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**Religion enters politics:
the process of politicization of religious issues
in four post-communist countries**

MA Thesis

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Foreword

Friends have asked me rhetorically: “Why do you think it is important to study religion and politics? Do you think it matters really?”

It would be reasonable to ignore religion, if one examined the actual situation and found out that a religion has absolutely nothing to do with politics. Looking back to history, the religion has really never stayed out of politics. I will give just two examples about how religious doctrine and religious symbol have been in the service of politics.

Plato invented a religious theory, which he called ‘theology’ – a doctrine about hell, sufferings and rewards in afterlife - and considered it as a good means according to which build cities and organize the masses that were unable to perceive the immortality of soul through the philosophy. Needless to say, this doctrine became popular also in the Middle Ages.

Another famous example of a religious symbol used in political arena comes from the year 312, when on a day before the crucial battle of Milvian Bridge, Constantine the Great saw in heaven a vision of a cross bearing the inscription "*in hoc signo vinces*" ("in this sign you will be victorious"). Constantine used the religious sign to represent his army, was victorious in the battle and both he and his empire were later converted to Christianity. This was not a religious doctrine, but a religious symbol, that was needed to mobilize the army.

The Communist regimes made the hardest effort to eliminate religion from public sphere, but they succeeded only for a short period. In the beginning of transition to democracy, religious institutions and symbols were in no way wiped out of public sphere. Religious institutions, the Churches, had got a chance to increase their privileges and social influence, and religion entered into politics again.

Introduction

Transition from Communist rule to democracy put Churches into a totally new situation. Formerly repressed religious institutions found new sources of threat - religious pluralism, 'free market of values', and liberalism that made Church only one source of identity and values among many others. The Church had to find a way, how to deal with these issues. In most post-communist countries there has been a political debate or even confrontation between clerical and anti-clerical political forces about issues like Church-state relations, financial assistance to Church, restitution of Church property confiscated during Communist regime, Church's influence over social norms and values.

The Church, although repressed and weakened under the Communist regime, was willing to regain its influence over society and political decision-making process. During transitional crises religion became more important in public sphere, religious identity functioned as a means of compensation for the losses accompanying the restructuring of society, and it gave cultural arguments in the public discourse¹. In the beginning of political competition between parties, religion was a potential resource to use for mobilizing the electorate and to build the party's identity on.

Where Church had enough power, it launched its project of re-Christianizing the society against a parallel project of re-secularizing (in a Western way) the society. As a result the political actors took pro- and anti-Church positions and the formation of the religious political cleavage started.

¹ Agadjanian 2001

This study analyses the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-communist countries. The main question of the study is, whether religion in society will eventually come to politics anyway because the social conflicts over religious and secular values, and over the public role of the Church will anyway enter politics in the long run, and the coming of the religion depends only on the institutional strength of the Church and the religious cleavage in society, or is the coming (or not coming) of religion to politics dependent also on the strategic choices of the Church?

This study is important, because the academic research of religion and politics in post-communist countries is largely undeveloped, especially concerning post-Soviet countries like Estonia². The situation is better regarding the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), but even there mainly case studies are made³. The comparative research in the area of religion and politics has been dealing with the voting preferences, party identification and moral attitudes of the practicing believers, religious parties and religious cleavage in the party system⁴, and take as granted the fact that the denominational differences influence the interference of religion to politics. None of these comparative studies have analyzed the activity of the Church using the religious market theory.

The goal of this study is to test the statement that the strategic choices of the Church influence the coming of religion into politics. The hypothesis of this study states that: *The religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society are necessary but not sufficient variables for the strength of religion in politics. The actual outcome is largely influenced by the strategic choices of the Church.*

² The political activity of the Baltic Churches has been analyzed by Goeckel 1995 and Barnett 2001.

³ Case studies of the Church and state relationship in Poland (Borowik 1996, Eberts 1998, Chan 2000, Korbonski 2000), in Hungary (Dobzsay 1996, Schanda 1999, Enyedi 2000a, Enyedi 2000b), in Estonia (Hart 1993, Hoppenbrouwers 1999), and in the Czech Republic (DiDomizio 1997, Prihoda 1997, Tretera 1999, Clark 1999, O'Mahony 2000, Winter 2000).

⁴ Gagnere 1993, Toka 1997, Evans et al 1998, Gautier 1998, Herbert 1999, Luxmoore 1999, Mojzes 1999, White et al 2000, Need et al 2001, Pollack 2001, Flere 2001. These comparative studies concentrate mostly on Visegrad countries.

Figure 1 shows the causal mechanism how the religion in society is brought to the politics according to the stated hypothesis.

Figure 1. The process of politicisation of religion



According to the hypothesis the existing religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society form the resources that the Church can, but is not forced to use in pursuing its goals. The raised hypothesis will pass the test, if there can be found deviations between the strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in politics, that are caused by the strategic choices of the Church. The hypothesis will not pass the test, if only the structural variables (denominational differences, institutional strength of the Church) have been the cause of the deviation. According to the hypothesis the deviations, if found, ought to be the outcome of the strategic choices made by the Church.

If the hypothesis will pass the test, then this will testify to the fact that the political activity of religious institutions can be analyzed by using religious market theory, the choices of the Church are not pre-determined by its doctrine, and the public activities of different denominations can effectively be analyzed by using comparative method.

The hypothesis will not pass the test, if there are either no deviations between the strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in politics (i.e. religion has in longer perspective ‘automatically’ come to the politics), or the deviations are explained by other causal mechanisms and not by the strategic choices of the Church.

The comparison of the four case studies eventually shows that the strength of religion in society does not automatically equal with the strength of the religion in politics. The strategies used by the Church and the choice of radicalism of its demands has influenced also the strength of religion in politics.

Overview of the study

Chapter 1 gives a theoretical framework and a framework of analysis. There are presented the concepts, the social cleavage model and a religious market theory used in this study. Based on the theoretical framework, several assumptions and propositions are made regarding the activity of the Church, religion in society and religion in politics. Figure 2 presents the modified social cleavage model as a theoretical basis of this study. The framework of analysis is divided into three parts: case studies, the operationalization of variables, and comparative framework. The reasons for the case studies are explained and by identifying the indicators of the variables, the variables are operationalized. Comparative framework explains how the theoretical model (presented in Figure 2) is used to compare the cases in order to test the raised hypothesis.

Chapters 2–5 present four case studies that deal with the politicization of religious issues in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia respectively. Each case study is divided into three parts: religion in society, religion in politics and the strategies used by the Church. In the first sub-section of the case study the structural variables (institutional religion, symbolical religion and religious social cleavage) are analyzed. The sub-section of religion in politics analyses the religious political cleavage, goals attained by the Church through politicization of religious issues, and access of the Church to the government. Third sub-section of the case study is devoted to the analysis of the strategies used by the Church and the radicalism of its demands during three parliamentary elections. Each case study ends with a discussion

how the strategic choices of the Church have influenced the strength-value of religion in politics.

In Chapter 6 the cases are compared according to the theoretical model and analytical framework presented in Chapter 1. The cases are compared according to the values of the variables that the cases have obtained in the case studies. According to the comparison of independent and dependent variables the strength-value order of the cases deviates on three occasions. In the end of Chapter 6 the causal influence of the strategic choices of the Church that has led to these deviations, is explained. The main outcomes of the study are summarized in the Conclusion.

Chapter 1. Theoretical and analytical framework

The basis of this study is the social cleavage model, but not in a pure form. The social cleavage model is modified by usage of the religious market theory for assessing the strategic choices made by the Church. And finally, the comparative method is used in order to find co-relations and deviations from co-relations between the cases according to the strength-values of religion in society and religion in politics.

But before going on to the theoretical framework, the main concepts used in the study – Christian party and Christian Democratic party, Church, institutional and symbolical religion, religious market, religious firm, religious economy, politicized religious issue, cleavage – are defined.

1.1. Definitions

The categorization between Christian parties and Christian Democratic parties takes into account the Christian Democratic tradition of Western Europe. Christian Democratic parties are secular rather than religious parties, although they retain traces of religious identity. Christian parties appeal more directly to the religious electorate, are more dependent on church, tend to take more extreme positions, and use religion (or issues related to religion or the church) as a primary issue for political mobilization and the construction of political identities⁵.

⁵ Kalyvas 1996:119. Stathis Kalyvas defines these parties as confessional, but for the sake of convenience they are defined here as Christian parties. For example, it would not be correct to define the Estonian Christian People's Party as a confessional party, although it is mainly backed by several neo-Protestant churches.

Another measures that are used to distinguish between these two types of parties are the membership in the Christian Democratic International and the rejection of too extreme political positions⁶. Christian Democracy has an ideology of its own and is not standing exclusively and radically for the interests of the church.

This study deals with a Church or Churches that are politically important and historically dominant religious traditions. The smaller neo-Protestant Churches have also been politically active (the Faith Church in Hungary, Baptist and Pentecostal Churches in Estonia), but as these churches are minor churches and have relatively few church-members (under 2% of the population), these are not included into the study. When I refer to 'Church', I mean in cases of Poland and the Czech Republic the Roman Catholic Church; Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church in case of Estonia and privileged traditional Churches (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Jewish) in case of Hungary. These four denominations in Hungary share the same legal privileges and act as a unitary actor in the defense of their interests, thus also in case of Hungary I call them a 'Church' or 'traditional Churches'⁷.

Religion in society is divided into institutional religion and symbolical religion. The indicators of institutional religion are the levels of religious attendance and religious affiliation of the population, and the public support to the social positions and doctrines of the Church. The indicator of symbolical religion is the proximity of the religion to the national identity. Institutional religion describes the influence of the religious institution over the believers. But not all believers share the positions of the Church and there are those who are not religiously affiliated or practicing, but still feel connected to religion through their national identity. This non-Church religiosity

⁶ Christian Democratic parties cover a wide range of political opinion and practice (Hanley 1994:3), but Christian Democratic International has rejected membership to several parties that nominally are Christian Democratic, because of their too extreme positions. For the Christian Democrats the philosophical, ethical and cultural issues are paramount. The Christian Democrats occupy a middle ground between *Gesellschaft* ('community' ideologies, represented by liberalism) and *Gemeinschaft* ('society' ideologies, represented by nationalism and ecologism) ideologies (Dierickx 1994:17-18,29).

of the population, religiosity that is linked to national identity, is defined as symbolical religion.

Religion is any system of beliefs and practices concerned with ultimate meaning that assumes the existence of the supernatural.

The religious market theory takes as an assumption that the Church is motivated by self-interest and acts like a rational actor. Religion is seen as a commodity – an object of choice and production. Consumers choose what religion (if any) they will accept. As with other commodities, this ability to choose constrains the producers of religion. Religious firms (the Churches) are social enterprises whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and supply religion to some set of individuals. Under competitive conditions, a particular religious firm will flourish only if it provides a commodity at least as attractive as its competitors. And as in other markets, government regulation can profoundly affect the producers' incentives, the consumers' options, and the aggregate equilibrium. Religious economy consists of all the religious activity going on in the society.⁸

Politicized religious issue is an issue linked to religious values or religious institution that causes an emergence of political conflict. When a solution is attained in these issues, the confrontation around them may end, or produce further controversies. In the last case, the issue becomes a long-lasting one and an indicator of religious political cleavage.

'Cleavage' is a critical division in opinion, beliefs or interests that leads to opposition between two groups, but is essentially more than just a conflict. Cleavage is a division that is accompanied by some structural forms of conflict that are nurtured

⁷ To say church regarding Jewish denomination is formally not correct, but for the sake of convenience, I use such simplification.

⁸ The description of religious market is based on Iannaccone et al 1997:351. I follow the definitions of religious firm and religious economy of Stark et al 1994.

through socialization⁹. Cleavage, whether political or social, is the strongest, when the opposing sides are equal and there is no one left that is indifferent in the conflict issue. The more biased conflict is to one side, the weaker it is.

This study identifies the social and political conflicts as cleavages, although the time has been too short for real political cleavages to emerge in post-communist countries. It would be more correct to speak about political divides, because the real cleavages are still in the process of formation. But as religion is one of the most fundamental bases of cleavage in society¹⁰, political religious divides are defined as ‘political religious cleavage’ in this study.

1.2. Social cleavage model

Every political society is split by cleavages, which vary greatly in intensity, distribution, and manner of combination¹¹. These cleavages may be ‘cross-cutting’ or ‘overlapping’¹², in the last case the cleavages divide the society in larger extent.

There is no such thing as ‘cleavage theory’. Political cleavages are associated with a vocabulary of concepts. These can be applied systematically in a range of theories that specify factors affecting the salience of cleavages, and consequences flowing from the fragmentation and cross-cutting caused by a particular cleavage structure¹³.

⁹ Cleavages require a structure, while conflict is not always accompanied by a defined structure (Shiratori 1997:6-7).

¹⁰ The most fundamental bases of cleavage are usually assumed to include social class, religion, nationality, language, race and gender (Laver 1992:440).

¹¹ Mény 1994:19

¹² Cross-cutting cleavages tend to off-set one another: for example, some Catholics are rich, others poor, some bourgeois, others workers, some rural, others urban, some more conservative politically, others less so. Cross-cutting cleavages of this kind help to create solidarities between different groups and reduce likelihood of the conflict and violence that are so common where cleavages overlap. (Mény 1994:20)

¹³ Laver 1992:442

Of the many applications of social cleavages¹⁴, this study concentrates on the model of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967), which states that the formation of Western European party system took place through institutionalization of social cleavages through the activity of political parties. The following four major social cleavages were the basis of creating parties in Western Europe: center/periphery cleavage for ethnically and linguistically based parties; state/church cleavage for religious parties; land/industry cleavage for agrarian, conservative and liberal parties; owner/worker cleavage for socialist and communist parties¹⁵. Lipset and Rokkan attempted to account for the variations in western European party systems in terms of the historical development of the cleavage structure and in particular of the abovementioned four cleavages. They stated that these social cleavages that have been transferred into the party system tend to remain “frozen” over longer periods of time¹⁶.

The religion becomes a dividing force in political arena based on the religious social divide, which in its more intensive and durable form can become a religious cleavage. Depending on the context and on the ‘confessional map’ of the country, there could be clerical/anti-clerical, Catholic/Protestant or religious/secular cleavage¹⁷. There also had to be a party, that institutionalized this cleavage.

¹⁴ For example, Arendt Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy shows how under certain circumstances, the absence of cross-cutting cleavages can make for stability (Arendt Lijphart (1997) *Democracy in Plural Societies: a comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press).

¹⁵ Ronald Inglehart added also material/postmaterial cleavage as the younger people no longer voted strictly according to membership of a social group, but on the base of individually held opinions and values (Inglehart, Ronald (1977) *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press). Material/post-material cleavage was the basis for green and ecology parties (Klingemann et al, 1994:6).

¹⁶ Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50

¹⁷ In Catholic countries there developed clerical versus anticlerical cleavage, which was based on disputes about schooling, abortion or divorce. Protestant versus Catholic cleavage developed in countries with mixed religious affiliations. In Protestant countries the disputes were about alcohol, unconventional life styles and the status of Biblical accounts of the origins of the species and so there was developed ‘morally traditional’ versus ‘morally permissive’ cleavage.

In this study the interdenominational cleavage is left out, as only the political activity of the dominant churches is under examination and the Church in Estonia, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic is defined in such a way that the interdenominational conflict is not relevant. The conflict in Hungary between four privileged Churches and new minor religious groups is seen as a clerical/anti-clerical¹⁸ cleavage. Also the anti-Catholicism in the Czech case is seen as anti-clericalism.

In order to translate the cleavage into the political arena, the activity of political parties becomes important¹⁹. I admit that the interests of the parties are not identical with the interests of the church; the choices, strategies and organizational capability of parties are important in the process of institutionalization of the cleavage as parties can choose and promote some social cleavages to be politicized and neglect others²⁰. But parties still do not create social cleavages, and choices available for the parties and their links to the Church are preconditioned by the strength of institutional and symbolical religion, and the choices made by the Church. This study concentrates on the strategic choices made by the Church.

1.3. Religious market theory

Religious market theory²¹ is a rational choice theory of religion. Rational choice theory uses deductive methods modeled on neoclassical microeconomics. It starts

¹⁸ Clericalism is a term used to describe the influence of religious hierarchies in political systems (Madeley 1992:107).

¹⁹ Peter Mair states that 'it is parties who ultimately set the agenda, determine the terms of reference through which voters understand and interpret the political world' (Mair 1998:9).

²⁰ Broughton et al 2000:4. Alan Ware states that because of the multiplicity of interests and identities in a society there is no natural order of conflicts, which then gets reflected and represented in a party system (Ware 1996:197). Also Angelo Panebianco criticizes the assumptions (that also this study makes) according to which the activities of parties are the product of the "demands" of social groups or a priori "goals" are attributed to parties (Panebianco 1988:4).

²¹ Rational choice theory used for the study of relationship between church and state has many different variations. This theory has been called also 'a theory of religious mobilization', 'religious

with assumptions, from which are derived non-obvious conclusions, which are then tested against observed behavior²². The main assumption, drawn from economics, states that actors in a process utilize the most efficient means for pursuing their goals²³.

Adam Smith was the one who laid the foundation for the economic theory to be used for analyzing the activity of religious institutions. He argued that self-interest motivates clergy just as it does secular producers, that market forces constrain churches just as they do secular firms; and that the benefits of competition, the burdens of monopoly, and the hazards of government regulation are as real in religion as in any sector of the economy²⁴.

According to religious market theory the demand for religion is stable and the key variable is the supply of 'religious products'. The levels of religious vitality are influenced by the structure of the religious economy²⁵. State control of the religious market suppresses diversity by inflating the start-up costs for new religions, the relaxation of state control leads to increased diversity of religious products and then to increased consumption²⁶. Using the religious market theory the following assumptions about the Church²⁷ are made:

Assumption 1. Religious institutions are unitary actors that act in a rational way.

This assumption means that the choices of the Church are not pre-determined by its doctrine, but the Church uses the most efficient means for pursuing its goals. The

economics', or 'economic model of church-state relations' (Bruce 1999; Iannaccone 1991;1992;1998; Iannaccone et al 1997; Stark et al 1994;1996; Kalyvas 1998; Gill 1994;1999).

²² McLean 1992:520

²³ Ware 1996:12

²⁴ Iannaccone 1991:1

²⁵ Bruce 1999:269

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 268,271

choices of the Church regarding social and political questions are not driven wholly by theological necessity, but are at least to some degree, driven by strategic concerns²⁸.

Assumption 2. The church wants to gain or protect its position of monopoly in the religious market.

Every Church offers “the Absolute Truth”. Absence of competition in the religious market leaves the ‘product’ of the Church unquestioned²⁹. The option of becoming a monopoly in religious market is more cost-effective way to handle religious competition than the improvement of the quality and marketing of the ‘product’. The capacity of a Church to monopolize a religious economy depends upon the degree to which the state regulates the religious economy.

Assumption 3. The Church needs an access to the government.

It is one of the main purposes for the Church to obtain access to the political decision-making process as the regulation of religious market is done through laws³⁰. When a religious monopoly is installed by state, this monopoly exerts influence over other institutions and as a result the society will be sacralized – the primary aspects of life, from family to politics, will be suffused with religious symbols, rhetoric, and ritual³¹.

²⁷ These assumptions are valid for the dominant Churches in the religious market. For a small Church, for example for a Church with 10 members, it is obvious that the first choice would be the improvement in the quality and marketing of the ‘product’, and legal equality of the religious groups.

²⁸ Douglas Perkins has said: “Theology, like any ideology, often provides a great deal of wiggle room when put into practice” (Perkins 2001:22).

²⁹ Gill 1994:406

³⁰ Prohibiting competition is more cost effective than actually competing. So it is logical to assume that maintaining friendly relations with the state is in the interests of the church. (Gill 1994:405,412)

³¹ Stark & Iannaccone 1994

In the post-Communist setting the regulation of church-state relationship (and religious market) was an issue that all countries considered in this study had to solve. All Churches were willing to get more restrictive laws for the regulation of the entrance of ‘newcomers’ (new religious groups) to the religious market. While the political arena was secular during Communist time, the religious economy was not ruled essentially by free religious market. The traditional Churches were those religious firms that clearly dominated the religious economy. Emerging religious pluralism in the beginning of transition promoted the project of further ‘de-sacralisation’ of the society due to relatively liberal laws for registration of religious groups. The Church, in turn, wanted to re-sacralize the society and to set the social norms.

According to the raised hypothesis, which sees the strength of religion in society as a necessary (but not sufficient) basis for the strength of religion in politics, the following propositions are made:

Proposition 1. The stronger the institutional religion is, the stronger is the ability of the Church to politicize religious issues.

Proposition 2. Strength of institutional religion and strength of symbolical religion are pre-conditions of the emergence of the religious political cleavage.

Strength of institutional and symbolical religion, and strength of religious social cleavage are the pre-conditions for the formation of religious political cleavage. If the pre-conditions are fulfilled, the emergence of religious political cleavage and its strength, are not yet pre-determined. The actual intensity of the religious political cleavage and the strength of religion in politics depend also on the strategic choices that Church makes (as shown on the Figure 2).

The Church takes into consideration three aspects: the level of uncertainty of the access to government, the radicalism of its demands and the choice of the strategy


(they way of getting access to the government). The Church has to balance these three aspects, as the level of uncertainty of getting access to the government increases the more radical demands the Church makes and the less neutral it is regarding the competition of political parties.

If the Church does not interfere to the political competition of parties, then it is more likely that it will have the access to the government (if Church does not support any political party, it is reasonable to assume that the attitudes of the political parties will not differ regarding the Church either). The lower the number of the parties supported by the Church, the higher the level of uncertainty of the access to the government.

Choosing the political allies with more radical positions allows the Church better to defend its interests in the political arena, but it limits the possibility of getting access to the government, as the too extreme positions of the Church and its political allies ought logically find less support among the electorate. While remaining neutral, the Church obviously has to have quite moderate demands that will not bring along the formation of radical opposition to Church's interests among parties. The alternative strategies of the Church are identified in more detail in the analytical framework of the study. Here, in the Figure 2, the choice available for the Church is shown as from neutrality regarding the competition of political parties to radical strategy of being closely identified with a political party (or parties) that closely represents the interests of the Church. Too radical demands and the choice of too radical political allies obviously increase the uncertainty of the access to the government. Too moderate demands may leave the goals unfulfilled.

The Church as a rational actor is seeking for the best means to attain its goals. What is best strategic choice of demands and strategy in one situation may not be the best one in the next one. There is no universal and ideal combination, which the Church ought to use. The Church may find that there is a need to change the strategy or radicalism of demands.

Figure 2. Modified social cleavage model



Proposition 3. The Church, in pursuing its aims and taking into account its structural resources, chooses a combination of the radicalism of demands and a way to get access to the government, which affects the strength of religion in politics.

The strategic choices made by the Church affect the eventual outcome – strength of religion in politics, which is measured by three indicators of independent variable (the strength of religious political cleavage; the actual access of the Church to the government and the level of Church' fulfilled goals).

The modified social cleavage model (Figure 2) is the theoretical basis of the study. This model does not claim that certain combination of demands and strategy produces invariably a certain pre-determined result. The Church chooses radicalism of demands and strategy by taking into account the structural resources it has available and the uncertainty of the access to the government that the chosen strategy involves. The Church has to balance the radicalism of demands and uncertainty of the access to the government.

1.4. Framework of analysis

1.4.1. Case-studies

The case studies of the countries have two aims: (1) to explain, how each case has obtained the values of the variables that are used in the comparison of the cases; (2) to show how the strategies and choices made by the Church have caused the changes that altered the previous position of this case in the strength-value relations between the independent variables of the cases.

The cases of this study - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia - are chosen because of several aspects: all of them came under Communist regime after

WW II; the democratization of these countries has been successful; and they provide different sets of similarities and differences in the dependent and independent variables used in this study.

1.4.2 Operationalization of the variables

There are two types of religious social cleavage: anti/clericalism-clericalism and religious-secular. Anti-clericalism is an attitude against political interference of the church. In this case, the social cleavage is centered upon the rights and privileges of the institutional religion. Religious/secular cleavage involves a conflict between religious and secular moral attitudes. The strength of the religious social cleavage is measured in 5-point scale (5 – very strong, 4 – strong, 3 – middle, 2 – weak, 1 – very weak) based on the empirical data about how strongly has the society been polarized according to this cleavage.

The other structural variable is the strength of religion. This variable has two indicators – strength of institutional religion and strength of symbolical religion. In each case both of them are measured according to a similar five-point scale. The institutional strength of religion is measured according to the following indicators: the levels of religious affiliation; the level of religious attendance; and popular support of the social positions of the Church. The symbolical strength of religion is measured according to the proximity of religion to national identity³².

Institutional and symbolical strength of religion form the resources that Church can use. The stronger these resources are, the more capable is the Church to present radical claims, yet the actual radicalism of the demands and the choice of strategy depends on the Church.

³² If national identity is inherently secular, then it is called ‘civic nationalism’ (Agadjanian 2001).

The possible strategies of the Church that in the theoretical framework were identified as situated between two poles – neutral and radical – are operationalized in the following way. The strategies of the Church are divided into three groups: (1) neutrality regarding political competition of the parties; (2) Christian Democratic strategy; (3) and Christian strategy. In public activity the Church usually chooses a combination between these strategies – for example a mixture of Christian and Christian Democratic strategy. It is analyzed, which of these strategies has the Church relied most on and how this emphasis has changed during the first three parliamentary elections.

The strategic choice to remain neutral regarding the political competition of parties does not mean only the official position of the Church to remain neutral, but also the essential neutrality.

The Christian strategy is the choice of the Church to rely on the Christian parties that represent more directly the institutional religion (social positions and interests of the Church). This strategy is the most radical by nature, but the choice of this strategy would be most ‘natural’ for the Church, if the Church has decided not to remain neutral in the political competition of parties. By using this strategy, the interests of the Church are represented most directly.

Christian Democratic strategy concentrates on religion in broader and more symbolical terms, and in this case the Church supports and finds allies among Christian Democratic parties or among parties, which defend the Church’s interests in broader and more symbolical terms. The parties chosen as allies according to the Christian Democratic strategy are not Christian parties (i.e. their primary political appeal is not religion). The Church relies on a political ideology that represents religion in very broad terms, as Christian Democracy is essentially a secular ideology

with religious roots³³. The choice of the Church to rely on Christian Democratic parties testifies to the fact that the Church is rationally seeking for a way that serves best its interests.

Also the outcomes are analyzed. The variables for the religion in politics are: (1) the strength of religious political cleavage; (2) goals attained by the Church; (3) access of the Church to the government.

The indicators of the religious political cleavage are: (1) religion as an indicator of voting preference and party identification; (2) religion as a basis of government coalition formation; (3) the existence of overlapping cleavages, which magnify the impact of religion in political arena.

Goals attained by the Church are measured by using the five-point scale according to the level how the politicized religious issues were solved³⁴. Finally, the assessment is made about the level of Church' fulfilled goals and overall value is given according to the same five-point scale.

Access of the Church to the government is measured according to the five-point scale based on the ability of the Church to influence the decisions of the governmental coalitions during three electoral periods in favor of its interests.

³³ As Stathis Kalyvas has stated: "Christian Democracy does not equal Church, Christianity or Catholicism. It's type of religious political identity that does not equal with social religious identity." (Kalyvas 1996: 245)

³⁴ 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church.

1.4.3. Comparative framework

According to the modified social cleavage model presented in Figure 2, the values of the indicators of the independent variables (variables of the religion in society) and dependent variables (variables of the strength of religion in politics) are compared according to the strength-value that these cases have obtained in the case studies.

Figure 3. Comparison of the independent and dependent variables





Figure 3 describes the process of comparison. The cases are put into strength-value order according to every variable. The logical co-relation between the values of independent and dependent variables would show that every case has retained its position regarding other cases. The case that had strongest value of independent

variable has also the strongest value of dependent variable. The case, which had a second strength-value of independent variable, has also a second strength-value of dependent variable and so on. If the strength of religion in society had the strongest value in the case of Poland, so ought it to have the strongest value also of the strength of religion in politics.

But if the strength-value relationship between independent and dependent variables of the cases is not the same, then there exists a deviation from the co-relations.

The goal of the comparison is to find out these deviations between the strength-values of the independent variables and dependent variables.

If there are no deviations found, then there is no reason to expect that the strategic choices of the Church have caused any change in the outcome in longer perspective, and the hypothesis will not pass the test.

If the deviations are found, then the strategies and radicalism of goals used by the Church become important. The strategic choices of the Church are compared as condition variables³⁵, which have influenced the variations in the dependent variable.

Finally, comparing the strategies and demands used by the Church in different cases tests the causal effect of the strategic choices of the Church.

³⁵ The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact that independent variables have on dependent variables (Van Evera 1997:11).

Chapter 2. Poland

2.1. Religion in society

2.1.1. Institutional religion

Poland is a highly religious country in terms of religious affiliation and practice³⁶. As a rule, the levels of religiosity, that have risen during transition crises in post-communist countries, fall back soon, but in Poland there has been no decline in the high levels of Church attendance, religious practice (praying) and strength of belief even several years after the times of transition crises³⁷.

Yet various types of Catholics³⁸ have different attitudes regarding the politically relevant religious issues. In 1997 majority of Poles did not share the attitude of the Catholic Church regarding premarital sex and euthanasia³⁹. Polish people support some goals of the Church and reject others. A majority of the population has no objection to religion in the schools⁴⁰. Population seems to be almost equally divided

³⁶ According to the European Values Study Surveys from 1999 95.7% of Polish people claim to belong to a religious denomination, 98.4% of respondents belong to the Catholic Church and 78.2% claimed to visit the Church more than once a month (Halman 2001:74, 75, 78).

³⁷ According to Polish General Social Surveys (PGSS) these levels remained almost the same from 1992 to 1997, in Chan 2000:179

³⁸ N.J. Demerath distinguishes three types of Polish Catholics - religious Catholics, the family Catholics and the cultural Catholics that represent different attitudes regarding the social positions of the Church. (Demerath 2000:129-130)

³⁹ PGSS of 1997 revealed that 71 per cent of respondents approved of the death penalty, whereas only 17 per cent thought it was wrong, 49 per cent thought voluntary euthanasia should be allowed, whereas 34 per cent condemned it, 57 per cent believed that premarital sex was not wrong at all, and only 8 per cent supported a total ban on abortion. (Chan 2000:177-178)

⁴⁰ Demerath 2000:129

on the issue of religious censorship of media⁴¹. Most clearly population feels that the Church ought to stay out of politics⁴². Having set as goals a total ban of abortion and active interference to politics, the Church acts in opposition to the average will of the Polish electorate.

The most obvious indicators of strong religious social cleavage are the abortion issue and the political influence of the Church. Regarding abortion the electorate is polarized from radical pro-choice to radical anti-abortion, while the average voter tends to favor more liberal solution than Church or clerical parties. Also regarding the political influence of the Church the population is divided, but tends more to reject than endorse the Church's influence⁴³. Especially in the first half of 1990s the public trust regarding the Church was declining due to the opinion that the Church interfered too much in public life and was too closely linked to the new institutions of the state⁴⁴. In 1996 the disapproval of the Church political activity reached its peak⁴⁵.

The electorate was firmly polarized regarding Church interference to politics by 1997. Based on the respondents' opinions on religious education, abortion, and the ratification of the Concordat, Polish General Social Survey discovered in 1997 that Poland is divided into two more or less equal clerical-traditional (42 per cent) and secular groups (46 per cent). The former group is composed of devoted Catholics, regular Church-goers, and right-wingers who contend that the Church should play an active role in the social and political arenas, whereas the latter group is composed of sceptical Catholics, non-believers, and left-wingers who advocate the separation of

⁴¹ In 1996 almost 50% of respondents were in favour of censorship protecting religious feelings of the believers, whereas 35% of respondents were against it (Eberts 1998:832).

⁴² Even two-thirds of those who attend church regularly share this sentiment (Demerath, 2000:129).

⁴³ Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319. 90% of the Poles characterise themselves as Catholic, but two-thirds of the population believe that the political influence of the Church is too strong (Enstad 2000:145). According to the PGSS, between 1992-97, more than half of Poles believed that the Church had too much power. (1992 – 63%, 1993 – 65%, 1994 – 54%, 1995 – 54%, 1997 – 52%). (Chan 2000:183)

⁴⁴ Beyme 1996:157-158. According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 only 9.4% of Polish people agreed that religious leaders should influence government decisions (Halman 2001:107)

⁴⁵ An overwhelming 85.8% of respondents declared that they were against the Church's direct participation in political life (Eberts 1998:830).

the Church and religious values from the state. There is also a very small, moderate group (12 per cent), which expressed mixed feelings towards the Church and its teachings.⁴⁶

2.1.2. Symbolical religion

Poland became a Christian country in the year 965, when prince Mieszko accepted Catholic baptism. From 1385 to 1572 Poland together with Lithuania formed Jagellonian Empire, which at its apex stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea⁴⁷. While the old eastern border of the Jagellonian Empire still roughly marks the boundary between the western Catholic and Uniate churches and the Eastern Orthodoxy⁴⁸, only about half of the population of that empire was Catholic. Protestantism was an important social force in Poland for 130 years (1520-1650) as persecuted Protestant groups came to Poland from Germany, France, Bohemia, and Italy. Protestantism, brought to Poland by immigrants, was expunged by the mid-seventeenth century⁴⁹. There has not been a typical church vs. state conflict, because of little influence that Reformation had in Poland.

In 1772 Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary⁵⁰. As all the neighbors except Austria-Hungary, were non-Catholics, the defense of Polish nation, cultural identity, habits and customs increasingly took on a Polish-Catholic identification⁵¹.

Between World Wars the Second Republic passed through the authoritarian rule of General Pilsudski (1926-35) to a repressive, nationalistic and anti-Semitic

⁴⁶ Chan 2000:189

⁴⁷ Enstad 2000:137

⁴⁸ Aarebrot and Knutsen 2000:20; Michta 1997:70

⁴⁹ Ramet 1998:101

⁵⁰ Zarycki 2000:860

⁵¹ Mojzes 1999; Zarycki 2000:858; Ramet 1998:93; Chan 2000:176

presidential dictatorship, which was marked by religious and national intolerance, but gave privileges to the Catholic Church⁵². During World War II as well as during the communist regime, the Catholic Church was an institution where Polish identity was preserved and political opposition both against fascists and communists was supported⁵³. After the Second World War Poland was territorially moved 150 miles to the West, what made it significantly more homogeneous both ethnically and religiously⁵⁴, as it had lost sizeable non-Catholic minorities⁵⁵.

Although the Catholic Church was restricted in its public activities during the entire period of communist rule, it remained independent of the state⁵⁶ and in confrontation with the state. In 1953 the regime arrested the Polish Primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, and put to prison eight bishops and 900 priests⁵⁷, but the government had to acknowledge the social strength of the Church and sought co-operation with the Church. In April 1950 the Church and the government had signed an agreement, which promised certain freedom and benefit to the Church in exchange for its willingness to promote respect for the communist authorities⁵⁸. In comparison with the situation of religious institutions in other Soviet satellite countries, Catholic Church in Poland had quite a number of privileges⁵⁹, which enabled it to retain its institutional strength until the end of the Communist rule.

⁵² Enstad 2000:138; Crawford 1996:330; Mojzes 1999

⁵³ Enstad 2000:145; Mojzes 1999

⁵⁴ In 1921 the Polish Republic was inhabited by 19 million Poles, four million Ukrainians, two million Jews, one million Germans and Byelorussians respectively, and smaller groups of Lithuanians, Russians and Czechs, besides two million Poles were living in the Soviet Union and 1.5 million in Germany (Enstad 2000:138).

⁵⁵ Since the end of the war, Roman Catholics have accounted for over 90% of the country's total population (Eberts 1998:818).

⁵⁶ Parrott 1997:13; Zarycki 2000:856; Michta 1997:73; Merdjanova 2000:252

⁵⁷ Eberts 1998:819

⁵⁸ Eberts 1998:819

⁵⁹ It had its own newspapers, a Catholic university in Lublin and the Polish armed forces had Catholic chaplains (White et al 2000:681); Polish Catholic Church had also free relations with Vatican (Enstad 2000:140); In 1957 the suppressed Catholic periodical *Znak* was revived, Catholic laity were given independent representation in the *Sejm*, Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs received permission to operate in Warsaw, Krakow, Torun, Posnan, and Wroclaw (Ramet 1998:33).

The regime was seeking co-operation with the Church especially in times of internal crises. Uprisings in 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976 culminated finally with general strikes and the founding of the non-communist (or even Catholic) trade union Solidarity in 1980⁶⁰. By that time Karol Wojtyla had become the first non-Italian Pope after centuries and that made the Catholic Church even more popular⁶¹. By the end of Communist regime the Church had become the only legitimate authority in the country in the eyes of the people⁶², the Catholic Church could claim to represent the entire nation, it was the oldest, the most trusted and most powerful social institution, which had upheld and defended Polish national identity and values in the face of the partitions, the two World Wars and Communism⁶³.

A strong tradition of religious unity and loyalty to the papacy, gave religion a high potential of mobilization⁶⁴.

Table 1. Poland. Indicators of the religion in society

Indicator	Nature	Value
Strength of institutional religion	Levels of religious attendance and affiliation very high	Very strong (5)
Strength of symbolical religion	National idea very closely linked to Catholicism. In the beginning of transition the public role of the Church was seen as legitimate by population.	Very strong (5)
Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage	Conflict concentrates on the church influence on politics	Very strong (5)
Religious-secular cleavage	Conflict concentrates on the abortion issue	Very strong (5)

⁶⁰ Enstad 2000:139. Solidarity workers movement was in close collaboration with the Catholic Church (Demerath 2000:128), if not totally a Catholic movement, like Piotr Korys have called it, as its leaders emphasized their connections with the church (Korys 2000:5). Kenneth Ka-Lok Chan states that Solidarity was “also a moral crusade based on an extraordinary mixture of romanticism, nationalism and Catholicism” (Chan 2001:613).

⁶¹ Mojzes 1999

⁶² Michta 1997:73; Ramet 1998:100,101. Church was a safe haven for dissidents, symbol of freedom and opposition to the communist authorities. When the talks between Solidarity and the Communist Party began in August 1988, the Church was the best intermediary available (Eberts 1998:819).

2.2. Religion in politics

2.2.1. Religious political cleavage

Religious political cleavage emerged to Polish party competition already in the beginning of 1990s, when the positions of Polish parties regarding abortion covered the whole continuum from radical pro-choice to radical anti-abortion. Also regarding the political influence of the Church the positions of Polish parties covered the whole continuum from rejection to endorsing.⁶⁵

Religion became a basis of government coalition formation and also an indicator of voting preference and party identification⁶⁶, but not on the same level as in Hungary, because in 1997 the pro-Church AWS had to form a coalition with a party, that hold a middle position on religious-secular scale and the main polarisation during the elections of the 1990s has been between the post-Solidarity and post-communist parties⁶⁷.

The major political parties after 1997 were clearly differentiated as to religious backing. The pro-Church parties gained most of the votes of practicing Catholics, the anti-clerical parties received most of the votes of non-practicing Catholics⁶⁸.

The political cleavages really do not overlap in the extent like they do in Hungary, but there is co-relation between religious, nationalist and anti-Communist right-wing

⁶³ Chan 2000:176; Herbert 1999:288

⁶⁴ Gagnere 1993

⁶⁵ Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319

⁶⁶ Smolar 1998:130. Religious individuals tend to vote for pro-Church parties and groupings (ZChN, PC, PL, the Solidarity trade union, and AWS), whereas members from the secular group are more likely to be found among supporters of liberal or secular left-wing parties (SLD, UP, KLD, UD, and UW) (Chan 2000:190).

⁶⁷ Smolar 1998:129; Enstad 2000:144; Michta 1997:90

⁶⁸ Flere 2001:196. According to a survey from September 1997, pro-Church AWS was supported by 36% of those who attend church several times per week and 8% of those who never attend church, the numbers for anti-clerical SLD were 5% and 34% respectively (Szczerbiak 1999:1430).

political attitudes. The part of the parties in promoting the religious cleavage has been relatively small, as the process began with radical demands of the Church, the Church's direct pressure on government and parties, and those, in turn, responded to the Church pressure⁶⁹. The Church was promoting the religious political cleavage also by turning down the compromise solutions. When the parties of the left sought compromises⁷⁰, the religious right fought against these proposals. When the compromise proposals were met with resistance, the left took more anti-clerical stand.

2.2.2. Goals attained by the Church

The strength of institutional and symbolical religion allowed the Catholic Church to make extremely radical demands. The Church raised following issues to the political arena: religious education, abortion, divorce laws, the influence of the Church over the Polish media and Church-State relationship. The Catholic Church tried originally even to push for the restoration of Catholicism as the official state religion of Poland⁷¹.

Giving support to its political allies, Church “won” most of its goals already during the first years after transition. In 1989 Church supported Solidarity and received rights to build all kinds of facilities, including hospitals and radio stations, rights to operate private schools and seminaries, there was also started the procedure of the restitution of confiscated Church properties. In 1990 *de facto* mandatory Catholic

⁶⁹ Eberts 1998:837; Zarycki 2000:860

⁷⁰ For example, the Democratic Left Alliance compromised with the religious right over the treatment of religious issues in the Constitution (Curry 1997:77).

⁷¹ Ramet 1998:294

religious instruction was introduced into public schools, in 1991 the Church succeeded in obtaining a tightening of divorce laws.⁷²

The Church had opposed the 1956 liberal abortion law for decades, but their call for a ban on abortion became a politically important question only when its allies gained representation in the Polish parliament. Mainly with the help of Christian-National Union a tough anti-abortion law was enforced in 1993, which was liberalized in 1996 by anti-clerical parties, but the new right-of-center parliament, elected in September 1997, voted to return the law to its 1993 version⁷³. The influence of the Church has led to one of the strictest anti-abortion laws in Europe with a result that annual figure of abortions in Poland is now about 150, while during the communist era, there were about 180,000 legal abortions every year⁷⁴. Abortion law remained an important political issue even after the parliamentary elections of 2001, as the victorious Democratic Left Party favors relaxing the existing rules on abortions⁷⁵.

From the beginning of democratization the Church made also an effort to expand its influence into the field of communications and mass media. Before the Second World War the circulation of Catholic press accounted for about 30% of the total press circulation in Poland⁷⁶. The Church uses a wide range of media canals also today. The political influence of the Catholic radio station Radio Maryja has been considerable especially in 1997 election⁷⁷. Besides religious media, the Church wants to set the norms also for the whole Polish media. The political allies of the Church

⁷² Ibid.; Demerath 2000:129

⁷³ Korbonski 2000:126-128; Eberts 1998:823-826; Chan 2000:183

⁷⁴ Ray Furlong. *Poland set for abortion battle*. BBC News, Wednesday, October 3, 2001.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Korbonski 2000:129

⁷⁷ It has been claimed to be responsible for the victory of AWS in 1997 parliamentary elections (Korbonski 2000:131). In 1997 Radio Maryja fielded its own candidates in the parliamentary elections, but year later the candidates of that radio station split from AWS (Gluchowski 1999:74). Radio Maryja has roughly 3 million listeners and has demonstrated its ability to mobilise its followers against an ever-increasing number of perceived enemies, which include besides drug abuse, pornography and abortion, also liberalism, EU and NATO (Gluchowski 1999:70; Smolar 1998:132; Lewis 2001:11).

passed in 1992 a law regulating radio and television in Poland, which demanded, that programs should respect religious feelings of their audiences and respect the system of Christian values⁷⁸.

Church-state relationship

In 1989 the parliament passed laws that gave a new basis for church-state relationships and supplied the Church with legal rights and state subsidies⁷⁹. The two main documents that define the legal status of the Catholic Church in Poland are the Concordat (signed in 1993 and ratified in 1998) and the Constitution (1997)⁸⁰.

The Concordat strengthened further the position of the Church both in society and in relationship with the state. It declares that the State and Catholic Church are independent and autonomous and both will cooperate for the development of mankind and of the common good. The Concordat also expanded the obligations of state to support the Church financially and ensured and reinforced the privileged status of the Church with many provisions.⁸¹

The final version of the Polish Constitution is a document of political compromise that incorporates many of the Church's demands, but not all⁸². Like the Church wanted, the preamble of the Constitution mentions God as a source of the truth, justice, goodness and beauty, but also mentions non-believers, who may derive these universal values from other sources. The preamble refers to the Christian heritage of

⁷⁸ Korbonski 2000:128; Eberts 1998:831

⁷⁹ The 1989 laws guaranteed state finances for covering a large share of the social insurance costs of the clergy, Church's autonomy from the state, provided the Church with tax and customs exemptions, including property tax release, legal regulations were made for restitution of Church properties (Eberts 1998:820).

⁸⁰ The Concordat between the Holy See and Poland was signed by pro-Church government in 1993, but due to the change of government coalition, it was ratified only on April 24, 1998 (Korbonski 2000:137; Mazurkiewicz 1999:4). Polish Constitution was passed by the National Assembly in April 1997, and approved by citizens in a referendum in May of the same year (Eberts 1998:832-833).

⁸¹ Eberts 1998:834

⁸² Enstad 2000:141

the Polish Nation, but does not point to Catholicism or the Church specifically. According to Article 25 of the Constitution, the Polish state is religiously and ideologically neutral.

In 1989 Poland got relatively permissive law for registration of the religious groups (passed still under Communist government). However, the laws for registration of religious groups were tightened in 1998. The law of 1989 required fifteen Polish founding signatures for legal registration of religious groups, the law of 1998 requires at least 100 Polish founding signatures⁸³. With the help of pro-Church government, the Catholic Church managed to limit the entry of newcomers to the religious market.

2.2.3. Access of the Church to the government

The Catholic Church managed to gain its goals regarding social norms and values very quickly and had vast impact on political decision-making process. Yet it is remarkable that the gains of the Church come from the time when it had its political allies forming a government. The gains of the Church in the field of Church-State relationship and regulation of religious market delayed because of the fact that anti-clerical parties formed the government between 1993-1997.

The political influence of the Church was clearly dependent on the political allies, when the allies of the Church lost governmental power, also the Church lost some of its influence together with them. But as most of the goals of the Church were fulfilled, and as even the left-wing governing coalitions were only partly able to ignore the interests of the Church, the total level of the access to the government is counted as strong.

⁸³ Luxmoore 1999

Table 2. Poland. Variables and indicators of religion in politics

Variable	Nature and value of the indicators	Value of the variable
Religious political cleavage	Religion is a strong indicator of voting preference and party identification (4)	Strong (4)
	Religion is a basis of government coalition formation, but not the most important one (4)	
	The religious political cleavage overlaps with other cleavages, but is not the dominant cleavage (4)	
Goals attained by the Church	Restitution of property was started in 1989 in a favorable way for the Church (5)	Very strong (5)
	Religious instruction solved in a favorable way for the Church 1990 (5)	
	Divorce laws were tightened in 1991 (5)	
	Religious censorship of media. Issue was settled in 1992, but remained controversial (4)	
	Tough abortion laws (1993 and 1997) (5)	
	Liberal law of 1989 for registration of Churches was changed into a more restrictive one in 1998 (5)	
	Concordat (1998) and Constitution (1997) did not fulfill all expressed wishes of the Church, but enlarged the privileges of the Church (5)	
Access to the government	The Church depends on the political allies, but had indirect influence also on the decisions of the anti-clerical governments.	Strong (4)

Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church.

2.3. Church's strategies

Radical Christian strategy

Party politics started with the parliamentary elections of 1991, as earlier the political confrontation was mostly between Solidarity and Communist Party. Since the Catholic Church in Poland is strong and right-wing parties have been relatively

numerous, there are many political allies of the Church. There were created Christian parties⁸⁴, but also many other parties were willing to make use of the resource of religion made available by the Catholic Church⁸⁵. The Christian parties were defending the radical claims of the Church and the Church chose to give its main support to them in the elections of 1991 and 1993.

Table 3. Parliamentary elections in Poland 1991-1997

Election year	1991		1993		1997	
	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (%)	Seats	Votes (%)	Seats
<i>Pro-Church lists:</i>						
NSZZ Solidarity (NSZZ)	5.05	27	4.9	-	AWS	
Peasant Alliance (PL)	5.46	28	0.37	-	AWS	
Catholic Electoral Action (WAK)	8.73	49	-	-	AWS	
Central Democratic Alliance (POC)	8.71	44	-	-	AWS	
Christian Democracy (ChD)	2.36	5			AWS	
Catholic Electoral Committee: 'Fatherland'			6.37	-	AWS	
Union of Poland-Central Alliance (ZP-PC)			4.42	-	AWS	
Coalition for Republic (KdR)			2.70	-	AWS	
Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)					33.83	201
Mov. for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP)					5.56	6
Total	31.42	157	20.76	-	39.39	207
<i>Lists having both clerical and anti-clerical elements:</i>						
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	8.67	48	15.40	132	7.31	27
Democratic Union (UD)	12.31	62	10.59	74	-	-
Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN)	7.50	46	5.77	22	-	-
Nonpartisan Block for Reforms (BBWR)			5.41	16		
Freedom Union (UW)					13.37	60
Total	28.48	156	37.17	244	20.68	87
<i>Anti-clerical lists:</i>						
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	11.98	60	20.41	171	27.13	164
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)	7.48	37	3.99	0		
Party 'X'	0.47	3	3.99	0		
Labour Solidarity (SP)	2.05	4				
Democratic-Social Movement (RDS)	0.46	1				
Labour Union (UP)			7.28	41	4.95	0
Total	21.97	105	34.42	212	32.08	164
Others:	18.13	42	7.65	4	6.28	2
Sejm (Lower House) size		460		460		460

Source: Chan 2000:182, with modifications

⁸⁴ Enstad 2000:145

⁸⁵ For example, The Union of Poland-Central Alliance (ZP-PC) recognised the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish politics, but they did not make Christian moral issues and values critical to their programs and they maintained some distance from the church hierarchy (Michta 1997:94).

In the election of 1991 abortion became the most important electoral issue and the bishops urged all Catholics to judge each candidate based on her or his attitude toward the protection of the unborn⁸⁶. The Church had both radical positions and chose to support more Christian-radical parties. Main representative of the Christian parties was the Christian National Union (ZChN), which stood for the appropriateness of the theology of the Catholic Church for politics and traditional political values such as nation, family and religion⁸⁷. Pro-Church group of parties included also some Christian Democratic parties that were less clerical-confessional in content. The major Christian Democratic party in Poland was in the beginning of 1990s the Centre Alliance (PC), which also has been a member of the Christian Democratic International⁸⁸.

The main political allies of the Church were Christian-radicals. The Church even organized a coalition the Catholic Electoral Action, which openly supported radical Christian party (ZChN) and its allies. This strategy proved to be a success, as parties endorsed by the Catholic Electoral Action gained enough seats in the parliament to become an attractive partner in any coalition government. Between 1991 and 1993 there were governments in favor of Church' interests⁸⁹.

In the 1993 parliamentary election Christian or Christian Democratic parties gained no seat in the Sejm, because the parties of the rightist camp were torn apart by ideological differences and splintered into a plethora of groupings too small to win

⁸⁶ Eberts 1998:828

⁸⁷ Chan 1999:12; Michta 1997:93. Mixing traditional Christian values with national sentiments ZChN became soon the principal spokesman of the Christian right in Poland, led by individuals who proclaimed themselves in favour of various policies advocated by the church. (Korbonski 2000:139)

⁸⁸ Crawford 1996:236. In the beginning of 2002, no Polish party belonged to Christian Democratic International.

⁸⁹ Beyme 1996:137

seats in the *Sejm* according to the new and more restricting electoral law⁹⁰. Also the active interference of the Church to the politics had motivated the major left-wing parties to take more anti-clerical stand in their electoral programs of 1993⁹¹. Only Democratic Union did comparatively well in 1993 with 10.6 percent of vote, because it did not operate in a clericalist way⁹². The Christian-radical strategy of the Church that worked well two year earlier, proved to be counter-productive in 1993, as no distinctly pro-Church parties gained seat in the *Sejm*.

Moderate Christian strategy

Poor electoral results in 1993 parliamentary elections forced Church and its political allies to a more rational collaboration. In 1994 Catholic and national-Catholic parties started to unite their forces, creating two federations of right-wing parties “Covenant for Poland”, and “Agreement of 11 November”⁹³. In 1996 was formed Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)⁹⁴. The historical Solidarity vs. Communism division had provided AWS leaders with tremendously powerful symbols for mobilization⁹⁵ and while the main competitor SLD was professedly secular, AWS was drawing on Christian traditions⁹⁶ with emphasis on Catholic family values and fighting of moral decay in society⁹⁷. The strategy of the Church in 1997 election was more moderate than before. First, the formation of the grand coalition AWS required a broad common program and in a way eliminated the strength of the extreme-clerical parties. Second, the Church also used more indirect canals of interference to the electoral contest and so the anti-clerical backlash was avoided. Before the elections the

⁹⁰ Chan 1999:12; Chan 2000:183

⁹¹ Szczerbiak 1999:1401

⁹² Beyme 1996:137

⁹³ Wesołowski 1996:233,237

⁹⁴ AWS was an electoral coalition of more than 30 right-wing groupings, where ZChN represented a strong clerical nationalist tendency, the Party of Christian Democrats (PChD) and Central Alliance (PC) were pro-market, pro-Europe Christian Democrats, other major groups were a conservative-liberal group and a group connected with the trade union Solidarity (Chan 1999:14; Enstad 2000:153-154).

⁹⁵ Chan 1999:15

⁹⁶ Szczerbiak 1999:1406

Episcopate issued a communiqué in which it urged Poles to take part in the election, but it cautioned that the mission of the Church could not be tied to any specific political party, although essential political neutrality of the Church was still out of question⁹⁸.

The pro-Church AWS won the most votes, 33.83%, and obtained 201 seats in the Sejm. Although the AWS formed a coalition government with the less-clerical center-right Freedom Union (UW), the Church was pleased with the election results⁹⁹.

From radical to radical-moderate

The radical style of the Church has brought Church to the position where it is no longer an unquestionable moral and political authority¹⁰⁰. The Church rejected any compromise in vital moral questions¹⁰¹, but when certain compromise results were later achieved, the Church sometimes decided to stop fighting while the results were not the best possible solution for the Church. So, in a way, the Church has taken into account the objective circumstances. It did not continue to fight the ratified Constitution, which in many ways did not fulfill the demands of the Church¹⁰². The Church does not fight also the 1998 abortion law, which restricts the availability of abortion, but does not fulfill the Church's demand of total ban of abortion¹⁰³.

⁹⁷ Chan 1999:14; Enstad 2000:153-154

⁹⁸ Chan 2000:187

⁹⁹ Eberts 1998:831

¹⁰⁰ Bruce 1999:273; Chan 2000:177; Korbonski 2000:125,145; Król 1999: 73

¹⁰¹ The Church has stated that when moral principles and the opinion of the people disagree, the former should prevail (Chan 2000:185). In 1993, when restrictive abortion law was in force, 58.2% of respondents opposed the Church's position on abortion, and only 33.2% supported it (Eberts 1998:825).

¹⁰² Yet earlier the pope, the church and its allies, especially Radio Maryja, went all out to defeat the constitutional draft, approved by an overwhelming majority in parliament (Korbonski 2000:138,141).

¹⁰³ The liberalised abortion law from 1996 received harsh criticism from the Church, the Primate and the Pope (Chan 2000:183,185; Eberts 1998:824-825).

The electoral defeat of its allies in 1993 forced the Church to choose more moderate political style that brought success in 1997. But the strategic choice of the Church to remain officially neutral and not to support only one party, has been one reason why there still is neither strong Christian nor strong Christian Democratic party in Poland. As a consequence the right-of-center parties are in constant competition for the support of the Church¹⁰⁴. Another cause of the division among rightwing parties is found in the radical goals of the Church that have inspired the radical Churchmen and radical Christian parties¹⁰⁵.

2.4. Discussion

The political religious cleavage is weaker than the social religious cleavage in Poland, because the radical demands and Christian strategy of the Church have brought along a political religious cleavage that is biased towards anti-clericalism (i.e. weakened). The radical demands and Christian strategy brought success to the Church' allies in the parliamentary election of 1991, but did not bring any success later. The radical positions have given the Church a high level of fulfilled goals, but also have provoked too strong anti-clerical backlash and electoral defeat for the political allies of the Church in 1993 election. In order to regain its access to the government, the Church choose a bit more moderate demands, and more moderate political allies in the 1997 election. The Church regained its access to the government and more of its goals were gained, but in the political competition of parties the religious political cleavage was not 'frozen' as a dominant organizer of political parties.

¹⁰⁴ Voltmer 1999:10; Marczewska-Rytko 2001. The AWS (which was under direct influence of the Church) brought political victory to the Church in 1997, but remained very loose coalition that began soon to split. In 1997 Lech Wałęsa founded a new party, Christian Democracy of Poland, Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski created another party, Social Movement-AWS (Chan 2000:189; Smolar 1998:124,125).

¹⁰⁵ Chan 2000:183,193; Korbonski 2000:142; Ramet 1998:306

Chapter 3. Hungary

3.1. Religion in society

3.1.1. Institutional religion

According to surveys the religiosity of Hungarians declined in the first Communist decades, but there has been a steady growth in religiosity since the late 1970s¹⁰⁶. While the number of religious persons has reached two-thirds of the total population in 1990s¹⁰⁷, only about one sixth describe themselves as “religious according to the Church teaching”¹⁰⁸, which is about as much as there are practicing religious people¹⁰⁹.

Overwhelming majority of Hungarians trust the churches¹¹⁰, support the idea that financial support should be restricted only to historical churches¹¹¹, and has liberal attitude regarding abortion¹¹². As the clericalism/anti-clericalism divide deepened in

¹⁰⁶ Schanda 1999:13

¹⁰⁷ According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 57.1% of Hungarians claim to belong a religious denomination (Halman 2001:74).

¹⁰⁸ Dobszay 1996; Enyedi 2000b:160; Luxmoore 1999

¹⁰⁹ According to the European Values Study Surveys of 1999 17.5% of respondents claimed to visit the Church more than once a month (Halman 2001:78).

¹¹⁰ Schanda 1999:14. The high level of trust has decreased, in 1998, 30 per cent expressed distrust in churches, as opposed to 22 per cent in 1991 (Enyedi 2000b:161).

¹¹¹ According to 1997 survey 16.4% disagreed with any financial support given to Churches, 36% proposed that all Churches should be supported, and 76.8% wanted to restrict this support to historical Churches. There is a public support for treating the Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist and Jewish denominations differently from the rest (Enyedi 2000a:10).

¹¹² According to the ISSP data from 1991 and 1998 Zsolt Enyedi found that about four-fifths of Hungarians stated that it is ‘never wrong’ to carry out abortion for health reasons and about half of them accept poverty as a legitimate reason for an abortion (Enyedi 2000b:161).

the political arena, also the public attitude became more critical regarding the political activity of the Church¹¹³. There are relatively few those who believe in religious dogmas but the sensibility towards the existence of supernatural phenomena has considerably increased and fundamental religious concepts have gained widespread acceptance¹¹⁴.

3.1.2. Symbolical religion

Hungary received Catholicism in the year 1000¹¹⁵, but starting from Reformation it became and remained a multi-confessional country. Protestantism provided local nobility with the opportunity to distance themselves from the Habsburg emperors who in turn were closely linked with the Catholic Church¹¹⁶. The emphasis in the early stages of the Counter-Reformation was placed on persuasion¹¹⁷ and by the end of the sixteenth century only about one-tenth of the population remained Catholic¹¹⁸. Following Counter-Reformation never managed to Catholicize the country¹¹⁹.

There has been a long tradition of close co-operation between the church and the state in Hungary. The Church received financial support from the state and in turn the appointments to the highest offices of the Church needed the approval of the government¹²⁰. The number of churches in co-operation with the state increased during the centuries. In the first part of the 19th century the Catholic, Lutheran,

¹¹³ In 1991, 13 per cent regarded the churches as being too powerful, in 1998 the respective figure was 21 per cent. The number of those who accept as legitimate the churches' influence on voters decreased from 15 per cent to 8 per cent. (Enyedi 2000b:161).

¹¹⁴ The proportions of those who believe in life after death, heaven, hell, miracles and personal God grew between 1991 and 1998 (Enyedi 2000a:162).

¹¹⁵ Gautier 1998; Mojzes 1999

¹¹⁶ Mojzes 1999; Gautier 1998

¹¹⁷ Ramet 1998:104

¹¹⁸ Mojzes 1999; Gautier 1998

¹¹⁹ Protestants were persecuted, but the confrontation did not escalate into military conflict like it happened in Bohemia. In 1880 Catholics made up only 56.14 percent of Hungary's population; most of the remainder were Protestants. (Ramet 1998:105)

¹²⁰ Enyedi 2000a:5

Calvinist and (since 1790) the Orthodox Churches were considered co-opted¹²¹. In 1895 religious freedom was proclaimed for all, yet the public worship was restricted to the co-opted Churches (the Catholic, Orthodox, Reformed, Lutheran, Jewish and Unitarian Churches)¹²². These mainstream churches remained part of the establishment until 1948¹²³. While the Catholic Church remained a “quasi-established” Church, as all its responsible appointments had to be approved by the government¹²⁴, all the privileged religious communities were pleased with that order of Church-state relations¹²⁵.

The idea of a Hungarian nation has been closely linked to religion, but there still is a competition over the matter which one is the proper religion of Hungarians¹²⁶. After Hungary gained autonomy in 1867 the Catholic Church ceased legally to be a state religion and until the First World War Hungarian Protestant nationalism dominated¹²⁷. The Catholic Church gained its privileged social-political status mostly because the aristocracy was largely Catholic, the history of the monarchy was strongly associated with Catholicism and the Catholic Church had a close alliance with the government¹²⁸. Protestantism gained its symbolic power through its association with national (anti-Catholic) freedom fights, 19th century liberalism, emphasis on national values and national character, important political position in the

¹²¹ Enyedi 2000a:9

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Schanda, 1999:15

¹²⁴ Ramet 1998:106-107

¹²⁵ Mojzes 1999

¹²⁶ At the end of the year 2001, the leader of the Justice and Life party, Calvinist Istvan Csurka, stated that the Calvinist church is the true voice of "Hungarian" religion, a historic repository of national feeling. (Christians At Odds. *Economist*, p. 59, December 12, 2001)

¹²⁷ Ramet 1998:107; Enyedi 2000a:3

¹²⁸ The Roman Catholics were always the most numerous religious community and were also the most closely aligned with the government. The Catholic bishop of Esztergom held the rank of prince and was second only to the king in political power. The Catholic Church was the greatest landholder in Hungary; it controlled more than half of all schools and had the power to mandate obligatory religious instruction for all children. In the end of 1940 forty-eight religious leaders, of whom fourteen archbishops held their offices by “right of birth”, represented the churches in Parliament. (Gautier 1998)

inter-war period and also by the fact that Transsylvania, the central symbol of Hungarian nationalism after 1918, was associated with Protestantism as well¹²⁹.

Interwar authoritarian, conservative regime re-established the state-dependent nature of the Churches through financial supervision¹³⁰. The government gave Churches extensive support, favored the Catholic Church, discouraged anticlericalism, and made religious instruction a compulsory subject in state schools¹³¹. The efforts of Hungarianizing of the religious communities motivated the Hungarian religious hierarchy originally to support the nation's alliance with Nazi Germany¹³².

Although the churches in Hungary were repressed by the communist regime¹³³, the tradition of close co-operation between church and state was soon re-established. The uncompromising leaders of Catholic, Reformed and Lutheran Churches were arrested or forced to resign¹³⁴. Remaining clergy accepted the reforms. Communists succeeded in reshaping the ideologies of the Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran churches¹³⁵.

¹²⁹ Enyedi 2000a:10

¹³⁰ Enyedi 2000a:3; Bozóki 1999:105

¹³¹ Ramet 1998:108

¹³² There was also a federation of Catholic organizations called the Catholic Social People's Movement that resisted to the Nazi presence in Hungary. Eventually this movement became the Christian Democratic People's Party and played a small part in the post-war coalition government. (Gautier 1998)

¹³³ Church and state became separated, most Church social organizations were banned, independent Catholic press was suppressed, Church lost most of its educational facilities, thousands of monks and nuns were in prisons and tortured (Ramet 1998:109).

¹³⁴ Ramet 1998:109; Gautier 1998

¹³⁵ The first agreement between the Catholic Church and state was signed in 1950 (Gautier 1998), in the same year an ecclesiastical "peace movement" backed by the state was organized within the Catholic church of Hungary (Ramet 1998:109). Both the Reformed and Lutheran churches subscribed to the so-called Theology of Diakonia, which stressed that church is to be at the service of the state (Ramet 1998:6).

After 1956 the organizing principle of Church-State relations became one of “Dialogue”¹³⁶, which involved the public support of the regime by religious authorities and the limiting of church activities to spiritual matters¹³⁷.

Step-by-step the co-operation between state and church became enhanced¹³⁸, there was the elite level co-operation between bishops and the state¹³⁹, and the clergy were bound by an oath of allegiance to the Hungarian constitution¹⁴⁰. Eventually the Church-state relations became even more cooperative in the 1976, when Laszlo Lekai became Primate of Hungary¹⁴¹ instead of troublesome former Primate Jozsef Mindszenty.

Church members became alienated from their religious leaders¹⁴², as the state approved hierarchy of Churches had to see to it that politically non-conformist clergymen were silenced and cut off from their flock¹⁴³, but the Catholic Church got also the positive chance to re-establish its national organization, to reclaim its privileges, and thus threaten the advances made by the Protestant Churches in the Hungarian religious market in the first decades of Communism¹⁴⁴.

The Churches were not the main force behind the revolutionary changes during transition from Communist regime¹⁴⁵. The Churches, however, still turned out to be the largest forces of civil society¹⁴⁶. Idea of Hungarian nationalism was closely linked

¹³⁶ Enyedi 2000a:3; Enyedi 2000b:160

¹³⁷ Enyedi 2000b:160

¹³⁸ During Janos Kadar’s rule the Catholic Church enjoyed the protection of the state, was still able to operate eight high schools, and did not have to worry about harassment or obstruction by the authorities (Ramet 1998:91).

¹³⁹ Ramet 1998:111; Enyedi 2000a:9

¹⁴⁰ According to the agreement with Vatican in 1964, the clergy were bound by an oath and the state had a right to veto any appointee in the appointment of bishops (Dobszay 1996).

¹⁴¹ Ramet 1998:110

¹⁴² Gautier 1998

¹⁴³ Tökés 1997:113

¹⁴⁴ Bruce 1999:273

¹⁴⁵ The revolutionary changes were mostly the work of reform communists (Gautier 1998).

¹⁴⁶ Schanda, 1999:16

to religion, but not to one religion only. The Hungarian state was never completely identified with Catholicism because of the presence and the political weight of Protestant communities and by the Catholicism of the Hapsburg dynasty¹⁴⁷.

Religion and ethnicity were among the most important political issues during the inter-war years. This in turn helped these non-economical issues to become also the symbolical center of the post-communist politics.

Table 4. Hungary. Indicators of the religion in society

Indicator	Nature	Value
Strength of institutional religion	There is a high level of religious affiliation and middle level of religious attendance in Hungary	Strong (4)
Strength of symbolical religion	National identity is closely linked to Catholicism and Calvinism. Privileges of the traditional churches are seen as legitimate. Historical tradition of co-operation between Church and state. Co-operation with Communist regime discredited the Churches.	Strong (4)
Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage	The social conflict over clericalism tends to be biased towards favoring the privileges of the traditional churches	Strong (4)
Religious-secular cleavage	Relatively few those who are religious according to Church doctrine	Middle (3)

3.2. Religion in politics

3.2.1. Religious political cleavage

The active role of Churches in public debates over politicized religious issues have provoked a mixed reaction and have politicized the religious divisions in Hungary to such an extent that today religiosity and clericalism are major predictors of party

¹⁴⁷ Enyedi 2000a:9

affiliation¹⁴⁸. Although the religious vote is dispersed among all parties¹⁴⁹, the mainstream religiosity and active membership in the established Churches is associated with the right-wing political block¹⁵⁰.

In 1991 the electorate of the Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) was significantly more religious than all the other constituencies. While the relationship between party preference and religiosity declined since 1991, the relative weight of religiosity has in fact increased as by 1998 clerical attitudes became thoroughly politicized. Party politics did not penetrate the realm of values closely linked to the social teaching of the Churches (family values, views on abortion), but became more centered on the clericalism issue¹⁵¹.

As the different issue dimensions tend to overlap, the inter-party distances on nationalist, religious, etc. issues tend to be the same¹⁵². Religion was also a basis for the government coalition formation in all three electoral periods¹⁵³, and the coalition-opposition relationship was perceived as religious-secular cleavage, later clericalism/anti-clericalism cleavage. For example between 1990 and 1994 all the parties in the government coalitions were in the authoritarian, religious, anti-Communist, and nationalist sector of the dominant competitive space, but they differed in their positions regarding economic issues¹⁵⁴. The rationale for the coalition was not their common program, nor the mutual sympathies of their voters,

¹⁴⁸ Enyedi 2000a:1,17. Zsolt Enyedi found according to ISSR 1991 and 1998 surveys an increasingly strong relationship between religiosity and clericalism and views on abortion (Enyedi 2000b:159).

¹⁴⁹ Tökés 1997:142-143

¹⁵⁰ Enyedi 2000b:157; Flere 2001:196

¹⁵¹ Enyedi 2000b:172

¹⁵² Enyedi 2000a:18; Enyedi, 2000b:157; Tóka 1997. Starting from 1990 the institutional-ideological cleavage of Christian ethics, anti-communism, and rural attitudes was represented by the conservative center-right and right-wing political parties and voters; anticlerical, pro-urban and right-wing political parties were on the same platform on the other side (Kowalik 2002:9).

¹⁵³ After 1994 election the social-democratic MSZP formed a coalition government with the left-liberal SZDSZ, the party which was probably the closest to the MSZP on non-economic issues, but was at the same time probably the most pro-market formation among all Hungarian parties (Enyedi, 2000a:157).

¹⁵⁴ Markowski 1997:242

but the contention that only they formed the Christian-National camp¹⁵⁵. Not surprisingly, their opposition took an anti-clerical stand.

The parliament members held clericalism in 1998 not as the most important, but still as the most “divisive” issue¹⁵⁶. Clericalism was one of the most important determinants of the parties’ overall ideological position¹⁵⁷, and so religion divided partisan camps in Hungary in a stronger way than in Poland¹⁵⁸.

3.2.2. Goals attained by the Church

In post-communist Hungary there have been serious political disputes over restitution of Church properties confiscated by the Communists, the politically constructed denominational hierarchies (the privileges of four “historical” Churches over the rest of the denominations), the annual finance of Churches, religious education and abortion.

The Church did not gain the maximum goal of the compulsory religious education. In the fall of 1990 religious education was offered in public schools on a voluntary basis, although the teachers are paid by the Hungarian state¹⁵⁹. The traditional Churches got large benefit from the new law, as in the 1990-1991 school year religious education became available in public schools with seventeen thousand classes for Catholics, five thousand for members of the Reformed Church, sixteen hundred classes for Lutherans, and forty-three for Jews¹⁶⁰.

¹⁵⁵ Enyedi 2000b:164

¹⁵⁶ Enyedi 2000a:19

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p.24

¹⁵⁸ Tóka 1997

¹⁵⁹ Gagnere 1993

¹⁶⁰ Rosalie Beck and David W. Hendon (1991) “Notes on Church-State affairs: Hungary”, *Journal of Church & State*, 2:384

The abortion issue was settled in 1992 when Hungarian parliament passed quite moderate abortion law¹⁶¹.

Restitution of confiscated property

The Hungarian government concluded an agreement with Vatican and later with other denominations on their property claims. Most of the denominations opted for a financial compensation paid every year instead of getting back all the buildings they were entitled to. The deadline for the restitution was extended until 2011, and the procedure of restitution is still raising some difficulties.¹⁶²

Return of Church property came to a standstill while the pro-Church coalition government (1990-1994) was still in office. Of the 7127 claims submitted, in only about 1500 cases was property actually transferred before 1994¹⁶³.

Regulation of religious market

In 1990 a new law concerning religion ended state interference in Church affairs¹⁶⁴, and established the principle of equality and state neutrality¹⁶⁵. Other regulations, however, do establish differences¹⁶⁶. The main religious conflict in Hungarian political arena is about the rights of the traditional and privileged Churches against

¹⁶¹ It allows women to have an abortion if either the pregnant woman or, the fetus has life-threatening health problems, if the woman is the victim of rape, or if the woman says that the pregnancy has caused a serious crisis for her. The law requires the woman to consult with a committee of unspecified composition before having the abortion. (Rosalie Beck and David W. Hendon (1993) "Notes on Church-State Affairs: Hungary", *Journal of Church & State*, 2:440)

¹⁶² Schanda, 1999:17

¹⁶³ Dobszay 1996

¹⁶⁴ Ramet 1998:112

¹⁶⁵ As a consequence of extremely liberal law for registration of the new Churches, there was registered unexpectedly large number of churches (Schanda, 1999:17).

¹⁶⁶ Privileged denominations can send their delegates to the public TV and radio boards, army chaplaincy was set up only for four historical denominations in 1994. The special governmental committee on Church-State relationships (established at the end of 1999) is also composed exclusively of the delegates of the four "historical" Churches. (Enyedi 2000a:10)

the rights of new and minority religious groups¹⁶⁷. Even ten years after the transition to democracy, the issue of equality vs. inequality of the denominations is still on the agenda¹⁶⁸. There are many small and new denominations, although their actual size in the population is small (around two percent). The most prominent of them is the Faith Church¹⁶⁹.

Also the parties are involved in the conflict. Right of center political parties tend to support the privileges of the historical churches, left-liberal parties favor the “strict neutrality” approach and are opposed to the establishment of any hierarchy among the Churches¹⁷⁰.

Political-religious debates in 1999 and 2000 were centered on Faith Church¹⁷¹, the pro-historical church government was eager to defend the historical Churches¹⁷² by being willing to legalize more restrictive law on registration of Churches¹⁷³ that would discriminate against the Faith Church and would leave the historical Churches untouched.

The church-state relationship in Hungary can be called co-operative separation. The state has the duty to provide Churches with the means that are necessary for their

¹⁶⁷ Enyedi 2000a:10,13

¹⁶⁸ Enyedi 2000a:2

¹⁶⁹ The charismatic-evangelical, Pentecostal denomination Faith Church, was established in 1979, and has around 35.000 members. The Church is strongly anti-Catholic, claiming that the policies of the pro-historical church government are manipulated by Vatican. (Enyedi 2000a:11)

¹⁷⁰ The strict neutrality approach sees in the (pro-historical church) government initiatives an attempt at re-establishing the pre-war feudal relationships between politics and religion, where none of them could develop full autonomy. (Enyedi 2000a:17)

¹⁷¹ The MPs criticized the community for practicing anathema against their enemies, for worshipping financial success, for making racist remarks against Arabs, for making controversial statements like that Hitler and Mussolini were the pupils of the Catholic Church, etc. The right-wing MPs repeatedly asked the Free Democrats to distance themselves from the Faith Church. (ibid. pp. 12-13)

¹⁷² The possibility for the Faith Church to participate in army chaplaincy through the Protestant chaplaincy, a practice existing since 1996, was denied in 1999 (Enyedi 2000a:13).

¹⁷³ The conservative coalition government elected in 1998 wanted to limit registration to those churches that have at least 10,000 members and have been active in Hungary for at least one hundred years (David W. Hendon; Dwight D. Allman and Donald E. Greco (1999) “Notes on Church-State

operation¹⁷⁴, and the Churches are clearly favored over non-religious associations. There is very liberal legal regulation of religious activity¹⁷⁵. Since the tax year 1997, taxpayers can offer 1% of their income tax to registered churches. In the secularized Hungarian society only slightly more than ten percent of the taxpayers donate one percent of their income tax to Churches¹⁷⁶. Since 1989 the amount of financial assistance to the Churches depended on the conditions of the budget and on the will of the parliamentary majority¹⁷⁷. There has been conflict between non-conformist and traditional Churches over the financial subsidies of the state¹⁷⁸. The socialist-liberal coalition government (1994-1998) did not change the system of financing the Churches, although every year there were renewed disputes about how much the state should allot to the Churches¹⁷⁹.

3.2.3. Access of the Church to the government

Like in Poland, the political influence of the Church was dependent on the political allies (the government was formed by the pro-Church parties in 1990-1994 and 1998-2002), but the actual level of the influence of the Church on even the pro-Church government decisions remained smaller than in the case of Poland, as the allies of the Church were less eager to defend its interests. At the same time the Church influenced indirectly also the decisions of the left-wing governing coalitions. The total level of the access to the government is counted as middle.

Affairs: Hungary”, *Journal of Church & State*, 4:856). These plans of the Hungarian government were highly criticised by the European Union officials in 1999 (Enyedi 2000a:16).

¹⁷⁴ Enyedi 2000a:5-6

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 6. The Churches have an almost absolute autonomy in financial issues: the state may not control the management of the Churches’ funds. The Churches have the right to establish educational institutions, to organize religious instruction in state schools, are exempted from paying local taxes etc.

¹⁷⁶ Enyedi 2000a:7

¹⁷⁷ Enyedi 2000b:164

¹⁷⁸ Enyedi 2000a:7

¹⁷⁹ Dobszay 1996; Luxmoore 1999

Table 5. Hungary. Variables and indicators of religion in politics

Variable	Nature and value of the indicators	Value of the variable
Religious political cleavage	Religion is the strongest indicator of voting preference and party identification (5)	Very strong (5)
	Religion is an important basis of government coalition formation (5)	
	Non-economic cleavages overlap (5)	
Goals attained by the Church	Compromise solution has been reached regarding the restitution of Church' property (3)	Strong-middle (3.5)
	Religious instruction (1990) is offered on voluntary basis (4)	
	Moderate abortion law (1992) (2)	
	Four historical denominations are legally privileged. They have not succeeded to gain more restrictive law for registration of religious groups (4)	
	The principle of 'co-operative separation' characterizes church-state relationship. Yet financial assistance to Church depends partly on the will of parliamentary majority (4)	
Access to the government	The Church depends on its political allies. Church' influence on the decisions of government is not as strong as in Poland.	Middle (3)

Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church.

3.3. Church's strategies

In the beginning of party politics the dominant attitude regarding the Church was positive. The left wing parties stressed their good will towards Churches while center-to-right parties posed as "good Christians". The only notable political party that went on open conflict course with the traditional churches was the Alliance of Free Democrats, a left-wing liberal party that acted as an advocate of religious minorities. The center-to-right parties were the allies of traditional Churches in the

moral revival of the nation, and most of the political arena was receptive to the social services of churches.¹⁸⁰

Table 6. Hungarian parties and distribution of percentage of list votes and number of seats in Hungarian parliamentary elections, 1945, 1947, 1990-1998

	1945	1947	1990	1994	1998
FIDESZ: Alliance of Young Democrats, after 1994 Fidesz-MPP: Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party	-	-	8.95 (21)	7.02 (20)	29.45 (148)
FKGP: Independent Smallholders' Party, agrarian-conserv.	57,0%	15,4%	11.73 (44)	8.82 (26)	13.14 (48)
KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party	FKGP	16,4%	6.46 (21)	7.03 (22)	2.31 (-)
MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum, conserv.	-	-	24.73 (164)	11.74 (37)	2.80 (17)
MIÉP: Party of Hungarian Justice and Life, nationalist	-	-	-	1.59 (-)	5.47 (14)
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party, social-democrats	17,4%	14,9%	10.89 (33)	32.99 (209)	32.89 (134)
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats, liberal	-	-	21.39 (92)	19.74 (70)	7.57 (24)

Pro-Church parties are in bold shrift. By third election, the FIDESZ had changed its position of being anti-clerical to clerical.

Mixed strategy

The Church supported Christian and Christian Democratic parties in the first two elections and had a mixed strategy (Christian and Christian Democratic strategy). By third election it decidedly choose a Christian Democratic strategy and withdraw its support from a Christian party KDNP.

KDNP is nominally Christian Democratic party, but essentially a Christian party¹⁸¹. Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was recognized by the West European

¹⁸⁰ Schanda, 1999:14

¹⁸¹ KDNP may be even called the Catholic-sub-cultural party, as according to the survey from mid-1990s 97 per cent of those who mentioned explicitly religious motives for voting, gave their vote for KDNP (Enyedi 2000b:167).

Christian democrats as their Hungarian sister party¹⁸² in the beginning of 1990s, since the MDF was much more 'centrist'¹⁸³. The 1991 electoral campaign of Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) was based on Hungary's historic identity as a Christian and European nation¹⁸⁴. Also FKGP should be considered as a Christian Democratic party, as its appeal was also moderate religious (in the 1990 election its motto was "God, Family and Fatherland").

The Church supported the coalition governments of FKGP, MDF and KDNP (1990-1994), and in a number of cases the Prime Minister of the government turned for moral support to the traditional Churches—the Catholic, the Calvinist, and the Lutheran¹⁸⁵. The policy towards the Churches of the pro-Church government between 1990-1994 was rated as favorable, although not all the goals of the Church were fulfilled¹⁸⁶. Also this 'Christian-national block' became fragmented, as MDF took on more Christian-radical rather than moderate centrist image and lost popular support¹⁸⁷.

The following socialist-liberal coalition government (1994-1998) did not change the privileges that the traditional Churches had gained earlier, but as far as new laws were concerned, it was more in favor of giving equal rights to the new and smaller churches.

¹⁸² MDF still is a member party of Christian Democrat and People's Parties International (The homepage of CDI/PPI, http://www.idc-cdi.org/parties/miembros_idc/Hungria_MDF.asp, accessed April 4, 2002).

¹⁸³ Crawford 1996:236. Also Gabor Tóka has found that MDF and FKGP had a much more complex appeal and they had more electoral support among irregular church-goers and the non-religious than the religious parties (Tóka 1996:111).

¹⁸⁴ Tökés 1997:118

¹⁸⁵ Dobszay 1996. Devoutly Catholic Prime Minister Jozsef Antall emphasized that the various churches and denominations of the country should participate in the program of National Renewal launched by the government (Gagnere 1993).

¹⁸⁶ Dobszay 1996

¹⁸⁷ Enyedi, 2000a:157

Christian-Democratic strategy

As KDNP took more extremist position by 1998, the Church abandoned this party, and KDNP was not able to surpass the 5 per cent electoral threshold¹⁸⁸. The Church supported more liberal party FIDESZ instead¹⁸⁹. FIDESZ had changed its position on the religious-secular continuum during 1990s. In 1990 FIDESZ had been on anti-clerical side, but became later less secular and less cosmopolitan on religious and national issues¹⁹⁰. The new ally of the traditional Churches, FIDESZ, served them well – it elevated Christian politicians to government positions, and satisfied the requests of these Churches – whether material or symbolic in nature – almost without exception¹⁹¹.

Moderate demands

The traditional Churches choose Christian Democratic strategy to support parties with moderate religious appeal, and in accordance with it the Churches kept quite low profile and did not become as militant as the Catholic Church in Poland¹⁹². The moderate solution on abortion issue was not fought against vehemently. The strategy of not going to extremes proved also efficient in the choice of the allies.

The Church supported the right-wing parties through all three elections. The Catholic Church expressed its right-wing sympathy through circulars issued before the elections without being directly linked up with any particular party, yet it called Christians to give their vote to the pro-Church parties¹⁹³.

¹⁸⁸ Enyedi 2000b:167

¹⁸⁹ In the circular issued before the 1998 elections, the clergy asked the flock not to waste votes for small parties. This declaration was widely understood as the withdrawal of the support from the previous ally, the Christian Democrats (KDNP), and a positive gesture towards FIDESZ. (Enyedi 2000a:5)

¹⁹⁰ Enyedi, 2000a:157

¹⁹¹ Enyedi 2000b:166

¹⁹² Gagnere 1993

¹⁹³ Dobszay 1996

Interestingly enough, the Church took away its support from parties that concentrated to the religious vote, took on a more extreme position and in that way, at least in principle, should have served the interests of religion and the Church in the best way. KDNP should have been the first choice of the Church, but wasn't. The fact, that the Church withdrew support from parties that narrowed their electoral appeal to religion, proves most tellingly that Church in Hungary has acted rationally and has chosen strategy that serves best its interests.

3.4. Discussion

Partly because of international pressure, the traditional churches of Hungary have not gained a more restrictive law for registration of religious groups. Otherwise, the pro-Church governments have met their need for resources, although the Church has not been able to have wide influence over the law-making, and especially moderate is the influence of the Church on the social norms and values. The main gains of the traditional Churches have been their legal privileges and financial assistance from state.

But religion has become politically even more relevant than in Poland, and not because of widely held Christian beliefs or wide support of the Church dogmas and positions on abortion and other politically important moral issues. Even the high symbolical value that religion has cannot explain why the religious cleavage has become stronger in the Hungarian politics than in society. The symbolical strength of religion was an available resource to use for political mobilization, but the moderate claims of the Church, and later also the change of strategy from a mixture of Christian Democratic and Christian strategies to a Christian Democratic strategy avoided too strong anti-clerical backlash and so the religious political cleavage remained with the strongest level of polarization.

Chapter 4. The Czech Republic

4.1. Religion in society

4.1.1. Institutional religion

There was a revival of interest in religion in the Czech Republic after the "Velvet Revolution" in 1989, but the number of those professing religious beliefs or participating in organized religion has fallen steadily since then¹⁹⁴. In 1991 the number of atheists rose for the first time above those belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, the proportional ratio of religious affiliation remained more or less the same in 1990s¹⁹⁵.

Despite the obvious secularity and high number of atheists, the religious traditions have still a relevant place in society. There still exists a tradition of Christmas Christianity, even among those who do not have strong Christian beliefs¹⁹⁶. Like in

¹⁹⁴ In an opinion poll of 1999 only 35 percent claimed to believe in a higher spiritual power, and 64 percent identified themselves as atheists (U.S. Department of State (2000) "The Czech Republic"). According to European Values Study of 1999 11.7% visit Church more than once a month, 33.6% belongs to religious denomination, 38.9% believe in God, 17.5% prays at least once a week (Halman 2001:78,74,86,98).

¹⁹⁵ The 1991 Czechoslovak census results for religion reported the following amounts of members and population percentages: 39.7 without confession, 39.2% Roman Catholic, 16.2% uncertain, 1.9% Czech Brethren, 1.7% Czechoslovak Hussite, other 1.3% (Clark 1996). In the end of 1990s these figures were Roman Catholic 39.2%, Protestant 4.6%, Orthodox 3%, Atheists 39.8%, other 13.4% (The World Factbook 1999 cited in O'Mahony 2000:1).

¹⁹⁶ Czech research institute STEM found in December 1999 that: 12% of Czechs attend church services at least once a month, 37% believe in God, 44% attend Christmas mass (Huk 2000).

other countries, the Czech Catholicism is far from being homogeneous and is made up of a variety of people who have a wide range of opinions on social issues¹⁹⁷.

About one fourth of the population favors the Church participation in politics¹⁹⁸, in the beginning of 1990s the population was sharply divided because of the main religious political issue - restitution of the confiscated property to the Churches –, but later the majority of the population tended to support the restitution of buildings and to oppose the restitution of forests, fields, and industries to the churches¹⁹⁹. As there are ten times more Catholics than Protestants, the attitude regarding restitution of property to Churches reflects the attitude regarding the Catholic Church²⁰⁰. There definitely exists strong anti-clericalism in Czech society. In 1999 only 12.6% of the respondents of European Values Study Surveys found that religious leaders should influence government decisions, only 8.9% found that it would be better for their country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office, and only 10.3% found that religious leaders should influence how people vote in elections²⁰¹. The population is in favor of pro-choice attitude regarding abortion, even the electorate of the Christian Democratic party KDU-CSL (which stood for ‘Abortion is prohibited’) were on less anti-abortion position than their party²⁰².

¹⁹⁷ There are tensions between "humble believers" and "intellectuals" especially regarding liberal values of Western society (Přihoda 1997).

¹⁹⁸ On the basis of survey data collected in 1997 26.1% considered it appropriate for the Church to declare itself on governmental policy (Flere 2001:187-190).

¹⁹⁹ Clark 1996. Opinion polls (by the Institute of Public Opinion Research) carried out from 1991 show an average of 50% or less opposed to church restitution with this figure falling to 36% by 1996. Another poll in 1996, showed that a majority of respondents were in favor of restitution. (O'Mahony 2000:8)

²⁰⁰ The Catholic Church still is the most powerful religious institution of the country. In 1999 84.3% of the religiously affiliated people belonged to the Catholic Church (Halman 2001:74).

²⁰¹ Ibid. pp. 105-107

²⁰² Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319

4.1.2. Symbolical religion

The Czech Republic²⁰³ consists of the territories of three historic Czech provinces: Bohemia, Moravia and southern parts of Silesia. There has never existed a Czechoslovak nation²⁰⁴. The ancestors of Czech people accepted Christianity in the 9th century²⁰⁵. Czech's national feeling is closely connected with the Hussites and the Battle of White Mountain (8 November 1620), where by that time the overwhelmingly Protestant Czechs were defeated by Catholic Austria²⁰⁶. The "Hussite" Church has been the historical national Church for the Czechs. Forced conversion to Catholicism in following Counter-Reformation was later perceived as anti-national²⁰⁷, so the Czechs took the Hussite Protestantism as a basis of national ideology in nineteenth century²⁰⁸.

The Catholic Church became increasingly subordinated to the state²⁰⁹, Catholicism remained the state religion also from 1867 to 1918²¹⁰. From 1867 all the churches

²⁰³ The Czech Republic has only existed since 1993, but the Czech's lands have been a separate geopolitical entity since the ninth century. Czechoslovakia, a composite state of the Czechs and the Slovaks, was created out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I and existed from 1918-93. (Clark 1996)

²⁰⁴ The Church in Czechoslovakia was never national, as Czechs and Slovaks had their own autonomous national histories and identities (Ramet 1998:113).

²⁰⁵ Tretera 1999:1

²⁰⁶ Ramet 1987:73-74,79; Ramet 1998:113. Before the Battle of White Mountain, approximately 85 to 90% of the population of the Czech lands were not Catholic, but under the new policy of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose land, those religion), the country was quickly and effectively reconverted to Catholicism (Clark 1996).

²⁰⁷ Under the Habsburgs, forced Catholicization proceeded hand in hand with Germanization and thus there has always been in the Czech lands a feeling that Catholicism, although the majority religion, is at the same time anti-national (O'Mahony 2000:9).

²⁰⁸ Protestantism became a crime punishable by death. Counter-Reformation decreased the number of the population of Bohemia and Moravia from 3 million to less than one million. The Catholic faith was the official religion of the state. In 1874 the government was authorized to regulate internal Church affairs, i.e. the Catholic Church became legally subordinate to the state. (Ramet 1998:114)

²⁰⁹ Since the Counter-Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church gradually came under the control of the state through most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Clark 1996).

²¹⁰ The principle *cuius regio, eius religio* allowed Catholicism to be the only legal religion in the Habsburg empire until 1849 (Winter 2000). From 1867 Catholicism remained the state religion in the Austrian half of the empire (Ramet 1998:106-107).

gained a right to be registered by the state if they fulfill legal demands²¹¹, but the population remained overwhelmingly Catholic up to the World War I²¹². While all the recognized churches were financially dependent on the state and had to gain the state's approval for church appointments, the Catholic Church remained clearly favored.

After the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the new Czechoslovak State incorporated the 1874 Habsburg law on state control of religion into its legal codex²¹³. As a result of an upsurge of anti-Catholic and anticlerical feeling among the Czechs the Hussite church was revived and many Czech intellectuals converted to Protestantism²¹⁴. The Czech anti-Catholicism lost much of its steam by the 1930s²¹⁵, although Czechoslovak President Tomas Masaryk tried to follow the Western model of separation of church and state and the Czechoslovak government supported Hussite churches²¹⁶. Like in the politics of 1990s, also for the Masaryk government the main concern was economy²¹⁷, not religion or cultural issues.

The Communist regime used for the persecution of the church the anti-Catholic sentiment prevalent in the population and the tradition of the subordination of the Churches to the state²¹⁸. The government particularly targeted the Catholic Church

²¹¹ Registered churches had the right to teach religion at public schools and to practice religious services in the army. Salaries of priests were partially financed by state (Tretera 1999:1).

²¹² Catholics formed 96.1% of the population of the Czech lands in 1890 (Clark 1996).

²¹³ Winter 2000

²¹⁴ Ramet 1998:114. After 1920 ca 20% of the Czech people voluntarily gave up their membership in the Catholic Church, half of these founded the Czechoslovakian Church in 1920 (Tretera 1999:1).

²¹⁵ Official land reforms of 1919 took lands from the Catholic Church, reducing their holdings to two percent of the current Czech Republic. Over time, the support for strict separation of church and state diminished, in 1925 the government officially supported the celebration of the 510th anniversary of Jan Hus's martyrdom and in 1929 it honored the millennium of St. Wenceslas. In addition, state financial support of registered churches was increased in 1926. (Clark 1996)

²¹⁶ Ramet 1998:115.

²¹⁷ Within a short time after World War I, the young Czech nation developed into the seventh largest industrialized state of its day (Stránský 2000).

²¹⁸ In Czechoslovakia the communist state continued to pay salaries to clergy (Ramet 1998:6). Under the 1948 constitution, all church lands, schools were nationalized and clergy became state officials. The State Office for Church Affairs supervised and controlled the churches. From 1949 direct state financial support was given to all registered churches. (Clark 1996)

and those who did not submit to the changed conditions²¹⁹. The situation improved only for a brief period during the Prague Spring of 1968, but later again the repressive laws were enforced²²⁰. There were also several clergy who remained part of the underground church and of the opposition to the end. The 1980s saw a clear sharpening of the regime's effort to undermine religion²²¹. The principal hardship for the Catholic Church was the Czechoslovakia's unwillingness to accept the Vatican's candidates for vacant Episcopal seats²²². There were a number of Catholic dissidents who during Communist regime played an active role in the opposition and brought with it also the rising public support for the Catholic Church both among believers and non-believers²²³.

The Roman Catholic Church entered the transition period as the oldest, the largest and most influential religious institution in the Czech Republic. In November 1989 bloodless "Velvet Revolution" there were some Church activists involved. Although the organized churches and the underground church were not nearly as involved in the revolution as they were in Poland²²⁴, the public supported the Church. The Catholic Church seemed to benefit a lot from the transition²²⁵. Having undergone severe persecution under Communist regime, the image of the Catholic Church had lost at least some of its anti-national image²²⁶.

²¹⁹ In 1950 police arrested 3000 monks and 10,000 nuns (Ramet 1998:117). Over 2,000 priests were placed in labor camps, and the majority of monastic orders were closed (Clark 1996; O'Mahony 2000:2).

²²⁰ O'Mahony 2000:1

²²¹ Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Catholic clergy and lay activists had been subjected to harassment, intimidation, arrests, the confiscation of religious materials, and even murder. In early 1980s still about a hundred priests were in prisons. (Ramet 1998:133,134).

²²² In November 1988 ten of the country's thirteen Episcopal seats remained vacant (ibid. p. 134).

²²³ O'Mahony names Frantisek Tomasek, Vaclav Maly and Vaclav Benda (O'Mahony 2000:9).

²²⁴ Clark 1996

²²⁵ The pope visited the country in 1990 and candidates selected by Rome filled all the vacant Episcopal seats. Also the restoration of confiscated property to the Church was started, and passage of a law in 1990 permitting private and religious schools. (Ramet 1998:139)

²²⁶ The Czech linguistic, cultural, economic, and political revival since the 19th century was never on very good terms with Catholicism (and vice-versa). The transition to democracy was one relative

During the first visit of pope to the Czech Republic, the socio-political position of the Catholic Church seemed to be good: there were several politicians from the political elite willing to use the pro-Catholic atmosphere of that period, which unfortunately motivated also the liberals within the Civic Forum to launch a counter-offensive²²⁷.

In the beginning of transition population did not share militant anti-Catholic sentiment, but the historical tradition of anti-Catholicism, closely linked to the national idea, became the main argument used in political debate for not changing the system of financial subordination of the churches to the state.

Table 7. The Czech Republic. Indicators of religion in society

Indicator	Nature	Value
Strength of institutional religion	Middle level of religious affiliation, level of religious attendance relatively low	Weak (2)
Strength of symbolical religion	National idea closely linked to anti-Catholicism and the Hussite church. In the beginning of transition the anti-Catholicism sentiment decreased for a brief period.	Middle (3)*
Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage	The social conflict tends to be biased towards anti-clericalism	Middle (3)
Religious-secular cleavage	Relatively few of those, who are religious according to Church doctrine, large proportion of convinced atheists	Weak (2)

* As the symbolical religion is essentially anti-Catholic, the strength of symbolical religion is very weak for the Catholic Church

exception to that rule that proved not to last long. Old stereotypes came back as the country returned to ordinary life. (Příhoda 1997)

²²⁷ Halík 1997

4.2. Religion in politics

4.2.1. Religious political cleavage

Religion is of secondary importance as an indicator of voting preference and party identification²²⁸. By far the strongest factor that divides issue opinions is socio-economic protectionism versus market liberalism, religion-morality dimension is much weaker than the economic divide²²⁹. Religious vote is most closely linked with the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovakian People’s Party (KDU-CSL), which is the only party that supports Church’s influence over politics and Church position on abortion²³⁰. Religion-secularism is important source of party identification mainly for KDU-CSL and Social Democrats, as both were appealing to the voters who identified themselves as centrist²³¹.

As KDU-CSL has relatively small share of seats in the parliament, religion is only relatively relevant in the party politics of the Czech Republic. The situation of the Church did not improve substantially during the time when KDU-CSL was part of government coalition (1992-1998). Religion (i.e. the restitution issue) was among the aspects that caused the break-up of the government in 1997, but as the KDU-CSL was only a minor coalition partner, religion can be counted at most as a secondary basis of coalition formation. Religious divide in the party politics does not overlap with other cleavages.

²²⁸ In 1997 public opinion survey only 8.6% of the respondents told that religious conviction has an impact on their political attitudes (Flere 2001:187).

²²⁹ Kitschelt et al 1999:266

²³⁰ Czech parties were in the mid 1990s mostly on the position of rejecting the church influence. Only KDU-CSL was endorsing the church influence. (Kitschelt et al 1999:318-319)

²³¹ There was a potential for rivalry for the Social Democrats and the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL); 61% of KDU-CSL supporters put themselves at the center and 60% of Social Democrat supporters also saw themselves as being centrist. (Mateju et al 1998:264)

4.2.2. Goals attained by the Church

The main religious issue that became politicized in the Czech politics was the restitution of Church property confiscated during the Communist regime. This issue in turn became closely linked with the issues of regulation of religious market and of social conflict. The abortion and religious education issues were solved without a major dispute and mostly by rejecting the will of the Church.

The Catholic Church had to accept the compromise solutions regarding religious education and abortion. Catholic Church was unable to obtain also the introduction of religious instruction *per se* into the public school system. Instead, a class on “civic education” has been introduced, designed to inform schoolchildren about morals and ethics²³². Also the goal of the Church regarding abortion – a strict ban on abortion - remained unfulfilled and compromise solution was incorporated to Constitution and to an abortion law²³³.

In 1948 Church land and forest holdings were confiscated²³⁴. In 1990-1991 church received some of its property back²³⁵, but proportionally relatively little. At the same time the practice of paying the clergy’s salaries was continued on the argument that the Church was not able to survive financially on the basis of believers’ donations

²³² Ramet 1998:140

²³³ In 1990 Czech bishops advocated a strict ban on abortion that the bishops expected to be incorporated into a major constitutional text. The Bill of Fundamental Rights and Liberties does not give them satisfaction on this point, although it does provide that "human life deserves protection even before birth." On 31 March 1992, a bill limiting abortion was introduced before the Czech National Council. (Gagnere 1993)

²³⁴ Winter 2000

²³⁵ In Czech Republic about 250 buildings and land plots were returned to Catholic religious orders and congregations, but the Church laid claim to an additional 3,300 buildings and 600,000 acres of land (Ramet 1998:140).

and its own resources²³⁶. In 1992 a draft bill that would have returned property to the Catholic Church failed in Parliament²³⁷.

Initially the Catholic Church wanted to receive back all the property that was earlier lost²³⁸, later the Church considered the increasingly negative political climate as well as its position as the greatest claimant of previously confiscated property, and was ready for compromise solution²³⁹. As the political opposition to the restitution of church property grew, the Church hierarchy was willing to accept a compromise solution, being content with the return of just 800 of the 3,300 buildings in dispute²⁴⁰. When the Social Democratic government came to power in August 1998, it halted further restitution of 432,250 acres of land and some 700 buildings to the Catholic Church²⁴¹. Both politicians and bishops stress that the restitution of property to the Catholic Church is failed due to the public opposition to it, because of an age-old antipathy towards Catholicism²⁴².

The 1992 constitution requires that the state not exclusively identify with one particular religion or ideology, but does not specify how closely the state should or should not cooperate with or support churches²⁴³. The Communist ‘Czechoslovak

²³⁶ Ramet 1998:140

²³⁷ O’Mahony 2000:5

²³⁸ In 1993 the Catholic bishops requested that the government return to the Church not only churches and monasteries but also other properties such as farms, forests, even some small breweries which had once belonged to the church. (DiDomizio 1997)

²³⁹ Sidonie Winter states that the Roman Catholic Church was deliberating about if and how much of its property would be needed to cover its expenses, aside from other financial resources such as gifts, collections, and intentions (Winter 2000).

²⁴⁰ Ramet 1998:140. This in turn would have meant that the church was still in need also of state subsidies.

²⁴¹ U.S. Department of State (2000) “The Czech Republic”

²⁴² O’Mahony 2000:7

²⁴³ The economic provisions of 1949 provide for direct state support of all registered churches, were still in effect in 1996. In 1995, this support equaled about 400 million crowns (\$15.4 million) yearly and was divided among fifteen of the registered churches as needed to pay the salaries of their clergy (Clark 1996).

Federal Law on Churches and Religious Organization' continues to operate as the enabling legislation²⁴⁴.

In comparison with other countries of the study the legal demands for registration of religious organization or church are extremely strict in the Czech Republic²⁴⁵ and there have been efforts to raise the legal demands for entry to the religious market even higher²⁴⁶. All religions officially registered receive subsidies from the State²⁴⁷. In 2000 there were 21 such state-recognized religions.

The Catholic Church is definitely the largest church in the religious market (more than 80% of affiliated religious people are Catholics), but it is the only one claiming restitution of property, as other denominations do not or cannot make such claims²⁴⁸. Restitution is important for the Catholic Church because it would provide an independent source of income²⁴⁹, and would increase the resources of the Catholic Church²⁵⁰. The disproportional benefits that the Catholic Church would get from restitution have led to increasing hostility regarding the Catholic Church²⁵¹.

The image of the Catholic Church has become increasingly spoiled partly because of the acts that the Church itself has done. In 1995 tensions between Catholics and non-

²⁴⁴ The Law maintains the institutionalized economic arrangement between church and state where priests and bishops (regarded under Communism as civil servants) remain on the payroll of the state. (O'Mahony 2000:3)

²⁴⁵ For a church or religious organization to be registered under 1991 law, 10,000 of Czech signatures are required or 500 Czech signatures if the church is a member of the World Council of Churches (Clark 1996).

²⁴⁶ In December 2001 President Vaclav Havel vetoed a proposed more restrictive law for registration of religious groups. Proposed law required for registration of religious groups 20,000 signatures of Czech citizens - double the number of signatures required earlier. (Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Praises Czech President for Veto of Restrictive Religion Law. *Washington*, December 10, 2001)

²⁴⁷ Churches receive approximately \$88.2 million annually from the Government. Funds are divided proportionately among the 21 registered religions according to membership. (U.S. Department of State (2000) "The Czech Republic")

²⁴⁸ Here are meant the Hussite Church, the Old Catholic Church and the Orthodox churches. Protestant Churches in Czech lands did not own any land, they are generally satisfied with state financial support and gladly settle for the return of a few previously owned buildings. (Winter 2000)

²⁴⁹ O'Mahony 2000:6

²⁵⁰ Winter 2000

Catholics, and also between the Catholic Church and the government increased when Pope John Paul II canonized Jan Sankander²⁵². Non-Catholics are afraid that the Catholic Church wants to assert its hegemony²⁵³ and the state subsidies to this church are perceived as too large²⁵⁴.

Table 8. The Czech Republic. Variables and indicators of religion in politics

Variable	Nature and value of the indicators	Value
Religious political cleavage	Religion is not a main basis of coalition formation (3)	Middle (3)
	Religion is of secondary importance as an indicator of voting preference and party identification (3)	
	Religious political cleavage is weak and does not overlap with other cleavages (1)	
Goals attained by the Church	Restitution of property started in 1990, but came to standstill (1)	Weak-very weak (1.5)
	No explicitly religious education classes in public schools (1)	
	The Church could not influence much the content of the moderate abortion law (1992) (2)	
	There are strict laws for registration of religious groups. The Church' effort to make them stricter has failed. 21 religions receive state subsidies (2)	
	Church and state are separated, but the Catholic Church has not achieved autonomy from state (1)	
Access to government	Church has not gained an access to the government	(1)

Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church.

²⁵¹ Ramet 1998:140

²⁵² In the eyes of many Czechs Sankander, a Pole, was branded a traitor to the Czech cause, because he reportedly betrayed military secrets to the invading Catholic army. (DiDomizio 1997; David W. Hendon and James M. Kennedy (1995). Notes on church-state affairs: Czech Republic. *Journal of Church & State* 4:927)

²⁵³ Ramet 1998:140

²⁵⁴ Catholic clergy said in 1996 that it would cost \$1.5 billion just to restore churches, monasteries, and other buildings. The expected burden to state has caused the increasing public resentment. (Jordan, Michael J. "Now-secular Hungarians reluctant to return schools to church", *Christian Science Monitor*, September 09, 1996, 199:7)

4.2.3. Access of the Church to the government

The inability of the Church to gain access to the government was the main reason for the change in strategy in the third parliamentary elections. The interests of the Church have been represented at the level of one party, but not at the level of the government. The total level of the access to the government is counted as very weak.

4.3. Church's strategies

Radical demands, Christian strategy, support to one party

The Catholic Church entered democracy with radical demands and active participation in the political process. In 1990 election, when the image of the Catholic Church was quite good, Czech bishops pointed out that in elections citizens should be guided by Christian principles²⁵⁵. But the initial public support for the Church did not last²⁵⁶. Church chose to be identified with one party, KDU-CSL, and that party represented the goals of the Church in the political arena²⁵⁷. That strategy anyway did not guarantee for the Church an access to the policy-making process, as the government coalition in whole did not accept the demands of the Church²⁵⁸. Church had no direct link to government, even in 1998 there did not exist any structural body

²⁵⁵ Gagnere 1993

²⁵⁶ Hanuš 2000

²⁵⁷ For example, KDU-CSL was militantly against the law that gave homosexual couples similar rights to those of a husband and wife ("Catholic church protests registered partnership for homosexuals", *AP Worldstream*, February 03, February 03, 2001), and stood in the political arena for the position of the Church that sex education must be based on 'Christian principles' (Ramet 1998:141).

²⁵⁸ The issue of restitution was processed entirely at the level of the state with the church having little impact on eventual outcomes (O'Mahony 2000:6).

where the politicians and the Church hierarchy could meet and discuss over the restitution-issue²⁵⁹.

Table 9. Election to the National Council (1992) and House of Representatives (1996, 1998)

Party	1992		1996		1998	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
(CSSD) Czech Social Democratic Party	6,5%	16	26,4%	61	32,3%	74
(ODS) Civic Democratic Party, conserv.	29,7%	76	29,6%	68	27,7%	63
(KSCM) Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, communist	14,0%	35	10,3%	22	11,0%	24
(KDU-CSL) Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party, christian-dem.	6,3%	15	8,1%	18	9,0%	20
(US) Freedom Union, conserv.-liberal	-	-	-	-	8,6%	19
(RSC-SPR) Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, nationalist	6,0%	14	8,0%	18	3,9%	-
(ODA) Civic Democratic Alliance, conserv.	5,9%	14	6,4%	13	-	-
(LSU) Liberal Social Union, liberal	6,5%	16	-	-	-	-
(HSD-SMS) Society for Moravia and Silesia, regionalist	5,9%	14	-	-	-	-
Others	19,2%	-	6,4%	-	7,5%	-

Pro-Church parties are in bold shrift.

Source: Europe - parliamentary elections since 1945, accessed March 6, 2002, <http://www-public.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de/~nordsiew/czech.html>

The predecessor of KDU-CSL, the Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL) was between 1948 and 1989 CSL under control of Communist Party. After the "Velvet Revolution" CSL has regained the status of an independent Christian political party. In 1992 the CSL fused together with the new party Christian and Democratic Union and the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-CSL) arose. The KDU-CSL was a part of the right-wing coalition that governed till the 1998 parliamentary election.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁹ Church was from the beginning concerned that it had not been allowed to participate officially in a democratic decision making process. (O'Mahony 2000:7)

²⁶⁰ Basic Information about KDU-CSL. KDU-CSL homepage, accessed March 6, 2002, http://www.kdu.cz/ENGLISH/def_inf.htm

KDU-CSL has been the most active party on issues of Catholic communal property²⁶¹ and has most eagerly sought clarity on the churches role in society²⁶². Originally, after 1989, there was also another ally of the Catholic Church - the Christian Democratic Party of Vaclav Benda, but this was a weak party with few roots in society and it merged soon with the ODS²⁶³. Although even certain leaders of the Civic Democrats have claimed that their party embodies many of the values attributed to Christian Democracy²⁶⁴, the only Christian party (that represents religious electorate²⁶⁵ and organized religion) remains KDU-CSL. In the first two elections, KDU-CSL should be counted as a Christian party, which radically stood for the religious values and the positions of the Church.

Too close identification of KDU-CSL with the Catholic Church motivated other parties to label it as ‘Vatican messenger-boy’. The other parties tried to forge their own identities by concentrating on negative identification with KDU-CSL - ‘we are not what you are’²⁶⁶.

As in the Czech Republic, almost all public issues and ideological orientations can be translated into left-right semantics, the KDU-CSL became soon disappointed in being too closely identified with the church and religious issues²⁶⁷.

The social mood gradually changed and anti-clerical emotions started to re-emerge, and there were also those who started cultivating and using that mood²⁶⁸. The culmination came in 1997, when the restitution issue was one of the factors behind

²⁶¹ U.S. Department of State (2000), “The Czech Republic”

²⁶² O’Mahony 2000:3

²⁶³ O’Mahony 2000:16

²⁶⁴ Gagnere 1993

²⁶⁵ In the beginning of 1990s KDU-CSL attracted 30 to 40 per cent of devout Czechs (Tóka 1996:111).

²⁶⁶ O’Mahony 2000:16,18

²⁶⁷ Zarycki 2000:867; Evans and Whitefield 1998:121,126; Markowski 1997:238;240

²⁶⁸ Halik 1997

the collapse of the government coalition²⁶⁹. For the Church, the situation did not improve when the Social Democrats formed government in 1998²⁷⁰. The bishops held anti-Catholicism as the cause for the Church's lack of success in creating links with the state²⁷¹. Anti-Catholicism was in turn fuelled by the Church's choice to emphasize the restitution issue too intensively, which created the impression that the church is an institution interested only in property²⁷². In 2001 the restitution question was unsolved, the Church was still dependent on state and lacking the access to the state²⁷³. The state has tried to isolate the church from public activity even more²⁷⁴.

But the positions of parties regarding the restitution issue were not stable. Throughout the period 1992-1998 the only two parties that remained consistent on the restitution-issue were relatively minor parties - the Communists and KDU-CSL²⁷⁵. There are many examples about the changes in the positions of parties regarding restitution issue²⁷⁶.

²⁶⁹ O'Mahony 2000:9. (Of the culminating tensions a year before wrote also David W. Hendon and James M. Kennedy (1996) "Notes on church-state affairs: Czech Republic", *Journal of Church & State*, 4:934)

²⁷⁰ O'Mahony 2000:7

²⁷¹ Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus made several statements in 1993-1994 criticizing the public role of the Catholic Church, but for the most part his remarks were directed not towards Catholicism *per se* but towards the potential role of the Catholic Church in Czech society. (O'Mahony 2000:13-14)

²⁷² Hanuš 2000

²⁷³ O'Mahony 2000:2

²⁷⁴ President Vaclav Havel vetoed in the beginning of 2002 legislation that would prevent churches from operating hospitals and charities, would give government officials the right to approve the opening of places of worship and formation of religious communities, would raise the membership threshold for churches seeking legal status and would require all profits from church-owned enterprises to be used solely for religious purposes. ("Czech Church Praises Veto of Legislation Limiting Churches". *America*, January 07, 2002)

²⁷⁵ O'Mahony 2000:10

²⁷⁶ Prior to 1992 the smaller of the two Christian Democrats, Vaclav Benda's right-wing Christian Democrats began with an extreme position on restitutions, modified this substantially when they formed an electoral pact with ODS. Throughout the coalitions KDU-CSL held back from criticizing the ODS' anti-church restitution line. The ODA began with an anti-church restitution line, later shifted their position to pro-restitution. The ODS was initially pro-restitution, but ultimately backed the Social Democrats policy to stop all church restitutions. Even Social Democrats modified for a while their opposing-position on the eve of their coming to power in 1998. (O'Mahony 2000:10)

More moderate demands, neutrality regarding political competition

The Church hierarchy has admitted that the strategic choice to be identified with KDU-CSL proved to be counter-productive. The Press Secretary of the Catholic Church stated in 1998 that the link with KDU-CSL is ‘very-very bad’ for the Church and that it would be much better to discuss with the Government, not through only one party²⁷⁷. Church would prefer direct links with the state, but has not been able to achieve these. During the years the Catholic Church have admitted its weak position in terms of symbolical religion and became more willing to accept compromise solutions (regarding abortion, religious education, even restitution issue).

KDU-CSL, in turn, decided to distance a bit from the Church and became of member of the four-party coalition in 1999. The four-party coalition is also determined to support the churches and Christian values, but this is done according to Christian Democratic tradition. In the document “The Christian Democratic Policy For the 21st Century” (1998) KDU-CSL states that they are not ‘political hand of the churches’.²⁷⁸

4.4. Discussion

Why has the Czech Church not gained access to government? Why is the level of attained goals so low? Would it been different, if the Church would have chosen another strategy and chosen not so radical demands? The Church itself has admitted that the choice of radical demands and Christian strategy (with a support to one party) proved to be counter-productive. The Church changed both its strategy to Christian

²⁷⁷ O’Mahony 2000:17

²⁷⁸ Four Czech center-right independent parties: KDU-CSL, US, ODA, and DEU – formed a four-party coalition in 1999. and a year later signed a Declaration “United for Change”, which states that these four parties represent “standard European political currents: a conservative and Christian-Democratic current, based above all on European Christian traditions, and a liberal current, which emphasizes the importance of the political and economic freedom of the individual.” (KDU-CSL homepage, accessed March 6, 2002, http://www.kdu.cz/ENGLISH/def_inf.htm)

Democratic (whereas the Church claims that the preferred solution for the Church would be neutrality regarding the competition of parties, i.e. a direct access to the government) and its radical demands to more moderate ones. If the strategy of neutrality or the choice of more moderate demands were taken by the Church from the beginning, the chances to get access to government and Church's goals fulfilled would have been better. The radical demands of the Church motivated parties to use the symbolical religion (anti-Catholicism) against the Church and its political ally. If more moderate claims were chosen, the motivation of the parties to use anti-clericalism would have been smaller.

The institutionalization of religious social cleavage to religious political cleavage was dependent on the strategic choices made by the Church. And in Czech case these choices advanced the institutionalization of religious political cleavage, but not the interests of the Church.

Chapter 5. Estonia

5.1. Religion in society

5.1.1. Institutional religion

As a legacy from communist rule, the levels of religious affiliation and attendance are very low in Estonia. Only approximately 17% of the population has established a formal membership with religious communities and the largest denomination, Lutherans, is approximately 11% of population, the second largest denomination is the Orthodox Church²⁷⁹. This shows a tremendous decrease since interwar state, where only less than 1% of population was not a member of some denomination.

Ethnic Russians tend to be more religious than ethnic Estonians²⁸⁰. The level of religious practice is also one of the lowest in the world - according to the World Values surveys from 1995-1997 only 4% of Estonians were attending church at least once a week. The levels of religiosity tend to remain the same among ethnical Estonians, while these are rising among other ethnic groups²⁸¹. According to the surveys of 1995 and 2000, the proportion of those who deemed religion to be especially important decreased from 8% to 7% among Estonians and increased from

²⁷⁹ Ringvee 2001; Liiman 2001

²⁸⁰ Smith-Sivertsen 2000:238

²⁸¹ According to the public opinion surveys made by Estonian Council of Churches, Estonian Bible Society and Estonian Evangelical Alliance (ECC-EBS-EEA survey) 19% of population belonged to the congregations in 1995, in 2000 the number was 24%. There was no increase among ethnical Estonians (it remained 24%), among other ethnic groups the affiliation level rose from 13% to 25%. (The homepage of ECC, accessed April 22, 2002, <http://www.ekn.ee/TOOVALDKONNAD/SOTS/index.htm>.)

11% to 14% among non-Estonians. The proportion of Estonians that identified themselves as believers increased from 9% to 11%, among non-Estonians the numbers were 25% and 35%²⁸². The overall percentage of those who identified themselves as believers rose from 16% to 20%²⁸³.

The public opinion is mostly indifferent regarding religious social issues²⁸⁴. The differences of attitudes between church-members and non-church-members do not differ markedly, as can be seen from the Table 10.

Table 10. Estonia. Comparison of the moral attitudes of Church-members and non-Church-members (percentage of those being in favor of...)

	Death penalty	Euthanasia	Abort	Extramarital sex	Prostitution
Church-member	53%	28%	13%	21%	2%
Non-church member	58%	45%	23%	37%	7%

Source: ECC-EBS-EEA survey of 2000

The religious-secular cleavage is weak in society, the Church-members tend to have more conservative positions, but liberally minded religiously non-affiliated people outnumber them. Besides that, there is no strong polarization in society over values.

As the Church has remained neutral regarding the political competition, and it has not chosen to support any party or coalition of parties, there has not arisen clerical/anti-clerical cleavage in society.

²⁸² Rimmel 2001:42,43

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ For example in the 2000 ECC-EBS-EEA survey, the answer 'I don't know, it depends on the situation' was given by 53.6% of respondents to question whether abortion was right, and by 49.3% of respondents to the questions whether homosexuality or extramarital sex was right. Only 7.9% of respondents were against death penalty, 22.7% against abortion, and 17.5% against extramarital sex. Also according to the survey made by the department of political science of University of Tartu in 2000, 55% of the respondents trusted the Church, but 33% did not know how to answer (Toomla 2001:30). Main reason could have been that they did not know a lot about the Church or the Church is not enough seen in the society.

5.1.2. Symbolical religion

Estonia was converted to Catholicism in the beginning of 13th century, but Reformation succeeded in the 1520s and in 1686 the Lutheran Church became a state church according to the Church law of Sweden. Some decades later Russia annexed Estonia, but the privileges of Baltic-German nobility to supervise the church remained.

In 1832 the status of the Lutheran Church was reduced to a tolerated religion next to Orthodox state church²⁸⁵. Denominationally homogeneous country became multi-confessional from the middle of 19th century, when there was a movement from Lutheran Church to Orthodox Church among Estonians²⁸⁶. Population perceived the Lutheran Church as a German church, and Orthodox Church as a Russian church²⁸⁷. The Lutheran Church as an institution fought against Estonian national awakening, although several pastors supported it. In the first half of 19th century the Lutheran Church fought against the Church of Brethren that was closely linked to Estonian national awakening²⁸⁸.

Estonian intelligentsia was divided regarding the proximity of Estonian national idea to Lutheran Church. There were those who hold the Church as the first enemy of the national awakening, and were against the idea that Estonians should become clergy in the Lutheran Church²⁸⁹. There were also some clergy of Estonian descent that tended to link Estonian national identity with the Lutheran church²⁹⁰, but even they were not pleased with the *ius patronatus* functioning in the Church (which allowed the

²⁸⁵ Liiman 2001:13

²⁸⁶ Ibid. By 1897 there was 13% of Estonian people Orthodox (ibid. p. 14).

²⁸⁷ Liiman 2001:14

²⁸⁸ Veem 1990:99

²⁸⁹ Saard 2000:48,106. The conflict between prominent leaders – Carl Robert Jakobson and Jakob Hurt – eventually divided the whole national movement. Jakobson accused the Lutheran minister Jakob Hurt (Estonian by descent) that he has changed the benefit of his country against the benefit coming from the social positions of the clergy (Jakobson, 1959:164).

landowners to invite and name the pastor for a congregation²⁹¹) and were sometimes repressed by the Lutheran Church²⁹².

The conversion from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy was supported by the Czarist government policy, the conversion back to Lutheranism became allowed only after the law of religious toleration in 1905²⁹³. Estonian intelligentsia remained religiously indifferent or even anti-clerical up to the 20th century²⁹⁴. The Estonian national movement tried to reconcile the division over Lutheranism, but the role of the religion was eventually limited mostly to the field of morals²⁹⁵. The nationalist movement wanted to decrease the power of the Church²⁹⁶. Only after 1905 Estonians started actively to demand Estonian clergy as parish vicars²⁹⁷. Until 1918 the German *Landeskirchen* were governed by the *ius patronatus* and belonged to the descendants of the Teutonic knights, the Estonian clerical participation in these German-controlled Lutheran churches remained minor²⁹⁸.

The independent Estonian state nationalized all the lands and buildings of the Church in 1919, in 1925 these were partly restituted²⁹⁹. In the interwar years there was no state church³⁰⁰, but both the Estonian Lutheran Church and Estonian Orthodox

²⁹⁰ The main argument for defending German culture was the idea that Estonian culture was a partaker in it (Hurt 1989:82).

²⁹¹ Veem 1990:162

²⁹² In 1879 the nationalist-minded Estonian pastor Jakob Hurt accused the Baltic-German Church in being against the Estonian national movement. As a result was 'exiled' to St Petersburg (Hurt 1989:9).

²⁹³ Karjahärm 1997:17, 18, 29

²⁹⁴ Karjahärm et al 2001:106

²⁹⁵ Veem 1990:166

²⁹⁶ There were different opinions of the proximity of the Lutheran Church to Estonian national identity, but it was widely accepted that the public school should not be under the influence of the Church (Tarvel 1960:138,120).

²⁹⁷ Saard 2000:312

²⁹⁸ Hope 2001:1274

²⁹⁹ Post, Evar. "Riigi ja Kiriku vahekord Eesti Vabariigis", *Eesti Kirik*, May 13, 1990; Karjahärm et al 2001:108

³⁰⁰ The 1920 Constitution set forth that there should be no state religion (Kiviorg 1999:2).

Church wanted to get closer to the national idea³⁰¹. Lutheran Church strived to get rid of the image of *Herrenkirche*³⁰² and to become a people's church, but in fact it did not manage to do so, because there remained too great number of clergy of German descent until the year 1939³⁰³. As a matter of fact, in the beginning of the 20th century there was proportionally more ethnical Estonian clergy in Orthodox Church than in Lutheran church³⁰⁴.

In 1934, Konstantin Päts, the head of state, established a mild authoritarian regime³⁰⁵ that passed laws strengthening the links between state and church and as the rights of the state increased, the quite democratic principles of the people's church were abandoned³⁰⁶, and the Lutheran and Orthodox churches became public-legal persons³⁰⁷.

Another sign of the fact that the Lutheran Church did not manage to become national church of Estonians during the interwar years was the quite low level of religiosity of Estonians³⁰⁸.

With the Soviet occupation and the implementation of anti-Christian legislation, the Church lost most of its clergy and its property was nationalized. The people did not

³⁰¹ In 1923 the Estonian Orthodox church went to judicial subordination to Patriarchy of Constantinople (Liiman 2001:15). Apostolic Orthodox Church introduced services, songs, liturgy in Estonian language, in order to get closer to the national sentiment (Karjahärm et al 2001:116-117).

³⁰² Goeckel 1995:202

³⁰³ In Lutheran church there were 44% of Estonian pastors in 1919, 77% in 1939, 54% of Germans in 1919, 22% in 1939, 3% of Swedes in 1919, 1% in 1939. During interwar years the German clergy, although numerous, was not allowed to take part in church leadership. In 1939 65 pastors left Estonia, all German pastors, but also some Estonian pastors. (Karjahärm et al 2001:108,111)

³⁰⁴ In 1909 there were 61% (75 out of 123) Estonian priests in Estonian Orthodox church, by 1936 Estonian Orthodox Church had 212,700 members. (Karjahärm et al 2001:111,115)

³⁰⁵ Svege et al 2000:51

³⁰⁶ Karjahärm et al 2001:113,114

³⁰⁷ Liiman 2001:16. Finally, Constitution of 1937 stipulated that there is no state church but added that the state can grant status in public law to big churches (Kiviorg 1999:2).

³⁰⁸ Goeckel 1995:219. In 1934 77,6% considered himself or herself to be Lutherans, 74,3% were members of the EELC, but only 17,8% of population paid annual membership tax to the Lutheran Church (Liiman 2001:18).

identify themselves as church-members and due to atheist socialization, the number of church-members decreased rapidly³⁰⁹.

Estonian Lutheran Church proved unable to maintain an independent profile during the Soviet era³¹⁰, because the identification of the Lutheran Church with nationalist sentiments was undeveloped and there has been no strong symbolic merger of church and nation³¹¹. Between 1958-1964, during the years of hardest repression of the religious denominations in Soviet Union, the number of Lutheran Churches did not decrease³¹², because they had been already dramatically weakened as institutions because of accommodation toward the regime³¹³. As a result, the Lutheran Church of Estonia played a minor role in the limited political opposition that arose in the early 1980s. The Lutheran leadership in Estonia lent no support to dissent movements³¹⁴. During transition crises individual pastors participated in opposition movement³¹⁵, Popular Front and Estonian Congress³¹⁶, while the Church remained neutral. The Estonian Lutheran Church was a beneficiary of the changes and not a driving force behind them³¹⁷.

³⁰⁹ Liiman 2001:38. Soviet time saw a harsh Stalinization, including arrest, deportation, and intimidation of numerous church leaders and clergy. The churches that were not closed were nationalized. The churches' social presence was eliminated totally, including charitable institutions, religious instruction in the schools, and auxiliary organizations. (Goeckel 1995:203)

³¹⁰ Nørgaard 1999:53

³¹¹ Johnston 1992:140

³¹² In that period the number of Lutheran Churches in Soviet Union even increased from 451 churches to 452. The number of Orthodox Churches in Estonia decreased 10 per cent. (Anderson 1994:56)

³¹³ After initial opposition, the Lutheran churches pursued a policy of accommodation toward the regime, calling for an end to armed resistance in the 1940s, supporting Stalin's peace campaign in the 1950s, issuing declarations supportive of Soviet foreign policy thereafter. (Goeckel 1995:204)

³¹⁴ Goeckel 1995:204,205

³¹⁵ Some Estonian pastors were deeply involved in resistance to the Russification of Estonia. In summer 1981 the KGB locked up pastor Vello Salum who had publicly declared that it was the duty of the Lutheran Church in Estonia to function as an opposition political party and to defend language, territory and welfare of Estonians (Ramet 1987:147).

³¹⁶ The church was officially declared neutrality, most pastors preferred to support the more independence-minded Estonian Congress. (Goeckel 1995:208)

³¹⁷ Ibid. p. 213

The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Estonia, that century ago was considered to be a German church, had not managed to become a national Church³¹⁸ by the beginning of transition. Like in other countries of this study, the levels of religiosity rose among the Estonian population³¹⁹, but the Church was institutionally quite unprepared for the transition – it had to define its place in society, its position regarding democracy, religious freedom, new religious movements, and moral issues. Also there practically did not exist parallel organizations of the Church in the beginning of transition. Although the levels of religious practice quite soon decreased again, the religion has become a part (although weak) of national identity for both Estonians and Russians living in Estonia³²⁰.

The Lutheran Church was only relatively weak in terms of symbolical religion, but was far weaker as a manifest church. The Lutheran Church had considerable symbolical influence - Lutheran Church as an oldest institution provided the symbols and beliefs for the solidarity of Estonian culture, it united Estonia culturally with Western civilization, and has been providing also a resource around which Estonians can rally for nationalist causes³²¹.

Though the levels of religious affiliation and attendance are among the lowest in the world, 40% of Estonians feel to have Lutheran identity³²², the Church is one of the

³¹⁸ Hoppenbrouwers 1999:162

³¹⁹ For example, the number of baptisms arose from 885 in 1970 to 18,608 in 1990 in EELC (Goeckel 1995:211).

³²⁰ The number of Estonians who call themselves Lutheran is many times higher than the active membership of the Lutheran Church (Hoppenbrouwers 1999:163). The same goes for ethnical Russians in Estonia. According to survey of 1998, the Orthodox faith (and faith in more broad sense had become an inseparable part of the identity of more than half of the Russians living in Estonia. As a conclusion Raigo Liiman states that faith strengthens the ethnicity of Estonian Russians. (Liiman 2001:108)

³²¹ Andrew Hart made the distinction between “manifest church” and the “latent church”. Manifest church includes the buildings, the services, a number of membership, doctrinal attitude not to interfere into the political arena. (Hart 1993:10-12)

³²² Smith-Sivertsen 2000:238

most trusted institutions in Estonia³²³, which maintains the fact that symbolical religion is not so weak as is the institutional religion.

Table 11. Estonia. Indicators of religion in society

Indicator	Nature	Value
Strength of institutional religion	Low level of religious affiliation, level of religious attendance extremely low	Very weak (1)
Strength of symbolical religion	Although the national idea is basically civic-secular, Lutheranism in Estonia is stronger in symbolical than in institutional terms	Weak (2)
Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage	The Church as an institution is weak, and there has not arisen social conflict. The Church has largely stayed out of political competition	Very weak (1)
Religious-secular cleavage	Population is overwhelmingly liberal or indifferent regarding religious values	Weak (2)

5.2. Religion in politics

5.2.1. Religious political cleavage

There is no religious cleavage in Estonian party politics, even if there is a small religious divide, it does not overlap with other cleavages. A research based on the cleavage formation according to the parliamentary elections of Estonia in 1999 found six cleavages and there is no religious cleavage among them³²⁴. Religion is little used in electoral competition, only some parties make a formal appeal to historical religious-national identity or influence of religion to morality in broad sense. There are parties representing Russian ethnical minority and Russian minority is more religious than Estonians, but they have not brought religious issues to political arena. The major Church – EELC – has not made distinction between political worldviews

³²³ According to ECC-EBS-EEA survey of 2000, church was trusted by 54% of respondents.

or parties, and the parties do not have substantially different attitudes regarding the Church³²⁵.

The weekly paper of Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church has presented articles about several chosen candidates before the parliamentary elections. This has in some extent influenced the vote of the people loyal to the Church, but as the several individual pro-Church candidates represent different political parties and the Church has not been willing to identify itself with a certain party, religion cannot be counted as an important indicator of voting preference.

5.2.2. Goals attained by the Church

The Lutheran Church has not fully followed the Lutheran doctrine that the Church should not interfere into the political competition, at the same time the positions of the Church are far from the extremes that could be seen in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic. The positions of the EELC are especially moderate regarding social values. For a long time the Estonian Lutheran Church did not even have a committee dealing with social-political questions³²⁶.

The only religious conflict involves the split of the Estonian Orthodox Church³²⁷. As many Estonians profess Orthodoxy, including some leaders of the independence

³²⁴ Grofman et al 2000:348. The main dividing lines are ethnic division, urban-rural divide, and socio-economic divide (Aarebrot et al 2000:309; Svege et al 2000:60)

³²⁵ Survey made by the department of political science of University of Tartu in 2000, Church was trusted most by the Moderates (61%), then Fatherland Union (57%) and other parties. According to 'I trust absolutely', the left-wingers trusted the church more (31%) than right-wingers (14%). (Toomla 2001:33)

³²⁶ Goeckel 1995:214

³²⁷ The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation, was reregistered under its statute of 1935 in August 1993. Since then, a group of ethnic Russian and Estonian parishes which preferred to remain under the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the Soviet occupation has insisted that it should claim the EAOC name but the Church has been unable to register under the same name. (U.S. Department of State (2000) "Estonia")

struggle³²⁸, the Orthodox split was not a national-religious conflict, but mainly over the property rights³²⁹.

Article 40 of Estonian Constitution says that there is no state church, but the church and state are engaged in a constructive dialogue. After Mart Laar became a Prime Minister in 1992, the Church wanted to have direct subsidies from the budget and not to get state subsidies through the ECC³³⁰ as it was done before. From that time on started the debate about giving a special status to the biggest churches, namely to EELC and EAOC (Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church)³³¹. The joint-commission of EELC and government was created in 1995. Although the Fatherland Union had lost governmental power by that time, the Minister of the Interior Edgar Savisaar stated during the meeting of Church hierarchy and government coalition that EELC should not remain a private legal person, but should become a public legal person³³². The debate become especially intense in 1998, when legal amendments were proposed in order to give a status of public-legal person to the largest religious groups.

The joint-commission of EELC and government has working groups in the fields of religious education, social work, maintenance of Church buildings, amendments of laws regulating the religious market, media and pastoral care in state institutions³³³. From February 1999 the Archbishop of EELC and Minister of the Interior head the commission³³⁴.

³²⁸ For example Arnold Rüütel belongs to Orthodox Church. Rüütel was the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Estonia 1990-1992, and from September 21, 2001 was elected the President of the Republic of Estonia.

³²⁹ Goeckel 1995:216

³³⁰ "Riigi ja Kiriku koostööst. Peaminister Mart Laar võttis vastu peapiiskopi ja piiskopi", *Eesti Kirik*, November 19, 1992

³³¹ Hoppenbrouwers 1999:170; Andres Pöder, "Kirik ja riik – partnerid või vaenlased", *Eesti Kirik*, January 13, 1993

³³² Andres Pöder, "Rohkem sotsiaalsust – rohkem demokraatiat!" *Eesti Kirik*, July 12, 1995

³³³ Jaan Kiivit, "Kirik ja riik: vastasseisust koostööni", *Eesti Päevaleht*, March 12, 2002

³³⁴ Tiiu Pikkur, "Usundilugu või maailmaõpetus", *Eesti Kirik*, February 8, 1999

State supports financially the registered churches through the Council of Estonian Churches³³⁵. There has been some discontent among other denominations with the fact that majority of the state funds go to the Lutheran Church³³⁶ through the joint-commissions that EELC has with the government.

Being financially dependent on the state, the Church wants the state to distinguish between religious groups³³⁷. The Church claims that the Estonian culture is based on Lutheranism, so EELC should have different treatment by state³³⁸.

The law for registration of religious communities (1993) is relatively liberal and follows pluralist norms³³⁹.

There are laws that guarantee the restitution of the confiscated property by Communist regime, but the actual restitution of properties has been delayed in several cases³⁴⁰, the whole process is generally considered fair but often slow and bureaucratic³⁴¹.

The situation with the religious education classes is also a problem, as only few children participate³⁴². EELC has little influence over the social norms, partly because the Church does not have strong positions and clear proposals in this field.

³³⁵ In 1998 the state budget 2 million Estonian crowns was distributed to churches through ECC (Kiviorg 1999:10).

³³⁶ Goeckel 1995:215

³³⁷ EELC 1998:13

³³⁸ Ibid. p. 9

³³⁹ It makes no mention of religious instruction in the schools, and guarantees no subsidies for the churches. The law proscribes property ownership by churches whose administrative headquarters are not in Estonia. (Goeckel 1995:217).

³⁴⁰ Kadri Ugur, "Kuidas korraldada riigi ja kiriku suhteid?" *Eesti Kirik*, June 15, 1994; "Peapiiskop Jaan Kiiviti mõtteid kiriku päevaprobleemidest", *Eesti Kirik*, February 15, 1995

³⁴¹ U.S. Department of State (2000) "Estonia"

³⁴² "Usuõpetusest kultuuri- ja haridusministri Peeter Kreitzbergi pilgu läbi", *Eesti Kirik*, June 21, 1995

5.2.3. Access of the Church to the government

The Church has remained neutral regarding the competition of political parties and has had access to the government during all three electoral periods. The access was strengthened substantially since 1995, when the joint-commissions of the Church and government started to work. Weakness of this access lies in the fact that the Church is limited in the choice of the radicalism of demands (due to the weakness of institutional and symbolical religion, and due to the neutrality of the Church regarding political parties), but the strength consists in the fact that this access to government is not dependent on the outcome of the elections. The total level of the access to the government is counted as middle-weak.

Table 12. Estonia. Variables and indicators of religion in politics

Variable	Nature and value of the indicators	Value of the variable
Religious political cleavage	Religion is almost of no importance as an indicator of voting preference and party identification (1)	Very weak (1)
	Religion is not a basis of coalition formation (1)	
Goals attained by the Church	Process of the restitution of property is fair, but often slow (3)	Middle-weak (2.5)
	There are voluntary religious education classes in public schools, but in practice few student attend (3)	
	Effort of EELC to gain the public-legal status failed (1)	
	There is a constructive dialogue between EELC and government. EELC receives substantial financial assistance from state (4)	
Access to the government	Access to the government does not depend on the political allies, but the radicalism of demands is limited by the weakness of institutional and symbolical religion, and due to the neutrality of the Church regarding political parties	Middle-weak (2.5)

Values for the indicators of the goals attained by the Church: 5 points are given if the issue was solved favorably for the Church, 4 points are given if the issue was solved basically favorably for the Church but with restrictions, 3 points are given for the compromise solution, 2 points are given for the issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church, but the Church had some influence over decisions and its interests were not ignored totally, 1 point is given for an issue that was solved unfavorably for the Church.

5.3. Church's strategies

There is one Christian Democratic party (FU) and one Christian party (ChPP) in Estonia. Since 1992 FU has nearly half of the years been a major governing coalition partner, ChPP has not even achieved a seat in Parliament. Besides FU and ChPP there were also other parties that expressed their support towards the Church and religion in their electoral programs. In 1992 most of the parties remained quite indifferent regarding religious matters and were in favor of state and church separation, but there were also some parties that saw the role of the Church as an ethical integrator of the society, and religion as a source of humanism and morality³⁴³.

Table 13. Elections to the Estonian Parliament 1992-1999

	1992		1995		1999	
	Votes%	Seats	Votes%	Seats	Votes%	Seats
Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP)	8.8	10	-	-	-	-
Fatherland Union (FU)*	22.0	29	7.9	8	16.1	18
Coalition Party (CP)	13.6	17	32.2	41	7.6	7
Estonian Center Party (CP)	12.2	15	14.2	16	23.4	28
Moderates (MOD)	9.7	12	6.0	6	15.2	17
Independent Royalists (IR)	7.1	8	0.8	0	-	-
Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen (BE/EC)	6.9	8	3.6	0	-	-
Estonian Reform Party (RP)	-	-	16.2	19	15.9	18
Estonian United People's Party (UPP)	-	-	5.9	6	6.1	6
Right Wingers' Party (RWP)	-	-	5	5	-	-
Estonian Country People's Party (CPP)	-	-	-	-	7.3	7
Estonian Christian People's Party (ChPP)	-	-	-	-	2.4	0
Total		101		101		101

* - FU has been most vocal in professing a pro-Church attitude, but as the actual policy regarding the Church has not changed during different governing coalitions, and the Church has not supported any party, the list does not identify pro-Church or anti-clerical parties.

³⁴³ "Kuidas Eesti erakonnad suhtuvad kristlusesse ja kristlastesse?", *Eesti Kirik*, June 11, 1992

Fatherland Union is according to its program a Christian Democratic party³⁴⁴, but this party has gone through a number of splits and mergers. In 1992 Fatherland was formed from five parties, two of them were Estonian Christian Democratic Party (ECDP) and Estonian Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Mart Laar, who was the prime minister in 1992-1994 and 1999-2002, was a member of ECDU. In 1994 the conservatives and republicans split from Fatherland, and a year later ENIP and Fatherland joined into Fatherland Union.³⁴⁵

Fatherland Union' main image is related to nationalism and conservatism, and only in very broad terms it touches the interests of the Church and religiosity. In this sense FU is clearly not a Christian party³⁴⁶. Its ideology is linked up with such Christian Democratic ideas like social market economy, social solidarity, co-responsibility, and Christian worldview. FU supports the Church and religion in very broad terms and does not to identify itself with one Church or even religion³⁴⁷. The image of a Christian Democratic party is also pragmatically useful for FU, because the international contacts will be important in case of Estonia being accepted to European Union³⁴⁸.

Estonian Christian People's Party was formed some months before parliamentary elections in 1999 and got 2.4% of votes. It appealed more clearly to religious electorate and to religious-secular divide in society.

³⁴⁴ The program of Fatherland Union. Homepage of FU, accessed April 4, 2002, http://www.isamaaliit.ee/sisu/erakond_programm.php3

³⁴⁵ Toomla 1999:290-291

³⁴⁶ Goeckel 1995:215

³⁴⁷ Betlem 1998:5,8

³⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 7. In 1992 the MP for Fatherland, Andrus Villem said that the reason for establishing Christian-democratic parties was to obtain support from abroad more easily (Daatland 1997:61).

Mixed strategy with emphasis on neutrality

If EELC would follow the doctrine of Martin Luther³⁴⁹, it would not interfere into the political arena, but there have been several pastors elected to Parliament. Table 14 shows, that the number of Lutheran pastors elected to Parliament has decreased through the years, but the number of Lutheran clergy in the electoral party lists has increased. The Church has not identified itself with any political party³⁵⁰, although Fatherland Union is perceived to have closer links with EELC than any other party³⁵¹, especially during first two elections.

Table 14. Lutheran Clergy in the elections to Estonian parliament

	As candidates in the party lists	Elected to Parliament
1992	8	3
1995	10	0
1999	16	1

Sources for the number of pastors put up as candidates in the party lists: *Eesti Kirik*, October 10, 1992; *Eesti Kirik*, February 15, 1995; *Eesti Kirik*, January 27, 1999.

The EELC has unofficially supported individual candidates who were willing to defend the interests of the Church. In 1992 parliamentary election the individual Church-loyal candidates of several parties found a coverage in the largest Estonian religious publication, weekly paper of the EELC³⁵². Church supported besides its pastors also lay-people, who later defended the interests of the Church in the political arena. After the formation of a ChPP in December 1998³⁵³, Archbishop Jaan Kiivit said that EELC did not approve a foundation of a Christian party like ChPP³⁵⁴. He

³⁴⁹ Martin Luther's "Zwei-Reiche Lehre" separates spiritual world from earthly one. Both areas are according to Luther of divine origin and good by nature, yet separated. Up to nowadays there has remained a prevailing tradition that Lutheran clerics do not interfere into political world.

³⁵⁰ EELC is ready to co-operation with the state and with any political force and interest group (EELC 1998:3).

³⁵¹ In March 1999 EELC hierarchy named Fatherland Union as their most friendly political party (Smith-Sivertsen 2000:237).

³⁵² "Mida ütlevad presidendiks pürgijad usu ja kiriku kohta?", *Eesti Kirik*, September 17, 1992. The same was done before 1995 and 1999 elections.

³⁵³ "Loodi Kristlik Rahvaerakond", *Eesti Kirik*, December 9, 1998

³⁵⁴ Tiiu Pikkur, "Tallinna sinodil arutati vaimulike osalemist poliitikas", *Eesti Kirik*, December 9, 1998

stated two weeks before the election in 1999 that “Christians ought to be members of the existing parties. It is not dangerous, if Christians belong to opposing parties”³⁵⁵.

Instead of finding a party whom to give its support, the EELC issued a document about the role of the Church in society (1998), which was meant as a guiding document for all church members who participate in politics, also for the parties that are willing to accept Christian principles³⁵⁶.

Until that document was published, the positions of the EELC on several religious-social issues were quite unclear. In 1995 the Lutheran pastors were against abortion, but the positions of the EELC clergy regarding the capital punishment differed, with a bias to be in opposition to the death penalty³⁵⁷. EELC does not make radical statements on issues linked to moral values. While the positions and proposals for the government remain quite vague in this field, there is not much doubt about the institutional goals of the EELC.

EELC has preferred to have joint commissions with the government and remain neutral regarding the political parties. Nearly all of the governments have been interested in co-operation with the EELC as long as it would not participate in any political competition and would not be in favor of any party³⁵⁸. There are no anti-clerical parties in Estonia.

The strategy of the EELC was nevertheless never total neutrality regarding political competition. Before 1992, ECDU and later FU have had close contacts with the Church, and the number of clergy participating in electoral contest has increased. Yet

³⁵⁵ Tiiu Pikkur, “Kristlane Erakonnapoliitika”, *Eesti Kirik*, February 24, 1999

³⁵⁶ Urmas Petti, “Kirik teadvustab oma missiooni ühiskonnas”, *Eesti Kirik*, March 17, 1999

³⁵⁷ “Peapiiskop Jaan Kiiviti mõtteid kiriku päevaprobleemidest”, *Eesti Kirik*, February 15, 1995

³⁵⁸ Such statement was made by Prime Minister Mart Siimann in 1998 (“Riik on alati valmis konstruktiivseks koostööks kirikuga”, *Eesti Kirik*, July 1, 1998). Also next Prime Minister Mart Laar made a similar statement (Tiiu Pikkur, “Kirik on kutsutud teenima inimest nii igaveses kui ajalikus elus”, *Eesti Kirik*, July 15, 1998).

the tendency of the Church is to stress more its neutrality and the main way to defend its interests is through direct commissions with the government. During 1990s the Church has become more moderate in its demands and more neutral regarding party competition.

5.4. Discussion

The strategic choice of the Church to remain outside the competition of political parties has given it a relatively good relationship with all political parties. The Church has not been able to raise radical demands and its goals are attained only on a moderate level, but in comparison with the weakness of religion in Estonian society, the Church has been surprisingly successful in defending its institutional interests.

Official neutrality in combination with the individual clergy participating in electoral contest between the party lists, unofficial support to individual candidates who were willing to defend the interests of the Church, close links to Fatherland Union, and active lobby-work on the government level have worked well for the EELC.

Both alternative choices – more radical demands and lending support to political parties – would have forced the Church into isolation due to its institutional weakness.

Chapter 6. Comparison of cases

6.1. Religion in society

The comparison of structural variables in case studies shows that the Polish Catholic Church has the strongest resources (institutional and symbolical religion) and Poland has also the strongest religious social conflict. There is a co-relation between the strength of symbolical religion, the strength of institutional religion and the strength of the religious social cleavage of the cases. Table 15 presents the values that the variables for religion in society have obtained in the case studies.

Table 15. Comparison. The strength of institutional and symbolical religion, and religious social cleavage

	POL	HUN	CZH	EST
Strength of symbolical religion	Very strong (5)	Strong (4)	Middle (3)	Weak (2)
Strength of institutional religion	Very strong (5)	Strong (4)	Weak (2)	Very weak (1)
Religious-secular cleavage	Very strong (5)	Middle (3)	Weak (2)	Very weak (1)
Clerical/anti-clerical cleavage	Very strong (5)	Strong (4)	Middle (3)	Very weak (1)

According to every indicator (religious social cleavage, institutional religion and symbolical religion), religion is the strongest in the society of Poland and the weakest in the society of Estonia, Hungary has the second place and the Czech Republic comes third. The co-relation between the strength-values of the cases is shown also on the Figure 4. There is no deviation from co-relations as far as the independent variables are concerned.

Figure 4. Comparison of the indicators of the independent variables



In order to test the values that the independent variables obtained in case studies, additional data is presented in Table 16 for the comparison of strength-values of independent variables of the cases. This data tests the strength-value relationship of institutional religion between the cases, but cannot test the strength-value relationship of symbolical religion or religious social cleavage.

Table 16. Comparison. Indicators of institutional religion

	POL	HUN	CZH	EST
Religious affiliation	99.2%	74.4%	40.3%	17%
Attends Church at least once a week	55%	22%	14%	4%
Confessional map	96%	56.4% Catholic 16.8% Protestant	34.9% Catholic 3.6% Protestant	11% Lutheran

Source: religious affiliation and confessional map: religious affiliation of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1993-4 (Need et al 2001:236), for Estonia Ringvee 2001; religious attendance (World Value surveys 1990-1991, 1995-1997)

It is evident that the strength-value relationship of institutional religion is from strongest to weakest: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia. Both the levels of religious affiliation and religious attendance testify to the fact that these cases have different strength-values of institutional religion and that the relationship of the strength-values of institutional religion obtained in the case studies is correct.

According to European Values Study Surveys the levels of the sentiment of anti-clericalism deviate from the strength-values of religious social cleavage that the cases obtained in case studies. As seen from Table 17, the sentiment of anti-clericalism in society (calculated as an average from 6 indicators of the anti-clericalism) is even more spread in Estonia than in Poland. Yet the higher level of anti-clericalism sentiment in Estonia does not prove that there is also a stronger religious social cleavage. In Estonia there is no religious social cleavage, but in Poland, there exists a strong religious social cleavage. The reason for the absence of the religious social cleavage in Estonia lies in the fact that the population in Estonia has overwhelmingly anti-clerical attitudes or is indifferent regarding this issue. Without meaningful opposition, there is no conflict.

Table 17. Comparison. Anti-clericalism among population in 1999 (percentage of positive answers to the raised questions)

	POL	HUN	CZH	EST
Strongly disagree and disagree with the following: Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office	64.3	65.7	80.2	59.1
Strongly disagree or disagree with the following: it would be better for your country if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office	42.7	50.1	71.6	42.2
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions	80.9	69.6	74	74.7
Religious leaders should not influence how people vote in elections	85.7	76.5	80.5	84.3
Churches are not giving adequate answers to social problems facing my country today	60.8	75.0	84.5	85.9
No Confidence in Church at all	7.4	24.6	39	17.3
Average anticlericalism	57	60.25	71.63	60.58

Source: European Values Study Surveys of 1999 in Halman 2001:85,104-107,185

6.2. Religion in politics

All the cases, except the Estonian case, did fulfill the pre-conditions of the formation of the religious political divide, as there existed both institutional and symbolical strength of religion and also a religious social cleavage. Although the Estonian Church had weak measure of symbolical strength of religion, it was institutionally very weak, and in accordance with the stated hypothesis, Estonian party politics does not have a religious political divide. As seen from Table 18, all other cases had by the third parliamentary election the religious political cleavage.

Table 18. Comparison. Religious political cleavage


	POL	HUN	CZH	EST
Religious political cleavage	Strong (4)	Very strong (5)	Middle (3)	Very weak (1)
Politicized religious issues that remained divisive	Abortion, public role of the Church	Church-state relationship	Restitution of properties, Church-state relationship	–

The Estonian case did not fulfill the condition of the hypothesis, which holds the religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society as necessary variables for the strength of religion in politics. In Estonian case there is no big religious conflict neither in society nor in politics. In Czech case, the clericalism conflict has entered political arena and also in the cases of Hungary and Poland the social cleavages have been translated into political competition. But there is a deviation in the order of the strength-values of the cases (see Figure 5): the religious political cleavage is the strongest in Hungary and not in Poland, because in Hungary it has produced a stronger polarization, it is a stronger indicator of voting preference, a clearer basis of coalition formation and also more clearly overlaps with other cleavages.

Only in the case of Poland have the moral issues (like abortion) become really divisive in political arena. The divisive politicized issues, even in the case of Estonia,

had mainly to do with the financial subsidies to the Church and Church-state relationship.

Figure 5. Comparison of indicators of religious social cleavage and religious political cleavage



Deviation 1. The religious political cleavage is stronger in Hungary than in Poland, although the religious social cleavage, and also institutional and symbolical religion, is stronger in Poland than in Hungary.

The second variable of the religion in politics is the goals attained by the Church. The Catholic Church in Poland has gained widest influence upon the legislation dealing with the social norms (abortion, religious censorship of media, divorce laws), and religious education. By and large the Polish Church has also achieved its institutional goals: all of the Churches pushed for more restrictive laws for registration of religious groups, but only Polish Church succeeded. The issues like restitution of property and financial assistance were solved already in the beginning of transition, and while not all wishes of the Church became manifested in the Constitution and Concordat, the Polish Church has clearly achieved most.

The values obtained in case studies for the goals attained by the Church and the access of the Church to the government are presented in the Table 19.


Table 19. Comparison. Goals attained by the Church and Church’s access to the government

	POL	HUN	CZH	EST
Goals attained by the Church	5	3.5	1.5	2.5
Access to the government	4	3	1	2.5

Source: values obtained in case studies

The Church in Hungarian case has managed to defend its traditional privileges and enjoys the high levels of state financial assistance. The Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church has definitely achieved more as an institution than Czech Catholic Church (see Figure 6). Their social influence has been materialized in a very low level, in Estonian case the religious education is taken as the modest achievement of the Church in this field, in Czech case the fact that the Church at least indirectly influenced the final solution of abortion law (that it did not become liberal). But in issues linked to institutional influence, the Estonian Church has better results on every level – restitution of property, financial subsidies, and Church’s autonomy from state. Only the registration of religious groups is stricter in the Czech Republic, but as there are 21 religions receiving state financial assistance in the Czech Republic, the actual situation (of state financing the dominant Church) is better in Estonia.


Figure 6. Comparison of the strength-values of religion in society and goals attained by the Church



Deviation 2. The religion is stronger in the society of the Czech Republic than in Estonian society according to every indicator, but the Church in Estonia has gained more of its goals than the Church in the Czech Republic.

Third variable of the strength of religion in society is the access of the Church to the Government. Figure 7 shows the deviation from the co-relations between the strength-values of religion in society and access of the Church to the government (shown in Table 19).

Figure 7. Comparison of the strength-values of religion in society and goals attained by the Church



Deviation 3. The religion is stronger in the society of the Czech Republic than in the Estonian society according to every indicator, but the Church in Estonia has gained a better level of access to the government than the Church in the Czech Republic.

Can these three deviations be explained by the causal effect of denominational differences? The Church doctrine itself did not pre-determine the strategic choices, intensity of demands (exactly which solution on abortion should still be fought against or not) and even the content of the demands that the Church chose. The Churches of the same denomination used different strategies and radicalism of demands. They were ultimately constrained not by their theological doctrine, but the structural resources available.

The strategy of the Czech Catholic Church to support one party only was not shared by the Polish Catholic Church, which did not identify itself with any particular party. The Lutheran Church in Hungary did not share the position of neutrality regarding the political competition of parties that the Estonian Lutheran Church had.

Can these deviations be explained simply by the institutional strength of the Church? The institutional strength of the Church does not co-relate with the found deviations. The Church in Poland was institutionally stronger than Hungarian Church. The strategic choices of the Church that was institutionally weaker caused a stronger outcome. Also the Czech Church was institutionally stronger than the Estonian Church, but according to two indicators, the coming of religion to politics was stronger in Estonian case.

Three stated deviations from the co-relations testify to the fact that the strategic choices of the Church have influenced the outcome – the strength of religion in politics. The comparison of the strategies used by the Church in the cases explains the causal mechanism of Church' choices.

6.3. Church' strategies

The Churches usually started with more radical demands and with more extreme strategy. In all countries, except Poland, the Church had distanced itself from Christian parties by the third elections. Also in Poland the formation of grand coalition of parties testifies to the fact that the Church became inclined towards more moderate demands and the Christian Democratic strategy. The only Church that chose to identify with one party, was the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic. The change of the strategy used by the Church is presented in Table 20 and Figure 8.


Table 20. Comparison. Church's strategies and radicalism of demands

	POL		HUN		CZH		EST	
	Strat.	Dem.	Strat.	Dem.	Strat.	Dem.	Strat.	Dem.
1 st election	C	R	CD-C	M	C, 1 party	R	N (CD)	M-R
3 rd election	C-CD	R-M	CD	M	CD-N	M	N	M

Strategies: C – Christian strategy; CD – Christian Democratic strategy; Neutral strategy; 1 party – choice to support only one party.

Demands: R – radical demands, M – moderate demands

Figure 8. Comparison of preferences and strategies of the Churches in the parliamentary elections



There has been a change in strategies used by the church. The Churches of all the cases have changed the radicalism of their demands or strategy used in attaining their goals. The formation of religious political cleavage was not in the interests of the Church. The aim of the Church has been to attain its goals, and if the goals have not

been met using one strategy, the Church tried another; if too radical demands have proved to be counter-productive, the Church has taken more moderate positions.

6.4. Discussion

There arose three deviations from the co-relations between the strength-values of the independent and dependent variables. Three questions need to be answered: (1) Why is the religious political cleavage stronger in Hungary than in Poland, while the religious social cleavage, institutional and symbolical religion, is stronger in Poland? (2) Why the Czech Church, that is obviously stronger institutionally than Estonian Church, has been less able to attain its goals? (3) Why the Czech Church has not gained access to government, but Estonian Church, which had much weaker starting point, has managed with it?

Strategic choices of the Church that led to deviation 1

In Hungarian case the strength of symbolical religion in combination with moderate demands from the traditional churches did provide symbols for parties to identify for and against, and to organize political confrontation. Important here is the fact that the traditional churches retained their position of moderate claims during elections and eventually concentrated more on a Christian Democratic strategy (the more radical stands of the first two elections were eliminated by the third), and as a result the religious polarization of parties endured!

The radical demands of the Polish and Czech Churches caused an increase of anti-clericalism, and the political opposition became biased, becoming unfavorable for the Church, especially in the Czech case. The Catholic Church in Poland came out of crises taking more moderate positions and moderate strategy. The polarization of political parties was again effective in 1997 *Sejm* elections, but as the coalition of

right-wing parties was not able to hold on to relatively moderate program, the polarization became later again biased towards anti-clericalism.

The Czech Catholic Church saw a way out of crises by reducing the radicalism of demands and by a shift towards neutrality regarding the political competition of parties, but the Church was constrained by the choices earlier made.

Strategic choices of the Churches that led to deviations 2 and 3

The choice of the strategy was important for both Estonian and Czech Church, as both saw a need to change their strategy. Estonian Church saw a need to distance itself more clearly from the competition of political parties and to suffuse all this competition with broad Christian values. In Czech case the symbolical religion was essentially against the Czech Catholic Church. The Church anyway decided to take part in the political competition of parties and did it with radical demands. The parties reacted and used the symbolical religion. The eventual outcome, the formation of religious political cleavage, was unfavorable for the Church, as it was strongly biased towards anti-clericalism. Yet it was not the strength or content of the symbolical religion that determined all in the longer perspective. If the Catholic Church of the Czech Republic had chosen more moderate demands, and/or neutrality regarding political competition of parties, the results could have been different. The chances of the parties to use the symbolical religion against the Church would have decreased. The actual choice of the strategy led to the situation that the Church's interests were represented at the level of one party, but not more. The Church did not get access to the government and so most of its goals remained unfulfilled.

The Estonian Church lacked institutional strength that the Czech Church had. The Church chose moderate demands and neutrality regarding the political competition of parties. The choice of the Church to remain outside the political competition of parties has provided the Church with access to government and also a better level of the goals attained.

Estonia is the only case, where the Church did not enter into the political competition, or entered only marginally (and by third election it became more carefully neutral). The Estonian church could have chosen not to stay out of the political competition. If the church had acted like the Church in Poland or in the Czech Republic (used radical demands) or the Church would have chosen moderate demands, but still would have taken part in the competition of political parties, the very low institutional strength (that is the necessary variable according to hypothesis!) would have caused very low importance of religious politicized issues, and the Church would have ended in isolation, with no access to the government and with goals unfulfilled like in the case of the Czech Church. The Czech Church chose a wrong strategy in pursuing its interests.

The neutrality regarding the political competition of parties would be better for both cases, because the Czech Church lacks positive symbolical religion, and the Estonian Church lacks institutional strength. After three electoral periods both Churches recognized that.

The small potential of the symbolical religion in the case of Estonia is used to legitimize the neutrality of the Church in relations with the political parties and benevolent co-operation between Church and state.

Conclusion

This thesis analyses the process of politicization of religious issues in four post-communist countries – Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia. The main question of the study is, whether the religion that exists in society will eventually come to politics anyway or is this coming (or not coming) of the religion influenced also by the strategic choices of the Church. The hypothesis of the study stated: *The religious social cleavage and the strength of religion in society are necessary but not sufficient variables for the strength of religion in politics. The actual outcome is largely influenced by the strategic choices of the Church.*

The thesis has been faced with several tasks. First task was to identify the situation and the values of the variables in four countries of this study. In each case study the values of the religion in society (institutional religion, symbolical religion and religious social cleavage), of the religion in politics (political cleavage, goals attained by the Church and access of the Church to the government) and of the condition variable (the strategic choices made by the Church) were analysed.

Second task was to compare the cases by using the values that the variables of the cases obtained in the case studies and to find out deviations from co-relations between the strength of religion in society and religion in politics. The raised hypothesis would not have passed the test, if there were found no deviations between the strength of religion in society and the strength of religion in politics. But the comparative analysis of the cases showed that there were three strong deviations.

Third task was to analyse whether these deviations were caused by the strategic choices made by the Church. The comparison of cases showed that the causal mechanism that led to these deviations was not the outcome of denominational differences, or institutional strength of the Church.

The church had to find an optimal solution in the choice of radicalism of its demands and in choosing a political way for attaining its goals. As a pre-condition, the Churches had to consider the institutional and symbolical strength of religion available. The outcomes (the strength of religion in politics) depended on two conditions: the strength of social religious conflict and strength of religion in society (a necessary condition) and the choices made by the Church (a sufficient condition).

The comparison of the four case studies shows that the strategies used by the Church and the choice of radicalism of its demands have influenced also the strength of religion in politics. In all of the cases, Church changed the strategy during three parliamentary elections.

The comparison of cases gave three deviations. Deviation 1 showed that the religious political cleavage was stronger in Hungary than in Poland, although the religious social cleavage, and also institutional and symbolical religion was stronger in Poland than in Hungary. Deviations 2 and 3 stated that although religion was stronger in the society of the Czech Republic than in Estonian society according to every indicator, the Church in Estonia gained still more of its goals and had better access to government than the Czech Church.

The strategic choice of the Hungarian Church to have moderate demands and to concentrate on Christian Democratic strategy caused a higher level of religious political cleavage than in Poland, where the Church used radical demands and a Christian strategy, which eventually caused the bias of the religious political cleavage towards anticlericalism (i.e. the political cleavage became weaker).

The Estonian Church chose to remain neutral regarding the political competition of parties and made moderate demands, but the Czech Church used radical demands and a radical strategy, which caused the religious political cleavage to be strongly biased towards anti-clericalism, and put the Czech Church into worse situation regarding the access of the Church to the government. The radical demands of the Church caused

the rise of anti-clericalism and the Church could present its interests only on the level of one party, their political ally KDU-CSL, but not on the level of government.

These deviations from co-relations were unintended outcomes of the strategic choices made by the Church. The Church was willing to defend its interests, but had to balance the choice of the strategy and radicalism of its demands with the uncertainty of access to government that this choice involves. The Church was interested to see its goals fulfilled and needed an access to government for that. The emergence of religious political cleavage was not in the interests of the Church. It was an unintended outcome or by-product of the activity of the Church.

All cases of this study proved that the transformation of religion into politics did not happen automatically nor was it derived from the religious creed. The results of this thesis show that the religious market theory can be used in the analysis of the political and social activity of the Church. The same theory can be efficiently used for comparison of the activity of the Church in different countries without concentrating on the denominational differences. The choices of the Church are not pre-determined by its doctrine, and the public activities of different denominations can effectively be analysed by using comparative method.

Appendix: Abbreviations used in the text and the tables

EAOC: Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church

ECC: Estonian Council of Churches

ECC-EBS-EEA: Estonian Council of Churches, Estonian Bible Society and Estonian Evangelical Alliance

EELC: Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church

PGSS: Polish General Social Surveys

ISSP: International Social Survey Programme

Political parties

Poland

AWS: Solidarity Electoral Action

BBWR: Nonpartisan Block for Reforms

ChD: Christian Democracy

KdR: Coalition for Republic

KLD: Liberal Democratic Congress

KPN: Confederation for Independent Poland

NSZZ: NSZZ Solidarity

PL: Peasant Alliance

POC: Central Democratic Alliance

PSL: Polish Peasant Party

RDS: Democratic-Social Movement

ROP: Movement for Reconstruction of Poland

SLD: Democratic Left Alliance

SP: Labour Solidarity

UD: Democratic Union

UP: Labour Union

UW: Freedom Union

WAK: Catholic Electoral Action

ZP-PC: Union of Poland-Central Alliance

Hungary

FIDESZ: Federation of Young Democrats

FKGP: Independent Small Holders Party

KDNP: Christian Democratic People's Party

MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum

MIEP: Party of Hungarian Justice and Life

MSZDP: Social Democratic Party of Hungary

MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party

MNP: Hungarian People's Party

MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party

SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats

The Czech Republic

CSSD: Czech Social Democratic Party

ODS: Civic Democratic Party

KSCM: Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia

KDU-CSL: Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party

US: Freedom Union

RSC-SPR: Republican Party of Czechoslovakia

ODA: Civic Democratic Alliance

LSU: Liberal Social Union

HSD-SMS: Society for Moravia and Silesia

Estonia

BE/EC: Better Estonia/Estonian Citizen

ChPP: Estonian Christian People's Party

CP: Coalition Party
CPP: Estonian Country People's Party
ECDP: Estonian Christian Democratic Party
ECDU: Estonian Christian Democratic Union
ECP: Estonian Center Party
ENIP: Estonian National Independence Party
FU: Fatherland Union
IR: Independent Royalists
MOD: Moderates
RP: Estonian Reform Party
RWP: Right Wingers' Party
UPP: Estonian United People's Party

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Magistritöö lühikokkuvõte

Käesolev magistritöö “Religioon ja poliitika: usuküsimuste politiseerimise dünaamika neljas post-kommunistlikus riigis” uurib, kuidas usuküsimused on jõudnud poliitikasse Poolas, Ungaris, Tšehhi Vabariigis ja Eestis. Maade valikul oli määravaks asjaolu, et need riigid olid olnud sama kaua kommunistliku võimu all, neis on toimunud edukas demokratiseerumine ning nad pakuvad erinevaid väärtuste kombinatsioone nii sõltuvale kui sõltumatule muutujale. Uurimuse põhiküsimuseks on, kas ühiskonnas esinev religioon ja usuline lõhe jõuavad aja möödudes nii või teisiti poliitikasse või sõltub usuküsimuste poliitikasse jõudmine (ja mitte jõudmine) ka kiriku strateegilistest otsustest. Uurimuse teoreetiliseks aluseks on religioonituru teooria ja ühiskondliku lõhe mudel.

Töö hüpotees kõlab järgmiselt: *Usulis-ühiskondlik lõhe ja religiooni tugevus ühiskonnas on tarvilikud, kuid mitte piisavad tingimused usu tugevuseks poliitikas. Usu jõudmine poliitikasse on mõjutatud ka kiriku strateegilistest otsustest.*

Käesolevas magistritöös tuli lahendada mitu ülesannet. Esiteks tuli kindlaks määrata olukord uurimuse all olevates maades (ehk üksikjuhtumites) ning teha kindlaks uuritavate sõltuvate ja sõltumatute muutujate väärtused üksikjuhtumite analüüsis. Iga üksikjuhtumi analüüsis omistati väärtused religiooni tugevusele ühiskonnas (mille indikaatoriteks on institutsionaalse religiooni, sümbolse religiooni ja usulis-ühiskondliku lõhe tugevus), religiooni tugevusele poliitikas (mille indikaatoriteks on usulis-poliitiline lõhe, kiriku saavutatud eesmärgid ja kiriku juurdepääs valitsusvõimule) ja teha kindlaks ka tingimusliku muutuja väärtused (kiriku strateegilised valikud).

Teiseks ülesandeks oli võrrelda üksikjuhtumeid kasutades eelnevas analüüsis üksikjuhtumite muutujatele omistatud väärtusi. Võrdluse eesmärgiks oli leida

kõrvalekaldeid üksikjuhtumite tugevusjärjestuses religiooni ühiskondliku tugevuse ja poliitilise tugevuse võrdlemisel. Kui sõltumatute ja sõltuvate muutujate väärtuste võrdlemisel ei oleks leidunud ühtegi kõrvalekallet üksikjuhtumite tugevusjärjestuses, siis osutunuks püstitatud hüpotees valeks. Kuid juhtumite võrdlev analüüs tõi esile mitu kõrvalekallet.

Kolmandaks ülesandeks oli analüüsida, kas nende kõrvalekallete põhjuseks oli kiriku poolt tehtud strateegilised otsused. Juhtumite võrdlus näitas, et põhjuslikku seost nende kõrvalekallete ja struktuuriliste tegurite (denominatsiooniliste erinevuste ja kiriku institutsionaalse tugevuse) vahel ei ole.

Kirik otsis parimat lahendust, kuidas kaitsta oma huvisid. Oma seisukohtade radikaalsuse ja poliitiliste liitlaste valiku üle otsustamisel pidi kirik arvestama ka, et radikaalsed seisukohad ja radikaalsed poliitilised liitlased esindavad küll paremini kiriku huve, kuid vähendavad tõenäosust, et kiriku huvid saavad esindatud valitsusvõimu tasemel. Eeltingimusena pidi kirik ka arvestama tema käsutuses oleva institutsionaalse ja sümboolse religiooni ressursi suurusega. Religiooni jõudmine poliitikasse sõltus kahest tingimusest: ühiskondlik-usulise lõhe tugevusest ja religiooni tugevusest ühiskonnas (tarvilik tingimus) ja ka kiriku strateegilistest otsustest (piisav tingimus).

Nelja üksikjuhtumi võrdlus näitab, et see, kui radikaalsed või mõõdukad positsioonid ja liitlased kirik valis, mõjutas religiooni tugevust poliitikas. Kõigis juhtumites kirik pidas vajalikuks muuta oma strateegiat kolmedel esimestel parlamendi valimistel.

Üksikjuhtumite sõltumatute ja sõltuvate muutujate väärtuste võrdlemisel tuli esile kolm kõrvalekallet: (1) usulis-poliitiline lõhe oli Ungaris tugevam kui Poolas, kuigi usulis-ühiskondlik lõhe ning ka institutsionaalne ja sümboolne usk olid Poolas tugevamad kui Ungaris; (2) kuigi religioon ühiskonnas oli iga indikaatori põhjal Tšehhi Vabariigis tugevam kui Eestis, siiski saavutas kirik Eestis rohkem oma institutsionaalseid eesmärke kui kirik Tšehhis; (3) kuigi religioon ühiskonnas oli iga

indikaatori põhjal Tšehhi Vabariigis tugevam kui Eestis, omas Eesti kirik oluliselt paremat juurdepääsu valitsusvõimule kui Tšehhi kirik.

Ungari kiriku strateegiline valik jääda mõõdukate nõudmiste ja kristlik-demokraatliku strateegia juurde tõi kaasa suurema usulis-poliitilise lõhe kui Poolas, kus kiriku radikaalsed nõudmised ja ka otsus toetada parteisid, kes esindasid radikaalseid seisukohti, tõi kaasa usulis-poliitilise lõhe kaldumise antiklerikalismi suunas (ehk usulis-poliitilise lõhe vähenemise).

Eesti luterlik kirik otsustas jääda parteipoliitika suhtes neutraalseks ning ei esitanud riigile ka radikaalseid nõudmisi. Tšehhi kirik seevastu kasutas radikaalseid nõudmisi ja ka sekkus parteipoliitikasse radikaalselt, toetades selgelt vaid ühte parteid. Tagajärjeks oli usulis-poliitilise lõhe kaldumine antiklerikalismi suunas ning Tšehhi katoliku kirik leidis end lõpptulemusena halvemast olukorrast kui Eesti luterlik kirik nii juurdepääsu osas valitsusvõimule kui ka oma institutsionaalsete huvide täitmise osas. Tšehhi kiriku radikaalsed nõudmised tõid kaasa antiklerikalismi tõusu ning kiriku huvid olid esindatud ühe partei tasemel, kuid mitte valitsusvõimu tasemel.

Mainitud kõrvalekalded olid kiriku strateegiliste valikute soovimatud tagajärjed. Kirik soovis kaitsta oma huve, kuid ühelt poolt tuli tal valida oma seisukohtade radikaalsus ja strateegia, teiselt poolt aga tuli tal arvestada ka sellega, et mida suuremad ja radikaalsemad on nõudmised, seda vähemaks jääb tõenäosus, et need huvid saavad esindatud valitsusvõimu tasemel.

Kirik oli huvitatud oma eesmärkide täitmisest ja vajab selleks juurdepääsu valitsusvõimule. Usulis-poliitilise lõhe teke ei olnud kiriku huvides. See oli kiriku tegevuse soovimatu tagajärg.

Kõik üksikjuhtumi analüüsid näitasid, et usu ülekandmine poliitikasse ei toimunud automaatselt ega tulenenud ka denominatsioonilistest erinevustest.

Antud magistritöö tulemused annavad tunnistuse sellest, et ratsionaalse valiku teoriast alguse saanud religioonituru teooriat (*religious market theory*) saab kasutada kiriku poliitilise tegevuse analüüsimisel.

See teooria võimaldab ka edukalt võrrelda eri denominatsioonidesse kuuluvate suurkirikute tegevust erinevates maades, sest usuliste institutsioonidena omavad need kirikud sarnaseid huve ja väljakutseid ning nende valikud ei ole ette määratud kiriku teoloogilise õpetuse poolt.

Võrdlevat meetodit ja religioonituru teooriat kasutades saab edukalt analüüsida erinevate denominatsioonide poliitilist tegevust.