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CHARACTER DESCRIPTION AND INVECTIVE: PERIPATETICS BETWEEN ETHICS, COMEDY AND RHETORIC

IVO VOLT

Department of Classical Philology, Institute of Germanic, Romance and Slavonic Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Tartu, Estonia

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Supervisor: Professor Anne Lill, University of Tartu

Reviewer: Professor Karin Blomqvist, University of Lund

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PREFACE

This thesis has originated from my interest in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, a remarkable piece of writing from the Greek antiquity and a true *aureolus libellus*.[1] I first read the *Characters*, in Russian, for a Russian class during my first year of study at the University of Tartu in 1993, and since then have come across this work several times, including a course on the *Characters* by Anne Lill in 1996, my B.A. and M.A. theses (1997 and 2000), a course on the *Characters* by myself (1999), and the Estonian translation and commentary of the work (Lill & Volt 2000).

I am grateful to all my friends and colleagues, both in Estonia and abroad, who have been helpful in many ways and various stages of the work. To list all those who, throughout the years, have helped with literature, personal advice or procuring scholarships would take too much space, but I would like to mention Simone Beta, Carl Joachim Classen, William W. Fortenbaugh, Heinz Hofmann, Luis Alfonso Llera Fueyo, Severin Koster, John McChesney-Young, Marcel Meulder, Janika Päll, Graziano Ranocchia, Stefan Schorn, Markus Stein, Peter Stork and Jaan Unt. I am especially grateful to Nancy Worman and Paul Millett who allowed me to see their work or parts of it before publication. I cordially thank my thesis supervisor Anne Lill for her continuous support and encouragement. Jeffrey Vollmer has taken on the task of checking my English.

I am greatly indebted to the Centre for Ethics of the University of Tartu (headed by Margit Sutrop) and to Volkswagen-Stiftung for awarding me a doctoral study grant for four years (from autumn 2001 till summer 2005). No philologist could live or work without libraries, and I wish to express my sincerest thanks to those in Tartu (especially the Department of Interlibrary Loans of Tartu University Library), Göttingen, Tübingen, Lund, Wolfenbüttel, Budapest and elsewhere. The preparation of this thesis was further supported by doctoral funding from the Ministry of Education and Science of Estonia (grant SF0182256),

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[1] This is Isaac Casaubon's often quoted description of the *Characters*, although in the original source, Jerome's *Against Iovinianus* 388.11b, it is used for his book on marriage (*aureolus Theophrasti liber de nuptiis* = Theophrastos fr. 486.7 FHS&G). Cf. FHS&G II: 258–9, Fortenbaugh 1994a: 24–5 (= 2003: 232–3), Diggle 2004: 14.

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Work on this thesis has been made considerably easier by the facilities offered by the CD-ROM disk #E and on-line database of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, and Packard Humanities Institute CD-ROM disks #5.3 (Latin texts) and #7 (inscriptions and papyri).[2] Translations of passages of ancient authors are my own, unless noted otherwise. In the case of Aristotle's works I have used, with occasional modifications, the revised Oxford translation edited by Jonathan Barnes (1984); quotations from the *Characters* of Theophrastos are adapted from James Diggle's translation (2004).

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[2] For searching and browsing texts on these CD-ROMs I have used two software programs: *Musaios* (various versions) by D. J. Dumont and R. M. Smith, and *Diogenes* (various versions) by P. J. Heslin.

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of the works of ancient Greek authors and occasional epigraphical or papyrological publications used in this thesis generally follow the practice of *LSJ*. The list below contains abbreviations that are absent in *LSJ* or differ from those listed in it. Abbreviations of the names of ancient authors do not always follow *LSJ*, as I have generally avoided Latinized or Anglicized forms of the Greek names (except in a few cases, such as Aristotle, Hesiod, Homer, Menander, Plato, Plutarch), or used a more indicative abbreviation. Such differing abbreviations are included. Abbreviations for periodicals follow *L'Année philologique*, with some minor exceptions, and are generally not included. Abbreviations for the manuscripts of the *Characters* of Theophrastos are not included (for these, cf. Diggle 2004: 37 ff., Stein 1992: 3 ff., Wilson 1962, Steinmetz 1960a: 60).

Aischin. = Aischines

ANRW = Temporini, Hildegard; Haase, Wolfgang (eds.) (1972–) *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*. Berlin etc.: de Gruyter

AP = Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία

Boisacq = Boisacq, Émile (1950) *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque étudiée dans ses rapports avec les autres langues indo-européennes*. 4. éd., augmentée d'un index par Helmut Rix. Heidelberg: Winter

ch. = chapter

Chantraine = Chantraine, Pierre (1968) *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des mots*. Paris: Klincksieck

Dein. = Deinarchos

Dem. = Demosthenes

Demiańczuk = Demiańczuk, Jan (1912) *Supplementum comicum: comoediae Graecae fragmenta.* Post editiones Kockianam et Kaibelianam reperta vel indicata collegit, disposuit, adnotationibus et indice verborum instruxit Ioannes Demiańczuk. Krakow: Nakładem Akademii Umiejętności [reprint Hildesheim: Olms, 1967]

Ernout & Meillet = Ernout, Alfred; Meillet, Antoine (1959) *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: histoire des mots*. 4. éd. rev., corr. et augm. d'un index. Paris: Klincksieck

Eur. = Euripides

FGrH = Jacoby, Felix (Hrsg.) (1923–) *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin: Weidmann (later Leiden: Brill)

FHG = Müller, Karl (ed.) (1841–70) *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*. Paris: Didot

FHS&G = Fortenbaugh et al. 1993 (see bibliography)

fr. = fragment

Frisk = Frisk, Hjalmar, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Heidelberg: Winter (Bd. I: 2., unver. Aufl. 1973; Bd. II: 3., unver. Aufl. 1991; Bd. III: *Nachträge, Wortregister, Corrigenda, Nachwort*. 2., unver. Aufl. 1979)

HWRh = Ueding, Gert (Hrsg.) (1992–) *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. Tübingen: Niemeyer

IG $2^2/3^2$ = Kirchner, Johannes (ed.) (1913–40) *Inscriptiones Graecae II et III: Inscriptiones Atticae Euclidis anno posteriores*. 2. ed. Berlin: Reimer

IPE 1^2 = Latyschev, Basilius (ed.) (1916) *Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae*. Vol. I: *Inscriptiones Tyrae, Olbiae, Chersonesi, Tauricae aliorum locorum a Danubio usque ad regnum Bosporanum*. 2. ed. St. Petersburg

Isokr. = Isokrates

Kock = Kock, Theodor (ed.) (1880–8) *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*. Leipzig: Teubner

LA [*Leipziger Ausgabe*] 1897 = *Theophrasts Charaktere* 1897 (see bibliography)

LSJ = Liddell, Henry George; Scott, Robert; Jones, Henry Stuart (1996) *A Greek-English lexicon*. With a revised supplement [edited by P. G. W. Glare with the assistance of A. A. Thompson]. Oxford: Clarendon Press

MS(S) = manuscript(s)

OLD = Glare, P. G. W. (ed.) (1983) *Oxford Latin dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Pack^2 = Pack, Roger A. (1965) *The Greek and Latin literary texts from Greco-Roman Egypt*. 2. rev. and enlarged ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

PCG = Kassel, Rudolf; Austin, Colin (eds.) (1983–) *Poetae comici Graeci*. Berlin: de Gruyter

PHerc. = *Papyri Herculanenses*

PV = *Prometheus Vinctus*

RUSCH = Rutgers University studies in classical humanities

SFOD = Stork et al. 2006 for Ariston; Stork 2004 for Lykon (see bibliography)

SOD = Stork et al. 2000 (see bibliography)

Soph. = Sophokles

SVF = Arnim, H. von (ed.) (1903–24) *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*. Leipzig: Teubner

TC = Tractatus Coislinianus

TrGF = Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta. Editores varii. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971–2004

Windekens = Windekens, Albert J. van (1986) *Dictionnaire étymologique complémentaire de la langue grecque. Nouvelles contributions à l'interpretation historique et comparée du vocabulaire*. Leuven: Peeters

Xen. = Xenophon

... δεῖ δ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν...
(Aristotle, *EN* 1104a8–9)

Vergebens bemühen wir uns, den Charakter eines Menschen zu schildern;
man stelle dagegen seine Handlungen, seine Taten zusammen,
und ein Bild des Charakters wird uns entgegentreten.
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Zur Farbenlehre*, 1810)

INTRODUCTION

Aim, structure, sources, methodology

My concern in this thesis is primarily with philosophers who are considered to belong to the Peripatetic school,[3] and of whom there are extant writings, sayings or testimonia that in one way or another deal with character description or character writing in general. I do not suppose that there existed a uniform practice of character studies within this school, but there are reasons to talk about a tradition that has changed and evolved. My study focuses on this tradition and its connections with ethics, comedy and rhetoric. This includes the analysis of the context of Peripatetic moral philosophy and rhetorical theory on the one hand, and the relations to popular usage in the comedy, and especially in the oratory, on the other. Thus, I do not confine myself to characterology in a narrow sense, but also take into account, for example, various ethical divisions that can be found in Aristotle or other writers, as well as instances of character denigration known from forensic speeches. The focus on tradition, together with an analysis of individual authors within it, is important in addressing issues such as authenticity of some texts or parts of a text.

The list of Peripatetics includes first of all Aristotle and the writings in the *corpus Aristotelicum*, whether genuine or not (in any case they form a part of the Peripatetic tradition). The discussion is focused, however, on Aristotle's student Theophrastos and his *Characters* as a work with

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[3] For the question of who were considered Peripatetics in the antiquity, see, e.g., Schorn 2003.

which character writing may be said to have reached its peak within ancient Greek literature. The subtitle of the thesis also reflects the confusion about the purpose and the general idea of Theophrastos' *Characters*: ethics, comedy and rhetoric are the most popular domains with which the work has been connected.

After Theophrastos, virtually all we have on this topic are fragments. The most important source for character writing of the successors of Theophrastos is Philodemos, whose works have been preserved in the papyri from Herculaneum, and who paraphrases and quotes an Ariston. There is a debate over the identity of this Ariston. I favour his Peripatetic origin, but even if this is not the case, the content of his writings compels us to compare them with Peripatetic ideas on similar topics.

The first part of the thesis presents a synopsis of character writing before Theophrastos, mainly in the Peripatetic tradition, but with a chapter on some forerunners of the Peripatetics. Character description in the Aristotelian corpus is reviewed in respect of four fields of study: ethics, rhetoric, poetics and physiognomics.

The second part focuses on the *Characters* of Theophrastos, touching upon questions of structure, authenticity and integrity of the work, its purpose and function. Here I also look at possibilities of distinguishing, grouping and classifying character types, and analyze their various lexical and semantic features. In addition, this part includes a study of the character sketches of Theophrastos in regard to various levels of social communication expressed in them. Some textological problems are addressed, as well.

The third part studies character writing in later, i.e. post-Theophrastean, Peripatetic authors, whose fragments reflect interest in character writing. A short *excursus* on Stoic character studies is included, as well.

Finally, some specific studies on character types in action are presented, focusing on the use of some character types as terms of disparagement, abuse and invective in one of the genres where they occur most often, viz. oratory. It also contains chapters devoted to the tradition and use of some specific characters, notably the dissembler. Additional sources for the final part of this study come from outside the Peripatetic tradition. There are various reasons for choosing oratory as the genre with which to compare the Peripatetic tradition of character writing. On

the one hand, I have followed K. J. Dover's suggestion that in the case of a division into moral philosophy and popular morality in ancient Athens, the main genre that can give us plausible information about the latter is practical rhetoric, i.e. Attic oratory (Dover 1974: 2). On the other hand, character writing need not always be connected with ethics, and sometimes its closeness to rhetoric or comedy is obvious or at least presumable (think, e.g., of various interpretations of the possible purpose and actual function of the *Characters* of Theophrastos).

I suggest that most of the types that Theophrastos included in the *Characters* were well known to his public, and that the basis of his selection was more or less the popular usage. Popular attitudes towards social types may be observed above all in the speeches of the orators and in comic texts. This may tell us something about the sources and background of Theophrastos' work. Whatever its purpose, the implicit sources of it must have also included contemporary oratory (and perhaps comedy), and we cannot exclude the influence of Aristotle's work on ethics, either. When Theophrastos came to Athens together with Aristotle in about 335 BCE, two of the major orators, Aischines and Demosthenes, were still very much active. The situation with comedy is less clear, as all major texts after Aristophanes and before Menander are lost. Menander was, however, already active at the time when the *Characters* were written (probably around 320s BCE),[4] so he should be taken into account, as well.

All texts analyzed here were in all probability written before the *Characters*. Thus I am not after any "Theophrastean influence" on these texts, although in the case of Menander and Deinarchos, who are claimed to have been his students, this cannot be entirely excluded. Rather, my aim is to indicate some similarities and differences between the Theophrastean sketches and the representation of negative social types in the popular tradition, i.e. comedy and especially oratory.

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[4] The precise date of composition, yet alone publication, is indeterminable, and there is no consistent dramatic date either. See Diggle 2004: 27–37 and cf. Cichorius in LA 1897: lvii–lxii; Rühl 1898; Boegehold 1959; Stein 1992: 21–45; Rusten 1993: 8–10; Lane Fox 1996: 134–9.

As a result, I hope to have shown that character studies hold a particularly important role within the Peripatetic tradition. Although other philosophical schools (e.g., the Stoics) did not entirely discard the topic, the Peripatetics seem to have paid special attention to it, whatever form they chose for it. I suggest that the reasons for this may be sought in Aristotle's ideas on connecting philosophical discussions with social practices. The ἔργον-oriented approach of the Peripatetics is necessarily focused on the latter and will naturally lead to the observation and evaluation of social types. In this, Theophrastos seems to have proceeded from the theoretical basis of Aristotle's teaching and developed this direction into something completely original by focusing on the practical application of these ideas.

In addition, I have presented an analysis of the lexical and semantic structure of at least part of this tradition, proceeding from the hypothesis that this structure can, to a certain degree, be correlated to the social phenomena. Methodologically, this study is bound to balance between an interpretative approach to some value terms and behavioural norms by which the "social value" of others is judged, and a lexical and semantic approach that explores actual attestations of the terms. As Lloyd-Jones (1971: 2) has warned, one cannot assume that in order to study the moral notions found in a work of art or in a society it is enough to list and analyze the words indicating moral concepts which occur in it. Although this approach is legitimate, a philological exploration should be supplemented by the study of actual behaviour, and form the basis for extrapolation and further theorizing (Sluiter & Rosen 2003: 4). Additionally, in the case of the source texts used in this study, textual problems sometimes cannot be separated from interpretative issues, as will be seen.

The final goal has been to scrutinize some passages from oratory, in order to find parallels to the Peripatetic tradition of character writing, or point out specific developments, which are important in assessing issues of popular morality and moral philosophy in ancient Greece. This includes tracing some general patterns of what makes the behaviour of "negative" character types socially unacceptable.

Terminology

Throughout the text I have used the terms 'character writing' and 'character studies' to denote a general approach to a topic concerned with aspects of human nature, relations and behaviour, and 'character description', 'character type', 'character sketch', or simply 'character' to point out more specific representations.

It has been noted that "character is not a subject which we can afford to explore from the starting-point of a fixed definition or a set of terminology" (Halliwell 1990: 33). This thesis does not aim at a systematic analysis of various terms used in ancient Greek texts to denote aspects of human nature and behaviour.[5] Several studies have been written, which deal with one or many facets of this subject, including the question if and how much (or how little) our modern concept of character coincides with something that can be observed in the Greek world.[6] However, some words have to be said about the main terminology.

The English word 'character' is derived from the Greek χαρακτήρ, but 'character' in the modern sense is not one of the original meanings of that Greek word. The most important study on the meaning and use of the word in antiquity is still an article by Alfred Körte (1929).[7] Körte is greatly indebted to Ernst Fraenkel's detailed linguistic studies on the Greek *nomina agentis* ending with -τηρ (but also -τωρ and -της), which have shown that *nomina agentis* with τηρ-ending, which were frequent in Homeric times, were in Attic dialect replaced, with some exceptions, with those ending with -της.[8] The word χαρακτήρ is originally an agent noun (*nomen agentis*) formed from the verb χαράσσειν. The first known occurrence of this verb is in Hesiod (*Op*. 387 and 573), where it means 'to sharpen' or 'to whet'. This meaning, which is also found in later prose, seems to have been derived from the basic meaning 'to scratch', which is also the basis of the technical sense 'to engrave' or 'to carve' (and also 'to

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[5]   These terms include, e.g., φύσις, τρόπος, ἦθος. Cf. Thimme 1935.
[6]   See, e.g., Adkins 1970, Pelling 1990, Gill 1996, etc.
[7]   Cf., however, also Milbradt 1974, who has important sections on χαρακτήρ, ἦθος and τρόπος.
[8]   See Fraenkel 1910, 1912 and 1913 and Körte 1929: 69–70.

mint (coins)') frequent in later times. Thus, χαρακτήρ means 'engraver' or 'one who mints coins'.[9] Already in Homeric times there is a tendency to use the agent nouns ending with the suffix -τηρ to signify tools with which some action is carried out (*nomen instrumenti*).[10] Thus, in some inscriptions, χαρακτήρ means 'stamp' or 'die'.[11] But the most common meaning goes even further, indicating the outcome of an action of engraving or carving, i.e. 'mark engraved', 'impress' or 'stamp', as *nomen rei actae*. Thus its meaning is similar to that of χάραγμα, and the two words are indeed sometimes used in the same sense by later authors.[12]

In literary texts, the first occurrence of the word χαρακτήρ is in Aischylos.[13] Its use is not frequent before Aristotle, and it is usually found in the sense somehow connected with money-minting, stamps on coins, or the coins themselves.[14] It is a distinguishing mark of type, value or genuineness.[15] The image of a stamp is quite early transferred to human sphere, but for facial or bodily features rather than in the sense of character.[16] As a 'stamp' it can also denote peculiarities of language or dialect,[17] and notably of style.[18] This last meaning is most common in

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[9] This meaning is found only in Stob. 4.39.27, citing a treatise Περὶ βίου by a Pythagorean author Euryphamos (in the sense 'engraver'), and in the so-called Protogenes-inscription from Olbia, *IPE* 1².32*A*18 (3rd century BCE, in the sense 'one who mints coins'). See Körte 1929: 71 and cf. *LSJ* s.v., I.1.

[10] See Körte 1929: 72 and Fraenkel 1913: 107 ff.

[11] *IG* 2².1013.64, 1408.11, 1424a.120, 280, 1469.107; cf. a simile in Arist. *GA* 781a28. See also *LSJ* s.v., I.3, and cf. Körte 1929: 72–3, who lists some other words ending with -τηρ that undergo the same development.

[12] See Körte 1929: 73, n. 3; 74, n. 4; 75, n. 2.

[13] *Supp.* 282: Κύπριος χαρακτήρ τ᾽ ἐν γυναικείοις τύποις / εἰκὼς πέπληκται τεκτόνων πρὸς ἀρσένων. The king compares the look of the maidens to "Cyprian impress stamped upon female images by male craftsmen." (Transl. Herbert Weir Smyth.)

[14] Körte (1929: 74, n. 1) knows of 15 occurrences in the literature before Aristotle.

[15] Cf. Eur. *El.* 558–9: τί μ᾽ ἐσδέδορκεν ὥσπερ ἀργύρου σκοπῶν / λαμπρὸν χαρακτήρ᾽; ἢ προσεικάζει μέ τωι; with the interpretation of Seaford (1998: 137–9). For the concept of χαρακτήρ in Euripides cf. Will 1960–1.

[16] Cf., e.g., Hdt. 1.116: χαρακτὴρ τοῦ προσώπου; Eur. *Med.* 519: οὐδεὶς χαρακτὴρ ἐμπέφυκε σώματι.

[17] Cf., e.g., Hdt. 1.57: γλώσσης χαρακτῆρα, 1.142: χαρακτῆρες γλώσσης.

[18] Both of speech (cf. Ar. *Pax* 220: ὁ γοῦν χαρακτὴρ ἡμεδαπὸς τῶν ῥημάτων) and of writing (the famous χαρακτῆρες λέξεως distinguished by many ancient authors).

later Greek authors. In later times, χαρακτήρ is also used to denote letters or written symbols.[19] Thus, in classical times, the word is never used for the personal character (trait) of a man.

In some cases, χαρακτήρ is used for type or character of a person or a thing. Menander's fr. 72 (ἀνδρὸς χαρακτὴρ ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται) is the most famous example. *LSJ* (s.v. II.4) cites this line as a rare example of χαρακτήρ denoting individual nature. According to Diggle (2004: 5), this means no more than 'the stamp of a man is recognized from his speech', i.e. the speech typifies him, makes him a distinct and recognizable individual. It is important to distinguish here between the typified character and the more distinct individual. Menander often creates more individual characters than the usual stock types of comedy. His *hetairai*, his soldiers and slaves are sometimes depicted as quite aberrant from the usual comic type. It is also noteworthy that Terence, using this verse in his *Heautontimorumenos*, understands χαρακτήρ as *ingenium*.[20] This fragment of Menander is, however, the only time that we can see χαρακτήρ used in the texts of the New Comedy, and we should not jump into conclusions from it (cf. also Körte 1929: 79).

The usual Greek word for what we would call 'character' is ἦθος, although in translating ἦθος as 'character' we are not encompassing every aspect of it. The original meaning of ἦθος was 'an accustomed place', in plural also for abodes of animals or men.[21] The more common meaning is that of 'custom' or 'usage', and following from this, 'character'. Ἦθος is related to the complex of behavioural regularities referring to reciprocal qualities and having a definite connection to social values.

The terms χαρακτήρ and ἦθος are conjoined in the title of Theophrastos' work as it is referred to in Diogenes Laertios (Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί or Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες), although the manuscripts that actually contain the *Characters* have a shortened title Χαρακτῆρες. (For this and other problems of interpreting the title, see ch. 2.1.1 below.) This kind of

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[19]   See Körte 1929: 83–4. Lukianos uses it for hieroglyphs as opposed to letters (γράμματα), see *Herm*. 44. Cf. also the similar use of the English word 'character'.

[20]   384: *nam mihi quale ingenium haberes fuit indicio oratio*. Cf. Körte 1929: 79.

[21]   E.g. Hom. *Il*. 6.511, *Od*. 14.411; Hes. *Op*. 167, 525; cf. *LSJ* s.v. I.

distinction is needed, for as we have seen, the word χαρακτήρ by itself means no more than 'marks' or 'types'. Theophrastos could have used simply ἤθη as a title, but we can assume that with the title Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες he wanted to point to a specific kind of description, that of behavioural regularities, which indeed was something new and therefore needed a new designation. It is wrong to conclude from the use of the adjective ἠθικοί that the work was concerned solely with ethics; the adjective may simply mark a connection with ἦθος. The term ἦθος is important in many fields of study, including ethics, rhetoric and poetics. All of them focus on different aspects of it, as is seen from the discussions of Aristotle (see ch. 1.3 below).[22]

Previous studies on the topic

Editions and commentaries of the *Characters* of Theophrastos naturally form a basis of a study like this. All of them cannot be recorded here, but I would like to point out some of the most important. The edition and commentary by James Diggle (2004) cannot, of course, be overlooked. It is an essential work that will be of great help to anyone dealing with the *Characters* or a hundred of other topics related to Athenian culture, even if one cannot agree with all of Diggle's textual readings or judgements.[23] The edition by Robert G. Ussher (1960, 2nd ed. 1993) is also important, although generally surpassed by Diggle. Two German editions and one study are also worth singling out. First, the 1879 edition by the Leipzig Philological Association, prepared by various German scholars and considered indispensable even nowadays. Secondly, the edition by Peter Steinmetz (1960, commentary volume 1962), which admittedly is controversial at many points, but certainly not "very dull" as stigmatized by Diggle (2004: 57). And lastly, the noteworthy study by Markus Stein (1992), which focuses on demonstrating that the definitions of the *Characters* are spurious. One should also emphasize the significance of

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[22] For relevant discussions see also van Groningen 1930, Milbradt 1974, Fortenbaugh 1994b.

[23] Reviews of Diggle's edition known to me include Habermehl 2005, Hinz 2005b, Parker 2006 and Worman 2007.

the contributions on the *Characters* by Otto Immisch, Giorgio Pasquali, Rudolf Stark, William W. Fortenbaugh (now also available in Fortenbaugh 2003), etc. My appreciation of the work of many other scholars should be apparent from the bibliography section of this thesis. As my work was nearing completion, I became aware of an important study by Paul Millett that was announced as forthcoming later in 2007. His *Theophrastus and his world* is the first extended study in English of Theophrastos' *Characters*, and it will certainly be a must for everyone dealing with the topic. I am very grateful to Dr Millett for allowing me to see the contents of this book before publication. Unfortunately, I have not, due to time limits, been able to take his ideas into consideration as much as I would have hoped.

Then there are studies which more generally deal with negative character types in ancient Greek literary tradition, even if some of them have also been written with the *Characters* of Theophrastos in mind. In the 19th century these studies were usually labelled 'ethological', i.e. concerned with the human ἦθος. The most eminent scholar in this field was Otto Ribbeck, who published treatises on εἴρων 'the dissembler' (1876), ἀλαζών 'the boaster' (1882, together with a translation of Plautus' *Miles gloriosus*), κόλαξ 'the flatterer' (1884) and ἄγροικος 'the boor' (1888). The so-called Theophrastean types have been given altogether the most attention, especially the first and in a way the most intriguing one, the εἴρων (cf. *Char*. 1).[24] Most of these studies aim at describing and analyzing one certain character type, its relevance and meaning throughout the classical Greek literature.

For the study of what is known as the school of Aristotle (i.e. Aristotle's students and followers starting with Theophrastos), two major research projects are indispensable. First, Fritz Wehrli's collection of fragments, with commentary, published under the title *Die Schule des Aristoteles* (1944–59, 2nd corrected and enlarged ed. Basel, 1967–69, supplements in 1974 and 1978). These volumes remain an important source, even if most of them have by now been superseded by the

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[24] In addition to the study by Ribbeck mentioned above, see the following (to mention only some titles): Büchner 1941, Bergson 1971, Markantonatos 1975, Amory 1981–2; cf. also Gooch 1987. A special case is the study on Sokratic irony by Gregory Vlastos (Vlastos 1987 and 1991), with criticism in Gordon 1996. See also ch. 4.1 below.

publications of Project Theophrastus. This project, guided by William W. Fortenbaugh, has produced a two-volume edition of the fragments of Theophrastos (with translation, FHS&G), plus several commentary volumes, with several others forthcoming. In addition, Fortenbaugh and others have published 13 volumes (so far) of the series *Rutgers University studies in classical humanities* (*RUSCH*), which focus on either Theophrastos or his colleagues, pupils and successors.[25] All in all almost 5000 pages, this series is certainly one the most influential publications on (mostly) Peripatetic thought available today. Many of these volumes include new editions of fragments with an English translation. For the present study the volume on Ariston of Keos (vol. 13) is especially important. As Ariston's fragments have been preserved in the papyri of Philodemos, I am also much indebted to the (mostly) Italian school of Philodemos scholars who have edited his texts and commented on them. These studies have been, for the most part, published in the journal *Cronache Ercolanesi*.

More general studies that have formed a background of this study are numerous, but I would especially like to point out the importance of Sir Kenneth J. Dover's book *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (1974), which first drew my attention to comedy and especially rhetoric as principal sources of information about ancient Greek popular morality.

My study owns a great deal to all of the above-mentioned books, papers and collections of papers. What it adds to these is an approach more specifically focused on the continuity of the Peripatetic tradition on the one hand, and the study of similar social types in other fields of Greek literature, mainly rhetoric, on the other. This is a study of not only the influence of the Peripatetic tradition of character writing, or more specifically of Theophrastos' *Characters*; such influence may be suggested

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[25] The first volume of the series (1983, paperback edition 2002) was on Areios Didymos; vols. 2 (1985), 3 (1988), 5 (1992) and 8 (1998) dealt with Theophrastos; vol. 4 (1989) focused on Cicero's knowledge of the Peripatos, vol. 6 (1994) on Peripatetic rhetoric after Aristotle; vol. 7 (1995) is a *Festschrift* to I. G. Kidd. Vol. 9 (2000) was devoted to Demetrios of Phaleron, vol. 10 (2001) to Dikaiarchos of Messana, vol. 11 (2002) to Eudemos of Rhodes, vol. 12 (2004) to Lykon of Troas and Hieronymos of Rhodes, vol. 13 (2006) to Ariston of Keos.

in some cases, but certainly not always. It is rather a study of some shared social paradigms, reflections of socially acceptable and commendable behaviour, indeed certain basic communal values, and deviations from them, with the *Characters* of Theophrastos being a focal point. The study contributes to relevant discussions on the purpose and function of the *Characters* of Theophrastos, on relations of Theophrastos and post-Theophrastean character writing, on points of contact and convergence between the *Characters*, contemporary comedy and rhetoric, and on some specific points of how character types are constructed, used, and abused in literary and political discourse.

PART 1. CHARACTER WRITING BEFORE THEOPHRASTOS

1.1. Forerunners of Theophrastos outside the Peripatetic school

The character description in the ancient Greek literature reached its peak with the *Characters* of Theophrastos, a novel work in both conception and design. His originality on the one hand and the theoretical background of the Peripatetic school on the other produced something that had not, as far as we know, been attempted before. I would like to underline the importance of the Peripatetic tradition, which in the case of Theophrastos is limited to the works and teachings of Aristotle, but also the circle of Aristotle's other students. There is no doubt that Theophrastos was original in composing a set of character sketches, whatever their purpose, but Aristotle's works form a basis of his approach. Indeed Aristotle may be said to have provided the seed from which Theophrastos' descriptions grow (Diggle 2004: 7).

Character creation and depiction, however, has a long history. There are two basic ways in which literary characterization is constructed:[26]

1) Describing someone's character directly, for instance by supplying epithets or an explicit evaluation.

2) Characterizing someone indirectly by narrating what they do or say or think (this may include descriptions of externally observable behaviour, speech, looks, or of inner thoughts and feelings).

Examples of both ways can be found, e.g., in the depiction of Thersites and his speech attacking Agamemnon at the assembly of the Achaian warriors in Hom. *Il.* 2.212–44 (cf. Vogt 2006: 264). The poet describes Thersites as ἀμετροεπής (*Il.* 2.212), a direct epithet letting us know that the man was 'unbridled of tongue'.[27] The physiognomic details are present, as well, cf. *Il.* 2.216–19:

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[26] For a recent application of this see, e.g., Vogt 2006: 264.

[27] This word is found only once in Homer (although cf. ἀφαμαρτοεπής at *Il.* 3.215), and it is almost equivalent in sense to ἀκριτόμυθος, also used of Thersites at *Il.* 2.246 (Kirk 1990: 139).

αἴσχιστος δὲ ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθε·
φολκὸς ἔην, χωλὸς δ᾽ ἕτερον πόδα· τὼ δέ οἱ ὤμω
κυρτὼ ἐπὶ στῆθος συνοχωκότε· αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε
φοξὸς ἔην κεφαλήν, ψεδνὴ δ᾽ ἐπενήνοθε λάχνη.

("He was the ugliest man of all those that came before Troy—bandy-legged,[28] lame of one foot, with his two shoulders rounded and hunched over his chest. His head ran up to a point, but there was little hair on the top of it." [Transl. Samuel Butler.])

Although the prevailing physiognomical interpretation of the Thersites scene in the *Iliad* is that of a correlation between ugliness and villainy (or conversely beauty and good character, but not always), this kind of correlation is challenged elsewhere in the *Iliad* and even more so in the *Odyssey* (cf. Vogt 2006: 265, n. 9). Thersites is, however, a 'speaking' name formed from θέρσος, the Aeolic form of Ionic θάρσος, implying rashness. It may also be significant that he is the only character in the *Iliad* to lack both patronymic and place of origin—perhaps to distinguish this outrageous person from his noble peers (Kirk 1990: 138–9; cf. also Latacz 2003: 70–3). As Kirk notes (1990: 140), "[t]he shambling, limping gait, the hunched back and shoulders and the pointed, balding cranium combine to make Thersites a monstrosity by heroic standards." Note that these are all external characteristics.

Longer descriptions of more specific character types had also appeared sporadically in the Greek literature, and it would be only fair to report some of the most conspicuous of these.[29]

Again, Homer offers a good example, describing (through the mouth of Idomeneus) the coward (δειλός)[30] and the brave man (ἄλκιμος) in ambush (*Il*. 13.276–286):

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[28] This is the sense given in *LSJ*; the exact meaning of this hapax is not known. Kirk (1990: 139) suggests 'dragging the feet (or one foot)'.

[29] The following survey is by no means all-inclusive. A short but useful synopsis is also given by Diggle (2004: 5 ff.).

[30] I cannot agree with the claim of Shipp (1972: 282, cited in Janko 1992: 81) that δειλός always means 'wretched' in Homer.

εἰ γὰρ νῦν παρὰ νηυσὶ λεγοίμεθα πάντες ἄριστοι
ἐς λόχον, ἔνθα μάλιστ᾽ ἀρετὴ διαείδεται ἀνδρῶν,
ἔνθ᾽ ὅ τε δειλὸς ἀνὴρ ὅς τ᾽ ἄλκιμος ἐξεφαάνθη·
τοῦ μὲν γάρ τε κακοῦ τρέπεται χρὼς ἄλλυδις ἄλλη,
280   οὐδέ οἱ ἀτρέμας ἧσθαι ἐρητύετ᾽ ἐν φρεσὶ θυμός,
ἀλλὰ μετοκλάζει καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρους πόδας ἵζει,
ἐν δέ τέ οἱ κραδίη μεγάλα στέρνοισι πατάσσει
κῆρας ὀϊομένῳ, πάταγος δέ τε γίγνετ᾽ ὀδόντων·
τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ οὔτ᾽ ἂρ τρέπεται χρὼς οὔτέ τι λίην
285   ταρβεῖ, ἐπειδὰν πρῶτον ἐσίζηται λόχον ἀνδρῶν,
ἀρᾶται δὲ τάχιστα μιγήμεναι ἐν δαῒ λυγρῇ·

("If the best men at the ships were being chosen to go on an ambush—and there is nothing like this for showing what a man is made of; it comes out then who is cowardly and who brave; the coward will change colour at every touch and turn; he is full of fears, and keeps shifting his weight first on one knee and then on the other; his heart beats fast as he thinks of death, and one can hear the chattering of his teeth; whereas the brave man will not change colour nor be frightened on finding himself in ambush, but is all the time longing to go into action..." [Transl. Samuel Butler.])

The translation misses an important notion of the original Greek: in line 277 there is a reference to ἀρετή, which is rendered periphrastically as "what the man is made of". Negative character traits are opposed to excellent qualities of a person, i.e. ἀρετή, and it is always useful to keep in mind the opposite of the quality described.

The similarity of the Homeric description and *Char.* 25 of Theophrastos was noticed in the 12th century by Eustathios, who thought that it foreshadowed the descriptions of Theophrastos.[31] The passage describes

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[31]   Eust. 931.22–3 (= 3.469.3–5 van der Valk) *ad* Hom. *Il.* 13.276–86: ... διασκευάσαντος τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἀρχετυπικῶς ὡς ἐν τύπῳ χαρακτῆρας, ὁποίους δή τινας ὕστερον καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐξετυπώσατο, οἷος μὲν ὁ ἄλκιμος ἐν καιρῷ λόχου, οἷος δὲ ὁ δειλός. (... the poet (sc. Homer) provided, in the form of a model, character types like those in later times moulded by Theophrastos, such as the brave man during an ambush, or the coward.) Cf. also below, ch. 2.1.6.

external signs of inner feelings, giving a kind of physiological picture of the coward.

The *iambos* of Semonides that describes ten types of women (or to be more precise, wives; fr. 7 West = Stob. 4.22.193) has also been considered an ancestor of Theophrastean character descriptions.[32] According to this fragment, Zeus has made ten women from various animals and elements: from a sow, a vixen, a bitch, an ass, a weasel, a mare, a monkey, and a bee, and from earth and the sea. Compare also Archilochos' famous verses in which an athletic but vain general is contrasted with the ugly but stout-hearted one (fr. 114 West).

Further texts include the description of a μούναρχος in Herodotos 3.80 through the mouth of the Persian Otanes, who suggested that the Persian monarchy should be abolished and the government turned over to the people (πλῆθος). Otanes' picture is a general one, focusing on disastrous effects of absolute rule on any man, even the best man on earth. Thus, the monarch will be overwhelmed with insolence (ὕβρις) and envy (φθόνος), and because of these he will do many reckless things. He is the best confidant of slander (διαβολὰς δὲ ἄριστος ἐνδέκεσθαι). In addition, Otanes describes the monarch in the following way:

> /.../ ἤν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν μετρίως θωμάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται, ἤν τε θεραπεύῃ τις κάρτα, ἄχθεται ἄτε θωπί. /.../ νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους.

> ("/.../ if you admire him modestly he is angry that you do not give him excessive attention, but if one gives him excessive attention he is angry because one is a flatter (= flatterer). /.../ he upsets the ancestral ways and rapes women and kills indiscriminately." [Transl. Alfred Denis Godley.])

Plato deserves a special mention in this context. In book 8 of the *Republic*, Plato takes up a topic discussed already in book 4, famously identifying different types of constitution. According to him, there are the same number of types of men (εἴδη ἀνθρώπων) corresponding to the types of

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[32] See Lloyd-Jones 1975: 29, 32–3.

constitution, for constitutions grow out of the characters in each city (*R.* 544d–e).[33] In book 8 and in the beginning of book 9 we find descriptions of types such as τιμοκρατικός, ὀλιγαρχικός, δημοκρατικός and τυραννικός.[34] It has been noted that this is the first general description of types of political life as seen from within in world-literature (Jaeger 1986: 325). W. Jaeger has also argued that this new psychological method of describing types of state is one of Plato's greatest contributions to ethical and political science. The important thing is that Plato focused on the ἦθος rather than the institutions of the state.[35] The aim of Plato's discussion is to determine four types of unjust men corresponding to four unjust constitutions.[36] Each of these constitutions is bound to decay because of its intrinsic principle, and each man due to family trouble and improper education (cf., e.g., *R.* 545d, 552e). The descriptions of these men are too long to be quoted in their entirety, but some key passages are worth pointing out.

Thus, the timocratic man is "somewhat self-willed and lacking in culture, yet a lover of music and fond of listening to talk and speeches" (αὐθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν ... εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ, καὶ φιλήκοον μέν, *R.* 548e).[37] Further (*R.* 549a), he is harsh (ἄγριος) to slaves, but gentle (ἥμερος) with the free men, and very obedient (σφόδρα ὑπήκοος) to authority, a lover of office (φίλαρχος) and of honour (φιλότιμος). He is also exceptionally keen on sport (φιλογυμναστής) and hunting (φιλόθηρος). When young, he might not care for money (χρημάτων ... καταφρονοῖ ἄν, 549b), but as he ages, he will become avaricious (τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως, 549b) and unreasonable. Thus,

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[33] Note that by ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν Plato does not mean the ἦθος of the constitution, but the ἤθη of the citizens. Cf. Jaeger 1986: 424, n. 267.

[34] *R.* 548d–50b, 553a–55a, 558c–62a and 571a–76b respectively. The passages also touch upon the origin of each type. For an important analysis of these passages see also Jaeger 1986: 320–47.

[35] Jaeger 1986: 423–4. Aristotle also discusses constitutions in his *Politics* (3.6 ff.), combining a theory of the perfect state with a morphology of bad constitutions (see Jaeger 1986: 321), but he does not describe corresponding types of men the way Plato does.

[36] For an examination of Plato's claim that each form of government must correspond to a character type in its citizens, see Brown 1983. Cf. also Meulder 1991, 1992a and 1992b.

[37] Passages of Plato's *Republic* are quoted in the translation of Paul Shorey, with minor modifications.

those who were lovers of victory (cf. 548e) and lovers of honour (cf. 549a) become lovers of gain-getting and of money (φιλοχρηματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι, 551a).

In fact, these men are already degrading into oligarchy, because the oligarchic man is driven by the love of money (551e). He realizes that ambition demands too many sacrifices, which do not pay, but may even bring loss and damage instead of honour and distinction. Thus, the desirous, money-loving part of his soul will take over (553c) and the ambitious man will transform into the avaricious type, who prizes wealth above everything (554a). The oligarchic man is a parsimonious (φειδωλός) and squalid (αὐχμηρός) fellow, looking for profit in everything (554a), and a hoarder (θησαυροποιός, 554b). One reason for this is his lack of culture (ἀπαιδευσία, 554b). The character of such a man appears wherever he has the power to get hold of someone's money without risk, as, e.g., in the case of the property of the orphan whose guardian he is (554c). In addition, he even refuses to spend money to show himself as an honourable person (555a).

Plato then shows how oligarchy degenerates into a democracy (see especially 557a). Due to bad education, false ideas (ἀλαζόνες λόγοι, 560c) start to dominate the man. According to these, decency (or however we will translate αἰδώς)[38] is really 'stupidity' (ἠλιθιότης), temperance (σωφροσύνη) is 'want of manhood' (ἀνανδρία), and moderation (μετριότης) and orderly expenditure (κοσμία δαπάνη) are 'boorishness' (ἀγροικία) and 'illiberality' (ἀνελευθερία, 560d).[39] The democratic man does not accept the truth that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those that are base (cf. Grg. 494e)—he throws back his head (a traditional negative gesture) at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed (561b–c). He indulges the appetite of the day, "now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics

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[38] For αἰδώς, see especially Cairns 1993.

[39] Cf. the famous passage in Thukydides 3.82.4, where it is explained how the collapse of morality was reflected in the meaning of the words. See also Jaeger 1986: 338.

and bounces up and says and does whatever enters his head. And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end." (561c–e). Thus, the democratic man is kind of a reed in the wind, unable to control his desires and living solely for the moment.[40]

The last description is that of a tyrannical man. While the democrat treats good and bad equally, the tyrannical man is governed entirely by the bad and the desire for the bad. He is driven by lust, and his lust will drive him completely out of control, it will become bestial and make him turn against everybody. As a young man, he first spends what he has and then seizes a portion of his father's estate (574a). If the parents resist, he first tries to rob and steal from them, and failing in that, seizes what he wants by force (574a–b). When the resources of his parents are exhausted, he becomes violent to others, laying hands on somebody else's house, robbing someone at night or making a clean sweep of some temple (574d). He will refrain from no atrocity of murder or from any food or deed (574e). If there are few such men, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap, and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes (575b). If, however, they become numerous, they create a mighty tyrant, who attacks the state itself (575c–d). The tyrannical men also associate with flatterers (575e), and they are no lesser flatterers themselves, though only until they have gained what they wanted (576a). They know no friendship; they are either masters or slaves, and they are mistrustful[41] and unjust (ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν ... καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους, 576a).

Apart from description, Plato mentions some of the negative character traits in various parts of his works. Notably, in book 9 of the *Republic* (590a–b), he attempts to show that the bad reputation of certain activities and personal traits is not simply arbitrary but is the result of their

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[40] For an analysis of Plato's critique of the democratic character in the *Republic*, see also Scott 2000.

[41] Perhaps this rather than the passive meaning 'faithless' as in the translation of Shorey.

connection with certain conditions of soul which Plato has already argued to be undesirable (White 1979: 236):

> Οὐκοῦν καὶ <u>τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν</u> οἴει διὰ τοιαῦτα πάλαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸ δεινόν, τὸ μέγα ἐκεῖνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα, πέρα τοῦ δέοντος;—Δῆλον, ἔφη.—Ἡ δ᾽ <u>αὐθάδεια</u> καὶ <u>δυσκολία</u> ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὔξηται καὶ συντείνηται ἀναρμόστως;—Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.—<u>Τρυφὴ</u> δὲ καὶ <u>μαλθακία</u> οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ;—Τί μήν;—<u>Κολακεία</u> δὲ καὶ <u>ἀνελευθερία</u> οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἕνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλα-κιζόμενον ἐθίζῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;—Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

> (“And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to <u>licentiousness</u> is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread, that huge and manifold beast overmuch?” “Obviously,” he said. “And do we not censure <u>self-will</u> and <u>irascibility</u> when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake in us?” “By all means.” “And do we not reprobate <u>luxury</u> and <u>effeminacy</u> for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it?” “Surely.” “And <u>flattery</u> and <u>illiberality</u> when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape instead of a lion?” “Yes, indeed,” he said.)

All of the terms mentioned in this discussion are later also important in Aristotle,[42] and three of them (αὐθάδεια, κολακεία, ἀνελευθερία) are included in the *Characters* of Theophrastos (*Char*. 15, 2 and 22 respectively).

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[42] For μαλθακία, Aristotle uses the more common form μαλακία.

One should also mention the literature on "national" characters (Boeotian, Spartan, etc.),[43] which was based ultimately on the sort of climatological determinism that can be seen in the Hippocratic treatise *On airs, waters, places* (Περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων),[44] and also in Aristotle (*Pol*. 7.7; see below, ch. 1.3.1). One of the most famous discussions on national character is found in Thukydides.[45] A later but expressive representative is the *Rhetoric* of Dionysios (or Pseudo-Dionysios) of Halikarnassos, which speaks of the ἤθη of the inhabitants of specific parts of Hellas (e.g. 11.5: ποῖόν τι ἔθνος Ἑλλήνων; Ἕλλην Ἀθηναῖος· τορός, λάλος, σοφός. Ἕλλην Ἴων· ἁβρός, ἀνειμένος. Ἕλλην Βοιωτός· εὐήθης. Ἕλλην Θετταλός· διπλοῦς καὶ ποικίλος. /---/ ὅσα πολιτειῶν εἴδη, τοσαῦτα ἠθῶν εἴδη ...).[46]

1.2. Peripatetic tradition: general introduction

The Peripatetic school that succeeded Aristotle was not a group of scholars and students who all shared each other's ideas. Dissenting opinions were common, and many were recorded as such by later authors. Quintilianus, e.g., transmitting Theophrastos' wish that the language in the deliberative kind of rhetoric should be removed as far as possible from all verbal affectation, comments that in this Theophrastos follows the authority of Aristotle, "although he is accustomed fearlessly to dissent from him."[47] This should be kept in mind, even if Theophrastos' reputation as the faithful follower of Aristotle's philosophy is quite common, and broadly correct (see Gottschalk 1998: 284, 287). The same holds true for Theophrastos' students; dissenting opinions were not uncommon. Thus, according to a χρεία ascribed to Zenon by Plutarch,

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[43] See Goebel 1915, who has collected proverbial portrayals of the inhabitants of various Greek *poleis*.

[44] Rusten 1993: 12. On this work, see, e.g., Edelstein 1931.

[45] Cf. especially 1.70 and 8.96.5, with Luginbill 1999 (note also the critique in the review by Tim Rood, *BMCR* 2000.02.20).

[46] This last sentence refers back to Plato, cf. *R*. 445c.

[47] Fr. 694 FHS&G (= Quint. *Inst*. 3.8.62: *dissentire ab eo non timide solet*). See also Fortenbaugh 2005: 301–5.

the former said, commenting on the large amount of Theophrastos' pupils, that "his chorus is larger, but mine is more harmonious."[48]

Although Aristotle provides the intellectual basis of the Peripatetic school and its tradition, Theophrastos was important in its institutional development. It has been noted that Aristotle died as a refugee from the anti-Macedonian backlash in Athens which followed the death of Alexander the Great, probably not hoping that anyone would try to propagate his ideas systematically, let alone found a school for this purpose (Gottschalk 1998: 282). Theophrastos, however, established the Peripatos as a school with its own campus and administrative structure.[49] Aristotle, being a metic, was not allowed to acquire real estate in Athens. Theophrastos was a metic as well, but he managed, with the help of his friend Demetrios of Phaleron (then governor of Athens in the Macedonian interest), to procure for the school a κῆπος together with some buildings. He was the head of the school for 34 years and is reported to have had 2000 students (over the years, not all at once, see D.L. 5.2.37). Theophrastos is also the only member of the post-Aristotelian Peripatos from whom a substantial body of writings has survived. In addition, the Aristotelian corpus contains several works which cannot be genuine but show signs of Theophrastos' influence. It is difficult, however, to determine this influence in every single case.[50]

We only have fragments, and occasionally lists of titles, from most of the successors of Theophrastos, but some general points can be made on the basis of this evidence. To begin with, most of these Peripatetics devoted themselves almost entirely to writing of a popular kind on ethics, history or literary theory, confining their serious scientific work to at most one subject or branch of philosophy (Gottschalk 1998: 289). Even Eudemos and Straton, who may be said to have worked on a greater amount of topics, show a strong tendency of specialization. Thematically, one of the striking features in the history of the Peripatetic school has been the decline in interest in natural philosophy after

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[48]   Fr. 15 FHS&G (= Plu. *Mor*. 78e: ὁ ἐκείνου χορός, ἔφη, μείζων, οὑμὸς δὲ συμφωνό-τερος; repeated in *Mor*. 545f). On some personal interactions of Theophrastos with his contemporaries within the school, see Gottschalk 1998: 290–2. On this χρεία see also Glucker 1998: 301.

[49]   Gottschalk 1998: 281; on the wills of the Peripatetic scholars see Gottschalk 1972.

[50]   See Gottschalk 1998: 288–9 on some cases.

Theophrastos and Straton, although this interest seems to have been peculiar in the context of other philosophic schools anyway (see Sharples 2006).

The decline of the original contribution within the school was considerable. Cicero presents a list of Peripatetics in which the two founders, Aristotle and Theophrastos, are contrasted with their successors, from Straton to Kritolaos and his pupils, none of whom are said to have measured up to them,[51] and Eudemos seems to have been forgotten altogether. Doctrines attributed to Aristotle and to Theophrastos have been conflated and contaminated with later ideas, perhaps by those later members of the school who were anxious to participate in the mainstream philosophical debates of their time (Gottschalk 1998: 295–6).

In addition, it has been noted that although Theophrastos, Eudemos and some of their colleagues attempted to carry on the study and research in all fields of knowledge, soon the 'empirical' study of nature, literature and history moved to Alexandria, where also the new discipline of philology was formed. Thus, Athens began to lag in these fields and the 'Peripatetic programme' came to fulfilment in Alexandria.[52] The ideal of science and research of the early Peripatos was thus given up in Athens, and was taken over by Alexandria. At the same time, Athenian philosophy returned to what is regarded as philosophy in the strict sense ("the genuine old Athenian brand of philosophy, that of Socrates and Plato") and no Alexandrian scholar or scientist, until the Roman period, made any lasting contribution to this.[53]

With regard to character studies, the successors of Theophrastos in the Peripatetic school have little to offer, with one important exception, Ariston of Keos. The following chapters first present the main points of interest in character in Aristotle and the Aristotelian corpus, then focus on Theophrastos (mainly studying the *Characters*, but also touching upon traces of character writing in his fragments), and finally deal with character writing in later Peripatetic authors. Ariston deserves a longer

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[51] Cic. *Fin*. 5.12 ff., *Off*. 1.3 with Gottschalk 1998: 295.

[52] Glucker 1998: 312; see also Fraser 1972: 1.320 and Lynch 1972. For the Alexandrian library more generally, see MacLeod 2000.

[53] Glucker 1998: 314; see also Fraser 1972: 1.480–94 and Görler 1998: 318.

analysis; from others who may have written anything on the topic (Demetrios of Phaleron, Lykon and Satyros) there is little preserved to comment on.

1.3. Aristotle and Ps-Aristotle on character

Interest in theoretical character studies first appears in Aristotle, and it may be said that all later ancient texts on the subject depend on him in one way or another (Vogt 2006: 265). The Peripatetic tradition is concerned with characterological questions in various areas of study (including biographical literature, cf. Schorn 2004: 434), and this interest is manifest already in Aristotle (see, e.g., Regenbogen 1940: 1504–6). In the following, I will present an account of Aristotle's interest in character in regard to various subjects. Some pseudo-Aristotelian texts are also included, as they contain Peripatetic ideas and form a part of this tradition.

It is possible to use the distinction between "inferential" and "conceptual" approach to character study (see, e.g., Vogt 2006: 265). In the case of inferential approach, the signs from which character is inferred are either internal (motivations and reasons which lead to specific behaviour) or external (bodily features and appearance). The conceptual approach defines character types by linguistic or logical methods: correlating distinct traits and types by comparing or contrasting similar or opposing types, by isolating subtypes, and analyzing their component factors or features.

The approach of Aristotle is mainly inferential, focusing on internal signs of motivations and reasons in the soul. However, in Aristotle the conceptual approach is also firmly established—e.g., each type receives a definition. Of the two pseudo-Aristotelian treatises that are important in this case, *On virtues and vices* relies solely on a conceptual approach and *Physiognomics* solely on an inferential approach (Vogt 2006: 271; see below).

1.3.1. Ethics and politics

According to Aristotle (*EN* 1103a11 ff.), there are two kinds of human excellences: excellences of thought or διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί, and excellences of character or ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί (usually translated as 'moral virtues' or 'moral excellences'). Aristotle was, as far as we know, the first one to coin the adjective ἠθικός (Chamberlain 1984).

In his ethical works, Aristotle presents an analysis of moral virtues (ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί) and vices (κακίαι). Notably his tripartite system of human ethical qualities consists of positive mean (μεσότης, τὸ μέσον), which is the ideal form, and two negative extremes, deficiency (ἔλλειψις or ἔνδεια) and excess (ὑπερβολή). A passage in *EN* (1107a32–8b6) lists 13 pairs of vices in relation to μέσον, for each range of emotion or sphere of action. This can be considered the most elaborate systematized account of negative character dispositions in ancient Greek literature,[54] and is presented in the following in the form of a table (I use abstract noun when Aristotle himself uses it, adjective in other cases; a reference to the *Characters* of Theophrastos is given where applicable):

Table 1. Tripartite system of virtues and vices in the *Nichomachean Ethics*.

connected with	deficiency (ἔλλειψις)	mean (μεσότης)	excess (ὑπερβολή)
feelings of fear and confidence	coward (δειλός; cf. *Char*. 25)	courage (ἀνδρεία)	rash (θρασύς)
pleasures and pains	insensible (ἀναίσθητος; cf. *Char*. 14)	temperance (σωφροσύνη)	self-indulgence (ἀκολασία)
giving and taking of money	illiberality, meanness (ἀνελευθερία; cf. *Char*. 22)	liberality (ἐλευθεριότης)	prodigality (ἀσωτία)
	niggardliness (μικροπρέπεια)	magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια)	vulgarity, tastelessness (βαναυσία)

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[54] It is, of course, related to Greek popular wisdom that avoidance of extremes is best. See Rusten 1993: 12 and cf., e.g., Kalchreuter 1911, Mette 1988, and Wolf 1988.

connected with		deficiency (ἔλλειψις)	mean (μεσότης)	excess (ὑπερβολή)
honour and dishonour		undue humility (μικροψυχία)	proper pride (μεγαλοψυχία)	empty vanity (χαυνότης)
		unambitious (ἀφιλότιμος)	rightly ambitious (φιλότιμος)	ambitious (φιλότιμος)
anger		inirascibility (ἀοργησία)	good temper (πραότης)	irascibility (ὀργιλότης)
intercourse in words and actions	truth	dissembling, mock modesty (εἰρωνεία; cf. *Char*. 1)	truthfulness (ἀλήθεια)	boastfulness, false pretension (ἀλαζονεία; cf. *Char*. 23)
	pleasantness	boorishness (ἀγροικία; cf. *Char*. 4)	ready wit (εὐτραπελία)	buffoonery (βωμολοχία)
		quarrelsome (δύσερις)	friendliness (φιλία)	obsequious (ἄρεσκος; cf. *Char*. 5)
		surly (δύσκολος)	friendliness (φιλία)	flatterer (κόλαξ; cf. *Char*. 2)
passions		shameless, sponger (ἀναίσχυντος; cf. *Char*. 9)	modest, with sense of shame (αἰδήμων)	bashful (κατάπληξ)
		spite (ἐπιχαιρεκακία)	righteous indignation (νέμεσις)	envy (φθόνος)

Aristotle himself notes that this kind of systematization may be somewhat artificial and violent, as for many virtues and vices that he had in mind there are no proper words in use, thus he had to invent them. Further on, in books 3 and 4 (*EN* 1115a4–28b33), he describes all of these virtues and vices in detail, discussing both the concerns shared by each triad and the different attitudes each trait has toward those concerns (e.g., death for the cowardly, rash, and courageous). It should be noted, however, that Aristotle not only describes the behaviour of each character in specific situations, he also explores the motivation underlying that behaviour (Vogt 2006: 267).

In books 5–10, Aristotle analyzes more closely two of the basic kinds of ἀρεταί: δικαιοσύνη and φιλία. He returns to σωφροσύνη also in book 10. Thus, the tripartite system is followed throughout the whole

EN in the same way. The analysis of φρόνησις is the third larger area, but here the excesses and deficiencies are not in the centre of attention.

A similar list of virtues and vices, yet with some important changes, is presented in *EE* 1220b38 ff. It is presented in a different order, some triads are left out, some parts of the triad have different values, etc. This list contains 14 pairs of vices with their mean, but two of the series (1221a9 κακοπάθεια–καρτερία–τρυφερότης and 1221a12 εὐήθεια–φρόνησις–πανουργία, below in brackets) have been excised by Susemihl.

Table 2. Tripartite system of virtues and vices in the *Eudemian Ethics*.

deficiency (ἔλλειψις)	mean (μεσότης)	excess (ὑπερβολή)
lack of feeling (ἀναλγησία)	good temper (πραότης)	irascibility (ὀργιλότης)
cowardice (δειλία; cf. *Char.* 25)	courage (ἀνδρεία)	rashness (θρασύτης)
bashfulness (κατάπληξις)	modesty (αἰδώς)	shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία; cf. *Char.* 9)
insensibility (ἀναισθησία; cf. *Char.* 14)	temperance (σωφροσύνη)	self-indulgence (ἀκολασία)
anonymous (ἀνώνυμον)	righteous indignation (νέμεσις)	envy (φθόνος)
loss (ζημία)	the just (δίκαιον)	gain (κέρδος)
illiberality (ἀνελευθερία; cf. *Char.* 22)	liberality (ἐλευθεριότης)	prodigality (ἀσωτία)
dissembling (εἰρωνεία; cf. *Char.* 1)	truthfulness (ἀλήθεια)	boastfulness (ἀλαζονεία; cf. *Char.* 23)
dislike (ἀπέχθεια)	friendliness (φιλία)	flattery (κολακεία; cf. *Char.* 2)
stubbornness (αὐθάδεια; cf. *Char.* 15)	dignity (σεμνότης)	obsequiousness (ἀρέσκεια; cf. *Char.* 5)
[submission to evils (κακοπάθεια)	endurance (καρτερία)	luxuriousness (τρυφερότης)]
undue humility (μικροψυχία)	proper pride (μεγαλοψυχία)	empty vanity (χαυνότης)
niggardliness (μικροπρέπεια)	magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια)	meanness (δαπανηρία)
[simplicity (εὐήθεια)	practical wisdom (φρόνησις)	cunning (πανουργία)]

Other major differences are the leaving out of ἀφιλότιμος–φιλότιμος–φιλότιμος and ἀγροικία–εὐτραπελία–βωμολοχία, and the addition of ζημία–δίκαιον–κέρδος (1221a4). Changes in one or two parts of the triad include ἀναλγησία *pro* ἀοργησία as the deficiency of πραότης (1220b38), δαπανηρία *pro* βαναυσία as the excess of μεγαλοπρέπεια (1221a11), and ἀπέχθεια *pro* δύσκολος as the deficiency of φιλία (the excess being κόλαξ or κολακεία). The second triad of the *EN* with φιλία as its mean (δύσερις–φιλία–ἄρεσκος) has here been replaced with αὐθάδεια–σεμνότης–ἀρέσκεια (1221a8), which means a reference to a Theophrastean character (αὐθάδεια, cf. *Char.* 15) that the account of *EN* did not have. In addition, the deficiency of νέμεσις, for which we have ἐπιχαιρεκακία (*Schadenfreude*) in *EN*, is left anonymous in *EE*. For more detailed descriptions of these virtues and vices, see *EE* 1228a23–34b13.[55]

The descriptions of the vices in Aristotle are more abstract than the descriptions of Theophrastos,[56] but they have probably influenced Theophrastos. In the *Characters* of Theophrastos we find 9 of the 26 vices mentioned in *EN*, to which may be added the reference to αὐθάδεια in *EE*.

As noted above, in book 7 of his *Politics* Aristotle speaks of the nature (τὴν φύσιν, *Pol.* 1327b20) of various peoples. This should perhaps be elaborated a bit more, although it really stands in the tradition of the climatological determinism that has little to do with Aristotle's discussion in the ethical works. In any case, he compares three peoples—the people of the colder regions of Europe; the people of Asia; and the Greek people. The first is "full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill" (*Pol.* 1327b24–5); the natives of Asia are "intelligent and inventive, but wanting in spirit" (*Pol.* 1327b27–8). The Greeks, however, are said to be intermediate in character, being "high-spirited and also intelligent" (*Pol.* 1327b29–31). Additionally, he notes that the same sort of difference as that between Greek and non-Greek peoples may also be traced among the inhabitants of various parts of Greece itself.

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[55] Cf. also the descriptions in *MM* 1190b9–93a38.
[56] Cf. the formulation of J. Diggle: "his persons exist, for the most part, out of time and space, moral paradigms, not flesh and blood" (2004: 7).

On virtues and vices (*VV*, *De virtutibus et vitiis*, Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, also known as only *De virtute*, Περὶ ἀρετῆς) is a work that has been preserved not only in the corpus of Aristotle (pp. 1249–51 Bekker), but also in the anthology of Stobaios (Stob. 3.1.194). In addition, it has been transcribed in the treatise Περὶ παθῶν of Pseudo-Andronikos, which leaves out the epilogue (*VV* 1251b26–39) and adds some Stoic inter- polations, also changing the order of presentation.[57] The short treatise has been very popular in the course of history.[58] It is certainly not the work of Aristotle, but opinions vary about its date. Some have suggested that it originates from the early Peripatos (Schmidt 1965: 16); others believe that it is a work of a later eclectic compiler (Susemihl 1884; Glibert-Thirry 1977: 9), which seems to be more plausible. The most important difference between the work and Aristotle's ethical treatises is the complete lack of references to the doctrine of mean; here, each virtue has one opposite, thus the tripartite system has given way to the bipartite. It also contains some mainly Platonic ideas (e.g. tripartite division of soul, four cardinal virtues, etc.), and the representations of the virtues and vices tend to be quite arbitrary.

The treatise connects virtues and vices with Platonic divisions of soul, whereby some are connected with one part, and some apply to the soul as a whole. The virtues represent four traditional cardinal virtues (φρόν- ησις, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη), to which are added four vir- tues from Aristotle (πραότης, ἐγκράτεια, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοψυχία; *VV* 1249a30–50a2). The main part of the work enumerates eight virtues together with their opposites, and then describes each in some detail. The following table illustrates the whole system:

[57]   See Schmidt 1965: 13, and cf. Schuchhardt 1883: 6–8 for the regrouping of the material in the treatise of Pseudo-Andronikos (the work is traditionally assigned to the corpus of Andronikos of Rhodes, the scholarch of the Peripatos around 70 BCE and probably the commentator and editor of Aristotle [see Moraux 1951: 235 ff. and cf. Plu. *Sull*. 26], but is usually dated to the 2nd century CE by modern scholars). See especially Glibert-Thirry 1977.
[58] There are, e.g., at least two Arabic and one Syrian translation of the work (see Glibert-Thirry 1977: 5).

Table 3. The division of virtues and vices in *VV*.

The soul (ἡ ψυχή)			
Rational part (τὸ λογιστικόν)	**Passionate part (τὸ θυμοειδές)**	**Appetitive part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν)**	**The soul as a whole (ὅλη ἡ ψυχή)**
practical wisdom (φρόνησις) – folly (ἀφροσύνη)	courage (ἀνδρεία) – cowardice (δειλία)	temperance (σωφροσύνη) – intemperance (ἀκολασία)	justice (δικαιοσύνη) – injustice (ἀδικία)
	good temper (πραότης) – irascibility (ὀργιλότης)	continence (ἐγκράτεια) – incontinence (ἀκράτεια)	liberality (ἐλευθεριότης) – illiberality, meanness (ἀνελευθερία)
			proper pride (μεγαλοψυχία) – undue humility (μικροψυχία)

In the more detailed descriptions of each of these, the author also mentions qualities that are characteristic to each virtue or vice, or accompany them. Sometimes one of these accompanying traits even recurs in a different section. A vice may also be divided into subgroups. For example, there are three species of irascibility: promptness to anger (ἀκροχολία), peevishness (πικρία), sullenness (βαρυθυμία); three species of injustice: impiety (ἀσέβεια), greed (πλεονεξία), outrage (ὕβρις); and three species of illiberality: pursuit of disgraceful gain (αἰσχρο-κερδία), parsimony (φειδωλία), stinginess (κιμβεία).

The work classifies character traits systematically according to both a bipartite scheme of virtue and vice and a Platonic tripartition of soul. The definitions presented in it specify both distinctive motivations of the characters and various related traits. It therefore provides an example of an exclusively conceptual approach to character studies that omits all inferential aspects of the subject (Vogt 2006: 269).

1.3.2. Rhetoric

In classical rhetoric, ἦθος is first of all connected with the character of the orator, but also, for example in the case of forensic speeches also with the character of his opponent. The orator tries to show himself in a favourable light and attract attention, win the public over to his side, and prevent his opponent's success by negative portrayal of him (see, e.g., Fortenbaugh 1994b: 1517).[59]

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains several discussions of character. With regard to the focus of this thesis, the following account touches upon some of the most important passages that reveal the position of character in his rhetorical theory.

First, Aristotle notes that the ἦθος of the speaker is probably the most important of three modes of persuasion or creating trust (πίστεις), even more important than either the disposition of the audience or the speech itself: σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος (*Rh.* 1356a13). The importance of the speaker's character is emphasized again in the introduction to the second book of *Rhetoric* (*Rh.* 1377b20–78a19). Thus, there are three things which establish the credibility of the speaker: practical wisdom (φρόνησις), excellence (ἀρετή), and goodwill (εὔνοια). These three, Aristotle notes, induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it.[60]

Another consideration of characters in the *Rhetoric* is the account of emotional dispositions as ethical/pathetic proofs in book 2.2–11. The account begins with three pairs of opposites: anger (ὀργή, 1378a30–80a5) and mildness (πραότης, 1380a6–b34), love (φιλία καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν) and hatred (ἔχθρα καὶ τὸ μισεῖν, 1380b35–82a19), and fear (φόβος, 1382a20–83a25) and the daring (οἱ θαρραλέοι, 1383a25–b10). It has been noted that the

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[59] Relevant studies touching upon character studies in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* include Immisch 1898: 210–12, Süss 1910, Furley 1953: 56–60, Matelli 1989, Schütrumpf 1970, Schütrumpf 1993, Fortenbaugh 1994a. Cf. also Worman (forthcoming).

[60] Cf. also Vogt 2006: 265–6 and see Fortenbaugh 1992 (= 2006: 281–316) for a more thorough study of persuasion through character in Aristotle. Also devoted to the same topic are Fortenbaugh 1991 (= 2006: 383–7), 1996a (= 2006: 389–412) and 1996b (= 2006: 317–38).

structure is getting looser and that in the third pair Aristotle fails to couple terms of the same morphological type: φόβος is an abstract noun, but its opposite is specified by an adjective (Vogt 2006: 266).[61] The next two emotions are described at length, but their opposites are only mentioned in passing: shame (αἰσχύνη, 1383b11–85a14) and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία, 1385a14–15), then gratitude (χάρις, 1385a16–33) and ingratitude (ἀχάριστοι, in an adjectival form, 1385a33–b10). For the last four emotions, the opposition is even more distorted: compassion (ἔλεος, 1385b11–86b7) has two opposites, both resentment (τὸ νεμεσᾶν, 1386b8–15) and envy (φθόνος, 1386b16–88a30), which are then followed by another positive emotion, eagerness (ζῆλος, 1388a31–b28).

All sections of this account start with definitions (following more or less the same pattern) and investigate the motivations and reasoning behind the emotions as well as the situations in which they are felt.[62] Some of these emotions have been compared with the *Characters* of Theophrastos to prove that the purpose of the work may have been connected with rhetoric.[63] Although it has been noted that these emotions are presented in dry, academic style and thus resemble Theophrastos' descriptions only superficially (Ussher 1993: 11), at least one of them is worth pointing out.

In *Rh*. 2.6 (1383b11 ff.), Aristotle gives examples of actions that are likely to provoke αἰσχύνη, and classifies them loosely under particular vices (see Furley 1953: 59). Shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία; cf. *Char*. 9) is the only emotion that is also illustrated by resulting actions. Aristotle defines shame as "pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit" and shamelessness as "contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad

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[61]   In *Rh*. 1383a16 Aristotle actually once uses the abstract θάρσος, as well as τὸ θαρρεῖν in 1383a14–15, just as he had also mentioned the substantivized infinitives τὸ φιλεῖν and τὸ μισεῖν above.

[62]   See Vogt 2006: 266–7. For more thorough studies of emotions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Fortenbaugh 1970 (= 2006: 9–37).

[63]   See Immisch 1898: 195, 207; Furley 1953: 59; Trenkner 1958: 148; *contra* Ussher (1993: 11).

things."[64] There follow descriptions of several actions with explanation as to what their source is. Thus, throwing away one's shield or taking to flight are due to cowardice (ἀπὸ δειλίας, 1383b19); withholding a deposit is due to injustice (ἀπὸ ἀδικίας, 1383b19–20); having carnal intercourse with forbidden persons, at wrong times, or in wrong places, is due to licentiousness (ἀπὸ ἀκολασίας, 1383b21–22); making profit in petty or disgraceful ways, or from helpless persons, e.g. the poor, or the dead, is due to low greed and meanness (ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας ... καὶ ἀνελευθερίας, 1383b22–25); giving less help than you might in money matters, or none at all, or accepting help from those worse off than yourself, borrowing when it will seem like begging, begging when it will seem like asking the return of a favour, asking such a return when it will seem like begging, praising a man in order that it may seem like begging, and going on begging in spite of failure are all tokens of meanness (ἀνελευθερίας ... σημεῖα, 1383b25–30); praising extravagantly a man's good points and glozing over his weaknesses, and showing extravagant sympathy with his grief when you are in his presence are tokens of flattery (κολακείας ... σημεῖα, 1383b30–33); refusing to endure hardships that are endured by people who are older, more delicately brought up, of higher rank, or generally less capable of endurance than ourselves are tokens of effeminacy (μαλακίας σημεῖα, 1383b33–84a2); accepting benefits, especially accepting them often, from another man, and then abusing him for conferring them are tokens of a mean and ignoble disposition (μικροψυχίας ... καὶ ταπεινότητος σημεῖα, 1384a2–4); talking incessantly about yourself, making loud professions, and appropriating the merits of others are tokens of boastfulness (ἀλαζονείας [sc. σημεῖα], 1384a4–6). Indeed, Aristotle adds, the same is true of the actions due to any of the other forms of badness of character (ἦθος), of the tokens of such badness, and the like: they are all disgraceful and shameless (αἰσχρὰ ... καὶ ἀναίσχυντα, 1384a6–8). Furley (1953: 59) has suggested that these σημεῖα might be equivalent to Theophrastos' χαρακτῆρες, comparing also the similar sense of the Latin *signa* in Ter. *Adelphoe* 821 f.

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[64] *Rh.* 1383b12–15: ἔστω δὴ αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἢ παρόντων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ μελλόντων, ἡ δ᾽ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

There follows, in *Rhetoric*, a catalogue of characters (ἤθη) according to their ages (youth, the prime of life and old age) and social conditions or fortunes (noble birth, wealth and power and their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune).[65] Schütrumpf (1987: 180) has noted that Aristotle seems to attempt to be exhaustive in his list of typical attributes of these groups. The study of these 'characters' will enable the speaker to adapt his language and arguments to the audience with a particular set of established attitudes, interests, intellectual convictions, emotional responses, desires, needs, all of which have an effect on their judgments and decisions.[66] Here, ἦθος concerns the audience. This is a further development of the important idea presented already in Plato's *Phaidros*, where Sokrates argues that there cannot be a true art of speech without a knowledge of the soul, enabling a speaker to fit the appropriate argument to the soul of the hearer.[67] Kennedy (1991: 164) maintains that these chapters (12–17 of the second book of *Rhetoric*) were almost certainly written in a non-rhetorical context and "only added to the *Rhetoric* at a later stage, without adequate revision to integrate them into the objectives of the treatise."

The lengthy descriptions of characters according to their ages include first the young (νέοι; *Rh.* 1389a3–b12), then the old or those who have passed their *akmē* (πρεσβύτεροι, παρηκμακότες; *Rh.* 1389b13–90a27) as opposites of the young, and finally those in the prime of life (ἀκμάζοντες; *Rh.* 1390a28–b13).[68] This picture reflects the common stereotypical views of antiquity. Awareness of the character of those one addresses is useful, because "people always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character" (*Rh.* 1390a25–26). Although Aristotle does not mention any situations in which it would be useful, some of the topics are found in Greek oratory, e.g. to explain the actions and

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[65] *Rh.* 1388b31–89a2. On the question of the meaning of ἦθος in the *Rhetoric* and the problems occasioned by identifying it as πίστις ἔντεχνος solely with the ἦθος of the speaker, see Grimaldi 1988: 183 ff. The need to discuss the effect of age, wealth and fortune on ἦθος is already pointed out in the first book of *Rhetoric* (1369a24–31).

[66] See Cope 1877: 138; Grimaldi 1988: 186; Kennedy 1991: 164.

[67] See especially *Phdr.* 271d–72b and 277b–c with Kennedy 1991: 163.

[68] For a general study, see Dyroff 1939.

motivations of a young man when he is accused before the jury of some crime.[69]

To describe and to evaluate the character of each age, Aristotle uses, among others, terms that are later found as denoting specific character types in Theophrastos. Notably these tend to be associated with the old age. Thus, the old are mistrustful (ἄπιστοι, cf. *Char*. 18), illiberal, or not generous (ἀνελεύθεροι, cf. *Char*. 22), cowardly (δειλοί, cf. *Char*. 25), shameless (ἀναίσχυντοι, cf. *Char*. 9) and incline toward loquacity (ἀδολεσχία, cf. *Char*. 3). In addition, the description of the old as always "thinking" but "knowing" nothing (καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ᾽ οὐδέν, *Rh*. 1389b18) resembles the behaviour of the Theophrastean dissembler (*Char*. 1) .[70]

As Aristotle himself notes, the characters of older men are in most cases opposite to those of the young (*Rh*. 1389b13–15). Thus, the young are confiding (εὔπιστοι), they desire more honour and victory than money (φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα), they are more courageous (ἀνδρειότεροι) and sensitive to shame (αἰσχυντηλοί). Only the loquacity of the old has no counterpart among the young, implying, perhaps, that both the old and the young are loquacious.

The character of those in the prime of life is, according to Aristotle, the mean (μεταξύ) between the other two, which represent the excess (*Rh*. 1390a28 f.).[71] Thus, some rudiments of Aristotle's tripartite system are also reflected in the *Rhetoric*, although not quite in the same form and extent.

Descriptions of characters according to fortunes are presented more briefly and include εὐγενεῖς, πλούσιοι and δυνάμενοι (*Rh*. 1390b16–

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[69] Kennedy (1991: 164) refers, e.g., to Lysias (*For Mantitheus* (16), esp. 11, 15–16), and mentions that juries have often been disposed to excuse youthful high jinks (cf. Cicero *Pro Caelio*, esp. 37–47).

[70] Cf. also the reproach to Sokrates for dissembling, e.g. in Plato *R*. 336b–37a, and see ch. 4.1.

[71] He adds that the body is most fully developed at age 30–35, the mind at about 49 (*Rh*. 1390b9–11). Kennedy (1991: 169, n. 97) notes that Aristotle first taught rhetoric in Athens about the age of 30 and returned there to open his school at the age of 49; thus, he may have written these words when he was approaching 49. According to Kennedy it is noteworthy that Aristotle does not specify the age limit of youth or the beginning of old age, only maturity. The ages specified here only approximately accord with the common Greek theory that life (at least that of men) could be viewed in ten stages of seven years each; see also *Pol*. 1335a7–9 with Kennedy *l.c.*

91a29). These also include Theophrastean character traits. Thus, the wealthy are, among others, arrogant (ὑπερήφανοι, cf. *Char*. 24).

1.3.3. Poetics

The term ἦθος is also one of the key words in theoretical discussions of poetics.[72] In Aristotle's *Poetics*, ἦθος is one of the main terms in the discussion of tragedy. It is, in the plural form ἤθη, one of the six components of tragedy, together with μῦθος, λέξις, διάνοια, ὄψις and μελοποιία (*Poet*. 1450a9–10). E. Schütrumpf has shown that in Aristotle's *Poetics*, ἦθος has the same meaning as in *EN*, i.e. mainly restricted to ἠθικαὶ ἕξεις, as contrasted to διανοητικαί qualities, although he does not believe that the *Poetics* is influenced by Aristotle's ethical philosophy (Schütrumpf 1970: 125, 1987: 180–1). G. F. Held (1985) has tried to understand ἦθος as used in the *Poetics* in the same broad sense as in the *Rhetoric*, to include intellectual qualities as well. This has been refuted by Schütrumpf (1987). For the anonymous *Tractatus Coislinianus*, a treatise on comedy with Peripatetic influence, see below, ch. 2.2.3.

1.3.4. Physiognomics

Physiognomics, which is nowadays considered a pseudoscience, claims that there is a correlation between a person's appearance and character, his outer look and his inner world. Accordingly, it is possible to judge a person's mental qualities by studying his physical characteristics. The pseudo-Aristotelian *Physiognomics* (Φυσιογνωμονικά, usually dated to around 300 BCE) is the most important ancient study of this discipline. It is a treatise in two parts on the theory and practice of inferring character traits from bodily features and comportment, especially the face.[73]

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[72] See especially Schütrumpf 1970 and cf. Schütrumpf 1987.
[73] On this treatise see especially Vogt 1999 (with a good *Forschungsüberblick* on pp. 242–7) and cf. also Vogt 2006: 269–70, Tsouna 1998. For possible connections with Theophrastos, see Battegazzore 1998, Lombardi 1999a.

The first part contains a catalogue of 22 character traits with various bodily signs listed under each of them, including comparisons to animals.[74] The first half of the list is systematized according to opposing types, whereas the second half includes very diverse material. The list starts with four pairs of opposites: the brave man and the coward (ἀνδρεῖος, δειλός, 807a31–b12), the naturally clever and the insensitive man (εὐφυής, ἀναίσθητος, 807b12–28), the shameless and the orderly man (ἀναιδής, κόσμιος, 807b28–808a1), and the high-spirited and the low-spirited man (εὔθυμος, ἄθυμος, 808a2–11). There follow two unrelated types: the lewd fellow (κίναιδος, 808a12) and the sour man (πικρός, 808a17). Then there is another pair of opposites, viz. the passionate man and the gentle man (θυμώδης, πραύς, 808a19–27). Then follow the dissembler (εἴρων, 808a27–29), the small-minded man (μικρόψυχος, 808a29–31), gamblers (φιλόκυβοι, 808a31–32), abusive people (φιλολοίδοροι, 808a32–33), compassionate people (ἐλεήμονες, 808a33–b3), those with good appetite (ἀγαθοὶ φαγεῖν, 808b2–4), the lecherous man (λαγνός, 808b4–6), the somnolent (φίλυπνοι, 808b6–8), talkers (λαλοί, 808b8), and finally those with good memory (μνήμονες, 808b9–10).

There are no definitions or descriptions of the motivation or behaviour of a type. There are some types that appear morally neutral and strictly physical conditions (such as good appetite, good memory, sleepiness), but most of the list consists of morally negative characters (cf. Vogt 2006: 270). The features mentioned include the body as a whole, and various parts of it, specifically proportions of limbs, skin, hair, and of course face and its parts.[75]

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[74] In *HA*, ἦθος is also discussed more specifically in the context of animals. This work has by some been attributed to Theophrastos or at least it might contain Theophrastean material. See Schütrumpf 1970: 34–6, Regenbogen 1940: 1426, 1432.

[75] Vogt (1999: 463–80) has a useful appendix on all the bodily features used in the work, together with corresponding character traits and, where available, explanations or comparisons to animals.

PART 2. THE *CHARACTERS* OF THEOPHRASTOS

2.1. Structure and authenticity of the *Characters*

Theophrastos' work as it stands now contains only negative character types and does not repeat the tripartite system that can be seen in the ethical works of his teacher. On the one hand, this could be connected with the possible (non-ethical) aim of the work, on the other it can be argued that it would be much more difficult to describe, especially in short sketches, positive character types. This is not to say that it is not possible or that it has not been done. Positive characterization is essential to encomia and the works of historians,[76] and can also be seen in epitaphs, especially in funerary inscriptions. Here, however, the characterization usually amounts to no more than a list of some laudatory epithets, such as χρηστός (which is the most popular epithet) or a lot of φιλ-compounds.[77]

It has been suggested that the work of Theophrastos once contained a second book of positive character types, but there is no evidence of such a book (see below, ch. 2.1.2). The effect and emotional impact of a negative character sketch is clearly stronger. In addition, one can usually derive the implicit positive trait from its negative counterpart.

We may recall the view of Aristotle that positive consists of moderate and avoids extremes. At the same time, in defining and exemplifying this positive, moderate mean, Aristotle also seeks help from those extremes—in a way, the middle can only be defined by opposing it to the extremes, although Aristotle also distinguishes actions and emotions that are absolutely negative and that are not the extremes of any positive mean.[78]

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[76] Cf., e.g., Xenophon's account of the Spartan king Agesilaos (especially *Ages.* 3–6), with Dover 1974: 66. See also Bruns 1896.

[77] Tod (1951) has claimed that generally metrical epitaphs and laudatory epithets were common, but it has been shown that in the fifth and fourth century Athens even adjectives characterizing the dead are relatively infrequent, and accompanying epigrams even rarer (Meyer 1993). Cf. also Lattimore 1962 and Dover 1974: 67 ff.

[78] See, e.g., *EN* 1107a8 ff.: οὐ πᾶσα δ᾽ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα

It has been claimed that the manuscript tradition of the *Characters* is perhaps the most corrupt among classical Greek authors, almost every other sentence requiring some emendation.[79] There have been scholars who have expressed doubts about the authorship of Theophrastos, usually because of the belief that a serious scholar like Theophrastos could not have written a lively piece like this. The poor state of the Greek text that contains several later additions, thus referring to a compilation, has been a reason for doubt, as well. Doubters throughout centuries have included, e.g., Petrus Victorius (Pietro Vettori), Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer, Richard Porson and Moriz Haupt.[80] More recently, Martin L. West (1969: 121, n. 29) has found it incredible that Theophrastos should have chosen to deal with each character in isolation, with no theoretical context, and to "press them into such a stereotyped form of exposition." He suspected that the *Characters* is "a Hellenistic compilation in which Theophrastean material was redistributed under single headings." Note, however, that this comment was no more than an aside in a paper on Near Eastern material in Hellenistic and Roman literature, as rightly emphasized by Millett (forthcoming). Nowadays most scholars agree on the authorship of Theophrastos, even though his text has been entangled by other hands (spurious preface and conclusions, dubious definitions and several interpolations in the text; see below).

The chapters in the manuscript tradition always follow similar structure. They begin with the title, which is an abstract noun ending with -(ε)ια (the so-called *nomen qualitatis*). This is echoed in the following definition and it is always a cognate of the following adjective or *nomen agentis*, which introduces the description of the trait. There follows the actual sketch, i.e. the description of the behaviour of a type. A conclusion, surely of later origin, is appended to some chapters. These structural parts will be dealt with in more detail in the following sub-

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γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ᾽ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. Note, however, that he uses ἀναίσχυντος also as an extreme belonging to the middle which is represented by someone who is modest, with sense of shame (αἰδήμων; cf. above, ch. 1.3.1).

[79] Rusten 1993: VII, Diggle 2004: 20. Cf. also H. Diels' formulation (1909: V): "hunc aureum libellum plumbeas epitomatorum manus non effugisse." At the same time one can agree with Lane Fox (1996: 128) that "[u]nderneath, humanity has survived intact."

[80] For these four, with bibliographical references, see Diggle 2004: 16.

chapters, but first some words about the title of the whole work and the spurious preface to it.

2.1.1. Title of the work

The title of the work in the list of Theophrastos' works preserved by Diogenes Laertios is Ἠθικοί χαρακτῆρες in 5.47 and Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί in 5.48. The word ἠθικοί in it has been seen as a reference to ethical approach (in the sense of moral philosophy) and translated accordingly by some.[81] Ethical philosophy was not, however, the only discipline that studied ἦθος: this is shown explicitly by various passages in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and in other rhetorical treatises.[82] In addition, ἦθος is also one of the key words in theoretical discussions of poetics.[83] Thus the title as it stands would mean something like "Character traits," "Behavioural types," "Marks that indicate character" or "Distinctive marks of character."[84]

The manuscript tradition of the *Characters* has dropped the word ἠθικοί, leaving only the title Χαρακτῆρες.[85] The papyrus fragments do not contain any reference to the title of the work. It is most probable that the original title must have contained the attribute ἠθικοί, for more than one reason. First, the word χαρακτήρ was not, for all we know, connected with human ἦθος at the time of Theophrastos,[86] and thus he would have wanted to add some necessary explanation to it. This does not mean that the purpose of the work has to be 'ethical' in the sense of

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[81] E.g. "caractères moraux" (Navarre 1924: XI).

[82] See, e.g., Süss 1910, Schütrumpf 1993.

[83] See Schütrumpf 1970. For characters of comedy in *Tractatus Coislinianus*, see below, ch. 2.2.3.

[84] See Furley 1953: 59, n. 4 and Diggle 2004: 5.

[85] Two late MSS (*Venetus Marcianus Nanianus* 266 and *Casanatensis Gr.* 420) have the full title Θεοφράστου ἠθικοὶ χαρακτῆρες, but this has probably been copied from printed editions (Torraca 1994: XII, n. 8), and not taken directly from Diogenes Laertios, as Steinmetz believed (1962: 7, n. 1, following Immisch in LA 1897: XVI). At least three late MSS of the group C have the title χαρακτῆρες περὶ ἰδιωμάτων (see Steinmetz 1962: 7, n. 1, and Stein 1992: 5–6), which probably reflects a wish to explicate the ambiguous title.

[86] Cf. Körte 1929: 69, van Groningen 1930: 45, Steinmetz 1959: 209, 224 ff., Steinmetz 1960a: 55, Steinmetz 1962: 7. See also Introduction: Terminology.

moral philosophy; the attribute ἠθικοί may refer to practical behaviour of men and be 'ethical' in this sense. Second, it has been supposed that the title list in Diogenes Laertios goes back to the *pinakes* of Theophrastos' writings composed by Andronikos and Hermippos.[87] The source of Diogenes' catalogue of Theophrastean writings and the reason for five separate lists within it is, however, a complex issue and cannot be discussed here.[88]

As the *Characters* have survived among manuscripts of rhetorical treatises (mainly of Aphthonios and Hermogenes),[89] the dropping out of the word ἠθικοί would be an indication that it was later perceived solely in the sense of 'moral' and as such was not suitable for a text that would be used for rhetorical purpose. It has been suggested that the one who left out this attribute, whoever he was, may have treated it as the kind of addition that are used as subtitles in the Platonic corpus (Steinmetz 1962: 7; cf. Steinmetz 1960a: 55). This shows that the confusion about the purpose of the work was already widespread in the antiquity.

2.1.2. Preface

The preface attached to the *Characters* is certainly fictitious. In addition to moralizing content, the preface states that the author is 99 years old. As Theophrastos died at 85 (D.L. 5.40), early commentators, such as Isaac Casaubon, emended one or the other number, which is not a solution.[90] There are other claims that are false or at least questionable, and the text is full of fatuous repetitions.[91]

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[87] For Andronikos, see Plu. *Sull*. 26, for Hermippos the scholion at the end of the fragment of *Metaphysics*, Ross-Fobes 12a4 ff. Cf. also Regenbogen 1940: 1363 ff., Steinmetz 1960a: 55, 1962: 7.

[88] For pertinent discussions see, e.g., Usener 1858: 1–24, Howald 1920, Regenbogen 1940: 1363 ff., Moraux 1951: 14, 211–14, 246–8, Steinmetz 1960a: 55, Steinmetz 1962: 7, Fortenbaugh 1984: 135–7 (commentary to S46) and Sollenberger 1985. Cf. also Lord 1986.

[89] See LA 1897: XXIX ff. (Immisch), Steinmetz 1960a: 39.

[90] The latest suggestion to correct the number 99 that I know of was by T. B. L. Webster (1951: 32). For a misunderstanding in Jerome, who claims that he lived to 107, see Diggle 2004: 163 and Fortenbaugh 1984: 238.

[91] For a thorough analysis see Steinmetz 1962: 25–32.

That the preface cannot be the work of Theophrastos was first demonstrated, as far as I know, by Karl Gottlob Sonntag (see Sonntag 1787). It has been dated to the 5th century CE and outside Greece (Steinmetz 1962: 32). Some scholars have identified the author of the preface with the anonymous who added moralizing conclusions to some of the characters.[92] The first part of the preface (§§ 1–4) has also been associated with the sophist Hippias,[93] which, however, remains a speculation.

2.1.3. Definitions

The integrity of the definitions in the *Characters* has been one of the most heated topics of Theophrastean research. Nowadays the prevailing opinion is that the definitions have been added later and by someone else.[94] Diggle (2004: 17) is right in emphasizing that if the definitions are spurious, they are all spurious, "[t]hey stand and fall together."[95]

Some of these definitions reflect the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions* (Ὅροι), others use the phraseology of Aristotle or pseudo-Aristotle, and some seem to have no predecessor in the philosophical literature. There are problems in reconciling them with the character description that follows—some of them define a form of behaviour that seems to have little or nothing to do with the behaviour described in the following sketch, some are too general or offer only a partial introduction to the sketch. Rusten (1993: 31) has noted that it is especially unfortunate that the definitions come first, since they lead the reader to try to match what follows to their formula, rather than reading the description itself. In addition, the inner motive of behaviour, which is sometimes alluded to

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[92] *Char.* 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 26, 27, 29; see Petersen 1859: 63, Pasquali 1919: 1 ff., Ammendola 1920.

[93] See Untersteiner 1948, who suggests that it might have been taken from the Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς of Hippias. Cf. also Diggle 2004: 161, n. 5.

[94] See especially Stein 1992, which Diggle (2004: 57) considers the most noteworthy contribution to the study of the *Characters* since the Leipzig edition published in 1897.

[95] Cf. Rusten 1993, who also agrees with the study of Stein, but brackets only some definitions. D. N. Darvaris was apparently the first who condemned all definitions as spurious in his 1815 edition (*non vidi*; see Diggle 2004: 17, n. 56, and 56).

in the definition (cf. *Char*. 2, 18), is strange to Theophrastean character description, which focuses on behavioural regularities.[96]

It has been suggested that the definitions cannot derive from Theophrastos because of their content, form and style.[97] M. Stein has found that at least six definitions cannot be the work of Theophrastos (*Char*. 1, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13), but there are also problems with the others. He argues that the work originally contained only descriptions of character traits and the definitions were added later, for it is improbable that later definitions replaced earlier, original ones (Stein 1992: 284). It is also improbable that some of the definitions have been meddled with while others have not, as suggested by Pasquali (1986: 76), or that Theophrastos himself borrowed the definitions from various collections of definitions (cf. again Pasquali 1986: 85, with Rusten 1993: 32).

All this means that the interpolator also had to rearrange the chapters syntactically, adding abstract titles to each chapter and μὲν–δὲ constructions to connect the definition and the description. The supposed interpolator did not simply take the definitions from another collection and "pasted" them to the beginning of the descriptions. On the contrary, one can see that whoever added the definitions tried to vary their structure and syntax.

On the basis of their formal linguistic and syntactic structure, one can distinguish two large groups of definitions in the *Characters*:
1) Those containing the verb δοκεῖν together with the infinitive εἶναι (*Char*. 1, 4, 7, 13, 16, 21, 23, 25–27).
2) Those containing the third person singular present of the verb εἶναι (*Char*. 3, 5, 6, 8–10, 12, 14, 15, 17–20, 22, 24, 28–30).

Beside these two structures there are *Char*. 2 with ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις ... εἶναι, and *Char*. 11 with Οὐ χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστι ... διορίσασθαι· ἔστι ... There is no reason to unify the structure of these definitions.

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[96]   See, e.g., Fortenbaugh 1975, 1981, 1996c etc. Cf. Smeed (1985: 4): "The inner man emerges from this description of externals."
[97]   See Stein 1992: 67 and a concise summary on pp. 283 ff.

The main argument of those in favour of the integrity of the definitions is that similar definitions occur in papyrus fragments.[98] Although this does not prove that the definitions were part of the original work, it shows that they were added very early. Therefore, let us review the material available on papyri. (There are some other papyrus fragments that contain passages of the *Characters*, but have been left out in the following, as they do not refer to the beginning of a chapter.)[99]

The first papyrus is *PHerc*. 1457 from the first century BCE, containing passages from Philodemos, Περὶ κακιῶν: Περὶ κολακείας.[100] There are verbatim quotations from Theophrastos' *Char*. 5 in col. 6 and 7. The papyrus has some empty space before the description of the type, where early editors (e.g. Bassi 1909 and 1914, but also Kondo 1971) found traces of letters that were supposedly part of a definition. The papyrus, however, has deteriorated, and a later autopsy by T. Dorandi showed that the remains of these letters were no longer visible (see Dorandi & Stein 1994: 4). A comparative text of the passage of a possible definition in an earlier and in a later edition is given in the following:

Kondo 1971:   Dorandi & Stein 1994:

Col. 6

. . . . ια . . . ϱ . . . .   [
. . . . ε   [
. . . .   [
. ασ . . . . [ὁ δ᾽]ἄϱεσκ[ος]   ὁ δὲ] ἄϱεσκ[ος
5 [ἀμέλει τοιοῦτός τις] ἄϱ᾽ οἷο[ς]   ἀμέλει τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος]
(...)   (...)

In the first four lines of col. 6, Kondo could, after removing a *sovrapposto*, still read remains of some letters, on the basis of which she suggested that the papyrus may have included a definition similar to that of the

[98]   Defenders of the integrity of the definitions from later times include, e.g., P. Steinmetz and L. Torraca.

[99]   Thus, *PHamb*. 143 (1st cent. BCE, Pack[2] 2816) contains sections of *Char*. 7 and 8 (see Gronewald 1979).

[100] According to T. Dorandi (1990: 2345–8) it is probably Book 7. For contributions on this text see also Crönert 1906: 182, Edmonds 1910: 134–5, Stefanis 1994.

manuscripts of Theophrastos (Ἡ δὲ ἀρέσκεια ἐστι μὲν, ὡς ὅρῳ περι-λαβεῖν, ἔντευξις οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική). Thus, Kondo (1971: 76) notes that the letters ασ of col. 6.4 are "indubbiamente" those belonging to the word παρασκευαστική. Indeed, already Bassi (1909, 1914) had reconstructed the definition in the papyrus, and after his edition had appeared most scholars considered it a proof that the definitions were included in Theophrastos' work already in his times. Unfortunately, Bassi's readings were highly conjectural, and Kondo warns against too much optimism, concluding that the papyrus cannot be used as a proof for the authenticity of the definitions (Kondo 1971: 77–8; cf. Dorandi & Stein 1994: 4–5). But the possibility that a definition was available already in the papyrus is very high, even if this does not prove that the original work contained definitions.

The second papyrus is *PHerc.* 222 from the first century BCE, again having the text of Philodemos, Περὶ κακιῶν: Περὶ κολακείας.[101] There is no mention of Theophrastos' name in this passage, thus it cannot be used to confirm the text of Theophrastos first-hand. It does contain, however, an almost verbatim quotation of the definition of κολακεία, which we have in the *Characters*.[102] Thus, col. 12.1–3 has: τὴν ὑπό]κρισιν τὴν τοῦ φιλεῖν [εἰ]ς [κέρ|δισ]τʼ ἢ τὴν αἰσχρὰν ὁμιλία[ν συμ|φέρ]ουσαν τῶι κολακεύον[τι .. The passage contains two definitions of κολακεία. Gargiulo (1981: 124) has suggested that the sentence depends on a λέγει as a predicate, believing that the subject could have been Theophrastos. He also suspects that Theophrastos may have been the author of the first definition. The source may have been Theophrastos' Περὶ κολακείας, mentioned by Diogenes Laertios in 5.47. We have at least one fragment of that work preserved in Athenaios' *Deipnosophistai* (6.254d–e = fr. 547 FHS&G), in which Theophrastos tells a story of a Kleonymos, who was a dancer and also a flatterer. When this man repeatedly sat himself beside the Argive Myrtis and his fellow judges, wishing to be seen with the eminent men of the city, Myrtis took him by the ear and dragged him from the chamber, saying so that others could hear it, "You will not dance here, nor will you hear us." As has been noted, this passage reminds of the description of the ἄρεσκος in the *Characters* of

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[101] Edited (with translation and commentary) in Gargiulo 1981. Cf. also Stein 1992: 66.
[102] This had been noted already by Ihm (1896: 315).

Theophrastos (see *Char.* 5.7).[103] It is, however, also possible that both definitions come from a collection of definitions and have nothing to do with Theophrastos.

The third papyrus involved is *PHerc.* 1082, again from the first century BCE and Philodemos, Περὶ κακιῶν: Περὶ κολακείας.[104] In col. 7.4–7, there is an echo of the definition of κολακεία in the *Characters*: τάχα δὲ καὶ γράφοντα | ʼτὴν δὲ κολακείαν ὑπολάβοι τις | [ἂ]ν εἶναιʼ – καὶ ὑ[π]όληψιν ἐμφαί|[ν]ων καὶ διστασμόν [ο]ὐ πρὸς ... There is no mention of Theophrastos' name here either, but the definition is again quoted verbatim. The connection of the quotation, however, remains unclear.[105]

The last papyrus is *POxy.* IV 699 from the third century CE.[106] This papyrus, although later than the first three, contains an epitome of parts of *Char.* 25–26. The fragment seems to be a part of a compendium like that of the *Codex Monacensis* (M)[107] of Theophrastos. (Unfortunately that manuscript includes only the first 21 chapters so that an actual comparison is not possible.) It does contain a definition, but it is presented in a shortened form, just like the definitions in M: [5][η ολι]γ[αρχ]ια εστ[ιν φιλαρχι|α] τις ισχυος ι[.........| γ]λιχομενη [ο δε ολιγαρχι|κ]ος τοιουτος ... Note that the definition, as restored by Blass, matches Casaubon's conjecture ὀλιγαρχικός for ὀλίγαρχος in *Char.* 26.1. In addition, the generic term φιλαρχία is supplemented by some later editors on the basis of a reading of *Char.* 26 in MS c; the main manuscript V has omitted the generic term altogether. According to Diggle (2004: 140, 464), the papyrus might be supplemented in another way: ἡ (δὲ) ὀλ]ιγ[αρχ]ία ἐστ[ί τις προαίρε]σις... The word προαίρεσις is applied to oligarchy by Demosthenes,[108] and it is also used in [Pl.] *Def.* 413a, e.

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[103] See, e.g., Petersen 1859: 77, Steinmetz 1962: 76, 82, Fortenbaugh 1984: 304 (with a *caveat* on Steinmetz' emphasis of motives), Diggle 2004: 236.

[104] Edited by Caina 1939; cf. also Stein 1992: 66. I owe thanks to Markus Stein for a copy of this edition.

[105] Perhaps it is worth mentioning that the rare noun διστασμός is also used in Theophrastos' *Metaph.* 11a4 (Stein 1992: 66, n. 3).

[106] See Blass 1906: 496–7, Edmonds 1910: 133–4, Diggle 2004: 50.

[107] For a more detailed study of the epitome of the *Characters* in this manuscript (*Monacensis gr.* 505), see Steinmetz 1960a: 44–52.

[108] 13.8: τὴν πρὸς τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς προαιρέσεως ἔχθραν.

Diggle further notes that the προαιρουμένους in the (spurious) conclusion of *Char*. 26 would be an echo of προαίρεσις in the definition.

For various reasons of form, content and coherence, the spuriousness of the definitions seems probable, yet it should be emphasized that the definitions have been added to the text very early and they cannot really be compared with the fictitious preface or moralizing conclusions attached to some sketches. The tradition of the definitions is a topic worth exploring, for they certainly contain some Peripatetic phraseology and form a part of this tradition. They are not just "banal" or "inept" (cf. Diggle 2004); they are a useful evidence of the text's reception. It would seem best to treat the definitions as a traditional (and early) part of a corpus, which may or may not include Theophrastean material.[109]

There are several ways to define something. The basic classification in the formal logic distinguishes between explicit and implicit definitions, both of which have further subgroups. In the case of explicit definitions, the notion that is defined (*definiendum*) and the notion that is used in defining (*definiens*) are clearly discernible. The definitions found in philosophical prose (e.g. Aristotle's ethical works) or attached to the *Characters* of Theophrastos belong to this group.

One should be cautious when using these definitions in drawing conclusions about the meaning of the defined notions in the Greek language. As K. J. Dover has argued (1974: 59), the definitions formulated by Sokrates in Plato's dialogues or those adopted in Aristotelian classifications cannot be treated as contributions to the lexicography of classical Greek usage: the former are metaphysical explorations, and the latter have a prescriptive function. The difference between philosophical usage and everyday, popular language is evident in this case. Thus, anyone who constructed a definition of, e.g., ἀναισθησία from all the examples of ἀναίσθητος in the orators would be surprised to find out that in Theophrastos' *Char*. 14 absent-mindedness is treated as the essence of ἀναισθησία (Dover 1974: 59).

These definitions can, however, still be used in tracking the concepts in a philosophical tradition, e.g. the Peripatetics. We should also keep in mind

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[109] Cf. Fortenbaugh 1996c: 454.

the fact that a great part of the ancient definitions that we have are spurious (in the sense that their real author is unknown), but at the same time many of them are found in the corpora of a specific philosophical tradition.

In the following, I will present a synopsis of the definitions in the *Characters* of Theophrastos as they stand in the work (with MS variants and emendations where necessary). My focus here is mainly on the generic terms used in the definitions. In addition, I will compare the definitions available in the *Epitome Monacensis* (M), in order to see how the epitomator has reshaped the original definitions. I will only comment in passing on possible relations and contradictions between the definitions and following descriptions; for these, I will refer to thorough studies of Steinmetz (1960a, 1962), Stein (1992) and Diggle (2004).

Table 4. Definitions in the *Characters* (including definitions in M).[110]

Char.	The text of Diggle (2004)	The text in M (Steinmetz 1960a)
1	Ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν, <u>προσποίησις</u> ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεων καὶ λόγων	Ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία ὡς τύπῳ περιλαβεῖν <u>προσποίησις</u> ἐστιν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον λόγων τε καὶ πράξεων
2	Τὴν δὲ κολακείαν ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις <u>ὁμιλίαν</u> αἰσχρὰν εἶναι, συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι	Ἡ δὲ κολακεία, συμφέρει μὲν τῷ κόλακι. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως αἰσχρά ἐστιν <u>ὁμιλία</u>
3	Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν <u>διήγησις</u> λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων	Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία <u>διήγησίς</u> ἐστι λόγων οὐ καιρίων ἢ μακρῶν. καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων
4	Ἡ δὲ ἀγροικία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι <u>ἀμαθία</u> ἀσχήμων	Ἡ ἀγροικία <u>ἀμαθία</u> ἐστί
5	Ἡ δὲ ἀρέσκειά ἐστι μέν, ὡς ὅρῳ περιλαβεῖν, <u>ἔντευξις</u> οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστική	Ἡ δὲ ἀρέσκεια <u>ἔντευξίς</u> ἐστιν ἡδονῆς παρασκευαστικὴ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίστῳ
6	Ἡ δὲ ἀπόνοιά ἐστιν <u>ὑπομονὴ</u> αἰσχρῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων	Ἡ ἀπόνοια <u>ὑπομονή</u> ἐστιν ἔργων αἰσχρῶν

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[110] Generic terms have been underlined. Note that M only has 21 chapters.

Char.	The text of Diggle (2004)	The text in M (Steinmetz 1960a)
7	Ἡ δὲ λαλιά, εἴ τις αὐτὴν ὁρίζε-σθαι βούλοιτο, εἶναι ἂν δόξειεν <u>ἀκρασία</u> τοῦ λόγου	Ἡ λαλιά ἐστιν <u>ἀκρασία</u> λόγων
8	Ἡ δὲ λογοποιία ἐστὶ <u>σύνθεσις</u> ψευδῶν λόγων καὶ πράξεων, ὧν < > βούλεται ὁ λογοποιῶν	Ἡ δὲ λογοποιία <u>σύνθεσις</u> ἐστι ψευδῶν λόγων καὶ πράξεων
9	Ἡ δὲ ἀναισχυντία ἐστὶ μέν, ὡς ὅρῳ λαβεῖν, <u>καταφρόνησις</u> δόξης αἰσχρᾶς ἕνεκα κέρδους	Ἡ δὲ ἀναισχυντία <u>καταφρόνησις</u> ἐστι δόξης αἰσχρ (inc. comp.) ἕνεκα κέρδους
10	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ μικρολογία <u>φειδωλία</u> τοῦ διαφόρου ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρόν	Ἡ μακρολογία (sic) ἔοικε (..) <u>φειδωλία</u> διαφόρου παρὰ καιρόν
11	Οὐ χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστι τὴν βδελυ-ρίαν διορίσασθαι· ἔστι γὰρ <u>παιδιὰ</u> ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος	Ἡ βδελυρία <u>παιδιά</u> ἐστιν ἐπονεί-διστος
12	Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκαιρία ἐστὶν <u>ἐπίτευ-ξις</u> <χρόνου> λυποῦσα τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας	Ἡ ἀκαιρία <u>ἔντευξίς</u> ἐστι λυποῦσα τὸν ἐντυγχάνοντα
13	Ἀμέλει <ἡ> περιεργία δόξει<εν ἂν> εἶναι <u>προσποίησίς</u> τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ᾿ εὐνοίας	Ἡ περιεργία <u>προσπίησίς</u> (sic) ἐστι λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ᾿ εὐνοίας
14	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἀναισθησία, ὡς ὅρῳ εἰπεῖν, <u>βραδυτὴς</u> ψυχῆς ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν	Ἡ ἀναισθησία <u>βραδύτης</u> ἐστι ψυχῆς ἐν λόγῳ καὶ πράξει
15	Ἡ δὲ αὐθάδειά ἐστιν <u>ἀπήνεια</u> ὁμιλίας ἐν λόγοις	Ἡ αὐθάδεια <u>ἀπήνειά</u> ἐστιν ὁμιλίας ἐν λόγοις
16	Ἀμέλει ἡ δεισιδαιμονία δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι <u>δειλία</u> πρὸς τὸ δαιμό-νιον	Ἡ δεισιδαιμονία <u>δειλία</u> τις ἐστι πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον
17	Ἔστιν ἡ μεμψιμοιρία <u>ἐπιτίμησις</u> παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδο-μένων	Ἡ μεμψιμοιρία <u>ἐπιτίμησίς</u> τις ἐστίν
18	Ἔστιν ἀμέλει <ἡ> ἀπιστία <u>ὑπό-ληψίς</u> τις ἀδικίας κατὰ πάντων	Ἡ ἀπιστία ἐστιν <u>ὑπόληψις</u> ἀδικίας κατὰ πάντων
19	Ἔστιν ἡ δυσχέρεια <u>ἀθεραπευσία</u> σώματος λύπης παρασκευαστική	Ἡ δυσχέρεια <u>ἀθεραπευσία</u> ἐστὶ σώματος λύπης παρασκευαστική
20	Ἔστιν ἡ ἀηδία, ὡς ὅρῳ λαβεῖν, ἔντευξις λύπης ποιητικὴ ἄνευ βλάβης	Ἡ ἀηδία ἔντευξις ἐστι λύπης ποιητικὴ ἄνευ βλάβης

Char.	The text of Diggle (2004)	The text in M (Steinmetz 1960a)
21	Ἡ δὲ μικροφιλοτιμία δόξει<εν ἂν> εἶναι <u>ὄρεξις</u> τιμῆς ἀνελεύ-θερος	Ἡ μικροφιλοτιμία <u>ὄρεξις</u> ἐστι τιμῆς ἀνελευθέρου
22	Ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶ †<u>περι-ουσία</u> τις ἀπὸ φιλοτιμίας δαπά-νην ἐχούσα†	–
23	Ἀμέλει δὲ ἡ ἀλαζονεία δόξει<εν ἂν> εἶναι <u>προσποίησίς</u> τις ἀγα-θῶν οὐκ ὄντων	–
24	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ὑπερηφανία <u>καταφρό-νησίς</u> τις πλὴν αὑτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων	–
25	Ἀμέλει δὲ ἡ δειλία δόξειεν <ἂν> εἶναι <u>ὕπειξίς</u> τις ψυχῆς ἔμφοβος	–
26	Δόξειεν δ᾽ ἂν εἶναι ἡ ὀλιγαρχία <<u>προαίρεσίς</u>> τις ἰσχύος καὶ κέρδους γλιχομένη	–
27	Ἡ δὲ ὀψιμαθία <u>φιλοπονία</u> δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν	–
28	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ κακολογία <u>ἀγωγὴ</u> ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ἐν λόγοις	–
29	Ἔστι δὲ ἡ φιλοπονηρία <u>ἐπιθυμία</u> κακίας	–
30	Ἡ δὲ αἰσχροκέρδειά ἐστιν <u>ἐπι-θυμία</u> κέρδους αἰσχροῦ	–

A lot of correcting and emending has been done on the definitions by modern scholars, especially in the case of those definitions in the latter part of the work that have less manuscript support. Thus, it is some-times rather difficult to follow what the text really has been. The above definitions are presented as they appear in Diggle's edition (2004). Diggle retains manuscript readings in every chapter, except in four cases:

1) *Char*. 23, where he prefers the version προσποίησις (Auberius) for the MS V's προσδοκία; this seems to be supported by the definition of ἀλαζονεία in [Plat.] *Def*. 416a10–11: ἀλαζονεία ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων (cf. Ingenkamp 1967);

2) *Char*. 26, where he supplies προαίρεσις, based on his papyrus reading (MS V here omits the generic term; Navarre has suggested πλεονεξία; MSS C have φιλαρχία, which is accepted by Steinmetz);

3) *Char*. 28, where he prefers Casaubon–Edmonds' ἀγωγή for the MS V's ἀγὼν τῆς; other emendations have been ἀγωνία (Meier), ἀγωγόν (Hottinger), ἀκρωνία τις (Ussher);

4) *Char*. 30, where he prefers Bloch's ἐπιθυμία for the MS V's περιουσία; other emendations have been περιποίησις (Foss), περιεργία (Hanow), περίπτυξις (Ussing), προσποίησις (Fraenkel, Groeneboom), ἀπουσία φιλοτιμίας (Hartung), περιουσία <ἐπιθυμίας> (Schneider), περιουσία <τις πλεονεξίας> (Holland, with ἐπιθυμητική added at the end).

The MS reading in the definition of *Char*. 22 is designated with a crux by Diggle. Some emendations include ἀπουσία τις φιλοτιμίας (Schweighäuser), περιουσία τις <φειδωλίας> ἀπὸ φιλοχρηματίας (Stark), περιουσία τις <φιλοχρηματίας> ἀπὸ <ἀ>φιλοτιμίας (Holland), περιουσία τις ἀφιλοτιμίας (Casaubon), περιουσία τις ἀποφιλοτιμίας (Fischer). For a discussion of these, and other emendations, see Diggle 2004: 420.

Basically, the MS M retains the same generic terms in the definitions, except in the case of *Char*. 12 (ἀκαιρία), where it has ἔντευξις for ἐπίτευξις (cf. *Char*. 5, *Char*. 20). The version ἐπίτευξις acquires some reliability by a parallel in pseudo-Platonic *Def*. 413c12, where εὐκαιρία is defined as χρόνου ἐπίτευξις, ἐν ᾧ χρὴ παθεῖν τι ἢ ποιῆσαι (cf. Ingenkamp 1967).

The epitomator's work is interesting to observe.[111] He keeps the definitions for all chapters, although sometimes changing and simplifying the text. He substitutes phrases containing aorist optative forms with simple indicative in each definition (e.g. *Char*. 1: δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι > ἐστιν; *Char*. 2: ὑπολάβοι ἄν τις ... εἶναι > ἐστιν). In the case of *Char*. 1, i.e. at the beginning of the work, he keeps the phrase ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν, only replacing λαβεῖν with περιλαβεῖν. In other cases, these phrases are not reproduced. Simplifications occur elsewhere, as well, as in the case of *Char*. 8, where we especially miss the interpretation of the author of M.

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[111] For an analysis of the epitomator's work on the descriptions themselves, see Steinmetz 1960a: 44–52.

In some cases, something is added to the definition, as in *Char*. 3 where our MSS have λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων but M has λόγων οὐ καιρίων ἢ μακρῶν. καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων. In other cases, a definition is shortened to the point that it only contains the generic term and no other specifications (*Char*. 4: ἡ ἀγροικία ἀμαθία ἐστί, leaving out ἀσχήμων; indeed, which ἀμαθία would not be ἀσχήμων?). The same holds true for *Char*. 17, where ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων is changed into ἐπιτίμησίς τις.

It is noticeable that in one case, M changes the *definiendum*: in *Char*. 10 it has μακρολογία instead of μικρολογία. This is probably a simple scribal error. Other, smaller changes can be seen in some definitions, such as leaving out λόγων (*Char*. 6) or ἐπιφανὴς (*Char*. 11); changing λόγου into λόγων (*Char*. 7), ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν into ἐν λόγῳ καὶ πράξει (*Char*. 14) or the phrase ὑπὲρ τὸν καιρόν into παρὰ καιρόν (*Char*. 10), etc.

In the case of definitions of character traits we should also look at texts outside the Peripatetic tradition. I have already referred to the collection Ὅροι (*Definitiones*), which belongs to the Platonic corpus but is certainly spurious. Modern authors have not paid much attention to this work, and the most thorough interpretation of it is the dissertation of H. G. Ingenkamp from 1966 (published 1967).

It has been suggested that this pseudo-Platonic work has been compiled on the basis of several earlier collections of definitions (see Ingenkamp 1967: 110 f.), or that it consists of one main part, which has later been supplemented (starting from 414e6, cf. Stein 1992: 283). What is important is the fact that it contains definitions of four character traits that are also found in the *Characters*:

1) κολακεία (*Char*. 2), of which there are two definitions (*Def*. 415e9–10): κολακεία ὁμιλία ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου· ἕξις ὁμιλητικὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὑπερβάλλουσα τὸ μέτριον. These definitions are actually more similar to the definition of ἀρέσκεια (*Char*. 5) in the *Characters*, emphasizing the orientation towards ἡδονή.

2) λαλιά (*Char*. 7), cf. *Def*. 416a23: λαλιὰ ἀκρασία λόγου ἄλογος. The word ἀκρασία is here to be understood as a synonym to ἀκράτεια (*LSJ* ἀκρασία B), not as 'bad mixture' (from κεράννυμι, *LSJ* ἀκρᾱσία A).

3) ἀναισχυντία (*Char.* 9), cf. *Def.* 416a14–15: ἀναισχυντία ἕξις ψυχῆς ὑπομενητικὴ ἀδοξίας ἕνεκα κέρδους. Its opposite, αἰσχύνη, is defined as φόβος ἐπὶ προσδοκίᾳ ἀδοξίας (*Def.* 416a9). The first known definition of ἀναισχυντία comes from Plato;[112] the definitions in the works of Aristotle are quite similar.[113]

4) ἀλαζονεία (*Char.* 23): see above, p. 62.

In addition, the pseudo-Platonic work contains a definition of εὐκαιρία, which has similarities with the definition of ἀκαιρία (*Char.* 12) in the Theophrastean corpus (see above, p. 62).

The pseudo-Platonic work has used several of the generic terms that occur in the definitions of the *Characters* in defining other abstract words, as well:

βραδυτής, which occurs in the definition of *Char.* 14, is used to define δυσμαθία (*Def.* 415e2: δυσμαθία βραδυτὴς ἐν μαθήσει);

ὁμιλία (cf. *Char.* 2) is used for σωφροσύνη (*Def.* 411e10: σωφροσύνη λογιστικὴ ὁμιλία ψυχῆς περὶ καλῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν);

ὄρεξις (cf. *Char.* 21) is used for βούλησις (*Def.* 413c8–9: βούλησις ὄρεξις εὔλογος· ὄρεξις μετὰ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν);

περιουσία (cf. *Char.* 22 and the MS reading of *Char.* 30) is used for πλοῦτος (*Def.* 415d1–2: πλοῦτος περιουσία χρημάτων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεινόντων);

προαίρεσις (cf. *Char.* 26 with the emendation of Diggle on the basis of a possible papyrus reading) is used for φιλία (*Def.* 413a10–11: φιλία προαίρεσις βίου τοῦ αὐτοῦ· ὁμοδοξία περὶ προαιρέσεως καὶ πράξεως), and cf. also the definition of καλοκαγαθία (*Def.* 412e8: καλοκαγαθία ἕξις προαιρετικὴ τῶν βελτίστων);

ὕπειξις (cf. *Char.* 25) is used for κοσμιότης (*Def.* 412d8: κοσμιότης ὕπειξις ἑκουσία πρὸς τὸ φανὲν βέλτιστον);

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[112] *Lg.* 701a–b: τὸ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βελτίονος δόξαν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι διὰ θράσος, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν σχεδὸν ἡ πονηρὰ ἀναισχυντία, διὰ δή τινος ἐλευθερίας λίαν ἀποτετολμημένης.

[113] *EE* 1233b27–8: ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος; *MM* 1193a3–4: ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἃ ἔτυχεν. Cf. *Rh.* 1368b23, 1380a20–1, 1383b14–15; *EN* 1108a34–5, 1115a14.

ὑπόληψις (cf. *Char.* 18) is used for εὐσέβεια (*Def.* 413a1: εὐσέβεια περὶ θεῶν τιμῆς ὑπόληψις ὀρθή), πίστις (*Def.* 413c4: πίστις ὑπόληψις ὀρθὴ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς αὐτῷ φαίνεται), ἐπιστήμη (*Def.* 414b10–c1: ἐπιστήμη ὑπόληψις ψυχῆς ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου· δύναμις ὑποληπτική τινος ἢ τινῶν ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου), δόξα (*Def.* 414c3: δόξα ὑπόληψις μεταπειστὸς ὑπὸ λόγου), and cf. μανία (*Def.* 416a22: μανία ἕξις φθαρτικὴ ἀληθοῦς ὑπολήψεως);

ὑπομονή (cf. *Char.* 6) is used for καρτερία (*Def.* 412c1–2: καρτερία ὑπομονὴ λύπης ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ· ὑπομονὴ πόνων ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ);

φιλοπονία (cf. *Char.* 27) is defined on its own (*Def.* 412c6: φιλοπονία ἕξις ἀποτελεστικὴ οὗ ἂν προέληται).

In addition, δειλία, which is the *definiendum* in *Char.* 25 (with the generic term ὕπειξις), is also used as a generic term in both the *Characters* (*Char.* 16, see above) and in the pseudo-Platonic definitions (*Def.* 416a3: ὄκνος δειλία ἀντιληπτικὴ ὁρμῆς).

These similarities need not indicate a direct interrelation between Ὅροι and the definitions of the *Characters*, for most of these abstract generic terms are very general and seem natural for formal definitions like those presented above.

At least three possibilities have been considered for the relation between Ὅροι and the *Characters* of Theophrastos:
1) Both collections have been created independently.
2) The Ὅροι has been influenced by the *Characters* (for both 1 and 2 see Steinmetz 1962: 12).
3) The Ὅροι has influenced the definitions in the *Characters* (Stein 1992: 283, cf. Steinmetz 1962: 12, who considers this improbable).

In a situation where both the Ὅροι and the definitions in the *Characters* are spurious, there is actually no way of determining their relation, but if one has to choose, the third possibility seems to be most plausible.

The definitions of the *Characters* do not use the generic term ἕξις, which can often be seen in the pseudo-Platonic definitions and in definitions elsewhere. It has been suggested that this is entirely in the tradition of the Aristotelian definitions, as Aristotle defines ἀρετή as a ἕξις (e.g. *EN* 1106b36), but rarely uses this term in the definitions of single ἀρεταί and

κακίαι (Steinmetz 1962: 13). But Aristotle is not consistent in this and he does use ἕξις, for example, in the case of ἀγροικία in *EN* 1108a26.

The definitions of the *Characters* lack one common generic term, and although some terms recur, the principles of compiling the definitions seem to be of another kind. One can see this especially in the case of newer compounds, where a term is defined by literally taking it to pieces and rewriting it with words and phrases of similar meaning or derived from the same root. Therefore, many of the definitions are what Steinmetz (1962: 14) has called "Umschreibungen des Begriffsinhalts". The following examples illustrate this procedure.

Table 5. A selection of *nomina qualitatis* and their definitions in the *Characters*.[114]

Char. 21	μικροφιλοτιμία	ὄρεξις τιμῆς ἀνελεύθερος
Char. 17	μεμψιμοιρία	ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων
Char. 29	φιλοπονηρία	ἐπιθυμία κακίας
Char. 28	κακολογία	ἀγωγὴ ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ χεῖρον ἐν λόγοις
Char. 27	ὀψιμαθία	φιλοπονία ... ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡλικίαν
Char. 8	λογοποιία	σύνθεσις ψευδῶν λόγων καὶ πράξεων
Char. 3	ἀδολεσχία	διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων
Char. 16	δεισιδαιμονία	δειλία πρὸς τὸ δαιμόνιον
Char. 30	αἰσχροκέρδεια	ἐπιθυμία κέρδους αἰσχροῦ

One cannot agree with Steinmetz' assertion (1962: 14) that in the same way the other *nomina qualitatis* are not defined but rewritten according to their content. Of course this is not the case when the defined terms cannot be dismantled, as, e.g., in the case of εἰρωνεία or κολακεία. But even when this can be done, most of the terms do not conform to such *Umschreibung* (cf., e.g., ἀγροικία).

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[114] The examples have been taken from Steinmetz 1962: 13.

2.1.4. Descriptions

The descriptions form the centre of the chapter and begin, with some variations, with introductory formula τοιοῦτός τις, οἷος ... The descriptions are structurally stereotyped, consisting mostly of infinitive constructions complemented by participles. Sometimes this structure is broken by remarks such as 'he is also apt to ...' (δεινὸς δὲ καὶ, e.g. *Char.* 6.5, 9.8, 10.10, 12.8, 14.8, 15.11, 29.5) or 'he is also capable of ...' (δυνατὸς καὶ, e.g. *Char.* 6.3), which refer back to the opening formula and, in turn, connect infinitive and participle constructions. The consecutive particle ὥστε attached to an infinitive can also be found frequently. The situations are usually introduced by a καί, which often simply notes different elements of a list, but may also be an indication of colloquial usage.

There are some deviations from this basic structure. In *Char.* 8, the author uses main clauses in indicative instead of regular infinitive constructions. The usual structure is also given up in some other chapters, mainly at the end of the description. One of the reasons for this may be the anacoluthic nature of the text: the syntactic rhythm of the main clause weakens, thereby causing the change in the structure. In any case, there seems to be no confident reason to unify the text by means of a conjecture or to suspect later additions solely because of the change in the formal structure of the chapter (cf. especially *Char.* 2, 6, 15, 16).

With regard to symmetry, some sketches have been considered to be incomplete or corrupt (see below, ch. 2.1.6). There are also numerous (suspected) additions that are embedded in the sketches, ranging in extent from single words to brief phrases (*Char.* 4.4, 8.7, 18.6, 19.4, 20.9, 21.11, 22.7, 30.10), whole sentences (*Char.* 2.9, 6.2, 7.5, 8.5, 16.13) and even a sentence of paragraph length (*Char.* 6.7) (cf. Diggle 2004: 17–18). It is not necessary to suspect a textual damage every time we cannot understand the point of the text at once. Many of these additions are in fact quite compatible with the sketch and need not be emended. It is always a question of interpretation. That, of course, does not mean that there are no interpolations in the text.

Depending on the structure of the scenes, the descriptions have been divided into two large groups (see Steinmetz 1962: 17, Steinmetz 1959: 212):

(1) Descriptions, where the author contrasts the situation and the re-action of the man in it. The situations are, as a rule, not predictable, thus the actions cannot be planned ahead and decisions to react in one way or another are not made κατὰ προαίρεσιν, to use the terminology of Aristotle (cf. *EN* 1111b4 ff., 1144a19 ff., *EE* 1226b3). At that, the reaction may be presented in short and generalized form, or described in small, characteristic (and comic) detail, revealing the disposition of a person.

(2) Passages, where the author describes habitual behaviour of the type, not following one specific situation. This kind of description can be presented in a very short form, often simply as a list.

Although the descriptions are those of a type, they are never real generalizations. They contain numerous vivid details, including the exact words of many types in various situations, and a huge amount of information about small things that were important in the life of ancient Athens. The situations and reactions of the types are more thoroughly analyzed in ch. 2.4, which focuses on levels of social communication in the *Characters*.

2.1.5. Conclusions

Some descriptions are followed by conclusions, which differ from the preceding text in both content and style. They moralize, generalize and are usually just blunt. One also notices frequent transition from singular to plural, conspicuous use of metaphors and ornate language. Such conclusions are found at the end of *Char*. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 26, 28 and 29. These fictitious conclusions may have been added in Byzantine times (Steinmetz 1960a: 55), and it is not impossible that their author was the same man who wrote the preface of the *Characters*, although this cannot be proved and the text may have suffered from various later hands.

There is also another sort of conclusion or epilogue that is contained in some MSS of the group E that have 15 chapters and possess no

independent value for the transmission (see Steinmetz 1960a: 43). This one does not pretend to be the work of Theophrastos, but is addressed to him. The text reads as follows:[115]

> τέλος τῶν τοῦ θεοφράστου χαρακτήρων.—ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν, ὦ θεόφραστε, χαλεπὸν καθαροὺς τῶν τοιούτων ἰδεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῆς ἐν τούτοις κακίας ὅλως ἀφεστηκότας. εἰ μὴ γὰρ τὰ πάντα δοκοίη τις εἶναι κακός, τοῖς γοῦν πλείοσι τοῦ χοροῦ τῶν ἀρίστων ἐξέωσται. ἢ τοίνυν σοὶ πειθομένους ἡμᾶς τὰς ἁπάντων ὄψεις φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ, ἢ κοινονοῦντας καὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων τὴν ἑκάστου γνώμην μιμεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω μὲν κακίας ἑσμὸς καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀλλοτρίωσις ἕπεται, ἐκείνως δὲ ἡ μισανθρωπία καὶ τὸ τοῦ Τίμωνος ἔγκλημα. ταύτῃ τοι χαλεπὸν ἑλέσθαι τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ δεινὸς ἑκατέρωθεν ὄλισθος.

The author of this epilogue is unknown.

2.1.6. Lost and merged sketches?

The manuscripts of the *Characters* contain thirty character sketches, transmitted in two parts;[116] they also include a table of contents for thirty chapters. In itself it is not impossible that more sketches existed at some time,[117] but if they did exist, they have been lost already in the ancient tradition. Most of the manuscripts that we have today (beginning with 10th/11th century) include a *pinax* that never lists more than thirty chapters.[118]

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[115] I follow the text presented in Steinmetz 1960a: 84.

[116] *Editio princeps* (Nürnberg 1527, ed. W. Pirckheimer) contains first 15 characters; characters 16–23 were added in 1552 (ed. G. Battista Gamozzi), characters 24–8 in 1612 (ed. I. Casaubon) and characters 29–30 in 1786 (ed. G. C. Amaduzzi). More on early editions and manuscript tradition see in Diggle 2004: 37–57.

[117] Diggle (2004: 18, n. 59) seems to be sure of this.

[118] Depending on the manuscript families, some have a *pinax* of 15 chapters, some of 30 chapters; V (containing *Char*. 16–30) has no *pinax*, but the chapters are numerated starting with number 16. See Steinmetz 1960a: 1.

Two points should be considered in connection with this. The first is concerned with the possible existence of a second book of the *Characters*, now lost. The second deals with the suspicion that some chapters of the work have been corrupted or lost in the transmission.

2.1.6.1. A second book?

The spurious preface of the work expresses a wish to describe both negative and positive character types, and indeed it has been argued that a second book of Theophrastos, describing virtuous characters, once existed. For one, the passage in Eustathios (931.22–3, see above, ch. 1.1) has given rise to such belief.[119] Eustathios, however, is citing these characters, i.e. the coward and the brave man, from Homer, not from Theophrastos, as is shown by the words ἐν καιρῷ λόχου.[120] Thus, there is no reason to suppose that Theophrastos should have described a brave man in the *Characters*. The existence of the second book rests on two further suppositions:

1) That the author of the *prooemium* of Theophrastos' *Characters* says he will describe both good and bad characters (*Prooem*. 2: τούς τε ἀγαθοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς φαύλους), thus seemingly having a knowledge of a book of ἀγαθοί.

2) That Diogenes Laertios lists *Characters* twice, seemingly referring to two separate books.

The first argument cannot be taken seriously because of the anonymous author's overall unreliability. It has been suggested that the interpolator who added the preface would not have referred to the second book if he had not actually known that it existed (Altamura 1985: 426), but it may well have been the anonymous' wishful thinking that a book of virtuous characters had indeed been compiled by Theophrastos. Altamura's suggestion (1985: 427–8) that we could imagine that Theophrastos did depict some positive character types to allow a comparison, and that these types were later excluded from the corpus because they were not

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[119] See Rostagni 1920: 439–40 (= 1955: 350–1), Altamura 1985: 427–8, Ussher 1993: XI, 3–4, 301–2, Torraca 1994: XXX–XXXII.

[120] See Navarre 1924: 207–11, Regenbogen 1940: 1508, Steinmetz 1962: 30 f., Diggle 2004: 19; cf. Ussher 1993: 4, n. 6.

written with the same vivacity and brilliance, remains a speculation and is not probable on intellectual grounds, either.[121]

The second argument is explained by the tradition of presenting a work with a two-word title under both letters in the lists of works. Thus, the manuscripts have Ἠθικοί χαρακτῆρες in 5.47 and Χαρακτῆρες ἠθικοί in 5.48. In the first instance, the number of the books (α', i.e. "one book") is given; in the second instance it is missing,[122] which may be a simple scribal error that predates our earliest manuscripts (Fortenbaugh 2005: 88). Fortenbaugh has suggested that the reason why the *Characters* is listed twice may be that the second of Diogenes' lists represents a single purchase by the library at Alexandria, and that the purchase contained two copies of the *Characters*, albeit with the words of the title reversed. He also believes that the copies may have been identical, but equally they may have been different versions of the same work (2005: 88). I would add another possibility: the work may already have been circulating at that time under the simple title Χαρακτῆρες that we have in the manuscripts, and was perhaps included under the letter X for that reason, with ἠθικοί added later to unify the two titles.

2.1.6.2. Lost sketches?

The suggestion that some chapters of the work have been corrupted or lost in the transmission is nowadays widely accepted. Diggle (2004: 15) argues that, with regard to symmetry of the work, some sketches are incomplete, and others may be. That some sketches have been corrupted or merged has been suggested before, but Diggle defends his position with remarkable vigour. Thus, *Char*. 5 and *Char*. 19 are said to consist of two parts, which come from separate sketches, and in *Char*. 5 both parts, in *Char*. 19 one or both, are said to be incomplete.

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[121] Altamura has also suggested that there may have been only one positive character sketch, bringing a parallel from the preface to the fables of Phaedrus (see Altamura 1985: 427).

[122] See, e.g., Regenbogen 1940: 1355. On the *Vita Theophrasti* in Diogenes Laertios (including the list of his works), see further Sollenberger 1985; more generally on the lives of the Peripatetics in Diogenes Laertios, book 5, see Sollenberger 1992.

In the case of *Char*. 5, §§6–10 seem to describe a different character,[123] although they follow the previous sections without break, in the papyrus as well as in MSS AB. Thus, it has been suggested that these sections are the latter part of a sketch whose beginning has been lost (Diggle 2004: 222). Various editors have identified the text as belonging to a sketch on ἀπειρόκαλος or βάναυσος (Casaubon), μεγαλοπρεπής (Schneider, Bloch), φιλότιμος (Schneider, Darvaris) and most often μικροφιλότιμος (*Char*. 21; Ansoldo Cebà and others, including Foss, Jebb, Ast, Dübner, Ribbeck, Edmonds, Navarre). The man depicted in these sections resembles two types described by Aristotle: the vulgar man (βάναυσος), who makes a tasteless display of his wealth, spending too much on inappropriate occasions (*EN* 1123a19–27); and the vain man (χαῦνος), who is ostentatious in dress and manner and wants others to see and hear how well-off he is (*EN* 1125a27–32).[124] The unity of the chapter has been defended by Goez, Korais, Petersen, Ussing, Pasquali, Gallavotti, Regenbogen, Torraca and especially Steinmetz (1962: 75–88). Diels, Immisch and Rusten have been suspicious, although leaving the sections where they are. If the sketch has indeed been corrupted, this has taken place very early, before our papyrus evidence (*PHerc*. 1457, first century BCE, which quotes *Char*. 5).

In the case of *Char*. 19, §§7–10 (or 8–10) have been considered to belong to another sketch.[125] Some scholars have suspected that they should be part of *Char*. 11, but Diggle (2004: 386) has emphasized that blaspheming when his mother visits the augur (§7) is not of a pattern with the shameless attention-drawing behaviour of the βδελυρός. In addition, this would mean applause and belching twice in the same sketch (*Char*. 11.3, *Char*. 19.5, 19.9). Other suggested locations are with *Char*. 14 (Klotz) or *Char*. 20 (Petersen). According to Diggle, it is more likely that we have here the remnant of a different sketch, whose beginning has been lost.[126] The unity of the chapter has been defended by Ussing, Steinmetz and Torraca.

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[123] A thorough discussion of differences is found in Stein 1992: 117–21 and a synopsis in Diggle 2004: 222.

[124] See Ussher 1993: 63 ("a title like περὶ χαυνότητος would, of course, be unique among the *Characters*, but περὶ βαναυσίας might be suggested"); Diggle 2004: 222.

[125] Most scholars would move §§8–10; Meier and Diels §§4–10; Navarre §§7–10.

[126] Diggle 2004: 386; see also Stein 1992: 206.

The passage of Eustathios (see ch. 1.1 and cf. above) has also been used to find traces of a lost sketch of another negative character type by Theophrastos. Kayser (1910: 327–58) has argued that Eustathios' portrait of the ὑποκριτής[127] is indebted to earlier descriptions of the κόλαξ. He fails, however, to prove a direct debt to the passage of Theophrastos, let alone to a lost Theophrastean sketch of a ὑποκριτής, although Eustathios seems to have had a fairly good knowledge of Theophrastos (Diggle 2004: 181; Wilson 1983: 200–01).

2.1.7. Traces of character writing in other works of Theophrastos

The fragments of Theophrastos' works contain some references to character types, but it is usually not certain what the context of these references is. Diogenes Laertios (5.47.12) mentions a work Περὶ κολακείας, from which we have at least one fragment (Athenaios 6.254d–e = fr. 547 FHS&G) that has been connected with the description of ἄρεσκος in the *Characters* (*Char*. 5; see above, ch. 2.1.3).

We are reminded of the description of the talkative person (*Char*. 7) in fr. 452 FHS&G (= *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 331), where Theophrastos is described to have said, encountering a babbler, "αὔριόν σε ποῦ ἔσται μὴ ἰδεῖν;" ("Tomorrow where will it be possible not to see you?")

It is possible that Theophrastos used the topics of character types in other works, as well. Titles such as Ἀρετῶν διαφοραί (D.L. 5.42.20), Περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (D.L. 5.43.7), Περὶ ψεύδους ἡδονῆς (D.L. 5.46.011), Περὶ ἀρετῆς (D.L. 5.46.16) and perhaps Περὶ γελοίου (D.L. 5.46.20) or Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης (D.L. 5.50.15) might have contained at least references to similar types, if nothing like we have in the *Characters*. It is certainly probable that he used something like this in his lectures, as is shown by fr. 12 FHS&G, where Theophrastos is depicted as imitating a gourmet (cf. below, ch. 2.2.1).

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[127] *De simulatione*, in T. L. F. Tafel, *Eustathii opuscula* (Frankfurt 1832), 88–98.

2.1.8. The thirty character sketches: an overview

Taking into account the structure of this thesis, a short synopsis of the character types of Theophrastos seems necessary, although I will not summarize the contents of the sketches, as there are readily available editions of the text. A general lexical and semantic overview presents etymological details where necessary. I add a synopsis of various English translations of each character trait and its bearer (minor orthographical differences, such as endings -or vs. -our, are not noted).[128] On the one hand, this may give a better picture of the type behind the word. On the other, it demonstrates how translators into one language, but from various times and with various backgrounds, have understood their source. (Indeed the translation history of the *Characters* is a good topic for study in its own right.)

I have added some sections on the use of corresponding abstract nouns and *nomina agentis* in Greek literature before and, to some degree, after Theophrastos. Special attention is given to cases in which the term is used in connection with other words denoting types in Theophrastos' gallery, but also in connection with other terms denoting negative character traits.

The quotations from the *Characters* generally follow Diggle's text (2004). Note that this edition has also caused confusion, as the editor has renumbered the sections of of the chapters, which makes it somewhat inconvenient to refer to them on the background of earlier editorial tradition.[129] In addition, Diggle has easily made conjectures in details,

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[128] This list is generally arranged in chronological order, from latest to oldest editions. D stands for Diggle 2004, R for Rusten 1993, A for Anderson 1970, V for Vellacott 1967, E for Edmonds 1929, J–S for Jebb & Sandys 1909, B for Budgell 1751 (this is a later edition of a translation published in 1713; at that time, and indeed until 1786, only 28 chapters were known. I am grateful to Christopher W. Marshall for briefing me on this edition back in 1998). Note that Diggle does not use abstract nouns as the titles of the chapters (except the Greek ones in the table of contents on p. 61), although they occur in the Greek text (they are noted in the *apparatus*). As he believes that the definitions attached to the descriptions are not genuine, he seems to consider the abstract titles as a later change or addition, as well (cf. Hinz 2005b: 231–2).

[129] See Diggle 2004: VIII ("My numbering reflects what I take to be the main divisions within the text.") Section numbers were first added by the Leipzig editors (1897) and later modified by Diels (1909).

but inserts cruces and lacunae wherever there is a greater textological problem. This is fully acceptable and perhaps even commendable in a critical edition, which then analyzes all textual variants in a commentary. It is rather inconvenient, however, for quoting and referral. Nor have I agreed with Diggle's readings in all passages. These disagreements, as well as some conjectures by other scholars, have been mentioned in the notes.

2.1.8.1. *Char.* 1: εἰρωνεία—εἴρων

As this chapter is treated more thoroughly in ch. 4.1, I here only present various English translations of the words: dissembling (D, R, E), irony (V, J–S), dissimulation (B)[130]—the dissembler (D, R), the insincere man (A), the ironical man (V, J–S).

2.1.8.2. *Char.* 2: κολακεία—κόλαξ

Translations: toadying (D), flattery (R, V, E, J–S, B)—the toady (D, V), the flatterer (R, A, [V], J–S).

The abstract noun κολακεία is derived from the adjective κόλαξ, the etymology of which is not clear. Ancient authors have connected it with the verb κολλᾶν (Ath. 6.258b) or the word κόλον (Ath. 6.262a).[131] Klearchos from Soloi (4.–3. c. BCE) reports, in his work *Gergithios*, that in Cyprus some kind of court officials were called κόλακες,[132] but this may have been a Cyprian peculiarity.

In the 5th century Attic literary language, κόλαξ denoted a person who demeaned to flattery and toadying, usually to make some profit,

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[130] Budgell's use of capital letters has not been preserved.

[131] Cf. Ribbeck 1884: 3 ff.

[132] Fr. 19.16 ff. Wehrli (= Athenaios 6.255c ff. = *FHG* 2.310). These were secret officials whose number was not known publicly and who were also not known by their appearance (excluding the noblest). They were divided into two groups: the γεργῖνοι spied among the people and submitted their reports, wheras the προμάλαγγες investigated, on the basis of these reports, cases that were considered important. See Kroll 1921, Ribbeck 1884: 5 ff.

e.g. a free meal (τὸ δειπνεῖν τἀλλότρια).[133] The type is common on comic stage. Menander has written a play titled Κόλαξ, and Eupolis is known to have written Κόλακες. Ribbeck (1884: 30 f.) lists 75 Greek and Roman comedies in which one or many characters could be character-ized as κόλαξ or παράσιτος.[134] Theophrastos is also known to have written a work dedicated specifically to flatter (Περὶ κολακείας, see above, ch. 2.1.3).

Some scholars have suggested that the mentioning of profit in the spurious definition is important for the distinction between this type and the obsequious man (*Char*. 5), although it does not explicitly emerge from the description itself (cf. Steinmetz 1962: 46). There are, however, other differences. The flatterer is focused on one specific person, "Him", his patron. The obsequious man wants to please as many as possible, better yet everyone (cf. the scene in the court, *Char*. 5.3). The flatterer demeans himself to perform duties that were usually performed by a slave (cf. *Char*. 2.8, 2.9, 2.11); for him it is important that his patron notice his flattery, thus he keeps reminding of his services (*Char*. 2.2).

The word κόλαξ in connection with other pejorative adjectives is found mainly in the speeches of the orators, especially Demosthenes, who uses it six times, contrasting the behaviour of the flatterer in various situations. Thus, the κόλαξ flatters those who are doing well, but if their luck turns, he acts like a προδότης (45.65). In Dem. 19.201, the nature of a κόλαξ is characterized with a triad: he is δωροδόκος (in active sense 'bribing' rather than 'traking bribes'), ταῖς ἀραῖς ἔνοχος 'subject to curses' (i.e. in order to gain something), and τῶν φίλων προδότης 'betrayer of friend'. In 2.19, κόλαξ is used together with λῃστής 'a robber' (probably metaphorically). In the speech on the crown, Demos-thenes brings more serious charges; here, the flatterers are θεοῖς ἐχθροί

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[133] Cf., e.g., Demokritos, fr. II B 268 D–K; Sophokles, fr. 314.160 (from the satyr drama *Ichneutai*); Aristophanes, *Eq.* 48, *V.* 45, 419, 592, 683, 1033, *Pax* 756, fr. 172 *PCG* (= 167 Kock), 689 *PCG* (= 657 Kock); Antiphon the sophist, fr. II B 65.3 D–K.
[134] For the differences and similarities between these two types, see Nesselrath 1985: 88–121; earlier authors usually assumed they meant more or less the same (see, e.g., Ribbeck 1884). Cf. also Brown 1992: 98 ff.

'enemies of the gods' (18.46).[135] The same speech contains an exceedingly emotional harangue on those who flatter foreign powers (18.296):

> ἄνθρωποι μιαροὶ καὶ κόλακες καὶ ἀλάστορες, ἠκρωτηριασμέ-
> νοι τὰς αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι πατρίδας, τὴν ἐλευθερίαν προπεπω-
> κότες πρότερον μὲν Φιλίππῳ, νῦν δ᾽ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τῇ γαστρὶ
> μετροῦντες καὶ τοῖς αἰσχίστοις τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐλευ-
> θερίαν καὶ τὸ μηδέν᾽ ἔχειν δεσπότην αὐτῶν, ἃ τοῖς προτέροις
> Ἕλλησιν ὅροι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἦσαν καὶ κανόνες, ἀνατετροφότες.

> ("They too are profligates, sycophants, fiends incarnate; they have mutilated their own countries; they have pledged away their liberty in their cups, first to Philip, and now to Alexander. They measure their happiness by their belly and their baser parts; they have overthrown for ever that freedom and independence which to the Greeks of an earlier age were the very standard and canon of prosperity." [Transl. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince.])

Together with examples from other *poleis* Demosthenes uses that of Aischines who is also the object of these epithets. In 10.76 [sp.] we can see the abstract noun κολακεία, which is used for verbal expression, connected with βλάβη and ἀπάτη, and contrasted with εὔνοια and παρρησία. In the end of the speech, the orator emphasizes the truthfulness of his words and the absence of any kind of flattery.

   In Aischines, the abstract nouns κολακεία and ἀσχημοσύνη are conjoined to describe the behaviour of Demosthenes (3.76). The charge of flattery from both sides reflects, of course, the contemporary political situation in Greece. Both pro-Macedonian and anti-Macedonian parties accused the other side of betraying the city, flattering and getting payed for this (either from Philip II or the Persian king). Isaios uses κολακεία once together with θεραπεία (8.37). Demades adds that a flatterer is ἄνθρωπος γόης (fr. 89).

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[135] This is not, however, to be connected with the charges of ἀσέβεια, which were quite usual in Greece and often used as political repression.

In Aristotle's ethical works, κολακεία is one of the extremes belonging to φιλία, the other extreme being ἔχθρα and the man ἀπεχθητικός (*EE* 1233b29–34). In *EN* 1125a1–2, it is said that all flatterers are θητικοί, and all who are ταπεινοί, are flatterers. In *Pol.* 1292a20–3, δημαγωγός and κόλαξ are compared: just as the flatterer whirls around the tyrant, the demagogue whirls around the people (cf. also *EN* 1313b39 ff.). In *Rh.* 1371a23–4, Aristotle asserts that the flatterer is only seemingly an admirer and a friend (φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος).

From the co-occurrence of κολακεία and other terms we can see one element that is not present in the character sketch of Theophrastos, viz. acting as a traitor (of either fatherland or friends). The aspect of deception is more emphasized, whereas love of profit is also seen in the Theophrastean sketch. The usage of κολακεία is most noteworthy in the speeches of Demosthenes, who uses it as an important argument, although rather emotional than juridical one. It should also be emphasized that flattery is one of the main charges that the orators brought against each other (the other being ὕβρις).

2.1.8.3. *Char.* 3: ἀδολεσχία—ἀδολέσχης

Translations: chatter (D, V), idle chatter (R), garrulity (E, J–S), impertinence in discourse (B)—the chatterbox (D), the idle chatterer (R), the garrulous man (A, J–S), the chatterer (V).

The meaning of the second part of the word ἀδολεσχία seems to be clear: λέσχη (probably from *λέχ-σκη, cf. λέχος) is originally a 'couch', then a 'lounging place', a '(public) meeting-place', and finally 'talk' or 'gossip'. The first part, though, is more controversial. It can be either a form with a verbal prefix meaning 'to interfere, to disturb', < *ἀαδολέσχης (Frisk *s.v.*), or a derivation from the form *ἀδϝο-λέσχης (cf. Homeric ἄδδην < *ἄδϝην 'to one's fill' (Boisacq *s.v.*, cf. Chantraine *s.v.*). The explanation that the origin of the word might be *ἀϝεδο- < *ἀϝεδ-, connected with ἀείδω 'I sing' (Attic contracted form ᾄδω), i.e. ἀδολέσχης < *ἀϝεδο-λέσχης meaning "chanteur-bavard" (Windekens *s.v.*) is unlikely.

We first meet ἀδολεσχία/ἀδολέσχης in Attic comedy: three times in Aristophanes,[136] once in Eupolis,[137] and once in Kephisodoros.[138] From the authors of the 5th and 4th century, Plato and Aristotle use these words and their derivates most often. The word ἀδολεσχία in a more narrow sense is used to denote the situation when a collocutor lingers too long on some detail, or when his talk remains obscure and incomprehensible—this is something that an ordinary citizen would experience in the case of philosophers and sophists.[139] The word never developed into a narrower philosophical term, though (Steinmetz 1962: 55).

Plato uses ἀδολεσχία and its derivates mainly in connection with astronomers/astrologers (μετεωρολόγοι, *Cra.* 401b7, *Plt.* 299b7, *Phdr.* 270a1; μετεωροσκόπον, *R.* 488e4; cf. *Amat.* 132b: ἀδολεσχοῦσι … περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες).

In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, ἀδολεσχία is the cause of inarticulateness of speech. Compare *Rh.* 1395b25 ff.: in the case of enthymemes one should avoid obscurity (τὸ ἀσαφές) that is brought about by the length of the argument, and idle chatter that is the result of saying what is manifest, i.e. presenting all steps that lead to a conclusion; *Rh.* 1406a32–4: speaking poetically (ποιητικῶς λέγοντες), one may import absurdity and frigidity (τὸ γελοῖον καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν) into speeches, as well as obscurity that comes from the verbosity (τὸ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὴν ἀδολεσχίαν; cf. also *Rh.* 1414a25).

In *EN* 1117b33 ff., Aristotle defines chatterers as men who "are fond of hearing and telling stories and who spend their days on anything that turns up".[140]

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[136] *Nu.* 1480 (συγγνώμην ἔχε / ἐμοῦ παρανοήσαντος ἀδολεσχίᾳ) and 1485 (ὡς τάχιστ᾽ ἐμπιμπράναι τὴν οἰκίαν / τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν), both of which refer to Sokrates; and fr. 506 *PCG* (= 490 Kock), which compares Prodikos to a chatterbox (τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ᾽ ἢ βιβλίον διέφθορεν / ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἷς γέ τις).

[137] Fr. 386 *PCG* (= 352 Kock), where again Sokrates is called a chattering beggar (μισῶ δὲ καὶ † Σωκράτην / τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην); the verb form is also used in fr. 388 *PCG* (= 353 Kock), where it is connected with sophists (ἀλλ᾽ ἀδολεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδαξον, ὦ σοφιστά).

[138] Fr. 9 *PCG* (= 9 Kock): οὐδ᾽ ὀψοφάγος οὐδ᾽ ἀδολέσχης.

[139] See Steinmetz 1962: 54–55 and Natali 1987.

[140] *EN* 1117b33 ff.: τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας /.../ λέγομεν.

Talking about zoological physiognomics, Aristotle mentions that big and protrusive ears are a mark of μωρολογία and ἀδολεσχία (*HA* 492b2–3).

2.1.8.4. *Char.* 4: ἀγροικία—ἄγροικος

Translations: country-bumpkin behaviour (D), boorishness (R, V, E, J–S), rusticity (B)—the country bumpkin (D), the boor (R, A, V, J–S).

The abstract ἀγροικία is derived from the adjective ἄγροικος, originally used for someone living in the country-side (< *ἀγρο-ϝοικος), i.e. a countryman (cf. Frisk 1973 *s.v.*).

These words were used without negative connotation until the days of the Peloponnesian war (Steinmetz 1962: 62). Popular attitudes towards this type may be observed, above all, in the comic texts. Aristophanes uses ἄγροικος and its derivates (including compounds) 19 times and generally in a positive sense. The word may have acquired its negative meaning—i.e. for residents of town—due to social rearrangement during the Peloponnesian war, and perhaps additionally because of the activity of the sophists (Steinmetz 1962: 63; cf. Aristophanes, *Nu.* 628, 646). This can be compared with the use of the word ἀστεῖος, which originally denoted 'of town' (for this literal sense mainly ἀστικός was used), but obtained the meaning 'polite, refined, elegant'. The real causes of such changes in meaning can, however, only be speculated (Dover 1974: 112 f.).[141]

Because already in the antiquity ἄγροικος denoted the countryman, but also everything negative about this type—boorishness, oafishness—, later grammarians tried to distinguish these two meanings by different accents: thus, ἄγροικος would mean 'the boor' and ἀγροῖκος 'the countryman',[142] but this probably does not reflect the actual use.[143]

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[141] For the opposition ἄγροικος/ἀστεῖος see Osborne 1985: 185 and Millett 1991: 35, 256. Cf. also Latin *agrestis*/*rusticus* and *urbanus scurra* (for the semantics and use of these see Lilja 1965: 62 ff.)

[142] Cf. Ammon. *Diff.* 6 Nickau; Ptol. *Diff.* A13 Palmieri; Pollux 9.12.

[143] The Attic dialect, at least, used *proparoxytonon* for both meanings, as reported by the 13th/14th century grammarian Thomas Magister (40.5–8 Ritschl: οἱ Ἀττικοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἀγρῷ οἰκοῦντος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰδιώτου καὶ ἀπαιδεύτου καὶ ἀναισθήτου προπαροξυτόνως λέγουσι).

Therefore, the word itself does not tell us if it is used for just a country-man, a boorish countryman or perhaps a boorish town-fellow. Ἄγροικος was a popular character in the comedy, figuring as a title of a comedy by various authors (Philemon, Menander, Alexandrides, Antiphanes, Anaxilas). In the 5th century we also find the word quite a few times in the works of Plato; from the 4th century authors, only Aristotle and Theophrastos use the abstract noun.

The words ἀγροικία and ἄγροικος are frequently connected with attributes that indicate lack of education also in other authors. Thus, in Plato, ἄγροικος is connected to expressions like ἀπαίδευτος ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας (*Tht*. 174d) and βέβηλος (*Smp*. 218b); the abstract is used together with σκληρότης (*R*. 607b) and ἀπαίδευτος (*Phdr*. 269b). Plato talks about the type in more detail in the part of his work that deals with the relation between intellectual and physical education and training.[144] Plato does not use ἄγροικος in the sense of a country bumpkin; it is rather a rude person in the wider sense, and the cause of his behaviour is wrong education.

In Aristotle's ethical works, ἀγροικία is one of the extremes belonging to εὐτραπελία, the other extreme being βωμολοχία (*EN* 1108a23–6).[145] The adjectives used with ἄγροικος are σκληρός (*EN* 1128a9), ἰσχυρογνώμων, ἰδιογνώμων and ἀμαθής (*EN* 1151b12–13). In *Rh*. 1417a23, ἀγροικία is connected to θρασύτης; in *Rh*. 1418b23–6 to λοιδορία.

Boorishness is important in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where it is represented by the leading character Strepsiades. In *Nu*. 43–4, Strepsiades praises his former life as a country-man: this life was ἥδιστος, εὐρωτιῶν and ἀκόρητος (the last two adjectives are also used in positive sense, if we take into account the comic context). In *Nu*. 628–9, an opposite character, the comic Sokrates, is speaking. For him any boorishness is of course negative, as is also seen from the adjectives used: ἄπορος, σκαιός[146] and ἐπιλήσμων (cf. also *Nu*. 646: δυσμαθής). Other co-

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[144] See *R*. 411a: a man who pays too much attention to the body is ἄγροικος; he is contrasted to the prudent man (σώφρων).

[145] Steinmetz (1962: 64) has noted that the meaning here is quite narrow and ἄγροικος seems to be more or less the same as δύσκολος in the comedy.

[146] Cf. Aristophanes fr. 927 *PCG* (= 901b Kock), and Ephippos fr. 23 *PCG* (= 23 Kock).

occurrences in Aristophanes include *Eq.* 40–1 with κυαμοτρώξ and ἀκράχολος; *Eq.* 808 with δριμύς. Cf. also *Ach.* 673–4, where μέλος εὔτονον and ἀγροικότονον are contrasted.

2.1.8.5. *Char.* 5: ἀρέσκεια—ἄρεσκος

Translations: obsequiousness (D, R), anxiety to please (V), self-seeking affability (E), complaisance (J–S), false complaisance (B)—the obse-quious man (D, R), the complaisant man (A, J–S), the ingratiating man (V).

The words ἄρεσκος and ἀρέσκεια are derived from a very common verb ἀρέσκειν. In Greek literature we start seeing these words only in the second half of the 4th century BCE (cf. Steinmetz 1962: 74).

The obsequious man is characterized by a wish to be in good terms with as many people as possible. Thus, it is an extreme form of friendliness (cf. Aristotle *EN* 1127a5–6). Aristotle compares obsequious man to politicians who want to be friends with everybody (*EN* 1171a15–17). For him obsequiousness is an extreme belonging to a nameless mean, which most resembles friendliness (φιλία); the other extreme is represented by the churlish and the contentious (δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες; *EN* 1126b11 ff.).

2.1.8.6. *Char.* 6: ἀπόνοια—ἀπονενοημένος

Translations: loss of sense (D), shamelessness (R), the quality of an outcast (V), wilful disreputableness (E), recklessness (J–S)—the man who has lost all sense (D), the shameless man (R), the man without moral feeling (A), the outcast, or the demoralized man (V), the reckless man (J–S), a profligate or shameless fellow (B).

Greek ἀπόνοια is a derivation from the verb ἀπονοεῖσθαι 'to lose one's νοῦς', 'to have lost all sense', the opposite of which is νοεῖν. The word is not easy to translate. *LSJ* gives the translation 'abandoned fellow' for ἀπονενοημένος and 'loss of all sense' for ἀπόνοια, adding 'lack of constraint, impropriety' for our passage in 1996 Supplement; Millett (1991: 179) gives examples of various ways in which ἀπόνοια has been translated ('desperate boldness', 'recklessness', 'moral insanity') and uses himself the translation 'moral degradation' (1991: 302). Diggle's

translation, "the man who has lost all sense", has been considered awkward and misleading, for the man is not senseless but insensitive (Worman 2007).

The man is characterized by coarseness and rudeness; he does not feel ashamed to oppose the norms accepted in the society. He is also apt to be an incumbent of occupations that were considered to be inappropriate for a free man—a tavern keeper, a pimp etc. Millet (1991: 179) emphasizes that taking into account the nature of the Athenian society it was inevitable that some people had to earn their living with these trades, but only someone with a personality disorder would like to accept them all.

The main author who uses ἀπόνοια together with other qualitative adjectives and abstracts is Demosthenes. In 18.249, he compares the ἀπόνοια of Sosikles, the συκοφαντία of Philokrates and the μανία of Diondas and Melantes. In 44.15 [sp.], the ἀπόνοια of the witness and the νόμοι of the state are contrasted; in section 58 of the same speech, we can see μεγίστη ἀπόνοια together with προπέτεια. In 25.33, there is an opposition between ἀπονοίας and νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ προνοίας πολλῆς; in 25.34 between ἀπονοίας and ἀναιδείας. In 43.41 [sp.], the orator admits that no one would be τολμηρός or ἀπονενοημένος enough to speak on behalf of the defendant.

Isokrates describes an ἀπονενοημένος as someone who does not care about what is holy, about his parents, his children or anything else besides himself (8.93). Some orators use the word ἀπόνοια to characterize Demosthenes himself.[147]

2.1.8.7. *Char.* 7: λαλιά—λάλος

Translations: talkativeness (D), garrulity (R), loquacity (V, E, J–S, B)—the talker (D, V), the garrulous (R), the talkative man (A), the loquacious man (J–S).

The words λαλιά and λάλος are derived from the verb λαλεῖν, which is an onomatopoetic word originally denoting uttering of sounds and unintelligible speech. It is used for the sound of babies or animals,[148]

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[147] See Hyp. *In Demosthenem* fr. 3.7.17–23, and Dein. 1.82 (cf. also 1.104).
[148] See, e.g., Aristotle *HA* 488b34, 536a24.

but also the speech of adults, when it resembles the sound of a baby or a bird, when it has no λόγος and is therefore not λέγειν.[149] Thus, the verb is also used in the sense 'to chat' or 'to prattle', which is common in both prose writers and poets. 'Chatting' has been considered by some to be a characteristic feature of the people of Attika.[150] By later authors, the verb is used as a synonym to λέγειν.

Λαλιά as talking "in a contemptuous or impatient way: talking too much, or talking when action would be more appropriate..., or talking out of turn when prompt and silent compliance is needed" (Dover 1993: 22) is something that Aristophanes reproached the sophists for.[151] In Plato, this is also used regarding Perikles (*Grg*. 515e).

In Aristophanes, talkativeness is once used together with a synonymous word στωμυλία (*Ra*. 1069); in *Ach*. 715–16, he contrasts νωδός and λάλος; in *Pax* 652–4, λάλος is used together with πανοῦργος, συκοφάντης,[152] κύκηθρον and τάρακτρον (used metaphorically). The last passage seems to be more negative in tone than is usual for a λάλος.

In the Aristotelian corpus, *Div. Somn*. 463b17, there is a claim that if someone's nature (φύσις) tends to be talkative or μελαγχολική, he sees various visions in his sleep. *Pr*. 954a30–4 speaks of the influence of black bile (μέλαινα χολή) to humans: those who have too much of it or in whom it is too hot (λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμή), are μανικοί, εὐφυεῖς, ἐρωτικοί and εὐκίνητοι πρὸς τοὺς θυμοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, but some of them are garrulous. In *Phgn*. 810b14–15 λάλοι is used together with μωρολόγοι.

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[149] Cf. Eupolis fr. 116 *PCG* (= 95 Kock): λαλεῖν ἄριστος, ἀδυνατώτατος λέγειν; see also Steinmetz 1962: 103.

[150] See Herakleides *Descriptio Graeciae* fr. 1.4 Müller.

[151] *Nu*. 931, 1053, 1394. He also blamed Euripides for it (*Ra*. 91, 917, 954, 1069, 1492).

[152] For sycophants in comedy see, e.g., Kaimio et al. 1990: 59. In general cf. also Lofberg 1917, Osborne 1990, Harvey 1990, Christ 1998. It has been noted that there was no specific charge against sycophants in Athenian law, because there was no precise definition of what a sycophant was or did, and because there was no efficient way to distinguish between a sycophant and a genuine democratic watchdog (Crawley 1970). Sycophancy can be described as a form of bribery (paying money to someone to avoid a court appearance), but unlike bribery, the term does not necessarily denote corrupt motives (Taylor 2001).

2.1.8.8. *Char.* 8: λογοποιία—λογοποιός

Translations: rumour-mongering (D, R), news-making (V, E, J–S)—the rumour-monger (D, R), the fabricator (A), the inventor of news (V), the newsmaker (J–S), the newsmonger (B).

Λογοποιός is literally 'maker of words', which implies a creative process. It was originally used for prose writers. Thus, e.g., Herodotos calls his greatest predecessor Hekataios λογοποιός (2.143, 5.36, 125).[153] When rhetoric and public speeches became socially more important, the word started to denote also those who wrote speeches for the use of others (as a synonym to λογογράφος).[154] The main objective of those who wrote these speeches was, naturally, to obtain a favourable decision in the court. For this, they used various rhetorical devices and tricks, sometimes also fiction. Because of this, a negative flavour was attached to the word λογοποιός. The abstract λογοποιία is not found before Theophrastos, nor is it frequent in later times (see Steinmetz 1962: 113, Dover 1997: 185).

Compared to the idle chatterer (*Char.* 3) and the loquacious man (*Char.* 7), this type uses fiction and deliberative falsification, albeit referring to authorities to add veracity to his words. There is only one situation: meeting with an acquaintance, sharing a portion of information with him, and going on the prowl for new victims.

In the 5th and 4th century literature, the word λογοποιός is mostly used in the sense of a prose writer. This is revealed by the frequent use of the word pair ποιητής—λογοποιός, e.g. in Isokr. 15.137, 5.109; cf. Plato *R.* 392a–b: καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων. The sense of lying in Plato is usually connected with the poets. As is well known, Plato mistrusted the poets. Poetry for him was something ἄλογον and resulting from inspiration (cf. *Ion* 533e), or mimetic (*R.* 595 ff.). Imitation (μίμησις) holds only the third place in his system of the world of prototypes (ideas) and the world of objects. With

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[153] Isokrates (11.37) uses it for historians in general; Arrianos (*An.* 3.30.8) for Herodotos himself.
[154] Cf. Plato *Euthd.* 289d.

some exceptions (such as for praising the gods), there is no place for poets in Plato's ideal state.[155]

Some of the connections that can be found in the texts of the orators include Lysias 16.11.6: *λογοποιοῦντας καὶ ψευδομένους*; Demosthenes 4.50: *ἀνοητότατοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ λογοποιοῦντες*. The passage of Lysias expresses the deceitfulness of the person; Demosthenes, however, emphasizes the intellectual side of the term.

2.1.8.9. *Char.* 9: *ἀναισχυντία—ἀναίσχυντος*

Translations: shamelessness (D, V, J–S), sponging (R), unconscionableness (E), impudence, as it proceeds from covetousness (B)—the shameless man (D, V, J–S), the sponger (R), the shamelessly greedy man (A).

Ἀναίσχυντος is someone who lacks the feeling of shame, *αἰσχύνη*. The first known definition of *ἀναισχυντία* comes from Plato;[156] the definitions in the works of Aristotle are quite similar.[157] The word is used both in connection with sexual life (cf. Plato *R*. 571d), and in a more general sense. Thus, it is bad when one is not ashamed of evil deeds, but the most important thing is not to commit such acts at all; being ashamed is not going to make things any better (Aristotle *EN* 1128b25–35; cf. Plato *Ap*. 38d; Aristotle *Rh*. 1390a2). In *Lg*. 649c–d, Plato suggests that we ought to be placed amongst those conditions which naturally tend to make us exceptionally confident and audacious (*ὡς ἥκιστα εἶναι ἀναισχύντους τε καὶ θρασύτητος γέμοντας*) when we are practising how to be as free as possible from shamelessness.

Demosthenes uses the abstract *ἀναισχυντία* four times in his first speech against the ill-reputed orator Aristogeiton; the man was, among

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[155] In his old age, Plato allowed choral lyrics into his second-best ideal state, but the *ὀρθότης* required from poetry had only ethical purpose: the 'right' kind of poetry had to have an effect upon ethical qualities of a man, not to give pleasure (*ἡδονή*; *Lg*. 655 ff., 668b, 700b–d).

[156] *Lg*. 701a–b: *τὸ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βελτίονος δόξαν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι διὰ θράσος, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν σχεδὸν ἡ πονηρὰ ἀναισχυντία, διὰ δή τινος ἐλευθερίας λίαν ἀποτετολμη-μένης.*

[157] *EE* 1233b27–8: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ μηδεμιᾶς φροντίζων δόξης ἀναίσχυντος*; *MM* 1193a3–4: *ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀναίσχυντός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν παντὶ καὶ πρὸς πάντας λέγων καὶ πράττων ἃ ἔτυχεν.* Cf. *Rh*. 1368b23, 1380a20–1, 1383b14–15; *EN* 1108a34–5, 1115a14.

other things, called "the (watch)dog of the people".[158] In 25.9, the abstract ἀναισχυντία is connected with τόλμα (also 25.25 and 38.5), κραυγή, ψευδεῖς αἰτίαι, συκοφαντία; in 25.24, with θρασύτης, ἀναίδεια; in 25.35, with συκοφαντία, ἐπιορκία, ἀχαριστία; in 60.21, with τολμηρός; in 54.42, with πονηρός; in 20.166, again with κραυγή and with βία.

In Aristotle's ethical works, ἀναισχυντία is the deficiency belonging to the mean αἰδώς (*EE* 1221a1; cf. *EE* 1233b27–8, *EN* 1108a31–5). In *EN* 1107a9–11, Aristotle distinguishes actions and emotions that are absolutely negative and that are not the extremes of any positive mean: in addition to ἀναισχυντία we find here ἐπιχαιρεκακία and φθόνος. Indeed being ashamed is not an excellence in itself, but people tend to praise some sort of sense of shame (cf. *EN* 1108a31–5). In *EN* 1115a12–14, in the discussion of courage, ἀναίσχυντος is also opposed to αἰδήμων. It is namely appropriate to fear some things, such as disgrace (ἀδοξία); the man who does fear these things is αἰδήμων, the man who does not is ἀναίσχυντος.

In *Rh*. 1380a20–1, Aristotle uses ἀναισχυντία in a context that helps us understand one of the facets of the behaviour of the type. In his discussion of anger, he mentions that angry people tend to grow calmer towards those who admit their fault and are sorry, accepting their grief at what they have done as satisfaction. His example is the punishment of servants: those who deny their offence will be punished all the more, for to deny what is obvious is a sign of shamelessness, and shamelessness is also contempt and disdain (ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ἡ δ᾽ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις). In *Rh*. 1383b12–15, there is an opposition between αἰσχύνη and ἀναισχυντία, shame being defined as pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt (ὀλιγωρία) or indifference (ἀπάθεια) in regard to these same bad things.

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[158] See 25.40.2: κύων νὴ Δία, φασί τινες, τοῦ δήμου. The same expression, which reminds of the slogans of democrats, is used by Theophrastos in describing the friend of villains (*Char*. 29.5).

Xenophon, *Smp*. 8.27, speaks of ἀναισχυντία and ἀκρασία; in *Cyr*. 2.2.25 he mentions people who are πρὸς δὲ τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν σφοδροὶ καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι.

2.1.8.10. *Char*. 10: μικρολογία—μικρολόγος

Translations: penny-pinching (D, R), stinginess (V), penuriousness (E, J–S), sordid avarice (B)[159]—the penny-pincher (D, R [the pennypincher A]), the skinflint, or stingy man (V), the penurious man (J–S).

According to lexical meaning of the word, μικρολόγος is someone who speaks of the smallest, least important things (this is first and foremost the meaning of the verb μικρολογεῖσθαι). It further denotes a man who pays unnecessary attention to details, i.e. a pedantic man. This quality is expressed above all in financial matters, thus one of the most common meanings of μικρολόγος is penny-pincher. Cf. also Arist. *EN* 1121b16–b28, *MM* 1192a8; [Arist.] *VV* 1251b14–16, *VV* 1251b24–25; *Phgn*. 809a19–23.

2.1.8.11. *Char*. 11: βδελυρία—βδελυρός

As this chapter is treated more thoroughly in ch. 4.2, I here only present various English translations of the words: repulsiveness (D), obnoxiousness (R), abominable behaviour (V), buffoonery (E), grossness (J–S)—the repulsive man (D), the obnoxious man (R), the offensive man (A), the abominable man (V), the gross man (J–S), a man abandoned to all sense of shame (B).

2.1.8.12. *Char*. 12: ἀκαιρία—ἄκαιρος

Translations: tactlessness (D, E), bad timing (R), unseasonableness (V, J–S), absurd or unseasonable behaviour (B)—the tactless man (D), the man with bad timing (R), the hapless man (A), the unseasonable man (V, J–S).

The word ἄκαιρος denotes things or actions that do not fit with a time or place (καιρός). It is in opposition with the usual phrase ἐς

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[159] Had Budgell known *Char*. 30, he would probably have chosen to use this translation there.

καιρόν 'at the right time' or 'in the right place'.[160] The word can also be used as an attribute of bad weather.[161] In the human sphere, words can be ἄκαιροι.[162] The phrase ἀκαιρία λόγου can mean a speech not suitable to a particular situation, and is opposed to συμμετρία (Isokr. 12.86).[163] The opposite of ἀκαιρία is either εὐκαιρία or εὐτυχία (see Steinmetz 1962: 150–1; cf. also [Plato] *Def.* 413c12), but we also find ἐγκαιρία and the adjective ἐπίκαιρος (e.g. Dem. 18.27).

The tactless man in the *Characters* does things that in the essence are not bad, but he chooses the wrong time, the wrong place, and the wrong way to do them. In some situations he is similar to the overzealous man (*Char.* 13), but unlike him, this man does not over-estimate his abilities. He cannot analyze the situation and expectations of other people, which results in unpleasant, unfriendly, impolite and tactless behaviour, although without any such intention. In some other context, such behaviour would even be commendable (cf. *Char.* 12.8). There are some similarities with the disagreeable man (*Char.* 20), but that man says and does things that are impolite in every situation.

2.1.8.13. *Char.* 13: περιεργία—περίεργος

Translations: overzealousness (D, R), overdoing it (V), officiousness (E, J–S), over-officiousness (B)—the overzealous man (D, R), the officious man (A, J–S), the presumptuous man (V).

In some cases, περιεργία can have positive connotations, as when used of doctors ([Arist.] *Resp.* 480b27). The abstract noun is not known before Theophrastos, but it seems to gain popularity during his lifetime. Thus, Herakleides mentions it as a characteristic trait of the inhabitants of Attika and Koronia (*Descriptio Graeciae* fr. 1.4 Müller).

In 5.98, Isokrates notes that if he told Philip about his own deeds, he would be ἀνόητος and περίεργος. In Isokr. *Ep.* 8.1, at the beginning of a letter addressed to the ruler of Mytilene, the author apologizes that he

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[160] Cf. Eur. *Hel.* 1081. For the use of καιρός in Greek drama, see Race 1981.
[161] Cf. Plato *Epin.* 976a; [Arist.] *Pr.* 941b24.
[162] Aisch. *PV* 1036. Cf. λόγοι ἀλαζόνες (Plato *R.* 560c).
[163] Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1406a10–17, which speaks of using inept epithets (ἐπιθέτοις ἀκαίροις χρῆσθαι) that make the language sound strange (ξενικὴν ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν). Cf. Dover 1997: 102.

has decided to write a letter to the magnicicent ruler only because the others have begged him; he would fear that in doing so he would be too ἄτοπος and περίεργος. At the end of the apology (*Ep.* 8.3), the author uses the same device with the adjectives μωρός and ὀχληρός (cf. also 4.13).

For Aischines, περίεργος is another possibility to attack Demosthenes; in 3.172, he calls him that and συκοφάντης.

2.1.8.14. *Char.* 14: ἀναισθησία—ἀναίσθητος

Translations: obtuseness (D), absent-mindedness (R), fecklessness (V), stupidity (E, J–S)—the obtuse man (D), the absent-minded man (R, A), the feckless man (V), the stupid man (J–S), the absent man (B).

The word ἀναίσθητος is a negative formation from the adjective αἰσθητός and may be used in either passive or active meaning. The passive meaning is 'not perceptible by sense', but the active meaning 'without sense' (i.e. lacking αἴσθησις) is more common, often also in the sense of 'without perception', 'without common sense'. For specific connotations, see Dover 1974: 122–3.

An ἀναίσθητος is opposed to an εὐφυής in Ps-Aristotle's *Phgn.* 807b12 ff. (cf. Vogt 1999 *ad loc.*). Compare also *EN* 1114a9–10, where Aristotle claims that "not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person (ἀναισθήτου)."

As a philosophical term, ἀναισθησία marks the anonymous deficiency in the realm of bodily pleasures, the mean being σωφροσύνη, and the excess ἀκολασία (*EN* 1107b7; cf. *EE* 1119a7, 1221a2, a19, 1231a26). Aristotle admits that persons deficient in regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence, such persons also have received no name, "but let us call them insensible" (*EN* 1107b6–8; cf. *EE* 1230b13–15).

Theophrastos uses it in a wider sense than not caring about pleasures. Here, ἀναισθησία indicates a general unperciptiveness or lack of sensitivity to present circumstances (Diggle 2004: 333). The man is absent-minded and unfocused.

Demosthenes connects ἀναισθησία with τόλμα (22.74, 24.182) and πονηρία (22.64). He also speaks of the attitude of various Greek areas to

Philip of Macedon: the Thessalians are κατάπτυστοι, whereas the Thebans are ἀναίσθητοι (18.43). Not surprisingly Demosthenes also calls his political opponent Aischines ἀναίσθητος and σκαιός (18.120).

2.1.8.15. *Char.* 15: αὐθάδεια—αὐθάδης

Translations: self-centredness (D), grouchiness (R), hostility (V), surliness (E, J–S), brutality (B)—the self-centred man (D), the grouch (R), the unsociable man (A), the hostile man (V), the surly man (J–S).

The word αὐθάδης is etymologically explained by a passage in *MM* 1192b33–4: ὁ γὰρ αὐθάδης αὐτοάδης τις ἐστίν, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἀρέσκειν. Being αὐθάδης is the reason why Prometheus is reproached by Hermes (Aisch. *PV* 1033; cf. 964, 1012, 1037), and Oidipus by Kreon (Soph. *OT* 549; cf. Plato *Lg*. 692a on Lykurgos). Such a man is self-willed and deaf to the advice or appeals of others.

Both the *Characters* and *MM* pay special attention to αὐθάδεια as expressed in someone's speech (Steinmetz 1962: 172–4). The self-centred man never wants to meet anyone or talk to anyone, and if he talks to someone, he is sure to be quite unfriendly. His behaviour is not marked so much by a particular goal as by contemptuous and inconsiderate manner (cf. Fortenbaugh 2006: 153).

The first known description of an αὐθάδης can be found in Plato *Plt.* 294b–c:

> Τὸν δέ γε νόμον ὁρῶμεν σχεδὸν ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συντείνοντα, ὥσπερ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον αὐθάδη καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ μηδένα μηδὲν ἐῶντα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν, μηδ᾽ ἐπερωτᾶν μηδένα, μηδ᾽ ἄν τι νέον ἄρα τῳ συμβαίνῃ βέλτιον παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν αὐτὸς ἐπέταξεν.
>
> ("But we see that law aims at pretty nearly this very thing, like a stubborn and ignorant man who allows no one to do anything contrary to his command, or even to ask a question, not even if something new occurs to some one, which is better than the rule he has himself ordained." [Transl. Harold N. Fowler.])

The practices of a state can be self-centred, too (τρόποις αὐθάδεσι καὶ χαλεποῖς), especially when strangers are not allowed to enter, and citizens are not allowed to leave; such behaviour would seem ἄγριον καὶ ἀπηνές to others (Plato *Lg.* 950b). Compare also *R.* 548e, which was paraphrased in ch. 1.1. In ch. 1.3.1, I also mentioned that in Aristotle's *EE*, there is the triad αὐθάδεια–σεμνότης–ἀρέσκεια that the *EN* does not have (*EE* 1221a8).

Isokrates mentions αὐθάδεια in a long row of admonishments in the speech to Demonikos (1.15): "Accustom yourself to be, not of a stern (σκυθρωπόν), but of a thoughtful (σύννους), mien; for through the former you will be thought self-willed (αὐθάδης), through the latter, intelligent (φρόνιμος)." [Transl. George Norlin.] In the *Erotic essay* found in the corpus of Demosthenes (61.14), the author praises an adressee who is harmonical by nature, adding that others are assumed to be mean-spirited (ταπεινοί) because of their gentleness (πραότης) and self-centred (αὐθάδεις) because of their dignity (σεμνότης), and are thought overbearing (θρασύτεροι) because of their manliness (ἀνδρεία), and stupid (ἀβέλτεροι) because of their quietness (ἡσυχία)..."

Other instances worth mentioning include the comic attack of Euripides against Aischylos in Aristophanes *Ra.* 837–9, where Aischylos is said to be ἀγριοποιός and αὐθαδόστομος, with a mouth that is ἀχάλινον, ἀκρατές, ἀπύλωτον, and who is ἀπεριλάλητος and κομπο-φακελορρήμων.

Xenophon uses the word when describing different kinds of dogs; they form a kind of tripartite system according to the amount of encouragement needed from the side of the hunter (φιλάνθρωπος, αὐθάδης, μέση; *Cyn.* 6.25). A tragic parallel is found in [Aischylos] *PV*, cf. 79–80, 436, 907–8, 1034–5, 1037–8.

2.1.8.16. *Char.* 16: δεισιδαιμονία—δεισιδαίμων

Translations: superstition (D, R, V, J–S, B), superstitiousness (E)—the superstitious man (D, R, A, V, J–S).

Before Theophrastos, these words are used only on rare occasions and their meaning is always positive. The negative meaning is the result of ἀβελτερία and exaggeration in religious practices. In this sense, we

see this word in the New Comedy (cf. also Aristotle *Pol.* 1314b38 ff.). For more thorough studies on the type see Bolkestein 1929 and Koets 1929 (on more general usage).

The negativity of the sketch is not reflected in the definition, which resembles more the Stoic definition (cf. *SVF* 3.98.42, 3.99.13). It should be noted that the generic term of the definition coincides with another type described in the *Characters* (*Char.* 25), which does not mean that δεισιδαιμονία is one of the sub-species of δειλία (cf. Fortenbaugh 1984: 271–2).

2.1.8.17. *Char.* 17: μεμψιμοιρία—μεμψίμοιρος

Translations: ungrateful grumbling (D), griping (R), to have a 'chip on the shoulder' (V), querulousness (E), grumbling (J–S), a discontented temper (B)—the ungrateful grumbler (D), the griper (R), the faultfinder (A), the man with a grievance (V), the grumbler (J–S).

Etymologically, μεμψίμοιρος is someone who finds fault with his μοῖρα, i.e. what the fate brings him. This kind of behaviour was considered to be characteristic for old people (cf. Isokr. 12.8) and females (cf. Arist. *HA* 608a20–b15). A comedy by the 4th century author Antidotos was titled Μεμψίμοιρος. In [Arist.] *VV* 1251b24, μεμψιμοιρία belongs to μικροψυχία together with μικρολογία (cf. *Char.* 10).

2.1.8.18. *Char.* 18: ἀπιστία—ἄπιστος

Translations: distrust (D), mistrust (R), lack of trust (V), distrustfulness (E, J–S)—the distrustful man (D, V, J–S), the mistrustful man (R), the suspicious man (A [a s. m. B).

Ἄπιστος is literally someone who cannot be trusted, but it also denotes something that cannot be believed. Quite early the word acquires an active meaning, as well: distrustful or mistrustful. This is the meaning in this sketch.

One can compare Plato *R.* 450d, where we hear from listeners who are ἀγνώμονες, ἄπιστοι and δύσνοι. The tyrant is claimed to necessarily turn into a man who is φθονερός, ἄπιστος, ἄδικος, ἄφιλος and ἀνόσιος (*R.* 580a). There is a similar statement in Arist. *AP* 19.1, where the tyrant is said to turn into someone who is ἄπιστος and πικρός. In

Rh. 1389b21–2, the old men are considered to be καχύποπτοι because of their ἀπιστία, and ἄπιστοι because of their experience (ἐμπειρία).

2.1.8.19. *Char*. 19: δυσχέρεια—δυσχερής

Translations: offensiveness (D, V, J–S), squalor (R), nastiness (E)—the offensive man (D, V, J–S), the squalid man (R), the repulsive man (A), a sloven (B).

Δυσχέρεια is etymologically connected with the lack of everything pleasant (χαίρειν), especially when sense of smell and taste are concerned. It also denotes wounds and medical deformities (cf. Soph. *Ph*. 900). Aischylos considers the sight of gorgons and griffins δυσχερής (*PV* 802).

In the case of human beings, the word may be used in the passive sense as 'one who feels disgust with something', and in the active sense as 'someone who causes disgust in others through his behaviour'. Here as also in the case of some other sketches, Theophrastos uses the term in quite a narrow sense, emphasizing skin diseases and lack of hygiene.

Cf. also Plato *Lg*. 922c (δυσχερής ... φοβερός) and *Phlb*. 46a (δυσχερής ... ἀσχήμων); Dem. 19.309 (αἰσχρόν ... δυσχερές), 58.63 [sp.] (δυσχερής ... ἀχάριστος), 60.24 (δυσχερής ... χαλεπός); Isokr. 11.48 (τῶν αἰσχρῶν αἰτιῶν ... δυσχερῶν πραγμάτων); Xen. *Ap*. 7 (ἄσχημον ... δυσχερές), *Oec*. 8.6 (κάλλιστον versus δυσχερέστατον).

2.1.8.20. *Char*. 20: ἀηδία—ἀηδής

Translations: disagreeableness (D), bad taste (R), tiresomeness (V), ill-breeding (E), unpleasantness (J–S)—the disagreeable man (D), the man with bad taste (R), the unpleasant man (A, J–S), the tiresome man (V), a troublesom fellow (B).

According to the derivation, the word ἀηδής means something that is not ἡδύ 'pleasant'. Thus, ἀηδία is often used as an opposite of ἡδονή (cf. Plato *Lg*. 802d, *Phdr*. 240d). Used of a person, the word ἀηδής first implicates that his or her behaviour or speech is unpleasant. Thereby, it also starts to denote a more general human quality (cf., e.g., Aristotle *EN* 1171b26).

Co-occurrences in the orators include Dem. *Ep.* 5.1, 24.31 (ἀηδής ... δεινός), 19.193 (ἀηδία ... μικροψυχία); Isokr. 12.31 (ἀηδία ... βαρύτης), 12.140 (ἀηδία ... λύπη), 12.156 (ἀηδῆ ... οὐκ ἀσύμφορον, of a speech that may be unpleasant but still useful). Plato connects ἀηδής and δεσποτικός (*R.* 563b), αὐστηρότερος and ἀηδέστερος (*R.* 398a); in addition, he speaks of the unjust and just life—the former is not only αἰσχίω and μοχθηρότερον, but certainly also ἀηδέστερον (*Lg.* 663d).

In Aristotle's *MM* 1200a15, we read that too much wealth makes people supercilious and disagreeable (ὑπερόπτας καὶ ἀηδεῖς). In *EE* 1238a24–5, in a passage on friendship, Aristotle compares people with wines and meats—the pleasantness of them shows itself quickly, but if it continues longer it is unpleasant (ἀηδές) and not sweet (οὐ γλυκύ).

2.1.8.21. *Char.* 21: μικροφιλοτιμία—μικροφιλότιμος

Translations: petty ambition (D, R, V, J–S), petty pride (E), vain-glory (B)—the man of petty ambition (D, R, A, V, J–S).

This is a Theophrastean hapax. The definition in the *Characters* runs as follows: Ἡ δὲ μικροφιλοτιμία δόξει<εν ἂν> εἶναι ὄρεξις τιμῆς ἀνελεύθερος. ("Petty Ambition would seem to be a mean desire for prestige.")[164] This resembles some definitions in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, cf. 1107b27, 1125b19. The word may have been coined by Theophrastos himself in order to mark a specific form of φιλοτιμία[165] or to avoid the ambiguity of the term. The latter is a usual and very frequent term, which is especially well known thanks to Aristotle's ethical treatises.[166] In relation to honour, Aristotle distinguishes two means with their extremes: first, in connection to great honour there is μεγαλοψυχία[167] with μικροψυχία and χαυνότης as its extremes. In

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[164] V has δόξει εἶναι, c¹ has δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι. M has Ἡ μικροφιλοτιμία ὄρεξις ἐστι τιμῆς ἀνελευθέρου. (This is the last chapter available in this MS.)

[165] Cf. Steinmetz 1962: 241.

[166] Together with derivations, the word is found more than 400 times in the texts of the period 8th–3rd century (including verbal forms, adverbs and adjectives). The word ἀφιλοτιμία together with its derivations is found before Theophrastos only in Aristotle (nine instances), Isaios (7.35.3) and Lykurgos (*In Leocratem* 69.3).

[167] For the meaning of this term in *EN*, see Schütrumpf 1989, Held 1993.

connection with usual honours, the mean is anonymous and the extremes are φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία (*EN* 1107b24 ff., 1125b1 ff.).

It should be noted that Theophrastos is also known to have composed a treatise περὶ φιλοτιμίας, consisting of two books. In addition to Diogenes Laertios (5.46), this is mentioned by Cicero in *Att.* 2.3.4, where he asks for Theophrastos' book from his brother's collection: *Θεοφράστου Περὶ φιλοτιμίας adfer mihi de libris Quinti fratris*.[168] The importance of τιμή in the Greek world is well known. Theophrastos himself is known to have said that τιμή is the one thing that, together with εὐεργεσία 'kindness' and τιμωρία 'vengeance', holds together the life of men (fr. 517 FHS&G = Stob. 4.1.72; cf. Fortenbaugh 1984: 110, 250). Moderate ambition was considered a positive characteristic that was important in assessing someone who was a μεγαλόψυχος. Thus, the word φιλοτιμία can be used for both the moderate mean and the excessive ambition (Fortenbaugh 1984: 110).

2.1.8.22. *Char.* 22: ἀνελευθερία—ἀνελεύθερος

As this sketch is treated more thoroughly in ch. 4.3, I here only present various English translations of the words: illiberality (D), lack of generosity (R), meanness (V, J–S), parsimony (E), a niggardly temper (B)—the illiberal man (D), the ungenerous man (R), the stingy man (A), the mean man (V, J–S).

2.1.8.23. *Char.* 23: ἀλαζονεία—ἀλαζών

Translations: boastfulness (D, V, J–S), fraudulence (R), pretentiousness (E), ostentation (B)—the boastful man (D, J–S), the fraud (R), the show-off (A), the boaster (V).

The origin of the word ἀλαζών is not clear. The Greeks themselves associated it with the verb ἀλᾶσθαι 'to wander'. Although this has had supporters also in modern times (see MacDowell 1990b: 290), the more common theory derives ἀλαζών from the Thracian tribe name Ἀλαζόνες,

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[168] 436.21 FHS&G. See Fortenbaugh 1984: 110. The mentioning of the treatise here depends on an addition on the margin of a 16th-century edition (*editio Cratandrina*, 1528), but the reading is defended by Fortenbaugh.

Ἀλαζῶνες or Ἀλιζῶνες/Ἀλιζῶνες (cf. Hdt. 4.17.52; Hom. *Il*. 2.856 etc; the forms vary), which has become an appellative in the same way as the French *bohémien*. It may also be a formation by analogy or some kind of comic false analogy (cf. also Hofmann 1961).

The word ἀλαζών seems to have been introduced more widely by the comic poets. It is very frequent in Aristophanes, and we also know of the πτωχαλαζών as a comic type.[169] The fourth century orators sometimes accuse each other of ἀλαζονεία (cf. Aischin. 1.178), which often is equal to lying. Plato also uses ἀλαζών and ἀλαζονεία mostly as synonyms of 'liar' and 'lying', as opposed to truthful way of life (e.g. *R*. 490a; cf. *Hp. Mi*. 369e, 371a, 371d). At the same time, we can also see the traditional use, when the ἀλαζών attributes to himself some achievement or quality that he actually does not have (cf. *Chrm*. 173c; *R*. 486b, 490a).

In his ethical works, Aristotle (see also below, ch. 4.1.3) introduces ἀλαζονεία as excess to the truthfulness (ἀλήθεια)—see *EN* 1108a21, 1127a21, *EE* 1221a24, 1233b39. He treats ἀλαζονεία in its usual sense of attributing to oneself qualities that one does not possess or possesses to a smaller degree. Depending on motives, Aristotle also distinguishes three types of ἀλαζόνες (*EN* 1127b9 ff.), emphasizing that it is not the capacity that makes the boaster, but the choice (οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει):

1) He who claims more than he has with no ulterior object (μηδενὸς ἕνεκα) is a contemptible sort of fellow (φαύλῳ ... ἔοικεν), but seems futile (μάταιος) rather than bad (κακός).
2) He who does it for the sake of reputation or honour (δόξης ἢ τιμῆς) is not very much to be blamed (οὐ λίαν ψεκτός).
3) He who does it for money (ἀργυρίου), or the things that lead to money, is an uglier character (ἀσχημονέστερος).

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[169] Athen. 6.230b–c (once considered to be by Alexis [fr. 303b Kock], but not any more; cf. *PCG* vol. 2, p. 24–5): πολίτην πτωχαλαζόν᾽ οἶδ᾽ ἐγώ, / ὃς ἔχων δραχμῆς ἅπαντα τἀρ-γυρώματα / ἐβόα καλῶν τὸν παῖδ᾽, ἔν᾽ ὄντα καὶ μόνον, / ὀνόμασι δὲ ψαμμακοσίοισι χρώμενον, / ᾽παῖ Στρομβιχίδη, τῶν ἀργυρωμάτων σὺ μὴ / τῶν χειμερινῶν νῦν, ἀλλὰ τῶν θερινῶν᾽ ἔφη / ᾽παράθες᾽.

Aristophanes connects ἀλαζών and ἀλαζονεία with words such as πονηρός, ὠχριῶν, ἀνυπόδητος and κακοδαίμων (*Nu.* 102–4, for sophists, including the comic Sokrates); μάσθλης (*Eq.* 269; *Nu.* 449); μάντις (*Pax* 1045–6); ἄκλητος (*Av.* 983) and φέναξ (*Ra.* 909).

In Demosthenes, we see an opposition between the natural talent of the orator (δεινότης) and boasting (5.11). In Aischines, boasting is explicitly connected with lying: when other liars try to be as obscure as they can, Demosthenes mentions the exact date of events that he knows never happened, and names people he has never seen; in addition, he is a πονηρός (3.99). He himself, Aischines claims, is speaking only truth, which is opposed to κόμπος and ἀλαζονεία; Demosthenes, on the other hand, is μιαρός and ἀνόσιος (3.101).

2.1.8.24. *Char.* 24: ὑπερηφανία—ὑπερήφανος

Translations: arrogance (D, R, V, E, J–S), pride (B)—the arrogant man (D, R, A, V, J–S).

The etymology of ὑπερήφανος is linguistically unclear. According to popular etymology, it consists of the prefix ὑπερ- and some form of the verb φαίνεσθαι—thus ὑπερήφανος would mean 'standing out above (the others)'. Usually the word is used in figurative contexts. It can denote a positive quality, someone who is proud of something. But as pride easily changes into arrogance, the word often acquires negative connotations. Sometimes it is even connected with ὕβρις (cf. Hom. *Il.* 11.694–5: ταῦθ᾽ ὑπερηφανέοντες Ἐπειοὶ χαλκοχίτωνες / ἡμέας ὑβρίζοντες ἀτάσθαλα μηχανόωντο). Thus, arrogance is the traditional meaning seen in Greek texts.

Co-occurrences are frequent in the speeches of the orators, especially Demosthenes. Arrogance is connected with terms such as ὕβρις (21.83, 24.121), πλοῦτος (21.96) and ἀσέλγεια (21.137). The behaviour of the young Alkibiades is described with adverbs ὑπερηφάνως, ταπεινῶς, ὑπερακρατῶς (61.45 [sp.]). Isokrates connects the adverbs ἀσελγῶς and ὑπερηφάνως (7.53) and adjectives μισόδημος, μισάνθρωπος and ὑπερήφανος (15.131). He also uses it together with πλοῦτος (15.151), while Andokides connects it with πλεονεξία (4.13).

In *Men*. 90a, Plato opposes ὑπερήφανος, ὀγκώδης and ἐπαχθής to κόσμιος and εὐσταλής; in *R*. 399b ὑπερηφάνως to σωφρόνως and μετρίως.

In Aristotle, arrogance is connected to φιλαργυρία (*AP* 5.3.12). In *Rh*. 1390b32–91a4, he speaks of vices that accompany wealth: the wealthy are ὑβρισταί, ὑπερήφανοι, τρυφεροί, σαλάκωνες and σόλοικοι. In *Rh*. 1391a33–b1, we learn that good fortune makes men more supercilious (ὑπερηφανώτεροι) and more reckless (ἀλογιστότεροι).

2.1.8.25. *Char*. 25: δειλία—δειλός

Translations: cowardice (D, R, V, E, J–S, B)—the coward (D, R, A, V, J–S).

The coward is naturally opposed to the brave man (ἀνδρεῖος).[170] Aristotle defines cowardice as a deficiency belonging to ἀνδρεία, the other extreme being θρασύτης (*EN* 1115a4 ff.). In Plato's *Prt*. 360c, Sokrates presents a definition of cowardice: ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἂν εἴη. According to him, people are afraid only because they do not know what should and should not be feared (cf. Aristotle *EN* 1116b3). This approach can also be seen in Plato's later works, where, however, associating fear with the disorder of the soul has become more prevalent (cf. *R*. 411a).

The words δειλία and δειλός are extremely frequent in co-occurrences. I will leave aside oppositions with ἀνδρεία and ἀνδρεῖος, which are most common. Other adjectives that are used to evaluate a coward include κακός (Plato *Lg*. 774c; *R*. 395e); ἀγύμναστος πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν (*Lg*. 816a); ἄδικος (*Lg*. 870c); ἀργός (*Lg*. 903a; *R*. 604d); βλακικός (*Plt*. 307c). Signs of a tripartite division between δειλός, θρασύτερος and ἀνδρεῖος can be found in Plato's *La*. 184b. Compare also *R*. 590b (above, ch. 1.1).

In Aristotle, one can find cowardice connected with ἀκόλαστος and ἀκολασία (*EN* 1130a28–32; *Pol*. 1260a1, a36). Cf. also *EN* 1116a20–1 (οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἔντιμοι); *EN* 1166b10 (διὰ δειλίαν καὶ ἀργίαν); *EE* 1228b35–6 (νοσώδεις καὶ ἀσθενεῖς καὶ δειλοὶ).

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[170] For conceptions of 'being brave' in the Greek antiquity, see Bartsch 1967, Rosen & Sluiter 2003.

Aischines connects cowardice with φθόνος and κακοήθεια (2.22), δωροδοκία and ἐμπληξία (3.214; cf. also 3.244); Lykurgos with ἀναίδεια and προδοσία (*In Leocratem* 110); Demosthenes with ἀνανδρία (21.160; with adjective ἄνανδρος also in Demades, fr. 75.9), κατάρατος (21.164) and ἄτολμος (19.206). Andokides, among others, describes the coward as leaving the fight and throwing away his shield (1.74). Lysias speaks of a man who is δειλός ... καὶ πένης καὶ πράττειν ἀδύνατος καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις διάφορος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων μισούμενος (14.44).

In comedy, we see that πρόνοια can sometimes be considered cowardice (Ar. *Pl.* 207); the adjective δειλός is connected with βραδύς (*Av.* 1328, 1336), πονηρός (*Th.* 836), λακαταπύγων (*Ach.* 664), and of course opposed to ἀνδρεῖος, as usual (*Ec.* 679). Alexis opposes the τόλμα of a man to the cowardice of a woman (fr. 247.10–11 *PCG* [= 245.10–11 Kock]). Philemon speaks of the traditional opposition between the lions (who are ἄλκιμοι) and the hares (who are δειλοί; fr. 93.4–5 *PCG* [= 89.4–5 Kock]).

Here we can also see some co-occurrences in tragedy. Sophokles connects δειλία and μωρία (*OT* 536), and δειλός and δυσάλγητος φρένας (fr. 952.2 *TrGF*); of course, there is also an opposition δειλός–θρασύς (*Aj.* 1315). In Euripides, wealth is called a δειλὸν ... καὶ φιλόψυχον κακόν (*Ph.* 579).

2.1.8.26. *Char.* 26: ὀλιγαρχία—ὀλιγαρχικός

Translations: oligarchy (D, E [as a title]), authoritarianism (R, V), oligarchical or anti-democratic spirit (E [in the text]), the oligarchical temper (J–S)—the oligarchic man (D), the authoritarian (R, V), the oligarch (J–S [as a title]), the oligarchical man (A, J–S [in the text]), an oligarchist; or, one who is of the faction of the nobles, in opposition to the people in a commonwealth (B).

The etymology is for once clear. The *nomen agentis* ὀλιγαρχικός is Casaubon's emendation for the hapax ὀλίγαρχος found in the MSS, and has been accepted by most editors; the reading of the papyrus is uncertain.[171] The adjective ὀλιγαρχικός is common for people whose

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[171] See J. Ilberg in LA 1897: 219–20; Edmonds 1908: 164; Edmonds 1910: 134; Steinmetz 1960a: 98; Steinmetz 1962: 298; Diggle 2004: 465; Hinz 2005a.

political views are oligarchic. Calling a behavioural regularity ὀλιγαρχία is not common in the Greek texts (although cf. the use in book 8 of Plato's *Republic*; see above, ch. 1.1), but this may reflect popular usage.

2.1.8.27. *Char.* 27: ὀψιμαθία—ὀψιμαθής

Translations: late learning (D, V [late-learning J–S]), rejuvenation (R), opsimathy or late-learning (E)—the late learner (D, A, V [the late-learner J–S]), the rejuvenated man (R), a man who would accomplish himself when it is too late (B).

Ὀψιμαθής is literally late-learner (ὀψέ + μανθάνειν), someone who wishes to learn in his old age things that are usually learnt in youth. In the anthology of Stobaios (3.29.68), we have a story about Sokrates who in his old age started *kithara*-playing under a citharode called Konnos. When someone wondered and mocked him for learning *kithara* at that age (τηλικοῦτος ὤν), Sokrates responded: "Better be a late-learner than an uneducated one" (κρεῖττον ὀψιμαθῆ εἶναι ἢ ἀμαθῆ).[172] The phrase seems to have acquired gnomic meaning (in the sense "better late than never").[173] From the tone of Sokrates we can be sure that the meaning of the word here is positive. In Plato, the word occurs two times, and both rather positive contexts (*R.* 409b, *Sph.* 251b).

The original meaning of ὀψιμαθής may well have been positive, but the negative side prevails in the extant literature. Aristophanes is just one example of this: ὀψιμαθής is a label that could be attached to Pheidippides (*Nu.*) or Philokleon (*V.*). The word ὀψιμαθής is also used to describe the sophists, but in those cases the meaning is clearly pejorative.[174]

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[172] The same story is also told earlier by Sextus Empiricus (*Adversus mathematicos* 6.13; here the name of the citharode is Lampon) and is recorded in *Suda* (Σ 829.47–9; here the name of the citharode is Konon and the mocker is Solon).

[173] Cf. also *Vita Aesopi* G 109.15 (= W 109.19), Kleitarchos *Sent.* 81, and Libanios *Epist.* 1352.1.

[174] E.g. Isokr. 10.2: Ἐγὼ δ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἑώρων νεωστὶ τὴν περιεργίαν ταύτην ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγγεγενημένην καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τῇ καινότητι τῶν εὑρημένων φιλοτιμουμένους, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐθαύμαζον αὐτῶν· νῦν δὲ τίς ἐστιν οὕτως ὀψιμαθὴς ὅστις οὐκ οἶδεν Πρωταγόραν καὶ τοὺς κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον γενομένους σοφιστὰς ὅτι καὶ τοιαῦτα

2.1.8.28. *Char.* 28: κακολογία—κακολόγος

Translations: slander (D, R), the habit of slander (V), backbiting (E), the habit of evil-speaking (J–S), detraction (B)—the slanderer (D, R, A, V), the evil-speaker (J–S).

Κακολόγος is a person who speaks badly (κακῶς λέγει) of other people, i.e. slanders. There are no hidden or figurative meanings; the word means what it says. Aristotle (*Rh.* 1384b9) also considers writers of comedy slanderers, because they deal with their fellow people's failings and vices.

The term is important in the Attic law, although the practice that was actually liable to prosecution was named κακηγορία, not κακολογία (cf. Dover 1997: 104–5). It is possible that Theophrastos did not wish to depict a type who could be easily impeached for his slander, and therefore chose to call him κακολόγος rather than κακήγορος. According to fourth century laws, it was prohibited:

1) To use certain words (so-called ἀπόρρητα) that were written down in the law (the fine, according to Isokr. 20.3, was 500 drachmas);[175]
2) To deliver slandering speeches in public spaces (temples, games etc.; cf. Lys. 9.9);
3) To disgrace the dead (cf. Dem. 20.104);
4) To disparage official authorities (cf. Dem. 21.32).

2.1.8.29. *Char.* 29: φιλοπονηρία—φιλοπόνηρος

Translations: being friendly with villains (D), patronage of scoundrels (R), love of evil (V), friendship with rascals (E), the patronising of rascals (J–S)—the friend of villains (D), the patron of scoundrels (R), the lover of bad company (A), the 'lover of evil' (V), the patron of rascals (J–S).

καὶ πολὺ τούτων πραγματωδέστερα συγγράμματα κατέλιπον ἡμῖν; (note also the occurrence of περιεργία in this section; cf. *Char.* 13); later also Ath. 3.101: πρὸς τοὺς ὀψιμαθεῖς τούτους σοφιστάς; and Plb. 12.8.4 (= Timaios *FGrH* 566 F 156): οὐ σοφιστὴν ὀψιμαθῆ καὶ μισητὸν ὑπάρχοντα (this last phrase is also popular in later sources, e.g. *Suda* A 3930.2). A curious example is the passage of the *Lexicon* of Pseudo-Zonaras (O 1445.32–3), where we find two illustrations of the use of the adverb ὅλως in the sense παντελῶς: ὅλως ὀψιμαθὴς, ὅλως σοφιστὴς.

[175] All of these are not known, but they included ἀνδροφόνος, ῥίψασπις, πατραλοίας, μητραλοίας. Cf. Lys. 10.2, 6, 8; Isokr. 20.3, Dem. 18.123 (Steinmetz 1962: 319; see also Clay 1982).

The abstract noun φιλοπονηρία is a hapax. Φιλοπόνηρος seems to be a neologism of the fourth century. The word πονηρός was used in aristocratic and oligarchic circles to depreciate democrats, and therefore had a political tinge to it. The φιλοπόνηρος is in a way a democratic opposite of the oligarchic man (*Char*. 26).

The *nomen agentis* φιλοπόνηρος is not frequent. Before Theophrastos, it is found only in Deinarchos and Aristotle. Aristotle explains the word with the help of a synonymous expression (*EN* 1165b16: φιλοπόνηρον γὰρ οὐ χρὴ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ὁμοιοῦσθαι φαύλῳ). According to fr. 42 of Deinarchos (= Pollux 6.168), the orator used the word together with εὐμετάβολος.

2.1.8.30. *Char.* **30: αἰσχροκέρδεια—αἰσχροκερδής**
Translations: shabby profiteering (D), chiseling (R), avarice (V, J–S), meanness (E)—the shabby profiteer (D), the chiseler (R), the basely covetous man (A), the avaricious man (V, J–S).

The words αἰσχροκερδής and αἰσχροκέρδεια are always connected with mean profiteering (αἰσχρός + κέρδος). As far as we know, the first author to use αἰσχροκερδής is Herodotos (1.187). According to Aristotle (*Pol*. 1286b18), shabby profiteering is one of the causes of the change of constitutions. In his ethical writings, Aristotle introduces αἰσχροκέρδεια as a variant of ἀνελευθερία (*EN* 1122a1–12; cf. *Char*. 22 and ch. 4.3 below). This kind of men are said to exceed in respect of taking by taking anything and from any source, e.g. those who ply sordid trades, pimps, gamesters etc. (*EN* 1121b31 ff.).

Xenophon connects αἰσχροκέρδεια with ἀδικία (*Cyr*. 8.8.18) and κακοήθεια (*Cyn*. 13.16). In Aristophanes (*Pax* 623), αἰσχροκερδεῖς is used together with διειρωνόξενοι, which is a hapax derived from the word εἴρων. The co-occurrences of Demosthenes include αἰσχροκέρδεια and μιαρία (29.4), πλεονεξία and ὕβρις (45.67), πονηρία (59.64); an αἰσχροκερδής is also ἄπληστος (49.67). Lysias also connects αἰσχρο-κέρδεια with ἀπληστία (12.19); Deinarchos speaks of αἰσχροκέρδεια and πονηρία (1.108), and μιαρός, ἀσεβής and αἰσχροκερδής (1.21). One can also compare Andokides 4.32 (φιλοχρήματος ... φειδόμενος ... δαπανώμενος ... αἰσχροκερδέστατος).

2.2. Purpose and function of the *Characters*

The question of the general purpose of the *Characters* of Theophrastos has been one of the most intriguing in the study of this work.[176] Some scholars have suggested that the *Characters* belong to Theophrastos' ethical studies, others believe in rhetorical purpose of the work, for yet others it is a study on comic characters within a poetic work. There are also those who consider it pure entertainment, a work of fiction.

The issue of the purpose seems to have been for the most part too constrained and aimed at reconstructing something like an Ur-Theophrastos. In my opinion, there is no reason to think that Theophrastos had only one specific genre in mind while composing the work. Perhaps it does not fit anywhere perfectly, but it has connections with many, and can be (and has been) used for various purposes by the posterity.[177] It seems to be more important to consider the function of the work than its exact purpose. In fact, it might be a new genre or a mixture of genres that cannot be categorized as a sub-genre of something else at all. Or it may be connected with some general tendencies of the philosophical school it was born in: e.g., as an application of the Peripatetic fascination with taxonomy to analyzing character types (cf. Gutzwiller 2007: 141). The various suggestions of modern scholars reflect, however, important features of the work itself and the Peripatetic tradition surrounding it, and are therefore reviewed in the following.

As mentioned already, there are several large categories to which the *Characters* have been thought to belong.

A) Ethics:
   A.1) We are dealing with an excerpt from a larger ethical work.
   A.2) It is a collection of material for some ethical work.
   A.3) It is a collection of illustrating sketches belonging to an ethical work, which was then in circulation independently, whereby the purpose could have been pedagogical.

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[176] See, e.g., Steinmetz 1959, Steinmetz 1962, Ussher 1993: 3 ff., Rusten 1993: 18–23, Furley 1953, Diggle 2004: 12–16, to name but a few important summaries.

[177] Rudolf Stark has noted (1960: 200) that reflecting on these descriptions "neben Theophrasts eigentlicher und nächster Absicht freilich auch noch zu den verschiedensten anderen Zwecken reizen konnte und reizte."

A.4) The work may have been created as a ridiculing weapon in the fight with other philosophical schools in some ethical issue.

B) Rhetoric:

B.1) It is a collection of models or examples for a lecture or work on rhetoric.

B.2) It is a collection of sketches produced in rhetorical exercises.

C) Poetics / comedy:

C.1) It is a handbook for describing character types in comedy.

C.2) It is an appendix to a work on poetics.

D) Pure entertainment: it is a work containing humorous scenes from everyday life, which may have originated from recitals at monthly dinners of the Peripatetic *thiasos*.

A more detailed analysis of some of these suggestions will be found in the following sub-chapters, whereby my aim has been to show that none of these possibilities can actually be dismissed, but at the same time none of them should be treated as a sole possibility available.

2.2.1. Ethics

Purely ethical purpose of the *Characters* has had its supporters in the past, but is rarely argued in the present day.[178] That said, one cannot claim the work lacks all ethical dimension.[179] The character traits have obvious connections with the ethical treatises of Aristotle, although the purpose of the work need not be ethical.[180] We can divide character description into philosophical and practical; hence, the literary genre where character description occurs plays an important role in its structure. The pictures of real life that we see in the *Characters* of Theophrastos use their own logic and differ from the philosophical treatment in this respect. Theophrastos gives us the most distinctive traits of a character. This can be contrasted with Aristotle's approach,

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[178] Cf., e.g., Richardson-Hay 2006: 172, according to whom Theophrastos' character sketches "were written from an ethical perspective."

[179] As is done, e.g., by Diggle 2004: 12.

[180] See Fortenbaugh 1975, Fortenbaugh 2005: 88.

which aims at illustrating a philosophical or an ethical principle. The occasional descriptions of character types in Aristotle are only meant to clarify discussion and to offer examples.

Thus, ethical theorizing was just not the reason why Theophrastos' work was created, and therefore nothing is analyzed, no moral is drawn, and—at least as a rule—no motive is sought.[181] At the same time it has been pointed out that the basic idea in the whole work of Theophrastos is to show that individual good or bad traits of character may be isolated and studied separately. This kind of analytical approach was mainly introduced by Aristotle.[182]

Comparison of the *Characters* with Aristotle's writings has been one of the most common lines of approach regarding the purpose of the work, although it is certainly not the only one. It is also useful and necessary to see what later authors made of it,[183] even if this tells us something about the tradition and not about the author's intention. Regardless of the purpose of the author, a text can be used as a work of moral guidance by posterity. The spurious preface and moralizing conclusions show that, at some later time, this indeed happened to the *Characters*. The definitions, which, if spurious, were at least added quite early, reveal that connections with ethics were easy to arise.

Another connection with ethics might be the one suggested by Giorgio Pasquali. According to him, Theophrastos' sketches were conceived as illustrative showpieces for a course of lectures on ethics, composed in a simple style which suits oral delivery.[184] There is no doubt that Theophrastos was a lively lecturer and could enrich his lectures with such illustrative material. Theophrastos' care while preparing his lectures is also emphasized by Diogenes Laertios in his *Vita Theophrasti* (= fr. 1 FHS&G); he was generally considered a very intelligent and industrious man.[185] A well-known characterization of his way

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[181] Cf. Diggle 2004: 12, with Furley 1953 and Fortenbaugh 1975 et al.

[182] Rusten 1993: 11–12. Aristotle formulates this notion in book 2 of his *Nichomachean Ethics* (cf. above, ch. 1.3.1).

[183] Cf., e.g., Regenbogen 1940: 1507–10, Furley 1953: 60.

[184] See Pasquali 1919: VI (= 1956: X): "parte ... di un corso di etica descrittiva", with Diggle 2004: 15, who seems to share this view.

[185] Cf. D.L. 5.36–7. For more laudatory epithets, see fr. 3b FHS&G (an Arabic source).

of lecturing is preserved in Athenaios.[186] In addition to characterizing Theophrastos, it should be noted that the passage has considerable similarities with Theophrastean sketches:

> Ἕρμιππος δέ φησι Θεόφραστον παραγίνεσθαι εἰς τὸν περίπα-
> τον καθ᾽ ὥραν λαμπρὸν καὶ ἐξησκημένον, εἶτα καθίσαντα
> διατίθεσθαι τὸν λόγον οὐδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενον κινήσεως οὐδὲ
> σχήματος ἑνός. καί ποτε ὀψοφάγον μιμούμενον ἐξείραντα
> τὴν γλῶσσαν περιλείχειν τὰ χείλη.

> ("Hermippos says that Theophrastos would arrive at the Peripatos punctually, looking splendid and well dressed, then sit down and deliver his lecture, refraining from no movement or gesture. And once while imitating a gourmet, having stuck out his tongue, he licked his lips.")

We do not know on what topic Theophrastos was lecturing while imitating a gourmet, but I can hardly imagine a course on ethics in this connection. Therefore, such illustrative showpieces could have accompanied courses on various topics.

2.2.2. Rhetoric

Although the *Characters* may have been somehow connected to Theophrastos' ethical writings, there are many characteristics that relate the work to rhetoric. An external connection is its inclusion in the manuscripts of rhetorical treatises. It remains a fact that 8th century rhetoricians found a way to use the descriptions of Theophrastos as pedagogical set of models or samples, and therefore included the text in their corpus (see, e.g., Fortenbaugh 1984: 95). That is not the same as to claim that rhetoric was Theophrastos' aim in writing the work. One has to be careful with such postulations, as is shown by the reception of another character piece from the Peripatetic tradition, Lykon's description of the drunkard (see ch. 3.3). This work was probably not written for rhetorical

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[186] 1.21a–b = Theophrastos fr. 12 FHS&G = Hermippos fr. 51 Wehrli.

instruction, but was quoted by Rutilius Lupus exactly to illustrate a rhetorical figure, χαρακτηρισμός. Something similar may have happened to Theophrastos' work.

At the same time, it remains a possibility that Theophrastos and other members of the post-Aristotelian Peripatos recognized the importance of a distinction between superficial regularities and deeper lying beliefs which motivate and explain them, and introduced into rhetorical instruction the study and composition of sketches like those contained in the *Characters* (Fortenbaugh 1994a: 35). In later rhetorical schools, there existed a custom to compose descriptions of characters called ἠθολογία or ἠθοποιία,[187] which may include behavioural regularities, but are aimed solely at rhetorical presentation of a credible image of the opponent or the speaker himself.

The *Characters* has also been compared to σημεῖα as described in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (cf. above, ch. 1.3.2). The purpose of such a description is practical; it aims at having an influence on the listener.

In Roman rhetorical terminology, the word χαρακτήρ (*resp.* χαρακτηρισμός) is rendered either as *notatio* or as *descriptio* (e.g. Cicero *Top*. 83). The author of *Rhetorica ad Herennium* explains the term by describing a boaster (4.50.63), which to some degree resembles the boaster of Theophrastos (*Char*. 23). The same work also mentions other such types as examples (e.g. the coward and the greedy, 4.51.65), but the approach is very different from that of Theophrastos, as illustrating actions of the man are joined to form a narrative. The general effect is anecdotal (Ussher 1993: 28), which, however, is not so far from the *Characters* of Theophrastos.

2.2.3. Poetics and comedy

The *Characters* have often been connected with Theophrastos' work on poetics, especially his writings on comedy.[188]

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[187] The terms vary, cf. Quint. 9.3.99, 1.9.3, 9.2.58. For ἠθοποιία see, e.g., Hagen 1966, Naschert 1994, Amato & Schamp 2005.
[188] See, e.g., Ussher 1977, Fortenbaugh 1981.

Nobody would doubt that the Peripatetics were eagerly engaged in questions connected with comedy, although their views on the topic are not always clear from our fragmentary sources. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle says that comedy is "an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the ridiculous, which is a species of the ugly. The ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others."[189] In comparing Old and New (in modern terms, probably Middle) Attic comedy, Aristotle argues that for the first, joking just meant bad language (αἰσχρολογία), while in the case of the latter it consisted of *double entendre* and ambiguity (ὑπόνοια; *EN* 1128a17 ff.). As has been pointed out, though, it is improbable that Aristotle or any Greek outside Aristophanes' lifetime saw any of his comedies performed; to Aristotle, as to most moderns, Aristophanes was "just a book."[190]

The definition of comedy preserved by Diomedes, "a story of private affairs involving no danger," has usually been attributed to Theophrastos, although the author assigns it vaguely to "the Greeks" (*apud Graecos*).[191] It has been emphasized that this definition omits any reference to worthless individuals and, therefore, contrasts with Aristotle's notion of comedy quoted above; this omission most probably reflects the development of comedy in the fourth century and in particular the plays of Menander (Fortenbaugh 2005: 139, 360). The fourth century comedy ceased to focus on inferior persons, and became a study of private affairs (Fortenbaugh 2005: 360 and Fortenbaugh 1981: 256–60). It has been argued that Theophrastos recognized the role which superficial traits

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[189] *Poet*. 1449a32–5: Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

[190] Ussher 1977: 71–2. Cf. also the assessment of Old and New Comedy by Plutarch, *Mor.* 853 ff.

[191] Fr. 708 FHS&G. The definition in Diomedes' *Ars grammatica* is presented in Greek: κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ἰδιωτικῶν πραγμάτων ἀκίνδυνος περιοχή. His own Latin definition is a bit extended, adding 'civic' to 'private': *comoedia est privatae civilisque fortunae sine periculo vitae conprehensio*. Note that Diomedes actually refers to Theophrastos only in the case of the definition of tragedy, not comedy. See also the commentary in Fortenbaugh 2005: 352–64 and cf. Fortenbaugh 1981: 258.

play in comedy and, therefore, recognized the importance of marking off comic character from Aristotelian choice (προαίρεσις; Fortenbaugh 1981). Thus, Theophrastos can be said to have dissociated himself from Aristotle in that he loosened the connection between worthless character and comic character.

The interest of Theophrastos in questions of comedy is revealed by two titles in the list of his works presented by Diogenes Laertios. The first is *On comedy* (Περὶ κωμῳδίας, 5.47.14 = 666.22 FHS&G [title]).[192] The passage relates a story about the people of Tiryns who were given to laughter and unfit for more serious affairs. The lesson of the story is that a long-standing habit (ἦθος; in this case, being given to laughter) is incapable of being cured. The same thought occurs in other fragments (cf. 465, 462, 463 FHS&G), but note that Theophrastos leaves the door open. Thus, character can be affected by an extraordinary event, such as severe illness (Fortenbaugh 2005: 366–7).

The second title is *On the ludicrous* (Περί γελοίου, 5.46.20 = 666.23 FHS&G [title]).[193] W. W. Fortenbaugh has suggested (2005: 142) that the Theophrastean discussion in this work may have gone beyond poetics and included topics proper to rhetoric and ethics. One can compare Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, where the utility of the ludicrous in debate is recognized (*Rh*. 1415a35–7, 1419b2–5), and *EN* 1127b33–28b4, where the ludicrous in social interaction is discussed. Fr. 710 FHS&G tells us that Theophrastos took note of a proverb, "No rotten fish is large (μέγας οὐδεὶς σαπρὸς ἰχθύς)," and explained how the cithara-player Stratonikos used that proverb—speaking the words separately—in order to make fun of an actor named Simykas, who is deficient in voice (ll. 7–10; see Fortenbaugh 2005: 144, 378 ff.). Perhaps also another text, 711 FHS&G, could be assigned to the work *On the ludicrous* (Fortenbaugh 2005: 144, 393–4).

In comedy, negative character traits are often used as invectives. Comic characters are, due to the genre, allowed to act and speak in a way that

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[192] Cf. Athenaios 6.261d = fr. 709 FHS&G, with commentary in Fortenbaugh 2005: 364–75 (cf. also 138–41 on 666.22 FHS&G).

[193] Cf. Athenaios 8.348a = fr. 710 FHS&G, with commentary in Fortenbaugh 2005: 377–90 (cf. also 141–5 on 666.23 FHS&G).

would be unacceptable and possibly punished by law in the real world.[194] The aim of a comedy writer is to entertain the public and make it laugh; everything else is subjected to this. This is especially true in the case of Old Comedy (i.e., mainly Aristophanes), where the role of the author's fantasy and visual comic is more important, although allusions and direct hints to contemporary political life are frequent, too. Thus, the unreal, fantastical world of the Old Comedy is combined with the critique of contemporary life, especially political events and persons, although the relationship between the plays of Aristophanes and contemporary politics has been considered intractable.[195] In the case of New Comedy (Menander, above all), reflections of real life on the stage have been observed, but their scope is far from certain.[196]

There has been much discussion over whether and to what extent the *Characters* is related to contemporary comedy, especially the work of Menander. Usually some influence of Theophrastos to Menander has been established.[197] Alkiphron, rhetorician and sophist of the 2nd or 3rd century CE, speaks of traditional friendship between Menander and Theophrastos (4.19.14), and it is known from elsewhere that Menander was Theophrastos' pupil.[198]

Although there are many characters in the comedies of Menander that resemble Theophrastean types, their way of presentation is different. The range of action of the Theophrastean types is narrower and more schematic than in the comedy, where one character trait forms a part of the whole, e.g. grouchiness as a characteristic of old men, cheating as a characteristic of slaves, etc.[199] In addition, it has been

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[194] See Dover 1974: 19; for obscenities in Attic comedy, see Henderson 1991.

[195] Heath 1987; see also Millett 1991: 243, Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 231.

[196] See Millett 1991: 243–4 and literature mentioned there.

[197] Cf., e.g., Steinmetz 1960b, Corbato 1959: 18–39. See also Gaiser 1967.

[198] D.L. 5.36, relying on a book by Pamphile (*FHG* 3.522). Cf. Fortenbaugh 2005: 139, 360. Some scholars have believed that the account is not true (cf., e.g., Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1955: 2.282: "Ob die Überlieferung von persönlichen Beziehungen der beiden Männer auf Tatsachen beruht, ist unsicher, Schüler Theophrasts ist der frühreife Dichter nicht gewesen.") Cf. Diggle (2004: 8) who calls Pamphile "a late and dubious source".

[199] Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1955: 2.282): "Theophrasts Charaktere zeugen /.../ von einer scharfen Beobachtung, und darin liegt eine Verwandtschaft mit Menander, wenn auch der Dichter, der individuelle Menschen schafft, von dem Philosophen stark

pointed out that in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, women, slaves, metics and foreigners only have marginal roles, and nobody is depicted as a young man, which distinguishes it from comedy (Leppin 2002: 39).

As only a small part of the 4th century comedy has come to us, it is difficult to establish for certain any specific relationships or influences. Extant titles of the plays indicate that comedy could have been built upon, among others, types similar to those described by Theophrastos.

There is a famous treatment of poetics that should be mentioned in this context, although its authorship is unknown. The anonymous *Tractatus Coislinianus* (*TC*) is a treatise on comedy from the 2nd or 1st century BCE,[200] which has been influenced by the Peripatetic school.[201] It lists comedy, tragedy, mime and satyr-drama as species of the dramatic or mimetic genus, whereby comedy is named first.[202] It also mentions three character types (ἤθη) of comedy, viz. βωμολόχος, ἀλαζών and εἴρων (*TC* 12 Janko: ἤθη κωμωδίας τά τε βωμολόχα καὶ τὰ εἰρωνικὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀλαζόνων). The last two also occur in the *Characters* of Theophrastos (*Char*. 23 and 1); all three are mentioned by Aristotle (*EN* 1108a21 ff. and elsewhere).

This may be related to the stock masks of the comedy, which combined various types with some basic characteristics. Attempts have been made to connect the types mentioned in *TC* with the characters of Aristophanes (e.g., Süss 1908), but this cannot be done consistently. In Aristophanes, they are more connected with the function of the character, but this can be transferred from one character to another in the course of the play (Silk 1990: 163–4). In the case of Old Comedy, specific masks were sometimes needed to depict real persons shown on the stage (e.g.

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verschieden ist, der die Laster charakterisieren will, also alle verwendbaren Züge zusammenstellen muß, unbekümmert, ob sie sich in einer Person zusammenfinden können."

[200] Preserved in one 10th century manuscript (*cod*. *Paris*. *Coislin*. 120), and named after Henri Charles du Cambout de Coislin, who once owned the manuscript.

[201] It has been suggested that the author may have been Theophrastos. See Fortenbaugh 1981: 251 and cf. Janko 1984, Nesselrath 1990: 102–62, Koster 1975. For a bibliography of *TC* (and Aristotle's *Poetics*) from about 900 till 1996, see Schrier 1998.

[202] *TC* 2 Janko. This reflects the fact that comedy is the focus of *TC*; see Janko 1984: 130 and cf. Fortenbaugh 2005: 361.

Euripides, Sokrates).[203] However, it was only New Comedy of the 4th century BCE that became famous for its stock characters.[204]

In a way, Theophrastos' types naturally belong to the world of comedy. When reading these pieces, one can take the role of a spectator, and the distance between the character type described and the spectator allows laughing at the situation without fear of infraction. The pointed presentation of vices and the creating of stereotypes help to create the comic effect. At the same time, the relation between the *Characters* of Theophrastos and, e.g., Menander's plays, may be that of having a common ground and similar approach to human character, not depending on each other.

2.2.4. Pure entertainment

Almost all commentators have pointed out the comical inherent to the *Characters*. They differ in the emphasis they put on it. Some have considered the comical to be incidental and related to the overall topic; others have believed that it is the very aim of the work. The comic of the *Characters* lies in situations, but it is also emphasized by some stylistic elements (e.g. diminutives). There is something comical in every chapter of the *Characters*, although its extent varies—from faint smile till poignant sarcasm. This extent depends on the specific type and on the graveness of the vice (see Steinmetz 1962: 22 f.; cf. also Indemans 1953: 80–7).

It should also be noted that the comic is meant for Greek ears and, in some cases, is lost for modern readers. More puristic of these readers, or rather editors, have even considered some expressions of the *Characters* too harsh and removed them, not only from the translation but also from original Greek text (e.g. Jebb & Sandys 1909). This prudish approach to textology by some scholars of the past can be illustrated by a quotation from Jebb's preface to his first edition (1870) in Jebb & Sandys 1909: VIII:

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[203] See Sutton 1993: 41–2, 124. For the masks of the Old and the New Comedy, cf. also Pollux 4.143 ff.

[204] See Ussher 1977, Cornford 1993: 176, Nesselrath 1990: 280–330.

"the coarseness in the delineations of Theophrastus is but a small element, accidental, not essential, and can in every case be separated from the portrait without injuring it as a whole." In addition he notes that "passages omitted in the translation could not, with due regard to symmetry, be left in the [sc. Greek] text." To leave them, he adds, "would have been equivalent to printing them in capital letters." Jebb is also known to have changed the order in which the MSS arrange the chapters, "for an order less embarrassing to the reader", thereby causing some unnecessary confusion.

That the comic is present in the *Characters* is something that is undeniable yet not fully explained. Jebb has once noted (Jebb & Sandys 1909: 13): "The difficulty is, not that the descriptions are amusing, but that they are written as if their principal aim was to amuse." As noted above, there are scholars who believe that Theophrastos' principal aim in writing these character sketches was amusement. It has been even concluded that, basically, the sketches are so funny that even if there was some other aim in composing them, it is lost to the ears of the one who reads them (cf. Jebb & Sandys 1909: 13). Thus, e.g., Rusten (1993: 22) writes that "[w]hat ultimately defeats any attempt to find an ethical, comic, or rhetorical basis in the *Characters* is the fact that there is no trace in them of structure or analysis at all. Like any other work of fictional literature—and unlike any other work of Theophrastus—the *Characters* are presented as pure entertainment." Lane Fox (1996: 141) suggests that "[w]ritten for like-minded readers, the sketches were meant to amuse, not teach." Diggle (2004: 15) believes, following G. Pasquali, that the sketches served Theophrastos as "a few moments' light entertainment amid more serious matter".

Although I completely agree with those who maintain that the sketches are funny, these suggestions neglect the important role that is given to depicting anti-social behaviour and social unintelligence in the text. The sketches are funny, but that is not all they are. They contain well-weighed descriptions of general patterns of behaviour of types that have abandoned certain basic communal values important for the functioning of the society. This may be a work of fictional literature, but it is also a work by a scientist who has collected information largely based on popular morality as revealed in his contemporary society.

2.3. Selecting, grouping and classifying characters

One of the questions that anyone dealing with the *Characters* of Theophrastos is faced with, at one point or another, is the basis of the selection of the types into the collection. The second question concerns the principle of their arrangement. The first question is, in my opinion, much more interesting and important.

The manuscript tradition of the *Characters* has thirty character sketches. There are scholars who have suggested, some more convincingly than others, that the work once contained more, perhaps many more, sketches, which have been lost for one reason or another (see above, ch. 2.1.6). Even so, we are still dealing with a selection of types. My suggestion would be that, in general, Theophrastos deliberately chose character types that were better known to his audience and seemed to be more important, and perhaps more conspicuous, in his contemporary society or in his opinion.

Of course there may be objections to this suggestion. Thus, μικροφιλότιμος (and the abstract μικροφιλοτιμία) in *Char*. 21 is found only in Theophrastos, and five out of thirty abstract nouns denoting the behaviour of a character are found for the first time in Theophrastos (*Char*. 8, 16, 17, 27, 29). If, however, we accept Diggle's position that not only the definitions, but also the abstract titles are later additions, this problem is solved; we would only have μικροφιλότιμος as a Theophrastean hapax or neologism. It should be noted, however, that there would be nothing new in Theophrastos' coining neologisms or using rare words. He is, after all, also the author of books on style, poetics etc.[205]

Regardless of the authenticity of the definitions and abstract titles, we are still dealing with a selection. Although many of the adjectives that Theophrastos uses in his sketches indeed denote well-known social types, there are probably other character types that were as important but have been left out for some reason. With no implications for the purpose of Theophrastos' work we might still draw a comparison with Aristotle.

In ch. 1.3.1, I have outlined Aristotle's systematization of virtues and vices in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. As was seen, Theophrastos' collection

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[205] Cf. again the list of his works in D.L. 5.42–50 = part of fr. 1 FHS&G.

includes nine out of twenty six vices presented by Aristotle, whereby six of them are defined as deficiency (ἔλλειψις) and three as excess (ὑπερβολή). The Theophrastean hapax μικροφιλότιμος is a special restriction of the Aristotelian φιλότιμος. The latter can denote both the rightly ambitious and the excessively ambitious; μικροφιλότιμος is a sub-type of the excessively ambitious (see also ch. 2.1.8.21 above).

Thus, on the one hand there are vices that could well have been included in Theophrastos' collection, and on the other, Theophrastos depicts some types that are not found in his teacher's systematized account. Indeed some of them are not found in Aristotle at all—in addition to the Theophrastean hapax μικροφιλότιμος also, e.g., *Char*. 6 ἀπονενοημένος (ἀπόνοια is found in one fragment), and others.

As for grouping character types, some attempts have been made with the *Characters* of Theophrastos. The question has been an intriguing one for earlier scholars, as the thirty chapters, each of which describes one character type, are in no recognizable order.

Some editors have tried to find connections between the sketches that would allow us to group them more logically, regardless of the question whether the author had any such intention. The edition by J. G. Sheppard, published in 1852, divides the chapters into eight groups, each based on one principle. Thus, *Char*. 21, 23, 24 and 27 would belong together, as one may find "egotism" deep in them all. In connection with Theophrastos' work, this classification has been considered too scientific (Jebb & Sandys 1909: 20).

R. C. Jebb and J. E. Sandys also change the order of the chapters with the reason that the text, as it stands according to the manuscripts, is too uncomfortable for the modern reader, because differences between some chapters are so tiny that it would be difficult to see them if they are not presented closely together (Jebb & Sandys 1909: 19–21). They are not after an overall generalization; the types are divided into small groups according to three characteristics:
1) Types closely connected with each other (e.g. *Char*. 10, 22, 30);
2) Types that are opposed to each other (e.g. *Char*. 26 and 29, 1 and 23);
3) General order, as much as this can be specified.

The two editors believe that essentially there are only two places where there is an interruption in the general order of the chapters. Thus,

they propose the following arrangement (I use the traditional numeration and underline chapters after which the interruptions would be): 2, 5, 15, 24, 1, 23, 21, 27, 12, 13, 20, 19, 14, 4, 9, 6, 11, 3, 7, 8, 28, 17, 18, 10, 22, 30, 25, 16, 26, 29.

I can see no point in regrouping the chapters in Theophrastos' work according to some similar or dissimilar characteristics, just for the pleasure of the reader, and modern editors have indeed given up such attempts. On the whole, however, such grouping would be interesting. It is well known that we can point out some groups in the *Characters* that share, in the broad sense, a common trait or characteristic. Thus, there are types that are explicitly connected with verbal exuberance (*Char*. 3, 7, 8, 28), or different kinds of love for money or greed (*Char*. 10, 22, 30, cf. also 9 and 18). An attempt of describing such related characters is found in Altamura 1990 (beware the utterly incorrect Greek in this paper), who deals with "los lisonjeadores" (*Char*. 2, 5, 13), "los charlatanes" (*Char*. 3, 7, 8) and "los avaros" (*Char*. 9, 10, 22, 30).[206]

There are also other possibilities of grouping, based on formal or structural principles. Peter Steinmetz (1962: 18–19) divided the descriptions into five larger groups, based on situational evaluation:

1) Chapters, where an integral action is depicted in only one or a few situations (e.g. *Char*. 3, 8, 25, 26);
2) Chapters, where a group of situations is connected by one action (e.g. *Char*. 2, 7, 11, 23);
3) Chapters, where the scenes are grouped by narrower and broader meaning of the word (e.g. *Char*. 5, 19, 22, 27);
4) Chapters that are presented at a culminating scale, where the final scenes have become utterly ridiculous (e.g. *Char*. 1, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21);
5) Chapters, where any of the principles described above if absent; the descriptions consist of a bunch of situations that do not seem to belong together in any way (e.g. *Char*. 12, 16).

Steinmetz admits that in some chapters, more than one of these principles has been followed (e.g. *Char*. 5).

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[206] For these types, see also Lombardi 1999b. On greed in classical Athens see especially Balot 2001. Cf. also below, ch. 4.3.

Konrad Gaiser has suggested (1964: 25, n. 3) that the chapters are somehow connected with each other in pairs (*Char*. 1+2, 3+4 etc.), whereby the basis of formation is either remarkable similarity or difference. This arrangement is called "assoziativ-dihairetische Anordnung", and is said to be lost only in the final part of the work (starting from *Char*. 25). This interpretation seems to be a little arbitrary, depending to a great part on the subjective intention of the interpreter.

What these attempts show is that there actually is no general principle of systematization that could be applied to the *Characters* as a whole. There are small groups of types that share some common trait, but this does not seem to be essential to the work. Nor does this lack of systematized presentation seem to be a problem for the author. There is no reason to reproach Theophrastos for not having presented a more systematic account of character sketches (e.g. Jebb & Sandys [1909: 9]: "it is scarcely conceivable that it [sc. this arrangement] can represent the author's final design"), as this probably was not his aim at all.

Might this lack of systematization tell us anything about the purpose of the work? One suggestion has been that the *Characters* are a collection of extracts from one or more works of Theophrastos.[207] The coherence and stylistic unity of the collection prove, however, that its parts are not derived from unconnected works.[208]

2.4. Levels of social communication in the *Characters*

Notably, the types depicted in the *Characters* of Theophrastos all represent deviations from socially acceptable and commendable behaviour. This remains a fact, even if opinions about the general purpose of the work (e.g. ethics, rhetoric, poetics, entertainment, etc.) are still discrepant. This chapter focuses on these deviations and the specific ways in which Theophrastos draws his details, i.e. what makes the types socially unacceptable. This is all the more interesting as Theophrastos himself

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[207] See Sonntag 1787, Schneider 1799: XXV, Sauppe 1853: 8–9, Petersen 1859: 56–118, Schreiner 1879 (with Diggle 2004: 13).

[208] Diggle 2004: 13. The same line of argument is shared by, e.g., Gomperz 1889a: 1–9 and Jebb & Sandys 1909: 9–16.

analyzes nothing, draws no moral, and—at least as a rule—seeks no motive. He presents pictures of some basic social roles of active participants in the life of the *polis*. The pictures are, however, twisted, as most of the cast display a deformed kind of ἀρετή, in the case of which even positive characteristics are seen as excessive and inappropriate. Many of the actions depicted are not negative *per se*, and some of them would be entirely positive if performed in a proper situation, at a proper time, in a proper place or towards the right person.

The descriptions of character types in Theophrastos' work mostly follow a similar pattern, with some variations. Although they contain many timeless elements that can be found in various cultures,[209] the descriptions are, as a whole, located in a specific time and place— Athens of the fourth century BCE. Lane Fox (1996: 129) has noted that eight sketches mention detailed institutions or settings which we know to be distinctively Athenian, but many other sketches also refer to contexts which are well attested in Athenian life, and no sketch mentions anything which has to be referred to a city other than Athens. Thus, the customs, practices and prejudices of that time and place form a background of the behaviour of the types. In addition, this is all set on a male background and every one of the depicted character types is male, although female caricature had a comic ancestry.[210] Furthermore, all characters can be considered to be grown-up and free Athenian citizens.[211]

The characters are depicted in a limited variety of situations and locations that are all important parts of the social network of the city. They convey several levels of social communication related to these situations or locations, and can, therefore, be analyzed at various levels of social engagement. The reactions of various types differ in similar situations and locations, and this can be an important aspect in assessing the exact nature of a type.

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[209] Some of them remarkably rare in other Greek texts, such as the loquacious man's trouble with children at bedtime (*Char*. 7.10), which, according to Lane Fox (1996: 128) is "life's eternal battle" discussed nowhere else in Greek literature.

[210] Lane Fox 1996: 130. Superstition, e.g., was typically associated with women in ancient literature, cf. Strabon 297c; Plu. *Mor*. 140b; Plaut. *Miles* 690 ff.

[211] See Lane Fox 1996: 129 f. Bodei Giglioni (1980: 77 f.) doubts this in three cases (*Char*. 2, 6 and 23), but there seems to be no reason for this (cf. Leppin 2002: 39).

Very generally, these levels of social communication can be divided into following categories, which are not always mutually exclusive:

1) *Polis* and public sphere (behaviour at the court, in the assembly, participating in delegations, being a trierarch, etc.);
2) Religious sphere (behaviour towards deities, participating in religious festivals and rites, religious behaviour in specific situations, etc.);
3) Economic sphere (business relations, buying and selling, etc.);
4) Cultural and educational sphere (theatre, sports, gymnasia, etc.);
5) Social sphere (friends, symposia, baths, visits, invitations, lending and borrowing, etc.);
6) *Oikos* and family sphere (relations with household members, women, children, slaves, behaviour at home).

The specific locations include home, market (including various subdivisions, such as women's market), baths, theatre, gymnasia, assembly, court, porticos, street, etc. In some cases a specific location cannot be determined with certainty.

My main interest in this chapter is to trace some general patterns of what makes the behaviour of the types socially unacceptable. I suggest that the main reason is that they abandon certain basic communal values that are important for the functioning of the society. In using this approach, I am well aware that there are other ways of looking at Theophrastos' collection, e.g. what makes the types so funny. Or, indeed why something that is socially unacceptable should be funny at all.

2.4.1. *Polis* and public sphere

Situations related to public sphere and the basic functioning of the *polis* are very important in the *Characters*. These include explicit engagement in politics, especially through participating in the assembly (ἐκκλησία). Thus, the oligarchic man will step forward when the people are considering whom to appoint to help the archon with the procession, suggests that those appointed should have plenary powers, and says, when others propose ten, "One is enough; but he must be a real man." (*Char*. 26.2). He also likes to recite a verse of Homer in favour of

monarchy (*ibid.*),[212] and suggests getting rid of the mob and the market-place, stopping courting office etc. (*Char*. 26.3). He also tells others how ashamed he is in the assembly when some scrawny type (λεπτός) who has not used oil (αὐχμῶν; cf. Diggle 2004: 473) sits beside him (*Char*. 26.4).

The aim of the author is not to show how the assembly works and how decisions are made. As always, he chooses the assembly as a place where the anti-social behaviour of various types can be displayed. The boor goes to the assembly after drinking a bowl of gruel (κυκεών), claiming that no perfume smells as sweet as thyme (*Char*. 4.2), and distrusts friends and family, but reports the proceedings of the assembly to the hired labourers working on his farm (*Char*. 4.3). The illiberal man gets up and slips quietly out, when emergency donations are being promised in the assembly (*Char*. 22.3). The friend of villains supports a villain when he is speaking in the assembly or when he is on trial in court (*Char*. 29.5).

There are also references to political vocabulary, such as the slanderer claiming that slandering is only another word for free speech and democracy and liberty (κακῶς λέγειν ἀποκαλῶν παρρησίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἐλευθερίαν; *Char*. 28.6).

Court is an even more important location for expressing the behaviour of the types. Some of the situations play at the court; in other cases we see communication after the court or about the court. The obsequious man, when called in to an arbitration, wants to gratify not only the man whose side he is on but also his opponent, so that he may be thought impartial (*Char*. 5.3). The ἀπονενοημένος is described as being capable of playing the plaintiff as well as the defendant, and at other times taking an oath to be excused attendance, or arriving with a boxful of evidence in the fold of his cloak and strings of little documents (perhaps memoranda) in his hands (*Char*. 6.8). The loquacious man prevents others from reaching a verdict while on a jury, naturally due to his constant talking (*Char*. 7.8). The tactless man arrives to give evidence after a case has already been decided (*Char*. 12.5), and while assisting at

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[212] Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω (*Il*. 2.204; cf. Arist. *Pol*. 1292a13). An important aspect that is noted in the text is that the man is completely ignorant of the rest of Homer, which refers to lack of proper education, or rather recklessness towards it.

an arbitration, puts the parties at loggerheads, though they are eager for a reconciliation (*Char*. 12.13). The overzealous man presses his case too much, so that even if it was agreed in the first place that his case is a fair one, he loses it (*Char*. 13.3). The obtuse man forgets that he has a lawsuit to defend and goes to the country (*Char*. 14.3). The ungrateful grumbler, winning a unanimous verdict in court, still finds fault with his speech-writer for leaving out many of the arguments in his favour (*Char*. 17.8). The friend of villains associates with people who have been defeated in the law courts and have lost public cases, supposing that he will learn the tricks of the trade from them (*Char*. 29.2). He is also apt to come to the defence of riff-raff and sit with them on the jury to see that villainy is done, and his judgement is "warped by a propensity to put the worst possible construction on the arguments advanced by the opposing parties" (*Char*. 29.6).

The cases of mentioning communication after a trial include the dissembler commiserating with people whom he has attacked behind their back, when they have lost a lawsuit (*Char*. 1.2), and the repulsive man offering his congratulations to a man who is leaving court after losing an important case (*Char*. 11.7). The oligarchic man accuses courts of corruption (*Char*. 26.5). And the late learner, having fallen for a *hetaira* and rammed her door, gets beaten up by her other lover and then takes him to court (*Char*. 27.9), a behaviour that would be pardoned in the young, but not the old.[213]

Participating in delegations and embassies is another component of the public sphere. The shabby profiteer, when he goes abroad on public service, leaves his official travel allowance at home and borrows from the other delegates, and asks his share of the presents and then sells them (*Char*. 30.7).

The duty of the trierarchy consisted in maintaining the efficiency of a trireme for one year (cf. Dem. 21.156). It was the most important public duty that a citizen or a group of citizens could fulfil, and the trierarch bore the heaviest expense of all liturgists (see Jebb & Sandys 1909: 126–7; Diggle 2004: 424; Gabrielsen 1994). When the illiberal man serves as a trierarch, he spreads the helmsman's mattress on the deck for himself

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[213] See Diggle 2004: 22, 482–3; Dover 1974: 103 and cf. Lys. 3 for a similar court case over a male prostitute.

and stows his own away (*Char*. 22.5). The boastful man boasts with sums that he has given out, noting that he has not included the trierarchies and other public services (*Char*. 23.6).[214] Note also that the oligarchic man demands the abolishment of compulsory public services and trierarchies (*Char*. 26.5); and indeed they were abolished by Demetrios of Phaleron between 317 and 307 BCE and never reinstated.[215]

2.4.2. Religious sphere

In the religious sphere the most important sketch is surely that of the superstitious man (*Char*. 16), which is entirely devoted to wrong re-ligious behaviour. Most of the actions and attitudes of this man would probably not have seemed abnormal to the ordinary Athenian; what sets him apart is the obsessiveness and compulsiveness of his behaviour (Diggle 2004: 350). Thus, the type is perhaps more accurately translated as blindly superstitious.

Apart from this sketch, we see abnormal religious behaviour in the case of several types. The shameless man salts the meat and stores it away after having held a sacrifice to the gods, and dines out at another's (*Char*. 9.3). It was customary to invite friends and relations to a feast that followed the sacrifice, or send them presents of food (cf. *Char*. 15.5). It may seem that the man is stingy, but the emphasis is on his dining out, which in this case is shameless.[216] The penny-pincher makes the smallest offering to Artemis of any of the diners at a communal dinner (*Char*. 10.3). The tactless man arrives with a request for payment of interest when people are engaged in a sacrifice and incurring heavy expense (*Char*. 12.11).[217] The self-centred man is described as apt to withhold credit from the gods, i.e. not to offer thanks to them (*Char*. 15.11). The

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[214] Boasting of liturgies was a common tactic of the orators, and sometimes they also characterize it as ἀλαζονεία, see Dem. 21.169, 36.41, Aischin. 3.101 with Diggle 2004: 440–1.

[215] See Diggle 2004: 33, 441; for Demetrios of Phaleron, see Fortenbaugh & Schütrumpf 2000.

[216] Cf. Xenophon *HG* 3.1.24 and see Diggle 2004: 293.

[217] The last part of the sentence follows Diggle's interpretation (2004: 325); according to others (e.g. Rusten 1993: 99), ἀναλίσκοντας here means 'consuming' a sacrifice.

offensive man scratches himself while sacrificing (*Char*. 19.5); further, he blasphemes when his mother has gone out to the augur's, and during a prayer and the pouring of a libation he drops his cup and laughs as if he had done something clever (*Char*. 19.7–8; this might be from a different sketch, cf. ch. 2.1.6 above). When the man of petty ambition has sacrificed an ox, he nails up the skull opposite the entrance to his house and fastens long ribbons around it so that his visitors can see that he has sacrificed an ox (*Char*. 21.7); and, he dedicates a bronze finger in the sanctuary of Asklepios and polishes, garlands, and oils it every day (*Char*. 21.10). He also arranges that he should be the one to make the public report on the conduct of religious business, and will step forward wearing a smart white cloak, with a crown on his head, and say "Men of Athens, my colleagues and I celebrated the Milk-Feast with sacrifices to the Mother of the Gods. The sacrifices were propitious. We beg you to accept your blessings." And after doing this, he goes home and tells his wife that he had an extremely successful day (*Char*. 21.11). At his daughter's wedding, the illiberal man sells the meat from the sacrifice (all but the priests' share) and tells the hired waiters to bring their own food (*Char*. 22.4). When the late learner is invited to a shrine of Herakles, he will throw off his cloak and try lifting the bull to get it in a neck-lock (*Char*. 27.5), and at his initiation into the cult of Sabazios he is anxious that the priest should judge him the handsomest of the initiands (*Char*. 27.8).

Taking oaths can also be considered part of religious behaviour. The ἀπονενοημένος is said to take an oath too readily (*Char*. 6.2). When the overzealous man is about to swear an oath, he says to the bystanders that he has sworn oaths many times before (*Char*. 13.11).

2.4.3. Economic sphere

At least some of the types depicted in the *Characters* belong to the upper reaches of the Athenian social pyramid, although we cannot assume that all of them do (Lane Fox 1996: 130; cf. also Bodei Giglioni 1980: 79–83). Three of the sketches refer to liturgies (*Char*. 22.5, 23.5, 26.6); the man of petty ambition is a *hippeus* (*Char*. 21.8); symposia are implied in several

examples and figures for prices and spending are high (*Char*. 23.8, 30.13, 21.5).

Some of the characters are bound to over-aim by their nature, such as the boastful man (*Char*. 23), who mentions grandiose offers and purchases, but actually lives in a rented house, which was not customary for a rich citizen in Attika.[218] When he speaks of spending two talents on clothing (*Char*. 23.8), the sum is a sign of his character, not of regular wardrobe-expenses among the rich (Lane Fox 1996: 130).

The economic sphere in the *Characters* is mainly connected with shopping, buying and selling. Lending and borrowing are important, as well, but these tend to have more to do with friends and the principles of φιλία (cf. ch. 2.4.5). Some kind of financial transaction is alluded to in almost every sketch. Thus, the dissembler is depicted abusing people who apply for a loan or a contribution, or who want to buy something (*Char*. 1.5; the passage is corrupt, cf. below, ch. 4.1.4). The flatterer buys apples and pears for the children of his admired man (*Char*. 2.6), joins the man himself in shopping for footwear (*Char*. 2.7), and is capable of doing errands in the women's market (*Char*. 2.9).[219] The boor says he is going to pick up some kippers from Archias' shop (*Char*. 4.13). The ἀπονενοημένος manages a mass of market-traders and lends them money, charging a daily interest of one and a half obols to the drachma, and does the rounds of the butchers, the fishmongers and the kipper-sellers, popping the interest from their taking straight to his mouth (*Char*. 6.9). The shameless man reminds the butcher of any favours he has done him, then stands by the scales and throws in some meat, if he can, otherwise a bone for the soup; if he is not allowed to have it, he snatches up some guts from the counter and makes off with these, laughing (*Char*. 9.4). The penny-pincher, when asked to settle his account, claims that every item, however little was paid for it, was too expensive (*Char*. 10.4); in addition, if he has something for sale, he puts such a high price on it that the buyer loses by the transaction (*Char*. 10.7), and when he goes shopping for food he returns home without

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[218] Cf. Osborne 1988: 311–15 and Lane Fox 1996: 130.

[219] This section is athetized by Diggle, but I see no reason to do that only with the reason that "it is intolerable not to be told how his breathless activities in the women's market serve the man he is flattering" (Diggle 2004: 193).

buying anything (*Char*. 10.12). The repulsive man buys a meal for himself and hires music-girls, then shows his shoppings to people he meets and invites them to join in (*Char*. 11.8). The tactless man is liable to bring along a higher bidder when one has already completed a sale (*Char*. 12.8). When the self-centred man has something for sale, he will not tell customers how much he would sell it for but asks what it will fetch (*Char*. 15.4). The distrustful man dispatches his slave to do the shopping and then sends another one to find out how much he paid (*Char*. 18.2). When the illiberal man has been shopping in the market, he carries the vegetables (and possibly meat) himself in the fold of his cloak (*Char*. 22.7), i.e. sparing on the delivery boys. The boastful man goes up to the high-priced horse market and pretends to the sellers that he wants to buy; and going to the clothing-vendors he picks out a wardrobe amounting to two talents and then quarrels with his slave for coming along without bringing any gold coins (*Char*. 23.7–8). Finally, the shabby profiteer sells watered-down wine to his friend (*Char*. 30.5).[220]

2.4.4. Cultural and educational sphere

Theatre is perhaps the most common locale in this connection. Again, it is not about the way theatre functions in the Greek society, but about the way people behave at the theatre. For the flatterer, theatre is just another place for toadying, as he takes the cushions from the slave and spreads them on the seat of his patron with his own hands (*Char*. 2.11). Notice the difference from the obsequious man, who does not play the toady to one specific man; rather, he sits near the generals when at the theatre (*Char*. 5.7).[221] The loquacious man prevents others from watching the play by his constant talking (*Char*. 7.8). When the guests from abroad of the shameless man have bought theatre seats, he joins them at the performance, but does not pay his part of the cost, and next day he even

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[220] Cf. also *Char*. 30.12, which seems to deal with buying from a friend, but the text is again corrupt here.

[221] Here and in the following it should be reminded that sections 6–10 of *Char*. 5 are by some editors considered to belong to a different sketch, which describes some kind of a show-off spendthrift. Cf. ch. 2.1.6.

brings his sons and the slave who looks after them (*Char*. 9.5). The repulsive man applauds at the theatre when no one else is applauding, and hisses actors whose performance the audience is enjoying, and when silence has fallen he raises his head and burps to make spectators turn around (*Char*. 11.3). The obtuse man is found asleep in his seat at the theatre when the audience has left (*Char*. 14.4). When the illiberal man wins the prize for the best tragic chorus (i.e. not as poet or actor but as choragus), he dedicates a strip of wood to Dionysos, inscribing his own name on it in ink (*Char*. 22.2).[222] Finally, the shabby profiteer goes to the theatre only when there is free admission, and then he takes his sons with him, as well (*Char*. 30.6).

Sports and exercises are mentioned, as well. The obsequious man dallies in the gymnasia in which the ephebes are exercising (*Char*. 5.7). The loquacious man enters schools and palaestras and stops the children's lessons by constantly talking to the trainers and teachers (*Char*. 7.5). The late learner goes to wrestling-schools and challenges others to a match (*Char*. 27.6), and practises fancy horsemanship while riding on a borrowed horse in the country, falls off and hurts his head (*Char*. 27.10). He also competes with his children's tutor at archery and javelin-throwing and tells them to take a lesson from him (*Char*. 27.13), and when he wrestles at the baths, he often twists his hips so that he will look well-trained (*Char*. 27.14).

2.4.5. Social sphere

Behaviour with one's friends and companions and following the basic principles of φιλία are arguably the most important constituents of the *Characters*.

Problems with lending, borrowing and contributing to collections (ἔρανος)[223] are naturally connected with those who are mean or stingy. When word has reached the illiberal man that a friend is raising a subscription, he cuts down a side-street on seeing him approach and takes a roundabout way home (*Char*. 22.9). The penny-pincher asks for

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[222] A dedication more dignified than a strip of wood is called for; see Diggle 2004: 420–2.
[223] See Millett 1991: 153–9.

repayment of half an obol before the month is out (*Char*. 10.2, probably as payment of interest); he is also liable to pursue overdue debtors and charge compound interest (*Char*. 10.10), and forbids his wife to lend salt, a lamp-wick, cumin, marjoram, barley meal, fillets or sacrificial grain, claiming that "little items like these add up to a tidy sum in the course of a year" (*Char*. 10.13). The shabby profiteer borrows money from a visitor who is staying with him, probably hoping that the guest leaves the town before the loan is repaid (*Char*. 30.3); and when he repays a debt of thirty *minai* he pays it back four drachmas (i.e. one coin) short (*Char*. 30.13), a sum that nobody will notice.

But Theophrastos also depicts other types in these situations. Thus, the shameless man goes back to a creditor whose money he is withholding and asks for a loan (*Char*. 9.2), or goes to a neighbour's house and borrows barley or straw, and makes the lender deliver it to his doorstep (*Char*. 9.7). The obtuse man is apt to get witnesses to support him when he is taking repayment of money that is owed him (*Char*. 14.8). The self-centred man first refuses a friend, when he asks for a contribution to a loan, but then comes along with it, adding that this is more money wasted (*Char*. 15.7). When the distrustful man asks his debtors for interest payments he has his witnesses present, so that they cannot deny the debt (*Char*. 18.5); and when someone comes asking for the loan of cups, he would rather say no altogether, but if he has to oblige a member of the family or a close relative he will lend them only after he has all but checked the quality and weight of the metal and practically got someone to guarantee the cost of replacement (*Char*. 18.7). When the man of petty ambition pays back a *mina* of silver, he pays it in brand-new coin (*Char*. 21.5). The boastful man boasts of the sums he has contributed towards loans for friends (*Char*. 23.6). Compare also *Char*. 1.5 with ch. 4.1.4 below.

Behaviour with friends and acquaintances is reflected at several levels. One of these is direct communication or, in some cases, lack of it. When the dissembler has heard something, he says he has not; and, if he has made an agreement, he says he does not remember it (*Char*. 1.5). Although the situation here is not specified, we can imagine a conversation with friends or at least acquaintances. When the rumour-monger encounters a friend, he asks him several questions, such as where he comes from, but never gives him a chance to respond and

starts to spread some gossip (*Char*. 8.2–3). The repulsive man calls out the name of a passer-by who is a complete stranger to him (*Char*. 11.5). The tactless man goes up to someone who is busy and asks his advice (*Char*. 12.2), and invites a man who has just returned from a long journey to go for a walk (*Char*. 12.7). When the obtuse man is notified of the death of a friend and invited to the funeral, his face darkens and he bursts into tears and says "And the best of luck to him!" (ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ; *Char*. 14.7). The ungrateful grumbler says to someone bringing him a piece of food sent by a friend "He did me out of the soup and wine by not inviting me to dinner" (*Char*. 17.2). When his friends have got together a loan and one of them says "Cheer up", he answers "How do you mean? When I have to refund every one of you and on top of that be grateful for the favour?" (*Char*. 17.9). The disagreeable man comes in and wakes up a man who has just gone to sleep, to have a chat (*Char*. 20.2). When speaking about his home, he says that he has cold water in a cistern and a garden with plenty of succulent vegetables and a cook who prepares a good dish, and that his house is an inn (it is always full), and his friends are a leaking jar (however many good turns he does them he cannot fill them up). He shows off the qualities of his parasite, and says that there is something available to amuse the company, and, if the guests give the order, the slave will go and fetch her right away from the brothel-keeper, "so that she can play for us and give us all a good time" (*Char*. 20.9–10). The coward uses a wounded friend to cover up his cowardice in the battle (*Char*. 25.5–8). Sitting in a group, the slanderer is apt to talk about whoever has just got up (probably to leave), and once he has started he will not stop before he has abused his household, too; he will speak particularly ill of his own friends and household, and the dead (*Char*. 28.5–6). The friend of villains claims that a villain is "smart and loyal and shrewd" (εὐφυᾶ καὶ φιλέταιρον καὶ ἐπιδέξιον; *Char*. 29.4). The shabby profiteer is the kind who does not provide enough bread when he gives a feast (*Char*. 30.2); when he is serving out helpings he says that it is right and proper that the server should be given a double helping and so he proceeds to give himself one (*Char*. 30.4). When he is oiling himself in the baths he says to his slave that the oil he bought is rancid, and uses someone else's (*Char*. 30.8). He takes a cloak to the cleaner's and borrows one from an acquaintance, and puts off returning it for several days until it is demanded back (*Char*. 30.10).

When he entertains members of his phratry, he asks for food for his slaves from the communal meal, and he has an inventory made of the radish-halves left over from the table, to prevent the slaves waiting at the table from taking them (*Char*. 30.16). When he is abroad with acquaintances, he uses their slaves and hires out his own without sharing the proceeds (*Char*. 30.17), etc.

The self-centred man (*Char*. 15), and especially the arrogant man (*Char*. 24), are naturally the most unfriendly of the types. Anti-social behaviour towards friends can be seen in almost every scene of these sketches. For example, when asked "Where is so-and-so?", the self-centred man replies "Don't bother me" (*Char*. 15.2). He does not return a greeting (*Char*. 15.3), he will not wait long for anyone (*Char*. 15.9), etc. (cf. also ch. 3.1.2). The arrogant man tells someone who is in a hurry that he will meet him after dinner while he is taking his stroll (*Char*. 24.2). He says that he never forgets a good turn that he has done (*Char*. 24.2), but at the same time he will never be the one to make the first approach (*Char*. 24.6). As he walks in the street he does not speak to passers-by but keeps his head down and looks up only when it suits him (*Char*. 24.8). When he gives a dinner for his friends, he does not dine with them but tells one of his employees to look after them (*Char*. 24.9), and he refuses visitors while he is putting on oil, bathing or eating (*Char*. 24.11). The expressions he uses are also arrogant: "I want this done" and "I have sent to you to pick up..." and "No alternative" and "Immediately" (*Char*. 24.13).

The flatterer and the obsequious man are good examples of different behaviour in similar situations. The flatterer is, of course, always playing the toady to his "master", but this also means that he vilifies or at least offends other people—he tells the company to be quiet when He is speaking, and tells any one who comes their way to stop until He has gone past (*Char*. 2.4–5). The obsequious man, on the other hand, greets anyone from a distance, expresses his admiration, embraces him with both arms and will not let him go, coming a little way with him and asking when he will see him again (*Char*. 5.2). The flatterer buys fruits, presents them to his master's children while their father is watching and gives them a kiss and calls them "Chicks of a noble sir" (χρηστοῦ πατρὸς νεόττια, *Char*. 2.6). He makes sure that the father of the children sees his generosity. The obsequious man, when he is invited to dinner,

asks his host to call in his children and declares that they are as like their father as two figs; then he draws them to him and kisses them, sits down beside them and plays with them (*Char*. 5.5), seeming eager to please both them and their father.

2.4.6. *Oikos* and family sphere

Relations with family (especially wife and children) and household members (including slaves) form a more intimate sphere of behaviour, which is nevertheless connected to all the other spheres by certain communal norms and values, which the types transgress. These should be observed both in the *polis* and in the *oikos*, which Aristotle saw as a basic social unit of the *polis*.[224]

The boor is described in various situations on his farm. He is said to distrust his friends and family, preferring to discuss important business with his slaves (*Char*. 4.3), and makes secret advances to the girl who does the baking (*Char*. 4.7). The ἀπονενοημένος lets his mother starve, gets arrested for theft, and spends more time in prison than at home (*Char*. 6.6). The loquacious man puts up with being mocked even by his own children when he wants to go to bed; they stop him by saying "Talk to us, so we can get to sleep" (*Char*. 7.10). Whenever a slave of the penny-pincher breaks a pot or a dish, the man deducts the cost from his rations; and, when his wife drops a three-penny piece, he shifts the kitchenware and the couches and the chests and rummages through the rubbish[225] (*Char*. 10.5–6). The tactless man serenades his girlfriend when she is feverish (*Char*. 12.3), stands watching while a slave is being whipped, and announces that a boy of his own once hanged himself after such a beating (*Char*. 12.12). The overzealous man goes and tells his father that his mother is already asleep in their bedroom (*Char*. 13.8).[226]

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[224] *Pol*. 1253b1–14; cf. *Pol*. 1260b8–27, *EE* 1242a40–b2. For the relation of *polis* and *oikos* in classical Athens see Roy 1999, suggesting that the Athenian *polis* did not generally interfere with the internal workings of the family.

[225] For reading καλλύσματα ('sweepings') instead of the otherwise unattested καλύματα ('floorboards'?), see Diggle 2004: 306–7.

[226] Diggle (2004: 329) interprets this as simply telling the father that it is bedtime. Most editors assume a slightly indecent interpretation originating from Casaubon ("... ut

The obtuse man is annoyed with his slave for not buying cucumbers during the winter (*Char*. 14.9); he tires out his children by forcing them to wrestle and run races with him (*Char*. 14.10); and when he is boiling lentil soup in the country, he puts salt into the pan twice and makes it inedible (*Char*. 14.11). When the ungrateful grumbler receives a message that a son has been born to him, he says "If you add 'And half of your property is gone,' you will be telling the truth" (*Char*. 17.7). The distrustful man asks his wife while lying in bed whether she has closed the chest and sealed the sideboard and whether the front door has been bolted, and if she says yes, he throws off the bedclothes anyway and gets up with nothing on and lights the lamp and runs around in his bare feet to inspect everything in person, and so hardly gets any sleep (*Char*. 18.4). He also tells the slave accompanying him to walk in front and not behind, so that he can watch that he does not run off on the way (*Char*. 18.8). The offensive man does not wash before going to bed with his wife (*Char*. 19.5). The disagreeable man takes his baby from the nurse and feeds it food which he has chewed himself, and mouths 'pop-o-pop-o-pop' to it and calls it 'Pop's bun in the oven' (*Char*. 20.5).[227] He is also prone to ask in front of his household "Mummy, tell me, when you were in labour and bringing me into the world, what day was it?" (*Char*. 20.7).[228] The man of petty ambition takes his son to Delphi to have his hair cut (*Char*. 21.3). The illiberal man will not send his children to school when there is a festival of the Muses, but will claim that they are ill, so that they do not have to contribute anything (*Char*. 22.6). Even though his wife brought him a dowry, he will not buy her a maid, but instead hires a girl from the women's market to keep her company on

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patrem admoneat tempus esse ut cubitum eat, ne sit matri iam cubanti imo dormire incipienti longior exspectatio molesta", cited as the only explanation in Steinmetz 1962: 160), therefore leaving it without a comment (e.g. LA 1897, Rusten 1993, Ussher 1993), or leaving out the passage altogether (Jebb & Sandys 1909).

[227] So Diggle (ποπανουργίαν, a word that is otherwise unattested); the MS reading (πανουργιῶν) is probably corrupt. Earlier editors have adopted, e.g., πανούργιον (Foss, Jebb & Sandys, Torraca), παίγνιον (Herwerden, Navarre), πανουργημάτιον (Edmonds, Steinmetz), πανουργότερον (Schneider, Rusten), etc. Cf. Steinmetz 1962: 236–7; Ussher 1993: 174; Diggle 2004: 397.

[228] There is no reason to obelize ἡμέρα because "[a] question about the date of his birth is unlikely in itself and has no obvious connection with what follows" (Diggle 2004: 399). See Steinmetz 1962: 237–8.

her outings (*Char*. 22.10). The boastful man lives in a rented house, but will tell someone who does not know that it belonged to his father and that he proposes to sell it because it is too small for the scale of his hospitality (*Char*. 23.9). The late learner learns military commands from his son (*Char*. 27.3). The slanderer reviles other persons and their families (*Char*. 28.3–4), even his friends and relatives (*Char*. 28.6). Finally, when the sons of the shabby profiteer do not attend school for the full month because of illness, he deducts a proportion of the fees, and, to avoid the expense, he does not send them for lessons during Anthesterion, because there are so many shows during that month (*Char*. 30.14).

2.4.7. Occupations and professions

Theophrastos does not specify the occupations of the depicted character types, perhaps with the exception of the boor (*Char*. 4), although even in this case all we can say is that the man probably lives in the countryside. At the same time, he alludes to quite a range of occupations. We hear from cooks, doctors, gymnasiarchs, trainers and teachers, pimps, seamen, augurs, fullers, bath attendants etc.

Unlike several modern imitators of the *Characters*, Theophrastos focuses on 'bad form', not 'bad blood', thus there is no classification by trades in his work (Lane Fox 1996: 131). There are, however, occupations that are explicitly declared unsuitable for a freeborn man. These include keeping an inn or a brothel, being a tax collector, working as an auctioneer or hired cook (*Char*. 6.5).

Some of the occupations mentioned in the text are connected with popular meeting places. They form a background for depicting various types in a similar situation, which would be well known for the reader. The barbers' shops, for example, were traditional venues for loungers and gossips;[229] therefore, they are also popular with the Theophrastean

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[229] As noted by Theophrastos himself (fr. 577a FHS&G = Plu. *Quaest. conv.* 679a: Θεόφραστος ἄοινα συμπόσια παίζων ἐκάλει τὰ κουρεῖα διὰ τὴν λαλιὰν τῶν προσκαθιζόντων; fr. 577b FHS&G = Plu. *Quaest. conv.* 716a: τὰ κουρεῖα Θεόφραστος εἰώθει καλεῖν ἄοινα συμπόσια διὰ τὴν λαλιάν). See Diggle 2004: 319–20 for a selection of references, and cf. Lewis 1995.

types. The ἄγροικος says that as soon as he gets to town he intends to have a haircut (*Char*. 4.13); the obsequious man has frequent haircuts (*Char*. 5.6); the repulsive man stops in front of the barber's or the perfumer's shop and explains that he intends to get drunk (*Char*. 11.9). One can also compare *Char*. 26.4, where the oligarchic man is depicted strutting about with his hair trimmed and nails carefully pared.

2.4.8. Concluding remarks

All of the types depicted in the *Characters* weary their fellow citizens morally, emotionally and intellectually. Their estimates of situations are inadequate, and this results in actions that are reprehensible. In short, they display a general lack of social intelligence. Generally, their behaviour does not cross the line of criminality (although the ἀπονενοη-μένος, *Char*. 6.6, is said to spend more time in prison than at home), but it does cross the line of various unwritten laws and customs. One of the common features is the transgression of the principles of φιλία: some of the types are too excessive in pursuing it; others undervalue its importance. In this respect we should recall Aristotle's views on φιλία as expressed in books 8–9 of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, where he studies social relations between people, and in the end defines man as πολιτι-κὸν ... καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός (*EN* 1169b18–19; cf. the famous identification of man as φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον in *Pol*. 1253a3).

PART 3. CHARACTER WRITING
IN LATER PERIPATETIC AUTHORS

As noted above, most of the successors of Theophrastos in the Peripatetic school have little to offer in regard to character writing. The following chapters focus on Ariston of Keos, but also touch upon the fragments of Lykon and Satyros.

Before proceeding to these authors I would like to mention some other names that also belong to the Peripatetic school. Demetrios of Phaleron was Theophrastos' pupil and ruler of Athens from 317 to 307 BCE. Otto Immisch has noted (1898: 208) that despite scarce remains of his works, Demetrios at least hints at his training under Theophrastos by parodying the ὑπερήφανος Krateros (Demetr. fr. 12 SOD):

> Πολλάκις δὲ ἢ πρὸς τύραννον ἢ ἄλλως βίαιόν τινα διαλεγόμε-
> νοι καὶ ὀνειδίσαι ὁρμῶντες χρήζομεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης σχήματος
> λόγου, ὡς Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς πρὸς Κρατερὸν τὸν Μακεδόνα
> ἐπὶ χρυσῆς κλίνης καθεζόμενον μετέωρον, καὶ ἐν πορφυρᾷ
> χλανίδι, καὶ ὑπερηφάνως ἀποδεχόμενον τὰς πρεσβείας τῶν
> Ἑλλήνων, σχηματίσας εἶπεν ὀνειδιστικῶς, ὅτι "ὑπεδεξάμεθά
> ποτε πρεσβεύοντας ἡμεῖς τούσδε καὶ Κρατερὸν τοῦτον"· ἐν γὰρ
> τῷ δεικτικῷ τῷ 'τοῦτον' ἐμφαίνεται <ἡ> ὑπερηφανία τοῦ Κρα-
> τεροῦ πᾶσα ὠνειδισμένη ἐν σχήματι.

In the list of Demetrios' works presented by Diogenes Laertios we find, among others, a work Περὶ μεγαλοψυχίας (5.81.21 = fr. 1.92 SOD), the content of which might have been ethical.

Herakleides Pontikos is said to have studied with Speusippos, but also listened to Pythagoreans and the Platonic school, and finally to Aristotle (D.L. 5.86).[230] The list of his works contains a book titled Χαρακτῆρες (D.L. 5.88.4 = fr. 165 Wehrli). The title is classified by Diogenes Laertios as belonging to μουσικά, which contain works on tragic poets, Homer, and poetics and music in general. There is no indication as to the content

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[230] On the possible extent of his connection to Aristotle see Wehrli 1969: 60.

of the work Χαρακτῆρες, and we have no fragments from it. Its place in this section, between Περὶ τῶν τριῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν and Περὶ ποιητικῆς καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, would suggest that the work may have been written on various kinds of style (Wehrli 1969: 119; cf. Diggle 2004: 5). The meaning of χαρακτήρ as 'character type' is not known before Theophrastos (Körte 1929: 77), thus the possibility that the work dealt with character types would probably also be ruled out for chronological reasons, although Herakleides was born only years before Theophrastos.

3.1. Ariston

3.1.1. Sources and identity

The first text of Ariston which is of importance for character studies is titled *On relieving arrogance* (Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας). The work has been preserved by Philodemos in his *On vices* (Περὶ κακιῶν, the first book of which is also known among scholars as Περὶ ὑπερηφανίας, although the papyrus does not contain this title), *PHerc*. 1008.[231] For some time it has been common belief that the author of this text is the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos (probably Lykon's successor in 225 BCE), but doubts have been expressed about his identity both in the past and again in recent times. It has even been claimed that the identification of the Ariston in Philodemos is the most difficult problem that the editors of the fragments of Ariston of Keos are faced with (Dorandi 2006: 217). The main reason is that there was more than one ancient philosophical writer named Ariston, and many ancient sources do not specify which man is meant. Stork et al. (2006: 3) list four Aristons: Ariston of

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[231] While at the moment the only complete edition of *PHerc*. 1008 is Jensen 1911a, the preparation of a new edition has been announced by G. Indelli (Indelli 2001; cf. Dorandi 2006 and Ranocchia 2001). The fragments containing Aristonean text have been newly edited and translated in Stork et al. 2006, where they stand in the section "Disputed", fr. 21a–o SFOD. (Cf. also Dorandi 2006 and Ranocchia 2006 and 2007 for editing history and present status of the papyrus interpretation.) Earlier editions include Knögel 1933 and Wehrli 1968 (first edition 1952; see also Wehrli 1983). For earlier English translations, see Rusten 1993: 182–95. The Greek quotes in the following sections have been taken from SFOD, omitting column formatting and dots under letters; the translation is also that of SFOD, with occasional minor modifications.

Keos, Ariston of Chios, Ariston the Younger and Ariston of Alexandria. Except Ariston of Chios, a Stoic, these were all Peripatetics. The first and the second Ariston are especially difficult to distinguish, for they are close in both time of living and in the Greek or Latin designation of their places of origin (Κεῖος/Χῖος resp. *Ceus/Chius*). Later Peripatetics with the name of Ariston never received the degree of public attention that Ariston of Keos and Ariston of Chios did (see Hahm 2006: 211). In addition to Peripatetics there were other Aristons, including those who belonged to the Academy (see, e.g., Hahm 2006: 182). Thus, the identification of the author of a fragment is in many cases inconclusive.

Recently, David Hahm has emphasized that the established methodology of reconstructing the work of lost authors has its limitations. In the case of the attribution of incompletely identified references, the most we can achieve at this point is the construction of several equally plausible possibilities (Hahm 2006: 183). Using an alternative methodology—not extracting the references from their context to create "fragments", but rather treating them as being essentially *testimonia*—Hahm has shown that throughout antiquity there is no evidence of any confusion between the two best-known Aristons (Ariston of Keos and Ariston of Chios) in the minds of the readers who knew them, and the confusion can be found only among modern interpreters. The source of this confusion seems to be an isolated ancient delusion reported (but not really endorsed) by Diogenes Laertios, viz. Panaitios' attempt to distance himself and the Stoic school from Ariston's ideas by alleging that the philosophical works circulating under his name were all really written by the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos (Hahm 2006: 211).

In the case of the work Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας, however, which has been transmitted only on papyrus, the results of this method amount more or less to same equal possibilities. Thus, other arguments come to play. Since the text is an important part of the ancient tradition of character writing, I will briefly touch upon the problems of the identification of its author.[232]

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[232] For more detailed studies, which also contain synopsis of previous work on the subject, see especially Dorandi 2006, Ranocchia 2006 and 2007, but also Ioppolo 1996 (cf. Ioppolo 1980), Tsouna 2006: 279–80 and Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 208–14.

The name of Ariston appears for the first time in col. 10.10 of *PHerc*. 1008 (in fr. 21a SFOD), which runs as follows:[233]

> [10]Ἀρίστων | το[ί]νυν [γ]εγραφὼς Περὶ τοῦ | κο[υ]φίζ[ειν ὑ]περ-ηφανίας ἐ|πιστολή[ν τ]ι [ἥ]διον μὲν ἔ|παθεν τῶν διὰ τύχην ὑπερ|[15]ηφ[ά]νων [ἐκ]είνων, ...

> ("Ariston, then, having written a letter *On Relieving Arrogance*, has indeed experienced something more naive[234] than these (people who are) arrogant on account of (good) fortune..." [Transl. Stork et al. 2006.])

The beginning of this passage contains important information about the author (Ariston), the title (Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας) and the genre (ἐπιστολή). As mentioned already, the name alone does not indicate whether Philodemos has the Peripatetic or the Stoic in mind. Thus, we must infer this from the title, the specified genre, and of course from the contents of the work.

3.1.2. *On relieving arrogance* (fr. 21 SFOD)

The reading at the beginning of l. 13 of the text quoted above has been one of the most controversial points in the interpretation of the passage, the whole work and the identity of its author. The question is whether the work mentioned was a *letter* or something else.

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[233] The reconstruction of the text of col. 10 in SFOD is that of Anna Angeli (unpublished to the date of publication of the volume, but put to use in it, cf. p. 71 n. 2). The text differs from that proposed by G. Ranocchia (2001), especially in ll. 12–15, where Ranocchia reads ἐ|πιστολικὰ τ[ὸ ἴ]διον μὲν ἔ|παθεν [τῶ]ν δ[ι]ὰ τύχην ὑπ[ε]ρ|ηφ[ά]νων [ἀ-φρόν]ων ... The textology of the passage is further analyzed in Dorandi 2006: 220 ff. Cf. also Ranocchia 2006: 240 ff., where he reads [ἐτ]αί[ρ]ων instead of [ἀφρόν]ων in l. 15. In his full edition of *PHerc*. 1008.10–24 (Ranocchia 2007), Ranocchia has suggested the reading [ἀφα]ι[ρ]ῶν. Cf. also my review of Fortenbaugh & White 2006 (Volt 2006).

[234] In translating the comparative of ἡδύς in this sense, the editors refer to the interpretation of Angeli, as quoted in Dorandi 2006: 222 f.

Basically, there have been three readings of the word in l. 12–13: ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗΝ, ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΑ, and ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ.[235] The word was read as ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗΝ already by Jensen in 1911; however, later (1930) he suggested the reading ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ instead. Since then, this has had many supporters, including Knögel (1933), Wehrli (1968), Capasso (1983), Mouraviev (1987), but has now proven to be false. Already Gigante (1997a: 154) has noted that this reading cannot be right.[236] Whether we read ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗΝ or ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΑ, that is already a secondary question. In any case we are dealing with a letter (or an epistolary treatise), and not an *epitome*—the latter seemed to prove the Peripatetic origin of the work once and for all. The epistolary form of the treatise, however, has been one of the main arguments for the Stoic authorship (Ioppolo 1996, Ranocchia 2006). The basis of the argumentation is that the work *Letters* is the only one from the list presented by Diogenes Laertios (7.163) that was not assigned to Ariston the Peripatetic by Panaitios and Sosikrates, whereas no letters (or an epistolary treatise) is known to have been written by Ariston the Peripatetic. The epistolary form in itself is not a proof that the author was Ariston the Stoic, but it has, to some degree, reopened discussion about the identity of the author that seemed to have come to an end with the wide acceptance of the reading ΕΠΙΤΟΜΗΝ.

Of course this formal point cannot be the only argument in this discussion. The contents of the work are more important, and have recently been subject of much heated discussion. Some scholars say that there are substantial discrepancies between the Peripatetic tradition (including the *Characters* of Theophrastos) and the text of Ariston, and believe that these discrepancies are strong arguments against Peripatetic authorship. Others believe, to the contrary, that even if there are discrepancies, these are not strong arguments.[237]

The *editor princeps* of the Aristonean text, Luigi Caterino (1827), attributed it to the Stoic Ariston of Chios, proceeding from an improbable

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[235] I use capital letters to include all variant readings of these words. For finer textological details see the *apparatus* in Stork et al. 2006: 70.

[236] He called Jensen's second proposal "una sfortunata δεύτερα φροντίς," arguing himself for the reading ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΑ (*ibid*.).

[237] For detailed studies of the history of reception, see Dorandi 2006 (especially 229–35) and Ranocchia 2006 (especially 241–6).

emendation φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων [Χῖ]|ος in col. 16.34–5. He proposed that it might derive from the work Ὑπομνήματα ὑπὲρ κενοδοξίας or from the four books of Ἐπιστολαί (Caterino 1827: 20). The first known modern author who favoured Ariston of Keos was Hermann Sauppe, who read φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, ο[ῖ]|ος in col. 16.34–5, and emphasized the similarity of Aristonean text to the *Characters* of Theophrastos, suggesting that Ariston imitated Theophrastos. He also underlined that in antiquity, at least till the time of Poseidonios, character writing was primarily practised by the Peripatetics (Sauppe 1853: 6–9). Of the following authors, to name but a few, Theodor Gomperz, Christian Jensen, Giorgio Pasquali, Wilhelm Knögel and Marcello Gigante (1997a) have supported the Peripatetic identity of the man, whereas Augusto Rostagni, Carlo Gallavotti (1927), and in recent times Anna Maria Ioppolo (1996) and Graziano Ranocchia (2006, 2007) have argued for the Stoic.

Graziano Ranocchia has been one of the strongest opponents of the Peripatetic authorship of the work (see, e.g., Ranocchia 2006, 2007). He argues that Ariston's treatise is a protreptic letter that is divided into two sections. The first of these sections collects a series of exhortations, each of which focuses on a particular aspect of ὑπερηφανία. Here, Philodemos does not cite his source directly. The intent of this section is said to be paraenetical rather that characterological, and the examination of formal characters shows that this is an example of *exhortatio*, which, together with *dissuasio*, constitutes one part of protreptic ethics (2006: 252). The second of these sections is characterological in nature and contains direct quotations from Ariston. It is a meticulous review of subtypes of the ὑπερήφανος, among which Ariston distinguishes seven categories. The unique aim of the treatise is, according to Ranocchia (2006: 253), to provide a remedy for the vice. The more characterological flavour of the second section, he proceeds, is not an aim in itself, but serves the protreptic character of the whole treatise, which again suggests Stoic authorship. Other arguments in favour of the Stoic include a re-interpretation of the verb κουφίζειν that appears in the title of Ariston's treatise (Ranocchia 2006: 254), and the compatibility of Philodemos' extensive use of Ariston's text and his evident confidence in Ariston's persuasive force with the eloquence and persuasiveness attributed to the man in ancient sources (2006: 256–7).

I cannot go into detailed discussion of specific arguments in this chapter. However, as mentioned above, I proceed from the hypothesis that the work belongs to the Peripatetic tradition of character writing. There are several reasons for this. First, I see no major contradictions between Ariston's character sketches and the Theophrastean descriptions. Although Ariston's descriptions are more intertwined and closely connected with each other, the style and technique are to a large degree similar (cf. Rusten 1993: 14; Diggle 2004: 10). He also uses introductory formulas, builds his sentences around infinitives and participles, and links sentences with a καί. As Millett (forthcoming, n. 43) has noted, not only form, but also content of the sketches is thoroughly Theophrastean, with much to say about etiquette and reciprocity. The descriptions are furnished with pedagogical notes, but this is not a strong argument for the Stoic authorship.

What also seems significant is the fact that Philodemos does cite the *Characters* of Theophrastos elsewhere in his treatise *On vices* (see above, ch. 2.1.3, and below, ch. 3.1.3). Assuming that there was no confusion about the identity of the two Aristons in antiquity, it seems probable that if Philodemos had used the texts of more than one Ariston, he would have specified which man he is citing in each passage. He certainly uses the text of Theophrastos together with that of Ariston, which might suggest that he considered them both to be Peripatetics. Of course Philodemos is a compiler and we cannot be too certain of his principles of quotation.

Ariston's treatment is the longest text on character types we have, apart from Theophrastos. His character sketches are all related to ὑπερηφανία 'arrogance' (cf. *Char*. 24), and presented as blends or sub-types of arrogance.[238] Losses at the beginning and end of some columns make it difficult to follow the relations between certain sub-types. Indeed there are scholars who believe that although there is some relation to ὑπερηφανία in every sketch, the differences are too great to allow a common source for those and the treatment of ὑπερηφανία in col. 10–16.28 (Wehrli 1968: 53 ff.; Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 219).

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[238] For a synopsis see Vogt 2006: 272. Cf. also Jensen 1911b: 395; Knögel 1933: 25; Stork at al. 2006: 89, 91, 101; Tsouna 2006.

What is different from the *Characters* of Theophrastos is the fact that the types are compared with each other. This allows for some kind of hierarchy in the negativity, but again, not always. The comparisons and categorizing evaluations before the descriptions of behavioural regularities recall, in a way, the definitions appended to the Theophrastean sketches, although they are not presented in such a short, fixed form.

The first sketch is of the inconsiderate man (αὐθάδης; col. 16.29–17.17 = 21g.29–h.17 SFOD; cf. *Char*. 15).[239] He is said to be "a blend of conceit, arrogance and disdain, along with a large dose of thoughtlessness."[240] He is first described as someone who demands hot or cold water in the bath without first asking his fellow-bather whether it is alright with him too. Then we learn that when he has bought a slave, he does not ask what his name is nor gives him a name himself, but rather calls him only "boy" (παῖδα). In the next scenes he is depicted as not returning a favour: he refuses to rub with oil in return the person who has rubbed him; and he does not entertain in return a guest who has entertained him. He knocks at someone's door but does not give an answer when asked who it is, waiting for the owner to come outside. When he is unwell and a friend comes to check on him, he will not say how he is doing, and he never asks such questions himself when checking on someone. The last sentence describes the man as never starting his letters with χαίρειν or ending them with ἐρρῶσθαι. The point is not, of course, that he does not use these specific traditional epistolary formulas, but that he refuses to begin and end the letter politely.[241]

As this is one of the two types Theophrastos and Ariston both have chosen to describe (the other being the εἴρων, see below), a comparison is called for. One will notice that there are some similarities between the two sketches. Thus, the αὐθάδης of the *Characters*, when asked 'Where is so-and-so?', replies 'Don't bother me!' (*Char*. 15.2). The αὐθάδης of Ariston does not reply quite like this, he does not reply at all, for

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[239] See also Knögel 1933: 26–8; Wehrli 1968: 59–60; Gigante 1997b: 345–7.

[240] 21g.29–33 SFOD: ὁ δ᾿ αὐθάδης λεγόμενος ἔοι‖κε μὲν εἶναι μεικτὸς ἐξ οἰήσε‖ως καὶ ὑπερηφανίας καὶ ὑπερ‖οψίας, μετέχων δὲ καὶ πολ‖λῆς εἰκαιότητος.

[241] Traditional formulas have been abandoned by some authors for other reasons, as well. Cf., e.g., D.L. 10.13–14 on Epikuros, who used to write εὖ πράττειν and σπουδαίως ζῆν instead of χαίρειν. See also Stork et al. 2006: 123.

example when knocking at someone's door, or when a friend asks how he is doing. The Theophrastean type does not return a greeting (*Char.* 15.3); the man described by Ariston refuses to use polite epistolary formulas. There are also scenes that are missing in the *Characters* (and vice versa), but the locales are familiar. The αὐθάδης is depicted in the baths in two scenes: he demands hot or cold water without asking what the others think of it, and refuses to return rubbing with oil.

The αὐθάδης of Ariston is said to have a share of arrogance, and indeed some traits in his behaviour are comparable with the arrogant man as described by Theophrastos. However, the αὐθάδης is not acting out of arrogance, although it may sometimes seem so. When he does not ask the name of the slave he has bought and does not give him a name himself either, calling him only "boy", the self-centred man is not being arrogant or showing his contempt—he just does not care and is by nature hostile in his social relations. The same holds true for other failings in reciprocal relations, such as not entertaining in return a guest who has entertained him.

The second sketch depicts the self-willed man (αὐθέκαστος; col. 17.17–18.11 = 21h.17–i.11 SFOD).[242] In the introduction, he is compared to the inconsiderate man and found to be not quite so thoughtless and lacking in regard for the feelings of others (οὐ πάνυ μὲν εἰ[καῖ]ός ἐ[στ]ιν οὐ|δ᾽ ἄλογος), but still thinking that he is the only one with any sense, and therefore being self-opinionated (ἰδιογνωμονῶν), believing that he will succeed in everything if he does it alone but fail if he avails himself of the judgment of another person. Thus, he is also said to have his share of arrogance (ὑπερηφανία). There follows a list of actions that the man will carry through without consulting anybody: he will go abroad, buy at the market, run for office, and other similar things. The emphasis here is on the lack of a basic constituent of social relations, viz. asking for advice, discussing important issues with one's friends and peers. Indeed when someone asks him what he is going to do, the man's reply is an abrupt "οἶδ᾽ ἐγώ," and when someone finds fault with him, he just says "ἐμὲ σύ;"—basically meaning that he knows better.[243] If somebody asks his

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[242] See also Knögel 1933: 28–30; Wehrli 1968: 60; Gigante 1997b: 347–8; Gallavotti 1927.
[243] For 21h.25–32 SFOD see also Gallavotti 1927: 476.

advice, he refuses to state what he thinks unless the person asking is going to do it. As the beginning of the next column (col. 18) is mutilated, one cannot state for sure what it contained, but a connection with the end of col. 17 sounds probable, giving a sense that in all things in which the man has failed, he is the kind to say that in doing it he had no wish to complete it.[244] The man is also not disturbed when you call him self-willed, saying that people who seek the guidance of others are like little children, and that he is the only one with a beard and grey hair. The sketch ends with a statement of the self-willed that he will manage to stay alive even if he finds himself in a deserted place.

The third sketch is of the "know-it-all" ($\pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\iota\delta\eta\mu\omega\nu$; col. 18.11–19.2 = 21i.11–j.2 SFOD).[245] The word $\pi\alpha\nu\tau\epsilon\iota\delta\eta\mu\omega\nu$ sounds common enough, but is actually a hapax. Again, the man is compared with the previous type and found "even worse" than the self-willed man. The know-it-all is a person who has completely convinced himself that he knows everything. He will construct a house and a boat by himself and without the help of a professional builder. He will draw up contracts for himself that require legal expertise. He will act as doctor not only to himself but also to his slaves, and try it on others, as well. He will engage in the sort of agriculture and merchant shipping that require good specialists to be successfully pursued. Indeed he does not stop his deranged behaviour ($\dot{\alpha}\pi o\pi\lambda\eta\xi\dot{\iota}\alpha$) even if he suffers shipwreck in everything. He makes a fool of himself by laying claim to all branches of knowledge, and calls those who laugh at him ignorant.

There follows a discussion of the consequences and negative effects of such behaviour for each of the three types in the same order (the inconsiderate man col. 19.2–17 = 21j.2–17 SFOD; the self-willed man col. 19.17–20.3 = 21j.17–k.3 SFOD; the know-it-all col. 20.3–32 = 21k.3–32 SFOD). Although these discussions have been considered to be Philodemos' "tedious and contorted analyses of the disadvantages of each trait" (Rusten 1993: 182) rather than the text of Ariston, we need not be as critical as this. There is actually no need to recreate a truly

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[244] Cf. Stork at al. 2006: 95 and Sauppe 1853: 26.
[245] See also Knögel 1933: 30–2; Wehrli 1968: 60–1 and 64; Gigante 1997b: 348–51.

"Theophrastean" Ariston by attributing all references to definitions and evaluations of the character traits to Philodemos (cf. Vogt 2006: 262).

After these comments the character sketches are resumed (21k.32 SFOD). The hierarchical structure of the following passage is not quite clear, as there are losses both at the end of the column and at the beginning of the next column. Three types are mentioned: the disdainful man (ὑπερόπτης; col. 20.32–21.4 = 21k.32–l.4 SFOD), the man affecting solemnity (σεμνοκόπος; col. 21.4–14 = 21l.4–14 SFOD), and the "swaggerer" (βρενθυόμενος; col. 21.14–38 = 21l.14–38 SFOD). The last two appear to be considered as a subspecies of the first (Knögel 1933: 32–3, 39; Stork et al. 2006: 101). The behaviour of the man affecting solemnity is not described in detail. The swaggerer is said to be a man who looks down and askance at everybody, shakes his head disapprovingly (Rusten translates "tosses his head"), and belittles everybody else, even the esteemed. The description ends with a quotation from Ar. *Nu*. 362: ὅ[τ]ι βρενθύ|[ηι] τ᾽ ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τὠ|φθαλμὼ παραβάλλεις. With these lines in the comedy the chorus of the clouds is addressing Sokrates (on the reference, see Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 219–21).

Taking into account the implicit reference to Sokrates just mentioned, it might not be a coincidence that the following sketch is of a dissembler (εἴρων; cf. *Char*. 1). This type is discussed in a rather long paragraph in col. 21.38–23.37 = 21l.38–n.37 SFOD.[246] As has been noted (Rusten 1993: 191, n. 3), the literal meaning, "ironic man", is better suited to the description here than in *Char*. 1 of Theophrastos. Sokrates is considered as a prototype of the type by the author, and this is clearly stated in the text, as will be seen.

The first sentence of the section on εἴρων contains the claim that the dissembler is, by and large, a species of the pretentious man (col. 21.38–9 = 21l.38–9 SFOD: ὁ δ᾽ εἴρων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ | [πλ]εῖστον ἀλαζόνος εἶδος). This may seem to contradict Aristotle's use of εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία as two extremes belonging to one mean, ἀλήθεια (*EN* 1108a20 ff., *EE* 1221a23 ff., 1233b38 ff., *MM* 1193a28 ff.), but for Aristotle this division

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[246] See also Knögel 1933: 34–9; Wehrli 1968: 61; Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 219–21; Nardelli 1984: 531–4; Gigante 1997b: 352–4.

seems to be only formal, and even he admits that sometimes dissembling may seem like boasting.[247]

The text at the beginning of the next column is not entirely clear; probably the dissembler is described as praising people he finds fault with but diminishing and censuring himself. He often mimics in mockery, makes faces, and smiles, jumping up and uncovering his head. He will remain silent for a long time in company. The rest of the sketch contains a lot of phrases that the dissembler is bound to utter. Thus, if someone praises him or bids him to speak, or if people say that he will be remembered, he responds with "What do I know except this, that I know nothing?" (ἐγὼ γὰρ | οἶδα τί πλήν [γ]ε τούτου ὅτι [οὐ]|δὲν οἶδα;)[248] or "What does my opinion count for?" (τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν λ[ό]|γος;) or "If indeed any will remember me" (εἰ δή τις ἡμῶν ἔστα[ι] | μνεία). He will also say things like "Some people are blessed in their natural gifts" or "in their capability" or "in their fortune." He does not call people merely by name, but says "fair Phaidros" (Φαῖδρος ὁ καλός) or "wise Lysias" (Λυσίας ὁ σοφός), and uses ambiguous expressions, such as "good" (χρηστόν), "sweet" (ἡδύν), "simple" (ἀφελῆ), "noble" (γεν-ναῖον), "brave" (ἀνδρεῖον).[249]

By now it has become clear that one of the prototypes of the sketch is Sokrates. Indeed he is mentioned by name in the following section: there it is said that the εἴρων will slyly show off ideas of his own as wise, but attribute them to other people, "as Sokrates with Aspasia and Ischo-machos."[250] Again, the beginning of col. 23 is mutilated, so we do not know exactly what the man is said to tell those who are being dismissed from the elections for a public office. With Ussing's supplement, the sentence would run: "You would have passed muster, if they had chosen you, for in everything you are formidably good at getting things done."

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[247] *EN* 1127b27 f.: καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται (sc. εἰρωνεία). Cf. also Wehrli 1968: 61, Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 220–1.

[248] This is, of course, Sokrates' famous statement, cf. Plato *Ap*. 21d.

[249] For parallels in (mainly) Plato, see Kleve 1983: 246–7 and Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992: 226–7.

[250] Commentators refer to Plato's *Menexenos*, where Sokrates quotes a funeral speech allegedly composed by Aspasia for Perikles, and Xenophon's *Oec*. 7–21, where Sokrates has a lengthy discussion with Ischomachos on estate management (Stork et al. 2006: 107).

Further, when the εἴρων meets someone (perhaps one particular individual who is also meant in the following sentences), he makes a display of being struck with amazement at his appearance and his dignity and his speech, and a display of admiration to those who are sitting nearby. If he is invited to deliberate with the other man, he seems to be afraid and says that even the smallest things (τἀλάχιστα) appear to him insurmountable (ἄπορα). And, if the other man laughs at this, he continues by saying "You are right to feel contempt for me, being the man you are, for this is exactly how I feel about myself" and "Would that I were young and not an old man, so that I could have put myself under your orders."[251] Further, when after a perfectly clear remark by anyone present the other man says "What do you mean by saying such a thing?", the dissembler throws up his hands and exclaims "How quickly you have understood!—but then how dull I am and slow and stupid (ἀφ[υὴ]ς | ἐγὼ καὶ βραδὺς καὶ δυσαίσθητος)!" When the other man is having conversation with him, he gives him his full attention and gazes at him with his mouth open, but a moment later makes innuendos and nods suggestively with his head to others around him, and sometimes laughs out loud.

The sketch ends with two expressions that the dissembler will say to whomever he happens to converse with: "You, my friends, please do point out to me my failures in literacy and my other blunders, and do not let me disgrace myself" and "Won't you explain to me the prosperity of so-and-so, that I may rejoice in it and, suppose I should have it in me, that I may become like him?" Sokrates is also mentioned one more time at the end of the column: "But what need is there to say more? For collecting all the reminiscences about Sokrates..."

Ariston's depiction of the εἴρων has been another key element in the question of authorship of the work (see Ioppolo 1996, Vogt 2006). The author's attitude towards εἴρων-Sokrates in these passages is explicitly hostile, whereas Aristotle tends to be more positive and Theophrastos does not name Sokrates by name, although he is describing a more

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[251] The phrase τηλικ[ο]ῦτος ὤν ("being the man you are") is translated "at your age" in Stork et al. 2006, with the explanation that the dissembler presents himself as an older man and the target of his irony apparently is younger, the point being that younger men tend to despise older men just because of the age difference but do not say so openly.

negative kind of εἴρων. The inclusion of Sokrates among examples of arrogance is, however, no evidence of Stoicism, because there were critics of Sokrates among the Peripatetics, as well (cf., e.g., Aristoxenos fr. 54 and 56 Wehrli). Ioppolo (1996: 724) argues that these Peripatetics attack the βίος of Sokrates rather than his philosophical position, but the fact of the confrontation remains.

Perhaps the tradition of the Peripatetic school and analogies with the *Characters* of Theophrastos are not sufficient to claim that the author has to be the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos (cf., e.g., Rostagni 1920 and Ioppolo 1996: 723). However, the arguments for the opposite are faced with the same problem: they are not sufficient to establish the Stoic authorship. In addition, the arguments are connected with the purpose of the *Characters*, but as this cannot be established for certain, the arguments themselves tend to stay on a very subjective ground. (Cf. Ioppolo 1996: 724: "La loro sanzione sta *esclusivamente* [my emphasis—*I.V.*] nel fatto di suscitare il riso"—a claim that is purely subjective.)[252] Also staying on a subjective ground, I find the arguments for the Peripatetic authorship to be more plausible. For the representation of εἴρων see also ch. 4.1.4 below.

In the last paragraph cited by Philodemos (fr. 21o.1–21 SFOD), the four similar and interrelated types of the disparager and utter disparager (εὐτελιστής and ἐξευτελιστής), the vilifier and utter vilifier (οὐδενωτής and ἐξουδενωτής) are briefly distinguished from each other according to the intensity of their abusive behaviour.[253] The utter disparager presents someone among those absent so as to seem rather insignificant (φαυλότερον), whereas the utter vilifier presents him as a thing of nought (ἴσον τῷ μηδενί). There are moments when they display their own superiority or that of those whom they extol, and there are moments when they merely run down certain other people. It is concluded that they are arrogant as well. Philodemos ends his account of Ariston's treatise by presenting Ariston's conclusion that the utter disparager and the utter vilifier are attended by the undesirable consequences of their

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[252] Note that Ioppolo (1996: 724, n. 22) attributes the 1993 Loeb edition of the *Characters* to I. C. Cunningham instead of J. Rusten; in fact, Cunningham edited and translated the text of Herodas in the same volume.
[253] See also Knögel 1933: 37; Gigante 1997b: 355–6.

arrogance even to a more excessive degree than the arrogant person through the slanderous and malicious and envious nature of their arrogance.

As has been noted (Vogt 2006: 272), the structure of the work indicates Ariston's clever use of the conceptual method—he presents a broad picture of several related character types, all of which he treats as subtypes of arrogance, thereby both providing a more substantial survey of the diverse aspects of arrogance and distinguishing its several sub-types. He skilfully combines both methods found in earlier Peripatetic tradition, i.e. the inferential (isolating superficial behavioural regularities), and the conceptual (defining traits by ways of opposites and synonyms, and subtypes and blends).

Vogt's study (2006: 274–6) of two types depicted by Ariston, ὑπερήφανος and εἴρων, both of which also feature in Theophrastos and Aristotle, has shown that:

1) In the case of arrogance, the basic conception is largely the same in all three authors;
2) In the case of the εἴρων, we can see an illustration of a clash of two different ideas within the same school.

3.1.3. *On flattery* (fr. 19–20 SFOD)

There are two further passages of Philodemos (in his Περὶ κολακείας) that mention Ariston. One of these passages (fr. 20 SFOD) was already included in Wehrli's edition; the other (fr. 19 SFOD) was discovered later, and we only have an apograph of the text (the papyrus itself has been lost).[254] In these two cases, Philodemos attacks the positions of an Ariston who is not further identified. There seems to be nothing to prevent us from identifying him as the Peripatetic,[255] and Philodemos' source could be the same as in other passages, i.e. Ariston's Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας, although this cannot be proved.

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[254] See Dorandi 2006: 226 ff.
[255] Cf. Gallavotti 1927, who argues to the contrary.

The text of these fragments, according to SFOD, runs as follows:

Fr. 19 SFOD (*PHerc*. 222, col. 10.1–10):[256]

> [. . . . . ἱ]κανὰ ταῦτα [. .]εφι | [. . . . . . οἴ]ησιν εἶναι τὴν [πρ]α-
> ό|[τητα πρὸς] τὸν κόλακα φιλο|[. . . . . (ψευδῆ? Gargiulo)]
> οὐχ οἷον ἱκαν[ῶ]ς ο|⁵[. . . . . κ]αθάπερ Ἀρίστ[ω]ν ἔ|[φησεν,
> ἀλ]λὰ μόριόν ἐστι τῶν | [ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ π]αραλελειμμέ[νω]ν, |
> [ὅπερ διεσαφ]ήσαμεν ἡμε[ῖς. ἄ]λ|[λο μὲν γὰρ] τὸ μιμεῖσθαί
> τ[ιν᾽, ἕ|¹⁰[τερον δὲ] τὸ ζηλοῦν κα[. . . .]το

> ("... adequate that ... that (adopting) a mild manner towards the
> flatterer is (a form of) self-conceit ... not such as in an adequate
> way ... in the way Ariston has said, but is part of the things that
> have been omitted by him, as we have made quite clear. For (it
> is) one thing to imitate someone, another to emulate (someone)
> ..." [Transl. Stork et al. 2006: 65.])

Gargiulo (1981: 123) has suggested that a treatise on κολακεία might
have been divided into μόρια (cf. l. 6) that could be understood as
'sections' or 'aspects', comparing this to Plato's *Grg*. 463c: τῆς κολα-
κείας μόριον εἶναι τὴν ῥητορικήν.

Fr. 20 SFOD (*PHerc*. 1457, col. 11.37–42):[257]

> ὁ μέντοι φιλέ|παινος ὑπ᾽ Ἀρίστωνος κα|λούμενος καὶ χαρακ-
> τηρι|⁴⁰ζό[μ]ενος οὔτ᾽ εἰ συνήθ{ε}᾽η᾽ς ἐσ|τὶν οὕ[τ]ω διαφέρων
> οὔθ᾽ ὅ|[λως .....

> ("... The person, however, who by Ariston is called and charac-
> terized (as) "lover of praise," neither (is he), if (that term) is in
> common use, so (very) different (from the person *who loves to
> please*) nor wholly ..." [Transl. Stork et al. 2006: 67.])

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[256] Philodemos, Περὶ κακιῶν 1 = Περὶ κολακείας (*CErc* 11.108.28–31 Gargiulo, see
Gargiulo 1981). On Philodemos' concept of flattery, see Longo Auricchio 1986.

[257] Philodemos, Περὶ κακιῶν 2 = Περὶ κολακείας (*CErc* 4.54.7–9 Kondo, see Kondo 1974).

The fragment does not indicate which Ariston is meant. However, because in the preceding col. 6 and 7 Theophrastos' *Char*. 5 (ἀρέσκεια) is quoted, Jensen (1911b: 405–6) took it to refer to Ariston of Keos, and he has been followed by Knögel and Wehrli.[258]

In the case of Ariston, Philodemos takes an attacking position. In the case of Theophrastos, Philodemos is quoting his source verbatim (*PHerc*. 1457, col. 6–7), which does not allow us to see his position. The preceding section, where Theophrastos is explicitly named (col. 5.40), seems to contain no criticism of him.

3.2. Lykon

Lykon succeeded Theophrastos' successor, Straton, as head of the Lykeion in 268–225 BCE.[259] His style of writing is highlighted by many ancient authors, and according to an anecdote, some of them jokingly added the letter Γ at the beginning of his name to associate it with the adjective γλυκύς (D.L. 5.66). In a passage from Cicero's *De finibus*, Piso considers the followers of Aristotle and Theophrastos in the Peripatetic school generally as degenerates (*Fin*. 5.13: *ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur*). He describes Lykon as *oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior*, "rich in style but rather poor in the content."[260] As has been noted, Piso's judgment in regard to poverty of content finds support in the fact that later authors hardly mention Lykon's views (Fortenbaugh 2004: 411). With regard to richness of style the judgment is difficult to confirm in the absence of surviving works, but also seems to find some support. Thus, Diogenes Laertios calls him φραστικός 'eloquent' (5.65 = fr. 1.3 SFOD) and, in addition, presents five sayings of Lykon in order to illustrate his eloquence (cf. Fortenbaugh 2004: 411 ff.).

Now, it has been doubted whether Cicero's assessment of Lykon's style really is of great value, because it seems that Cicero did not have any detailed knowledge of Lykon's views and his treatment of him is

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[258] See also Stork et al. 2006: 67; Dorandi 2006: 227–8; Dorandi & Stein 1994; Acosta Méndez & Angeli 1992; Kondo 1974: 53–4.

[259] Cf. D.L. 5.65–74. For an ancient report of Lykon's life and activities see also Ath. 12.547d ff.; for a modern analysis see Mejer 2004.

[260] *Fin*. 5.13 (= Lykon fr. 11.6–7 SFOD); cf. also Fortenbaugh 2004: 411.

quite superficial (Fortenbaugh 2004: 412). The conciseness of the passage in *De finibus* does not, however, seem to be strong argument against this description, especially if it is in agreement with what Diogenes Laertios wrote. The formulation of Cicero's passage rather suggests that he has read at least some of the works of the Peripatetics who followed Theophrastos, though we cannot be sure that he read Lykon. Compare, for example, Cicero's opinion on Ariston (*Fin*. 5.13): *scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet*. The last part of that passage, especially the *nescio quo pacto*, may suggest a certain familiarity with Ariston's text.[261] Besides, there is no reason to suppose, as Fortenbaugh does (2004: 412), that Lykon's style in his writings on scientific subjects or on drama "is likely to have lacked richness." A writer may have been φραστικός or *locuples* in whatever he wrote. We should not degrade the man on the ground of writings that we do not have. It should be noted that while Fortenbaugh's conclusion is cautious, he admits that there is actually no good reason to reject the judgment of Cicero and Diogenes (2004: 413).

The fragment connected with character writing is unfortunately problematic as an evidence of Lykon's style, as what we have is preserved in a Latin rhetorical treatise by Rutilius Lupus (*De figuris* 2.7 [= 32.1–27 Brooks] = Lykon fr. 12 SFOD = fr. 26 Wehrli).[262] Rutilius Lupus is a Latin rhetorician of the first century CE, and the text in question is an adaptation or a partial (or condensed?) translation of a similar work by the younger Gorgias, a rhetorician who lived at the end of the first century BCE.[263] It is not quite sure whether it is an epitome of a larger work or a collection of excerpts from it. Quintilianus knows the work (*Inst*. 9.2.102): *... Rutilius Gorgian secutus, non illum Leontinum, sed alium*

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[261] Cf. also the use of *nescio quo pacto* in other writings of Cicero (e.g. *In Cat*. 1.31).

[262] The fragments of Lykon have recently been published in the *RUSCH* series (Stork 2004 in Fortenbaugh & White 2004, for which I use the abbreviation SFOD, as preferred by the editors).

[263] Cf. *De fig*. 2.12 and see Münscher 1912; Duret 1986: 3249–50; Fortenbaugh 2004: 434. Latest editions of the text of Rutilius Lupus include Barabino 1967 (which, in addition to text, offers a commentary on each figure and on the sources of Rutilius) and Brooks 1970 (based on a 1968 dissertation; he has not used Barabino and focuses on manuscripts and history of the text).

sui temporis, cuius quattuor libros in unum suum transtulit. The text of Rutilius as we have it consists of two books and only discusses figures of style. Gorgias had written about the subject of figures (of both style and thought) in a work consisting of four books. Therefore, the emendation of Ahrens *in usum suum transtulit* is very attractive (see Schenkeveld 2001).

In any case a portion of material seems to have been lost through transmission. There are 41 figures described. As a rule, each figure is first defined and then illustrated. However, as has been noted (e.g. Fortenbaugh 2004: 434), in some case we have illustrative material without a definition (1.21 *ethopoiia*); in other cases the manuscripts exhibit an initial lacuna (1.6 *antimetabole*).

The quotation from Lykon in Rutilius Lupus' work illustrates the use of the rhetorical figure χαρακτηρισμός,[264] and consists of a description of a drunkard. It has been suggested that this description might derive from Lykon's work Περὶ μέθης (e.g. Brink 1940: 933; cf. Fortenbaugh 1984: 94–5). Fortenbaugh (2004: 438) notes that four other Peripatetics, Aristotle, Theophrastos, Chamaileon and Hieronymos, are said to have written works with this title, so it is easy to imagine Lykon doing the same. The elements used in describing a drunkard were universal in antiquity,[265] but this lengthy passage is remarkable for its clear structure and skilful use of details.

I quote the text in its entirety, following the edition of Stork (2004: 50–3):[266]

> *quem ad modum pictor coloribus figuras describit, sic orator hoc schemate aut vitia aut virtutes eorum, de quibus loquitur, deformat.*

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[264] Quintilianus (*Inst*. 9.3.99) says that this and some other Rutilian figures are not figures at all, adding that he will pay no attention to those authors who have inserted among figures that which belongs to arguments.

[265] Cf., e.g., Lucretius *RN* 3.474 ff. The theme of the descent of the symposium into chaos as more and more wine is drunk was commonplace; cf., e.g., Alexis fr. 160 *PCG* (= 156 Kock), etc. See also Olson 2007: 316 ff. and Rosen 2003: 131–5 (arguing that mutual abuse and mockery were a regular feature of symposia).

[266] I have not used *u* for small *v* for consistency with other quotations. For the text, cf. also Wehrli 1968: 14–15 (with many emendations); Ussing 1868: 61–2, 181–3. Some more important textual problems, especially differences from the text of Wehrli, are addressed in footnotes to the text; for full critical apparatus see Stork 2004: 52.

Lyconis: quid in hoc arbitrer bonae spei reliquum residere, qui omne vitae tempus una ac desperatissima[267] consuetudine producit? nam simul atque ex prioris diei nimia cibi ac vini satietate, vix meridiano tempore plenus crapula est experrectus, primum oculis mero madidis, humore obcaecatis, visco[268] gravidis, lucem constanter intueri non potest; deinde confectis viribus, utpote cuius venae non sanguine sed vino sunt repletae, se ipse erigere non valet; tandem duobus innixus, languidus, qui cubando sit defatigatus, tunicatus, sine pallio, soleatus, praeligato palliolo[269] frigus a capite defendens, flexa cervice, summissis genibus, colore exsangui, protinus ex cubiculari lectulo excitatus in triclinium trahitur. ibi praesto sunt quotidiani pauci[270] eodem studio excitati convivae. hic vero princeps paulum illud, reliquum quod habet menti ac sensu, poculis extrudere ex ea festinat; bibendo provocat, lacessit, <si,>[271] sicut in hostium proelio, quam plurimos superarit atque adflixerit, amplissimam sibi victoriam partam existimans. interea procedit simul et †illud tempus et potio†[272]; oculi vinum lacrimantes caligant, ebriosum ipsi vix ebrii cognoscunt. alius sine causa iurgio proximum lacessit; alius somno deditus vi cogitur vigilare, alius rixari parat, alium turbas vitantem ac domum reverti cupientem retinet ianitor, pulsat, exire prohibet, domini interdictum demonstrans. interea alium contumeliose extra ianuam eiectum vacillantem puer sustentat ac ducit pallium per lutum trahentem. novissime solus in triclinio relictus, non prius poculum ex manibus emittit, quam somnus oppressit bibentem, ac dissolutis artubus ipsum poculum suapse natura dormienti excidit.

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[267] The reading of the MSS. Wehrli has accepted Halm's conjecture *despicatissima*.

[268] The emendation of Barth and Gesner; the MSS have *visu*. Casaubon suggested *vino*.

[269] The emendation of Jacob; the MSS have either *prae lectulo palliolo* or *pro lectulo pallido*.

[270] The reading of the MSS has been preserved both by Stork and by Wehrli, but obelized by Brooks (see 1970: 87–8). Emendations have included *<nec> pauci* (Ruhnken), *fuci* (Haupt), *poculi* (Mähly), *faucium* (Morawski). Fortenbaugh (2004: 437) rightly observes that there is no need to see a contradiction between the *pauci* here and *quam plurimos* a few lines below. Indeed *pauci* creates a fine ironical contrast with the victory over many that the drunkard imagines himself winning.

[271] Added by Helm, also accepted by Wehrli.

[272] The MS reading, which most consider corrupt. Haase has suggested *illudendo tempus et potando*, which is also accepted by Wehrli. Cf. Brooks 1970: 88–9.

("[In the way that a painter uses colours to represent figures, so does the orator use this figure to delineate either the vices or virtues of those about whom he speaks.] From Lykon: What remnant of good hope should I think remains in the man who conducts the whole span of his life in accordance with one and the most desperate habit? For as soon as he awakens after too great an indulgence in food and wine the day before, with difficulty, by the time of midday, filled with intoxication, at first with eyes sodden with unmixed wine, blinded by a film of moisture, and heavy with sticky stuff, he cannot look at the light without blinking. Then, drained of strength as he is, since his veins are filled not with blood but with wine, he does not by himself have the strength to get himself up. At last, leaning on two persons, listless, exhausted by sleeping as he is, in his tunic, without a cloak, wearing his slippers, keeping the cold from his head with a handkerchief wrapped round it, with bended neck, sunken knees and bloodless colour, he straight from being roused from his sleeping bed is dragged to the dining room. There a few regular companions, roused with the same effort, are present. Our man, however, as leader hastens to drive out of his mind with drinking cups the little that he has left of mind and sense; by drinking he provokes them, he assails them, because he thinks that <if>, as in a battle with enemies, he has conquered and floored as many as possible, he will have won a most splendid victory. Meanwhile proceeds at the same time †that time and drinking†; the eyes dropping tears of wine become dimmed, drunk themselves they hardly recognize a drunk; one without cause assails his neighbour with taunts; another, who has capitulated to sleep, is with main force brought to wake; another is ready to pick a quarrel; another, who seeks to avoid the commotion and desires to return home, is held back, struck, prevented from departing by the doorkeeper who makes clear his master's prohibition. Meanwhile, another, who is tottering after being thrown out the door, is supported by a slave boy and led on with his coat dragging through the mud. Finally, left alone in the dining room, he does not let his cup leave his hand before sleep has overwhelmed him while drinking, and, the strength in his limbs being dissolved, the cup of its own nature

falls out of his hand while he is sleeping." [Transl. Peter Stork (2004: 51, 53), with slight modifications.])

This sketch is the longest of the examples presented by Rutilius Lupus. Although Rutilius does not say that he is quoting from Lykon the Peripatetic, there seems to be no reason to doubt this identification.[273] It is clear that Rutilius uses the quotation to illustrate a rhetorical figure, but that does not necessarily mean that the original description was composed for a similar reason. The beginning of the quotation ("What remnant of good hope should I think remains in the man who conducts the whole span of his life in accordance with one and the most desperate habit?") may suggest an ethical concern (Diggle 2004: 9) or pedagogical purpose, but these remain speculations.

Fortenbaugh (2004: 438) has suggested that there is no reason why this forceful rhetorical question could not begin a display piece, which Lykon had composed for use in teaching rhetoric. He also suggests (2004: 439) yet another alternative, according to which the opening sentence may have introduced a sketch written primarily for entertainment, to be enjoyed either at symposia or in a more private setting.

Thus, we are in much the same situation as in the case of the *Characters* of Theophrastos. The difference between Theophrastos' *Characters* and Lykon's sketch of the drunkard is that the latter is, to a large degree, a physiological description, while the sketches of Theophrastos feature this kind of details only very seldom and focus more on social context.

There is also an anonymous later poem (probably 4th rather than 5th century) that should be mentioned in this context. It is titled *Carmen de figuris vel schematibus*,[274] and the first part of it has much in common with Rutilius' *De figuris* (cf. D'Angelo 2001). Χαρακτηρισμός is the last figure of the first part (ll. 148–50), and the anonymous also depicts a drunkard:

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[273] See Fortenbaugh 2004: 434. The identification was first made by David Ruhnken in his edition of *De figuris* (Ruhnken 1768).

[274] For *Carmen de figuris* see D'Angelo 2001, Schindel 1999; for the reception of the Hellenistic theory of rhetorical figures by the Romans in general, see Schindel 2001.

fit depictio, cum verbis ut imagine pingo.
'pocula, serta tenens flexa cervice iacebat,
limo[ni]des, gravis optutu, madido ore renidens.'

The similarity between the two texts is conspicuous (cf. D'Angelo 2001: 128). Both here and in Rutilius we have *flexa cervice*; *madido ore renidens* recalls *oculis mero madidis*; *pocula ... tenens* can be compared to *non prius poculum ex manibus emittit*. Note that the anonymous has used the phrase *gravis optutu*, which would suggest that the author may have been content with the manuscript reading *visu gravidis* or, if he used Gorgias rather than Rutilius, its Greek equivalent. There is also a second possibility. The emendation of Barth and Gesner, *visco gravidis*, would bring into the text something the anonymous probably has preserved. The word *limo[ni]des* deserves special mention in this context. It is the consensus of nearly all scholars who have commented on the text that *limonides* is corrupt. Some have tried to read a personal name (Simonides, Liodes), but that is not probable. Haase's reading *lemodes* (or, according to itacist pronunciation, *limodes*) has won most recognition. This suggests we are dealing with a transliteration of the Greek word λημώδης 'full of rheum' or 'bleary', which could have been the original Greek in Lykon's text.[275]

Despite numerous similarities, some differences between the anonymous and Rutilius seem to indicate that the anonymous may have used a common source, according to D'Angelo (2001: 31) probably Gorgias.

As mentioned above, Rutilius' (or Lykon's) sketch is remarkably well-structured and full of observant details. Unlike most of the characters in Theophrastos, this sketch does not illustrate a character trait with a series of individual acts, preferring a single scene. It resembles the technique used by Theophrastos in the description of the coward (*Char*. 25), or even more so the rumour-mongerer (*Char*. 8), which presents a single scene (cf. Diggle 2004: 9, Fortenbaugh 2004: 439, n. 96).

There are, to my count, seven separate scenes, each marked by an introductory adverb.[276] The following table summarizes this description.

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[275] For more emendations see D'Angelo 2001: 129 (cf. also 31, n. 14).
[276] See also Fortenbaugh 2004: 434–6, who suggests six scenes.

Table 6. Scenes in Lykon's description of a drunkard

	Lines (SFOD)	Marked by	Description
1	6–10	*primum*	awakening
2	10–12	*deinde*	inability to stand up
3	12–18	*tandem*	being taken to the dining room, supported by two
4	18–22	*hic*	the actual drinking, behaviour of the drunkard
5	22–28	*interea*	behaviour of the guests
6	29–31	*interea*	description of the guest outside the house
7	31–34	*novissime*	the drunkard alone again, falling to sleep

Note that the central scene, although not the longest, is the only one that explicitly describes the drinking and carousing. It is also marked by *hic*, which, unlike other introductory adverbs in the sketch, is used in local sense. The first three scenes are devoted to giving an impression of the hangover from the previous day, while the last three scenes depict an already drunk company starting to break down. The sketch begins with the drunkard awaking, and ends with the drunkard falling asleep again. Thus, the ring composition is completed. Considering this, the original sketch must have had the same structure, for it is difficult to imagine that something could be added to the structure that we have, and improbable that Rutilius somehow changed this structure.

The text is, of course, in Latin, and we do not know how the original Greek "sounded". Fortenbaugh (2004: 436, n. 84) has noted, for example, that the word order at the end of the sketch, *ipsum poculum suapte natura dormienti excidit*, is Latin and from Rutilius, and that it cannot be attributed to Lykon. As far as I can understand, the dramatic effect is achieved with the word *excidit* coming last. Fortenbaugh rightly emphasizes that reading this, "one all but hears the cup hit the floor" (*ibid*.). This, however, may also have been the case in the original Greek.

The question is how much Rutilius followed the stylistic features of the Greek text in preparing his Latin version. It has been suggested that he was for the most part free to add to or to improve upon the style of Lykon's text (Münscher 1912: 1609, Fortenbaugh 2004: 437). It would be helpful to compare quotations of other Greek authors translated by

Rutilius with their original Greek to establish how far his Latin goes. Unfortunately, Rutilius' citations are surprisingly rarely and with much difficulty identifiable with anything now extant from these authors. Of various passages that he quotes—mainly from the orators, especially Demosthenes, Hypereides, Lysias and Lykurgos—only a few are found in our texts.[277] Comparing translations of Rutilius and the few known original passages, one can see that he is indeed sometimes quite free in his renderings, adding words and modifying syntax; nevertheless, he tends to keep the syntactic and stylistic features of the original in many cases, e.g. especially 2.19, which is almost verbatim translation of Isokr. 8.10.[278]

I tend to consider it more likely that, in general, Rutilius tried to reproduce the Greek original as closely as he could. I agree with Fortenbaugh (2004: 437–8) that the asyndeton and epibole are probably already present in the Greek text. I disagree in the case of Rutilius' use of ablative constructions, which according to Fortenbaugh (2004: 437) probably has no direct connection with the original. The Greek counterpart might not have been only the genitive absolute, but also infinitive or participial constructions, like those often found in the *Characters* of Theophrastos.

Some scholars have suggested that in style, Lykon's description is far from Theophrastos: "colours garish, rhetoric over-dressed, cleverness unremitting" (Diggle 2004: 9). However, we should not search for clones of the Theophrastean types in every imitation. The sketch is entirely comparable with the Theophrastean descriptions in both liveliness and presentation of details, although it is not set in the social context as those of Theophrastos.

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[277] Cf. Barabino 1967: 75 ff. and her *Index Auctorum* (1967: 209–10). Thus, 1.6 can be compared to Plato *R.* 473d; 1.16 = Dem. 18.130; 2.1 = Dem. 18.42; 2.19 = Isokr. 8.10. In addition, Rutilius uses a quotation from Theophrastos that is also known from elsewhere (1.6, cf. Plu. *Mor.* 482b and also Seneca *ep.* 1.3.2, Cic. *Lael.* 85 [without mentioning Theophrastos' name] = Theophr. fr. 538a–f FHS&G.)

[278] Cf. also 1.16: *sero, sero loquor? immo vero nuper atque his paucis diebus simul et Atheniensis et eloquens est factus*; Dem. 18.130: ὀψὲ γάρ ποτε–ὀψὲ λέγω; χθὲς μὲν οὖν καὶ πρώην ἅμ᾽ Ἀθηναῖος καὶ ῥήτωρ γέγονεν. Cf. also Barabino 1967: 78–9.

3.3. Satyros

Satyros was a Peripatetic biographer who lived in the 3rd and 2nd century BCE. He is called ὁ περιπατητικός three times by Athenaios (6.248d, 12.541c and 13.556a), and, although it has sometimes been doubted whether he really was one,[279] the amount of Peripatetic material in his works, especially in the *Life of Euripides*, shows that there is no reason for this.[280]

A text by Satyros that should be mentioned in connection with character writing is a fragment from his work *On characters* (Περὶ χαρακτήρων). It is in essence a condemnation of prodigality (ἀσωτία). The work itself must have contained several volumes, as Athenaios speaks of it using the plural form (ἐν τοῖς Περὶ χαρακτήρων), but this is the only fragment we have. It is preserved in Athenaios 4.168b–d (= *FHG* 3.164 fr. 20 = fr. 26 Kumaniecki = fr. 27 Schorn), which is part of a longer collection of quotations and anecdotes on the topic of prodigality (4.165d–169b). Schorn (2004: 434) suspects that the fragment may have been part of a chapter on ἀσωτία. I quote the text following Schorn (fr. 27; 2004: 127):

> Οἱ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄσωτοι κατὰ τὸν Ἀμφιν· "πίνουσ᾿ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας δι᾿ ἡμέρας", διασειόμενοι τοὺς κροτάφους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀκράτου, καὶ κατὰ τὸν Δίφιλον· "κεφαλὰς ἔχοντες τεῖς ὥσπερ Ἀρτεμίσιον", πολέμιοι τῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχοντες, ὡς Σάτυρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ χαρακτήρων εἴρηκεν, κατατρέχοντες τὸν ἀγρόν, δι-αρπάζοντες τὴν οἰκίαν, λαφυροπωλοῦντες τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, σκοποῦντες οὐ τί δεδαπάνηται ἀλλὰ τί δαπανηθήσεται, οὐδὲ τί περιέσται ἀλλὰ τί οὐ περιέσται, ἐν τῇ νεότητι τὰ τοῦ γήρως ἐφόδια προκαταναλίσκοντες, χαίροντες τῇ ἑταίρᾳ, οὐ τοῖς ἑταίροις, καὶ τῷ οἴνῳ, οὐ τοῖς συμπόταις.

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[279] Cf., e.g., the opinion of Nesselrath: "der ... doch wohl nur in sehr loser Form dem Peripatos zuzurechnen ist" (1990: 164).

[280] See Schorn 2003: 48–9, 51–2, and Schorn 2004: 10–11. Cf. also West 1974, who cautiously suggests that it is not impossible that Satyros had some connection with the Peripatos at some stage in his life.

("Those, however, who are not prodigal in this sense [sc. as Demokritos mentioned in the preceding passage], in the words of Amphis, 'Drink every day throughout the day,' with temples badly shaken by the unmixed wine; or, as Diphilos says, 'carrying three heads, like an image of Artemis.' 'They are enemies of their own property,' as Satyros says in his work *On Characters*, 'trampling down their fields, pillaging their houses, looting their funds, looking not to what has been spent but to what is going to be spent, not to what will be left over but to what will not be left over; in their youth squandering too soon the provision for their old age, delighting in a mistress, not in mates, and in wine, not in the company at wine.'" [Transl. Charles Burton Gulick, with slight modifications.])

Assessment of the fragment has been quite consentient, and a few examples will suffice. R. G. Ussher (1993: 5) claims that writers in the Theophrastean genre, Satyros among them, "appear flat and lifeless, so far as we can judge them, compared with their master's vivid sketches." J. Diggle (2004: 11) notes that "[t]he style, all rhetorical balance and antithesis, is unlike Theophrastus, but is not unlike some of the spurious accretions."[281] S. Schorn (2004: 435) comments that "[i]nhaltlich und stilistisch unterscheidet sich Satyros hier stark von Theophrast".[282]

Thus it is generally agreed that the work (or what is left of it) is part of the Theophrastean tradition but clearly inferior to the *Characters* of Theophrastos. I do not think, however, that we should try to mould all subsequent character descriptions in the Peripatetic tradition according to the model of Theophrastos. It was not necessarily the intention of the later Peripatetics to *imitate* Theophrastos in composing this kind of character descriptions. What the later Peripatetics do have in common with Theophrastos is the fact that they all, as far as we know, describe negative character types.[283]

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[281] Cf. also Pasquali 1918: 144 (= 1986: 58–9).

[282] He also refers to a similar assessment by Franz Boll already in 1913, see Schorn 2004: 435, n. 1280. Cf., however, Schorn's earlier article (2003: 52), where he states that *On Characters* does stand "stilistisch und inhaltlich in der Tradition Theophrasts."

[283] Cf. Schorn 2004: 435.

There is, of course, no chapter on ἀσωτία in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, but Satyros' passage on the ἄσωτοι can be compared to another description of the same vice in Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. In *EN* 1121a8–b10, Aristotle speaks of the prodigal fellow, who "is neither pleased nor pained at the right things or in the right way." "Prodigality," he says, "exceeds in giving and not taking, and falls short in taking," in contrast to meanness, which "falls short in giving, and exceeds in taking, except in small things" (1121a15).

Other fragments of Satyros have been compared with the *Characters* of Theophrastos, as well. Schorn (2004: 435) has noted that sketches in fr. 20 and 24 are more close to the Theophrastean model. The first of these fragments (= Athen. 12.534b–f) depicts Alkibiades, and the second (= Athen. 6.248f–249a) is concerned with the flatterer Kleisophos.

There is yet another text by Satyros that should be mentioned, viz. his *Life of Euripides*, preserved on a papyrus from Oxyrhynchos.[284] Recently Stefan Schorn has emphasized that Satyros characterizes Euripides in a way that closely resembles the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle (Schorn 2003: 52 and 2004).

3.4. Excursus: on character writing in the Stoic school

Whether one accepts the Stoic identity of the Ariston or not, it cannot be denied that the Stoics, at least in later times, were interested in character studies, as well. The most important fragment is Seneca's paraphrasing of Poseidonios in *ep*. 95.65–7 (= fr. 176 Edelstein–Kidd = A236 Vimercati):[285]

> *(65) Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem (nihil enim nos hoc verbo uti prohibet) sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat; his adicit causarum inquisitionem, aetiologian quam quare nos dicere non audeamus, cum grammatici, custodes Latini sermonis, suo iure ita appellant, non video. Ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque*

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[284] *POxy*. IX 1176 = fr. 19 Kumaniecki = fr. 6 Schorn.
[285] For an interpretation of this fragment see also Ranocchia 2007.

virtutis; hanc Posidonius 'ethologian' vocat, quidam 'characterismon'
appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas reddentem, quibus
inter se similia discriminentur. (66) Haec res eandem vim habet quam
praecipere; nam qui praecipit dicit 'illa facies si voles temperans esse', qui
describit ait 'temperans est qui illa facit, qui illis abstinet'. Quaeris quid
intersit? alter praecepta virtutis dat, alter exemplar. Descriptiones has et,
ut publicanorum utar verbo, iconismos ex usu esse confiteor: propona-
mus laudanda, invenietur imitator. (67) Putas utile dari tibi argumenta
per quae intellegas nobilem equum, ne fallaris empturus, ne operam
perdas in ignavo? Quanto hoc utilius est excellentis animi notas nosse,
quas ex alio in se transferre permittitur.

("[65] Poseidonios pronounces his opinion that not only 'pre-
cepting'[286] (I don't see anything to stop me using the term) is
necessary for moral training, but so is recommending, consoling
and encouraging too;[287] and to that list he adds the investigation of
the causes—I don't see why I can't call it aetiology, since our
professors of language, guardians of our Latin tongue, do so on
their own authority. He says that description of each virtue will
also be useful. Poseidonios calls this 'ethology'; others call it
'characterization', i.e. allotting a stamp or mark for each virtue and
vice whereby like forms may be distinguished. [66] This has the
same force as giving a precept; for anyone who gives a precept is
saying, 'If you want to be self-controlled, you will do this'; while a
person who is giving a description is saying, 'The self-controlled
person is the man who does this, keeps off that'. What's the
difference?, you ask. Well, the one gives precepts for virtue, the
other an exemplar of virtue. These 'descriptions', 'specifications' to
use the technical jargon of contractors, are useful, I admit: in
setting forward an example for praise, you will find an imitator.
[67] You think it useful to be given evidence whereby you can
recognize a thoroughbred horse, and not be cheated in your
purchase, or waste time on a nag. How much more useful then

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[286] I.e. the use of maxims, rules, injunctions in moral training (Kidd 1999: 242).

[287] Kidd (1999: 242) notes that these (*suasio, consolatio, exhortatio*) are all terms for set
categories in both Greek and Latin philosophy and rhetoric.

this is, to recognize the marks of an outstanding mind, marks which can be transmitted from another to yourself." [Transl. Kidd 1999: 242–3, with slight modifications.])

Unlike the terms *suasio*, *consolatio* and the like, *ethologia* (ἠθολογία) is felt by Seneca to require more explanation, probably because it is more idiosyncratic to Poseidonios and unfamiliar in this connection (Kidd 1988: 650). It is characterized generally as description of each virtue, which is by some called *characterismos* (χαρακτηρισμός), i.e. distinguishing by a χαρακτήρ, stamp or mark.

As has been noted (Kidd 1988: 650), Seneca distinguishes *ethologia* from *praeceptio*. They differ in 1) linguistic form: a precept may be expressed as a hypothetical injunction—if you want to be self-controlled, you will do this; but ἠθολογία is couched in a descriptive statement: the self-controlled person is the man who does this, keeps off that; and 2) logical function: the one gives precepts of virtue, the other an exemplar of virtue.

It is emphasized that *ethologia* is a useful and necessary tool of practical ethics, because to display a model of virtue is to invite its imitation (Diggle 2004: 11).

References to Poseidonios' concepts are frequent in Seneca, although he does not always agree with him. In *ep*. 87.32 he transmits a definition of arrogance, which seems to derive from Poseidonios: *Quae bona sunt fiduciam faciunt, divitiae audaciam; quae bona sunt magnitudinem animi dant, divitiae insolentiam. Nihil autem aliud est insolentia quam species magnitudinis falsa.* Cf. also *ep*. 104.20–22.

The Stoics seem to have been interested in definitions and this interest is of some importance for our topic. Thus, we have a Stoic definition of ἀγροικία by Chrysippos, which is more detailed and narrower than the one appended to the *Characters* of Theophrastos: (φασι) τὴν γὰρ ἀγροικίαν ἀπειρίαν εἶναι τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐθῶν καὶ νόμων (*SVF* 3.169.34, fr. 677.2), i.e. boorishness is ignorance in regard to customs and laws of the town. At the same time this definition omits a specific negative flavour. Boorishness is here connected with limited social experience; it is a kind of lack of social breeding as manifested in an urban environment.

Another definition of Chrysippos is that of δεισιδαιμονία, which resembles the definition of the *Characters* in that the negativity of the type is not reflected in the definition (fr. 408): <δεισιδαιμονία> δὲ φόβος θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων.

PART 4. CHARACTER TYPES IN ACTION

4.1. Εἰρωνεία and εἴρων:
Sokrates and the tradition of dissembling

Sokrates is one of the most famous, and controversial, characters in the history of philosophy, but his role is also eminent in political, legal, and literary history of the Western culture.[288] However, it is also well known that not all Greek authors depicted him in positive light. The Sokrates of the philosophers and the Sokrates of the comic tradition, for example, represent a very different kind of person. In addition to this, the Sokrates of Sokrates himself—as written down by, e.g., Plato—is sometimes a curious, and ironic, compilation of both traditions. It is not really the question of how the actual, real Sokrates behaved or what kind of person he was. Nowadays it is generally accepted that the picture of Sokrates that we encounter in the works of Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, i.e. that of a person of high personal integrity and a teacher of philosophy, is more accurate than the comic version of an immoral sophist.[289] What is interesting, however, is the extent and endurance of a popular tradition that is not limited to comedy but may have been influenced by it to a large degree.

It is interesting to see that Sokrates has been labelled with a great number of notions that are used for depicting negative character traits (or what were considered negative character traits) in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, e.g. εἴρων, βδελυρός, ὀψιμαθής, ἀλαζών, ὑπερήφανος. In addition to single epithets we often encounter paired expressions and, to a lesser degree, what may be called "moral clusters".[290] The aim of the use of such terms may differ depending on the genre. In the orators, for

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[288] The trial of Sokrates has been called the second-famous in the history, after the trial of Jesus. Suffice it to quote one opinion on his importance (Bruns 1896: 203): "an seiner Gestalt [hat] die Kunst griechischer Charakteristik die höchsten Triumphe gefeiert" and "das Interesse des Publicums für das Individuelle [hat] ihm gegenüber seinen Höhepunkt erreicht."

[289] Cf., e.g., Fisher 2001: 319.

[290] For the use of the term "moral clusters", see, e.g., Fuqua 1993.

example, the purpose is often character denigration in the context of what is usually called ἠθοποιία.[291]

In the following I focus on one specific notion, viz. Sokrates as an εἴρων. The figure of εἴρων is an obvious one to begin with when talking about Sokrates and his representation in the Greek literature.[292] The main sources for connections of such types with Sokrates are the Attic comedy and oratory, but I set no strict limits and also encompass other authors in order to see how the model of Sokrates has transformed during the centuries following him.

The abstract noun εἰρωνεία is derived from εἴρων, the original meaning of which is not clear. There are various explanations, none of which seems to be particularly certain, and some of which are indeed curious.

1) The most usual explanation is to connect εἴρων etymologically with either the verb εἴρειν 'to say, to tell' or εἴρεσθαι 'to ask'.[293]
2) Another hypothesis is the association of the stem of the word with the Latin *errāre* and identification of its meaning with that of ὁ πλανῶν (= deceiver; Ernout & Meillet *s.v.*; cf. Markantonatos 1975: 16).
3) It has been suggested that the word was derived from the Spartan ἴρην (= Attic εἴρην, a young soldier whose military training included cunning and deception, which were trained using various paramilitary exercises), with the stem-ending replaced by the colloquial nominalizing suffix -ων, which had an important and productive role of creating epithets and nicknames from adjectives and nouns (Cotter 1992: 31). According to this, εἴρων may have designated a man who was deceitfully cunning like an εἴρην.[294]

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[291] Burke (1972: 10–11) divides character denigration into three: simple disparagement, terms of abuse, and invective (see below, ch. 4.4.1). It is sometimes, however, quite difficult to distinguish between these groups.

[292] Research on the term, including in connection with Sokrates, is abundant. E.g., see (in chronological order) Schmidt 1873, Ribbeck 1876, Büchner 1941, Stark 1953, Gaiser 1964, Pavlovskis 1968, Bergson 1971, Markantonatos 1975, Amory 1981–2, Vlastos 1987, Gooch 1987, Vlastos 1991, Scolnicov 1991, Cotter 1992, Gordon 1996, Edmunds 2004. Cf. also the short synopsis in Diggle 2004: 166–7.

[293] Frisk *s.v.*, see also Markantonatos 1975: 16 and Gourinat 1986, but cf. Chantraine *s.v.*

[294] Cf. Cotter 1992: 31–2 for various examples of words with similar derivation.

4) The word εἴρων could originally have been a proper name of some Athenian who was notorious for his slyness, and become used for persons with the same vice (Markantonatos 1975: 17, n. 1).[295]

To be sure, these individual hypotheses are not exclusive, as the etymological meaning of a word can be supplemented by a secondary pragmatic meaning.

Before Theophrastos, the *nomen agentis* εἴρων is found only in comedy (Aristophanes, Philemon) and in Aristotle.

4.1.1. Comedy

Aristophanes uses the word εἴρων and its derivatives for both Sokrates and the sophists. The word may have come to wider use in the time of the first Sophistic and become fashionable; otherwise, Aristophanes probably would not have used it in this manner (Bergson 1971: 411). There are three relevant passages.

In *Wasps*, we are dealing with an attempt of deception. Philokleon lies saying that he wants to sell his donkey, in order to escape from a guarded house. Xanthias, the guarding slave, says to him (*V*. 174 f.): οἵαν πρόφασιν καθῆκεν, ὡς εἰρωνικῶς, ἵν᾽ αὐτὸν ἐκπέμψειας, and Bdelykleon adds (175 f.): ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔσπασεν ταύτῃ γ᾽· ἐγὼ γὰρ ᾐσθόμην τεχνωμένου.

In *Av*. 1208 ff., Peisthetairos asks the goddess Iris by which gate she has entered the city of the birds. When Iris says she does not know (1210), Peisthetairos accuses her of dissembling (1211: Ἤκουσας αὐτῆς οἷον εἰρωνεύεται;), probably meaning that she is concealing something she knows very well, and that she wants to present herself more stupid than she is (cf. Büchner 1941: 343; Steinmetz 1962: 34). Here, Aristophanes seems to refer to the Sokratic display of ignorance (cf. Iris' remark οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε in 1210).

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[295] Parallels are drawn with the vulgar use of the proper names Μάρκος (= blunderer, naive) and Γιάννης (= inexperienced, silly) in Modern Greek. This would be a proof of the word's popular origin.

In *Nu.* 449, εἴρων is a part of a catalogue of invectives that also contains other types present in the *Characters*.[296] Attempts have been made to explain its meaning with the help of words that surround it.[297] This approach can, however, be problematic, because the exact meaning of many of these words is unclear. In addition, we cannot presume that the invectives in a comic passage are arranged in a specific order, and we must also take into account metrical necessities. Thus, the conclusions reached using this approach have been substantially different.[298] It seems safer to presume that the comic effect is attained by the amount of invectives that are quickly enumerated (Bergson 1971: 411). Nevertheless, it has been noted that the types in the passage are exclusively negative, and those in the same line can all be connected to materials such as oil and leather, referring to slipperiness, viscosity, stretching etc. (Büchner 1941: 343; cf. Ribbeck 1876: 381).

From Philemon we have a fragment that tells us that the nature of all animals from the same species is similar, whereas in the case of humans it varies. Here the adjective εἴρων is opposed to αὐθέκαστος.[299] This last word is seen in both negative and positive sense in ancient Greek texts. Positive sense is most evident in Aristotle, who uses the term to denote a positive mean between dissembling (εἰρωνεία) and boastfulness (ἀλαζονεία).[300]

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[296] *Nu.* 445–51 (types that also appear in *Characters* are written in bold): θρασύς, εὔγλωττος, τολμηρός, ἴτης, / **βδελυρός**, ψευδῶν συγκολλητής, / εὑρησιεπής, περίτριμμα δικῶν, / κύρβις, κρόταλον, κίναδος, τρύμη, / μάσθλης, **εἴρων**, γλοιός, **ἀλαζών**, / κέντρων, μιαρός, στρόφις, ἀργαλέος, / ματιολοιχός.

[297] See, e.g., Ribbeck 1876: 381–2, Büchner 1941: 343, Stark 1953: 81–2. A scholion to the play tries to define εἴρων as ὁ πάντα παίζων καὶ διαχλευάζων καὶ εἰρωνευόμενος· ἀπατεὼν καὶ ὑποκριτής.

[298] This is also obvious from some renderings. Cf., e.g., Ribbeck 1876: 382 (*Flausenmacher*), Büchner 1941: 343 (*Bescheidene und Hilflose*), Stark 1953: 81–2 (*abgefeimter, heuchlerischer Schwindler*).

[299] Fr. 93.6–7 *PCG* (= 89.6–7 Kock): οὐκ ἔστ᾽ ἀλώπηξ ἡ μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει / ἡ δ᾽ αὐθέκαστος. Cf. also Markantonatos 1975: 16.

[300] *EN* 1127a23 ff. In other passages, Aristotle uses truthfulness (ἀλήθεια) as the mean between these two extremes (see below).

4.1.2. Plato

Sokrates is the most famous εἴρων in the Greek literature.[301] In Plato, Sokrates never uses the word εἴρων for himself or his method.[302] Even in *Ap*. 38a, where he uses a participle from the word εἰρωνεύεσθαι, he is actually presenting the words of his opponents: οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ. This is not surprising, for an εἴρων usually does not claim to be one (cf. Bergson 1971: 410, n. 2). He can, however, claim that he is not one.[303]

Plato uses the term in speaking of some sophists, e.g. in *Sph*. 268a, where he mentions people who are μιμηταὶ δικαιοσύνης, leaving the impression of having some sort of knowledge but not really believing it. He distinguishes two types of μιμηταί: ἁπλοῦς μιμητής and εἰρωνικὸς μιμητής. In the case of the latter, there are further subtypes (268b): τὸν μὲν δημοσίᾳ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλήθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύ-εσθαι /---/, τὸν δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ. The first is called a δημολογικός, the second is a sophist (cf. Bergson 1971: 410). This is deliberately wrong behaviour, just like in the case of *Cra*. 384a–b. There, Hermogenes tells Sokrates that Kratylos did not want to clarify his claim that names (ὀνόματα) are given to things being (ὄντα) by nature, but was just trying to leave the impression of knowing: οὔτε ἀποσαφεῖ οὐδὲν εἰρωνεύεταί τε πρός με, προσποιούμενός τι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ διανοεῖσθαι ὡς εἰδὼς περὶ αὐτοῦ. Here, as in the case of the previous passage, we are dealing with a different kind of εἰρωνεία than that of Sokrates: Kratylos does not pretend not to know, he pretends to know. In *Lg*. 908d–e, Plato uses the word εἰρωνικόν for the kind of atheists who are not willing to publicly show their contempt for sacrifice and oaths but pretend that they are believers (cf. Ribbeck 1876: 383). In *Euthd*. 302b there is a discussion between Sokrates and Dionysodoros,

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[301] He is "l'uomo-simbolo dell'ironia greca" (Beta 2004: 248).

[302] Xenophon never uses the word. Cf. Gooch 1987: 100, n. 11; Ribbeck 1876: 382.

[303] Cf. Cicero *Fam*. 4.4.1: *Et ego ipse /---/ me non esse verborum admodum inopem agnosco* (εἰρωνεύεσθαι *enim non necesse est), sed tamen idem (nec hoc* εἰρωνευόμενος) *facile cedo tuorum scriptorum subtilitati et elegentiae.*

and Sokrates describes the latter making an "ironical" pause in his speech (εἰρωνικῶς πάνυ ἐπισχών).

At the same time Plato lets some sophists use the word εἴρων for Sokrates. Thus, in *R*. 336b–e, Thrasymachos vehemently intervenes in the conversation and demands that Sokrates at last state his opinion. When Sokrates dodges, Thrasymachos accuses him of his "customary dissembling".[304] As the passage shows, the behaviour and response of Sokrates was predictable and characteristic to him. Indeed, in *Smp*. 216e, Alkibiades characterizes Sokrates' way of life as dissembling and dallying: εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ.

Thus, the word εἴρων and its derivates are used by both the sophists and Sokrates, whereby both use it for the other party. A good example is *Grg*. 489e, where Kallikles rejects praise that is not meant seriously, reproaching Sokrates for εἰρωνεία (εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες). Sokrates, however, directs the same reproach against Kallikles himself (πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με). In this situation it is not at all surprising that people made no distinction between Sokrates and the sophists, but found that Sokrates, as the most famous εἴρων, is also the most dangerous specimen of the "species" (cf. Ribbeck 1876: 384).

4.1.3. Aristotle

One might expect that Aristotle tries to define εἰρωνεία when occasion offers, or at least to specify its meaning in his systematized approach. However, he seems to have been inconsistent in this.

Starting with the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle's approach indeed seems to be controversial. In the second book of the treatise, *Rh*. 1379b30–1, he briefly notes that the "ironists" (τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις) make angry those who speak seriously (πρὸς σπουδάζοντας), and that εἰρωνεία indicates contempt (καταφρονητικὸν γὰρ ἡ εἰρωνεία). Aristotle's attitude here is not entirely clear; his aim is probably only to enumerate the causes of

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[304] 337a: αὕτη ᾿κείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ ταῦτ᾿ ἐγὼ ἤδη τε καὶ τούτοις προύλεγον ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, ἀλλ᾿ εἰρωνεύσοιο καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο, εἴ τίς τί σε ἐρωτᾷ.

anger, and not to distinguish them into just and unjust (Pavlovskis 1968: 22; cf. Bergson 1971: 412).

A little later in the same book (*Rh*. 1382b19–22), Aristotle deals with a more refined type, noting that "of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet (πρᾶοι), dissembling (εἴρωνες), unscrupulous (πανοῦργοι); since we never know when they are upon us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance." Here, εἰρωνεία is a kind of dissimulation, something that might be unpleasant to notice in one's opponents, but not to notice it may be disastrous (Pavlovskis 1968: 22). But perhaps εἰρωνεία is so dangerous only if it is found together with other negative qualities found in a πανοῦργος? (*ibid*.)

In any case, near the end of the *Rhetoric*, 1419b8–9, Aristotle notes that εἰρωνεία is more suitable for a free man (ἐλευθεριώτερον) than buffoonery (βωμολοχία), because the εἴρων jokes to amuse himself, whereas the buffoon jokes to amuse other people. Here, Aristotle is speaking about various kinds of jests (εἴδη γελοίων) and refers the reader to his own classification in the *Poetics*.[305]

The last passage of the *Rhetoric*, 1420a1–3, suggests that one may want to compare his own case with that of his opponent, and one way to do this would be to use modest "irony" (ἐξ εἰρωνείας, sc. παραβάλλειν), as in "He certainly said so-and-so, but I said so-and-so" (οὗτος γὰρ τάδ᾽ εἶπεν, ἐγὼ δὲ τάδε) or "How vain he would have been if he had proved all this instead of that!" (καὶ τί ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ τάδε ἔδειξεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ταδί;) Thus, Aristotle does not explain in the *Rhetoric* what he considers the nature of εἰρωνεία. The reason may be that he presumed it to be well known (Bergson 1971: 412).

In the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (ch. 21.1–2), we see the term εἰρωνεία used in the way it was generally understood in later times:

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[305] This must have been in the second book of the work that has been lost (see also Nesselrath 1990: 125 ff.). Theophrastos also wrote a work titled Περὶ γελοίου (D.L. 5.46); it has been suggested that he may also have covered εἰρωνεία in it (Markantonatos 1975: 19, n. 1).

Εἰρωνεία δέ ἐστι λέγειν τι μὴ λέγειν προσποιούμενον ἢ {ἐν} τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὀνόμασι τὰ πράγματα προσαγορεύειν.

("Irony is to say something and pretend that you are not saying it, or else to call things by the names of their contraries." [Transl. E. S. Forster.])

Turning to Aristotle's ethical treatises, we may ask whether the situation with εἰρωνεία is different there. Of course one has to take into account the different aims of these works. In ethical writings, Aristotle uses εἰρωνεία to describe social behaviour of men, and also attempts to define it. Here, εἰρωνεία is introduced into the tripartite system of ethical qualities that focuses on the doctrine of mean (τὸ μέσον; see above, ch. 1.3.1). One of the best-known passages is *EN* 1108a19–23, where εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία are two extremes of the positive mean, viz. ἀλήθεια:

περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων <ὁ ἔχων>

("With regard to truth, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is mock modesty and the person characterized by it mock-modest.")[306]

The same kind of division can be seen in *EN* 1127a21 ff.:

δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζὼν προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζόνων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὢν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ

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[306] 'Mock modesty' and 'mock-modest' are used by W. D. Ross in his translation (revised by J. O. Urmson) published in Barnes 1984. Cf. also Table 1 above, ch. 1.3.1.

ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτόν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω.

("The boastful man, then, is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring repute, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has, and the mock-modest man on the other hand to disclaim what he has or belittle it, while the man who observes the mean is one who calls a thing by its own name, being truthful both in life and in word, owning to what he has, and neither more nor less.")

There are further instances of the same division in other ethical works of the Aristotelian corpus, cf. *EE* 1233b38 ff., *MM* 1193a28 ff.

In the case of Aristotle, one may presume that while describing εἰρωνεία he had the personality of Sokrates in his mind. This may have influenced the way in which he composed these descriptions. In the fourth book of *Nichomachean Ethics* (*EN* 1127b22 ff.), Aristotle even mentions Sokrates in the course of the discussion:

οἱ δ᾽ εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ ἤθη φαίνονται, οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει.

("Mock-modest people, who understate things, seem more attractive in character; for they are thought to speak not for gain but to avoid parade; and here too it is qualities which bring reputation that they disclaim, as Sokrates used to do.")

It has been noted that usually Aristotle does not give illustrations to the types he describes, especially as specific as this (Gooch 1987: 95). Sokrates may be the reason why εἰρωνεία can, in some cases, have positive connotations. In discussing the μεγαλόψυχος, Aristotle notes that this type is "given to telling the truth, except when he speaks in

irony to the vulgar."[307] The *communis opinio* is that here Aristotle has Sokrates in mind.

Note also that right after mentioning Sokrates as an example of εἴρων in *EN* 1127b25–6, Aristotle goes on to distinguish worse types of εἴρωνες (*EN* 1127b26 ff.):

> οἱ δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ φανερὰ [προσποιούμενοι] βαυκοπανοῦργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρονητότεροί εἰσιν· καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν.

> ("Those who disclaim trifling and obvious qualities are called humbugs and are more contemptible; and sometimes this seems to be boastfulness, like the Spartan dress; for both excess and great deficiency are boastful.")

Then he returns again to the more "attractive" kind of εἰρωνεία, although not mentioning Sokrates as an example any more (*EN* 1127b29 ff.):

> οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδὼν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαρίεντες φαίνονται.

> ("But those who use understatement with moderation and understate about matters that do not very much force themselves on our notice seem attractive.")

If one knows how to control one's εἰρωνεία, it can have positive applications. It can even be practical in pedagogical matters (cf. Pavlovskis 1968: 25). Thus, it seems likely that Aristotle's attitude towards Sokrates formed the background of his treatment of εἰρωνεία (see Büchner 1941: 344; Pavlovskis 1968: 24 f.; Bergson 1971: 413, n. 4). Sokrates may have been "the controlling model for the analysis rather than an innocuous example" (Gooch 1987: 95).

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[307] *EN* 1124b30 f.: ... καὶ ἀληθευτικός (sc. ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι), πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι᾽ εἰρωνείαν· εἴρων δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. Here, εἴρων is the conjecture of Fr. Susemihl; most of the MSS have εἰρωνεία, while N^b has εἴρωνα.

The opinion that the person of Sokrates, and his individual usage of εἰρωνεία, gave the term a new content cannot be accepted without limitations. According to Ribbeck (1876: 386), the opponents of Sokrates, who did not like his methods, started to call him an εἴρων (cf. Plato *R.* 337a), but later when he was generally acknowledged and admired, the meaning changed.[308] It is probable, however, that the original εἴρων lived on and only for posterity did "Sokratic irony" become the model (Bergson 1971: 414; cf. also Markantonatos 1975: 17, n. 4). The expression εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους then denoted deliberate modesty which was used to help a collocutor towards real understanding.

In his ethical works, Aristotle systematically introduces a more positive picture of the εἴρων than the one found in Aristophanes or Plato. By doing this he unintentionally idealized the Sokratic εἰρωνεία, as Sokrates did not use εἰρωνεία only when talking to οἱ πολλοί, but also in associating with the σπουδάζοντες, who did not really like it at all (cf. *Rh.* 1379b31 f.). That the inclusion of εἰρωνεία into the tripartite system of ethical qualities did not restrict the use of the word is shown by passages in Aristotle himself (cf. Bergson 1971: 414). The meaning of εἰρωνεία depends on the situation, the motives of the εἴρων, his person and social context. Aristophanes used the word in a not so pleasant way for both the sophists and Sokrates, as did Plato for some sophists. On the one hand, Aristotle frees the word from its everyday context to introduce it to his systematic account, but on the other hand he uses it the same way as Aristophanes and Plato, i.e. in a regular "practical" sense.[309]

Something similar is done by Demosthenes in the *First Philippic*, when he describes the idleness and verbosity of the Athenians as opposed to Philip's untiring urge to take action, and characterizes the defeatists as εἴρωνες (cf. Bergson 1971: 414)—see 4.7 and 4.37. In both passages εἰρωνεία is opposed to words denoting acting and action (πράττειν, πρᾶγμα); cf. also 60.18. The εἰρωνεία, as described by Demosthenes, consists of unwillingness to participate in what is socially beneficial and necessary. It may be reminded that Sokrates was not one

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[308] See also Stark 1953: 82 f., Steinmetz 1962: 35 and cf. Bergson 1971: 414, Pavlovskis 1968: 25.

[309] Also for sophists, cf. *Pol.* 1275b26, where Gorgias is said to have spoken τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ᾽ εἰρωνευόμενος.

of the passive citizens, as he even took part in the Poteidaia campaign (432–429 BCE; cf. Plato *Smp.* 219e ff., *Chrm.* 153a ff.).

The Aristotelian corpus also contains hints to physiognomical representation of the εἴρων. Eyebrows that curve out towards the temples are said to be a sign of humour and dissimulation.[310] The εἴρων is described as having a chubby and drowsy face and wrinkled eyes.[311] This physiognomical image may well have been suitable for marking those politically passive persons that were reproached because of their εἰρωνεία by Demosthenes (see above) and Deinarchos (2.11).

4.1.4. Theophrastos

In the *Characters* of Theophrastos, εἰρωνεία is the first of the types described. The most common translation of the word has been 'dissembling' (Diggle, Rusten, Edmonds), although some (Vellacott, Jebb & Sandys) have used 'irony'. For the convenience of referral I quote the text of the chapter in its entirety according to the edition of Diggle (2004: 64, 66):

> [1] [Ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρωνεία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι, ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν, προσποίησις ἐπὶ χεῖρον πράξεως καὶ λόγων.]
>
> [2] ὁ δὲ εἴρων τοιοῦτός τις οἷος προσελθὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐθέλειν λαλεῖν †οὐ μισεῖν†· καὶ ἐπαινεῖν παρόντας οἷς ἐπέθετο λάθρᾳ καὶ τούτοις συλλυπεῖσθαι ἡττημένοις· καὶ συγγνώμην δὲ ἔχειν τοῖς αὑτὸν κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένοις <γελᾶν>. [3] καὶ †πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικουμένους καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντας† πρᾴως διαλέγεσθαι. [4] καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνειν κατὰ σπουδὴν βουλομένοις προστάξαι ἐπανελθεῖν, καὶ μηδὲν ὧν πράττει ὁμολογῆσαι ἀλλὰ φῆσαι βουλεύεσθαι καὶ προσποιήσασθαι ἄρτι παραγεγονέναι καὶ ὀψὲ γίγνεσθαι [αὐτὸν]

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[310] *HA* 491b16–17: αἱ (sc. ὀφρύες) δὲ πρὸς τοὺς κροτάφους μωκοῦ καὶ εἴρωνος (sc. σημεῖον).

[311] [Arist.] *Phgn.* 3.808a27–29: εἴρωνος σημεῖα πίονα τὰ περὶ τὸ πρόσωπον, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα ῥυτιδώδη· ὑπνῶδες τὸ πρόσωπον τῷ ἤθει φαίνεται.

καὶ μαλακισθῆναι. [5] καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δανειζομένους καὶ ἐρανίζοντας < > ὡς οὐ πωλεῖ καὶ μὴ πωλῶν φῆσαι πωλεῖν. καὶ ἀκούσας τι μὴ προσποιεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδὼν φῆσαι μὴ ἑωρακέναι καὶ ὁμολογήσας μὴ μεμνῆσθαι· καὶ τὰ μὲν σκέψεσθαι φάσκειν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ θαυμάζειν, τὰ δ᾽ ἤδη ποτὲ καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω διαλογίσασθαι. [6] καὶ τὸ ὅλον δεινὸς τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι· "Οὐ πιστεύω", "Οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω", "Ἐκπλήττομαι", καὶ ⸆λέγει ἑαυτὸν ἕτερον γεγονέναι⸆, "Καὶ μὴν οὐ ταῦτα πρὸς ἐμὲ διεξῄει", "Παράδοξόν μοι τὸ πρᾶγμα", "Ἄλλῳ τινὶ λέγε", "Ὁπότερον δὲ σοὶ ἀπιστήσω ἢ ἐκείνου καταγνῶ ἀποροῦμαι", "Ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα, μὴ σὺ θᾶττον πιστεύεις".

[7] [τοιαύτας φωνὰς καὶ πλοκὰς καὶ παλιλλογίας εὑρεῖν ἔστι τοῦ εἴρωνος. τὰ δὴ τῶν ἠθῶν μὴ ἁπλᾶ ἀλλ᾽ ἐπίβουλα φυλάττεσθαι μᾶλλον δεῖ ἢ τοὺς ἔχεις.]

The presentation of the εἴρων here is twofold. The spurious definition says that "Dissembling, to define it in outline, would seem to be a pretence for the worse in action and speech."[312] Thus, the dissembler makes his deeds and words appear poorer than they really are. This recalls Aristotle's definition in *EN* 1108a19 ff., quoted above in ch. 4.1.3. There are some differences: Aristotle uses the word προσποίησις in absolute form, whereas the definition in the *Characters* connects it with 'action and speech' or 'deeds and words' (πράξεων καὶ λόγων).[313] The same phrase can, however, be found some lines before the quoted passage in Aristotle, *EN* 1108a10 f.: πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ (sc. μεσότητες) εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. In addition, Aristotle uses the comparative ἔλαττον, while the definition of the *Characters* has χεῖρον, perhaps influenced by ὁ ... ἐπὶ τὰ χείρω καθ᾽ αὑτοῦ ψευδόμενος μὴ ἀγνοῶν εἴρων in *EE* 1233b39 ff. This does not affect the meaning of the phrase, even if χεῖρον might refer to more qualitative self-denigration than ἔλαττον (Büchner 1941: 347; cf. Stein 1992: 64).

The definition refers to self-denigration at both verbal and practical levels. The man who is described in the following situations is a

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[312] This is the translation of Diggle (2004).
[313] Cf. also the definitions of *Char*. 6, 8, 13 and 14.

dissembler. Whether he dissembles for the sake of the action or has any motive in doing so is a question of dispute.[314] In any case, this is not what is meant by the definition. The latter is, rather, connected with the picture of εἴρων drawn by Aristotle (cf. also Stein 1992: 63).

M. Stein (1992: 63) believes that the definition has been composed by an unknown author on the basis of Aristotle's parallel expression. Both the definition and description have been connected with the person of Sokrates (see, e.g., already Ribbeck 1876 and cf. Gomperz 1889ab). P. Steinmetz (1962: 42) has tried to show that the aim of Theophrastos in this chapter is to combine the broad and the narrow, Sokratic meaning of (quasi-)modesty of the word εἰρωνεία (cf. the critique of this theory in Gaiser 1964: 27–8).

Theophrastos must have been aware of the way the εἴρων was treated in his teacher's ethical works. The question is, how much did he consider this while composing this sketch? The spurious definition seems to fit with Aristotle's attitude, whereas the description leaves an impression of a more negative type. It seems probable that Theophrastos depicts the so-called original εἴρων, and the more positive image of the type, connected with Sokrates, is an exception for him.

He most probably knows that Sokrates has been considered one of the most prominent εἴρωνες, but deliberately avoids mentioning his name, just as he never mentions a possible example in the case of other sketches. In this he differs from Ariston, who mentions Sokrates explicitly several times. The negative attitude towards Sokrates as seen in Ariston does not, however, mean that the author could not have been a Peripatetic.

The sketch that follows the definition depicts the behaviour of an εἴρων in various situations. The topology of Theophrastos' descriptions is usually quite similar—he shows his types at the market, courthouse, theatre, on the streets, etc. In the case of εἰρωνεία, the situations are not marked so that we could easily locate the man in one of these arenas.

It is the description of a man who pretends to feel the way he really does not feel, and conceals his true feelings. In §2 we have a description of the εἴρων's behaviour towards people with whom he is in some kind

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[314] See Diggle 2004: 167, who cites opinions of both sides.

of conflict. He will turn to his enemies and chat with them, not letting his hatred show. Note that the author speaks of a deliberate encounter (προσελθὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς), not an accidental one (Stein 1992: 46, Diggle 2004: 169). The end of the sentence, ἐθέλειν λαλεῖν οὐ μισεῖν, is textually problematic, therefore οὐ μισεῖν is obelized by Diggle (and athetized by some; cf. a summary of emendations by earlier scholars in Diggle 2004: 169–70). Some (e.g. Steinmetz 1962: 32, 37) have suggested that μισεῖν here denotes an expression of feeling, and indeed this is the way the epitome M interprets the passage (προσελθὼν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ μισεῖν). This does not exclude the possibility that we are dealing with a gloss, but it need not be as unfortunate one as has been thought (e.g. Stein 1992: 47).

What is important here is that conventional morality dictates that enemies should be treated as enemies, and one's hatred towards them should not be concealed.[315] While going to an enemy and chatting (or talking, λαλεῖν is used in both senses in the *Characters*) to him may be an indication of dissembling, the way how this is done seems to be even more indicative. Thus, I do not agree with Diggle (2004: 170) on the point that concealment of hatred, passive behaviour, is a less telling detail than chatting to enemies, active dissimulation. In addition, similar parallelisms also occur in the next scenes.

The εἴρων as depicted in this scene can be compared with the arrogant man (ὑπερήφανος) of *Char*. 24, who will never be the one to make the first approach (§6), and does not speak to passers-by while walking in the street, keeping his head down and looking up only when it suits him (§8). Some scenes further, the εἴρων is, however, quite similar to the arrogant man (see below). This reminds us that single types in the *Characters* should never be studied isolated from the whole work (cf. Stein 1992: 46).

Why the εἴρων dissembles and wishes to chat with his enemies may remain unclear. Those who have searched for motives in the chapter have usually come to a conclusion that the man dissembles to avoid trouble and inconvenience (Büchner 1941: 348, Gaiser 1964: 28, Bergson 1971: 415, Stein 1992: 61–2, Rusten 1993: 168). This, however, does not

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[315] See Büchner 1941: 347 f., Dover 1974: 181 ff., Diggle 2004: 170; cf. Plato, *R.* 332d, 335d–36a. According to Aristotle (*EN* 1124b27), he who conceals his hatred is afraid.

explain why he turns to his enemies, when he could have avoided them (Diggle 2004: 167). Büchner (1941: 348) has also suggested that the man just want his enemies to become angrier or wishes to hurt them even more under the disguise of a friend, but this evidently does not belong to the behavioural traits of the εἴρων (Stein 1992: 46). However, there is no need to look for a motive. The man does these things just because this is his behavioural regularity (see Gomperz 1889a: 15, Fortenbaugh 1996: 454 and elsewhere, Diggle 2004: 167). Assuming that the figure of Sokrates is somehow behind the εἴρων, the enemies could be understood as the sophists (Ribbeck 1876: 394).

The next scene depicts the dissembler praising to their face the people whom he has attacked behind their back, and commiserating with them when they have lost a lawsuit. One may compare the description of εἴρων in the fragments of Ariston, where we learn that the man is in the habit of praising someone whom he faults (*PHerc*. 1008 col. 22.4 = 21m.4 SFOD: ὥστ᾽ ἐπαινεῖν ὃν ψέγε[ι; cf. Steinmetz 1962: 38, Stein 1992: 48). Those who see the figure of Sokrates behind the sketch have interpreted the phrase ἐπιτίθεσθαι λάθρα as 'secretly attack in the conversation', thus referring to the Sokratic ways of leading a discussion (Ribbeck 1876: 394). Diggle connects "those who have lost a lawsuit" with the previous phrase, but this has also been considered a separate scene.[316] The verb ἡττᾶσθαι[317] need not denote losing a lawsuit, in fact it often does not, unless it is qualified by some object (e.g., μεγάλην δίκην in *Char*. 11.6; cf. Stein 1992: 47), but this would seem to be the simplest interpretation in this passage. In addition, the word is also found unqualified in several texts (see Diggle 2004: 170). Some scholars have argued that the verb may suggest that someone is a "loser" in a discussion, as often in the Platonic dialogues, thus once again referring to Sokrates (Ribbeck 1876: 394).

In the next scene the εἴρων forgives people who speak abusively about him and, accepting Darvaris' conjecture <γελᾶν> as Diggle does,

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[316] Thus the emendations, such as <οἷς / πρὸς οὓς δικάζεται> τούτοις ... (Rusten 1993: 52; cf. Stein 1992: 48).

[317] Diggle changes the present ἡττωμένοις found in the MSS to perfect ἡττημένοις, following Schwartz. This is unnecessary, unless one wants to find more support to the verb being applied to a state of legal defeat (cf. Diggle 2004: 170).

laughs at their abuse. This conjecture had already been adopted in the most common English edition by Rusten (1993). The reason for the conjecture is, as Diggle has put it (2004: 171), that in the sentence καὶ συγγνώμην δὲ ἔχειν τοῖς αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς καθ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένοις, "the second phrase is feebly repetitive and needs a colourful verb to give it point." The second part also seems pleonastic, which is usually not the case in the *Characters* (cf. Stein 1992: 49). I am not sure γελᾶν is the best suggestion, though, as it does not seem to fit the behaviour of the εἴρων; if anything, perhaps μειδιᾶν as suggested by Büchner (see Diggle 2004: 171) would suit better. Leaving the pleonastic final part in the text, one could interpret it in the way that the dissembler forgives people who speak abusively about him, and he also does not mind anonymous gossip.

It remains unclear whether the εἴρων really forgives people who speak abusively about him, and clearly states this, or is just concealing his actual emotions. The text also does not say whether he is abused to his face or behind his back. Again, what is important is that the man acts contrary to the rules that the Athenian popular morality has set, just like in the first scene of the sketch.

The next scene depicts the εἴρων talking mildly to those who have been wronged and are outraged. Diggle obelizes πρὸς τοὺς ἀδικουμένους καὶ ἀγανακτοῦντας, arguing that if the point is that the dissembler takes too lightly the grievances of others, then this point is "unclearly formulated and of doubtful aptness" (2004: 172), adding that "[i]f the wrongs have been suffered by others, then a dissembler will feign indignation, not mildness" (2004: 173). This passage shows how important it is to keep in mind the general background of the work, which focuses on deviations from socially acceptable and commendable behaviour. There would be nothing socially unacceptable in the dissembler's feigning indignation if someone else has been wronged. In fact, vigorously sympathizing, perhaps even encouraging revenge (feigned or not), would have been normal according to Greek popular morality. This is exactly what the dissembler fails to do. Compare a similar picture from Xenophon's *An*. 1.5.14, where Klearchos resents the fact that, when he had nearly been stoned to death, Polemarchos made light of his πάθος.

The passage of *Rhetoric* (1382b20; see above, ch. 4.1.3) in which Aristotle links πρᾶοι καὶ εἴρωνες is also relevant in this context. Although in his ethical works (e.g., *EN* 1125b26 ff.), Aristotle considers mildness or 'good temper' (πραότης) a mean between the deficiency inirascibility (ἀοργησία) and the excess irascibility (ὀργιλότης), he admits that good temper inclines towards the deficiency. The good-tempered man is angry at the right things and with the right people, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought.

Further, the next scenes show the dissembler's behaviour towards those who approach him with some request. Thus, when people urgently seek a meeting, he tells them to come back later; he never admits what he is doing, but says that he is thinking it over (βουλεύεσθαι), and pretends that he has just arrived or that it is too late or that he fell ill.[318] This behaviour can again be compared with that of the arrogant man (ὑπερήφανος) of *Char*. 24, who tells someone who is in a hurry that he will meet him after dinner while he is taking his stroll (§2). A similar situation is also seen in *Char*. 20, where the disagreeable man (ἀηδής) asks visitors to wait until he has gone for a stroll (§4). Each of these types acts for different reasons, but we do not really need specific motives to explain their behaviour. The arrogant man lets his visitor wait because he is arrogant; the disagreeable man because he is disagreeable; and the dissembler because he is a dissembler. That is just something he does, and whether he is motivated by a desire to avoid inconveniences, or something else, is not important.

The topic of the next scene is very common in the *Characters*, dealing with lending and contributions, buying and selling,[319] but unfortunately the passage is corrupt. We learn that the dissembler does or says something to people who apply for a loan or a contribution (ἔρανος), then there is a lacuna, and then the man says that he has nothing for sale, and when he has nothing for sale he says that he has. Various supplements have been suggested to fill the lacuna, which seems to extend to two situations. The sense of most of the supplements is to say, in the first

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[318] Rusten (1993: 55) suggests that the verb μαλακίζω is used not of illness (as most translators understand it), but of cowardice or irresolution. This does not seem probable; cf. Diggle 2004: 174.

[319] See Millett 1991: 5–6.

sentence, that the man has no money or that he is not rich enough, and in the second sentence, that selling something he will say he has nothing for sale.[320]

Further, if the dissembler has heard something, he pretends he has not; if he has seen something, he says he has not; if he has made an agreement, he does not remember it. He says about some things that he will look into them (σκέψεσθαι), about others that he does not know, about some that he is surprised, about others that he once had the same thought himself. The situation is not specified and the phrases are general enough to be used in all circumstances. A comic fragment has often been compared to this passage. The men in Menander's fr. 460 are arrogant and lowering philosophers, οἱ τὰς ὀφρῦς αἴροντες ὡς ἀβέλτεροι / καὶ 'σκέψομαι' λέγοντες. The behaviour of the εἴρων, however, is not connected to arrogance (Stein 1992: 57 f.; cf. Ilberg in LA 1897: 8).

The sketch ends with a list of expressions that the dissembler commonly uses: 'I don't believe it', 'I can't imagine it', 'I'm astonished', 'You're telling me he's become a different person' (obelized by Diggle, but this seems to be the meaning of the phrase), 'But that was not the account he gave to me', 'This thing is a mystery to me', 'Tell that to someone else', 'I don't know whether I should doubt you or condemn him', 'Be careful you don't make up your mind too quickly.' What all these expressions have in common is that the dissembler never lets his opinions show. In this respect, the last sentence is especially telling: the εἴρων mentions both alternatives, but never says which one he prefers. His attitude remains hidden from the others (cf. Stein 1992: 58). One can compare this with the reproach to Sokrates in Plato, *R*. 336b–37a (see above, ch. 4.1.2).

The Byzantine cauda is moralizing in tone and adds nothing to the sketch (cf. above, ch. 2.1.5).

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[320] Thus, Steinmetz (1960a) prints <εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐ πλουτεῖ· καὶ πωλῶν φῆσαι>; Rusten (1993) has <φῆσαι ὡς χρημάτων ἀπορεῖ, καὶ πωλῶν τι φῆσαι>, mainly following Kassel. For an earlier synopsis, see Steinmetz 1962: 41, for a more recent one, Diggle 2004: 175 f. The passage has some similarity with Cicero *Off.* 3.15.61.

The question of possible motives of the behaviour of the εἴρων has already come up several times. Already Theodor Gomperz (1889a: 15) had suggested that what is important is the external behaviour of the man, not the motive behind it. Similar arguments have been most vehemently defended by William W. Fortenbaugh (1975: 62 ff.; 1996: 454 etc.), who has argued that what we see in the *Characters* are behavioural regularities (*Verhaltensregelmäßigkeiten*) which do not need a motive to explain them. Motives are referred to in some definitions, but these were probably not part of the original work. Of course motives can be sought, and found, but one should not claim that each type is motivated by one certain desire.

4.1.5. Ariston of Keos

One of the crucial passages in Ariston's sketches is the description of the εἴρων, 'the dissembler' (see above, ch. 3.1.2). This is indeed an instructive case, as it shows that we should not expect to find exactly the same ideas within the same school, but rather some different evaluations due to contemporary ideas and values (see Vogt 2006: 275). Ariston, as Theophrastos, was certainly aware of Aristotle's milder attitude towards the εἴρων. One of the reasons why both of them choose to depict a more negative type, the so-called original εἴρων, may be that their basis was popular usage. As mentioned already, the difference is that Theophrastos never mentions Sokrates by name, but Ariston does. Some scholars have taken this to prove that this Ariston cannot have been a Peripatetic. It seems entirely acceptable, however, to suggest that Ariston is just trying to combine two conceptions of dissembling that are not really compatible. This is what Aristotle had to do, as well, but for him, the overall result was more positive. Ariston, on the other hand, has come up with a mixture that is more negative. The reasons for this are not clear, but these may have included a change in the contemporary evaluations of Sokrates.

4.1.6. Εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία

In the text of Ariston of Keos, preserved in Philodemos' Περὶ κακιῶν, εἴρων is also said to be a kind of ἀλαζών (col. 21.37–8). This is not entirely new, for Aristotle also notes that it ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται (*EN* 1127b28). It well illustrates the changes in the relation between these two terms. Εἴρων and ἀλαζών are connected already in Aristophanes, although they are not opposed or subordinated to each other. They both belong to the catalogue of invectives in *Nu.* 449 (cf. also *Nu.* 102, 1492). Thus, both could be used by Aristophanes for Sokrates and his followers (cf. Bergson 1971: 415). Plato also does not oppose the two terms, using ἀλαζονεία in its traditional meaning, although in some cases it could just signify 'lying'.

As noted above (ch. 4.1.3; cf. also 1.3.1 and 2.1.8.23), in Aristotle's ethical works, both εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία have been included into the tripartite system of ethical qualities that focuses on the doctrine of mean. Thus, in *EN* 1108a19–23 εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία were seen as two extremes of the positive mean ἀλήθεια. Both εἴρων and ἀλαζών are φιλοψευδής (*EE* 1234a3; cf. Bergson 1971: 413), but the ἀλαζών is more blameworthy (*EN* 1127a30). The definitions of both qualities contain a reference to pretence: the εἴρων pretends to have less than he has (προσποίησις ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον), and the ἀλαζών pretends to have more than he actually has (προσποίησις ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον).

In *Tractatus Coislinianus*, three characters of comedy are mentioned: ἤθη κωμῳδίας τά τε βωμολόχα καὶ τὰ εἰρωνικὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀλαζόνων (*TC* 12 Janko; see above, ch. 2.2.3). This also reflects the long-time connection of εἰρωνεία and ἀλαζονεία.[321]

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[321] For the connection of εἰρωνεία and βωμολοχία, cf. also Arist. *Rh*. 1419b8–9.

4.2. Βδελυρία in Theophrastos and Aischines' speech
Against Timarchos[322]

Repulsiveness is not a character trait anyone would wish to be detected in oneself. It can, however, be an effective instrument in abusive contexts. In the following, I will first discuss the history and earlier usage of the words βδελυρός/βδελυρία, then focus on the presentation of βδελυρία in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, and finally analyze the first speech of Aischines, where the word comes up most frequently. Some comparisons with the speeches of Demosthenes are made, as well.

4.2.1. Etymology and early usage

Attempts have been made to trace the meaning of βδελυρός in our extant texts, to reconstruct what constitutes the behaviour of such a type. The lexical meaning of the word suggests etymological connections with scatological vocabulary (βδεῖν, 'to fart'), and the originally medical verb βδελύσσομαι ('to feel a loathing for food', then also more general 'to feel a loathing at'). However, it seems that there are no specific behavioural patterns or traits that are always characteristic to someone labelled βδελυρός. The confusion of Aristophanes' scholiast illustrates this well; he explains, commenting on *Nu.* 446: βδελυρός· καὶ τὸν πόρνον οὕτως ἐκάλουν, καὶ τὸν μίσους ἄξιον, καὶ τὸν ἀνελεύθερον.

It has been suggested that the original, strong meaning of the word has weakened in the course of time, which would be an indication of colloquial language.[323] P. Steinmetz (1962: 142) has pointed out that βδελυρός can be a synonym of πόρνος (as already noted by Aristophanes' scholiast),[324] and concludes that the meaning of the word becomes quite general and is applied for any kind of loathsomeness.[325] He

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[322] A part of this chapter was read at the conference *Colloquium Balticum V* in Lund, October 2005.

[323] Steinmetz 1962: 142; see also Ussher 1993: 112.

[324] In this sense it is often used by Aischines for Timarchos, see 1.189; cf. 1.26, 1.105, 1.70, 1.41, 1.60, and Dem. 25.27.

[325] See And. 1.122; cf. Aischin. 1.107; Ar. *Ra.* 465; Is. 8.42; Dem. 17.11, 19.206, 208.

suggests that the word can also obtain a nuance of wishing to joke and make other people laugh, referring to Aisch. 1.31, where it said that the man who is βδελυρός also uses his body καταγελάστως. This, however, does not tell us anything about the *intention* of the man, and, in any case, his behaviour is not funny but ridiculous, and this is also the meaning of καταγελάστως in the passage. Steinmetz' other example of using the word of a person who makes improper or unpleasant jokes, with or without sexual content, comes from Plato's *R*. 338d, where Thrasymachos uses it for Sokrates: Βδελυρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταύτῃ ὑπολαμβάνεις ᾗ ἂν κακουργήσαις μάλιστα τὸν λόγον. Here, the meaning is something like 'blackguardly' and may express some playful protest (cf. Ussher 1993: 112), but it does not mean the person who behaves in this way is funny. He is rather a tomfool or an irresponsible buffoon.

The word is quite well attested in comedy. As far as we can tell, Aristophanes is the first author who uses βδελυρός. We encounter it in eight of his extant eleven comedies, in altogether eleven instances.[326] In most passages it is used in the company of other offensive and more or less low-register terms, such as μιαρός, ἀναίσχυντος, τολμηρός, παμμυσαρός, and in two cases its emotive meaning has been intensified by a prefix παν-.[327] In *Nu*. 446, it is part of a "catalogue" of abusive words that the creditors could shout at Strepsiades after he has got rid of his debts thanks to the tricks learned from Sokrates.[328] Although this is just a row of invectives, these have one thing in common: they can be used of sophists, thus they are to a great degree related to verbal communication and rhetorical skill (see MacDowell 1990b: 288; cf. also Beta 2004: 102 ff.). For ancient attempts to explain these invectives see the scholia to Aristophanes.

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[326] *Nu*. 446, *Ach*. 288–9, *Eq*. 134, 193, 303–4, *V*. 914, *Lys*. 969, *Ra*. 465, *Ec*. 1043, *Pl*. 993 and 1069.

[327] *Ach*. 288–9: Ἀναίσχυντος εἶ καὶ βδελυρός; *Eq*. 303–4: Ὦ μιαρὲ καὶ βδελυρὲ κρᾶκτα...; *Lys*. 969: ἡ παμβδελύρα καὶ παμμυσάρα; *Ra*. 465–6: Ὦ βδελυρὲ κἀναίσχυντε καὶ τολμηρὲ σὺ / καὶ μιαρὲ καὶ παμμίαρε καὶ μιαρώτατε; *Ec*. 1043: ὦ παμβδελυρά. For μιαρός, cf. also Dickey 1996: 167 ff.

[328] *Nu*. 445–51: θρασύς, εὔγλωττος, τολμηρός, ἴτης, βδελυρός, ψευδῶν συγκολλητής, εὑρησιεπής, περίτριμμα δικῶν, κύρβις, κρόταλον, κίναδος, τρύμη, μάσθλης, εἴρων, γλοιός, ἀλαζών, κέντρων, μιαρός, στρόφις, ἀργαλέος, ματιολοιχός.

For comedy, there is also one instance of βδελυρός in the fragments of Eupolis,[329] and later perhaps in Menander,[330] as well as in some fragments of unknown authors.[331] The exact meaning of the word, however, or what constitutes the behaviour of the type, is not clear from these passages.

4.2.2. Theophrastos

In the gallery of types presented in Theophrastos' *Characters*, the repulsive man (βδελυρός, *Char*. 11) is certainly one of the coarsest. Comparable in this respect is perhaps the offensive man (δυσχερής, *Char*. 19).[332] Again, I quote the text of the chapter in its entirety according to the edition of Diggle (2004: 100):

> [1] [Οὐ χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστι τὴν βδελυρίαν διορίσασθαι· ἔστι γὰρ παιδιὰ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος.]
>
> [2] ὁ δὲ βδελυρὸς τοιοῦτός <τις> οἷος ἀπαντήσας γυναιξὶν ἐλευθέραις ἀνασυράμενος δεῖξαι τὸ αἰδοῖον. [3] καὶ ἐν θεάτρῳ κροτεῖν ὅταν οἱ ἄλλοι παύωνται καὶ συρίττειν οὓς ἡδέως θεωροῦσιν οἱ πολλοί· καὶ ὅταν σιωπήσῃ τὸ θέατρον ἀνακύψας ἐρυγεῖν, ἵνα τοὺς καθημένους ποιήσῃ μεταστραφῆναι. [4] καὶ πληθούσης τῆς ἀγορᾶς προσελθὼν πρὸς τὰ κάρυα ἢ τὰ μύρτα ἢ τὰ ἀκρόδρυα ἑστηκὼς τραγηματίζεσθαι, ἅμα τῷ πωλοῦντι

[329] Fr. 57 *PCG* (= 50 Kock): ἀνεκάς τʼ ἐπαίρω καὶ βδελυρὸς σὺ τὸ σκέλος. This could be earlier than Aristophanes, but the fragment consists of only one line and we have no way of dating it.

[330] As identified in Sandbach's edition, *Sicyonius* 209 = *Adespota novae comoediae* fr. 19.4 Demiańczuk: κοὺ] παντελῶς ἦν βδελυρός...

[331] Fr. 260.1 *PCG* (= 6.1 Kock): βδελυρὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ πρᾶγμα..., and perhaps fr. 1018.25 *PCG* (= *Adespota novae comoediae* fr. 15.25 Demiańczuk): [σὺ δὲ βδελυρεύ]ῃ πρός με... (Kassel & Austin print the supplement of Körte–Edmonds, ἀλαζονε]υῃ, so it is not certain what the text originally had.)

[332] Translations vary, I here follow the latest editor (Diggle); βδελυρός has also been translated as, e.g., 'the obnoxious man' (Rusten), 'the offensive man' (Anderson), or 'the abominable man' (Vellacott), and δυσχερής has been rendered as 'the squalid man' (Rusten), or 'the repulsive man' (Anderson). Note that Anderson's renderings are opposite to those of Diggle.

προσλαλῶν· [5] καὶ καλέσαι δὲ τῶν παριόντων ὀνομαστί τινα ᾧ μὴ συνήθης ἐστί· [6] καὶ σπεύδοντας δέ ποι ὁρῶν < >. [7] καὶ ἡττημένῳ δὲ μεγάλην δίκην ἀπιόντι ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου προσελθεῖν καὶ συνησθῆναι. [8] καὶ ὀψωνεῖν ἑαυτῷ καὶ αὐλητρίδας μισθοῦσθαι καὶ δεικνύειν δὲ τοῖς ἀπαντῶσι τὰ ὠψωνημένα καὶ παρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ ταῦτα. [9] καὶ διηγεῖσθαι προσστὰς πρὸς κουρεῖον ἢ μυροπώλιον ὅτι μεθύσκεσθαι μέλλει.

The sketch consists of eight situations: the repulsive man is shown lifting up his clothes in front of ladies (§2), disturbing spectators at the theatre by applauding when others have finished, hissing actors whose performance the audience is enjoying, and when the audience is silent, burping so that others would turn around (§3)[333] and troubling shopkeepers on the agora (§4), calling out people he does not know (§5), stopping those who hurry somewhere (§6),[334] congratulating someone who has just lost a lawsuit (§7), buying food himself, hiring aulos players and inviting people to join the party (§8), and finally stopping at the hairdresser's or the perfumer's and explaining that he intends to get drunk (§9).

Diggle (2004: 314) has listed an array of adjectives, which characterize the behaviour of the man in these situations: indecent (§2), disruptive and crude (§3), discourteous (§4), over-familiar (§5), tactless (§7), tasteless (§8), and tiresome (§9).

This might be telling us something about the ways in which Theophrastos worked when composing his *Characters*. Although we do not know what the purpose of the collection was (see ch. 2.2), we could imagine that the author first had a word, or a notion, before him,

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[333] The Athenian audience was emotional and let it show when it did not like the play. See Pickard-Cambridge 1968: 272–3 and cf. Aischin. 3.231, Luk. *Nigr*. 8, 10. (In Aischin. 3.76, the audience is hissing Demosthenes because of his unseemly flattery towards some ambassadors.) Thus it is not the action of the βδελυρός that is improper, but the time when he is doing it. He opposes himself to the rest of the audience, thus showing contempt to the opinion of others and undermining the performance that was an important public event in Athens.

[334] The text in this passage is corrupt, but this may be the sense; cf. Steinmetz 1960a: 33, Steinmetz 1962: 145 and Diggle 2004: 318.

βδελυρός in our case. He then probably tried to think of what comes up first when one thinks of such a type. Perhaps some specific person known from the past or the contemporary Athenian community had influence on some of the sketches.[335] Theophrastos may also have asked his students to pronounce on the topic and collected emotions and reactions to complete his model sketches. In the case of more narrative chapters, like that on the coward (δειλός, *Char*. 25), he may have found it more convenient to focus on only a few situations, whereas in some cases the sketch consists of quite loosely connected situations and the reactions of the specific type in these situations.

One can notice that the author has often tried to describe the behaviour of a type in circumstances that were most common in ancient Athens. These include behaviour as a guest at someone's house, conduct in theatre, on the street, at home, at the market, in the baths, in gymnasia, in the assembly, or in the court (cf. ch. 2.4). Many of these situations can be seen in the sketch of βδελυρία. We certainly have scenes on the streets (§2, 5), in theatre (§3), on the agora (§4, 8), or near the court house (§7). Here, too, Theophrastos may have had a list of possible situations in his head or put before the students, imagining the behaviour of one specific type in concrete situations.

The problem with the sketch of βδελυρία is that it is not very easy to define the type. Sure, we have the definition of the *Characters*: Οὐ χαλεπὸν δέ ἐστι τὴν βδελυρίαν διορίσασθαι· ἔστι γὰρ παιδιὰ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ ἐπονείδιστος ("It is not difficult to define Repulsiveness. It is conspicuous and reprehensible tomfoolery" [tr. Diggle]). The prevailing opinion nowadays is, however, that the definitions have been added later (but at least by the 1st century BCE) by someone other than Theophrastos.[336] But, for lack of anything better, we might take this definition to start with and see where it takes us. First of all, is it in accord with the following sketch? Markus Stein, who has thoroughly analyzed the suitability of the Theophrastean definitions, has little to say on βδελυρία (1992: 189–90). It differs from the other definitions by its

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[335] Cf. the possible influence of Sokrates on *Char*. 1, the εἴρων (above, ch. 4.1.4).

[336] See above, ch. 2.1.3. Like many other definitions, however, this one also contains Peripatetic phraseology. There is, e.g., some similarity with the description of the βωμολόχοι in Aristotle, see *EN* 1128a4–7 and cf. also *EN* 1108a23, *EE* 1234a4 ff.

introductory formula, but this is hardly significant for the content. Stein concludes that the definition is not incorrect, but it is also not very precise, as the word ἐπιφανής only implies that the jokes of the repulsive man are plain to see, not that he makes them in the public. Thus, one could also understand these words as an opposite to hidden jokes, and the definition could similarly be used for αἰσχρολογία.[337] In any case, the definition explicitly connects βδελυρία with some kind of joking (παιδιά).

Might some textual loss have occurred? After Giovanni Cristoforo Amaduzzi had first published chapters 29 and 30 of the *Characters* of Theophrastos in 1786, modern editions of the work contain thirty chapters and usually also thirty character types. It is not surprising, though, in the case of a work with manuscript tradition sometimes considered the most corrupt in all of Greek literature, containing several later additions (preface and epilogues, definitions, several interpolations), that many editors believe the *Characters* once contained more than thirty chapters, parts of which have been lost (see ch. 2.1.6).

One of the suspicious passages is *Char*. 11 (βδελυρός), which is relatively short in comparison with others. Thus, one has sometimes suspected some text loss at the end of this character description. It is followed in MSS AB by the text in modern editions found as *Char*. 30.5–16. This shows that textual contamination has occurred. We do not know how far this kind of contamination goes, and there may be other passages in the *Characters* that belong elsewhere. Thus, e.g., some sections of *Char*. 19 (δυσχέρεια) do not seem to belong to that sketch, but it is not certain whether they should belong to some other sketch or are a relict of some sketch not preserved.[338] Many have suggested that these (usually §8–11) should be part of *Char*. 11, or else we must assume a lost column of text that contained the end of *Char*. 11 and the beginning of the now lost anonymous sketch.

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[337] Stein 1992, 189; cf. also Aristotle's account in *EN* 1128a23 f., where he distinguishes the ὑπόνοια of the New Comedy from the αἰσχρολογία of the Old Comedy. Of course there is no sketch on αἰσχρολογία in the *Characters*.

[338] For relevant discussion see Steinmetz 1962: 220 ff. (who has defended the integrity of the chapter), Stein 1992: 205–6, Rusten 1993: 176 and Diggle 2004: 386.

4.2.3. Aischines

The word group βδελυρός/βδελυρία is restricted mainly to two genres: comedy and oratory. It is well known that the orators used character denigration and slander as a standard device in their speeches. Some orators are more inclined to it than others, but there is hardly one who would avoid it completely (cf. ch. 4.4.1). It has even been claimed that unless a speaker in a forensic speech can show that his adversary is a man of bad character, acting from discreditable motives, or that he himself is of good character and well-motivated, he has no case to present to the court (Pearson 1981: 78). The orators can get away with only a limited amount of direct fabrication, knowing that it would destroy their credibility if they were seen to be flagrantly lying (cf. MacDowell 1990a: 1). But they have other devices than fabricating facts and events for influencing the mind of the listeners, including the jury. The powerful rhetorical techniques of abuse, which most of the orators use, are much more difficult to refute but have a considerable impact on the listeners, leaving a generally negative picture of the defendant in the minds of the public.

Βδελυρός and its derivatives occur 29 times in Demosthenes, 14 times in Aischines, once in both Isaios and Andokides, and in a fragment of Demades;[339] it is not found in Isokrates, Lysias or any of the other orators. The speeches that mention it most frequently are Aischines 1 (*In Timarchum*; 13 times), Demosthenes 21 (*In Midiam*; 8 times) and 19 (*De falsa legatione*; 6 times). This usage focuses on certain characters in these speeches, which in the case of Aisch. 1 and Dem. 21 are evident from the titles of the speeches. In the case of Dem. 19, the defendant is Aischines. The chronological sequence of the speeches is the following:[340]

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[339] Is. 8.42.2; And. 1.122; Demades fr. 75.17.

[340] The dates are those of delivery, but the texts we have are published, and probably revised, versions of what each said in the court (cf. Fisher 2001: 3; on the issue of revision see further Dover 1968: 167–9, Worthington 1991 and Worthington 1994a: 115 ff.).

Demosthenes, *In Midiam* (21):   347/346[341]
Aischines, *In Timarchum* (1):   346/345 (Timarchos is convicted)
Demosthenes, *De falsa legatione* (19): 343/342 (Aischines is acquitted)

Naturally, βδελυρός/βδελυρία are not the only abusive words used by either orator, and they are also not the main argument of any of the speeches. There are various negative attributes that the orators employ to denigrate and to assault their opponents. Sometimes these are used in connection with βδελυρός/βδελυρία, sometimes they stand for themselves or form pairs with other derogatory terms (cf. below).

As mentioned above, the orator who uses the words βδελυρός/βδελυρία most extensively is Demosthenes. In the following I will, however, focus on Aischines' speech against Timarchos, which has the greatest concentration of these terms and will therefore serve as an example. It is possible that Aischines borrowed the term from Demosthenes' abusive repertoire and used it with the intensity that was peculiar to him in a speech that was formally directed against Timarchos, but in fact also against Demosthenes, who was Timarchos' supporter. The source may have been Demosthenes' speech against Meidias (21), in which case it probably was delivered, but this remains a speculation. That the argument of βδελυρός/βδελυρία is taken up by Demosthenes again in his speech *On the false embassy*, i.e. against Aischines himself, is somewhat a curiosity (cf. 19.175). Although here Demosthenes may actually consider the argument his own, he is known to have tried to turn arguments of Aischines against him (cf. Fisher 2001: 24); this may perhaps have been a common practice. Aischines himself uses several humiliating accusations (although not βδελυρός) against Demosthenes in his second speech, perhaps trying to repeat the successful tactics that he used against Timarchos (cf. Buckler 2000: 139).

Aischines' description of Timarchos in the speech *Against Timarchos* is one of the most conspicuous depictions of a βδελυρός in the Greek

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[341] There is some doubt as to whether the speech was actually delivered or not (cf. Aischin. 3.51–2, later taken up by Plutarch in *Dem*. 12.3–6). According to MacDowell (1990a: 28) there is no proof for either; a compromise before the trial could have been reached; cf., however, Harris 1989. See also Wilson 1991: 187, Worthington 1992: 169, and Ober 1994.

oratory.[342] The speech is an important testimony of Greek attitudes to sexuality and connections between sexuality and politics. The high sexual content of the speech, although mostly inexplicit, has been one of the major reasons why most classical scholars had, until recently, quite neglected it.[343] In connection with this, the speech makes repeated and rhetorically effective use of the term ὕβρις.[344]

The speech originates from the time when Athens had agreed to make peace with Philip II of Macedon and was full of debates over this. Aischines was facing a trial for his part of the embassy, and in this speech brings charges against his prosecutor Timarchos. These included the allegations that in his youth, Timarchos "had permitted acts of disgraceful sex to be performed on his body by a succession of men for material rewards" (Fisher 2001: V).

In the speech against Timarchos, Aischines draws a vivid picture of the defendant and his behaviour. He turns to the character of Timarchos, as promised in the beginning of the speech,[345] in 1.37. There he thinks it necessary to ask the jury to forgive him if he should speak about practices that are ignoble by nature—he says he uses plain language because he wishes to inform the jury of the facts. Thus, as the defendant happens to have lived his life so shamefully (αἰσχρῶς), it becomes impossible for a man describing his deeds to speak as he himself wishes without uttering some of these types of expressions, which, however, he will try to avoid if possible (1.37–8).

Although Aischines uses various negative attributes to describe Timarchos and his behaviour, by far the most frequent of these is

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[342] Aischines uses the term only once in his other speeches (3.246).

[343] The most important treatment of the speech that has opened up the text for other scholars is Kenneth Dover's *Greek homosexuality* (1978; updated edition with a new postscript 1989). The first, and excellent, commentary of the speech is Fisher 2001. The speech has, especially in 1990s, become a very popular source in the discussions over the history of democracy and freedom of speech (see, e.g., the works of Robert W. Wallace or Paul A. Rahe, with Sissa 1999).

[344] Fisher 2005; for various aspects of ὕβρις and/or the law of ὕβρις (γραφὴ ὕβρεως), see also Cairns 1996, Cohen 1991, Fisher 1976, 1990, 1995 and especially 1992, Gagarin 1979, MacDowell 1976 and 2000b.

[345] 1.8: [...] βούλομαι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, [...] ἀντεξετάσαι τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς Τιμάρχου [...].

βδελυρός/βδελυρία, which is used 13 times.[346] In fact, no single work of a Greek author contains more references to these words than this speech, up to Cyril the theologian in the 4th-5th century CE. If we consider the nature of the speech, the frequent use of a word group that suggests disgust and repulsion is perhaps not surprising. The word βδελυρία has been considered "the most telling word to encapsulate his [sc. Timarchos'] generally disgusting behaviour" (Fisher 2001: 223). It is always used with reference to Timarchos' behaviour, whether his alone, that shared with his friends, or behaviour of people like him (Fisher 2001: 155). The abundant use of βδελυρός/βδελυρία may be compared to the *Leitmotiv*-technique that Demosthenes exploits in his speech on the false embassy (19). There, the repetition of terms such as δωροδοκία, δωροδοκεῖν, δῶρα λαμβάνειν, ἑαυτὸν πιπράσκειν/μισθοῦν, μισθαρνεῖν, χρημάτων ἀποδίδοσθαί τι etc. are seen throughout the speech (see Paulsen 1999: 481 ff.).

It has been stated that although βδελυρία is a strong term, it is fully acceptable in the normal register of oratory, for behaviour that is revolting and disgusting, and makes people feel sick.[347] Aischines' register is not, however, the normal one for oratory. As Burke (1972) has shown, Aischines' employment of character denigration is unique among the orators, and the speech against Timarchos is, as V. Hunter (1990: 309) has put it, "a masterpiece of abuse and vilification." Indeed, Aischines himself insinuates, as it were, that it is more important to judge a man by the facts (or "facts") that are known about him—his habits and associates, his style of life, the way in which he manages his household—than to make one's decision on the basis of what witnesses might say about him.[348] Thus, it seems that in cases like this, proof may be neither necessary nor available, and the prosecutor depended on gossip instead.[349]

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[346] That the speech was notorious for its use of the term is evident from another scholion to Aristophanes' *Nu.* 446: βδελυρόν, ὡς ἐν τῷ κατὰ Τιμάρχου Αἰσχίνης (RVM, ed. D. Holwerda).

[347] Fisher 2001: 155, with Dickey 1996: 171.

[348] Cf. Aischin. 1.90 and 1.153 with Hunter 1990: 309.

[349] Hunter 1990: 310; cf. Dover 1989: 22, 39–40.

The occurrences of βδελυρός/βδελυρία in Aischines' speech against Timarchos are the following:[350]

1.26: Timarchos threw off his cloak and did all-in fighting routines naked in the assembly (ῥίψας θοἰμάτιον γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ), his body was in a dreadful and shameful condition through drink and disgusting behaviour (κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας). Here, βδελυρία must be something that, together with extensive drinking, could make his appearance so repulsive that 'men of sound judgement' (εὖ φρονοῦντες) covered their eyes and were ashamed for the city. Fisher (2001: 155) has noted that the term "covers more than his [sc. Timarchos'] sexual acts, and may include violence, and as here perhaps excessive consumption of food and drink." Dover (1989: 69) suggests that "the latter phrase [sc. drunkenness and disgusting way of life] most naturally refers to his gluttony and hetero-sexual over-indulgence."

1.31: Aischines relates the law: the words of a debauched man (ἀνθρώπου βδελυροῦ), who has used his own body in a contemptible way (καταγελάστως), and consumed his ancestral estate shamefully (αἰσχρῶς), however well expressed, would not bring benefits to their audience. Compare also the verb form ἀσελγαίνῃ ('behaves disgus-tingly') in 1.32.

1.41: Aischines is giving account of those in whose houses Timarchos stayed while prostituting himself. The first one is a certain Misgolas, a man who in all other respects is said to be 'fine and good' (καλὸς κἀγαθός),[351] but is phenomenally (δαιμονίως) devoted to 'that thing' (τὸ πρᾶγμα τοῦτο), i.e. pederasty. Now this man paid a sum in advance and kept Timarchos at his house, 'since he had a good body, was young and disgusting, and fitted for the act which he had made it his choice to perform and Timarchos his to endure' (εὔσαρκον ὄντα καὶ νέον καὶ βδελυρὸν καὶ ἐπιτήδειον πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ προῃρεῖτο ἐκεῖνος μὲν πράττειν, οὗτος δὲ πάσχειν). Here, βδελυρός is used almost as an approbatory term from the point of view of Misgolas (something like

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[350] The translations and paraphrases are adapted from Fisher 2001.

[351] On various interpretations of the term in this passage cf. Ober 1989: 257, and Fisher 2001: 171.

'nasty bitch', i.e. prepared for any sexual acts that the partner might fancy).

1.46: Misgolas, the active part (ὁ πράξας) of the claimed homosexual acts is ashamed and chooses to pay 1000 drachmai so as not to come and testify, but Timarchos, the passive part (ὁ πεπονθώς) comes forth and addresses the people. Thus, Aischines proceeds, the lawgiver who debarred such disgusting persons (τοὺς οὕτω βδελυροὺς) from the platform was indeed wise. One notes the implicit connection of βδελυρία to the homosexual passivity in this passage.

1.54: After living with Misgolas, then with a certain Antikles, Timarchos started to spend his days in the gaming-house where men played the dice and set the cocks fighting (1.53). From there, a wealthy state-slave named Pittalakos took him up and kept him at his house. Thus, Timarchos, 'the polluted wretch' (ὁ μιαρὸς οὑτοσί), did not care if he had sex with a public slave, so far as he could have him as a 'sponsor for his foul debauchery' (χορηγὸν τῇ βδελυρίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ).[352] It has been noted that the rhetoric of denunciation in this passage is "fierce and very pompous in tone" (Fisher 2001: 191–2). Indeed the text contains, in addition to strong words like μιαρός and βδελυρία, verb forms that indicate shame and degradation (οὐκ ἐδυσχέραινεν, καταισχύνειν). We also have two references to 'public slave-fellow, a servant of the city' (ἄνθρωπος δημόσιος οἰκέτης τῆς πόλεως) in this short passage.[353] In the next section, Aischines makes a great fuss about not being able to utter the words that would describe the deeds of Timarchos (cf. 1.37–8).

1.60: When Timarchos was staying with Pittalakos, a man named Hegesandros arrived from the Hellespont. He had acquired some wealth and visited the gambling den where he saw Timarchos and desired him at once. Pittalakos refused to give him up, but Hegesandros quickly persuaded Timarchos. Indeed, Aischines emphasizes, Timarchos' wickedness and infidelity have been remarkable (δεινὴ ἡ κακία καὶ ἀπιστία, 1.57). It ended with Hegesandros and Timarchos together with some

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[352] Cf. Aischin. 3.240, where Aischines uses similar rhetoric against Demosthenes: σὺ δὲ πλουτεῖς καὶ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σαυτοῦ χορηγεῖς.

[353] See Fisher 2001: 190 f. on the problem of the status of Pittalakos: it seems that he was, at the time of the speech, a freedman, perhaps as a result of having been able to accumulate some wealth as a public slave. For δημόσιος οἰκέτης τῆς πόλεως, cf. Aischin. 1.62. See also Fisher 2004.

other men, drunk, bursting in at night into Pittalakos' house, smashing up everything, killing the cocks, tying the man himself to a pillar and beating him up (1.58–9). On the next day, when Pittalakos came, without clothes, into the agora and sat down at the altar of the Mother of the Gods, Hegesandros and Timarchos are said to have taken fright, in case their disgusting conduct (βδελυρία) became proclaimed throughout the city. Here it would be natural to suppose that by disgusting conduct Aischines means the plundering of Pittalakos' house and beating him up, but it may also be an implicit allusion to the nature of the sexual relation of Hegesandros and Timarchos, meant to reinforce the picture in the minds of the listeners. At last the two surrounded Pittalakos and begged him to get up from the altar, excusing themselves with their drunkenness, and in the end persuaded him (1.61).

1.70: When Hegesandros refuses to swear to his testimony (where the nature of his relation with Timarchos is put forth only implicitly), Aischines carries on more explicitly, saying that Timarchos prostituted himself with a prostitute (πρὸς τὸν πόρνον πεπορνεῦσθαι). This sentence emphasizes the moral equivalence of Timarchos and Hegesandros.[354] Further, he says, we can only imagine what 'excesses of loathsomeness' (ὑπερβολὰς ... βδελυρίας) the two committed when offensively drunk and on their own. This is only rhetoric: no one knows what the two did; and the nature of their alleged acts is derived directly from the nature of the men themselves, and vice versa.

1.88: Here, Aischines is concerned with the juridical problems of evidence of the misdeeds: the fact that one party does not give evidence that he hired someone else for ὕβρις, or the other party that he hired himself out for ὕβρις, does not mean that those accused should in fact be acquitted. Comparing the case of Timarchos with some old members of the assembly or the court, who were accused of bribery and condemned to death, Aischines claims that *they* could not defend themselves against old age and poverty, and that is, in a way, their excuse, whereas Timarchos cannot restrain his own disgusting behaviour (βδελυρίαν) and should be put to death because of this. The argument, however, that

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[354] Fisher 2001: 208. As Fisher points out, the outrage here is directed on the nature of the acts a πόρνος must commit rather than the numbers of partners he may have (*ibid.*)

anyone who hired out an Athenian adult, or an adult who agreed to be hired out, for ὕβρις, was liable to a capital charge, is fallacious.[355]

1.95: As long as the property lasted, Hegesandros and Timarchos lived in conditions of abundant and unstinting debauchery (ἐπὶ πολλῆς ἀσελγείας καὶ ἀφθονίας). When the property of Hegesandros had been wasted and Timarchos himself was 'past his bloom' (ἔξωρος),[356] no one would give him anything any more. But his revolting and unholy nature (βδελυρὰ φύσις καὶ ἀνόσιος) still desired the same. It is then that he turned to the eating (and drinking) up of his inherited property. Fisher (2001: 229 f.) emphasizes that "the same things" Timarchos' nature desires are probably all concerned with the activities listed in 1.42 (i.e., gambling, food, drink and sex with *hetairai*), and this does not mean that Timarchos actually enjoyed being penetrated, as he is nowhere in the speech presented as a κίναιδος, as a man who "positively enjoyed, rather than merely accepted, the 'woman's part' of being penetrated" (Fisher 2001: 339–41). Indeed, when Aischines uses the term κιναιδία in 1.131 (together with ἀνανδρία), he has Demosthenes in mind. And when the names of Timarchos and Demosthenes occur in the same sentence, it is again Demosthenes who is described as such (1.181: Τίμαρχον ἢ τὸν κίναιδον Δημοσθένην); this is also evident from the mention of his effeminate clothes and ambiguous sexual practices with his pupils.[357]

1.105: A powerful rhetorical opposition is built between what Timarchos once had, and what is left to him. He has no house, no συνοικία,[358] no land, no slaves, no money out on loan, 'nor anything else from which those who are not criminals earn their living.' What is left to him, are, in the first place, debauchery (βδελυρία), but also sycophancy (συκοφαντία), insolence (θράσος), luxury (τρυφή), cowardice (δειλία),

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[355] See Fisher 2001: 223 and cf. Aischin. 1.72 and 1.90.

[356] Once the beard was grown, a young male was supposed to be passing out of the ἐρώμενος stage (see Dover 1989: 86 and Fisher 2001: 26–7, 229).

[357] Cf. Fisher 2001: 48, 272, 340; see also Worman 2004: 14. Aischines is the only one of the orators who uses the words κίναιδος/κιναιδία at all; see also Aischin. 2.88, 99, 151, and cf. 2.23.

[358] The word can mean both cohabitation in the sense of marriage (= συνοίκησις), and a multiple-dwelling, a tenement-house. The last sense seems probable in this passage, for that would be something one can earn living from (cf. also 1.124 where the term is defined, and also 1.125).

shamelessness (ἀναίδεια), and the inability to blush at his shameful acts (τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἐρυθριᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς). With these, he has become the worst and the least beneficial of citizens (ὁ κάκιστος καὶ ἀλυσιτελέστατος πολίτης).

1.107: Timarchos is said to have consumed not only his inheritance, but also common possessions of the *polis*. In addition to taking bribes and bringing sycophantic charges while holding the office of an auditor (λογιστής),[359] he supplied his debauchery (εὐπορίαν τῇ βδελυρίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ... ποιούμενος) from Athenian allies in Andros, i.e. by borrowing money (and at a very high rate, see Fisher 2001: 245). Furthermore, he revealed an unprecedented level of wantonness (ἀσέλγειαν) in relation to the wives of free men.[360] For ἀσέλγεια, which in 1.32 was used in verbal form in connection with sycophancy (καὶ συκοφαντῇ καὶ ἀσελγαίνῃ), and in 1.95 together with ἀφθονία, cf. also 1.108, 1.37, and 1.190.

1.189: In the conclusion of the speech, Aischines turns to the jurors, posing a rhetorical question: 'To which of you is the repulsiveness (βδελυρία) of Timarchos not known?' We all recognize, he says, the athletes by their good condition, and in the same way we recognize those who have prostituted themselves (τοὺς πεπορνευμένους) from their shamelessness and boldness (ἐκ τῆς ἀναιδείας καὶ τοῦ θράσους). The ignoring of laws and of σωφροσύνη that such a person displays is strongly emphasized. The final sentence of the section employs terms that are connected with philosophical discussions on character formation (e.g. ἕξις, a condition, or a disposition, even if it also refers to εὐεξία, 'good condition of body', used above for the athletes; see also Fisher 2001: 346–7). It should be noted, with Fisher 2001: 346, that the argument here has shifted: instead of arguing about the lasting physical effects of their activities on the πόρνοι, Aischines "suggests that their repeated activities have a permanent deleterious effect on their characters (or 'souls'). This is designed to provide a more intellectual

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[359] For the nature and possible dating of this and other posts Aischines held, see Fisher 2001: 243–5.

[360] This allegation points towards a tyrant, see Fisher 1992: 30–1, 128–9, Omitowoju 1997: 4–6 and Fisher 2001: 246. On the portrayal of Timarchos as a tyrant cf. Meulder 1989 and Davidson 1998: 282.

justification of one basic assumption behind the law, that voluntary involvement in shameful sexual practices makes men unsuitable characters to lead their city." Fisher has also noted (*ibid*.) that the term βδελυρία is here and in 1.192 employed again "as the final emphasis is on the physical unpleasantness of what he did, and its effects on his body."

1.192: The last instance of βδελυρία in this speech occurs in the fifth section from the end. Aischines admonishes the jury to listen to him very carefully and to remember his words. He claims that if Timarchos is declared guilty, the jury will have established the basis for good order (ἀρχὴν εὐκοσμίας) in the city. If, however, he is acquitted, it will induce many others to do wrong, leading to a critical situation (καιρός). When presenting the two possible results, Aischines does not forget to emphasize once again the repulsiveness of the defendant: Timarchos is said to be the first, and best known, in βδελυρία. This demonstrates Aischines' wish to let the allegation he has used throughout the whole speech stay in the minds of the jury.

As mentioned above, Aischines uses various negative attributes for Timarchos and his behaviour, as well as for any of his defendants.[361] Employed in connection with βδελυρός/βδελυρία, we can see expressions conveying shameful behaviour or shamelessness (κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακείμενος, of his body, 1.26; αἰσχρῶς, of consuming his ancestral estate, 1.31; τὸ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἐρυθριᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς, of his inability to blush at his shameful acts, 1.105; ἀναίδεια, 1.105; together with boldness, ἐκ τῆς ἀναιδείας καὶ τοῦ θράσους, 1.189; θράσος also in 1.105); wantonness (ἐπὶ πολλῆς ἀσελγείας καὶ ἀφθονίας, of the living-style of Hegesandros and Timarchos, 1.95; ἀσέλγειαν, in relation to the wives of free men, 1.107); contemptible behaviour (καταγελάστως, of using his body, 1.31); sycophancy (συκοφαντία, 1.105); luxury (τρυφή, 1.105); cowardice (δειλία, 1.105); unholiness (ἀνόσιος, 1.95); and pollutedness (ὁ μιαρὸς οὑτοσί, on having sex with a public slave, 1.54). In sum, he is the worst and the least beneficial of citizens (ὁ κάκιστος καὶ ἀλυσιτελέστατος πολίτης, 1.105). One notices that a lot of these

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[361] For some of these, see also Diggle 2004: 314.

attributes are accumulated in §105 of the speech, which indeed displays a strong rhetorical attack on the character of Timarchos.

Similar and other negative attributes are found throughout the speech, and although these are not always directly connected with the picture of Timarchos as a βδελυρός, they contribute to it. This character denigration is mainly directed against Timarchos, but also against some of his associates such as Misgolas, Hegesandros and also Demosthenes.

Thus, shamelessness is one of the most common charges against Timarchos (αἰσχρῶς βεβιωκότι, 1.3; τοὺς αἰσχρῶς βεβιωκότας, of those men that the lawgiver does not allow to address the people, 1.28: Aischines still relates the law, and although Timarchos is not mentioned, he is included implicitly; οὐ γὰρ αἰσχύνονται, 1.34; οὕτω γὰρ αἰσχρῶς τυγχάνει βεβιωκὼς, 1.38; ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις γέγονε καταισχύνων τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὴν πόλιν, μισθαρνῶν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, 1.40; μέλλων ἑαυτὸν καταισχύνειν ... τῶν δὲ καλῶν ἢ τῶν αἰσχρῶν οὐδεμίαν πώποτε πρόνοιαν ἐποιήσατο, 1.54; τὴν πατρῴαν οὐσίαν ὡς αἰσχρῶς ἀνήλωκε, 1.116).

He is also reproached for wickedness and infidelity (κακία καὶ ἀπιστία, 1.57), sycophancy (αὐτὸς ἰδίᾳ συκοφαντούμενος, 1.1; συκο-φαντεῖν, 1.3; συκοφαντῇ καὶ ἀσελγαίνη, 1.32), and of course ὕβρις (1.15–17, 1.55, 1.62). He is μιαρός (1.42, 1.54) and πόρνος (μεμισθαρνη-κότα αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ σώματι ... πεπορνευμένος, 1.52; οὐ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν πρὸς τὸν πόρνον πεπορνεῦσθαι;, 1.70; δοκεῖ πεπορνεῦσθαι Τίμαρχος, 1.79; οὐκ ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐλευθέρου, ἀλλὰ πόρνου, 1.123; 1.130; εἰς ὁποτέραν τάξιν Τίμαρχον κατανέμετε, πότερα εἰς τοὺς ἐρωμένους ἢ εἰς τοὺς πεπορνευμένους, 1.159), his deeds are contemptible (καταγέλαστα, 1.43; τῶν σοὶ καταγελάστως πεπραγμένων ἔργων, 1.76), he is also known as a thief (τίς ὑμῶν οὐκ οἶδεν ὡς περιβοήτως ἐξηλέγχθη κλέπτης ὤν;, 1.113), etc.

At the same time, Aischines emphasizes the difference between his own and the defendant's behaviour (cf. μέτριον in 1.1, μετρίως in 1.3, 1.39). He claims that he thinks it one of the most shameful things (τι τῶν αἰσχίστων) if one does not help the city, the laws and all people (1.2).

The opposition between Timarchos and the *polis*, the laws, the jury and people in general is evident throughout the speech. One can compare, for example, the mention of σωφροσύνη in connection with the old lawgivers such as Solon and Drakon in both 1.6 and 1.7. The

laws are concerned with orderly conduct (1.8 εὐκοσμία) and the well-being of the city. The opposition is explicitly declared by Aischines himself in 1.8: he contrasts the laws of the city and the character of Timarchos. The conclusion should be clear: Timarchos has lived in a manner contrary to all the laws (ἐναντίως ἅπασι τοῖς νόμοις). One of the causes of this would be bad education, for Aischines says that if a person receives a bad start (πονηρὰν ἀρχὴν ... τῆς παιδείας), the result would be similar to Timarchos. In fact, Aischines claims that the law-giver thought that the result of such badly brought-up (ἐκ τῶν κακῶς τεθραμμένων) boys would be citizens similar to the defendant.[362] The fine and morally proper (καλῶν καὶ σωφρόνων) laws, and the character (τρόπον) of Timarchos are opposed also in 1.20. The panegyric characterization of Autolykos, a member of the Council of Areopagos who made fun of Timarchos before the assembly (1.81: καλῶς νὴ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω καὶ σεμνῶς καὶ ἀξίως ἐκείνου τοῦ συνεδρίου βεβιωκώς), can also be seen as implicitly opposed to Timarchos.

As has been pointed out, there appears to have been nothing illegal about selling one's body, as long as the man who did it did not a) address the Council or Assembly; b) hold any public office (whether the post be appointed by lot or by election); or c) bring a public charge.[363] The law, Aischines relates, denied the privileges of public office to a man who:
1) Has treated his parents dishonourably (beats his father or mother, fails to support them, fails to provide a home for them, 1.28);
2) Has failed to perform military service or thrown away his shield in battle (1.29);
3) Has prostituted himself or acted as an escort (1.29: ἢ πεπορνευμένος ... ἢ ἡταιρηκώς), which means that the man has sold his own body in ὕβρις (τὸν γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐφ᾿ ὕβρει πεπρακότα);

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[362] This tactic, speaking as if the lawgiver's main intention was precisely to prepare a legal system to deal with Timarchos, is one used repeatedly (cf. 1.18; Fisher 2001: 134–5 and 143).

[363] See Aischin. 1.19–21, where this law is related and read out. For the distinction of private and public sphere, and the absence of legal regulations of private life, see Wallace 1994. Cf. also Sissa 1999: 154 ff.

4) Has consumed his ancestral goods, and whatever else he was heir to (1.29).

Our sources claim that the citizen who stood up and expressed his opinions about public matters, after having committed one of these deeds, was liable to be denounced. If proved correct in court, the accusation determined the formal loss of public rights, ἀτιμία (Sissa 1999: 154; cf. Aischin. 1.19–32). This was what Aischines tried to obtain from the judges. The four types of 'shameful lives' that he details "constitute major failings to live up to the fundamental ideals of the city and what it required of its male citizens" (Fisher 2001: 159; cf. Fisher 1998: 68–73), i.e. protecting the family, fighting for the city, upholding an independent and non-mercenary sexual identity, and maintaining the family property for his heirs.[364]

Prostitution is here only one rhetorical argument among others. Thus, acting against nature (παρὰ φύσιν) is not specific to prostitution; using one's body in a certain manner, feminizing it is not peculiar to a monetary exchange; and the fact that Timarchos' sexual restlessness has shaped his body goes far beyond simply selling oneself (Sissa 1999: 157).

Actually, the case against Timarchos was weak, and Aischines was probably well aware of this. He has no solid proof, and defends his use of hearsay and rumour as proof of the misdeeds of Timarchos (cf. Fisher 2001: 54). Sordid as it may sound, this was the way one played the game of politics in classical Athens, and not only then and there. Aischines could expect his opponents, especially Timarchos' supporter Demosthenes, to resort to the lowest forms of character assassination, so it was a good idea to strike first. His aim was, as it seems, to win a conviction on moral grounds, not on political, presenting a powerful image of the apparently respected politician who was in reality a die-hard degenerate (see Fisher 2001: 55).

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[364] For the (unsurprising) overlap with the list of questions asked of potential archons and with the list of especially shaming allegations, which if made in a public place, may entitle the abused man to bring an action for slander, see Fisher 2001: 159 and Todd 1993: 258–62. Cf. Lys. 10 and Dem. 57.30.

So what does Aischines tell us about Timarchos' behaviour and character?

1) First, Timarchos behaves indecently in public places, leaping around half-naked in the assembly where the laws rather require modest dress and deportment. Especially important in this connection is 1.26, which contains a powerful visual image of the disgrace Timarchos was bringing on the city.[365]

2) Timarchos served as a prostitute, using his body in a contemptible way (e.g. 1.31, 40, 41, 42, 46, 52, 54, 75, 76).

3) Timarchos hung around in gambling dens and dicing houses (e.g. 1.42, 53, 75, 95).

4) He consumed his patrimony (e.g. 1.31, 42, 94, 105, and elsewhere).

5) He bought his way into public office (e.g. 1.105, 106 ff.).

All these characteristics serve as a purpose to condemn Timarchos legally. In describing him, Aischines accumulates negative attributes, which repeat themselves and often form so-called invective groups that can contain several insulting and derogatory terms (cf., e.g., 1.105).[366] This tendency to form such invective groups is perhaps most conventional in ancient comedy, especially Aristophanes, but also in the Attic oratory.

This brings us back to the *Characters* of Theophrastos. Assuming that most of the types Theophrastos included in his work were well known to his public, and the basis of his selection was more or less popular usage, we may search in the Greek literary works for invective groups that contain one or more of the types also present in the *Characters*. Indeed, we can see that in this regard the role of oratory becomes eminent. This may also be another indication of the main role of oratory

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[365] [...] Ἐκεῖνοι μέν γε ἠσχύνοντο ἔξω τὴν χεῖρα ἔχοντες λέγειν, οὑτοσὶ δὲ οὐ πάλαι, ἀλλὰ πρώην ποτὲ ῥίψας θοἰμάτιον γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οὕτω κακῶς καὶ αἰσχρῶς διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας ὥστε τούς γε εὖ φρονοῦντας ἐγκαλύψασθαι, αἰσχυνθέντας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, εἰ τοιούτοις συμβούλοις χρώμεθα. Cf. Fisher 2001: 55–6.

[366] My usage of the term 'invective group' can be compared to 'moral clusters' (Fuqua 1993) or 'sections of personal abuse' (Burke 1972: 11), although their range may vary.

in studies of popular morality.[367] It is especially noteworthy that the use of some of the so-called Theophrastean types in invective groups is limited only to oratory and comedy: one of these is ἀπόνοια (cf. *Char*. 6), and the other is βδελυρία (cf. *Char*. 11), which is in this position mainly due to the speeches of Demosthenes, and especially Aischines' speech against Timarchos.

4.2.4. Demosthenes' counter-attack

In his *De falsa legatione* (*or*. 19),[368] Demosthenes attacks Aischines and Philokles with much the same rhetoric that Aischines had used against Timarchos, Demosthenes' protégé.

He tells the jury that 'this horrible shameless man' (ὁ βδελυρὸς καὶ ἀναιδὴς οὑτοσί)—meaning Aischines—stayed with Philip for a night and a day when the rest departed (19.175). Demosthenes and Aischines each had separate meetings with Philip, and each later accused the other of using these meetings to plot against Athenian interests (cf. MacDowell 2000a: 277). It should be noted that this is the first instance of using the same word against Aischines that he had exploited in his speech against Timarchos.

Further on, in 19.206, he builds tension with three anaphoric τίνα-questions to the jury (see Paulsen 1999: 215), which he himself answers one by one:

1) Which man is the most obnoxious (βδελυρώτατον) and the most full of arrogance and audacity (πλείστης ἀναιδείας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας[369] μεστόν) in the *polis*? — Philokrates.
2) Who has the loudest voice and can say the most clearly whatever he wishes? — Aischines.[370]

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[367] See especially Dover 1974; cf. also Taylor 1990, Herman 2000. The great importance of forensic oratory for the understanding of popular moral standards had also been recognized earlier (see, e.g., Earp 1929: 11). These standards may also have influenced the orators and their usage of certain rhetorical devices.

[368] The translations and paraphrases are adapted from MacDowell 2000a.

[369] In some manuscripts, the nouns are given in reverse order; see MacDowell 2000a: 291.

[370] On the vocal qualities of Aischines (including his career as an actor), see also Dem. 19.336 ff. and cf. MacDowell 2000: 351–2. See also Worman 2004.

3) Which man do *they* call timid and cowardly (ἄτολμον καὶ δειλόν), but I call cautious? — Myself, i.e. Demosthenes.[371]

Here, Demosthenes uses essentially the same words for Philokrates that were seen in 19.175 for Aischines (βδελυρὸς – βδελυρώτατον; ἀν-αιδὴς – ἀναιδείας). As Philokrates and Aischines were on one side, Demosthenes makes no difference in choosing the abusive language when attacking them.

In 19.208, again the most impudent men (βδελυρώτατοι) of Athens, and the loudest speakers are mentioned, to whom Aischines, in the opinion of Demosthenes, clearly belongs. In 19.287, Demosthenes stresses the fact that while Aischines was talking about prostitution (περὶ πορνείας, sc. of Timarchos), he had two brothers-in-law standing by: one was Nikias 'the loathsome' (βδελυροῦ), the other the 'damned' (καταράτου) Kyrebion. In 19.291, the term βδελυρὸς is again used for Philokrates, but he is explicitly connected with Aischines. Finally, in 19.309, Philokrates is the one who is said to be notorious for his disgusting life (βδελυρῶς βεβιωκέναι) that no additional degrading (αἰσχρὸν) or offensive (δυσχερές) epithet needs to be applied to him.

4.2.5. Concluding remarks

Aischines is especially fond of the terms βδελυρός and βδελυρία in his speech against Timarchos, which has the greatest concentration of them in the classical Greek literature. Thus we could attempt a comparison between his description of Timarchos as a βδελυρός and the sketch of βδελυρός in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, taking into account that βδελυρός in Aischines is only a part of the abusive repertoire he uses to denigrate Timarchos.

We can see direct similarities only in respect of the man's exhibitionist behaviour. The βδελυρός of the *Characters* lifts up his clothes and

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[371] That Demosthenes is considered a timid politician is also known from other passages. Cf., e.g., Dem. 8.68, Plu. *Dem*. 6.5 and ch. 4.4.3 below; see also Paulsen 1999: 215 and MacDowell 2000a: 291.

exposes himself in front of ladies (*Char*. 11.2),[372] and Timarchos is related to have thrown off his cloak and done all-in fighting routines naked in the assembly (1.26).[373] Other features of the Theophrastean sketch seem to have no direct parallels in Aischines, although the repulsive man's announcement that he intends to get drunk (*Char*. 11.9) might be compatible with the excessive consumption of wine noted in the case of Timarchos (cf. 1.26).

As already mentioned, one has suspected some text loss at the end of this chapter of the *Characters*, due to its relative shortness when compared to others. If it was longer, would it contain references to behaviour like that of Timarchos (serving as a prostitute, gambling, eating up one's patrimony, etc.)? In other words, does Aischines use βδελυρός simply as an abuse,[374] or are the traits of Timarchos' behaviour related to his being a βδελυρός? One possibility would be that the term functions both as a sort of cover term for various repulsive acts or coarse behaviour, and as a more specific notion connected with sexual practices. This would also, to some degree, account for the confusion seen in the comment of the scholiast to Aristophanes.

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[372] Cf. *Char*. 4.4: the boor just does not care that he sits with his cloak hitched up above his knees, thereby revealing his nakedness.

[373] Note that in 19.196, Demosthenes accuses Aischines of insolence and drunken violence towards a free woman of Olynthos. Aischines finds this accusation offending but at the same time he is glad, because the Athenians would not listen to Demosthenes, as he was dwelling on the charge (Aischin. 2.4). Cf. also Dem. 19.309.

[374] Beta (2004: 104) has interpreted βδελυρός and other originally scatological words as a mark of "degenerate oratory", especially of politicians.

4.3. Illiberality and servility:
ἀνελευθερία in the Greek world[375]

4.3.1. General questions and sources

This chapter deals with some aspects of ancient Greek moral vocabulary against the background of the concept of liberality in ancient Greek society. I will distinguish between popular morality and moral philosophy, and this distinction is to be understood the way that Sir Kenneth J. Dover has defined it in his fundamental and still important book *Greek popular morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle*: 'morality' of a culture denotes the principles, criteria and values which underlie its responses to various moral experiences; while 'moral philosophy' or 'ethics' denotes rational, systematic thinking about the relationship between morality and reason (Dover 1974: 1). In addition, Dover asserts, there are other types of rational thinking about morality, which can be assigned to linguistics, psychology and sociology. The existence of the distinction between popular morality and moral philosophy or ethics should, in fact, be self-evident, and has been considered as such by recent writers (e.g. Taylor 1990: 233).

Thus, two approaches are possible in this kind of study: theoretical and practical. Theoretical discussion on ethical subjects from the antiquity is well preserved in the works of philosophers, whereas from the practical side, everyday use of moral language and the so-called popular morality, very little is known (see below on ancient sources available). At the same time, the question of how things were functioning in practice is very intriguing, especially when Aristotle, the most important ancient theoretician on moral philosophy, particularly emphasizes practice (see, e.g., *EN* 1103b26 ff.).

In the preface of *Greek popular morality*, Dover has expressed his surprise on the fact that although there are many books about the history of moral concepts in early Greek poetry and in Attic tragedy, as well as treatises that follow the history of these concepts in the historians and philosophers, "none has treated works composed for the persuasion or

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[375] Previous version of this chapter was published as Volt 2003.

amusement of large audiences as the primary evidence for the moral assumptions made by the average Athenian citizen during the years when Plato was writing the *Republic* or Aristotle the *Nicomachean Ethics*" (Dover 1974: XI). Although carefully avoiding the use of philosophical works in his treatment of popular morality, Dover agrees that the opinions and statements of the two great theorists whose works have survived, viz. Plato and Aristotle, form an inevitable background of the study of ancient Greek morality and values. Thus, they even appear in the title of Dover's book, although primarily as an indication of the temporal scope of the work.

The reason for this limitation in time is the fact that we are much better informed about the period 428–322 (from the birth of Plato until the death of Aristotle) than about any previous or subsequent period of Greek history. In these roughly one hundred years we find the whole Attic oratory, historians such as Thukydides and Xenophon, most of the surviving plays of Euripides, some of Sophokles, all comedies of Aristophanes, and nearly all the quotations from Old and Middle Comedy. The circulation of Herodotos' work almost coincided with the birth of Plato, and Menander's career began immediately after the death of Aristotle (see Dover 1974: 4).

The second limitation is in space. Since the literature of the period is practically all written by Athenians or by participants in Athenian culture, it is reasonable to concentrate on moral phenomena of Athens (see Dover 1974: 2, Pearson 1966: 2).

Finally, the third limitation is in gender. It goes without saying that all of the moral philosophy of the period is written by men. Even if we would leave aside the philosophers, all other material that would tell us anything about popular morality is also written by men. Thus, we are dealing with the Athenian society in the 5th and 4th century BCE, as seen and depicted by men. In studying the above-mentioned authors and works we shall learn something about what men believed women to think and portrayed them as thinking, but not necessarily anything about what women actually thought (Dover 1974: 2).

In respect of sources, Dover has claimed that in the study of popular morality, the main genre that gives us plausible information is practical rhetoric, i.e. the Attic oratory. He warns against imagining that either Plato's work or Aristotle's represented an intellectual systematization of

the principles which were manifested in the moral choices and judgments of the ordinary unphilosophical Greek (1974: 1–2), stating that studies of ancient Greece have suffered already from assuming Greek morality to be 'epitomised in Plato and Aristotle' (1974: 2, n. 1; see also Pearson 1966: 210–12). While this is certainly true, one should not, at least not without good grounds, accept the other extreme either, namely the view that Plato and Aristotle should be left aside when talking about popular morality.

So, the question is whether Plato and Aristotle are reliable sources of evidence for the moral views current in their time. It has been claimed that their writings may be expected to provide, in addition to their theoretical views, *some* evidence of current moral attitudes. In Plato's dialogues, for example, some characters do not express Plato's own beliefs, but rather views which Plato presumably believed to be current at the time. Aristotle, on the other hand, counts some current moral beliefs as those which the ethical theory has to systematize and harmonize.[376] In his words, "we must examine the principle (sc. the definition of good for man, or happiness) in the light not only of a logical argument, its conclusion and premises, but also of what is commonly said about it", and after mentioning a few typical concepts of happiness, "some of these views are popular and traditional (literally, held by many people and from ancient times), others held by a few distinguished men; and it is not reasonable that either class should be wholly wrong, but more likely that they should be right in one respect at least, or even in most."[377]

The question as to what extent a scholar setting out to diagnose and analyze the sentiments, emotions and behavioural patterns that were predominant in a "dead" society is entitled to draw unselectively on a wide range of dissimilar sources has been emphasized by G. Herman (2000: 11). He, too, values the forensic speeches most highly, suggesting that they should be privileged above other sorts of evidence.[378] Compared

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[376] *EN* 1095a28–30, *EE* 1216b26–35, 1235b13–18; see Taylor 1990: 233, and cf. Dover 1974: 7 for opposite opinions.

[377] *EN* 1098b9–11, 27–9.

[378] Herman 2000: 13, with an addition that this is true at least in so far as the problem he is analyzing, viz. revenge in Athenian society, is concerned.

to Aristotle, the passages from the Attic orators, he says, by virtue of the context in which they were pronounced and of their lack of reflexivity cannot but be read as direct, straightforward expressions of Athenian social mores.

In this chapter, I have not confined myself to practical rhetoric, as the various sides of the concept of liberality and illiberality can more effectively be seen in comparison of different genres. In drawing conclusions, however, the two sides—i.e. popular (actual) morality and philosophers' ideas about morality—should be kept apart.

The paper has its origins in the work on Theophrastos' *Characters*.[379] While it contains various interesting social types that have deserved and deserve scholarly attention, choosing ἀνελευθερία has special reasons that will be explained below.

4.3.2. Freedom and slavery

Status as one of the determinants of moral capacity has been observed, in the context of Ancient Greece, from three aspects: 1) wealth and poverty, 2) town and country, and 3) freedom and slavery (Dover 1974: 109–16). Freedom (ἐλευθερία) is one of the most important social values for the Greeks of classical Athens, and terms connected with it, both on the positive and negative scale, are extremely important in Greek social and ethical context.[380] M. H. Hansen has distinguished three different meanings of ἐλευθερία, depending on context: freedom as opposed to slavery (social), freedom in the sense of the autonomy of the *polis* (political), and freedom of the individual in public and private spheres (constitutional).[381] Various sides of linguistic and semantic questions that

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[379] It may be argued that Theophrastos does not wholly fit in the temporal scope described above. He is, however, a pupil of Aristotle, and can be discussed in Aristotelian tradition, and his work *Characters* is usually dated to the year 319 BCE, i.e. only three years after the death of Aristotle.

[380] For thorough treatises on the Greek ἐλευθερία, see Raaflaub 1981, 1984, and especially 1985 (English translation Raaflaub 2004). Raaflaub follows its historical development from the archaic times on, covering various spheres of its use (e.g., inner liberty, liberty of a state, liberty outside the state, etc.).

[381] Hansen 1991: 75–6, paraphrased after Kallet-Marx 1994.

should be taken into account in a terminological study have been thoroughly discussed by K. Raaflaub (1985: 13 ff.). Thus, in examining the notion of 'liberty', we should not confine ourselves to one specific word (viz. ἐλευθερία), but rather examine a broader semantic field that includes terms more or less connected with 'liberty'. In addition, one also has to take into account various contrastive and complimentary notions (Raaflaub 1985: 16). I am aware that the approach used here may, in some case, be too focused on some specific words. This does not, however, affect my principal conclusions.

It has been stated that the slave was not expected—as the citizen was—to display the virtues of loyalty, good faith and self-sacrifice. It was usually taken for granted that a slave could not be trusted, which does not mean that there were no exceptions (see Dover 1974: 114; cf. Lys. 13.18). We may even find the sentiment that a slave of good character is a better man than a free citizen of bad character.[382] In contrast with the slave, the free man was expected not to be dominated by fear, but to take the path of toil and sacrifice wherever there was a choice between pleasure or safety on the one hand, and honour or service to the community on the other (Dover 1974: 115). According to Demosthenes, the most important difference between a slave and a free man in Athens was that for any wrongdoing the slave had to answer with his body, while the free man could, in most cases, satisfy the law by paying the necessary amount of money, and corporal punishment was the last penalty to be inflicted on him.[383]

In addition, the very contrast between democracy and other forms of constitution, in which the distribution of power was restricted, could easily be expressed in terms of freedom and slavery (see Dover 1974: 116). Compare, for example, Herodotos 5.78, who offers the opinion that when the Athenians were ruled by tyrants, they fared poorly in war because their hearts were not in the doing of their masters' bidding, but when Athens became a democracy, they fought with greater success because each man felt that he was fighting for himself. Aristotle identified the sovereignty of the majority and freedom as the two things which were considered to be the defining features of democracy, and

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[382] Cf. Eur. *Ion* 854–6, Men. fr. 722; see also Dover 1974: 115.
[383] Dem. 22.55, 24.167; see also Sinclair 1988: 28.

noted that people asserted that freedom was the aim (τέλος) of every democracy.[384] The most important freedom that was often emphasized was ἰσηγορία: the right of the citizen to address the sovereign assembly of the people. This inevitably led to a more generalized freedom of speech (παρρησία).[385]

The state of not being free can be expressed by a special word like the English 'slavery' or Greek δουλεία, or by means of negative prefix. Thus, we have the word ἀνελευθερία, derived from the adjective ἀνελεύθερος, which in turn is an opposite of ἐλεύθερος 'free'.[386] The specific words δοῦλος and δουλεία are mostly used for slaves and slavery in the strict sense of those words. The form with negative prefix covers a wider semantic field and has stronger ethical connotations.

Starting from the positive side, the key word is the adjective ἐλευθέριος, from which we have a derivative abstract noun ἐλευθε-ριότης. Both the adjective and the abstract noun have two major meanings: 1) speaking or acting like a freeman, fit for a freeman, liberal *resp*. liberality (broad sense); and 2) freely giving, bountiful *resp*. freeness in giving, generosity (in relation to money, narrow sense). Negative counterparts reflect the same distinction; ἀνελευθερία means: 1) illibe-rality of mind, servility; and 2) illiberality in money matters, stinginess.

These meanings are widely known and reported by any major Greek dictionary (see, e.g., *LSJ s.v.*; cf. also Raaflaub 1981: 299). It is interesting to see how those parallel meanings are reflected in Greek texts: some-times both appear in one genre, author or group of authors, while in other cases we can see strict usage of the words in only one of the meanings distinguished above. Thus, I will discuss the background of these concepts and follow their use mostly in philosophical, but also in historical and rhetorical, as well as dramatic context.[387] I will also touch

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[384] *Pol.* 1317a40–b16; cf. also Ober 1989: 295, Sinclair 1988: 21.

[385] On those two terms and their application see Ober 1989: 296 and especially Raaflaub 1980 and 1985: 277–83, 325–6; cf. also Finley 1983: 139–140.

[386] Formally, because actually the adjective ἐλευθέριος forms a more exact opposite (cf. Latin *liber* and *liberalis*), but ἐλεύθερος is also used in this sense (see Plato *Lg.* 914c, 669c).

[387] Dramatic is, in this case, restricted to comic, as the words ἀνελεύθερος/ἀνελευθερία are almost never used in Greek tragedies (with the exception of Soph. fr. 314.149). We can, however, see many references to the opposition of ἐλεύθερος and δοῦλος, e.g. Eur. *Andr.* 433–4, *Hec.* 234; Soph. *Tr.* 63, etc.

upon the relation between these two concepts, for I believe that they have much in common.

4.3.3. Theophrastos

As mentioned above, it is characteristic to the structure of the *Characters* that at the beginning of every chapter we find a definition of the abstract noun, which is followed by a description of the character trait in various situations; this description, in turn, begins with the agent noun. The spurious definitions in the *Characters* differ from the definitions of Aristotle (see below, ch. 4.3.5) in that they almost entirely lack allusions to the tripartite system, where character traits are defined as negative extremes at both sides of a positive mean.

The description part of the character sketch consists of common, everyday situations and the reactions of different character types in them. The aim of Theophrastos is not the creation of ethical theory; his description is concerned with prototypes of behaviour and follows the occurrence of those types in real situations.

The definition of ἀνελευθερία in the *Characters* (*Char.* 22) is corrupt. Diggle (2004) prints Ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶ †περιουσία τις ἀπὸ φιλο-τιμίας δαπάνην ἐχούσα†. ("Illiberality is **** ambition **** expense."). Traditional reading, which follows Schweighäuser's conjecture, would be Ἡ δὲ ἀνελευθερία ἐστὶν ἀπουσία τις φιλοτιμίας δαπάνην ἐχούσης ("illiberality is the lack of any ambition connected with expenses"). Although I use the translation 'ambition' for φιλοτιμία, it should be noted that the Greek word is mainly used in a positive sense to denote the behaviour of those who value and treasure honour. Honour (τιμή) is a reciprocal phenomenon, which includes the ways in which others value my conduct and achievements.

The following description of the illiberal type shows that he does not wholly lack ambition—he just tries to satisfy it at the lowest possible cost. Compare also *EN* 1122b19, b35, where Aristotle mentions some expenses that are connected with magnificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια): 1) things connected with the worship of gods (§§ 2 and 4 in the *Characters*); 2) social obligations (§§ 2, 3, 5, 6); and 3) personal expenses (§§ 6–13). The definition also has similarities with Aristotle's definition in *EE*

1221a33, and the Pseudo-Aristotelian definition in *VV* 1251b13 f. The characterization by Theophrastos has much in common with his own description of μικρολογία 'pettiness' (*Char*. 10) and αἰσχροκέρδεια 'shabby profiteering' (*Char*. 30; see especially Ussher 1993: 103 ff., 184 ff. and 254 ff.).

Thus, Theophrastos understands the word in the narrow sense as 'stinginess' or 'meanness over money'. The description is given in decreasing gradation—in the final situations the expenses that are needed become smaller and smaller.

It should be mentioned that the real-life images of Theophrastos follow their own logic and differ essentially from philosophical treatment. The *opus* of Theophrastos is unique in that it sketches the most typical outlines of character types. The habits of behaviour are mainly described in their external manifestations as behavioural regularities, and the discussion of the motifs that lie behind them is almost absent.[388] The description of each individual in the *Characters* presumably has the sole purpose of revealing the character trait he is supposed to possess. In this they differ from Aristotle's descriptions which aim primarily to illustrate a philosophical, or specifically ethical, principle. The aim of Aristotle is to reach an ethical conclusion, and occasional descriptions of traits help him reach that aim, but are not an aim in their own. (At the same time, Aristotle stresses that his goal is practical and concerned with moral improvement; see *EN* 1103b26.)

Now, if we search for occurrences of those words which Theophrastos uses to denote specific character types, in other Greek authors of the same or preceding period, it appears that most of those words denote well-known social types. In addition, they are very often found in bundle with each other or with other words and expressions denoting negative social behaviour in the Greek literature of the 5th and 4th century BCE. Thus, 25 out of 30 Theophrastean character types are somehow connected with each other in the authors of the period.[389] It can be speculated that some kind of hierarchy of the Greek moral and

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[388] This has been stressed many times, see especially Fortenbaugh 1975.

[389] Excluding *Char*. 6, 8, 16, 21, 29. It should be recalled that five out of 30 abstract nouns are found for the first time in Theophrastos (*Char*. 8, 16, 17, 27, 29), and both μικροφιλοτιμία and μικροφιλότιμος in *Char*. 21 are found only in Theophrastos.

social values may be revealed through the most widely used character-istics in Theophrastos and the earlier and contemporary tradition. Also it is expected that Theophrastos deliberately chose character types that were better known to his audience and important in the society. The most eminent character type on this negative scale is ἀνελευθερία 'illiberality' *resp.* ἀνελεύθερος 'illiberal' (*Char*. 22 in Theophrastos). It has to do with questions of submissiveness and dependency on the one hand, and self-reliance on the other. Freedom has an economical side which is connected with the use of money and the question of how and how much one spends it. This is what we can explicitly see in the work of Theophrastos, exemplified by the description of a negative counter-part.

4.3.4. Plato

Unlike Aristotle (see below, ch. 4.3.5), Plato does not give a systematic overview of negative character traits; he just mentions them here and there. Two of the most important places are *R*. 590a–b and *Lg*. 649d. In *R*. 590a–b, Plato attempts to show that the bad reputation of certain activities and traits is not simply arbitrary but is the result of their connection with certain conditions of soul which Plato has already argued to be undesirable (White 1979: 236). Here, both illiberality and flattery (κολακεία)[390] are connected with money (χρήματα).

The adjective ἀνελεύθερος and the agent noun derived from it are used abundantly in the dialogues of Plato, also in connection with various words and phrases expressing value judgments. In general, it is associated with a) desire of profit (through money or power), and b) servility. In both cases we can see connections with flattery (*R*. 590b, *Smp*. 183a–b). Servility is often used by Plato as a synonym for unworthy and illiberal behaviour—cf., e.g., *Lg*. 880a, where he speaks of a 40-year-old man, who at this age is bold enough to fight with someone, either in attacking or in defending. Plato states that this kind of man is boorish

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[390] Flattery is another important negative characteristic in ancient Greek (and not only) society. For an old, but still valuable study of it see Ribbeck 1884. Some new inter-pretations can be found in Nesselrath 1985: 88–121. See also ch. 2.1.8.2 above.

(ἄγροικος), illiberal (ἀνελεύθερος) and slavish (ἀνδραποδώδης).[391] Friendship, which plays an important role in Plato's theory, is not possible in a state where rulers and the ruled ones live like master and slave (hence liberty and friendship go closely together), nor, on the other hand, if the good and the worthless are treated alike, for "equality between unequals is inequality" (*Lg*. 757a). Either extreme leads to discord (cf. Guthrie 1978: 340).

In *Lg*. 919e, Plato asserts that although in a *polis* one should in most cases observe attentively that the citizens do not become infected with impudence (ἀναισχυντία) and illiberality (ἀνελευθερία), it is not easy to determine by laws what exactly is appropriate to freemen and what is not. Liberality is often described in terms of what it is not, e.g. by saying what a liberal man must not do, and not what he has to do to be liberal. Theft (κλοπή), in any case, is considered unworthy and illiberal, see *Lg*. 941b (where we also read the word ἀναίσχυντος 'impudent' again).[392] By theft Plato (in the ideal state of Magnesia) also means appropriation of things one has found.

Ἀνελευθερία is also connected with meanness or petty behaviour (*R*. 486a: σμικρολογία, *R*. 469d: σμικρὰ διάνοια). Even some kind of music can be ἀνελεύθερος (*Lg*. 802c–d).

In *R*. 486b, Plato talks about the distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical disposition. He explains that a man with a cowardly (δειλός) and illiberal (ἀνελεύθερος) nature is not able to have a share in true philosophy. In the following section, he adds the adjectives φιλοχρήματος 'money-loving' and ἀλαζών 'boasting'. Although the adjective ἀνελεύθερος is used here in the broader sense, we can notice an allusion to financial interests, denoted by the word φιλοχρήματος.

In two cases, ἀνελευθερία in the works of Plato is connected with ὑπερηφανία 'arrogance', which is treated as an opposite of it. We are reminded of Aristotle's tripartite system in *Criti*. 112c, where Plato describes the former size of and living conditions in Athens and its

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[391] Cf. *R*. 577d, where Plato uses ἀνελευθερία together with the word explicitly denoting slavery (δουλεία).

[392] Cf. *Lg*. 857a: a thief will be detained in prison until he has paid twice the value of the theft unless excused by his prosecutor.

acropolis, here specifically the soldiers' quarter: in building houses (incl. temples) no gold or silver was used, but a middle way between arrogance and illiberality was followed. Thus, Plato actually talks about a positive mean here, but does not specify it. In *R*. 391b–c we are dealing with criticism of Homer: what Plato does not like is that the poet ascribes to heroes and gods qualities that they could not possibly have possessed. For example, we cannot believe, according to Plato, that Achilleus, who was of divine descent, possessed two antagonistic qualities—illiberal love of money[393] and arrogance towards gods and men. Here, too, the connection of ἀνελευθερία with money matters is explicitly stressed. Compare also *R*. 560d, where ἀνελευθερία in narrow sense as 'stinginess' is opposed to κοσμία δαπάνη 'modest (i.e. proper) spending'.

In *Tht*. 184c, the word ἀνελεύθερος is used in opposition with adjective ἀγεννής 'ignoble': here, Plato makes his case in saying that the easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is, in general, a sign of good breading (οὐκ ἀγεννές), whereas the opposite is ἀνελεύθερον. This manifestation of Plato's dislike of technical precision in the use of words has been emphasized when dealing with his own philosophical key terms, which can also be "multivocal" (Guthrie 1978: 97).

In *Grg*. 465b, Sokrates describes self-adornment (κομμωτική)[394] as κακοῦργος 'rascally', ἀπατηλή 'deceitful', ἀγεννής 'ignoble' and ἀνελεύθερος. In *Grg*. 518a, he continues on the theme: in comparison with gymnastics and medicine, other arts are slavish (δουλοπρεπεῖς), menial (διακονικάς) and illiberal.

In *R*. 400b, ἀνελευθερία is used together with ὕβρις 'wantonness, insolence' and μανία 'madness' (following ἄλλη κακία 'other evils') in the context of rhythm and metrical feet (fr. 8 of Damon the musical theorist). A bit later, in *R*. 401b, we are told that in the ideal city there

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[393] Literally ἀνελευθερία μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας; cf. *R*. 485e–86a, where honesty, the love of truth and the rejection of both φιλοχρηματία and ἀνελευθερία are hallmarks of the philosopher. The last two are considered characteristic to Egyptians and Phoenicians in *Lg*. 747b.

[394] In his treatment it is flattery disguised as gymnastic, because it deceives men by forms and colours, polish and dress, so as to make them, in the effort of assuming an extraneous beauty, neglect the native sort that comes through gymnastic.

should be a watch over craftsmen to forbid them to represent malice (κακόηθες, literally 'having bad ἦθος'), the licentious (ἀκόλαστον), the illiberal (ἀνελεύθερον) and the graceless (ἄσχημον), either in the likeness of living creatures or in buildings or in any other product of their art. In *R*. 422a, Plato asserts that both wealth and poverty should be kept from slipping into the *polis* without the knowledge of the guards, for one of them brings along soft luxuriousness (τρυφή), idleness (ἀργία) and innovation (νεωτερισμός), and the other illiberality and the evil of bad workmanship (κακοεργία).

In *Lg*. 644a, Plato states that an upbringing which aims at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, would be vulgar (βάναυσος), illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name 'education' (παιδεία).

In *Lg*. 728e, we see Plato prefer the mean position between opposite extremes in the case of honour, for one extreme makes souls puffed up (χαῦνος) and over-bold (θρασύς), the other makes them base (ταπεινός) and illiberal (ἀνελεύθερος). The connection with ταπεινός 'mean, base' is seen again in *Lg*. 774c and 791d. In *Lg*. 843c–d, ἀνελευθερία appears with ἀναίδεια 'shamelessness' (in the context of neighbourly relations); in *Lg*. 914c, ἀνελεύθερος is connected with ἀκοινώνητος νόμων 'having no share of, i.e. disregarding, laws'.

Thus, ἀνελευθερία in Plato's works is connected with both servility (i.e., behaviour that is inappropriate to freemen) and, in a narrower sense, stinginess. Nevertheless, the broad sense prevails, although sometimes there are allusions to the financial side, as well. As has been mentioned, Plato finds it quite difficult to determine by laws, what exactly would be appropriate to freemen.

4.3.5. Aristotle

Aristotle divides human ethical qualities into three groups: positive mean (μεσότης), which is the ideal form, and two negative extremes, deficiency (ἔλλειψις) and excess (ὑπερβολή).[395] The positive mean is the way of behaviour which is accepted in society and considered desirable. The extremes are, eventually, reproachable. The aim of Aristotle is to demonstrate the negative qualities of the extremes, thus reaching the conclusion that the middle way is the best. Extremes are opposite to the mean, but also to each other, and the mean is opposite to the extremes. At that, the reciprocal opposition of the extremes is greater than opposition to the mean; some extremes may even have some similarities with the mean. It should also be remembered that the mean is sometimes more opposed to one extreme, sometimes to other (see *EN* 1108b13 ff.).

In connection with ἀνελευθερία, let us first deal with a triad that in Aristotle's treatment falls under liberality: ἀνελευθερία—ἐλευθεριότης—ἀσωτία. The third term (ἀσωτία, 'prodigality, wastefulness') is not very important for Aristotle (as mentioned already, the parts of the tripartite system do not have to be of equal importance). He writes that prodigality is not really vicious and only appears when a person has nobody to guide him; with the help of guidance, the prodigious man can achieve the positive mean. Ἀνελευθερία, on the other hand, is incorrigible, and it is caused by two things: a) old age (γῆρας), and b) any kind of inability (πᾶσα ἀδυναμία, *EN* 1121b13–4). Both of these are related to some deficiency and inability to act in a useful way. As an extreme illustration of ἀνελευθερία, Aristotle mentions usurers (τοκισταί), who lend small sums at high interest: this is because they "take more than they ought and from the wrong sources" (by which Aristotle presumably means poor citizens, *EN* 1122a1–3). At the opposite end of the scale, the 'generous man' gets his wealth from proper sources (e.g. his own private means, *EN* 1120b1), and gives it in the right amounts at the right time to the right people (*EN* 1120a24–6). Again, we may presume that Aristotle has in mind "the deserving poor" (Millett 1991: 43).

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[395] See, e.g., *EN* 1107a33–8b7, *EE* 1220b38 ff. The general view that moderation is good, and excess to be avoided, had been anticipated by popular morality and by poets as well as by Plato. See also ch. 1.3 above.

Aristotle also mentions subgroups of ἀνελευθερία, which are in turn divided in two: one group is characterized by the too small a wish to give something away (ἔλλειψις τῆς δόσεως), and the other one by the too great a wish to acquire something (ὑπερβολὴ τῆς λήψεως, see *EN* 1121b16 ff., cf. also *EE* 1232a6 ff. and *Rh*. 1366b15). In *MM* 1.24.1 (1192a9 ff.), we also find a general note that there are many kinds of ἀνελευθερία,[396] with the reason that the vice has often many forms, whereas the virtue does not. A medical parallel is offered to illustrate this claim: illness has many forms, while health has only one. Thus, in all passages mentioned above, the term ἀνελευθερία is used in the narrow sense.

A short treatise with traditional Latin name *De virtutibus et vitiis*, which we find in Aristotle's corpus (see above, ch. 1.3.1), should also be taken into consideration, as sections 1250b25–35 of this text are devoted to the term ἐλευθεριότης. Liberality is, first of all, characterized as a quality of being generous in money matters (although not in every situation, but only in case of praiseworthy activities), spending a lot on necessary things and offering help in the case of important expenses. It is probable that the author here combines the treatment of liberality with that of friendliness, as both assume mutual relations and depend on reciprocal opinions. The term ἀνελευθερία is discussed longer in the same treatise, sections 1251b4–17, where it is again divided into three subgroups: a) αἰσχροκερδία 'pursuit of disgraceful gain', b) φειδωλία 'parsimony', c) κιμβεία 'stinginess' (an abstract used only in this treatise). It seems that the author tries to combine both meanings of the word here, because he ends the treatment of ἀνελευθερία with the assertion that life characteristic to an ἀνελεύθερος is commonly lived by servants, and is slavish and dirty.

Ethics and politics constitute for Aristotle an interrelated study, which he calls the philosophy of human life (ή περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια φιλοσοφία, *EN* 1181b15). The subject of both is the good for man, the end to which all human activities are directed, and the happiness of each individual and that of a whole state are the same thing (*Pol*. 1324a5 ff.). But does his treatment of ἀνελευθερία in political works coincide with what we have seen in his ethical treatises? First of all, the tripartite

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[396] The author actually uses a rare parallel form ἀνελευθεριότης.

system that is central to his ethical (and, one should add, biological) works—viz. that the mean is natural and the best, whereas excess in either direction is a disorder—is not used in the *Politics*; τὸ μέσον appears only in a few normative generalizations (see Finley 1983: 10).

Pol. 1336a29–30 mentions conditions that should be observed in bringing up children: among other things, the games that children play must not be ἀνελεύθεροι—here 'not appropriate to freemen'—and also not too weary or disorderly. In *Pol*. 1336b3 ff., the author continues on the upbringing of children and the word ἀνελευθερία is again used in a broader sense: children up to seven years of age should by all means be kept at home, so that they could not acquire unworthy habits from what they hear and see. Here, ἀνελευθερία is also connected with αἰσχρο-λογία 'foul language, obscenity' and ἀνδραποδωδία 'servility'. The same context is found some sections further: in *Pol*. 1337b4 ff., Aristotle states that the youth should be taught useful skills, but not everything that is useful, and only what is necessary and appropriate to freemen. It should be monitored strictly that young people do not engage in some-thing that would turn a man βάναυσος 'vulgar'. Vulgar, in Aristotle's definition, is something that in practice acts contrary to principles of ἀρετή, be it in connection with body, soul or mind.[397] At the same time the goal of doing or learning something is important. If something is done in the name of itself, friends or ἀρετή, i.e. out of inner motivation and without external force, this behaviour is not unworthy (οὐκ ἀν-ελεύθερον); but he who acts for the sake of others, i.e. not on his own initiative, is often slavish.

Activities are illiberal mostly for two reasons: a) because they prevent men from living an honourable and liberal life, tying their mental and physical powers with a specific skill, thus making it impossible to achie-ve real happiness (εὐδαιμονία); and, b) because they have a serving function, they are done on someone else's demand, they aim at financial profit and make people materially and mentally dependent on others (Raaflaub 1981: 305).

Thus, the *Politics* uses the term ἀνελεύθερος and its cognates in the broader sense, differing from Aristotle's ethical works.

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[397] For a recent ethical and social examination of Aristotle's use of "vulgar", see Adams 2001–2.

4.3.6. Historiographers

Compared to Plato and Aristotle, other authors of the period use the word ἀνελευθερία and its cognates relatively seldom. We may find some phrases and words expressing value judgment connected with it in Xenophon, e.g. οὐ πρέπον ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ 'not appropriate to good and noble man' (*Mem.* 1.2.29); ἀκρατής 'incontinent, intemperate' (*Mem.* 4.5.4). In *Smp.* 8.23, it is stated that union with someone whose regard is for the body rather than for the soul, is ἀνελεύθερος. In Sokrates' defence, Xenophon lets him say that he will prefer death to begging meanly (ἀνελευθέρως) for longer life and thus gaining a life far less worthy in exchange for death (*Ap.* 9). An interesting passage is Xenophon's *Mem.* 3.10.5, where Sokrates formulates some antitheses, including ἐλευθέριον/ἀνελεύθερον:

> "Moreover, nobility (τὸ μεγαλοπρεπές) and dignity (τὸ ἐλευθέ-ριον), self-abasement (τὸ ταπεινόν) and servility (τὸ ἀνελεύθε-ρον), prudence (τὸ σωφρονικόν) and understanding (τὸ φρόνι-μον), insolence (τὸ ὑβριστικόν) and vulgarity (τὸ ἀπειρόκαλον), are reflected in the face and in the attitudes of the body whether still or in motion."[398]

Finally, in the *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*, Xenophon compares some Spartan habits to those of other *poleis*. He says that in other states the most powerful citizens do not even wish it to be thought that they fear the magistrates; they believe such fear to be a badge of slavery (ἀνελευθερία). But at Sparta the most important men show the utmost deference to the magistrates: they pride themselves on their humility, on running instead of walking to answer any call, in the belief that, if they lead, the rest will follow along the path of eager obedience (*Lac.* 8.2).

    Thus, the broader meaning of the terms can be seen in the historio-graphical works.

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[398] The translation is that of E. C. Marchant (in Loeb Classical Library series).

4.3.7. Comedy

In comedy, we have some occurrences of ἀνελεύθερος in Aristophanes: in *Pl.* 591, ἀνελεύθερος is connected with φιλοκερδής 'loving gain' and denotes the behaviour of a rich man, thus having the narrow meaning. Aristophanes, fr. 706 *PCG* (= 685 Kock), opposes average Attic usage of language to usages typical of townsmen or countrymen. The usage of the "city fops" is much too elegant and feminine, whereas the country language is ἀνελεύθερος and overly boorish.[399] Here we can see a popular representation of the opposition between extremes and the middle that is so characteristic to Aristotle. The word ἀνελεύθερος is used here in the broad sense.

From fragmentarily preserved comic texts, a fragment of Pherekrates consists of a single line, ἀνελεύθερον σῶμα 'un-free body' (fr. 131 *PCG* = 8 Demiańczuk). Although we have no context, it is difficult to interpret the use of ἀνελεύθερος here otherwise than as a synonym of 'servile'. The last known occurrence is in Alexis' fr. 265 *PCG* (= 263 Kock), where an unknown character expresses the view that an awkward and undignified gait is a mark of the ἀνελεύθερος.[400]

That ἀνελευθερία was connected with flattery (κολακεία), has been shown above in connection with Plato. We can also see this in comedy, although without direct mention of the negative term itself. Thus, according to Eubulos, Dionysios, the tyrant of Syracuse, was hard on flatterers but well-disposed to those who made fun of him, "thinking that such a man alone was free, even if he was (sc. formally) a slave."[401]

Thus, the comic writers use the term ἀνελεύθερος in both narrow and broad sense, and no preference can be deduced from the material available to us.

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[399] διάλεκτον ἔχοντα μέσην πόλεως, / οὔτ᾿ ἀστείαν ὑποθηλυτέραν / οὔτ᾿ ἀνελεύθερον ὑπαγροικοτέραν.

[400] Cf. also Dover 1974: 115, in whose interpretation the point of this passage presumably is that a free man should suggest even by his physical movements that he is, as it were, in control of the situation.

[401] Fr. 25 *PCG* (= 25 Kock): ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι τοῖς σεμνοῖς αὐθαδέστερος / καὶ τοῖς κόλαξι πᾶσι, τοῖς σκώπτουσι δὲ / ἑαυτὸν εὐόργητος· ἡγεῖται ‹δὲ› δὴ / τούτους μόνους ἐλευθέρους, κἂν δοῦλος ἦ; cf. Dover 1974: 115–16.

4.3.8. Oratory

If we look for examples of ἀνελεύθερος and its cognates used in the texts of the orators, we only find four. Lysias notes that to go to court because of slander is characteristic to men who are ἀνελεύθεροι and too φιλόδικοι 'litigious' (10.1.2). Aischines, too, uses the word in a broader sense; this is illustrated by the attribute ἀγεννής 'ignoble' (3.46; cf. above, Plato *Tht*. 184c). Demosthenes uses the word ἀνελεύθερος for Megarians in the narrow sense ('stingy'), which is also supported by a word of similar meaning, μικρολόγος (59.1.36). The same meaning is also found in Hypereides' fragment 255.

The orators usually do not associate this word with servility, which was common in, e.g., Plato. We can see, however, that some other words connected with money-loving, such as φιλοχρηματεῖν, were considered derogatory and expressed servility (cf. Isokr. 10.17), and a man could be blamed as 'worsted by money' or 'enslaved ...', or praised as 'superior to money' (e.g. Dem. 58.29; see also Dover 1974: 171–2). At the same time it should be stressed that the opposition between slaves and freemen or persons with slavish character and those acting as is proper to a freeborn man, was abundantly exploited by the orators. They attack political opponents for their slavish actions or behaviour.[402] Attacks upon the former "servile" occupations of an opponent or members of his family (incl. ancestors) are common in the political, although not so much in private speeches (see Ober 1989: 277–9 for a more thorough discussion on this subject).

4.3.9. Concluding remarks

What was the role of ἀνελευθερία in the context of ancient Greek popular morality and moral philosophy? The evidence from the orators and comedy, which, if anything, could give us reliable information on actual morality of the time, is inconclusive. Taking into account the relatively infrequent use of the term in popular language (as based on

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[402] E.g. cowardice, which was considered a natural characteristic of a slave; see Dem. 19.210, 22.53, 24.124; Aischin. 1.42; with Ober 1989: 271–2.

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rhetoric and comedy), it should be concluded that the concept of ἀνελευθερία probably did not play a very significant role in popular morality.

Looking at other kinds of literary evidence presented above, it is clear that the broader concept prevails. Its use is especially abundant in the works of philosophers such as Aristotle (except in his ethical treatises) and, even more so, Plato, and it is seen in connection with numerous other (negative) notions from the field of moral vocabulary. Now it may seem strange that Aristotle, in his ethical works, is mostly talking about ἀνελευθερία in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. as meanness over money. However, his aim here is to illustrate a specific ethical principle. This can be compared with Theophrastos who describes the lack of positive individual character traits with the help of explicit examples that are visible in everyday life and have practical output in social relations. He exemplifies moral qualities that he believes to be important in the society. Meanness over money is just one of these. I do not think, however, that this narrow concept should be separated from the broader background that prevails in the rest of our evidence.

Plato is a special case. No other author from the period uses the term ἀνελευθερία and its cognates as frequently as he does. Relying on him, we can see that ἐλευθερία, and its opposite ἀνελευθερία, bear a social value and form a basis for the relations between the members of the *polis*. Ἀνελευθερία in Plato fits well with his idea of an elitist society and supports the system of the privileged and suppressed levels of the *polis*. The negative aspect of this concept focuses on meanness in every sense, although there are often allusions to its specific connections with money-matters. Ἐλευθερία combines respect of the person's self with the care for others. It is a basic concern for every well-functioning society. Ἀνελευθερία in the broad sense is something that denotes suppression of the individual initiative and subjection to constraint. Its connection with servility and submissiveness makes it a remarkable ethical category on the negative scale. This is also reflected in Aristotle's *Politics*, and can be seen in Xenophon, especially in the defence speech of Sokrates.

Thus, the major part of the philosophic approach to ἀνελευθερία seems to treat it as a limited-range cover term that embraces many kinds of negative qualities and dispositions, including ἀνελευθερία in the

narrow sense. For example, every type in the collection of Theophrastos has something ἀνελεύθερον in it, i.e. not appropriate to a free man (cf. Arist. *Pol*. 1342b18–20). I would say that here we can see signs of the social values characteristic to the members of the democratic society. Democratic values were opposed to slavery and tyranny, and this meaning is reflected in the broad concept of ἐλευθερία–ἀνελευθερία.

4.4. Characters in oratory: the case of Deinarchos

4.4.1. Introduction: invective and oratory

In a book that appeared almost a century ago but is still often used and cited today, Wilhelm Süss emphasized that rhetorical theory and rhetorical practice, or oratory, are two independent fields, and specifically that the aim of rhetorical theory is not to copy the practice (Süss 1910: 225 ff.). Of course it is natural to suppose that the theory grew out of practice, but that does not mean that the theory always came after practice or that practice always developed independently from theory (cf. Schenkeveld 2007: 25–6). Indeed, both had developed independently and at the same time had many points of convergence. The topic of the interdependence between rhetoric and oratory is an interesting one, and lately extensive research has been done on it.[403] The question is of some relevance here.

Aristotle speaks about the *topoi* to be used in *psogos*, but he associates this practice with epideictic speeches, not forensic speeches.[404] The fourth-century Attic orators, however, are famous for excessive use of invective and abuse in their forensic speeches. Indeed it has been noted that Demosthenes and Aischines do not seem concerned to stick to the issues which Aristotle authorizes forensic or deliberative rhetoric to deal with, but work in *topoi* usually associated with epideictic rhetoric (Conley 2007: 235).

In their speeches, the Attic orators make use of various rhetorical devices for showing their opponents in bad light and for drawing attention to their negative characteristics. As already mentioned (ch. 4.2.3), character denigration and slander are a standard device in this regard.[405] One means of character denigration is to heavily use attributes that have explicitly negative flavour, some of which will have a long tradition of being used for describing negative social types in the Greek literature. As such, the character types depicted by Theophrastos in his *Characters*

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[403] See, e.g., Worthington 1994a, and cf. Schenkeveld 2007: 26 for more references.
[404] See *Rh*. 1366a36–b22, 1368a36–7, and cf. *Rh. Al*. 1441b15–29, with Conley 2007: 231.
[405] In addition to Süss 1910, see Koster 1980, especially 76–90.

are called to mind immediately, as well as some negative types mentioned in the ethical works of Aristotle. It should come as no surprise that many of the traits sketched by Theophrastos in the *Characters* turn up in this context. The reason may be that Theophrastos has generally chosen types that are remarkable for their deviations from the socially acceptable behaviour, and thus well suited for using in the abusive context.

The basis of calling an attribute negative should perhaps be clarified. In the character denigration employed by the Attic orators, Burke (1972: 10–11) has distinguished three basic divisions:

1) Simple disparagement (terms which are only mildly pejorative in connotation, and elicit little significant emotional response).
2) Terms of abuse (more violent and personal, generally employed less frequently, usually aimed at vilifying an opponent or at creating a definition of his attitudes and actions which transcends the legal force of the issues of the indictment).
3) Invective (employed less frequently, more violent in tone; generally aimed at the person of the antagonist himself; appears in the vocative case or else is applied in appositional fashion to a person's name.)

Other devices mentioned by Burke include sarcasm, irony and lengthy sections of personal abuse. This classification can, however, be more complex, and it is sometimes quite difficult to distinguish between the above-mentioned groups. Indeed, it might be impossible to distinguish exactly between insult, abuse, invective, disparagement, slander etc.

Most of the terms used can be classified as insults, and as Dickey (1996: 166) has emphasized, the social meaning of an insult is not determined by its lexical meaning, although classifying insults by their lexical meanings can produce interesting results. She also notes that "[i]t is very often the case that words with certain types of lexical meaning are more likely to become insults, or more likely to become particularly offensive insults, than are other words, but such rules are not absolute and cannot be relied upon by themselves when we are trying to determine the social meaning of a particular word."

Most of the terms that also appear as types in the *Characters* of Theophrastos are actually pure invectives and retain that meaning in the Greek literature as a whole. Some can be used in both negative and posi-

tive sense, depending on the context and/or the extent of the occurrence of the quality that they mark.

4.4.2. Oratory and popular morality

Certain similarity in the use of character traits in the speeches of orators and the comedies can be observed. The orators, however, try to present their opponent's bad character in a more well-reasoned way. In the case of forensic oratory, leaving good impression of one's own and bad impression of one's opponent's character was one of the most important elements of the defence.[406] At the same time, the speaker had to avoid overly harsh words that could somehow insult the judges.[407] In the case of a political speech, one had more liberty, because one did not speak under the threat of immediate penalty. In the case of a funeral oration or a panegyric, negative expressions were completely out of place (see Dover 1974: 6).

In drawing conclusions about real situations and arguments from the speeches, one has to be cautious, because the orators paid attention to various aspects: what really happened, what they themselves thought of the matter, what rhetorical devices were most appropriate for the occasion, what was the personality of the one charged, what were the intentions or expected intentions of his opponent, what reaction may come from the judges, etc. (Dover 1968: 71–2). In addition, some of the texts are of uncertain origin, although they are traditionally listed under the name of one of the ten Attic orators.[408] This last point, however, need not worry us in a study which encompasses a larger tradition and does not focus on specific historical details.

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[406] See, e.g., Voegelin 1943; cf. also Lane Fox 1996: 139.
[407] See Dover 1974: 5–6, Dover 1968: 76–8, Earp 1929: 11.
[408] See Millett 1991: 242–3, Dover 1968: 23–7, Dover 1974: 8–10.

4.4.3. Deinarchos' style and character denigration

Deinarchos[409] is a somewhat special case among the Greek orators, because we know from several sources that he was a pupil of Theophrastos.[410] One has to keep this fact in mind when reading his speeches, although it should not force anyone into implicit arguments for a relation between the texts of master and student. We are not dealing with direct loans but rather influence that may originate from the lectures of the teacher (cf. Immisch 1898: 207).

Deinarchos was included in the so-called Canon of the Ten Attic Orators, which testifies to his reputation.[411] His style, however, has been the subject of criticism from antiquity up to the present times.[412] He is often reproached for incoherent arrangement of his speeches, long and formless sentences, absence of logical connection between sections of the speeches, excessive use of invective, plagiarism of earlier orators, etc.[413] On the other hand the criticism of his compositional abilities has been refuted by the identification of complex ring composition in his speeches.[414] It has also been pointed out that his use of vocabulary and means of expression often resulted in later authors quoting him and elevated his speeches above the ordinary (Worthington 1992: 15–16). What seems to be an important issue in connection with this study is the assertion that there is a "close association [sc. of Deinarchos] with the vocabulary and, at times, style of Middle Comedy" (*ibid*.). Given that the

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[409] For a thorough overview of Deinarchos' life, and a translation and commentary of his speeches (excluding fragments), see Worthington 1992. (The book draws heavily on an unpublished PhD thesis of G. Shoemaker, *Dinarchus: traditions of his life and speeches and commentary on the fragments of the speeches* [Columbia University 1968], unavailable to me.)

[410] Cf. 18.7 FHS&G. The main source is D.H. *Din*. 2.

[411] For the Canon in general see, e.g., Worthington 1994b.

[412] See Worthington 1992: 14 ff. Among other things, he was called ἄγροικος Δημοσθένης ("rustic Demosthenes"; D.H. *Din*. 8) and κρίθινος Δημοσθένης ("gingerbread Demosthenes" in the translation of *LSJ*, or "small-beer Demosthenes" in Burtt 1980: 162; Hermog. *Id*. 2.11); cf. Burtt 1980: 162.

[413] Cf., e.g., the assessment of Burtt: Deinarchos "was not a great orator" (1980: 162); "though the attack is vigorous, no logical sequence can be traced in the argument and much that he says seems unconvincing" (of the speech *Against Demosthenes*, 1980: 168).

[414] See Worthington 1991: 58–9, Worthington 1992: 27–36 and cf. Worthington 1994b: 248.

information we have on Middle Comedy is not exactly vast, one expects a more thorough survey of these lexical and stylistic similarities. Worthington refers to heavy use of *topoi* and especially invective, which "had its basis in Old and probably Middle Comedy" (1992: 23). But invective is something that is not limited to Deinarchos. As has been shown, there are ingredients of vilification and ridicule of individuals that are common property of comedy and oratory.[415] Thus, the argument amounts to postulating that invective is used both in the speeches of the orators and in comedy. The best that could be said is that the *topoi* of invective used by the orators have been "perhaps even influenced by the pejorative terms of Old and Middle Comedy" (Worthington 1992: 261).

Invective is, of course, related to character portrayal, which is an essential part of most of the speeches. Character portrayal in Deinarchos' speeches has been dealt with before.[416] In the following I will first review and expand some of the ideas found in earlier studies, and then try to apply these to the speeches of Deinarchos.

Otto Immisch considered the *Characters* of Theophrastos to have been written with a practical purpose. According to him, such writings are to be understood not only as studies and models, but also as a collection of literary motifs, as a paint-box (Immisch 1898: 207). This he illustrates using a comparison with the speeches of Deinarchos (1898: 207–8). W. W. Fortenbaugh has, in addition, shown that the speech *Against Demosthenes* (1) of Deinarchos[417] can be used as an illustration of how Theophrastos' method of sketching superficial behavioural regularities has been applied to practical oratory.[418]

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[415] See Dover 1974: 30–3. Cf. also Burke 1972 for Aischines' excessive use of character denigration.

[416] See Immisch 1898: 207–8, Fortenbaugh 1994a: 25–8 (= 2003: 234–7).

[417] The attribution of this speech to Deinarchos was queried in antiquity by Demetrios of Magnesia (as reported but not really endorsed by Dionysios of Halikarnassos, *Din*. 1). Modern scholars rarely consider the judgment of Demetrios to be of any importance, see Worthington 1992: 12, Fortenbaugh 1994a: 26 (= 2003: 234), n. 38, also referring to Lesky 1963: 657; but cf. Burtt 1980: 162.

[418] Fortenbaugh 1994a: 25–8 (= 2003: 234–7).

4.4.4. Historical background of the speeches of Deinarchos

The three extant speeches of Deinarchos are all connected with the so-called Harpalos affair.[419] Harpalos was a Macedonian noble who served as Alexander's treasurer. He was left in charge of the Persian treasures at Ekbatana, when Alexander's army proceeded eastwards. Believing that Alexander would not return, he indulged himself with despotic liberty, and on realizing his error he sought refuge in Athens. In Athens he was arrested and his money was deposited on the Akropolis. Harpalos said he had brought seven hundred talents with him, but the amount deposited on the Akropolis was found to amount to no more than half of this sum. When some time later Harpalos managed to escape and flee to Crete, it seemed obvious to many Athenians that Harpalos had ensured his escape by extensive bribery. Demosthenes himself proposed that the council of the Areopagos hold an inquiry. After six months the Areopagos published a list of names with a sum of money imputed to each. This list included, in addition to Demosthenes, the names of Aristogeiton and Philokles, the defendants of Deinarchos' second and third speech. The suspects were prosecuted; Demosthenes was one of those who were found guilty; Aristogeiton and perhaps Philokles were acquitted.

4.4.5. *Against Demosthenes* (Dein. 1)

Demosthenes was the first prominent citizen to come up for trial in connection with the Harpalos affair. It was reported that he had received twenty talents from the man (Dein. 1.6). Of the accusers, Stratokles spoke first and was followed by the (unknown) orator who delivered the speech written by Deinarchos. Demosthenes was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, and being unable to do this, was imprisoned, but soon escaped to Aigina.

   In the case of the speech *Against Demosthenes* the first speaker, Stratokles, had probably mentioned everything pertinent to the case (cf.

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[419] For the affair and the story behind it, see, e.g., Worthington 1992: 41–77 and Worthington 1994c; cf. also Burtt 1980: 165–7 and Eder 2000.

Dein. 1.1), and therefore it has been suggested that the second speaker was compelled to resort to excessive abuse and same kind of arguments that had been used by Aischines (Burtt 1980: 168–9). This is probable, and although at some points this excessive abuse is deliberately focused on love of money and profit, which is natural considering the nature of the charge against Demosthenes, Deinarchos also accuses him of an array of other vices, many of which have a parallel in the *Characters* of Theophrastos. Sometimes the parallels are verbal; sometimes we are reminded of the behaviour of a Theophrastean type. Deinarchos even offers something like a mini-sketch quite in the Theophrastean manner.

Fortenbaugh (1994a: 28 = 2003: 236) has also emphasized another side of this excessive abuse: a clever orator may first try to establish some behavioural regularity in the defendant, and only after this slip in all kinds of motives, so that these motives are accepted uncritically by the jurors, because they often (but not always!) explain the regularity. Indeed, details that are not substantiated by evidence may be more readily believed if they fit into the pattern of behaviour suggested by the character sketch. Additionally, in the case of longer speeches, it becomes necessary to recapitulate and re-elaborate the portrait at intervals (cf. Pearson 1981: 81).

Let us examine the speech more closely, keeping in mind that the Demosthenes that emerges from the accusations of his opponents need not necessarily resemble the real man in every detail; as in the case of many speeches, we may expect the scales would be heavily weighted towards rhetoric as opposed to objectivity (cf. Worthington 1992: 168). The orators wish to create prejudice; they do not offer any level-headed discussion of motivation (cf. Harvey 1985: 103). It is more important to pick out characteristics that the audience will understand and that will arouse the reaction that the speaker wants (cf. Pearson 1981: 80).

One of the main topics of the abusive charges in Dein. 1 is connected with greed, avarice and meanness. This is a favourite topic of many orators, who accuse their opponents of πλεονεξία, φιλαργυρία, αἰσχροκέρδεια or other similar vices (cf. Harvey 1985: 102–3). Verbally, Demosthenes is accused of avarice (cf. *Char*. 30) in two passages. In 1.21, Demosthenes did not want to give ten talents to the Theban envoys for bribing the Arcadian general in order to ensure that the Arcadians help the Thebans against Alexander. Instead he "hung around" waiting for

others to furnish this money.[420] He is described by Deinarchos as ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδής. In 1.108, near the end of the speech, Deinarchos returns to Demosthenes' αἰσχροκέρδεια. Here it is described, together with πονηρία, as something which is natural (ἔμφυτος) to Demosthenes: ἡ ... ἔμφυτος αἰσχροκέρδεια καὶ πονηρία. There is also a passage in which he is reproached for φιλαργυρία (1.22). Note that in his speech against Philokles, Deinarchos uses very similar rhetoric, although here the αἰσχροκέρδεια of the defendant is mentioned only once (Dein. 3.6); compare, however, Dein. 3.18: τὸν δὲ μιαρὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ προδότην, ... τὴν ἔμφυτον πονηρίαν ...

Another section of the speech against Demosthenes recalls the behaviour of the illiberal man of the *Characters* (*Char*. 22). Here, Demosthenes is pictured as proposing that others contribute heavily from their own possessions, even to the point of melting down the private ornaments of their wives and the drinking cups, and then personally contributing perhaps only fifty drachmas, the sum that he had paid at the previous levy (Dein. 1.69). It has been suggested[421] that this description is a variation on—or intensification of—Theophrastos' illiberal man who gets up and slips quietly out when emergency donations are being promised in the assembly (*Char*. 22.3).

In addition to these passages, the depiction of Demosthenes' concern with money while on public embassy recalls Theophrastos' shabby profiteer who turns a public trip to his own material advantage.[422] The αἰσχροκερδής in the *Characters* leaves his official travel allowance home when he goes abroad on public service, and borrows from the other delegates (*Char*. 30.7). Demosthenes is described (Dein. 1.80) as having himself appointed envoy—to escape from the city—after he had heard that Philip was intending to invade Athens, and having snatched up eight talents from the treasury at a time when everyone else was contributing from his own resources to the safety of the city. The shabby profiteer in the *Characters* also leaves town when his friend is getting married or marrying off a daughter, so that he won't have to send a

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[420] For the actual role of Demosthenes in the "betrayal" of Thebes, see Worthington 1992: 164 ff.

[421] See Fortenbaugh 1994a: 26 (= 2003: 235) and cf. already Immisch 1898: 208.

[422] See Fortenbaugh 1994a: 26 (= 2003: 235).

present (*Char*. 30.19), but in the case of Demosthenes the reason would probably be cowardice.

Cowardice actually is one of the best-known vices Demosthenes is accused of. The charge of cowardice in battle is often brought against Demosthenes by Aischines (e.g. 3.175); it is mentioned by Plutarch (*Dem*. 20) and in the spurious *Lives of the Ten Orators* traditionally attributed to Plutarch (*Mor*. 845f). As Fortenbaugh has noted (1994a: 26 = 2003: 235), the orator realizes that when jurors think someone generally vicious, they are likely to think him capable of whatever crime happens to be under consideration. In 1.12, Deinarchos imagines Demosthenes claiming to have brought everyone into line at Chaironeia ('ἐγὼ παρέταξα πάντας εἰς Χαιρώνειαν') and then retorts that Demosthenes alone fled from the line there (ἔλιπες ... τὴν ... τάξιν). Similarly in 1.71, Demosthenes is described as ordering others to take the field while himself deserting the battle-line. We are reminded of the military scene in the Theophrastean sketch of cowardice (*Char*. 25, starting section 3). There, the coward tells others that he was in such a hurry that he forgot to bring his sword, runs to his tent, sends his slave outside with instructions to see where the enemy are, and hides it under the pillow, spending a long time pretending to look for it. A Theophrastean ring has been recognized in 1.82:[423]

> τοιοῦτος οὗτος, ἐν μὲν ταῖς παρατάξεσιν οἰκουρός, ἐν δὲ τοῖς οἴκοι μένουσι πρεσβευτής, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρεσβευταῖς δραπέτης ἐστίν
>
> ("Such is the man: in the battle-line he is a stay-at-home, among those who remain at home he is an envoy, and among envoys he is a runaway.")

It has been suggested that most of the depictions of Demosthenes' behaviour are manifestations of a general *shiftiness* attributed to him.[424] According to this, the main portrait painted by Deinarchos would be that of a μεταβαλλόμενος (cf. Dein. 1.17, 94, 97), the sort of man who

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[423] See Fortenbaugh 1994a: 27 (= 2003: 235).
[424] Immisch 1898: 207–8; Fortenbaugh 1994a: 27–8 (= 2003: 235–6).

keeps switching back and forth, a kind of political chameleon who makes a multitude of differing statements, but never the same one (Dein. 1.91). The manifestations of this shiftiness may be his greed, his cowardice, his ambition etc. There is even something like a mini-sketch that illustrates this shiftiness (Dein. 1.94–5):

ἐῶ γὰρ τἄλλ᾽ ὅσα μεταβαλλόμενος ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ δημηγορῶν οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς διατετέλεκε, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν γράφων καὶ ἀπαγορεύων μηδένα νομίζειν ἄλλον θεὸν ἢ τοὺς παραδεδο-μένους, τοτὲ δὲ λέγων ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸν δῆμον ἀμφισβητεῖν τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ τιμῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅταν δὲ μέλλη κριθήσεσθαι παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, Καλλιμέδοντ᾽ εἰσαγγέλλων συνιέναι ἐν Μεγάροις τοῖς φυγάσιν ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δήμου, καὶ ταύτην τὴν εἰσαγγελίαν εὐθὺς παραχρῆμ᾽ ἀναιρούμενος, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἐκκλ-ησίᾳ ταύτῃ τῇ πρώην γεγενημένῃ προσάγων καὶ κατασκε-υάζων ψευδῆ μηνυτὴν ὡς ἐπιβουλευομένων τῶν νεωρίων, καὶ περὶ τούτων γράφων μὲν οὐδέν, αἰτίας δ᾽ ἕνεκα τοῦ παρόντος ἀγῶνος παρασκευάζων· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑμεῖς τούτῳ μάρτυρές ἐστε.

("I disregard any other changes in his policies and unwise speeches he has delivered, how at one time he introduced a proposal banning anyone from believing in any god other than the traditional ones, and then said that it was necessary for the people not to dispute deifying Alexander. Or when he was about to be tried before you, how he impeached Kallimedon for scheming with the exiles at Megara to subvert the democracy, and then forthwith rescinded this impeachment, bringing forward and priming a false informer at the recent meeting of the assembly to say there was a plot against the dockyards. He produced nothing for these proposals and only allegations for the present trial, for you yourselves are witnesses of all these things against him." [Transl. Worthington 1922: 102.])

This suggests that Deinarchos' depiction of Demosthenes relates to Theophrastos' sketches in presenting typical pieces of behaviour, which

are not tied to any particular deeper lying explanation (Fortenbaugh 1994a: 27 [= 2003: 235]).

Deinarchos does not confine himself to these few Theophrastean behavioural regularities (shabby profiteering, illiberality, cowardice) in attacking Demosthenes. Without presenting enlarged descriptions, he associates Demosthenes with flattery, claiming that he was the first one to introduce into Athens the custom of flattering Macedon (τὸ κολα-κεύειν τοὺς Μακεδόνας, 1.28; cf. *Char*. 2).

Deinarchos also reproaches Demosthenes for his ἀπόνοια (cf. *Char*. 6): εἰδῆτε τὴν Δημοσθένους ἀπόνοιαν (1.82); τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον καὶ τὴν ἀπόνοιαν (1.104).[425]

Although the depiction of Demosthenes is certainly the most conspicuous use of Theophrastean behavioural regularities as invectives in Deinarchos, his other speeches offer some examples, as well.

In *Against Aristogeiton*, the depiction of the defendant as having spent more time in prison than out of it (2.2; cf. 2.18) recalls the behaviour of the Theophrastean ἀπονενοημένος (*Char*. 6.6; cf. already Immisch 1898: 208). While he has been in debt to the state, he is said to have prosecuted men with citizen rights (κατὰ τῶν ἐπιτίμων) and committed numerous other offences. This is comparable to the Theophrastean type, who slanders men of influence and is ready for anything and everything (*Char*. 6.2). Aristogeiton did not pity his own father when reduced to starvation (2.11; cf. 2.18), and the Theophrastean ἀπονενοημένος lets his mother starve (*Char*. 6.6).[426]

We should be careful in claiming any direct influence of Theophrastos on Deinarchos, or vice versa. W. W. Fortenbaugh has suggested that perhaps Deinarchos used the *Characters* when he studied under Theophrastos, or that perhaps he reversed the teacher-student relation-

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[425] Deinarchos also reproaches Aristogeiton for it (see below), and Hypereides has used it for Demosthenes, as well (*In Demosthenem* fr. 3 col. 7.17–23: ἡ γὰρ] | σὴ ἀπόνο[ια ὦ Δημό]|σθενες ὑπ[ὲρ ἁπάντων] | τῶν ἀδ[ι]κο[ύ]ντων | νῦν προκ[ι]νδυνε[ύ]|ει καὶ προ-αναισχ[υν]|τεῖ, also a case over the Harpalos affair).

[426] For some other possible illustrations of the Theophrastean types see Immisch 1898: 208.

ship and instructed Theophrastos by practical example (1994a: 28 [= 2003: 237]). It should be noted, however, that although there are similarities in their using of behavioural regularities, Deinarchos also stands in the tradition of rhetorical invective, which can be seen in the speeches of most of the orators, and perhaps has some connections with the comic invective (cf. above). This is especially evident in the use of invective groups, like ὁ μιαρὸς οὗτος καὶ ἀσεβὴς καὶ αἰσχροκερδὴς (1.21) cited above, or the depiction of Demosthenes as δωροδόκον ὄντα καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην τῶν φίλων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀνάξιον καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τοῦτον τύχην γεγενημένην (1.41), or γόης ... καὶ μιαρὸς ἄνθρωπός ... καὶ οὔτε τῷ γένει τῆς πόλεως πολίτης οὔτε τοῖς πεπολιτευμένοις αὐτῷ καὶ πεπραγμένοις (1.95). In addition, there are important differences between the *Characters* and the depiction of behavioural regularities in the oratory. Above all, in oratory we notice a complete lack of the comic that is so peculiar to the *Characters*.

CONCLUSION

The topic of this thesis has been character description in the Peripatetic tradition and its various connections with ethics, comedy and rhetoric. It has also included specific studies on character types in action outside this tradition. The study of the changing and evolving tradition of character studies within the Peripatetic school, although beginning with some forerunners and Aristotelian corpus, was focused on the *Characters* of Theophrastos and character descriptions in the work of Ariston of Keos.

It was first shown that although character descriptions had sporadically appeared in earlier literature, Aristotle was the first one to submit them to theoretical systematization. We find character (ἦθος) to be an important element in his ethical, rhetorical and poetical works, as well as in the physiognomical works belonging to the *corpus Aristotelicum*. Aristotle does not write character sketches in the manner of Theophrastos, but his works provide a seed from which the Theophrastean types grow. Thus, comparison between the Theophrastean character sketches and the theoretical studies of Aristotle is a legitimate approach in the study of the Peripatetic tradition. At the same time, there is no need to look for complete compliance between the *Characters* and Aristotle's systematized account. It was suggested that one reason why character studies especially flourished in the Peripatetic tradition was the ἔργον-oriented approach of the Peripatetics, which necessarily focused on social practices, thus leading to the observation and evaluation of social types. The role of Theophrastos, who advanced the ideas of Aristotle and developed a practical application of this focus on social practices, is not to be underestimated.

The *Characters* of Theophrastos is the most significant contribution to character studies in the Greek literature, but it is by no means easily interpreted. This thesis has touched upon questions of the structure and integrity of the work, its purpose and function. Discussions about the purpose of the *Characters*, in particular, have occupied scholars for many centuries; it has been connected with ethics, comedy (poetics), rhetoric, or considered to be written with the aim of entertainment, or as a collec-

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tion of illustrative showpieces for a course of lectures. What I have attempted to show is that the issue of the purpose seems to have been for the most part too constrained and aimed at reconstructing something like an Ur-Theophrastos on the background of genres known to us from the antiquity. It seems to be more important to consider the function of the work than its exact purpose. In fact, it might be a new genre or a mixture of genres that cannot be categorized as a sub-genre of something else at all. Most of the suggestions of modern scholars reflect important features of the work itself and the Peripatetic tradition surrounding it. None of these possibilities can actually be dismissed, but at the same time none of them should be treated as a sole possibility available. Thus, it seems wrong to claim that the work has no ethical dimension. It certainly has an ethical dimension, too, although ethical theorizing was not Theophrastos' aim in writing the work, and the ethical dimension is not of the same kind that can be seen in Aristotle's works. The same holds true for possible rhetorical and poetical connections. No one would doubt, for example, that the pointed presentation of vices and the creating of stereotypes helps to create the comic effect. But the relation between the *Characters* of Theophrastos and, e.g., Menander's plays, may be that of having a common ground and similar approach to human character, not dependence on each other.

Another important aspect of the *Characters* is the integrity of the work. While accepting the view revived by recent commentators and editors that the definitions appended to the character sketches are spurious, I have emphasized the importance of the definitions in the reception history of the *Characters*. They are not a late addition to the text, such as the moralizing conclusions appended to the end of some sketches. Similar definitions occur already in papyrus fragments of the first century BCE, which does not prove that the definitions were part of the original work, but shows that they were added very early. The tradition of the definitions is a topic worth exploring, for they certainly contain, among others, Peripatetic phraseology, and form a part of the Peripatetic tradition. They are not just "banal" or "inept" (J. Diggle); they are a useful evidence of the text's reception, and a traditional (and early) part of the corpus. They can also be an important source for the study of differences between philosophical and everyday, popular language.

Further, I have suggested that in general, Theophrastos deliberately chose character types that were better known to his audience and seemed to be more important, and perhaps more conspicuous, in his contemporary society or in his own opinion. If we accept that the definitions and, following James Diggle, the abstract titles are later additions, we would only have one character trait introduced by Theophrastos as a neologism (*Char*. 21 μικροφιλότιμος, a specific case anyway, as this seems to be a restriction of the Aristotelian φιλότιμος). But we are still dealing with a selection. There are other character types that were as important but have been left out for some reason. No attempt has been made to find a solution to this problem, which may also to some degree depend on the state of the transmission.

Attempts of regrouping the character sketches are in this study considered futile, at least when the aim is to present the thirty chapters in an order that is somehow less uncomfortable for the reader. Some formal or structural grouping is, however, possible and may help to better understand the differences between some sketches. There are small groups of types that share some common trait, but this does not seem to be essential to the work. Nor does this lack of systematized presentation seem to be a problem for the author. There is no reason to reproach Theophrastos for not having presented a more systematic account of character sketches, as this probably was not his aim.

More important for the understanding of differences and similarities between the sketches is the final chapter of the second part of this study. Here, I have analyzed the levels of social communication in the *Characters*. The types depicted in the *Characters* all represent deviations from socially acceptable and commendable behaviour. I have focused on these deviations and the specific ways in which Theophrastos draws his details, i.e. what makes the types socially unacceptable. He analyzes nothing, draws no moral, and seeks no motive. He presents pictures of some basic social roles of active participants in the life of the *polis*. The pictures are, however, twisted, as most of the cast display a deformed kind of ἀρετή, in the case of which even positive characteristics are seen as excessive and inappropriate. Many of the actions depicted are not negative *per se*, and some of them would be entirely positive if performed in a proper situation, at a proper time, in a proper place or towards the right person. In short, the types display a general lack of

social intelligence. The characters are depicted in a limited variety of situations and locations that are all important parts of the social network of the city (specifically Athens). They convey several levels of social communication related to these situations or locations, and can, therefore, be analyzed at various levels of social engagement. The reactions of various types differ in similar situations and locations, which is an important aspect in assessing each type. The chapter includes analyses of the following levels of social communication, which are not always mutually exclusive: a) *polis* and public sphere (behaviour at the court, in the assembly, participating in delegations, being a trierarch, etc.); b) religious sphere (behaviour towards deities, participating in religious festivals and rites, religious behaviour in specific situations, etc.); c) economic sphere (business relations, buying and selling, etc.); d) cultural and educational sphere (theatre, sports, gymnasia, etc.); e) social sphere (friends, symposia, baths, visits, invitations, lending and borrowing, etc.); f) *oikos* and family sphere (relations with household members, women, children, slaves, behaviour at home). The specific locations include home, market (with various subdivisions, such as women's market), baths, theatre, gymnasia, assembly, court, porticos, street, etc. In some cases, a specific location cannot be determined with certainty. I have suggested that the main reason why the behaviour of the types is socially unacceptable is that they abandon certain basic communal values that are important for the functioning of the society.

After Theophrastos, virtually all we have on Peripatetic character types are fragments, most important of which are the passages of Ariston's work *On relieving arrogance* quoted by Philodemos. Although there is a debate over his identity (the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos or the Stoic Ariston of Chios), arguments seem to weigh slightly on his Peripatetic origin. There are discrepancies between Ariston's presentation of some types and the Peripatetic tradition (including the *Characters* of Theophrastos), but these discrepancies do not seem to be strong enough arguments for attributing the work to the Stoic Ariston. The case of the εἴρων, who is studied by Aristotle and described by both Theophrastos (*Char*. 1) and Ariston, is the most important in this connection. Ariston's attitude towards εἴρων-Sokrates in these passages is explicitly hostile, whereas Aristotle tends to be more positive when analyzing the type.

Theophrastos does not name Sokrates by name, although he is describing a more negative kind of εἴρων. The inclusion of Sokrates among examples of arrogance (of which εἴρων is one) is, however, no evidence of Stoicism, for there were critics of Sokrates among the Peripatetics, as well. A clash of two different ideas within the same school should come as no surprise. Even if the tradition of the Peripatetic school and analogies with the *Characters* of Theophrastos are not sufficient to claim that the author is the Peripatetic Ariston of Keos, the arguments for the opposite are faced with the same problem: they are not sufficient to establish the Stoic authorship. In addition, the arguments are connected with the purpose of the work, but as this cannot be established for certain, the arguments themselves tend to stay on a very subjective ground.

The fragment of Lykon, the successor of Theophrastos' successor Straton as head of the Lykeion, consists of a description of a drunkard. An analysis of the passage and other quotations suggests that Rutilius Lupus, the author who quotes the text in his Latin treatise, probably tried to reproduce the Greek original as much as he could. Although Rutilius Lupus uses the quotation to illustrate a rhetorical figure, the original description was not necessarily composed for a similar reason, although this is not ruled out, either. Ethical concern or pedagogical purpose remain speculations, as well. The difference between Theophrastos' *Characters* and Lykon's sketch of the drunkard is that the latter is to a large degree a physiological description, while the sketches of Theophrastos feature this kind of detail only very seldom and focus more on social context. The sketch is entirely comparable with the Theophrastean descriptions in both liveliness and presentation of details, although it is not set in the social context as those of Theophrastos.

From the Peripatetic biographer Satyros, we have a fragment on prodigality from a work *On characters*. It is generally agreed that the work is part of the Theophrastean tradition, but clearly inferior to the *Characters* of Theophrastos. However, it was not necessarily the intention of the later Peripatetics to imitate Theophrastos in composing this kind of character descriptions.

In the fourth part of the work I have presented some specific studies on character types in action, mainly outside the Peripatetic tradition. I

study the usage of three types in the texts of mainly the 5th and the 4th century BCE, focusing in each case on specific aspects related to that type. In the case of εἴρων (*Char.* 1), the focus is on its connections to Sokrates. In Greek literature, Sokrates has been labelled with a great number of notions that are used for negative character traits in the *Characters* of Theophrastos, e.g. εἴρων, βδελυρός (*Char.* 11), ὀψιμαθής (*Char.* 27), ἀλαζών (*Char.* 23), ὑπερήφανος (*Char.* 24). The figure of εἴρων is, however, an obvious one to begin with when talking about Sokrates and his representation in the Greek literature. I first trace the possible origin of the word, and then compare the evidence found in the comic writers, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastos and Ariston.

In the case of βδελυρός (*Char.* 11), the main focus is on its presentation in the speech of Aischines against Timarchos, which uses the word more frequently than any other text from the Greek literature until Late Antiquity. Taking into account the few direct parallels to the sketch of Theophrastos, and the confusion of the earlier scholiasts in explaining the meaning of βδελυρία, it is suggested that the term may function both as a sort of cover term for various repulsive acts or coarse behaviour and as a more specific notion connected with sexual practices.

A similar conclusion was reached in the case of ἀνελεύθερος (*Char.* 22) and its derivates. After an analysis of its usage it is concluded that the concept of ἀνελευθερία probably did not play a very significant role in popular morality, but was important for philosophers, especially Plato. A major part of the philosophic approach to ἀνελευθερία seems to treat it as a limited-range cover term that embraces many kinds of negative qualities and dispositions, although there are often allusions to its specific connections with money-matters. This specific use of the term can be most explicitly seen in Aristotle's ethical works and in the *Characters* of Theophrastos.

Most of the types depicted by Theophrastos are, due to their behaviour which transgresses social norms, very popular in genres that naturally feed on this kind of deviations, particularly comedy and oratory (forensic speeches). These two genres, especially oratory, have also been considered our most important source for the study of actual, popular morality in the ancient Greek society. Relations of the Theophrastean types to comedy and rhetoric are touched upon in virtually all parts of this thesis. The final chapter, however, focuses on one specific

case, where the relations may be especially strong. In the speeches of the orator Deinarchos, who was one of Theophrastos' students, one can see many similarities with the character sketches of Theophrastos. At the same time we should be careful in claiming any direct influence, as Deinarchos also stands in the tradition of rhetorical invective where this kind of words with strong negative implication had been extremely popular.

The main focuses of this study have been on the continuity of the Peripatetic tradition on the one hand, and popular usage of character traits, on the other. Popular attitudes towards social types may be observed above all in the speeches of the orators and in comic texts. This may tell us something about the sources and background of Theophrastos' work. Its implicit sources probably included both theoretical background of the Peripatos and popular usage in the contemporary oratory and perhaps comedy. Proceeding from this basis, Theophrastos has chosen one specific topic and an original approach to it, which proved to be relevant for ethics, comedy, and rhetoric.

By analyzing lexical and semantic features of these two traditions, one can see that the various value systems are reflected in the language, i.e., lexical and semantic features can, with some reservations, be correlated to the social phenomena; the lexical context helps to recover the social background. Therefore, a larger study on the use of character types in the oratory is recommendable, although not in the scope of this thesis.

KOKKUVÕTE

KARAKTERIKIRJELDUS JA INVEKTIIV:
PERIPATEETIKUD EETIKA, KOMÖÖDIA JA
RETOORIKA VAHEL

Käesoleva doktoritöö uurimisteemaks on eelkõige karakterikirjeldus peripateetikute traditsioonis ning selle mitmesugused seosed eetika, komöödia ja retoorikaga. Lisaks sellele käsitletakse töös mõningaid karakterikirjelduse praktilisi avaldumisi väljaspool seda traditsiooni. Peripateetikute koolkonna karakterikäsitluse traditsiooni uurimine keskendub Theophrastose teosele *Inimtüübid* ning tüübikirjeldustele Keose Aristoni fragmentides, ehkki vaadeldakse ka selle traditsiooni mõningaid eelkäijaid ning karakterikäsitlust Aristotelese teoste korpuses.

Töös näidatakse, et ehkki tüübikirjeldusi leidub sporaadiliselt ka varasemas kirjanduses, on Aristoteles esimene, kelle teostes leiame vastavasisulise süstemaatilise käsitluse. Eetos (ἦθος) on oluline element tema eetika-, retoorika- ja poeetika-alastes töödes, aga ka *corpus Aristotelicum*'i kuuluvais füsiognoomiakäsitlusis. Aristoteleselt ei leia selliseid tüübikirjeldusi nagu Theophrastosel, ent tema teostes on alge, millest Theophrastose tüübikirjeldused lähtuvad. Seetõttu on peripateetikute traditsiooni uurimisel Theophrastose tüübikirjelduste ning Aristotelese teoreetilise käsitluse võrdlemine igati õigustatud, ehkki täielikku vastavust ei ole tarvidust taotleda. Käesolevas töös väidetakse, et üks põhjus, miks karakterikirjeldus oli eriti peripateetikute traditsioonis nii levinud, on peripateetikute ἔργον'ile keskenduv lähenemine, mille tähelepanu alla satuvad vältimatult sotsiaalsed tavad ning seeläbi ka sotsiaalsete tüüpide jälgimine ja kirjeldamine. Theophrastos arendas edasi Aristotelese ideid ning lõi sellele sotsiaalseile tavadele keskendumisele uue praktilise väljundi.

Theophrastose *Inimtüübid* on kreeka kirjanduses karakterikirjelduse vallas olulisim teos, ent selle tõlgendamisega on seotud mitmed raskused. Käesolevas töös puudutatakse teose struktuuri, terviklikkuse, eesmärgi ja funktsiooni küsimusi. Mitme sajandi klassikalisi filolooge on

eriti painanud arutlused *Inimtüüpide* võimaliku eesmärgi üle. Teost on seostatud eetikaga, komöödiaga (poeetikaga), retoorikaga; seda on peetud meelelahutuslikuks kogumikuks või loengukursuse illustreerivaks abimaterjaliks. Siinses töös väidetakse, et Theophrastose teose eesmärgi küsimus on sageli olnud liialt kitsa suunitlusega ning selle eesmärgiks on olnud n-ö alg-Theophrastose rekonstrueerimine meile tuntud antiikkirjanduse žanrite taustal. Näib olevat olulisem arvestada teose funktsiooni kui selle kirjutamise algse eesmärgiga. Tegemist võib olla täiesti uue žanriga või žanrite seguga, mida ei saagi millegi muu alažanriks klassifitseerida. Samas peegeldab enamik teose käsitlejate ettepanekuid *Inimtüüpide* ning seda ümbritseva peripateetikute traditsiooni olulisi aspekte. Ühtki neist arvamustest ei saa täielikult välistada, ent samal ajal ei tohiks ühtki neist käsitleda ainsa võimaliku variandina. Seetõttu ei ole näiteks õige väita, et teosel puutub eetiline dimensioon, ehkki see ei pruugi olla Theophrastose eesmärk ning tegemist ei ole sellise eetilise dimensiooniga nagu me näeme Aristotelese teostes. Sama kehtib võimalike sidemete kohta retoorika või poeetikaga. Nii ei ole kahtlust, et pahede teravdatud esitus ning stereotüüpide loomine aitavad saavutada koomilist efekti. Samal ajal võib Theophrastose tüübikirjelduste ning nt. Menandrose komöödiate seose aluseks olla sarnane lähenemine inimloomusele, mitte teineteisest sõltumine.

Inimtüüpide oluliseks aspektiks on teose terviklikkus. Siinses töös aktsepteeritakse viimaste väljaandjate ning kommenteerijate vaadet, et Theophrastose tüübikirjeldustele lisatud definitsioonid ei ole autentsed. Samal ajal rõhutatakse definitsioonide olulisust *Inimtüüpide* retseptsioonis. Tegemist ei ole hilise lisandusega tekstile, nagu on moraliseerivad epiloogid mõne tüübikirjelduse lõpus. Definitsioone või nende jälgi võib leida ka 1. sajandist e.m.a pärinevaist papüürosefragmentidest; see ei tõesta küll nende autentsust, ent näitab, et nende korpusele lisamine pidi toimuma väga vara. Definitsioonide traditsioon on oluline teema, sest ka need sisaldavad peripateetikute sõnavara. Need ei ole lihtsalt „banaalsed" või „ebapädevad" (J. Diggle); tegemist on olulise tõendusmaterjaliga teksti retseptsioonist ning korpuse traditsioonilise ning varajase osaga. Definitsioonide põhjal on võimalik teha järeldusi ka filosoofilise ning igapäevakeele vahekorra ning erinevuste kohta.

Töös oletatakse, et Theophrastose alus tüüpide valikul oli enamasti nende üldine tuntus ja olulisus või silmatorkavus kaasaja ühiskonnas.

Kui aktsepteerida definitsioonide ning—järgides James Diggle'i ette-panekut—abstraktnoomeni kujul esitatud pealkirjade mitteautentsust, jääb alles ainult üks tüübinimetus, mille näol on tegemist Theophrastose neologismiga (*Char*. 21 μικροφιλότιμος, ent siin on tegemist erijuhuga, kuna see näib olevat Aristotelese φιλότιμος'e teatud variant). Valikuga on tegemist sellegi poolest. Leidub mitmeid olulisi tüüpe, mida ei ole Theophrastose teosesse võetud. Sellele probleemile ei ole töös lahendust pakutud; teatud määral võib siin rolli mängida ka teksti transmissioon.

Tüübikirjelduste ümbergrupeerimist peetakse käesolevas töös koha-tuks, eriti kui ümbergrupeerimise eesmärgiks on peatükkide esitamine järjekorras, mis oleks lugejale n-ö mugavam. Samal ajal on teatud for-maalne grupeerimine võimalik ning võib aidata tüüpide erinevusi pare-mini silmata. Teoses on mõned väiksemad grupid, mis jagavad üht käitumisjoont; see aga ei tundu teose terviku seisukohalt olevat eriti olu-line. Süstemaatilise esituse puudumine ei näi ka autori jaoks mingi probleem olevat. Ei ole mingit põhjust heita Theophrastosele ette seda, et ta ei ole tüübikirjeldusi esitanud süstematiseeritumalt, sest see ei olnud ilmselt tema eesmärk.

Tüübikirjelduste erinevuste ja sarnasuste mõistmiseks on olulisem käesoleva töö teise osa viimane peatükk, kus analüüsitakse *Inimtüüpides* esinevaid sotsiaalse suhtluse tasandeid. Theophrastose poolt kujutatud tüübid esindavad kõik kõrvalekaldeid sotsiaalselt aktsepteeritud ja soovitavast käitumisest. Siin on keskendutud nendele kõrvalkalletele ning Theophrastose spetsiifilisele detailikujutusele ehk sellele, mis teeb tüübid sotsiaalselt mitteaktsepteeritavaks. Tüüpide esitamisel Theophras-tos ei analüüsi, ei moraliseeri ega otsi tüüpide käitumise motiive. Ta esitab kujutisi polise elu aktiivsete osaliste põhilistest sotsiaalsetest rolli-dest. Need kujutised on aga esitatud teatud kõverpeeglis, sest osaliste ἀρετή on moondunud ning selle puhul näivad isegi positiivsed oma-dused üleliigse ning kohatuna. Paljud kujutatud tegevused ei ole iseenesest negatiivsed ning mõned neist oleksid isegi positiivsed, kui need toimuksid õiges situatsioonis, õigel ajal, õiges kohas ning õigete inimeste suhtes. Tüüpide puhul ilmneb üldine sotsiaalse intelligentsuse puudumine. Theophrastos kujutab tüüpe piiratud hulgas situatsioo-nides ja kohtades, mis on kõik (Ateena) linna sotsiaalse võrgustiku olulised osad. Tüübikirjeldustes väljenduvad situatsioonide või kohta-dega seotud sotsiaalse kommunikatsiooni eri tasandid. Tüüpide hinda-

misel on oluliseks osaks ka nende erinevad reaktsioonid sarnastes situatsioonides. Töös vaadeldi järgmisi sotsiaalse kommunikatsiooni tasandeid: a) polis ja avalik sfäär (käitumine kohtus ja rahvakoosolekul, osalemine saatkondades, liturgiate täitmine jne); b) religioosne sfäär (käitumine seoses jumalustega, osavõtt religioossetest pidustustest ja riitustest, religioosne käitumine eri situatsioonides jne); c) majanduslik sfäär (ärisuhted, ost ja müük jne); d) kultuuri- ja haridussfäär (teater, sport, gümnasionid jne); e) sotsiaalne sfäär (sõbrad, sümposionid, saunad, külaskäigud, küllakutsed, laenamine jne); f) *oikos* ja perekonnasfäär (suhted pereliikmetega, naistega, lastega, orjadega, käitumine kodus). Seejuures ei ole need tasandid alati üksteist välistavad. Spetsiifiliste kohtade hulka kuuluvad kodu, turg (koos alajaotustega, nagu näiteks naisteturg), saunad, teater, gümnasionid, rahvakoosolek, kohus, sammaskäigud, tänav jne. Teatud juhtudel ei ole võimalik tegevuse kohta kindlalt määrata. Töös väidetakse, et tüüpide käitumine ei ole sotsiaalselt aktsepteeritav peamiselt seetõttu, et nad hülgavad teatud põhilised ühisväärtused, mis on olulised kogukonna funktsioneerimiseks.

Theophrastose-järgsete peripateetikute tüübikirjeldustest on meieni säilinud ainult fragmente. Neist kõige olulisemad on katkendid Aristoni teosest *Kõrkuse vähendamisest*, mida tsiteerib Philodemos. Kuigi Aristoni koolkondlik kuuluvus ei ole täiesti selge (teada on samanimeline peripateetik ja stoik), leitakse käesolevas töös, et enamik argumente räägib pigem peripateetiku kasuks. Aristoni tüübikirjelduste ning peripateetikute traditsiooni vahel on teatud vasturääkivusi, ent need ei ole piisav argument fragmentide omistamiseks stoik Aristonile. Siinjuures on olulisim εἴρων'i (silmakirjatseja) kirjeldus, mille leiame nii Aristonilt kui Theophrastoselt (*Char*. 1) ning keda käsitleb ka Aristoteles. Aristoni suhtumine εἴρων'isse, kelle esindajaks on Sokrates, on otseselt vaenulik, sellal kui Aristoteles kaldub silmakirjatseja käsitlemisel teda pigem positiivses valguses näitama. Theophrastos kirjeldab küll negatiivset εἴρων'it, ent ei nimeta näitena Sokratest. Sokratese arvamine kõrkuse näidete hulka, kuhu εἴρων Aristonil kuulub, ei ole aga tõendus autori stoitsistlikust taustast, sest Sokratese kriitikuid leiame ka peripateetikute hulgast. Tegemist on teatud suhtumiste kokkupõrkega ühe koolkonna raames, mida võib näha teistelgi juhtudel. Isegi kui analoogiad Theophrastose *Inimtüüpidega* ei ole piisavad väitmaks Philodemose poolt tsiteeritud

Aristoni kuulumist peripateetikute koolkonda, on sarnased probleemid ka tema stoitsistliku tausta pooldajail: argumente ei ole piisavalt. Lisaks on argumendid alati seotud (nii Aristoni kui Theophrastose) teose eesmärgi küsimusega, millele on antud väga erinevaid vastuseid, mistõttu ka need argumendid on alati paratamatult subjektiivsed.

Töös käsitletakse ka peripateetikute kooli Theophrastosest arvates ülejärgmise juhi Lykoni fragmenti, mis sisaldab joodiku kirjeldust. Tekst on säilinud Rutilius Lupuse ladinakeelses tõlkes. Selle katkendi ning teiste Rutilius Lupuse poolt tsiteeritud tekstide analüüs näitab, et tõenäoliselt püüdis autor kreeka originaali keelt ja struktuuri edasi anda nii täpselt kui võimalik. Kuigi Rutilius Lupus tsiteerib joodiku kirjeldust teatava retoorilise figuuri illustreerimiseks, ei pruukinud Lykoni eesmärk kirjelduse koostamisel olla tingimata seotud retoorikaga, kuigi seda ei saa ka välistada. Spekulatsiooniks jääb ka seos eetikaga või pedagoogiline eesmärk. Suurim erinevus Theophrastose tüübikirjelduste ning Lykoni kirjelduse vahel on selles, et viimases on ülekaalus füsioloogilised detailid, sellal kui Theophrastos kasutab seda võtet väga harva ning keskendub enam sotsiaalsele kontekstile. Samas on kirjeldus oma detailide esituse ning elavuse poolest täiesti võrreldav Theophrastose tüüpidega, kuigi ei ole esitatud sotsiaalses kontekstis.

Viimasena vaadeldakse lühidalt peripateetikust biograafi Satyrose fragmenti, mis kirjeldab priiskamist. Üldise arvamuse kohaselt kuulub see Theophrastose traditsiooni, ent on n-ö kvaliteedilt viletsam. Tuleb aga möönda, et hilisemate peripateetikute eesmärk seesuguste tüübikirjelduste esitamisel ei olnud tingimata Theophrastose jäljendamine.

Doktoritöö viimases osas käsitletakse karakterikirjelduse praktilisi avaldumisi, enamasti väljaspool peripateetikute traditsiooni. Vaadeldakse kolme tüübi esinemist peamiselt 5.–4. sajandi kirjanduses, keskendudes igaühe puhul konkreetse tüübi spetsiifilistele aspektidele. Εἴρων'i puhul (*Char*. 1) on selleks võimalikud seosed Sokratesega. Kreeka kirjandusest näeme, et Sokratese kirjeldamisel on kasutatud mitmeid tüübinimetusi, mis esinevad ka Theophrastose teoses. Nii leiame, et Sokrates võib olla εἴρων, βδελυρός (*Char*. 11), ὀψιμαθής (*Char*. 27), ἀλαζών (*Char*. 23), ὑπερήφανος (*Char*. 24). Seejuures on εἴρων'i kuju selgelt olulisim ning Sokratesega eksplitsiitselt seostuv. Töös käsitletakse εἴρων'i tausta ning

selle kasutamist komöödias, filosoofilises kirjanduses, Theophrastosel ning Aristonil.

Βδελυρός'i puhul (*Char*. 11) on põhitähelepanu selle kasutamisel Aischinese kõnes Timarchose vastu, kus see esineb sagedamini kui üheski teises kreeka autori teoses kuni hilisantiigini. Võttes arvesse väheseid paralleele Aischinese kõne ning Theophrastose kirjelduse vahel, aga ka varaste skoliastide segadust βδελυρία tähenduse selgitamisel, järeldatakse töös, et βδελυρός võis olla kasutusel nii erinevaid tülgastavaid tegevusi ning jämedat käitumist hõlmava katusterminina kui spetsiifilises, seksuaalseid toiminguid kajastavas tähenduses.

Samalaadse järelduseni jõutakse ka ἀνελεύθερος'e (*Char*. 22) puhul. Selle kasutamist analüüsides leitakse, et ἀνελευθερία käsitlemine oli oluline kreeka filosoofilises kirjanduses, eriti Platonil, samal ajal kui tavamoraali uurimise jaoks olulistes tekstides, eelkõige praktilises retoorikas, ei pöörata sellele nii suurt tähelepanu. Suur osa kreeka filosoofilisest traditsioonist käsitleb ἀνελευθερία't katusterminina, mis hõlmab mitmeid negatiivseid käitumisjooni, kuigi sageli leiame ka vihjeid selle kitsamale, rahalise aspektiga seotud tähendusele. Seda spetsiifilist tähendust kohtame kõige selgemalt Aristotelese eetika-alastes kirjutistes ning Theophrastose *Inimtüüpides*.

Enamik Theophrastosel esinevaist negatiivseist tüüpidest on oma sotsiaalseid norme rikkuva käitumise tõttu väga levinud žanrides, mille olemuse jaoks on säärased rikkumised ühel või teisel põhjusel olulised — eelkõige komöödias ja praktilises retoorikas ehk Atika reetorite (kohtu)-kõnedes. Neid žanre, eriti praktilist retoorikat, on peetud ka olulisemaiks allikaiks vanakreeka tavamoraali uurimisel. Seoseid komöödia ja/või praktilise retoorikaga vaadeldakse töö enamikus osades, ent lõpupeatükis keskendutakse ühele spetsiifilisele juhtumile, mille puhul on alust oletada eriti tihedaid sidemeid peripateetikute traditsiooniga. Theophrastose õpilaste hulka kuulunud kõnemehe Deinarchose tekstides võime näha Theophrastose tüübikirjeldustega sarnaseid jooni, ent otsese mõju tuvastamisel tuleb olla ettevaatlik, sest samal ajal kuulub Deinarchos ka praktilise retoorika traditsiooni, milles sääraste negatiivse sotsiaalse värvinguga tüübinimetuste kasutamine vastase mustamiseks ja kohtu silmis pahelisemana näitamiseks oli väga levinud.

Töö peamised rõhuasetused on olnud ühelt poolt peripateetikute traditsiooni järjepidevusel ning teiselt poolt tüübinimetuste populaarsel kasutusel ehk nende esinemisel väljaspool seda traditsiooni, eelkõige komöödias ja praktilises retoorikas. Nende seoste põhjal on võimalik väita, et Theophrastose teose allikmaterjali hulka kuulusid nii osad peripateetikute eetikakäsitluse teoreetilisest baasist kui kaasaegne komöödia ja retoorika. Sellelt aluselt lähtudes on Theophrastos valinud ühe konkreetse teema ning selle originaalse käsitlusviisi, mis on osutunud oluliseks nii eetikale, komöödiale kui retoorikale.

Peripateetikute traditsiooni ning tavamoraali jaoks oluliste tekstide leksikaalsete ning semantiliste iseärasuste analüüsimisel võib näha väärtussüsteemide peegeldumist keeles. Seega on teatud määral võimalik leida leksikaalsete ja semantiliste nähtuste korrelatsiooni sotsiaalsete nähtustega; leksikaalne kontekst töötab kaasa sotsiaalse tausta avamisele. Selle teema edasiseks arendamiseks on soovitatav uurida erinevate negatiivsete sotsiaalsete tüüpide kasutamist kogu kreeka retoorikas, ent see jääb käesoleva töö ulatusest välja.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

I. Üldandmed

1. Ees- ja perekonnanimi: Ivo Volt
2. Sünniaeg ja -koht: 3. mai 1975, Pärnu, Eesti
3. Kodakondsus: Eesti
4. Kontaktandmed: Ülikooli 17–413, 51014 Tartu;
   tel: +372 7376252, +372 5271764; e-post: Ivo.Volt@ut.ee
5. Praegune töökoht: Tartu Ülikool, filosoofiateaduskond, germaani, romaani ja slaavi filoloogia instituut, klassikalise filoloogia teadur
6. Hariduskäik: 1993 Pärnu Sütevaka Humanitaargümnaasium; 1997 Tartu Ülikool, *B.A. cum laude* klassikalises filoloogias; 2000 Tartu Ülikool, *M.A. cum laude* klassikalises filoloogias
7. Teenistuskäik: 1995–1997 Tartu Karlova Gümnaasium, ladina keele õpetaja; 1997–1999 Tartu Ülikooli, klassikalise filoloogia metoodik; 1998–2001 Tartu Miina Härma Gümnaasium, ladina keele õpetaja; 1999–2001 Tartu Ülikool, klassikalise filoloogia projektijuht; alates 2002 Tartu Ülikool, klassikalise filoloogia teadur

II. Teadus- ja arendustegevus

1. Peamised uurimisvaldkonnad: negatiivsed karakteritüübid vana-kreeka kirjanduses, eelkõige peripateetikute koolkonna esindajate teostes; Theophrastos Eresosest, tema looming ja selle retseptsioon; ladina epigramm ja selle retseptsioon; klassikalise filoloogia ajalugu Eestis.
2. Osalemine toimetuskolleegiumides ja erialastes seltsides: rahvusvahelise humanitaarteaduste ajakirja *Studia Humaniora Tartuensia* tegevtoimetaja (alates 2000); sarja *Morgensterni Seltsi toimetised* (*Acta Societatis Morgensternianae*) toimetaja (alates 2003); Eesti Assürioloogia Seltsi liige (alates 1998); Morgensterni Seltsi liige (alates 1999); *American Philological Association*'i liige (alates 2007)

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CURRICULUM VITAE

I. General information

1. Full name: Ivo Volt
2. Date and place of birth: 3 May 1975, Pärnu, Estonia
3. Nationality: Estonian
4. Contact information: Ülikooli 17–413, 51014 Tartu; tel: +372 7376252, +372 5271764; e-mail: Ivo.Volt@ut.ee
5. Current position: University of Tartu, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Germanic, Romance and Slavonic Languages and Literatures, research fellow in classical philology
6. Education: 1993 Pärnu Sütevaka Grammar School; 1997 University of Tartu, *B.A. cum laude* in classical philology; 2000 University of Tartu, *M.A. cum laude* in classical philology
7. Employment: 1995–1997 Tartu Karlova Grammar School, teacher of Latin; 1997–1999 University of Tartu, advisor in classical philology; 1998–2001 Tartu Miina Härma Grammar School, teacher of Latin; 1999–2001 University of Tartu, project manager in classical philology; since 2002 University of Tartu, research fellow in classical philology

II. Professional activities and administrative positions

1. Main research interests: negative character types in ancient Greek literature, especially in the works of the Peripatetics; Theophrastos of Eresos, his works and their reception; Latin epigram and its reception; history of classical scholarship in Estonia.
2. Participation in editorial boards and professional societies: managing editor of the international journal of the humanities *Studia Humaniora Tartuensia* (since 2000); editor of the series *Acta Societatis Morgensternianae* (since 2003); member of the Estonian Assyriological Society (since 1998), Morgenstern Society (since 1999), American Philological Association (since 2007).

III. Selected publications

Aavik, T.; Keerus, K.; Lõuk, K.; Nõmper, A; Pevkur, A.; Saarniit, L.; Simm, K.; Sutrop, M.; Tõnissaar, M.; Vaher, A.; Volt, I. (2007) *Eetikakoodeksite käsiraamat*. Tallinn: Eesti Keele Sihtasutus.

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