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**DETERIORATED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON
PERCEPTION OF THREAT IN THE NON-ALIGNED STATES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FINNISH AND SWEDISH
PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON SECURITY AFTER THE CRIMEAN
ANNEXATION**

MA thesis

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Abstract

It is widely recognised that Russia's foreign policy has become increasingly aggressive for the past decades, whereas the Crimean annexation in 2014 has been perceived especially alarming in the European security context. This study examines and compares the Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debate in order to determine how the mainstream political circles have reacted to the deteriorated security environment in the two non-aligned states. By using qualitative content analysis, this study reviews three debates of both countries conducted between 2015-2020, while scrutinising the following topics: NATO membership, military cooperation and national military capabilities.

The findings indicate that, in general, threat perception has increased among the political elite of both states, which has found reflection in their altered security policy preferences. The majority of both parliaments favoured enhancing international military cooperation, supported measures to strengthen the country's national military capabilities, and some political actors changed their position vis-à-vis NATO membership. Regarding the latter, the Swedish debate turned out to be more sophisticated and detailed, and there is an increasingly higher understanding in the parliament that Sweden should opt for membership in the Alliance. However, the membership question has also intensified in the Finnish debate but without significant position changes among the parties.

This study concludes that threat perception has witnessed a greater increase in Sweden, which was confirmed with the more concrete and rapid responses to the changed security environment by the Swedish political actors. Secondly, in general terms, both states are gradually drifting away from their old, constructed identity of non-alignment which has previously been a central element of these states' security thinking.

Keywords: Finland; Sweden; non-alignment; security environment; threat perception; NATO membership; military cooperation; national military capabilities

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List of abbreviations

CEE – Central and Eastern Europe

CSS – Critical Security Studies

EOP – Enhanced Opportunities Programme

EU – European Union

FCMA – Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance

GDP – Gross domestic product

HX – Hornet replacement procurement

ISAF – International Security Assistance Force

KFOR – Kosovo Force

MP – Member of parliament

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NORDEF – Nordic Defence Cooperation

Pesco – Permanent Structured Cooperation

PfP – Partnership for Peace

PM – Prime minister

QCA – Qualitative content analysis

StratCom – Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence

US – United States

Introduction

Joint assessment of the Finnish and Swedish security politics has been a subject of academic inquiries for years (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001; Michel, 2011; Ojanen 2000; Rusi, 2016). These two Nordic states pose an interesting security phenomenon that dates to the Cold War era when both countries upheld non-alignment in a polarised Europe. Sweden and Finland have stayed non-aligned ever since and are often examined together because of favourable methodological conditions. Apart from being neighbours, these countries share various features, e.g., culture, history, and also the geographical location between the core of Europe and Russia. Despite various similarities, the Swedish and Finnish doctrines of non-alignment are different in origin, but the roots of non-alignment keep influencing their political decision-making even today. One reason for this is that neutrality is still strongly reflected in the historically constructed identities of these states.

Credible non-alignment and neutrality have also required military capabilities, and both countries have invested substantial resources into territorial defence, especially during the Cold War. However, with the end of the Cold War, it seemed that deep confrontation and military threat had permanently vanished, a belief, which illustrated especially the development of Swedish defence policies. Military capabilities which were once considered significant for its size were dwindled remarkably and the Swedish military found new implementation, predominantly related to peacekeeping operations (Ojanen, 2016, p. 141). Finland, on the other hand, did not rush to alter its defence policies and has kept its military capabilities up to date, which can arguably be a more thoughtful choice retrospectively speaking.

As soon as Russia was recovering from the confusion and weakness caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the turbulences in the 1990s, it started to become evident that Moscow seeks to restore its power-based influence, especially in its near-abroad. The events of Georgia (2008) and Crimea (2014) demonstrated that Russia does not hesitate to use military force against other sovereign states to achieve its foreign political goals, whereas the aggression vis-à-vis Ukraine was perceived especially alarming in the European security context, including in Finland and Sweden (Finnish Prime Minister's Office, 2016; Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service, 2019). Hence, the European security situation witnessed significant deterioration due to Russia's behaviour

and forced the surrounding actors to adapt. Because Finland and Sweden are unallied, the security *problématique* of these states evolves around the question of how the non-aligned actors have reacted to the changed security conditions.

Research puzzle, aim and questions

In spite of the changed security situation, the paradox is that leaders of both states have remained loyal to the principle of non-alignment, even though the events of Crimea have altered public opinion and made the countries to seek deeper partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). For instance, the opinion polls indicate that support for NATO membership increased in Finland from 17% in 2013 to 26% in 2014, and in Sweden from 31% in 2013 to 40% in 2014 (Orjala, 2017; Thurfjell, 2014; Semneby, 2014). In addition, Finland and Sweden have gradually become one of the closest partner-states of NATO and practice substantial cooperation (Wieslander, 2019). Hence, the purpose of this research is to find out how has deteriorated security environment in Europe changed threat perception among the Finnish and Swedish mainstream political circles, while having the focus on their altered security policy preferences.

There are many ways to study this puzzle and public opinion is one indicator of the internal domain which witnessed change in security policy preferences. However, public opinion remains insufficient in reflecting the deeper reasoning behind different sentiments. Therefore, this study approaches this topic by focusing on the countries' political elite, i.e., parliamentary parties, whereas such parties represent different segments of the society. Moreover, parties as entities have often more elaborated standpoints on issues like security politics and they can have a strong influence in forming the policy preferences of their supporters (Slothuus, 2010). Hence, parties as such are well observable and examining political actors enables to grasp the domestic insight on security in a more comprehensive manner.

To conduct the study, this research compares and contrasts the parliamentary debate on security between Sweden and Finland by observing three security-related debates of both countries within 2015-2020: NATO membership, military cooperation and national military capabilities. The debates will be examined with the help of qualitative content

analysis (QCA), indicating that this study guides from an interpretivist approach to work with the empirical material.

By handling the data in an above-mentioned way, the results of this work will automatically provide a two-level analysis, even though the general focus of the chosen research design is on cross-national analysis. Firstly, this research sheds light on how the discourse on security has changed in the Finnish and Swedish parliaments by exploring different standpoints among the parties in both states (intra-state level analysis), and secondly if any similarities between the two states can be detected with regard to the discourse change (cross-national level analysis).

In order to meet the objectives of this study, the research guides from the following research question: *how does deteriorated security environment affect the political elite's security policy preferences in a small non-aligned state?* The main research question will be answered with the help of two sub-questions: *how does threat perception change as a result of deteriorated security environment; what changes does altered threat perception evoke in security policy preferences?*

The assumption is that a deteriorated security environment makes domestic actors, such as the political parties, critically reflect upon the current security situation which accordingly finds translation in an increased level of threat perception. Derived from this, increased threat perception is expected to initiate change in security policy preferences. It should also be noted that this research departs from the constructivist paradigm and acknowledges that security is socially constructed and may be perceived differently among domestic actors. Hence, while it is anticipated that there exist diverse opinions, this study aims to grasp the general trends of the debates.

Research structure

The first part of the thesis focuses on the theoretical aspects of the study by introducing security and threat perception. These concepts will be elaborated and discussed from the viewpoint of different schools of thought, and finally reviewed through the prism of constructivism by leaning on the writings, among others, of Smith (1999) and Stein (2013).

The second part of the work starts with the historical background by exploring what has essentially led to the non-alignment for Finland and Sweden, and then continues with providing an overview of the contemporary security politics of both countries. In the case of Sweden, the focus will primarily be on the dilemma of an interest-based and ideas-based approach to security. In the case of Finland, the central topic will be Finlandisation and its impact on the Finnish security politics.

The third part introduces the methodological aspects of the work, where research design, the exact method for analysis and some data-specific details will be presented.

The following section presents the empirical data of the three debates of both parliaments on three pre-determined topics. A state-level analysis will follow each parliamentary debate. After the intra-state analysis, the study continues with contrasting and comparing the states' security debate, which will be the paramount part of the analysis. The research ends with a conclusion, which includes an overview of the results and suggests additional topics for prospective research in the light of the findings.

1 Conceptualising security and threat perception

The purpose of this chapter is to position this research in the academic realm in order to provide a correct meaning of how the central concepts of security and threat perception are approached. This chapter begins with presenting the debate between the traditionalist and wideners' approach to security and then proceeds with explaining security through the constructivist prism, which was found the most suitable approach on security as per the objectives of this study. The second part of the chapter focuses on threat perception, where the concept is elaborated and discussed from different paradigms accordingly. This chapter ends with a short paragraph on the expected relationship between the concepts.

1.1 Security

Even though security might sound like a self-explanatory concept, it usually remains unproblematic until it is taken under greater scrutiny (Booth, 2007). Indeed, it is no surprise that there exist multiple interpretations and understanding over the nature of security among different theoretical traditions. The most notable academic inquiries of security have developed around the questions of the referent object (security for who) and security from what (what is the threat). For example, depending on the tradition, the main actor of security might be an individual or the state. Of course, there are other matters to consider when conceptualising security, such as, is it something that can be measured? Baldwin (1997) gives an example of General Jacob L. Devers, who believed that security could not vary in degree, i.e., you are either secure or insecure, and there cannot be any halfway (Baldwin, 1997, p. 14). Buzan et al. (1998) agree and suggest that trying to measure security as a matter of degree can be problematic as the word itself indicates something absolute (Buzan et al., 1998).

One can also think about the importance or necessity to discuss security; in other words, what makes security important? According to Baldwin, security is a crucial prerequisite for other life values such as peace and freedom (Baldwin, 1997, p. 18). Therefore, some academic traditions, such as neorealism and realism, which place the state in the centre, tend to argue that security is the ultimate value that each state should pursue (Baldwin, 1997, p. 21). However, there are alternative views, for instance, constructivism, that challenge this state-centrism and are eager to broaden the scope of security in relation to its subject(s) and the field of applicability.

It turns out that there is no consensus in the academic realm on what does security actually stand for. Conversely, there exists a debate between two major camps around the meaning of security (Buzan et al., 1998). However, even though security has initiated debate among different academic realms, three fundamental layers of security can be determined which are more or less agreed upon among the scholars of different tradition: the presence of a referent object (security for who); the existence of a real or possible danger (security of what); the desire to mitigate or escape the danger (Booth, 2007, p. 100). The following section presents the central debate about security, where on the one side, there are traditionalists who state that security should remain orthodox and be included only in the military analysis. On the other hand, there are the so-called wideners who argue that due to the overall development and interwovenness of the world, security encompasses far more areas than the military domain, and therefore security cannot be only seen from a state-centric view.

1.1.1 *The traditionalists*

Security has traditionally been associated with the realist school of thought, and literature in this field can at least be traced back to the classical article of Wolfers (1952) "'National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol' where security is understood as states' physical power to protect its values and interests (Wolfers, 1952). In more specific, Wolfers talks about security as an acquired value. He argues that "*nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.*" (Wolfers, 1952, p. 484) and continues, "*security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.*" (Wolfers, 1952, p. 484). Hence, being 'secure' is in correlation with the ability to deter and defeat a danger if needed for the sake of protecting one's way of life, order and norms, understood as values. In other words, the traditionalist account on security is about survival of the state.

Derived from that, Walt (1991) suggests that security studies should primarily concentrate on the topic of military force (Walt, 1991). "*Security studies assume that conflict between states is always a possibility and that the use of military force has far-reaching effects on states and societies.*" (Walt, 1991, p. 212). Thus, traditionalists believe that protection of the absorbed values by the military form the core of security. As traditionalists place the

state in the middle and the military indeed can be used to measure states' capability to deter and escape their threats, it seems understandable why traditionalists wish to stick to the military domain while discussing security.

Therefore, it is no surprise that traditionalists are not excited about expanding the concept. Walt expressed his concern that if the concept of security becomes too vague and incorporates issues such as pollution, diseases, and economic recessions, it would harm the 'intellectual coherence' of the security studies and make the concept meaningless (Walt, 1991, p. 213). Hence, the key argument of the traditionalists against broadening the concept is that by deviating from the state-centrism and military focus of security, the concept will eventually lose its meaning and become void (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 3). On the other hand, traditionalists are aware of the broader tendency regarding the pressure to widen the concept. This means that some traditionalists are, to some extent, ready to admit that there might be a need to broaden the scope in the search of looking for non-military causes in conflicts, but they reassert that the domain of military is of paramount importance in the security studies (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 3).

Although this study considers military domain as an essential part of Finnish and Swedish security, the traditional thinking of security remains short in explaining the origin of security interests, specifically when it comes to understanding the different internal factors making up the security interests within Finland and Sweden. Therefore, additional explanations of security will be introduced.

1.1.2 *The 'wideners'*

Since the 1980s, the political and academic discourse of security has experienced a wave of change due to the 'new security challenges' that have emerged into the international arena (Stritze & Vuori, 2016). Stritze & Vuori claim that the wars in the Balkans, ethnic conflicts in Africa and regional security dynamics in the Middle East have proved that security has encompassed several domestic factors to be considered with (Stritze & Vuori, 2016, p. 51).

One of the first such critics, Ullmann (1983), argued that there was a need to widen the scope of security from its traditional realm of military force because focusing merely on the military aspect of security would leave a false image of reality (Ullman, 1983). First of all, it causes states to focus only on military threats, which leaves other areas (the new

sources of threats) blank and secondly, he claimed, that the general militarisation would only harm the international relations in the long run and make it increasingly insecure (Ullman, 1983).

Mathews (1989) also emphasised the need to reconsider what constitutes security. He believes that in addition to the economic domain, there is a need to include even sectors such as the environment, resources and demographic situation into security issues (Mathews, 1989). Mathews argues that thanks to the overall development of communication, labour movement, and trade, i.e., globalisation, the previous assumptions and institutions are insufficient to tackle the problems of the changing world (Mathews, 1989). Hence, the understanding of what can be considered a security issue must broaden from the military domain as the tendencies of our planet cannot be separated by artificial borders created by humans.

Hence, new opinions emerged claiming that the ‘new security challenges’ extend beyond the traditional military domain, thereby challenging the orthodox stand on security and state-centrism and arguing for an expansion of the scope of security studies because of the changing nature of threats, as they have become increasingly non-military (Booth, 1994; Buzan et al., 1998; Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007; Mathews, 1989; Smith 1999; Ullmann, 1983). This critique has evolved into different branches of criticism, whereas Critical Security Studies (CSS) and the Copenhagen School have stood out most prominently.

The Copenhagen School departs from an understanding that security is closely related to survival regardless of the object (state, society, party, and *et cetera*) and see security more as an act (Diskaya, 2013). The act of security is about claiming something as a matter of security which enables actors to undertake (sometimes extreme) measures to counter the danger, meaning that an issue is taken above the regular politics by using special tools (Buzan et al., 1998). In other words, security is about mobilisation of political attention to highlight an issue that is considered paramount. To grasp the phenomenon better, Buzan et al. have labelled this act as securitisation, which can be seen as a more extreme version of politicisation.

In more concrete terms, securitisation is about how an actor presents an issue as a threat and how this presentation is perceived by the audience (Diskaya, 2013). An issue is

successfully securitised when it is first labelled as a security issue by the securitiser and, secondly, accepted by the public as such (Diskaya, 2013). Thus, the Copenhagen School's security approach is primarily interested in how a speech act constructs security and the broader implications of this move, regardless of the topic. However, this research does not scrutinise speeches for the sake of deconstructing security in the search of danger, and the approach of the Copenhagen School is therefore not practical as per the objectives of this study.

CSS is closely related to the Critical Theory of international relations and has its roots in Marxist ideology (Diskaya, 2013). Despite being a diverse approach, Browning & McDonald (2013) note that the core of CSS is based on two major concerns, the political and ethical implications of security. The political implications are related to what kind of political responses does security evoke and how security is used to legitimate the roles of certain actors (Browning & McDonald, 2013, p. 237). The second point concerns ethical issues and is mainly about the winners and losers of security practises, whereas the focus of security in this regard is on human emancipation (Browning & McDonald, 2013, pp. 237-238; Diskaya, 2013). As this study does not examine the effect of security on different actors but instead concentrates on the more structural aspects of it, such as the internal sources of security's construction in Finland and Sweden, the CSS is incompatible with the general approach to the topic.

The current overview of the academic literature reveals that the concept of security has indeed broadened and included several new domains, including non-military ones. As a result, not only have these new tendencies initiate a pressure to deepen and expand the concept of security, but they have also eroded the previous demarcation of intra-state and international security questions (Stritzel & Vuori, 2016, pp. 50-51). Booth argues that broadening the concept has been an inevitable consequence of the security studies, as its supreme goal is to provide a greater understanding of security itself that can be achieved by understanding the multidimensionality of today's world (Booth, 1994). At the same time, neither does the recently developed critique try to prove that military and war are not necessary for the security studies, but instead break the exclusive subject (the state) and focus (the military domain) of it (Booth, 1994).

However, not all scholars agree that this deliberation has been fruitful. Baldwin argues that despite the new ideas and fields of security in recent years, it is just the different colours of the same topic (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23). Hence, the increasingly multidimensional spectrum of security has still the same basics as brought up by Wolfers already in 1952 and that the current matters (the new security challenges) can be accommodated into the same old framework (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23). Baldwin remains thus critical towards scholars who try to present the broadened range of security's applicability as something revolutionary, claiming that "*redefining 'security' has recently become something of a cottage industry.*" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5). He adds that one should instead gain a better understanding of the word itself, not on its applicability, "*relatively little attention is devoted to conceptual issues as such.*" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5).

Baldwin, therefore, argues that security is a neglected rather than a contested concept. The recent works (including the debate between the traditionalists and wideners) have not entailed any progress in terms of providing a deeper conceptual analysis of security (Baldwin, 1997). Similarly to Baldwin, Booth does not think that the core elements of security are contested, but "*when it comes to world politics this core is then encased in layers of meaning that derive from different political theories, and that these are contested according to the ebb and flow of political theories, and the rise and fall of international political systemic paradigms.*" (Booth, 2007, p. 100). Hence, while some of the basic arguments about security are accepted on different sides of the debate, it seems that in the end it is up to the ontological positioning of the researcher that defines how one sees security.

Taken together, even though there are aspects among the critical approaches to security that match with the objectives of this study, they still do not provide the necessary tools to comprehend security as for the needs of this research. The Copenhagen School's approach remains too attached to the speech act as such, and CSS's approach concentrates too much on the subject of the political speech. Therefore, this study opted for conventional constructivism instead. While staying on the same ontological ground with CSS and the Copenhagen School, the focus of this research is slightly different and suits better with more of a conventional type of constructivism. The biggest difference among the conventional and critical constructivist approach to security, for example, in terms of identity, is that conventional approach uses identity in an explanatory manner to explain

security-related phenomena, while critical approach generally takes identity as a starting-point in order to grasp securities and insecurities (Cho, 2009).

1.1.3 *Security and constructivism*

As a result of the debate around the concept, security has expanded for the past 40 years and incorporated additional fields, especially by those scholars who represent the non-traditional literature. Also, the meaning and importance of security might depend on the angle of approach. As this study employs constructivist means in studying deteriorated security environment and threat perception in Finland and Sweden, the following section provides an outlook on the constructivist stand on security.

As what is inherent for other new approaches to security, constructivists are also critical towards state-centrism and argue that both international and domestic factors have a vital role to play when speaking about security (Smith, 1999). Constructivists highlight that “*security communities are path-dependent and socially constructed*” (Smith, 1999, p. 87), which implies that security is something constructed, it is dependent on what different actors make of it (Smith, 1999). Farrell (2002) provides a solid explanation between the differences of realist and constructivist approaches to security: “*What matters most for realists is the material structure of world politics. States do what they have the power to do. For constructivists, states do what they think most appropriate.*” (Farrell, 2002 p. 52). Thus, as generally with constructivism, it remains unconstrained with its explanations regarding security and allows us to interpret security as dependent on values, norms and identities, in addition to the imperative feature of power as it is in the traditional realm.

Constructivists also fill the gap that remains unnoticed for realists regarding state interests, their origin and essence (Farrell, 2002). In more specific, Karacasulu & Uzgören list several points that can be seen as a constructivist contribution to security studies. According to them constructivists acknowledge that actors may act as role-players who do not act to maximise their utility from a rational point of view (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 37). Instead, actors derive from the ‘logic of appropriates’ and act how they perceive appropriate (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 37). And secondly, constructivists comprehend that actors’ interest and identities are not fixed but subject to change which takes place during the interaction with other actors (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 38).

Hence, interests and identities of actors are socially constructed, which can even be applied to the nature of international relations – actors' interest and roles are subject to change in time.

With a real-life example, Schimmelfennig (1998) provides a constructivist explanation of NATO enlargement after the Cold War. He argues that this enlargement was based on international socialisation, whereas socialisation stands for the internalisation of the common norms and values (Schimmelfennig, 1998). After restoring their sovereignty, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states pursued to join NATO as they were willing to embrace the community values and norms of the West, which resulted from identification with the West. On the other hand, NATO acted value-rationally by accepting these post-communist states, as it was willing to promote liberal values, peace, and multilateralism with the CEE states (Schimmelfennig, 1998, p. 230). Hence, it can be argued that states and (state)-interests are still valid while talking about security, but the constructivist approach to security allows us to include additional spheres to explain states' action, including norms, values, and identity.

To conclude, as this research is merely interested what are the different internal factors behind the security debate (such as history, identities, and other different subjective interpretations), this study benefits from the constructivist paradigm best to examine what changes have taken place in the security debate of Sweden and Finland. The following paragraph elaborates the meaning of security environment.

Security environment has a central importance in this study, and it should be briefly explained what is meant by this conception in this research. Security environment as understood here refers to a single security space as perceived by the political elite, with additional sub-factors such as alignment and non-alignment (Iso-Markku et al., 2018). Hence, even though security environment is based on the authorities' perception of the surrounding space, security environment inevitably includes a geographical element within it. For example, Sweden perceives the Baltic Sea region (including the bordering countries) as a direct part of its security environment, whereas a conflict in the Baltic states would not leave Sweden unaffected (Iso-Markku et al., 2018, p. 34). Hence, while the central factor of security environment is the relationship between the decision-makers

and their perception of the surroundings, security environment also contains different sub-dimensions with a political, military and geographical character.

1.2 Threat perception

There are multiple ways to approach threat perception in international relation while staying within the constructivist paradigm. One of these approaches guides from psychological reasoning and seeks to trace the relationship between the decision-making patterns and cognitive perception and misperception of reality (Jervis, 1976). However, the *problematique* of this paper concerns the influence of a changed security situation on domestic actors in non-aligned states. Because of this, this paper concentrates on how threat perception has altered political actors' security policy preferences. Thus, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the concept as applied in this paper, the concept will be first divided into *threat* and *perception*.

There are usually two types of threats to be distinguished, verbal and physical. Verbal threats are usually conducted through communication where threatening is used to achieve a wished outcome by the threatener (Stein, 2013). On the other hand, physical threats indicate some physical signal or move, for instance, the accumulation of military power or economic sanctions to persuade the weaker side to comply with the will of the threatener (Stein, 2013, p. 2). By perception, it can be indicated that threats do have a referent object which the threats are targeting. This means that these threats are perceived by someone or something in the process of perception, which is "*the process of apprehending by means of the senses and recognising and interpreting what is processed*" (Stein, 2013, p. 2). In other words, threat perception is the ability to process and analyse information coming from the surrounding environment while filtering out what might constitute a threat.

As argued previously, the constructivist account does not inherently reject explanations from realists. Instead, they try to add some elements which realists do not cover. The same goes for the concept of threat perception. Therefore, it might be useful to briefly look at the realist stand on threat perception. Farnham (2003) brings out that for realists, the condition of posing a threat is fulfilled when there exists capability. This means that according to realists, states who are capable of harming (by having the militaristic or

economic capabilities) will use it and implying that weaker states are often seeing more powerful actors as threatening (Farnham, 2003).

Additionally, threat perception is related to the balance of threat as suggested by Walt (1985), according to which states who perceive themselves threatened change their alliance behaviour (Walt, 1985, pp. 12-13). Walt lists multiple scenarios which might push states to seek balance to the perceived threat. Among others, Walt argues that offensive intention materialised as aggressive behaviour might evoke counteraction from other states (Walt, 1985, pp. 12-13). Also, threat perception is usually seen as a connecting feature of action and reaction in the situation of a crisis (Cohen, 1978). This indicates that there is often an event that initiates increased threat perception by other actors. Here, this work sees Russia's aggressive foreign policy as an impulse for Sweden and Finland to balance against the new perceived threat.

Constructivists, on the other hand, see threat perception as something socially constructed with a different level of analysis for it – individual, group or state (Stein, 2013, p. 43). According to constructivists, threat perception emerges as a result of synthesis within the public discussion between politicians, experts and the wider public, while each group uses their unique way to observe and detect the threat (Meyer, 2009). This suggests that threat perception emerges and evolves in the mixture of different domestic factors. Furthermore, there seems to be a correlation between the social structures of a state and the perception of threat. *“Domestic society and its accompanying identities influence how a state's decision makers perceive threat”* (Stein, 2013, p. 7). This has also been stressed by Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero (2007) who argue that under certain conditions, identity can dominate over the objective balance of power, meaning on some occasions sticking to a certain identity outweighs the perception of threat (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007). Hence, according to constructivist, actors do not necessarily perceive threats ‘objectively’. Instead, they guide by their own beliefs and understandings, influenced by their identity.

The constructivist approach also pays attention to agreed rules and norms of regulating life, which means threat perception as such is directly linked to the common norms and rules (Cohen, 1978). Cohen believes that once the common rules, such as the international law, has been violated by a state, it signals to the other actors that threat from this

particular state may be anticipated (Cohen, 1978). But as threats are probabilistic or theoretical, meaning that their realisation can either happen or stay hypothetical it is up to the actor whether to consider the perceived threats or not (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007, p. 745). By the same token, change in threat perception might evoke changes in identity, because as argued earlier, constructivist do not see actors' identities as fixed but rather subject to change.

A parallel can be brought up with the examples of Finland and Sweden, who had a strong attachment to neutrality during the Cold War but became members of the European Union (EU) and have advocated military non-alignment ever since (Möller & Bjereld, 2010). Moreover, since Russia's ambition is to make a return as a great power, Finland and Sweden have gradually approached NATO, hinting that there are additional identity-related changes taking place. Hence, the threat perception of Finland and Sweden has changed due to Russia's increased aggressiveness, meaning that both countries are willing to make changes to mitigate the impact of the changing nature of the security environment. At the same time, threat perception is socially constructed, and different domestic actors within these states might have a different interpretation of the threat and how to perceive it, meaning that certain parties do not necessarily perceive changed security situation similarly and/or do not support similar measures to deal with the increased threat.

1.3 Ontological and epistemological considerations

Leaning on constructivism matches also with the interpretivist epistemology of the work. This study is not merely interested in states as actors (seen as the paramount actor among realists), but rather in the internal dynamics of decision-makers (subjective) reflection on security and threat perception. Constructivist approach also fits the fact that the two countries have historically embodied different constructed identities over time – in the case of Sweden, there is a traditional belief in non-alignment, which has been embraced in the society throughout the centuries. Regarding Finland, there is the phenomenon of Finlandisation and a strong understanding of state's ability to defend itself in a case of a conflict, which both are/have been strong constructions of the Finnish identity.

To conclude, it can be concisely reflected on how the concepts of security and threat perception are expected to relate to each other. Contrary to positivistic causality, this

paper does not anticipate any specific causal mechanism between security and threat perception per se. It is rather assumed that change in the security environment caused by the Russian aggression against Ukraine has initiated a change of the security debate in Finland and Sweden. Derived from this, this work's theoretical puzzle is related to how deteriorated security environment affect threat perception of domestic actors in non-aligned small states. Answer to this question will be yielded by the empirical examination of the security debates in Finland and Sweden.

2 Overview of the Finnish and Swedish security politics

Understanding non-alignment in the European security architecture after the Second World War

When it comes to security arrangements in Europe after the Second World War, non-alignment and neutrality could be the main keywords characterising the security politics of Sweden and Finland. As known, both countries decided to stay out of the military alliance, NATO, after its formation in 1949, whereas both had their reasons to stay out of the Alliance. However, a closer look on the map reveals that Sweden and Finland were not the only ones that remained non-aligned during the Cold War. Apart from Sweden and Finland, there are additional ‘grey spots’ in the security map of Europe. Even today, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, whom all would have the possibility to make a decision and join NATO, have decided not to opt for that.

Cottey (2013) argues that despite the differences behind the countries’ reasoning to non-alignment as mentioned above, neutrality has become deeply rooted in the countries’ domestic policies and national identity. Moreover, it can be said that non-alignment has developed into a sort of institution which therefore makes non-alignment hard to change, even after the end of the Cold War (Cottey, 2013). As this study is focusing on the Finnish and Swedish security debates, the following section takes a closer look at the individual reasoning and explanations behind the non-alignment of these two states.

2.1 Finland and the roots of the current security policies

2.1.1 *Neutrality and Finlandisation*

Finnish security thinking cannot be separated from the presence of its big neighbour Russia, since the two countries share a border of more than 1300km. Even though some roots in this relationship can be traced back to the era of the Russian Empire, the contemporary security dynamics are most meaningful when departing from the aftermath of the Second World War. As known from history, Finland fought two wars with the Soviet Union, and after a loss in the Continuation War, it lost over 10% of its territory, it had to agree with the Soviet naval base in Porkkala and was forced to carry a heavy burden in war indemnities (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). In addition, Finland was later on in a

position where it was forced to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA¹) with the Soviet Union in 1948 (Forsberg, 2018, p. 3).

This treaty asserted Finland's commitment to neutrality, assured to deter any attempt to use Finnish soil to attack the Soviet Union by foreign states, and included the possibility to ask military aid from the Soviet Union if needed to fulfil the treaty (Forsberg, 2018, p. 3). Even though the treaty can be regarded as vague in its wording and it did not enforce any major commitments to its parties, this treaty is seen as a symbolic indication of the Finnish will to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union in exchange for keeping its sovereignty (Rusi, 2016, pp. 33-35). Hence, good relations with the Soviet Union were something that the political elite needed to reckon with. The leaders and the nation absorbed these principles, and this Finnish political practice has been labelled as Finlandisation.

Finlandisation, also known as the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line², describes the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union, where the latter made Finland to abide by its preferred foreign policy track, while enabling Finland to stick to formal sovereignty. In order to please Moscow, Finland had to conduct its foreign and security politics in a way which would, first of all, be acceptable to the Soviet Union, and secondly, would not leave any suspicion that the Finnish soil could be used in attacking the Soviet Union (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 85). Hence, the Kekkonen-Paasikivi line was based on the assumption that Finland should avoid substantial integration with the West, and even more firmly preclude itself from the West's military alliances such as NATO.

In addition, thanks to the arrangements with the Soviet Union, Finland did not criticise the Soviet Union, even during the events in Hungary (1956) and Prague (1968) (Forsberg, 2018, p. 4). However, the same policy worked the other way around too, meaning that Finland refrained from condemning the United States (US) for its invasion in Vietnam, thereby attempting to truly hold a balance on its neutrality policy (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001, p. 70). Taken together, Finlandisation meant that Finland was firmly attached to the concept of neutrality which was absorbed into the Finnish security thinking. The core of the Finlandisation implied that Finland was not free in its decisions,

¹ In Finnish widely as known the YYA treaty.

² Named after the presidents who were firm followers of certain principles labelled as Finlandisation.

and self-censorship had to be adopted to adjust to the geopolitical circumstances of Cold War Europe.

When it comes to the impact of Finlandisation on Finnish politics, Rusi (2016) claims that Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine has had a serious effect on the Finnish foreign and security politics throughout the second half of the 20th century, and its traces are still visible in the Finnish politics (Rusi, 2016. pp. 89-90). Rusi argues that Finlandisation is sometimes seen in an unjustified positive light by some political actors in Finland, *“Finlandisation has been turned into a success story, which can be used to preserve and protect the national self-esteem, but it cannot be made without embellishing the truth or even distorting it.”*³ (Rusi, 2016, p. 14). Rusi believes that because Finlandisation is portrayed as a success, especially by the Finnish left, the constructed reality of the past distorts the reality of today (Rusi, 2016, p. 14).

The advocates of the Kekkonen-Paasikivi doctrine, on the other hand, stress that Finland managed to hold distance from the Soviet Union thanks to neutrality and thereby maintained its independence (Tiilikainen, 2006, p. 76). More interestingly, it can be said that Finlandisation as such was accepted among the Finns even on the eve of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1988, 80% of the population supported the FCMA Treaty, suggesting that good relations the Soviet Union were important to the Finnish people (Forsberg, 2018, p. 4). This indicates that historical facts are not always the decisive factors. Rather, it is how constructed historical lessons determine the past and are thereby absorbed into the people's collective memory (Forsberg, 2018). For this reason, many Finns might see the policy of neutrality as something positive. Simultaneously, by the process of Finlandisation, neutrality became part of the Finnish identity and was seen as a guarantee of Finnish sovereignty.

Strong self-defence capabilities are yet another part of the Finnish security-related identity. In this regard, the main task is to protect the neutrality and the national borders of Finland by building up credible self-defence structures (Pajunen, 1968, p. 85). The centrality of this argument stems from the experience of the Second World War. Even

³ *“Suomettuminen on käännetty menestystarinaksi, jolla voidaan hoitaa kansallista itsetuntoa, mutta se ei onnistu ilman totuuden kaunistelua tai jopa vääristelyä.”* (Rusi, 2016. p. 14). Translated from Finnish by the author.

though Finland did not receive any significant support from the West, Finland was the only country that lost the war but was not occupied by other state(s), which is today attributed to the preparedness and strong will of the Finnish military (Pajunen, 1968, p. 85). Therefore, the ability to protect its soil is central to the Finnish identity, and the country has had a conscription throughout the Cold War and even today (Pajunen, 1968, p. 86).

Also, in contrast to Sweden, Finland maintained its military capabilities even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when it was widely believed that peace and an end to the political division have arrived to stay in Europe. Strong will to be prepared to defend the country even today is reflected by the fact that more than 70% of the population supports the current conscription arrangements, and 80% of the population are ready to defend the country in a conflict (Järvenpää, 2016, p. 6) Thus, there is a consensus in the Finnish society that the country must be prepared to defend itself on its own in a crisis.

2.1.2 *Finnish security politics after the Cold War period*

The collapse of the Soviet Union and annulment of the FCMA Treaty broadened Finland's possibilities to practice more autonomous security and foreign politics. Indeed, Finland and Sweden both approached the institutions of the West by becoming members of the EU in 1995 and by intensifying their cooperation with NATO. By the mid-1990s, the old Cold War division of geopolitics had blurred completely, and a range of new actors⁴ emerged into the Finnish security thinking, who all started to influence Finnish foreign policy (Blombergs, 2016, p. 38).

Finland started carefully adapting to the changing environment. In 1994, Finland became part of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which provided a framework to develop cooperation with NATO and a possibility to take part in the NATO-led peace-keeping operations (Blombergs, 2016, p. 30). Blombergs brings out that joining the PfP marked the outset of the deepened cooperation between Finland and NATO while still enabling Finland to position itself as non-aligned. As a part of this general mood of increased collaboration, Finland also took a decision to have the so-called NATO-option as early as 1994 (Forsberg, 2018, p. 5-6). A NATO-option was created with the intention that Finland will not seek membership in NATO right away but reserves itself a right to

⁴ Such as the Baltic states (mainly Estonia) and the EU, in addition to NATO.

seek membership immediately if it feels the need to do so (Forsberg, 2018, p. 6). Hence, NATO membership per se was not on the table, because as argued by some Finnish politicians, there was no need to fix the working policy of non-alignment at the time (Forsberg, 2018, p. 5).

In addition, as Forsberg notes, there might have been identity reasons why Finland wanted to keep the NATO membership topic distanced. Namely, Finland did not want to be associated with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states who were seeking membership in NATO at the time (Forsberg, 2018, p. 7). Moreover, Finland was initially detrimental towards the Alliance's enlargement into the East, as it feared that such a move would off-balance the existing power dynamics and create new lines of division (Forsberg, 2018, p. 7).

However, the security environment did not stay as calm in post-Cold War Europe as many had hoped. Since 2004 there were signs that Russia is interested in restoring its power-based influence as it had been during the Cold War, which found confirmation by the infamous Putin's Munich speech, Georgian invasion in 2008 and Crimean annexation in 2014. Derived from the Finnish geopolitical location, these developments have altered the perception of the security situation, which on the other hand, made the Finnish NATO-debate more fruitful again and made Finland seek other means to improve its security situation (Nokkala, 2016, pp. 98-99). Most importantly, cooperation with Sweden, NATO and the US have been the recent outcomes of the changed circumstances (Nokkala, 2016, p. 99).

For the last decades, Finland has sought to increase Nordic cooperation, whereas bilateral relations with Sweden have become the most crucial part of this. Cooperation with Sweden has intensified, especially in the second half of the 2010s (Honkanen, 2016), whereas during the Cold War, there were different internal and external factors hindering this cooperation (Salonius-Pasternak & Vanhanen, 2020). Today, the Finnish-Swedish partnership is based on the similarities between the two states as both are non-aligned, share a common history, have substantially integrated economies, and represent similar values (Finnish Prime Minister's Office, 2016, p. 21). Thus, it can be said that Sweden constitutes an important piece of Finnish security thinking, meaning that Swedish foreign policy choices (in relation to NATO; understanding the security situation in the Baltic

Sea region) reinforce Finnish foreign policy (Forsberg, 2016, p. 372). This means that as long as there is no major deviation in the contemporary security policy of Sweden, Finland does not stand alone in moral and psychological terms. Hence, Sweden is a close partner of bilateral defence cooperation and an important reference point for the current Finnish security politics from an identity aspect.

What begun with NATO in the framework of PfP in 1994 has developed further, and Finland has increased its partnership with NATO ever since. In the 1990s and 2000s, the emphasis of the cooperation was on crisis management as Finland was contributing to NATO's peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force - ISAF) and Kosovo (Kosovo Force - KFOR) (Forsberg, 2018, pp. 8-9). However, over time, the nature of the partnership has changed to match with the nature of the contemporary security environment, and the current focus is increasingly on the interoperability between the Finnish and NATO forces (Forsberg, 2018, p. 9). Hence, the most recent upgrades of the partnership have most notably been the Enhanced Opportunities Programme (EOP) and Host Nation Support agreement. The former allows Finland to increase interoperability with NATO in a tailored manner, meaning that Finland can align its military standards with NATO by information exchange, political consultations, access to NATO's training programmes and exercises in a way that takes into account the specific of Finland (Bergquist et al., 2017, p. 20; NATO, 2020). On the other hand, the Host Nation Support pact is simply put a legal framework for receiving military help from NATO in a case of a conflict (Forsberg, 2018, p. 8).

Finland has also cultivated its ties with the US, especially when it comes to military equipment. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Finland has acquired high technology military machinery from the United States, most famously the F/A-18 Hornet jet fighters and air-defence systems (Forsberg, 2018, p. 9). Also, the US Congress has given its acceptance to deliver new jet fighter to Finland even today, if Finland should opt for an American manufacturer as per the ongoing jet fighter procurement (Keränen, 2020). In addition, Finland and the United States signed an agreement of bilateral defence cooperation in 2016, intending to deepen and enhance the security and defence-related cooperation between the two states (Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2016). Even though the pact might leave a declaratory impression, it is a sign that Finland is interested in enhancing its cooperation with the United States.

Despite the increased tensions in the security environment during the past decade, many Finnish politicians have shown great cautiousness in condemning Russia and its aggressive foreign policy moves. Rusi calls this the effect of post-Finlandisation, which indicates how deep-rooted Finlandisation was (Rusi, 2016, p. 131). Most visibly, many high-ranked Social Democrats⁵ but also former President Tarja Halonen has condemned voices in Finland which have suggested a departure from the traditional non-alliance principle and expressed critical notes regarding Russia's aggressive behaviour (Rusi, 2016, pp. 88-89; 98). On the other hand, even other mainstream parties and actors have generally refrained from being resolute and using strong words when addressing Russia. Hence, it seems that many Finnish political actors have held a constant line not to publicly claim that Russia might pose a military threat to Finland nor criticise Russia for its action (Michel, 2011, p. 2).

When it comes to NATO membership, this question has turned out to be one of the most significant security-related issue causing dissent among the Finnish parties. Largely speaking, four parties in the Finnish parliament have taken a clear stand on the topic, whereas the rest of them have expressed mixed signals or are divided internally. The National Coalition Party and Swedish People's Party of Finland have taken a stand on supporting Finnish membership in NATO (Kokoomus, 2020; RKP, n.d.). While Swedish People's Party concluded this decision in 2016, National Coalition Party has advocated a NATO membership since the mid-2000s (de Fresnes & Harala, 2016; Yle, 2006). On the opposite, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats have maintained a position that Finland should stay out of the Alliance, whereas the Left Alliance argues that a Finnish membership in NATO would decrease Finland's security and Social Democrats continue to stress the importance of other means to increase security (Vasemmistoliitto, 2021; SDP, n.d.).

In relation to the rest of the parties, the picture gets mixed, and Centre Party is a good example of this ambiguity. The party does not support NATO membership but argues for good relations with the Alliance and having the option to join the Alliance if needed (the NATO-option) (Keskusta, 2020). Hence, Centre Party is a traditional supporter of the orthodox position of non-alignment, but there are some more pro-NATO opinions within

⁵ For instance, the former foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja and the former party leader Eero Heinäluoma.

the party which however constitute only a minority (Forsberg, 2018, p. 11). A similar situation characterises the Finns Party, which has not concluded any specific stand on NATO membership. This is reflected by the lack of clear-cut statements on NATO membership on behalf of the party. However, the current party leader Jussi Halla-Aho has personally suggested that Finland could join the Alliance at some point, but Finland should not rush on this matter (Hakahuhta, 2019). Similarly to the Finns Party, Christian Democrats have left the membership topic open. They support an increase in cooperation with NATO and state that in case Finland would opt for a membership in the future, a referendum should be arranged (Kristillisdemokraatit, 2016). The Green League does not favour membership in NATO at the moment but agrees that such a decision must be subject to popular vote (Vihreät, 2016). However, different party members have expressed various opinions regarding the topic, indicating that there is no complete unanimity on the issue within the Green League (Forsberg, 2018, p. 12).

2.2 The origins and essence behind Swedish neutrality

Sweden has a long tradition of neutrality and has managed to avoid war for over 200 years. Even during the world wars, Swedish neutrality policy handled the pressure as the country was neither occupied nor forced to align, even though its neutrality lacked consistency with Sweden's concessions to Germany in trade and by enabling Germans to transport its troops through the Swedish territory (Möller & Bjereld, 2010, p. 373; Nilsson, 2009, p. 305).

During the Cold War, Sweden's neutrality stemmed from the aspiration to uphold its sovereignty between the two powers of the US and the Soviet Union (Möller & Bjereld, 2010, p. 374). In more detail, Ydén et al. (2019) argue that the Swedish neutrality policy during the Cold War stemmed from two fundamental considerations. The first of them was related to the pragmatic interest-based strategy for neutrality, according to which Sweden was better off when it stuck to neutrality as a mean to avoid war (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 4). Hence, this formula suggests that neutrality during peacetime lays the basis for the ability to stay non-aligned in the event of war (Ojanen, 2016, p. 133). As a part of this doctrine, Sweden also invested a significant number of resources into its military capabilities because it was seen as a crucial backbone of staying neutral (Möller & Bjereld, 2010). Moreover, the overall positive stand on improving country's self-defence

enhanced even the domestic military manufacturing, whereas Sweden became one of the top countries in arms export per capita (Jackson, 2014).

The second important aspect, which became prevailing during the Cold War, was an ideas-based approach to neutrality, where identity and ideology-related reasonings were the leading advocates to maintain neutrality (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 4). According to this tradition, Sweden should promote normative values in the international domain and argue for clear rules regarding the use of force (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 4). Indeed, Sweden became involved internationally to promote diplomacy and cooperation, as it was convinced that security could be enhanced by international engagement in addition to national defence (Sundelius, 1990, p. 122). Furthermore, Ojanen argues that neutrality and non-alignment were intertwined and merged into a higher moral value than pure neutrality, meaning that Sweden seek recognition as a power of morality and was therefore ready to condemn and criticise certain moves of both sides of the Cold War. Hence, in some ways, Sweden was seen as an impartial force and a bridge-builder between the rivalling sides of the Cold War (Sundelius, 1990, p. 122).

But this moralistic strain did not only have externally signalled objectives. Furthermore, this kind of positive ‘force for good’ was seen as enhancing the internal cohesion of the Swedish society and thereby increasing the political legitimacy of the Swedish authorities (Ojanen, 2016, p. 133). As a result of this process, neutrality became over the years a part of the national identity, and Sweden’s neutrality became a brand on its own (Michel, 2011, p. 10). Thus, the Swedish official approach to the Cold War division could be seen as ‘third way’ between the powers of the West and East.

2.2.1 *Double structure of neutrality*

On the other hand, Sweden’s Cold War dichotomy between the two sides of neutrality is not as simple as it seems. Ydén et al. argue that there has been a clear difference between what was being said and what was being done in the Swedish foreign policy (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 2). In specific, there seemed to be a difference between the reality of the Swedish military doctrines and the official political rhetoric. Based on the investigations and published reports in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s, several authors have noted that in the case of war in Europe, Sweden was considered a part of the Western military preparation and was *de facto* incorporated into NATO’s wartime infrastructure (Nilsson,

2009; Ydén et al., 2019, p. 9; Tunander, 1999, Ojanen, 2016, p. 134). The main focus of the cooperation during peacetime was done in intelligence and airspace (Agrell, 2006). From the Swedish side, motivation for accepting to these classified arrangements originated from the fear that in the case of war, Sweden would be dragged into the war anyhow (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 9). For NATO, the airspace of Sweden provided a vital part of protecting NATO's Nordic members in the case of a conflict with the Soviet Union due to the strategic value of Sweden's geographical location (Nilsson, 2009).

In addition, Sweden had close links directly with the US and was prepared to host American military aircraft on its soil in during an outbreak of a conflict with the Soviet Union (Tunander, 1999). Moreover, Sweden was covered by the nuclear umbrella of the US, at least since the 1960s (Tunander, 1999). These arrangements were kept in such secrecy that most of them was not even written on paper but communicated and transferred orally. As General John Vessey, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described military cooperation between the two countries: "*when it comes to Sweden, there was only one rule: Nothing on paper.*" (Tunander, 1999, pp. 184-185).

Hence, the great contradiction of Swedish neutrality politics lied in the fact that the core security arrangements had to be kept secret, as this informal alliance was not compatible with the official (self-) image of Swedish neutrality. These previously unknown facts from the Cold War days have initiated a new type of inquiries whether Swedish neutrality was, after all, the cornerstone of its successful foreign policy during the Cold War, whereas strategically important arrangements were conducted in secrecy (Ojanen, 2016, p. 134). Also, it clearly shows the tensions between the interest-based and identity-based security politics, which were perhaps even more significant than previously known. This leads to the questions of how to perceive Swedish security politics today.

2.2.2 *Swedish security politics after the Cold War period*

The end of the Cold War simultaneously meant changes in Swedish foreign and security politics. The first meaningful change implied that Sweden abandoned its strict attachment to neutrality, which was also marked by Swedish politicians who started to stress the non-alignment in terms of military alliances over political neutrality (Ojanen, 2016, p. 136; Ydén et al., 2019, p. 11). The earliest implication of this was witnessed in 1991 when Sweden decided to head towards the EU and became a member of the Union in 1995

together with Finland. Sweden also started to approach NATO and has become a close partner of the Alliance through the decades. Hence, neutrality became a policy among the others, not an aim on its own (Ojanen, 2016, p. 139).

The second significant shift was seen in the priorities of Swedish security politics. Contrary to Finland, the security paradigm took a considerable transformation as Sweden started to retreat from the traditional territorial defence strategy and increased emphasis on security-related politics on the international level, where the major goal became the protection of the liberty and rights of individuals (Westberg, 2016, p. 413; Ojanen, 2016, p. 141). Thus, the central topics of the Swedish security politics were increasingly not so much about the military security per se, but rather the security of human lives, democracy and human rights (Ojanen, 2016, p. 141). As Ojanen also notes, the changed priorities were also reflected on the state budget, whereas less resources were allocated to the Swedish territorial defence and participating in the international peace operations became *de facto* the only objective of the Swedish military (Ojanen, 2016, p. 142). As a result of the years-lasting cuts in the military spending and decommissioning of conventional military troops in Sweden, the country found itself in a position where it could not defend its territory. According to a high-ranked Swedish military official's acknowledgement in 2012, Sweden was not capable of defending its territory for more than one week in a case of military conflict (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 14).

Swedish security debate was brought back into the spotlight in 2014 when a severe deterioration of the security environment took place. As the Swedish government noted in its proposal 2014, the events of the Crimea “... *are the biggest challenge to the European security structure since its establishment a quarter of a century ago.*”⁶ (Swedish Government, 2015, p. 2). Due to this, it is argued that non-alignment lost all of its practical relevance, and Sweden needed to update its defence and security strategies (Westberg, 2016). Sweden has thereafter increased military cooperation with Finland, the US and NATO, and started to reform its defence sector again for re-establishing sufficient military capabilities.

⁶ “*Det är den största utmaningen mot den europeiska säkerhetsordningen sedan den etablerades för ett kvarts sekel sedan.*” (Swedish Government, 2015, p. 2). Translated from Swedish by the author.

Regarding cooperation with NATO, Sweden signed the Host Nation Support pact in 2016 similarly to Finland, which allows Sweden to receive help from NATO and potentially use Swedish territory in a case of emergency by NATO (Møller, 2019, p. 242). Also, in 2017, Sweden hosted the most extensive military exercise on its soil after the Cold War, Aurora 2017, which was remarkable in many ways. As Yden et al. note, “*For the first time on Swedish territory, Swedish soldiers prepared for operations side-by-side with US tanks and soldiers—a sight that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.*” (Ydén et al., 2019, p. 13). In addition, the domestic NATO debate has also been affected by the changing security environment. As of 2019, all the centre-right (Alliance⁷) parties are now favouring a Swedish NATO membership, and Swedish Democrats expressed their support for a NATO-option in late 2020, meaning that there is now a majority in the Swedish parliament supporting even closer attachment to NATO (Ydén et al., 2019; Rydberg, 2020). Hence, as of today there exists a clear dichotomy among the major traditional parties on the NATO issue, whereas the Alliance parties support membership, and the red-green bloc⁸ opposes it.

In addition to NATO, partnership with the United States has increasingly become important for Sweden. Especially since the events in Crimea, Sweden started to intensify its networks of military cooperation with external partners, whereas the transatlantic link is one of the priorities (Brattberg, 2017, p. 24). Hence, by developing bilateral ties to the US, Sweden builds parallel links with the US, in addition to the existing partnership within NATO’s framework.

In recent years, there has been much discussion of increasing military cooperation with Finland, and the idea seems to enjoy comprehensive support in both countries, especially on the political level. However, some scholars have pointed out that from a pure military-strategic viewpoint of Sweden, there are critical questions to be asked vis-à-vis increased Swedish-Finnish military cooperation, especially when it comes to the different nature of the countries’ military build-up and doctrine (Edström et al., 2016, pp. 120-121). Also, stronger ties to Finland would simultaneously count as a step towards the east, meaning that there are two sides of the coin in the increased Finnish-Swedish partnership for the

⁷ In Swedish known as the *Alliansen*, consists of Moderates, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian Democrats.

⁸ Consisted of Social Democrats, Green Party and Left Party.

Swedish perspective (Ojanen, 2016, p. 151). However, as mentioned, at least on the political level, Sweden considers it essential to strengthen its military partnership with Finland, and the two countries have conducted several military exercises on a bilateral basis but also as a part of other frameworks during the past years (Swedish Armed Forces, n.d.).

2.3 A joint overview of the Finnish and Swedish security politics

Since the end of the Cold War, Finland and Sweden have abandoned the doctrine of neutrality, become involved in Western institutions, and advocated a military non-alignment instead of neutrality. Both countries have also been developing their security ties to other states and organisations, which has intensified especially on the other half of the 2010s after Russia's annexation of Crimea. As of today, both countries have bilateral defence cooperation with the US, NATO, and within the Nordic states, whereas Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is the most notable framework within this. In addition to Finland and Sweden, this military cooperation encompasses even Norway, Denmark and Iceland, and is considered one of the most effective regional defence cooperation formats (Pykönen, 2016, p. 41).

Finland and Sweden provide an interesting security phenomenon as both countries have gradually approached the Alliance by increasing their interoperability, conducting regular exercises and training with NATO, but are still hesitating to take the final step towards membership. Some scholars have started to call this a paradox of post-neutrality, whereas both states are pursuing a close partnership with NATO as possible while excluding the possibility of an actual membership (Forsberg & Vaahtoranta, 2001).

Hence, it can be said that on the surface, the security situation of the two Nordic states appears to be similar in multiple ways. However, there are some meaningful differences in the reasoning behind security politics, most notably related to history and constructed identities. For Finland, non-alignment evokes positive connotations regarding the survival of its sovereignty during after the Second World War and during the Cold War (Forsberg, 2018, pp. 19-20). In addition, Swedish non-alignment only strengthens Finnish attachment to the non-alignment by providing a 'security club' to belong to (Forsberg, 2018, pp. 19-20). For Sweden, non-alignment is still some sort of ethical choice that has followed Swedish identity since the Cold War days (Forsberg, 2018, p. 16).

Based on the above, the question of acting together or alone has always had its place in the academic discussion of Finnish-Swedish comparison in the field of security and defence (Rusi, 2016). Even though there exists a mutual understanding⁹ that possible a NATO membership is assessed together (Gummesson, 2016), none of the states has excluded the possibility of individual initiatives in this matter. This could be the case especially for Sweden, since the country had *de facto* security guarantees during the Cold War (Tunander, 1999), and the current build-up of Swedish defence policies suggests that Swedes have a tacit expectation of receiving military aid from other actors in a case of a conflict, while Finland does not take such assistance for granted (Pyykönen, 2016, p. 16).

In addition, the Swedish declaration in 1991 to join the EU came as a somewhat surprise for Finland, suggesting that Sweden did not provide Finland sufficient consultation about this intention (Rusi, 2016, p. 168). Taken together, far-reaching changes in security are possible, and if one of the countries should, for example, become a member of NATO, it has a great effect on the NATO question in the neighbouring state. However, history has shown that individual initiatives are more likely to originate from Sweden and according to Rusi, Sweden will eventually conclude its security dilemmas individually from its own point of view, it has done before (Rusi 2016, p. 185). This, accordingly, would put Finland into a position where it would be hard not to follow suit (Rusi, 2016, pp. 168-173; Forsberg, 2018, p. 19).

⁹ Both states have expressed a belief that possible steps towards NATO membership should be taken together, however, without any official commitments (Gummesson, 2016).

3 Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the methodological aspects of this work. This research is guided by the interpretivist epistemology and employs qualitative content analysis as the primary tool to approach the chosen data of parliamentary debate. The research design is based on a cross-country comparison, as this work brings out the changed nature of the security debate in Sweden and Finland after the events of Crimea in 2014.

3.1 Research design

This work applies comparative research design to determine whether the Swedish and Finnish mainstream political circles have perceived the changed security circumstances similarly or not, and what conclusions can be drawn from these altered perceptions. To reach this goal, this work approaches the topic by interpreting and comparing the standpoints of the Swedish and Finnish political parties represented in their respective parliaments and then proceeding with a cross-national comparison between these two states. A cross-national comparison is *“an approach to knowing social reality through the examination for similarities and differences between data gathered from more than one nation.”* (Elder, 1976, p. 210).

There are many reasons to opt for a comparative study. Firstly, comparison can be seen as the origin of all research related to political science because a lot of reasoning and argumentation is derived from the comparison (Toshkov, 2016, p. 258). Secondly, social phenomenon such as deteriorated security situation can be understood better if there is a comparison moment of different actors' perception towards the social phenomenon (Bryman, 2016, pp. 64-65). Finally, the third reason derives from the current political situation of these states. As Sweden and Finland are the only states in the region of North-East Europe¹⁰ that are officially non-aligned, thereby constituting a 'vacuum' between NATO and Russia, it would be insufficient to examine Sweden's and Finland's solutions to tackle the current security challenge individually.

Therefore, a cross-national approach to the topic becomes handfull because by examining the same issue on two states with different socio-cultural settings, greater understanding

¹⁰ Considered as Western states.

of the similarities and differences between the two states vis-à-vis the case can be gained (Bryman, 2016, pp. 65-67). Taken together, this research design allows to gain greater knowledge about the effects of the changed security environment on Sweden and Finland, which correspondingly also provides a better understanding of the current security setting in Europe.

This research is based on constructivist ontology, which implies that social phenomena are taking place because of social actors who interact, meaning also that the social life is in constant change (Bryman, 2016, p. 29). Furthermore, this ontological stand matches the interpretivist nature of this research because it acknowledges that reality is a product of social action and may be different for different actors¹¹, making reality subjective (Ryan, 2018; Bryman, 2016, p. 29). Hence, the chosen epistemological and ontological stands influence how the data is approached in the sense that the data requires interpretation, which correspondingly requiring greater responsibility from the author. The following section continues with introducing the chosen method.

3.2 Method

Due to the nature of the chosen data, it was found most suitable to apply qualitative content analysis (QCA) as the main tool of processing the empirical material. QCA is a method that enables to organise and analyse qualitative data, such as written or verbal communication, in a systematic manner (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 108). QCA is often used as a method when dealing with material that needs interpretation because, according to the interpretivist paradigm, data never speaks for itself, and therefore it is the researcher's task to attribute meaning to it (Schreier, 2012, p. 5). An additional feature of the QCA is that it helps to reduce the amount of data, meaning that the study will limit the analysis only to those parts of data, which are reflecting the central aspects originating from the research inquiry (Schreier, 2012, p. 5). Thus, it can be said that the main benefit of QCA is that it is systematic while staying flexible, and it is practical because it helps to reduce the amount of data.

When going into more specifics, coding is an underlying feature of QCA. It is a unique way of structuring data within QCA by dividing central themes into categories and

¹¹ Domestically and between the two states.

subcategories, thereby creating an entity called the coding frame (Schreier, 2012, pp. 60-62). The coding frame becomes thereafter a central reference object used to categorise the data, which in this study means that political debates of different politicians are labelled and categorised accordingly. The biggest benefit of the coding process is that it helps to filter out the most meaningful parts of the data (Schreier, 2012, p. 7). In this case, this study deals with qualitative data of parliamentary speeches and debates that need interpretation to comprehend the internal and external dynamics of Swedish and Finnish security politics. To achieve that, speeches from different political parties in their respective parliaments were analysed. The explicit logic of sampling will be presented in the ‘data and sources’ section.

The coding frame of this research consists of three different dimensions. On the first dimension, there are questions of NATO membership with subcategories of ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Mixed’. The second dimension measures politicians' view on national military capabilities with subcategories of ‘Increase’, ‘Decrease’ or ‘Maintain the current level’. Finally, the last category assesses politicians' stand on military cooperation and has subcategories of ‘Increase’, ‘Decrease’, ‘Maintain the current course’, whereas this category has a sub-dimension regarding the subject: ‘the US’, ‘NATO’ and ‘the Nordic states’. A visualised version of the coding frame can be found in **Figure 1**.




Figure 1. Coding frame of the research.

Source: the author.

As argued, QCA as a method is widely applicable and can be employed differently, depending on the aim of the research. Therefore, it would be relevant to determine the exact approach of the QCA as applied in this thesis. Hsieh & Shannon (2005) have suggested three approaches of QCA: conventional, directed, and summative. How this work applies QCA matches the characteristics of what Hsieh & Shannon have labelled as directed content analysis. In this approach, the theoretical framework or theory aids determining the codes of the coding framework (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1281-1283). This means that some categories in the coding frame were already set before analysing the data, whereas the predetermined part of the coding frame is guided by the conceptual framework and previous research.

Hence, directed content analysis in this work is at least partly applied deductively, in a concept-driven way because some of the categories were chosen based on the previous research, where the key categories were identified (Schreier, 2012, p. 60).

3.3 Empirical data and sources

The empirical data of this research consists of parliamentary debate and speeches held in the Parliament of Finland¹² and the Parliament of Sweden¹³, meaning that political parties are the central actors. Observation of parliamentary parties was found the most suitable way to detect the change because political discussion in parliaments is the highest domain of debate prior to legislative change, at least in democratic states. This means that all possible reactions to external changes are legislatively initiated by the governments and debated by the parliaments. Hence, by studying the debates of Finnish and Swedish political parties, the general perception and mood can be determined vis-à-vis the changes in the security environment. This, correspondingly, which puts this study also on safe grounds in terms of validity. Another minor aspect worth mentioning concerns reliability. As this research deals with primary data in a written form acquired from original sources, there should not be any issues regarding the reliability of the data.

The speeches and debates were retrieved from the websites of both parliaments, <https://www.riksdagen.se/> and <https://www.eduskunta.fi/>, where one can find all parliamentary debates in transcription and video format. Three debates from both

¹² *Eduskunta* in Finnish.

¹³ *Sveriges Riksdag* in Swedish.

countries were chosen within the timeframe of 2015-2020, whereas each of them contained around 70-110 speeches which were analysed on paragraph level and then categorised accordingly as explained above. Hence, the unit of analysis was paragraph. All debates were based on different reports prepared by the governments or special committee(s) of the respective countries.

The following debates were chosen for Finland: ‘Government’s foreign and security policy report’¹⁴ conducted in 2016, ‘Government’s defence report’¹⁵ conducted in 2017 and ‘Government’s foreign and security policy report’ conducted in 2020. A similar logic guided the Swedish selection of debates: ‘Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020’¹⁶ conducted in 2015, ‘Defence policy report of the Defence Committee’¹⁷ conducted in 2017 and ‘Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025’ conducted in 2020. While selecting suitable the debates for analysis, the goal was to find similar debates between the two countries in terms of subject of matter and time of conduct. This turned out to be successful.

It is also important to stress that this work uses empirical material in their native languages, i.e., in Swedish and Finnish, meaning that this work deals with primary data. This brings up two important advantages worth mentioning: as suggested above, original sources can be seen as increasing reliability in comparison to secondary sources, and secondly, the results of this research can have more scientific value.

3.4 Operationalisation

Each piece of data, i.e., the speeches, was placed into a coding frame category. As introduced in the method section, speeches chosen for analysis were divided into three different sections by topic: NATO membership, military cooperation and national military capabilities. These themes were picked to map the discourse and discussion among the decision-makers in Sweden and Finland as these indicators were found to be most suitable in reflecting the security debate based on the theoretical framework and

¹⁴ *Valtioneuvoston ulko- ja turvallisuuspoliittinen selonteko*. Translated from Finnish by the author.

¹⁵ *Valtioneuvoston puolustuselonteko*. Translated from Finnish by the author.

¹⁶ *Säkerhetspolitisk inrikting - Sveriges försvar för perioden 2016-2020*. Translated from Swedish by the author.

¹⁷ *Säkerhetspolitik. Utrikesutskottets betänkande*. Translated from Swedish by the author.

previous research. The following tables (**Table 1**, **Table 2**, **Table 3**) explain the logic of how the speeches were categorised.

Table 1. *Code guide of NATO membership.*

Name	Pro-NATO membership	Against NATO membership	Mixed position on NATO membership
Description	There are elements in the speech that clearly suggest a pro-NATO membership stand	There are elements in the speech that clearly contain an anti-NATO membership justifications	There are elements in the speech that cannot be clearly interpreted as a pro- or against NATO membership
Example	The speaker articulates that the country should join NATO	The speaker articulates that the country should not join NATO	The speaker does not take a clear stand on the issue or takes a somewhat neutral stand, e.g., suggest a NATO-option

Source: the author.

Table 2. *Code guide of military cooperation.*

Name	Increase in military cooperation	Decrease in military cooperation	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position
Description	There are elements in the speech that clearly suggest increase in military cooperation with foreign actor(s)	There are elements in the speech that clearly suggest decrease in military cooperation with foreign actor(s)	There are elements in the speech that speak for maintaining the current level of military cooperation with foreign actor(s) / mixed position on the issue
Example	The speaker supports increased	The speaker speaks for decreased	The speaker does not take a clear stand on

	military cooperation with foreign actor(s)	military cooperation with foreign actor(s)	increasing/decreasing military cooperation with foreign actor(s) or the opinion is mixed
Third dimension of the code: subject	The Nordic states, NATO, the US	The Nordic states, NATO, the US	The Nordic states, NATO, the US

Source: the author.

Table 3. Code guide of national military capabilities.

Name	Increase in national military capabilities	Decrease in national military capabilities	Maintain the current balance of national military capabilities / mixed position
Description	There are elements in the speech that clearly suggest increase national military capabilities	There are elements in the speech that clearly suggest decrease in national military capabilities	There are elements in the speech that cannot be clearly interpreted as supporting increased/decreased national military performance
Example	The speaker suggest that the country should increase its military spending	The speaker suggests that the country should decrease its military spending or cancel planned procurements	The speaker acknowledges importance of the military defence but does not argue for strengthening it

Source: the author.

3.5 Limitations

Derived from the chosen method, QCA, the research might be a subject of criticism in terms of objectivity. However, as this is an interpretivist research, it is acknowledged that the words of politicians are a matter of interpretation and the role of the author is meant to be bigger in comparison to a research with positivistic epistemology.

Another limitation can be brought up in terms of data. As mentioned, the data is in either Swedish or Finnish in its original form. Even though the author masters both languages on an advanced level, something may always be lost in translation. In order to avoid this, the author has used all available tools to prevent this, for instance, by consulting with different dictionaries and with native speakers if needed, even though this was a rare occurrence and can therefore be seen as a minor limitation of this work.

4 Data presentation and analysis

This section of the research presents the data and analysis. Firstly, there will be a country-specific data presentation which is directly followed by an intra-level analysis. Finally, the conclusive reflection on the findings is yielded in the cross-country analysis section, which can be seen as the paramount part of the analysis. In addition, when going through data presentation, it should be noted that cooperation and military cooperation are used interchangeably, as the meaning of cooperation in this context refers to a collaboration in the military domain.

4.1 Post-Crimea security debate in the Finnish parliament

4.1.1 *Power dynamics of the Finnish parties during the debates*

During the first two debates, Finland had a centre-right government lead by Juha Sipilä (Centre Party), and the coalition included Centre Party, the National Coalition Party and the Finns Party. Hence, it can be argued that the centre-right parties had a dominant position in the parliament, which might have found reflection in a way that left-wing parties were more critical towards the government's reports during the first two debates.

In 2019, Finland had a general election, and Finland got a coalition inclined towards the left. During the last examined debate, Finland was led by Sanna Marin (Social Democrats), and the coalition was comprised of Social Democrats, Centre Party, the Green League, the Left Alliance and the Swedish People's Party of Finland. This means that during the last debate, the left-wing parties were in a power position, as they had gained more seats in comparison with the two previous debates. The exact division of seats after the elections in 2015 and 2019 can be found in Appendix 1.

4.1.2 *Finnish Government's foreign and security policy report in 2016*

The first debate was based on the Finnish government's foreign and security policy report where the purpose was to provide an overview of the contemporary security situation. The codes of this debate are available in Appendix 2.

NATO membership

The first category scrutinised parties' perception towards NATO membership. In this debate, two parties favoured Finnish membership in NATO – the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People's Party of Finland. The National Coalition Party had a rather

strong position on this question, and they argued that Finland should become a member of the Alliance because they see NATO as the only reliable security guarantee for Europe and for Finland alike. A similar view was shared by the Swedish People's Party of Finland, who justified their pro-NATO stand with the fact that membership would be the only way to ensure Finnish security in a case of war, a belief which the Alliance parties also share in Sweden. As argued by Stefan Wallin (Swedish People's Party of Finland): *“Here we share a belief with the Alliance bloc in Sweden. The Alliance parties have suggested that Sweden should join NATO because in a case of a conflict the Baltic Sea region, it would be better and safer if Sweden would belong to the Western defence alliance NATO.”*¹⁸ (Finnish Parliament, 2016).

Understandably, there was another view towards the possible NATO membership, which was not supportive of the idea. This block consisted of Centre Party, Social Democrats, the Left Alliance and the Green League. The most common argument for opposing the membership was motivated by an understanding that any deviation from the traditional line of non-alignment would harm Finnish security. It was also argued that Finland should seek to hold good relations with all of its neighbours, which can best be achieved by staying non-aligned, whereas military non-alignment ensures that Finnish territory cannot be used for hostile activities against anyone. Another noteworthy remark was made by Eero Heinäluoma (Social Democrats), arguing that changes in the security situation are largely overstressed: *“The suggested changes in the security environment have been illustrated with extra heavy brushes.”*¹⁹ (Finnish Parliament, 2016).

The third group of NATO opinions consisted mainly of the representatives of the Finns Party and Centre Party. Here, the central argument was that Finland must have the NATO-option, meaning that Finland leaves itself the right to seek membership whenever it feels it necessary. According to both parties, this was important for the sake of having manoeuvring room in security and foreign politics. In addition, Kari Kulmala (Finns

¹⁸ *“Här är vi inne på samma linje som det borgerliga blocket i Sverige. Allianspartierna har flaggat för att Sverige ska gå med i Nato och de delar vår syn att vid en potentiell militär konflikt kring Östersjön är det bättre och tryggare om vi tillhör den västliga försvarsalliansen Nato.”* (Finnish Parliament, 2016). Translated from Swedish by the author.

¹⁹ *“Tätä turvallisuusympäristön muutosta on maalattu erittäin raskain pensselein.”* (Finnish Parliament, 2016). Translated from Finnish by the author.

Party) linked the Finnish decision regarding membership with Sweden's stand on the issue.

Military cooperation

The next topic examined parties' perception of military cooperation. All Finnish parties except the Left Alliance stressed the need to increase military cooperation with the Nordic states, but most importantly with Sweden. Many parties argued that Sweden is something unique for Finland, and military partnership between the two countries is something given and natural thing to have. For example, as Centre Party argued, no boundaries should be set when it comes to cooperation with Sweden. Also, as suggested by Jaana Pelkonen (National Coalition Party), the changing nature of the security environment creates a situation where Finland cannot rely on its own, and therefore thigh partnership with Sweden becomes vital.

Some parties also argued that Finland should also elaborate its partnership with the United States. For example, the Finns Party acknowledges that America's presence in Europe contributes to the common good because it increases security in the region. Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) also believed that despite the current situation of the Finnish NATO membership debate, links with the US are also essential and must be reinforced. In addition, the Finns Party also mention the need to increase military cooperation with NATO itself.

On the other hand, the Left Alliance and the Green League remained critical towards cooperating with the US and NATO and presented arguments in favour of reducing such cooperation. Their main claim was that the current cooperation forms with the US and NATO undermine the Finnish doctrine of non-alignment and that NATO's and the US's presence in the Baltic Sea area contributes to increased tensions.

The third type of position acknowledged the importance of maintaining all current partnerships, i.e., the Nordic States, the US and NATO. This was mainly addressed by Centre Party and Social Democrats, who argued that all types of partnerships are essential for Finnish security.

National military capabilities

Lastly, the question of national military capabilities did not find that much reflection in this debate. However, the Left Alliance and Centre Party suggested that the current level of military capabilities should be maintained. While the Left Alliance argued that accumulated military power in the Baltic Sea area does not solve the issue of increased tensions, Centre Party toned the importance of the country's self-defence capabilities, where a conscription-based army plays a vital role in the Finnish defence.

4.1.3 *Finnish Government's defence report in 2017*

The second Finnish debate was about the government's defence account accepted earlier in 2017, meaning that the focus of the discussion was on the current situation of the Finnish defence and the future of it, for example, on the planned investments. The entire list of codes of this debate are presented in Appendix 3.

NATO membership

As this debate was more inward focused because of the nature of the debate's topic, the NATO question did not find that much coverage. Pro-NATO statements were expressed by the National Coalition Party, who claimed that Finland's best security interests are served if Finland has the NATO door open and join the Alliance someday. However, it was acknowledged that membership alone is not the solution to security-related challenges. Therefore, arguments against NATO membership found more reflection in this debate than the pro-NATO stands.

The shared focus of the opposing view was that the orthodox line of non-alignment has been beneficial for Finland, and by following that principle, Finland can avoid becoming involved in a military conflict. Hence, Finland should stay out of NATO. Furthermore, membership in the Alliance would put Finland in danger, as argued by Satu Taavitsainen (Social Democrats) and Mika Niikko (Finns Party). Lastly, a mixed position on NATO membership was represented by Stefan Wallin (Swedish People's Party of Finland), who noted that Finland should ensure that there would not be any obstacles to join NATO if the country perceives it as a way to go.

Military cooperation

The second topic concerned the question of military cooperation. Many Finnish parties brought up the need to increase Finnish ties to the Nordic states, especially to Sweden. The main arguments stressed the importance of not acting alone, and Sweden was mentioned as an important ally to deepen cooperation with. For example, Christian Democrats argued that Finland must increase its cooperation with Sweden due to the changed nature of threats. Social Democrats, on the other hand, saw that increased partnership with Sweden would strengthen the security of the whole region. The National Coalition Party argued that increased cooperation with Sweden benefits the credibility of Finnish defence.

Simultaneously, the National Coalition Party stressed the importance of increasing partnership with the United States, whereas their main argument was that the changed situation requires cooperation with many different parties, including the US. Moreover, other right-wing parties stressed the importance of NATO in this regard as well. Here, the arguments were similar: Finland needs to increase the partnership with NATO because more can be achieved security-wise with partners than alone. In addition to the National Coalition Party, these views were expressed by Christian Democrats and the Swedish People's Party of Finland.

When it comes to decreasing military cooperation, none of the parties expressed the view that this should be done in relation to the Nordic states. However, members of the Left Alliance and Social Democrats argued against a partnership with NATO, and the Left Alliance against a partnership with the US. Their main concern was that if Finland was about to cooperate with NATO and the US, Finland's territory could potentially be used for hostile activities against other states, which accordingly does not correspond to the self-claimed non-alignment of Finland.

The third type of reflections regarding military cooperation addressed the need to maintain the current partnerships. Here, most of the codes included speeches by the Finns Party, Centre Party but also Social Democrats. In this section, the arguments were similar as for the need for increased cooperation which all concluded that Finland is a small country and therefore must rely on external cooperation for a safer security environment.

Many of the speeches also reflected an understanding that the current military cooperation with external actors is a strong pillar of the Finnish defence.

National military capabilities

The last code group of national military capabilities included the most codes because the national defence was the central theme of the debate itself. In this dimension, there existed largely speaking two types of an opinion. One of them saw that Finland should increase its national military capabilities, meaning more resources and funds to be allocated to the defence sector. This view was shared by all the parties except the Left Alliance and the Green League. The greatest attention of this debate was addressed on the two major procurements of Finnish defence forces, Laivue 2020²⁰ for new military vessels and the HX-procurement²¹ of new jet fighters, whereas the price tag for them in total reached almost 10 billion euros. However, as mentioned, most of the parties acknowledged the heavy price and supported the planned investments. Such parties stressed the need to adapt to the changed nature of security and the need to keep up the Finnish defence's credibility. For example, Sofia Vikman (National Coalition Party) argued that Finland could not neglect its own military capabilities, despite the increased international cooperation.

As already mentioned, there was an opposing view towards the increased national military capabilities as well, represented by the Green League and the Left Alliance. The arguments of the opposition can be presented by two major concerns. The first of them is related to the cost estimate of the planned procurements, which both parties believed to be too high. As exemplified by Paavo Arhinmäki (Left Alliance), spending 15-20% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) on a single procurement is not rational. The second argument for decreasing the national military capabilities was related to the overall militarisation in the region. As argued by Krista Mikkonen (Green League), there are no winners in the race of armament, which is the reason why they oppose the suggested procurements and increased militarisation of Finland. Krista Mikkonen (Green

²⁰ Laivue 2020 is a procurement of the Finnish Marine Forces, which will replace many of the old vessels that will be decommissioned during the following years (Finnish Defence Forces, n.d.)

²¹ HX-procurement is a procurement of the Finnish Air Forces which will replace all current jet fighters by the year of 2025. The H stands for the current jet fighters (Hornet) and X stands for the replacement, which in this case is currently unknown and marked with X (Ministry of Defence, n.d.).

League): “*It should be said out loud that any increase in the defence budget is a negative thing and can be seen as an indicator of an unsuccessful foreign policy.*”²² (Finnish Parliament, 2017).

Code ‘maintain the current level of military capabilities/mixed position’ was not distinguished in this debate.

4.1.4 *Finnish Government’s foreign and security policy report in 2020*

The third debate under scrutiny concerned the Finnish Government’s report from 2020 regarding the contemporary security environment for Finland and the central goals in the security domain to pursue for Finland to improve its security. The codes of this debate can be found in Appendix 4.

NATO membership

Once again, the first topic to cover was NATO membership. Here, two parties were arguing for a Finnish membership in the Alliance, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People's Party of Finland. Both parties saw the membership as an important milestone for Finland to pursue, as they claimed that NATO membership would strengthen the security of Finland. Jaana Pelkonen (National Coalition Party) suggested that the issue of Finnish NATO membership should be put under scrutiny and studied more extensively. Eva Biaudet (Swedish People's Party of Finland) highlighted that Finland must be able to decide upon its alignment policies freely and that the country has the opportunity to become a member of the Alliance one day.

The spectrum of the anti-NATO membership stances of the debate consisted of two parties: the Left Alliance and Centre Party. The Left Alliance argued that the Finnish tradition of security politics is incompatible with what NATO represents. Finland should work for promoting peace through reconciliation, i.e., not become a part of the conflict which alignment with NATO would, according to the Left Alliance eventually mean. Additionally, the Left Alliance argued that NATO is a foundation to protect the interest of the US, where the small states play the role of protecting the US’s interests. Tuomas Kettunen (Centre Party) reminded that NATO membership is not compatible with the

²² “*On syytä sanoa ääneen, että puolustusbudjetin kasvattaminen on aina huono asia ja kertoo osaltaan ulkopoliittikan epäonnistumisesta.*” (Finnish Parliament, 2017). Translated from Finnish by the author.

Finnish non-alignment policy, and the country should count on partnership with Sweden and its own military capabilities instead.

Lastly, the mixed signals regarding possible NATO membership were declared by Centre Party and Finns Party. Here the main arguments suggested that NATO partnership is one pillar of the Finnish defence and that Finland reserves itself a right to seek NATO membership if it feels necessary, as stated already in 1994 when the partnership began. The Finns Party also noted that in case there would emerge a more serious discussion about possible NATO membership, this decision should only be taken based on detailed calculations.

Military cooperation

As in the two previous Finnish debates, many of the parties and speakers highlighted the importance of Finnish cooperation within the Nordics, especially in relation to Sweden. Almost all of the parties except the Left Alliance expressed the need to increase the bilateral work with Sweden. Once again, many speakers justified the need for partnership with Sweden because the security situation has deteriorated, and the best Finland can do to counterbalance this is to increase partnership with Sweden in terms of security. In more specific, Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) suggested that Finland and Sweden could form an official agreement to assist each other in case of a war or crisis. Kimmo Kiljunen (Finns Party), on the other hand, spoke about the reasons why Sweden is such an important partner for Finland and brought up the close relations between the countries in terms of history, culture, and good relations. When it comes to military cooperation with the US, Ilkka Kanerva (National Coalition Party) believed that despite the current state of the NATO debate, Finland should pursue to increase the bilateral partnership with the US. Codes of increased military cooperation with NATO did not find applicability on this speech.

Conversely, the Left Alliance was the only party as per this debate suggesting decreased military cooperation with both the US and NATO. The Left Alliance argued that Finland would become dependent on the United States in the light of the recent procurements, and by dependency, the US can ensure that the Nordic states such as Finland will pursue America's interest vis-à-vis Russia for example, in the Arctic region. In addition, as argued by Markus Mustajärvi, NATO's increased proximity in the Baltic Sea region

increases tensions and contributes to the accumulation of military power in the region, which is the reason why Finland should avoid partnership with NATO, “*The report states numerous times that NATO’s increased presence has a stabilising effect. Just as well, we can claim that it creates instability. The accumulation of military power and general armament increase tensions in both the Baltic Sea and the Arctic region.*”²³ (Finnish Parliament, 2020).

As per the coding frame, there also exists a third type of opinion, maintaining the current level of cooperation with the Nordic states, the US and NATO. The codes of this category were dominated by the centre-left parties, consisting of Social Democrats, the Green League, the Left Alliance, Centre Party, but there were also a few codes by Christian Democrats and the National Coalition Party. The centrality of the speeches’ arguments included that it is good to continue the cooperation between Sweden and Finland as both countries are non-aligned and that the countries have become natural pillars in each other’s security thinking.

In terms of maintaining military collaboration with NATO, the Green League and Christian Democrats characterised this as a mutually beneficial and important partnership. In more specific, Christian Democrats highlighted the need to be involved in different multilateral organisations as such, because they ensure stability and peace in over-all terms, meaning that Finland benefits from this as well. When it comes to partnership with the US, codes were assigned to the speakers from the Green League, the National Coalition Party and Centre Party. The Green League and Centre Party argued that the partnership with the US is meaningful because these two countries share common values and think alike. In fact, they saw the common values as the foundation for the countries to collaborate. The National Coalition Party toned that despite the current state of the Finnish NATO membership topic, cooperation with the United States is essential and must be continued.

²³ “*Selonteon useammassa kohdassa todetaan, että Naton lisääntynyt läsnäolo monilla alueilla vakauttaa tilannetta. Aivan yhtä hyvin voi sanoa, että se synnyttää epävakautta. Sotilaallisen voiman kasaaminen ja varustelukierre lisäävät jännitteitä niin Itämerellä kuin arktisella alueella.*” (Finnish Parliament, 2020). Translated from Finnish by the author.

National military capabilities

The last topic of the debate covered national military capabilities. Centre Party underlined the need to increase national military capabilities. Members of the party argued that Finland needs to increase its defence capabilities due to the turbulence in world politics caused by the great power rivalry. Among others, Finland must develop its cybersecurity competence and complete the jet fighter and navy procurements to increase the country's defence.

In opposition to this, the Left Alliance was the only party whose statements could be considered under the category of decreased national military capabilities. Namely, the Left Alliance saw many downsides with the planned procurements. Firstly, they would provide little extra value in terms of the power balance vis-à-vis Russia, and secondly, they would contribute to the general militarisation and increased tensions of the region, which would thereby decrease Finnish security.

The most extensive section in the national military code of this debate was the 'maintain course'. Here, there existed various opinions from the Left Alliance, Social Democrats, Centre Party and the Finns Party. The speeches of the category had the same focus that Finnish security is largely based on self-defence capabilities which in turn consists of conscription and reserve-based army. In more detail, the Finns Party tended to talk about self-defence as a pillar among the others, constituting the Finnish defence, while other parties assigned higher importance to the fact itself that Finland should continue to have trustworthy defence forces.

4.2 Analysis of the Finnish debate

First of all, it can be said that the parties in the Finnish parliament had many division lines and some statements were even controversial, meaning that members of a single party had different opinions, and not everyone followed their party lines. Hence, there was some divergence of opinion within the parties themselves. On the other hand, some parties held relatively constant line in their positions, such as the National Coalition Party, Christian Democrats, the Swedish People's Party of Finland and the Left Alliance. In addition, it seems that there is no consensus about the nature of the threat either. Some parties saw that Finland must become a member of NATO to mitigate the risks derived from the deteriorated security environment. Other parties saw the possible deviation from

the orthodox non-alignment as the biggest security threat for Finland, mainly the speakers from the Left Alliance and Social Democrats.

NATO membership

It can be said that the largest topic at stake was the NATO membership which also stimulated the most vigorous debate among the parties (and to some extent within the parties, as mentioned), and most of the members of parliaments (MP) had a strong position on this topic. Since the first debate, the National Coalition Party and the Swedish People's Party of Finland have expressed their support for the NATO-option and favoured Finnish membership in NATO, as both parties had concluded a pro-membership position earlier²⁴. Both parties suggested that Finland should develop a plan to join the Alliance, arguing that NATO is the backbone of European security, and a membership will also provide security guarantees for Finland. It was also suggested that Finland should act pro-actively and join the Alliance when the situation does not require urgent action, instead of attempted to join NATO amid a potential crisis when there would be the greatest need for NATO's security guarantees.

The NATO debate was also related to the question of threat perception. All pro-NATO speeches saw that threat was caused by the changes in the security environment where Finland is located, implying that the environment itself has become somewhat less secure. It was perhaps best brought up by Pauli Kiuru (National Coalition Party), who argued that the events in Ukraine should be taken as a warning example of this shift. Hence, Russia's increased aggressiveness initiated a change in threat perception, and to mitigate the impact of the deteriorated security situation, Finland should opt for NATO membership.

The second group of parties can be called the so-called doubters who either provided a mixed position between 2016 and 2020 or argued that a NATO-option is something that Finland should have, but for some other reason do not support the membership at the moment. The Finns Party is a good example in this regard, whereas, in the first debate in 2016, members of the party expressed opinions of opposing NATO membership but supported the idea of NATO-option. In comparison, in the 2020 debate, the Finns Party did not express any anti-membership views. Instead, all their speeches of NATO

²⁴ The Swedish People's Party of Finland opted for this quite recently before the first debate, in June 2016 (de Fresnes & Harala, 2016).

membership were categorised as ‘mixed position on NATO membership’, whereas the tone of talking about the potential membership left an impression that the Finns Party would not mind if Finland would become a member of NATO. Hence, the Finns Party was gradually changing their perception towards NATO membership but did not express any pro-membership view.

Another type of doubters was represented by Centre Party and the Green League, whose members expressed a wide range of opinions about the membership. There seemed to be no unity in the parties, as some speakers strongly opposed the idea of NATO membership and expressed NATO criticism. Other members highlighted the importance of NATO membership and cooperation with NATO, despite preferring that Finland was to be non-aligned. Interestingly, the highest difference seemed to be between the members of higher position (such as ministers) who were more pragmatic and had a softer tone regarding NATO versus some other members, who tended to be more pessimistic in relation to NATO. In addition, none of the Christian Democrats’ speeches could be labelled as pro- or against NATO membership, though the party tends to represent the doubters/mixed group. This was illustrated by the fact that none of the party-members took any particular stand on the NATO membership nor NATO-option per se but expressed support for increased cooperation with NATO.

The last group of the parties were the firm opposers of NATO membership, represented by the Left League and Social Democrats. Both parties remained critical towards NATO (but also towards the US, as elaborated down below) and strongly opposed the idea of a Finnish NATO membership. However, neither did they advocate the NATO-option. Furthermore, the fiercest opposers of NATO membership also perceived threat differently from the ones supporting NATO membership, whereas possible deviation from the traditional line of non-alignment was perceived as a major threat for Finland. The most common argument was that by becoming militarily aligned, Finland enters the great power rivalry and might become a target itself (Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats).

Hence, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats saw NATO’s increased presence in the region as an additional source for the increased tensions and distinguished from the rest of the parties by their different understanding of threat perception. In fact, their position can be seen as an instance of post-Finlandisation, as introduced earlier by Rusi. For

example, traces of post-Finlandisation can be noticed when examining their arguments and overall tone regarding NATO and the US. The clearest example concerns the logic behind non-alignment, whereas both, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats, argued that non-alignment is necessary in order to exclude the possibility that Finnish territory could be used against any other state. Both parties made it also clear that Finland should seek to uphold good relations with all of its neighbours, despite the circumstances, and as argued by Markus Mustajärvi, Finland should know its place based on history: “*Finland should remember its history, know its place in Europe and practice foreign policy in a way that takes these two facts into consideration.*”²⁵ (Finnish Parliament, 2016). These statements have a relatively high match with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, where Finland had to perform its foreign policy in a view that would keep the Soviet Union satisfied.

Military cooperation

One aspect that enjoyed all parties’ support was the importance of Sweden as an ally, even though the Left Alliance’s opinion noted the importance but did not suggest an increase in this. However, this opinion was repeated from debate to debate, and can be highlighted as one of the central elements in the Finnish security debate. Parties stressed Sweden as a natural ally of Finland, and most parties argued that there should not be made any limits of how far this partnership can develop. It seems that for many parties in the Finnish parliament, Sweden is important both physically and mentally, indicating that Sweden constitutes an important pillar of Finnish security thinking.

Cooperation with NATO and the US also enjoyed the support of the majority. All parties except the Left Alliance and some members of the Green League and Social Democrats argued that partnership with both actors should be maintained and/or increased. It seems that the question here followed similar logic as it was with the case of the NATO debate. However, the left-wing parties tended to be less enthusiastic about this cooperation, and parties did not always follow the same line. Additionally, members of the Left Alliance believed that NATO is made for protecting the interests of the United States. In more specific, small states, such as Finland, will be only used as tools to pursue America’s

²⁵ “*Suomen kannattaisi muistaa oma historiansa, tietää paikkansa Euroopassa ja harjoittaa tervettä kansallista edunvalvontaa.*” (Finnish Parliament, 2016). Translated from Finnish by the author.

interests vis-à-vis Russia, whereas statements as the latter match with the narratives pursued by Russia.

National military capabilities

As it was the case for military cooperation, there seemed to be greater unity about national military capabilities among the parties than it was the case with NATO membership. Most parties supported increasing the national military capabilities. The discussion revolved around two significant procurements of navy vessels and new jet fighters. Despite the high price, most parties were supporting this. It became clear from the debates that credible defence capabilities were yet another fundamental component in the Finnish security-related identity, as brought up by Pajunen and Järvenpää in the previous literature chapter.

When it comes to the opposition of increasing the military capabilities, the biggest challenger of this policy was the Left Alliance, and to a lesser extent the Green League. Both parties argued that military spending cannot be disproportionate in relation to the state budget and that the major procurements should be cancelled. Speakers from both parties argued that the armament of the region does not benefit anyone. It can be said that this opinion might not be related to the fact that these parties would like to see the Finnish military capabilities decreased. Instead, it might be that these parties expressed such opinions because of ideological reasons such as more funds for welfare (as argued by the Left Alliance), and that increase in military budget undercovers the failed foreign policy on other fronts (as argued by the Green League).

4.3 Post-Crimea security debate in the Swedish parliament

4.3.1 *Power dynamics of the Swedish parties during the debates*

Sweden has had a red-green government led by Stefan Löfven (Social Democrats) since 2014, and the coalition has been established between Social Democrats and Green Party. After both general elections, in 2014 and 2019, a minority cabinet was formed, meaning that the coalition has had to count on votes outside the coalition, mainly from the Alliance parties in return for certain Alliance's demands regarding the state budget (Sverigesradio, 2014). This has caused a situation where the coalition, mainly the Prime Minister (PM) party, has had to somewhat balance between the opinion of parties supporting the

minority cabinet and coalition's own line. All of this was even noted even during the debates, where the coalition and the Alliance were more or less on the same page, but Social Democrats as the PM party still had to advocate the government's choices.

What is general for the Swedish parties' power dynamic during the past decade is that two major parties, Social Democrats and Moderates, have lost seats to the smaller parties. Perhaps most vividly, Swedish Democrats increased their share of seats from 49 seats during the first two debates to 62 seats during the last debate (Swedish Election Authority, 2019; Swedish Election Authority, 2020). The exact number of seats per party of the Swedish parliament after the 2014 and 2019 elections can be found in Appendix 5.

4.3.2 *Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020 in 2015*

The current debate was based on the report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Swedish Parliament with the aim to determine a security policy focus for Sweden for the period of 2016-2020. The codes of the debate can be found in Appendix 6.

NATO membership

The first examined topic was NATO membership. A pro-NATO stand was expressed by two parties, People's Party (currently the Liberals) and Moderates. People's Party representative Allan Widman raised two arguments. Firstly, Swedish cooperation with NATO has already reached a level where it is seen as closely linked with NATO, meaning that Sweden is already *de facto* part of the NATO bloc for a potential enemy. Secondly, NATO's activity is highly influencing the surrounding security environment of Sweden, without Sweden's ability to take part in the decision-making because of Swedish status as a non-member. As noted by Allan Widman: "*We cannot handle those serious security challenges created by great powers such as Russia on our own. As a member of NATO, we could have influence – we could have had a voice around the table, instead of waiting for the decision outside the room, whilst decision about international operations are being made, as it has been for years.*"²⁶ (Swedish Parliament, 2015). On the other hand, Moderates stressed that the changed nature of security requires new means from Sweden,

²⁶ "Vi klarar inte att på egen hand anta allvarliga säkerhetsutmaningar från stormakter som till exempel Ryssland. Som medlemmar av Nato hade vi fått ett inflytande - vi hade fått en röst vid bordet i stället för att, som under många år av internationella operationer, få vänta ute i hallen på att ett besked ska komma." (Swedish Parliament, 2015). Translated from Swedish by the author.

and it is, therefore, justified for Sweden to initiate a clear NATO debate, whereas Moderates see NATO membership as something necessary to pursue.

The opponents of the membership consisted of Swedish Democrats, Left Party, Green Party and Social Democrats. Social Democrats and Swedish Democrats tended to argue that Sweden should not deviate from its traditional position on non-alignment, as this principle has kept Sweden safe for more than two centuries. Left Party and Green party stressed the consequences of a possible NATO membership. Left Party argued that Sweden would lose its sovereign security decision-making, and secondly, NATO is seen as a nuclear alliance, which goes against the self-image of Swedish values. Green Party suggested that NATO membership would, in fact, decrease Swedish security, as Sweden may become a battleground in a case of war. Additionally, Swedish membership in NATO would be taken as a provocation by some forces in Russia, and Sweden would also be required to host nuclear weapons on its soil.

A mixed position on this issue was presented by the members of Centre Party, Christian Democrats and some members of Social Democrats. Centre Party and Christian Democrats believed that NATO membership is something that needs some clarifications and suggested that additional examination is required before reaching any conclusion. Anna-Leena Sörenson (Social Democrats) argued that Sweden should align its position with Finland in this question, and that any movement towards NATO must have a large support by the people shown by a majority-vote by a referendum.

Military cooperation

The second subject under the focus was military cooperation. Increased military cooperation within the Nordics was supported by most the Swedish parties, while Finland was the most popular actor brought up in this context. For example, Swedish Democrats suggested that Sweden should create a military alliance with Finland, as it would be a mutually beneficial project. Moderates and Centre Party expressed the need to coordinate foreign policy moves, such as possible NATO membership, with Finland.

Moderates and Christian Democrats suggested intensified cooperation with NATO and the US. They pointed out that both actors are already considered as parts of the Swedish security thinking, and it will benefit Swedish security to develop these partnerships even

further. While there were no codes interfiled as ‘decrease in military cooperation with the US’, Left Party argued for a decreased cooperation with NATO. This stand was motivated by the belief that the current partnership is already undermining Swedish security. In more specific, Left Party opposed that Swedish land is used for joint exercises with NATO and, as a part of this, urged the government to cancel the Host Nation Support agreement.

Maintaining the current military partnership with all three actors was supported exclusively by Social Democrats. Maintaining the cooperation with the Nordic states was justified because different types of Nordic cooperation, such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) are increasing the security of all sides and working together with partners is upweights acting alone. When it comes to NATO, Social Democrats acknowledged that NATO has an important meaning to the security of Europe, which is also benefiting the security of Sweden. Sweden chose to partner with NATO already in 1994 and this partnership is seen as an element in the Swedish defence today. Social Democrats also pointed out the good relations between the US and Sweden and that the US’ contribution to European security is appreciated.

National military capabilities

The third topic was about national military capabilities. Swedish Democrats provided multiple arguments in support of this. According to them, it has been the fault of the previous governments why the Swedish defence capabilities are currently insufficient, whereas territorial defence was almost completely erased. The second argument concerned military spending in comparison to GDP. As noted by Swedish Democrats, Sweden is the least spending country in the region and should increase its military spending to 2% of GDP as done by many of its neighbours. The third point concerns civil defence which must be rebuilt as an important pillar of the general defence plan. Social Democrats agreed that Sweden must rebuild its military capabilities that were phased out after the end of the Cold War. In addition, Social Democrats saw that the country should increase the number of women in the army, as gender equality pays off in increased defence. Christian Democrats also welcomed the decision that the government re-established permanent military presence on the island of Gotland.

‘Decrease in national military capabilities’ and ‘maintain the current level of military capabilities/mixed position’ remained uncoded in this debate.

4.3.3 *Swedish Parliament's Defence Committee's report in 2017*

As what can be understood by the title, this debate was largely focusing on the security situation of Sweden, the direction of its defence policies, national military capabilities, and international cooperation. Codes of this debate is visualised in Appendix 7.

NATO membership

Despite the focus on internal affairs, the NATO question become a solid reference point throughout the debate. Christian Democrats, Moderates and Liberals expressed their support for Swedish membership in the Alliance. In terms of motivating such conclusion, Moderates argued that despite the good partnership with NATO, Sweden is lacking the security guarantees of what a full membership would encompass. In other words, it would be only a technical nuance to become a member of the Alliance in real terms, as Sweden would already be compatible with the NATO standards. Liberals' argument had similar roots. They claimed that for a potential enemy, e.g., Russia, Sweden is *de facto* a NATO partner, which means that Sweden is considered a part of NATO without actually having NATO's security guarantees. Christian Democrats pointed out that without membership, Sweden cannot have a say in NATO's decision-making.

The opposition to Swedish NATO membership consisted of Left Party, Social Democrats, Swedish Democrats and Green Party. Social Democrats favoured dialogue and cooperation with external actors. However, when it came to NATO, Social Democrats saw that partnership does not presuppose membership, and they did not see the need to join the Alliance. Left Party and Green Party stressed the importance of stability and farsightedness of Swedish security, which is the reason why Sweden should stick to non-alignment. In addition, Left Party saw the membership as a danger to Swedish security, as Swedish NATO membership increases the risk that Sweden would be forced to become involved in a conflict for foreign matters elsewhere. Swedish Democrats also stressed the importance of non-alignment and claimed that Sweden would become involved in the rivalry of great powers by NATO membership. Jan R Andersson (Moderates) argued that in case of a conflict between NATO and Russia, Sweden could not stay neutral and would inevitably be dragged into it. This statement was labelled as a mixed position of NATO membership.

Military cooperation

The next topic was about external military cooperation. Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Swedish Democrats felt it necessary to point out the need to increase military cooperation with the Nordic states, especially with Finland. The main argument was that it is complicated to enhance security alone. As argued by many, Finland is an excellent partner to develop cooperation with as it is similar to Sweden in many ways, most notably by being non-aligned in this context. Roger Richtoff (Swedish Democrats) went even further and suggested that a military alliance could be formed between the two states. In relation to increased cooperation with NATO, Jan R Andersson (Moderates) spoke on behalf of the Alliance parties and said that cooperation with NATO must be deepened to become a member of the Alliance eventually. ‘Increase in military cooperation with the US’ code was not detected in the speeches.

In relation to decreasing cooperation with NATO, only Left Party expressed such view. According to them, Sweden should not take part of NATO’s initiatives, such as the Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom²⁷). According to Left Party, the purpose of StratCom is to spread NATO’s lies and rumours, and Sweden should not take part in such propaganda. Stig Hendriksson (Left Party) noted that: “*Swedish membership makes Sweden an active part of NATO’s work of propaganda and disinformation campaigns.*”²⁸ (Swedish Parliament, 2017). Codes of decreased cooperation with the US and Nordic states were not applicable to this debate.

Social Democrats were the only party arguing for maintaining the current level of cooperation with NATO. For instance, according to Social Democrats, Sweden took part in StratCom initiative in order to collaborate with like-minded states. Also, Social Democrats did not see any controversy in having good ties with NATO, while staying outside of the Alliance. Jan R Andersson (Moderates) argued for upholding the good bilateral relationship with the US.

²⁷ NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence is a Riga-based NATO-accredited communication organisation for enhancing communication between the Allied states (Stratcom, n.d.).

²⁸ “*Ett svenskt medlemskap gör att Sverige blir en aktiv part i Natos propagandaarbete och desinformationskampanjer.*” (Swedish Parliament, 2017). Translated from Swedish by the author.

National military capabilities

The last dimension includes codes of national military capabilities. In the column of increasing national military capabilities, all parties were represented except Left Party. The most popular suggestion to increase the national military capabilities was to raise funding. As noted by many speakers, Swedish military expenses were relatively low, and parties suggested to increase financing by figures (11 billion SEK by Centre Party, 4 billion SEK by Swedish Democrats), or as Liberals and Christian Democrats argued, Sweden should aim to reach the 2% GDP margin. In addition, Christian Democrats and Moderates suggested increasing the capabilities in the cybersecurity domain, whereas Swedish Democrats suggested increasing the number of people in the conscription. Hence, it was common for all parties represented in this category that funding must be increased, one or the other way.

The only party arguing against an increase in the military defence capabilities was Left Party. They backed their opposition to increasing national capabilities with the claim that other parties justify the need for armament by the Russian threat, which would simultaneously aim Swedish course towards NATO membership.

Only one statement was considered suitable for the category of maintaining the current level of military capabilities – Social Democrats noted that a lot had already been done to increase Swedish military capabilities. As an example, Mattias Ottosson (Social Democrats) remarked that the Swedish coastal guard has been strengthened, and there are permanent military units on the island of Gotland.

4.3.4 *Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025 in 2020*

The last Swedish debate took place in 2020 and was similar to the first Swedish debate. Here, the aim was again to debate the direction of the Swedish security politics for 2021-2025. Codes of the debate can be accessed in Appendix 8.

NATO membership

A clear pro-NATO stand was taken by Moderates, Centre Party, Christian Democrats and Liberals. All the parties agreed that Swedish NATO membership would increase the country's security position, as NATO is the only force that can provide enough security guarantees for Sweden in the destabilised security environment. In more specific,

Christian Democrats argued that as a member, Sweden would have better opportunities to take part and coordinate the crisis-time planning between NATO and itself. In addition, Christian Democrats and Centre Party acknowledged that Swedish NATO membership is not only important for Sweden. This decision will also increase the security of the Baltic states as Swedish territory provides an essential corridor for transport if NATO needs to assist the three Baltic states.

Opposition to NATO membership was expressed by the members of Social Democrats, Left Party, Green Party and one member of parliament (MP) from Swedish Democrats. The main message was that Sweden should stay non-aligned as this doctrine has been beneficial for Sweden. In more specific, The Swedish Democrats' MPs noted that despite supporting a NATO-option, the party had not altered its decision when it comes to full membership. Roger Richthoff (Swedish Democrats) also suggested that if the Baltic Sea became an inland sea for NATO, it would not contribute to the political instability of the region. Social Democrats and Left Party argued that if Sweden declared a NATO-option, it would leave a false impression of Swedish non-alignment to the broader public. Furthermore, both parties were afraid that a Swedish declaration of NATO-option would be just a step closer to the actual NATO membership, which both parties oppose. As argued by Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence, Social Democrats): *"To alter our security policy doctrine with the NATO-option would be a beginning of a sliding – I feel that it will not be enough for Moderates, Christian Democrats and other such parties, after this there will come another demand, and another. This is eventually about NATO membership."*²⁹ (Swedish Parliament, 2020). In addition, Left Party expressed a view that Swedish independent decision-making will be curbed by this membership, as it has happened due to the membership in the EU.

Mixed position regarding NATO membership was almost entirely dominated by the Swedish Democrats' speeches. Together with one opinion of Centre Party, the underlying argument was that NATO-option does increase the opportunities of Swedish security politics. Swedish Democrats also argued that a Swedish NATO-option would synchronise

²⁹ "Att däremot börja ändra den säkerhetspolitiska doktrinen, där detta med Nato-optionen är början på en glidning - jag ser inte att det är nog för Moderaterna, KD och vilka partier det nu är, utan sedan kommer nästa och nästa igen. Detta handlar ytterst om Natomedlemskap." (Swedish Parliament, 2020). Translated from Swedish by the author.

the country's position to what Finland currently has. Furthermore, if any change in the NATO questions should emerge, potential membership should be considered in parallel with Finland. Björn Söder (Swedish Democrats) also noted that by taking the NATO-option, Sweden takes higher responsibility to meet the NATO standards when it comes to military expenses.

Military cooperation

Again, the second topic as per the coding frame was about military cooperation. Here, numerous parties suggested that partnership should be increased, especially with Finland. Swedish Democrats, Moderates Centre Party, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats all argued for this option. Once again, the main suggestion of the Swedish Democrats was to form a military union with Finland. According to their logic, Finland is in so many ways similar to Sweden, in addition to the geopolitical location, that such a close military union would be possible. In addition, Swedish Democrats, Centre Party and Christian Democrats brought up another reason for increased cooperation. This time, Sweden should seek to harmonise its position with Finland in relation to NATO, and possibly move on with the membership question together with Finland. As argued by Björn Söder (Swedish Democrats): *“NATO-option includes that Sweden and Finland harmonise their stand in relation to the NATO question, which additionally brings us closer and signals our willingness to increase cooperation...”*³⁰ (Swedish Parliament, 2020).

Hence, all the parties stressed that it is good to act together when approaching the NATO matter. Centre Party argued that partnership with Finland is not enough and believed that cooperation should be increased with other actors as well, such as the US, Great Britain, Norway and Denmark. Social Democrats, on the other hand, argued for increased cooperation with NATO and the US, claiming that NATO is the most natural partner for Europe in terms of security. According to Ann Linde (Social Democrats), bilateral partnership with the US has always been important for Sweden, and Sweden is seeking to improve this relationship.

³⁰ *“Nato-optionen innebär också att vi nu harmoniserar Sveriges och Finlands inställning till handlingsfrihet i Natofrågan, vilket innebär ett ytterligare närmande och signalerar en vilja till fördjupat samarbete...”* (Swedish Parliament, 2020). Translated from Swedish by the author.

When it comes to arguing for a decrease in military cooperation, Left Party alone was suggesting this in relation to the US and NATO. According to Left Party, the United States is not a credible partner for Sweden, whereas the US has reportedly carried on espionage on Swedish defence industry companies. The reason for cutting cooperation with NATO stems from an understanding that increased NATO presence in the region is only fuelling the tensions in relation to Russia. Secondly, such cooperation is undermining Sweden's traditional role as a non-aligned state, and the argument that Swedish security is in danger is invalid. The third type of concern was about the pollution of the environment and overall harm to economic activity which the trainings with NATO are causing in Sweden, for example, in the county of Norrbotten. However, the most considerable argument reaffirmed that cooperation with NATO harms country's image as a non-aligned state. A decrease in military cooperation with Nordic states was not suggested by any of the parties.

When it comes to maintaining the partnerships, this sub-category included only 'maintain the current level of military cooperation/mixed position with NATO' by Swedish Democrats and Social Democrats. While Swedish Democrats argued that Sweden should use the current framework with NATO for its own benefit, Social Democrats argued that the existing partnership with NATO enjoys the majority of the Swedish Parliament, but that does not mean that there would be support for a Swedish NATO membership. Codes of upholding the current level of partnership with Nordics and the US were not reflected upon this debate.

National military capabilities

The last part examined parties' perception on national military capabilities. Here, the opinions of increasing national military capabilities were distinguished by the speakers of Swedish Democrats and Christian Democrats. Swedish Democrats argued that by NATO-option, the country has the responsibility and ability to grow its military budget. On the other hand, Christian Democrats asserted that the country should increase its military spending to the level of what is seen average in the region, meaning that the country should aim to reach the 2% of GDP bar. As per this debate, there were no opinions arguing for decreasing national military capabilities. The sub-category of maintaining the current level of military capabilities contained codes from Left Party. Left Party argued

that to maintain a credible non-alignment position, the country needs to have functioning defence forces capable of protecting Sweden from different dangers.

4.4 Analysis of the Swedish debate

NATO membership

Questions of cooperation and membership in relation to NATO caused expectedly most emotion in the Swedish foreign and security debates. In overall, the NATO-debate in Sweden was characterised by higher volatility compared to the Finnish one, whereas two major shifts took place during the debates between 2015-2020. As of 2020, the majority of the Swedish Parliament is supporting a NATO-option, and all of the centre-right parties of the Alliance bloc are favouring Swedish NATO membership.

The proponents of NATO membership claimed that a real membership enables Sweden to participate in the NATO decision-making because as long as Sweden is not a member of the Alliance, Sweden has less influence over it. Secondly, as Allan Widman (Liberals) argued, Sweden is currently a close partner of NATO, yet not a member. Hence, in the eyes of a potential adversary, Sweden would already be counted as a country belonging to the 'NATO bloc' anyhow, however, without NATO's security guarantees.

Taken together, the pro-NATO camp seems to have an understanding that the nature of the security situation makes it self-evident that Sweden will join NATO one day. This was reflected in their arguments as well. As Sweden already has substantial cooperation with NATO, the pro-NATO parties tended to argue that an upgrade to membership would only be a technical nuance and Sweden would have a lot to gain from this 'last step'. For instance, Sweden would have better opportunities to talk along in forming its security environment if it was a member of the Alliance.

It should be also highlighted that Swedish political actors have gradually become more pro-membership. During the 2015 debate, only Moderates and the former People's Party (current Liberals) argued for Swedish membership in NATO, and Centre Party and Christian Democrats supported an investigation for potential membership. By 2017, Christian Democrats had joined the camp of NATO-supporters, and in 2020, the Centre Party had developed a pro-NATO opinion as well.

The group of NATO opponents has stayed stable without any remarkable shifts in between 2015-2020 and is currently composed of Social Democrats, Left Party, Green Party and Swedish Democrats, with the small exception of the latter who today supports the NATO-option. Therefore, the anti-membership bloc can be divided into two groups – Green Party and Left Party, who would like to see a decrease in the NATO-Swedish partnership in every aspect. On the other hand, there are Social Democrats and Swedish Democrats who are against the membership but support increased relations. Even though all of the membership-opposing parties tended to use the traditional line of non-alignment as their major talking-point, there are some differences as well. For example, Green Party presented ideological reasons to oppose the membership, as their justifications were based on anti-nuclear stands, disarmament and environmental protection. On the other hand, Left Party can be seen as the fiercest opposer of NATO and argues that by membership, Sweden would put itself in danger because this move could be seen as a provocation by Russia. Hence, they tended to argue that Sweden should hold a line of non-alignment not only for the sake of Sweden itself but also for the region's stability.

Surprisingly, Social Democrats did not express any specific reasons other than the continuity and tradition of Swedish non-alignment to oppose the membership in NATO. It might be that as the Social Democrats have led the country during all the examined debates, they needed to justify the cooperation with NATO and therefore could not allow themselves to take too critical positions in terms of an actual NATO membership. And lastly, the tone of the Swedish Democrats has softened remarkably. While in the first debate they claimed that there is no way of Sweden joining NATO, in the last debate, they were in a position where they had to distance themselves from the pro-NATO camp, as they had opted for NATO-option.

NATO-option

The Swedish NATO-debate differentiated from the Finnish counterpart by one additional element of debate – NATO-option³¹. It appears that NATO-option has more symbolic meaning than actual practical value in the Swedish debate because parties tended to have an understanding that support for the NATO-option can be translated as a pre-step

³¹ As noted earlier, Finland opted for a NATO-option already in 1994, and the issue did not therefore find that much coverage on the Finnish debate.

towards NATO membership, even though it does not have to be that way with the example of Finland. Nonetheless, NATO-option made its way to the debate, especially in the last debate of 2020. For understandable reasons, all the pro-NATO parties supported the idea of a NATO-option. However, there was also a notable change that took place just before the debate in December 2020. Namely, Swedish Democrats announced in the late 2020 that they have opted for the NATO-option (Rydberg, 2020). This implied that the Swedish parliament had now a majority supporting the NATO-option, which was considered as a meaningful development in the Swedish NATO debate and found wide coverage in media. Even though Swedish Democrats tried to ease the broader implication of their position-change by reminding that the party had not altered its view on non-alignment, it is yet another indication that some changes are taking place in the Swedish NATO debate.

On the opposite side, arguments against NATO-option by the PM party were noteworthy. On multiple occasions, the argument was that a spelled-out NATO-option would leave a wrong image of the Swedish NATO question for the wider public. This belief was also shared by Left Party, who argued that NATO-option is a hidden pre-phase of NATO membership, and such decision would leave a vague impression of Swedish non-alignment. It can only be suggested that this argument had an internal dimension as well, whereas supporting NATO-option might look like as an unexpected act in the eyes of the Social Democrats' voters. Thus, it can be said that as it was the case during the Cold War, reputation and country's image are still very contemporary points of thought in the Swedish politics, especially when it comes to such a sensitive topic as Sweden's relationship to NATO. However, the big difference is that today Sweden is open about its relations to NATO, and cooperation is practised transparently. However, one can always ask how much about the exact Swedish-NATO relations are classified today. The answer to this question remains, however, out of scope for this research.

Military cooperation

When it comes to military cooperation, all parties except Green Party supported an increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states, especially Finland. In a sense, it has been the Swedish Democrats who have been willing to take it to the furthest since the first debate. Namely, they have suggested to form a military alliance with Finland, which

seems to carry two goals. Firstly, to increase Swedish security and secondly, to provide an alternative to the NATO membership. Additionally, Finland was used as an argument according to which Sweden should harmonise its politics with Finland concerning NATO and opt for a NATO-option, as Finland did 25 years ago.

When it comes to cooperation with NATO and the US, the picture is different than it was regarding NATO membership. There seems to be unity between Social Democrats and many of the centre-right parties as they all support upholding and increasing cooperation with NATO and the United States. It can be almost said that Social Democrats were the biggest supporters of this, according to the debates. Not surprisingly, it is Left Party who is against this partnership with NATO and the US, it is alone on this, however. Left Party has many objections regarding this cooperation, but most importantly, they argue that this cooperation is a hidden method of taking Sweden closer to the Alliance itself.

National military capabilities

In general, most of the parties supported strengthening the national military capabilities by increasing the military budget. In more specific, many of the parties argued that in order to prepare for the NATO-option, Sweden must harmonise its security politics with the NATO standards. For example, Liberals, Swedish Democrats, Christian Democrats used the compatibility with NATO's standards as an argument to achieve the military spending of 2% of GDP. As a part of this, Swedish Democrats also took the opportunity and used this topic to criticise the previous governments (i.e., mainstream parties) for running down the national defence of Sweden after the end of the Cold War, whereas as of 2015, the Swedish military spending was the lowest in comparison with its neighbours. Another aspect which received wide support was the rebuilding Swedish territorial defence. The best example of this was the re-introduced permanent military forces on the island of Gotland.

Once again, the only deviating force was Left Party, whose members were expressing mixed positions on this topic. While some speakers agreed that Sweden must maintain good defence capabilities for having a credible non-alignment, some speakers opposed increasing the national military capabilities. The argument was that other parties use the Russian threat as a justification for armament and the hidden goal behind it would be to put Sweden on the NATO track.

4.5 Deteriorated security environment and its impact on the political elite's security policy preferences. The cases of Finland and Sweden

To begin with, some general remarks about the overall character of the Finnish and Swedish debates can be made. It seems that the Swedish debate was more clear-cut, and division lines among the parties were somewhat more apparent. Even though parties' standpoints were more dynamic and witnessed greater change over time, the Swedish parties as entities were more unitary in their views in relation to the Finnish parties. Indeed, the Finnish debates witnessed more significant divergence within the parties, which was especially evident for Centre Party, the Finns Party and the Green League. On the other hand, there was less movement in the positioning on significant issues in the Finnish debate, whereas none of the 8 observed Finnish parties changed their stand on NATO membership during the period of observation.

Differences in debate

When comparing the NATO debate between the two states, it looks like the Swedish one was more developed and sophisticated. This became evident, especially when considering the arguments of the Swedish proponents of NATO membership. For instance, Moderates, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian Democrats not only did assert that NATO enhances Swedish security, but their arguments also highlighted the benefits of what NATO membership would entail. In this regard, it was mentioned that Swedish membership increases Sweden's possibilities to take part in the decision-making of the region's security, and as Sweden's interoperability is already on a high level, fully-fledged membership would be only as a technical nuance. In addition, Sweden is already considered so close partner to NATO that it can *de facto* be considered as a part of the NATO bloc by the possible adversary. In comparison, the Finnish NATO debate remained rather basic, and the NATO proponents' arguments were mainly about claiming that membership in NATO would enhance Finnish security rather than elaborating in specific terms of what Finnish membership would bring along.

Another specific point that describes the Finnish debate but was less detected in the Swedish one was about what was perceived as threat. Some opponents of NATO membership in the Finnish debate (for instance, Social Democrats and the Left Alliance)

expressed a strong belief that Finland would place itself in danger if it would become a member of the Alliance. Hence, despite the deteriorated security situation which was recognised by both parties, Finland would be more secured when maintaining its non-alignment than by aligning. However, similar justifications were also used on a few occasions in the Swedish debate, hinting that an understanding what constitutes a security threat for the country is somewhat different among the opponents of NATO membership of both states.

When it comes to military cooperation, the Finnish debate demonstrated that Sweden plays an essential role in Finnish security thinking, as many Finnish politicians explicitly emphasised the crucial role of Sweden in terms of security cooperation. The importance of Finnish partnership was also stressed in the Swedish debates, however, with a slightly more modest tone. In overall terms, the military cooperation domain was the most similar of the examined debates.

National military capabilities was perhaps a bigger topic in Sweden, whereas it had run down its territorial defence after the end of the Cold War and its current territorial defence was more vulnerable. The most notable remarks of improving the Swedish defence were about extra funding to the military domain, troops deployment to the island of Gotland and reforms in the army to increase the amount of people in conscription. Issues addressing insufficient defence were not affecting the Finnish debate, as Finland had constantly maintained its military capabilities. Hence, the Finnish debate was mostly concentrating on the procurements of military equipment and about the general improvement of Finland's defence capabilities.

Findings related to political parties

Some important outcomes can be highlighted in relation to the parties themselves as well. Firstly, there seems to be a general tendency of the left-wing parties to stick to non-alignment in comparison to the centre-right parties in both countries. Secondly, both right-wing populist parties, Swedish Democrats and the Finns Party, have gradually altered their stand towards NATO. While in the first two debates in 2015 and 2016, both parties opposed NATO membership firmly, then by 2020, both parties had moved much closer to what can be seen as a mixed position on this issue, even though Swedish Democrats explicitly noted that they cannot be considered as membership supporters. In

any case, there has been some sort of change among the right-wing populists of the two Nordic states in relation their perception towards NATO, which deeper roots remained, however, unrevealed.

Thirdly, Swedish parties are on their way to approaching NATO (membership). When comparing the debates of 2015 and 2020, it becomes clear that Swedish parties have become closer to NATO, whereas all the Alliance parties are now supporting a Swedish NATO membership, and there is a majority for a NATO-option (with the help of Swedish Democrats). In addition, the biggest party, Social Democrats, are strong advocates of the Swedish-NATO partnership but still hesitate to support an actual membership. Also, when looking at the Social Democrats' argumentation regarding opposing the membership, only identity-related justifications were detected. In Finland on the other hand, the parties did not alter their position on NATO membership during the period of observation, as already mentioned.

One of the main empirical conclusions of this work is that when it comes to NATO membership, the examined debates suggest that the Swedish debate is more advanced and mature on this issue. As history has shown, individual initiatives are possible when considering the possibility of a Swedish NATO membership. If that would be the case, this new situation would additionally put Finland in a difficult position, as it would lose a member of its current 'security club', meaning that such circumstances would additionally stimulate a Finnish debate of NATO membership as well.

Constructed identities of the past still matter

It also became apparent that constructed identities still matter, which was especially the case for the opponents to NATO membership in both countries. In addition to the statement that non-alignment has served the country well, opponents of NATO membership had some country-specific reasonings matching the historically constructed identities of neutrality. The strongest Finnish opponents to NATO membership (Social Democrats and the Left Alliance) used the same arguments as what characterised Finnish politics during the Cold War – Finland must stay neutral in order to ensure that Finnish soil could not be used against hostilities of any country, and that good relations should be maintained with all neighbours. Moreover, Markus Mustajärvi (Left Alliance) made a direct reference to history by claiming that Finland should remember the past and know

its place as a non-aligned state, as if Finland would be in the same position vis-à-vis the eastern neighbour as during the Cold War. Hence, as claimed by Rusi, post-Finlandisation is detectable in contemporary Finnish politics in the arguments proposed by the opposers of NATO membership.

When it comes to the Swedish opponents of NATO membership, the best example of the past's influence was detectable in Ann Linde's arguments during the 2020 debate (Social Democrats, Minister of Foreign Affairs). She stated that an open Swedish NATO-option would leave a false impression to the international public, meaning that Sweden does not want to be considered as a NATO country. Hence, what can be understood from Linde's words, thoughts about a Swedish NATO membership are somewhat incompatible with Sweden's international image of neutrality and non-alignment, suggesting that there are still some unsolved ethical dilemmas regarding NATO membership. Thus, for both countries, it is especially the left-wing parties that seemed to be attached to the old narratives that were dominant in the past.

Theoretical reflections in the light of findings

Additionally, it can be also reflected and reminded what does constructivist approach to the concepts tell in the light of these results. As constructivist argue, norms and identities, in addition to power, are influencing actors' stand on security. When it comes to states, it is often the case that states absorb certain roles that do not necessarily follow the rationalist maximisation of the situation. Hence, when looking at the security politics of Finland and Sweden, these two Nordic states could have joined NATO immediately after the end of the Cold War, or even after 2014 when it became clear that the old east-west confrontation has made a return. However, as argued by Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, attachment to a certain identity can be so strong that it can dominate over the perception of threat. Thus, even though Russia has become more powerful, unpredictable and aggressive, it does not certainly mean that all domestic actors (different expert groups, parties, *et cetera*) would, first of all, perceive the changed security environment similarly, and secondly, abandon non-alignment as part of identity right away. Hence, the findings suggest that at least some domestic actors (left-wing parties) are likely to guide from their own beliefs and historical memory influenced by identity.

On the other hand, as constructivists also note, actor's interests and identities are not fixed and are subject to change. As seen, Finland and Sweden have both abandoned political neutrality (by joining the EU) and advocated a military non-alignment instead. Also, parties in both countries which do not support NATO membership are willing to deepen the partnership with NATO while acknowledging that this might erode their trustworthiness of military non-alignment, especially in the eyes of potential adversaries. Thus, this research suggests that a gradual identity change is taking place in Finland and Sweden, whereas attachment to non-alignment is slowly receding.

In addition, constructivists argue that threat perception emerges and evolves in a mixture of different domestic factors. Indeed, the majority of the parties represented in both parliaments are supporting to increase military cooperation with each other, but also with the US and NATO. Finland and Sweden have participated in and hosted international military exercises with NATO, whereas the most remarkable was Aurora in 2017 when NATO's ground forces trained on the soil of Sweden for the first time. This is something that was hard to foresee, for instance, 20 years ago, and can therefore be accounted for the altered security situation.

However, not all parties have perceived threat similarly. The examples of the Finnish Social Democrats and the Left Alliance indicated that threat perception is still very much subjective and may not be the same for all domestic actors. As brought up previously, many MPs from these parties expressed a belief that Finland would put itself into a greater danger if it would become a member of NATO. Hence, while the general threat perception has increased in both countries, there are some political actors in both states which have not necessarily perceived the change in security environment similarly. This means that those actors who have different perception of threat, might not agree with the changed security policy preferences of other actors.

How does deteriorated security environment affect the political elite's security policy preferences in a small non-aligned state?

Despite having some country-specific features, there are some general trends that can be highlighted in relation to Russia's increased aggressiveness and the threat perception of the Finnish and Swedish political elite. One inevitable consequence has been that political actors in both countries have started to seek possibilities to strengthen their

security position. As observed in this research, change in three domains was detected in this regard.

The first of them is related to military alignment. What was inherent, especially for the Swedish debate, was that Swedish (centre-right) parties started to support military alignment. This was less apparent for the Finnish debate as none of the parties altered their position towards military alignment during the observation period. However, there are proofs that, at least on the debate level, deteriorated security environment stimulated the NATO debate even in Finland. The second indication concerns military cooperation whereas both states started to stress the importance of international cooperation and started to find ways to enhance this with like-minded states, e.g., each other, states in Nordic, the United States, and other European states. The last point is about national military capabilities. The analysed debates proved that national defence received increasingly more attention as a result of the changed security environment, and both countries were willing to allocate additional resources to maintain and reinforce their national defence capabilities. This was especially evident in the case of Sweden, which had drastically decreased its military capabilities after the end of the Cold War.

Conclusion

This research aimed to discover how has deteriorated security environment altered security debate in two small non-aligned states. To achieve this, the research examined the parliamentary debate of Sweden and Finland after the Crimean annexation in 2014, which is considered as the most serious and most explicit sign of the changed nature of European security. Changes in the security environment have forced several European states to critically re-evaluate their self-defence capabilities, including the political actors in Sweden and Finland.

The core of this study was based on the examination of the three security debates of the Finnish and Swedish parliaments conducted between 2015-2020, while focusing on three themes: NATO membership, military cooperation and national defence capabilities. The empirical material of the debates was coded by following the qualitative content analysis method, and the speeches were thereafter labelled according to the coding frame. By guiding from the findings and to answer the first sub-question, *how does threat perception change as a result of deteriorated security environment*, this study argues that deteriorated security environment converts into increased threat perception among the political actors, which finds translation in changes of their preferences for security policies. Respectively, to answer the second sub-question, *what changes does altered threat perception evoke in security policy preferences*, deteriorated security environment increases the political elite's motivation to approach alliances that are perceived as a source of security guarantees, reinforce military cooperation with like-minded actors, and it also makes the political actors of non-aligned states to critically reflect on the national military capabilities.

Based on the examination of the Finnish and Swedish parliamentary debate and to answer the main research question, *how does deteriorated security environment affect the political elite's security policy preferences in a small non-aligned state*, this research argues that deteriorated security environment has increased the Swedish political elite's support for military alignment with NATO and stimulated the NATO debate among the Finnish political elite. The second shift in security policy preferences concerns military cooperation, whereas deteriorated security environment has increased the Finnish and Swedish politicians' willingness to seek international cooperation with other like-minded

actors, for instance, with each other (Finland-Sweden), within the Nordic, with NATO and the US. Thirdly, deteriorated security environment has also made the political actors to critically reflect upon the country's national military capabilities, whereas political actors in both states are favouring increased military spending and additional measures to enhance the national military capabilities. More considerable changes are taking place in Sweden, due to the weaker position of their defence competences in the first place.

In terms of contrasting the Swedish and Finnish results with each other, this research concludes that the Swedish NATO debate is more mature and elaborated than the Finnish one, and there is a bigger chance of a Swedish initiative to become militarily aligned than it would be for Finland. Similarly, national defence capabilities are a more significant concern for the Swedish political elite than it is for the Finnish counterparts due to Sweden's drastic decrease in military capabilities after the end of the Cold War. When it comes to military cooperation, the results are similar. Both countries are interested in reinforcing their partnership ties to each other, the US, NATO, and other European states. It can be concluded that even though the political elite in both countries has altered their security policy preferences because of the deteriorated security situation, changes in Sweden have been more concrete and rapid. Hence, threat perception among the Swedish political actors has been somewhat greater than it has been for the Finnish counterparts.

Additionally, this research determined that Finland and Sweden have their own (historical) roots for the strong attachment to non-alignment. For Finland, non-alignment and neutrality were the only options to maintain its sovereignty after the World War Two, whereas Swedish neutrality can be seen as a conscious choice which has developed during a longer time span. Hence, as neutrality has been part of the security doctrines for so long time, it has simultaneously become a substantial part of these countries' security identity. This confirms the constructivist explanation on security, according to which not only power determines how actors perceive and think of security. Instead, it is a mix of power, norms and identities that make up actor's approach to security, whereas this study was focusing on the identity's influence on security politics. In fact, absorbed identity can be so strong that it can dominate over 'objective' threat perception, which was demonstrated by the diverse interpretation of the nature of threat and the ways to tackle it. Thus, threat is a social construct, and different domestic actors may interpret it differently, making threat a subjective matter.

In addition, the empirical findings indicated that for both states, it was especially the left-wing who tended to advocate the old, constructed identities. Hence, despite the deteriorated security situation, left-wing parties were more likely to be reluctant to alter the grand security positions, such as the NATO membership. For instance, in the Finnish debate, the Left Alliance and Social Democrats drew argumentations for non-alignment that were used to describe Finlandisation. In Sweden, Social Democrats, Left Party, and Green Party argued that alignment is incompatible with (international) Sweden's image.

Hence, states absorb roles, and their decisions are influenced by the identities of these roles, which was confirmed by the results of this work. Even though Russia's foreign policy has become increasingly risk-taking and aggressive, parties who feel attached to particular identities are hesitant for changes in security politics, if it requires substantial shifts in identity. However, interests and identities are not fixed and are subject to change.

One of the conclusions of this research is that Sweden and Finland are witnessing a slow shift in identity, whereas non-alignment and neutrality will gradually lose their significance in light of the recent security situation changes. Therefore, this research concludes that changes in the NATO membership question are likely to happen, especially when it comes to Sweden, particularly in the light of the upcoming general elections in 2022. As mentioned, all the Swedish Alliance parties have adopted a pro-membership position, and the right-wing populist party is also increasingly supportive for approaching NATO. Hence, considerable changes may have been on hold due to the fact that Sweden has not had right-wing government since 2014.

In addition to the findings related to the left-wing parties and their attachment to identity, this study discovered some evolution in the right-wing populist's approach to NATO, as both such actors in Finland and Sweden have gradually softened their stiff opposition to NATO membership over time. For instance, in the last examined debate in 2020, both parties appeared to more pro-NATO than ever before. Hence, this study suggests two topics for prospective research. Firstly, examination of left-wing parties' attachment to (historically) constructed identities. Secondly, if the Swedish and Finnish right-wing populist's increasingly NATO friendly position is part of a wider European phenomenon, or whether it is something against the general trend.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Seats in the Finnish Parliament

After the elections in 2015, the 200 seats in the Finnish parliament were allocated as follows:

Centre Party 49 (*Keskusta*) seats; Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*) 38 seats; National Coalition Party (*Kokoomus*) 37 seats; Social Democratic Party (*Sosialidemokraattinen puolue*) 34 seats; Green League (*Vihreä Liitto*) 15 seats; Left Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto*) 12 seats; Swedish People's Party of Finland (*Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue*) 9 seats; Christian Democrats (*Kristillisdemokraatit*) 5 seats; Åland Coalition (*Åländsk Samling*), 1 seat (Yle, 2015).

After the elections in 2019, the 200 seats in the Finnish parliament were allocated as follows:

Social Democratic Party (*Sosialidemokraattinen puolue*) 40 seats; Finns Party (*Perussuomalaiset*) 39 seats; National Coalition Party (*Kokoomus*) 38 seats; Centre Party (*Keskusta*) 31 seats; Green League (*Vihreä Liitto*) 20 seats; Left Alliance (*Vasemmistoliitto*) 16 seats; Swedish People's Party of Finland (*Suomen ruotsalainen kansanpuolue*) 10 seats; Christian Democrats (*Kristillisdemokraatit*) 5 seats; Movement Now (*Liike Nyt*) 1 seat (Finnish Parliament, 2021).

Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government's foreign and security policy report in 2016

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016		Government's foreign and security policy report	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	NATO's 'open doors' policy is important for Finland, because this provides an opportunity to obtain membership one day.		
Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland		
Motivation	To leave the NATO-door open is one thing. Another thing is to actually take a course towards the membership. In this regard, Swedish People's Party of Finland is going to take a step further and openly declare the party's position to seek Finnish membership in NATO by 2025. By Finnish membership in NATO, it can be ensured that Finland would be protected in case of war. According to Wallin, this view finds support even among the Alliance parties in Sweden.		
Name and party affiliation	Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	As it came out from the report, the government agrees that increased NATO presence is contributing to a safer environment in the Baltic Sea area. According to the logic of the National Coalition Party, this means that Finnish membership in NATO would only enhance Finland's security.		
Name and party affiliation	Pauli Kiuru, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	The purpose of defence alliances is to defend, and nobody has dared to attack NATO. At the moment Finland is only a partner-state of NATO, which does not give it the security guarantees. This is something that Finland should learn after Ukraine and Crimea.		

Name and party affiliation	Pauli Kiuru, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Becoming a member of NATO is a long process and it may take years. Therefore, it be better to apply during the peacetime not in a case of an emergency. Finland should think ahead and act pro-actively.
Name and party affiliation	Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Many of Finland's friend in Europe are part of the EU and NATO, and the Alliance has a central meaning the European security. However, the security guarantees of NATO are only applicable to NATO members. This is the reason why there is no valid argument of keeping Finland outside of NATO.
Name and party affiliation	Jukka Kopra, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Discussion about NATO-option is pleasant but it will not help when there is an actual crisis. It would be therefore wise for Finland to seek NATO membership during the peacetime.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Against NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Matti Vanhanen, Centre Partry	
Motivation	Non-alignment has served the country well, and the party sees that Finland stays non-aligned even in the future.	
Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party	
Motivation	It is important to realise that Finnish interests are best served by staying non-aligned, as it is the way for Finland to stay out of military conflicts. By non-alignment it can be assured, that nobody can suspect Finland of becoming a source hostile military activity.	
Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party	
Motivation	Social Democrats do not see any valid reason to undermine the Finnish position of non-alignment.	

Name and party affiliation	Krista Mikkonen, Green League
Motivation	The Green League is against NATO membership as they believe that it would only increase tensions in the Baltic Sea. Also, NATO membership would be a deviation from the orthodox Finnish security-position and any change in this issue would require a wide discussion and a referendum.
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	It is important for Finland to stay outside to military conflicts. By the current non-alignment this is possible. However, membership in NATO would take away this possibility which is the reason why Finland should not seek membership in the Alliance. It is also important to note that from the Finnish security perspective, it is essential that Finnish territory would not be used to any hostilities against any other country.
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	The best Finland can do to stabilise the security situation in the region is by staying out of military alliances and by practising an active policy of solidity.
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	Finland should remember its history and know its place in Europe. Finland is secure by having good relations with the east and west, and this is only possible by staying non-aligned.
Name and party affiliation	Eero Heinäluoma, Social Democratic Party
Motivation	Changes in the security situation have been overstressed. There is no need for Finland to change its security course. We stick to non-alignment and take care of our security on our own.
Name and party affiliation	Tuomo Puumala, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland needs to take care of its defence on its own which implies that Finland will stay out of military alliances. One presumption of course is that Finland has the necessary resources to fulfil this.

Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party
Motivation	The position of pro-NATO parties in the parliament does not correspond to Finnish security realities. Vice versa, membership in NATO would put Finland into greater danger.
Name and party affiliation	Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance
Motivation	Finland must stay out from military alliances and seek to balance its relationships with all neighbours, including Russia. Finnish security and foreign politics should be aimed at maintaining good relations with all sides which is achieved by neutrality.
Name and party affiliation	Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland should realise its geopolitical location. It has always had good realisation with all neighbours, with Russia too. Hence, Finnish foreign and security politics should not alter its course to confrontations.
Name and party affiliation	Johanna Karimäki, Green League
Motivation	Finland is already too close to NATO, whereas without NATO's safety guarantees. Green League does not support NATO membership nor close cooperation. Finland needs friends that are close, for example the Nordic states and the EU.
Name and party affiliation	Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland is a non-aligned country, and it is not seeking any membership at least in the coming years.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Mixed position on NATO membership

Name and party affiliation	Timo Soini, Finns Party
Motivation	Finland upholds the option for applying for a membership NATO when it feels the necessity. Therefore, NATO's open doors policy is important for Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party
Motivation	It is justified to keep the NATO-option open for Finland. Finland has all rights to reevaluate its non-alignment position as it feels it necessary.
Name and party affiliation	Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party
Motivation	Finland is a non-aligned country, but we maintain the option to seek membership if necessary.
Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party
Motivation	Keeping the NATO-option available and regular reassessment of the security situation are important tools for the Finnish foreign and security politics.
Name and party affiliation	Aila Paloniemi, Centre Party
Motivation	Finnish security debate does not need to get stuck on the NATO membership. Finland is not going to seek membership anytime soon, but it has the NATO-option.
Name and party affiliation	Timo V. Korhonen, Centre Party
Motivation	NATO-option is an important aspect. Finland must have the opportunity, regardless of the circumstances, to join NATO if it finds reasons to do this. Finnish security and foreign policy need manoeuvring room,
Name and party affiliation	Kari Kulmala, Finns Party
Motivation	Even though Finland is roughly speaking a non-aligned state, it is keeping the NATO-option open. However, no course change is expected to happen in the following years. The question of NATO membership is perhaps even more related to the decisions made by Sweden, as it would be unwelcomed from the Finnish perspective to stay alone in vacuum.

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016		Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Timo Soini, Finns Party		
Motivation	Sweden has a unique position in the Finnish bilateral partnerships which is the reasons why Sweden has a central meaning in the Finnish security and foreign politics. Cooperation is developed on the basis of numerous common interests.		
Name and party affiliation	Simon Elo, Finns Party		
Motivation	Finns Party argue for an increased cooperation with Sweden as it benefits the Finnish security position.		
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	Increasing military cooperation with Sweden can be seen as a default option for the Finnish security and foreign policy. This must me continued.		
Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democratic Party		
Motivation	Social Democrats agree that cooperation with Sweden has a unique position in the Finnish foreign policy, and it will therefore be elaborated even further.		
Name and party affiliation	Krista Mikkonen, Green League		
Motivation	The Green League agree with many other parties that cooperation with Sweden is important and needs to be intensified.		
Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland		
Motivation	Rapid changes in the security environment require even deeper cooperation. Swedish People's Party of Finland welcomes the understanding that the need to increase cooperation with Sweden is highlighted in this regard.		

Appendix 2 (continued)

Name and party affiliation	Sari Essayah, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Christian Democrats join the government's suggestion that Finnish, but also the region's security can be enhanced by increased cooperation. For Finland, cooperation with Sweden has the highest importance in this regard.
Name and party affiliation	Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister,) Centre Party
Motivation	Sweden and Finland have found each other in the security domain. As for Finland, the cornerstone of its security politics is based on non-alignment. However, this does not set any boundaries for the bilateral cooperation between us.
Name and party affiliation	Anna-Maja Henriksson, Swedish People's Party of Finland
Motivation	It is refreshing to see that almost everyone is convinced that our cooperation with Sweden must be deepened.
Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party
Motivation	We need to increase and deepen our cooperation with Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though we value our ability to protect ourselves, Finland cannot rely on its own on this question. It is in Finland's best interest to deepen cooperation with Sweden.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Timo Soini, Finns Party	
Motivation	Finland and the US are increasing their cooperation. America's involvement in NATO and its military contribution to Europe's security is important for the Finnish security	

Name and party affiliation	Simon Elo, Finns Party
Motivation	It is good that cooperation with NATO and the US is developed, as it benefits all the partners. For Finland, cooperation with the West is especially important due to Finland's and Sweden's strategical location.
Name and party affiliation	Aila Paloniemi, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland and the US are increasing their cooperation. The US's commitment in Europe through NATO is relevant for the Finnish security.
Name and party affiliation	Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party
Motivation	We must continue our military cooperation with the United States which means that we should actively participate in the military exercises in the region. Only by doing that we can ensure that we are capable and ready to receive help if we need.
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Despite the current stand on the NATO membership question, Finland must seek to improve the cooperation with the United States

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Timo Soini, Finns Party	
Motivation	NATO's activity increases the security situation in Europe. It is important for Finland to maintain and develop political cooperation and communication with NATO on regular basis.	
Name and party affiliation	Simon Elo, Finns Party	
Motivation	It is good that cooperation with NATO and the US is developed, as it benefits all the partners. For Finland, cooperation with the West is especially important due to Finland's and Sweden's strategical location.	

Appendix 2 (continued)

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016		Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance		
Motivation	Left Alliance does not accept the government's uncritical view towards the increased military presence of the US in the Baltic Sea area.		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016		Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance		
Motivation	Left Alliance does not accept the government's uncritical view towards the increased military presence of NATO in the Baltic Sea area.		
Name and party affiliation	Li Andersson, Left Alliance		
Motivation	NATO's military presence has contributed to increased tensions in the Baltic Sea area. It does not come to the benefit to have cooperation with NATO as Finland can contribute to the security of the Baltic Sea area by staying non-aligned, as this traditional line brings predictability and trust.		
Name and party affiliation	Johanna Karimäki, Green League		
Motivation	I believe that Finland is already too close to NATO, whereas without NATO's safety guarantees. I do not support NATO membership nor close cooperation, because we need friends that are close, for example the Nordic states and the EU.		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016		Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states

Appendix 2 (continued)

Name and party affiliation	N/A
Motivation	N/A

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party	
Motivation	The Nordic countries constitute one important pillar in the Finnish international cooperation.	
Name and party affiliation	Jukka Gustafsson, Social Democratic Party	
Motivation	With the cooperation with non-aligned Sweden, we can contribute to the security of the Nordic and Baltic Sea region.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party	
Motivation	Partnership for peace with NATO constitute one important pillar in the Finnish international cooperation.	
Name and party affiliation	Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party	
Motivation	Finnish cooperation with NATO has a history of a quarter of a century. NATO has a great importance in European and Baltic Sea security.	

Appendix 2 (continued)

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	Matti Vanhanen, Centre Party	
Motivation	Bilateral relations with the US are important and appreciated.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance	
Motivation	Left Alliance does not believe that rearmament by any actor in the Baltic Sea area would solve the issue of increased tensions.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 21.6.2016	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party	
Motivation	The cornerstone of Finnish defence is its conscription-based army that will fill the reserve in the event of a war. This needs to be of course enhanced by the will to defend our country.	

Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakane, Centre Party
Motivation	Our current foreign and security politics is based on our self-defence capabilities. Finnish general conscription and our reserve army will meet the demands necessary for holding this line.

Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government's defence report in 2017

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017		Government's defence report	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	The report acknowledges that Finland keeps itself a right to seek alliance in NATO. It is in the best interest of Finland to keep this option available.		
Name and party affiliation	Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	National Coalition Party has reached an understanding that even though NATO would increase Finland's security which is the reason why the membership is useful, membership alone does not solve the security-related challenges. Finland needs to strengthen its own military capabilities as well.		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017		Government's defence report	Against NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party		
Motivation	Finland is a non-aligned country.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Kari, Social Democrats		
Motivation	Social Democrats are favouring the traditional line in Finnish security politics which is based on non-alignment. One prerequisite for fulfilling this are strong will and capabilities for defending the country.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Kari, Social Democrats		
Motivation	International cooperation and military trainings will have to respect the ground principle of Finnish security which is that the country is non-aligned.		

Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	Finland holds a strong security positions thanks to its non-alignment, as it is not bound to any military alliance. This includes not having any commitments to Sweden, even though the cooperation may sometimes be beneficial.
Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats
Motivation	The best foreign policy for Finland is the one that keeps us out of conflict, and which assures that Finnish soil will not be used any hostilities.
Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland follows a policy which sees the country non-aligned. This doctrine has served the country for a long period of time and enjoys people's support.
Name and party affiliation	Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats
Motivation	The report says that Finland is a non-aligned state. It should be also noted that it will stay this even in the future. Joining the Alliance would put us in danger, because we would voluntarily make us a potential target, in case a conflict between great powers. Also, by joining NATO, we would risk with the lives of Finnish men and women who could be sent to war for foreign interests in foreign soil. These are the reasons why Finland should not become a member of NATO.
Name and party affiliation	Mika Niikko, Finns Party
Motivation	It is highly unlikely that NATO's membership would be the 'magic key' to solve the security issues in a situation, where there would be a crisis in Europe. Vice versa, it would be highly likely, that Finland would be dragged into a conflict if it was to be a NATO member in a case of conflict somewhere in Europe.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Mixed position on NATO membership

Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland
Motivation	The report states that Finland maintains the NATO-option and ensures by its activity that there are no obstacles for eventually joining NATO if it finds suitable.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party	
Motivation	Our national defence is reinforced by different cooperation, but most important, Finland needs to increase its cooperation with Sweden for providing a safer security environment in the Baltic Sea region.	
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party	
Motivation	Finland and Sweden could coordinate their foreign and internal security policies which would bring our cooperation to a new level. This cooperation could become a role-model for other regions within the EU.	
Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland	
Motivation	Active cooperation with foreign partner is always beneficial for small states such as Finland. Bilateral cooperation especially with Sweden has great importance for Finland in this regard.	
Name and party affiliation	Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats	
Motivation	The changed circumstances in the security environment require new approaches. Christian Democrats agree that deepened cooperation with Sweden and partnership with NATO help to tackle the new threats.	
Name and party affiliation	Juha Sipilä (Prime Minister), Centre Party	
Motivation	Cooperation with Sweden has been a success and we will increase our cooperation with Sweden even further.	

Name and party affiliation	Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party
Motivation	As a part of our defence's credibility, Finland must work jointly with external partner. Among other, it is important to keep up the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Anna-Maja Henriksson, Swedish People's Party of Finland
Motivation	The party is pleased to see that government takes the cooperation with Sweden seriously, and does not set any limitations in this partnership.
Name and party affiliation	Antti Lindtman, Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats support the close cooperation with Sweden. By such initiatives we can improve the security situation in the region.
Name and party affiliation	Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party
Motivation	Increased cooperation with Sweden today is a smart thing to do. This partnership should not set itself limits and this could be taken as far as both countries see it necessary.
Name and party affiliation	Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party
Motivation	I express support to the suggested increase in military cooperation with NATO and Sweden
Name and party affiliation	Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, Nordic states and the US.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Increase in military cooperation with the US

Name and party affiliation	Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party
Motivation	As a part of our defence credibility, Finland must work jointly with external partner. Among other, it is important to keep up the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, Nordic states and the US.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland	
Motivation	Active cooperation with foreign partner is always beneficial for small states such as Finland. Increasingly deep cooperation with NATO is a good sign of this.	
Name and party affiliation	Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats	
Motivation	The changed circumstances in the security environment require new approaches. Christian Democrats agree that deepened cooperation with Sweden and partnership with NATO help to tackle the new threats.	
Name and party affiliation	Petteri Orpo (Minister of Finance), National Coalition Party	
Motivation	As a part of our defence credibility, Finland must work jointly with external partner. Among other, it is important to keep up the partnership with the US, NATO and Sweden.	
Name and party affiliation	Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party	
Motivation	I express support to the suggested increase in military cooperation with NATO and Sweden	

Name and party affiliation	Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though Finland is non-aligned, we are not neutral. We are part of the EU. The report clearly brings out the changed circumstances in our surroundings which is the reason why we need to keep up and develop our cooperation with NATO, Nordic states and the US.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Decrease in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance	
Motivation	The Left Alliance does not support the various partnerships with the US. Unfortunately, Finland has been dragged into multiple military agreements especially with the US during the past years.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance	
Motivation	The Left Alliance agree with the statement that Finland does not allow its territory to be used for hostilities against any country. Therefore, it is worrying that the government still supports the Host Nation Agreement with NATO that allows to use Finnish infrastructure.	
Name and party affiliation	Satu Taavitsainen, Social Democrats	
Motivation	Finland and Sweden are close when it comes to security thinking. However, Finland should not follow Sweden in its decision to allow NATO's operability in its space in a crisis situation. Finland is a non-aligned country, and it should not let any foreign actor to use its territory for hostile activity against any state.	

Appendix 3 (continued)

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017		Government's defence report	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A		
Motivation	N/A		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017		Government's defence report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Olli Immonen, Finns Party		
Motivation	Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if needed.		
Name and party affiliation	Krista Mikkonen, Green League		
Motivation	The Green League agrees with the government that one country lies in the centre of Finnish external partnerships - that is Sweden.		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017		Government's defence report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party		
Motivation	Partnership with NATO is yet another pillar in the Finnish security strategy.		

Name and party affiliation	Olli Immonen, Finns Party
Motivation	Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if needed.
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Kari, Social Democrats
Motivation	Finland's national defence is enhanced by the international cooperation, most importantly within the EU and Partnership for peace with NATO.
Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland is a small country and cannot rely only for its own in order to be safe. Therefore, cooperation is needed with the US, the EU and Sweden.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	Olli Immonen, Finns Party	
Motivation	Finland does not have any external security guarantees, but by having partnerships with Sweden, EU, NATO and the US, Finland makes sure that it has all the odds to receive help if needed.	
Name and party affiliation	Pertti Hakanen, Centre Party	
Motivation	Finland is a small country and cannot rely only for its own in order to be safe. Therefore, cooperation is needed with the US, the EU and Sweden.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Increase in national military capabilities

Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	The changed nature of our surrounding environment is not a matter of opinion. This is the reason why Finland must react and increase its national defence capabilities. Credible defence is the key for having manoeuvring room in a crisis situation.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	Finland will increase its war-time manpower from 230 000 men to 280 000 men. Even though the nature of today's wartime has changed, a country must have military capabilities even in the most traditional sense.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	For the following years, the government will increase military expanses by hundreds of millions. This is needed to maintain a credible defence capability.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	Finland will increase the funding of developing rapid response force by 55 million annually. This is needed for maintenance, trainings and for other expanses.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	The government will initiate a procurement for purchasing six new vessels for the marine forces that would be ready to operate in all kinds of circumstances in the Baltic Sea. The Laivue 2020 procurement has a cost-estimate for around 1.2 billion EUR.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	Recent conflicts have once again shown the importance of controlling the air space. The government will prepare a procurement for purchasing new fighter jet for the Finnish air forces, with an estimate price-tag of 7-10 billion EUR.

Name and party affiliation	Olli Immonen, Finns Party
Motivation	Finns Party support the government by enlarging the war-time reserve from 230 000 to 280 000 men, which increases the security of the country.
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Kari, Social Democrats
Motivation	Credible national defence is only achieved when enough resources are allocated to our air land and maritime forces.
Name and party affiliation	Stefan Wallin, Swedish People's Party of Finland
Motivation	The suggested procurements, especially the fighter jet and military vessel procurements and are significant steps towards increasing Finland's security.
Name and party affiliation	Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Christian Democrats support the government's plan to increase military spending and the planned procurements that will all enhance Finland's security.
Name and party affiliation	Jussi Niinistö (Minister of Defence), Finns Party
Motivation	The government will increase the funds of the land forces by 55 mil EUR in order to develop the rapid reaction forces.
Name and party affiliation	Antero Laukkanen, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Considering the fact that our security environment has deteriorated, it is important that Finland takes the measures needed to answer these changes. Therefore, it is understandable that the amount of money needed for maintaining credible defence must grow.
Name and party affiliation	Sofia Vikman, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though Finland maintained its conscription apart from Sweden, it does not mean that Finland should neglect its defence now. We should continue to develop and fund our defence forces.

Name and party affiliation	Markku Pakkanen, Centre Party
Motivation	It is good that wartime reserve will be increased into 280 000 men. This will increase our territorial defence capability remarkably.
Name and party affiliation	Timo Heinonen, National Coalition Party
Motivation	I express my support to the suggested procurements of jet fighters and military vessels. This will increase our readiness to react in a crisis situation.
Name and party affiliation	Eero Suutari, National Coalition Party
Motivation	Even though the planned investments in military vessels and jet fighter are expensive, they are justified. There is a reason why experts in the military field have concluded that such investments are necessary for our country.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Decrease in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	Krista Mikkonen, Green League	
Motivation	The Green League argue that increasing the military budget is always a bad thing and it only signals the unsucces of our foreign policy on other fronts. Greens aim for general disarmament as there are no winners in the race of armament.	
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance	
Motivation	The Left Alliance does not support the suggested procurement of new combat aircrafts with a price tag of 7-10 billion EUR. This money is needed elsewhere, especially in the social services.	
Name and party affiliation	Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance	
Motivation	Finland needs to seriously assess whether it really need to buy fighter jets that are approximately 15-20% of the national budget. The country needs military forces, but only when it has something valuable, such as the welfare state, to protect.	

Name and party affiliation	Kari Uotila, Left Alliance
Motivation	The suggested increases in military spending will additionally mean more resources in maintenance, which means that Finland will be forced to cut more in welfare. The government should carefully calculate the long-term meaning of the planned military procurements.
Name and party affiliation	Li Andersson, Left Alliance
Motivation	The Left Alliance is a strong opponent of the jet fighter procurement, especially due to its high cost.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 08.03.2017	Government's defence report	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

**Codes based on parliamentary debate of the Finnish Government's
Foreign and Security Policy Report in 2020**

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020		Government's foreign and security policy report	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	We have suggested a membership in NATO for many times, and we continue to do so. We see it as a security enhancement to the country. Therefore, we also highlight the importance of NATO's open door policy that still gives us a chance to join the Alliance.		
Name and party affiliation	Eva Biaudet, Swedish People's Party of Finland		
Motivation	Even though this report does not include any specific stance on possible NATO membership, the party sees it vital for Finland to be able to freely decide its alignment policies, which includes the option that the country will be a member of the Alliance one day.		
Name and party affiliation	Jaana Pelkonen, National Coalition Party		
Motivation	The party sees that a membership in NATO would only strengthen Finland's security. We suggest to our potential NATO membership under scrutiny.		

Finland		Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020		Government's foreign and security policy report	Against NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance		
Motivation	The centrality of the Finnish defence lies in our policy of non-alignment. By this principle, we take care of our defence on our own and can contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation.		

Name and party affiliation	Paavo Arhinmäki, Left Alliance
Motivation	As a non-aligned state, Finland can continue to be active in reconciliation negotiations, rather than being a side of a conflict.
Name and party affiliation	Katja Hänninen, Left Alliance
Motivation	The traditional line of security for Finland is based on neutrality and the Left Alliance says that this should be kept this way. One presumption for this is credible national defence.
Name and party affiliation	Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance
Motivation	NATO is founded to protect the interests of the US, whereas the US uses small states to achieve its own goals. NATO is not so much about the idea of enhancing international security rather than protecting the security of the US.
Name and party affiliation	Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and not approach NATO membership. We should build our defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that we need to have good national defence capabilities.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Mixed position on NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League	
Motivation	Finland stresses the importance of NATO's policy according to which states who fulfilled the stated requirements, are able to join the Alliance. Thereby Finland can assure that it leaves itself the NATO-option.	

Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party
Motivation	The safety of our region is strengthened by our cooperation with our friends in Sweden and Norway, but also by developing our NATO-partnership.
Name and party affiliation	Jani Mäkelä, Finns Party
Motivation	I believe that this report overestimates the EU as an actor to provide security. The reality is that most of the EU members are part of NATO which fills the international security framework from them. Finland did not follow the path to join NATO in the 1990s nor 2000s, and we live with the consequences even today.
Name and party affiliation	Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party
Motivation	Finland practices partnership with NATO, and we see that the door to NATO membership should also stay open, if there is need to join the alliance.
Name and party affiliation	Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party
Motivation	The central argument when it comes to NATO membership for me is whether Finnish NATO membership increases Finland's security or not. Finland should base its decision by this calculation.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League	
Motivation	Finland most important partner in terms of security is Sweden. This partnership will be elaborated even further, as the turbulences around us makes such cooperation even more meaningful.	

Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party
Motivation	The importance of Finnish cooperation with Sweden and Norway has increased, and this is expected also to continue. We suggest that maybe there is a reason to think about an official agreement for a crisis situation management between Sweden and Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party
Motivation	The safety of our region is strengthened by our cooperation with our friends in Sweden and Norway, but also by developing our NATO-partnership.
Name and party affiliation	Eva Biaudet, Swedish People's Party of Finland
Motivation	Due to Finland geopolitical location, Finland is exposed to any changes taking place in the Baltic Sea region in terms of security environment. It is therefore useful for Finland to partner up and increase cooperation with other states in the Nordic region, especially with Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats
Motivation	It good to see that partnership with Sweden gets more and more attention in such reports. Christian Democrats understand this and argue for a deepen cooperation with our neighbour in this regard, especially due to the volatile nature of the security situation. Also, cooperation with other Nordic and Baltic States are necessary as well.
Name and party affiliation	Antti Kaikkonen, (Minister of Defence), Centre Party
Motivation	Sweden is the most important partner of us when it comes to security. I can confirm that this understanding is mutual, and deepen cooperation is underway. Support for this partnership is also strong among both nations and parliaments.
Name and party affiliation	Kimmo Kiljunen, Finns Party
Motivation	The report shows clearly why Swedish cooperation is important and on what is it based. We have common values, have shared history and have excellent relations otherwise. This is a good lay-out to deepen and increase our partnership.

Name and party affiliation	Mika Niikko, Finns Party
Motivation	I want to highlight the meaning of Finnish-Swedish cooperation in the field of security and foreign politics. We share the understanding of our security environment and we are in many ways in the same position. This is something we should keep and develop further.
Name and party affiliation	Sanna Marin (Prime Minister), Social Democrats
Motivation	The EU is currently the most important framework of Finnish foreign relations and security community. In parallel to our intra-national cooperation, it is important to take the partnership with Sweden to new levels and without setting any limits.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Ilkka Kanerva, National Coalition Party	
Motivation	Despite the circumstances regarding NATO membership, Finland must increase its cooperation with the US.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the US

Name and party affiliation	Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance
Motivation	Finland has increased its partnership with the US since the 1992 when the first batch of jet fighter were bought from them. We believe that the current procurement is not justified, and it will keep us locked under the influence of Pentagon for many decades.
Name and party affiliation	Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance
Motivation	Since the early 1990s, NATO's goal has been to agitate Nordic states to secure US's interest in the arctic region against Russia.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance	
Motivation	The report states that NATO's proximity in the region has increase security perception. We counterargue and say that this as indeed increased the tensions. Finland should avoid the accumulation of military power in the region as this race has no winners.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic states

Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats
Motivation	As a part of the wider international cooperation, non-aligned Sweden is the closest ally of Finland and we do not set any limits to this partnership.
Name and party affiliation	Atte Harjanne, Green League
Motivation	Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our friends in the Nordic, but also with NATO and the US.
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	Similarly, to Finland, Sweden is a non-aligned country and cooperation with Sweden is natural part of our security politics. However, in the end, Finland will conclude its decisions on its own, as Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and not approach NATO membership. We should build our defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that we need to have good national defence capabilities.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League	
Motivation	Finland will maintain its practical cooperation with NATO as can be characterized as mutually beneficial.	
Name and party affiliation	Atte Harjanne, Green League	
Motivation	Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our friends in the Nordic, but also with NATO and the US.	

Name and party affiliation	Päivi Räsänen, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Christian Democrats support the statements in the report, which see the United Nations, the EU and NATO as instances which have great importance of maintaining stability and peace for Finland. Therefore, bilateral partnership with these institutions is seen as important for the Finnish security.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	Pekka Haavisto (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Green League	
Motivation	The United States is an important ally of Finland and partnership is conducted in various fields, most importantly in foreign and security policy. Common interests and value-base are boosting this cooperation even further.	
Name and party affiliation	Atte Harjanne, Green League	
Motivation	Greens comprehend the importance of cooperation with our friends in the Nordic, but also with NATO and the US.	
Name and party affiliation	Hannu Hoskonen, Centre Party	
Motivation	From the Finnish perspective it is necessary for us to keep our relations good with our neighbours. We need to keep close to partners, who think alike. Hence, good relations to the EU level among the different countries are vital. But also, with the US, despite the circumstances.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Increase in national military capabilities

Name and party affiliation	Esko Kiviranta, Centre Party
Motivation	The nature of the contemporary security can be characterised by rapid changes and unexpectedness. Therefore, Finland should do its best to stay safe. Finland needs to among other to develop its readiness to counter cyber threats, and make sure that the country's self-defence capabilities are being developed, by completing the jet fighter procurement.
Name and party affiliation	Joonas Könttä, Centre Party
Motivation	It is extremely important to proceed with the major procurements such as the Laivue and HX procurements, as such investments ensure our national defence capabilities.

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Decrease in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	Johannes Yrttiaho, Left Alliance	
Motivation	The jet fighter procurement is unnecessary for multiple reasons. Firstly, they are not capable of answering the potential Russian threat, secondly this would contribute to the overall armament, which would only increase tensions in the region and thereby undermine our security that way.	

Finland	Debate	Code name
Date: 11.11.2020	Government's foreign and security policy report	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position
Name and party affiliation	Erkki Tuomioja, Social Democrats	
Motivation	Finland must take care of its defence, which is developed by international cooperation that gives us more experience and know-how.	

Name and party affiliation	Tuomas Kettunen, Centre Party
Motivation	Finland should stick to non-alignment even in the future and not approach NATO membership. We should build our defence policies on two major pillars. One of them is Sweden and other Nordic cooperation and the second one implies that we need to have good national defence capabilities.
Name and party affiliation	Mikko Savola, Centre Party
Motivation	Finnish defence is based on the nation-wide conscription that has credible reserve army and international cooperation. The provide a preventive threshold against threats that can potentially address our country.
Name and party affiliation	Markus Mustajärvi, Left Alliance
Motivation	The guarantee of Finnish security is our credible and independent defence, which can be achieved by continuity and predictability of our main principles, such as the non-alignment.
Name and party affiliation	Mika Niikko, Finns Party
Motivation	Finnish security is based on our diplomacy, credible self-defence capabilities and international law.
Name and party affiliation	Mika Kari, Finns Party
Motivation	Finnish security can be based on four major pillars of credible self-defence, different international partnership, good relations to Russia and meaningful cooperation in the UN.
Name and party affiliation	Juha Mäenpää, Finns Party
Motivation	The most important factor in the Finnish defence is the strong and functional reserve-based army.

Seats in the Swedish Parliament

After the elections in 2014, the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament were allocated as follows:

Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*) 113 seats; Moderates (*Moderaterna*) 84 seats; Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) 49 seats; Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*) 25 seats; Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*) 22 seats; Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*) 21 seats; People's Party (currently Liberals, *Folkpartiet liberalerna*) 19 seats; Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*) 16 seats (The Swedish Election Authority, 2019).

After the elections in 2018, the 349 seats in the Swedish parliament were allocated as follows:

Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*) 100 seats; Moderates (*Moderaterna*) 70 seats; Swedish Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) 62 seats; Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*) 31 seats; Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*) 28 seats; Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*) 22 seats; Liberals (*Liberalerna*) 20 seats; Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*) 16 seats (The Swedish Election Authority, 2020).

Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish security policy focus for 2016-2020 in 2015

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, People's Party (currently Liberals)		
Motivation	Sweden's self-claimed non-alignment does not have reliability in the eyes of external observers. Sweden does indeed have close relations with NATO today, but it has not taken the last mile and become a fully-fledged member. However, without membership, there are no security guarantees.		
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, People's Party (currently Liberals)		
Motivation	Sweden is a small country in relation to Russia, and there is no way for Sweden to compete with Russia in military spending in terms of absolute figures. Sweden should have joined NATO 20 years ago already, as Sweden would have had a voice in the decision-making regarding issues that have concerned Sweden as well.		
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, People's Party (currently Liberals)		
Motivation	Not being a member of NATO has increased Sweden's dependence of NATO. It is clear that NATO's activity affects Swedish security, but as a member of the Alliance, Sweden has better position to talk along in the issues that affect it.		
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party		
Motivation	For moderates it is not the question of whether Sweden should be a member of NATO, rather it is how.		
Name and party affiliation	Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party		
Motivation	Sweden is more better off with a NATO membership than without it. It is refreshing however that a discussion about this has emerged.		

Name and party affiliation	Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party
Motivation	Current times are turbulent and subject to rapid changes. Sweden needs a new approach to security and an open NATO debate is a necessary element of it.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Against NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden should make it clear that it will not join any military alliance.	
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	Sweden's most important goal in terms of security is to stay safe. This is best achieved by having a credible military non-alliance.	
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	Left Party sees Swedish close military cooperation as a threat to Swedish independent foreign policy making which simultaneously works against peace and disarmament.	
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	Sweden should avoid from NATO membership as it is against Swedish core principle. NATO is a nuclear weapon alliance.	
Name and party affiliation	Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party	
Motivation	A NATO membership would rather increase the risk for war for Sweden rather than to decrease it. Additionally, Sweden would be required to host NATO forces, maybe even nuclear weapons.	

Name and party affiliation	Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party
Motivation	Swedish NATO membership would also give Russia even more arguments to militaries the region as Sweden would be an additional 'danger' from the west. Hence, Swedish membership could be seen as a provocation by some forces in Russia.
Name and party affiliation	Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party
Motivation	Swedish foreign policy has a long tradition of peace and diplomacy. There is no valid argument to abandon the doctrine non-alignment which has served us well under a long period of time.
Name and party affiliation	Pernilla Stålhammar, Green Party
Motivation	If Sweden was to become a member of NATO, it would risk becoming also a battlefield in case of war.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	Even though the government has evaluated and calculated the pros and cons of different partnerships and cooperation, possible NATO membership is not on the table and Sweden stays non-aligned.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	The current government keeps its line of non-alignment in terms of security and does not have ambitions to increase its current cooperation to membership.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	It has been made clear by the government that NATO question is out of the table for this government.
Name and party affiliation	Kent Härstedt, Social Democrats
Motivation	Non-alignment has served Sweden well over 200 years. It will continue to do so, if Sweden employs it wisely.

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Mixed position on NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party		
Motivation	Centre Party favours a comprehensive investigation of what a NATO membership would mean to Sweden.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats		
Motivation	Christian Democrats are waiting for a report where all the pros and cons regarding Swedish NATO membership are brought up.		
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party		
Motivation	When speaking about security, Centre Party will stress the importance of having a substantial report about the different aspects of possible Swedish NATO membership.		
Name and party affiliation	Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats		
Motivation	In case there is a real debate about Swedish NATO membership, this must be approached together with Finland and secondly, the Swedish people must have a say too.		
Name and party affiliation	Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats		
Motivation	It would be hard to imagine any government who would take any decision regarding NATO membership without consulting with the people, through a referendum, as it would be a tremendous turn in the Swedish security politics, that has followed a line of non-alignment since the early 1800s.		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states

Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Sweden should form a military alliance with Finland
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party
Motivation	Cooperation is sometimes necessary and Left Party supports increasing cooperation with other Nordic States, mostly with Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party
Motivation	Moderates are willing to increase the cooperation within the EU, but especially with our Nordic and Baltic neighbours.
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party
Motivation	Moderates are willing to start a dialog together with Finland in relation to NATO membership, because these decisions need a wide discussion and debate.
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party
Motivation	Sweden and Finland are so close that they their decision are inevitably affecting the other state. Vi must follow closely the moves Finland makes in these questions.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Sweden has an important partnership with Finland and the Baltic states that must be developed further.
Name and party affiliation	Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party
Motivation	In case we are in a position to start a real NATO-debate, this should be done in close co-ordination with Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Jeff Ahl, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	It is important to form a sort of military alliance with Finland. This move would benefit the security of both states and would also enable both countries to avoid the rivalry of great powers.

Appendix 6 (continued)

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Increase in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Hans Wallmark, Moderate Party		
Motivation	The bigger and more complicated military cooperation we have with the US, the better it is for our security.		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party		
Motivation	Swedish cooperation with NATO has been increased in the recent years and continues to do in the following years. This cooperation enhances Swedish security by every mean.		
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party		
Motivation	Sweden should increase its cooperation with NATO as it is the best way to increase security in the times of insecurity.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats		
Motivation	Sweden is even no longer a neutral state, as it is a member of the EU and the UN. NATO is an important partner for Sweden in terms of security, and it is an important part of Sweden's defence. Sweden must continue to develop this partnership.		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Decrease in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	N/A		
Motivation	N/A		

Appendix 6 (continued)

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party		
Motivation	Swedish non-alignment is being undermined with Swedish close cooperation with NATO, which is the reason why Sweden should withdraw from cooperation with NATO. Left Party stands against the Host Nation Agreement.		
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party		
Motivation	Sweden should not be an exercise platform for NATO, therefore Sweden should nullify the Host Nation Agreement and avoid taking part in other military cooperation's in organizations of NATO and EU.		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A		
Motivation	N/A		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats		
Motivation	The world is global, and Sweden is not alone. There is a cooperation with the Nordic countries, especially with Finland.		

Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	NORDEFECO is a security project between the Nordic states of Finland Sweden and Norway. We have over 40 joint exercises per year.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the NATO
Name and party affiliation	Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden is a partner country of NATO which enables Sweden to undertake joint military exercises with NATO.	
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats	
Motivation	Cooperation and inclusion are keys to peace. This is why Sweden chose to co-operate with NATO already in 1994. However, the debate of our cooperation has now intensified since the events of Crimea.	
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden has a partnership with NATO which enables Sweden to take part of different NATO exercises. These are important in terms of crisis handling and readiness.	
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden chose a line in 1994 to cooperate with NATO.	
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats	
Motivation	It has been made clear by the government that Host Nation Agreement is included in the current security strategies.	

Name and party affiliation	Anna-Lena Sörenson, Social Democrats
Motivation	Swedish cooperation with NATO is important as it for rest of the Europe. Sweden uses the Partnership for Peace framework in order to meet the demands of the possible crisis situations.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden appreciates the good transatlantic link to the US. Thanks to the military capabilities of the US, it is and will be an important partner for Europe in terms of security.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Increase in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Swedish sensitive geopolitical location is part of the reasons why Sweden must have capabilities to be able to protect itself. After the Cold War, Swedish defence was almost erased, which was a big mistake.	
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden has to take responsibility for its security, it has the means and funds to do it. There is no excuse not to do it.	
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Many of Sweden's neighbours are investing into its security, whereas Poland and Estonia over 2% of GDP. Today for Sweden this only around 1%.	

Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Sweden should increase its military spending to at least 2% of GDP.
Name and party affiliation	Åsa Lindestam, Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden must rebuild its civil defence which was almost vanished as a result of general disarmament. Civil defence is an important part of the total defence doctrine.
Name and party affiliation	Karin Enström, Moderate Party
Motivation	Swedish own defence capabilities must be increased.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist, (Minster of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	The government has reached an agreement to increase military spending by additional 10.2 billion SEK and we will re-establish permanent military presence on the island of Gotland.
Name and party affiliation	Jeff Ahl, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Sweden should rapidly increase its military spending to meet the needs of the changed circumstances. Only this way we can constitute that Sweden is safer and the potential aggressor would think twice to attach Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Alexandra Völker, Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden must also pay attention to gender balance in the country's defence. We must get more women to join and stay in the national military forces. Greater gender balance will pay off in stronger defence.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Decrease in national military capabilities

Appendix 6 (continued)

Name and party affiliation	N/A
Motivation	N/A

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 15.06.2015	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2016-2020	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish Parliament's Defence Committee's report in 2017

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017		Defence Committee's defence policy report	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats		
Motivation	If Sweden would be a member of NATO, we could coordinate its military planning in the region, which would be beneficial from the Swedish point of view.		
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates		
Motivation	There is a general will by the Alliance parties to increase and deepen our partnership with NATO with the aim of eventually receive full security guarantees by real membership.		
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, Liberals		
Motivation	We believe that Sweden is still in a no-man's-land, as we cooperate with NATO, but are not members of it. In more specific this means that in the eyes of Russia our non-alignment is void, but on the other hand we do not have the security guarantees as a membership in the Alliance would automatically provide.		
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates		
Motivation	We argue that since our cooperation with NATO is currently so wide, the next phase of this partnership, that is the membership, would in technical sense require so little from us. However, the benefits of this move are remarkable as it would contribute to the safety of Sweden and the Baltic Sea region.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats		
Motivation	Christian Democrats favour NATO membership. We believe that it always better to be prepared than improvise, especially when it comes to security.		

Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates
Motivation	Even according to the study made by the defence forces, Sweden could not stay outside a conflict if it would realise in the Baltic Sea region. Apart from many our neighbours, Sweden cannot rely on NATO's military back-up in that case.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Against NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	It has been suggested that in a case of conflict, Sweden would be dragged into war anyhow. This will happen if Sweden is a NATO member, as this is exactly what this membership would guarantee for Sweden. Hence, staying out of the Alliance helps Sweden to stay out of conflicts as well.	
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	The Alliance parties seem to suggest that NATO membership would dissolve all Swedish security related issues. Left Party does not share such vision and see it rather as an illusion.	
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party	
Motivation	Left Party suggest that the best security guarantee is the traditional one. Sweden does not need NATO, membership nor to increase its military spending. Sweden should aim to work towards disarmament by using diplomacy, research partnership, formal and informal contacts.	
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden upholds the right to cooperate with any partner and Sweden has a partnership with NATO. However, Social Democrats believe that the current security line of Sweden of non-alignment enjoys the largest support of the Swedish people.	

Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	In terms of security, it is always good to communicate with neighbours. Make friends, not enemies. Sweden and Finland are together non-aligned, and it is a good thing.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats favour cooperation, dialog, and conversation with other like-minded states. However, there are several reasons why Social Democrats do not support NATO membership.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats understand the need to cooperate with other states, and this is indeed done with Finland and NATO to keep Sweden safe. However, cooperation does not presuppose membership. For Social Democrats it important to maintain the current non-alignment.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	There is no controversy in having good and tight partnership with NATO but staying outside of it. The most important is to understand that it is Sweden which has to stand up for its security, not NATO, Finland or any other external actor.
Name and party affiliation	Anders Schröder, Green Party
Motivation	Swedish foreign policy is based on stability and farsightedness, and therefore Sweden should not make rapid changes in this field. Sweden's and the regions interests are served best if Sweden continues with non-alignment.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	One of the founding principles of non-alignment is to stay out of the games played by great powers. A credible non-alignment means that Sweden should not choose a side in the rivalry.

Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Non-alignment consists of credibility, resources and will. Sweden needs all of the above to be truly non-aligned.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Mixed position on NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates	
Motivation	Moderates argue that the current situation makes it impossible to stay neutral or non-aligned. If a conflict between Russia and NATO would start, Sweden would inevitably be dragged into it.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states (Sweden)
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats	
Motivation	Cooperation with Finland is absolutely necessary and must be continue. But Sweden can broaden the scope of partnerships for other EU countries as well.	
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats	
Motivation	In addition to the internal dimension related to Swedish security, Sweden must work externally as well. Sweden has a good cooperation with its Nordic neighbours, especially Finland and the Baltic States.	
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats	
Motivation	Social Democrats understand the need to cooperate with other states, and this is indeed done with Finland and NATO to keep Sweden safe. However, cooperation does not presuppose membership. For Social Democrats it important to maintain the current non-alignment.	

Appendix 7 (continued)

Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	One cannot build peace and freedom alone. Partners are always required. The priority for Sweden is partnership with Finland, who is also non-aligned as Sweden.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	To be military non-aligned does not mean that Swedish Democrats are not willing to cooperate. Swedish Democrats suggests that Sweden stays out of the great power rivalry and forms an alliance with Finland instead.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Increase in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates	
Motivation	There is a general will of the Alliance parties to increase and deepen the partnership with NATO with the aim of eventually receive full security guarantees by real membership.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Appendix 7 (continued)

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017		Defence Committee's defence policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party		
Motivation	Sweden should cancel its partnership when it comes to NATO StratCom. This propaganda structure is only made for making up lies and rumours. There is no need for Sweden to participate in NATO's propaganda.		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017		Defence Committee's defence policy report	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A		
Motivation	N/A		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017		Defence Committee's defence policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A		
Motivation	N/A		

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017		Defence Committee's defence policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with NATO

Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	NATO's StratCom is a framework for cooperation for different states. Sweden's participation is a good thing because Sweden is it provides a possibility to cooperate with like-minded countries whom Sweden has good relations in other fields as well.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden will and can have a partnership with NATO which does not have to include membership in the Alliance.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	There is no controversy in having good and tight partnership with NATO but staying outside of it. The most important is to understand that it is Sweden which has to stand up for its security, not NATO, Finland or any other external actor.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates	
Motivation	There are many different aspects of security. One of them is bilateral partnership which Moderates see as having great importance for Sweden. The US can be brought up in this regard as a good example of this.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Increase in national military capabilities

Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, Liberals
Motivation	Liberals have suggested to increase military expanses to 2% of GDP, as the security situation does not leave any other way. Furthermore, if Sweden continues to be militarily non-aligned, this figure has to increase even further.
Name and party affiliation	Jan R Andersson, Moderates
Motivation	In order to meet the demands of contemporary threats, Sweden must critically reassess its weak spots. One of them is related to the cybersecurity. Moderates suggest that Sweden should produce a cyber doctrine.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	There cannot be any comprehensive defence without civil defence. Swedish Democrats suggest to additionally allocate four billion SEK to increase the civil defence readiness.
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, Liberals
Motivation	Liberals agree that Sweden must invest more money into its defence. Therefore, Liberals have suggested to increase military budget by 28 billion SEK in comparison to 2015.
Name and party affiliation	Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party
Motivation	Centre Party believes that the modernisation of Swedish defence forces which has begun must continue, despite the huge challenges regarding staff and equipment.
Name and party affiliation	Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party
Motivation	Sweden is the least spending Nordic country when it comes to security. It is much lower than the neighbours. Hopefully, all parties represented in the parliament understand why it is necessary to increase the military budget.

Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Swedish Democrats believe that one way to improve Swedish defence is to increase the number conscription. While it is around 4000 today, Swedish Democrats seek to increase this number to 8000. It is important to have enough reserve in terms of war-time units.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	The security situation has become worse in the recent years, which is the reason why Swedish defence direction needs an upgrade. More resources are needed in the defence sector for this and the coming years.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Europe has already shown a reaction to increased Russian military presence. Many of Sweden's neighbours have increased their military spending and are above 2% by now. Christian Democrats believe that Sweden should follow this line in order to pay the bill for its security.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	The security of Gotland is central for Sweden and our friends for many reasons. It is good that Sweden has re-established military presence on the island, but much more is needed. Christian Democrats point out that Sweden could have permanent artillery and air defence units located there.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Sweden should also standardise its cyber defence. Today there is a situation where every state institution has their own standard. Hence, there is room for development in this field.
Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	With the current security provision, Social Democrats will flip the curve of the Swedish military from disbarment into increasing our security.

Name and party affiliation	Anders Schröder, Green Party
Motivation	Green party is open for discussion of how to increase Swedish defence capabilities in the short run.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Jansson, Social Democrats
Motivation	One of the central perspectives regarding Swedish security is the civil defence. It must be understood that without civil defence, there is no point of having military defence.
Name and party affiliation	Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party
Motivation	Centre Party is ready to set goals for improving Swedish security. Centre Party suggests that Swedish military spending should reach at least the Nordic average which means that 11 billion SEK will be allocated during the next four years.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richtoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Swedish Democrats have argued for a comprehensive defence for years. Swedish military capabilities should not aim at any specific threat, for example Russia. Instead, Swedish defence should be ready to tackle any type of enemy.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Decrease in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 18.01.2017	Defence Committee's defence policy report	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position

Name and party affiliation	Mattias Ottosson, Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats see, that much has already been done for the improvement our security. For example, Sweden has strengthened our coastal guard and we have troops on Gotland now.
Name and party affiliation	Stig Henriksson, Left Party
Motivation	It seems often that some actors are using the Russian threat just to justify the need for armament, which simultaneously puts on the NATO membership track.

Codes based on the parliamentary debate of the Swedish security policy focus for 2021-2025 in 2020

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Pro-NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Hans Wallmark, Moderates		
Motivation	Moderates believe that it is only the NATO membership that can give Sweden a comprehensive military protection from the uncertainties that are prevailing the Baltic Sea region at the moment.		
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party		
Motivation	Centre Party also believes that Sweden should eventually join NATO as it is the only organisation that can provide us enough security guarantees. At the same time, we would like to see that Finland is with Sweden on this journey to membership. The whole region will benefit from our membership in NATO, for instance our Baltic friends.		
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party		
Motivation	Sweden's increasingly close partnership with NATO means that big part of Swedish security is based on cooperation. Hence, Sweden is closely linked to NATO, yet without the real security guarantee.		
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats		
Motivation	For Christian Democrats it is a given fact that NATO is the only credible source of security guarantees, at least in Europe. Therefore, it is welcoming that Sweden already has a close relationship to NATO. However, Christian Democrats believe that this should be developed even further, and Sweden should become a member of the Alliance one day. By being a member, Sweden have would have a better chance to take part in the coordination and plan-making of crisis-time management.		

Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Swedish NATO membership would not only contribute to Swedish security. In a case of an emergency, Swedish territory would be needed to use to assist the Baltic friends. Hence, Swedish NATO membership would have a wider positive security impact.
Name and party affiliation	Allan Widman, Liberals
Motivation	The truth is that our partnership with NATO has reached such a level that there is frankly speaking little room to develop. The only way forward is to officially join the Alliance.
Name and party affiliation	Pål Jonson, Moderates
Motivation	Swedish current line of non-alignment is something much more than just the fact that Sweden is not part of any military alliance. Moderates' standpoint is that the current state actually does not serve the best security interest of Sweden. The current non-alignment would be especially dangerous in a crisis situation.
Name and party affiliation	Pål Jonson, Moderates
Motivation	Moderates do not think that the government should present non-alignment as something positive for Sweden, as this is based on false illusions whereas it is currently expected that in a crisis situation, we would get help from NATO countries.
Name and party affiliation	Daniel Bäckström, Centre Party
Motivation	Centre Party appreciates that there is an increasingly greater consensus in the Swedish parliament that Sweden should have a NATO-option and that a membership in the Alliance is eventually needed.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Against NATO membership

Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Despite supporting the NATO-option, it is important to note that Swedish Democrats have not changed the general perception when it comes to membership in NATO. Swedish Democrats do not support a full membership as for today.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party does not share the view with the government that Sweden should cooperate with NATO, whose increased presence is partly responsible for the increased tensions in Europe along with Russia. Sweden should cut all such ties to NATO that are bringing us closer to the membership of the Alliance. Sweden must stay non-aligned.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party believes that the NATO-option is a wrong way to go for Sweden, as it deviates from the orthodox security line without any major analysis and wider debate for allowing this. This is a wrong way to go as this is yet another victory by the forces of pushing Sweden closer to the membership of the Alliance.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Swedish image in the world is closely linked with non-alignment and that it should be Sweden's strength to be able to state this non-alignment. However, the current direction is messing up this image and making it unclear for everyone. Instead of taking the NATO course, Sweden should set its priority for peace and reconciliation politics.
Name and party affiliation	Janine Alm Ericson, Green Party
Motivation	Despite the fact that the majority of the parliament has suggested the so-called NATO-option does not mean that the guiding principle of Sweden's defence policy has been altered. Sweden a non-aligned state.

Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats see the NATO-option as a step towards full NATO membership which is pursued by the Alliance parties and Swedish Democrats. Social Democrats see that this would be a source of a change in our non-alignment principle and Social Democrats therefore against NATO-option.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	It is also surprising how Finland is used by some parties to argue for a Swedish NATO membership. Finland has shown a firm support for non-alignment and this is expected to continue.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden has opted for a comprehensive partnership with NATO which enjoys the support of the majority of the parliament. However, this does not mean that Sweden is seeking a membership.
Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden's current role and its historical position supports the current line of non-alignment. Sweden should not experiment with its security politics, which the NATO-option would eventually lead to.
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to peace and security in this part of Europe. Swedish non-alignment is backed by wide range of cooperation, especially with Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrat's perception of Swedish security is that Swedish security politics must be stable, predictable and should be based on continuity. This is how Sweden can contribute best to its own and Europe's security.

Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Bringing parallels between Finnish and Swedish NATO-option is based on false understandings. The decision made by Finland 25 years ago does not constitute how should Sweden act today. Sweden can cooperate with Finland regardless of the NATO-option.
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Social Democrats will stress that an open Swedish NATO-option would leave a false impression to the international public. Sweden should not make too rapid changes when it comes to our security.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richthoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	There are many aspects what a Swedish NATO membership would entail. One thing would be that the Baltic Sea would turn into the inland sea for NATO, which according to Swedish Democrats does not support the security and political development of the region.
Name and party affiliation	Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party
Motivation	It is important for Sweden to maintain its sovereignty when it comes to foreign policy making. Left Party believe that Sweden's ability to conduct independent foreign policy will be curbed if the country would alter its non-alignment principle and opt for a membership in NATO. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to lose this independence since Swedish membership in the EU.
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to peace and security in our part of Europe. Swedish non-alignment is backed by wide range of cooperation, especially with Finland.

Sweden		Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020		Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Mixed position on NATO membership
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats		
Motivation	Swedish NATO-option is not controversial according to Swedish Democrats. This resolution does not change Sweden's long-lasting doctrine of non-alignment as it does not say anything about NATO membership.		
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats		
Motivation	NATO-option is also important because this decision synchronises Swedish and Finnish approach vis-à-vis NATO's partnership. As known, Finland has had this NATO-option already for 25 years. Hence, by NATO-option, Sweden would simultaneously lay the basis for stronger partnership to Finland.		
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats		
Motivation	Swedish Democrats argue that Sweden should explicitly spell out the NATO-option today. This means that Sweden has a possibly to join NATO if it sees it necessary for the country's security. However, Sweden should not move closer to NATO, that is to become a full member, unless Finland does the same. At the moment a full membership is not a contemporary issue in neither of the countries.		
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats		
Motivation	Swedish Democrats are only then ready to change is current decision regarding membership when there are clear signals from the Swedish people that a membership in the Alliance has become relevant. Even if this would be the case, it is obvious that such things are decided by a referendum.		

Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	NATO-option also enables Sweden to concentrate on the development of its armed forces. As a part of this NATO-option, Sweden must fulfil the requirements of what it takes to become a member of NATO. This means that Social Democrats but also the Alliance parties cannot use Swedish defence forces as a milk cow to fund other sectors as it had been for decades in the past.
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party
Motivation	Centre Party sees the NATO-option as an opportunity. It is not about membership per se, rather than a possibly for it.
Name and party affiliation	Roger Richthoff, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Apart from the statements in media, Swedish Democrats has not changed its perception towards NATO membership. Swedish Democrats base their foreign policy thinking on the fact that Sweden should seek to align its security politics with Finland. It would be even better if Sweden could form a defence alliance with Finland. The current NATO-option would only help Sweden to achieve this.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Increase in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Swedish Democrats have for years suggested for a defensive military union with Finland, as Finland is in a similar position in terms of geopolitics and security.	
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	There are multiple reasons to increase cooperation with Finland. Among others, have strong cultural and political ties. Finland and Sweden together as a union would increase the threshold effect of our defence.	

Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	NATO-option is also important because this decision synchronises Swedish and Finnish approach vis a vis NATO's partnership. As known, Finland has had this NATO-option already for 25 years. Hence, by NATO-option, we simultaneously lay the basis for stronger partnership to Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats
Motivation	Finland is not the only country we increase our cooperation. We have the general framework of NORDEFCO which is made for partnership among all of the Nordic states. We should increase our ties within this framework.
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party
Motivation	Sweden has strengthened its military ties to Finland, and it continues to do that. However, even today, an assault against Sweden cannot be ruled out. The increasing need to cooperate shows, that even our bilateral partnership with Finland is not enough. It is justified to increase cooperation even with other actors such as the US, Great Britain, Norway and Denmark.
Name and party affiliation	Kerstin Lundgren, Centre Party
Motivation	Centre Party also believes that Sweden should eventually join NATO as it is the only organisation that can provide us enough security guarantees. At the same time, we would like to see that Finland is with us on this journey to membership. The whole region will benefit from our membership in NATO, for instance our Baltic friends.
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Sweden and Finland have a clear relationship when it comes to defence cooperation which is good. However, there is room for an increase in this field.

Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	It is important that Sweden and Finland hold a same level proximity to NATO. Since both countries have now adapted the NATO-option, we can claim that it has increased the threshold against the potential aggressor.
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	Non-alignment has served Sweden well and it contributes to peace and security in our part of Europe. Our non-alignment is backed by wide range of cooperation, especially with Finland.
Name and party affiliation	Pål Jonson, Moderates
Motivation	In order to increase security of our region, increased cooperation with Finland is a natural thing to opt for. We stand behind this partnership and hope that we can deepen this even further.
Name and party affiliation	Pål Jonson, Moderates
Motivation	Our cooperation with Finland should even cover the areas of operational cooperation in the crisis and war. It is therefore logical that we widen the scope of our partnership in the field of security.
Name and party affiliation	Pål Jonson, Moderates
Motivation	We can say that NATO-option is the biggest divide between the Finnish and Swedish approach to NATO. It is important for Sweden to adopt NATO-option as it will harmonise our policies with Finland in this regard.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Increase in military cooperation with the US

Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats
Motivation	A strong transatlantic link between the US and Europe is an important part of our security. Sweden and the US have had good partnership in the field of security for years and Sweden will continue to develop this partnership.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Increase in military cooperation with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Ann Linde (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Social Democrats	
Motivation	NATO is the most important framework for the European and America's. It is therefore natural, that Sweden deepens cooperation with NATO through the current frameworks.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Decrease in military cooperation with the US
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party	
Motivation	Left Party opposes the government's action to increase military partnership with the United States. The US cannot be taken as a trustable partner in the light of the news that the US has carried on espionage on Swedish companies of our defence industry.	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Decrease in military cooperation with NATO

Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	The current motion of Swedish NATO-option can possibly cause unnecessary concern and interpret the reality through false lenses. There is no need to believe that Swedish security and territorial sovereignty would be under risk now which means that any steps closer to NATO are unjustified.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party does not share the view with the government that Sweden should cooperate with NATO, whose increased presence is partly responsible for the increased tensions in Europe along with Russia. Sweden should cut all such ties to NATO that are bringing us closer to the membership of the Alliance. Sweden must stay non-aligned.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party believes that the NATO-option is a wrong way to go for Sweden, as it deviates from our orthodox security line without any major analysis and wider question. This is a wrong way to go as this is yet another victory by the forces of pushing us closer to the membership of the Alliance.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party expresses concern regarding the increased military training in the region of Norrbotten, whereas increasingly bigger exercises have taken place within the partnerships in NATO, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the EU. This has serious consequences to the local environment and economic activity in the region.
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party
Motivation	The greatest concern is that the current cooperation with NATO is seriously undermining Swedish non-alignment. Sweden should therefore cut all the NATO-led exercises taking place on our soil and airspace. Sweden must also cancel the Host Nation Agreement.

Name and party affiliation	Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party
Motivation	Left Party acknowledges that international cooperation in general enhances international security. However, Swedish non-alignment is threatened by the close cooperation with NATO which is the reason why it should not be continued.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Decrease in military cooperation with the Nordic states
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the Nordic States
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with NATO
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	Sweden should continue to cooperation with NATO as it has been in the recent times, meaning that Sweden should continue to take part of the joint exercises.	

Name and party affiliation	Peter Hultqvist (Minister of Defence), Social Democrats
Motivation	Sweden has opted for a comprehensive partnership with NATO which enjoys the support of the majority of the parliament. However, this does not mean that Sweden is seeking a membership.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Maintain the current level of military cooperation / mixed position with the US
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Increase in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	Björn Söder, Swedish Democrats	
Motivation	NATO-option also enables us to concentrate on the development of our armed forces. As a part of this NATO-option, we must fulfil the requirements of what it takes to become a member of NATO. This means that Social Democrats but also the Alliance parties cannot use our defence forces as a milk cow to fund other sectors as it had been for decades in the past.	
Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats	
Motivation	Christian Democrats believe that it is important to increase our national military capabilities. Sweden must be capable of protecting itself until we get help.	

Name and party affiliation	Mikael Oscarsson, Christian Democrats
Motivation	Sweden is a country which spends the least on its security among the Baltic Sea countries. We should seek to increase this to around 2% as many of our friends have and what is also considered as a NATO standard.

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Decrease in national military capabilities
Name and party affiliation	N/A	
Motivation	N/A	

Sweden	Debate	Code name
Date: 14.12.2020	Security policy focus - Sweden's defence in 2021-2025	Maintain the current level of military capabilities / mixed position
Name and party affiliation	Håkan Svenneling, Left Party	
Motivation	The guiding principle of the country's foreign and security policies is Swedish security. This is achieved by full-functioning defence forces that can protect the country but also contribute to peace in other parts of the world.	
Name and party affiliation	Lotta Johnsson Fornarve, Left Party	
Motivation	A credible non-aligned Sweden needs credible defence forces who are able to protect Sweden from all kinds of threat with a different nature.	

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