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**THE PRESERVATION OF OLD BELIEF IN ESTONIA:  
SOCIAL CAPITAL AS END AND MEANS OF PUBLIC  
POLICY**

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Master of Arts in Public Administration and Social Policy

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# INTRODUCTION

Old Believers represent a small ethno-confessional minority in Estonia. Unlike members of the Russian Orthodox Church, Old Believers adhere to the Christian traditions that existed in the Church before the Schism until the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Old Believers have been living in Estonia since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, and hence, they have accumulated tangible and intangible heritage. Therefore, Old Belief is an important cultural phenomenon in the context of Estonian and European culture. Religious assimilation and, more specifically, “symbolic violence” threaten the continuity of Old Belief. Social capital, which at the most general level means an asset made of social interactions that help individuals to perform common action, may be one possible solution for the preservation of Old Belief.

The objective of this thesis is to research social capital formation in Old Believers’ congregations with regards to the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia.

The thesis is divided into three parts. First, I consider the genesis of Old Belief and the present situation of Old Believers in Estonia. I also pay special attention to the complexity of the historical relationships that have existed between Old Believers and public institutions. Second, I present the theoretical framework I use for the analysis. Theory distinguishes bonding, bridging and linking types of social capital that reflect the specifics of human collaboration at horizontal and vertical levels. Social capital evolves from a purely academic to a more politics- and policy-centred concept that reflects its potential as a policy objective and tool. Regarding the latter, government has a different role and scope of intervention in social capital formation that should rely on analysis. Additionally, I devote attention to the specifics of social capital in religious congregations. Third, I describe the research method I use, which is qualitative. I interviewed 22 persons and the sample was composed according to a “snow ball” technique. Data was collected by means of a semi-structured questionnaire based on open questions. I interviewed respondents in person in their natural environment (excluding one phone interview and one interview by e-mail). I analysed data by means of

discourse analysis. Further, relying on the “state-synergy” approach towards social capital formation, I raise the following hypotheses:

(H1) Old Believers rely on bonding social capital that undermines their ability to preserve cultural heritage.

(H2) Old Believers lack in bridging social capital that is crucial for the preservation of heritage at horizontal level;

(H3) Linking social capital plays an essential role in the preservation of Old Belief, which implies the importance of government intervention.

Finally, I represent, discuss and summarise the results.

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# 1. OVERVIEW OF OLD BELIEF

## 1.1. THE SCHISM IN RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY IN THE 17<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

In general, Old Believers and Orthodox Christians have a common theological background but disagree on traditions. Whereas Old Believers adhere to rituals, liturgy and ceremonials adopted in 988, Russian Orthodox Christians conform to the rules changed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century (see appendix 1 for details).

Patriarch Nikon (1605-1681) uniformed the rites according to the Greek Orthodox Church. The Russian Church anathematised believers who rejected reforms in 1666-1667 and the government persecuted them by law, unequal rights and imprisonment. For example, according to 12 decrees published by the Tsarina Sofia, individuals who promoted old traditions had to be tortured and burned and those who followed old traditions had to be whipped and exiled. Peter the Great levied double taxation and a special tax for wearing a beard for Old Believers. Nicholas I, whose ruling principles were “autocracy”, “Orthodoxy” and “nationality”, initiated wide arrests and imprisonment of Old Believers. Tsar Nicholas II signed an Act of Tolerance in 1905, which formally put the persecutions of all religious minorities in Russia to an end. The Old Believers were given the right to build churches, hold processions and organise themselves. Still, some restrictions were preserved; e.g. Old Believers had no right to join civil service (Melnikov 1999). Besides that, only in 1971 did the Church adopt the decision that the Holy Synod made in 1929. Ultimately, both old and new traditions were acknowledged as equally valid. The anathema was repealed and Nikon’s reforms were characterised as “abrupt and hasty breaking of the Russian Church ceremonials” (Kutuzov 1992). This section discerns three versions of the Schism: a) the “official version”, b) the Old Believers’ approach and c) the alternative explanation in terms of technological progress.

First, the state and dominating class stereotyped Old Believers as ignorant and illiterate because they disobeyed Nikon's reforms. For example, Bulgakov (1900/1994) writes that Nikon decided to rewrite religious books because Church Slavonic texts were contradictory and inaccurate. Poor education and overall ignorance fostered the negative attitude to the reform that negated true Christian spirituality and traditions. The famous Russian historian Solovjev (1851-1879/1995) characterised Old Believers as "narrow-minded" and "with immature soul" or as Kljuchevski (1904/1993: 390) wrote in his classical history of Russia, "Some Russians were suspicious and arrogant about using rational and scientific approach to religion".

Second, Old Believers did not accept corrections because of their origin. In 1054, the Christian Church split up into the Western Catholic Church in Rome and the Eastern Orthodox Church with its centre in Constantinople under the patronage of the Byzantine emperors. Looking for protection from the Turks, Byzantine had to develop close social and economic relations with the Catholic Church. For example, an Old Believer Prozorov (1933/2002: 14) writes that Greeks printed religious books in Venice and Catholic editors corrected them. Orthodox Greeks studied in Catholic monasteries and schools. What is more, under the threat of a Turkish invasion, the Greek Church made the Council of Florence with the Catholic Church in 1439. The Greek Church recognised the domination of the Catholic dogma and accepted the authority of Rome while preserving Orthodox ceremonies. Russian clergy and Grand Duke Vasily the Dark accused the Council of betraying Orthodoxy. After the Turks, the Ottomans conquered Byzantine in 1453 and the theory of Moscow as the third Rome (centre of the authentic Orthodox Christianity) spread in Russia. This theory preserved the Russian life style, cultural and religious traditions. However, in its extreme form, the theory supported cultural isolationism and alienation in foreign policy. Nevertheless, the adoption of Greek religious traditions and texts, which Catholics obviously corrected, was equal to heresy and renunciation from true Orthodoxy.

Lobachev (2003: 115) argues that the origins of the Schism are open for methodological reasons. According to the socio-political aspect, the development of Russian absolutism and centralisation caused the unification of religious traditions. Others tend to think that Russian foreign policy facilitated reforms. For the consolidating Moscow dynasty wanted to rule Ukraine and Belarus, which required the religious unification of the Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Greek Churches. Additionally, some scholars analysed the personality of Nikon and his ambitions as the engine of reformation. In fact, as Lobachev contends, the process of centralisation already began in Russia in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. What is more, the Stoglavnyi Council unified rituals without contradictions in 1557. Finally, the Tsar, nobles and religious leaders had an interest in reforms. After Nikon was overthrown and accused of disloyalty, the elite sustained the result achieved by Nikon. Therefore, Lobachev (2003: 31, 49, 116) suggests concentrating on the cultural context of Nikon's reforms. For Russia experienced a cultural renaissance after the Times of Trouble that particularly facilitated the development of typographies. In comparison to manuscripts, printed literature became a cheaper and faster way for spreading religious ideas among the population. Consequently, corrections became an essential part of the technological process – printing identical copies. The publisher had to compare manuscripts in order to print the final version, which raised the question about the original. Numerous Ukrainian and Belarusian translations of Grecian religious texts were dissimilar. Therefore, correctors went back to the original texts in Greek. The Tsar supported the printing of Grecian literature in Russia after the relations between the Greek and Russian Churches normalised. The Schism was a rather natural result of the changes in the cultural life and the technological progress where adherents and opponents of Nikon's reform referred to different originals.

Overall, notwithstanding the “naturalness” of the Schism argued by Lobochev or the ideological contestation between adherents of the old and new traditions, the state was the first who supported Nikon's reforms and ensured their further implementation that tried to assimilate the disobedient group of believers by physical force or ideology.

### 1.1.1 Old Believers' denominations and agreements

Old Believers do not constitute a single and monolithic religious group. Even though Old Believers appeared to be opposed to Nikon's reforms, social contradictions and internal struggle divided the believers into multiply groups and subgroups with notable differences in interpretations and religious practice (Tayevski 13 April 2006). First of all, Old Believers are divided into two *soglasie* or agreements/concords: priestist – Popovtsy and non-priestist – Bespopovtsy. The Popovtsy have a religious hierarchy and priests. In general, this denomination differs from the Orthodox Church only in ceremonials and liturgy that remained unchanged. The Popovtsy accept all seven sacraments<sup>1</sup> as the Russian Orthodox Church does including the Eucharist. Contrary to that, the Bespopovtsy do not have priests and they accept only some sacraments. The Bespopovtsy argue that as Nikon destroyed clergy, new priests do not have the holiness traditionally transferred from one generation to another. Instead, the Bespopovtsy have preceptors or mentors that each congregation individually chooses. Unlike Popovtsy, Bespopovtsy accept only some sacraments because some sacraments can only be performed by a priest. Thus, Bespopovtsy do not have the Eucharist. The Bespopovtsy denomination has various teachings or *tolks*. The most widespread in Russia are Pomortsy, Fedoseevtsy, Chasovennye, Spasovcy, Fillipovcy, (see Map of Old Believers' agreements). For example, Pomortsy accept Baptising, Confession and Marriage. Fedoseevtsy used to reject Marriage and accept Confession and Baptising. Additionally, many minor groups and break-off sects with some extreme religious practices and social life emerged and have either completely or almost disappeared by the end of the 20th century. Consider Skoptzy who practice castration to attain salvation from the sin of sexual activity. Beguny (Runaways) rejected any official papers, civil responsibilities and obligations as a symbol of the Antichrist. Dyrniky (“Hole-worshippers”) rejected icons and prayed looking in the hole made in the eastern corner under the ceiling. “Mainstream” Old Believers, however, did not consider members of these groups Old Believers (Tayevski, 12 April 2006).

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<sup>1</sup> Baptism, Chrismation, Confession, The Eucharist, Holy Unction, Ordination and Marriage

## 1.2. OLD BELIEVERS IN ESTONIA

There are two versions of the origins of Old Believers in Estonia. According to the mainstream version maintained by Richter (1996), Ponomareva (1999) and Plaat (2004), Old Believers fled from Russia to western coastline of Peipsi Lake, which is called Prichudie in Russian or Peipsiääre in Estonian<sup>2</sup>, hiding away from persecutions. Savihin (2005) argues, however, that Russians already lived in Prichudie before the Schism. To put it differently, the local population merely remained true to old rites and did not migrate from Russia at least massively as above-mentioned opponents argue.

Richter (1996: 72) argues that whereas an Eastern-Slavic tribe called Krivichy could have lived in the eastern part of the Peipsi Lake in the 9<sup>th</sup> century and Russian fishermen visited this region in the 13-14<sup>th</sup> centuries, Old Believers settled down at the western coastline only in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Ponomareva (1999: 32) specifies that the first Old Believers came to the western coastline near Mustvee in the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Savihin (2005) contends that the core of future Old Believers already lived in Estonia in the Swedish period, 1558–1710. For example, the population census conducted before the Schism in 1638 showed that natives of Russia and Orthodox believers constituted about 15% (20% according to Plaat 2004: 9) of the local population in the Tartu bishopric, which the western Peipsi coastline belonged to. Under the control of Sweden and Lutheran ideology, Nikon's reforms could not affect local Orthodox believers and a large group of Russians could not freely immigrate to Estonia. No data confirms migration of Russians to Estonia in this period. Later, however, when Russia won the North War (1700-1721) and conquered Estonia, Old Believers started migrating to Estonia as an already formed religious minority. Overall, the main difference between these approaches is that the former concentrates on Old Believers as a religious group and the latter stresses Old Believers as a Russian minority in Estonia.

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<sup>2</sup> Lake Chudskoe or Peipsi as it is called in Estonian is a water boarder between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia.

The state tried to assimilate Old Believers in Prichudie by force and ideology. Ponomareva (1999: 33) writes that the Rāpino monastery was destroyed in 1719 by military force. A false report about fugitive soldiers hiding in the monastery served as a pretext. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, authorities tried to fortify Orthodoxy by building new churches and initiating criminal proceedings against Old Believers; Old Believers were baptised according to Orthodox traditions. What is more, it was prohibited to marry, baptise and bury according to their traditions. Furthermore, the state power continued persecutions in the times of the Estonian Republic (1918-1940) and Soviet occupation (1941-1991). Plaat (2004: 11) writes that on the one hand, Old Believers received larger religious freedom in 1918-1940 in comparison to Tsarist Russia. However, the Estonian government prohibited celebrating church feasts according to the old calendar in 1932. The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church supervised Old Believers who refused to accept this change. Consequently, relations with authorities became so critical that Old Believers' worshipping places were closed down and some mentors were deported in 1935. After Old Believers sent a petition to the president, the situation received a peaceful solution favourable to Old Believers. Therefore, despite the hostile state policy, Old Believers did not respond in a similar way, e.g. riots, strikes etc. To the contrary, Old Believers used rather civil methods. What is more, it is an acknowledged historical fact (Richter 1996, Ponomareva 1999, Plaat 2004) that Russian Old Believers were loyal Estonian citizens and spoke Estonian. Furthermore, under the Soviet regime, the law, the NKVD and later the KGB restricted and controlled the activity of religious associations. Not explaining the phenomenon, Plaat (2004: 16) writes that the central authorities did not consider Old Believers dangerous in 1947-1948, which excluded repressions. Still, considering the data critically, Plaat says that the number of Old Believers by faith ceased from 1,600 in 1961 to 600 persons in 1989. Ultimately, Old Believers' revival in Estonia began in the 1990s (Ponomareva 1999: 44) after Estonia became an independent democratic state that guaranteed the freedom of religious affiliation and activity.

Regarding the present geographic situation, precise number of Old Believers is unknown. The last population census in 2000 provides information about 2,515 Old Believers ([www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee)). The data represents persons (15 years old, adults and persons with unspecified age) who certified their religious affiliation as Old Belief. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (31 December 1999) provides statistics about 5,000 persons registered in 11 Old Believers' congregations in 1999. The total number of Old Believers might be around 11,000 or even as high as 15,000 persons (Ponomareva 1999). As one may see, the vast majority of Old Believers live in the Harju, Tartu and Jõgeva counties (see appendix 2, figure 1). Except for the cities of Tallinn and Tartu, Old Believers traditionally inhabit rural areas and live in small towns and villages along the western coastline of Peipsi Lake. These are Varnja, Kasepää, Suur and Väike Kolkja in the Peipsiääre parish; Raja and Kükita in the Kasepää parish; Piiri, Saare, Tooni in the Piirissaare parish; Mustvee and Kallaste town (see appendix 2, figure 2 and 3). According to the official statistics ([www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee)), 23% of the total Estonian population was affiliated to a certain religion in 2000 (11% Lutherans, 10% Orthodox). Therefore, the small number of officially registered Old Believers, which might be 17-25% compared to the general population of Old Believers in Estonia, reflects the general trend of secularization in the society.

Nine Old Believers' congregations are located in Prichudie, one in Tartu and one in Tallinn. Ten congregations belong to the *Pomorian* teaching and one to the *Fedoseevskiy* teaching (Raja village). Additionally, Old Believers have two NGOs that represent the interest of their congregations and communities. These are the Estonian Union of Old Believers' Congregations (EUOBC) and the Society of Old Believers' Culture and Development (SOBCD). EUOBC has a coordinating role in religious issues. SOBCD has a socio-cultural role that concerns: 1) Culture and integration projects on Old Believers culture, the Old Slavic language; 2) Old Believers' culture Research projects; 3) Social projects; 4) The promotion of information exchange and communication between the Old Believers' Community in Estonia and the Estonian community through

publications, organising international events and conferences, and the official web site [www.starover.ee](http://www.starover.ee).

The proportion of Old Believers in comparison to the general population can be relatively large, at least in nine villages (Raja, Kükita, Suur and Väike Kolkja, Kasepää Piiri, Saare and Tooni) as table 1 shows.

**Table 1.** Population of Old Believers in Estonia, 2000

	Administrative unit	Actual population	Old Believers
1.	Tallinn	396,879	246
2.	Tartu	98,695	483
3.	Kallaste	1,195	342
4.	Mustvee town	1,744	243
5.	Raja village	471	128
6.	Kükita village	236	139
7.	Suur and Väike Kolkja	400	186
8.	Varnja village	258	106
9.	Kasepää village	276	149
10.	Piirissaare (Piiri, Saare, Tooni villages)	113	69

(Source: [www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee))

The small local governments in Prichudie, where Old Believers live, experience a disadvantaged socio-economic situation. First, according to the Ministry of Finance (2005 a, b), the Kasepää, Peipsiääre and Piirissaare municipalities are the poorest in a group of 47 poor municipalities in Estonia whose income per capita was below 3,000 Estonian crowns<sup>3</sup> in 2004. Mustvee and Kallaste are also the poorest in a group of 12 poor towns in Estonia<sup>4</sup> in 2004 whose income per capita was below 3,000 crowns (in 2004, the average salary was 7,287 crowns per capita [www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee)). What is more, the local economy, based on fishing and gardening,

<sup>3</sup> The average income in this group of municipalities is 2,649 Estonian crowns per capita. Kasepää, Peipsiääre and Piirissaare have respectably 1,769, 1,333 and 1,285 crowns per capita.

<sup>4</sup> The average income is 2,620 Estonian crowns per capita. The towns of Mustvee and Kallaste have respectably 2,220 and 1,834 crowns per capita.

cannot generate sufficient financial capital for the region. The gross salary of Estonian shore fishermen is on average 1,400-1,500 Estonian crowns per month. Fishing is an important additional source of income to pension to 90% of population which lives along Estonian coastline. Fishermen's income has not increased on average for the last 10 years. Those who work in fish-producing plants earn less than the average county salary (Kangur and Hämmäl 2005: 2). Up to 75% of the fishermen are solitary or small enterprises that cannot invest in fishing. Investors do not take the risk because fishing is seasonal (Peipsi fishery development programme 2004).

Second, according to Peipsi Veerearngu Foundation (31 January 2006) and Tuubel (2005: 7), the natural increase of the population is negative and the outflow of inhabitants is very high. The number of the local population in Prichudie has declined by up to 50% for the last 50 years. Pensioners constitute the majority in many villages. Precisely, the general population in the Western Peipsi region was 57,000 in 1970 and about 38,287 in 2004. Have a close look at table 2, which represents official statistics on population trends in Peipsiääre, Piirissaare, Kasepää, Kallaste and Mustvee.

**Table. 2** Number of total population in four municipalities, 1970, 1979, 1989 and 2005

Municipality	Population			
	1970	1979	1989	2005*
Peipsiääre parish	1,817	1,330	991	914
Piirissaare parish	308	193	106	90
Kasepää parish	2,058	1,843	1,622	1,350
Mustvee town	2,245	2,087	1,994	1,662
Kallaste town	1,798	1,431	1,361	1,166

(Source: Population of Estonia by Population Census 1995, I and [www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee)\*)

Third, Hankov, Sepp and Vildo (2004: 309) find that regional programmes in Estonia do not facilitate the development of poor or less developed municipalities. Analysing the GDP at the regional level in the period of 1996-2001, the scholars conclude that the less developed regions in Estonia are Northeastern and South Estonia (see appendix 2, figure 4). Poor local municipalities experience problems with European structure funds that require relatively much self-finance. It is possible to initiate projects in the unions of local governments but this is not popular.

Plaat (2004: 28-30) draws the following conclusions about Old Believers' identity: First, religion served as a basis for a common identity for most Old Believers in Prichudie up to the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After that, however, ethnic and linguistic identity became more significant for younger and middle-aged individuals. Second, the older generation of Old Believers is the prime group that keeps the traditions alive. Additionally, women constitute the majority of religiously active Old Believers. Third, descendents who identify with Old Believers' culture participate in religious activities rather on special occasions like big feasts and baptise children<sup>5</sup>. Overall, Plaat concludes that secularisation or religious assimilation is the main threat to Old Belief that other confessions face as well. At the same time, he acknowledges that the state power, as in the case of Tsarist Russia and the USSR, supported secularisation.

Overall, statistical data imply that the disadvantaged socio-economic development in Prichudie affects the preservation of Old Belief, and Varunin (2004: 309) stresses the "quality" of modern Old Believers in Estonia.

We do not know much of our own history and culture even now. Some things turned out to be fatally forgotten; some things were not called for or appreciated. Long closeness of the Old Belief, lack of its own scholars and hard times have had an impact on its destiny. Nobody and nothing is in our way now - would there be a

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<sup>5</sup> I should stress that declined religiousness is not a phenomenon that inheres to Old Believers in Estonia. Shahov (17 May 2006) reports that Old Believers in the Baikal area face a similar situation.

desire only. And, apparently, it is. There are Old Believers ready to work for preservation of their inheritance. There are scholars interested in studying our language and culture.

### 1.2.1 Need for Preservation of Small Cultures

Assimilation is one of the main threats to the continuity of small cultures like Old Belief (Plaat 2004). Assimilation is a process in which a minority continuously and ultimately loses the culture and religion that differentiate them from the dominant majority.

The EU and its member states' policies play a particular role in preventing assimilation. Briefly, policies support a growing cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, and reject assimilative methods under the pressure of academics, politicians and civil movements. Therefore, the EU acknowledges the positive outcomes of multiculturalism that is associated with tolerance, antiracism and anti-discrimination, the preservation of cultural heritage; equal treatment, employment, education, social services, economic activity and political representation. At the same time, taking into account the negative side of multiculturalism, opponents contend that it may jeopardise the national identity and core national societal values (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2005).

Assimilation can be either voluntary or forced, which in my opinion implies "symbolic violence". Plaat (2004: 29-30) implicitly refers to this phenomenon by arguing that secularisation and state policy negatively affected the religiousness and religious identity of Old Believers in Estonia. Bourdieu (1996: 167-168) argues, "Symbolic violence is the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity. I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such". "Symbolic violence" plays an essential role in the acquisition of cultural capital that an individual can transfer into social and economic capitals. Cultural capital is a system of symbolism and meanings that the dominant class imposes on a

subclass or minority in a given case by means of education. The pedagogical process is the main instrument that carries forward values considered universal and objective in society. Ultimately, by recognising and acquiring the dominant culture, members of a minority receive access to work in organisations controlled by the ruling class and wider social relations. Thus, minorities are not completely free to decide over their behaviour.

Regarding the potential negative outcomes of cultural assimilation to Old Believers, Estonian national legislation, cultural policy and ratified international conventions formally include Old Believers into the national policy-making process. The very fact that Old Believers have accumulated intangible<sup>6</sup> and tangible<sup>7</sup> cultural heritage in Estonia at least since the 17<sup>th</sup> century highlights the significance of Old Belief in both an Estonian and European context.

First, Estonian legislation provides Old Believers with the basic right of a religious, cultural and associational life. The ratified Universal declaration of human rights declares freedom for religious activity, a peaceful associational life and free participation in cultural life (Articles 18, 20, 27). Estonian Constitution § 49 enacts that everyone shall have the right to preserve his or her ethnic identity; and § 50 entitles minorities living in Estonia to cultural autonomy. In more detail, Law on Cultural Autonomy of Minorities (1993) stipulates that minorities that apply for cultural autonomy must live in Estonia, differ from ethnic population (ethnic origin, culture, language or religion), have durable connections with Estonia and wish to preserve their traditions, religion and language, which are the basis for their common identity. The law defines minorities as Germans, Swedes, Russians, Jews and others numbering over 3,000 persons. Therefore, taking into account the statistically registered number of Old Believers by faith and their descendants, Old Believers represent an ethnic, religious and cultural minority.

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<sup>6</sup> The practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated there with – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups (UNESCO 2003: 2).

<sup>7</sup> Monuments, groups of buildings, sites (works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites) (UNESCO, 1972: 136).

Second, at the policy-making level, in 1998, the Estonian Parliament approved the national cultural policy (Approval of Estonian state cultural policy basics 1998) developed by the central government. The objective is to ensure the continuation of ethnic and cultural traditions, to support the cultural autonomy of minorities, and to provide the viability of professional and national culture in every cultural sphere. The state acknowledges its responsibility for the preservation of unique and endangered areas that have a special cultural background. Regarding religious minorities, the state acknowledges and supports registered religious organisations in order to provide the desired ethical ambience. The Church and volunteer organisations are considered important partners in national and local culture development (Approval of Estonian state... 1998). Thus, 11 registered Old Believers' congregations and NGOs (Estonian Union of Old Believers Congregations, Society of Old Believers Culture and Development) are considered to be potential actors in networking within the policy-making process.

Third, according to UNESCO, it is crucial to preserve and sustain tangible and intangible cultural heritage. In 1995, Estonia ratified the UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). In more detail, the national heritage protection law (2002) defines the material cultural heritage as chattel and real estate that have historical, archaeological, ethnographic, city architectural, architectural, art, scientific, religious or other cultural value. The Estonian government approved of the UNESCO "Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage" (2003) that came into force on 20 April 2006 by government order. Therefore, Old Belief can be preserved both in social and physical dimensions. Overall, formally, Estonian legislation and cultural policy implicitly take into account both tangible and intangible cultural heritage of Old Believers. The potential preservation of Old Belief invokes the social capital formation issue as one potential solution that may facilitate the continuity of Old Belief in Estonia.

## **2. SOCIAL CAPITAL**

### **2.1. FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCEPT**

Social capital has become a popular concept since the 1990s thanks to Robert Putnam, who introduced the idea of social capital to a wide audience. Today, social capital is clearly advancing from an academic concept to a more practical policy objective (Fukuyama 2002: 35). In spite of its novelty, social capital has intellectual foundations stemming in my opinion from “individual-collective” contestation and classical theories of capital.

#### 2.1.1 Individualism and collectivism

According to individualism, persons have their own goals, needs, uniqueness and act independently. Collectivism stresses mutual obligations, the importance of group and common interests. As Siisiäinen (2000:14) argues, “knowledge of the social world becomes the object of political and ideological struggles“. In other words, these paradigms determine the development of society, e.g. individualism in USA and collectivism in China or the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, both individualism and collectivism have negative sides. For example, collectivism is associated with communism and totalitarian regimes that suppress and absorb individuality. Individualism facilitates social atomisation that disperses social solidarity, trust, and distorts organic relations between person and society. Ultimately, individualism has created the fiction of a modern society that functions at the expense of independent individuals (Coleman 1990). However, the “individual is not God and lives with similar individuals” (Arendt 1946 in Drechsler 2001), and as Aristotle (1995) says, humans are by nature political animals

[a]nd therefore, men, even when they do not require one another's help, desire to live together; not but that they are also brought together by their common interests in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of well-being This is certainly the chief end, both of individuals and of states.

According to Drechsler (1995 in Allik, Realo 2004: 30), simultaneous dependency and independency creates an intrinsic and irresolvable tension between the individual and society in modern Western democratic society, which places ultimate value on the individual person. Consequently, Allik and Realo (2004: 29, 31) suggest, it is possible to conceptualise paradigms as complementary. On the one hand, interpersonal cooperation, mutual dependence, and social solidarity require individuality, autonomy, and self-sufficiency. The scholars used data about the relation between individualism-collectivism and social capital in the USA. The data support Durkheim's view that becoming more autonomous and seemingly liberated from social bonds, individuals actually become even more dependent on society. Additionally, Montuori and Purser (2000: 26) find that synthesis of polarisation, which exists between the individual and the group, may facilitate social creativity – “There is no anymore ‘all or nothing’ view of total identity loss or total self-assertion, but a contextual dance of relational patterns”.

Overall, I argue that the development of social capital is an attempt to find some balance between individual and collective values. at the most general level, social capital implies individuals who enjoy collective action as required without confluence<sup>8</sup>.

### 2.1.2 Economic and human capital

Lin (2002) argues that economic, human and social capitals have one common feature – the investment of resources to attain the desired results in the market, e.g. economic, political, and labour or community. Traditionally, capital was viewed as economic, e.g. money, land, labour and raw materials used to produce

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<sup>8</sup> The term “confluence”, which is used in Gestalt psychology, implies the blurring of the differentiation between the self and the environment (Corey, 1996).

goods. Karl Marx widened economic capital by incorporating labour-power relations. The emergence of human capital shifted the attention from classes to separate actors who invest their knowledge into the market. Marx used a term “capital” to describe surplus value that emerges from the production and consumption of commodities generated by the relationship of struggling classes (capitalists and labourers). Without specifying Marx’s approach, his main contribution is the macro level explanation of how society produces capital. First, capital stems from the production and exchange of commodities in the market. Second, capital implies the process where various actors perform different roles and have different obligations. Third, any resulting capital is a benefit (surplus or profit) in this process. Fourth, social relations accumulate capital. Fifth, humans possess capital via commodity production and exchange. Further, human capital opponents tried to overcome the strict division and immobility of classes. Unlike economic capital, human capital resides in single individuals who are the central actors of production. Knowledge and skills that an individual has or may have via education, training or work experience may enhance his or her wealth. Educated and skilled labourers work more efficiently and produce more commodities as compared to uneducated associates. Consequently, they demand higher payment and receive surplus from their labour that increases their economic capital. Therefore, human capital is an asset that helps to attain the desired outcomes in the market. Having knowledge, the labourer is a motivated investor who could improve his or her social position and change class bonds. What is more, workers are free to choose occupations (Lin 2002: 7-8). Overall, being different in terms of production, economic and human capitals refer to the importance of human relations occurring within the resource accumulation process. In other words, the concept stresses the importance of relationships and their quality that individuals, groups and communities may have to attain the demanded goals.

## 2.2. SOCIAL CAPITAL APPROACHES

Hanifan (cited in Productivity Commission 2003: 6) used the term social capital – with a meaning similar to the one now adopted – for the first time in 1916, when he referred to it as:

Those intangible assets [that] count most in the daily lives of people: good will, fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit.

Later, the notion of social capital may be traced in Loury's work (Loury 1977 in Coleman 1990: 301; in DeFillips 2001: 783). Loury criticises the narrowly individualistic and atomistic understanding of human capital in neoclassical economic theory. He identified that social resources inherent to family and community are useful for the development of children and young people and human capital in general. He wrote:

... absolute equality of opportunity, where an individual's chance to succeed depends only on his or her innate capabilities, is an ideal that cannot be achieved... An individual's social origin has an obvious and important effect on the amount of resources that is ultimately invested in his or her development. It may thus be useful to employ a concept of "social capital" to represent the consequences of social position in facilitating acquisition of the standard human capital characteristics.

Notwithstanding, earlier notions of social capital were either inexplicit or underdeveloped. The vast majority of scholars (both opponents and proponents) would agree that Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and especially Robert Putnam are the most influential contributors to the present concept of social capital used in academic and political discourses (DeFillips 2001; Lin 2002; Field 2003; Adam and Roncevič 2005).

### 2.2.1 Pierre Bourdieu: social capital as network structure

Bourdieu (1983) argues that capital exists in the social world, which is a set of social structures and constraints, in three forms: economic, cultural and social. Society is the plurality of social fields where the possession of capitals determines positions and opportunities. Bourdieu considers capitals as mutually transferable within class domination and struggle that reproduce society.

Bourdieu (1983: 242-243) writes that economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the forms of property rights, is not sufficient to comprehend the complex structure of society. Money cannot measure all forms of capital as economists usually suggest. That is why Bourdieu also distinguishes *cultural capital* (it is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of educational qualification) and *social capital*, made up of social obligations (“connections”), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the forms of a title of nobility. A more subtle definition of social capital given by Bourdieu (1983: 248-249) sounds as follows:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a "credential" which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.

Two conclusions can be drawn according to Siisiäinen (2000: 10-12). First, the amount of social capital that an individual has depends on his or her networking and group membership. What is more, networks do not exist per se as an “initial natural or social act of institution” (family, kinship, groups). Solidarity and activity are the prerequisite for rewards and profits that individuals acquire from networking. If individuals want to enjoy usable and

durable networks, they should develop and maintain networks individually or collectively, consciously or unconsciously. In other words, social networking is a result of permanent and continuous sociability and investments e.g. time, efforts, economic and human capital into social relations. Second, members of networks should recognise each other as members of one network and their social capital as such. Social capital becomes effective if actors transform it into symbolic capital. To put it differently: give meaning and significance to social capital.

### 2.2.2 James Coleman: social capital as function

Social capital originates from social-structural functioning. For social structures generate resources and outcomes that would be expensive or difficult to acquire by means of only human or economic capitals. Besides that, the combination of economic, human and social capitals would have more results than using them separately (Coleman 1990). In detail, Coleman defines social capital in the following way:

Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure (Coleman 1990: 302).

Coleman (1990: 300) stresses that depending on the character and purposes of the social structure, social capital has various forms that can be negative or positive. For example, the scholar writes that the relations of authority, and of trust, and the norms are the forms of social capital. Additionally, Coleman distinguishes informational potential, and voluntary and intentional organisations.

First, norms and effective sanctions cannot exist without reproduction. Agents of social structures should maintain the effectiveness of rules by means of status, honour, control etc. At the same time, norms and sanctions may not only facilitate but also constrain behaviour. For example, if community has strong norms about

young persons' behaviour, it will help the whole community as such. However, it may exclude young people from having a good time. Second, obligations and expectations facilitate trust among individuals. People trust each other for very practical reasons. Provided individuals know that taken obligations will be repaid later, they help each other. Therefore, social structures differ in the level of trustworthiness that depends on repaid obligations and the actual extent of obligations taken by individuals. Third, authority relations refer to the situations when individuals within the social structure delegate some rights and control to one individual. As a result, the latter (often charismatic) represents the whole group and uses the total amount of social capital. Consequently, this vests authority and power in the hands of the leader. On the one hand, it implies some threats of misuse of social capital. On the other hand, it helps to prevent the free-rider problem. Individuals have to join the group under one common authority that reflects their interests to get social capital. It follows that social capital is a public good. The individual cannot gain social capital if he or she does not belong to the social structure. Thus, the first distinctive feature of social capital is its inalienability. Social capital is not a private property of any persons who benefit from it. Fifth, the acquisition of information is often costly and requires attention. Information inheres in social relations, and individuals who have dense social relations get valuable information more quickly and with fewer efforts. Sixth, existing organisations are initially created for a small number of individuals. However, the social capital of these organisations can also aid others, for example being a partner of governmental programmes in the field of policy implementation (Coleman 1990: 318-321).

Finally, social capital is a product of social relations which come to an end if they are not renewed. The creation, maintenance and destruction of social capital depends on the closure of social networks; stability (destruction of social structure causes a decline or even loss of social capital); and finally, ideology that directs the way in which individuals cooperate with each other.

### 2.2.3 Robert Putnam: bonding and bridging social capital

Putnam (2003) defines social capital as a system of social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance and trustworthiness. Unlike physical or human capital that enhances individual productivity, social capital facilitates coordination and co-operation (Putnam 1995: 66). Social capital cannot be generalised by means of one variable as it originates from various ties of family, friendship, civic associations, political parties, labour unions, and religious groups (Putnam 2004: 3).

Putnam (2001) does not incorporate altruism (doing good for other people) in social capital. However, he acknowledges that there is empirical evidence, at least in the United States, that social connectedness is a very strong predictor of altruism. What is more, Putnam does not interchange the term social capital with social cohesion. “Abundant *social capital* of the right sort can best be seen as an intermediate policy target that, if achieved, could help governments and societies advance toward the broader objective of *social cohesion*” (2004: 3).

Like Coleman (1990), Putnam acknowledges that social capital has both positive and negative forms. Individuals may use trust, networks and mutual assistance for asocial purposes. For example, the Mafia, the Ku Klux Klan or corrupted officials enjoy a certain amount of social connectedness, trust and reciprocity.

Putnam (2003) distinguishes two types of social capital: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital links people with similar cultural, religious, ethnic or any other common features. Bridging social capital, on the contrary, is outward-looking and encompasses individuals who have different backgrounds and origins. Putnam values the latter more as bridging social capital helps to cope with heterogeneity in modern society. Bridging relations sustain solidarity and reciprocity that diminish various splits in communities, which is important for reconciling democracy and diversity. Putnam is not the first who introduced the importance of bridging social ties. Consider Granovetter (1983) who used the

term “weak ties”. Living in a close community predisposes individuals to not have control over external forces. Regarding the internal life of the community, individuals have a clear idea about existing matters. However, the lack of “diplomacy” with other communities, provincial news and views deprives the community from the wider social world. This reduces its ability to resist changes coming from the external environment. Consequently, it may be challenging to integrate such communities since they draw on familiar and routine arrangements.

Specifics of social capital formation depend on the density and the size of the community. Social capital is easier to accumulate in small communities or groups where people have more direct and face-to-face contacts. Nevertheless, small groups tend to adhere to narrow personal motives and disregard the concerns of the wider community (Putnam 2003: 275). One example of such group behaviour is familism represented by Fukuyama (2002: 27). Family-owned enterprises in Latin America constitute close kinship networks between families. It strengthens the opportunistic behaviour among family members in politics and government. Besides that, it denotes the lack of trust towards strangers and outsiders that limits their, or excludes them from, access to business environment. To the contrary, a bigger community with various actors has advantages for a better consolidation of power, technical efficiency and diversity. This is especially essential in situations where networking requires bridging social capital. However, heterogeneity may reduce the effectiveness of co-operation and co-ordination. Facing the dilemma of size, Putnam (2003: 277) suggests that organisers of networks need to consider how to combine the advantages of a small scale with the offsetting advantages of a large scope. One strategy is the *cellular* approach – to nest smaller groups within a larger, more encompassing organisation as in the case of a federation.

Overall, unlike Bourdieu and Coleman who implicitly stress the importance of horizontal and vertical relationships, Putnam (1995) conceptualises social capital within the horizontal level of social interactions. Vertical networks are hierarchical, rest on dependence, “patron-client” relationships and link unequal actors that cannot generate mutual assistance, reciprocity, and trust for collective

endeavours. Nevertheless, negating the vertical level of relations, as the authors mentioned below argue, undermines the state as a supranatural force that affects the pace of society development at the micro-, mesa- and macro-levels.

#### 2.2.4 Linking social capital

Adherents of the linking social capital approach contend that unlike bonding and bridging social capitals, linking social capital describes vertical and hierarchical relations in society that exist between formal institutions and communities (Grootaert 1998, 2001; Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

It is possible to distinguish Putnam's implicit notions about the importance of linking social ties that Boix and Posner (1996, 1998) try to develop by means of "micro linkages" that exist between the state and citizens. These are: a) rational voters and competitive elite, b) civic virtue, c) bureaucratic efficiency, d) rule compliance, and e) elite accommodation.

First, the rational voters and competitive elite model refers to the situation where a perfectly competitive democracy exists. Social capital facilitates the articulation of societal demands indirectly through representative organs. An active democratic majority holds politicians accountable for the quality of governmental performance. Politicians must accept voters' preferences if they want to stay in power. Otherwise, citizens may re-elect non-representative politicians thanks to shared norms of co-operation, networking and trust. Second, civic virtue suggests that social capital affects "the nature of what citizens articulate". Networks that rest on trust and mutual assistance facilitate common political identity and shift community tastes from personal to more community-orientated preferences. Third, social capital promotes institutional effectiveness through its effects on the ability of government bureaucrats to co-operate with each other in the course of carrying out their duties. As community has clearly articulated preferences, it may influence the quality of public service provision according to local needs. Fourth, rule compliance reduces the costs of enforcing and implementing governmental

policies and regulations. For example, joint communities have internal control and regulations, e.g. neighbourhood watch, and that connectedness accelerates the flow of information among members. Eventually, this minimises transactions in citizen-governmental relations. Finally, the fifth model implies the ability of social capital to foster accommodative practices among antagonistic elites. Social capital helps to reduce conflicts and foster compromise, which facilitates the decision-making process for public purposes.

However, Boix and Posner see power institutions as rather passive and stress the proactive role of horizontal actors. The complexity of social relations cannot be fully understood only at the expense of the horizontal level because public institutions make up an essential part of social reality. Community action may fail not because of distrust or lack of networking inside the community or within network actors. Professionalism of civil servants and officials, robust bureaucracy and responsive public institutions, which represent public interests and provide citizens with public goods, directly affect the quality and outcome of public-private relations (Evans 1997; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). According to Evans (1997: 180), the embeddedness of “public-private” interactions lies at the heart of linking social capital. He defines embeddedness as “ties that connect citizens and public officials across the public private divide”. Communities that are integrated in networks with formal institutions have different resources and constraints than those that are not (Moody, White 2003: 4). Therefore, indeed, as Putnam (2003) would contend, linking social capital refers to unequal actors with different social status, power, access to resources etc. This does not imply, however, an unproductiveness of linking social capital. Additionally, linking social capital captures external connections of community with formal institutions like local government, public agencies that either directly or indirectly affect community life. Overall, linking social capital approach is useful to comprehend governmental contributions and inputs to communities or to focus on the role and responsibilities of public institutions in relation to the development of communities (Brooks, Kelson and Robyn 2001).

### **2.3. NORMS, NETWORKS AND TRUST**

A single definition and measure of social capital cannot be derived for epistemological reasons (Adam and Roncevič 2005). Debates have generated a huge array of explanations about the origins, nature and methods of investigation of social capital. However, in spite of disagreements, most authors would agree that social capital has three key elements: networks, trust and norms (Productivity Commission 2003).

First, according to Fehr and Fischbacher (2004: 189), it is not possible to understand the peculiarities and the forces behind human cooperation unless we understand social norms. Social norms, or in other words generalised expectations of behaviour, affect communication in a predictable and socially desirable way. The motivational power of norms depends upon acceptance that is influenced by a person's perception of how other members of his or her social group behave (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004: 189). If other group members cooperate, the norm also requires us to cooperate; if others defect, we also feel allowed to defect. Thus, individuals share and maintain norms collectively. Once entrenched, norms change to self-enforcing behavioural regularities that people conform to automatically (Epstein 2001: 2). A person who violates norms accepted in his or her group, community or society is excluded from it by e.g. misrecognition, expulsion, and punishment. This in return reduces his or her resources or access to resources that membership guarantees. On the contrary, the recognition of norms provides the individual with socially significant rewards like status, honour, respect, support etc. Thus, it seems to be rational and useful to accept social norms.

Second, social network theory describes networks in terms of nodes and ties. Nodes are the individual micro, mesa and macro actors e.g. a person, group, organisation, society. Ties are the relations between individual actors (Kadushin 2004)

Actors of one network may have either one relationship or multiplex relations. According to social network theory, it is not possible to reduce human relationships to one or a few variables. Social relationships have different characters (directional or non-directional), and may occur between actors simultaneously. For example, believers in a religious community are interrelated with each other by not only worship services or spiritual practices. They may also have an unequal scope and quality of family, kinship and friendship ties, business relations, status, formal or informal position etc. Additionally, members of a network have multiple attributes or characteristics (gender, nationality, ethnic origins, interest etc) in common, as well.

Finally, trust refers to the notions of vulnerability, uncertainty and risk (Miztal 1996). For example, according to Coleman (1990), trust facilitates mutual obligations and expectations under uncertainty, risk and vulnerability.

Coleman (1990: 307-309) writes that it is a rational decision to trust or not to trust someone. We trust those who reward our expectations and obligations. To the contrary, we can hardly rely on untrustworthy persons who use our help and assistance without reciprocity. To put it differently, trust is the confidence that partners will not exploit each other's vulnerability. Thus, a high level of trust implies a predictable environment that minimises the risk of losing or wasting resources, whereas a low level of trust implies a risky social environment.

Miztal (1996: 102) argues that trust plays an important role in social relations for the following reasons. First, it makes social life predictable. Second, it creates a sense of community. Third, it makes collaboration easier. The more citizens are suspicious about the honesty of fellow citizens and experience actual dishonesty, the less they tend to risk and invest resources in common action. What is more, Rothstein and Stolle (2002: 2) argue that neutrality and impartiality of the public sector is a crucial source of generalised trust in society. Generalised trust refers to the potential readiness of citizens to cooperate with each other and the abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavours with each other. If citizens know that

civil servants take bribes, treat similar individuals differently in similar situations, provide services selectively, e.g. information, allowances, citizens will tend not to ask for help. Uncertainty and the risk of discrimination nourish distrust in officials and fellow citizens who unfairly benefit from the public sector.

Overall, social norms are important as they facilitate solutions to the problems of cooperation among individuals and encourage individuals to contribute their time, energy and resources for common endeavours. Cooperation, which transfers material or immaterial resources, makes actors interdependent and this demands trust.

## **2.4. RELIGION AS A SOURCE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL**

A religious organisation is not a soccer club. It has own distinctive niches and limitations in secular spheres like community development (Coleman 2003: 47).

First, regarding policy-making issues, the report of Saguaro Seminar (2005: 65) claims that any effort to realise the potential of religious contributions to a wider civic life must be guided by pragmatism and principles. For it is essential not to advise congregations how they should or should not carry out their religious practices. Instead, the unique role and potential of religious groups as partners in local development strategies should be taken into account. For example, Sobel (2002: 148) stresses the importance of local and small-scale social capital building strategies instead of uniform methods because small communities develop different methods to solve collective-action problems.

In other words, as Coleman (1990) would say, religious organisations are already existing social structures whose social capital can be used for wider social concerns. Here, it is crucial to mention some general challenges of local partnership. Parissaki and Humphreys (2005: 8) arrive at the following conclusions from Crete experience. On the one hand, it is easier to transfer knowledge and experience, to share a common philosophy of networking, and to

include relevant people with local experience. On the other hand, disadvantages are that some partners lack knowledge on social issues or have different local cultures and technical infrastructure. Some local partners also lack the necessary means for activities or capacity-building initiatives.

Second, a religious minority has specific worldviews that shape social capital formation (Curry 2003). Curry ranked communities<sup>9</sup> according to the scale that reflected bonding-bridging social capital. Bonding social capital was measured by communal orientation. Communal involvement entails the primary group as family and friends who share common religious and cultural heritage. In order to capture the communal orientation, the scholar told the respondents a story about a farmer who must sell a farm because of developmental pressures. Consider the farm is the biggest and it helps to sustain the community, e.g. by jobs, rent of land etc. Therefore, selling the farm will decrease community prosperity and undermine the interests of fellow farmers. In other words, the story represents a dilemma of individual and collective interests. Further, Curry used the average number of memberships per capita in local organisations that was supposed to measure bridging social capital. Farm-related organisations were chosen as they most directly provide information and avenue for influencing and understanding government policy. Concisely, Quakers, German Reformed and Catholic communities appeared to have low bonding but high bridging social capital. In contrast to that, Dutch Reformed, Mennonite and the Reorganised Church of the Latter Days Saints have high bonding social capital and low bridging social capital. Curry interprets his findings in the following way. First, relatively homogeneous groups with a high level of face-to-face relationships have different stocks of bonding and bridging social capital. Secondly, it is not enough for a community and its development to have high levels of bridging social capital if bonding social capital is absent. Third, a low level of bridging social capital, which facilitates the establishment of networking with the larger society, does not

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<sup>9</sup> Communities that belong to the sample were chosen according to the following criteria: population is less than 3,000 persons; ethnic and religious homogeneity; farming is a dominant activity in local economy; and the religious group actively maintains its religion. According to religious affiliation communities represented in the survey are Quakers, German Reformed, Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Mennonite and Reorganised Church of the Latter Days Saints.

explain per se why a community fails to prosper. Associational activity does not fully explain the social capital formation process. Rather, religious worldviews, traditions and the philosophy of engagement encourage religious groups to create bridging social ties and institutional structures that increase the community's capacity to perform networking. Overall, it is essential to understand worldviews that constitute intangible cultural heritage of communities.

Third, congregations face the dilemma of “efficacy” and “witness” (Coleman 2003: 43). In order to survive, a congregation has to find a balance between material values or issue-oriented civil activity and specific religious practise. A symbiosis of para-churches<sup>10</sup> and congregations can be a solution to the problem. The congregation may have some endowments of social capital but simultaneously lack the expertise to invest and multiply social capital into the larger society. Para-churches on the other hand have knowledge about fund-raising or lobbying power institutions.

Fourth, members of religious organisations tend to have different motivations to perform common action than members of secular organisations. Harris (2003: 137) finds that whereas believers may have material incentives, descriptive analysis from the Citizen Participation Study indicates that churchgoers are far more motivated by their faith, altruism, and their desire for social intimacy than by material interest.

Fifth, the density of religious participation affects the amount of donations and volunteer work that believers contribute to members of secular communities. Nemeth and Luidens (2003: 119) explain that religious groups tend to be more likely to meet on a weekly basis than members of secular organisations. Compared with less active believers, weekly participants donate more.

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<sup>10</sup> As the scholar argues, the term refers to special purpose organisations that provide help to risk groups e.g. soup kitchens, shelters, low cost housings, food banks. While having certain religious backgrounds, these organisations are independent and autonomous from the congregation. Unlike the latter, para-churches work on wider social issues using congregations to obtain volunteers.

Overall, the experience from the USA represented in this section illustrates religious organisations as valuable social partners in local development, provided policy-makers take into consideration the specifics of religious groups as social capital generators<sup>11</sup>. Regarding Estonian cultural policy (Approval of Estonian state... 1998), the government considers churches and volunteer organisations important partners in national and local culture development that leaves doors open for Old Believers participation in the community development.

## **2.5. SOCIAL CAPITAL AND GOVERNANCE**

### 2.5.1 Social Capital as a Policy Objective and Tool

Whether social capital is an objective or not depends upon politics (Field 2003: 118), which at the most general level, again, represents individualistic and collectivistic worldviews.

Consider, for example, proponents of neo-liberal and neo-Marxist philosophy who tend to be sceptical about social capital as an objective for the following reasons. The former may argue that the deliberate promotion of the NGO sector by the state threatens individual freedom and undermines *laissez-faire*. The latter may contend that social capital disorientates from actual causes of inequality, e.g. poverty, unequal rights, access, opportunities or poor education etc. Additionally, some welfare-state theorists point that social capital merely disguises welfare cuts and inefficient policies. In opposition to that, the Third Way, centrist and left-centrist policy-makers tend to be interested in the practical aspects of social capital. Consequently, politicians may refer to growing empirical evidence about the correlation of social capital and policy outcomes. For example, social capital is related to the level of economic development (Fukuyama 2002, Levitte 2004,

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<sup>11</sup> Working with faith-based organizations and NGOs, however, is fraught with danger because these organizations often have their own social and political agenda (e.g. Hamas). To the extent that faith-based organizations are like clubs with exclusive membership and restrictive entry requirements, they may ultimately get in the way of generalized trust. This was the view of Smith, Jefferson, and Voltaire and the reason why they favoured a secular state and sought to weaken the power of the Church (Fafchamps 2002: 7).

Sabatini 2005), political participation (Ikeda, Ken'ichi 2002), education (Putnam 2004, Kilpatrick *et al* 2001), personal well-being (Helliwell 2005), quality of life (Parissaki, Humphreys 2005), poverty (Grootaert 2001) and health (Muntaner *et al* 2000, Holtgrave, Crosby 2003). Additionally, concerning Estonia, Päll (2004: 70) finds that the amount of social capital depends on confidence in media, political activity, and unemployment. What is more, while Päll treats the results critically, her quantitative analysis, done by means of factor analysis, implies unequal stocks of social capital in the regions. Precisely, the counties of Tartu, Ida-Viru, Võru, Valga, Jõgeva, Pärnu and Harju had to compare with the rest of eight Estonian Counties (see appendix 2, figure 1 for the map of Estonia).

Consequently, empirically measured social capital is a good evidence for state intervention. However, policy-makers may be forced to accept that some indicators will do for some purposes, and some for others. Besides that, it is a matter of debates if social capital is a dependent or independent variable that complicates interpretations (Field 2003).

To sum up, social capital as an objective may depend on the political course of action. Still, social capital may become another important variable that widens the scope of political concern. Consider that politics has already employed such abstract objectives like justice, inequality, discrimination etc. Some international policy-making bodies like OECD (2001) and World Bank and some governments, i.g. UK (Harper and Kelly 2003), have also integrated the social capital concept into their policy discourse (Field 2003).

Second, scholars try to avoid a normative approach to social capital as a policy tool by stressing its functional or instrumental nature. Social capital has no political background. It is an idea that belongs neither to left nor to right ideology. It is not a substitution for effective public policy but rather a prerequisite (Putnam 2004).

Fafchamps (2002: 9) would agree with Putnam. Social capital is not an easy or cheap replacement for effective state policies and it should be seen in the context of government capacity building. Additionally, following Bourdieu's (1983) notions about the complementarity of economic, human and social capitals, policies should not concentrate upon social capital as a single asset but rather take into consideration its relation with economic and human capitals. In other words,

at a minimum, adopting a social capital lens could provide policy makers with insights into the importance of social network ties (or lack thereof) for the well-being of individuals and groups. More broadly, social capital represents a useful tool for complementing other policy approaches and instruments (such as investment in the creation of human and financial capital) that cannot address by themselves the complexities of the modern world (Charbonneau and Simard 2005: 2).

Parissaki and Humphreys (2005: 54, 90) argue that there are no more or less beneficial types of social capitals. It is a means not an end that should be used according to context, type of disadvantage, needs etc. Besides that, policy-makers should take into account the already existing social capital that a community possesses (DeFillips 2001; Coleman 1990). It is a temptation, which in my opinion stems from poor analysis and neophyte adherence to the concept, to treat the community as one that does not have social capital at all. The question arises here of what type of social capital and how much. Different types of social capital are relevant to different policy-making purposes.

Bonding social capital is an essential prerequisite for the basics of social functioning, e.g. family or friendship (Evans 1997). This type of social capital is very important in young and old age when humans need strong social ties with parents, relatives, and a feeling of belonging that determines the quality of life (Aldridge *et al* 2002). A community may also demand bonding social capital if it lacks previous social capital repositories and experiences (Parissaki and Humphreys 2005). Putnam (2004) values bridging social capital more because it fosters heterogeneity and democracy by diminishing various splits between

different communities. Sabatini (2005: 23) finds that bridging and linking social capital are positively associated with human development and social well-being. At the same time, bonding social capital is negatively correlated with these variables. She argues that Southern Italy has lower development and higher bonding social capital whereas Northern part of the country has more bridging and linking social capital and a higher pace of economic development. Using data on 54 European regions, Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003: 21) also find almost no positive relation between bonding social capital and economy. By investing time in bonding social capital, individuals sustain the opportunistic behaviour that exists in close relations with friends and families.

Third, the question of whether social capital is a private or a public good evokes debates about the individual and communal nature of social capital. According to Coleman (1990: 315), social capital is a public good because it is generated within the social structure where people contribute resources into a common pool. Excluding the individual from the source of social capital (group, community, institution) will disconnect him or her from the social structure and consequently reduce or eliminates stocks of social capital. Putnam's (2000) horizontally generated social capital can be simultaneously a private good and a public good that the community and its single members can possess. In contrast to that, DeFillipps (2001: 789) stresses that unlike institutions or individuals, a community cannot possess anything because it is an outcome of social, economic and power relationships. Individuals that create communities make decisions. To sum up, the main difference seems to be in the perspective. Sociologists like Putnam and Coleman take into consideration the collective attribute. Economists or those who adhere to social capital as an integral part of economic capital like DeFillipps (2001) or human capital like Glaeser (2001) and Fukuyama (2002) concentrate upon the individual aspect (Anderson, Mellor and Milyo 2005).

Overall, social capital as a policy objective and tool evokes the dilemma of balance of state intervention. First, how much should the state invest into social capital to avoid under-investment and over-investment into networking, social

norms and trust? Second, while implementing policies that generate positive social capital in one community, it may simultaneously facilitate negative social capital in another. Third, what is the optimal mix of bonding, bridging and linking social capitals? Considering the role of the government may provide us with some answers.

### 2.5.2 Role of the Government in Social Capital Formation

I discern the potential role of the government by means of three approaches: the society-centred (Putnam 2003), institution-centred (Rothstein and Stolle 2002) and “state-society” synergy approaches (Evans 1997, Woolcock, Narayan 2000). Different types of social capital make each approach specific.

First, according to Putnam (2003), social capital is created at the horizontal level within communities, associations, clubs etc. This, according to Woolcock and Narayan (2000), reflects the communitarian view of society.

In “Making Democracy Work”, Putnam (1994) writes about cultural and historical experience of civil activity in horizontal networks arrangements and civic associations as the main determinant that shapes social capital. Briefly, analysing the experience of civil activeness in Italy, Putnam (1994, 1995: 65) concludes that the norms and networks of civic engagement powerfully affect the performance of the representative government. Italian regions with similar institutional systems had different social, economical, political, and cultural traditions. The wealth of Northern Italy has its roots in solid traditions of civic engagement that do not stem from party politics, ideology, affluence and prosperity, social stability or political harmony.

Rothstein and Stolle (2002: 9) criticise Putnam’s approach for the following reasons. First, associations may use social capital for personal needs with no interest in wider social concerns. Second, associations may use social capital for negative purposes. Third, historical determinism negates current policy options

that affect social capital in the future. Finally, there is no clear evidence about how causal mechanisms create social capital, e.g. how trusting people create better service performance and politicians; whether they contact officials more than distrusting people; how trust in public servants is stimulated etc.

Second, Rothstein and Stolle (2002: 10) contend that social capital emerges from political and administrative institutional arrangements. In other words, government generates, maintains and destroys social capital.

Informal and horizontal relationships do not exist separately from formalised institutional structures like government, political regime, the rule of law, and the court system (Grootaert 1998). The vitality of networks is the product of the political, legal, and institutional environments. Norms of cooperation and civic engagement can be promoted by public agencies that interact with citizens daily (Evans 1997; Woolcock and Narayan 2000), i.e. street-level bureaucracy.

On the one hand, citizens expect political, legal and social institutions to act as their agents. On the other hand, citizens expect public institutions to act neutrally, fairly and impartially. Therefore, generalised trust depends on the quality of public sector performance. Generalised trust indicates a potential readiness of the citizens for cooperation and an abstract preparedness to engage in civic endeavours. Provided civil servants are partial in their treatment of citizens, people do not trust fellow officials who discriminate and citizens who benefit from discrimination. Citizens make a difference between institutions they trust and those that they don't; they do not view all institutions as similar. Therefore, the role of government in social capital formation might be researched as follows: a) To specify institutions that generate social capital (political, administrative, military etc.) and b) how certain institutions affect social capital genesis among citizens (Rothstein and Stolle 2002). This approach helps to avoid the omission of using one generic variable that measures citizens' trust in public institutions. A generic variable does not automatically imply a trustworthy and efficient government.

Rothstein and Stolle divide institutions into three groups: political/biased institutions (parliament, political parties, and government), power-checking institutions (press, TV, civil service) and neutral/order institutions (police, army, legal institutions). They find that order and implementation institutions are more important for generalised trust as citizens have dense contacts with these institutions. Consequently, depending on the level of institutional experience, citizens develop different levels of trust. Persons who suffered from discrimination trust institutions less. Additionally, Stolle (2005: 187) finds also that the character of Sweden's local, regional and national governments shapes civil society and social organisation that nourish generalised trust in return. What is more, Patulny (2005) maintains that under globalisation, state policies favour a less universal welfare regime and social rights that in fact result in a shift from bridging to bonding social capital. The latter refers to a higher fragmentation of society into more close communities with potential negative externalities.

Overall, the quality of local (or national) service delivery, a healthy politician-citizen relationship, fair political and social institutions, and state policies can cause differences in political and institutional trust. Consequently, lack of trust affects stocks of social capital in society.

Third, the state-society synergy approach is in fact a combination of the society-centred and the institution-centred approaches. The approach depicts social capital and government reinforcing relationships via synergy that stems from the complementarity and embeddedness of public-private actors (Evans 1997).

The term "complementarity" refers to supportive relations that exist between the public and private sectors in the production of commodities and public goods (Evans 1997). Neither the private nor the public sector alone can provide efficient inputs to commodity production. Both have their strong and weak sides. Thus, if we put the sectors' inputs together, this results in greater outcome (Aquino and Bekke 1993). Embeddedness refers in return to the ties that connect citizens and public servants. I regard street-level bureaucracy as a vivid example of

embeddedness. Street-level bureaucrats represent the state at the lowest administrative level that delivers public services and represents “the state in daily life”. Street bureaucrats communicate with citizens directly and have face-to-face contacts (Lipsky 1983; Keiser 2003). In addition, regarding the local level modern local governments are evolving into “enabling authorities” that play the role of community activator by developing linking social ties (Bailey 1999). For example, municipalities include citizens into local policies by information, consultation and participation; they incorporate community plans and develop public trust in local government through transparent processes and accountability, and through democratic dialogue (Bovaird and Löffler 2002).

Further, the synergy approach reflects a robust public sector, and horizontal communities generate social capital in the synergetic process. Social capital is, indeed, important at the micro-level. At the same time, the core problem is how to “scale up” social capital that the community already has (either latently or evidently), so that it becomes politically and economically significant (Evans 1997). Synergy may fail because of insufficient governmental support, lack of competent public institutions etc. Not always do communities mistrust each other and have few motives for cooperation. There are situations when a community needs professional assistance and support. Ultimately, unfair and corrupted bureaucracy may hamper and prevent the genesis of social capital. This is the reason why adherents of this approach value both bridging and linking forms of social capital. Finally, Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 236) sum up the fundamentals of the synergetic approach in the following way.

- Neither the state nor societies are inherently good or bad; governments, corporations, and civic groups are variable in the impact they can have on the attainment of collective goals.
- States, firms, and communities alone do not possess the resources needed to promote broad-based, sustainable development; complementarities and partnerships forged both within and across these different sectors are required. Identifying the conditions under which these synergies emerge (or fail to emerge) is thus a central task of development research and practice.

- The state's role in facilitating positive developmental outcomes is the most important and problematic. This is so because the state is not only the ultimate provider of public goods (stable currencies, public health, universal education) and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law (property rights, due process, freedom of speech and association) but is also the actor best able to facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion. Communities and firms also have an important role to play in creating the conditions that produce, recognize, and reward good governance.

Concerning these findings, Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 234) draw our attention to future research on state-society synergy. First, on how community and formal institutions interact. Second, on the development of institutional strategies based on bonding and bridging social capital. Third, on determining how positive social capital can neutralise effects of negative social capital (corruption, opportunism, isolationism, sectarianism). This, again, implies the policy-making process concerning different types of social capital. It is difficult to discern a generic approach to the role of government that might be in general direct or indirect. Fukuyama (2002: 34) argues that the state can format social capital indirectly by means of human capital (education policies), e.g. educated people share common features, networks, values and trust. According to the society-centred approach, the government should rather respond to initiatives coming from the horizontal level. Fafchamps (2002: 8) contends that the state should rather promote generalised trust than expanding the reach of personalised trust via the promotion of clubs and networks. It is relatively easy to create horizontal clubs, associations and organisations, e.g. by means of NGO-friendly legislation, but challenging to promote generalised trust. The institutional-centred approach would suggest in return the inclusion of communities that have some bonding or bridging social capitals but need additional resources to enhance or improve the pace of development. It is crucial to note, as Canadian experience shows, that there are

pitfalls of “scientific” expertise that government agencies tend to have being involved in the social capital formation strategies<sup>12</sup>.

Finally, adherents of the synergy approach would consider both levels of interactions and stress the uniqueness of vertical-horizontal networking, norms and trust. Overall, the potential role of the government in social capital formation is “to enable social capital and then step back” (Field 2003: 134; Parissaki and Humphreys 2005).

To sum up the chapter, I present the table below composed by Woolcock and Narayan that reflects the society-centred (communitarian and networks view), institutional and synergy views of social capital with regard to potential actors in social capital formation and policy prescriptions.

**Table 2. Four Views of Social Capital**

Perspective	Actors	Policy prescriptions
Communitarian view Local associations	Community groups, voluntary organisations	Small is beautiful, recognise social assets of the poor
Networks view Bonding and bridging community ties	Entrepreneurs, business groups, information brokers	Decentralise, create enterprise zones, bridge social divides
Institutional view Political and legal institutions	Private and public sectors	Grant civil and political liberties, institute trans- parency, accountability
Synergy view Community networks and state-society relations	Community groups, civil society, firms, states	Coproduction, complementarity, participation, linkages

(Source: Woolcock, Michael and Deepa Narayan. 2000. “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy”. The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 225–49)

<sup>12</sup> Charbonneau and Simard (2005: 166) argue, “Almost all the experiences we reviewed refer to the use of ‘scientific’ expertise. When subordinated to the objectives set by the group network, this expertise can lend credibility to the project (and earn funding for the evaluation of the project), or provide avenues for action based on documentation of existing experiences that can be reproduced and adapted. [...] Furthermore, importing models for action or existing programs must always take into account the importance of adapting to local conditions – one of the principles most often neglected. The worst use of scientific expertise is the authoritarian implementation (initiated by government) of a pre-existing action program imposed on a given milieu, because it corresponds to the characteristics of a particular population ‘in need’ by enticing local actors with material or financial resources for a limited period – just enough time to test the program for the first time.”

### **3. SOCIAL CAPITAL FORMATION IN OLD BELIEVERS' CONGREGATIONS IN ESTONIA**

#### **3.1. METHOD DESCRIPTION**

The objective is to research social capital formation in Old Believers' congregations with regard to the preservation of cultural heritage of Old Belief in Estonia. Relying on Putnam's approach to social capital, which regards the horizontal level of social capital formation, I initially developed the following two hypotheses.

(H1) Old Believers rely on bonding social capital and this undermines their ability to preserve cultural heritage;

(H2) Old Believers lack bridging social capital that is crucial for the preservation of heritage at the horizontal level;

However, after the pilot interviews (Mayor of Mustvee Gennadi Kulkov, head of Kasepää parish government Jüri Vooder, and head of Peipsiääre parish government Nina Baranina<sup>13</sup>) and preliminary data analysis I faced the importance of considering the vertical level of social capital formation. Consequently, I used the third hypothesis in addition for further data collection and analysis.

(H3) Linking social capital plays an essential role in the preservation of Old Belief that implies the importance of government intervention.

Regarding the general nature of social capital, I agree with Lin (2002) that social capital is an investment to attain expected results. The result to be expected in a given case is the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia. I follow Bourdieu's (1983) theoretical stance on convertibility and mutual dependence of capitals in the

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<sup>13</sup> I accidentally erased the first interview with Baranina so I made a new interview with Baranina on 11 November 2005.

society. In other words, for example the availability of social capital in congregations facilitates the acquisition of financial capital and vice versa.

Further, I define social capital according to Putnam's (2003) definition. Social capital is a system of social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance and trustworthiness shared by the actors. I admit that social capital is a public good that a single person can also use (Coleman 1990; DeFillipps 2001). To put it differently, a congregation as a group of individuals accumulates social capital thanks to networking, norms and trust that each member may use if not excluded from the network. Social capital is a complex concept that consists of networks, norms and trust. I concentrate primarily on the networking aspect because networks reflect the practice towards the preservation of Old Belief. Additionally, because Old Believers represent a religious minority I take into consideration potential specific worldviews that religious minorities have according to Curry (2003) and Coleman (2003).

Regarding the specific types of social capital Old Believers may have, I employ the bonding, bridging and linking social capital approaches for the purpose of my analysis and rely upon the "state-community" synergy approach towards social capital formation in the congregations. While Putnam's approach without a doubt offers useful insights for the analysis of the horizontal process, it does not provide a framework for the proactive role of the central and local government that Boix and Posner (1996, 1998) try to overcome. Consequently, the chosen approach allows analysing both the vertical and horizontal levels of social capital formation where I concentrate on social structures (Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1990) that reproduce either directly or indirectly and destroy social capital in society (Rothstein and Stolle 2002; Stolle 2005), e.g. registered congregations, NGO-s, local and central governments.

I use a qualitative method of research. Old Believers in Estonia have, for example, been researched from ethnographic, historic and linguistic perspectives (Richter 1976, 1996; Ponomarjeva 1996; Külmoja 2004) and still require further research

(Varunin 2004). At the same time, social aspects of Old Belief should not be omitted. The available qualitative data, e.g. migration, local prosperity, reflect the disadvantaged social and economic situation in Prichudie. This implies objective forces that may affect the preservation of Old Belief. At the same time, it should also be researched how Old Believers manage to preserve their traditions and culture by means of social capital in the context of regional and local development. Consequently, my qualitative approach facilitates an in-depth exploration of what initiatives exist, who the actors are, how these actors quantify the preservation of Old Belief and what it means to Old Believers.

First, I employed a non-random technique of sample generation called “snowball” or “reference” sample. For the first informal interview, I contacted the head of the Society of Old Believers’ Culture and Development, Pavel Varunin, who provided me with information about the general situation of Old Believers in Estonia and the actors involved in the process. Consequently, I had a potential respondent each time I finished an interview. This helped me to meet with those actors who either directly or indirectly belong to one network aimed to preserve Old Belief.

Ultimately, I succeeded to interview 19 individuals in person, one person via e-mail after an earlier phone contact (Kristin Kuutma, senior research fellow at the Estonian Museum of Literature) and one person by phone (representative of the Estonian Council of Churches) (see pages 131-132 for the list of respondents). Two respondents did not want to be recorded and I had to have informal interviews with them (member of Tartu Congregation Savihin and the preceptor of Kasepää congregation Sergin). In terms of religion or cultural background, the sample represents 10 Old Believers and 12 non-Old Believers; in terms of hierarchy, 12 members of horizontal organisations (congregations, NGOs, the Estonian Council of Churches) and ten members of vertical organisations (the heads of the Kasepää, Peipsiääre, Piirissaare, Kallaste, and Mustvee municipalities, the head of the department of economic development in the Tartu County government, associates from the Peipsi veerearengu Foundation, the

National Heritage Board Protection and the Estonian Museum of Literature) are equally represented.

Second, I interviewed the respondents in their natural environment, mainly in Prichudie excluding the phone interviews. Depending on the respondents' nationality, the interviews were in Estonian or Russian. I taped the interviews, then transcribed them and translated the quotations used for the data analysis into English. On average, each interview lasted about 50 minutes. Additionally, I contacted the three respondents on the phone to specify information they shared with me (Varunin, Baranina and chairwoman of Tallinn congregation Aleksandra Fomina). I interviewed the first representatives of the target group in October-November 2004 (Kulkov, Vooder, Baranina) for the pilot analysis, as I already mentioned. Then, I proceeded to interview in the period of June-August 2005 and then collected additional data during spring 2006.

Third, I used a semi-structured questionnaire with open questions that I changed if the information flow demanded to develop questions that were more specific during the interviews (see appendix 3 for details about the initial questionnaire). In general, I presented social capital to the respondents in terms of cooperation, mutual assistance and networking that facilitated the comprehension of the concept among the respondents. In order to get additional information, I used articles from Estonian newspapers that reflected the published opinions of the two present Estonian ministers (minister of population Rummo and regional minister Õunapuu). I employed legal and official documents and statistics as well.

Finally, after I transcribed and documented the interviews I used discourse analysis. By means of coding technique I labelled quotations that represent, for example, different types of social capital in congregations, the quality of networking between the actors, problems that actors face during the course of the preservation of Old Belief, the future, present and past situation of Old Believers in Estonia, activities, actors, methods of preservation of Old Belief.

### **3.2. RELIGION: SOURCE OF BONDING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN OLD BELIEVERS' CONGREGATIONS**

As follows from the works of American research (Coleman 2003; Curry 2003; Nemeth and Luidens 2003), religion is the key source of social capital that such a confessional minority like Old Believers may have. Religion bonds Old Believers and facilitates their norms, networks and trust.

Religion plays a minor role in the process of identity building among younger generations of Old Believers. Consequently, different identities divide Old Believers into two groups: Old Believers by “faith” and Old Believers by “birth” (Plaat 2004). Relying on the interviews, I argue that alongside identity, different levels of religious participation should be considered. Religious activeness means not only spiritual but also wider social interactions among believers that are essential for the survival of the congregation (Nemeth and Luidens 2003). Therefore, I use the terms “passive” and “active” Old Believers to describe Old Believers by “faith” and “birth”. Passive Old Believers are individuals who identify themselves as Old Believers but visit worship houses irregularly and mainly on special occasions like big religious feasts at best. Active Old Believers have a religious identity and contribute a certain amount of resources (time, money and volunteer work) into worship houses on a regular basis, e.g. weekly visits of worship houses for services. Hence, Old Believers by “faith” constitute the core of registered congregations and play the leading role in the preservation of Old Belief at the horizontal level of social interactions.

11 registered congregations represent the horizontal organisations because registered congregations have NGO status (Putnam 2003). In more detail, Coleman (1990) would suggest that the Old Believers' worship house is a social structure that generates social capital among members of congregations, and more specifically, bonding social capital thanks to common traditions and culture (Putnam 2003). Some respondents argue that “state-community” relationships developed the “neutrality” and “autonomy” of Old Believers towards the external

environment. This in my opinion implies the fact that congregations traditionally rely and depend on bonding social capital.

*Historically the state rejected Old Believers. Old Believers were persecuted and ignored. Perhaps, gradually it became a habit not to ask for help institutions (Kulkov).*

The objective of “autonomy” and “neutrality” means stability that former head of Kallaste town council Leonti Kromonov describes as a tendency “to live self-sufficiently” without asking for help. In the historical context of “state-community”, autonomy means avoiding compromising and provocative contacts with the state structures and dominating religion (Russian Orthodox Christianity). Both the state and the Church tried to assimilate Old Believers by “sword or word”. I assume that disconnectedness from these structures was a prerequisite for survival. It demanded internal resources that the community could generate at the expense of bonding social capital. Therefore, in positive terms, bonding social capital was essential for sustaining the very basics of Old Believers communities, e.g. family, kinship, friendship (Evans 1997). What is more, bonding social ties provided group closure that is an essential for social capital accumulation (Coleman 1990). It seems not to lose its importance for the preservation of Old Belief today.

Nowadays, however, avoidance of contacts and interactions, which ultimately means relationships resting on either bridging or linking social ties, has a rather opposite effect. Consider, for example, the statement made by Kulkov that may generalise the challenge to congregations.

*Life forces us to communicate and does not tolerate separation. The latter is possible if a community has strong financial support, skills to earn money, which is difficult now. Because communities are weak, they tend to interact with others.*

The democratic state does not threaten Old Belief because it guarantees the right of religious freedom to Old Believers. The state formally granted Old Believers religious freedom in 1905 and in some sense, it informally existed in the Soviet Union because Old Believers were not persecuted or deported but still not welcomed as a religious group (Plaat 2004). This is the reason why Ponamareva (1999: 44) associates the revival of Old Believers with democratic and independent Estonia since 1992. Today, for example, cultural state policy (1998) considers the Church its partner; national legislation and ratified UNESCO contentions create potential for the inclusion of Old Believers into culture preservation programmes as well.

Interviewed Old Believers acknowledge that the amount of resources that worship houses are able to generate thanks to the networking of parishioners is not sufficient for the preservation of tangible and intangible heritage. Additionally, families cannot transfer traditions organically as in the past, which implies a declined religiousness not only in terms of identity (Plaat 2004) but also in religious participation.

*Children came to Church [worship houses – A.A.] with their parents, and this was the way from generation to generation. During the Soviet time, a few generations were separated from the Church. It is difficult because already three, four generations of parents did not grow up in the traditions (Kromonov);*

*We who grew up here [in the village, Peipsi Lake – A.A.] remained true to our traditions, and our children who grew up in a different cultural surrounding did not acquire anything (Zoja Kutkina, chairman of Varnja congregation);*


*I – What about those people belonging to the middle generation who came back to the village?*

*R – As parishioners they are lost. Not all. Some of them visit services at least at the time of feasts. When they were young, they went to the city in the Soviet time. Perhaps it [Old Belief – A.A.] is established in one's childhood. (Raissa Poljakova, member of NGO Varnja Pereselts).*

Consequently, I draw the following conclusions concerning the specifics of congregational membership that are congruent with Plaat findings. First, the number of active believers who meet with each other in worship houses weekly is extremely small compared with passive Old Believers. Such numbers like 5,000 members in registered congregations in 1999 or 2,515 statistically registered Old Believers by faith in 2000 seem to be an exaggeration at least in the case of weekly religious activity within worship houses. Second, the vast majority of believers are in pre-pension or pension age. According to Glaeser (2000), older people tend to have less social capital in childhood and old age (see additionally quotation about the specifics of older people's behaviour in worship houses on page 90). This in fact means that the congregation needs younger generations for dense networking with other social actors. Third, in comparison with men, women participate in services more actively, which is congruent with Harris' (2003) findings on more active religious participation among women. Fourth, few active churchgoers represent younger generations in worship houses. The Old Believers I had interviews with stress that "generation gap" and "lack of continuity" in terms of religion are the main challenges active Old Believers face.

Younger generations tend to migrate to cities, which leads to the emerging of a greater distance between grandparents, parents, children and grandchildren. However, the distance is not only geographical but also cultural. Descendants still visit their native villages and towns in Prichudie but rather as passive Old Believers, which Plaat (2004) calls "Old Believers by birth". In order to specify the potential size of communities, I requested information from the statistical office of Estonia (3 May 2006). For this purpose, I use the total number of people who were born in Old Believers' traditional settlements (Kallaste, Mustvee, Kasepää, Kolkja, Varnja, Kükita and Raja) and live in any other part of Estonia today. According to this rough estimation (see figure 9 below), which does not reflect descendants, communities, and consequently the number of Old Believers, would be essentially bigger if no migration happened.

**Figure 9.** Estimated population in traditional Old Believers' settlements by municipality, 2005



(Source: request of information to the statistical office of Estonia on 3 May 2006)

For Old Believers, migration not only mean changes in geographical but also cultural and social environments. The former may imply “symbolic violence” as Bourdieu (1996) would suggest. In order to attain a better life (job, education, social environment) or in terms of capital theory, human and economic capitals, migrated Old Believers have to accept the norms and values that the dominating class ideology, which represents secularised worldviews, prescribes. Additionally, the cultural environment also changed inside of Old Believers communities. For example, while Plaat (2004) and some respondents argue that religiousness declined remarkably after the 1950s, Savihin (about 65 years old) stresses that in fact, traditions started to decline even earlier. To justify his statement he showed me a family picture of his grandmother, grandfather and mother. Unlike his grandparents who wore traditional and simple clothes, his mother had a fashionable and stylish “city” dress of that time. According to Savihin’s interpretation, fashion illustrates that Old Believers started to accept some cultural

changes at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In any case, it seems that secularisation affected both internal and external environments.

*Traditions that existed until the 50s have already been broken. When I studied at the academy, a young Old Believer came to our group. This was at the end of the 50s. He never took someone else's cup in a student hostel, never smoked... Nevertheless, by the third year of education, I took him into komsomol (Viktor Klychko, former Mayor of Kallaste);*

*Education was scarce and all information was in the surrounding community. There were no more sources of information. Well, maybe only from school. This is the reason why it was easier to carry traditions. They were rooted easier because a child grew up in a family with grandfather and grandmother who educated her or him in the same spirit. As children moved to the city, they got wider frames instead of those they had here and felt free. It had been different earlier. The Orthodox persecuted us and if Old Believers went somewhere, they faced ignorance. When they went back home, they felt at home and comfortable. We who grew up here [in the village, Peipsi Lake – A.A.], remained true to our traditions, and our children who grew up in a different cultural surrounding did not acquire anything (Kutkina);*

*I do not remember my parents demanding of us to visit the worship house. People go to worship houses thanks to their grandparents who demanded of them to do so in their childhood. This helped much (Poljakova).*

At the same time, a different social environment may have a positive meaning to Old Believers in terms of wider connections with the outer social world at the expense of migrated individuals. For living in another social environment like the city means new potential relationships with other confessions and nationalities (Estonians, Lutherans, Orthodox, the Russian-speaking population, e.g. Tatars, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews), e.g. fellow workers, neighbours, friends. This may imply broadening “weak” (Granovetter 1983) and bridging ties. However, Liina Miks from Peispi Veerearengu Foundation raises the question of why younger generations of Old Believers, who have migrated or migrate to cities like Tallinn

or Tartu, do not for example join the Tartu or Tallinn congregations. One possible explanation may be that Old Believers who migrate from Prichudie are already passive believers who belong to younger generations. Another explanation is that the external environment, again, does not force Old Believer to return to his or her native community as Kutkina mentions above. These findings should be researched further.

Finally, I bring the following quotations and pictures to illustrate active Old Believers and membership specifics in congregations.

*At the moment, our community is small. Actually, 15 persons visit services regularly. However, when the preceptor heard confessions in the last Great Fasting, 116 persons came. They are the relatives of those who used to live in the village. Single young people come to the services. If we talk about those who live here, I have the feeling that we will be over soon (Kutkina);*

*The number of members is very small and the worship houses are filled with people only at big feasts like Easter or Christmas. Young people come from the cities to visit their parents This does not yet mean that they are all believers. Some simply show their respect to their parents or come out of curiosity (Kulkov);*

*There are few people who come each Sunday. Few. We have perhaps 20, 25, who are mainly old women and men (Fedor Korotkov, former head of Piirissaare parish Council);*

*We have about 23-30 believers and more. This depends on the celebration. There are services with singers only and three, four parishioners present. The registered number, however, is 200 believers (Fomina).*

The two first pictures below (see appendix 2, figure 5 and 6) represent the active members of the Tartu and Piirissaar congregations. As one can see, again, the members of these congregations are old people. The next two show the members of two Old Believers' Councils held in 1928 and 1998 (see appendix 2, figure 7 and 8). One may see that whereas in the first case, only men participated in the

Council, woman are equally represented in the second picture. This is not because Old Believers strive to attain gender equality but simply because congregations lack men who traditionally were the spiritual leaders.

Overall, Old Believers living in Prichudie do have some other bonding social ties that may facilitate their common action today, e.g. they are ethnically Russians, speak Russian, coherently live in one geographical area, which is the Peipsi Lake coastline, and have kinship ties<sup>14</sup>. Nevertheless, religion with concomitant traditions, culture and history is the first feature that makes Old Believers a specific minority among the Estonians and the rest of the Russians inhabiting Estonia. I argue that if religion is left behind, we will speak not about Old Believers, but rather one part of the general Russian minority in Estonia.

### 3.2.1 Formation of bonding social capital in the case of declined religious activeness

First, congregations lack active and literate persons who could promote intangible cultural heritage. The term “literate person” refers to Old Believers who know Old Slavonic, the traditions and history of Old Belief. Knowledge of Old Slavonic is inseparable from Old Belief, e.g. all religious books, literature and services are in Old Slavonic. If Old Believers by “birth” change to Old Believers by “faith”, they have to be reintegrated in terms of culture, which takes time and resources.

*There are many strong and educated preceptors in Latvia. This is the problem in Estonia. We lack literate, wise and strong preceptors in worship houses. It makes a difference whether there are 80 congregations [in Latvia –A.A.] or 11 [in Estonia – A.A.] (Varunin).*

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<sup>14</sup> *Let's say that today, Old Believers in Estonia are an ethno-confessional community. During the centuries, this rests on kinship, confession and ethnicity. Everyone may gather from your surname that you are from Mustvee, Kallaste or maybe that you have a surname that people from Kolkja have (Varunin).*

Varunin reports below that traditionally, Old Believers' congregations have two types of leaders that fulfil different tasks. In my opinion, this implies the division between "efficacy" and "witness" which according to Coleman (2003) is crucial for the survival of religious congregations in a secular world.

*Preceptors are the spiritual leaders who deal with spiritual issues that concern the internal life of the congregation, for example what sort of service to have and when. They do not deal with social issues as I do for example. Chairmen are the leaders that are responsible for administration, management and communication including power relations with the local government and so forth. Thus, they have different tasks (Varunin).*

Today only three congregations (Mustvee, Tartu and Kasepää village) have preceptors. The rest of the parishes have chairmen because there are no men over 40 years who know the traditions and read and comprehend Old Slavonic<sup>15</sup>. In other words, preceptors are responsible for the spiritual survival and obviously for intangible culture. Chairmen have the task to ensure the physical prosperity of the congregation, which predisposes them to interact with the wider social world and to develop bridging/linking social ties. What is more, spiritual and administrative leaders have a certain authority (Coleman 1990) that helps them to represent the whole parish and to use the social capital accumulated by the congregation thanks to networks, norms and trust. Therefore, the organisation of worship houses leadership has potential for both bonding and bridging social ties.

Further, Varunin discerns a qualitative difference in the level of religious education between Old Believers in Estonia and Latvia. Namely, Old Believers in Latvia tend to be more religiously educated; e.g. they know the specifics of *znamennoe* singing, rituals and traditions, and they have issued the religious newspaper *Spiritual Sword* since 2000. Preceptor of the Old Believers' congregation in Daugavpils Aleksei Zilko argues that the actual number of Old

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<sup>15</sup> Women cannot hold the position of preceptor. However, as few men visit worship houses, women are allowed to conduct the services.

Believers is politically lowered. The statistical office of Latvia registered 8,000 Old Believers in 2004. However, the general number of Old Believers might be around 65,000-80,000 and there are 67 registered congregations in Latvia. Similarly to Varunin, Zilko points to the small number of active and the big number of passive believers in Latvia that is still bigger than in Estonia.

*Member of the congregation and parishioner are not the same. Say, we have 42 parishioners but the number of those who come to confirmation is more than four thousand. In addition, we register their names in special confirmational books. What about people who have not managed to visit confession this year? According to my practise, it is almost the same number (REGIONS.RU).*

Regarding the last population census in Estonia, Baranina and Miks also imply an underscoring of Old Believers during the last national population census 2000.

*I recollect the times when the interviewers asked about your religion with no option to mark your religion as Old Belief. Nina Baranina or someone else said that they were offended (Miks);*

*Indeed, there was no notion about Old Belief as a religion on the questionnaire. It was in Tartu when those responsible for the questionnaire did not want to mark Old Believers as Old Believers. They argued that Old Belief is some religious sect or something that does not exist. I talked about this later at the state level (Baranina).*

Second, congregations, which consist of older people and pensioners, cannot accumulate a sufficient amount of financial capital to preserve tangible heritage, e.g. icons, books and worship house architecture.

*Elders, pensioners come to services. They buy candles but the donations are two, three crowns. But at least they contribute thanks to their participation and it helps a lot. We have no paid workers. Everything is done collectively. It should be borne*

*in mind that congregations are poor with few believers. Old women and pensioners come who cannot contribute because of their low incomes (Fomina);*

*Elders, they cannot bear long services. How can we take contributions from old women? Well, ten persons come to service and buy candles. What these 20 crowns mean? We have no one who gets salary. Everything is grounded in public participation (Fillimon Kuznetsov, chairman of the Piirissaare congregation);*

*Today, where can the parish get money? Only thanks to some contributions made by believers. To sell candles, calendars. But these are such tiny sums. The vast majority is old persons. They are maybe not so informed about opportunities and changes in the world (Kulkov).*

A representative of the Tartu congregation Savihin, who I had an informal interview with, stresses that even if the vast majority of Old Believers cannot attend services they at least could contribute to worship houses in their native villages. However, Savihin argues, bringing as an example the Tartu congregation, that passive Old Believers rarely donate. This statement is congruent in some sense with Nemeth and Luidens' (2003) findings on the positive correlation between the level of religious participation and the amount of donations and volunteer work contributed by believers to help members of secular communities. The difference is that low religious activeness seems to affect contributions to one's own congregation as well. Consider, for example, the existing worship houses that Old Believers build by means of donations. Fomina recollects a story from her childhood. Her father and grandfather took a loan from the bank in order to finish building the worship house in Varnja after the collected contributions depleted. Today, donations are rather the exception than the rule but still there are some positive cases. The Tallinn community had contributions from a grandson of Stefanida Andreyevna Maeberg<sup>16</sup> who sponsored the building of the new roof for the worship house that prevented the worship house from closure

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<sup>16</sup> In 1930, according to Old Believer Stefanida Andreyevna Maeberg's will, her husband, a Lutheran Ado Maeberg built a worship house. A member of the parish Yevfimia Sapozhnikova made a generous donation to support the building. The Baranins' family decorated the worship house ([www.starover.ee](http://www.starover.ee) (10 March 2006)).

as it was certified dangerous for people and inappropriate for use. Additionally, a person who remained anonymous for me supported the restoration of the worship house in Raja as head of Kasepää parish Vooder reports.

Third, respondents realise that congregations depend upon wider social interactions with each other and other social actors.

*A man who was a chairman before me was old. He got sick. When Estonia became independent, people had to apply in order to get their property back. He did not manage to do this. When I came, it was already past the deadline for applications and the city government took our building. After I discovered that, I used a lawyer for help. Finally, we got the building back and can use it for 35 years free of charge [the building itself is municipal property – A.A] (Fomina).*

Overall, regarding the above-mentioned, I argue that the first hypothesis (H1) partly finds empirical justifications. Namely, on the one hand bonding social capital is crucial for the organic preservation of Old Belief by Old Believers themselves. Today, it is a difficult task because congregations have a low level of networking between older and younger generations as the result of declined religious activeness and different identities among older and younger generations. The small groups of active Old Believers who have face-to-face meetings and weekly religious practice in worship houses cannot generate financial capital at the expense of internal resources. On the other hand, respondents realise that they need other types of networking that may support the internal life of congregations.

### **3.4. BRIDGING SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONGREGATIONS**

Data analysis shows that active Old Believers also have bridging social ties generated by alternative social structures in the NGO sector where both Old Believers and non-Old Believers act upon a common objective – to preserve Old Belief.

First, these are EUOBC and SOBCD. Each NGO has different tasks that may imply the balance of “efficacy” and “witness”. Again, this reflects the internal organisation of Old Believers into spiritual and administrative leaders. EUOBC is responsible for religious issues and for bonding social capital among Old Believers and elects a head of SOBCD. SOBCD represents Old Believers in the “secular world” and facilitates networking between registered congregations.

*Our Old Believers' community was in semi-soporific condition up to now. Just recently, we have chosen Filimon. He is a new chairman. He is a man that is more active. We hope that he will help us find solutions for our problems because an old woman had been in charge before and many issues are still open. Nobody rejected us but the thing just stood still. It was a deadlock situation. Our chairman was too old, a woman over 79. She could barely visit meetings of congregations or somehow participate in life. Pavel Varunin visited us, told us what applications we had to file, and advised us. Nobody had worked on the problem before. No information. Only now, we get information about the other congregations thanks to Pavel Varunin (Korotkov);*

*Younger Varunin is striving. He organised meetings among all congregations. Finally, we saw each other's faces. Before, we lived separately, just everyone apart doing her or his business (Fomina).*

Varunin says that Russian Old Orthodox Pomorian Church (ROOPC) and SOBCD have some networks in terms of cultural exchange, formal greetings for religious feasts and supply religious calendars to Estonia. I should mention that ROPC is the centralised coordination and consultative organ of all Pomorian congregations in Russia and abroad (Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, USA, Kazakhstan etc) (see Modern Old Orthodoxy: informational portal about modern life of Old Believers for details). However, both do not have large-scale projects or activities. Additionally, Old Believers of Pomorian and Belokrynetski agreements (non-priestist and priestist agreements) from Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine have made a treaty for cultural cooperation in order to preserve and promote Old Believers' culture, e.g. the organisation of

festivals, seminars, conferences, and museums (Modern Old Orthodoxy (a)). Again, I could not find empirical evidence of dense cooperation in terms of financial support. Additionally, regarding para-church organisations (Coleman 2003), a representative of the Estonian Council of Churches (ECCH)<sup>17</sup> says that although Old Believers do not belong to ECCH, the organisations have had some cooperation.

*R – We have not had dense cooperation yet. We have got stable contacts since 1999-2000. We have had contacts rather in the form of conversations. They could apply for member status in the Council. They must have discussed this but nothing has happened yet. We are in one project called Ware farers Churches that has been lasting for two years. Churches are open for visitors during the day. There is also a worship houses support programme and we were intermediates because we are a member of this Council. We also helped to get some money for international projects to cover travel expenses.*

*I – Klychko said that Old Believers do not belong to ECCH because you have a high membership fee. Is it true?*

*R – No, the fee is not high. Besides, it is possible to get it from the state budget.*

According to explanations, Old Believers do not belong to ECCH for ideological reasons – ECCH is an ecumenical organisation. Still, it does not eliminate the potential of “weak” ties between organisations.

*R – The principles do not allow it. It is a sin. We have no right to communicate with this religion. Obviously, it is just to prevent our outflow to other confessions (Fomina);*

*I – Why do you not belong to the Council of Churches?*

*R – First of all, because of what this organisation practices. This organisation is ecumenical. We have ideological disagreements. Then, the second is a financial reason. The fee must be around 50,000 crowns a year. We could be in the Council as observes for 25,000.*

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<sup>17</sup> ECCH unites the Christian Churches in Estonia e.g. Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Protestant.

*I – A representative of the Council said that you might get money from the state if you have no money.*

*R – Well, it can be so, I mean to get money from the state, but still we cannot afford to have common liturgies for ideological reasons. Besides, I see no coordinational changes. Well it tends to be rather like sitting, talking and then going away. We do have some informational support at web sites (Varunin).*

Further, SOBCD is a member of the NGO “Estonia Bureau of Lesser Used Languages”<sup>18</sup>. The Christian internet portal made by the NGO “Kompass” provides information about the religious life and events in Estonia including Old Believers. The NGO Cultural Society “Prichudie” bonds people born in Prichudie who live in Tallinn. Leader of the society Zinaida Palk argues that of the 89 members, 39 are Old Believers. Although the organisation is located in Tallinn, it has dense contacts with Prichudie. It organises cultural activities in both Tallinn and Mustvee. Further, the NGO Peipsi Centre for Transboundary Cooperation<sup>19</sup> (CTC) has an objective to develop Peipsi Lake holistically. A representative of CTC, Virve Tuubel, sums up the work done already towards the preservation of Old Belief.

*We got trainings for museum workers who represent the Old Believers and Setu minorities. This obviously was needed in order to establish bridging ties between project participants. Another bigger project is to research and think of the preservation of heritage, well, to develop some sort of tourism routes. Kallaste has an information office for tourists. So it spreads information about Old Believers as well. We researched the area as a whole and issued a brochure that propagandises tourism.*

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<sup>18</sup> The Estonian Bureau of Lesser Used Languages (EstBLUL) is a non-governmental organisation that is promoting lesser-used languages in Estonia (Yiddish, German, Swedish, Russian, Romani, Tatar and Finnish, regional languages Setu and Võru). The members of EstBLUL are the organisations of the respective language communities as legal persons. EstBLUL is a member of the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL) acting as its Estonian organisation. EstBLUL has cooperation partners like the Ministry of Education and Research of Estonia, the Estonian Council of Gambling Taxes and the Non-Estonians’ Integration Foundation (<http://www.estblul.ee> (12. March 2006)).

<sup>19</sup> CTC Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation was founded in 1993 and has next working fields: environmental awareness, tourism development and protection of cultural heritage, community development, cross-boarder and development cooperation between Russian and Estonia in the Peipsi Lake area ([www.ctc.ee](http://www.ctc.ee) (19 March 2006)).

The NGO “Piiripeal” cooperates with the NGO “Varnja Pereselts” run by Old Believers in Varnja village. The latter organises social activities for youth, adults and seniors living in Varnja village, e.g. festivals, cultural evenings, parties for young, mature and old persons etc. As Kutkina says, “There are things that you cannot discuss in the worship house”.

Third, I asked some respondents about the difference between Old Believers and non-Old Believers in secular social life. They say that compared to the past, the overall cultural activity in Peipsi Lake has declined regardless of confession or ethnicity. Nevertheless, that does not mean that there is no horizontal activity at all.

In the newspaper *Peispirannik*, chairman of the Union of Slavic Educational and Charity Societies, Solovjev criticises the local population for its small amount of cultural activity in Prichudie. Solovjev stresses the particular role of churches in the organisation of socio-cultural activities or community development in the past.

*Various clubs and hobby rings existed and actively worked in all localities. A vivid socio-cultural life especially embraced almost all population old and young in those places where the Church was (Fedor Maspanov, newspaper Peispirannik, journalist and editor June 2005).*

Maspanov, agrees with Solovjev that the present cultural life is lower compared to the past. Poljakova also witnessed the disappearance of public houses, choirs and fire brigades in Varnja village during the Soviet time. Additionally, the historical overview of congregational activity made by Ponomarjeva shows that those congregations had a dense association life (see <http://www.starover.ee/> for details). However, Solovjev seems to exaggerate that “there is no valuable Russian society or cultural collective in Prichudie”. Consider for example the nine Old Believers’ congregations in Prichudie, NGOs like EUOBC, SOBCD, the Cultural Society “Prichudie”, “Varnja Pereselts”, the informal club of Prichudie poets that unites 30 local poets, the only Old Believers’ choir in Estonia in Kolkja

village. What is more, the newspaper *Peispirannik* thoroughly represents a vivid cultural and social local life. Maspanov contends that Prichudie does have its cultural life stemming from the grass root level. Solovjev merely negates the actual causes of declined cultural activity in Prichudie. Using Mustvee town as an example, Kulkov and Palk argue that the low social activity in Prichudie is an outcome of socio-economic development (Hankov, Sepp and Vildo 2004; Tuubel 2005; Ministry of Finance 2005 a, b; Kangus and Hämmal 2005).

*In order to make the thing interesting, you always need to raise the people, talk with them and explain why you do this. You need to find some local enthusiast who is ready to help and then do something together. In particular, Mustvee waits for us after we visited the area for three years. Our activities are demanded in Kallaste as well. There is one such enthusiast, Maret Rätsepp who heads the house of culture. I remember the first time we made a concert dedicated to the Trinity. Few persons came. However, this year, there were no free places in the hall. I have the impression that the local population feels that the government and municipality forget about them. I mean the coastline. They are passive now in this sense. Nevertheless, the people have started to wake up. They want to make the town better and demand this from the local government (Palk);*

*In fact, people face a more difficult situation than before. I cannot call it any other way than timelessness, which was here before... During the ten years people lost their jobs because the border was closed ... and after the border was closed, the local population felt a vacuum or emptiness in their work, incomes and so forth. Moreover, I cannot negate that some started to drink and lost their dignity. Still, there are people born in the Soviet time who are not young any more but found the power to return to the Church (Kulkov).*

It is tempting to conclude that the disadvantaged situation of congregations may stem from the lack of bridging social ties or “weak” ties with other horizontal organisations as Putnam (2003) and Granovetter (1983) would suggest. Therefore, the second hypothesis (H2) could be disproved. Nevertheless, as Curry (2003) contends, congregations have a mix of bonding and bridging social capitals rather

than just one of them. Consequently, I should question how respondents evaluate the quality of bridging ties.

At the most general level of the representative organs of Old Believers Varunin says that

*various organisations try to help us. For example, the Tartu County government or CTC, those deal with Old Believers. However, while they decide our destiny, they do not call us even to participate in their discussions and meetings.*

Consider another example. The Cultural Society “Prichudie” organised the so-called “days of Prichudie” in Tallinn. Official representatives of local governments like Peipsiääre parish, Kallaste and Mustvee, and representatives of other nationalities and confessions from Prichudie were invited as well. Varunin said that although he represents one of the biggest communities in the region, the NGO “Prichudie” did not invite him to the meeting. Varunin said that it is good to have such initiatives but according to his experience, such activities have no effect on the daily life of the local population in Prichudie. Varunin recommends for the organisations to have more contacts with the local population (Modern Old Orthodoxy (b)). Klychko and Kromonov would agree with Varunin if asked, for example, how they estimate the work of CTC.

*Kromonov – in my opinion, they do great work but with little outcome, some training programmes for exemplary citizen.*

*Klychko – Their programmes are poorly adopted for local conditions. They treat us like developed Europeans but we still need preliminary work, I mean the ordinary citizens of Kallaste.*

*I – And what about Aime Güsson from the NGO Piiripeal?*

*Klychko – As I understood she is a solitary actor and CTC is a mighty organisation. They compete with each other. She does good work, practical<sup>20</sup>.*

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<sup>20</sup> General tasks that NGO “Piiripeal” has are the following support and preserve Old Believers life style and work fields e.g. handicraft, onion produce, fishing etc; promote Old Believers traditions and spirituality. One particular initiative that the NGO has is creation of community house in Varnja village. NGO has bought land and is looking for financial support to build the building that

Aime Güsson who represents the NGO “Piiripeal” speaks of her contacts with Old Believers in a positive way. For example, the NGO initiated a project that helped members of “Varnja Pereselts” to establish some “weak” ties with the Union of Estonian Villages and Small Towns (UEST). Briefly, UEST is an association of non-governmental organisations that has local offices in all 15 counties of Estonia. The initiative to create UEST came from a local activist who established contacts with the national village initiatives in Sweden, called "All Sweden Shall Live" (<http://www.kodukant.ee/eng/news.php> (14.05.2006)). At the same time, Tuubel and Varunin are sceptical about the community house that according to the NGO “Piiripeal” should represent the authentic culture of Old Believers. Instead, the initial design of the community house does not reflect Old Believers’ typical architecture but rather a simplified and commercialised view of Russian architecture.

Returning now to the second hypothesis, bridging social capital seems to exist in terms of connections with associations but lacking in terms of quality. According to Boix and Posner (1996, 1998), bridging social capital can be measured by its effect on government decisions. The case of the Setu and Võru minorities, which I will present later, confirms this theoretical assumption. At the same time, adherents of linking social capital will imply the fact that bridging social capital is not always effective (Evans 1997; Grootaert 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Parissaki and Humphreys 2005). While various horizontal associations try to preserve Old Belief, they may not include representatives of Old Believers.

Overall, the present “low” social activeness of the local population, where active and passive Old Believers represent an important group, may have its roots in the past but not because the local population was merely uncivil or lacked traditions of associational life, as Putnam (1994) interprets these findings. Respondents imply “the habit of low social activity” that could appear because of the social “vacuum” and “timelessness” that implies the

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should offer not only cultural and recreation opportunities but also some jobs for local population who will work in the community house (Background information about NGO “Piiripeal”).

disadvantaged socioeconomic development in Prichudie. The internal organisation of leadership of Old Believers' congregations and associations embraces two dimensions: "efficacy" and "witness" that may facilitate bridging social ties. Congregations have some mix of bonding and bridging social capitals that cannot guarantee the effective preservation of cultural heritage. Bridging social capital may indeed have ideological obstacles, as in the case of cooperation with ECCH, and poor networking and representatives of Old Believers at the level of secular organisations.

### **3.5. PRESERVATION OF OLD BELIEF: LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE**

#### 3.5.1 Central government initiatives

In general, Varunin and Head of Economic Development Department Taivo Tali argue that it is not possible to say that the central government does not provide Old Believers with support. Still, respondents find that the support tends to be rather fragmented, based on small-scale projects or subsidies that cannot guarantee a large-scale impact upon the general community of Old Believers<sup>21</sup>.

*R - As a chairman of the union I have not witnessed negative treatment for eight years. If we had some things, we were helped. We were not denied or abhorred. Some material support was always provided. Well, maybe, indeed, the project costs sixty thousand, we got ten, twenty. Anyway, something was given. For example, the organisation of the patronal festivals. The government is changing, Mart Laar, Siim Kallas and I have not seen any brushing aside.*

*I – Is there any documented, official point of view how to help Old Believers?*

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<sup>21</sup> Consider for example the reply I received to my official request for information to the Jõgeva County Government (15.03.2006/ nr. 1.2-10/1442). I asked them to inform me about the total monetary support Old Believers received from the Jõgeva County government in 1994-2006. The reply was as follows: "Jõgeva County government and NGO Raja Old Believers Congregation had a contract for 15,784.00 crowns on the 6 May 2005 nr 1.3-3/57. Money received from local initiative programme for the project "Raja Congregation worship ceiling renovation" for activity nr 2 "Ceiling painting". Money transferred on the 27 June 2005". I made a similar request via the official site of the Tartu County Government but received no reply.

*R – No, not at all. Regarding the phenomenon of Old Belief, I have been talking about this all the time, we need some government programme (Varunin);*

*Well, sort of tiny regional development programmes. But there is not such massive monetary support like for Setu at the state level. Slowly, the local governments contribute to small programmes. Once we did a proposal to create a cultural protection zone there that could be like the one Setu have (Tali);*

*I – What sort of initiatives has the state taken to preserve Old Believers culture?*

*R – Actually, nothing direct. Perhaps it thinks of it and wishes to do so. It is possible that the minister of ethnic affairs and population spends big sums on ethnic minorities each year. At the same time, they are not who receive the money. They are Russians who are distinguishable because of their religion. I do not know if they applied for support. In principle, some money is available. The fact is that it is up to state policy to develop state strategies for the development of this area, for example tourism (Tuubel);*

*If the government collaborating with the local governments develops a programme, this will be the support. We have not seen such initiative yet. I do not want Prichudie to become a reservation. We are not Indians. Still, regarding originality, Old Believers should be supported. Social programmes are necessary. The role of the third sector is also to be discussed, how, what form and what to do (Kromonov).*

Despite political claims by the present minister of population and ethnic affairs Rummo<sup>22</sup>, and regional minister Õunapuu<sup>23</sup>, which can be traced in the press, the issue of a coordinated programme remains open. Both ministers personally visited Old Believers' communities. Õunapuu is a former head of Tartu County

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<sup>22</sup> According to the representative of Rummo, it is essential to initiate a similar programme in the Peipsi Lake area as that for Setu. The minister expressed his hope that the programme could already be written by the next year. Up to now, the state supports Old Believers by means of project contests in Non-Estonians' Integration Foundation and subsidies for ethnic cultures societies (BNS 14 September 2005).

<sup>23</sup> If Kihnu culture belongs to the UNESCO heritage and Setu has set forth a list of cultural heritage, I do not exaggerate if I postulate that Old Believers culture may also belong to the UNESCO world heritage. The unique culture of Old Believers is worth protecting and preserving (Leesment 29 October 2005).

and has some contacts with Old Believers living in Tartu County. He represents the political party Eesti Rahvaliid<sup>24</sup>, which Old Believers from the Peispiääre parish collaborate with<sup>25</sup>.

Besides that, the Ministry of Culture has acknowledged Old Belief as important cultural heritage but, again, without direct impact on the congregations so far. Kuutma reports that in order to include Kihnu cultural heritage into the UNESCO list of endangered cultures, Estonia had to mark five other equally valuable cultures in the application. These are the Setu singing traditions, the Koguva village in Muhu Island, the Kääriku handicraft village in Mulgimaa, the Avinurme village wood design and Old Believers in Prichudie.

*The Ministry of Culture has started to compose a representative list of cultural heritage that should be protected in Estonia. I comprehend the situation that the Old Believers' community should be there. This eventually means a step towards the preservation of Old Belief (Kuutma).*

What is more, Kuutma finds that the further implementation of the convention on the preservation of intangible cultural heritage (2003) in Estonia and UNESCO's advisory role mean certain changes to Old Believers in terms of their representation at the level of central government. If Old Belief is officially considered endangered, Old Believers will be directly included in the national decision-making process as the convention prescribes. In other words, the national programme for the preservation of Old Belief may facilitate the formation of linking social capital.

Regarding the present situation, I have succeeded to find one example of a holistic approach to preserve Old Belief, namely, the state programme "Preservation and development of sanctums" (2003). The programme

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<sup>24</sup> The party has a branch "Rahvaliidu Vene Ühendus" representing the Russian-speaking population within Eesti Rahvaliid political ideology and course of political action (see [www.russkie.ee](http://www.russkie.ee) for details).

<sup>25</sup> Baranina says that Old Believers do not formally belong to Eesti Rahvaliid but during the last local voting, they found it useful to collaborate with that political party.

concentrates on all churches, worship houses or temples in Estonia without confessional preferences. Varunin said in the interview that the vast majority of work has already been done, e.g. tangible heritage held by congregations (books, icons and worship houses) is documented so that it will be feasible to provide worship houses with targeted financial support. It should be noted, however, that whereas the programme concentrates on the preservation of tangible heritage, Old Believers also stress the importance of intangible cultural heritage that broadens the potential scope of intervention (see page 79 for details).

Overall, some government representatives who are directly responsible for regional and ethnic affairs in Estonia have sympathy towards Old Believers. Still, the scope and methods of state intervention remain open. Today, Old Believers' congregations are open for cooperation with the state. Despite negative relationships with the state structures in the past, modern Old Believers accept the state as a potential partner. The mix of bonding and bridging social capital, which congregations have, cannot, at least in the current situation, guarantee the effective preservation of Old Belief. Hence, the interviewed representatives of the congregations look for an additional type of social capital that is linking social capital.

### 3.5.2 Municipal initiatives

The Ministry of Finance (2005 a, b) and the presidential roundtable of local governments and regional development (2005) report a low administrative capacity of municipalities in Pridudie. Some leaders of these municipalities like Kulkov, Klychko, Kromonov, and present head of Piirissaare parish government Kalju Sakk, confirm that the low administrative capacity is an obstacle for the preservation of Old Belief at their municipalities.

*All leaders of local municipalities from Peipsi towns report with bitterness a lack of governmental attention and care that could help to solve the existing problems. Mayor of Mustvee town Gennady Kulkov said, for example, that over 40*

*representatives – members of parliament, ministers, and even the prime minister himself – visited the region. Promised, but forgot about their promises by leaving Prichudie at the end of their election campaign (Kuznetsova, Molodez Estonii, journalist).*

The above-mentioned leaders argue that it is possible to attain additional resources by means of projects but municipalities have no specialists or money to hire project managers. Municipal support in these units tends to be fragmented similar to central intervention. Kallaste, Mustvee and Piirissaare stress the importance of the state programme that could improve the municipal capacity. These findings are congruent to Hankov, Sepp and Vildo's (2004) findings on the low administrative capacity of poor municipalities to initiate projects and apply money from European structure funds. At the same time, leaders of similarly poor municipalities like Baranina (Peispiääre) and Jüri Vooder (Kasepää) seems to have the ability to initiate projects and support Old Believers.

*I – What projects does your municipality support?*

*R – Generally, for example the worship house got double monetary support thanks to the parish's application to the Phare programme. This was last year [2003 – A.A.]. This year, we applied for restoration of the worship house walls and burial vaults, and the parish did one part of the rooms in the worship house and paid its share (Vooder, head of Kasepää parish government).*

During my visits of Prichudie, I had the impression that the Peipsiääre parish seems to pioneer the preservation and restoration of Old Belief. Ülle Jukk (National Heritage Protection Board), Varunin and Miks share this opinion. Consider for example the following facts.

First, the municipal secondary school in Kolkja village (administrative centre of Peipsiääre parish) has had lessons of spirituality since 2000. The lessons provide children with general knowledge about religion and specific knowledge, e.g. reading in Old Slavonic. Initially, lessons were organised for all students

including primary and secondary school. Later, the school decided to concentrate on the youngest students in primary school.

*I – I see that others parishes do not have such a school as you. How did you manage to create it?*

*R – I did. Pulheria Baranina, an aunt of my husband, wanted me to do the museum of Old Believers and education like that in school. I used my authority. At first, the preceptor of the school did not want it, was against it. I said that if he said no, we would change the principle.*

*I – What about the principle now?*

*R – Now he likes it.*

Today an Old Believer, Anna Portnova, teaches the children. A former teacher of this class and present chairwoman of the Varnja congregation Kutkina shares her teaching experience.

*I had the first, second, third and fourth grades. There are many children of Old Believers. Surely, I did not make any difference between Orthodox and Old Believers. As I am myself an Old Believer, we learned prayers and commandments in Old Slavonic. By the end of the fourth grade, all were able to read in Old Slavonic. Of course, they did not understand some things and I explained them. The rest was up to them. The fact that the parents are not interested is an obstacle. It remains at the level of knowledge. In fact, I wanted to say to these children that they will never be alone as they believe in God. This is first, and the rest is about morality.*

Kutkina argues that provided Old Believers do not sustain traditions in their families, lessons of morality will remain just information without praxis.

Second, the only Old Believers' choir in Estonia, which consists of children from the school, belongs to Kolkja school. Third, the parish has a famous restaurant that has the nickname "Onion Restaurant". The restaurant offers traditional Russian food of Prichudie that reflects Old Believers' food as well. The restaurant was built by means of a project that Phare financed. Fourth, the

NGO “Varnja Pereselts” run by Old Believers received a former post office from the parish to implement its activities. Unlike EUOBC and SOBCD, “Varnja Pereselts” has an important role in the community development process at the lowest level of a single village. Finally, two of the three museums of Old Believers’ culture are located in the Peipsiääre parish (Kolkja and Varnja village) and the third is in Mustvee. It is possible to acquaint yourself with the Peipsiääre parish in detail at <http://kolkja.edu.ee/gallerii.htm> (17 May 2006).

It is tempting to draw a cliché conclusion that the low administrative capacity is first in affecting the municipal activity in the preservation of Old Belief. The budget of Kallaste town has increased up to 81% as Kuznetsova (8 April 2005) reports referring to data provided by Klychko. This implies a certain administrative capacity of Kallaste. However, Kallaste does not offer Old Believers a similar amount of support as the Peipsiääre parish does. Therefore, I asked local officials to explain to me why their municipalities succeed or do not succeed in helping Old Believers’ congregations.

Baranina and Vooder imply stable connections that the congregation and the municipality have. Baranina is, in fact, an active Old Believer and has been a head of the Peipsiääre parish government since the middle of the 1980s. She uses authority, which is one source of social capital (Coleman 1990), to pioneer the preservation of religious activity among Old Believers in Peipsiääre. Additionally, quotations that represent the experience of Fomina, Kromonov, who is also an Old Believer, report the importance of linking ties in the preservation of Old Belief at the level of local government.

*I – Where did the initiative come from?*

*R – Well, let’s say, now the initiative came from cooperation with the community... we have close relationships between the chairmen of the Old Believers’ community and the parish government.*

*I – What does this cooperation look like?*

*R – We got meetings and negotiations and we discussed together how we could adopt such things. And we got suggestions from them (Vooder);*

*After the congregation managed to renovate the roof of the worship house thanks to a private donation made by a grandchild, I stated visiting Kristine borough. We need to repair doors, the thermal shell. They said that they have no money. Then I applied to the board of heritage protection. I know we have original icons remaining from the Swedish time. I was at the Ministry of Culture, visited a board of heritage protection of the republic and Tallinn City Council. Finally, the thing started working. We were helped. He [a head of heritage protection in Kristine borough, Tallinn – A.A.] organised a meeting and called Kristine as well. Thanks to him, we got alarm financed by the board of heritage and Kristine pays a monthly fee for it. I negotiate about taking our building under protection. It is going well (Fomina);*

*I have made some effort to get help from outside to purchase church utensils. I do not want to say now who and where from. If it is done, I will inform you. The council takes these steps and representatives of the worship house are included as well. The municipality has already helped with the initial expenditures required for the project (Kromonov);*

*The Moscow foundation of compatriots of Yuri Dolgoruki gave to the Kallaste worship house a set of church utensils. In detail, Kromonov applied to the fond via the Russian embassy and the Estonian Union of Russian compatriots that eventually established relationships with the Sofrino Art Company of the Russian Orthodox Church that produces church utensils (BNS 28 August 2005) [see also [www.sofrino.ru](http://www.sofrino.ru) for details – A.A.].*

Referring to Kallaste, Baranina says, “This municipality is at war”. In other words, changes in local politics affect the density of networking between the municipalities and congregations.

*Let’s count how many local folks are in the municipality... eleven. Two are local. The rest came from outside. The city secretary is from Alatskivi. The Economic*

*adviser is from Alatskivi, the adviser is from Alatskivi and so forth. This shows that we cannot find staff on the spot. I tried for some time; it is not a secret that each mayor makes his or her own team because the old team is used to the previous mayor and sometimes unconsciously works against the new mayor. I have no local persons to work with. If local educated people, who know the town best, were in such a team, it would be the best (Klychko);*

*I – I heard Kallaste is not so successful because of local politics.*

*R – Yes.*

*I – Everyone strives to do his or her own business?*

*R – Indeed. The Piirissaar parish is even more complex where 100 individuals compete for power. Mustvee and Kallaste, which have more men and reasonable men, have political contestation. This especially concerns Kallaste. It is bizarre that Kallaste is in the same condition as in 1980s and functions according to its old patterns. The only thing is that they have unemployment. All is about who is the mayor and who you get along with. New elections come that absorb vital attention to the town itself (Jukk);*

*As far as local government is concerned, the thing is that the second mayor is an Old Believer. A mayor before me was also an Old Believer. As you may have already heard, we have had permanent contestation with the former power. Still, we can support one of our churches with 10,000 crowns at least each year (Kulkov).*

Local elections provide Old Believers with opportunities to be directly elected into the parish/town government and/or the parish/town council, and additionally to have indirect access to the municipality via political or administrative officials working in the municipalities. According to the last local elections held in October 2005, some Old Believers were elected or re-elected to the municipal organs. For example, already-mentioned Kulkov, Baranina, member of Piirissaare parish council Kuznetsov and others. The potential of linking social capital that congregations may have via representatives facilitates the preservation of Old Belief at the Peispiääre and Kasepää parishes. Congregations may lack closure

and stable networking with municipality because of political contestation as in the case of the towns of Kallaste and Mustvee.

Overall, the municipal preservation of Old Belief depends on how each municipality manages to help the congregations. While all municipalities in Prichudie belong to the group of the poorest local governments in Estonia and function in a disadvantaged socioeconomic environment, they do provide different support for the congregations. Respondents imply the importance of the stability of networking between the congregations and municipalities that rest on linking social ties. The latter may be affected in some municipalities by local political contestation.

### 3.5.3 Congregations' initiatives

Relying on collected information about the local and central governments' initiatives, both interviewed Old Believers and non-Old Believers stress the importance of linking social capital, which confirms the third hypothesis.

Now, analysing ongoing initiatives that active Old Believers undertake within congregations and NGOs to restore intangible and tangible heritage, I need to consider the ambiguity about the continuity of Old Belief in Estonia first.

In general, active Old Believers are anxious about the continuity of Old Belief in Estonia. The referring point to pessimism are the ongoing socio-economic problems and the reduced connectedness of Old Believers. Provided communities receive support, respondents turn out to be more optimistic.

*That is the reason I go to the heritage protection office. I see no perspective. Concerning parishioners, it is possible to say that the younger generation will come, rarely but still it will come. Provided the worship house is preserved. The thing is that we have few literate people. The bigger part of believers, I may say, has been renewed in my time. The younger and youngest generations do not want*

*to study. It is Old Slavonic. You need to learn it thoroughly. I think no one would come (Fomina);*

*My point of view is that if we let it develop as it is going now, we will have nobody who could support the spiritual life (Kuznetsov).*

The other group of believers seems to be more optimistic. Some respondents contend that even though Old Believers face migration, the generation gap and poor economic development, some Old Believers tend to return to their native villages and parishes. The discourse that lies behind this assumption might be the following.

*People identify as Old Believers not because they go to church but because they are Old Believers by origins. The very principle of community survival is based on, first, that a person identifies as an Old Believer until a certain age but does not attend services. Later by a certain age, a person recollects his or her origins and returns. It is a natural phenomenon and not only in the case of Old Believers. It is based on what people recollect who are in their 50s, 60s. There is a huge array of examples. People were far from religion like Zoja Ivanonva Kutkina who returned to her village at pension and now heads the Varnja congregation. In Tallinn, Aleksandra Yefimonva Fomina used to work in the Ministry of Economics and returned to the community as well. These are bright examples of, say, high enthusiasm (Varunin).*

Varunin refers to a certain regeneration of Old Believers' congregations. Indeed, some of the Old Believers I had interviews with returned to Peipsi Lake. In addition to Fomina and Kutkina (returned to native village Varnja after 50 years of living and working in other parts of Estonia), cases mentioned by Varunin, there are also the biographies of Poljakova and Maspanov. It is worth mentioning that today, Fomina, Kutkina, Poljakova and Maspanov play an essential role in the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia.

That is why regarding the fact of a potential regeneration of the community at the expense of returning Old Believers, the following three questions arise. First, what Old Believers leave communities? Second, what Old Believers return to the community? Third, to what place do Old Believers return? The underlying logic of these questions is that it is not enough to be an Old Believer by birth. Old Belief is a practice, i.e. the practice of certain religious traditions and knowledge, e.g. Old Slavonic. For example, Poljakova argues that Varnja village was revived after some persons belonging to the middle generation (about 30-40 years old) returned. Poljakova says with bitterness that as parishioners, these people are lost.

Consequently, the interviewed Old Believers suggest the preservation of religiousness among Old Believers by birth by means of restoration of worship houses and religious education among adults and especially children that could enhance bonding social capital that congregations need for the organic preservation of Old Belief. In the next two sections, I present an in-detail overview of the mentioned initiatives.

Active Old Believers and the National Heritage Board seem to share a common goal, which is the preservation of worship houses in physical terms. At the same time, whereas the National Heritage Board considers worship houses from a tangible heritage perspective (The State Program “Preservation and Development... 2003), Old Believers also stress the intangible aspect, which is essential for bonding social capital. Varunin brings the following narrative to illustrate the very necessity of the existence of worship houses in the Old Believers’ communities.

*As Russian experience shows, it is a classical example of Cossack-Nekrasovcy who resettled from Turkey to the Stavropoulos region. There are two Cossack villages and atamans’ meeting came about. One village told them to build a school for children. The second demanded a worship house. Ultimately, there are no Old Believers in the first village, where the school was build. But Old Believers still live*

*in the second village with the worship house. In any case, the foundation is the worship house and books (Varunin)<sup>26</sup>.*

As one may see, Varunin does not imply here a worship house as an architectural or historical object, which is also important as part of tangible heritage along with icons, books and artefacts. Instead, he stresses the social aspect of the worship house. In other words, the worship house facilitates social interactions, connectedness and networking among believers. Ultimately, the worship house accumulates social capital that the community uses to sustain itself.

The interviewed Old Believers acknowledge that today, they have to transfer traditions “artificially” by means of projects instead of the organic way, e.g. family and community. Briefly, projects are aimed to include potentially active Old Believers in networking. Varunin, reports that such projects have little participants and fail to render the large-scale activation effect on potential believers. Consequently, the implementation of these projects occurs within a single congregations and depends on the congregation’s ability to initiate projects. Because religious activity tends to be low among younger generations, active Old Believers want children to be religiously educated. Respondents tend to think that this will guarantee the continuity of Old Belief in the future. In other words, religious education provides children with a certain amount of information about Old Belief. Later, when these children grow up, they will have an opportunity for faster integration into the congregation and a deliberate restoration of their bonding social ties.

Overall, the main concern of Old Believers is to preserve religion, which is a source of bonding social capital by means of traditional and organic methods, e.g. family and the worship house. However, in order to achieve this, they need linking social capital.

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<sup>26</sup> The Cossack-Nekrasovcy who adhere to Old Belief migrated from Turkey to the USSR in 1962 – A.A.

### 3.6. POTENTIAL SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

The interviewed persons prefer direct intervention of the government. While the common objective which community development practitioners share is to preserve Old Belief, respondents discern a different scope of attention towards Old Believers.

The first approach might be called “objective”, which adherents like Maspanov may represent. In general, Maspanov argues that the situation of Old Believers in Prichudie is not specific. Other communities, e.g. Lutheran, Orthodox, Russian or Estonian living in Prichudie experience similar problems in terms of socioeconomic development, e.g. migration and unemployment (Päll 2004; Hankov, Sepp, Vildo 2004; Tuubel 2005). Therefore,

*we must not separate Old Believers from the rest of people living here. Including Estonians, Chuvashians, Jews... or whoever they are here. The conditions of Peipsi Lake, they are equal for everyone. There is no work. It is a widely known fact. Unemployment is about the same as in the rest of Estonia more or less (Maspanov).*

As Maspanov explains, the reason of such objectiveness are “speculations at the expense of Old Believers”. In other words, programmes aimed to improve Old Believers’ life, which have a potential of establishing stable and dense networking with horizontal or vertical actors, may not help Old Believers. Other actors benefit from the programmes using Old Believers as a tool for personal resource generation. Therefore, instead of using Old Believers as a “brand”, policy-makers should develop a regional policy in Prichudie that targets all local population.

*The development of the rural districts bordering Peipsi Lake depends on a national regional policy or more precisely its efficiency, positive and real influence in the Peipsi area and local initiative. Relying merely on the support of the state can*

*mean maximum financing of a few projects that are not followed by any development because of the indifference of the locals. In principal, such investment would be wasted money and effort. When only the local initiative is stressed without any real investment by the state, the local population would get the message that on the level of the state they are left outside “vital” Estonia (Tuubel 2005: 8).*

Respondents confirm that the preservation of Old Belief occurs within a disadvantaged regional and local development (Peipsi fishery development... 2004; Kangur and Hämmäl 2005; Päll 2004; Hankov, Sepp, Vildo 2004; Tuubel 2005). Additionally, respondents stress that current government policies in fishery and the absence of specific employment strategies negatively affect local originality and cannot ensure the prosperity of the region. According to the interviews, Prichudie started prospering due to the close trade relations with Leningrad in the 1970s. Small family-owned fishing and gardening were the main sources of income. After Estonia became independent, the Estonian-Russian border made the market unreachable for single entrepreneurs in terms of cross-border regulations (taxes, visa).

*15 years before we had a well-established sewing industry and connections. Now there is just a small part left. We lost jobs. We had two markets before. Traditional gardening and fishing. Now a system of buyer-ups emerged and they buy up vegetables. If something costs six crowns on the market, they buy it up for three. Well, the local population still goes fishing but the huge organisation “Eesti Kalur” buys fishing licenses. Then it apportions licenses to those who deliver fish to the company for half the price. This is why poaching is wide-spread. People are used to living on the lake. They do not understand that they harm it. No profit (Klychko);*

*We need jobs. We could freely visit St. Petersburg before. We used to grow a huge amount of vegetables. You cannot even imagine what a time it was when your work was valued. Compared with that period our gardens are dispensable (Baranina);*

*I – Perhaps religious activity declined because of the Soviet Union?*

*R – No, not exactly. We did not have any restrictions. I was born in [19]59 and everyone here baptised their children and visited the worship house under Soviet authority. It is purely economic in the case of Piirissaar. We depend on fishing here. At the end of the 60s, our prosperous kolkhoz was merged with less successful one in Mehikorma, After that, along the coastline with Kallaste. After the first merger, a number of young men aged 30, 40 dropped. All capital remained in Mehikorma and later in Kallaste. Nothing was given back and built here. Today, we have the same picture. The mergers gave it a negative impetus (Korotkov).*

Additionally to cross-border relocations, national legislation imposes certain restrictions on fishing. The local population has difficulties in selling gardening products as well.

*Today the traditional originality of local people oriented to fishing, gardening and handicraft is being shattered. People have been fishing here for several centuries. We depend on the lake. Everything is fine but the whole bunch of various structures from the local to the European level intervenes. The requirements that an ordinary fisherman faces are overwhelming. The laws created for the fisherman work against him. The breach of the traditional lifestyle forces him to pay fines and steal from the state and entrepreneurs. The problem of gardening is well known. It was a market, a functioning market. We had a commodity and money circulation. The market lapsed. Dead end. People still grow vegetables approximately in the same amount but the buy-up system artificially lowers the prices. Uncontrolled. We need more freedom in the economic sense not political, which is sufficient. Laws do not suit the local population, originality and traditional lifestyle. Our conservative people are oriented to the activities that they have had for centuries (Maspanov).*

Consequently, gardening and fishing cannot generate sufficient financial capital among the local population (Kangur and Hämmäl 2005). Precisely local fishermen, who are as a rule solitary entrepreneurs, cannot compete with fishing companies (Peipsi fishery development... 2004). For example, respondents from the Piirissaare parish (Sakk, Korotkov and Kuznetsov) argue that companies buy licenses and then resell them to fishermen who agree to sell fish to the company for a price that is below the market price. Besides that,

fishermen cannot fulfil the technical requirements imposed by laws, e.g. boat characteristics and safety, the small latitude of the fishing area. As a result, fish poaching is widespread, which may imply negative social capital. Consider someone wants to fish without a license and the gears prescribed by the law, which could mean a risky and uncertain environment according to Misztal (1996). The fisherman should be certain that no one would report him for inspection, which implies trust and networking among the local fishermen. Second, local vegetables, which the local population grows mainly by manual labour, cannot compete at the market with cheaper products coming from abroad or other parts of Estonia. Intermediaries buy local vegetables, again, for a lower and less competitive price. Overall, the local economy, traditionally based on small entrepreneurship, cannot accumulate the financial capital that improves the economic development in Prichudie including Old Believers communities.

Alternatively, direct intervention that takes into account Old Believers as a specific and endangered ethno-religious group with a distinctive culture can be used. Taking into account Maspanov's concern about "speculations on behalf of Old Believers", Varunin suggests enhancing representation of Old Believers

*We need to include, let's say, the lowest level of Old Believers and discuss together, not just that someone up there who decides. For example, like the Võru institute or something like that. We need a centralised programme that includes preceptors of congregations, public activists. Moreover, we have to work out a special programme for Old Belief in Estonia. It is possible to talk about Old Belief not only as a confessional group but also as ethno-confessional (Varunin).*

In other words, Varunin implies the bottom-up approach that Putnam (2003) calls the "cellular" approach. EUOBC and SOBCD already represent the interests of the congregations and communities. Both organisations can be represented at the governmental level as partners in the community development process. Provided Old Believers have linking social capital, this could fortify more successful bonding social ties (Evans 1997, Woolcock and Narayan 2000).

Summing up the “objective” and “specific group” approaches, respondents would agree with the members of the Saguaro Seminar (2005) that the internal life of congregations should remain under Old Believers’ authority. To the contrary, Old Believers can be represented as either secular representatives of the wider local population, e.g. entrepreneurs, or as religious members of congregations in the development and implementation of strategies at the local, regional or national levels.

*Old Believers must sustain their spirituality by themselves. I talked with one woman. She said you know, Fedor, you clearly understand that it is an Old Believers’ thing. To put it differently, the Estonian state or some organisation can help at the external level (Maspanov);*

*The thing is that the church does not need any secondary organisation. It itself works and does not require a supporting structure as in the Lutheran or the Orthodox Church. Old Belief is the same. Well, some NGOs may somehow work for a common interest (Kromonov);*

*Community preservation is an activity in itself. I mean, for example, the state policy is about the preservation of their tangible cultural heritage. But that concerns Sunday schools or, say, spreading traditions among youth; this works on the spot (Miks).*

By stressing government intervention, respondents imply the preservation of Old Belief by means of the “state-society” approach (Evans 1997, Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Old Believers already are endowed with bonding and bridging social capital, which might be ineffective today but still exists (Coleman 1990). This assumption helps to escape from the temptation of treating Old Believers as “uncivil” in terms of Putnam’s view of social capital formation. Today, horizontal organisations, which represent Old Believers directly (EUOBC and SOBCD) or indirectly (CTC, Cultural Society “Prichudie”), function in Estonia. The component that seems to be lacking is vertical relationships, or embeddedness as Evans (1997) would say. In other words, the lack of strong and dense connections between congregations and central authorities undermines the effective

preservation of Old Belief. Paraphrasing Moody and White (2003), Old Believers should be integrated in networks with formal institutions to get access to resources.

Previously, I argued that historically, the state tried to assimilate Old Believers either by ideological or physical methods. This implies the direct role and intervention of the state into social capital formation aimed to undermine the very basis of bonding social capital for Old Believers – religion. Today, the democratic state does not threaten Old Believers and guarantees religious freedom. At the same time, it is possible to take into consideration the indirect role of the government as some scholars (Fukuyama 2002) do. Namely, the disadvantaged regional and local development negatively affects social life, for example in terms of migration and unemployment.

Overall, on the one hand, respondents tend to adhere to a uniform action plan that at first glance may contradict Sobel (2002) or Fukuyama's (2002) point of view about the importance of local and small-scale social capital building strategies. In fact, the Estonian national experience in the preservation of the Setu and Võru minorities, which I present in the next section, shows that at some point of the development, horizontal initiatives require linking social capital.

### 3.6.1 State support for cultural and linguistic minorities in Estonia: the Setu and Võru case applied to the Old Believers

Today, the Estonian government directly supports linguistic and cultural minorities like Setu and Võru by means of state-funded programmes. Preliminary work carried out at the grass-roots level facilitated the development and implementation of these programmes (Ministry of Culture 2005).

The first programme is the South-Estonian culture and language programme 2000-2004 and 2005-2009. The programme directs financial resources to the NGOs, legal persons in public law and some business organisations (local

newspapers) that initiate projects in the following strategic fields stated by the government regarding the promotion of South Estonian culture and languages (primarily Setu and Võru, which have been preserved better and more actively by the minorities themselves than Mulgi and Tartu): research, school education, journalism, and contemporary culture. What is more, the representatives of the South Estonian minorities belong to the council responsible for the implementation of programmes and participate in workgroups that shape programmes according to the minorities' preferences (Ministry of Culture, 2006). Consider for example the Võru experience.

*The Võru grassroots movement was embraced by the Estonian government, which founded the Võru Institute in 1995<sup>27</sup>. The Institute is engaged in a wide range of activities to meet the challenges facing lesser-spoken languages, including (to name just a few) establishing school programmes, conducting linguistic and regional research, preserving place-names and their corresponding stories, publishing Võru-language scholarship and school textbooks, and organising annual language conferences. The aim of these activities is to encourage the Võru people to speak their own language and to preserve their characteristic life-style (Võru Institute 19 March 2006).*

The second ongoing initiative that rests on the networking of vertical and horizontal actors is the Setomaa state cultural programme 2006-2009. The programme supports Setu in such spheres as folklore, language and education, research, media and reputation, and community. Again, a brief historical overview shows that the horizontal level of social relations facilitates

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<sup>27</sup> The idea to establish a Võru Institute was born in the late 1980s thanks to the Võru Union. On 12 November 1988, the Võru Language and Culture Foundation was established by the Võrumaa heritage protection society, the Kanepi heritage protection society, the Võru education society, the editorial staff of the newspapers *Töörahva Elu* and *Koit*, and the magazine *Pioneer*. In mid-1990, it became obvious that the Võru Union needed state support and it was not efficient to organise activities solely at the expense of the horizontal level. For this reason, the Estonian government established a science and development organisation called Võru Institute in 1995. Today, the Institute functions under the authority of the Ministry of Culture. It draws on state laws and its statute; it is coordinated by the Council; it is financed through state budget, foundations and programmes (<http://www.wi.ee>).

interactions between communities and the state structures. Namely, the government started to pay attention to Setu after the third Setu Congress held in 1993. At the end of 1993, it created a support group in the parliament and the position of Estonian government representative in the region. Setu issued the first newspaper in their language in 1995 thanks to initiatives of parishes and launched a radio in collaboration with the Ministry of Culture. The government launched the programme for Setu in 1997. In 2003, accepting suggestions made by the parishes where Setu traditionally have been living the and Setu Congress, the parliament decided to provide Setu with financial support via the Ministry of Culture. Since 2003, the commission, which belongs to the Ministry of Culture, coordinates and makes decisions together with the Ministry of Culture.

The case of Võru and Setu shows that horizontal activity may facilitate common action among actors with similar features and then help to shape government decisions. Official documents, which I used in this section, report the proactive role of minorities. This implies the hypothetical models of “micro linkages” by Boix and Posner (1996, 1998) like “civic virtue” and “bureaucratic efficiency”, which try to broaden Putnam’s implicit view of linking social capital. In other words, the horizontal activities which Setu and Võru had, became insufficient in terms of the profound, large-scale effect and the long run sustainability. Realising this, minorities applied to the government for help. Obviously, thanks to already established social structures in the NGO sector, minorities had articulated preferences and common needs (“civic virtue”) and by interacting with bureaucrats managed to facilitate cooperation (“bureaucratic efficiency”). Ultimately, it is possible to conclude that the “state-society” approach to social capital formation may explain the development of national support to the Võru and Setu minorities.

Regarding Old Believers, the question arises as to why Old Believers have not yet succeeded to attract government attention. I argued before that the mix of bonding and bridging social capital that the congregations have has not

generated access to financial capital as it seems to be in the case of Setu and Võru. Consequently, both Old Believers and non-Old Believers explicitly imply the need of linking social capital. Hereby, I would like to broaden the possible interpretations concerning the specifics of active Old Believers within the scope of earlier research on religion as social capital by American scholars. The starting point might be the “passivity” that some non-Old Believers report. Sharing experience of collaboration with Old Believers, Jukk and Miks report the following.

*It should be their initiative. It is possible that the state itself undertakes some action plan or makes some decision. It is possible. But if this initiative initially comes from them, the state is even more ready to support and negotiate with people from Peipsi, for example by means of those structure foundations. Some self-finance is required and the state could help to get it. Any way, the initiative should come from Old Believers as well (Jukk);*

*It is like in the Orthodox Church where I also have contacts. If they need help, they do not ask for it. Well, only in case of emergency (Jukk);*

*They do not want to use opportunities... afraid of new opportunities. They spoke out against the European Union<sup>28</sup>. They cannot adapt to the present world. They could be more open, which does not mean negating traditions and culture (Miks).*

Some respondents would agree with Jukk and explain “passivity” in terms of the impact of historical “state-community” relationships or membership that may shape the congregations’ attitudes towards external interventions.

*I – You have eleven congregations. Are there any local initiatives, activities, say, some lobbying?*

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<sup>28</sup> The Peispiääre parish had the highest percent of people (76.1%) voting against the EU on 14 October 2003 (Kallaste 63.1% Kasepää 58.6% and Piirissaare 51.8%). The national average was 33% (Results of referendum in Tartu and Jõgeva County 14 October 2003). This fact was widely publicised in the media, e.g. Heinla, Eve (16 September 2003); Eri laid, Tõnis (15 September 2003); Öerumaa, Tarmo (16 October 2003).

*R – No. Let’s say there are aged people that do not tend to talk about themselves, as youth would do. We have mature people in who have no such objectives. At least I have never heard about lobbying at the level of the central government or international. This is for the younger generations (Varunin);*

*I – Is there any difference between the social activity of Old Believers and non-Old Believers?*

*R – Old Believers, they are slightly... well, how can I say... they do not lack activeness but they are now rather self-absorbed. They do not dare yet... I do not believe that they are like that; the thing is that they were persecuted and punished for a long time (Vooder, head of Kasepää parish government);*

*Historically the state rejected Old Believers. Old Believers were persecuted and ignored. Perhaps, it gradually became a habit not to ask for help from the state institutions (Kulkov).*

At the same time, some respondents like Klychko (see for example pages 66, 97 for details of his discourse) would disagree with Jukk and Miks because the methods that “outsiders” use may mismatch the local conditions. In other words, the question is how religious and secular actors interpret and approach community development (see the next section on tourism development that represents these findings) for the preservation of Old Belief (Harris 2003).

Indeed, Old Believers have inward activities in terms of religious practices. However, respondents of congregations also realise that “self-sufficiency” or “autonomy” is not possible. Jukk and other non-Old Believers, e.g. Güsson report that Old Believers have become more open. Thus, generalisations about the “passivity” of Old Believers should be treated with scepticism because Jukk reports that Orthodox believers also “tend to be shy”. To the contrary, some Old Believers have initiatives in “civilised forms” (a representative example is SOBCD and NGO “Varnja Pereselts”). I assume that obviously, they lack expertise how (Coleman 2003) to use horizontal social capital to influence the government decisions. This hypothesis should be researched further.

Nevertheless, the situation that both the target group and the community development practitioners face is the transition from “vacuum” and “timeliness” in the context of socioeconomic problems in Prichudie towards a more open social environment as the analysis of horizontal activities shows (see chapter “Bridging social capital in congregations” for details).

In addition, I cannot negate the fact that while Võru, Setu and Old Believers are minorities they are still different in terms of bonding social ties with Estonians that makes communication easier (Putnam 2003). For example, Võru and Setu descendants speak Estonian as a mother tongue while trying to preserve their linguistic originality. Regarding the language as a bridging tie, I supposed that unlike those Russians who migrated to Estonia during the times of Soviet occupation, Old Believers spoke Estonian at least better than “Soviet” Russians. To put it differently, Old Believers as a religious group have lived in Estonia for three centuries and had close contacts with the ethnic population, which helped them to learn Estonian and have bridging ties with the Estonian community. However, respondents (both Old Believers and non-old believers) changed my point of view. It is a myth that all Old Believers speak Estonian.

On the one hand, Fomina and Güsson argue that Estonians call Old Believers “our Russians”, which clearly distinguishes Old Believers from those Russians who migrated to Estonia during Soviet occupation. Despite such sympathy, which also may exist at the political level, e.g. Rummo and Õunapuu interviews in the press, Old Believers are still Russians and not all of them speak Estonian just like the rest of the Russians in Estonia<sup>29</sup>. It must be stressed that the poor knowledge of Estonian is not a specific feature of Old Believers but also other Russians in Estonia, which can be interpreted as an obstacle to the formation of bridging and linking social ties between representatives of different ethnic communities.

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<sup>29</sup> The integration of Russians and the Russian-speaking population, e.g. Tatars, Ukrainians, Byelorussians etc (who in 2005 constituted about 30% of all ethnic population), is a political objective and one of the most debated in Estonia (National Program “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007; TNS Emor 2004. Subject in the Estonian language)

Consider for example the ongoing language reform in Russian schools that concerns Old Believers.

The Ministry of Education and Science has launched the programme of gradual transition of the working language in Russian upper secondary schools from Russian to Estonian. The ministry plans to implement the programme by 2007 (Sildam 2006 and “To the non-Estonian student” 18 May 2006). The general justification of the reform is that Russian-speaking children will have better opportunities to learn Estonian. Consequently, thanks to the language skills, Russian children will have better access to academic education and work. After wide political debates, the ministry headed by Mailis Reps (2001-2003 and 2005-) who represents centrist party “Keskerakond”, decided to implement the reform. Regardless of the opposition, which insisted rather on a total transition of education from Russian to Estonian, the ministry developed a “partial” programme (only a limited number of subjects will be in Estonian). According to the research ordered by the Ministry of Education and Science (TNS Emor 2004), Russian schools realise the necessity of subjects held in the Estonian language. For example, 83%, which amounts to 63 schools, already have some subjects in Estonian and the vast majority (72% of all schools) plans to enlarge the amount of subjects in Estonian. Remarkably, Russian schools have two reasons to accept the reform. First, identity, “We live here and we want to stay here, and our children need to get education in Estonia”. Second, legislative influence and initiated language reform. Nevertheless, despite the realised necessity of education in Estonian, schools have a rather negative attitude towards the reform. The lack of experience in teaching in Estonian, attitudes and fear of assimilation are the main causes.

Kromonov and Kutkina who used to head lessons of spirituality in Kolkja Secondary School seem to reflect this anxiety – a radical language reform jeopardised bonding social ties. Namely, even though Russian and Old Slavonic are different languages, they still have similarities. Kromonov and Kutkina argue

that knowledge of Russian facilitates the learning of Old Slavonic, which is essential for the preservation of intangible culture.

Finally, some respondents admit that Old Believers spoke Estonian better in the past before Soviet occupation. However, they tend to think that today, it is rather a politically created myth aimed to show to the “Soviet” Russians that it is possible to learn Estonian and to integrate into Estonian society. Varunin specifies that

*it is wrong perhaps to take the language as an etalon of loyalty towards the state. This community is very loyal to Estonia. It is the motherland in a spiritual and in any sense. This community is not loyal to the government but to all of Estonia. This is the reason why it was no shock when Estonia became independent. This community has never tried to bring Russia to Estonia. This has never happened. Power institutions change but people are still people.*

Therefore, the preservation of Old Belief in terms of social capital as a policy tool should be guided by pragmatism and principles (Saguaro Seminar 2005), which does not depend on politics as Fafchamps (2002) and Putnam (2004) argue because

*we can be good colleagues. We can even be friends and help each other in daily life. I mean to live a normal human life. However, at the wider social level, we misunderstand each other. In other words, there is a mismatch between personal daily life and socio-political positions. We do not understand each other or interpret differently, each one sticking to his or her position. It is not bad because people are different but it is essential to prevent conflicts and attempts to negate opinions. We cannot behave in politics as we do in daily life, yet. It is important to equally represent Russians (Kromonov).*

### 3.6.2 Development of tourism: the dilemma of “efficacy” and “witness”

The development of tourism is the main discourse that preoccupies the development of Prichudie. In my opinion, tourism means a dilemma of “efficacy” and “witness” for Old Believers (Coleman 2003). Today, both horizontal (NGOs

CTC and NGO “Piiripeal”) and vertical organisations (municipalities<sup>30</sup>, Peipsiveere arengu Foundation, South Estonia Tourism Foundation) devote much attention to tourism, which may channel financial capital to Prichudie. The interviewed Old Believers think that tourism ruins the internal life of congregations – it undermines the already diminished religiousness. Therefore, according to Coleman (2003), practitioners should consider that active Old Believers are not a secular group.

According to the Estonian state tourism development strategy for 2007-2013, tourism is a valuable tool that should enhance the pace of economic development in Estonia. The South-Estonia tourism development strategy until 2010 (1999-2000) writes that one potential resource for tourism in the Prichudie region is the ethnic and cultural originality of Old Believers. The strategy directly concerns Old Believers but no Old Believers participated in the official working group that compiled the strategy as the list of participants’ shows (South-Estonia Tourism Foundation 1 March 2004). The formal principles that guide the implementation of the strategy are client-centeredness, preservation of local identity (traditions, culture and nature) and partnership. The research made by CTC (Tuubel 2005) also confirms the potential of Prichudie region for ecotourism development. Consequently, the cultural heritage of Old Belief is a resource for tourism developers that generates financial capital. Indeed, Old Believers are good “eye catchers” for the tourist.

*During the celebration of hanseatic days in Tartu city, the Tartu Tourism Foundation offered two tours. One was to Old Believers’ villages and another to Otepää. 160 tourists wanted to visit Old Believers and only 9 wished to see the nature of Southern Estonia (Güsson).*

*What catches the eye the most in Peipsi are Old Believers’ worship houses and graveyards, Estonian fashion type small houses, old women wearing varicoloured*

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<sup>30</sup> Tuubel finds that the local development strategies that municipalities in Prichudie worked out, concern tourism as the main community development tool.

*shawls and children with scratched knees. Of course fields of onions as well (Leemet 5 July 2003).*

On its positive side, tourism may channel financial capital to the poor municipalities of Prichudie, which eventually improves the economic development and makes the communities wealthier. This will attract people born in Prichudie, including Old Believers and their descendants, to return to “the homes of ancestors”. However, Old Believers’ stance towards tourism is rather negative.

Old Believers are worried about the potential threats of tourism. In terms of trust, as Misztal (1996) would suggest, tourism reflects the risk and uncertainty that Old Believers face. Some believers are critical about taking the risk of developing tourism because

*you see, all this is done for a tourist who could visit us but not for the true faith. It is good but in the sense of faith, we need to do something (Kutkina).*

Paraphrasing Coleman (2003), the dilemma of Old Believers is “to develop tourism, attract tourists and perhaps get richer” or “not to develop tourism and try to strengthen bonding ties by means of religious education and the preservation of worship houses”. Only one interviewed Old Believer treats tourism positively and is not afraid of becoming open for visitors. The rest of the interviewed Old Believers represent either a conservative (communities should not be advertised and popularised) or a “the third way” stance. The latter means that provided tourists treat Old Believers and their traditions with respect, they will be welcome. The message I got during my visits to Prichudie is that tourism may lead to the situation where Old Believers’ communities function as a simple attraction or even Disney Land. In other words, tourism discloses the inherently intimate world of Old Belief that stems from attitudes and emotions that do not match the reality of external pressures.

*There are contradictions between the traditions of Old Believers to live self-sufficiently without advertising, showing off or even receiving some financial support and the realities of modern life. These impose constraints on how Old Believers should live today (Kromonov).*

The exposure of religious activities makes a congregation more open, which is not in line with Old Believers' general worldview. Some respondents would agree with Old Believers.

*Tourism is not a magic wand that may still be used. If tourism disturbs worship houses, this will be bad indeed (Jukk);*

*They stress very actively the tourism development in Raja, which might evolve into a too commercial activity (Jukk);*

*Without accurate planning, management and preliminary knowledge, it may not be profitable for local inhabitants. It can rather cause irretrievable damage to the environment and that way discredit the idea of developing ecotourism (Tuubel 2005).*

Miks and Jukk argue that Old Believers do appreciate and welcome activities that directly improve their religious life, which means a strengthening of bonding social capital, e.g. the state programme "Preservation and development of sanctums".

The analysis shows that similarly to bridging social ties, which Putnam (2003) values most of all, the establishment of linking social ties or embeddedness (Evans 1997) also demand trust, dense networking and norms that regulate relationships between different actors.

The following quotations represent mainly the experience of non-Old Believers, excluding Poljakova, in the creation of job opportunities, the

development of tourism, and the implementation of the programme for preservation and development of sanctums.

*We had a plant for producing fish in Kolkja. The boss came to the village, called people and offered jobs. Nobody came. But you want to work. Go ahead. You can try at least for a while. No I will not come because it is cold there. I have no idea where do they get money for alcohol (Poljakova);*

*R – We wanted to create a business association that could help to grow onion. Find a market together, run the accounting, and achieve some capacity together. But they push their carts to Tallinn or Tartu only, each one separately and they disagree to cooperate with neighbours. The community has two sides. Now we are making some seminars about business associations. Estonians did come. I visited Kolkja to make a seminar but no one came. This happened for a few times. They seem to have no such thing as initiating something altogether. This is our Peipsi Lake, our onions and we can work together. We have a different vision about community development.*

*I – In my opinion, they see community in terms of faith*

*R – Well, you should ask Pavel Varunin about this. I understand that they are never ready to cooperate in terms of economic activity. Everyone is alone with his or her family or descendants. It is the same thing with trainings. We talk about what has happened in Estonian society, talk about euro money, talk about structure funds, talk about self-realisation, talk about how to start some business or do business is your field. Nevertheless, they do not come to the sport. Estonians may come but they will not (Miks);*

*The onion restaurant made much noise for someone to come, build a casino and bring western culture (Miks);*

*Do not speculate on behalf of Old Believers! We have a museum of Old Believers in Mustvee. Why it is the museum of Old Believers? It is an ethnographic museum of the local population (Maspanov);*

*I –Miks told me she wanted to establish some association to grow onions and Old Believers were not enthusiastic about the idea.*

*R – Not only Old Believers. The thing is that she did not research the problem well enough. If she had applied for consultation before making plans, I would have said that Old Believers are ready to participate if there is a market. Ok, let's assume we have grown onions that cost five crowns but the market price is three crowns. So what? It is difficult to sell something without the market. That is why local folk did not accept the idea because they know the problem. She is educated and can write projects to get money from EC but does not know how to grow vegetables (Klychko);*

*R – We had no complications while observing worship houses but we did have some tension in the case of books. Our archivists could not always access all places. Some parishes did not treat them neutrally. Fortunately, Pavel Varunin was on the spot and helped to communicate. Still some people were sceptical. I guess this attitude might be at least neutral. I do not wait for some exaltation but I do wait for cooperation. Our specialists spare much time for developing human relationships. These people have been interacting with the community for a year and not just like someone who just started to work.*

*I – Do you mean that those officials faced a cold admission?*

*R – Some people. I had this feeling sometimes. I do see that the attitude has improved. Some worship houses were fairly exclusive and only a small number of people managed to enter. Today, they are more open, and they have understood that if they do not communicate and remain close, this will not help. This change is remarkable in close congregations (Jukk).*

Overall, for Old Believers, horizontal and vertical initiatives which are either directly or indirectly targeted to preserve Old Belief mean that they have to alter their worldviews in terms of community development and “become more open for non-Old Believers that approach community development differently”. Tourism seems to be inevitable in the general development strategy in the case of the Prichudie region, which is a source of external threat to Old Believers’ worldviews. Consequently, practitioners that strive to initiate projects in Prichudie face the necessity of dense networking, trust and norms that help to build bridges between the congregations and organisations they represent in order to preserve Old Belief and simultaneously develop tourism.

## 4. DISCUSSION

My findings rest on qualitative data without quantification that could widen descriptive part of analysis. For example, how much money the local and central governments spent for the preservation of Old Belief, how many and what projects have been financed by the NGO or public sector etc.

The statistical data on the regional and local development in Prichudie I lean on, clearly refer to the context of socioeconomic development problems Old Believers face. Albeit, the available statistics do not guarantee an in-depth analysis of how modern Old Believers manage to preserve their culture. Therefore, the qualitative method is justified.

The “snowball” technique I used for the sample generation excluded passive Old Believers from interviewing. Interviews with passive Old Believers could enhance information about attitudes and opinions towards Old Belief preservation. Nevertheless, the results are still important because they represent individuals who are related to the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia in practice.

Further, I should stress that not all published works on Old Believers are represented in the theoretical part of the thesis. Estonian political scientist Eiki Berg who research national minorities in Estonia has published some articles and done presentations in the international conferences<sup>31</sup> on Old Believers that I discovered in the final stage of completing the thesis. While the materials are at least 10 years old, I briefly represent some Berg’s findings that might be useful for the further analysis.

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<sup>31</sup> Berg, Eiki. 1997. Identity Options of Russian Old Believers in Estonia. Conference on 20th Century Europe: Inclusions/Exclusions, 27.-30. August, Essex, U.K.  
Berg, E., Kulu, H. 1996. Peispi Russians: An Example of Problematic Region. Ethnical Minorities in Estonia: their problems and future. Materials for Conference in Jõgeva, pp. 43-50=Peipsivene: Eeskujulik Probleemala. Etnilised vähemused Eestis, nende tänased probleemid ja tulevik. Konverentsi materjalid. Jõgeva, lk.43-50;

Berg and Kulu (1995: 1164) report that Prichudie is special for two reasons, which seems to be congruent in some degree with respondents' reflections on socioeconomic problems in Prichudie. First, Prichudie needs a pragmatic minority policy with no black-and-white view of the Russian-speaking population in the region. Second, the region is typical in the sense of regional policy. It is a peripheral area with an aging population. Its local economy is based on traditional business activities (gardening and fishing) and high unemployment. The development of tourism might be a solution to the problem. However, it should be questioned, as the interviewed Old Believers also stress, whether or not tourism suits the preservation of local traditions in Prichudie.

According to Berg and Kulu (1995: 1173), Prichudie seems to be a “more bilingual area” compared to the rest of Estonia. Consider that 46% of the Russians speak Estonian fluently, which is remarkably high compared to an average 15% in all of Estonia. Besides that, while on average, 33% of the Estonians speak Russian fluently, 44% of the Estonians in Prichudie speak Russian fluently. However, younger generations of Russians speak Estonian to a lesser extent than older generations. The latter seems to better reflect “the myth about the Russians in Prichudie fluently speaking Estonian” that I consider in my analysis.

Similarly to Plaat (2004) and my qualitative analysis, religion is the source of identity to Old Believers. 40% of the respondents say that Old Belief is very important, 41% say it is important, 19% report religion is not important. Further, 28% of the families say that they have distinctive Old Believers' features, 32% say it is true on average, and 19% say they have no relationship with Old Belief. Again, religion is more important for older generations than younger people. In detail, 5% of those born in 1965 and afterwards say that religion is very important, 55% of those born in the period 1915-1939 say that religion is very important and it is true for 75% of the persons born in 1914 and earlier. Additionally, Berg and Kulu (1995: 1177) find that thanks to precious isolation and marriage the vast majority of people share some kinship ties, as Varunin also says in his interview. This helps to sustain a sense of communion [bonding social capital – A.A.].

Regarding discrimination, which is not analysed in the thesis, Berg and Kulu find that 31% of the Russians from Prichudie tend to think that Russians are discriminated against in Estonia, 46% reject that and 23% have no answer. 87% argue that Russians are treated with prejudice and 96% think of Prichudie as having ethnic problems. The vast majority of those who tend to evaluate the situation of Russians in Estonia as critical are middle-aged (30-54 years old) adults. Older generations do not accept the idea of discrimination and young people have no opinion about the issue. This implies that for the latter group, identity is not essential yet.

Prichudie Russians are relatively active voters (consider for example 76% of the population in the Peipsiääre parish voted against the European Union in 2003). Berg and Kulu have the following result. The number of participants in the local elections in 1995 was 81% in Piirissaare, 81% in Kallaste, and 73% in Peipsiääre. Nikolai Maspanov, who was elected to parliament, was born in Tallinn but has Prichudie roots. It might mean that “it is great to have our man in the parliament”. However, the scholar finds that the interest that Maspanov represented in parliament was mainly economical.

Berg and Kulu (1995) draw the following conclusion. First, traditions are an essential prerequisite for the integration of minorities and their sense of assuredness. The minority is able to respect the interests of the majority as the experience of older generations in discrimination implies. Second, the economic decline in Prichudie may negatively affect the majority-minority relationships that regional policy-makers should pay attention to. The development of job opportunities that matches local specifics and traditions is important. Support of Prichudie is the basis for developing good relationships between minority and majority. The local population knows best how to develop Prichudie.

It is remarkable that Varunin who I spoke with about research on Old Believers did not mention these articles as well. As a rule, respondents mentioned ethnographic or linguistic works but socio-political studies were outside the

scope. Still, the interviews I conducted are a valuable source of information for the government if Old Belief will be officially certified an endangered culture.

Regarding the hypotheses, bonding social capital has both negative and positive meaning in theory. The analysis shows that bonding social capital is a crucial asset that helps to preserve the main feature of Old Believers – religion –, which makes Old Believers a specific minority. Still, Old Believers need other forms of social capital because the dependence on bonding social guarantees the survival of the community. Interviewed Old Believers recognise the importance of other types of social capitals and especially linking social capital. Indeed, if Old Believers rely only on bonding social capital, this may threaten their continuity under the pressure of the external environment, e.g. the development of tourism that does not take into account Old Believers' concerns. While bonding social capital strengthens the community from inside (Evans 1997), bonding and linking social capital facilitate resource generation for the development of the community (Putnam 2003; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Second, data, which is congruent with the hypothesis about lacking of bridging social capital, is ambivalent. On the one hand, there are actors Old Believers cooperate or at least have “weak” ties with but at the same time, Varunin and Maspanov imply that secular associations try to decide the destiny of Old Believers without Old Believers. Third, the lack of linking social ties between Old Believers and government institutions refers again to the fact that in addition to the horizontal level, Old Believers are underrepresented at the vertical level. The importance of representation comes mainly from the conversation with Varunin. Hence, it might be a personal problem of the respondent. However, bearing in mind the fact that active Old Believers chose Varunin to represent Old Believers in a “secular world”, Varunin still reflects the opinion of other Old Believers.

This study concentrates on the positive potential of social capital. Nevertheless, negative social capital should also be researched further as it is crucial to comprehend how and why NGO or government initiatives may fail in Prichudie.

There is only one remark about potential negative social capital that local fishermen may have (fish poaching).

The analysis confirms the necessity of networking but does not clarify the context of representation of Old Believers. The chosen theoretical frame reflects rather the resource, which Old Believers have or fail to have, than the specifics of polity. Alternatively, other theories can be used for further investigation e.g. poliarchy.

Dahl (1971) argues that the key feature of democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equal. The responsive government provides people with institutional guarantees that can be divided into three opportunities: 1) to formulate their preferences; 2) to indicate their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action and 3) to have their preferences weighted equally (no discrimination) in the conduct of the government. Perfectly competitive democracy is akin with the situation where a high level of liberalisation (public contestation) coexists with the inclusiveness (participation) that Dahl calls poliarchy

Additionally, Mintzberg (1996) stresses that while the government functions within different models, there are some better and some worse models<sup>32</sup>. The task of the modern government is to take into consideration the network model but at the same time shift to the normative-control model of governance to silence the negative effects of bureaucracy. This means that along with networking, norms and trust are important parts of modern governance.

The Setu and Võru case should be researched further because I drew conclusions relying only on official documents available on the internet. Interviews with representatives of these minorities may essentially widen the scope of information about the Setu and Võru experience that might be a useful practical guide for Old

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<sup>32</sup> Mintzberg discerns five models: the government-as-machine model, the government-as-network model, the performance-control model, the virtual-government model and the normative-control model.

Believers. Besides that, it is important to investigate into the present relationships of the Setu and Võru minorities with the government. In other words, how vertical relationships affect horizontal actors.

Further, I critically accept the findings on how Old Believers' religious views may influence social capital formation (Curry 2003). "Passivity" must not be attributed to Old Believers. "Reluctance", "lack of enthusiasm" or "passive resistance", which some practitioners report, should be considered a reaction towards external activities that the community deems inappropriate or "untraditional". It is difficult to disagree with Putnam (2003) that bridging, and I think linking social ties as well, demand time and energy to evolve. Therefore, if we want to research how religious worldviews affect social capital, we need to investigate other religious groups living in Prichudie, e.g. Lutherans and Orthodox. What is more, associational activity of other communities might be researched if we want to generalise the scope and density of Old Believers' horizontal activity.

Overall, regarding the potential of further research, the following aspects might be considered in the vein of comparative analysis: a) the statistical data on NGO, local and central financial support to the preservation of Old Believers and other cultural communities in Prichudie, b) the specifics of passive Old Believers, c) the representation of Old Believers in Estonia, d) the local bureaucracy and community development in Prichudie, e) the relationships between horizontal associations and vertical level actors in Prichudie, f) the analysis of the Setu and Võru experience and finally g) negative social capital.

## CONCLUSION

Religion is the key source of social capital that active Old Believers may have as a religious minority. Modern Old Believers living in Estonia have other bonding features that may facilitate their common action, e.g. they are Russians ethnically, speak Russian, live in one geographical area, the western coastline of Peipsi Lake, and have kinship ties. However, religious traditions and culture are first in making Old Believers a specific minority in Estonia and facilitating the organic preservation of cultural heritage at the expense of internal resources.

The small number of active Old Believers, who constitute the core of registered congregations in Estonia, experiences difficulties in the preservation of Old Belief. The available networks, norms and trust, which believers share with each other within worship houses, cannot generate sufficient financial capital that could enhance the capacity of congregations to preserve the heritage at the expense of active believers. What is more, passive Old Believers, as the name implies, tend to have rather low religious activity and networking within worship houses. The interviewed Old Believers realise their dependence on external support and the growing demand of interactions with other actors who are either directly or indirectly engaged in the preservation of Old Belief. The latter means not only an intellectual but also a practical activity. For congregations possess bridging social capital thanks to horizontal social structures functioning in the NGO sector, which represents the interest of Old Believers. Consequently, congregations have some mix of bonding and bridging social capital. However, the question to be answered in this qualitative research is not about the amount but the quality of bridging social ties.

Up to now, Old Believers and non-Old Believers who I interviewed have not succeeded to influence the governmental decision-making process by means of common action as the Setu and Võru minorities did. The Setu and Võru case implies that minorities need linking social capital at some point of cultural

renaissance because horizontally accumulated social capital cannot facilitate the long-run capacity and coordinated continuity of horizontal initiatives.

While a certain level of sympathy towards Old Believers may exist among some local and central officials, the minority has been supported in a fragmented way as respondents report. Still, a positive example is the national programme for the preservation and development of sanctums in Estonia that provides a holistic approach to the preservation of Old Believers' worship houses. A formal background which includes and accepts Old Believers as an endangered cultural minority already exists, e.g. Estonian cultural policy, legislation and ratified international documents (especially UNESCO conventions on the preservation of intangible and tangible cultural heritage).

The government may use horizontally accumulated social capital. This means direct participation of Old Believers who are interested in the preservation of Old Belief by networking with vertical actors according to the "state-society" synergy approach. The scope of government intervention is a delicate issue and should be considered with pragmatism. On the one hand, not only Old Believers but also other communities live in Prichudie and face similar socioeconomic problems that make the region an unattractive place to live. The modern state guarantees religious freedom to Old believers. What is more, it does not threaten the minority as Tsarist or Soviet Russia did by means of deliberate assimilation policies. Rather, respondents find that the disadvantaged socioeconomic development in Prichudie affects the preservation of Old Belief, which implies, in fact, the absence of a holistic regional policy. Therefore, one policy option might be, for example, to combat unemployment and prevent migration by improving life conditions in Prichudie. Job opportunities could channel financial capital to the western coastline of Peipsi Lake and revitalise communities.

On the other hand, it is impossible to negate the fact that Old Believers are a specific minority among Russians and the Russian-speaking population living in Estonia. As an alternative, government intervention may have the form of state-

funded programmes as in the case of the Võru and Setu minorities. Both have succeeded to attract government attention and to facilitate the development of national state-funded programmes for the preservation of cultural and linguistic specifics. It should be noted that Old Believers are not Setu or Võru. Even though Old Believers have been living in Estonia at least since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, they have qualitatively less bonding features with Estonians than the Setu and Võru minorities. Regarding local governments, the analysis shows that the effectiveness of municipal support may depend on the density and stability of networking, as respondents report. While excluding the cities of Tallinn and Tartu, all municipalities, where Old Believers live, are poor, which should be also considered during the strategy development, the unstable local political life in Mustvee and Kallaste interrupts the continuity of the preservation of Old Belief.

By becoming more open, active Old Believers face the dilemma of “efficacy” and “witness”, which challenges traditional worldviews as in the case of tourism development. It seems that both Old believers and non-Old Believers share a common goal – the preservation of Old Belief. Old Believers see community development in terms of religious education, the preservation of worship houses or alternatively regional policy without stressing Old Believers specifics. Interviews imply a potential regeneration of Old Believers’ communities at the expense of persons who migrated from Prichudie. Still, the question is about the quality of those potential parishioners who represent passive Old Believers. They tend to have little or no knowledge about religious traditions, which in turn demands their reintegration. At the same time, tourism is the main tool expected to generate the financial capital that the whole region including Old Believers needs. In fact, tourism may imply a risky and uncertain environment that facilitates risk aversion among Old Believers and reduces enthusiasm towards “untraditional” initiatives. Nevertheless, as some practitioners report, Old Believers have become more open as compared to a previous decade.

“Passiveness”, which some non-old believers report, should not be considered as something inevitably inherent to Old Believers. Other communities, like Orthodox

believers, may also wait but not ask for help. The question is rather about the transition from a more close to a more open social environment for Old Believers. This requires trust, norms and networks that bridge different communities and representatives of Old Believers in the process of linking social capital formation. The latter is promising if Estonia officially presents Old Belief to UNESCO as endangered cultural heritage and develops a national strategy for the preservation of Old Belief in Estonia.

## APPENDIX 1

### **Detailed Differences between Old Believers and post-Nikonian Russian Orthodoxy**

Old Believers use 2 fingers while making the sign of the cross (2 fingers straightened, 3 folded) while new style Orthodoxy uses 3 fingers for the sign of cross (3 fingers straightened, 2 fingers folded). That is not the major difference between the two branches of Orthodoxy, but one of the most noticeable. Old Believers reject all changes and emendations of liturgical texts and rituals introduced by the reform of Patriarch Nikon. Thus, they continue to use the older Church Slavonic translation of the sacred texts, including the Psalter, striving to preserve the "pre-Nikonian" practices of the Russian Church.

Old Believers only recognize baptism performed through three full immersions and reject the validity of any baptismal rite that has been performed otherwise (e.g. through pouring, as has been occasionally accepted in the Russian Church since the 18<sup>th</sup> century).

Old Believers are in principle opposed to ecumenism, even though there have been many instances of good relationship and collaboration with other Eastern Orthodox churches.

Old Believers and new style Orthodoxy have a lot of small, but essential differences in church services. The very style of service is different.

Old Believers do not use polyphonic singing, but only monodic, unison singing. They also have their own way of writing down music: not with linear notation, but with special signs, Kryuki or Znamena ('hooks' or 'banners' in English translation). There are several types of Old Believers' znamennoe singing: znamenny raspev, stolpovoy raspev, pomorsky raspev (or khomovoe singing), demestvenny raspev etc. Old Believers use only icons of Old Russian or Byzantine iconography; they do not believe in venerating realistic images of Christ, Our Lady and the Saints as icons (which is widely accepted in new style Orthodoxy).

Old Believers do not kneel while making prayers, but in comparison with new style Orthodoxy, they perform more bows and especially low bows (nearly prostrations). While making low bows, Old Believers use a special little rug called a *podruchnik*, placing their hands on it. It is necessary that the fingers that are used for the cross sign remain clean during the prayers.

On average, the Old Believers' services are 2-3 times longer than in new style Orthodoxy. In general, the Old Believers insist on following the rubrics to the letter, and refrain from shortening the Psalter readings and hymnography. They also tend to combine several services together, sometimes redundantly. Thus, a typical Old-Rite "vigil service" (*vsenoschnoe bdenie*) would include shortened ("small") vespers, solemn ("great") vespers, compline, midnight office, matins and the First Hour.

It is advisable to attend Old Believer services in native Russian dress, or at least to try to correspond to the very style of this dress. For men, it means that shirts should be worn outside the trousers. It is also advised that a belt should be put on, but nowadays this recommendation is rarely followed. For women, a long skirt and a head kerchief are necessary. The kerchief shouldn't be tied (as it is in new style Orthodoxy), but rather fastened with a pin under the chin.

While saying repetitive prayers, Old Believers use a special type of beads called *lestovka*.

The Liturgy is performed with 7 Hosts, but not 5, as in new style Orthodoxy. The alleluia verse after the psalmody is chanted twice, but not three times, i.e., as in Russian Orthodoxy today, the section of the psalmody would end: *Alleluia, alleluia, alleluia, glory to you, O God*, the Old Believers retain the earlier version: *Alleluia, alleluia, glory to you, O God*.

A more strict preparation to Communion (among those who have ordained priests) is used – very strict fasting within the week before Communion.

This is one of the reasons why Communion among laity is common only during Lent and other long fasts.

It is common after each Confession to have some epitimia. Usually, it is a certain number of bows, which are counted with the help of *lestovka*.

Old Believers do not venerate saints that appeared in Orthodoxy after 1666. For example, they do not venerate St. Seraphim of Sarov, one of the most well-known Russian saints of the 19th century. On the other hand, many Old Believers' ecclesial bodies have canonized a number of saints who are not being recognized by the Russian Orthodox Church, e.g. archpriest Avvakum and others.

Old Believers use cast (silver, bronze) and carved (wooden) icons as well as painted ones. The veneration of icons in relief was prohibited in new style Orthodoxy, but in Old Belief it wasn't only not forgotten, but became very popular, since Old Believers often had to hide their religious implements. Cast icons, which were little and often also folded (see *skladen*) were very useful in that purport.

Old Believers also have unique daily life practices:

To shave a beard is considered a sin. Some modern denominations of Old Believers are rather tolerant toward shaved chins, however. Some denominations prohibit drinking coffee and tea. Smoking or any other use of tobacco is considered a dire sin. The most strict and eschatological Old Believers have practices of refraining from the outer world. That may include: prohibition of sharing meals with people of other faiths, of using their belongings and wares, etc.

(Source: Wikipedia. Old Believers: Detailed Differences between the Old Believers and post-Nikonian Russian Orthodoxy)

## APPENDIX 2

**Figure 1.** Number of Old Believers in Estonia by county, 2000



(Source: [www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee))

**Figure 2.** Jõgeva County, Peipsi Lake western coastline (Mustvee, Raja, Kükita)




(Source: [www.regio.ee](http://www.regio.ee) 23 May 2006)

**Figure 3.** Tartu County, Peipsi Lake western coastline (Tartu, Kallaste, Kolkja, Kasepää, Varnja and Piirissaar Island)



(Source: [www.regio.ee](http://www.regio.ee) 23 May 2006)

**Figure 4.** Regional GDP in 1996-2001, per capita



Joonis 1. Regionaalne sisemajanduse koguprodukt regiooniti aastatel 1997-2001 (Allikas: Statistikaamet)

(Source: Hankov, Monica, Jüri Sepp, and Siret Vildo. 2004. "Regional development Programs Impact on Local Governments = Regionaalsete Toetusprogrammide Mõju Kohalike Omavalitsuste Arengule" Berlin/Tallinn: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH/Mattimar OÜ: 309-321)

**Figure 5.** Parishioners of the Tartu congregation



(Source: [www.strarover.ee](http://www.strarover.ee) 23 May 2006))

**Figure 6.** Parishioners of the Piirissaare congregation



(Source: <http://www.peipsi.org/peipsi.org-v2/wiki.phtml> (23 May 2006))

**Figure 7.** The fifth Council Of Old Believers, 17 June 1928



(Source: [www.starover.ee](http://www.starover.ee) 23 May 2006)

**Figure 8.** Council of Old Believers in Kallaste, 1998



(Source: [www.starover.ee](http://www.starover.ee) 23 May 2006)

## APPENDIX 3

### Questionnaire

- 1) Tell me about your congregation with regard to the present situation
- 2) What activities have Old Believers in worship houses
- 3) What other activities do parishioners enjoy outside of the worship house in your community
- 4) What differences exist between Old Believers and other members of the community
- 5) Who helps the congregation
- 6) What cooperation exists between Old Believers and other social actors
- 7) How does the municipality help Old Believers
- 8) How does the central government help to preserve Old Belief
- 9) How does the NGO sector help Old Believers
- 10) What do you think about the support you receive
- 11) What do you think about the perspectives of Old Belief in Estonia

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## KOKKUVÕTE

Magistritöö keskendub sotsiaalse kapitali kujunemisele Peipsiääre piirkonna vanausuliste kogukondades ning riigi rollile vanausuliste pärandi säilitamisel läbi sotsiaalse kapitali teooria.

Eesti vanausulised on ainulaadne vähemus, kes eristub vene ja vene keelt kõnelevast kogukonnast oma religiooni ning Eestiga pikaajaliste sidemete poolest. Religioosse vähemusena on vanausulised elanud Eestis juba alates 17. sajandist. Kolme sajandi jooksul on nad loonud ning kogunud märkimisväärselt kultuuri, millest on saanud Eesti üldkultuuri lahutamatu osa. Tänapäeval on aktuaalseks muutunud vanausuliste pärandi säilitamine. Ühest küljest ohustab sekulariseerunud ühiskond vanausulisi assimilatsiooniga. Plaat (2004) eristab näiteks tänapäevaseid vanausulisi identiteedi alusel: vanausulised kultuuri- ja usuidentiteediga. Viimane grupp, kes on suhteliselt väike ning koosneb peamiselt vanema põlvkonna inimestest, moodustab koguduste tuumiku. Teisest küljest tingivad Peipsiääre piirkonna sotsiaalmajanduslik mahajäämus ja ebasoodsad elamistingimused noorema vanausuliste põlvkonna ümberasumise linnadesse ja mujale Eesti piirkondadesse. Üks võimalikke lähenemisi, millega saab uurida vanausuliste pärandi säilitamist ning riigi rolli selles, on sotsiaalse kapitali teooria.

Sotsiaalse kapitali idee tähendab kõige laiemas laastus seda, et inimsuhted on ressurss, mis aitab lahendada ühiseid probleeme. Sotsiaalne kapital on muutunud viimase aastakümne jooksul populaarseks lähenemiseks nii akadeemilisel kui poliitilisel tasandil. Tänu sellele käsitletakse sotsiaalset kapitali ühe võimaliku kapitali liigina, mille abil saab suurendada grupi, kogukonna või terve ühiskonna heaolu. Sotsiaalse kapitali kujunemist käsitletakse antud töö raames läbi „riigi-kogukonna sünergia” lähenemise, mis võimaldab keskenduda nii horisontaalsele kui vertikaalsele inimeste vaheliste suhete tasandile. Töös esitatud teoreetiline raamistik eristab sotsiaalse kapitali tüüpidena siduvat (ingl. kl *bonding*), ühendavat (*bridging*) ning *naalduvat* (*linking*). Analüüsimeks sotsiaalse kapitali kujunemist kasutan võrgustiku (*networks*) lähenemist.

Uurimus põhineb kvalitatiivse analüüsi meetodil. Andmed koguti poolstruktureeritud süvaintervjuude abil, mis rajanesid avatud küsimustikel. Lisaks viidi üks intervjuu läbi e-posti ning üks telefoni teel. Intervjuud toimusid peamiselt Peipsiääre piirkonna külades (Kolkja, Varnja, Raja) ning linnades (Kallaste, Mustvee), kus vanausulised traditsiooniliselt on elanud, samuti ka Tallinnas ja Tartus. Intervjuud toimusid nii eesti kui vene keeles. Intervjuud kestsid olenevalt vastajast keskmiselt 50 minutit. Valim moodustati „lumepalli“ tehnika abil ning kokku on intervjuueeritud 22 inimest, kes esindavad nii vanausulisi kui neid, kes on seotud vanausuliste pärandi säilitamisega.

Uurimuse hüpoteesid on järgmised: (H1) Vanausulised kasutavad ainult siduvat (*bonding*) sotsiaalset kapitali, mis vähendab võimalusi kultuuri säilimiseks; (H2) Vanausulistel puudub ühendav (*bridging*) sotsiaalne kapital, mis on hädavajalik kultuuri säilitamiseks horisontaalsel tasandil; (H3) *Naalduv* (*linking*) sotsiaalne kapital omab erilist tähtsust vanausuliste kultuuri säilitamisel, mis viitab riigi sekkumise vajalikkusele.

Analüüsi käigus osaliselt tõestati esimest ja teist hüpoteesi ning kolmas hüpotees osutus täielikult kinnitatuks. Nimelt sõltuvad kogudused siduvast sotsiaalsest kapitalist, mis võimaldab traditsioonide ning kultuuri säilitamist traditsioonilisel kujul s.o perekonna ja koguduse poolt. Samal ajal ei suuda väikeste koguduste aktiivsed liikmed, kes on eakad ning pensionieas olevad inimesed, leida piisavalt ressursse tänu oma ühisele koostööle, normidele ning usaldusele. Küsitletud vanausulised väidavad, et kogudustel on vaja välist toetust, mis viitab vajadusele teiste sotsiaalse kapitali liikide järele. Praegusel hetkel olemasolev siduv sotsiaalne kapital ei võimalda kogudustel säilitada oma pärandit iseseisvalt ning teiste abist sõltumata. Teise hüpoteesi kinnitamine näitab, et ühest küljest on Peipsiääre vanausulistel olemas horisontaalsed organisatsioonid, kes tegelevad kas otseselt või kaudselt vanausuliste kultuuri säilitamisega. Need on nii vanausuliste kogudused ja mittetulundusühingud kui teised, mitte-religioossed organisatsioonid. Ent vaatamata olemasolevale koostööle pole vanausulised jõudnud mõjutada keskvalituse otsustamisprotsessi sarnaselt näiteks Setu ja Võru

vähemustele. Üks võimalik vastus, mis tuleneb intervjuudest vanausulistega, seisneb selles, et vanausuliste probleemidega tegelevad organisatsioonid ei kaldu haarama oma töösse vanausulisi esindavaid organisatsioone nagu Tartumaa Vanausuliste Kultuuri ja Arengu Ühing. Samuti ei pruugi valitud meetodid kokku langeda sihtgrupi kogukonna arendamise ideega.

Kolmanda hüpoteesi kinnitamine näitab omakorda, et praegusel hetkel on vanausuliste kultuuri säilitamine keeruline tulenevalt horisontaalsel tasandil toimivate tegevuste koordineerimatusest, mis vajab riiklikku sekkumist ning tähendab *naalduva* sotsiaalse kapitali loomist kogukondades. Setu ja Võru vähemuste kogemus näitab, et teatud arenguetapil on vaja koostööd vertikaalsete institutsioonidega, mis võimaldab tegevuste jätkusuutlikkust ning rahastamist. Tänapäeval on Eestis olemas formaalne raamistik, mis võimaldab säilitada vanausuliste kultuuri riiklikul tasandil. Ent vanausuliste huvide eest võitlevad organisatsioonid ei ole esindatud keskvalitsuse tasandil.

Rääkides keskvalitsuse võimalikust sekkumisest vanausuliste pärandi säilitamise protsessi, pakuvad intervjuueeritavad kahte valikut. Üks keskendub Peipsiääre sotsiaalmajanduslikule arengule ilma vanausuliste eripära rõhutamata, näiteks üldise regionaalpoliitika raames. Teine vastupidi keskendub vanausulistele, näiteks eraldi toetusprogrammina sarnaselt Setu ja Võru vähemustele. Antud protsessis mängib valitsus aktiivset rolli vastavalt „riik-kogukond“ lähenemisele. Valitsus saab kasutada koostöö otstarbeks juba olemasolevaid võrgustikke, mille moodustavad horisontaalsed organisatsioonid Peipsiäärel.