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**1920-1930te ja 1990-2000te Eesti, Vene ja Soome päevalehtedes
esinevate väärtuste võrdlev analüüs**

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Kommentaar artiklile

Vaatamata sellele, et maailma riigid ja ka Euroopa riigid läbivad sajandite vältel omi arenguteid, mõjutavad üksteist, sulanduvad kokku ja moodustavad liite, kultuuri ja ühiskonna uurija otsivad võimalusi ja süsteeme, mille abil oleks võimalik neid riike omavahel võrrelda. Käesolev töö tutvustab minu käsitletavate probleemide-küsimuste konteksti ning lõpeb töö eesmärgi ning põhiprobleemi sõnastamisega. Erilist huvi pakub muidugi 20. sajand, sest siis toimunud sündmuste tagajärje mõjul on tekkinud just see Euroopa, milles meie elame. Neist 20. sajandi protsessidest sõltub olulisel määral ka riikide edasine tee, tulevik.

Erinevate lähenemiste seas on viimasel ajal populaarseks muutunud väärtuste-uuringud. Kultuure võrreldakse domineerivate väärtuste alusel, luuakse skaalaid ja võrdluste põhjal tehakse järeldusi ühiskonna arengu kohta. Kultuuride ja ühiskondade võrdlemise meetod on end aina rohkem tõestamas. Suurel määral on see nii tänu tuntud väärtusuurijate Hofstede, Schwarzzi ja Ingleharti tööle. Nende poolt välja töötatud süsteemid leiavad kasutamist ka antud uuringus. Vaatamata sellele, et andmed pärinevad erinevatest allikatest (küsimustikud vs. ajakirjanduslik tekst) moodustavad väärtused ühiskondades oma meta-süsteeme, kus allikate erinevus on vaadeldav kui väärtuste ilmnemise erikiht.

Antud artikli puhul on tegemist kultuuridevahelise meediauuringuga (*cross-cultural media study*) Eesti, Vene ja Soome päevalehtede näitel. Uurimistöö peaesmärk on teha võrdlev analüüs neist väärtustest, mida leidub eesti, vene ja soome ajakirjandusartiklites. Allaeesmärgid on võrrelda aastakümnete (1920-1930 ja 1990-2009) lõikes kolme ühiskonna ajakirjandustekste väärtus-esituse seisukohalt, selgitada välja väärtuste muutumise tendentse vaadeldava perioodi jooksul ning seejärel võrrelda konstrueeritud väärtussüsteeme riikide lõikes, seostada neid ajastu aktuaalsete sotsio-poliitiliste ja kultuuriprotsessidega. Püüan luua ühtset väärtussüsteemianalüüsi mudelit, mille kaudu esitub ajastu väärtuste olukord ajakirjandustekstide alusel.

Grandiprojekti nr.5854 kodeerimisjuhendi alusel loodud artiklite andmebaas nõuab uuringus mitte ainult väärtuste uuringutele viitamist, vaid ka kõrvalharusid: identiteet kui tähenduste allikas (Manuel Castells) ehk mis (väärtus) on tähenduslik/tähtis ja mis ei ole (George Gerbner); isiklik ja sotsiaalne identiteet (grupi väärtused – gruppi kaasatus või välistatus) (Daniel Bar-Tal); sotsiaalne identiteet kui süsteemi taju osa (süsteemi ja ühiskonna väärtused vs. isiklikud huvid (Schwarz)); väärtused ja ideoloogia (T. van Dijk). Antud harude kaasamine on vajalik selleks, et mõista ja silmas pidada väärtuste rakendatavust, nende tähendust subjekti elus, subjekti tegevuste ja valikute kõrval.

Töö põhineb eeldusel, et väärtused meediatekstides pole juhuslikud, vaid väljendavaid ühiskonna tendentse. Selleks on kaks võimalust. Esiteks võivad väärtused olla implementeeritud teksti võimul oleva surverühma poolt (ideoloogilised), teiseks võivad nad ilmned a loomulikult, sest artikli autorid ehk ajakirjanikud on ühiskonna liikmed, kelle tekstid väljendavad antud ühiskonna väärtusi (kultuurilised). Mõlemal juhul on võimalik rääkida väljendatavate väärtuste seosest ühiskonna ja kultuuriprotsessidega. Tähtis on näha ka, milliseid väärtusi kannavad millised sotsiaalsed grupid.

Täpsemalt on võimalik uurida nii andmetele rakendatud lähenemist kui ka refleksiooni sellele meetodile artikli vastavas osas pealkirjaga „Method“. Meetodi osas on olemas ka väärtuste tabel, mis näitab iga väärtuskategooria alamelemente.

Uurimistöös raames on püstitatud järgmised hüpoteesid:

- 1) Väärtused on meta-kategooriad, mis vaatamata ühiskondade erinevustele võivad näidata ka ühiskondade sarnasusi ja kokkupuutepunkte.
- 2) 1920-1930te päevalehtedes esinevad väärtused on riigiti väga spetsiifilised, ning ühiseid väärtusi riikidel on suhteliselt vähe.
- 3) 1920-1930te päevalehtede artiklid sisaldavad palju väärtusi (paljude väärtuste esinemise protsent kodeeritud artiklites on kõrge, üle 15%).
- 4) 1990-2000te artiklites esinevad väärtused on kolme riigi jaoks enamikus ühtsed, sest globaliseerumise ja muude suurte maailmaprotsesside tagajärjel väärtused standartiseerivad ja unifitseerivad, on tekkinud “väärtuste standard”.

- 5) Ainult üksikud väärtused on säilinud 1990ndate-2000ndatel riikide päevalehtedes võrreldes 1920ndate-1930ndate perioodi ajast.
- 6) Viimastel aastakümnetel esinevate väärtuste põhjal võime ennustada ühiskondade edasisi arengusuundi.

Uuringu tulemusena on kõik 6 hüpoteesi osaliselt või täielikult tõestatud. Sellest saab täpsemalt lugeda artikli osades „The tendencies of the 1920-30s“, „The tendencies of the 1990-2000s“ ja kokkuvõtvast osas „Discussion“.

Põnevaks osutus töö käigus dialoog eelpool nimetatud autorite seisukohtadega. Võrdlus Ingleharti (2007) järelustega WVS (World Value System) baasil artikli diskussiooni osas andis Eesti ja Soome puhul toetavat ja Venemaa puhul hoopis teistmoodi pilti. Venemaal ja Soomes ilmnes sarnane võrgustikuühiskonna teke protsess ja grupi-kesksete väärtuste domineerimine. Kahe niivõrd erineva (Ingleharti järgi) riigi sarnasus andis positiivse impulssi sarnasuste väljatoomiseks. Muidugi, siinkohal tuleb arvesse võtta andmekogumise erinevusi ja ka riikide meediasüsteemide spetsiifikaid. Eesti puhul on näha selget väärtuste üldist langust. Me ei näe niivõrd muutumist-transformatsiooni, vaid hoopis üldist väärtussüsteemi nõrgenemist – meedia tekstidest ei näe enam, et varasematest aegadest olulisi asju väärtustaks. Selle karmi tulemuseni jõudsin oma analüüsis. Vaatamata sellele, et mingil määral on võimalikud statistika ja tööluse kitsaskohad ja „vead“ andmete spetsiifikast lähtudes, neid andmetöötlusprobleeme analüüsin uuringu viimases, meetodi kriitika osas.

Uuringu vahetulemusena kujunesid välja 1920-1930te puhul *Staatiline väärtuste mudel* (Fig. 1.1 artiklis), mis väljendab skemaatiliselt kolme riigi väärtuste tendentsi kahe aastakümne jooksul, ja *Dünaamiline väärtuste mudel* (Fig. 1.2 artiklis), mis on seotud algse kodeerimisjuhendiga (baseerub neljal väärtuste tasandil: persoon, ühiskond (grupp), süsteem ja abstraktne tasand) ja näitab ilmnevate väärtuste süsteemi ilma aja dimensioonita.

1990-2000ndate aasta jaoks on olemas võrdluseks ka *Dünaamiline väärtuste mudel* (Fig. 1.3 artiklis), mis annab aluse riikide vaheliseks võrdluseks nii sünkrooniliselt (1990-2000te väärtuste lõikes) kui ka diakrooniliselt (võrdluses 1920-1930tel esinevate väärtustega). Samuti aitab selline indifferentsiaalne ühtne mudel suurema pildi, milline on võimalik kõige kolme ühiskonna olukord väärtustega, millised väärtused on kadunud või kadumas, millised domineerivad,

millised tasemed tulevad esile ja miks. 1990-2000ndate kohta esitan ka Staatilise ja Dünaamilise Staatilise väärtuste mudel näitab väärtusi tasemete lõikes ja kõneleb sellest, millised tasemed ja milliste väärtustega on selle kahe kümnendi jooksul domineerinud. Dünaamiline mudel näitab aga võimalikult ühtset protsessi kõigis kolmes riigis ning ka seda, kuidas on toimumas väärtuste transformatsioon.

Vaatamata sellele, et tegemist on pilootprojektiga ja meetod on välja töötamisel, tulid käesoleva uuringu alusel esile mitmed uued võimalused. Esiteks sai võimalikuks luua selline kategooriate süsteem, mis võimaldab vabalt liikuda vägagi erinevate ühiskondade ja maailmavaadete tasemete vahel. Teiseks võimaldab see süsteem teha diakroonilisi ja sünkroonilisi võrdlusi. Kolmandaks võimaldab ta näha ühiskonna nõ eksistentsiaalseid või taust-süsteeme, mis tegelikult aitavad näha ka seni nägemata ja avastamata seoseid. Ja neljandaks võimaldab selline lähenemine meediatekstile analüüsida ühiskondade arenguid ja arengute neid arengusuundi, mille poole ühiskond suundub, aga millest otsesõnu diskursiivselt ei kõnelda. Samuti võimaldab see võrrelda ühiskondi ja luua uut konteksti diskursustele ja sotsio-poliitilistele ja kultuurilistele protsessidele.

Refleksioon artikli kirjutamisele

Kuna ma astusin magistrantuuri samamoodi sõnastatud väärtuste teemaga, kestis teoreetilise tausta uurimine kaks magistrantuuriaastat. Esiteks hoidsin kogu aeg fookuses, et uurin väärtusi eritasanditel ja teiseks ka seda, et tuleb leida meetod, kuidas selliseid abstraktseid ja raskesti mõõdetavaid kategooriad mõõdetakse. Muidugi, osalemine grandiprojekti andmete analüüsis oli väga viljakas arusaamade allikas.

Nagu mainisin, alustasin teoreetilise raamistiku loomisega. Sinna kuulusid meedia-teoreetikud nagu Habermas ja Luckmann, sotsiofilosoofid Schutz, Luhmann, Bourdieu, Castells ja väärtuste teoreetikud Ingelhart, Schwarz, Hofstede. Esimese kahe rühma autorid aitasid mul saada arusaama sellest, kuidas inimene üldse maailmaga suhtleb; milliste kategooriatega, kuidas ta meediat kasutab ja kuidas meedia kui sotsiaalne süsteem sellele vastavalt käitub; millist rolli inimese elus mängib. Väärtusteteoreetikute suhtes tekkis valikuraskus, kuna Ingelhart tegutses peamiselt kultuuride võrdluse tasemel ja Schwarz aga indiviidi tasemel. Hofstede tundus siinkohal kõige adekvaatsem, sest ta suutis organisatsioonide-uuringus luua interdistsiplinaarse mõistestiku, mis võimaldab mobiilsust väärtuste eritasemete vahel.

Järgnevalt uurisin lähemalt kodeerimisjuhendit. Kodeeritud kategooriad tundusid võõrad ja rakendamatud. Pidin neid mõtestama, lahti kirjutama, ning andmetöötluse käigus lisandusid kasutatavatele kategooriatele uued aspektid, parameetrid. Selle protsessi esitan artikli lõppvariandis vastava seletava tabeli vormis.

Tagantjärele vaadates peab mainima, et artikli kirjutamisel läbisin kolm astet. Esimene oli andmete töötlus. Suur hulk Excelis esitatud andmeid, numbreid, mis seisid minu eest, aga ei kõnelenud. Pidin nii 1920-30te kui ka 1990-2000te andmeid vaadates läbi numbrite nägema, millised väärtused ja väärtuskategooriad kõnelevad sotsi-kultuurilistest protsessidest. Sajandi alguse tendentsi mõtestamiseks värskendasin mälus iga riigi ajaloolise arengukäigu, mis kujunes välja 1920-30te väärtuse analüüsis sisaldavateks ajaloole ülevaadeteks. Peale selle sai võimalikuks minna edasi järgmisele astmele.

Järgmine aste tähendas trendi mõtestamist. Mis on minu uuringu raames väärtuste trend? Lühidalt, väärtuse trend võib väljenduda kahel viisil: 1) väärtus esines tugevalt/nõrgalt ühe

aastakümne kodeeritud artiklites, kuid teise aastakümne lehtede selle ilmumine kasvas/langes/jäi muutumatuks; 2) väärtus ei oma kõrget ilmnemissagedust, ei muutu või muutub vähesel määral, kuid samas selle nõrk ilmumine või järsk kadumine tähenduslik laiema ühiskondliku protsessi kontekstis. Need kaks põhimõtet aitasid mul tulla välja 36 väärtusega 1920-30te ja veel 20 väärtusega 1990-2000 aastatel. Olles valitud need kategooriad, vaatlesin Hofstede järgi iga väärtuse intensiivsust (ilmnemise protsent või selle puudumine) ja suunda (langus, kasv, stabiilsus, kadumine, ilmumine). Need kaks dimensiooni aitasid luua lõppkokkuvõtteks Dünaamilise mudeli 1920-1930te jaoks. Seejärel, lähtudes juba kodeerimisjuhendist (kus esines eelpoolmainitud 4 taset), grupeerisin neid valitud väärtusi vastavalt tasemetele, mille tulemuseks sai mõlema perioodi Staatiline väärtuste mudel. Need mudelid aitasid korrastada numbrilisi näitajaid. Samuti aitas andmekorrastust ja mõtestamist nende tekstiline lahtikirjutamine.

Kolmas aste oli ja jääb kõige keerulisemaks. Isegi teades protsente ja nende muutumise tendentse, on keeruline eemalduda numbrilistest näitajatest ja näha suuremaid väärtuste protsesse sotsi-kultuurilises kontekstis. Ehk väärtuste tõlgendamine, seletamine, seostamine riigiti, tasanditi, periooditi on see koht, kus on olnud keeruline hoida ühtset liini. Kuna andmed on loodud sellisel moel, et võimaldavad kõiki neid kombinatsioone, tegu on puhteadusliku ja otstarbelise valikuga, millises kontekstis millist vaatevinklit esile tuua. Seetõttu tundub see artikli kõige haavatavam ja kritiseeritavam koht, kuid mille üritan kompenseerida piisava refleksiooni meetodi üle ja argumenteerimisega tõlgendusel.

Viimaseks pean mainima, et kuigi meetod on minu arvates tõestanud enda rakendatavust, tekkis minul uurimustöö käigus hulk küsimusi nõ meetodile. Neid arutan meetodi kriitika osas, kus toon välja meetodi kitsaskohti ja soovitusi selle parandamiseks ja arendamiseks.

Artikli kokkuvõtte eesti keeles

Antud artikli puhul on tegemist kultuuride vahelise meediauuringuga (*cross-cultural media study*) Eesti (Eesti Päevaleht), Vene (Pravda, Komsomolkaja Pravda) ja Soome (Helsingin Sanomat) päevalehtede näitel. Uurimistöö peamine eesmärk on teha võrdlev analüüs väärtustest, mida leidub eesti, vene ja soome ajakirjandustekstides. Allaeesmärgid on võrrelda aastakümnete (1920-1930dad ja 1990-2000dad) lõikes kolme ühiskonna ajakirjanduslike tekstide väärtuste seisukohalt, selgitada välja väärtuste arengu tendentse vaadeldava perioodi jooksul ning seejärel võrrelda konstrueeritud väärtussüsteemide riikide lõikes ja siduda neid ajastule aktuaalsete sotsioliitiliste ja kultuuriliste protsessidega. Võimalusel ka luua ühine väärtuste süsteem, mis peegeldaks ajastu väärtuste olukorda ajakirjanduslike tekstide alusel. Uuringu konteksti loovad ennekõike silmapaistvate väärtuste uurijate teooriad: Hofstede, Schwarzzi ja Inglehardi teooriad. Kõrvale on võetud meediateksti, ehk Tulviste, Aarelaid-Tarti, Gansi ja Lõhmuse lähenemised väärtustele.

Metodoloogiliselt on tehtud mitu ringi valikuid, mis võimaldavad luua väärtuste süsteeme, näha nende tendentse ning seejärel rakendada neid sotsioliitilise ja kultuurilise protsessi mõtestamisel. Kogu kodeeritud väärtustest on valitud need, mis esinesid tugevalt/nõrgalt ühe aastakümne kodeeritud artiklites, kuid teise aastakümne lehtede selle ilmumine kasvas/langes/jäi muutumatuks või ka need, mis ei oma kõrget ilmnemissagedust, ei muutu või muutuvad vähesel määral, kuid samas on neil nõrk ilmnemine või järsk kadumine tähenduslik laiema ühiskondliku protsessi kontekstis. Kokku on valitud 36 väärtust esimese 1920-30te ja veel 20 1990-2000te jaoks, sest osa nendest kattub. Väärtusi mõõdetakse vastavalt nende ilmumise protsendile kogu päevalehe aastakümne jaoks kodeeritud artiklite arvu suhtes. Suunda näitab nende muutus läbi aastakümnete.

1920-1930te aastate tendentside kirjeldamisel on ennekõike toodud välja ajalooline ühiskondlik kontekst, ning seejärel on analüüsitud andmeid ja tõlgendatud neid selle kontekstiga seoses. Antud periood on vaadeldud riikide lõikes. Eesti Päevalehe kodeeritud artiklites domineerivad süsteemi ja abstraktse taseme väärtused (süsteem, riigi/süsteemi julgeolek, turvalisus, stabiilsus, võitlus süsteemi säilitamise eest, süsteemi funktsioneerimise parandamine, oma riigi olemasolu ja selle huvide eest seismine, heaolu ja komfort, suhe riigiga jt.). Pravda kodeeritud artiklites domineerivad ühiskonna ja süsteemi taseme väärtused (poliitiline aktiivsus, sotsiaalne

tunnustatus, töö kollektiiv, riigi/süsteemi julgeolek, turvalisus, stabiilsus, võitlus süsteemi säilitamise eest jt). Samuti konstrueeritakse aktiivselt ideaalse inimese kuvandit läbi abstraktsete tunnuste sõnastamise: töökas, vapper, kangelaslik, abivalmis jt. Kodeeritud Helsingin Sanomat ei toonud välja oluliste väärtuste olemasolu, kuid esile tulid kaks stabiilset ühiskonna taseme väärtust – suhtumine teistesse ja lojaalsus.

Kõige kolme riigi stabiilne põhiväärtus on rahvus (Soome ja Eesti kodeeritud lehtedes) või rahvas (Vene kodeeritud lehtedes). Üldiselt võib seda perioodi iseloomustada kui väga variatiivset, sest igal riigil on peamiselt omad spetsiifilised väärtused, ühiseid väärtusi on ainult mõned üksikud ja väga üldised (rahvus/rahvas, süsteem, stabiilsus ja julgeolek jt).

Seda perioodi illustreerivad ka kaks visuaalset mudelit. Dünaamiline mudel näitab väärtuste arengut kolmes riigis kahe aastakümne jooksul (mis üldiselt näitavad kõigi kolme riigi kodeeritud lehtedes langust). Staatiline mudel põhineb kodeerimisjuhendis olevatel neljal väärtuste tasemel (persooni, ühiskonna (grupi), süsteemi ja abstraktsuse tase), ning aitab luua kolme riigi kodeeritud lehtede alusel ühise väärtuste süsteemi antud ajastu jaoks.

1990-2000te aastate uurimisel oli tunduvalt lihtsam luua ühine pilt kolme riigi päevalehtedes esinevatest väärtustest. Siinkohal pidas paika väärtuste unifikseerimise ja standartiseerimise hüpotees 20. sajandi lõpu kohta. Tõepoolest, selle kahe aastakümne puhul oli keerulisem leida spetsiifilisi väärtusi. Ühtset pilti loob Staatiline väärtuste mudel, mille keskel on endiselt rahvuse/rahva väärtus. Vaadates riigiti võib öelda, et Eestis on hetkel (2000tel) väärtuste kriis, kus kaks 90te keskset väärtust (süsteem ja rahvus) on järsult langemas. Enam-vähem stabiilne rahvuse väärtus ei ole enam ühtegi kaasaaitava väärtusega toetatud ja jääb kuidagi isoleerituks. Seda enam kõigi teiste olematute väärtuste taustal (ainul 0-7% ilmnenist aastakümneni kodeeritud artiklitest). Kodeeritud Komsomolskaja Pravda tekstides tegeldakse aktiivselt inimese ja grupi taseme väärtustega, kusjuures gruppide hulgas tulevad esile erialane kollektiiv, huvide ja väärtuste alane kollektiiv. Isiklikest omadustest on sagedane kodeeritud artiklites vastutus, juhtimisvõime, kogemus, veendumused. Süsteemi tase on nõrgenemas, kuid abstraktsete väärtuste tasemel on esil heaolu ja komfort, stabiilsus ja julgeolek, õiglus ja progress. Väärtused kodeeritud Helsingi Sanomat artiklites paiknevad peamiselt ühiskonna ja abstraktselt tasemel. Süsteemi väärtused hoopis langevad. Helsingin Sanomate kandvad väärtused on oskus juhtida ja

otsustusvõime, stabiilsus ja julgeolek, ühiste grupi huvidega arvestamine, suhe sotsiaalse keskkonnaga ja ühine kollektiiv humanismi põhimõtte alusel.

Kõigi kolme ühiskonna jaoks on nüüd tähenduslik isegi madal järgnevate absoluutselt uute väärtuste ilmumine: avalik sfäär ja avatus, sotsiaalne vastutus ja õiglus. Kõik kolm väärtust märgivad uue väärtustesuuna teket, mis on seotud eelkõige ühiskonna eneseteadlikkusega.

Me viimase kahe aastakümne väärtusi vaadates (1990-2000te Staatilise mudeli abil) on võimalik teha järgnevaid üldistusi kõigi kolme ühiskonna jaoks. Esiteks muutusid võrreldes 1920-1930te aastatega persooni taseme väärtused individualistlikumaks ja konkreetsemaks (võrreldes abstraktsete domineerivate isikuomadustega sajandi alguses). Teiseks, enamik kodeeritud ajakirjanduslikes tekstides esinevaid väärtusi paiknevad persooni-grupi-ühiskonna tasemetel, kusjuures abstraktsel ja süsteemi tasemel jäävad ainult mõned üksikud (heaolu ja komfort, stabiilsus ja julgeolek, progress jt). Süsteem ei seostu enam niivõrd riigiga kui on nihkunud ühiskonna poole – tähtis on indiviidi suhe süsteemiga (ja seda mitte otseselt riigiga vaid ühiskonnaga laiemalt: mittetulunduslike ühenduste, huvigruppide, tegevuste kesksete gruppide, professionaalsete rühmiadega). Rahvus on ainuke ühine väärtus, mis on stabiilselt olemas kõigi kolme riigi kodeeritud lehtedes.

Ilmselgelt on kõik kolm riiki otsimas uusi väärtussüsteeme ja 1990tel on toimunud suur ümberorienteerimisprotsess. Samas annab positiivset vaadet uute, nõ. demokraatlike ja ühiskonna-kesksete ja enneolematute väärtuste tulek.

Üldistades väidan, et 2000test võime rääkida kui väärtuste standardi kehtestamise ja unifitseerimise ajastust.

The Comparative Analysis of Values Expressed in Estonian, Finnish and Russian Daily Newspapers of the 1920-1930 and 1990-2000.

Introduction

The following article explores values expressed in Estonian, Finnish and Russian daily newspapers. Firstly, the focus is on the period of 1920-30s, as it is a period rich of ideals and idealistic views on the present and future. After the Great Depression of the 1929 societies, economies, politics, cultures and values gain more simple patterns. This simplification and, in Parsons' (1997: 43) words, generalization of values has taken place during the 20th century. Recently, I have faced this simplification when watching a film about one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century Juri Lotman "Lotman's World". Shot in 2008, the film commentator marks Lotman's knowledge of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky works when he was about to enter the university. This is a good example of culture simplification, because if today reading Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky is associated with education and intelligence, in the times of Lotman these very the fundamental essential authors to be read in early age. Such reading was taken for granted. This is a small example of how cultural values and their significance change over time.

Besides the value trends of the 1920-1930s, the paper focuses on values and value trends of the second period of independence, the 1990s and 2000s (until 2009). The aim of it is not only analyze what are the nowadays value trends, but to compare the two "beginnings" of the state establishment (for Estonia and Russia) and new directions of development (for Finland). Values prevailing in the daily newspapers can also shed light on possible future developments of the countries, as we are able to see the starting point of this departure.

Further I will provide a short theoretical framework on value significance as part of identity building and cause for action. In the second paragraph of this article we will see previous studies of values, their methodologies, outcomes and shortcomings. This will be followed by the introduction of method used in this research, but its shortcomings and possible improvements will be discussed only in the last, discussion part. Methodological part will be followed by the analysis of the countries' specific trends of the 1920-30s and comparison of their common values. Further on we shall see the countries' specific trends of the 1990-2000s and the comparison of countries on the basis of common values. For each decade, if possible, will be mentioned social groups that carry the dominating values. The last part, which is Discussion, shall be dedicated to diachronic comparison, nowadays trends, possible interpretations and critique for the method.

To begin with, it is obvious that individual's actions influence the environment which makes an action a basic way of interaction with society and culture, the world (see the life-world structures by Schutz 1973). Participation in culture assumes collectivity, which consist amongst other in values. These values are perceived by individuals and groups of individuals. Hofstede (2001: 2-6) points out that in individual's mental program values exist on personal (here values are taken for granted, as received in a very early age), collective and universal level. Individuals perceive and pass on the social programs through groups, organizations and societies. Researching social identity, Daniel Bar-Tal (1998) also states that individuals are believed to perceive some of the

values through their social identity and participation in a group. Group values can also become a basis for group norms and beliefs. They preserve the constructed common reality of the group as well as the feeling of belonging (answer to the basic question „we are the group”) (Bar-Tal 1998).

As stated above, it is vital to see group and social identity formation as a two-way process through which individuals and a group as a whole constantly re-actualizes elements that testify their existence (values, rituals, heroes, symbols as Hofstede (2001) distinguishes them). The approach applied to the material in this article distinguishes both the individual and group/system level of values.

This article is based on the assumption that values expressed in the dailies have certain functions being either implemented by the governing group (ideological) or reflecting the tendencies of the society (as these texts are produced by journalists, members of the society). In any case, values expressed in the media are believed to be significant and influential to the society or state as a large group of people sharing common identity. This is why it is important to see the change in the value emergence during the focused periods. Strongly expressed values support much of the structural change that occurred during the period at hand. This assumption of value and social change interconnection is supported by Teun A. van Dijk (2005: 94) when he states, that values are either basis for the ideology, peoples' beliefs and opinions, or they are wider and more fundamental than the ideology, which means that they constitute cultural evaluation schemes. This means that the existing fundamental socio-cultural status of values excludes any possibility of reducing them to the level of a sole individual.

Method

It has also become common in value research, and especially cross-cultural comparisons to use questionnaire surveys as data source, ex. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys. World Values Survey started in 1981, when its beginning source – European Values Survey – had included 14 countries outside of Europe (22 in total). The survey was repeated again in about 10 years. Back then, the project aimed at the longitudinal and cross-cultural measurement of values' variation. From that point on further research has been done every 5 years. Now questionnaires consist of about 250 detailed questions and are assisted with face-to-face interviews. One of the most influential figures of values research field is Ronald Inglehart, who influenced the extension of the survey at its very beginnings.

Ronald Inglehart (2007) is mostly famous for his Cultural Map of the World, which is based on WVS data. He has worked out 4 polar dimensions for systemizing countries on the basis of the types of values common for them: Survival and Self-expression values and Traditional/Secular-rational values. This classification entails a global reflection on where the world is at. As he states (Inglehart 2005), when a country moves from the area of Survival and Traditional values (family, father-child bonds) to Self-expression and Secular-rational values, it is moving toward such values as subjective well-being, tolerance, trust and political moderation, individual freedom and self-expression. All of these are crucial for the existence of democratic political culture. He also states that Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity, and they also reflect mass polarization over tolerance of outgroups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality.

This last point of Inglehart's analysis has been discussed by another value researcher Shalom Schwartz (2007). He discussed universal moral values (for out-group, when opposed to common to in-group benevolence values, ex. security, tradition) and their role in formation of the inclusive moral universe. Schwarz also studies whether people who refer to universal values also project them on out-group individuals. Data is presented by SVS (Schwarz Value Survey), where respondents rate value items according to the importance on 9-point importance scale.

On the basis of SVS surveys Schwarz (2007: 715) proposes a spatial two-dimensional model of individual-level value structure. Schwarz introduces different dimensions for classification of values: moral, universal, expressing benevolence, traditional etc. He draws conclusions on how societies can be characterized according to the borders of moral inclusiveness. Schwarz's own conclusion is that moral inclusiveness is defined rather by established societal boundaries than solely individual's preferences. Perhaps, it would be tempting to try to prove or reject some of Schwarz's, Inglehart's or Hofstede's statements and models on the basis of the data analyzed in the paper. But this is not the aim of current analysis. The conclusions and generalizations they arrive to are based on questionnaires and personal interviews, which is a distinct material from encoded daily papers. For this reason I will not try to correlate these different approaches, but will discuss some possible comparison points in the Discussion part. Though we should not underestimate the importance of descriptive language provided by these authors as well as inspiration gained from their work.

As we have discussed the use of data from questionnaires combined with face-to-face interviews, I would like to mark, that values have also been studied on the solely basis of face-to-face interviews. The in-depth interviews have been used for this purpose by Tulviste and Ahtonen (2007[1]) as well as Aarelaid-Tart (2006[2]). These and other approaches are concerned with values expressed by people. This way of collecting data has been accustomed by researchers for over several decades, and last waves of World Values Survey have put this method on the unexpected scale.

Obviously, there has been few studies of values expressed by media text. For example work by Lee Wilkins[3] „Between Facts and Values: Print Media Coverage of the Greenhouse Effect, 1987-1990“ or „Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time“ by Herbert Gans (1980). As Gans studies types of people, knows and unknowns, activities in the news, he also focuses on the values. Both, in the sense of being part of journalist's worldview influencing the news he makes and different value categories appearing in news. Among general categories that embody values are ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, rural and anti-industrial values, individualism, moderatism etc. that he found all present in America's (national) evening news by the means of content analysis. (Gans 1980: 39-62)

Geert Hofstede (2001: 11-12) compares 50 modern nations in the ways they maintain stability in culture patterns throughout generations. He suggests that values lie in the core of practices, but they should be shared by major groups of population. They derive from ecological, environmental factors and aim at establishing societal norms, which help to maintain institutions in society with structures and ways of functioning.

It is interesting though, that Hofstede (2001: 15) states that when we study "values", we study individuals. But when we study "culture", we study societies. The current research aims at

making these two oppositions meet. We depart from the point that texts do express dominant values of societies in current times, and that through the study of these values in texts we are able to compare societies and their socio-historic processes. For example, McClelland (1961; through Hofstede 2001: 9) has done a cross-cultural comparison on the basis of content analysis of children's stories in 40 countries. On the basis of ego-texts, belletristic public texts and their blueprints, Juri Lotman (1982) has studied the reflexive identity construction process of the Russian poet Aleksandr Pushkin, where values and their transformation played a central role. Another example of value studies through text analysis is also the doctoral thesis by Maarja Lõhmus (2002: 205-225), where she has studied the ways of constructing worker's identity through values propagated in totalitarian public text. Lõhmus has done that on the basis of journalistic text, radio text to be precise.

In fact, content analysis of values expressed in a public text is a kind of questionnaire for the text. When we interview a person, his or her answers may vary being influenced by very different factors (age, moods, current state of health, situation of the interview etc.). People are changeable and dependent on very different factors, and not all of them are able to be reflexive enough and observe themselves at the same extent. Questionnaires can provide a researcher with a subjective interpretation and evaluation of individual's social environment. But they hardly perceive explicitly values, that exist on system level (*nation, amending the functioning of the system, relations of state system and a person* and others), as *system* is often of existential meaning and is taken for granted.

Texts, on the other hand, remain unchanged since the point of their publication. They express dominating here-and-now attitudes, themes, discourses, social groups, values, worldviews etc. For this reason a fundamental study of a public text and its values can reveal levels, that aren't usually expressed by individuals when answering a questionnaire or giving an interview. In other words, public text reflects current (for the time of publication) trends and describes more or less solid period of historical time.

The content analysis states the question, whether this or that value is present or absent in the text. Presence or absence can be meaningful, if seen in a broader historical, cultural, social context. Interviewing a person would hardly give a perspective of large socio-historical processes of transformation and change. And text already embodies them we only need to find them. Indeed, text research gives more of up-down, structural and functional view on society: what were its organizing principles, its needs and controversies, aims and means of achievements. This picture cannot be created only on the basis of interviews and questionnaires, but they can serve as additional for text content analysis.

During the coding process for the texts' research at hand, every value occurrence has been encoded only when there's been a strong evaluation of a value category. All values were divided into 7 groups (The practical skill and abilities of a person, The characters and qualities of a person, the person's relations to others/system, Values on the level of the group and relations, Values on the level of element, Values on the level of system, Abstract values). The basic system consisted of 4 main categories (person – society – system – abstract level), which organized all of the significant encoded values in a logical way. The general question that rose from this systematization is which level is (more strongly/weakly) present in each country at each period. An answer to this question is to be found in the outcome of coded data analysis and it will provide basis for comparison between countries.

This categorization is in dialogue with Hofstede's triangle scheme entitled Three Levels of Human Mental Programming (Hofstede 2001: 2-3). Here he states that universal level enclaves (ancient) values common to all human species, individual level values vary from one person to another (even children of one same family), and between them are collective values that are common among people who underwent same learning process but do not have same genetic makeup. I propose that in this classification system is a semi-abstract, semi-social level (as it is felt by individuals through social practices and common educational knowledge).

- 1) Abstract (abstract concepts like love, humanity, environment etc.);
- 2) System (state, government, political system);
- 3) Society, group (social, demographical or other identity-based group, inc. nation);
- 4) Individual (personal traits, skills etc.).

Value in this sense becomes a very polyphonic concept. If we turn to Hofstede (2001: 2-6) he defines values as a widespread tendency of preferring one things to others. This definition is valid both for individuals and groups of individuals, but it brings forth the behaviorist approach, apparently answering the question, how do values influence actions. If we view the journalistic text (not an individual or a group) as material for value research, it is also important to take into account the definition of value by George Gerbner (1969: 130), who states that the crucial question for public message is "what is right", what is treated as positive in public message. From this textual point of view, values are any kind of concepts evaluated as right, positive in the encoded journalistic text. Throughout the coding process for the current research, concepts evaluated as generally positive have been encoded as values. This is the point of view of encoder and his texts. But for me as a researcher, it is also important to keep in mind during the analysis the hofstedian definition which is concerned with people, groups of people, actions and their connectedness with values. So in the framework of this research we need an ambivalent definition. So value is a tendency of preferring one thing to another, widespread among individuals and groups of individuals. But as values are transmitted via media texts between groups and individuals, and they help them to socialize and build common social (group, national etc) identity, values are also key factors in both establishing normative attitudes, ways of thinking and triggering action (even if it an counteraction to what is established through text).

In this context person (individual) level values are those that transmit via text those personal traits and skills, that are normatively accepted, evaluated positively within a group (for which this channel is the source of information). Any possible aims or functions of expressing personal level values are discussed further in the paper. Society or group level values are those that help individuals form groups and feel their membership within the group (for more on social and group identity see D. Bar-Tal, 1998). These values also make a link between the individual and the system values, as through being member of a society and involved social groups one feels his inclusiveness in the system, whether it is a state, a social network, a trans-national organization or any other large structure. Values that express and serve the system's needs are called system level values. On this level values are by meaning closer to aims rather than beliefs (more common for person level values). It is also logical as systems usually place the maintenance, securing and developing the system as crucial to all and each of its participants. These kinds of values are often linked with the abstract level values, turning from system-centered to rather

obsolete categories. Establishment of these is viewed as common good, which will be beneficial to everybody. This is the point where abstract values linked to system meet with abstract individual traits. For example, when being honest and loyal is described as advancing society to more welfare and comfort. These intangible and hardly measurable, but very widespread concepts link the individual and the abstract level values through common understanding of morality. These are four levels that values are based on. Of course, there it is impossible to draw a line between these levels, as meanings of these concepts change through time and changes in the societies. This makes value-formation process extremely dynamic and influenced by very varied factors, but which can be traced in a media text.

One of the main aims of this research is to find out values' tendencies, interconnections and systems they constitute. As Hofstede (1998: 20-21) states, it is a case for comparing apples with oranges. Namely, values have both *intensity* and *direction*.

In the framework of this research, *intensity* is the number of maximum occurrence of a value. In this sense, *direction* shows whether a value is relevant to time factor (is there a rise or a decline throughout the period at hand). The combination of these two features reveals temporal tendencies and general significance of every value category. In other words, values in their emergence show meaningful tendencies (or meaningful absence of tendencies).

Engaged in this research, I faced the need for classification of a large amount of material so that it would have been possible to find connections and interpret them. Material at hand consisted of 109 value categories that each had number of occurrences per decade. As the aim of the research is to find out values' tendencies, interconnections and their groupings according to the first two, I made the first excluding choice of values according to the tendency presence/absence factor. This means that values that remained low throughout the 1910-1930 and 1990-2000 were filtered out due to the lack of tendency. In my second round of filtering I grasped values that had both 1) maximum occurrence small number (under 5% in a decade) and those that had 2) little or no change in the number of the occurrences (less than 5% change in a decade). These values introduced little interest because neither have they been prominent in any moment of time nor did they show any tendency throughout the period.

Throughout the text I will refer to the percent (%) of occurrences of a value in the total amount of articles encoded for every decade. Table 1.1 shows how many articles have been encoded for every decade.

	1910	1920	1930	1990	2000
Eesti Päevaleht/Rahva Hääl	170	288	180	79	152
Helsingin Sanomat	106	196	139	170	249
Pravda/Komsomolskaja Pravda	57	179	182	142	178

Table 1.1. Number of encoded articles for 1910-1930 and 1990-2000. Source: Encoded Channel Table for Grant Project nr. 5854.

After these two steps of filtering I came out with 36 value categories (or simply “values”) for 1920-30s and additional 20 for 1990-2000s. These categories both have quite high maximum occurrences’ number and show obvious change, tendency (or meaningful stability). These value categories were also very varied and representative for their corresponding levels (ex. individual, group or system level values). Such kind of approach to the data allowed systematization and application to the chronology and socio-historical context as well as overall trending of values.

But before we begin with drawing parallels, we should see in detail the meaning of each value category. A good example of how values can be explained for a better understanding of the research is created by Klaus Helkama and Tija Seppälä (2004: 7) after Schwarz.

Value	Major Aspects
System	Structure, autopoetics, self-reproduction, involvement, relations of power and obedience, hierarchical order
Relations to the social environment	Solidity, horizontal social relations, sense of interrelations with a group, harmony
Relations to others/system	Interaction, sense of inclusion, shared goals, power and capital distribution
Personality	Individual, dignity, identity, skills and knowledge, experience, social connections
Closeness, union and the harmony of person and state system	Balance, two-sided communication, considering people’s expectations and needs, equality, responsibility, trust
Fending one’s own state and it’s interests	Civic responsibility, acknowledging interests, involvement, common action, trust and cooperation
Considering people’s expectations and needs	Social responsibility, trust and cooperation, two-sided communication, common public sphere, equality, harmony, continuity
Nation	Ethnic group, common culture, myths (heroes, rituals) and past experience, shared identity, common views on other groups, common need for security, survival and continuity, basic group of any nation-state
Social responsibility	Ethical behavior within public sphere, norms, self-regulation, welfare
Considering common group interests	Group identity, relations within group, acknowledging common interests, correlating personal and group interests
Loyalty	Commitment, object of loyalty, hierarchical relations, sense of duty, accepting obligations
Responsibility	Common good, ethical behavior, reflexive identity
Amending the functioning of the system	Harmony, coherent development, sense of inclusion, security and stability, perceiving order and personal position/role
Progress	Structural change, collective achievement, shared goals, capital input, benevolence, advanced society
Development of technology	Research and application, capital input, share of unexpectedness, achievement of more general goals
Welfare and comfort	Basic well-being, health, happiness, safety, prosperity, fortunes, commodity
Peace and peacefulness	Harmonious functioning and continuous existence of a group, stability and

	security, conflict-free oriented structure, life in peace
Harmony, beauty	Pleasure, meaning, satisfaction, balance, coherence of elements, continuous variability
Remembering and bond to the past	Tradition, bond between generations, culture continuity, perceiving common group mythology
Wisdom, eruditeness	Deep understanding, consistency, truthful knowledge, control over emotions
Experience	Memory, tradition, personal involvement, perceiving through senses
Self-realization	Personality, self-identification achievement, possibility fulfillment, growth, integrity
Sense of perspective	Vision, ability to foresee, wisdom, acknowledging the variety of choices
Good work	Action, production, self-realization, responsibility, interaction with the world, making a change, inclusiveness.
Relations to the state and system	Loyalty, acceptance of authority, hierarchical relations, capital (re)distribution, inclusiveness
Security, stability of the state system and fight for survival of the system	Continuity of common existence, perceiving order and personal position/role, possibility for development, safe environment
Political activity	Participation, political view expression, power of influencing change, support and opposition
Societal appreciation	Achievement, public praise, respect, authority, involvement, appreciation from others
Work collective	Common aims and functions, values, heroes, myths, rituals, production, stability and survival, material wealth
Equality	Equal opportunities and obligations within group,
Laborious	Work, stamina, achievement, commitment
Combatatness	Direct participation, ability to fight, opposition,
Courage	Confrontation, sense of justice, action, will, honor
Heroism	Defense, high morality, self sacrifice for humanity, power
Confluent development of the state system	Continuity of common existence, balance, harmony, coherent structural changes, stability and expectedness
Helpful, helpfulness	Assistance, kindness, openness, common good, morality
Honest, honesty	Trust, openness, truthfulness, integrity
Stability and security	Survival, continuity of common existence, balanced relationships with all other groups
Fending unified collective: humanity	General inclusiveness, minimum discrimination, human dignity, mutual respect, equality
Humanity	Empathy, sympathy, person dignity, compassion for the weak, universal value, general inclusiveness
Ability to lead, decisiveness	Vision, leadership, conviction, strong worldview
Equity	Protection of the weak, sense of security
Talent, creativity	Giftedness, ability to create, esthetics, personal style
Common public space, openness	Transparency, open discussion among subjects, flexibility, two-way communication between groups, equality

Fending unif coll: subject field coll	Corporate agreement, involvement, common action and values, development, capital input, production,
Criticizing organizations	Shared responsibility and control, two-way communication, critical public sphere, self-regulation
Prosperity and material wealth	Pleasure, satisfaction, achievement, multiple possibilities and advantages, power, accumulation of capital
Globalization, internationalization	Openness, global integration, interdependence, trans-national network
Systematizing, securing immediate environment	Security, harmony, life-world, life in peace
Intuition, convictions	Beliefs, trust in oneself, gained experience
Fending value based interest group	Common values, welfare, continuity, stability, inclusiveness
Fending family	Tight bonds between contemporaries and generations, tradition, survival, continuity, relatives, most basic conservative group
Fending children	Personal and universal dimensions, values, tradition, continuity, survival, stability
Person's freedom	Open possibilities and choices, reflexive identity, responsibility, moral principles and self-regulation, welfare
Raising and socializing a person	Continuity of culture, tradition and common existence, involvement and participation, identity, sense of belonging
Civic responsibility	Civic identity, shared feeling of responsibility, common good

Table 1.2. Table of values. Source: Coding Book for Grant Project nr. 5854.

As I anticipate, in the Discussion part of the paper I would expect some fundamental questions to arise. Firstly, whether values in the 2000s are diversifying or generalizing. Whether societies strive toward systematization and formal arrangements, or new network society and fragmented identity (Castells) theories have grounds that can be seen in this material. Is there really a structural transformation of societies going on? Do value ideas remain important in the new millennium? And the main aspect I would want to view through the prism of values is how it all affects an individual, his position in the world, ways of involvement and interaction.

For these purposes I would see the correlation of analyzed material with the society system theory by Talcott Parsons. As I move on to the level of individual and the effects these large processes have on him, I will refer to Niklas Luhmann and his system theory, as by now it seems the one able to give adequate model for explanation and understanding of what is happening in the world.

The central concept of this paper is system. And this word is used in three different ways. Firstly, *system* is a value no matter whether it is state as a system or other. In this case, it is a structure, meaningful and purposed organization of elements. Here we can speak of geographical, demographical, political, economical, social, cultural or any other system.

Secondly, this concept is used to describe structure made of values from different levels. And do they create any system at all? Obviously, as we will see further, some values from different value levels rise in some period and create connections with each other. I assume, that through these connections values become meaningful and only then they are able to describe the world.

Thirdly, in Discussion we are going to speak about the system of systems in the sense Niklas Luhmann (2007: 11) reveals it in his System theory. He distinguishes different kinds of systems: biological, social, psychological, machine systems. They all have their boundaries, but these boundaries are constantly broken by separate elements of each system. Luhmann sees a person not as a system in itself, but as an object filled with parts of other (biological, psychological, social) systems. But this aspect is to be discussed in more detail in the Discussion part of the paper.

Discussing values and value trends on the basis of provided data I use a collocation “value crisis”. Such a strong term surely needs a detailed explanation. This is not an evaluative but a technical term in the framework of this research as it refers to a sudden (having over 10% of occurrences before crisis) and significant decline (values occur in less than 5% of encoded papers) of majority of values formerly expressed in the papers. Crisis differs from transformation, as in crisis there are no rising values (or groups of values) that would substitute the declined ones (transformation, on the contrary, is supported by the rise of some other values instead of previous ones). As for interpretation of crisis, it is a complicated phenomenon that, for any further interpretation, would need an additional analysis of texts and channels other than daily papers (ex., public speeches, performed drama, radio text, official documents etc) in case at some point values are been transmitted via other channels, not in daily papers. Though, the fact of sudden decline in values in such a general channel is also significant as it reflects the dominating discourses within society.

Nation

As we are going to see throughout the paper, we meet some concepts valid for both periods. One of them as well as the main concept for studying cultures, societies and their values in general in the 20th-21st century is *nation*. And, as this concept will be often used in the paper, I will define it as fully as possible for the sake of clear understanding. If look at the nationalism from the European perspective, Brubaker (1997: 17-22) defines nation as institutionalized concept closely linked to a particular political field and a state system. In this light he prefers not to narrow it down to just a type of community or an attributed personal status. Also notable is Brubaker’s approach to nationalization as being not a long-term process, but in some cases an event, a product of sudden crystallization. In general, he states, that nation is a constantly available and resonant category of social vision and division.

I would sum up that individuals and groups of individuals (as large as states and states’ unions) are often considered from national point of view and are divided accordingly to it. Yet, in the framework of current research, it is necessary to clarify the differences of perception of word nation in different countries and periods.

When Dogan (1998: 81) describes the process of nationalism development in Europe in the beginning of the 20th century he fairly states that after its decline in Western Europe and after the Russian revolution, nationalism spread anew in new nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe

after the World War I. So it is perfectly right to assume that *nation* is the main value for all three countries in the period of nation- and state-building.

In the 1920-1930s newly formed Soviet Russia is a growing multinational empire that unites a multiple of ethnicities living in vast territories. In this sense, nation cannot be treated in its European, ethnicity and state centered meaning, but is rather a multiple of aspects all constituting one concept. This is mainly due to the cultural heritage and historical development of the country in previous centuries. According to the definition of Joseph Stalin, “nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (Stalin 1994: 18-21). This is indeed an appropriate definition (that excludes ethnical aspect or possibility of single dominating ethnic group) for a multinational empire. This is also connected with the term *soviet person/people* referring to geographical and political (ideological) neither ethnical nor cultural aspects of a person or a group of people. Also, with the rise of the labors’ movement nation is rather close to the notion of *people* (rus. *narod*) that also refers to multiple groups stating other than ethnical aspects of their being.

Neither does Russia (Russian Federation) in 1990-2000s give meaning to nation as ethnical group (ex. rising neo-nationalistic movements and their rhetoric). In the latest period nation as constituting the core of the state can refer to several aspects (Brubaker 1997: 142-144)

- Russkie – Russians by ethno-cultural nationality.
- Rossiiane – refers the territorial aspect of Russia, when one identifies oneself with the state, it being a homeland. This is a politically correct form of referral.
- Russkoiazychnye – Russian-speakers not only in linguistic, but in identity sense, when people of ethnicities other than Russian live in Russia and identify themselves with Russians and the state, and for those living outside Russia, but still with Russian as mother tongue and strong self-identification with the country.
- Sootechestvenniki – compatriots, who share a common fatherland (*patria, otechestvo*). They can be former subjects of Russian Empire or USSR that do not have Russian citizenship, but tied spiritually and cultural-ethnically to Russia (Blishchenko through Brubaker, 1997). This combines legal, ethnographic and identitarian aspects. This concept has been formed in mid-90s.
- Grazhdane – Russian citizens residing in other states. It is also used synonymously with sootechestvenniki and, roughly, as referring to Russia’s responsibility for all former Soviet citizens. What is not mentioned by Brubaker is that this term is close to phenomenon that has been called in previous years *soviet citizens/people* as it puts forth the territorial as well temporal (common Soviet past) aspects of being ignoring the others (cultural, ethnical etc).

For Estonia the concept of nation has not remained the same throughout the century. The important social processes and history twist have influenced that what is perceived as nation.

In the first period nation is based on varied aspects. Gustav Laurentius (1923: 7) defines nation as a group of people that have unified around one language during a historical process. People

within nation always have something in common physically as well as spiritually. Laurentius also refers to spatial aspect saying, that people who live together for some time obtain something from each other both spiritually and physically. Nation is also what distinguishes them from others. He also describes so called “Estonian character” when compared with other nations – a kind of stereotypical description. (Laurentius 1923: 7-8, 21-31)

Another definition is provided by M. Amjärv (1918: 10-11), nation is a group of people unified by inner biological feature, breed and outer distinctive memories concealed for some period of time, which are language, territory, statehood, history, traditions and faith. The author marks that they are hardly ever present all at once. And they should also be accompanied by the feeling of belonging to certain culture, or accepting certain culture. (Amjärv 1918: 10-11)

By the end of the 1980s the notion has went through considerable transformations, bringing forth certain features of nation as well demolishing others. Haav (1990: 101) describes that one’s belonging to a nation is not defined by blood or ethnical origin any more but by one’s ethnical self-consciousness, evaluation of one’s ethnicity. Ethnicity (knowing and practicing ancestors’ language and traditions) plays now a major role, and this feature is decisive for both Estonians and non-estonians within Estonian territory. (Haav 1990: 101)

In nowadays Estonian context nation is a complicated concept. According to Eva Priimäe (2010: 77) nation is considered to be an imagined (intentional) moral community based on the sense of belonging among individual members and characterized by 1) shared ancestry and history, 2) ties to a specific area, 3) shared historical, political and cultural heritage and 4) (often but not always) a shared language or religion.

I would add to Priimäe’s definition that natin may sometimes refer to the ethnical group (incl. ethnical Estonians that fled out of the country but who refer to Estonia as their fatherland) that constitutes the base of the state. But in some cases it also grasps ethnical non-Estonians living within the territory of Estonia (est. *eestimaalased*) as well as citizens with residence outside the country (est. *Eestima kodanikud*). In the last years, and especially due to the rise of the non-profit sector and local initiatives, the idea of civic society is gaining strength. Not only are we speaking of socialization and involvement on other than nationally based group (but rather place of residence or feeling of connection with the (social) environment), but also of a larger transformation from national to civil society.

For the Finnish society, nation and national aspect also play a major role in both periods at hand. If the first part of the 20th century can be characterized by strong need for unification of nation that is when national is referred to as source of common vision (specific Finnish fields of production, like forestry or food production, ex. fin. *suomalainen maito* - finnish milk). As Heinsoo (2005: 17-18) states by the time Finland gained independence, the cultural identity has already been formed. He also cites Matti Klinge, who stated that Finland did not entail finnish-language or Swedish-language culture, the culture has been a whole no matter the language. Although linguistically there were important markers of development: changing names for finnish-like ones (1906-7, 1935-36), forming the Union of Finns (*Suomalaisuuden Liitto*, 1906), fighting for the finnish-language higher education (1920s) and other national movements. (Heinsoo 2005: 17-19)

In Finnish context nation is nowadays tightly connected with the citizenship. Even words for expressing national aspect fin. *kansa*, *kansallisuus*, *kansalainen* also mean citizen, where *kansakunta*, *kansakuntaisuus* means citizenry. This expresses a tight connection between the national and the civil aspect, which do not appear in this way in Estonia or Russia (where nation represents rather a spiritual and cultural bond).

After 1995, when Finland entered EU, the notion of nation has become a means of vision of common Finnish people and division from the rest of EU, like it once was for distinguishing from Sweden in the 18th century. Maarja Lõhmus (2005: 337-346) describes Finnish society as future-oriented. This means that future survival of Finnish people is kept in mind whenever a decision takes place. Its social policy is based on trustworthy rules accepted by the citizens. Fulfilling these rules by members and society as a whole (honesty, skillful, encouraging and caring) guarantees stability and future survival.

Interesting is a major difference in perception of what is Estonian and Finnish nation. Contrary to Estonian closed concept, where being Estonian demands fulfilling a number of standards (having Estonian ancestors, being born in Estonia, knowing the language fluently, having citizenship, expressing loyalty to the state in different ways etc.), in relation to immigrants Finnish express another point of view: “The representation of being Finnish is socially shared and available to everybody, but it is based on tradition and history. The history and tradition that were not shared by immigrants, in which they did not participate, and due to that they do not always understand the meaning of this representation. (Maahanmuuttajat ja suomalaisuus 2002)”

In all the cases seen above, nation can be seen as a group of people, a community that has common cultural heritage as well as (in the case of Estonia) ethnical feature. These aspects are valid and important in all three countries in both periods. Implicitly notion of nation also includes territorial, economical, social, environmental, temporal aspects, but within current study those are essential as we are studying daily newspapers that all had certain audiences on certain territories within certain economic and social system as well as more or less diverse temporal perception of (common) past, present and future.

[1] Article “Child-Rearing Values of Estonian and Finnish Mothers and Fathers.” By Tiis Tulviste and Maaret Ahtonen published in Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (SAGE) vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 137-155.

[2] Book “Cultural Trauma and Life Stories.” By Aili Aarelaid-Tart. Tartu: Kikimora Publications.

[3] Published in Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, 71-84 (1993).

The tendencies of the 1920-30s

Estonia

By the 1920-s Estonian society was experiencing highly romantic moods about gained independence and the possibility of constructing own nation-based identity. This changed over the decade when the society faced the first upcoming challenges and failures of a newly

established state. Rooted in the 19th century local communities (*seltsid*) Estonian culture sought its way towards independence through the empowerment of local initiatives. These communities gained popularity rapidly and involved even more native people (so-called sons of the soil, see Laitin 2007: 6-7) possibly excluding non-Estonians. This contributed to the building of a social identity based on nationalism, as was common to older European states (Caramani 2004: 252-258). Besides providing the cultural unification in order to form a culturally homogeneous state (see Crouch 1999: 284), geographical unification was of central importance here. Due to that, it was obvious that when the agrarian reform of the 1919 enabled the spread of privately owned farms (est. *talud*) the romantic vision of new liberal state order being able to solve all the inner and external problems spread widely. Liberal democracy as well as new agrarian order had been seen as a value in its end. During the first decades of the 20th century not only did Estonia gain independence (2nd February 1920) and establish its first, ultraliberal parliament, it also went by the western European states both economically and culturally.

In the 20-s Estonia established its own national currency, which has been associated with highly valued economical and political stability. This vision went through major changes during the following years caused by country's external debts and the closure of the previously available Soviet market (in particular Petrograd as a large-scale agricultural goods outlet). Then, after the economical crisis of the 1923-1924 (and later on the world economical crisis of the 1929), Estonia's previously industrial development and export priority had been reoriented towards agriculture and domestic market. During the period of 1918-1933 Estonia went through 20 governmental crises, which resulted the formation of synonymous meaning "democracy" and "instability". (Estonica. 1918-1940.)

In the 1930s the country underwent a quite controversial development process. On one hand, it gained stable position in the international market during the previous decade (selling agricultural as well as raw or half-raw industrial goods), which triggered intense modernization. On the other hand, the economic world crisis deepened, Estonia's economy kept on becoming planned and protectionist, sale of goods got monopolized by state.

Despite the odds, the accepted then model of economy rapidly raised the level of life of people, which now had become close to middle Europe. People got used to bias conditions as a lot of cultural and economical markers had been remaining positive. For example, strengthening of the Estonian-language based professional culture, opening of numerous clubs (over 500) and public libraries (728), establishment of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. Estonian literature was influenced by West-European trends. Minorities also got vast rights and issued magazines and papers (102 in total during 1920s-1930s) in their own languages (Tchassovskaia 2001: 19).

And despite the high numbers of unemployed in the 1932-33 (25 000 unemployed), the second half of the decade with its pre-war boom and intense investments as well as orders from Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavian countries triggered the new wave of development for the economy, improving opportunities for previously unemployed people. By the end of the

decade Estonia was a developed agrarian country with stable markets (28% of agricultural output exported, to Great Britain, for example, the goods were bacon and butter) as well highly modernized industry with industry's share in national income reaching 32% in 1938. As mentioned above, political life went through several crises, saw governments changing rapidly. This instability had been followed by the military *coup d'état* in 1934 with Konstantin Päts and Johan Laidoner violating the constitution and setting the regime of personal power. (Estonica. 1918-1940.)

With the closer look at the values expressed in Eesti Päevaleht throughout the 20-30s, the interrelation between these socio-economical tendencies and value tendencies is clear. First, it all began with the decadence of this romantic mood due to the new critical state of the society in the mid-1920-s. Presumably due to the instability of the state system (expressed by the numerous governmental crisis) as well as the people's unanswered romantic expectations *system* as a dominating explicit value of an article remains very low (1.7% per decade) in Eesti Päevaleht. Together with the disappointment in the system, *relations to the social environment* as a value decline from 12.3% in the 1910s to 4% by the end of the 1920s. This might be based on the growing national self-consciousness of the people, when after the agrarian reform they became land owners in their own right and more abstract values do not seem attractive any more. This growing sense of unification is supported by the fact that *relations to others/system* and *personality* itself as values appear to be constantly dominating throughout the first third of the 20th century.

This need and sense of unification and state stability is also demonstrated by the trends of other system-level values. The prominent among them are 1) *values of closeness, unison and harmony of the state/system and a person*; 2) *fending one's own state and its interests* (both growing from 5.9% and 1.8% in 1910 to 11.5% and 13.8% by the end of the 1920s correspondingly). Though implicitly controversial is a significant decline of the value of *considering people's expectations and needs* that has been stable in the 1910s and then dropped from 9.4% to 1% by the end of the 1920s. This decline in fact signals the change from the new ultraliberal democratic state to dictatorship (silent state¹) of Konstantin Pats in the 1930s.

Nevertheless, among group level values *nation* as value grows constantly from 7.7% in 1910s to 10% in 1920s. There are no other outstanding values on the group level (examp. *social responsibility, considering common group interests, loyalty, responsibility* etc. occur in no more than 5% encoded newspapers for the decade), and it means that *nation* is treated as the most important value in context of group values. This trend overlaps with the dominating values of *social environment* and *relations to others/system* that have been mentioned above.

¹ For silent state see Estonica

http://www.estonica.org/eng/lugu.html?kateg=43&menyy_id=98&alam=61&tekst_id=254

Despite the economical prosperity, but consequent to the political crisis, value trends in the 1930s are quite destructive. They can be generally divided into two categories: those expressing the crisis of system and those expressing the crisis of personal values. First category includes the declining of such values as *amending the functioning of the system* (8.7% to 5%), *closeness, unision and harmony of state and a person* (14.6% to 7.8%), *fending one's own state and its interests* (11.5% to 1%). The decline of values of *progress* (6.7% to 0%) and *development of technology* (13.5% to 10%) also has overlapping significance, as it reflects the blurry future of the country consequent to the transformation of the political regime. If the state and society can be seen as one's environment, then highly significant for the 1930s is the disappearance of many element values: *welfare, comfort* (14.2% to 1%), *peace and peacefulness* (5.2% to 0%), *harmony, beauty* (7% to 4.4%). No surprise, that these abstract welfare values lose their positions, as turbulent and violent changes occur when out of the power of citizens.

Previously idealized, but quite consequent development of the newly independent state is now transformed into doubted perspective, as it is facing the unexpected empowerment of totalitarianism. Time-fixed value *remembering and bond to the past* declines almost twice the number of 1920s from 7.3% to 5% in 1930s.

The second group, the crisis of personal level values is expressed through the decline of such previously valued traits as *erudeness, wisdom* (9.4% to 4.4%), *experience* (9% to 1%), *sense of perspective* (3.8% to 0%) when compared to the numbers in 1920s. Highly estimated in the 1920s value of *good work* declines twice the number in 1930s (7.6% to 5.5%).

These trends reveal that despite the new and seemingly stable positive trends in the country's economical and cultural development, values were not something to pay much attention to in printed press. Based on these trends, we can clearly state that by the mid-1930s the time of idealistic, romantic visions and positive evaluations of the past, present and future was over. From now on Estonia entered a "silent", rather indefinite phase of political and social development.

The Soviet Russia

Before any possible analysis of data gathered from encoded "Pravda", we should consider two major distinctive aspects. First, the origin and specifics of daily newspaper "Pravda" and, second, the specific interrelation of private and public sphere in Soviet Russia. Indeed, Pravda was not a daily paper in the traditional European sense as it has been established by Lenin himself in 1912 in order to fulfill the functions imposed by the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Pravda has been the most popular and wide-spread daily paper in the country throughout the soviet period and, at the same time, it "fulfilled the role of collective agitator, propagandist, organizer of workers." Editorial of the paper consisted of Bolsheviks and deputys of the 4th Stately Duma. (Andronov 1975: 1397-1404)

Keeping in mind this special feature of “Pravda”, we are obliged to comment the specifics of the soviet public sphere ever since the Soviet state. Oswald and Voronkov (2004: 105-112) fairly state that right from the beginning the official public sphere and private sphere were sharply separated, which lead to the establishment of informal legal norms in daily life and in citizens’ life-world. Scheme “The Private-public Sphere in Soviet society” (Oswald and Voronkov 2004: 107) demonstrates that in 1920-1930s the official public sphere dominated over the private public sphere. In late Soviet era, the private-public sphere emerged, building a clear-cut border between the private and the official-public sphere. The private-public sphere entailed friends and family, spatially it was situated in separated private dwellings and within this sphere people communicated jokes, urban folklore, opinions on political and other issues and other. (Oswald and Voronkov 2004: 105-112)

From the point of view of the historical process, 1920s were unstable and very changeable for the Soviet Russia. In the beginning of the decade the greatest challenge has probably been the restoration of connection and economical cooperation of cities and countryside. Besides everything else, this also incorporated winning the trust from peasants toward the state. Having faced disorders in cities and countryside in January and February of 1921, the decade began with NEP (New Economical Policy). The new policy allowed some liberalization of the economical order of the state. This includes a number of stabilizing reforms: allowance of a free barter for country products (28.03.1921), restoration of the consumers’ cooperatives (7.04.1921), abrogation of the Decree (from November 1920) on the nationalization of small enterprise (17.05.1921), the allowance of formation of small industries of less than 20 employees etc. Although these reforms were not able to prevent the famine in summer 1921, when 30 million people were suffering the hunger and 5 million died despite the external help as well as 1 200 thousand remained unemployed (1924).

Opposing the initiated liberalization, Stalin announced in December 1925 shift toward rapid industrialization. This decision became apparent in 1928-29 when taxation of small entrepreneurs was enlarged, workers’ brigades were formed and the first 5-year plan was approved. These changes went along with emerging massive collectivization announced in December 1929. (Conte 1994: 197-210)

This is how Soviet Russia entered the 30s. It was on its way for the transition from agrarian to industrial economy. No need to say, that largely this transformation was carried out on the basis of mobilization of human labor. Millions of workers invested their time and forces in fulfillment of the announced „plan”. There’s been abstract belief and motivation which soon turned into more of the system of compulsion.

Agrarian collectivization was performed rapidly by the means of threatening the peasants. By the end of the first 5-year plan 70% of the cultivated land belonged to collective farms or kolkhozs. In summer of 1930 there already were established statements on fulfilling 5-year plan in 4 years and the overall speeding-up of country’s development. In 1932 several statements on narrowing

the rights of workers and the weakening of labor unions' influence on employers got accepted. Further years can be defined as countries' upbringing by fear and (often accusative) propaganda. (Laitin 1994: 211-227)

If seen retrospectively, the mobilization of human force played a great part in the overall transformation of Soviet Union "from agrarian, barely developed country to one of the greatest military powers in history in just three decades", as it is described by Manuel Castells in "End of Millennium" (2001: 22-23). This could ever happen only by taking its toll on the Soviet civilian economy and its citizens' everyday life.

If we look at the value tendencies in the articles encoded from daily newspaper Pravda of 1920s, the ill condition of both: city and country population as well as instability and disappointment in the state system might have been the cause of rapid decline of values by the end of the decade. For example *system* as a value emerges from 21% in the 1910s to 23% in 1920s. After this point it is constantly dropping. Value of *relations to the state and system* drops drastically from 95% in the 1910s to only 7% in the 1920s. This means that in media individual becomes irrelevant to state. It is also worth considering the fact that the state is incapable of sustaining peoples' basic life needs. But the value of *relations to others/system* shows stability throughout the 1910s (25%) and 1920s (20%) in the 1920s. This goes hand in hand with the weakness of state, which is empowering the local community, where only non-individualistic values provide survival. This trend is supported by constant presence of the value of relations to others/system (24.6% in 1910s, 20% in 1920s and 21% in 1930s) as well as insignificance of the value of *personality* (3.5% in 1910s to 1.1% in 1920s and 3.8% in 1930s).

Although *system* as a solid value declines in occurrences in articles, its presence is felt strongly by other relevant values. Prominent values on the system level are 1) *the security, stability of state/system and fight for survival of the system* growing from 2% in 1910s to 33.5% in the 1920s; 2) *amending the functioning of the system* (rising from 5% in 1910s to 18.4% in the 1920s). Both values substitute the highly propagated ideological importance of maintaining the newly established soviet state order and, when its stability is secured, the need for its constant improvement.

As a means of mobilizing people for participation in building up the state system, among the group level values Pravda also puts forward *political activity* (26% in 1910s to 46% in 1920s) going hand in hand with the rapidly growing value of *societal appreciation* (from 2% in 1910s to 26% in 1920s) and *work collective* (from 2% to 14.5% in 1920s). They are both supposed to stimulate collective sense of participation and give immediate social environment the role of evaluator of how one coped with his duties. Despite this trend *responsibility* as a value occurs rarely up to the 1930s (not more than 4% per decade).

Pravda puts forward *nation* (already discussed in previous section Method) as a value (10.5% in the 1910s turning into 37% in the 1920s). At the same time, *equality* grows very little from 1.8%

(1910s) to 6% in the 1920s, which otherwise could have been supportive for the ban of private property and sharing of previously private assets.

Obviously, the changes in the working culture and worker's everyday routine in the 1930s demanded highly abstract motivation (as material goods were hardly accessible due to country's orientation toward heavy, not light, industry). Social scientist Pierre Bourdieu (1998) states that different types of (inc. symbolic) capital are always produced within a state and society's subjects resist the power of the state in order to obtain this capital. For this reason it has been highly important for Soviet Russia to pace the subjects and prevent their appearance in the future (among most radical methods were threats and terror). The compulsion and suppression of individuals was accomplished through planting of his *habitus* (the basis for individual's practices and images, Bourdieu) and what Hofstede names *practices*, which include one's rituals, heroes and symbols, being directly connected to values (see „onion” scheme by Hofstede 2001: 11). Values are very important as they define one's rationality and, through that, are the basis for choices and actions made by an individual. (Hofstede 2001: 2-11)

Although using a different source² Ronald Inglehart (2007: 25) interlinks values and people's orientations concerning work motivation. No surprise that Russian Pravda begin to highly promote person level values in 1930s. Indeed, there has been a strong need for constructing the most effective type of person (for answering state's economic needs) by constructing single traits. For this reason, encoded articles of Pravda propagate such personal traits as *laboriousness* (14% to 24%), *combatatness* (from 2% to 13%), *courage* (4% to 11.5%), *heroism* (0.6% to 8%), *good work* (26% to 49%). These abstract values were motivating, as one needed to correspond to these features in order to be „the right worker (and a good person)”. Personality-driven value system is also supported by the temporary decline of the value of *work collective* (from 14.5% to 6% in 1930s), pointing more directly now at one's lot in the common success.

In this personal trait centered propaganda, it is interesting that *responsibility* and *social responsibility* are both kept low throughout the 1920-1930s (only ca 4% per decade). We might see this as a way of resistance of the state to any possible social subjects in the sense Bourdieu (1998) describes them.

The system of compulsion is expressed in Pravda in several ways. For example, the dominating value of *societal appreciation* is highly propagated. It's already a strong presence in the encoded articles of the 1920s (26%) intensifies even more in 1930s with 33.5% during the decade. This implicitly imposes an important role on the community to see and decide, whether to appreciate (synonymous - to evaluate positively) or not one's behavior. This is supported by the constancy of values of *relations to others/system* and *nation* which show little change in this decade. Another supportive trend for this mechanism is the doubling (from 10% to 22.5% in 1930s) of the value of *confluent development of the state/system*.

² The contemporary World Value Surveys and European Value Surveys.

To put it all in a nutshell, the overall trend of values Pravda in 1930s is two-sided. On one hand, it propagates personal traits as values and intensifies each worker's personal commitment to work and the state by helping the „plan”. On the other hand, Pravda intensifies the value of society and system that go hand in hand with the previously mentioned worker's commitment. This two-sided (individual abstract and collective abstract) pressure upon a personality surely kept workers committed to the high demands of the rapid industrialization.

Finland

In comparison with the trends in Estonia and Soviet Russia, Finland experiences a more stable period in the 1920-s. After signing peace treaty in Tartu (Dorpat) with Soviet Russia on 14th of October 1920 Finland gained independence. During first fifteen years non-socialist governments were governing Finland. The most important reform for this period has probably been the 1918 law, which allowed the tenant farmers to acquire rented holding, which further lead to vast establishment of small farms (approx. 50 000). (Häikiö 1992: 21)

Meeting a lot of challenges of a newly independent state, Finland surprisingly didn't face the rise of fascist movement popular then in many European countries (Häikiö 1992: 22). Nevertheless the new constitution, which embodied a compromise between monarchist and republican positions, brought certain instability into politics with rapidly changing short-term governments varying in their political composition. Already in 1926 Social Democrats formed parliament and it can be seen as a general establishment of democracy (as previously dominating the Left split into Social Democrats and Socialist party). (Klinge 1990: 100-104)

The economy was also experiencing rise with the help of both internal and external development. One of the primary objectives of the government in the early years was the “ideal” of self sufficiency in foodstuffs supported by necessary legislative and land reforms. Cooperatives (Valio, Enigheten, Atri, Lso, Metsäliitto etc.) buying food and forestry products from farmers and delivering them to consumers were driven by the aim of providing service rather than just making profit, which positively influenced the attitudes towards maintaining appropriate price levels. Export was also crucial for Finland in 1920-30s, export (as well as import) doubled compared to the levels of 1913. One of the main Finnish export items – wood – achieved larger markets thanks to Russia's withdrawal from the export markets after the revolution. This ended in 1928 when Russia re-entered the world timber market. (Ojala ed al. 2006: 73, 80)

In 1930s Finland experienced the impact of the Great Depression both politically and economically, which lead to growing unemployment and debts of smallholdings. Many banks were also obliged to stop their activities or even merge with larger ones. The population movement and other changes that were taking place in Soviet Russia provoked the formation of Lapua anti-communist movement, being in fact part of a larger European movement against parliamentarism and liberalism. The 1930s are also marked by the rise of the peasant movement, attempt at anarmed rebellion in 1932 and further shift for long-term parliaments and political as well as financial stabilization. But neither the idea of strengthening of the security of Nordic

countries, nor the neutral openness of Finnish development did prevent the Winter war of 1939. (Klinge 1990: 105-109)

If we turn to the values expressed in Helsingin Sanomat, we can see that in 1920s there is one constant dominant value – value of *relations* to others/system (30% in 1910s and 20% in 1920s). This goes hand in hand with the formation of multiple small farms after 1918 and the collaboration of the employees and employers on the non-formal level, in the fields of construction industry and handicrafts (until the burst of the Great Depression of 1930s) (Ojala ed al. 2006: 172). That is because both provided good reason for maintaining importance of immediate environment rather than any bigger system. This trend is also supported by the stability of the value of *loyalty* (14.2% in 1910s and 12.2% in 1920s). Schwarz (2007: 715) in his contemporary study on inclusiveness of moral universe on the basis of values puts *loyalty* (the value of a person being loyal) in the group of benevolence close to *helpful*, *honest* and *responsible*. These values are present in Helsingin Sanomat on the person level: *helpfulness* (5% in 1910s and 5.6% in 1920-s), *honesty* remaining low (7% in 1910s and 1% in 1920s) and *responsibility* almost non-present (maximum of 1.5%) in the coded articles. Obviously, in that time these values did not form a solid block and were rather detached.

In 1920s, there is a strong growth of the value of *amending the functioning of the system* (from 7.5% in the 1910s to 14.8% in the 1920s) and no other value shows any strong trend as they all remain below 10% per decade. But when it comes to 1930s, *amending the functioning of the system* declines from 14.8% to as little as 5.8%. It signifies the overall disbelief in the capacities of the system.

Such values as *system* and *relations to the state* remain stable throughout the 1910-20s (around 5-10% in 1910s-1920s). *Development of technology* (6% to 11%) and *stability and security* (6% to 10%) are also constantly present in Helsingin Sanomat showing little growth. This trend anticipates the influences of the American ideology of Safety First on Finland, which embraced the objectives of economic and technological rationalization with the needs of labor protection (Ojala ed. al. 2006: 294).

In the 30s, similarly to Estonia, values common to the welfare state are clearly declining in numbers. Those are *sense of perspective* (7.7% to 0.7%), *welfare, comfort* (5.6% to 5%), *peace and peacefulness* (5.6% to 2.1%). Values of *fending unified collective from perspective of humanity* (9.7% to 4.3%) and *humanity* as an abstract value (8.7% to 2.1%) also decline significantly and are likely to show the end of formerly dominating idealistic visions. In the encoded articles, *loyalty* as a group value also drops from 12.2% to 7.2%.

In 1930s most of the personal level values show no change and continuously remain at a very low level with a maximum of 10%. Even if some of them had stronger trends in the 1920s, their occurrences declined closely to zero in the 1930.

Despite all the changes in values, *nation* as a value is constantly present in Helsingin Sanomat (20% in 1920s and 16.5% in 1930s). Differently from previously described Estonia and Soviet Russia, *nation* as a group value is stably present in Helsingin Sanomat even earlier, in 1900-20s (23% in 1900s and 30% in 1910s). It is undeniable that presence of this value supported the rise and establishment of the newly independent state in 1920. Though, we must acknowledge the fact that in Finnish context the notion of *nation* had a rather different function than in Estonia and Soviet Russia. Although we can't deny it serving the need of spiritual and social unification in the context of Finland's mobilization and preparation for war during the 1930s (Tillotson 1993: 89-93).

To sum up the changes in values of this period in all three countries, I must say that common to Estonia, Soviet Russia and Finland are values of *amending the functioning of the system*, *nation* and *relations to others*. Besides them such values as *development of technology*, *welfare and comfort* as well as *peace and peacefulness* are common in Finland and Estonia. In encoded papers of Finland and Soviet Russia common values were *responsibility* and *relations to the state and nation*. Common exclusively in Soviet Russia and Estonia were values of *harmony and beauty*, *societal appreciation* and *good work*.

Although it might be confusing that values of *good work* and *nation* for Eesti Päevaleht in Estonia (colored in green) are distinct from the same notions for encoded Pravda. That is because they showed tendencies and occurrence numbers other than encoded in Helsingin Sanomat and Pravda, I had to make a differentiation within the model as well.

The following dynamic model contains all the value categories mentioned in the countries' descriptions above. The horizontal arrow at the bottom shows the time flow direction through 1920-30s. The three horizontal areas parallel to it divide the field into three imaginary horizontal sections: low (0 to 10%), middle (10-15%) and high (15-50%) percent of occurrences in the encoded papers. These two scales help to see the position of a value according to the period and frequency. But what makes the model dynamic is the general directions of rise and decline in value emergence. Arrows stand for rise and decline of certain values. As the overall trend of the three countries' dailies has been the rise of the values in the 1920s and their change (mostly decline) in the 1930s, these two directions correlate well with the bottom time flow direction. Values that are situated not in the area of the arrows, but in the white background remain at the same level in both decades.

In order to illustrate the tendencies of three countries, it is convenient to build a visual model.




Fig. 1.1 *Dynamic Value System Model 1920-1930*. Source: *Coding Book for Grant Project nr. 5854*.

Colors stand for Russia (red), Finland (blue) and Estonia (green). If a value belonged to the trends of one country (marked by color) and to Finland, it is underlined. If it belonged to the trends of one country and to Estonia, it is written in *italics*. This means, that *responsibility* was a value common for Russia and Finland. And *welfare, comfort* for Finland and Estonia. So, this model sums up everything said on values in countries' descriptions.

Value System of 1920-1930s

In the previous section we have seen trends that are specific for each country. But in order to make a conclusion on their differences and similarities, I would offer to draw a visual model that would reflect dominating values for all three countries in accordance with the four levels (person, society, system, abstract).

The static model (Fig. 1.2) shows values that have emerged in the encoded daily papers during the 1920-30s. They are organized according to the four levels that were described in the methodological section, this means on personal, social (or group), system and abstract level. The position of each value reflects its more loose or tight connection to the level. For example, personal traits like *heroism* and *wisdom* belong to person and abstract level, as they express rather ideal maxims than adequate skills and features. Or *societal appreciation* is closer to society level rather than abstract, as it reflects individual's relation with others, not ideal maxim of how one "ought to be".




Fig. 1.2 *Static Value System Model 1920-1930*. Source: *Coding Book for Grant Project nr. 5854*.

The core value and idea of the model is *nation*, as it has been present in 3 countries' encoded articles throughout the whole period. *Nation* also represents the idea that organizes around itself most of other values. Obviously, because the main function of these values had been the formation of national, social and personal identities for inhabitants of the newly emerged states (state systems). This identity formation is most prominent when we look at the bottom part of the

model (the person and society levels). Explicitly expressed in the encoded articles, one's way of being and interacting with the environment are crucial in the identity-building process and further meaning-giving process (see Introduction). The two levels on top (system and abstract level) help to maintain established order and re-legitimize it if necessary.

All elements of the model have already been described in previous sections of the article (Method and Value Trends of 1920-1930s). Common values for three countries' encoded articles are mostly situated in the upper left part of the model. Those are value of *system*, *amending the functioning of the system* and *relations to others/system*, which is concerned not with system but with society.

Encoded articles from Estonia and Finland have in common values that are situated in the upper part of the model, the system level (*amending the functioning of the system*) and abstract level (*sense of perspective, peace and peacefulness, welfare and comfort*). Articles of Helsingin Sanomat and Pravda have in common (beside values common to all three countries) only one value: *relations to the state and system*. In the encoded articles for Pravda is almost absent the abstract level (ex. value of *harmony and beauty*), and for Helsingin Sanomat – the person's level with few exceptions and the society level expresses absolutely different values.

Besides values that are common to all three countries, encoded articles of Pravda and Eesti Päevaleht also show few common values. For society level - *good work* and *societal appreciation*. They have no common values on system or abstract level, as encoded articles for Eesti Päevaleht are concerned with establishing connections between a person and (state) system (values of *considering people's expectations and needs, fending one's own state and its interests* and *closeness, union of state and person*). Encoded articles for Pravda are dominated by values of system in its end: *stability and security of the state system, confluent development of the state system* and *political activity*. They also have no significant occurrences of abstract level values.

To put it in a nutshell, indeed values expressed in the encoded articles of Eesti Päevaleht, Pravda and Helsingin Sanomat are very varied. They surely correspond to the needs and priorities of these states and societies. Although post-independence development might seem a homogeneous process, we can object that by the provided data. In fact, what we have seen is the search for rather specific ways of development as well as general parting of values right from the beginning of independence period.

It is also useful to see which social groups were dominating the newspaper articles in the two decades. For Finland, those are surely politicians, party representatives and statesmen, as they appear in 17% for of encoded articles for 1920s and in 30% of encoded articles of 1930s. Although lower in numbers, in encoded articles of Eesti Päevaleht is dominating the same social group (appearing in 14-13% of encoded articles). In an interesting manner, in Russian Pravda politicians, party representatives and statesmen are not the carrying force. They occur only in 8-10% of the articles during the two decades. In fact, for Pravda, there is no strongly dominating social group. And if in the cases of Helsingin Sanomat and Eesti Päevaleht it is obvious, that the state-centered values are logically propagated by politicians, party representatives and statesmen, then for Pravda this remains unanswered. Values seem to be anonymous and abstract, with no basis in any of the social groups.

Framework for the 1990-2000s

It is a common opinion that values persist over the time and their change is slow (Inglehart 2007: 30-31). They are so basic and essential to an individual as well as a group of people that these changes demand a long time. But societies and states do change rapidly as their development priorities are influenced and changed, their policies are reoriented and, consequently, the demands for all these developments are different. And individuals as well as groups in the society are constrained to adapt to these changes.

As it is seen from the previous analysis of the 1920s and 1930s, dominating values as well as changes of more weak value groups are hardly ever occasional. They are symptomatic to the needs and actions of the society as a whole. In the case of the first third of the 20th century we are already aware what the outcomes of these changes were. But if we have a glimpse at the nowadays tendencies of the values, we yet don't know where are they heading. So what we are aiming to investigate for 1990s and 2000s is whether

- 7) values expressed in the daily newspapers are rather specific for each country (like it has been in 1920s and 1930s) or nowadays values are merging into common "value standard";
- 8) values have changed with new independence (cases of Russia and Estonia) and new developments (ex, entering EU for Finland) in comparison with the previous period of independence in the beginning of the 20th century;
- 9) there could be made any predictions about the future of the three societies on the basis of these values, do they correspond to general discourses of our time (democracy discourse, human rights discourse, welfare state discourse etc.) and what is their predictable future.

No need to say that 1990s are characterized by very low levels of values in all three countries. Only value of *nation* is constantly present in the encoded papers of all three countries. Other values emerge or rise in 2000s. But before we move on to the value trends expressed in encoded Estonian, Finnish and Russian daily newspapers of the last two decades, it is necessary to present a short socio-historical framework for processes these countries underwent during the 1990s and 2000s.

During the last two decades the world, and especially Europe, has went through a lot of changes and entered yet unseen phase of development. Three countries analyzed within this research have all made key decisions that influenced their future development and position within the world community.

For Russia the most important has obviously been the fall (or as it is often called - collapse) of the Soviet Union. Further, significant have been process and consequences of the outburst “wild capitalism” that lead to, mostly corrupted, privatization that allowed not the rise of the new Russian middle-class, but the small elite that accumulated vast capital within key sectors of the economy (gas, oil, diamond, chemical production). By the end of Yeltsin’s reign not only did country experience constant worsening of key spheres of life (social sector, healthcare, education, culture and science) but it also suffered under political combinations that led to permanent instability. Among key events in Russian Federation were the two wars in Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2000) and recent armed conflict with Georgia (08.2008), Russia’s entering the G7, which becomes G8 (06.1997), the economical crisis called “default” in 1998. The new millennium began with the elections of new president, that resulted in strengthening of central state control over regions, media and other fields of life. Stately power was given into the hands of former military key-figures. But positive social reforms as well as stopping worsening of situations also took place. This was managed mostly thanks to high prices for oil at world markets rather than inner stabilization and development of national business initiatives. (Dejnitshenko 2010: 319-374)

Estonia gained independence in 1991 and entered a phase of transition from post-communist to a modern European society. Former soviet republic quickly reoriented and began integrating into Western democratic society. This not without help from external monetary institutions (EU, IMF, World Bank, WTO etc.), the influence of financial and knowledge flows from the West to the East as well as two-way cooperation. Liberal reforms took place, but slowly due to perceived traditional values, identities that changed in a modest manner. The agents of these reforms were political, economic and cultural elites that actively interacted with their external partners which affected Estonian agenda. Until 1995 the country experienced radical reforms that were changed toward stabilization as well integration into the international structures (EU and NATO). During these preparations, until 2004, there were growing tensions within society on whether Estonia should enter new union having just stepped out of the previous. By the new millennium Estonia managed to form a vast elite that set its own priorities. These people already had enough economical, social and cultural capital for setting own goals and they knew how to use outer resources. Nevertheless, this winners and success discourse formed and enlarged the number of people socially excluded (Russian-origin minority of the population). Only by the end of the 1990s the social issues were dealt with in proper order, generally supported by the European Social Fund after the country has entered the EU in 2004. But these problems emerged in an even sharper manner anew after the recent economic crisis of 2008. Estonia is still recovering from this crisis and there is obvious rise of the public debate on the need for setting new agenda largely based on idea of sustainable development. (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009: 1-21)

As for Finland, this country’s development has been quite distinct from the two described above. Probably the most significant events of the 1990s for Finland were the banking crisis that lasted for several years. In 1991 there was even talk about selling Nokia. It has been a systematic

breakdown of the country's economic sector that stabilized thanks to the loan from the government as well as securing the saving funds. After this crisis integrating country into the international organization has been an uneasy decision. Still, in 1994 Finland enters the EU and the WTO. Talking about important decisions for the Finnish society, probably major has been the general orientation toward Finland's future within the global community. That is when in 1996 Tampere university began to study systematically the information society. Participation in global decision making processes can be marked by Finland's important role in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro and in 2002 in Johannesburg, where Finnish scientists participated actively in the strategic planning of environmental and global developments. During the second part of the 2000s Finland has showed highly cooperative moods and supported common EU foreign policy vision. (Löhmus 2004: 337-346, 351)

Building up a framework of the last two decades we should certainly turn our attention toward the international movements. Amongst the most important are the process of globalization and the anti-globalist movement provoked by it. Globalization developed and develops further in tight connection with technological development and spread. This bond is thoroughly discussed in Manuel Castells' trilogy "The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture". The rise of the global network that allows hardly controllable and hyper-fast knowledge and finance flows provides with world with both the good and the evil. By evil I mean the black market with intense human, drug, weapon, organ trafficking as well as integration of terrorist networks into the societies of the world. This all promotes global deepening injustice and uneven division of very basic resources (food, clear water, basic medical aid). By good I mean the rise of effective NGOs (non-profit sector) and voluntary/charity organizations that strive toward general benevolence for the people of the world. Global networks also help to monitor and improve work on ecological issues such as global warming and recycling materials. The good and the evil put on such scale are highly integrated into each other, mainly through money and information flows.

Information is now said to be the new oil and this saying proves itself at any level of society. The process of production is also highly integrated, and this state of things strongly affects everyday practices as well as overall structure of social relations, the culture. By the end of the first decade of the 2000s we came to realize that these processes are far more complicated than we thought them to be in the 1990s (labeling them "McDonaldisation", "Americanization", "westernization"). To conclude I want to say that all these national and global processes as well as general awareness about them and their vast influence on an individual and his environment are irreversible as much as unpredictable. And as stated throughout Manuel Castells' "The Power of Identity" (2007), they are also irreversible on the scale of basic values, meanings, one's identity and understanding of the world.

The tendencies of the 1990-2000s

In our selection of Estonian newspaper Eesti Päevaleht we see a quite distractive picture of values. The overall trend is characterized by very weak presence of values (mostly under 10% of encoded papers express any value), by their insignificant growth (2-3%) and by general decline in 2000s. The only exception is the value of *nation* (13% in 1990s to 21% in 2000s). But still there is neither strong value presence nor growth when compared to it. The values showing any growth are *amending the functioning of the system* (from 6% to 8%) and *good work* (from 5% to 8%). This kind of growth is quite insignificant.

There is obvious general decline in values. Value category *system* declined from 64% to only 17% in 2000s. Declining are also *relations to social environment* (-8%), *societal appreciation* (-4.9%), *considering common group interests* (-3.7%), *social responsibility* (-10.1%), *self-realization* (-3%), *erudeness and wisdom* (-3.8%), *helpfulness* (-1.7%) and other categories independent of whether being at abstract, system, social or person's level.

In an interesting manner, there are several new values that emerged in this period and remained at almost same level in 2000s: *fending subject field collective* (10% in 1990s and 8% in 2000s), *criticizing organizations* (10% remained almost the same with 9.2% in 2000s), *common public space and openness* (from 0 to 1,3% in 2000s). Although they might not show high occurrence levels, their emergence is meaningful to the development directions of the country that has spent a decade in transition from post-soviet to early capitalist and democratic society.

When we take a look at the encoded values of the Finnish Helsingin Sanomat, trends are more stable and rather positive than negative. First of all, our encoded selection shows growth for values of person being *laborious* (+4.5%) *development of technology* (+6.9%), *prosperity and material wealth* (+5.8%), *globalization and internationalization* (+5.8%) as well as *systematization*, *securing immediate environment* (+6%). They all appear in about 10% of encoded papers. Stable in 1990-2000s is the value of *fending unified collective on the basis of humanity* (8.8% in 1990 and 10% in 2000).

As was already mentioned in the previous abstract, in our selection of Helsingin Sanomat values common to all three countries remain stable or grow in 2000s. Among them are *nation* (from 11.8% to 18.5%), *political activity* (from 6.5% to 12%), *ability to lead and decisiveness* (11.8% and 11.6%), *good work* (from 1.2% to 14%), *social responsibility* (1.2% to 11.2%), *common public space and openness* (2.5% to 5.6%). As we can see from these growth numbers, rising are values of person's conscious participation for the common good. This positive trend is probably supported by the decline of system level values such as *fending one's own state and its interests* (-8.8%) and *amending the functioning of the system* (-9.4%). *System* as a value remains low throughout the 1990s and 2000s (8% and 4% correspondently).

Despite the overall decline of system and the strengthening of social function in values, value of *relations to others/system* declines from 21% to only 12% and of *relations to social environment*

slightly declines from 12.4% to 10%. This could signify that the understanding of what is influencing the society and relations within it has shifted from being (social)system centered to a more general, global and abstract understanding. This is also seen from the rise of abstract values of *welfare and comfort* (+8%), *equity* (from 1.8% to 4.4%), *progress* (+3.7%), and other values already described above. These and all other values common to all three countries will be described in the comment for Static Value Model for 1990-2000s.

The dominating tendencies of the encoded Komsomolskaja Pravda are indeed phenomenal, especially if compared to the trends in Estonian and Finnish dailies. Not only do values rise at all four levels (ca +10-12% rise in 2000s), but they also show surprising interconnections. Among values specific to Russian development we can distinguish two groups 1) rise of values that support person being of core value and 2) rise of group values that were close to non-present in 1990s.

The first group of values places person and his needs at its core: *person's freedom* (0.7% to 19.7%), *raising and socialising a person* (2% to 15.2%), *responsibility* (6.3% to 18.5%), *social responsibility* (7.8% to 13.5%) and *civic responsibility* (4% to 17%), *considering people's expectations and needs* (2% to 25.3%). A person being at the core of the value system is also expressed by significant rise of values common to all three countries: *self-realization* (10% to 18.5%), *talent and creativity* (6.3% to 13.5%), *experience* (12.7% to 21.3%), *intuition and convictions* (13% to 25%) and stable value of *ability to lead, decisiveness* (10% to 12%).

The second group is connected with the rising importance of feeding different social groups: *value based interest group* (2% to 18%), *subject field collective* (1.4% to 15.7%), *family* (0.7% to 13%), *children* (0.7% to 7.3%), *considering common group interests* (0.7% to 17%). Nation also rises greatly from 17% to 36%. On behalf of the society, slightly rise values of *relations to others/system* (15.5% to 18%) and *relations to the social environment* (5% to 12%).

These two positive trends are supported by neutral or negative trend of the system level values. Stable are values of *amending the functioning of the system* (8.5% to 10%), *feeding one's own state and its interests* (9.2% to 13%). Do decline values of *system* (14% to 3.4%) and *political activity* (25.4% to 15%). Value of *good work* yet remains stable (14% and 15.7%)

As we look at abstract level values, they are mostly concerned with conforming society. These are *equity* (1.4% to 10%), *stability and security* (3% to 26.4%), *welfare and comfort* (2% to 24.2%), *common public space and openness* (1.4% to 11%), *progress* (4% to 8%). Meaning of such a complex development of values will be discussed in more detail and within context of future perspective in Discussion part of the paper.

In order to illustrate these tendencies, we will turn to the Dynamic Value System Model 1990-2000 (Fig 1.3), that has the same form as the model for the 1920-1930s (Fig. 1.1), but reflects tendencies for the 1990-2000s.




Fig. 1.3 *Dynamic Value System Model 1990-2000*. Source: *Coding Book for Grant Project nr. 5854*. (for legend see Fig. 1.1)

As we can see from the description above as well as the model, it is pretty complicated to draw common tendencies for all three countries. Although further Static model (Fig. 1.4) shows that countries show a lot of common values, tendencies of these values are specific for each country. Encoded articles of *Komsomolskaja Pravda* show high percentage of occurrences of many values. At the same time encoded *Eesti Päevaleht* gives a view of a crisis, where no value shows growth, they all decline in occurrences. Finnish *Helsingin Sanomat* is mostly stable and value occurrences remain at the level close to where they were in the 1990s.

What is most interesting is that *system, amending the functioning of the system and fending one's own state and its interests*, all decline in the 2000s. At the same time, in all three countries we can see rise of groups – *family, children, nation, subject field collective*. This is an obvious mark of shift from system-state values to social and group values. This large-scal transformation is

also supported by the rise of such socially important values like *equity, ability to lead, social responsibility, raising and socializing a person, relations to others* etc. On this basis we can describe the process as a transformation from hierarchical to network state system with a lot of importance given to an individual as well as groups of individuals.

Compared with the dynamic model of the 1920-30s, the model of 1990-2000s contains much less abstract values and far more society-centered values. Almost gone from the picture (if not, then declining) are values concerning state. In general, the transformation is less dynamic and vivid than the one occurred in the 1920-30s, but it might be none-the-less crucial for formation of new societies' structures, a point that is discussed further in the paper.

Value System of 1990-2000s

By now we have seen trends that are specific in encoded articles for each country in 1990-2000s. But for a better understanding of their differences and similarities, I propose to upgrade the Static Value System model of 1920-1930s according to the data of the last two decades. It will show dominating values in all three countries in accordance with the four levels (person, society, system, abstract) and allow to make a diachronic comparison with the value system of 1920-1930s.




Fig. 1.4 *Static Value System Model 1990-2000*. Source: *Coding Book for Grant Project nr. 5854*.

In general, we can say that values expressed in the daily newspapers have become more unified and are focused on person and group level rather than system or abstract level. For example, only

6 values from system and abstract level are included in the scheme: *system, progress, amending the functioning of the system, stability and security, welfare and equity*. That is instead of 11 for the 1920-1930s. Also society and person levels have been enriched in 1990-2000s. The person is now valued not according to abstract maxims (ex. *heroism, wisdom* common for the beginning of the 20th century), but according to skills: *ability to lead, experience, talent, creativity*. It seems as if in last two decades knowing something or having ability for something has become more valued than one's general traits.

Looking at the person and group (society) level, it catches the eye that there is a symbiosis of strong individualism (values of *self-realization, ability to lead, experience* etc.) and importance of a group (*societal appreciation, social responsibility, considering common group interests* etc.). The level of society is now filled with more person-centered values rather than attached to the system and state as it was in 1920-30s (see Fig. 1.2). In a broader sense, society became oriented toward value and interest. This is also signified by the decline of the value of *work collective* (despite the remaining value of *good work*, which obviously changed its meaning over the century from a way of production to the way of expression, communication with environment and way of social inclusion) and the rise of such valued groups as *subject based unified collective* (Estonia 10-8%) and *family and children* as unified collectives (Russia). In general, in Russia and Finland we see the rise of the value of *considering common group interests* (10-20% in 2000s), which again proves the transition to a group-oriented value system. Although our selection of Helsingin Sanomat shows the stability for value of *unified collective on the basis of humanity* (8.8% and 10%, and it was also present in 1920-1930s 9.7%-3%), it is true for 2000s as value of *systemizing, securing immediate environment* rises (1.2% to 7.2% in encoded Helsingin Sanomat). It is also attached to only two abstract level values that remained present in the encoded dailies from 1920-30s are *stability and security* and *welfare and comfort*. Value of *stability and security* declines only in Estonian encoded papers (8.9% to 4%), but is stable in Finnish (15.3% and 13.3%) and grows in occurrences in Russian ones (3% and 26.4%). *Welfare and comfort* value grows significantly in encoded Finnish (5.3% to 13.3%) and Russian (2% to 24.2%) dailies, but is absent in encoded Eesti Päevaleht.

Absolutely new to all three countries are values of *common public space and openness, social responsibility, relations to social environment* and value of *equity* (probably replacing *equality* of the 1920-30s). Although these values are just emerging and appear in about 10-15% of encoded papers, their emergence is significant to the development of the countries, the newest trends in social transformation. Also interesting is that these 4 "social" values begin to emerge in all three countries despite other differences.

The value of *system* has been very high in encoded Estonian papers of 1990s (64%), but it declined significantly in 2000s (17%). In Russia value of *system* has been less significant (14% to 3.4% in 2000s), and in Finland practically absent (8-4%). The only 2 values from the 1920-30s remaining at this level are *amending the functioning of the system* (quite weak trend, in between 10-15% and declining in 2000s) and *progress* (below 10%). Despite the spread of hi-

tech and other global technology processes, the *development of technology* is not as often values, because only encoded Helsingin Sanomat included this value (it grew from 4.7% to 11.6% in 2000s).

The three elements not discussed yet are *nation* (and its elements, see part Nation for detailed discussion), *fending one's own state and its interests* and *political activity*. They all remained in the static model since the 1920-30s, but at the same time they lost the ambient they used to exist in. Now these three values find themselves in a socio-centered value system, and it surely influences their meanings. Firstly, value of *nation* has not been as stable as we might think. It went through a downfall in all three countries in the 1990s, but now is growing in occurrences in encoded papers: +8% in Eesti Päevaleht, +7% in Helsingin Sanomat and +19% for Komsomolskaja Pravda.

Value of *political activity* is stably present in encoded Eesti Päevaleht (8.9% and 7.2%) and growing in Helsingin Sanomat (6.5% and 12%). In Russia we can see the stabilization with this value reaching the other two countries' average of 15% in 2000s after it has been as high as 25% in 1990s. The only state-centered value - *fending one's own state and its interests* drops in encoded Helsingin Sanomat (-8.8%) and remains low in Eesti Päevaleht (4-6%), but rises a little in encoded Komsomolskaja Pravda (+3.8%).

In the encoded Helsingin Sanomat, the dominating social group is the group of politicians, party representatives and statesmen, as they occur in 29% of the encoded papers in 1990-2000s. Another group that is present in the papers consists of scientists and experts (11% in 1990s), but the slightly decline in occurrences in 2000s (7%). Encoded articles of Eesti Päevaleht in the 1990s and 2000s are also dominated by politicians, party representatives and statesmen. They are present in 25% of the encoded articles of the 1990s and 20% of the 2000s. In encoded articles are also present other social groups, like culture people (8 and 10%), scientists and experts (9% and 13%) as well as state workers (9% and 11%). This variety explains the socialization of the values stated above as various subject field experts express their points of views in public sphere of a daily paper. This domination of not state-centered but group-centered social groups is also present in encoded Kosomolskaja Pravda. Here, politicians, party representatives and statesmen are not the dominating social group as they occur only in 13% (1990s) and 4% (2000s) of the articles. In fact, there is no dominating social group as all of them occur in less than 5% of encoded articles.

Discussion

The data described in the two previous parts of the paper provides fruitful thinking and conclusions. We can highlight several general value trend in the encoded articles of the two recent decades:

1. person level values are now more individualized and are concerned with personal knowledge and skills, self-realization rather than abstract traits;
2. the majority of appearing values have now shifted from system and abstract level (1920-30s) to person and society (group) level;
3. group and social responsibility/transparency values are becoming more important;
4. system is less associated with state and there is little connection of social and system levels;
5. abstract values become irrelevant in 1990-2000s and almost disappear from daily papers;
6. *nation* is the only constant value in all 3 countries, yet it differentiates in meaning.

So what can be concluded on the basis of these 6 points? Inglehart (2007) says that modernized states shift from survival to self-expression values, from traditional to secular-rational values, and it brings about emancipation from authority. This change begins with the economical development and results in the flourish of democracy and its institutions.

These suggestions made on the basis of Value Surveys are fairly true to the results of our research. The loss of values concerning the state and system, the shift of system notion toward its social meaning as well as intense growth of group values help to move away from hierarchical authority toward network society. The discourse of civic society common for all three countries is also supported by the rise of values of group level and involvement and participation values (*fending one's own state and its interests, relations to others/system, considering common group interests, societal appreciation*). The decline of the traditional way of influence, *political activity*, is supporting this hypothesis. An individual here is connected with the immediate environment and group identity rather than any larger, more abstract system (state, for example). This trend could have not developed without growing popularity and visibility of communities, local initiatives, and world-wide network of non-profit organizations. Obviously social environment and smaller groups (smaller than nation as a group) are more attractive for a reflexive individual. I suppose that the loss of value of *work collective* but the presence of *good work* can be seen as part of this group involvement paradigm, because work nowadays is not only a way of production and earning. It has become a way of reflexive interaction with the ambient and a strong factor in identity building.

This growing importance of social identity and social aspects in building personal identity are obvious. The group values become most important, because smaller groups allow stronger bonds

between members. They offer better socialization for individuals, but they also need more specific leadership and leaders, other than political and national groups (that tend to rather charismatic, populist, symbolic rather than skilled leaders). That is why experience, personal skills and degree of social interaction of an individual are becoming of higher value. The acknowledging of importance of common public space and openness is also a new step toward more transparent, open and flexible groups.

Although the person and group levels are dominated by values in the value space of 1990-2000s, we should not underestimate the group aspect in system and abstract level values. That is system (without direct connection to the state) seems to be an essential supported by values of *amending the functioning of the system, progress, stability and security, welfare and comfort* together with *equity*. What we can see here is a large-scale process of shifting from state being the system toward system as a structure for sustaining the society and people's social needs (for equity, comfort, stability, security, progress etc). This new understanding of what system is correlates with the democracy and social responsibility/equality discourse that are concerned with solving social issues and providing equal opportunities for all social agents.

If we compare static models (Fig. 1.2 and 1.4) of two periods at hand, we will see that the transformation of values has been uneven for different levels. Firstly, the core value of *nation* (and its components) has been persistent for both periods. High in occurrences in all decades it plays a central role in value system. Secondly, the obvious domination of values has shifted from system and abstract to person and society levels. On the one hand, some values have lost their importance since the 1920-30s (ex. *development of technology, considering people's expectations and needs, relations to the state* etc.). On the other hand, five values on system and abstract level have remained, those are: *security and stability, welfare and comfort, progress, system, amending the functioning of the system* as well as *relations to social environment, relations to others, fending one's own state and its interests, political activity, societal appreciation, good work, experience*. Thirdly, there are key values that have emerged by the end of the millennium, such as *equity, ability to lead and decisiveness, common public space and openness, self-realization and social responsibility*. These newly emerged values are obvious markers of the developing social consciousness as well as importance of interactivity between the individual and a group (let it be nation, family, subject field collective or any other). The overall comparison of all levels leads to a conclusion, that there has been a crystallization, because values emerge in much clearer sense, without presence of other values that express some of their elements (in 1920-30s' model those overlapping values were (supporting state as value) *relations to the state, closeness, harmony and union of state and person, fending one's own state and its interests*; supporting person as value - *heroism, combatatness, courage*.)

It is interesting to see the tendencies of last two decades and the transformation of importance of different value levels in the context of Parsons' theory on the system of modern societies. Parsons (1997: 16-32) states that the new type of social system is the societal collective that is based mainly on loyalty of individuals toward groups and on the loyalty of groups toward a

larger societal collective. There are altogether three levels: 1) macro-level of individual, or “behavioral organism”; 2) meta-level of the larger societal collective, or cultural, political, economical environments that provide reproduction of pattern, achievement and adaptation and 3) binding meso-level of societal collective described above. This meso-level is of greatest interest as at this level involvement, integration, or in our words, socialization takes place. Through this level individuals also bridge the gap between macro and meta-level. So, if applied to the results of our data analysis, major values in the 2000s are situated on the meso-level, and that is when social aspect becomes central. For this reason it is not possible to draw as clear parallels between values and socio-historical and cultural context, as we have done with value trends of the 1920-30s. Value connections and system logic are now distinct from what it was in the beginning of the 20th century. The major question now is whether values combine into system at all, or do they represent distinct elements essential for political, economical and cultural environment of the societal collective?

Another large-scale question arising from our analysis is whether, commonly to idealistic tradition, value ideas showing how things “should be” have remained decisive for the system of actions or relationships of people? Parsons (1968: 487) states that they are highly significant for human action. As we can see from the data of our research, it is obvious that the majority of values are situated on group level. Even abstract level values (*stability and security, welfare and comfort, progress, equity*) and person level (*ability to lead, wisdom, talent and creativity*) values do not serve the interest of an abstract idea, system or state, but rather aims at improving and securing environment of an individual and groups of individuals. Abstract ideas and values of the 2000s are connected not with macro-, but with micro-level of social system. What is important in this overall process of shift from abstract and system to group and personal values is that it proves the theoretical assumption of Durkheim, Piaget and Parsons (Parsons 1968: 401) that ultimate values are not integrated in the social system, but developed in the process of social interaction. This is to prove that a truly utilitarian society is possible.

It is interesting to compare the main generalizations made on the basis of our data with the conclusions reached by other scientists concerned with social and cultural change. For example, Inglehart and Baker (2000: 23-24) state that in industrialized societies values shift from survival to self-expression values, that individuals become less obedient to any groups and that these societies are concerned rather with well-being and self-realization. This statement is supported by the data from current research. It would be a violation to conclude that group values dominate over personal ones. It is impossible, without text-close reading, to build any kind of hierarchy among appearing values. And this has not been the aim of this research. By now, we can only make conclusions about the rise and decline of certain values in encoded daily papers and associate them with becoming more or less important within society.

I am sure that no single conclusion can be made (that is why the last part is called not Conclusion but Discussion). In the end I would surely want to refer to Luhmann’s system theory as he fairly states that in the end of the 20th century an individual is not perceived as a solid whole. He is

rather a mix of elements that derive from different systems (social, biological, technological etc.) and that make up a temporary combination that is changeable and dependent on many external factors. Indeed, one's identity is now torn in pieces, as by the end of the 20th century we have abandoned the absolute domination of one feature and accepted the possibilities of persona, social, civic, group, cyber, political and other identities. And this unforeseen technologically advanced way of identity building leads to absolutely new worldviews, new ways of social interaction, new social relations and further formations.

On a larger scale throughout the paper we have seen that values and value systems built up from our data make it possible to see both the current state of the society and culture as well as larger processes of transformation. Societies might not express directly (explicitly) presence of some tendencies, phenomenon and changes, but they are still present in the media texts on latent level. The acknowledging of a process going on usually happens with a delay, as it takes time for a group of people to reflect on the new conditions, crystallize and define new phenomena as well as analyze it. But the method applied within this research allows us to make assumptions, to carry out analysis and foresee tendencies almost synchronically to when then they appear in public sphere. I assume that there is a degree of silence of society about what are its larger development processes. But yet we can trace these processes by hidden elements, values. Partly because in social sciences, psychology, culture sciences and others we already know how values function on different levels of society, how they are interconnected with discourse and (personal and collective) action.

For example this large-scale value analysis showed how totalitarian society began in Soviet Russia in 1920s and how media has been constructing the image of a (ideal) person, the notion of nation and relations between person and the state. We have also traced the idealism of successful Estonia of the 1920 and mechanisms that triggered "the silent era" in the 1930s. Our analysis has shown that already in the first decades of the 20th century Finnish society has been supporting its course for technology development, security and stability, humanity and loyalty – persistent phenomenon that have helped it to achieve positive development within last century.

When going through data of the 1990-2000s we see the critical condition that has affected all three countries due to the collapse of a large structure, the Soviet Union. In the new millennium we now definitely see the traces of civic society as well as openness and orientation toward social issues. Throughout the paper we have proved that three countries' tight cultural, historical, economical and (in some cases) political bonds as well as their later integration into the global world processes make them seem more alike than different as they head toward building socially conscious network society with stability, equity and welfare among its major priorities. To conclude I must say that such synchronic as well as diachronic analysis is opening new ways of understanding, describing as well as discussing interrelations of societies, cultures and epochs.

Critique for the method

This paper wouldn't have been complete without a critique on the method. When analyzing the data I have come to several conclusions about the problems within methods. This quantitative method of cultural research and cross-cultural comparison consists in content analysis of articles in the printed newspapers. But as one of objectives of this paper were to reveal tendencies and construct meta-level system based on values as well as explain the meaning, it is very close to what is usually done on the in-depth discourse analysis of (media) texts. Within this research there has been an attempt to make these two methods meet despite them usually seen as opposite to each other (quantitative vs. qualitative).

This is why the main critique, probably, would be that the paper makes assumptions and conclusions that are usually based on qualitative research by using quantitative data. Encoded categories can vary from article to article, but they are still encoded as one. Such standardization evokes mistrust toward the conclusions made. The basic question is whether quantitative data is able to give adequate answers to qualitative questions (what is important, why something is absent, what is the meaning of presence and absence of phenomena, what is their interrelation as a system etc). My answer based on the paper at hand would be that this doubt can only be dissolved by practical research and further comparison of results based on qualitative and quantitative data. If these results do not contradict or show minor contradictions based on method difference, then such an approach becomes as justified as any other.

The second problematic point is that the method is interdisciplinary. The data can show any numbers, but they cannot become meaningful unless the right cultural and historical background is attached to them. This assumption of qualitative knowledge of the background and vast socio-historical context makes the meaning-giving process very dependent on the researcher and his abilities. The subjective selection from a massive varied material should be accepted with certain level of trust into researcher's knowledge and skills. That is why I would recommend going as much into detail as possible in explaining all the stages of filtering and operations undertaken with data. The methodology must be transparent, clear and, as a result, convincing to the reader of any kind. No gaps or uncertainties are allowed at all the stages of research. Every step should be explained.

The first two critique points concern the handling of data and approach to it. But what also need further development is the selection of encoded papers. So far, there have been encoded prominent papers of every country. But when exploring so varied fields of knowledge (values, as in the current case and economical issues, foreign policies etc.), we should take into account that each country most probably has specialized papers for them. For example, investigating economical issues and their construction would be more appropriate on the basis of articles in "Äripäev" in Estonia and „Kommersant“ in Russia. If we want to see in-depth what are the political outlooks of these countries, we should surely select several papers, maybe even party-

owned papers. Encoding only one paper also gives a rather one-sided (in some cases mainstream) point of view on any issue. But if it is the aim of the research, such selection seems appropriate.

The critique can be also concerned with a larger question, that is, that prominent public texts that speak for the dominating values (or, in case of other research focus, political ideas, applied economical models, foreign representations etc.) are not only newspapers articles but also texts of other kinds. For example, parliamentary discussion reports (for Estonia and Finland) or, in case of Soviet Russia, reports on the party gatherings. Or, maybe those can be interviews on the radio or television, comments and reviews for public works of art (exhibitions, film-festivals, books etc). If to research any field of life, we would need to see best expressive texts for this field. This would surely enrich the scope of questions asked to the material and possible answers.

And as we move on to the possibility of a more varied text selection (both channel and field specification), we cannot deny the fact that even if in the first half of the 20th century daily newspapers have played an important role in public message production and distribution, nowadays they occupy a much more modest share in public debate. And if we should investigate the 1990-2000s, then obviously we would rather turn to the Internet, and television in a less extent.

To conclude, I would say that this pilot project indeed aimed to prove the efficiency of the method. And at this level of method development it did reach this aim. Indeed, content analysis allows to find phenomena within texts in a standardized and quantitative way. This method gives a great advantage for qualitative research, as it both serves a background for it and, at the same time, helps qualitative researchers to see in a critical light existential, taken for granted phenomena as researchable and questionable.

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