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**German and French constructions of European Identity –
overcoming the Eastern vs. Western Divide?
A Media Analysis for the case of Estonia.**

Master dissertation

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Abstract

This Master dissertation analyses the dynamics of German and French construction of European identity with regard to the inclusion of the East-European EU member states on the case of Estonia. The analysis is oriented around the key date of the EU's East-European enlargement on 1 May 2004 in order to assess changes in identity constructions due to the enlargement of Europe's political-economic unit, the EU. The research contributes to the debate on the Eastern vs. Western divide in European identity by focussing on the national distribution and (re)construction of European identity and the concrete examples of France and Germany. If European integration beyond a political-economic unit is sought, understanding the dynamics of in- and exclusion of the East-European member states is indispensable. The analysis relies on a combined quantitative and qualitative analysis of frames in all German and French quality news magazines between 2000 and 2011. An increased inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere can be observed in the case of France and Germany. Nevertheless, it remains limited for both countries in several aspects, some of them related to the respective national identity. Estonia's inclusion thus seems only partly related to the enlargement of the political-economic unit of the EU. Knowledge of the factors influencing processes of in- and exclusion will help to define the necessary steps towards cultural-historical cohesion in both the framework of the EU and other occasions of intra-European dialogue.

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Abbreviations

C Culture

CEEE Central and East-European Enlargement of the EU (2004)

E Economy

EE East-Europe/East-European

H History

P Politics

(p) partially

S Society

WE West-Europe/West-European

1. INTRODUCTION

The European project seems to consist of two distinct but closely intertwined components: A political-economical dimension, realised primarily in the European Union, and a cultural-historical dimension present both in intellectual definitions and in popular perceptions of Europe in everyday life and in the media as part of it. The cultural-historical dimension provides a basis for defining goals and purpose of the European project, a basis for identification and creation of legitimacy, solidarity and popular participation in the political Europe. The political-economical dimension, in turn, provides a framework to realise cultural-historical visions of Europe, it provides the means to foster and shape the emergence of a common and shared identity.

The European Union as political-economical realisation of a cultural-historical European project has, between 1951 and 2004, to a certain extent, generated a community of experience and memory among its members. Simultaneously, it has actively been fostering the emergence of a shared identity. In 2004 and 2007, when the EU incorporated many of the countries it formerly defined itself in opposition to, a new challenge emerged: Not only the bridging of different national identities and related visions of Europe, along with the different national memories, cultures and languages, but also the opening and re-definition of previous identity constructions towards inclusion of the new member states, formerly othered as communist. This is particularly complex, as in the old member states pertinacious and negatively connoted discourses on “Eastern Europe” have persisted since the Cold War era.

Yet the inclusion of the new member states into an integrated identity is crucial for the functioning of a wider European project: To avoid power imbalances or their abuse, to foster intra-European dialogue and the determination of shared goals, to deepen European

integration and possibly take it one step further. Furthermore, on the level of the individual new member states, the inclusion may have important consequences, for instance on foreign financial investment, tourism or population flows.

For these reasons I aim to analyse whether French and German constructions of European identity are opening up towards the new member states. I decided to focus on France and Germany as they are frequently the driving force behind the European Union while simultaneously possessing largely divergent national identities, ties to East-Europe¹ (EE) and initial positions on the EU's Central and East-European Enlargement (CEEE). The case of Estonia has first and foremost been chosen for the importance that being recognised as an integral part of Europe has in her own national development. Furthermore, Estonia presents a combination of features relevant for the analysis of inclusion: First, she shifted within just 15 years from a position as an integral part of the Soviet Union (i.e. not only of the Warsaw Treaty) towards EU membership. Second, she actively promotes a national narrative on her inherent, but during Soviet times suppressed, cultural Europeanness and Westernness. Last, her sphere of everyday experience is, due to her economical surge over the past decade and the emphasis on tele- and cybercommunications, similar to that of many West-European states. These three points make Estonia a case of (1) political inclusion of the most othered Other, (2) intense contestation of this othering through the nation's narrative and (3) similarity as to everyday experience. An inclusion of Estonia into German and French constructions of European identity would thus signify that the Eastern vs. Western divide may be modified through the conjunction of political inclusion, intense contestation of the divide by EE states and a similar everyday reality. My exact research question is thus: Is Estonia, in France and Germany, today more regarded as an integral part of Europe than before her EU accession in 2004? If so, in relation to what events, topics or aspects?

European identity has been extensively researched, especially concerning elite

¹ East-Europe (EE) refers to the European states formerly covered by the Soviet Union or associated to it in the Warsaw Treaty or otherwise under communist rule, i.e.: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. I use the term "East-Europe" in opposition to the historically marked "Eastern Europe" which will only be used in the context of negatively connoted discourses with reference to the past.

discourses on European identity (e.g. Baasner 2008), normative or cultural aspects defining the borders of the European project (e.g. Todorov 2008) and also the concrete European identification of the single citizen (e.g. Bruter 2006). Furthermore, an important amount of attention has also been devoted to research of the Eastern vs. Western divide of Europe (e.g. Kuus 2006, Eder/Spohn 2005) and the inclusion of the new member states. However, this has rarely been researched on the assumption of specific national constructions of European Identity and not yet for Estonia's inclusion into French and German constructions of Europe.

In order to fill this gap, I analyse quantitatively and qualitatively the dynamics of representation of Estonia in French and German quality news magazines between 2000 and 2011. I first establish my theoretical framework on the basis of identity and media theory, then explain the empirical background concerning the different relevant factors in Germany's and France's inclusion of Estonia in constructions of European identity. On this basis, I develop a combined methodology based on quantitative Content Analysis and a subsequent qualitative text analysis. Finally, I present and evaluate the results before ending with a conclusion and recommendations for further research.

Before starting the analysis, I would like draw attention to the fact that collective identity constructions are fluid, thus in constant change. Yet, as to the reproduction processes involving rooting in cultures and a mass public, the change of collective identities is slow. A Western European² identity has been constructed as a European identity over the past 50 years. Thus, when analysing the inclusion of Estonia in German and French constructions of Europe for a period of eight years after CEEE, I cannot expect dramatic changes. Still, I can determine whether tendencies towards inclusion emerge – or whether, on the contrary, intra-European boundaries are maintained or even reinforced after CEEE.

² “Western” refers to the EU15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Identity constructions are a highly abstract research object that cannot be measured directly. I will thus establish a theoretical framework that helps me to define (1) what I mean by constructions of European identity, (2) where I can find them and (3) how I can evaluate them.

2.1 What are “Constructions of European Identity”?

To explain what I mean by “constructions of European identity”, I need to split the term in its two components: “constructions” and “European identity”.

As for the “constructions”, I depart from the point of view that social reality is constructed. Berger/Luckmann ([1966]1991) argue that an objective reality does not exist. Instead, it is constructed through human action: People objectivate their subjective perceptions in objects such as signs, especially language (Berger/Luckmann 1991:50). As language spatially, temporally and socially transcends the “here&now”, it bridges different subjective zones within the reality of everyday life and creates a meaningful whole, an integrated reality for society (Berger/Luckmann 1991:54). Furthermore, through its symbolic function, language classifies and objectifies experiences and thereby builds up a social stock of knowledge, available to individuals in their everyday life (Berger/Luckmann 1991:56). The European project is, just as a nation, not a natural entity (see below). Therefore, both require (1) societal definition of their constitutive concept (see below) and (2) individuals in whose minds the community is imagined (Anderson 1983). I thus consider European identity as being constructed through the interaction of individuals in

society, via communication, i.e. objectivation through language. Constructions of European identity simultaneously contribute to the social stock of knowledge and are limited by it through pre-existing concepts.

Following this approach, the large variety of languages within the EU, then leads to a variety of social stocks of knowledge with their respective constructions of European identity. These different constructions of European identity are usually national, for two reasons: First, most of the languages spoken within the EU are languages of a nation-state. Second, distinct national identities exist within the EU and are closely intertwined with constructions of European identity (Spohn 2005), as outlined for France and Germany below. Last, the largely national construction of European identity is reinforced by the lack of a shared European public sphere:

[T]he 'public sphere' within which political life takes place in Europe is largely a national sphere. To the extent that European issues appear on the agenda at all, they are seen by most citizens from a national perspective. The media remain largely national, partly due to language barriers; there are few meeting places where Europeans from different Member States can get to know each other and address issues of common interest. (European Commission 2006:4)

As to the second term to be defined, "European identity", I need to take a step back and start by defining identity. Three types of identity can be found in literature: individual, social and collective identity. Identity on an individual level has been defined as an individual's self-concept (Tajfel 1982:2) and social identity as

that *part* of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and the emotional significance attached to that membership (ibid.) (Taifel 1982:2).

Following this definition, an individual needs to know about the aspects defining the group as a whole to be able to identify with it. Social identity thus seems to consist of two components: a concept of a group and a feeling of belonging based on that concept. This takes us to the third type of identity mentioned above: Collective identity. It is frequently used interchangeably with social identity, yet with a slightly different focus: The research

object is frequently this concept of a group, i.e. shared self-categorisation (Turner/Oakes 1989:264-265) and the definitions of belonging based on it, more detached from the single individual. It is this construction of European identity as collective identity that I am interested in here: the societal construction of a concept of Europe and the in- or exclusion of Estonia as to this concept.

This concept of European identity has frequently been defined with the most relevant parameters being: (1) shared norms which may refer to both immaterial norms such as values and material norms such as a certain living standard (Arnaud 2000:21, Miard-Delacroix 2008:18, Spohn 2005:3); (2) shared memories which mostly imply a shared vision of 20th century history (Baasner 2008:9, Todorov 2008, Spohn 2005:3); (3) shared interests both with regards to the European project and with regards to non-European partners (Arnaud 2000:21); (4) a shared sphere of experience both synchronically in everyday experience and diachronically in a shared experience of European integration (Baasner 2008:9, Bruter 2005:32); (5) a shared sphere of communication (Baasner 2008:9, Triandafyllidou et al. 2009:5) and (6) a shared sphere of institutional organisation through politics or legislation, with the EU as its main actor (Miard-Delacroix 2008:18, Von Oppeln/Sprungk 2005:8). As it appears, some of these aspects are predominantly cultural, such as values or memories, others are predominantly political, such as interests or institutional organisation. Yet, cultural and political aspects are not entirely separable: Shared cultural values, for instance, can be a basis for shared political goals. On the other hand, a shared sphere of institutional organisation may lead to a shared sphere of everyday experience. This leads back to the initially mentioned close interrelation between Europe as a cultural-historical project and its political realisation in the EU. When talking about European identity, I thus refer to the concept and definitions of belonging based on this concept constructed within the framework of the EU, yet, on the basis of the cultural-historical vision for Europe.

2.2 Where can Constructions of European Identity be found?

If I want to analyse the collective, social and national construction of European identity, I need to determine what the actors and scenes involved in this construction are. On this basis, I will outline why media representations, in their categorising function, make societal constructions of reality explicit.

Actors and Scenes of societal Construction of collective Identities

To do so, I will apply theories on national identity to European identity. National identity having extensively been researched, I believe, the theories I picked provide the most developed framework to understand the social construction of collective identities. This step may be contentious, as European identity is often regarded as a meta-identity to national identity. Yet, my argument relies on three points: First, as outlined above, I believe that – at the present stage – no single European identity exists, but European identity is nationally constructed and (re)distributed. Then, second, the conceptualisation of European identity as (1) “a weak addendum to strong national identities” or (2) as an identity that will in the long term “restructure the existing national identities by decoupling a European collective identity from the collective identities bound to the nation state” (Spohn 2005:2) is ultimately determined by the national constructions of European identity, as illustrated through the examples of France and Germany below. Third, the European Union and a nation have several relevant features in common, that make it possible to apply theories of national identity to European identity. If a nation is

an extensive set of non-relatives who think and feel that they have important things in common and that they differ so much from other large groups, that they constitute a distinctive and self-contained society (De Beus 2001:292),

then the construction of a European identity appears to be not fundamentally different from

the construction of a national identity: both are “modern and massive collectives of strangers” (De Beus 2001:292). In addition, further parallels between a nation and the European Union exist: (1) common political institutions and the need to legitimate them (2) a shared sphere of life with unconditioned moving, working, exchange of goods and the fostering of this space through elites (3) shared symbols such as flag, anthem or currency, (4) clearly defined borders of the political entity, but not of the “natural” borders of the in-group (5) the creation of an identity, where it did not exist previously. On this basis, I will now identify different actors and scenes in the national construction of collective identity.

Gellner, (1983:52) points at the crucial role of cultural, political and economic institutions: they standardise and disseminate culture and knowledge. European identity seems to equally originate from an elite initiative, yet – as opposed to Gellner's functionalist approach – a multitude of motivations may be assumed for elites to contribute to the process of construction of European identity. Anderson (1983), outlines the role of media and print-languages in the creation of unified fields of exchange and communication (Anderson 1983:44). Furthermore, he points at the creation of “imagined communities” through the dissemination of national ideas and the reinforcement of boundaries in their content (Anderson 1983:6). Europe may just as a nation be conceptualised as an “imagined community” with media playing a crucial role in the distribution of its identity. Billig (1995:10-12, 174) adds to this approach that framing is as important as the content, and suggests that only the combination of subtle re-iterations of nationhood in the realm of the everyday, including media, with the exceptional, spectacular staging of nationhood renders them natural, unquestioned entities (Billig 1995:8-10). Edensor's (2002) approach adds to this by conceptualising national identity as a multidimensional matrix:

[I]dentity is best conceived as a process of continually weaving together fragments of discourse and images, enactions, spaces and times, things, and people into a vast matrix, in which complex systems of relationality between elements constellate around common sense themes. (Edensor 2002:30)

Within these matrix, Edensor suggests, “[t]he mass media has proved to be the most important way of disseminating representations of the nation” (Edensor 2002:141). Applied to European identity, its creation in the circular interrelation of a multitude of actors,

factors, topics on various scenes may thus be stated with the media as one of the most important. Edensor further suggests the fluidity, flexibility and largely unreflective maintenance of this matrix (Edensor 2002:2,17,29-30). Applied to European identity, these characteristics provide a theoretical justification for the simultaneous maintenance of different national constructions of European identity.

The construction of European identity through the interplay of various actors on different scenes leads me to clarify my conceptualisation of the roles of elite, society and individual. The interrelation of the latter two is explained above. Elites then set new impulses in the circular, national reproduction of European identity. These impulses are then taken up in the matrix of reproduction, reshaped and integrated in the existing construction in the social stock of knowledge by the whole of society, i.e. interacting individuals. Being aware of this complexity leads me to acknowledge that an exhaustive analysis of European identity constructions goes, if at all possible, far beyond the scope of a Master dissertation. I will thus focus on one of the major scenes of identity construction identified above: media.

Media Representations as Source for the Analysis of Identity Constructions: Representation and Categorisation

Having identified media as one of the major scenes of largely unreflective construction of European identity, I will now argue that media are a particularly good source for the analysis of identity constructions. This is due to two aspects: (1) the categorisations entailed in media representations and (2) their function as a mouthpiece of society through framing.

Representation, as outlined by Saussure ([1916]1995) and Hall (1997), inherently entails categorisation. Saussure established that a sign consists of two inseparable aspects: the *signifiant*, the embodied, perceptible representation, and the *signifié*, a mental representation of a segment of reality (Saussure 1995:97-99). Hall goes beyond Saussure's foundations when establishing that Saussure's system of representation is actually a double

one: the system of *signifiants* represent the *signifiés* and the system of *signifiés* representing elements of reality (Hall 1997:18).

I am particularly interested here in the aspect of categorisation. According to Saussure, *signifiés*, our mental representations of elements of reality, have no natural borders and are only defined as distinct entities in opposition to each other. These definitions are conventionalized in society. At the same time, society conventionalizes the originally arbitrary relation between *signifiant* and *signifié* in a code, a system of rules of representation and categorisation specific for each language (Saussure 1995:105). As a result, only the use of sign systems, language being the most important one, allows us to categorize, perceive and communicate about the world (Saussure 1995:112). More importantly, the other way around, no use of language or representation is possible without simultaneous categorisation.

Following Hall (1997), it is, however, crucial to acknowledge that meaning in society depends on larger units than the single sign and is, as a cultural product, never ultimately fixed. Hall draws on Foucault's theory here to argue that the code is not a closed system, but as part of culture subject to constant change (Hall 1997:35).

Foucault was concerned with the relations between meaning, knowledge, power and truth in society (Hall 1997:49-54). He views discourse as a system of representations in a certain society at a certain historical moment. These discourses entail statements, meaning, and are simultaneously the means by which a society is able to communicate over a certain topic. They simultaneously forge knowledge and "truth", both being closely interrelated to power: (1) Knowledge is a form of power; and (2) power decides what knowledge is to be applied and forms, in conjunction with knowledge, truth (ibid.). Foucault draws on a concept of power as circulating in society.

As a result, meaning can be viewed as relatively categorized in systems of representation, such as narratives, discourses and statements. Simultaneously, it is open ended in society and never ultimately fixed.

For the empirical analysis I therefore conclude: (1) Constructions of collective identity can be understood through the analysis of media representation, as representations inherently categorise and categorisation is a main factor in identity construction; (2) the

analysis cannot be based on the single sign, but needs to take into account the textual and extra-textual context of representations; (3) discourses as generating powerful categories in the domains of knowledge and truth need to be taken into account when looking at identity constructions; (4) the meaning of representations and systems of representation is open-ended and thus susceptible to change over time.

A second reason for media being a particularly good source for the analysis of social constructions of collective identity is their circular interrelation with society as a whole, and their function as a mouthpiece of society. Hall (1971 in Davis 2004) first conceptualises this relationship. Taking a Marxist approach, he claims that media align themselves with the ideology of the current dominant power, interested in maintaining hegemony (Davis 2004: 45-52). Then, media, by categorizing, legitimizing and disseminating their categorisations, control the meaning of situations as they evolve in favour of the current dominant power (Davis 2004: 62). This is possible, as media texts, as texts in general, carry a “preferred reading” that determines to a large extent the way they are decoded by the recipients (Hall 1980:29). Media representation, from this point of view, is systematic, institutionalized and ideological (Davis 2004:45-50).

Although following Hall's approach generally, I would like to put into perspective several points. First of all, especially with the arrival of globalisation, “media” cannot be understood as a single entity in society. Rather should they be viewed as “mediascapes” (Appadurai [1996] 2005:35) consisting of a plurality of media organisations which operate on different channels and vary in structure, ownership and ideology. Second, power structures seem equally affected by globalisation. If in today's society, power emanates rather from within society, and from various different sources (Lash 2007), there is no central power that media could align with. As a consequence, media may align their representations to the most widespread ideas in society, yet, not with a single one and not necessarily with the one of the ruling power. Last, material, economical and structural factors in the emergence of media representation have to be taken into account more strongly, as also suggested by Hall (Hall 1997:59). These points are not to contradict Hall's idea, but to demonstrate its limitations. I thus follow Hall's approach as to the idea that media (1) are one of the most important scenes building knowledge, meaning and thus also

European identity in society and that (2) media representations follow the most widespread and influential ideas, opinions and discourses in a given society and reinforces them. Media then work as a mouthpiece: they make more salient existing societal categorisations, re-disseminate them and thereby contribute to the reproduction of national constructions of European identity. This process of media working in a way to make certain social categorisations more salient has been researched under the definition of “framing”:

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the described item. (Entman 1993, emphasis original)

Framing thus adds a level of intentional categorisation to the already inherently categorising representation. Representation then “works as much as through what is *not* shown, as through what is” (Hall 1997:59). Framing consists of two closely intertwined processes: Decisions on *whether* an issue is represented and decisions on *how* it is represented (Scheufele/Tewksbury 2007:13-16). It is this reinforcement of salience of societal categorisations through framing that make media representations a particularly good source for the analysis of constructions of European identity.

Society impeding on the Weight of the individual Author

Having established why I believe media representations to be a particularly good source for the analysis of constructions of European identity, I now need to identify the author of media representation. Certainly, every article has its physical author. But to what extent is this author representing his or her individual perception? And to what extent can then conclusion be made on society-wide constructions? I will argue that the weight of the individual author is rather limited from three perspectives: (1) the role of the individual in social constructions of reality, (2) the interrelation between media and society and (3) the categorisations made in representation and framing.

First, as to the role of the individual in social constructions of reality, following Berger/Luckmann ([1966]1991), I have established above that the society's stock of knowledge, and thus constructions of European identity, are build up by the individuals' objectivations of their subjective perceptions. Yet, in turn, individuals are guided in their perceptions and evaluations by the already pre-existing social stock of knowledge they integrate during socialisation (Berger/Luckmann 1991:58). As a result, the individual journalists may well frame their articles from their particular standpoints at the intersection of several realities, yet, these realities are pre-defined by society and form in their sum the society's integrated reality.

Second, as pointed out by Hall's approach on the circular relation between media and society (see above), it appears that certain ideas and categorisations dominate in society's realities. If media tend to align their representations with these dominant patterns of categorisation, the individual journalist needs to consciously take a stance of critical distance in order not to reiterate these established patterns of categorisation. I argue that this is rarely the case, especially not with regard to constructions of collective identities, as these are constructed largely unreflectively (see above).

A third angle to determine the weight of the individual author are features of categorisation in both (1) sign-based representation and the (2) process of framing. As for sign-based representation, Saussure outlined the *societal* conventionalisation of a code to interpret signs (see above). The categorisations made inherently through the use of a particular natural language are thus societal rather than individual. Second, a closer look at the framing process helps to understand the relatively small weight of the individual author. Scheufele gives a good overview on the different locations of frames and their interaction in his "Process Model of Framing" (1999):




Fig. 1: A process model of framing research (Scheufele 1999:115)

On the basis of a review of empirical studies, Scheufele develops a model to explain the processes involved in framing. He differentiates between “Media frames” as the textual frames found in media representations and “Audience frames” as the mental frames, i.e. categorisations, of audiences. Then, he identifies four key processes concerning frames: the journalistic production of frames, their dissemination to the audience, their effects on e.g. behaviour and their effects back on the journalistic production. In the process of frame building, Scheufele links journalistic frames back to the following “Inputs”: (1) social norms and values, (2) pressures of interest groups and elites, (3) the ideological and political orientation of journalists (4) organisational pressure and constraints and (5) journalistic routines (Scheufele 1999:109-110). Leaving aside journalistic routines which mainly consist of the use of already existing frames to accelerate the production process (Scheufele 1999:108), we are thus left with four major impacts on the framing process. Yet,

all of them leave relatively few space for the individual author.

First, social norms and values relate to the culture surrounding the production and reception process. Van Gorp (2007:61) defines culture as an organised set of beliefs, codes, myths, stereotypes, values, norms – and frames – in the collective memory of a given society. As none of these factors can be changed by the individual, Gorp suggests that frames are largely situated externally of the individual, in a cultural “stock of frames”, and as such, similar to a code, enable the reception of produced messages (Van Gorp 2007:61-64). The journalist, when producing the text, thus chooses from a pre-existing stock of frames known by the public, rather than framing every topic anew as it comes up (ibid.).

The second point, pressures of interest groups and elites, relates to the role of media in society as outlined by Hall and put into perspective above.

Third, the political and ideological orientation of the journalist or journal's editor impacts on the framing process. This will be taken into account in the methodological part by choosing material that covers the whole range of political/ideological orientations in the respective society. A point to remain aware of is the prevailing of national loyalty over journalistic professional values when issues of perceived national interest are at stake, as demonstrated by Nossek (2004:363).

Fourth, organisational pressure and constraints relate to questions of media ownership and profit, and the constraints they impose on media content, as outline e.g. in Herman/Chomsky (1988). In order to increase profitability, a journalist or the editorial board are thus likely to select common frames over exceptional ones, and generally those that promise the more interesting story.

As demonstrated, the framing freedom of the individual journalist appears to be limited by number of societal constraints. Therefore, the analysis of media representation permits to make conclusions on frames that go beyond those of the individual author: societal frames and categorisations express identity constructions.

2.3 How can Constructions of European Identity be evaluated?

This section serves to determine, how exactly I will evaluate identity constructions. I believe that identity, because of its complexity and fluidity, is best understood in contextualising comparisons: over time and in between countries, hence the comparative design of the study. This section serves to outline what aspects of frames I believe to be relevant for the social construction of European identity and which I thus intend to assess. Considering the European project, just as a nation, a social group constructed through the objectifications of individuals' subjective sense (see above), I need to consider the individual's "psychological processes which are responsible for the "cognitive construction of groups" (one's own and others)" (Tajfel 1982:3). I will draw here on Tajfel/Turner's (1986) Social Identity Theory (SIT) and its development in Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT). Both theories are empirically grounded and have reached wide recognition among scholars.

SIT states that the process of identity building is a process of comparison: Individuals and groups compare themselves to other individuals and other groups, find differences and evaluate them (Turner/Oakes 1989:234, Brown 2000:747). It is crucial that the evaluation of these differences results in a positive evaluation of the self or the in-group as opposed to the other or the out-group. In this case, an in-group identity is formed and self-esteem enhanced. If the evaluation of the in-group compared to the out-group is negative, the individual de-identifies with the group. Stating this, SIT simultaneously addresses (1) the notion of superiority often found in conceptualisations of group identities and (2) the fact that inclusion automatically entrains exclusion. However, it does not account for identification with low-status groups. To explain this point, SIT has been developed in SCT. SCT explains "group formation as a transition from personal to social identity" (Turner/Oakes 1989:240) through categorisation. To put simply, it states that categorisation leads to group formation, which in turn then leads to group cohesion (Turner/Oakes 1989:237). In this process, the origin of the categorisation is of no importance: whether it is a result of comparison or external categorisation subsequently accepted by the individuals, identity-building ultimately results from it (Turner/Oakes

1989). Note also that SCT views comparison and categorisation as interdependent: On the one hand, some form of categorisation is prerequisite for comparison. On the other hand, comparison leads to reinforced categorisation. Once categorisation and the resulting group formation are completed, individuals start attributing characteristics that are supposedly shared by the members of the group to their own self. In this process of self-stereotyping, both in-group and out-group are perceived as more homogeneous than they actually are (Turner/Oakes 1989:267).

Understanding these processes of group formation allows me to identify the aspects I need to focus on if I want to evaluate in- and exclusion of EE in constructions of European identity. Following SIT and SCT these aspects are: (1) categorisation, (2) comparison as to evaluation and hierarchical positioning and (3) homogenisation. As outlined above, these processes do not occur in a linear order, but mutually influence each other. They provide the basis for my empirical analysis.

3. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

Having established the theoretical framework, I will now outline the empirical background of the study that allows me to apply the theory to my cases. The research is contextualised in the emergence of a European identity within the EU as a political realisation of a cultural-historical project of Europe. As outlined above, I believe constructions of European identity to be largely national. Therefore, I will outline German and French constructions of European identity on the background of their specific national identities. Furthermore, I will define their respective ties to EE, especially Estonia, as well as certain discourses on Eastern Europe in WE. Both will serve to conceptualise the empirical analysis and to evaluate its results.

3.1 German and French Constructions of a (Western) European Identity

In view of my constructivist ontological and epistemological position, an objective assessment of German and French constructions of European identity is not possible. This section serves to outline those aspects I consider relevant for the following analysis.

The political-economic realisation of a European project emerged after the Second World War with the desire of both France and Germany to anchor Germany in a political community and prevent a recurrence of German expansive ambitions (Stark 2010:18). Yet, since, their respective constructions of European identity developed in interrelation with their national identities. Von Oppeln/Sprungk (2005:11) point to the large variety and divergence of elite discourses on European identity in both countries, and hence the difficulty of clearly delineating constructions of Europe. Yet, certain dominant patterns can

be clearly discerned. For Germany, this is the construction of Europe and the EU as (1) a community of values (Miard-Delacroix 2008:17), (2) a community of interests and a civil power on the international scene (Miard-Delacroix 2008:22,31, Von Oppeln/Sprungk 2005:8) and a project deserving (3) virtually unlimited German support (Guérot 2006:2). All three points illustrate the weight of the German national narrative of historical responsibility. Furthermore, they point at an apparent paradox: Whereas Europe and the EU seem to be constructed as a structure overarching the nations and acting on a basis of subsidiarity, European identity, values or interests frequently seem to substitute the lack (or a lack of clear definition or expression) of national ones (Miard-Delacroix 2008:17, Von Oppeln/Sprungk 2005:8, Guérot 2006:2): Europe seems to replace the nation. This argument is supported by a recent empirical study on German national identity (Buß/Klein 2009) coming to the following conclusion: (1) A German national identity exists in the private, unspectacular everyday realm of the individual citizen, turned towards the inside rather than the outside. It is not publicly staged or promoted. (2) Regionalisation, Europeanisation or globalisation of identities frequently prevail over national identification. (3) For its historical burden, German national identity is most frequently related to a perceived particular – pacifist – responsibility towards the international community. The last point will become particularly important for Germany's approach to EE (see below).

As for France, the construction of Europe seems to be different, if not opposite, to the German one, in several aspects. This concerns several aspects: First, in France, Europe and the EU have for a long time been constructed not as a substitute, but as an enlargement of the own nation: the EU has been conceptualised as a “super-State à la française, a super-France”³ (Arnaud 2000:10) based on French values of the civic nation and her model of the welfare state (Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). This approach constructs the EU as a quasi-nation and thus blurs the boundaries between Europe and the nation, regarded as operating on the same level. By the same token, Europe becomes a way to maintain French influence in the world and represent her interests (Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). This construction of Europe is equally related to the own national identity which seems to be strong and confidently turned towards the outside (as evident from publications such as: Haut Conseil

³ “un super-Etat à la française, un super-Hexagone”

de l'Integration 2009). Her strong national identity and resulting constructions of Europe as an extended France is largely based on (1) France's former position as a great power with two large colonial empires, (2) her long-lasting position as a model for the intellectual, noble or cultural elite throughout royal courts in Europe and (3) the fact that Enlightenment started in France and first produced a definition of inalienable human rights with the "Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen" (1789) (Röseberg 2001: 24). Closely related to especially the third point is also the tradition of a (formerly "civilizing") mission for the world, implying the international diffusion of certain values claimed to be French, and French culture (see e.g. Décret n°59-889, art. 1).

These German and French constructions of European identity are different, yet there seems to be some overlap, as without agreement on certain basics the European project would not exist in its present form. This overlap seems to be intensely fostered by the EU as political frame of the European project. Bruter (2005) convincingly argues that the EU has attempted to create a *shared* identity in (1) the creation of symbols, such as flag, anthem, passport or currency, which due to their abstract character allow for identification without precise knowledge – or definition (?) - of European identity (Bruter 2005:76); and (2) the EU's "efforts on human mobility, easiness of travel, students and youth exchange programmes, and workers mobility programmes" (Bruter 2005:32) creating a space of shared experience. Indeed, all aspects of my definition of European identity (see above), can be argued to have been reinforced by the EU. Yet, the fostering of a shared identity in this form is restricted to the space limited by membership in the EU. I therefore argue that what has been constructed as a European identity in the past 60 years, and what is still regarded as a European identity in Germany and France, is actually a Western European identity.

3.2 European Identity in Opposition to “Eastern Europe”

This (Western) European identity seems to have been, also beyond the Cold War era, based on the exclusion of the Russian and Eastern European Other, lacking a positive self-definition (Hettlage 1999:253). The inclusion of part of EE into the EU in 2004 and 2007, thus leads to a situation with two apparent possibilities for redefinition of identity constructions: (1) the inclusion of the new members into the existing constructions of European, i.e. Western European, identity or (2) the re-definition of European identity towards an entirely new construction inclusive for both new and old EU member states. However, neither of both alternatives seem to have been achieved yet. Kuus (2007) presents numerous examples from politicians speeches (such as Chirac's and Fischer's), newspapers (such as the Economist), scholarly papers and the Western aid community to suggest that EE “was not incorporated into the imagined community of a united Europe. It was instead assigned a special place in Europe's waiting room” (Kuus 2007:27).

The continuing othering of EE is especially evident in widespread discourses on Eastern Europe in WE. I will now briefly synthesise previous research on these discourses, as these discourses constitute one aspect in my empirical analysis.

Several authors (such as Kruus 2007, Murawska-Muthesius 2006, Ekekrantz 2004, Brubaker 1998, Kürti 1997) have analysed medial discourses on Eastern Europe. Their results reveal different types of negatively connoted, othering discourses: First, EE is depicted as (1) backward, immature and underdeveloped with respect to “normality” in WE (Kuus 2007:28-31; Murawska-Muthesius 2006:304; Ekekrantz 2004). Thus, EE is, second, a learner in “a period of transition coached by the West”, (2) new, dynamic and in rapid change (Kuus 2007:28;). Third, EE is depicted as an (3) insecure place, due to its unclear Eastern border and some of its other features such as nationalism, thus simultaneously constituting a source of insecurity to the West (Kuus 2007:22, 31; Bruter 2005:81). Fourth, EE is constructed as a homogeneous aggregation of (4) weak, victimized and marginalized nations, lacking agency and a functioning civil society as a result of their communist past (Murawska-Muthesius 2006: 280, 304). Last, EE is constructed as a place where (5) nationalism, ancient hatreds and passion prevail over civic nationhood, modern tolerance

and reason (Brubaker 1998: 281).

As evident from these discourses, none of the two options of inclusion of EE in Western constructions of European identity has yet been realised. Nevertheless, a change in constructions of EE is clearly discernible. As opposed to the former division of Europe into an Eastern and a Western part, a new, tripartite formation of Europe has emerged and shifted Easternness further eastwards. Now there is “the European core, Central Europe, which is not yet fully European but in tune with the European project; and the Eastern peripheries of Europe, effectively excluded from membership” (Kuus 2007:22). This equals a graduation of Europeanness, where “no-one is not European, but more or less European, more or less close to the centre” (Kuus 2007:27-30). Yet, even if this change took place, the standards for Europeanness in the new, tripartite formation of Europe seem to still be set by WE. Thus, Western constructions of European identity appear to remain constructions of Western European identity. Particular attention will be paid to this aspect in the empirical analysis.

3.3 Different ties of Germany and France to EE, especially Estonia

My above definition of European identity presents the community of memory and experience as two of its important aspects. I thus need to take into account France's and Germany's respective relations to EE in order to evaluate the empirical results.

Germany's bonds to EE are strong and provoke on the French side a perception of EE as Germany's “backyard⁴”, a sphere of privileged German influence (Stark 2006:105). The strong political bonds of Germany to EE were reinforced by Germany's division during the Cold War and Willy Brandt's “Ostpolitik” (Stark 2006:106). Historically, there are equally strong connections with EE. For Estonia, from the crusades in the 12th and 13th century onwards, there has been a continuous German presence in the territories belonging to Estonia: Colonisation, trade relations in the Hanseatic League, Baltic German feudal rule

⁴ “Hinterhof”

for several centuries and German occupation during WWI and WWII (Kasekamp 2010: 11-15, 20, 31, 37, 51, 57, 93, 124). Culturally, German connections with EE are as strong as they are ambivalent. As a result of shifting borders, about 1/5 of citizens in the FRG have background in a German East that no longer exists (Liulevicius 2009: 238). However, this connection is ambivalent as delicate personal stories of flight and displacement lead to the tabooing and ignoring of the GDR and EE territories in society (Fürnrohr 1995:30). Today, with the network of Goethe Instituts, a well developed cultural connection to EE and Estonia exists on an institutional level (see Goethe Institut: Weltweit). Yet, despite the external opening, inside the German society, classifications from the Cold War era seem to persist. In 2011, the German Federal Agency of Civic Education classified Estonia as Eastern European and associates her, together with Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, with Russia:

■
■ **Völker in Osteuropa und Nordasien**




Fig. 2: Peoples in Eastern Europe and Northern Asia (BPB 2011:Völker in Osteuropa und Nordasien)

The very sparse Estonian cultural presence in Germany (see Estonian Embassy in Berlin 2012) does not seem to have an impact on these constructions. In the economic domain, German presence in EE is strong, with EE markets being perceived as enlarged German domestic markets with low cultural barriers (De Champris 2004:26). A network of institutions supports this development (*ibid.*), for Estonia for instance the German-Baltic Chamber of Commerce (see Deutsch-Baltische Handelskammer).

France, in comparison, has had much less and sparse contact with EE, so that EE seems to be a geographically far and diffuse space that has not been explored either geopolitically, economically or commercially, except for French cultural diplomacy (Stark 2006:104). Historically, the closest a French army ever got to Estonia were battles on the Baltic littoral during the Crimean War (1853-1856) (Kasekamp 2010:72). Politically, very few interest has been shown, for instance in the Versailles conference, for the fate of the Baltic States, viewed as a part of Russia (Kasekamp 2010:99,105). More recently, political categorisations seem to have undergone some change as evident in the joint visit of Tallinn and Helsinki by the French Prime Minister François Fillion in 2008 (Portail du Gouvernement 2008). As for the cultural domain, France's network of cultural institutions is – despite its clearly more important presence worldwide – in EE just slightly more developed than the German one (Stammer/Thomas 2004:37). It maintains, however, an institution in Tallinn (see: Institut Français Estonie). Yet the other way round, Estonian cultural presence in France is barely noticeable: Very few associations exist in addition to the official representation (see Estonian Embassy in France and Association France-Estonie). Economically, too, French connections to EE are sparse, mainly due to the big, quasi-monopoly entities that structure French economy (De Champris 2004:27).

From the differences in especially political and historical bonds to EE emerged the initially different positions of France and Germany towards CEEE. France's policy was largely perceived as opposing CEEE in fear of German domination (Skålnes 2005:215) or as relegating it to an uncertain future (Stark 2006:110), even though French diplomacy later disclaims these interpretations (see e.g. Majza 2003). Germany, in contrast, immediately after the end of the Cold War started promoting CEEE (Stark 2006:109). Yet German civil society did not unanimously support CEEE, which is obvious in publications as Van Laer's

Osteuropa und Wir (2007) or surveys among the population (Miard-Delacroix 2008:22).

These differences in bonds with EE and Estonia and in the respective national identities result in different approaches to EE. I will briefly summarise them, as they provide valuable background for the evaluation of the empirical results.

Germany seems to approach EE under the angle of support for development, largely motivated by her perceived historical responsibility:

Indeed, if the Germans (...) need to inspire their foreign policy by their past, and if one considers that poverty in Eastern Europe is the result of forty years of communist rule, which in turn are a consequence of the expansion of Nazi troupes to Eastern Europe, then the “backward” side of Eastern European countries is due to Germany. Then, it would be logical that the Germans make for Eastern Europe as a whole the same efforts of reconstruction that they made for the former GDR.⁵ (Stark 2006:110)

Furthermore, Germany as Europe's largest economy also has a very concrete interest in supporting EE's development: The ending of her status as “a borderland of stability” (Liulevicius 2009: 235). France, in opposition, seems to approach EE, largely unknown to her, more hesitantly and in her more general tradition of attempting to spread certain values: “The values of democracy, respect for human rights, good governance, we defend them everywhere, in Asia just like in Latin America or in Eastern Europe.”⁶ (Sarkozy 2006 Cotonou). Diplomatic papers equally show that France seems to conceive of her support to EE on a moral level:

We need to make Europe not only in the interests of free nations, but also to be able to accommodate the nations of the East, who, once delivered from their subjections they suffer until now, will ask us for accession and for our moral support.⁷ (Schuhman, Robert 1963 quoted in Majza 2003:447)

⁵ “En effet, si les Allemands [...] doivent inspirer leur politique étrangère de leur passé, et que l'on considère que la pauvreté en Europe de l'Est est le résultat de quarante années passées sous le régime communiste, qui sont elles-mêmes une conséquence de l'expansion des troupes nazies en Europe de l'Est, le côté “arrière” des pays de l'Est est dû à l'Allemagne. Il serait donc logique que les Allemands fassent pour l'ensemble des pays est-européens les efforts de reconstruction faits pour l'ancienne RDA.”

⁶ “[L]es valeurs de démocratie, de respect des droits de l’homme, de bonne gouvernance, nous les défendons partout, en Asie comme en Amérique latine ou en Europe de l’Est.”

⁷ “ Nous devons faire l'Europe non seulement dans l'intérêt des peuples libres, mais pour pouvoir y recueillir les peuples de l'Est, qui, délivrés des sujétions qu'ils ont subies jusqu'à présent, nous demanderaient leur

In addition, a certain diffuse anxiety of German expansionism with regard to EE seems to mark France's approach (Stark 2006:108).

Germany and France seem thus both to view themselves as superior to EE, and simultaneously as an aid for its development: Germany on a economical level and France on a moral one. This and the different connections to EE will play a role when evaluating the analysis' results.

3.4 Bi-Directionality of the Inclusion Process: Estonia's Efforts to (re-)integrate into the West

If a certain shift in constructions of (Western) European identity can be stated, this seems to be, at least partly, a result of the bi-directionality of the inclusion process. A number of EE nations have since the mid-nineties been branding their nations as less Eastern and more Western, i.e. more European. Estonia is an excellent example of how the process of inclusion may be reinforced by the desire of a whole nation to re-brand herself:

The Baltic peoples expect that the self-evident outcome of political liberation will be their Return to Europe. (...). Their wish to be accepted again by the West and to be recognized as an integral part of the Western cultural realm is a more substantial driving force in their development than mere economic or political motivation could ever be. (Lauristin 1997:29)

Yet it is not fully evident whether the issue is indeed the same for both directions of the process: Whereas Estonia attempts to be recognised as part of an established WE community, two alternatives of inclusion are conceivable for WE constructions of European identity as outlined above. Yet, Estonia, in her strive for recognition as Northern, i.e. WE, seems to sustain and perpetuate the construction of European identity as a Western European identity. In any case, it is important to understand Estonia's national re-branding

adhésion et notre appui moral. “

as the context of a possibly changing coverage in the empirical analysis.

Estonia, since the end of Soviet rule, is in the process of intensely defining her national identity (Lauristin 1997:26, Ilves 2009), since the tripartial categorisation of culture in the Soviet era did not leave room for the formation of distinct, modern national identities (Lauristin 1997:27-28). The abundance of Estonian institutions and organisations around nationhood and language (see Estonian Institutions) indicates the enduring intensity of this process. An important part of her national re-definition is the adoption of the narrative of Soviet occupation (Lauristin 1997:31). This narrative seems to have been chosen as it permits for “rupturing all possible links to the Soviet Union and Russia” (Pettai 2010: 154). Yet it risks to have the opposite effect as it perfectly strengthens Western discourses of Eastern Europe as a number of weak and victimized states (see above).

Estonia pursues her re-branding on several scenes: (1) On the basis of linguistics, Toomas Ilves (president of Estonia since 2006) introduced in 1998 the concept of the Yule countries to construct a new, alternative socio-geographical entity:

The people of the Yule countries – Brits, Scandinavians, Finns and Estonians – consider themselves rational. (...) we are businesslike and logical, stubborn and hard-working.⁸ (Ilves 1998:30-31)

He since tried to promote the concept abroad (see e.g. Ilves 1999). (2) In the domain of symbols, discussions on the Westernisation of Estonia's flag and international name took place under the cabinet of Maart Laar (1999-2002). As for the flag, a more Northern design bearing a cross was suggested. As for Estonia's international name, it was suggested to change it to “Estland” in order to get rid of the ending “-ia” perceived as too Eastern since resembling names such as Macedonia, Albania and Armenia. However, a final decision was never taken (Lagerspetz 2003:54-55). (3) In the domain of genetics, Estonia's ethnic belonging to WE was attempted to be proven in genetic studies in 1996, comparing the genetic material of Estonians to those of West-Europeans (Feldman 2001:10).

All these examples illustrate Estonia's efforts to (re-)integrate into a WE sphere.

⁸ “Jõulumaade rahvused – britid, skandinaavlased, soomlased ja eestlased – peavad ennast kaine mõistuse etaloniks. [...] oleme meie asjalikud ja loogilised, visad ja töökad.”

However, Estonia's (re-)integration to the West appears to be suspiciously looked upon by “more distant European metropolises” (Lauristin 1997:31-35). If recognition of a post-communist country as belonging to the Western sphere is related to “shared historical experiences and opportunities for communication” (Lauristin 1997:31-35), then her recognition should be easier in Germany than in France. The empirical analysis will shed light on this assumption. Knowing about the bi-directionality of the re-construction of European identity will help to interpret the empirical results.

4. RESEARCH QUESTION

The theoretical background of the dissertation thus posits (1) the national construction of European identity with the media as one of the most important actors, (2) the importance of the processes of categorisation, comparison and homogenisation in the collective construction of identity through the interaction of individuals, (3) the categorising function of media representation, inherent in language and further enhanced through framing and their (4) representation of the different realities and the integrated reality of a society in the applied frames. Empirically, I posit (1) the construction of a Western European identity as a European identity over the past 50 years in the EU15 and thus in France and Germany, (2) the existence of negatively connoted discourses on EE in WE and (3) Estonia's striving for recognition as an integral part of Europe.

From this theoretical and empirical research arises the following research question: Is Estonia, in France and Germany, more regarded as an integral part of Europe today than before her EU accession in 2004? If so, in relation to what events, topics or aspects?

When evaluating the results on the basis of the theoretical framework, special attention will be paid to the aspects (1) whether the inclusion concerns political-economic or cultural-historical aspects of European identity and (2) what the nature of the change is: inclusion into a pre-existing (Western) European identity or a profound re-definition of a European identity?

To answer the research questions, each of the employed methodologies will focus on specific aspects. First, a quantitative Content Analysis will give a general overview on changes that occur as to (1) categorisations, (2) topic areas, (3) presence of discourses on Eastern Europe, (4) evaluation and (5) hierarchical positioning of Estonia. As outlined above, I consider these aspects relevant to make conclusions on the inclusion of Estonia

into constructions of European identity. In a second step, a qualitative analysis will serve to determine the meaning of certain categories of the Content Analysis. The analysed categories correspond to real frames and were chosen after Content Analysis for two reasons: (1) they appeared to be specifically contentious or shifting in meaning and, more importantly, (2) all chosen frames are othering frames. It is this second point that gives the qualitative analysis a purpose that goes beyond a deeper analysis of the quantitative categories. If constructions of European identity have previously been based on the opposition to the Eastern European Other (see above), then it is especially through the analysis of othering frames that I can determine as to what aspects Estonia is today more included into a European identity than before CEEE. The qualitative analysis will examine three aspects: (1) the meanings of the respective frames and their interrelation, (2) the parameters of European identity (see above) with respect to which Estonia is included or othered (3) changes that occur over time. Whether a possible increased inclusion is due to a profound change of European identity constructions, or, on the other hand, Estonia's increasing compliance with norms of Westernness may equally become clearer.

5. METHODOLOGY

As outlined above, identity constructions are a highly abstract research object that is difficult to grasp because of its complexity and constant change. In this section, I will outline my choice of methods and data and explain why I believe them to be most appropriate to answer my research question.

5.1 Methods

Constructions of European identity are, I believe, best measured through a combined qualitative and quantitative methodology: Due to the society-wide construction of collective identity and the relatively slow development of identity constructions over time, a large amount of data from several different sources needs to be analysed over a long time span. At the same time, media representations are through their categorising function inherently interpretative and can, in turn, only be accessed through interpretation.

Quantitative Content Analysis accounts for the first point. It permits to analyse a large amount of relatively unstructured data over a period of several years (Krippendorff 2004:44). Furthermore, it allows for the simultaneous, systematic assessment and inter-comparison of several dimensions on a synchronic and diachronic scale. It thus seems most appropriate to gain a holistic understanding of the development of representations of Estonia in France and Germany over the past decade. Yet, in my case its explanatory power is limited, as correlations between several variables cannot be made due to the relatively small amount of available data. A qualitative text analysis will therefore permit to understand the meaning of frames, their interrelation with topics as well as their change

over time. Qualitative analysis constitutes an open approach to the text that does not impose pre-defined categories. Furthermore it allows for contextualising the analysis and for the consideration of details. These points make the method an ideal complement to Content Analysis.

Both of my methods rely on a constructivist ontology and epistemology. My use of Content Analysis, even though developed on the basis of a foundational ontology for a positivist epistemological approach (Titscher et al. 2007:56), is thus equally based on the qualitative characteristics of text as outlined in Krippendorff (2004:22-23).

In the Content Analysis, I deal with six dimensions apart from the general information on date (V1), year (V2), title (V3), magazine (V4), genre of the article (V5) and length of the article (V6). These are: First, the framing perspective (V7) and second, Estonia's geopolitical framing (V8, V9, V10) as to the insights they provide on categorisation and homogenisation. I decided to analyse both quantitatively (as opposed to e.g. an open coding) because the categories to use emerged clearly from the above research on the empirical background and, because of the pioneer character of the study, I needed a rigid framework to gain an overview that is as objective as possible. The coding of Estonia's geopolitical framing on three levels of importance does not contradict the principle that categories in Content Analysis should be mutually exclusive and complete (Titscher et al. 2000:59). It simply becomes necessary through the fact that Estonia is in numerous articles predominantly associated with a certain geopolitical setting but also categorised within other settings throughout the same article. I further coded, third, the framed topics (V11, V14, V17) as in conjunction with other variables they may reveal certain topics of in- or exclusion; fourth, the presence of a discourse on Eastern Europe in relation to the framed topic (V12, V15, V18) as they shed light on the extent and aspects of in- and exclusion, fifth, the evaluation of Estonia in relation to the framed topic (V13, V16, V19) and finally the hierarchical positioning of Estonia with respect to the main Western unit of reference (V20). These dimensions and their respective categories were established on the basis of (1) the theoretical framework and empirical background, especially on the psychological processes of identity construction and the outline of discourses on Eastern Europe in WE, (2) a screening of articles of the years 2000, 2002/2003 and 2011 prior to

the coding and (3) a pilot coding. All dimensions, criteria for their assessment and examples can be found in the Coding Sheet (see appendices). The coding is intentionally not limited to explicit contents such as keywords. Instead, based on the theoretical assumption that meaning in a text depends on larger units than the single sign (see above), the coding takes into account implicit meanings in tone, use of vocabulary and context.

The qualitative analysis is mainly oriented around the aspects described with the research questions (above). I proceeded as follows: (1) extraction of the relevant passages from the articles of the respective qualitative sample, (2) analysis of content of the passages, taking into account also vocabulary and textual structures, (3) grouping of the passages according to content and time of publication. In the second step, the textual analysis is inspired by Fairclough's scheme for Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1989:110), as it provides a good overview of relevant aspects. Yet, my approach, as opposed to Fairclough's, does not aim at a discourse analysis. Instead, it aims at the qualitative assessment of explicit and implicit content and categorisations as this is what I consider revealing of constructions of European identity (see above).

5.2 Limitations of the Research Design

Both methodologies, as every methodology, also have their drawbacks. Content Analysis, aiming at generalisation through categorisation, it is inevitably imprecise and reductive. Furthermore, despite frequent claims for it to be an objective methodology (Glynn 2004:108), it is actually not. First, the categories used to code the content are a result of my previous research, which, in turn, is influenced by several factors such as my interests and previous knowledge, termed by Temple (1997) the researcher's "intellectual autobiography". Second, the coding of the articles is, despite rigid rules, ultimately a result of my interpretation of the text, as meaning is a result of the interaction of the readers with the text. As a result, an influence of my very own standpoint at the intersection of several realities cannot be avoided.

The influence of the researcher on the research is even stronger in the qualitative analysis. Being even less structured than Content Analysis, the interpretative freedom entails the risk of over-interpretation or one-sidedness. Furthermore, as only a small amount of data can be qualitatively analysed, generalisations cannot be made.

These criticisms, however, need to be put into perspective. First, as to the application of categories in Content Analysis, it seems that any type of research – also qualitative research – seems to be based on categorisations by the researcher, namely his or her personal, mental frames. The advantage of Content Analysis is that the applied categorisations are both made explicit and justified through research of the empirical background. Furthermore, to avoid misleading conclusions related to categorisation, I will pay attention to larger, more obvious trends during evaluation, knowing that the boundaries of categories are not always unambiguous.

Second, as to the interpretative base of both methodologies, I depart from the understanding that *social* reality is always constructed and therefore cannot be objectively assessed. However, in order to make my assessment inter-subjectively comprehensible, I make my own background explicit as recommended in Temple (1997). My background consists of socialisation in Germany and, since I left school, an intense personal, professional and academic preoccupation with France where I lived for two years. As a consequence, I am familiar with both languages and cultures, yet my knowledge on Germany is more intuitive whereas my knowledge on France is to a larger extent academic. As for the French language, although my level is near-native, I cannot entirely exclude that I may have overlooked certain metaphors based on a more exhaustive knowledge of French culture.

Last, the drawbacks of the respective methodologies are reduced through their combination: Content Analysis provides a systematic overview, whereas the qualitative analysis accounts for the analysis of meaning in context and its change. The interrelation and compensation of mutual drawbacks is also taken into account in sampling: The qualitative analysis takes into account not only those articles that were to a certain category in Content Analysis and thereby compensates for the latter's inevitably reductive categorisation.

5.3 Data Source

The choice of news magazines as data source of my analysis is related to features concerning both media in general and news magazines in particular. As to media, I outlined above that I consider them a particularly good source for my research aim because of the societal frames they contain. Second, media are “archives” of identity definitions and thus one of the very few sources providing genuine access to identity definitions ten years ago. Third, media analysis is “an “unobtrusive” or “nonreactive” research method (Glynn 2004:108) and therefore minimises the influence of the research process on the results. The choice of news magazines out of other media relies on several reasons. First, these magazines are produced by a nation's upper and middle class for this nation's upper and middle class and those best correspond to the society-wide, aggregate approach to identity definitions I aim to take. Second, news magazines, depending less on the current flow of news than newspapers, have more freedom to choose their topics. In addition, their articles are usually longer and more illustrated. News magazines thus provide most exhaustive frames. Thereby the explanatory power of the analysis increases. Third, printed news magazines cover Estonia more regularly as for instance audiovisual magazines. For a diachronic analysis, this regularity of coverage is indispensable. Last, all chosen magazines enjoy a high level of trust in their respective societies and therefore make the impact of their frames back on societal constructions of European identity most probable.

The analysis will comprise all quality news magazines from Germany and France with a relevant circulation. These are for Germany: *Der Spiegel*, *Focus* and *Die Zeit*; for France: *L'Express*, *Le Point* and *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Unfortunately, the only magazine for the Franco-German sphere, *ParisBerlin*, could not be included because of the unavailability of data.

	Circulation (rounded average 2011)	Founded in	Political orientation
German magazines			
Focus	550 000	1993	Middle-right
Die Zeit	500 000	1946	Social-liberal
Der Spiegel	950 000	1947	Initially leftist, however more recently moving towards neo-conservatism
French magazines			
L'Express	620 000	1953	centrist
Le Nouvel Observateur	500 000	1964	middle-left
Le Point	410 000	1972	Middle-right

Fig. 3: Overview over analysed magazines⁹

These magazines have several points in common. First, they all appear weekly with a circulation of around 500 000 exemplars, except for Der Spiegel, whose circulation is about twice as high. Second, they all are anchored in the societies of their respective nation for several decades and enjoy an image of providing trustworthy, high quality journalism. Third, they are all aiming at a readership composed of the elite, upper and middle class of their respective nation. Third, their mixture of long and short articles is relatively similar, except for Die Zeit who tends towards longer articles. Last, none of the journals officially follows an explicit political line, yet all of them can clearly be assigned to a certain political orientation (as outlined above) and cover in their sum both in Germany and France the range from centre-left to centre-right. Possible influences of the journalist's political or ideological orientation on the framing are thus balanced.

As for the choice of articles, the overall population was selected using the search terms

⁹Sources: Der Spiegel 2011: Auflagenmeldung, Der Spiegel 2012: Sieben Gründe für eine Belegung, Der Spiegel: Konzept, Der Spiegel: Geschichte, Focus: Deutschlands Nachrichtenmagazin, Focus: Memo, Die Zeit: Verlagszahlen, Die Zeit: Marketing, Die Zeit: Wie alles begann, L'Express 15/02/2012, Le Point: Contacts, Le Nouvel Observateur: Positionnement et chiffres-clés

“HEADLINE(estnisch) or BYLINE(estnisch) or HLEAD(estnisch) or HEADLINE(Estland) or BYLINE(Estland) or HLEAD(Estland) or HEADLINE(Esten) or BYLINE(Esten) or HLEAD(Esten) or HEADLINE(Estinnen) or BYLINE(Estinnen) or HLEAD(Estinnen)”

for Germany and

“HEADLINE(Estonie) or BYLINE(Estonie) or HLEAD(Estonie) or HEADLINE(estonien!) or BYLINE(estonien!) or HLEAD(estonien!)”

for France in the NexisUK database. For Die Zeit and Le Nouvel Observateur not being available from NexisUK, the articles have been determined by the search function of their Internet archives. As these search functions are not as detailed as the one on NexisUK, I cannot exclude that certain articles might have been overlooked.

Out of a total population of 305 articles I excluded all articles longer than 170 words mentioning Estonia only once in an enumeration. The final sample for the Content Analysis then comprised 243 articles. The sample for qualitative analysis was compiled out of the articles ascribed to a certain category in either first, second or third priority in the quantitative Content Analysis. To reduce the large sample while maintaining complexity, all articles in which the relevant passage was shorter than two lines were excluded. Furthermore, I added those articles that contained the respective frames but, due to the inevitably reductive coding scheme, could not be assessed in Content Analysis. Therefore, the qualitative analysis explores essentially the meanings of certain categories of the Content Analysis, yet goes beyond it in the inclusion of a few uncoded framings.

The time span for the analysis has been set to 2000-2011 which allows for the inclusion of time before Estonia's EU accession. Simultaneously, it excludes possible particularities in representation related to the start of accession negotiations in 1998, which would take the analysis one step further and goes beyond what I can cover in this Master dissertation. The time period was, for the quantitative analysis, divided into pre- and post-CEEE (01/05/2004) in order to be able to detect changes due to the inclusion of Estonia

into the political-economical unit of Europe. Certain particularities are, however, analysed with regard to the single years. In the qualitative analysis, I set time periods according to the respective results.

6. RESULTS

This section serves to present the results of the empirical analysis.

6.1 Results of the quantitative Content Analysis

I will first give a general overview over the composition of the sample. The amount of articles on Estonia is with a total of 141 in German magazines almost a third higher than in French magazines with a total of 102 articles.




Fig. 4: Distribution of articles per magazine, absolute numbers

The distribution of articles over the years is very unequal and ranges from 26 (Germany 2007) to 2 (France 2000, 2002):



Fig. 5: Distribution of articles per year, absolute numbers

In both French and German magazines in the period between 2004-2008 more articles on Estonia have been published. When looking at the transition from 2003 to 2004, a strong surge in the number of articles published on Estonia is observable: for Germany, the number has more than tripled, for France doubled. Most of the increased attention seems to be due to EU enlargement: articles on the enlargement itself, but also travel documentations or cultural portraits dominate in both French and German magazines. In German magazines, a further significant peak is reached in 2007, due to the covering of the discussion, riots and cyberattacks around the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue in Tallinn. In French magazines, a moderate peak is reached in 2008 in relation to the covering of Herman Simm being discovered as a spy for Russia in the NATO and the inclusion of the EE states into the Schengen area. Since 2008, no general trend is discernible, however the attention Estonia receives in German and French magazines seems to converge.




Fig. 6: Attention devoted to Estonia

When evaluating the lengths of articles, it appears that Estonia receives significantly more attention in German magazines. When looking at single years, a particularly high amount of medium and long articles is visible in 2004 for both French and German magazines, as well as for the whole period 2004-2008 in French magazines, both in relation to the recent EU enlargement.

Before starting the analysis, a few limitations need to be pointed out: First, no data has been available for *Le Nouvel Observateur* for the period 2000-11.2003, which corresponds, calculated on the average number of articles/year in this magazine, to about 5 missing articles. Second, the absolute number of articles published on Estonia is as follows:

	France	Germany
Before EU accession	21	44
After EU accession	81	97

Fig. 7: Absolute number of articles on Estonia before and after CEEE

The low number of articles published in French magazines on Estonia before her EU accession will be taken into account in the evaluation. Third, some aspects have been coded with different levels of importance or a high number of categories to assure a maximum of preciseness. Yet, due to the low number of articles a systematic correlation (a) of the three levels of importance or (b) with the other variables assessed in relation turned out not to provide reliable results. In these cases I will, for (a), only give a systematic overview of the dominant framing and add observations from the other levels where appropriate; and for (b) relegate the analysis of interrelation of frames, topics and meaning to the qualitative analysis.

I will now give an overview over the assessed dimensions.

Framing Perspective

Certain changes are discernible in the choice of a framing perspective with regard to Estonia pre- and post-CEEE:




Fig. 8: Framing perspectives (V7)

As for German magazines, the national framing perspective remains stable at 64% in both periods. It is with 100% particularly strong in 2005 due to a large amount of articles in the domain of politics and particularly on the integration of the new EU members. The framing perspective of Europe as a whole increases, mainly due to the coverage of the NATO agent Simm issue in 2008. However, the EU15 perspective does not entirely disappear with the end of EU15. Instead, certain issues are still framed from a WE perspective, such as in 2006 financial investment in EE, in 2008 the opening of the Schengen area to the new EU members and in 2011 the end of restrictions on free mobility for workers from EE in Germany. This perspective seems frequently to be connected to issues raising popular anxiety, for instance on migration. In general, it is to note that the high rates of the national framing perspective are partly due to the coding criteria: a national perspective was assumed for all articles not evidently taking another stance.

As for French magazines, the national perspective seems equally strong – mainly for the same coding related reason as above – and increases significantly after the 2004 enlargement. When set in relation to the absolute number of articles, the national perspective appears to be particularly frequent in 2005 (10 articles) and mostly related to

the topics of the recent EU enlargement and accounts of communist history. When looking at single years, it is evident that in French magazines the national perspective increases significantly after the 2004 enlargement at the expense of the Europe-wide perspective.

For both French and German magazines, the national perspective generally dominates and is particularly strong in 2004/2005 related to coverage of the recent CEEE. In German magazines, post-CEEE, the EU15 perspective significantly reduces but is maintained for topics concerning a perceived threat, whereas in French magazines it nearly disappears. Its reduction in German magazines goes along with a more frequent holistic European perspective, whereas in French magazines the EU15 share falls to the national perspective.

Estonia's geopolitical Categorisation

Estonia's dominant geopolitical categorisation evaluates clearly:




Fig. 9: Estonia's most important geopolitical categorisation (V8)

Concerning German magazines, the range of dominant geopolitical framings of Estonia is more varied after her EU accession. It goes along with a decrease of her dominant framing as a nation, a Baltic State and part of Eastern Europe and the increase of her framing as part of Europe as a whole. The latter is related to the coverage surrounding the accession, but also to the fact that Estonia is now more often used as a point of reference in statistical EU wide comparisons. However, when Estonia is dominantly framed as part of Europe as a whole, she is usually also framed as a nation and as part of Eastern Europe as indicated by the other levels of categorisation (V9, V10). Furthermore, her association to Russia increases. This frame, after her EU accession, usually goes hand in hand with Estonia's second and third most important framing as a nation and as part of Europe as a whole or the NATO. Thus the overall meaning seems to be more complex than a straightforward association to Russia and will be analysed in detail in the qualitative analysis. Last, Estonia's framing as an Eastern European country decreases only slightly, and she is not at all framed as part of Northern Europe.

Concerning French magazines, Estonia's geopolitical categorisation is equally more varied after her EU accession. Whereas before, she was most frequently framed as a nation and part of Eastern Europe, after her EU accession five different categories have more and almost equal weight: her categorisation as a Baltic State, as part of Eastern Europe and Europe as a whole, her association to Russia and spontaneous geopolitical framings. Estonia's categorisation as part of Europe as a whole, is for both periods, like in German magazines, frequently related to her framing as a nation on other levels, and unlike in German magazines, not systematically related to her framing as Eastern European. The Eastern European as most important frame visibly decreased with no change in the associated second or third frames. Furthermore, the framing of Estonia being in Russia's sphere of influence increased, yet its meaning seems as contentious as for German magazines. Finally, the large part of framing as NATO country before Estonia's EU accession is due to Estonia's accession to the NATO on 29/03/2004 *before* she joined the EU.

When looking at both French and German magazines, it becomes evident that

Estonia's framing as belonging to Europe as a whole has increased. This is particularly obvious, when taking into account the second and third most important frames and the ambiguous meaning of her association to Russia. Furthermore, it appears that Estonia's categorisation as Eastern European seems to decrease more easily in French magazines than in German magazines and that generally new categorisations are more widely adopted in French magazines than in German magazines.

I will now look more closely at specific periods. For France, the years 2000-2002 have been grouped, as there is not enough data available (2-4 articles/year).




Fig. 10: Estonia's most important geopolitical framing (V8) by year

In German magazines, Estonia's categorisation as belonging to Europe as a whole holds a stable level of around 25% since 2007 with the exception of 2009 where this framing is completely absent. Her association to Eastern Europe has been particularly strong in 2004 and 2005 and is since fluctuating around the same level as before her EU accession. Since 2006, Estonia's association to Russia is increasing (explanation as above) as well as her association to the NATO. Yet, it is remarkable that Estonia's joining of NATO in 2004 does not seem to have been a newsworthy event, since her main categorisation as member of NATO only started in 2008 with a delay of 4 years. The same delay is visible for her categorisation as part of Europe as a whole. Furthermore, since 2005 Estonia starts to be represented in spontaneous geopolitical frames which is related to her increased inclusion into statistical comparisons as e.g. on state finances or murder rates throughout Europe. Last, in 2011 the first dominant framing of Estonia as a Nordic Country appears.

For French magazines, two years are conspicuous: Neither in 2009 nor in 2011 Estonia has been dominantly framed as a nation. This result is first due to the low number of articles in both years (6/year) and second to the fact that in both years the framing as a nation is relegated to the second or third most important level. In the period from 2005-2007 a strong framing of Estonia as part of Europe as a whole is evident and linked to coverage of her recent EU accession. Simultaneously her framing as Eastern European significantly decreases and increases again after 2009. The graphic also shows Estonia's increased association to Russia, especially for the period 2007-2009 (explanation see above). Furthermore, the framing of Estonia in spontaneous spacial formations appears in 2004 and increases since due to statistical comparisons. Last, the chart clearly shows that the first dominant framing of Estonia as a Baltic State appeared in 2004 and that the importance of this category has since increased. This is particularly striking, as even in the second and third most important geopolitical framings of Estonia, the Baltic frame did not play a role before 2004. The categorisation of Estonia as part of Northern Europe or a Nordic Country is absent in French magazines.

When comparing French and German magazines, it is obvious that before Estonia's EU accession, she is in French magazines more frequently framed as Eastern European (25-33%) than in German magazines (13-17%). The frequency of the Baltic State frame

decreases in German magazines since Estonia's EU accession, but increases in French magazines. For both, French and German magazines, Estonia's association to Russia is contentious and includes Estonia's simultaneous categorisation as part of Europe as a whole or the NATO. Furthermore, Estonia's categorisation in spontaneous spacial formations increased since her EU accession (explanation see above). Equally her categorisation as part of Europe as a whole increased, in French magazines in the aftermath of CEEE but decreased since, and in German magazines with a delay of about 3 years. Yet, Estonia's self-categorisation as a Nordic country seems to have found its way only to German magazines, and only very recently.

Topics related to Estonia

The topics covered in relation to Estonia equally demonstrate a certain development:




Fig. 11: Most important topic related to Estonia (VII)

As to the framed topic, for both French and German magazines, it is visible that the range of regularly covered topics is much more diverse after CEEE than before. One of the most striking findings is, for both French and German magazines, again, the covering of Estonia's relations to Russia exclusively after her EU accession (explanation see above). For both countries the EU enlargement remains, also after CEEE, an important topic.

Equally noticeable for both French and German magazines is the large amount of travel documentations in preparation of CEEE, which after CEEE develops differently: For German magazines, the number of travel documentations reduces – just as the coverage of cultural issues in general, whereas in French magazines travel documentations reduce after CEEE in favour of an increased coverage of other cultural subjects in relation to Estonia. Two further differences between French and German magazines are conspicuous independently from the time-period: Whereas in French magazines communism as part of history is regularly covered, the focus in German magazines lays on transition.

Discourses on Eastern Europe related to Estonia

I will now move on to the development of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia.




Fig. 12: Types of discourses on Eastern Europe related to Estonia (V12)

As for discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia, a general decrease of the presence of discourses on Eastern Europe is visible on the level of the most important topic.

In German magazines, the presence of discourses on Eastern Europe drops significantly from 80% to 60%. Especially the discourse of Estonia as a learner diminishes, while all other types of discourses remain stable.

In French magazines, the presence of discourses on Eastern Europe reduces from 70% to 60%, with a reduction of all types of discourses except the discourse of weakness. The latter is mainly related to coverage of the cyberattacks and tensions with Moscow after the relocation of the Bronze Soldier in 2007.

The relation of discourses on Eastern Europe to a certain topic will be analysed in the qualitative analysis. Yet, two correlations are already noticeable when looking at single years: First, in 2008 in German magazines the amount of articles using the insecurity discourse is particularly high and related to the NATO agent Simm issue, depicting Estonia as a source of insecurity for the NATO. Second, in 2010 in French magazines only 30% of the articles mention a discourse on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia (compared to 60% on average). This drop can be related to the high number of articles on cultural issues (travel, music, books) with no use of discourses on Eastern Europe.

In both German and French magazines, the presence of discourses on Eastern Europe for further topics covered in an article is significantly lower and remains stable for both time periods around 30%.

Evaluation of Estonia

Changes are also visible concerning the evaluation of Estonia:




Fig. 13: Evaluation of Estonia as to most important topic (V13)

When looking at the evaluation of Estonia (V13, V16, V19), related to the most important topic some changes are clearly discernible. In German magazines, her ambivalent evaluation reduced in favour of a stronger positive or neutral evaluation. The remaining negative evaluations are most often related to conflictual relations with Russia, sometimes also to discourses of backwardness in relation to Estonia. For French magazines, the significant rise of negative evaluations of Estonia is equally related to a decrease of ambivalent evaluations and the start of coverage of her association to Russia. Nevertheless the positive evaluation of Estonia increases slightly in both French and German magazines with respect to a large variety of topics.

When relating the evaluation of Estonia back to the presence or absence of discourses on Eastern Europe, enough data to make reliable conclusions is only available for the post-accession period: The presence of a discourse on Eastern Europe frequently

entails a negative or ambivalent evaluation of Estonia, for both French and German magazines. For instance, the positive, neutral or absence of evaluation totals around 90% in both countries when Estonia is not related to any discourse on Eastern Europe. When one of these discourses is present, however, only 70% of the articles in German magazines and 75% of the articles in French magazines evaluate Estonia positively, neutrally or not at all.

Hierarchical Positioning

The hierarchical positioning of Estonia develops as follows:




Fig. 14: Hierarchical positioning of Estonia (V20)

In German magazines, a substantial decrease of inferior positioning of Estonia in favour of a higher equal or ambivalent hierarchical positioning is visible. As to Estonia's superior positioning, it is, before her EU accession related to 2 articles: the first, one on her referendum for EU accession, evaluates this practice as more democratic compared to German magazines, where even fundamental EU related decisions are taken by the

government. The other article covers music. After Estonia's EU accession, her superior positioning concentrates around topics of IT-innovation (such as E-voting and the NATO's IT-defence centre in Tallinn) and the Estonian economic success-story.

Concerning French magazines, the inferior positioning of Estonia equally decreased since her EU accession, mainly in favour of no positioning at all. Furthermore, a small percentage of articles do now position Estonia as hierarchically superior, which was not at all the case before. These four articles relate to arts (2), E-voting (1) and Estonia's excellent state finances (1).

When comparing French and German magazines, it appears that before CEEE German magazines tended to depict Estonia more often as hierarchically inferior than French magazines – 66% and 57% respectively. French magazines, instead, viewed her more often as hierarchically equal than German magazines – 29% and 14 % respectively. This difference may be related to the equally stronger presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in German magazines. After CEEE there is no difference between French and German magazines as to their inferior, equal or superior positioning of Estonia. Differences exist only between the ambivalent positioning, stronger in German magazines, and the absence of positioning, stronger in French magazines. Yet, both positionings visibly increase in both countries compared to pre-CEEE.

6.2 Results of the qualitative Analysis

In the qualitative analysis I analysed the categories (1) Estonia association to Russia (category 10 in V8, V9 and V10), and Estonia's depiction as (2) backward, (3) a learner and (4) an insecure place or a source of insecurity (categories 3, 4 and 5 in V12, V14 and V18). The choice of categories and the research questions are explained above.

I will analyse the different types of discourse for German and French magazines respectively and give a summarising overview in the end.

Estonia's Association with Russia

The meaning of Estonia's association with Russia seems to be similar in French and German magazines.

German magazines

In German magazines Estonia's association to Russia is related to three recurrent theme complexes. First, Estonia is associated to Russia in a larger geopolitical setting often around topics related to the EU/NATO accession. This meaning visibly shifted over the past ten years. Before Estonia's EU and NATO accession, Estonia was regarded as belonging exclusively to Russia's sphere of influence. This included the perceived risk to provoke Russia when too closely collaborating with Estonia and occurs especially in relation to Estonia's NATO accession, for instance in:

Putin seems to be present as a silent guest at the table in every one of Schröder's talks. The process of advancing the links of the Baltic States to the West is "not directed against Russia" assures the chancellor publicly and ubiquitously.¹⁰ (Der Spiegel, 06/12/2000)

After EU and NATO accession, Estonia is, instead, portrayed as one of the states *formerly* under Russian sphere of influence, and now constantly in the process of dissociating herself from Russia. This portrait occurs in relation to her general protest against the separation of geopolitical spheres of influence in the EU, her refusal to attend the commemoration of the end of WWII in Moscow and her active opposition against Russia's invasion of Georgia:

On a stage in the centre of Tiflis the five Eastern Europeans from Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic States held each others hands firmly and solemnly promised to defend Georgia's freedom. "Russia", yelled Poland's president Lech Kaczinski (...), "wants to restore her hegemony, but these times are over now!" And his Estonian counterpart Toomas Hendrik Ilves shouted in Georgian through the Microphone: "I am a Georgian" - just like US president John F.

¹⁰ "Putin sitzt bei jedem Gespräch Schröders gleichsam als steinerner Gast mit am Tisch. Der Prozess der Westanbindung des Baltikums sei "nicht gegen Russland gerichtet", beteuert der Kanzler öffentlich und allerorten."

Kennedy promised solidarity and protection against the Soviet power to Berlin's inhabitants in 1963 by declaring: "Ich bin ein Berliner". (...). While "New-Europeans" and Americans already identified the culprit in the recent conflict in Caucasus, politicians from the "old Europe" reacted with more composure.¹¹ (Focus, 18/08/2008)

In these accounts, a division between "old" and "new Europe" is often not only explicitly stated, or insinuated through the claim that the new members are easily manipulated through the US, but also implicitly emphasised. For instance, in the above example the reactions of the Estonian and Polish presidents are framed as insecure, childlike and defiant overreactions towards Russia through the use of vocabulary and punctuation: Estonia's and Poland's presidents "yelled" and "shouted [...] through the microphone", whereas the American president, in a similar situation, "promised" by "declaring". These points suggests that Estonia is now being seen as constantly in the process of dissociating herself from Russia, rather than as a full member of a united European sphere. Albeit included into a European community of institutional organisation (the EU, or, as a Western community, the NATO) and, partially, into a community of interests opposed to the Other (Russia), Estonia is, just as EE as a whole, othered as to her national memories and the resulting action (harsh opposition to Russia, compliant support of the US). This is further enhanced by Estonia's depiction as a source of insecurity within NATO (see below). Yet, compared to previous definitions of Estonia's geopolitical belonging, a shift is clearly discernible.

A second theme in Estonia's association to Russia concerns bilateral issues between Estonia and Russia and occurs especially in relation to the relocation of the Bronze soldier and the associated riots and cyberattacks. The ten articles in the sample relating to this topic show different trends in the respective magazines. Whereas *Die Zeit* reiterates old clichés and others both Estonia and Russia by characterising them as irrational and unwilling to cooperate, *Focus*, in opposition, clearly includes Estonia into a civilised European sphere

¹¹ "Auf einer Bühne in der Innenstadt von Tiflis hielten sich die fünf Osteuropäer aus Polen, der Ukraine und dem Baltikum fest an den Händen und gelobten feierlich, die Freiheit Georgiens zu verteidigen. "Russland", schmettete Polens Präsident Lech Kaczynski (...), "will seine Vorherrschaft wiederherstellen, aber diese Zeiten sind vorbei!" Und sein estnischer Amtskollege Toomas Hendrik Ilves rief in georgischer Sprache durchs Mikrofon: "Ich bin ein Georgier" - ganz so wie 1963 US-Präsident John F. Kennedy den Berlinern mit den Worten "Ich bin ein Berliner" Solidarität und Schutz gegen die Sowjetmacht versichert hatte (...). Während für "Neu-Europäer" und Amerikaner der Schuldige im jüngsten Kaukasuskonflikt längst ausgemacht ist, reagierten Politiker des "alten Europa" zurückhaltender."

suffering from intolerable aggressions of her impulsive neighbour Russia. Der Spiegel takes an intermediate position by altering between both depictions. This categorisation of behaviour includes or others Estonia in the depiction of her action on the geopolitical scene as respectively conform or deviant from European norms of reason and civilisation, these norms being understood as West-European (see above: Brubaker 1998). Both Focus and Der Spiegel evoke the revival of the Cold War, with, however, Estonia on the Western side, pointing again at her inclusion into the shared sphere of institutional organisation.

A third type of association of Estonia to Russia occurs in the depiction of Russian culture in Estonia's everyday societal life. German stereotypes of Russian everyday lifestyle (poverty, alcohol) are reiterated, and their association to Estonia simultaneously others Estonia as to standards in everyday lifestyle, e.g. in the description of Lasnamäe:

Built 20 or 30 years ago to settle as many Russians as possible. Here people swallow collectively huge amounts of alcohol at 8 in the morning, rummage on small, filthy markets in used clothes, stand around on the street.¹² (Die Zeit, 23/05/2002)

This meaning does not seem to have undergone much shift in the analysed period. It is often used to illustrate either the starting point or the downside of the Estonian success story and usually includes references to Estonia's Soviet past, less often references to her initial economic dependence on Russia.

Overall, for German magazines, a partial shift in meaning can thus be stated: In a geopolitical setting, Estonia is now much stronger included into a European sphere of common institutional organisation, and, partially, interests. Yet, within this sphere, and also in a bilateral setting, her belonging remains ambivalent as illustrated above. For her association to Russian culture, finally, no shift takes place.

French magazines

As for French magazines, Estonia's association to Russia is complex and not as

¹² “Gebaut vor 20, 30 Jahren, um möglichst viele Russen anzusiedeln. Hier kippen die Menschen morgens um acht kollektiv Alkohol, wühlen auf kleinen, schmutzigen Märkten in gebrauchten Klamotten, stehen auf der Straße.”

clear-cut and manifestly evolving as in the German magazines. Only one article dates to the pre-accession period. Post-accession, associations to Russia are usually made on a bilateral level. Two topics recur: (1) Russia's unjustified aggression of Estonia and (2) the conflict on "historical truth" between the two countries. Both topics occur especially, but not exclusively, related to the Bronze Soldier.

As to Estonia's aggression by Russia, Russia is usually othered as the impulsive, unpredictable villain opposing victimised and westernising Estonia:

Outcry in Moscow. But also among Estonia's Russian speaking minority (...) who takes offence. The Russian authorities threaten to break off diplomatic relations, urge the boycott of Estonian products and demonstrators besiege the embassy in Moscow. In Tallinn, the pro-Russians confront the police. Result: 1 person killed and 150 wounded.

Lots of damage for the sake of a monument. And in Moscow, the resentment towards her Baltic ex-republics who have changed sides towards the West, is still intense. Just like in Estonia, independent since 1991, member of the EU and the NATO since 2004... and striving to erase fifty years of Soviet occupation.¹³ (Le Point, 10/05/2007)

In- and exclusion as to several aspects are contained in these accounts. The above example shows: (1) Inclusion of Estonia into a community of values in opposition to exclusion of Russia through the depiction of her political strategies non-conform to (Western) European norms of reason (see above); (2) Simultaneous exclusion of Estonia from this (Western) European community of values as she comprises part of the Russian Other in her Russian minority; (3) Further exclusion from this sphere of values as to the equation of Estonia's reaction with Russia's reaction; (4) Exclusion from a (Western) European community of memory through depiction of Estonia's Soviet past as an aspect requiring erasing. Estonia is thus partially included into the European Self, but, just like in German magazines, represented as a new member evolving towards becoming fully European. In other articles,

¹³ "Tollé à Moscou. Mais aussi parmi la minorité russophone d'Estonie (...), qui y voit un affront. Les autorités russes menacent de rompre les relations diplomatiques, appellent au boycott des produits estoniens et des manifestants font le siège de l'ambassade à Moscou. Beaucoup de dégats pour un monument. Et la rancœur toujours vive de Moscou vis-à-vis de ses ex-républiques baltes passées à l'Ouest. Comme l'Estonie, indépendante depuis 1991, membre de l'Union européenne et de l'Otan depuis 2004... Et soucieuse d'effacer cinquante années d'occupation soviétique."

this is stressed through depictions of a defiant Estonian attitude towards Russia, especially with regard to history and her need for protection by her Western partners.

As to the conflict about historical truth, depictions continually alter between (1) both the Estonian and the Russian/Soviet version of history being equally valid and (2) the Russian version being invented. Notably, the Estonian version of history is never depicted as false which might be evaluated as an essential inclusion of Estonia into a European community of memory when dealing with Russia as the Other. Yet, even when the Estonian version of history is approved, her independence is dated to 1991 which attests only a partial understanding of Estonia's view on history (this phenomenon is also frequent in German magazines).

Last, Estonia association to Russia seems to be an underlying motive in a large variety of subjects, ranging from her good knowledge of Russia as advantageous for EU investors to a canard on Estonian farms declaring themselves independent Soviet Republic. Sometimes these associations lack a direct logical connection, as in:

On the first of January, Estonia, Baltic Republic of 1,3 million inhabitants, became the 17th member of the eurozone. This allows her to even more cut her ties with Russia.¹⁴ (Le Point, 06/01/2011)

These last type of associations to Russia formally insist on Estonia's ongoing or completed dissociation from Russia. Yet, the sole mentioning of her dissociation from Russia in a context where there is no imminent need for it, implies the underlying assumption of an unspecific, continuous association to Russia.

Due to the lack of articles on Estonian-Russian relations in the pre-accession period, no change of meaning can be assessed. Yet, the sole fact that only Estonia's EU and NATO accession makes her relations with Russia worth media coverage suggests an inclusion into the shared sphere of institutional organisation, and possibly interests and experience.

¹⁴ “Le premier janvier l'Estonie, république balte de 1,3 million d'habitant, est devenue le 17e membre de l'euro. Cela lui permet de couper plus encore les liens avec la Russie.”

Estonia as backward, immature or underdeveloped

The depiction of Estonia as backward is much more present in German magazines, than in French. However, for both a development can be stated.

German magazines

In German magazines, the depiction of Estonia as backward, immature or underdeveloped carries several meanings. First, it can refer to material poverty of individuals or the whole society, for example in:

In Kopli, ten minutes by car away from the city centre, people ail in holes that you could formally call houses, as they have walls and a roof. But no electricity, no running water, no sanitary arrangements and life threatening fireplaces. It smells, like rats, like schnapps and even worse. Natalja and her husband Walerij live here, both are unemployed, with their three children, in one and a half room (...). It is not rare that they are hungry, first the parents and later in the month also the children.¹⁵ (Die Zeit, 11/03/2004)

The description of material poverty is usually used to illustrate the downside of Estonia's rapid economical growth and general societal transition (termed in the following "Estonian success-story"). Sometimes it is associated to depictions of criminality and insecurity. Also the incapacity or the outdated methods of the Estonian state when dealing with it are mentioned. In this form, discourses of backwardness are othering Estonia as to norms and experience, respectively compared to West-European standards. Simultaneously, the negative connotations of these discourses clearly assign an inferior position to Estonia.

The same connotations and effects go with a second meaning of backwardness: the depiction of Estonia as lacking societal maturity. This lack of maturity can concern society as a whole or specific domains such as politics, sciences or economy. Mostly, it is evaluated negatively, as for instance in:

¹⁵ "In Kopli, zehn Autominuten vom Stadtzentrum entfernt, vegetieren Menschen in Löchern dahin, die man formal natürlich Häuser nennen kann, weil sie Wände und ein Dach haben. Aber keinen Strom, kein fließendes Wasser, keine sanitären Anlagen, lebensgefährliche Feuerstellen. Es stinkt, nach Ratten, nach Schnaps, nach Schlimmerem. Natalja und ihr Mann Walerij leben hier, beide arbeitslos, mit drei Kindern, in anderhalb Zimmern (...). Nicht selten hungern sie, erst die Eltern, später im Monat auch die Kinder."

Data protection is not a topic for debate in a state, where the daily struggle to survive in the still unfamiliar post-communist capitalism costs a lot of energy¹⁶ (Der Spiegel, 18/09/2000).

In this case, it is mostly also connected to discourses of insecurity or even threat, for individuals, Estonian society or Western partners. However, also ambiguous and even positive evaluations of societal immaturity can be found, as for instance in:

Provincial, so what? The provinciality – in a positive sense – of the new members may turn out to be a blessing for the alliance. The seven post-communist societies joining the alliance are to a large extent absorbed in their own issues and have in many respects less sense for their global responsibility than the old NATO members. This may rescue the alliance almost bursting with its own excessive ambitions.¹⁷ (Die Zeit 01/04/2004)

This type of discourse can stand on its own, but also be related to accounts of threat/insecurity and equally to illustrate the ambiguity of the Estonian success-story. It is partially including, as to a community of institutional organisation and interests, yet excluding as to experience and memory with reference to West-Europe. As above, it entails connotations of Estonia's inferiority.

A third meaning found in the discourses of backwardness, is the one of rural idyll:

When Franz starts filming with his camcorder a farmer scything the high grass by the road, Edgars [the tourist guide] asks loudly: Why would you film anyone at work?

But these are the pictures that the cyclists from the West want to see: the grandmother with her crutch stooping down in the bed of cabbage, the girl walking with a bucket to the drawing well, families picking blueberries in the forest. This looks like my childhood in Swabia: the poverty, the woodsheds, the

¹⁶ “Mit einem Thema wie Datenschutz setzt sich dagegen kaum einer auseinander in einem Staat, in dem der tägliche Überlebenskampf im immer noch ungewohnten postkommunistischen Kapitalismus viel Kraft kostet.”

¹⁷ “Provinziell, na und? Die Provinzialität der Neuen könnte sich noch als Segen für die Allianz erweisen. Die sieben postkommunistischen Gesellschaften, die nun dem Bündnis beitreten, sind sehr auf sich selbst bezogen und haben in mancher Hinsicht weniger Sinn für ihre globale Verantwortung als die alten Nato-Mitglieder. Indes könnte das für ein Bündnis, das ob der eigenen Überforderung fast zerspringt, sogar die Rettung sein.”

little gardens with beds to grow one's own food, says Maria.¹⁸ (Die Zeit 09/07/2006)

This meaning implies several connotations. First, positively, it is connected to purity and stability with Estonia depicted as a place to escape “Western” hectic and pressures. It is othering as to norms and experience, yet in an exoticising, positively connoted way. Second, it is connected to discourses of material poverty, othering as to the same respects, yet negatively connoted. In both cases, Estonia is assigned an inferior position.

The meanings of backwardness develop over time. Discourses of backwardness were most often related to insecurity or threat in the years 2000-2002. This meaning disappears after 2006. In turn, the meaning of backwardness as idyllic first appears in 2004. Discourses on backwardness are most frequently othering from WE through their explicit reference to Estonia's Soviet past.

French magazines

As for French magazines, the meanings of backwardness are with only 7 articles in the qualitative sample clearly less present and complex. They are not related to specific contents. All articles depicting Estonia as backward portray her either (1) in a group with other EE countries and, after 2006 (2) in comparison with other EU countries. Both groups may other Estonia through content in norms and experience, yet, the later group includes her through the comparison with other EU countries simultaneously into a common sphere of based on institutional organisation. These articles represent Estonia as societal immature in domains such as medicine and economy. In addition, moral plays a role:

But actually, communism leaves us truly gigantic ruins: Economical ruins: All you have to do is visit these countries to understand their situation. Political ruins, of course, as you cannot simply reconstruct a democracy, easily, in a few months. And, what is more and even profounder, societal ruins. The social

¹⁸ “Als dann ein Stück weiter Franz mit seinem Camcorder einen Bauern filmt, wie er mit der Sense das hohe Gras am Wegesrand mäht, fragt Edgars laut: Warum nimmt man bloß jemanden bei der Arbeit auf? Solche Bilder aber wollen die Radler aus dem Westen sehen: das Mütterchen mit der Krücke, das sich im Kohlbeet bückt, das Mädchen, das mit dem Eimer zum Ziehbrunnen läuft, Familien, die Heidelbeeren im Wald pflücken. Das sieht hier aus wie in meiner Kindheit im Schwäbischen, sagt Maria, die Armut, die Holzschuppen, die Gärten mit Beeten zum Selbstversorgen.”

fabric has been destroyed, the elites have been destroyed, the points of orientation have been destroyed... Moral benchmarks, for instance, have disappeared to a large extent. Thousands of girls from the East prostitute themselves in the West. This is an enormous catastrophe. And also all these mafias... (Interview with the French author of a book on communism, L'Express, 03/10/2002).¹⁹

The represented moral inferiority of Estonia (elsewhere also in relation to the lack of gay rights in Estonia) clearly others her and puts her, from a French stance, into an inferior position.

As for the development of meaning, no change can be stated for the content. Yet, as to the textual representation an inclusion into a common sphere of institutional organisation, experience and interests seems to appear in the textual structure of representation, i.e. the comparison with other EU countries.

Estonia as a Learner

The framing of Estonia as a learner is connected to a much larger variety of topics in France and in Germany.

German magazines

In German magazines, discourses of Estonia as a learner are mostly related to narratives of the Estonian success story. Three topics are most often covered in these narratives: First, Estonia's rapid reaching of a high-level of technologisation of society, specifically concerning Internet and mobile communication. Especially the payment by sms is recurrently depicted and thus seems to be perceived as a particular proof of progress – if not technological superiority. Second, Estonia's economical liberalisation is very present

¹⁹ “Or, en fait, le communisme nous laisse des ruines absolument gigantesques. Ruines économiques: il suffit d'aller visiter ces pays pour voir de quoi il retourne. Ruines politiques, bien sûr, parce qu'on ne reconstruit pas une démocratie comme ça, en quelques mois. Et puis, beaucoup plus en profondeur, ruines de la société. Le tissu social a été détruit, les élites ont été détruites, les repères ont été détruits... Les repères moraux, par exemple ont en grande partie disparu. Il y a des milliers de filles de l'Est qui se prostituent à l'Ouest. C'est une énorme catastrophe. Plus toutes les mafias...”

along with the representation of her strong and rapid economical growths. Third, the young age of high ranking decision makers in politics and economy is frequently focussed on. These three elements are interwoven in almost all accounts of the Estonian success story. The first two aspects are both: including through the depiction of similar norms and a similar sphere of experience, yet excluding through the insistence of the (nearly) completed development. Furthermore, the third aspect reinforces exclusion as to the same respects, norms and experience. All three aspects posit a hierarchical equal or superior position of Estonia. Some articles, in addition, insist on the initial aid by foreign investments from the Nordic countries equally reinforcing exclusion through an inferior hierarchical positioning.

Longer articles do, however, usually also insist on the downside of the Estonian success story and thus posit Estonia's inferiority. Especially four recurrent themes can be identified: First, the insistence on the superficiality of the new wealth and its lack of substance coming along with instability and the risk of an equally rapid decrease. In this storyline, comparisons with Ireland are sometimes drawn. Second, the inexperience of the young society in politics, economy and sciences is frequently pointed out in metaphors of dreams and illusion pointing at the risk of failure when reality catches up. Third, the lack of social welfare and the over-liberalisation of society is criticised along with the beginning split of society in winners and losers of transition. Last, sometimes a threat for old EU members is identified – or denied – in either the cheap labour or the low taxes in Estonia. Sometimes Estonia is qualified as a possible threat to German economical interests. The first three aspects other Estonia as to experience, whereas the last one others her as to interests but includes her as to institutional organisation.

References to Estonia's Soviet past appear in relation to her success story and other her as to memory, norms and experience. First, comparisons with Soviet times are drawn to illustrate the high degree and incredibility of Estonia's change. Since 2004, and especially in 2010/2011, throughout all magazines, a causal relationship starts to be introduced between Estonia's starting from scratch and her economical success, for instance in the technological domain:

Estonia's huge advantage is her complete restart 20 years ago. The computers,

the machines, the infrastructure of hospitals, everything is on a state-of-the-art level.²⁰ (Die Zeit, 22/12/2010)

This also occurs with reference to society in general:

Smart restart: The small republic (1,3 million inhabitants) smartly used her restart from scratch when seceding from the Soviet Union in 1991 and emphasized flat hierarchies and transparency.²¹ (Focus, 18/05/2011)

Furthermore, different types of Soviet legacy are related to her success story. First, material poverty is referred to as a challenge to overcome. Second, a psychological legacy is sometimes identified in the defiance Estonians show with regard to Russia or Russians. Last, Estonian Russians are mentioned as a legacy from the Soviet era. They are typically portrayed as either (1) victims of the change, (2) successful businesspeople or (3) as the sole Estonian character in an article. The latter leaves open whether the journalist understood at all that different ethnic groups are living in Estonia or chose purposefully a Russian name to render the story more interesting as to common, exotic imaginaries on Russia in Germany.

As to inclusion or exclusions of Estonia, an evident trend can be discerned in the use of vocabulary and the general tone of articles: Whereas in the early 2000s the emphasis in articles laid on Estonia's wishful development, on the notions of "illusion", "dream" and a surrealist progress of Estonia "Starship Enterprise", it developed in the accession period to an enthusiastic, but patronizing account of Estonia's development, not freed yet from the notion of unreality. For both periods, Estonia is thus looked upon from a superior stance and thus excluded from belonging to a common European sphere. Yet, with the beginning of the financial crisis, the articles split into two groups: One group insists on disillusion and reality catching up with the inexperienced learner. This group takes a superior stance and others Estonia as to norms and experience. The other group continues to depict Estonia as

²⁰ "Estlands großer Vorteil ist, dass es vor 20 Jahren komplett neu gestartet ist. Die Computer, die Maschinen, die Krankenhausausrüstung, alles ist auf dem modernsten Stand."

²¹ "Geschickter Neuanfang. Die kleine Republik (1,3 Mio Einwohner) nutzte clever die Stunde null bei seiner Loslösung von der Sowjetunion im Jahr 1991 und setzte auf flache Hierarchien mit viel Transparenz."

the economic “wonderland” resistant to any form of crisis and starts to ask: What can Germany/Europe learn from Estonia? This question is usually related to liberalism, transparency and higher efficiency thanks to the use of IT in public administration and politics. This group even inverses the positions of teacher and learner and includes Estonia into a common sphere of experience and interests.

Last but not least, discourses on Estonia as a learner also occur with very few other topics such as population decrease or political participation.

Overall, a partial development of discourses on Estonia as a learner can thus be stated, namely in the domain of Estonia's economic development after the financial crisis, inverting positions of learner and teacher and thus including her into a common sphere of interests and experience.

French magazines

As for French magazines, the passages concerning Estonia as a learner are generally shorter and usually less illustrated than in the German magazines. An important part equally concerns the Estonian success story, one of the more illustrated examples being:

Ene and her husband, business lawyer, embody the new Estonia who threw herself without further consideration into ultra-liberalism. The Soviet slumber is far: Tallinn resonates now to the rhythm of business. At every corner, clothing and design shops are opening their doors.²² (L'Express, 07/08/2003)

The topics related to the Estonian success story are nearly identical to the ones in German magazines and concern (1) Internet with focus on e-government, (2) rapid economical surge preventing immigration to Western countries, (3) the importance of the young generation in politics and economy and (4) financial starting aid by Nordic Countries. In- and exclusion of Estonia in relation to this aspects concerns, just as in German magazines, norms and shared experience. As opposed to German magazines, two further topics recur, namely (5) the framing of this transition process through carrot-and-stick schemes by the

²² “Ene et son mari, avocat d'affaires, incarnent la nouvelle Estonie, qui s'est jetée à corps perdu dans l'ultralibéralisme. La torpeur soviétique est loin: Tallinn vibre désormais au rythme du business. A chaque coin de rue, des boutiques de prêt-à-porter ou de design ouvrent leurs portes.”

EU pointing at an inclusion as to institutional organisation, and (6) the attractiveness of Estonia for outsourcing as long as she is still in the learning process.

(...) This country highly attracts investors thanks to her qualified, hard-working and very cheap labour force. It is hard to predict in how many years Estonia will catch up with her Nordic neighbours, but in the meantime she remains very attractive.²³ (L'Express, 26/04/2004)

This last aspects others Estonia as to norms and interests, but includes her as to institutional organisation.

French articles being generally shorter, the portray of the Estonian success story is usually less comprehensive and includes less often accounts of its downside. Sometimes, risks of economic overheating and inflation are mentioned, and with the start of the economical crisis insistence on the rapid economical crash can be found. Both other Estonia as to experience. As opposed to German magazines, no discourses of Estonia being a possible threat to old EU members is visible. Most of the articles on the Estonian success-story, appearing from 2003 onwards, contain both superior and inferior hierarchical positionings yet a patronizing general tone.

As opposed to German magazines, the discourse of Estonia as learner is in French magazines related to a larger panel of topics. Independently of the success story, important weight is given to the role young people play in Estonian society, sometimes intertwined with criticism of their inexperience:

“Here, everything needs to be reinvented, radical decisions need to be made and older people, marked by the Soviet era, are often incapable to do so” (...). The older people, frequently referred to as the “lost generation”, are often annoyed by these young people who believe in economic liberalism without distinction and whose decisions sometimes have consequences of striking brutality.²⁴ (Le Point, 22/01/2004)

²³ “Hormis la proximité géographique, ce pays attire beaucoup d'investisseurs grâce à sa main-d'oeuvre qualifiée, travailleuse et très bon marché. Il est difficile de savoir en combien d'années l'Estonie comblera son retard sur ses voisines nordiques, mais, en attendant, elle reste très attrayante.”

²⁴ “‘ Ici, tout est à inventer, il faut prendre des décisions radicales et les plus âgés, façonnés par l'époque soviétique, en sont incapables... ’. (...). Quant aux plus vieux, que l'on désigne souvent comme une ' génération perdue ', ils sont souvent agacés par ces jeunes gens qui croient au libéralisme économique sans nuances et dont les décisions ont parfois des conséquences d'une brutalité inouïe...”

These accounts most obviously other Estonia as to experience. A third important topic related to the learner discourse is Estonia's EU accession, namely in the domain of minority rights and Estonia's supposed naïve belief in France's and Germany's power to stabilize the Euro. However, also the other way round, the EU sometimes is depicted as a learner when dealing with Estonia, namely when dealing with the – exoticised and thus othered – Estonian language or, also, on the topic of minority rights:

The president of the parliamentary assembly of the European Council, the Dutch René Van der Linden has got an earful in Estonia and Latvia, where he came to lecture on the status of the Russian speaking minority (...). He multiplied mistakes and knowledge gaps, ignoring that non-citizens participate in local elections in Estonia (...).²⁵ (L'Express, 11/10/2007)

These accounts on the one hand other Estonia as to norms. On the other hand the depiction of a learning process of the EU may indicate the beginning of an entire reconstruction of the European project. A further topic implied in Estonia as a learner is that French magazines, as opposed to Germans, represent a certain awareness of the fact that EE is still widely unknown by the large public. These accounts are, albeit including Estonia as to institutional organisation, usually patronizing and othering her as to experience, for instance in:

In three days, ten new member states will come to join us in the European Union, and, on the whole (...) people could not care less. Where is the minimum that in whatever human society in the world is due to the little new ones that join a club?²⁶ (Le Point, 29/04/2004)

Last, Estonia is represented as a learner in depictions of her constant attempt to release herself from Russia or to digest her Soviet past, for instance around topics such as the

²⁵ “Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, le Néerlandais René Van der Linden a essuyé une volée de bois vert en Estonie et en Lettonie, où il était venu faire la leçon sur le statut des minorités russophones (...). Il a multiplié les erreurs et les lacunes, ignorant que les non-citoyens participent aux élections locales en Estonie, (...).

²⁶ “Dans trois jours, dix nouveaux Etats viennent donc nous rejoindre dans l'Union européenne et, grosso modo (...): tout le monde s'en fout. Où est le minimum que dans n'importe quelle société humaine au monde on doive à des petits nouveaux qui rejoignent un club?”

replacement of the nuclear power plant or the introduction of the Euro. These accounts may include her as to institutional organisation, but other her as to memory and experience.

Overall, no substantial development for discourses of Estonia as a learner can be stated for French magazines. Whereas pre-CEEE her depictions seem to be orientated towards the past (Estonia as a learner due to her Soviet past), in the accession period they seem to be more orientated towards the future (rapid change in preparation or as a result of CEEE). Yet, very recently (since 2010), a mixture of both depictions is again observable.

Estonia as a Place or a Source of Insecurity

Estonia's depiction as a place or a source of insecurity has similar meaning in France and Germany.

German magazines

In German magazines, Estonia is mostly depicted as an insecure place or a source of insecurity when associated to Russia and/or the NATO. In this context, several meanings can be identified. First, Estonia is depicted as actively searching to provoke Russia, as in:

The relations between Russia and Estonia have not been good for quite a while already. The Estonian authorities delay the giving of citizenship to more than 100 000 residents belonging to the Russian minority. They want them to learn Estonian first. Simultaneously, (...) president Ilves, who lived over 20 years in the US, searches for proximity with Bush's government.²⁷ (Der Spiegel, 22/01/2007)

But also Russia is depicted as being the source of provocation:

The pathetic indignation in Russia and the drum fire of propaganda, lending

²⁷ "Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Estland sind schon länger nicht besonders gut. So verzögern die estnischen Behörden die Vergabe der Staatsbürgerschaft an mehr als 100 000 Einwohner, die zur russischen Minderheit zählen: Sie sollten erst Estnisch lernen. Zugleich sucht (...) Präsident Ilves, der über 20 Jahre in den USA lebte, die Nähe zur Regierung Bush."

patriotic splendour even to Russian youngsters looting alcohol shops in Tallinn, does deliberately not contribute to calming the situation or to mediation in the conflict.²⁸ (Die Zeit, 02/05/2007)

In both scenarios, the depicted mutual provocation entails a risk for the NATO and her members, as to the mutual defence clause. Estonia and Russia, through their irrational, provocation way of action are both othered from (Western) European ideals as to norms. In the same depictions, Estonia is represented as an insecure place within Russia's sphere of interest with the NATO increasing her security. She is thus included in a sphere of institutional organisation and interests (safety from Russia), yet othered again as to norms, namely her incapacity to protect herself. The Russian minority in Estonia plays a particular role in this scenario, either as a pretext for a possible Russian invasion, or as a source of unrest and trouble inside Estonia, especially in relation to the Bronze Soldier. These aspects other Estonia even more as to norms, under the assumption that a WE state would be able to deal with its immigrants in a way preventing this type of events. Furthermore, Estonia is – along with other EE states – depicted as a source of insecurity inside the organisation of the NATO: either as a compliant supporter of US interests or as to disloyalty and treason, both due to her communist past. These accounts include Estonia into the common sphere of institutional organisation, yet they other her as to memory and experience. The latter especially occurs with the Simm issue:

The case of Simm demonstrates what a risk the alliance took when extending after the Cold War step by step eastwards. Every single of the now 28 member states has access to almost all secret informations of the alliance. Already this fact sufficiently worries experts. But even more alarming is that members of the old elite, whose loyalty belonged to a completely different political system, are still working in the security systems of some of the new candidate [sic!] countries. People like Herman Simm.²⁹ (Der Spiegel, 26/04/2010)

²⁸ “Die pathetische Empörung in Russland und das Propagandatrommelfeuer, das noch den Plündertruppen russischer Jugendlicher in Tallinns Alkoholläden patriotischen Glanz verleiht, trägt bewusst nicht zu einer Beruhigung der Lage und einer Vermittlung im Konflikt bei.”

²⁹ “Der Fall Simm aber zeigt, welches Risiko das Bündnis einging, als es sich nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges schrittweise nach Osten ausdehnte. Jedes der mittlerweile 28 Mitgliedsländer hat nun Zugang zu fast allen Geheiminformationen der Allianz. Das allein ist für Experten schon beunruhigend genug. Noch besorgniserregender allerdings ist, dass in den Sicherheitsapparaten einiger Beitrittsländer [sic!] nach wie vor Angehörige der alten Elite arbeiten, deren Loyalität zuvor einem völlig anderen politischen System gehörte. Leute wie Herman Simm.”

A second meaning of Estonia's insecurity is related to her depiction as backward. Pre- and post-CEEE, the depiction of poverty, uncivilisation or lack of data protection as entailing insecurity for the Estonian population is represented. These accounts other Estonia as to (Western) European norms. Pre-accession, also a risk for other countries is identified for instance in outdated equipment of Estonian tankers, othering Estonia as to the same aspects.

A third type of insecurity is represented in the economical domain. Either Estonia's low taxes and cheap labour or depicted as a threat to older EU states or Estonia, along with other East-European states, is represented as a source of migrants flooding the EU15 job-markets. Both depictions include Estonia as to institutional organisation, yet exclude her as to interests. Sometimes, these scenarios are put into perspective, as in: "Also, various, often exaggerated fears of the consequences of EU accession exist in old EU states just as much as in the new ones."³⁰(Der Spiegel, 30/09/2002).

A last, but very rare type of insecurity is the association of Estonia, with other EE states, to criminality (theft of cars, burglary) related to poverty and thus othering her as to WE norms despite her inclusion as to institutional organisation. In both articles, the associations are, however, put into perspective.

When looking for development, a partially increased inclusion may be stated with respect to her depiction as insecure as to backwardness and criminality and, on a geopolitical setting through the depiction of a shared institutional organisation and a shared interest in an alliance against Russia. Yet, although the depiction of Estonia in a geopolitical setting increases with her EU and NATO accession and may point at a generally increased inclusion as to newsworthiness, within these institutional frameworks she remains othered on the bases of categorisations from the Cold War era.

French magazines

Concerning French magazines, the main depiction of Estonia as a place and source

³⁰ "Dazu kommen mannigfache, oft übertriebene Ängste vor den Beitrittsfolgen bei alten wie neuen EU-Partnern."

of insecurity is equally related to the NATO. The topics and respects of in- and exclusion are similar to those in German magazines: First, the mutual provocation with Russia and Estonia's need for Western protection includes Estonia as to institutional organisation and partially as to interests. However, it others her as to norms through the depiction of irrational action and the incapacity to protect herself. Second, Estonian Russians are represented partly as well integrated and partly as Moscow's 5th column or a source of insecurity on the Estonian territory:

Despite the reached agreements on the facilitation of access to citizenship and the learning of the Estonian language as one of the conditions for it, and despite some apparent progress concerning integration, the mutual defiance returned extremely quickly after the riots the consequences of which are still visible in Tallinn.³¹ (L'Express, 17/05/2007)

These accounts partially include Estonia into a European sphere as to experience (integration of immigrants), partially they exclude her as to norms (inability to deal with a source of insecurity on their territory). A last topic in the geopolitical context is the Simm issue, related to treason:

“This is a real catastrophe! says the editor of the agency Baltic News. Because of one of us, Russia, our enemy, received a copy of all our military secrets, and this since our independence.””What a humiliation”, adds the young prosecutor in his strict, black suit. We just came to join the Atlantic family and now one of us betrayed her.”³² (Le Nouvel Observateur, 18/12/2008)

As opposed to German magazines, the Simm issue is, however, less covered in general and the treason not explicitly generalised to Estonia as a whole. Instead, also accounts can be found that ascribe the treason to Estonia's inexperience and thus Estonia herself as a victim. Although Estonia in this case is, besides her inclusion as to institutional organisation, not

³¹ “Malgré les facilités consenties ces dernières années pour favoriser l'accèsion à la citoyenneté, et l'apprentissage de l'estonien, qui en est l'une des conditions, malgré quelques progrès apparents de l'intégration, la défiance mutuelle est remontée en flèche à la suite des émeutes dont Tallinn porte encore les séquelles.”

³² “«Le ciel nous est tombé sur la tête! dit le rédacteur en chef de l'agence Baltic News, Ainar Ruusaaar. Grâce à l'un d'entre nous, la Russie, notre ennemie, a reçu une copie de tous nos secrets militaires, et cela depuis notre indépendance.» «Quelle humiliation! ajoute la jeune procureur Lapp dans son strict tailleur noir. Nous venions tout juste de rejoindre la famille atlantique et voilà que l'un de nous la trahit.»”

othered as to memory, she is still othered as to experience. As a result, Estonia is not othered through the return to frames from the Cold War era, but instead as a new, unreliable member.

Further, less current topics associate Estonia to insecurity: First, coverage of drug criminality others her as to norms, i.e. the incapacity of the Estonian state to deal with it. Second, the depiction of Estonia as source of immigration to the West includes her as to institutional organisation and experience, yet excludes her as to interests. Third, the emphasis on economical overheating as a result of the rapid change others her as to WE norms of speed of change.

Overall, for French magazines, a development in the othering content can hardly be stated. Yet, as outlined above for her association to Russia, only after Estonia's EU and NATO accession her relations to Russia become a newsworthy event in the domain of security. Therefore, an inclusion into a common sphere of institutional organisation, interests and experience can be stated independently of the still othering content.

Overview of the Results of the qualitative Analysis

	Germany	France
Association to Russia	<p><u>Content: three types of contexts</u></p> <p>1) larger geopolitical setting:</p> <p>initially: belonging to Russia's sphere of influence <i>entirely othered</i></p> <p>after EU and NATO accession: newly Western and constantly in the process of dissociation from Russia <i>ambivalent belonging: inclusion as to institutional organisation and interests (p), exclusion as to memory</i> => clear development</p> <p>2) bilateral setting: memory <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation and norms (p); exclusion as to norms (p)</i></p> <p>3) association of Estonia to Russian culture <i>exclusion as to norms</i> => no development</p> <p>** =>partial development, yet within the new borders still othered.</p>	<p>Estonian-Russian relations only post-accession covered <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, interests and experience</i> => development</p> <p><u>Content (post-accession period)</u></p> <p>1) bilateral setting prevails: a) conflict: Russia othered as aggressor, Estonia yet not fully included in the European sphere but represented as the “new” member <i>inclusion as to norms (p), exclusion as to norms (p) and memory</i> b) views on history: <i>inclusion as to memory and norms (p), exclusion as to norms (p)</i></p> <p>2) large variety of topics => diffuse association to Russia <i>diffuse exclusion</i></p> <p>** => development towards inclusion, as EU and NATO accession only makes Estonian-Russian relations newsworthy, yet depictions partially remain othering in their content.</p>
Discourses of backwardness	<p><u>Content</u></p> <p>Initially:</p> <p>1) uncivilisation and material poverty <i>othering as to norms and experience</i></p> <p>2) societal immaturity <i>othering as to norms, experience and memory</i></p> <p>Later:</p>	<p>Few presence and complexity.</p> <p><u>Content</u></p> <p>1) societal immaturity</p> <p>2) moral underdevelopment or decay <i>both othering as to norms and experience</i></p> <p><u>Categorisations</u></p> <p>Before 2006 in a group with other EE states</p>

	<p>3) positive re-evaluation of (2) <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation and interests, exclusion as to norms, experience and memory</i></p> <p>4) rural idyll <i>exclusion as to norms and experience, yet positively connoted</i></p> <p>** => Meaning and evaluation develops yet remains largely othering.</p>	<p>After 2006 in comparison with other EU countries <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation</i></p> <p>** => Development towards inclusion through textual context of representation, despite continuous depiction of backwardness.</p>
Discourses of Estonia as a learner	<p><u>Content: Estonian success story</u></p> <p>1) superior or ambivalent position: technology, economic liberalism, flexible society <i>inclusion and exclusion as to norms (p) and experience (p)</i></p> <p>2) inferiority: risk, inexperience, social welfare, cheap labour <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to experience and interests</i></p> <p>3) othering: Soviet past and legacies <i>exclusion as to memory, norms and experience</i></p> <p><u>Vocabulary and tone</u> before financial crisis: othering as to experience and norms through the notion of “illusion”</p> <p>after: split in two groups a) continuous othering as in (2) b) inclusion as to experience and interests through inversion of positions of teacher</p>	<p><u>Content: four types of context</u></p> <p>1) success story: ambivalent positioning <i>inclusion as to norms (p), experience (p) and institutional organisation, exclusion as to norms (p), experience (p) and interests</i></p> <p>2) youth of society: inferior positioning <i>exclusion as to experience</i></p> <p>3) EU accession: a) inferiority of new members <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to norms and experience</i> b) ambivalent: EU in a learning process <i>inclusion pointing at entire reconstruction of European identity</i></p> <p>4) othering: constant dissociation from Russia <i>exclusion as to memory and experience</i></p> <p><u>Tone</u> patronizing, with few exceptions.</p> <p>** => change during accession period, yet</p>

	<p>and learner</p> <p>**</p> <p>=> partial development towards inclusion especially in the domain of economics and related to experience and interests</p>	<p>more recently again mixture between excluding depictions oriented towards the past and including depictions oriented towards the future</p>
<p>Discourses of Estonia as a place or a source of insecurity</p>	<p><u>Content: four different contexts</u></p> <p>1) In the geopolitical setting: a) searching to provoke Russia b) provoked by Russia <i>both: inclusion as to institutional organisation and interests (p), exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>c) Russian minority as pretext for Russian intervention or as source of unrest inside Estonia <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>d) compliant supporter of US within the NATO and source of treason within NATO due to Cold War loyalties <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to memory and experience</i></p> <p>2) related to backwardness <i>exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>3) economical insecurity, work migration <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to interests</i></p> <p>4) criminality <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>**</p>	<p>Most articles from post-accession period, as Estonian-Russian relations only post-accession covered <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, interests and experience</i> => development</p> <p><u>Content: three different contexts</u></p> <p>1) In the geopolitical setting: a) searching to provoke Russia b) provoked by Russia <i>both: inclusion as to institutional organisation and interests (p), exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>c) Russian minority as pretext for Russian intervention or as source of unrest inside Estonia <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation and experience (p), exclusion as to norms (p)</i></p> <p>d) source of treason within NATO, due to her inexperience <i>inclusion as to institutional organisation, exclusion as to experience</i></p> <p>2) criminality <i>exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>3) migration</p>

	<p>=> partial inclusion since EU and NATO accession, yet especially in the geopolitical setting clear othering on the base of Cold War geopolitical categorisations.</p>	<p><i>inclusion as to institutional organisation and experience, exclusion as to interests</i></p> <p>4) economical overheating <i>exclusion as to norms</i></p> <p>**</p> <p>=> partial development: no development for the still othering content. Yet development towards inclusion: Estonian-Russian relations are only after Estonia's accession to EU and NATO relevant as to security matters. Yet, within this institutional inclusion still remaining othering.</p>
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Fig. 15: Overview of the results of the qualitative analysis

7. DISCUSSION

The results of the empirical analysis provide a complex picture as to the inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere. In this section, I will relate the empirical results back to the theoretical and empirical framework. I recall that due to the abstract character of collective identity constructions it is impossible to assess them directly. Instead, on the basis of representation theory (Saussure 1916, Hall 1997) I make inferences on collective identity constructions through the analysis of media frames as making explicit realities in society. My basis of interpretation is the assumption that both *what* is represented and *how* it is represented constitute active framing decisions (Scheufele/Tewksbury 2007:13-16). Special attention will be paid to the processes of categorisation, comparison and homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989). The former two allow for conclusions on in- and exclusion. With regard to homogenisation, in turn, phase of the identity construction process may be determined, since both the in- and the out-group are homogenised. Furthermore, aspects of European identity as outlined on the basis of Arnaud (2000), Baasner (2008), Bruter (2005), Guérot (2006), Todorov (2008) and Spohn (2005) will be taken into account.

7.1 German Constructions of European Identity

The use of frames for the depiction of Estonia in German magazines provide a fragmented, but clear picture of Estonia's increased inclusion into constructions of European identity.

Inclusion...

The inclusion of Estonia into constructions of European identity will be evaluated with regard to the processes of categorisation and comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989).

Concerning categorisation, a certain inclusion of Estonia into constructions of European identity can be stated:

First, the chosen framing perspective reveals the categorisation of the Self with respect to Estonia: Are both located within the same entity? Here, the increase of the European-wide perspective at expense of the EU15 perspective may point to an increased inclusion.

Second, the geopolitical categorisation of Estonia equally indicates some inclusion: Estonia is more frequently categorised as part of Europe as a whole and the qualitative analysis reveals her partial inclusion also with regard to cultural aspects such as norms, when Russia appears as the Other. It is, of course, true that also her association with Russia increases. This increase is, however, related to the fact that before CEEE Estonian-Russian relations have barely been covered, as seen in the evaluation of topics. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis shows a clear development towards inclusion in her association to Russia in a geopolitical setting. Both points indicate her increased inclusion into a common European sphere of interest. Furthermore, after CEEE, Estonia is more frequently represented in spontaneous geopolitical categorisations. Her EU accession thus seems to promote her to a relevant point of reference in Europe-wide comparisons.

Third, the development of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia equally indicates an increased inclusion: their presence decreases. It is conspicuous that only the discourse of Estonia as a learner has substantially decreased. In conjunction with the fact that coverage of Estonia's economical transition, to which this discourse is predominantly related, remains stable in both periods, this decrease may indicate a real step towards inclusion, possibly due to the end of a political transition phase with Estonia's EU accession. Furthermore, within the remaining share of Estonia's framing as a learner, a

partial inversion of the positions of teacher and learner takes place in her depiction as technologically more advanced or societally more innovative. With regard to hierarchical positions (Turner/Oakes 1989) this may equally indicate an increased inclusion. Finally, the share of some discourses remains stable in the quantitative analysis, yet their meaning shifts towards Estonia's inclusion. The discourse of backwardness undergoes some re-evaluation as actually having positive aspects. And the discourse on insecurity remains stable only due to the increase of coverage of Estonian-Russian relations post-CEEE which may indicate an actual decrease on its other meanings. Both point thus at an increased inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere.

With regard to the process of comparison, the relation between evaluation and inclusion posited in theory (Turner/Oakes 1989) seems contentious: in the qualitative analysis, the re-evaluation of discourses on backwardness demonstrates how a positive evaluation can entail an othering as to hierarchical position or certain aspects of European identity, such as norms. However, two points support a correlation between positive evaluation and inclusion: First, the qualitative analysis on Estonia as a learner indicates that an inclusion to more than a political-economical unit, i.e. as to norms and experience, is indeed correlated with a positive evaluation. Second, Estonia is more frequently positively evaluated in absence of discourses on Eastern Europe. Both points do indeed suggest a correlation between positive evaluation and inclusion, even though it may not be as straightforward as assumed on the basis of Turner/Oakes (1983). Therefore, an increasing inclusion can equally be stated: Estonia's negative evaluation decreases in favour of her positive and ambivalent evaluation. Furthermore, her hierarchically inferior positioning has with 30% even more dramatically decreased, mostly in favour of an equal positioning. Yet, it is to note that these results may partly be due to the high amount of very short articles on Estonia after her EU accession and the little room in these articles for explicit evaluation or hierarchical positioning.

Independently of the processes of categorisation and comparison, the dramatic increase of travel-documentations in the accession period suggests a certain readiness to engage with EE.

...with Limitations

The inclusion of Estonia into a common European sphere seems, however, to be limited. This becomes clear when more closely examining certain dimensions of the process of categorisation (Turner/Oakes 1989).

First, Estonia's inclusion as an integral part of Europe seems to be limited to positively connoted aspects. This becomes clear in the analysis of framing perspectives: Delicate topics continue to be covered from a EU15 perspective or a national perspective. This corresponds to Nossek's (2004) findings of the prevalence of a national perspective when national interests are at stake. Both the national and the European perspective being a safe option to go back to is most probably related to Germany's partial replacement of national identity through a European identity (Buß/Klein 2009). Yet simultaneously, this partial replacement makes German constructions of European identity much more vulnerable to changes than e.g. in France, where European identity seems to add to national identity rather than partially replace it (Arnaud 2000, Seidendorf 2008, Lieb 2008). The fact that this inclusion as to positive aspects regards mainly Estonia's EU accession may be explained by the strong support of European integration out of historical responsibility in Germany (Guérot 2006).

Second, Estonia's inclusion is limited as to her ongoing depiction as a “new” member catching up with the West. This confirms Kuus' (2007) results of a new, tripartial formation of Europe and indicates simultaneously that German constructions of European identity are still constructions of a Western European identity. Evidence for this interpretation is provided by the changes within othering discourses: In the discourse of Estonia as a learner, accounts of Estonia's technological superiority remain frequently intertwined with depictions of insecurity, inexperience or backwardness. These degrade her technological superiority to one aspect in a learning process in which Estonia, on the whole, is inferior and constantly attempting to reach Western standards. Estonia is thereby, albeit included as to norms (p) and experience (p), still othered as to memories, interests,

experience (p) and norms (p). Furthermore, the othering of Estonia as a new, inferior member is equally visible in the shift of meaning of the backwardness discourse: Estonia's depiction as backward surely undergoes a certain re-evaluation as positive. However, the underlying pattern of categorisation (Estonia as backward) remains unmodified and continues to other her as to cultural-historical aspects such as norms, experience and memory. This partial inclusion may be explained by Germany's approach to EE based on historical responsibility (Stark 2006): It provides a basis for openness towards political-economical inclusion and support, yet the ambition of being a helper implies unequal hierarchical positions and thus prevents further inclusion.

Third, Estonia's inclusion into a common European sphere seems to be frequently – not exclusively – limited to political-economical aspects of European identity (as defined above). The evaluation of the othering discourses shows: Whereas Estonia is frequently included as to institutional organisation and partially as to interests and experiences, she remains othered as to norms, memory and sometimes interests and experience. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of Estonia's association with Russia reveals that the sudden newsworthiness of Estonian-Russian relations is related to a political reality rather than to a profound redefinition of constructions of European identity: Estonia's membership in the NATO makes her relations with Russia newsworthy on the background of the mutual defence clause. This is reflected in her inclusion as to institutional organisation and partially as to interests and norms, but remaining exclusion as to memory, norms (p) and interests (p) relying on her – also cultural – association to Russia.

Last, Estonia's inclusion remains limited as to a certain rootedness of othering frames – especially the Eastern European frame – in the German societal stock of frames (Van Gorp 2007). This is suggested by several points: (a) Estonia's framing as part of Europe as a whole – although increasing – frequently entails her framing as Eastern European on the level of second or third most important framing; (b) the framing of Estonia as part of Europe as a whole only becomes current with a delay of about 3 years after CEEE, in opposition to France where it appears very shortly after CEEE; (c) Estonia's dominant framing as Eastern European has not diminished; (d) frames from the Cold War era immediately resurge in case of a perceived threat to Germany in the insecurity

discourse, for instance in the agent Simm issue. This appears even more striking in comparison with France, where the insecurity discourse substantially decreases despite the coverage of Estonian-Russian relations only post-CEEE. The anchoring of these frames may be related to Germany's own profound experience of the Cold War in the division of the Self which explains an oversensitivity towards any issue that may be perceived as a threat from the East. To this may contribute that German contacts with EE reach far back in history, and that societal frames, as discourses on Eastern Europe, have thus been constructed and rooted for a long time already. Yet, a certain consciousness seems to exist about the reiteration of stereotypical frames on Eastern Europe: in the insecurity discourse depictions of insecurity (migration) and stereotypes (criminality) are usually put into perspective – as long as they do not concern a larger geopolitical setting.

Ongoing Re-Definition

This limited inclusion does not, however, seem to be the final stage of a process of European identity redefinition. As outlined on the basis of Billig (1995) and Edensor (2002), the national distribution of European identity is an ongoing process of reproduction. The evaluation of the empirical results with regard to homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989) shows that German constructions of European identity have not yet re-established patterns of re-iteration: First, Estonia's geopolitical categorisation is much more varied since CEEE and new categories like Estonia's framing as a Nordic country have just very recently been introduced in 2011. Second, the range of topics covered in relation to Estonia is now almost twice as varied as before CEEE. Third, the depiction of Estonia as a learner has recently split into two groups and comprises since a great variety of evaluations, hierarchical positionings and in- or excluding respects. And fourth, her in- and exclusion into a European sphere with respect to Russia as the Other seems to depend on the respective magazine: a society wide consensus does not seem to exist yet. All these points suggest that constructions of European identity are currently in a phase of substantial re-definition in

Germany.

7.2 French Constructions of European Identity

Dynamics in in- and exclusion of Estonia are equally visible in French frames.

Inclusion...

When evaluating the empirical results with regard to the processes of categorisation and comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989), an increased inclusion of Estonia into constructions of European identity may equally be stated.

First, the analysis of the framing perspective sheds light on the categorisation of the Self with respect to Estonia. The stability of the framing perspective Europe as a whole in both time periods suggests Estonia's perception as part of Europe independently of the current borders of the EU.

Second, as for the geopolitical categorisation of Estonia, several points indicate an increased inclusion into a common European sphere: (a) Her framing as Eastern European decreased; (b) her framing as part of Europe as a whole increased, starting from 2005 and may point at a greater easiness of inclusion compared to Germany where this frame first becomes current in 2007; (c) her framing in spontaneous spacial formations increases and indicates Estonia's relevance as a point of reference in Europe-wide comparisons; (d) even her increased association to Russia may partly be interpreted as inclusion: Estonian-Russian relations are exclusively covered after CEEE and indicate through the extension of newsworthiness an inclusion into a common sphere of institutional organisation, interests and experience. Furthermore, Estonia is partially included into a common European sphere as to norms and memory when Russia figures as the Other. As opposed to Germany, the inclusion seems thus to be less focused on political aspects of European identity (as defined

above).

Third, changes in the framing of Estonia through discourses on Eastern Europe provide evidence for her increased inclusion: (a) The overall amount of discourses on Eastern Europe diminished; (b) the textual structure of Estonia's depiction as backward post-CEEE frequently integrates her into a framework with both West-European and East-European states; (c) the learner discourse includes her as to institutional organisation and interests and, with reference to technological and societal innovation, as to norms and experience. More importantly, it sometimes suggests an entire re-definition of European identity through the depiction of the EU becoming a learner with CEEE. Increased inclusion is further suggested by (d) the significant decrease of the insecurity discourse despite Estonia's increased association to Russia and its including function as to institutional organisation and partially interests and experience. Last, (e) the absence of discourses on Eastern Europe with cultural topics, and the – with reference to Germany – particularly high coverage of Estonia with cultural topics after CEEE, demonstrate inclusion also with respect to cultural-historical aspects.

Last, the evaluation of the empirical results with respect to the process of comparison (Turner/Oakes 1989) allows only ambivalent conclusions. On the one hand, an increased inclusion may be stated as to Estonia's positive evaluation increased despite the introduction of the new, often negatively connoted coverage of her relations to Russia. Furthermore, her ambivalent evaluation decreased, which may indicate that societal frames (Van Gorp 2007) are becoming more concrete for Estonia, previously part of a diffuse, distant EE space (Stark 2006). On the other hand, both phenomena may, at least partially, be explained through the higher number of short and very short articles after Estonia's EU accession and the fact that they leave less space for comprehensive, ambivalent, representation. Yet, Estonia's increased negative evaluation may not be interpreted as increased exclusion: it is mainly due to the coverage of relations with Russia only post-CEEE.

...with Limitations

Estonia's increased inclusion into a common European sphere is, however, limited also in France.

First, just as in Germany, Estonia's inclusion into a common European sphere is limited by her depiction as a “new” member: (a) Estonia remains othered from Europe as to norms and memory, although Russia is othered even stronger. This confirms the shift of Easternness further eastwards in recent Western constructions of European identity (Kuus 2007); (b) Estonia's depiction as a learner, despite increased inclusion during the accession period, continues to other her as to interests and memory and partially also as to norms and experience. Moreover, it often entails a patronizing tone reiterating Estonia's hierarchical inferiority; (c) discourses on Estonia as a place or source of insecurity continue to other her as to norms and partially as to experience and interests; (d) discourses on backwardness continue to other Estonia on a cultural/civilisational level with particular attention to moral backwardness. This focus on moral may be explained by the French ambition to spread certain values in the world (as outlined above) and to assist EE beyond a material development (Schuhman 1963 in Majza 2003). This position clearly others Estonia through her implied inferiority.

Second, a profound, ongoing disorientation concerning Estonia's status, belonging and features may be stated with regard to several points: (a) the national framing perspective is chosen with regard to Estonia even more frequently after CEEE than before, and especially during the accession period. France's national identity being particularly strong (see above), this may be interpreted as a return to a safe stance in times of insecurity through change. (b) Estonia's othering is often diffuse: brief, not very illustrated and connected to a large variety of topics, e.g. in Estonia's association to Russia, her depiction as a learner and as a place or source of insecurity. This is especially evident with regard to the aspects of European identity: Whereas for Germany a dominant political-economical inclusion can be stated, for France no clear delineation is possible and political-economical aspects alter in in- and exclusion with cultural-historical ones. Last, (c) Estonia's hierarchical non-positioning increases substantially and may indicate that journalists, being

unsure of where to position her, do not position her at all.

Ongoing Re-Definition

In France, the process of construction of European identity equally seems to currently be in a phase of profound re-construction. Several points suggest this with regard to homogenisation (Turner/Oakes 1989).

First, as to Estonia's geopolitical categorisation, the almost equal weight of all categories – apart from the categorisation as a nation – indicates a lack of consensus in France on Estonia's geopolitical categorisation. This appears even clearer when considering that Estonia's geopolitical framing showed clear patterns of preferred categorisation before CEEE. This abrupt and radical change may be related to the fact that France's relations with Estonia neither reach back a long time in history nor have been very profound (Stark 2006:104). Therefore, fewer societal frames (Van Gorp 2007) are already available for Estonia's framing: the need and the freedom to frame Estonia anew arises and results in a variety of equally weighted frames. This interpretation is strengthened by the emergence of new frames, like the Baltic State frame which only appeared in 2004 and gained popularity ever since. Last, the range of covered topics has almost doubled after CEEE and equally indicates decreased homogenisation and thus an ongoing re-definition of identity constructions.

7.3 Comparative note

Apart from the differences between France and Germany already mentioned in the respective evaluation, a few further aspects require discussion.

Discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia seem to be (1) more present, (2) more elaborate and (3) more strongly connected to a relatively defined range of topics in Germany than in France. The first point is quantitatively noticeable, but becomes even more obvious in the qualitative analysis: for all three qualitatively analysed discourses, the

French qualitative sample is much shorter and much less complex than the German one. The second point is connected to the recurrence of certain themes: whereas in Germany a certain number of relatively illustrated pictures recurs in relation to Eastern Europe (e.g. poverty, grey houses) the discourses in France seem to be more abstract, vaguer. The third point relates to the relatively clearly defined range of topics that discourses on Eastern Europe are related to in Germany, whereas in France the, albeit weaker, discourses are connected to a larger variety of topics. All three points may be explained as follows: (1) East-Europe, and Estonia with it, is a largely undiscovered space for France (Stark 2006), whereas in Germany public imaginaries – and stereotypes – reach centuries back and have been more strongly influenced through the Cold War. (2) Related to this point, Estonia receives much more attention in Germany than in France – which also leaves more opportunities for framing and reiterating patterns of representation. The influence of national memory is further visible in the coverage of communism in France as opposed to post-communist transition in Germany. Communism being different from French national memories may invoke interest and promise an interesting story, whereas in Germany memories of the own experience with post-communist transition render transition related topics more interesting.

Frames seem, furthermore, to have different popularity and possibly different meaning in Germany and France. Estonia is, for instance, before CEEE much more frequently framed as Eastern European in France (25-33%) than in Germany (13-17%), which may be due to the non-existence of alternative frames, such as the Baltic State frame. The frequency of the Baltic State frame, in turn, decreases in Germany since Estonia's EU accession, but increases in France, which may be related to different connoted meanings in France and Germany. The precise meaning of frames, other than the ones researched here, would be worth considering in further studies.

Relating both points back to identity constructions, the assumption that Estonia's recognition as part of Europe as a whole is easier in states with “shared historical experiences and opportunities for communication” (Lauristin 1997:31) may be contradicted: the creation of new, more inclusive frames seems to be easier in a context, where Estonia is to be (re-)invented after very sparse historical contact.

8. CONCLUSION

On the basis of representation theory (Saussure 1916, Hall 1997), framing theory (such as Scheufele 1999, Scheufele/Tewksbury 2007:13-16) and theories on the formation of collective identities (such as Edensor 2002, Tajfel 1982 and Turner/Oakes 1983), this dissertation has quantitatively and qualitatively analysed the framing of Estonia in French and German news magazines. In conclusion of the analysis, a visible shift in Estonia's position in German and French constructions of European identity may be stated.

In Germany, Estonia seems to be increasingly regarded as a part of Europe – yet predominantly with respect to political-economic aspects. An inclusion as to cultural-historical aspects is rare and mostly connected to the representation of Russia as the common Other. Furthermore limits of inclusion can be identified in (1) her inclusion mainly in relation to positively connoted topics and a German historical responsibility, (2) Estonia's othering as a “new” member within the European frame and (3) the societal rootedness of certain othering frames, mainly with regard to security issues, impeding on the construction on an integrated European identity. Especially point (2) suggests the close interrelation of current German constructions of European identity with previous ones of a Western European identity: Borders between East and West seem to have been relocated from outside the political entity to the inside the political entity and are now slowly – but steadily – in the process of dissolution.

For France, an increased inclusion may equally be stated. It is, however, also limited, mostly with regard to Estonia's othering as a “new” member within the European framework. Yet French constructions of European identity seem less marked by the Cold War era, i.e. more flexible to accommodate the new member states independently of an

Eastern vs. Western divide: Estonia's representation is much more various, Eastern European frames vaguer and less present in general, and her in- and exclusion cannot be assigned to political-economic or cultural-historical aspects in particular. Along with this goes a slightly greater openness towards a profound re-definition of European identity independently of the previous (Western) European identity and a stronger independence of the cultural-historical project of Europe from its political-economic realisation.

The results suggest that beyond the inclusion into the political unit of the EU and Estonia's similar everyday reality, further factors influence(d) dynamics of in- and exclusion: (1) NATO enlargement, (2) the context: intra-European or Russia as the common Other and (3) national identity with (3a) national memory and (3b) current national ambitions. Surprising is the minor impact that Estonia's promotion of her Western national narrative seems to have. All these factors need to be tested as to the extend of their influence in further studies. Concerning theory, the exact interrelation of positive evaluation and inclusion needs to be more closely determined for the construction of collective identities.

In view of the slow development of constructions of collective identity, the results of this dissertation may be interpreted as a sign for the development towards a united Europe, already prematurely proclaimed with CEEE as an “historic enlargement which signified the re-unification of Europe after decades of division” (see European Commission: *From 6 to 27 Members and Beyond*). The crucial challenge is now not to get stuck mid-way at a partial level of inclusion, but to continue and foster exchange between East- and West-European countries in view of the emergence of a united Europe.

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Eesti Keele Instituud (Estonian Language Institute): <http://www.eki.ee/eki/> ;

Eesti Õiguskeele Keskus (Estonian Legal Language Centre):

<http://www.legaltext.ee/et/andmebaas/ava.asp?m=022> ;

Emakeele Selts (Estonian mother tongue society): <http://www.emakeeleselts.ee/> ;

Keeleinspektioon (Language inspectorate): <http://www.keeleinsp.ee/index.php?lang=1> ;

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APPENDICES

A) List of the quantitative Sample

Nr	V1 Date	V3 Title	V4 Magazine
<i>German magazines</i>			
1.	01/10/2011	Würmer, Trojaner und logische Bomben	Focus
2.	18/07/2011	In der Schuldenfalle. Die Tricks des Tigers	Focus
3.	05/02/2011	Gesamttitle: "Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten". Dort arbeiten, wo die freien Stellen sind	Focus
4.	05/02/2011	"Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten"	Focus
5.	13/09/2010	Multinationales Europa	Focus
6.	31/05/2010	Währungsunion	Focus
7.	22/03/2010	Noch mehr digitale Attacken	Focus
8.	15/03/2010	"Angst ist eine starke Waffe"	Focus
9.	12/10/2009	Care-Pakete an die Armen	Focus
10.	16/02/2009	Mittelmäßig gläubig	Focus
11.	08/12/2008	NATO. Top Spion	Focus
12.	08/09/2008	Boykott der Sänger	Focus
13.	18/08/2008	Georgien. Klare Warnung aus Moskau	Focus
14.	17/12/2007	Schengen	Focus
15.	19/11/2007	Focus TV Reportage	Focus
16.	15/10/2007	Europäische Union: Brüssel and die Macht	Focus
17.	13/08/2007	Zur Sonne, zur Freiheit!	Focus
18.	23/07/2007	EU-Korruption. Deutschland bockt	Focus
19.	11/06/2007	Umschalten auf Fakten	Focus
20.	14/05/2007	Estland. Ein zweites Polen	Focus
21.	07/05/2007	Held gegen Held	Focus
22.	30/04/2007	Russland. Sowjetische Strategie	Focus
23.	19/03/2007	Kurse & Notizen. Tallinna Vesi: gut versorgt	Focus
24.	23/10/2006	Genesen in Deutschland	Focus
25.	18/09/2006	Gierige Rundfunke	Focus
26.	15/05/2006	Kure & Notizen: Fonds, Grenzgänger	Focus
27.	05/12/2005	EU-Musterknabe in Aufruhr	Focus

28.	23/05/2005	Vorreiter bei der Internet-Wahl	Focus
29.	19/07/2004	Die Meistersinger von Tallinn	Focus
30.	14/06/2004	Europa in Stuecken	Focus
31.	29/05/2004	Beruf & Karriere. Knigge fuer Europa-Reisende	Focus
32.	10/05/2004	Boersenticker. Die Böerse in Stuttgart...	Focus
33.	03/05/2004	1000 Herzen für Europa	Focus
34.	03/05/2004	Tendenz-o-meter. Alle da?	Focus
35.	03/05/2004	Slovakei, Kapitalbesteuerung	Focus
36.	26/04/2004	Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München	Focus
37.	05/04/2004	Reisen. Laendertest Baltikum	Focus
38.	29/03/2004	Bedingungen zum EU-Beitritt	Focus
39.	22/09/2003	Unsere Nachbarn haben es besser	Focus
40.	18/08/2003	EU, no!	Focus
41.	02/12/2002	“Es besteht ein enormes Risiko”	Focus
42.	21/10/2002	Bildung vom Feinsten, EU, Estland	Focus
43.	07/10/2002	EU, Estland. Raumschiff “Enterprise”	Focus
44.	08/07/2002	Zeitbomben, Hochstapler und Nixen. Bezaubernd	Focus
45.	28/01/2002	Gaeste-Liste, preisverdaechtig	Focus
46.	23/07/2001	Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer	Focus
47.	08/01/2001	Genforschung: Erbgut im Angebot	Focus
48.	10/10/2011	Korrektur	Der Spiegel
49.	01/10/2011	Eine dicke Scheibe Estland	Der Spiegel
50.	19/09/2011	Estland: Der smarte Staat	Der Spiegel
51.	19/09/2011	Ein merkwürdiges Land	Der Spiegel
52.	23/05/2011	Mehr Schutz vor Cyber-Attacken	Der Spiegel
53.	06/12/2010	Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie estonienne	Der Spiegel
54.	06/12/2010	Mörderisches Baltikum	Der Spiegel
55.	28/06/2010	Mission impossible	Der Spiegel
56.	31/05/2010	Härter und bescheidener	Der Spiegel
57.	26/04/2010	Weißer Ritter	Der Spiegel
58.	09/02/2009	Hacker in Uniform	Der Spiegel
59.	15/12/2008	Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim BND	Der Spiegel
60.	01/12/2008	Ein Riss im Bollwerk	Der Spiegel
61.	24/11/2008	Zitate	Der Spiegel
62.	17/11/2008	Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa	Der Spiegel
63.	17/11/2008	Dicker Fisch	Der Spiegel
64.	01/09/2008	Kalter Frieden	Der Spiegel
65.	30/06/2008	Jagd auf “Jonny Hell”	Der Spiegel
66.	01/01/2008	Verhängnisvolle Wende	Der Spiegel
67.	10/12/2007	Euphorie im Osten	Der Spiegel
68.	22/10/2007	Unangekündigte Kontrollen	Der Spiegel

69.	08/10/2007	Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel	Der Spiegel
70.	20/08/2007	Tallinn	Der Spiegel
71.	01/08/2007	“Man wird, was man tut”	Der Spiegel
72.	20/07/2007	Dubioses Theater	Der Spiegel
73.	25/06/2007	“Widerwärtige Vorwürfe”	Der Spiegel
74.	21/05/2007	Wer steckt hinter dem Cyberangriff auf Estland?	Der Spiegel
75.	07/05/2007	Frustrierte Großmacht	Der Spiegel
76.	26/02/2007	“Wenig anzubieten?”	Der Spiegel
77.	22/01/2007	Befreier oder Besatzer	Der Spiegel
78.	20/03/2006	Gestorben Lennart Meri	Der Spiegel
79.	23/01/2006	Der Rebell als Mystiker	Der Spiegel
80.	14/05/2005	Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an	Der Spiegel
81.	14/03/2005	“Wunden in der Seele”	Der Spiegel
82.	10/05/2004	Nordischer Block	Der Spiegel
83.	26/04/2004	“Das muss aufhören”	Der Spiegel
84.	29/03/2004	Baltischer Tigersprung	Der Spiegel
85.	11/03/2003	Boomende Balten	Der Spiegel
86.	25/11/2002	Feuer in den Kulissen	Der Spiegel
87.	18/11/2002	Der Spiegel berichtete	Der Spiegel
88.	30/09/2002	Aufgeblähte Verträge	Der Spiegel
89.	18/06/2001	USA mit Schirm und Charme	Der Spiegel
90.	28/05/2001	Osterweiterung weckt Phantasie	Der Spiegel
91.	21/05/2001	Chronik	Der Spiegel
92.	09/04/2001	“Sensibel für die eigenen Ängste”	Der Spiegel
93.	06/12/2000	Steinerner Gast	Der Spiegel
94.	09/10/2000	Erweiterung ohne Polen?	Der Spiegel
95.	18/09/2000	Blut fürs Vaterland	Der Spiegel
96.	29/05/2000	“Russland ist unberechnbar”	Der Spiegel
97.	02/10/2000	“Ein Traum muss sein”	Der Spiegel
98.	03/01/2000	Bomben am Bug?	Der Spiegel
99.	22/12/2010	Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur Estland nicht.	Die Zeit
100.	30/09/2010	Im Keller der Geschichte; Sofi Oksanen mischt KGB-Akten mit bäuerlicher Idylle zu einem Leseabenteuer	Die Zeit
101.	02/09/2010	Freie Arbeitsplatzwahl in der EU	Die Zeit
102.	09/10/2009	Paavo Järvi: Der wunderbare estnische Dirigent schöpft aus einem tiefen Stausee kultureller Einflüsse: Russische Seele, skandinavische Herbheit, europäischer Reichtum	Die Zeit
103.	20/08/2009	Singen für die Freiheit	Die Zeit
104.	13/08/2009	Balten in der Krise	Die Zeit

105.	16/05/2007	Fragen zu Europa Im BMW nach Tartu	Die Zeit
106.	03/01/2007	Arbeit wird wertvoll	Die Zeit
107.	21/09/2006	Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin	Die Zeit
108.	23/08/2006	Spiele Schach	Die Zeit
109.	31/12/2007	Baltikum Schön eben	Die Zeit
110.	16/03/2006	Finnen: Berauscht	Die Zeit
111.	22/09/2005	Sie gehen so schnell	Die Zeit
112.	08/09/2005	Arvo Pärt, Kommt ihr Brüder, helf mir klagen	Die Zeit
113.	01/09/2005	Steuern. Niedrige Steuern für alle	Die Zeit
114.	07/05/2005	Europareise. Bush feiert Osteuropas Demokratien	Die Zeit
115.	08/05/2005	Europareise. Russland am Pranger	Die Zeit
116.	23/03/2005	Antikorruptionsplan	Die Zeit
117.	23/03/2005	Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher	Die Zeit
118.	17/03/2005	Tag der Absage	Die Zeit
119.	11/11/2004	Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht	Die Zeit
120.	16/09/2004	Architektur. Mit sanftem Schwung in die Kurve	Die Zeit
121.	09/06/2004	EU Europas Sternchen	Die Zeit
122.	15/04/2004	Literarische EU-Erweiterung. Das Boskop-Land	Die Zeit
123.	01/04/2004	Osterweiterung. Invsion vom Pluto	Die Zeit
124.	01/04/2004	Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne	Die Zeit
125.	11/03/2004	Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die Datenautobahn	Die Zeit
126.	15/01/2004	Lesezeichen	Die Zeit
127.	14/08/2003	Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen!	Die Zeit
128.	24/07/2003	Estland. Freiheit für das Gemüse	Die Zeit
129.	28/05/2003	Genforschung. Patriotisches Kataster	Die Zeit
130.	31/10/2002	Aufschwung Ostsee	Die Zeit
131.	29/05/2002	Livland – 12 Punkte	Die Zeit
132.	23/05/2002	Hier spielt die Musik	Die Zeit
133.	02/05/2001	Fegefeuer in Estland	Die Zeit
134.	08/02/2001	Hast du mir was mitgebracht?	Die Zeit
135.	17/05/2001	Geschichten, die das Leben schrieb	Die Zeit
136.	24/08/2000	Die EU-Beitrittskandidaten	Die Zeit
137.	21/06/2000	In fremden Betten	Die Zeit
138.	02/05/2007	Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht	Die Zeit
139.	04/01/2007	Paavo Järvi. Zugriff!	Die Zeit
140.	09/12/2004	60 Sekunden für Übersetzer	Die Zeit
141.	25/11/2004	Berichtigung	Die Zeit
<i>French magazines</i>			
142.	21/09/2011	Nausée baltique	L'Express
143.	09/02/2011	Devoir de mémoire	L'Express
144.	24/11/2010	La vie de château	L'Express

145.	03/11/2010	Esprit estonien	L'Express
146.	20/10/2010	La quête de l'inouï	L'Express
147.	08/09/2010	Les mystères de l'Est	L'Express
148.	08/09/2010	Un Estonien à Paris	L'Express
149.	01/09/2010	Tragédie balte	L'Express
150.	26/05/2010	Hommage	L'Express
151.	22/04/2010	Occasion	L'Express
152.	11/03/2010	Elargissement: à chacun son protégé	L'Express
153.	23/07/2009	A la page: une autre Europe	L'Express
154.	12/03/2009	Russie. Un aveu pas du tout virtuel	L'Express
155.	11/09/2008	Canard soviétique	L'Express
156.	21/08/2008	“Les Russes ont l'impression d'être de retour”	L'Express
157.	12/06/2008	L'estonien à la maternelle	L'Express
158.	03/04/2008	Guerre électronique	L'Express
159.	14/02/2008	Lotte, du village des inventeurs	L'Express
160.	07/02/2008	Manoeuvres à l'Union	L'Express
161.	03/01/2008	Estonie, Sandra Sule, 27 ans, dirige un service de l'académie des arts: “La mondialisation, c'est bien, non?”	L'Express
162.	13/12/2007	Estonie, high-tech	L'Express
163.	29/11/2007	De Lisbonne à Tallinn	L'Express
164.	11/10/2007	Amateurisme	L'Express
165.	17/05/2007	La main de Moscou; Estonie	L'Express
166.	17/05/2007	La main de Moscou	L'Express
167.	03/05/2007	Les curieuses nostalgies de Moscou	L'Express
168.	19/04/2007	International. Des Européens inégaux vus de Wahington	L'Express
169.	07/12/2006	Le tigre high-tech. Estonie	L'Express
170.	27/07/2006	L'Europe des inégalités	L'Express
171.	15/06/2006	Un paradis entre dunes et plages; Riviera balte	L'Express
172.	04/05/2006	Energie: le défi balte; Europe	L'Express
173.	15/12/2005	Le sumo se lève à l'ouest; Tendances	L'Express
174.	29/09/2005	Accords parfaits; Arvo Pärt	L'Express
175.	22/09/2005	Euro visions	L'Express
176.	06/06/2005	Réévaluation de l'Histoire	L'Express
177.	23/05/2005	En combien de langues la Constitution existe-t-elle?	L'Express
178.	02/05/2005	“Voilà comment j'ai vécu votre Libération”; Jaan Kross	L'Express
179.	02/05/2005	A chacun sa mémoire; Pays-Baltes-Russie	L'Express
180.	24/05/2004	Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à	L'Express
181.	26/04/2004	Tiina ou la passion de la vieille ville; Les nouveaux européens 10. Les Estoniens	L'Express
182.	26/04/2004	Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à	L'Express

183.	05/04/2004	Alliance antiterroriste; OTAN	L'Express
184.	01/03/2004	Départ immédiat	L'Express
185.	07/08/2003	Tallinn: Du Moyen Age au wi-fi	L'Express
186.	07/08/2003	Estonie pratique	L'Express
187.	05/12/2002	Série Les futurs membres de l'union; 10. Estonie Les cicatrices de l'Histoire	L'Express
188.	03/10/2002	Interview: "Le communisme nous laisse des ruines gigantesque"	L'Express
189.	22/12/2010	Punk éthique	Le Nouvel Observateur
190.	18/11/2010	Un roman estonien par Katrina Kalda	Le Nouvel Observateur
191.	27/05/2010	L'euro séduit toujours	Le Nouvel Observateur
192.	18/12/2008	Espionnage "Opération Jésus"	Le Nouvel Observateur
193.	03/04/2008	Les exemples en Europe	Le Nouvel Observateur
194.	03/01/2008	Les neuf nouveaux de Schengen	Le Nouvel Observateur
195.	14/06/2007	Cybercombat contre l'Estonie	Le Nouvel Observateur
196.	14/01/2007	Vote électronique	Le Nouvel Observateur
197.	21/09/2006	Les talents de la Baltique	Le Nouvel Observateur
198.	31/08/2006	L'Est en tête	Le Nouvel Observateur
199.	22/06/2006	Ailleurs en Europe	Le Nouvel Observateur
200.	25/05/2005	"About Estonia"	Le Nouvel Observateur
201.	21/10/2004	Tallinn	Le Nouvel Observateur
202.	03/06/2004	La déportation des juifs continue	Le Nouvel Observateur
203.	27/05/2004	Tänan väga (Merci beaucoup!)	Le Nouvel Observateur
204.	13/05/2004	danse	Le Nouvel Observateur
205.	29/04/2004	Le tarte à l'Union	Le Nouvel Observateur
206.	04/12/2003	Le chiffre	Le Nouvel Observateur
207.	30/12/2011	Estonie architonique	Le Point

208.	21/07/2011	Les baltes	Le Point
209.	27/01/2011	Hold-up sur le CO2. Fraude	Le Point
210.	06/01/2011	L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrage	Le Point
211.	25/11/2010	“Purge” Sofi Oksanen. Les vingt meilleurs livres de l'année	Le Point
212.	13/09/2010	Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie estonienne	Le Point
213.	26/08/2010	Premier Prix	Le Point
214.	12/11/2009	Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
215.	23/07/2009	6,6% Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
216.	19/03/2009	L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou	Le Point
217.	08/01/2009	L'espion qui frimait. Estonie	Le Point
218.	04/12/2008	75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
219.	18/09/2008	Lauréats de la Fondation HSBC	Le Point
220.	21/08/2008	La mousson d'été	Le Point
221.	12/06/2008	La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur	Le Point
222.	21/02/2008	110 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
223.	31/01/2008	Les manoeuvres de Moscou	Le Point
224.	24/05/2007	La Russie attaque par le Web. Estonie	Le Point
225.	10/05/2007	Les manoeuvres de Moscou: Estonie-Russie	Le Point
226.	03/05/2007	Serguei Mironov. En baisse	Le Point
227.	25/01/2007	Une statue encombrante	Le Point
228.	29/06/2006	13,1% Le Chiffre	Le Point
229.	11/05/2006	La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction	Le Point
230.	26/01/2006	Expositions: Arvo Pärt	Le Point
231.	29/09/2005	Etats-Unis. Euro-Visions	Le Point
232.	03/02/2005	Russie-etats baltes	Le Point
233.	29/04/2004	Spécial Europe: Tallinn, Riga, Vilnius: Capitales de la Baltique	Le Point
234.	22/01/2004	Union européenne: L'Estonie prend un coup de jeune	Le Point
235.	24/10/2003	Pays scandinaves: Alcool. La guerre des prix	Le Point
236.	11/04/2003	A l'affiche Juha Parts, 36 ans	Le Point
237.	14/02/2003	Estonie: La vengeance du passé	Le Point
238.	30/11/2001	L'Estonie délie sa langue	Le Point
239.	28/09/2001	A l'affiche Arnold Ruutel 73 ans	Le Point
240.	18/05/2001	La photo de la semaine: Estonie le rêve européen	Le Point
241.	27/04/2001	Finlande: parrains de proximité	Le Point
242.	08/12/2000	Estonie: une mine d'or génétique	Le Point
243.	17/11/2000	Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur	Le Point

B) Coding Scheme for the quantitative Content Analysis

General Information

V1) *Date*

V2) *Year*

- 1) 2000
- 2) 2001
- 3) 2002
- 4) 2003
- 5) 2004
- 6) 2005
- 7) 2006
- 8) 2007
- 9) 2008
- 10) 2009
- 11) 2010
- 12) 2011

V3) *Title*

V4) *Magazine*

- 1) Focus
- 2) Der Spiegel
- 3) Die Zeit
- 4) L'Express
- 5) Le Nouvel Observateur

6) Le Point

V5) *Genre*

- 1) none
- 2) other
- 3) article
- 4) interview
- 5) comment
- 6) announcement
- 7) reader's letter
- 8) correction

V6) *Attention: Length of the article*

- 1) < 170 short note, corresponding to “brève”, “filet”, “Meldung”
- 2) 171-299 short article
- 3) 300-599 medium size article
- 4) 600-1999 long article
- 5) > 2000 documentation, corresponding to “reportage”, “dossier”, “enquête”, “Reportage”, “Dokumentation”

Content

V7) *Framing perspective*

The framing perspective is determined by one of the three methods:

- 1) Evaluation of the primary unit of reference used in the article, e.g. in “Sieben Jahre lang mussten Arbeitnehmer aus den acht EU-Ländern Estland, Lettland, Litauen [...] auf die Öffnung der Grenzen warten. Wie gut ist Deutschland auf die neuen Jobsuchenden vorbereitet?” (Focus, 2/5/2011) the primary unit of reference is

Germany.

- 2) Evaluation of topics that have previously received a large amount of media attention in the respective entity, e.g. in “Pour l'heure, sur les 17 pays de la zone euro, 6 seulement bénéficient du triple A [...]” (Le Point, 15/12/2011) the topic of triple-A ranking clearly refers to France's recent loss of her triple-A, which indicates the national, French, perspective of the article.
- 3) Evaluation of deixis and determination of the unit of reference of pronouns such as “us” and “they”.

Categories for *framing perspective*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) local
- 4) regional
- 5) French
- 6) German
- 7) Franco-German
- 8) EU15
- 9) other European region
- 10) Europe (EU 27)
- 11) NATO

V8) Geopolitical framing of Estonia (most important)

The geopolitical framing of Estonia is determined by:

- 1) Evaluation of the context of Estonia's first explicit naming, unless at a later point significantly more attention is devoted to Estonia. Note: The simple mentioning of “Estonia” by her name is only evaluated as a dominant national framing, if it is not immediately preceded or followed by another spatial specification. Examples: “l'Estonie, république balte” (Le Point, 6/2/2011) is evaluated as the predominant

classification of Estonia as a Baltic State; “das kleine EU-Mitglied Estland” (Focus 18/7/2011) as a predominant classification of Estonia as part of Europe as a whole.

In both cases, the second most important framing is then national.

In addition can be evaluatd:

- 2) Groupings, such as in “aus den acht EU-Ländern Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, Slowakei, Slowenien, Tschechien und Ungarn” (Focus 2/5/2011) classifying Estonia as Eastern European through association with other CEE countries
- 3) Comparisons, based on the assumption that comparisons are made with entities judged as appropriate to evaluate certain features because they have other features in common
- 4) Implicit associations, such as in “Cela lui permet de couper plus encore les liens avec la Russie.” (Le Point, 6/2/2011) which, by insisting on Estonia's active dissociation from Russia, implies her enduring association to Russia.

Categories for Geopolitical framing of Estonia

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) nation
- 4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
- 5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
- 6) Eastern Europe
- 7) Northern Europe
- 8) Europe as a whole
- 9) some undefined “abroad”
- 10) associated to Russia
- 11) spontaneous spacial formations drawn in the article on the basis of certain characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
- 12) NATO

V9) *Geopolitical framing of Estonia (second most important)*

Determination as V8

Categories for *Geopolitical framing of Estonia*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) nation
- 4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
- 5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
- 6) Eastern Europe
- 7) Northern Europe
- 8) Europe as a whole
- 9) some undefined “abroad”
- 10) associated to Russia
- 11) spontaneous spacial formations drawn in the article on the basis of certain characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
- 12) NATO

V10) *Geopolitical framing of Estonia (third most important)*

Determination as V8

Categories for *Geopolitical framing of Estonia*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) nation
- 4) a Baltic State (comprising Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but not Finland)
- 5) part of the Nordic countries (comprising Scandinavia plus Finland)
- 6) Eastern Europe
- 7) Northern Europe

- 8) Europe as a whole
- 9) some undefined “abroad”
- 10) associated to Russia
- 11) spontaneous spacial formations drawn in the article on the basis of certain characteristics such as a successful economy or a shared past
- 12) NATO

V11) *Framed content (most important topic related to Estonia)*

Determination of the relevance of a topic by lengths and position in the article (first, second, third mentioned topic).

Categories for *Framed content*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) culture: travel
- 4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
- 5) culture: auditive; music, singing
- 6) culture: other topic
- 7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa
- 8) history: WWII
- 9) history; communism, Soviet rule
- 10) history: other topic
- 11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
- 12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
- 13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
- 14) politics: other topic
- 15) society: migration
- 16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
- 17) society: minorities

- 18) society: other topic
- 19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
- 20) economy: EURO-introduction
- 21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
- 22) economy: other topic

V12) *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia and the most important topic*

Determination by content. Note:

- 1) Do not only take into account explicit content as in “Des Estoniens qui font peur” (Le Point, 17/11/2000) for category 5 – insecurity, but also code more implicit allusion, when a certain discourse is clearly discernible in an article, as in “Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten” (Focus, 2/5/2011), equally for category 5 – insecurity.
- 2) Differentiate category 1 – backwardness from category 2 – development towards a Western level. Even though development, in this sense, always implies backwardness only code articles as category 1 – backwardness when no perspective of development is mentioned as in “Geschickter Neuanfang” (Focus, 18/7/2011).
- 3) Be aware that the mentioning of “smallness” does not necessarily equal “weakness” as in category 6. Only code a discourse of weakness, if Estonia is either repeatedly termed as “small”, or in relation to big neighbours, or explicitly as in “la fragile Estonie, longtemps broyée par le laminoir communiste” (L'Express, 21/9/2011).
- 4) Discourses on nationalism are coded in mentioning of patriotism, proudness on language and culture, as e.g. in “eine junge, hoch gebildete und patriotische Elite” (Focus, 29/3/2004).

Categories for *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following

- 3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
- 4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
- 5) insecure/source of insecurity
- 6) weak, victimized, marginalized
- 7) nationalist

V13) *Evaluation of Estonia as to most important topic*

Determination by:

- 1) Explicit evaluation, as in “die Esten sind ein Mustervolk” (Der Spiegel, 19/9/2011)
- 2) Assessment of the general tone of the article

Categories for *Evaluation of Estonia*

- 1) -
- 2) positive
- 3) neutral
- 4) negative
- 5) both

V14) *Framed content (second most important topic related to Estonia)*

Determination as V11

Categories for *Framed content*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) culture: travel
- 4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
- 5) culture: auditive; music, singing
- 6) culture: other topic
- 7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa

- 8) history: WWII
- 9) history; communism, Soviet rule
- 10) history: other topic
- 11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
- 12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
- 13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
- 14) politics: other topic
- 15) society: migration
- 16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
- 17) society: minorities
- 18) society: other topic
- 19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
- 20) economy: EURO-introduction
- 21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
- 22) economy: other topic

V15) *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia and the second most important topic*

Determination as in V12.

Categories for *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe*

- 1) none than one of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
- 4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
- 5) insecure/source of insecurity
- 6) weak, victimized, marginalized
- 7) nationalist

V16) *Evaluation of Estonia as to second most important topic*

Determination as V13.

Categories for *Evaluation of Estonia*

- 1) -
- 2) positive
- 3) neutral
- 4) negative
- 5) both

V17) *Framed content (second most important topic related to Estonia)*

Determination as V11

Categories for *Framed content*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) culture: travel
- 4) culture: visual; art architecture, theatre, film
- 5) culture: auditive; music, singing
- 6) culture: other topic
- 7) history: ancient; crusades, feudalism, Hansa
- 8) history: WWII
- 9) history; communism, Soviet rule
- 10) history: other topic
- 11) politics: EU-adhesion, EU-enlargement
- 12) politics: international organisations: NATO, UN, OECD and other
- 13) politics: relations to Russia, Russian influence
- 14) politics: other topic

- 15) society: migration
- 16) society: cyber- and telecommunication
- 17) society: minorities
- 18) society: other topic
- 19) economy: transition, Estonian success story
- 20) economy: EURO-introduction
- 21) economy: investing in Estonia, chances and risks for framing unit (V7)
- 22) economy: other topic

V18) *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe in relation to Estonia and the third most important topic*

Determination as in V12.

Categories for *Presence of discourses on Eastern Europe*

- 1) none of the following
- 2) other than one of the following
- 3) backward, immature, underdeveloped
- 4) learner: new, dynamic, rapid change
- 5) insecure/source of insecurity
- 6) weak, victimized, marginalized
- 7) nationalist

V19) *Evaluation of Estonia as to third most important topic*

Determination as V13.

Categories for *Evaluation of Estonia*

- 1) -
- 2) positive

- 3) neutral
- 4) negative
- 5) both

V20) *Hierarchical positioning of Estonia with reference to the main Western Unit of framing*

Determination by

- 1) evaluation of explicit and implicit comparisons
- 2) Tone of the article, e.g. patronizing as in: “Dans trois jours, dix nouveaux Etats viennent donc nous rejoindre dans l'Union européenne et, grosso modo, l'accueil qui leur est fait est assez simple à résumer: tout le monde s'en fout. Où est le minimum que dans n'importe quelle société humaine au monde on doive à des petits nouveaux qui rejoignent un club?” (Le Point, 29/04/2004)

Categories for *Hierarchical positioning of Estonia*

- 1) no hierarchical positioning
- 2) both, superior and inferior depending on respective aspect
- 3) superior
- 4) equal
- 5) inferior

C) Samples for the qualitative Analysis

Estonia's Association with Russia

Nr.	Date	Title	Magazine
		<i>German magazines</i>	
1.	10/02/2000	“Ein Traum muss sein”	Der Spiegel
2.	06/12/2000	Steinerne Gast	Der Spiegel
3.	18/06/2001	USA mit Schirm und Charme	Der Spiegel
4.	23/07/2001	Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer	Focus

5.	23/05/2002	Hier spielt die Musik	Die Zeit
6.	31/10/2002	Aufschwung Ostsee	Die Zeit
7.	11/03/2004	Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die Datenautobahn	Die Zeit
8.	01/04/2004	Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne	Die Zeit
9.	26/04/2004	Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München	Focus
10.	11/11/2004	Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht	Die Zeit
11.	14/03/2005	“Wunden in der Seele”	Der Spiegel
12.	17/03/2005	Tag der Absage	Die Zeit
13.	07/05/2005	Europareise. Bush feiert Osteuropas Demokratien	Die Zeit
14.	08/05/2005	Europareise. Russland am Pranger	Die Zeit
15.	21/09/2006	Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin	Die Zeit
16.	22/01/2007	Befreier oder Besatzer	Der Spiegel
17.	26/02/2007	“Wenig anzubieten?”	Der Spiegel
18.	30/04/2007	Russland. Sowjetische Strategie	Focus
19.	02/05/2007	Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht	Die Zeit
20.	14/05/2007	Estland. Ein zweites Polen	Focus
21.	21/05/2007	Wer steckt hinter dem Cyberangriff auf Estland?	Der Spiegel
22.	07/05/2007	Held gegen Held	Focus
23.	07/05/2007	Frustrierte Großmacht	Der Spiegel
24.	25/06/2007	“Widerwärtige Vorwürfe”	Der Spiegel
25.	20/07/2007	Dubioses Theater	Der Spiegel
26.	08/10/2007	Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel	Der Spiegel
27.	01/09/2008	Kalter Frieden	Der Spiegel
28.	01/12/2008	Ein Riss im Bollwerk	Der Spiegel
29.	08/09/2008	Boykott der Sänger	Focus
30.	08/12/2008	NATO. Top Spion	Focus
31.	18/08/2008	Georgien. Klare Warnung aus Moskau	Focus
32.	17/11/2008	Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa	Der Spiegel
33.	24/11/2008	Zitate	Der Spiegel
34.	15/12/2008	Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim BND	Der Spiegel
35.	26/04/2010	Weißer Ritter	Der Spiegel
		<i>French magazines</i>	
1.	27/04/2001	Finlande: parrains de proximité	Le Point
2.	26/04/2004	Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à	L'Express
3.	03/02/2005	Russie-Etats baltes	Le Point
4.	02/05/2005	A chacun sa mémoire; Pays-Baltes-Russie	L'Express
5.	25/01/2007	Une statue encombrante	Le Point
6.	03/05/2007	Les curieuses nostalgies de Moscou	L'Express
7.	03/05/2007	Serguei Mironov. En baisse	Le Point
8.	10/05/2007	Les manoeuvres de Moscou: Estonie-Russie	Le Point

9.	17/05/2007	La main de Moscou; Estonie	L'Express
10.	24/05/2007	La Russie attaque par le Web. Estonie	Le Point
11.	14/06/2007	Cybercombat contre l'Estonie	Le Nouvel Observateur
12.	31/01/2008	Les manoeuvres de Moscou	Le Point
13.	11/09/2008	Canard soviétique	L'Express
14.	18/12/2008	Espionnage "Opération Jésus"	Le Nouvel Observateur
15.	08/01/2009	L'espion qui frimait. Estonie	Le Point
16.	12/03/2009	Russie. Un aveu pas du tout virtuel	L'Express
17.	19/03/2009	L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou	Le Point
18.	13/09/2010	Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie estonienne	Le Point
19.	06/01/2011	L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrement	Le Point

Estonia as backward

Nr.	Date	Title	Magazine
German magazines			
1.	03/01/2000	Bomben am Bug?	Der Spiegel
2.	18/09/2000	Blut fürs Vaterland	Der Spiegel
3.	02/12/2002	"Es besteht ein enormes Risiko"	Focus
4.	14/08/2003	Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen!	Die Zeit
5.	11/03/2004	Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die Datenautobahn	Die Zeit
6.	01/04/2004	Osterweiterung. Invasion vom Pluto	Die Zeit
7.	16/09/2004	Architektur. Mit sanftem Schwung in die Kurve	Die Zeit
8.	22/09/2005	Sie gehen so schnell	Die Zeit
9.	09/07/2006	Baltikum Schön eben	Die Zeit
10.	23/10/2006	Genesen in Deutschland	Focus
11.	03/01/2007	Arbeit wird wertvoll	Die Zeit
12.	16/05/2007	Fragen zu Europa Im BMW nach Tartu	Die Zeit
13.	01/08/2007	"Man wird, was man tut"	Der Spiegel
14.	12/10/2009	Care-Pakete an die Armen	Focus
French magazines			
1.	03/10/2002	Interview: "Le communisme nous laisse des ruines gigantesque"	L'Express
2.	24/05/2004	Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à	L'Express
3.	22/06/2006	Ailleurs en Europe	Le Nouvel Observateur
4.	27/07/2006	L'Europe des inégalités	L'Express
5.	21/02/2008	110 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point

6.	04/12/2008	75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
7.	23/07/2009	6,6% Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point

Estonia as a Learner

Nr.	Date	Title	Magazine
		German magazines	
1.	02/10/2000	“Ein Traum muss sein”	Der Spiegel
2.	21/06/2000	In fremden Betten	Die Zeit
3.	09/10/2000	Erweiterung ohne Polen?	Der Spiegel
4.	18/09/2000	Blut fürs Vaterland	Der Spiegel
5.	08/01/2001	Genforschung: Erbgut im Angebot	Focus
6.	23/05/2002	Hier spielt die Musik	Die Zeit
7.	07/10/2002	EU, Estland. Raumschiff “Enterprise”	Focus
8.	30/09/2002	Aufgeblähte Verträge	Der Spiegel
9.	31/10/2002	Aufschwung Ostsee	Die Zeit
10.	11/03/2003	Boomende Balten	Der Spiegel
11.	24/07/2003	Estland. Freiheit für das Gemüse	Die Zeit
12.	01/04/2004	Osteuropa. Holperfahrt in die Moderne	Die Zeit
13.	11/03/2004	Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die Datenautobahn	Die Zeit
14.	29/03/2004	Baltischer Tigersprung	Der Spiegel
15.	15/04/2004	Literarische EU-Erweiterung. Das Boskop-Land	Die Zeit
16.	26/04/2004	Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München	Focus
17.	26/04/2004	“Das muss aufhören”	Der Spiegel
18.	29/03/2004	Bedingungen zum EU-Beitritt	Focus
19.	09/06/2004	EU Europas Sternchen	Die Zeit
20.	19/07/2004	Die Meistersinger von Tallinn	Focus
21.	11/11/2004	Wir werden weniger. Sexy allein reicht nicht	Die Zeit
22.	23/03/2005	Antikorruptionsplan	Die Zeit
23.	23/03/2005	Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher	Die Zeit
24.	14/05/2005	Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an	Der Spiegel
25.	01/09/2005	Steuern. Niedrige Steuern für alle	Die Zeit
26.	03/01/2007	Arbeit wird wertvoll	Die Zeit
27.	20/08/2007	Tallinn	Der Spiegel
28.	13/08/2009	Balten in der Krise	Die Zeit
29.	31/05/2010	Härter und bescheidener	Der Spiegel
30.	22/12/2010	Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur	Die Zeit

		Estland nicht.	
31.	18/07/2011	In der Schuldenfalle. Die Tricks des Tigers	Focus
32.	19/09/2011	Estland: Der smarte Staat	Der Spiegel
33.	19/09/2011	Ein merkwürdiges Land	Der Spiegel
		French magazines	
1.	17/11/2000	Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur	Le Point
2.	18/05/2001	La photo de la semaine: Estonie le rêve européen	Le Point
3.	30/11/2001	L'Estonie délie sa langue	Le Point
4.	14/02/2003	Estonie: La vengeance du passé	Le Point
5.	07/08/2003	Tallinn: Du Moyen Age au wi-fi	L'Express
6.	22/01/2004	Union européenne: L'Estonie prend un coup de jeune	Le Point
7.	05/04/2004	Alliance antiterroriste; OTAN	L'Express
8.	26/04/2004	Johanna Korhonen; 3 questions à	L'Express
9.	29/04/2004	Le tarte à l'Union	Le Nouvel Observateur
10.	21/10/2004	Tallinn	Le Nouvel Observateur
11.	03/02/2005	Russie-Etats baltes	Le Point
12.	29/09/2005	Etats-Unis. Euro-Visions	Le Point
13.	04/05/2006	Energie: le défi balte; Europe	L'Express
14.	11/05/2006	La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction	Le Point
15.	29/06/2006	13,1% Le Chiffre	Le Point
16.	31/08/2006	L'Est en tête	Le Nouvel Observateur
17.	21/09/2006	Les talents de la Baltique	Le Nouvel Observateur
18.	07/12/2006	Le tigre high-tech. Estonie	L'Express
19.	19/04/2007	International. Des Européens inégaux vus de Wahington	L'Express
20.	11/10/2007	Amateurisme	L'Express
21.	13/12/2007	Estonie, high-tech	L'Express
22.	03/01/2008	Estonie, Sandra Sule, 27 ans, dirige un service de l'académie des arts: "La mondialisation, c'est bien, non?"	L'Express
23.	12/06/2008	La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur	Le Point
24.	27/05/2010	L'euro séduit toujours	Le Nouvel Observateur
25.	13/09/2010	Sofi Oksanen catalyse la schizophrénie estonienne	Le Point
26.	06/01/2011	L'Estonie compte en euros. Déchiffrage	Le Point
27.	30/12/2011	Estonie architonique	Le Point

Estonia as a Place or a Source of Insecurity

Nr.	Date	Title	Magazine
		<i>German magazines</i>	
1.	06/12/2000	Steinerne Gast	Der Spiegel
2.	18/06/2001	USA mit Schirm und Charme	Der Spiegel
3.	23/07/2001	Klopfen an der Nato-Tuer	Focus
4.	02/12/2002	“Es besteht ein enormes Risiko”	Focus
5.	23/05/2002	Hier spielt die Musik	Die Zeit
6.	30/09/2002	Aufgeblähte Verträge	Der Spiegel
7.	31/10/2002	Aufschwung Ostsee	Die Zeit
8.	25/11/2002	Feuer in den Kulissen	Der Spiegel
9.	11/03/2003	Boomende Balten	Der Spiegel
10.	14/08/2003	Rumääänien... o nein, ausgeschlossen!	Die Zeit
11.	11/03/2004	Osterweiterung. Mit Gewürzbier auf die Datenautobahn	Die Zeit
12.	29/03/2004	Baltischer Tigersprung	Der Spiegel
13.	26/04/2004	Momentaufnahmen von Tallinn bis München	Focus
14.	26/04/2004	“Das muss aufhören”	Der Spiegel
15.	14/03/2005	“Wunden in der Seele”	Der Spiegel
16.	23/03/2005	Osteuropa. Das Baltikum rückt näher	Die Zeit
17.	14/05/2005	Osteuropas kleine Tiger greifen an	Der Spiegel
18.	16/03/2006	Finnen: Berauscht	Die Zeit
19.	21/09/2006	Bundeswehr. Nix wie hin	Die Zeit
20.	22/01/2007	Befreier oder Besatzer	Der Spiegel
21.	26/02/2007	“Wenig anzubieten?”	Der Spiegel
22.	02/05/2007	Baltikum. Denkmal der Zwietracht	Die Zeit
23.	07/05/2007	Held gegen Held	Focus
24.	25/06/2007	“Widerwärtige Vorwürfe”	Der Spiegel
25.	08/10/2007	Schröders Lobbyarbeit in Brüssel	Der Spiegel
26.	17/12/2007	Schengen	Focus
27.	01/09/2008	Kalter Frieden	Der Spiegel
28.	01/12/2008	Ein Riss im Bollwerk	Der Spiegel
29.	08/12/2008	NATO. Top Spion	Focus
30.	17/11/2008	Moskaus Top-Spion in Europa	Der Spiegel
31.	17/11/2008	Dicker Fisch	Der Spiegel
32.	24/11/2008	Zitate	Der Spiegel
33.	15/12/2008	Top-Spion der Russen kassierte auch beim BND	Der Spiegel
34.	02/09/2010	Freie Arbeitsplatzwahl in der EU	Die Zeit
35.	15/03/2010	“Angst ist eine starke Waffe”	Focus
36.	26/04/2010	Weißer Ritter	Der Spiegel
37.	22/12/2010	Wir sind deutscher als die Deutschen”; Ganz	Die Zeit

		Europa spricht von der Euro-Krise, nur Estland nicht.	
38.	05/02/2011	Gesamttitle: "Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten". Dort arbeiten, wo die freien Stellen sind	Focus
39.	05/02/2011	"Wir rechnen mit Millionen von Migranten"	Focus
		<i>French magazines</i>	
1.	17/11/2000	Finlande: Des Estoniens qui font peur	Le Point
2.	27/04/2001	Finlande: parrains de proximité	Le Point
3.	24/05/2004	Jérôme Derigny; 3 questions à	L'Express
4.	11/05/2006	La tour de Babel européenne. Traduction	Le Point
5.	03/05/2007	Les curieuses nostalgies de Moscou	L'Express
6.	17/05/2007	La main de Moscou; Estonie	L'Express
7.	14/06/2007	Cybercombat contre l'Estonie	Le Nouvel Observateur
8.	31/01/2008	Les manoeuvres de Moscou	Le Point
9.	12/06/2008	La crise dans les pays Baltes; Le point sur	Le Point
10.	21/08/2008	"Les Russes ont l'impression d'être de retour"	L'Express
11.	11/09/2008	Canard soviétique	L'Express
12.	04/12/2008	75 Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
13.	18/12/2008	Espionnage "Opération Jésus"	Le Nouvel Observateur
14.	08/01/2009	L'espion qui frimait. Estonie	Le Point
15.	19/03/2009	L'Estonie sous l'oeil de Moscou	Le Point
16.	12/11/2009	Le chiffre de Jacques Marseille	Le Point
17.	21/07/2011	Les Baltes	Le Point