

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Faculty of Social Sciences
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Christopher Aloe

Dynamics of Armenia's Role Conceptions and Expectations
2018-2024: Navigating EU-Russia Contestation

Master Thesis

Supervisor: Prof. Eiki Berg

Tartu
2024

Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited. Word count of the thesis: 24 168 words

Christopher Aloe, 20.05.2024

Abstract

This thesis analyses the change of role conceptions and expectations of Armenia from 2018 to 2024, focusing on what can be seen as critical junctures that could induce role changes: the Velvet Revolution in 2018, the defeat of the Second Karabakh war in 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Additionally, the Russian full-scale aggression war against Ukraine in February 2022 significantly altered the geopolitical landscape, intensifying the West and Russian contestation over what is considered to be in-between of these two powers. This study not only explores how a country in the region – Armenia – perceives its role in the world, the contestation of these two powers and who their partners should be, but also how changing conditions and external shocks impact the roles of a country. This examination reveals the volatility and stability of the role a country conceptualizes for itself and others.

Armenia's role was influenced by these events, leading to changes in its role conceptions and expectations regarding the EU and Russia, though not resulting in a complete U-turn. Whereas Armenia initially viewed itself as a faithful ally of Russia, considering Russia a security guarantor, this perception shifted, with Armenia seeing Russia as just another ally/partner, unable to provide security guarantees and even posing a potential threat. Throughout the time Armenia saw itself as being a European democracy and the EU as a partner in democratic development and reforms. Over time, this perception evolved, with Armenia increasingly seeing the EU as a security guarantor and with whom Armenia seeks as close relations as possible. In managing these relations Armenia saw itself in the role of a bridge and, ultimately, also as an independent actor, who has relations with everyone. Additionally, Armenia saw itself in the role of genocide preventer.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	5
1. Role Theory	8
1.1 Holsti's Role Theory	8
1.2 Core concepts	10
1.3 Role change	13
1.4 Strategies of Role Change	16
1.5 Previous studies	18
2. Research Design.....	21
2.1 Method	22
2.2 Sources and Sample	24
3. Regime Change and the Second Karabakh War as a Game Changer	26
4. Armenia's Role in the World.....	30
4.1 Relations with Russia – From Faithful Ally to being Betrayed	30
4.2 Relations with the West: Revolutionary European Democracy	38
4.3 Managing the In-between: Independent	46
4.4 Managing the In-between: Bridge	51
4.5 Genocide Preventer	53
5. Role enactment.....	56
Conclusion	62
Bibliography	66
Analysed Corpus of Texts	70
Appendices.....	94

Introduction

Armenia has been going through tremulous times in the past years, and its world has been turned upside down. In 2020, it suffered a defeat in the Second Karabakh war, and in September 2023, Azerbaijan managed in a one-day offensive to make the de-facto Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, whose patron state Armenia has been since 1991, surrender. This resulted in the dissolution of Nagorno-Karabakh, the mass exodus of Karabakhi-Armenians to Armenia proper, and Azerbaijan taking control over the territory. This has been a great tragedy for Armenians, for whom Nagorno-Karabakh has been a symbolic and essential part of their identity.

During this turmoil, Armenia has become increasingly critical of Russia, which has been a historic security guarantor for Armenia – Russia has a military base in Armenia, peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia is part of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. At the same time, the European Union has stepped up its efforts in Armenia with the establishment of a monitoring mission on the border of Armenia and has regularly hosted meetings between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia held military exercises with the USA on its soil in September.

This is unexpected since Armenia has, throughout its history, positioned itself as a Christian Island that is encircled by Muslim powers, and Russia has been the natural Christian ally, which helps keep the Muslim countries in check. This traditional relationship seems to have been damaged by the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and the subsequent Nagorno-Karabakh capitulation in September 2023, and Armenia seems to be in the middle of a significant foreign political shift away from Russia towards the Western powers.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia envisioned itself as a regional hegemon and considers the post-Soviet space as its sphere of vital interest or near abroad and aimed to establish a Russia-centred security order (Götz 2022, 1729). To do this, many regional organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty organization were created, which Armenia became a member state of.

The European Union started after the 2004 enlargement its own regional programs – the European Neighbourhood Policy and starting 2009 the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program, which Armenia is a part of. Whereas initially, the countries where both Russia and the EU were trying to assert influence, were considered part of the common neighbourhood the relations between the two blocks deteriorated, and the region became a contested neighbourhood, where Russia and the European Union employ different instruments of power, requiring as a result local actors to navigate between different integration projects and values, ideas and visions of society (Dembińska & Smith 2021, 247-248). This contestation has reached unprecedented levels since the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022.

While there is extensive scholarship examining the contestation between Russia and the EU/West and their competing regionalist integration projects (Delcour 2021, Götz 2022, Makarychev 2014 under others), studies focusing on the countries in the contested field concerning their identity, perceptions and role in the world are limited (Siminov 2022, Nygymetova 2020, Torres-Adán 2021, Dembińska & Smith 2021, Delcour & Wolczuk 2018, Herbut 2017 under others).

External shocks, systemic changes, and crises are seen in foreign policy analysis as one of the causes of foreign policy change (Gustavsson 1999, 85). Furthermore, the environment of contestation between two major powers gives those in between them opportunities to renegotiate their geopolitical roles (Berg & Vits 2020, 2). Armenia is in a situation where it has experienced an external shock – it lost the second Karabakh war in 2020 and lost the area completely in 2023, as well as a domestic shock – the Velvet Revolution in 2018, which resulted in regime change and is in a situation in which the relations of primary major powers in the region have deteriorated significantly due to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Also, since a shift in Armenian foreign political stance away from Russia and closer to the West can be observed, it is necessary to analyse where Armenia sees its place in the world and how it perceives what its relations with other actors should look like. This paper uses the premises of role theory and conducts a qualitative content analysis of Armenian leadership statements and interviews to determine Armenia's national role conceptions and its role expectations towards Russia and the West (the US, the EU and its member states). According to role theory, on the one hand, roles are relatively stable because they have been internalized and are used by the foreign policy elite to grant stability to its foreign policy, but on the other hand, they are still dynamic since they

emerge through interaction and Armenia is in a precarious situation, where the conditions needed for a change are present. The main research question of the study is therefore: How has Armenian perception of its role in the international arena and expectations of others changed since 2018?

Investigating how Armenia understands its role and views other actors helps us comprehend the country's foreign policy actions and gain insight into how it perceives the European Union, Russia, and other actors in these turbulent times. Furthermore, researching Armenia will also supplement role theory by analysing role change and showing how countries' role perceptions are either volatile and dynamic or, in case there is no change in roles, very rigid. If Armenian role conceptions do change, the research shows the conditions under which such a change occurred and therefore contributes to the wider research into role change. If the role conceptions, on the other hand, do not change, then the study has determined that role concepts are very rigid because, for Armenia, there have been a lot of external and internal changes – a colour revolution, loss of war, inactivity of allies concerning support during military actions and also the change in the international system as a consequence of the Ukraine war, which ultimately has brought back cold-war like antagonisms to the international sphere and this especially in the region. If one takes into account how Germany and Japan completely changed their role conceptions after the defeat in World War II, assumably the same applies to Armenia.

In the first section of the thesis, the main tenets of Role theory, its main concepts and how roles change are outlined. In the second section, a brief overview of why regime change and the second Karabakh war could be game changers is elaborated. In the third chapter, the research design, methodology, and collection of data for the study are explained. The fourth chapter delves into the analysis of the roles that Armenia has conceptualized for itself and what it expects from others. The fifth chapter shows how these role conceptions have been enacted.

1. Role Theory

1.1 Holsti's Role Theory

Role theory emerged in the 1970s and has been utilized in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to distinguish different patterns of behaviour among states during the Cold War era and categorize them based on these patterns into distinct roles in international relations (Harnisch 2011, 7).

Role theory, in its essence, is used to understand why states have made certain foreign policy decisions (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 146). It has been used to analyse the foreign policy of small states, as was done by Herbut (2017), who used role theory to explain policies in small states and took Georgia and Moldova as examples to explore theories about their possible strategy options. Additionally, Delcour & Wolczuk (2018) employed role theory to analyse perceptions about the EU in the South Caucasus.

Role theory originated in sociology, drawing inspiration from theatre, where actors are assigned roles that dictate their actions (Biddle 1986, 68). This analogy extended to the understanding of individuals and small groups in social interaction, suggesting that their behaviour is similarly guided by societal rules and expectations (ibid.). In short, according to role theorists, the social behaviour of an individual is influenced by self-conceptualized roles, which are generated by expectations that come from experience from interactions with others in a social system and the person's position in that system (ibid.). There are three main concepts regarding this: role performance, in other words, the behaviour of the individuals; positions, meaning the space that the individuals occupy in the society; role prescriptions, which are the norms and expectations of others for individuals in certain positions (Holsti 1970, 239). Behaviour is thus shaped by both the position one has and the expectations others project onto the position. Therefore, roles emerge from social interactions, and these roles are present in all kinds of social engagements, from sexual and familial to professional context. Sociologists have analysed behaviour through the lens of these roles.

Role theory came to prominence in foreign policy analysis and international relations when Kalevi Holsti (1970) applied in his influential work "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" the tenets of role theory from sociology to study foreign policy. Holsti (1970) brought out how it is often talked about the roles state play and that analysts, in general, try to find patterns in foreign policy decisions and have even made references to roles which they saw

as possible causal variables but found that the language used to describe these patterns was limiting, as they were confined to broad categories such as “non-aligned,” “bloc leaders,” “balancers,” “satellites”, “aggressors” or “defenders” and therefore ignored the variety of roles that small states have (Holsti 1970, 233-234). One of the main shortcomings he brought out was that analysts were only allocating states a singular role.

To use role theory to study foreign policy, three assumptions must be made. The first assumption is that the leaders of states play an important role in the foreign policy formulation process (Grossman 2005, 336). Secondly, the international system has to function as a social system (ibid.). Thirdly, an analogy between individual and the state has to be established. By making these assumptions, the premises that the theory had regarding individuals is applied to the state and the social system/society becomes analogous to the international system.

In his study, Holsti (1970) researched the roles of 72 countries through content analysis of leadership statements and speeches in the time period of 1965-1967 and found 17 different roles: Bastion of revolution-liberator, Regional leader, Regional protector, Active Independent, Liberation supporter, Anti-imperialist agent, Defender of the faith, Mediator-integrator, Regional-subsystem collaborator, Developer, Bridge, Faithful Ally, Independent, Example, Internal Development, Isolate and Protectee, and that most countries exercised a multitude of these different roles.

To do this, Holsti (1970, 240) overtook four concepts from sociology to analyse foreign policy: *“(1) role performance, which encompasses the attitudes, decisions, and actions governments take to implement (2) their self-defined national role conceptions or (3) the role prescriptions emanating, under varying circumstances, from the alter or external environment. Action always takes place within (4) a position, that is, a system of role prescriptions.”* Role performance, in this sense, is the general foreign behaviour or actions of states, and it is what most research intends to explain. The position was seen as an estimation of the states ranking in the international system, but because in comparison to societies in the international regime, position/status are much vaguer, this was seen as not being useful for foreign policy analysis (Holsti 1970, 242). Holsti (1970) argued that the most important part of these concepts for foreign policy analysis are the national role conceptions and that they take precedence over external role prescriptions, or others thoughts about what the state should do. That is because

states having sovereignty means that states have supreme authority over what they do, and therefore, decisions from foreign policy or role performance are influenced mostly by policymakers' "role conceptions, domestic needs, and critical events or trends in the external environment" (Holsti 1970, 243) and because the international system does not have very rigid norms and rules.

In his study, Holsti (1970, 244) considered, therefore, the external environment for the states, which means the status and role expectations, to be constant and focused solely on national role conceptions. According to Holsti (1970, 245), national role conceptions are "*the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their "image" of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment*". The actions of the state are, therefore, attempts to enact the national role conceptions that the policymakers have, and therefore, state behaviour can be explained by its national role conceptions (Holsti 1970, 247). He did however also acknowledge that role expectations of others do play a role in the national role conceptions (ibid.).

1.2 Core concepts

After Holsti's work, there have been a myriad of works which have used the notion of roles to widen the scope of the roles that he found and to conduct in-depth case studies about single states, regions, and international organizations. The initial framework has been developed further, and consequently there are also many different views on the definition of roles, role conceptions, role expectations and role performance. The concept of roles and what they entail has evolved through time, and there have been various different definitions of roles.

This study adopts the definition of Harnisch et al. (2011, 1-2), who defined roles as "notions of actors about who they are, what they would like to be with regard to others, and how they therefore should interact in (international) social relationship". Roles represent a country's social positions that are constituted by domestic expectations of the appropriate role of the state and other actors' expectations of the actors' role (Harnisch 2011, 7). Roles give actors a purpose for their existence in groups and justifications for their actions (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 148). In

these terms, roles give countries goals for action like "save a nation from dominance, to end the war in Europe proper" (ibid.). Defining roles, therefore, is useful to determine the general directions of a nation's foreign policy since "the articulation of a national role betrays preferences, operationalizes an image of the world, triggers expectations, and influences the definition of the situation and of the available options. It imposes obligations and affects the definition of risks." (Le Prestre 1997, 5).

Roles in themselves consist of two parts: role conceptions (the ego), meaning self-conceptualizations about a state's purpose and others' expectations about how the state should act – role expectations (alter part) (Harnisch 2011, 8). The latter describes how other actors perceive the country, meaning external perceptions and expectations (Delcour & Wolczuk 2018, 44). Role conception, on the other hand, consists of the actor's perception of their position with regard to others and how they perceive the other's role expectations (Harnisch 2011, 8). Roles and role conceptions emerge through the interaction of states through foreign policy, which sends signals to other states and acquire their meaning through this interaction (Grossman et al. 2022, 6). In creating the role conceptions, policymakers also take into account the country's material capabilities, such as wealth, territory, military capabilities, and influence (Grossman 2005, 337). Role conceptions, therefore, limit the number of policy options that are seen as viable by policymakers (Grossman 2005, 337). This effect is amplified by the fact that role conceptions are articulated publicly, making it difficult for a leader to go back on his word. Additionally, they are widely accepted beliefs and ideas about a country's foreign policy, which further constrain leaders compelling them to act in accordance to these established perceptions. In general, researching national role conceptions helps one understand how nations create their roles in international relations by using their identity and culture, material resources, and position in the international structure (Breuning 2011, 26).

A third relevant concept is role performance/enactment, i.e. how the role conceptions are enacted by the actor in real actions (Harnisch 2011, 9). Role enactment is, therefore, the foreign policy actions of a country. Foreign policy actions are dependent on the nation's role conceptions, which prescribe possible actions that the country can take. Ultimately, it is role enactment that studies try to explain by analysing a country's roles. It has been established through studies that role

performance can be explained by national role conceptions and that policymakers act in the way they perceive their country's role to be (Grossman 2005, 336).

Roles are, in their nature, intersubjective, and they emerge through interaction with others since every role needs a counter or complementary role from other actors. This is because if a country takes on the role of a leader, it needs others to take on the role of a follower (Harnisch 2011, 7). In other words, roles are constructed through social interactions with other states. Accordingly, not every role can be played by a state in international relations because the roles have to be in accordance with their material capabilities, and others have to accept the role (Wehner 2015, 438). Here bigger states have more leeway to define their roles and strategies, while smaller countries are more constrained by their capabilities and have oriented themselves more to the roles of bigger countries (Herbut 2017, 172). Role conceptions in themselves entail role expectations of others because a country has to make sure that its role is being accepted by other actors and that other actors take suitable counter-roles to the state's own national role conception. Accordingly, role conceptions are always contested because they collide with other actors' role conceptions and enactment, be that internally or externally (Harnisch 2011, 12).

Roles, in general, have two forms: the master role, which is the prominent role of an actor and auxiliary roles, which enhance the master role and give it meaning (Wehner & Nolte 2017, 108). Master roles are the most important characteristics of a specific nation or position in the international system – small states, great powers, regional powers, patrons, and emerging states (ibid.; Wehner 2015, 437). Auxiliary roles are then the secondary, more concrete, and narrower roles a state has.

As roles emerge through interaction, other actors and their expectations of a country's role are important for the national role conceptions of a state, which is why, in role theory, others are divided into significant and generalized others (Harnisch 2011, 11). Generalized others are abstract ideas of others, such as humanity or the international community (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 150). Significant others in sociology are considered to be the primary socializing agents of a person, such as parents or siblings; in foreign policy, they play a similar role and are considered to be the states that have a stronger relationship with the country and are often mentioned in the political discourse of a state through for example comparisons, which is why their role expectations matter more to the state (ibid.). Therefore, significant others directly impact the role

conceptions of the self. At the same time, in international relations, states have a broader ability to choose which countries are significant others for the state and if they are positive or negative others (Harnisch 2011, 12). According to Beneš & Harnisch (2015, 147), national role conceptions are "patterns of role taking with regards to both current and historical others", and the experiences gained by historical collaboration and alliances are used to reproduce past patterns, which therefore do not break down easily. The nation's relations with both historical and current others can be determined by the significance political elites put on them, for example, through referencing past experiences (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 151). Furthermore, if roles indicate identification or actions with a significant other, it signals how the owner of the role sees its relations with that country in the future (ibid., 152). In general, there are two types of significant others – ones who are seen in a negative light and those who are seen positively, such as partners. The occurrence of significant others and changes in the relations with significant others are usually tied to external shock situations in which previous role conceptions are challenged (Harnisch 2011, 12). Since significant and historical others are important for the national role conceptions, the expectations held by significant others also resonate within a country's role conceptions.

Identity is a closely related concept to roles, and they overlap a lot. It has been argued that they are in a close relationship with each other in the sense that roles provide a stable sense of identity, and at the same time, identities provide roles with meaning (Nabers 2011, 82). This is because while performing their roles, actors "reinforce, support, and confirm their identities", and at the same time identity provides actors a frame of reference for interpretation of the social position the role supplies the actor with (ibid.). Le Prestre (1997, 9) argued that role conceptions are rooted in identity or "societies' understanding of themselves and of what they represent in the world". According to Breuning (2011), in research, identity, self-images, and culture could be seen as part of national role conceptions or even be equated to it. He also argued, that norms could be seen as constituting role perceptions and role performance is synonymous with agency (Breuning 2011, 22).

1.3 Role change

One of the main aspects studied in foreign policy analysis are the changes in countries' foreign policy and concurrently also the reasons for foreign policy change. Role theory has been widely utilized to explain foreign policy change. As national role conceptions guide policymakers in making decisions about the change, then, it is logical that for foreign policy to change, the national role conceptions have to undergo through change as well.

Roles are thought to provide consistency to a country's foreign policy behaviour because they are embedded in social relations (Nilsson 2019, 446-447) and have been internalized in the minds of not only the policy elite of a nation but its general population as well. If roles are broadly recognized and seen as essential for the nation, they can crystallize, but in times of instability, they can destabilize (Nabers 2011, 84). Since it is considered hard and costly for a state to stray from existing role conceptions even in situations where they clash with policymakers' other interests, according to role theory, roles in international relations and foreign policy, in general, are relatively stable (*ibid.*). Roles can, therefore, be used to explain the continuation of foreign policy, even in situations of external and internal shocks (Le Prestre 1997, 6). This is because roles provide the policy elite guiding principles of how to act and these become especially essential in times of crisis.

Although roles, like identity, are relatively stable constructs, they are not seen in role theory as being completely static. Since states are ultimately sovereign they can in their roles or role conceptions create new roles, make adjustments to or even disregard the expectations that other states have regarding to them (Wehner & Dies 2014, 415). If change was not possible policymakers and states, in general, would have no agency whatsoever. Thus, the possibility of change grants states agency, as states do not have to succumb to the pressure of others. Roles are bound to be changing, because roles are also not just something that has been given to policy makers, but instead policy makers firstly have to conceptualise them and assess if old roles are still viable or need to be modified. As Hollis and Smith (1990, 165) stated “actors interpret information, monitor their performance, reassess their goals” (Nabers 2011, 79). The roles change because they already emerge from interaction with other actors and, therefore, have to be dynamic. Also, domestic interests or the country's situation in the international environment can change.

An important concept in role change has been identified as being role conflict. States can have many significant others, and they can develop various roles that relate to these others (Nilsson 2019, 447). Different roles can also exist domestically, as people have different understandings of what role a state should play, and these could lead to domestic political contestation (ibid.). Role conflicts emerge when there is a lack of internal consensus about the role or when the expectations of significant others are inconsistent, and they differ from national role conceptions (Nabers 2011, 76). These conflicts have to be addressed by the country. Role conflicts can lead to the current foreign policy of a country to be dysfunctional, and they can be aggravated through changes in the international systems and crises (Le Prestre 1997, 9). These conflicts therefore induce role change since they can be resolved either through communication so that other actors change their expectations, changing their own role conceptions or through temporarily adjusting the behaviour of the state (Nabers 2011, 77).

Gustavsson (1999) identified that foreign policy change occurs in turning points or critical junctures, when the fundamental structural conditions shift, when there is a crisis, and when decision makers' beliefs change since all these factors together provide a window of opportunity for change. Critical junctures are situations where there is a possibility to enact change and push through reforms (Gustavsson 1999, 85). Nabers (2011) also identified that two premises needed for a swift change in roles are the dislocation of a social system and a crisis, as they can be formative events and provide windows of opportunities. Nabers (2011) drew comparisons between identity and roles in explaining foreign policy change. He argues that, when there is no crisis, there is subsequently also no need for politics to act and change something (Nabers 2011, 86). But if there is, for example, a major war, the people and the leadership of a nation need answers and actions regardless of how fundamental the identity or role conceptions of a state are (ibid.). In a crisis situation, the former structures become dislocated, and former policies and ideas become increasingly seen as obstacles in the effort to bring back structure and stability to the situation (ibid.). Crisis, therefore, provides opportunities to not adhere to constraints the role conceptions and role expectations otherwise impose on decision-makers and to redefine their roles (Nilsson 2019, 449). Change in roles can occur if actions that are perceived as necessary contradict previous role conceptions and expectations (ibid.). If a country changes its role perception, it has, at the same time, to be in unison with domestic values and has to be accepted by other actors (Breuning 2011, 30).

According to Nilsson (2019), the impact of a crisis depends on communication of the policy elite and what aspect is blamed for the happening of a crisis. The first step in a crisis situation is for the policymakers to make sense of what is happening, why and what has to be done (Nilsson 2019, 449). They can either identify the crisis as being exogenous to the system in order to defend the status quo of the country's policy-making (ibid.). The second possibility is admitting that the causes of the crisis are flaws in the current system, meaning endogenous to the system, which allows the exposure of shortcomings and facilitates change (ibid.)

According to Grossman et al (2022), systemic change and role change are in a feedback loop because when the system changes, there is increased pressure on actors, who adjust their roles because of the pressure provoking role adjustments of other actors, because of the role change of the first actor, and this in the end provokes systemic change. States create new roles in response to systemic change, which therefore puts pressure on other actors, who need to stabilize their roles (Grossman et al. 2022, 7). The uncertainty for actors becomes high when a state's international status changes and, therefore, requires creating new roles, which puts the country's relations with others under stress because they need to either accept the new role and create new counter-roles or not accept it (ibid.). When the new role is not accepted, great powers will try to pressure the state that changes its role back into its previous role (ibid.). This pressure and uncertainty are accordingly the highest when "the relative material status of great powers changes, creating an environment in which other states feel motivated (or intimidated) to change their roles." (ibid.).

1.4 Strategies of Role Change

If countries' roles are changing, it raises the question of how do these roles change and what are the different logics and strategies behind the change. There are different strategies of role change, and through these strategies, the amount of change can vary from minor adaptations to a complete rethinking of a nation's role. In cases where a country's foreign policy and roles are changing, Breuning (2011, 30) distinguished between adjustment change, programme change, goal change, and international orientation change. With adjustment change, only the intensity or amount of countries towards whom the policy/role is directed changes; with program change, new instruments for action come into play; with goal change, the foreign policy objectives

change; and with international orientation change, the entire foreign policy and orientation towards international relations changes (ibid.).

The strategy with the smallest change has been identified as role adaptation or adjustment, according to which states decide to re-establish role stability through adapting their existing roles to new realities instead of outright abandoning roles when there is a role conflict (Nilsson 2019, 450). Through adaptation, the goals and values of a state do not change, but the way in which foreign policy instruments are used and how the problem is perceived changes (Harnisch et al. 2011, 10). According to Nilsson (2019), role adaptation can occur through rationalizing or compensation. When a state rationalizes its roles, it tries to modify its role expectations by trying to accommodate actions inconsistent with the previous role to the role (Nilsson 2019, 450). Therefore, the role itself is not changed, but it is instead adapted to the new situation. Compensation takes place when, after actions that do not adhere to the prescribed role, the state decides to behave according to the role in other situations to show that this role still applies to them (ibid.). Nilsson (2019) found that Georgia used these two strategies in 2007 when the country suppressed protesters and after the war in 2008 with Russia to maintain their roles of being a beacon of liberty in the region and a net-security contributor in the region.

The other way in which role change can occur is through role learning (Harnisch et al., 2011, 12). Through role learning, countries change their beliefs by observing and interpreting past experiences (ibid.). In the scholarship about role learning, there are two schools of thought: according to rationalists and cognitivists, it is a causal process that happens because of new information, and according to social constructivism, learning is a fundamental process of roles, since in a social group that is not stagnant, but constantly evolving, as new roles emerge through interaction, which in turn provoke the adaptation of other new roles (ibid.).

Another way in which change can occur is through altercasting. Altercasting refers to knowing manipulation of one's own roles in order to make other actors change their roles (ibid.). This often happens with so-called novice- or new states, which only hold a few roles, and the roles that they hold are being cast upon them by other actors. In niche situations, roles can change in conversations with others about an appropriate role, like in negotiations, in other words, through normative persuasion (Harnisch et al. 2011, 13).

Furthermore, role change can occur through socialization, that means when a country internalizes the behaviour and rules of a group of other nations (ibid.). This is done either by the group of states when they use conditionality to change the other actors or through social influencing, in which case, in an uncertain situation, a state imitates other states or organisations (Harnisch et al. 2011, 14). Socialization also happens with newer states, which have to construct a role for themselves in the international environment (Nilsson 2019, 447). These roles have to be accepted by the international community and, depending on whether the role is fitting, others either try to punish or reward the actor in order to influence it (ibid.). This is usually done by great powers, which are the main socializers in their respective spheres of influence but it can also be undertaken by outside actors (ibid.).

1.5 Previous studies

In his study Grossman (2005) analysed Russian leadership speeches with the help of content analysis to determine if changes in expressed national role conceptions preceded the changes in Russian foreign policy behaviour. Grossman (2005) determined that Russian voting behaviour in the United Nations was preceded by more confrontational role conceptions regarding USA/the West. Consequently, the study confirmed that prior to actual change of foreign policy behaviour the national role conceptions communicated by the policy elite change.

Beneš & Harnisch (2015) used in their study qualitative content and narrative analysis to analyse how Germany and Czechia's roles have changed and how their national role conceptions shape their foreign policies towards the EU. They conducted their study by analysing the arguments made in parliament over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. They also analysed the countries' role expectations and found that Czechia's politicians' views have changed after 1968 Prague Spring from viewing Western great powers negatively and a positive view of the Soviet Union to having negative expectations of great powers in general because of their history of being the playground of them, and the expectations of different powers differs only in how big of a danger they are (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 158-160). Regarding the EU its role changed from the role of an apprentice in the 1990s towards a more sceptical look coherent with its anti-great power role, because the EU was seen as an emerging great power (ibid.). Furthermore, since 1968, the role of a small power that stands up to great powers to right historical wrongs emerged (ibid.). Germany

also experienced role change, as it viewed its history as a negative significant other, and therefore, it was the art of its civilian power role to be willing to grant authority and to empower international institutions, but in the debates over the Lisbon treaty, the change towards a more positive self-identification was observed as the role of safeguarding and exporting Germany's core values emerged (Beneš & Harnisch 2015, 152-156).

Le Prestre et al. (1997) analysed the nature, evolution and origins of the Soviet Union/Russia, USA, Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain, China and Canada's national roles in comprehensive in-depth case studies. The study roughly followed three steps to analyse roles: firstly, foreign policy debates were examined to differentiate roles that are outside of the government; secondly, it conducted content analysis of selected speeches from policy elites; and thirdly, role conceptions were divided into ones about status or identity (Le Prestre 1997 11-12). Under role identity, they understood the general image of the country and under status, the standpoint of the country in international relations, its characterisations in the system, the system's impact on the country and threats it faces (ibid.). To identify roles all references to countries mentioning their duties and responsibilities in the international system were coded (ibid.). When comparing the results, Le Prestre (1997b, 251) found that systemic changes induced national debates over roles and, therefore, provided more opportunities to challenge dominant rules, but that they rarely went beyond traditional role concepts. Furthermore, when role change was apparent it was mostly states secondary roles becoming the dominant one, not completely new roles being created and replacing the old ones (ibid., 252).

There have been a few studies, that have researched Armenian roles, but these studies have analysed roles before 2018. Delcour and Wolczuk (2018) researched Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian role perceptions of the European Union through analysis of interviews and focus groups. They found that Armenia views the European Union as a weak security player in the region, when compared to Russia, but is viewed as a role model for modernization of Armenia (Delcour & Wolczuk 2018, 54-55). The weakness was perceived especially regarding the EU's role regarding Ukraine and was perceived to even have a destabilising role vis-à-vis militant Russia and therefore it was suggested that for Armenia there is not much choice, but to have Russia as an economic- and security partner (ibid.). Nygmetova (2020) researched Armenian, Belarusian, Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani role conceptions and self-presentation themes

regarding Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from 2010 to 2017 through conducting discourse analysis of leadership speeches of respective countries. She found that different Armenian leaders from the same government had differing views about EAEU and the EU, some criticising the former and the others the latter (Nygymetova 2020, 185). She identified during that time frame seven different roles for Armenia: bridging state, peripheral partner, integration facilitator, equal, subordinate, economic integration promoter and committed to the EAEU (ibid., 187). The biggest change was that before joining the EAEU Armenian self-presentation and roles were more critical of it and after joining EAEU more roles and more positive roles started to appear (ibid.). Also, the role of peripheral partner changed after 2015 to subordinate (ibid.). The role of subordinate illustrates Armenia's policymakers' belief that they have very limited freedom in international relations and are pressured and dependent on Russia (ibid.).

2. Research Design

The goal of this thesis is to trace the change of how Armenia perceives its role and how the Second Karabakh war changed Armenia's relations with other actors. The central research questions are: How has Armenian perception of its role in the international arena and expectations of others changed since 2018? How has this affected Armenian foreign policy?

The study, therefore, analyses how Armenia sees its role in the world, what role it sees other actors playing in the region, as well as how it sees its relations with other actors taking into account its role. In addition to the main research question further questions will be answered: How does Armenia perceive the region and the EU and Russia competing for influence over it? How does Armenia perceive the two competing regional integration efforts? Furthermore, since the study researches the change in role conceptions and expectations, it also tries to answer two role theoretical questions: Do role conceptions and expectations change abruptly, or do they evolve gradually? If a country's roles do change, are there features that remain the same?

In its essence, the study is a single case study. Case studies are often used to get a better understanding of major events or crucial break points (Odell 2001, 163). Case studies are detailed and in-depth empirical examinations of certain aspects of phenomena in order to develop or test theoretical explanations of these phenomena (Ruffa 2020, 1135). The two main functions of case studies are describing an event or phenomenon and, secondly, generalizing the findings to other cases (*ibid.*). Therefore, it is not per se used to generate new theories, but to test known ones on a selected case. In doing so, case studies can improve existing theories through their in-depth observations and analysis and put the theory in a new light.

Analysing Armenia and its role conceptions and expectations serves as a good opportunity to understand the country's foreign policy behaviour and role change, as there are many conditions which indicate that Armenia's role conceptions should be changing. Accordingly, this study can also be seen as a most likely case study or theory-infirming case study. If there is no change of roles in the case of Armenia, we can assume, that roles and role conceptions in general are tough and unlikely to change, even in cases of significant disruptions in a country's external and internal environment. The study adopts a constructivist paradigm, viewing the world as socially

or discursively constructed, and aims to understand the actors' social construction of the world (Marsh et al. 2018, 190-191) as it investigates how Armenia constructs its role and its perception of the world.

2.1 Method

To conduct the study qualitative content analysis is applied in order to analyse Armenian role conceptions and expectations. Starting from Holsti (1970), this method has been used widely to determine the roles of countries. Qualitative content analysis is used to describe meanings in a systemic way by categorizing data (Schreier 2014, 170). In doing so the focus is on the research question, which guides the research as it determines what part of the material is described and provides the angle from which data is analysed (Schreier 2011, 3-4). Qualitative content analysis focuses only on certain aspects of the material, therefore reducing the amount of data that is vital for analysis (ibid.). This does not mean that something is left out since a vital part of the method is to examine all of the data that is somehow relevant to the research question (Schreier 2014, 171).

Central to qualitative content analysis are the categories, which are created according to the research questions (Mayring 2000, 3). It is, however, important to remain as close as possible to the text analysed when categories are created (ibid.). This study uses inductive category development, according to which using the research question and theory criteria are formulated to determine which aspects of data are considered for the study (ibid., 4). The data is then analysed according to the criteria and relevant passages are coded (ibid.). After a certain time, the categories are revised and finalized.

This study focuses on two points. On the role perceptions of Armenia, which is at the same time also influenced by the external role expectations and how this perception is also performed. This is done to understand how Armenia sees its place in the region and in the world. The second focus of the study is Armenia's expectations of other actors in order to understand, what Armenia expects from its significant others or the two competing powers: Russia and the European Union/West in their relations with Armenia. Understanding Armenian expectations helps us to further understand why it has taken certain steps in foreign policy and what it wants to achieve by doing this. In doing so, the study's goal is not to reproduce the quite general roles that Holsti

(1970) identified while looking at almost the whole world but instead it takes a more in-depth look at the roles Armenia has conceptualized for itself in relation to its region and the most important actors for it.

Following the tenets of qualitative content analysis, this study follows three steps. In the first step of the study, a corpus of texts is compiled. All of the data from the time period will be scrutinized with the research questions kept in mind, and texts that make a reference to roles or role expectations of Armenia will be added to the sample. To analyse the data in addition to the research question following questions are used to identify Armenian role conceptions and relevant data for analysis: Who we are? Where do we belong? Who should we work (more) with? What role does Russia play for Armenia? What role does the EU/West play for Armenia?

In the second step of the study, the collected texts from each of the time periods will be coded using MAXQDA while keeping the study's focus in mind. Analysing publicly available sources, while at the same time using them as they are, allows the study to focus on the codes that are employed in regard to other actors, rather than attempting to discern the collective beliefs of the entire population or individual decision makers (Waeber 2002, 27-28). The codes will then be categorized, and the role perceptions will be summarized. By using inductive coding the following categories were established: "West/EU – democracy and reform promoter"; "Revolutionary European Democracy"; "Faithful Ally of Russia"; "EAEU Integration Facilitator"; "Loyal Partner in CSTO"; "Independent"; "Bridge"; "Genocide Preventer"; "Russia –Security Guarantor"; "Russia –Mediator"; "CSTO – Security Guarantor"; "EU – Security Provider"; "EU – Mediator"; "Russian Ally"; "Russia – failed ally"; "Russia – failed Security Guarantor"; "Russia – failed Mediator"; "CSTO – failed Security Guarantor"; "Turkey trying to oust Russia from the Region"; "Changing geopolitical situation", which provided the fundamental basis for the analysis.

As an integral part of roles is also role enactment or performance, meaning the actual foreign policy behaviour of the state, in the third step the paper will also study how foreign political actions of Armenia and its bilateral relations with other actors correspond to the roles that have been identified. This allows the study to prove that the way in which the roles were communicated also manifested in the country's foreign policy.

2.2 Sources and Sample

The study will examine public statements, speeches, comments made by, and interviews given by the main decision makers of the country when it comes to foreign policy – the foreign minister and the prime minister. The study looks at three episodes, longer or shorter periods as critical junctures, when foreign policy change and therefore role change are most likely to happen: the year 2018, when there was a regime change as a result of the Velvet revolution, 2020, when the Second Karabakh war rolled out and 2023, when through one-day offensive Azerbaijan forced Nagorno-Karabakh to capitulate. In order to have a good look at the critical junctures and their effect the study also looked at the first four months of 2021 and three months in 2024 because both the agreed-upon ceasefire in the Second Karabakh War and the cessation of de facto existence of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic happened in the end of year and in order to ensure that the effects of the crisis will become visible at six months after the end of the crisis were included to the study. Furthermore, in 2015, a referendum was held in Armenia, which reformed the country from a presidential to a parliamentary republic, and the transformation was completed in 2018, transforming the role of the president into a symbolic one, which is why statements from the president were not added. Since the Armenian Prime ministers and foreign ministers' office publish their statements, speeches and interviews given to media on their webpage in English these posts will form the data that is analysed in this study. The official webpage also serves an important role for the self-representation of the country. Additionally, strategic documents such as "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia" which was released in 2020, the chapter "Security and Foreign Policy" of the "Programme of the Government of the Republic of (2021-2026)" which was released in 2021 and the Foreign Ministry and Defence ministry chapters of the two annexes to "The 2021-2026 Action Plan of the Government of the Republic of Armenia", which was amended in December 2022, will be analysed as well. The Corpus of texts for the study consists of 220 documents in total: 55 from the first time period, 88 from the second time period and 77 from the last time period.

The study analyses a wide range of different materials and in doing so acknowledges that these different materials and the information that can be traced in them differs from each other. A similar problem emerges with the context in which for example a speech, was made. The

contents of speeches and which roles are emphasized differs in a speech that is held in front of the European Parliament or after a meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin. This can result in contradictory role conceptions and expectations being communicated. To mitigate this problem and in order to get a comprehensive picture of Armenian role conceptions and expectations having a wide variety of different materials is crucial.

The study focuses therefore on the role conceptualization made by the decision makers and not the general, public discussion about the roles of the state. Roles that state leaders use in their speeches are the result of the negotiations about roles in the government and they inherently have to resonate with both the domestic audience and the international dimension – states relations with others and the international system (Breuning 2011, 23-24). Therefore, speeches of analysing decision makers resonates also with the will of the domestic audience, as they are the representatives of the state, who carry their role out and communicate it to the world. Since roles develop through interaction with other actors in the international community, analysing text provided by the country in English ensures that communication that is meant for the international audience is included in the study.

One could argue that studying only the leaderships statements the study disregards the multitude of role conceptions that are present in a state. In the long run, however, the internal discussions and multitudes of differing opinions do not matter as much because the most dominant one is the one that has made it to the leadership level and also, ultimately, makes the foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, if there is a reasonable contestation about the role conceptions of the leadership, this will eventually also reflect in the role conceptions of the policymakers. Nevertheless, this study acknowledges that the roles that are identified here are not the only ones that exist in the state.

3. Regime Change and the Second Karabakh War as a Game Changer

In the case of Armenia, the loss of the Second Karabakh war in 2020 and the subsequent loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, which constituted an important part of Armenian identity is a foreign political crisis. This crisis is reinforced through the fact that Russia and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) did not help Armenia in overcoming Azerbaijani aggression. Additionally, the international structural conditions have changed due to the Second Karabakh war, as it strengthened the position of Armenian arch-enemies Azerbaijan and Turkey and also because of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has made Russia a pariah state. Furthermore, the international system has changed in this sense that being "in-between" has become increasingly difficult for smaller states because the contestation between the wider West and Russia has reached unprecedented levels where there is increasing pressure from both parties to choose a side.

The EU and Russia have been contending over the region that is in-between them already from 2004, when the EU Eastern- and Central European Enlargement took place and simultaneously also launched the European Neighbourhood Policy to engage with countries that were east of the new EU. The EU tries to create a ring of stability, security and prosperity around its new borders through promoting democratization and Europeanization in its neighbourhood (Bulyuk & Shapovalova 2017, 36). Russia at the same time considers the post-Soviet area, where the EU was getting involved in, as its backyard or near abroad, where it had privileged interests. This has created tensions between the two powers. After the Eastern Partnership programme was created by the EU in 2009, Russia countered it with its own regionalists project – Eurasian Customs Union, which became the EAEU, to influence the contested countries (Delcour 2021, 396). Armenia is one of the countries which is under contestation, and it has been torn between the two blocks.

For Armenia, the Russian Federation is a significant other, as it has been Armenia's main security provider and partner since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 1988-1994 First Karabakh War. Already during the First Karabakh War Armenia benefitted from more Russian assistance

(de Waal 2010, 117-122). Since the conflict did not really end after the war Armenia relied on Russian security guarantees and military-technological cooperation with Russia to keep Azerbaijan at bay and this determined greatly Armenian foreign policy (Casier 2022, 1682-1683).

Armenia is also part of many Russian-led international organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union. Furthermore, Russia's predecessor, the Soviet Union, could be viewed as a historical colonial other. Armenia also has significantly relied on Russia on economic terms as millions of Armenians work in Russia and Armenia is dependent on Russian energy in terms of natural gas (Casier 2022, 1682-1683). This was used by Russia to steer Armenia towards it joining EAEU and not signing an Association agreement with the EU by hiking up the gas prices by 50% before the decision (ibid.).

Armenia's relations with the collective West and with Russia have been through different phases, and its relations with the actors have always been dynamic. In general Armenia has since its independence looked up to the EU and has framed its stance as pro-European in civilisational sense and therefore has sought also more cooperation with the EU and European powers (Terzyan 2017). Therefore, the European Union is another significant other and this is illustrated by Armenia being in the Eastern Partnership programme and in the process of signing an Association Agreement with it before 2013 and, in 2017, signing a comprehensive and enhanced partnership agreement with the EU, which came into force in 2021. In Armenian foreign policy, the first U-turn regarding the EU, was in 2013, when Armenia, after years of negotiations, backed away from signing an Association Agreement with the EU and opted instead for the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (Terzyan 2017). Therefore, the Armenian role changed in 2013 becoming more Russian-friendly and Eurasianist. This stance has been prominent in Armenian role conceptualization from that time onwards, and it was broadly assumed in Armenia that another U-turn and a shift from Russia-oriented foreign policy, or a big foreign policy shift in general, is impossible for Armenia, because of the environment it is in – between two hostile countries Azerbaijan and Turkey – meaning that it needs Russia for its survival (Iskandaryan 2019, 2).

In 2018 a colour revolution took place in Armenia, which has been dubbed the Velvet Revolution. Due to the Velvet Revolution the previous head of state Serzh Sargsyan, who tried to serve a third consecutive term as head of state, was forced to resign and the pro-democratic Nikol Pashinyan came to power. Pashinyan had been critical on Armenia joining the EAEU and abandoning the EU Association Agreement and during the protests was campaigning with strong pro-European rhetoric. This shift put Armenia onto a more pro-European path and deteriorated relations with Russia, since a move towards EU is against Russian strategic interest in South-Caucasus, which Russia considers a part of its sphere of influence. In general Russia opposes democratic leaders coming to power through colour revolutions, as can be seen from its response to Georgian Rose Revolution and the Euromaidan in Ukraine. Instead, Russia prefers to have close ties with more authoritarian leaders.

By 2020 Azerbaijan had strengthened its military so much that it was confident that they could win a war against Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh if there is no external involvement by Russia (Askerov, Ibadoghlu 2023, 247). For Russia the Karabakh conflict has been a way to influence both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Furthermore, Russia was frustrated with Armenian pro-European stance. Since Pashinyan came to power through a revolutionary movement and a popular vote he needed to have strong popular support and Russia might have hoped that letting Azerbaijan attack Nagorno-Karabakh and losing the war could result in an overthrow of his government (ibid., 248). Even if Pashinyan was to remain in power with this would remind Armenia of its dependence on Russia, show that Russia does not tolerate Armenia's move towards the West and could make Pashinyan change its pro-Western course (ibid. 253).

Initially Russia won a lot from the Second Karabakh War not only because they had punished Armenia and made them turn towards Russia for help, but they gained military presence also in Azerbaijan in the form of peace-keeping troops. Furthermore, they showed the world and regional powers that they are an important actor in the region. With Azerbaijan showing its military dominance over Armenia however, they did not stop there, which made it hard for Russian peacekeepers to maintain control and to increasing Azerbaijani actions towards regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh. This led to the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities and Armenia making further and further concessions and ultimately to the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and to the one-day offensive, which resulted in Nagorno-Karabakhi capitulation on 20.

September 2023. For Armenia however Russia had always been the most important partner not because of ideological reasons or values, but because they guaranteed Armenian security, which had not only proven to be insufficient in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Azerbaijani incursions into Armenia in 2021 and 2022. Consequently, through the Karabakh conflict coming to an end Russia lost the leverage it had over Armenia and a reason for Armenia to have privileged allied relations to Russia.

Considering the Second Karabakh War and worsening relations between Russia and Armenia, the study's hypothesis is that after the Second Karabakh War, there was another U-turn away from Russia. Therefore, the study expects to find shifts in Armenian leader's role conceptions and, especially in the sense of who they see as their partners, with whom they should develop stronger relations with and who they have become critical of. In this sense the study also analyses the role expectations that Armenia has towards the West and Russia. This study at the same time does not intend to analyse in detail Armenian roles and views regarding Azerbaijan and Turkey. This is because the situation has not changed for Armenia regarding these actors, as they are still the main adversaries and threats to the country. Thus, a change in role conceptions about these countries has most likely not changed. The only likely change has been in the sense that, prior to losing the Second Karabakh War, Armenia saw itself in stronger position regarding Azerbaijan because it had won the previous war. Nevertheless, this remains outside this work's scope, as the main focus is on Armenian views regarding its possible partners and its place in the world.

4. Armenia's Role in the World

4.1 Relations with Russia – From Faithful Ally to being Betrayed

After the Velvet revolution, it was emphasized by the government that although there has been a regime change and a revolution, these changes were of domestic nature and therefore its foreign policy stance remains stable, and no U-turns will take place in its relations with other countries. Therefore, it was highlighted that Armenia remains a reliable partner: *“Despite the radical transformations in the internal political life, our foreign policy agenda does not have U-turns. The continuity of Armenia’s foreign policy depicts Armenia as a predictable and reliable partner.”* (PM 2018a). This was primarily directed towards Russia, as there were concerns in Armenia and Russia about the two countries' relations after the turn democratic turn in the country. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who went to Russia six times during the year 2018, referred to the concerns explicitly and tried at the same time to reaffirm that the relations are exceptional when meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow: *“I think the regularity underscores the special nature of our bilateral relations. Let me point out that our personal relationship is special as well. I want to stress that despite certain pessimism evident in both the Armenian and Russian media and in social networks, it is my belief that our relations are developing dynamically.”* (PM 2018b). In other statements, which were made in a similar manner, he emphasized that he is one of the most regular visitors of Russia, which shows how committed Armenia is to their strategic relationship with Russia.

Armenia, therefore, took on the role of a faithful ally to Russia by communicating to Russia that they are a fraternal nation and a strategic partner of Armenia, with whom the relations will continue. In accordance, Armenian leaders often stated that Russia is Armenia's main partner, and their primary objective is to build on those good relations. The sectors that were emphasized were economy and security. However, it was noted that the relations encompass every sphere, as was mentioned by foreign minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan when he met his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Moscow: *“This includes historical, cultural, and civilizational understanding, quite deep perception of mutual connection, and collaboration that stems from those priorities on which we build our systems, our security, and development policy. Our foreign policy priorities are built exactly in the context of how well they serve our internal goals of creating solid*

foundations for strengthening and developing our security. In this context, the Armenian-Russian relations are quite logical and consistent, while the stability of the course of our foreign policy is logical and understandable for us and we will, therefore, continue this policy.” (MFA 2018a). This quote shows the differences between Armenian perception of the EU and Russia. Whereas the former is crucial for domestic political reforms, the latter is seen as having the role of security guarantor of Armenia and an economic partner, therefore more important in the foreign realm. Furthermore, during meetings with Russian counterparts, it is constantly emphasised that Armenia is interested in developing and strengthening the allied relationship between the two countries. At the same time, Armenia stresses that Armenian and Russian relations are based on equal partnership, mutual respect and non-interference, as stated by Pashinyan in Moscow: *“I am sure that these issues will be resolved on the basis of our allied relations, which are anchored in mutual respect for our countries’ interests and sovereignty, and the principle of non-interference”* (PM 2018a). This shows that although Russia and others do not see them as equal partners, Armenia does.

Furthermore, Armenia conveyed that it is a committed member of Russia-led integration projects such as the Eurasian Economic Union and plays an active role in it. To show that it is committed to these regionalist efforts, Armenia took the role of EAEU integration facilitator. Armenia emphasized the economic benefits of EAEU, how the ties have been developing and how their exports to EAEU have been growing and therefore argued for further integration processes and more comprehensive ones: *“We are ready to do our best to further develop the integration-targeted institutions and find new ways and mechanisms for cooperation”* (PM 2018c). Armenia often brought out the remaining problems and identified areas in which more steps could be taken. This role goes hand in hand with the role of being a faithful ally to Russia.

Regarding Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia's language is more critical. It sees itself as a loyal partner regarding the alliance: *“No one can blame us for not fulfilling our commitments in any point. Armenia has always proved to be a loyal partner”* (PM 2018d). However, at the same time, it sees others as being unloyal towards Armenia when it comes to the Karabakh conflict: *“Unfortunately, this cannot be said about all our CSTO partners. Therefore, we say let us clarify our relationships, whether we are allies or not, if we are allies, we have to fulfil all of our commitments, but we do not understand those actions, which contradict these*

obligations. We need to know who we can count on.” (ibid.). Armenia here communicated that they are unsure if they can count on CSTO for their security. Regarding CSTO, Armenia expects other partners to take a clear stance regarding the conflict and stand more firmly on its side.

In the big picture, the Armenian role conception regarding Russia did not change in 2020-2021 compared to the previous period. Russia was still seen as the most important ally of Armenia and extending cooperation in economic areas, but increasingly more in the security field became a priority. The advancement of cooperation with Russia was important already before the Second Karabakh War started, as was communicated in the National Security Strategy (2020, 18): *”In the defense and security sectors, Armenia shall continue to develop both bilateral and multilateral formats of military, military-political, and military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation, including the expansion of collective defense capabilities and continual advancement of allied relations.”* However, the security dimension of the relationship became more important during the July clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijani border and became prominent with the start of the Second Karabakh War. Armenia saw itself in the role of a protectorate of Russia because of their military alliance, and it emphasized that should Armenia proper be attacked, Russia would come to its aid. Russian 102nd military base is seen as a security guarantee that contributes directly to Armenian security. Armenia stated that they were even having negotiations about extending the Russian 102nd military base and that they were working closely with Russia to reform the Armenian military after the war had ended. Prime minister Pashinyan best illustrates the Armenian view in his speech in the Armenian parliament in 2021, where he stated: *“We must state that the Armenian-Russian military alliance is the pledge for ensuring the external security of the Republic of Armenia, which is strengthened by several dozen international agreements of a strategic nature, with mutual commitments. [...] By the logic of the agreements formed by these two systems, an attack on Armenia means an attack on Russia, the two countries must jointly face external challenges.”* (PM 2021c). Therefore, the Armenian expectation from Russia was that they would provide security to Armenia and help them in their time of need.

In the case of the Karabakh conflict, it was understood that Russia could not come to help because Nagorno-Karabakh is not part of recognized Armenian territory. This neutrality came unexpectedly, which is illustrated by Armenian leadership constantly bringing up that in case

Armenia is attacked, Russia would fulfil its obligations. After the end of the second Karabakh War, the Russian peacekeepers deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh became an essential dimension of Russian security guarantees, as was highlighted by prime minister Pashinyan: *“Deployed along the line of contact in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Lachin corridor, which connects Artsakh and Armenia, the Russian peacekeeping force is the guarantor of peace and security in the region”*(PM 2020b). This was seen as part of Russian security guarantees and in line with the allied relations between Russia and Armenia.

In the same line of thought, the Russia-led CSTO was seen as an important part of the Armenian security system as well. Regarding CSTO, Russia was also continuously mentioned, which shows that Armenia considers it to be the main actor in the organisation. Although Armenia has allied relations already with Russia, CSTO was seen as an important part of the Armenian security system, since it provides the security guarantees with an international dimension: *“The Republic of Armenia makes no exception in this regard; we must continue to develop our allied relations with our main security partner, the Russian Federation. We must continue to develop our relations in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and ensure the security of our country and people through international mechanisms”* (PM 2021a). To ensure the functioning of CSTO, Armenia emphasized that they are reliable partners in the organisation and supported further cooperation between the organisation's member countries.

To explain the neutrality of Russia during the Second Karabakh War, Armenia emphasized its role as a mediator and member of the Minsk Group Co-Chair. Regarding the Minsk Group, the work of France and the USA was appreciated, but Russia was seen as the most important co-chair and mediator. This was explained by the fact that Russia is closer and is actually present in the region: *“The OSCE Minsk Group is the only international framework for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. At the same time, it should be noted that in practice Russia is acting as the most active mediating state. And this is somewhat understandable because Russia is directly present in the region - Russia itself is a country in our region”* (PM 2020c). The other co-chairs were seen as having a supporting role to Russia. The efforts of Russia as a mediator were commended by Armenia, and the neutrality regarding the Karabakh conflict was seen as being complementary to Russia's role as an ally of Armenia: *“Russia is not neutral in terms of being a strategic ally of Armenia. The Russian authorities and President Putin repeatedly stated that*

Russia will fulfil its security-related commitments towards the Republic of Armenia, if necessary. As for the Karabakh issue, I have already said that Russia has been a co-chairing, and mediating country since the formation of the Minsk Group, and thus had an obligation to maintain neutrality” (PM 2020d).

During the hostilities, Armenia saw the Second Karabakh War as being part of Turkey's geopolitical and imperialist play. This was explained by Azerbaijan being Turkey's ally and acting on its behalf. Hence the region of South Caucasus is being geopolitically contested, and Turkey as a regional power is seen as trying to oust Armenian ally Russia from the region. This was openly stated by Pashinyan in an interview to Russian state news agency TASS: *“Turkey’s actions are aimed at ousting Russia from the South Caucasus. Let us not forget that the statement was adopted on the initiative of the President of Russia. Some forces, and specifically Turkey, are interested in the failure of Russia’s initiative. And they hope so to undermine the authority of the Russian Federation in the South Caucasus” (PM 2020e).* Accordingly, Armenia, therefore, sees itself as being caught up in a geopolitical play between two bigger powers. During the war, Armenia also tried to draw Russia's attention to Azerbaijan using terrorists from Syria, who were recruited by Turkey, to show that the war was becoming regional, and that Russia should, therefore, come to Armenia's aid. Furthermore, this means that according to Armenian understanding, the South Caucasus is part of the Russian sphere of influence. After the cessation of hostilities Armenia ceased to use this sort of rhetoric.

In the economic sphere, Russia and the EAEU were seen as important partners of Armenia during the second time period, and the Armenian role as integration facilitator in this regard did not change. Armenia emphasized that its position as an active and committed member of the EAEU and advocated for further integration. Furthering EAEU cooperation was seen as an essential part of dealing with the economic effects of the COVID pandemic, keeping borders open was the most critical issue and furthering integration in the sphere of digital technologies was considered to be a priority for Armenia.

After the conflict had ended, it became evident that there was some friction in the relations, and this was communicated by Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian, who said to Le Monde that it is hard to evaluate Russian actions during the conflict, because Putin stated that for Russia Armenia is a strategic ally and Azerbaijan a strategic partner (MFA 2020a). Furthermore, Armenia said that

Russian peacekeepers must ensure the security of the Nagorno-Karabakh population after the first incident happened, where Azerbaijani troops took control over new areas (PM 2020f). It was also communicated that Armenia has to reassess their role in the region and its relations to strategic partners: *“In addition, we must assess the regional situation. We must reassess our role and our significance in the region, including the relations that we have in the region. We need to redefine our long-term strategic agenda in the region and with the regional players. This is one of the most important things to do”* (PM 2021b). This is one of the first signs that Armenia is disappointed in Russia and is looking for additional allies.

In the third period under review, while the role of being an ally of Russia was still present, it was much less eminent. The rhetoric that Russia had failed Armenia became more prominent, which underscores the fact that the role conceptions and expectations regarding Russia have changed or are in the process of changing. This process was already taking place before the one-day offensive of Azerbaijan, which resulted in Nagorno-Karabakh authorities capitulating, because already from 12th December 2022, Nagorno Karabakh was under Azerbaijani blockade, and in September 2022, Azerbaijani troops invaded Armenia and were occupying Armenia's territory, which were both straining the two countries' relations.

Allied relations and furthering cooperation with Russia were primarily emphasized in the Government Action Plans for 2021-2026, which was amended in December 2022, so the Nagorno-Karabakh blockade had just begun. In these documents, it was emphasized that firstly, the cooperation within CSTO and EAEU is beneficial for Armenia since it ensures economic development and higher security through strengthening the defence structures for Armenia. At the same time, it was admitted that the collective defence frameworks both in Armenia-Russian relations and within CSTO must be improved, which shows that shortcomings in this area were already acknowledged.

Overall, the Armenian policy elite was disappointed with Russian security guarantees during this period. It was pointed out that Russia had the obligation to help Armenia in case of aggression against its sovereign territory. Therefore, leaving Armenian official calls for help unanswered and failing to fulfil its alliance commitments were seen as breaking Armenia's trust and ultimately making the security guarantees of Russia worthless and Russia's role as the security guarantor of Armenia obsolete: *“The attacks undertaken by Azerbaijan against the Republic of Armenia in*

recent years lead to an obvious conclusion that the external security systems in which we are involved are not effective for the state interests and security of the Republic of Armenia. This was seen both during the 44-day war and during the May and November events in 2021, as well as in September 2022, and this list goes on” (PM 2023a). This is aggravated by the fact that Russia communicated that they assumed a neutral position in the Second Karabakh War because the hostilities were not taking part on recognized Armenian territory and that if Armenia proper were under threat, they would come to aid, but this did not happen.

Furthermore, the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and the 1-day offensive of Azerbaijan took place under the watchful eyes of Russian peacekeepers, whom Armenia saw as being the security guarantors of Karabakhi-Armenians. The peacekeepers were blamed for their inaction and even accused of siding with Azerbaijan and taking hostile actions against Armenia, because they were aiding Azerbaijani troops in hoisting their flag on Armenian territory: *“Although these actions were a clear and gross violation of the Trilateral statement, the Russian Federation took no counteractions. Instead, Russian peacekeepers on June 15, 2023, actively supported the attempt to raise the Azerbaijani flag on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, which is outside the scope of their mission and geographical area of responsibility”* (MFA 2023a). The peacekeeping mission of Russia was therefore considered to be a failure, which was another blow to the allied relations and the trustworthiness of Russian security guarantees, as stated by Prime Minister Pashinyan in an interview with The Wall Street Journal: *“In general, after the failure of the peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation in Nagorno-Karabakh, many questions arise, and these questions are legitimate, because by saying failure I mean that it is a fact that the peacekeeping troops of the Russian Federation were unable or unwilling to ensure the safety of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh”* (PM 2023b). Consequently, Armenia sees that Russia either decided that they will not help Armenia or that their power and capabilities in the South Caucasus were fading rapidly as a consequence of being preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. Although Russia has communicated that Armenia is destroying relations with Russia through the advancement of relations with the West, for Armenia Russian inaction was seen as Russia deciding to leave the region: *“But when we talk with our Russian partners, sometimes we express our opinion and our assessment that it’s the opposite, we see that Russia by virtue of a number of steps it takes or fails to take, itself leaves the region”* (PM 2023c). Here parallels were

drawn to the times of the First World War and Russia exiting the region back then as well and ultimately letting the Armenian Genocide to take place.

CSTO formed another part of the Armenian security mechanism, which was seen as also failing in its role as a security guarantor for Armenia, thus being part of Russia's failure, since it is seen as the most important actor in the alliance. According to Armenia, they are in the zone of responsibility of CSTO, but CSTO did not act against aggression on Armenian territory and failed to draw a red line there. Since the guarantees were failing Armenia openly questioned the function of CSTO and their participation in the organisation, as Prime Minister Pashinyan explained to France 24: *“You know, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, in our estimation, has failed to fulfil its obligations in the field of security towards the Republic of Armenia. In particular, in 2021 and 2022, and this could not go unnoticed by us and without consequences. And the consequence in practice is that we have essentially frozen our participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization”* (PM 2024a). In general Armenia feels betrayed and abandoned by the CSTO, which was emphasized by Pashinyan: *“The question is not whether Armenia leaves or will leave the CSTO or not. The question is whether the CSTO is leaving or exiting Armenia”* (PM 2023d).

The distancing from Russia and allegations against them went as far as claiming that Russia did not help Armenia against Azerbaijani incursions to provoke an overthrow of the current government and replace it with a pro-Russian one: *“The purpose of this provocation, which took place before the parliamentary elections, was to thwart the upcoming parliamentary elections and paralyze the statehood of Armenia, or at least to form a puppet government”* (PM 2023e). This was also not done only behind closed doors because Armenia also criticized that Russian officials and TV channels, who were openly inviting Armenian people to overthrow the government. Russia is hence seen as using Armenian security vulnerabilities to meddle in its internal affairs and, therefore, is a threat to Armenian sovereignty and the democratic system.

As a result of this, Armenian leaders emphasized that they have to completely rethink the security system of Armenia and have to diversify its security relations in order to maintain Armenian security. At the same time, Armenia still considered itself to be an ally or partner of Russia and did not want to break off the relationship completely, as Russia acts as a balancer for

Armenia in other relations. The exception being the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine from which Armenia distanced itself and emphasised that in that issue they are not allies.

When taking into consideration the entire time period under review, the role of being an ally of Russia deteriorated from being one of the master roles for Armenia to being a secondary or auxiliary role. In the first and second periods, Armenian role conception regarding Russia saw it as being a faithful ally of Russia, which was complemented in the second period with the role of being a protectorate of Russia. The reasoning being that in the first period the Armenian government, which had come to power was not established enough to change everything and had to show some stability. Also, the Russian security guarantees, which is one of the most important parts for Armenia in their allied relations, were seen as still functioning and therefore no change was deemed necessary. In the second period the security situation became more tense for Armenia, which is why they emphasized their allied relations more vigorously and tried to project the role of security guarantor to Russia. This role combination of protector-protectorate already existed in the first period, but the Second Karabakh War amplified its significance, because Armenia felt increasingly threatened. In the third period, while the role of being an ally of Russia persisted, Armenia no longer portrayed itself as a faithful ally of Russia, with whom the relations are a top priority. Instead, Armenia presented Russia as just one of its many partners, and even as a threat. The role of being a protectorate of Russia diminished as well in the third period. This can be explained by Russian inactivity towards Armenia in the third period, but also during the Second Karabakh War during which Armenia unwillingly accepted the Russian role of being neutral in the conflict, while being surprised by it and in the end also feeling deceived, although this manifested itself only later in the context of other failures of Russian security guarantees. The role of being an integration facilitator in the EAEU meanwhile remained unchanged throughout the whole time period but became less prominent in the last time period.

4.2 Relations with the West: Revolutionary European Democracy

After the Velvet Revolution concluded in May 2018 and Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister, most of the speeches emphasized that the revolution had led to the triumph of democracy, which had become an integral part of Armenian identity. This is important in two ways. In doing this,

Armenia emphasized its strong anti-authoritarian stance: *“Dictatorship shall be ruled out in the Republic of Armenia; democracy in our country is irreversible”* (PM 2018e). Although the revolutionary language was primarily directed to domestic audiences, it also has foreign political implications. This was clearly stated by Pashinyan when he was visiting France: *“I think a new process has started in Armenia, which will spread all over the world. I want to believe that the Armenian people and Armenia have assumed a role which is of global significance, and I also believe that the Armenian nation has the necessary potential, historical background and skills to have a say in developing new systems in the world”* (PM 2018f). In that context, Armenia is of the opinion that they did something unprecedented because they managed to have a democratic transition without a shot fired, and Nikol Pashinyan became prime minister, although his party only had a few spots in the parliament. Armenia's boldness can also be explained through the fact that it felt that other international actors have viewed the revolution and democratic developments in Armenia positively, as was stated by Pashinyan: *“We can state that those foreign political achievements recorded by our country in 2018 were the reflection of domestic development, because in fact, Armenia's image boasts a serious improvement worldwide, and the changes that started in May and reached their peak in December, 2018 by the holding of early parliamentary elections gives us a good basis for achieving serious success in foreign policy and diplomacy”* (PM 2018g). Armenia has thus conceptualized for itself the role of a revolutionary democracy and sees itself as an example for the world, and through that, their democratic identity affects its international relations as well.

Democracy is also seen by Armenia as a core value of Europe, and therefore, being democratic means also being part of Europe. This line of thought is best illustrated by Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan's speech at the World Forum for Democracy: *“We are a relatively new member to the Council of Europe. We are one of the beneficiaries of that multilateralism because we have chosen a model, once we restored our independence, we have chosen a model, which absorbs the values of Europe, which absorbs the principles of Europe, it absorbs the architecture, national building, state and institutional building along the lines that are known to Europe”* (MFA 2018b). At the same time he acknowledged that Armenia has sometimes steered off this course but that the Velvet Revolution brought them back on the European track and that the Council of Europe played an important role in this process: *“Because it was through the Council of Europe, with the Council of Europe, with the generation of this*

collective effort to bring the expertise, the knowledge to our country and to instill what we call the values of Europe in our country” (ibid.). Since democracy is seen as being the core value of Europe the role of revolutionary democracy is directed at European countries and the European Union to show that they have taken a path similar to theirs and are therefore natural allies.

With regards to democracy and the reform process Armenia sees the European Union as its main partner. When there is talk about reforms the European Union is often mentioned by Armenian leaders, but it is not mentioned at all when talking about the EAEU or Russia. In this regard, Armenia expects from the European Union further support in its reforms that are taking place after the Velvet Revolution, as was stated by Pashinyan when he met EU-member state ambassadors: *“We are set for the reform of our political and economic institutions. However, your support will help us complement the existing opportunities to make reforms more effective. It is not accidental that today as we have recorded tangible progress in strengthening democracy, the Armenian society expects greater assistance from European partners”* (PM 2018h). Accordingly Armenian policymakers constantly state that cooperation with European countries is a priority: *“Deepening cooperation with European countries is one of the most important directions of our government’s foreign policy”* (PM 2018i). Therefore, the Armenian role expectation is that the EU and European countries are democracy- and reform promoters in the region and in their relations with Armenia.

From individual countries France was singled out as a country with whom Armenia has privileged relations. In the relations to France also the membership in La Francophonie was mentioned, which was seen as another international mechanism through which Armenia could cooperate with other countries and promote democracy. In general, Armenia saw that Armenia and France are supporting each other in all domains and the French-Armenian community plays a big part in this.

Armenia is in a conflict-ridden region in three senses: since it is a former Soviet state it is part of the Post-Soviet region, where conflicts are commonplace; secondly it is also part of the broader Middle East, which is conflict ridden and more specifically, it is part of the South-Caucasus, where all three countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – have since the fall of the Soviet Union been in bloody conflicts with each other or with Russia. Pashinyan acknowledged this during his speech at the Nelson Mandela Peace Summit: *“I come from a region, where*

unfortunately bloody conflicts, corrupt system of governance, animosity between people overshadow wisdom and the need for peaceful coexistence” (PM 2018j). In this context, Armenia has adopted the main tenet of the democratic peace theory, which states that democracy brings peace because democratic countries are not as likely to wage war against other democracies. And this is articulated also by Pashinyan: *“Democracies are not supposed to wage wars against each other. I hope that one day our region’s democratic development will rule out the risks of hostilities, wars and hatred. Armenia has firmly embarked on this path of and strongly stands for regional peace, stability and reconciliation”* (ibid.). The fact that Armenia is peaceful and seeks a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan is brought out in Armenian communications about the conflict. At the same time, Armenia tries to show that it stands for peace in the whole world as well and is an active participant in peacemaking efforts: *“Armenia’s cooperation under the umbrella of the United Nations is both comprehensive and vibrant. Without entering into all the details, let me mention our contribution to the global peace under the auspices of the UN led and UN-supported peace operations in an impressive geographical scope that extends from Afghanistan to Lebanon, Kosovo and Mali.”* (PM 2018a). One reason for Armenia’s desire for broader peace is its large diaspora around the world. Conflicts can pose significant dangers to Armenians globally, making peace a crucial priority for the. Therefore, a subcategory of the role “democratic” is democratic: peaceful, as being peaceful is part of Armenia’s understanding of how democratic countries, and thus they themselves, should act in international relations. Furthermore, this understanding guides Armenia’s relationships with other countries and possible allies.

In the second period of the study the principal views regarding the West/EU remained the same. It was emphasized that what binds the EU, USA and Armenia are the common democratic values. And in foreign relations it was highlighted that Armenia conducts value-based foreign relations, but at the same time also has relations with other partners: *“In its foreign relations, Armenia draws on civilizational and democratic value systems, as well as the continual development of mutually beneficial and equal relations with all states”* (National Security Strategy 2020, 17). The EU was therefore seen as the main partner concerning democracy, reform process and institution building and the role of Armenia–EU Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was emphasized: *“At each stage of the reforms, we have felt the unconditional support of our European friends. Indeed, the European Union is*

Armenia's primary partner in institution building. In this regard, the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement is of particular importance" (PM 2020g). EU's role in Armenian reform process and furthering cooperation with the EU was mentioned in both speeches and also in the Government Programme and National Security Strategy. The democratic system is seen by Armenian leadership as a central part of not only the reform process, but also for the country's security: *"In this new context, Armenia's security policy hinges upon the democratic system of governance laying sound foundations for the strengthening of the country's economic, political, intellectual, and consequently, military potential"* (National Security Strategy 2020, 8). This is because democracy is viewed as essential for the country's modernisation process.

The two countries that were singled out in this regard were Germany and France. Germany being the biggest Armenian trading partner in the EU, but also a role model for Armenia, since it is a parliamentary democracy. France was seen as being a special and friendly partner of Armenia and Armenian membership and the importance of their relations was underlined in La Francophonie. The US is also seen as being a similar partner as the EU, with whom cooperation is based upon common values. Cooperation with the US is seen also in the field of democratic transformation and reform process, but strong relations are also seen as important for Armenian security: *"Maintaining a strong relationship with the United States is particularly important for Armenia, for reasons related both to our security and our values"* (MFA 2020b). In this light the strategic dialogue and defence cooperation was mentioned. France and USA were also regarded as being mediators as co-chairs of OSCE Minsk group, but rather as having a complementary role to Russia.

During the Second Karabakh War, Armenia tried to position itself as being in the forefront of fighting autocracy and imperialism to garner support from Western countries. Armenia emphasized that it is fighting two authoritarian countries in the Second Karabakh War – Azerbaijan and its patron Turkey – who are waging war against democracy. This was emphasized by prime minister Pashinyan in an interview with The Spectator: *"When I became prime minister of Armenia, I said that a new war against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia by Azerbaijan would amount to a war against democracy. I can now officially say that Azerbaijan's war against democracy in the South Caucasus has been unleashed. It is not only a fight for the freedom of*

one nation or one state. This is a fight for democracy since it is a war declared by dictatorship against democracy” (PM 2020h). Thus, Armenia tried to take on the role of being the defender of democracy and Europe. Portraying this as a fight between democracy and autocracy goes also along the lines of democratic peace theory, since the attacking country is an authoritarian country. Armenia portrayed itself as being a peaceful democracy that is ready to solve the conflict via diplomatic means. The fact that this was a fight against European values and Europe was emphasized by Pashinyan in his interview to France 24, where he said that Turkey tries to reinstate the Turkish Empire and is not only aggressive in Karabakh, but also with regards to Greece, Syria and Iraq, thereby emphasizing the need for Europe’s support in helping Armenia deal with this threat or face authoritarian and imperialistic Turkey in the future themselves: *“Let no one think that this is too far from Europe. This is not that far from Europe, and that is why I say Armenia and Karabakh are at the forefront of a civilizational confrontation, and if Turkey succeeds here with its imperialistic policy, you will have to meet them halfway in Vienna”* (PM 2020i). Armenia tried to and expected to receive support from other democracies and Europe through communicating this role. Armenia also stated that they expect the West and international community to condemn Azerbaijani aggression. At the same time, it did not view the West as a significant player in its security field, emphasizing the roles of Russia and the CSTO instead. Nevertheless, this role conception did not seem to be accepted by the West, Armenia ceased to articulate this position after the hostilities ended.

In the third period under review the West – the EU and the USA – became to be seen as even bigger partners for Armenia than in the previous time periods. Regarding common values and Western support of Armenian democracy, reform process and institution building the views of Armenia remained the same. The difference is that whereas before deepening relations were highlighted, now it was emphasized that Armenia wanted to become as close to the EU as possible. This statement was made for the first time, when prime minister Pashinyan spoke in front of the EU parliament, at the end of his speech stating: *“The Republic of Armenia is ready to be closer to the European Union, as much as the European Union considers it possible. Our joint statement with President von der Leyen reads: “In these difficult times, the EU and Armenia stand shoulder to shoulder.” Let us continue to stand shoulder to shoulder in our commitment to make the times better”* (PM 2023e).

Accordingly, Armenia acclaimed the EU decision to give candidate status to and open accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova and especially also granting Georgia candidate status. This is regarded as the EU becoming more active in the region, which is why Armenia saw it as being a window of opportunity in its relations with the EU as well, as was stated by prime minister Pashinyan: *“Basically, I think that it is very important and essential for Armenia to position itself around that event”* (PM 2024b). This goes hand in hand with deepening relations with the EU as much as deemed possible by the EU and led to Armenian leadership openly stating that EU candidacy is also being discussed and that Armenian people do have EU aspirations: *“Well, especially having in mind all the challenges that we have been facing during the recent couple of years, three years, four years, many new opportunities are largely being discussed in Armenia nowadays, including, it will not be a secret if I say, the idea of membership in the European Union. I can add that the people of Armenia do have European aspirations, and as I said we’re passing through a process and we will see”* (MFA 2024a). Armenia accentuates therefore that the EU has become more important than ever for Armenia and that they have taken a clear pro-EU stance in times of high geopolitical contestation between the West/EU and Russia. The reason for this shift is explained as being driven by the challenges Armenia has faced in recent years, i.e. losing not only the Second Karabakh War and Nagorno-Karabakh altogether, but also the security and alliance system that kept Armenia safe. These statements further illustrate that Armenia is testing the waters of taking on the role of EU aspirant. This also means that Armenia expects the EU to be more active in the region and to provide further ways to enhance cooperation between Armenia and the EU.

Although the USA and France were seen as mediators previously as well and Russia was considered to be the main mediator, in 2023-2024 the EU was additionally perceived as exercising this role and became dominant amongst the possible mediators. In this regards the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan that they recognize each other’s territorial integrity – Azerbaijan comprising of 86.600 km² and Armenia of 29.800 km² – which was done under EU and French mediation, was hailed. At the same time, Armenia voices the concern that the EU has no real power to enforce the agreements as a mediator.

However, Armenia hails the decision of the EU to deploy the monitoring mission on Armenian border as the EU showing its willingness to be more active in stabilizing the region and

contributing to the security of Armenia: *“Since February of this year, the long-term civilian mission of the European Union has been operating in Armenia, which monitors the security situation along the state border of Armenia with Azerbaijan. This is a key event through which the European Union got involved in Armenia's security agenda for the first time”* (PM 2023e). In this regard Armenian leadership thanked the EU for it numerous times and emphasized that the mission is successful, since the situation on the borders has become less tense. The decision to deploy the monitoring mission is also considered to be a direct answer to the threats against Armenia proper: *“It is important to assess the security situation under which the deployment of the EU mission was carried out. It followed the large-scale attack and occupation of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia by Azerbaijan in September 2022. [...] We highly appreciate the role of the EU Monitoring Mission in the context of deterring the intentions to use force in the region and strengthening stability on the Armenia-Azerbaijan interstate border”* (MFA 2024b). Since Russia and CSTO remained in this regard passive, the EU is seen as providing something that Russia and CSTO refused to do. Therefore, Armenia sees this as a first step of the EU becoming a security guarantor of Armenia or one of the security guarantors of Armenia or at least a partner in this field.

In this context it was acknowledged that EU has taken an active step not only regarding the mission in Armenia, but also in defending Ukraine, where Armenia viewed the EU as taking on the role of a defender of democracy. Therefore, Armenia communicated that it is necessary for the EU to position itself similarly also in the case of Armenia-Azerbaijani conflict: *“The collapse of the European security architecture, rise of authoritarianism in the world, massive violations of the UN Charter on the one hand and the democratic values on the other, make it necessary to seriously rethink how the EU should position itself”* (MFA 2023b). In this context the role of being a defender of democracy was revitalized, emphasizing the fact that Armenia is a democratic country, that makes an effort to become even more democratic and at the same time doing everything it can to survive in an international environment, where not only Armenia, but democracies in general are under attack.

In general, Armenia hoped for additional support regarding the blockade of Nagorno Karabakh from the international community and from the West. In this regard, Armenia felt that the issue was not given enough attention and that it was left alone with this situation. Therefore, Armenia

expected of international actors to become more involved. Armenia recognized that the EU has an important role to play in this context as well as seeing the EU as capable of not only bringing the parties to the negotiating table, but also of possibly establishing a similar mechanism in Nagorno Karabakh as it did on the borders of Armenia. Additional aid was also expected by the US, whom Armenia asked for help based on common values: *“We believe that the United States, based on its own values of democracy and human rights protection and its commitment and involvement in the establishment of lasting peace in the region, should adequately respond to these statements in order to prevent the expansionist policy of the Azerbaijani leadership towards the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia and attempts of ethnic cleansing in Nagorno Karabakh”* (MFA 2023c).

Throughout the whole period under study not a single time Russia and democracy, reform process or governance style were mentioned in the same context and therefore Russia was not a role model for Armenia in this regard. When talking about role models European states and specifically Germany was brought up. As a whole, the role of European democracy did not change in the whole period under study. What changed was more the expectations of Armenia regarding the West. During the first period the EU/West was seen as the primary partner in the reform process of Armenia, thus taking on the role of being democracy and reform promoters and this continued through all three time periods. In the second period Armenia tried in to take on the role of defender of democracy, but this was not accepted by other actors, since no real help was offered to Armenia by the West and therefore Armenia stopped communicating this role. In the third period the West and the EU in particular came to be seen as the main partners for Armenia in all fields, including security. This was because the EU became more active both in its mediating efforts and also by sending a monitoring mission to Armenia’s border. Additionally, in the context of the Ukraine war the EU strengthened its role of as the defender of democracy. Armenia therefore saw the EU becoming also a security guarantor or a partner and sought as close relations with the EU as possible, highlighted by the fact that it took on the role of EU candidacy aspirant.

4.3 Managing the In-between: Independent

In managing its relations with the two blocks, Armenia took on the role of being independent after the Velvet Revolution. They communicated extensively that Armenia's foreign policy is not being influenced by any actor and that the primary goal of their foreign policy is to protect their national interests. In doing this, they adopted the strategy of multi-vector foreign policy. Armenia, therefore, emphasized that working with one partner does not exclude working with others as well and that their foreign policy is not pro- or anti-European Union, USA or Russia: *“Our position is clear - Armenia stands ready to have a constructive dialogue and cooperation with all partners. However, we do not intend to develop our relations with one partner at the expense of another. We underline the role of multilateralism on global and regional levels”* (PM 2018a). This is illustrated well by Armenian leadership stating that cooperation with the EU is also their priority at meetings with Russian leadership and the Eurasian Economic Union meetings and the other way around. The goal of the multivector foreign policy is to balance the different actors and ensure that no actor has too much influence over Armenia. When asked by Al Jazeera about Russian influence over Armenia, prime minister Pashinyan said that there is no absolute independence for anyone because countries are interconnected in today's world and emphasized that although Russia has influence over Armenia, that: *“to manage this situation, we are going to increase the quality of our relations with Russia, with the European Union, with the United States”* (PM 2018k). Furthermore, deepening relations with other countries in the region, such as Iran and Georgia was also seen as part of that strategy. Therefore, Armenia maintains its role or status of being independent through cooperating with everyone and not being fully part of any block, although it understands that Russia has influence over it.

In the second period Armenia continued to pursue its role of being an independent country pursuing multivector foreign policy, despite the fact that during the Second Karabakh War Russia was the main partner they looked towards for assistance. In Armenia's communications and Government Strategy and National Security Strategy the importance of cooperation with both the West, Russia as well as regional powers such as Iran and Georgia was stressed. The logic being here that as a small country Armenia needs to have a multitude of partners in order to have equal relations with individual powers and agency in the international arena, as was stated in the National Security Strategy: *“Armenia shall conduct proactive and effective multilateral diplomacy with the conviction that effective multilateralism fosters equitable cooperation*

between large and small states, and is a prerequisite for international security, peace, and development” (National Security Strategy 2020, 25).

The second reason for multivector foreign policy is that Armenia views itself and the region to be the meeting ground of the Middle East, Asia and Europe, which is why the region is geopolitically contested between bigger powers. Since the region is geopolitically contested it is necessary for Armenia to have and balance relations with these powers: *“The Caucasus is situated on a geographic crossroads, a nexus where Europe, Asia, and the Middle East come together, a region prone to wider geopolitical competition. Armenia conducts a balanced, multifaceted foreign and security policy to address and mitigate this challenge, to reduce violence and project stability”* (MFA 2020b).

With regards to the Second Karabakh War being part of Turkey’s imperialist and expansionist policy, which is also taking place in other regions such as the Middle East, especially Egypt amongst the other Middle Eastern countries was regarded as being potential balancers against Turkey. In general, Armenia recognised that it is part of the wider Middle East and therefore relations with the countries there are important. In an interview to Al-Akhbar newspaper foreign minister Zhorab Mnatsakanyan, when asked about bilateral relations between Armenia and Egypt, said that they face similar challenges, which is why cooperation needs to be widened. Regarding Armenia’s main priorities in the region he emphasized this point: *“Last but not least, security between the Middle East and the South Caucasus is interrelated. Therefore, we need stronger cooperation in this field including in countering transnational threats”* (MFA 2020c). Iran was perceived in this regard to have a special interest in maintaining stability and countering Turkey’s imperialistic policy. Finding further allies in the Middle-East coincides with Armenia’s role of being an independent nation, which cooperates with everyone and tries to balance its relations with bigger powers.

The role of being independent became increasingly important in the third time period, when Armenia started moving away from Russia, and it is showcased best through Armenia not mentioning that relations with Russia are the main priority. On the one hand, Armenia’ strategic objective was to become and remain independent from Russia and other actors for its security. However, this also meant that Armenia acknowledged its dependence on Russia and recognized that relying solely on one actor was a mistake, as stated by prime minister Pashinyan to the

Italian newspaper La Repubblica: *“Armenia’s security architecture 99,999% was linked to Russia, including in the logic of procurement of arms and ammunition, but today we see that Russia itself is in need of weapons, arms and ammunition and in this situation it’s understandable that even if it wishes so, the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia’s security needs. This example should demonstrate to us that dependence of linkage in security matters from just one partner is just a strategic mistake”* (PM 2023c). Here Armenia shows that being dependent on one country can be fatal, because their focus can change, as they were dependent on Russia and Russia became preoccupied in Ukraine and therefore was not able to support Armenia. Armenia stressing that being bound to only one partner – Russia – is a mistake shows that they consider that in order to have successful security policy they need to link themselves to more actors. Accordingly, Armenia saw the US and the EU playing bigger roles in its security relations. Ultimately it is at the same time important not to be dependent on bigger powers, regardless on which ones, too much: *“And the question is the following – should we manage our relations with our neighbors, I am sorry to use that word, through Moscow, Washington and Brussels. In terms of the paradigm - no, but in practical terms we lack that political tradition”* (PM 2023d). This quote shows that Armenia considers itself to be dependent on bigger powers but wishes to become more independent. Thus, Armenia considered diversifying its relations to be the appropriate strategy to become less dependent on individual actors and therefore gain more independence, and in doing so, also become more autonomous and independent. On the other hand, Armenia did not want to completely sever relations to Russia and stated that their relations to any country is not directed against a third one: *“Our security relations with the United States, or France, or India, or the European Union are not naturally directed against Russia. This is simply the consequence of the reality that the security relationships we used to have in the past do not address our security needs”* (PM 2024b). This underlines the fact also that Russia as a partner is still considered important, if not otherwise then in order to balance Armenia’s relations with the West.

The role of being independent in its relations to Russia and the West came under strain during the third period, because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which resulted in increasing geopolitical contestation between Russia and the West. Under these circumstances it is increasingly hard for states to not pick sides and maintain their independent position. In this sense Armenia positioned itself strongly as not being part of any blocks and that they do not take sides. Under the circumstances of the new geopolitical reality, the West and Russia respectively

expect Armenia to choose a side, since they do not consider having good relations with both sides and being impartial as not possible anymore: *“Now, naturally, in some sense they also think that we should communicate less with the other side, but this is a wrong approach from the point of view of Armenia's interests. We cannot enter that zone and say we are talking to this one, we are not talking to the other, because from our point of view, our perception, their relationship has changed, but our relationship with them has not changed. But since their relationship has changed, so has their perception of our relationship with others changed”* (PM 2023f). This had put Armenia in a difficult situation, since both sides consider Armenia to be in the opposing block, which hampers their relations with Armenia. In this regards the Ukraine war is an important issue for both sides, and both of them see Armenia as not doing enough to support their side: *“And here the biggest problem of our current position is as follows: if being pro-Russian could have some potential benefits, or if being pro-Western could have some advantages, Armenia does not take advantage of the benefits of being pro-Russian, because in Russia they do not consider Armenia enough pro-Russian, for example for the reason that Armenia in their opinion does not provide enough assistance to them in the Ukrainian issue. On the other hand, Armenia cannot take advantage of the potential benefits of being pro-Western, because in the West they consider Armenia not to be sufficiently pro-Western, because for example, from their perspective, Armenia does not sufficiently oppose Russia in the Ukrainian issue”* (PM2023c). Consequently, Armenia saw itself as being caught up in bigger powers geopolitical rivalry and its position in the in-between. Despite Armenia’s efforts to continue its pragmatic policies and working with both sides, they understand that it has become increasingly difficult to do so.

To balance and diversify its relations a big vector of this strategy is developing relations with other powers than the West and Russia, as was already mentioned also in the previous time periods. In this context Armenia underlined that they are trying to have a more regional focus, because they are not bordering the West and Russia: *“I responded that in reality it’s a wrong impression that we are in the middle of the West and Russia. We are in the middle of Georgia, Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan”* (ibid.). From regional powers, the friendly relations with Iran and Georgia were highlighted and Iran is seen as being an important player in regional security and stability. At the same time improving relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey is also seen as necessary to ensure stability in the region: *“And I bring forward this logic that we should work,*

first of all, to improve our relations in our region, with whom we have good relations, to make those relations better. This refers to Georgia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and create those relations and try to move forward step by step with those countries with which relations are strained or there are no relations” (PM 2023b). Additionally, intensifying cooperation with Egypt and the Arabian world, but also with India were an important part of Armenia diversifying its relations. Having a more regional focus further highlights that Armenia attempts to distance itself from the geopolitical rivalries of bigger powers.

Throughout the studied time period the role of being independent was always an important part of Armenia’s role conception and therefore did not change in itself. What could be observed is a change in how this role and the reasons for it have been communicated. On top of that, during the third time period Armenia communicated openly that it had not been fully independent before, since it was dependent on Russia, but that it wished to become more independent through multi-vector foreign policy. At the same time, Armenia also acknowledged that the role independent was under strain because of geopolitical changes and increasing West – Russia confrontation. In comparison to that the role independent was communicated during the first two periods rather as the reason for Armenia having relations with both the West and Russia. In the second time period this role was also less important, because Armenia was in the time of crisis seeking help from its main partner – Russia.

4.4 Managing the In-between: Bridge

Armenia also understood that its foreign political situation and being part of the Eurasian Economic Union and at the same time having good relations with the European Union is an opportunity, as they can take on the role of a bridge between the two blocks. This was also emphasized by Pashinyan: *“Our geographic location, human resources with deep knowledge and understanding of different cultures, our balanced foreign policy are competitive features of our country and society makes me confident that we are going succeed. We are a full member of the Eurasian Economic Union, which has opened tremendous opportunities for our economic development. Armenia is prepared to bridge the interests and positions of the EAEU and EU, as much as accepted by both sides”* (PM 2018l). The focus was on potential economic benefits that both blocks, but also Armenia, could achieve through cooperation. Therefore, the bridging role is

seen as an opportunity to bring both blocks closer together and, by doing so, also becoming more important for both blocks. The bridging role was also recognized in EAEU's relations with Iran. As the EAEU had signed a provisional agreement in 2018 with Iran in order to eventually form a free trade zone, Armenia emphasized that: *"We are ready to become an active platform for establishing reliable trade and economic relations between Iran and the EAEU countries"* (PM 2018m).

In the second period Armenia's role of being a bridge between the East and the West remained unchanged. This was emphasised in the National Security Strategy of Armenia: *"Positioned at 'the West of the East' and 'the East of the West' throughout its history, Armenia often found itself center-stage to civilizational conflict. We dismiss the presumption of civilizational conflict and position ourselves as a proponent for dialogue between civilizations.[...] Facilitating dialogue and multilateral relations between civilizations, nations, and states must become the manifestation of our commitment to peace and stability in the world."* (National Security Strategy 2020, 6). Armenia views its role as a bridge between different civilizations and enhancing cooperation and dialogue between different actors as contributing to its security and also stability in the whole region. One of the main dimensions being facilitating cooperation between EAEU and the EU: *"Last year Armenia presided in the EAEU and it was a successful presidency. Armenia is an advocate of economic and political cooperation between the EAEU and the EU, and we will do our utmost to make that cooperation work"* (PM 2020j). At the same time, Armenia also saw itself as a bridge for the EAEU to Iran, and also to Egypt, with whom EAEU had ongoing free trade agreement negotiations. Becoming a regional transit hub between EAEU, Iran and Georgia for electricity was also brought up.

In the third period the role of being a bridge diminished. This can be attributed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the increasing geopolitical contestation between Russia and the West, which made the idea of facilitating cooperation between the two blocks obsolete. The Western countries had introduced a multitude of sanctions against Russia. Therefore, economic cooperation with EAEU and Russia became undesirable for Western countries and was an area of contestation in their relations with other EAEU members, who were seen as supporting Russia in avoiding sanctions. In turn, the deteriorating relations with Russia

and other EAEU members, who are also part of CSTO, also made this role be less desirable for Armenia.

At the same time the role did not completely dissolve. The role remained in the context of opening regional communication and transport routes, which was part of the ceasefire deal that brought an end to the Second Karabakh war. In this context developing various highways were mentioned and the importance of their project Crossroads of Peace was emphasized: *“In his opening remarks, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia presented the "Crossroads of Peace" project, which is one of the backbones of Armenia's agenda for establishing stability and peace in the South Caucasus. It aims to connect the East to the West, North to the South, and, by strengthening economic and cultural ties and people-to-people contacts, to contribute to the political dialogue and achieve comprehensive and lasting peace in the region for the benefit of all peoples”* (MFA 2023d). In this regard, Armenia sees itself as a bridge, and a promoter of regional integration. What changed, however, was that Armenia no longer specifically mentioned actors such as Russia/EAEU and the EU/West.

4.5 Genocide Preventer

Due to its history Armenia has conceptualised the role of genocide preventer for itself. Because of its historical experience with Armenian Genocide in 1915, they see it to as their obligation to prevent such events from happening. In the first time-period the role had more of an international dimension. Armenia took on a role of a spokesperson for the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, highlighting the importance of the prevention of genocide worldwide, as well as identity-based discrimination and violence generally. In this context Armenia was promoting early intervention to prevent Genocide from happening:

“Armenia has been consistently promoting the recognition of the importance and priority of early prevention, which entails sufficient capacity to detect, monitor and address early warning signs of situations, which, if not addressed, may lead to deteriorations beyond control and all the way to the perpetration of massive crimes. Early prevention means early action” (MFA 2018c).

In general Armenia portrayed itself as an activist in genocide prevention and recognition, advancing these topics internationally through the UN and other organisations.

In the second period under study the international dimension was still a part of Armenia's role of being genocide preventer, but because of the Second Karabakh War the focus moved towards preventing genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh. Accordingly, before the war started the international dimension was emphasized, as in the previous period: *"Preventing genocide and crimes against humanity is one of the most important components of Armenia's security and foreign policy, reflected in Armenia's strategic approach to both regional security and international cooperation."* (National Security Strategy 2020, 25). After the beginning of the Second Karabakh war the Azerbaijani aggression was seen as continuing Ottoman empire's genocidal policy of 1915 towards Armenians and therefore the need to help Karabakhi Armenians was foregrounded. Armenia expected the international community to condemn the aggression and help defend the Karabakhi Armenians from genocide which was also emphasized: *"The international community needs to know that there is really a serious threat and that threat is a serious threat not just for the context of Nagorno-Karabakh, but that in parallel there are geopolitical threats, because this is an attempt, through genocide, to continue Turkey's imperialistic policies"* (PM 2020k). Armenia therefore saw itself as protecting Karabakhi-Armenians from genocide, but felt that the international community, the West and Russia included, had to step up their obligation to protect them from genocide.

In the third period Armenia felt abandoned by the international community due to a lack of support in regard to the dire situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. This was communicated throughout the whole third period, because Nagorno-Karabakh was also the whole time under blockade. Armenia expected the international community to be more active in preventing genocide and wanted Azerbaijani actions to be condemned and a fact-finding mission to be established: *"The absence of condemnation of the use of force and strong response from the international community three years ago, the ineffectiveness of the security guarantees created after the 44-day war of 2020 and the absence of international access to Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan's actions and policy of Armenophobia were not only continued but also reached their new manifestation - forcible displacement, ethnic cleansing of a major part of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh following the military attack unleashed by Azerbaijan on September 19"* (MFA 2023e). What becomes clear from this statement is that Armenia sees the international community not only to be partly at fault of the displacement of Karabakhi Armenians in 2023, but that the inaction of international community already since 2020 was to be blamed for how the

situation unfolded. In this sense Armenia hoped the whole international community would be more active, but also especially Russia, which had peacekeepers in the region, as well as the European Union and the West in general. The exodus of Karabakhi-Armenians and the failure of the international community at the same time enhanced Armenia's will to be a pioneer in the fight against ethnic and religious discrimination and genocide in the international realm, since it made them realize that this is still a problem for them and also in the international community: *"Decades ago, when Armenia assumed responsibility in mainstreaming human rights into genocide prevention, we were driven by our moral duty towards the past. Today, we see that it is not merely about the past, rather our joint efforts are aimed at the present and future: a future of humanity free of hatred, racism, xenophobia and intolerance leading to mass atrocity crimes"* (MFA 2023f).

When looking at the whole time period the role of being genocide preventer did not change, since the changes were only minimal and were about the content of the role. After The Second Karabakh War Nagorno-Karabakh became the focus of this role, whereas in the first period preventing genocide in the whole world was stressed. However, the international focus was still present in the second and third time periods and the overall logic of the role did not change since it was anchored on the national tragedy of the Armenian Genocide.

5. Role enactment

The role of being a faithful ally of Russia manifested before the Second Karabakh War in Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan visiting Russia 6 times after coming to power on 14th of May 2018 along with numerous phone calls made with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Armenia's close relations with Russia and Armenia trying to maintain the favour of Russia can also be seen in Armenia's decision to send aid to Syria. In July 2018 Armenia sent in cooperation with Russia humanitarian aid to Syria and in February 2019 they sent 83 soldiers to Syria as part of Russian demining and humanitarian mission (Eurasianet 2019). This was a way of showing support to Russia, who was involved in Syria and had been unsuccessfully seeking allies to aid their efforts there.

In 2019 Armenia had the chairmanship of EAEU. Although the chairmanship is passed from country to country in a rotational basis, taking on the role shows that Armenia wishes to cooperate with EAEU member countries and tries to strengthen the economic integration and cooperation between the countries. In 2024 the chairmanship was assumed again, despite the Russian-Armenian relations being at an all-time low. This shows that Armenia considers it still important to work with Russia and other EAEU countries at least in the economic sphere and does not cut off the relations completely.

In the second period of the study Armenian role enactment of being a faithful ally of Russia and protectorate of Russia is illustrated by Armenia turning towards Russia to stop the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijani offensive. Although France and the USA also tried to mediate a ceasefire, the main mediator was Russia, with whom Armenia had the most frequent contact during the war and under whose mediation several ceasefire agreements were agreed upon and ultimately the 10th of November ceasefire agreement was signed. Under the conditions of the ceasefire agreement the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh was agreed upon. This shows that Armenia considered Russia and Russian peacekeepers as being able to give proficient security guarantees to both Armenia and Karabakhi-Armenians. Meaning that Armenia thought that Russia would be able to contain further Azerbaijani aggression. Deploying Russian peacekeepers instead of peacekeepers from other countries or the UN ones, had to be agreed upon by Azerbaijan as well. Therefore, this decision might not have been solely because Armenia wished so, even though Armenia stood to gain more from the deployment of a

peacekeeping mission, given they were losing ground. Furthermore, in the 9th of November 2020 ceasefire agreement Armenia agreed to unblock regional transport routes between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan and the control over transport communication was to be provided by the Russian Border Guard Service. Thus, in Armenia's view Russia would be in this regard the appropriate actor to help them open transport communications. In addition to this, Armenia signed bilateral defence contracts with Russia worth 400 million dollars after the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The fact that Armenia turned towards its ally Russia when it needed further arms to defend their country after the loss of the Second Karabakh War aligns with Armenia seeing Russia as its main security partner and Armenia being a faithful ally to Russia.

That Armenia was still trying to portray itself as being a faithful ally to Russia during and initially also after the Second Karabakh War is also evident, when considering Armenian decision to send 100 soldiers to Kazakhstan, where mass anti-regime protests were taking place, in 2022 as part of Russian-led CSTO peacekeeping operation (OC-Media 2022). Through this action Armenia tried to show that it is a faithful ally, who honours its commitments under CSTO and towards Russia. As a result of CSTO and Russia not helping Armenia during the Second Karabakh War this action can be viewed as Armenia trying to push others to support them as well in their time of need. Furthermore, Armenia was holding the CSTO chairmanship position in the year 2022. During this time Azerbaijani incursions to Armenia had already happened as already in 2021 there was a first Azerbaijani incursion to Armenia proper, which ended with around 40 km² of Armenian territory being occupied as well as resulting in Armenia asking CSTO for aid, which they refused to give. Nevertheless, Armenia viewed during the Second Karabakh War and in its aftermath Russia as the main security provider and considered the Russian security guarantees, meaning Russian peacekeepers, to still be functioning. Armenia asking for aid from the CSTO during 2021 and 2022 Azerbaijani incursions against Armenia proper also showed that they still considered the CSTO and Russia to be the main security partner and guarantee for Armenia, who should come to Armenia's aid.

In the third period the deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations and Armenia seeing Russia and CSTO as having failed Armenia became very apparent through Armenian actions. Regarding the CSTO already in November 2022 prime minister Pashinyan refused to sign a CSTO summit

collective security declaration and collective measures to give aid to Armenia, because Armenian views, wishes and needs were not sufficiently addressed. This was followed by Armenia deciding not to send a representative to serve as CSTO deputy secretary general in March 2023 and started boycotting CSTO meetings (Jam-News 2023). Armenia also announced in January 2023 that they refused to host CSTO military exercises in Armenia in the 2023 (ibid.). In October 2023, Armenia additionally decided not to take part in CSTO military exercises in Kyrgyzstan. Ultimately, Armenia even made the decision to freeze Armenian participation in the CSTO in February 2024 and refused to finance CSTO in May 2024 (Jam-News 2024). All these steps show growing Armenian frustration with the CSTO and Russia and seeing them as not being functional anymore in providing Armenia security guarantees.

Similar developments were also happening in the Russian-Armenian bilateral relations, but concrete policy actions started later than with the CSTO. When the United Nations held a vote on a resolution in February 2023, which demanded that Russia withdrew its troops from Ukraine, Armenia abstained. Taking into consideration the allied relations between Armenia and Russia it would be expected that Armenia would vote against the resolution, but with its abstention Armenia showed that it remains neutral in the case of Russian aggression war in Ukraine, as did Russia in the case of Nagorno Karabakh. This was accompanied by prime minister Pashinyan's wife Anna Hakobyan visiting Ukraine to Summit of First Ladies and Gentlemen in September 2023, where she met Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky and his wife Olena Zelenska, which is a subtle show of support to Ukraine. In March 2024 Armenia also decided to block Russian TV programs in Armenia as an answer to constant anti Armenian government comments made there. Furthermore, Armenia asked in March 2024 Russia to remove Russian border guards from Yerevan airport and in May asked Russia to withdraw its border guards on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border (The Moscow Times 2024). This shows clearly that Armenia does not consider Russian security guarantees to be of use and that Armenia is distancing itself from Russia and that they do not see themselves as being faithful allies to Russia anymore. Furthermore, Armenia decided in 2023 to ratify the Rome Statute and become part of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued an arrest warrant for Russian president Vladimir Putin (ibid.). This means that when president Putin would visit Armenia, Armenia would have the obligation to arrest him and turn him over. To top all this off, prime minister Pashinyan refused to take part in Putin's inauguration in May 2024, deciding to meet Putin a few

days after that. The visit shows however that Armenia still tries to have some relations with Russia.

There were numerous policy actions that pointed towards closing relations between the EU and Armenia. Generally, Armenia continued cooperation with the EU in all formats throughout the time period – most importantly in the context of EU’s Eastern Partnership format. In March 2021 the European Union – Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which was signed in 2017 came into force. The agreement is an alternative to the Association Agreement, which was not signed in 2013 after the negotiations for the Association Agreement had already finished, because of Armenia’s sudden U-turn and decision to join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic. CEPA’s purpose is to further EU-Armenian cooperation therefore shows a turn towards more cooperation with the EU. This also coincides with the role of being a bridge, since Armenia strengthened its ties with the EU, but also at the same time remaining part of the EAEU. This was accompanied by Armenia turning towards the EU for mediation in their conflict with Azerbaijan after the Second Karabakh War. Furthermore, the EU and Armenia had a new EU-Armenia Political and Security Dialogue in Yerevan in January 2023 with the goal of deepening cooperation and dialogue between the two sides in foreign- and security policy (EUNeighboursEast 2023). The second meeting under this new forum took place in November 2023. Creating a new forum to develop cooperation shows Armenia’s willingness to become as close to the EU as possible also in regard to the spheres of foreign- and security policy, which were traditionally the spheres where cooperation with Russia was prioritized. The most apparent turn towards the EU and away from Russia is Armenia accepting the deployment of EU Monitoring Capacity (EUMCAP) on the Armenian side of the border with Azerbaijan in 2022, despite the CSTO offering a monitoring mission to be deployed (OC-Media 2023). The EU monitoring mission was also widened in December 2023 and became EU Mission in Armenia (EUMA). This move aligns with Armenia seeing the European Union as becoming more active in the region and ultimately also becoming a security guarantor for Armenia. At the same time, although Armenia’s role conceptions reveal their wish of having as close relations to the EU as the EU deems possible, as well as having EU aspirations, they did not apply to join the EU as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia did. This process would also be more complex for Armenia because they would have to leave the EAEU first and therefore this may not have been possible as quickly.

While Armenia refused to hold military exercises under the auspices of CSTO, they did hold small-scale military exercises together with the US in Armenia in September 2023 (Reuters 2023). Holding exercises with USA and not with Russia is a strong signal by Armenia, that they do not want to strengthen their cooperation with Russia and are instead turning towards the West. Similarly, while Armenia was complaining that they had not receive the weapons that they ordered from Russia after the 2020 war, France stepped up and announced in October 2023 that they will sell military equipment in the form of armoured personal carriers and air defence radars to Armenia to help strengthen their defence against Azerbaijan. Furthermore, various media outlets have reported that Armenia has signed military contracts worth over 400 million dollars with India to buy military equipment and weaponry (Azatutyun 2023). This illustrates that Armenia is looking towards other actors for security cooperation and is diversifying its relations in the military-technical field in accordance with its role as being independent. In general, maintaining relations with both the West and also Russia aligns with Armenian role of being independent, as is developing further relations with the EU and USA, since they acknowledged that their dependence on Russia was too strong, these steps are therefore crucial to become independent from Russia.

Part of Armenian role of being a peaceful democratic country and also independent is Armenia sending aid to Turkey after the devastating earthquake in February 2023. Armenia sending Turkey both humanitarian aid and rescuers illustrates that it is trying to cooperate also with its adversaries and that it takes humanitarian issues seriously.

Part of its role enactment of being a bridge is Armenia continuing to trade with both Russia and the EU and furthering economic relations with both blocks. Also, its role of being a bridge between the EAEU and Iran was strengthened when the EAEU, Armenia included, signed a temporary free trade agreement with Iran in 2019 and replaced it with a full agreement in in December 2023.

Regarding the role of genocide preventer Armenia being active when it comes to prevention of genocide is part of the role. Accordingly, Armenia has been supportive and active of the UN adopting resolutions on the prevention of Genocide, which were adopted in 2018, 2020 and 2022. Armenia also initiated and organized global forums against the crime of genocide in Armenia in 2018 and 2020. As genocide preventer with regards to Nagorno-Karabakh becomes

apparent by Armenia appealing to the United Nations Security council numerous times and also suing Azerbaijan in the International Court of Justice for ethnic cleansing. Although Armenia did not send troops to help Nagorno-Karabakh after the Second Karabakh War, they did provide refuge to the fleeing Karabakhi-Armenians and were the ones negotiating on their behalf with Azerbaijan.

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to determine Armenian role conceptions and expectations in the period of 2018-2024 and how the three events – The Velvet Revolution, The Second Karabakh War and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh – which can be considered as critical junctures impacted them. The theoretical framework of the study was role theory, according to which states conceptualize roles for themselves based on their capabilities and place in the international system while simultaneously taking into consideration other states' expectations of them. These roles determine countries' foreign policy actions, since they provide an anchor point for decision makers. Therefore, roles are relatively stable constructs, but at the same time bound to be changing since they emerge in interaction with others and especially in crisis situations. From the theoretical perspective the study also assessed how dynamic or static roles are in general since role change is most likely to occur in situations of internal or external shocks. The hypothesis of the study was that the three critical junctures and especially the Second Karabakh War induced role change and resulted in a U-turn in Armenian roles in relation to Russia and the EU/West. To test this hypothesis qualitative content analysis of a specified corpus of statements, speeches, comments and interviews of the foreign minister and the prime minister were analysed.

In the first time period, the study found that Armenia is a faithful ally of Russia and a committed member of Russian-led integration projects, such as the EAEU, where Armenia took on a role of integration facilitator and CSTO, where it saw itself as being a loyal partner. In this context Armenia constantly emphasized that Armenia's foreign political stance remains stable in its relations to Russia. According to its roles, Armenia had many visits to and supported Russia in Syria by sending humanitarian aid and a demining mission. These roles continued in the second time-period, but due to the Second Karabakh War the security dimension of the relations became increasingly important. Therefore, Armenia saw Russia as being the main mediator in the conflict and together with the CSTO being its security guarantors or protectors and itself the protectorate, since Armenia believed that CSTO and Russia would provide aid if Armenia proper were to be attacked and due to Russian peacekeepers providing security to the Karabakhi-Armenians. Turning towards Russia for mediation is the means in which Armenia enacted its role. In the third period, however, while Armenia communicated that they are not cutting ties to Russia completely, the failing security guarantees had led to increasing frustration and disappointment

in Russia and the CSTO. When the relations further deteriorated, Armenia saw Russia even as a threat, since they were supporting anti-government forces. Accordingly, Armenia froze its membership in the CSTO and asked Russia to withdraw its border guards from Armenia.

Armenia considered itself to be a European democracy throughout the time period. After the velvet revolution it viewed itself also as a revolutionary democracy, but this revolutionary language faded. Armenia considered the EU and Western countries to be its main partners in democracy promotion and reform process, taking on the role of democracy and reform promoters and this role expectation persisted throughout the time period. In the second time period, Armenia tried to position itself as the defender of democracy but dismissed this self-portrayal shortly after the war had ended. From 2023 to 2024 however Armenia communicated that it wants to be as close as possible to the EU and even saw itself as being a possible EU candidacy aspirant. Furthermore, Armenia viewed the EU as being a mediator in its conflict with Azerbaijan and saw the cooperation developing in every sector including security. In this context, Armenia regarded the EU monitoring mission on the borders of Armenia as a first step of the EU becoming its security guarantor or at least a partner. Armenia enacted its role through the CEPA coming into force and accepting the deployment of the EU monitoring mission over CSTO one.

In managing its relations with Russia and the EU/West, Armenia took on the role of being independent. According to this role Armenia is independent in its foreign policy from other actors and develops relations with all partners according to its national interests, therefore adopting the strategy of multi-vector foreign policy. Accordingly, Armenia communicated that it develops relations with both the EU/West and Russia, but also with other powers to balance these relations. This role was one of the dominant ones throughout the whole time period, but became increasingly important in the third time period, when Armenia was moving away from its dependency on Russia, even though due to the increasing Russia-West rivalry this role came under strain. Also, Armenia admitted that it had been dependent on other powers and mostly Russia but wished to become more independent. This role was enacted by Armenia having relations with both the West and Russia and through increasing cooperation in the security field with the EU and other actors.

Armenia recognized however that having relations with both Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union and at the same time also with the European Union granted them opportunities Therefore,

it saw itself as a bridge. It viewed itself as being geographically at the crossroads of East and West, North and South, which provided opportunities mainly concerning economic aspects, but also cooperation in general. Therefore, Armenia saw itself as promoting cooperation between the EU and EAEU, but also between the EAEU and other powers. In the third time period this role had diminished in the sense that furthering cooperation between the EU and EAEU was out of the picture because of the geopolitical situation and Western sanctions against Russia. This, however, did not change Armenia's self-perception as bridge between countries in the region.

A specific role that Armenia has constructed for itself is the role of being a genocide preventer. This is because Armenians experienced genocide in 1915 by the Ottoman Empire and therefore this collective trauma is a big part of Armenian identity. Therefore, Armenia was active in preventing genocide in the whole world through advocating for the genocide convention of the UN, which was the focus in the first time period. In the second and third time periods preventing genocide being committed against the Karabakhi-Armenians and rallying for international engagement in the conflict became the focus, but the international dimension was still there.

The study showed that the role conceptions and expectations of Armenia have been subject to change and therefore the three crises did have an impact on Armenian role conception. However, Armenian roles did not do a complete U-turn, since although the role conceptions and expectations regarding Russia and EU did alter, the overall logic of Armenian role conceptions still fits with the role of being independent, which did not go through significant change, as well as other roles. The change in Armenian roles regarding Russia and the West/EU did not happen directly after the Second Karabakh war, but with some delay in the third time period, when Russian security guarantees were seen as having completely failed after the Azerbaijani incursion to Armenia proper. Therefore, in Armenia's case there was no abrupt changes in the country's roles, but they evolved more gradually and also roles like genocide provider and independent did not go through significant change. Furthermore, some features of the role conceptions and expectations regarding the EU/West and Russia remained unchanged. At the same time, it is possible that Armenia's roles are in the process of changing, which is why a complete change has not yet happened. Therefore, when Armenia was facing a role conflict, Armenia did not go through a complete international orientation or goal change, but went through adjustment change or program change and thus went through role adaptation.

Despite my in-depth analysis of Armenia's recent role conceptions, there are certain limits of this paper, e.g. that only the government's positions were analysed and therefore the internal debates and contestation of roles was not reflected upon. Additionally, by researching not the entire time period but three excerpts, the exact moment of change could not be clearly identified, although it was shown that role change is a gradual process. Further research into how Armenia's role was negotiated and the debates around it is therefore needed in order to understand the internal development of roles. Further studies concerning role change could also be conducted by examining other states' roles amid the situation of ever higher West-Russia contestation in the region such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, but also in Central-Asia. Nevertheless, this paper is valuable in shining a light on Armenia's view of its role in the world and in its relations to Russia and the West under changing geopolitical circumstances and contributed to role theory through researching roles and role change.

Bibliography

Askerov, A.; Ibadoghlu, G. (2023) “The Causes and Consequences of the Second Karabakh War September 27, 2021–November 10, 2021” in Yavuz, M.H.; Gunter, M. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Historical and Political Perspectives”, *Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series*, 245-272.

Beneš, V.; Harnisch, S. (2015) “Role theory in symbolic interactionism: Czech Republic, Germany and the EU” *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(1), 146–165.

Berg, E.; Vits, K (2020) “Transnistria’s European Drive: A Means to What End?” *Geopolitics*, 1-23.

Biddle, B.J. (1986) “Recent Developments in Role Theory” *Annual Review of Sociology* (12), 67-92.

Breuning, M. (2011) “Role theory research in international relations State of the art and blind spots” in Harnisch, S.; Frank, C. and Maull, H.W. “Role theory in International Relations Approaches and analyses” *Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics*, 16-35.

Bulyuk, O.; Shapovalova, N. (2017) ““Veni, Vidi, ...Vici?” EU Performance and Two Faces of Conditionality towards Ukraine” *East European Politics*, 33 (1), 36-55.

Casier, T. (2022) “Why Did Russia and the EU Clash Over Ukraine in 2014, But Not Over Armenia?”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, 74(9), 1676-1699.

Delcour. L. (2021) "From a 'common to a 'contested' neighborhood: Connecting levels of analysis in EU-Russia interaction", in *The Routledge Handbook of EU-Russia Relations*, 392-402.

Delcour, L. & Wolczuk, K. (2018) “Well-Meaning but Ineffective? Perceptions of the EU’s Role as a Security Actor in the South Caucasus”, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 23, 41–60.

Dembińska & Smith (2021) “Navigating in-between the EU and Russia”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 62(3), 247-263.

De Waal, T. (2010) “The Caucasus An Introduction” *Oxford University Press*.

Dunn, K.C; Neumann, I.B. 2016 “Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences “, chapter in Dunn, K.C; Neumann, I.B. “Undertaking Discourse Analysis for Social Research”, University of Michigan Press, 1–16.

Gustavsson, J. (1999) “How We Should Study Foreign Policy Change” *Cooperation and Conflict* 34(1), 73-95.

Grossmann, M. (2005) “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s” *International Politics*, 42, 334-351.

Grossmann, M; Schrotgen, F.; Friedrichs, G.M. (2022) “National Role Conceptions in a New Millennium Defining a Place in a Changing World”.

Götz, E. (2022) “Near Abroad: Russia’s Role in Post-Soviet Eurasia” *EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES*, 74 (9), 1529–1550.

Harnisch, S. (2011) “Role theory: operationalization of key concepts” in Harnisch, S.; Frank, C. and Maull, H.W. “Role theory in International Relations Approaches and analyses” *Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics*, 7-15.

Harnisch, S.; Frank, C. and Maull, H.W. (2011) “Introduction” in “Role theory in International Relations Approaches and analyses” *Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics*, 1-4.

Holsti, K.J. (1970) “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy” *International Studies Quarterly*, 14 (3), 233-309.

Herbut, M. (2017) “The Application of Role Theory in Explaining the Policies of Small States” In Andrzej Czajowski, Renata Kunert-Milcarz, Maciej Herbut book “Georgia and Moldova in the Context of Russian Imperialistic Foreign Policy” 161- 186.

Iskandaryan, A. (2019). “Armenia-Russia Relations: the Revolution and the Map” *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, 109, 2-4.

Le Prestre, P.G. (1997) “Author! Author! Defining Foreign Policy Roles after the Cold War” in Le Prestre, P.G.” Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era”, 3-14.

Le Prestre, P.G. (1997b) “Change and Continuity in Foreign Policy Role Conceptions after the Cold War” in Le Prestre, P.G.” Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era”, 251-262.

Mayring, P. (2000) “Qualitative Content Analysis” *Forum Qualitative Social Research (FQS)*, 1 (2), 1-10.

Minesashvili, S. (2022) “Before and after 2014: Russo-Ukrainian conflict and its impact on European identity discourses in Ukraine”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 1-27.

Makarychev, A. (2014) “Russia, Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership: From Common Neighborhood to Spheres of Influence?” *Insight Turkey*, 16 (3), 181-199.

Nabers, D. (2011) “Identity and role change in international politics” in Harnisch, S.; Frank, C. and Maull, H.W. “Role theory in International Relations Approaches and analyses” *Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics*, 74-92.

Nilsson, N. (2019) “ Role conceptions, crises, and Georgia’s foreign policy” *Cooperation and Conflict*, 54(4), 445-465.

Nygymetova, G. (2020) “Self-presentation in Eurasian Integration: National roleconceptions and public rhetoric in Armenia, Belarus,Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 2010 – 2017” University of Reading, Doctor Thesis.

Odell, J.S. (2001) “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy” *International Studies Perspectives*, 2, 161-176.

Wæver, O. (2002) “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy: Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory”, in Lene Hansen, Ole Wæver “European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States”, Routledge, 20–49.

Wehner, L.E.; Thies, C.G. (2014) “Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles” *International Studies Review*, (16), 411–436.

Wehner, L.E. (2015) “Role Expectations As Foreign Policy: South American Secondary Powers’ Expectations of Brazil As A Regional Power” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 11, 435–455.

- Wehner, L.E.; Nolte, D. (2017) “Role Theory and Geopolitical Thinking in South America” *Power Dynamics and Regional Security in Latin America*, 101-120.
- Ruffa, C. (2020) “Case Study Methods: Case Selection and Case Analysis” in Curini, L.; Franzese, R. “The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations”, (1), 1133-1147.
- Schreier, M. (2012) “Qualitative Content Analysis in Practice” *SAGE Publications Inc.*
- Schreier, M. (2014) “Qualitative Content Analysis” in Flick, U. “The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis” , 170-183
- Siminov, L. M. (2022) “Shifting attitudes towards identity, borders and geopolitical choices: The case of Moldova” *Regional Science Policy & Practice* 15(2), 200-215.
- Terzyan, A. (2017) “The EU vs Russia in the foreign policy discourse of Armenia: the fragility of normative power or the power of Russian coercion?” *Eastern Journal of European Studies*, (2), 185-203.
- Toal, G. (2017) “Near Abroad: Putin, the West, and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus” *New York: Oxford University Press.*
- Torres-Adán, Á. (2021) “Still winners and losers? Studying public opinion’s geopolitical preferences in the association agreement countries (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine)”, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 37(4), 362-382.
- Eurasianet (2019) “Armenia sends military deminers and medics to support Russian mission in Syria”, 08.02.2019, <https://eurasianet.org/armenia-sends-military-deminers-and-medics-to-support-russian-mission-in-syria> (Accessed 12.05.2024)
- Azatutyun (2023) “Another India-Armenia Arms Deal Reported”, 08.11.2023, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32676413.html?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR1cRvGaWP3FfbclY9TL34EtyDgGbBTePpQnvKehVV4ceQOIT9wW2zmn8iE_aem_AYdMUAKeEk6bfrgIpyKSIXze7UXp3pcpUI7aIXP_fc9YQ7imASvxmkcJT5nqCPHW8kuXAw7OLHTVSTjdKktcE-fW (Accessed 12.05.2024)

EUNeighboursEast (2023) “EU and Armenia hold Second Political and Security Dialogue”, 16. November, <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-and-armenia-hold-second-political-and-security-dialogue/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Open Caucasus Media (2022) “Armenia sends troops to quell Kazakhstan protests”, 6. January, <https://oc-media.org/armenia-sends-troops-to-quell-kazakhstan-protests/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Open Caucasus Media (2023) “Armenia refuses CSTO Deputy Secretary General term”, 10. March, <https://oc-media.org/armenia-refuses-csto-deputy-secretary-general-term/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Jam-News (2023) “"Take aid to Armenia off the agenda" - Yerevan's appeal to the CSTO”, 20. November, <https://jam-news.net/armenias-rejection-of-csto-assistance/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Jam-News (2024) “"Belated response": on Armenia's freezing of participation in the Russian-led CSTO bloc” 24. February, <https://jam-news.net/armenias-participation-in-the-csto-is-frozen/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Reuters (2023) “Armenia-US military exercise kicks off near Yerevan”, 11. September, <https://www.reuters.com/world/armenia-us-military-exercise-kicks-off-near-yerevan-us-spokesperson-2023-09-11/> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

The Moscow Times (2024) “Russia Agrees to Remove Some Troops, Border Guards From Armenia”, 9. May, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/05/09/russia-agrees-to-remove-some-troops-border-guards-from-armenia-a85084> (Accessed 19.05.2024).

Analysed Corpus of Texts

Government of Armenia (2020) “National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia”, <https://www.mfa.am/filemanager/security%20and%20defense/Armenia%202020%20National%20Security%20Strategy.pdf> (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Government of Armenia (2021) “Programme of the Government of the Republic of (2021-2026)”, <https://www.gov.am/files/docs/4737.pdf> (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Government of Armenia (2022) “The 2021-2026 Action Plan of the Government of the Republic of Armenia Annex No 1”, <https://www.gov.am/files/docs/4740.pdf>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Government of Armenia (2022) “RATIONALE FOR THE 2021-2026 ACTION PLAN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA”, <https://www.gov.am/files/docs/4901.pdf>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018a) „Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan's statement and answer to the question of a journalist at a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov“, 7. June, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/06/07/fm-russia-asulis/8296>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018b) “Remarks by acting Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at Plenary Session of World Forum for Democracy “Women, security and democratization in the context of multilateralism”, 22. November, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/11/22/fm_coe_speech/8758, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018c) “Opening remarks by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, at High Level Panel on the 70th Anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, 13. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/09/13/fm_un_gen_remarks/8486, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018d) “Statement by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at UNAOC Group of Friends Ministerial Meeting”, 28. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/09/28/fm_unaoc_speech/8589, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018e) “Statement by Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at the 38th Meeting of Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, 27. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/06/27/fm_bsec_statement/8359, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018f) “Remarks by Mr Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at the 10th Informal Dialogue of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Eastern Partnership Countries”, 22. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/06/22/fm_remarks_ep/8345, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018g) “Message of Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on the occasion of the Europe Day”, 29. May, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/05/29/fm-europe-day/8263>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018h) “Remarks of Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on the occasion of the reception dedicated to 100th anniversary of restoration of Georgia's independence”, 25. May, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/05/25/fm-georgia100anniv/8251>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018i) “Comment by Edward Nalbandian, Foreign Minister of Armenia, on the situation on the Line of Contact between Artsakh and Azerbaijan, 23. April, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2018/04/23/statement-fm-artsakh/8148>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018j) “Remarks by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at the joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Germany Heiko Maas”, 29. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/06/29/arm_ger_sp/8371, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018k) “Press Statement by Foreign Minister Mnatsakanyan on the results of the Armenia-EU Partnership Council”, 21 June, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/06/21/fm_statement_brussels/8353, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018l) “Remarks by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at the opening session of the Third Global Forum Against Crime of Genocide“, 10. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/12/10/gf_yerevan_speech/8856, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018m) “Remarks by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Foreign Minister of Armenia, in Eastern Partnership Ministerial meeting in Luxembourg”, 15. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/10/15/fm_eap_speech/8625, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018n) “Joint press statement following the first Partnership Council meeting between the European Union and Armenia”, 21. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/06/21/brussels_joint_statement/8342?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMATAAR15xrM74stWz0bzMEpp, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018o) “Remarks by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on the Occasion of National Holiday of France”, 14. July, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/07/14/fm_france/8398?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMATAAR3Z0iM0rRnUUWO03g4GGxEhCx8vbQPCPyn..., (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018p) “Statement by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at 39th Session of Human Rights Council”, 13. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/09/13/fm_3hrc_statement/8489?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMATAAR1Tzbhuy7IclonY7YhrVkpimDDbxNGo..., (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018q) “Remarks by Edward Nalbandian at the meeting of the Political Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of La Francophonie”, 20. March <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/03/20/fm-apf-speech/8066>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018r) “Statement by Edward Nalbandian, Minister of Foreign affairs of Armenia at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament”, 21. February, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2018/02/21/fm-afet-speech/7958>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018s) “Remarks by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on the outcomes of the meeting with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian”, 28. May, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/05/28/fm-asulis-ledrian/8254>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018t) “Remarks and answers to questions of journalists by Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian at the annual press conference for the diplomatic year 2017 - Part I”, <https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2018/01/29/fm-annual-2017/7907>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020a) “Interview of Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian to "Le Monde" newspaper”, 16. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/12/16/fm_lemonde/10722, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020b) “Op-ed by Varuzhan Nersesyan, ambassador of Armenia to the United States, to the National Interest”, 26. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/06/26/ambassador_usa_oped/10334%20, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020c) “Interview of Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to “Al-Akhbar” newspaper”, 18. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/09/18/fm_al_akhbar/10451, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020d) “Remarks and answer to a question of journalist by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan during the joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Egypt Sameh Shoukry”, 13. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/09/13/fm_shoukry/10442, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020e) “Remarks by Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at Eastern Partnership Foreign Affairs Ministerial video-teleconference”, 11. June, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/06/11/ep/10300>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020f) “Statement by H.E. Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia on the U.S. Independence Day Virtual Celebration July 4th, 2020”, 4. July, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/07/04/fm_statement_usa/10345, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020g) “Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan delivered remarks at “The UN and the regional and sub-regional organizations: the role of the International Organization of La Francophonie” open discussion of the UN Security Council”, 8. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/09/08/fm_oif/10434, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020h) “Interview of the Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to the Interfax News Agency”, 31. August, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/08/31/fm_interfax/10428, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020i) “Interview of the Adviser to the Foreign Minister Ruben Karapetyan to “Lurer” programme”, 10. September, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/09/10/int/10436>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020j) “Interview by Spokesperson of the MFA of Armenia Anna Naghdalyan to online newspaper “Lenta.Ru””, 18. July, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/07/18/armspox-lenta/10385>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020k) “Interview of the Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to “Sky News Arabia””, 19. July, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/07/19/sky_news/10388, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020l) “Minster Zohrab Mnatsakanyan’s interview to “Herankar” programme”, 31. July, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/07/31/fm_herankar/10407, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020m) “Article by Ambassador Tigran Balayan at Diplomat Magazine: Democracy and human rights are important, even during pandemic”, 13. April, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/04/13/armamb-dipmagazine/10211>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020n) “Statement by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, at the 12th Ministerial Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect”, 24. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/09/24/fm_R2P/10459, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020o) “Interview of Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to the Public TV's "Today on Call " program”, 24. April, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/04/24/int_hh/10230, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020p) “Remarks and answers to the questions of journalists by Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan at the joint press conference with the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias”, 16. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/10/16/fm_greece /10533, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020q) “Opening remarks by Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Ara Aivazian at a meeting with journalists following the negotiations with Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov”, 7. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/12/07/fm_moscow_press_conf/10699, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020r) “Opening remarks of the Foreign Minister of Armenia Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and answers to the questions of journalists at the joint press conference of the Armenian and Russian Foreign Ministers”, 12. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/10/12/arm_ru_conf/10518, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020s) “The press statement of the Foreign Minister of Armenia Ara Aivazian for the media representatives during the press conference following the meeting with Foteign Minister of France Jean-Yves Le Drian”, 8. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/12/08/fr_conf/10703, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020t) “Remarks by Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia on the 130th Session Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe”, 4. November, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/11/04/fm_coe_130/10629, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020u) “Statement by Ara Aivazian, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia at the 27th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council”, 3. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/12/03/OSCE_Ministerial/10688, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020v) “Remarks of Foreign Minister of the Republic of Armenia Ara Aivazian at the meeting with Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov”, 7. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2020/12/07/fm_lavrov/10698, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020w) “Brief report on Armenia-EU relations”, 16. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/12/16/Arm_EU/10721, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020x) “Doorstep statement by Foreign Minister of Armenia Ara Aivazian at Armenia-EU partnership council”, 17. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/12/17/fm_eu/10728, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020y) “MFA Spokesperson Statement in response to the statement by the EEAS Spokesperson on the so-called “strikes on the city of Ganja””, 18. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/10/18/st_g/10540, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020aa) “Zohrab Mnatsakanyan’s Interview to Deutsche Welle”, 21. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/10/21/FM_ZM_Deutsche%20Welle/10577, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ab) “Armenian Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan’s interview to Sputnik International”, 1. November, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/11/01/armfm-sputnik/10620>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ac) “Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the occasion of the International Day of Commemoration of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide”, 9. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/12/09/fm_statement/10705, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ad) “Briefing of the Foreign Minister of Zohrab Mnatsakanyan on the results of the statement of Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”, 10. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/10/10/comment_min_cession/10513, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ae) “Interview of Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan to Russian “RBK” news agency”, 13. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/10/13/fm_rbk/10527, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020af) “Zohrab Matsakanyan’s Interview to SkyNews Arabia”, 30. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/09/30/fm_skyarabia/10480, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ag) “Statement of the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the CSTO Victor Biyagov on Azerbaijan's aggression against the Republic of Artsakh”, 29.

September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/09/29/st_csto/10472, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020ah) “Zohrab Mnatsakanyan’s Interview to BBC Newshour”, 29. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2020/09/29/inter_bbc/10473, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021) “Statement for press by Foreign Minister Ara Aivazian following a meeting with Ann Linde, the Foreign Minister of Sweden and OSCE Chairperson-in-Office”, 16. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2021/03/16/FM_OSCE_Chairperson/10843, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023a) “Comment of the Spokesperson of MFA of Armenia regarding the statement of the official representative of the MFA of the Russia”, 31. August, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/08/31/spox_comment/12172, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023b) “Remarks of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the 15th annual Assembly of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum”, 15. November, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/11/15/arm_EaP_CSF/12333, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023c) “In response to media inquiries: comment on the press statement made by the spokesperson of the US State Department on May 30”, 31. May, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/05/31/spox-usa/12032>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023d) “Remarks by the Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the Ministerial Meeting of the Landlocked Developing Countries”, 14. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/12/14/arm_lldc/12421, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023e) “MFA Statement”, 27. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/09/27/MFA_Statement/12243, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023f) “Remarks by the Foreign Minister of Armenia at HRC meeting dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, 4. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/12/04/Mirzoyan_speech/12391, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023g) “Press statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and answers to the questions of journalists during a joint press conference with Catherine Colonna, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of France”, 28. April, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/04/28/fms_arm_fr/11988, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023h) “Press statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and answers to the questions of journalists during a joint press conference with

Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jean Asselborn”, 22. February, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/02/22/fms_armenia_luxembourg/11880, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023i) “Remarks of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and answers to the questions of journalists during a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Croatia Gordan Grlić Radman”, 8. February, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/02/08/fms_armenia_croatia/11856, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023j) “Remarks of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and answers to the questions of journalists during a joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Germany Annalena Baerbock”, 7. February, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/02/07/armenia_germany_pressconference/11852, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023k) “Statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly”, 23. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/09/23/fm_unga/12236, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023l) “Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia at the UN Security Council emergency meeting”, 22. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/09/22/UNSC_Urgent/12225, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023m) “Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the Human Rights Council 52nd Session”, 28. February, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/02/28/Mirzoyan.HRC/11898>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023n) “Remarks by Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan during the 10th Ordinary Session of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly”, 20. February, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/02/20/dfm.euronest/11874>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023o) “Remarks by Foreign Minister of Armenia at the launching conference of the Council of Europe Action Plan for Armenia 2023-2026 “, 16. February, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/02/16/CoE.ActionPlan/11867>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023p) “Remarks by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan for the exchange of views at the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of the European Parliament”, 24. January, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/01/24/fm_mirzoyan_speech_afep/11838, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023q) “Remarks by Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the Special Meeting of OSCE Permanent Council”, 17. January, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/01/17/mirzoyan_speech_osce/11822, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023r) “Remarks of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the Voice of the South Virtual Summit-2023”, 12. January, <https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/01/12/SouthVirtualSummit/11816>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023s) “MFA statement on Azerbaijan's aggression in Nagorno-Karabakh”, 19. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/09/19/MFA_Statement/12203, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023t) “Statement of MFA of Armenia on the actions of Azerbaijan’s armed forces in the direction of Gegharkunik region of Armenia”, 1. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/09/01/MFA_Statement_Sotq/12174, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023u) “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia on the abduction of persons transported from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia”, 28. August, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/08/28/arm_az_nk/12164, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023v) “The interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan to the Austrian daily “DerStandard””, 21. July, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/07/21/Mirzoyan_interview/12103, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023w) “Comment of the MFA Spokesperson in response to media inquiries”, 22. June, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/06/22/spox_comment/12057, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023x) “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia”, 29. May, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/05/29/mfa_statement/12029, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023y) “Statement on the outcome of the negotiations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Azerbaijan”, 19. May, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/05/19/statement/12016>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023aa) “Statement of the MFA of Armenia on the 108th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide”, 24. April, <https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/04/24/armeniangenocide/11981>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ab) “The Statement of MFA of Armenia regarding the installation of an illegal checkpoint by Azerbaijan in the Lachin corridor”, 23. April, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/04/23/statement_lachincorridor/11980, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ac) “The interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan to the Egyptian AlQahera News Agency”, 23. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/03/23/mirzoyan_interview_alqahera/11939, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ad) “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia”, 18. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/03/18/mfa_statement/11929, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ae) “Statement of the MFA of Armenia on the disinformation spread by Azerbaijan”, 8. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/03/08/statement_azdisinformation/11912, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023af) “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the massacres of Armenians in Sumgait”, 27. February, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/02/27/statement_sumgait/11888, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ag) “Answers of the Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Vahan Hunanyan to the questions of “Armenpress” News Agency”, 12. January, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/01/12/spox_comment_armenpress/11814, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ah) “Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the 30th OSCE Ministerial Council”, 30. November, https://www.mfa.am/en/speeches/2023/11/30/Mirzoyan_speech/12375, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023aj) “Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Iran and their joint press conference”, 27. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/12/27/armenia_iran/12446, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023ak) “Press statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan and answers to the questions of journalists during the joint press conference with the Foreign Minister of Estonia”, 13. December, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/12/13/Mirzoyan_speech_/12419, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023al) “Press Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan during the joint press conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada”, 25. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2023/10/25/armenia_canada/12297, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023am) “Statement of the MFA of Armenia on the ICJ Order of November 17”, 18. November, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/11/18/mfa_statement/12346, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2023an) “Comment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia on the visit of the delegation led by the UN Resident Coordinator in Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh”, 5. October, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2023/10/05/mfa_comment/12260, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024a) “The One on One interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan to TRT World”, 9. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2024/03/09/Mirzoyan_interview/12542, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024b) “The answers of the Spokesperson of the MFA of Armenia to the questions of "Armenpress" News Agency”, 27. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2024/03/27/spox_comment/12578, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024c) “Statement by the FM of Armenia and answers to journalists' questions during the joint press conference with the FM of Cyprus”, 7. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2024/03/07/armenia_cyprus/12536, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024d) “Press statement of Foreign Minister of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan during the joint press conference with the Foreign Minister of Croatia”, 19. January, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2024/01/19/fm_statement/12457, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024e) “Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Ararat Mirzoyan at the Press Conference with EU HR/VP Josep Borrell”, 13. February, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2024/02/13/press_conference/12491, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2024f) “Statement by the Foreign Minister of Armenia following the meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan”, 18. March, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2024/03/18/arm_kz/12551, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018a) „Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan delivers speech at UN General Assembly“, 26. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/09/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018b) „Nikol Pashinyan meets with Vladimir Putin in Moscow“, 8. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/09/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-met-with-Vladimir-Putin>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018c) “Nikol Pashinyan attends Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting - Armenia takes on EAEU presidency” 6. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/12/06/EAEU-meeting/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018d) ““The government’s task is to transform the political revolution into an economic revolution” - Nikol Pashinyan meets with Armenian community in Saint Petersburg”, 6. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/12/06/Nikol-Pashinyan-Saint-Petersburg-Armenian-Community/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018e) ““The realization of national potential is to be the most important result of our revolution” - Nikol Pashinyan meets with Armenian community representatives in Kazakhstan”, 9. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/11/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-The-Armenian-community-of-Kazakhstan/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018f) “Nikol Pashinyan’s Visit to France Kicks Off: PM laid a wreath at Komitas Memorial and met with Armenian community representatives”, 13. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/09/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-France/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018g) “Nikol Pashinyan attends Foreign Ministry reception on New Year and Christmas”, 25. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/12/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-New-Year-Event-Ministry-of-Foreign-Affairs/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018h) “Nikol Pashinyan receives EU-member states’ ambassadors”, 13. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/11/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-EU-Ambassadors/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018i) “Speech delivered by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan while introducing the Government Program to the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia”, 7. June, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/06/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech-National-Assembly/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018j) “PM Nikol Pashinyan attends Nelson Mandela Peace Summit at UN Headquarters and delivers a speech”, 24. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/09/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018k) “Nikol Pashinyan talks to Al Jazeera”, 27. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2018/07/27/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Al-Jazeera> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018l) “Nikol Pashinyan briefs Carnegie Europe Research Center experts on his vision of Armenia’s development”, 11. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/07/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Karnegi-Europe/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018m) “Nikol Pashinyan attends opening of Eurasian Week international forum-exhibition; PM gets acquainted with the products on display”, 22. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/10/22/Nikol-Pashinyan-participated-Eurasian-week/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018n) ““We must come together at home, reasonably negotiate and find logical solutions to get out of this situation” - Interview by First Deputy Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan to Armenia TV Company”, 20. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2018/04/20/First-Deputy-Prime-Minister-Karen-Karapetyans-interview/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018o) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s press conference in Stepanakert”, 9. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2018/05/09/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyans-press-conference>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018p) “Our goal is to trigger large repatriation, centralize our nation’s human, financial and economic potential in Armenia - PM meets with representatives of Armenian community in Sochi”, 14. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/14/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-visited-Armenian-church/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018q) ““Armenian-Georgian relations will go strengthening ahead” - Prime Minister Pashinyan meets with Armenian community in Tbilisi”, 30. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/30/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-met-with-representatives-of-Armenian-community/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018r) “Memorial plaque commemorating First Armenian Republic’s 100th anniversary inaugurated and official reception held in Tbilisi”, 30. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/30/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-attended-festive-event/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018s) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan visits Georgia’s Samtskhe-Javakheti region”, 31. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/05/31/Prime-Minister-Nikol-Pashinyan-met-with-representatives-of-Armenian-community/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018t) “Nikol Pashinyan congratulates Mamuka Bakhtadze on his election as Prime Minister of Georgia”, 22. June, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/06/22/Nikol-Pashinyan-congratulations/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018u) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s message to 7th Armenian-Russian Interregional Forum participants”, 29. June, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/06/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-message-29.06.18/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018v) “Address by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on the occasion of Independence Day”, 21. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/09/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-congratulatory-message-Independence-Day/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018w) ““Economic development may take place in Armenia if the government and business community establish real partnership” - PM Attends “My Step for Tavush” Investment Forum”, 9. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/09/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-attended-forum/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018x) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Speech at Rally Dedicated to 100 Days in Office”, 17. August, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/08/17/Nikol-Pashinyan-100-day-rally/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018y) ““The logic of charity needs to be replaced with that of labor”- RA Prime Minister Meets with Russia-Based Armenian Businessmen in Moscow”, 8. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/09/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-Meeting-Businessmen/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018aa) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Anyone who may try to ignore the law, the people’s opinion and demands will end up in history’s dump””, 7. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/10/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Ejmiatsin/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ab) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s remarks at homage ceremony for Charles Aznavour”, 9. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/10/05/Nikol-Pashinyan-Charles-Aznavour/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ac) “Statement by RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the opening ceremony of the 17th Summit of La Francophonie”, 11. October, www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/10/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-speech-at-the-17th-Francophone-Summit/, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ad) “Nikol Pashinyan: “We are a country that has its unique place on the global map of information technology”, 29. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/10/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-FAST/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ae) ““We want to do the impossible, since what seems to be impossible will henceforth be possible for us” - Nikol Pashinyan meets with residents of Ashtarak and Aparan”, 21. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/11/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Aragatsotn-Marz-21-11/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018af) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Let no one try to insinuate the idea that we are poor wretch; we are strong: this is the people of Narekatsi, Mashtots, Monte, Marshal Baghramyan and Tigran the Great””, 19. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/11/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Gegharkunik/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ag) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan Presents Priorities of Armenia’s Presidency in EAEU”, 25. January, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2019/01/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-EEU/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ah) “Nikol Pashinyan meets with Vladimir Putin in Moscow”, 27. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/12/27/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting-Vladimir-Putin/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018ai) “Armenian Prime Minister, German Chancellor summarize their talks and answer journalists’ questions”, 24. August, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2018/08/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-Angela-Merkel-press-conference>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2018aj) ““The Government will do everything in its power to protect and promote freedom of speech and freedom of the press” - Nikol Pashinyan holds reception for media representatives on the occasion of New Year and Christmas”, 26. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2018/12/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-New-Year-Event-Media/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020b) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Ruling out any provocation, as well as exchanging the war prisoners and the bodies of victims is a priority”, 2. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech-CSTO-session/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020c) ““I propose that Israel send that aid to the mercenaries and to the terrorists as the logical continuation of its activities,” Prime Minister Pashinyan tells The Jerusalem Post”, 3. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/11/03/Interview-Jerusalem-Post/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020d) ““Every day of continued war will bring frustration to Azerbaijani society,” Nikol Pashinyan tells Al Jazeera”, 1. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/11/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Al-Jazeera/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020e) ““The right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination is of strategic importance to us,” Nikol Pashinyan told TASS news agency”, 19. Oktober, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-TACC/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020f) ““We look forward to seeing the repatriation of the officially approved group of Armenian captives in the nearest future” - PM Addresses the Nation”, 14. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020g) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Armenia is committed to further developing partnership with the EU based on shared democratic values””, 18. June, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/06/18/Nikol-Pashinyan-attends-Eastern-partnership-summit/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020h) ““This is a war declared by dictatorship against democracy” – Armenian Prime Minister’s interview with The Spectator”, 29. September,

<https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/09/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-The-Spectator/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020i) ““Civilization will triumph; a nation that has the will to live cannot miss the victory” - Prime Minister Pashinyan’s interview to France 24”, 4. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-France24/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020j) ““Democracy is a deep-seated value in Armenia: it goes in tune with our people’s perceptions, mentality and culture” - Nikol Pashinyan visits Friedrich Ebert Foundation”, 13. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/02/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020k) ““Armenians are facing an existential threat in Nagorno-Karabakh” – Prime Minister’s Interview with Spanish EFE news agency”, 23. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-EFE/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020l) “Remarks and answer to a question of journalist by Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan during the joint press conference with Foreign Minister of Egypt Sameh Shoukry”, 13. September, https://www.mfa.am/en/press-conference/2020/09/13/fm_shoukry/10442 , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020m) “Prime Minister: “Based on non-discriminatory principles, the single energy market should become a pillar for EAEU integration””, 19. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/05/19/Session-of-the-EEU-Supreme-Council/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020n) ““Azerbaijan cannot force us to make unreasonable and unilateral concessions” – PM Pashinyan attends Eurasian Intergovernmental Council meeting in Minsk”, 17. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/07/17/Nikol-Pashinyan-Eurasian-Intergovernmental-Council/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020o) “Statement by RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at the general debate of the 75th session of the General Assembly”, 25. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/09/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-General-Assembly/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020p) ““The economic forum of October ushered in a new vector in Armenian-German relations” - Nikol Pashinyan, Angela Merkel address mass media representatives”, 13. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/02/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-meet-with-Angela-Merkel/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020q) ““Interaction between Armenia and Artsakh is the key to our people’s security” - The Security Councils of Armenia and Artsakh are holding a joint session in Stepanakert”, 22. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/02/22/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting-Security-Council/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020r) ““We should do our best to expand the scope of Armenia’s friends worldwide” - PM congratulates diplomats on professional day”, 2. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/03/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech-Diplomat-Day/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020s) “The rule of law has opened up new horizons for closer Armenian-Georgian cooperation“, 3. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/03/03/Press-Conference/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020t) ““We must be ready to take advantage of such economic opportunities as may arise in the post-crisis period” - PM Pashinyan attends Eurasian Intergovernmental Council videoconference “, 10. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/04/10/Session-of-the-Eurasian-Intergovernmental-Council/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020u) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Armenia adheres to tactics based on cooperation philosophy””, 14. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/04/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-meeting-EAEU/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020v) “PM Pashinyan reaffirms Armenia’s readiness for close cooperation towards EAEU development”, 4. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-EAEU-speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020w) ““Armenia committed to consistently promoting EAEU’s economic interests on the global market” - PM attends Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting”, 11. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-EAEU-speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020x) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Address to the Nation”, 14. October, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/10/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-message-to-the-nation/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/1/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/10/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-message-to-the-nation/#photos[pp_gal_1]/1/), (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020y) ““The tragedy should not kill us; instead it should save us” - PM Addresses the Nation”, 19. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/12/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-message/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020aa) “PM Pashinyan: “The will to win should tell us that we will not retreat; we will not back down; we will not be broken””, 21. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2020/10/21/Nikol-Pashinyan/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ab) ““If the international community fails to consider the situation accurately, Europe will have to see Turkey in to Vienna” - PM's interview to BILD”, 4. October, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Bild/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/0/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Bild/#photos[pp_gal_1]/0/), (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ac) ““The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has nothing but a peaceful solution, and confronting the aggression will de facto prove it” – PM Nikol Pashinyan’s interview to Al Jazeera”, 3. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/03/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Aljazeera/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ad) ““The international community must intervene as swiftly as possible to prevent the spread of violence” – PM Pashinyan’s interview with Le Figaro”, 2. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Le-Figaro/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ae) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview with BBC World News TV Channel”, 7. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-BBC/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020af) “Prime Minister: “The joint statement provides for the return to their homes for people living in the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh””, 25. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/11/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-TACC/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ag) ““Artsakh is Artsakh with the people living there” - Prime Minister’s interview to the Public TV”, 13. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/11/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ah) ““World War III is on its way in the form of hybrid warfare” – Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview to German ARD TV Channel”, 7. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/11/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-ARD/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ai) “We are not going to repeat the 1938 “Czechoslovakia” concessions to anyone: Nikol Pashinyan”, 30. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/30/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020aj) ““I expect the international community to acknowledge that the principle of “remedial secession” is applicable to Nagorno-Karabakh” - PM gives interview to Indian WION TV channel”, 25. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-WION/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ak) ““We strive to get the international community to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh” - Prime Minister’s Interview to Interfax News Agency”, 22. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/22/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Interfax/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020al) ““The war unleashed by Azerbaijan is a threat to the entire region” – Armenian Prime Minister’s Interview to IRNA”, 21. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-IRNA/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020am) ““In this situation, the Karabakh conflict has one solution: the principle of “remedial secession” – Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview to Liberation”, 16. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/16/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Liberation/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020an) ““The international community should apply the principle of “remedial recognition of independence” for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh” – Prime Minister’s Interview to RTS”, 16. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/16/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-RTS/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ao) “Nikol Pashinyan: “As long as Turkey’s position remains unchanged, Azerbaijan will not stop fighting,””, 13. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Reuters-Interview/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ap) “Yes, the recognition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh can be a way out of this situation” – PM Pashinyan gives interview to German ZDF TV channel”, 10. October, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/10/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/1/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/10/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview/#photos[pp_gal_1]/1/) , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020aq) ““International recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence is a way to prevent the threat of genocide” - Nikol Pashinyan tells La Repubblica”, 9. October, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-La-Repubblica/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/0/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-La-Repubblica/#photos[pp_gal_1]/0/) , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020ar) ““An adequate response in this situation would be for European countries, the international community, individual nations to find strength in themselves, take a decisive step and recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh” -

Nikol Pashinyan tells TV5 Monde”, 8. October, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Tv5Monde/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/0/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Tv5Monde/#photos[pp_gal_1]/0/) , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020as) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Azerbaijan has no longer control of its destiny; Turkey is the decision-maker in Azerbaijani””, . october, [https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Spiegel/#photos\[pp_gal_1\]/0/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/08/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Spiegel/#photos[pp_gal_1]/0/) , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2020at) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Nagorno-Karabakh cannot and will never be part of Azerbaijan; this is evidenced by Azerbaijan’s actions””, 7. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2020/10/07/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-RBK/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021a) ““We will definitely live up to the task, which is to ensure the security of Armenia and Artsakh” - PM Pashinyan’s congratulatory remarks on the occasion of Army Day”, 28. January, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2021/01/28/Nikol-Pashinyan-visit-to-Ministry-of-Defense/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021b) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Interview with Nver Mnatsakanyan”, 23. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2021/02/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Nver-Mnatsakanyan/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021c) “Remarks delivered by PM Pashinyan while presenting the 2020 Government Program Performance Report in the National Assembly”, 14. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2021/04/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021d) “PM Nikol Pashinyan’s Message on Armenian Genocide 106th Anniversary”, 24. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2021/04/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-April-24/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021e) ““We should strive to ensure that the borders between the EAEU states disappear at the digital level” - PM attends Almaty Digital Forum 2021”, 5. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2021/02/05/Nikol-Pashinyan-Almaty-Digital-Forum-2021/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021f) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Armenia prioritizes the development of a common approach to the protection of EAEU internal markets””, 5. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2021/02/05/Nikol-Pashinyan-EAEU-speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021g) “Nikol Pashinyan: “Relations with the Russian Federation will continue to be a priority for Armenia””, 6. April,

<https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2021/04/06/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-RIA-Novosti/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021h) “Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan: Armenia is committed to broad and long-term military-technical cooperation with Russia”, 6. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2021/04/06/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Interfax/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2021i) ““The Origins of the 44-Day War,” an article authored by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan”, 4. January, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2021/01/04/Nikol-Pashinyan-04-01/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023a) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's message about Independence”, 24. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/09/24/Nikol-Pashinyan-messages/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023b) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with The Wall Street Journal”, 25. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-The-Well-Street-Journal/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023c) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s interview to Italian La Repubblica newspaper”, 2. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/09/02/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-La-Repubblica/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023d) “Prime Minister Pashinyan’s interview to AFP”, 21. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/07/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-France-Press-Agence/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023e) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s speech at the European Parliament”, 17. Oktober, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/17/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023f) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview to Public TV”, 11. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/09/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Petros-Ghazaryan/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023g) “Armenia will take measures to launch international mechanisms for the prevention of genocides. Prime Minister”, 16. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/03/16/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023h) “Despite challenges, Armenia consistently continues to implement democratic reform agenda – Prime Minister”, 29. March,

<https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/03/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023i) “Prime Minister's final speech at the discussion of implementation report of the Government's Action Plan 2021-2026 for the year of 2022 in the National Assembly”, 21. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/04/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023j) “Azerbaijan's efforts to turn Nagorno-Karabakh into a new scaffold for Armenians must be stopped. the only way for this is the presence of representatives with a broad international mandate in Nagorno-Karabakh. Prime Minister”, 27. April, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/04/27/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023k) “It is necessary to send an international fact-finding mission to NK and Lachin Corridor. Prime Minister's speech at the CoE summit”, 17. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/05/17/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023l) “The Prime Minister's speech at the discussions of the state budget 2022 annual report in the National Assembly “, 29. May, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/05/29/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023m) “Banning the entry of humanitarian cargo will confirm Baku's intention to commit genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh. prime minister”, 27. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/07/27/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023n) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan refers to the created situation”, 21. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/09/21/Nikol-Pashinyan-21-09-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023o) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview to POLITICO Europe”, 13. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/09/13/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-POLITICO-Europe/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023p) “Euronews interview with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan”, 1. August, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/08/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-Euronews/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023q) “Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan holds press conference”, 25. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/07/25/Nikol-Pashinyan-Press-Conference/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023r) “The international community should take steps to stop the blockade of Nagorno Karabakh. Prime Minister's article for Le Monde”, 24. July, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/07/24/Nikol-Pashinyan/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023s) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with CNN Prima News”, 1. June, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/06/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview-CNN-primanews/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023t) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave a press conference”, 14. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/03/14/Nikol-Pashinyan-Press-Conference/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023u) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's final speech during the discussion of the draft budget 2024 at the National Assembly”, 16. November, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/11/16/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023v) “Motherland is the state. If you love your motherland, strengthen your state. Prime Minister's speech at the discussion of the draft state budget 2024 during the joint session of the National Assembly Standing Committees”, 30. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/10/30/Nikol-Pashinyan-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023w) “As a result of the ethnic cleansing policy implemented by Azerbaijan, the exodus of NK Armenians continues, it is our duty to receive our brothers and sisters with care. Prime Minister”, 28. September, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2023/09/28/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023x) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with Petros Ghazaryan”, 19. December, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/12/19/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Petros-Ghazaryan/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2023y) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview to Public TV”, 10. October, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2023/10/10/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Petros-Ghazaryan/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2024a) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with France 24 TV” 23. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/02/23/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-France-24/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2024b) “Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's interview with British The Telegraph”, 11. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/02/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-British-The-Telegraph/>, (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

[press-conferences/item/2024/02/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-The-Telegraph/](https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/02/11/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-The-Telegraph/) , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2024c) “Prime Minister Pashinyan's interview to the Greek daily Kathimerini”, 26. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/03/26/Nikol-Pashinyan-interview/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2024d) “The Prime Minister refers to the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on the need for closer ties between the European Union and Armenia and a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan”, 14. March, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/statements-and-messages/item/2024/03/14/Cabinet-meeting-Speech/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (2024e) “Prime Minister Pashinyan's interview to the "Security Environment" program of the Public Radio of Armenia”, 1. February, <https://www.primeminister.am/en/interviews-and-press-conferences/item/2024/02/01/Nikol-Pashinyan-Interview-Armradio/> , (Accessed 19. 05. 2024).

Appendices

Appendix 1: Code Frame

Year	Category	Code	Description of Code	No. of Codes	No. of Category
2018	West/EU – democracy and reform promoter	EU Reform Process	European Union assistance in democratic reforms	7	32
		EU Furthering Cooperation	Describing common projects, talking about further cooperation	15	
		SO France	Privileged, value-based relations with France. Part of La Francophonie	5	
		SO USA	Friendly ties with USA, help in reforms	3	
		SO Germany	Germany biggest EU trade partner, exceptional ties	2	
	Revolutionary European Democracy	Revolutionary Democracy	Velvet revolution making AM an exceptional democracy	13	38
		Democratic	General comments about commitment to democracy	8	
		Democratic: peaceful	Being democratic making the country be peaceful	13	
		Part of Europe	Being part of Europe because of its democratic values	2	
		Anti-Authoritarian	Having an anti- authoritarian stance	2	
	Faithful Ally of Russia	RU Faithful Ally	Fraternal-, allied-, strategic-priority relations with Russia	18	33
		Stable	Revolution did not change foreign political stance	10	
		RU Security Partner	Russia being AM security guarantee/partner	2	
		RU Equal	Allied relations based on equality	2	
		RU Economic Partner	Russia being primary economic partner	1	
	EAEU Integration Facilitator	EAEU Further Integration	Showing willingness for further integration, talking about further projects	8	15
		EAEU Active Member	Showing that Armenia is an active member in the EAEU – ready to assume further	7	

			posts		
	Loyal Partner in CSTO	CSTO AM Loyal Partner	Armenia having always adhered to CSTO allied relations	2	3
		CSTO Expecting More from Others	Other countries not showing enough support to AM in conflict with AZ	1	
	Independent	Multivector Foreign Policy	AM being ready to engage with all actors in its relations.	13	40
		Independent	AM being independent in their foreign political decisions	6	
		SO Georgia	Georgia being Armenian valued partner	10	
		Small	Being small, thus needing partners	5	
		SO Iran	Iran being Armenian valued partner	4	
		SO China	Cooperation with China	2	
	Bridge	EAEU cooperation with Iran and 3. countries	Armenia being a neighbour of Iran and acting as a bridge to further relations. Same for Egypt	3	8
		Bridge	Geographic location acting as a bridge between East and West	2	
		Bridge between EAEU and EU	AM being in the EAEU and having good relations with EU – good for trade and enhancing relations	3	
	Genocide Preventer	Genocide Preventer	AM doing work with international partners to prevent genocide	7	7
2020-2021	West/EU – democracy and reform promoter	EU Reform process	European Union assistance in democratic reforms	10	49
		EU furthering cooperation	Describing common projects, talking about further cooperation	7	
		EU/West needs to be more active N-K	Communicating that EU/West has to do more with regards to Nagorno-Karabakh – needs to condemn AZ aggression	10	
		EU Not Security Actor	Describing that EU can not be a security actor	1	

		SO France	Privileged, value-based relations with France, FR mediator. Part of La Francophonie	6	
		SO Germany	Germany biggest EU trade partner, exceptional ties, being a role model for AM	5	
		SO USA	Friendly ties with USA, help in reforms, being a mediator	8	
		NATO political dialogue	AM having political dialogue with NATO - continuing	2	
	European Democracy	Defender of Democracy	Communicating that AM is a democratic country defending against autocracy. Defending European democracy against imperialism/autocracy	16	41
		West: Common Democratic Values	Having common democratic values with EU, its member states and USA	10	
		Democratic: Peaceful	Being democratic and a peaceful country	7	
		Democratic	General comments about commitment to democracy	6	
		Value-Based Foreign Policy	Describing that AM is conducting value-based foreign policy	2	
	Faithful Ally of Russia	RU Faithful Ally	Fraternal-, allied-, strategic-priority relations with Russia	39	42
		RU Economic Partner	Russia being primary economic partner	3	
	Russia – Security Guarantor	RU Security Guarantees	RU being AM primary partner in the security field – describing cooperation. RU coming to help if AM proper would come under attack	37	69
		RU Peacekeepers	RU peacekeepers deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh acting as security guarantors	14	
		RU Military Bases	RU military bases acting as security guarantees	3	
		RU partner in military reform	RU helping AM conduct military reform after the loss of war.	4	
		AM Important for	Communicating that AM and	4	

		RU Security	the Second Karabakh War is important for RU security because of foreign terrorists being deployed on the side of AZ		
		RU needs to do more	RU should help AM more and adopt more specific measure – conduct an anti-terrorist campaign	5	
		Need to reassess role	AM needing to rethink its importance to other actors and reassess the situation after the loss of war	3	
	Russia – Mediator	RU Mediator	RU honouring its alliance through its mediating efforts	20	39
		RU more important than others in Minsk Group	RU being the main mediator and having more leverage than others	19	
	TR trying to oust RU from the Region	TR Geopolitical play	Second Karabakh War being a Turkish geopolitical play aiming to destabilize the region and gaining upper hand	40	48
		TR tries to oust RU from the region	TR geopolitical play being directed towards pushing RU out of the region	4	
		Geopolitically contested	Armenia and South Caucasus being geopolitically contested	3	
		RU Focus on other regions	RU focus being increasingly on other regions	1	
	Independent	Multivector Foreign Policy	AM being ready to engage with all actors in its relations.	12	35
		Small	Small – therefore needing allies	7	
		SO Iran	Iran being Armenian valued partner, who has interest in the stability of the region	4	
		SO Middle East	AM being part of Middle-East and Middle-East having similar problems with Turkey, therefore further cooperation.	6	
		SO Egypt	Egypt being valued partner	5	

			of AM, which is also seeing Turkey's expansionist policies, therefore could act as counter to TR.		7
		SO Greece	Greece also experiencing Turkey's aggression	1	
	Bridge	Bridge	Geographic location acting as a bridge between East and West	3	
		EAEU cooperation with Iran and 3. countries	Armenia being a neighbour of Iran and acting as a bridge to further relations. Same for Egypt	3	
		Bridge between EAEU and EU	AM being in the EAEU and having good relations with EU – good for trade and enhancing relations	1	17
	CSTO – Security Guarantor	CSTO Security Guarantees	AM being part of CSTO acting as a security guarantee – they would help if AM proper were attacked	10	
		CSTO Active Member	AM communicating that it's an active member	5	
		CSTO furthering cooperation	Further cooperation in CSTO needed	2	
	EAEU Integration Facilitator	EAEU furthering integration	Showing willingness for further integration, talking about further projects	33	33
	Genocide Preventer	Genocide Preventer	AM acting as a genocide preventer in case of Nagorno Karabakh – defender, advocate	15	15
2023-2024	West/EU – democracy and reform promoter	EU Reform process	European Union assistance in democratic reforms	11	60
		EU strengthening relation	Communicating that relations with EU are strengthening – stating that AM wants to deepen relations as much as possible	19	
		EU aspirations	Talking about possible AM EU aspirations	4	
		AM EU US cooperation	Talking about AM EU US cooperation	2	
		SO France	Privileged, value-based relations with France, FR mediator. Part of La	5	

			Francophonie		
		SO Germany	Germany biggest EU trade partner, exceptional ties, being a role model for AM	5	
		SO USA	Friendly ties with USA, help in reforms, being a mediator	7	
		Adhering to Western Sanctions	Communicating that AM is adhering to Western sanctions against RU	3	
		EU/West important partner	Communicating that EU/West are important partners for AM	4	
	European Democracy	West: Common Democratic Values	Having common democratic values with EU, its member states and USA	7	28
		Democratic	General comments about commitment to democracy	10	
		Democratic: Peaceful	Being democratic and a peaceful country	5	
		Value-Based Foreign Policy	Describing that AM is conducting value-based foreign policy	2	
		Defending Democracy	AM defending itself and democracy against authoritarian aggressors	4	
	EU – Security Provider	EU Monitoring Mission Provides Stability	Communicating that EU deploying a monitoring mission on the borders of AM provides stability and security. EU becoming active in security field	27	31
		EU Security Cooperation	Security dialogue with EU and general cooperation on security field	2	
		EU need for bolder steps	Communicating that EU needs to do more, as it is also doing in Ukraine – become more active in the region	2	
		NATO cooperation	Continuing dialogue and bilateral programs with NATO	1	
	EU –Mediator	EU Mediator	Communications about EU becoming a mediator between AZ-AM	9	9
	RU Ally	RU Allied	Communicating that they	9	12

		Relations	still allied relations with Russia		
		RU Economic Partner	Russia being primary economic partner	2	
		AM has never betrayed its allies	Communicating that AM has never failed its allies	1	
	Russia – failed ally	RU Tense Relations	Communications which show that relations are tense	7	29
		RU Exiting the Region	Accusing RU for exiting the region	5	
		RU not an Ally regarding UA	Communicating that AM is neutral in the case of Ukraine war	3	
		RU siding with AZ	Accusing RU and RU peacekeepers in siding with Azerbaijan	4	
		RU meddling in AM internal affairs	Accusing RU of trying to meddle in AM internal affairs and toppling the government	7	
		RU reactions a disappointment	Communicating that they are disappointed in RU	2	
		Putin might be arrested	Not ruling out the arrest of Putting after ratifying ICC	1	
	Russia – failed Security Guarantor	RU Peacekeepers not Functioning	Communicating that RU peacekeepers have failed	22	51
		RU Security Guarantees not functioning	Communicating that RU security guarantees in general have failed – incursions against AM proper	21	
		Security Dependency on RU a mistake	Communicating that being dependent on RU in the security field was a mistake	6	
		RU improving Security cooperation	Communicating the need to further security cooperation	2	
	Russia –failed Mediator	RU Mediation a Failure	Communicating that RU mediation was a failure	2	2
	CSTO – failed Security Guarantor	CSTO Security Guarantees not Functioning	Communicating that CSTO security guarantees in general have failed – incursions against AM proper	21	33
		CSTO left AM	Accusing CSTO of abandoning AM	6	

		CSTO Improving Collective Defence	Communicating the need to further cooperation and collective defence mechanisms	6	
	Bridge	Bridge	Geographic location acting as a bridge between East and West, North and South	2	7
		Promoter of Integration	Promoting integration projects in the region, opening transport routes	5	
	EAEU integration facilitator	EAEU furthering integration	Showing willingness for further integration, talking about further projects	3	3
	Independent	Multivector Foreign Policy	AM being ready to engage with all actors in its relations. Balancing and diversifying its relations.	31	73
		Dependent on Foreign Actors	Describing that AM has been to dependent on other foreign actors and especially Russia	11	
		Independent from other actors	Communicating that AM is independent from other actors	9	
		Becoming independent from RU	Communicating that AM is trying to become independent from RU in the field of security	5	
		Regional focus	Communicating that AM is focusing on other regional actors not West/RU	6	
		SO Iran	Iran being Armenian valued partner, who has interest in the stability of the region	4	
		SO Egypt	Egypt being valued partner of AM, which is also seeing Turkey's expansionist policies, therefore could act as counter to TR.	2	
		SO Georgia	Georgia being Armenian valued partner	1	
		SO Greece	Greece being valued Armenian partner	1	
		SO India	Communicating that it is developing relations with India	1	

		Not part of RU-West rivalry	Saying that it does not take part in RU-West rivalry	2	
	Changing geopolitical situation	Changing geopolitical situation	Communicating that the geopolitical situation has change for Armenia and the region	11	24
		Caught in Geopolitical Rivalry between RU-West	Communicating that AM is caught in RU-West rivalry	7	
		UA War impacts	Communicating that Ukraine war has had impacts on the region	6	
	Genocide Preventer	Genocide preventer	Communicating that AM is trying to prevent genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh and internationally	22	43
		Left Alone by International Community	Communicating that AM was left alone by the international community in the case of AZ aggression and Nagorno-Karabakh	7	
		Expects International reaction	Communicating that an international intervention is needed to prevent Genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh	10	
		West should be more involved	Communicating that West needs to put more attention towards Nagorno-Karabakh and do more to prevent genocide	4	

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Christopher Aloe, 39612151417, herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created by me „Dynamics of Armenia’s Role Conceptions and Expectations 2018-2024: Navigating EU-Russia Contestation“, supervisor Eiki Berg,

- reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digitalarchives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1;
- I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.