

TARTU UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Social Sciences Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science

Adam Fudala

From Russia, with love (and other values):

A social constructivist evaluation of Russian public international diplomacy as a tool of soft power in Brazil between 2003 and 2014

IMESS Thesis

Supervisor: Elena Pavlova, PhD

Tartu 2024

Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Word count of the thesis: 20 400

Adam Fudala, 20.05.2024.

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Adam Fudala, herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created me In Russia, with love (and other values): A social constructivist evaluation of Russian public international diplomacy as a tool of soft power in Brazil between 2003 and 2014 supervisor Elena Pavlova, PhD,

- reproduce for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1;
- I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe on other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Abstract	6
INTRODUCTION	6
Background	6
Relevance	8
Research Puzzle	9
Objective	10
Research question	10
Thesis structure	10
Theoretical expectation	10
Methodology	11
Essential sources	12
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW	12
Nye's conceptualisation of soft power	12
Critical responses to soft power	13
Soft power as an American export product	16
Attraction, narration or attractive narratives?	17
Measurement fiasco	19
Public diplomacy as a form of soft power	22
Summary	24
LITERATURE REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY	25
Evaluation of Russian soft power	25
Russian Presence in Brazil	28
Russian soft power in Brazil	29
METHODOLOGY	31
Research design	31
Choice of methods	32
Data collection methods	33
Principles of data analysis	34
Research limitations	36

ANALYSIS	38
Russia's emitted values	38
2003-2007: The Generic Engagement	38
Questioning the international order	38
Giving a platform to non-Western states and regional recognition	39
(Post) Soviet Legacy	40
2008-2010: Maturing of the Narratives and Images	41
Personalisation of message	41
Linking of national and international aspiration	41
Structure alternative to the West	42
2011-2014: Directed and Personalised Message	42
Realised superpowerdom	43
Rule-breaking rationalised	44
Summary	45
Russia's received image in Brazil	47
2003-2007: the Back and Forth Era	47
Superpower in Doubt	47
Troublemaking as a negative	48
Personal warming up	49
Doubting the Western states, 50	
2008-2010: the Period of Intensification	51
The Rise of BRIC	51
Shared values	52
2011-2014: Mature Political Partnership	54
Equal kinship	54
The internalisation of superpower discourse	56
Russian troublemaking as price	57
Comparison and contrast of the projected and received image	58
Approach to the West	58

Approach to the International System	58
Troublemaking in the international	59
Status of Superpower	59
Reasoning for the success of narratives	63
Anti-western sentiment	63
Responsiveness and directness of narration	65
The focus of the practice	65
Soft power effectiveness	66
Conclusion	67
Bibliography	72

Abstract

The thesis examined the concept of Russian soft power in South America, with a particular focus being placed on the image and narrative projected via state documents between 2003 and 2014. In spite of the dominance of Western influence over both the theoretical and empirical concept of soft power, Russia has managed to establish a narrative foothold within like-minded states through ideological and diplomatic efforts in geographically distant states such as Brazil. The study supports the ongoing academic trends of a more critical approach towards soft power by focusing on novel aspects of research such as but not limited to (I) centring the experiences of the receiving state of the soft power, (II) evaluating the success of soft power practises on the basis of change within the receiving state; and (III) referencing the conservative soft power potential, critical to the original conception of Nye. The work builds on the works of Keating and Kaczmarska as well as Jane Bially, filling in the lacuna of both empirical and theoretical knowledge with regard to Russian soft power in South America. Utilising qualitative discourse analysis of key Russian statecraft actors and official documents, the thesis uncovers the elements of Russian soft power that resonate most with Brazil. The findings highlight the role of anti-Western sentiment, the pursuit of global influence, shared values, and strong leadership in Russia's soft power strategy.

Mamie, Tacie,
Eli,
Benie, Ines
Joannie.

INTRODUCTION

Background

In its latest global strategy of 2022, the Russian Federation announced its continuous efforts in “international humanitarian cooperation and promotion of international development” despite the developments in Ukraine.¹ Bearing this in mind, the Russian strategies of spreading influence and using their image internationally, broadly defined as soft power generating efforts, have become more critical than ever. Simultaneously, Russia has reaffirmed its focus on cooperating with its past allies, who, like the Russian state, also share the view that the global international order has been solely under Western influence for too long.² The list of said allies includes states such as, but not limited to, the historical partner Cuba, the recently turbulent Venezuela, and the South American rising power Brazil.³ Evidently, the return of Russia to Latin America has transitioned from a theoretical discussion within academia to a political reality throughout the past decade.⁴ Nevertheless, these states have not joined the Russian supporting group in merely the days preceding the beginning of the conflict. On the contrary, those are the countries on whose passive support or “neutrality” Russia could count on even during its most severe breaches of international norms. One such breach was the Russian annexation of Crime in 2014.⁵

The government of Dilma Rousseff in 2014 made little to no actual attempts to condemn Russia’s breach of international norms in Crimea - much to Western dismay.⁶ This somewhat unexpected alliance between Russia and the last one of the triumvirate as mentioned above of Latin American states seems particularly vexing - especially bearing in mind the geographical distance between these two countries, as well as Brazil’s location within the US's traditionally

¹ Russian Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Activity State Programme, 2022.

² Russian Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Interview With Newsweek, September 21, 2022,.

³ Gabriel Stargardtner. Bolsonaro Won't Condemn Putin, Says Brazil Will Remain Neutral Over The Invasion. (2022, February 27) Reuters. & Yasmeen Serhan. A New U.N. Vote Shows Russia Isn't As Isolated As The West May Like To Think. (2022, October 13) Time.

⁴ Mónika Szente-Varga, The Footprints Of The Bear. Why Does The Return Of Russia To Latin America Matter?, Nordic Journal Of Latin American And Caribbean Studies, 2022, 38.

⁵ Felix Hett And Moshe Wien Between Principles And Pragmatism: Perspectives On The Ukraine Crisis From Brazil, India, China And South Africa, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015, 3.

⁶ Oliver Stuenkel, Why Brazil Has Not Criticised Russia Over Crimea Executive Summary, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014, 3.

defined sphere of influence.⁷ Surely, if it were merely a matter of economy or military cooperation between the two countries, the Western international community would not be as perplexed as it was with the response - or rather the lack of such - taken by Brazil.⁸ Although economic and security ties were significant, it seemed an outstanding risk for Dilma Rousseff's government - especially since the Brazilian state was an incipient addition to the "big league" of global power back in 2014 and was now joining said league with such a political burden. One could assume that, in order to foster such a positive relationship, Russia must exercise some sort of non-obvious attraction - which could be seen as a form of Nye's soft power - from the South American state's perspective. One could then wonder how Russia managed to shape a narration around itself so that a previously Western-optimistic state has started to lean towards a more radical approach to the international order.

Relevance

Russia's soft power as a concept tends to be marginalised even in the immediate context of the Eastern European countries, which are in favour of focusing on the hard and coercive power exercised through its foreign policy.⁹ In the scholarly field, it has been primarily referred to either (a) in terms of continuous "propaganda" in states already devoted to the Russian cause or (b) failed attempts to moralise Russia's strategy to disrupt the existing international order.¹⁰ Furthermore, culture remains the fundamental pillar of soft power analysis, both universally and case-specifically. Indeed, considerable pressure is put on more niche aspects of soft power operated by state-associated actors - such as, but not limited to, the idea of *Russkiy Mir*, or quite generally, Russian culture and its adjacent.¹¹ None of these, however, help explain the fundamental nature of Russian soft power in South America, particularly Brazil. These

⁷ Maria Regina Soares De Lima, And Mônica Hirst. "Brazil As An Intermediate State And Regional Power: Action, Choice And Responsibilities." *International Affairs (Royal Institute Of International Affairs 1944-)* 82, No. 1 (2006), 34.

⁸ Valdir Bezerra, *Brazil-Russia Positioning Within Brics: Global And National Perspectives*, Saint-Petersburg State University, 23.

⁹ Mark Beeson. *Can China Lead?*, *Third World Quarterly*, 2013, 34.

¹⁰ Antoaneta Dimitrova Et Al. *The Elements Of Russia's Soft Power: Channels, Tools, And Actors Promoting Russian Influence In The Eastern Partnership Countries*, *Eu-Strat*, (2017),13-14. & Theodore P. Gerber And Jane Zavisca 'Does Russian Propaganda Work?', *Washington Quarterly* 39(2):(2016) 82.

¹¹ Andis Kudors, 'Russia's Soft Power Approach To Compatriots Policy', *Russian Analytical Digest* 81, 2010, 2-4.

approaches marginalise the existence of nuance and personalised strategic narration and communication, creating a certain lacuna of knowledge that this thesis will aim to cover.¹²

This lends itself to the broader issue found in the study of the concept of soft power, where it emphasises neoliberal values, narrations, and identities as the standard of “attractiveness”.¹³ Much like other illiberal actors in the international sphere, Russia has been seen as lacking the capacity to use their already limited soft power effectively - as what they are offering other states is, quite simply, not attractive in comparison to the “civilised” values of the West.¹⁴ In line with the writing of Keating and Kaczmarska as well as Robinson, the thesis aims to recontextualise soft power concerning Russia’s status as an “International Conservative Power”, as well as to propose a more constructivist focus on identities and narrative generation within public diplomacy discourse.¹⁵ This could further the debate on soft power outside the Western-centric sphere, as well as introduce potential new cases for comparative studies.

Research Puzzle

Considering the global response to the recent Russia-Ukraine war, it can be seen as interesting how Russia is planning to maintain positive relationships around the world with the selected few like-minded states. Furthermore, as the Russian economy is bound to undergo some changes due to the current sanctions and war spending, one would be perplexed about how they will foster positive relations. Existing research on Russian strategies of soft power in Latin America, especially Brazil, currently focuses on the projection of conservative ideals and non-intervention policy - yet empirical analysis demonstrating this is lacking. Additionally, this research seems to omit the overarching question related to the benefits of projecting soft power in Latin America when Russia has limited goods and values to offer to those states. This can lead to a wider research puzzle: Why does Russia project soft power towards Latin American states such as Brazil despite having a small portfolio in this field limited to promoting conservative values and political support?

¹² Keating & Kaczmarska. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The ‘Hidden’ Attraction Of Russia*. 10.

¹³ Kwang-Ho Lee, *The Conceptualization Of Country Attractiveness: A Review Of Research*. *International Review Of Administrative Sciences*, 82(4), 2016, 809.

¹⁴ Marlene Laurelle, *Russia’s Niche Soft Power Sources, Targets, And Channels Of Influence*, *Ifri*, 2021, 5.

¹⁵ Paul Robinson, “Russia’s Emergence As An International Conservative Power”, *Russia In Global Affairs*, No. 1, 2020, 24. And Keating & Kaczmarska. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The ‘Hidden’ Attraction Of Russia*. 17.

Objective

The study's main objective would be to understand the nature of Russian soft power in Latin America, focusing on Brazil and whether it can establish a lasting and sustainable alliance between these two countries. Subsidiary goals of the thesis include: (I) reframe the concept of soft power and successfully apply and assess it in a non-US-adjacent context; (II) examine the strategies and policies used by Russia in their soft power attempts, consciously or subconsciously, and how they feed into larger Russian identity discourse; (III) analyse how Russian soft power is affecting Brazil, both in public and private sectors.

Research question

The research question of the thesis is: what was the nature of Russian soft power in Brazil between 2003 and 2014? Additional research questions could include: (I) How was the notion of soft power constructed in the Russian official discourse with reference to Latin America and Brazil specifically; (II) How were the narratives received by the Brazilians? (III) How successful can they be deemed, and (IV) how do narratives fit within the larger theoretical discourse on soft power?

Thesis structure

The thesis is structured along the following: (I) a literature review focused on the theoretical underpinning of soft power as a concept within international relations; (II) an overview of scholarly work done on the case study with reference to soft power (both universally and directly linked to the analysed example of Brazil); (III) the methodological outline, focused on proper conceptualisation and operationalisation of the examined topic as well as the data and principles of its analysis; (IV) the presentation of Russian public diplomacy soft power strategies and their reception by the Brazilian establishment; (V) comparison and contrast of the emitted and received values; and (VI) conclusion.

Theoretical expectation

The research would locate the image of Russia in Brazil and what elements of their soft power narration resonate most with the state and media. Based on the discursive analysis, the research anticipates finding categories reflecting Russian narrative soft power capabilities. These can include notions such as (but not limited to): (I) active opposition to the West, especially the US; (II) the strive for legacy and global power capacity building; (III) dissemination and promotion of ultra-conservative moral outlooks; (IV) Russian and Soviet cultural relevance and global importance; as well as (V) the respect for strong leadership. Overall, the notions presented would then be considered to determine whether they can be seen as ways of granting Russia international legitimacy and authority.

Methodology

The sources will be approached from a social constructivist perspective, using qualitative discourse analysis strategies. Firstly, the message and key elements will be decoded. These are going to originate from the most vital statecraft actors (such as the President) and official documents from Rossotrudnichestvo or Russian MFA, as well as leading think tanks and scholars involved in the creation of Russian soft power (such as but not limited to Russia in Global Affairs, Valdai Discussion Club, or Konstantin Kosachev's writing). Based on the information found from these sources, an overall agenda with the intended goals of Russian Soft Power in Latin America will be created and denoted as the ideal image to be received by Brazil. Secondly, and following Roselle et al.'s recommendations, the analysis is primarily going to concentrate on the reception side rather than the production.¹⁶ From the evaluated primary sources, the aims would be to extract the discourse, terms, and references that openly express support and admiration towards Russia as well as the values they represent, noting which elements of Russia's soft power strategy might have been involved in influencing the Brazilian side.¹⁷ Lastly, the intended message will be compared with the received and understood message on the Brazilian side, allowing for an evaluation of the success of soft power practices.

¹⁶ Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon And Ben O'loughlin 'Strategic Narrative: A New Means To Understand Soft Power', *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), 2014, 74.

¹⁷ Keating & Kaczmarek. "Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The 'Hidden' Attraction Of Russia", 13.

Essential sources

While trying to capture the general discourse practices of Russian soft power, official sources such as speeches, agendas, and general strategies from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rosstrudnichestvo will be considered. However, these are only the introductory elements of analysis, which will provide a broader context of what the Brazilian side is responding to. Soft power data is going to focus on how the message is received and how the message is being sent and presented to the Brazilian side. Therefore, the elite discourse concerning Russia, including leaders of political parties' responses, speeches, and public government documents. The media response (depicted in the articles written in the leading Brazilian newspapers such as but not limited to *Folha de Sao Paulo*) will be used as a secondary source of reference to delineate another aspect of the establishment response to the soft power practices of Russia. Additionally, academic sources on the theory of soft power - such as Nye, Kaczmarek, and Ford, together with the research papers on the application of the concept in other South American states - are going to be referenced.¹⁸

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Nye's conceptualisation of soft power

Firstly, it is crucial to trace the theoretical discourse surrounding soft power. Constructed by Joseph Nye within the 1990 book "Bound to Lead", the concept was quite simply defined as "getting others to want the outcomes that you want."¹⁹ The concept was developed by further defining it as "(an ability to) affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment".²⁰ In its early ideation, the concept was applauded for its quite vast and somewhat universally applicable nature to most sources of power, which previously could not be captured by the military or material approach to power in international relations.²¹ Indeed, Nye could list nearly infinite strategies to generate soft

¹⁸ Christopher A. Ford. "Soft On 'Soft Power.'" *The Sais Review Of International Affairs* 32, No. 1, 2012, 92. & Joseph Nye, "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, No. 80, 1990, Pp. 153–155.

¹⁹ Joseph S. Nye., "Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics", New York: Public Affairs, 2004, 5. And Joseph Nye, "Bound To Lead : The Changing Nature Of American Power". *Basic Books*, 1990, 17.

²⁰ Joseph Nye, "Public Diplomacy And Soft Power." *The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science* 616, 2008, 98.

²¹ James Doesner, Melissa Nissbelt, "The Art Of Soft Power A Study Of Cultural Diplomacy At The Un Office In Geneva", King's College London, 2017, 14.

power in the international: from education and media to “sports, fashion, Hollywood movies, tourism, infrastructure, economy, political system, etc.”.²² Thus, it can be said that the novelty of the concept lied on its effort to expand the previously seemingly dichotomous understanding of power beyond coercion (“sticks”) and monetary or material methods (“carrots”), locating a third, previously ignored, locus of power.²³ Crucially, the work of Nye helped push the subsidiary concepts associated with soft power - such as culture, values, and attractiveness, essentially social constructivist ideas - into mainstream debates of international relations, previously dominated by the neorealist and neoliberal theoretical framework.²⁴ Although this is not entirely novel, as scholars of culture in politics such as Putnam and Inglehart have been advocating for further implementations of the concept into the scholarship, it was thanks to Nye’s work that these ideas started to become attractive to policymakers and individuals outside of scholarly debate.²⁵ Overall, from this traditional perspective, the concept of soft power seems to be an umbrella term with limited definitions, which leads to its potentially dubious academic value. Yet the recognised brilliance of Nye’s work arguably lies in this universality: the concept of soft power allows researchers to spot the sources of influence and control that have previously remained clouded. Although this was abused in the past by scholars “stretching” the concept, soft power, as constructed by Nye, helped find power niches for both state and non-state actors, whose influence over political reality had hitherto been vastly trivialised.²⁶

Critical responses to soft power

It is vital to note that Nye has never abandoned the concept throughout his academic career, providing continuous updating and revisitings of the idea.²⁷ Soft power has, therefore, evolved considerably since its conception in the 1990s. However, the core of this concept has remained vastly unchanged and, in a sense, unphased by the critical response provided by other scholars. Additionally, Nye seems to have withdrawn a lot of his more visionary approach (proclaiming the era of soft power) in favour of a more conservative and measured outlook that emphasises

²² Joseph Nye, “Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics”. New York, Ny: Public Affairs, 13.

²³ Joseph Nye, “American Soft Power In The Age Of Trump”, Project Syndicate, 2019, 6.

²⁴ Nye, “Public Diplomacy And Soft Power.”, 2008, 13.

²⁵ Putnam Robert. 2001. “Bowling Alone: The Collapse And Revival Of American Community” Ny: Simon & Schuster, 8. & Inglehart, R. And Welzel, C. “*Modernization, Cultural Change, And Democracy The Human Development Sequence*”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22.

²⁶ Joseph Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, 2006, 12.

²⁷ Joseph Nye “Soft Power: The Evolution Of A Concept”, Journal Of Political Power, 2021, 199.

soft power as a strategy in the realist and liberal toolkit, secondary to the more traditional forms of power.²⁸ Despite these attempts, his work could not escape considerable questioning from academia. The criticism of the conceptualisation of soft power remains as active as ever.²⁹ The first wave of the scholarly review comes from authors concerned with Nye's changing ideation and continuous adjustment of the concept to fit the then-contemporary political and international reality.³⁰ The current issue is that - according to scholars such as, but not limited to Kearn - even if one agrees to opt for one of the shifting definitions provided by Nye, the concept holds ground and could be seen beyond "an ambiguous signifier with a nebulous theoretical core."³¹ A similar critique can be found in Bially Mattern, who points out that nearly all of the terms used to construct the understanding of soft power could be seen as "subjective experiences" rather than academic terms.³² This sentiment is further echoed in the works of Reich and Lebow, who state that the values found by Nye as attractive are "assumed, in unspecified ways".³³ Additionally, Kroening, McAdams, and Weber rightly point out a certain lack of academic definition from the very conception of the term.³⁴ All of the scholars mentioned above questioned one foundational flaw of Nye's logic: namely, the lack of consistency and the potential for re-use in other concepts - as well as, more generally, falsifiability. They, in turn, suggest more academic rigour when it comes to defining and employing the term soft power by introducing the set conditions (namely, a present openness of the recipient for ideas and the possibility of attitude change, both nationally and internationally) that need to pre-exist in order for scholars to talk about soft power in more detail.³⁵ Lastly, one cannot forget about the broader issues within the literature on the notion of power - as noted by Barnett and Duvall - and their implications for the concept of soft power.³⁶ Indeed, by lacking an internal taxonomy or academic complexity, Nye's work can be seen as rather shallow - and, importantly, incapable of standing alone as an academic notion.³⁷

²⁸ Joseph S. Nye, "Whatever Happened To Soft Power?", Project Syndicate, 2022, 15.

²⁹ Jarosław Cwiek-Karpowicz, "Limits To Russian Soft Power In The Post-Soviet Area", 2012. 6.

³⁰ Kearn Dw "The Hard Truths About Soft Power". *Journal Of Political Power* 4(1), 2011. 66.

³¹ *Ibid*, 75.

³² Jane Bially Mattern, Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics. *Millennium*, 2005, 584

³³ Simon Reich, & Lebow, Richard. *Good-Bye Hegemony! Power And Influence In The Global System*, 2014, 35.

³⁴ Matthew Kroenig & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. *Taking Soft Power Seriously*. *Comparative Strategy*, 2010, 410.

³⁵ Kroenig & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. *Taking Soft Power Seriously*. *Comparative Strategy*, 2010, 413.

³⁶ Barnett, Michael, And Raymond Duvall. "Power In International Politics." *International Organization* 59, No. 1, 2005, 42.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 54.

Its existence, in many ways, relies on the strong presence of “hard power” as a basis for what “soft power” is not. This identity of soft power as an opposition is explored in Guzzini’s social constructivist work, which suggests that the concept can be seen as tangled in a complex web with other notions of power - be they hard or taxonomically complex like discussed in Duvall.³⁸ Thus, One can look at soft power from a strictly social constructivist perspective and understand that power discourse generation is steeped in a socio-cultural context. Vitaly, one can use this interpretation to their analytical advantage as they evaluate the applications of the ‘soft power’ concept within a given context, understanding that it itself has its own epistemological limitations.³⁹

Overall, the discourse of soft power remains highly contested, especially within the theory-crafting sphere. To a certain extent, there seem to be two main theoretical schools in conceptualising soft power: traditional and expansionist. The former, shaped by Nye, suggests that there must exist certain fundamental assumptions (such as the given value of attraction and the strategies that can generate them, regardless of the context) that should not be questioned in order for the concept to be academically feasible - and, even more importantly, to be recognised as a potentially important element of policy. The latter school, consisting of an array of critics, rather doubtfully approach the topic of “assumed” and “given” elements within the theoretical background. The tendencies of the soft power debate on this side focus on expanding its academic content so that it is capable of describing the contemporary reality of power more accurately and consistently, as well as further working on providing the ramifications that go beyond its relation to hard power. Contemporary criticism suggests that soft power needs to be understood beyond a policy tool-like nature and should be able to stand alone as a concept of International Relations. Importantly, despite all of the divisions, the scholars all remain in agreement that some form of soft power is still relevant within the international community today - it is the form and interpretation that it is to take and be understood that vexes them the most. Additionally, another aspect of the conceptualisation that most of the scholars seem to agree on is that its form is highly context-dependent.⁴⁰ Without concrete examples and cases to refer to, analysis of soft power might lead to a similar pitfall of illusionary universality that was critiqued in Nye’s first conception of the term.⁴¹ Therefore, it

³⁸ Guzzini, S. The Concept Of Power: A Constructivist Analysis. *Millennium*, 33(3), 2005, 499.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 504.

⁴⁰ Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power.” 160.

⁴¹ Abhinav Dutta, “The Concept Of Soft Power: A Critical Analysis”, *International Affairs Forum*, 2018.

remains to ground the study of soft power within a concrete framework of actors and timescapes. What seems to be the most optimal approach is, thus, an understanding of soft power with a focus on *what* is being generated internationally and, even more importantly, towards the recipient actor.

Soft power as an American export product

Having defined Nye's work in the theoretical concept, as well as understanding its critiques, one simply cannot forget that its knowledge production occurred in a very particular period of time and thus may reflect the then-contemporary faulty ideations of international reality.⁴² Much like other Western academic work from that period, Nye's writing, akin to Fukuyama and Huntington, suffers from the post-Soviet collapse shift of power, when the scholarly goal was to explain all of the new rules that were bound to define the forming new global order.⁴³ This can be seen in one of the initial texts on soft power, where Nye tries to proclaim this up-and-coming idea of non-coercive power within the international community as the new way of ensuring one's global control.⁴⁴ This leads to his writing on soft power being crucially US-centric and policy-oriented - both features that have been criticised by scholars of non-Western soft power such as Kaczmarek, who laments the omission of non-neoliberal states such as Russia and Turkey within the international.⁴⁵ The subsequent replication of Western ideals of attractiveness within the studies of states such as China leads to incomplete and sometimes simply wrong depictions of reality.⁴⁶ Others, such as Vuving, point out that the "Western beauty" aspect of Nye's soft power is not universal, and while it "resonated neatly with the people in Eastern Europe", the same cannot be said of every other part of the world.⁴⁷ In a sense, Nye's theory is for the West, by the West, and focuses on the values deemed appealing by the West.

⁴² Joseph Nye, 'The Rise Of China's Soft Power', 2005 Wall Street Journal Asia, 29.

⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, "The End Of History?" *The National Interest*, No. 16, 1989, 14. And Samuel Huntington "The Clash Of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, No. 3. 1993, 5 And Edward Said, "The Myth Of The Clash Of Civilizations", University Of Massachusetts, Amherst 1996, 21

⁴⁴ Nye, Joseph. "The Future Of American Power Dominance And Decline In Perspective". *Foreign Affairs* (Council On Foreign Relations), 2010. 8

⁴⁵ Keating & Kaczmarek. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The 'Hidden' Attraction Of Russia*. 13.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 17.

⁴⁷ Alexander Vuving, "How Soft Power Works", Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies, 2009, 13

A considerable effort has been put into the decentralisation of Western perspective - especially in the work of Tefero Abrosseti, who notes the possible existence of the anti-thesis of Western soft power, one which embraces all of the values discarded by the neoliberal world.⁴⁸ Lastly, it is worth noting how, according to Nye, the origin point of soft power is not only geographically and temporarily linked to the West and specifically the United States.⁴⁹ Demidov remains in direct opposition to this notion, commenting that Nye simply claimed for the American world what has already existed for centuries past.⁵⁰ Indeed, critical theorists such as Foucault, Bourdieu, or Gramsci have already been known to theorise a similar influence-based power structure, be it based on knowledge production or cultural hegemony.⁵¹ The critical scholars thus propose a certain level of de-Americanisation of the term: the new approach to soft power should be more neutral and focused on the capacity and execution of influence. Echoing the previous paragraph, there is a need to leave assumptions, stop focusing only on Nye's conceptualisation of soft power, and understand how it interacts with the critical theory that surrounds it.

Attraction, narration or attractive narratives?

From its very conception, soft power relied on the idea that certain values within the international can be seen as "attractive" and potentially desired.⁵² However, it is important to understand that within the modern study of soft power, one cannot focus solely on the ideas related to attraction. Indeed, scholars have already broken down this singular element of Nye's theorycraft in multiple ways. What seems to be the general consensus of more progressive authors is that the neoliberal perspective on the concept of soft power and, with it, the existence of universal attraction simply does not deliver on the analytical promise anymore. Some, such as Wagner, would go as far as to state that from the beginning, the formation of the concept steeping in this reality was faulty and bound to fail from the get-go.⁵³ Graham, in a similar

⁴⁸ Eleonora Tafuro Abrosseti, "The Charm Of Anti-Westernism: Russia's Soft Power In Africa", Italian Institute For International Political Studies, 2022, 47.

⁴⁹ Joseph Nye, *Bound To Lead : The Changing Nature Of American Power. Basic Books*, 1990, 17.

⁵⁰ Andrei Demidov, "From Soft Power To Managed Chaos". Geopolitical Journal, 2014, 89.

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, "Discipline And Punishment: The Birth Of The Prison", 2nd Ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1995, 15; And Antonio Gramsci, "Selections From Prison Notebooks", New York: International Publishers, 1971, 12; And Pierre Bourdieu, "Language And Symbolic Power", Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, 43.

⁵² Joseph S. Nye, "Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics" New York: Public Affairs, 2004, 6.

⁵³ Jan-Phillip Wagnes "The Effectiveness Of Soft & Hard Power In Contemporary International Relations", E-International Relations, 2014, 5.

fashion, questioned whether this prophesied attractiveness is an inherent value of an element of foreign policy (so the producer of the value does not matter) or whether it can be simply cultivated and generated by the state, therefore linking the identity of the producer to the attractiveness of value.⁵⁴ Bially Mattern, from a sociolinguistic perspective, considers the act of value promotion as inherently antagonistic and, thus, attraction as a rather aggressive interpretation of what soft power was meant to be.⁵⁵ Above all, scholars do tend to point towards a more significant issue related to the idea of the attractiveness of soft power, namely, treating it in an instrumental way.

Kisileva, for instance, warns that clinging to attraction relies on the premise that the values and narrations within the sent message could be infinitely shaped and reshaped by the state.⁵⁶ The author's warning could be seen as valid as, indeed, should one consider soft power in such ways, they actively deny the agency of the recipient of the message - an approach criticised previously on multiple occasions.⁵⁷ Analysis should, thus, focus on “strategic communication, which develops a set of simple themes, much as a political or advertising campaign does” and how these are received.⁵⁸ Further echoing the move from values to strategic narratives can be seen in Roselle, who points out that it is the narratives, not their attractiveness, that “explain the world and set constraints on the imaginable and actionable, and shape perceived interests.”⁵⁹ Therefore, soft power, to a certain extent, could be seen as shaping one's optics, hoping they are going to be well received by the other side rather than the simple act of possession of attractive values. Such an approach, calling for further empathy and more precise recognition of the other side of the narration generation, not just the projecting one, seems to become the standard.

Overall, a change to a more narrative and value-driven approach towards soft power seems inevitable and, to a certain extent, welcomed by scholars. Importantly, understanding soft power has to go beyond the instrumental approach, and thus, both researchers and policymakers

⁵⁴ Graham, Sarah Ellen. “Emotion And Public Diplomacy: Dispositions In International Communications, Dialogue, And Persuasion.” *International Studies Review* 16, (2014),

⁵⁵ Bially Mattern, Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics. *Millennium*, 2005, 583–612.

⁵⁶ Kiseleva, Yulia, “Russia’s Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status And The Attraction Of Power. Politics”, 35(3–4), 2015, 319.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 323.

⁵⁸ Mark Leonard, “Public Diplomacy”, London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002, 32.

⁵⁹ Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon And Ben O’loughlin ‘Strategic Narrative: A New Means To Understand Soft Power’, *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), 2014, 74.

need to move from this simple and assumed attractiveness in order to form a more precise image of the soft power capacity. In this fashion, a key way of understanding soft power should be to consider it as a set of narratives and values that could potentially possess an attraction (which cannot be assumed anymore). Regardless of what becomes the focus of the study, the question that remains, however, is how one is to evaluate and potentially measure the success of a soft power strategy. Even with more attraction, there still remains a vast methodological query in front of them.

Measurement fiasco

Regardless of which of the aforementioned theoretical trends one is subscribed to, a similarly heated debate remains within the discourse related to the operationalisation (and thus possible measurement) of soft power. Truly, it seems that there is little to no agreement on what exactly constitutes a soft power policy application and execution.⁶⁰ Initially, the scholarly environment was less rigorous and overall more lenient when it comes to the notion of quantifying soft power, per Nye himself.⁶¹ Indeed, this can be seen in “Bound to Lead”, as he stressed the relatively intangible nature of the resource that is based on the relation between actors.⁶² This focus on the intangible led to an increased divide among academics on how to properly operationalise the notion. On the one hand, one can say that soft power in its traditional understanding was still to be ranked, compared, and contrasted.⁶³ The measurement attempts reinforced the understanding of soft power as a strategic asset that is to be quantifiable and thus in desperate need to be linked to a certain material component.⁶⁴ Due to this fact - as of the accounts of McClory and Yang - one can note the predominance of culture and media in the analysis of soft power.⁶⁵ The scholarly field thus focused primarily on listing the capacities of a state and assessing their theoretical impact, paying little to no attention to how it would actually impact the targeted agent. Even Nye himself noticed with a slight concern this

⁶⁰ Yun, Seong-Hun. “An Overdue Critical Look At Soft Power Measurement: The Construct Validity Of The Soft Power 30 In Focus”. 2018, 23.

⁶¹ Macdonald, Stuart & Son, Dr & Singh, Professor. “Soft Power Today Measuring The Influences And Effects”, 2017, 21.

⁶² Nye, Joseph S. *Bound To Lead : The Changing Nature Of American Power*, 1990, 14.

⁶³ Chaka Ferguson. “The Strategic Use Of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions Of The Chinese–Russian ‘Strategic Partnership’”. *Journal Of Strategic Studies*, 2012, 43.

⁶⁴ James, McClory,. *The New Persuaders Ii: A 2011 Global Ranking Of Softpower*, Institute For Government, 2010, 21.

⁶⁵ McClory,. *The New Persuaders Ii: A 2011 Global Ranking Of Softpower*, 23. And Rui Yang. “Soft Power And Higher Education: An Examination Of China's Confucius Institutes”. *Globalisation. Societies And Education*. 2010, 240.

academic focus on tallying up additional resources of soft power without even attempting to evaluate the effects and larger implications of said resources.⁶⁶ Much like in the conceptual case, one can identify a need to “decouple” soft power from its assumed dichotomy from hard power.

Another facet of the measurement fiasco of soft power is the tendency to attach causality (ranging from indirect to direct) to certain soft power scenarios without strong reasoning related to it. Nye himself seemed to have found such a causal link between (a) the strategies adopted by the United States regarding the proliferation of culture and Western neoliberal values within the international and (b) the eventual downfall of the USSR, amongst others.⁶⁷ This attitude, argues Miskimmon, is by itself faulty, as causality in narrative-based studies is hard to directly attach, especially in cases regarding poorly defined notions such as the soft power.⁶⁸ More pragmatic authors working on this concept suggest the need to introduce a rigid temporal structure whereby change, be it attitudes or identities, can be observed. This approach seems to become increasingly more popular within the scholarly field, with the introduction of studies of the nexus between identity and soft power like the one offered by Feklyunina.⁶⁹

Another possible approach to help cope with the seemingly immeasurable nature of soft power is to shift the analytical weight from the emitter of soft power towards its recipients. Instead of focusing on resources *per se*, one needs to examine the ways in which different audiences “read” an actor and their strategies - a notion already denoted within the more theory-based literature.⁷⁰ Measurement of soft power could thus be seen through the changes in the narration and identity of the emitter from the perspective of the recipient, observed within the pre- and post-production of soft power. This change of identity seems to be a particularly interesting thread, as it suggests that the change can occur not only within the understanding of the emitter but also the identification of the recipient’s self in light of the soft power.⁷¹ Here, the

⁶⁶ Joseph, Nye. Transcript Of Witness Testimony To The House Of Lords Select Committee On Soft Power And Uk Influence, 2013.

⁶⁷ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, 27 & Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. *Taking Soft Power Seriously*. *Comparative Strategy*. 2010. 417.

⁶⁸ Miskimmon A, O’loughlin B, Roselle L (2013) *Strategic Narratives, Communication Power And The New World Order*. New York: Routledge. 34.

⁶⁹ Valentina Feklyunina 'Soft Power And Identity: Russia, Ukraine And The 'Russian World(S)', *European Journal Of International Relations*, 2015, 17.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 32.

⁷¹ Umut Yukaruc, “A Critical Approach To Soft Power”, *Institute Of Social Sciences*, 2017, 42

constructivist perspective seems to yet again provide an elegant way of evaluating success, stemming from the writing on Onuf: thus, one may consider a successful execution of power to be one whereby a recipient's identity is reconstructed in an image akin to the one they were exposed to through the exercise of soft power.⁷²

While considering the other alternatives to measurements of soft power, Weber et al. suggest that there is a need to expand the understanding of soft power beyond the traditional structures of political science or international relations and to instead evaluate it with the support of the scholarly bodies of communication studies, sociology, and social psychology, in order to generate a more accurate picture of the concept.⁷³ Such ideas are further echoed within the writings of Bially Mattern and Roselle, who point out that without a proper focus on the narratives generated through the implementation of soft power strategies, one cannot fully grasp the full extent of the power.⁷⁴ A possible way to include such an approach is to focus more on the qualitative discourse analysis within the research, which could potentially allow for a better understanding of the possible shifts within the receiving actor's attitudes towards the emitter of soft power.

In conclusion, scholars point out that a certain locus (or loci) of focus must always exist within the measurement of soft power. Some, like Nye and Yang, decide to focus on the means itself and see soft power as a phenomenon of its own. Others, such as Roselle, however, emphasise the plurality and equal importance of other points of reference, especially the receiving part of the message. The main problem with soft power pertains to measurement, as most of the studies focus excessively on ranking the soft power capacities and abilities rather than actually looking for the potential impact made by their attractiveness, narratives, or cultural strategies.⁷⁵ This circle backs to the nebulous nature of soft power (both in theoretical and practical application), as stated by many critics since the inception of the concept. There is, however, one point of scholarly consensus: that the key element remains to be the understanding of the tool, i.e., the

⁷² Nicholas Onuf, "Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism In Social Theory And International Relations", 2013, 19.

⁷³ Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. "Taking Soft Power Seriously. Comparative Strategy". 2010. 413

⁷⁴ Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon And Ben O'loughlin 'Strategic Narrative: A New Means To Understand Soft Power', *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), 2014, 74. And Jane Bially Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics". *Millennium*, 2005, 590.

⁷⁵ Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. Taking Soft Power Seriously. Comparative Strategy. 2010, 413.

sent message and the form it takes before reaching its designated audience. Furthermore, the scholarly focus has been moving slowly away from merely focusing on the producers themselves and towards creating an emitter-receiver nexus whereby to fully grasp the effects of power. The conclusion from this review of theoretical discussions on soft power measurement could be summarised by the need to stray away from a simple listing of the tools and strategies. The strategies and methods adopted by the state should then be evaluated with reference to what values, narratives, or images (or a combination of these) are being projected through the strategies and how they are seen by the recipient actor.

Public diplomacy as a form of soft power

As per the previous chapter, there exists a need to contextualise soft power further in order to provide a fair and academically sound examination of our object of analysis. Rightly so, scholars such as Wojciuk also suggest a need for further compartmentalisation of the study of soft power for individual subfields such as educational soft power, sport soft power, and similar.⁷⁶ This is to ensure a more case-to-case examination that is better suited for explaining certain phenomena - rather than Nye's semi-universal model, which mostly focuses on spotting the possibility of soft power within certain political loci. One could look at the more case-based approach as a focus on different manifestations of soft power. One of such can be public diplomacy.

It is not that the definition of public diplomacy has been particularly *contested* by scholars - but, more precisely, that public diplomacy is continuously changing and expanding. Indeed, the definitions fluctuate between the mere use of propaganda within the international period during the interbellum and war period to the total politics of the Cold War, ending up on national branding in the contemporary period.⁷⁷ There is, however, an agreement that the distinction between past and present forms of public diplomacy is, to a certain extent, futile.⁷⁸ Scholars like Leonard simply posit that the concept experienced “frequent, irregular structural reformulations in light of shifts in the actors engaging in international political communication” and, therefore, that it should be considered more continuously fluid rather than embedded in a

⁷⁶ Wojciuk, Anna “Higher Education As Soft Power In International Relation” In Handbook Of Cultural Security. Edgar Elgar, 2018, 350.

⁷⁷ Pamment, J. New Public Diplomacy In The 21st Century: A Comparative Study Of Policy And Practice (1st Ed.). Routledge, 2021, 28.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 36.

binary diction between old and new forms of public diplomacy. Indeed, Cull approaches it in a similar way, deducing elements of public diplomacy that are fundamental regardless of the temporary context - namely, listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and platform providing.⁷⁹ What remained relatively stable within the study is the actor involved in the generation of soft power - which is most likely to be the state itself or the agents (such as, but not limited to, institutions, associated organisations, representatives) tied to it in an easily traceable way.⁸⁰ The association with the state remains critical, even despite the contemporary introduction of social media, personalised and tailor-made narration through targeted messaging, or the general relaxation of entry-level points and requirements into the global market of ideas. Thus, public diplomacy could be seen as the campaigns and strategies that affect the understanding of a state and its actions and, ultimately, spin it in a beneficial way.

As of now, the definition of public diplomacy remains somewhat universal and overlaps with other potential elements that could be generating soft power. One should doubt whether such a vast conceptualisation of public diplomacy is any different than adopting a purely Nye-oriented approach to soft power. However, regarding this aspect, a considerable distinction that needs to be stressed within this chapter is that public diplomacy is a means to ultimately achieve soft power - and that, therefore, it is a subsidiary of the term. The role of public diplomacy in soft power analysis could be, as argued by Hayde, the provision of the much-needed context and methodological tools to precisely and eloquently evaluate means.⁸¹ Indeed, this seems to be the perfect answer to the previously mentioned measurement fiasco of soft power. The scholars of public diplomacy devised ways that allow for both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the discourse - such as perception analysis and outcome analysis, which could help address the aforementioned theoretical limitations of soft power and thus provide a great opportunity for contextualisation and improvement on the sometimes hard to grasp, intangible nature of soft power.⁸²

The discourse of public diplomacy, thus, could be seen as the much-needed grounding for soft power discourse, both on a theoretical and practical level. With a focus on soft power

⁷⁹ Nicholas J. Cull "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies And Histories." *The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science* 616, 2008, 46.

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 51.

⁸¹ Craig Hayde, "Scope, Mechanism, And Outcome: Arguing Soft Power In The Context Of Public Diplomacy, *Journal Of International Relations And Development*, 2015, 10.

⁸² Nicholas J. Cull, *From Soft Power To Reputational Security: Rethinking Public Diplomacy And Cultural Diplomacy For A Dangerous Age. Place Brand Public Dipl* 18, 2022, 18.

manifesting within public diplomacy, one has the opportunity to observe a defined subset of means of soft power and then distil the narratives hidden within them, assessing them against how they were received. Such an approach provides a clearer opportunity to establish a causal link between the two.

Summary

Nye's conception of soft power drew attention to the previously neglected face of power within the international, giving way to more culture- and discourse-driven research in International Relations. Though not entirely novel, it captured the imagination of the masses and helped locate new and exciting loci of power. Nevertheless, critical scholars agree that there are a considerable number of flaws in the theoretical underpinning of this concept. From the review of theoretical literature, one may come to the discouraging conclusion that there exists a limited accord on how to properly study soft power within international relations. Scholars have proposed many avenues whereby to expand the concept's application, narrow down its theory, or even, in some radical cases, abandon the concept altogether. Nevertheless, one could still create a list of best practices and use them while evaluating soft power. Firstly, there is a need for more academic rigour in both theoretical investigations and pragmatic research, both of which are desperate to introduce more context within their work. There is also a strong movement suggesting the analysis of single-emitter-and-recipient case studies, thus moving away from attempts at making semi-universal theories akin to the one initially devised by Nye. A similar level of focus should be employed as we dwell on selecting a singular, broadly defined field or strategy rather than looking into all of the aspects of soft power simultaneously. Should such a compartmentalised approach be adapted, the reading of political reality would become much clearer.

Overall, one could posit that the scholarship would greatly benefit from research in line with these practices, especially if applied to a non-Western context. Indeed, another key conclusion from this theoretical literature is that non-traditional producers of soft power within the international community should be given proper analytical attention and should not be neglected any further. Additionally, the notion of attractiveness, which has been vastly criticised due to its Western-centric nature, needs to be sidelined in favour of other concepts that could be more appropriate for explaining attraction, such as value, identities and, most importantly, narratives.

LITERATURE REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY

Evaluation of Russian soft power

The discourse on Russian soft power shows a considerable amount of scholarly diversity and relative unevenness, though it is not as developed in comparison to the more coercive or material elements of Russian foreign policy.⁸³ It tends to place the Russian soft power efforts along two main axes: intensity and prevalence, thus creating a proportional relation between them. This results in a false understanding that only prevalent and intense soft power is worth noting, leaving little space for the analysis of more precise and intimate stories.⁸⁴ Another issue that exists within the study of Russian soft power is that it seems to be placed in opposition to hard power.⁸⁵ Nye argues that Russian soft power is limited in comparison to their traditionally defined power and is thus eclipsed and deemed “irrelevant”.⁸⁶ However, soft power can still be an element coercive as well as a material aspect of power and, therefore, does not always lie in contrast to hard power - as others such as Bially Mattern might have suggested.⁸⁷ On the other hand, scholars have often argued that Russia tends to combine its efforts of hard power with soft power, and thus renders somewhat useless the analysis of the latter, as its existence is conditional on the former.⁸⁸ Academics focusing on the Western and neoliberal conception of soft power, such as Rutland and Kazantsev, adopt a somewhat condescending tone when describing the capacities of the Russian state - calling “the elite (incapable of) grasping the point”.⁸⁹ Although the authors suggest a certain move towards pragmatism within the foreign policy, it is questioned by Kaczmarska as she later followed by how ideological foundations have been strengthened in the following year.⁹⁰ What seems to be crucial here within the understanding of the soft power of Russia is that it cannot be viewed in a monolithic way and should span a larger period of time as the Russian influence has a tendency to “ebb and flow”

⁸³ Peter Rutland & Andrei Kazantsev, The Limits Of Russia’s ‘Soft Power’, *Journal Of Political Power*, 9:3, 2016, 399.

⁸⁴ Bially Mattern Jane, Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics. *Millennium*, 2005, 590.

⁸⁵ Efremenko, Dmitry, Anastasia Ponamareva, And Yury Nikulichev. “Russia’s Semi-Soft Power.” *World Affairs: The Journal Of International Issues* 25, No. 1, 2021, 111.

⁸⁶ Joseph Nye, What China And Russia Don’t Get About Soft Power, *Foreign Policy*, 2013, 19.

⁸⁷ Bially Mattern Jane, Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics. *Millennium*, 2005, 600.

⁸⁸ Sergunin, Alexander & Karabeshkin, Leonid. Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy. *Politics*. 2015, 35.

⁸⁹ Rutland & Kazantsev, The Limits Of Russia’s ‘Soft Power’, *Journal Of Political Power*, 9:3, 2016, 400.

⁹⁰ Kaczmarska. Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The ‘Hidden’ Attraction Of Russia. 19.

within its perimeters.⁹¹ Indeed, the Russian state does not seem to reach the heights achieved by other leading world powers such as the US, which is often deemed the origin of soft power in practice. From this, one can get a rather discouraging image of Russian soft power scholarship: one where there are no given concepts and the existing foundation of the analysed power is relatively weak - both in practice and theory.

In Russia's case, it would be beneficial to disengage from the traditional attractiveness of values and instead peer into a more nuanced perspective on the topic. Such ideation of Russian values can be seen in the writing of Kaczmarzka and Keating, who formulate a perspective of conservative soft power that, through the promotion of values such as, but not limited to strong leadership, illiberal government, and traditional value, Moscow conservative can create "a source of inspiration that generates followership".⁹² Similarly, Laruelle considers the notion of niche soft power that focuses on "issues of morality and so-called traditional family, notion of "sovereignism", and patterns of illiberal governance" that has a limited following that can only resonate within the existing polarised countries.⁹³ However, when Russian soft power is placed within such a location, it tends to gather great support - regardless of whether it is Eastern Europe, Africa or Latin America.⁹⁴ In both critical conceptualisations, one can see that Russia seems to take an active position in the dissemination of soft power by taking a leadership role and directly "leading by example".⁹⁵ In contrast to Rutland, Laruelle suggests that Russia had a clearer focus on their ideological footground (on conservatism and conservative values) and their soft power should not be marginalised or downplayed simply because it does not fit the established narration.⁹⁶

Echoing the debate on the Western origin of the concept, a similar debate is seen in the practical evaluation of a non-Western state's soft power. As referenced by Horvath, it is indeed the fact that the vast majority of scholarly research has been put into the evaluation of soft power by Western states such as but not limited to the US, the UK or France.⁹⁷ Indeed, the soft power 30 indexes between 2015 and 2019 accounted for only four non-western aligned states (Turkey,

⁹¹ Kaczmarzka. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The 'Hidden' Attraction Of Russia*. 22.

⁹² Keating & Kaczmarzka. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The 'Hidden' Attraction Of Russia*, 2017, 25.

⁹³ Laruelle, *Russia's Niche Soft Power Sources, Targets, And Channels Of Influence*, Ifri, 2021, 5.

⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 9.

⁹⁵ James, Sherr, *Ard Diplomacy And Soft Coercion*: Brookings Institution Press, 2013, 12.

⁹⁶ Laruelle, *Russia's Niche Soft Power Sources, Targets, And Channels Of Influence*, Ifri, 2021, 2.

⁹⁷ Robert Horvath, 'The Reinvention Of 'Traditional Values': Nataliya Narotschnitskaya And Russia's Assault On Universal Human Rights', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 2016, 890.

Russia, People's Republic of China, and Brazil).⁹⁸ The academic trend here suggests two main schools of thought when it comes to the concept of Russian soft power - as a failed idea and policy where the state was incapable of generating Nye's notion of soft power or as an empire of attractive conservative values that rely on the notion of rule-breaking and niche narration. The former method of study should be viewed with certain caution, as it can, due to its Western-aligned conception of soft power, obscure certain faces of the soft power may become obscure and hidden from the analysis. The niche approach is best defined in the example of Russia's unorthodox approach to certain disputes within the international or their participation in the BRICS movement, where they stand as the critical antithesis to what the US and their Western Allies tend to represent.⁹⁹ What seems to be an important aspect of Russian soft power is microtargeting individual fields of a state and overall microtargeting with the overall presence of the state within the international.¹⁰⁰

Overall, the problems flagged in the theoretical section do seem to linger within the practical study of the Russian soft power case. Indeed, one sees not only poorly defined theoretical concepts, attempts to cover the entire scope of Russian soft power at the same time, or the focus on simply listing the means without elaborating them at all, but also the neglectful approach related to the Western roots of soft power. Moreover, the majority of Western scholarship seems to simply neglect Russia and diminish its soft power, assuming its soft power cannot achieve attractiveness, and even if so, it is incomparable to the extent of its hard power. However, the scholarly discourse does not remain homeless. Indeed, there have been attempts to generate academic-quality knowledge on the issue with the stellar works of Kaczmarek or Feklyunina that ground their research in more critical perspectives that aim to steer away from faulty theoretical and methodological assumptions.

Russian Presence in Brazil

The presence of Russia in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean has been relatively marginal due to the considerable geographical distance and the seemingly lacking cultural and historical background that would unify both of these places.¹⁰¹ The initial interest Russia took

⁹⁸ USC Centre On Public Policy, *Soft Power 30 Report*, Portland, 2019, 43.

⁹⁹ Zaki Laidi, *The Brics Against The West?*, Ceri Strategy Papers, 2011, 1-2.

¹⁰⁰ Laurelle, *Russia's Niche Soft Power Sources, Targets, And Channels Of Influence*, Ifri, 2021, 5.

¹⁰¹ Farah, Douglas, And Caitlyn Yates. "Great Power Competition In Latin America: A New Normal." *The Fletcher Forum Of World Affairs* 44, No. 2 2020: 45.

in South and Middle America can be traced back to the episodic relations established in the XVIII century, during the rapidly rising independence movements of both the Spanish and the Portuguese colonies, when the forefather of Latin freedom, Francesco de Miranda, travelled to Europe in search of potential allies to the cause.¹⁰² Despite the initial confirmations and support from Catherine the Great, Russia has remained relatively calm when solidifying its relations with the nations searching for their independence.¹⁰³ Although this characterised the initial interaction between the two regions, we can see an inevitable thawing occurring, with the Russian Empire becoming the Soviet Union, based on the practical application of principles of Leninism and Marxist philosophical thought, and the competition becoming ever so palpable between the rising global powers of both the East and West. The in-between period of then and the present seems to demonstrate only menial interaction between the states and the importance of their bilateral relation to show similar quality. The presence of Russia within Latin America was for the longest time defined by the inherited reasoning of the Soviet period: engagement in the region is needed as it is both traditionally and geographically been the sphere of influence of the main opposition of the USSR - the US.¹⁰⁴ However, with the ever-increasing globalisation of the world, the convergence of time and space convergence, and the developments in places such as Ukraine and Syria, one cannot deny that the importance of relations has been becoming ever more relevant in the contemporary political landscape.

Russian soft power in Brazil

Lastly, it is vital to engage in the practical discourse of the Russian soft power in Brazil. Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to declare the current scholarly body as relatively limited, primarily attempting to fit Brazil within a larger narrative of the region.¹⁰⁵ Authors such as Pashentsev argue that the need to consider singled-out cases within Latin America is limited and could be seen as potentially yet another attempt to “stretch” the analytical concept of soft power to fit a narration.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, there is some validity to this statement because Russia has a grand strategy related to its places that seems to be a fit-all approach, as pointed out. However,

¹⁰² Katarzyna Krzywicka, *Ameryka Łacińska I Rosja: Między Ideologią I Pragmatyzmem*, Maria Skłodowska-Curie University, Lublin, 2006, 293.

¹⁰³ Robert Mroziewicz, Rafał Stemplowski (Red.), *Dzieje Ameryki Łacińskiej*, Warszawa 1979, 411.

¹⁰⁴ Mónica Szente-Varga, The Footprints Of The Bear. Why Does The Return Of Russia To Latin America Matter?, *Nordic Journal Of Latin American And Caribbean Studies*, 2022, 38.

¹⁰⁵ Troyansky, O. Karpovich, A. Davydova, Russia's Latin American Policy: New Challenges And Threats, *International Affairs*, 2022, 39.

¹⁰⁶ Evgeny N. Pashentsev, *Strategic Communication Of Russia In Latin America In Russia's Public Diplomacy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, 18.

it cannot be said that the entire region, as the studies were usually done in the past; scholars tended to equate other states to either radical countries such as contemporary Venezuela or the historical allies of the soviet union like Cuba, projecting their reality onto the other, more comparatively liberal states such as Argentina, Chile, or the studied case - Brazil.¹⁰⁷ Mostly, the literature focuses on the precise conservative values or only loosely defines them as opposition to the West. Additionally, these tend to exist usually in the form of enumeration, giving little to no focus on the actual reception part of the soft power, primarily looking at soft power capacities as a list rather than something to be critically analysed. Thus, the current scholarly debate seems to be lacking the focus on the particularity of Brazil and how it responds to the narration and values projected by Russia into the international. The problem of the scholarly discourse on Russian soft power in Brazil is, as with most of the discourses of Russian soft power, steeped in the Western-centric understanding of the concept. This means that only since Brazil started to lean towards more radical rightwing and conservative ideology under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro has the scholarly discourse started to pay attention to the projected values and narrations from Russia into the Latin American stay.¹⁰⁸

The underlying issue, however, is that many of those scholars have seemed to have ignored the particularity of Brazil as a receiving state and simply projected many of the existing discourses in regions such as but not limited to Eastern Europe onto the Latin American context and seeing what fits. The lack of nuance was particularly visible during the governments preceding the time of Jair Bolsnoaro, where authors and researchers focused primarily on the region as a whole, paying little to no attention to the particularities of Brazil.¹⁰⁹

Summary

Overall, the scholarly discourse of Russian soft power exemplifies a plurality of perspectives with varying depths that, unfortunately, tend to leave much for criticism. What seems to be the most prominent case is that many of the conceptual challenges mentioned previously within the theoretical framework review are visibly manifesting: (I) Russian soft power analysis is clouded by continuous comparison with its hard power capacities; (II) and the muddling of soft

¹⁰⁷ Claudia González Marrero, Armando Chaguaceda, *Russia's Sharp Power In Latin America: Global Autocracy, Regional Influence, Gobierno Y Analisis Politico*, 2019, 14

¹⁰⁸ Fabricio H. Chagas-Bastos, Marcela Franzoni. *The Dumb Giant Brazilian Foreign Policy Under Jair Bolsonaro*, University Of Copenhagen, 2019, 48.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 40.

and hard competencies of the state, as well as (III) Western-focus approach towards the concept within the scholarship. However, there are important examples that seem to be setting new standards for the analysis. Laurelle, with their concept of specialised soft power that allows for emitting Russia-specific values, followed by Kaczamrska and Keating, with their work on the promotion of conservative soft power, allow for a better understanding of the concept more universally, as well as in the very regional specific focus such as the study of Brazil. What also tends to be vital is noticing how Russian soft power can be emitted through example and their leadership within the international (in organisations such as but not limited to the UN), not solely individual policies or strategies enacted by the state. While evaluating the soft power relations between Russia, Latin America, and Brazil, one can evidently spot the relative novelty of the topic compared to traditional spheres of influence of the Russian Federation, such as but not limited to Eastern Europe or Central Asia. Although the focus on the region is growing and more scholars are leaning into the analysis of the forms of soft power being exercised, overall, the discourse remains rather conservative, with a priority of pressure being put on the more evident Russian allies such as but not limited to Cuba or Venezuela. Additionally, even more contemporary studies rely primarily on the historical nature of these relations, centralising their Soviet ancestry within the research and leaving little space for the more modern connotations. Brazil seems to remain, from the Russian perspective, in a quite peculiar position as the recipient of soft power influence: (I) it is the strongest economic partner in the region; (II) arguably the most politically and culturally prominent state in Latin America, with their self-proclaimed ambitions to be the first global leader from there; (III) culturally and historically quite distinct from the rest region; and (IV) experienced limited American influence, especially compared the rest of the region. These initial characteristics already make the state possibly interesting for the Russian government to engage in.

METHODOLOGY

Research design

The research design aims to investigate the impact of Russian soft power on Brazil between 2003 and 2014, a period marked by relative stability in both countries' political landscapes. This investigation employs a strategic analysis method focused on qualitative content analysis.

The proposed time frame encompasses the period between 2003 and 2014 since, during this time, Brazil experienced ten years of relative stability regarding its ruling party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (firstly under the presidency of Lula and then of Dilma Rousseff). Though one should not overstate this 'internal political stability' period within the government, it can be said that both Lula and Rousseff represent similar (even if not continuous) approaches towards international politics. Importantly, the proposed time frame avoids the inclusion of the internal crisis that resulted from *Operação Lava Jato* (a political scandal that eventually led to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff), which could cloud the results of Russian influence.

Although the Russian Federation did also experience certain changes within the national legislation, a similar consistency can be seen during the selected time frame. Even more so than in the Brazilian case, there is a tendency to talk about a certain continuation or consistency of ideas in Russian international politics during the selected decade. This is supported by the continuous *de facto* leadership of Vladimir Putin, albeit with a rather cosmetic change of positions occurring with Dimitri Medvedev.

In order to ensure consistency of analysis along the temporal span of ten years, a division based on the three terms of the Brazilian presidency is going to be opted for, focusing more on the response.

Choice of methods

In order to operationalise the key concept of this study, the method suggested by Roselle of strategic analysis is going to be implemented.¹¹⁰ An important source for reference for approaching the research is the study done by Kaczmarska on the contemporary soft power of the Russian Federation in Eastern Europe.¹¹¹ However, the dissertation focuses primarily on the qualitative aspect of analysis, based on content analysis methods, as these tend to be the most suited for catching the more subtle changes of attitudes in the receiving country, which is crucial for the more complex study of soft power. Furthermore, these approaches are more in line with the more critical study of soft power, which tends to suggest borrowing more from humanities and social studies more broadly.

Data collection methods

The data has been acquired from publicly available sources and open-source intelligence stemming from the governments of both states and associated institutions. The practices and strategies reference publicly available documents from both the state and state-associated units, interviews, and media responses, understanding them as elements of public diplomacy.¹¹² The Russian side focuses on documents released by the states, primarily the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation from respective years, with supplementary materials provided by the government such as but not limited to research papers, interviews, and speeches provided by important policymakers such as Vladimir Putin or Kosachev.

The Brazilian side and their response to this are going to be traced through speeches, interviews, and released state papers of the government and its leading politicians (including, but not limited to, the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs), as well as the media coverage on the state elite. These are likely to reflect the effectiveness of the Russian soft power narrative as received by the Brazilian side: the engagement of Brazilian politicians with Russia-promoted discourse is never “costless”, as the choice to support and proliferate the images and

¹¹⁰ Roselle, Miskimmon And O’loughlin ‘*Strategic Narrative: A New Means To Understand Soft Power*’, *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), 2014. 21.

¹¹¹ Keating & Kaczmarska. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The ‘Hidden’ Attraction Of Russia*. 15

¹¹² Leonard, Mark. “Diplomacy By Other Means.” *Foreign Policy*, No. 132 (2002): 49.

perspectives promoted by Russia can “end up hurting or helping them”.¹¹³ The reflection of Russia's ideas by the Brazilian political elite can have two potential implications: either the idea genuinely resonates with them, or it simply serves their internal agenda. Nevertheless, following the analytical purpose of soft power, success between an actor, a true believer or an opportunist does not matter.

In terms of case selection, it is vital to discuss the suggested scope of the analysis. Although the given timeframe is quite considerable, spanning major world-changing events such as but not limited to the world economic crisis of 2008 and or the aftermath of 9/11, having such a wide scope is vital for understanding the change that occurred within the discourse on Russia in Brazil. Importantly, this approach mimics the ones suggested in the writings of Kisielva, who advocated for a deeper understanding of shifts within larger points of reference. Should one consider only one of the said periods, the changes would either seem ephemeral or even poorly traceable.¹¹⁴

This also resonates with the initial idea behind the study - the research is to suggest an overarching theme of Russian soft power in Latin America, specifically Brazil, providing empirical evidence and links between the discourses - something that the current scholarly approach seems to be somewhat lacking. Moreover, this could potentially form the basis for more comprehensive and comparative studies within the region, filling the lacuna of knowledge related to the currently quite limited academic investigation into the dynamics between the researched states.

Principles of data analysis

As per recommendations of the contemporary scholars of soft power and bearing in mind the criticism listed within the literature review part of this thesis, the study is going to focus on adopting a social constructivist perspective. The approach borrows from the writing of Feklyunina and their focus on discursive elements such as, but not limited to, the values and

¹¹³ Keating & Kaczmarek. *Conservative Soft Power: Liberal Soft Power Bias And The ‘Hidden’ Attraction Of Russia*. 12.

¹¹⁴ Kiseleva, Yulia, “Russia’s Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status And The Attraction Of Power. Politics”, 35(3–4), 2015, 321.

sentiments behind the terms used and the continuous presence of certain terms within the discourse.¹¹⁵

All of the sources are going to be scanned and analysed for content and language suggesting attitude, approach, and intention. Furthermore, the study will utilise qualitative data analysis methods to delve into the discourses and narratives underpinning conservative soft power projection. Through discourse analysis and content analysis, the authors examine how conservative regimes frame their messages and shape perceptions on the global stage. Qualitative analysis, as suggested by Keating Kaczmarek, allows for a deeper understanding of the ideological underpinnings and strategic objectives driving conservative soft power initiatives.

By deconstructing these discourses through the focus on language, rhetoric, and symbolic representations utilised in official statements, media portrayals, and public diplomacy efforts, the study of the underlying ideological frameworks and strategic objectives drives conservative soft power initiatives. Moreover, discourse analysis allows subtle nuances and hidden meanings embedded within conservative narratives, shedding light on the 'hidden' attractions of Russia and challenging prevailing biases in assessing global influence.

This approach not only provides insights into how conservative actors construct their soft power strategies but also offers a deeper understanding of the discursive mechanisms employed to wield influence in the international arena. Thus, discourse analysis emerges as a powerful tool for unravelling the complexities of conservative soft power and reevaluating conventional paradigms in the study of international relations.

Firstly, the Russian soft power strategy is going to be evaluated in order to identify the core aspect of the message sent by the state towards Brazil, both passively and actively. The examined reality is going to be evaluated on the basis of writing given by Weber and McAdam, “focusing on the communicate to an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas, persuade the target to change its attitude on a relevant political issue and ensure that the target’s

¹¹⁵ Valentina Feklyunina, 'Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the 'Russian world(s)', *European Journal of International Relations*;, 2015, 13.

newly held attitude influences international political outcomes.”¹¹⁶ Additionally, strategies, policies, and gestures that, per the writing of Cull, could be seen as “listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange, and platform providing” are going to be of particular importance to the study.¹¹⁷ The mere presence of these does not generate a causal link within the Russian global strategy to their effectiveness as a soft power enactment. However, only a thorough and rigorous understanding of the Russian message conveyed within their public diplomacy efforts can add a layer of theory testing, which potentially could help to establish a more precise footing for what can be seen as an actual evaluation of a soft power strategy.

Secondly, the response of the Brazilian side, both nationally and within international organisations, through media outlets, state speeches, and responses generated by state institutions will be considered. What is going to be the primary concern of analysis is the possible change that could be seen within the Brazilian attitude towards Russia and, if so, whether it mirrors, partially reflects, or is completely independent of the message generated by the Russian public diplomacy efforts and strategies.

Lastly, the two images, projected and received, within given temporal frames will be compared and contrasted to assess whether or not there could be some considerable overlap. As these strategies do not occur within a political and economic vacuum, one has to look out for strong narrative similarities.

Research limitations

As with most studies of soft power, it is impossible to cover the entirety of its aspects in one research paper. This thesis, therefore, does not aim to describe and analyse the personal and societal responses to Russian soft power, leaving it for future research. Instead, the study focuses on the establishment responses in two forms: the Brazilian government and its subsidiary institutions and representatives and the media response. Though the latter option could be seen to a certain extent as a more individual-mattering response, it would be a vast overstatement to project the selected media response onto a society as diverse and vast as

¹¹⁶ Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. Taking Soft Power Seriously. *Comparative Strategy*. 2010. 413.

¹¹⁷ Cull, Nicholas J. “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies And Histories.” *The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science* 616, 2008: 40.

Brazil. The study does not cover the social media presence of the Russian government in Brazil, which, albeit important in the construction of the totality of the Russian soft power in Latin America, is not crucial in understanding governmental relations within public diplomacy and the narratives and values generated through it. The thesis focuses on the strategic narrative soft power, primarily within the discourse of public diplomacy as defined by Roselle and Pamment, and acknowledges that there are other ways to focus and narrow down the study in order to avoid generalisations and sweeping statements so common in the past and contemporary studies of soft power.¹¹⁸

In a similar sense, one cannot disregard that soft power practices within the international do not happen in a vacuum. Indeed, as Brazil is being directly or indirectly affected by Russian influence strategies, it is also likely to be the target of such major global actors such as but not limited to the USA and China, other great powers on the rise like South Africa or India, or even regionally important players such as Venezuela or Argentina. Indeed, especially within the social constructivist approach, these remain important factors to consider regarding the Brazilian identity and the narration it adopts within the international context. The study acknowledges a certain polyphony of soft power practises internationally and does not deny the importance of narratives and discourses delivered by other actors, such as the aforementioned list. Tracing elementary similarities between Brazilian and Russian practises, such as they occur in any prevalent, simply highlights their considerable value.

It is also vital to mention that the study is inherently skewed and considers only the emitter-receiver complex in a unidirectional context. Some scholars, such as Guzzini or Onuf, could argue that a true social constructivist research tradition would require an examination of the identity and discursive formation taking place in the form of “exchange” between the two.¹¹⁹ This approach, though academically sound, might potentially obscure any finding of the thesis, placing them in the context of the seemingly unending circle of interaction between two sides. Moreover, it would obscure one of the primary focuses of this paper, namely the Russian potential of soft power in Brazil, not other potential and equally important study foci, such as but not limited to the factors shaping it.

¹¹⁸ Roselle, Alister Miskimmon And Ben O’loughlin ‘Strategic Narrative: A New Means To Understand Soft Power’, *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), (2014), 74. And Pamment, J. *New Public Diplomacy In The 21st Century: A Comparative Study Of Policy And Practice*, Routledge, 2012, 26.

¹¹⁹ Onuf Nicholas, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism In Social Theory And International Relations*, 15 And Guzzini, S.. *The Concept Of Power: A Constructivist Analysis*. Millennium, 2005.

ANALYSIS

Russia's emitted values

2003-2007: The Generic Engagement

The cornerstone of Russian foreign policy practices in this period, as with others to come, was the Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation of June 2000. In their rhetoric regarding soft power-generating and discursive practices in this period, the following overarching themes could be seen: (I) questioning the international order, (II) giving a platform to non-Western states, and (III) relying on the (post) Soviet legacy.

Questioning the international order

Participation in international organisations such as the UN was seen as undeniably important, as it was stressed as one of the principal ways of influencing the “general world processes”.¹²⁰ However, what seems to be evidently emerging from the writing is the overall disdain and discontent with the lack of an “equitable” division of power between states within the system. Indeed, the key papers directly refer to establishing a new “stable system of international relations based on principles of justice, mutual respect, and mutually advantageous cooperation”.¹²¹ An additional aspect of the apathy towards the international order could be seen in the Russian understanding of the balance of power and how its “unipolar” structure and “limited composition” leads to further conflict in the world and power showcases between states.¹²² This overall reads as if Russia participates within the international organisations and systems associated with it, not out of true recognition of their positive impact on a global scale but rather as a necessity or requirement imposed on it by Western states. In its projected image, Russia seemingly aimed to encourage other states to think of the system in a similar way.

¹²⁰ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, 2000, 5
Accessed 21.04.2023, 4

¹²¹ Ibid, 8.

¹²² Ibid, 10.

Giving a platform to non-Western states and regional recognition

What must be stressed is that from the first conception of its foreign policy in the XXI century, Russia sought alternative routes for cooperation rather than simply relying on Western structures.¹²³ In this first period, one could observe how Russia started to establish its idea of multipolarity, relying on “sub-regional integration” with South America, amongst other potential partners.¹²⁴ Indeed, in this period, one can already see the growth of regional cooperation within alternative structures with the introduction of BRIC in 2006.¹²⁵

However, it has to be stressed that South America was seen as a fraction of a potential ally, especially compared to states of Eastern Europe or Asia. Additionally, the limited existing engagements were merely a fraction of what had been achieved back in the USSR period.¹²⁶ This thus created a somewhat muddled message, in which the region of South America, and by proxy Brazil, seemed appreciated and prioritised by the Russians while at the same time belonging to the larger “catch-all” universal agenda for regional cooperation. Even the BRIC grouping, in a sense, equalised the ambitions and needs of Brazil, India, and China in relation to Russia - all three of which were on different developmental levels to begin with.

(Post) Soviet Legacy

In this period, Russia’s public diplomacy was undeniably making efforts to reapproach the region of Latin America, focusing especially on the previously untapped potential allies such as Venezuela and others directly linked to the Soviet legacy.¹²⁷ This can be primarily seen in the concept of support for authoritarian regimes and “emphasis on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference”.¹²⁸ In this sense, the initial periods of Russian engagement within the South American region, let alone in Brazil as a singled-out state, were considerably weaker. The efforts relied on the previously existing links of the Soviet global legacy. Although Vladimir Putin has already established his position within the state, the approved Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation made little to no mention of precise strategic cooperation between Russia and South America, let alone singled out states such as Brazil.¹²⁹

¹²³ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, 2000, 9

¹²⁴ Franciso Ruiz Gonzalez, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study, Instituto Espanol De Estudios Estrategicos, 2013, 11.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 16.

¹²⁶ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, 2000, 9.

¹²⁷ Marrero, Claudia González Marrero, Armando Chaguaceda, *Russia’s Sharp Power In Latin America: Global Autocracy*, Regional Influence, Gobierno Y Analisis Politico, 2019, 11.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 12.

¹²⁹ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, 2000, 8.

Overall, the image projected of Russia towards Brazil could be read as rather confused and disorganised. The issue at hand remained that even though Russia possessed the potential capacity to exercise power akin to a soft one, it seemed to be misplacing the opportunities and wasting its potential. Russia was focusing on a “one-fit-all” approach in its public diplomacy and soft power strategies rather than trying to personalise the message, which is seen as one of their main pitfalls.¹³⁰ What has to be highlighted is that in this initial period, Russia lacked any considerable strategy of how exactly they would approach the region as “the system of foreign policy propaganda became poorly coordinated, controversial, low-powered, inefficient, and far from the needs of suiting Russia’s long-term interests; at the time”.¹³¹ Although somewhat minimal in specificity, Russia acknowledged the strategic importance of the region—both economically and politically - and singled out Brazil as the most promising partner through BRIC. That being said, there was, in a lot of ways, little to no diversification and personalisation of the message of the Russian side when it comes to Latin America. All of the states, be they previously aligned with the Soviet side or traditionally landed in the US and Western sphere of influence, received the same general projected message of anti-Western sentiment, the need for further regional recognition, and Soviet kinship, if applicable.

2008-2010: Maturing of the Narratives and Images

Personalisation of message

Akin to the writings of Bially, in this period of Russian soft power strategies in Brazil, there seemed to have been a realisation that the process of gathering support and public recognition is more intimate than one could have initially anticipated.¹³² Indeed, Russia’s public diplomacy during this period developed a newfound appreciation for the personalisation of the message and tightening of bilateral relations between the states.¹³³ A key element of this strategy was the amplification of summits and personal meetings between both sides. Over the years, the Russian side co-organised ten high-profile meetings that, in the majority of cases, included the

¹³⁰ Katherine P Avegerinos, *Russia’s Public Diplomacy Effort: What Kremlin Does And Why Is It Not Working*, *Journal Of Public And International Affairs*, 2009, 32.

¹³¹ Ruiz Gonzalez, *The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study*, 2013, 15.

¹³² Bially Mattern Jane, *Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force And The Sociolinguistic Construction Of Attraction In World Politics*. 2005, 16.

¹³³ Cull, N.J. *From Soft Power To Reputational Security: Rethinking Public Diplomacy And Cultural Diplomacy For A Dangerous Age*. 2022, 42.

heads of both states.¹³⁴ The message and narration conveyed by this seem clear: Russia's dealings with the states were to be seen as partners who deserve recognition akin to that given to Western states. The Russian narrative here seems to focus on uplifting elements by using terms such as, but not limited to, “strategic partnership” or “traditional partner” while referring to a nation like Brazil.¹³⁵

Linking of national and international aspiration

During this analytical period, Russia considered its international ambitions an extension of national politics and, by proxy, extended it to other regional powers.¹³⁶ The logic presented could be understood as a justification for great nations that do not belong to the West to act against the established rules of the international system.¹³⁷ However, this mandate for rule-breaking was seen more as a reaction towards the seeming unequal treatment of superpowers within the international systems.¹³⁸ Russia projected a narrative that suggested the following: as long as the system was flawed, there could be space for them to disregard the rules of the said international organisation.

Structure alternative to the West

This trend of anti-western attitudes was further developed in the Russian approach towards the organisation within the international as a whole. Russia was to present an alternative to the organisation of the international community, which was seen as the “extension of the historic West [and] its monopoly in global process”.¹³⁹ In this period, one can see the push towards novel ways of interaction between regional partners and geographically distant states, most notably the BRIC.¹⁴⁰ The first BRIC summit in 2009 was one of the key moments in Russia's public diplomacy as it moved previously only theoretical anti-Western and anti-establishment

¹³⁴ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation, 2007, 6, Accessed 24.04.2023

¹³⁵ Ibid, 8.

¹³⁶ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation, 2007, 4, Accessed 24.04.2023

¹³⁷ Ibid, 7.

¹³⁸ Ibid, 9.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 8.

¹⁴⁰ Ruiz Gonzalez, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study, 2013, 7.

discussions from the realm of discourse into tangible political practice.¹⁴¹ The conception in this period was, therefore, twofold: to strengthen principles of multilateralism while creating an alternative architecture of international community that “would reflect the [world’s] diversity”.¹⁴² This was further highlighted in the vocal advocacy for changes within the UN system, especially in the composition of the United Nations Security Council, where names of nonwestern states were dropped.¹⁴³ Overall, this pillar of Russian soft power emitted

2011-2014: Directed and Personalised Message

In this last analytical period, little to no novel and new ideas for addressing Brazil in the soft power discourse seem to have been introduced; the notions were simply developed further. What was particularly interesting, however, was how radicalised and pointed the discursive elements of Russia became.

This could be linked to Russia realising the full potential of soft power and their possibility to influence other states. In 2012, Russia, through the speech of Vladimir Putin, manifested its definition of soft power. The then-prime minister of Russia concluded that the other states, such as the USA and China, had already been actively using soft power as a way to gradually shift the approaches of the international community.¹⁴⁴ Konstantin Kosachev, the then-head of Rossotrudnichestvo, would further develop the notion of Russian soft power, implying it was bound to move away from what Russia wants and needs to particularly observe how the message was received.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, one could see that the Russian state seemingly understood that there existed a fundamental need to adjust the message and focus directly on the individual aspects of the message that seem to resonate most with the targeted group.¹⁴⁶ Overall, from the government's perspective, this was the period of realisation of personal image and its power within the international.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation, 2007, 12, Accessed 24.04.2023

¹⁴² Ibid, 9.

¹⁴³ Ruiz Gonzalez, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study, 2013, 9.

¹⁴⁴ Дмитрий Косырев, Путин В Миде: Мягкий Стиль, Мягкая Сила, *Риа Новости*, 09.07.2012, Accessed 22.04.2024.

¹⁴⁵ Konstantin Kosachev, The Specifics Of Russian Soft Power, *Russia In Global Affairs*, 2012. Accessed 22.04.2024.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Jill Dougherty, Russian “Soft Power” Strategy, *Georgetown University*, 2013, 9.

Bearing all of these theoretical shifts in mind as well as the highlighted need for noticed “Rapid acceleration of global processes in the first decade of the 21st century and growing new trends in global development”, the Russian efforts within the field of soft power primarily manifested themselves in the following three main patterns: (I) realised the identity of superpower, (II) rule-breaking within the international rationalised and expanded to other non-western states, (III) and more pragmatic and sceptical approach to the international structures.

Realised superpowerdom

In this final analysis period, the Russian soft power practises focused on the image of the state as an undeniable member of the superpower group among states such as China and the US. Even in spite of not being able to export an “alternative to what is offered by China, the West or the Islamic World” to other states, Russia provided “conditions to work out their own development concepts, support and regional cooperation projects”, creating an image of a benevolent international state that is there to nurture non-Western allies into similar greatness to their own - an approach that was referred to by Kosachev as offering “*not a fish but a fishing rod*”.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the projected image, in this case, was aiming at creating an international state that was supposed to not only theoretically support non-Western states but also provide them with tangible boons and benefits. Interestingly enough, in this period, the anti-UN rhetoric seemed to have dialled down, with its charter and structures being mentioned as one of the more important foundations of the international order.¹⁴⁹ Although Russia was not arguing that the systems were able to necessarily cure themselves and become representative to all of the nations, the Western control over them has definitely diminished, leaving the possible field of traditionally non-Western actors to actively participate.¹⁵⁰ This could have stemmed from the fact that Russia might have realised that their potential to use the system to their advantage might be more beneficial for them than simply arguing for abolishing the existing structures - the so-called “flexible participation in multilateral mechanisms”, as they call it.¹⁵¹ Overall, the Russian superpower discourse within their soft power practise in this period could be seen twofold: Russia as a giving state, supporting individual nations to achieve their regional

¹⁴⁸ Konstantin Kosachev, *The Specifics Of Russian Soft Power*, Russia In Global Affairs, 2012. Accessed 22.04.2024.

¹⁴⁹ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, *The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation*, 2013. Accessed 24.04.2023

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

¹⁵¹ Ibid

(especially non-Western) potential, as well as Russia as the agent for change within the international system, exemplified by an organisation such as the United Nations.

Rule-breaking, rationalised

Public diplomacy in Russia during this period focused on rationalising radical ideas within the field of international relations. The prime example of such includes a certain mandate given to Russia, to itself by itself, to act in order to secure its position and benefits within the “increasingly complex and unpredictable” global order.¹⁵² Indeed, as the world becomes further correlated by common economic, cultural, and security dynamics, the movements of troublemaking agents begin to be somewhat restricted.¹⁵³ By using terms such as “eroding global security architecture”, “global competition on a civilisational level”, or “blatant neglect of fundamental principles of international law”, Russian foreign policy emits a message that the current state of international order is inherently failing.¹⁵⁴ Importantly, attention is also brought to the fact that rule-breaking had already been occurring in the form of the “use of coercive measures and military force (...) to eliminate profound socioeconomic, ethnic and other antagonisms” brought by Western states. In this twisted reality, Russia projected a global discourse to fellow non-Western states that could be seen as an encouragement to exercise their right to bypass international order and carve their own niche within global politics. In conclusion, this could be seen as the most radical version of the Russian troublemaking message that was emitted towards Brazil. Interestingly, this time, one could see once again that the projected notion seemed to be more targeted towards the South American state.

Overall, the projected image of Russia in this last analytical period could be considered the most cohesive and focused one out of all three. This refocusing and more defined approach to soft power was definitely linked to the key statesmen, such as Vladimir Putin himself, realising the importance of influence within the then-contemporary global reality.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, the narratives became more personalised and, for the first time, started to address Brazil directly, not solely as the state within a region important politically and economically to Russia, but as a country worth maintaining strong communication and alliance with. Russia no longer needed

¹⁵² Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation, 2013.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

to rely on its Soviet legacy or kinship with non-Western states due to their “underdog” position.¹⁵⁶ On the contrary, it started to create new alliances and interstate relations based on its brand and realised its identity as an international superpower. This new notion of internationally significant Russia was further emphasised by their little regard for the rules and customary laws of the international system - with the annexation of Crimea being the prime example of such.

Summary

The Russian approach within their soft power discourse evident in the state documents can be summarised in the following table:

¹⁵⁶ Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of Russian Federation, 2013.

Table 1 - Table summarising the main thematic components of the Russian soft power practises within their state documents and public diplomacy rhetoric.

2003-2007	2008-2010	2011-2014
<p>The international system is important, albeit anachronistic, favouring the Western states.</p>	<p>The system of organisation is flawed and undeniably favouring the Western states</p>	<p>The system and the organisations associated with it are products of the West, but their power over the international community is waning. Therefore, alternative forms of organisation within the international community should be considered a priority for further cooperation at the regional and sub-regional levels.</p>
<p>Non-western powers, which, in the majority, would be more regionally relevant, need further recognition.</p>	<p>Regional powers are to have a certain mandate to break the international order to foster their growth and claim their rightful position within the global system.</p>	<p>Rule breaking and troublemaking within the international system is the right of considerable powers due to the inherent faulty nature of the global order.</p>
<p>Bonds forged during the Soviet period are as valid now as they were in the past.</p>	<p>It is time to form new alliances based on contemporary reality, less lingering in the past.</p>	<p>Alliances and support should be granted on the premise of regional growth and self-help for development.</p>

When it comes to Russian public diplomacy practices and discursive approach to international relations, both with direct and indirect reference to the regions of South America and Brazil,

visible continuity exists from its initial conception.¹⁵⁷ While organising the themes of the Russian emitted values in Table 1, one can easily observe that the shift that occurred along the three main pillars of narration is gradual and, in a sense, seems like a natural progression. Indeed, what could be referenced is the overall maturing, clarification, and intensification of the same ideas throughout the years. Thus, the initial lack of enthusiasm for international structures such as the UN becomes the sense of being trapped within a broken system; the timid acknowledgement of regional powers on the rise shifts to the creation of alternative alliances in direct opposition to the Western-focused systems; and the overall values shift towards a certain notion of international exceptionalism, allowing radical states to act without the permission of the global community. Importantly, it has to be stressed that the rhetoric seems to become more targeted and less universal, with direct references being made not only to the Latin American region but, more specifically, to Brazil itself. Indeed, it seems as if the ideas that were being projected towards Brazil between 2003 and 2014 not only evolved with reference to the politics of Russia but were also fine-tuned so that they resonate better with the intended audience.

Russia's received image in Brazil

2003-2007: the Back and Forth Era

Superpower in doubt

The Soviet legacy did not carry such a significant and negative connotation within the Brazilian context compared to the other states of the region; however, the previous “superpower of the Cold War period” status did not seem to bring particular benefits to the Russians either.¹⁵⁸ Indeed, Russian “good” intentions were doubted and treated with an appropriate distance and separation. When projected towards Brazil, Russian superstate status in the international sphere did not seem to resonate the same way as it did in Eastern Europe; the Latin American country seemed to be more cautious of the approaching of Russia. The Russian state was still, to a certain extent, seen as a foreign power trying to meddle with Brazilian affairs - much like the

¹⁵⁷ Franciso Ruiz Gonzalez, *The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study*, Instituto Espanol De Estudios Estrategicos, 2013, 11.

¹⁵⁸ Darya B. Kazarinova, Vasilisa B. Taisheva, *Perceptions Of Russia In The Global World Does Russian Education Policy Work?*, Russian Foundation Of Basic Research, 2017, 11.

US has done in Latin America in the past.¹⁵⁹ Their previous engagement and machinations as the Soviet Union in states all over the world (be it Vietnam, Cuba, or Afghanistan) were still present within the Brazilian discourse and affected the positioning of the Russian Federation's rapprochement towards the region.¹⁶⁰ These notions are best illustrated by President Lula's conscious approach to the matter of the alliance and siding with Russia within a regional context - one that was supposed to be where Russian soft power thrived. Even back at the very beginning of this first analysed period, Russia was only invited to the sidelines of crucial regional meetings organised by Brazil, such as but not limited to the MERCOSUR summit in Monte Video of 2003.¹⁶¹

Clearly, during this period, the anti-Western sentiments did not resonate as powerfully with the Brazilian establishment, as Russia was still seen as yet another self-centred global superpower that simply wanted to exploit Brazil for its own gain. Thus, the historical element of the Russian soft power strategy seemed to fail to deliver Brazil closer to the emitter state. In fact, it could be said that it alienated Brazil from fully committing to a potential deeper engagement with Russia. The introduction of BRIC was an important turning point during which the message of the

Troublemaking as a negative

Throughout this first analysed period, Brazil remained actively committed to the rest of the global world, subscribing to the neoliberal construction of the world and focusing on cooperation and mutual benefit on cooperation and mutual benefit.¹⁶² Indeed, the Latin American state still wanted to achieve the status of superpower through the existing neoliberal network - rather than being outside of it.¹⁶³ Brazil would even encourage other countries, even Russia, to remain active within the existing structures, such as the WTO, hoping it would boost

¹⁵⁹ Ferraz Lucas, *La Agencia Brasileña De Inteligencia Espiô Diplomáticos Extranjeros*, Folha Do Sao Paulo, 2013.

¹⁶⁰ Ivanov, I. *The New Russian Identity: Innovation And Continuity In Russian Foreign Policy*. *The Washington Quarterly*, 24(3), 5–13
Lula Y Dilma. *Diez Años De Gobiernos Posneoliberales En Brasil*

¹⁶¹ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, *Cronologia Da Política Externa Do Governo Lula (2003 – 2006)*, 2007, 27.

¹⁶² Ministério Do Meio Ambiente E Mudanças Do Clima, *Mma Participa De Conferência Sobre Mudanças Climáticas*, 05/12/2003, 122.

¹⁶³ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, *Resenha Ministério Das Relações Exteriores De Política Exterior Do Brasil Número 97, 2º Semestre De 2005*, 25.

their global position.¹⁶⁴ Despite Russia's critical discourse, cooperation within the international organisations would become the cornerstone of the Brazilian-Russian international partnership - presumably allowing the Latin American state to secure a stronger foothold within the Western world. Here, the Russian outsider image was not seen as a positive aspect of their narrative. Russia's dismay in international affairs, organised around the Western-centric axis, made them the odd one out, an outcast to the "civilised" world - the world where Brazil wanted to become a recognised insider.¹⁶⁵ This desire for belonging to the West could echo in Brazilian active participation in global accords such as the Kyoto Protocol, as well as in the public scolding of Russia for their neglectful approach to international issues such as climate change or global scientific cooperation.¹⁶⁶ Russia's troublemaking nature within the international community created a negative impression in Brazil, with the Latin American state showing "disappointments" and "doubts" about their future participation in joint international efforts, as seen in speeches by Lula.¹⁶⁷

To further comprehend the weakness of Russia's anti-establishment message in Brazil in the first analysed period, one may also note the instances when Brazil acknowledged the moments when Russia focused on cooperation within the international community.¹⁶⁸ Indeed, Brazil was first to praise Russia's direct and peaceful cooperation with the P5 members - be it in WTO, in environmental agreements, or in joint efforts of cultural exchange - as long as they remained within the established neoliberal agenda.¹⁶⁹

Russia, as an aspirational ally, was thus only attractive as long as it remained part of the international system and was content with its rules. Even when they were not beneficial to either actor, Brazil seemed to be a steadfast part of the neoliberal world and, to a certain extent,

¹⁶⁴ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Declaração Conjunta Sobre Os Resultados Das Conversações Oficiais Entre O Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, E O Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladimir V. Pútin (18/10/2005), 326.

¹⁶⁵ Ministério Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Discursos Do Presidente E Da Ministra Marina Silva No Lançamento Do Proinfa, 30/03/2004.

¹⁶⁶ Ministério Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Ministra Lamenta Decisão Da Rússia Sobre Protocolo De Kyoto, 02/12/2003.

¹⁶⁷ Emir Sader, *Lula Y Dilma: Diez Años De Políticas Posneoliberales En Brasil*, Traficantes De Sueños, 2014, 43.

¹⁶⁸ Sader, Emir. *Lula Y Dilma: Diez Años De Políticas Posneoliberales En Brasil*, Traficantes De Sueños, 2014, 65.

¹⁶⁹ Câmara Dos Deputados, Discurso Do Presidente Lula No Congresso Nacional, 2003.

aimed to minimise its interaction with a troublemaker like Russia - unless they were operating within the rules of the international agenda of organisations such as the UN.¹⁷⁰

Personal warming up

The increasing number of visits of the states' leaders, with a 2004 meeting in Brasilia and a 2005 one in Moscow, started a considerable change in the Brazilians' understanding of the Russian narrative.¹⁷¹ During these meetings and the two more following shortly after in 2006, the Brazilian side was able to notice the personal touch Russia was trying to deliver in their increased contacts.¹⁷²

Importantly, the documents that followed the meetings shifted the weight of the relationship from the one focused on internationality and global cooperation towards tighter direct kinship. Indeed, this can be seen in papers such as the Shared Declaration following the meeting of Lula and Putin, where among strategic points related to economy and trade, the leaders agreed on more “direct bilateral cooperation between the states”.¹⁷³ Crucially, this could be interpreted as one of the first times that the alternative status of Russia seems to have taken roots within the Brazilian establishment. The importance of this meeting was further emphasised in the key documents of Itamaraty, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and continues to be referenced both in official documents as well as during official visits as the grounding moment of recognition of the other international states as a considerable ally to the Brazilian state.¹⁷⁴

Doubting the Western states

This period already showed a change in Brazil's language regarding other Western leaders in comparison with the discourse in relation to Russia. Bush's presidency, and with it the general

¹⁷⁰ Ministério Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, *Estudos Da Onu Favorecem Expansão Da Plataforma Continental Brasileira*, 10/01/2007

¹⁷¹ Dobronravina Nikola And Victor Jiefets, *Beyond The Brics: Russian-Brazilian Relations Since The Collapse Of The Ussr*, Pensamento Propio, Coordinadora Regional De Investigaciones Económicas Y Sociales, 2019, 42

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 78.

¹⁷³ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, *Declaração Conjunta Sobre Os Resultados Das Conversações Oficiais Entre O Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, E O Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladimir V. Putin (18/10/2005)*, 32.

¹⁷⁴ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, *Declaração Conjunta - Iv Reunião Da Comissão Brasileiro-Russa De Alto Nível De Cooperação - Brasília, 4 De Abril De 2006 (4 De Abril De 2006) Resenha De Pol. Ext. Brasil, A. 17.33, N. 98, 1º Semestre 2006*

image of the West, became as much of a problem to the Brazilian establishment as previously the Russian trouble-making.¹⁷⁵ The questionable actions of the collective West in the then-ongoing Iraq War, reminding the Brazilian side of neocolonial practices, allowed for the narration of Russia's anti-Western perspective to seep in more deeply. The degrading image of the West, similar to the notions projected by the Russian side, could be seen in the rather increasing number of speeches from Lula regarding “concern” and “doubt” towards the US and its allies on the international stage.¹⁷⁶ What has to be remembered, however, is that even though Brazil started to share a closer outlook on the West than Russia, the government still strongly sided with the neoliberal institutions of the world order. Overall, throughout this first period, the received narration of Russia became a potential aid in establishing Brazil within the UN structures, such as the P5 of the Security Council and securing its recognisable position within the Western states. Therefore, one could see that the overall value of the Russian narrative, which was related to criticising the West alongside the organisations that came with them, was not fully recognised by Brazil’s establishment.

The image of Russia that was received was still highly contested within this initial period. Brazil has not managed to form a cohesive idea of what the governmental image of Russia is, both within the national and international politics, which could possibly suggest the overall weakness of the message and the means of communicating. However, it is here where the most crucial elements of the narration, namely superpower discourse, anti-establishment approach, and Western scepticism, started to take noticeable roots. These ideas and approaches managed to stand against the test of the Brazilian elite and seemed to resonate with the public - something that Russia was likely to take notice of. Overall, the Back and Forth Era of 2003-2007 resonated fully with the Brazilian audiences, likely due to its highly volatile and chaotic nature, as well as the lack of strongly focused messaging directly towards Brazil.

2008-2010: the Period of Intensification

The following period could be seen as a much more positive reception of Russia. During 2008-2010, most of Brazil's doubts about Russia were dispelled, thanks to the more personalised

¹⁷⁵ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Audiência Pública Da Comissão De Relações Exteriores E Defesa Nacional Do Senado Federal, Sobre As Relações Brasil-Bolívia Resenha De Pol. Ext. Brasil, A. 33, N. 98, 1º Semestre 2006, 15.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 17.

message and the more considerable role of the alternative to the West forums such as BRIC. This was likely to provide a sense that Russian values and discourses explored within their policy were not solely theoretical but also showed the relevant, tangible potential of giving a platform and providing the recognition that could not be won in the West at that time.

The rise of BRIC

The then-contemporary President Lula himself started to state in interviews that the BRIC (including the relations between its members, as well as with the rest of the international) were as politically important as G7 or G20—especially when faced with a crisis, as they hold “the potential to (re)shape the global economy”.¹⁷⁷ Brazil’s image of the Russian Federation had become the image of a partner and a foundational ally within the new international.

Much as could have been seen in the Russian emitted values, this era was primarily concerned with developing ideas planted during the previous four years. Focusing on their bilateral relation and the alternative to the West entailed by this relation, Brazil saw Russia as not only a key partner within strategic sectors of trade but also within politics, culture, and education, as stated in 2010 the memorandum of VI Comissão Intergovernmental Brasil Rússia de Cooperação Econômica, Comercial, Política e Tecnologia, covering topics ranging from shared standardisation practices within research and technology to increased cooperation within human resources of crucial scientific fields.¹⁷⁸ Ultimately, the narrative received here was one of accepting Russia as the main ally for Brazil outside of its regional sphere of influence.

It is important to note that BRIC is still an international organisation modelled after Western standards. However, in the progressivist movements under Lula, the idea was agency and ownership of one's own structures. BRIC was made by non-Western states for non-Western states as a glaring alternative to the establishment. BRIC was to be a force for alternative voices within the international community to be heard, creating an informal insider circle celebrated by Brazil.¹⁷⁹ Importantly, this period was signified by a certain disillusion with the international

¹⁷⁷ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Entrevista Exclusiva Concedida Por Escrito Pelo Presidente Da República, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, À Offshore Magazine, Da Noruega - Oslo - Noruega, 01/10/2009, 5.

¹⁷⁸ Centro Do Estudos Sudamericanos, Vi Comissão Intergovernmental Brasil-Rússia De Cooperação Econômica, Comercial, Política E Tecnológica – Vi Cic, Instituto De Relaciones Internacionales, 2010, 3.

¹⁷⁹Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Entrada Da África Do Sul No Bric 31/12/2010 Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil Número 107, 2º Semestre De 2010, 21.

system - the emphasis on justice within the international community has become evermore prominent.¹⁸⁰

Shared values

During this period, the Brazilian establishment started to find itself increasingly convinced of Russia's story regarding its defence of values as well as its unique identity within the global discourse. Indeed, this was one of the first times when one could observe the kinship between Brazil and Russia on a more identity-based level. This tendency was greatly emphasised in the speech presented by the Secretary of Strategic Affairs at the President's office, who described that the connection between Russia and Brazil could no longer be considered in a similar way to the many other allies of the Brazilian state, namely through the lens of "similiatries seen from the outside".¹⁸¹ In his view, echoed by President Lula later on, the states shared a certain "affinity of values" that could not go unnoticed.¹⁸² The aforementioned speeches were not the final examples of Brazil's affirmation of a new approach to values modelled after the Russian one. This shift was further amplified by the positive evaluation of Russia's then-contemporary participation in the advocacy of conservative values, as well as of Russia's (and the Soviet Union's) past positions as defenders against nazism and their "decisive role" in protecting what could be seen as important to both Brazil and Russia.¹⁸³ In many cases, such as Lula's speech during the commemoration of 180 years of Brazilian-Russian relations, the representatives of the states would specify that the two states were standing jointly as the global defenders against "ideologies of superiority and intolerance".¹⁸⁴ This notion can be considered especially important, as one can evidently see not only the changing understanding of the Russian Federation's narrative but also the shift in Brazil's own identity. Namely, Russia began to be

¹⁸⁰ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 Declaração Conjunta Do Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia 14/05/2010, 45.

¹⁸¹ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 "Ciclo De Palestras" Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) Palestra Do Ministro Celso Amorim No "Ciclo De Palestras" Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) - Brasília , 25/02/2010, 22.

¹⁸² Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 "Ciclo De Palestras" Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) Palestra Do Ministro Celso Amorim No "Ciclo De Palestras" Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) - Brasília , 25/02/2010, 43.

¹⁸³ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 Declaração Conjunta Do Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia 14/05/2010, 143

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 150.

seen as an ally not only within the international sphere (through aspects such as but not limited to the economic and political regional importance, the previous cooperation within the international organisations, or the growing standing of BRIC) but also in regard to their shared ideological and cultural values. The language used to describe Russia started to focus more on their “determination”, “courage”, and their mission to support other developing nations rather than the doubtful underpinning of their actions as it did in the previous period.¹⁸⁵

Overall, this period of Russia-Brazil interaction was particularly significant due to the considerable shift of values that could be observed. It could be said that Brazil’s own understanding of itself changed throughout its interaction with Russia. In their own discourse, one could see a further emphasis on Brazilian steadfastness against “foreign” ideologies and more declines in the preservation of the self.¹⁸⁶ In the previous period, one could observe the seeds of doubt being planted by Russian soft power discourse when it comes to the Western powers. Within this consecutive period, these notions could be seen to take form, with Brazil becoming ever so doubtful of the West and the neoliberal order. In the context of the global turmoil of this period, Brazil, a previously well-prospering country with ambitions to reach its superpower status through means similar to those proposed by the West, started to lean towards regionality and non-Western allies such as the ones grouped up within the BRIC - with Russia at the forefront. The image of Russia that emerges from this period is definitely positive; it is somewhat of a paragon of virtues, mostly the conservative ones, that stands with those who do not seem to have a strong place within the international community.

2011-2014: Mature Political Partnership

In this last period, Brazil's reception of Russia’s image seemed to shift and reach its more mature form, with solidified themes from the previous eras only becoming further established. While evaluating the response from state actors towards Russia, the tone of narration changed from its initial awe of the superpower status and its rebel attitude towards a more pragmatic response. Three main thematic categories were created from investigating this period, reflecting the Russian soft power capacities within Brazilian discourse, namely, (I) non-

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, 152.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid 156.

Western equal kinship, (II) trouble-making rationalised, and (III) following the alternative structures of international architecture.

Equal kinship

Starting in this analysed period, Russia was fully seen as an international power Brazil would like to be compared to, akin to other emergent states such as China and India, as well as regional partners such as Argentina.¹⁸⁷ Importantly, Russia, denoted by Lula's and Rousseff's governments as an "empire and a millenary civilisation" of great resilience, was considered aspirational, especially within international organisations.¹⁸⁸ Notably, this was also evident in nearly all fields of state activity - from international political standing, trade, and internal policies - Russia could be used to model one's behaviour and lessons.¹⁸⁹ Thus, the received image was no longer of a mentor state but rather a country whose position one could usurp should one exploit and understand its failings in detail.

This shows one of the major shifts in the Russian received image. Russia was not to be the point of comparison, evaluation, or reference, thanks to which Brazil aspires to and models its state after, simply by adjusting for location in Latin America and regional flavouring. The goal was not to be *like* Russia - it was to be *better* than Russia. Thus, it is important to stress how Brazil seemed to be out of the direct Russian influence and learned from the foreign states and started comparing itself more globally (further reference other states, especially regional rivals such as Argentina or Chile or states outside of BRICs like Mexico).¹⁹⁰ However, Russia remains a more valuable ally in the Brazilian narrative of non-Western superdom, even if their continuous ties may potentially damage Brazil itself.¹⁹¹

Emblematic of these ideas of outrunning Russia and the sense of competition with it became the shared aspiration related to the Olympic Games and the FIFA Championships. Spanning

¹⁸⁷ Erica Fraga, *Industria De Brasil Presenta Peor Desempeño Que El De Sus Competidores*, Folha De Sao Paulo, 25/07/2011

¹⁸⁸ Sader Emir, *Lula Y Dilma: Diez Años De Políticas Posneoliberales En Brasil*, Traficantes De Sueños, 2014, 45.

¹⁸⁹ Fabiano Maisonave, *Impuesto Más Alto Puede Frenar Inversión China*, Folha De Sao Paulo, 20/09/2011 And Carolina Matos And Maeli Prado, *Brasil Es El Más Lento Entre Los Brics Para Abrir Una Empresa*, Folha De Sao Paulo, 15/02/2012

¹⁹⁰ Erica Fraga, *Brasil Pierde Fondos Con Otros Países Emergentes*, Folha De Sao Paulo, 15/01/2013

¹⁹¹ Igor Gielow, *Brasil Admite Una Futura Negociación Con Rusia Sobre El Kaza De Quinta Generación*, Folha De Sao Paulo, 17/10/2013, 23.

both governments of Lula and Rousseff, Brazil sought both kinships with Russia, as a fellow organiser of the approximate Olympic Games, and rivalry, providing them with an opportunity to show on a global scale that Brazil was capable of outperforming Russia in a power showdown that was to be acknowledged on a global level. The trend of cooperation for the Olympic games was continued with Dilma Rousseff's government, as the cooperation "in Governance and Legislation Concerning the Olympic and Paralympic Games and FIFA World Cups" was put as the primary point of yet another bilateral agreement between states, followed by the material and strategic elements of the treaty.¹⁹² Nevertheless, it is indisputable that Russia's received image was that of a superpower, yet this notion was, as mentioned before, no longer based on admiration. Indeed, there existed a certain understanding that Russia and Brazil belong "in the group of high human development nations."¹⁹³

Interestingly, the shared conservative values were not as strongly received during that period as they had been in the past. This can be seen in how, in the vast section on "global governance, peace, and international cooperation", there is little to no mention of "shared values" as it was in the past.¹⁹⁴ Instead, the countries talk of "interests", "goals", and "shared plans".¹⁹⁵ Even with a discourse on the criticism of nearly all Western engagements and meddling within the international, the language focuses primarily on the

Russian troublemaking sympathy

In this last period, Brazil could be considered somewhat on the fence when it comes to Russian troublemaking. On one hand, the idea of Brazilian exceptionalism greatly resonated with the state and its officials. Indeed, this sense of manifested mission of Brazil towards not only its region but the global community as a whole could be seen in the words of both Lula and Rousseff.¹⁹⁶ What seemed to be particularly resonating for the Brazilian side was how Russia, despite their active criticism of the international system and continuous breaking of the rules,

¹⁹² Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Comunicado Conjunto Da Presidenta Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 111, 2º Semestre De 2012, 67.

¹⁹³ Ibid, 73.

¹⁹⁴ Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Comunicado Conjunto Da Presidenta Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 111, 2º Semestre De 2012, 14.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. 16.

¹⁹⁶ Thorsten Brenner, Brazil as a norm entrepreneur: the "Responsibility While Protecting" initiative, Global Public Policy Institute, 3.

remained at the forefront of essential humanitarian support. This could be seen in Russia's "fundamental role in managing to obtain a solution for the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal, and by having a firm position in the UN Security Council, (...) avoiding the possibility of an armed intervention at a time when that would have aggravated the humanitarian drama."¹⁹⁷ A similar way of being both a troublemaker and a participant within the international structure could be seen in President Rousseff's UN General Assembly speech, where she declared the Brazilian idea of changing one of the cornerstone ideas of the UN - responsibility to protect. Indeed, in her speech, President Rousseff mentioned that "Much is said about the responsibility to protect; yet we hear little about responsibility in protecting."¹⁹⁸ Overall, the Russian troublemaking was received somewhat positively, making it impetuous for the Brazilian side to start proposing drastic changes only a superpower could. In this sense, the discourse of superpowers being allowed to break rules was well-received.

Importantly, during this period, one can see how Brazil started to adopt language similar to Russia while talking about their intervention policies, granting itself a similar mandate to regulate its region, such as in the case of Venezuela.¹⁹⁹ The country's role back then was not only actively participating in shaping the global order but also to give out platforms to other countries - something that had been done by Russia towards Brazil in the not-so-distant past.

In a sense, Russia's image of a superpower was able to take root even in this very last period. Indeed, it was seen from the Brazilian side as a relevant ally of great international power. However, due to the considerable aspirational messages sent by Russia of developing one's own way, of disregarding the international order in the name of personal interest, and the certain exceptionality of non-Western states, in combination with the ongoing economic and political growth of Brazil with reference to other countries, Brazil stopped seeing itself as a state that had to be guided by Russia. On the contrary, possibly thanks to the discursive support from Russia, which encouraged Brazil to develop in spite of Western states, the South American country was able to realise its own potential.

¹⁹⁷ Eliane Cantanhede, "Defendemos el diálogo con los opositores en Venezuela", dice el canciller brasileño, *Filha de Sao Paulo*, 04/03/2014.

¹⁹⁸ Speech given by President Dilma Rousseff during the general debate, opening the 66th UN General Assembly, 21 September 2011, <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/11d-Pr-Dilma-Rousseff-openingof-the-66th-general-assembly.html>

¹⁹⁹ Eliane Cantanhede, "Defendemos el diálogo con los opositores en Venezuela", dice el canciller brasileño, *Filha de Sao Paulo*, 04/03/2014.

Comparison and contrast of the projected and received image

Approach to the West

In both the projected and the received image, one can evidently see the prominence of non-Western sentiments. Indeed, both sides started with a certain degree of antipathy towards Western states, with Russia leading the pair due to its historical animosity. What can evidently be seen is the overall growth of dissatisfaction towards the West with the maturing of the partnership between Russia and Brazil. However, as much as Russian efforts focused on fully making the West seem like a completely different group to the promoted ideas of regional developing power or non-Western superpower, Brazil retained some of its fondness towards the West. Although at the end of the last period, Brazil realised that it could not expect the West to represent its needs, it still retained cordial relations with major Western powers while simultaneously closing in on its relationship with Russia.

Approach to the international system

Operation within the international system remains a curious element of the interaction between the two states in terms of soft power. Although Russia seemed to radicalise between 2003-2014 in its approach towards various Western-centric forms of international architecture, the message did not seem to reach the Brazilian side as easily. Indeed, despite the growing discontent with how the global forums, such as but not limited to the UN, were one of the primary messages emitted by the Russian discourse, Brazil remained strongly associated with the pre-existing global world order. Only with time could one observe a stronger reliance on the alternative structures offered by the non-Western states, such as the BRICS forum. Yet, Brazil, just like Russia in the last analysed period, remained focused on reform rather than total abandonment of the international order. Overall, the message in this case seems to have resonated with the Brazilian audiences, but only as it has mellowed down throughout the years.

Troublemaking in the international

Breaking the rules (or reinterpreting them in their own favour, much as has been attributed to the US by Russia) was definitely one of the points of a certain rift between the emitted message

of Russia, which emphasised its global influence, and the received one in Brazil, which was more cautious and sceptical. Russia used this notion of trouble-making as an escape route within the failed, from their perspective, international order that needs fixing. Interestingly enough, only in the second analytical period was this notion possible to enshrine itself within the Brazilian perspective. Though Brazil would not commit to troublemaking itself within the international community on a large scale, it would start becoming more idle in situations that would require it to criticise another superpower, such as in the case of the Russian annexation of Crimea.

Status of Superpower

One particular difference that could be noted is that Brazil and its people saw itself not as aspirational to the position of Russia by standing next to it or replacing it; Brazil saw itself as the possible third way between the US and Russia. In a lot of ways, the admiration towards Russia was tied not to the values they present on their own but rather the status they possess - especially during the initial periods. One of the key elements of the narration that was seemingly omnipresent throughout the years in Russian public policy was the image of power and control over one's future and the possibility of carving one's destiny in spite of all oppressors.

An argument raised against the Russian soft power in Latin America has historically been that it's not specialised or it's not being actively reshaped to fit the needs of the region.²⁰⁰ These notions, however, do not seem to be fully supported by the gathered data. Indeed, Russia remained rigid at the core principles of its soft power ideals and yet was capable of producing more pronounced and directed narratives that were more likely to resonate with its audience. Overall, the themes and their success could be divided into individual periods and the following three tables: Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4. Evidently, one can see that Table 2 boasts the fewest successes for the soft power emitted at a time when Russia put little to no attention to the personalisation of the message and relied primarily on the more general approaches, both to Latin America and regional powers more universally. The shift through time seems quite pronounced, and with time and further specification of the message, Russia has managed to

²⁰⁰ Claudia González Marrero, Armando Chaguaceda, *Russia's Sharp Power in Latin America: Global Autocracy, Regional Influence*, *Gobierno y Analisis Politico*, 2019, 8 or Rutland Peter & Andrei Kazantsev, *The limits of Russia's 'soft power'*, *Journal of Political Power*, 9:3, 2016, 32.

score further partial and full implementation of the projected image within Brazil - which can be seen in Table 3 and Table 4.

Table 2 - Table evaluating the success of different projected values of Russia towards Brazil in Period I - 2003-2007

Theme	Russian projected message	Brazilian perspective	The success of the projection
International System	The international system is flawed and beneficial more to the Western states that established it rather than everyone as they were supposed to	The system is necessary for the state's growth and tool of achieving a global superpower	Not successful
Rule breaking	As the system was made against non-Western states, there exists a certain area	Trouble-making within the international community slows the progression of states towards achieving the status of a global power.	Not successful
Russia within the international	Superpower with a great legacy of the Soviet period and responsibility to the non-Western states as a leader.	International actors of great power could potentially meddle with Brazilian affairs.	Not successful
Western World	Even after the end of the Cold War, the Western world was incapable of accurately representing the needs of all.	The West should be seen as allies, although there should remain a healthy dose of doubt when approaching them.	Partially successful

<p>Alternative forms of organisations within the international</p>	<p>Secondary international architecture should exist in order to provide a platform and listening space for those who are not given ample space within the pre-existing international institutions.</p>	<p>Developing states deserve recognition as long as it does not interfere with their overall standing within the pre-existing neoliberal world order.</p>	<p>Successful</p>
---	---	---	-------------------

Table 3 - Table evaluating the success of different projected values of Russia towards Brazil in Period II - 2008-2010

Theme	Russian projected message	Brazilian perspective	Successful projection
International System	International systems are to be altered to more accurately depict the global community and to stop favouring Western states.	The system does not represent everyone equally, and therefore, there is a need to associate in alternative groupings.	Somewhat successful.
Rule breaking	Some states, such as regional powers, should be allowed to disrupt the international standards in order to secure their rightful place within the community.	The international system does not allow non-Western states to defend their values appropriately; therefore, a certain exceptionalism is in order.	Somewhat successful.
Russia within the international	Russia as the protector of the individual political ideals behind a state, giving each country a right to their own development.	Russia is a state with which Brazil can identify and share key values and ideals.	Successful.
Western World	Western states are self-interested and cannot be trusted to represent every state.	The Western states have fundamentally different values than the states associated with subgroups like BRIC.	Somewhat successful.

Table 4 - Table evaluating the success of different projected values of Russia towards Brazil in Period III- 2011-2014

Theme	Russian projected message	Brazilian perspective	Successful projection
International System	The international system is skewed towards the West, although it can and should be used to the advantage of non-Western states.	The international order is a necessary tool for projecting one's power, although one must remember to strive for continuous change within it.	Successful.
Rule breaking	Superpowers and regionally significant states are allowed to commit acts that normal states are not allowed to.	Superpowers, in the stride of greatness, are allowed to commit acts outside of the international status quo.	Successful.
Russia within the international	Russia serves as the "fishing rod" for other developing nations, supporting their development on a regional scale in a manner that is appropriate for them.	Russia should no longer be seen as an unachievable aspiration but rather as a partner and a healthy competition that allows Brazil to strive for further greatness.	Somewhat successful.

Reasoning for the success of narratives

Anti-western sentiment

What is crucially highlighted within the writing of Weber et al. is the notion that “attitude change will be more likely to result in a change in the international political environment when states target relevant political actors and when the message of the soft power campaign does not conflict with the target audience’s core material interests”.²⁰¹ This could not have been more vital in the understanding of soft power relations between Russian and Brazilian bilateral reality and why the anti-western narration of Russia has managed to fit within the discourse of the receiver so well. The message presented by the Russian soft power narration, in a lot of ways, fits into the larger narratives of progressivism and anti-colonial struggle. The narration presented by the Russian soft power suggests that non-Western states are not bound to constantly live off what the West offers them through hegemonic structures and relations, akin to the writings of Gramsci.²⁰² Importantly, the message includes understanding that the existing international structures, such as the UN, have been made to favour only the Western side of political reality. One possible reflection of this can be found in the *Anthropophagic Manifesto* by Oswald de Andrade, where the potential roots of the Brazilian inferiority complex can be seen.²⁰³ The Brazilian people, who were to “cannibalise” on the culture from the West, still remained thriving by generating their own interpretation of reality and combining both the Western and native perspectives. This notion, however, has also been seen as an inherent flaw of the Brazilian narration, that it always remains in relation to some other power and cultural context.²⁰⁴ Russian soft power and the narrations associated with it propose a potential alternative: Russian media and narration by Russians and all those who are willing to listen. Additionally, the narrative suggests an international standing where Brazil does not have to pander to Western tastes and, in a sense, a vicious cycle of self-orientalisation. On the contrary, the Russian message is to reclaim agency and control over one’s identity.

Within the scope of anti-western conceptualisation lies the refocusing of Latin American and Brazilian narratives and perspectives within the international context. An important aspect of

²⁰¹ Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. Taking Soft Power Seriously. *Comparative Strategy*. 2010. 412-431.

²⁰² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections From Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 43.

²⁰³ Bary, Leslie. “The Tropical Modernist As Literary Cannibal: Cultural Identity In Oswald De Andrade.” *Chasqui* 20, No. 2 (1991): 10–19.

²⁰⁴ Tosta, Antonio. (2011). Modern And Postcolonial?: Oswald De Andrade's Antropofagia And The Politics Of Labeling. *Romance Notes*. 51. 217-226.

Russian soft power remained engagement in the public and political affairs of the region. Indeed, Russia holds observer status in most international organisations in the Latin American region.²⁰⁵ This gives them a somewhat overseeing position, an agent who is actively engaged with the internal affairs of the region, not solely through their own perspective but centring the voices of the people. In a sense, it is a way of restoring agency and importance to Latin America and Brazil without interesting one's exploitative needs. Importantly, it lies in stark contrast with the alternative proposed by the overarching power of the US, which has, in a sense, contemporary "neglected the region" in favour of maintaining a stronger relationship with UE and fighting a multipolar war against both China and Russia.²⁰⁶

Responsiveness and directness of narration

Another reason for the success of Russian narratives within the Brazilian context was their promptness. As one looks at the communications between the two sides, there were little to no periods of information draught or prolonged periods of silence in which one could assume a certain degree of lacking interest or instrumentality of the relation between the two states. On the contrary, as the relationship intensified over the span of 10 years, the time between meetings and visits, whether during organised state-to-state meetings or larger summits within the BRIC framework, has drastically decreased.²⁰⁷ Moreover, once Russia located the particular message that was of interest to the Brazilian side and saw Brazil as a potential ally within the international community, it started to refer to the South American state at any given opportunity. Therefore, the success here could be traced back to the focus on the emitter that the Russian state started to exhibit as well as the continuous interaction on all levels, be it bilaterally or multilaterally, within Western and non-Western aligned organisations.

The focus of the practice

Importantly, the narrations and the discourse emitted within the international by Russia were greatly observant and specified in later years when it comes to Brazil. Indeed, the strength and effectiveness of the soft power practice in this case lies in the Russian capacity to focus on the initially seemingly unattractive conservative and illiberal values. Despite their initial lack of

²⁰⁵ M. Troyansky, O. Karpovich, A. Davydova, Russia's Latin American Policy: New Challenges And Threats, *International Affairs* (2022)

²⁰⁶ Sitenko, A. 2016. Latin American Vector In Russia's Foreign Policy: Identities And Interests In The Russian-Venezuelan Partnership. *Politics In Central Europe*, 12(1): 37–57. Doi:

²⁰⁷ Augusto César Dall'Agnol et al. The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil, *Military Review Online*, 2018, 3.

success, as evident in the primary period of the analysis, the Russian government did not follow a U-turn strategy or decided to mellow down the initial message behind their international presence. On the contrary, it is possible to say that Russia's commitment to values and the evident linking of actions and discourse allowed the Brazilian side to better understand Russian discourse and, thus, ultimately, support it on a global scale. This could be seen as an echo of Kroenig and McAdam, who highlighted the need for adjustment of the message in relation to the recipient and the possibility of self-changing in order to successfully project soft power.²⁰⁸

Moreover, a considerable number of soft power practices introduced by Russia in their global discourse, be it supporting regional development, questioning the international order, or suggesting change within the international, bear significant resemblance to the key notions of successful public diplomacy practices of Cull, namely listening, advocacy, and platform providing.²⁰⁹ This clarification over time of both the message and the form of message emitted might explain, to a certain extent, why the Russian projected image managed to fit well within the geographically distant context of Brazil.

Soft power effectiveness

The judgement of the effectiveness of a soft power policy or emission of values is that the state's international position is improved from the Brazilian perspective, per the writing of Feklyunina.²¹⁰ Although it would be almost impossible to say that the values of the Brazilian state have changed solely due to Russian influence, as has already been discussed in the limitations of this thesis, there exists a considerable link between the shift of values and perception occurring within the Brazilian elite mindset that falls similarly close to what Russia was attempting to project for a long time. Importantly, the link extends beyond just the discursive similarity, adding credibility to Russian sentences within the international. The symbolic change could be evident in one event, mentioned at the very beginning of this paper, namely the lack of direct opposition to the annexation of Crimea.²¹¹ Russia did not manage to gain the direct support of Brazil and boast with it like it had with Venezuela or Cuba. However,

²⁰⁸ Kroenig, Matthew & Mcadam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. *Taking Soft Power Seriously*. Comparative Strategy. 2010, 29.

²⁰⁹ Cull, N.J. *From Soft Power To Reputational Security: Rethinking Public Diplomacy And Cultural Diplomacy For A Dangerous Age*. Place Brand Public Dipl 18, 2022, 21.

²¹⁰ Valentina Feklyunina, 'Soft Power And Identity: Russia, Ukraine And The 'Russian World(S)', *European Journal Of International Relations*., 2015, 23.

²¹¹ Oliver Stuenkel, *Why Brazil Has Not Criticised Russia Over Crimea Executive Summary*, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014, 10.

moving a state of such standing as Brazil from a likely opposition to a position of ambivalence could be seen as a success of soft power.

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to answer the following research puzzle: why does Russia project soft power towards Latin American states such as Brazil despite having a small portfolio in this field limited to promoting conservative values and political support? Furthermore, it aimed to evaluate the answers to the following main research question: what was the nature of Russian soft power in Brazil between 2003 and 2014? Supporting research questions included: (I) How was the notion of soft power constructed in the Russian official discourse with reference to Latin America and Brazil specifically? (II) How were the narratives received by the Brazilians? (III) How successful can they be deemed? and (IV) how do narratives fit within the larger theoretical discourse on soft power?

As one examines the notion of official discourse with reference to Brazil, it can be evident that Russia initially paid little to no attention to using its soft power effectively in Latin America. In the beginning, the project lacked specificity and instead focused on the catch-all approach to the nations of the region. Only with time and appropriate attention given to it by state officials did it develop into more focused notions that more acutely resonate with the recipients, in this case, Brazil. The soft power of Russia was constructed along the main pillars of the anti-western agenda, especially in terms of international organisation and the image of a superpower that is providing a platform to regional powers and developing nations. Despite not being the focus of the Russian government within the initial analysed period between 2003-2010, the soft power practises and discourse emitted were clearly visible in statemen's speeches and cornerstone foreign policy documents.

The narratives received by the Brazilian side resonated with themes similar to those projected by Russia. However, what has to be stressed is that there is no clear one-to-one acceptance of the narratives, as throughout the discourse's interaction with the Brazilian identity, one can observe a certain level of adaptation and adjustment of the themes to the Latin American ground. Additionally, the reception of the notions projected by Russians has changed significantly throughout the examined time frame - with the most direct translation of narratives from one state to another being seen in the second period of 2008-2010.

Overall, the narrative and soft power project of Russia in Brazil could be seen as somewhat successful in the overall context. This notion of success could be considered in a certain trifecta

of accomplishments of the Russian state: (I) namely the successful adoption of a positive image of Russia in Brazil; (II) the diminishing significance of international organisations in favour of alternative forms of multilateral interaction such as BRICS; and (III) the limiting of international persecution of the rulebreaking within the international, which is most evidently seen in the Brazilian ambiguous reaction to the annexation of Crimea. However, it is important to stress that this positive approach is only applicable should one adopt a more holistic approach to the examined timeline, as the initial success rate, especially in the rather turbulent and chaotic first period, was somewhat limited.

The narratives that were exposed throughout the research echo important points in the theoretical debates over the value of non-traditional ideals of soft power. Indeed, through discontent with the international order, their evident anti-Western agenda, as well as pushing for the rulebreaking mandate being given to non-Western states (seemingly as a way of equalising opportunities among the members of the international), Russia's discursive practice exemplifies the academic important notion of conservative soft power - an idea previously hardly tackled by Nye's simple consideration of value attractiveness.

The thesis supports the idea that through the limited, western-centric, and neoliberal-supporting conceptualisation of soft power, the Russian capacity to exercise such power is being obscured. Bearing this in mind, there is a pressing need for a more nuanced understanding of soft power, particularly with regard to non-liberal agents such as Russia and Latin American states. Contemporary theories of soft power must be expanded beyond established boundaries to account for the many factors that contribute to a state's attractiveness on the global stage. While there is still much to be learned about Russia's role in Latin America and the effectiveness of its soft power strategy, the case study provided in this analysis can serve as a starting point for further research. In the case of Russian soft power between 2003-2014, change in attitudes can be quite evident - Brazil growing further suspicious of the US, more supportive of alternatives within the international community proposed by the Russian government, and the tightening of perceived values seem to fit to the overall message sent by the Russian side.

Although the study's design may have some implications about the effectiveness of soft power overall, it is still focused on a specific case study. It provides an amalgamated analytical framework that scholars could use to consider other states within the Russian sphere of influence (such as but not limited to post-Soviet states, Eastern European satellite states or

other countries in South America), generating a starting point for either a comparative study or a meta-analysis in larger samples. The thesis not only lays potential groundwork for further comparative study both within and outside of the region but also holds the promise of inspiring a new wave of research that challenges the existing norms and expands our understanding of soft power. What is particularly interesting is using the findings of this research and comparing them with potential data available on the influence of other important actors from the Brazilian perspective, such as but not limited to China, USA, or India, and seeing whether a certain "centripetal map" of soft power influences could be drawn.

Western scholars must challenge their reluctance to acknowledge the power of non-traditional soft power agents like Russia, as this perspective could significantly affect the future of the region. The field of soft power studies is at a crucial juncture where it must strive for greater inclusivity in order to understand the complex dynamics at play in the global arena. By broadening the definition of soft power, one can begin to dismantle the notion of Western superiority and recognise that other nations have distinct modes of influence and appeal. This understanding is not just important but vital for the propagation of discourse on non-liberal soft power giants such as Russia.

Having acknowledged that, one can potentially start to see the answer to the given research puzzle. Although the reasons why a state such as Russia projects soft power regions so geographically detached from them are bound to be multifaceted, one of the possible answers that emerge from the thesis is how, with a relatively limited cost, Russia was able to gain a considerable ally in values. For a state that was seen historically as the other, the troublemaker, or the rulebreaker within the international, to have a considerable power (both regionally and globally) back them in their approach, even to a certain extent, is a great boon to Russian standing. With more key players of the international system becoming more akin to Russia and their modus operandi, the less abnormal radical behaviours of Russia become within the international community, guaranteeing a lesser backlash for such paradigm-shifting behaviours like the annexation of Crimea.

The study of Russian soft power in Latin America highlights the importance of recognising soft power's plasticity and adaptability and how it can rely on seemingly opposing values to appeal to different audiences. The moderation that characterises Russian conservatism could be a key factor in its attractiveness to certain groups, and this should be taken seriously by those seeking to understand and influence global politics.

It is crucial to exercise caution when drawing conclusions about the nature and extent of soft power in different regions, especially those that have recently become a focus of Russian attention. The case of Russia and Latin America demands meticulous attention, and further research is necessary to fully comprehend the complexities at play. However, this analysis has successfully challenged the existing limited scholarly discourse, prompting a broader understanding of soft power beyond traditional norms. It has also highlighted the diverse elements of narration that contribute to a state's standing in different parts of the world. By embracing greater inclusivity in the study of soft power, we can strive for a more accurate depiction of the global political landscape.

Bibliography

1. Abhinav Dutta, *The Concept of Soft Power: A Critical Analysis*, International Affairs Forum, 2018.
2. Andis Kudors, *Russia's Soft Power Approach to Compatriots Policy*, Russian Analytical Digest 81, 2010.
3. Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. *Power in International Politics*. International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005).
4. Bary, Leslie. *The Tropical Modernist as Literary Cannibal: Cultural Identity in Oswald de Andrade*. Chasqui 20, no. 2, 1991
5. Beeson, Mark. *Can China lead?*, Third World Quarterly, 2013.
6. Bially Mattern Jane, *Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics*. Millennium, 2005
7. Bourdieu, Pierre. *Language and Symbolic Power*, Harvard University Press, 1993.
8. Cantanhede Eliane, *"Defendemos el diálogo con los opositores en Venezuela", dice el canciller brasileño*, Filha de Sao Paulo, 2014.
9. Chagas-Bastos Fabricio H., Marcela Franzoni. *The Dumb Giant Brazilian Foreign Policy under Jair Bolsonaro*, University of Copenhagen, 2019.
10. Cull, N.J. *From soft power to reputational security: rethinking public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy for a dangerous age*. Place Brand Public Dipl 18, 2022.
11. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Jarosław Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area, DGAPanalyse, 2012.
12. Demidov Andrei, *From Soft Power To Managed Chaos*. Geopolitical Journal, 2014.
12. Dall'Agnol Augusto César et al. *The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil*, Military Review Online, 2018
13. Dimitrova Antoaneta et al. *The Elements of Russia's Soft Power: Channels, Tools, and Actors Promoting Russian Influence in the Eastern Partnership Countries*, EU-Strat, 2017.
14. Dobronravin Nikola and Victor Jeifets, *Beyond the BRICS: Russian-Brazilian Relations since the collapse of the USSR*, Pensamento Propio, Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales, 2019.
15. Doesner James, Melissa Nissbelt, *The art of soft power A study of cultural diplomacy at the UN Office in Geneva*, King's College London, 2017.

16. Douglas Farah and Caitlyn Yates. *Great Power Competition in Latin America: A New Normal*. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 44, no. 2, 2020.
17. Efremenko, Dmitry, Anastasia Ponamareva, and Yury Nikulichev. *Russia's Semi-Soft Power*. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 25, no. 1, 2021.
18. Ferguson, Chaka. *The Strategic Use of Soft Balancing: The Normative Dimensions of the Chinese–Russian 'Strategic Partnership'*. Journal of Strategic Studies, 2012.
19. Ferraz Lucas, *La Agencia Brasileña de Inteligencia espió diplomáticos extranjeros*, Folha do Sao Paulo, 2013.
20. Ford Christopher A, Soft on 'Soft Power.'” The SAIS Review of International Affairs 32, no. 1, 2012.
21. Foucault, Michel, *Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed.* New York: Vintage Books, 1995.
22. Fraga Erica and Larisssa Guimaraes, *Brasil está avanzando lentamente en el índice de desarrollo humano*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2011.
23. Fraga Erica, *Brasil pierde fondos con otros países emergentes*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2013
24. Fraga Erica, *Industria de Brasil presenta peor desempeño que el de sus competidores*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2011.
25. Franciso Ruiz Gonzalez, *The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation: A Comparative Study*, Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos, 2013.
26. Fukuyama, Francis. “*The End of History?*” The National Interest, no. 16, 1989
27. Gerber Theodore P. and Jane Zavisca, *Does Russian Propaganda Work?*, Washington Quarterly 39(2), 2016.
28. Gielow, Igor, *Brasil admite una futura negociación con Rusia sobre el kaza de quinta generación*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2013.
29. Graham, Sarah Ellen. *Emotion and Public Diplomacy: Dispositions in International Communications, Dialogue, and Persuasion*. International Studies Review 16, 2014.
30. Gramsci Antonio, *Selections from Prison Notebooks*, New York: International Publishers, 1971.
31. Guzzini, S.. *The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis*. Millennium, 33(3), 2005.

32. Hayden, Craig, *Scope, Mechanism, and Outcome: Arguing Soft Power in the Context of Public Diplomacy*, Journal of International Relations and Development, 2015.
33. Hett Felix and Moshe Wien, *Between Principles and Pragmatism: Perspectives on the Ukraine Crisis from Brazil, India, China and South Africa*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015.
34. Horvath, Robert *The Reinvention of 'Traditional Values*, Nataliya Narotschnitskaya *Russia's Assault on Universal Human Rights'*, Europe-Asian Studies, 2016.
38. Huntington, Samuel P. "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3, 1993.
39. Ivanov, I, *The new Russian identity: Innovation and continuity in Russian foreign policy.*, The Washington Quarterly, 24(3), 2013.
40. Kazarinova Darya B., Vasilisa B. Taisheva, *Perceptions of Russia in the Global World Does Russian Education Policy Work?*, Russian Foundation of Basic Research, 2017.
41. Kearn DW, The hard truths about soft power. Journal of Political Power 4(1), 2011.
42. Kiseleva, Yulia. *Russia's Soft Power Discourse: Identity, Status and the Attraction of Power*. Politics, 35(3-4), 2015.
43. Kroenig, Matthew & McAdam, Melissa & Weber, Steven. *Taking Soft Power Seriously*. Comparative Strategy. 2010.
44. Krzywicka, Katarzyna, *Ameryka Łacińska i Rosja: między ideologią i pragmatyzmem*, Maria Skłodowska-Curie University, Lublin, 2006, 293.
45. Laidi Zaki, The BRICS Against the West?, Ceri Strategy Papers, 2011, 1-2.
46. Laurelle, Marlene, *Russia's Niche Soft Power Sources, Targets, and Channels of Influence*, IFRI, 2021.
47. Lee, KH, The conceptualization of country attractiveness: a review of research. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 82(4), 2016.
48. Leonard, Mark. *Diplomacy by Other Means*. Foreign Policy, 2002.
49. MacDonald, Stuart & Son, Dr & Singh, Professor. *Soft Power Today Measuring the Influences and Effects*, 2017.
50. Maisonnave Fabiano, *Impuesto más alto puede frenar inversión china*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2011.

51. Marrero, Claudia González Marrero, Armando Chaguaceda, *Russia's Sharp Power in Latin America: Global Autocracy, Regional Influence*, Gobierno y Analisis Politico, 2019.
52. Matos Carolina Matos and Maeli Prado, *Brasil es el más lento entre los BRICS para abrir una empresa*, Folha de Sao Paulo, 2012
53. McClory James, *The new persuaders II: A 2011 global ranking of soft power*, Institute For Government, 2010.
54. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Entrada Da África Do Sul No Bric 31/12/2010 Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil Número 107, 2º Semestre De 2010
55. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Audiência Pública Da Comissão De Relações Exteriores E Defesa Nacional Do Senado Federal, Sobre As Relações Brasil-Bolívia Resenha De Pol. Ext. Brasil, A. 33, N. 98, 1º Semestre 2006
56. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Comunicado Conjunto Da Presidenta Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 111, 2º Semestre De 2012
57. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, *Cronologia Da Política Externa Do Governo Lula (2003 – 2006)*, 2007.
58. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Declaração Conjunta - Iv Reunião Da Comissão Brasileiro-Russa De Alto Nível De Cooperação - Brasília, 4 De Abril De 2006 (4 De Abril De 2006) Resenha De Pol. Ext. Brasil, A. 33, N. 98, 1º Semestre 2006
59. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Declaração Conjunta Sobre Os Resultados Das Conversações Oficiais Entre O Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, E O Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladímir V. Pútín (18/10/2005)
60. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Declaração Conjunta Sobre Os Resultados Das Conversações Oficiais Entre O Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, E O Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia, Vladímir V. Pútín (18/10/2005) Punkt 11
61. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Detenção De Ativista Brasileira Do Greenpeace Na Rússia 01-10-2013 Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 113, 2º Semestre De 2013

62. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Discurso Durante Reunião Ampliada Com O Presidente Da Rússia, Dmitri Medvedev Discurso Do Presidente Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva Durante Reunião Ampliada Com O Presidente Da Rússia, Dmitri Medvedev - Moscou, Rússia – 14 De Maio De 2010
63. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Entrevista Exclusiva Concedida Por Escrito Pelo Presidente Da República, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, À Offshore Magazine, Da Noruega - Oslo - Noruega, 01/10/2009
64. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 Declaração Conjunta Do Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia 14/05/2010
65. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Resenha Ministério Das Relações Exteriores De Política Exterior Do Brasil Número 97, 2º Semestre De 2005
66. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores, Seminário “Os Brics E O Sistema De Solução De Controvérsias Da Omc” 09/10/2012 Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 111, 2º Semestre De 2012
67. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 “Ciclo De Palestras” Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) Palestra Do Ministro Celso Amorim No “Ciclo De Palestras” Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) - Brasília , 25/02/2010
68. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 “Ciclo De Palestras” Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) Palestra Do Ministro Celso Amorim No “Ciclo De Palestras” Na Secretaria De Assuntos Estratégicos Da Presidência Da República (Sae-Pr) - Brasília , 25/02/2010
69. Ministério Das Relações Exteriores Resenha De Política Exterior Do Brasil. Número 106, 1º Semestre De 2010 Declaração Conjunta Do Presidente Da República Federativa Do Brasil E Do Presidente Da Federação Da Rússia 14/05/2010
70. Ministerio Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Adesão Russa Dá Fôlego Ao Protocolo De Quioto, 21/10/2004
71. Ministerio Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Discursos Do Presidente E Da Ministra Marina Silva No Lançamento Do Proinfa, 30/03/2004

72. Ministerio Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Estudos Da Onu Favorecem Expansão Da Plataforma Continental Brasileira, 10/01/2007
73. Ministerio Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Ministra Lamenta Decisão Da Rússia Sobre Protocolo De Kyoto, 02/12/2003
74. Ministerio Do Meio Ambiente E Mudança Do Clima, Mma Participa De Conferência Sobre Mudanças Climáticas, 05/12/2003
75. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept Of The Russian Federation, 2000, Accessed 21.04.2023
76. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 2007.
77. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, The Foreign Policy Concept of Russian Federation, 20013.
78. Miskimmon A, O'Loughlin B, Roselle L (2013) Strategic Narratives, Communication Power and the New World Order. New York: Routledge.
79. Mroziwicz, Robert, Rafał Stemplowski (red.), *Dzieje Ameryki Łacińskiej*, Warszawa, 1979.
80. New York :Basic Books, 1990
81. Nye Joseph S. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004.
82. Nye Joseph S., *Think Again: Soft Power Foreign Policy* (February 2006)
83. Nye Joseph, *American Soft Power in the Age of Trump*, Project Syndicate, 2019
84. Nye Joseph, *Bound to Lead : the Changing Nature of American Power*. Basic Books, 1990.
85. Nye Joseph, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 2008.
86. Nye Joseph, *What China and Russia Don't Get About Soft Power*, Foreign Policy, 2013.
87. Nye, Joseph S. *Soft power: the evolution of a concept*, Journal of Political Power, 14:1, 2021.
88. Nye, Joseph, *Whatever Happened to Soft Power?*, Project Syndicate, 2022.
89. Nye, Joseph. *The Future of American Power Dominance and Decline in Perspective*. Foreign affairs (Council on Foreign Relations), 2010.
90. Nye, Joseph. *Transcript of witness testimony to the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and UK Influence*, 15 October, 2013.

91. Onuf Nicholas, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations*, 2013.
92. Pamment, J. *New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice (1st ed.)*. Routledge, 2012.
93. Pashentsev Evgeny N., *Strategic Communication of Russia in Latin America in Russia's Public Diplomacy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020.
94. Putnam Robert. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001. & Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C. *Modernization, cultural change, and Democracy The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
95. Robinson, Paul, *Russia's Emergence as an International Conservative Power*, *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 1, 2020.
96. Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon and Ben O'Loughlin 'Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power', *Media, War & Conflict* 7(1), 2014.
97. Rui Yang. *Soft Power and Higher Education: An Examination of China's Confucius Institutes. Globalisation. Societies and Education*. 2010.
98. RUSSIA'S "SOFT POWER" STRATEGY Jill Dougherty
99. russia's PuBliC diPlomaCy eFFort: what the kremlin is doing and why it's not working Katherine P. Avgerinos, 128
100. Russia's Sharp Power in Latin America, Global Autocracy, Regional Influence
101. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's interview with Newsweek, September 21, 2022,.
102. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Activity state programme, 2022.
103. Rutland Peter & Andrei Kazantsev, *The limits of Russia's 'soft power'*, *Journal of Political Power*, 9:3, 2016.
104. Sader Emir, *Lula y Dilma: Diez años de políticas posneoliberales en Brasil*, *Traficantes de Sueños*, 2014.
105. Said, Edward, *The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations*, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1996.
106. Sergunin, Alexander & Karabeshkin, Leonid. (2015). Understanding Russia's Soft Power Strategy. *Politics*. 35.

107. Serhan Yasmeeen. *A New U.N. Vote Shows Russia Isn't as Isolated as the West May Like to Think*. Times, 2022.
108. Sherr, James (2013) *Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion*: Brookings Institution Press, 12.
109. Simon Reich, & Lebow, Richard. *Good-Bye Hegemony!: Power and Influence in the Global System*. 2014. 35.
110. Sitenko, A. 2016. Latin American vector in Russia's Foreign Policy: Identities and interests in the Russian-Venezuelan partnership. *Politics in Central Europe*, 12(1): 37–57. DOI:
111. Soares De Lima, Maria Regina, and Mônica Hirst. *Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities*. *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 82, no. 1, 2006.
112. Stargardtner Gabriel. *Bolsonaro won't condemn Putin, says Brazil will remain neutral over the invasion*. Reuters, 2022.
113. Stuenkel Oliver, *Why Brazil has not criticised Russia over Crimea Executive summary*, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2014.
114. Szente-Varga, Mónica. *The Footprints of the Bear. Why does the Return of Russia to Latin America Matter?* *Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 2022.
115. Tafuro Abrosetti Eleonora, *The Charm of Anti-Westernism: Russia's Soft Power in Africa*, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2022.
116. Tai Nalon, Rousseff intercede por la activista brasileña detenida en Rusia, *Folha de Sao Paulo*, 11/10/2013
117. THE FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Approved by the President of the Russian Federation V.Putin June 28, 2000
118. Tosta, Antonio. (2011). Modern and Postcolonial?: Oswald de Andrade's Antropofagia and the Politics of Labeling. *Romance Notes*. 51. 217-226.
119. Troyansky M., O. Karpovich, A. Davydova, *Russia's Latin American Policy: New Challenges And Threats*, *International Affairs*, 2022.
120. Troyansky, O. Karpovich, A. Davydova, *Russia's Latin American Policy: New Challenges And Threats*, *International Affairs* (2022)

121. Umut YUKARUÇ, A Critical Approach to Soft Power, Institute of Social Sciences, (2017)
122. USC Centre on Public Policy, Soft Power 30 report, Portland, (2019), 43.
123. Valdir Bezerra, Brazil-Russia Positioning Within Brics: Global And National Perspectives, Saint-Petersburg State University, 23.
124. Valentina Feklyunina 'Soft Power and Identity: Russia, Ukraine and the 'Russian world(s)', European Journal of International Relations:, 2015.
125. Vuving Alexander, How Soft Power Works, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, (2009), 13
126. Wagnes, Jan-Phillip *The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations*, E-International Relations, 2014.
127. Wojciuk, Anna “Higher education as soft power in international relation” in Handbook of Cultural Security. Edgar Elgar, (2018): 343-360.
128. Yun, Seong-Hun. An Overdue Critical Look at Soft Power Measurement: The Construct Validity of the Soft Power 30 in Focus. (2018)
129. Хейфец В.Л. Место Латинской Америки в многополярном мире: взгляды и подходы российских ученых. Латинская Америка. М., 2021, № 5, сс. 50-68 [Jeifets V.L. Mesto Latinskoj Ameriki v mnogopolyarnom mire: vzglyady i podhody rossijskih uchenyh
130. Speech given by President Dilma Rousseff during the general debate, opening the 66th UN General Assembly, 21 September 2011, <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/11d-Pr-Dilma-Roussef-openingof-the-66th-general-assembly.html>