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A radical right lived ideology:
an in-depth case study of the ideology of Sinine Äratus

MA thesis

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Tartu 2024

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my mom and my brother who have been nothing but supportive, especially in these last three months. I am thankful to Henrik, who has inspired me intellectually and supported me in many ways. I am grateful to my Tartu Analytica friends who kept telling me that “it’s not a life project, just submit it already”. I am grateful to my acroyoga family, who made me laugh and fuelled me with adrenaline. I am thankful to Maarja and Helen, who helped me stay grounded during these last months, and I am thankful to all those friends who have been there for me during a stressful time.

Most of all, I would like to express special gratitude towards my supervisors, Eva Piirimäe and Louis Wierenga, who guided me in writing this thesis. I am also appreciative of the feedback that I got from Martin Mölder and to the members of Sinine Äratus who trusted me to explore their beliefs.

Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Word count of the thesis: 29 696 (excluding footnotes with reference to the quotes from the data).

Isabel Mari Jezierska, 15th January

Abstract

This thesis answered the research question “What is the nature and what are the core features of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?”. The decision to investigate the ideology of Sinine Äratus, a radical right youth organisation associated with the radical right Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, is multifaceted. Firstly, it serves as a compelling case for exploring the ideology of a radical right youth organisation, offering a rich source of information. Additionally, Sinine Äratus is situated in Eastern Europe, has global affiliations with other radical right organisations and activists, and has the potential to influence its mother party. To answer the research question, the author used dual-method approach. First, through theory-driven content analysis, the author demonstrated that the ideology of Sinine Äratus encompasses three key characteristics of radical right ideology: authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and nationalism, as defined by Elisabeth Carter. This confirmed that Sinine Äratus indeed is a radical right ideology. Second, the author employed data-driven qualitative content analysis along with morphological analysis to delve into the concepts, arguments connecting these concepts, and the underlying values that constitute the ideology of Sinine Äratus. The identified concepts were categorised into three themes: ethnonationalism, national independence, and environment. Using two different methods for studying the ideology of Sinine Äratus not only allowed the author to reconstruct the ideology of Sinine Äratus from two different perspectives but also allowed the author to demonstrate what researchers would fail to capture if they were to just use one method for studying an organisation’s ideology.

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Introduction

Radical right party family members are often identified via their radical right ideology (Beyme & Martin, 1985; Mudde, 2000, 2007, 2017). Given that the radical right parties are the “most studied party family in political science” (Mudde, 2017, p. 22), extensive research has been dedicated to understanding the ideology of these parties (Betz & Johnson., 2017; Bruter & Harrison, 2011; Carter, 2017; Minkenberg, 2015; Mudde, 2000, 2007, 2017; Pirrò, 2015, to name a few). Interestingly, even though the radical right parties and their common radical right ideology have been vastly studied, little has been said about the ideology of their affiliated youth organisations or other radical right groups.

This thesis focuses on a single case representing the phenomenon of radical right youth organisations. This study, in line with the definition of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin, 2003, p. 13), examines the ideology of Sinine Äratus. Specifically, this thesis has one overarching aim – it aims to understand the ideology of Sinine Äratus (SÄ) by evaluating to what extent Carter’s definition of radical right ideology applies to the ideology of SÄ and by explicating the morphology of the ideology of SÄ. A secondary goal is to compare the analytical gains that different kinds of methods provide (more specifically, the author wishes to compare a theory-driven qualitative content analysis and a data-driven qualitative content analysis combined with the morphological analysis). The dataset consists of written material from members of SÄ and interviews conducted with the most influential members of SÄ from the last six years. The analytical framework that sets the boundaries of qualitative content analysis is influenced by Michael Freeden’s understanding of the nature of ideologies and their structure.

Sinine Äratus is a compelling subject for researching a radical right youth organisation’s ideology because it is a radical right youth organisation from Eastern Europe, and because of its global affiliations and its potential influence on the mother party – the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (EKRE). In the first chapter, the author will set the ground for studying the ideology of Sinine Äratus in depth by outlining this study’s theoretical framework. In this chapter, the author will introduce their understanding of ideology and radical right ideology. They will also introduce SÄ as a subject of this study and provide reasons why studying the ideology of SÄ is worthwhile. At the end of this chapter, the author will introduce the research question and two subquestions of this thesis. In the second chapter, the author will present the

research design of this study. First, they will introduce their philosophical commitments that inform their research, and second, they will introduce their dataset and research methods and briefly describe the limitations of this thesis. In the third chapter, the author will answer the first subquestion of the thesis, namely, “To what extent does the ideology of Sinine Äratus correspond to Carter’s definition of radical right ideology?”. They will discuss authoritarianism, anti-democracy and nationalism in turn. In the fourth chapter, the author will answer the second subquestion of the thesis, namely, “What is the morphology of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?” by first looking at the theme of ethnonationalism, then at the theme of national independence and finally, at the theme of environment. In the discussion, the author will bring together answers presented in the previous two chapters and answer the research question, namely, “What is the nature and what are the core features of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?”. They will also briefly compare the two methods applied in this thesis, as comparing them helps reveal what one would fail to capture if one were only interested in either the overlap between ideologies or the specificities of the ideology.

Chapter One: Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical framework utilised in this study to analyse the ideology of Sinine Äratus, a radical right youth organisation in Estonia. Firstly, the author will define political ideologies in accordance with Michael Freeden and explore the differences between studying ideologies versus engaging in analytic political philosophy and the Skinnerian history of political thought. After clarifying the author's understanding of what ideologies are, the author will delve into Carter's conceptualisation of radical right ideology. This will lead to a discussion on why the ideologies of radical right youth organisations have not been studied, followed by introducing SÄ as a case study and explaining the rationale for studying this specific ideology and giving a brief overview of SÄ and its mother party, EKRE. The chapter highlights that SÄ is an information-rich case and an ideal case study for analysing a radical right youth organisation's ideology. Lastly, the author will introduce the research question and two sub-questions that will aid in answering the research question.

Political ideology and the study of political ideologies

What are political ideologies? In this thesis, the author follows Michael Freeden's conceptualisation of 'political ideology' (in this thesis referred to as 'ideology'). According to Freeden, ideologies are political phenomena which "operate at the intersection of language, power, and allegiances to public goals" (Freeden, 1999, p. 413). He argues that a

"political ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern (2) are held by significant groups (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community" (Freeden, 2003, p. 32).

By 'politics' Freeden means

"any human interaction that involves power transactions, the ranking and distribution of significant goods, the mobilization of support, the organization of stability as well as instability, the exercise of finality in decision-making for collectivities and the construction of – or resistance to – political plans and visions" (Freeden, 2022, p. 27).

Freeden also clarifies that ideologies "are complex combinations and clusters of political concepts in sustainable patterns" (Freeden, 2003, p. 51) and they have "a wide-ranging

structural arrangement that attributes decontested meanings to a range of mutually defining political concepts” (Freeden, 2003, p. 54).

Ideologies are social – they “are produced by, directed at, and consumed by groups” (Freeden, 1996, p. 22). Ideologies are symbolic devices that help us order the social world (Freeden, 2003, p. 42). There are various manifestations of the same ideological family, as various social groups have claimed an ideology and made it their own by making it fit their specific social context and various needs and goals. So, these ideologies are like maps for the social world, and various social groups, even in the same community, have different maps for this world. Ideologies consist of political concepts that are decontested within the network of shared meanings within the language community (Lundström & Poletti Lundström, 2023, p. 4). This means these maps of different ideological families share at least some concepts¹. However, these shared concepts have varying meanings as they are embedded in varying networks of concepts and their meanings.

It is important to allude to the similarities and differences between political ideology (as understood by Freedden), political philosophy (as understood by analytically trained political philosophers) and the history of political thought (as understood by its most recognised practitioners such as Quentin Skinner) and to the way political ideology and history of political thought are studied and political philosophy is done – as these insights clarify how the author approaches the morphological analysis of ideology. First, political ideology and political philosophy are **both forms of political thinking**, which are composed of “political concepts and their interrelationships” (Freedden, 1996, p. 27). An important difference between them is that political philosophy assumes a level of nuance and complexity that is fully accessible only to trained philosophers. In contrast, political ideology is, or at least aspires to be, **accessible to the general public** (Freedden, 1996, p. 41). Some social groups are more intellectual than others, which means that some lived ideologies are more complex than others. So, the difference between political ideology and political philosophy might seem to be, to some extent, arbitrary. Nevertheless, their audiences are still remarkably different (professional analytic political philosophers vs potential ideological intellectual sympathisers). Their aspirations and discourse ethical standards are different too – political philosophers aspire to

¹ They are the same concepts so far as the larger society considers them as being the same concepts. It is compatible with the pragmatist view that as these concepts have varying meanings, they are, in fact, different concepts, and so, actually people are mistaken that these are the same concepts (as there is nothing outside of language that makes one definition more true than the other).

argue with the strongest opponents and strongest readings of their opponent's arguments; ideological entrepreneurs and transmitters of ideologies, on the other hand, often simplify the arguments of their opponents² (i.e., by employing the strawman in their arguments or evoking emotions rather than relying simply on rational arguments). This is not surprising as the aim of political ideologies is "to wield influence on mass publics or at least on crucial political groupings, to steer public policy-making, and to gain control over political language" (Freeden, 2022, p. 33). Both analytic political philosophers doing a rational reconstruction of political philosophy³ and researchers studying political ideologies are interested in concepts, arguments, distinctions and justifications. However, the difference is that analytic philosophers are interested in **refining** them, making the philosophical position more coherent and analytically appealing to the academic audience. The study of political ideology is interested in **uncovering** the concepts, arguments, distinctions and justifications, but **not refining** them; otherwise, one forgets "what work ideologies are designed to perform" (Freeden, 2022, p. 34).

The study of political ideologies and the Skinnerian history of political thought are interested in the **actual** political thinking with their inconsistencies and incoherence. The main difference between them is that the study of political ideology is interested in "the elite, professional, and vernacular political thinking" (Freeden, 2015, p. 116), as **both laymen and intellectuals** can belong to social groups that hold ideologies,⁴. In contrast, the Skinnerian history of political thought (like analytic political philosophy) is interested in understanding individual philosophers' political thought (Freeden, 2022, p. 33). Furthermore, the Skinnerian history of political thought **takes the intentions** of the examined **individual philosophers** very seriously (Freeden, 1996, pp. 100-101). Morphological analysis of ideologies looks at how **social groups** understand political thought, and so **the intentions of specific individuals are not considered** in the morphological analysis of ideologies⁵. Nevertheless, given the authors' pragmatist commitments, the morphological approach takes seriously how the social groups as a whole

2 Freeden argues that some of the ideology transmitters "seek to emulate the techniques of political philosophers, but only up to the point where ideological messages will be comprehensible to intelligent citizens untrained in philosophical method" and so, "ideological promotion of debate depends on an elaborate mixture of rational and non-rational argument" (Freeden, 2003, p. 69).

3 Rorty distinguishes between historical reconstruction of philosophy (done, for example, by Skinner) and rational reconstruction of philosophy (done, for example, by Strawson) (Rorty, 1984, p. 49).

4 This position is compatible with the view that individual members of social groups can ascribe to the ideology of the social group they belong to.

5 The reasons for this can be found in Freeden (1996, pp 104-109).

make sense of their ideology. The task of the researcher studying the ideology is to interpret or make explicit their vocabulary, arguments and values to the academic audience.

Given all this, the study of ideologies encompasses “the enterprise of decoding, of identifying structures, contexts, and motives⁶ that are not readily visible” to outside observers and often even those holding these ideologies (Freeden, 2003, p. 11, 47). This study contributes to the study of the radical right ideology by applying and developing Freeden’s morphological analysis (with the author’s qualifications) to the reconstruction of a lived ideology. Such an approach allows for the researchers of radical right to understand the ideologies of radical right parties, organisations and groups in terms of how they themselves understand their ideologies, as their actions are influenced not by how researchers would make sense of their ideologies but by how they themselves make sense of the concepts, arguments and values of their ideologies. The author will elaborate on the morphological analysis of ideologies in the methods section of this thesis.

The radical right ideology

Before turning to the conceptualisation of the ‘radical right ideology, the author finds it vital to clarify what the term ‘right’ means. Namely, the term ‘right’ does not refer to the organisation’s economic position, as then, many radical right organisations would have to be described as left-leaning, and that would be oxymoronic. Rather, ‘right’ denotes the organisation’s non-egalitarian view, according to which inequalities among individuals are perceived as inherent and natural and thus, the government should not try to promote equality by intervening and mitigating the inequalities (Bobbio, 1994; Pirrò, 2023, p. 104). There are different ways in which ‘right’ has been conceptualised over time in social science literature; however, as scholars of radical right usually define ‘right’ in these terms, the author will not explore the intricacies of this debate. Now that it has been established what the term ‘right’ means in the context of radical right literature, it is pertinent to turn to the concept of ‘radical right ideology’.

First, it is imperative to remark on the usage of the concept of ‘radical right ideology’. Over the years, scholars have had differing views on the appropriate terms in describing the ideology

⁶ Motives ought not to be confused with intentions.

of these parties, organisations and movements. For example, some authors that this chapter mentions have used the following terms and their variations: ‘the ideology of the extreme right’/ ‘extreme right ideology’ (Bruter & Harrison, 2011; Carter, 2017; Klandermans & Mayer, 2005; Mudde, 2000), ‘the ideology of the far right’/ ‘far right ideology’ (Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; Miller-Idriss, 2018a; Pirrò & Róna, 2019), ‘right wing ideology’ (Miller-Idriss, 2018a), ‘extreme right-wing ideology’ (Klandermans & Mayer, 2005; Valk, 2013), ‘white supremacist ideology’/ ‘racist ideology’ (Kimmel, 2007), ‘the ideology of the radical right’/ ‘radical right ideology’ (Betz & Johnson, 2017; Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023), and ‘the ideology of populist radical right’/ ‘populist radical right ideology’ (Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2017; Pirrò, 2015). In this thesis, when referring to these articles, the author employs the terms ‘radical right’ and ‘radical right ideology’ even if the cited articles use other terms. The author assumes that even when scholars employ different terms, they still refer to the same concept. The reason for the assumption is that radical right scholars describe more or less “the same set of parties” (Givens, 2005, p. 20; Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1178) as well as their definitional content is similar enough (Carter, 2018).

It is a common trope in radical right literature that there is no consensus on the content of the concept of ‘radical right ideology’ and its variations (Carter, 2018, p. 157). However, Elisabeth Carter has demonstrated convincingly that, contrary to popular belief among scholars, a relative consensus has been achieved regarding what the radical right ideology means (Carter, 2018, p. 167). Indeed, earlier definitions of the concept varied considerably, but they “have become more parsimonious and more similar over the last 20 years” (Carter, 2018, p. 175). Based on the evaluation of 15 different definitions from prominent scholars like Mudde, Rydgren, Hainsworth, Givens, and Minkenberg, Carter proposes a minimal definition of radical right ideology as an ideology that encompasses **authoritarianism**, **anti-democracy** and **nationalism** (Carter, 2018, p. 174). The purpose of the minimal definition is not to describe the radical right parties and explain in depth their ideologies, but rather, its purpose is to provide a working definition for determining which parties belong to the radical right party family. It is crucial to note that Carter’s definition of radical right ideology does not correspond to any specific lived radical right ideology; rather, it is an abstraction of radical right ideology based on the similarities between lived radical right ideologies.

Carter conceptualises **authoritarianism** following Adorno et al.’s socio-psychological account of authoritarianism, according to which “authoritarian personality adheres to traditional values,

submits to authority and to the social norms that these authorities endorse, and condemns those who violate these norms and values” (Carter, 2018, p. 169). Indicators that an organisation’s ideology is authoritarian are if they want to “promote traditional social norms, values, morality, roles and lifestyles”, for example, by opposing abortion, gay rights, other minority or outgroup rights, protecting traditional family structures, and speaking of “the values of order, discipline and compliance, and the duty to respect, defer to, and show pride in the authorities and the state”, as well as promoting the organic vision of society that needs to be upheld by strong leadership (Carter, 2018, p. 169). **Anti-democracy** is conceptualised as any opposition to the procedural and/or substantial features of democracy (Carter, 2018, p. 170). Democracy is understood procedurally as “fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997, p. 434) and substantially as including “a belief in the value of diversity and hence tolerance of difference (i.e. pluralism), the principle of political equality (i.e. fundamental equality of human beings), and the valuing of, and respect for, civil and political freedoms” (Carter, 2018, p. 170). **Nationalism** can take various forms: nationalism can be holistic, exclusionary, holistic and exclusionary, or more open, either being less or more exclusionary and/or holistic. Holistic nationalism considers the nation to take “on independent attributes and which requires the individual to be subservient to the nation’s will and goals” (Carter, 2018, p. 172). Exclusionary nationalism defines “membership of the nation in ethnic terms” and advances “policies of exclusion or expulsion for non-members” (Carter, 2018, p. 172). Holistic and exclusionary nationalism exemplifies both characteristics. More open nationalism sees “the tie between the nation and its members” as less intense, as it places “more emphasis on individualism and individual liberties” (Carter, 2018, p. 172) and/or is “more open to non-members assimilating into the national community and to being able to acquire membership” (Carter, 2018, p. 172).

There are two things to note about this definition of radical right. First, such an understanding of radical right ideology and the definitions on which the latter is based have been developed with the aim of making sense of **the common ideology of the radical right party family** (Carter, 2018). As the introduction notes, examining their ideologies is the best way to identify radical right parties. So, making sense of the ideology of the radical right party family is necessary for developing a definition of the ‘radical right party family’, which helps identify the radical right parties. However, such an agenda does not facilitate an in-depth study of the various radical right ideologies. Moreover, only what is common to these parties’ ideologies

will be identified as radical right ideology. Inevitably, understanding ‘radical right ideology’ (built on these parties’ ideological commonalities) does not shed light on the lived ideologies (i.e., their ideological differences or specificities) held by specific radical right parties nor on **other non-party radical right organisations and movements**. Second, the ideology described by this definition uses concepts that do not belong to the ideologies of the parties they seek to describe. For example, most radical right parties deny that they are racists (as suggested by the broader definition of radical right ideology (Carter, 2018, pp. 172-173), and instead, they argue that they are ethnopluralists; furthermore, they sometimes even claim that people who do not ascribe to ethnopluralism are racists themselves (Havertz, 2023, pp. 8-9), i.e., a great deal of interpretative work is needed to establish the presence of certain beliefs in an ideology, as well as mediate between the vocabularies of actors and scholars.

One might argue, alongside Carter, that “although nearly all the definitions [of radical right ideology] originate from studies that focus exclusively on political parties, they can equally be applied to social movements, or to looser groups or networks of activists” (Carter, 2018, p. 162). Carter supports this claim by referring to Minkenberg’s article published in 2003. However, it is not clear why his article should support this claim as in this article, Minkenberg claims that since “there are no comprehensive and systematic studies of the non-party sector of the radical right in Western Europe”, his remarks in his paper “are only very tentative and assume nothing more than pointing out the direction that future research might take” (Minkenberg, 2003, p. 164). Moreover, the hypothesis that he is testing is whether, in established democracies, radical right movements tend to become less radical when radical right parties become entrenched (Minkenberg, 2003, p. 149). So, he is not examining whether definitions that originate from studies on radical right parties can be applied or whether it is useful to apply these definitions to other radical right organisations.

The research gap

When it comes to radical right youth, three questions have been, in one way or another, researched more in-depth: i) Why do young people support radical right parties, i.e., vote for radical right parties? (Gigengil et al., 2005; Miller-Idriss, 2018a; Siedler, 2011), ii) Why do young people support radical right ideologies or adopt radical right attitudes? (Gabriel, 2014; Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015; Miller-Idriss, 2018a; Mitrea et al., 2020; Uba & Bosi., 2022), and iii) Why do young people join radical right youth parties, organisations, movements or groups?

(Kimmel, 2007; Klandermans & Mayer, 2005; Krasteva, 2017; Miller-Idriss & Pilkington, 2017; Miller-Idriss, 2018a; Pirrò & Róna, 2019; Valk, 2013).

Like many other aspects⁷, the ideological part has often been overlooked in the few studies on radical right youth, unlike in the studies on radical right parties. One of the reasons why the ideology of radical right youth is understudied is that the research questions stated above, as well as the answers to these research questions, have not supported studying radical right youth organisations', movements' and groups' ideologies. In the case of Jobbik, for example, Pirrò & Róna have claimed that youth in Hungary have become ideologically aware through participation in party activities once they have already joined Jobbik's youth division Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat (Jobbik IT) (Pirrò & Róna, 2019, p. 620). In the case of Scandinavian neo-Nazis, the recruited youth see the entrance to the neo-Nazi scene as a masculine right of passage rather than a commitment to the radical right ideology (Kimmel, 2007, p. 216). In fact, Kimmel argues that a "white supremacist ideology played a relatively minor role" in the reasons for young people becoming neo-Nazis and leaving the neo-Nazi scene (Kimmel, 2007, p. 213). Finally, in the case of the Greek radical right like the Golden Dawn, youth engage with the radical right to seek a sense of belonging, security, and shelter from the "collapsing world" (Konsta & Lazaridis, 2014, p. 34). Since ideology is not a significant factor explaining why youth joined Jobbik's youth division in Hungary, why Scandinavian youth joined neo-Nazis, and why youth in Greece have engaged with radical right parties, it is not surprising that these organisations' ideologies are not discussed in depth in these articles.

Cas Mudde's edited volume, "Youth and The Extreme Right," published in 2014, which is probably the most comprehensive book on the radical right youth, also demonstrates that ideology is not at the centre of the studies on the radical right youth as it has been in the studies on the radical right party family. While the book aims to make sense of why youth join the radical right and develop radical right attitudes (Mudde, 2014, pp. 19-81), why they occasionally turn to violence (Mudde, 2014, pp. 83-162) and how such violence can be prevented (Mudde, 2014, pp. 163-245), it predominantly sidelines the exploration of radical

⁷ First, Timofejevs and Wierenga point to the fact that little is known about the radical right youth organisations associated with radical right parties, except for more extremist groups like the skinheads or neo-Nazis, more specifically, they claim that the transnational networks of radical right youth organisations are understudied (Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023, pp. 62-63). Second, Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2018a) argues that intellectual beliefs are held intellectually, and these beliefs are also embodied, so the embodiment of radical right beliefs and behaviours should be studied too. Moreover, Andrea L. P. Pirrò (2015) argues that radical right in post-communist countries have gotten too little attention.

right ideology (what the authors of this volume call radical right attitudes). Mudde's edited volume reflects the prevailing trend within the broader body of literature on radical right youth, where ideology is given relatively little attention, and its discussion mainly serves to elucidate violent behaviour and prejudiced attitudes.

The fact that research on the radical right youth has more often than not overlooked the ideological aspect of the radical right youth organisations, movements and groups is problematic as ideologies matter for understanding their political behaviour (Maynard, 2013, p. 302). If we are to understand the actions of people with different belief systems from us, like that of radical right youth, then we ought to make sense of their ideologies. Ideologies "order the social world, direct it towards certain activities, and legitimate or delegitimate its practices", and they create a "framework within which decisions can be taken and make sense" (Freedon, 2003, p. 10). Ideologies shape people's actions, and people use them to explain and defend their actions to themselves, their ideological associates, and those adhering to opposing ideologies. If we do not understand their ideologies, then an essential aspect of their action-making is misunderstood. For example, they might explain their actions to the public by writing articles or giving interviews. However, the public will not understand them as these explanations will not make sense to those who do not understand the broader framework in which their explanations are situated.

Case selection rationale

As radical right youth organisations and their lived ideologies are understudied (Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023; see the last subchapter), this research carves the way for studying the unexplored terrain. To do this, the author has decided to study the ideology of Sinine Āratus. The main reason for studying particularly the ideology of SĀ stems from the authors' interpretivist stance. SĀ is an information-rich case, and social science done in the interpretive paradigm seeks information-rich cases as these contribute to the holistic understanding of social phenomena (Patton, 2002, pp. 228-229). The idea is that the guiding principle for choosing a suitable case for an interpretive case study involves a preference for a case that offers substantial and relevant information regarding the studied topic (Patton, 2002, p. 230). In simpler terms, by doing an interpretive case study, one should choose a case for which one can feel that one "can learn the most" (Stake, 2005, p. 451). As the author wishes to understand better the lived ideologies of radical right youth organisations, SĀ is a compelling case for such

an endeavour. The author expected SÄ to be an information-rich case because of the prior works which have mentioned SÄ in various contexts: Saarts et al. (2021) mention SÄ in the context of EKRE and the context of the identitarian activists, Timofejevs & Wierenga (2023) study SÄ in relation to radical right youth organisations abroad, Wierenga (2017) also mentions SÄ in relation to EKRE, and Zúquete (2022) mentions SÄ in the context of the identitarian European alt-Right.

SÄ stands out as a youth organisation affiliated with a radical right party because of its association with the identitarian movement (Zúquete, 2022, p. 212; Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358). Zúquete defines identitarianism as a movement 1) which unites activists who believe that not anyone can be or become a European, 2) and who value Europe's ethnic diversity, which they argue must be preserved and protected, 3) and which considers European nations in the European continent to be united by a unique civilisation (Zúquete, 2022, p. 208). Zúquete elaborates on the views of the identitarian movement:

“Europeans constitute a biocultural community of flesh-and-blood human beings for whom heredity, genealogy, biology, and culture are dimensions of real human life, rather than free-floating, atomized individuals or particular iterations of an abstract, universal, atemporal humanity. Thus, European culture did not suddenly emerge ex nihilo and somehow persist through the ages; it has a vibrant, earthy vitality to it. The Identitarian message is clear: If you change the people, you irremediably change the culture—and Europe with it.” (Zúquete 2022, p. 209)

It is important to mention that in this thesis, the author will not explore the relation of SÄ to the identitarian movement nor their views; however, this thesis could serve as a grounding work for this future research endeavour.

There are many other reasons why the author has decided to study SÄ. First, Buščíková and Kitschelt (2009), Minkenberg (2013, 2017), Auers and Kasekamp (2015), and Pirrò (2015) have observed that the radical right parties in post-communist countries differ ideologically from Western radical right parties. Radical right parties in the region are ideologically more extreme (Minkenberg, 2017) and more anti-democratic (Trumm, 2018, p. 334); however, they “remain committed to the rules of parliamentary democracy” (Pirrò, 2015, p. 195). So, SÄ as a radical right organisation from Estonia – a Post-Communist country – and as a youth organisation rather than a party is an intriguing and significant case for studying a lived radical right ideology and for evaluating its alignment with Carter's definition of radical right

ideology. This in-depth analysis will allow for further comparative studies to rely on a nuanced understanding of the ideology of SÄ. Second, SÄ has a global significance. Researchers and journalists studying radical right elsewhere might be interested in this research since Sinine Äratus is affiliated with radical right organisations and people worldwide (Zúquete, 2022, p. 212; see also Wierenga, 2017; Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023). Moreover, SÄ has been organising international “Etnofutur” conferences for years where various international radical right activists and politicians have been gathering and networking⁸.

Third, a thorough understanding of Estonian radical right youth organisations’ ideology opens up potential new ways of understanding the mother party, EKRE, to which Sinine Äratus is linked. Many radical right parties are embedded in a network of related structures, such as youth organisations and newspapers, that extend their influence in society (Klandermans & Mayer, 2005). EKRE, too, is embedded in various networks like Uued Uudised (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 359) and its affiliated youth organisation SÄ. Moreover, SÄ is not only a youth organisation of EKRE, but many members of SÄ are also active members of EKRE⁹. The author agrees with Morris, who argues that “ideologies direct human praxis” and so they “require careful analytical evaluation” (Morris, 2009, p. 8) as understanding the ideologies that political actors adhere to can help us to understand their actions. Given this, understanding the ideology of SÄ can help further researchers make sense of the actions of SÄ members within the context of EKRE. Furthermore, youth organisations are known to serve “as the main channel of recruitment for political parties” (Bolin et al., 2022, p. 527). This is confirmed by Louis Wierenga, who argues that SÄ has been “very active in recruiting members for EKRE” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 10)¹⁰. Given this and the fact that they are active in “maintaining an online presence and fostering transnational connections with other nationalists”, Wierenga argues that “their ideas and positions should be taken into account in an assessment” of the mother party

8 Sinine Äratus has organised five Etnofutur conferences. Last year the speakers were Toni Jalonen, the leader of the Finnish nationalist and ethnofuturist cultural organisation Suunta; Paul Ray Ramsay, a famous American white nationalist; Olena Semenyaka, a representative of the Ukrainian National Corps – to mention a few controversial figures from the line-up. <https://www.facebook.com/events/centennial-hotel-tallinn/etnofutur-iv/2341703279264030/> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024].

9 In the year 2021, 22 members of SÄ were represented on the EKRE list in the municipal elections: <https://sininearatus.ee/2021/10/10/ekre-nimekirjas-kandideerib-22-sinise-aratuse-noort-ule-eesti/> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024]. Moreover, many members of SÄ currently represent EKRE in various positions: <https://sininearatus.ee/erakond/> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024]. Additionally, they maintain an active presence in Uued Uudised, a media outlet associated with EKRE.

10 In a private conversation, Louis Wierenga, an expert on the Baltic radical right, has said that “SÄ does attract a considerable amount of identitarian as well as right-wing conservative youths”, but they have become more “selective and not anyone can join: if a person is deemed to be pursuing a mainstream career in politics (determined by the board of SÄ), then they will be rejected”.

EKRE (Wierenga, 2017, p. 10). Wierenga has also demonstrated that SÄ has influenced EKRE's discourse by introducing the ideas of ethnofuturism, Intermarium and white identity to their vocabulary (Wierenga, 2017, pp. 10-12, 15-16). Saarts et al. agree that SÄ "plays an important ideological role" in EKRE (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358). They support this claim by emphasising that SÄ organises "the annual Etnofutur conference, which welcomes identitarian and far right activists across the world as speakers" and "the party's annual torch march on Estonian Independence Day, which usually attracts over a couple of thousand participants and involves political speeches by the party leaders" (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358).

Fourth, SÄ might represent the future political elite of EKRE. The reason for such expectation is that many European radical right parties have youth sections that have provided them with their leaders – parties like the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People's Party, the Finns Party, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Flemish Interest and the Northern League in Italy¹¹. As a matter of fact, Jaak Madison, EKRE's representative in the European Parliament, has a background in SÄ (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358). Additionally, as noted by Cynthia Miller-Idriss (2018b), scholarly consensus exists regarding the persistence of political attitudes that develop and form during adolescence and early adulthood. This would suggest that leading members of SÄ, like other politically engaged youth, even if they did not become the new political elite of EKRE, would continue to be involved in politics in the future as radical-right sympathisers, activists or politicians just like they are now. This expectation aligns with Timofejevs and Wierenga, who argue that leading members of SÄ "if they decide to continue their political careers in the mother parties," could be even expected to "serve as East European nodes in a wider pan-European network of" radical right parties as they have already in their youth established meaningful connections to radical right abroad (Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023, p. 73).

Fifth, by studying the ideology of SÄ, the author reckons Freeden's contention that the study of ideologies ought to take seriously the political thinking of social groups (compared to the thinking of political philosophers) (Freeden, 2013, p. 67). Finally, journalists in Estonia have made claims about the nature of the ideology of SÄ¹², and so have scholars – for example,

11 Reference is to the project on radical right youth of prominent scholars like Cas Mudde and Ann-Cathrine Jungar:

<https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/projects/makingtomorrowleaders/> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024].

12 An example: <https://ekspress.delfi.ee/artikkel/85780205/riigikogusse-valitud-ruuben-kaalepi-natslik-ja-antisemiitlik-jaljerada-on-lai-nagu-lasnamae-kanal> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024].

Saarts et al. claim that the SÄ is ideologically further to the right than the mother party (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358). However, as the ideology of SÄ has not been studied in depth, it begs the question: What is the ideology of SÄ?

Overview of the case

Before turning to the research question and the two subquestions of this thesis, the author will give an overview of SÄ and its mother party. SÄ is a youth organisation tied to the Conservative People's Party of Estonia [Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE], which is considered to be a populist radical right party (Mudde, 2017, p. 7; see also Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp et al., 2019; Petsinis, 2019). However, EKRE's members prefer to present themselves with the label 'national conservatives' (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 355). EKRE is known to embrace anti-immigration (Kasekamp et al., 2019, p. 53), Euroscepticism, traditional family values, anti-Russian rhetoric, anti-liberalism, populism (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 355), racism, anti-globalism and welfare chauvinism (Jakobson & Kasekamp, 2023, p. 116) among other things. This means that EKRE exhibits all three ideological aspects that describe populist radical right parties according to Mudde, namely, EKRE exhibits nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Jakobson & Kasekamp, 2023, p. 116). EKRE was established in 2012 when the People's Union of Estonia [Eestimaa Rahvaliid] and the nationalist pressure group Estonian Patriotic Movement [Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine] merged. By this time, the People's Union was taken over by Mart Helme, who became the leader of EKRE. The current leader is his son, Martin Helme. The newly formed party "vowed to protect the national interest, preserve Estonian traditions", and "offer a viable alternative to the voters" (Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019, p. 5). Electorally, EKRE has been a very successful party as in the 2019th parliamentary elections, EKRE scored the third-best result (17.9% of the total vote) (Jakobson et al., 2021) and was invited to be part of the government coalition and they joined (Mölder, 2020). In the 2023 parliamentary elections, EKRE scored the second-best result (16.1% of the total vote)¹³ compared to their first parliamentary elections in 2015 in which they participated and obtained 8% of the total vote and received just seven seats in the parliament (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 355).

In 2012, the same year EKRE was created, Sinine Äratus was established as a youth organisation of EKRE. SÄ is mostly known for its annual torchlight marches on the

¹³ Estonian official election results: <https://rk2023.valimised.ee/et/election-result/index.html> [last accessed on the 15th of January 2024].

Independence Day of Estonia, which they have been organising since 2014 (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358) and for the Etnofutur conferences that they have been organising since 2017. SÄ is considered a more radical organisation than its mother party EKRE (Saarts et al., 2021, p. 358). As an organisation, they are associated with various radical right groups from all around the world – youth organisation of the National Alliance from Latvia, Lithuanian National Youth Union from Lithuania, Finns Party Youth from Finland, Kryptis from Lithuania, the Conservative Political Action Coalition from the US, the Azov Battalion and the National Corps from Ukraine, the All-Polish Youth from Poland, Jobbik and Our Home-land Movement from Hungary, Lega Subelpena from Italy, the London Forum from the UK and many several other groups (Timofejevs & Wierenga, 2023, p. 71).

Research question and subquestions

Given the literature on the radical right, the author's understanding of the nature of ideology and their knowledge of SÄ, they have arrived at the following research question:

RQ: What is the nature, and what are the core features of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?

To answer this question, the author has to answer the following subquestions:

SQ1: To what extent does the ideology of Sinine Äratus correspond to Carter's definition of radical right ideology?

SQ2: What is the morphology of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?

The author will systematically explore the ideology of the Sinine Äratus by examining to what extent Sinine Äratus corresponds to Carter's definition of radical right ideology and by looking at how the ideology can be understood within its own terms. The first subquestion helps to answer the first part of the research question; namely, the subquestion will help uncover the relation of the ideology of SÄ as a lived ideology to the radical right ideology as an ideological abstraction. The second subquestion will help answer the second part of the research question; namely, it will help reconstruct the features that the ideology of SÄ is composed of and which can only be uncovered by the morphological analysis. These SQs also come from the authors' wish to test different methods for studying lived ideologies.

Chapter Two: Research Design

This chapter commences by elucidating the author's philosophical commitments, which have led the author to embrace interpretivism. Interpretivism affects the author's work, and thus, the author's methodology must be made explicit. After introducing the reasons for embracing interpretivism and rejecting positivism, the author will turn to the research design. First, the author will introduce the data, and then they will go on to talk about the research methods. In the methods section, the author will argue that the first subquestion is tackled by employing theory-driven qualitative content analysis and the second subquestion is tackled by employing data-driven qualitative content analysis. Subsequently, the author will introduce the morphological analysis, which provides the analytical framework for the data-driven qualitative content analysis.

Methodology

Before turning to the research design of this thesis, it is crucial to provide some context regarding the philosophical commitments that underpin this research. As a pragmatist, the author considers language as not mirroring the world, rather, "language use is woven into the fabric of daily life" (Schaffer, 2016, p. 27). So, the author considers words as tools rather than reflecting or mirroring the objective world separate from our language. Furthermore, the author accepts meaning holism, which means that the word's meaning stems from the web of meanings, i.e., its place in the language game. That is also true about political language. Like any other language, political language is holistic (Freedden, 1999, p. 414). This means that we cannot step outside the language, meaning we cannot *know* an "objective" reality separate from our language. The author also rejects correspondence theories of truth and embraces a pragmatist theory of truth, which turns away from understanding truth as something separate from us and our endeavours to understanding "truth as a function of the practices people engage in, and the commitments people make, when they solve problems, make assertions, or conduct scientific inquiry" (Capps, 2023). Thus, as a pragmatist, the author adopts an interpretivist stance on methodology in social science. By methodology, the author means the ontological and epistemological commitments and basic presuppositions about the aims of inquiry in social science research that inform and influence how social science research is done.

Furthermore, the author rejects positivism. Positivism is understood as the position that the social sciences' methods should be modelled on the natural sciences, which are seen to "provide a privileged, indeed the *only* access to neutrality and objectivity" (Hay, 2002, p. 67). The underlying premise behind positivism, which the author rejects, is that there is an "objective" reality "out there". According to this view, rigorous methodologies can liberate us from the influence of our language and culture, unveiling "pure" scientific knowledge that stands as an "objective" entity, untouched by the language and cultural nuances in which it is embedded. Contrary to the positivist view that knowledge is **discovered** is the view, which the author shares, that knowledge is "literally **created** as the investigation proceeds." (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 111).

However, it is important to mention that the author shares Colin Hay's belief in the value of methodological pluralism (Hay, 2002, p. 3), recognising that various research methods (that is also true about methods traditionally employed by positivists) have strengths and weaknesses and serve distinct purposes given their distinct features. Quantitative methods offer simplicity as they use statistical data, and their structured nature allows generalisability and facilitates replicability, allowing other researchers to validate the findings more easily. On the other hand, quantitative methods often oversimplify complex phenomena, potentially missing crucial nuances and context, and they also lack the flexibility necessary to explore new topics. Conversely, qualitative methods excel in exploring (new) complex phenomena and provide researchers with greater flexibility, enabling novel knowledge creation and mitigating path dependency concerns associated with quantitative methods (quantitative methods require that the existing literature predefines the research questions and hypotheses and this can hinder new knowledge creation in the area of research). However, qualitative methods are less generalisable and rely *more* heavily on researchers' interpretations, making them less replicable as systematically as quantitative methods. As an anti-positivist, the author believes that a researcher has to avoid the positivist pitfalls and explicitly acknowledge the limitations of the methods employed (Bevir & Blakely, 2018, p. 88). To avoid the positivist pitfalls, one has to embrace the idea that "meanings and actions are historically contingent and can only be understood in particular contexts" (Bevir & Blakely, 2018, p. 72). This means that one must avoid essentialist claims about the "nature" of things.

Data

The author analysed primary data to uncover the concepts, their meanings and their links to the ideology of SÄ. The empirical material consisted of various written content both in Estonian and English by influential members of SÄ who have been active in SÄ in the last six years, such as their programmes, articles, public speeches and manifestos published on their webpage and international media and webpages such as Counter-Currents, Mallard and American Renaissance, Uued Uudised, which is affiliated with their mother party EKRE, and Koiduaeg, which is a project of member of SÄ, and mainstream media such as ERR, Delfi and Postimees, and a book written by one member of SÄ¹⁴. All this primary data is from the years 2018 - 2023.

The author also conducted semi-structured interviews with the most influential members of SÄ. These interviews helped the author understand how the context informs the concepts, arguments and values SÄ seeks to further in the Estonian public discourse. The decision to conduct semi-structured interviews stemmed from the need for flexibility, enabling the author to unveil the internal morphology of SÄ's ideology that might have remained unnoticed by those unfamiliar with the radical right ideology and even the members of SÄ themselves. Furthermore, comparing the content of the written material with the content of the interviews enhanced the reliability of this research. In this thesis the author refers to the data in the footnotes by quoting the relevant sentence or passage in the original language and form.

Research methods

Semi-structured interviews

The interviews were semi-structured, and the questions were open-ended. There were three considerations why the author intended to conduct semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. First, the open-endedness gives “respondents latitude to articulate fully their responses” as this approach allows for capturing the contextual nuances within their responses (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the author endeavours to navigate the challenges associated with positivist research, with one of these challenges pertaining to the limitations of heavily structured interviews, which have the potential to overlook the dynamic and context-dependent nature of the beliefs and meanings

¹⁴ A list of the primary data can be found in the Appendix.

held by the individuals being interviewed (Bevir & Blakely., 2018, p. 96). Second, as this study explored the unknown (the ideology of SÄ as an example of an ideology of a radical right youth organisation), there was not much literature to draw on in constructing the questions. A semi-structured interview format better accommodated this fact. Thirdly, using open-ended questions had the possibility of empowering respondents to express the intricacies of their belief systems, reducing the likelihood of imposing the authors' preconceived notions upon them. This approach enhanced the validity of the responses, aligning well with the exploratory and in-depth nature of the research (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). However, it should be noted that this approach did make the subsequent coding and analysis process more challenging (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002, p. 674). Lastly, as the questions stemmed from the initial analysis based on the first coding of the written materials published by the members of SÄ, the semi-structured format allowed for the author, as the interviewer, to follow up on questions that might have remained unanswered in the initial analysis. With the participants' consent, audio recordings of live interviews were made. The live interviews lasted around 120 minutes. The interviewees signed a contract with the author that their answers will stay anonymous. Due to the interviewees' request, two of the four interviews were conducted as e-mail exchanges. The reason for conducting just four interviews was that the author intended to conduct interviews with just the most relevant actors of SÄ from the last six years (2018 - 2023). The interviews were conducted with people who had held leading positions within the SÄ during these years. The author also exchanged emails with the two members with whom they carried out live interviews to ask additional questions that arose during the writing of this thesis. Unfortunately, the other two respondents did not have time to respond to these additional questions.

Qualitative content analysis

The analysis of the ideology of SÄ employed a qualitative content analysis approach (QCA), which involved the examination of literature produced by SÄ and interviews conducted with key figures within the organisation. While QCA can be more time-consuming and labour-intensive compared to quantitative content analysis methods (such as the approach outlined by Budge et al., 1987), it is particularly well-suited for the exploratory objectives of this study. Quantitative content analysis often equates "the coding frequency of a given theme with its importance" (Schreier, 2014, p. 171). In contrast, QCA is able to capture rich and detailed information regarding the issues being investigated (Pirrò, 2015, p. 19), making it a valuable

tool for in-depth exploration and analysis of the ideology of SÄ. While it is true that human coding introduces an additional element of subjectivity into the process, it should not be perceived as “a failing needing to be eliminated but as an essential element of understanding” (Stake, 1995, p. 45). Simply put, when using QCA, the researcher reads carefully the selected material and presents the most important ideological features with illustrative quotations (Mudde, 2000, p. 22). Reading carefully and interpreting “is a response to the question ‘what does this mean?’” (Willig, 2013, p. 137) or more specifically, ‘what “has to hold in order for this utterance to make sense/be true/ be right for its producers and consumers?”’ (Freeden, 2003, p. 71). For conducting the coding process, the author used ATLAS.ti software. The reliability and validity of this study were ensured through activities recommended by Lincoln and Guba (1985), including prolonged immersion and engagement and repeatedly revising the coding frame.

Theory-driven qualitative content analysis

To answer **the first subquestion** [SQ1], ‘To what extent does the ideology of Sinine Äratus correspond to Carter’s definition of radical right ideology?’, the author used theory-driven QCA where the coding frame corresponded to Carter’s conceptualisation of radical right ideology where radical right ideology was understood as being composed of authoritarianism, anti-democracy and nationalism. The indicators of authoritarianism were 1) opposition to abortion, 2) opposition to gay rights and other minority or outgroup rights, 3) protecting the traditional family, 4) speaking about the authoritarian values and duties, and 5) promoting the organic vision of society. The indicators of anti-democracy were 1) being against free elections, and 2) being against civil liberties, or 1) not seeing value in diversity and not being tolerant of pluralism, 2) not accepting fundamental equality of human beings, and 3) not valuing and respecting civil and political freedoms. The indicator of nationalism is the presence of at least one form of nationalism, either 1) exclusionary nationalism, 2) holistic nationalism, or 3) open nationalism. These indicators served as the coding frame for the theory-driven QCA.

The use of theory-driven QCA allowed the author to make sense of the ideology of SÄ more directly within the paradigm of radical right research and helped evaluate the usefulness of Carter’s theory for studying radical right youth organisations’ ideologies such as that of SÄ. The process of answering the first SQ followed these two simple steps:

1. First, the coding frame was applied to all the data, both gathered from the written content of the members of SÄ as well as from interviews conducted with the most influential members of SÄ.
2. Second, the author interpreted the findings and reconstructed the ideology of SÄ as understood within the framework of Carter's understanding of radical right ideology.

Data-driven qualitative content analysis

To answer **the second subquestion** [SQ1], 'What is the morphology of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?', the author used data-driven QCA as this question drove the author to make sense of the ideology of SÄ understood within their own discourse; i.e., the ideology of SÄ was spelt out in terms of how they themselves understand their ideology. Theory-driven qualitative content analysis or theory-driven quantitative analysis with preset expectations would not enable such exploration, especially of an unexplored organisation's ideology. The QCA was influenced by Freeden's morphological analysis of ideologies, which allowed the author to make sense of the morphology of the ideology of SÄ, i.e., investigate the relationships between the concepts that compose this ideology. The author will elaborate on this in the next section titled "Morphological analysis of ideology". The fact that answering the SQ was data-driven does not mean that the coding process is done simply as *a posteriori*. The author's knowledge of radical right literature still heavily influenced the coding process. The coding process is a cyclical act (Saldana, 2013, p. 7), meaning that data and theory influenced the coding frame cyclically. To say that the QCA is data-driven¹⁵ means that the coding frame is developed within the coding process rather than created beforehand based on the prior relevant research without reference to the data. The existing literature on the radical right also heavily influenced the data analysis. The process of answering the SQ, influenced by Schreier (2012, p. 6), followed these steps:

1. First, the author selected published and public materials.
2. Second, the author started coding the data and developing a coding frame which was constantly developed and clarified in relation to the data. Each code corresponded to a concept of the ideology of SÄ.
3. Third, as the author had coded all the available data, they did the initial data interpretation.

¹⁵ Positivists would prefer the term 'inductive' or 'abductive' instead of 'data-driven'.

4. Fourth, the author conducted interviews based on the preliminary analysis and the resulting knowledge gaps.
5. Fifth, the author modified the coding frame and each code's definition with the help of interviews.
6. Sixth, the author carried out a second coding round on both their published materials and interviews to refine the codes and the coding.
7. Finally, the author interpreted the findings and reconstructed the ideology of SÄ.

Morphological analysis of ideology

The data-driven qualitative content analysis is framed by morphological analysis of ideology. As mentioned earlier, “ideologies are particular patterned clusters and configurations of political concepts” (Freeden, 1996, p. 54). Given this understanding of ideologies, Freeden has developed a morphological analysis of ideologies whose “main concern is to focus on political concepts and examine how they can illuminate an understanding” of an ideology (Freeden, 1996, p. 5). The purpose of morphological analysis “is to explain, to interpret, to decode, and to categorize” the concepts of an ideology (Freeden, 1996, p. 6). So, in the morphological study of ideologies, the political concept¹⁶ is at the centre of the analysis of an ideology. (Freeden, 1996, p. 48). Ideologies are built from concepts that are contested in the broader society, i.e., their meanings are disputed in a language community. However, within the ideology, these ‘essentially contested’ concepts become, at least for some time, decontested. Understanding the particular conceptual meanings of decontested concepts is best by studying the ideological morphology, i.e. by looking at the concepts’ “particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts” (Freeden, 1996, p. 4).

Freeden differentiates concepts assembling an ideology into three categories – core concepts, adjacent concepts, and peripheral concepts (Freeden, 1996, p. 159). In a nutshell, the idea is that political decontested concepts of a political ideology are located “on an axis between the centre and periphery” (Lundström & Poletti Lundström, 2023, p. 4) and the analysis of an

¹⁶ Freeden defines ‘political’ as a social conduct “[a]ppropriating the locus of ultimate decision-making, including determining, parcelling out, and regulating domains and boundaries of competence among social spheres”, “[d]istributing material and symbolic goods”, “[m]obilizing or withdrawing public support, “[o]rganizing the social complexities through which stability or conflict and disruption are manufactured”, “[p]olicy-making and option-selection for collectivities”, and “[w]ielding power (which cuts across the above five categories)” (Freeden, 2013, p. 34).

ideology uncovers where the concepts are more or less located on this axis. The core, adjacent and peripheral concepts become relevant to the morphological analysis of an ideology if the analysis is used to understand **mature ideological families** (ideological families like liberalism, conservatism, socialism and anarchism); these are the **abstractions** derived from the commonalities of lived ideologies that belong to a particular ideological family. **Lived ideologies** are the actual political thinking of social groups.

There are some things that this study did differently, as it studied a lived ideology rather than a mature ideology. First, this thesis looked at an ideology during a specific time frame (2018-2023) and investigated the ideology of a specific social group (SÄ). Second, as this study studied a lived ideology, it did not try to identify the location of the concepts on the centre-periphery-axis. Third, this study was not interested in looking at how concepts have evolved over time (though in specific cases, this can be noted) and in identifying concepts which have stayed constant over time, nor was it interested in comparing how various social groups have conceptualised the same concepts over time. The morphological analysis informed the thesis **by guiding the author to investigate how the concepts of the ideology are interlinked, examine the arguments connecting these concepts, and uncover the values informing these arguments.** This study took seriously Freeden's contention that "each concept within an ideology is crucially informed by the conceptual environment in which it is located" (Freeden, 2015, p. 171), and thus, the morphology of the ideology should be carefully investigated. In his theoretical work, Freeden is not explicit about what constitutes the networks between concepts of an ideology (in his terms, what constitutes the conceptual environment of the concepts of the ideology). However, in his application of the morphological analysis to specific lived ideologies¹⁷, it is clear that the conceptual environment is composed of **meanings of these concepts and the arguments linking these concepts and values underpinning these arguments.**

Limitations of this thesis

One of the limitations of this research, as a consequence of the method chosen, is that Sinine Äratus members are taken at their word. Since there is no proof to the contrary, the author assumed that Sinine Äratus members are honest in their published work and interviews.

¹⁷ In the fourth chapter of his book "Ideology Studies – New Advancements and Interpretations" (2022), Michael Freeden examines various lived ideologies by looking at how their concepts are interlinked by arguments.

Fortunately, this limitation was mitigated by comparing their statements from their published work with their statements from the interviews. This dual approach enhanced the scrutiny of their expressed views and contributed to the overall robustness of the study. Another limitation is that one might argue that the morphological analysis is developed primarily to analyse mature ideologies (Thérien, 2015, p. 344). At least, Freeden himself applies the morphological analysis most of the time to mature ideologies. This is highlighted by Thérien, who argues that “some dimensions of a morphological inquiry may be suitable only to particularly ‘evolved’, complex ideologies in which there is a degree of stability both in the core elements and in the range of adjacent concepts” (Thérien, 2015, p. 344). Nevertheless, as some scholars have demonstrated, the morphological analysis can be adjusted to the analysis of “lived” ideologies¹⁸, i.e., ideologies of certain organisations or institutions (e.g. Kajsiu, 2019; Buckle, 2013; Koval et al., 2022; Lees & Shepherd, 2018; Lubarda, 2021; Finlayson, 2021; and actually, Freeden himself too, even though it is not clear how exactly he conducts his analysis: Freeden, 2022¹⁹). Above, the author clarifies how they have adjusted the morphological analysis to suit this thesis and the research questions; namely, the author does not try to position the concepts of the ideology on the core-periphery axis. The third limitation of this study is that this thesis has omitted the emotional aspect of the ideology and focused only on its intellectual aspect. The author agrees that ideologies are “not wholly or merely rational or calculating, but highly, centrally, and often healthily emotional” (Freeden, 2003, p. 120). While it is important to acknowledge that ideologies are multifaceted and influenced by emotions, it should not be presumed that the study of ideologies becomes uninteresting or loses its significance when the emotional dimension is not directly examined. Nevertheless, looking at the emotional aspect of the ideology of SÄ would be an entrancing endeavour for further research. The fourth limitation is that the whole organisation is the unit of analysis. This means that the author looked for the ideology of SÄ rather than tried to understand the different political views of its various actors. The author accepts the possibility that there are different factions within SÄ, and so, when applicable, the author has brought out views that differ cardinally within the organisation as a whole. Finally, the analysis of an ideology carries with it the threat that the researcher applies their own normative preferences to the analysis. The author agrees with Freeden that this possibility has to be minimised. The author acknowledges that the idea of studying ideologies is not to evaluate their truth and falsehood but to interpret, decode and

¹⁸ The author has borrowed the term ‘lived ideologies’ from Katarina Pettersson (2017). But Freeden also uses this term in his book “Ideology studies: New Advances and Interpretations” (2022).

¹⁹ For example, Freeden has a chapter on Brexit in that book.

reconstruct their ideology (Freedden, 1996, p. 33, 2022, p. 26). This can be done by “appreciating an ideology’s internal relationships” (Freedden, 2015, p. 165) and not focusing on their truth or falsity nor on trying to make their arguments more logically coherent compared to how they are presented by those holding and transmitting the ideologies.

Chapter Three: Carter Applied to the Ideology of SÄ

Introduction

In this chapter, the author will answer the first SQ: ‘To what extent does the ideology of Sinine Äratus correspond to Carter’s definition of radical right ideology?’. The coding frame will correspond to Carter’s conceptualisation of radical right ideology, composed of authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary nationalism and the above specified indicators of these characteristics.

Is Sinine Äratus radical right?

Does SÄ exhibit the characteristics of radical right ideology, namely authoritarianism, anti-democracy and nationalism? The author will consider these characteristics in turn.

Is Sinine Äratus right-wing?

However, before turning to the radical right ideology, it is pertinent to look at whether the ideology of SÄ can even be considered to be right-wing. In the first chapter, the author defined ‘right’ as the non-egalitarian view, according to which inequalities among individuals are perceived as inherent and natural and thus, the government should not try to promote equality by intervening and mitigating the inequalities. As SÄ considers humans to be inherently unequal²⁰ and they think this inequality should be appreciated²¹, it seems that it makes sense to position SÄ as a right-wing organisation. SÄ agrees as they argue that “true nationalism must be Right-wing in the true, philosophical meaning of the term – it must recognize a hierarchy; it must recognize an elite”²².

Does the ideology of Sinine Äratus exhibit the component of authoritarianism?

Carter argues that an organisation’s ideology is authoritarian if the organisation promotes “traditional social norms, values, morality, roles and lifestyles”, for example, by opposing

20 “Ethnofuturism recognises the universal inequality of man — the differentiation. This does not mean discrimination, but the recognition of the facts of reality — every man is unequal to every other. Equality can only be contextual, not absolute.”

21 “Universal inequality is a factor that allows the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find his place in the organic whole.”

22 “And this is why true nationalism must be Right-wing in the true, philosophical meaning of the term – it must recognize a hierarchy; it must recognize an elite.”

abortion, gay rights, other minority or outgroup rights, protecting traditional family structures, and speaks of “the values of order, discipline and compliance, and the duty to respect, defer to, and show pride in the authorities and the state” as well as when it promotes the organic vision of society that needs to be upheld by strong leadership (Carter, 2018, p. 169). ‘The organic vision of society’ or ‘organicism’ is the idea that society functions as a complete, organised and homogeneous living being. As the state functions like an organism, it means that anyone born into the state or society has a fixed role to play in society; this, in turn, implies that society is hierarchical in nature (Mudde, 2000, p. 188). The idea of organicism is also related to the idea that the nation is part of the ecosystem. Lubarda writes that the idea of organicism views each human community and culture as unique and authentic as it forms “a common ecosystem or biome with other organic and inorganic elements, from which kinship ties with other creatures are inferred” (Lubarda, 2020, p. 724).

Before turning to the characteristics of authoritarianism detected in the ideology of SÄ, it is important to note that what matters is not the ideological reasoning behind these stances but simply the existence of these indicators. Now, the author will turn to the first indicator of authoritarianism detected in the ideology of SÄ, namely, the protection of the traditional family. In their program, SÄ declares that they aim to “defend Estonian identity, nation, language, culture and family from all the attempts to undermine, belittle, or alter them through revolutionary means”²³. One member argues that the “family is the foundation of society” and this family should be composed of “a man, a woman, and children”²⁴. They also say that it is important that “a man is a man and a woman is a woman”²⁵. Another member agrees that the identity of being a male or a female “are now under attack”²⁶ and they argue that a “return must also be made to an understanding of the family as cooperation between a man and a woman”²⁷ as being “a male or female, just as belonging to a nation, is inherent to being human”²⁸. They also emphasise the importance of motherhood to being a woman: a “mother and child should

23 “Kaitseme Eesti identiteeti, rahvust, keelt, kultuuri ja perekonda kõigi katsete eest neid õõnestada, alavääristada või revolutsioonilisel moel muuta.”

24 “On pere – mees, naine ja lapsed. Perekond on ühiskonna fundament.”

25 “Lihtsad asjad – mees on mees ja naine on naine.”

26 “A fundamental example is one’s identity as a male or female. Even these identities are now under attack. Nevertheless, authentic identity is based on the unchanging and eternal laws of Cosmos and it cannot be vanquished.”

27 “A return must also be made to an understanding of the family as cooperation between a man and a woman, rather than a place for competition.”

28 “Being a male or female, just as belonging to a nation, is inherent to being human.”

gain the highest value in society”²⁹. Another member is sceptical of the trans community. They say that as a conservative person, they “do not wish for anyone else to raise” their children, “especially during times when schools are teaching new family models or when there’s an uncle on TikTok dancing, claiming to be a woman”³⁰. When it comes to LGBT+ rights more broadly, their views on the community are not favouring; for example, one member writes that the LGBT movement “uses the weakness of” the institution of family “and feeds on the egoistic and materialistic interpretation of the family”³¹. Regarding the marriage equality, one member claims that the question on whether same sex couples could marry, is a matter which should be decided in a referendum, though they argue that they would prefer to see “marriage as a union between a man and a woman”³².

When it comes to abortion, then in their program, SÄ writes that Estonia needs more “effective and versatile counselling, along with other measures” that “must ensure a gradual reduction in domestic violence and abortions”³³. According to one member, the views on abortion differ among members of SÄ, but their personal view is that they are “not strongly against abortion” because they “see some benefits in it”³⁴. For example, “if there is a foetus with severe abnormalities, in that case, abortion should be available” because “forcing a child who needs 24/7 care for its entire short life to live in poverty is truly burdensome for the parent, and the benefit of that is small”³⁵. However, they do think that generally, “the conditions could be stricter” than they are now³⁶, although they also emphasise that since “the trend has been consistently declining since the 90s”, it is “not a topic that currently requires much attention”³⁷. Another member argues that they see abortion as immoral, but they think that banning abortion,

29 “A mother and child should gain the highest value in society.”

30 “Konservatiivse /.../ [inimesena] ma ei soovi, et keegi teine minu lapsi kasvataks, eriti veel ajal mil koolides uusi peremudeleid õpetatakse või TikTakis tantsib onu, kes arvab, et on naine.”

31 “The LGBT movement is not the main threat to the family. Rather, it just uses the weakness of this institution and feeds on the egoistic and materialistic interpretation of the family.”

32 See on just selline küsimus, kus minu meelest ei oleks tohtinud muudatusi teha (ega tohiks ka tulevikus neid kummaski suunas teha) ilma rahvahääletusega. Isiklike eelistuste poolest hääletaksin selle poolt, et abielu oleks mehe ja naise vaheline liit: näen selle sügavamat tähendust bioloogiliste sugupoolte vastandlikkuse sümbioosis spirituaalsel-psühholoogilisel tasandil.

33 “Tõhusam ja mitmekülgsem nõustamine ning muud meetmed peavad tagama pereväärtuste ja abortide järkjärgulise vähenemise.”

34 “Meil on kindlasti liikmeskonna seas eriarvamusi – nüüd jagan oma isiklikku arvamust –, et miks ma näiteks ei ole nii-öelda abordile tugevalt vastu on puhtalt selle pärast, et ma näen selles mõningaid kasutegureid.”

35 “Ja ma näen kasutegurit selles, et näiteks tõesti, kui on mingi tugeva väärtusega loode, siis sellisel juhul peaks abort olema kättesaadav. Noh, näiteks sundida vaesuses elama last, kes vajab 24/7 hoolekannet terve oma lühikese elu, ja see on tõesti koormav vanemale ja selle kasutegur on väike.”

36 “Üldiselt võiksid tingimused karmimad olla, kuid siin on inimeste enda suhtumine vast kõige efektiivsem piirang.”

37 “Õnneks on trend alates 90ndatest olnud pidevas languses, nii et minu jaoks pole tegu teemaga, mis hetkel erist tähelepanu nõuaks.”

“does not contribute to understanding or solving the reasons behind abortion”³⁸. They say that if one wants “the actual number of abortions to decrease”, then instead of “seeking political or legislative solutions to this issue”, the society ought to be taught how to “value life, family, and love”, as well as, “healthy and respectful relationships in culture”³⁹. They also emphasise that the “state should ensure that no child is left unborn solely due to the parents’ economic insecurity”⁴⁰ and that the “prohibition of abortion could be discussed if it were supported by the majority of women of childbearing age”⁴¹.

When it comes to the rights of Russian minority in Estonia, SÄ argue that the Russian people in Estonia with a citizenship should have the same rights that ethnic Estonian citizens have. One member emphasises that every “Estonian citizen, regardless of their ethnicity, has equal rights and responsibilities”⁴². Another member clarifies that any citizen should be able to vote and run for elections unless they have a criminal record⁴³. However, they do emphasise that people without a citizenship (like people with grey passport or just a residence permit) should not be eligible to vote even in the local elections: “only citizens should have the right to vote because local government should represent the Estonian state and stand equally for the protection of the interests of the citizenship as the central government”⁴⁴. They emphasise that “this issue has been particularly acute in Ida-Viru County, where it can indeed be argued that some municipalities represent interests other than those of the Estonian state and people”⁴⁵.

38 “Isiklikult pean aborti ebamoraalseks, kuid selle keelamist eksiteeks, mis ei aita kaasa aborti põhjuste mõistmisele ega lahendamisele.”

39 “Kuna ma tahan, et abortide arv päriselt väheneks, ei otsi ma sellele küsimusele poliitilisi ega seadusandlikke lahendusi, vaid tahaksin hoopis panustada elu ja sünni, perekonna ja armastuse, tervislike ja austavate suhete väärtustamisse kultuuris.”

40 “Muidugi peaks riik selle kõrval tagama, et ükski laps ei jääks sündimata ainuüksi vanemate majandusliku ebakindluse tõttu.”

41 “Abordi keelamist võiks arutada, kui seda pooldaks valdav osa sünnitamisealisi naisi.”

42 “Igal Eesti kodanikul on, oma rahvusele vaatamata, võrdsed õigused ja vastutused.”

43 “Kohalikel valimistel peaksid valima ainult kodanikud, sest kohalik omavalitsus peaks esindama Eesti riiki ja seisma kodanikkonna huvide kaitsel samavõrd kui riigi keskvõim. Eriti terav on see probleem olnud Ida-Virumaal, kus tõepoolest saab väita, et mõned omavalitsused esindavad mingeid muid, mitte Eesti riigi ja rahva huve. /.../ Ei [igati ei peaks olema Eestis õigus kandideerida Eesti kohalikel ja riigikogu valimistel] /.../ Võib seada ka muid piiranguid, näiteks vanusepiirang või piirang kriminaalkaristuse korral. Küll aga ei tohi sellised piirangud lähtuda päevapoliitilistest ega erakondlikest huvidest.”

44 “Kohalikel valimistel peaksid valima ainult kodanikud, sest kohalik omavalitsus peaks esindama Eesti riiki ja seisma kodanikkonna huvide kaitsel samavõrd kui riigi keskvõim.”

45 “Eriti terav on see probleem olnud Ida-Virumaal, kus tõepoolest saab väita, et mõned omavalitsused esindavad mingeid muid, mitte Eesti riigi ja rahva huve.”

SÄ shares the radical right organic vision of society, which is an important characteristic of authoritarianism as understood by Carter. SÄ argues that the organic principle “is expressed in the self-evidence of communality”⁴⁶. One member elaborates:

“For when you have roots, and the roots give you wings, you will look around and you see the whole, the organic unity of extended integral nationalism that unites your people, your land and all forms of life that belong to your land. It is incomprehensible for us how modern man can claim to feel close to a human of the same species from the far side of the planet but apart from an animal or tree from his own home forest.”⁴⁷

They also argue that an organic society is more desirable as it allows the society to be more dynamic:

“Universal inequality is a factor that allows the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find his place in the organic whole. This is the non-discrimination principle of the organic state, and it is opposed to mechanistic humanism, according to which the individual is considered a ‘cog in a machine’, replaceable according to the needs of some project of a superstate or the needs of the market. Total equality would mean a world without life. Freedom and hierarchy are not opposites, but prerequisites of one another. Without hierarchy, there is no freedom, and without freedom, there is no true hierarchy. A strong state is the main guarantee of freedom, while a weak one is a threat to it; what else is tyranny if not aggression from a spiritually weak state?”⁴⁸

Another member argues that next to the principle of the primacy of the nation is the principle of the body politic⁴⁹. The principle of the body politic is understood in the following way:

46 “On the individual level, the organic principle is related to that which is already inherent to man before he even understands that he is — namely, his essence. Collectively, it is expressed in the self-evidence of communality.”

47 “For when you have roots, and the roots give you wings, you will look around and you see the whole, the organic unity of extended integral nationalism that unites your people, your land and all forms of life that belong to your land. It is incomprehensible for us how modern man can claim to feel close to a human of the same species from the far side of the planet but apart from an animal or tree from his own home forest.”

48 “Universal inequality is a factor that allows the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find his place in the organic whole. This is the non-discrimination principle of the organic state, and it is opposed to mechanistic humanism, according to which the individual is considered a ‘cog in a machine’, replaceable according to the needs of some project of a superstate or the needs of the market. Total equality would mean a world without life. Freedom and hierarchy are not opposites, but prerequisites of one another. Without hierarchy, there is no freedom, and without freedom, there is no true hierarchy. A strong state is the main guarantee of freedom, while a weak one is a threat to it; what else is tyranny if not aggression from a spiritually weak state?”

49 “Rahva ülimuslikkuse ja rahvusliku keha kontseptsioon, ma arvan, need on kaks põhilist väärtust.”

“The people or nation and the state are one large organism with all its components working towards the greater goal of the healthy functioning of the organism. Each part of this national body has its value and should be appreciated.”⁵⁰

Furthermore, the idea of the ethnic spirit that SÄ often refers to is tied to their understanding of the nation as being rooted – among other things – when individual members of the nation have a connection to the land and nature⁵¹. One member in one of their speeches has said that by “connecting to our soil and our forefathers, we align ourselves with a universal order”, and to connect to these, one must respect “forests, lakes, mountains, and seas, for in them, we behold the souls of our forefathers”⁵². They also argue that the “protection of the Estonian living environment is inseparably linked to the defence of Estonian identity” as the protection of these two is “united in the same struggle against a rootless global urbanised dystopia”⁵³. The latter indicates that Estonian identity is inherently interlinked with the Estonian environment, as the Estonian nation can only survive when the environment in which the Estonian nation resides survives. Similar environmentalism is also shared by other radical right youth organisations in France and Italy (Krasteva, 2017, p. 168).

The author did not detect SÄ as “speaking of the values of order, discipline and compliance, and the duty to respect, defer to, and show pride in the authorities and the state” nor did they detect SÄ arguing that the organic society or state should be upheld by strong leadership (Carter, 2018, p. 169). However, Carter emphasises that different parties exhibit different characteristics, as some parties are more socially conventional than others (Carter, 2018, pp.169-170), so SÄ too can be considered to exhibit authoritarianism in their ideology as they exhibit some characteristics of authoritarianism, namely, they protect traditional family, marriage, the traditional understanding of what it is to be a man and woman, and they promote the organic vision of society.

50 “Rahvas või rahvus ja riik on üks suur organism, millel on kõik oma komponendid, kes nii-öelda töötavad selle suurema eesmärgi organismi tervisliku toimimise nimel. Igal osal sellest rahvuskehast on oma väärtus ja seda tulebki väärtustada.”

51 “See on rahvusriikluse hülgamise selge tulemus, kuna abstraktsed inimõigused või lääneliku väärtused ei asenda mitte kellegi etnilist identiteeti, mis on juurtega kodumaa mullas.”

52 “By connecting to our soil and our forefathers, we align ourselves with a universal order. We revere the forests, lakes, mountains, and seas, for in them, we behold the souls of our forefathers.”

53 “Eesti elukeskkonna kaitsmine on lahutamatu seotud eestluse kaitsmisega, neid ühendab üks ja sama võitlus juurtetu globaalse linnastunud düstopia vastu.”

Does the ideology of Sinine Äratus exhibit the component of anti-democracy?

Democracy can be understood procedurally as “fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly and association” (Collier & Levitsky, 1997, p. 434) and substantially as including “a belief in the value of diversity and hence tolerance of difference (i.e. pluralism), the principle of political equality (i.e. fundamental equality of human beings), and the valuing of, and respect for, civil and political freedoms” (Carter, 2018, p. 170). Carter conceptualises anti-democracy as any opposition to the procedural and/or substantial features of democracy (Carter, 2018, p. 170). Different radical right parties oppose different aspects of democracy; more often, they oppose substantial features, but some parties also oppose procedural features of democracy (Carter, 2018, p. 170).

SÄ is critical of what they call liberal democracy⁵⁴, but they are not against the procedural aspects of democracy⁵⁵. They argue that regular elections and “referendums, as well as mechanisms that “punish” politicians for unpopular decisions” are important aspects of democracy⁵⁶. One member even claims that the rule of law is part of Estonian “culture, and a sense of justice requires that laws be interpreted uniformly”⁵⁷. SÄ promote the idea of direct democracy⁵⁸ as it is seen as having the potential to revitalise democracy. One member argues that “the most important mechanism of direct democracy” in their opinion “is the citizens’ initiative: the opportunity to initiate referendums with a specific threshold of signatures from citizens” as this “ensures that the parties in the parliament cannot” arrange “a silent agreement to avoid public debate on certain national issues”⁵⁹. However, it is important to note, that one member is more sceptical of direct democracy as they do not see different factions “being able to compete on equal terms in the political arena, especially on issues related to values”⁶⁰.

54 “Liberaaldemokraatia on totalitaarne muuhulgas sel põhjusel, et see üritab väga selgelt piiritleda lubatavat mõttevahetust avalikus ruumis.”

55 “Siinjuures on Eesti demokraatlik riik, kus õigus riikliku tähtsusega küsimustes kaasa rääkida on igal kodanikul.”

56 “Tooksin välja kaks minu jaoks olulist tunnust: regulaarsed valimised ja/või hääletused, ning mehhanismid, mis “karistavad” poliitikuid ebapopulaarsete otsuste eest (viimased ei pea ega saagi olla absoluutsed).”

57 “Jah, see [õigusriiklus] on osa meie kultuurist ja õiglustunne nõuab, et seadusi tõlgendataks ühetaoliselt.”

58 “Me pooldame otsedemokraatiat, mis järgiks Eesti varasemate põhiseaduste vaimu ja võimaldaks rahvahääletusi olulisemate riigielu küsitluste üle ning ka nende algatamist.”

59 “Kõige olulisem otsedemokraatia mehhanism on minu arvates rahvaalgatus: võimalus algatada rahvahääletusi kindla künnise ületanud hulga kodanike allkirjadega. See tagab, et parlamendierakonnad ei saa moodustada kartelli (nt vaikivat kokkulepet vältida avalikku debatti mõne riigielu küsimuse üle).”

60 “Ma ei näe, et erinevad osapooled suudaksid poliitilisel areenil konkureerida võrdsetel alustel, eriti väärtusküsimuste puhul.”

SÄ support the right of religious freedom⁶¹ and the right of freedom of association⁶² as long as the organisation or their members publicly do not “present messages directed against the Estonian state, its independence”, or the idea of the nation-state⁶³. When it comes to freedom of speech, they even see this as one of their defining values. For example, SÄ opposed the European Union’s Copyright Directive because it posed a “severe threat of restricting freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, and self-expression”⁶⁴. They also oppose the Estonian Hate Speech Law as it is seen to create the conditions in which it might be difficult “to advocate for the collective interests of Estonians (and Finno-Ugric peoples, Europeans, and indigenous peoples worldwide)”⁶⁵. They argue that the paradigm, which sets the criteria of what is allowed and what is forbidden to talk about, is the liberal paradigm of the individual⁶⁶, which goes against the ethnonationalist view, which sees humans as being inherently part of the collective⁶⁷. One member argues that EKRE, the mother party of SÄ, is the only party which stands “strongly for freedom of speech, personal freedoms, and direct democracy”⁶⁸. However, the same person criticises EKRE for supporting freedom of speech in the political sphere but not internally within the party⁶⁹. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, SÄ members are free to disagree with one another. One example in which members’ views differ radically is their views on forest management. Moreover, in this chapter, the author demonstrated that the views of members on abortion vary. This demonstrates that SÄ values freedom of speech internally within their organisation. SÄ has also addressed other civil rights; for example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, in one of their public statements, they wrote “that the COVID

61 “Ei näe mingit põhjust selle keelamiseks, usk on inimese enda asi.”

62 “Igal eestlasel ja/või EV kodanikul peaks see õigus olema.”

63 “Probleem tekib siis, kui organisatsioonid või nende liikmed hakkavad avalikult esitama sõnumeid, mis on suunatud Eesti riigi, iseseisvuse või rahvusriikluse vastu.”

64 “Siin on tegemist sõnavabaduse, arvamusevabaduse ja eneseväljenduse rääge piiramise ohuga.”

65 “Kuid vihakõneseadus ei tee mind murelikuks lihtsalt vaba kodanikuna, vaid rahvuslasena, kelle jaoks on äärmiselt oluline säilitada võimalikult soodsad võimalused kõnelemaks eestlaste (ja soomeugrilaste, eurooplaste ning maailma põlisrahvaste) kollektiivsete huvide eest.”

66 “Liberaaldemokraatia on totalitaarne muuhulgas sel põhjusel, et see üritab väga selgelt piiritleda lubatavat mõttevahetust avalikus ruumis. Seal tulevad sellised terminid nagu poliitkorrektsus ja vihakõne. Oma etniliste huvide väljendamine läheb vihakõne alla, vähemalt kui seda teevad valged eurooplased. Juba mõte, et eurooplastel võivad oma riikides olla oma rahvuslikud huvid, on liberaaldemokraatlikus ühiskonnas meie ajastul sisuliselt vihakõne.”

67 “Vihakõneseadust ei ole võimalik vaadata lahus konkreetsete poliitiliste vaadete diskrimineerimisest, ega tänapäeva tühistamiskultuurist. Kõik need ideelised suunad on otseselt rahvusluse vastu: nende jaoks on üksikindiviid kõikide asjade mõõdupuu, inimese käsitlemine osana kollektiivsest grupidist on aga ohtlik või tuleks keelata.”

68 “Eestis ei ole teist erakonda, kes seisaks nii jõuliselt sõna- ja isikuvabaduste ning otsedemokraatia eest.”

69 “Muidugi sõnavabaduse puhul paistab see olevat vaid poliitiliste sõnumite tasandil – erakonna siseselt üritatakse seda vaigistada.”

restrictions dangerously approach mandatory vaccination, thereby jeopardising civil rights”⁷⁰. They elaborated:

“The implementation of such measures, according to the assessment of Sinine Äratus, is an extremely disproportionate infringement on civil rights. EKRE youth calls on the government to adhere to the constitution, which includes, among other things, everyone's right to freedom and personal inviolability, and prohibits subjecting anyone to medical or scientific experiments against their free will.”⁷¹

As demonstrated in this section, the mentioned civil and political freedoms are important values to SÄ; however, when it comes to the substantial features of democracy, then SÄ can be seen as being anti-democratic. Firstly, SÄ does not value the idea of human rights. The main reason for that is that according to one member human rights, as defined by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are not “just one set of rights among many, and crimes against humanity” are “not just one set of crimes among many”; instead, they are “essentially religious, dogmatic concepts” that define “the ultimate good and the ultimate evil”⁷². The problem, according to this member, is that these rights “ignore the rest of the layers of identity, whose uniqueness is the foundation of intra-species diversity”⁷³.

Secondly, when it comes to pluralism or diversity, it is clear that SÄ values the homogeneity of its nation – the Estonian nation ought to be composed of ethnic Estonians rather than people from various cultural and racial backgrounds, and Estonian citizens ought to be mainly ethnic Estonians. Their program states:

“Estonian citizenship must remain based on the right of blood, and the citizenry must largely overlap with the Estonian ethnic society. Citizenship is a privilege that not every non-Estonian living in Estonia should obtain. Similarly, we cannot allow the dilution

70 “EKRE noorteühendus Sinine Äratus leiab, et Kallase valitsuse kehtestatud koroonapiirangud jõuavad ohtlikult lähedale sundvaktsineerimisele ja seavad sellega ohtu kodanikuõigused.”

71 “Seesuguste meetmete rakendamine on Sinise Äratuse hinnangul äärmiselt ebaproportsionaalne kodanikuõiguste riive. EKRE noored kutsuvad valitsust üles kinni pidama põhiseadusest, mis sätestab muu hulgas igaühe õiguse vabadusele ja isikupuutumatussele ning keelab allutada kedagi vaba tahte vastaselt meditsiini- ega teaduskatsetele.”

72 “Inimõigused polnud ühed õigused paljude seast, inimsusevastased kuriteod polnud ühed kuriteod paljude seast, vaid neist said sisuliselt religioossed, dogmaatilised mõisted, mis defineerisid ülima hüve ja ülima kurjuse.”

73 “See on õõnes, sest see ignoreerib ülejäänud identiteedikihte, mille omanäolisus ongi liigisisese mitmekesisuse alus.”

or neglect of the term Estonian'. An Estonian cannot be someone lacking Estonian ancestors and roots in this land."⁷⁴

One reason why they are against multiculturalism stems from their claim that multiculturalism has led to higher crime rates: "multiculturalism and multi-ethnicity often imply higher crime rates in many places"⁷⁵. They say that real appreciation of diversity is not embracing multiculturalism within a society, but rather, the appreciation of diversity of cultures and humankind. They say that "Europeanness necessarily includes appreciation of the diversity of the many European nations and cultures"⁷⁶. All this implies that their understanding of diversity and pluralism is very different from how radical right scholars define these concepts. The author will elaborate on SÄ-s understanding of pluralism and diversity in the next chapter. But it is safe to claim, that SÄ is against pluralism and diversity as conceptualised by radical right scholars.

Thirdly, when it comes to the fundamental equality of human beings, then SÄ can be seen as not respecting this democratic value as they argue that "people are inevitably unequal in terms of their abilities and opportunities"⁷⁷ and so "every man is unequal to every other"⁷⁸. One member claims that "if everyone is equal, then no one is truly equal"⁷⁹. Thus, the state should not strive to ensure equality for everyone; instead, inequality is something that the state should embrace⁸⁰. However, one member does emphasise that even though not everyone is equal, it does not mean that people should be discriminated against; rather, they should be valued for

74 "Eesti kodakondsus peab jääma vereõigusel põhinevaks ning kodanikkond peab suurel määral kattuma eestlaskonnaga. Kodakondsus on privileeg, mida ei pea saama iga Eestis elav mitte-eestlane. Niisamuti ei saa me lubada sõna "eestlane" lahjendamist või mahasalgamist. Eestlane ei saa olla keegi, kellel puuduvad eesti esivanemad ja juured selles maas."

75 "Eesti on alati olnud maailma kontekstis väike kogukond, rahvusriik, mis põhineb usaldusel, erinevalt suurtest paljurahvuselistest impeeriumidest, kus on palju rohkem eri konflikte eri ühiskonnagruppide vahel, multikultuursus ja paljurahvuselisus tähendab väga paljudes kohtades kõrgemat kuritegevust ja need ühiskonnad on ajalooliselt olnud ka rohkem kontrolliühiskonnad."

76 "As defined by the multistage view of identity, Europeanness necessarily includes appreciation of the diversity of the many European nations and cultures. For this is the true diversity that is ironically more and more lacking from the world with the triumph of globalism, even as the globalist ideologists often use 'diversity' as their call sign."

77 "Sealjuures ei kritiseerinud nad üksnes majanduslikku ebavõrdsust kui sellist, mis teatud määral kuulub alati turumajanduse juurde, kuna inimesed on paratamatult oma võimete ja võimaluste poolest ebavõrdsed."

78 "This does not mean discrimination, but the recognition of the facts of reality — every man is unequal to every other."

79 "Teadagi, et kui kõik on võrdsed, siis ei ole keegi võrdne."

80 "Universal inequality is a factor that allows the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find his place in the organic whole. This is the non-discrimination principle of the organic state, and it is opposed to mechanistic humanism, according to which the individual is considered a 'cog in a machine', replaceable according to the needs of some project of a superstate or the needs of the market. Total equality would mean a world without life."

who they are⁸¹. All in all, given the fact that SÄ exhibits the substantial indicators of anti-democracy, SÄ can be seen to exhibit the anti-democratic component of radical right ideology as conceptualised by Carter.

Does the ideology of Sinine Äratus exhibit the component of nationalism?

Nationalism is considered a defining feature of radical right ideology next to authoritarianism and anti-democracy. However, nationalism can take various forms, which can be divided into many categories: nationalism can be holistic, exclusionary, holistic and exclusionary, or more open, either being less or more exclusionary or holistic. Exclusionary nationalism defines “membership of the nation in ethnic terms”, and advances “policies of exclusion or expulsion for non-members” (Carter, 2018, p. 172). Holistic nationalism considers the nation to take “on independent attributes and which requires the individual to be subservient to the nation’s will and goals” (Carter, 2018, p. 172). Exclusionary and holistic nationalism exemplifies both characteristics. More open nationalism sees “the tie between the nation and its members” as less intense, and it places “more emphasis on individualism and individual liberties” (Carter, 2018, p. 172) or it is “more open to non-members assimilating into the national community and to being able to acquire membership” (Carter, 2018, p. 172).

Given that SÄ is sceptical of the notion of ‘civic nationalism’⁸² as well as of ‘individualism’⁸³, it can be inferred that SÄ is not embracing an open understanding of nationalism. However, as SÄ embraces ethnonationalism, which embraces the principle of the primacy of the nation, according to which the most important thing is the endurance, continuity, and development of the ethnic nation through time⁸⁴, SÄ’s ideology definitely exhibits the characteristics of exclusionary nationalism. As mentioned earlier, with regard to pluralism, SÄ would want to

81 “Jah, selles mõttes tõepoolest, inimesed ei ole võrdsed oma võimetes, mõned inimesed on näiteks akadeemiliselt andekamad ja selle tõttu nad tõenäoliselt jõuavad ühiskonnas nii-öelda edasi rohkem ja võib-olla mõni teine inimene ei ole ja seetõttu tema võimalused ongi piiratud. Aga samas, see ei ole häbiasi, et kui sellest hoolimata, et ta oma annete tõttu või nende puudumise tõttu ei jõua väga kaugele, siis kui ta ikkagi ennast teostab, annab oma maksimumi, täiemahuliselt teostab oma potentsiaali, siis ma arvan, et see on igati õige, et kui sa tunned või sa tead, et sa võib-olla ei jõuagi kaugemale kui näiteks mingi vabrikutöoline, aga samas sa teed oma tööd hästi, sa teed seda kohusetundlikult, siis ma arvan, et see on igati kiiduväärne.”

82 “Nn kodanikurahvuslus on lihtsalt globalismi üks vorm, ja rahvusluse all me mõtleme siin ja edaspidi just etnilist rahvuslust.”

83 “Lisame sinna veel lokaalset individualismi, mis lõikab inimese ära oma perest, sugulastest, hõimlastest, naabritest ja rahvuskaslastest.”

84 “Ma arvan, et kõige lihtsamalt, kõige paremini saab kokku võtta rahvuse ülimuslikkusega, inglise keeles võiks öelda, et principle of the nation – ehk siis selle kestmine, püsimine, areng läbi aegade.”

see Estonian citizens colliding with ethnic Estonians⁸⁵. The anti-immigration policies they support are, by definition, based on the exclusion of non-members. For example, in their program, they write that they “firmly oppose new immigration pressures, regardless of the immigrant’s country of origin or cultural background”, and argue that “the repatriation of foreigners residing in Estonia” should be promoted⁸⁶.

When it comes to holistic nationalism, then SÄ also exhibits this characteristic; namely, it views a nation as “something more than a collection of citizens” as a “nation has a tradition unified by language, and that language is the only one capable of expressing that nation’s central myth”⁸⁷. A similar sentiment is expressed here:

“For a true nationalist the nation is always more than a sum of its people. Nationalism is inherently an essentialistic perspective. For us the nation is an essence in itself. Therefore, our vision of the future Europe is not to be built of just people – it will be built of ethnic spirits. We are against all forms of materialism. Nation for us is transcendent. Ethnic spirit is the ultimate political authority.”⁸⁸

One member in their speech has said that to “be an ethnonationalist means to love one’s nation and one’s country and prioritise their well-being and development above all else”⁸⁹. New members of SÄ also have to say a similar thing when giving an oath: “A true nationalist prioritises Estonia and Estonian identity above everything else. Wherever possible, Estonia comes first!”⁹⁰

Conclusion

First, the author demonstrated that SÄ can be considered to be a right-wing youth organisation as it exhibits the main characteristic of right-wing ideology (as theorised by radical right

85 “Eesti kodakondsus peab jääma vereõigusel põhinevaks ning kodanikkond peab suurel määral kattuma eestlaskonnaga. Kodakondsus on privileeg, mida ei pea saama iga Eestis elav mitte-eestlane. Niisamuti ei saa me lubada sõna “eestlane” lahjendamist või mahasalgamist. Eestlane ei saa olla keegi, kellel puuduvad eesti esivanemad ja juured selles maas.”

86 “Seisame kindlalt vastu uuele immigratsioonisurvele, olgu immigrantide lähteriik või kultuuriruum milline tahes, ning edendame Eestis elavate võõramaalaste tagasirännet.”

87 “What is a nation? A nation is always something more than a collection of citizens. A nation has a tradition unified by language, and that language is the only one capable of expressing that nation’s central myth.”

88 “For a true nationalist the nation is always more than a sum of its people. Nationalism is inherently an essentialistic perspective. For us the nation is an essence in itself. Therefore, our vision of the future Europe is not to be built of just people – it will be built of ethnic spirits. We are against all forms of materialism. Nation for us is transcendent. Ethnic spirit is the ultimate political authority.”

89 “Olla rahvuslane tähendab armastada oma rahvust ja oma riiki ning seada nende heaolu ja areng kõigest muust ettepoole.”

90 “Tõeline rahvuslane seab Eesti ja eestluse ettepoole kõigest. Kus iganes võimalik, Eesti ennekõike!”

scholars), namely that individuals are inherently unequal, and this is natural, and thus, the government should not try to promote equality by intervening and mitigating the inequalities. More importantly, the author demonstrated that SÄ exhibits the characteristics of radical right ideology, namely authoritarianism, anti-democracy and nationalism. The ideology of SÄ can be seen as authoritarian as it manifests the indicators of authoritarianism: SÄ thinks that the traditional family model needs to be protected; they emphasise a traditional understanding of what it means to be a man and a woman; they are sceptical of the LGBT+ community; and they support the organic vision of society, which sees the nation inherently linked to the local environment. The ideology of SÄ is also anti-democratic. Anti-democracy can be against the procedural and substantial aspects of democracy. SÄ is against the substantial aspects of democracy: they are sceptical of the value of the idea of human rights; they do not value pluralism of society, as they are sceptical of multiculturalism; and they do not value fundamental equality of human beings as they see people as inevitably unequal. Finally, the ideology of SÄ exhibits nationalism; more specifically, it exhibits both exclusionary and holistic nationalism. The exclusionary aspect of their nationalism manifests in the fact that ideally, they would see the majority of Estonian citizens being ethnic Estonians and they are strictly against immigration. The holistic aspect of their nationalism manifests in the fact that they see a nation as something bigger than the sum of its people and that individuals should prioritise the well-being of the nation above all else.

Chapter Four: The Morphology of the Ideology of SÄ

Introduction

In this chapter, the author will answer the second SQ: “What is the morphology of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?”. The chapter is divided into three sections according to the themes occurring in the ideology of SÄ – ethnonationalism, national independence and environment. Coincidentally, the guiding slogan of SÄ in their program is “*Eesti rahvus. Eesti loodus. Eesti iseseisvus.*” which can be translated as “Estonian nation. Estonian nature. Estonian independence.” which divides their programmatic themes into three similar categories. Such division of themes allows the author to look at the concepts that compose these themes systematically and to highlight the connections between the concepts of these separate themes that are not self-evident and that otherwise could go unnoticed.

Ideology of Sinine Äratus: ethnonationalism

In this subchapter, the author will introduce the concepts that fall under the theme of ethnonationalism. This theme could also be called ‘ethnofuturism’, as according to one reading of ‘ethnonationalism’, ‘ethnofuturism’ can be considered as a synonym for ‘ethnofuturism’. The author will expand on this in the final section of this subchapter. The theme of ethnonationalism encompasses the following concepts: ‘ethnonationalism’, ‘nation’, ‘ethnic identity’, ‘bioculture’, ‘tribal identity’, ‘tribe’, ‘Finno-Ugric tribe’, ‘Finno-Ugric identity’, ‘Finno-Ugric value framework’, ‘tribe members’, ‘genocide,’ ‘self-determination of peoples’, ‘national independence’, ‘indigenous nations’, ‘cultural diversity’, ‘humanism’, ‘human rights’, ‘layers of identity’, ‘nation-state’, ‘homeland’, ‘ethnic continuity’, ‘heritage’, ‘ethnic consciousness’, ‘ethnofuturism’, ‘ethnopluralism’, ‘cyclical nature of history’, ‘the decline of the West’, ‘rebirth of Europe’, ‘esoteric vanguard’, ‘national awakening’, ‘universal inequality of man’ and ‘body politic’. The author will introduce these concepts and the relations between these concepts in turn.

The concepts of ‘ethnonationalism’, ‘the principle of the nation’, ‘nation’, ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘bioculture’

As mentioned in the first chapter, the nature of political ideologies is that their concepts are decontested. This is to say that the conceptual environment fixes the meanings of the concepts

within the ideology that these concepts belong to⁹¹. The concept of ‘ethnonationalism’ [rahvuslus] – the central political concept of the ideology of SÄ – has a very distinct and fixed meaning to SÄ. According to SÄ, “nationality and ethnicity are /.../ one and the same”⁹², and “nation and ethnos are synonymous”⁹³. This means that if ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ are synonyms, then the term ‘ethnonationalism’ is an oxymoron. The same goes for the term ‘*etniline rahvuslus*’ in Estonian. SÄ explicitly acknowledges this issue, but they also recognise that not all of their audience accepts that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ (as well as ‘*ethnos*’ and ‘*rahvus*’) are synonyms. For example, they admit that some might consider ‘civic nationalism’ [‘*kodanikurahvuslus*’] to be a form of nationalism, though they dismiss it as “just one form of globalism”⁹⁴. Even though they acknowledge that not all agree with their equation of ‘nation’ with ‘ethnicity’, they say that “the idea of non-ethnic nationalism” is foreign to Estonians and Estonian language⁹⁵. By saying this, they indicate the misconception of those who disagree with them on the meaning of these two terms. Nevertheless, depending on the context, SÄ uses different terms to refer to their concept of ‘ethnonationalism’. So, on the one hand, when addressing Estonian politicians, SÄ uses the term ‘*etniline rahvuslus*’ [‘ethnonationalism’] to emphasise their potentially different understanding of nationalism from their audience. When addressing their Estonian readers both on their platforms and on Uued Uudised, SÄ uses the term ‘rahvuslus’ [‘nationalism’]. On the other hand, in English, when addressing their ideological sympathisers, SÄ uses the terms ‘nationalism’, ‘ethnonationalism’ and ‘ethnic nationalism’ interchangeably. Ethnonationalism encompasses what they call ‘the principle of the nation’ or the ‘principle of the primacy of the nation’ [‘*rahva ülimuslikkus*’], which means that the biggest value and the goal of ethnonationalism is “the endurance, continuity, and development of the ethnic nation through time”⁹⁶, or in other words, ‘ethnonationalism’ stipulates that the nation “should be a topic that should always be kept in mind in any political debates”⁹⁷.

91 This is consistent with the view that the meaning of these concepts within the ideology can change over time as the meaning of a concept is a constant pull and push between other concepts of that ideology, and an ideology is constantly shaped by various transmitters of the ideology.

92 “Nationality and ethnicity are of course one and the same; an attempt to separate them is to fail to understand the value of either.”

93 “For me, it is an ethnonationalist worldview, because in my part of the world, nation and ethnos are synonymous.”

94 “Nn kodanikurahvuslus on lihtsalt globalismi üks vorm, ja rahvusluse all me mõtleme siin ja edaspidi just etnilist rahvuslust.”

95 “Meie jaoks rahvus tähendab täiesti vaieldamatult just etnilist gruppi ja seega idee mitte-etnilisest rahvuslusest on eestlastele võõras.”

96 “Ma arvan, et kõige lihtsamalt, kõige paremini saab kokku võtta rahvuse ülimuslikkusega, inglise keeles võiks öelda, et principle of the nation – ehk siis selle kestmine, püsimine, areng läbi aegade.”

97 “Aga rahvuslus pigem vastab ühele küsimusele või annab ühe fookuse, et rahvus on see teema, mida tuleks alati mees pidada igasugustes poliitilistes vaidlustes.”

So far, what is clear is that their understanding of ‘ethnonationalism’ is essentially related to their understanding of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ [‘etnos’ and ‘rahvus’], which to them are synonyms. They claim that the term ‘nation’ [‘rahvus’] is “not a political or a social construct”⁹⁸ as some might have it. Nation cannot be deconstructed in their opinion; it is a metaphysical reality. ‘Nation’ is defined by what they see as three interrelated things: nation “is a biological fact” as it “consists of a certain ethnic group” and it is defined through “a clearly distinguishable language and culture”⁹⁹. They argue that on the one hand, ethnonationalism considers the nation-state as the ideal: “the national home of one ethnic group”¹⁰⁰; on the other hand, they consider ethnonationalism to be “a profound and mysterious passion”¹⁰¹, “transcendental and, therefore, spiritual, and at its core, an irrational disposition”¹⁰². Ethnonationalism recognises that the national or “the collective aspect of being human” is “a valuable attribute of the individual”¹⁰³, and it emphasises that a person has “a special relationship” to their “tribe and country”¹⁰⁴. SÄ calls this the ‘ethnic identity’ or ‘national identity’ [‘rahvusidentiteet’] or ‘tribal identity’ [‘hõimuidentiteet’]. The ethnic identity “has roots in the soil of the homeland”¹⁰⁵. The idea is that one has to have a spiritual connection to the land and its people to connect to one’s ethnic identity. The ethnic identity is closely tied to the local: the community and the land. One member writes that the village and the city are important in forming an ethnic identity:

“A traditional village in the old times was a microcosm of the whole nation, and a model of our collective values and traditions. In such a village we saw the close-knit relationships, mutual support, and shared customs and rituals that define us as a people, for it is here that our traditions and customs are lived out in everyday life. It is here that our relationships and connections are forged, and where our values are tested and

98 “Nationalism is not a political or social construct.”

99 “Rahvus on minu jaoks paar asja – ta on bioloogiline fakt, et rahvus koosneb teatud etnilisest rühmast. Selle liikmetel on vereside või sugulussuhe nii-öelda nende eelnevate põlvvedega. Samuti on ta tegelikult etnokultuuriline kooslus, oma selgelt määratletud või selgelt eristatava keele ja kultuuri kaudu.”

100 “Kõige lihtsamalt öeldes on rahvuslased need, kelle ideaaliks on rahvusriik: ühe rahvuse ehk etnilise grupi rahvuskodu.”

101 “Rahvuslus on tema sõnul sügav ja müstiline kirg, mis on väljenduse leidnud mitte ainult temas, vaid väga paljudes Sinise Äratuse liikmetes.”

102 “Rahvuslik maailmavaade, weltanschauung, on selgelt transsendentaalne ja seetõttu ka vaimne, oma tuumas, irratsionaalne hoiak.”

103 “Rahvusluse olemuse juurde kuulub aga just nimelt inimeseks olemise kollektiivse aspekti teadvustamine ja veel enam, selle tunnistamine indiviidi väärtuslikuks omaduseks.”

104 “That means, we emphasise ethnonationalism — a special relationship of the person to his tribe and country — as the only meaningful opposition to globalism, and Futurism as it was manifested in Italy, both in its artistic freedom and youthful attitude.”

105 “See on rahvusriikluse hülgamise selge tulemus, kuna abstraktsed inimõigused või lääneliku väärtused ei asenda mitte kellegi etnilist identiteeti, mis on juurtega kodumaa mullas.”

reinforced. It is in this ethnically rooted village that we find tangible expressions of our national identity — the physical and cultural spaces that make us who we are.”¹⁰⁶

By losing one’s connection to one’s innate ethnic identity, the ethnic collective and the homeland, one will experience an identity crisis. Such crises are experienced by rootless Western mass consumer societies that lack connections to their ethnic identities. The author will expand on this idea in the ‘national independence’ subchapter.

This raises the question as to who belongs to an ethnic community and what the boundaries of the nation are. They say that an “Estonian cannot be someone who lacks Estonian ancestors and roots in this land”¹⁰⁷. This can be understood in light of the fact that according to SÄ, ethnic members of a nation do not only share a common cultural background but also a common genetic makeup. Together, they form what they call a ‘bioculture’. They insinuate that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘bioculture’ are inherently entangled¹⁰⁸. The biological and cultural components (“the genes and memes”) are thought of not as separate entities but as “intertwined and interdependent”¹⁰⁹. One member of Sinine Äratus writes that one’s “genetic makeup influences the way” one perceives and interacts with the world, shaping one’s “cultural preferences and predispositions”, and in turn, one’s cultural heritage is deeply embedded in one’s “genetic memory, passed down from generation to generation”¹¹⁰. To be an Estonian, one has to have Estonian ancestors, as nationality is something you are born with, it “is not something you can change over the course of your life based on personal preference”¹¹¹. Someone who has Estonian ancestors but has grown up with a different language and in a different country has the possibility of reclaiming their ancestral roots and becoming an Estonian¹¹². Without Estonian ancestors, one cannot become an Estonian. One member argues that there are much

106 “We can also consider the role of the village and the city in an ethnic identity. A traditional village in the old times was a microcosm of the whole nation, and a model of our collective values and traditions. In such a village we saw the close-knit relationships, mutual support, and shared customs and rituals that define us as a people, for it is here that our traditions and customs are lived out in everyday life. It is here that our relationships and connections are forged, and where our values are tested and reinforced. It is in this ethnically rooted village that we find tangible expressions of our national identity — the physical and cultural spaces that make us who we are.”

107 “Eestlane ei saa olla keegi, kellel puuduvad eesti esivanemad ja juured selles maas.”

108 “Ethnicity or bioculture is the most fundamental element of Ethnofuturism.”

109 “Genes and memes are not separate entities, but are intertwined and interdependent.”

110 “Our genetic makeup influences the way we perceive and interact with the world, shaping our cultural preferences and predispositions. Our cultural heritage is in turn deeply embedded in our genetic memory, passed down from generation to generation.”

111 “Ka see on hästi oluline, et rahvus on kaasasündinud. See ei ole asi, mida saad elu jooksul muuta oma siis isiklikust soovist lähtudes.”

112 “Aga sinna lisandub ka see, et kuivõrd tal ikkagi on Eesti juured, siis saan teda ikkagi täisväärtusliku eestlasena võtta hoolimata sellest, et ta on sündinud ja kasvanud Venemaal, või siis nii-öelda vene peres.”

stricter criteria for being an Estonian, namely, an Estonian has at least one parent who is Estonian and has grown up in the Estonian cultural space¹¹³.

The concepts of ‘tribal identity’, ‘tribe’, ‘Finno-Ugric tribe’, ‘Finno-Ugric identity’, ‘Finno-Ugric value framework’

‘Ethnic identity’ is closely related to the concept of ‘tribal identity’ [‘hõimuidentiteet’] or ‘tribal mentality’ or ‘tribal feeling’ [‘hõimutunne’]. According to SÄ, tribal identity is undeniably “inherent to our species”¹¹⁴ as “human species is tribal”¹¹⁵. In traditional societies, ancient tribal identity means that a person has a connection to a specific language, culture, “distinct rituals, lifestyles, and mythology”¹¹⁶. By speaking of tribal identity, they are making a claim about human nature, namely, that deep within a person, there is a subconscious sense that one is part of one’s tribe.

It might seem like ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘tribal identity’ are the same thing; however, it makes more sense to think of ‘tribal identity’ as something that can be applied to smaller and bigger collectives. SÄ uses the term ‘tribe’ in different contexts with various meanings. Indeed, when speaking of ‘tribal identity’, namely that humans are necessarily tribal, ‘tribe’ [hõim] is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘nation’ or ‘ethnicity’ [rahvus]. For example, when they say that the nation is “the most natural thing to feel a sense of belonging to”¹¹⁷, then ‘nation’ is used interchangeably with the term ‘tribe’. However, ‘tribal identity’ can be extended to other identity layers too; for example, they claim that “within the Estonian people, there are different tribes such as Mulks, Setos”¹¹⁸ who share a tribal identity with the people from their county, and they also claim that by talking “about the tribal identity” they can also refer “to the whole Finno-Ugric tribe”, and one can talk about tribal identity “in the context of

113 “Eestlane on inimene, kelle üks vanem on eestlane ja ta on kasvanud Eesti kultuuriruumis.”

114 “Loomulikult täpselt samamoodi saab hõimuidentiteet olla meile omane täpselt niipalju kui see on meie liigile omane – mida see vastuvaidlematult ka on.”

115 The future is ethnic, because the human species is tribal.

116 “Hõimuidentiteedile, mis kõigis traditsioonilistes ühiskondades tähendas mitte ainult teist keelt ja ainelist kultuuri, vaid ka omanäolisi rituaale, eluviise ja mütoloogiat, selles kohta ei olnud.”

117 “Inimesel on hõimutunne, et ta tahab kuuluda ja ma arvan, et tegelikult rahvus on kõige loomulik asi, milles tunda kuuluvust või kuhu kuuluda.”

118 “Tegelikult on jah sellel sõnal mitu tähendust ja me saame ka rääkida, et näiteks Eesti rahva sees on erinevad hõimud nagu mulgid, setod.”

Europeans”¹¹⁹. Jokingly, they claim that ‘tribal identity’ can theoretically be extended to the whole humanity “when communicating with aliens from outer space”¹²⁰.

There is one more context in where ‘tribe’ is used interchangeably with ‘nation’. For example, one member claims that when “discussing Estonia’s older history”, they use the term ‘tribe’ interchangeably with ‘nation’ as some historians argue that the nation did not exist before the 18th-19th centuries¹²¹. However, as tribe “carries exactly those attributes that the nation carries” and it existed way before, when talking of Chronicle of Henry of Livonia, one can claim that he “speaks of Estonians as a whole” as a nation or as a tribe¹²². When speaking of the Finno-Ugric tribe that Estonians, Hungarians, Finnish, as well as, Finno-Ugric people in Russian territory belong to, ‘tribe’ is used as an umbrella term for all these nations that, according to SÄ, “share a similar history, and in some cases, even similar customs and languages”¹²³. Finally, when speaking of Finno-Ugric tribes that Estonians and other Finno-Ugric nations descended¹²⁴ from, for example, when talking about the ‘Finno-Ugric value system’¹²⁵, they use ‘tribe’ to refer to the common ancestors of these nations who lived in tight-

119 “Oleneb kontekstist. Võrokesed kindlasti ütlevad, et side oma hõimuga on eelkõige ilmselt oma maakonnaga. Aga võin täpselt sama öelda kõigi eestlaste tähenduses. Ja ma võin soome-ugri päevadel öelda, et meil on siin side oma hõimuga. Isegi eurooplaste tähenduses.”

120 “Või siis noh, teoreetiliselt tulnukatega suheldes maa pealt.”

121 “Hõimu kasutan rahvuse tähenduses siis, kui räägin Eesti vanemast ajaloost. Et kuna osad ajaloolased või üldse uurijad leiavad, et rahvust ei olnud üldse olemas enne kaheksateistkümnendat-üheksateistkümnendat sajandit, siis ütleme, et rahvus on uus asi, aga mis sel juhul on hõim.”

122 “Hõimu kasutan rahvuse tähenduses siis, kui räägin Eesti vanemast ajaloost. Et kuna osad ajaloolased või üldse uurijad leiavad, et rahvust ei olnud üldse olemas enne kaheksateistkümnendat-üheksateistkümnendat sajandit, siis ütleme, et rahvus on uus asi, aga mis sel juhul on hõim. Et mis tegelikult ju kannab täpselt neid seda olemust ja atribuutikat, mida rahvas kannab, mis on palju vanem. Eesti puhul Henriku kroonika räägib eestlastest ikkagi kui ühest tervikust.”

123 “Aga samas ikkagi on teada, on näha, et on selline üks suur katus, mille all me oleme teistega ka sellepärast, et meil on tihtipeale sarnane ajalugu, mõnel juhul isegi sarnased kombid, sarnased keeled.”

124 “Näiteks, on fakt, et eestlased ja ka teised läänemeresoomlased põlvnevad Uurali Soome-Ugri hõimudest ning see annab ka meile legitiimsuse näha ennast eraldiseisva etnosena.” and “Selle liberaaldemokraatliku ja globalistliku, olgu Prantsuse või Vene revolutsioonist lähtuva ideoloogia, selle asemele peab astuma eesti rahvuslus, meie põliseuroopa ja soome-ugri juured, meie ühine teadvus ja hing.” and “Contrary to the worldviews of the later Western world, in the ancient Finno-Ugric and European cosmic view the dualistic principle did not exist.”

125 “Eestis maadlevad teineteisega vähemalt kaks erinevat väärtusruumi: niinimetatud lääne väärtusruum, mis keskendub abstraktsetele inimõigustele ja globaalsele kaubandussüsteemile, ning soome-ugri väärtusruum, mis keskendub rahvusriiklusele ja rahvaste enesemääramisele.”

knit communities¹²⁶ and whose languages, values and culture Finno-Ugric nations have inherited¹²⁷.

Sinine Äratus aims to “promote a rediscovery of ancient tribal mentality and spirituality”¹²⁸. In the case of Estonians, according to SÄ, their tribal identity is their Finno-Ugric identity, as the Estonian nation belongs to a Finno-Ugric tribe¹²⁹. SÄ speaks of human roots being tribal, which means that the roots of the Estonian nation are in the Finno-Ugric culture. They claim that Estonians have more in common with Finno-Ugric people and Finno-Ugric culture than with those who do not belong to the Finno-Ugric tribe, for example, Western European nations. The commonalities lay in the common value framework [väärtusruum]. ‘The Western value framework’ [‘Lääne väärtusruum’] “focuses on abstract human rights and the global trade system”, and ‘the Finno-Ugric value framework’ [‘soome-ugri väärtusruum’] focuses on the values of ethnonationalism, “the nation-state and the self-determination of peoples”¹³⁰. Furthermore, the Finno-Ugric tribal identity legitimises the claims of Estonians for establishing themselves as a distinct nation in the eyes of the others. A nation’s self-determination aspirations are determined by “biological imperatives” and a connection of the nation’s members to their ethnic spirit¹³¹. However, in the eyes of those seeking rational reasons, a nation has a right to self-determination if it is a distinct nation within a region (in the case of Estonia, within the region of Europe). So, the fact that Estonians descended from the Uralic Finno-Ugric tribes makes them a distinct nation from European Indo-European nations who have not descended from Finno-Ugric tribes. Thus, the fact that Estonians descended from the

126 “A traditional village in the old times was a microcosm of the whole nation, and a model of our collective values and traditions. In such a village we saw the close-knit relationships, mutual support, and shared customs and rituals that define us as a people, for it is here that our traditions and customs are lived out in everyday life.”

127 “Selle liberaaldemokraatliku ja globalistliku, olgu Prantsuse või Vene revolutsioonist lähtuval ideoloogiale, selle asemele peab astuma eesti rahvuslus, meie põliseuroopa ja soome-ugri juured, meie ühine teadvus ja hing.”

128 “In many ways, we promote a rediscovery of ancient tribal mentality and spirituality, which in no way stand in conflict with modern technology.”

129 “Inimeses sügaval enda sees on peaaegu alateadlikult tunnetatav tunne, et mina olen osa sellest hõimust.”

130 “Eestis maadlevad teineteisega vähemalt kaks erinevat väärtusruumi: niinimetatud lääne väärtusruum, mis keskendub abstraktsetele inimõigustele ja globaalsele kaubandussüsteemile, ning soome-ugri väärtusruum, mis keskendub rahvusriiklusele ja rahvaste enesemääramisele.” and “Tõelisteks väärtusteks, mis on eestlaste ürgse elutunnetusega kooskõlas ja millest peaksime maailmapoliitika lavadel, sealhulgas ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogus lähtuma, saavad olla vaid rahvaste enesemääramine, rahvusriiklus ja etniline rahvuslus.”

131 “Rahvuse ja isiku tungi vabadusele, iseseisvusele ja enesemääramisele ajendavad tihti bioloogilised imperatiivid, aga arvestades asjaolu, et tänapäeva maailmas on hulgaliselt selle ürgse tungi aktiivseid eitajaid, tuleb meil otsida vastust ka väljastpoolt ratsionaalsust, seirata vaimsust.”

Uralic Finno-Ugric tribes legitimises the self-determination of Estonians in the eyes of other European nations¹³².

The concepts of 'tribe members', 'genocide', 'self-determination of peoples', 'national independence', 'indigenous nations', and 'cultural diversity'

SÄ ardently support the rights of Finno-Ugric people. One reason for this is that Finno-Ugric people are our tribe members '[hõimlased' or 'vennasrahvad']', and, as our tribe members, they deserve our support when needed. SÄ argues that there is "a moral obligation to help keep" one's tribe viable¹³³. Finno-Ugric people are taken to be "under existential threat"¹³⁴ as Russia is committing genocide against its indigenous nations¹³⁵ like that of Finno-Ugric people, and it is also repressing their efforts of self-determination¹³⁶. They define 'genocide' '[genotsiid]' following the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as "an act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups, including the imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of the group."¹³⁷ By 'self-determination of peoples' '[rahvaste enesemääramine]' they mean the ability of nations to establish their own independent nation-states in their indigenous lands and their "opportunity to choose their own destiny, lifestyles, political systems, and economic systems."¹³⁸ Only when a nation has established its nation-state, and they are able to choose its own destiny, lifestyle, political systems, and economic systems, one can say that a nation has achieved 'national independence' or 'nation-states' independence' '[rahvusriigi iseseisvus]'. When talking about Estonia, they use the term 'Estonian independence' '[Eesti iseseisvus]' or 'Estonian nation-states' independence' '[Eesti

132 "Tõsi, ka rahvuslikul mõtteviisil on empiirilisel tajutavaid ja vaadeldavaid kultuurilisi ja etnilisi aluseid mis tuleb meie filosoofiasse inkorporeerida. Näiteks, on fakt, et eestlased ja ka teised läänemeresoomlased põlvnevad Uurali Soome-Ugri hõimudest ning see annab ka meile legitiimsuse näha ennast eraldiseisva etnosena. Samas ei tohi unustada, et rahvuslikku maailmavaadet ja rahvuslasi ennast on alati läbi ajaloo inspireerinud teatud laadi idealism, vaim, elaan. Rahvuse ja isiku tungi vabadusele, iseseisvusele ja enesemääramisele ajendavad tihti bioloogilised imperatiivid, aga arvestades asjaolu, et tänapäeva maailmas on hulgaliselt selle ürgse tungi aktiivseid eitajaid, tuleb meil otsida vastust ka väljastpoolt ratsionaalsust, seirata vaimsust."

133 "Meil on olnud õnne, aga just seetõttu on meil võimalus ja ka moraalne kohustus aidata hoida meie suurt hõimu elujõulisena."

134 "On teada, et meie soome-ugri vennasrahvad kannatavad agressiivse venestamispoliitika ja seetõttu ka eksistentsiaalse ohu all."

135 "Putini režiimi venestamispoliitikat viiakse ellu ilmselge kavatsusega kaotada põlisrahvaste rahvuslik, etniline ja mõnel juhul ka usuline eripära, mistõttu vastavalt rahvusvahelisele õigusele on Venemaa süüdi põlisrahvaste genotsiidis."

136 "Venemaa mitte ainult ei identifitseeri end Nõukogude Liidu järglasena, vaid ka okupeerib endiselt Eestile kuuluvat Petserimaad ja Ingerit ning surub maha meie soome-ugri sugulasrahvaste enesemääramispüüdeid."

137 "Rahvusvaheline genotsiidi vältimise ja karistamise konventsioon, millele on liitunud ka Venemaa, defineerib II artiklis genotsiidina tegu, mis on toime pandud kavatsusega hävitada osaliselt või täielikult rahvuslikke, etnilisi, rassilisi või usulisi üksusi, sealhulgas üksusele tahtlikult selliste elutingimuste pealesurumist, mis põhjustab üksuse täielikku või osalist hävimist."

138 "Peame oluliseks rahvusriikide tõelist iseseisvust ja võimalust valida ise oma saatust, eluviise, riigikorda ning majandussüsteemi."

rahvusiigi iseseisvus’]. SÄ argues that only an independent state allows its “people to determine their own destiny.”¹³⁹ The second reason for SÄ for supporting Finno-Ugric people’s rights is precisely that they believe that all nations deserve to have the possibility for self-determination. In their oath, they say that they “believe in the self-determination of all nations, recognizing that all the world’s peoples walk on the eternal path from ancestors to descendants.”¹⁴⁰ One member of SÄ has said that they “do not stand for Russia’s minority peoples because they are persecuted, they have a minority status, or because they are in the opposition, but primarily because they are indigenous nations who have lived in their own land for thousands of years, and whose quest for freedom deserves recognition.” By ‘indigenous nations’ [‘põlisrahvad’] or ‘natives’ [‘põliselanikud’], they mean the nations that have lived on their land for generations. In the view of SÄ, indigenous nations have a claim on the lands where they have lived for generations. The third reason why SÄ supports the self-determination aspirations of Finno-Ugric people is that they find value in the cultural diversity of humankind. ‘Cultural diversity’ or ‘plurality of humankind’ refers to a concept that posits the inherent value of cultural and biological diversity within the human species. In other words, cultural diversity emphasises the importance of diversity of people with diverse layers of ethnic and tribal identities. The more people from different ethnicities and tribes mix, the more similar they become and the less cultural diversity or plurality of humankind we have. They use these terms interchangeably; however, ‘cultural diversity’ emphasises the cultural component of nations’ diversity, and ‘plurality of humankind’ emphasises the biological or genetic aspect of nations’ diversity. As in SÄ-s mind, culture and biology are inherently entangled, these terms can be considered the same concept.

These values also translate into supporting other nations that do not belong to the Finno-Ugric tribe. However, they emphasise that they aim to “support the aspirations for freedom of small nations, especially in the case of Finno-Ugric peoples”¹⁴¹. Nevertheless, they say that a “true ethnonationalist cares for all nations, and the principle of ethnonationalism seeks to provide every nation with a homeland”¹⁴². They also argue that when “we respect the connection of all nations to their land”, then we have “a greater chance to come closest to a utopia like world

139 “Üksnes iseseisev riik võimaldab meie rahval ise määrata oma saatust ja seda esiisade verega lunastatud õigust kaitseme me sama kindlalt.”

140 “Me ei seisa Venemaa vähemusrahvuste eest nende tagakiusatuse, vähemuseks olemise või lihtsalt opositsioonilisuse pärast, vaid eelkõige seetõttu, et tegemist on põlisrahvastega, kes on omal maal elanud tuhandeid aastaid, ja kelle vabaduspüüe väärib tunnustamist.”

141 “Võimalusel toetame suurriikide poolt allasurutud väikerahvaste vabaduspüüdeid, eriti soomeugri rahvaste puhul.”

142 “A true ethnonationalist cares for all nations, and the principle of ethnonationalism seeks to provide every nation with a homeland.”

peace”¹⁴³. Most importantly, they seek to support indigenous nations in their self-determination efforts and in defending their nation-states’ independence once they have achieved self-determination. However, different nations deserve different kinds of support. For example, SÄ is advocating for Estonia to support Ukraine in its war against Russia as well as its people: they argue that the “Estonian attitude towards Ukrainian refugees should be more accommodating than towards immigrants from outside Europe.”¹⁴⁴ The reason for helping Ukraine and Ukrainians is, to some extent, pragmatic – they say that “we are not just providing humanitarian aid; we are directly supporting a European country fighting for freedom”¹⁴⁵ and thus defending the whole of Europe, especially Estonia, which could be the next victim of Russia. They emphasise that by giving refugees a place to stay, Estonia must not settle Ukrainians here as that “would mean their definitive uprooting from their homeland”.¹⁴⁶ This would not only hurt the Estonian nation, but settling Ukrainians in Estonia would “be a disservice to the emerging Ukrainian ethnic and cultural consciousness”¹⁴⁷.

The concepts of ‘humanism’, ‘human rights’, and ‘layers of identity’

SÄ juxtapose the concept of ‘nationalism’ with ‘humanism’, which is part of what the author called earlier ‘the Western value framework’. For example, they argue that social democrats want to substitute nationalism with humanism¹⁴⁸. Humanism is a dogma “according to which humanity is more important than tribe or wildlife”¹⁴⁹. They claim that humanism as a worldview “can be inherent to us only as much as it is inherent to our culture” and as humanism “is foreign to people of nature” like that of Finno-Ugric people, the statement describing humanism, namely, ‘that belonging to a human species is more important than belonging to a

143 “Minu arust seda peaks tegema, sest, väga lihtsa ratsionaalse põhjuse tõttu, et see on, ma arvan, kõige suurem šanss ja suurem võimalus jõuda kõige lähemale utoopiale nagu maailma rahu. Kui me austame kõigi rahvaste sidet oma maaga. See on etnopluralism.”

144 “Enesestmõistetavalt peab Eesti suhtuma Ukraina põgenikesse hoopis vastutulelikumalt kui väljastpoolt Euroopat pärit immigrantidesse.”

145 “Sellega ei paku me lihtsalt humanitaarabi, vaid toetame otseselt Euroopa vabaduse eest sõdivat riiki.” and “Aga ukrainlased ei kaitse ainult oma maad, nad kaitsevad tervet Euroopat, eriti neid riike, keda Venemaa verejanulised valitsejad on läbi ajaloo kõige rohkem ihaldanud.” and “Ukraina toetamine on otseselt nii meie kui ka nende rahvuslikes huvides, seda eelkõige pärast sõda. Arvestades asjaolu, et Balti riigid on Vene vallutusplaanides loogiline (kuigi hetkel kauge) eesmärk, on meile strateegiliselt igatpidi kasulik, kui Vene karu nina Kiievi all veriseks lüüakse.”

146 “Ukrainlaste võõrale maale põlistamine tähendaks nende lõplikku lahtikiskumist oma kodumaast koos juurtega.”

147 “Kui me laseme neil sulanduda venekeelsesse keskkonda siin, siis tegelikult see oleks karuteene Ukraina rahvuslikule ja kultuurilisele eneseteadvusele, mis praegu alles on tõusmas, on alles jalgu alla saamas.”

148 “Rahvusluse asemele pakuvad nemad inimsust: “Me oleme ju kõik inimesed”, “Ainus rass on inimrass”. Eestis on sellist retoorikat kõige rohkem märgata sotsiaaldemokraatide puhul.”

149 “Dogma, mille kohaselt inimsus on olulisem nii hõimust kui ka elusloodusest, ei lase end sellest aga kõigutada.”

tribe or a nation', is not in line with Estonian value framework¹⁵⁰. For example, one member of SÄ has said that as an Estonian, they naturally feel a much greater affinity with their dog "than with a Negro or South American from the other side of the Earth"¹⁵¹. Furthermore, they claim that humanism, as it ignores other identities such as ethnic identity, is undermining the diversity within the human species¹⁵².

Their scepticism about humanism is also translated into scepticism about the value of human rights. By 'human rights', they mean the dogmas of The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, according to which human rights "are the ultimate good" and crimes against humanity "are the ultimate evil"¹⁵³. SÄ does not agree with these claims. Nevertheless, they do not deny the possibility of the existence of the identity of the human species, i.e., the identity of humanity. However, they are against the humanist claim that the identity of the human species is more important than other identities¹⁵⁴. Implicitly, they claim the opposite, namely, that the ethnic identity is the most important identity and the human species identity is the least important. In between these identities, there are various other layers of identities that diminish in importance the closer they get to the human species identity. For example, an ethnic Estonian individual has the following 'layers of identity' ['identiteedikihid']: they have their own individual identity, maybe even a local identity like being a Seto, Estonian ethnic identity – its most important identity –, a Finno-Ugric tribal identity, European identity, White racial identity/ European descendants' identity and at last comes the identity of human species¹⁵⁵. They argue that ethnonationalism seeks to establish harmony between various layers of identity¹⁵⁶. Harmony here does not mean that all identities are equal and treated as equal; rather,

150 "Dogma, mille kohaselt inimsus on olulisem nii hõimust kui ka elusloodusest, ei lase end sellest aga kõigutada. Tegu on lääne liberaaldemokraatlikku süsteemi väga sügavalt sisse istutatud ideega, mis sellegipoolest on võõras loodusrahvastele, kelle hulka vaimsuselt tuleb lugeda ka soomeugrilased ja baltlased."

151 "Näiteks on mulle eestlasena täiesti loomulik tunda oluliselt suuremat lähedust oma koeraga kui neegri või lõunaameeriklasega teisest maakera otsast."

152 "Aga inimsus on õõnes ja kahepalgeline religioon. See on õõnes, sest see ignoreerib ülejäänud identiteedikihite, mille omanäolisus ongi liigisisese mitmekesisuse alus." and "Samal ajal on rahvusluse selgeks eesmärgiks ka rahvusesiseste kogukondade ning rassi- ja liigisisese mitmekesisuse kaitse: natsionalism tahab seega identiteedikihid seada harmooniasse, mitte panna üht kihti teiste üle domineerima."

153 "Inimõigused polnud ühed õigused paljude seast, inimsusevastased kuriteod polnud ühed kuriteod paljude seast, vaid neist said sisuliselt religioossed, dogmaatilised mõisted, mis defineerisid ülima hüve ja ülima kurjuse."

154 "Eestlase traditsioonilises maailmapildis pole liik samuti olnud hõimust või elust tähtsam kategooria."

155 "Kaasasündinud identiteedil on palju kihte: üksikisik, kogukond, rahvus, rass, liik ning elu ja universum tervikuna. Neist kõigiga saab – ma ütleks lausa, tuleb – end oma kindlas kontekstis samastada."

156 "Sellest lähtudes jäävad identiteedikihid omavahel harmooniasse ja seda rahvuslus taotlebki." Samal ajal on rahvusluse selgeks eesmärgiks ka rahvusesiseste kogukondade ning rassi- ja liigisisese mitmekesisuse kaitse: natsionalism tahab seega identiteedikihid seada harmooniasse, mitte panna üht kihti teiste üle domineerima." and "Samal ajal on rahvusluse selgeks eesmärgiks ka rahvusesiseste

the hierarchy of identities is not out of balance¹⁵⁷. Even though every individual has all these layers of identities, they only become relevant, according to SÄ, once a collective with that shared identity needs to differentiate itself from another collective. They refer to Schmitt and argue that an “identity inevitably arises from opposition to others”, and if “there is no opposition, there is actually no identity”¹⁵⁸. So, for example, the identity of humanity becomes relevant “only when faced with an invasion of aliens”¹⁵⁹. One member argues that once “we move further up and add layers” to the Finno-Ugric identity “, difficulties start to arise” with identifying with these bigger communities and with experiencing a sense of belonging with that community¹⁶⁰. On the one hand, they describe human nature: it is in human nature to much easier “feel a sense of belonging to what is concrete, present, and close”¹⁶¹. On the other hand, they are also making a normative claim, namely, that one has “a greater responsibility towards those who are closer to” them, and those who are closer are the ones who are similar, who share a similar layer of identity¹⁶². This explains why Estonians have a greater responsibility to help Finno-Ugric people in Russia than some other people with whom they do not share such close identity layer with.

The concepts of ‘nation-state’, ‘homeland’, ‘ethnic continuity’, ‘heritage’, and ‘ethnic consciousness’

This leads the author to the concept of ‘nation-state’ [‘rahvusriik’], in English, also labelled as ‘ethnostate’. SÄ claims that ethnonationalists are “those whose ideal is the nation-state: a homeland for one ethnic, that is to say, for one national group”¹⁶³. So, SÄ, as an ethnonationalist group, also aims “to create a nation-state for the whole Estonian nation”¹⁶⁴.

kogukondade ning rassi- ja liigisisese mitmekesisuse kaitse: natsionalism tahab seega identiteedikihid seada harmooniasse, mitte panna üht kihti teiste üle domineerima.”

157 “Ma ei vastanda hierargiat ja harmooniat, sest tihti peale hierarhiad ongi harmoonilised. Küsimus on selles, et kas seal üksikud elemendid satuvad kuidagi omavahel vastuollu.”

158 “Carl Schmidt rääkis sellest, et identiteet tekib vältimatult vastandumisest teistega. Kui ei ole vastandumist, siis ei ole tegelikult ka identiteeti.”

159 “Inimkonnaga identifitseerumine jõuab kohale alles siis, kui tuleb tulnukate invasioon.”

160 “Kui liikuda kaugemale ülespoole ja lisada veel kihte näiteks soomeugrilaste juurde, siis hakkab tekkima raskusi. Vähemalt mina ei suuda tunda niivõrd tugevat kuuluvustunnet kas siis itaallasega kui ma võin näiteks soomlasega.”

161 “Palju lihtsam on tunda kuuluvust sellega, mis on siin konkreetselt praegu ja lähedal.”

162 “No ma ütleks niimoodi, et meil on suurem vastutus nende ees, kes on meile lähedasemad. /.../ Need aga ei määra, tähendab nad ei keela mitte kuidagi aidata ka neid, kes on kaugemal.”

163 “Kõige lihtsamalt öeldes on rahvused need, kelle ideaaliks on rahvusriik: ühe rahvuse ehk etnilise grupi rahvuskodu.”

164 It is important to mention that in the Estonian language, nations are written with small letters (i.e., “eesti rahvas”) and the states are written with a first capital letter (i.e., “Eesti rahvas”). In this quotation, “tahame luua rahvusriiki tervele eesti rahvale” “eesti rahvas” is with a big letter, which means that they refer to Estonian nation rather than, more broadly, people living in Estonia.

Just like they claimed that a nation cannot be non-ethnic, they also claim that the idea of a non-ethnic nation-state is foreign to the Estonian language and Estonians¹⁶⁵. So, a nation-state is necessarily ethnic. The nation-state has two distinct tasks. First, it is to be a homeland for an ethnic population¹⁶⁶, and second, its aim is to help realise ethnic continuity¹⁶⁷. The concept of 'homeland' ['kodumaa' or 'rahvuskodu'] signifies the connection between the nation and the land in which the nation resides. A nation is rooted in the land as the ethnic identity "is rooted in the soil of the homeland"¹⁶⁸. Following Mircea Eliade, they claim that "the homeland is a *cosmic center* that connects us to the sacred dimensions of existence"¹⁶⁹. They even go on to say that "homeland is everything"¹⁷⁰. The idea of 'ethnic continuity' ['rahvuse püsimajäämine'] is that over time, an ethnicity would continue to make up a majority population within the demography of that nation with its specific genetic makeup and culture. So, in the context of Estonia, SÄ wants three things. First, that the Estonian nation-state's population would continue to consist of a majority ethnic Estonians in the future. They argue that one of the most important objectives of Estonia's state "is to ensure that Estonians will inhabit our land even a thousand years from now"¹⁷¹ and so, all "national and local decisions must serve the sacred goal of the eternal existence of the Estonian nation"¹⁷². Second, that these future ethnic Estonians would be the descendants of ethnic Estonians¹⁷³ so that the genetic

165 "Aga mida tähendab mitte-etniline rahvusriik? Siin on pigem tegemist tõlkeveaga, sest inglise keeles nationality võib tähendada nii rahvust kui ka kodakondsust. Eesti keeles nii ei ole. Meie jaoks rahvus tähendab täiesti vaieldamatult just etnilist gruppi ja seega idee mitte-etnilisest rahvuslusest on eestlastele võõras."

166 "Kõige lihtsamalt öeldes on rahvuslased need, kelle ideaaliks on rahvusriik: ühe rahvuse ehk etnilise grupi rahvuskodu."

167 "The question of how to secure ethnic continuity is a deeply political question as well. Every state takes care to regenerate what it considers its values, and these values do not exist in a vacuum. They have preconditions which need to be preserved if they are to continue. This means that the state has a supreme spiritual function that goes beyond mere politics. It is responsible for preserving and regenerating the values that define us as a people. We cannot ignore the deeply political dimensions of this question. If a state is to live up to its name, it has to take care of its values and also what lies beneath those values." and "Eesti Vabariik on loodud meie rahvuse püsimajäämise nimel. Sellest tulenevalt on riigi üks tähtsamatest eesmärkidest kindlustada, et meie maal elaks eestlasi ka tuhande aasta pärast."

168 "See on rahvusriikluse hülgamise selge tulemus, kuna abstraktsed inimõigused või lääneliku väärtused ei asenda mitte kellegi etnilist identiteeti, mis on juurtega kodumaa mullas."

169 "Mircea Eliade, the great philosopher of religion and a man of the Right, observed that the homeland is a *cosmic center* that connects us to the *sacred dimensions of existence*."

170 "Mircea Eliade, the great philosopher of religion and a man of the Right, observed that the homeland is a cosmic center that connects us to the sacred dimensions of existence. Our attachment to our country is not simply a matter of geography or politics, but also a reflection of our deepest spiritual longings and aspirations."

171 "Eesti Vabariik on loodud meie rahvuse püsimajäämise nimel. Sellest tulenevalt on riigi üks tähtsamatest eesmärkidest kindlustada, et meie maal elaks eestlasi ka tuhande aasta pärast."

172 "Kõik riiklikud ja kohalikud otsused peavad teenima eesti rahvuse igavese kestmise püha eesmärki."

173 "Ta [rahvus] on bioloogiline fakt, et rahvus koosneb teatud etnilisest rühmast. Selle liikmetel on vereside või sugulussuhe nii-öelda nende eelnevate põlvedega."

makeup of Estonians would not change by mixing with other nations and races genes¹⁷⁴. And third, securing ethnic continuity is seen as a valuable task worth undertaking by ethnonationalists, as only ethnic continuity can “ensure that our heritage is passed down to future generations”¹⁷⁵. In other words, ethnic continuity does not only secure the nation’s survival with its specific genetic makeup, but also with its specific heritage. ‘Heritage’ [‘pärand’], ‘cultural heritage’ [‘kultuuripärand’], ‘ethnic heritage’ [‘rahvuslik pärand’], ‘ethnic culture’ [‘rahvuskultuur’] are terms for the same concept which refer to the idea that ancestors of a nation have passed down a heritage to their descendants – they have passed down traditions, myths, nature, an environment, history, language, culture, a value system. The concept of ‘ethnic consciousness’ and its synonyms like ‘national consciousness’ [‘rahvuslik teadvus’], ‘ethnic spirit’ and ‘national spirit’ [‘rahvuslik vaim’] refer to the relation between an individual and its national heritage. A person is ethnically conscious or carries an ethnic or national spirit when they can cherish their heritage and have a meaningful connection to that heritage. They say that to “reject one’s own ethnic spirit is to reject a part of oneself”¹⁷⁶ as through ethnic spirit one can “sense the home where”¹⁷⁷ one belongs and that by reclaiming one’s ethnic spirit one can ensure “the ethnic continuity throughout time”¹⁷⁸.

The concepts of ‘ethnofuturism’, ‘ethnopluralism’, ‘cyclical nature of history’, ‘the decline of the West’, ‘rebirth of Europe’, ‘esoteric vanguard’, ‘national awakening’, ‘universal inequality of man’ and ‘body politic’

Another central concept of the ideology of Sinine Äratus is ‘ethnofuturism’ [‘etnofuturism’]. This concept is also labelled as ‘ethnofuturist nationalism’ and ‘21st-century nationalism’ [‘21. sajandi rahvuslus’]. The things mentioned earlier about ethnonationalism can well be transferred to the meaning of the concept of ‘ethnofuturism’. Equally, the concepts related to the concept of ‘ethnonationalism’ can be transferred as the related concepts to the concept of ‘ethnofuturism’. For example, just like the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘bioculture’ [‘biokultuur’] play an important role in SÄ-s understanding of ethnonationalism, SÄ argues

174 “The image invariably appears remarkably beautiful, a testament to the wondrous nature of our world, in which true and beautiful diversity requires separation, because mixing destroys both diversity and beauty.”

175 “In our time, it is more important than ever to consciously strive for ethnic continuity. Only then we can ensure that our heritage is passed down to future generations.”

176 “To reject one’s own ethnic spirit is to reject a part of oneself.”

177 “Because through ethnic spirit we sense the home where we belong.”

178 “Let us be the generation that reclaims our ethnic spirit and ensures its continuity throughout time!”

that “ethnicity or bioculture is the most fundamental element” of ethnofuturism¹⁷⁹. The added value of the concept of ‘ethnofuturism’ compared to the concept of ‘ethnonationalism’ is that it is a new label which tries to shrug off the negative connotations that 20th-century ethnonationalist ideologies, and with that, the term ‘ethnonationalism’, carry¹⁸⁰. One member argues that using the label ‘ethnofuturism’ instead of ‘ethnonationalism’ “is a way to give ethnonationalism back its sex appeal”¹⁸¹. Another member argues that nationalists of other nations are often “stuck in the legacy of the mid-20th century”, which is pointlessly chauvinist¹⁸². So, using the label ‘ethnonationalism’ is also an attempt to distance themselves from chauvinist ethnonationalism. Chauvinist ethnonationalists are those who do not embrace the principle of ‘ethnopluralism’ [‘etnopluralism’]. Ethnopluralism¹⁸³ can be described by the slogan suggested by one member and endorsed by another: One “cannot respect their own nation if they do not respect others, and one cannot respect other nations if they do not hold their own nation sacred”¹⁸⁴. Contrary to the common conception of racism, which is associated with radical right, ethnopluralism does not see different ethnicities as superior or inferior in relation to each other, but rather different ethnicities are seen as different and incompatible with one another (Rydgren, 2018, p. 26). Cas Mudde also clarifies that ethnopluralist doctrine sees that “people should live within their own group and the groups should live separated” and that “people have both the right and the duty to live according to their own ‘natural way’” (Mudde, 2000, p. 187).

SÄ labels their ideology sometimes as ‘ethnonationalism’ and sometimes as ‘ethnofuturism’, depending on the context. Their program states that their “ideological stance, inspirational creed, and guiding principle is ethnofuturism”¹⁸⁵. One member argues that ‘ethnonationalism’

179 “Ethnicity or bioculture is the most fundamental element of Ethnofuturism.”

180 “Sellepärast ma arvan, et nõustun selle hinnanguga, et etnofuturism mõistet kasutame selleks, et ennast distantseeruda rahvuselusest, mis on mineviku vigade tõttu mõnes mõttes põlu all. Ma arvan, on hea eesmärk, et taastada rahvuslust nii-öelda tänapäeva oludes. See muidugi ei tähenda seda, et sealt konkreetsed põhitõed kaoks. Näiteks see fakt, et rahvus on etniliselt, kultuuriliselt, keeleliselt eristatav eraldiseisev rühm. Ja et rahvuseluse eesmärk peaks olema just selle rühma heaolu püsijäämine, areng, kasvamine. Need asjad jäävad kindlasti alles. Aga ümbermõtestamise eesmärk on see, et välditakse vigu, mida varem tehti.”

181 “See on viis anda rahvuselusele tagasi tema sex appeal.”

182 “Minu jaoks etnofuturismi üks osa on ikkagi etniline rahvuslus – rahvuse ülimuslikkus. Rahvuslus on äärmiselt laiapindselte rakendatav asi. Aga etnofuturism on püüdlus või proov luua rohkem elujõulist kahekümne esimese sajandi rahvuslust, mis on vabanenud mineviku takistustest. Üks probleem, mis mul on tihti näiteks teiste maade rahvuslastega, on see, et nad on kuidagi väga kinni sellises kahekümenda sajandi alguse keskpaiga pärandis, milleks on täiesti mõttetu šovinism.”

183 “See on etnopluralism.”

184 “Sest ei saa austada enda rahvust see, kes ei austa teisi, ja ei saa austada teisi rahvusi see, kes ei pea pühaks enda rahvust.”

185 “Meie ideoloogiline hoiak, inspireeriv kreodo ning teenäitaja on etnofuturism.”

denotes their worldview, which sets the aims of their organisation and their individual members, whereas ‘ethnofuturism’ denotes an ideology, a strategy for realising their ethnonationalist aims¹⁸⁶. One member differentiates ‘ethnofuturism’ from ‘ethnonationalism’ because, in this context, they use the term ‘ethnonationalism’ with the meaning of the concept of the celebration of tribal identity. SÄ says that tribal identity is very natural, not dependent on the cultural context or the language¹⁸⁷. Rather, a tribe or a nation – and here these can be seen as synonyms – is a metaphysical reality independent of how we talk about things and what the culture’s values are, and so, ethnonationalism too “is something that, broadly speaking, should always be relevant, regardless of time and place”¹⁸⁸. Ethnofuturism, on the other hand, according to this view, “is a specific and distinct cultural phenomenon in a particular point in time”¹⁸⁹. In this context ‘ethnonationalism’ is narrowed down to the acceptance and celebration of ‘tribal identity’.

If one would want to be consistent, it would be appropriate to consider everything else that has been said about ‘ethnonationalism’ to be reattributed to ‘ethnofuturism’. However, it is important to mention that SÄ members are not using these concepts consistently, and so it makes sense to state that they use the term ‘ethnonationalism’ in two different ways – when they use ‘ethnonationalism’ with its broader meaning, then ‘ethnonationalism’ is a synonym for ‘ethnofuturism’, when they use ‘ethnonationalism’ with its narrow meaning, then ‘ethnonationalism’ is just the acceptance and celebration of ‘tribal identity’. One member claims that for them, ethnonationalism – the belief in the supremacy of the nation – is part of ethnofuturism¹⁹⁰. So, in this context ethnonationalism is used with the narrow meaning of the celebration of tribal identity. They go on to say that “ethnofuturism is an attempt or an endeavour to create a more viable form of ethnonationalism in the twenty-first century, one that has liberated itself from the impediments of the past”¹⁹¹. Here, they use the term

186 “Täheandab, ma ütlesin seda, et etnofuturism saaks asendada konservatismi. Konkreetsetes ajas ja ruumis ideoloogia on strateegiline vahend, mida maailmavaade kasutab. See vastab küsimusele, mida meil on Eestis kahekümne esimesel sajandil vaja rahvusluse seisukohalt.”

187 “Rahvuslus, mille essents hõimutunne on palju vanem asi ja ta on ikkagi nagu inimesele algusest peale omane ja olemas. Inimesed algusest peale ongi jagunenud hõimudeks ja tänapäeva rahvused lihtsalt on nagu selle sellesama asja väljendus.”

188 “Rahvuslus on selline asi, mis peaks laias laastus olema alati relevantne, olenemata ajast ja kohast.”

189 “Neil on vahel sellepärast, et etnofuturism on konkreetne spetsiifiline kultuuriline nähtus kindlas ajas. Aga rahvuslus ei ole. Vähemalt ta on mitme sajandi pikkune. Aga etnofuturism on midagi uut.”

190 “Minu jaoks etnofuturismi üks osa on ikkagi etniline rahvuslus – rahvuse ülimuslikkus.”

191 “Aga etnofuturism on püüdlus või proov luua rohkem elujõulist kahekümne esimese sajandi rahvuslusi, mis on vabanenud mineviku takistustest.”

‘ethnonationalism’ with the broader meaning to which other characteristics can be attributed and which can be considered as a synonym for ‘ethnofuturism’.

Ethnofuturism is to replace conservatism: ethnofuturism is “contrasted with the inertia and half-measures of the traditional conservatives that have brought us this far”¹⁹². The reason why conservatism needs to be substituted by ethnofuturism is that up until now, ethnonationalists have used conservatism¹⁹³, and before that, they have used liberalism¹⁹⁴ as a strategy to achieve ethnonationalist aims, but conservatism is failing ethnonationalists now in achieving the ethnonationalist aims and so, ethnofuturism as a new ideology and as a new strategy is needed for realising these aims¹⁹⁵. Conservatism aims to “defend and conserve”, but ethnofuturism aims to create¹⁹⁶. As mentioned earlier, others regard ‘ethnonationalism’ and ‘ethnofuturism’ more or less as synonyms. This is not surprising as sometimes ethnofuturism is also called ‘ethnofuturist nationalism’¹⁹⁷ and ‘21st-century nationalism’¹⁹⁸ [‘21. sajandi rahvuslus’] and ‘21st-century ethnonationalism’¹⁹⁹ and ‘a new form of nationalism’²⁰⁰. One member emphasises that the concept of ‘ethnofuturism’ “is, fortunately, or unfortunately, still in its early stages – it can be reshaped, alternative interpretations can be created, synthesised, so that in fifty years there will be something much more concrete”²⁰¹. So, the following things, in their opinion, equally describe ethnonationalism as an ideology.

192 “A determined minority with a vision, possessed by a spirit that would always be dynamic and on the attack — contrasted with the inertia and half-measures of the traditional conservatives that have brought us this far.”

193 “Täheandab, ma ütlesin seda, et etnofuturism saaks asendada konservatismi. Konkreetsem ajas ja ruumis ideoloogia on strateegiline vahend, mida sa kasutad, mida maailmavaade kasutab. See vastab küsimusele, mida meil on Eestis kahekümne esimesel sajandil vaja rahvusluse seisukohalt.”

194 “The nationalists of the 19th century were predominantly liberals, as they also usually fought against any ruling system and monarchies that did not relate to national borders.”

195 “Minu jaoks ideoloogia on nagu strateegiline vahend selleks, et maailmavaadet kas siis kehtestada või selle eest seista.” and “Ajalooliselt üheksateistkümnendal sajandil rahvuslased olid pigem liberaalid, sest et siis olid vanad konservatiivsed impeeriumid, mis ei vastanud rahvusriikide piiridele. Kahekümne sajandi esimesel poolel olid parempoolsed radikaalsed ideoloogid. Praegu on konservatiivid. Ja etnofuturismis ma näen võimalust konservatismi asendada millegi muuga, mis vaataks rohkem tulevikku.”

196 “Rather than defend and conserve, it creates.”

197 “For many years I have spoken, both in my home country and abroad, about a new, 21st-century, ethnofuturist nationalism.”

198 “This 21st-century nationalism is not new in essence — it is rather an affirmation of the conclusions that all nationalist leaders and philosophers in every country have come to during all of human history.”

199 “A 21st century ethnonationalist is grounded in his tradition and heritage.”

200 “This cooperation would be based on a completely new form of nationalism — Ethnofuturism.”

201 “Etnofuturism on piisavalt, õnneks või kahjuks, algstaadiumis – saab veel ümber mängida, saab alternatiivseid tõlgendusi luua, sünteesida, et siis viiekümne aasta pärast oleks midagi juba palju konkreetsemat.”

They argue that ‘ethnofuturism’ “addresses the future of the nation: how to navigate present and future challenges while remaining true to oneself and maintaining a connection” with one’s ancestors²⁰². When speaking of ethnofuturism, SÄ emphasises the necessity of combining the connection one has with one’s ethnic heritage, like having an archaic worldview and a connection to one’s ancestral traditions with technological advancements. The idea of ethnofuturism is that if the Estonian nation wants to navigate the future successfully, it needs to rediscover its “ancient tribal mentality and spirituality” and embrace modern technologies like “biotechnology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence”²⁰³. One member delves into the history of the concept:

“The concept of Ethnofuturism was born in Estonia during the Singing Revolution. It was first envisioned as a cultural strategy that would revitalise the ethnic consciousness of Finno-Ugrians in spite of, and even using the means provided by, postmodernity. We, however, will add a political dimension to the concept. That means, we emphasise ethnonationalism — a special relationship of the person to his tribe and country — as the only meaningful opposition to globalism, and Futurism as it was manifested in Italy, both in its artistic freedom and youthful attitude.”²⁰⁴

When speaking of ethnofuturism, SÄ emphasises the cyclical nature of civilisation, as described by their reading of Spengler. The idea of the ‘cyclical nature of civilisation’ [‘tsivilisatsioonide tsüklilisus’] is that a civilisation has a natural life cycle in which “the spiritual rise and exaltation in their beginning has a corresponding spiritual fall near their end”²⁰⁵. They argue that we are currently experiencing an end of one cycle where the “world is breaking apart” and all the “systems are collapsing”²⁰⁶, which they call the ‘decline of the West’ [‘lääne allakäik’]. One member highlighted that “we have now reached a point where

202 “See käsitleb rahvuse tulevikku: kuidas toime tulla oleviku ja tuleviku väljakutsetega, jäädes iseendaks ja kaotamata sidet esivanematega.”

203 “In many ways, we promote a rediscovery of ancient tribal mentality and spirituality, which in no way stand in conflict with modern technology. Advances such as biotechnology, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence will force man to return to a mythical understanding of the world.”

204 “The concept of Ethnofuturism was born in Estonia during the Singing Revolution. It was first envisioned as a cultural strategy that would revitalise the ethnic consciousness of Finno-Ugrians in spite of, and even using the means provided by, postmodernity. We, however, will add a political dimension to the concept. That means, we emphasise ethnonationalism — a special relationship of the person to his tribe and country — as the only meaningful opposition to globalism, and Futurism as it was manifested in Italy, both in its artistic freedom and youthful attitude.”

205 “Thus, in the natural life cycle of civilisations, the spiritual rise and exaltation in their beginning has a corresponding spiritual fall near their end.”

206 “The world is breaking apart. All systems are collapsing.”

we seriously need to consider how to move forward as the current system is simply not sustainable, neither from a social, economic, nor environmental perspective”²⁰⁷. One indicator of the decline of the West is the crisis of immigration in which Europe has transformed “into a conflict zone where European natives are regular victims”²⁰⁸. Even though SÄ embraces the Spenglerian idea of the decline of the West, they reject his fatalism and argue that “the decline of the West has been the one necessary precondition for the rebirth of Europe,”²⁰⁹ which is to be welcomed and embraced as the “future is ethnic”²¹⁰. They claim that despite “the occurrence of an economic collapse or an ecological catastrophe in some part of the world, the nation-state endures” as the nation, language, and culture persist²¹¹. The rebirth of Europe is “the ultimate end goal and conclusion of this chaotic process”²¹². They claim that the ‘rebirth of Europe’ [‘Euroopa taassünd’] or ‘the new Europe’ [‘uus Euroopa’] or ‘new European civilisation’ signifies a new civilisation which is “free from the paradigm of the previous civilization, in the sense that its materialistic emphasis on thought and form will be replaced by an authentic essence” and “this essence will be found in Finno-Ugric as well as Baltic, Slavic, and Germanic ancestral connection with our tribes and our soil”²¹³. They think that Estonians can certainly adapt to the end of civilisation and to the new Europe, as “adaptation is facilitated when you have a closely-knit group that trusts each other, working together towards a common goal” like Estonians in their opinion do, or at least have the potential to²¹⁴.

207 “Siis ma arvan, et nüüd me oleme hakanud jõudma sinna punkti, kus me peame tõsiselt mõtlema selle üle, et kuidas siit edasi minna, sest praegune süsteem lihtsalt ei ole ole jätkusuutlik, ei sotsiaalsest, majanduslikust ega keskkonna perspektiivist kohe kuidagi mitte.”

208 “The deep crisis of our culture — the nihilistic and destructive tendencies of the last centuries — are overshadowed by an even more dangerous crisis of immigration, which means the ethnic transformation of Europe into a conflict zone where European natives are regular victims.”

209 “In fact, if we start looking at the history of the world in the manner our ancestors would have, which is to say, organically, we discover that the decline of the West has been the one necessary precondition for the rebirth of Europe.”

210 “The future is ethnic, because the human species is tribal. And we will be part of the global ethnofuture.”

211 “Ja kuidas nüüd rahvuslus sellega suhestub? Siis hoolimata sellest, et isegi kui majanduskollaps või ökokatastroof juhtub kuski maailma osas, siis rahvusriik jääb alles. Rahvus, keel, kultuur, need ikkagi püsivad.”

212 “And yet we do not suggest turning back time or reversing history, for we see a rebirth as the ultimate end goal and conclusion of this chaotic process.”

213 “The rebirth of Europe free from the paradigm of the previous civilization, in the sense that its materialistic emphasis on thought and form will be replaced by an authentic essence. And this essence will be found in Finno-Ugric as well as Baltic, Slavic, and Germanic ancestral connection with our tribes and our soil.”

214 “Ei tohi alahinnata inimese võimet kohaneda. Ma arvan, et mis iganes ka tulevikus ei oleks, ma arvan, et inimkond ja kindlasti eestlased suudavad sellega kohaneda. Kui palju valu selle kohanemisega kaasneb, ma ei oska öelda. Aga kui nüüd panna siia juurde veel rahvuslik perspektiiv, siis selle kohanemisega aitab kaasa see, kui sul on tihedalt koos töötav teineteist usaldav, üheskoos mingi eesmärgi poole pürgiv rühm. Ma arvan, et see aitab kindlasti kaasa sellega, et see kohanemine toimuks valutult.”

SÄ members see themselves as part of the actors that will bring about this new future for Europe as they want “to be participants in this great cultural and historic struggle over the fate of Europe”²¹⁵. The “rebirth of a civilisation is an ever-present possibility that has to be comprehended and realised”²¹⁶, which means that the rebirth of Europe will not happen without a push from actors towards an ethnic future. There are two alternatives for the future: the “world either is to become one, led by a totalitarian mass culture, or regrow into many — a diversity of unique ethnostates”²¹⁷. It is in the hands of the esoteric vanguard, including SÄ, “to help decide the result”²¹⁸. The actors who would bring about the rebirth of Europe are labelled as ‘the founders’, ‘the nationalist elite’, ‘cultural vanguard’ and ‘esoteric vanguard’. Their task of the esoteric vanguard is to find “a balance between the old traditions and the dynamic energy that propels us into the future”²¹⁹.

To bring about the rebirth of Europe, the European nations have to experience a national awakening. And this, too, has to be brought about by the ethnonationalist esoteric vanguard: they have “to accomplish a national awakening of Europeans”²²⁰ as the “Western civilization itself will not produce an awakening to our true ethnic consciousness”²²¹. By ‘new national awakening’ [uus rahvuslik ärkamine] or the ‘ethnic revival’ [‘rahvuslik taassünd’], SÄ means both the act of the preservation of one’s history and the act of advancement of one’s culture²²². So, this concept is closely related to the concept of ‘ethnic consciousness’. A nation is ethnically conscious when it is able to cherish its heritage and have a meaningful connection to that heritage. A nation is nationally awakening when it is actively also advancing its culture. When speaking of the historical national awakening of the 19th century Estonians, SÄ recalls how Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald composed an epic “Kalevipoeg”:

“Kreutzwald did not simply compile these legends and myths as a curiosity; he saw in them the potential for a truly powerful epic, one that would celebrate the pre-Christian

215 “The struggle begins with ourselves. The men of our generation want to be someone — not a part of the masses, not mere consumers. But this naturally leads to the following task: to be participants in this great cultural and historic struggle over the fate of Europe.”

216 “Therefore, the rebirth of a civilisation is an ever-present possibility that has to be comprehended and realised.”

217 “The world either is to become one, led by a totalitarian mass culture, or regrow into many — a diversity of unique ethnostates. It is in our hands to help decide the result.”

218 “It is in our hands to help decide the result.”

219 “The key for nationalism of this century lies in finding a balance between the old traditions and the dynamic energy that propels us into the future.”

220 “This is a cultural vanguard that has to accomplish a national awakening of Europeans.”

221 “Western civilization itself will not produce an awakening to our true ethnic consciousness.”

222 “We nationalists really need to face this and be brave and contribute to the awakening of our peoples, the preservation of our history, and the advancement of our culture — and to teach these to our children.”

past of the Estonian people and their long history of resistance against outside forces. Kreutzwald knowingly sought to create a powerful symbol of Estonian spiritual and ethnic continuity, a link between the past and the present. He thus saw his mission not merely as that of a compiler of folklore, nor as an author with free poetic license. He believed that all these myths had been part of a single ancient tale, and that his tale had been lost and forgotten over time, with only fragments remaining. Kreutzwald saw himself as taking on the responsibility of restoring the epic to its former glory, just as one rebuilds an old building from the ground up. He was determined to revive the Estonian cultural heritage, which he saw as his duty as an Estonian.”²²³

Their understanding of Kreutzwald’s reasons for his creative work gives a key to understanding what the new national awakening of the Estonian nation would look like. One way in which this can be done is by creating new things like art inspired by one’s heritage. It is important to emphasise that there are two important aspects to understanding ‘ethnofuturism’ and ‘national awakening’. The first aspect of ‘ethnofuturism’ is that it is “about preserving national heritage with modern methods, especially through modern technology”, and the second aspect of ‘ethnofuturism’ is that ethnofuturists should actively seek revitalisation of Estonianness and discover new things and create new national traditions and rituals²²⁴. One member argues that Estonians already have the Estonian Song Festival, but they argue that Estonians should have more such rituals that would have more of “a religious flavour”, for example, something like a state sanctification ritual inspired by Japanese history²²⁵.

SÄ also emphasises that ethnofuturism “recognises the universal inequality of man”, which is the recognition of the idea that “every man is unequal to every other”²²⁶. Not everyone can

223 “Kreutzwald knowingly sought to create a powerful symbol of Estonian spiritual and ethnic continuity, a link between the past and the present. He thus saw his mission not merely as that of a compiler of folklore, nor as an author with free poetic license. He believed that all these myths had been part of a single ancient tale, and that his tale had been lost and forgotten over time, with only fragments remaining. Kreutzwald saw himself as taking on the responsibility of restoring the epic to its former glory, just as one rebuilds an old building from the ground up. He was determined to revive the Estonian cultural heritage, which he saw as his duty as an Estonian.”

224 “Ja mina näen seda võib-olla veidi teistmoodi kui tema. Minu jaoks on see segu etnilisest rahvuslusest ja modernistlikust või kaasaegsest lähenemisest. Uuesti leiutada, luua uut rahvuskultuuri, võib-olla veidi uuemalaadset rahvuslikku müütost. Tema jaoks võib-olla on see rohkem rahvusliku pärimuse hoidmine kaasaegsete meetoditega, eelkõige kaasaegse tehnoloogiaga. See on muidugi tähtis ka, aga samas minu seisukoht on see, et me ei tohiks häbeneda teatud uuenemist või mõnes mõttes eestlase taasleiutamist.”

225 “Ma sain tegelikult inspiratsiooni veidi jaapani ajaloost. Nimelt rahvuslikud rituaalid, eestlaste rahvuslik rituaal on laulupidu. Aga neid võiks rohkem olla ja et nad võiksid olla rohkem religioosse maiguga.

Riigi pühitsemine. Sellised asjad minu jaoks tähendavad ka seda, et peame aktiivselt otsima taas elavdamist, uute asjade leidmist. Traditsioonid, pärimus on oluline, aga kindlasti meil on potentsiaali selleks.”

226 “Ethnofuturism recognises the universal inequality of man — the differentiation. This does not mean discrimination, but the recognition of the facts of reality — every man is unequal to every other. Equality can only be contextual, not absolute.”

become an esoteric vanguard, not everyone can awaken the nation. SÄ argues that inequality allows “the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find” their “place in the organic whole”²²⁷. They call this concept ‘body politics’ [‘rahvuslik keha’]. The idea of ‘body politics’ is that “the nation and the state are like one large organism, with all their components working towards the greater goal of the healthy functioning of the organism”, and within that organism, each part “has its own value, and it should be appreciated” for what it is²²⁸. One member argues that “meritocracy is a positive thing for society” as individuals “best suited for leading positions are appointed based on their merit”²²⁹. However, they also emphasise that as an individual one should not completely overlook one’s responsibility to the collective, to the nation²³⁰. Similar hierarchy is also emphasised when talking about various identity layers, namely, harmony is achieved when “all these layers fit seamlessly into each other” and each layer plays its role²³¹.

Before turning to the theme of national independence, it is important to mention that everything that has been said about ‘ethnofuturism’ and its related concepts is consistent with how Louis Wierenga defined ethnofuturism in his 2017 paper, namely that ethnofuturism “is a nationalist doctrine intended to create a new European civilization based upon identity and roots and led by Eastern Europe” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 12). Wierenga also argues that this “philosophy stresses cooperation between nationalists” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 12), and as the author demonstrated that ethnofuturism is embracing ethnopluralism, this thesis also confirms this claim about ethnofuturism. Wierenga also attributes anti-imperialism, and more specifically, anti-Russian stance to ethnofuturism (Wierenga, 2017, p. 12). He writes that the “driving principle behind” wanting to create a new European civilisation “is that Eastern Europe is caught between two major global spheres of interest: The U.S. and the Russian Federation” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 12) First of all, given that ethnofuturism is an ideology which SÄ members

227 “Universal inequality is a factor that allows the world to be dynamic and to evolve, giving everyone a chance to find his place in the organic whole.”

228 “Rahvas või rahvus ja riik on üks suur organism, millel on kõik oma komponendid, kes nii-öelda töötavad selle suurema eesmärgi organismi tervisliku toimimise nimel. Igal osal sellest rahvuskehast on oma väärtus ja seda tulebki väärtustada.”

229 “Sellepärast, et ikkagi meritokraatia on ühiskonnale ikkagi hea asi. Juhtivatele kohtadele saavad inimesed, kes sinna kõige paremini sobivad.”

230 “Aga samas leian, et me ei tohiks inimestena täielikult kõrvale jätta seda teatud vastutust kollektiivi ees. Eesti-suguse väikerahva puhul on see esmatähtis, et ei unustataks seda, et meil on ikkagi see oma riik, oma rahvas, mille eest me peame enda kõrval ka hoolitsema.”

231 “Harmoonia tuleneb sellest... see aitab väga palju kaasa, et kõik need kihid ilusti sobituvad üksteise sisse ja kõigil on oma roll kanda.”

would want to see other ethnonationalists in different parts of the world embrace too²³², the author would argue that their stance on anti-imperialism should be attributed to ethnofuturism, but their anti-Russian stance is specific to their context and is not part of their understanding of ‘ethnofuturism’, but rather it is their political position which stems from the fact that Russia is imperial and actually poses a threat to Estonian independence. Second of all, there are many other reasons why SÄ are advocating for the creation of the new European civilisation. The author has highlighted some above, and the next section will outline many more reasons.

Ideology of Sinine Äratus: national independence

In the subsequent subchapter, the author introduces the concepts that fall under the theme of national independence. Predominantly, these concepts orbit around the myriad threats perceived by SÄ regarding Estonian national independence. Noteworthy exceptions are ‘freedom of speech’, which expresses a value that SÄ shares, and ‘Intermarium’, which is a political project of SÄ that aims to address and mitigate the threats identified by the other concepts. The theme of national independence encompasses the following concepts: ‘mass immigration’, ‘Great Replacement’, ‘Eurabia’, ‘Afroeuropa’, ‘low birth-rates’, ‘liberal democracy’, ‘totalitarian ideology’, ‘freedom of speech’, ‘the hate speech act’, ‘liberalism’, ‘left-liberalism’, ‘globalism’, ‘Western consumer society’, ‘market economy’, ‘imperialism’, ‘Russia’, ‘Intermarium’. The author will sequentially introduce these concepts and elucidate the relationships among them.

The concepts of ‘mass immigration’, ‘Great Replacement’, ‘Afroeuropa’, ‘Eurabia’, and ‘low birth-rates’

The concept of ‘national independence’ is closely related to the concept of ‘nation-state’ [‘rahvusriik’]. It was established that the nation-state has two distinct tasks: it is to be a homeland to an ethnic population, and its aim is to help realise ethnic continuity. And it was established that by ‘national independence’ SÄ means the ability of a nation-state to determine its own future. The national independence of an Estonian nation-state is threatened by various forces, according to SÄ: mass immigration, low birth-rates, ideologies like liberalism, leftism, and globalism, which “seek to strip us of our heritage and turn us into a homogeneous mass”

232 “I firmly believe that my message speaks to all nationalists around the world. For many years I have spoken, both in my home country and abroad, about a new, 21st-century, ethnofuturist nationalism.”

society²³³, liberal democracy, organisations like that of the European Union and its various institutions, capitalism, the Western civilisation and imperialist forces like Russia.

By ‘mass immigration’ [‘massiimmigratsioon’], they mean the influx of non-European people to Estonia. They argue that the biggest threat of immigration to the European nation-states’ “is not Islamic terrorism but precisely the fact that we become a minority, as it directly leads to the inability to preserve our culture”²³⁴. And as “Estonia is the only place in the world where heritage, language, and culture of Estonians can endure forever”, Estonians ought “to halt mass immigration” as this is the only way the Estonian nation can “remain the majority on this land.”²³⁵ The reason why ethnic Estonians must stay a majority in Estonia is that “when another nation, both numerically and culturally, dominates in your own country, you actually have no means to ensure the preservation of your culture.”²³⁶ SÄ is opposed to immigration generally; an indication of this is that they have expressed their worry about Estonia integrating Ukrainian refugees into Estonian society²³⁷ and about allowing people here not as Ukrainian refugees but as cheap labour²³⁸. They argue that the “emphasis of support programs should be directed towards temporarily assisting refugees and facilitating their eventual return to their home country”²³⁹. However, overall, they are mostly worried about immigration from non-European nations. One member has indicated in their speech that non-European immigrants should not be allowed to come to Estonia:

“I asked a new person who wanted to join our movement in Estonia why is he against immigration. “Migrants bring instability, they bring conflict, they are bad for the economy.” – Is this your only argument? “Well the Islamic migrants bring attack vans and Sharia law and everything.” – Is this still your only argument? “Look, I have rape statistics, crime records, look at all the numbers.” – So I ask are you even a nationalist? “Why, of course I am, I oppose immigration, you see.” – Then what about hard-working

233 “Our ethnic continuity is threatened by the forces of modernity and globalization, who seek to strip us of our heritage and turn us into a homogeneous mass.”

234 “Kõige suurem oht ei ole islamiterrorism, vaid konkreetset ongi see, et me jääme vähemusse, sest tegelikult see viib väga otseselt selleni, et ma ei suuda enam oma kultuuri säilitada.”

235 “Eesti on ainus koht maailmas, kus eestlaste pärand, keel ja kultuur saavad igavesti kesta ja selleks, et eesti rahvus jääks sellel maal enamusrahvusena alles, pole muud võimalust kui massiimmigratsioon peatada.”

236 “Kui sul juba su enda maal mingi teine rahvas domineerib nii arvuliselt kui kultuuriliselt, siis sul ei olegi tegelikult enam vahendeid, millega tagada seda, et su kultuur püsiks.”

237 “Ühegi integratsiooniprogrammi eesmärgiks ei tohi olla sõjapõgenike alaline kinnistamine ei siinsesse eesti- ega venekeelses kogukonda.”

238 “Samuti tuleb üle vaadata seni kergekäeliselt odavtööjõule väljastatud elamisload.”

239 “Toetusprogrammide rõhk tuleb suunata põgenike ajutiseks toetamiseks ning nende tulevaseks tagasipöördumiseks oma kodumaale.”

Japanese migrants? No terrorism, no Sharia law, no rape gangs, higher than average IQ? Your arguments are not the reason you oppose immigration, you see. So what about the fact that the migrants just aren't European? That they aren't us? How's that for an argument?"²⁴⁰

Furthermore, they argue that mass immigration is not only threatening the ethnic continuity of Estonians in Estonia but also White nations in Europe more broadly, as European nations are seen as being replaced by other races and ethnicities. One member writes that:

"The influx of foreign populations that began in Europe in the 1960s, if it continues in its current form, is predicted to result in indigenous populations becoming minorities in most Western European countries by the 2050s-2060s. In the United States, the white population is expected to become a minority by the 2040s, with whites already being a minority among children born today."²⁴¹

They label this process as 'Great Replacement' and the result of this process as 'Afroeuropa' and 'Eurabia'. According to the Great Replacement theory, white native Europeans are being replaced by non-native non-white peoples²⁴². They argue that "in the great cities of Western Europe, native Europeans are already a minority" and "the French, Germans, Swedes, and Dutch will be a minority in their own countries by 2060 or 2070"²⁴³. They claim that this is happening "because of EU's catastrophic immigration policies"²⁴⁴. One member wants to emphasise that Afroeuropa and Eurabia "are not conspiracy theories but rather clear demographic projections within the next 30-40 years".²⁴⁵ By 'Afroeuropa' they mean a Europe

240 "I asked a new person who wanted to join our movement in Estonia why is he against immigration. "Migrants bring instability, they bring conflict, they are bad for the economy." – Is this your only argument? "Well the Islamic migrants bring attack vans and Sharia law and everything." – Is this still your only argument? "Look, I have rape statistics, crime records, look at all the numbers." – So I ask are you even a nationalist? "Why, of course I am, I oppose immigration, you see." – Then what about hard-working Japanese migrants? No terrorism, no Sharia law, no rape gangs, higher than average IQ? Your arguments are not the reason you oppose immigration, you see. So what about the fact that the migrants just aren't European? That they aren't us? How's that for an argument?"

241 "Euroopas 1960ndatel alanud võõrrahvaste sissetung viib praegusel kujul jätkudes prognoositavalt selleni, et 2050–2060ndatel jäävad põlisrahvused enamikus Lääne-Euroopa riikides vähemusse. USA-s jääb valge elanikkond vähemusse 2040ndatel; praegu sündivate laste hulgas on valged juba vähemuses."

242 "Ma defineeriks seda niimoodi, et see on demograafiline protsess mis on suundumus sellele, et eurooplased jäävad oma kodumaades vähemusrühmaks."

243 "Liberals call this a "conspiracy theory" — despite the fact that it is obvious to everyone that in the great cities of Western Europe, native Europeans are already a minority. According to the pure demographic data, the French, Germans, Swedes, and Dutch will be a minority in their own countries by 2060 or 2070."

244 "This is due to the EU's catastrophic immigration policies that they are forcing not only on their own countries but on every single Member State."

245 "Eurabia või Afroeuropa pole vandenõuteooriad, vaid selge demograafiline projektsioon 30–40 aasta jooksul."

dominated by African people and their descendants; by ‘Eurabia’ they mean a Europe dominated by people from Arabic countries and their descendants. They say that these concepts “are the expressions about the dystopia that awaits in the future if Europeans become a minority in their own countries”²⁴⁶. SÄ tries to distance themselves from the concept of ‘white identity’. One member wanted to emphasise that when they “use the word ‘white’ [‘valge’], it is just a symbol, it does not in any way define the essence of the matter”²⁴⁷. They elaborate that “geneticists have discovered that around ten thousand years ago, during the Stone Age, Europeans were likely to have darker skin than they do now”, but “they still fall under the category of the white race, regardless of the actual skin colour”²⁴⁸. And they add that when they “talk about race in the biological sense, it is a genetic cluster where specific genetic groups belong, without a clear boundary, but rather a transition.”²⁴⁹ It is more so interesting that SÄ wants to distance itself from using ‘white identity’ as one member of SÄ emphasised in its early days, in 2016, that “whenever two white nations together face something that is not white, they will see that eventually it is better to work together” (Wierenga, 2017, p. 15) and it can be argued that they introduced the idea of ‘white identity’ into EKRE’s discourse.

Other than the immigration threatening to change the demographic composition of the population in Estonia, another threat Estonia faces, according to SÄ, is low birth-rates²⁵⁰. The idea is that low-birth rates threaten Estonians to go extinct in the future. Estonian nation-state’s task is to secure the ethnic continuity of Estonians “even a thousand years from now.”²⁵¹ Given this, SÄ argues that the “natural population growth of the Estonian people must rise to a level where we can sustainably reproduce our ethnicity”²⁵². When speaking of ‘low birth-rates’ [‘madal iive’], SÄ is distinctly speaking about the low birth-rates of Estonian ethnic people not having enough kids and, thus, the Estonian ethnic population not growing enough²⁵³. They

246 “Need on väljendid selle düstopia kohta, mis siis tulevikus ees ootab, juhul kui eurooplased jäävad vähemusse oma maades.”

247 “No see, kas me kasutame sõna valge, see on lihtsalt ju sümbol, see ei ole mitte kuidagi selle asja sisu.”

248 “Geneetikud on avastanud, et kiviajal mingi kümmekond aastat tagasi eurooplased olid tõenäoliselt tumedama nahaga, kui praegu. Käib vaidlus, et kui palju tumedama. Aga nad samamoodi on selles mõttes osa valgest rassist, olenemata sellest, et mis on tegelik nahavärv.”

249 “Kui me nüüd räägime rassist, bioloogilisest mõistest, siis see on geneetiline klaster, kuhu siis mingid kindlad geneetilised grupid kuuluvad, millel ei ole ei ole ühte selget piiri, vaid on üleminek.”

250 “See ma arvan, ikkagi kajastub päriselus kohe kindlasti, et meil on kõik materiaalsed eeldused olla edukas, tugev, toimiv ühiskond, ja ma ei väida seda, et ühiskond praegu ei toimiks, aga et mis saab tulevikus, siis üheks probleemiks on kindlasti populatsiooni kahanemine. See on tõsine mure.”

251 “Eesti Vabariik on loodud meie rahvuse püsijäämise nimel. Sellest tulenevalt on riigi üks tähtsamatest eesmärkidest kindlustada, et meie maal elaks eestlasi ka tuhande aasta pärast.”

252 “Eesti rahva loomulik iive peab tõusma vähemalt tasemele, kus suudame oma rahvust taastoota.”

253 “Meie eesmärk on eestlaste sündivuse tõstmine ja, eriti silmas pidades rahvusülikooli olemust, vaimse potentsiaali maksimeerimine.”

argue that the Estonian nation-state is failing at its task of securing the ethnic continuity of Estonians – the social security of young families is getting worse, so no-one should be surprised “why young people don’t want children anymore”.²⁵⁴ Instead, the nation-state should, first, value families by recognising that the families are “one of the main carriers of Estonian identity”²⁵⁵, and second, the nation-state should “create conditions that support establishing a family”²⁵⁶, for example, by “a tax and support policy that favours large families”²⁵⁷. One member argues that if Estonia does not mitigate this threat, then the Estonian nation has no chance of solving other societal problems it faces²⁵⁸.

The concepts of ‘liberal democracy’, ‘totalitarian ideology’, ‘freedom of speech’, ‘the hate speech act’, ‘liberalism’, and ‘left-liberalism’

Ethnonationalism is opposed to liberal democracy, globalism, liberalism and left-liberalism, as they are considered to be “hostile forces, as their actions are directed towards weakening other layers of identity in favour” of the identity of human species.²⁵⁹ ‘Liberal democracy’ [‘liberaaldemokraatia’] is an umbrella term encompassing ideologies like liberalism, conservatism and social democracy²⁶⁰. First, liberal democracy – and by extension the three ideologies – accept the humanist dogma and the idea of human rights, which SÄ rejects²⁶¹. Liberal democracy “does not recognise the soul of any nation and considers nationality as a

254 “Iseseisvat elu alustavatel noortel ei tohiks olukorda keerulisemaks muuta, et pärast inestama, et miks küll on depressioon ühiskonnas levinud kui katk või, et “miks noored enam lapsi ei taha.”

255 “Sellele aitab kaasa suuri perekondi soosiv maksu- ja toetuspoliitika ning perede tunnustamine riigi tasandil, avalikkuses ja kultuuris eestluse ühe peamise kandjana.”

256 “Rahvusriik peabki aitama selle põlvkondadevahelise sideme hoidmiseks, mis rahvuskultuuri kõige kindlamalt edasi annab. See eeldab tänapäeval eesti keele arendamist, et ta püsiks konkurentsivõimeline inglise keelega (nt teaduskeelena, aga ka noorte kõnepruugis). See eeldab perede väärtustamist ning selliste tingimuste loomist, mis aitavad pere rajamist.”

257 “Sellele aitab kaasa suuri perekondi soosiv maksu- ja toetuspoliitika ning perede tunnustamine riigi tasandil, avalikkuses ja kultuuris eestluse ühe peamise kandjana.”

258 “Sellepärast, et sellest asjaolust, kas meil on piisavalt inimesi, sõltub kõik muu. Ei lahene majanduskriisid, haridus ei lahene. Kliimakriis, keskkonna kriis – ükski neist ei lahene ilma selleta, et meil oleks piisavalt inimesi seda kriisi lahendama. Ja praegu lihtsalt tundub, et, et inimesed ei võta seda piisavalt tõsiselt.”

259 “Sellest seisukohast on vaenulikeks jõududeks vasakpoolsus ja liberalism, kuna nende tegevus on suunatud teiste identiteedikihide nõrgestamisele liigi tasandi kasuks.”

260 “Tooksin näite ideoloogiate kohta, et kui võtta see praegu läänemaailmas valitsev poliitiline paradigma, siis see on liberaaldemokraatlik. Aga selle sees on põhimõtteliselt kolm konkureerivat ideoloogiat mis on liberalism, konservatism, sotsiaaldemokraatia. Need on aktsepteeritud liberaaldemokraatia raamistik. Liberaaldemokraatia on laiem või sügavam raamistik.”

261 “Dogma, mille kohaselt inimsus on olulisem nii hõimust kui ka elusloodusest, ei lase end sellest aga kõigutada. Tegu on lääne liberaaldemokraatlikku süsteemi väga sügavalt sisse istutatud ideega, mis sellegipoolest on võõras loodusrahvastele, kelle hulka vaimsuselt tuleb lugeda ka soomeugrilased ja baltlased.”

social construct”²⁶². Liberal democratic ideology does not consider the ethnic continuity and the endurance of Estonians as a majority ethnicity as fundamentally national objectives.²⁶³ Instead, it values the “mixing and melting of nations, producing rootless global citizens”²⁶⁴. They argue that “the ultimate goal of liberal democracy is a global supermarket”²⁶⁵. Liberal democracy, in their opinion, has totalitarian tendencies like communism, fascism²⁶⁶ and cultural Marxism²⁶⁷. By ‘totalitarian ideology’ [‘totalitaarne ideoloogia’], they mean the aspect of ideology that tries to limit the freedom of expressing the beliefs that go against the ideology. They argue that the “reason why liberal democracy is totalitarian is, among other things, that it attempts to clearly define permissible discourse in the public sphere”, and this “gives rise to terms such as political correctness and hate speech.”²⁶⁸ One member writes that the totalitarian nature of liberal democracy becomes apparent when considering the fact that “one of the great theorists of liberal democratic ideology, Karl Popper, has said that a tolerant society must not tolerate intolerance”.²⁶⁹ Another indicator of the totalitarian nature of liberal democracy is what they call ‘the deep state’ which means that the “political, ideological, business, and media interests” are intertwined²⁷⁰.

Such a paradigm, in SÄ opinion, has enabled liberal democratic countries like Estonia to start curtailing freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is one of the most important values of SÄ. By ‘freedom of speech’ [‘sõnavabadus’], they mean the ability to express one’s opinion publicly even if this opinion goes against the values of the mainstream, i.e., against the liberal democratic paradigm of the Estonian state. They argue that “if freedom of speech is genuinely

262 “Ideoloogiat, mis ei tunne ühegi rahvuse hinge ja peab rahvust sotsiaalseks konstruktsiooniks.”

263 “Eesti rahvuse tulevik, püsima jäämine, meie peremehetunne sellel maal, meie enamusrahvusena kestmine – need ei ole selle ideoloogia järgi põhimõtteliselt riiklikud eesmärgid.”

264 “Aga piiride avamine Aafrikale ja Aasiale, rahvuste segamine ja kokku sulatamine, juuretute maailmakodanike tootmine – need kõlbavad eesmärgiks küll.”

265 “Mitte kumbki ei salli etnilist rahvuslust, üks rõhutab totaalset individualismi, teine terve inimkonna kollektivismi – kommunismi lõppeesmärk on globaalne Gulag, liberaaldemokraatia lõppeesmärk on globaalne supermarket – tegelikult suurt vahet ei ole.”

266 “Mechanistic ideologies have one thing in common — the total instrumentalisation of the perceived world and man to some sort of ultimate Will, as is the case with totalitarian ideologies like liberalism, communism or fascism.”

267 “This system is interested in the uprooting of people, which communists practiced by physically deporting the people outside their homelands; but the ‘soft’ totalitarianism of Cultural Marxism does this in a more ‘attractive’ way — with the help of mass culture, which at the same time works as a social compensation for a loss of dignity and any real meaning of life.”

268 “Liberaaldemokraatia on totalitaarne muuhulgas sel põhjusel, et see üritab väga selgelt piiritleda lubatavat mõttevahetust avalikus ruumis. Sealt tulevad sellised terminid nagu poliitkorrektsus ja vihakõne.”

269 “Ka liberaaldemokraatliku ideoloogia üks suuri teoreetikuid Karl Popper on öelnud, et salliv ühiskond ei tohi sallimatust sallida.”

270 “Liberaaldemokraatliku poliitilise klassi totalitaarne olemus ehk nn süvariik, mis seisneb poliitiliste, ideoloogiliste, äri- ja meediahuvide omavahelises läbipõimitusel.”

respected, it must apply equally to socialists as well as to Nazis, liberals as well as supporters of Juche”²⁷¹. One way in which the Estonian government has been trying to curtail freedom of speech is by introducing what they call ‘the hate speech act’ [‘*vihakõne seadus*’]²⁷². An important thing to mention is that, like many other people opposing this law in Estonia, they often call this act ‘*vihakõne seadus*’ instead of referring to the act as ‘*vaenukõne seadus*’. In the Estonian language ‘*viha*’ [‘the feeling of hate’] is a noun that expresses a feeling, whereas ‘*vaen*’ in ‘*vaenukõne seadus*’ refers to ‘*vaenu õhutama*’ [to inflict hate’], which is a verb. One member claims that freedom of speech is in danger because “adults want laws that emphasise emotions”²⁷³. Furthermore, they claim that liberal democratic societies are more and more emphasising political correctness, and because of this political correctness, there are “a whole series of questions that are fundamental from the perspective of national interests but are very difficult to raise in Western countries”, questions like the low birth-rate, “cultural decline and stagnation, dysgenics”, increasingly also the question of “pride in one’s history and its awareness, and, of course, immigration issues.”²⁷⁴

Liberalism, in their opinion, is also “totalitarian because it does not tolerate competing metaphysics — it tolerates nothing that challenges its hedonistic utility”²⁷⁵. ‘Liberalism’ [‘liberalism’] denotes an ideology which has declared competing “ideologies as an absolute evil” and which pathologises “all signs of European national pride”.²⁷⁶ According to the principles of liberalism, every country belongs to everyone, but in SÄ-s opinion, this means that, thus, “every country” belongs “to no one”.²⁷⁷ Liberalism has nothing good to offer; it only offers “sold-out homelands, broken communities and a stolen future”.²⁷⁸ Liberalism, like Marxism, is centred around human species, however, liberalism “fights all remaining layers of

271 “Tõepoolest, kui sõnavabadust päriselt austada, peab see ühtviisi kehtima nii sotsidele kui natsidele, liberaalidele kui Juche pooldajatele.”

272 “Jah, väga ohus vaenukõne seaduse pärast.”

273 “Jah, sest täiskasvanud inimesed tahavad tunnete rõhuvaid seaduseid.”

274 “On terve rida küsimusi, mis on rahvuslike huvide seisukohast fundamentaalsed, aga mida lääneriikides on väga keeruline tõstatada, sest selline teemapüstitus ei ole poliitkorrekne. Sellised küsimused on näiteks enamike Euroopa riikide madal sündivus, kultuuriline allakäik ja mandumine, düsgeenika, üha rohkem ka uhkus oma ajaloo üle ja selle teadvustamine, ja loomulikult immigratsiooniküsimused.”

275 “Liberalism is totalitarian because it does not tolerate competing metaphysics — it tolerates nothing that challenges its hedonistic utility.”

276 “Besides, it has become a monopolistic ideology, declaring competitive ideologies as an absolute evil and pathologising all signs of European national pride.”

277 “Therefore, ours is a rebellion against the principles of liberalism, which see every country as belonging to everyone — and thus to no one.”

278 “Liberalism offers us sold-out homelands, broken communities and a stolen future.”

identity” and “simultaneously praises the individual”.²⁷⁹ Liberalism and globalism are one side of the same coin – when liberalism emphasises the layer of individual identity, then globalism emphasises the layer of human species above other layers – what “unites globalism and liberalism is the downplaying of the importance of those intermediate layers of identity”.²⁸⁰

By ‘left-liberalism’ [‘vasakliberalism’] SÄ means the postmodern version of liberalism, which mixes liberalism with cultural Marxism.²⁸¹ More specifically, according to SÄ, ‘left-liberalism’ perceives “an individual's inherent gender, physique, language, and culture /.../ as externally imposed chains, and true freedom is only possible by overcoming these constraints” and the “ultimate goal envisions a seamless flow of identities (gender, race, subculture) and liberation from external, oppressive chains that are independent of the individual’s will, including liberation from the constraints of the human body and other external factors.”²⁸² They claim that cultural Marxists or neo-Marxists believe that “the rule of so-called liberal European values” is a historical inevitability, and it is a “march towards the end of history”²⁸³. SÄ also argues that leftist liberals promote green environmental policies not because of their “desire to preserve the environment but rather from the goal of solidifying their political power and the current multicultural and hedonistic, materialistic consumer culture, which undermines” nations and their values²⁸⁴. In other words, left-liberalism hides in every step its true agenda.

279 “Nii liberalism kui marksism on liigikesksed, marksism võitleb kõigi ülejäänud identiteedikihide vastu, sama teeb liberalism, kuid ülistab sealjuures üksikisikut.”

280 “Nad on hetkel poliitiliselt ühes klastris. Liberaalid on tihti ka globalistid. Globalism on vaade, mis poliitilisel tasandil on see soov kehtestada ülemaailmseid poliitilisi struktuure. See vaade seostub antropotsentrismiga hästi tugevalt. See seab inimese tasandi teistest kihidest kõrgemale. Liberalismi keskmes on kindel arusaam vabadusest, mis on määratletud lääne individualismi kaudu. Vabadus just isiklike huvidest, et see on see kõige kõrgem väärtus. Mis selles on hästi määrav, on just üksikisiku identiteedikihid kõige kõrgemaks. Siin tekib kohe küsimus, et kuidas ta saab globalismiga koos toimida. Selles mõttes saab, et et kuna need on nagu ühe jada kaks otsa. Niisugune tavapärane käsitlus, et kõige väiksem identiteedikihid, millest me alustame, on üksikisik. Mis globalismi liberalismi ühendab, on nende vahepealsete identiteedikihide alatahtsustamine. Aga seal on omakorda veel väga huvitavad nüansid, liberalismis, et kuidas nad üldse üksikisikut näevad ja defineerivad või et mille kaudu ja mulle tundub, et lõppkokkuvõttes läbi materiaalsete huvidest. Et mitte läbi sellise sügava vaimse või ka teadvuse.”

281 “At the same time, this liberalism and its postmodern version, which is strongly mixed with Cultural Marxism, strive towards an inclusive totalitarian utopia, one that would allow the world once and for all to transform into a globe without borders, nations and families.”

282 “Sellise käsitluse järgi on inimese sünnipärane sugu, füüsiline, keel ja -kultuur väljastpoolt pealesurutud -ahelad ja tõeline vabadus on võimalik vaid nende kiuste. Lõpptulemus näeb ette hõõrdumatut (soo-, rassi-, subkultuuri-) identiteetide voolavust ning vabanemist inimkehast ja muudest välistest, subjekti tahtest sõltumatutest ja seetõttu -rõhuvatest ahelatest.”

283 “Should we take the rule of so-called liberal European values as a historical inevitability, and as a march towards the end of history, as the neo-Marxists would have it?”

284 “Lõppkokkuvõttes ei tulene vasakliberaalide motiiv “roheline” plaani läbisurumiseks soovist keskkonda säilitada, vaid pigem eesmärgist kinnistada nende poliitilist võimu ja praegust multikultuursuset ning hedonistlikku, materialistlikku tarbimiskultuuri, mis õhustab meie rahvusi ja väärtusi.”

The concepts of 'globalism', 'Western consumer society', 'Eastern Europe', 'conservatism', 'market economy', 'Imperialism', 'Russia' and 'Intermarium'

By 'globalism' ['globalism'] they mean "the form of capitalism prevailing in the early 21st century".²⁸⁵ Globalism has penetrated many aspects of people's lives, it is "in a position of power in international politics, mass media, Western education systems, and global financial capital".²⁸⁶ Globalism aims to create a connected world and by doing that it is "a threat to global cultural diversity, sustainable environmental conservation, and the sovereignty of nation-states".²⁸⁷ First, cultural diversity is something which SÄ finds as one of their most important values²⁸⁸ and as globalism works against cultural diversity, it creates "a mentally empty, rootless, and solely convenience-driven mass culture that does not belong anywhere".²⁸⁹ Second, natural habitats are destroyed "to produce products for consumers living on the other side of the planet".²⁹⁰ Third, the "globalist value system has subjugated the foundational values of European nation-states".²⁹¹ Instead of states the global economy "is regulated by global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank /.../ and regional alliances like the European Union, which increasingly assert themselves as higher authorities than sovereign states".²⁹² They further argue that the

"conflict between globalism and nationalism is the most intrinsic conflict in Europe and North America, the resolution of which determines the rebirth of European self-consciousness, the ability to assert oneself in one part of the world, and the survival of indigenous peoples in countries particularly affected by waves of immigration."²⁹³

285 "Kolmandat, 21. sajandi alguses valitsevat kapitalismi vormi tuntakse ka globalismi nime all ja see on tõepoolest ülemaailmne."

286 "Sisemised ohud on tingitud sellest, et globalism on jõupositsioonil nii rahvusvahelises poliitikas, massimeedias, Lääne haridussüsteemis kui globaalses finantskapitalis."

287 "Mittemarksistlikult (ja ka filosoofiliselt parempoolselt) positsioonilt on võimalik tänapäeva globaalset kapitalismi tugevalt ja karmilt kritiseerida kui ohtu maailma kultuurilisele mitmekesisusele, jätkusuutlikule keskkonnahoiule ja rahvusriikide suveräänsusele."

288 "Globalism, in its pursuit of a connected world, brushes aside the delicate nuances of true cultural diversity. The call for a universal identity overshadows the uniqueness of each nation."

289 "Kultuuri valdkonnas võitleme me vaimselt sisutühja, juurtetu ja ainuüksi mugavusest motiveeritud ei-kuhugi-kuuluva massikultuuriga."

290 "Sedalaadi kapitalismi "toimivus" ilmneb massilises rahvastikurändes "tööjõu vaba liikumise" sildi all, looduslike elupaikade hävitamises planeedi teises otsas elavale tarbijale toodete valmistamiseks ning valdavalt USAst pärit telesaadete, videomängude, sotsiaalsete normide ja suhtlemiskultuuri maailmavallutuses."

291 "The globalist value system has subjugated the foundational values of European nation-states."

292 "Seda reguleerivad riikide asemel globaalsed institutsioonid nagu IMF ja Maailemapank ning regionaalsed ühendused nagu Euroopa Liit, mis aina enam kehtestavad end suveräänsetest riikidest kõrgema autoriteedina."

293 "Konflikt globalismi ja rahvusluse vahel on Euroopas ja Põhja-Ameerikas kõige olemuslikum konflikt, mille lahendusest sõltub eurooplaste eneseteadvuse taassünd, võimekus end ühes maailmaosas kehtestada ning põlisrahvaste ellujäämine immigratsioonilaines eriti palju kannatanud riikides."

As mentioned earlier, globalism or capitalism has created a mass consumer culture that brings about and is the result of a 'Western consumer society'. By 'Western consumer society' ['lääne tarbimisühiskond'] or 'Western declined well-being society' ['lääne mandunud heaoluühiskond'], or 'soulless global consumer society' ['hingetu ülemaailmne tarbimisühiskond'], or 'meaningless society', or 'soulless mass' ['hingetu mass'], or 'rootless mass' ['juurtetu mass'], or 'grey consumer mass' ['tarbijate hall mass'] they mean all the societies affected by globalism, especially in the Western world²⁹⁴. However, they argue that "it is hard to blame those who have grown up within" consumer society, "because they have never known anything better", especially as they are experiencing a "profound identity crisis" for they "all know there is a terrible lack of something fundamental"²⁹⁵. Nevertheless, they claim that all is not lost for these rootless global consumer societies, as the ethnic spirit is inherent to each individual²⁹⁶ and by (re)creating the connection to one's heritage, one can regain one's connection to one's nation, and by getting one's roots back, one can overcome this identity crisis²⁹⁷. Moreover, even though they claim that globalism has penetrated all societies, they differentiate between the Eastern European countries and Western Europe as Eastern Europe has maintained a more conservative stance and so has a better chance at overcoming the ills of globalism: "It can be quite a culture shock for an ordinary Eastern European conservative to encounter what they call "Western values," and for an ordinary Western European liberal to encounter what we call "European values" here"²⁹⁸. In this context, by 'Eastern European countries', they mean to include both Central and Eastern European countries. By 'conservatism' ['konservatism'] they mean to say that nationalism is seen as healthy in these countries, and it accompanies the belief that nationalism "is necessary for a country and a people to sustain itself"²⁹⁹. Earlier, it was claimed that the decline of the West is

294 "This lack gives rise to a profound identity crisis, not only in the Western world but everywhere, because globalism infects all cultures. Some cultures, such as that of Communist China, follow an older strain of globalism, but they all are part of a soulless global consumer society."

295 "When the mixing of cultures and races creates a meaningless society, it is hard to blame those who have grown up within that society, because they have never known anything better. And yet deep inside, they all know there is a terrible lack of something fundamental. This lack gives rise to a profound identity crisis, not only in the Western world but everywhere, because globalism infects all cultures."

296 "Jah, alati on võimalik oma juuri teadvustada."

297 "Kõige suurem piirang on lihtsalt see, et me ei julge mõelda nii vabalt kui saaks. Me oleme konditsioneeritud sotsiaalselt, kultuuriliselt, igasugu eri tasanditel. Tõenäoliselt suur hulk inimesi, enamus neist ei jõua sellise taipamise või arusaamiseni. Aga mida rohkem neid on, seda suurem protsent jõuab selleni ja imed juhtuvad alati. Võimalus on alati."

298 "It can be quite a culture shock for an ordinary Eastern European conservative to encounter what they call "Western values," and for an ordinary Western European liberal to encounter what we call "European values" here."

299 "In one part of Europe nationalism is healthy; it is necessary for a country and a people to sustain itself."

the one necessary precondition for the rebirth of Europe³⁰⁰. Another precondition for the rebirth of Europe is the national revival of Eastern European nations, which have the potential to transform the whole of Europe. They claim that the West is declining and the East is not, as Eastern Europe, as was just mentioned, has retained its conservatism. To bring about the rebirth of Europe, Eastern European countries need to unite and become “both a new pole of power and a new centre for Europe, eventually supplanting the declining Western European states”³⁰¹.

They differentiate ‘globalism’ or ‘capitalism’ from ‘market economy’ [‘turumajandus’]. Economic inequality is considered to be inherent “to the market economy to some extent, as individuals inevitably differ in their abilities and opportunities”.³⁰² This understanding of economic inequality ties to their understanding of universal inequality of man mentioned earlier as they emphasise that “adult, capable individuals are responsible for their own well-being”³⁰³. Given this, they value private ownership and the market economy, which they think should be protected³⁰⁴. However, at the same time, they argue that the government should play “a crucial role in protecting the country and its people from the negative side effects of market economy, such as monopolies and market failures”³⁰⁵, as well as “the oppression by a financial cartel of private banks”³⁰⁶. Furthermore, they “consider it necessary to achieve a more equal distribution of tax revenues between the national, county, and local government levels”³⁰⁷. They also argue that the state should support young families and regional development in the countryside by “supporting local (small and medium-sized) businesses”³⁰⁸. So, their economic position is left-leaning. Their economic position is consistent with Buštková’s contention that

300 “In fact, if we start looking at the history of the world in the manner our ancestors would have, which is to say, organically, we discover that the decline of the West has been the one necessary precondition for the rebirth of Europe.”

301 “The final goal would be this bloc becoming both a new pole of power and a new centre for Europe, eventually supplanting the declining Western European states.”

302 “Sealjuures ei kritiseerinud nad üksnes majanduslikku ebavõrdsust kui sellist, mis teatud määral kuulub alati turumajanduse juurde, kuna inimesed on paratamatult oma võimete ja võimaluste poolest ebavõrdsed.”

303 “Täiskasvanud teovõimelised inimesed vastutavad ise oma heaolu eest ja tehtud vigadest tuleb õppida, et neid enam mitte korrata.”

304 “Eraomandit ja turumajandusel põhinevat süsteemi tuleb kaitsta, sest just seeläbi saame olla oma maal peremeesteks.”

305 “Samas on valitsusel tähtis roll, et kaitsta riiki ja rahvast turumajanduse negatiivsete kõrvalnähtude nagu monopolide ja turutõrgete eest.”

306 “Valdav osa maailma rahvaid on rõhutat erapankade finantskartelli poolt, kes oma tohutu võimu kaudu kontrollivad keskpankade rahapoliitikat ja seeläbi riikide majandust.”

307 “Peame vajalikuks maksutulude võrdsemat jaotust riigi, maakonna ja omavalitsuse tasandi vahel.”

308 “Esmatähtis on kohalike (väikeste ja kesksuurte) ettevõtete toetamine, eelkõige maakohtades.”

the East European radical right is economically more left-leaning compared to the radical right elsewhere (Buščíková, 2018, p. 802)³⁰⁹.

SÄ ties ‘globalism’ with ‘imperialism’ [‘imperialism’], which, in their opinion, are “the twin enemies of nationalism”.³¹⁰ Globalism aims to create a global society with one identity, and it does that by destroying the individuality of each nation’s identity, and imperialism aims to dominate the conquered nations and impose their culture upon them, and thus is destroys the individuality of the conquered nation’s identity:

“Globalism, in its pursuit of a connected world, brushes aside the delicate nuances of true cultural diversity. The call for a universal identity overshadows the uniqueness of each nation. As the world becomes a global supermarket, the voices of small communities become silent in the cacophony of the masses. Imperialism, on the other hand, advances by conquest, seeking dominion over lands and hearts alike. It reaches far and wide, imposing its will upon cultures and peoples. The call for domination destroys the uniqueness of each nation, leaving a trail of shattered identities in its wake.”³¹¹

More specifically, by ‘imperialism’, they mean the state’s allure to imperial conquest of other nations and their lands by expanding their sphere of influence to these other nations and lands³¹². The main imperial power which SÄ writes and talks about is Russia. They argue that the “greatest and most decisive security risk factor for Estonia is the immediate proximity of Russia”³¹³ as geopolitically, “Russian imperialism is inevitably interested in expanding its sphere of influence as far west as possible”³¹⁴. They support this interpretation by emphasising that “Russia not only identifies itself as the successor to the Soviet Union” and “continues to

309 Mudde argues that this is also true more generally about radical right – he argues that “the populist radical right is not ‘right’ in the classic socio-economic understanding of the state versus the market” as in “practice, most populist radical right parties support a hybrid socio-economic agenda, which combines calls for fewer rules and lower taxes with economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism, i.e. protection of the national economy and support for welfare provisions for ‘natives’ (only)” (Mudde, 2017, p. 27).

310 “The only way for those nation-states to survive as unique European homelands is to stand uncompromisingly against the twin enemies of nationalism: globalism and imperialism.”

311 “Globalism, in its pursuit of a connected world, brushes aside the delicate nuances of true cultural diversity. The call for a universal identity overshadows the uniqueness of each nation. As the world becomes a global supermarket, the voices of small communities become silent in the cacophony of the masses. Imperialism, on the other hand, advances by conquest, seeking dominion over lands and hearts alike. It reaches far and wide, imposing its will upon cultures and peoples. The call for domination destroys the uniqueness of each nation, leaving a trail of shattered identities in its wake.”

312 “We must guard against the homogenizing force of globalism and resist the allure of imperial conquest.” and “We must guard against the homogenizing force of globalism and resist the allure of imperial conquest.”

313 “Suurim ja määravaim ohutegur Eestile on Venemaa vahetu naabus.”

314 “Geopoliitiliselt on Vene imperialism vältimatult huvitatud oma mõjusfääri laiendamisest nii kaugele läände, kui võimalik.”

occupy Estonia's Pechory region and Ingria”, but Russia also suppresses the self-determination aspirations of Finno-Ugric peoples who are Estonian tribe members³¹⁵.

SÄ argues that Estonia is “facing a world divided into playgrounds of imperialist superpowers, where the only hope for the survival of small nations lies in forming strong regional blocs.”³¹⁶ The bloc, to which Estonia should belong to, in their opinion, is what they call ‘Intermarium’ [‘Intermaarium’]. This geopolitical project aims to unite the Central and Eastern European nations against Western globalism and Russian imperialism³¹⁷. There are two reasons why Central and Eastern European countries could form an alliance; the first reason is that “Estonia’s national interests overlap to a significant extent with the Central and Eastern European nations that have emerged from communism”³¹⁸, the second reason is that because of this similar past³¹⁹, they are “predominantly characterised by nationalist and traditionalist views”³²⁰. Not only would this alliance unite Central and Eastern European nations against Western globalism and Russian imperialism, but it would also be able to save nationalist Europe³²¹. The three purposes of Intermarium are the united “struggle against Russian imperialism, supporting the nationalism and self-determination of indigenous peoples suffering from Russian influence, and the defence of common national values” in these countries³²².

They argue that currently, the “fate of Europe is being decided in Ukraine, and it is not only a matter of whether Russian imperialist aggression will cease or continue, but also a question of

315 “Venemaa mitte ainult ei identifitseeri end Nõukogude Liidu järglasena, vaid ka okupeerib endiselt Eestile kuuluvat Petserimaad ja Ingerit ning surub maha meie soome-ugri sugulasrahvaste enesemääramispüüdeid.”

316 “Me seisame taas silmitsi imperialistlike suurriikide mängumaaks jaotatud maailmaga, kus väikeriikide ja -rahvaste ellujäämise ainsaks lootuseks on koondumine tugevateks regionaalseteks blokkideks.”

317 “See tähendaks Euroopa Liidu asemele uue alliansi loomist, mis ühendaks omavahel neid Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riike, kes on valdavalt rahvuslike ja traditsionalistlike vaadetega ning suudaks ühise blokina vastu seista Lääne globalismile ja samuti Vene imperialismile.”

318 “Estonia's national interests overlap to a significant extent with those of all the nations in Central and Eastern Europe that have emerged from communism.”

319 “Tugevdame koostööd samameelsete ning sarnase ajaloolise kogemusega Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikidega ning anname oma panuse Intermariumi idee ja Kolme Mere Algatuse tugevdamiseks ja populariseerimiseks nii Eestis kui ka laiemalt.”

320 “See tähendaks Euroopa Liidu asemele uue alliansi loomist, mis ühendaks omavahel neid Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riike, kes on valdavalt rahvuslike ja traditsionalistlike vaadetega ning suudaks ühise blokina vastu seista Lääne globalismile ja samuti Vene imperialismile.”

321 “Ühinenud Intermarium võib olla võti rahvusliku Euroopa päästmiseks, kuna Lääne-Euroopas jääb puhtpoliitiliste vahenditega olukorra muutmiseks võimalusi iga aastaga vähemaks ja seda juba demograafilistel põhjustel.”

322 “Initsiatiiv koondab enda taha rahvuslasi ja organisatsioone kelle ühisteks eesmärkideks on Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa riikide vaheline Intermariumi liit, võitlus Vene imperialismi vastu, Vene mõju all kannatavate põlisrahvaste rahvusluse ja enesemääramise toetamine ning ühiste rahvuslike väärtuste kaitsmine meie riikides.”

how we envision the cooperation of European nations decades from now”³²³. The idea is that if Ukraine, as the main supporter and promoter of Intermarium³²⁴, comes out of the war stronger, then other Central and Eastern European nations would want to associate themselves with Ukraine. Thus, the future of this project would be successful: from “the ruins and ashes of Ukrainian cities emerges a new Phoenix – a new Europe, which core and heart is Intermarium”³²⁵. If Ukraine comes out of the war weaker, then no one would want to associate with Ukraine, and thus, the project would probably not even come to fruition.

Ideology of Sinine Äratus: environment

In this subchapter, the author introduces the theme of environment along with its related concepts. SÄ considers the extinction of species a great problem that Estonia as a society should actively address. This theme exhibits various connections to the previous themes. For instance, SÄ considers the Estonian nation to be inherently linked to the Estonian ecosystem. Consequently, they posit that the continuity of the Estonian ecosystem is intertwined with the continuity of the Estonian nation. The underlying idea is that for the Estonian nation to thrive, active preservation of the Estonian ecosystem is imperative. SÄ even tie anti-immigration to their environmental position; namely, they argue that from the environmental perspective one ought to be against immigration as immigrants do not care for the local ecosystems as indigenous people do. All in all, the theme of environment encompasses the following concepts: ‘climate change’, ‘extinction of species’, ‘biodiversity’, ‘heritage landscapes’, ‘national-conservative environmental politics’, ‘conservatism’, ‘connection to nature’, ‘balance between nature and people’, ‘sustainable forest management’, and ‘ecosystem’. The author will introduce these concepts and elucidate the relations between these concepts in turn.

The concepts of ‘climate change’, ‘extinction of species’ and ‘biodiversity’

SÄ consider climate change as a real issue that we are faced with. One member writes:

“Climate change is already visible. Species are dying, heatwaves are becoming more frequent, and changes in currents have caused tropical cyclones. The more carbon dioxide oceans absorb, the more acidic the water becomes, leading to the death of fish

323 “Euroopa saatus otsustatakse Ukrainas ja otsustatakse mitte üksnes see, kas Venemaa imperialistlik agressioon peatub või jätkub, aga ühtlasi otsustatakse, kas ja millisel kujul näeme Euroopa rahvaste koostööd aastakümnete pärast.”

324 “Kõige aktiivsemalt seisavad Intermariumi loomise eest Ukraina rahvuslased, aga see idee on järjest populaarsem ka Poolas, Ungaris ja Baltimaades.”

325 “Ukraina linnade varemeist ja tuhast kerkib uus Fööniks – uus Euroopa, mille tuumaks ja südameks on Intermarium.”

and corals. The death of coral reefs results in extreme tidal waves that devastate coastal cities. Due to global warming, Antarctica is melting, and the thermal expansion is causing sea levels to rise. At this rate, we may have to move from Tallinn to Munamägi in 50 years.”³²⁶

However, they argue that participation “in global climate policy must not occur at the expense of Estonia’s sovereignty”; nevertheless, they “consider international cooperation important for preserving the natural environment”³²⁷. When talking about ‘the decline of the West’ and the end of the current civilisation being triggered by the environmental crisis, they talk about environmental crises as happening “in some part of the world”³²⁸, and when Estonians can figure out Estonian environmental problems, then Estonians are all good. The reason for this is that Estonians “cannot influence the world on a global scale very much”, but what Estonians can do is look at their behaviour locally as they “can actually make a significant impact for” themselves³²⁹.

When talking about environmental policies, they emphasise that Estonia should focus instead of talking about ‘climate change’ on its local environmental problems with biodiversity, and more specifically, seek solutions to the problem of the extinction of species³³⁰. ‘Biodiversity’ [‘ökoloogiline mitmekesisus’] means the amount of variety of species within an ecosystem. The reason for focusing on ‘the extinction of species’ [‘liikide väljasuremine’] is that they claim it is a more pressing matter compared to climate change³³¹, although they recognise that the extinction of species and global warming are interlinked and reinforcing one another³³². They emphasise that “an inevitable ecological catastrophe awaits us”³³³:

326 “Kliimamuutust on näha juba praegu. Liigid surevad, tihenevad kuumalaineid ja muutused hoovustes on põhjustanud troopilised tsüklonid. Mida rohkem süsihappegaasi ookeanid koguvad, seda happelisemaks läheb vesi ning kalad ja korallid surevad. Korallrahude surm põhjustab ekstreemseid tõusulaineid, mis laastavad mereäärseid linnu. Globaalse soojenemise tõttu antarktika sulab ning soojusliku paisumise tõttu meretase tõuseb. Sellises tempos peame 50 aasta pärast Tallinnast Munamäele kolima.”

327 “Globaalses kliimapoliitikas osalemine ei tohi toimuda Eesti suveräänsuse arvelt, küll aga peame oluliseks rahvusvahelist koostööd looduskeskkonna hoidmisel.”

328 “Ja kuidas nüüd rahvuslus sellega suhestub? Siis hoolimata sellest, et isegi kui majanduskollaps või ökokatastroof juhtub kuskil maailma osas, siis rahvusriik jääb alles.”

329 “Me ei me ei saa maailma mastaabis väga palju mõjutada. Aga mida me saame teha, on vaadata siin kohapeal meie käitumist. Eelistada ühistransporti, sorteerida prügi. Sellest me saame ise tegelikult enda jaoks palju.”

330 “No kui sa küsid mõne ökoloogi käest, mis on kõige suurem oht praegu maailmas liikide mitmekesisusele, siis number üks probleeme ei ole kliimakriis, vaid on elupaikade kadu.”

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332 “Kliima muutus, on üks asi, mis saab seda võimendada, aga on väga palju asju veel.”

333 “Ma ütlen teile otse, mida see tähendab: meid ootab paratamatu ökoloogiline katastroof.”

“Even if the Western world were to reject neoliberalism and turn off the consumption taps, it wouldn't be of much help. The world is no longer Western-centric: over 80% of oceanic plastic waste comes from Asia and India. Asia also contributes to over half of the greenhouse gas emissions. This is just the beginning; China, with its rapidly growing consumer society, is poised to surpass us soon. Through foreign investments, they have started shifting their production to Africa. The industrialization of Africa will be a painful reality for all of us. I'll tell you straight: an inevitable ecological catastrophe awaits us.”³³⁴

This aligns with the views of the average radical right. Schwörer & Fernández-García argue that radical right parties are “less willing to accept the necessity to fight climate change than are other party groups” and they “are the only party family that on average explicitly rejects climate policies” (Schwörer & Fernández-García, 2023, p. 19). However, there are three strategies that radical right parties adopt to climate change policies. The first strategy is to “reject climate protection, but consider climate change as an important issue”, the second strategy is to “address the issue and accept the necessity of acting against global warming, maintaining a low profile”, and the third strategy is to “refuse to address the issue in their” manifesto (Schwörer & Fernández-García, 2023, p. 20). SÄ, even though it is not a party, when it comes to climate change, they fall into the first category as they criticise policies which address climate change, but they do think that climate change is an important issue. However, their views on environmentalism, ecological crisis and their emphasis on the problem of the extinction of species are not uncommon among radical right parties. Radical right parties which emphasise ethnonationalism “tend to stress environmental protection to a greater extent” compared to radical right parties that emphasise populism “which tend to express skepticism towards the “climate change lobby”” (Timofejevs, 2020, p. 1). More so, ecologism is not uncommon to radical right ideology (Macklin, 2022). Lubarda argues that the ideas of radical right of today on the environment are not new, instead, they stem “from nineteenth-century writings on the environment, predominantly the *völkisch* and ethnonationalist traditions that contributed to the coinage of the eco-fascist ‘Blood and Soil’ concept” (Lubarda, 2021, p. 124)

334 “Isegi siis, kui läänemaailm hülgaks neoliberalismi ja keeraks tarbimiskraanid kinni, poleks sellest suurt tolku. Maailm pole enam ammu läänetsentriline: Aasiast ja Indiast pärineb üle 80% ookeanides ulpiv prastikprügi. Aasia toodab ka üle poole kasvuhoonegaasidest. See on alles algus, Hiinas on aina kasvav tarbimistühiskond mis varsti ületab meid. Välisinvesteeringute kaudu on nad hakanud oma tootmist Aafrikasse lükkama. Aafrika industrialiseerumine saab meile kõigile valus tõehetk olema.”

The concepts of ‘ecosystem’, ‘heritage landscapes’, and ‘wildlife’

SÄ sees the continuity of an Estonian ecosystem as linked to the continuity of the Estonian nation, as they claim that the local people and the local nature are interdependent:

“Ethnic continuity, as we shall see, is fundamentally related to the continuity of our ecosystem, because every country is an ecosystem where its nature is fundamentally interdependent and its people are one part of that — and ethnic continuity is a great symbol of the ever-present potential of our environment and of our planet to heal themselves and continue the circle of life from times immemorial into everlasting rebirth. It is the spirit of nature that is present throughout the human species, underlying and regenerating all of human history.”³³⁵

This interdependence is illustrated by reference to the concept of ‘heritage landscapes’ [pärandmaastikud]. In their program, SÄ writes that a “significant part of cultural landscapes consists of semi-natural habitats: coastal meadows, flood meadows, wooded meadows, and pastures, the formation and biodiversity of which have been made possible only through long-term care and livestock farming”³³⁶. As nature and the landscape shape the nation³³⁷, they have to be preserved if we want to maintain the cultural differences of people³³⁸, and so Estonians too, if they want to preserve their culture, they have to preserve their nature and landscapes, as there “can be no Estonian culture without the untouched solitude of vast forests, wetlands and the long Baltic coastline”³³⁹.

They also relate ethnonationalism with love for the ecosystem that the nation is part of:

335 “Ethnic continuity, as we shall see, is fundamentally related to the continuity of our ecosystem, because every country is an ecosystem where its nature is fundamentally interdependent and its people are one part of that — and ethnic continuity is a great symbol of the ever-present potential of our environment and of our planet to heal themselves and continue the circle of life from times immemorial into everlasting rebirth. It is the spirit of nature that is present throughout the human species, underlying and regenerating all of human history.”

336 “Lisaks puutumata loodusele on Eesti kultuuri ja olemuse säilitamiseks ülioluline pärandmaastike hoidmine. Need on kujunenud aastatuhandete jooksul inimese ja looduse harmoonilises koostöös ning peegeldavad ühtviisi eestlaste minevikku ja sisemaailma. Pärandmaastike säilitamiseks on vaja ühelt poolt väärtustada ja toetada rahvuslikku taluarhitektuuri ning põllumajanduse jätkumist, teiselt poolt tutvustada ja taasavastada traditsioonilisi eluviise. Suure osa pärandmaastikest moodustavad poollooduslikud kooslused: ranna-, luha-, puisniidud ja -karjamaad, mille kujunemine ja liigirikkus on võimalikuks saanud üksnes tänu pikaajalisele hooldusele ja karjakasvatusele.”

337 “Nationalists in these countries understand that a nation and its culture are born out of their surroundings. The landscape, climate and nature has shaped us for generations into what we are.”

338 “In addition, the nature and landscapes of Europe have to be preserved, as those are vital to the cultural heritage and differences between people.”

339 “There can be no Estonian culture without the untouched solitude of vast forests, wetlands and the long Baltic coastline, as there can be no Romanian culture without the purity and magnificence of the Carpathian mountains.”

“We will truly understand nationalism when we see it as a love for the entire ecosystem that sustains us. This love is rooted in a deep appreciation for the natural world, which was celebrated by our ancestors as a source of inspiration, beauty, and spiritual renewal. In this view, our love for our country is not merely a matter of one’s political or social allegiance, but is rather a reflection of our deepest spiritual and cultural values. These values are rooted in a sense of connection to the land, to the natural world, and to the cosmic forces that sustain us.”³⁴⁰

Caring for the ecosystem or nature is related to caring for the homeland: “the best motivation for environmental protection is the love for” one’s homeland as one wants “to see it beautiful, clean, in order”³⁴¹. More broadly, “the protection of the Estonian living environment is inseparably linked to the defence of Estonian identity; they are united by the same struggle against a rootless global urbanised dystopia”³⁴². When they talk about ‘nature’ [‘loodus’], then they talk about the forests, the swamps, and the landscape, which means that ‘nature’ and ‘ecosystem’ [‘ökosüsteem’] are treated as synonyms, as ‘ecosystem’ is usually understood as the collection of all the species as well as the abiotic factors like the landscapes within the region. They sometimes talk about ‘wildlife’ [‘elusloodus’], which refers to all living beings like people, animals and insects.

The concepts of ‘national-conservative environmental policies’, ‘conservatism’, ‘connection to nature’, and ‘sustainable forest management’

In some contexts, SÄ emphasise conservatism; in others, they differentiate themselves from conservatism. Earlier, the author suggested that ‘ethnofuturism’ is proposed as a strategy that would substitute ‘conservatism’, as ethnofuturism better addresses 21st-century problems compared to conservatism. However, when speaking of environmental politics or family values³⁴³, they emphasise that their environmental views are guided by conservatism. In this

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341 “Minu jaoks on kõige parem motivatsioon keskkonna kaitseks on armastus oma kodumaa vastu. Tahan näha, et see oleks ilus, puhas, korras – kõike seda.”

342 “Eesti elukeskkonna kaitsmine on lahutamatu seotud eestluse kaitsmisega, neid ühendab üks ja sama võitlus juurtetu globaalse linnastunud düstopia vastu.”

343 “Konservatiivse naisena ma ei soovi, et keegi teine minu lapsi kasvataks, eriti veel ajal mil koolides uusi peremudeleid õpetatakse või TikTokis tantsib onu, kes arvab, et on naine.”

context, ‘conservatism’ [‘konservatism’] means “preserving, valuing, and developing that which contains eternal positive value”³⁴⁴. One thing which they emphasise that needs to be preserved, valued and developed is nature³⁴⁵. They claim that valuing nature is inherent to the Finno-Ugric value system as Finno-Ugric people are people of nature. In this value system, humanity is not more important than the tribe and wildlife like it is in the liberal democratic value system³⁴⁶; instead, mutual “respect and interaction with the surrounding wildlife are inherently fundamental to Estonians”³⁴⁷. They also emphasise that the “land belongs to all the indigenous life, not just to humans”³⁴⁸. For example, in their program, they argue that “it is important to consider both the environmental and landscape aspects when implementing large infrastructure projects by constructing tunnels and eco-bridges as needed to minimise the impact on wildlife”.³⁴⁹

In their program, SÄ states that “Sinine Äratus supports a conservative environmental politics”³⁵⁰. By ‘conservative environmental politics’ [‘konservatiivne keskkonnapoliitika’] they mean policies which aim to “preserve the natural environment, biodiversity, and heritage landscapes” and which foster “a relationship between humans and nature based on mutual respect”³⁵¹. There are two main reasons for preserving the natural environment, biodiversity, and cultural landscapes of Estonia. First, environmental politics “helps the nation live in a good environment, be healthy”³⁵². Second, nature is part of the cultural heritage of Estonians, and

344 “Olla konservatiiv tähendab hoida, hindada ja arendada seda, mis sisaldab igavikulist positiivset väärtust.”

345 “Loodus on minu silmis lahutamatu osa mõlemast kategooriast.”

346 “Dogma, mille kohaselt inimsus on olulisem nii hõimust kui ka elusloodusest, ei lase end sellest aga kõigutada. Tegu on lääne liberaaldemokraatlikku süsteemi väga sügavalt sisse istutatud ideega, mis sellegipoolest on võõras loodusrahvastele, kelle hulka vaimsuselt tuleb lugeda ka soomeugrilased ja baltlased.”

347 “Modernne tarbimisühiskond on väga paljus üles ehitatud teiste elusolendite väärkohtlemisele inimese mugavuse ja heaolu tarbeks. Selline ühiskond on kaotanud oma hinge, eemaldudes austusest kõige elava vastu ja tasakaalust loodusega. Vastastikune austus ja suhtlemine ümbritseva elusloodusega on eestlastele ürgomane.”

348 “Me hoiame Eesti maad ja loodust, mis on üles kasvanud meie esivanemad ja pärandame selle tulevastele põlvedele, teades, et see maa kuulub kõigele siin põliselt elavale, mitte vaid inimestele.”

349 “Samuti tuleb nii keskkonna kui maastikuilmega arvestada suurte taristuprojektide rajamisel, ehitades vajadusel tunnelid ja ökodukte, et minimeerida elusloodusele tekitatav kahju.”

350 “Sinine Äratus pooldab konservatiivset keskkonnapoliitikat, mille eesmärgiks on Eesti looduskeskkonna, liigirikkuse ja pärandmaastike säilitamine ning vastastikust austustest kantud suhe inimese ja looduse vahel.”

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352 “Kindlasti ma arvan, räägime sellest veel, et näiteks keskkonna või kliimapoliitika, kuidas iganes seda tahetakse nimetada, siis mis aitab rahvusel elada heas keskkonnas, olla tervislik.”

cultural heritage is necessary for cultivating one's ethnic consciousness³⁵³ as we "cannot remain Estonians if we do not have this land"³⁵⁴. Third, Estonians should preserve cultural heritage for future generations to save them from rootlessness, i.e., from lacking ethnic consciousness. In their own words:

"The Estonian environment and landscapes are an inseparable part of our common heritage alongside language and national culture. Since ancient times, the Estonian people have drawn spiritual strength, physical nourishment, and cultural inspiration from the surrounding nature. The untouched nature, clean water and air, and dispersed settlement that have survived in Estonia to this day are rare worldwide. Our obligation is to preserve them for future generations as a counterbalance to the consumer frenzy and ecologically unsustainable welfare societies that have gripped the world. Protecting the Estonian living environment is inseparably linked to the defence of Estonian identity; they are connected by the same struggle against rootless global urbanised dystopia. Love for one's land and people is the strongest motivation for preserving nature!"³⁵⁵

Their program also says that every "Estonian child must have the opportunity to spend their childhood in nature"³⁵⁶. The reason is that they emphasise the importance of connecting to nature. By 'connection to nature' ['side loodusega'], they mean a person's connection to the forest³⁵⁷, to the soil³⁵⁸, to the land³⁵⁹ and landscapes³⁶⁰. One way in which Estonians can cultivate harmonious interaction with nature is by looking after the Estonian heritage landscapes. This can be done by "valuing and supporting national rural architecture and the

353 "I can never take this degenerate Western civilization seriously or lament its downfall because as an Estonian – and the same goes about Finns – the spirit of my people was never part of this West. We never lost our connection with nature, with our land, with our mythology."

354 "Me ei saa eestlasteks jääda, kui meil ei ole seda maad."

355 "Eesti keskkond ja maastikud on eraldamatu osa meie ühisest pärandist keele ja rahvuskultuuri kõrval. Juba iidsetest aegadest on eestlane ümbritsevast loodusest ammutanud vaimset väge, füüsilist kosutust ja kultuurilist inspiratsiooni. Eestis tänase päevani säilinud puutumata loodus, puhas vesi ja õhk ning hajaasustus on kogu maailmas haruldased. Meie kohustus on neid säilitada tulevaste põlvete jaoks kui vastukaalu maailma haaranud tarbimishullusele ja ökoloogiliselt jätkusuutmatuile heaoluühiskondadele. Eesti elukeskkonna kaitsmine on lahutamatu seotud eestluse kaitsmisega, neid ühendab üks ja sama võitlus juurtetu globaalse linnastunud düstoopia vastu. Armastus oma maa ja rahva vastu on kõige tugevam ajend looduse kaitsmiseks!"

356 "Igal eesti lapsel peab olema võimalus veeta lapsepõlv looduses."

357 "Nad kasutavad loodust, et oma olematut enesehinnangut kasvatada. Kuidas sa saaksidki hoolida millestki, millega sul sidet pole?"

358 "By connecting to our soil and our forefathers, we align ourselves with a universal order."

359 "We never lost our connection with nature, with our land, with our mythology."

360 "Ja [suhtel] maastikega."

continuation of agriculture” and “rediscovering traditional ways of life”³⁶¹. The balance between humans and nature can also be cultivated by reconnecting with forests. They argue that the “connection between Estonian identity and the forest must be re-established and revitalised”; thus, “the natural landscapes and greenery should be easily accessible to all Estonian people”³⁶². However, they caution that building “a friendship with the local forest may take time”, but over time, one can “gain a genuine understanding of what it means to care for nature”³⁶³. The third way in which Estonians can seek balance with nature is by not exploiting natural resources. SÄ, in their program, supports sustainable forest management³⁶⁴. When talking about ‘sustainable forest management’ [‘jätkusuutlik metsamajandamine’] they emphasise that Estonian forests as “Estonia’s natural heritage must not simply become one of many industries from which endless profits are extracted”³⁶⁵ to feed “the growing demand and mass consumption of the world”³⁶⁶, instead, harvest “volumes and methods must preserve the integral value and biodiversity of Estonia’s forests”³⁶⁷. However, it is important to mention that one member of SÄ is less critical of current forest management³⁶⁸.

When talking about other specific environmental policy measures, each key member’s opinion differs. One member emphasises the importance of individual responsibility: “You have to start with smaller, simple things that are easy to implement. For example, just throw your cigarette butt in the trash, right? Sort your waste.”³⁶⁹ But they also talk about the policies that could be implemented by the government and local municipalities. First of all, the local government should “support people in sorting their waste and ensuring that as much as possible goes into

361 “Pärandmaastike säilitamiseks on vaja ühelt poolt väärtustada ja toetada rahvuslikku taluarhitektuuri ning põllumajanduse jätkumist, teiselt poolt tutvustada ja taasavastada traditsioonilisi eluviise.”

362 “Eestluse ja metsa igavene suhe tuleb taasluua ning äratada uuele hingamisele. Loomulik loodus ja roheline olgu kõigile Eesti inimestele kergelt kättesaadavad.”

363 “Kohaliku metsaga sõbrunemine võib võtta aega, kuid peale hingerahu saad sa ka tõeliselt aru, mida tähendab loodusest hoolimine.”

364 “Metsamajandus peab olema jätkusuutlik metsa enda jaoks – siis on ta jätkusuutlik ka majanduslikult. Raiemahud ja -meetodid peavad säilitama Eesti metsa tervikliku väärtuse ja liigirikkuse, laiaulatuslik lageraie ei ole sobiv üheski Eesti nurgas.”

365 “Kuigi metsa majandusliku realiseerimise võimalused on kaugele arenenud, ei tohi Eesti looduslik pärand muutuda lihtsalt üheks mitmetest majandusharudest, millest lõputult kasumit koorida.”

366 “Eesti metsa ülesanne ei ole toita maailma kasvavat nõudlust ja massitarbimist.”

367 “Raiemahud ja -meetodid peavad säilitama Eesti metsa tervikliku väärtuse ja liigirikkuse, laiaulatuslik lageraie ei ole sobiv üheski Eesti nurgas.”

368 “Metsasektor on viimased aastad saanud ainult kriitikat – küll raiutakse liiga palju, ei kaasata otsustesse kohalikke, lõpuks jõuame linnade parkidesse, kus ei tohi puid maha võtta, oksa ka mitte kärpida. Üllatuslikult on kisa veelgi suurem kui elekter on kadunud, sest puud või võsa on liinis või juhtub õnnetus mil pargis viibinud inimene sai kannatada, st puuga pähe. Uudistes rõhutatakse, et suurfirmade omanikud mõjutavad kindlasti poliitikat ja ainult negatiivses suunas ehk – raiuda, raiuda, raiuda!”

369 “Tuleb alustada väiksematest lihtsatest asjadest, mida on lihtne rakendada. Näiteks lihtsalt see, mida sa indiviidi tasemel ära viskad. Koni viska prügikasti, eks ole. Sorteeri prügi.”

recycling”; for example, they should “provide these opportunities for people living in apartment buildings, so that you have separate bins for bio-waste, glass packaging, metal packaging, and so on”³⁷⁰. Second of all, the government should impose stricter “punishments for environmental pollution”³⁷¹. And third of all, the government should work against car-centric infrastructure development³⁷² and instead support rail transportation, as a “train is not only an environmentally friendly mode of transportation but, in some ways, it also serves as a lifeline for small rural areas”³⁷³. Another member is primarily concerned about the future of the forests, and a third member does not really see how their ethnonationalist views are related to environmental politics.

All in all, they tie together immigration and conservative environmental politics and claim that Estonia should take a stance against immigration as immigrants coming here do not care for our nature like Estonians do, as only Estonians can love their homeland and the love of nature is the love of homeland³⁷⁴:

“Immigration must also be rejected from an environmental standpoint. Large masses of people arriving in our continent, for example, show little concern for the conservation of endangered species in Europe. No, their only interest is to adopt the most materialistic, superficial, and amoral consumer culture. Their interest is to accumulate as much money, Canada Goose jackets, and Air Jordans as possible. In all of this, they naturally demand housing, and before you know it, that mystical fairytale forest where you played as a child is turned into concrete to build more grey and soulless apartment buildings for people who have no interest in you or the fate of your land in the slightest.”³⁷⁵

370 “Ja siis, kuidas seda saab näiteks riik kohaliku omavalitsuse või riigi tasandil toetada, et inimesed sorteeriksid prügi ja võimalikult palju läheks taaskasutusse. Näiteks tuleks pakkuda need võimalused kortermajades elavatele inimestele, et sul oleks biojäätmekonteiner, klaaspakend, metallpakend, kõik need.”

371 “Üks seisukoht, mis mul näiteks on, on see, et karistused looduse saastamise eest peaksid olema märgatavalt rangemad.”

372 “Ja üks asi, millega ma lähen EKRE peavooluga vastuolule on see, et minu seisukohast peaks korralikult pidurit tõmbama autotumisele.”

373 “Rong ei ole mitte ainult keskkonnasõbralik transpordiviis, vaid on ka mõnes mõttes väikestele maakohtadele elutingimus. Väikesed külad, alevid, linnukesed, mis on kõige elujõulisemad, on ikkagi need, mis jäävad suuremate raudtee trasside peale.”

374 “Minu jaoks on kõige parim motivatsioon keskkonna kaitseks on armastus oma kodumaa vastu.”

375 “Ka immigratsioon tuleb keskkonna vaatepunktist tagasi lükata. Suured inimmassid, kes meie maailmajakku saabuval, ei hooli näiteks Euroopa ohustatud loomaliikide säilitamisest. Ei, nende ainus huvi on omaks võtta kõige materiaalsem, tühisem ja moraaltum pinnapealne tarbimiskultuur. Nende huvi on koguda võimalikult palju raha, Canada Goose jopesid ja Air Jordani tossusid. Kõige selle juures nõuavad nad loomulikult eluaset ja enne kui arugi saate, on see müstiline muinasjutumets, kus te lapsena mängisite, betooni valatud, et ehitada juurde rohkem halle ja hingetuid korterelamuid inimestele, keda ei huvita teie ega teie maa käekäik vähimalgi määral.”

Such an argument is not uncommon for radical right ideology, as there are radical right groups who make similar claims. Macklin describes this radical right rhetoric:

“Nature and nationalism are intrinsically linked. The basic building blocks of race and nation rest upon accepting that the nation is ringfenced by “natural” borders within which a unique “native” population resides that requires defence against the depredations of “invasive species” from outside. Migrants, being “nomadic” rather than “rooted,” have no organic bond with their host country, lacking the essential connection through “blood and soil” in classic Nazi parlance, and thus, it is argued, care little for the natural environment or indeed any other aspect of national heritage. They are despoilers, not preservers of nature.” (Macklin, 2022, pp. 979- 980)

Conclusion


In this chapter, the author reconstructed the morphology of the ideology of SÄ. Under the theme of ethnonationalism, first, the author discussed how SÄ understands the meaning of ‘ethnonationalism’ and ‘nation’. To SÄ, a nation is necessarily ethnic. To indicate this understanding, the author had titled this theme ‘ethnonationalism’ rather than ‘nationalism’. SÄ understands ‘nation’ as consisting of an ethnic group which shares genes, language and culture. The ideal political system for a nation is a nation-state, which is to be the homeland of the nation. The homeland allows the nation to have its roots in the land of this homeland. Rootedness is an important factor for an individual to have an ethnic identity that allows the individual to be and feel like part of the national collective. The rootedness comes from an individual’s connection to their heritage. When an individual has a connection to their heritage, they can be described as ethnically conscious. According to SÄ, human nature is such that any individual needs and wants to belong to a community. In their opinion, the nation is the most natural community one can be part of. They call this the ethnic identity or tribal identity. In the context of Estonians, SÄ also emphasises that Estonians, Hungarians and other Finno-Ugric people are part of the Finno-Ugric tribe, a collective which unites the Finno-Ugric people. Finno-Ugric people share a Finno-Ugric value framework, which is contrasted to the Western value framework, which encompasses humanism and the idea of human rights, which are seen as more important than nations’ collective rights. Since Finno-Ugric people in Russia are the tribe members of Estonians with whom they share a value framework, they deserve the support of Estonians in their self-determination aspirations. The self-determination of people is an important value of SÄ. In an ideal world, they would see all nations with self-determination

aspirations having their own independent nation-states. SÄ can be described as embracing ethnopluralism, which is the idea that the plurality of distinct ethnic nations should be preserved and their distinct features should be valued as “mixing of different ethnicities leads only to cultural extinction” (Rydgren, 2018, p. 26). The ideology of SÄ can also be described by using the concept of ‘ethnofuturism’. Ethnofuturism is understood as an ideology that should replace conservatism as an accompanying ideology of ethnonationalism. In the context of ethnofuturism, ethnonationalism can be understood as a synonym for embracing and valuing one’s tribal identity. Ethnofuturism is a strategy for realising the ethnonationalist aims that stem from the broader understanding of ethnonationalism, namely, the preservation and continuation of the nation through time. SÄ embraces the Spenglerian idea of the cyclical nature of civilisation. They believe that the Western civilisation is coming to an end and the Eastern European ethnonationalists will bring about the new European civilisation. For this rebirth of Europe to happen, the European nations need to experience a new national awakening.

Under the theme of national independence, the author introduced what SÄ consider threats to the Estonian nation and its national independence. First, SÄ considers immigration and low birth-rates as threatening the demographic composition of the Estonian ethnic nation. Mass immigration threatens Estonians as an ethnic majority in their homeland. They claim that when this happens, Estonians cannot preserve their culture. This threat is not something only Estonia faces, but they argue Europe more broadly faces too. The process of white natives being replaced by non-Europeans is labelled as the ‘Great Replacement’. They also argue that low birth-rates threaten Estonian ethnic continuity as the Estonian population is not growing enough. Another threat which Estonia faces is ideological. Namely, liberal democracy, globalism, liberalism and left-liberalism are considered hostile forces to ethnonationalism. Liberal democracy, in their opinion, exhibits a totalitarian nature. One way that it is expressed is that liberal democratic countries – countries that have embraced liberal democratic ideology – have started to curtail freedom of speech by mainly targeting expressions of ethnonationalist values. They also consider liberalism as a totalitarian ideology which claims that every country belongs to everyone and which overemphasises the layer of individual identity over other collective layers of identity, including ethnic identity. Left-liberalism is, in their opinion, a postmodern version of liberalism, which mixes liberalism with cultural Marxism. SÄ understands ‘globalism’ as a synonym for ‘21st-century capitalism’. Globalism values the layer of human identity over other collective layers of identity, including ethnic identity. Globalism

has created a Western consumer society, which contributes to the decline of the West, something SÄ do not want Estonia to be associated with –the West is liberal, and the East, to which Estonia belongs to, is conservative. Another threat which Estonian national independence faces is Russian imperialism, as Russia is interested in expanding its sphere of influence as far west as possible. The solution to the dual threat of Russian imperialism and the declining liberal and globalist West is Intermarium, envisioned as a political project that would unite conservative Eastern European nations against these threats.

Under the theme of environment, the author introduced the positions of SÄ on the environment and explained how these views relate to other themes that had already been introduced. First, the author argued that SÄ is not a climate change denialist organisation. However, SÄ think Estonia should focus on the local environmental problems rather than the global climate change problem. So, SÄ reject climate protection, but they consider climate change as an important issue. SÄ sees the continuity of an Estonian ecosystem as linked to the continuity of the Estonian nation, as they claim that the local people and nature are interdependent. They also relate ethnonationalism with love for the ecosystem that the nation is part of, as the ecosystem is part of the homeland of the nation. They claim that their views on environmental policies are conservative as they aim to preserve, value, and develop that which contains an eternal positive value. First, preserving the environment is important as the nation's well-being depends on its environment. Second, the ethnic consciousness of an individual member of a nation depends on the individual's connection to their heritage, which includes the environment. If there is no environment to which one can relate, then one cannot be rooted, and then one cannot be ethnically conscious. To preserve nature, SÄ supports sustainable forest management. However, it is important to emphasise that individual members have different views on the policies the Estonian state should adopt to tackle environmental problems. They also relate environmentalism with anti-immigration policies as they argue that immigrants coming here do not care for Estonian nature like Estonians do, and if one cares for the environment, one should be against immigration.



Scheme of the concepts and their relations of the ideology of SÄ.

Discussion

In this chapter, the author will answer the RQ: “What is the nature and what are the core features of the ideology of Sinine Äratus?”. By ‘nature’, the author means the relationship of the lived ideology of SÄ to the abstraction of the radical right ideology proposed by Carter. By ‘core features’, the author means the internal structure of the ideology, which is composed of concepts and relationships between these concepts. The author will combine the answers from the previous two chapters to answer the research question. In the third chapter, the author analysed the ideology of SÄ based on the theory-driven QCA and answered the question, “To what extent does the ideology of Sinine Äratus correspond to Carter’s definition of radical right ideology?”. In the fourth chapter, the author analysed the ideology of SÄ based on the data-driven QCA framed by the morphological analysis and answered the question, “What is the morphology of the ideology of SÄ?”. The first subquestion helps in answering the first part of the research question; namely, the analysis demonstrated that the ideology of SÄ can be thought of as belonging to the family of the radical right ideology. If SÄ would not have exhibited all of the three core features of radical right ideology, namely authoritarianism, anti-democracy and nationalism, then the ideology of SÄ could not have been considered as a radical right ideology. The second subquestion helps in answering the second part of the research question, namely, the morphological reconstruction of the ideology of SÄ helped to uncover the concepts, the arguments and the values of the ideology of SÄ. The concepts and their relations can be seen in the scheme above of the ideology of the SÄ, which demonstrates how various concepts are related to one another. The arguments and values interlinking these concepts are introduced in the fourth chapter. The short overview of this can be seen in the conclusion of this fourth chapter.

The author would like now to turn to discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the two methods applied. On the one hand, applying Carter to the data and conducting theory-driven qualitative content analysis brought the author’s attention to aspects of the ideology of SÄ that otherwise would have been unnoticed. For example, abortion was not really something that came up in the morphological analysis. It seemed like a policy position that some members had, but it was not something which they would promote with their actions by writing articles on abortion or talking about abortion in their speeches. However, as Carter had cited the stance on abortion as an indicator of authoritarianism, the author had to clarify what their position on

abortion was. Furthermore, if it would not have been for Carter, then their views on LGBT+ would also have been overlooked. By applying Carter's theory of radical right ideology to analysing the ideology of Sinine Äratus, many aspects of the organisation's ideology had been lost. Aspects like their idea of ethnofuturism or Intermarium, to name a few. Suppose researchers focus only on the commonalities between lived ideologies of radical right organisations to arrive at an abstraction of radical right ideology, as so many researchers have done. In that case, researchers will look past many important aspects of these organisations' ideologies, and thus, much explanatory capacity of researchers' understanding of these ideologies will be lost.

The main strength of the data-driven qualitative content analysis combined with the morphological analysis to reconstruct the ideology of SÄ is precisely its elucidatory capacity. It allows for the researcher to delve into the data and bring out the aspects of this ideology that are important to the group embracing this specific ideology rather than emphasising the aspects of the ideology that seem important to the researcher as these are the features that are similar to the aspects of other similar organisation's ideologies. However, a drawback of this approach is that it may neglect aspects of the ideology that members do not frequently discuss publicly and may not consider particularly relevant. From an alternative ideological perspective, these overlooked elements might be deemed problematic. For instance, their stances on abortion and LGBT+, without applying Carter's method to the data, would likely have gone unnoticed, as they appeared to be relatively insignificant facets of their ideology.

This study reconstructed the morphology of the ideology of Sinine Äratus and demonstrated that it is a radical right ideology as understood by Carter. By doing this, it opened up potential new research endeavours. An intriguing prospect involves conducting a second round of interviews with the leading members and other members of SÄ to evaluate whether they agree with the author's reconstruction of their ideology. While the time constraints prevented the author from doing this for this thesis, this would have tremendously strengthened the author's analysis. However, it could also be considered a separate research path that could be undertaken in the future. Additionally, an interesting endeavour for future research would be to use the findings of this thesis as a starting point and to uncover the philosophical and intellectual influences shaping their ideology. The findings of this thesis could also be used to explain the behaviour of SÄ as an organisation and of its individual members, for example, in the context of EKRE or the identitarian movement. One could ask how the ideology of SÄ relates to the

ideology of EKRE and whether it has had influence over the ideology of its mother party and, if so, then in what ways.

An interesting endeavour would also be to look at the beliefs of its women, as this could yield valuable insights into women in the radical right. Radical right tend to be dominated by men (Coffé, 2018, p. 303) since men tend to engage more with radical right than women (Gigengil et al., 2005). However, SÄ is a notable exception, as its current leader is a woman (Pille-Riin Kahro), and many women have held leading positions in SÄ over the last few years. Two interesting questions could be asked: first, whether the beliefs of women and men differ within the organisation, and second, whether in the last years, when women have become more represented in the leadership positions within SÄ, they have influenced the ideology of SÄ in some way. This would contribute to the study of women in radical right, which, according to Katarina Pettersson, is an unjustly understudied subject (Pettersson, 2017, p. 8). Finally, it would also be interesting to see morphological analysis applied to other radical right youth organisations' ideologies, especially to other identitarian youth organisations' ideologies, as inspired by how it has been done in this thesis. This would open up the possibility for comparative research to better understand the commonalities between radical right ideologies of radical right youth organisations.

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Appendix – a list of primary data

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