Collective Memory and Memorialization in Depictions of Soviet Female Combatants In Soviet and Post-Soviet Contexts

By

Jessica Bawgus
Matriculation ID: 2398363

Submitted to
University of Glasgow, Department of Central and East European Studies
University of Tartu, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science
Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, Department of Sociology

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
International Masters of Central and East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies
Master of Arts in Social Sciences (Central and East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies)
Master in Sociology (World Politics, Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies)

Word Count: 23,734

2020

Supervisor:
Professor Julia Sofronova, Lobachevksy State University
Professor Rebecca Kay, University of Glasgow

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

Jessica S Bawgus

The defence will take place on ..... at .... in auditorium number .....

Opponent ..... (.....), ... /

Non-exclusive licence

I, Jessica Bawgus:

1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making thesis public, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright, my thesis entitled “Collective Memory and Memorialization in Depictions of Soviet Female Combatants In Soviet and Post-Soviet Contexts”, supervised by Professor Julifa Sofronova at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, Russia and Professor Rebecca Kay at the University of Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom.

2. I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives, until the expiry of the term of copyright.

3. I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in pp. 1 and 2.

4. I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Done at Tartu on 7 September, 2020

Jessica S. Bawgus

A Note on Translation and Transliteration

When applicable, I have chosen to use the original author's spellings of Russian or Kazakh names rendered in English. Some names will have changed over time in accordance to shifting norms in Latinization - e.g., *Zoia* versus *Zoya.* I rendered names of people and places to avoid diacritics, which can be inconsistently rendered in electronic document form (e.g., Manshuk Zhiengalikyzy Mametova instead of Mänşük Jïenğaliqizi Mämetova). Additionally, place names remained consistent with the English renderings as they were at the time - e.g., spelling the capital of Ukraine as *Kiev* when discussing it in the 1940s, but *Kyiv* when discussing it in the 2010s. In the body of the text, I will use English, with the original Russian included as footnotes; unless otherwise noted, translations will be my own with assistance of machine translation.

Introduction

> The people need a hero, a saint - General Skovelev, Feodor Kuzmich, Ivan the Terrible - they are alike to them. And the more remote, the more vague, the less accessible the hero, the more freedom for the imagination ...There must be a 'Once upon a time there lived' about it - something of the fairy tale. Not a God in heaven, but here, on our dismal earth. Someone of great wisdom and monstrous power.
>
> -Vasilii Breev, as quoted by Gorky in Michael Cherniavsky's *Tsar and people: studies in Russian myths*[1]

This quote is one that opens Anita Pisch's analysis of Joseph Stalin as both a warrior and saviour in Soviet iconography and historiography. Yet the listed qualities can apply to a number of the heroes that came out of the Second World War - more specifically, the Great Patriotic War [2], the years between 1941 and 1945 during which the Soviet Union lost millions of its soldiers and citizens. Moscow's Victory Museum has halls where the names of the glorious dead are etched in gold onto white marble, or photographs of young people who are lauded even though they never turned twenty-one. Even smaller, localized museums - a few rooms given over to memorializing the war in places such as Nizhny Novgorod's Military Commissariat - punctuate their photographs with "Heroism during the Great Patriotic War became mass - the words of Vladimir Lenin came true: Russia is able to give not only single heroes...Russia will be able to nominate these heroes by the hundreds or thousands…"[3]. Among those photographs and those

[1] Breev quoted in Anita Pisch, "Stalin Saves the World - Stalin and the Evolution of the Warrior and Saviour Archetypes," in *The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929-1953: Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications* (ANU Press, 2016), 291.
[2] Over the course of this essay, I will refer to the "Great Patriotic War" not as an event distinct from the Second World War, but to the specific phase of it marked by Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union and the subsequent entrance of the Soviet Union into the larger conflict.
[3] "Героизм в годы Великой отечественной войны стал массовым, сбылись слова Владимира Ильича Ленина: Россия способна давать не только одиночек - героев...Россия

names are curiosities, distinguished from the rest either by the grammatical femininity necessitated by their names or the cut of their hair - the women who served, fought, and often died for the Soviet Union. For the united socialist republics sent more women into combat during the war than any nation before or after, even accounting for the increasing integration of contemporary militaries; estimates range from 570,00 to over a million women saw duty in the Red Army, as partisans or volunteers, and nearly one hundred were awarded the highest distinction for state service, the Hero of the Soviet Union.[4] Of those women, many are still remembered and discussed in the contemporary states which followed the Soviet Union's dissolution, as subjects of films and political controversies, used to compare today's women with those of the glorious generation.

Female combatants ranged from 6 to 12%[5] of total casualties from non-civilians in the war, but in depictions of the war, the female partisan or soldier is nearly always included, even if only a token example. Films such as Stanislav Rosotosky's *The Dawns are Quiet Here*[6] (1972) and Joseph Vilsamir's *Stalingrad* (1993) are to be considered two ends of a spectrum depicting

---

сможет выдвинуть этих героев сотнями, тысячами…" Nizhny Novgorod Military Commissariat Museum

[4] Anna Reid, "Introduction," in *Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union's WWII Sniper Corps*, by Lyuba Vinogradova (New York and London: MacLehose Press, 2017), 15–20, 15.

[5] An exact total of Soviet war dead in the Great Patriotic War is contested and variable. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation puts the total at 26.6 million, 8,668,400 of which came from the Armed Forces. The total number of partisans active in the western parts of the Soviet Union similarly are difficult to calculate, and can range anywhere from 15,000 to 550,000. (http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=11359251@cmsArticle, http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/2/i80_181.htm, Strobl, 141-142)

[6] Russian: "А зори здесь тихие". The Russian title's use of the word *'зори'* is noteworthy as it references the Slavic mythological figures of the Заря́, maidens who herald the coming of dawn. This connects the women in the film to the pre-Christian Slavic goddesses and the characteristics it implies.

female combatants in war films, ranging from a full battalion of women to a single entity meant to represent the Soviet Union as a whole. Soviet, post-Soviet[7] and even non-socialists' (e.g., German or American) memory of the war gives a prominent and permanent position to the girl fighter, and they were frequently selected to highlight the patriotism and sense of duty felt by all Soviet citizens during the war era. During the years of the war, women were frequently selected among the troops and highlighted for achievement at home and abroad. For example, despite speaking little English, Lieutenant Lyudmila Pavilchenko, age twenty-five, was selected as one of two representatives to travel to the United States for an international students' assembly in late 1942, as her studies at Kiev University had been interrupted due to the war. Despite fears that "women are difficult to control", as Pavlichenko herself wrote on her selection in her memoirs, "if [the selected woman is] good-looking, they will present the USSR in the most favorable light"; in America, her appearance became a major curiosity and point of note[8]. Her visit was a chance for Americans to ask innumerable questions and make assumptions about the lives of women in the Soviet Union, and also to subscribe qualities to the foreign army; reporters could simultaneously critique her lack of a noteworthy physicality ("Isn't it a part of military philosophy that an efficient warrior takes pride in his appearance? Isn't Joan of Arc always pictured in beautiful and shining armor?") while others could write at length to those qualities ("What Lieutenant Pavlichenko possesses is something more than just beauty. ...She has the face

[7] "Post-Soviet" over the course of this essay will be used to refer to belonging to the states, cultures, or peoples of any of the 15 independent countries which resulted from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

[8] Lyudmila Pavlichenko, *Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*, trans. David Foreman (Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), 174.

of a Madonna from a Correggio painting and the hands of a child…")[9]. As an example from a country as foreign and strange as the Soviet Union, American reporters could see in Pavlichenko whatever they wished of her.

To return to Vasilii Breev's comments on heroes "the more remote, the more vague, the less accessible the hero, the more freedom for the imagination" - Pavlichenko could be, and was, anything to the Americans. Yet in her homeland, this was also true, for a woman in uniform was just as remote, just as vaguely known, and just as inaccessible as a Soviet citizen was to Americans.

How could this be? For as Russian historian Lyuba Vinogradova writes, "In a country that proclaimed 100 per cent [sic] equality of the sexes, it did not seem strange to anyone that an extensive mobilisation [sic] of women for the army should take place".[10] Women's combat service is, more than seventy years later, remembered in the successor states of the Soviet Union as an indication of these female citizens' extreme patriotism, the state of total war which demanded sacrifices from all sectors, and the success of communism's mission in the liberation of the oppressed gender. Memory, in contrast to the historian's work, is not always a full recollection of impartial facts. The prominence of women combatants in memory is inconsistent throughout the decades of the Soviet Union's existence. Vinogradova's statement can and should be taken as a contemporary echo of post-*Glasnost* and post-Soviet mnemonic revisionism; one assumed that because the state proclaimed equality and nondiscriminatory practices, that it

---

[9] Gilbert King, "Eleanor Roosevelt and the Soviet Sniper," *Smithsonian Magazine*, February 21, 2013, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/eleanor-roosevelt-and-the-soviet-sniper-23585278/; New York Post quoted in Pavlichenko, 189.

[10] Lyuba Vinogradova, *Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union's WWII Sniper Corps*, trans. Arch Tait (MacLehose Press, 2017), 27.

would exist, but one need only look at Svetlana Alexevich's extensive interviews of female veterans to see that gender egalitarianism was less than a minor concern at the time of war, and many female veterans were shamed into hiding or minimizing the roles they played.[11] In her doctoral dissertation, Adrienne Harris repeatedly demonstrates how many women who served were sidelined after their demobilization, and how between the 1960s and 1980s, they struggled to have their stories told.[12] Women in armed combat were, as stated, a new feature to the popular landscape; despite such noteworthy historical characters as Nadezhda Durova[13], the collective psyche of the Soviet peoples did not have an existing ontological space for these figures. Not only was this true in Russian culture, but in the Turkic, Caucasian, and other ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, where women were meant to be mothers, daughters, lovers - passive or nurturing figures whose existence was incompatible with violence and military culture.

When we circle back to Pavlichenko and women like her - some of more than the half a million female-bodied peoples that served in the Red Army, and the thousands of others that were non-official combatants in the four years of the Great Patriotic War - their memory becomes a question of depiction. While Pavlichenko was able to write memoirs and tell her own version of the war, it was more often that combatants died than returned home from the Eastern front. Thus, how did others tell their stories? When the framework of war presupposes a masculine presence, and a feminine one upsets that framework, how were women spoken of

---

[11] Anja Tippner, "Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia and the Image of Young Soviet Wartime Heroines," *The Russian Review* 73 (July 2014): 371–88, 377.
[12] Adrienne Harris, "The Myth of the Woman Warrior and World War II in Soviet Culture." Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008, 228-231.
[13] Nadezhda Andreyevna Durova (1783-1866) was a Russian woman who disguised herself as a man in order to join the army in battle against Napoleon's armies. Her autobiography *The Cavalry Maiden* (Russian: "Сочинения кавалерист-девицы") is one of the earliest examples of female military memoirs.

when they lacked the ability to speak for themselves? Were they patriots, liberated by the state from bourgeois gender roles, who chose willingly to enter into combat? Or were they Joans of Arc - as had been so snidely referenced by an American columnist on Pavlichenko, when she asked why the sniper did not take more pride in her appearance and dress in "shining armor"? Or were they the "harpies and hyenas" that their most virulent critics leveled against them?

The questions are important because both blur the lines between symbols and crass reality. The *symbol* of Joan of Arc helps show "our most self-flattering illusions*"* despite "the ideas they embody [being] questionable, however brave and loyal and true they themselves were in pursuit of their aims".[14] Reality, as hardly needs to be stated, can serve as a threat if it runs contrary to those self-flattering illusions. At the same time Vinogradova states there was no surprise in women's recruitment and enlistment, the very title of her books on female Soviet soldiers - *Avenging Angels* and *Defending the Motherland*[15] - put femininity first and foremost in the mind of the reader, and as responsive actors rather than active ones. The further time moves away from the Great Patriotic War, the more its female combatants become historical objects capable of being instrumentalized and manipulated. This reveals the answer to the aforementioned questions - that female combatants were, as a collective, capable of being anything and nothing because of the multiplicity of identities they held. When there was no single pre-existing archetype[16] Lyudmila Pavlichenko could fit in to, then she could be anything

---

[14] Marina Warner quoted in Adrienne Harris, "The Lives and Deaths of a Soviet Saint in the Post-Soviet Period: The Case of Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia," *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes* 53, no. 2/4 (December 2011): 273–304, 275.

[15] Russian: "Женщины-снайперы Великой Отечественной" and "Защищая Родину. Летчицы Великой Отечественной Ангелы мщения" respectively.

[16] In her dissertation, Adrienne Harris argues that "women warriors fall into three types based on deep cultural archetypes: the martyr, the handmaiden, and the knight (*polianista*)" yet that these archetypes come from folkloric genres such as *byliny* or *skazki*. As such, the women who fought

and everything depending upon the lens with which one chose to view her. Female combatants - a term which is intended to encompass both soldiers and partisans, and exclude civilians and the home front - are oftentimes more individually remembered than their male counterparts, who can fall under the generic image of a 'soldier' in the collective memory and imagination of a war. Yet simultaneously, we see them stripped of individual characteristics and given new ones reflective of the virtues or politics of a time period. We see them transformed into symbols that can remain remarkably consistent between Soviet and post-Soviet mnemonic cultures, inexorably linked to the memory of the Great Patriotic War and resilient when faced with contemporary re-examinations. Most fascinatingly is that those contemporary re-examinations by Russian public officials and personalities are often attempts to ascribe negative human characteristics and behavior back onto these individual women. As historical objects, female combatants of World War II remain flexible tools in the post-Soviet space. Their ties to the Great Patriotic War supersede ethnic and national bounds, and yet this simultaneously makes them potent political tools in reshaping national memory in a contentious arena.

Over the course of this essay, I hope to examine memory and memorialization of the female combatants via three different women and how, following the war, they were depicted in such media as film, statues, and publications. The goal of this examination is to see what conclusions might be drawn at large about how women who produced first hand accounts were received versus subsequent memory actors' depictions of their subjects, and what contexts may have influenced changes in these depictions. Attention is paid to how the balance between

---

in the twentieth century and with more modern weaponry (ie., aeroplanes and machine gun), have difficulty mapping on to either the handmaiden or the knight archetypes. The martyr archetype and its role in Soviet female combatants is discussed later in this essay. Harris 2008, 8-16.

'woman' and 'soldier' changes in non-fictional productions. To do so, however, first must be laid out the framework with which I approached this study - as a piece in the interdisciplinary field of 'memory studies', which, like the figure of the female combatant, can encompass anything it needs to be. The theoretical groundwork for this thesis, composed of its second chapter, is divided in two sections to first distinguish the major bodies of work I drew upon.

The first section of the second chapter is dedicated to collective memory and memory politics relating to the Great Patriotic War - presupposing that the war's overshadowing legacy and importance in the Soviet Union's history is known. I consider it vital to not only discuss the role of the female combatant in Soviet-Russian memory, but in other ethnic groups', considering that it was not only Slavic Russian women who served in the Red Army and fought as partisans. In this aspect, I will be discussing ethnic Kazakhs and Kazakhstan insofar as it relates to the memorialization and memory of female soldiers. To neglect this interethnic example is to continue to push the non-Russian to the periphery, when there were distinct efforts by the Communist Party to develop and foster these national identities in addition to a shared, Soviet one. Katherine Verdery's 1999 work on dead bodies and monuments as totems of memory politics is a source of heavy inspiration and guidance when it comes to bridging the gap between theory and reading of monuments as mnemonic texts.[17]

The second section is given to gender and war, which draws heavily upon the works of historians Maria Bucur; although primarily a historian of Romania, her contributions to the interplay between gender and war and memorialization provide a thorough grounding on the

[17] Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

topic.[18] In addition, art historian Elisabeth Bronfen's seminal work on death, femininity and aesthetic is given attention because of how thorough it articulates the symbolic power of a dead woman's image, which comes into tight focus when I examine the case studies.[19] This thesis is deeply indebted to Adrienne Harris' body of work on 'woman warriors' and mythmaking in the Soviet Union.[20] As war and, especially, the Great Patriotic War is traumatic because of the sheer scale of death and the images of it which circulated, I feel Bronfen's lens is relevant as despite its different academic field.

The third chapter of this work will briefly discuss my methodology and choice of cases for this study, which form the bulk of the fourth and final chapter. An explanation and description of materials used - primarily newspaper articles, films, memoirs, and biographies - for my analysis will be contained within this section. Following this section, I will discuss three female combatants - Zoia Kosmodemyanskaya, Lyudmila Pavlichenko, and Manshuk Mametova - and how they have been memorialized and remembered in both the Soviet Union and two key successor states (the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan). While temporally broad, this approach takes into account the potential for voices and perspectives stifled under state socialism; when changes are noted and these women's memories become entangled with wider post-independent/post-Soviet issues, it becomes extremely clear how easily the female

[18] Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies (Indiana University Press, 2006. Bucur, Maria. *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania*. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009).
[19] Elisabeth Bronfen, *Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
[20] Harris 2008. Harris 2011.

combatant as a mnemonic object can be altered or invoked based on the needs of the collective and the states which claim to represent them.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Background

Great Patriotic War and Memory Politics

Before delving into the specific utilization of female combatants vis a vi their connections to World War II and specifically the Soviet and post-Soviet memory of the war, it is necessary to try and examine memory of the war itself. This is no easy or succinct task, and scores of authors and theorists have tried to untangle the Gordian knot that unites the Soviet Union, its successor states, and their collective memory of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore it is best to step back and define various terms - memory, collective memory, history - and their uses.

The idea of a collective possessing traits that their individual components do not is not a modern creation; in the nineteenth century, Gustave Le Bon referred to the "psychological law of the mental unity of crowds" - that despite the specific individuals which compose a crowd, including backgrounds, character, and intelligence, their presence within a crowd puts them in possession of a "collective mind, which makes them feel, think, and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation", akin to the nature of cells in a living body.[21] Collective memory, as first used by sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, denotes not the gathered result of individuals remembering an event, but a reconstruction of an image of the past "which is in accord, in each epoch, with the predominant thoughts of the society".[22] An event enters into the imagination of both those who

[21] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 2002), 4.
[22] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A Coser, 1st ed., Heritage of Sociology Series (University of Chicago Press, 1992), 40.

experience it and those who are told about it, like a game of narrative telephone, capable of minor alterations or complete revisions based on the abilities and intentions of the reteller. It is separate from what Halbwachs refers to as "the preservation of memories by cerebral processes", and additionally requires a study and understanding of the "social framework" in which the collective memory is formed and shaped: "no memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections".[23] From this initial theorist, historian Adrienne Harris has further defined memory as "representation of the past and the making of it into a shared cultural knowledge by successive generations in 'vehicles of memory' such as books, films, museums, and commemorations, and others"[24]. While memory and history are intimately linked, and often frequently overlapped or misinterpreted as the other, I look to Pierre Nora's differentiation of the two as an example to follow. He writes that:

> Memory is always a palpable phenomenon, a tie experienced in eternal presence. History, on the other hand, is a representation of the past. ...Memory sacralizes the past, history which is oriented towards disenchantment, desacralizes [sic] it. Memory is owned by a group and it is the cement of this group. ...History, on the other hand, belonging to everybody and nobody, makes a claim to universality.[25]

Not all who work with and study commemorative practices agree with the definition or use of the term 'collective memory'. In her extensive body of work on war, gender, and memory in Eastern Europe, historian Maria Bucur does not use the concept of 'collective memory', because, in her view, of "the distinction between product and process". Remembering is a

---

[23] Ibid, 39-43.
[24] Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," American Historical Review 105.2 (1997) quoted in Harris 2011, 275.
[25] *Les lieux de mémoire*, ed. Pierre Nora (Paris: Gallimard, 1984-199, 23-43 quoted in Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard, "A Theory of the Politics of Memory," in *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 7–34.

process, and she does not identify any single stable result or product which can be identified as "collective memory". In her view, "political elites in modern states [are] constantly attempting to employ narratives and rituals about the past to gain political legitimacy" and identifies these as "commemorative discourses". While these discourses do not "reflect" memories, they are "appropriated" by elites "in a social politicized context".[26] However, Halbwachs specifically discusses that collective memory is discursive and dynamic, rather than a specific phenomenon that can be pointed to and identified at a given moment:

> We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives and these are continually reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is perpetuated.
>
> But precisely because these memories are repetitions, because they are successively engaged in very different systems of notions, at different periods of our lives, they have lost the form and the appearance they once had.[27]

The process and resulting changes are integral to any study of what might be termed collective memory. Although there is not a specific source to which one can point and identify as *the* collective memory, it can be identified by what specific qualities are repeated and carry on through reproduction. Those elements which remain consistent

Memory Politics

Svetlana Alexevich recounts a specific instance - a marriage formed of both a male and female veteran - in the introduction to her *Unwomanly Face of War*, in which the husband specifically instructs his wife to recount the war "the way I taught you. Without tears and women's trifles". The wife specified further "He studied *The History of the Great Patriotic War*

[26] Maria Bucur, *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press2, 2009), 9-10.
[27] Halbwachs, 47.

[sic] with me all last night. He was afraid for me. And now he's worried I won't remember right. Not the way I should".[28] This moment can be taken as both an example of and metaphor for the core struggle of many women interviewed for Alexevich's book - the tension between the correct, masculine experience of the war, and the women's potential emotionalized skewing of the facts. The former is sanctified in books, and contestation risks punishment; despite whatever official record may exist, the wife risked repercussions by veering into tales of hair-braiding and beauty. This tension exemplifies the utilization and shaping of collective memory; Halbwachs refers to it as the *reconstruction of the past*, altered by the multiplicity of ways society relates to and interferes with the individual personality. Although he suggests that "modern societies pretend to respect the individual personality", such sentiment must be disregarded when approaching societies where state institutions were ideologically predisposed to transforming their inhabitants into ideal citizens. If culture is one framework which profoundly influences and interprets memory, than another equally influential one is conscious deliberate manipulation by institutions in their attempt to create a "useable past".[29] In Alexevich's example, the institutions would be represented by those writers of *The History of the Great Patriotic War*, the censors which approved and edited its content, and the party which required its specific narrative to lack an emotionalized perspective.

To instrumentalize these conflicts, political scientists Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard created a schema breaking down the framework into two distinct categories, 'memory actors' versus 'memory regimes'. The former is further broken down into four typologies - mnemonic

[28] Svetlana Alexievich, *The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II*, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York: Random House, 2017), xxiv.
[29] Kubik and Bernhard, 19.

pluralists, warriors, abnegator, and perspectives (see Appendix C for full breakdown) - based on the answer to Harold Lasswell's definition of politics - "*who* gets *what*, *when*, and *how*"[30]. For instance, Kubik and Bernhard identify a 'mnemonic warrior' as one who views themselves - by extension, their ethnic group and/or nation-state - in an 'Us vs Them' struggle over truth, where others with a contradictory or competing memory culture are 'attacking our 'history'. A pluralist would instead be considered an actor willing to accommodate and allow a competing or contrasting interpretation of the past to exist, as "in addition to "us" and our vision of history, there are "them" with their own vision of the past".[31]

The second matrix of categorization - memory regimes - is defined by what type of actors are present within the cultural mnemonic discourse.[32] Kubik and Bernhard focus on two key factors in classifying regimes - "(1) an organized way of remembering a specific issue, event, or process (2) at a given moment or period".[33] These regimes are dynamic and change depending on the specific composition of mnemonic actors in the given context. As an example, "when a mnemonic warrior enters a debate on a particular issue, and there is an intention to draw a sharp line between "true" versions of the past and "false" version being propagated", the regime is "fractured", while a "unified" regime is one that is largely free of mnemonic conflict between parties. They note that because of the degree of salience any particular event may have at any given point of time, analysis of an overarching "mnemonic field" encompassing a context in

[30] Ibid, 14.
[31] Ibid, 13.
[32] Ibid, 11-22.
[33] Ibid, 16.

totality and any conclusions drawn from such examinations should be done only after an inductive analysis of memory regimes on their own.[34]

Using the wealth of information and analyses done on contemporary Russian memory politics, I would argue that the memory of the Great Patriotic War maps cleanly onto what Kubik and Bernhard call an "official regime", which they define as one: "Formulation and propagation that involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society (the authorities and major political actors such as parties, who are organized to hold and contest state power".[35] Furthermore, the Russian mnemonic regime surrounding the Great Patriotic War is heavily populated by mnemonic warriors, and one should look no further than Vladimir Putin's speech on 18 June, 2020 "attacking" Western countries for failing to learn the "true lessons" of World War II for proof of the us vs them mentality in the memory culture.[36]

Returning to Kubik and Bernhard's discussion of individual analyses of memory regimes over time, one must examine the Soviet Union's intensely controlled memory regime before trying to parse those of its successor states. Each post-socialist state grapples with its past according not only to its individualized circumstances leading into democratization, but the "by several unique *structural (institutional) constraints* of this sort".[37] Again referring to Kubik and

---

[34] Ibid, 17-18.
[35] Ibid, 17.
[36] "Putin Publishes Essay on 'Real Lessons' of WWII: Russian President Attacks European Narrative of WWII, Days before Rescheduled Victory Day Parade.," The Moscow Times, June 18, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/18/putin-publishes-essay-on-real-lessons-of-wwii-a7062; Vladimir Putin, "Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II," The National Interest, June 18, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982?page=0%2C1.
[37] Kubik and Bernhard, 20-21.

Bernhard, we note that the "first, we consider the type of state socialism…[we] focus only on a very simple, yet almost unanimously accepted generalization that there were two main types of state socialist regimes: *liberalized* and *hard-line* [sic]. ...The distinction between reformist[38] and hard-line communist systems has important ramifications for the nature of the extrication from communism. The former were much more likely to negotiate with their opponents, whereas the latter were more resistant to change, and this difference has powerful repercussions for the games of memory politics after the breakthrough"[39]. This explains not merely the differences in, say, Albania's relationship to its communist past as compared to Soviet successor states', but also how different successor states grapple with their Soviet pasts. For the core of an empire always will have marked differences to the experiences of the periphery, and the transitions out of communism experienced by newly independent states can have marked similarities to the effects on their memory politics as different types of state socialisms. Comparing Estonian memory politics to Kazakhstani, for instance, must take into account the forms of government that came in after socialism, as they can be compared to the differences between the 'reformist' and 'hard-line' systems Kubik and Bernhard speak of.

The Great Patriotic War and Nation Building in the (Post-)Soviet Consciousness

> When it comes to the most somber aspects of our existence...it seems they are enveloped by clouds that half cover them. That faraway world where we remember that we suffered nevertheless exercises an incomprehensible attraction on the person who has survived it and who seems to think he has left the best part of himself, which he tries to recapture. This is why, given a few exceptions, it is the case that the great majority of people more or less frequently are given to what one might call nostalgia for the past.[40]

[38] Kubik and Bernhard use the terms *liberalized* and *reformist* interchangeably with regard to how to differentiate types of communist/socialist regimes.
[39] Ibid, 20-21.
[40] Halbwachs, 48-49.

To say in any way how the Great Patriotic War is referred to as the Soviet Union's most successful victory and biggest defeat is still an understatement. The above quote comes from Maurice Halbwachs and perhaps goes some way to explaining why the war looms largest of any event in the country's memory - more so than the revolution which founded it, and the moment which dissolved it. The sheer scale of Soviet losses[41] and the multiplicity of the war experience - occupation, bombardment, mobilization, and displacement - has

Within the task of analyzing the connections between memory of the war and political democratization, writes Thomas Wolfe, "the Soviet case appears stubbornly anomalous"[42]. For much of the Soviet Union's existence, its citizens lacked a public sphere where could be engaged the presence and absence of historical interpretation; it lacked war trials or seminal works similar to *Le Syndrome de Vichy* where the average citizen could read and debate ideas with their own family or learned experiences of the war years. Even now, nearing thirty years since the official death of the Soviet Union, there remains the strange predicament of engagement with the Soviet past. Adrienne Harris points to the long-term effect of an official regime on the collective's memory: "The Russian case is a special one: the nation's collective memory, strongly controlled from above, evolved during the first seven decades of the Soviet period only to splinter during the *perestroika* [sic] years and the post-Soviet period. During the post-Soviet period, the shared and uncontested, at least officially, cohesive collective memory Russians had inherited from the *pre-glasnost* [sic] Soviet period reluctantly gave up ground".[43] However, it should be noted that

[41] See Footnote 5 for casualty counts.
[42] Thomas C Wolfe, "Past as Present, Myth, or History? Discourses of Time and the Great Fatherland War," in *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 249–83, 249.
[43] Harris 2011, 276.

Harris wrote the above in 2011, and subsequent years have come to see a strengthening of the Soviet-style mnemonic regime on the topic of the Second World War, and the Russian Federation's refusal to allow for challenges to that narrative even at the expense of relations with the European Union.[44] While far from true across all nations which emerged from the Soviet Union, examples in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan show there can be a strong bottom-up nostalgia for both the Soviet state apparati and culture, leading to varying salience among populations when Soviet memory is invoked by state actors.[45]

To again quote Thomas Wolfe - "post Soviet Russia has not seen this kind of Vergangenheitsbewältigung[46]...that has been a vital issue in other European states", and thus it is to little surprise that the official mnemonic regime would be inherited almost whole cloth from the Soviet Union. Russia has lacked any of the "complex negotiations over memory between political parties and their corresponding social and cultural constituencies, corporate and state media, generational cohorts" - and even any agreement on *which* events should be the topic of such negotiations and self-reflection.[47] Lacking a singular event comparable to the Holocaust in Germany or the Atlantic slave trade in the United States that debates about the nature of guilt and victimhood can be centralized, too many elements of the Soviet statehood can be pulled in to "collective therapeutic project", as Wolfe calls it. Plucking at these strings risks dismantling the

---

[44] Putin, "Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II".
[45] Dimitry Solovyov, "Soviet Nostalgia Binds Divergent CIS States," *Reuters*, December 8, 2011, sec. World News, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cis/soviet-nostalgia-binds-divergent-cis-states-idUSTRE7B713O20111208.
[46] German: "working through the past". More narrowly defined in the Duden lexicon as "public debate within a country on a problematic period of its recent history". "Duden | Vergangenheitsbewältigung | Rechtschreibung, Bedeutung, Definition". https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung.
[47] Wolfe, 250-251.

Federation's understanding of its whole history; arguably, it has been better for Vladimir Putin's presidency to support these ideas rather than subject Russians to more catastrophic changes in their worldview and place in the mnemonic cosmos. For any analysis can be taken as criticism - thus, an attack - on the Soviet Army, and both liberals and nationalists take umbrage to the 'cynical insult' to those who sacrificed themselves for patriotism and the protection of their home.[48] This is not merely a top-down enforcing of the memory regime, for there is a great appeal among the population for exaltation of the war era. As phrased succinctly by journalist Natalia Antonova:

> In this sense, coming together to remember World War II is a grand, public-bonding ritual for an atomized society in which people have a hard time trusting each other (once again, the legacy of Stalin's Terror is a major factor in this atomization). It's not so much about triumph in a terrifying conflict anymore as it is about tradition, a way of expressing pride, even if it be a twisted "Russia has enemies everywhere and will stomp on them if necessary" kind of pride.[49]

In the Central Asian states formed from the Soviet republics, where little if any land was subject to invasion, the war still stands as a "seismic event" - one which saw the solidification of Soviet rule over its periphery and gave its citizens an opportunity to prove themselves as "full citizens", as Soviet as they were Uzbek or Kazakh.[50] Former Kazakhstani president Nursultan Nazarbayev referred to the Great Patriotic War as a moment where the people - *all* people in their multiethnic territory - came together, unified, and proved their strength. While historian

---

[48] Dina Khapaeva, "History without Memory: Gothic Morality in Post-Soviet Society," http://www.eurozine. com/articles/2009-02-02-khapaeva-en.html (last accessed February 26, 2014), quoted Tippner, 387-388.
[49] Natalia Antonova, "Russia's Role in WWII Isn't 'Part of Our Collective Memory'" (The World, May 9, 2019), https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-09/russia-s-role-wwii-isn-t-part-our-collective-memory.
[50] Roberto J Carmack, *Kazakhstan in World War II: Mobilization and Ethnicity in the Soviet Empire* (University Press of Kansas, 2019), 2.

Roberto J. Carmack argues in his overarching work on the history of Kazakhstan and World War II that "the war's true impact lies between two extremes of disintegration and unification", he nevertheless contends that "many of the memories and identities associated with the conflict have outlasted the Soviet Union itself".[51] Additionally, Timur Dadabaev points to how in Central Asia, there is a "long tradition of history construction...where political pressures and official ideology always had a decisive say in how that history was interpreted and eventually constructed". There has been two discourses, at times oth separated and overlapping, in officialized construction - nationalistic and Soviet - which result in "two different poles" intended to develop both a sense of patriotism to the supranational entity and devotion to the ethnic nation which the peoples belonged to.[52]

On this question of national memories of a similar event, we again look to Kubik and Bernhard on the topic:

> There is no "national character" or "collective consciousness" somehow encoded in the population's genes or mysteriously handed over from one generation to another. There exist, however, several official systems of social communication and education that deliberately manufacture and disseminate sets of "official" narratives about the national past and equally powerful sets of "unofficial" narratives generated and reproduced within personal networks, which may be at odds or only partially congruent with official narratives.[53]

When looking post-Soviet, these official and unofficial narratives do take on especially nationalized tensions. Despite the assertion that there is no "national character" encoded in a population's genes, there is repeatedly a political insistence that such a character does exist. It is something that appears required as part of the process of justification for why a nation should be

[51] Carmack 2019, 158.
[52] Dadabaev, 26-31.
[53] Kubik and Bernhard, 22.

independent. “Nations are not something eternal. ...They had their beginnings and they will end”. They are founded on a legacy of memories - to Dominique Schnapper, “for individuals and peoples alike, memory is the predicate of self.[54]

The tension in Kazakhstani historical research lies between those who adhered to their scholarly training, generally along the Soviet model, and those who engage in “mythologizing history”, which has found appeal among the newly independent republic.[55] Furthermore, these mythological - sometimes interchangeable with “alternate” or “suppressed” - histories are also argued to be in line with the tribal structure of Kazakh society, with its emphasis on kinship ties. As representations of honorable historical figures enter prominently into contemporary Kazakhstani life - as statues, state and city-wide celebrations, and national holidays - these newly-prominent histories join together with the ambitions of contemporary tribal elites to form a different type of memory politics than that seen in the Russian Federation.[56] On the topic of the Great Patriotic War, placing Kazakhstan into Kubik and Bernhard’s model is complicated; President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev confirmed that his state would not tolerate the “falsification of history” which would “diminish” the role of the USSR in Germany’s defeat, but the field is absent of the type of debates and fury which dominate discussion of the war in Ukraine or even neighboring Uzbekistan.[57] In contrast, however, to Russia and the European portions of the

---

[54] David Rieff, *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies* (Yale University Press, 2016), 29.
[55] Anuar Galiev, “Mythologization of History and the Invention of Tradition in Kazakhstan,” *Oriente Moderno*, Nuova Serie, 96, no. 1 (2016): 46–63, 47
[56] Galiev, 49-50
[57] “President Tokaev Committed to Memory of World War II, Won’t Tolerate USSR Role Revisionism,” *The Astana Times*, May 5, 2020, sec. International, https://astanatimes.com/2020/05/president-tokaev-committed-to-memory-of-world-war-ii-wont-tolerate-ussr-revisionism/; “In Rememberance of the World War II,” QAZAQSTAN TARIHY, May 11, 2018, https://e-history.kz/en/news/show/7136/.

Soviet Union, where World War II was the great national tragedy which touched every family, the largest events which spur debate in Kazakhstani memory of the Soviet past is collectivization and the Gulag's role in changing the traditional Kazakh way of life. Even above that is the question on the legacy of Soviet nationalism policies - as historian Martha Olcott phrases it, "was [the USSR] just a new vehicle of Russian imperialism albeit with a transformed ideology, or was it an ideologically driven multinational state in which the majority nationality largely controlled the political, economic and social agendas."[58]

As it relates to the Second World War, Kazakhstani mnemonic regimes would suggest that there is a fondness for the latter interpretation of the Soviet Union; the war was a time when peoples regardless of their origins were able to come together in an ideological battle, communism versus fascism. Quoting Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, a Kazakh recipient of the Hero of the Soviet Union and the People's Hero of Kazakhstan, a 2019 Kazakhstani article prints:

> ... They were different in age and nationality. But the demand was the same from everyone, everyone was equal before the oath given to the Motherland - whether you are Kazakh or Russian, Moldovan or Georgian. More experienced, experienced fighters taught young soldiers wisdom, ingenuity, shared everything in a brotherly way: tobacco, crackers, the last sip of water ... Together they mourned the dead, rejoiced together in victory, and went into battle together, shoulder to shoulder.[59]

This has persisted since independence; a recent example of this historical interpretation can be found in President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's remarks surrounding a new law which would award 1 million tenge[60] to surviving veterans for the 75th anniversary of the war. He

---

[58] Martha Brill Olcott, "Kazakhstan's Soviet Legacy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 20, 2011, https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/30/kazakhstan-s-soviet-legacy-pub-46096.
[59] "С Днем Победы! О Казахстанских Героях.," Orient Solutions, May 8, 2019, http://ors.kz/company/news/2016/.
[60] Approximately 2,400 USD.

stated, “We remember all the war heroes who forever remain lying on the battlefields, who sacrificed everything so that we could have a peaceful life”.[61] Cultural projects following in the model of Russia’s have proliferated in Kazakhstan over the last five to ten years, seeing the gathering of documents, eyewitness accounts, and individual memories for preservation of the war to pass along to the next generation. Beyond the desire for objective historical archivism, many of these projects see direct involvement by the Kazakhstani state.[62] As more access to archives and material are being allowed to foreign scholars and researchers, it remains to be seen what potential challenges to the official mnemonic regime will be allowed. Complications are further stressed by tensions with neighboring states over the Soviet past when there are distinct elements of society simultaneously calling collectivization a ‘genocide’ and praising the benefits of industrialization on Central Asian SSRs’ economies. Partial evidence can be found in statements such as these, found peppered through Kazakhstani state news articles - "Recently, other symbols of the military glory of the Soviet Union were dismantled in Uzbekistan. The rewriting of history in Uzbekistan affected the ways the war is perceived and Soviet memory is neglected. In Kazakhstan, on the contrary, Soviet symbols of the World War II are stored and even multiplied."[63] There is hesitation in Kazakhstan around renouncing their Soviet past, which is how actions such as statue removal in Uzbekistan have been perceived. Geopolitical ties to Russia further push Kazakhstan into alignment with Putin’s Russia, which comes with accepting its memory regime of the Great Patriotic War. We can say that while memory of the Soviet past

[61] Shayakhemetova, “President Tokayev Exclusive Interview: Kazakhstan Must Lead Effort To Improve Relations With Neighbors.”
[62] “Больше Памяти о Большой Победе Благодаря Инновациям,” May 19, 2020, sec. Аналитика и комментарии, https://e-cis.info/news/566/86959/.
[63] “In Rememberance of the World War II.”

writ large is "fractured", in the Great Patriotic War's memory in Kazakhstan there is an official regime which reflects Russia's. When this lens is turned on to the case of Mamshuk Mametova, as compared to her Russian contemporaries' treatment post-Soviet Union, the impact of Soviet nostalgia and consideration to the Russian mnemonic regime will be

Statues as Bodily Memory

Returning to Maria Bucur's difficulty with the use of the term collective memory, her main point of contention is the lack of a 'product' which is stable and quasi-tangible. In terms of analysis, then, it becomes useful to identify specific objects around which debates and arguments can be centered. Even more specifically, one can look at specific types of cultural products as manifestations of collective memory insofar that at the time they were produced, they were meant to embody a person, object or idea, and convey that to a wider audience. Commemorative statues, for instance, have become flashpoints around which memory politics are debated, as they were items ideologically designed to concentrate state power and its spatial and temporal order, and for the sheer amount of specifically Soviet-style monuments[64] that were produced.

Statues represent a unique overlapping of both generalized symbolism and specific, individualized memory; they represent the visage of a specific person while simultaneously existing as the body of said person. "By arresting the process of that person's bodily decay, a statue alters the temporality associated with the person", writes Verdery, "bringing him into the realm of the timeless or the sacred". Likewise, removing a statue achieves the same effect as removing an icon from a church - not only is it removed from an audience, it is stripped of its

[64] Katherine Verdery refers to these qualities that distinguish Soviet statues from statues in other places - "their gigantism and in the *kind* [sic] of time they froze". .

protection by the authority which had erected it in the first place. Thus, one of the first markers of communism's end in Europe was the removal of statues previously, and simultaneously, representing the state, its leaders, and its protection of a codified, permanent memory.[65]

In the former socialist bloc, there are specific considerations when applied to analyses of dead-body politics, as Verdery calls it. "The shift to new democratic politics, the development of markets and the restitution of private property, the enlivening of religious worship, the creation and territorial bounding of new states"[66]. Verdery also acknowledges the objection of putting statues - constructed, artificial, and artistic as they are - in the same category as the corpses and bones of the person. A statue of Lenin removed in Astana does not have the same mnemonic effect as removing his embalmed body from Red Square, for instance. However, her argument is that the line can be thin, and the spectacle of removal produces an emotional response akin to witnessing a corpse, evidenced by mourning or funerary practices performed on the spot. "In Yerevan, Armenia...those who took down Lenin's statue placed it on a truck and drove it as they might the body of a deceased person, round and round the central square as if in an open coffin". [67]

To briefly reference Julia Kristeva's argument that a corpse is neither a subject nor an object, it thus lacks any ability to serve in any way as an agent; the corpse of Lenin both stands for Lenin himself and the myriad of qualities ascribed to Lenin, and is wholly incapable of supporting or refuting any of them. Verdery emphasizes this as well, writing that, "the multiplicity of available meanings makes something (such as a dead body) a good political

[65] Verdery, 5.
[66] Verdery, 3.
[67] Ibid, 12.

symbol, effective in moments of system transformation".[68] By transitive logic, if dead bodies and statues can come to symbolize one another, then both corpses and statues can be ascribed with any number of meanings as well as stand for ideologies on their own. Once this is understood, it is clear to see why and how statues become major flashpoints for arguments in memory politics. When these considerations meet with discoures surrounding the depiction of women's bodies within political art, the need to analyze closely statues and memorials of female combatants appears in order to expose the intersections between gender, memory, and state priority.

Gender and War | Women Combatants in WW2

In the flux of the war period, when gender roles were being re-stabilized and national identity (re-)confirmed, the figure of the female combatant presented an unusual conflagration of identities to be utilized in a variety of ways by the state - as connections to older historical traditions, examples of the exceptionalism of the new Soviet/Socialist human, or tragic victims of fasco-capitalist brutality. Now that we have been able to review the concept of collective memory and the specific frameworks that the female combatant has been reconstructed in, it becomes necessary to look at the intersection of women and war as it relates to the Soviet aspect of World War II. Or as Maria Bucur and Nancy Wingfield would state - "to render women visible".[69]

In the introduction to a collection of essays on gender and war, Bucur and Wingfield argue that their intentions are not to 'gender' history - to write women into a narrative that did

[68] Ibid, 125.
[69] Bucur and Wingfield, 4.

not originally include them - but to bring to light areas where women's contributions and roles had been minimalized. "What historians have constructed as universal is, in fact, masculine. Making women visible underscores this point. Nowhere is this clearer than in the construction of wartime heroism. Expanding upon our feminist predecessors from the 1970s, whose aim was to shed light on an "authentic" [sic] female experience, we seek to demonstrate how this experience has been culturally constructed and is therefore contingent upon a specific context"[70]. Rather than cloistering women's deeds into the specific subcategories of 'women's history' or 'gender studies', Bucur and Wingfield's motivation is to draw attention to the artificial binary created between 'history' and 'women's history' and, in doing so, deconstruct it. This approach includes examining in detail those cases in which history and memory have already rendered women visible - or indeed elevated, as could be argued, to a level above that of their male contemporaries. As the adage goes, the exception proves the rule, and by examining those exceptions we can better understand what qualities or instances in the abnormal feminine align with masculine ideals and/or norms.

As Wingfield and Bucur continue - "as [women] moved beyond the auxiliary roles...they defied the masculine norms that identified heroism and courage with men. ...Fellow soldiers, civilian politicians, mothers, and wives at home could only make sense of their heroic actions as manly (read: unfeminine) and out of the ordinary (read: abnormal)."[71]

As has been demonstrated, the act of recruiting women into the Red Army was both political and symbolic - a decision intended to humiliate men and provoke them into becoming brave and patriotic soldiers. Wingfield and Bucur highlight "[male] veterans turned participation

[70] Ibid, 4.
[71] Ibid, 7.

in combat into an important element for separating "true men" [sic] from the rest, thus upending traditional masculine class and educational hierarchies"[72]. This assertion is repeated by a number of different scholars in, perhaps oxymoronically, explaining what happened when women were brought into combat and the Red Army. British historian Catherine Merridale discusses the intentions behind the initiative, which in her words had less to do with gender equality than calculated use of gender disparity;

> The most conspicuous innovation [of the Red Army], which began in earnest in the summer of 1942, was the recruitment of young women. In the first weeks of the war women had been discouraged from applying for active service roles. But a labor shortage everywhere, at the front line and in the factories, changed everything. That summer, the military expressed itself keen to recruit "healthy young girls".
>
> To some extent the idea was to shame the men into greater effort. The other goal was to make civilian women more effective, to shame them, too, into working long hours in armaments plants or on the farms. ...Unlike the men, they found it hard to fit their bodies into the heroic mold, to see themselves as warriors. There had been women at the front in Russia's other wars, but never on this scale.[73]

Anna Krylova in her extensive body of work on female soldiers posits a different thesis: that women who fought and participated in combat during the Second World War in the Soviet Union did so not because of necessity, in order to 'free a man to fight', but because by 1941 they were part of a generation that had been raised within an ideological system which saw male and female genders as differentiated but non-oppositional when it came to traditionally masculine work, such as military service.[74] Drawing on work from both veterans' memoirs and propaganda, Krylova writes that:

---

[72] Ibid, 7.
[73] Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945* (Picador, 2006), 165.
[74] Krylova quoted in Adrienne M. Harris, "Yulia Drunina: The 'Blond-Braided Soldier' on the Poetic Front," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 54, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 643–65, 646.

> In their universe, the woman soldier [sic] choice of self-identification did not constitute a contradiction in terms because the very notions of womanhood and soldierhood did not stand in self-evident, intuitive disagreement with each other. By no means were female volunteers, combatants, and veterans, at any point, oblivious to conventional - that is, opposition-generated - gender ideals of appropriate male and female wartime behavior.[75]

Women were not forced to decide between the role of patriot or of woman - as the culture from the Revolution through Stalinism allowed for an overlap of identities in this sphere. In Krylova's finding, it did not masculinize the woman to serve the state in an active combative role. In the same way the Soviet Union fostered both Soviet and ethnic identities in their non-Russian subjects, so too did early to Stalinist USSR permit one to have their gender and serve the state. Krylova is challenged by the post-war treatment of women. Svetlana Alexevich provided a number of first hand accounts showing that this non-oppositional gender dynamic was far from universally accepted even by the one/two generations it supposedly influenced. Revolution-era parents of "professionally violent women" castigated their daughters upon their return home from the front, showing that transgression from women's prescribed criteria resulted in rejection and alienation.[76]

Krylova and Merridale, however, do not stand in direct contrast to each other but rather present two different subjects with competing motivations that led to a brief moment where traditional gender divide between soldier/male and homefront/female were weaker. Krylova speaks to the motivation of the women who went to combat, while Merridale discusses the viewpoint of the state which loosened restrictions on female service. In the absence of an existing paradigm to which a female soldier could fit, and the inability to manufacture one

[75] Krylova 2010, 13-14 quoted in Ibid, 646.
[76] Alexievich.

rapidly in the culture of a total war, we must look at older conceptions of women, war, and death in order to understand how they could be conceptualized.

The aesthetics and power of dead women

A man dying in war is both a harsh reality and a glorious sacrifice - the individual subject willingly and nobly subsuming himself into the grinder of battle - while the woman should never have found herself in the situation. This dichotomy is pervasive throughout historiographies of warfare.[77] If Axis - and even Allied - observers viewed the presence of Soviet women in combat as proof of communism's upending of this historical norm, then likewise the Soviet Union viewed their women going to battle as evidence of the desperate tragedy of it all. Though writing on the Spanish Civil War, Brian Bunk points to the images and memory of 'political martyrs', several of whom were women. "The sacrifices and horrors endured by revolutionary martyrs served as both example and indictment for future political and military actions. The success of martyr imagery in generating assistance helped mobilize divisive social groups..."[78] Political parties hoped citizens would unite around the "inspirational memory", stirred by the "outrage and horror arising from the graphic depictions of suffering".[79] "In part these efforts [employing traditional gender roles to mobilize political support in the aftermath of the 1934 October revolution in Spain] represented the mirror image of commemorations designed to stabilize

[77] Markwick, Roger D., and Euridice Charon Cardona. *Soviet Women on the Frontline In the Second World War*. Hampshire: Palgravee Macmillian, 2012., 2.
[78] Brian D. Bunk, *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 62.
[79] Ibid, 74.

masculine roles by requiring women to fulfill their passive responsibilities as witnesses, victims, and rewards".[80]

To that we can turn to Elizabeth Bronfen, whose seminal study of death, femininity, and aesthetics, draws attention to the power and pathology depictions of the female corpse have upon spectators. At the core of Bronfen's examination of the feminine corpse and its depiction in art and culture is her thesis:

> Narrative and visual representations of death, drawing their material from a common cultural image repertoire, can be read as symptoms of our culture. Furthermore, because the feminine body is culturally constructed as the superlative site of alterity, culture uses art to dream the deaths of beautiful women. Over representations of the dead feminine body, culture can repress and articulate its unconscious knowledge of death which it fails to foreclose even as it cannot express it directly. If symptoms are failed repressions, representations are the symptoms that visualise even as they conceal what is too dangerous to articulate openly but too fascinating to repress successfully. They repress by localising death away from the self, at the body of a beautiful woman, at the same time that this representation lets the repressed return, albeit in a disguised manner.[81]

The aestheticization of the female corpse is one seeped in European and gothic tradition - which, despite its pointed separation from bourgeois art, the Soviet Union still shares an artistic heritage with. Indeed, Victoria Bonnell discusses how even the first images of women in art after the Bolshevik Revolution followed in neoclassical tradition, specifically the French; Bolsheviks turned an aesthetic eye towards the Jacobin revolution for connections to the historical narrative of libraration against elites.[82] Though later changes to political art and propaganda reflected a state desire to make visual media more accessible across social classes, this continuity among allegorical symbols is vital in interpreting depictions of dead female combatants. On a society

---

[80] Ibid, 121.
[81] Bronfen, xi.
[82] Victoria E. Bonnell, "The Representation of Women in Early Soviet Political Art," *The Russian Review* 50, no. 3 (July 1991): 267–88, 270.

which had cultivated associations of 'freedom', 'truth' and 'Motherland' ('*svaboda', 'pravda'* and '*rodina*' all feminine words, and common allegories depicted as woman from early Bolshevik art onward) to a girl with long flowing hair and a dress, to see these figures echoed in war dead likely evoked strong emotions. Or they could be used to do so, if utilized correctly in propaganda.

Returning to Bronfen, she discusses an argument that she had with a fellow art historian over the questions of whether depicting death is in-itself a violence revisited upon the artistic subject. Rene Girad is quoted as stating "[death is] the worst violence that the human being is subjected to" in and of itself, the violence of transformation from subject to object. Bronfen's opponent posits that representations of dying - the act, rather than the result - are not violent, "because [the representation]...implies the safe position of a spectator ('voyeur') and because a fragmentation and idolisation of the body - i.e. a severing of the body from its real materiality and its historical context ("fetishism [sic]) - is always built into such images"). Yet in contrast, Bronfen argues that the depictions force a spectator into the crossroads between an "aesthetic and empathetic response" - forced to choose between treating the depicted body as the material it references, or as mere representation to be viewed with distance? Are we meant to mourn the woman as though we are placed at her physical deathbed, or are we meant to view a painting as a collection of symbols, subjects, and pigments? Or are we, as spectators, meant to do both?[83]

It is thus not irrelevant to discussion of the power the image of a dead woman conveys when turning the lens to the Soviet Union. Bronfen writes, "The feminine body appears as a perfect, immaculate aesthetic form because it is a dead body, solidified into an object of art. The

[83] Bronfen, 44-45.

aesthetically pleasing unity this corpse seems to afford draws added power from the fact that we know it is about to be cut into"[84]. Again, the subject-object confusion is addressed, and a woman's corpse transitions from an active agent into a piece that can be ascribed with meaning and temporal uncertainty. In a state of abjection, a corpse is uncanny - recognizable by kin and yet not - and a woman's corpse doubly so, for she ought to be desirable as a woman and yet is repulsive as a symbol of mortality.[85] If the female combatant in her boundary-blurring creates ontological confusion, then the corpse of a female combatant can be seen as the horror which threatens worldviews and one's understanding of themself. To quote Kristeva, "The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us".[86]

Notably still, Julia Kristeva brings in the possibility of sublimation in the face of abjection. In terms of warfare, women, and death, the corpse can come to represent ideals more heavenly and ideal. Again, looking to Bunk's analysis of women participants in the Spanish Civil War, "the revolutionaries used the youth and purity of female participants to demonstrate the moral and ideological superiority of their cause. ...Pro-revolutionary groups used images of motherhood and virginity…[which] portrayed the motivations of the insurrection and those who participated in it as morally pure, while those against the revolt became evil beings determined to

---

[84] Although in this quote Bronfen specifically refers to the painting *Der Anatom* by Gabriel von Max, the 'cutting into' can be taken as metaphor for all postmortem damage done by either autopsy or decomposition. Ibid, 5.
[85] Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1-6.
[86] Ibid, 4.

destroy all who opposed them, including women". Taken this way, a woman who dies and produces a corpse possesses the ability to link heaven to earth, the immortal to the moral, and the cause which produced her death indicative of Lacanian *jouissance.* The pain of death had been worth experiencing because of the pleasure felt by embodying an ideological life. Likewise, the conservative/right-wing response demonstrated they viewed these female participants as proof of their enemy's malevolence, who through their corruptive force caused women to turn away from motherhood and caregiving and become 'harpies and hyenas'.[87] The highly polarized ideologies of the Great Patriotic War made defense of one's country a statement of political allegiance, and identification as a soldier in that fight became both code and shorthand for the ideology itself.

Women, War Propaganda, and Beyond

Lisa Kirschenbaum points to the construction of Leningrad as a female entity - a body ravaged by Nazi aggression, filled with women and children and thus needing defense by the male frontline. She argues that this was the state's representation of the city during the time of the siege, which is complicated by the representation put forth by the state that Leningraders were "soldiers in civies".[88] This construction is a useful metaphor for showing how the Great Patriotic War blurred ontological separation between what were thought to be understood and unshakeable differences - the homefront and the frontline, the masculine and the feminine. Indeed Wingfield and Bucur write that these were equated with one another - while these definitions have been helpful insofar as they represented averaged experiences and ascribed

[87] Bunk, 120-121.
[88] Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, "'The Alienated Body': Gender Identity and the Memory of the Siege of Leningrad," in *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 220–34, 225.

gender norms and ideological expectations of the time, editors Wingfield and Bucur acknowledge that a need to problematize these divisions exist.[89] Kirschenbaum points out, gender differentiations blurred when, during the siege of Leningrad, the traditional 'women's work' of finding food and tending to the family became the task of any able-bodied survivor in the city, and that the corporality of starvation - the creation of an 'alienated body' - stripped people of the physical differentiations between man and woman.[90]

The women who entered into combat and the army also cast aside their femininity, and ceased to be 'true women'. A core takeaway from Svetlana Alexevich's seminal book *The Unwomanly Face of War* is that transformation which occurred among scores of Soviet female veterans who, upon returning home from war, were deemed unsuitable for marriage and had disgraced their family. Furthermore, it was not simply Russian or Slavic or Soviet gender norms that turned female combatants into non-women, for similar sentiments can be ascribed to the female combatants throughout the twentieth century from Ireland to Greece.[91] Thus, after the war, there was a necessity to re-establish these differences as part of the process of returning to 'normalcy' - showing that state socialism could transition from total war to functional peacetime. The Soviet Union responded to the supposed destruction of the gender binary[92] by returning to

---

[89] Wingfield and Bucur, 4.
[90] Kirschenbaum, 220.
[91] Bunk; Margaret Poulos Anagnostopoulou, "From Heroines to Hyenas: Women Partisans during the Greek Civil War," *Contemporary European History* 10, no. 3 Theme Issue: Gender and War in Europe c. 1918-1949 (November 2001): 481–501..
[92] Both Maria Bucur and Roger Markwick draw reference to the 'double helix' thesis of disruption and restoration of gender hierarchies put forth by Margaret and Patrice Higonnet. Quoting Markwick: "Wartime...in which male warriors monopolize combat while women are relegated to the home front…[is] a metaphorical 'double helix,in which the entwined strands of constructed manhood and womanhood revolve around each other, allowing women momentarily to displace men in industry but with the male strand of combat always prevailing". M. R

images of women as mothers, not as soldiers or victims; “In July 1944, the Soviet Union began its campaign to create iconic mothers, striking medals for the women who had given birth to large broods of healthy, surviving young. The ideal woman...was stern and provident, tough as a tank driver, the nurse and teacher of armies to come”.[93]

Catherine Merridale connects this initiative directly to the anger felt by men deployed, who suffered from resentment as letters from home told them of families collapsing, rapes and deaths and affairs, and took their anger at the destruction of their homelives out on women removed from their place. Merridale suggests that state initiatives on re-emphasizing motherhood and traditional Russian femininity were a pacifier to the ire of soldiers who felt that their sacrifice was not being rewarded with loyalty and a home, complete with housewife, to return to. [94] Quoting anthropologist Sharon MacDonald, Adrienne Harris explains that post-war Russia coped with the collective of women warriors in one of two ways - either by stressing their femininity and womanliness at the expense of her warrior qualities, or showing her as “unnatural”, something not completely female.[95] Furthermore, as per historian Anna Froula, “National narratives of masculinist war movies and stories rely on the erasure of women in order to identify ‘soldier’ as synonymous with ‘male’. Counter-narrating the gendered history of the military with its hypermasculine myths, training, folklore, and culture - especially with stories of women’s service - threatens the institution's role as an exclusively male rite of passage”.[96] In

---

Higonnet et al., eds., *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars* (New Haven) quoted in Markwick 2012, 2.
[93] Merridale, 316.
[94] Ibid, 316-317.
[95] Wendy MacDonald quoted in Harris 2010, 648.
[96] Anna Froula, “Free a Man to Fight: The Figure of the Female Soldier in World War II Popular Culture,” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 2, no. 2 (2009): 153–65, 154.

discussing the figure of the female soldier in American popular culture during World War II, Froula suggests that overtly feminizing women in uniform was to quash fears that a woman could become too 'mannish' - deviant and homosexual.[97] Therefore - "Wartime narratives that portrayed women at once as vital to the war effort and as indestructibly feminine and inextricably tied to the world of family and children drew on and substantially modified earlier representations of women in Soviet political art".[98]

To conclude and transition into more concrete analysis of the three chosen case studies, one final quote from an historian will sum up the oxymoronic dichotomy that can be considered the core of the power in a combative woman's image: "[the] weak, vulnerable woman fighting can be peculiarly powerful, harnessing the struggle of good against evil and the weak against the powerful, to the struggle of the nation against its enemies'."[99] Exemplified in *The Motherland Calls,* the statue which stands in memory of the battle of Stalingrad, is both mother and warrior, the nation embodied in feminine form, and protective of its children.

---

[97] Froula, 159.
[98] Kirschenbaum, 221.
[99] Wendy Bracewell, "Problems of Gender and Nationalism", ms., 1992, quoted in Barbara Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women's Movements in East Central Europe* (London and New York: Verso, 1993), 223.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Three individual women have been chosen to compare and contrast as case studies on the memory of female combatants within Soviet and post-Soviet sphere: Zoya Anatolyevna Kosmodemyanskaya, Manshuk Zhiengalikyzy Mametova, and Lyudmila Mikhailovna Pavlichenko (see Appendix A for pertinent biographical information). The choice of these three cases was based upon both similar and contrasting elements in their backgrounds, as well as the plethora of material in each of their biographies which has allowed them to exist as memory totems following their own deaths and/or the end of the war. All three women saw combat in the Great Patriotic War and were later made Heroes of the Soviet Union in recognition of their service, thus officially recognizing them and incorporating them into (supra)national narratives. All three were combatants - their primary wartime activity was killing, rather than medical or aviation services. For this reason, neither nurses nor the women of 588th Night Bomber Regiment will be featured in the analysis.

A number of differences exist between the three chosen cases to investigate how contrasts effect their mnemonic regimes. Only one, Pavlichenko, survived the war and was able to articulate her own experiences in a published memoir, serving as a subject active in shaping narratives around her. Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova both died in the war and could not actively influence how their narratives were presented. Two were Slavic - Pavlichenko born and raised in what is now present day Ukraine, and Kosmodemyanskaya in Tambov Oblast, and later Moscow - and one non-Slavic - Mametova, an ethnic Kazakh raised in what is now Almaty; these contrasts allow for a partial examination in to how overlapping identities may or may not affect the mnemonic practices. These differences were chosen in order to see how ethnic

differences may have influenced and compounded depictions during the Soviet Union and the successor states formed by the 'dominant' ethnicities in the former SSRs.

Material analyzed over the course of this study spans a wide temporal period and mediums, including memoirs, newspaper articles, statues, and film, both fictional and not. While disparate, this sampling attempts to show multiple different angles through which memorialization occurs, and the populations that produce them. A state-financed propagandistic telling of Zoya Kosmodemyanska's life must be read differently than an artist's painting of her death scene three years later, and yet similarities between them will show which characteristics have been widely disseminated among the population. The choice to use both fiction and nonfiction raises the question of what this study intends to analyze, and the answer to that is the representation of the female combatant in these mediums. If the portrayal and characteristics ascribed to her are consistent between fictionalized accounts and biographical materials, and between products aimed at different audiences at different points in time, then we can draw conclusions about what aspects of her rise to dominate the mnemonic regime surrounding her. It is precisely because a variety of disparate materials are analyzed that her place in collective memory can be identified and analyzed, instead of assuming that its shaped by the nature of the media (ie., film tropes, fictional archetypes, or memoir self-aggrandizing). That said, particular attention has been given to visual representations, based on their historic importance in shaping the Soviet consciousness.

Harking back to its uses by the Bolshevik government at the end of the revolutionary period, visual media presented the best means for educating and shaping the masses.[100] Drawing

[100] Bonnell, 267.

on Jay Winter's reasoning, that visual media - film, television, museums, etc. - is a "theatre of memory", a specific type of 'collective remembrance' - "understood as activities shared by collectives, groups of people in the public domain". These theatres are "spaces where those who were not there see the past not in terms of their own personal memoirs, but rather in terms of public representations of the memories of those who came before".[101] This does, however, come with the acknowledgement that films produced during state socialism only reached mass audiences after scrutiny and censorship by the state to ensure that they abided by official narratives. With this noted, I believe such films are still valuable as part of an analysis of mnemonic regimes, as while they may not represent 'free' artistic expression and critical looks at their subjects, as indicators of collective memory they provide evidence of what qualities and people were being emphasized by the state and imparted onto the collective.

Furthermore, though she writes on the topic of literature and its representation of women under state socialism, Barbara Einhorn succinctly identifies a conflict at the core of representing the female combatant to the post-Soviet generation; "...The shock of transition is currently muting this aspiration, reducing it for many to be the 'fear of freedom'. There is a desire to escape into compensatory models and images which might assuage the pain of the present. ...It is perhaps not so curious, then, that the current search for identity involves a retreat from unaccustomed complexity, a reaching out for the presumed simplicity of a past agrarian idyll."[102] If the war is a noted period of social upheaval, then the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and the

[101] Jay Winter, *Remembering War: The Great War Between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006)., 2.
[102] Einhorn, 217-218.

various challenges faced by post-Soviet states also serve as periods where, potentially, gender roles and depictions of women are altered.

Secondly, this study intends to be partly historiographical in nature as well, and trace the evolution or consistencies in history of Soviet women combatants using these three case studies. Still, while taking into account differences in how historians have approached female combatants and their role in the Soviet experience of the war, the main focus of the study is on fluctuations within memory culture concerning them. As such, historical writing, such as Lyuba Vinogradova's work on women of the Red Army is primarily treated as a product of its context, asking why in 2017 Vinogradova may speak about her subjects the way she does, and if it is consistent with how these women were discussed in 1989 or 1968. These are as treated examples of what Jonathan Brooks Platt called 'chronotropic hybridity' - pieces meant to reference and be representative of two distinct time periods/Bakhtinian chronotopes simultaneously.[103]

Use of memoirs[104] falls in line with the "peculiarly Soviet form of autobiography", which tended to receive memoirs as a recording of individual memories for distribution among the collective. These are personal narratives 'bearing witness' to events that readers would not have experienced, so that they would not be lost to subsequent generations or 'glossed over' by government accounts.[105] In the pattern established by Lenin's widow, N. K. Krupskaya, Soviet

---

[103] Jonathan Brooks Platt, "Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya between Sacrifice and Extermination," *New Formations*, 2016, 48–70, https://doi.org/10.398/newf:89/90.03.2016, 57-61.
[104] Throughout the essay I will use the term 'memoirs' or 'biography' in English, with an awareness that in Russian, the terms 'мемуарная литература' or 'документальная литература' are used instead. The connotation of 'literature' as containing literary elements and command of speech is lost in the English terms, and place greater emphasis on the documentary aspects of the work. Toby W. Clyman and Judith Vowles, eds., "Introduction," in *Russia Through Women's Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 19696), 6.
[105] Ibid, 7.

memoirs serve more as "testimonial narratives" or "sources of mass origin", produced by an individual that is still subsumed within the collective identity of Sovietism. Women's war memoirs in particular are, to borrow Roger Markwick's phrasing, "women worthies" - a type of instructional material to be read by other women in order for them to model their behavior after females who had achieved some great feat.[106] Furthermore, as Barbara Walker argues, the autobiographical experience of writing and selling memoirs are "ways that their authors, as participants in Russian culture, view the world: how they think of their past, and how they connect it to their present; how they believe that society should work and what they see as appropriate or ideal social, economic and political behavior"[107]. The two main memoirs used in this study are Lyudmila Pavlichenko's 2015 work - published in Russian as *Ya - snaiper. V boyax za Sevastopol i Odeccy*[108], and in English as *Lady Death: Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*, and Lybov Kosmodemyaskaya's 1953 work[109] *The Story of Zoya and Shura*[110].

The various films analyzed are meant to only serve as potentially more nuanced examples of female combatants; a statue is static and memoirs lack visuals and framings which can dramatically alter depictions and perceptions. Rather than trying to serve as feminist critiques or readings of the films, my interest remains firmly on how the films remain consistent or in

---

[106] Roger D. Markwick, "'A Sacred Duty': Red Army Women Veterans Remembering the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 54, no. 3 (2008): 403–20, 405.
[107] Barbara Walker, "On Reading Soviet Memoirs: A History of the 'Contemporaries' Genre as an Institution of Russian Intelligentsia Culture from the 1790s to the 1970s", *Russian Review*, 59 (July 2000): 327-352, quoted in Markwick 2008, 420.
[108] Russian: *Я - снайпер: В боях за Севастополь и Одессу*
[109] While not explicitly a memoir in that it is an author writing about themselves in a documentary fashion, it is a mother writing about her two children in a documentary way, and I believe the term can still be applied to the work. Important distinctions between the author's self-referencing and L. Kosmodemyanskaya's work will be discussed as appropriate.
[110] Russian: *Повест за Зоя и Шура*

contrast to other theaters of memory. Particularly as film has always been set upon a pedestal in the Russian-speaking world, and the versions of female combatants they show audiences will, in many ways, speak the loudest to them.

Chapter 3: Case Studies

Lyudmila Pavlichenko

In many ways it is best to begin an analysis with Lyudmila Pavlichenko for in both literal and figurative terms, she served as a poster-girl for the women of the Red Army. Still credited as the highest scoring female sniper of all time, as a historical figure Pavlichenko remains of interest to military and cultural historians, especially after the publication of her memoirs. However, as a mnemonic figure, Pavlichenko has not had the same echo that other Soviet female combatants have managed to produce; while still discussed and mentioned, her name has not managed to generate the same symbolic energy as her contemporaries, like Kosmodemyanskaya, due to a lack of ability to be adaptable to narratives over time. Her survival through the war may drive the inflexibility in her depictions, or her lack of salience as a mnemonically symbolic figure. These elements that have not made her as prominent a mnemonic figure despite the aberration of a highly skilled female sniper are worthwhile to identify before embarking on analyses of others.

During the 1940s, Pavlichenko was the subject of propaganda and journalism expected to show the Soviet Army in the best possible light, capable of producing soldiers of uniquely high caliber in skill and motivation. Her success in battle early in the war meant that she could quickly be identified and used by Party apparati in public relations at home and abroad. When looking at articles written about and discussing her, two main traits stand out as being frequently connected to Pavlichenko - her physical appearance, and her sniping skills. Her appearance is further

broken down into two distinct elements, being her youth and her attractiveness/femininity, which Pavlichenko herself attributes as part of what made her a useful agent in war propaganda. A 1942 pamphlet published by the USSR People's Navy Commissariat (later republished in *Izvestiya*) includes the following description:

> The wind rustled her close cropped fluffy hair, which seemed as soft as that of a child. A silken lock of hair fluttered over her clear, prominent maiden's brow. Her delicate, nervous face breathed with an expression of impetuous instability, of a profound passion of character. ...But after a minute [her eyes] lit up with a certain *joie de vivre* [sic], with such a child-like transparency, that they illuminated everything around.[111]

Twenty-six at the time, Pavlichenko was hardly old, but the repeated description of her child-like attributes suggest either someone much younger or someone with much less intelligence (a fact that she herself seemed to have taken umbrage with). Instead, this description does illicit a specific sadness that such a childlike person would be sent out to war, and that her marksmanship is reminiscent of a prodigy, which even seventy years later is still discussed in such terms.[112] However, it was not the dominant take on her, as other articles and descriptions of her take the opposite approach. Instead of depicting a child, they describe her as an Amazon:

> On 29 August 1942, many newspapers reprinted a brief report to the effect that,
>
> Twenty-six-year-old Lieutenant Lyudmila Pavlichenko, a bewitching warrior princess who has the highest individual score among the best snipers of the Red Army, yesterday did two things she could never have imagined when, a few weeks ago, during the defence [sic] of Sevastopol, she shot her 309th fascist.
>
> 1) She arrived in Washington, becoming the first Amazon of the Red Army to visit the capital of the United States.
> 2) She spent the night at the White House as a guest of President Roosevelt and America's First Lady.

---

[111] B.A. Lavrenyov, "Lyudmila Pavlichenko", (USSR People's Navy Commissariat*,* 1945), quoted Pavlichenko, 169-170
[112] Pregler, x-xi.

Miss Pavlichenko has been awarded the Order of Lenin and wounded on four occasions."[113]

The warrior-princess approach aligns more with the emphasis upon her hatred of Germans and her body count she herself puts forth in memoirs, and is echoed in different publications; "With her rifle Lyudmila Pavlichenko wiped out 309 Germans at Odessa and Sevastopol. 'This is the right and proper attitude to adopt towards the Germans. If you don't kill them at once, you'll have no end of trouble,' she once wrote to her mother".[114] When materials were either directly quoting her or written from her perspective, this aspect appears to be more prominent. Commentary on her appearance and youth were more dominant in others' descriptions of her, as most evident in her interactions with English-language press while in the United States. Questions directed at her concerned makeup and fashion, while her answers emphasized the conditions in Russia or her wartime activities.[115] "As Pavlichenko toured the United States, many American servicemen cautioned their sisters, sweethearts and daughters 'not' to enlist in the military"[116]. Abroad, she was used to stir the pot in America, which was then able to be transported back into the USSR as evidence of capitalism's flaws - their focus on materialism by directing questions about fashion to a war hero, their unwillingness to let able-bodied women do patriotic duties, and America's ignorance of the struggle the Soviets had been facing for one long and bloody year. Several of the most oft-repeated lines from her time in

---

[113] "Guerrilla queen at Washington", *Press and Journal,* 29 August 1924, quoted in Vinogradova, 34-35.
[114] Pavlichenko, 171.
[115] Pavlichenko, 185-186; "Lyudmila Pavlichenko 'Lady Death': History's Deadliest Female Sniper" (AETN UK, 2020), https://www.history.co.uk/article/lyudmila-pavlichenko-lady-death-historys-deadliest-female-sniper.
[116] J. Holm, *Women in the Military: An Unfinished Revolution* (revised edition), (New York: Presidio, 1992), quoted in Froula, 156.

the United States are rebukes of American journalists - sharp-tongued critiques, and assurances that "in Russia there are no parades at the moment" - frequently portrayed in the black-and-white narrative one expects is clouded by Cold War mentality looking back.[117]

The result of many of these newspaper and pamphlet descriptions is to highlight a discrepancy between what people wanted out of Pavlichenko and what she as an active agent wished to convey. Both Soviet and American press in directing their attention to her youth, dress, and grooming tried to put her in the framework of women at the time. In contrast, Pavlichenko had been through two major sieges and nearly two full years of frontline experiences, away from any role other than a soldier. Throughout her memoirs, she is determined to speak on her military experience rather than her experience as a woman in military; most indicative is that the Russian title of her memoirs *Ya - snaiper. V boyax za Sevastopol i Odeccy* lacks any indicator that it would have been written by a woman, while the translators' choice is to ascribe the book, and her words, by the moniker "Lady Death". Her absence of reaffirming feminine gender roles should not be taken as 'feminist', or an attempt to dismantle stereotypes about what a woman would be capable of, but like Adrienne Harris points to in her analysis of Yulia Drunina's[118] wartime poetry, a lack of affirmation does not equate a negation, and there is a complexity in identities that Pavlichenko occupies. Woman enough to not reject portrayals of beauty - only childishness - but aligning with soldiers and veterans with whom she shared her experience.[119] In this sense, Pavlichenko's experiences as conveyed through her memoirs reflect Anna Krylova's findings on non-oppositional gender cooperation. More notable, however, is the real lack of an

[117] Pavlichenko, 180-189.
[118] Yulia Vladimirovna Drunina (1924 - 1991)
[119] Harris, "Yulia Drunina", 649.

individual/subjective presence. In her accounts of Sevastopol, for example, one feels the narrative distance as if reading a novel with an omniscient narrator through its frequent citations from other soldiers or Tolstoy. While these give the account an authoritative weight, they are not the personal reflections one would anticipate in a memoir, particularly of a highly charged event.

Pavlichenko's memoirs read as a restrained and uncontroversial account of her wartime activities, supplemented with excerpts from others' journals, newspapers, and official publications to add to the veracity of her observations and experiences. They do not deviate from the official regime; when Pavlichenko observes that "nobody saw anything romantic" in sniping, or that she bristled against a particular characterization of herself, they are not critiques against any higher authority but harmless, non confrontational notes on culture or against individuals. Read against the text, then, it is evident that Pavlichenko knew how to navigate party politics and use her wartime celebrity to secure a stable future for herself and family. Following the war's end, Pavlichenko had a career in academia - proving Maria Bucur's words that memoirs, while "an exercise in self-representation and [...] a clear form of recollection, situating the personal experience presumably in the center of the narrative. … It does not, however, provide a global picture of wartime experience, because all the authors tend to be relatively well, if not highly, educated and to come from urban areas. Therefore, what follows is an evocative rather than comprehensive analysis of the personal experience of the war".[120] Pavlichenko, a professor, would have fallen into that category of highly educated; similarly, as a trained historian, she tries to present events objectively, with frequent quotations from others' journals and letters, and newspaper articles and pamphlets included wholecloth with minimal commenting on her

[120] Bucur, 174.

emotional reaction to them. Minimal time is spent on her family life and upbringing, and descriptions of school-life are kept to a bare minimum, in contrast to memoirs such as Yulia Zhukova's[121], which firmly centers the events as *her* subjective experiences and responses. One walks away with the impression that Pavlichenko did not deviate from the official regime - mnemonically or politically; there are no suggestions of someone caught up in a storm or thrust into a spotlight unwillingly, but of a soldier who knew their duty from the moment of the war's announcement and, at most, didn't like to be spoken down to by those who weren't on the field with her. In short, her memoirs remind of Alexevich's anecdote about the husband and wife who both served. The official *History of the Great Patriotic War* did not allow for 'feminized' emotional accounts, and Pavlichenko kept this perception in mind. Ironically, her subjective experiences have, in her memoirs, been rendered as objectively as possible.

Moving forward in time to a 1969 collection of essays on heroes of the Soviet Union published by *Politizdat*, Pavlichenko's section again repeatedly emphasizes her abilities as a sniper above all else - from sections placing the reader in battle alongside her division and her position, to quotes about her later training of snipers: "The newspaper of the Primorye army reported: "Comrade Pavlichenko perfectly studied the habits of the enemy and mastered sniper tactics... Almost all the prisoners captured at Sevastopol speak with a sense of animal fear about our super-sharp shooters: "We have been suffering the most losses recently from the bullets of Russian snipers.""[122] The only exception to this description comes near the end of the essay, in

---

[121] Yulia Konstantinovna Zhukova (1926 -) was a sniper and junior sergeant whose memoirs *Girl With a Sniper Rifle* (Russian: *Девушка со снайперской винтовкой)* were published in 2006.

[122] "На слете снайперов Павличенко рассказала о том, как в самой сложной обстановке удается ей обучать товарищей снайперскому делу. Она не скрывала от своих учеников ни риска, ни особой опасности своей военной профессии. В апреле на снайперском слете ей

an interesting, almost accidental-feeling, observation on the differences between her self-perception and the perception others' had of her:

> Performing tasks and in short hours of respite, Pavlichenko continued to work with young snipers. The young woman considered herself an old man. However, all who remained in the ranks, having started their military path from the very beginning of the war, rightfully considered themselves old fighters.... Gray streaks appeared in the black hair of this extraordinarily beautiful woman, whose soulful face was well known throughout the country. There were correspondences about her in the Central press — her courage, experience, and self-control helped thousands of people to put out what seemed unbearable.[123]

The conflict between 'considering herself an old man' while others saw an 'extraordinarily beautiful woman' is one whose implications are much heavier than the description would suggest. When participation in war leaves one stripped of gender, dehumanized by combat, the gap widens between how the verteran-subject views themselves versus how outsiders will see them.

Moving from written publications to monuments, there is a notable absence of statues to Pavlichenko despite her wartime celebrity. There are memorial signs dedicated to her in Odessa

---

был вручен диплом. Газета Приморской армии сообщала: «Товарищ Павличенко отлично изучила повадки врага и овладела снайперской тактикой... Почти все пленные, захваченные под Севастополем, с чувством животного страха говорят о наших сверхметких стрелках: «Больше всего потерь мы несем последнее время от пуль русских снайперов».” Л Руднева, “Людмила Павличенко,” Роль Женщин в великой отчественной воине, n.d., http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/11/i80_128.htm.

[123] “Выполняя задания и в короткие часы передышек, Павличенко продолжала заниматься с молодыми снайперами. Себя молодая женщина считала уже старичком. Впрочем, все, кто оставался в строю, начав свой воинский путь с самого начала войны, по праву считали себя старыми бойцами. Так оно и было. День здесь был равен месяцу, иногда году. Седые прядки появились в черных волосах этой необыкновенно красивой женщины, чье одухотворенное лицо хорошо знала вся страна. О ней появлялись корреспонденции в центральной прессе — ее мужество, опыт, выдержка помогли тысячам людей выдюжить то, что казалось невыносимым.”
Ibid.

and Sevastopol, but no different to those one sees throughout the former Soviet Union indicating a person of note is associated with the building (see Figure 1). The largest and most prominent monument she is associated with to is the Monument to the Second Siege of Sevastopol, constructed in 1967, but it is not dedicated to her individually but rather to all those who defended the city in 1941. Her name is listed on the memorial wall beneath the abstract stone figure carved in typical Soviet brutalist fashion. The absence of individualized statues or monuments can be attributed to the fact that she did not die in the war, and there was a lack of urgent need to create the proxy-corpse to honor her memory - for a direct counter to Pavlichenko is Nina Onilova[124], who has a specific statue erected in her individual memory in Odessa, a site separate from her gravestone (see Figure 2). At the time of the construction of the Second Siege of Sevastopol's monument, Pavlichenko was also alive; it would not be a stretch to assume that she, alongside other surviving veterans of the siege, would have been there to commemorate its completion.

The most significant challenge to Pavlichenko to emerge in post-Soviet discourse surrounding her biography is the veracity of her kill count, though suspicions had been present since the war period. In the foreword to the English edition of her memoirs, Martin Pregler rather aggressively puts forth the claim that her memoir "sets the record straight about much of the of the ill-founded criticism and inaccurate writing that has been subsequently aimed at her, particularly suggestions that she was not a sniper at all, but the product of the Red Army propaganda machine".[125] Doubt dogs articles and mentions of Pavlichenko in recent times,

[124] Nina Andreyvna Onilova (1921 - 1942)
[125] Martin Pregler, "Foreword," in *Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*, by Lyudmila Pavlichenko (Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), ix–xiii, ix.

although there are those who claim that the rumors against her originated within the Soviet armed forces during the years of her service. Journalist Natalia Antonova, whose grandfather served in the Red Army not with but contemporaneously to Pavlichenko, writes, "my grandfather blamed the persistent rumor that Pavlichenko was a fraud on male resentment. There was also the fact that Pavlichenko repeatedly rebuffed the advances of her superior officers, which only furthered that resentment".[126] This connects to the impression left on historians such as Catherine Merridale that a primary push of women in the Red Army was to humiliate and inspire men to do more; the reverse effect, naturally, would be that women would become the targets of resentment and anger as a result of feelings of male inadequacy. If combined with Pavlichenko's sexual unavailability to powerful men, it is unsurprising that out of anger, some may have looked for ways to discredit her success and notoriety.

Lyuba Vinogradova, rather abruptly after describing Palichenko in her history on the women of the Soviet sniper corps, turns critical of the veracity of Pavlichenko's fame and exploits:

> Why did this woman, about whom, until the fall of Sevastopol, nobody knew anything, become famous so precipitately? Was it because the top brass, who until then had overlooked her spectacular successes in battle, suddenly came to their senses? ...Why did Pavlichenko almost never show off her shooting skills during her tour of America? In his memoirs, [Vladimir] Pchelintsev writes that, wherever they went, people could not wait to see how well the Red Army snipers could shoot. ...Pchelintsev only once mentions Lyudmila shooting during the visit, and describes her performance as "slapdash".[127]

---

[126] Natalia Antonova, "The Life and Myths of Lyudmila Pavlichenko, Soviet Russia's Deadliest Sniper" (The World, March 9, 2018), https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-03-09/life-and-myths-lyudmila-pavlichenko-soviet-russias-deadliest-sniper.

[127] Vinogradova, 43-45.

She casts doubt on the authenticity of Pavlichenko's 'sniper record book', and even discusses the destruction of all records of the Maritime Army, with which Pavlichenko had served, so that no contemporary documentation of her tally or her name as a sniper attached to her regiment exists. "Almost all we know about her is based on her own words, which are full of contradictions".[128] Pavlichenko is not the only figure to receive such criticisms and suspicions; Roza Shanina[129], another well-known sniper who perished during the war, is also a subject of suspicion in Vinogradova's biography. The author goes into detail about idiosyncrasies in Roza's diaries to portray her as someone who kept coded accounts of love affairs, was not satisfied merely being a sniper due to its lack of adventure and danger, wrote poems whose shallow substance was reflective of a lack of life experience, and ultimately asking if women like Shanin and Pavlichenko were patriots or "madwomen out for glory".[130] As mentioned earlier, Pavlichenko appeared not only to be aware of these rumors against her but tried to refute them - a privilege afforded to her by survival, as she can herself become a mnemonic warrior in the debate around her. However ultimately, the suspicion is not enough to remove Pavlichenko's inclusion from Vinogradova's books on Soviet heroines, nor has it risen to the level of national debate - even in Ukraine, Pavlichenko's birthplace, where mnemonic debates with warriors on both sides have seemed to seize on any figure of note.

If there is proof that Pavlichenko's biography has not become the stuff of a contested collective memory it is that she has become a footnote in Ukrainian mnemonic regimes, even as

---

[128] Ibid, 47.
[129] Roza Georgiyevna Shanina (1924-1945) was a senior sergeant credited with fifty-nine confirmed kills and perished in East Prussia late in the war. Her wartime diary survives today and has seen publication in both Russian and English.
[130] Ibid, 208-220.

other wartime heroes and heroines are either Ukrainized or Russified. Despite usage in social media memes associated with right-wing extreme nationalists in Ukraine and among rebel groups in Donbass, Pavlichenko has not emerged as a polarizing figure in larger mnemonic discourse surrounding Ukraine, the Soviet Union, and the Second World War.[131] In discussion of contemporary Ukrainian war memory and women's roles in World War II, Kateryna Kobachenko the country's Institute of National Remembrance and their projects that attempts to highlight specific women from the Ukrainian SSR or of Ukrainian heritage - from which Pavlichenko is largely absent.[132] Presuming this could be a result of her connection to the Soviet state, Kobachenko corrects that, stating that, "the Soviet heroes of World War II who were not involved in Soviet crimes and had a connection with Ukraine remain among the officially recognized heroes of modern Ukraine [sic]."[133] As an example, she points to the success of the 2015 dramatized biography of Pavlichenko which was released in Russian and Ukrainian theaters.

Titled *Battle for Sevastopol* in Russia and *Indestructible*[134] in Ukraine, the film was a joint effort by both countries; despite the timing of the film's release, it was able to achieve

---

[131] Amandine Regamey, "Falsehood in the War in Ukraine: The Legend of Women Snipers," *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Socities*, no. 17 (2016): 1–29.
[132] "'ВІЙНА НЕ РОБИТЬ ВИНЯТКІВ. ЖІНОЧІ ІСТОРІЇ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ'. ІНФОРМАЦІЙНІ МАТЕРІАЛИ ДЛЯ ЗМІ ДО ВШАНУВАНЬ 8-9 ТРАВНЯ 2016 РОКУ," Український Інститут Національної Пам'яті, 2020 2016, https://old.uinp.gov.ua/news/viina-ne-robit-vinyatkiv-zhinochi-istorii-drugoi-svitovoi-informatsiini-materiali-dlya-zmi-do-v?q=news/viina-ne-robit-vinyatkiv-zhinochi-istorii-drugoi-svitovoi-informatsiini-materiali-dlya-zmi-do-v.
[133] Kateryna Kobchenko, "Women's Faces of Ukrainian Contemporary Memory of World War II as Exemplified by Kyiv Urban Space," Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation, May 15, 2020, https://ua.boell.org/en/2020/05/15/zhinochi-oblichchya-suchasnoi-pamyati-ukrainciv-pro-drugu-svitovu-viynu-na-prikladi
[134] Ukrainian: *Незламна*.

financial success[135] , a fact that its director, Sergey Mokritskiy, attributes to the film's lack of a "clear ideological component".[136] By choosing to follow Pavlichenko and her personal relationships instead of any larger national narrative, the film attempts to appeal to audiences on both sides of a mnemonic binary. It presupposes that Pavlichenko is exceptional and noteworthy out of a fear that showing how Soviet culture and/or institutions shaped her into a legendary sniper would be perceived by its international audience. Looking at it as how Pavlichenko is remembered and portrayed to a cross-cultural collective is where the film becomes difficult to pin down, as there are nearly three distinct versions of her seen throughout the film's two-hour run time - her pre-war, while in battle, and during her time in the United States. Furthermore, much of her characterization is done in contrast to or via her relationship to others, particularly men, and especially due to the three distinct love interests she has throughout the film. This splitting of her characterization and relationship is emblematic of what Kubik and Bernhard refer to as a a "fractured regime" surrounding Pavlichenko as a historical figure; despite the wealth of evidence about her as a historical figure, she lacks a codified mnemonic narrative, and so the film attempts to portray her in multiple ways at once rather than in the one unified light which

[135] Box office results worldwide at $9,054,676, in Russia at RUB 435,468,256 ($8,702,274), in Ukraine at UAH 14 million (approx. $530,000). "Ukrainian Film Heads the Top-10 Weekend Box Office in Ukraine," Ukraine Crisis Media Center, August 9, 2017, https://uacrisis.org/en/60164-ukrainian-film-heads-top-10-weekend-box-office-ukraine.

[136] The film has one particular scene where, at a press conference in America, Pavlichenko is confronted by a Russian dissident and asked to answer about the Finnish war, Soviet aggression, and "what they are doing to your own people", but the press conference is concluded before Pavlichenko can answer and thus, have any potentially-controversial statement attributed to her. The film never returns to this plot point or mentions the dissident again; Kobchenko, "Women's Faces of Ukrainian Contemporary Memory of World War II as Exemplified by Kyiv Urban Space."

audiences would know her best. The element that stands out as most consistent through her portrayal is her exceptional sniping skills.

By presenting scenes out of order chronologically, the film shows these three different versions of Pavlichenko overlapping one another but not in harmony with each other. The connection between these iterations is the exceptionalism others see in her - repeatedly, people of note call her "special", "unique", capable of "outfighting" both the men and the best sniper in the German army. Pre-war, viewers are shown Pavlichenko as a serious-minded student attempting to receive praise from her emotionally distant and withholding father, an NKVD officer and veteran of the Civil War who is chastised by his wife for "all her life you were making a boy out of [Lyudmila]". Her first time at a shooting range - where the teacher is still walking her through how to load bullets into the gun - she achieves first place in a marksmanship contest, and is singled out in school to participate in a six-month shooting program as a result. During the war, she is repeatedly said to be preternaturally skilled in the arts of war, a soldier of note to both generals and her commanding officer, with whom she wishes to pursue a relationship but he holds back. Finally, in her time in America, Eleanor Roosevelt takes a particular interest in Pavlichenko - first out of a "want to understand her as a woman" by having her stay in the White House (when "no other Soviet citizen ever been invited" there before), and then in a maternal way, as they are shown cooking together, sharing cultural customs, and Roosevelt comforts Pavlichenko during episodes of PTSD and derision by her Soviet handler. The result, rather than showing Lyudmila at different stages of her life and how the war impacts her, presents an almost schizophrenic view of Pavlichenko, unable to decide if she is serious, someone out for the competition of shooting and for glory in battle, or emotionally battered by the war. This is

compounded by how little Pavlichenko as a character speaks, and as an audience we are left understanding a throughline of her motivations. Instead, the most viewers see is the effect she has on those around her - particularly, her love interests.

While Roger Markwick remarks that "sexual relations between *frontoviki* and *frontovichki* undoubtedly has been one of the silences in the historical and private writing about the Fatherland War", *Battle for Sevastopol* places romance at the forefront.[137] The film gives her three distinct love interests over the film's run time - a Jewish doctor named Boris, her commanding officer Makarov, and a sniper based on her second husband Kitsenko[138] - who are listed both in order of introduction but in the level of attachment Lyudmila feels towards them. Her two closer relationships are with fellow soldiers, with whom she has both playfully competitive and philosophically meaningful relationships, culminating in a sex scene and the implication that Kitsenko is the father of her child. It avoids any mention of her first real husband and Rotislav Pavlichenko's father - instead, making Pavlichenko her father's surname as well, and so that Lyudmila is unmarried/virginal when she leaves for the front. Each of these men sees greatness in Pavlichenko and is motivated by her - love for her drives Boris to serve as a frontline doctor, Makarov makes sure that his gun and final words make their way to her, and Kitsenko and she have intercourse in the beseiged Sevastopol, having found in each other a reason to fight. The decision to add romance to a war film likely broadens the appeal, but also significantly feminizes Pavlichenko, showing her as the object of care and suggesting that her survival is due to these men looking out for her - a view which is especially reinforced by the ending, where Boris gives up his evacuation pass so that Lyudmila can escape Sevastopol and he

[137] Markwick 2008, 417.
[138] Alexei Kitsenko in life, while his film counterpart is named Leonid Kitsenko.

can die instead of her. Her relationships with Makarov and Kitsenko are suggestive of her relationship with her father - she pursues Makarov despite his attempts to deny her, in a similar way to how her father denied her attention at the film's start. Notably, while all three men die in the war, the audience never sees their deaths or bodies on screen. Aside from the Germans which Pavlichenko - sometimes quite sadistically - kills, Morkritskiy's *Battle for Sevastopol* is a war film light on depictions of corpses.

Perhaps the most telling scene in the film, however, is not with any of these men, but after Kitsenko is killed and Pavlichenko is brought to a hospital. When the Germans report that she has also been killed in battle, a propagandist and his photographers arrive and override doctor's orders to have Pavlichenko marked unfit for combat due to injury. "Pavlichenko is not just a soldier anymore. With this, she becomes a symbol" says the propagandist, announcing too that more Germans will be arriving and that his men "will be going to battle with her name on their lips". Even her falsely reported death catapults her into usefulness. As will be seen in later sections, the surviving veteran presented less opportunity for imagination in memory than the wartime dead could.

Pavlichenko survived the war which meant, unlike Onilova or many other women, she could not be canonized as a martyr; rather, what was emphasized was her capacity to kill and her skill with a gun.[139] What this meant is that when the war was over, her most noteworthy trait - being a sniper - could not be repurposed for peacetime. She even admits so herself - the title for the final chapter of her memoirs translates to "I am sidelined!", and contains lamentations about how the sniper's 'art' was being phased out of emphasis by the Ministry of Defence in favor of

[139] Ibid, 206.

atomic bombs. When the most consistently remembered element of her life is her preternatural marksmanship, it then becomes understandable why the film - and, at large, her mnemonic regime - fails to present a unified character. Instead it begins to rely on an amalgamation of various other traits attributed to female combatants and Soviet girl-heroines - romance, trying to live up to paternal expectations, an ideal student and Soviet citizen, and a desired return to girlhood and femininity subsumed by war - in order to present a figure that its audiences could recognize.[140] While Lyudmila Pavlichenko's memoirs show a personal adherence to official narratives and regimes, failing to deviate, she as a mnemonic figure lacks cohesion enough to stand out from other female combatants, and is blended into the archetype created by those girls who died during the war.

[140] Tippner.

Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya

If Lyudmila Pavlichenko can be considered the poster-child of women in the Red Army, then Kosmodemyanskaya is the model against which all female combatants are measured. Zoya - "Tanya" as she was first known to Soviet press - was among the first partisans who had their tragic end known throughout the country, and among the few whose biographies were most extensively fleshed out in the public eye. Thus she served in a real sense as the 'archetype' of the female war hero - and as the "gestalt" for wartime dead girls to stand against the victim imagery.[141] Kosmodemyanskaya was one of the martyrs with whom every Soviet soldier became familiar - transcending national and ethnic bounds to form the core of a Soviet pantheon of war heroes.[142] From the moment of her death, images of her began to circulate and be compounded upon, entering into the collective unconscious of the wartime public. Much of the power afforded to her story and memory can be crystallized down to a single instance - not her death itself, but the photographs of her corpse, which became widely seen by the Soviet public (see Figure 3). While photographs of her execution were found on the corpse of a German officer in Smolensk in 1943 the photograph of her corpse cut down from the noose after suffering weeks of decay was taken by S.N. Strunnikov in January of 1942. It's publication in *Pravda,* accompanied by an essay by Pyotr Lidov, was people's main exposure to Zoya and her death.[143] The visual horror of her

[141] Tippner, 371
[142] Roberto J. Carmack, "History and Hero-Making: Patriotic Narratives and the Sovietization of Kazakh Front-Line Propaganda, 1941-1945," *Central Asian Survey* 33, no. 1 (2014): 95–112, 103
[143] Pyotr Lidov. "Partizanskaya Tania". "Pioneer" newsletter. January–February 1942

corpse could be then paired with a number of different significances, and Kosmodemyanskaya's memory buckles under the variants in symbolism and significance attributed to it.

While initially introduced as 'Tanya', a pseudonym to an otherwise unknown partisan, this initial anonymity meant that both speculation and imagination could create whatever people needed or wanted. Recalling Breev and Kristeva, the Soviet press and *Pravda* readers knew nothing about the girl when confronted with the abject image of her postmortem photograph. She could have been anyone - and more poignantly, anyone's daughter, anyone's sister. While in this state of horror at the adjective image and the simultaneous empathic response her mysterious identity would produce, it did not matter who Tanya really was for her to be the everyman mourned as a proxy for the untold dead in that first year of war. Helpful in this interpretation are the closing lines to Lidov's essay, which initially accompanied the photograph's print - and, as Platt mentions, were printed directly opposite of Strunnikov's photograph:

> Tanya was buried without honors, outside the village, under a weeping birch, and a blizzard blew the grave mound. And soon came those for whom Tanya in the dark December nights made her way to the west with her chest.
>
> Having stopped for a halt, the fighters will come here to bow to her ashes to the ground and say sincere Russian thanks to her. And to the father and mother, who gave birth to and raised the heroine; and the teachers who raised her; and comrades who strengthened her spirit.
>
> And the unfading glory will spread about her all over the Soviet land, and millions of people will think with love about the distant snow-covered grave, and Stalin will mentally come to the tombstone of his faithful daughter.[144]

---

[144] Russian: "Таню похоронили без почестей, за деревней, под плакучей березой, и вьюга завеяла могильный холмик. А вскоре пришли те, для кого Таня в тёмные декабрьские ночи грудью пробивала дорогу на запад. / Остановившись для привала, бойцы приедут сюда, чтобы до земли поклониться её праху и сказать ей душевное русское спасибо. И отцу с матерью, породившим на свет и вырастившим героиню; и учителям, воспитавшим её; и товарищам, закалившим её дух. / И немеркнущая слава разнесется о ней по всей

Eventually the partisan was identified as Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya and the symbolism easily switched when both state and public had a key actor to dispel questions about the girl - her own mother, Lybov Timofeena Kosmodemyanskaya. She wrote a pamphlet in 1942 titled "My Daughter Zoya", which served as the basis for expanded memoirs later titled *The Story of Zoya and Shura* and published in 1953. These writings allowed readers into the interior of a grieving mother - to individualize and contextualize her mortem photographs to the collective, so that the Soviet public could not only grieve Zoya's loss as a Russian woman killed by a foreign enemy, but be allowed to mourn her the same way the private family was.[145] They are one of the few depictions of Zoya outside of the official mnemonic regime in that more of the focus is upon Zoya's childhood and family life; in showing this perspective, however, what is reinforced to readers is the life and normalcy lost because of the war and her murder. They contain what claim to be first-hand witness accounts to Zoya's death via a fellow female partisan, which reads as both consolations to a grieving mother and a prophecy for what was to come of Zoya postmortem:"I have no words to console you with. I realize that the words do not exist that could console you in your grief. But I want to tell you this: the memory of Zoya will never die, it cannot die. She lives among us. She will arouse others to the struggle."[146]

советской земле, и миллионы людей будут с любовью думать о далёкой заснеженной могилке, и Сталин мысленно придёт к надгробию своей верной дочери." Ibid.

[145] A note on the textuality of the photographs of Zoya's death. Noting, however, the relative newness of photograph as an art form and of mass newspapers in the 1940s Soviet Union, it's likely that a large amount of readers would be exposed to photographed death for the first time via this publication, and the empathic effect of such would be difficult to find comparison for.

[146] Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, *The Story of Zoya and Shura*, trans. Mike Bessler (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/story-zoya-shura/index.htm, "Klava's Story".

In this sense it seems that Zoya was able to enter the collective imagination at the instance of her death - but also instantly used as a tool to motivate the sympathetic to the war cause. This effect was compounded upon by the immediacy of material released about Zoya - the 1942 pamphlet, a film about her partisan activities and capture was released in 1944, and the 1953 publication of Lybov's memoirs all served to keep her daughter's name and image fresh in the collective's memory.[147] Rather than fading into the periphery, these repetitions would further reinforce the importance of Zoya's sacrifice and name. The effort came both from the top-down and the bottom-up as Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, after her children's death, championed their memory through public appearances and open letters. This extended after the war's end as well. She would make appearances at monuments to Zoya and give speeches about her daughter on anniversaries and Party events.[148] A notable moment is when she wrote an open letter to Elizabeth Moos, an American peace activist, in 1949 invoking Zoya's name and the image of her death as an anti-war measure:

> Let the image of my Zoya, shouting words of truth under the gallows with the noose around her neck, give you the strength to face any persecutions and help you, even when threatened by the notorious un-American activities committee, to tell your people the truth, and to demand peace and democracy.
> …
> I am sending you an old photograph of my Zoya and Alexander, in the hope that the image of my children, who gave their young lives for the happiness of all mankind, will inspire you in the struggle against war and fascism.[149]

---

[147] The text of the pamphlet was later reproduced in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on 21 May, 1942. http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/articles/1942/ycl-pravda.htm; http://www.gammacloud.org/features/zoya/gallery/Pages/1.html

[148] https://img.gazeta.ru/files3/941/10383941/upload-15-pic905v-895x505-79673.jpg; https://www.orel.kp.ru/daily/26677/3700292/

[149] https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b286-i012

This connection between both Zoya and her brother to wider anti-fascist and peacetime appeals is not a particularly repeated motif in her depictions. Neither is the connection between Zoya and her brother as *both* victims of Nazism. While Lybov ties both of her children together - their deaths connected events and part of a larger tragedy rather than individual losses in isolated incidents - Aleksandr Kosmodemyansky has not had the same long-lasting impact as his sister has had upon the Soviet and Russian consciousness. His tomb also stands in Novodevichy Cemetery, but it lacks the same large-scale memorial statue that his sister's does, and there are few sites dedicated specifically to his memory.[150] A number of possibilities stand as to why Shura was disconnected from his sister in mnemonic culture. Aleksandr died in April 1945, close to the conclusion of the war, and as a commander of an artillery regiment rather than as a volunteer partisan. His death, while tragic, is that of another young man in the service of his country - expected to a population which had grown numb to young men dying. Finally too, it is possible to turn to Arkadii Nedel and his essay on the metaphysics of childhoods under Stalinism - "the cultural value that is attributed to the dead child in Soviet ideology and concludes that, in death, the gender differences that are otherwise underplayed become important again".[151] Both of Lybov's children and their memories are intertwined in her perspective, while at the culture writ large, the gendered differences made Zoya the more potent icon

The complication in Kosmodemyanskaya's depictions is that media productions of her death and dying circulated contemporaneously with photographs taken at the moment of her

[150] Most notable is the bust of Aleksandr Kosmodemyansky which stands in present-day Kaliningrad, and the minor planet 1977 Shura. Two additional planets - 2072 Kosmodemyanskaya and 1793 Zoya - are named for his mother and sister respectively. Schmadel, Lutz D. *Dictionary of Minor Planet Names.* (Springer; Berlin and Heidelberg, 2003).
[151] Tippner, 383.

death. Artists were able to refer to 'authentic' references, and civilians could compare the products to these references, suggestive of a feedback loop in which the scene of her execution is reinforced by both primary and secondary materials. For an example of this, one can look at the comparison of the photographs of her execution scene (see Figures 4 to 6), the painting produced by Kukrynisky of the scene (see Figure 7), and a screenshot from director Lev Arnshtam's *Zoya* (1944) (see Figure 9), which all cement the visual and visual coding of her death. Taking a moment to examine Kukrynisky's painting - "standard social-realism" according to art critic Sophie Pinkman - one sees all eyes turned upon Zoya - here an androgynous figure, her black uniform almost reminiscent of the dark suits worn by Eugene Onegin. Her spectators include civilians and soldiers, who are not overtly identifiable as Germans until one examines the cuts of their coats and style of their hats. Her execution is a medieval moment, a hanging, that unites multiple strata of society. Yet while the Germans treat this as an attraction to photograph and stage, the common people are there without cameras, dressed in head scarfs and short coats, on horseback suggestive of a long journey that brought them to this instance. So perhaps, like Onegin, Zoya's death produced a rippling effect felt as far away as the clouds of black smoke on the horizon.[152]

Arnshtam's *Zoya,* at the scene of the execution, brings audiences further into the moment - passed the border of soldiers and onlookers, close enough to see the expression on Zoya's face - to transform them from a voyeur into a quasi-participant in the moment. Referencing Bronfen's question on if the depiction of death is meant to elicit an aesthetic or empathic response, it must be asked which route the film takes - aesthetic or empathic. Considering that the scene of her

[152] Sophie Pinkham, "Leninopad: Double Agents in Kyiv," *N+1*, Winter 2016, https://nplusonemag.com/issue-24/ukraine-supplement/leninopad/.

execution is bookended by scenes of Zoya's final moments in German captivity, and her face transposed over images of artillery, airplanes, and warfare, it seems evident that the film intends to bring its audience from a microscopic look at her death to its connection to the international scale of war. If viewers are being told to witness her stoicism in captivity and her execution as a prosthetic participant - unable to stop what they know to be an unjust act - then the empathy and frustration they feel for Zoya's situation are to now be connected to the larger war effort. If viewers could do nothing for Zoya, then they can take their voyueristic frustration and put it to the Soviet war effort.

This is, of course, precisely the film's intended effect; produced by studio *Soyuzdetfilm* while in its wartime exile in Dushanbe, it's 1944 release date still saw audiences living in a state of war when the hatred of Germans and mourning of the dead was still exceptionally raw. Quoting Harris again but bringing in Anna Froula's analyses of the girl-heroine of Soviet children's literature, Zoya as an archetype was meant to inspire her age group into action, motivate the population with the cruelty of her action - as proof, "Zoia's brother Aleksandr exemplified the proper reaction to Zoia's execution by becoming a tank commander seeking to avenge Zoia through his will to destroy the enemy".[153] What is then interesting is that neither the film nor painting take reference from the most striking and evocative photo that exists of Zoya - that of her corpse. Instead statues and monuments, pseudo-corpses, to her took up the task of spreading that image throughout the Soviet Union.

The amount of statues of Zoya is both extensive, and their styles vary in their depictions of her. In general it becomes possible to classify them into two rough sections - those which

[153] Harris 2011, 278.

depict her in a more natural, 'realistic' depiction of the partisan hero and those which show an idealized, imaginary form,. The ur-example of the former would be the depiction of Zoya on display at Partizanskaya Station in Moscow (see Figure 10), which shows her armed with a rifle and dressed, while feminine, in boots and a sweater - clothing apt for guerilla warfare. This statue, sculpted in 1942 and placed in the station in May 1944, is akin to the Zoya seen in Arnshtam's film, although already there is a shift away from androgyny in depictions. Furthermore, as Adrienne Harris points out, the placement in the metro station serves the purpose of positioning Zoya among the common people, amid the 'great family' that tied Muscovites and the Soviet people together stronger than blood.[154] It also is close to the original statue which stood in Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow; that piece, created by E. A. Rudakov, stood in the cemetery from 1954 to 1986 and depicted her upright torso, hands positioned as if to draw a weapon and show her determination.[155] These are the earliest depictions of Zoya, and suggestive of Anna Krylova's theory of non-oppositional gender mobilization during war. There is not a barrier against depicting Zoya as both feminine and armed. Even the decision to make Zoya the first female Hero of the Soviet Union shows the wartime willingness to allow for gender-neutral heroism. Their placement in prominent urban settings forced popular engagement and confrontation with Zoya's memory. Rather than physically separated or cloistered off into a deliberately crafted site, the public is faced with Zoya's visage when they may not have sought it out. Combined with her depiction in the Arnshtam's *Zoya*, there was a brief period of time in which women could be shown as eager and able to engage with violence in defense of the nation,

[154] Harris 2012, 77.
[155] Harris 2011, 280.

rather than the type of detachment or ambitious competitiveness shown by Pavlichenko in her 2016 biopic.

The statue of Zoia-as-partisan in Novodevichy, however, was replaced in 1986 with one designed by Oleg Komov, where Zoya-as-victim is the primary aesthetic effect. Zoya's full body is depicted, knees bent and body contorted so that her head is tilted back and her chest is pushed outward (see Figure 14). Adrienne Harris takes the perspective that it is the resurrection of Zoya to "wholeness"; her breast, mutilated after her death, has been restored. It is her at "the moment she transcends mortality".[156] Platt views it instead as Zoya in ecstasy, with her body's resurrection to wholeness creating a reading of the hero in jouissance - her pain commuted to pleasure now that her wounds have been healed.[157] In an opposing viewpoint, it is also the most prominent statue of Zoya in a now-heavily touristed area of Moscow, and the one which most closely resembles the photograph of her corpse. Although interpreted by some as depicting Zoya falling as in flight, suggestive of an angel - or 'like the cry of a bird, halted at its most sonorous note' - overlaying the Strunnikov photograph with one of the statue shows that it seeks to capture the same moment and expression.[158] The head is tilted back in the same manner, with the angle now cast in the reflection of a neck broken by a noose, and her shirt is torn open to show the disfigured breast. While the reconstructed breast could be, as Harris phrases it, a transfiguration post-mortem into a whole body once again, alternative explanations could be that her femininity is now being re-emphasized through a more prominent bust, or a statue of a disfigured corpse would have been found to be repellent by those visiting Novodevichy. Although she discusses it

[156] Ibid, 282.
[157] Platt, 48.
[158] Platt, 64-65.

within the context of the Orthodox Church's theological distaste for Lenin's embalmed and unburied corpse, Verdery points to the ingrained Russian cultural belief that the dead must be buried. "If someone is not buried or is buried improperly (or if *ab*normal [sic] people are given a "normal" burial), then bad things will happen. Because an unburied body is a source of things not being quite right in the cosmos…"[159] This suggests, in some way, that the treatment of Kosmodemyanskaya's body violated heavenly law which, in combination of her youth and womanness, was too thoroughly a taboo broken for all in the Soviet Union to stand. In this sense, Zoya's whole body is metaphorically buried via the statue's erection in the cemetery, and theological values have not been transgressed. Conservative tastes have been satisfied.

On theology, Zoya as a Soviet 'saint' is a frequent description, and this depiction comes through in the other categorization of her memorials - the idealized form. Arguably Zoya was able to become so known due to the ability to map her narrative onto that of a Christian martyr; tortured, refusing to renounce her beliefs, and dying for them. The actual act performed on her - the mutilation of her breast - recalls specific saints such as Agatha of Sicily[160]. These statues are most frequently found at sites of 'pilgrimage' - such as Zoya's birthplace in Osino-Gay or in Petrishchevo where she perished (see Figures 14 and 15). Alongside the statue of Zoya which currently stands in Moscow's Victory Museum (see Figure 12), these pieces differ stylistically but all show Zoya barefoot, clad in a gown, standing proud and saintly. Instead the saintly symbolism can be read as politically deliberate - opting to code an ideological death in religious iconography, both making her narrative palatable to a nation of believers and creating a

[159] Verdery, 45.
[160] "In Byzantine martyr legends, women's nipples or breasts were often severed in sexualized torture". Constantinou, 22 quoted in Harris 2011, 293.

replacement, whose feats were for communism, for nonsecular icons. The pieces in Petrischevo and the Victory Museum in particular are extremely evocative of depictions of Joan of Arc being marched to her execution - unclad of any armor and weapons yet confident, as if aware that a higher power watches out for her. The comparison to Joan of Arc is so ubiquitous as to become a cliche, but a key similarity is the two martyrs' virginity. For again referring to Adrienne Harris:

> Russian authors and artists have always been convinced of Zoia's chastity and the violation of her pure body during her *podvig* [sic]. [Stavroula]Constantinou notes that most legends of female martyrs can be characterized by a preoccupation with sexuality and the martyrs' virginity. ...Numerous allusions to [Zoya's] violated chastity demonstrate that this aspect of her narrative penetrated the Soviet citizenry to its core, feeding the need to see the enemy as wholly evil and brutal.[161]
>
> Initially in 1942, the media bombarded the Soviet public with two contradictory photographs of Zoia: Strunnikov's post-mortem photograph and Zoia's school portrait. The visual discrepancy between these two bodies led to the persistent rumors that Zoia was not the "Tania" executed in Petrischevo. In the early mythopoeic process, this disconnect led to her body functioning as an empty vessel and site for others' projections. When juxtaposed with each other, contradictory depictions of Zoia's body as both prepubescent and as voluptuous draw attention to her youth and her lost potential as wife and mother, a common theme in literary texts about Zoia.[162]

Platt elaborates on the tension between these depictions of Zoya; in his analysis, there is an erotic factor to her death and photographs, and the nature of her death recalls a revulsion in the viewer. "The striking beauty of the executed woman, along with the uncomfortable eroticism of the harrowing image, made it one of the most memorable of the war."[163] When faced with the paradigm, the post-Stalinist Soviet Union took to revirginizing Zoya. The armed and warlike depiction of the female combatant was no longer deemed as acceptable for a role model to

---

[161] Harris 2011, 293; Stavroula Constantinou, *Female Corporeal Performances: Reading the Body in Byzantine Passions and the Lives of Holy Women* (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005) 22 quoted in Ibid, 293.
[162] Ibid, 294
[163] Platt, 48.

contemporary women and recalled too much the image of her as an active agent capable of fighting and dying.[164] Instead, the statues that emphasized femininity with their dresses and delicate forms were appropriate. So much so that previous depictions breaking this rule had to be altered; in wartime, the gender hierarchy had been disrupted along with societal norms that would have otherwise never allowed Strunnikov's photograph to be published initially. Referencing the Kukryniksy painting again, its original 1942 presentation showed, instead of Zoya giving her final call to Stalin, the moment when the noose tightened and the executioner's block kicked out from underneath her feet (see Figure 11). This was changed before its 1947 version, which is the one which presently hangs in the Moscow gallery.[165] The Zoya which stands in Osino-Gay wears clothing reminiscent of a schoolgirl or Pioneer uniform, where school-aged girls in the 1970s and 1980s could see themselves directly reflected in this heroine and model. However, despite this redirection onto femininity in the hopes of recapturing the contemporary female gaze, by the 1980s[166] and *glasnost,* the hagiographic elements in her depiction had begun to lose their effect and the canonization of Zoya as a secular, socialist saint had become unpalatable. Challenges to the official narrative had started to take root, which would see an explosion of controversy surrounding Zoya's till-then codified story and biography.[167]

---

[164] Harris 2011, 281-282.
[165] Platt, 62-63.
[166] Harris points out that this was not a phenomenon new to the 1980s and Gorbachev's reforms: "According to dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva, already by 1950 some Komsomol volunteers did not want to deliver lectures about Kosmodem'ianskaia: 'Her story had become stale with repetition. On top of that, there were competing, unofficial versions of the events in Petrischevo"". Ludmilla Alexeyva and Paul Goldbert, *The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era* (University of Pittsburg Press, 1993), 61 quoted in Harris 2011, 287.
[167] Ibid, 286-291.

The 1990s saw, along with the end of the Soviet Union, a brief moment when Vergangenheitsbewältigung could have been possible in the then-fledgling Russian Federation. Adrienne Harris has observed that "In the post-Soviet period, individuals attacked the univocality of the Soviet historical narrative, tearing down previously exalted mythic figures, when it became clear that Soviet history had largely been constructed of lies and thus, undermined the whole system".[168] However, the war was a controversial topic - mnemonic warriors long silenced now seizing on an opportunity to release nearly fifty years of censored views, and Zoya's intimate connection with war memory saw an attempt at diversifying the narrative. In 1991, publications in Moscow weekly newspaper *Argumenti i Fakti* by A. Zhovtis put forward the claim that there had been no German military presence in Petrischevo, and the burning of the village by partisans was the result of their over-eagerness to implement "scorched earth tactics". Namely, that due to their willingness to follow Stalin, Russians and Russian property had been needlessly harmed.[169] The controversy released by these publications created or released other conspiracy theories surrounding Zoya's actions - that she had been schizophrenic, that she was a fanatic rather than a patriot, that the burning of Petrischevo was misattributed to Zoya, or that the corpse had not been hers at all. However, the reaction writ large was to condemn the articles with proclamations that "Zoya has been executed again" - an unwillingness by readers to suffer the besmirchment of her legacy; the controversy quieted after a criminal investigation could not produce any new evidence to challenge the established memory regime.[170] Vladimir Kharchenko-Kulikovski released a documentary in 2005 that

---

[168] Ibid, 303.
[169] "Легенды Великой Отечественной. Зоя Космодемьянская," April 5, 2006, http://web.archive.org/web/20051227015937/http://www.smi.ru/05/04/05/3442763.html.
[170] Harris 2011, 291.

repeated the findings of that 1991 investigation - "Pravda o podvige Zoi Kosmodem'ianskoi" - which was praised by critics for teaching young people not only facts about the war, but 'patriotism and love for their Motherland'.[171] Compounding this was the desecration of a monument to Zoya in Volgograd - an image which read to many that not only was the vandal insulting a single individual (Zoya), but the legions of Soviet dead that had fallen in the Battle of Stalingrad.[172] The intertwining of these two memories into one single act of insult, which would have forced officials to comply with restoring the monument regardless of their personal feelings on the subject. As a mnemonic moment, it demonstrates the results of when a warrior pushes too far and the possibility for deliberation breaks; rather than merely discussing the possibilities of falsehoods and exaggerations in Zoya's myth, violence was leveled against her pseudo-corpse. Running semi-simultaneous was the movement to have Zoya canonized as an Orthodox saint - decades of having used hagiographic imagery to her now converging with the return of the Orthodox Church to political saliency and increasing identification of 'Orthodox' with 'Russian'. [173] By the decade's end, not only had Putin's rise to the presidency ushered in a close to potential fracturing of the war - and Zoya's - memory in Russia. At least, temporarily, until the next major moment of shifting territorial integrity within the Russian Federation.

---

[171] "Pravda o podvige Zoi Kosmodem'ianskoi", *Moskovskii veteran* 29-30 (2005): 6 quoted in Ibid, 295.
[172] Ibid, 296-298.
[173] Quoting Harris, "Re-contextualization of heroes like Zoia within an Orthodox framework may strengthen the Orthodox Church itself, for as John Garrard and Carol Garrard have shown, Patriarch Aleksii II sensed that the Church needed to link itself with the military and patriotism in order to revive and establish itself as a permanent force in society and took measures to do so." John Garrard and Carol Garrard, *Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 86-245 quoted in Harris 2011, 301-302.

For 2016 - two years after the expansion of Russian borders - saw a second moment of potential fracturing of Zoya's mnemonic regime, and for a second time saw its entanglement with war memory and an assault on a statue push critics into the category of desecrators and 2016 saw the publication of cartoonist and psychiatrist Andrei Bilzho's editorial in which he diagnoses Zoya with schizophrenia, while seemingly aware that the topic would produce the 'violent' reaction it did illicit:

> Now I will tell a terrible, seditious thing that will blow up the Internet and me, but, thank God, I am now far away. ...Before the war, Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya was in [a psychiatric hospital] more than once, she suffered from schizophrenia. All the psychiatrists who worked in the hospital knew about this, but then her medical history was withdrawn, because when perestroika began, information began to leak out, and Kosmodemyanskaya's relatives began to be outraged that this offends her memory.[174]

Here, however, unlike the 1991 *Argumenti i Fakti* articles, Bilzho is not attempting to challenge or alter the narrative around Zoya's actions in Petrischevo or her death. Yet it produced nearly as much outrage as those articles from more than a decade before, because instead of actions her character was being questioned. It was as sacrilegious to suggest that she could have been mentally ill as it was to suggest she had been in Petrischevo unjustly[175]. Again correlating to this event is the desecration of the statue of Zoya which had stood in Kyiv, Ukraine (Figure 13); in 2016, first vandalized and then stolen off the street entirely.[176] One of more than

---

[174] Андрей Бильжо, "Диагноз недели с доктором Бильжо: Мединский никакой не историк, а 29-й панфиловец и есть," *The Insider*, December 9, 2016, https://theins.ru/opinions/38959.
[175] Although it is to suggest that the 1991 controversy also contained strong implications on questioning Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya's mental state, with the insinuation that she had been deluded by Stalinist scorched earth tactics into burning down buildings.
[176] "В Киеве вандалы разрисовали и повалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской," *Лента.ру*, September 5, 2016, sec. Украина, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/09/05/vandals/; Александр Марущак, "В центре Киева исчез памятник партизанке," *Сегодня*, 2016, sec. Происшествия, https://www.segodnya.ua/kiev/kaccidents/v-centre-kieva-ischez-pamyatnik-partizanke-749077.ht

500 monuments to Soviet-era notables vandalized in Ukraine between 2014 and 2016, it becomes symbolic in that Ukrainian anger against Russia following the annexation of Crimea was taken out on female figureheads associated with the Soviet (by proxy, Russian) mnemonic regime.[177] Read in this sense, Zoya's presence as a statue is a reminder not only of the prevalence of Soviet myths, but of the forced acceptance of the official regime upon a population. Attacks against the female pseudo-corpse show a relief of humiliation at having been subjected to the mnemonic regimes even after independence, to sweep back to the claims made by Merridale about what men had felt when women first entered military service in the Red Army.

Two decades after the death of the Soviet Union, Zoya has survived despite the repeated assaults on her memory. Largely this has been due to the symbolism attributed to her early on in her post-death second life as a symbol, even when the ideological nature of her actions in life are no longer palatable to a post-Soviet Russian world. The complexity of these symbolisms, layered with deep connections to both the particularly Russian condition and an intense intergenerational emotional response, have allowed certain elements of her story - femininity or saintliness or wartime patriotism - to become prominent depending most upon the needs of the time. This however comes with the awareness that attacks on her memory could be attacks against any of the myriad ideas that her memory has stood for. In this, she rather uniquely appears chameleon-esque in the intersection of identities her corpse and its representations have been able to inhabit.

---

ml; "В Киеве разрисовали и свалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской," *Взгляд; Деловая газета*, 2016, https://vz.ru/news/2016/9/5/830758.html.

[177] "Vandalism," Civic Nation, 2017, https://civic-nation.org/ukraine/society/glorification_of_nazism/vandalism/.

Manshuk Mametova

The number of ethnic Kazakh women who were sent to the frontlines of the Great Patriotic War is given at over five thousand by the Kazakhstani government, although other figures suggest up to or surpassing seven thousand.[178] From them, two Kazakh women were made Heroes of the Soviet Union following their wartime deaths - the first was Mansuk Mametova, who received the title in 1944, and three months later Aliya Moldagulova was raised to the same level. Despite their fixation on lists of Kazakh dead from the Great Patriotic War, both are frequently a footnote in Russian-language accounts of the war, although scholarship on the intersectional identities of Kazakh and women in the Great Patriotic War has been increasing in Russian-language studies.[179] This absence is more indicative of a wider neglect of non-Slavic and non-European Soviet soldiers, as well as the minimization of women's efforts. These problems can be traced back to the war itself, where the Main Political Administration of the Red Army (PUKKA) itself treated Central Asian soldiers as an 'afterthought'. The neglect persists to the present day, as in a comprehensive look at the historiography of Kazakh women in the Great Patriotic War, historians Z.G. Saktaganova and K.K. Abdrakhmanova wrote that, "And to this day, unfortunately, Kazakhstan's comprehensive monographic works on women's history in the war years have not appeared."[180] The inclusion of both women when mentioning Kazakh, and

[178] Дина Игсатова, "У войны не женское лицо...," Республиканский общество-политический журнал, June 3, 2019, http://mysl.kazgazeta.kz/?p=13613.
[179] З. Г. Сактаганова and К. К. Абдрахманова, "Советская и современная казахстанская историография проблемы «Женщины Казахстана в годы Великой Отечественной войны»," *Вестник КарГУ*, 2018, https://articlekz.com/article/29617.
[180] Russian: И до сегодняшнего дня, к сожалению, казахстанских комплексных монографических работ по женской истории в военные годы так и не появилось. Ibid.

female Kazakh, contributions is frequently deliberate, and to a particular degree their memories have become intertwined with each others'. Despite this, however, Mametova has more statues and memorials in her home country[181], one of the few female figures that has broken out from the ranks to stand as not only a symbol of Kazakh people's efforts in the Great Patriotic War but as a figure in the pantheon of national heroes - a position that she is able to be afforded by virtue of her association with the war.

During the 1940s, Mametova was a figure vital to the PURKKA's effort to glorify Kazakh Red Army soldiers. Why? Roberto Carmack posits this and in turn yields the floor to Anna Krylova and Karel Berkhoff for possible explanations as to why Mametova and her fellow female soldier, Aliya Moldagulova, became key figures in the Kazakh heroic pantheon. Krylova suggests that "Soviet wartime propagandists deliberately sought to erase any discrepancy between femininity and combat duty by portraying these components of female military identity as fully compatible"; in contrast, Berkhoff posits that "descriptions of brave Soviet women on the battlefield implicitly called into question the adequacy of male soldiers", and that Mametova and Moldagulova's heroics cast a disparaging light on the masculinity of Kazakh soldiers, who ought to step up and reclaim their honor as men and soldiers.[182]

However, in fear that more contemporary events in the 20th, 19th or even 18th centuries could be cast in a colonial vs independence struggle, party organs in 1942 used older historical

---

[181] Aliya Moldagulova appears to have more monuments and memorials within the territory of the Russian Federation, with statues in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Rybinsk. While a closer analysis of Moldagulova is beyond the scope of this thesis, it can be speculated that her actions in the defense of Leningrad and service in the European regions of Russia have helped make her memory more prominent in the western portions of the former Soviet Union. Галя Галина, "Дочь Лениниграда," accessed July 25, 2020, https://www.np.kz/2010/04/16/doch_leningrada.html.

[182] Krylova, Berkhoff quoted in Carmack 2014, 105.

figures and struggles (eg., Tauke Khan and the fight against the Dzungars in the late 17th century) to instill national-patriotic fire in Kazakh troops. After 1944, this was projected even further into the distant past - to the ancestors of the Turkic peoples in Central Asia in their struggles against Alexander the Great or Chingis Khan. The key elements of this in-progress narrative were "simultaneous resistance to foreign invaders and indigenous exploiter collaborators" and "the Kazakhs as an eternally militant albeit divided people".[183] "Memoirs written by Kazakh veterans and published during the *glasnost* and post-Soviet periods suggest that these troops identified strongly with the core messages disseminated by PURKKA. It was not uncommon for Kazakh soldiers to express notions of Soviet patriotism by referring to Kazakh historical figures". Some of these trends were later resurrected by the Nazarbayev government and post-independence Kazakh historical-cultural institutions.[184] Carmack states that, "PURKKA's sustained attempt to instil a complementary Soviet-Kazakh identity distinguishes the Soviet Union from other World War II-era combatants who fielded multi-ethnic armies", comparing to the British propaganda efforts against the development of East African or Indian identities that could contradict a united British identity during the war. Nevertheless, while Kazakh-language propaganda never strayed from its goal of dual identity formation, "the balance between these two facets shifted in favour of [Soviet] by war's end".[185] Yet he concludes by stating that eventually the Communist Party lost interest in looking at non-Russian epics for inspirational propaganda, and Stalin and other high-ranking officials ceased tolerating any depictions of conflicts between Russians and non-Russians, "as [by 1944] the Russian people

[183] Ibid, 103-104.
[184] Ibid, 108.
[185] Ibid, 108.

had become so central to notions of Soviet patriotism that any negative reference to them whatsoever threatened to destabilize the entire propagandistic edifice".[186]

Knowing this, it becomes interesting when viewing the 1969 film made of Manshuk Mametova's feat, which despite its title of *Song of Manshuk*[187] is less of a biographical account than it is a war film featuring aspects of her life and death. Despite having both a Kazakh director and star, Majit Begalin and his wife Natalya Arinbacarova, *Song of Manshuk* depicts Mametova primarily as another soldier within the larger events of the Red Army at the Battle of Nevel. She is frequently shown among crowds of soldiers where the camera does not zoom in upon her, and her death is cut short by the film's end rather than lingering over it as seen in earlier works such as *Zoya*. In a sense, it is a more a film about a Kazakh soldier's experience of the war rather than a woman's, with its documentary shaky-cam cuts to scenes of wheat fields and nomadic hunting groups in the Kazakh SSR represented as a utopia the war has taken soldiers away from, rather than a subjective childhood that Mametova has lost by going to the frontline. The film's year of production is significant in that it culminates a decade which had seen renewed scholarly work and interest in Kazakh contribution to the war; the twentieth anniversary of the victory saw "8 books, 24 brochures and more than 200 articles were published in the republic, and by 1970 about 900 books, brochures, scientific and popular scientific articles on military and logistical topics had been published in the republic. ...But in these works, the plots about women during the war years are extremely limited, Kazakh researchers practically ignore this problem."[188] With this in mind, Mametova in Begalin's film became a vehicle for

---

[186] Ibid, 103-104.
[187] Russian: *Песень о Маншук.*
[188] Сактаганова and Абдрахманова, "Советская и современная казахстанская историография проблемы «Женщины Казахстана в годы Великой Отечественной войны»."

awareness of Kazakh contribution to the war effort to a wider Soviet audience. It integrates pieces of archetypical Kazakh imagery - fields of wheat, falcon hunting on horseback, ethnic song - into what by-then would have been a rote-standard war film to Soviet audiences, with its sweeping battlefield shots and scenes of uniformed men in dark rooms discussing strategy. It reinjects Kazakh soldiers and their contributions back into the war, but in this sense, Mametova's gender is not factored into the narrative in any way stronger than a small romantic subplot.

In independent Kazakhstan, particularly in the last decade, there has been a great effort in lifting up Manshyk Mametova to the level of national hero and inscribing her name to Kazakh, rather than a blended Soviet-Kazakh, history. These efforts by the government have seen her name attributed to mountains and lakes - there is both Manshuk Mametova Lake and Lake of the Glacier Manshuk Mametova within driving distance of Almaty - as well as universities and medical schools, with the association that she had studied medicine briefly before the outbreak of the war.[189] The prescribing of Mametova's name into the landscape of Kazakhstan metaphorically integrates her into the body of the country itself, rendering her deeds - and particularly, her heroism - as indissoluble to Kazakhstan as the steppe or the mountains. Furthermore, there have been historiographical attempts at placing Mametova as a twentieth century incarnation of a heritage, where women have always been present. In this report by *The Astana Times*, the service of Kazakh women in the Red Army is directly connected to the ancient and the native:

> Kazakh people have always admired their daughters for their beauty, intelligence and courage. The women of the great steppe always held high status in the socio-political

[189] "Museum of 'Hero of Soviet Union Manshuk Mametova' and 'History of University,'" Academic, Semey Medical University, n.d., https://semeymedicaluniversity.kz/en/about-us/structure/academic-work/museum-of-hero-of-soviet-union-manshuk-mametova-and-history-of-university/.

> hierarchy of Kazakh governments. In Kazakhstan's nomadic tradition, women have always been equal to men in everything, including work and war.
>
> Women have been powerful in what is now Kazakhstan since the early Iron Age, when women joined men on the battlefield. The percentage of female warriors fluctuated at times, but they were always present.[190]

Manshuk Mametova is no different from Queen Tomyris or Princess Bopay-Khansha, and an incarnation of that nomadic tradition during a time when Kazakhs were denied their heritage. "The frequent celebration of ancient and modern heroes' anniversaries contributes to making [the potential division of Kazakhstan into three parts due to tribalism] a self-fulfilling prophecy. These anniversaries aim at strengthening all-Kazakh self-consciousness, but in reality they strength the ambition of the informal leaders of the three *zhues*[191]"[192]. Both Mametova and Moldagylova have seen the production of television specials as part of the series *Tainhi, Cydbi, Imena*[193] produced by one of the largest state news agencies, Khabar TV, aimed at promoting important Kazakhs throughout history. These specials aim at not only promoting the names and narratives of these women, but at correcting misconceptions about their biographies; for instance, a particularly noteworthy element of Mametova's special is on her childhood. With actors brought in to show a child Mametova playing in the family home while parents watch, the narration and guest experts explain away why she went to live with an aunt and uncle instead of with her nuclear family. No mention is made of her father's arrest by Soviet police, which is found in other biographical material. In short, it not only presents Mametova in a favorable,

---

[190] Maral Zhanataykzy, "Nation Remembers Warrior Women of the Great Steppe," *The Astana Times*, March 13, 2013, sec. People, https://astanatimes.com/2013/03/nation-remembers-warrior-women-of-the-great-steppe/.
[191] Lit. 'hundred', meaning hordes in the sense of tribal division. Kazakh society consists of three regionally organized *zhuz.* Galiev, 57.
[192] Ibid, 59.
[193] Russian: *Тайны, Судьбы, Имена*,

heroic light, but the home and culture that she came from, accompanied by an aesthetic which seamlessly blends Kazakh carpets and textiles with vintage Soviet appliances and goods.[194] The program's production of specials on both Mametova and Moldagylova again represents that historiographical push to include their memories as part of a long line of great Kazakhs but also to detach the 'Sovietness' from their deeds and actions. Simultaneously, it nationalizes and reclaims them, while not explicitly seeking to completely erase the influence from Russian culture.

Kazakh intellectuals live in a perpetual shadow of trying to prove that their culture is as rich as that of the Russians, and of working through a pre-Russian cultural past in search of aspects which can be used in a highly secularized modern age. The nomadic past, rather than the Islamic as seen in neighboring Central Asian states, is more quickly evoked, to the extent that Islam could even be described as "a foreign culture superimposed on the integral Kazakh nomadic culture", with the strongest emphasis placed on kinship units.[195] Finally, and vitally, qualities ascribed to Mametova in her depictions through agitprop could not be considered 'national' in any significant way, insofar as those same qualities were being given to any heroic soldier in the Great Patriotic War, from Slavic to Tajik. Roberto Carmack puts forth that "the only characteristics of [Mametova and Moldagylova] that were specifically Kazakh...were their names and places of origins", and that similarities they shared with other Soviet Red Army heroes was an intentional thrust of state propaganda work. Insofar that national agendas could be subscribed to the ascension of these women to the status of Soviet heroes was Communist Party

---

[194] "«Тайны. Судьбы. Имена». Маншүк Маметова," *Тайны. Судьбы. Имена* (Хабар, n.d.), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35MfD6vziRs&t=303s.
[195] Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, Second, Studies of Nationalities (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).

efforts to 'raise' the status of Central Asian women from the 'oppression' of premodern Central Asian-Islamic societies. Charles Shaw demonstrates this throughout his dissertation in discussion of Uzbek women on the homefront in the war; the relative lack of Uzbek women serving on the frontlines did not stop the Party from finding "new women" who, in roles such as entertainers or kolkhoz farmers, represent the successes of Moscow-backed modernization in the region.[196] By using Mametova and Moldagylova as figures within Kazakh-language propaganda, PURKKA - and by extension, the Communist Party and state - were putting Kazakh women on the same level as Kazakh men, and proving the success of the Soviet mission to bring its gender egalitarianism to the patriarchal societies of Central Asian republics.[197]

In a prominent square in the city of Almaty is a massive statue (see Figure 16) depicting both Manshuk Mametova and Aliya Moldagylova marching nearly arm-in-arm; behind them stands a globe upon which cherubic figures release doves of peace. Read literally, the woman - depicted armed, stern-faced, in full military uniform - are marching with peace to follow behind their battle. It is a decidedly unfeminine depiction, and beneath them the medals serve to emphasize how they have been rewarded as soldiers rather than as saints or sacrifices. It is another source which shows the two women interconnected, despite Mametova and Moldagylova never serving together or being part of the same corps in the military. The duplication effect suggests that, instead of these women being two seperate outliers, that there is a strong basis of heroes to draw from; two women present in propaganda and statues amplify the strength of the

[196] Charles Shaw, "Making Ivan-Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945" (Doctoral Dissertation, Berkeley, Calif, University of California, Berkeley, 2015), https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Shaw_berkeley_0028E_15628.pdf.
[197] Carmack, 105.

historical basis from which contemporary government officials draw from. Two additional statues of Mametova stand in Nevel and Uralsk (see Figures 17 and 18) which follow in the mold of the militaristic and proud soldier. The exception to these consistencies memorials is, vitially, the statue of Mametova which stands in front of her memorial museum in Uralsk (see Figure 19). Here instead, she is shown in a dress, with her hair in braids and her hands holding flowers. While the motif of stepping forward is repeated from the Almaty square statue, she is distinctly feminized as compared to her standard showings. The caption underneath then paradoxically reads *"Neprovotimaya Manshuk"* - "Unparalleled Manshuk"[198] - suggestive of her exceptionalism that had earned her the Hero of the Soviet Union. The discrepancy in appearance is explained by its location; the House-Museum of Manshuk Mametova was formed out of the home she and her adopted family lived in for a period of the time in the 1930s, and a domestic Manshuk Mametova is the one who stands to welcome visitors to its entrance. Rather than the soldier, which is how the public knows her, this statue of her out of uniform shows both that visitors will be entering her private, civilian abode, and that it is meant to depict the homefront which she came from and fought for. The change in garb and the feminine adornments - a non-military hat, flowers, braids - all reinforce the connection between the feminine and the homefront, separate from the masculinized war which took away these elements from this young girl.

There is, however, a limit to variation allowed, and it comes when the stylistic depictions come from outside of the government's purview. 2019 saw the unexpected addition of a hand-carved wooden statue in Victory Park in the northeastern town of Semey stated by the artist

[198] Russian: *Неповторимая Маншук*

to be of Mametova (see Figure 20), and both official and popular responses were negative on the grounds that it did not depict her in accordance to any official sources. Users of social networking sites such as VK and Instagram wrote various captions critiquing the aesthetic qualities of the statue: “Sorry, but it's just plain ugly”, “Where is the artistic advice? Who allows? Some kind of blasphemy”, “Manshuk Mametova is very beautiful in the photographs and in the movies, but what is this, the appearance here is really ugly, and then made of wood, bad taste, sorry”.[199] City officials agreed but rather than the piece’s aesthetic qualities, rejected it on the grounds of failing to match the dignity of the space that it had been placed in: “Perhaps the subjects of the Great Patriotic War and the material, as well as the processing technique associated with it, were not taken into account during the implementation of the project.”[200] Despite the response of the artist arguing that it ‘shouldn’t matter if it's made of wood or marble’, the statue was later removed from the Victory Park on orders, though some controversy persists on who was responsible for issuing such.[201]

Government monopoly on mnemonic productions and activities extends out from the erection of statues. Local and national authorities have taken control over events such as the

---

[199] Russian: "Извините, но это просто некрасиво", "Где худсовет? Кто разрешает? Кощунство какое-то", "Маншук Маметова на фотографиях и в кино очень красивая, а это что такое, здесь внешность очень ужасная, еще из дерева, безвкусица, жаль". Рабига Дюсенгулова, “Автор ответила критикам деревянной Маншук Маметовой,” *Tengrinews*, November 4, 2019, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/avtor-otvetila-kritikam-derevyannoy-manshuk-mametovoy-383195/.

[200] Ibid.

[201] Рабига Дюсенгулова, “Деревянную скульптуру Маншук Маметовой убрали из парка Семея,” *Tengrinews*, November 4, 2019, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/derevyannuyu-skulpturu-manshuk-mametovoy-ubrali-parka-semeya-383237/.

Immortal Regiment's marches on Victory Day.[202] Historian Timothy Garton Ash would argue that the lack of a collective memory is the lack of a collective identity - "a national or any political community without memory is likely to be childish" - and though the empirical evidence in support of such a claim could be debated, less so is the evidence that political mnemonic actors behave as though the statement were true.[203] In the Kazakhstani example, there is ample evidence to suggest a real fear in the minds of elites that without a shared - and agreed upon - Kazakh history that extends from prehistoric times to modernity, that their modern state risks fragmentation or complete disintegration. Following in the model of Kosmodemyanskaya's 'rehabilitation' from Soviet icon to specifically Russian, the circumstances of Mametova's actions during the war has allowed her to be held up as an ethno-nationalist hero as popular memory of the war has not dwindled in Kazakhstan.

[202] Chris Rickleton, "Kazakhstan: World War II Parade Puts Local Authorities in a Bind," Eurasianet, May 10, 2018, https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-world-war-ii-parade-puts-local-authorities-in-a-bind.
[203] Rieff, 36-38.

Conclusion

While disparate in several notable ways, comparisons between the three women are both possible and illuminating. Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova both have managed to separate themselves from the identity of a purely ideological hero and martyr and become connected to the ethnicities of their respective successor states - Zoya as a Russian and Orthodox icon, and Mametova as a sample of the enduring spirit of Kazakh women. Even Pavlichenko to a degree has been able to pull away from the ideology of the war and the Soviet Union, although this is a turn far more recent and less pervasive than the previous two. This, of course, is due to the longer history of memorialization for the former two combatants than the latter; the dead make for more compelling stories than the living. Notably as well, the relative sparseness of biographical information and details about them at key early moments in the mythologicalization process meant that they could capture the Soviet, Russian, and Kazakh imaginations more strongly than a highly decorated and known woman.

While it appears anticlimactic to conclude that the dead are more compelling than the living, it highlights a particular aspect of women in war that could otherwise be overlooked. The assumption is that women are meant to die in war - as victims, as the homefront that could not be defended accurately. In *Battle for Sevastopol*, when the character of Eleanor Roosevelt looks at Pavlichenko's back full of healed bullet wounds, she is prompted to ask "where were the men to defend you" rather than express amazement at Pavlichenko's survival. The deaths of Kosmodemyanskaya and Mametova, regardless of what they did or did not do in life, confirm that fact. Their deaths are a correction of the aberration of their combat experiences;

Pavlichenko's survival is what should not have occurred. As such, the victim or martyr imagery is much more apt and palatable to post-Soviet cultures, regardless of ethnic differences.

Despite the exceptionalism that each woman is ascribed with - from preternatural sniping skills, to heaven- or Stalin-given acknowledgement - individual personality traits are not brought to light. Even when the mother of one of the women, Lybov Kosmodemyanskaya, is present to influence the narrative, the symbolism swallows the subject. Wartime narratives reject characteristics beyond valor and sacrifice. In lieu of interiority, the physicality of the women become the forefront, and time has narrowed the criteria they can display. Each successive decade has seen more depictions which emphasize beauty of feminine delicacy - Kosmodemyanskaya's statues lose their association with weaponry and warfare to the extent that she is shown in a thin gown and barefoot more than she is with a rifle in hand. These depictions suggest that when femininity is the most dominant characteristic, their ideological association can be minimized, and thus they are acceptable historical and mnemonic figures when ideology can be complicated in modern memory politics. The acceptance of Mametova as a Kazakh hero rather than a victim of a non-Kazakh/Russian war, even when overall the Soviet past in Kazakhstan is a fractured regime, speaks to this effect.[204]

Even seventy-five years after the war's end, the Great Patriotic War is still able to unite disparate people behind its heroes when there is a core flexibility to their identities. Notably, each case lacks a very strong presence during the decades between the war's end and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; each woman saw a resurgence of interest, even in the form of

[204] Ski Krieger, "Victory Day in Kazakhstan: Bittersweet Memories of WWII," Travelmag, February 4, 2020, https://www.travelmag.co.uk/2020/02/victory-day-in-kazakhstan-bittersweet-memories-of-wwii/.

controversy, between the 1990s and the 2010s. Even in Zoya's case, where she had been a figure of note with new statues put up in the 1960s through the 1980s, she saw a second life during transfiguration from Soviet to Russian icon. Due to this, we can conclude with Breev - that women were lesser known, vaguer, more capable of being imagined, and can be treated flexibly in media and depictions. For to conclude, no matter what Svetlana Alexevich wrote in *The Unwomanly Face of War,* or how many statues can be erected and movies made presenting female combatants as exceptional or sublime, they are always reconfigured for the needs of the present rather than for the deeds in the past. Despite the evidence presented in this thesis and the terms female combatants are discussed in, Ekaterina Solovyova of the Russian War Historical Society still found a way to say, "It is clear that the war can not be idealized, it was not only feats – it was both dirty and scary. But when we write or talk about it, we must always be as correct as possible, careful of the memory of those people."[205]

[205] Russian: Понятно, что войну нельзя идеализировать, это были не только подвиги – было и грязно, и страшно. Но когда мы пишем или говорим об этом, нужно всегда быть максимально корректными, бережными к памяти о тех людях. Екатерина Соловьева, Могилы с ромашками. Как женщины жили и умирали на войне, accessed July 25, 2020, https://histrf.ru/biblioteka/b/moghily-s-romashkami-kak-zhienshchiny-zhili-i-umirali-na-voinie.

Appendices

Appendix A - Visual Media

Figure 1: "In memory of L. M. Pavlichenko memorial signs are installed in the cities of Odessa (on the house where L. M. Pavlichenko worked in 1941), Sevastopol (on the house No. 1 on Pavlichenko street (the building of the Prosecutor's office of the city of Sevastopol), Moscow (in the columbarium of the Novodevichy cemetery)"[206]

[206] "В память о Л.М. Павличенко установлены памятные знаки в городах Одессе (на доме, в котором в 1941 году работала Л.М. Павличенко), Севастополе (на доме №1 по улице Павличенко (здание прокуратуры города Севастополя), Москве (в колумбарии Новодевичьего кладбища)." "Героини обороны Одессы Нина Онилова и Людмила Павличенко," *Одеський краэзнавець* (blog), n.d., http://kraevedodessa.blogspot.com/2014/03/25.html.

Figure 2: Monument for Second Siege of Sevastopol. Built in 1967. Sculptor V.V.Yakovlev, architect I.E.Fialko. Pavlichenko is one of two women named on the monument, the other being Nina Andreyevna Onilova

Figure 3: Sergey Strunnikov, *Photograph of the Corpse of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya*, January 1942, Photograph, January 1942, http://waralbum.ru/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/zoya.jpg.

Figure 4: Unknown, *Photograph of Kosmodemyanskaya's execution,* 1943, Photograph, https://twitter.com/EmbassyofRussia/status/1200301069659779072?s=20.

Figure 5: Unknown, *Execution of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Petrischevo*, 1943, Photograph, 1943, https://img.gazeta.ru/files3/905/10383905/upload-09-pic905v-895x505-800.jpeg.

Figure 6: Unknown, *Execution of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Petrischevo*, 1943, Photograph, 1943, https://img.gazeta.ru/files3/911/10383911/upload-10-pic905v-895x505-31957.jpg.

Figure 7: Kukrynisky, *Tanya*, oil on canvas, 1947. State Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow.

Figure 8: Kukrynisky, *Tanya*, Underpainting, 1942, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/12/01/to-be-great-again-russia-resurrects-soviet-legends-a56380.

Figure 9: Screenshot from film Zoya (1944). И Фрэз and В Сухобоков, *Зоя*, 1944, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeoehc-b1PI.

Figure 10: Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya at the Partizanskaya metro station in Moscow. Author's photo.

Figure 11: *Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyankaya in Novodevichy Cemetery*, Photograph, accessed September 3, 2020, https://i1.wp.com/shtorm777.ru/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/zoya-kosmodemyanskaya-5.jpg.



Figure 12: Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya on display in the Victory Museum, Moscow. Sculpted by M.V. Taratynov, USSR, 1984. Author's photo.

Figure 13: *Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Kyiv, Ukraine*, Photograph, September 5, 2016, https://icdn.lenta.ru/images/2016/09/05/19/20160905191343322/pic_1c9f36ba52e8d9aaf684467be2831902.jpg.

Figure 14: *Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Osino-Gay, Tambov Oblast, Russia*, Photograph, https://histrf.ru/lichnosti/pamyatnie-mesta/place/item-204.

Figure 15: *Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in the Village of Petrishchevo*, Photograph, November 29, 2016, https://www.gazeta.ru/science/photo/zoya_kosmodemyanskaya.shtml.

Figure 16: *Monument to Manshuk Mametova and Aliya Moldagylova in Almaty, Kazakhstan*, Photograph, October 23, 2018, http://novoetv.kz/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/manshuk-aliya.jpg.

Figure 17: *Monument to Manshuk Mametova in Uralsk, Kazakhstan* Photograph, October 23, 2018, http://novoetv.kz/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%88%D1%83%D0%BA-%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BC%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA-%D0%A3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BA.jpg.

Figure 18: *Monument to Manshuk Mametova in Nevel, Russia*, n.d., Photograph, n.d., https://nevelikc.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CIMG8696.jpg.

Figure 19: *Statue of Manshuk Mametova before the Museum of Manshuk Mametova in Uralsk, Kazakhstan*, n.d., Photograph, n.d., https://www.komandirovka.ru/upload/save_file19/774/7740039981a93ab3ea515a7836b457c7.jpg.

Figure 20: Yulia Kurtunovoy, *Statue of Manshuk Mametova*, n.d., Photograph of Statue, n.d., https://tengrinews.kz/userdata/images/u359/resized/7985c2f9a7c19468c080e80db9084582.jpg.

Appendix B - Biographical Information

Lyudmila Pavlichenko

Lyudmila Mikhailovna Pavlichenko, neé Belova, was born in the city of Belaya Tserkov in 1916, then part of the Russian Empire. Her father, Mikhail Ivanovich Belov, was an employee of the NKVD and his work moved the family to Kiev in 1932 when Lyudmila was sixteen; her mother, Elena Trofimovna, taught foreign languages in a girls' school. Little is written about her husband, Aleksei Pvalichenko, although in Lyudmila's own words - her "first, schoolgirl, love" was comparable to "the end of the world, a voluntary blindness, a loss of reason". Their relationship produced one son, Rotislav (1932 - 2006), Pavlichenko's only child. Prior to the war, she nearly completed a university education in history at Kiev University and held a job at the arsenal factory. She volunteered for the front at the war's beginning, and became a sniper as part of the Independent Maritime Army and later the 25th Rifle Division, with which she participated in defense of Odessa and Sevastopol. Between August 1941 and May 1942, Pavlichenko reached the rank of lieutenant with a confirmed kill count of 309, the highest recorded total for a female sniper. After being injured in 1942, she never returned to the front and spent the remainder of the war as a propagandist, traveling to America, Canada and the United Kingdom as representative of the Soviet Union. By 1943, she had achieved the rank of major and was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union, and twice received the Order of Lenin. She survived the war to finish her education and work as a professional historian with both Kiev University and Soviet Navy headquarters. Between 1967 and 1972, she wrote her memoirs, although they were first published in Russian only in 2015. In October 1974, she died

of a stroke, and was buried in Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow, alongside numerous other peoples of Russian historical significance.[207]

Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya

Zoya Anatolyevna Kosmodemyanskaya was born in Osino-Gay, a village in the Tambov Region in Central Russia, in September 1923. Her family relocated to Moscow when Zoya was young, and she participated in both the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol since the age of eleven. Following the beginning of the war, she became active in partisan activities which ultimately led her to the village of Petrishchevo on occupied territory, which is where she was captured by the German army after setting fire to a number of buildings. Tortured and interrogated, Zoya was eventually hung on 29 November, 1941; her body was left on display for a number of weeks. She was buried before the Red Army re-captured the area around Petrishchevo in January 1942. Her younger brother, Aleksandr Anatoyevich, would later posthumously receive the Hero of the Soviet Union award for his actions in the capture of territory near Königsberg.[208]

The sparseness of her biography here does not reflect a dearth of information but rather the controversy surrounding certain aspects of it. For instance, while it is known that the family moved to Siberia in 1929, the reasoning behind the move is subject to numerous explanations, ranging from 'escaping an accusation' to her father's direct criticisms of collective farming to the

---

[207] Martin Pregler, "Foreword," in *Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*, by Lyudmila Pavlichenko (Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018), ix–xiii, ix; Pavlichenko, 1-52; Vinogradova, 35-37.

[208] "Zoya's Story," n.d., http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/home.html; "Prominent Russians: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya," Russiapedia, n.d., https://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/history-and-mythology/zoya-kosmodemyanskaya/.

family's history of involvement with Orthodoxy Clergy and blasphemy. Likewise, a childhood diagnosis of "nerve illness" in her mother's words is believed by some to be schizophrenia.[209] Due to the fame surrounding Zoya after her death, biographical details have most assuredly been subject to either exaggeration or excessive scrutiny, and are thus extremely difficult to pin down objectively.

Manshuk Mametova

Manshuk Zhiengalikyzy Mametova was born in the Ural region of present-day Kazakhstan in October 1922; her childhood was spent in Alma-Ata in the care of an aunt, her parents having either died or been arrested. She completed two years of a medical education at Alma-Ata Medical Institute before volunteering for the war. In 1942, she left the Kazakh SSR as part of the 100th Rifle Brigade, also known as the 100th Kazakh Rifle Brigade[210] - first as a clerk, then a nurse, and finally as a machine-gunner with the rank of senior sergeant. She died at the age of 18 during the Battle of Nevel in Western Russia, 15 October 1943.[211] It was due to her actions at Nevel that she earned the Hero of the Soviet Union in 1944, being one of two Central Asian women to receive the award.[212]

---

[209] "Prominent Russians: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya."; Валентина Кученкова, "КРЕСТНЫЙ ПУТЬ СЕЛЬСКОГО СВЯЩЕННИКА ПЕТРА КОСМОДЕМЬЯНСКОГО (1872-1918)," n.d., https://web.archive.org/web/20081020094524/http://mir.voskres.ru/mirbo07/a22.html.

[210] She is also said to have been a member of the 21st Rifle Division of the 3rd Guard Shock Army. "Manshuk Mametova," QAZAQSTAN TARIHY, n.d., https://e-history.kz/en/prominent-figures/show/12734/.

[211] "Love and Heroism: Interesting Facts about Kazakh Machine Gunner Manshuk Mametova," Kazakh TV, May 5, 2020, https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/society/page_212142_love-and-heroism-interesting-facts-about-kazakh-machine-gunner-manshuk-mametova; "Manshuk Mametova."

[212] "In 1982 the Manshuk Mametova's Memorial House and Museum Was Opened in Uralsk," QAZAQSTAN TARIHY, n.d., https://e-history.kz/en/calendar/show/27996/?sphrase_id=1534.

Appendix C - Mnemonic Regime and Actor Typology[213]

Actor Type	Description	Regime Type	Description
Mnemonic Warrior	"View themselves as the protagonists in a discourse that they construct about the past and how they are expected to relate to other types of actors who are assumed to populate the field of memory politics. Us vs them."	Pillarized regime	"Memory politics which accommodates competing visions and provides a platform for a dialogue among them."
Mnemonic Pluralist	"In addition to "us" and our vision of history, there are "them" with their own vision of the past, and both are entitled to their own visions."	Official regime	"Formulation and propagation that involve the intensive participation of state institutions and/or political society (the authorities and major political actors such as parties, who are organized to hold and contest state power."
Mnemonic Abnegator	They are "either uninterested in memory politics or simply resist involvement in it. One reason for this abnegation may be that dwelling on certain memory issues could be irrelevant given current social or	Fractured regime	"When a mnemonic warrior enters a debate on a particular issue, and there is an intention to draw a sharp line between "true" versions of the past and "false" version being propagated."

[213] Nari Shelekpayev, "Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration Ed. by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik," *Ab Imperio* 3 (January 2015): 368–75, https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2015.0079: Kubik and Bernhard, 11-18.

	political circumstances. Another reason may involve a conscious strategy of "purposive forgetting"".		
Mnemonic Prospectives	"Assert that they have solved the riddle of history and thus have the key to a better future." ... "They tend to instrumentalize their vision of the future instead of imposing one rooted in the past."	Unified regime	"Predicated on agreement over the interpretation of the past and thus are largely free of mnemonic conflicts."

Bibliography

Visual Media

Kukrynisky. *Tanya*. 1942. Underpainting. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/12/01/to-be-great-again-russia-resurrects-soviet-legends-a56380.

Kurtunovoy, Yulia. *Statue of Manshuk Mametova*. n.d. Photograph of Statue. https://tengrinews.kz/userdata/images/u359/resized/7985c2f9a7c19468c080e80db9084582.jpg.

Monument to Manshuk Mametova in Nevel, Russia. n.d. Photograph. https://nevelikc.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CIMG8696.jpg.

Monument to Manshuk Mametova in Uralsk, Kazakhstan. October 23, 2018. Photograph. http://novoetv.kz/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%88%D1%83%D0%BA-%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%BC%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA-%D0%A3%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D0%BA.jpg.

Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyankaya in Novodevichy Cemetery. Photograph. Accessed September 3, 2020. https://i1.wp.com/shtorm777.ru/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/zoya-kosmodemyanskaya-5.jpg.

Monument to Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in the Village of Petrishchevo. November 29, 2016. Photograph. https://www.gazeta.ru/science/photo/zoya_kosmodemyanskaya.shtml.

Statue of Manshuk Mametova before the Museum of Manshuk Mametova in Uralsk, Kazakhstan. n.d. Photograph. https://www.komandirovka.ru/upload/save_file19/774/7740039981a93ab3ea515a7836b457c7.jpg.

Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Kyiv, Ukraine. September 5, 2016. Photograph. https://icdn.lenta.ru/images/2016/09/05/19/20160905191343322/pic_1c9f36ba52e8d9aaf684467be2831902.jpg.

Statue of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Osino-Gay, Tambov Oblast, Russia. n.d. Photograph. https://histrf.ru/lichnosti/pamyatnie-mesta/place/item-204.

Strunnikov, Sergey. *Photograph of the Corpse of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya*. January 1942. Photograph. http://waralbum.ru/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/zoya.jpg.

Unknown. *Execution of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Petrischevo*. 1943. Photograph. https://img.gazeta.ru/files3/905/10383905/upload-09-pic905v-895x505-800.jpeg.

———. *Execution of Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya in Petrischevo*. 1943. Photograph. https://img.gazeta.ru/files3/911/10383911/upload-10-pic905v-895x505-31957.jpg.

Primary Sources

QAZAQSTAN TARIHY. "In 1982 the Manshuk Mametova's Memorial House and Museum Was Opened in Uralsk," n.d. https://e-history.kz/en/calendar/show/27996/?sphrase_id=1534.

QAZAQSTAN TARIHY. "In Rememberance of the World War II," May 11, 2018. https://e-history.kz/en/news/show/7136/.

Kosmodemyanskaya, Lybov. *The Story of Zoya and Shura*. Translated by Mike Bessler. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953. http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/story-zoya-shura/index.htm.

Kazakh TV. "Love and Heroism: Interesting Facts about Kazakh Machine Gunner Manshuk Mametova," May 5, 2020. https://kazakh-tv.kz/en/view/society/page_212142_love-and-heroism-interesting-facts-about-kazakh-machine-gunner-manshuk-mametova.

QAZAQSTAN TARIHY. "Manshuk Mametova," n.d. https://e-history.kz/en/prominent-figures/show/12734/.

Mokritiskiy, Sergey. *Battle for Sevastopol*. 20th Century Fox, 2015.

Semey Medical University. "Museum of 'Hero of Soviet Union Manshuk Mametova' and 'History of University.'" Academic, n.d. https://semeymedicaluniversity.kz/en/about-us/structure/academic-work/museum-of-hero-of-soviet-union-manshuk-mametova-and-history-of-university/.

Pavlichenko, Lyudmila. *Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*. Translated by David Foreman. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018.

"President Tokaev Committed to Memory of World War II, Won't Tolerate USSR Role Revisionism." *The Astana Times*, May 5, 2020, sec. International.

https://astanatimes.com/2020/05/president-tokaev-committed-to-memory-of-world-war-ii-wont-tolerate-ussr-revisionism/.

Russiapedia. “Prominent Russians: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya,” n.d. https://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/history-and-mythology/zoya-kosmodemyanskaya/.

The Moscow Times. “Putin Publishes Essay on ‘Real Lessons’ of WWII: Russian President Attacks European Narrative of WWII, Days before Rescheduled Victory Day Parade.,” June 18, 2020. https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/06/18/putin-publishes-essay-on-real-lessons-of-wwii-a70623.

Putin, Vladimir. “Vladimir Putin: The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II.” The National Interest, June 18, 2020. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vladimir-putin-real-lessons-75th-anniversary-world-war-ii-162982?page=0%2C1.

Shayakhemetova, Zhanna. “President Tokayev Exclusive Interview: Kazakhstan Must Lead Effort To Improve Relations With Neighbors.” *The Astana Times*, May 4, 2020, sec. International. https://astanatimes.com/2020/05/president-tokayev-exclusive-interview-kazakhstan-must-lead-effort-to-improve-relations-with-neighbors/.

Ukraine Crisis Media Center. “Ukrainian Film Heads the Top-10 Weekend Box Office in Ukraine,” August 9, 2017. https://uacrisis.org/en/60164-ukrainian-film-heads-top-10-weekend-box-office-ukraine.

Civic Nation. “Vandalism,” 2017. https://civic-nation.org/ukraine/society/glorification_of_nazism/vandalism/.

Zhanataykzy, Maral. “Nation Remembers Warrior Women of the Great Steppe.” *The Astana Times*, March 13, 2013, sec. People. https://astanatimes.com/2013/03/nation-remembers-warrior-women-of-the-great-steppe/.

Zhukova, Yulia. *Girl with a Sniper Rifle: An Eastern Front Memoir*. Translated by David Foreman. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2019.

“Zoya’s Story,” n.d. http://gammacloud.org/features/zoya/home.html.

Амител, ИА. “Подвиг Зои Космодемьянской: правда и ложь,” September 13, 2019. https://www.amic.ru/news/317502/.

———. “Почему Андрей Бильжо назвал Зою Космодемьянскую шизофреничкой?,” December 19, 2016. https://www.amic.ru/voprosdnya/377705/.

Бегалин, Мажит. *Песнь о Маншука*, 1969. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KAECX51rBJ8.

Бильжо, Андрей. “Диагноз недели с доктором Бильжо: Мединский никакой не историк, а 29-й панфиловец и есть.” *The Insider*, December 9, 2016. https://theins.ru/opinions/38959.

“Больше Памяти о Большой Победе Благодаря Инновациям,” May 19, 2020, sec. Аналитика и комментарии. https://e-cis.info/news/566/86959/.

Буккер, Игорь. “Лики войны: Людмила Павличенко, героиня США.” *Правда.ру*, December 23, 2019. https://nasledie.pravda.ru/1120842-pavlichenko/.

“В Киеве вандалы разрисовали и повалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской.” *Лента.ру*, 2016, sec. Украина. https://lenta.ru/news/2016/09/05/vandals/.

“В Киеве разрисовали и свалили памятник Зое Космодемьянской.” *Взгляд; Деловая газета*, 2016. https://vz.ru/news/2016/9/5/830758.html.

Український Інститут Національної Пам’яті. “‘ВІЙНА НЕ РОБИТЬ ВИНЯТКІВ. ЖІНОЧІ ІСТОРІЇ ДРУГОЇ СВІТОВОЇ’. ІНФОРМАЦІЙНІ МАТЕРІАЛИ ДЛЯ ЗМІ ДО ВШАНУВАНЬ 8-9 ТРАВНЯ 2016 РОКУ,” 2020 2016. https://old.uinp.gov.ua/news/viina-ne-robit-vinyatkiv-zhinochi-istorii-drugoi-svitovoi-informatsiini-materiali-dlya-zmi-do-v?q=news/viina-ne-robit-vinyatkiv-zhinochi-istorii-drugoi-svitovoi-informatsiini-materiali-dlya-zmi-do-v.

Галина, Галя. “Дочь Ленинграда.” Accessed July 25, 2020. https://www.np.kz/2010/04/16/doch_leningrada.html.

Одеський краэзнавець. “Героини обороны Одессы Нина Онилова и Людмила Павличенко,” n.d. http://kraevedodessa.blogspot.com/2014/03/25.html.

Дюсенгулова, Рабига. “Автор ответила критикам деревянной Маншук Маметовой.” *Tengrinews*, November 4, 2019. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/avtor-otvetila-kritikam-derevyannoy-manshuk-mametovoy-383195/.

———. “Деревянную скульптуру Маншук Маметовой убрали из парка Семея.” *Tengrinews*, November 4, 2019. https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/derevyannuyu-skulpturu-manshuk-mametovoy-ubrali-parka-semeya-383237/.

Еременко, С.Б. “К вопросу о потерях противоборствующих сторон на советско-германском фронте в годы Великой Отечественной войны: правда и вымысел.” Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. Accessed September 3, 2020. http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/history/more.htm?id=11359251@cmsArticle.

“Зоя Космодемьянская. Правда о подвиге.” *История*. Россия Телеканал, April 1, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwYC1OYRvHY.

Игсатова, Дина. “У войны не женское лицо...” Республиканский общество-политический журнал, June 3, 2019. http://mysl.kazgazeta.kz/?p=13613.

Кученкова, Валентина. “КРЕСТНЫЙ ПУТЬ СЕЛЬСКОГО СВЯЩЕННИКА ПЕТРА КОСМОДЕМЬЯНСКОГО (1872-1918),” n.d. https://web.archive.org/web/20081020094524/http://mir.voskres.ru/mirbo07/a22.html.

“Легенды Великой Отечественной. Зоя Космодемьянская,” April 5, 2006. http://web.archive.org/web/20051227015937/http://www.smi.ru/05/04/05/3442763.html.

Марущак, Александр. “В центре Киева исчез памятник партизанке.” *Сегодня*, 2016, sec. Происшествия. https://www.segodnya.ua/kiev/kaccidents/v-centre-kieva-ischez-pamyatnik-partizanke-749077.html.

Роль Женщин в великой отчественной воине. “ПИСЬМО КОМАНДИРА ПУЛЕМЕТНОГО РАСЧЕТА Н. А. ОНИЛОВОЙ,” n.d. http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/8/i80_302.htm.

Руднева, Л. “Людмила Павличенко.” Роль Женщин в великой отчественной воине, n.d. http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/11/i80_128.htm.

Orient Solutions. “С Днем Победы! О Казахстанских Героях.,” May 8, 2019. http://ors.kz/company/news/2016/.

“Свидетель казни: Зоя Космодемьянская с эшафота призывала немцев сдаться.” *Вести в субботу*. Россия 24, December 17, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_Y1opRXYJs.

“«Тайны. Судьбы. Имена». Маншүк Маметова.” *Тайны. Судьбы. Имена*. Хабар, n.d. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=35MfD6vziRs&t=303s.

Роль Женщин в великой отчественной воине. “У ПОЛЬСКИХ МСТИТЕЛЕЙ,” n.d. http://www.a-z.ru/women_cd2/12/2/i80_181.htm.

Фрэз, И, and В Сухобоков. *Зоя*, 1944. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeoehc-b1PI.

Secondary Sources

Alexievich, Svetlana. *The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II*. Translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. New York: Random House, 2017.

Anagnostopoulou, Margaret Poulos. "From Heroines to Hyenas: Women Partisans during the Greek Civil War." *Contemporary European History* 10, no. 3 Theme Issue: Gender and War in Europe c. 1918-1949 (November 2001): 481–501.

Antonova, Natalia. "Russia's Role in WWII Isn't 'Part of Our Collective Memory.'" The World, May 9, 2019. https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-05-09/russia-s-role-wwii-isn-t-part-our-collective-memory.

———. "The Life and Myths of Lyudmila Pavlichenko, Soviet Russia's Deadliest Sniper." The World, March 9, 2018. https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-03-09/life-and-myths-lyudmila-pavlichenko-soviet-russias-deadliest-sniper.

Arbuckle, Alex Q. "1942-1945: Soviet Women Snipers." Mashable, n.d. https://mashable.com/2016/07/30/soviet-women-snipers/.

Bonnell, Victoria E. "The Representation of Women in Early Soviet Political Art." *The Russian Review* 50, no. 3 (July 1991): 267–88.

Bronfen, Elisabeth. *Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic*. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Bucur, Maria. *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Bucur, Maria, and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds. *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies. Indiana University Press, 2006.

Bunk, Brian D. *Ghosts of Passion: Martyrdom, Gender, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007.

Carmack, Roberto. “History and Hero-Making: Patriotic Narratives and the Sovietization of Kazakh Front-Line Propaganda, 1941-1945.” *Central Asian Survey* 33, no. 1 (2014): 95–112.

———. *Kazakhstan in World War II: Mobilization and Ethnicity in the Soviet Empire*. University Press of Kansas, 2019.

Clyman, Toby W., and Judith Vowles, eds. “Introduction.” In *Russia Through Women’s Eyes: Autobiographies from Tsarist Russia*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 19696.

Einhorn, Barbara. *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe*. London and New York: Verso, 1993.

Froula, Anna. “Free a Man to Fight: The Figure of the Female Soldier in World War II Popular Culture.” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 2, no. 2 (2009): 153–65.

Galiev, Anuar. “Mythologization of History and the Invention of Tradition in Kazakhstan.” *Oriente Moderno*, Nuova Serie, 96, no. 1 (2016): 46–63.

Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Translated by Lewis A Coser. 1st ed. Heritage of Sociology Series. University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Harris, Adrienne. “The Lives and Deaths of a Soviet Saint in the Post-Soviet Period: The Case of Zoia Kosmodem’ianskaia.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne Des Slavistes* 53, no. 2/4 (December 2011): 273–304.

———. “Memorializations of a Martyr and Her Mutilated Bodies: Public Monuments to Soviet War Hero Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, 1942 to the Present.” *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 5, no. 1 (2012): 73–90.

———. “The Myth of the Woman Warrior and World War II in Soviet Culture.” Doctoral Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008.

———. “Yulia Drunina: The ‘Blond-Braided Soldier’ on the Poetic Front.” *The Slavic and East European Journal* 54, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 643–65.

King, Gilbert. “Eleanor Roosevelt and the Soviet Sniper.” *Smithsonian Magazine*, February 21, 2013. https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/eleanor-roosevelt-and-the-soviet-sniper-23585278/.

Kirschenbaum, Lisa A. “‘The Alienated Body’: Gender Identity and the Memory of the Siege of Leningrad.” In *Gender and War in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*, 220–34. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Kobchenko, Kateryna. “Women’s Faces of Ukrainian Contemporary Memory of World War II as Exemplified by Kyiv Urban Space.” Heinrich Böll Stiftung Foundation, May 15, 2020. https://ua.boell.org/en/2020/05/15/zhinochi-oblichchya-suchasnoi-pamyati-ukrainciv-pro-drugu-svitovu-viynu-na-prikladi.

Krieger, Ski. “Victory Day in Kazakhstan: Bittersweet Memories of WWII.” Travelmag, February 4, 2020. https://www.travelmag.co.uk/2020/02/victory-day-in-kazakhstan-bittersweet-memories-of-wwii/.

Kristeva, Julia. *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Kubik, Jan, and Michael Bernhard. “A Theory of the Politics of Memory.” In *Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration*, 7–34. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Le Bon, Gustave. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 2002.

“Lyudmila Pavlichenko ‘Lady Death’: History’s Deadliest Female Sniper.” AETN UK, 2020. https://www.history.co.uk/article/lyudmila-pavlichenko-lady-death-historys-deadliest-female-sniper.

Markwick, Roger D. “‘A Sacred Duty’: Red Army Women Veterans Remembering the Great Fatherland War, 1941-1945.” *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 54, no. 3 (2008): 403–20.

Markwick, Roger D., and Euridice Charon Cardona. *Soviet Women on the Frontline In the Second World War*. Hampshire: Palgravee Macmillian, 2012.

Merridale, Catherine. *Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945*. Picador, 2006.

Narottum, Sunil Kumar. “Politics of Nation-Building and State-Formation in Kazakhstan.” *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 2 (April 2006): 49–71.

Olcott, Martha Brill. “Kazakhstan’s Soviet Legacy.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 20, 2011. https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/30/kazakhstan-s-soviet-legacy-pub-46096.

———. *The Kazakhs*. Second. Studies of Nationalities. Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1987.

Pinkham, Sophie. "Leninopad: Double Agents in Kyiv." *N+1*, Winter 2016. https://nplusonemag.com/issue-24/ukraine-supplement/leninopad/.

Pisch, Anita. "Stalin Saves the World - Stalin and the Evolution of the Warrior and Saviour Archetypes." In *The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929-1953: Archetypes, Inventions and Fabrications*. ANU Press, 2016.

Platt, Jonathan Brooks. "Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya between Sacrifice and Extermination." *New Formations*, 2016, 48–70. https://doi.org/10.398/newf:89/90.03.2016.

Poe, Edgar Allan. "The Philosophy of Composition." In *The Selected Writings of Edgar Allan Poe*, edited by G.R. Thompson, 675–84. New York: Norton, 2004.

Pregler, Martin. "Foreword." In *Lady Death: The Memoirs of Stalin's Sniper*, by Lyudmila Pavlichenko, ix–xiii. Yorkshire: Greenhill Books, 2018.

Qualls, Karl D. "Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol after World War II." *Dickinson College Faculty Publications* Paper 1 (2011). https://scholar.dickinson.edu/faculty_publications/1.

Regamey, Amandine. "Falsehood in the War in Ukraine: The Legend of Women Snipers." *Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Socities*, no. 17 (2016): 1–29.

Reid, Anna. "Introduction." In *Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union's WWII Sniper Corps*, by Lyuba Vinogradova, 15–20. New York and London: MacLehose Press, 2017.

Rickleton, Chris. "Kazakhstan: World War II Parade Puts Local Authorities in a Bind." Eurasianet, May 10, 2018. https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-world-war-ii-parade-puts-local-authorities-in-a-bind.

Rieff, David. *In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies*. Yale University Press, 2016.

Shaw, Charles. "Making Ivan-Uzbek: War, Friendship of the Peoples, and the Creation of Soviet Uzbekistan, 1941-1945." Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2015. https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Shaw_berkeley_0028E_15628.pdf.

Shelekpayev, Nari. "Twenty Years after Communism: The Politics of Memory and Commemoration Ed. by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik." *Ab Imperio* 3 (January 2015): 368–75. https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2015.0079.

Strobl, Ingrid. *Partisanas: Women in the Armed Resistance to Fascism and German Occupation (1936-1945)*. Translated by Paul Sharkey. Edinburgh, Oakland, West Virginia: AK Press, 2008.

Tippner, Anja. "Girls in Combat: Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia and the Image of Young Soviet Wartime Heroines." *The Russian Review* 73 (July 2014): 371–88.

Verdery, Katherine. *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Vinogradova, Lyuba. *Avenging Angels: Young Women of the Soviet Union's WWII Sniper Corps*. Translated by Arch Tait. MacLehose Press, 2017.

Winter, Jay. *Remembering War: The Great War Between Historical Memory and History in the Twentieth Century*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006.

Wolfe, Thomas C. "Past as Present, Myth, or History? Discourses of Time and the Great Fatherland War." In *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, 249–83. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006.

Сактаганова, З. Г., and К. К. Абдрахманова. "Советская и современная казахстанская историография проблемы «Женщины Казахстана в годы Великой Отечественной войны»." *Вестник КарГУ*, 2018. https://articlekz.com/article/29617.

Соловьева, Екатерина. Могилы с ромашками. Как женщины жили и умирали на войне. Accessed July 25, 2020. https://histrf.ru/biblioteka/b/moghily-s-romashkami-kak-zhienshchiny-zhili-i-umirali-na-voinie.