the human race, not being able to form intelligible class concepts of things, had a natural need to create poetic characters, that is, imaginative class-concepts or universals”<sup>406</sup> In turn, this is what led Verene to see that, “Vico’s discovery of the imaginative universal is the discovery of a principle of identity that is linked with the notion of metaphor as the fundamental epistemological element. The metaphor is that by which identity is originally achieved in perception”.<sup>407</sup> It is acting upon these imagnate universals that precedes language itself. As Wittgenstein said: “The origin and primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning was the deed’[Goethe]”.<sup>408</sup>

It is the fact that humans themselves have acted to create human institutions that institutions themselves become the best way to study humanity and our minds. It is here, “in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of a truth beyond all question.”<sup>409</sup> For it is “that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men and that its principles are to be found within the modifications of our own human mind.”<sup>410</sup>

This is where Vico sees the fault of so many philosophers that have come before him. For “[w]hoever reflects upon this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which since men made it, men could come to know.”<sup>411</sup> This is why he calls for a rational civil theology of divine providence.<sup>412</sup> The work of Raudla in affective-imaginative modeling grounds Vico’s work in Lotman’s semiotics. As stated in the introduction, the postsecular

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<sup>403</sup> Milbank, “Vico’s Science of Imagination: D.P. Verene,” 337.

<sup>404</sup> Milbank, “Vico’s Science of Imagination: D.P. Verene,” 337.

<sup>405</sup> Giambattista Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time* (1709), trans. Elio Gianturco (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 106.

<sup>406</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 209.

<sup>407</sup> Donald Phillip Verene, *Vico’s Science of Imagination* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 79.

<sup>408</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, introduction by G. Von Wright, translated by P. Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), 31.

<sup>409</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 331.

<sup>410</sup> Vico, *New Science*, par. 331.

<sup>411</sup> Vico, *New Science*, para. 331.

<sup>412</sup> Vico, *New Science*, s 385.

equivalent of divine providence will be explored in chapter four as ‘emergent exemplarity’ guided by socially strategic justification.

### ***Light: Connecting Objects and Perception***

The key to understanding the interaction between the light and the human eye is the difference between foveal and peripheral vision. This next section will take some time to explain light’s role in conscious perception. This is because it is the central form of knowledge making and the root of the key metaphor at the core of this work – ‘knowing is seeing’. With that said, It was Leonardo da Vinci who first noted the difference between this central and peripheral vision. Leonardo Da Vinci was the first to argue that the eye only has clear vision at a line of sight. The spotlight. He is therefore the first to distinguish between the center and the periphery.<sup>413</sup> Foveal and peripheral vision.

Light is focused in the human eye onto photoreceptor cells in a layer called the retina. Light first passes through cornea, and then a fluid in the anterior chamber and then the pupil, then lens. This adjusts focus. Then another fluid the vitreous humor and then finally the retina. There is a black hole in human vision. It is the blind spot where the optic nerve exits the retina. The light is then picked up by rods and cones. Rods are for black and white vision and are not in the fovea. They are not responsive to spatial and temporal changes of light. There are far more rods than cones in the eye, with rods then representing peripheral vision.<sup>414</sup> Cones are trichromatic. The three primary colors here are red, green, and blue. Cones are not as much about intensity of light but all about color and photopic vision. Rods don’t see color.

Fovea comes from the Latin word foves, meaning pit. It is only 1.5mm wide. Entirely composed of cones – no rods – and detects color shape, distance and visual acuity. An even tighter area is the foveal avascular zone without any blood vessels in order to allow pure light to be seen without loss. The Foveola is only between 0.35mm and 0.5mm. Half of all nerve fibers in the optic nerve come from the fovea and the rest comes from the other portions of the retina.<sup>415</sup> This is the only area where 20/20 vision is possible. When there is good lighting it is known as photopic vision. This vision is what allows color perception and higher visual acuity. The opposite is scotopic vision. Dark conditions. In well lit, photopic conditions, cones in the fovea are the most used and aid with color perception, with higher visual acuity. This is spatial representation. Whereas scotopic vision relies more upon rods for night vision, and changes in the peripheral vision.

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<sup>413</sup> K. D. Keele, “Leonardo da Vinci on Vision,” *Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine* 48, no. 5 (1955): 384–390.

<sup>414</sup> E. R. Kandel, J. H. Schwartz, and T. M. Jessell, *Principles of Neural Science*, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), 507–513.

<sup>415</sup> Jan M. Provis, Adam M. Dubis, Ted Maddess, and Joseph Carroll, “Adaptation of the Central Retina for High Acuity Vision: Cones, the Fovea and the Avascular Zone,” *Progress in Retinal and Eye Research* 35 (2013): 63–81.

The dynamic dimension. The fovea is less than 1% of retinal size but over 50% of visual cortex. It incredibly only sees 2 degrees of the visual field.

Historically there was an extromission and intromission view of the eyes. One view was that the eyes emitted rays. The other was that rays bouncing off the object entered the eyes. This is what Isaac Newton and John Locke built upon. Entering through the eye's aperture. Alhazen was the first to say that light is the source of the rays. Hermann von Helmholtz studied the eye and proposed the hypothesis of the unconscious inference in 1867. This is the idea the brain is actually making predictions and assumptions from incomplete data. Using past experience.<sup>416</sup> Bayesian inference in visual perception.<sup>417</sup>

So again, the story has been one of light interacting with photoreceptors, then the lens, retina, and optic nerve. From there the signal is transduced and moves to the thalamus and then to the primary visual cortex. This is where lines, orientation and color are processed. Full representation of the image is put together in the temporal cortex. Hierarchy of processing visual information from simple to complex. Tunnel vision is the loss of peripheral vision and keeping central vision. Opposite is central scotoma. Where the peripheral cannot see detail, color or shape clearly. The peripheral is good at detecting motion with Magno cells. Central vision is poor in the dark – scotopic vision. Cones lack sensitivity in low light. Whereas rods work better in low light.

Now the key to light in human biology is a process known as transduction, which is the process of translating electromagnetic wavelength information into electrochemical, known more specifically as visual phototransduction. It takes place through the work of proteins that start in the eye found within rods and cones. The perceived outcome within the human body is color.

Human perception is built around color constancy that ensures that colors remain constant even under changing lighting conditions. This ability is known as chromatic adaptation. To preserve color even under altered lighting. In photography this is known as white balance. The fault in this system can be seen with the Purkinje effect, where different light can reverse the relative brightness between objects because of a shift in sensitivity towards different colors in different light.

While light is one key aspect, the receptacle of the light is the other. The human eye is called trichromatic, this means that it can only absorb three major colors and by adding those three colors together the rest of the color palette is formed. Blue-violet receptors are the most responsive to blue light. Their wavelengths are around 450nm. These are also short wavelengths. Green cones are called middle wavelengths at 540nm. Long wavelengths are received by red cones and receptive to 570nm.

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<sup>416</sup> Hermann von Helmholtz, *Handbuch der physiologischen Optik*, 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Voss, 1925).

<sup>417</sup> J.V. Stone, "Footprints Sticking Out of the Sand. Part 2: Children's Bayesian Priors for Shape and Lighting Direction," *Perception* 40, no. 2 (2011): 175–90.

This is the reason that seven colors in particular stand out to the human eye. The first are these primary colors of red, green and blue. However, when they overlap it produces even brighter colors in yellow, turquoise and magenta. When all three overlap it produces white. The key to understanding why the color one sees is not what actually exists in the ‘objective’ world is that in light itself red and blue never touch, but as the human eye only takes these colors they can be put together to create a light and color that does not naturally exist, magenta. This purple hued. Furthermore, as the work of Edwin Land in the 1970’s, the brain also seeks to produce color constancy. Ultimately then, the brain seeks constancy and invents the color of magenta to produce the panoramic vision that presents itself to our consciousness, but that is not found itself in the objective world. Magenta converts a linear spectrum to a continuous loop. So color can do something that light can’t.

This is why the eye works on additive coloring and has seven key colors that are brighter than the rest. Conversely when learning to paint, the system works off of subtractive coloring. When the colors overlap they produce a different schema. The clearest being that in subtractive coloring all the colors mixed together produce black. Whereas with the eye and additive coloring all the colors overlapping at the same time produces white light, and their absence of all color produces black. It is cones then that provide color and are largely produced in the foveal region, but rods record not in color but greyscale and that is how the right hemisphere largely produces a broader global and less focused, more dynamic view on the world.

Now that light has entered the eye and passed through the rods and trichromatic cones, it is split into two separate streams to be processed in separate directions in the brain. This is known as the two-streams hypothesis. A conceptualization first found in the paper of David Milner and Melvyn Goodale in 1992.<sup>418</sup> A similar division happens with the auditory system also. The two pathways are the ventral and dorsal streams. Often referred to as ‘what’, and ‘where’. The ventral stream goes through the temporal lobe where the dorsal stream goes through the parietal lobe. The Parietal lobe being found on top of the temporal lobe. This dorsal stream then processes spatial location and motion. On the other hand, the ventral stream goes further in identifying the object and filling out greater details and information on the extracted object. This is recognition. The dorsal stream comes through the primary visual cortex (V1) from the occipital lobe into the parietal lobe. There it becomes interconnected with the ventral stream which runs from V1 through the temporal lobe. Here is the beginning of the distinction between the two forms of consciousness discussed in the work of Lotman.

The importance of laying out this process in more depth has been to delve deeper into the embodied aspect of perception. It is the relationship between light, knowledge and perception that ground the central metaphor of this work and that

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<sup>418</sup> M.A. Goodale and A.D. Milner, “Separate Visual Pathways for Perception and Action,” *Trends in Neurosciences* 15, no. 1 (1992): 20–25.

enables through the theory of mind and embodied cognition to enable a roadmap to be constructed for analyzing the Imago Dei in the post secular age. With that said, the next section will show the tension that arises in predictive perception between the top down and bottom up feedback loops that confront what is perceived.

### ***Mystical Philosophy***

For humans to be drawn to the ideal word, and to the very present image brings the mind in two opposing directions. This has been captured by Bertrand Russell when he said,

“Metaphysics, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed, from the first, by the union and conflict of two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, others through the other alone: in Hume, for example, the scientific impulse reigns quite unchecked, while in Blake a strong hostility to science co-exists with profound mystic insight. But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonise the two was what made their life, and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.”<sup>419</sup>

Russell noted this as, “The facts of science, as they appeared to [Heraclitus], fed the flame in his soul, and in its light he saw into the depths of the world by the reflection of his own dancing swiftly penetrating fire. In such a nature we see the true union of the mystic and the man of science.”<sup>420</sup> For Russell “the highest eminence, as I think, that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought.”<sup>421</sup>

Here sandwiched between idealism and materialism is beautiful exemplarity. For, “It is only in marriage with the world that our ideals can bear fruit: divorced from it, they remain barren. But marriage with the world is not to be achieved by an ideal which shrinks from fact, or demands in advance that the world shall conform to its desires.”<sup>422</sup> This is the mode of common sense. “The first and most direct outcome of the moment of illumination is belief in the possibility of a way of knowledge which may be called revelation or insight or intuition, as contrasted with sense, reason, and analysis, which are regarded as blind guides leading to the morass of illusion.”<sup>423</sup>

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<sup>419</sup> Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1914), 1.

<sup>420</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 4.

<sup>421</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 4.

<sup>422</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 7.

<sup>423</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 9.

To feel this sentiment poetically, “Reality is regarded with an admiration often amounting to worship; it is felt to be always and everywhere close at hand, thinly veiled by the shows of sense, ready, for the receptive mind, to shine in its glory even through the apparent folly and wickedness of Man.”<sup>424</sup> In this realm the “poet, the artist, and the lover are seekers after that glory: the haunting beauty that they pursue is the faint reflection of its sun. But the mystic lives in the full light of the vision: what others dimly seek he knows, with a knowledge beside which all other knowledge is ignorance.”<sup>425</sup> This is akin to Vico’s understanding of intuition as “poetic imagination, not science”<sup>426</sup>

There are certain key elements of this philosophy. “In addition to this sense of revelation, he argues, three other criteria define mystical philosophy”.<sup>427</sup> The first is “a ‘belief in unity,’ which negates all polarities and divisions”.<sup>428</sup> The second is “a ‘denial of the reality of Time’, which stems from the negation of divisions, for ‘if all is one, the distinction of past and future must be illusory’.”<sup>429</sup> The third is “a belief that ‘all evil is mere appearance’, an illusion produced by the divisions and oppositions of the analytic intellect.”<sup>430</sup>

Even for Bertrand Russell then, intuition is the Queen of Creativity. “What I do wish to maintain – and it is here that the scientific attitude becomes imperative – is that insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth, in spite of the fact that much of the most important truth is first suggested by its means... But in fact the opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realm, it is insight that first arrives at what is new.”<sup>431</sup> This aspect of intuition and insight will be explored more fully in chapter four.

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<sup>424</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 10.

<sup>425</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 10.

<sup>426</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 3.

<sup>427</sup> Maria Popova, “A Largeness of Contemplation: Bertrand Russell on Intuition, the Intellect, and the Nature of Time,” *Brain Pickings*, January 30, 2024, <https://www.brainpickings.org/2015/01/30/bertrand-russell-intuition-intellect-time/>.

<sup>428</sup> Popova, “A Largeness of Contemplation: Bertrand Russell on Intuition, the Intellect, and the Nature of Time”.

<sup>429</sup> Popova, “A Largeness of Contemplation: Bertrand Russell on Intuition, the Intellect, and the Nature of Time”.

<sup>430</sup> Popova, “A Largeness of Contemplation: Bertrand Russell on Intuition, the Intellect, and the Nature of Time”.

<sup>431</sup> Russell, *Mysticism and Logic*, 13.

## *Conclusion*

Ultimately, this has been a story of light not in a material and physical sense, but a biological, perceptual and semiotic sense. The difference being that it ties together the transformation of light with the nervous system it interacts with. Light is not the subject then, but the medium, and the medium is the message. Light precedes life, and life predates the ability to see light. Yet, this ability to see has been integral to its continued existence. This is because light is the medium of information. It carries information about objects and guides the actions that close the loop between perceiver and perceived. Specifically, light transformed by the nervous system produces the images humans perceive and act upon. However, the nervous system doesn't just receive incoming data. It actively predicts a scenario, and overlays all the objects on a predicted map and dampens the exploratory behaviors of humans.

Light as read by perception is a metaphor. This is the realm of allegory and imagination. To 'see' not simply the subject, but the predicates. The pragmatic realm is always a limited epistemology surrounded by an ontology that cannot be completely captured in limited categories. As Einstein said, "The fairest thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science. He who knows it not and can no longer wonder, no longer feel amazement, is as good as dead, a snuffed-out candle."<sup>432</sup> Contrary to an object being a passive material that can simply be described, objects are opened up as near limitless potentiality that a subject's motivations transform into solid objects. That potentiality is a complete mystery and could surprise with being as equally good as bad, leading to an anxious reaction. It is the utilization of objects that give them meaning and shape in perception. For Tesla, all phenomena in the universe was not equal: "Of all the endless variety of phenomena which nature presents to our senses, there is none that fills our minds with greater wonder than that inconceivably complex movement which, in its entirety, we designate as human life."<sup>433</sup> Life's "mysterious origin is veiled in the forever impenetrable mist of the past, its character is rendered incomprehensible by its infinite intricacy, and its destination is hidden in the unfathomable depths of the future."<sup>434</sup>

Predicates are guided by teleology, by end-directed results. Biosemioticians believe this teleology is what separates life from the inanimate universe. Physical semioticians such as Charles Peirce would go farther and argue that the universe itself is end directed in the sense of moving to greater crystallization. This could be supported by the notion that Action is fundamental, momentum is ever present, and the second law of thermodynamics defines the direction of entropy. Conscious experience is born in a great mystery. One doesn't perceive a world, one perceives how to transform a world. Peripheral vision (gestalt psychology) is the

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<sup>432</sup> Albert Einstein, "The World as I See It," *Forum and Century*, vol. 84 (1930): 193–194.

<sup>433</sup> Nikola Tesla, "The Problem of Increasing Human Energy," *Century Magazine* (1900): 175.

<sup>434</sup> Tesla, "The Problem of Increasing Human Energy," 175.

space where information that is novel is then first encountered. The periphery also finds itself known as edge effects in ecology. The boundary of two or more habitats. This allows for greater biodiversity.

This pragmatic realm is how novel information is tested against prior categories in order to extract propositions. This process has been captured at the level of political philosophy most clearly through the work of Rawls, Ferrara, and Fabbrizi. In this realm the key question is what is the ‘most reasonable’, as opposed to rationality alone. This separate measure allows multiple epistemoi, multiple comprehensive views to stay within the same political space.

This realm of the predicate is captured by Kenneth Burke’s trope of the metaphor; Literary theories view on allegory; Carl Jung’s dimension of feeling; Claudia Welz view of the Mimetic model of Imago Dei. This is the realm of Alessandro Ferrara’s exemplarity, reflective authenticity, judgement, and the dimension of depth within Ferrara’s model of identity. It is the propositional predicate. It is the area of the Hypothesis in logic. It is Piagetian assimilation.

Ultimately, the autogen as a self-referring system is the basis for how propositional memory has been created. Further work can explore the emergent nature of memory. In the case of humans, memory has three layers of propositions. The cerebellum produces propositions that are automatic responses to events based upon an overlapping of experiences. The hippocampus produces propositions that are akin to a drama with characters and roles. The propositions of the semantic memory in the cerebral cortex are the propositions of symbols that are tuned by social communities. The category of firstness at each emergent tier connects to the thirdness of a tier below. This connection is a new index. In this sense Rods are complete and cones are consistent as rods cones are more heavily indexical whereas rods are more clearly symbolic.

Here the Eye of Justice was again explored as a catalyst in preparation for its role that will be discussed in chapter four. Catalysts enable possibility and not necessity to exist within a system because there is a choice of structure. Here then “semiosis is the general catalyst”<sup>435</sup>. To be more particular it is semiosis rooted in the omni science perspective. That from the altricial gaze/the Eye of Justice/the Omniscient point of view knowledge is scaffolded. From Hoffmeyer’s generalized notion, scaffolding “is what results from learning. Semiosis produces scaffolding”<sup>436</sup>, the structures of which support further semiosis in return; “catalysts in living systems – in organisms and cultures – are just special kinds of scaffolds”.<sup>437</sup> Thus semiosis is not only a learning process but a building process. Not only organismic bodies but also cultures are products of scaffolding built through semiosis. This is what makes the work of Wilhelm Otswald of Tartu so important

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<sup>435</sup> K. Kull, “Catalysis and Scaffolding in Semiosis,” in *The Catalyzing Mind: Beyond Models of Causality*, ed. K. R. Cabell and J. Valsiner (New York: Springer Science + Business Media, 2014), 114, [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8821-7\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8821-7_6).

<sup>436</sup> Kalevi Kull, “Evolution, Choice, and Scaffolding: Semiosis is Changing Its Own Building,” *Biosemiotics* 8 (2015): 230, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-015-9243-2>.

<sup>437</sup> Kull, “Catalysis and Scaffolding in Semiosis,” 117.

in laying out how physical, biological and social systems evolved through catalysis.

This chapter has looked at how memory interacts with its environment and how new propositions can be accepted into the system already in place. This is ‘assimilation’ of new knowledge in the Piagetian sense. It requires utilizing ‘the most reasonable’ propositions in the system already in place or as it can be assimilated. The process of assimilation is again where a model can absorb novel information. Accommodation in the Piagetian model is in the alternative where that novel information requires a new model to accommodate it. This depth of propositions commences by procedural memory building a bank of actions that successfully work. These are synchronized through gamma waves. These propositions then run through dramatic configurations through the hippocampus and episodic memory to see what works within a context. These are synchronized through theta waves. Ultimately a semantic system of propositions overlaying these systems inputs social semantic information that must find equilibrium with the environment as it is. These are synchronized through alpha waves.

In this model the prior chapter dealt with beta waves that freeze action until a narrative has been encountered to resolve the errors of resonant gamma waves that together caused beta waves to come into existence. The following chapter will explore what happens when alpha waves conflict with gamma waves, and chapter four would harness an alpha wave feedback loop that favors exploration in the face of uncertainty. This is how social epistemology is formed. In a political sense, self-congruence here can be expanded based upon authenticity, exemplarity and judgment. It is the hypothesis that is the key indicator of this realm of the pragmatic.

The first half of this chapter sought to highlight the foundations of a political philosophy rooted in abductive logic and critical common sense, from Rousseau’s legislator, through Rawls’ political liberalism and the authenticity, judgement and exemplarity of Ferrara. This has highlighted the opening for a new form of contextualized universalism. It has required reincorporating perspective into knowledge formation and a particular moral knowledge rooted in the altricial gaze. The ability to take this perspective has proven to be an opening to moving beyond inductive and deductive logic as a grounding for sovereignty and human rights. This has been the story of an embodied metaphor of light. With that said, it is important now to confront the traditional basis of the Enlightenment, of Liberalism, of Logic, and of the Sciences – that of the world of reason. This will be the foundation of exploration in the following chapter 3.



## **PART TWO**

### Episteme



## CHAPTER 3

### Thirdness: Citrinitas Proposition

(The True Symbolic Theory of Justice)

#### Section A: Dianoia/Din/Deduction

##### *Center and Periphery*

When John Locke first put forward his notion of natural rights that would serve as the cornerstone of individual sovereignty and human rights he had in mind the Image of God as a foundational axiom of a rational system. It was this combination of Greek rationality and Jewish revelation that has served as the cornerstone of John Locke's political philosophy, which in turn mirrors that of western civilization as a whole – even as the Enlightenment sought to extend beyond these roots. In fact, the very term Enlightenment itself means to en-lighten to equate light with reason. The primary motivation of this period, what could be referred to as the God-term – even without God – is that the logic captured by the human mind is ontologically present in reality. The logos then is the fundamental reality. However, no longer is God's word "a lamp to my feet and a light to my path".<sup>1</sup> Simply the word. Logic itself. It is for this reason that this section will study moral necessity as the metaphorical light of this era. This will be the derash/din of PRDS. The key takeaway here is that often the blinding simplicity and certainty of deductive logic leads individuals to mistake the map for the territory, probability for statistics. This simplification breaks down in areas of contradiction and uncertainty.

Here logic is a third order of mutual information. It is doubly conventional and recursive as the information is necessary, and not just likely – by definition. In a physical sense then this information must contain the physical structure of recursion as it means that it reproduces itself in a physical sense. This is why those linguists who study language from parts miss the fact that a symbol actually finds mutual information between two distinct third order pieces of information. It is where a third order proposition and a third order physical interaction are held within that symbol that a recursive self is represented. A proposition automatically contains as a whole the possibilities of differentiating its parts into indexes and then icons. Wholes to parts, and not parts to wholes.

Agrippa the Skeptic was the individual that produced the five major tropes of skepticism. One direction of the tropes is the Criterion of Dissent. The other is the Criterion of Action. Agrippa is only known by one citation in Diogenes

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<sup>1</sup> Psalm 119:105

laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers*.<sup>2</sup> Sextus Empiricus spelled out what these five modes were in greater detail.<sup>3</sup> Sextus Empiricus says skepticism is “a capacity for opposing appearances to appearances and judgments to judgments in whatever manner, so that we are brought ... first to epochē and then to tranquility”<sup>4</sup>. One of the tropes says that “we find an irresolvable conflict both among lay people and philosophers.”<sup>5</sup> Another that “the underlying object appears thus and so in relation to the one judging and concomitant circumstances, so we suspend judgment as to its real nature”<sup>6</sup>. Regress notes that: “what is adduced as confirmation for what is posited itself requires further confirmation, and that another, and so on ad infinitum”<sup>7</sup>. The Fourth is the Mode of Hypothesis, “when being forced to regress ad infinitum, take as an axiom something which they have not established, but see fit to assume as agreed without demonstration”<sup>8</sup>. Whereas circularity, “what ought to support the matter under investigation itself requires confirmation from that very matter”<sup>9</sup>. In this chapter in particular, the key issue for Agrippa's criteria of dissent is ‘progress ad infinitum’, counterbalanced by the criteria of action ‘custom and laws’.

What is missing from logic is its relationship again with what is absent and how it is tested against the environment within which it is embedded. This exposes logic to experimentation and time in the field of action. This corrects several issues that deduction generally faces. For instance, Plato says justified true belief in *Theaetetus*<sup>10</sup> and *Meno*<sup>11</sup>. However, Edmund Gettier showed that epistemic luck could produce this ‘knowledge’ even where it does not match reality. What is missing from Gettier is naturally the notion of ‘time’. It is a social-historical

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<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers*, trans. Robert D. Hicks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1925), 9.88.

<sup>3</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.164–177).

<sup>4</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*.

<sup>5</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.165, cf. DL 9.88).

<sup>6</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.167).

<sup>7</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.166).

<sup>8</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.168).

<sup>9</sup> Annas and Barnes, eds., *Outline of Scepticism: Translation of Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, (PH 1.169).

<sup>10</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus*, 210a, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).

<sup>11</sup> Plato, *Meno*, 97a–98b, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).

process that is continually tested against reality. This is for instance what Adam Schaff argued.<sup>12</sup>

The Molyneux Problem shows concretely that tactile information must be connected with visual representations by learning. The connection is not automatic. William Molyneux asked John Locke if a man gained sight for the first time whether he could automatically understand what he saw before touching them. Here again, it is this notion of action and imagination that precedes dissent. Facts in the world of secondness precede their being categorized in the abstract world of thirdness. The primary direction is important as the Criterion of Action precedes Criterion of Dissent. This was confirmed in the landmark case of Held et al. in 2011.<sup>13</sup> This has further been confirmed.<sup>14</sup>

Agrippa's trilemma, and his greater tropes perfectly map out this world of thirdness that is locked into a deductive system that cannot ground itself. The axioms have to come from without and the paradigm can shift. This is captured by the scholars of the western periphery Thomas Kuhn and Alfred Tarski. Tarski famously said "arithmetical truth cannot be defined in arithmetic."<sup>15</sup> It is captured on the eastern periphery by the cultural school of semiotics in Juri Lotman. The notion of the symbol is captured in depth by Umberto Eco. The Proposition is the key to this third realm. This is the world of deductive logic, determinant and deontological judgment. In linguistics it is the world of semantics because it is the world of necessary meaning, not pragmatic meaning that was explored in the prior chapter. Semantic meaning is propositional in nature, even if extracted through prior successful human actions captured as predicates. It is the world of Kenneth Burke's synecdoche. The world of Carl Jung's 'thinking'.

It is a logic that internally looks to coherence, and externally to consistency through constructivism. It is the world of practical reason. A world where multiple epistemoi, multiple comprehensive beliefs exist. When it is in harmony with the previous world discussed it brings about justified true judgements that are most reasonable and rational. The difficulty with this realm on its own is highlighted in the linguistic turn noted by Wittgenstein and Heidegger. Also on its own, it leads to a moral model of autonomy and not of authenticity. This is the world of episteme and coherence. Coherence being that dimension of authenticity "related to the possibility of unifying the plurality of vicissitudes undergone by a given identity into a narrative."<sup>16</sup> It is represented in Rome by Mussolini's new center of Rome EUR. The model of a fascist and tyrannical rule.

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<sup>12</sup> Adam Schaff, *History and Truth* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976).

<sup>13</sup> R. Held, Y. Ostrovsky, B. De Gelder, T. Gandhi, S. Ganesh, U. Mathur, and P. Sinha, "The Newly Sighted Fail to Match Seen with Felt," *Nature Neuroscience* 14, no. 5 (2011): 551–53, <https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2795>.

<sup>14</sup> Hayley Crawford, "Mapping Touch to Sight Takes Time to Learn," *New Scientist*, April 17, 2020, <https://www.newscientist.com/article/2246704-mapping-touch-to-sight-takes-time-to-learn/>.

<sup>15</sup> Cieśliński, "How Tarski Defined the Undefinable." 149.

<sup>16</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 112–113.

Citrinitas means yellowness. For Carl Jung, this third realm is captured mythologically by the Wise Old Man, and in his own terms by the Animus. The Logos opposed to the Eros. Again the First realm was the shadow, the second the anima, the third this wise old man and the fourth will be explored in the next chapter as the Self. In Sigmund Freud's terminology this third realm is the superego. Here is the world of the Proposition, the Logos, the Son. In the terms of Josiah Royce this is the third conception of Being: Critical Rationalism. For Charles Peirce this is the combination of intension and extension, whereby intension x extension = information. This the realm of thirdness, of deduction and the symbol. In this realm symbol is akin to a habit, regularity and law that connects a proposition in language to the true relations it points to in the physical and dynamic world. This realm contains a hermetically sealed truth. Truth in itself, not compared to truth in reality.

For Paul Tillich this is where the anxiety around meaninglessness arises. It is where Charles Darwin's natural selection ensures the fitness between successful semantic meaning and unsuccessful semantic meaning. Here, only 'fit' symbols are recursive, and therefore symbols that remain physically 'necessary' in the way demanded by logic. Here this is when knowledge gets to the edge and beyond of Plato's cave. This is the Episteme. It begins with Dianoia, which is knowledge itself. In the PRDS key this is the Din. The world of moral truths, and a moral interpretation of reality. In terms of theories of truth, this is where coherence finds its home as the last half of this chapter will explore. For John Rawls, this is where he began his search for justice in creating a theory that was entirely rational and not pragmatic like his later Political Liberalism. This is where the Theory of Justice finds itself in its original form. An ideal system based on abstract calculation alone. In Hayden White's theory of metahistory it is the emplotment of a divine comedy, as it ends with the alignment of logic with its environment, and through ascendance, peace has been restored.

For reasons that will be explored throughout this work a rational foundation for human rights is actually difficult to come by, as it depends upon the pre-suppositions the argument begins with. Even focusing on a simple syllogism – a simple argument – of the Image of God within humanity shows the difficulty of finding human value. For example consider the simplest argument of all:

A is B  
B is C  
Therefore, A is C

If humanity is a reflection of God (A is B), and culture is a reflection of that humanity (B is C), then how could the nation state that commits the murders of millions of its own innocent citizens on behalf of its culture be an ultimate reflection of God (A is C)? Does that fault and moral responsibility then lie with the God(s), with humanity, or with culture? Can a belief in God be sustained in the face of these horrendous mass killings by a culture composed of humans reflecting its own image? Removing a belief in one or more Gods from the

equation or placing it on 'free will' would simply lay the problem at the feet of humans – whether acting individually or collectively. Then it begs the question of whether humanity is worth salvation if this is what it is collectively capable of.

The twentieth century is filled with such vicious examples as the Holocaust, the Gulags, the Rwandan Genocide. So horrible were these atrocities that by the middle of the century the collective nation states of the world sought to enshrine an international code of human rights and by the end of the century sought to go further and actually enshrine a moral responsibility to protect individual citizens in foreign states from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This last change actually meant the complete restructuring of the traditional international legal concept set from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that the state was sovereign at the international level. Known as Westphalian Sovereignty. A responsibility to protect meant that the end of the century placed the notion of individual sovereignty and not state sovereignty squarely at the foundation of our international system of governance.

On February 24, 2022 the integrity of the sovereignty of Ukraine was challenged by Russia seeking a return to a bygone era. Amazingly this was the day its fellow Okraina country Estonia celebrated its own independence day from Russia. In between these two dates contained the entire history of the USSR. Hiding in a secret farmhouse on the outskirts of Tartu in Estonia lay the snake in the garden of the Soviet Empire. A snake that would soon lead to its fall. That snake came shaped as a book in the name of the Gulag Archipelago, written by Aleksander Solzhenitsyn. A book that exposed the moral faults that lay in the reality of a communist system, as opposed to its theory. The *New York Times* would write that "... Where many sought to lay the blame of the Gulag at the feet of Stalin, Solzhenitsyn presented the evidence to show that there was no separating applied communism from this outcome."<sup>17</sup> The *New York Times* went further, and said "Solzhenitsyn should be remembered for his role as a truth-teller. He risked his all to drive a stake through the heart of Soviet communism and did more than any other single human being to undermine its credibility and bring the Soviet state to its knees."<sup>18</sup>

While the work of Solzhenitsyn might be inspiring, the practice of the USSR was not. The moral credibility of that empire was raised to a fever pitch through the sound of music from a festival that started in Estonia. The songs were folk-songs from its history that connected it. In 1988 it was the students of Tartu University who showed up to the Tartu Festival to first hear and raise their voices to the Five Patriotic Songs, which in turn led to more the Singing Revolution that through harmony showed the call for freedom in terms that were visualized by a million people holding hands across the border of three countries. One third of the entire population in one instant showing through peace the call for freedom. Soon the USSR would explode and this region would be the first to be free. Estonia's most respected and renowned academic Juri Lotman closed out his

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<sup>17</sup> M. Scammel, "The Writer Who Destroyed an Empire," *New York Times*, 2018.

<sup>18</sup> Scammel, "The Writer Who Destroyed an Empire".

career by looking at just this nature of Culture and Explosion with this time period in mind.

What had made Tartu the expert on explosive events in culture? The very category of “explosion” becomes the center of Lotman’s thought since, in contrast to gradual progress or evolution, it presupposes the utmost uncertainty: “The moment of explosion is also the place where a sharp increase in the informativity of the entire system takes place”<sup>19</sup>. Juri Lotman would argue that change comes not from the center of culture, but from its periphery. This is exactly where Estonia has found itself around the edge of many empires. Leading it to be a fountain of new knowledge and not simple reproduction, but recreation. In fact, it was one of the last areas impacted by the reach of the culture of the Roman Empire and its Christian religion. It was in fact Teutonic Knights returning from the crusade in Israel that led them to go the outer reaches of Europe in the 13th century to complete the conversion to Christianity. This became known as the Livonian Crusade. Here the impact of John Locke’s words were lived in real-time. Explosion is tied ultimately to the history of every word as over time it drifts from the environmental reality of contexts that are ever shifting.

John Locke’s third Book would focus on words. Specifically, how words connected with the ideas they signified. For Locke, the key was clarity, and the abuse of words then was when individuals changed the meaning of terms and increased obscurity around meaning. This matching of word to idea has a published history dating back at least as far as Plato’s *Cratylus* where the question revolved around whether words and things had a deeper connection than simply arbitrary relations. Conversely the field of Semiotics that John Locke helped to name came about exactly on saying that words were arbitrary symbols. In the third section of John Locke’s work on *Human Understanding* the key question was how symbols (words) related to their reference. This is the same issue at the heart of Plato’s work *Cratylus*, and is known as the Symbol Grounding problem. This section will argue that symbols have been misunderstood because of thinking they contain meaning, when they only refer to something meaningful. Shared reference. It is the reproduced icon that is non-arbitrary. In the terminology of Terrence Deacon symbols in this sense carry ‘aboutness’ and ‘entionality’.<sup>20</sup>

The first half of this chapter has focused on John Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and a theory of justice based completely on ideal conceptions. It has been shown how any ideal and rational theory on its own is hermetically sealed from reality and therefore drifts from its fitness over time without the proper update. This is what led John Rawls himself to lead in the direction of composing *Political Liberalism* to correct this error. With that said, the second half of this chapter aims to bring clarity to this realm of thirdness by grounding this aspect of propositions in wider theories of rhetoric, language and theories of truth.

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<sup>19</sup> Juri Lotman, *Culture and Explosion* (Semiotics, Communication and Cognition), trans. Wilma Clark, ed. Marina Grishakova (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 28.

<sup>20</sup> Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter*.

In the same sense that Giambattista Vico answered Descartes' focus on philosophy with a focus on philology, and imaginative topics over philosophical critiques. Just as Ricoeur shows a distinction between a hermeneutics of faith from one of suspicion. So too are the tropes of Agrippa responded to by the tropes of Sextus Empiricus. Whereas one set of tropes is focused on the criterion of dissent, another is focused on the criterion of action. This means ultimately that the realm of thirdness is best not studied in a disembodied sense that will always lead to collapse, but as an embodied field of rhetoric that takes place within a context demanding action. Here then is a different look at the deductive realm and the beginnings of understanding why these first three realms of knowledge are not the ultimate ground.

The problem of the criterion is in a sense fundamental to this issue. The Problem of the Criterion asks: Where does knowledge begin? This is not asking about how knowledge is justified, but precedes that. This problem extends from the work of Sextus Empiricus<sup>21</sup> and the earlier Pyrrho who noted "neither our sense-perceptions nor our doxai (views, theories, beliefs) tell us the truth or lie".<sup>22</sup> Roderick Chisholm in *Theory of Knowledge* breaks this down into two questions: what do we know and how do we know? Answering the first is particularism, and answering from the latter is methodism. One can't be answered without the other.

The two questions then. What do we know? And How do we know it? The proposed solution: The Will; and History. Here one will find that the problem is the solution. It is the irritation of doubt that Peirce noted was the beginning of both an indexical as well as symbolic error. The cause and effect occurring simultaneously. This is the same occurrence as anxiety and the state of exception. "The distinction of the three types of anxiety is supported by the history of Western civilization. We find that at the end of ancient civilization ontic anxiety is predominant, at the end of the Middle Ages moral anxiety, and at the end of the modern period spiritual anxiety."<sup>23</sup> Here again the problem is its own solution. This is why universal and abstract notions of justice and equality aren't the foundation of knowledge, but the inverse, contextualised experience (that only upon reflection becomes reflected as abstracted injustice) and that sense of inequality that 'set the imagination in motion'. Issues of sovereignty and human rights then provide the space for responding to those experiences that have not yet been semantically mapped.

Eleanor Roosevelt put this view best in 1958 when she said, "Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home – so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world".<sup>24</sup> This contextualized

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<sup>21</sup> Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 2:4–9.

<sup>22</sup> Christopher I. Beckwith, *Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 22–23.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), 62.

<sup>24</sup> Eleanor Roosevelt, *In Our Hands*, speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York, 1958, United Nations.

grounding of human rights can be seen in the work of Marina Calloni. Calloni recognizes the importance of this grounding through an *ex negativo* vision of human rights that stems not from a broad concept of human dignity at the global level, but in relation to the violence one encounters even as a child within one's own home. "Violence is a deprivation of capabilities, which limits the functioning of human beings and the access to a full citizenship."<sup>25</sup> Calloni in particular had in mind gender based violence that grounds human rights in their "concrete interpersonal relations"<sup>26</sup>.

In this way human rights are not simply conceived *ex positivo* through human dignity, but also "*ex negativo* as a concrete expression toward fair human relationships, based on respect, dignity, and the non-humiliation of individuals, starting from everyday life."<sup>27</sup> This model sees concrete fear within the home as a child a more likely starting place for grounding human rights than those traditionally espoused within the literature. Here, "A counter-factual and normative analysis of fairy tales [for instance] can also indicate a new understanding of the idea of dignity and the concrete utopia of human rights, which arises often unconsciously as a not-yet-rationalized sentiment in the household as a sense of fear and deprivation"<sup>28</sup>. This "affective– emotive dimension of human rights therefore becomes compatible with universalism and cultural pluralism."<sup>29</sup>

This chapter will be focused on looking at humans as the symbolic species, and at Rawls' initial political philosophy grounded in a deductive system of thought that produced his Theory of Justice. It is in this realm that the constitution as a static entity finds itself, but through the rhetorical situation and interpretation actually reveals itself to be grounded in a reality beyond itself. This is why the symbolic world is always representative of a third order of mutual information in relation to the environment it finds itself contextualized in. The second half of the chapter will therefore be focused on the 'light of reason'. More specifically though, its fall. This reacquaintance with rhetoric and tropes grounded in the tetractys will naturally lead to the necessity of completing the tetramorph in the following chapter 4. Ultimately this chapter will be focused on coherent and constructive truth depending or not on whether background information is included.

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<sup>25</sup> Marina Calloni, *War, Terrorism and Torture: Reframing a Humanitarian Theory of Justice as a Critique of Violence*, 7.

<sup>26</sup> Marina Calloni, *War, Terrorism and Torture: Reframing a Humanitarian Theory of Justice as a Critique of Violence*, 12.

<sup>27</sup> Marina Calloni, "Images of Fear in Political Philosophy and Fairy Tales: Linking Private Abuse to Political Violence in Human Rights Discourse," *Journal of International Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (2016), 70.

<sup>28</sup> Marina Calloni, "Images of Fear in Political Philosophy and Fairy Tales: Linking Private Abuse to Political Violence in Human Rights Discourse," *Journal of International Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (2016), 70.

<sup>29</sup> Marina Calloni, "Images of Fear in Political Philosophy and Fairy Tales: Linking Private Abuse to Political Violence in Human Rights Discourse," *Journal of International Political Theory* 12, no. 1 (2016), 86.

## *Symbolic Species*

In 1997 Terrence Deacon proclaimed humans to be the ‘Symbolic Species’. This is equivalent at its core with being the linguistic species, the analytic species, the legal species. Symbols are distinct from indexes and icons in the physical sense in that symbols are recursive. This means that the third order of mutual information is doubly conventional as requiring both physical and verbal necessity. Another way to frame this is that humans are the Redundant Species. Each individual carries around a redundant cultural code within their mind that has been produced by conditioning overtime. This redundancy allows for successfully ‘fit’ actions to continue over time. However, as the next chapter will be explored, adaptation requires delving into the ‘noise’, and not only the redundant ‘signal’ in the Shannonian sense. This is why third order mutual information is Darwinian and related with Darwin entropy. This is the Number 2 of the Tetractys, as Symbols are binary – do or do not, If-then statements. These symbols are over time what become separated from reality and are connected with what Baudrillard refers to as the simulacrum. This is where the symbol itself becomes the hyper-real. In Kalachakra, this is the Chala as a symbol reveals as well as conceals.

In this realm, all behavior becomes constrained around static laws. However, these laws only correlate with a transforming environment for the time that the environment is static. This is the basis of Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory. That the fittest will survive. In the full sense, it is the fittest actions based upon memory. Yet as Deacon notes, nature is incomplete. This means adaptation is just as necessary as fitness, and that lies beyond the symbol.

Humans add an additional layer of redundancy as a community produces redundant human behavior, and culture itself is a redundant code. This redundancy is key to civilization as it enables code to successfully reproduce, and it also allows for mutations to enable greater possibilities for individuation that creates higher order symbiotic relations. The purpose of highlighting law as redundancy is to enable it to be more explicitly connected with Claude Shannon’s Information Theory. Redundancy is equivalent to ‘mutual understanding’, and therefore the mode of Being in *Existential Hermeneutics* and Heidegger’s *Dasein*. This is the realm that takes over the foveal vision and leads to what Giambattista Vico refers to as the Conceit of Nations and Scholars.

However, what all skeptics have honed in on, from Buddha and Pyrrho in Ancient times, to postmodernists, and deconstructionists in the current era is that these words, symbols, laws only have provisional meaning. They fit a particular historical and sociological context. This is a key issue of trying to ground human rights within the space of law, as that is a historically conditioned space centered on a moral relativism and not a universalism. For Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus, the key for the criterion of action is the customs and laws. While Pyrrhonism has

as a goal the ataraxia – untroubled mind – it still believes that action can occur through beliefs that are uncertain.<sup>30</sup>

Within the Buddhist tradition the limitation of concepts is grasped by the notion of ‘provisional meaning’. This means that they are historically situated, relational, and liable to change. This is compared to what Dolpopa referred to as Definitive Meaning that relies upon omniscience. He defined it succinctly when he noted that ‘knowing one, all is liberated’. This will be more greatly explored in the following chapter. Dolpopa’s major work the ‘Mountain Dharma: Ocean of Definitive Meaning’ focuses precisely on this point. Within the wheel of time this ‘provisional meaning’ represents chala. This meaning is deceptive as it is built on both revealing and concealing aspects of reality. The benefit of this process is that it allows simplification of logic to If/Then statements, which are automatic. This is therefore a lower energy demand system as it offloads decision costs.

For Schopenhauer this is what he termed ‘knowing’ in his fourfold model. This is the realm of abstraction. This is a realm of fixed representations. For Karl Jaspers this is ‘Consciousness-in-General. This is an “immanent mode of encompassing entails a form of consciousness in which universal truths and objective knowledge, such as logic, mathematics and scientific knowledge, can be ‘cognised’ and, in principle, shared by everyone who has the intellectual capacity to reflect.”<sup>31</sup> In other words, “This level also called the mode of abstract rational and conceptual understanding is methodologically bent towards generation and application of concepts and methods in general which are public and verifiable. The knowledge acquired here is universal and objective.”<sup>32</sup> To go further, “In consciousness-in-general an interchangeable point of mere thought speaks. It is thought-in-general, not that of a particular individual or the selfhood of Existenz,<sup>33</sup>” These are the bounds of symbolic thinking.

### ***Rawls’ Theory of Justice: Veil of Ignorance and the Original Position***

The key political philosophy in modern times has been John Rawls, and his work as reflected through Alessandro Ferrara’s judgment view of justice has been shown to be important to the current work. John Rawls originally sought to ground a foundationalist definition of justice in the Theory of Justice as a philosophy opposed to utilitarianism. The unique aspect was the original position that saw an ideal thought experiment take place behind a veil of ignorance. This was a secular version of an even earlier work that sought to ground a community of equals within the Christian concept of the Trinity as represented by the Image of God

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<sup>30</sup> James Warren, *Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology of Ataraxia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), I.

<sup>31</sup> Onyenuru Okechukwu, “The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers,” no date, 3–4, PhilPapers [Online].

<sup>32</sup> Okechukwu, “The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers,” 3–4.

<sup>33</sup> Okechukwu, “The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers,” 3–4.

before he turned away from religion caused partly by his taking part in war and learning of the devastation of the holocaust.

One idea of Rawls rises above all others, “The most famous and substantial formulation of it is John Rawls’ theory of justice, which he calls justice as fairness. Justice as fairness begins with a simple idea: the most appropriate conception of justice is one that people would choose in a fair situation.”<sup>34</sup> What is a fair situation? “A fair situation is a hypothetical choice procedure called the original position. It organizes various concepts, considered judgments, and precepts into a procedure that frames deliberations.”<sup>35</sup> Whoever utilizes “this procedure will reason according to these elements of rationality and reasonableness. In other words, these building blocks provide the raw material from which principles of justice are constructed.”<sup>36</sup>

The key question for John Rawls was: “How is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”<sup>37</sup> For John Rawls, his “vision [was] of a perpetually peaceful and cooperative international order, where liberal and decent peoples stand ready to pacify aggressive states, to secure core human rights, and to help struggling countries until they become self-sufficient.”<sup>38</sup> The two key aspects of his work are “a) his post-1980 situated normative standard captured by the phrase “the most reasonable for us” and b) his view of liberal-democratic legitimacy as centered around consent on the constitutional essentials (“legitimation by constitution”).”<sup>39</sup>

Justice is composed of principles and “just principles are, for Rawls, those which rational actors, deliberating behind a veil of ignorance in the course of a thought experiment – called “the original position” and meant to replace the “state of nature” of older contract theory – would select for the purpose of grounding the basic structure of society.”<sup>40</sup> In his own words, “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”.<sup>41</sup>

A great difficulty in Rawls first work on the Theory of Justice is that there are a plurality of reasonable doctrines. The “fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines ... shows that, as used in Theory, the idea

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<sup>34</sup> Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Political Constructivism,” citing John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (1st ed.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 310.

<sup>35</sup> M. Buckley, “Political Constructivism,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

<sup>36</sup> Buckley, “Political Constructivism”.

<sup>37</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 4.

<sup>38</sup> Leif Wenar, “John Rawls,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2021 Edition, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/rawls/>.

<sup>39</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, “‘Il più ragionevole per noi’: L’eredità rawlsiana nel XXI secolo,” *Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics* 23, no. 3 (2021): 29–45, EUT Edizioni Università di Trieste. In Presentation

<sup>40</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 24.

<sup>41</sup> Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 6.

of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic.”<sup>42</sup> Ferrara points out that, “The second flaw is mentioned in footnote 7 of Lecture 2 of *Political Liberalism*, where Rawls describes the idea that “the theory of justice is a part of the theory of rational decision” as “simply incorrect”<sup>43</sup>. In fact, “The normative notion of “the rational” certainly deserves a role of its own within a political conception of justice, but justice as fairness (now reconceived as a political conception of justice) “tries to give an account of reasonable principles of justice”.”<sup>44</sup> As opposed to, “what many theorists from Hobbes to David Gauthier have tried to do, justice as fairness includes “no thought of deriving those principles from the concept of rationality as the sole normative concept.”<sup>45</sup>

Ultimately then, the two key innovations and takeaways from Rawls work in the eyes of Alessandro Ferrara are: the ‘most reasonable’ and ‘legitimation by constitution’. Here, “The answer, in a nutshell, is that stability can be combined with just institutions if, first of all, in such a well-ordered society “everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice” or a publicly recognized political, not comprehensive, conception of justice.”<sup>46</sup> Secondly, “if the basic structure of such society (“its main political and social institutions”, that add up to a system of cooperation) “is publicly known, or with good reasons believed, to satisfy those principles”.<sup>47</sup> Thirdly, “if the citizens “generally comply with society’s basic institutions, which they regard as just.”<sup>48</sup>

## ***Rawls and Rights***

The core question in John Rawls’ *Political Liberalism* asks “how is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?”<sup>49</sup> In Rawls’ words, “our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, xvii.

<sup>43</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 53

<sup>44</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 28.

<sup>45</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 28. Quoting John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 53

<sup>46</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 29

<sup>47</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 29

<sup>48</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 28. Quoting John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 35

<sup>49</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, XVIII.

<sup>50</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 137

Seeking to find the basis for human rights Rawls noted “they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally. Further: the political (moral) force [of these rights] extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states.”<sup>51</sup> However, if that is the case they cannot be simply matters of prudence or *modus vivendi*, but come from a deeper source.

The difficulty for Rawls is that “human rights appear to be beyond the contractarian framework of the Law of Peoples in at least three senses.”<sup>52</sup> In the first way, it is “in the sense that the eight principles approved of in the original position do include the duty to protect human rights, but do not contain a specification of which rights are to be considered human rights.”<sup>53</sup> In the second way “the parties thus appear to be approving of a principle whose content remains totally unspecified.”<sup>54</sup> Finally, “because rights are declared to be binding also for those states which do not and cannot have representatives in the original position and thus cannot be said to have subscribed to them, their bindingness appears to be evidently of a non-contractarian nature.”<sup>55</sup>

Human rights are then “moral rights, independently grounded, which set external limits to the sovereign will of peoples... Rawls does not offer any argument for grounding these moral rights, but merely invites us to presuppose their being justified.”<sup>56</sup> This is very different from determinant judgment, which “presupposes that translation flows effortlessly and without loss of essential meaning back and forth between the locally prevailing frameworks of meaning and the rules or principle, of whatever nature, that need to be applied to them”<sup>57</sup> This enables “the context-transcending capacity of “the universal” [to] be fully displayed.”<sup>58</sup> This is the world of Immanuel Kant that Rawls’ work seeks to transcend. Kant sought to show that the rule itself contains the perfect ethics. This pragmatic soul of ‘the People’ is fundamentally a source rooted in people.

Thus far it has been seen that the people are a praxis centered around applying the constitution in real-time. The constitutional order exists as a stable identity over time. Populism might represent a valid democracy, but its constitutional model removes stability over time. Populism is defined by four key features: Firstly “An intrinsic and irreducible conflict between the elite and the people, with the former seen as the most radical foe of the latter.”<sup>59</sup> Secondly, “An illiberal and anti-pluralist definition of democracy, that rejects cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism,

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<sup>51</sup> Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 81.

<sup>52</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>53</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>54</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>55</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>56</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>57</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 19.

<sup>58</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 19.

<sup>59</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, *The Populist Upsurge in Contemporary Liberal Societies: Implications for Constitutional Democracy*, CAS SEE Spring/Summer Fellowship, 2022, 3.

and liberal-democratic values.”<sup>60</sup> Thirdly, “The celebration of leadership and authoritarian decision-making.”<sup>61</sup> Lastly, “A nationalistic and conservative impulse, especially within right-wing approaches.”<sup>62</sup>

The question of the constitutional order itself has called for Valerio Fabbrizi to highlight how the constitutional consensus Rawls briefly mentions plays a far larger role in the process of social order than it has been given the time and attention for. “There is, here, in my opinion, the deepest critique to Rawls: the fact that he leaves the constitutional consensus on the background, totally focusing his consensus theory on the dichotomy between overlapping consensus and *modus vivendi*.”<sup>63</sup> For Fabbrizi, “constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus have the same theoretical relevance; here, constitutional consensus becomes crucial in constitutional moments in which, as I argued, we cannot limit ourselves to a consensus on the principles.”<sup>64</sup> The solution is “to move on further to reconstruct the meaning of these principles and the impact they have for our personal convictions and beliefs and for our lifestyles.”<sup>65</sup>

Fabbrizi also believes that John Rawls’ views on neutrality have been too narrow and constricted as reasonable disagreement around moral issues should be allowed in the arena of public debate. Only issues around constitutionality should be restricted to overlapping and constitutional consensus. This is a view that extends Rawls closer to those views held by Bellamy and Waldron.

The key to a proposition is that it is automatically an automatic response and yet automatic responses don’t work in the face of objects that are not stable or consistent. The extracted propositions still serve as the basis of ideology and therefore when ideology is not checked against reality it serves as a decontextualized symbol akin to cancer that disrupts and distorts societal equilibrium. Just as artificial intelligence can veer off course if not continually checked against physical reality. For Charles Morris, the sign, the proposition is the epistemological atom. It is therefore a matter of biology more than physics. The traditional view is that “For, in its entirety, nature knows no ‘ought’.”<sup>66</sup> However, the second law of thermodynamics shows that the universe knows only an ought.

Matteo Bianchin has expressed this principle with the language of looping effects. Whereby ideology initially serves to legitimate power structures. Only

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<sup>60</sup> Fabbrizi, *The Populist Upsurge in Contemporary Liberal Societies: Implications for Constitutional Democracy*, 3.

<sup>61</sup> Fabbrizi, *The Populist Upsurge in Contemporary Liberal Societies: Implications for Constitutional Democracy*, 3.

<sup>62</sup> Fabbrizi, *The Populist Upsurge in Contemporary Liberal Societies: Implications for Constitutional Democracy*, 3.

<sup>63</sup> Fabbrizi, *Overlapping Consensus and Constitutional Consensus: Another Interpretation*, 5.

<sup>64</sup> Fabbrizi, *Overlapping Consensus and Constitutional Consensus: Another Interpretation*, 5.

<sup>65</sup> Fabbrizi, *Overlapping Consensus and Constitutional Consensus: Another Interpretation*, 5.

<sup>66</sup> Johannes Fischer, “Human Dignity and Human Rights,” in *Religion and Human Rights: Global Challenges from Intercultural Perspectives*, ed. Lars Charbonnier and Wilhelm Gräß (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 74.

after looping effects occur does ideology then become constitutive of a continual social structure. Even where the underlying power structure then begins to shift, ideology is stuck in place. This causes ideology to become disruptive in reproducing relations that are now detrimental to their environment. In Bianchin's words, "ideologies primarily perform a legitimating function at the anchoring level, yet they are turned by looping effects into constituent parts of the facts for which they are designed to anchor frame principles."<sup>67</sup>

This then "suggests that their [ideology's] constitutive and causal roles are derivative from their etiological function and only come to the forefront once ideology percolates into social facts by looping effects."<sup>68</sup> It is this "epistemology of delusion [that] connects the etiological function of ideologies with their epistemic flaws, while looping effects account for how they get embedded in the facts they are designed to anchor and their effects are fed back on their replication."<sup>69</sup> In this case it is the former that "'helps to explain how ideologies originate and possibly collapse. The latter helps to explain how they reproduce. Looping effects are located as mechanisms that underlay the process and are provided with a specific explanatory role in the context of a functional explanation."<sup>70</sup> A key takeaway is that ideology is not where structural imbalances originate, but it is where they come to find persistence: "This reading also suggests that the primary causes of injustice are located in distributive conflicts and power imbalances that are originally external to ideology while acknowledging that ideology might exacerbate existing injustices and make new forms of injustice possible."<sup>71</sup>

The first half of this chapter has focused on John Rawls' veil of ignorance, and a theory of justice based completely on ideal conceptions. It has been shown how any ideal and rational theory on its own is hermetically sealed from reality and therefore drifts from its fitness over time without the proper update. This is what led John Rawls himself to lead in the direction of composing *Political Liberalism* to correct this error. With that said, the next half of this chapter aims to bring clarity to this realm of thirdness by grounding this aspect of propositions in wider theories of rhetoric, language and theories of truth.

### ***Stability for the Right Reasons***

In regards to the question on legitimacy, Rawls extracted his principle of the 'liberal principle of legitimacy', whereby "our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and

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<sup>67</sup> M. Bianchin, "Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics," 25.

<sup>68</sup> Bianchin, "Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics," 25.

<sup>69</sup> Bianchin, "Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics," 25.

<sup>70</sup> Bianchin, "Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics," 25.

<sup>71</sup> Bianchin, "Explaining Ideology: Mechanisms and Metaphysics," 26.

rational.”<sup>72</sup> A key aspect of this legitimacy is that it needs to extend beyond mere prudence, as “A constitution accepted out of preoccupation for the political consequences of conflict can at best legitimate a *modus vivendi*, a Hobbesian stable society, but cannot legitimate the authority structure of a “stable and just” society.”<sup>73</sup> The ‘legitimation by constitution’ model has been written most authoritatively by Frank Michelman and Alessandro Ferrara. Ferrara has taken this model a step further by showing that there are in fact two layers of legitimacy, legitimacy of the constitutional order, and legitimacy of amendments to the constitution.<sup>74</sup> This second layer is integral to the present work.

John Rawls further believed in the principle of neutrality around achieving an overlapping consensus on political culture. However, Fabbrizi has shown that there is space for moral and reasonable disagreement in the public sphere as long as neutrality is preserved over the constitutional essentials. Even these constitutional essentials are not backed by Bellamy and Waldron. A key distinction for Rawls in political liberalism is between rationality and reason. For Rawls, a reasonable person seeks for cooperation and to enhance the collective interest, whereas rational strategic individuals seek to maximize their self-interest. Public reason is the reason of all free and equal citizens aiming for the common good.

In regards to the most reasonable Rawls clarified that, “What justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us.”<sup>75</sup> The idea of a thought experiment grounding political culture goes against the model of sovereignty proposed by Schmitt as, “the sovereign had to be a real person and not only a juristic person because only real persons can make decisions.”<sup>76</sup>

In opposition to this is Fabbrizi writes that, “The idea of a body politic should be now replaced by the idea of a constitutional rule of law, in which constitution is no longer the product of the sacred and inviolable will of the Leviathan, namely the law which subdues people to the sovereign power.”<sup>77</sup> Whereas, “by contrast, constitutions become the product of the deliberation of a constituent assembly, representing the will of people, aimed at delimiting and controlling the sovereign power.”<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 217.

<sup>73</sup> Ferrara, “The Revolution of ‘The Most Reasonable’: Rawls’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” 31

<sup>74</sup> Ferrara, *Sovereignty Across Generations: Constituent Power and Political Liberalism*, 2023.

<sup>75</sup> Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” 519.

<sup>76</sup> V. Kahn, “Political Theology and Fiction in *The King’s Two Bodies*,” *Representations* 106, no. 1 (2009): 84.

<sup>77</sup> Valerio Fabbrizi, “Theory of Sovereignty and the Body Politic in Modern and Contemporary Political Thought,” *Philosophica Critica* 4, no. 1 (2018): 17.

<sup>78</sup> Fabbrizi, “Theory of Sovereignty and the Body Politic in Modern and Contemporary Political Thought,” 17.

Equilibrium is a fundamental aspect of politics. Where law itself “represents the principle of social reproduction”<sup>79</sup> and “the very aim of constituent power seems to drive towards a degree of relative stability. The point is that constituent power can only turn into constituent authority, and therefore represent a successful attempt at legitimisation, if it goes through the process of legitimisation and keeps that process alive”.<sup>80</sup> The only “alternative is to definitively fix democracy’s principles of legitimacy, and that is to dispense with politics from the start, and ultimately to undermine democracy altogether.”<sup>81</sup>

Reflective equilibrium is central to this model. Where “the fundamental elements comprising a hypothetical procedure are justified in virtue of their supporting and being supported by the match between the outcome of the procedure (the principles of justice) and our firmly held moral intuitions, which Rawls calls considered judgments.”<sup>82</sup> Rawls shows that “By going back and forth ... sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances [hypothetical procedure], at others withdrawing our [considered] judgments and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description.”<sup>83</sup> This is a description “of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium.”<sup>84</sup>

A difficulty for John Rawls is discovered when extending who is included in ‘The People’ to more individuals across space and time. Across space, Ferrara has highlighted the difficulties in the notion of hyperpluralism. For, “What does characterise a hyper-pluralist society is that not everyone accepts the burden of judgement resulting in the idea of tolerance.”<sup>85</sup> Therefore, “not everyone agrees with the reasonable pluralism that is at the source of both the need for, and the possibility of, a political justification of principles of justice.”<sup>86</sup> With that said, “if hyper-pluralism is a realistic initial condition, the point is not to fix the conditions under which a society can consist of individuals who diverge on religious and moral matters, but are prepared to recognize one another as free and

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<sup>79</sup> van Asseldonk, “Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis,” 385.

<sup>80</sup> van Asseldonk, “Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis,” 385.

<sup>81</sup> van Asseldonk, “Who, the People? Rethinking Constituent Power as Praxis,” 385.

<sup>82</sup> Buckley, “Political Constructivism”.

<sup>83</sup> Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, 18.

<sup>84</sup> Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, 18.

<sup>85</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, quoting John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, 177.

<sup>86</sup> Matteo Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies* (Reset, 2015), 1.

equal.”<sup>87</sup> Instead, it is “to determine how individuals who are not prepared to take the last step can coexist and cooperate.”<sup>88</sup>

Hyperpluralism is a challenge on three key fronts: “firstly, the justification of pluralism, because political liberalism cannot be applied to those who are not prepared to restrict the justification of political institutions only to principles that can be shared by those who do not share the same comprehensive concepts of goodness.”<sup>89</sup> In addition to that, “Secondly, it concerns the manner in which liberal political institutions can be accepted by the representatives of unreasonable comprehensive doctrines.”<sup>90</sup> Finally, “Third, because rights are declared to be binding also for those states which do not and cannot have representatives in the original position and thus cannot be said to have subscribed to them, their bindingness appears to be evidently of a non-contractarian nature.”<sup>91</sup>

A major challenge to Rawls is that his theory ultimately may not even require overlapping consensus to exist as, “Communities can come to an overlapping consensus on the interpretation of justice through the use of public reason, but this is not what justifies the principles of justice.”<sup>92</sup> Justification “depends only on exercising two moral powers, rationality and reasonableness, which allow individuals to converge on political principles also when diverging on the truth of their respective comprehensive doctrines.”<sup>93</sup> This means that, “justification does not depend on consensus; it rather explains why consensus can be expected as long as reasonable people engage in the public use of reason.”<sup>94</sup>

The key difficulty of his model however extends from the notion that fairness precedes justice, where a proper theory will see justice preceding fairness. In other words, “In this sense, Mouffe just revives a Hegelian criticism of contractualism, stating that the principles of freedom and equality can only be extracted as outcomes of the social contract as long as one presupposes that all human beings are free and equal.”<sup>95</sup> This is saying that free and equal are already the axioms that produce its own political philosophy. Agrippa’s trilemma shows the impossibility of extracting the axioms where they are automatically given as the foundational propositions themselves. Therefore, even the question of Rawls’ political liberalism requires a deeper justification.

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<sup>87</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, paraphrasing Alessandro Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71.

<sup>88</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, paraphrasing Alessandro Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71.

<sup>89</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 1.

<sup>90</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 1.

<sup>91</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 124.

<sup>92</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 1.

<sup>93</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 1.

<sup>94</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 1.

<sup>95</sup> Bianchin, *Pluralism, Deliberation and Multiple Democracies*, 2.

## *Constitution, Amendments and the Golden Eternity Clause*

A key paradox in political philosophy is known as Rousseau's riddle, and it is the question of how a 'people' is constituted. This is because they are not said to exist until an agreement says they exist, but they must have preexisted the agreement in order to have put it into place. Alessandro Ferrara argues that this leap is possible because *ethnos* can be transformed to *demoi*, the difference comes when disparate groups make a commitment to make commitments together. It is normativity that transforms a group that doesn't have commitments into one that does. A change from a factual group to a normative group.

This work will take this argument a step further and argue that what makes humans a distinct species was the evolution into Deacon's 'symbolic species'.<sup>96</sup> This evolution 'as-a-whole' was born out of this commitment to share commitments. This fundamental commitment is an irrecusable commitment to the people. All symbols are normative and social constraints. The global constitutional order then was born at the moment of symbolization in ritual in human culture'. This irrecusability is the foundation for what will be shown to be the eternity clause. It is also the basis of the evolution of the constitution and political culture as it bends towards a direction of reasonability. Symbols then are inseparable from social constitutionalism.

This is what makes the constitutional order simply an explicit categorization of an implicit social order co-extensive with life of the 'symbolic species' itself. The constitutional order then has always implicitly contained two core principles, one is that the order holds onto those constraints that are the axioms of the social order. They also hold one dynamic axiom, which is that the order wishes to reproduce itself across generations. It is this dynamic that enables constitutional amendments to gain legitimacy without simply being viewed as ordinary law.

Amendments can only make a constitution 'more reasonable' over time through vertical reciprocity. They are a source of increased reasonableness. Rousseau's riddle is therefore solved by semiotics. Phila Msimang shows how biosemiotics and social ontology can be connected to present one clean story that moves from biology through to John Searle's model of social reality.<sup>97</sup> Evolution is about constituent power evolution. The People can evolve over time. It is from this constituent power that amendment power comes. With that said, traditional constitutional interpretation comes from the courts and transformation comes from amendment. This finds parallels in the Piagetian model of assimilation and accommodation. The difference between interpreting and amending the constitution towards actions that are the 'most reasonable', and evolution of the 'most reasonable. This model is substantivist, as opposed to populist constitutionalism that is only formalist.

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<sup>96</sup> Deacon, *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*.

<sup>97</sup> Phila Msimang, "Living in One World: Searle's Social Ontology and Semiotics," *Signs and Society* 2, no. 2 (2014): 173–202.

Richard Bellamy and Jeremy Waldron are traditional realists about the constitution, with Tushnet having a clearly defined model of populist constitutionalism. A key aspect of this work is recognizing that vertical reciprocity transforms normativity into motivations as it means that the commitment to share commitments stems from this irrecusability. This permanence of the people. The motivation then isn't about having a constitution itself but about the survival of its praxis. Leading constitutional scholars that will be discussed include Rawls, Habermas, Ackerman, Dworkin, Ferrajoli, and Michelman. The key is recognizing the layering of entropy to homeostasis to justice as models of equilibrium. This equilibrium is found through self-congruence, exemplarity and reflective authenticity.

What nature introduces into the discussion is a continuous veil of ignorance as opposed to Rawls discontinuous veil of ignorance – his original position. Where for Rawls, his thought experiment is run once and is complete, the continuous veil depends upon the unique position that no human can predict which categories will change in all circumstances. This is the equivalent of the inductive problem. It is in this place that the eternity clause is discovered. Prior to there being the force of an example in Alessandro Ferrara's model of the judgment view of justice, an example must first be found. This example is found not in reflective authenticity, but transformative authenticity.

Another key issue is what language should be included in the political discourse. John Rawls argues for neutrality, but this faces controversy over the role of moral and controversial issues in the political realm. Valerio Fabbrizi argues that moral issues are completely acceptable in the political realm, but must remain neutral only in the realm of the constitution. The fundamental axioms of society. Constituted power comes from reflective judgement that brings together 'principles and situated identity'. Under a model of serial sovereignty, no freedom of future generations is actually entailed, whereas in the model of sequential sovereignty the aim is precisely the freedom of future generations. For these future generations are included in the definition of 'the People'.

Rousseau's paradox is the question of how can a people adopt a constitution if a collective people already must be held together by a constitution of some sort. This work will show that the issue does not exist as a paradox in the context of semiotics that sees the symbolic species evolution towards a level of thirdness in language. The People is a set of normative conditions to constrain actions. The constituting people share a commitment to share commitments. In this model the Induction problem set by David Hume actually becomes the source of human value.

The traditional Rawls theory stopped at legitimation by constitution, but the key follow up is where the constitution receives its legitimacy from the golden eternity clause. The theory of justice is rooted in an ideal thought experiment, but this model is rooted in error. This golden eternity clause truly means that there are three tiers of law, a three layered constitution, with ordinary law, constitutional law and the golden eternity clause. Where constitutional law will be shown to be drawn from 'sideways at the entrance of the cave'; it's legitimacy will draw from the knowledge extraction process that requires individuals to once again go 'beyond the cave' in periods where constitutional orders recognize their

own limitations in the face of confronting how to enable humans to flourish in novel and unpredicted environments. The Universal as opposed to the Relative here is vitality – revitalization – the subjective feeling of life vivification becomes universalized when justified. Then at this point it moves from a level of faith in the action into justified action.

### *Interpretation*

The key to understanding judicial review is seeing its role as the pragmatic interpreter of the constitution in the face of novel information:

“To anticipate, let me start with the benchmark for assessing the soundness of the court’s interpretation: drawing on Rawls’s dual normative standard of the ‘reasonable’ and the ‘most reasonable’, when a constitutional court acts as an exemplar of public reason, its (re)-interpretation of a constitutional provision commands consent not just because it is one of the reasonable conclusions of public reason, but because it is arguably the most reasonable. That expression, when applied to the interpretation of a contested constitutional standard or principle, signals that the majority of the court undersands such interpretation – for example, interpreting ‘equal protection’ as excluding segregation or allowing same–sex marriage – a an ‘irrecusable’ commitment that ‘the people’, including its presently living segment, within which the matter is contested, cannot but make, lest its permanence as the self-same people which authored the constitution be endangered.”<sup>98</sup>

Due to the model, “Calling one interpretation of a constitutional clause the ‘most reasonable’, in other words, is equivalent to the court’s addressing the entire transgeneration people by saying ‘we can do no other than interpret the controversial constitutional matter in this way, if we want to continue to pursue the constitutional project that regulates our political life’”<sup>99</sup> On the other side of the coin “Dissenting justices and other public voices, instead, when they dispute that claim of ‘non-cognitive necessitation’, maintain that the ‘most reasonable’ interpretation is at best ‘just reasonable’ and is being pushed further up on the scale of normativity out of the court majority’s arbitrary preference.”<sup>100</sup>

This distinction of constitutive and regulative rules also finds itself within Rawls’ work as ‘Two Concepts of a Rule’. “Here Rawls distinguishes between two functions of rules, the one explaining existing regularities, the other referring to the practices that institute them”<sup>101</sup> Rawls would say that, “justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules”<sup>102</sup>. What is at stake, is ‘the distinction between the

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<sup>98</sup> Ferrara, *Sovereignty Across Generations: Constituent Power and Political Liberalism*, 10.

<sup>99</sup> Ferrara, *Sovereignty Across Generations: Constituent Power and Political Liberalism*, 10.

<sup>100</sup> Ferrara, *Sovereignty Across Generations: Constituent Power and Political Liberalism*, 10.

<sup>101</sup> Roberto Frega, “The Social Ontology of Democracy,” *Journal of Social Ontology* 4, no. 2 (2018): 165.

<sup>102</sup> John Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” *The Philosophical Review* 64, no. 1 (1955): 5.

justification of an institution and the justification of a particular action falling under it'<sup>103</sup>...The difference between these two practices calls for two distinct modes of justification which, in turn, points to two distinct normative logics."<sup>104</sup> What is the difference between these two sources? "Rawls distinguishes between a "summary" conception of rules, and a "practice" conception of rules. According to the summary view, rules are summaries of past decisions, so that the principles that justifies the individual occurrence and that which justifies the general rule are the same."<sup>105</sup>

On the other hand, "The practice conception of the rule ... conceives of social order not as the result of the sum of individual actions, but as the result of a constitutive act which institutes the order itself."<sup>106</sup> In this case "a system of legal sanctions can be justified on utilitarian grounds, whereas what provides the norm for individual conduct (individual action or application of the law) is compliance with the social order."<sup>107</sup> In this model the "individual must obey the law in the specific case not because this action would increase utility, but because the generalized compliance with the law does. In that sense justifying the action and justifying the practice follow two distinct normative logics."<sup>108</sup> In other words, "In one case, the practice is the casual result of independent interactions. In the second, actions achieve a collective consistency because they articulate a pre-existing shared practice which defines the meaning of the actions themselves. The upshot of the second is that the meaningfulness of social action depends on the tacit or explicit acceptance of a given system of rules as defining the "game" they will play."<sup>109</sup>

For Matteo Bianchin, his reading of Tomasello and Habermas together suggests that "constructions of social reality is normatively constrained by the boundaries reasons impose on what we can accept."<sup>110</sup> Bianchin sought to bring these authors together because, "The background idea is that critical theory can benefit from cognitive science, just as it benefited in the past from psychoanalysis, sociology and other social sciences. Critical theory has always been calling for an interdisciplinary approach in which economists, sociologists, psychologists – and of course philosophers – work in partnership 'without losing sight of the larger context'."<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," 10.

<sup>104</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 165.

<sup>105</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 165.

<sup>106</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 165.

<sup>107</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 165.

<sup>108</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 166.

<sup>109</sup> Frega, "The Social Ontology of Democracy," 166.

<sup>110</sup> M. Bianchin, "From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 41, no. 6 (2015): 595.

<sup>111</sup> Bianchin, "From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science," 595.

This mix has several benefits, “On one hand, philosophical problems can receive a more accurate formulation and get a grip on empirical research by being translated into the idioms of contemporary science.”<sup>112</sup> At the same time “empirical research may be enlightened by confronting the broader tasks of philosophical reflection and critique.”<sup>113</sup> In seeking to bring these models together Bianchin first found the difficulties.

“Tomasello’s work seems at first to clash with the central tenets of the theory of communicative action. First, non-linguistic understanding and communication are taken to be pervasive both in human and in non-human animals: in this sense intersubjectivity does not rest on linguistic practice. Second, both joint intentionality and joint agency are taken to predate the acquisition of language and provide the cognitive basis for the development of linguistic conventions. Third, linguistic communication is taken to rest on more basic capacities for mindreading and joint attention, and thus to be explained according to Gricean intention-based semantics.”<sup>114</sup>

Tomasello and Rakoczy “maintain that joint attention works both as the precursor and as the cognitive basis of collective intentionality, understood as the conscious and reflective ability to think and act in the ‘we-mode’ according to a full-fledged belief-desire psychology.”<sup>115</sup> Here then is the source of social thought, and by “Tracing back collective intentionality to such simpler forms of shared intentionality has been taken to account for the irreducible character displayed by the we-mode intentionality, which is crucial to the construction of social reality.”<sup>116</sup>

The key idea is that of ‘Recursive mind reading’. “both approaches sharply contrast communicative with strategic interactions. Social cooperation presupposes understanding as a mechanism to coordinate individual actions and which cannot in turn be generated by strategic rationality.”<sup>117</sup> Tomasello’s model supports “the view that agents endowed with strategic rationality alone cannot engage in cooperation because they lack the capacity to share the representation of goals and to coordinate their individual actions accordingly.”<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>112</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 595.

<sup>113</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 596.

<sup>114</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 597.

<sup>115</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 598.

<sup>116</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 598.

<sup>117</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 600.

<sup>118</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 600.

This is why Tomasello, “takes the mindreading routines that underlie joint attention to explain symbolic communication, rather than relying on our participation in the practices of a linguistic community.”<sup>119</sup> Symbolic communication “is a case of cognitive cooperation... This is why, in explaining human communication, we cannot begin with language and must focus instead on the ‘mostly hidden, highly complex, species-unique, psychological infrastructure of shared intentionality’.”<sup>120</sup>

For Tomasello, “The basic components of such an infrastructure are indeed the cognitive skills required in order to generate joint intentions – that is, a capacity for recursive mindreading – and the pro-social motives involved even in the most basic forms of cooperation – that is, the social motivation for helping and sharing with others.”<sup>121</sup> However, “This runs against the claim that it is language, or the intersubjective structure of linguistic communication, that provides us with the cognitive resources we need to overcome the egocentric bias of strategic rationality.”<sup>122</sup> Should this be the case, then “language is non-fundamental and communicative action builds on previous sociocognitive skills.”<sup>123</sup>

This would in turn mean that “If Tomasello is right, however, Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations just reverse the order of explanation: we should not go from rule-following to meaning and agency, but from the latter to the first.”<sup>124</sup> Ultimately, “we should not expect transcendental arguments – however weak – to ground the theory of rationality. Instead, we should look for a detailed account of how communicative rationality emerges from more basic cognitive capacities.”<sup>125</sup>

In other words, “creating a convention to use a symbol according to a shared understanding just presupposes the capacity to jointly attend to the referent and the mutual knowledge that everyone has a preference for conforming to the convention, if everyone else does so.”<sup>126</sup> Hence “we cannot take conventional symbols to be as primitive as the cognitive capacities for joint attention and mind-

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<sup>119</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 600.

<sup>120</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 600.

<sup>121</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 601.

<sup>122</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 601.

<sup>123</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 601.

<sup>124</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 602.

<sup>125</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 602.

<sup>126</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 604.

reading. In fact, language can only be granted a fundamental role in the explanation of thought if it is not a matter of convention.”<sup>127</sup>

Bianchin has found then, “that the construction of social reality should be found to involve more than cognitive-instrumental rationality (plus a basic capacity for sharing intentions).”<sup>128</sup> Instead “we should find the construction and the reproduction of the social world to be internally connected with a specific form of communicative rationality which goes far beyond our pre-linguistic capacity for joint attention”.<sup>129</sup> A social world that “is governed by normative standards that provide the potential for social criticism.”<sup>130</sup>

This idea can also be read through the work of John Searle. For Searle, “Institutional facts here require participants to accept a constitutive rule according to which a status function gets attributed to a specific kind of object or event – e.g., the rule that this sheet of paper counts as a five-euro banknote in the context of currency systems.”<sup>131</sup> This means that, “we need to represent the rule linguistically in order to recognize the rule, converge over it, and keep acceptance stable over time.”<sup>132</sup> Here two or more people would then “need to reach a common understanding about something, and in order to do that we cannot avoid engaging in discourses. Of course, the reasons we have for accepting social norms and institutions are for the most part embodied in a culture and play their motivating role in the background.”<sup>133</sup>

Imagination here then is key. “According to simulation theories, in mind-reading we “identify” with others in imagination and run our cognitive system off-line to enact their doings in a way that “multiplies the first person”<sup>134</sup>. Imagination “plays a crucial role in that simulation as it ‘involves an imaginative shift in the reference of indexicals’: as we project ourselves onto others, they become the reference “I”, their time and place become the referents of “now” and

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<sup>127</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 604.

<sup>128</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 610.

<sup>129</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 610.

<sup>130</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 610.

<sup>131</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 610.

<sup>132</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 609.

<sup>133</sup> Bianchin, “From Joint Attention to Communicative Action: Some Remarks on Critical Theory, Social Ontology and Cognitive Science,” 609.

<sup>134</sup> Matteo Bianchin, “Simulation and the We-Mode: A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons,” *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 45, no. 4–5 (2015): 455.

“here”.”<sup>135</sup> Due to this “generally we “re-center our egocentric map to simulate their thoughts, emotions, and motivations to act.”<sup>136</sup>

Here then Bianchin has helped sketch “a cognitive account of collective intentionality which focus on how mental states get self-attributed to “us” jointly in the first person plural, so that a sense of shared ownership arises for mental states that lack a corporate bearer.”<sup>137</sup> This model aims to “make sense of the plural subjectivity of joint actions and collective mental states without making group agents and minds require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness.”<sup>138</sup> With that, a foundation underlying symbolic thought has now been laid out.

The first half of this chapter has focused on John Rawls’ veil of ignorance, and a theory of justice based completely on ideal conceptions. It has been shown how any ideal and rational theory on its own is hermetically sealed from reality and therefore drifts from its fitness over time without the proper update. This is what led John Rawls himself to lead in the direction of composing Political Liberalism to correct this error. With that said, the next half of this chapter aims to bring clarity to this realm of thirdness by grounding this aspect of propositions in wider theories of rhetoric, language and theories of truth.

The story of the Enlightenment was one of rupture. A complete break from the past, from tradition, and from archaic structures of authority. The basis of this clean break was centered on basing society on human knowledge, and not on metaphysical ontology. This is why politics could then be served solely through the tools of science and reason. However, in the 21st century the knowledge claims from each of these fields has come under criticism. The next section will highlight some of those arguments. Behind the symbol however resides the living word, the living constitution. This is where the following chapter will take the journey. Where a constitution is not simply a document of static meaning alone. Should “you want to go on a pilgrimage to the birthplace of our Constitution, go to the mountains where the Partisans died, go to the prisons where they were jailed, go to the fields where they were hung. Wherever an Italian died to redeem freedom and dignity, you should travel there with your mind, young souls, because it is there that our Constitution was born.”<sup>139</sup> Whereas the first half sought to highlight the deductive logic behind Rawls’ Theory of Justice and the static nature of the constitution itself, the second half is going to explore the story of the light of reason in both its fall, and in its reincorporation within a theory of nature that surrounds logic.

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<sup>135</sup> Bianchin, “Simulation and the We-Mode: A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons,” 455.

<sup>136</sup> Bianchin, “Simulation and the We-Mode: A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons,” 455.

<sup>137</sup> Bianchin, “Simulation and the We-Mode: A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons,” 461.

<sup>138</sup> Bianchin, “Simulation and the We-Mode: A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons,” 461.

<sup>139</sup> Piero Calamandrei, *La Costituzione e la gioventù: Discorso pronunciato da Piero Calamandrei nel gennaio 1955 a Milano* (Milano: 1975), 8.

## Section B: Coherence

### *The Fall of Logic*

After describing the fall of deductive logic and the formal sciences, this half of the chapter will serve to reground language and the proposition within the contextual experience of rhetorical situatedness. After highlighting this philological process stemming from the tetractys the chapter will lead directly to the contradiction explored in chapter 4. The difficulty in ascribing math total explanatory power however comes from key proofs of the twentieth century, By Kurt Godel, Turing and Church among others. The key word here is paradox, although it is also described as self-reference, strange loops, and visualized as the ouroboros. Namely, mathematics itself will always provide an incomplete or inconsistent system depending on which parameter is chosen. There were further questions as to whether every mathematical problem was in fact simply computable under the Church-Turing thesis. This would have been resolved with what became known as the Universal Turing Machine, named by the same person who helped crack Enigma in World War II.

The problem it turns out is that there is the undecidability problem, known as the halting problem, that shows within itself an answer can never be put forward whether a computation will be completed. “Any mechanical procedure for generating formulas is essentially a Turing machine. Any formal system, therefore, must have undecidable propositions. Mathematics is not decidable. Incompleteness follows from uncomputability.”<sup>140</sup> Finally, “Gregory Chaitin uncovered the inherent randomness in mathematics by introducing uncomputable numbers and extending the legacy yet again.”<sup>141</sup> While, “Computation is different from mathematics. Mathematics turns out to be the domain of formal languages, and is mostly undecidable, which is just another word for saying uncomputable (since decision making and proving are alternative words for computation, too).”<sup>142</sup>

This means that at its core mathematics and computability are incomplete, inconsistent, undecidable and uncomputable at their edges and therefore are not closed wholes, but require input from outside of themselves. Even within itself then mathism runs into a dead end as being either incomplete or inconsistent. It leaves questions uncomputable, such as the halting problem. This ultimately calls into question the entire scientific project as its epistemological and ontic foundations rest upon a method that in turn is never logically complete. The problems then become compounded when trying to extract this incomplete system and providing it sanctity as the only ground of untouchable knowledge not only within

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<sup>140</sup> James Gleick, *The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood* (New York: Pantheon/Random House, 2011), 212.

<sup>141</sup> Glattfelder, “A Universe Built of Information,” 477.

<sup>142</sup> James Brockman, *Know This: Today's Most Interesting and Important Scientific Ideas, Discoveries, and Developments* (New York: Harper Collins, 2016), 228.

itself, but as the guide for all normative and ideal action. Somehow extracting an ought from an is.

One suggested solution for trying to salvage physics from this mathematical error has been proposed by Max Tegmark “that only Gödel-complete (fully decidable) mathematical structures have physical existence. This drastically shrinks the Level IV multiverse, essentially placing an upper limit on complexity, and may have the attractive side effect of explaining the relative simplicity of our universe.”<sup>143</sup> However, Chaitin bluntly states, ““Let me repeat: formal axiomatic systems are a failure!”<sup>144</sup> He goes on to say, “randomness is as fundamental and as pervasive in pure mathematics as it is in theoretical physics.”<sup>145</sup> In his opinion “it also gives further support to “experimental mathematics”, and to the “quasi-empirical” view of mathematics which says that although mathematics and physics are different, it is more a matter of degree than black and white.”<sup>146</sup>

Paradoxes are self-referential concepts. They are contradictory statements. Statements that run counter to expectation. Even though the premises seem true the conclusion seems logically unacceptable. The Liar’s Paradox, the statement that ‘all cretans are liars’, or ‘this statement is false’ are some of the earliest written examples. Some are used to question the existence of a god, ‘can god make something heavier than he/she/it can lift?’. ‘Bad is good’. ‘Darkness is light’. In math this is known as impredicativity. The Ouroboros is the symbol of self-reference, and the reflexive loop. The snake is eating its own tail. Within time self-reference happens as well. Self-replication in life is self-referential. A key question is the Ship of Theseus, if over time each part breaks down and is repaired, is it still the ship of theseus? Paradoxes contain “persistent contradiction between interdependent elements .. [leading to a] unity of opposites”.<sup>147</sup> Paradox is what Hofstadter argues to be the core of self-identity. In Vico’s terms this is the barbarism of reflection.

Beyond the incompleteness theorem, four hidden faults lay within the logic of mathematics itself. One is what Kenneth Burke labels the paradox of substance, another is the tautological lie, the third is reification, and the fourth is the paradox of time. The first means that any empirical object, as opposed to an abstract object, can only be defined in relation to that which it is not. It is its relational properties then and not its intrinsic properties that set a boundary on an object. Outside of the contiguous relationship is the tautological lie, the idea that similarity is treated as sameness. The third hidden fault is tense related to past, present and future,

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<sup>143</sup> Peter Hut, Michael Alford, and Max Tegmark, “On Math, Matter and Mind,” *Foundations of Physics* 36, no. 6 (2006): sec VI.A.1

<sup>144</sup> Gregory J. Chaitin, *Meta Math! The Quest for Omega* (New York: Pantheon, 2005), 146.

<sup>145</sup> Cristian S. Calude and Gregory J. Chaitin, “Randomness Everywhere,” *Nature* 400 (1999): 319.

<sup>146</sup> Calude and Chaitin, “Randomness Everywhere,” 319.

<sup>147</sup> Jonathan Schad, Marianne W. Lewis, Sebastian Raisch, and Wendy K. Smith, “Paradox Research in Management Science: Looking Back to Move Forward,” *Academy of Management Annals* 10, no. 1 (2016): 10.

and the paradox held within empirical objects over time. Ultimately, it means that math may be falling for the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. These four properties aren't only detrimental to the truth value of mathematics, but to reason, rationality and logic itself. Even though God is dead in the public sphere, Kenneth Burke argues that the God-term of society reveals its ultimate motivation. The God term argued to be present in the modern age is that of the rational animal.

Firstly, to define tautology. This simply means when a definition contains its own identity in the definition. For instance, Tautology: 'A human is a human'. It is "the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can recognize that they are true from the symbol alone"<sup>148</sup> Juri Lotman 'a = b + c', "'a' has definite content"<sup>149</sup> Without any "connection with systems outside the equation"<sup>150</sup>. We can certainly "ascribe an external meaning to 'a'", of course, "but if we do not make this substitution, these signs will still have meaning"<sup>151</sup>.

The difficulty for every other empirical object is that it requires a negative mode of definition. To "tell what a thing is, you place it in terms of something else"<sup>152</sup> and "as signs, they are themselves something other than what they signify, and the "real presence" we perceive recedes from us as we try to grasp it."<sup>153</sup> More fully developed:

"To an "immediate" apprehension of some object we've encountered within experience, we give a name. In order to define that object, however, we intend to do more than simply name it, which means framing it in terms of other objects, giving rise to a more complex semiotic structure. But these other objects must be defined as well and in the same way, so that the hallway of description extends further away from us. We never end up approaching the ontological core we sought to define, and we end up chasing names, as it were."<sup>154</sup>

The identity of the subject is in some sense tied to its regularity. "Deely<sup>155</sup> positions substance as a technical Aristotelian term for addressing different kinds of change. The substance is "the individual being or existent" that can undergo change while remaining that same individual."<sup>156</sup> There is a core that does not change, and a periphery that can. Further, "Given the definitions established within the

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<sup>148</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, reprinted with a few corrections (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1933), 6.113.

<sup>149</sup> Juri Lotman, *The Structure of the Artistic Text*, trans. Ronald Vroon (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1977), 35.

<sup>150</sup> Lotman, *The Structure of the Artistic Text*, trans. Ronald Vroon, 35.

<sup>151</sup> Lotman, *The Structure of the Artistic Text*, trans. Ronald Vroon, 36

<sup>152</sup> Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 24.

<sup>153</sup> J. Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics* (Tartu: 2022), 110.

<sup>154</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, 110.

<sup>155</sup> John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-first Century* (Toronto, Buffalo & London: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 72.

<sup>156</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, 111.

argument's frame, each proposition is a tautology taken at face value for the sake of logical operations; the values are inputs that logic takes as if they were true and deploys them within its operations, generating certain conclusions by necessity."<sup>157</sup> This is referred to as entailment. Therefore, "the propositions of logic don't tell us empirical specifics about the world; we cannot move from structural properties or logical forms themselves to a description of cosmic actualities"<sup>158</sup>

The tautological lie on the other hand is to eradicate any difference in objects, thereby converting similarity to sameness, total equality. This helps in getting rid of spurious and inconsequential information, but it also eradicates uniqueness and ensures a simple statistical result. There is then found only the homogeneities, and none of the heterogeneities of objects. "This is what Wittgenstein means by a logical form. Our "knowledge" of it is not dependent upon conclusions about empirical givens but is a priori. When "all [of a network's] properties can be given a priori", we can say that they are "purely geometrical"."<sup>159</sup>

In other words, "the truth of the proposition can be derived from its symbols alone. In that sense, logical propositions are tautologies because they "have certain structural properties", and "when they are connected in a certain way", they yield further tautologies."<sup>160</sup> These "certain combinations of symbols – whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character – are tautologies."<sup>161</sup> Converting an empirical object then into a tautological object is a tautological lie. It hardens a probability into a necessity. Where Bayesianism can correct that error in showing it simply being a degree of belief. For "outside logic everything is accidental".<sup>162</sup> Further, "What science calls "laws" are really models. It's not that these models tell us nothing about the mind-independent world, but they speak "indirectly, about the objects of the world".<sup>163</sup>

The third issue is tense. What does it mean to say that 'mathematics is a language'? Math is generally studied in a far different manner than language as it does not seem to resemble a natural language. Formal systems are much more constrained in their operation. The barrier starts to break down when only looking at formal semantics, as through the work of Frege, Tarski and Richard Montague.

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<sup>157</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, 125.

<sup>158</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, 125.

<sup>159</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and D. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977 [1921]), §6.35.

<sup>160</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and D. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977 [1921]), §6.12.

<sup>161</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, 125.

<sup>162</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and D. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977 [1921]), §6.3.

<sup>163</sup> Griffin, *A Semiotic of Motives: Kenneth Burke and Deely-Tartu Semiotics*, quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921; London, Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 6.3431.

Mohan Ganesalingam has looked at math using formal linguistics, and noted that a major area of difference is tense. Another area is “Effectively, we are allowed to introduce a word in one part of a sentence, and declare its part of speech in another; and this operation has no analogue in natural language.”<sup>164</sup> Outside of that the same analytical tools can often be used.

The key argument that counters that however, is noting that tense is not absent, it is just hidden. Hidden by not being mentioned. In fact, the truth claim of math is that it is a static piece of information, which means that it is making the specific claim that it holds for past, present and future tenses. This is not the same as being tenseless, in fact the claim as to when it is scientific is that it is true at all times within time, not outside of time. However, tenses do not adequately grasp the greater possibilities of absence ever partnered with what is present.

Reification and Category Mistake is another key issue. This mistaking a mathematical object for an empirical object is known as a category mistake, and a reification of the situation. Which means the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Where an abstraction is treated as if it were the real physical event. Or an abstract idea for a physical object.<sup>165</sup> This is also known as mistaking the map for the territory.

These quasi-empirical monsters both reveal and conceal truth. They excel at extracting homogeneities, but they hide all differences. They reveal presence, but don’t quite capture all the possibilities of absence over time. They show relations beyond context, but wipe away the evidence of the context from which they were drawn from.

The quasi-empirical objects are the “traditional targets of scientific inquiry are available to sensory analysis, localized in time and space, and simultaneously accessible to the individual experience of multiple observers (at least under carefully controlled conditions).”<sup>166</sup> Yet these targets are all within the field of time, space, and causality. Abstract objects are argued to be removed from time, space and causality. For empirical objects time holds their opposites, their contradictions. In logic there is a law of non contradiction and a law of the excluded middle that makes it so that this creates paradoxical situations. If math spoke of objects beyond human perception, then “non-human intelligent beings should exist that understand the language of advanced mathematics. However, none of the non-human intelligent beings that we know of confirm the status of (advanced) mathematics as an objective language.”<sup>167</sup>

On the one hand logic has been proposed in his 1918 work *Recherche* as the key to unlocking a unity of science, whereby logic founds math, which founds

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<sup>164</sup> Mohan Ganesalingam, *The Language of Mathematics: A Linguistic and Philosophical Investigation*, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7805 (Springer, 2013), 251.

<sup>165</sup> Simon Blackburn, *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 58.

<sup>166</sup> Peterson, *The Pragmatics of Meaning*, 1.

<sup>167</sup> Brian Greene, *The Hidden Reality: Parallel Universes and the Deep Laws of the Cosmos* (New York: Random House Inc., 2011), 299.

physics, which founds chemistry, which founds biology, which founds psychology, which founds sociology, and ultimately the theory of knowledge, which itself is based upon logic.<sup>168</sup> However, this system must be careful about eating its own tail by starting with a system that is inherently incomplete or inconsistent from the outset.

What math is missing then is the rate of change of structures and objects. Both with their own statistical life spans. How long can the axioms stand? What is the rate of transformation? Again, it fails to grasp the greater possibilities of absence that surrounds that which is present. This is the exact space where imaginary numbers, and imagination itself have a possibility for capturing this greater reality than traditional mathematics alone.

To come back to Wigner's question of the unreasonable effectiveness of math, applied mathematician Richard Hamming warned that they may be due to humans seeing what they want to see, ex post facto fitting the facts to the case – creating math to fit a situation, ignoring deeper questions about the objects such as their value, and remembering that evolution itself has made humans instinctively a mathematical animal. As Bertrand Russell said “Physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover.”<sup>169</sup>

However, the last word goes back to Albert Einstein, “How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality?”<sup>170</sup> In Einstein's “opinion the answer to this question is, briefly, this: As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”<sup>171</sup>

### ***Burke's Tropes***

In contrast to a word representing an objective connection with an object, it is actually a motivated subjective connection that is then coordinated intersubjectively. This is best exemplified in the work of Kenneth Burke, and what he termed symbolic actions. All symbols are motivated. Further, all words that are chosen both reveal and conceal aspects of what they refer to, especially when in the form of a metaphor. Kenneth Burke argued that the motivated symbols rest upon key terms, identification, dramatism.

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<sup>168</sup> Jean Piaget, *Recherche* (Lausanne: La Concorde, 1918).

<sup>169</sup> Russell, *An Outline of Philosophy*, chapter 15, “The Nature of Our Knowledge of Physics”, 163.

<sup>170</sup> Albert Einstein, “*Geometry and Experience*”, an expanded form of an address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin (January 27, 1921), in *Sidelights on Relativity*, translated by G. B. Jeffery and W. Perrett (New York: Philosophical Library, 1923).

<sup>171</sup> Einstein, “*Geometry and Experience*”, an expanded form of an address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in Berlin, remarks.

Burke summarizes his own view of symbolic action, “The dramatic view of language, in terms of “symbolic action,” is exercised about the necessarily suasive nature of even the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures.”<sup>172</sup> Burke feels that the underlying motivations that are felt within every aspect of language shapes what is seen and what is hidden. Burke has said that “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function as a deflection of reality.”<sup>173</sup> Motivation is then key to perception and action, “...our interests (in the widest sense, our vocations) are essential in shaping the nature of our discoveries... and our interests are ethical.”<sup>174</sup>

Burke provides an example of a grasshopper to make his point. This is because a “grasshopper will find a universe that is different from ours because the vocation or ethics of a grasshopper is different. Man and grasshopper have different “work patterns,” which will be reflected in different systems of values.”<sup>175</sup> This is where point of view becomes particularly important to rhetorical situations that are often ignored in logic. In this example, each grasshopper “approaches the universe from a different “point-of-view,” and the difference in point-of-view will reveal a corresponding difference in the discovery of relevant “facts.”<sup>176</sup> For a time though this motivated nature led Burke to pessimism, “If action is to be our key term, then drama; for drama is the culminative form of action... But if drama, then conflict. And if conflict, then victimage. Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing problem that comes to a culmination in tragedy, the song of the scapegoat.”<sup>177</sup>

Kenneth Burke believed that with symbolic action at the core, one could study the words of theology to understand their ultra-motivations. Logology then would be the study of the words about words of God. The God-terms would be the ultimate highest motivators. He also put forward a roadmap called dramatism and its dramatic pentad of how to understand how symbolic words were utilized as action. This requires an agent, to utilize an agency, to complete a task, for a purpose, that takes place within a scene. These are known as agent, agency, action, purpose, and scene respectively. Kenneth Burke himself aligned these terms with major philosophical schools. Phenomenology, darwinism, idealism, existentialism, materialism . This is the pentad: Materialism = Scene, idealism = agent, realism/phenomenology = act, pragmatism = agency, existentialism = purpose.

It is important to take in the fact that Kenneth Burke recognized these four main tropes appear across unexpected disciplines:

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<sup>172</sup> Kenneth Burke, “Terministic Screens,” in *Language as Symbolic Action* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 45.

<sup>173</sup> Kenneth Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 45.

<sup>174</sup> Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*, 3rd ed., with a new afterword (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 256.

<sup>175</sup> Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 256.

<sup>176</sup> Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 256.

<sup>177</sup> Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 55.

“The “literal” or “realistic” applications of the four tropes usually go by a different set of names. Thus: For metaphor we could substitute perspective; For metonymy we could substitute reduction; For synecdoche we could substitute representation; For irony we could substitute dialectic.”<sup>178</sup> Indeed, “in keeping with the older theory of realism (what we might call “poetic realism,” in contrast with modern “scientific realism”) we could say that characters possess degrees of being in proportion to the variety of perspectives from which they can with justice be perceived. Thus we could say that plants have “more being” than minerals, animals have more being than plants, and men have more being than animals, because each higher order admits and requires a new dimension of terms not literally relevant to the lower orders.”<sup>179</sup>

The couple metaphor-metonymy had a prominent role in the renewal of the field of rhetoric in the 1960s. In his 1956 essay, “The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles”, Roman Jakobson describes the couple as representing the possibilities of linguistic selection (metaphor) and combination (metonymy); Jakobson’s work became important for such French structuralists as Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes.<sup>180</sup> In his essay, Jakobson also argues that metaphor is the basis for poetry, especially as seen in literary Romanticism and Symbolism, whereas metonymy forms the basis for Realism in literature.<sup>181</sup> This background on Burke has now opened up the space to discuss the four modes and four tropes.

### ***Four Modes***

With symbolic action, rhetoric takes center stage in language. Within the field there are what are known as the four modes of rhetorical discourse first written by Samuel P. Newman in *A Practical System of Rhetoric* in 1827: description (picturing); exposition (explaining); argumentation (Convincing); and narration (telling). Description means to provide greater detail upon the object being discussed. Exposition means to provide greater information about the objects. Argumentation means how to properly put the information together. All of these descriptions are static. However, the final description is dynamic. That is the narrative. The narrative is unique in that time and conflict become major components of the structure. Narratology also states that narratives structure our thought process, our personality and ultimately our culture. It therefore requires a deeper look.

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<sup>178</sup> Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 503.

<sup>179</sup> Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” *The Kenyon Review* 3, no. 4 (1941): 422.

<sup>180</sup> René Dirven, “Metonymy and Metaphor: Different Mental Strategies of Conceptualisation,” in *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast*, ed. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 75–112.

<sup>181</sup> Roman Jakobson, “The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles,” in *Metaphor and Metonymy in Comparison and Contrast*, ed. René Dirven and Ralf Pörings (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 41–48.

Narration generally follows a plot structure of equilibrium, followed by a change of space, time or relations between characters leading up to a conflict that once resolved leads back to equilibrium. Todorov's three part structure of state of non-conflict, disruption, then resolution. The point of view is told either from the view of the narrator, or told to an audience, or spoken of from the perspective of a third party. The first, second and third point of view, respectively. The final common point of view is the omniscient point of view that takes a free flowing viewpoint that can see the story from anywhere. The first person being subjective and idealistic. The stream of consciousness is one approach of getting inside the actual thought process and motivations of a character. The third person being from outside the viewpoint of the characters. The omniscient point of view comes close to representing the view science wants for itself, the view from nowhere, where the subject is completely removed and only objects are left to be studied. The key difference for narrative then is the authority it places on perspective and interpretation.

Why narration is important to understand however is because of the research in psychology showing its relationship to the thought process of the human mind in general. This world is far too complex to maneuver without simplification.<sup>182</sup> It is said that our brain can only comprehend seven bits of information at any given moment<sup>183</sup>. This simplification allows our attention to remain focused on our biologically and socio-culturally driven needs and wants. We build collective stories and narratives around these ideal end-states with stable rewards<sup>184</sup>. We also stereotype and build frames to reduce complexity.<sup>185</sup> These shared stories allow us to fulfil our wishes, while at the same time balancing our individual motivations with the needs of the members of our community we share our history, culture and geography with.

As Jonathan Gottschall said, "Story is the grease and glue of society: by encouraging us to behave well, story reduces social friction while uniting people around common values."<sup>186</sup> As long as the system is working, our conceptual model of the world is fine. It is only when enough errors and cracks show up that our narratives start to crumble and uncertainty and anxiety begin to grip us. Without orientation we don't know how to act until we have once again re-

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<sup>182</sup> Jordan Peterson, *Maps of Meaning: The Architecture of Belief* (Toronto: Random House, 1999).

<sup>183</sup> George A. Miller, "The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information," *Psychological Review* 63, no. 2 (1956): 81–97, <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043158>.

<sup>184</sup> Roger C. Schank and Robert P. Abelson, *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1977), 35–40.

<sup>185</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal and Erica Teichman, *Stereotypes and Prejudices: Theoretical Approaches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 78–81.

<sup>186</sup> Jonathan Gottschall, *The Storytelling Animal: How Stories Make Us Human* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 138.

established a new narrative. This is why we hold onto our current models of the world so dearly, and seek to suppress error information.<sup>187</sup> They do so much to protect our psychological and social order. Even if that social order includes a degree of conflict at its borders.

Winslade and Monk<sup>188</sup> grabbed onto this idea in founding Narrative Mediation. However, in their work they actually aim to help narratives collapse so as to replace them with a new more cooperative one. First they say that “giving contradictions and gaps in a conflict story more attention can open up spaces for change.”<sup>189</sup> Emergent complexity and anxiety is actually a net benefit for narrative and behavior change. Ryan J. Millard applied this analysis to protracted cross-border conflict.

However, this is only half of the story, as building a new narrative between different cultural groups requires bridging a ‘meaning’ divide. Jurgen Habermas laid out the concept of Lifeworld, which delineates the cultural space where meaning can be shared amongst members of the community. Outside of this ‘lifeworld’ meaning can’t easily be communicated. This is because it incorporates all of the life experiences and culturally relativistic models that have shaped an individual being.

Building shared meaning is key to cooperation. In peace and conflict studies ‘collateral experiences’ of the conflicted parties themselves hold the key to moving pieces of resolution forward. So peace can once again hold more meaning than war. Key examples tying narratives to life beyond the text are cybernetics discussed elsewhere and emplotment. This is how people structure their personal experiences through narratives. Owen Flanagan of Duke University, “Evidence strongly suggests that humans in all cultures come to cast their own identity in some sort of narrative form. We are inveterate storytellers.”<sup>190</sup> Tying this all back to the Bayesian brain. Peter Abell developed a Bayesian Narrative theory whereby ‘action a causes action b in a specified context’. If the evidence is not completely clear then counterfactuals come into discussion.<sup>191</sup>

Kenneth Burke breaks down the four major tropes within literature itself as Metonymy (Chapter two), Metaphor (Chapter one), Synecdoche (Chapter three), and Irony (Chapter four). The third mode is synecdoche. An example running

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<sup>187</sup> T. Proulx, M. Inzlicht, and E. Harmon-Jones, “Understanding All Inconsistency Compensation as a Palliative Response to Violated Expectations,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 16, no. 5 (2012): 285–91, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.04.002>.

<sup>188</sup> J. Winslade, G. Monk, and A. Cotter, “A Narrative Approach to the Practice of Mediation,” *Negotiation Journal* 14, no. 1 (1998): 21–41, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024606303501>.

<sup>189</sup> Winslade, Monk, and Cotter, “A Narrative Approach to the Practice of Mediation,” 26.

<sup>190</sup> Owen Flanagan, *Consciousness Reconsidered* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 198.

<sup>191</sup> P. Abell, “A Case for Cases: Comparative Narratives in Sociological Explanation,” *Sociological Methods and Research* 32 (2009): 1–33.; P. Abell, “Singular Mechanisms and Bayesian Narratives,” in *Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms*, ed. Pierre Demeulenaere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).; P. Abell, “History, Case Studies, Statistics and Causal Inference,” *European Sociological Review* 25 (2009): 561–69.

throughout this work of the recursive self would see this is the realm of that aspect of oneself that is a stable identity over time. This is what John Locke would in fact equate with consciousness. Locke contends that consciousness is what distinguishes selves, and thus:<sup>192</sup>

“...in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of rational Being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.”<sup>193</sup>

With all of that said, it is important to take these tropes and see how Carl Jung’s work on the Imago Dei in the 20th century aligns with Philo’s work two thousand years prior.

### ***Tetractys: Grounding Quaternity in History***

As seen in chapter one, Carl Jung and Wolfgang Pauli showed that the Quaternity is rooted in a deeper discourse around what was known as the Tetractys – made known by Pythagoras after having studied what were known as ‘the mysteries’ starting with learning Egyptian from Amasis. This is also the model that Maria the Alchemist popularised in her axiom. The tetractys is built on a simple and powerful idea that the structure of the mind could be described in only four numbers. Within these four numbers Philo would explain how the ‘Image of God’ fit within this model and for that reason it is important to explain.

The model says that out of an idea (one) arises its absence (two) that together birth the third (three) and out of the four comes the one (four). This was held to be a special number as it told the story of time through the four seasons and the story of space through the four cardinal points. It also held truths about the motion of planets and the basics of harmonic sounds. Most importantly though, it is a reflection on how individuals have perceived their own minds over time. Regardless of whether there is any cosmological, numerical, musical or philosophical truth at any other layer. The one important aspect in this discussion is that of the mind. Especially in the context of embodied cognition.

Here the Pythagoreans would say, “Bless us, divine number, thou who generated gods and men! O holy, holy Tetractys, thou that containest the root and source of the eternally flowing creation! For the divine number begins with the

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<sup>192</sup> Jessica Gordon-Roth, “Locke on Personal Identity,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Fall 2019 Edition), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/identity-personal/>.

<sup>193</sup> John Locke, “Of Identity and Diversity,” in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 2nd ed. (London: Thomas Basset, 1694), Book II, Chapter XXVII.

profound, pure unity until it comes to the holy four.”<sup>194</sup> They would also provide the oath, “By that pure, holy, four lettered name on high, nature’s eternal fountain and supply the parent of all souls that living be, by him, with faith find oath, I swear to thee.”<sup>195</sup>

Pythagoras is famously said to have studied with Amasis, Zoroaster, the Chaldeans, the Magi, the Jewish population in captivity in Babylons. Several centuries later his work would be picked up by another mystery school participant, arguably the earliest recorded alchemist – Mary the Jewess. Mary the Jewess was said to be an alchemist from Alexandria likely in the first century near the time of Jesus. She is most famous for the Axiom of Maria: “One becomes two, two becomes three, and out of the third comes the one as the fourth”<sup>196</sup>. She is also quoted to have said, “Join the male and the female, and you will find what is sought.”<sup>197</sup> Carl Jung would see these as metaphors of wholeness and individuation. In Jung’s *Psychology and Alchemy* he quotes alchemist Christianos as saying that Maria the Jewess was a “Hebrew prophetess... the Jewess, sister of Moses, or the Copt.”<sup>198</sup>

She was matched in her abilities by Cleopatra the Physician and Cleopatra the Alchemist, who was known as the Queen of Egypt. She is noted as writing in the *Chrysopoeia* (the Gold-Making) of Cleopatra, “One is the Serpent which has its poison according to two compositions, and One is All and through it is All, and by it is All, and if you have not All, All is Nothing.”<sup>199</sup> Her motto found in the *Basilica Philosophica* of Johann Daniel Mylius says, “The divine is hidden from the people according to the wisdom of the Lord”.<sup>200</sup>

If she is the same as Cleopatra the Physician she is a first century Alexandrian who authored two books on gynecology (*Gynaecia* and *Pessaria*) and a book titled *Cosmetics*. This text was quoted by famed physician Galen, as well as Aetius of Amida and Paulus of Aegina. It is possible to discover when she lived as her work was already cited in the work of 1st century physician Crito and yet she used a weight standard adopted after 64 CE. Aetius identified her as the Queen of Egypt.

It must be recalled that when speaking of the Image of God even sources from two thousand years ago, such as that of Philo, made clear that the Image of God

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<sup>194</sup> Tobias Dantzig, *Number: The Language of Science* (1930; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 42.

<sup>195</sup> Dantzig, *Number: The Language of Science*, 42.

<sup>196</sup> C.G. Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1968), xxxiii.

<sup>197</sup> Raphael Patai, *The Jewish Alchemists: A History and Source Book* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), 66.

<sup>198</sup> C. W. Jung, *Psychological Types*, vol. 12 of *Collected Works* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 209.

<sup>199</sup> Marianne Offereins and Renate Strohmeier, “European Women in Chemistry,” in *European Women in Chemistry*, ed. Jan Apotheker and Livia Simon Sarkadi (Wiley-VCH GmbH & Co. KGaA, 7 March 2011), 5, 6.

<sup>200</sup> Stanislas Klossowski de Rola, *The Golden Game: Alchemical Engravings of the Seventeenth Century* (1988; reprint, London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 150.

referred to an aspect of the mind. It is for this reason that the Tetractys and Maria's Axiom is an example of how to locate intuition with the mind, "the invisible divine reason, perceptible only by intellect, [Moses] calls the image of God."<sup>201</sup> Here: "XXIII. (69) Moses says that man was made in the image and likeness of God... And let no one think that he is able to judge of this likeness from the characters of the body".<sup>202</sup> It has in fact always and only been a reference to the mind, "for neither is God a being with the form of a man, nor is the human body like the form of God; but the resemblance is spoken of with reference to the most important part of the soul, namely, the mind."<sup>203</sup>

The fact that humans have a mind and can impute motivations onto the universe through the theory of mind is what leads Philo to say, "for the mind which exists in each individual has been created after the likeness of that one mind which is in the universe as its primitive model, being in some sort the God of that body which carries it about and bears its image within it."<sup>204</sup>

Philo further noted an early model of the theory of mind by suggesting that it is from 'perception' a 'mind' is inferred, and one's notion of God stems from an omniscient perspective. For, "In the same rank that the great Governor occupies in the universal world, that same as it seems does the mind of man occupy in man; for it is invisible, though it sees everything itself; and it has an essence which is undiscernible."<sup>205</sup>

For those familiar with Dante's *Paradiso* they will see the parallels in language about the journey through the stars based on the story of the tetractys, "it is borne upwards to the higher firmament, and to the revolutions of the heavenly bodies."<sup>206</sup> This ... "being itself involved in the revolutions of the planets and fixed stars according to the perfect laws of music, and being led on by love, which is the guide of wisdom, it proceeds onwards till, having surmounted all essence intelligible by the external senses, it comes to aspire to such as is perceptible only by the intellect"<sup>207</sup>

Philo further noted at this early stage that this aspect of knowledge within the mind was captured by the metaphor of light:

"And the image of this image is that light, perceptible only by the intellect, which is the image of the divine reason, which has explained its generation. And it is a star above the heavens, the source of those stars which are perceptible by the external senses, and if any one were to call it universal light he would not be very wrong; since it is from that the sun and the moon, and all the other planets and

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<sup>201</sup> Philo of Alexandria, *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), trans. F.H. Colson, in *The Works of Philo*, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann, 1937), paragraph 31.

<sup>202</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), (69).

<sup>203</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), (69).

<sup>204</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), Paragraph 31.

<sup>205</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), (69).

<sup>206</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), 70.

<sup>207</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), 70.

fixed stars derive their due light, in proportion as each has power given to it; that unmingled and pure light being obscured when it begins to change, according to the change from that which is perceptible only by the intellect, to that which is perceptible by the external senses; for none of those things which are perceptible to the external senses is pure.”<sup>208</sup>

This image of God as a reflection of an aspect of the mind that is not in any way gendered, In fact, it was explicitly stated that “man, made according to the image of God, was an idea, or a genus, or a seal, perceptible only by the intellect, incorporeal, neither male nor female, imperishable by nature.”<sup>209</sup> This aspect of the mind was further noted as fundamental to natural law. Philo here two thousand years ago explicitly grounds natural law within the context of this intellectual ‘image of God’, “[Moses’s law] as I have already said, is most admirable; embracing the creation of the world, under the idea that the law corresponds to the world and the world to the law, and that a man who is obedient to the law, being, by so doing, a citizen of the world, arranges his actions with reference to the intention of nature, in harmony with which the whole universal world is regulated.”<sup>210</sup>

An important part of classical education was the Quadrivium. This was astronomy; geometry; arithmetic and music. Pythagoras, Philo, Mary the Jewess and the later kabbalists believed that only one number could describe the perfection of all these fields. Philo noted how the seasons carried the perfect number four: “the heaven was embellished in the perfect number four, and if any one were to pronounce this number the origin and source of the all-perfect decade he would not err. For what the decade is in actuality, that the number four, as it seems, is in potentiality”<sup>211</sup>  $1+2+3+4=10$ . Here for example Philo speaks of music, “Moreover the number four also comprehends the principles of the harmonious concords in music, that in fours, and in fifths, and the diapason, and besides this the double diapason from which sounds the most perfect system of harmony is produced.”<sup>212</sup> This number was also the number of justice as “the number four is the first number which is a square, being equal on all sides, the measure of justice and equality.”<sup>213</sup>

Outside of music it also expressed key aspect of the story of geometry: “it is according to the unit that that thing is reckoned which is spoken of in geometry as a point: and a line is spoken of according to the number two, because it is arranged by nature from a point; and a line is length without breadth. But when breadth is added to it, it becomes a superficies, which is arranged according to the number three. And a superficies, when compared with the nature of a solid

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<sup>208</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), VIII. (30).

<sup>209</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XLVI (134)

<sup>210</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), I (1).

<sup>211</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XV (47).

<sup>212</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XV (47).

<sup>213</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVI (49).

cube, wants one thing, namely depth, and when this one thing is added to the three, it becomes four.”<sup>214</sup>

It went as deep as creation itself, “And the number four has many other powers also ... At present it is sufficient to add this that it was the foundation of the creation of the whole heaven and the whole world. For the four elements, out of which this universe was made, flowed from the number four as from a fountain. And in addition to the four elements the seasons of the year are also four, which are the causes of the generation of animals and plants, the year being divided into the quadruple division of winter, and spring, and summer, and autumn.”<sup>215</sup> As to astronomy: “the Creator of necessity adorned the heaven by the number four, namely by that most beautiful and most godlike ornament the lightgiving stars.”<sup>216</sup>

Ultimately, these lights in the sky formed a model that reflected the mind through the metaphor that will be discussed in the next chapter. Here Philo already captures a piece of it as “knowing that of all existing things light is the most excellent, he made it the instrument of the best of all the senses, sight. For what the mind is in the soul, that the eye is in the body. For each of them sees, the one beholding those existing things which are perceptible only to the intellect, and the other those which are perceptible to the external senses.”<sup>217</sup> Here the quadrivium is complete.

However, it must be noted that most importantly this was seen as a metaphor. A very specific metaphor – that of ‘knowing is seeing’. Here, “the mind is in need of knowledge in order to distinguish incorporeal things, and the eyes have need of light in order to be able to perceive bodies, and light is also the cause of many other good things to men, and particularly of the greatest, namely philosophy.”<sup>218</sup>

This metaphor had the power to ground natural law, “if we call the original founder of our race not only the first man, but also the first citizen of the world... [S]ince every city in which laws are properly established, has a regular constitution, it became necessary for this citizen of the world to adopt the same constitution as that which prevailed in the universal world.”<sup>219</sup> This natural law then is grounded in an aspect of reason that is grasped through the tetractys, “And this constitution is the right reason of nature, which in more appropriate language is denominated law, being a divine arrangement in accordance with which everything suitable and appropriate is assigned to every individual.”<sup>220</sup>

Here then is the universal constitution of the mind. Where image and word meet. “But of this city and constitution there must have been some citizens before man, who might be justly called citizens of a mighty city, having received the

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<sup>214</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVI (49).

<sup>215</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVI (52).

<sup>216</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVII. (53).

<sup>217</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVII. (53).

<sup>218</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), XVII. (53)

<sup>219</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), 1937 XLIX. (142)

<sup>220</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), L. (143).

greatest imaginable circumference to dwell in; and having been enrolled in the largest and most perfect commonwealth.”<sup>221</sup> Who were the first citizens? “And who could these have been but rational divine natures, some of them incorporeal and perceptible only by intellect, and others not destitute of bodily substance, such in fact as the stars?”<sup>222</sup> Seven perceptible lights, and the three imperceptible. The trinity of keter, chochmah and binah. Here then the mind could find its most stable expression as a metaphor, through the stars. “he is a celestial animal, by reason of that most important of the senses, sight; being by it brought near the sun and moon, and each of the stars, whether planets or fixed stars.”<sup>223</sup> Here is a model of the celestial constitution. The ability for the ancients to begin to map out a legal order based upon an aspect of the mind by projecting it out towards the heavens through embodied cognition. As Lotman might say, the constitution of the ‘universe of the mind’.

This mind filled with ideas and sensations were then called heaven and earth within the text, and “by one command, God makes both things: the idea of mind, which, speaking symbolically, he calls heaven, and the idea of sensation, which by a sign he named earth.”<sup>224</sup> Moses, “likens the idea of mind, and the idea of sensation to two fields; for the mind brings forth fruit, which consists in having intellectual perception; and sensation brings forth other fruits which consist in perceiving by the agency of the external senses.”<sup>225</sup> Here Charles Peirce would likely have come to feel some resonance with his own model, “as the mind, and sensations, and the object perceptible by the external sense are three different things, the middle term is sensation; and the mind, and the object perceptible by the external sense, are the two extremes.”<sup>226</sup> Ultimately, “a living animal is superior to that which is not a living animal in two points, imagination and appetite.”<sup>227</sup>

Outside of the earlier mentioned Quadrivium the classics held that a liberal arts education producing a citizen worthy of being free (*liber*) needed the trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. This would complete the seven arts that equate with the seven classical planets and seven classic metals of alchemy. Charles Peirce showed a pathway for grounding this trivium in the kernel of language, the proposition. Terrence Deacon has shown how to ground that process of semiosis further into Shannon Information Theory; Boltzmann thermodynamics; and Darwinian natural selection. This work would like to ‘turn the three to the four’, in the sense that there is a missing category at the level of mutual information that will be termed the ‘propositionless predicate’. This relies on what this work has

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<sup>221</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), L. (143).

<sup>222</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), L. (144).

<sup>223</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On the Creation of the World* (De Opificio Mundi), LI. (147).

<sup>224</sup> Philo, *On The Allegories of the Sacred Laws: First Part*, ix 21.

<sup>225</sup> Philo, *On The Allegories of the Sacred Laws: First Part*, ix 21.

<sup>226</sup> Philo of Alexandria, *Allegorical Interpretation I*, XI 28.

<sup>227</sup> Philo of Alexandria, *Allegorical Interpretation I*, XI 30.

termed Deacon entropy. These are the mutations to third order mutual information that are not recursive on their own, but exist through the ability of redundancy to mask noise, and through complementarity can in fact create novel synergistic and symbiotic recursive units.

To end back at the Eye of Justice, and the theory of mind, “to him who is addicted to the contemplation of the sublime bodies of the sky there appears to be nothing whatever greater than the world; and therefore he refers to the causes of all things that exist to the world. But the wise man, beholding with more accurate eyes that more perfect being that rules and governs all things, and is appreciable only by the intellect”<sup>228</sup> Here one can be granted the ability to be politically agnostic as to whether humans have the ability to infer God’s mind, or whether humans are projecting their own mind on the universe. What is important is that a roadmap has been laid as to what aspect of the mind the tetractys is referring to, and what the Imago Dei can then be symbolically unpacked to mean. For that, it has required going through the tropes.

### ***Coherent and Constructive Truth***

The difficulty with symbols is that there is an inherent tension discussed most brilliantly by the mathematician Kurt Godel, that you can either have a system that is consistent or complete. In philosophical terms, these can be labeled as coherent, or constructive truths. This tension of the symbol then means that two separate forms of truth are sought and are in conflict. For coherence, truth arises only from a system as a whole. There is no truth from outside the system. All propositions must be connected within one another in a closed system as a consistent whole. The set against the set of concepts, the universe of discourse, is then crucial to assessing validity. This is numeric truth. The “theory of knowledge which maintains that truth is a property primarily applicable to any extensive body of consistent propositions, and derivatively applicable to any one proposition in such a system by virtue of its part in the system”<sup>229</sup> Bertrand Russel’s key critique is that no consistent system is ever complete. It is filled with antinomies. Oxymorons. Paradoxes. Self-reference. There is a system for every belief, and its negation.

Coherence is what is sought for in bringing in new knowledge. Mathematically it would be termed consistency, but is inherently incomplete. It is this incomplete system that serves to in turn produce constructive truth. Constructive truth is the aspect that looks for completeness and not consistency. The symbol then has an inherent tension between coherence and constructive truth. One that strives for internal consistency, and one that starts for a complete mapping of a

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<sup>228</sup> Philo of Alexandria. *On Abraham*, XVIII. (81).

<sup>229</sup> A. Cornelius Benjamin, “Coherence Theory of Truth,” in *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company, 1962), 58.

reality external to the symbol. This coherence is at the heart of the identity and self-congruence theory of Alessandro Ferrara.

Ferrara sees coherence as composing three key dimensions – cohesion, continuity, and demarcation.<sup>230</sup> For cohesion, “Weber understands the cohesion of collective identities primarily as a function of the consistency of their symbolic ingredients – such as beliefs, norms, values.”<sup>231</sup> Further, “Weber’s theory of rationalization of religious cultures is based on the assumption that cohesion – understood as the explication of value premises for the purpose of rendering these premises consistent with one another – is crucial to any culture and is a fundamental motive underlying every creative endeavor.”<sup>232</sup> This means, “the process of cultural rationalization is fueled, according to Weber, by the need to overcome the contradictions and tensions which exist within the web of representations of which every identity consists.”<sup>233</sup> Here symbolic coherence is a key function of identity narrative construction.

Constructivism says there is an external reality, but that our knowledge of it always stems from the mind and social construction. Ultimately, it is the search for modeling reality within symbols. “But paradigm debates are not really about relative problem-solving ability, though for good reasons they are usually couched in those terms.”<sup>234</sup> The real “issue is which paradigm should in future guide research on problems many of which neither competitor can yet claim to resolve completely.”<sup>235</sup> A decision here “between alternate ways of practicing science is called for, and in the circumstances that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future promise. ... A decision of that kind can only be made on faith.”<sup>236</sup> Stephen Hawking calls science, model-dependent realism.<sup>237</sup>

The constructive theory of truth has its limits: “given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality”<sup>238</sup> For a scene “the corresponding philosophic terminology is materialism; an agent is idealism; agency is pragmatism; purpose is mysticism; act is realism”<sup>239</sup>. Where dramatism deals with actions, the scientific “begins with questions of naming, or definition”<sup>240</sup>.

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<sup>230</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 113.

<sup>231</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 113.

<sup>232</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 113.

<sup>233</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 113.

<sup>234</sup> Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 4th ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 156. First published 1962.

<sup>235</sup> Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 156.

<sup>236</sup> Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 157–58.

<sup>237</sup> Eugene Koonin, *The Logic of Chance: The Nature and Origin of Biological Evolution* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press Science, a division of Pearson Education, Inc., 2011), 427.

<sup>238</sup> Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 45.

<sup>239</sup> Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 128.

<sup>240</sup> Burke, *Language as Symbolic Action*, 44.

At the heart of the difficulty around symbols are that they refer to something they aren't. In the words of Burke, "'substance,' used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word designating something that a thing is not"<sup>241</sup>. So "to designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it"<sup>242</sup>. Ultimately, a difficult question is how can constructive truth be explored where there are no set deductive rules with which to explore? This is the question the next chapter seeks to resolve.

## *Conclusion*

Where chapter 2 was a story of light, chapter 3 is a story of sound and the light of reason – of the word. The Logos that is semantic memory, conceptual knowledge. This chapter has reaffirmed the notion that the 'medium truly is the message'. The human body, light and the alphabet, and electricity are all examples of mediums that shape the message. All language constrains form. Ultimately, we see that at all levels symbolic thinking has taken hold and presents an incomplete picture. From genetic DNA as the selfish gene being at the core of being, to a self that holds onto the past through self-deception, It is the cause of this mechanistic, reductionist, decontextualized world. In a retelling symbols are not absolutes, they are probabilities that must be enabled to adapt to changes in iconic patterns, based on the indexicality of the body within an environment.

The deontological, deductive, symbolic realm of the proposition is the realm of the necessary. It is Kenneth Burke's trope of synecdoche as there is an isomorphism between an aspect of the symbol and that to which it refers. This synecdoche ensures that there is a tension between the part and the whole that is always left partial. The key issue being to mistake the map for the territory. This is Carl Jung's realm of 'thinking'. It is Claudia Welz' relational model of the Imago Dei Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. This is the complete model in Piagetian terms that novel information can either assimilate to, or destroy in a reconstructed accommodation.

There are two key deductive systems, numerical and linguistic. Numerical is vastly different as it equalizes predicates, whereas verbal predicates are based around binaries. This means utilizing words or numbers changes the outcome and the process of achieving that outcome. In political terms this is seen as producing either a communism that sees all individuals as not having distinct predicates. Or on the other hand it produces conservatives that seek to uphold a binary hierarchy, or poststructuralists that seek to overturn old binaries, or postmodernists that claim the binary just doesn't exist.

Once again we see that the model of culture is defined by a center and a periphery. There is a static dimension, matched by a dynamic dimension that includes explosions before returning to homeostasis. We see a model of culture

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<sup>241</sup> Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 23

<sup>242</sup> Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 23

from the beginning of philosophy as being modelled around the soul as having three components. Standing in for the Axis Mundi of religion, where rationality is placed as the ultimate sacred value, with philosopher kings as the high priests. Again the tripartite structure is made clear: Pragmatics is firstness, it is catalysis. It is the mutual information of work and the iconic self. Physical Syntax is secondness, it is grammar. This does not stem from the Chomskyan mind of universal grammar, but from the physical interactions in space time. Translating those indexicals into the indexical locations of nouns and verbs is what produces linguistic grammar. Semantics is thirdness. It carries aboutness as third order mutual information. Syntax, semantics, pragmatics, grammar, logic rhetoric. Trivium

The natural world now is the one that is magical and superstitious, opposed to reason. The cultured world is the one centered upon reason and its empirical extension in science. Magical thinking based upon connections of similarity and proximity. This is the world of coherence and the one of maximum translatability. The ultimate aim for human society. The difficulty is that a shifting world means that it is ever untranslatable in its totality. Odin's lost eye. This is why "Culture itself may be regarded both as the totality of messages exchanged by different senders ... and as a single message sent by the collective "I" of humanity to itself. From this point of view, the culture of humanity is a colossal example of auto communication. ("O dvukh modeliakh")".<sup>243</sup>

Culture itself is built from the ground up, logic doesn't appear out of thin air, but is built off of rough and tumble play where motivations become coordinated towards joint goals and mutually agreed upon rules. For this reason, cognitive scientists have been seeking to ground morality not in logic, but in play. However, that is actually missing a final piece that will be explored in the next chapter. Culture then inherently creates a worldview of an objective world against a subjective culture. This is why anthropology separates between the emic, and etic way of studying culture. As if a part of nature, and as if a culture. For a post-modernist power-knowledge is the fundamental piece of culture.

However, there seems to be a missing fourth, as seen with the work of Burke, and Schopenhauer. The ability to learn from the other, to use a right hemisphere approach to relationship and not a left hemisphere approach to consistency. Four rhetorical modes have been laid out and aligned with the proposition: predicate is exposition, subject is description, logic is argumentation, narrative is motive. Logic is actually the state of equilibrium, the ideal state for which humanity aspires. It is tenseless. This is the place of stability of logic systems, the necessary symbol. The purpose of human value is in many ways extracting this maximum translatability then.

As Yuri Lotman quoted Umberto Eco in his work on semiotics, "If we put together many branches and a great quantity of leaves, we still cannot understand the forest."<sup>244</sup> On the other hand, if we "know how to walk through the forest of

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<sup>243</sup> Lotman, *Culture and Explosion*, 87.

<sup>244</sup> Eco, "Introduction," in *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, by Yuri M. Lotman, xiii.

culture with our eyes open, confidently following the numerous paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we be able to understand better the vastness and complexity of the forest, but we shall also be able to discover the nature of the leaves and branches of every single tree.”<sup>245</sup> The one problem “with this worldview is that it slices away symbols from context and therefore only leaves in the words of Democritus “Nothing exists except atoms and empty space; everything else is opinion”. In contrast, reality is filled with continuous flow.”<sup>246</sup>

Deductive logic here is necessary to understand how two propositions are put together for a necessary conclusion. Coherence of this system is necessary internally, and completeness and consistency with environmental information is necessary externally. This is opposed to the pragmatic system of abductive knowledge and the realist system of inductive logic discussed in the prior chapters. One key missing piece that will be explored next is logic that isn’t based on any propositions. Throughout this chapter the first half sought to explore a deductive model of political philosophy before exposing its limitations and setbacks. The second half then sought to show how reason must be regrounded within context not through philosophy and critique, but through philology, rhetoric and action. Ultimately, the model of Philo’s tetractys shows that the story is as yet incomplete.

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<sup>245</sup> Eco, “Introduction,” in *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, by Yuri M. Lotman, xiii.

<sup>246</sup> Eco, “Introduction,” in *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*, by Yuri M. Lotman, xiii.

## CHAPTER 4

### Zerone: Rubedo Propositionless Predicate

(The Anagogical Meaning of Sin and Faith)

#### Section A: Noesis/Sod/Analogy

##### *Center and Periphery*

In this chapter the focus will be on closing the loop around Locke's model of knowledge by incorporating the imaginative universal centered on affective imaginative (poetic logic). This is the location of Charles Peirce's *Il Lume Naturale* (natural light) and the ur-abduction. It is the encounter with The Other as Oneself and the fulfillment of identity through irony. The second half of this chapter will spell out this story of light not only as knowledge, but seeing the 'light as good'. This will involve exploring embodied cognition, and unpacking the medium as the message. It involves exploring how the third was mistaken for the fourth and how analogy must be returned to a completed model.

The fourth version of Rome is the Rome of fundamental rights as essential in states of exception, and therefore central to the sovereignty of the individual. This is the Rome of Tor Vergata, where legal constitutionalism is being explored to the greatest extent in this post-secular age. Key scholars that represent this upcoming section include Pico Della Mirandola of Italy, Thomas-Andreas Pöder of the Tartu school of theosemiotics; and George Lakoff's model of embodied cognition at Berkeley.

At the heart of this work is clarifying that the Self actually should be discussed at two very distinct levels that have been termed: the propositional self; and the propositionless self. This distinction is what has led to the need to differentiate between Reflective Authenticity and what this work has termed Transformative Authenticity in order to capture where a self knows how to act, and where a self must act out of its vital impulse even in the face of incoherence, and a lack of available categories. It is also the distinction between an exemplary Self, and the emergent exemplary Self. One must transcend the other. Human rights are grounded here in transformative authenticity and not in law, morality or politics. This is the realm of contradiction, the coincidence of opposites, Carl Jung's dimension of intuition, Kenneth Burke's trope of irony. It is the anagogical and analogical realm. It is Hayden White's metahistorical emplotment of 'the satire'. For Agrippa and the Pyrrhonist's criteria of dissent this would be the basis of dissent balanced by the 'will' of the criteria of action. It is the sod, and mystical reading of exegesis. This is the realm of the unjustified predicate.

At this layer of the story novelty is key. This means a focus on the inversion of Claude Shannon's information theory. Where he focused on increasing signal, this world is focused on increasing noise. In both circumstances it is redundancy

that enables both. This is due to recognizing that redundancy doesn't reduce noise, it masks it. Therefore allowing it to communicate clearly while holding the key to evolution. It is noise that is the basis of novel information that serves to produce novel interactions with an environment. This is how W. Ross Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety is ultimately met. It is importantly a key piece of Deacon's theory of inverse Darwinism. In cultural terms language transforms humans into redundant codes of culture. However, within each individual there is an accumulation of noise that is masked. Only through human interactions with society and with the environment can that excess noise at times find a greater symbiosis and complementarity. This is noted in evolutionary literature under the DDC (Duplication, Degeneration, Complementarity) and CNE (Constructive Neutral Evolution) models. This is the process of individuation. Sovereignty lies then not with culture or the constitution, but through the process of individuation and complementarity itself.

Here is where the vital spark is needed when it is most lacking in social structure. In Ferrara's words, "to lose in vitality means, for a cultural collective identity, that its members only externally and cynically orient themselves to its core values".<sup>247</sup> With "a social identity a loss in vitality consists in the unenthusiastic attitude with which the integration of diverging interests is attended... the fact that its members fulfill their obligations mainly out of the fear of external sanctions."<sup>248</sup> In other words, "a low degree of vitality translates in the fact that the members of the group perform the rituals constitutive of their group's identity exactly in that manner which we call "ritualistic".<sup>249</sup> Here then, the more ritualistic a society and its constitution becomes, the more unstable it becomes overtime as it loses the vitality of 'the People'.

A ritualistic situation is then what dynamic liberalism seeks to overcome through grounding its legitimacy within the golden eternity clause, the fundamental and human rights in themselves for re-encountering the ground beyond current epistemological categories. This requires returning that vital spark to society. The fact is that a, "poorly cohesive, insecure, enfeebled, anomically fluctuating or decaying collective identity does not react with the same degree of determination."<sup>250</sup> Listening to that vital spark, according to Weber, requires a "readiness to accept change."<sup>251</sup>

The issue of grounding human rights has an even further complexity in that in a post-secular age the foundation can not only appeal to a secular vision, but can find an overlapping consensus with all other reasonable comprehensive views – be they religious, economic or political. Post-secular society must therefore be grounded in a view that extends beyond comprehensive doctrines.

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<sup>247</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 118.

<sup>248</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 118.

<sup>249</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 118.

<sup>250</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 119.

<sup>251</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 119.

As Jack Balkin noted, “You cannot step into the same Constitution twice, but this is not because the Constitution is always changing; it is because you and the position from which you interpret the Constitution are always changing.”<sup>252</sup> At this moment in reconstructing the process of categorizing social objects we come to the end of the model of knowledge produced by John Locke and his four books. Here Locke concludes:

“I doubt not my Reader by this Time may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all of this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas: but who knows what those Ideas may be?... But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Man’s own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters now that Mens Fancies are, ‘tis the Knowledge of Things that is only to be priz’d; ‘tis this alone gives a Value to our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man’s Knowledge over another’s, that is of Things as they really are, and of Dreams and Fancies.”<sup>253</sup>

Up to this point the object, predicate, and the combined proposition have been explained in detail. This has allowed the underlying ontological object to ultimately be looked at largely through the propositional predicate, but the current section will look at the propositionless predicate. This requires extending beyond what has already been categories, and is akin to Piagetian accommodation, as opposed to assimilation. This is the spot where models break down, not where they can be extended. This requires identity to identity with vitality even in the face of no coherence. It is also the ultimate source and value of human rights. For, even though we are all uniquely different, we all confront the ‘Other’ in the exact same way. The other is the ontological world that transcends the epistemological. This is true even when considering Claudia Hassan’s recognition that the ‘Other’ can present itself both through one’s own fear, or one’s resentment projected outward.<sup>254</sup>

In the theory of exemplarity this is the moment where an example does not yet exist, and due to judgment and success can lead to an example that can ultimately be adopted by others through the Rawlsian process of the ‘most reasonable’. It is really Novel exemplarity then. As opposed to a political liberalism focused on justice and a legitimacy by constitution, this is a dynamic liberalism focused on individual sovereignty and sovereignty of relations in the state of exception rooted in legitimacy by fundamental rights. The foundation of an ‘emergent exemplarity’.

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<sup>252</sup> Jack M. Balkin, *Living Originalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Belknap, 2011), 269.

<sup>253</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, 2nd ed., ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1.

<sup>254</sup> Claudia Gina Hassan, “Victim, Racism, Anti-Semitism,” *Trauma and Memory* (Fondazione Europa Ricerca Onlus, Roma, 2018), 44–47.

Here then is a return to Rawls' original work *Meaning of Sin and Faith* that as opposed to his static model of the Image of God. Here is Claudia Welz's dynamic model of the Image of God that enables novel information to enter a community in a manner that is not explosive, and yet at the same time is not closed off to it. Here then is where the metaphor light and darkness is met through the overcoming of contradiction in the faith of goodness in action beyond explicit categorization. This is where novel anchoring relations need to be created without any model found in the grounding relations. The shared interpretive frame cannot take in the novel information. Here then is why sovereignty cannot rely upon the constitution, but must be based beyond the constitution, in the state of exception as Schmitt said. Yet the control over the state of exception must be left in the hands of the individual who is in the position biologically to confront reality and extract novel information.

In this dimension it isn't an example that first sets the imagination in motion. Firstly, it is the imagination that is set in motion to produce an example in one particular case, which then leads to the possibility for reflective judgment after the fact. It is only reflective disclosure at this point, and not yet reflective judgment. Only then does there arise a reflective judgment centered on the 'most reasonable'. The ultimate foundation for the eternity clause is not 'the most reasonable' as there aren't any reasonable alternatives to reflect upon. The foundation here is vitality. It is the vital impulse that draws one forward. It is this vital spark that is the source of where amendments can ultimately come from. The vital spark of 'the Peoples'. It is the spark that must be kept alive through time. The source of increasing reasonableness over time. The evolution of reasonableness.

Ferrara believes that, "It is of crucial importance that human rights not just be moral rights. We want them to be law in order to withdraw them from the contingencies of political confrontation and local majorities basically for the same reasons why on a domestic scale we want certain essentials of political life removed from the arena and secured as rights."<sup>255</sup> In this case it means for Ferrara that three roles for human rights are required:; Firstly, "Their fulfillment is a necessary condition of the decency of a society's political institutions and of its legal order."<sup>256</sup> Secondly, "[t]heir fulfillment is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other peoples, for example, by diplomatic and economic sanctions, or in grave cases by military force."<sup>257</sup> Lastly, "[t]hey set a limit to the pluralism among peoples."<sup>258</sup> However, human rights in this work are shown not to be rooted in legal positivism or morality for reasons that have been shown. They are in fact rooted in the fourth trope.

A central aspect of the transformative authenticity that will be discussed in this chapter is the distinction from reflective judgment. The key difference here

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<sup>255</sup> Ferrara, "Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights," 416.

<sup>256</sup> Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 80.

<sup>257</sup> Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 80.

<sup>258</sup> Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 80.

being that judgment is when several examples/propositions can be compared against another in order to find the ‘most reasonable. Whereas transformative authenticity is required where there are not yet propositions in place. What has been termed the propositionless predicate. Here then is not reflective judgment, but reflective disclosure akin to that discussed by Nikolas Kompridis.<sup>259</sup> The central need here is receptivity to the environment, and to that vital spark within leading to self-congruence. Not the self that has a semantic identity, but the self below the semantic level of memory.

Nikolas Kompridis extended the work of Martin Heidegger on world disclosure, as well as Charles Taylor, Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt to put forth his philosophy on reflective disclosure. The goal is to go beyond the rules already in place and disclose alternative possibilities. What he terms the “space of possibility”.<sup>260</sup> It is in this way that critical theory in itself becomes a theory of reflective disclosure, a possibility-disclosing practice. This receptivity demands, “a way by which we might become more attuned to our pre-reflective understanding of the world, to our inherited ontologies.”<sup>261</sup> This is necessary where the “logical space”<sup>262</sup> itself needs to change.

Kompridis focuses largely on confronting the underlying ontology, the world disclosed and not epistemology in order to extract novel information. The key for disclosure is confronting ‘the world’, which is “not a possible object of knowledge – because it is not an object at all, not an entity or set of entities. It is that within which entities appear, a field or horizon [that set] the conditions for any intra-worldly relation, and so is not analysable in terms of any such relation.”<sup>263</sup> The reason it is called reflective disclosure, is because the first-order of disclosure is that which is unconscious.<sup>264</sup> The second-order reflective disclosure is when reflection is placed upon the ‘conditions of intelligibility’ to reshape the background information/culture. This then alters the ‘space of possibilities’. Changing the logic space, changes such facts as “what counts as a thing, what counts as true/false, and what it makes sense to do.”<sup>265</sup>

World disclosing “arguments cannot assume that the logical space necessary to rendering visible the inferential relations between the premises and the conclusions already exists; rather, their success depends on the degree to which they can expand existing logical space in order to make room for the conclusions to

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<sup>259</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 199–210.

<sup>260</sup> Kompridis, “World Disclosing Arguments?” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 118–121, 137, 264.

<sup>261</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 201–202.

<sup>262</sup> Kompridis, “World Disclosing Arguments?” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 118–121, 137, 264.

<sup>263</sup> Stephen Mulhall, *Heidegger and Being and Time* (London: Routledge, 1996), 96.

<sup>264</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 33.

<sup>265</sup> Hubert Dreyfus, “Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 4, no. 1 (March 1996): 4, cited in Nicholas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 126.

which they lead.”<sup>266</sup> A key difference from traditional logic is that it is not in anyway focused on soundness and validity, but instead on solving a problem that the current category system cannot. This may be due to a paradigm shift. An epistemological crisis. “Since we are not dealing with deductive or inductive styles of reasoning (which are truth-preserving, not possibility disclosing), we cannot know in advance what form [they] will take.”<sup>267</sup> In other words, “critique depends not just on showing that x is a disguised effect of y, which effect in turn requires the exclusion or repression of r.”<sup>268</sup>

Ludwig Wittgenstein highlighted the fact that it is not only logic, but the system of logic in place that dictates the outcome. “All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system.”<sup>269</sup> Due to this fact, “this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument... as the element in which arguments have their life.”<sup>270</sup> Reflective disclosure seeks to go beyond the logical system in place itself.

A key difference from Kompridis is that he sees immanent critique and “reflective disclosure are practically indistinguishable, and that is because they are structurally homologous.”<sup>271</sup> Whereas, in this current model immanent critique is a method best used to show the contradictions arising against comparing the propositions in place against reality, whereas reflective disclosure seeks to aim to find propositions that have not yet been.

For Nikolas Kompridis there are two forms of fallibility, one centered on truth claims and one focused on his disclosure of possibility which is contextual based.<sup>272</sup> “the degree to which our interpretations, valuations, our practices, and traditions are temporally indexed”<sup>273</sup> and not simply new evidence. Whereas, a time-responsive (not evidence responsive) fallibilism is the key to reflective disclosure.<sup>274</sup> At this stage it is now important to explore Lockean semiotics; the imaginative universal; and the natural light. Then the story of light will continue. A story about a light that is ‘good’.

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<sup>266</sup> Kompridis, “World Disclosing Arguments?” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 119.

<sup>267</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 174.

<sup>268</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 254.

<sup>269</sup> Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, §105.

<sup>270</sup> Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 107.

<sup>271</sup> Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 254.

<sup>272</sup> Kompridis, “Two Kinds of Fallibilism,” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 180–183.

<sup>273</sup> Kompridis, “Two Kinds of Fallibilism,” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 181.

<sup>274</sup> Kompridis, “Two Kinds of Fallibilism,” in *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future*, 181.

## *Lockean Semiotics*

Chapter One showed the limitations of seeking a system of logic based solely upon induction through indexical signs. Chapter Two showed the key to the hypothesis as a foundational structure of human logic and knowledge in situations where past patterns can be applied. The world of iconic signs. From there, Chapter Three showed the strengths and weaknesses of deductive logic. The world of the symbol. The missing piece of logic however, is that of the analogy. The situation where past patterns do not apply in a direct way, as the situation confronted is unique and ineffable. This requires not a hypothesis, but a metahypothesis. The constraint on all other hypotheses. This is the ur-abduction, the creative abduction, *Il Lume Naturale*.

John Locke's Book IV, "Of Knowledge and Opinion," culminates his work's journey with the definition of knowledge. Locke defines knowledge as "the perception by reason of the connection and agreement or repulsion and disagreement between any two or more of our ideas".<sup>275</sup> Knowledge is defined here as the relationship between ideas without connection to the outside world. It is only once ideas can be compared and contrasted that knowledge is actually produced. Not science, but math then is where knowledge is born. Not what is seen, but how it compares with other signs. The four connections between ideas were: identity, relation, coexistence and actual existence. Then three tiers of knowledge: intuition; demonstration, and sensitive knowledge. Complex ideas are built from simple ones. Simple ideas come from sensation and reflection. Knowledge then is built upon a coherent model of truth. The deontological model that matches with Immanuel Kant's vision of ethics stemming from humans being treated as ends and not means.

The first three chapters have laid out a model of knowledge based upon current research. It is now time to shine a light on that part of PRDS which is so controversial today. Sod. The esoteric/mystical/secret interpretation of light that may hold the key to unlocking a theory of human value not centered on rationality and coherent truth. Before getting there, human value in the modern world is rooted in the notion of individual sovereignty. More specifically, the rational self-interested individual that only cares about concrete material goods and abstracted currency for its exchange. This notion is at the heart of economic models studied at the top universities in the world, and followed by leading governmental agencies. Human rights moral foundations have been derived from this same notion of rationality. It is even argued to be the Burkean 'God-term' of the modern era, as has been shown in the previous chapters. This is the model that serves as the foundation of the 'End of History'.

However, the difficulty with this notion is that one of the most important philosophers of all time, Plato, demonstrated how truly prizing reason would value dictatorship over democracy. Reason for Plato was having mental access to the Form of the Good. Further, putting the individual first leads to utilizing a left

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<sup>275</sup> Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV (IV.i.2).

hemisphere function of goal construction over a right hemisphere focus on relations. Charles Peirce has also shown how deductive logic can't ever explain the physical world by itself, and the physical world can never be used to justify deductive logic and so it is the abductive hypothesis that truly grounds knowledge.

The 'paradox of substance' in the modern era also shows that looking at life from the viewpoint of an agent or scene will not be a consistent and complete theory of knowledge. While an analytical view of the world has produced truly life saving innovations, it is also an incomplete model and does not bring forth complete individuals, or a proper rationale for dignifying all individuals with respect. With that said, behavioral finance has led the way in collapsing the image of the rational self-interested individual. However, far from being 'irrational', what is truly exposed are greater methods of calculation than through semantic memory alone. Now that God is Dead, it is only to man alone that ultimate sovereignty rests. However, unlocking the true semiotic component of the Image of God will enable an alternative political philosophy to be revealed.

By utilizing the model constructed in the first three chapters, this fourth chapter will define the current model of human knowledge, before unlocking the interpretant and referent space of the Image of God, and then ultimately utilize that key to lay the foundation for a new political philosophy that has human value at its core. What has been missing from this entire discussion has been the role not of instinct, or of fast vs. slow processing, but of intuition. An entirely separate form of knowledge that completes the quaternity. It is intuitive knowledge that serves as the key to unlocking a moral foundation for human value and a basis for an entirely new political philosophy for reasons that will be seen. More importantly, an intuition that is motivated by vitality, that utilizes imagination, and is constrained by the altricial gaze. Where classical liberalism had focused on the rights and responsibilities of the individual, and socialism and communism focused on the ability for the state to make decisions at a collective level, the new foundation is that of the nexus of relationship. In order to unlock the map of knowledge, and to interpret the meaning of the Imago Dei it is now time to step over the border into the realm of the untouchable supernatural through the analogical reading of light. The Sod of PRDS.

Coming now down to the fourth book of John Locke's, and the sixth day of creation brings us to the limits of human knowledge. The sum of all ideas and perceptions held in the human mind. Meaning the foundation of all knowledge. At the conclusion of his work, John Locke laid out the framework that all knowledge could be classified into three primary headings: Physics, ethics and semiotics. In other words: nature, culture and the code mediating both. Locke would use the term sem(e)iotike in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, in which he explains how science may be divided into three parts:<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV (IV.i.2), 174

“All that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, first, the nature of things, as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation: or, secondly, that which man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary agent, for the attainment of any end, especially happiness: or, thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated; I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts.”

Thirdly, the third branch [of sciences] may be termed σημειωτική, or the doctrine of signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Λογική, logic; the business whereof is to consider the nature of signs the mind makes use of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others.<sup>277</sup>

The entire lens of John Locke’s work focused on the notion of ideas that were central to his framework. Ideas could only enter the mind through the senses or upon reflection. These ideas then were not innate and it is what served as the foundation of empiricism in opposition to those who felt that ideas themselves could be innate. However, a difficult aspect of this work is that John Locke himself said we never directly apprehended the object, but only the idea of the object. Which in itself is not the object directly. In many ways then Locke’s work veers astonishingly close to innateness, both in the sense of ideas still arising not completely from a world independent of human cognition and in the fact that all reflection is an a priori system that is itself innate. These ideas themselves then came as discussed with primary and secondary qualities and referenced by words.

All of this leads to John Locke’s ultimate definition of knowledge which is the comparison and differentiation between ideas. Where they are in agreement or disagreement. Knowledge then is ranked in a hierarchy based upon certainty. The only certain knowledge is along the lines of mathematics and structured relations. The agreements between ideas. Below that certain knowledge is only probable. Science itself could not be certain knowledge along the lines of David Hume’s induction problem. From there the hierarchy goes further away from certainty towards uncertain information. However, as has been developed in this work, the direction of Locke’s uncertainty is incorrect in terms of how knowledge is truly built.

Locke writes “Of the Reality of Knowledge”:

“I doubt not but my Reader by this Time may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me, To what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas: but who knows what those Ideas may be?... But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Men’s own Imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the reality of things? It matters not what Men’s Fancies are, ‘tis the Knowledge of Things that is only to be priz’d; ‘tis this alone gives a Value to

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<sup>277</sup> Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV (IV.i.2), 175.

our Reasonings, and Preference to one Man's Knowledge over another's, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and Fancies."<sup>278</sup>

However, this is misplacing the fact that things are never empty of the motivations of the individuals that interact with them, and their thing-ness ultimately ties to their utility as tools. This utility is tested and extracted in use through dreams and fancies. The purity of ideas in Locke's work began at a false beginning. It is really this notion of idea that has served as the fraying of current knowledge between modern and postmodern thinking. Between substance and the paradox of substance. Between tautology and semiotics.

What is it to be human? Are we at the core savages, or enlightened beings born of goodness? Does society tame us, or corrupt our initial state? These questions were at the heart of the political enlightenment ideals, a battle between nature and culture. To this day we use the concept of 'being cultured' to look down on the more 'primitive' among us. Primates being our natural uncultured selves. A state of base nature that we have risen out of, and grown up from. We are also aware that our culture is at all times surrounded by the forces of nature whose destructive forces can sweep us away at any time. For which we erect walls and barriers to protect us. Are we civilized or did we trace our behaviors prior to civilization and are therefore uncivilized? Our entire value system then is implicitly and explicitly attached to 'culture'.

Modern political philosophy arguably found its beginning in the work of Thomas Hobbes *Leviathan*. While most see it as a political work, it was equally a theological work. Where a left-brain thinker would see the work as crafting an argument around a rational self-interested individual, the religious reader would actually read a story of fear and one that potentially collapses deeply held beliefs. This is because Thomas Hobbes first had to prove that God had exited the stage of human drama and would not intervene in human affairs, leaving mankind to construct its own political system. This was argued to be centered around this unique time period humanity finds itself in when Christ left the world, to when the Second Coming will occur as a reintervention of God in human relations. This emptiness led to the need then to analyze humans left to their own devices. In this regard, the next stage of Hobbes' idea is that humans left in the state or nature have lives that are 'nasty, brutish, and short.'

Culture then is what then was called for. However, culture was not born of utopia, but out of man's worst instincts and the need to protect against them. The only way to prevent humanity's horrible nature was to have a force more powerful than one man alone. That was the collective man. The *Leviathan*. Named after the underwater snake in the Bible in the Book of Job. The ultimate monster. Government then was the ultimate monster, the head of the beast was the monarch, which for Hobbes was the least bad alternative. A monarch that should not have its authority checked by religion as religion without God was corrupt enough to start the destructive religious wars. Within these wars was the arguable incentive for

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<sup>278</sup> Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV (IV.i.2). *Book 4 Chapter 4*.

modern political philosophy to be birthed in the first place in that time of history. In this period of time Filmer similarly wrote Patriarcha to support the monarchy. The monarch was argued to have its authority granted from descent from the original sovereign of the world, Adam in the Garden. This sovereignty thus was provided to the monarchy because of its traditions rooted in Adam and his family being provided dominion over the earth. This was the environment within which the work of John Locke was a retaliation.

Locke still founded his political philosophy on a belief in God and biblical tradition. He believed that God created humans, and felt that natural law stemmed from revelation. He noted that life, liberty and property were protected in the Ten Commandment, the Decalogue, and believed in the principle of the Image of God in Genesis 1 and 2. His work underscored the golden rule and equality of women and men. At the same time he was also opposed to atheism. Locke further felt that reason was key to understanding Christianity, and at the same time Christianity was fundamental to completing reason. This is because Locke felt that reason alone could not build a moral code. In fact, in its practical usefulness of completing rational conduct it is at the very least a pragmatic truth. This is in his book Reasonableness of Christianity.

“But Natural Religion in its full extent, was nowhere, that I know, taken care of by the force of Natural Reason... ‘tis too hard a task for unassisted Reason, to establish Morality in all its parts upon its true foundations; with a clear and convincing light... Experience shews that the knowledge of Morality, **by meer natural light**, (how agreeable soever it be to it) makes but slow progress, and little advance in the World. And the reason of it is not hard to be found in Men’s Necessities, Passions, Vices, and mistaken Interests.; which turn their thoughts another way... ‘tis plain in fact, that humane reason unassisted, failed Men in its great and Proper business of Morality. It never from unquestionable Principles, by clear deductions, made out an entire Body of the Law of Nature. And he that collect all the Moral Rules of the Philosophers, and compare them with those contained in the New Testament, will find them to come short of the Morality delivered by our Saviour...”<sup>279</sup>

Further, John Locke felt that a responsibility that extended beyond the short term was necessary. Here, “The view of Heaven and Hell, will cast a light upon the short pleasures and pains of this present state; and give attractions and encouragements to Virtue, which reason, and interest, and the Care of our selves, cannot but allow and prefer.”<sup>280</sup> It would be only “Upon this foundation, and upon this only, Morality stands firm, and may deny all competition.”<sup>281</sup>

Locke also had strong opinions on atheists “those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the

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<sup>279</sup> John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 149.

<sup>280</sup> Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 149.

<sup>281</sup> Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 149.

bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist.”<sup>282</sup> In this way, “The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration”<sup>283</sup> Further, “Not only does the simple idea of atheism rob you of your rights in society, but it proves you unworthy of the tolerance of others, which is apparently a benefit enjoyed by the devout exclusively.”<sup>284</sup> For “If atheists cannot be relied upon to fulfill ‘promises, covenants, and oaths,’ then they cannot be relied upon to be loyal to the ultimate contract which binds each man to all other members of society, government, and the laws thus established.”<sup>285</sup>

As to his position on natural rights:

Sect. 6. “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our’s. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.”<sup>286</sup>

For Locke then, reason enabled humanity to access a part of God’s thinking, and in our self-preservation we understand it to be in God’s plan that God wanted the self-preservation of all men to serve as the foundation of political life. Whether a rationalist or an empiricist the agreed upon God-term of the Enlightenment was human rationality as equivalent with nature itself. This is still largely at the foundation of our economic models.

In human relations this fault is at the heart of economic theory, which George Soros notes is an “axiomatic system based on deductive logic, not on empirical evidence. If the axioms are true, so are the mathematical deductions. In this

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<sup>282</sup> John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (London, 1689), 20.

<sup>283</sup> Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, 20.

<sup>284</sup> Adalei Broers, “John Locke on Equality, Toleration, and the Atheist Exception,” *Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse* 1, no. 12 (2009): 5.

<sup>285</sup> Broers, “John Locke on Equality, Toleration, and the Atheist Exception,” 5.

<sup>286</sup> John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* (1690; reprint, edited by C. B. Macpherson, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), Section 6.

regard, economic theory resembles Euclidean geometry. But Euclid's postulates are modeled on conditions prevailing in the real world while at least some of the postulates of economics, notably rational choice and rational expectations, are dictated by the desire to imitate Newtonian physics rather than real-world evidence."<sup>287</sup> Humans are expected to be perfectly rational, with complete information, and have perfect competition. Lionel Robbins of the London School of Economics popularised the notion that economics is about allocating limited means to unlimited alternatives as ends.

The issue is always mistaking a symbol for an icon. A symbol holds its form perfectly and provides the certainty an ideologically tuned mind searches for. The fundamental flaw of modern society is seeing symbols as final solutions as opposed to being the most probable relation. Math treats dynamic structures with similarities, as static and equal/identical structures.

This is not simply wrong from a theoretical level, but empirically causes suffering. The hedge fund billionaire George Soros, student of Karl Popper at the London School of Economics showed that humans don't simply work on supply and demand in the financial markets because they are invested in gaining greater returns from their purchase. This causes positive feedback loops to take off through reflexive actions that actually shift the fundamentals of a company. This is because finance is run by an abstract entity, whereas physical entities are all concrete. This means that the abstract notion of credit and debt do not run under the physical laws of the universe bringing back full circle to the father of nuclear transmutation, Frederick Soddy. Soddy was worried that the heart of wars came down to this mismatch between the abstract and concrete. He devoted the second half of his career focused on finance and interest as he saw this to have a deeper impact on humanity's future than his work on chemistry alone. Economics further produces funny results such as the Water-diamond paradox. This is the notion that after water carries far less value in terms of pricing than does diamonds. One sustains life and the other does not. Why is this so?

In one swoop this paradox destroys the leading candidates for an economic theory of value. It disproves the labor theory of value. The argument for why this works is known as marginal utility and connects more with a subjective theory of value. However, the model constructed throughout this work could more accurately be called the OSO theory of value. First the needs are objective, and only once those needs are met does a subjective interest kick in. However, that subjective view is heavily influenced by the objective culture through the dominance hierarchy, which gives diamonds their worth.

Nowhere are the effects of the water-diamond paradox more confrontational than in South Africa, in an issue that should truly be known as the human-diamond paradox. In Southern Africa lies a desert known as 'the waterless place'. The Kalahari. Once, a luscious land in history time has slowly made the land more and more inhospitable. Leaving in place one of the remaining hunter-

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<sup>287</sup> George Soros, "Fallibility, Reflexivity, and the Human Uncertainty Principle," *Journal of Economic Methodology* 21, no. 3 (2014), 19.

gatherer populations in the world. Scientifically, the people of the land have the oldest lineage in human history. There is debated evidence that the earliest ritual and earliest modern humans started at Lake Okavongo. Tsodilo Hills is where the center of the world is argued to have begun.

Four hills mark out its territory, representing father, mother and child, and a second wife. Known only by names given by foreigners, either as the San, or the Bushmen, they are in fact the First People of the Kalahari. Where water has kept most through difficult times in ostrich eggs. From which Beads were made that have served as some of the earliest symbolic instruments of humanity. However, diamonds were found on their land and they have been removed step by step from traditional territories. This has amounted to cultural genocide.

Amazingly, the individual who is largely considered by modern liberals to have forged a secular political vision beyond Locke, actually began his journey not in a secular manner at all, but in a deeply religious sense built its foundation on his notion of the Image of God, John Rawls. “The idea of justice expressed in the political theories of Hobbes and Locke, the view of Adam Smith that we best serve our fellow-men by enlightened self interest, are all false views of community. Any society which explains itself in terms of mutual egoism is heading for certain destruction.”<sup>288</sup> For Rawls, relations were the key step forward. “In experience as we know it there are actually three types of relations: (a) personal and communal, (b) natural and © causal. The first type is between two persons, the second between a person and some object insofar as personality is involved in the relation, and the third is the relation between two objects.”<sup>289</sup> For Rawls, “Personal relations are motivated by egotism or by fellowship and love”<sup>290</sup>

Ultimately, John Rawls grounded this ability to enter proper relations as being derived from his notion of the Image of God. “The Imago Dei is that which in man makes him capable of entering into community by virtue of likeness to God, who is in Himself community, being the Triune God.”<sup>291</sup> However, after experiencing war and questioning his faith Rawls would entirely depart from this early work and aim to discover a completely secular political philosophy. A postsecular world must incorporate and extend beyond a vision that excludes either atheist or religious comprehensive beliefs in a way that ultimately satisfies both.

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<sup>288</sup> Rawls, Nagel, Cohen, and Adams, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith*, ed. Thomas Nagel, 189.

<sup>289</sup> Rawls, Nagel, Cohen, and Adams, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith*, ed. Thomas Nagel, 114.

<sup>290</sup> Rawls, Nagel, Cohen, and Adams, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith*, ed. Thomas Nagel, 118.

<sup>291</sup> Rawls, Nagel, Cohen, and Adams, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith*, ed. Thomas Nagel, 118.

## ***The Imaginative Universal and Affective Imaginative (Poetic) Modelling***

It is now time to turn back to the imagination. It is here that one finds the basis of consciousness and free will, as Sartre for example has argued. It must be remembered that Aristotle's common sense and imagination are arguably the same.<sup>292</sup> Further, it is the constraint of one's imagination and actions towards the betterment of their fellow human beings by transforming them from strangers to neighbours that has served as a fundamental direction of the human species – as discussed by Giambattista Vico. Here then is the basis of consciousness and free will, and the foundation of the fabric of society. The freedom to constrain behavior towards the community. Vico's work has been continued by Raudla/Pern, Tateo; Danesi, Nuessel, Ponzio and Verene amongst others. His work is especially becoming a greater focus in semiotic cultural psychology.

It is important to note up front the distinction between the universals stemming from imagination, and those argued to stem from naming. This is the distinction between Chapter 3 (Naming) and Chapter 4 (Imagination). The previous chapter has already shown the limits of determinative judgements. In the context of this chapter Luca Tateo for instance shows that imagination is distinct from rational thought. Here it is said in the context of Vico's work:

“This makes imaginative universals quite distinct from intelligible universals. An intelligible universal would be constructed through an act similar to what we would ordinarily think of as ‘naming’. An imaginative universal is created through the repeated imitation of an event. Words are merely the associated sound that goes with that imitation. So, for Vico, the first words were actually rituals that served as metaphors for events.”<sup>293</sup>

This distinction is again made clear “Vico describes the primordial human way of understanding the world as poetic logic of the first men.”<sup>294</sup> In this case, “‘poetic’ refers to the imaginative nature of the sensemaking processes Vico describes: poetic logic is governed by rules that are distinct from logic based on rational thinking, creating its own type of generalisation, the imaginative universal.”<sup>295</sup> This concept, “Universale fantastico, the imaginative universal is a basic component of poetic logic. It is the manifestation of a special kind of categorization process that precedes rational concept formation.”<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> Brann, *The World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance*, 43. And Pavel Gregorić, *Aristotle on the Common Sense* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 205.

<sup>293</sup> Alexander Bertland, “Giambattista Vico,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed January 9, 2025, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/vico/>.

<sup>294</sup> Donald Phillip Verene and Isaiah Berlin, “Vico's Philosophy of Imagination,” *Social Research* 43, no. 3 (1976): 417, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970234>.

<sup>295</sup> Tuuli Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 2023, 18 <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.27784.80640>.

<sup>296</sup> Raudla, “Vico's Potential in Semiotics: The Imaginative Universal and its Bodily Roots,” 266

Not only is it important to understand the pre-rational foundation of the imaginative universal, but that it is also an embodied process. This imaginative universal is embodied and opens the door to the work of Lakoff and Johnson, as Frank Nuessel has shown that Lakoff's work is essentially Vichian.<sup>297</sup> It has been said that "Vico was one of the first thinkers to describe processes that we now recognise as the concept of embodied mind: he emphasised that human thinking is not solely rational but also involves sensory perception, human passions, and imagination, all of which are inherently embodied."<sup>298</sup>

Raudla/Pern has shown a pathway for integrating Vico and Lotman through the use of affective semiosis<sup>299</sup> and the *umwelt*.<sup>300</sup> They are deeply connected as "Affective processes underlie image formation – we start imagining (and therefore remembering, structuring, differentiating) when we relate to something affectively."<sup>301</sup> This is because, "affect gives value of life to the world".<sup>302</sup> Raudla/Pern has updated Lotman's model as "Lotman has described language as a primary modelling system; however, ... [Raudla] describes affective-imaginative modelling as primary in relation to verbal modelling."<sup>303</sup> She has stated that "Affective-imaginative modelling is based on what Vico termed poetic logic and Lotman mythological thinking (or mythic, according to Donald 1991), a way of making sense of the human world that relies not on rational logic and abstract linguistic concepts, but instead on imagination and affective response to experience."<sup>304</sup>

In order to access this pre-linguistic and pre-rational concept Giambattista Vico noted that it was in fact even more accessible to study than philosophical inquiry. This is because it could be studied through the actions that humans do in fact take. It could be studied through what humans create – including social institutions. In this case, "Vico's methodology, as well as his theoretical model, is based on the *verum-factum* principle."<sup>305</sup> To implement the *verum-factum* principle, which can translate as 'the true is what is created', "he analyses what is made, and the process of making, in order to arrive at the truth. In other words,

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<sup>297</sup> Frank Nuessel, "Vico and Current Work in Cognitive Linguistics," in *Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science: Philosophy and Writing*, ed. Marcel Danesi (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 127–146.

<sup>298</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective," Summary.

<sup>299</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective".

<sup>300</sup> Jaan Valsiner, "Needed for Cultural Psychology: Methodology in a New Key," *Culture & Psychology* 20 (2014): 3–30, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X13515941>.

<sup>301</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective," 10.

<sup>302</sup> Sergio Salvatore and Maria Francesca Freda, "Affect Unconscious and Sensemaking: A Psychodynamic Semiotic and Dialogic Model," *New Ideas in Psychology* 29 (2011): 126.

<sup>303</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective," 11.

<sup>304</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective," 11.

<sup>305</sup> Pern, "Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective," 11.

Vico sought to understand and elucidate the workings of the human mind by analysing the meaningful or semiotic world that the mind creates.”<sup>306</sup>

Vico has already been grounded in relationship to Peircean semiotics:

“The mind is no more given for introspection than the world is for extrospection. Nor does it shine out through human faces, least of all from our own in the glass. It is known by hypothesis and induction from human doings and makings, in large part the same as those from which the world is known. The doings and makings by which world and mind are known enter into the making of both mind and world. If the human mind could be given at all, it would be in nothing short of the history of human institutions; but that history, like the history of the natural world, is a laborious, secular, incompletable construction.”<sup>307</sup>

Isaiah Berlin in Vico and Herder and Verene are scholars of Vico’s work on imagination. The distinction of imagination is that it does not seek regularities and patterns, but is more attuned to sensations and feelings in the encounter with ‘the Other’.<sup>308</sup> Here “Vico explicitly stressed the importance of the human body with its senses and passions as constitutive in the creation of the human world.”<sup>309</sup>

According to Verene, “In Vico’s view the poetic, or what in more modern terms we would call the myth, is the beginning of knowledge”.<sup>310</sup> Furthermore, it is “in Vico’s own view, as well as the point of view of [Raudla] the processes described as poetic are seen as part of human meaning creation as such, not limited to specific phase of cultural development or historical period.”<sup>311</sup>

Lotman, Vico and Peirce are directly connected through three key terms: fantasia (imagination), ingegno (invention) and memoria (memory). These derive from Vico where he says that:

“[M]emory is the same as imagination, which for that reason is called memoria in Latin [...]. Imagination is likewise taken for wit or ingenuity. [...] Memory thus has three different aspects: memory when it remembers things, imagination when it alters or imitates them – and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrangement and relationship”.<sup>312</sup> In other words: “fantasia – for image creation (imitates); ingegno – for establishing relations between images (gives things a new turn); memoria – for returning to previous images (the

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<sup>306</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 12.

<sup>307</sup> Max H. Fisch, “Vico and Pragmatism,” in *Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch*, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 223.

<sup>308</sup> John Shotter, “Vico, (Particular) Imaginative Universals, Divine Providence, and the Imaginative Work Needed in Relating Oneself to Others,” in *Giambattista Vico and the New Psychological Science*, ed. Luca Tateo (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2017), 120.

<sup>309</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 17.

<sup>310</sup> Donald Phillip Verene, “Imaginative Universals,” in *Giambattista Vico and Anglo-American Science*, ed. Marcel Danesi (Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 203.

<sup>311</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 17.

<sup>312</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 819.

springing up again of reminiscences).<sup>313</sup> Fantasia is what makes cognition a possibility.<sup>314</sup> For Vico, “It is true that these faculties appertain to the mind, but they have their roots in the body and draw their strength from it”<sup>315</sup>.

The distinction the current work would like to make is that fantasia needs to be more finely differentiated between image creation guided by memory, or image creation that is in the position of requiring a solution beyond what has already been successfully tried in the past. It is in this sense that the imaginative universal is distinct from what in cultural psychology is termed sensemaking. One model requires transcending the iconic self already in place, the other depends upon recursively producing what already has successfully worked. In the case of the imaginative universal, “the first men [...] not being able to form intelligible class concepts of things, had a natural need to create poetic characters; that is, imaginative class concepts or universals, to which, as to certain models or ideal portraits, to reduce all the particular species which resembled them.”<sup>316</sup> This imaginative universal is argued therefore to be “a primordial sensory identity”<sup>317</sup> long before rational thought. Within the process of knowledge creation identification, and not synecdoche is key here. In acting upon an imaginative universal, “every instance is the universal.”<sup>318</sup>

The basis for the universals is, quite naturally, the human body; “When men are ignorant of the natural causes producing things, and cannot even explain them by analogy with similar things, they attribute their own nature to them”<sup>319</sup>

Vico urges scholars to look at “the modifications of our own human mind” in order to find the principles of the human world<sup>320</sup>. Vico’s holistic approach indeed incorporates both into its method and subject matter passion, imagination, and the dynamic nature of human understanding.<sup>321</sup> It is for this reason that in order, “to form a fruitful, accurate description of how we create the meaningful human world, it is important to acknowledge that our own humanity is always present in the terms we use, questions we raise, and how we choose to answer them.”<sup>322</sup> In

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<sup>313</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 819.

<sup>314</sup> Marcel Danesi, “A Note on Vico and Lotman: Semiotics as a ‘Science of the Imagination,’” *Sign Systems Studies* 28 (2000): 103.

<sup>315</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 819.

<sup>316</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 209.

<sup>317</sup> Robert E. Haskell, “Cognitive Science, Vichian Semiotics and the Learning Paradox of the Meno: Or What Is a Sign a Sign Of?,” in *Semiotics as a Bridge Between the Humanities and the Sciences*, ed. Paul Perron, Leonard G. Sbrocchi, Paul Colilli, and Marcel Danesi (Toronto: Legas Press, 2000), 354.

<sup>318</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 20.

<sup>319</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 180.

<sup>320</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 331.

<sup>321</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 20.

<sup>322</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 20.

terms of putting this into Lotmanian terms, “a model is an analogue of an object of perception that substitutes it in the process of perception.”<sup>323</sup>

It is important to take the time to lay out the fact that, as stated previously, there is a key distinction between the knowledge constructed through this process discussed in chapter 4 and that as discussed in chapter 2. The process in chapter 4 is about novelty, where chapter 2 is about repetition and recursion. For an example of a chapter 4 process Täteo states: “People make sense of their Umwelt through the work of all psychic functions (thinking, imagining, remembering, feeling, communicating), but when it reaches the limits of the personal bubble, on the edge of Umgebung, the hierarchy of functions changes and the role of imaginative work becomes even more important”.<sup>324</sup> Therefore, “at the border of the umwelt, when reaching out towards a new meaningful connection with Umgebung, the given world, modelling – involving imaginative work – is at its most active.”<sup>325</sup>

Raudla explicitly makes the distinction of the two forms of abduction in her work that have been explored here in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 respectively:

“To further throw light on the notion of human modelling, it is useful to focus on processes where modelling has a crucial and explicit role. It is possible, although only in theory, to discern two extreme states of experience in relation to modelling: one is stable, the other unstable. The theoretical stable state would mean that the subject’s umwelt is complete: it has already modelled the environment sufficiently to overcome any adversity and sustain itself so there is no need to create new models, as the previously created representations and formed habits take care of all needs. The umwelt in this case already incorporates all significant phenomena and behaviours. The unstable state would then be an umwelt in the midst of change where the subject is confronted with the need to constantly create new models to overcome rising adversities and try to fit to the changing world.”<sup>326</sup>

This is the story of the ‘umwelt collapse’.<sup>327</sup> It is at this point that “Modelling becomes active when something new appears: it needs to be cognised, organised, acted upon. All the aforementioned processes are (at least in humans) complex – and therefore released via modelling systems.”<sup>328</sup> For it is at this junction point that “A new object cannot just be independently assigned a meaning, and not just because the meaning only exists in the context of the semiotic system – the

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<sup>323</sup> Juri Lotman, “The Place of Art Among Other Modelling Systems,” *Sign Systems Studies* 39, no. 2/4 (2011): 250, <https://doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2011.39.2-4.10>.

<sup>324</sup> Luca Täteo, *A Theory of Imagining, Knowing, and Understanding* (Berlin: Springer Nature, 2020), 60.

<sup>325</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 23.

<sup>326</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 23.

<sup>327</sup> Timo Maran, “Umwelt Collapse: The Loss of Umwelt-Ecosystem Integration,” *Bio-semiotics* 16, no. 3 (2023): [1–9], <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-023-09545-8>.

<sup>328</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 24.

process of creating the meaning also necessarily involves the whole semiotic system.”<sup>329</sup>

As Vico says, “man in his ignorance makes himself the rule of the universe, for in the examples cited he has made of himself an entire world. So that, as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes all things by understanding them, this imaginative metaphysics shows that man becomes all things by not understanding them.”<sup>330</sup> This is no minor distinction as “perhaps the latter proposition is truer than the former, for when man understands he extends his mind and takes in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them.”<sup>331</sup> In other words, “The human body with its senses and passions is turned into a model for the world.”<sup>332</sup> Therefore when “faced with change and new experiences, humans approach them with the entirety of their semiotic repertoire, utilizing all their senses, feelings, knowledge, and capabilities as resources for modelling.”<sup>333</sup> Ultimately, “the anthropomorphic world of ancient narratives and bodily basis of metaphors.”<sup>334</sup>

Here then is the beginnings of what makes possible the symbolic species, “For all organisms, the contact with external reality is mediated and selective as such. The selection is determined biosemiotically, but in case of humans, imagination interferes in this process.”<sup>335</sup> It is within imagination that one “forms poetic meaning, creating connections between some perceptual images, thus multiplying their importance, and declares some images nonexistent.”<sup>336</sup>

In the work of Raudla/Pern the very concept of modelling is actually only distinctly related to chapter 4 knowledge connected with novelty. In this sense Raudla/Pern in fact differentiates all modelling from sensemaking, seeing modelling related to novel knowledge and sensemaking by habit. This intermediate encoding is also arguably what distinguishes humans from animals, “An interesting intermediate between the iconic coding of animals and the verbal coding of human speech can be recognised in human dreaming and human myth.”<sup>337</sup>

As Johnson noted “without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without imagination, we could never make sense of our experience. Without imagination, we could never reason toward knowledge of reality”<sup>338</sup>. Ultimately, “Vico concludes that it is through a poetic logic of metaphorical

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<sup>329</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 24.

<sup>330</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 405.

<sup>331</sup> Vico, *The New Science*, par. 405.

<sup>332</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 24.

<sup>333</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 24.

<sup>334</sup> Pern, “Affective-Imaginative Modelling in Semiotic Context: A Vichian Perspective,” 24.

<sup>335</sup> Tuuli Raudla, “Vico and Lotman: Poetic Meaning Creation and Primary Modelling,” *Sign Systems Studies* 36, no. 1 (2008): 155

<sup>336</sup> Raudla, “Vico and Lotman: Poetic Meaning Creation and Primary Modelling,” 155.

<sup>337</sup> Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Jason Aronson, 1987), 429.

<sup>338</sup> Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), ix.

association – not through an analytic logic of abstract reasoning – that the three fundamental institutions of religion, marriage, and burial that ground the possibility of law, morality, and society are instituted”.<sup>339</sup> Here then it is seen that modelling and sensemaking require iconicity to be separated into two distinct signs: what has been referred to as seeker signs and icons.<sup>340</sup> A seeker sign being the sign that a novel identity is required that hasn’t been implemented previously. This is because the human mental self is nested within the physical self, and so while the physical self can remain the same process, there are many different recursive versions of the mental self possible within the physical self. Imagination is therefore about altering the mental recursive unit. This enables broader ‘identities of loyalty’<sup>341</sup> to arise. It is this novelty that distinguishes emergent exemplarity in times requiring adaptation, from exemplarity found in contexts of fitness.

### ***Uncritical Common Sense: Il Lume Naturale and the Ur-Abduction***

A Creative abduction is one where, “The law must be invented ex novo. To invent a law is not so difficult, provided our mind is “creative” enough.”<sup>342</sup> Eco notes this process as the connection of semantic insights. However this only makes sense in terms of the dynamic alteration of redundant symbols over time, enabling novel recursion. For Eco then, it is “When this process is rapid and unexpected and joins up very distant points, it appears as a ‘jump’ and the addressee, though confusedly sensing its legitimacy, does not detect the series of steps within the underlying semantic chain that join the apparently disconnected points together.”<sup>343</sup>

This is why someone may believe “that the rhetorical invention was the product as an intuitive perception, a sort of ‘illumination’, or a sudden revelation, whereas in fact the sender has simply caught a glimpse of the paths that the semantic organization entitled him to cross.”<sup>344</sup> However, there is a key process of thought that Eco left out of his model that does provide a greater sense of creativity than semantic connections alone. This is the fact that noise in an information sense, and mutations in a biological sense are constantly disrupting prior semantic information. Counterintuitively Shannonian redundancy actually enables accumulation of this mutated information allowing a space for true novelty

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<sup>339</sup> David Ingram, “Vico’s New Science of Interpretation: Beyond Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” in *Issues in Interpretation Theory*, ed. (editor name, if available) (publisher, 2007), 210.

<sup>340</sup> M. L. Kalkman, “Theosemiosis: An Essay on Consilience and the Perennial Philosophy,” *Sign Systems Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 398–432, <https://doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2023.51.2.10>.

<sup>341</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (1908; reprint, New York: Macmillan, 1995).

<sup>342</sup> Umberto Eco, “Horn, Hooves, and Insteps – Some Hypotheses on Three Types of Abduction,” in *The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, and Peirce*, ed. Umberto Eco and Thomas A. Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 206.

<sup>343</sup> Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 284.

<sup>344</sup> Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, 284.

of interaction in dynamic environments to exist. Not merely new associations, but new information completely.

It is this space of creative abductions in this fuller sense that are the basis of chapter 4. In Peirce's terms, the hypothesis is that we have "some instinct or natural impulse to believe [...] in conformity with the real nature of things."<sup>345</sup> Peirce has said, "[t]here is a reason, an interpretation, a logic, in the course of scientific advance; and this indisputably proves [...] that man's mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bed-rock of logical truth."<sup>346</sup> Peirce has said that abduction is grounded in regulative principles as one acts based upon what one expects to be the answer, not what is or is not in fact the answer.<sup>347</sup>

Here is the reasoning underlying abduction itself: "1. It is observed that scientific theories obtained by abduction are relatively often true. 2. If abduction were a valid mode of inference, then the relative frequency of the truth of those theories would be a matter of course. 3. Hence, there is reason to think that abduction is a valid mode of reasoning."<sup>348</sup> Peirce said one has "some instinct or natural impulse to believe [...] in conformity with the real nature of things."<sup>349</sup>

Peirce's account is as follows: "[S]ince all modern science depends ultimately on this method, its history furnishes such a sample of intelligent hypotheses, that a student of that history must be blind not to see that man's mind has a certain power of divining the truth"<sup>350</sup>. It is "This mysterious convincingness which the history of science seems to show is well borne out by the relatively small proportion of good retractions that have turned out to be quite false."<sup>351</sup> Moreover, "This statistical argument, which, it must be noted is itself retroductive (so that we must be on our guard against a begging of the question), is one of the supports,

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<sup>345</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, *R 637*: (October 1909), in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), 13–14.

<sup>346</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," in *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Vol. 2 (1893–1913), ed. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 309–324. Section IV

<sup>347</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, *Third Lowell Lecture of 1903*, in *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol. 1, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), 462:40.

<sup>348</sup> Francesco Bellucci and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "Peirce on the Justification of Abduction," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 84 (2020): 9, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.04.003>.

<sup>349</sup> Charles Peirce, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 2, *Elements of Logic*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), 444.

<sup>350</sup> Charles Peirce, *R 638: Some Applications of the Logic of Relatives*, in *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 6, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 14–15.

<sup>351</sup> Charles Peirce, *R 652: The Logic of Continuity*, in *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 8, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 23–24.

though by no means the principal support, of my doctrine that the human mind has a power of divination.”<sup>352</sup>

Imagination based on the broader notion of absence and possibility is even argued by Peirce to be foundational to the fabric of the universe itself in his model of objective idealism, as he famously states: “The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws.”<sup>353</sup> As stated in Chapter 1, Stephen Hawking himself also suggested the greater ontological reality of grounding physics itself in imagination and imaginary time:

“One might think this means that imaginary numbers are just a mathematical game having nothing to do with the real world. From the viewpoint of positivist philosophy, however, one cannot determine what is real. All one can do is find which mathematical models describe the universe we live in. It turns out that a mathematical model involving imaginary time predicts not only effects we have already observed but also effects we have not been able to measure yet nevertheless believe in for other reasons. So what is real and what is imaginary? Is the distinction just in our minds?”<sup>354</sup>

Charles Peirce also notes the key role of imagination in the scientific process, for “A modern physicist on examining Galileo’s works is surprised to find how little experiment had to do with the establishment of the foundations of mechanics. His principal appeal is to common sense and *il lume naturale*.”<sup>355</sup> Peirce has even gone so far as to say “Modern science has been builded after the model of Galileo, who founded it, on *il lume naturale*.”<sup>356</sup>

This is why Peirce says even science should not be seen ultimately as grounded in inductive logic, but in this notion of *Il Lume Naturale* – the natural light:

“The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. But it finds, at once [...] it finds I say that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to *il lume naturale*. But in so far as it does this, the solid ground of fact fails it. It feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must then find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon

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<sup>352</sup> Charles Peirce, *R 652: The Logic of Continuity*, in *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 8, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 23–24.

<sup>353</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 6, *Science and Philosophy*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 25.

<sup>354</sup> Hawking, *The Universe in a Nutshell*, 59.

<sup>355</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Architecture of Theories,” *The Monist* 1, no. 2 (1891): 161–176.

<sup>356</sup> Peirce, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” 490, 6.477.

the bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.”<sup>357</sup>

Il Lume Naturale is therefore “the simpler Hypothesis in the sense of the more facile and natural, the one that instinct suggests, that must be preferred; for the reason that, unless man have a natural bent in accordance with nature’s, he has no chance of understanding nature at all.”<sup>358</sup> Il lume naturale, “the natural light that has little to do with logical simplicity, but with affinity between mind and nature”.<sup>359</sup> It is for this reason that, “general considerations concerning the universe, strictly philosophical considerations”<sup>360</sup> for Peirce, “all but demonstrate that if the universe conforms, with any approach to accuracy, to certain highly pervasive laws, and if man’s mind has been developed under the influence of those laws, it is to be expected that he should have a natural light, or light of nature, or instinctive insight, or genius, tending to make him guess those laws aright, or nearly aright.”<sup>361</sup> Peirce shows that a form of naturalism “does not exclude God, on the contrary it is the best “proof” of God’s reality. For Peirce the hypothesis of the reality of God has a natural simplicity to the highest degree.”<sup>362</sup>

The Big Abduction seeks to argue that God is a natural consequence of Il Lume Naturale as the improbability of successful hypothesis selection by scientists must be formed to a higher degree than chance. Common sense then would gain its power from “the ancient hypothesis that man has been made in the image of his Maker, so far as his Reason goes”<sup>363</sup>. Again, the current work seeks to make no theological claims. This is what Peirce has stated, but for the present matter, what is important is to establish the universality of il lume naturale that has been formed over billions of years of evolution through creative exploration and natural selection.

With that said, in terms of the Image of God, Charles Peirce’s father once said, “The divine image, photographed upon the soul of man from the centre of light, is everywhere reflected from the works of creation. (...) ‘In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth’.”<sup>364</sup> Benjamin Peirce felt that, “Without this

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<sup>357</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 589.

<sup>358</sup> Peirce, “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God,” 490, 6.477.

<sup>359</sup> Jaime Nubiola, “Il Lume Naturale: Abduction and God,” *Semiotiche I/2* (2004): 97.

<sup>360</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5, *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 604.

<sup>361</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5, *Pragmatism and Pragmaticism*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 604.

<sup>362</sup> Nubiola, “Il Lume Naturale: Abduction and God,” 98.

<sup>363</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 2, *Elements of Logic*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931), 22.

<sup>364</sup> Benjamin Peirce, *Ideality in the Physical Sciences* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1881), 31, 36.

treasure of faith, the omnipresent ideality of science terminates in an impoverished and powerless pantheism. With it, the observed ideality is the divine thought, and the book of Nature is the divine record.”<sup>365</sup> In the words of Einstein paraphrasing Kant is a version of ur-abduction put very succinctly, “the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility.”<sup>366</sup>

It is as Vico noted himself, not in nature that one even has the potential to find the image of God, but in the mind’s relationship with nature. Here “there is a reason, an interpretation, a logic in the course of scientific advance, and this indisputably proves to him who has perceptions of rational or significant relations, that man’s mind must have been attuned to the truth of things in order to discover what he has discovered. It is the very bedrock of logical truth.”<sup>367</sup> From the “discoveries of science, their enabling us to predict what will be the course of nature, is proof conclusive that though we cannot think any thought of God’s, we can catch a fragment of his Thought, as it were.”<sup>368</sup>

With all of that laid out, Peirce also highlighted how *il lume naturale* cannot be critiqued in a philosophical sense in the same way that Vico argued with regards to imagination. Returning to the criterion of the problem, Peirce has shown how the errors that make themselves known to our predictions in the world of secondness precedes the abstract logic in the realm of thirdness. For this reason it is possible that “all our knowledge may be said to rest upon observed facts”.<sup>369</sup> He did not mean by this that induction was the basis, he meant the imagination and the response of facts both preceded rational thought. In fact – just as Vico had argued – Peirce too stated “attempts to justify philosophically our ‘observations of fact’ are largely pointless and superfluous. To engage in such activities we have to pretend that we are doubtful and hesitant about things concerning which, in fact, we can have no reasonable doubt at all.”<sup>370</sup> Peirce in fact stated:

“... it is true that there are psychological states which antecede our observing facts as such. Thus, it is a fact that I see an inkstand before me; but before I can say that I am obliged to have impressions of sense into which no idea of an inkstand, or of any separate object or of an ‘I,’ or of seeing, enter at all; and it is true that my judging that I see an inkstand before me is the product of mental operations upon these impressions of sense. But it is only when the cognition has become worked up into a proposition, or judgment of a fact, that I can exercise any direct control

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<sup>365</sup> Peirce, *Ideality in the Physical Sciences*, 31, 36.

<sup>366</sup> Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality,” in *Ideas and Opinions*, trans. Sonja Bargmann (New York: Bonanza, 1954), 292.

<sup>367</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 5 and 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 325.

<sup>368</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 5 and 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 346.

<sup>369</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 5 and 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 356–57.

<sup>370</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 5 and 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 356–57.

over the process; and it is idle to discuss the ‘legitimacy’ of that which cannot be controlled. Observations of fact have, therefore, to be accepted as they occur.”<sup>371</sup>

It is for this reason that “Peirce’s argument, therefore, effectively rules out the possibility of drawing the world of experience into question as so many philosophers have attempted to do.”<sup>372</sup> Common sense and *il lume naturale* is “necessary to all men for their being and preservation, and therefore it is unconditionally given to all men by the Author of Nature.”<sup>373</sup> Ultimately, this has all been meant to establish that “Peirce maintains that the validity of abduction is grounded upon the more fundamental abduction, which we may call *ur*-abduction, that nature is explainable.”<sup>374</sup> This means that “we cannot go behind what we are unable to doubt”<sup>375</sup>. Since it could be shown that “all modern science depends ultimately on this method, its history furnishes such a sample of intelligent hypotheses, that a student of that history must be blind not to see that man’s mind has a certain power of divining the truth.”<sup>376</sup> Therefore, “The history of science is as it were the *ur*-induction that verifies the *ur*-abduction that we have a power of abduction, just like single inductions verify single abductions.”<sup>377</sup>

In the end it is beyond political theory to discuss whether this capability arose through any other means in addition to evolution, but at its foundation “the human mind has a natural tendency to reason correctly about natural phenomena because it is a product of the same influences, forces and drivers as natural evolution is.”<sup>378</sup> To end with a little paradox at the heart of the criterion of the problem, “The cause (not the reason) of the validity of this mode of reasoning must be that man’s mind having been formed under natural influence has an indefinite tendency toward believing the truth. But the reason for trusting to this method of reasoning is the reason of despair.”<sup>379</sup> It is the need to fix things that *ur*-abductions are needed – in the face of doubts and uncertainties – but it has been placed there through the noise of mutation and chiseled by nature.

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<sup>371</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vols. 5 and 6, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 356–57.

<sup>372</sup> John W. Oller Jr., “C.S. Peirce’s ‘Neglected Argument,’” *Peirce Studies* (March 1, 1984).

<sup>373</sup> Charles Peirce, *Epistemological and Investigative Papers*, vol. 4, ed. Nathan Houser, Don D. Roberts, and James Van Evra (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 412.

<sup>374</sup> Francesco Bellucci, “Eco and Peirce on Abduction,” *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* (2018), section 47 <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpp.1122>.

<sup>375</sup> Charles Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, vol. 3, ed. Edward C. Moore, Arthur W. Burks, and Thomas A. Goudge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), 14.

<sup>376</sup> Charles Peirce, *R 638: Some Applications of the Logic of Relatives*, in *The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 6, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 14–15.

<sup>377</sup> Bellucci, “Eco and Peirce on Abduction,” section 49.

<sup>378</sup> Bellucci and Pietarinen, “Peirce on the Justification of Abduction,” 9.

<sup>379</sup> Charles Sanders Peirce to Victoria Welby, July 1905, in *The Correspondence of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1, edited by Maria Chiara Pievatolo, 463, p. 51.

## *The Other as Oneself*

The final stage of the magnum opus is represented by the red color of the Phoenix, rose. Here is the confrontation with 'the Other' as oneself, as Ricouer puts it. This is the course of Carl Jung's individuation and the fourth mode of Josiah Royce's being where he says that "to be is to be uniquely related to a whole"<sup>380</sup>. The whole, the individual, and the relation between them. In this mode Levinas talks of ethics as being the first philosophy as the encounter with the other through the face creates a difference and a responsibility. To recognize the Other within oneself and integrate what was once one's shadow. Face-to-face and Oneself as Another are key then.

In alchemical terms: In Turba Philosophorum,

"O Turba of Philosophers and disciples, now hast thou spoken about making into white, but it yet remains to treat concerning the reddening! Know, all ye seekers after this Art, that unless ye whiten, ye cannot make red, because the two natures are nothing other than red and white. Whiten, therefore, the red, and redden the white."<sup>381</sup>

For Karl Jaspers' model this is the mode of Existenz. "The concept of Existenz stands for the non-empirical and non-objective actuality of selfbeing and true self-hood."<sup>382</sup> In this way, "It is the authentic ground of human being, exemplified by the intimate dimension of personal autonomy, existential freedom, authenticity and undetermined moral decisions. It is the absolutely unique inner core of the individual that creates the authenticity of the person."<sup>383</sup> In other words, "Existenz lacks a definite definition partly due to limitation of language and partly to the absence of an object to refer to, since it is a possibility in all men."<sup>384</sup> For this reason "Existenz may also be described as the ultimate source or origin of all concrete being. It is in this sense the principle of freedom, creativity and pure spontaneity. It is the quality of life, a universal structure."<sup>385</sup>

With that understanding, "we can also talk about an experienced hermeneutician. It is not the one who has developed a particular efficiency, but the one who is essentially open to a new experience (Offenheit für Erfahrung). This openness is a radically undogmatic opening as an expression of hospitality to the new and the other, to that which wants to be understood."<sup>386</sup> In this way, "After Gadamer, we can repeat that only such activity is worthy of being called the hermeneutic

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<sup>380</sup> Auxier, *Time, Will, and Purpose: Living Ideas from the Philosophy of Josiah Royce*, 46.

<sup>381</sup> A.E. Waite, *The Turba Philosophorum* (London: The Theosophical Publishing Society, 1895), [page number].

<sup>382</sup> Okechukwu, "The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," 3–4.

<sup>383</sup> Okechukwu, "The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," 3–4.

<sup>384</sup> Okechukwu, "The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," 3–4.

<sup>385</sup> Okechukwu, "The Theme of Existence in the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers," 3–4.

<sup>386</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 50.

experience, which is not guided by the logic of expectation that ensues from a calculative attitude to oneself and the Other as well as to that which is understood.”<sup>387</sup>

Within the world of hermeneutics *il lume naturale* has often been given the title of the inner word, “Hans-Georg Gadamer summarized the universal aspect of his language-oriented hermeneutics as “the *verbum interius*,” not the word that is the subject of the philosophy of language or linguistics, but the inner word, the core of Augustine’s teaching on the Trinity.”<sup>388</sup> The inner word connects the notion of intuition and being with language itself. In this way “Being has to reveal itself to us to open us toward its self-manifestation. On our way to Being, language is both bridge and barrier: It reveals Being, but only as a being.”<sup>389</sup> Due to this fact, “the correlation of the manifestation of Being and the understanding of Dasein exposes the fact that they belong together in language.”<sup>390</sup> In fact, “The universality of language and hence the universality of hermeneutics lies in the dialectic of question and answer.”<sup>391</sup> In this way “The *verbum interius* is the primordial horizon of understanding within which meaning occurs. The lingual structure of Dasein elevates language to ontology, and hermeneutics to a universal theory of understanding.”<sup>392</sup>

### ***Fulfillment of Identity and Irony***

As could be seen throughout this work, the model of oriented reflective judgment brought about a connection between the interacting layers of propositions and the fulfillment of identities in: maturity; depth; coherence; and vitality.

“Coherence is “the possibility of summing up the modifications undergone by an identity during the lifetime of its bearer in the form of a narrative”; Vitality “designates the experience of joyful empowerment,” the “immediate and joyful experience of the self as worthy of love and esteem” as “genuine and spontaneous”; Depth suggests “self-knowledge or self-reflection” as well as the “capacity to be alone”; Maturity is the “capacity to maintain a certain congruence between our ideal self and the actual potentials of our real self” – it’s also to show “an ironic acceptance of one’s finitude.”<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 50.

<sup>388</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 174.

<sup>389</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 61.

<sup>390</sup> Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 477.

<sup>391</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 65.

<sup>392</sup> Wierciński, *Existential Hermeneutics: Understanding as the Mode of Being in the World*, 65.

<sup>393</sup> Geoff Boucher, *Habermas and Literature: The Public Sphere and the Social Imaginary* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021), 157.; Quoting Alessandro Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 80,87,96,100.

Key to this entire discussion has become Kenneth Burke's fourth great trope, that of irony. The contradiction. The paradox. "Irony is a subjective and intersubjective phenomenon that is affective-emotional in its operation. It involves an orienting of the self, and an orienting of the self to others, that works because it does not depend on any sort of 'indicating device'."<sup>394</sup> This is what then "suggests that irony rests with those emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual, and nonconceptual embodied practices described by Gallagher and Hutto<sup>395</sup> that enable children's human interaction and continue to 'provide a primary access for understanding others'."<sup>396</sup>

The difficulty with how identity had been looked at without the added trope of irony is that self was locked in place with no ability to evolve. In that sense, the traditional "philosophical attempt to renew our understanding of personal identity highlights the practical dimension of the self and pays little attention to the various forms of self-detachment that narratives allow."<sup>397</sup> The use therefore "of irony in the construction of narratives is paradigmatic of such forms of self-detachment, which enable the narrator to take a critical distance towards the characters of the story told."<sup>398</sup>

The same issue of Rousseau's paradox mirrors the very same issue found at the heart of theories on identity and self-constitution: "How can you constitute yourself, create yourself, unless you are already there? And how can you need to constitute yourself if you are already there?"<sup>399</sup> The solution is to be "engaged in an endless activity of self-constitution."<sup>400</sup> A living thing, "is a thing that is constantly making itself into itself."<sup>401</sup> However, this implicitly signifies an emergent self, and not a static one. Here "we do not merely determine ourselves in the sense that we act from the principles of our own causality – we determine ourselves in the deeper sense that we choose the principles of our own causality."<sup>402</sup> Self-Consciousness liberates us from instincts, but requires conscious choice in turn. By

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<sup>394</sup> David Simpson, "Irony, Dissociation and the Self," *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 15, no. 6 (2008): 134.

<sup>395</sup> Shane Gallagher and Dan Hutto, "Understanding Others Through Primary Interaction and Narrative Practice," in *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity*, ed. J. Zlatev, T. P. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008).

<sup>396</sup> Simpson, "Irony, Dissociation and the Self," 119–35, quoting Shaun Gallagher, "The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction?" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 8, no. 5–7 (2001): 83–108, 85.

<sup>397</sup> "Self-Narratives and Irony," workshop, March 2, 2023, 2:30–5:30 pm, Deakin Downtown, Level 12, 727 Collins Street, Docklands.

<sup>398</sup> "Self-Narratives and Irony," workshop, March 2, 2023, 2:30–5:30 pm, Deakin Downtown, Level 12, 727 Collins Street, Docklands.

<sup>399</sup> Christine Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 35.

<sup>400</sup> Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*, 41–42.

<sup>401</sup> Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*, 41–42.

<sup>402</sup> Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*, 6.1.1.

acting on choice we have now gone down a different path completely than being guided by instinct. This means that our identity is performative. Here again identity is constructed out of choices based upon the ‘most reasonable’, and where there are no coherent responses, a decision must be made at a deeper level of incoherent vitality. Self-constitution then always is transcendent as it requires going beyond what currently is defined as the self.

Returning then to Ferrara, it was seen in chapters two how exemplarity is tied with self-identity, and that it is exemplarity and not generalizability that is the human universal. This means extracting a general from a particular. What completes the philosophy however, is extracting the particular from the particular. The pure analogy, which can only be acted on through faith, and not maturity. For Ferrara, “Just like well-formed works of art, balanced identities share an exemplary quality of congruency and self-containedness which inspires in us pleasure and a sentiment of awe.”<sup>403</sup> Here, “the ability to choose courses of action and assign priority to values in a way that results in an authentic, as opposed to a shallow or fragmented, identity”.<sup>404</sup> It is in this way that “Ferrara argues that this redefinition of phronesis allows him also to redefine the ‘good life’ in terms of the authentic fulfillment of one’s unique identity.”<sup>405</sup>

Here then is where Ferrara draws up the four key aspects of identity:

“Drawing on psychoanalysis, he reconstructs ‘our’ contemporary intuitions about a good identity by specifying four dimensions of ‘post-modern eudaimonia’, as he says, to wit: coherence (“perception of permanence and self-sameness throughout change”), vitality (“the experience of joyful empowerment which results from the fulfillment of one’s central needs”), depth (“a person’s capacity to have access to his or her own psychic dynamism”) and maturity (“the ability to bring diversity to non-coercive unity”).<sup>406</sup>

Justice in these terms of identity ties directly back then to discussions on equilibrium as justice here is defined by “the idea that the meaning of justice cannot be understood apart from the meaning of the self-realization of a collective identity”.<sup>407</sup> Here then is how justice is defined for a community: “In this contextual perspective, a political decision involving conflicting claims can only be said to be just if it does not affect the chances of the political community to lead its

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<sup>403</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 229.

<sup>404</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 45.

<sup>405</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 229.

<sup>406</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 229.

<sup>407</sup> Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity*, 180.

identity to a ‘fully fledged fulfillment’, conceived along the lines of coherence, vitality, depth and maturity.”<sup>408</sup> Surrounding this identity formation is an attitude of openness. Openness is “an attitude of receptiveness to novelty, of exploration of new possibilities for a life form, for a historical horizon, for a social configuration.”<sup>409</sup> Here “we can understand ‘openness’ as the property of those elements that set the imagination in motion, create a space of possibilities, allow for the space of reasons (and of judgment) to work and constitute a standard of political desirability”.<sup>410</sup> At this point this work comes back to receptive agency and reflective disclosure in a way. For, “This is understood as an attitude of receptivity to the new, in favour of exploring new possibilities of political life, promoting a public culture that fosters unconventional solutions, and a condition of cognitive receptivity, the preparedness to be self-critical.”<sup>411</sup>

Whereas Chapter 2 focused on a critical common sensism – a pragmatic truth – there is a prior will that must act not on evidence, but on trust. A hermeneutics of faith, and not suspicion in Ricoeur’s terms. Here is a common sense that takes the approach: “Reid, in his stead, suggests an innocent-until-proven-guilty principle of rationality. Belief begins with trust, not with doubt. We ought to trust, he contends, the deliverances of our cognitive faculties, unless reason provides us with substantial grounds for questioning that belief (1764: 12).”<sup>412</sup> Here it is, “Under the presumption of innocence, a belief ought to be accepted as rational until it is shown to be specious. Contemporary philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff affirms Reid’s intuitions and develops them into a criterion of rationality (1983a: 163–164).”<sup>413</sup> It is “On this conception of rationality, beliefs produced by our cognitive faculties are rational unless or until one has good reason to cease believing them.”<sup>414</sup> Moreover, “Reid believes that reasoning is empty unless Common Sense supplies it with material for thought. We need something to reason from.”<sup>415</sup> Alternatively, “If we, in a Cartesian and Humean vein, admit only what can be established by reasoning, we will admit nothing. Without the principles of common sense, we

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<sup>408</sup> Kunneman and Vandenberghe, “[Review of *Reflective Authenticity: Rethinking the Project of Modernity; Justice and Judgment: The Rise and the Prospect of the Judgment Model in Contemporary Political Philosophy*, by A. Ferrara],” 230.

<sup>409</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 49.

<sup>410</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 65.

<sup>411</sup> Quoting Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 14, 48, 214.

<sup>412</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

<sup>413</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

<sup>414</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

<sup>415</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

will believe nothing.”<sup>416</sup> This is because ultimately, “most of the beliefs supplied by our cognitive faculties are ones that we must simply accept or trust, not ones that we can or should reason to. So we can and must trust the beliefs delivered to us by our cognitive faculty unless or until such beliefs are undermined or defeated.”<sup>417</sup>

Jaspers presents the case that all existentialist, phenomenologists, hermeneuticians come to. The fact that empiricism and the scientific method cannot access a source of knowledge that transcends itself. This is why Jaspers follows in the footsteps of Kierkegaard in reckoning that in order to step into existenz one must take a leap of faith that there is a grounding of Transcendenz.<sup>418</sup> Existentialism; Phenomenology; Hermeneutics; Semiotics all then meet this initial moment of meaning creation, where one must act without prior knowledge. One must act on a hermeneutics of faith, of trust. Within the model of Sextus Empiricus this is for the Criterion of Action the aspect of pathos. Of drive and will.<sup>419</sup> Here is the key moment where action counteracts dissent. As the will acts on enthymemes and not syllogisms. This is why the will is primary and conceptual debate only secondary. Why topics precede critique.

This first section has sought to lay out the Eye of Justice and Providence in relation to the metaphor of ‘Knowing is Seeing’. Now it is time to look at how embodied cognition operates, why that highlights the significance of the body as the medium and how that dictates the message. This will enable a space for novel analogies that precede abductions based upon hypotheses from prior laws. In these instances there are no generalised laws, principles or practices yet in place. The ability to see the light as good is fundamental to the affirmation of life. Here then to close this section with the words of Nietzsche:

“Suppose that we said yes to a single moment, then we have not only said yes to ourselves, but to the whole of existence. For nothing stands alone, either in ourselves or in things; and if our soul did but once vibrate and resound with a chord of happiness, then all of eternity was necessary to bring forth this one occurrence – and in this single moment when we said yes, all of eternity was embraced, redeemed, justified and affirmed.”<sup>420</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

<sup>417</sup> Clark and Barrett, “Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion,” 649.

<sup>418</sup> Jaspers, *Philosophy*, vol. 1, 67.

<sup>419</sup> Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Book I, Chapter 11, Section 23, trans. R. G. Bury, 123.

<sup>420</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s*, trans. R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti (New York: Penguin Books, 2017), 566.

## Section B: Vitality

### *Unified Narrative of Embodied Cognition*

Now that the working model has been described and built, it is time to utilize a technique in cognitive semiotics to extract the interpetant. Namely, embodied cognition. The primary notion is that abstract ideas and concepts are understood and communicated when they are attached metaphorically with embodied, concrete interactions of the body.

What is interesting is that Lakoff's schema was originally put together following a piecemeal approach that discussed individual segments and movements that served as foundation for unique metaphors. However, a dynamic model connects the process as one flows from motivation to the motion towards an object that is completed in homeostasis. This process is 'Balanced' and contains an equilibrium between the 'maternal' and 'paternal' aspect of rules. For example: 'Motion (with a Mover, Source, Path, Goal, and possible Impediment), Containment (with an Interior, Boundary, and Exterior)'. Separately, Lakoff argued in the specific field of politics and morality that family relations is how morality on the national level is structured. Right leaning individuals follow the 'strict father' model, whereas left leaning individuals follow the 'nurturing parent model'.

The Ecological Theory of Metaphor found within the field of cognitive semiotics seeks to place metaphor within a broader footing of the 4E model of cognition. Metaphor is how you transform conscious thoughts into objects. The conduit metaphor itself represents specifically those versions of the metaphor that treat an abstract thought as an object that one can transfer to another. "Everyone should consider his body as a priceless gift from one whom he loves above all, as a marvelous work of art, of indescribable beauty and mastery beyond human conception, and so delicate and frail that a word, a breath, a look, nay, a thought, may injure it."<sup>421</sup>

What exactly is embodied cognition? In many ways it began with the discovery of a single metaphor that turned out to be central to human language as a whole. It is known as the conduit metaphor. George Lakoff stated that:

"The contemporary theory that metaphor is primarily conceptual, conventional, and part of the ordinary system of thought and language can be traced to Michael Reddy's now classic essay... With a single, thoroughly analyzed example, he allowed us to see, albeit in a restricted domain, that ordinary everyday English is largely metaphorical, dispelling once and for all the traditional view that metaphor is primarily in the realm of poetic or 'figurative' language. Reddy showed, for a single, very significant case, that the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behavior reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience. Though other theorists had noticed

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<sup>421</sup> Tesla, "The Problem of Increasing Human Energy," 177.

some of these characteristics of metaphor, Reddy was the first to demonstrate them by rigorous linguistic analysis, stating generalizations over voluminous examples.”<sup>422</sup>

This discovery was soon picked up and developed by George Lakoff who extended this idea to its potential by realizing how central conceptual metaphors are to everyday speech, and even deeper to the thought process itself.

In order to adapt the model developed by George Lakoff into an ecological metaphor it is important to convert it from a static model into a dynamic one that incorporates embodied, extended, and enactive systems. The core is realizing that, as opposed to seeing these movements as piecemeal and disjointed, there is in fact only one concrete narrative upon which abstract ideas extend out from. The simple story of a force causing motion in space towards a container (object) upon which equilibrium would be reached. There are two ways one is taught what to value, the strict father approach that imposes a value structure, and a nurturing mother approach that is permissive in allowing one to explore their own value structure. Diana Baumrind of Berkeley has research that shows the ideal parenting style provides a value structure with flexibility. This third way of parenting is therefore optimal. Again, this matches the model of father culture and mother earth in balance.

The story then goes as follows. A morality, a value structure is programmed into the center of the circle whether through programming from necessity, or from trial and error. A point of disequilibrium opens up perception of objects in the world that take the form of containers. A force causes motion towards that object leading back to a point of equilibrium. Abstract notions can then be attached to this one story that is at the center of lived experience. The ultimate ideal is in verticality, to reach upwards, to be upright and upstanding. One example of a whole metaphor is Road not taken – life is a journey. The embodied school of linguistics has built a strong case that the vast majority of constructions of morality come from either embodied experience, or from the structure of the family. For instance, all of those qualities of well-being – being healthy, wealthy, loving and happy – connect with the verticality treatment of up being related to all of these quantities and down the opposite. For instance: ‘I am feeling up today’; ‘I am filled up with love’; ‘I desire for you to have more’.

### ***Medium is the Message***

In Chapter Three in Philo’s interpretation it was shown how Genesis 1 could be read as a metaphor of knowledge, with the heavens as the intellect and the earth as sensations. Within the field of embodied cognition, knowledge and the mind has been understood through embodied actions. In the ‘Mind as Body system’

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<sup>422</sup> George Lakoff, “The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor,” in *Metaphor and Thought*, 2nd ed., ed. Andrew Ortony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 204.

Eve Sweetser<sup>423</sup> has shown that there is an extensive subsystem of metaphors for mind in which the mind is conceptualized as a body.<sup>424</sup> In fact, the entire simplified narrative could represent the mind as body. “There are four extensive special cases of this metaphor, with thinking conceptualized as four different kinds of physical functioning: moving, perceiving, manipulating objects, and eating.”<sup>425</sup> Knowing is seeing (I see what you’re saying) and knowing is eating are two that will in particular be shown to be important and greater detail is needed:

“[Sweetser]<sup>426</sup> provides extensive evidence for the existence of the Knowing Is Seeing metaphor over the whole range of the Indo-European languages, going as far back into antiquity as is possible. Her data includes a myriad of cases from various branches and times in which words from the domain of vision change to acquire additional meanings in the domain of knowledge. For example, consider the Indo-European root \*weid-, whose reconstructed meaning is “see.” This develops in Greek into both eidon, “see,” and oida, “know” (from which we get English “idea”). In English, it becomes both the vision word “witness” and the knowledge words “wit” and “wise.” In Latin, it shows up as video, “see,” while in Irish it becomes fios, “knowledge.” Other roots meaning “see” have similar histories: roots originally meaning “see” come to mean “know” throughout the Indo-European language family at various times in various branches... These are all independent developments, occurring at different times in different places with different roots. They cannot be random changes. Sweetser’s argument is that they can all be explained if one assumes that the Knowing Is Seeing metaphor developed early in Indo-European and has been naturally learned by generation after generation of Indo-European language speakers.”<sup>427</sup>

To see the metaphor in practice: “Someone who is ignorant is in the dark, while someone who is incapable of knowing is blind. To enable people to know something is to shed light on the matter. Something that enables you to know something is enlightening; it is something that enables you to see. New facts that have come to light are facts that have become known.”<sup>428</sup> Ultimately, there are “three ways in which the mind is conceptualized in bodily terms. In these, thinking is seen as bodily functioning-as moving, perceiving, and manipulating objects. The

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<sup>423</sup> Eve Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>424</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 235.

<sup>425</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 236.

<sup>426</sup> Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*.

<sup>427</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 85.

<sup>428</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 239.

central concerns of those metaphors were gaining knowledge, reasoning, comprehending, and communicating.”<sup>429</sup> So, “The Knowing Is Seeing metaphor is so firmly rooted in the role of vision in human knowing and is so central to our conception of knowledge that we are seldom aware of the way it works powerfully to structure our sense of what it is to know something.”<sup>430</sup>

Another major example is, “Acquiring Ideas Is Eating”<sup>431</sup>. In this example, “An interest in ideas is conceptualized as an appetite for food, as in having a thirst for knowledge, an appetite for learning, and an insatiable curiosity.”<sup>432</sup> Another aspect of this metaphor is, “Digestion in this metaphor is the full mental processing required for full understanding.”<sup>433</sup> Lakoff and Johnson<sup>434</sup> argue that metaphors represent the basic structure through which abstract concepts are understood and manipulated.<sup>435</sup> Simply stated, metaphors reflect thoughts rather than speech.

“Reason is not disembodied, as the tradition has largely held, but arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience. This is not just the innocuous and obvious claim that we need a body to reason; rather, it is the striking claim that the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment. The same neural and cognitive mechanisms that allow us to perceive and move around also create our conceptual systems and modes of reason. Thus, to understand reason we must understand the details of our visual system, our motor system, and the general mechanisms of neural binding. In summary, reason is not, in any way, a transcendent feature of the universe or of disembodied mind. Instead, it is shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, and the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world.”<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>429</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 241.

<sup>430</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 394.

<sup>431</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 241.

<sup>432</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 242.

<sup>433</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 242.

<sup>434</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*.

<sup>435</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*.

<sup>436</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*. 4

## *Analogy/Anaduction*

Now it is time to bring the fourth (as the first) back into inference. The objective world was the world of induction. The cultural world was the world of deduction. The hero's world is the world of pragmatism. All of these forms of logic deal with extracting general laws from the empirical world. However, the final piece of inference is what all others are built off of, and that is only comparing one particular instance with another. The unique and ineffable connected with the free energy metaphor. Analogy is arguably the 'the core of cognition'.<sup>437</sup> David Hume wrote, "All our reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on a species of Analogy."<sup>438</sup> which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes."<sup>439</sup> This signifies that "Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive"<sup>440</sup>

Analogy is a part of nature, where in biology it is known as convergent evolution. This is where analogous structures are created in different times to satisfy the same end goal. In biological classification known as cladistics this is known as homoplasy. For example the recurrent evolution of eyes previously discussed. Or the different ways animals fly. The key term for analogy across fields is mapping. A mapping not only of objects, but also their relations. It is all about mapping a source predicate to a target.

Perhaps the most famous analogy is Plato's analogy of the sun in the sixth book of *The Republic*.<sup>441</sup> It is written as a dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon's. This analogy is used because goodness can't be defined by Socrates. A literal description isn't possible.<sup>442</sup> Socrates can only speak of the "the child of goodness"<sup>443</sup> (Greek: "ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ"). The sun. Goodness is then not an object to be defined, but a medium, enabling sight.<sup>444</sup> "As goodness stands in the intelligible realm to intelligence and the things we know, so the sun stands in the visible realm to sight and the things we see."<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>437</sup> Douglas Hofstadter, "Analogy as the Core of Cognition," in *The Analogical Mind: Perspectives from Cognitive Science*, ed. Dedre Gentner, Keith J. Holyoak, and Boicho Kokinov (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 499–538.

<sup>438</sup> Peter S. Fosl and Julian Baggini, *The Philosophers' Toolkit* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010), 53.

<sup>439</sup> David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, in *The Harvard Classics*, vol. 38 (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909–14), "Of the Reason of Animals." paragraph 82.

<sup>440</sup> Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, "Of the Reason of Animals." Section 9 E 9.1.

<sup>441</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 507b–509c, in *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997).

<sup>442</sup> Louis Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 169.

<sup>443</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 169.

<sup>444</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 169.

<sup>445</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171.

Here then is what knowledge truly extends from. As knowledge of goodness is the light versus the dark. Knowing truly is seeing. “Well, here’s how you can think about the mind as well. When its object is something which is lit up by truth and reality, then it has – and obviously has – intelligent awareness and knowledge.”<sup>446</sup> However, “when its object is permeated with darkness (that is, when its object is something which is subject to generation and decay), then it has beliefs and is less effective, because its beliefs chop and change, and under these circumstances it comes across as devoid of intelligence.”<sup>447</sup>

At the same time, the sun is more than simply a medium, it is the provider of energy, “The sun provides not only the power of being seen for things seen, but, as I think you will agree, also their generation and growth and nurture, although it is not itself generation”.<sup>448</sup> In a similar manner, “with things known, you will agree that the good is not only the cause of their becoming known, but the cause that they are, the cause of their state of being, although the good is not itself a state of being but something transcending far beyond it in dignity and power.”<sup>449</sup>

Even deeper, truth itself stems from goodness “Well, what I’m saying is that it’s goodness which gives the things we know their truth and makes it possible for people to have knowledge. It is responsible for knowledge and truth, you should think of it as being within the intelligible realm, but you shouldn’t identify it with knowledge and truth, otherwise you’ll be wrong”.<sup>450</sup> It is “right to regard light and sight as resembling the sun; So in this realm it is right to regard knowledge and truth as resembling goodness, but not to identify either of them with goodness, which should be rated even more highly”.<sup>451</sup>

Analogy is wrongly labeled a form of inductive logic, when it is actually the cousin of abductive logic without the generality – in biological terms. This is because a predicate needs to be attached to an object in the first place before a proposition is extracted. It must be understood that an analogical category for biological life must always be emergent. This is because biological categories that persist over time are by definition recursive. Yet an analogy does not have this recursive nature as part of its definition. Therefore, this is only the novel step for biological species that are seeking recursive habits to survive. In linguistics an analogy is known as the conceptual metaphor. It is about mapping a source to a target. It either maps a more complex domain onto a simpler domain, or it maps a more familiar experience to a problematic area. As it does not apply a general law, it is sometimes used as a form of moral particularism.

Law is a perfect area to see how analogy is used, as it is in instances where there has been no prior authoritative decision. In statutory law it is the unprovided

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<sup>446</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171.

<sup>447</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171. The Republic VI (508c and 508d)

<sup>448</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171. The Republic VI (508c and 508d)

<sup>449</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, trans. W. H. D. Rouse, Book VI (509b) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 509b.

<sup>450</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171. The Republic VI (508c and 508d)

<sup>451</sup> Pojman and Vaughn, *Classics of Philosophy*, 171. The Republic VI (508e–509a)

case that provides a gap *extra legem* to be filled by an analogy *extra legem* (outside the law). It might also clarify the law in an analogy *intra legem*. The ratio legis is important as it is the purpose of the legislation for which the analogy fills. Analogy taurus from the law in general. Ultimately, the biological analogy is the core logical process of ‘emergent exemplarity’. In the context of the recursive self, analogy is the realm of zeroness.

It should be clear that in strict terms this form of inference could be argued to be captured by abduction in a more broadly defined foundation, and so what is actually being highlighted is the fact that the fourth is truly a higher order of the first. In such a manner it is through logical type paradoxes that a higher order dimensionality can be utilized to find higher order similarities. It is therefore this metainference as a higher order abductive inference being generated from prior deductive inference that enables a ‘falling up’ in terms of creativity and novel insight.

Analogy can produce higher order novel information that becomes more likely to produce functional results. This higher order metainference will be termed anaduction. Anaduction becomes possible due to the fact that there are often semi-independent variables that are adjacent to one another. It is the potential they still carry within their relationship whereby changing one can still potentially change the other that leads to a higher order inference through constraining lower order difference. Within a physical system for instance, structure and function are adjacent variables and they both follow their own semiotic logic towards habit formation.

Terrence Deacon, Gregory Bateson, Arthur Koestler, Stuart Kauffman, Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner are a few individuals from disparate fields who noticed a higher order form of this inference that was additive to the traditional model set out by Charles Peirce. This is due to the ‘adjacent possible’ space of information that allows novel functional information to be captured by complementary structural relations. Gregory Bateson referred to this information generating space as double description<sup>452</sup>; Arthur Koestler as bisociation<sup>453</sup>; Stuart Kauffman as the adjacent possible<sup>454</sup>; and Fauconnier and Turner as the conceptual blend<sup>455</sup>. Here there is a greater chance that slight differences in structure can contain within themselves a complementarity for a higher order structure that not only maintains function, but improves it.

Examples of this logic can be seen in double description through binocular vision for instance when putting the images of the left and right eye together. It is only their differences that produce information about depth. The same goes for moire patterns and beat sounds. In each case two similar yet slightly different patterns generate a third that is in relation to the other two. In logical terms, this

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<sup>452</sup> Gregory Bateson, *Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1979).

<sup>453</sup> Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York: Penguin Books, 1964).

<sup>454</sup> Stuart A. Kauffman, *Investigations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>455</sup> Mark Turner and Gilles Fauconnier, “Conceptual Integration and Formal Expression” (University of California San Diego, 1995).

is based upon the logical type situations described by Bertrand Russell.<sup>456</sup> In biosociation Koestler shows this logic forming the basis of art, humor and scientific discovery. This is a logic that has been captured in biology through such theories as the Constructive Neutral Theory of Evolution, and Duplication/Degenerative/Complementarity.

In each case redundancy allows noise to be neutralised in such a way that novel complementary relations – and then function – could ultimately be found in a manner that is generative and far more likely than the traditional model of mutation only found within neo-Darwinism. In this way the space of adjacent abductions lead to a novel form of inference that not only preserves function, but produces novel and/or improved function. In order to maintain the naming structure of prior inferential schema, a fitting title would be anaduction as a higher order form of analogy. Ducere meaning to lead, and ana, upward. To lead upwards. In contrast, induction means to lead towards, abduction to lead away, and deduction to lead from.

To quote the monk Thomas Merton again: “One cannot apprehend a symbol unless one is able to awaken, in one’s own being, the spiritual resonances which respond to the symbol not only as sign but as ‘sacrament’ and ‘presence.’ The symbol is an object pointing to a subject. We are summoned to a deeper spiritual awareness, far beyond the level of subject and object.”<sup>457</sup> From here arises the value and power of mythology:

“Mythologies, in other words, mythologies and religions, are great poems and, when recognized as such, point infallibly through things and events to the ubiquity of a “presence” or “eternity” that is whole and entire in each. In this function all mythologies, all great poetries, and all mystic traditions are in accord; and where any such inspiriting vision remains effective in a civilization, everything and every creature within its range is alive. The first condition, therefore, that any mythology must fulfill if it is to render life to modern lives is that of cleansing the doors of perception to the wonder, at once terrible and fascinating, of ourselves and of the universe of which we are the ears and eyes and the mind. Whereas theologians, reading their revelations counterclockwise, so to say, point to references in the past (in Merton’s words: “to another point on the circumference”) and Utopians offer revelations only promissory of some desired future, mythologies, having sprung from the psyche, point back to the psyche (“the center”); and anyone seriously turning within will, in fact, rediscover their references in himself.”<sup>458</sup>

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<sup>456</sup> Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910).

<sup>457</sup> Joseph Campbell, *Myths to Live By* (New York: Penguin Compass, 1993), 257.

<sup>458</sup> Thomas Merton, “Symbolism: Communication or Communion?” *New Directions* 20 (1968): 11–12.

## Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the embodied metaphor of light. It was the misappropriation of this metaphor that served as the biased foundation of the Enlightenment era. As, “Descartes takes the Knowing As Seeing metaphor as a philosophical truth. This allows him to formulate the fundamental problem of knowledge as a problem concerning how it is possible to obtain clear and unobscured (intellectual) vision.”<sup>459</sup> Lakoff notes however that “the problem of the philosophical method becomes a problem about how to see clearly the idea-objects that are present to the mind for inspection and also to discern the relations existing among these ideas.

The mind’s ability to see clearly is what Descartes calls “intuition.”<sup>460</sup> In this way, “Thought consists of ideas. Since Ideas Are Objects and Knowing Is Seeing, thought can be seen by Reason.”<sup>461</sup> At this point “two further commonplace folk theories of vision enter: You are conscious of what you see. Every object is capable of being seen. If all ideas are objects and all objects can be seen consciously, and if Knowing Is Seeing, then all ideas can be known consciously.”<sup>462</sup> The problem for the Enlightenment then, and for the foundations of economics, and human rights and value all stem from mistaking the third for the fourth. The three permeating the four. Mistaking reason and logic for the true foundation of human value and knowledge. In this chapter the time arrived to extract that fourth meaning. Sod.

There was a specific group of metaphors that could actually be labeled free energy metaphors and cybernetic metaphors. These are the metaphors that are dynamic in time seeking satiation. By reintroducing tense four metaphors arise out of object and their relations to a recursive. Firstly a mathematical object is empirical so far as it is historical. With the reintroduction of time an empirical object is a field of possible transformations by a constructor. This is the object world. The predicate metaphor looks at the possible actions of momentum that could act on that object in order to attain a certain end directed goal. The proposition metaphor, aka the symbolic metaphor aims to provide logical, necessary, argumentative truths. An object in time is therefore very different then the structural mathematics and language that is at the heart of formal logic. It is extension, intension, proposition, contradiction.

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<sup>459</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 394.

<sup>460</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 394.

<sup>461</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 396.

<sup>462</sup> Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*, 396–397.

The fourth metaphor then relies heavily upon the idea introduced by Roger Penrose that consciousness doesn't calculate on logic alone. It is this escape from logic that arguably undergirds consciousness itself according to the Penrose-Lucas argument, as mathematicians themselves don't judge mathematical truths using sound mathematical procedures to check work.<sup>463</sup> This is in the sense that one cannot deduce mathematical understanding from calculations alone.<sup>464</sup> It is this seeking that labels the fourth metaphor. This is the home of what will be referred to as the seeker sign – turning the third to fourth.

This last chapter has been that of the 'anomaly'. The mystery. The strange loop. Paradox as irony. The contradiction. Self-reference. The Revelation. When there is a difference in concept and percept. The halting problem. The semiotic Trinity of Peirce deals with stable information structures, the quaternary adds novelty. So then: Condensation is verb, is momentum, is kinetic energy; is metaphor; is sympathetic magic. Displacement is noun, object, is contiguity, is the potential energy position in a set. It is the index and contagious magic.

The tripartite structure all descend from the transcendentals: truth, goodness, and beauty. It can be seen that the direct parallel is in syntax, pragmatics and semantics. Rhetoric, grammar and logic. You, I, and we. The missing component is the omniscient point of view. The grounding that allows other points of view to be adopted. Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason: Being – Becoming – Knowing – Willing. Plato's divided line. Aristotle's causes: Material cause representing the object, Formal Cause representing the predicates, Efficient cause the proposition and final cause as the contradiction. However, beneath all of that it is the attraction towards these transcendentals that is fundamental. The attraction to the absolute. This is what shapes the reality that presents itself. The literal equals the subject. The allegorical predicate. The proposition the moral and the contradiction the narrative. Conflict is the contradiction of good and evil. Metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, part-whole, condensation, displacement symbolizing. The fourth is where the 'aboutness' has been lost. Where the goal structure doesn't match the environment any longer. Here are the 4 e's cognition.

Now having this complete roadmap of the tetramorph, the paradise key (PRDS), the kalachakra (kaya, la, chala, krama) it is possible to piece together a dynamic and hierarchical process of semiosis that incorporates information theory, thermodynamics and evolution theory in its two components (fitness from abduction; and adaptation from analogy). This chapter has therefore sought to lay out how the imaginative universal has primed the natural light of ur-abductions to treat the stranger as a neighbour. This has required confronting the other as oneself and understanding how irony can only be seen from the omniscient perspective. With this model described in its four fundamental aspects it now becomes important to place this model within the broader context of hermeneutics, the cognitive sciences of religion, and counterfactual identity. To round out the picture requires

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<sup>463</sup> Roger Penrose, "Mathematical Intelligence," in *What is Intelligence?*, ed. Jean Khalifa, 107–36 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>464</sup> Penrose, "Mathematical Intelligence," in *What is Intelligence?* ed. Jean Khalifa, 107–136.

going beneath the world of Schopenhauer's representation and to peer as close as one can to the 'will' that guides the individual and the 'general will' that guides the community towards Peirce's agapism and Dante's 'love that moves the sun and the other stars'.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>465</sup> Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Bantam Classics, 1982), Paradiso, Canto 33.

## **PART THREE**

Transformative authenticity and  
emergent exemplarity



## CHAPTER 5

### Theosemiosis: A Post Secular Epistocracy (Colloquium of the Seven)

#### Section A: The Metahypothesis

##### *Omni Science: Counterintuitive; Theory of Mind and Agent Detection*

Agrippa's final trope within the criteria of dissent focused on issues with circular reasoning. However, the action of an individual does not receive its justification from within its own argument, but from its interaction with its environment. Here then is where an axiom does not rest upon its own foundations, but upon the evidence that it does not become 'selected' out over time. Novel information as well can become added to this inferential foundation even beyond what has already been captured historically. Here is the basis for an emergent exemplarity. With the tetramorph in place, it is important to round out the picture by placing this model within the context of an omni science as a whole. This will require grounding this notion within the cognitive science of religion. Particularly through counterintuition, the theory of mind and agent detection.

This will be shown to influence the nature of questions and their contextualised responses that require a hermeneutics of interpretation leading to the root source of the foundation for sovereignty and human rights in a postsecular society – the counterfactual identity. Once that has been put in place the first half of this chapter will place this work within the greater frame of theosemiosis. The second half of this chapter will try to go beyond a discussion of the representational and semiotic aspects of this work towards the underlying will itself. This will be explored within the context of motivational drive theory in psychology. Where chapter one leaned on the physical sciences, chapter two on the life sciences, chapter three on the formal sciences, this remaining chapter will seek to explore the omni science that was starting to be unpacked in chapter four. This requires firstly placing the notion within the cognitive sciences of religion itself.

Scholars in the Cognitive Sciences of Religion have also discussed this four-fold distinction and placed the category of religious thought within what is termed counterintuition. This fourfold unit is composed of induction, ontological intuition, deduction, and counterintuitive. "What makes a concept "intuitive" or "counterintuitive"? As several psychologists and anthropologists have noted, the key is whether the concept is consistent with, or violates, ontological assumptions about the properties of ordinary objects."<sup>1</sup> In this regard, "Boyer popularized the argument for the "counterintuitiveness" of religious ideas insofar as they are

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<sup>1</sup> A. Norenzayan, S. Atran, J. Faulkner, and M. Schaller, "Cognitive Science and Religion: A New Approach to the Evolution of Religion," *Cognitive Science* 30, no. 3 (2006): 532.

“counterontological”<sup>2</sup>, and Scott Atran speaks of religion as a counterfactual enterprise when he notes they are based on “cognitive commitments to factually impossible worlds.”<sup>3</sup>

Norenzayan and Purzycki alone have produced a complete body of evidence required to suggest that a cognitive omniscient perspective (based on counter-intuitive deep inference) is a psychological and ‘existential’ universal, and that this perspective is central to what makes religion universal. It is distinct from chapter 2 categories that are also formed through common sense, but that are built upon intuitive categories: “In this sense, “intuitive cognition” is variously characterized as innate, modular, evolved, “not anchored to a particular cultural context,” “not culturally variable,” and a “part of basic human nature.””<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Norenzayan holds that there are psychological universals. He holds that there are three primary interpretive strategies for interacting with the world (secondness in semiotic terms). He terms these ‘existential universals’, as culture has a role in controlling the level of display of the different modes of logic – even though they are cognitive universals found within all mentally functioning humans. These three come from his work connecting Dual Process Theory with Nisbett’s Holism-Analytic distinction.<sup>5</sup>

There is System 1/Holism utilizing intuitive ontology (firstness in semiotic terms). Then there is System 2/Analytic (thirdness in semiotic terms). The most important however, is what Norenzayan and his colleague Scott Atran have developed, which is the core of all his research, this is counterintuitive ontology. This is the category of zeroness and what Norenzayan has shown as key to connecting with the omniscient perspective and large scale political order.<sup>6</sup> These are not analytical categories, they are categories of reasoning that cannot be reduced into each other. Here are again within the work of the cognitive science of religion the four irreducible categories of reason.

Norenzayan argues that Counterintuition is the central universal of all religion and is largely driven by existential anxiety, but co-opted by large scale groups to maintain order in the face of anonymous strangers. This is buffeted by the ability to mentally symbolize counterintuition, to watch others engage in committed acts to this counterintuitive worldview, and to engage in synchronous emotional activities focused on activating counterintuitive.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Benjamin Grant Purzycki and Aiyana K. Willard, “MCI Theory: A Critical Discussion,” *Religion, Brain & Behavior* 5, no. 1 (2015): 7.

<sup>3</sup> Scott Atran, *In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion* (New York: OUP USA, 2002), 4.

<sup>4</sup> Purzycki and Willard, “MCI Theory: A Critical Discussion,” 6.

<sup>5</sup> Richard E. Nisbett, Kaiping Peng, Izumi Choi, and Ara Norenzayan, “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic Cognition,” *Psychological Review* 108, no. 2 (2001): 291–310, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.2.291>.

<sup>6</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*.

<sup>7</sup> See: Ara Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” in *Human Morality and Sociality: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Høgh-Olesen

Norenzayan makes the following empirical claims about counterintuition:

1. This is the universal foundation of religion.
2. Counterintuition is contextual (which means it can only be pointed to through the use of atemporal and ahistorical signs).
3. Counterintuition is grounded in holistic reasoning.
4. Counterintuition is not reducible to analytical reasoning.
5. Anxiety (Death, Guilt, etc.) is connected with analytical thinking.
6. Anxiety alleviation is connected with holistic thinking.
7. Religious disbelief is connected with analytical thinking.
8. A Secular omniscient perspective can replace religious omniscient perspective where secular governments can alleviate existential anxieties.

Counterintuitism is rooted in the Theory of Mind (Tomasso) and mentalizing that enables a projection of intentions onto supernatural agents. This is the foundation of the omniscient perspective that is necessary for any large scale society. Norenzayan makes this his fundamental political philosophical claim; that it is only because of this cognitive ability of counterintuition and the omniscient perspective that large scale society is even possible. This is the fact that Big Gods (closer on the spectrum to omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence) with moral intentions can produce individuals that engage with the uncertainty of anonymous strangers with acts of cooperation, compassion and generosity.

Benjamin Purzycki makes even stronger claims than Norenzayan about not only the universality of the omniscient perspective, but also the claim that morality in general is a cognitive (and not cultural) intuition and that it is fundamentally based in the omniscient point of view, also referred to as ‘socially strategic information’ and moral cognition.<sup>8</sup> In relating this directly to the omniscient perspective: “How intuitive, then, are the omniscience and moral concern we attribute to supernatural agents? It appears a priori that most people around the world assume and/or believe that gods know more than humans, even if they are not thought of as being absolutely all-knowing.”<sup>9</sup>

Psychologists Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner said, “The high cost of failing to detect agents and the low cost of wrongly detecting them has led researchers to suggest that people possess a Hyperactive Agent Detection Device, a cognitive module that readily ascribes events in the environment to the behavior of

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(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Or, Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27, no. 6 (December 2004): 713–30; discussion 730–70, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X04000172>, PMID: 16035401.

<sup>8</sup> For instance: Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 163–179.

<sup>9</sup> For instance: Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 165.

agents.”<sup>10</sup> Gray and Wegner say that HADD and the Theory of Mind “give us the basic cognitive capacity to conceive of God.”<sup>11</sup> Through experiment it has been found that a “class of evidence more directly probes the brain networks that are recruited when people are thinking about God. If mental representations of God are rooted in ordinary mind perception, then the same brain networks that are involved when people think about the minds of other people should also become active when people think about the mind of God. Neuroimaging studies show exactly that.”<sup>12</sup> Cross-cultural studies show that omniscience and moral concern show a high degree of correlation.

Benjamin Purzycki argues that they are cognitively entwined with the omniscient perspective, and predate the emergence of large scale societies. Purzycki calls it priming when the local cultures constrain the omniscient perspective. “It follows that religious cognition and the underlying deeper faculties at work will vary along predictable lines... In other words, local contexts should prime, steer, and harness deep inferences in various ways.”<sup>13</sup>

### ***Socially Strategic Information***

Due to the fact that the omniscient perspective is correlated with socially strategic information, It bears looking therefore at what socially strategic information is. “Boyer observes that people are far more interested in the minds of their gods rather than other features and posits that people are more likely to endow supernatural agents with access to domains of “socially strategic information’.”<sup>14</sup> Boyer defines this as “the subset of all the information...that activates the mental systems that regulate social interaction”<sup>15</sup>. Bering defines “strategic social information” as “any information that, once exposed, could influence one’s reproductive success”<sup>16</sup> It is the fact that “access to this reputational information is often held to be the primary distinction between gods and other counterintuitive agents”.<sup>17</sup> This is because “gods who care about such information are more salient to our minds than other agents without such abilities (e.g., cartoons, mythological creatures).”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Kurt Gray and Daniel Wegner, “Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14, no. 1 (February 2010): 9–10.

<sup>11</sup> Gray and Wegner, “Blaming God for Our Pain: Human Suffering and the Divine Mind,” 9–10

<sup>12</sup> Norenzayan, *Big Gods: How Religion Transformed Cooperation and Conflict*, 18.

<sup>13</sup> Purzycki and Willard, “MCI Theory: A Critical Discussion,” 28.

<sup>14</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>15</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>16</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>17</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>18</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

Here in the literature of the cognitive science of religion is where the Eye of Justice makes its appearance, “one thread of research suggests that the links between supernatural agents, their minds, and socially strategic knowledge function to mediate social behavior and thus contribute to the evolution of cooperation.”<sup>19</sup> The connection with Hobbes’ Leviathan and Vico’s New Science is that the omniscient perspective can be applied just as cleanly to the government that humans instinctively infer to have a mind just as the Big Gods. “It appears that God and government are both culturally and psychologically interchangeable.”<sup>20</sup>

For example, “Experimentally induced reminders of secular moral authority had as much effect on generous behavior in an economic game as reminders of God.”<sup>21</sup> Another example is that the “effect of participation in a world religion on punishing of selfish behavior disappears when a third-party punisher is introduced into the game, also suggesting some psychological interchangeability between supernatural and secular sources of monitoring and punishment.”<sup>22</sup>

Cognitive science of religion “regularly claims that the ability to mentalize is the essence of religious cognition; our commitment to supernatural beings requires the ability to make sense of other minds.”<sup>23</sup> What makes Purzycki’s research so strong in this regard is assessing whether morality is attached with gods regardless of what culture primes them to be. A running thread through Purzycki’s work is “whether or not there are cognitive biases towards endowing supernatural agents with such domains of socially strategic knowledge even when such knowledge is not among their explicitly held concerns. If there is such a bias, it would suggest that gods play a role in mediating interpersonal social behavior regardless of explicit cultural beliefs”.<sup>24</sup> This is because “not all gods are explicitly conceptualized as omniscient, but some evidence suggests that there is a positive relationship between the breadth of knowledge attributed to gods and their concern with moral matters.”<sup>25</sup>

Socially strategic knowledge is “the subset of all the information . . . that activates the mental systems that regulate social interaction.”<sup>26</sup> Superhuman agents and moral knowledge are connected at a deep level of intuition.<sup>27</sup> The key method for Purzycki to test this was through theological incorrectness. “Theological incorrectness, then, is a matter of how cognitive biases systematically betray the

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<sup>19</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>20</sup> Ara Norenzayan, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33, no. 6 (2010): 611, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X10002063>.

<sup>21</sup> Norenzayan, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” 611.

<sup>22</sup> Norenzayan, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” 611.

<sup>23</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>24</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 165.

<sup>25</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 165.

<sup>26</sup> Pascal Boyer, *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 152.

<sup>27</sup> Benjamin G. Purzycki et al., “What Does God Know? Supernatural Agents’ Access to Socially Strategic and Non-Strategic Information,” *Cognitive Science* 36 (2012): 846–69.

content of cultural models. In the case of gods' minds, one such bias may be knowledge of and concern for socially strategic behavior."<sup>28</sup> The reason this should work is because "If moralizing gods' minds is intuitive, people should endow gods with more knowledge and concern of moral information than non-moral information."<sup>29</sup> One example of a study showed that "American Christians who believe God is omniscient are more confident that he knows about moral acts than mundane information (Purzycki, 2013)."<sup>30</sup> A key takeaway is that culture can ultimately be formed also by evoking intuitive responses and not merely be transmitted models.

The results of course suggest that moral behaviors are connected with Gods even where not theologically explicit.<sup>31</sup> Here within this perspective is a human universal, "despite the world's religious diversity and cultural models, interpersonal social behavior is an essential constant in religious cognition."<sup>32</sup> This ultimately means that "Gods may explicitly not care about morality, but moral domains nevertheless lie beneath the surface of explicit, reflective representations."<sup>33</sup> The strong conclusion from these facts are that "religious systems around the world may indeed be essentially about interpersonal social regulation and monitoring regardless of whether or not moral concern is explicitly attributed to gods. More concretely, nonmoral gods may nevertheless promote human morality."<sup>34</sup>

Underlying the cognition process are key intuitive categories of thought over which knowledge it built. "People reason about entities in various domains (e.g., PERSON, ANIMAL, PLANT, ARTIFACT) in very similar ways and attribute a number of inferences to objects in these categories with little, if any, empirical evidence to support them."<sup>35</sup> The omniscient perspective itself is an intuitive process. Within the cognitive science of religion "evidence suggests that omniscience can be quite intuitive; even young children grant supernatural agents with access to more knowledge than human agents."<sup>36</sup> This would therefore suggest "that the cognitive foundations of omniscience may be more intuitive than not

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<sup>28</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 164.

<sup>29</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 168.

<sup>30</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," in abstract.

<sup>31</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 164.

<sup>32</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 163–79, section 4, 1st paragraph.

<sup>33</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 163–79, section 4, 1st paragraph.

<sup>34</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 163–79, section 4, 1st paragraph.

<sup>35</sup> Benjamin G. Purzycki, "Humor as Violation and Deprecation: A Cognitive Anthropological Account," *Journal of Cognition and Culture* 11, no. 1–2 (2011): 220, <https://doi.org/10.1163/156853711X568752>.

<sup>36</sup> Purzycki, "The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency," 164.

and “culture” merely builds on and exaggerates the intuitive stance of omniscience.”<sup>37</sup> It is important to recognize that any notion of an image of God could only be found within *il lume naturale*. This is “Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion.”<sup>38</sup>

The omniscient perspective and its relationship with morality is a human universal. Norenzayan in defining Existential Universals has noted “A psychological tendency is an existential universal if it is in principle cognitively available to normal adults in all cultures, even though the cultures may differ markedly in the ways or frequency with which the process is utilized in everyday life.”<sup>39</sup> Norenzayan has shown through his research that the omniscient perspective is ultimately an existential universal, and that “Religion is a species-specific human universal.”<sup>40</sup> To be even more specific, “There is universality of (1) belief in supernatural agents who (2) relieve existential anxieties such as death and deception, but (3) demand a passionate and self-sacrificing commitment that is (4) validated through emotional ritual.”<sup>41</sup>

Boyer, Atran and Norenzayan have all therefore argued that religion is grounded in that folkpsychology of intentional agents, and goal directed behavior that is akin to common sense. In this way, “cultural evolution favored the spread of a special type of supernatural agent – omniscient, moralizing supernatural watchers who facilitated cooperation and trust among strangers and contributed to the expansion of human group size”<sup>42</sup> It was this “cultural innovation, along with costly commitment aided by ritual, made possible a novel social phenomenon – stable, large, cooperative moral communities of genetically unrelated individuals.”<sup>43</sup>

The two ingredients that cognitive science of religion experts say are fundamental to all religions are supernatural agents, who hold moralistic concerns. An omniscient perspective geared towards how individuals treat strangers. In other words, “The core cognitive feature of religion – belief in supernatural agents, itself a byproduct of the naturally selected disposition for detecting agents - was further culturally transformed from counterintuitive agents to counterintuitive

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<sup>37</sup> Purzycki, “The Minds of Gods: A Comparative Study of Supernatural Agency,” 164.

<sup>38</sup> Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, “Religion’s Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 27, no. 6 (2004): 713–30. In abstract

<sup>39</sup> Ara Norenzayan and Steven Heine, “Psychological Universals: What Are They and How Can We Know?” *Psychological Bulletin* 131, no. 5 (2005): 763, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.5.763>.

<sup>40</sup> Ara Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” in *Human Morality and Sociality: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Henrik Høgh-Olesen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 68.

<sup>41</sup> Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” 68.

<sup>42</sup> Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” 68.

<sup>43</sup> Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” 58.

and morally concerned policing agents.”<sup>44</sup> This again ties back to the imaginative universal as “Imagination really is at the foundation of religion as well as of culture in general. Imagination is the foundation for the miracle that enabled humans to break out of their solipsistic animal state and share with others not only food and care, but also knowledge and creativity.”<sup>45</sup> This cognitive universality stems from the fact that “Religions and their constitutive elements are products of the human mind. As such they need to have features and functions that are recognizable to other human minds and across history and culture, that is, as aspects of psychic unity.”<sup>46</sup>

Ultimately, the imaginative universal of a Big God is key to political philosophy as noted by Vico’s work, and now more recently by Norenzayan and Purzycki. Here it is found that “in addition to curbing cheating behavior, the imagined presence of supernatural policing agents can reduce selfishness and increase the adoption of fairness norms, even with anonymous strangers.”<sup>47</sup> As Voltaire had intended “‘If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him’ was written with direct reference to the effectiveness of God as a supernatural policing agent.”<sup>48</sup>

From a philosophical and semiotic lens, this omniscient perspective ties in with that of Josiah Royce and his philosophy of loyalty. A philosophy that led to greater and greater identity with a broader set of humans. The ‘beloved community’ therefore became the ultimate identity of loyalty. Where the ideal is hypothetical, the application is practical and contextual.

The “spiritual union [of the lovers] also has a personal, a conscious existence, upon a higher than human level. An analogous unity of consciousness, a unity superhuman in grade, but intimately bound up with, and inclusive of, our separate personalities, must exist, if loyalty is well founded, wherever a real cause wins the true devotion of ourselves.”<sup>49</sup> If one should “Grant such an hypothesis, and then loyalty becomes no pathetic serving of a myth. The good which our causes possess, then, also becomes a concrete fact for an experience of a higher than human level”.<sup>50</sup> Here again is found the concrete universal of the ‘beloved community’ born of a postsecular Imago Dei.

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<sup>44</sup> Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” 58.

<sup>45</sup> J. S. Jensen, *What is Religion?* (1st ed.; New York: Routledge, 2014), 44, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315729466>.

<sup>46</sup> Jensen, *What is Religion?* 45.

<sup>47</sup> Norenzayan, “Why We Believe: Religion as a Human Universal,” 66.

<sup>48</sup> Mark Schaller, Ara Norenzayan, Steven J. Heine, Toshio Yamagishi, and Tatsuya Kameda, “The Birth of High Gods: How the Cultural Evolution of Supernatural Policing Influenced the Emergence of Complex, Cooperative Human Societies, Paving the Way for Civilization,” in *Evolution, Culture, and the Human Mind*, 1st ed. (New York: Psychology Press, 2009), 18,

<sup>49</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 311.

<sup>50</sup> Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 311.

## *Questions and the Quadriga*

I keep six honest serving-men  
(They taught me all I knew);  
Their names are What and Why and When  
And How and Where and Who.<sup>51</sup>

A central thread throughout this work has come down to one concept. Questions. The questions one asks produces the information one receives. For those interested simply in matter and motion the questions can be broken down into yes-no bits of information. However, in order to understand a particular situation it means asking the Five W's and How – the six magic questions. Three of the questions involve the realm external to the self: space, time and object – the world of secondness. The other three align – as per Kenneth Burke's work – with the other tropes. Questions are in digital bits, and questions are unique to the moment. It is also important to note that the first questions are not asked in words, but in movement. The questions were asked not by the mind, but by matter. Recursion is the answer to all questions. The five W's, the elements of circumstance, were first mentioned in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. These questions distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions. They also help evaluate morality in decision making.

In Aristotle's words, "Thus, with ignorance as a possibility concerning all these things, that is, the circumstances of the act, the one who acts in ignorance of any of them seems to act involuntarily, and especially regarding the most important ones. And it seems that the most important circumstances are those just listed, including the Why".<sup>52</sup> In terms of morality, Aristotle writes about it in politics. "I mean, for instance (a particular circumstance or movement or action), How could we advise the Athenians whether they should go to war or not, if we did not know their strength (How much), whether it was naval or military or both (What kind), and how great it is (How many), what their revenues amount to (With), Who their friends and enemies are (Who), what wars, too they have waged (What), and with what success; and so on."<sup>53</sup> In relationship to ethics, "The characters and circumstances which lead men to commit wrong, or make them the victims of wrong"<sup>54</sup> or to do right.

Hermagoras stated that all hypotheses came from these seven circumstances: "In other words, no hypothetical question, or question involving particular persons and actions, can arise without reference to these circumstances, and no

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<sup>51</sup> Rudyard Kipling, *Just So Stories* (London: Macmillan, 1902), 15.

<sup>52</sup> M.C. Sloan, "Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* as the Original Locus for the *Septem Circumstantiae*," *Classical Philology* 105 (2010): 240.

<sup>53</sup> Aristotle, *Politica*, trans. B. Jowett, ed. W.D. Ross, in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 10 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921), 1396a7–11.

<sup>54</sup> Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W.R. Roberts, ed. W.D. Ross, in *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 11 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920), Bk. I.12, 1372a4–1373a35.

demonstration of such a question can be made without using them.”<sup>55</sup> The interpretive structure leading to the questions and responses is abductive logic. The questions are a priori, the answers are synthetic. Universal information is digital and particular are the five w’s. These are the interrogatives. The questions are central to information theory. One question in particular is important to judging morality. It is *mens rea*, the mental aspect of intentions.

Thus, it brings us back to the beginning.

Littera gesta docet, Quid credas allegoria, Moralis quid agas, Quo tendas anagogia.<sup>56</sup>

The literal teaches what God and our ancestors did,  
The allegory is where our faith and belief is hid,  
The moral meaning gives us the rule of daily life,  
The anagogy shows us where we end our strife.<sup>57</sup>

Scriptural interpretation is sometimes referred to as the Quadriga, a reference to the Roman chariot that was pulled by four horses abreast. The four horses are symbolic of the four submethods of Scriptural interpretation. Four ethics: subject is consequentialism; predicate is pragmatism; proposition is deontological; contradiction is virtue ethics. Constructivism as a linguistic hierarchy of logic.

The fourfold structure was completed by St John Cassian adding anagogy to the three interpretations laid out by Origen in the 4th century.<sup>58</sup> St. Augustine used this interpretive method in *On Christian Doctrine*. The typological allegorical approach draws patterns connecting Hebrew and Christian Bibles. The tropological is the moral interpretation. The anagogical deals with the supernatural. Eschatology, heaven, and hell, resurrection. In Origen’s words “the reader must endeavor to grasp the entire meaning, connecting by an intellectual process the account of what is literally impossible with the parts that are not impossible but historically true, these being interpreted allegorically in common with the part which, so far as the letter goes, did not happen at all.”<sup>59</sup>

In *Myths to Live By*, Joseph Campbell laid out a very concise understanding of the Quadriga:

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<sup>55</sup> D.W. Robertson, “A Note on the Classical Origin of ‘Circumstances’ in the Medieval Confessional,” *Studies in Philology* 43, no. 1 (1946): 9.

<sup>56</sup> Robert M. Grant, *A Short History of Biblical Interpretation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 85.

<sup>57</sup> Grant, *A Short History of Biblical Interpretation*, 85.

<sup>58</sup> Tarno Toom, “Introduction,” in *Patristic Theories of Biblical Interpretation: The Latin Fathers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–19.

<sup>59</sup> Origen, *On First Principles*, in *Readings in World Christian History* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 75.

“Dante in his philosophical work the *Convito* distinguishes between the literal, the allegorical, the moral, and the anagogical (or mystical) senses of any scriptural passage. Let us take, for example, such a statement as the following: Christ Jesus rose from the dead. The literal meaning is obvious: “A historical personage, Jesus by name who has been identified as ‘Christ’ (the Messiah), rose alive from the dead.” Allegorically, the normal Christian reading would be: “So likewise, we too are to rise from death to eternal life.” And the moral lesson thereby: “Let our minds be turned from the contemplation of mortal things to abide in what is eternal.” Since the anagogical or mystical reading, however, must refer to what is neither past nor future but transcendent of time and eternal, neither in this place nor in that, but everywhere, in all, now and forever, the fourth level of meaning would seem to be that in death – or in this world of death – is eternal life. The moral from that transcendental standpoint would then seem to have to be that the mind in beholding mortal things is to recognize the eternal; and the allegory: that in this very body which Saint Paul termed “the body of this death” (Romans 6:24) is our eternal life – not “to come,” in any heavenly place, but here and now, on this earth, in the aspect of time. That is the sense, also, of the saying of the poet William Blake: “If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite.”<sup>60</sup>

The simple proposition then has been seen throughout this work to have become the entire atom of truth. It contains within it all information about the physical and invisible world. The subject, the predicate, the proposition and the contradiction. Far from being a simple sentence, this is actually the grounding structure of all knowledge and learning. In fact, every major field of philosophy, theology, the humanities and the sciences is modeled after it. In addition to the four dimensional model of Claudia Welz. Plato’s analogy of the divided line. Burke’s major tropes. Carl Jung’s four dimensions. Kabbalah’s four modes of interpretation. The Christian tetramorph. Kalachakra’s four directions.

In a broad sense philosophy labels these terms metaphysics/ontology, epistemology, logic, and axiology. Studying the nature of reality, how knowledge is constructed, how arguments operate, and how to value people, places and things in a dynamic world. Then each of those areas become a further fractal once peering inside. For logic, there is the logic that looks at objects directly, that is inductive logic based on a correspondence theory of truth. There is abductive logic based upon pragmatic truth. There is deductive logic based upon coherent truth. Then finally there is analogical logic based upon intuitive truth. Within metaphysics the object is looked at through ontology in space-time. Causation is studied first as possibilities, then in a necessary sense. Then there is a metaphysics of incompleteness set by Terrence Deacon. Epistemology as objects known only as belief. Predicates known through justificatory evidence. Truth known through logic. Finally, skepticism wins in the sense that no knowledge would arguably hold universally and timelessly without paradox. When looking at axiology there is a visual sense and a verbal sense. These four modes are: Being; becoming;

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<sup>60</sup> Campbell, *Myths to Live By*, 256.

knowing; willing. Put together as a dynamic flow shows why a 'criterion of action' is more fundamental to knowledge formation than the criterion of dissent.

In an aesthetic sense images are again judged on four standards as art's four pieces: literalism/imitationalism, emotionalism(expressivism), formalism, instrumentalism(functionalism). In music it is: Pitch(chord, harmony); Rhythm; Melody and Dynamics. Another way of saying this is sound, duration, melody and dynamics. Here the "The true goal of music – its proper enterprise – is melody. All the parts of harmony have as their ultimate purpose only beautiful melody. Therefore, the question of which is the more significant, melody or harmony, is futile. Beyond doubt, the means is subordinate to the end."<sup>61</sup> In movies it is the point of view; the close up; the relations; the action. The musical tone is the proposition that contains the pitch and duration. In fourier analysis it shows the reversibility of position and momentum with frequency and time. For Deleuze in film there is also: perception; affection; mental image and the action image.

Imitation says art is successful when it is realistic. Emotionalism says art is successful when it communicates a feeling. Formalism says art is successful when it properly incorporates a code that can be interpreted, meaning it is arranged by the Elements of Art and Principles of Design. ELEMENTS OF ART being: The visual components of color, form, line, shape, space, texture, and value. In instrumentalism art is successful where it communicates a message of meaning that isn't simply literal, emotional, or formal. In politics it is libertarian; political liberalism; communism(numerical)/Conservatism and Poststructuralism (verbal); and dynamic liberalism. It is empirical history; normative/practical history; analytical history; dialectic history.

Ultimately, the first four chapters were meant to show how the proposition has been looked at by countless scholars from four angles that are its built in possibilities. Each scholar has been pulled more greatly in one direction or the other, but it takes understanding not only all four, but how they collectively build categories out of interactions with reality that together produce theosemiosis, requiring an omniscient perspective at the level of articulation.

### ***Vico, Grotius, Natural Law and Hermeneutics***

Vico created an innovative methodology based upon one phrase, *verum et factum*. This meant that truth and creation were one and the same. Humans then could only truly understand what they themselves created. This means human texts and human institutions were within the realm of the knowable. Understanding is therefore historically situated and is tied to humanity's ability to shape its own world. This source of human understanding goes through a cycle that therefore enacts itself in history – the *corsi e ricorsi*. Gadamer, Heidegger and the

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<sup>61</sup> Allen Forte, *Tonal Harmony in Concept & Practice* (1979; repr., New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), 203. – quoting Johann Philipp Kirnberger.

doctrine of *existentia hermeneutica* in a related manner all see understanding as lingually mediated.

Vico saw that critical common sense in a way was grounded in the work of Hugo Grotius, and yet it is an incomplete story. This is because Grotius disregarded the eye of providence. In fact, Grotius is famous for his principle of *etsi deus non daretur* (“as if God does not exist”). “First Grotius, just because of the great love he bears the truth, sets aside divine providence and professes that his system will stand even if all knowledge of God be left out of account. Thus all the reproofs which in a great number of matters he brings against the Roman jurists, do not touch them at all, since they took divine providence for their first principle and proposed to treat the natural law of nations, not that of the philosophers and moral theologians.”<sup>62</sup> Vico also sees Pufendorf limited in this respect. “Pufendorf begins with an Epicurean hypothesis, supposing man to have been cast into this world without any help or care from God. Reproved for this, he defends himself in a special dissertation, but, because he does not admit providence as his first principle, he cannot even begin to speak of law.”<sup>63</sup> A postsecular age requires going right down the middle between Grotius and Vico. No declaration can be made about God or his providential fate for humanity. However, due to *verum et factum* a philosophy can be built from the Image of God as it reflects the ‘mind of the universe’ through the ‘universe of the mind’.

Tying in Vico’s work with Alessandro Ferrara’s requires seeing that, “As judgment is the eye of intellect, so imagination is the eye of *ingenium*”<sup>64</sup> It is here where “Vico comes full circle in his battle against Cartesian philosophy. The development of knowledge takes place, not through rational or inferential thought, but rather through *ingenium*, this innate human capacity to grasp similarities or relationships.”<sup>65</sup> This is because “imagination is the special power by which *ingenium* can realize its ability. Human beings develop their intellectual capacities and make sense of the world around them thanks to their natural imagination; the processes of abstraction arise only in the successive phases of cognitive development.”<sup>66</sup>

Another way of looking at this step from a logical perspective is that it is about enthymemes versus syllogisms. Enthymemes are constructed not only out of experiences, but also out of shared metaphors and images of community.<sup>67</sup> Vico’s common sense “judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire

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<sup>62</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 395.

<sup>63</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, paragraph 397.

<sup>64</sup> Giambattista Vico, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, trans. L. M. Palmer (New York: Cornell University Press, [1710] 1988), 6.

<sup>65</sup> M. Granatella, “Imaginative Universals and Human Cognition in The New Science of Giambattista Vico,” *Culture & Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2015): 194, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X15575795>.

<sup>66</sup> Granatella, “Imaginative Universals and Human Cognition in The New Science of Giambattista Vico,” 195.

<sup>67</sup> Schaeffer, *Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism*, chapter 3.

people, an entire nation, or the entire human race”.<sup>68</sup> Here then is the four stage model of Vico if each of the tropes are fully included. The poetic age is metaphorical. The heroic age is metonymy. The age of men begins in synecdoche. However, the barbarism of reflection ends in irony. Only the omniscient perspective can transcend the irony. Hence starting the process over, the ricorso. Each age is therefore characterized by the tropes that govern it. Eternal ideal history therefore follows the tropology; four senses of scripture; exegesis. This process stands without needing to tread into theological territory.

Just as Pico della Mirandola believed, for Vico religious thought (the omniscient perspective) is primary for humans as all cultures have religion, marriage and burials. Piety and modesty are therefore the foundational moral virtues. As noted previously Vico says Descartes can't defeat skeptics who ask for the origin of an idea. However, if one causes the idea one can know its origination. *Verum Factum* then is what one can know, one's actions. Origination is key to knowledge. Knowing the origins of knowing is therefore the central point for also how the origins of political institutions began as well as being their guiding force. Vico believed that philosophers were hung up on projecting out their rational world, and historians on their cultural world. Vico's Conceit of Scholars is this notion that philosophers interpret history as if reason is always applied equally, instead of different ages being in different parts of a cycle of human knowledge. Conceit of nations is that our culture is the center of history. The center and periphery.

As to the flow of history Vico foreshadowed the work of Lakoff and Johnson: “Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, whenever it is lost in ignorance man makes himself the measure of all things.”<sup>69</sup> People from different times were solving different problems with different mental tools. The initial stage begins with poetic wisdom. There is an Age of Gods, Age of Heroes, Age of Man. Then the Barbarism of Reflection. It must be remembered that “The nature of everything born or made betrays the crudeness of its origin” – man very much included.”<sup>70</sup> In this historical sense “All the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor. It is most praised when it gives sense and passion to insensate things”<sup>71</sup> Due to that fact, “it follows that all the tropes (and they are all reducible to the four types above discussed), which have hitherto been considered ingenious inventions of writers, were necessary modes of expression of all the first poetic nations”<sup>72</sup>

Natural law is therefore guided by a fundamental principle, “the natural law proceeds from choosing the good that you know to be equitable.”<sup>73</sup> Since, “good

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<sup>68</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, Element XII, §145.

<sup>69</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, 20.

<sup>70</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, II.361.

<sup>71</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, II.404.

<sup>72</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, II.409.

<sup>73</sup> Giambattista Vico, *On the One Principle and One End of Universal Law*, trans. John D. Schaeffer, *New Vico Studies* 21 (2003): 66.

cannot fall under the senses, and it is consequently the mind that, for its sake, moves the senses to virtuous actions.”<sup>74</sup> This is the *aequum bonum*. As noted previously, “The main affinities between Lakoff and Johnson’s theory of metaphor and Vico’s work are the importance they both lend to bodily experience and imagination – and the way they understand metaphor as a figure of thought on the most primordial level, not a deviation or embellishment of literal linguistic expression.”<sup>75</sup> Tuulia Pern has noted that “Imaginative universals may well prove to be an essential concept in creating a theoretical model of the primary level of human thought – and semiotics the discipline that is able to integrate it most usefully into current research mediating between the philosophical and cognitive scientific perspectives.”<sup>76</sup> In this sense, “‘The true is precisely what is made’ (Verum esse ipsum factum).”<sup>77</sup>

With this postsecular liberalism that: relies heavily upon the work of Vico; focuses on transcendence of the self for the flourishing of a greater whole; and incorporates certain aspects of religiosity – it is important for future work to analyze the thought of Augusto Del Noce and Giovanni Gentile to understand how this does not lead to the final outcome in Gentile’s career. One that led to Gentile ultimately supporting fascism. In this regard, the work of Giovanni Dessi is illuminating in highlighting how Gentile moved from liberalism to fascism. Dessi shows how Gentile built a foundation from liberalism that saw creative freedom of the spirit as distinct from the atomistic materialism he saw as denying of freedom. This creative freedom called for wholeness and where religion traditionally played the role of transcendence of the self towards the greater whole, Gentile saw the state as the modern carrier of that drive.<sup>78</sup> However, he ultimately made a fundamental error in equating the State with the religious impulse in its search for totality. The State is by its nature Static, but the bond between the People is dynamic and temporal, as highlighted throughout this work.

Del Noce’s thought also needs to be looked at more closely in understanding how his vision of positive freedom beyond traditional scientific, deductive based liberalism could give way to a liberalism that was rooted in a non-empirical notion of freedom that seeks human flourishing. A key question for Del Noce was whether there are objective values that can be called upon that are non-empirical, in this way bringing back a form of authority. The key here again is recognizing that these deeper values cannot by definition be dictated by institutions, but must stem from a more fundamental source.

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<sup>74</sup> Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, section 1110.

<sup>75</sup> Raudla, “Vico’s Potential in Semiotics: The Imaginative Universal and its Bodily Roots,” 268.

<sup>76</sup> Raudla, “Vico’s Potential in Semiotics: The Imaginative Universal and its Bodily Roots,” 269.

<sup>77</sup> Vico, *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians: Unearthed from the Origins of the Latin Language: Including the Disputation with the Giornale De’ Letterati D’Italia*, trans. L. M. Palmer, 46.

<sup>78</sup> Giovanni Dessi, “Dal liberalismo al fascismo. Il 1923 di Gentile,” in *Anni di svolta. Crisi e trasformazioni nel pensiero politico della prima età contemporanea*, edited by Franco Di Sciullo (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007), 169–95.

Dessi has also illuminated in his work the key debates between Walter Lippmann, John Dewey, and Reinhold Niebuhr in trusting the individual versus the state when it comes to interactions with mass media. In this regard again, Dessi highlights Niebuhr's focus on building an intrinsic morality that goes beyond self-interested rationality. Lippmann famously leaned against the public being able to prevent itself from allowing emotions to take over from informed opinion. With that said, Dewey felt that the individual must be trusted to be in conversation with the media and the state in order to produce higher quality citizens. In each of these regards Dessi has highlighted possible pathways and pitfalls in highlighting a postsecular liberalism – based upon an analysis of 20th century political philosophy. With that said, another avenue of approach with Vico is through the sphere of hermeneutics.

Akin to the work of Juri Lotman, hermeneutics also see a limitation to translation. In both, understanding the body as a space of translation helps to bring their models into alignment. For hermeneutic “understanding of the role translation plays in our everyday lives will show us that what Ricoeur calls the “ordeal of translation” has implications for both our own self-understanding (and thus education in its most profound sense) and our relations with others (and thus ethics in its most profound sense).”<sup>79</sup> In fact, “Ricoeur’s “paradigm of translation” aims at elucidating what is happening to us in the act of translating. Claiming that translation is virtually impossible and realizing the linguistic and ontological implications at the various levels of translation, we must translate if we wish to arrive at our self-understanding.”<sup>80</sup>

Key to *existential hermeneutics* is understanding that interpretation is creation and therefore is the source of ethical action. How one interprets the stranger. Hence the paradoxical meanings of several key terms in this area: “In Greek, ξένιος denotes a stranger, a guest, who enters into our life. Similarly, Latin hospes describes both a guest and a host, and hostis can refer to guest or enemy. In everyday life it is not always easy to make a distinction between hostile and hospitable strangers.”<sup>81</sup> Ultimately, a relationship that can transform the other is the rebirth of the self, as “Ricoeur’s central claim is that religion aims at the regeneration of human capability – in his words, ‘the rebirth of the capable self’.”<sup>82</sup> Putting this all together shows the power of the body as a tool of interpretation between the image and the word has created a space to bring together the voices of Vico and Grotius in terms of hermeneutics. Thus enabling a further pathway for grounding natural law, sovereignty and human rights in the language of 20th and 21st century scholars.

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<sup>79</sup> International Summer School in Philosophy and Education, *Hermeneutics as Education and Translation*, May 25–26, 2021. Description.

<sup>80</sup> International Summer School in Philosophy and Education, *Hermeneutics as Education and Translation*, May 25–26, 2021. Description.

<sup>81</sup> Wierciński, *We Must Interpret: The Hermeneutic Retrieval of the Philosophical Tradition*, 1.

<sup>82</sup> Gregor, *Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of Religion: Rebirth of the Capable Self*.

## *Counterfactual and Emergent Identity*

Here then, the discussion returns to the work of Ferrara, as Ferrara mapped out how identity can expand by taking in its counterfactual identity through imagination and confrontation of ‘the Other’. Here, “The key idea of a judgment view of justice is that if we identify that locus of intersection we can have it play the role of a vantage point from which we can counterfactually envisage an identity encompassing the conflicting ones.”<sup>83</sup> This counterfactual identity “can then be treated like an identity in its own right whose own exemplary fulfillment – which in the case of moral judgment comes to coincide with a counterfactual anticipation of the realization of humankind – does all the work that traditional views of justice are supposed to do.”<sup>84</sup>

Virtual identity is then a key element of this discussion at this stage, but “Why should we care about the realization of this virtual identity within which both our opponents and us are included?”<sup>85</sup> This is answered by the judgment view of justice in the following terms: “Because this virtual identity contains a piece of our own identity as well, its failure to come to realization dooms our own separate identity to experience a lesser degree of realization than it could attain if the superordinate one were also to flourish.”<sup>86</sup>

Ferrara brings this to be his foundation for human rights, for “The moral point of view can then be understood as a way of assessing practical controversies based on what is requested by the optimal fulfilment of the largest imaginable identity: the identity of humanity.”<sup>87</sup> This “standpoint of the good for humanity possesses the desired characteristics of being impartial with respect to the particularism of the single contending identities”.<sup>88</sup> Yet, “it is not a formula, an abstract principle. Rather, the good for humanity is a concrete universal whose substantive content varies over time.”<sup>89</sup>

Of course, this brings back an issue central to this work as to why only humanity should obtain these rights. Ferrara’s response is that “One could wonder, at this point, why only the fulfillment of humanity, as opposed to the fulfillment of all organic life, or the fulfillment of a divine entity, is supposed to orient our judgments.”<sup>90</sup> Ferrara’s argument “is that humanity is the most inclusive imaginable identity which remains characterized by the most salient trait of all human identities, individual or collective.”<sup>91</sup> This is key to innovation as “fundamental source – exemplarity and its force, which proceeds from the radical

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<sup>83</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>84</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>85</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 403.

<sup>86</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 131.

<sup>87</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 132.

<sup>88</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 405.

<sup>89</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 405.

<sup>90</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 405.

<sup>91</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 405.

self-congruence of an identity and appears to reconcile ‘is’ and ‘ought’, ‘facts’ and ‘norms’.”<sup>92</sup> With that said, a key aspect of this ability to incorporate ‘the Other’ within itself is still the fundamental ground of this complementary layer of authenticity known as transformative authenticity. It is that “The second modality is called “reflective” because the bridging of the hiatus proceeds from the law’s active self-transformation in the direction of “reenacting” within itself its own demarcation from the extra-legal: in Menke’s words<sup>93</sup>, “self-reflective law contains its other within itself”.”<sup>94</sup>

This self-limitation of the law is key to its own survival, for “how can law contain the other within itself and do so without yet again reducing it to itself?”<sup>95</sup> Menke “replies that, drawing on the character of Eve within Kleist’s *The Broken Jug*, a right to remain silent in court, or not to disclose significant elements of the life-world in which one is immersed, can be construed as a “right against the law,” secured through law itself.”<sup>96</sup> In this way, “Through giving up its own imperialistic pretense to rule over the whole of social life, law “renders itself relative” and self-limits itself.”<sup>97</sup>

Ferrara makes clear in his philosophy that what is important is emergent identity, not identity as it currently exists: “I understand my own attempt to reformulate the notion of justice as an oriented reflective judgment concerning the conditions for the flourishing of an inclusive identity that embeds the conflicting parties.”<sup>98</sup> This is “an attempt that is somehow more in line with a full appreciation of the pragmatist contribution and in a way constitutes a radicalization of it in the direction of an exemplarist view of validity.”<sup>99</sup>

Again for Ferrara, “This gap is bridged by judgment not by way of limiting the pluralism of the alternative positions assessed in discourse, but by way of harnessing politics to the reasonable, namely, to the area of overlap where what is shared can be found.”<sup>100</sup> In this way the “art of judgment is the art of extending as far as possible this area of overlap while continuing to keep the normative

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<sup>92</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 38.

<sup>93</sup> Ferrara, *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 40.

<sup>94</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s *Law and Violence*,” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 128.

<sup>95</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s *Law and Violence*,” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 128.

<sup>96</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s *Law and Violence*,” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 128.

<sup>97</sup> Ferrara, “Deconstructing the Deconstruction of the Law: Reflections on Menke’s *Law and Violence*,” in *Law and Violence: Christoph Menke in Dialogue*, ed. Christoph Menke, 128.

<sup>98</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 11.

<sup>99</sup> Ferrara, “Language After the Linguistic Turn: Rethinking Universalism,” 11.

<sup>100</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 33.

relevance of what lies within the area of overlapping consensus still undiminishedly capable of exemplarily reflecting the superordinate identity, which includes the conflicting parties...<sup>101</sup>

Central to the judgment view of justice “is that if we identify that locus of intersection we can have it play the role of a vantage point from which we can counterfactually envisage an identity encompassing the conflicting ones.”<sup>102</sup> From this vantage point “This counterfactual identity can then be treated like an identity in its own right whose own exemplary fulfillment – which in the case of moral judgment comes to coincide with a counterfactual anticipation of the realization of humankind – does all the work that traditional views of justice are supposed to do.”<sup>103</sup> Due to this process, “This identity both orders the conflicting claims on a scale of justifiability and helps us set legitimate limits to the pursuit of conceptions of the good. And it does so by relying not on general principles, but on its own kind of self-contained, reflective, exemplary authenticity.”<sup>104</sup>

Identity, equal respect and self-congruency therefore together created an oriented reflective judgment towards a superordinate identity, ““This view allows us then to conceive of the universalism of justice as originating in an oriented reflective judgment concerning what the fulfilment of a superordinate identity requires a judgment oriented.”<sup>105</sup> This is “not simply by common intuitions concerning what it means for an identity to attain self-realization (the dimensions of coherence, vitality, depth and maturity), but also by the ideal of equal respect.”<sup>106</sup>

How does this work? Well, “Much like Kant argued that reflective judgment, when it considers natural beauty, can be oriented by the notion of finality, which works like a guideline (Leitpfad), so we can imagine that other notions exert that guiding or orienting function in other domains.”<sup>107</sup> This is because, “When we consider matters of justice along the lines mentioned above justice as the optimal fulfillment of a superordinate identity which contains the identities in conflict”<sup>108</sup> it leads to “the guiding function exerted by the ideal of equal respect preempts the potentially totalitarian conclusions that could follow if the well-being and affirmation of the superordinate identity were envisaged without keeping the needs and legitimate aspirations of the parties in equal consideration.”<sup>109</sup>

In short, “The judgment view of justice also allows us to conceive of the moral point of view as the vantage point of the fulfilment of humanity, taken as the most

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<sup>101</sup> Ferrara, *The Democratic Horizon: Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism*, 33.

<sup>102</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>103</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>104</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>105</sup> Ferrara, “Two Notions of Humanity and the Judgment Argument for Human Rights,” 402.

<sup>106</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 129.

<sup>107</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 129.

<sup>108</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 129.

<sup>109</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 130.

inclusive imaginable human identity.”<sup>110</sup> In this way, “The fulfilment of humanity is not a formula, an abstract principle of reciprocity or consistency, but a kind of concrete universal bound up with substantive presuppositions that change over time, and that is why the judgment as to which solution to a practical conflict best serves its fulfilment is a situated, yet universalistic, reflective judgment.”<sup>111</sup>

Ultimately, the counterfactual and emergent identity that serves as the foundation for a judgement view of justice demands a clear separation between the exemplary identities that currently exist, and the possibility for an exemplarity that transcends the current identities and calls for an emergent exemplarity. Here then is the space of the connecting point with the imaginative universal and *il lume naturale*. Ferrara’s work has provided all of the parts. This work would simply like to make clearer a distinction between ‘exemplarity’ that relates with ‘reflective authenticity’, and an ‘emergent exemplarity’ dependent on a ‘transformative authenticity’.

### *Theosemiotics*

At the heart of this work has been understanding the process of meaning making in novel contexts that requires utilizing a notion of self-congruence that is deeper than the extracted semantic identity currently in place. It therefore cannot rely upon a reflective judgment stemming from a reflective authenticity, but must rely upon vitality itself to bring about a transformational judgment based upon ‘Transformative Authenticity’. A large key to extracting this model of identity has been relying upon Ferrara’s four part model: maturity; depth; coherence; vitality. This is how identity comes into interaction with its environment to test its propositions. Meta-identity then is how identity is extracted out of novel experiences by reaching to the depths of authenticity and vitality. Where those actions prove exemplary the secondary step of reflective judgment and authenticity kick into place. This is the secondary step of the ‘most reasonable’.

Semiotics and religion are intimately bound together by the simple idea that at a certain level of resolution they are one and the same. “The ability of the sign to figure something absent intersects with the general problem in religion concerning how (and whether) to represent transcendence”<sup>112</sup>. Both then are founded upon this singular idea that the world is ‘perfused with signs’<sup>113</sup> whose existence is to indicate something other than themselves. The difference between these fields only arises when looking underneath the sign to the specific object at hand. In this regard religion focuses narrowly on sacred objects and beings that can be

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<sup>110</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 130.

<sup>111</sup> Ferrara, *The Force of the Example: Explorations in the Paradigm of Judgment*, 40.

<sup>112</sup> R. Yelle, “Semiotics,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the Study of Religion*, ed. M. Stausberg and S. Engler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 208.

<sup>113</sup> Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5, “The Basis of Pragmaticism” (1906), para. 448, in *Collected Papers*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 448.

imminent or transcendent. The interrelationship between semiotics and religion comes down to whether a science of signs is used to understand the underlying sacred object, or whether – in the case of religion – the underlying object can conversely provide any greater information about sign systems. It is time to look at a history of the three waves of the post-Saussurean field of ‘Religion and Semiotics’. This is to set the scene for understanding how an interpretant can be extracted from the *Imago Dei*.

Religion and Semiotics have been deeply entwined since the Theologians of the medieval period led the way in defining the taxonomy of signs – from St. Augustine to Duns Scotus and John Poinsett. However, this current work will be focusing solely on the history of ‘Religion and Semiotics’ as a field from the time it took shape as a modern discipline under the guiding hands of Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure. With that being laid down as the point of entrance, the field has since that time developed broadly in three different waves: the first wave encompassed the use of Saussurean structuralism and semiology; the second wave, a use of both a narrow and broad Peircean Theosemiotic approach; finally, there is now a turn to late-period Lotmanian view extending the work of cultural semiotics into the field of religion. As with all history, these lines of distinction aren’t sharp around the edges, but blur at the periphery into one another. With that being said, the adoption of techniques have largely followed this pattern of popularity amongst researchers.

Prior to the empirical study of that branch of semiotics known as linguistics came philology. The study of language was largely comparative and historical. One of the founders of modern semiotics, Ferdinand de Saussure himself argued that linguistics went through three phases before evolving into a truly empirical science. First came grammar, then philology and finally, comparative philology at the hands of Franz Bopp and Max Muller amongst others. Through Max Muller’s work on studying the ancient Sanskrit texts known as the Rig Veda he also arguably not only led to an empirical linguistic through Saussure, but is also credited as the forerunner of Religious Studies that sought to bring empirical methods to comparative religion. This meant that the study of religion was no longer left solely in the hands of Theologians. The reason these texts were so important to both linguistic and religious scholars is because it was the deep intrinsic motivation of religion that led to their being written, and yet what they revealed was something just as deep. A common Indo-European heritage in both an ancestral language and religion amongst one united people at a certain point in time. This fascinated many scholars at the time when empirical methodologies were on the rise.

With that as a starting point, Saussure consciously approached a modern linguistic system completely separate from looking at historical or comparative language. His framework served as a powerful foundation for what came to be known as structuralism. He popularized certain key notions such as: words are arbitrary and conventional in naming objects; that linguistics should focus on synchronic language systems as opposed to diachronic; and that language was structured around binary oppositions – amongst other foundational principles.

This established the field of structuralism that served as the foundation for the first wave of modern ‘Religion and Semiotics’.

Ferdinand de Saussure’s<sup>114</sup> work entered religious studies in what Robert Yelle<sup>115</sup> referred to as the Structuralist Movement of 1960–1975. Leading research was accomplished by Claude Lévi-Strauss on myth<sup>116</sup>, Mary Douglas’s<sup>117</sup> work on ritual symbols, and Victor Turner’s<sup>118</sup> work on ritual processes. Further, Edmund Leach<sup>119</sup> analyzed the Bible and Wendy Doniger<sup>120</sup> analyzed Hindu mythology. Post-structuralists such as Clifford Geertz<sup>121</sup> – founder of symbolic anthropology – believed this universalising approach too narrow. Yelle<sup>122</sup> agrees, describing it as “not able to account for historical and cultural differences”<sup>123</sup>. Due to this fact, “Following the poststructuralist critique of structuralism in other disciplines and a general shift of emphasis from the analysis of symbols to that of social processes, religious studies has largely moved away from explicit engagement with semiotic methodologies.”<sup>124</sup>

One specific scholar who deserves mention at this stage is Tim Murphy. His work has aimed to revive a structuralist view in religion. However, it is unique in the sense that his work seeks to extend beyond Saussurean synchronic analysis to see an evolving system in its place. In fact his open, dynamic, asymmetric system hints at those ideas central to Lotman’s cultural semiotics. A key argument for the change is by incorporating an interpretive element from the work of Jonathan Z. Smith he refers to as the hermeneute<sup>125</sup>. The hermeneute is the interpreter who takes from the traditional canon just as syntagm builds from a paradigm in Murphy’s view. However, bringing in this interpretive element would arguably bring the model far closer to Peircean semiotics than Saussurian. It is to Peirce and Lotman we now turn.

To understand how Charles Peirce’s ideas have entered into the space of religious studies, it is important to first note that there is a narrow interpretation, and a broad interpretation. To begin with the narrow interpretation requires starting with an early popularizer of his work, Roman Jakobson. While Jakobson also popularized Saussure in the first instance, he had in fact been one of the key

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<sup>114</sup> de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, originally published in 1916.

<sup>115</sup> Yelle, “Semiotics,” 208.

<sup>116</sup> Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Mythologiques*, 4 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1964–71).

<sup>117</sup> Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*.

<sup>118</sup> Victor W. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine Pub., 1969).

<sup>119</sup> Edmund Leach, *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).

<sup>120</sup> Wendy Doniger, *Siva: The Erotic Ascetic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

<sup>121</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

<sup>122</sup> Yelle, “Semiotics,” 3.

<sup>123</sup> Yelle, “Semiotics,” 3.

<sup>124</sup> Yelle, “Semiotics,” 1.

<sup>125</sup> Tim Murphy, “What is a Semiotic Theory of Religion?” 34 (4): 7 (2005): 1.

proponents of utilizing Peirce's distinction between icon, index, and symbol in the written text. Especially in his work on utilizing indexical icons in poetry. Both Stanley Tambiah<sup>126</sup> and Thomas Sebeok<sup>127</sup> show the correlation of indexical icons with the work on sympathetic magic described by James G. Frazer<sup>128</sup>. In this manner the work of Peirce through Jakobson's poetics has also reached in through the anthropology of Richard Parmentier<sup>129</sup> and Michael Silverstein<sup>130</sup>. This method proves especially useful in the context of ritual and other religious performance. As "ritualization, as a form of semiosis, involves such factors as the deployment of poetry, reflexivity, and metricalization."<sup>131</sup>

The work of Robert Yelle, Massimo Leone and Webb Keane have leaned towards arguing that the semiosphere itself is not what it now claims to be. The Western world is trapped into the notion that all signs are conventional and arbitrary. It still holds this structuralist view within itself. However – using religion – Yelle argues that this view is itself only a limited cultural and historical construct and that can be seen from taking the longer view. For example, prior to the disenchantment of society and language, words were seen to be magically connected to what they were naming. This change is tied to a rise of the printed text and literalism and decline of oral tradition and symbolic, allegorical communication.<sup>132</sup>

In Yelle's words, "The semiotic ideology of modernity reflects an inheritance from Protestant iconoclasm: a bias against metaphysical and poetic language."<sup>133</sup> Webb Keane<sup>134</sup> studied this Protestant concept of semiotic ideology in the context of Dutch Calvinists in their encounters with the indigenous in an Indonesian archipelago known as Sumba. This showed Protestants stereotyping the religious beliefs as fetishizing the transcendent based upon a literal interpretation. Robert Yelle argues that the same happened with the British in India when encountering

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<sup>126</sup> Stanley Tambiah, *Culture, Thought, and Social Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 35.

<sup>127</sup> Thomas Sebeok, *Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 31–32.

<sup>128</sup> Robert A. Yelle, *Semiotics of Religion: Signs of the Sacred in History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 27.

<sup>129</sup> Richard Parmentier, *Signs in Society: Studies in Semiotic Anthropology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

<sup>130</sup> Michael Silverstein, "The Improvisational Performance of Culture in Realtime Discursive Practice," in *Creativity in Performance*, ed. R. Keith Sawyer, 265–311 (Greenwich, CT: Ablex Publishing Corp., 1998).

<sup>131</sup> Yelle, "Semiotics," 208.

<sup>132</sup> Yelle, "Semiotics," 208.

<sup>133</sup> Yelle, "Semiotics," 209.

<sup>134</sup> Webb Keane, *Christian Moderns: Freedom and Fetish in the Mission Encounter* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

Hindu beliefs.<sup>135</sup> Massimo Leone<sup>136</sup> has written work in favor of this concept of semiotic ideology and in fact sees religion as a tool to explore all of language itself through what he terms the religious philosophy of language. In a certain sense, the works of Kenneth Burke<sup>137</sup> could be read into this thinking through his field called Logology. Where Theology studies the word of God, Logology studies the ‘words of the word’ of God to understand the motivation built within language.

The broader view of Peirce is more ambitious. In fact, it seeks to bring semiotics and religion to the edge of human understanding. “This is no longer simply a claim about human perception and cognition or about the essential nature of human inquiry as semiosis; rather, it is a fundamental metaphysical thesis”<sup>138</sup> It all begins with a method of Charles Peirce<sup>139</sup> known as ‘musement’ that he used in the Neglected Argument. At the heart is Peirce’s remark that “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs”<sup>140</sup> Another way this has been described is that the universe is “a complex text (a universe of signs), the meaning of which is ultimately religious.”<sup>141</sup>

As a school of Pragmatism the ultimate purpose of interpreting this sign is through action. From this position Michael Raposa sees this form of thinking echoing in Peirce and Royce and leads him to the ultimate conclusion that, “Theology is a kind of thinking that comes to completion in love, and this love is displayed in deliberate (habitual) action.”<sup>142</sup> As an aside to this argument Peter Ochs<sup>143</sup> disputes the a posteriori discovery of love out there in the universe, but believes it is itself an a priori position brought in from those of faith. Ochs argues that while Peirce lays claim to scientific inquiry arising out of doubt, Ochs believes it is likely that this was brought in from a religious attitude towards suffering and the interpretant being the compassionate response to resolve that suffering.

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<sup>135</sup> Robert Yelle, *The Language of Disenchantment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

<sup>136</sup> Massimo Leone and Semiotic Society of America, “Semiotics of Religion: A Map,” *The American Journal of Semiotics* 35, no. 3 (2019): 309–33, <https://doi.org/10.5840/ajs20201258>.

<sup>137</sup> Kenneth Burke, *The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology* (Berkeley: University of California, 1970).

<sup>138</sup> Michael L. Raposa, “In the Presence of the Universe: Peirce, Royce, and Theology as Theosemiotic,” *Harvard Theological Review* 103, no. 2 (2010): 239.

<sup>139</sup> Charles Peirce, *A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* (G), MS [R] 842, 1908.

<sup>140</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 5, para. 448, from “The Basis of Pragmatism.” para. 448.

<sup>141</sup> Raposa, “In the Presence of the Universe: Peirce, Royce, and Theology as Theosemiotic,” 239.

<sup>142</sup> Michael L. Raposa, “A Brief History of Theosemiotic: from Scotus through Peirce and Beyond,” in *The Varieties of Transcendence: Pragmatism and the Theory of Religion*, ed. Hermann, 148 (2016).

<sup>143</sup> Peter Ochs, “Theosemiotics and Pragmatism,” *The Journal of Religion* 72, no. 1 (1992): 59–81.

Andrew Robinson and Southgate<sup>144</sup> have taken this metaphysical argument a step further by arguing that the structure of the Trinity is itself built into the very fabric of the universe and this allows the recent discoveries in evolution to be reconciled with theology. This connection comes in through bringing Charles Peirce's firstness, secondness and thirdness into parallel with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Where the Father is the perfect dynamic object, the Word is an embodied reflection of that object acting as its sign. The Holy Spirit in turn is forever interpreting that sign of the perfect object. An individual has the ability to become adopted into the place of the Spirit by undertaking the responsibility to interpret the Word as the sign of the perfect Father by enacting it in oneself.

Now that both Saussurean structuralism, and Peircean signs and metaphysics have been discussed it is time to look at an emerging third wave of semiotic influence – Juri Lotman's cultural semiotics. Juri Lotman initially studied culture as a 'secondary modeling system' of language. This allowed him to utilize the structuralist methods of Ferdinand de Saussure outside of the linguistic context alone. However, what differentiates Lotman from the structuralist authors previously mentioned is that his work evolved to move away from static analysis to include elements of what he termed 'explosion'. For Lotman this explosive element is exemplified in the concept of art. For art is "a child of explosion. The work of art is born in the moment of explosion and cannot be understood without taking into account the very nature of that birth."<sup>145</sup>

Thomas-Andreas Pöder has made the case that religion is another exemplary field through which to study explosions in the semiosphere. This is because "Religion is a child of explosion. Religion is both: what humans do and what happens to them, because its moment of birth is explosion"<sup>146</sup>. Out of that explosion "religions function as semiotic mechanisms and resources for 'orientation and transformation'"<sup>147</sup>. This is due to the fact that "Somebody's discovery of his or her being present in the presence of God is an unpredictable event. It is an explosion in culture – a re-orientation of life"<sup>148</sup>. This notion of explosion and indeterminism is then an area that can be explored and expanded upon through the field of religion.

When turning to the Lotmanian view, Thomas-Andreas Pöder shows how theology and religious studies can be united through the perspective of auto-communication. Theological (first point of view) and Religious Studies (Third

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<sup>144</sup> Andrew Robinson and Christopher Southgate, "Semiotics as a Metaphysical Framework for Christian Theology," *Zygon* 45, no. 3 (2010): 689–712.

<sup>145</sup> Mihhail Lotman, "Semiotics and Unpredictability," in *The Unpredictable Workings of Culture*, ed. J. Lotman, 239–78 (2013), 87.

<sup>146</sup> Thomas-Andreas Pöder, "Religion in the Semiosphere: Theosemiotics in Dialogue with Juri Lotman," in *Sign, Method and the Sacred: New Directions in Semiotic Methodologies for the Study of Religion*, ed. Jason Cronbach Van Boom and Thomas-Andreas Pöder (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2021), 40, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110694925-004>

<sup>147</sup> Pöder, "Religion in the Semiosphere: Theosemiotics in Dialogue with Juri Lotman," 39.

<sup>148</sup> Pöder, "Religion in the Semiosphere: Theosemiotics in Dialogue with Juri Lotman," 40.

person point of view) both increase the ability for knowledge to reflect reality through this dialogical process. This is taking culture as one holistic, singular whole with all of the participants then speaking with the reference point of 'I'. The human semiosphere. This ability to speak back to culture can improve the ability for humans to face an indeterminate world. As previously discussed, where this truly becomes helpful is in times of explosion – both individually and collectively.

A great danger for religion is that it becomes static and disconnected with the very figure around which it is organized. At its worst case, “The possibility of religion – God as the unpredictable promise – is turned into a necessity. The difference between trusting God and possessing God is overlooked”<sup>149</sup>. This is what semiotics can then offer religion, a possibility to critique this stifling nature from developing. Opening this up then ensures “the sign “God” plays a crucial role as the center of orientation and as the source of transformation in individual, social and cosmological respect”<sup>150</sup>. Similarly Peet Lepik<sup>151</sup> has shown how devotional belief systems can gain proper foundations through applying the communication method of cultural semiotics to religious belief.

The three schools of thought presented throughout this work have followed in a rough timeline from the application of Saussurean semiotics, to two branches of Peircean semiotics; and most recently through a layer of Lotmanian semiotics. While the three waves have a certain level of contemporaneity and all still have adherents to this day, there have been three different peaks and crests of popularity which stood in separate time periods. This has enabled a historical walk-through of the main applications of semiotics in religion as well as religion through semiotics. Ultimately, this brief sketch has highlighted key authors and texts as a starting off point to delve further into understanding theology in relation to semiotics.

The work of Kenneth Burke ties in with this history by showing how God as a sign can operate. This is what Burke refers to as the God term. The God term within any text is the ultimate term at the top of the hierarchy that all goodness extends from. Jonathan Griffin of Tartu University has connected Burke’s Gods-term with the work of Charles Peirce to reveal human motivations as a sign pointing to their own God-term:

“The idea that human agents are themselves complex signs can be traced back in semiotics to C.S. Peirce himself. This is fairly well known. Max Fisch and Christian Kloesel summarize his idea by saying that “the entire thought-life of any one person is a sign”. John Deely called this “a major thesis” of Peirce... Peirce grounds this claim in the inferential nature of human thought, which we explored with Relevance Theory, and he says that “the content of consciousness, the entire

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<sup>149</sup> Pöder, “Religion in the Semiosphere: Theosemiotics in Dialogue with Juri Lotman,” 41.

<sup>150</sup> Pöder, “Religion in the Semiosphere: Theosemiotics in Dialogue with Juri Lotman,” 44.

<sup>151</sup> Peet Lepik, “(Religious) Belief and Atheism from a Semiotic Viewpoint,” *Sign Systems Studies* 43, no. 1 (2015): 48–76.

phenomenal manifestation of mind, is a sign resulting from inference”<sup>152</sup>. Our thoughts, conclusions, and other products of mental activity are necessarily semiotic products ... Given that human thought is (largely) a product of inference, and given that both the mind and the word share fundamental semiotic qualities, “we must conclude that the mind is a sign developing according to the laws of inference”<sup>153</sup>.

The Image of God would then be not pointing to an undefinable object by a finite creature, but the God-term that individual develops their own life by. This aim thus far has sought to unmask the working structure of knowledge based upon consilience of information between fields for a convergence on a central model. Where modern academia is heavily influenced by what it perceives to be the most certain knowledge in the form of empirical sciences and the ‘Queen of the Sciences’ in the form of Mathematics, in fact the most valuable knowledge is not tautological, but semiotic. It stems not from symbols, but from the human eye for reasons that will be shortly expressed.

The most important point is making conscious the fact that all knowledge is motivated. This in turn means that the God-term of society is the fundamental driver of culture. The current working of the modern period still functions around the God-term of the rational animal. Yet it is empirically false in the economic sphere, incapable of providing a solid foundation to human value in the political realm, and empirically invalid with David Hume’s induction problem. Reason alone can’t ground morality, and it can’t explain for a fact that the sun will rise tomorrow. Further, the rational man can explain meaning in the all, but raises anxiety of particular death. If science took its place completely, the biological man can explain death but raises anxiety of meaninglessness. If religion were reintroduced, the theological man can explain redemption, but raises anxiety of reason and science.

Up to this point each chapter has been represented by a book of John Rawls that correlates with a distinct form of logic. Here then to conclude is the small work attached in print to John Rawls thesis, his paper My Religion. In this work John Rawls exposed the central story that captures his key themes, the story of the Colloquium of the seven by Bodin.

In this work these individuals, the seven, come together and find a way to dialogue in peace even where they come from different religious perspectives and worldviews. This ultimate aim was the goal of John Rawls himself. In this work it exposed the idea that category systems will ultimately become mini universes unto themselves. A similar expression has been caught in Agamben’s words, “Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties

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<sup>152</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (CP 5.313).

<sup>153</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (CP 5.313).

in favor of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is.”<sup>154</sup>

Agamben, just as Rawls, sees the zone of indistinguishability of categorization as the key space of political activity where humans should be engaged. Even though this will always be a direct threat to a static government, “Whatever singularity, which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is the principal enemy of the State.”<sup>155</sup> Due to this fact tyrannical states will be most exposed. For, “wherever these singularities peacefully demonstrate their being in common there will be Tiananmen, and, sooner or later, the tanks will appear.”<sup>156</sup>

Beyond the systems of truth, the axioms of categories and paradigms there is the encounter with ‘the Other’, and in this space a model can be constructed that aims for dialogue, deliberation, persuasive argumentation, and ultimately peace. This work has sought to show how that story must always remain open and dynamic in a world that extends beyond symbols in order to continuously bring in novel information. This form of exemplary universalism isn’t based upon the example, but upon having the faith to act in the absence of examples, and in this process, to extract new exemplary categories. Here then is the seed of the idea that has not yet been birthed, that imagination then reflects on to disclose a new world. The judgment to act on that idea is how it can be tested against reality and new propositions extracted.

This is the seed of an idea born in Schmitt’s ‘state of exception’. The root source of individual sovereignty. As all of language is founded upon a global constitution that shares as its foundation the fundamental golden eternity clause, this clause transcends any local constitution. Free and equal citizens are not the axiom of the constitution, but the outcome of justice serving as the equilibrium point of a constitution, and key components ultimately forming around human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The ‘trinitarian mantra of constitutional thought’.<sup>157</sup> Self governance and self-constitution are of central importance to building a society that is adaptive, based on categorical variance, but of the same love that flourishes in all living species. Laws in this case are social, but the metalaw is natural, the space beyond categories, the ‘untranslatable’. Semiosis is how these worlds connect.

This golden eternity clause is rooted in our interacting with anchoring relations by interpreting them through the lens of grounding relations, trying to bring equilibrium to our identities and the social objects that they interact with. There is a dynamicity of anchoring relations that transform all humans into social

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<sup>154</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 2.

<sup>155</sup> Agamben, *The Coming Community*, 86.

<sup>156</sup> Agamben, *The Coming Community*, 86.

<sup>157</sup> Mattias Kumm, *Global Constitutionalism: History, Theory and Contemporary Challenges* [*Constitucionalismo Global: História, Teoria e Desafios Contemporâneos*], (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

scientists of a specific methodology, that of the critical theorist. This is because the beginning of the process of categorization, of proposition/symbol extraction is going beyond the system already in place. This then is opposed to the inductive world of quantitative social science, the pragmatic world of interpretivism and the poststructuralist tradition of overturning binaries. It is about going beyond the very categories in place, and a ‘transcendence’ of ‘the Self’.

The first half of this chapter has sought to ground this Imago Dei from the omniscient perspective in its broader context of the cognitive science of religion; hermeneutics and theosemiosis. The ultimate culmination point has been this transcendent self, this emergent exemplary self extending from a counterfactual identity. An identity that is guided by a more fundamental seed of an idea. The seed of all ideas. In Italy there are the words of Dante who grasps, “the love that moves the sun and the other stars”.<sup>158</sup> In Berkeley, Allen Ginsberg grasped that the ““The weight of the world is love”.<sup>159</sup> Or when thousands of voices sang out in harmony in Estonia the words ‘my fatherland is my love’<sup>160</sup> in defiance of a tyrannical government. All can be related to that original pronouncement in Jerusalem to ‘love thy neighbour’.<sup>161</sup>

## Section B: Exemplary Universalism

### *Mode of Action*

The Imago Dei as a sign is not static. It signifies a mode of action<sup>162</sup> John Locke himself clearly had in mind his faith relating to love of neighbour as the basis for social morality, ”To love our neighbor as ourselves is such a truth for regulating human society, that by that alone one might determine all the cases in social morality.”<sup>163</sup> Further, the “Love to God, and charity to ourselves and neighbours, are no doubt at all times indispensably necessary.”<sup>164</sup>

Within Christian tradition imitation is closely connected with the theological concepts of divinization and theosis. This process involves three states of perfection leading to union with the divine. In Eastern Orthodox tradition the three stages are known as purification (katharsis), illumination (theoria), and ultimately union of God. St. John of the Cross in the Roman Catholic tradition would label

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<sup>158</sup> Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum, Paradiso, Canto 33.

<sup>159</sup> Allen Ginsberg, *Howl and Other Poems* (San Francisco: City Lights, 1956), 23.

<sup>160</sup> Lydia Koidula, *Emmajõe Öpik* (Tartu: I. Tartus, 1866), 29.

<sup>161</sup> Leviticus 19:18

<sup>162</sup> Baranzke. “‘Sanctity-of-Life’ – A Bioethical Principle for a Right to Life?” 295–308.

<sup>163</sup> Lord King, ed., *Excerpts from The Life and Letters of John Locke* (London: George Bell & Sons, 1884), 110.

<sup>164</sup> King, ed., *Excerpts from The Life and Letters of John Locke*, 110.

these as via Purgativa, via Illuminativa, and via Unitiva. Origen would write about this from the perspective of transformation from the logos of the scripture.

To provide a depth of meaning to these three stages, Origen would write that the three books of Solomon in the wisdom tradition – Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs – aligned with the three schools of Greek philosophy: ethics; natural philosophy; and what Origen referred to as enoptics – an equivalent to logic. The three stage path laid out is firstly about going through a state of moral reflection and purging of sin. The second stage of illumination would lead to the contemplation of forms – their creation and destruction – and ultimate human powerlessness. The third and final stage was ultimately meeting in love with the creator as exemplified in the Song of Songs.

These three motivations have been explored outside of theology in the fields of philosophy and psychology. An exploration of these three stages in a non-theological context will enable these motivational layers to be compared with a potentially universal notion of human rights that extends beyond the religious tradition where it was first encountered. This section is set then to look not at the theological foundation of the Imago Dei, but the philosophical and psychological foundation of the Imago Dei as a focus for a mode of action. This requires looking at the primary motivational drives as highlighted in the wisdom tradition as purgatory, illumination, and unity. 1) Base desires. 2) Powerlessness in the face of creation and destruction of forms. Ultimately, 3) divine love.

What are the ‘primary motivational drives’<sup>165</sup> in humans? What drives our ‘will’? Stage 1 related to purification and overcoming base desires. This bottom up motivational drive is exemplified by Sigmund Freud’s ‘Will to Pleasure’. The Illumination stage of powerlessness and being confronted with life and death creates a healthy and unhealthy motivational response. One is Viktor Frankl’s ‘Will to Meaning’. The other relates to Alfred Adler’s ‘Will to Power’. The final motivational response then comes from Via Unitiva and suggests the ultimate motivation to be the ‘Will to Love’. Here, “Any judgment that does not follow its previously existing ground or reason... must be produced by an act of will which has a motive.”<sup>166</sup>

When Sigmund Freud set forth his theories that would become the basis of psychotherapy, he used as the cornerstone this central notion of the pleasure principle, our ‘will to pleasure’. That it is in our very nature as humans to be driven towards pleasure and all of our psychological issues stem from this desire. This viewpoint found philosophical support in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer who was the first to propose the notion that humans have a central motivating drive. However, Schopenhauer’s own disciple, Friedrich Nietzsche, disagreed with his overall approach and instead proposed the ‘will to power’ as being the true central motivating factor. This idea was vital to Alfred Adler and his school of Individual Psychology. In 1946, Victor Frankl proposed a third school of

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<sup>165</sup> Viktor Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959), 99.

<sup>166</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *On The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, S 43, trans. E. Payne (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997), 9.

thinking, Logotherapy, based upon the philosophical beliefs of existentialism, that in fact the central drive was towards meaning and purpose, and the ‘will to meaning’ was what needed to be corrected. Three schools of psychotherapy based upon three competing motivating drives – all resting upon foundations laid in philosophy.

Via Unitiva requires a fourth motivation, a ‘will to love’ that will be shown to extend from the philosophy of Max Scheler who provided strong philosophical foundations for this drive; it will show that the research performed in psychology already highlights this drive; and, will ultimately show that not only is this a real drive, but it is the primal biological drive from birth onwards. This chapter will aim to show that the ‘will to pleasure’, ‘will to power’, and ‘will to meaning’ are not separate schools, but in fact different sides of the same coin, depending upon where the breakdown of the ‘will to love’ has taken place. With this motivational foundation secured the monograph will then explore how these motivations intersect with human rights and sovereignty.

### ***Love and Will***

It is important to define the notion of love. In Ancient Greece love was defined in four unique ways: Eros, Philia, Storge, and Agape. It is the form of love known as Agape, unconditional love, that will serve as the basis of this chapter, which can be contrasted with Eros, passionate love. To give a very brief summary of the four different forms of love: Eros is love centered on sexual passion that became the basis of Freud’s work, Philia is a form of friendship and affection shared between friends and family as equals. Storge is a form of love relating to natural familial love that extends to those one is related to. Agape is also known as Caritas, and is unconditional love. As Jeremy Griffith says, it is unconditional selflessness.<sup>167</sup> Thomas Aquinas has stated it is to “will the good of another”<sup>168</sup> and to “love your neighbour like yourself”<sup>169</sup> It is a true commitment to love both one-self and others.<sup>170</sup> It correlates with Plato’s concept of divine love as written in *The Republic*.

To explain the concept of ‘will’, this section shall provide a brief summary of the philosophical concept of our motivating desire: Schopenhauer’s ‘will to live/pleasure’, Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’, and Kierkegaard’s ‘will to meaning’.

With these words, Schopenhauer laid out his philosophy that the world of our perceptions, our five senses, was what he referred to as ‘his idea’<sup>171</sup> – his Representation – whereas the world beyond the perceptions, the true reality, was

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<sup>167</sup> J. Griffith, *What is Love?*, in *The Book of Real Answers to Everything* (WTM Publishing & Communications Pty Ltd, 2011).

<sup>168</sup> “St. Thomas Aquinas, STh I–II, 26, 4, corp. art”.

<sup>169</sup> Leviticus 19:18

<sup>170</sup> Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2000).

<sup>171</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World As Will and Idea*, 3 vols., trans. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1883–1886).

‘the will’. This concept dates back to an idea of Parmenides in Ancient Greece, that there is a world of perception in front of us, which is finite and constantly changing, but that is hiding the true reality underneath, which is infinite, timeless and unchanging. Originally the true reality was called ‘the One’.

A second concept, ‘nous’, relating to our modern notion of intuition was also introduced. Nous referred to the ability to see this true reality underneath our perceptions. Plato referred to this intuition as the ‘idea (form) of the Good’, illuminating the truth. Immanuel Kant then used these concepts to lay down his own theory of the separation between the Phenomenal world (the perceived reality), and Noumenon/the thing-in-itself (the true reality). St. Augustine referred to this true reality as the Christian God. However, one major area Kant disagreed with these earlier thinkers is that he believed that the true reality was forever unknowable. Even our intuition could not perceive it.

Schopenhauer picked up these ideas, but preferred the original approach that the true reality could be intuited, and that was through our ‘will’, specifically the ‘will to live’. He further added to these western philosophical beliefs by adding his own interpretation of eastern philosophy to the mix, incorporating the Upanishad’s separation between the illusion of the self, Atma, and the true reality called Brahman. Relying upon his reading of Eastern Philosophy, Schopenhauer saw this ‘will’ as negative and something that needed to be suppressed. The ‘will to live’ was at the root of all suffering because it had an infinite amount of desires in a finite world. He therefore argued for a suppression of that will and a turn to an ascetic lifestyle.

The parallels at this stage can be seen. The ‘will’ for Schopenhauer was equivalent to ‘the One’, to God, to Noumenon, the thing-in-itself and to Brahman. Our individual ‘will to live’ was the drive towards this infinite. Whereas the world as Representation, was the finite, Phenomenal world of the senses.

According to Schopenhauer, the will-to-live knows no bounds and wants to continue on for eternity, which is where our sexual impulse arises. Something similar to Freud’s thinking. Therefore, to suppress this will one would then be able to return to an appreciation of the finite world.

It is the ‘will to pleasure’ that would serve as the foundation of Freud’s later theories, “Man’s knowledge all comes through his body. Every impression on the body is also an impression on the will. When it is opposed to the will it is called pain, and when consonant with the will, pleasure. My body is the objectivity of my will.”<sup>172</sup>

In retaliation, Friedrich Nietzsche’s entire philosophy was constructed to counteract what he perceived to be the weakness in Schopenhauer’s view of ‘the will’. Nietzsche once wrote, “Schopenhauer’s basic misunderstanding of the will (as if craving, instinct, drive, were the essence of will) is typical: lowering the

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<sup>172</sup> Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Indian Hills, CO: The Falcon’s Wing, 1958), s 18.

value of the will to the point of making a real mistake.”<sup>173</sup> He replaced this idea of the will to life/will to pleasure with this formulation, “This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides!”<sup>174</sup>

Nietzsche’s work had three central targets in mind when he put forth his philosophy: Schopenhauer, Plato and Christianity. Nietzsche disagreed with Schopenhauer’s ‘will to live’, as well as the ‘will to truth’ at the core of Platonic ideals and Christianity. He suggested ‘will to power’ is more important than ‘will to life’, as people will risk their own lives for more power. It could be argued of course that people are just as likely to risk their lives for the people they love and care about.

We have so far set out Schopenhauer’s ‘will to life’, and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’. The other school of thinking that would have an impact on psychotherapy was the existentialist school’s ‘will to meaning’ starting with Kierkegaard.

Kierkegaard again takes a religious view that there is the infinite reality of God, and the finite reality of our perceptions.<sup>175</sup> The infinite, the Noumena, spirit, eternal, separated from the finite, Phenomena, body, temporal. It is this tension between finite and infinite that is at the heart of what has become known as existentialism.

Resolving this tension for Kierkegaard was through finding meaning and purpose. He believed this to be our central driving force, a belief that formed the core of psychotherapist Frankl’s thinking. “What I really need is to get clear about what I must do .... What matters is to find a purpose.”<sup>176</sup>

It is for each of us to create meaning for our own lives that we live for passionately and authentically. Where Kierkegaard found his meaning in religion, believing that God and the essence of life originate before us, Sartre took the opposite stance “... man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.”<sup>177</sup> This latter viewpoint is one that psychotherapist Viktor Frankl strongly disagreed with.<sup>178</sup>

However, what is really the key to Kierkegaard’s thinking within the context of this work are actually his views on what he termed Passion. For Kierkegaard our greatest desire was the desire for the infinite. For Kierkegaard the root of this drive was Love itself. Kierkegaard believed there could only be true meaning in life if his passion, his love, had a divine source.

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<sup>173</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), s 2 vignette 84.

<sup>174</sup> Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, §1067.

<sup>175</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

<sup>176</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *Journals and Papers*, Part 1: *Autobiographical, 1829–1848*, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 34.

<sup>177</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1948).

<sup>178</sup> Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, 100.

Kierkegaard even hinted that the ‘will to love’ comes first, as only when love of one-self is lost, is the will to life lost. “When the depressed person desires to be rid of life, indeed of himself, is this not because he is unwilling to learn earnestly and rigorously to love himself?”<sup>179</sup>

For existentialists then, the world can’t define you; you must define yourself, the true self, which is your authentic self. While Kierkegaard has been known to place finding our purpose as a central drive, his work on the concept of Passion clearly signifies that for himself unconditional love was his own driving force.

### ***Freud’s Pleasure Principle***

The first to relate his form of psychotherapy to a philosophical work on the driving will was the very individual who invented the modern form of psychoanalysis itself, Sigmund Freud. Freud’s central motivating force for people was the pleasure principle, ‘will to pleasure’, which for all intents and purposes is equivalent to Schopenhauer’s ‘will to life’. He himself acknowledged this correlation:

“Probably very few people can have realized the momentous significance for science and life of the recognition of unconscious mental processes. It was not psycho-analysis, however, let us hasten to add, which took this first step. There are famous philosophers who may be cited as forerunners – above all the great thinker Schopenhauer, whose unconscious ‘will’ is equivalent to the mental instincts of psycho-analysis.”<sup>180</sup>

It should be noted that Freud mentioned that he came to his conclusions independent of Schopenhauer, but they came to the same realizations in their respective fields. These unconscious desires form the basis of our libido, our sexual energy that is at the core of our Id.

For Freud there was a tripartite system of id, ego, and super-ego. Our id is where our base desires are found, our super-ego is where our guilt-forming morals are to be found, and our ego is in a perpetual state of balancing the two.

To overcome our basic pleasure principle, Freud argued that over time we develop a ‘reality principle’ that takes into account what is actually possible in the real, material world, in a way that limits our primary desires.<sup>181</sup> This is similar in many ways to Schopenhauer’s belief in suppressing the will to an extent. While Freud still argued that even the reality principle was based on pleasure, it was based on a more realistic view of pleasure within the constraints of the world we find ourselves in. This is the basis of delayed gratification. Freud is very faithful

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<sup>179</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 23.

<sup>180</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, Standard Edition, vol. 15 (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 143.

<sup>181</sup> Sigmund Freud, *On Metapsychology* (PFL 11), ed. Albert Dickson (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 36.

to the work of Schopenhauer then, that suggests the id, the unconscious, the will, needs to be suppressed.

Over time, this ‘will to pleasure’ took on the name Eros to signify the life drive, that our base desires serve as our prime driver to continue living. This can be equated with the vulgar Eros in the time of Plato, base love filled with desires and passions. Our libido, sex drive, is at the core of our unconscious desires, our id. To counteract this drive for life, Freud needed to find a reason for all of our risky behaviors, and he termed this Thanatos, the death drive. While humans are driven to pleasure, they are also at times driven to death, and these drives are constantly in a state of competition with one another. Freud equated this death drive to the ultimate outcome that Schopenhauer argued for, the annihilation of the will. “Freud seemed to have landed in the position of Schopenhauer, who taught that ‘death is the goal of life’”.<sup>182</sup>

Even though Freud placed our ‘will to pleasure’ as the central motivating drive, still Freud admits that succumbing to our base desires would be destructive, “an ego thus educated has become ‘reasonable’ [if] it no longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle.”<sup>183</sup> So an unchecked ‘will to pleasure’ is in fact destructive, a destructive drive.

### ***Adler’s Individual Psychology***

While Freud focused his psychoanalytical approach on the pleasure principle, Adler focused his system squarely on that of the ‘will to power’. As Adler noted, “Nietzsche’s ‘Will to power’ and ‘Will to seem’ embrace many of our views, which again resemble in some respects the views of Féré and the older writers, according to whom the sensation of pleasure originates in a feeling of power, that of pain in a feeling of feebleness (Ohnmacht).”<sup>184</sup>

According to this definition, pleasure was merely a result of power, with power itself serving as the primal motivating factor. Adler wanted to move away from the internal sex drive and move towards external societal forces and the will to feel powerful in them. These external forces were present most strongly in three forms: societal, love interests, and career.

For Adler, our problems start as children when we enter a world where we are instantly inferior, and it is this inferiority that drives us. This primary sense of inferiority is complemented by a secondary sense that is developed when an adult sets an unrealistic goal that cannot be met. This sense of inferiority really stems from the internal feeling that one has an inability to cope with the struggles of the external world, as the pressures are too great to bear with their weaknesses.

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<sup>182</sup> Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (London: Basic Books, 1964), 508.

<sup>183</sup> Sigmund Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (PFL 1), 402–403.

<sup>184</sup> Alfred Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution* (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1912–1917), ix.

Significance is the key word in Adler's individual psychology. Everyone is striving for significance. This chapter will show that it is this concept that Adler may have potentially misjudged, as it is not in fact significance itself that everyone wants, but attachment. It is the striving for significance that has often led people to strive for power over others. This inferiority and striving for significance together lead to people compensating, and many times over-compensating for their weaknesses. People can also under-compensate for their weaknesses, giving in to them.

The key for Adler was to convert these harmful feelings of the need for power into the need to help the greater community instead. He termed this *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*.<sup>185</sup> Therefore, Adler himself noted the weakness of Nietzsche's 'will to power', seeing it as psychologically defective. Just as Freud saw a 'will to pleasure' as a destructive drive that needed to be overcome, Adler saw the 'will to power' as a destructive drive that needed to be overcome.

### ***Frankl's Logotherapy***

Viktor Frankl founded his school of Logotherapy on the concepts originating from the philosophical school of existentialism that started with Kierkegaard's focus on meaning. "Our main motivation for living is our will to find meaning in life."<sup>186</sup>

It is "this striving to find a meaning in one's life [that] is the primary motivational force in man. That is why I speak of a will to meaning in contrast to the pleasure principle (or, as we could also term it, the will to pleasure) on which Freudian psychoanalysis is centered, as well as in contrast to the will to power on which Adlerian psychology ... is focused."<sup>187</sup>

Frankl based his theories on phenomenology and existential therapy as well as the work of Adler – to which school Frankl once belonged. The ultimate goal for Frankl was for an individual to become a part of something bigger than him or herself, whether through loved ones, or work, or those close to them. One technique of his was called Dereflection, which aimed to have the patient stop focusing on the self and engage in life instead. So again, while the initial point of focus for Frankl is unique (for him it is to find meaning), the outcome is the same, which is to aim to become selfless and caught up in something bigger than yourself.

However, existentialism itself is its own weakness as it fails to define if there actually is meaning or if it is merely invented. This is seen most clearly in the divide between the religious existentialism of Kierkegaard who sees meaning as real, and the atheistic existentialism of Sartre who believes all meaning is only

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<sup>185</sup> Alfred Adler, *Superiority and Social Interest: A Collection of Later Writings* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1964), 38.

<sup>186</sup> Goal of the Viktor Frankl Institute.

<sup>187</sup> Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, 154.

created. Frankl himself believed that meaning was objective, and disagreed strongly with Sartre, but this was his only personal choice.

Even though Freud, Adler, and Frankl all start with different motivating drives, all are in agreement about what a healthy, fully functioning individual should look like. For Freud he starts with base desires of pleasure as the foundational drive of a human before arguing that these desires need to be healthily controlled in order to function in the real world, along the lines of Schopenhauer who believed in suppressing the base desires and adopting an ascetic lifestyle of self-control. For both Freud and Schopenhauer morality needed to be guided by something beyond the ego. Adler on the other hand, started with the initial condition of inferiority to which aggressive dominance was a negative counter reaction, and the true healthy response was to become a healthy contributor to society. For Frankl, who started with the notion that our crises begin with a loss of meaning, the healthy response was for people to connect with something greater, whether that be through work, society, love or through finding meaning in suffering.

Each of these psychoanalysts believed that we should not in fact be controlled by our base desires, and a healthy individual strives to go beyond themselves for the people around them, their work life, and their love lives. The healthy response is therefore known, but for Freud it required suppression of desires, for Adler it required suppression of a striving for dominance, and for Frankl it required suppression of a feeling of meaninglessness in the face of an absurd world.

Each of them described a destructive portion to their will: Freud saw an unchecked will to pleasure as being destructive; Adler saw will to power and dominance over others as being destructive; and Frankl saw the objective meaninglessness of Sartre and other existentialists who believed only in subjective meaning as destructive.

This chapter will now show that every one of these theories has a kernel of truth within them, but does not get to the heart of the central motivating drive, even though all mentioned it as the end goal. To use Frankl's own words:

“A thought transfixed me: for the first time in my life I saw the truth as it is set into song by so many poets, proclaimed as the final wisdom by so many thinkers. The truth – that love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire. Then I grasped the meaning of the greatest secret that human poetry and human thought and belief have to impart: The salvation of man is through love and in love.”<sup>188</sup>

### *Via Unitiva and Max Scheler's Hierarchy of Values*

It is important to understand what a motivation centered on love would be like following this model to bring it in line with the 'States of Perfection.' There is already a thread of support throughout the first half of this discussion for this fourth construct of a will. Each of the cited writers has alluded to it even when

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<sup>188</sup> Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, 56–57

they presented their arguments for pleasure, power or meaning. This is an idea dating back to Plato's views on Love as expressed in *The Republic*, whereby divine love drives us towards 'the Good'. It continued through Schopenhauer's view of our need to suppress the will to find the ascetic lifestyle, Nietzsche's views on the 'will to truth', and Kierkegaard's concept of passion and pathos. Furthermore, as has already been shown, the healthy outcome for all the psychotherapies mentioned is a person guided by drives that aren't their base pleasures, and for Adler and Frankl at least, are in fact guided by selflessness and love.

Just as Freud matched Schopenhauer, Adler matched Nietzsche, and Frankl matched Kierkegaard and Heidegger, it is important to explain the philosophical foundations for a 'will to love. For this concept of 'the will to love', its philosophical foundations would be based upon the Phenomenological work of Max Scheler – specifically, Max Scheler's *Hierarchy of Values, Stratification of Emotional Life, and Ressentiment*.<sup>189</sup>

Viktor Frankl liked to rely upon Scheler to show that values are objective and universal, but disagreed as to the central motivating factor. For Scheler, there was no question that 'the Spirit' of divine love was the motivating factor. However, for Frankl as was already seen, meaning was the central drive, with values only representing potential routes towards meaning.

When speaking of love, Scheler defined it in terms of the form of unconditional love this chapter has at its core. Scheler attacked the base form of love based upon desires, needs and wants. This form of love he felt worshiped the strong. Scheler saw this as the weak helping the powerful, whereas his belief in 'Christian love' was about the powerful helping the weak. This was to resemble God's own love. Through loving you are actually most true to your real self. Scheler argues that our central motivation is not need, but desire to express one's complete self through love. The lower desires are not bad, but obstacles in the way to the complete self. He believes this defies those who apply Christian love.<sup>190</sup>

For Scheler there were two urges, the vital urge, and the spirit. The vital urge was for all intents and purposes related to our base desires. The Spirit (Geist), on the other hand, is our drive that "elevates man above world and above himself (as organic being)... Spirit, then, cannot have its foundation or source in this objective world, but only in the primordial principal of the cosmos (Urgrund) itself."<sup>191</sup> So it can be seen that the Spirit, the Geist, is the philosophical idea upon which the 'will to love' is to be built. Scheler believed that the Spirit could be intuited.

The opposite of love for Scheler is resentment. Resentment is the blaming of others for our own frustrations. Where personal transcendence moves toward higher values, resentment moves downward. Where love lifts upwards on the value scale, resentment pushes downwards. The pyramid of values itself was

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<sup>189</sup> Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, trans. M. Frings and R. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 104–110.

<sup>190</sup> Max Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. William H. Holdheim (New York: Noonday, 1973), 22.

<sup>191</sup> Manfred S. Frings, *Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the World of a Great Thinker* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996), 15.

composed of the following values: sensual values, vital values, mental values, and values of the Holy. “True love opens our spiritual eyes to ever-higher values in the object loved.”<sup>192</sup> It only stands to reason then that hatred is the closing off of higher values. For Scheler love is not a reaction to values, but is where values stem from. Scheler writes, “Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feelings of a being...is either extended or narrowed.”<sup>193</sup>

When moving upwards through the drive of love it moves towards an *Ordo Amoris*, a well-ordered emotional life created in God’s image [ens aman]. However, hatred moves in the opposite direction towards a disordered heart [d’ordre du couers] – hardened heart. Scheler saw virtuous character as a positive force towards *Ordo Amoris*.<sup>194</sup> Love is the kernel of our hierarchy of values. This is from the divine and can be intuited. Love is emotive a priori. It even transcends death itself. Scheler argues that a fear of death is a sign of an incomplete life. He further believed human beings would prefer positive values to negative values. This includes how people would spend their time and energy, such as caring for their children even at their own expense. “Love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value “A” in an object, its higher value is visualized, and this vision is the essence of love.”<sup>195</sup>

The basis of ethics is that it informs a direction to take and for Scheler love informs a direction expressed through our emotive life. Scheler sees the Spirit as the Divine Essence, God, which illuminates the soul towards love. This is an internal drive he matches to be at least as strong as the vital urge. He refers to this as the ‘eternal in man’: “a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles.”<sup>196</sup> Love is the “primal essence of all essences” (Urwesen).<sup>197</sup>

M. Scott Peck mirrored these thoughts in his work, ‘The Road Less Travelled’. He too argues that love is the driving force. He starts with the principle of discipline as being key to spiritual evolution. This includes delaying gratification, taking responsibility, and seeking truth. Peck argues the driving force behind spiritual growth to be love. He believes that this true form of love is not merely “falling in love” but something deeper. This means extending beyond our own egos. This form of love is nurtured by a force he terms grace, which comes from outside the conscious human will: “the miracles described indicate that our

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<sup>192</sup> Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. by Peter Heath (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 57.

<sup>193</sup> Scheler, *Ressentiment*, trans. William H. Holdheim, 261.

<sup>194</sup> Max Scheler, “Ordo Amoris,” in *Selected Philosophical Essays*, trans. David R. Lachterman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 103–104. See also Plato’s *Republic* (the Soul).

<sup>195</sup> Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath, 153.

<sup>196</sup> Max Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 74.

<sup>197</sup> Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble, 75.

growth as human beings is being assisted by a force other than our conscious will”<sup>198</sup>

At this stage then, love is at least an equal motivating desire as that of ‘the vital urge’, the ‘will to pleasure’. This chapter will now seek to show that for psychological and biological reasons love is actually the initial condition, and the primary drive, overtop of food and other base desires. As Immanuel Kant said, “Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will”.<sup>199</sup>

### ***Maslow’s Self-Transcendence***

Maslow is known to most as the Father of Humanistic Psychology with his pyramid of needs, but it is less known that he also helped lay the foundations for transhumanism, what has become known as transpersonal psychology, the fourth-force of psychology.

Originally Maslow defined the highest aspiration for an individual to aim for was self-actualization. Maslow saw self-actualization to be about the realization of one’s potential, as their true self. The original conception of self-actualization first arose from the work of Kurt Goldstein, who defined it as “the tendency to actualize, as much as possible, [the organism’s] individual capacities”<sup>200</sup> This push for self-actualization was actually expressed as the core motivator, “the only drive by which the life of an organism is determined”<sup>201</sup>

While Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs showed the healthy needs humans must acquire in order to return to a state of wholeness and completion, he began moving beyond his humanistic philosophy when he proposed in the book ‘The Farther Reaches of Human Nature’ that “the fully developed (and very fortunate) human being, working under the best conditions tend to be motivated by values which transcend his self.”<sup>202</sup> The ability to go beyond the self is the actual true aspiration.

Another early figure in transpersonal psychology was Roberto Assagioli. Assagioli saw a difference between the “I” and the Self. The Self being described as the higher, transpersonal self. Assagioli compares listening to this higher self as being related to the “call” from a higher power.<sup>203</sup> “The self is a deep, inner,

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<sup>198</sup> M. Scott Peck, *The Road Less Traveled* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 281.

<sup>199</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals: Text and Critical Essays*, trans. Lewis White Beck, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 11.

<sup>200</sup> Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man* (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 196.

<sup>201</sup> Goldstein, *The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man*, 106.

<sup>202</sup> Abraham H. Maslow, “The Farther Reaches of Human Nature,” *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology* 1 (1969): 4.

<sup>203</sup> Roberto Assagioli, *The Act of Will* (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), 114.

guiding factor, which can seem to be quite different, even alien, from the ego and consciousness.”<sup>204</sup>

He too, felt there to be two driving wills in humans, one that was selfish and another to do good, a philosophy stretching back to Plato, “It is good will, or the will-to-good, which must regulate the selfish or egocentric will.”<sup>205</sup>

This will-to-good was related to our higher consciousness, which Assagioli defined as, ‘an autonomous realm, from where we receive our higher intuitions and inspirations – altruistic love and will, humanitarian action, artistic and scientific inspiration, philosophic and spiritual insight, and the drive towards purpose and meaning in life’.<sup>206</sup> Like Freud’s superego ‘the higher, moral, supra-personal side of human nature...a higher nature in man’.<sup>207</sup> For Assagioli, “Accounts of religious experiences often speak of a “call” from God, or a “pull” from some Higher Power; this sometimes starts a “dialogue” between the man [or woman] and this “higher Source”...”<sup>208</sup>

Once again, it can be seen that while the initial starting point for Maslow’s philosophy was different, with his hierarchy stating that our base desires were again the initial starting point, the fact remains that the end point was again the same, self-transcendence. The healthy individual is the one who goes beyond the self. Dr. Pamela Rutledge has also suggested Maslow’s starting point may be incorrect as, “None of Maslow’s needs can be met without social connection.”<sup>209</sup> For Assagioli, this meant listening to the higher consciousness inside the self.

### ***Jung’s Individuation and Imago Dei***

This section will look at the concept of individuation and specifically the concept of the imago dei that will be described shortly. It will then take a broader look at the correlation between psychology and mythology through the work of Joseph Campbell before looking at how this inner transformation relates to the process known in religion as divinization and theosis.

Carl Jung’s theory centered on what he termed ‘individuation’, whose aim was the creation of a complete self. A key cornerstone of this theory was Jung’s view that we use symbols and characters, known as archetypes, to express our inner transformation. Jung traces his entire concept of the archetype back to Philo Judaeus who mentioned the Imago Dei as an archetype, translated as the image

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<sup>204</sup> Assagioli, *The Act of Will*, 114.

<sup>205</sup> Roberto Assagioli, “The Will: Interview by Stuart Miller,” *Intellectual Digest* (1972), 3.

<sup>206</sup> William Stewart, *An A-Z of Counselling Theory and Practice* (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes, 2005), 386.

<sup>207</sup> Freud, *On Metapsychology* (PFL 11), 36, 375.

<sup>208</sup> Assagioli, *The Act of Will*, 114.

<sup>209</sup> Pamela Rutledge, “Social Networks: What Maslow Misses,” *Psychology Today*, 2011, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/social-networks-what-maslow-misses>.

of god.<sup>210</sup> He equates the symbolism of this complete self to the image of god within ourselves, the Imago Dei: “the spontaneous symbols of the self, or of wholeness, cannot in practice be distinguished from a God-image.”<sup>211</sup> This is a symbol of transformation.

This image of wholeness as imago dei will soon be shown to be important. While Jung compares wholeness to the imago dei, he also equates it to the truth inside of us as expressed through alchemy:

“(The) theoria and the Arcanum in matter are both called veritas. This truth “shines” in us, but it is not of us: it “is to be sought not in us, but in the image of God which is in us.” [Alchemist Gerhard] Dorn thus equates the transcendent center in man with the God-image. This identification makes it clear why the alchemical symbols for wholeness apply as much to the Arcanum in man as to the Deity.”<sup>212</sup>

Jung compares Christianity to alchemy and the transformation they perform within the individual. “In Christianity it is the life and death of the God-man which, by a unique sacrifice, bring about the reconciliation of man<sup>213</sup> ... From this point of view, alchemy seems like a continuation of Christian mysticism carried on in the subterranean darkness of the unconscious.”<sup>214</sup> So it is clear that alchemy expressed the transformation of the Self, and related to the religious sense of “Christ as a symbol of the self.”<sup>215</sup>

The Dark Night of the Soul by St. John of the Cross was a perfect representation of this inner transformation.<sup>216</sup> Jung again connects this story with alchemical transformation believing that the transformation was an internal one, just the same as the religious experience. To express the connection, Jung equates the following alchemical phrases with his own theory of individuation: nigredo is the shadow, albedo the anima and animus, citrinitas the wise old man, and rubedo the Self. Rubedo is when the ego merges with the Self.<sup>217</sup> The Great Work, the philosopher’s stone, as well as the text ‘The Secret of the Golden Flower’ all relate to this central notion.

One of Jung’s admirers, the renowned comparative mythologist Joseph Campbell used Jung’s constructs of archetypes to delve into the psychological meaning of myths shared throughout the world. This inner transformation is equated with

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<sup>210</sup> De Opificio Mundi, I, 69. Cf. Colson/Whitaker trans., I, p. 55. In Jung, C.G., *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, Collected Works 9 (1), 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Bollingen, 1981).

<sup>211</sup> C. G. Jung, *Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, vol. 9, pt. 2 (1951), para. 73.

<sup>212</sup> C.G. Jung, *Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, AION 40 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). 171

<sup>213</sup> Jung, *Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, AION 40. Part 3, Chapter 3.3

<sup>214</sup> Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, Part 3, Chapter 5.1

<sup>215</sup> Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, Part 3, Chapter 5.1.

<sup>216</sup> Leeming, David A., Kathryn Madden, and Stanton Marlan, *Encyclopedia of Psychology and Religion: L-Z* (Springer Science & Business Media, 2009), 40.

<sup>217</sup> Euryhaessa, *Running into Myself*, 278.

the concept of ego death seen within the Hero's Journey, and equated with Jung's Psychic death. Ego death is the transformation of the psyche.<sup>218</sup> This is the self-surrender phase of Joseph Campbell's Hero's Journey.<sup>219</sup> This is "because it implies a shift back to the existential position of the natural self, i.e., living the true purpose of life."<sup>220</sup> It is when the unification of opposites occurs in Jungian psychology, when the consciousness itself dies. Jung labeled this "the transcendent function."<sup>221</sup>

This is all related with the 'descending to the underworld' mythologies seen around the world. In Odysseus this journey to the underworld is known as Nekyia. For Jung, "the Nekyia is no aimless or destructive fall into the abyss, ... its object the restoration of the whole man".<sup>222</sup> So the journey to the underworld is an "introversion of the conscious mind into the deeper layers of the unconscious psyche".<sup>223</sup> The apt story to tell here is the story of Psyche and Eros, where Psyche went everywhere seeking to reclaim the love of Eros. When she journeyed to the underworld she ended up dying for her love of Eros, but then was brought back to life for acting on that love. In fact, for her actions she was granted immortality to exist equally with Eros. Together Psyche and Eros had the child Hedone. Translating these words into English, when Love met the Soul, Bliss was born. This interestingly tracks with the Indian phrase Sat-Chit-Ananda [truth-consciousness-bliss], if this love is seen as inward truth.

Ego death can really be seen as the surrender to the super-ego, surrendering to the Self, the 'will to good' of Assagioli. This is all about letting the true self emerge from the false self,<sup>224</sup> returning to the initial condition. D.W. Winnicott, introduced this notion of a separation between a true and false self<sup>225</sup> with the true self being defined as the initial condition at birth, when you have no projections put onto you and just exist. It is this initial state to which he argues one should aim to return. Kierkegaard expressed a similar idea philosophically, "to will to be that self which one truly is, is indeed the opposite of despair" – the despair of

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<sup>218</sup> Sören Ventegodt and Joav Merrick, "Measurement of Quality of Life VII. Statistical Covariation and Global Quality of Life Data: The Method of Weight-Modified Linear," *The Scientific World JOURNAL* (2003)

<sup>219</sup> Bron Taylor, *Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature* (London: A&C Black, 2008).

<sup>220</sup> Ventegodt, Soren; Merrick, Joav (2003), *Op cit.*, p. 2021.

<sup>221</sup> John P. Dourley, *Paul Tillich, Carl Jung and the Recovery of Religion* (London: Routledge, 2008), 106.

<sup>222</sup> Quoted in David R. Griffin, *Archetypal Process* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 118.

<sup>223</sup> C.G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology* (London: Routledge, 1976), 41.

<sup>224</sup> Larry H. Rosen, "Archetypes of Transformation: Healing the Self/Other Split Through Active Imagination," in *The Fantastic Other: An Interface of Perspectives, Volume 11*, ed. Cooke et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), 228.

<sup>225</sup> D.W. Winnicott, "Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self," in *The Maturation Process and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the Theory of Emotional Development* (New York: International University Press, 1965), 140–152.

choosing “to be another than himself.”<sup>226</sup> This true self for Winnicott is therefore to be found at birth, the initial condition. The next section of this chapter will explore the concepts of Attachment Theory and the biology of love to explore this idea further.

Similarly, the higher consciousness in this case is the *imago dei*, with the love of god serving as the source of eternal life. To tap into this higher consciousness/’divine will’ requires going beyond the ego. In religion this experience is known as divinization. This is embracing the Great Commandment that ‘thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself’, through seeing God as love. This transformation is also known as *kenosis*, the emptying of the self to become of service to others, releasing self-will and accepting divine will.

This theme of divinization is not only found in Christianity, but across several major religions. In Buddhism there is the idea of Buddhahood, in Hinduism Avatars are said to be human forms of gods that seek to bring people back onto a path of righteousness known as Dharma.

As Jungian Joseph Campbell said, it is time to move on towards understanding the true will:

“some people are living on the level of the sex organs, and that’s all they’re living for. That’s the meaning of life. This is Freud’s philosophy, is it not? Then you come to the Adlerian philosophy of the will to power, that all of life is centred on obstructions and overcoming the obstructions. Well, sure, that’s a perfectly good life, and those are forms of divinity also. But they are on the animal level. Then there comes another kind of life, which involves giving oneself to others one way or another. This is the one that’s symbolized in the opening of the heart. It must be recognition of your life in the other, of the one life in the two of us. God is an image for that one life.”<sup>227</sup>

According to the psychology of Jung the psychological processes that accompany an enlargement of consciousness can be represented as the coming into being of a new centre embracing conscious as well as unconscious contents (called “self” by Jung). These “centring” processes are always characterized by the symbolical pictures of the mandala and the rotating movement. In Chinese texts the latter is very vividly termed “circulation of light.” In an attempt to apply these results of analytical psychology to the phase of intellectual history known as the rise of classical mechanics in the seventeenth century (which is most closely connected with the heliocentric idea), we should bear in mind that the attention of the scientists who helped to found classical mechanics was directed only outward. It is therefore to be expected that the above mentioned inner centring processes, together with the appropriate images, would be projected outward. Indeed we can observe, in Kepler’s views specifically, that the planetary system with the sun as centre became the bearer of the mandala-picture, the earth being related to the

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<sup>226</sup> Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1961), 110

<sup>227</sup> Joseph Campbell, *The Power of Myth*, with Bill Moyers and Betty Sue Flowers, eds. (New York: Anchor Books, 1988), 168.

sun as the ego to the more embracing “self.” It appears that in this way the heliocentric theory received, in the mind of its adherents, an injection of strongly emotional content stemming from the unconscious.<sup>228</sup>

### *Archetypes, Alchemy, Shadow*

This four part structure then is at the heart of alchemy and the psychophysical theories of Carl Jung. Nigredo. Albedo. Citrinitas. Rubedo. This is the magnum opus. How to produce the philosopher’s stone. For Carl Jung, “the rediscovery of the principles of alchemy came to be an important part of my work as a pioneer of psychology”.<sup>229</sup> Four character types matched with four tiers. A picture of the four as yin yang symbol. Sensory, intuitive, feeling and thinking. This is also the four stages of the transformation of the sun, from the sol niger (black sun, through white, yellow and red. Further, these four can be seen in Genesis 2 as the Snake, Eve, Adam and the Cherubim. The nigredo creates the mass confusa, chaos, then whiteness, which aims at “bringing light and clarity to the prima materia (the First Matter)”.<sup>230</sup>

This first phase represents the shadow. Also represents sensory perception. Dark night of the soul. “confrontation with the shadow produces at first a dead balance, a standstill that hampers moral decisions and makes convictions ineffective or even impossible...nigredo, tenebrositas, chaos, melancholia.”<sup>231</sup> ... “the darkest time, the time of despair, disillusionment, envious attacks; the time when Eros and Superego are at daggers drawn, and there seems no way forward... nigredo, the blackening.”<sup>232</sup> The second stage of albedo represents the anima and animus. Represents feelings. “an enantiodromia; the nigredo gives way to the albedo...the ever deepening descent into the unconscious suddenly becomes illumination from above.”<sup>233</sup> Citrinitas, “yellowness.” The “solar light”. This is the wise old man archetype. Rubedo as redness and as a final step is the Self. So again, darkness gives away to the light of time, before the light of space, and meets its wholeness in the infinite light. Intuition is then the missing key.

Levinas says, the “alterity of the Infinite is not cancelled in the thought that thinks it,”<sup>234</sup> We see in the face of other humans knowledge of paradise that transcends our own keys to paradise. The Infinite Other is the Key to Paradise. Self

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<sup>228</sup> Wolfgang Pauli, *Writings on Physics and Philosophy*, ed. C. A. F. Weizsäcker (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994), 234.

<sup>229</sup> Carl G. Jung, *Man and His Symbols* (London: Aldus Books, 1978), 40.

<sup>230</sup> Euryphaessa, *Running Into Myself*, 39.

<sup>231</sup> C.G. Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis* (London: Routledge, 1963), 497.

<sup>232</sup> Christopher Perry, “Transference and Countertransference,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Jung*, ed. P. Young-Eisendrath and T. Dawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 152–153.

<sup>233</sup> Jung, *Psychology of the Transference*, in *Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, Vol. 16, 279.

<sup>234</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger* (Paris: 1979), 172.

is the closed logic system, Other is the room for contradiction. In between the Infinite Other and the self is the Transfinite Other. The Transfinite Other. Not the absolute other, but ever outside the logic system. The Transfinite Key. The Transfinite Self. The Infinite Self. Life is good. The implicit axiom of living in this world. As Levinas writes:” [l]anguage makes possible the objectivity of objects and their thematization. Already Husserl argued that the objectivity of thought consists in being valid for everyone. To know objectively is therefore to constitute my thought in such a way that it already contain[s] a reference to the thought of others.”<sup>235</sup> This brings one face to face with the fact that, “What I communicate therefore is already constituted in function of others.”<sup>236</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

At the heart of this section has been a quest to establish the philosophical and psychological motivational drives that equate with the States of Perfection of the *Imitatio Dei*. The purpose is to lay out a universal equivalent of the *Imago Dei* in human rights.

The first half of this chapter has sought to ground the *Imago Dei* and the omniscient perspective in its greater context of the cognitive sciences of religion, hermeneutics and theosemiosis. This has been grounded in the work of Norenzayan and Purzycki. The second half of this chapter has shown an evolution of the concept of the will from Schopenhauer through Nietzsche, through to Kierkegaard and the existentialists. The ‘will to pleasure’ correlated with Freud’s work, the ‘will to power’ with Adler’s, and the ‘will to meaning’ with Frankl’s. However, this paper sought to show that these drives were secondary to our true drive, ‘the will to love’.

Going back to the beginnings of western philosophy there is already a precedent for seeing divine love as the illuminator of the truth through the words of Diotima in *The Republic*. With Schopenhauer we can see again the drive towards true compassion that is beyond the ego. The only difference being that Schopenhauer believed one could only reach this state by denying the will to base pleasures, as opposed to seeing it as a will of its own. Nietzsche on the other hand, believed that this higher drive to truth was in fact a drive in its own right, which he termed the ‘will to truth’, and the ‘will to nothingness’. Kierkegaard likewise felt that our true drive, our true passion was towards divine love. Within the kernel of all of their work is this admittance of a will existing even while the different authors proposed their own theories.

Turning to the work of the psychotherapists, Freud stated pleasures to be at the base of our will, but then argued that pleasures themselves are destructive if left out of check and are unhealthy. Likewise, Adler felt that overcompensating

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<sup>235</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essais sur l'Extériorité*, *Phaenomenologica* 8 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961), 210.

<sup>236</sup> Levinas, *Totalité et Infini: Essais sur l'Extériorité*, 210; trans. Alphonso Lingis as *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 210.

for inferiority leading to a 'will to power' was itself unhealthy and destructive. Believing that a healthy individual rededicated themselves to their community and the greater good, a concept of loving thy neighbor found in the Bible. Frankl too agreed that the greatest source of meaning was to dedicate one-self to something greater.

What could be concluded from this information already is that while all believe in a different motivating factor, all agree that a healthy individual is one who leans towards unconditional love. It is for this reason that the chapter makes the argument that the central motivating 'will' for a healthy individual is one leaning towards love. To discuss a motivational equivalent to the *via Unitiva* this chapter then laid out philosophical support through the work of Max Scheler, psychological support through Maslow, Assagioli, Jung, and others. While there are certainly more individuals that could be cited, these sources should serve as a sufficient foundation of this concept.

The conclusion to be drawn at this stage then can be that the initial condition from birth is unconditional love. It is the desire to return to this state that we find within ourselves this connection point to a feeling of unconditional love found at the focal point of all religions. Religions are built to get at this universal truth of wholeness beyond the tensions between the finite and infinite. The secret to the riddle of life is found within us and expressed to the world as the striving for unconditional love, towards one-self and to others.

Returning to embodied cognition, the mind seeks equilibrium. This is why we speak of being balanced, and finding solid ground and stability for our mental states. At the tip of our intuition is a seed of an idea that leads to this balance. It is only at this point – that can be trusted when the omniscient view is taken – that the 'vital' spark of identity and self-congruence can be listened to in order to interact with the environment. Love draws forth all action, but imbalance comes from where one or another aspect of memory dominates in an imbalanced way. This is why the PRDS key has served as a guide at a religious, literary and logical level. Here is where a self-congruence exists that lies beyond the Propositional Self. Here lies the Propositionless Self.

## CONCLUSION

“...every one of us is in one sense a born explorer: our only choice is what world we will explore, our only doubt whether our exploration will be worth the trouble.” – Victoria Welby

With a little imagination and sight change of perspective it is again possible to see the ‘light as good’. The light that equally guided Plato’s cave, Moses’ book on genesis, King Pundarika’s stainless ornament and the natural light of Charles Peirce and Galileo Galilei. This perspective is the key to both transcending the ‘Self’ (through the encounter with the ‘Other’), and grounding sovereignty in the postsecular age. The central question throughout this work has been to assess what aspects of the *Imago Dei* can still be applied to issues of sovereignty and human rights in a postsecular society. The tool used has been that of semiotics to unpack what is being symbolized. In particular a dynamic and hierarchical semiosis that finds its ground in the work of Terrence Deacon. In this regard, bringing Giambattista Vico’s notion of the *Imago Dei* as ‘imaginative universal’ into discussion with John Locke’s novel field of semiotics has opened up that very pathway. This is necessary in the 21st century as not only is religion no longer allowed to serve as a valid foundation, but reason itself has come under attack due to the limits exposed by the ‘linguistic turn’ and Godelian incompleteness – spelling the end of Enlightenment 1.0.

This work has sought to present the research to show that Philo, Giambattista Vico, Thomas-Andreas Pöder, Tuuli Pern, and Claudia Welz amongst others have opened a route to viewing the *Imago Dei* as a dynamic model of action that can be applied even through agnostic application. Ara Norenzayan and Benjamin Purzycki in the field of Cognitive Science of Religion have shown this action to be empirically grounded in ‘socially strategic information’, aka moral knowledge. Key to this idea has been *verum factum* that ‘creation is truth’. Human political institutions are in fact that key to understanding the mind, and there is one aspect of the mind that grounds the *Imago Dei*, in particular. One trope and category of being in a dynamic and hierarchical semiosis that was discussed in chapter four: zeroness, the root of creativity.

Juri Lotman’s key text on the Universe of the Mind highlighted how the individual plays a role in creation through the creative untranslatability of the image and the word that generate the major tropes. This is the dynamic space of individuation. Here lie the tropes of Kenneth Burke, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and Giambattista Vico. Here lies the quaternity of Carl Jung, the magnum opus of the alchemists, and the exegesis of the tetramorph, the Kabbalistic Pardes, and Naropa’s four part Kalachakra. White’s four emplotments of metahistory: the tragedy; the romance; the comedy; and the satire matched by the mechanistic; organisitic; formistic; and contextualist arguments of historians. It is this space that holds the hope for grounding sovereignty in an ‘emergent exemplarity’ stemming from a ‘transformative authenticity’. In this way bringing sharp focus

onto the themes developed by Alessandro Ferrara, John Rawls, Valerio Fabbrizi and Matteo Bianchin in the field of political philosophy.

This dynamic grounding has been shown to commence with the imaginative universal that is centered on the altricial gaze/eye of justice, which constrains the imagination towards actions that might be justified to a caregiver and a loving parent – should a stranger enter into one’s local environment and actually be treated as a neighbour, or even a sibling. Where Enlightenment 1.0 had focused on reason and science. Enlightenment 2.0 helps to supplement that foundation with imaginary reason and the omni science perspective. This form of reasoning has been empirically shown to be related with socially strategic/moral knowledge that undergirds the growth of large scale political society.

In order to understand the hierarchical and dynamic process of semiosis that enables the production of greater and greater counterfactual identities has required going through each of the steps along the way from the moment of doubt, to the moment of hope; from critiques to topics; from suspicion to faith; from philosophy to philology; from dissent to action; from the end of history to ideal eternal history (*aequum bonum*). Where chapter one focused on inductive logic and the empirical world, chapter two focused on abductive logic and the pragmatism of the exemplary. Chapter three alternatively focused on deductive logic and the aboutness it carries. Chapter four focused on the novel analogy – and the anaduction – that transcends prior extracted identities and laws. Chapter five sought to ground this model in the cognitive science of religion and theosemiosis before peering into the ‘will’ behind and beyond the ‘representation’. By the introduction of time a dynamic model of self-understanding has been reintroduced that enables a space for grounding human dignity not only through morality, but necessity. The necessary drive for peace and prosperity. The state of human flourishing that grounds the golden eternity clause. Natural law is therefore not rooted in reason, but in history – and that has made all the difference.

Each of the chapters further referenced the work of Jung’s alchemy; Kenneth Burke’s modes of persuasion; Royce’s four conceptions of being; Schopenhauer’s fourfold root; and Rawls layered political philosophy amongst others. The dynamic model of semiosis leaned heavily on the work of Terrence Deacon. The omniscient perspective on Norenzayan and Purzycki. The criteria of action and dissent on Sextus Empiricus and Agrippa. The imaginative universal on Vico. Vico himself felt these four worlds were themselves best represented by four authors focused on the distinct logics: Francis Bacon; Hugo Grotius; Tacitus; and Plato. All of this research together shows a path to ensuring the foundation of sovereignty in a postsecular world that has faced the collapse of formal logic and universal language.

This pathway incorporates the theory of mind, the social catalyst of the altricial gaze and the eye of justice. Through the embodied cognition reflecting one’s mind on the universe it has been possible to understand how a twenty first century political philosophy grounds the future within each individual who ‘each’ contain the potential to transcend their present and past model of actions based upon what they believe would be best for others. This is even, and especially,

when no evidence is yet in place. It is the fact that overtime there evolves a greater and greater likelihood that strangers will be treated as neighbours and brought into the one ‘beloved community’ of Josiah Royce, driven by Peirce’s agapism – which was itself partially derived from Henry James Sr.’s work on Emanuel Swedenborg – and the love that brings one to life. It is what leads evolution of the human species towards ‘the most reasonable’. By listening to that call to action that is deep within and that says ‘here I stand I can do no other’<sup>1</sup>.

At its most fundamental level all layers have stemmed from hierarchical mutual information between work and representation. Firstness represents the work that correlates with the recursive iconic self. Secondness with the correlation between self and other within an environment (indexicals). Thirdness related to the necessary relations between self and other for recursion to be instantiated over time. Zeroness as the process to produce novel mutual information. This model has incorporated Shannon entropy, Boltzman entropy; and Darwin entropy. It has further shown how nature has found a way to oppose these entropies through W. Ross Ashby’s law of requisite variety by harnessing redundancy to carry excess noise that served as the basis of novel complementary relations. This additional entropy has been termed Deacon entropy. The very relations that stem from the individuation process within each individual that transcends their cultural laws. Here then is where sovereignty rests.

If the universe were complete, nation states would be all that is needed. Yet nature is incomplete and due to the hierarchical nature of symbols a state needs novel icons and indexes that can only be extracted through praxis, through human action that transcends even its own codes. The secret to human evolution is that this novel action has been guided towards treating the other as oneself in interpretation. Here is where sovereignty is grounded in the individual and the whole through being itself: “to be is to be uniquely related to a whole”.<sup>2</sup> The whole, the individual, and the relation between them. Whether it is preferred to think of this through the Quadriga; the Tetramorph; PRDS [Peshat; Remez; Din; Sod]; Beautifia [BEcome; AT-one; IF-then; IAmb]; tetractys; kalachakra [kaya; la; chala; krama]; or through the words of Dante – all lead to the same understanding of human logic. Induction, abduction, deduction and the analogy. The extracted Dei’s Law of the process has been to see the ‘light as good’ so as to transcend what one sees from a limited third person perspective.

Throughout this work the concept has relied upon the eye of justice; the metaphor of ‘knowing is seeing’ and its relationship to logical propositions. This work has described the universe of the mind that sees creative tropes produced through the non translatability of image and word. The dynamic identity that is produced in turn in this dynamic process undergirded by the quaternity. From the state of exception, from doubt and anxiety it was shown that the process inference and inquiry commences. The fact that localized units are more capable of discovering complementary relations than that directed by a static hierarchy

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<sup>1</sup> Luther, *Speech at the Diet of Worms*, 112–113.

<sup>2</sup> Auxier, *Time, Will, and Purpose: Living Ideas from the Philosophy of Josiah Royce*, 46.

immediately suggested a different basis of sovereignty from that offered by Carl Schmitt.

The criterion of the problem here then serves as the basis of the criterion of action. This transcendent action that is not justified by any evidence, is without any maturity of identity and cannot be captured by either the law or morality that has been set up as a historical event. When interpreting the light from this perspective the focus was on induction and empiricism. However, a deeper basis of science was shown not to be based on observation, but on imagination. The *gedanken* thought experiments from *il lume naturale*, the natural light. This meant that the correspondence theory of truth was not the sole basis of truth, and only in chapter four it was shown that it was in the imagination that the central metahypothesis was uncovered.

From there this work discussed in the second chapter the abductive logic captured in Rousseau's legislator, Rawls' political liberalism and Ferrara's authenticity, judgement and exemplarity. This showed the pathway towards a new contextualized universalism centered on common sense, interpretation and the eye of justice. Here was a deeper interpretation of the light not as the visible spectrum, but as the metaphor for knowledge. A light that preceded inductive and deductive logic. This was a world of pragmatic truth.

At that point this work assessed the realm of deductive logic and its role in the basis of humanity as a symbolic species. It showed the power of Rawls' Theory of Justice as a deductive work, but its limitations for the same reason. Judicial interpretation was shown as one key method that time has been introduced into a static constitutionalism. It is the static nature of logic that was shown to be its downfall and the necessity of seeing language therefore in its contextualized setting as rhetoric and the parallel tropes. However, as a set of tropes it also revealed that a further trope needed to be answered for, that of irony – which presents a paradox and contradiction. In this world of thirdness logic sought to be internally coherent and externally constructive.

In chapter four it was shown to be necessary to reintroduce the imaginative universal and *il lume naturale* as the foundation of a dynamic semiosis, what has also been referred to as affective imaginative (poetic) modelling. This is the stage of the confrontation of the Other as oneself. The contradiction, paradox and irony that leads to the fulfilment of a richer identity. It required looking deeply at how metaphors are embodied. Ironic metaphors require counterintuition, as opposed to the metaphors in chapter 2 that could rely upon intuitive categories alone. In this realm the logic was analogical – meaning that a particular context was calling for at this stage only a particular solution – not a generalised one yet. Only through justification and maturity does a particular solution become a generalisable one.

It became possible at this point to show how this tetramorph has already been supported by the latest research in the cognitive science of religion through counterintuition, theory of mind and agent detection. The correlation between the omniscient perspective and socially strategic information was especially clarified, as well as the relationship of the quadriga to the fundamental questions humans have shaped all conversations around since before written history. After

placing the idea within the context of a greater history of thesemiosis the notion of a counterfactual identity was shown to be key to emergent exemplarity and the sovereignty of the individual. To conclude the matter required digging behind the representations to look as close as possible to the will only to find the ‘love that moves the sun and the other stars’<sup>3</sup>.

The Paradise Key. PRDS: Peshat; Remez; Din; Sod. The four modes of interpretation: literal; allegorical; moral; and anagogical. Metonymy; Metaphor; Synecdoche; Irony. This key, this framework has been shown to be equivalent to looking at the four different relationships between a proposition and the environment it is embedded in through action. The metaphor of ‘knowing is seeing’ has allowed a relationship between, light, sight and the word to be made explicit so as to enable a clearer model to be explicated that can place science, philosophy, history and religion on one map. It has also been laid out to show how a political philosophy based upon human epistemology and ontology should ideally be constructed in order to capture and harness the power of novel information from the environment. Information that can both be caught by the current constitutional order through interpretation by judges. Yet also through amendments to the constitutional order where the novel information extends beyond the previous order, but continues the orders ability to survive and thrive through its irrecusability with its self-congruence and self-preservation.

Future work can explore the connection between condensation and displacement with metaphor and metonymy in order to explore another avenue of psychoanalytic tradition. It can also go further into an exploration of embodied cognition by recognizing that the ‘spiritual’ battlefield of the mind is placed on the external world through the vertical line.<sup>4</sup> This is explored in the literature not only discussing how God, and angels are placed on the top of the vertical line – and demons and the devil placed at the bottom – but also ties in with the base line that up is good, and down is bad found in the works of George Lakoff on well-being. One avenue is exploring the connection between verticality and the tripartite memory structure of the cerebellum, hippocampus and neocortex.

Future work can also for instance explore the historic unfolding of the shentong versus rangtong view in Buddhism related to the ground of the omniscient perspective found in the works of Dolpopa, Taranatha, and Bamda Gelek of the Jonang tradition. A deeper exploration, therefore, of the Ocean of Definitive Meaning. Provisional meaning being related to the third person perspective and Definitive grounded in the omniscient that has been so central to this work. Further work can also explore how the channels, winds and drops connected with the body (waking consciousness), speech (dream consciousness) and mind (deep sleep) connect with the quaternary system through the addition of turiya bliss consciousness.

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<sup>3</sup> Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum, Paradiso, Canto 33.

<sup>4</sup> B. P. Meier et al., “What’s ‘Up’ with God? Vertical Space as a Representation of the Divine,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93, no. 5 (2007): 699–710.

## **Exegesis of light, Timeless Semiotic Freedom, and Intuition**

At the heart of this work has been an aim to understand how to ground human rights in the postsecular era, where neither the traditional religious concept of the *Imago Dei*, nor the secular arguments based upon rationality hold to ground a universal claim. This is all the more clear in a postmodern era that has followed the ‘linguistic turn’ captured by Wittgenstein and Heidegger. There has been a clear need to find a post-secular grounding. The tool of theosemiosis has been used to ground a new model of epistocracy that goes ‘beyond the cave’. For it is here that social epistemology and ontology meet its limits against physical ontology, and this requires biological creatures to step their foot beyond the constitutional order and extract that knowledge that captures the vital spark, which can ultimately revitalize ‘the Peoples’.

This would then become a constitutional order that itself could be constructed ‘sideways at the entrance of the cave’, as long as it was rooted in the golden eternity clause – the fundamental and human rights – that legitimize the constitution and its continued existence through time and across generations itself. Unlike Plato’s final solution this does not rely upon a Philosopher King, but is a dynamic solution that demands the active engagement of all ‘Peoples’ – both symbolic and natural – and their continued interaction with novel information in situations that include the states of exception that transcend the current constitutional order. In that novel information lies the potential for novel exemplarity, novel reflective judgment on the ‘most reasonable’, and an evolution of ‘the People’.

The problem and the solution extend back to the hands of one political philosophy: John Locke. Within the same individual were formed the basis of the social contract and its limitations around natural rights extending from the Image of God. At the same time Locke wrote a separate book on knowledge that said truth claims in society should only be based upon what can be physically sensed. The school of Empiricism. The problem is that an empirical world holds no space for supernatural experience, and therefore any mention of God cannot enter the discussion, and therefore the Image of God no longer holds meaning.

With that said, John Locke also possibly held one door open for resolving this great difficulty. In a throwaway line at the end of his work on a model of knowledge he mentioned that there should be a new field created called semiotics. It took centuries for this line to be developed at the hands of Charles Peirce through his triadic model in America, and Ferdinand de Saussure in his model of structuralism in Europe. From this work Claudia Welz built a model of the *Imago Dei* through the lens of semiotics to seek a grounding in the current age.

The question is how to bring that model back into political philosophy. In order to do this the current work has sought to show how the major schools of political philosophy have been built upon one single metaphor that embodied cognition can unpack to reveal its connection with meaning making, and the atom or knowledge: the proposition. As the proposition is simply a symbol in the Peircean school of semiotics it is possible to bring these models all back in line.

Once that model had been laid out it was possible to show how human rights and sovereignty can be grounded in this postsecular era.

The central metaphor stemmed from the allegory of the cave that formed the heart of the work of Plato. The notion that we are all in a cave looking at shadows on the wall instead of seeing the true subjects exposed to the light. Alessandro Ferrara has been able to show how a liberal model would fit within this metaphor by suggesting that a political system could be built not on episteme, but ‘sideways at the entrance of the cave’. This metaphor light is also at the foundations of religion – for example the Book of Genesis, exegesis and the tetramorph. It is also why the age of reason has been called the age of ‘Enlightenment’.

Embodied cognition was ultimately used to show how this metaphor stemmed from the phrase ‘knowing is seeing’, and therefore could be directly equated with the proposition. The semiotic model of Charles Peirce could then be used to highlight how the political and constitutional system directly aligns with the layers and perspectives of the proposition. It was shown how two fundamentally different relations (anchoring and grounding) align with the subject and propositional realms. Their interaction leads to either justice centered on authenticity, or ideology centered on alienation. Looping effects can spiral this connection either towards greater or less self-congruence. The negative externalities were caught most strongly in the work of Matteo Bianchin.

Again, the proposition has been at the heart of the metaphor, and the heart of this work. It is the atom or knowledge and the model of leading thinkers Plato, Ferrara, Burke, Jung, and numerous others. It has been built around this structure in order to highlight a key distinction between the propositional predicate and the propositionless predicate.

The proposition has been shown to be applied in real time to objects based upon four components. The First world is the inductive world, the world of objects. Objects are constructed out of maturity and justification, the evidence that a model works over time. This maturity leads to Entrenchment of the object as a category. This is the world of anchoring relations. The second world is the world of the predicate with possible propositions to work with as a hypothesis. It is the pragmatic world. It is the world of action. The third world is the proposition. These are past categories that have successfully worked and with foundational axioms can be deductively extended. The zeroth world is really the same as the pragmatic realm, the world of the predicate, but is required where no fully formulated propositions exist to form a hypothesis around. This model matches with that provided in biblical interpretation through exegesis and the tetramorph. It is described also in the special acronym of PRDS, *pardes* meaning orchard. With each letter representing the form of interpretation and perspective taken. Chapter one dealing with the second person perspective. Chapter two: the first person perspective. Chapter three the third person perspective and chapter four the omniscient perspective.

Ultimately it is this last world that lays the foundation of legitimacy in dynamic liberalism, centered on the eternity clause, amendment power, thermodynamic entropy, transformative authenticity, exemplar justice as homeostasis, justice

preceding fairness, and evolution of the 'most reasonable'. It seeks to incorporate the work of John Rawls and Alessandro Ferrara by incorporating the *modus vivendi*, constitutional consensus and overlapping consensus within the first three chapters. It also seeks to extend beyond the work where it meets its limits in space and time. Human rights seeks to go beyond the two tier model of Ackerman to a three tier model of law that is centered on the eternity clause and amendment power. This model extends the work of Valerio Fabbrizi, who has captured the distinction of these two tiers strongly by opposing liberalism with illiberal populist constitutionalism. It is rooted not in societal agreement, but at the forefront of the limits of human knowledge. It is a form of metalaw because it is what generates the law and is not the law itself. The state of exception. This fourth world showed human value to stem from the incompleteness of the physical and epistemological world. How exploration (seeking circuit) and reflection principle capture pieces of this world.

Throughout this work the model of the center and periphery was captured by highlighting scholars representing the different schools of thought from Italy in the center, Estonia in the eastern periphery and California in the west. This helped show how political philosophy could be rooted in realism, pragmatism, rationality, or transcendence (in the epistemological sense of the word). Rooted in Machiavelli, Ferrara, Umberto Eco or Pico Della Mirandola. It showed how the semiotics could be focused on Otswald's physical world of catalysts, on von Uexkull's world of biosemiotics; on Juri Lotman's focus on cultural semiotics; or Thomas Andreas Pöder's theosemiotics. It showed on the west coast how it could be focused on the material world of Gian Carlo Wick; the biological world of Terrence Deacon; the axiomatic world of Thomas Kuhn; and the embodied cognitive world of George Lakoff.

This entire basis of sovereignty of relations and human rights can be summed up in two words: experiential learning. Culture is composed of static symbols of successful actions that the community has extracted from the past. If-then statements. These learned lessons are what cultures hold up as sacred. However, the environment around culture evolves and is dynamic. The environment includes both nature, and the surrounding external cultures on the periphery of the semiosphere. The individuals that compose that culture carry around a small subset of its goals and through time their own health and wellness depends upon the alignment of these goals and the environment. Therefore, dynamic environments can lead to contradiction in these cultural and individually extracted symbols. This can lead to the 'problem of explosion' of an entire logical system that has been set up by the individual and culture which would be disastrous and is the foundation of anxiety. In the literature this situation means the code is acting as an ideology and not as a model of justice. Ideology rooted in alienation, as opposed to justice rooted in authenticity.

In a means-ends equation, the uncertainty of the means of a goal are uncertain, and in worse times it also means the ends are uncertain. This is why wholeness is separate from sacredness. It is in the search for wholeness with an environment that is dynamic that further static symbols are evolved. Only through imitation

and communication can these symbols then be transferred to other individuals in a culture and at a large enough scale become culture itself. In mathematical terms, the difference is between probability and statistics. Whereby, culture has provided the probabilities, but it is only individual experience that can provide the statistics.

It is the individual therefore that needs to step beyond anxiety in order to extract new information. This can only happen if there is a metahypothesis that is more powerful than anxiety. That metahypothesis states that the new information will provide a greater good than living with the status quo information. One key source for this metahypothesis stems from the sacred scriptures of documents that set up the base interpretation of new information. Scientifically, new information is argued to be foundational to a universe with expanding space, as that space enables a greater separation of photons from atomic structures, meaning that the atoms can form certain information. A key model of the Imago Dei discussed throughout has been the four part model utilized by Claudia Welz through its mirroring of semiotics. In the meantime exposing a fourth layer untouched by Charles Peirce:

“The functional model, typified by exegetes of the priestly sources (Genesis 1:26–26, 5:1–3, and 9:6), emphasizes Representation – the human functions as God’s representative in God’s creation, exercising creative dominion and care. The mimetic model, typified by Augustine, Luther, and Bonhoeffer, emphasizes resemblance – the human resembles God by means of an analogy, whether that analogy involves ontological structures or existential freedom. The relational model, typified by Thielicke, Barth, Ebeling, Benjamin, and Buber, emphasizes the event of dialectical encounter. The fourth dynamic model, typified by Mirandola, Eckhart, and Kierkegaard, emphasizes (con) formation.”<sup>5</sup>

The infinite other, the eternal thou, endless contradiction. The human encounter with this reality is the ground for human value as that is how useful knowledge is extracted. Humans ‘accommodate’ themselves to it in a Piagetian sense. The knowledge fractal depends on perspective. The object stays the same, but the knowledge extracted values based upon motivations can evolve. It is because of catalysis and complementarity that novel stabilized structures can come into being. This goal structure extracted through the different memory systems composes the personality of the subject. The self.

Symbolization is ultimately the purpose and ground of human rights and sovereignty. The extraction of social symbols from individual experience with a changing environment. Ultimately, ‘all models are wrong’, and in that there is political hope for humanity. A hope that there is a purpose a tyrannical State cannot replace. In the end, “Inference in general obviously supposes symbolization: and all symbolization is inference. For every symbol contains information.

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<sup>5</sup> Matthew Puffer, review of *Humanity in God’s Image: An Interdisciplinary Exploration* by Claudia Welz, *Reading Religion* (2017), 1. <https://readingreligion.org>.

And all kinds of information involve inference. Inference, then, is symbolization. They are the same notions.”<sup>6</sup>

The transcendent is still the key to connecting science, religion and politics. However, it is in terms of that which ‘transcends’ human symbols, human categorization. That which transcends the recursive, dynamic ‘Self’. Stepping into this understanding requires not the scientific hypothetico-deductive logic, but alternatively a hypothetico-inductive logic, based upon the metahypothesis. This is to get as close as possible to entering the space to observe new information. The metahypothesis is beyond human thought, it is human intuition. For the human body only moves in the direction that it feels can lead to its goodness. The vital spark of self-congruence and transformative authenticity. Exploration, and curiosity lead on from this metahypothesis.

The metahypothesis itself is grounded in justice as societal homeostasis, the ultimate end of all goods. The ground that makes goodness not simply subjective, but an objective state within the universe. The action of the universe looks for minimizing energy and within the same time frame greater possibilities. Every hypothesis has an impact on what information is seen, and therefore the solution to the ought-is problem is that there is no ‘is’ without an ‘ought’. Every ‘is’ is perceived through this ought of homeostasis. There is no getting beyond the hypothesis. A hypothesis is the antecedent of a proposition in an ‘if-then’ statement; it is the If question. This is an assumption in a counterfactual question. The closest state to true empiricism then requires a metahypothesis of ultimate goodness.

The first chapter showed that there is never true induction. The closest to experience requires a hypothesis, and at an even deeper level, a metahypothesis. The key difference between induction and deduction is predictability. In philosophical terms, a key misunderstanding has been the difference between ontology and epistemology. Generally the argument goes that epistemology is a subset of ontology. However, every ontological claim must come through human knowledge. Therefore, all ontology can ultimately state is that there is information that cannot be contained in human knowledge, a component that transcends what can be known. This is argued to be the ‘transcendent’ of religion. This is closer to pure experience without prior knowledge. True empiricism then belongs to the world of transcendence.

## **Enlightenment 2.0**

Science has been misinterpreted in the 21st century. It starts from this misunderstanding that it is based upon ‘direct observation’. In reality, science is a hypothetico-deductive model that starts from the application of a mathematical model that can be hypothesised to mirror what will then be observed (at least the homogeneities and regularities). This is an inversion of induction. This is why

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<sup>6</sup> Charles Peirce, 1865, quoted in Max H. Fisch, *The Philosophy of Peirce: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 280.

delving deeper into the structure and function of logic's components has been key to understanding the future direction of the enlightenment. Logic ultimately has four components: Induction, Abduction, Deduction, Analogy.

The functional circle is the key embodied and dynamic narrative that utilizes these differing and hierarchical logics in such a manner as to produce novel memories and tools of action. This circle is the very basic fact that an internal motivation causes a human to pursue a targeted object and once that object has been retrieved homeostasis is achieved. However, while it is a simple concept it is the foundation of humanity's central embodied metaphors. describes how the visual pattern of retrieving a desired object, is mirrored internally by the emotions, motivations and feelings that propel the desire to reach homeostasis. Archetypes aren't unconscious images stored in the memory, but are the natural extension of explaining this functional circle. The map of verticality in embodied speech is simply imposed on the natural environment. Humans in this regard make themselves the measure of things and interpret their own mind through external objects. The depths and heights of embodied verticality then will be represented by snakes, and the heights by birds. Demons and Angels. They are consciously built as the foundation of language and the completion of the functional circle.

Balance between the sacred and the holy, between consistency and completeness is the challenge of all logical systems. Sacred is for the order of culture and the holy is for its relationship with the environment and what culture could be. Godel's Incompleteness theorem points to the world of zeroness as the spot where consistency needs to be reclaimed for the sake of survival, at the expense of completeness. This is the world of the functional circle. The first chapter showed how pure induction must succumb to the hypothesis. The second chapter showed memory and how experience is actually built from the bottom up, layers of depth. Pragmatic action here was seeking to build new connections from old information. The third chapter sought to lay out the world of analytical philosophy that is built on a completely deductive system. The fourth chapter showed how a deductive system explodes in the face of contradiction and therefore requires humans to update the axioms, leading at times to moments of paradigm shifts due to the barbarism of reflection. The fifth chapter showed harmonious love as the intellectual map to wholeness that serves as the prime example for others to follow as the 'most reasonable' path.

Knowledge construction was shown to come through a process known as semiosis by translating past memory into use against present experience. The omniscient perspective, through the Theory of Mind, was seen to be the unconscious lens upon which to interpret the incoming source data that is novel, contradictory, and/or ill-defined. The omniscient perspective in this sense rectifies time within systems of static logic. The second chapter grounded knowledge physically, the third chapter grounded it biologically and the fourth socio-culturally. This was ultimately to show that embodied cognition is used to grasp the unique and ineffable through analogy, as opposed to the general rules and propositions of logic looked at in the previous chapters.

With that being said, nothing in the world contains more linguistic truth than that ‘this statement is a lie’. Within this one sentence contains the key to all truth’s secrets. What can and cannot be expressed within and through the subject, the predicate, the proposition, the non-contradiction. PRDS. What it cannot express is where human value commences. Hopefully it is clear that knowledge is built up and evolves from these four components. From that foundation it becomes clear that the modern knowledge community based on Enlightenment 1.0 has been limiting itself to valuing a small subset of the knowledge available from the total pool of knowledge that is there to capture through imagination and perspective in relation to its motivations of living, growing and flourishing.

An object can be studied through description, but also the ways to transform it and connect it with other signs – which can come through dreams and the imagination. That object can be placed in a logic game and its relations and possibilities can be explored as long as the system is stable. Or knowledge can go further, to see the deeper underlying motivations hidden within the actions of those one encounters: the Macro-Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Understanding these components is a semiotic task, and as Charles Peirce says, “The world is perfused with signs.”<sup>7</sup> These four components exist wherever there is a memory of necessary action separated from a dynamic world that includes a level of chance.

From procedural memory, to episodic memory, to semantic memory, information is built from physical interactions, up through contextual situations, to decontextualized concepts. An idea manifests itself then in the reverse direction: from concepts, to context, and then entering circulation. The human soul is that which seeks to integrate these systems in thoughts, words, and deeds. The ultimate aim is to arrive at upper homeostasis. A set point that enables homeostasis across space with other human beings and through time. With this structure it can be seen that all predicates arise from an embodied interaction with the world across the markov blanket. The medium truly is the message then. The medium of the body, of light and of sound. Encapsulated at the highest level in alphanumeric. However, what humans are so familiar with visually is actually the abstracted world from a concrete will – not the reverse situation we immediately imagine.

The purpose of this work has been to close out this chapter in human history that has pitted the universe at odds with human development, and that has decentered humanity’s role in history. Leading to nihilism, loss of purpose and hope, a rise of a sensate materialistic culture that exploits sexes, races, genders in the pursuit of pleasure with no moral grounding or meaning. The great progress society has made in health, wealth, longevity, on the external level has been met with a decline in meaning, purpose, rise in anxiety, fear and depression on a personal level. This is because the narrative of the times is incomplete. It has lost

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<sup>7</sup> Charles Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* (CP 5.448).

touch with all of the interpretive tools that are required to dig deep in understanding energy, momentum, action, attraction; object, subjective action, logic, and motivation.

With the rise of language humans have become separated from the events directly surrounding them and can now see a world far behind its sight in space, and through foresight in time. Understanding being at this deeper level has required a deeper level of justification as people know the harm of their actions on other beings, and the fact that all will suffer the loss of loved ones and will also die no matter how well they live. A true look at the present, objective world is one of chaos and potential. Without an internal value structure and hierarchy that chaos is anxiety provoking and destructive. A hierarchy built not of power, but of love is what psychology shows to be most healthy. A system of government that supports the freedom to establish relations through love and choice is one that harnesses that energy. At one point religion was able to connect an ethos with a worldview, but in a literal world that is harder to integrate. Science has upended the general worldview in so many amazing awe inspiring and destructive ways, but the is-ought(fact-value) problem at its core has presented the challenge of nesting cause-and-effect patterns of proximal-distal relationships in a way that is grounded in reality.

The aim of this work has been to more clearly define the interpretive framework governing our lives, extending from the smallest atom of truth claim – the proposition. To understand that there are four key components of human knowledge in connecting memory with the environment. In responding to stimuli appropriately. In connected objects and their relations and from there predicting their movements. The four tropes, and modes, and steps of the magnum opus. The Nigredo, Albedo, Citrinitas, Rubedo. The Shadow, the Anima, the Animus as wise Old Man, and the Self.

Transformation is at the heart of lived experience. The action of time. Creation, destruction, recreation. Throughout those transformations there is no destruction of energy that is conserved, but there are destructions of forms. Destruction of information. The arrangement of matter. In addition to spontaneous transformations there are computational transformations that require constructors. This simple model is at the basis of all natural and social sciences. How catalysis leads to physical knowledge in the form of memory, and how the universal motivation for pleasure is calculated through a subjective entity, for all memories are symbols.

As has been expressed in the previous chapters, symbols are not accurate representations of reality, but are mediated knowledge (Gustav Teichmüller)<sup>8</sup>. What symbols truly are are a priori, probabilistic models of reality, ie. cause-and-effect memories. In other words, “Internal representations that reliably correlate with states of the world, and that participate in inferences that tend to derive true

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<sup>8</sup> Gustav Teichmüller, *Neue Grundlegung der Psychologie und Logik*, ed. Jacob Ohse (Breslau: Wilhelm Koebner, 1889).

implications from true premises, may be called knowledge.”<sup>9</sup> As the symbolic species the key evolution has been the symbol, but it has also been the source of the most confusion. A symbol must be understood as probabilistic where an index is statistical.

What this means is that a symbol never accurately represents a more complex underlying reality, but it is sufficiently accurate to have its predictive success for a time. However, the human mind interprets them in reverse as this “strong attentional predisposition to look for hidden symbolic regulatory relationships beneath the surface appearance of communications allows us to automatically treat symbols as buoys marking positions within an implicit submerged meaningful and relational landscape.”<sup>10</sup> In this way the “aspect of language expressed in the physical world, therefore, only makes sense as an expression of a more basic invisible conceptual world.”<sup>11</sup> The key then is not to mistake certainty for probability. Where symbols calculate probabilities, indexical relations calculate statistics. Indexical relations then relate to possibilities of cause-and-effect relations. Icons are the regular patterns themselves. In this work the key icon has been the recursive self. Logic can only deal with objects already imbued with meaning. It can’t be applied to objects that haven’t had their meaning defined yet. This is where human action is required.

A fundamental error in linguistics in the 20th century was focusing on language as a set of verbal symbols. The same error that has occurred by equating logic with only the subset known as formal logic. This was taken to mean that words were arbitrary, but then structure is what was universal. This then would have meant that grammar and syntax were innate. This is the basis of universal grammar. This presumed that grammar was innate structural rules as opposed to being extracted laws from a dynamic syntax. This is looking at language as a reductionist machine, as the symbols were taken to be a one-to-one reference of word to object. Akin to the selfish gene of DNA when it is decontextualized. However, dynamic and recursive Symbols aren’t arbitrary; they (re)produce icons. Symbols then are indexically connected with and produce icons. These icons are produced through sensory-motor interaction. Symbols have a kernel of arbitrariness, but must successfully reproduce an expected icon in order to be a symbol. The outcome then is non-arbitrary, which means the transformation induced is necessary.

Science itself is only one form of logic, the most important form of logic is how humans should move in space-time. An even deeper understanding is realized that action happens even where there are no formal reasons. This is even according to pyrrhonist skeptics. Action, not semantic knowledge, is key to human evolution. Action both with the help of semantic knowledge, and also

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<sup>9</sup> Steven Pinker, *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress* (New York: Viking, 2018), 21.

<sup>10</sup> Terrence Deacon and Tyrone Cashman, “The Role of Symbolic Capacity in the Origins of Religion,” *Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture* 4, no. 1 (2010), 7.

<sup>11</sup> Deacon and Cashman, “The Role of Symbolic Capacity in the Origins of Religion,” 7.

where semantic knowledge breaks down. The key to new information is making inferences based upon past memory and testing if new information can be assimilated to old models or whether the model itself must adapt to accommodate the new information.

From the outset it has been shown that the semiotic ideology one adopts frames their worldview. The theory behind this work stems from the field of cognitive semiotics. It seeks to go against a Theory of Forms that sees goodness within a perfect deductive system. On the contrary, goodness is extracted from the environment through lived and felt experience. The four chapters of this work have laid out two models of human knowledge acquisition utilizing the latest research in neuroscience, physics, biology, linguistics. One model declares the foundational reality of symbols. This means that numbers and geometric shapes are in a sense more real than what presents itself to the senses. The universals have ground over the particulars. The worldview of Pythagoras and Plato. The worldview of mathematical objects. Of digital physics.

This one model follows and utilizes a left-hemisphere dominant form of mathematics. These formal models are necessarily described. British philosopher A.N Whitehead once said: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”<sup>12</sup> At its broadest it means that all are mathematical structures. At its narrowest it means that even math must give away half of itself in order to truly represent reality, to drop the continuous for the discrete. This view on forms and semiotics is foundational to the linguistic school of Universal Grammar started by Noam Chomsky. It follows from the fact that symbols are arbitrarily assigned for communication to take place. This puts all the specialness of human communication onto the syntax. The rules of how to combine symbols.

Science has traditionally been thought of as three different strands, natural, social and formal. This work has sought to uncover the fourth in order to begin the process of moving away from grounding reality in formal logic (in third order mutual information). The ground can then be recovered for zero order mutual information. However, seeing the importance the world of thirdness has held in the modern world, it is important to close out by looking at the formal sciences. These are fundamentally different from the other two branches of science as they do not in fact relate to the natural empirical world at all and yet serve as the very foundation of science. They are mathematics, logic (deductive reasoning), decision theory, and computer science. They are bound by this idea of truth.

These concepts in this realm are timeless and universal. In a positive sense, this holds the power of predictability. It is ultimately the application of timeless and universal concepts to time bounded and local objects that has unlocked the power of science. These abstract ideas are so powerful that they have served as the foundation of the most important philosophies in history, starting with Plato’s idea of the Forms. However, this work has aimed to show the limits to these ideas

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<sup>12</sup> Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 39.

and why the formal sciences are so powerful and yet also so potentially destructive. When used correctly they have improved every facet of life, and yet when used incorrectly they are the direct cause of all its issues. This work has sought to return the omni science perspective and zero order mutual information.

This journey has been a story of light and sound. Image and word. With the creative tropes born in between. Or more accurately, how light and sound are combined and integrated with touch. When an object comes into the view of central foveal vision and becomes articulated that object has been shown thus far to be processed in two separate ways, one as symbolic language, and the other as a visual three dimensional object. Taken together this is a concept in semantic memory. However, a visual concept contains the traces of the meanings brought forth from stress signals. The hard problem of consciousness has been looking at the issue upside down. Its flaw is imagining that a greater informational context can ever be described in words or numbers, when these are lower resolution structures that only reference more extensive information products such as motion of the body itself.

There is a quote attributed to Viktor Frankl that “Between stimulus and response there is space. In this space is the choice of response. It is that choice that is the center of all growth and freedom.” This space in between is voluntary action. VOLUNTARY motor control is truly the heart of this work. Our nervous systems evolved to map action to senses. Perception and voluntary action only evolved later. It is voluntary action and its justification that demands we say how we act and why we act. The Eye of Justice based on Theory of Mind has catalyzed the justifications of our actions towards strangers as if neighbours. That is fundamental to our being.

Over time repetitive voluntary actions become involuntary and stored in procedural memory. Stimuli come about because an organism is no longer in equilibrium with its environment. Internally this is because of homeostasis loss and externally because of threats. Voluntary actions aim to be integrated actions, which means that actions match the best information available. It is the quest for novel beneficial information that is key to an Enlightenment 2.0. A quest that demands going beyond the traditional model of the rational self-interested individual, towards the imaginative being who can see the potential for a greater collective identity embracing all humanity – not simply as an ideal, but within the lived and embodied contexts that present themselves. Here it is not Darwin’s entropy that is fundamental, but what has been called Deacon’s entropy. Deacon’s entropy shows how the noise and biological mutations that have been accumulated create a space for evolving through a faith in actions that transcend what the Self is – towards what the Self could be. The discovery being none other than ‘emergent exemplar’ actions for the betterment of all humanity.

Throughout this work a key aspect has been reintroducing a dynamism and hierarchy to semiotic categories that have often been treated as separate and distinct. When confronted with novelty, imagination starts the process. The altricial gaze guides and constrains it towards seeing ‘the good’. In cases that are similar to what has been experienced before a hypothesis can be formed that can

test this past category against reality. The outcome is that the model either ‘assimilates’ this information, or a new model must be built to ‘accommodate’ the information. It is this space of novelty that forever lies beyond the written constitution, but is integral for its survival across generations. It is humans that have the ability to discover the pragmatic use of novel information and novel relations that lie within and between one another, and here is the space for sovereignty. In the end, the Imago Dei may help to ‘shine a light’ on a pathway to incorporating imagination and perspective alongside reason and science in an Enlightenment renaissance that is guided by the ‘love that moves the sun and the other stars’.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy: Paradiso*, trans. Allen Mandelbaum, Paradiso, Canto 33.

## FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The key academic reviewers of this work have expertise in intercultural law/legal chorology and hermeneutics – Mario Ricca and Andrzej Wiercinski, respectively. With that in mind, each of these reviewers have taken the time to explore how to extend future developments of this work within their respective fields. This final section of the monograph will therefore lay out these possible areas of future developments for those readers interested in exploring more deeply the relationship between the monograph, hermeneutics and/or intercultural law.

### Intercultural Law/Legal Chorology

The work of Mario Ricca has shown how such a model proposed in the monograph could be applied to the emerging field of intercultural law. Prior work by Ricca on human dignity and semiotics shows this very roadmap. From a semiotic standpoint Ricca has already highlighted that “meaning lies beyond any isomorphic correspondence between the symbol and what is signified by it. Insofar as meaning is an adaptive process, linguistic expressions are only vehicles of its ongoing unfolding.”<sup>1</sup> Further, there is a “close connection between the semantic openness/entropy of categories and agentive-generative dignity.”<sup>2</sup>

From this starting point parallels can be seen within legal semiotics, as “in the translation/valorization of the Otherness represented by other legal systems, each legal system finds authentic meaning, namely the axiological and semantic horizon, of its own foundation of legitimacy and existence.”<sup>3</sup> Again, the field of intercultural law highlights this center and periphery relationship leading to transformation. “The relationship of law – including state law – to culture and everything that could be considered nonlaw appears, through the lens of the intercultural legal approach, as an immanent tendency towards self-transformation that may be checked in all of the normative systems.”<sup>4</sup>

This is very much in line with Juri Lotman’s map of asymmetrical culture with translation at the periphery. The future developments within the legal space can begin to see parallels with the cultural borders described by Lotman in terms of law through legal chorology. The notion that there is already a space of cultural meaning within which legal codes are located. In this way, “this trans-lational

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<sup>1</sup> Ricca M, “Processive Hoping,” in *Hope as a Sign/La Speranza come Segno*, ed. Susan Petrilli (Milano-Udine: Mimesis, 2024), 407.

<sup>2</sup> M. Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” *Jus Cogens* (2025): 31.

<sup>3</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 32.

<sup>4</sup> Mario Ricca, *Intercultural Law, Interdisciplinary Outlines: Lawyering and Anthropological Expertise in Migration Cases Before the Courts*, *E/C Rivista Telematica dell’Associazione Italiana di Studi Semiotici*, March 2014, 47.

function of ‘dignity’ also applies (or, can be applied) to the relationships between different legal systems. This is because legal systems are nothing but spatialized universes of meaning and discourse (also definable as semio-spatial frameworks).<sup>5</sup> With that being the case, “When human beings cross the boundaries of different legal systems, they implicitly open a path to the renewal of the process for the invention of meaning.”<sup>6</sup>

Human dignity is then very tied to this pragmatic notion of the boundary, as “Human dignity, from a pragmatic point of view, is the reciprocal ‘tran-slation’ – once again, according to the Latin etymological roots ‘trans-ferre:’ to transport, to carry through – of different spaces of experience, universes of discourse, semiotic landscapes where each individual and each community live in and by.”<sup>7</sup> Therefore, it is “the imaginary arrival point, the horizon, where those different spaces – which are always semanticized spaces – conflate and can give birth to the invention of something new. Which is, at the same time, the result of their trans-lation and the renewal of what has already overdetermined each of them (even before their own origin: chôra or the semantic-spatial continuum prior to any categorization).”<sup>8</sup>

This pathway forward shows why intercultural law can provide a more constructive map than comparative law studies alone in defining the legal landscape across boundaries. Whereas, “Comparative law studies showcase – in its deepest, albeit not frequent instances – the dependence of formal law on its backdrop of social sense but with theoretical and descriptive aims.”<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, “the intercultural legal approach is centred on how positive legal statements are irresistibly transformed when they come into contact with new cultural landscapes of sense.”<sup>10</sup> In this way, intercultural law can also highlight how Otherness can be interpreted through crossing narratives, intercultural cross-contextualizations and translations.<sup>11</sup> In this way, “crosscontextual narratives can

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<sup>5</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 15.

<sup>6</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 15.

<sup>7</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 14.

<sup>8</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 15.

<sup>9</sup> Ricca, *Intercultural Law, Interdisciplinary Outlines: Lawyering and Anthropological Expertise in Migration Cases Before the Courts*, 47.

<sup>10</sup> Ricca, *Intercultural Law, Interdisciplinary Outlines: Lawyering and Anthropological Expertise in Migration Cases Before the Courts*, 47.

<sup>11</sup> Mario Ricca, *Errant Law: Spaces and Subjects*, June 30, 2016, 18, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802528>

prevent ‘our culture’ from camouflaging as ‘human nature.’”<sup>12</sup> Again, transformation through interaction and translation provide the basis for a dynamic model unlike comparative law.

This connection between politics, symbols and transformation have also been highlighted in Ricca’s work. The findings of intercultural law similarly show that “Democracy entails transformation as well openness to it; and yet, any genuine transformation involves semantic changes. Hence, democracy and semiosis should be figured as two sides of the same coin.”<sup>13</sup> With this map of a space of borders around legal systems, Ricca notes human dignity as this horizon, as the “agentive-generative dignity and its suitability to serve as an interface of intercultural and interspatial translation between legal systems”.<sup>14</sup> Otherness here then becomes key as “from the bridging of mutual Otherness, the world is generated: in a sense, the world is creatively ‘invented’.”<sup>15</sup> Here then lies not a static vision of human dignity, but a dynamic vision as expressed in the present monograph, as ““the meaning of human dignity should not be traced in what has already been, but rather in what has yet to be, by virtue of each human being’s commitment and responsiveness to the Other. And this precisely because in responsiveness to Otherness the birthing of the world perpetually inhabits.”<sup>16</sup>

This dynamic version of human dignity can be seen to be based upon a transformative authenticity, as “Human dignity, from the perspective just outlined, is also a source for the transformation of experiential space. And this precisely because through the ‘relation to Otherness’ – which is simultaneously a relation to God, at least from a Christian stance – space is made new, that is, makes sense.”<sup>17</sup> The grounding and source of rights aren’t simply equivalent to rights themselves, “interpreting dignity as a principle that merely epitomizes a battery of rights is, more or less, like confusing the source of the river with its mouth: the result is that the very bed of rights is doomed to dry up insofar as it is divorced from its origin.”<sup>18</sup>

Extending beyond intercultural law into its close initial theological connections with the *Imago Dei*, Ricca has also noted that, “The secular idea of human

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<sup>12</sup> Ricca, Mario. “Mario Ricca – Intercultural Use of Human Rights and Legal Chorology,” p. 4 ... Ricca, Mario. (2016). *The Intercultural Use of Human Rights and Legal Chorology*. SSRN Electronic Journal. P. 4

<sup>13</sup> M. Ricca, “How to Undo (and Redo) Words with Facts: A Semio-enactivist Approach to Law, Space and Experience,” *International Journal for the Semiotics of Law* 36, no. 1 (2023): 357.

<sup>14</sup> Mario Ricca, *Agentive/Generative Dignity and Legal Experience*, abstract (2024).

<sup>15</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 6.

<sup>17</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 7.

<sup>18</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 7.

dignity, the same one inscribed in the declarations of human rights and liberal-democratic constitutions, stems from the de-theologizing of a religious conception of human beings: precisely, the Judeo-Christian one.”<sup>19</sup> In this way, “the Judeo-Christian meaning of *imago Dei* as the foundation of human dignity is not ascriptive but agentic-generative, not static but dynamic, not ontologizing but processive.”<sup>20</sup>

Furthermore, this dynamicity ensures the entanglement of present conditions and future expectations, as “the adoption of a processive outlook to the natural world and its meaning, as such rooted in the dynamic/relational signification of human dignity traceable in Genesis, prompts one to find the origin of the value-facts conflation in the dynamic and proactive involvement of human action in the factual signification of the world.”<sup>21</sup> This then “entails that the internal forum and external forum, psychological inside and material outside, present conditions and teleological perspectives, the now and the future, insofar as they are mediated by human activity, are not radically and sharply distinguishable.”<sup>22</sup> What this means is that, “‘Things’ in the present are means (and even meaning-ful components) of the future, so that their meaning does not correspond to the morphological structure of their extant condition.”<sup>23</sup>

All of this discussion ultimately brings the notion back to ‘the Other’. “Taking the contemporary secular idea of dignity back to its biblical roots means ‘making the Other’ and ‘making the world through relationship with the Other.’”<sup>24</sup> In this way, “dignity is mainly agentic-generative because its ‘issuing’ towards Others valorizes them insofar as it allows their potential abilities to flourish.”<sup>25</sup> Ultimately, “Human beings generate the world and its meanings simultaneously with their ‘making the Other,’ and when this ‘making the Other’ is authentic and effective, that is, when it is creative rather than destructive or annihilating.”<sup>26</sup> Within this relation is found a basis for transformative authenticity, “In turn, ‘authentic and effective’ means that the agentic-generative making is oriented

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<sup>19</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 7.

<sup>20</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 7.

<sup>21</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 14.

<sup>22</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 14.

<sup>23</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 14.

<sup>24</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 15.

<sup>25</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 22.

<sup>26</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 29.

toward valorizing the Other by allowing them to express their own agentive-generative potentialities.”<sup>27</sup>

In regards to future work Mario Ricca has suggested that:

one could emphasize the ‘closeness’ between Vico and Peirce and, more specifically, between the ‘verum factum’ principle and pragmatism – with specific regard to the Peirce’s conception of the ‘object’: which is never something placed out there but, in any case, a product of inferential/relational dynamics.

## **Hermeneutics**

Andrzej Wiercinski provided the following suggestions for future development in relating the monograph to hermeneutics in his in own words:

### ***1. Deepening the hermeneutic reflection on semiotics***

How does the event-character of understanding (Gadamer’s *Wirkungsgeschichte*) shape the evolving meaning of the *imago Dei* across cultures and times? How does hermeneutic openness (*hermeneutische Offenheit*) challenge or nuance the semiotic model of constraint? Could the “altricial gaze” itself be interpreted not just as a biological-semiotic function but as an early hermeneutic event, where meaning first emerges dialogically between infant and caregiver? By bringing Gadamer, Ricoeur, or even Betti into closer dialogue with Peirce and Deacon, the dissertation could amplify its sensitivity to historicity, dialogicality, and the irreducible play of understanding.

### ***2. Clarifying the role of tradition and application (Anwendung)***

A key strength of hermeneutics is its focus on the fusion of horizons and the role of application. Kalkman’s postsecular framework might benefit from a more explicit reflection on how traditions (religious, cultural, political) are not merely inherited semiotic codes but living interlocutors that shape, resist, or transform emergent meaning. How does the *imago Dei*, as a symbolic attractor, work across traditional differences? How do contemporary communities apply and reinterpret this symbol in light of new challenges? This would open space for reflecting on the limits of semiotic generalization and the irreducible particularity of interpretation.

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<sup>27</sup> Ricca, “The Stream of Human Dignity and Its Relational/Generative Ecology: Biblical Past, Human Rights, Planetary Future,” 29.

### ***3. Expanding the concept of absence with hermeneutic nuance***

While Kalkman's use of absence (via Deacon and Peirce) is philosophically rich, hermeneutic thought (especially in Ricoeur) offers an additional layer: Ricoeur's notion of distanciation suggests that absence is not merely a negative or generative condition but also a structural feature of all meaning. We understand only because we are distanced from the immediacy of things. This means absence is not just a motor of emergence, but also a condition of freedom, play, and re-interpretation. Exploring this could help articulate a more existentially textured account of absence, linked not just to information theory but to the fragility and creativity of human existence.

### ***4. Addressing pluralism through hermeneutic solidarity***

Kalkman acknowledges pluralism, but a hermeneutic perspective on solidarity could enrich his political vision: Gadamer's idea of *Verständigung* and *Solidarität* through *Gespräch* might offer a counterbalance to semiotic constraint models. How can sovereignty in a plural world be envisioned not just as symbolic illumination but as a hermeneutic practice of negotiation, listening, and solidarity? This would allow the dissertation to articulate a more dialogical ethics, especially important in postsecular and multicultural settings.

### ***5. Incorporating the ontological dimension of interpretation***

While the dissertation focuses on symbolic and ethical dimensions, the ontological dimension of interpretation, as articulated in Heidegger and Gadamer, could be further developed: How does interpreting the *imago Dei*, sovereignty, or human dignity disclose something about the being of a human being? Could sovereignty itself be seen not only as a symbolic process but as a mode of being-in-the-world, marked by openness, finitude, and relationality? This would give the project deeper existential resonance and connect it to fundamental questions about human being.

“Given the exceptional quality of this work, its original contribution to knowledge, and its impressive scholarly maturity, I strongly and without reservation recommend its acceptance as fully satisfying the requirements for the doctoral degree in theology” – Andrzej Wiercinski

“The work under review is undoubtedly to be approved. I begin this review with this unusual statement because this text is the result of extraordinary commitment. As a PhD dissertation, it is undoubtedly well above average. The author demonstrates, in sequence: originality of thought; methodological maturity; interdisciplinary scope in research; extensive knowledge of the literature; clarity of exposition valuable theoretical; and reconstructive skills” – Mario Ricca

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## KOKKUVÕTE

### Valgustatud suveräänsus: postsekulaarne semiootiline „Jumala kujutis“

Uurimust läbivaks keskseks küsimuseks on hinnata, milliseid *Imago Dei* – jumalanäolisuse ehk jumalakujulisuse – aspekte saab jätkuvalt rakendada suveräänsuse ja inimõiguste probleemide käsitlemisel postsekulaarses ühiskonnas. Sümboliseeritava lahtimõtestamiseks kasutatakse tööriistana semiootikat. Täpsemalt toetub uurimus dünaamilise ja hierarhilise semioosi mudelile, mille aluse leiab Terrence Deaconi töödest. Selles kontekstis on Giambattista Vico arusaama *Imago Dei*'st kui „kujutuslikust universaalist“ asetatud dialoogi John Locke'i poolt uue uurimisvaldkonnana esitatud semiootikaga – ja just see on avanud uurimistöö põhitee. Selline lähenemine on hädavajalik 21. sajandil, mil mitte ainult et ei lubata religioonil enam olla suveräänsuse ja inimõiguste kehtivaks aluseks, vaid ka mõistus ise on sattunud rünnaku alla, kuna „keeleline pööre“ ja Gödeli mittetäielikkuse teoreem on paljastanud selle piirid – tähistades seega Valgustusajastu 1.0 lõppu.

Uurimuses näidatakse, et Philon Aleksandriast, Giambattista Vico, Thomas-Andreas Pöder, Tuuli Pern ja Claudia Welz ning mitmed teised on osutanud võimalusele käsitleda *Imago Dei*'d kui dünaamilist tegevusmudelit, mida saab rakendada ka agnostilises kontekstis. Kognitiivse religiooniteaduse vallas on Ara Norenzayan ja Benjamin Purzycki näidanud, et empiiriliselt põhineb see tegevus „sotsiaalselt strateegilisel informatsioonil“, st moraalsel teadmisel. *Imago Dei* kui dünaamilise tegevusmudeli tuumaks on *verum factum* – arusaam, et „loomine on tõde“. Inimeste poliitilised institutsioonid on vaimu mõistmisel võtmetähtsusega ning *imago Dei* toetub eelkõige ühele konkreetsele vaimu aspektile. Selleks on hierarhilise ja dünaamilise semioosi troop ja olemise kategooria: nimelt nullisus (*zeroness*) – loovuse juurpõhi, mida käsitletakse uurimuse neljandas peatükis. Nullisus on ühtlasi neljanda järeldusviisi tüübi – anaduktsiooni – allikas.

Juri Lotmani teos „Vaimu universum“ („Universe of the Mind“) toob esile, kuidas indiviid osaleb loomises pildi ja sõna loova mittetõlgitavuse kaudu, mis genereerib peamised troobid. Loovas tõlkimatuses on individuatsiooni dünaamiline ruum. Siia kuuluvad Kenneth Burke'i, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricuse ja Giambattista Vico troobid; samuti Carl Jungi neljasus (*quaternitas*), alkeemikute *magnum opus* ja neljakordne ehk tetramorfne eksegees, kabala *pardes* (PRDS) ja Naropa neljaosaline kaalatšakra. Just selles ruumis peitub lootus rajada suveräänsus „emergeeruvale eeskujulikkusele“ (*emergent exemplarity*), mis tuleneb „transformeerivast autentsusest“. Nõnda tulevad selgelt esile poliitilise filosoofia teemad, mida on käsitlenud Alessandro Ferrara, John Rawls, Valerio Fabbrizi ja Matteo Bianchin.

Dünaamiline alus lähtub kujutuslikust universaalist, mis keskendub altritsiaalsele (abivajavale) pilgule ehk „õigluse silmale“. See piirab ja suunab kujutusvõimet sellistele tegudele, mida võiks õigustada hooliva hooldaja ja armastava

vanema ees – näiteks juhul, kui võõras siseneb inimese vahetusse keskkonda ja teda koheldakse tegelikult ligimese või isegi õe-vennana. Kui valgustus 1.0 keskendus mõistusele ja teadusele, siis valgustus 2.0 täiendab seda kujutlusliku mõistuse ja kõikehõlmava teadmise (*omni science*) perspektiiviga. Empiiriliselt on näidatud, et selline mõtlemisviis on seotud sotsiaalselt strateegilise ehk moraalse teadmisega, mis toetab laiaulatusliku poliitilise ühiskonna kujunemist.

Mõistmaks hierarhilist ja dünaamilist semioosi protsessi, mis võimaldab luua üha suuremaid ja keerukamaid kontrafakuaalseid identiteete, osutus uurimuses vajalikuks läbida kõik etapid teel kahtlusest lootuseni, dekonstruktsioonist konstruktsioonini, umbusust usalduseni, filosoofiast filoloogiani, erimeelsusest tegudeni, ajaloo lõpust ideaalse igavese ajalooni (*aequum bonum*). Uurimuse esimene peatükk keskendub induktiivsele loogikale ja empiirilisele maailmale. Teine peatükk pühendub abduktsioonile ja eeskujulikkuse pragmatismile. Kolmandas peatükis käsitletakse deduktiivset loogikat ja sellele omast „suunatust millelegi“ (*aboutness*). Neljas peatükk keskendub uuele analoogiale, mis ületab varasemalt tuletatud identiteetid ja seadused. Viies peatükk asetab vaadeldava mudeli kognitiivse religiooniteaduse ja teosemioosi alusele, enne kui suunab pilgu „tahtele“, mis asub „representatsiooni“ taga ja sellest teispool. Aja dimensiooni lisamisega tuuakse taas esile dünaamiline enesemõistmise mudel, mis loob ruumi nägemaks inimväärikuse alusena mitte ainult moraali, vaid tarvidust – sisemist tungi rahu ja õitsengu järele. „Kuldne igaviku klausel“ põhineb inimese õitsengu seisundil. Loomuõiguse aluseks ei ole seega mõistus, vaid ajalugu – ja just see muudabki kõik.

Iga peatükk viitab lisaks Jungi alkeemia-alastele töödele, Kenneth Burke'i veenmisviisidele, Josiah Royce'i neljale olemiskäsitlusele, Schopenhaueri neljakordsele juurele ja Rawlsi kihilisele poliitilisele filosoofiale. Semioosi dünaamilise mudeli osas toetatakse tugevalt Terrence Deaconi töödele. Kõikehõlmava teadmise perspektiiv põhineb Norenzayanil ja Purzyckil, tegutsemise ja erimeelsuse kriteeriumid Sextus Empiricusel ja Agrippal, kujutluslik universaal Vicol. Vico ise kõneleb neljast maailmast, mida esindavad kõige paremini neli autorit, kes keskenduvad erinevatele loogikatele: Francis Bacon, Hugo Grotius, Tacitus ja Platon. Kõik need uurimisliinid üheskoos näitavad teed suveräänsuse aluse kindlustamiseni postsekulaarses maailmas, mis on olnud tunnistajaks formaalse loogika ja universaalse keele kokkuvarisemisele.

Kaasatud on vaimuteooria, abivajav (altritsiaalne) pilk ja õigluse silm kui sotsiaalsed katalüsaatorid. Kehalise tunnetuse kaudu, mis peegeldab indiviidi vaimu universumis, on võimalik mõista, kuidas 21. sajandi poliitiline filosoofia rajab tuleviku igas indiviidis – igaüks kannab endas potentsiaali ületada oma praegune ja senine tegutsemismudel, lähtudes sellest, mida ta peab teiste jaoks parimaks, isegi siis – ja eriti siis –, kui tõendused veel puuduvad. Aja jooksul kasvab tõenäosus, et võõraid hakatakse kohtlema kui ligimesi ning et nad kaasatakse Josiah Royce'i mõistetud „armastatud kogukonda“, mida kannab Peirce'i agapism ja armastus, mis annab elule alguse. Just see suunab inimliigi evolutsiooni „kõige mõistlikuma“ poole – kuulates seda sügavalt sisimast tulevat tegutsemiskutset, mis ütleb: „Siin ma seisán, teisiti ma ei saa.“

Kõige fundamentaalsemas tähenduses on kõik semioosi kihid pärit hierarhilisest vastastikusest informatsioonist tegevuse ja representatsiooni (esituse) vahel. Esmasus (*firstness*) tähistab tegevust, mis on seotud rekursiivse ikoonilise minaga; teisasus (*secondness*) tegevust, mis toimub mina ja teise vahelises suhtes kindlas keskkonnas (indeksikaalsed seosed); kolmasus (*thirdness*) tähistab mina ja teise vahelisi vajalikke suhteid, et rekursioon saaks ajas teostuda; nullsus on protsess, mis toodab uut vastastikust informatsiooni. See mudel integreerib Shannoni entroopia, Boltzmanni entroopia ja Darwini entroopia. Samuti näitab mudel, kuidas loodus on leidnud viisi nendele entroopiatele vastandumiseks W. Ross Ashby tarviliku mitmekesisuse seaduse kaudu, kasutades liiasust liigse müra kandjana, millest saavad alguse uued komplementaarsed suhted. Seda täiendavat entroopiat nimetatakse uurimuses Deaconi entroopiaks. Just need suhted, mis tulenevad iga indiviidi sees toimuvast individueerumisprotsessist ja ületavad kultuurilised seadused, ongi see paik, millele rajaneb suveräänsus.

Kui universum oleks lõpetatud, piisaks rahvusriikidest. Kuid loodus on lõpetamata ning sümbolite hierarhilise loomuse tõttu vajab riik uusi ikoone ja indekseid, mida saab tuletada üksnes praktika kaudu – inimese tegutsemise kaudu, mis ületab isegi omaenda koodid. Inimese evolutsiooni saladus seisneb selles, et see uus tegutsemine on suunatud teist tõlgendades kui iseennast kohtlema. Suveräänsus rajaneb indiviidis ja tervikus – olemise enese kaudu: „olla tähendab olla ainulaadses suhtes tervikuga“. Tervikut, indiviidi ja nendevahelist suhet võidakse eelistada mõtelda *quadriga*, tetramorf, PRDS-i [*pešat, remez, din, sod*], beautifulia [*BEcome, AT-one, IF-then, IAmb*], tetraktüüsi, kaalatsakra [*kaya, la, chala, krama*] või Dante sõnade kaudu. Kõik need viivad samale arusaamale inimlikust loogikast: induktsioon, abduktsioon, deduktsioon ja analoogia. Sellest protsessist tuletatud „jumalik seadus“ seisneb „valguse nägemises heana“ – et ületada see, mida nähakse kolmanda isiku piiratud vaatepunktist.

Uurimus tugineb läbivalt õigluse silma kujundile, metafoorile „teadmine on nägemine“ ning nägemise ja loogiliste propositsioonide vahelisele seosele. Uurimuses kirjeldatakse vaimu universumit, mis näeb loovaid troope tekkimas pildi (kujutise) ja sõna tõlkimatuse kaudu. Selles dünaamilises protsessis kujunev identiteet on oma olemuselt dünaamiline ja rajaneb nelikstruktuuril (kvaternaarsusel). Uurimus näitab, kuidas erandseisundist, kahtlusest ja ärevusest saab alguse järeldamise ja uurimise protsess. Tõsiasi, et lokaalsed üksused on võimelised avastama komplementaarseid seoseid tõhusamalt kui staatilise hierarhia poolt juhitud süsteem, viitab suveräänsuse teistsugusele alusele kui see, mida pakkus Carl Schmitt.

Seega on probleemi kriteerium siin tegevuse kriteeriumi aluseks. See on ühegi tõenduseta transsendentne tegevus, millel puudub väljakujunenud identiteet ning mis ei allu ei seadusele ega ajalooliselt kujunenud moraalile. Kui uurimus tõlgendab valgust sellest vaatenurgast, on keskmis induktsioon ja empirism. Kuid uurimus näitab, et teaduse sügavam alus ei rajane mitte vaatlusel, vaid kujutlusvõimel. Loomulikust valgusest (*il lume naturale*) lähtuvad mõtteeksperimentid näitavad, et tõe vastavusteooria ei ole tõe ainus alus; alles neljandas peatükis selgub, et just kujutlusvõime kaudu avaneb keskne metahüpotees.

Sealt edasi käsitleb uurimus teises peatükis abduktsioonilooikat, mis avaldub Rousseau seadusandjas, Rawlsi poliitilises liberalismis ning Ferrara autentsuse, otsustuse ja eeskujulikkuse käsitustes. Uurimus näitab sellega teed uue kontekstuaalse universalismi poole, mille keskmes on loomupärane arusaamine, tõlgendus ja õigluse silm. Siin toimub valguse sügavam tõlgendus – mitte kui nähtav spekter, vaid kui teadmise metafoor. See on valgus, mis eelneb induktiivsele ja deduktiivsele loogikale – pragmaatilise tõe maailm.

Sellel kohal käsitleb uurimus deduktiivse loogika valdkonda ja selle rolli inimkonna kui sümboolse liigi alusstruktuuris. Uurimus näitab Rawlsi „Õigluse teooria“ jõudu deduktiivse tööna, ent samal põhjusel ka selle piiranguid. Selgub, et kohtulik tõlgendus on võtmetähtsusega viis, kuidas aeg tuuakse sisse staatilise konstitutsionalismi. Just loogika staatiline loomus osutub selle nõrkuseks ning teeb ilmseks vajaduse näha keelt kontekstualiseeritud raamistikus – retoorikana ja paralleelsete troopide süsteemina. Troopide süsteemina avaldab keel aga, et reageerida tuleb veel ühele troobile – irooniale, mis toob esile paradoksi ja vastuolu. Selles kolmasuse maailmas püüab loogika olla sisemiselt sidus ja väliselt konstruktiivne.

Neljas peatükk näitab, et on vajalik uuesti tuua sisse kujutluslik universaal ning *il lume naturale* kui alus dünaamilisele semioosile, mida uurimus nimetab ka afektiivseks kujutluslikuks (poetiliseks) modelleerimiseks. See on staadium, kus inimene kohtub Teisega kui iseendaga – vastuolu, paradoksi ja iroonia tasand, mis viib rikkama identiteedi teostumiseni. Siinkohal oli uurimuses vajalik lähemalt selgitada, kuidas metafoorid on kehastunud. Iroonilised metafoorid eeldavad vastuintuitsiooni – erinevalt teises peatükis vaadeldud metafooridest, mis võivad toetuda üksnes intuiitivsetele kategooriatele. Selles valdkonnas on loogika analoogiline – selles mõttes, et konkreetne kontekst nõuab selles staadiumis üksnes konkreetset lahendust, mis ei ole veel üldistatav. Alles õigustamise ja küpsuse kaudu muutub konkreetne lahendus üldistatavaks.

Selles kohas näitab uurimus, kuidas tetramorf ehk neljakujulisus leiab juba toetust uusimast uurimistööst kognitiivse religiooniteaduse vallas, mis käsitleb vastuintuitsiooni, vaimuteooriat ja agendituvastust. Täpsemalt selgitab uurimus kõikehõlmava teadmise perspektiivi ja sotsiaalselt strateegilise informatsiooni korrelatsiooni, samuti *quadriga* ehk neliktõlgenduse suhet nende fundamentaalsete küsimustega, mis on kujundanud inimkonna mõtlemist ja vestlusi juba enne kirjaliku ajaloo algust. Paigutades selle idee hõlmavamasse teosemioosi ajaloo raamistikku, näitab uurimus, et kontrafaktuaalse identiteedi mõiste on võtmetähtsusega nii emergeeruva eeskujulikkuse kui ka indiviidi suveräänsuse jaoks. Uurimuse viimase sammuna on vajalik süveneda representatsioonide taha, et näha võimalikult lähedalt üksnes tahet – ja leida „armastus, mis liigutab päikest ja teisi tähti.“

Paradiisi võti on PRDS – *pešat, remez, din, sod* – neli tõlgendusviisi: sõnasõnaline, allegooriline, moraalne ja anagoogiline; samuti metonüümia, metafoor, sünekdohh ja iroonia. Uurimus näitab, et see võti – see raamistik – on samaväärne sellega, kui vaadelda nelja erinevat suhet väite (propositiooni) ja selle keskkonna vahel, millesse väide on tegutsemise kaudu asetatud. Uurimus näitab, et metafoor

„teadmine on nägemine“ võimaldab muuta valguse, nägemise ja sõna vahelise seose selgesõnaliseks ning avada selgema mudeli, mis suudab paigutada teaduse, filosoofia, ajaloo ja religiooni ühele kaardile. Uurimus kasutab seda mudelit ka selleks, et näidata, kuidas inimese epistemoloogial ja ontoloogial põhinev poliitiline filosoofia peaks ideaalis olema üles ehitatud, et tabada ja rakendada keskkonnast pärineva uue informatsiooni jõudu. See on informatsioon, mida saab kehtiva põhiseadusliku korra raames kätte kohtunike tõlgenduse kaudu, aga ka põhiseaduse muudatuste kaudu, kui uus informatsioon ületab senise korra piirid, ent säilitab selle võime püsima jääda ja areneda tänu sisemisele järjekindlusele ja enesesäilitusele.

Uurimuse keskne eesmärk on mõista, kuidas põhjendada inimõigusi postsekulaarsel ajastul, mil universaalset väidet ei suuda enam toetada ei traditsiooniline religioosne *imago Dei* mõiste ega ratsionaalsusel põhinevad sekulaarsed argumentid. See on iseäranis selge postmodernsel ajastul, mis järgneb Wittgensteini ja Heideggeri mõtestatud „keelelisele pöördele“. On olemas selge vajadus leida inimõigustele postsekulaarne alus. Uurimus kasutab selleks teosemioosi kui tööriista, et rajada uus mudel – epistokraatia –, mis ulatub „koopast väljapoole“. Just teosemioosis kohtuvad sotsiaalne epistemoloogia ja ontoloogia oma piiridel füüsilise ontoloogiaga – ning see nõuab, et bioloogilised olendid astuksid sammu põhiseadusliku korra piiridest väljapoole, et tuletada see teadmine, mis kannab endas elavat sädet ja võib lõppkokkuvõttes elustada „rahvaid“.

Sellest teadmisest võiks siis kujuneda põhiseaduslik kord, mida saab üles ehitada „koopasissekäigu piiiril, seal, kus valgus ja vari kohtuvad“, niikaua kui see on juurdunud kuldses igaviku klauslis – see tähendab põhi- ja inimõigustes, mis legitimeerivad põhiseadust ning tagavad selle püsiva kehtivuse läbi aja ja üle põlvkondade. Erinevalt Platoni lõpplahendusest ei toetu epistokraatia filosoofkuningale, vaid on dünaamiline lahendus, mis nõuab kõigi „rahvaste“ – nii sümbolsete kui ka loomulike – aktiivset osalust ja nende pidevat suhestumist uue informatsiooniga, sealhulgas olukordades, mis hõlmavad erandseisundeid ja ületavad kehtiva põhiseadusliku korra piirid. Just selles uues informatsioonis peitub uue eeskujulikkuse, „kõige mõistlikumat“ puudutava reflektiivse otsustuse ning „rahva“ evolutsiooni potentsiaal. Nii uurimuse probleem kui ka lahendus viivad lõpuks tagasi ühe poliitilise filosoofi juurde – John Locke’ini.

## RIASSUNTO

### **Sovranità Illuminata: Un'Immagine di Dio Semiotica Postsecolare**

La domanda centrale che attraversa l'intero lavoro è stata quella di valutare quali aspetti dell'Imago Dei possano ancora essere applicati alle questioni della sovranità e dei diritti umani in una società post-secolare. Lo strumento impiegato è stato quello della semiotica, al fine di decifrare ciò che viene simbolizzato. In particolare, si è fatto ricorso a una semiosi dinamica e gerarchica che trova il proprio fondamento nel pensiero di Terrence Deacon. In tale prospettiva, mettere in dialogo la nozione vichiana dell'Imago Dei come universale fantastico con il nuovo campo semiotico inaugurato da John Locke ha permesso di aprire il percorso stesso di indagine. Ciò si rivela indispensabile nel XXI secolo, poiché non solo la religione non può più fungere da fondamento legittimo, ma anche la ragione è stata posta sotto accusa a causa dei limiti messi in luce dal linguistic turn e dall'incompletezza gödeliana – segni inequivocabili della fine dell'Illuminismo 1.0.

Il presente lavoro ha inteso mostrare, attraverso la ricerca condotta, come Filone di Alessandria, Giambattista Vico, Thomas-Andreas Pöder, Tuuli Pern e Claudia Welz, tra gli altri, abbiano aperto una via per considerare l'Imago Dei come un modello dinamico d'azione, applicabile anche in una prospettiva agnostica. Nel campo delle scienze cognitive della religione, Ara Norenzayan e Benjamin Purzycki hanno dimostrato che tale azione trova un fondamento empirico nella cosiddetta socially strategic information, ovvero nella conoscenza morale.

Elemento chiave di questa prospettiva è il principio *verum factum*, secondo cui la creazione è verità. Le istituzioni politiche umane costituiscono, in effetti, la chiave per comprendere la mente, e vi è un aspetto di quest'ultima che fonda in modo particolare l'idea di Imago Dei: una categoria dell'essere e una figura tropica che, in una semiosi dinamica e gerarchica, corrisponde a ciò che nel quarto capitolo è stato definito *zeroness*, la radice della creatività. Essa rappresenta altresì la fonte di una quarta modalità d'inferenza, l'anaduzione.

Il testo fondamentale di Juri Lotman, *Universe of the Mind*, ha messo in luce come l'individuo partecipi attivamente al processo creativo attraverso la intraducibilità creativa dell'immagine e della parola, le quali generano i principali tropi. Questo è lo spazio dinamico dell'individuazione. In esso si collocano i tropi di Kenneth Burke, Agrippa, Sesto Empirico e Giambattista Vico; vi risiede altresì la quaternità junghiana, il magnum opus degli alchimisti, l'esegesi del tetramorfo, il Pardes cabalistico e il Kalachakra in quattro parti di Naropa. È in questo spazio che si conserva la speranza di fondare la sovranità su un principio di esemplarità emergente derivante da una autenticità trasformativa. In tal modo, l'analisi porta in primo piano i temi sviluppati da Alessandro Ferrara, John Rawls, Valerio Fabbrizi e Matteo Bianchin nell'ambito della filosofia politica.

Questo fondamento dinamico è stato mostrato avere origine nell'universale fantastico, centrato sullo sguardo altriciale – o occhio della giustizia – che orienta l'immaginazione verso azioni suscettibili di essere giustificate dinanzi a un caregiver e a un genitore amorevole: ossia, quando uno sconosciuto entra nel proprio ambiente e viene trattato come un vicino, o addirittura come un fratello.

Se l'Illuminismo 1.0 aveva posto il proprio accento sulla ragione e sulla scienza, l'Illuminismo 2.0 ne integra il fondamento con la ragione immaginativa e con una prospettiva di onniscienza. È stato dimostrato empiricamente che tale forma di ragionamento è strettamente connessa all'informazione socialmente strategica – o conoscenza morale – che sostiene la crescita delle società politiche su larga scala.

Per comprendere il processo gerarchico e dinamico della semiosi, che consente la produzione di identità controfattuali sempre più ampie, è stato necessario percorrere ciascuno dei passaggi lungo il cammino: dal momento del dubbio al momento della speranza; dalle critiche ai temi; dalla sospettosità alla fede; dalla filosofia alla filologia; dal dissenso all'azione; dalla fine della storia alla storia eterna ideale (*aquum bonum*).

Se il capitolo uno si è concentrato sulla logica induttiva e sul mondo empirico, il capitolo due ha affrontato la logica abduttiva e il pragmatismo dell'esemplare. Il capitolo tre, alternativamente, ha posto l'attenzione sulla logica deduttiva e sul suo "aboutness". Il capitolo quattro ha approfondito la nuova analogia che trascende le identità e le leggi precedentemente estratte. Il capitolo cinque ha cercato di fondare questo modello sulla scienza cognitiva della religione e sulla teosemosi, prima di sondare la "volontà" al di là e dietro la "rappresentazione".

Con l'introduzione del tempo, è stato reintrodotta un modello dinamico di auto-comprensione, che crea uno spazio per fondare la dignità umana, non solo attraverso la morale, ma attraverso la necessità: la spinta necessaria alla pace e alla prosperità, lo stato di fioritura umana che fonda la clausola d'oro dell'eternità. La legge naturale non si fonda quindi sulla ragione, ma sulla storia – e questo ha fatto tutta la differenza.

Ciascun capitolo ha inoltre fatto riferimento al lavoro sull'alchimia di Jung, ai modi di persuasione di Kenneth Burke, alle quattro concezioni dell'essere di Royce, alle radici quaduple di Schopenhauer, e alla filosofia politica stratificata di Rawls, tra gli altri. Il modello dinamico di semiosi si è basato in larga misura sul lavoro di Terrence Deacon, così come la prospettiva onnisciente su Norenzayan e Purzycki. I criteri di azione e dissenso sono stati esplorati attraverso Sextus Empiricus e Agrippa, mentre il concetto di universale immaginativo è stato sviluppato tramite Vico.

Vico stesso riteneva che questi quattro mondi fossero meglio rappresentati da quattro autori, ciascuno concentrato su logiche distinte: Francis Bacon, Hugo Grotius, Tacito e Platone. Tutta questa ricerca, considerata nel suo insieme, indica un percorso per garantire le fondamenta della sovranità in un mondo post-secolare, segnato dal crollo della logica formale e del linguaggio universale.

Questo percorso incorpora la teoria della mente, il catalizzatore sociale dello sguardo altriciale e l'occhio della giustizia. Attraverso una cognizione incarnata

che riflette la propria mente sull'universo, è stato possibile comprendere come una filosofia politica del XXI secolo possa fondare il futuro in ciascun individuo, il quale possiede intrinsecamente il potenziale di trascendere il proprio modello attuale e passato di azione, sulla base di ciò che ritiene essere meglio per gli altri. Ciò vale anche e soprattutto quando non vi è ancora alcuna evidenza disponibile. Nel tempo, infatti, evolve una probabilità sempre crescente che gli estranei vengano trattati come vicini e integrati nella "comunità amata" di Josiah Royce, guidata dall'agapismo di Peirce e dall'amore che dà vita. È questo processo che conduce l'evoluzione della specie umana verso ciò che è considerato il più ragionevole, seguendo quell'invito all'azione che proviene dal profondo e che proclama: «Ecco, sto qui, non posso fare altro».

A livello più fondamentale, tutti gli strati derivano dall'informazione reciproca gerarchica tra opera e rappresentazione. La prima rappresenta l'opera che correla con il sé iconico ricorsivo. La seconda con la correlazione tra sé e altro all'interno di un ambiente (indice). La terza riguarda le relazioni necessarie tra sé e altro affinché la ricorsione possa essere istanziata nel tempo. La zeroness rappresenta il processo volto a generare nuove informazioni reciproche. Questo modello ha incorporato l'entropia di Shannon, l'entropia di Boltzmann e l'entropia darwiniana. Ha inoltre dimostrato come la natura abbia trovato il modo di opporsi a queste entropie attraverso la legge della varietà necessaria di W. Ross Ashby, sfruttando la ridondanza per trasportare rumore in eccesso che serve come base per nuove relazioni complementari. Questa entropia aggiuntiva è stata definita entropia di Deacon. Le relazioni stesse derivano dal processo di individuazione all'interno di ciascun individuo, che trascende le proprie leggi culturali. È proprio qui che risiede la sovranità.

Se l'universo fosse completo, gli Stati nazionali sarebbero tutto ciò di cui si avrebbe bisogno. Tuttavia, la natura è incompleta e, a causa della natura gerarchica dei simboli, uno Stato necessita di icone e indici nuovi che possono essere estratti solo attraverso la prassi, attraverso l'azione umana che trascende persino i propri codici. Il segreto dell'evoluzione umana risiede nel fatto che questa azione innovativa è stata guidata verso il principio di trattare l'altro come sé stesso nell'interpretazione. Qui la sovranità si radica nell'individuo e nel tutto attraverso l'essere stesso: «essere significa essere unicamente relazionati a un tutto». Il tutto, l'individuo e la relazione tra essi. Che si preferisca concepirlo attraverso la Quadriga; il Tetramorf; PRDS [Peshat; Remez; Din; Sod]; Beautifia [BEcome; AT-one; IF-then; IAmb]; la tetractys; il kalachakra [kaya; la; chala; krama]; o attraverso le parole di Dante, tutti conducono alla stessa comprensione della logica umana: induzione, abduzione, deduzione e analogia. La Legge del Processo estratta dal Dei ha consistito nel vedere la luce come bene, al fine di trascendere ciò che si percepisce da una prospettiva limitata di terza persona.

In tutto il presente lavoro il concetto si è basato sull'occhio della giustizia, sulla metafora del "sapere è vedere" e sul suo rapporto con le proposizioni logiche. Questo studio ha descritto l'universo della mente che osserva i trope creativi prodotti attraverso la intraducibilità di immagine e parola. L'identità dinamica che ne scaturisce, a sua volta, in questo processo dinamico è sostenuta

dalla quaternità. Dallo stato di eccezione, dal dubbio e dall'ansia, si è mostrato come abbia inizio il processo di inferenza e indagine. Il fatto che le unità localizzate siano più capaci di scoprire relazioni complementari rispetto a quanto diretto da una gerarchia statica ha immediatamente suggerito una base della sovranità diversa da quella proposta da Carl Schmitt.

Il criterio del problema, in questo contesto, funge quindi da base per il criterio dell'azione. Questa azione trascendente, che non è giustificata da alcuna evidenza, è priva di maturità identitaria e non può essere catturata né dalla legge né dalla morale, entrambe costituite come eventi storici. Interpretando la luce da questa prospettiva, l'attenzione si concentrava sull'induzione e sull'empirismo. Tuttavia, si è dimostrato che una base più profonda della scienza non si fonda sull'osservazione, bensì sull'immaginazione. Gli esperimenti mentali (*gedanken*) derivanti da il lume naturale, la luce naturale. Ciò implicava che la teoria della corrispondenza della verità non fosse l'unica fondazione della verità e solo nel capitolo quattro si è dimostrato come fosse nell'immaginazione che si rivelasse la metapositiva centrale.

Da questo punto, il lavoro ha trattato nel secondo capitolo la logica abduttiva così come emerge nel legislatore di Rousseau, nel liberalismo politico di Rawls e nei concetti di autenticità, giudizio ed esemplarità di Ferrara. Ciò ha delineato il percorso verso un nuovo universalismo contestualizzato, centrato sul senso comune, sull'interpretazione e sull'occhio della giustizia. Qui si sviluppa una interpretazione più profonda della luce, non come spettro visibile, ma come metafora della conoscenza. Una luce che precede la logica induttiva e deduttiva. Questo è un mondo di verità pragmatica.

A questo punto, il lavoro ha esaminato il regno della logica deduttiva e il suo ruolo come fondamento dell'umanità in quanto specie simbolica. È stata evidenziata la potenza della Theory of Justice di Rawls come opera deduttiva, ma anche i suoi limiti proprio per questo motivo. L'interpretazione giudiziaria è stata identificata come uno strumento chiave attraverso il quale il tempo viene introdotto in un costituzionalismo statico. La natura statica della logica si è dimostrata, infatti, la sua debolezza, evidenziando la necessità di considerare il linguaggio nel suo contesto, come retorica e insieme di tropi paralleli. Tuttavia, come insieme di tropi, è emerso che un ulteriore tropo doveva essere affrontato: l'ironia, che introduce paradosso e contraddizione. In questo mondo della terzietà, la logica mira a essere internamente coerente ed esternamente costruttiva.

Nel capitolo quattro è stato mostrato come fosse necessario reintrodurre l'universale immaginativo e il lume naturale come fondamento di una semiosi dinamica, ciò che è stato altresì definito come modellazione affettivo-immaginativa (poetica). Questa è la fase della confrontazione dell'Altro come sé stessi, in cui la contraddizione, il paradosso e l'ironia conducono al compimento di un'identità più ricca. Ciò ha richiesto un'analisi profonda di come le metafore siano incarnate. Le metafore ironiche richiedono contro-intuizione, in contrasto con le metafore del capitolo 2, che potevano fare affidamento esclusivamente su categorie intuitive. In questo ambito, la logica è risultata analogica, nel senso che un contesto particolare richiedeva in questa fase una soluzione specifica, non ancora

generalizzabile. Solo attraverso la giustificazione e la maturità una soluzione particolare può diventare generalizzabile.

A questo punto è stato possibile dimostrare come questo tetramorfo sia già stato sostenuto dalle ultime ricerche nella scienza cognitiva della religione, attraverso la contro-intuizione, la teoria della mente e il rilevamento degli agenti. È stata chiarita in particolare la correlazione tra la prospettiva onnisciente e l'informazione socialmente strategica, così come il rapporto della quadriga con le questioni fondamentali attorno alle quali l'umanità ha plasmato tutte le conversazioni fin da prima della storia scritta. Collocando l'idea nel contesto di una più ampia storia della thesemiosis, è stato mostrato che la nozione di identità controfattuale è cruciale per l'esemplarità emergente e per la sovranità dell'individuo. Concludere la questione ha richiesto di scavare dietro le rappresentazioni, per avvicinarsi il più possibile alla volontà, solo per trovare "l'amore che muove il sole e le altre stelle".

La Chiave del Paradiso. PRDS: Peshat; Remez; Din; Sod. I quattro modi di interpretazione: letterale, allegorico, morale e anagogico. Metonimia, metafora, sineddoche e ironia. Questa chiave, questo quadro concettuale, è stato dimostrato essere equivalente a considerare le quattro diverse relazioni tra una proposizione e l'ambiente in cui essa è inserita attraverso l'azione. La metafora del "conoscere è vedere" ha permesso di esplicitare la relazione tra luce, vista e parola, al fine di rendere possibile un modello più chiaro, capace di collocare scienza, filosofia, storia e religione su una stessa mappa. Inoltre, è stato delineato come una filosofia politica basata sull'epistemologia e ontologia umana dovrebbe idealmente essere costruita, per catturare e sfruttare il potere delle informazioni innovative provenienti dall'ambiente. Informazioni che possono essere recepite sia dall'ordine costituzionale attuale attraverso l'interpretazione dei giudici, sia mediante emendamenti all'ordine costituzionale, quando le informazioni nuove superano l'ordine precedente, ma ne mantengono la capacità di sopravvivere e prosperare attraverso la irrevocabilità, l'autocongruenza e l'auto-conservazione.

Al centro di questo lavoro vi è l'obiettivo di comprendere come fondare i diritti umani nell'era post-secolare, in cui né il concetto religioso tradizionale di Imago Dei, né gli argomenti secolari basati sulla razionalità, sono sufficienti a sostenere una pretesa universale. Ciò risulta ancor più evidente in un'epoca post-moderna successiva al "giro linguistico" delineato da Wittgenstein e Heidegger. Si è manifestata una chiara necessità di individuare un fondamento post-secolare. Lo strumento della teosemiosis è stato impiegato per stabilire un nuovo modello di epistocrazia che si spinge "oltre la caverna". È qui che l'epistemologia sociale e l'ontologia incontrano i propri limiti rispetto all'ontologia fisica, richiedendo agli esseri biologici di oltrepassare l'ordine costituzionale ed estrarre quella conoscenza che cattura la scintilla vitale, la quale può infine rivitalizzare i Popoli.

Ciò si tradurrebbe in un ordine costituzionale che potrebbe essere costruito "di lato, all'ingresso della caverna", a condizione che sia radicato nella clausola dell'eternità dorata – i diritti fondamentali e umani – che legittimano la costituzione e la sua continuità nel tempo e attraverso le generazioni. A differenza della soluzione finale di Platone, questa non si fonda su un Filosofo-Re, ma

costituisce una soluzione dinamica che richiede l'impegno attivo di tutti i Popoli – sia simbolici sia naturali – e la loro continua interazione con informazioni nuove in situazioni che includono gli stati di eccezione che trascendono l'ordine costituzionale vigente. In queste informazioni nuove risiede il potenziale per una nuova exemplarità, un nuovo giudizio riflessivo sul “più ragionevole”, e un'evoluzione del Popolo. Il problema e la soluzione rimandano alle mani di una sola filosofia politica: John Locke.

# CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: Matthew Kalkman  
DOB: 15 January 1988  
Email: matthewkalkman@gmail.com

## Research Interests

Religion; Politics; Semiotics; Law; Philosophy; History; Social Science

## Education

2021–2025 University of Tartu, PhD in Religious Studies  
2023–2025 University of Rome Tor Vergata, PhD in History, Philosophy and Social Science  
2009–2010 London School of Economics, Masters of Science in Regulation  
2006–2009 Durham University, Bachelor of Law

## Certifications

2011–2012 University of British Columbia Law School, NCA Certificate of Qualification (awarded to pass the bar exam in Canada and practice law)  
2018 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Series 7 and Series 66

## Conference Co-Chairing and Presentation

2025 Co-presented “Evolution as Inference” with Terrence Deacon at The 14th conference of the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies along with the 15th Annual Lotman Days on a jointly written MIT Press publication set to be published in 2026  
2022 Co-chair of three panels on Religion and Semiotics at the Juri Lotman Centenary Congress in Estonia  
2022 Presented at one of the Religion and Semiotics panels at the Juri Lotman Centenary Congress in Estonia

## Publications related to the topic of the dissertation by year

Kalkman, Matthew & Deacon, Terrence, “Evolution as Inference”. *MIT Press*. (To be published by Winter 2025)  
Kalkman, Matthew. “Theosemiosis: An Essay on Consilience and the Perennial Philosophy.” *Sign Systems Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 398–432.  
Pöder, Thomas-Andreas & Kalkman, Matthew. “Introduction: Religion in the semiosphere”. *Sign Systems Studies*. 51, no. (2023): 235–238.

- Pöder, Thomas-Andreas & Kalkman, Matthew. Guest Editors of Special issue: Religion in the semiosphere. *Sign Systems Studies*. 51, no. (2023): 230–432.
- Kalkman, Matthew. *New Liberalism*. Granville Island Publishing, 2011.
- Kalkman, Matthew. “Re-Assessing Regulation in Light of the Financial Crisis.” *Inter Alia* (2010): 96–106.
- Kalkman, Matthew. “Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow.” *Cambridge Student Law Review* 5 (2009): 75–92.

## ELULOOKIRJELDUS

**Nimi:** Matthew Kalkman

**Sünniaeg:** 15. jaanuar 1988

**E-post:** matthewkalkman@gmail.com

### Uurimisvaldkonnad:

Religioon, poliitika, semiootika, õigus, filosoofia, ajalugu, sotsiaalteadused

### Hariduskäik:

2021–2025 Tartu Ülikool, doktoriõpe, religiooniuringud

2023–2025 Rooma Ülikool Tor Vergata, doktoriõpe, ajalugu, filosoofia ja sotsiaalteadused

2009–2010 Londoni Majanduskool (London School of Economics), magistrakraad (MSc) regulatsioonis

2006–2009 Durhami Ülikool, õigusteaduse bakalaureusekraad (LLB)

### Kutsetunnistused:

2011–2012 NCA kvalifikatsioonitunnistus, Briti Columbia Ülikooli Õigusteaduskond (*õigus sooritada advokatuuriksam Kanadas ja praktiseerida õigust*)

2018 USA Finantssektori Reguleeriva Ameti (FINRA) litsentsid Series 7 ja 66

### Dissertatsiooniga seotud publikatsioonid:

Kalkman, Matthew & Deacon, Terrence, “Evolution as Inference”. *MIT Press*. (2026)

Kalkman, Matthew. “Theosemiosis: An Essay on Consilience and the Perennial Philosophy.” *Sign Systems Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 398–432.

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Kalkman, Matthew. *New Liberalism*. Granville Island Publishing, 2011.

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Kalkman, Matthew. “Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow.” *Cambridge Student Law Review* 5 (2009): 75–92.

**Konverentsikorraldus ja ettekanded:**

- 2025** Ühisettekanne Terrence Deaconiga MIT kirjastuses 2026. a lõpus ilmuvast kahasse kirjutatud publikatsioonist “Evolution as Inference”, Põhjamaade Semiootikauuringute Ühingu konverents / Lotmani päevad, Eesti
- 2022** Kolme religiooni ja semiootika paneeli kaaskorraldaja Juri Lotmani 100. sünniaastapäeva kongressil, Eesti
- 2022** Ettekanne religiooni ja semiootika paneelil Juri Lotmani 100. Sünniaastapäeva kongressil, Eesti

# CURRICULUM VITAE

**Nome:** Matthew Kalkman

**Data di nascita:** 15 gennaio 1988

**Email:** matthewkalkman@gmail.com

## **Aree di ricerca:**

Religione, politica, semiotica, diritto, filosofia, storia, scienze sociali

## **Formazione:**

- 2021–2025 Università di Tartu, dottorato di ricerca in studi religiosi  
2023–2025 Università di Roma Tor Vergata, dottorato di ricerca in storia, filosofia e scienze sociali  
2009–2010 London School of Economics, laurea magistrale (MSc) in regolamentazione  
2006–2009 Università di Durham, laurea in giurisprudenza (LLB)

## **Certificazioni professionali:**

- 2011–2012 Certificato di qualificazione NCA, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell'Università della Columbia Britannica (abilitazione all'esame di avvocato in Canada e alla pratica legale)  
2018 Licenze Series 7 e 66 dell'Autorità di regolamentazione del settore finanziario degli Stati Uniti (FINRA)

## **Pubblicazioni relative alla tesi di dottorato:**

- Kalkman, Matthew & Deacon, Terrence, “Evolution as Inference”. *MIT Press*. (2026)  
Kalkman, Matthew. “Theosemiosis: An Essay on Consilience and the Perennial Philosophy.” *Sign Systems Studies* 51, no. 2 (2023): 398–432.  
Pöder, Thomas-Andreas & Kalkman, Matthew. “Introduction: Religion in the semiosphere”. *Sign Systems Studies*. 51, no. (2023): 235–238.  
Pöder, Thomas-Andreas & Kalkman, Matthew. Guest Editors of Special issue: Religion in the semiosphere. *Sign Systems Studies*. 51, no. (2023): 230–432.  
Kalkman, Matthew. *New Liberalism*. Granville Island Publishing, 2011.  
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Kalkman, Matthew. “Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow.” *Cambridge Student Law Review* 5 (2009): 75–92.

### **Organizzazione di conferenze e presentazioni:**

- 2025 Presentazione congiunta con Terrence Deacon sulla pubblicazione scritta a quattro mani “Evolution as Inference”, in uscita presso la casa editrice del MIT alla fine del 2026, Conferenza dell’Associazione Nordica per gli Studi Semiotici / Giornate Lotman, Estonia
- 2022 Co-organizzatore di tre panel su religione e semiotica al congresso per il 100° anniversario della nascita di Juri Lotman, Estonia
- 2022 Relatore nel panel su religione e semiotica al congresso per il 100° anniversario della nascita di Juri Lotman, Estonia

## DISSERTATIONES THEOLOGIAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

1. **Tarmo Kulmar.** Die Theologie der Kraft-, Götter- und Seelenvorstellungen der ältesten Schicht der estnischen Urreligion. Tartu, 1994, Autorreferat, 45 S.
2. **Toomas Paul.** Die Geschichte der estnischen Bibelübersetzung, I Teil (XVI–XIX Jahrhundert). Tartu, 1994, Autorreferat, 27 S.
3. **Kalle Kasemaa.** Semitistik ja poeetikat. Tartu, 1997, 131 lk.
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5. **Riho Altnurme.** Eesti Evangeeliumi Luteriusu Kirik ja Nõukogude riik 1944–1949. Tartu, 2000, 326 lk.
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