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**Political Subjectivity: Discourse of Democracy in Estonia,  
Created in Focus Groups and Tested by Q-methodology**

Master's Thesis

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## Ülevaade

Käesolevas magistritöös kasutati fookusgrupi intervjuu meetodit ja Q-metodoloogilist faktoranalüüsi, et uurida **poliitilist subjektiivsust**. Uurimistöö eesmärk oli kirjeldada võimalikke demokraatia diskursusi Eestis ning see sai võimalikuks tänu projektile Tartu Ülikooli politoloogia osakonnas. Käesolevas töös on siiski esitatud ainult autori enda läbiviidud tegevused.

*Politoloogiliselt* vaadatuna kuulub Eesti riikide hulka, mida tuntakse demokratiseerumise kolmanda lainena ja mis sai võimalikuks tänu Nõukogude Liidu kokkuvarisemisele, 1990. aastate lõpus saavutatud iseseisvusele ning järgnenud kiiretele muutustele, mida hakati nimetama siirdeks. Täna näitavad erinevad demokraatia mõõdikud, et kõik tollal siirderiikideks nimetatud ei ole olnud samavõrd edukad ja/või järjekindlad demokraatliku korra kindlustamisel, kuid kahtlemata saab rääkida ulatuslikust nihkest poliitilises, õiguslikus, majanduslikus ja muudes mõtlemis- ja käitumisviisides.

Inspiratsioon käesolevas töös kirjeldatud uurimuseks tuli John S. Dryzeki ja Leslie T. Holmesi poolt läbi viidud tööst, mis uuris kolmeteistkümne postkommunistliku riigi demokraatia diskursusi, ning kvalitatiivsest konstruktsionistlikust raamistikust lähtudes hakati otsima vastuseid uurimusküsimustele: a) millised on Eesti erinevad demokraatia diskursused? b) kuidas Eestis demokraatiat nähakse ja sellest kõneldakse? c) millised inimesed peituvad leitavate diskursuste taga? ning d) kuhu paigutuvad Eesti diskursused Dryzek-Holmesi uurimuse tulemuste taustal?

Neile küsimustele vastuste leidmiseks viidi esmalt üle Eesti läbi kümme nii eesti- kui venekeelset **fookusgrupi intervjuud**, mis lindistati, transkribeeriti ning koguti neist umbes 400 väidet Eesti demokraatia kohta. Need kodeeriti viieteistkümnesse kategooriasse vastavalt poliitilise diskursuse analüüsil põhinevale maatriksile, ning valiti välja kuuskümmend. Hoolikalt valitud vastajatel paluti seejärel seada need väited pingeritta vastava raamistiku alusel, ning viimaks analüüsiti saadud andmeid **Q-metodoloogilist faktoranalüüsi** kasutades.

Selle tulemusena olid vastused uurimusküsimustele järgnevad:

**a)** Faktoranalüüs tõi päevavalgele kolm üksteisest eristuvad faktorit, mida interpreteeriti kui Eestis esinevaid demokraatia diskursusi ning mis nimetati vastavalt *Elitismi hukkamõistuks*, *Idealistlikuks intellektuaalsuseks* ja *Positiivseks arenguks vaatamata minevikule*. Esimene neist eristus terava kriitika poolest, mõistes hukka nii paregusi poliitilisi kui ka majanduslikke arenguid. Siiski ei esinenud selles otsest demokraatiavastasust. Teised kaks diskursust on slegelt positiivsed, kuid *Idealistlik intellektuaalsus* torkab silma oma naivistliku, filosoofilise ja ebapraktilisusega, samas kui *Positiivne areng vaatamata minevikule* kirjeldab arvamusi, mis on märksa põhistatumad, kirjeldades Eesti demokraatiat kui protsessi minevikust tulevikku.

**b)** Olulisena ja mõnevõrra ohtlikuna terves demokraatia diskursuses tuleb märkida kahte aspekti. Esiteks kipub eestimaalaste demokraatiakeeles puuduma tegutseja – erilisi rolle ei omistata ei tavainimestele ega ka poliitilistest tegutsejatele, mistõttu jääb mulje, justkui oleks eestimaalased kustutanud iseennast valimist *demos + cratos*. Teiseks ei ole väidete sorteerimisel osalenud eriti seostanud ennast ka nende väidetega, mis otseselt määratlesid demokraatiat selle kaudu, mis ta on või ei ole. Seega on põhjust karta teatavat identiteedikriisi Eesti demokraatias, kuna selle mõiste taga ei tundu olevat muud kui rida eetilisi-moraalseid omadusi, mida aga kellelegi pole võimalik omistada.

**c)** Kuigi uurimuse raames ei viidud läbi spetsiaalset sotsio-demograafilist analüüsi, lubab osalenute koodnimetuste süsteem teha järgmisi järeldusi. *Elitismi hukkamõist* esindab i) nooremapoolseid, keskmisest haritumaid ja heal järjel venekeelseid elanikke, kelle kriitikapõhjuseks võib pidada laiemat muret rahvuskaaslaste ebasoodsa olukorra pärast Eesti ühiskonnas; ning ii) vanemapoolseid, madalama sissetuleku ja haridustasemega estikeelseid naisi, kelle kriitiline meel võib pärineda tugevalt arenenud õiglustundest, mida vürtsitavad madalast elustandardist tulenevad isiklikud raskused. *Idealistlik intellektuaalsus* kajastab eelkõige keskmisest suurema sissetulekuga eestlasi ja venelasi, kes ilmselgelt on praeguse olukorra ja arengutega rahul ning ehk üldistavad omaenda rahulolu ka teistele. *Positiivne areng vaatamata minevikule* on puhas eesti diskursus, hõlmates vanemaid põlvkondi, kes isiklikust elukogemusest lähtuvalt on teinud otsuse praeguse süsteemi kasuks.

d) Dryzek ja Holmes pakuvad oma töös välja kaks taksonoomiat. Esimesse paigutub eesti oma demokraatia diskursuste poolest üsna kenasti – eesrindlikku gruppi koos Tšehhi ja Poolaga. Teise puhul, mis püüab diskursuste põhjal kaardistada riikide edasised võimalikud arengusuunad, ei ole aga nii kerge liigitada Eesti diskursusi liberaalset, vabariikliku, osaluslikku või tugeva riigi teed järgivaks. Kui *Elitismi hukkamõist* esindab ehk kõige paremini tugevat riiki ja sellest lähtuvat korda eelistavat suunda, siis *Idealistliku intellektuaalsuse* võimalikuks suunaks nimetati hoopis *absentism*, mis õigustab eemalejäämist ühiskonnaelu korraldamisest (kuid ei võta arvesse sellele järgneda võivaid eliitide võimumänge) ning diskursusele *Positiivne areng vaatamata minevikule* arengusuund nimega *progressiivne enesesäilitus*, mis hõlmab endas nii pidevat arengut paremuse suunas kui demokraatia fatalistikku enesesäilitamisvõimet.

Üldised järeldused uurimustöö lõppedes olid järgnevad:

- Kuigi kvalitatiivne analüüs ja poliitilise subjektiivsuse uurimine ei ole veel politoloogias oma kohta leidnud, võivad nad avada hoopis uusi huvipakkuvaid dimensioone ning on seega väärt katsetamist.
- Demokraatia on küll igivana mõiste, kuid selle aktuaalsus ja tähenduste erinevus ajastust ajastusse kinnitab vajadust objektiivselt mõõdetavate suuruste kõrval uurida lähemalt ka tähendusi, konnotatsioone ja keelt, mida sellega seoses kasutatakse.
- Käesoleva töö metodoloogilist lähenemist ega ka tulemuste tõlgendusi ei maksa mingil juhul käsitleda kui valmis ja soovituslikku paketti subjektiivsuse uurimiseks mistahes valdkonnas, vaid see peaks pigem andma uusi ideid, millega mängida.

**Keywords:** political subjectivity, Q-methodology, focus group interview, democracy.

## Table of Contents

<b>Ülevaade</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Problem-setting, Literature Overview</b>	<b>11</b>
<i>1.1. The Problem – What is Democracy?</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>1.2. Studying Discourse in Transition</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>1.3. Studying Political Subjectivity</i>	<i>18</i>
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>19</b>
<i>2.1. Philosophical Viewpoint – Social Constructionism</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>2.2. Method of Phase One – Focus Group Interviews</i>	<i>23</i>
<b>2.1.1. Moderating</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>2.1.2. Questions</b>	<b>25</b>
<i>2.2. Method of Phase Two – Q-methodology</i>	<i>26</i>
<b>2.2.2. Fundamentals of Q-methodology</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>2.2.3. Applications of Q-methodology</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>3. Phase One – Data Creation</b>	<b>30</b>
<i>3.1. Assembling Focus Groups</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>3.2. The Interviews</i>	<i>32</i>
<b>3.2.1. Introduction to the Topic</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>3.2.2. Location, settings</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>3.2.3. Atmosphere</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>3.2.4. Feedback from Participants</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>4. Phase Two – Data Testing</b>	<b>36</b>
<i>4.1. Coding the Focus Group Transcripts</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>4.2. Compiling the Q-Sample of Statements</i>	<i>39</i>
<i>4.3. Analyzing Individual Q-sorts</i>	<i>40</i>
<b>4.3.1. Selecting subjects</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>4.3.2. Analyzing data</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>4.3.2. Unexpected feedback</b>	<b>42</b>

<b>5. Results and Discussion</b>	<b>43</b>
5.1. <i>Data from Q-analysis</i>	44
5.2. <i>Discourse One – Condemnation of Elitism</i>	47
5.3. <i>Discourse Two – Idealistic Intellectuality</i>	49
5.4. <i>Discourse Three – Positive Development Despite the Past</i>	51
5.5. <i>Prospects for Estonian Democracy</i>	53
<b>5.5.1. Dryzek-Holmes’ four roads</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>6. Conclusions</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>Appendices</b>	<b>63</b>
<i>Appendix 1: Focus Group Question Routes (in Estonian)</i>	64
<i>Appendix 2: Focus Group Question Routes (in Russian)</i>	65
<i>Appendix 3. Focus Group Feedback Form (in Estonian)</i>	66
<i>Appendix 4. Focus Group Feedback Form (in Russian)</i>	67
<i>Appendix 5: Coding Matrix</i>	68
<i>Appendix 6: Q-Sample of Statements (in Estonian)</i>	69
<i>Appendix 7: Q-Sample of Statements (in Russian)</i>	71
<i>Appendix 8: Instructions (Estonian version)</i>	73
<i>Appendix 9: Instructions (Russian version)</i>	77

## Introduction

Estonia belongs to the group of countries which in Political Science are generally referred to what Samuel P. Huntington called the third wave of democratization<sup>1</sup>. The creeping collapse of the Soviet Union being the main trigger, the democratic processes in these countries began to take shape in the middle or late 1980s, resulted in (re)gaining independence in the early 1990s and were followed by a phase of rapid and overall societal, political and economic change known as the transition.

Different **measures of democracy** tell us now that not all of the third wave countries have been similarly successful and/or consistent in adopting and consolidating the democratic ways of running a society, but generally speaking it is appropriate to talk about a shift in political, legal, economic ways of thinking and acting.

With all the countries in question operating as perfect experimental laboratories, such an intensive change during so short a period turned out to be an unexpectedly juicy topic of research for all social scientists, creating a new study area called transitology. The changes in these laboratories, however, **started to differ** very shortly after „ready-steady-go“, so all sorts of different measures of and criteria for democracy started to hover about, each of them trying to **can the meaning** behind the term more objectively and accurately than the rest. Fifteen years later we are left with 500+ definitions of democracy, and thousands, if not millions of pages have been and are being written to describe the phenomenon, the process and its key elements.

In the face of the observed clash of civilizations (again, a term first used in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993<sup>2</sup> and popularized in his famous book in 1996 by Samuel P. Huntington<sup>3</sup>), the **meaning of democracy** is growingly puzzling everyone who happens to have given a thought to it, as well as different attempts to export and plant it all over the world into different countries and cultures. Freedom, liberty, human

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<sup>1</sup> **Huntington, S. P.** (1991). *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Harvard University Press.

<sup>2</sup> **Huntington, S. P.** (1993). „The Clash of Civilizations?“ *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, Vol. 72 Issue 3, p. 22-49.

<sup>3</sup> **Huntington, S. P.** (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

rights, equality, tolerance, peace – these are some of the most general ideas usually connected to the **idea of democracy**, and surely everyone appreciates them. But why is it then that people around the globe understand them so differently from each other?

As it becomes clear from the Chapter 1.1., the main emphasis on trying to study democracy in post-transitional third wave countries has been through minimalist comparative perspective. The data collected is processed and analyzed to test the hypotheses raised by researches who are mainly looking for answers to questions *what?* and *how much?* Little attention has been paid to the meaning of democracy in those labs, in the heads and hearts of people who actually live it out every day of their lives and make the thing real by doing so.

That was, however, what John S. Dryzek of the Australian National University and Leslie T. Holmes of the University of Melbourne set out to do in their ambitious study *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourse Across Thirteen Countries*, first published in 2002.<sup>4</sup> Their standpoint was that democracy is **not** just a matter of constitutions, parliaments, elections, parties, the rule of law and other phenomena which can easily be **formally** established and run, and therefore objectively and quantitatively measured and analyzed. Instead, to understand how democracy works, one also has to attend to **qualitative and subjective** issues of what people make of it.

So they aimed at mapping the way democracy and democratization are thought about and lived by people in the post-communist world (China, Yugoslavia, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechia), including the people for whom the term *democracy* might have negative connotations, using qualitative techniques to gather and analyze the first-hand data, and later on give it a final touch via Q-methodological factor analysis.

In each of the thirteen cases, they tried to find the dominant discourses of democracy and explore the probable and possible implications these might have to trajectories of political development, because, in their words, political development and discourses interact with each other. They were not interested in testing and developing any grand

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<sup>4</sup> Dryzek, J. S., Holmes, L. T. (2002). *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourse Across Thirteen Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



theories for democratization, they focused on interpretation and (re)construction instead. They believe that in the discourses of today one can find the interpretations of the past and possibilities for the future.

Dryzek's and Holmes' study was a source of inspiration in trying to map the possible discourses of democracy in Estonia. A research project was launched in the Department of Political Science of Tartu University which this thesis is an account of. The account is not complete, though, because it captures only the steps of research carried out by the author in person. Therefore, the reader will not find a detailed overview of the focus group interviews with Russian-speaking participants, for example, although data presented by them is included in the final analysis. Neither does it include more detailed socio-demographic analysis of the individuals behind each of the discourse found, although some conclusions are drawn.

Ambition of the thesis is two-fold. Besides mapping the discourses of democracy in Estonia, great interest lied in testing out the methodology used by Dryzek and Holmes, since it – **the Q-methodology** – was promised to function very well as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative analysis, as well as means for testing the former. Therefore, the data was created in two phases. Firstly, **focus group interviews** were conducted all over Estonia which were then coded and analyzed to be used in the *more quantitative* Q-analysis. **Several questions rose** in all of the phases (coding the focus group interview transcripts, compiling the Q-sample, analyzing the Q-sorts) which all have been elaborated on in the respective chapters. In some cases, the initial Dryzek-Holmes way of doing things was changed, in some cases left unchanged, leaving plenty of puzzles to ponder about **for the next generations of researchers of subjectivity**.

It should also be noted that the research presented here was carried out a couple of months after the hotly debated presidential elections of August 2006 and several months prior to the general elections of March 2007. **A wave of fierce political events** was sweeping over Estonia at the time of the completion of this thesis which, however, find no special mention here – the results interpreted here are **solely** based on the data gathered and all the possible changes and re-evaluations are left to the future studies of the kind.

As for the **structure of the thesis**, Chapter 1 aims at giving an overview of how democracy is generally viewed and approached by various modern day renowned classics, as well as how the *objective* studies of the political realm could be accompanied by studies of subjectivity. Chapter 2 is devoted to explaining the theoretical-philosophical viewpoint to put the reader in the proper mindset for understanding the research questions presented and gives a detailed description of the methods used to find answers to them. Chapter 3 describes the process of data creation via focus group interviews, while Chapter 4 focuses on preparing, collecting and analyzing the data, using Q-methodology. Chapter 5 presents the new results of the final analysis in discussion with the existing information, while Chapter 6 concludes the topic.

The list of References has been included, as well as Appendices with all the materials which were created during different phases of the research and which even further convey the idea of what was done and how the results presented here were reached at.

Finally, **special thanks** are in order. Firstly, I am indebted to Vello Pettai, Professor of Comparative Politics at the Department of Political Science at Tartu University, for having introduced me to the topic in the first place. Secondly, special thanks to Rune Holmgaard Andersen, without whose assistance in recruiting, organizing, managing and analyzing the focus group interviews I would have ended up in a chaos.

I am also grateful to all of those who helped with finding contacts all over Estonia, especially to Urve Toots, Ravil Khair Al-din, Hanno Luukas, Tiina Ulm, Margus Martin, Teele and Toomas Nigola, and Erge Kalbus. Also, special thanks to all of those who participated in both data creation and data testing – without their willingness and alertness I would not have got very far indeed.

Many thanks also to Kadri Aas who stepped in at a crucial point to put an order into the numbers in my head, and finally and most importantly to my supervisor Judit Strömpl whose influence goes far beyond the covers of this thesis.

## 1. Problem-setting, Literature Overview

### 1.1. The Problem – What is Democracy?

It is a well-known fact that the term “democracy” was coined in ancient Greece. In the beginning, though, *cratos* by *demos* functioned somewhat differently from what we are used to in modern times. For example, in Athenian democracy taking shape by the mid-sixth century BC,<sup>5</sup> the government offices were filled with ordinary citizens through allotment, and all citizens were included to and eligible to speak and vote in the Assembly which set the laws. In both theory and practice, it was exclusive, rather than inclusive in several ways<sup>6</sup> – in addition to underaged, women, slaves and non-residents had no political rights and were thus excluded from the citizenry. In Roman Republic, the votes of the wealthy and the nobility had also more weight than of the ordinary citizens, making the Roman democracy oligarchic by today’s categorization.<sup>7</sup>

The Middle Ages saw the rise of several systems, also oligarchic in nature, which involved either assemblies or elections or both, but still a minority of a population was engaged (elections of King Gopala in Bengal, assemblies such as Althing in Iceland, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Veche in some Slavic countries, Sakai in Japan, Tings in Scandinavia).<sup>8</sup> One of the modern day examples of a parliamentary democracy, the Parliament of England, has its roots in the Magna Carta Libertum, issued in 1215, which is considered one of the most important legal documents in the history of democracy, because it limited the power of the king and led to the rule of constitutional law.<sup>9</sup>

Although the political ideals of the classical Greek democracy – equality, liberty, rule of law – have shaped the Western political thinking ever since, its legacy did not escape criticism by thinkers of the time. Aristotle (384–322 BC) was one of the first scholars to give a detailed account of ancient democracy, and he did not see the system as wondrous as we are accustomed to view it today.<sup>10</sup> His systematic

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<sup>5</sup> **Held, D.** (1987). *Models of Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 15.

<sup>6</sup> **Dahl, R.** (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New haven: Yale University Press, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup> *ibidem*, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup> **Wikipedia**, The Free Encyclopedia, [www.wikipedia.org](http://www.wikipedia.org) (19.04.2007).

<sup>9</sup> **Holt, J. C.** (1992). *Magna Carta*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>10</sup> **Held, D.** (1987). *Models of Democracy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 19.

framework of political systems consists of three “good” ones and of three “deviant” ones which are shaped by two dimensions – the rule by the one/the few/the many, and the rule in the interest of the ruler *versus* the rule in the interest of the common gain. The good forms of ruling therefore are monarchy (by the noble one), aristocracy (by the noble few) and polity (by the middle class), in which the rulers are able to take into account the interests of everyone and avoid extremes, while the deviances are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy, respectively, with the Aristotelian democracy representing the rule of the majority (the poor) in their own interest.

Aristotle’s approach to democracy and whether he opposed or preached it is still hotly debated, though, because, as is relevant for the cause of this thesis, he has stated: “...a particular government may be preferable, but another form may be better for some people”<sup>11</sup> and „democracy, as well as other constitutions, has more than one form.“<sup>12</sup>

Another classical figure in the theory of democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), has also stressed the *fluidity* of the meaning of the term. Namely, in his rich and complex evaluation of democracy in the nineteenth-century United States, *De la démocratie en Amérique*, he concluded that democracy as political system could not easily be transplanted to his home-country France since the social, geographical, and historical circumstances were different and could not be duplicated.<sup>13</sup>

In modern studies and teachings of democracy, the more philosophical inward look has been replaced by the more formal organizational approach which focuses mainly on how democracies are organized and run. Although Abraham Lincoln’s definition of “government of the people, by the people and for the people“ from 1863 is still much quoted, the *people* are not addressed, but instead the attention is channelled to either the concept, process and location of governing; creation of normative patterns and theories; or descriptive comparisons of existing systems.

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<sup>11</sup> **Aristotle**, Politics, Book 4:XI, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html (13.04.2007)

<sup>12</sup> *ibidem*, XIII.

<sup>13</sup> **Copp, D., Hampton, J., Roemer, J. E.** (eds) (1995). The Idea of Democracy. Cambridge University Press, p. 2.

Arend Lijphart<sup>14</sup>, for example, is mainly concerned with the question of how many are included in the governing, so he distinguished between the majoritarian (power in the hands of the majority of people) and consensual (power shared by and dispersed among as many as possible) democracies. The majoritarian model therefore concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority, making it exclusive, competitive and adversarial, whereas the consensual model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining and compromise.<sup>15</sup>

Drawing on this distinction, Lijphart's school focuses on party systems, cabinets, executive-legislative relations, electoral systems, interest groups, constitutions, concentration *versus* division of legislative power in parliaments, etc, and presents clusters of countries, found via factor analysis in which all the different measures have been taken into account.<sup>16</sup>

Another present day classic and a popular textbook writer Robert A. Dahl takes a broader view and deals with the more inward and more qualitative questions about what he calls the transformations of democracy, as well as its limits and possibilities in the future.<sup>17</sup> In his view, the first democratic transformation occurred when the ancient Greeks replaced the idea and practice of rule by the few with the idea and practice of rule by the many, with the city-state as the site for democracy. The second transformation took place when city-states were made obsolete by nation-states and the idea of *cratos* by *demos* was taken to a much larger scale, creating phenomena such as republicanism, representation and the logic of equality. The third wave is, in his words, now under question, and it is to do with the very meaning of democracy.

The idea of democracy has become universally popular, with more and more regimes making some sort of claim of being *democratic*. So, he says, the term is losing or has already lost its restricted and specific meaning. He does note that during the two millennia the term has existed, it has meant different things in different times and spaces, but then he nevertheless takes a jump backwards, stating his aim to be

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<sup>14</sup> Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

<sup>15</sup> *ibidem*, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup> Lijphart, A. (1984). *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 211.

<sup>17</sup> Dahl, R. A. (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 2.

combining normative and empirical aspects of democracy into a single theoretical perspective – to draw a *grand theory* of democracy which would take into account the problems posed by critics as well, and would, in the end, be a base for a single practice relevant to the kind of world in which we are likely to live in the foreseeable future.<sup>18</sup> So, he and his followers are also not so much interested in mapping the way different organizations and institutions are made to function in the interaction with the people and cultural-historical specificities of a state, but rather in setting theoretical and practical *normatives* of how they should be.

The boom of crude descriptive comparisons of present day democracies started after the events of the final decade of the 20th century, with the most interesting and significant changes taking place in the republics of the former Soviet Union and its satellites. These accounts usually present descriptions of how electoral systems, party structures, legislative recruitment, the media, economy and the like function in each of the countries.<sup>19</sup> Usually the data is presented in absolute numbers and percentages.

Different global watch-dogs and advocates of democracy, liberty, freedom and well-being, such as the World Bank, OSCE, Freedom House, UNO, and the like fall into the same category. They produce and publish different indices and listings of world countries, based on different measures which they see relevant in their assumption that “freedom for all peoples is best achieved in liberal democratic societies”<sup>20</sup> and in work “to promote the principles of democracy by building, strengthening and protecting democratic institutions”.<sup>21</sup>

One of the most popular models (too popular, according to Dryzek and Holmes) that researchers have settled with is the so-called minimalist or electoral approach which draws on Schumpeter’s vision of real democracy existing in the electoral struggles between competing elites. According to this view, the ordinary citizens are depicted

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<sup>18</sup> **Dahl, R. A.** (1989). *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 2.

<sup>19</sup> e.g. **LeDuc, L., Niemi, R. G., Norris, P.** (eds) (1996). *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications; **Nagle, J. D., Mahr, A.** (1999). *Democracy and Democratization : Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective*. London: Sage; **Ström, K.** et al (eds.) (2003). *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>20</sup> **Freedom House** (2006). *Freedom in the World*. Introduction, [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org) (20.04.2007).

<sup>21</sup> **OSCE** (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). [www.osce.org](http://www.osce.org) (20.04.2007).

as uniform and apathetic, with an occasional role of a voter, but generally unable to exercise effective control over what goes on in public policy. Although this model is past its prime among theorists of democracy, it is still very widely in use among transitologists<sup>22</sup>, maybe as an easier way out of the numerous definitions and forms democracy has been able to take in the so-called transition countries.

In transition to democracy, two aspects are important – the transition and the consolidation. In Schumpeterian model, the former has occurred once free, democratic and competitive elections have taken place, and the latter once the competitive elections have stabilized, become a habit in the society. This requires the *counter-elites* (both old and new ones) to accept the electoral order, as well as freely elected government to give up power after having being defeated in elections (Huntington's two-election test). The minimalist test is passed if we are just interested in the pure form of delegative democracy, in which the masses accept voting as their limit of participation, leaving all the decision-making unquestioned, something belonging to the territory and competence of the elected elites. In doing so, the researchers can only address democracy on a supportive/not supportive scale.<sup>23</sup>

Once one acknowledges, though, that there might be more to democracy than a universally applicable *one-size-fits-all* minimalist model, a new range of spheres opens up which requires to treat democracy not as a uniform destination to be reached, but rather as an open-ended discussion in which everyone, in fact anyone, in the society takes part of.

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<sup>22</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 6–10.

<sup>23</sup> Schedler, A. (1998). What is Democratic Consolidation? *Journal of Democracy*, 9: 91–107.

## 1.2. Studying Discourse in Transition

Discourse and analyzing it is one of the concepts which has obtained very different meanings in different disciplines. In Semantics and Linguistics, a discourse refers to linguistic units consisting of sentences, such as conversations, speeches, arguments. In Social Sciences, a discourse is seen more as a unit of thoughts, a way of institutionalized thinking which regulates what is said and how it is said on the basis of social acceptance, the possible truths and non-truths of a group of people.

The term *discourse* is often linked to French postmodern social thinker Michel Foucault (1926–1984). The language is divided into several discourses which give different meanings to words and sentences. As he puts it, the language is an action that creates the objects it talks about<sup>24</sup> – for instance, we can speak differently of flowers and weeds in the discourses of gardening or agriculture; even the term *plant life* only has a meaning in the context where it is distinguishable from some other term, e.g. *animal life*.<sup>25</sup>

The concept of discourse is also linked to theories of power and state, because it is seen as something which a) defines the reality, making certain things *more true* than others; and b) reproduces itself constantly, because the longer the social truths are kept unquestionable, the longer dominance is held. Because of these connections, discourse and analyzing it was started to be seen as one of the options of studying post-communist transition in a more qualitative way, focusing on how social and political domination is created, reproduced or resisted in text and talk.

In case of transition, though, the main problem seems to be that it takes place virtually everywhere. One of the aims can be defined as an attempt to “examine the impact of such change on language use and cognitive patterns in the domain of the political”<sup>26</sup>, with the *political* meaning not only the formal discourses of political institutions, but also the politically oriented language of the media and even of everyday social intercourse, but even so it is difficult to point out the exact object of research. This is

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<sup>24</sup> Foucault, M. (2001). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

<sup>25</sup> Burr, V. (1997). *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge. Lk. 57

<sup>26</sup> Chilton, P. A., Ilyin, M. V., Mey, J. L. (eds) (1997). *Political Discourse in Transition in Europe 1989–1991*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company, p. 7.



partly a theoretical problem: the theories of discourse in use are relatively under-developed, and do not provide basis for accounts of how discourse interacts with other non-discursive facets of processes of transition. Therefore, only a limited understanding of how discourse figures in processes of transition has so far been produced.<sup>27</sup>

In Estonia, the studies of discourse related to the overall societal change have kept away from dubious and hard-to-capture paths of trying to capture *The Discourse*, and have settled mainly with the media studies, concentrating on the press and other texts of public debates.<sup>28</sup> Questions of identity have mainly been addressed through the nationality prism, since Russia and the Russian-speaking minority have understandably been one of the key elements in shaping the whole Estonian *transition to democracy*. Also, integration to Western structures, such as the EU or NATO, have been a topic of study.

As it will become clear from the next chapter, research conducted for this thesis tries to take a look at the concept of democracy in Estonia from another angle. As mentioned before, democracy is not seen as a destination to be reached, but as an on-going process which is constantly being created and recreated in the minds and interactions of people with their own subjective ideas, conceptions and understandings. Discourses created through the process of data collection and analysis are presented as one facet of this many-sided socio-political phenomenon.

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<sup>27</sup> **Fairclough, N.** Discourse in processes of social change: 'Transition' in Central and Eastern Europe. [www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/norman.htm](http://www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/norman.htm) (24.04.2007).

<sup>28</sup> **Berg, E., Oras, S.** (2000). Writing Post-Soviet Estonia on to the World Map, *Political Geography*, 19: 601–625; **Lauristin, M., Vihalemm, P.** (eds) (1997). Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition. Tartu: Tartu University Press; **Talts, M., Kirch, A.** (1998). Eesti ja Euroopa Liit: poolt ja vastu Eesti ajakirjanduses, in Ruutsoo, R., Kirch, A. (eds). *Eesti Euroopa Liidu lävepakul*. Tallinn: Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus; **Talts, M.** (2002). Euroopa Liidu teemalise debati areng ja probleemid Eesti ajakirjanduses. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.

### 1.3. Studying Political Subjectivity

According to Brown, it has partly been due to the way the behavioural sciences have evolved that subjectivity is seen as something erroneous,<sup>29</sup> so that joining science and subjectivity is seen almost as something unnatural. However, as Stephenson, the creator of Q-methodology, puts it, “the fundamental difference between the objective and subjective ... is merely a matter of self-reference.”<sup>30</sup>

Ward draws a distinction between a science of behaviour with a subject and a science of behaviour without a subject, and concludes that, for most part, political science is “a science without the very subject that all of its analysis implies”.<sup>31</sup> Different measures are being measured and analyzed in their relation to one another, but not much attention is paid to what is holding those relations together, making them measurable and analyzable in the first place.

The absence of work focusing on political subjectivity and the “realm human opinion [in which the] political objects, by and large, exist”<sup>32</sup> seems further to stress that point even today. Therefore, it is difficult to position the results presented here in the context of other results reached at via some other methodology than Q. It is, of course, debatable, whether the Q-methodology advocated by Brown and applied here serves as the absolute best method for studying subjectivity in Political Science, but no critical accounts based on detailed and documented fieldwork was available.

Still, there is one local example – Pami Aalto’s *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia* which also seems to be taking steps onto an unknown territory of subjectivist and constructionist approach on geopolitics as well as the Q-methodology, making it “somewhat unconventional [and] using methods that are not always found on top in the toolkits of scholars”<sup>33</sup> of international relations or post-Soviet studies.

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<sup>29</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 324.

<sup>30</sup> **Stephenson, W.** (1980) Foreword, in Brown, S. R. (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. x.

<sup>31</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 332–333.

<sup>32</sup> **Jaffa, H. F.** (1960). The Case Against Political Theory. *Journal of Politics*, 22: 259–275.

<sup>33</sup> **Aalto, P.** (2001). *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

## 2. Methodology

Taking into account all the different understandings and possible research emphases behind the word *democracy* described in the previous chapters, the appropriate question is *what kind of theoretical and methodological approaches in Social Sciences would be the best to address these issues?* or – how to find the philosophical framework, research questions and methods for data collection and analysis?

### 2.1. Philosophical Viewpoint – Social Constructionism

One of the possible answers in regard of a broader philosophical framework is Social Constructionism which has its roots in the micro-interactionist approaches to the society. Micro-interactionism differs fundamentally from other major paradigms such as Structural Functionalism, Conflict Theory or Rational Choice theories because a) the interactionists' main concern is not with large structures and institutions which shape and channel the everyday life, but social relations and interactions between individuals and small groups; and b) more importantly for this thesis, according to interactionists, the social reality is the very outcome of these interactions – the society is made real and created via interactions between social actors.<sup>34</sup>

To make these interactions possible and fruitful, we, humans, have two crucial advantages at our disposal – the language (a shared system of meanings) and memory (for remembering and re-using the meanings). With the help of language and memory we can create complex and volumous cultural systems which we are able to learn, to control and to change. Our consciousness, the ability to think and to develop the systems of shared meanings is why we can construct *understandings* about the society and culture, and act as if they existed *physically*. According to Social Constructionism, the social reality is a creation, a symbolic product that comes to life through the thoughts we think and express. Society has no separate objective nature because it is nothing but a fictitious space created by us, in which we store the shared meanings in order to learn them through the process of socialization – because otherwise social interacting would be difficult at best.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Collins, R. (1994). *Four Sociological Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>35</sup> **Sociological Pathways**, [www.sociology.org.uk/pathways.htm](http://www.sociology.org.uk/pathways.htm) (19.04.2007)

In 1966, Peter Berger and Thomas Lukmann published their notorious book *The Social Construction of Reality*, and the following developments in the mainstream sociology have even been called a shock.<sup>36</sup> The new group claimed that sociology, which had up to that point been dealing with the world as if it was totally independent of the individuals inside it, was naive and had been studying the wrong things. In short, the radical approach of the new sociologists was coined in a statement that the society consists of illusions, which are, however, necessary because individuals could not lead their lives without being able to define situations through general rules and roles, even if they only existed in their own explanations. If people are made to doubt in meanings which appear to be self-evident, they become anxious for not accepting the agreed meanings would make their worlds uncomfortably fragile.<sup>37</sup>

Different authors have different opinions on the philosophical roots of Social Constructionism – the influences have said to have been made by Heidegger's and Sartre's existentialism, Weber's and Mannheim's approaches on social reality, and even by Nietzsche's nihilistic criticism on Enlightenment era philosophy.<sup>38</sup> In a broader sense, more recent social thinkers, such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, and postmodernism in whole can be considered relevant to the birth of Social Constructionism.<sup>39</sup>

Postmodernism does not agree with claims about absolute truth, hidden structures and meta-narratives. Instead, its emphasis lies on the diversity of situation-specific life-styles. With modern technology, channels of media and mass communication, we have access to several different types of knowledge – different disciplines of natural and social sciences, religions, medical approaches, life-styles, etc which exist parallel to each other and which we can use according to our own wishes. Postmodernism made its way everywhere – architecture, music, art and literature, where it led to a statement that there is no right or wrong way of understanding poems or prose, but that any interpretation is as good as any other, and the author's initial one has no relevance at all.

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<sup>36</sup> **Collins, R.** (1994). *Four Sociological Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press. Lk. 266

<sup>37</sup> *ibidem*, lk. 276

<sup>38</sup> **Collins, R.** (1994). *Four Sociological Traditions*. New York: Oxford University Press; **Burr, V.** (2003). *Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge; **Delanty, G.** (1997). *Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

<sup>39</sup> **Burr, V.** (1997). *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge.

Although *social constructionism* is a term mainly used by social psychologists, its main claims are of sociological origin.<sup>40</sup> The most important ones are the following:

- criticism towards taken-for-granted knowledge (people's idea of social reality may not necessarily refer to its objective nature);
- historical and cultural specificity (the understanding of the world depends on the time and space we are in, therefore different ways of thinking and behaving cannot be viewed as right or wrong);
- knowledge sustained by social processes (with language skills people in specific time and space adopt abilities to recreate versions of knowledge about the world which are appropriate in that time and space and which lead to certain behaviour).<sup>41</sup> In the view of Social Constructionism, there are no underlying structures, functions or models. The target of investigation for this school of thought are the dynamic processes of interaction, during which phenomena and knowledge is created.

When social constructionists talk about understanding being created through interactions, they do not mean that every single individual can rearrange the world as he or she pleases. We are born to a certain time and space in which people use certain conceptual frames which derive from the language that they use.<sup>42</sup> So the social constructionists have solved the *hen-and-egg* problem differently from the traditional psychology – the language is not the means for people to express their inner and objective selves, but it is through the language that it becomes possible in the first place to construct and structure one's self, the social reality and individuals' experience in a way we perceive it day by day.<sup>43</sup>

Before starting to study societal phenomena one needs to establish the relation between the individual and the society. In other words, in which direction the arrow of influence points. Is it bottom-up (the individual is the logical pre-post of the society, with the latter being no more than the sum of all individuals in it) or top-down (the individuals become the results of the society they are born into – they will behave alike, live alike, dress alike and conform with the norms and values of the society)?

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<sup>40</sup> Burr, V. (1997). *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Burr, V. (2003). *Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge.

<sup>42</sup> *ibidem*, p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> *ibidem*, p. 33.

By default, Social Constructionism is not satisfied with either of the approaches. The former is *social-constructionally* totally unthinkable, because it eliminates the social element and comprises of everything the social constructionists reject – objective nature, solid and predetermined self, ability to make decisions based purely on individual will. The main fault with the latter is that it shifts the emphasis from discourse onto the social structure.<sup>44</sup> This comes partly from the dichotomous way of understanding the world which is especially common in the Western world – we tend to categorize phenomena as if they signified the opposite ends of something (individual/society, reason/emotions, body/soul).

According to French post-structuralist thinker Jacques Derrida (1930–2004), this way of thinking goes back thousands of years<sup>45</sup> and is not, of course, easily changed. Already an early-20th century American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley has tried by saying “‘Society’ and ‘individuals’ do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing.”<sup>46</sup> In other words, the individual and the society are not separate units to be studied separately, but are, in fact, an eco-system<sup>47</sup> which is made up of individuals and their actions; of social structures in which they live in; and of discourses that frame their thoughts and experience, with the latter being in the centre of attention in this thesis.

In an attempt to capture some of the discourses to do with the phenomenon called *democracy*, this thesis is an overview of a study which takes a qualitative constructionist view on how democracy is created and viewed by people in Estonia.

The questions we were looking answers for were the following:

- what are the different discourses of democracy like in Estonia?
- how is democracy viewed and talked about in Estonia?
- what kind of people are behind the different discourses of democracy?
- where do Estonia’s discourses stand in the Dryzek-Holmes context?

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<sup>44</sup> Burr, V. (1997). *An Introduction to Social Constructionism*. London: Routledge, pp. 96-97.

<sup>45</sup> Sampson, E. E. (1989). “The Deconstruction of the Self”, Shotter, J., Gergen, K. J. (eds) *Texts of Identity*. London: Sage.

<sup>46</sup> Coser, L. (1977). *Masters of Sociological Thought*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 305

<sup>47</sup> Bateson, G. (1972). *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*. New York: Chandler. [Sampson’s (1989) reference]

## 2.2. Method of Phase One – Focus Group Interviews

In market research, focus groups have been used to search for ways to improve and market products to consumers since the 1950s. During the last 20 years, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nonprofit organizations have started using findings from focus group interviews to help make decisions about their products and services. Educational and environmental organizations also have used the technique to listen to their employees as well as to their potential users to generate diverse ideas.<sup>48</sup> Since the 1990s, international public health organizations as well as the entire medical field has been making use of focus groups.<sup>49</sup>

In Social Sciences, though, this method has not reached its peak of popularity yet, especially in Political Science, although it is quite widely used in Social Work studies and Social Psychology. Since the data created in focus groups comes mainly in the form of unstructured (by the researcher) opinions and insights which describe the personal experience, prejudice, motives and behaviour of the participants, it may not be the most comfortable way to get easily analyzable data.

Focus group interviews are, however, irreplaceable when one aspires to map the areas relatively untouched or at a different angle<sup>50</sup>, and it corresponds very well to the whole idea of phenomena being created in interactions among different actors described in Chapter 2.1. Focus groups are also valuable in research situations where the researcher already possesses a strong opinion about the topic. Although he may be aware of the fact that he is the product of a certain time and space as much as anyone else, it is still easier to let the participants create their own discussion, with the researcher only providing the framework. Focus groups also enable to get a glimpse at people's understandings about the social reality and into how they express their attitudes, emotions, beliefs, experience in a group. This remains hidden in several data collection methods (observation, individual interviews and questionnaires).<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Krueger, R. A., Casey, M. A. (2001) Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews, in Krueger, R. A. et al (eds) *Social Development Papers*, 36, Washington: The World Bank.

<sup>49</sup> Powell, R. A. and Single, H. M. (1996) Focus groups, *International Journal of Quality in Health Care* 8: 499-504.

<sup>50</sup> Hess, B. B., Markson, E. W., Stein, P. J. (2000). *Sotsioloogia*. Tallinn: Külim, p. 35

<sup>51</sup> Gibbs, A. (1997). Focus Groups. *Social Research Update, Issue 19*. University of Surrey: Department of Sociology.

### 2.1.1. Moderating

The moderator's mission is somewhat paradoxical – his importance is stressed in his ability to make himself redundant. The main task of the moderator is to lead the discussion and keep the participants on the relevant track while refraining from directing and interrupting them in order not to risk losing valuable data. The challenge of moderating is making people feel comfortable enough to share in a group what they think and how they feel. Participants must trust the moderator, the process, and the sponsoring organization, and they must believe that the results will be used in a positive way. The moderator must know when to wait for more information and when to move on. He must be able to control dominant speakers and encourage hesitant participants, and he must respect the participants, listen to what they have to say, and thank them for their views even when the moderator may personally disagree with those views.<sup>52</sup>

In some cases, it is not absolutely necessary (or might even be dangerous, if the researcher is able to acknowledge his own bias) to have the focus group interviews conducted by the person in charge or on managing position of the research project. Although my strong belief is that any researcher should be able to distance himself in order not to get too personally involved, it has become increasingly possible to hire a professional moderator. In any case, he or she does not need to be an expert on the topic, but should understand common terms that will be used in the discussion, as well as be aware of the aim of the research to know where to ask for more information.

The researcher should also carefully consider things like gender, age, race, and ethnicity. For some topics, these issues may not matter, but for other topics they are very important. The moderator should also be fluent in the participants' language. It can sometimes also be useful to have a moderator who looks like the participants. This can make the participants more comfortable and give the impression that "this person will understand what I have to say."<sup>53</sup> These last couple of points became especially useful in the 2 of our focus group interviews to which we invited Russian-speaking participants.

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<sup>52</sup> Krueger, R. A. (1988). *Focus groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research*. Newbury Park: Sage.

<sup>53</sup> Krueger, R. A., Casey, M. A. (2001) *Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews*, in Krueger, R. A. et al (eds) *Social Development Papers*, 36, Washington: The World Bank.



Guidebooks to focus group interviews also recommend to have someone who has been labelled an *assistant moderator*, making this position sound somewhat inferior to the moderator. An assistant moderator is the one who is meant to be in charge of recording equipment, refreshments, the room, and moreover – sit in a designated location, take notes and not participate in the discussion.<sup>54</sup>

My strong belief is that presence of a person behaving as described above can do more harm to the comfortable and trusting atmosphere of a focus group interview than his absence. In my view, the main need for another moderator comes from the fact that during the interview there is so much going on and the whole event can be so intense that it can become very demanding for just one person to handle. An extra brain and a pair of hands, legs, ears and eyes is extremely helpful both during the interview and in post-interview analysis, but it is extremely unwise to create a visible hierarchy and division of labour. Therefore, I had extra help with moderating the focus group interviews and we shared both the title *co-moderator* and the possible responsibilities and privileges.

### 2.1.2. Questions

Focus group interviews like any other type of interview need not necessarily have pre-determined questions – if the area of study is either totally uncovered or approached by a new angle, it is wiser not to ask any specific questions, but wait (at least in the early phase of data collection) for the participants to give the necessary insights.

In our case, though, we decided to use a semi-structured question-route mainly because a) the topic of democracy is far too wide and having let the discussion flow totally freely would probably have taken us in different direction in each of the focus groups; and b) drawing on the Dryzek-Holmes project, we had developed some certain points we wanted the participants to discuss. The question-routes we used are in Appendix 1 and 2. Although we did not make an effort to have the participants cover the topics in the order presented in the question-routes, we still feel that in a couple of cases we lost control over the interview. More about that in Chapter 3.2.3.

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<sup>54</sup> Krueger, R. A., Casey, M. A. (2001) Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews, in Krueger, R. A. et al (eds) *Social Development Papers*, 36, Washington: The World Bank.

## 2.2. Method of Phase Two – Q-methodology

In the relatively artificially created conflict between quantitative and qualitative methods, the Q-methodology has been described as combining “the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research traditions”<sup>55</sup>, thus creating the bridge between the two.<sup>56</sup> In this case, it is used to see how democracy looks subjectively to people. It is usually accompanied by a coding system of some sort (in our case, a modified matrix based on political discourse analysis; see Chapter 4.1. for details). Approach used here is interpretative, but in addition these qualitative interpretations are given a statistical touch. Still, those are, as Dryzek and Holmes also point out, in the position to inform, not substitute for interpretive judgment.<sup>57</sup>

Q-methodology was created in 1935 by British psychologist William Stephenson (1902-1989). Because of its mathematical structure, it is well known in quantitative circles, but it is well applicable in qualitative research as well, because it is developed to reveal the subjectivity involved in any situation possible. Fundamentally, Q-methodology provides a foundation for the systematic study of subjectivity, and it is this central feature which recommends it to persons interested in qualitative aspects of human behavior.<sup>58</sup>

In fact, it can be called a hybrid method, since it includes aspects which are traditionally associated with both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative aspects dominate in the creation and selection of the Q-sample statements as well as in participants filling the Q-sort; the quantitative aspects emerge in the factor analysis stage; and finally, the qualitative approach is again used when interpreting the factors.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> **Dennis, K.E., & Goldberg, A.P.** (1996). Weight control self-efficacy types and transitions affect weight-loss outcomes in obese women. *Addictive Behaviors*, 21: 103-116.

<sup>56</sup> **Sell, D.K., Brown, S.R.** (1984). Q Methodology as a Bridge Between Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Application to the Analysis of Attitude Change in Foreign Study Program Participants, in Vacca, J.L., Johnson, H.A. (eds) *Qualitative Research in Education*. Kent: Kent State University.

<sup>57</sup> **Dryzek, J. S., Holmes, L. T.** (2002). *Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourse Across Thirteen Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 20.

<sup>58</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1991). Q-methodology. [www.qmethod.org/Tutorials/Primer\\_1.htm](http://www.qmethod.org/Tutorials/Primer_1.htm) (25.04.2007)

<sup>59</sup> **Aalto, P.** (2001). *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, p. 108.

### 2.2.2. Fundamentals of Q-methodology

When more familiar R-methodology techniques, such as survey research, model patterns within and across variables, Q-methodology is used to study patterns of subjectivity by modelling patterns within and across individuals. The patterns across individuals are then explained using factor analysis, with each of the factor found representing – in our case – the discourse of democracy.<sup>60</sup> Factor analysis was invented by Charles Spearman at the turn of the last century and it is still very much in use for studying relations between traits in political and other social sciences. As for correlation and factoring of persons, it was only Stephenson's innovations that made a separate methodology possible.<sup>61</sup>

Most typically, a person is presented with a set of statements (40–70) about some topic, and is asked to order them, usually on a scale of *agree* to *disagree*. The source of the statements is of great importance, though. As it was already discussed in connection to social constructionism as well as focus group interviews, the language that people use to talk about the phenomena existant in the social reality around them is the key element in constructing them. Therefore, it is also important in Q-statements that they are in a language that the subjects are likely to relate to and use themselves. To do that, the researcher needs to “acknowledge and present the reality constructions of different women and men without prejudging or discrediting them, and without insisting on the superior (more “objective”) status of the researcher's own construction of reality.”<sup>62</sup>

It is important to ensure, then, that the statements come from sources which are outside the researcher's *control* – one can use media texts and other textual sources available<sup>63</sup> or use different interviewing methods (as we have done; more about that in Chapter 3) or combine the two, like Dryzek and Holmes did in their study. Whatever the method, it is advisable within this subjectivist-constructionist approach not to edit the statements, except for corrections of grammar or substituting a relevant noun for

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<sup>60</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 21-28.

<sup>61</sup> Brown, S. R. (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 12.

<sup>62</sup> Kitzinger, C. (1986). *Introducing and Developing Q as a Feminist Methodology* in Wilkinson, S. (ed) *Feminist Social Psychology*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press [Dryzek & Holmes (2001) reference, p. 23].

<sup>63</sup> Aalto, P. (2001). *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

it.<sup>64</sup> The textual material (texts, articles, transcripts of interviews, etc) is then coded to identify different kinds of statements to be included in the Q-sample. This process is, of course, not totally free from *researcher-subjectivism*.

Each subject participating in the Q-sorting is asked to order the statements into piles in a quasi-normal distribution as seen on Figure 1.<sup>65</sup> This process is called Q-sorting, the product of which is the individual's personal Q-sort (see Chapter 4.3. and Appendices 8 or 9 for details).




Figure 1. The Q-sort template, containing 60 cells for distribution of the 60 statements.

The statements represent matters of opinion, not facts, and the Q-sorter ranking the statements from his own point of view is what brings subjectivity into the picture. Since the interest of Q-methodology is in the nature of the existing segments of subjectivity and the extent to which they are similar or dissimilar, the issue of large numbers, so fundamental to most social research, is relatively unimportant. In principle as well as practice, single cases can be the focus of significant research.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 25.

<sup>65</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 21.

<sup>66</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1991). Q-methodology. [www.qmethod.org/Tutorials/Primer\\_1.htm](http://www.qmethod.org/Tutorials/Primer_1.htm) (25.04.2007)

As mentioned earlier, the quantitative aspects of Q-methodology come up in the factor analysis stage of the Q-sorts and is conducted with the help of special software, PQMethod, because statistical packages like, for instance, SPSS, do not provide optimal support for entering and factor-analyzing Q-sort data. Yet, they may be indispensable for additional statistical procedures not available with QMethod software (e.g., analysis of variance). In practice, therefore, one often needs to use both, general and specialized statistical software, alongside with each other, especially in cases of mixed Q- and R-designs (within-subjects and between-subjects perspectives of analysis).<sup>67</sup> Usually, centroid factor analysis followed by varimax rotation is used.

The results of the statistical analysis can then be presented in the form of a) factors emerged from the analysis and their descriptive power based on the cumulative percentage; b) scores of statements on the factors found; and c) subject loadings for the factors found, as Dryzek and Holmes have done.

### 2.2.3. Applications of Q-methodology

Basically, the Q-methodology is a method for understanding situations in which the self is involved, be it in political or other matters of social domain. When individuals are involved and can be expected to express opinions, attitudes, beliefs and viewpoints on things around them, the Q-methodology can outline the major effects. Therefore, anyone wishing to study, for example, public opinion and attitudes, decision making, socialization, personality, values or communication can surely make use of the technique.<sup>68</sup>

The Q-technique also enables to study a situation more intensively, to analyze a single person or a group more deeply. As Stephenson has put it, "... *any* person, in principle, can be made the subject of detailed factor and variance analysis".<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> **Schmolck, P.** The Qmethod Page. [www.lrz-muenchen.de/~schmolck/qmethod/](http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~schmolck/qmethod/) (25.03.2007)

<sup>68</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 58.

<sup>69</sup> **Stephenson, W.** (1974). *Methodology of Single Case Studies*. *Journal of Operational Psychiatry* 5: 3–16 [Brown's (1980) reference, p. 58]

### 3. Phase One – Data Creation

#### 3.1. *Assembling Focus Groups*

According to Krueger, the first step in recruiting participants is to identify as precisely as possible the characteristics of the target audience.<sup>70</sup> A basic principle of focus groups interviewing is that the researcher controls attendance. The researcher invites people because they meet the qualifications of the study devised in the planning stages. Participants are selected and invited because they have certain experiences or qualities in common, not simply because they are interested in attending. In our case, we did not need to go through very much trouble in finding people – all they really needed to have in common was Estonian residency.

One of the challenges of focus group research is getting people who are not interested in the study to participate. They may be apathetic, indifferent, or even consider the topic to be irrelevant. However, there is a limit of how far a focus group recruiter can go in his persistence while inviting people. Since our main goal was to create a group who would find it easy to get the discussion going, and, as mentioned earlier, we did not need participants of very specific qualities, we were quite satisfied with people who were just interested in attending.

For finding the potential participants we used a) contacts of people whom we knew to have some relationship to any of the locations; b) help from local cultural centres and libraries; and c) snowball sampling. People were either invited by phone, email or someone whom we had approached, to participate in a *nice and informal discussion group* to talk about *things that had to do with Estonian democracy and the society at large*.

Different guidebooks to focus group interviewing also make a point about what incentives to offer to people to encourage their participation. This, of course, depends strongly on the budget of the research project as well as the cultural specificities. We felt that in Estonia it might even be insulting to offer the participants money for taking

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<sup>70</sup> Krueger, R. A., Casey, M. A. (2001) Designing and Conducting Focus Group Interviews, in Krueger, R. A. et al (eds) *Social Development Papers*, 36, Washington: The World Bank.

part in our study, so we organized the discussions at local cafes and other such places instead, so that we could all have something to nibble at during the interview, with us taking care of the bill after we had finished. Since we also wanted the participants to fill a short questionnaire, we had pens with Tartu University insignia which the participants could keep as mementoes.

The incentives need not be of material kind only, so when recruiting people we stressed the value of their opinions to us – we have all the 500+ textbook definitions on democracy; we know what political scientists think that people think or ought to think about democracy; we also know what politicians or the media think that people think, but what we do not know is what do the real people actually think.

We made sure that we had a local contact whom we could phone an hour or two prior to the focus group interview – in some cases to ask directions to find the specific location which the participants had suggested meeting, but also to give him or her a chance to remind other participants of the event.

### 3.2. *The Interviews*

We started with a pilot focus group interview in our home town Tartu with our own acquaintances attending. The main idea was to test the questions-routes as well as to give an idea of a focus group to the members of the research team who had not come into contact with this type of data collection method before. Almost simultaneously we began recruiting people to focus groups in other locations as well as analyzing bits of data as they emerged. The initial plan was to follow the pattern of the study made by Dryzek and Holmes, including their coding matrix, but soon we realized that we were not very successful in fitting our data in their *boxes*, so we decided to take it step by step and worry about more precise coding once we had all the transcripts ready. More about coding in Chapter 4.1.

In addition to focus groups in Tartu (the initial pilot group and later on, a group consisting only of young people aged 15–17), we *covered* Estonia in four separate tours – a day-trip to Kambja; a two-day-trip to western Estonia (Pärnu, Lihula, Kärđla); a two-day-trip to northern Estonia (Rakvere, Tallinn); and the Russian-speakers in Narva and Tallinn. So altogether, 10 focus group interviews were conducted (8 with Estonian-speaking participants and 2 with Russian-speaking participants) with the overall number of 68 participants (47 Estonian-speakers and 21 Russian-speakers). The number of participants per group varied from 4 to 12 and the interviews lasted for 2–3 hours. To make things easier for ourselves, we set certain dates and times (taking into consideration the usual working hours or late weekend mornings), and asked our contacts to find participants who would find those times suitable.

We also designed a brief post-interview questionnaire to cover the main social-demographic characteristics of the participants and give an opportunity for them to give feedback on the interview. About feedback, see Chapter 3.2.4.

#### **3.2.1. Introduction to the Topic**

We arrived at the agreed locations about 30 minutes earlier to make sure everything was ready. Usually the furniture needed to be rearranged in a circle, so that all the participants could see each other, and in some cases we had to ask the staff of the café



to turn down the music to have the recordings as clear as possible. When people started arriving, we greeted them, asked them to take a seat and make themselves comfortable. Drinks and snacks were ordered and served or passed around.

After everyone had arrived and settled down, we started with the *official* part by introducing us once again, describing the purpose of the study, and stressed our need for their freely expressed personal opinions. We also reminded that the interview was most likely going to last 2–2.5 hours and asked for participants' permission to record the discussion. After that we ran a brief introductory round with everyone stating their first name and field of activity.

### **3.2.2. Location, settings**

In setting the locations for the focus group interviews, two things were kept in mind. Firstly, the territory has to be comfortable for a 2.5-hour sit and as neutral as possible (or, if anything, then disadvantageous towards the moderators, but not the participants). Secondly, the recording devices need to be able to cope with the possible background noise.

Keeping that in mind, we organized our focus groups in local cafés (University Café in Tartu, Jazz-Café in Pärnu, Nordtooder in Kärkla), cultural and sport centres (in Kambja and Rakvere) and libraries (Lihula). Usually the locations were suggested by someone local and we made contact with the staff to book a table and make all the necessary arrangement.

### **3.2.3. Atmosphere**

In most of the focus groups, the atmosphere was positive, friendly and relatively relaxed. None of them consisted of people who were friends among each other, so different views were expressed and debated. Encouragement from moderators was only necessary in the beginning, soon the conversation took its own course.

There were a couple of negative cases, though, during which the we as moderators failed either to *tame* the dominant and/or destructive participants or to bind the pieces of expressions into a flowing discussion. In Tallinn's case (the Estonian-speakers), the situation got out of hand quite from the very beginning when some of the people

attending seemed to get an idea that their purpose of being there was to oppose each other and destructively confront anything someone else had said. At first, the moderators decided to take a humble position and just listen to what was said, and later on it must have already been too late to take back the control. It was a failure from our side, because this focus group produced the least number of statements to add to the Q-sample – most of the text in the transcript was in the form of challenging questions which did not say much.

In Lihula's case there was a person among the 6 participants who did not seem to have either the skill or the will to accept that other people's views might differ from his, so very often after he had commented on someone else's opinions, it was difficult to carry on with the interview.

The absolute record of duration goes to Rakvere where a person joined us just about when we were finishing up, and the rest of the participants were happy to stay and the debate continued. Our moderator-alertness had *died down* by that time, but since we knew from the feedback forms that people really appreciated someone coming and asking to share their views in such a form, and since the next focus group was scheduled for the next day, we did not hurry to leave.

#### **3.2.4. Feedback from Participants**

Although representativeness is not something one wants to and can aim at in qualitative data collection methods, we still kept records of the participants' socio-demographic characteristics, because after a couple of interviews it became clear that people of different socio-economic status put emphasis on different issues. We also wanted to ensure that our focus group material represented the widest and most varied range of opinions to capture the possible discourses of democracy, so an overview of the kind of people we had already interviewed helped us recruit the participants for the next focus groups. Not to exhaust people even further after a hot 2-hour debate, we asked very shortly about their sex, age, profession, education, ethnical background, and of political/civic engagement (see Appendices 3 and 4).

In addition to socio-demographic data we were also interested in their comments and suggestions about the focus group interview. Most people had filled in that section of the feedback form, so we could distinguish three broader topics.

Firstly, participants expressed the necessity for all the issues discussed in the group to be published to a wider public. Since the media was generally spoken of as something crucial to democracy, but selective and biased in the Estonian case, the voice of an ordinary citizen was said not be reaching very far. In that sense, we were seen and encouraged to act as message-carriers who would tell the leaders “what people really think”.

Secondly, since most people had not had any similar kind of experiences, they were worried that we might not have got what we wanted, because they got too carried away and spent the time, discussing and arguing among themselves. As already mentioned, in our view the only negative example was the Estonian-speakers’ group in Tallinn, and understandably the most critical comments on moderating came from people who felt overrun by the *non-behaving* participants.

Still, people were very satisfied that someone had bothered to come and talk to them and really listen to what they had to say, not just tick some boxes in a questionnaire. They also appreciated the possibility to share their views with each other and generally concluded that they had a pleasant and interesting evening. The young people’s group was especially enthusiastic in this respect – they even suggested that we organized whole days of discussion on different topics, and the only thing they had missed was “more orange juice”.

## 4. Phase Two – Data Testing

### 4.1. Coding the Focus Group Transcripts

To produce textual material for coding, all the focus group interviews were recorded with a digital recorder and later on the sound files were transcribed, producing roughly 300 pages of text. The first round of text analysis included selecting all the sentences and pieces of utterances which reflected the topic of democracy in any possible way. Editing done to statements was only limited to grammatical corrections. Some statements were ambiguous and/or contained more than one opinion, but that was considered to be the characteristic to the political language, so they were left as they were. As a result of round one, some 400 statements had been produced.

Since the raw material of text of any kind can, in principle, contain an indefinite number of statements and opinions, it is difficult to estimate if and when the most important dimensions have been covered and are represented in the final Q-sample of statements. Therefore, a theoretical modelling of some sort is helpful. The purpose of modelling is two-fold – it helps to select the statements as well as ensures that the selection is adequate and theoretically informed.<sup>71</sup> Usually, a two-dimensional cell structure is used to capture a broad spread of different kinds of statements to be able to define and separate different discourses.<sup>72</sup>

As mentioned earlier, the initial plan was to follow Dryzek and Holmes in their coding method and select the statements, using the principles of political discourse analysis. In their coding matrix, the key elements of political discourse (constituting the one dimension) were:

- ontology (set of entities whose existence is recognized, e.g. nations, international system, individuals, politicians, the mafia, social classes, civil society, etc);
- agency ascribed to those entities (i.e. the capacity to act, which some of the entities mentioned have and some might not);

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<sup>71</sup> Aalto, P. (2001). Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, p. 91.

<sup>72</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 25.

- motives of agents (high-lighted, ignored or denied, relating to survival, personal advancement, public well-being, self-interest, etc);
- natural or unnatural relationships (conflict between nations or social groups, equality, harmony, competition, or hierarchies based on wealth, ability, degree of political interest, age, gender, experience, etc).<sup>73</sup>

The other dimension of Dryzek-Holmes coding matrix represented the types of claims people make in arguments:

- definitive (concerned with the meaning of terms);
- designative (concerned with matters of fact);
- evaluative (concerning the worth of something that exists or might exist);
- advocative (concerning something that should or should not exist).<sup>74</sup>

So, their matrix enabled them to code the statements into 16 different categories, as seen in Table 1:

	<b>Discourse element</b>			
<b>Type of claim</b>	<b>Ontology</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Motives</b>	<b>Relationships</b>
Definitive	1	2	3	4
Designative	5	6	7	8
Evaluative	9	10	11	12
Advocative	13	14	15	16

*Tabel 1. Dryzek-Holmes matrix applying political discourse analysis to sampling statements.*

It became clear from the very beginning of data collection and statement analysis that this matrix did not seem to be applying to the data being gathered – it seemed highly abnormal and unnatural to force the statements made by people of Estonia into these cells.

Also, on pure theoretical grounds it was not always possible to define the type of claim, especially when the choice was between definitive-designative and evaluative-advocative. Studying the lists of statements provided by Dryzek and Holmes did not

<sup>73</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 25–26.

<sup>74</sup> *ibidem*

shed much light onto these problem-places, so a theoretical modelling technique based on the Glaserian approach of grounded theory was opted for, according to which the qualitative data collected is not handled with some theoretical idea thought of before-hand, but the theory is allowed to emerge from the data itself.<sup>75</sup>

Indeed, the data collection and analysis process led us to a different matrix (see Appendix 5), in which the x-dimension was made up of the following five elements:

- what is democracy (definitions, descriptions, qualities ascribed to democracy in Estonia);
- who is democracy (actors, i.e. individuals, organisations, institutions, other entities mentioned in connection to democracy in Estonia);
- where is democracy (places, social classes, parts/levels of society where democracy is stated to exist);
- cultural features (cultural and/or historical features stated to affect democracy in Estonia);
- future of democracy (predictions for developments in democracy in Estonia).

The y-dimension of newly-designed matrix was defined through whether the statements made in each of the five categories were positive, negative, or neutral statements of fact, thus producing a cell structure which distinguished between 15 different types of statements, as seen in Table 2:

	<b>Discourse elements</b>				
<b>Type of claim</b>	<b>What</b>	<b>Who</b>	<b>Where</b>	<b>Culture</b>	<b>Future</b>
Positive	1	2	3	4	5
Neutral	6	7	8	9	10
Negative	11	12	13	14	15

*Tabel 2. Modified matrix used for sampling statements in mapping the discourses of democracy in Estonia.*

The second round of coding process, then, consisted of categorizing all the initial 400 statements extracted from focus group interview transcripts into 15 categories.

<sup>75</sup> **Charmaz, K.** (2000). Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist methods in Denzin, N. K., Lincoln, Y. S. (eds). Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

#### 4.2. Compiling the Q-Sample of Statements

In the next step the Dryzek-Holmes way was not followed either. To reduce the initial number of statements to a suitable amount for Q-analysis (40–70), they chose four statements at random from each of the category, thus producing a Q-sample of 64 statements.<sup>76</sup> In the Estonian case, however, it was clear that several sub-topics emerged in each category. I did not want to ignore the substructure of the emerging discourses, so an extra round of coding was carried out, grouping the statements in each category according to the emerged sub-category, on the basis of which one statement of each sub-category was chosen to the final Q-sample. In the end, it did produce the same results, i.e. four statements per cell, because there were 4–5 distinguishable *mini-discourses* in each of the 15 categories, but it still felt better not having selected the statements based solely on my own random judgment.

And even a third difference must be described. Since Dryzek and Holmes had approached their raw material of focus group interviews with a preconstructed theoretical modelling matrix, they were inevitable left with statements which did not fit into any category as well as some empty cells. Statements with no clear cell were eliminated from analysis and empty cells were filled with statements found from published sources, such as newspapers and magazines. Our main reason for rejecting this idea was that the discourse found in the media is something quite different to what people express in focus group interviews, therefore it is not methodologically correct to combine the two, especially in order to substitute one for another.

After three rounds of coding, a list of 60 statements was compiled in Estonian and translated into Russian (see Appendices 6 and 7). Numbers given to the statements were chosen so that the first digits represents their position in the coding matrix and the last one their own *personal* number (so, for instance, statements 11, 12, 13 and 14 define the four statements belonging to the first category of the matrix *Positive statement about WHAT is democracy*, whereas statements 151, 152, 153 and 154 represent statements in cell number 15, *Negative statements about FUTURE of democracy*).

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<sup>76</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 26.

### *4.3. Analyzing Individual Q-sorts*

Although researchers develop their own theoretical model to select the statements and produce an overview of a phenomenon as expressed by people, the beauty of Q-methodology is in the fact that the participants of the final round have an opportunity to sketch out their own theory – to determine the issues of concern and the importance of different facets of the phenomenon studied by sorting the statements into their own personal Q-sort.<sup>77</sup> Since Q-statements contain opinions, not matters of fact, sorting the statements is like mixing a tobacco blend – based solely on personal taste, making any one Q-sort just as valid as any other.<sup>78</sup>

#### **4.3.1. Selecting subjects**

Fourty individuals were recruited to complete the Q-sorts. Since Q-methodology is an intensive one, it works with a relatively small number of subjects and adding more beyond fourty would give little extra information, unless they were of specific characteristics which had not been represented before.<sup>79</sup>

Because of the small number, it is not appropriate to use random sampling. Still, we wanted to make sure that we covered the “ordinary people” of Estonia and that none of the population groups would not dominate the final results. So, we carried out a process resembling quota calculation, reducing some characteristics of the Estonian population to fourty people (Table 3).

This cannot, of course, be called representativeness in the statistical sense, but it gave us a standpoint to start recruiting different kinds of people in order to maximize their variety. The relevant characteristic included sex, age, ethnicity, place of residence and level of education, producing us a sample of people described in Table 4.

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<sup>77</sup> **Aalto, P.** (2001). *Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia*. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, p. 100.

<sup>78</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 55.

<sup>79</sup> **Dryzek & Holmes**, p. 27.



	<b>Estonia in 2006<sup>80</sup></b>		<b>Our sample</b>	
<b>Population</b>	1 344 684		40	
<b>Ethnicity</b>	921 908 Est 345 168 Rus		28 Est 12 Rus	
<b>Sex and age</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>
15–17 (a)	32 472	30 775	3	2
18–25 (b)	84 666	81 695	2	2
26–35 (c)	93 897	93 444	3	3
36–45 (d)	87 994	94 894	3	3
46–55 (e)	85 101	100 228	3	4
56–65 (f)	62 283	84 001	2	4
65+ (g)	68 763	141 786	2	4
<b>Level of education</b>				
<b>1</b> (basic)	238 500		9	
<b>2</b> (general or vocational after basic)	525 000		18	
<b>3</b> (vocational after general)	88 800		5	
<b>K</b> (higher)	196 800		8	
<b>Education by location (%)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>K</b>
Tallinn	2	3	1	4
Tartu	2	-	2	3
Pärnu	-	2	1	-
Narva	1	1	1	1
Eastern counties	1	3	-	-
Southern counties	1	3	-	-
Western counties	1	3	-	-
Mid-Estonia	1	3	-	-

Table 3. Our preliminary sample of Q-participants, as calculated on the basis of Estonian general data.

	<b>Level of education</b>			
<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>K</b>
Tallinn	2EF	3 (2RF+1EM)	1RM	4 (EM+EF+RM+RF)
Tartu	2EM		2 (EF+RF)	3 (EM+EF+RM)
Pärnu		2E (M+F)	1EF	
Narva	1RM	1RM	1RF	1RF
Eastern counties	1RF	3 (RF+EM+EF)		
Southern counties	1EM	3E (M+2F)		
Western counties	1EF	3E (2M+F)		
Mid-Estonia	1EM	3E (M+2F)		

*Symbols: E = Estonian; R = Russian; M = male; F = female;  
1 = basic education (9 years); 2 = general or vocational education on the basis of basic education;  
3 = vocational education on the basis of general education; K = higher.*

Table 4. Our final sample of Q-participants.

<sup>80</sup> Statistics Estonia, databases at [www.stat.ee](http://www.stat.ee) (15.03.2007)

Participants with necessary characteristics were carefully chosen, using snowball sampling technique and contacts from the focus group recruitment. None of the focus group interview participants were included in Q-sorting, though. Participants were contacted beforehand to ensure their willingness to participate as well as to confirm the postal address and give explanations if asked. Forty sets of statement cards, introductory letters, instructions, draft sorting tables, clean sorting tables with a short questionnaire and a stamped envelope with a return address were prepared and posted to participants (see Appendices 8 and 9).

#### **4.3.2. Analyzing data**

According to Brown, contrary to conventional beliefs, Q factor analysis is not simply another factor-analytic method among others. In R, columns are single centered around the idea of individual differences for objectively scorable traits and the elements of the sample (i.e. the persons) do not interact, whereas in Q, rows are single centered around the assumption that intraindividual differences are significant and the elements of the sample (i.e. the statements) interact with one another during the course of analysis. In R, traits are variables; in Q, the persons are.<sup>81</sup>

The patterns across individuals were therefore analyzed with the help of PQMethod, a software specially designed for Q-methodological analysis. Centroid factor analysis followed by varimax rotation was used. Each factor represents a discourse found in the general discourse of democracy in Estonia. Factors explaining the greatest amount of variation across the subjects were reported.

#### **4.3.2. Unexpected feedback**

Although it was not anticipated and no space was indicated for it on the return sheets of the Q-sort, we received altogether five anonymous feedback letters together with the Q-sorts. The main concern in the letter writers was that Estonian democracy was turning more and more elitist, with decisions taken not on behalf of the majority of the people, but in the interests of small circles who had better access to influencing the decision-making process. These opinions were consistent with the critical discourse found; more about that in the following chapter.

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<sup>81</sup> **Brown, S. R.** (1980). *Political Subjectivity: Applications of Q-methodology in Political Science*. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 55.

## 5. Results and Discussion

In remaining true to the discursive and constructionist aims of the study, in this chapter the reader will find the factor interpretations in the form of narratives. Readers unhappy with descriptions given here are, of course, welcome to create their own stories from the data that is presented.

It should be noted that, drawing on Dryzek-Holmes,<sup>82</sup> no mechanical formula was used to select the number of factors to report. While in conventional R factor analysis, a “scree test” is often used to decide on the number of factors to report based on the cumulative percentage of variance that the factors explain, in Q-methodology one is more encouraged to follow “interpretive plausibility”. So, factors most different from each other were reported. Also, the number of subjects loading on each factor was taken into account - if there were one or two people loading on a factor at the 0.1 level of significance, the factor would not be reported.

From the final output file of PQMethod software, five illustrative pieces of data have been chosen. These are given in figure form and then, in the respective sub-chapters, each factor is elaborated on. Approach is two-fold: firstly, the pure text form of the statements is interpreted, just as the participants had done; and secondly, the most and least descriptive statements are commented on, based on their position in the coding matrix (see Appendix 5).

The Estonian discourses are also compared to Dryzek-Holmes’ results from their study of thirteen post-communist countries, and some attention is given to socio-demographic characteristics of the participant loading highest on each of the factor, although no special analysis was carried out. The participants were given code-names consisting of ethnicity, sex, age group, level of education, and income (x = up to 4000EEK; y = 4001–7000EEK; z = 7001–10 000EEK; o = 10 001–15 000EEK; q = above 15 001EEK).

Finally, some possibly developments are drafted for the Estonian democratic way.

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<sup>82</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 29.

### 5.1. Data from Q-analysis

Factor Characteristics	Factors		
	1	2	3
No of Defining Variables	15	12	11
Average Rel. Coef.	0.800	0.800	0.800
Composite Reliability	0.984	0.980	0.978
S.E. of Factor Scores	0.128	0.143	0.149

Figure 2. Factor characteristics for factors 1, 2, 3.

	Correlations Between Factor Scores		
	1	2	3
1	1.0000	-0.0397	-0.2363
2	-0.0397	1.0000	0.6376
3	-0.2363	0.6376	1.0000

Figure 3. Correlation between factor scores.

Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort			
Q-SORT	Loadings		
	1	2	3
1 EFa1x	0.3549X	0.0298	-0.1332
2 EFa1x	0.3538X	0.0378	-0.1321
3 Emd2z	0.2297	0.5274X	0.2341
4 EFdkq	0.1368	0.4766X	0.3005
5 EmdKq	0.0080	0.4888	0.6558X
6 RFb2y	0.7176X	-0.0979	0.1201
7 RMe2z	-0.1508	0.6985X	0.2514
8 RFe3x	0.3940X	-0.1015	0.1274
9 RFeKq	0.4803X	0.3550	0.0629
10 RMckO	0.0661	0.4725X	-0.3568
11 EMa1x	0.6862X	0.1978	-0.2248
12 EMa1x	0.6763X	0.1969	-0.2149
13 EFc3z	0.0006	0.5583X	0.3878
14 EMckO	0.0080	0.4888	0.6558X
15 EFgKy	0.3841X	0.0127	0.1304
16 RFc3z	-0.1508	0.6985X	0.2514
17 RMckY	0.4803X	0.3550	0.0629
18 EMB2x	0.5275X	0.2055	-0.0634
19 EFe2z	0.3982	-0.2976	0.5891X
20 EFF3y	0.6726X	-0.1400	-0.3196
21 RMa1x	0.4146	0.3797	0.1951
22 Rmd2y	0.4056	0.3887	0.1852
23 RFe3y	-0.0083	0.3413X	0.0710
24 RFckz	0.7176X	-0.0979	0.1201
25 RFd1y	-0.0083	0.3413X	-0.0710
26 RFg2x	0.3456	-0.0719	0.4018X
27 EFg2x	0.0595	0.3867	0.6300X
28 EMB2o	0.0006	0.5583X	0.3878
29 EMg1y	-0.2843	0.4331X	0.1144
30 EMe2y	0.3882	-0.2876	0.5892X
31 EFF2x	0.3983	-0.2977	0.5991X
32 EFg2x	0.3456	-0.0719	0.4018X
33 EFb1x	0.5275X	0.2055	-0.0634
34 EFd2z	0.2297	0.5274X	0.2341
35 EMg2x	0.0595	0.3867	0.6300X
36 EMf2y	0.3982	-0.2976	0.5891X
37 EMe1y	0.1104	0.1557	0.3839X
38 EMf2y	0.1527	0.4538X	-0.0209
39 EFF2y	0.6826X	-0.1501	-0.3296
40 EFF2x	0.6727X	-0.1480	-0.3197
% expl.var.	16	13	12

Figure 4. Explained variance and subject loadings on factors, with an X indicating defining sorts.

Statement scores on factors		Factors		
No.	Statement	1	2	3
1	11Demokraatia on erinevate huvigruppide...	2	4	2
2	12Demokraatia on sõnavabadus, teovabadu...	-2	3	2
3	13Demokraatia ei ole võibolla parim val...	3	1	2
4	14Demokraatia on õige siis, kui enamuse...	2	-4	-2
5	21Igaühel on meie demokraatias tegelik...	-5	0	0
6	22Me ise oleme need 101 inimest seal, n...	-5	-1	1
7	23Ma usun küll, et enamuste erakondade ...	-5	0	0
8	24Uus president saab küll üsna palju te...	-2	2	-1
9	31Tööl on demokraatlik mõtlemine väga t...	-3	1	1
10	32Demokraatlik ruum meie ümber on suure...	-2	5	4
11	33Hästi töötab demokraatia kohalikul ta...	-1	1	0
12	34Demokraatiat on tunda igal pool - pa...	-2	3	3
13	41Oleme ikka paremini hakkama saanud ku...	-2	3	3
14	42Oleme läbi aegade töökad olnud, jonna...	-4	2	-1
15	43Meie noored on juba jõudnud demokraat...	-3	2	0
16	44Oleme ikka väga lühikese aja jooksul ...	-4	-1	0
17	51Mida aeg edasi, seda enam ühiskond pu...	-4	-1	5
18	52Meie seadused arenevad üha edasi sinn...	-4	3	4
19	53Kuulumine rahvusvahelistesse organisa...	-3	4	1
20	54Ilvese saamine presidendiks tähendab ...	-1	2	-1
21	61Ühiskond toimib usaldusel: kui valin ...	0	-2	1
22	62Kui inimene ei tea, kuhu ta homme oma...	3	-1	-3
23	63Demokraatial ei ole piire - kui on de...	-2	0	0
24	64Demokraatia on sisemine küpsus ja har...	5	5	3
25	71Demokraatia puhul on paratamatu, et o...	3	2	4
26	72Sellist valdkonda ei olegi, kus riigi...	2	2	-1
27	73Kodaniku roll on endaga hakkama saada...	2	1	2
28	74Avaliku elu tegelased, keda kõikjal n...	1	1	0
29	81Demokraatia saabki toimida ainult väg...	1	-5	-1
30	82Erinevates riikides töötab demokraati...	4	4	1
31	83Mida demokraatlikumaks muutub riigi v...	1	3	2
32	84Demokraatiast saab rääkida valdkondad...	1	-3	3
33	91Osa probleeme tuleb sellest, et meil ...	-1	-1	5
34	92Põhimõtteliselt on Eestis demokraatia...	-3	0	3
35	93Eesti rahval demokraatliku ühiskonna ...	1	0	1
36	94Kõik riigid peavad oma kasvuraskused ...	0	1	1
37	101Demokraatia edasiseks arenguks on kõ...	3	5	4
38	102Demokraatia tulevikust ei saa rääkid...	3	1	-5
39	103Demokraatia paratamatult küpseb pika...	0	-4	-3
40	104Kui igäüks annab igapäevaselt endast...	0	4	5
41	111Demokraatiaga on mindud liiale: ming...	-1	-4	-4
42	112Poliitiliselt surutakse maha kõik, m...	1	-3	-1
43	113Seda nimetatakse demokraatiaks, kuid...	5	-2	-4
44	114Ma ei kuule, et minu häält kuskilt s...	2	-2	-3
45	121Rahva enamik ei tunne end kodanikuna...	2	-3	-2
46	122Poliitikutel on eelkõige isiklikud a...	5	0	-2
47	123Kogu ajakirjandus ei täida seda ülim...	0	-2	-1
48	124Omal ajal oli Moskva, nüüd on Brüsse...	1	-2	-4
49	131Demokraatia kasvatuses on olulised k...	-1	-5	-2
50	132Ühiskondlikus elus on demokraatia pi...	4	0	2
51	133Erakondades demokraatia ei toimi: kõ...	4	-1	-3
52	134Turumajandusele ja kapitalismile ehi...	4	-3	-5
53	141Meie demokraatia on tihtiväga primit...	0	-1	-2
54	142Abituse tunne, loidus ja argus on ee...	0	-4	-1
55	143Meil puudub ühtekuuluvus: kui ühele ...	1	1	1
56	144Meie häda on meie rahvaarv: meid on ...	-1	-2	0
57	151Demokraatial ei ole tulevikku, sest ...	-3	-5	-4
58	152Ohtlik meie demokraatia arengule on ...	-1	0	-3
59	153Mida enam edasi läheb see demokraati...	0	-3	-5
60	154Suur oht meie demokraatialle on see, ...	-1	-1	-2

Figure 5. Statement scores on factors 1, 2, 3.

Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 1		
No.	Statement	Z-SCORES
46	122Poliitikutel on eelkõige isiklikud a...	1.959
43	113Seda nimetatakse demokraatiaks, kuid...	1.711
24	64Demokraatia on sisemine küpsus ja har...	1.672
52	134Turumajandusele ja kapitalismile ehi...	1.591
50	132Ühiskondlikus elus on demokraatia pi...	1.579
18	52Meie seadused arenevad üha edasi sinn...	-1.343
16	44Oleme ikka väga lühikese aja jooksul ...	-1.511
5	21Igaühel on meie demokraatias tegelik...	-1.582
7	23Ma usun küll, et enamuste erakondade ...	-1.625
6	22Me ise oleme need 101 inimest seal, n...	-2.378
Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 2		
No.	Statement	Z-SCORES
24	64Demokraatia on sisemine küpsus ja har...	1.605
37	101Demokraatia edasiseks arenguks on kõ...	1.520
10	32Demokraatlik ruum meie ümber on suure...	1.470
19	53Kuulumine rahvusvahelistesse organisa...	1.459
40	104Kui igaüks annab igapäevaselt endast...	1.447
41	111Demokraatiaga on mindud liiale: ming...	-1.464
4	14Demokraatia on õige siis, kui enamuse...	-1.551
57	151Demokraatial ei ole tulevikku, sest ...	-1.624
29	81Demokraatia saabki toimida ainult väg...	-1.789
49	131Demokraatia kasvatuses on olulised k...	-1.870
Normalized Factor Scores -- For Factor 3		
No.	Statement	Z-SCORES
40	104Kui igaüks annab igapäevaselt endast...	1.968
17	51Mida aeg edasi, seda enam ühiskond pu...	1.444
33	91Osa probleeme tuleb sellest, et meil ...	1.441
37	101Demokraatia edasiseks arenguks on kõ...	1.420
18	52Meie seadused arenevad üha edasi sinn...	1.361
43	113Seda nimetatakse demokraatiaks, kuid...	-1.474
48	124Omal ajal oli Moskva, nüüd on Brüsse...	-1.482
52	134Turumajandusele ja kapitalismile ehi...	-1.729
38	102Demokraatia tulevikust ei saa rääkid...	-1.909
59	153Mida enam edasi läheb see demokraati...	-2.220

Figure 6. The five most descriptive and the five least descriptive statements for factors 1, 2, 3.

## 5.2. Discourse One – Condemnation of Elitism

*Most characteristic statements:*

*122-Politicians serve first and foremost their own ambitions, they behave as if they were outside the law, no responsibility is taken whatsoever; 113-It is called democracy, but actually it is an illusion - everyone is listened to, but in the end the decisions are still made in the interest of a small group.*

*Least characteristic statements:*

*22-We are the 101 persons there [in the parliament], so they actually work very well as a mirror; 23-I really do believe that in most parties it is possible to take decisions according to one's own conscience.*

Factor 1 clearly represents a discourse which is highly critical towards the present condition of democracy in Estonia, as well as the development towards it during the last 15+ years. It is described by disillusionment with the post-soviet *status quo* and is critical of both politics and economy of today's Estonia. Politicians are using their position of power to fulfill their personal goals, they cannot be considered representatives of the electorate – this hierarchical game of representative democracy does not work, since it excludes ordinary people.

Discourse One does not also see much good in market economy and capitalism as a way to run economy in a democratic society, because it creates inequality and corruption, as well as is considered one of the obstacles in achieving true democracy. The Discourse does acknowledge inner maturity and intelligence to be necessary for a democratic system to work, but taking into account the way the power elites are behaving, they lack these qualities.

Still, in its criticism, Discourse One is not very constructive – it does not seem to be idealizing any other (especially the previous) system of governing, or making any suggestions about who or what could improve the present situation. If anything, it is laying all the responsibility onto the shoulders of the power elite – they are the ones responsible for the mess, whereas not much power, potential or responsibility is invested into the hands of the electorate. This may, however, speak secretly of the remains of the previous regime where the people were also kept out of decision-making and discouraged from sharing both power and responsibility.

Discourse One does also seem to be lacking any hopes (or fears, for that matter) for the future. It is a static criticism, with especially characteristic of its negativism being the fact that four out of the five most descriptive statements were coded *negative* in the coding matrix, and all the ones it is opposing to belong to the *positive* category of statements.

A look at the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents who have loaded highest for this factor tells us that there are three groups of people behind Discourse One: a) relatively highly educated Russian-speakers in their 30s and 40s; b) Estonian-speaking young people (below 26 years of age), probably students; c) older generation (above 56 years of age) of Estonian-speaking females, probably retired. Negativism described by the Factor 1 may result either from the recently observed scandals and corruption cases, or in the personally experienced inequalities and exclusion. Both may apply for the c-group (high sense of right and wrong, spiced with the low income and a relatively low standard of living), but for Russophones the reason for criticism may lie on wider grounds of the relatively lower standard of living and less opportunities for inclusion of the whole Russian population, compared to Estonian-speakers. Young Estonian-speakers are somewhat a mystery, though. They could – consciously or subconsciously – be representing the semi-organized critical nationalist movement of the political establishment, or their opinions may just be a more general expression of their *restless years*.

As for Dryzek's and Holmes' study, the closest discourses to Estonia's *Condemnation of Elitism* are probably what they have called *Disaffected Egalitarianism* of Czechia and *Disaffected Majoritarianism* of Poland. Both of them can be described as disillusionment with the democratic ways and condemnation of social, economic and political inequality, as well as criticizing the power of money, political game-playing and democracy being used as a disguise. Still, both the Czech and the Polish discourses are seeking better democracy in the future, whereas in that the Estonian discourse is closer to the Chinese *Alienated Egalitarianism* which has been described as discontented and cynical.



### 5.3. Discourse Two – Idealistic Intellectuality

*Most characteristic statements:*

*64-Democracy is inner maturity and cultivation which the people must reach at themselves in order to be able to consider their rights as well as obligations; 101-Most important in the developments of democracy is the individual and his intellectual cultivation.*

*Least characteristic statements:*

*131-In cultivation of democracy, the most important factors are the home and the school, but our children get absolutely no guidance from either; 81-Democracy can only work at a very low level – the smaller the group, the more democracy there is.*

Factor 2 represents a discourse which holds inherent intellectual qualities of the whole population most important. It is a peaceful, neutral, even somewhat naive discourse, considering democracy to be a natural outcome of an intellectual development. Therefore, the regime in place in Estonia is just the proof of people of Estonia possessing the necessary qualities and of Estonia filling its rightful place in the worldwide categorization of countries and organizations with similar qualities.

Democracy is at work everywhere (both most descriptive and least descriptive statements cover all the *x-dimension* categories of the coding matrix), and no *transitional* or *past-related* problems seem to matter in Discourse Two. Democracy is viewed not so much as a clearly defined system, but a state of mind which only has positive connotations and which knows no limits. Therefore, no distinction between who rules over whom is relevant here, and no-one or nothing can be defined as having the responsibility for maintaining it – it maintains itself, once achieved. Democracy operates as an idealistic umbrella-term for people of high moral qualities living together in an international space which is not necessarily defined by states and organizations, as often is the approach of a branch of political science studying international relations, but by a shared mindset.

*Positive neutrality* of Discourse Two is also evident in the fact that out of the five most descriptive statements, three belong to the *neutral* category of the coding matrix (remaining two are *positive*) and four out of the five least descriptive statements had been coded *negative*.

A closer examination of socio-demographic characteristics reveals a group of people, both Estonian- and Russian-speakers, with an income clearly above the average of the individuals representing the previously described discourse. So, Discourse Two can be defined as a discourse of those benefiting under the present political and economic regime, although there is no sense of materialism or self-interest *in the air*. The representation of Estonians and Russians behind this discourse is almost equal, further giving an impression of democracy as an arrangement in which people co-exist happily, regardless their ethnicity (or other possible indicators of social status).

The contentment of Discourse Two may have two sources. Firstly, it may result from a relatively self-centered outlook – the participants loading high on Factor 2 may find nothing wrong with the society, because they are willing to generalize their own experience onto the whole population and not notice or believe into the importance of possible problems in the society. Their contentment could, however, be also fed by narrower and more recent societal events, such as the last presidential elections, which could be viewed as proofs for the naturally right way or even as democratic tests which Estonia has passed so successfully that there is no need for discontentment or concern for either present, past, or the future. Either way, Discourse Two seems to represent emotions and perceptions, rather than expressions of analytic and calculated opinions.

In the context of the Dryzek-Holmes' study, Estonia's *Idealistic Intellectuality* is most similar to *Prosperous Contentment* of Ukraine. Both the Estonian and Ukrainian discourses are explained in their satisfaction with the present situation (although that is, according to several political and economic indicators, different in each of the countries), and Dryzek and Holmes have, very suitably for Estonia's *Idealistic Intellectuality*, described Ukrainian *Prosperous Contentment* as a *dream-land*.

#### 5.4. Discourse Three – Positive Development Despite the Past

*Most characteristic statements:*

*104-Things will start to change when everyone starts doing their best and thinking democratically every day; 51-The more time passes, the cleaner the society will become: the ones not turning democratic will have to step aside, and so there will be more democracy.*

*Least characteristic statements:*

*153-The further the democracy goes and the longer we are free, the more we lose our culture, traditions, uniqueness; 102-Democratic development can not be spoken about until economic levers are used to make things happen.*

Factor 3 represents a discourse which is also clearly positive about both the political and economic changes that occurred when independent Estonia opted for a democratic regime after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, compared to Discourse 2, it is much more grounded and its reasons for optimism are clearly based on the changes that have occurred.

So, when Discourse Two was somewhat “timeless” in its evaluation, Discourse Three does acknowledge the recent past that Estonia has come from and the possible mental transformations that people of Estonia need to go through in order to become democratic in the true sense of the term. Estonia’s democracy is young, but in the course of time the generations of the previous order will be replaced by new ones, born and raised in democracy.

The future is also expressed in Discourse Three (six of the ten most/least characteristic statements for this factor were coded under the label of *Future of democracy*) – the further direction of the changes is not questioned. The self-cleansing process of the society is seen as self-evident and unstoppable, the development of the legal system and the overall arrangement of both political and economic ways of running the society are considered unthreatened – democracy is clearly *the only game in town*.

As for the structure of the statements, three of five most descriptive statements were labelled *neutral* in the matrix; four of the five least descriptive ones were *negative*.

In socio-demographic terms, Discourse Three is predominantly an Estonian discourse – out of eleven people loading highest on Factor 3, only one is a Russian-speaker. This further carries the idea of the Discourse in the distinction between *then* and *now*, with the former being captured in terms like *Soviet Union* and *Russian-speakers*, and the latter defining the *Estonian-ness* that followed after re-gaining independence in 1991.

Also, Discourse Three is a relatively *old* discourse – people having loaded highest on Factor 3 belong predominantly to the generations born before 1950. This is consistent with an interpretation given earlier, stating that Discourse Three is grounded in its positive evaluations – people having come of age deep in the Soviet years have seen enough of the two different regimes to be able to ground their arguments.

Quite the reverse explanation could, however, be that the groundedness is a mere surface to an attitude of *everything back then was bad and everything now is good* which could be seen plausible in the relatively low levels of education represented in this group (general or vocational after basic). Here, further research (e.g. in the form of individual interviews) would help to draw conclusions.

In the results reported by Dryzek and Holmes, one cannot find a discourse quite similar to Estonia's *Positive Development Despite the Past*. There are several which distinguish sharply between the present and the previous regimes and a) either see democracy as part of the country's future (e.g. Yugoslavia's *Democratic Future* and *Participatory Self-Management*, Moldova's *Democratic Development*, Slovakia's *Developing Pluralism*), or b) long for the days gone by (e.g. Belarus' *Presidential Populism*, Russia's *Reactionary Anti-Liberalism* and *Authoritarian Development*), but the key element in those discourses is strong criticism which is absent in *Positive Development Despite the Past* of Estonia. The most similar, given the time-gap between the two countries' developments, might be Georgia's *Democratic Enthusiasm* which is less naive about the possible threats of young democracy (ethnic conflict, corruption, deep social cleavages), but it still maintains its optimism because negative experiences are not seen as failures of democracy as such.

### *5.5. Prospects for Estonian Democracy*

When following the Dryzek-Holmes' categorization of post-communist countries into either pre-transition countries (China and Yugoslavia), halting transitions (Belarus, Russia, Ukraine), transitions torn by war (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova), late developers (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria) or trailblazers (Poland and Czechia), it is the easiest – and most pleasing to Estonians themselves – to place Estonia into the trailblazers' camp. Indeed, there are several similarities. With Poland, Estonia shares the reputation of a rebel even under communism, and with Czechia, the title of countries most likely to succeed with post-soviet democratization, whatever that actually means.

The results of the research carried out for this thesis do not state the absolute opposite. Differently from discourses found in countries belonging to other groups, Estonia, just like Czechia and Poland, lacks a discourse which would challenge the present regime and explicitly advocate for a form of government that has existed or might exist somewhere else in time or space. So, it is reasonable, based on data gathered for this thesis, to suggest that Estonia a) is on the right tracks, and b) is unlikely to face forces, either from inside or out, that would push it off this path, since higher living standards will start reaching the less well-off social groups as well, and Estonia has firmly settled in to an international system favouring the continuation of present developments.

Still, there are a couple of specific facts to mention which may, in the wider philosophical approach of this thesis, give reasons for concern. Namely, Estonia's discourses of democracy seem to be somewhat void of identifiable and conscious actors, or, as in the case of Discourse One, they are considered to be negative characters or have been denied functions. This could already be anticipated from the first round of data creation, but is further evident in the fact that statements having been labelled as *Who is democracy* in the coding matrix (starting with numbers 2, 7 and 12) are least represented in the two positive discourses and serve a negative purpose in the critical one.

Also, none of the discourses are especially definitive about what democracy is, or, for that matter, is not. Although defining democracy was in the very beginning of the focus group question routes (see Appendices 1 and 2) and produced quite a number of either positive, negative or neutral statements, the second round of participants do not seem to have connected to statements starting with numbers 1, 6 and 11. It is therefore plausible to suggest that Estonian democracy may face an identity crisis if democracy is not defined by anything else but a list of qualities, which, in effect, on a practical level include no real entities to whom the qualities can be ascribed to.

#### **5.5.1. Dryzek-Holmes' four roads**

Although “squeezing out more taxonomies” and “contemplate further the causes of cross-national differences and similarities” is not what Dryzek and Holmes aim at in their study, they still draw a map of democracy with four possible directions for a post-soviet country to take. These include a liberal road, a republican road, a participatory road and a statist one.

The liberal road is possible for those countries in which the discourses talk about aggregation and reconciliation, and a system of neutral constitutional rules which regulate competition and specify the individual rights against government. Relevant discourses have been found in China, Belarus, Russia, and Romania. The republican road is somewhat similar to the liberal one, but discourages material interests and is, in addition, characterized by active, public-spirited citizenship, with political actors striving for discovering and creating common interests. Here Poland and Czechia take the lead. According to the authors, the participatory road has not been explored by any of the post-communist countries, because they tend to believe that it places unrealistic demands on the political capacity of ordinary people, since it further stresses the need for an active citizenry. Still, participatory discourses were found in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and China, and also in the *disaffected* discourses of Poland and Czechia. Finally, the statist road is described by a strong state, an effective leadership, resisting both authoritarianism and anarchy. Discourses relevant for this road are often found in where civil society is weak, the society is deeply divided and corruption and crime rampant; in the authors' view in Russia, Armenia and Georgia.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Dryzek & Holmes, p. 268–273.

Based on the three discourses revealed in the data presented in this thesis, Estonia cannot be firmly placed onto any of these roads. Discourse One seems to be advocating for an effective government acting in the interest of wider audience, rather than themselves or small interest-groups, so here a strong statist notion can be seen.

Discourse Two, on the other hand, does not seem to be representing any of the roads proposed by Dryzek and Holmes, since it expresses no liberal *free-market* ideas for the liberal road, does not yearn for a strong state for a statist road, and for republican and participatory roads, as mentioned earlier, it does not define the active actors needed to pursue these roads. In fact, in its idealism, naivety and *dream-landiness*, it is difficult to see any elements of practical, day-to-day involvement in statelike affairs. Hence, the suitable road for this discourse could be called *absentism*. It takes for granted that the state gets run and things get done in the best way, because the fact that Estonia can be defined democratic is based on the best qualities of its people, therefore there is no need for active participation by the citizenry – it is okay to *be absent* from the affairs connected to governing. The fact that it may, in the end, bring about elitist power games, does not seem to be of concern.

Discourse Three of Estonia is also hard to place on any of the four roads described by Dryzek and Holmes. It is not statist because it does not advocate for a *firm hold*, but its lack of actors does not make it suitable for republican or participatory roads either. Still, it is not as *absent-minded* as Discourse Two, although it does ascribe a *fatalistic*, self-evident element to the democratic development. Therefore, a name for a possible democratic road suitable for this discourse could be *progressive self-maintenance*. This incorporates the idea of an on-going development and changing the way things were in the past, as well as the self-evident and self-regulatory elements that are ascribed to democracy in Estonia.

It should be remembered, though, that all the possible taxonomies are mere constructions which, on one hand, represent ideal types, and, on the other, always make room for more.

## 6. Conclusions

In this Master's Thesis, **political subjectivity** was studied, using focus group interviewing and Q-methodological factor analysis. The aim of the research was an attempt to map the possible **discourses of democracy in Estonia** as part of a research project launched under the guidance and finances of the Department of Political Science at Tartu University in autumn 2007. Only the research carried out in person by the author of this thesis was described.

More precisely, the research was inspired by a similar study carried out by John S. Dryzek and Leslie T. Holmes, and designed in a broader framework of Social Constructionism and qualitative approach to give **answers to the following questions:** a) what are the discourses of democracy like in Estonia? b) how is democracy viewed and talked about in Estonia? c) what kind of people are behind the different discourses of democracy? and d) where do Estonia's discourses stand in the context of the results of the study by Dryzek and Holmes?

In the first round of data creation, ten **focus group interviews** were carried out with 47 Estonian-speakers and 21 Russian-speakers in different locations all over Estonia from October to December 2006. The interviews lasted for 2–3 hours, during which the participants were asked to discuss topics given by moderators. The interviews were recorded and transcribed.

In the second round, statements about democracy were selected from the transcripts of focus group interviews, and coded into fifteen categories, using a modified matrix for political discourse analysis. Then, sixty statements were chosen to the Q-sample and forty carefully chosen participants were asked to rank the statements to produce their own unique Q-sort. Finally, **Q-methodological factor analysis** was carried out, using a special software PQMethod.

Here, a short comment about the methodology is in order. Focus group interviews turned out to be highly productive in terms of statements, so there was no need for any other sources to be used. Dryzek and Holmes had used a pre-designed coding



matrix as their theoretical model, and were therefore left with some empty cells as well as statements not consistent with any of the theoretical categories. In analysis done for this thesis, this was purposefully avoided in order not to mix possibly different discourses of “ordinary people” and the media. Therefore, the theoretical model used for coding here was designed *post factum* to ensure it reflected the data gathered.

As a result, the answers to our research questions were the following:

a) Q factor analysis revealed **3 distinctive factors** which were interpreted as discourses One, Two and Three, called *Condemnation of Elitism*, *Idealistic Intellectuality* and *Positive Development Despite the Past*, respectively. The first of the discourses is the only critical one, condemning both political and economic behaviour of today’s Estonia. Politicians are using their position of power to fulfill their personal materialistic goals, they cannot be considered representatives of the electorate. Still, ***Condemnation of Elitism*** is rather passive in its criticism, because it does not advocate openly for any change towards any other possible regimes.

***Idealistic Intellectuality*** and ***Positive Development Despite the Past*** are both positive in nature, but the former is thoroughly philosophical and impractical, defining democracy as an idealistic umbrella-term for people of high moral qualities living together in space defined by a shared mindset. The third of the discourses is more grounded and argumentative – it distinguishes between Estonia’s past, present and future and sees democracy as a mental (and later on, behavioural) transformation. Still, no criticism or even doubts are expressed within this discourse, clearly considering democratic development “the only game in town”.

b) Two distinctive features were observed in how the democracy is – or is not – viewed in Estonia. Firstly, Estonia’s discourses of democracy seem to be somewhat **void of identifiable and conscious actors** – they lack both *people* and other possible political subjects, such as the state, the government, the electorate, and the like. Paradoxically, participants in the survey have erased themselves from the formula *demos + cratos*.

Secondly, the discourses are **not very definitive about the direct meaning** of democracy – participants did not seem to be connecting to statements about what democracy is. Therefore, one might detect a possible identity crisis if democracy is only defined by an obscure a list of moral qualities, with no real entities to ascribe the qualities to.

c) Although no special socio-demographic analysis was carried out by the author of this thesis, code names for participants filling in Q-sorts enables to draw some conclusions about who was behind each of the discourse. *Condemnation of Elitism* was, for instance, mainly characterized by relatively young, well-off and educated Russian-speakers on one hand, and an older generation of low-income and less educated Estonian females. Probable reasons for that might be wider concern for economic, political and social exclusion of fellow-Russians for the former group, and strong sense of right and wrong coupled with personal hardships for the latter.

*Idealistic Intellectuality* was mainly an expression of both Estonians and Russians, with an income clearly above the average, constituting a group who must be satisfied with the present political and economic system. *Positive Development Despite the Past* is a pure Estonian discourse and an older one which may speak of a knowledgeable decision taken in favour of *now*, rather than *then*, based on clear arguments grounded in personal experience.

d) Dryzek and Holmes produce **two different taxonomies** in their study. The first one categorizes post-communist countries into pre-transition countries, halting transitions, transitions torn by war, late developers, and trailblazers. Here, it is not difficult to position Estonia into the last group of countries together with Poland and Czechia. The second categorization Dryzek and Holmes give drafts the possible democratic road for a country, with the options to choose from being liberal, republican, participatory and statist. Here, positioning Estonia's discourses is not so easy. Discourse One seems to fit with the statist road of democracy, but for Discourse Two and Discourse Three, new possible roads were named, *absentism* and *progressive self-maintenance*, respectively. It was concluded, though, that for a qualitative researcher, the interpretive constructionist road is endless, so no taxonomy can exhaust the possible trajectories of democratization.

Conclusions which can be drawn from the study described in this thesis can be summarized as follows:

- Although qualitative research and studies of subjectivity do not belong to the mainstream Political Science, they can open up a whole new sphere of interest and should therefore used with greater courage.
- Democracy, although an ancient concept, has still enough substance to feed debates, discussions and even warfare, resulting from different understandings of the same term. Therefore, to accompany the more objectively measurable indicators of democratic development, closer inspection of meanings, connotations and language used in connection to democracy is in order.
- The methodological design used in research presented in this thesis, as well as the final interpretation of the results, should not be viewed as a ready-made and fully advisable package for studies of political or any other subjectivity, but should be taken as an idea to modify and play with.

This M. A. thesis is the result of my independent research. All ideas and concepts borrowed from the works of other authors and sources have been provided with proper references.

Irja Toots  
May 4, 2007

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## **Appendices**

## *Appendix 1: Focus Group Question Routes (in Estonian)*

1. Demokraatia palju kuulnud/kasutatud sõna – mida see teie jaoks tähendab...?  
Kuidas te iseloomustaksite demokraatiat?  
Mis on demokraatias oluline? (jooned, aspektid, ...)  
Valimised, osalus, kodanikuühiskond, jne...  
Kui oluline see demokraatia üldse on?  
Kui oluline demokraatia teie igapäevaelus?  
Kui oluline poliitika teie igapäevaelus?  
Oliver Kruuda väide, et tugevakäeline juht on parim – mida arvate?
2. Kuidas on teie arvates lood demokraatiaga Eestis?  
Mõelge protsessile, mis algas 15a tagasi – milline on olnud areng?  
Millise hinnangu annaksite Eesti demokraatiale?  
On elu parananud? Halvenenud?  
(Kuidas teie arvates minevik meid mõjutab? Naaberriigid? Muud tegurid?)
3. Millega te ei ole rahul meie demokraatia toimimises?  
Millised on suurimad probleemid?  
Millele peaksime teie arvates rohkem tähelepanu pöörama?  
Kuidas kitsaskohti teie arvates lahendada saaks?
4. Millega te olete rahul, mis on teie arvates hästi?  
Mida peaksime hoidma/jätkama/edasi arendama samal kursil?  
Kas me sellist Eestit tahtsimegi? ☺
5. Et lõpetada vaatega tulevikku:  
Milline võiks Eesti demokraatia olla 15a pärast?  
Milliste arengutega te oleks rahul, millistega mitte?  
Kui te saaks Eesti poliitilist süsteemi muuta, siis kuidas/mida muudaksite?  
Milline oleks nn ideaalvariant?

Kas on veel mõtteid, repliike...?

Kas on veel mingeid teemasid, mida me pole arutanud, aga võiks...?



## *Appendix 2: Focus Group Question Routes (in Russian)*

1. Слово «демократия» часто произносится/используется – что это слово значит для вас...?

Как бы вы охарактеризовали демократию?

Что важно в демократии? (признаки, аспекты, ...)

Выборы, участие, гражданское общество и т.д....

Насколько вообще важна эта демократия?

Насколько важна демократия в вашей будничной жизни?

Насколько важна политика в вашей будничной жизни?

Что вы думаете об утверждении Оливера Крууда, что самое лучшее – это жесткий руководитель?

2. Как, по-вашему, обстоят дела с демократией в Эстонии?

Подумайте о процессе, начавшемся 15 лет назад – какой прогресс был сделан?

Какую оценку вы бы дали демократии в Эстонии?

Жизнь стала лучше? Хуже?

(Как, по-вашему, влияет на нас прошлое? Соседние государства? Прочие факторы?)

3. Чем вы недовольны в функционировании нашей демократии?

Какие проблемы самые серьезные?

На что, по-вашему, мы должны обращать больше внимания?

Как, по-вашему, можно было бы решить проблемы узких мест?

4. Чем вы довольны, в какой области, по-вашему, дела обстоят хорошо?

Что следует удерживать/продолжать/развивать в том же направлении?

Хотелось ли нам именно такой Эстонии? ☺

5. В завершение, взгляд в будущее:

Какой могла бы быть демократия в Эстонии через 15 лет?

Какими изменениями вы были бы довольны, а какими нет?

Если бы вы могли изменить политическую систему Эстонии, то как/что вы бы изменили в ней?

Каким был бы т.н. идеальный вариант?

Если ли еще какие-либо мысли, замечания...?

Может быть, есть еще темы, которые мы не обсудили, хотя должны были бы обсудить?

### *Appendix 3. Focus Group Feedback Form (in Estonian)*

Veidi teie endi kohta:

Sugu	M	N
Vanus	18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+	
Amet	.....	
Haridus	põhiharidus keskharidus keskeriharidus kõrgharidus (bakalaureus) kõrgem (teaduslik kraad vms)	
Rahvus	eesti vene muu (palun täpsustage)	

Kas olete mõne poliitilise partei liige?	JAH	EI
--	-----	----

Kas olete mõne muu organisatsiooni liige	JAH	EI
--	-----	----

Millise?

Kas käisite valimas viimastel üldvalimistel (2003)?

Kui soovite, siis märkige põhjus, miks

Kas plaanite minna valima järgmistel üldvalimistel (2007)?

Kui soovite, siis märkige põhjus, miks

Millised on teie kommentaarid/tähelepanekud fookusgrupi kohta?  
Soovitused läbiviijatele?



## Appendix 5: Coding Matrix

	<b>WHAT is democracy</b>	<b>WHO is democracy</b>	<b>WHERE is democracy</b>	<b>Cultural features</b>	<b>Future of democracy</b>
<b>Positive statement</b>	Definitions, descriptions, qualities ascribed to democracy in Estonia which people are happy /pleased with <b>1</b>	Actors (individuals, organisations, institutions, other entities) mentioned in connection to democracy in Estonia which people are happy /pleased with <b>2</b>	Places, social classes, parts/levels of society where democracy is stated to exist in a form which people are happy /pleased with <b>3</b>	Cultural and/or historical features stated to affect democracy in Estonia which people are happy /pleased with <b>4</b>	Predictions for developments in democracy in Estonia which people are happy /pleased with <b>5</b>
<b>Neutral statement (of fact)</b>	Definitions, descriptions, qualities ascribed to democracy in Estonia which people are neutral to <b>6</b>	Actors (individuals, organisations, institutions, other entities) mentioned in connection to democracy in Estonia which people are neutral to <b>7</b>	Places, social classes, parts/levels of society where democracy is stated to exist in a form which people are neutral to <b>8</b>	Cultural and/or historical features stated to affect democracy in Estonia which people are neutral to <b>9</b>	Predictions for developments in democracy in Estonia which people are neutral to <b>10</b>
<b>Negative statement</b>	Definitions, descriptions, qualities ascribed to democracy in Estonia which people are NOT happy /pleased with <b>11</b>	Actors (individuals, organisations, institutions, other entities) mentioned in connection to democracy in Estonia which people are NOT happy /pleased with <b>12</b>	Places, social classes, parts/levels of society where democracy is stated to exist in a form which people are NOT happy /pleased with <b>13</b>	Cultural and/or historical features stated to affect democracy in Estonia which people are NOT happy /pleased with <b>14</b>	Predictions for developments in democracy in Estonia which people are NOT happy /pleased with <b>15</b>

Appendix 6: Q-Sample of Statements (in Estonian)

11. Demokraatia on erinevate huvigruppide vaheline pidev dialoog, aktiivne ühisosa otsimine ja läbirääkimiste pidamine.	62. Kui inimene ei tea, kuhu ta homme oma pea paneb ja suutäie saab, siis ei huvita teda, kas on demokraatia või midagi muud. Demokraatia sõltub heaolust.	113. Seda nimetatakse demokraatiaks, kuid see on tegelikult näiline – kuulatakse küll kõik ära, kuid langetatakse ikka otsused mingi kitsa huvigrupil huvides.	24. Uus president saab küll üsna palju teha, et muuta asju demokraatlikumaks.	121. Rahva enamik ei tunne end kodanikuna, ta ei ole suuteline võimu kandma: kodanikud räägivad ainult õigustest, aga kohustuste peale ei mõtle üldse.	32. Demokraatlik ruum meile ümber on suurenenud, saab teistelt riikidelt abi ja eeskujut. Saab malli võtta, ei pea jalgratast leiutama.
12. Demokraatia on sõnavabadus, teo- vabadus, usu- vabadus: võime kohtuda, kellega tahame, kus tahame, ja rääkida, millest tahame.	63. Demokraatia ei ole piire – kui on demokraatia, siis on paratamatult kõigil ühiskonnas sõnaõigus.	114. Ma ei kuule, et minu häält kuskilt sealt mäe otsast kostaks, ilmselt siis keegi ei esinda mind.	71. Demokraatia puhul on paratamatult, et on igasugused vahemused ja huvigrupid, kes saavad asjadest erinevalt aru.	122. Poliitikutel on eelkõige isiklikud ambitsioonid, nad on justkui väljaspool seadust, mingit vastutust oma tegude eest ei võeta.	33. Hästi töötab demokraatia kohalikul tasandil, kus võimu esindajad saavad inimestega otse suhelda.
13. Demokraatia ei ole võimalik parim valitsemisvorm, aga midagi paremat pole inimkond siiani välja ka mõelnud.	64. Demokraatia on sisemine küpsus ja haritus, milleni rahvas ise peab jõudma, et arvestada nii oma õiguste kui ka kohustustega.	21. Igaühel on meie demokraatias tegelikult võimalik kaasa rääkida ja osaleda.	72. Sellist valdkonda ei olegi, kus riigi seksuolegi, mis poleks, sest mingil tasemel on regulatsioonid vajalikud igas valdkonnas.	123. Kogu ajakirjandus ei täida seda ülimat ja tõelist rolli, mis ajakirjandusel on, vaid tegelikult ju lammutab demokraatiat.	34. Demokraatiat on tunda igal pool – paremaks on läinud nii majanduslikult kui vaimselt, saame ise teha valikuid, otsustada oma elu üle.
14. Demokraatia on õige siis, kui enamuse sõna ühiskonnas maksab vähemuse üle.	111. Demokraatiaga on mindud liiale: mingeid piire ega reegleid ei ole, kõik teevad, mis ise tahavad.	22. Me ise oleme need 101 inimest seal, nii et tegelikult on nad väga heaks peeglik.	73. Kodaniku roll on endaga hakkama saada ja võimalust mõõda riigi toimimisele kaasa aidata.	124. Omal ajal oli Moskva, nüüd on Brüssel: aina allume, oma peaga ei mõtle ja muutume jälle passiivseteks.	81. Demokraatia saabki toimida ainult väga väikeses rühmas: mida madalam grupp, seda suurem demokraatia.
61. Ühiskond toimib usaldusel: kui valin poliitiku, siis usaldan riigi valitsemise tema kätte ja mul on õigus rohkem sellega ise mitte tegeleda.	112. Poliitiliselt surutakse maha kõik, mis alt-poolt tuleb: osalemist tegelikult ei püütagi juurutada, inimeste käest ei küsita ja siis ei tule ka otsuseid.	23. Ma usun küll, et enamuste erakondade sees on ikka võimalik otsustada omaenda sündamatusnustuse järgi.	74. Avaliku elu tegelased, keda kõigjal näeme, on tegelikult need, kes ju suunavad ka meie väärtusi. Nende roll on olla eeskujuks ja teenida rahvast.	31. Töö on demokraatlik mõtlemine väga tunnetav: on võimalused oma arvamuse avaldamiseks, neid arutatakse ja võetakse arvesse.	82. Erinevates riikides töötab demokraatia erinevalt, ei saa alati malli võtta ja kopeerida.

83. Mida demokraatlikumaks muutub riigi valitsemine, seda enam areneb demokraatia teistes valdkondades.	134. Turumajandusele ja kapitalismile ehitatud ühiskonnas ei saagi mingit demokraatiat olla, raha määrab kõik suhted.	91. Osa probleeme tuleb sellest, et meil on noor demokraatia, natuke peame ootama, kuni vana korra põlvkonnad vahetuvad.	142. Abituse tunne, loiidus ja argus on eestlasel liiga sees, ja see ei lase sel demokraatlikul ühiskonnal ka nii hästi funktsioneerida, kui reeglid lubaksid.	53. Kuulumine rahvusvahelisesse organisatsioonis vähendab hirmu endiste ohtude ees ja kindlustab meie demokraatlikku riigikorda.	104. Kui igaüks annab igapäevaselt endast parima ja hakkab mõtlema, siis asjad hakkavad ka muutuma.
84. Demokraatiast saab rääkida valdkondade kaupa: mis on majanduses demokraatia, mis ühiskonnaelus, mis poliitikas.	41. Oleme ikka paremini hakkama saanud kui paljud meie "saatusekaaslased"-riigid, sest kõik erinevad rahvused ju ei taha mujale minna.	92. Põhimõtteliselt on Eestis demokraatia just selline, nagu ta ongi, ta peab lihtsalt Eesti näo saama.	143. Meil puudub ühte kuuluvus: kui ühele tehakse liiga, ei hakka näiteks ametiühing streikima.	54. Ilvese saamine presidendiks tähendab väga palju positiivset meie demokraatia edasisele arengule.	151. Demokraatial ei ole tulevikku, sest noored lähevad ära.
131. Demokraatia kasvatuses on olulised kodu ja haridus, aga meie lapsed ei saa mingisuguseid harjumusi ei kodust ega koolist.	42. Oleme läbi aegade töökad olnud, jonnakus ja visadus aitavad meid rasketest aegadest üle ja oma tarkuses suudame küll oma demokraatiat teha.	93. Eesti rahval demokraatliku ühiskonna traditsioon praktiliselt puudub, seepärast me ei käitu ka nii nagu vanades demokraatiates.	144. Meie häda on meie rahvaarv: meid on liiga vähe ja selle võrra on ka rahval vähe neid, kelle hulgast valida.	101. Demokraatia edasiseks arenguks on kõige olulisem inimene ja tema haritus.	152. Ohtlik meie demokraatia arengule on see, kui me ei suuda ennast kehtestada ja jääme ääremaadeks.
132. Ühiskondlikus elus on demokraatia piiratud, mingitel tasanditel ikkagi saadakse kodanikuühiskonnast väga erinevalt aru.	43. Meie noored on juba jõudnud demokraatlikus ühiskonnas elada, nad ei oska midagi karta, nad on ilma näinud ja nende silmaring on avaram.	94. Kõik riigid peavad oma kasvuraskused millaski üle elama, et demokraatlikuks saada.	51. Mida aeg edasi, seda enam ühiskond puhastub: kes demokraatlikuks ei muutu, peavad kõrvale astuma, nii saab ka demokraatiat rohkem.	102. Demokraatia tulevikust ei saa rääkida senikaua, kuni majanduslike hoobade kaudu kõike juhitakse.	153. Mida enam edasi läheb see demokraatia, mida kauem me oleme vabad, seda vähem on meil oma kultuuri, oma traditsiooni ja eripära.
133. Erakondades demokraatia ei toimi: kõikides neis mängib rolli ainult parteipoliitika ja "õigesti" hääletamine.	44. Oleme ikka väga lühikese aja jooksul saavutanud selle, et kõik meetodid ja mängumaa meil hästi paigas ja toimivad.	141. Meie demokraatia on tihtivõimalikult primitiivne tasemel, me ei ole jõudnud veel kohanda, elame ikka alles nõuka-ajast.	52. Meie seadused arenevad üha edasi sarnaspoole, et kõigil on võimalik tegeleda ja oma huvisid kaitsta.	103. Demokraatia paratamatult küpseb pikapeale üle: demokraatlik maailm läheb pidevalt vähem demokraatlikumaks.	154. Suur oht meie demokraatiale on see, kui väljaspoolt aetakse meid siin riigis omavahel tulli.

Appendix 7: Q-Sample of Statements (in Russian)

11. Демократия представляет из себя постоянный диалог между группами интересов, активный поиск общих моментов и ведение переговоров.	62. Если человек не знает, будет ли у него завтра крыша над головой и еда, то его мало интересует демократия. Демократия зависит от благосостояния.	113. Это называется демократией, но фактически все это только видимость: всех действительно выслушивают, а потом все равно принимают решение в пользу какой-то узкой группы интересов.	24. Новый президент на самом деле сможет довольно много сделать, чтобы все стало делаться более демократично.	121. Большая часть народа не чувствует себя гражданами, не в состоянии нести бремя власти: граждане говорят только о правах, а об обязанностях и не задумываются.	32. Демократическое пространство вокруг нас расширилось, от других стран можно получить пример и поучиться. Не надо изобретать велосипед, можно воспользоваться готовой формулой.
12. Демократия это свобода слова, действий, вероисповедания: можем встречаться с кем хотим и где хотим и говорить то, что нам хочется.	63. В демократии нет ограничений: если у нас демократия, то все члены общества неизбежно обладают правом голоса.	114. Я не слышу, чтобы мой голос звучал там наверху; видимо, никто меня там не представляет.	71. В демократии неизбежно присутствуют разные меньшинства и группы интересов, которые по-разному воспринимают те или иные вещи.	122. Для политиков на первом месте их личные амбиции, для них заголовки словно не существуют, не принимают на себя никакой ответственности за свои действия.	33. Демократия хорошо работает на местном уровне, где представители власти могут напрямую общаться с людьми.
13. Возможно, что демократия не самая лучшая форма правления, но ничего лучше человечество пока не придумало.	64. Демократия это внутренняя зрелость и образованность, до которой народ должен дойти сам, чтобы научиться считаться как со своими правами, так и обязанностями.	21. Фактически, в нашей демократии у каждого есть возможность высказать свое мнение и принять участие.	72. Нет такой сферы, в которой бы отсутствовало вмешательство государства, поскольку в каждой сфере требуется регулирование в большей или меньшей степени.	123. Пресса в целом не выполняет возложенной на нее высшей и серьезной роли, а фактически только разрушает демократию.	34. Демократия ощущается повсюду – улучшилась экономическая и духовная ситуация, можем сами делать выборы, принимать решения в своей жизни.
14. Демократия является правильной в том случае, когда мнение большинства в обществе превалирует над мнением меньшинства.	111. С демократией перестали палку: нет никаких правил и ограничений, все делают, что хотят.	22. Мы и есть те самые 101 депутат, поэтому фактически они служат очень хорошим зеркалом.	73. Роль гражданина в том, чтобы самому справиться со своей жизнью и, по возможности, помогать функционированию государства.	124. В свое время была Москва, а теперь Брюссель: умеем только подчиняться, своей головой не думаем и снова становимся пассивными.	81. Демократия может функционировать только в очень маленькой группе: чем ниже группа, тем больше демократии.
61. Общество функционирует на доверии: когда я выбираю политика, то доверяю ему управление страной и у меня есть право больше не участвовать в этом процессе.	112. Происходит политическое подавление всех идущих снизу инициатив: фактически, никто не стремится поощрять участие, у людей ничего не спрашивают и решения тоже не принимаются.	23. Я действительно верю, что в большинстве политических партий есть возможность принимать решения согласно собственной совести.	74. Общественные деятели, которых мы видим повсюду, фактически формируют наши ценности. Их роль в том, чтобы подавать пример и служить народу.	31. На работе демократическое мышление очень хорошо ощущается: есть возможность высказывать свои мнения, их обсуждают и учитывают.	82. В разных государствах демократия работает по-разному, не всегда можно брать готовую формулу и копировать.

83. Чем демократичнее становится управление государством, тем больше развивается демократия в других сферах.	134. В основном на рыночной экономике и капитализме обществе не может быть никакой демократии, все отношения определяются деньгами.	91. Часть проблемы обусловлена тем, что наша демократия очень молодая; нужно немного подождать, пока сменятся поколения, привыкшие к старым порядкам.	142. Ощущение беспомощности, вялость и робость слишком укоренились в эстонцах и это не позволяет демократическому обществу функционировать так хорошо, как позволяют правила.	53. Членство в международных организациях уменьшает страхи перед прежними угрозами и укрепляет наш демократический государственный строй.	104. Если каждый станет постоянно прилагать все усилия и начнет думать демократически, то тогда и ситуация начнет меняться.
84. О демократии можно говорить в конкретной области: демократия в экономике, в общественной жизни, в политике.	41. Мы все-таки справились лучше, чем многие другие страны, разделившие нашу судьбу: ведь из Эстонии не хотят уезжать представители других национальностей.	92. В принципе, демократия в Эстонии именно такая, какой и должна быть демократия, она должна лишь приобрести отличительные эстонские особенности.	143. У нас отсутствует сплоченность: если с кем-то поступили несправедливо, то, к примеру, профсоюз не начнет забастовку.	54. Избрание Т.Х.Ильвеса принесет очень много позитивного для дальнейшего развития нашей демократии.	151. У демократии нет будущего, потому что молодежь уезжает.
131. В воспитании в духе демократии важную роль играет дом и образование, а наши дети не приобретают никаких демократических привычек ни в школе, ни дома.	42. Мы во все времена отличались работоспособностью, упорством и упорство помогают нам пережить тяжелые времена и своим умом мы всяко сможем устроить демократию.	93. У эстонского народа практически отсутствует традиция демократического общества, поэтому мы и ведем себя по-другому, чем в старых демократиях.	144. Наша проблема в небольшом населении: нас слишком мало, поэтому и в народе мало тех, среди кого можно выбирать.	101. Для дальнейшего развития демократии самое важное значение имеют люди и их образованность.	152. Для развития нашей демократии опасность состоит в том, что мы не сможем себя реализовать и останемся периферийным государством.
132. В общественной жизни демократия ограничена, на определенных уровнях гражданское общество все равно понимается очень по-разному.	43. Наша молодежь уже успела пожить в демократическом обществе, она не умеет ничего бояться, повидала мир и обладает более широким кругозором.	94. Все государства в какой-то момент должны пережить кризис роста, чтобы стать демократическими.	51. Чем дальше, тем чище становится общество: кто не становится демократическим, должен отойти в сторону, так и демократия усиливается.	102. О будущем демократии нельзя говорить до тех пор, пока все управляется экономическими стимулами.	153. Чем дальше развивается эта демократия, чем дольше мы остаемся свободными, тем меньше у нас остается своей культуры, традиций, своеобразия.
133. В партиях демократия не функционирует: там везде имеют значение только политика партии и «правильное» голосование.	44. Все-таки за очень короткое время нам удалось добиться, что у нас установлены и хорошо функционируют все методы и правила игры.	141. Наша демократия часто находится на очень примитивном уровне, мы еще не успели адаптироваться, все еще живем в советском времени.	52. Наши законы все больше развиваются в том направлении, что у всех появляется возможность действовать и защищать свои интересы.	103. С ходом времени демократия неизбежно разлагается: постоянно становится менее демократическим.	154. Большая опасность для нашей демократии состоит в том, что нас перессорят между собой иностранные государства.



## *Appendix 8: Instructions (Estonian version)*

### **Hea osaleja!**

Suur tänu Sulle, et nõustusid meie uuringus osalema.

Käesolev uuring püüab kaardistada eestimaalaste arvamusi demokraatiast ja hinnanguid selle toimimisele Eestis. Selleks viisime kõigepealt läbi vestlusringe, millele tuginedes sõnastasime need 60 väidet, mida nüüd palumegi Sul sorteerida.

Käesolevast ümbrikust leiad:

- 60 väitekaarti,
- juhendi väidete sorteerimiseks,
- mustanditabeli sorteerimise hõlbustamiseks,
- tagastatava ankeedilehe, mis koosneb puhtanditabelist ja lühiankeedist,
- margistatud ja adresseeritud ümbriku.

Tee nii:

- Loe läbi juhend.
- Sorteeeri väited, kasutades abivahendina mustanditabelit.
- Kui oled lõpliku valiku teinud, täida tagastataval ankeedilehel olev puhtanditabel ja märgi samas ka andmed enda kohta.
- Pane tagastatav ankeedileht margistatud ja adresseeritud ümbrikusse ning postita.

Kui Sul peaks väidete sorteerimise kohta tekkima mingeidki küsimusi, siis helista kindlasti! Helistame Sulle tagasi ja vastame koheselt kõigile küsimustele.

Tänulikult,

Vello Pettai

(Tartu Ülikooli politoloogia osakonna võrdleva poliitika professor)

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## Juhend väidete järjestamiseks ja väitetabeli täitmiseks

Väited on trükitud ükshaaval eraldi kaartidele ning igal väitel on oma number, mis tuleb kanda vastavasse tabelisse. Töö hõlbustamiseks oleme kaasa pannud kaks samasugust tabelit. Mustanditabelit võid vabalt sorteerimise jooksul kasutada, oma arvamust mitu korda muuta ja numbreid üle sodida. Puhtanditabelisse aga palume kanda oma lõplik valik võimalikult selgelt ja korrektset.

Soovitame teha nii:

1. Loe kõigepealt kõik väited läbi ning ja jaga nad enam-vähem võrdselt kolme ossa: 1) need, millega Sa kindlasti nõus oled; 2) need, millega Sa kindlasti nõus ei ole; ja 3) need, mille suhtes Sa oled neutraalsel seisukohal.
2. Laota laiali kõik need väited, millega Sa nõus oled, ning vali nende hulgast välja kolm, millega Sa kõige rohkem nõustud. Kanna nende numbrid mustanditabelisse arvu +5 kohale ruutudesse (igasse ruutu üks number; väidete järjekord ülalt alla ei ole oluline).
3. Järgmiseks laota laiali kõik need väited, millega Sa nõus ei ole, ning vali nende hulgast välja kolm, millega Sa kõige vähem nõustud. Kanna nende numbrid mustanditabelisse -5 kohale (igasse ruutu üks number; väidete järjekord ülalt alla ei ole oluline).
4. Seejärel pöördu uuesti tagasi nende väidete juurde, millega Sa nõus oled, ning vali nende hulgast järgmised neli. Kanna nende numbrid mustanditabelisse arvu +4 kohale. Ka nende väidete hulgast, millega Sa nõus ei ole, vali järgmised neli ning kanna nende numbrid mustanditabelisse arvu -4 kohale. Jätka samamoodi, kuni oled lõpetanud mõlema kuhjaga.
5. Seejärel alusta neutraalsete väidete sorteerimist. Kui võrd kõik väited peab etteantud ruudustikku ära mahutama, siis jätka neutraalsete väidete paigutamist sealt, kust teistega pooleli jäid – neid väiteid, millega Sa pigem nõus oled, hakka paigutama Ost paremale jäävatesse tulpadesse, ja neid, millega Sa pigem ei ole nõus, Ost vasakule. Viimaks paiguta kõik ülejäänud neutraalsed väited arvu 0 kohale tulpa.
6. Lõpuks vaata oma järjestus veelkord üle, et olla kindel, et see kirjeldab just Sinu arvamusi. Muidugi võid Sa muudatusi teha ja väiteid ümber tõsta, kuid pea meeles, et lõpuks peavad kõik väited ruudustikus omale koha leidma ning et puhtanditabelisse kantud tulemused peaksid olema võimalikult selged ja üheselt mõistetavad.
7. Lõpetuseks kannagi oma lõplik tulemus puhtanditabelisse, täida ka selle kõrval olev lühiankeet, pane paber väikesesse margistatud ja adresseeritud ümbrikusse ning saada meile.

**Suur aitäh!**



## Tagastatav ankeedileht

## Sinu puhtanditabel

Kirjuta igasse ruutu väite number vastavalt Sinu lõplikule eelistusele (igasse ruutu ainult üks number)

## Andmed Sinu kohta

*Märgi kindlasti!*

Sugu	M	N
Vanus		
	15-17	
	18-25	
	26-35	
	36-45	
	46-55	
	56-65	
	65+	
Haridus	põhi- kesk-/kutse- keskeri- kõrgem	
Sissetulek	kuni 4000 4001-7000 7001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001+	
Rahvus	.....	
Elukoht	Tallinn Tartu Pärnu Narva	
	Ida-Eesti Lõuna-Eesti Lääne-Eesti Kesk-Eesti	

## *Appendix 9: Instructions (Russian version)*

### **Уважаемый участник!**

Благодарим Вас за согласие принять участие в нашем исследовании.

Задача настоящего исследования – составить схему, показывающую разброс мнений жителей Эстонии о демократии и те оценки, которые они дают ее функционированию в Эстонии. С этой целью мы предварительно провели несколько дискуссий в группах, по результатам которых сформулировали 60 утверждений, с просьбой отсортировать которые мы теперь обращаемся к Вам.

В этом конверте Вы найдете:

- 60 карточек с утверждениями,
- инструкцию по сортировке утверждений,
- черновую таблицу, которая поможет при сортировке,
- возвращаемую анкету, включающую чистовой вариант таблицы и краткую анкету,
- конверт с почтовой маркой и адресом.

Сделайте так:

- Прочитайте инструкцию.
- Отсортируйте утверждения, пользуясь черновой таблицей как вспомогательным средством.
- Когда Вы сделаете окончательный выбор, заполните чистовой вариант таблицы на возвращаемой анкете и на том же листе впишите данные о себе.
- Вложите возвращаемую анкету в конверт с маркой и адресом и отправьте по почте.

С благодарностью,

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## **Инструкция по сортировке утверждений и заполнению таблицы**

Каждое утверждение напечатано на отдельной карточке под собственным номером, который нужно вписать в соответствующую графу таблицы. Для облегчения работы мы сделали два одинаковых экземпляра таблицы. Черновым вариантом можно свободно пользоваться при сортировке, можно несколько раз менять свое мнение, зачеркивать и переписывать номера. Но в чистовой вариант таблицы просим вносить только Ваш окончательный выбор и делать это по возможности разборчиво и правильно.

Рекомендуем поступить следующим образом:

8. Сначала прочитайте все утверждения и разделите их на три приблизительно равные части: 1) с которыми Вы точно согласны; 2) с которыми Вы точно не согласны; и 3) в отношении которых Вы придерживаетесь нейтральной позиции.
9. Разложите перед собой утверждения, с которыми Вы согласны и выберите из них три, с которыми Вы соглашаетесь в наибольшей степени. Запишите номера этих утверждений в колонку +5 в черновой таблице (в каждый квадрат таблицы только один номер; последовательность утверждений сверху вниз не имеет значения).
10. После этого разложите перед собой утверждения, с которыми Вы не согласны и выберите из них три, с которыми Вы не согласны в наибольшей степени. Запишите номера этих утверждений в колонку -5 в черновой таблице (в каждый квадрат таблицы только один номер; последовательность утверждений сверху вниз не имеет значения).
11. После этого снова вернитесь к утверждениям, с которыми Вы согласны и выберите из них следующие четыре. Запишите номера этих утверждений в колонку +4 в черновой таблице. Так же выберите следующие четыре утверждения из числа тех, с которыми Вы не согласны и запишите их номера в колонку -4 в черновой таблице. Продолжайте таким же образом до тех пор, пока не закончите сортировку обеих групп утверждений.
12. После этого приступайте к сортировке нейтральных утверждений. Поскольку в таблицу должны войти все утверждения, то продолжайте размещение нейтральных утверждений с того места, где вы закончили с предыдущими группами: те утверждения, с которыми Вы скорее согласны, начинайте размещать в колонки справа от 0, а те утверждения, с которыми Вы скорее не согласны, слева от 0. В самом конце поместите все оставшиеся утверждения в колонку над цифрой 0.
13. Затем еще раз проверьте получившийся результат, чтобы убедиться, что он верно отражает именно Ваше мнение. Разумеется, можно вносить изменения и перемещать утверждения в таблице, но просим помнить, что в конце концов все утверждения должны найти себе место в таблице и что заносимые в чистовой вариант таблицы результаты должны быть по возможности четкими и недвусмысленными.
14. В завершение перенесите окончательный результат в чистовой вариант таблицы, заполните краткую анкету на том же листе, положите в конверт с маркой и адресом и отправьте нам.

**Большое спасибо!**



## Возвращаемая анкета

## Ваша чистовая таблица

Впишите в каждый квадрат номер утверждения согласно Вашему окончательному решению (в каждый квадрат только один номер)

## Ваши личные данные

Заполните обязательно!

Пол	М	Ж
Возраст	15-17 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+	
Образование	осн. общее сред./проф.-техн. сред. специальное высшее	
Доход	до 4000 4001-7000 7001-10 000 10 001-15 000 15 001+	
Национальность	.....	
Место жительства	Таллинн Тарту Пярну Нарва	Вост. Эст. Юж. Эст. Зап. Эст. Сред. Эст.

							-5
							-4
							-3
							-2
							-1
							0
							+1
							+2
							+3
							+4
							+5