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THE BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION

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1. THE AIMS AND GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE INVESTIGATION

Estonian educational renewal that began in 1987 with the Congress of Estonian educationists declared the need to change our curricula to be more compatible to the child's needs and interests. Science-centred curricula have been claimed to deepen motivational deficit of learning. Instead of subject-centred and society-centred curriculum it has been proposed to create child-centred curriculum. In the *MAIN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN ESTONIA (1989)* the Estonian educational curriculum was criticized for the reversed logic - the achievements of science had been enumerated, whereas the broader social and meaning context of scientific activities as well as the ways of resolving the scientific problems were not explained or opened to the learner. Such kind of critique significantly revived quite uncritically the old popular slogan of child-centredness. In many ways it is the revolt against outside pressure to learners what is incompatible with their intrinsic interest or motivation. From the three main principles of educational renewal in Estonia- democratization, humanization and setting a high value to education, the humanization rather directly emphasizes that the learner is given a content of education based on his inner motivation escaping from the monopoly of science-centred education.

The recognition of the controversy between science-centredness and child-centredness riped already during the last decades when the declarations of the need to substitute science-centred approach by child-centred one was often declared. However, there is no critical attention neither to the historical roots nor to contemporary practice of applying of the above

mentioned approaches. Various strains of free schoooling or alternative schooling often seem to represent in themselves the way away from outside pressure, what makes it actual to analyse the roots of child-centred approach to educational process more profoundly what is often represented as the very negation excluding every extrinsic prescription of learning.

Since 1987 a number of articles in the Estonian newspapers and journals has been published, describing and criticizing the educational situation in Estonia. In the first years of educational renewal the criticism of previous ways of teaching and learning had been quite hard, focusing by many authors on the necessity to change the attitudes of teachers and educationists principally, to shape the whole educational system more human, personality- and child-centred. The low motivation of children to learning has been critically noticed as well as the decline of pupils' interest to school in the first two-three years of their school-age, the anxiety of children in school. The school instead of being a place of enjoyable learning and experiencing, has been destructing the inner activity and creativity of children. One of the reasons is the curriculum which is overloaded with atomistic scientific knowledge. The result of inhuman, alienated, authoritarian school system was the repugnance of children to teaching and learning and, at last, to the whole school as an institution (Ahun, Kadajas, a.o., 1987, Pilt, 1987).

Some years later, after the period of criticism, the activities striving for educational innovation had been developed in three main directions: firstly,to more generalized statements about fundamental and paradigmatical problems (Grauberg, 1991; Kreitzberg, 1992; Orn, 1992), secondly, proposals to improve the teaching in state schools emphasizing integrated curriculum and personality-centredness (for example, using methods of Estonian educational theorist and schoolmaster, a representative of child-centred education - Johannes Käis), (Sepp, Leht, 1989; Völli, 1990) and, thirdly, the movement of free or alternative schools, including a big number of writings about school-diversity and different approaches to schooling and to child (Lepik, 1989; Madise, 1990; Lulla, 1990; Kuurme and Siim, 1991).

In the free school movement, of all various types the Waldorf-schools have been the most successful in Estonia. In 1993 five Waldorf-schools have been established and some others alternative pedagogical conceptions and methods of alternative schooling have been attempted to realize in our schools, too: Freinet-pedagogy, catholic pedagogy, active learning methods.

All these schools, differing from each other conceptually and methodically, have one similar feature: they pay more attention to child, his inner development, the child's needs and interests, his rights to be a personality with his uniqueness - far more as it has been accepted in our state schools during the last decades usually. The notable interest among parents, teachers and educationists in different types of schooling, in various pedagogical approaches and conceptions, the rise of new schooltypes in our educational landscape have generated the necessity of searching the historical roots of the ideas of the child-centred education and its appearances in various types of schooling. So far as the attention of Estonian educationists is turned more significantly as before to the child as the possible source of justifying educational planning and decisions, it seems that we have to analyse the roots of child-centred educational thinking critically and explicitly, to consider its relevance in shaping educational environment.

The aim of the present investigation is more explicit analysis of the child-centred doctrine in the works by Rousseau - a founder of the doctrine, to understand its various premises and possible implications in relation of different educational theories.

Methodologically, we have been supported by the approach of interpretative (hermeneutical) school, which is regarding educational problems in historical process, taking in account the educational praxis (Kemmis, 1985; Odman, P.-J., 1985), and by the historical-critical analysis (Kaestle, C.F., 1985).

I try to show difficulties to limit ourselves only to ideas which reflect child in separation of subject matter and society.

I am going to describe and analyse more explicitly some contemporary educational considerations on the basis of the emphasis of the child's needs and interests and their applicability in practical teaching.

To better understand Rousseau's educational considerations we should begin with the description of general assumptions about the natural and social world followed by the enlightenment philosophy. Rousseau was one of the most influential writers of the 18th century reflecting quite distinctly the general world picture of the Enlightenment. As Jimack (1985) wrote, his educational thinking does not reflect any significant novelty in details, almost all the positions defended by Rousseau were expressed by different other writers, notably by Locke and even by Plato, the favourite educational writer of Rousseau. His novelty lies in systematic and inter-linked elaboration of those various statements expressed before. And probably the most distinctive feature of Rousseau's writings is their very influential style.

2. ROUSSEAU AS THE FOUNDER OF CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION

2.1 ENLIGHTENMENT

The term "Enlightenment", taken roughly, summarizes the common world-view resulting from the former elaboration of various philosophical questions (Valjavec 1961). Description of the general features of the Enlightenmental thinking enables us to understand the aspirations and beliefs of Rousseau as well as of his great contemporaries - Kant, Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu and others.

Enlightenmental philosophy established the fundamentals of whole world picture of modern era. Its paradigmatical assumptions about the man, society and knowledge had a great impact on the whole educational theorizing over the subsequent centuries up to now. Only during some last decades all the Enlightenmental program of rationalization has been questioned more and more often, so that the new term - that of "Postmodernity" has been proposed to designate the new coming era, where the Enlightenmental philosophy is rejected in all its major points (Kiziltani, a.o., 1990).

Next, I will present a short overview of the features of Enlightenemental thought and its approach to educational issues using mainly the works by Bowen, 1964; Schröder et al. 1974; Valjavec, 1961; Kreitzberg, 1993.

The Enlightenment is primarily a cultural historian's designation of a historical period in Western society, used for the eighteenth century, but by some historians as the "Age of Reason" for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries together.

The Enlightenment had various trends and branches in many European countries, but, particularly in France, it took place as the revolt against accepted traditions and institutions: against the domination of the ancients in literature, art, and philosophy, against the church and its formal interpretations of Christianity; against absolutism in government; against highly artificial social and economic conditions and modes

of education. In this process of building a new world view, the increasing prestige of natural science ("natural philosophy") - played an important role. The achievements in mathematics, astronomy, and physics culminated in Newton's *"Principia"* (1687) are the most important ones. The new apprehension through Newton's ideas, widely penetrating the public mind of the Western world, was an apology of science, a growing evidence, that human beings, using their "natural" reasoning powers in a "right" way, could not only understand what human beings are in the universe; they could understand what human beings are really like, and by combining this knowledge of nature and human nature, learn how to live better and happier lives (Bowen 1964). Thus, we could hypothesize that the natural-scientific approach to all the meaningful phenomena in the man's life including education, man and society began to dominate in theoretical considerations. It was the proloque to general positivistic approach first systematically justified by A. Comte.

According to Brinton (1967), the three keywords which unit a cluster of ideas, forming our model of the world view of the Enlightenment are: reason, nature and progress.

REASON

Descartes, one of the main representatives of the "Age of Reason" and one of the predecessors of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, has affirmed three positive axioms which were universally accepted. These are:

1) the supremacy of reason;
2) the invariability of the laws of nature;
3) an exact method of testing or verifying the truth.

The Encyclopedists had also a supreme faith in the ability of human reason and understanding to discover all the truth, to find out all laws, and, by these, to bring in an era of human happiness (Ahrbeck, 1978; Schröder et al., 1974; Bowen, 1964). Like any other physiological function, reason was held to work always and in substantially the same way in all human beings as nature designed them. But, from the point of view of Enlightenment, environmental conditions (institutional and cultural environment, rather

than physical environment) - had in the West corrupted the normal physiological working of reason in most human beings. Church, state, superstition,ignorance, prejudice, poverty, and vice all successed to work together to impede the proper functioning of reason. The philosophers would have ranked the church as the greatest corrupting influence. Voltaire's "crush the infamous thing" ("écrasez l'infâme") rang through the century.

Kant (1966) explains the enlightenment as a way out from the non-maturity, caused by fault of human being themselves ("selbstverschuldete Unümndigkeit"). This non-maturity is the impossibility of human beings to use their reason without others help. The Enlightment will encourage them to use their reason.

NATURE

By many writers, the eighteenth-century has been called the "century of Nature" (Thomsen, 1991). Nature, in the eyes of Enlightenment, usually has been perceived in an idyllic sense, often held up as the best model for imitation in all things. The decline of mankind is caused by ignorance or neglect of nature's laws. Prejudice and superstition were the main obstacles of perceiving and following the natural order.

The term "Nature" in Enlightenment, which was a part of conception of good, right and beautiful, must be understood in two antithesis (Bowen, 1964). The first means the "super"- or "supranatural" - the revealed truths of religion. For the Enlightenment all these truths were only imaginations, the inability of human beings to see the right ways of nature and reason. The second means the "unnatural", artificial, which does exist, consisting of irrational customs, traditions and prejudices, accumulated through historical time. How the natural got to be unnatural was a question difficult to answer. Rousseau, for example, in the *Essay on the Origin of Inequality* describes the fatal doing of the first man, which has courage to fence in a piece of land and says "This is mine". Rousseau, indeed, does not explain the causes of a natural man to behave so unnaturally. In general, nature was simply the "good", an ethical and aesthetical standard.

Some writers, particularly in the second half of the eighteenth century, affirmed, that on earth there has been a state of nature in which men lived free from evil. Some of them placed this ideal state into the past, in the Golden Age of the Hellenistic tradition, others placed it into the present age far from Europe, for example, into the islands of South Sea or to the indians of America. But for the most part, the eighteenth-century writers had only a half belief in the historical reality of an idyllic state of nature. Even Rousseau seemed to be aware that the state of nature is a myth, a useful form to show the advantages of a new order in comparison to the contemporary corrupted state (Bowen, 1964).

PROGRESS

The leaders of the eighteenth century thinking were conscious that a profound change was taking place in the depth of the human spirit. This change was a new intellectual awakening, an emancipation from the dark past, dominated by superstition, error, ignorance, prejudice and tradition, a spiritual process which by the twentieth-century sociologist Max Weber is called "disenhcantment of the world", a process through rationalization leading mankind as unilinear progress towards moral perfection (see e. g. Habermas, 1984).

Scientific knowledge had put an end to this era and brought enlightenment and liberty. Scientific knowledge was a live topic in the fashionable salons; ladies studied astronomy, mechanics, and anatomy. The Baconian slogan "knowledge is power", had been proved by science and invention. The best instrument which could be trusted to lead to the perfection of human nature and happiness was the spreading of knowledge (Bowen, 1964). Intellectual enlightenment was the sure instrument of human perfectibility. Civilization was in its infancy and not in its old age, as it had been wrongly thought.

The clear beginning of the belief that the present could be better than the past, came in the late seventeenth century. In France the combat was called the "quarrel of the ancients and the moderns"; in the early eighteenth century the moderns began to win in public opinion. The French philosopher Turgot outlined in the *On the Successive Advances of the Human Mind*

(Discours sur les progrès successifs de l'esprit humain, 1750) a complete doctrine of progress. Condorcet, a disciple of Turgot, described in the *Sketch for a Historical Picture (1794)* an optimistic utopia of indefinite progress, about what Jurgen Habermas (1987) in *The Theory of Communicative Action* says that "Condorcet believes in eternal life before death".

The first agent of progress is reason, only by means of reason it could be possible to control the physical and cultural environment. Education became one of the major means, how to set free reason. From Locke to Rousseau, Kant and Pestalozzi, the Enlightenment produced a series of writings on education, and recognized the importance of educational activities in building up a new, enlightened world.

2.2 BIOGRAPHY OF ROUSSEAU. THE MAIN TREATISES.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was born in Geneva in 1712, in a family of a calvinist watch-maker. He was brought up by an aunt and by his father, since his mother died a few days after his birth. Rousseau's childhood was idyllically happy, spent in an atmosphère of harmony. He admits that the children of a king could not have a happier childhood than he had it during the first years of his life (Rousseau 1959).

By the age of six or seven, he was reading avidly, first the sentimental novels which had belonged to his mother, later historical books. When he was nearly thirteen, he was apprenticed to an brutal engraver, whose brutality, he claimed, began to have destructive influence on his character. He was sixteen, when he left Geneva. In a month he had renounced calvinism and had been baptized a Catholic in Turin. He spent one more year in Italy, a part of the time as a servant, and then returned to France. After another two years of wanderings and adventures, in the age of nineteen, he finally settled down in Chambéry, to live together with Mme de Warens.

Rousseau's own "education" in his childhood and youth was certainly unusual; in the sense of "formal education" it didn't exist. It was only in the twenties that Rousseau began systematically educate himself in the intellectual sense. His career as a teacher began some years earlier: when he was eighteen, he was giving music lessons in Neuchâtel. In 1740 he

accepted the post of a tutor to the children of M. de Mably, but his talents were not sufficient for two small boys and he left Lyon after a year. It was the only educational experiment as tutor in his life.

In 1743, Rousseau was appointed secretary to the French ambassador at Venice, M. de Montaigu, but he lost this post the following year because of a quarrel with him. On a personal level, Rousseau's liaison with Thérèse Levasseur began in 1745, and in the next few years she bore him five children, all of them placed in a foundling's home, to his bitter regret, expressed in *Emile:*

> "A man...has no right to be a father, if he cannot fulfil a father's duties. Poverty, pressure of business, mistaken sociale prejudices, non of these can excuse a man from his duty, which is to support and educate his own children. If a man of any natural feeling neglects these sacred duties he will repent it with bitter tears and will never be comforted."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.17)

In the spring of 1756 Rousseau took up residence in the Hermitage, a small house belonging to Mme d'Épinay. Having quarrelled with her, Rousseau left the Hermitage in 1757 and moved to Montmorency, where he became friendly with the Marechal de Luxembourg and his wife. After the publishing of *Emile,* and *Social Contract,* which were condemned by church in Paris, Geneva, Amsterdam and Rome, the years of wandering and escape of Rousseau began: Switzerland, Prussia, England, living one year by the english philosopher David Hume. He had already broken with the encyclopedists Voltaire, Diderot and Grimm, now he was rejected by the opposite camp, too. He finally returned to France in 1767, under the assumed name of M. de Renou, still liable to arrest, sick and silently endured by government.

He eventuelly settled in Paris in 1770. On July 2, 1778, he died at Ermenonville, near Paris.

Rousseau in his essay, *Discourse on Arts and Sciences (Discours sur Si le progrès des sciences et des arts a contribué a corrompre on à épurer les moeurs?, 1750)* is showing the difference between the ideal social man of ancient Greece and Rome and the contemporary corrupted social man.

In the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes, 1754)* Rousseau is explaining the sources of inequality among human beings.

Rousseau's moral program is written down in the roman *"New Heloise" (Julie ou La nouvelle Héloïse', 1761).*

Emile, (Émile ou De l'éducation, 1762) involves Rousseau's educational views, his imagination of an appropriate education to bring up a new man free from corruption and dependence from others, having characteristics and forces to form a new society.

In his main political writing the *Social contract (Du contrat social,1762)* Rousseau outlines the new society, its main principles and mechanisms.

Considérations about the government of Poland (Considerations sur le gouvernement de Pologne et sur sa réformation projetée en avril, 1772) involves concrete proposals to Poland in politics and education of polish people.

Like his contemporaries, Voltaire, Diderot and other philosophers of the eighteenth century, Rousseau was a versatile writer: political theorist, educationalist, music theorist, drama-writer, novelist. In spite of his position among philosophers and novelists, many authors claim that anyone of his works holds as much current interest for the modern reader as *Emile,* his main work on education.

To understand the world of Rousseau's thought, some of his works have to be regarded as a whole, presenting a conception of human being and society. Rousseau himself said in a letter to Malesherbes, January 1762, that the first *Discours,* the one on inequality, and the treatise on education, Emile, are inseparable and form together a whole (Jimack, 1985). According to his statement, that everything is radically connected with politics, he wrote the *Emile,* a treatise on education, and the *Contrat social,* a treatise on politics, as two parts of the same work.

> "The manner of education advocated in *Emile* is supposed to be the prime means of ensuring the success of the kind of society idealized in the *Social Contract*, which, in turn, will allow the natural Emile to thrive, which he certainly could not have done in the society of his day that Rousseau so much despised."
>
> (Barrow, 1974, p.12)

The programme which Rousseau had worked out to solve this problem was presented in two levels: in *Emile* in a form of moral education for the new man, and in the *Social contract* of the political principles for shaping a new society. Thus *Emile* is an attempt to deal with the problem of an education which is in accordance with man's nature, but simultaneously fitting him for the society, for others. Through a new social consciousness man can become good for others, and, as in nature, good for himself.

2.3 ROUSSEAU'S CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT SOCIETY

Rousseau dealt with the problem of society in the second *Discours* and in the *Social Contract*. Here he outlined the features of uncorrupted society for which he later designated the education of Emile. It is not possible to understand fully his educational ideas without knowing the background notions about society.

According to Rousseau, nature has been lost in so far as *amour de soi* has been transformed into the non-natural and artificial *amour propre*. In the *Social contract* Rousseau writes:

> "Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains."
>
> (Rousseau, 1988, p.38)

According to Rousseau in the contemporary human society everything is dictated by convention, prejudice, artificiality, customs, opinions of others.The root of the social problem is this other-dependent consciousness, which is not peculiar to human nature but only the product of society. Society is always characterized by competition and rivalry, the opposition of interests, and always the hidden desire to make one's profit at the expense of others. All these evils, Rousseau says, are the first effect of property, and the inseparable consequence of growing inequality. What Rousseau attempts to do is to reconciliate nature and society, to find something in human nature which constitutes a capacity for communal living without corrupting other-dependency.

General Will

One of the central ideas in Rousseau's social thinking is the idea of General Will. Rousseau considered that what we need for communal living is the situation when interests of all get equal consideration. That can be achieved when society is organized on a basis of agreement, of a social contract between all citizens, not only between the rulers and the ruled. Rousseau describes the main question of the social contract through the necessity to find a form of social agreement which will make it possible, to defend the person and property of every member of society, to enable every person to live together with others and to obey only to himself, preserving his former freedom [1].

> [1]"Eine Form der gesellschaftlichen Vereinigung gilt es zu finden, die mit der ganzen gemeinsamen Kraft die Person und das Vermögen jedes Gesellschaftsgliedes verteidigt und schutzt, und durch die jede einzelne, obgleich er sich mit allen vereint, gleichwohl nur sich selbst gehorcht und so frei bleibt wie vorher."
>
> (Rousseau, 1988, p. 48)

If this contract is to achieve its purpose, each idividual must obey its demands. Rousseau formulates it:

> "Each one of us puts into the community his person and all his powers under the supreme direction of the general will: and as a body, we incorporate every member as an invisible part of the whole."
>
> (Rousseau, 1988, p.49)

The authoritative direction of the community does not lie in a part of the community, but in the General Will. The problem is, how to ensure that the terms of the social contract will be generally recognized and accepted by all citizens as desirable? The basis and guarantee for the consensus is the General Will, which is always right. The General Will has to be distinguished from the Will of All, which is the opinion of majority. In the *Social Contract* Rousseau explains the difference, quite vague, but with conviction, saying that there is a big difference between the Will of All and of the General Will. The latter is directed to the common interest, the former to the private interest [2].

> [2]"Es besteht ein grosser Unterschied zwischen dem Willen aller und dem Allgemeinwillen; letzterer geht nur auf das Gemeininteresse aus, ersterer auf das Einzelinteresse und ist nur eine Summe einzelner Willensmeinungen. Zieht man nun von diesen Willensmeinungen das Mehr und Minder, das sich gegenseitig aufhebt, ab, so bleibt als Differenzsumme der Allgemeinwille ubrig."
>
> (Der Gesellschaftsvertrag, p.60)

According to this explanation we know that we do not achieve the General Will by counting votes; that would only give us the Will of All, unless we could rely on every individual vote in accordance with the demands of the General Will. However, at this point we have to remember that the *Social contract* is not supposed to be taken in isolation. Rousseau did not imagine that after he had explained the theory, we would all accept it. In the state in which mankind actually finds itself it is not to be expected that it should embrace the idea of the social contract or be able to interpret and realize the General Will. We are all depending on opinions of others, full of artificiality and selfishness. But, the idea of Rousseau is, if we had not been brought up in this corrupting manner which alienates us from ourselves, from our inner nature, but had been educated according to the laws of nature, we would be naturally inclined to recognize and use the rules and opportunities of the General Will.

In Rousseau's social theorizing the democratic idea of deciding all important social questions by the vote in General Assembly by all the adult members of the society from one side and the idea of the existence of some impersonal and unparticular general will get in controversy. By Charvet (1974) Rousseau has lost any idea of particular individual with his particular and often uncommensurable interests. It seems possible to interprete that for Rousseau there are those who recognize the "right" general will which does not distinguish an individual from every other and those who are corrupted and whose will is consequently not in accordance with the "right" general will.

Berlin (1966) analysing such teleological kind of notion which emphasizes some natural right - the only right basis of social being, wrote:

> " ..individual freedom of choice ...is ultimately an illusion...the notion that human beings could have chosen otherwise than they did usually rests upon ignorance of facts..."
>
> (Berlin, 1966, p.58)

Ignorance is assumed to be the only reason of the lack of recognition of one's right needs or the General Will. Freedom would mean to know one's right ends of being. It is the imagination that we can harmonize our interests and aims on the basis of purely rational basis. Here is the basis for justifying coercion of man' s empirical self to make it free through

inculcating true ends of being, true interests and needs. Berlin asserted that such a way of thinking characterizes all the declarations of the rights of man in the eighteenth century and those who look upon society as a design constructed according to rational laws of the wish of lawgiver, or of nature, or of history, or of supreme being.

Equality-inequality

Rousseau distinguishes between natural inequality and moral or political inequality. The assertion of natural equality is not a claim that men are equal in all respects, in their faculties of mind and body, but it is a claim that

> "no man has any natural authority over his fellows."
>
> (Rousseau, 1962,p.27)

The grounds for this assertion lie in the term "natural", by which it is meant in a state of nature, in absence of social activity and social order. The moral or political inequality can emerge in two ways. In the first place in relation to the common activities, in which some men are judged by others to possess superior capacities, an inequality of status results. In the second place an inequality of wealth develops the opportunities provided by the creation of an economy which enable the more skilful and inventive accumulate more than others. This inequality of condition affects inequalities of status in so far as the richer have more opportunities to develop their talents. The corrupting mentality of society creates not only the possibility of inequality of status, but through *amour propre* stimulates the desire for superiority over others, so that inequality of status appears as the cause and object of all social disorders. If, therefore, a new consciousness will replace the old, it will do away with the conditions that make moral or political inequality possible and desired. A social guarantee for a new equality will be the General Will:

> "The private will inclines by its very nature towards partiality, and the general will towards equality."
>
> (Rousseau, 1988, p.58)

The love of equality will emerge as a principle of the new social consciousness, as the love of inequality was a principle of the old one.

2.4 NOTIONS ABOUT A NATURAL MAN

Rousseau sees education as the means to make adults capable and willing to discern the common interest. The key to the appropriate education and to a stable and just state lies in letting natural man emerge. All will be well, when we recognize that what is going wrong is that we have been moulded by corrupted society instead of shaping society according to human nature. Rousseau emphasizes that the relationship between education and society is reciprocal: on the one hand the correct education is needed to realize the perfect society based on social contract, on the other hand, the arrangement of proper education demands the just society. From this point of view the education of Emile is not more than a contribution towards changing the society here and now into something nearer to the ideal, which in turn will constitute a setting for the education of ideal type.

On the first page of *Emile* Rousseau writes:

> "God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they became evil. He forces one soil to yield the products of another, one tree to bear another's fruit. He confuses and confounds time, place, and natural conditions. He mutilates his dog, his horse, and his slave. He destroys and defaces all things; he loves all that is deformed and monstrous; he will have nothing as nature made it, not even man himself, who must learn his paces like a saddle-horse, and he shaped to his master's taste like the trees in his garden... Under existing conditions a man left to himself from birth would be more of a monster than the rest. Prejudice, authority, necessity, example, all the social conditions intro which we are plunged, would stifle nature in him and put nothing in her place."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.5)

Rousseau's famous claim that man is naturally good, was in fact presented already in the first *"Discourse"*, in which he affirms that modern man, despite all his knowledge and culture, was not to be compared with the unsophisticated citizens of ancient Sparta and Rome. Between the contemporary society and the nature of man a fundamental antithesis seemed to exist. European civilization had sacrificed the moral demands of human nature to the superficial allure of a purely intellectual culture and replaced natural needs by artificial. Likewise, insisted Rousseau, the scien-

ces and the arts, in spite of their brilliance, are not the genuine expression of fundamental human needs but the result of pride and vanity. Consequently, when luxury and idleness are growing rapidly, the corruption of the contemporary society is increasing and the human relationship is becoming steadily weaker. Man is alienated from his true nature and in pursuit of the illusions of opinions, he vainly grasps at objects outside himself, instead of listening to the voice of nature in himself.

In his early works Rousseau opposed his contemporary society that was the source of corruption, the "virtue", conferring stability and unity upon human existence, giving man an authentic openness and innocence. It was still in the second *Discourse* that the pre-social man, naturally good and self-sufficient, came as Rousseau's ideal on the scene. Although the life of primitive man could be limited and instinctive, he knew how to live in a happy accordance with his innate needs. Natural men will be free, equal beings, physically well adapted to their environment, naturally good, then the corrupted and vicious passions of social men were unknown for them. About the transformation from the natural stage of equality and happiness to the one of inequality in man's nature Rousseau wrote:

> "As ideas and feelings progressed, and the mind and the heart were exercised, men continued to be less wild; their connexions with each other became more binding as they developed. They accustomed themselves to assemble before their huts or around a large fire; singing and dancing, true off-spring of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation of men and women thus idly gathered together. Each one began to consider the rest and to wish to be considered in turn, and public esteem came to acquire a value. Whoever sang or danced the best, whoever was the most handsome, the strongest, the most skilful, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration; and this was the first step towards inequality and vice at the same time. From these first distinctions arose on the side vanity and contempt, on the other shame and envy; and the fermentation caused by these new germs finally produced compounds fatal to innocence and happiness."
>
> (Rousseau, 1962, p.174)

The transformation of man's nature and consciousness from its original to its social constitution is that men came from purely private identity in state of nature to public identity, created by public opinion. A natural man was largely self-sufficient, he was not only supplied with an urge of self-preservation, self-love *(amour de soi)*, but also with an innate feeling of natural pity. These two fundamental principles of their soul - *amour de soi* and pity - constituted the basis for natural goodness. Charvet (1974) describes the natural man of Rousseau as follows:

> "He possesses neither imagination nor language, and having no understanding of past and future, lives only in the present. His behaviour in the present is governed by those two principles, *amour de soi* and pity, which themselves are impulses of the soul derived directly from nature, and not dependent of the existence of reason. In allowing himself to be guided by them, he follows instinctively what Rousseau calls the maxim of natural goodness."
>
> (Charvet, 1974, p.9)

The pity, Rousseau also argues, is the basis for all subsequent social virtues, for what, he asks, are generosity, mercy, humanity, if they are not pity for the weak, the guilty and the human race in general (Rousseau, 1962).

Rousseau explains the difference between *amour de soi* and *amour propre, between two kinds of self-love as follows:*

> *"Amour de soi* is a natural sentiment, which leads every animal to concern itself with its own preservation, and which, directed in man by reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue."
>
> (Rousseau, 1962, p.217)

On the other hand,

> *"amour propre"* is only a relative and factitious sentiment which is born in society, which leads each individual to make more of himself than of every other, which inspires in men all the evils they perpetrate on each other,"
>
> (Rousseau, 1962, p.217)

Rousseau claims, this *amour propre,* depending on the making by each individual of comparisons between himself and others, which natural man is not able to do, does not exist in a state of nature. The arrival of vice on the scene was caused only through the above-mentioned process where the nature of man's self-love has been transformed from *amour de soi* into *amour propre.*

The main idea in the two *Discours* was that the creation of the society, based on the property, was the principal cause of the corruption and unhappiness of the contemporary man. From the first *Discours* it was evident that Rousseau was not rejecting social man as such, but only the inadequate, corrupted social man he saw around him. The two *Discours* were rather descriptive than directed to offer some proposals for reforming the society or reshaping the contemporary corrupted social man. Only his later

writings, *Emile* and the *Social contract* are attempts to conceive the solution to it. *Emile* provides an account of the educational and moral relations, and the *Social contract* the political relations that must be realized between men for the problem to be solved.

2.5 *EMILE* AS THE TREATISE ABOUT THE EDUCATION OF NATURAL MAN

In *Emile* Rousseau distinguishes between two types of education: a public or communal and a private or domestic education. The aims of these two types of education are totally different and contradictory. The aim of the former is to educate a man to live for others, accepting the demands of society, the aim of the latter is to educate a man for himself, accepting the demands of nature.

> "Forced to combat either nature or society, you must make your choice between the man and the citizen, you cannot train both."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.7)

Rousseau goes on to explain the above-mentioned thought:

> "The natural man lives for himself; he is the unit, the whole, dependent only on himself and on his like. The citizen is but the numerator of a fraction, whose value depends on its denominator; his value depends upon the whole, that is, on the community. Good social institutions are those best fitted to make a man unnatural, to exchange his independence for dependence, to merge the unit in the group, so that he no longer regards himself as one, but as a part of the whole, and is only conscious of the common life."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.7)

A result of an education which does not accept the laws of nature will be a man who is always in contradiction with himself, always wavering between his inclinations and duties, a creature, which is neither a man nor a citizen, he will be not good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of contemporary men, a Frenchman, an Englishman, nothing (Rousseau, 1985).

Despite these oppositions Rousseau immediately goes on to assert that the two objects of two kinds of education, producing a man and producing a citizen, may be reconciliable with each other.

> "There remains the education of the home or of nature; but how will a man live with others if he is educated for himself alone? If the twofold aims could be resolved into one by removing the man's self-contradictions, one great obstacle

> to his happiness would be gone. To judge of this you must see the man full-grown; you must have noted his inclinations, watched his progress, followed his steps; in a word you must really known a natural man."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.9)

The *Emile* is an evidence and proof of the claim that the natural man has to be known, a demonstration what the education according to nature involves, and how Emile, the product of such an education, will not only be able to take his place as citizen in a just state, but will be well fitted for the citizenship. In this case it will be possible at the same time and without contradiction to join two aims of education: to educate a man for himself and for others, to educate both man and citizen.

> "The problem is the reconciliation of nature and society, and the programme to resolve the opposition between them, first in terms of a moral education, and secondly in terms of political principles proper for a reformed communal life."
>
> (Charvet, 1974, p.39)

The immediate programme of *Emile* is to present an example of an education in accordance with man's nature, the product of which will be a new kind of man. Rousseau says:

> "When he leaves me, I grant you, he will be neither a magistrate, a soldier, nor a priest; he will be a man."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.9)

Emile's fate is not to be educated for a particular position in a particular society, but to be fitted for the status of being a man. The aim is to liberate man from his existing social context. To be educated in contemporary context is to be educated from the very beginning in the false and corrupting ways of that world. In this respect traditional methods and principles are useless, their wisdom appears as prejudice, their customs empty convention, so that the formation of the new man requiring an education directed against existing society, needs the creation of a new education, involving new wisdom, new principles and methods.

The life Rousseau would have children lead is one that would be free and independent, involving the possibility to be co-operative and social individuals, supplied with new consciousness.

> "Where is the path of true happiness? ... The mere limitation of our desires is not enough, for if they were less than our powers, part of our faculties would

> be idle, and we should not enjoy our whole being... True happiness consists in decreasing the difference between our desires and our powers, in establishing a perfect equilibrium between the power and the will ... That man is truly free who desires what he is able to perform, and does what he desires."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, pp.44-48)

This equilibrium between what is feasible and what is wanted has long been distorted for mankind in general, and, despite existing by birth, through the artificial desires and false expectations of society will be destroyed in every individual. True education would preserve the harmony and enable people to live independently and happily.

The first thing that Emile's tutor should do is to remove him from human society, then his primar task is to keep the unnatural corrupting elements of civilisation away from a young child. Every child must have his own tutor which will remain with him from his birth till his marriage. It is assumed by Rousseau, that natural surroundings will make possible the development of all inner potentialities of a child. Consequently, in the world, where the surroundings are rather unnatural, the education has to be merely "negative", to remove impediments hindering the free and natural development of a child.

Rousseau argues against the practice of swaddling clothes for babies on the grounds that it is unnatural, involving a danger for natural physical development of a child. He insists that the mother should suckle her own young rather than hire a wet-nurse, on the grounds that it is more natural, too. Jimack (1985) argues that the subject of maternal breast-feeding and swaddling clothes seem to have been the only area in which there was any considerable influence of *Emile* in practice.

Rousseau's message for the early years is: let the child run free. Let him learn from nature in the sense both of learning what nature has to teach and of learning by means of natural experience. He says:

> "Fix your eyes on nature, follow the path traced by her."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.14)

Rousseau's statement that the vocabulary of a child should be let limited has been attacked from many sides but he is arguing that peasant folk, nearer to perfection and natural man than the people of cities, has

"few ideas, but those few ideas are thoroughly grasped."

(Rousseau, 1985, p.40)

From the age of two to twelve years, the second stage of Emile's education begins. Emile will learn all as a result of becoming aware of the natural consequences of whatever he does. The role of a tutor is not to prescribe but conduct:

> "Besides, I prefer to call the man who has this knowledge master rather than teacher, since it is a question of guidance rather than instruction. He must not give precepts, he must let the scholar find them out for himself."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.19)

Emile has to be free of all worry; he will simply learn through experience to avoid what harms him. The surest way to learn what can harm him is to be hurt. Rousseau admits, that other children may receive fewer injuries, but the price is to be always "thwarted and constrained", they are safe but frightened. Nevertheless, Emile won't do himself any real harm unless he

> "has been foolishly left on a high place, or above the fire, or within reach of dangerous weapons."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.42)

Here can be added that Emile is evidently not left to learn anything and everything from experience and by means of suffering natural consequences. Some things at least are guarded against by Rousseau, though precisely what things and how it is determined is not very clear.

It is clear from the last book of *Emile* that man must be educated for society, though not necessarily for society in its present form. Man's nature is not fully mature until it becomes social. However, the natural man in the state of nature and the natural man in the social state cannot be identical, for whereas the former is predominantly an instinctive, primitive creature living on the spontaneous expression of his innate vitality, the latter is a rational, moral being aware of his obligations to other people, a man called upon to subordinate the impulse of "goodness" to the demands of "virtue". Therefore, only in society a genuinely human morality can become possible (Bowen, 1964).

3. CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION

Through all the centuries until Locke and Rousseau, the theory and practice of education had been determined and arranged from the standpoint of adult, his interests and his social life. Of course, there was no lack of writers of Enlightenment, who, mainly influenced by Locke's sensationalism, appealed for an educational reform, for the more natural education of children, especially in physical education. But, according to Jimack,

> "... there was no serious challenge to the tradition of intellectual education; and most works dealing with the subject, even after *Emile*, confined themselves to discussing minor details of the curriculum, and perhaps some changes in the methods of learning the traditional subjects."
>
> (Jimack, 1985, p.XIV)

In this context, Rousseau stood out from his predecessors above all in subordinating the details of education to an overall conception of man and of the development proper to him.

Up to Rousseau, there couldn't be principally any other point of view from which to approach the education of the young. Rousseau assailed this basic assumption as injurious for individuals and for society. In place of ideas and views of adults, he substituted the spontaneous interests and activities of a child and its natural course of development.

Rousseau's supreme contribution to the education and to the history of educational thought lies in making the child the new centre from which the education has to be viewed. A child has his own rights; the childhood has his own natural laws.

> "Mankind has its place in the sequence of things; childhood has its place in the sequence of human life; the man must be treated as a man and the child as a child."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.43)

Being one of the first, Rousseau stresses the importance of a progressive education: each stage of the process must be carefully adapted to the individual's developing needs and so follow "the natural progress of the human heart." Rousseau maintains that what a truly progressive education will recognize is that the child has his own special needs as a being who exists in his own right.

> "Nature would have them children before they are men. If we try invert this order we shall produce a forced fruit immature and flavourless, fruit which will be rotten before it is ripe; we shall have young doctors and old children. Childhood has his own ways of seeing, thinking and feeling; nothing is more foolish than to try and substitute our ways."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.54)

Rousseau's analysis of society and education involves the view that what is basically wrong is what is being taught, is an uncritical acceptance of status quo. The overt curriculum requires students to imbibe a lot of ununderstandable formulae. But

> "... once you teach people to say what they do not understand, it is easily enough, to get them to say anything you like."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.218)

Rousseau also emphasizes the importance of distinguishing education as a whole from related concepts such as discipline and instruction. Rousseau is not interested in instructions; he wants education for Emile and therefore Emile has to grow up in the countryside, then Rousseau does not believe that school, a place for public education, would be right for his aims. The chief problem is to inoculate him so that he can successfully resist all the contagious evils which he must inevitably encounter in adult life. He is to be educated as a savage to enter society as it is and not as it ought to be. To this end he must be trained for the exercise of independence of judgement and a will power. In this situation individuality is more necessary than sharing the communal sentiments. He must be left free to follow his own bent and to develop according to nature. His education, like that of the savage, depends upon his physical environment and inner nature, and not upon social conditions. On the one hand it is the demand for a wider environment where Emile can learn through experience, on the other hand it is Rousseau's mistrust to institutions, to their corrupting influence.

"Civilized man is born and dies a slave. All his life long man is imprisoned by our institutions."

(Rousseau, 1985, p.11)

3.1 FEATURES OF CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION

1. *Teacher's approach should be governed by the nature of the child rather than by some preconceived plan.*

Rousseau admonishes:

"Oh, wise man, take time to observe nature; watch your scholar well before you say a word to him; first leave the germ of his character free to show itself, do not constrain him in anything, the better to see him as he really is."

(Rousseau, 1985, p.58)

Rousseau is not advocating the idea, that there should be no preconceived aims and objectives, but what he is striving is the capability of teachers to accept of the limits imposed upon them and their plans by the actual capacities of their pupils at any given time.

He says:

"We know nothing of childhood; and with our mistaken notions the further we advance the further we go astray. The wisest writers devote themselves to what a man ought to know, without asking what a child is capable of learning. They are always looking for a man in the child, without considering what he is before he becomes a man."

(Rousseau, 1985, p.1)

For example, Rousseau doesn't insist that a teacher should entertain the preconceived idea that the children ought to read by the age of ten. Emile's tutor was not worried when his pupil couldn't read before fifteen. But, despite of that, Rousseau certainly intends and expects Emile to read in the end, according to his inner development.

2. The education should be related to children's readiness.

By this principle Rousseau means not necessarily (but desirably) the expression of a child to learn something eagerly. He is rather stressing that the teacher has to wait with any lesson or task of learning until the child is ready to be prepared accordingly. In spite, he accepts the interest or readiness of a child to learn something as a ground or indication for a teacher really to begin to teach it, for the pupil is ready for it. The idea of education accrding to readiness requires that the ground for teaching something has to be prepared.

> "That is to say, the child should be ready for X before he is taught X, but it does not follow that he necessarily should be taught X because he is ready for it."
>
> (Barrow, 1978, p.35)

3. Education must take into account the child's needs and interests, his spontaneity.

By Rousseau the problem of needs of a child is a quite complicated one, because the teacher has to distinguish between natural and articifial needs. In every particular situation someone else than child (in this case the teacher) has to determine what kind of needs the child has.

> "Then you must distinguish carefully between natural and artificial needs, between the needs of budding caprice and the needs which spring from the overflowing life just described."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.50)

According to child we are told that

> "give him not what he wants, but what he needs."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985 p.49)

Rousseau seems to have a big confidence in the capacity of a tutor to recognize what the real needs of a child are.

> " He is only subject to others because of his needs, and because they see better than he what he really needs, what may help or hinder his existence. No one, not even his father, has the right to bid the child do what is of no use to him."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.48)

The interpretation of this claim seems to be that teaching should take account of what children actually need and not, what they want or say, then beyond a wish can be a caprice or an artificial need. The decision-making can done only by teacher through keeping a close watch over the pupil to recognize his inner nature.

> "Do you know the surest way to make your child miserable? Let him have everything he wants; for as he wants increase in proportion to the ease with which they are satisfied, you will be compelled , sooner or later, to refuse his demands, and this unlooked - for refusal will hurt him more than the lack of what he wants. He will want your stick first, then your watch, the bird that flies, or the star that shines about him."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p. 51)

When Rousseau is writing about a child's interests, his spontaneity, his subject is more clear and straightforward.

He claims:

> "Present interest, that is the motive power, the only motive power what takes us far and safely."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.81)

Rousseau's viewpoint considers the present interest of a child as a motivational one: education should take into account the interests of children because that will increase the learning motivation. Emile's study of geography for instance begins with the town he lives in and his father's house; the attention should never be the result of constraint, but of interest or desire.

> "Nature provides the child's growth in her own fashion, and this should never be thwarted. Do not never make him sit still when he wants to run, nor run, when he wants to be quiet."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.50)

No reference is made by Rousseau that the child's interests having put into effect, constitute value in itself. Child's curiosity is a great motivational power, this, rightly directed, is the means of development at a certain age.

> "In the first place do not forget that it is rarely your business to suggest what he ought to learn; it is for him to want to learn, to seek and to find it. You should put it within his reach, you should skilfully awaken the desire and supply him with means for its satisfaction."

(Rousseau, 1985, pp.141-142)

It is better, to put the problems in front of the child and let solve them rather than satisfy his curiosity too quickly.

> "Let him know nothing because you have told him, but because he has learnt it for himself."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.131)

All in all, Rousseau's stress on needs and interests, though important, is not as sweeping as it is sometimes suggested.

4. Learning through experience.

> "By the middle of the eighteenth century, most thinkers, Rousseau among them, had rejected Descartes' doctrine of innate ideas in favour of the sensationalist description of man given by Locke: all knowledge, all ideas are acquired through the experience of the physical senses. The development of the senses is thus of primary importance for the whole of education, and Rousseau stresses the repeatedly..."
>
> (Jimack, 1985, p.XV)

According to Rousseau's viewpoint sensationalism as well as the exploitation of the children's interest could be realized by learning through experience.

> "His ideas are few but precise, he knows nothing by rote but much by experience."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.124)

Rousseau criticizes the typical schooling as being preoccupied with mental abstraction and divorced from practical knowledge. The stress on the importance of learning through experience has two considerations: firstly, the idea, that knowledge of practical matters and skills may be of advantage and, secondly, the idea, that any knowledge can be better acquired through experience.

> "Give your scholar no verbal lessons; he should be taught by experience alone."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.56)

And he adds:

> "Since everything that comes into the human mind enters through the gates of sense, man's first reason is a reason of sense-experience."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.90)

5. The individuality of the child.

This dimension of Rousseau's conception of child-centered education may be regarded from two respects. First, Rousseau stresses that the child is not a miniature adult and should not be treated as such. He is different from adults because he has no "true memory" and therefore can not judge immaturely. He is a being of instinct not reason, a creature of sensation not reflection.

> "He should be neither beast nor man, but a child."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.48)

The child is not only living at present for an adult life in future; the childhood has his own rights, here and now.

Secondly, each individual child is a particular being and differs greatly from other children.

As Rousseau admits:

> "My example may be right for one child and wrong for the rest. If you enter into their way of looking at things you will know how to vary your instances as required; the choice depends on the study of the individual temperament, and
>
> this study in turn depends on the opportunities which occur to show this temperament."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985 p.155)

A child-centered educator in Rousseau's sense has to accept a child he is dealing with as a being which must be understood as such, different from adults, and as a particular being with sometimes totally perplexing ideas and unpredictable reactions.

6. The relationship between the pupil and his tutor.

To have a complete picture of all the elements constituent Rousseau's idea of child-centered education there must be an imagination of the particular nature of relationship between Emile and his tutor. It has been often supposed, and Rousseau himself seemed to believe it, that it was a real partnership, an one-to-one relationship between master and pupil. It was a

crucial idea of Rousseau, that all the upbringing should take place for the most part in complete isolation from the other people, included fellows of Emile, the idea, which makes the possibility of a real partnership basing on mutual admiration and respect in a way suspicious: there aren't too much possibilities for comparison and reflection. Rousseau has posed Emile's tutor as his father (Emile is an orphan), but, reading *Emile*, the feeling can arise that the tutor is more doing a job as a professional, that Emile as a person is of little consequence for him. Rousseau's tutor seems to be a manipulative figure, who's aim is more to make Emile think that the relationship is a close one between equals as it is in reality. What really distinguishes the tutor as a wise and clever teacher from a typical teacher (in Rousseaus sense usually a pedant) is not that the former feels and shows love for his individual charge, but that he uses the idea of such a relationship.

> "The pedant and the teacher say much the same; but the former says it at random, and the latter only when he is sure of its effect."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.284)

7. Useful knowledge and learning.

The emphasis on useful knowledge, coupled with attacks on most of the typical school curriculum as being remote, useless or irrelevant, is predominant in contemporary radical literature. Rousseau thought that what is worth learning is what is useful, and , according to his approach to the contemporary educational system, the cardinal defect of it was the teaching of useless things as well.

Rousseau's plan of education is designed to fit the individual in particular ways for life in a particular kind of community, and we have to indicate his approach to the usefulness of knowledge of that broad aim. Rousseau holds the straightforward general view that what is useful is

> "the small store which really contributes to our welfare."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.129)

But what does contribute to our welfare? Assuming that we share Rousseau's vision from the ideal state of nature in future, it is at this point that reference to the useful is likely to become useless as a criterion for giving us practical help in discerning what ought to be done.

"The radical mind is in danger of focusing on a few hitherto neg- lected goals and then confining the term useful to a select list of the most obvious and immediate paths leading to each goal."

(Barrow, 1978, p.49)

Rousseau's program is suffering from the same weakness as these of contemporary radicals: he has too facile and unimaginative idea of the possibilities of use of the big number of ways in which things may be useful, longterm, short-term, direct, indirect, to hundreds of goals which may in themselves also function as useful steps towards other goals. (Barrow, 1978).

Rousseau objects to the studies of heraldry, geography, chronology, languages etc. so remote from man, and even more remote from the child, that it is a wonder if he can ever make any use of any part of them.

In the sense that this knowledge is not obviously and immediately part of everyday life and thoughts, such studies are likely to be remote from many children. But from the fact that something is initially remote in this sense of unfamiliar it does not follow that it will remain so. Initiation in some remote subject may quite literally transform one's thought and everyday life, so that what was previously remote becomes immediate and important. We have to consider the immediate and long-term use of something. to consider, what is the goal of useful knowledge etc., but the more serious problem by Rousseau as well as by contemporary radicals is the fact that the term obscures rather than clarifies argument, since its meaning often does vary. Rousseau does not show us that the examples of activities and studies that he regards useful are such in any significant sense; By Barrow (1978) he has therefore not produced an adequate argument to support his specific claims about which studies are useful, which useless. That being so, we do not have a clear or satisfactory answer to the question, what is worth learning.

3.2 FREEDOM AND "GROWTH"—METAPHOR IN ROUSSEAU'S CONCEPTION OF CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION.

"Every means has been tried except one, the very one which might be succeed - well-regulated liberty."

(Rousseau, 1985, p.56)

Rousseau starts from the premise, that natural man is good; but he is both a cause and a result for being good. As he then appears bad, it means,

that his education has been not in accordance with nature, then the first impulses of nature are always good. In other words he has been corrupted by men, by society. The spirit of Rousseau's project is, to give children more real liberty and less power, to confine their wishes within the limits of their powers. As a result the children will scarcely feel the want of whatever is not in their power. In countryside, isolated from society, the child's inner nature will be free to develop in its own accord. The young Emile will spend most of his time out of doors, leading a natural and free life of a young savage. The "negative education" of the "Age of Nature" means, that the development of the mind should be delayed:

> "Exercise his body, his limbs, his senses, his strength, but keep his mind idle as long as you can."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.58)

The full significance of "negative education" will be clear through this description: the child is free virtually from birth to explore the world about him and to gain physical experience; a mass of physical experience to be used as "raw material" for future development.

In the next stage, the age of intellectual education, Rousseau is continually circumspect with restraints: the child must learn only what he wants to learn, through teacher's abilities his curiosity for the subject must be aroused. At the end of this stage Emile knows little, but what he knows is really his own, and, what is more important, he is in possession of his natural freedom, he will still be happy. Until his meeting and marriage with Sophie, Emile will be educated to true freedom which comes only from self-sufficiency.

Rousseau has often been regarded as a champion of liberty and democracy, as the founder of free education. Anyway, according to writings of many critics, this identification is not so unambiguous.

Jimack is arguing that

> "The other principle, associated with man's goodness, and which Rousseau stresses throughout *Emile*, namely his freedom, is similarly ambiguous. It is true that Emile is subject to hardly any obvious restrictions; but particularly as he grows older, he is increasingly controlled, if only indirectly, by his

> tutor: even his chance meeting with Sophie and their consequent falling in love have been carefully planned in advance.Such subtle manipulation might well seem to encroach far more seriously on the child's natural freedom than the traditional restraints."
>
> (Jimack, 1985, p.XIX)

The tutor guides and controls Emile's development, carefully keeping in view, that Emile doesn't perceive his subtle manipulation. Emile is not conscious of any restraint of his liberty, hopefully he is feeling free, what is the goal of his tutor. Man feels free when he wants only what is within his reach, this voluntary self-restriction is by Rousseau the main agent, from which the true liberty will derive. It is the task of the tutor to set the natural environment as a laboratory, where the encounter with an animal or another event is controlled by him. The tutor decides that hurting himself is right for Emile's development, he will not take pains to prevent Emile from hurting himself; far from it,

> "to bear pain is his first and most useful lesson."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.41)

More than once Rousseau claims that Emile is not to have something just because he wants it, asks for it or has an interest in it. He will have what he needs and it is always adult's task to determine what are the natural needs of a child and what are artificial needs, derived from childish caprices.

The most significant statements according to the tutor's control and setting of environment are made by Rousseau in the Book II of *Emile:*

> " Take the opposite course with your pupil; let him always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will itself is taken captive. Is not this poor child, without knowledge, strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole environment so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? His work and play, his pleasure and pain, are they not, unknown to him, under your control? No doubt he ought only to do what he wants, but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do. He should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.85)

All this should not be interpreted as Rousseau wants children to have unlimited freedom. It is explicitly said that Emile must not obey, but beside this assertion it has been claimed that he must be dependent.

> "The teacher is seen as ever-present, ever-active in Emile's education.... But he still holds to the distinction between the child's perception and reality, and to the assumption that the teacher is better placed to grasp reality."
>
> (Barrow, 1978, p.41)

Barrow also asserts that there are two ways for the tutor to control the reality: first he sometimes let the children proceed according to their inclinations so that they discover for themselves that their perceptions are not always accurate. Secondly, the overall situation can be manipulated in such a way that the tutor has some considerable control over what the child does perceive as being real and present value in the first place. This particularly distinguishes Rousseau from many present child-centred theorists: they write and proceed frm the fact what interests the child is a sacred given. Rousseau says that there is nothing sacred about it and that it is seldom an inevitable and unalterable given (Barrow, 1978).

Grinsley (1967) and Charvet (1974) agree that Rousseau is not liberal in the classical sense since he does not believe in any rigid separation of the individual and the state. The permanence of the state depends upon the moral integrity and undivided loyalty of its citizens. Rousseau has been sometimes showed as an example of an extreme collectivist and destroyer of individual freedom.

> "The absurdity and incoherence of Rousseau's theory lies precisely in the elaboration of a social ideal founded on a rejection of the right of individuals to live and value each other in their particularity."
>
> (Charvet, 1974, p.146)

For further explanation of Rousseau's point of view according to freedom and the development of a child can be the "growth" metaphor, which Goldman (1989), Scheffler (1960) and several other authors are regarding as one of the most important and widespread education-related metaphors. It is the root metaphor of Rousseau's *Emile*

> "Plants are fashioned by cultivation, man by education."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p.6)

This is the main construction around which Froebel (1989) as one of the successors of Rousseau built his theory of child development as an unfoldment of his inner nature. By Froebel, the teacher or parent should be

careful not to interfere with nature's laws of self-expression or self-development. On the contrary, every effort should be made to create an educational situation in which the inborn forces of the child's nature would have every opportunity to unfold. The "growth" metaphor, by Scheffler, expresses the revolt against authoritarianism in education. There is an obvious analogy between the teacher and the gardener. In both cases the development of a plant or of a child passes certain phases of growing, quite independant of teacher's or gardener's efforts.

The "growth" metaphor is usually seen as a parallel to the "human nature" metaphor that regards human development like a process of man's destiny being unfolded. Dewey (1916) used the "growth" metaphor also as the main metaphor of his theoretical constructions, although he criticized Rousseau sharply, claiming that Rousseau's conception involves a fatally prefixed human nature.

> "Nature is supposed to furnish the law and the end of development: ours, it is to follow and conform to her ways...he believes, that there is an independent, "spontaneous" development of the native organs and faculties. He thinks that this development can go irrespective of the use to which it is put ... Rousseau was right ... in holding that the structure and activities of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the use of organs, but profoundly wrong in intimating that they supply not only the conditions, but also the ends of their development ... The instinctive activities may be called, metaphorically, spontaneous, in the sense that the organs give a strong bias for a certain sort of operation ... But the notion of a spontaneous normal development of these activities is pure mythodology. The natural, or native, powers furnish the initiating and limiting forces in all education: they do not furnish the ends or aims."
>
> (Dewey, 1916, p.131-133)

Dewey's own use of "growth " metphor does not imply such fatalistic and full analogy between the plant and the child. By him the child's growth is more indetermistic not having any definite end in the frames of those biological constraints that delimit the unfolding of child's destiny (see e.g. Kreitzberg, 1993).

Clark (1988) showed that the "growth" metaphor that Scheffler (1960) sees as a parallel metaphor to that of human nature, has its ancient roots in the Aristotlean physics. A child is supposed to be free of extrinsic hindrances, grow into the educated state where the growth results from an original urge, impulsion, principle, dynamic, or striving, as it is

variously called, which is seen inside the individual. Clark called the belief of child-centred educators, that of removal of hindrances as "midwifery logic". That does not have to promote any positive end of the process, the last is already guaranteed. What it concentrated upon is the hindering of hindrances from the way of growth.

Kreitzberg (1993) argues that Rousseau's statements about educational aims are contradictory: on the one hand, the child's interests should determine the aims, on the other, the teacher will lead the child to wish the things that he sees proper: therefore it is justified to capture the will of children.

> "The teacher's mastery is directed to creating an illusion of freedom where the spontaneity and child's interests have a vague role. It is the same widespread paradigmatical difficulty that characterises the educational thinking of even the 2oth century, where the aims of education are stated from the point of view of the individual, the society and the culture and where the synthesis of them, or complementary approach, up to now is merely declared but not realized."
>
> (Kreitzberg, 1993, p.79)

3.3 CHILD-CENTREDNESS AS AN EDUCATIONAL SLOGAN

What many contemporary educational writers consider Rousseau's main achievement is the conception of child-centred education. All enthousiasts of child-centredness would without hesitation accept Rousseau's appeal "Hold the childhood in reverence", but everyone of them would choose for it a way quite different from others. What we need to know is what way of reverence is implied in Rousseau's conception of child-centred education and what main themes and ideas, having their roots in Rousseau's thinking, are involved in conceptions of contemporary radical educationalists.

At first, the term "child-centredness", used by many educationalists in different times, needs some explanation. Historically, G. Stanley Hall (1846-1924), an educational psychologist and a pupil of W.Wundt, one of the participants of "child-study movement", called this view "paidocentric". From that time on into the twentieth century the cliché "child-centred" has been used by representatives of progressive education in USA (see e.g Cremin, 1971) and in Europe between 1890-1930 (in Europe the movement was known under the term "reform pedagogy"), who made from it an educational aim. The new vawe of progressive education during the early

1950s in the United States and in Europe also made use from the same term, which had been rediscovered by a new generation of educators. Up to now, the term is current in writings and discussions of radical educationalists and in conceptions of different "alternative", "non-state" or "free" schools.

According to Clark,

> "the doctrines of child-centred education are unusually persistent, rediscovered by each generation with fresh enthousiasm for the great new dawn that they always promise, and, quite often, it seems, with no idea that they have ever been put forward before in different verbal forms by others."
>
> (Clark, 1988, p.75)

The child-centred educators were often accused of being distinctive for the ardour they inspire and, as a consequence of this ardour, the indifference to any kind of objection or counter-argument.

Scheffler is arguing that the educational slogans have to be distinguished from educational definitions.

> "Educational slogans are clearly unlike definitions in a number of ways. They are altogether unsystematic, less solemn in manner, more popular, to be repeated warmly or reassuringly rather than pondered gravely. They do not figure importantly in the exposition of educational theories. They have no standard form and they make no claim either to facilitate discourse or to explain the meanings of terms. We speak of definitions as clarifying, but not of slogans; slogans may be rousing, but not definitions."
>
> (Scheffler, 1960, p.36)

Slogans provide symbols of the key ideas and attitudes of movements. With time, by adherents as well as by criticists, slogans are taken more and more as literal doctrines or arguments. In this case it will be needful to evaluate slogans from two standpoints: as straightforward assertions and as symbols of a social movement, without confusing them. Educational ideas formulated in careful, often difficult writings will soon be current among teachers in popularized versions as slogans, provoking criticism to the parent doctrine. Through this process it is always needed, to evaluate the task of a slogan as well as the real content of the parent conception.

Scheffler shows it by the example of John Dewey, who was the acknowledged intellectual leader of the progressive education movement in the United States. His systematic, qualified arguments soon were translated into

striking fragments serving as slogans for the new progressive tendencies in the American education. Dewey himself criticized the uses to which some of his ideas were put, but, however, the progressive slogans have taken on a life of their own. They have been defended as literal statements and attacked as such. Critics, in particular, have often begun by attributing the literal defects of progressive slogans to Dewey's parent doctrines and gone on to imply that the progressive movement has thereby been shown unworthy in its aims and practice.

The above-mentioned statements are more or less valid for the term "child-centredness", which has become something of a slogan with more emotive than defining meaning and is therefore of little use in serious dicussions. The formulation that" we teach the child instead of subject matter" juxtaposed in controversial manner the child as the source of educational planning to that of subject matter.

The educational conception of Rousseau, with its richness of ideas (of course, often contradictory and vague ones) has given impulses for several generations of child-centred enthousiasts and radicals in education, has been attacked for its slogan of "child-centredness" from many sides. From the other side, the subsequent writers did not always ask for roots or for real content of a parent conception, they merely preferred merely to use some fragments of it to strenghthen their practical enterprises or social strivings theoretically.

In order to analyse more exactly what the child-centredness stands for in this context, we try to express it through a number of specific statements, all of them explicitly made by Rousseau.

3.4 DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM "NATURE".

Rousseau's arguments obtain a good deal of credibility from the use of the term "nature". It is clear, that in one sense "natural" means nothing more than what is right, appropriate or fitting, according to Rousseau's main belief. But, in some other senses the term "natural" has been used by Rousseau in another meaning. Barrow (1978) classified the opportunities of using the term "natural" as follows:

1. "Natural" may be used in some contexts as a synonym for "usual". It can be the content of the command "behave naturally" or the idiom "natural expression". As an antonym for it the term "unnatural" could be used in the sense of strange, unusual or unexpected.

2. The word "natural" can be used in the sense as "breathing is natural", what suggests reference to certain physical or biological norms.

3. The sense of natural talents and characteristics, for example, when we use the idiom "the migratory instinct is natural in certain birds".

4. "Natural" may imply genuineness, authenticity or reality and be contrasted with "artificial".

5. It may mean something like spontaneous. In this sense natural behaviour is unpremeditated and unreflective, while unnatural behaviour might ber calculated. Closely connected is natural behaviour in the sense of easy and graceful behaviour contrasted with unnatural in the sense of clumsy of awkward.

6. "Natural" can be used as a term in contrast with civilised or sophisticated. It is not precisely the opposite of either or them, for one would not equate "unnatural" with "civilized" or "sophisticated" or "unsophisticated" with "natural". But the word does none the less carry the force of primitive in some contexts. For example, "The way of life of the American Indians used to be more natural than it is now".

7. The previous sense may perhaps be an offshoot of that sense of "natural" that is applied to non-artefacts and suggests something of "as it turns out" or "as it occurs". Thus "I am letting my hair grow naturally". Rock and wood are natural in this sense, in a way that ashtrays and chairs are not.

8. Sometimes the word "natural" implies something semi-automatic and practically unavoidable, as when we say of somebody provoked beyond endurance that "it was only natural for him to react like that".

The preceding list is not supposed to be definitive; often the word in a particular context can carry different meanings. But there is a necessity to distinguish between different shades of the word when Rousseau or a child-centered educator or someone else is using the term "natural" as something what justifies a certain decision or behaviour only on the grounds that it is natural to do so. Anyway, we can see that the conceptual core of child-centred education based on the notion of "natural man" is quite unequivocal and criticizable from many sides.

Rousseau's use of the term "natural" obviously changes in different contexts. When he refers to the "inner growth of our organs and faculties" as "the education of nature" it is evident that he is thinking of "natural" in the sense of some biological norm. It amounts to the fact that there are certain stages and details of physical development that must necessarily have been reached before certain paths are open to one, and to that extent they have primacy.

When he proclaims that "prudence is unnatural" he might mean a lot of things. Probably he wants to express that it is a habit or convention in civilised communities, not spontaneous, and therefore it is not good. But it can have another meanings, too.

Whether, for example, it is or is not in accordance with human nature to be friendly depends on whether we mean by "human nature" "whatever human do spontaneously", "whatever was characteristic of human behaviour prior to the advance of civilisation", "whatever is typical of human beings" or something else.

The above examples illustrate some of the different senses of Rousseau's use of the word "natural". Beside the term "freedom" it is the second main construction in Rousseaus *Emile,* predominantly in his two *Discourses* and in *Social contract,* too. Both of them, freedom and nature, give in their ambiguosity a number of opportunities for different interpretations. For understanding the framework of ideas of child-centred education in his historical background and development the knowledge of these circumstances seems to be quite unavoidable.

4 CONTEMPORARY FOLLOWERS OF ROUSSEAU

Ovide Decroly (1871-1932), founder of a line of reform still effective in some schools in Belgium and France today, attacked the "serious defects" of schools in 1921:

1. There is little or no connection between the various activities performed by the children.
2. The subjects taught are insufficiently related to the fundamental interests of the child and their development.
3. The division of the subjects is made without regard to the natural development of the child's mental capacity.
4. In most subjects, the quantity of materials exceeds the capacity for absorption and retention of most children.
5. The curricula excessively favourise those subjects in which teaching is only verbal.
6. Too little opportunity is given for individual activities chosen by the children themselves.

(Klassen, Th. F., a. o., 1990, p.8)

From the big number of the critics of "old school" from the beginning of the 20th century, the voice of Ovide Decroly was one of the most moderate. More extreme criticism of school is expressed by Ellen Key (1849 - 1926), who spoke about the school as a "murder of the spirit". Since the most "free" or "alternative" schools which had developed in different directions, carried from general spirit of child-centredness, are more or less connected to "traditional" progressive education, the criticism, expressed in the first decade of the 2oth century b Decroly,has relevance to the present situation as well.At least it is compatible to the criticism of many child-centred writers.

Although the community of progressive schools (both of older traditional or of recent mould) is unanimous in the chorus against the "old school", the various directions present themselves differently, indeed in considerable opposition, in their own peculiar theoretical and practical bases. The decisive elements of approach to innovation extend from Rudolf

Steiner's anthroposophical view of human life and things, and experimentally empirical theories with some religious components (Maria Montessori), from anthropological-sociological conceptions (Peter Petersen) to socially critical and emancipatory approaches (Celestin Freinet, and recent "free" or "alternative" schools) (Klassen, Th. F. a.o.,1990).

The common element in the conceptions of most progressive schools lies - with the rejection of the picture of the pupils of the "old school" - in the concept of "child-centredness" and in the claim to give children the opportunity to develop according to its nature as a "whole person", involving all varying definitions of "nature".

Regarding the above-mentioned criticism of "old school", written by Decroly, two approaches inside of child-centred school movement can be distinguished. One of them is emphasizing the development of a creative individual. This point of view is centering educational efforts on the free development of all the powers and potentialities of the individual, especially on his creativity, freedom, independence, self-determination, physical and emotional powers - on the "whole child". The other point of view is emphasizing the necessity to shape curriculum according to the needs and interests of child to preserve what is spontaneous and creative in him.

Next I will concentrate on some most famous representatives of radical and child-centred educationists.

4.1 RADICAL EDUCATION.

"Radical education" is a term used for a big and incoherent movement beginning in eighteenth century with Rousseau, whose radicalism consisted in the aspiration to change the contemporary corrupted society through education. The general spirit of this conception was the belief in man's natural goodness and the centredness on child's natural development. Up to now, the radical educators, more or less emphasizing the originality of their own conceptions, are in reality sharing the main views which are involved in Rousseau's conception of child-centred education.

The term "radical education" has been used differently by educational theorists, social philosophers and politicians. Often the radicalism in education has been automatically equated with left-wing radicalism, but Lichtenstein (1986), for example, explicitly distinguishes between liberalism (both classical and modern) and left-wing radicalism (in radical liberalism of social philosophy as well as in educational philosophical tradition.)

Rorty, for example, is putting together Rousseau and Marx, saying that

> "What the Right describes as civilizing the young, the Left describes as alienating them from their true selves. In the tradition of Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche and Foucault, the Left pictures the society as depriving the young of their freedom and of their essential humanity so that they may function as frictionless cogs in a vast, inhuman socioeconomic machine."
>
> (Rorty, 1990, p.44)

In this work, the term "radical" in education has been used only to outline radicals in education as those who want change that involves going to the root of the matter, as opposed to one who wants no change at all or who wants only superficial change. The term, in this usage, is intended to be evaluatively neutral. In this sense, we are sharing the view of Barrow to the radical education who says that

> "insisting on a fundamental change is, in itself, neither good nor bad."
>
> (Barrow, 1978, p.1)

He adds:

> "Alternative labels, such a "progressive", "revolutionary" or "anarchic" are equally ambiguous and probably, in most of their senses, less appropriate...Besides, if these people want to be called radicals and are called radicals, why shouldn't they be? They *are* radicals in the specific sense of people who propose fundamental change...These are not educationalists whose propose tinkering with the educational system as it is: they propose blowing the system as it is to pieces."
>
> (Barrow, 1978, p.2)

4.2 THE VIEWS OF A.S. Neill

Alexander Sutherland Neill (1883-1973) was born in Forfar, Scotland. His father, George Neill, an earnest calvinist, was a schoolmaster. Neill

attended his fathers village school , where he 1899 became a pupil teacher. At this stage he failed to become a fully qualified teacher. In 1921 he was one of those who founded an international school in Dresden. That was the origin of the schools that eventually became Summerhill in England.

A.S. Neill experienced an upbringing at the opposite end of the spectrum to Rousseau's ideals. Unlike to Rousseau, he was a schoolmaster, first and foremost. To theory and theoretical work he had rather hostile feelings, theory was for him, at best, "talk".

Among the radical educators, A.S. Neill is often held the founder and main representative of "free education". The usual imagination of his educational conception (as well as of Rousseau) is mainly that children do not need any restraint or prescriptions, they have only to follow spontaneously their interests and needs. Below I am going to explain Neill's conception concentrating on some main constructions of radical education as freedom, interest and happiness, which are essential labels of Neill's educational concerns.

Happiness.

Neill is less concerned about reforming society as Rousseau. He doesn't think that the reform is not needed, he says that "our veneered civilisation" is full of "sham and shoddy" (Neill, 1961) and we need to be rid of it. But he doesn't see the main cause of evil in artificiality or hypocrisy as Rousseau, he sees the root cause of the sick and unhappy civilisation in lack of freedom for children, and in hate, as a consequence of what the children are dehumanised. Despite of the criticism of contemporary society, Neill doesn't strive to change it.

> "I have to compromise...realising that my primary job is not the reformation of society, but the bringing of happinness to some few children."
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.35)

Neill's hope is that in time the society will change, but his immediate task is to make some children happy now and making them capable to live

happily in future. According to his assertions, happiness is the aim of life. Characteristically to Neill, he doesn't bring reasons to the statements, but it is clear that he understands happinness as something substantially similar to Rousseau's consideration: happinness is a feeling of inner balance, of being contented with life.

Now a basic difference between Rousseau and Neill arises. Rousseau, for all the references to freedom, has an image of man as he would like to be and makes a lot of educational proposals to lead him in that direction. Therefore Emile is constantly under the control of his tutor, his freedom is well-directed. Neill, in contrary, means, that children, once placed in a particular environment, should be for the most part of time left alone to do what they want. His belief is that if they are left alone they will rapidly become happy and social persons. Rousseau's plan is to introduce Emile in history and physics when the time is ripe (at first consists the whole library of Emile only from "Robinson Crusoe"). Neill will let the children t have free choice in learning. Both - Rousseau and Neill - prefere to see the children more in the playground rather than in the classroom, but with a certain difference: Rousseau will get them to play the games he wants them to play, Neill will let them play what they like. He does not want them to learn through doing or playing so much as to play and enjoy themselves (Barrow, 1978).

Neill's belief is that if the child is given freedom and love he will be happy and grow up naturally so that he is able to be happy in adult's life continually. He is not concerned about academic success or cultural goals. In common with most radicals, he is thinking that in usuaL schooling too much emphasis has been placed on reason, knowledge and intellect, and not enough on feeling and emotion. That means that the traditional school curriculum in comparison with Summerhill, makes no contribution to the happiness of the individual. Most schools, according to Neill, create fear and hate through their overt values and the covert influence of the means they employ to run the institution.

Freedom.

Neill does not think that spontaneity and freedom are good in themselves, but that what is done spontaneously and freely will be good and men innately good.

> "The child has been born good...will inevitably turn out to be a good human being if he is not crippled and thwarted in his natural development by interference."
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.224)

Despite of the various remarks like

> "self-regulation means the right of the baby to live freely, without outside authority"
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.104)

or

> "the child should not do anything until he comes to the opinion, his own opinion, that it should be done"
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.111)

it is obvious, that in his school a child is not allowed to do as he pleases.

How then, Neill considers freedom? Neill does it like Rousseau, quite vaguely, asserting that

> " At Summerhill...freedom does not mean the abrogation of common sense. We take every precaution for the safety of the pupils."
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.34)

Numerous examples do not clarify the principles in which case something is allowed for children , in which case the solution will be made by self-government or in which case Neill himself orders what to do. He seeks to sort out the problem, distinguishing between liberty and licence, but does it purely formally. At last, he finds some help in the classic liberal formula:

> "Each individual is free to do what he likes as long as he is not trespassing on the freedom of others."
>
> (Neill, 1961, p.143)

In relation to freedom happiness is the one's ultimate aim and the freedom can be valued only as means. Considerations of happiness may, where necessary, curb freedom. When Neill says that

"we have proved that self-government works"

(Neill, 1961, p.59)

it has to be understood that the life in Summerhill is happy for children and that it is the justification of the school in general.

Neill has asserted that, different from other radical educators, he has no fixed human picture or conception of a human nature. Otherwise, the statements that the authority and restraint, in so far as they curb the innate spirit, are "crippling" and "thwarting", gives reason to assume a static picture of an innate nature.

Interest

Like Rousseau and subsequent radicals Neill cnsiders important the possibilities of learning through experience. In addition he emphasizes the importance of "real doing", "real self-expression". He asserts that nobody is obliged to study anything at Summerhill, the wants of a child should determine what the child will learn. But, when for Rousseau the interest was only a crucial source of motivation, and therefore something, what could be manipulated and directed by teacher, for Neill, the interest is a more serious phenomena. In his view,

"true interest is the life force of the whole personality, and such ineterest is completely spontaneous."

(Neill, 1961, p.149)

Such interest cannot be implanted or created by teacher. Neill adds that

"one can compel attention, one cannot compel interest."

(Neill, 1961, p.149)

As Barrow comments it:

" It does not follow that interests cannot be generated by the individual himself or by others. Neill's assumption that it does seems to rest on two mistakes: first, his tendency to see interests no less than the rest of the individual's nature as part of a set of baggage he is born with and carries through life , and second a confusion between compulsion and cause which no doubt arises (or is compounded by) the ambiguity of the word "make."

(Barrow, 1978, p.90)

Whereas most educationalists see beyond the word "interest" something what fascinates a child, Neill understands it as something what the individual sees as being to his advantage.

In conclusion it seems possible to say that it is the idea of education according to nature that provides the main connection link between Rousseau and Neill; otherwise the similarities are for the most part negative ones. Despite the widespread meaning that Neill's school, Summerhill, is the embodiment of Rousseau's theory, there are very important differences between them: in Summerhill the children are to a large extent left alone, to grow up as they will, given the arbitrary constraints of a group as a whole; whereas Emile is certainly not left alone to follow his own independent choices. Rousseau and Neill both seem to share the belief in a static innate human nature which is at odds with corrupted contemporary society. In another point both Rousseau and Neill are similar: they are regarding themselves as pioneering a new kind of education appropriate to a truly democratic society as opposed to a so-called democratic society. Rousseau imagines that Emile will think and vote in accordance with the terms of General Will, which is the basis and quarantee of a just and perfect society. Neill claims that children educated along the lines that he advocates will gain a sufficient experience of the democratic process and grow up to be hostile to externally imposed authority and take in account the interests of their fellow men.

4.3 THE VIEWS OF I.ILLICH.

The name of Ivan Illich (born in 1926) is usually connected with the term "deschooling". The term is vague and used in different senses by different people. According to Barrow (1978), it was accidentally coined by Illich, to his subsequent regret. It involves explicit emphasis on two ideas involved in Rousseau's theory: first, the recognition that education and schooling are not necessarily the same thing or ritual and content should not be confused; secondly, that the institution of schooling being an institutionalized process itself automatically and inevitably causes damage. Illich says:

> "What goes on in schools is not necessarily education."
>
> (Illich, 1971, p. 79)

The message of Illich is that the educational system creates the demand for its own services, it creates the need for its own products and it validates its own activities (Illich, 1971). Illich talks of "deschooling" society and of "disestablishing" the schools, for what deschooling implies is being rid of the ritual imprisonment that schools achieve because they are institutions. The society must be "deschooled", and the responsibility for education must be returned to the learner. The school systems, which are justifying and evaluating themselves, claiming that they are the only channels for acquiring education, are in the first place asserting their own activity.

Everett Reimer (b.1922), one of the leaders of contemporary radical education, who is principally sharing the views of Illich accoording to "deschooling of society", adds:

> "Studies of prisons and asylums indicate how overwhelmingly such institutions produce the very behaviour they are designed to correct."
>
> (Reimer, 1971, p. 25)

According to Kreitzberg,

> "Illich thinks that school is not able to liberate us from progressive consumerism and does not eliminate the restrictions of freedom. And his main message is the proclamation: schools should be institutions that provide free communication and interaction between people: the process of the formation of values must not be controlled by technocrats. He claims that already now most of the people acquire their education outside of schools, in incidental ways....Illich protested against the outside pressure to learners at schools that produces a society with prefixed values and people with prefixed parameters, that oppresses personal freedom, and is leading us towards an environmental catastrophe through un unlimited economic growth."
>
> (Kreitzberg, 1993, p. 45)

"Hidden curriculum"

One of the most important themes and points of criticism by radicals on contemporary schooling is the "hidden curriculum". In contemporary writings, the term means the norms and values that are implicitly but effectively taught in school and that are not usually talked about in the teacher's statements concerning the ends or goals.

It was the message of Rousseau (despite he did not use the term "hidden curriculum"), that education is not able to liberate individuals from chains of conventions and artificial needs of contemporary society, in contrary, it is producing them. In *Emile* he is prophesing the coming gloom:

> "This practice, with other causes of depopulation, forbodes the coming fate of Europe. Her arts and sciences, her philosophy and morals, will shortly reduce her to a desert."
>
> (Rousseau, 1985, p. 12)

Illich claims, that the overt curriculum, which is talking about freedom of thinking and acting, seducing people by the rituals and trappings of democratic elections and the exhibition of academic freedom, is in actuality leading to the hidden curriculum to preserve "status quo". It is, according to Illich,"celebration of the present". The children's role in life is only

> "to know their place and to sit still in it."
>
> (Illich, 1973, p. 4)

For Illich and other radical educators, the fact that schools have a hidden curriculum, is indisputable. Education cannot be neutral and its values come out in both the overt and hidden curriculum. Therefore a full-scale curriculum reform must also involve a change in the hidden curriculum. But the idea of some change that would do away with the hidden curriculum altogether is inconceivable. Deschooling would not remove all signs of the hidden curriculum: it would merely place it beyond immediate control and allow no calculated steps to offset his effects.

Lichtenstein (1986) in his work *Radical Liberalism and Radical Education* names Illich, Freire and Dewey the main representatives of recent movement of radical education. He outlines their main theoretical features, common to all three , which we will shortly comment to give more extended overview about the educational concerns of Illich. The six main coordinates characterizing Illich's educational thinking are:

1) pluralism;
2) developmental individualism;
3) solidarity;

4) egalitarianism;
5) participation:
6) social revolution.

Pluralism

According to Illich, the current school system violates basic pluralistic values by centralizing initiatives and authority. Education in industrial society has become institutionalized, removing other groups and organisations from the opportunities and rights to educate. Modern school systems are therefore self-generative, creating their own criteria for judging how much and what kind of education is necessary for society to provide.

Developmental individualism.

The centralized, compulsory nature of modern education thwarts the individual's growth intellectually. The individual alienates from the process of education, a process, which is reified in an institution over which he or she has no control.

> "The power of school thus to divide social reality has no boundaries; education becomes unworldly and the world become uneducational."
>
> (Illich, 1971, p. 24)

Solidarity

Illich, being himself a Catholic priest, sees the solidarity in fraternal relations among people symbolized by the Christian's union with Christ. In education, the hierachical and other contradictory relations between pupil and teacher, administrators and teachers do not enable the shaping of such a community.

Egalitarianism

Illich regards the educational system as a prime source of social inequality: only the schools and universities have the financial resources and legal authority to educate. Educational institutions therefore become

manipulative bureaucracies which addict their clients to the consumer oriented values and interests of business. Students are nothing more than docile, passive consumers. The negation of this tendency would consist of egalitarian educational system without "schools", of voluntaristic webs in which everyone would have equal access to society's educational resources.

Participation

Illich foresees, as mentioned above, a system of educational "webs" or channels of access to educational resources. The system should consist of reference services, skill exchanges and other means and would be an alternative to the current system of compulsory education. It would provide equal access to resources and provide public forums for anyone wishing to share ideas. Such a system would allow everyone to participate freely and fully in all aspects of education.

Social revolution

The primary goal of radical educators is the liberation of people from oppression and from the constraints imposed by a class-divided industrial society. They see a social transformation leading to a non-alienating, developmental,libertarian culture.

Illich's liberationist program begins with education, because the school as it is is directed to preserve the state and the power of certain groups in society. Thus, a revolution directed at education would have more success and would be less painful and bloody than another kind for change the society it could do.

His program for change is not directed at the democratization of compulsory schools but at their elimination. This requires

> "a new understanding of the educational style of an emerging counterculture."
> (Illich, 1971, p. 70)

a counterculture, which calls for morality of the present world and which is, to Illich, the task of Christian salvation, in secular terms-liberation.

In summary, the general theory of social change involving in the works of Illich (as well as of Freire and Dewey) gives the most important place to the education. Social transformation to a really democratic society requires that the education would be controlled by learners instead of a certain separate class. Education can be liberating, it can emancipate humanity by awakening consciousness of the learner and making the learner aware and active, instead of being passive and docile. All in all, generally the views of the most radical educationalists, including Illich, are involved in Rousseau's theory of social transformation through appropriated education. The awakening of consciousness (in Freire's terminology "conscietizing") which will make a new real democracy possible through a new relationship between people, who are obeying only to common good, preserving their individual freedom, is the endpoint of Rousseau's theory.

> "Conscience!...sure guide for a creature ignorant and finite indeed, yet intelligent and free; infallible judge of good and evil, making man like to God! In thee consists the excellence of man's nature and the morality of his actions..."
> (Rousseau, 1985, p. 254)

In relation of the transformation of society, Illich explicitly says that

> "we cannot begin a reform of education unless we first understand that neither individual learning nor social equality can be enhanced by the ritual of schooling."
> (Illich, 1971, p. 43)

His hope is to change society, but through a cultural revolution, which implies a new outlook or the transformation of both public and personal reality.

5 RELEVANCE OF CHILD-CENTRED APPROACH

If to understand child-centredness as something excluding every kind of extrinsic educational planning outside of the child's interests then, Rousseau can hardly be seen as child-centred educationist. If we take his considerations on social matters, for instance the idea of General Will which definitely rejects the view to an individual as something unique and free from social constraints, then it is difficult to see him as an advocate of child's personal interests. Actually he denied any significant particularity of individuals demanding that everybody shall alinate himself fully to society. Those who consider Rousseau's educational views

detached from his social ideals, too easily and one-sidedly emphasize that Rousseau is the advocate of spontaneity and child's self-determination. Actually Rousseau put these ideas into the extremely rigid extrinsic constraints. Even if Rousseau argues for child's free will, the very idea is to hide the pressure of tutor's will behind so to say natural consequences. It means that tutor's will is, however, definitely present, though indirectly.

Rousseau views the child's destiny unfolding quite in a prefixed way fitting later to his ideal society. Such kind of fatalistic position in relation of the child's development delimits free choice merely to following one's predestined fate. The concept of the child's needs as some deficit in development identified by the tutor remarkably supports capturing of the real and free will of the child.

Despite of the controversial nature of Rousseau's educational thinking, Rousseau was interpreted by many of his followers as the pure child-centred educationist and if we are further analysing the child-centred doctrine expressed in its most extreme form by the slogan that we don't teach subject matter but the child, then it is not justified to link it with the Rousseau's general view to education.

Taba (1902-1967) an Estonian educationist who for a long time worked in America under the supervision of Kilpatrick, Dewey and Tyler, argued against versus thinking where the child has been opposed to a subject matter and society and where he has been viewed as the sole basis of educational planning and justification of educational decisions.

> "Child-centered, society-centered, and subject-centered curricula are vying with each other as the exclusive approaches to the entire curriculum. An emphasis on a single basis, such as the content, the needs of society, or the needs of the learner, have produced an unnecessary versus thinking with its unfortunate juxtaposition of considerations that should be combined into one comprehensive curriculum theory; interest vs. subject matter; life-centeredness vs. subject-centeredness; method vs. content; emotional development vs. intellectual growth; basic skills vs. the growth of the whole child and so on."
> (Taba, 1962, p.3)

If Dewey in his *Democracy and Education (1916)* emphasized mainly the need to follow the child's interests, then later, in *Experience and Education*

(wrote in Brubacher, 1966) he made an attempt to reconciliate two approaches - the one from the position of subject-matter, the other - from the position of the child, He tried to integrate two approaches:

> "Abandon the notion of subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside the child's experience; cease thinking of the child's experience as also something hard and fast, see it as something fluent, embryonic, vital; and we realize that the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of the child and the facts and truths of studies define instruction."
>
> (Dewey, 1956, p.11)

In this way Dewey designated the complementary approach to child-centred and subject-centred curriculum.

By Taba (1962) students are to be involved in inter-thematic planning, whereas curriculum essentials have to be carefully preplanned ahead.

> "...it is possible to "fix" the essential things to be learned and allow the details through which to learn them to be determined by student interests, thus providing for both."
>
> (Taba, 1962, p.289)

It would be the only way to keep simultaneously the continuity of learning and providing higher motivation of learning. At the same time Taba considers the problem of student's interests as one of the most misunderstood questions in educational theory. She rejected the following of student's momentary interests as the basis of curriculum planning.

One of the directions of resolving the controversy between child-centred, subject-centred and society-centred approaches is to look for the complementary or integrated approach escaping from versus or one-sided emphasis on one of the three sources of educational planning - society, knowledge and man (Kreitzberg, 1993). Child-centredness is relevant as a slogan what pays attention to the need of balancing the education centred around the ready-made subject matter and so to say societal needs with considerations stemming from the child interests. As the sole basis of educational planning it is irrelevant and unrealizable.

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KOKKUVÕTE

LAPSEKESKSUSE PEDAGOOGILISED TAGAMAAD JA SEOSED.

1. UURIMUSE EESMÄRGID JA PÕHIJOONED.

Uurimuse esimeses osas on antud ülevaade mõnest põhimõttelisest muudatusest viimase aja Eesti pedagoogikas alates Eesti Õpetajate Kongressist 1987. aastal. Üheks põhiliseks kriitikaobjektiks said kongressi sõnavõttudes ja arvukates artiklites koolide õppekavad, mille ainekesksus leiti olevat peamine õpilaste motivatsioonilise defitsiidi põhjus. Lapsekesksus põhilise muudatusena ka hoiakutes ja suhtumistes näis olevat koos õppekava ainekesksest lapsekeskseks muutmise vajadusega pedagoogiliste uuenduste põhisuunaks (Pilt, 1987).

Mõni aasta hiljem võis pedagoogilisi uuendustaotlusi jagada kolme põhivaldkonna vahel: esiteks teoreetilised üldistused (Grauberg, 1991; Kreitzberg, 1992; Orn, 1992), teiseks ettepanekud ja katsed muuta koolide õppekavu (Sepp, Leht, 1989; Völli, 1990) ja kolmandaks alternatiivsete või vabakoolide loomine koos erinevaid koolitüüpe ja pedagoogilisi lähenemisviise tutvustava kirjanduse väljaandmisega (Lepik, 1989; Madise, 1990; Lulla, 1990; Kuurme ja Siim, 1991).

Lapsekeskse lähenemise problemaatika püsis endiselt päevakorral, mis sai ka käesoleva too kirjutamise ajendiks. Opetajate, lapsevanemate ja pedagoogikateadlaste huvi ning oma kontseptsioonides lapsekeskset lähenemist deklareerivate koolide tekkimine meie koolimaastikus töi kaasa vajaduse uurida selle mõiste ajaloolist sisu ja tähendust ning selle avanemist kaasaegsetes lahendustes. Kuni laps, tema vajaduste arvestamine püsib ühe võimaliku lähtekohana hariduse planeerimisel, näib olevat vajalik kaaluda kriitiliselt selle mõtlemissuuna ajaloolisi juuri ja tähendust kaasajale.

Käesoleva too eesmärgiks on lapsekesksuse doktriini analüüs Rousseau kui nimetatud õpetuse rajaja tööde põhjal taotlusega näidata järgnevalt neid raskusi, mis tekivad lapsekesksuse ühekülgsel interpreteerimisel ja rakendamisel, jättes kõrvale uhiskonna ja hariduse (aine) sisu problemaatika.

Metodoloogiliselt on käesolevas töös toetutud interpreteeriva (hermeneutilise) koolkonna lähenemisviisile, mis vaatleb pedagoogikaprobleeme ajalolises protsessis, arvestades haridus praktikat ja puudes praktikute vaimsete horisontide avardamise kaudu laiendada nende haridusotsustuste langetamise aluste piire. (Kemmis, 1985; Odman, P.-J.; 1985). Meetodina on kasutatud ajaloolis-kriitilist analüüsi. (Kaestle, C.F.; 1985).

2. ROUSSEAU LAPSEKESKSE LÄHENEMISVIISI RAJAJANA.

Teine peatükk sisaldab ülevaate valgustusajastu põhiideedest, mille üheks esindajaks Rousseau oli, eesmärgiga näidata ajastu maailmavaatelist ning filosoofilist problemaatikat ja sellelt pinnalt paremini mõista Rousseau ideaale ning püüdlusi; samuti ülevaate Rousseau eluloost ja põhitöödest.

Käesolevas töös on rõhutatud vajadust Rousseau mõttemaailma mõistmiseks vaadelda ühe tervikuna tema teoseid, milles ta esitab oma vaateid inimesele, ühiskonnale ja pedagoogikale. Ei ole võimalik mõista Rousseau kasvatus- ja haridusvaateid (põhiliselt esitatud raamatus "Emile"), võtmata arvesse tema vaateid inimesele üldse, inimloomusele, inimese paratamatule korrumpeerumisele (mõlemad "Discourse'id") ja tema vaateid uhiskonnale, sellele inimese korrumpeerumise põhjusele ("Ühiskonnaleping"). Viimases näitab Rousseau ära ka võimalused korruptsioonist pääsemiseks, milleks on üldine tahe (volonté générale) ja selle baasil sõlmitud ühiskonnaleping, mis võimaldab inimestel ühtaegu koos elada ja oma loomulikku vabadust säilitada. Kriitiliselt läheneb sellele Rousseau ühiskonnakäsitlusele Charvet (1974), väites, et Rousseau'l kaob üldise tahte arvestamise vajadusega täiesti areenilt isiksus, tema individuaalsed huvid ja vajadused. Berlin (1966) kritiseerib vabadusekäsitlust Rousseau laadis, väites, et taoline mehhanism loob suurepärased eeldused vägivallaks.

"Emile'i" esimesel lehekuljel väljendab Rousseau oma põhipaatost inimese ja ühiskonna suhtes, öeldes, et kõik on hea, mis tuleb Looja käest, kõik väärastub inimese käte all.(Rousseau, 1985). Rousseau usub inimese loomulikku headusesse, mille kaasaegne uhiskond on paratamatult hävitanud, ja selle taastamise võimalikkusesse õige, loomuliku kasvatuse kaudu, milleks ta "Emile'is" esitab üsna põhjaliku programmi. Ta eristab kasvatuses kahte viisi, millest üks kasvatab teiste jaoks, ühiskonna vajadusi silmas pidades, ja teine iseenda jaoks, arvestades looduse vajadusi, andes inimesele sõltumatuse teistest inimestest ja ühiskonnast. Esimene kasvatusviis kasvatab eelkõige kodanikku, teine inimest. Rousseau ei eita ühiskonda üldse, vaid ainult kaasaegset korruptsioonil, kunstlikkusel ja valel põhinevat kaasaegset ühiskonda. Saades õige kasvatuse, on Emile'il võimalik vältida kaasaegse ühiskonna mõju, olles kasvatatud sõltumatuks, ennast määratlevaks inimeseks, on võimalik hakata kujundama uut ühiskonda, kus õige kasvatuse saanud inimesed mõistavad üldise tahte seadusi ja oskavad vastavalt ühiskonnalepingule seda aktsepteerida ja oma loomulikku vabadust säilitades kasutada. Alles selles kontekstis on võimalik mõista Rousseau kasvatuspüüdlusi ja -ideaale.

3. LAPSEKESKSUS PEDAGOOGIKAS.

Kolmandas peatukis vaadeldakse Rousseau põhiteeneid pedagoogikasse lapsekeskse lähenemise toomisel. Järgmised punktid tema lapsekeskses käsitluses võiksid olla olulised (kasutatud on R.Barrow' klassifikatsiooni; Barrow, 1978):

1. Opetaja peab oma lähenemises lapsele toetuma eelkõige loodusele ja mitte mõnele muule kellegi poolt ettekoostatud plaanile.
2. Kasvatus peab arvestama lapse valmisolekut.
3. Kasvatus peab arvesse võtma lapse vajadusi ja huvisid, tema spontaansust.
4. Õppimine peab toimuma vahetu kogemuse kaudu.
5. Kasvatus peab arvestama lapse individuaalsust.
6. Õpilase-õpetaja suhete problemaatika Rousseau'l.
7. "Kasulikud teadmised" ja õppimine.

Käesolevas peatükis on kriitiliselt analüüsitud Rousseau seisukohti vastavalt eelpooltoodud punktidele, samuti tema vabadusemõiste realiseerumist

tegelikkuses, "kontrollitud vabadusena". Lähtuvalt Rousseau vabadusekäsitusest on analüüsis kasutatud Scheffleri (1966), Dewey (1916), Clarki (1988) ja Kreitzbergi (1993) kasvumetafoori käsitlusi.

Omaette alapeatükk on pühendatud lapsekesksuse mõiste kujunemisele ja selle muutumisele loosungiks (Scheffler, 1966; Clark, 1988), mis on võimaldanud seda mõistet kasutada erinevate seisukohtade ja erinevate hariduslike või poliitiliste püüdluste realiseerimiseks.

Mõisteliselt on vördselt "lapsekesksusega" pedagoogika ajaloos mitmemõtteline ja laialivalguv "looduse" mõiste Rousseau käsitluses. Vastavalt Barrow' esitusele (1978) on küllalt raske kindlaks teha, millist tähendust mõiste "loodus" Rousseaul igal konkreetsel juhul omab. Nii "vabadus" kui "loodus" Rousseaul võimaldavad teha kaasaegsetes käsitlustes väga erinevaid interpreteeringuid ja kasutada neid mõisteid erinevates pedagoogilistes ning koolikontseptsioonides.

4. ROUSSEAU KAASAEGSED JÄRGIJAD.

Neljandas peatükis on avatud "radikaalsuse" mõistet pedagoogikas, analüüsitud kaasaegsete alternatiiv- ja vabakoolide ühiseid jooni, tõmmates paralleele Rousseau käsitlustega, ning analüüsitud lähemalt kahe "radikaalse hariduskäsituse" kaasaegse esindaja - A.S. Neilli ja I.Illichi pedagoogilisi kontseptsioone.

Vördluses Rousseau käsitlusega on analüüsitud Neilli pedagoogilisi vaateid, kontsentreerudes mõistetele "önnelikkus, vabadus, huvi". I.Illich, kelle pedagoogilist vaatenurka "deschooling society" on eesti keelde tõlgitud "ühiskonna vabastamine koolist", jagab selgelt Rousseau seisukohti kahe rõhuasetusega pedagoogikas: esiteks äratundmine, et haridus ja koolitus ei ole tingimata üks ja seesama (s.t. ei saa ära segada rituaali sisuga), ja et kool institutsioonina ja koolitus institutsionaliseeritud protsessina on automaatselt ja möödapääsmatult ühiskonna pahede uks peapõhjusi. Kolmandaks oluliseks paralleeliks Rousseau ja kaasaegsete lapsekesksuse apologeetide vahel Illichi kaudu on "varjatud õppeplaani" probleem, mille üks ja esimene eesmärk on status quo säilitamine, jättes lapse osaks Illichi sõnul "teada oma kohta ja seal vaikselt istuda" (Illich, 1961).
Sarnaselt Rousseau'ga (samuti Dewey ja Freirega) seab Illich ühiskonna muutmise vahenditena esikohale kasvatus- ja haridusküsimused.

5. LAPSEKESKSE LÄHENEMISE TÄHTSUS.

Eelnenud analüüsi põhjal võib öelda, et mõistes lapsekeskse lähenemise all igasugust väljastpoolt tuleva hariduse planeerimise välistamist, on Rousseau'd usna raske pidada selle mõtteviisi esindajaks. Sotsiaalses plaanis jätab uldisele tahtele allumise vajadus uksikindiviidi ilma võimalusest käituda vastavalt isiklikele huvidele ja kalduvustele, ka lapse isiklike huvide üle valvab kasvataja tahe: küll võimalikult märkamatu, kuid pidevalt kohalolev ja korraldav. Laialtlevinud arusaam, mis põhineb suurelt jaolt Rousseau pedagoogiliste eesmärkide ja vahendite eraldikäsitlemisel tema ühiskonnavaadetest, on Rousseau'st teinud vabakasvatuse ideoloogi, kelle õpetus välistab igasuguse välise sekkumise lapse arengusse. Käesoleva töö üheks eesmärgiks oli näidata sellise arusaama paikapidamatust ning tuua

ajaloolise tagasivaate abiga välja lapsekesksuse tagamaad ja seosed kaasaegsete lapsekesksust deklareerivate kontseptsioonide ja käsitlustega.

Lapse huvide ja vajaduste arvestamist ühe hariduse planeerimise lähtekohana on kriitiliselt vaadelnud Hilda Taba, öeldes, et lapsekesksed, ühiskonnakesksed ja ainekesksed õppekavad võistlevad üksteisega üksteist välistavatena terviköppekava suhtes. Rõhu asetamine ühele osale nagu õppeaine, ühiskonna vajadused või õppija vajadused on põhjustanud mõttetut vastandamist: huvi contra õppeaine, elulähedus contra ainekesksus, meetod contra hariduse sisu, emotsionaalne areng contra intellektuaalne areng, põhioskused contra lapse kui terviku kujundamine ja nii edasi. (Taba, 1962).

John Dewey rõhutas oma raamatus "Demokraatia ja kasvatus" (1916) vajadust järgida lapse huvisid, kuid tegi hiljem mööndusi, püüdes integreerida kahte lähenemist - ühte ainekesksuse positsioonilt ja teist lapsekesksuse positsioonilt (Brubacher, 1966).

Üks võimalikke lahendusi lapsekeskse, ainekeskse ja ühiskonnakeskse lähenemise vastandamise vahel õppekavade koostamisel oleks otsida komplementaarse või integreeritud lähenemise võimalusi, püüdes vältida vastandamisi või ühekülgseid rõhuasetusi uhele kolmest hariduse planeerimise lähtekohast - ühiskond, teadmised ja inimene. (Kreitzberg, 1993). Lapsekesksuse mõistel (sageli loosungil) on tähendust enneköike tasakaalustava osana kindlaksmääratud ja õppekavas prevaleerivate teadmiste ja ühiskonna nõudmiste ning vajaduste suhtes. Hariduse planeerimise ainukese lähtekohana on see lähenemisviis ühekülgne ja ja mõeldamatu.

STRUCTURE

1	THE AIMS AND GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE INVESTIGATION	1
2	ROUSSEAU AS THE FOUNDER OF CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION	
2.1	Enlightenment	5
2.2	Biography of Rousseau. The main treatises	9
2.3	Rousseau's considerations about society	12
2.4	Notions about a natural man	16
2.5.	"Emile" as the treatise about the education of natural man	19
3	CHILD-CENTRED EDUCATION	23
3.1	Features of child-centred education	25
3.2	Freedom and "growth"-metaphor in Rousseau's conception of child-centred education	31
3.3	Child-centredness as an educational slogan	36
3.4	Different meanings of the term "nature"	38
4	CONTEMPORARY FOLLOWERS OF ROUSSEAU	41
4.1	Radical education	42
4.2	The views of A.S. Neill	43
4.3	The views of I.Illich	48
5	RELEVANCE OF CHILD-CENTRED APPROACH	53
	REFERENCES	56
	KOKKUVOTE	58

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