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GREEN PARTIES IN THE GLOBALIZATION DIVIDE: ECONOMIC POLICY
POSITIONS AS PREDICTORS OF ELECTORAL RESULTS

MA thesis

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Abstract

Can policy positions predict the electoral results of Green parties? By placing European Green parties in Western and Eastern Europe in a framework of globalized politics and conducting a large-N statistical analysis, this thesis shows that economic policy positions of Green parties are significant predictors of electoral results for Green parties, and that the comparatively weaker electoral results of Green parties in post-communist Europe can be explained through these policy positions. The results also show nuance in Green parties' positioning within globalized political conflicts and contributes to the literature on the globalization divide.

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1 Introduction

Research on the political effects of globalization is "booming" (Walter, 2021). The traditional divides of politics based on class, religion, and the urban-rural and center-periphery divides have decreased in importance, and the structure of the traditional divisions has changed. These changes have been traced back to both the economic and political effects of globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008; Walter, 2021; Rodrik, 2010). As the issues voters give preference to have changed, researchers have gained insight into the changing cleavages. Some have argued that the traditional political cleavages have been unfrozen (Hooghe & Marks, 2018), while others have argued in favor of the emergence of a completely new political divide (Kitschelt, 1988), and others still for a political backlash against globalization (Walter, 2021).

Globalization has had deep and lasting effects on European political scenes. These effects can be divided into two categories: economic and political. The economic effects of globalization have splintered existing political cleavages. Parts of the traditional working class have experienced increasing competition from globally integrated markets, which has also caused downward pressure on wages. As industrial workers in advanced economies have begun competing with industrial workers in developing economies, only some of the global working classes stand to gain the economic benefits. Parts of the working classes of advanced economies have lost in the relative economic gains of globalization (Rodrik, 2010; Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011), which has contributed to a shift in political interests. At the same time, a rise in international integration and communication – political globalization – has played a role in the rise of "new" social values. Post-materialists (Inglehart, 2018), or categories of people with political concerns beyond immediate material survival, have grown and have become a political force unto themselves.

As the traditional political cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) have become unfrozen and new divides have increased in importance, research on either Green political ideology or "new" social movements (Hamilton, 2002) has been used as analytical tools to explain the emergence, rise and staying power of Green parties. In practice, new social movements refer to civil society that organized and advocated for political action in a post-materialist framework. Often, this line of query has taken the view that Green parties, among other newcomer parties, are symptoms of the rise of a new political divide (Kitschelt, 1988; Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Dolezal, 2010). The salience of environmentalism has been used as a proxy for a shift in values toward post-materialism (Inglehart, 2018), and the results of Green parties as a marker for the presence of a pro-integration pole of the globalization divide (Hooghe et

al., 2010; Kriesi et al., 2008). By measuring voters, issue salience, and voting preferences, research has typically taken to measuring environmentalism and Green parties with survey data. This has limited the breadth of explanations available.

At the intersection of environmentalism and globalization, Green parties have become successful political organizations, advocating for a political ideology that takes the environment more actively into consideration. The Greens are considered pro-globalization parties, pushing for cultural and social values that promote globalization. Their voters are also sometimes called the "winners" of globalization (Walter, 2021; Rodrik, 2010); they are workers in industries that have been more likely to benefit from globalization. Green voters, standing to benefit from globalization, tend to be in favor of further integration. At the same time, researchers have pointed out differences in the left-right placement of Green parties between regions (van Haute, 2016). While the Greens are pro-globalization, differences in their policy positions exist. As Stephanie Walter (2021) discusses, the calls of environmentalist movements to decrease global emissions show an uneasy relationship toward globalization, on one hand seeking global solutions to climate change, but on the other, looking to limit the effects of economic globalization on the environment. Some have also talked of an ideological divide between different strains of environmentalism within Green parties (Burchell, 2014). Within Green parties in Western and Northern Europe, the "fundi-realo" division has been a defining characteristic. This division is defined by ideologically purist ecologists on one hand, and compromise-seeking environmentalists on the other (Burchell, 2014).

Green parties rose to the political scene in the 1970s and 1980s in Western Europe, and after 1989 in post-communist Europe. They have become mainstays in national politics, but with varying electoral results between regions. While Western Greens have, on average, increased their electoral results, Eastern Greens have floundered. Consistent voter profiles of Greens have been established, and sound explanations of their electoral results can be inferred based on this. Globalization has also seemed to cement the Green stance in terms of social and cultural values. But what is the effect of the policy positions that Green parties have? While demand-side explanations focusing on voters exist, little research has considered the effect of parties themselves.

Western and Eastern Green parties have varying electoral results between regions. Can some of their policies help explain the difference? Only one explanation, focusing on voters, is offered by the existing literature. In it, Green voters and their values play a key role. These voters tend to be young, urban, educated, and are more likely to be women (Dolezal, 2010; Saarinen et al., 2018). All the while research has found ideological and historical differences

between Green parties, pointing toward differences between the Green parties in Western and Northern Europe and the Greens in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, researchers have argued for the importance of the globalization divide – the shifting of political conflicts due to globalization – for Green parties. They are socially and culturally pro-globalization parties, but the different origins and trajectories of Western and Eastern Green parties suggest different anchoring points for their economic policy positions. In terms of political globalization – that is, their stance toward the European Union (EU) and international attempts at mitigating climate change – their position is clear. In terms of economic globalization – the role of the state in the economy – the Greens differ in their positions.

The objective of this thesis is to shed light on whether the policy positions of the Green parties, alongside voter preferences, influence their electoral results. The research question that follows is: *What are the effects of policy positions of European Green parties on their varying electoral results?* By analyzing the policies of Green parties and finding their effect on electoral results. The aim is to gauge whether policy positions are linked with electoral results and whether a difference between regions can explain that difference. Another theory-oriented, objective is to shed light on how European Green parties place themselves in globalized political divides. By conducting a large-N analysis, this thesis uses statistical means to make two inferences: first, that some economic policies of Green parties can predict their electoral results, and second, that there is a difference between the economic policies of Western and the Eastern Green parties. Its data comes from the dataset compiled by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). It composes of hand-coded electoral manifestos of political parties and tracks the electoral results of parties in national parliamentary elections.

The immediate relevance of this thesis lies in the added knowledge it gives on European Green parties and their stances on the globalization divide. This thesis shows that Green parties cannot be considered uniformly as pro-globalization parties and that the party family is divided on economic policy. A novelty in it is also the inclusion of post-communist Green parties, and the comparison of European regions. Further relevance stems from the fact that this thesis can also begin to answer questions on Green political responses to climate change as its effects become increasingly tangible. Combining Green economic policies, voter profiles and Green political ideology (or ideologies), an image of the interplay between the three aspects can be drawn. Summarized, the relevance of this thesis is in its contribution to the theory of the globalization divide and the Greens' position in it. Added relevance stems from the knowledge generated about the already dire, and increasing, need for a political response to climate change.

After the introduction (1), the thesis begins with a (2) theory section discussing the development of environmental movements in Europe and their transition into formal party organizations. Here, discussions on the effects of globalization on European politics, the Green parties' position in globalized politics, and earlier explanations of their varying results are described. In politics perforated by globalization, Green parties have been placed as pro-globalization organizations, while their voter profiles have proved a solid cultural and value basis for their support. After establishing the context and theory, relying on both the globalization divide as a theoretical background and earlier research on Green parties, a hypothesis on the position of Green parties in globalized political conflicts is derived. Then, (3) the approach to the analysis is formalized, and the methodology is presented. The hypothesis is tested with electoral manifesto data using linear regression. (4) The analysis presents results from the dataset. (5) A discussion of results follows, and limitations and avenues for future research are offered. Finally, (6) a concluding section summarizes the thesis.

2 Development of environmentalism in Europe

Common points of departure for environmentalism across Europe can be seen in different forms of political and civic unrest. In Western Europe, its roots can be traced to rising material wellbeing and a generation of new social movements (Burchell, 2014). Green parties entered the party systems not only as the standard-bearers of environmental thinking but as representatives of a new generation of political actors. In the East, however, lacking a political system allowing public debate, environmentalism came to be an outlet for political dissent (Szulecka & Szulecki, 2019; Jehlička & Jacobsson, 2021; Sarre & Jehlička, 2007). At the same time, commonalities can be found in both East and West, the Chernobyl disaster loomed large, and both movements began as grassroots movements among activists (Jehlička, 1994).

Environmentalism in Western Europe came to the political scene as a part of the social unrest originating in the 1960s and 70s (Burchell, 2014). Their emergence has also been linked with research that began to show a negative impact on the environment caused by industrial societies (Jehlička, 1994). The origins of environmentalists in Western Europe are rooted in a broad concern for the environment that does not only consider immediate and tangible environmental concerns. This distinction has been defined as a distinction between "green" and "brown" environmentalist thinking (Tietenberg & Folmer, 2000). Later, in political science literature, the "new" social values (Burchell, 2014) around which the civic activism of the 1960s and 70s revolved have been defined as GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) values (Hooghe & Marks, 2017). This is a categorization of a group of voters that has emerged from research on the effects of globalization on politics. After widely publicized nuclear disasters, like in Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, anti-nuclear activists became an increasingly vocal and important part of civil society in the West. At the same time, another section of GAL activism formed around international peace movements. In this way, the development of environmentalism in Western Europe can be seen as the rise of new values that have been redefined by globalization.

Both the peace movement and anti-nuclear activists, in their ways, represent aspects of GAL values. Environmentalism and the peace movement stem from post-materialist ways of thinking (Inglehart, 2018), where material concerns and immediate survival give way to more abstract concerns. In Western Europe, post-war economic growth secured the material existence of an expanding middle class (Rodrik, 2011). Generations reaching adulthood in conditions where material wellbeing was never a real concern turned toward post-materialist

concerns – global peace and environmentalism. Social movements organized around these "new" values have later been conceptualized as GAL values.

Soviet Russia was an early implementor of top-down environmentalism (Foster, 2015), and grassroots environmentalist movements existed within the broader Soviet bloc (Szulecka & Szulecki, 2019; Jehlička & Jacobsson, 2021; Agarin, 2009). Their impact seems to have been small until the last years of European communism. During the futile attempts by Mihhail Gorbachev at reforming the Soviet system, more forms of environmentalist movements were allowed to exist within the Communist bloc. These nature clubs and discussion forums were informal, and on the surface, kept a distance from politics. The organizations presented themselves as merely being in favor of preserving nature, and as Michael Waller and Frances Millard (1992, p. 161) put it: "[w]ho, after all, could object to improving the environment? Here, paradoxically, the positions of power and dissent met." Political authorities could allow environmentalist criticism because it did not make the connection between environmental degradation and communist rule.

After the implementation of *perestroika* and *glasnost* (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012)*,* these innocuous forms of civil activism put newly found political freedoms to the test as environmental movements made the connection between the prevailing political system and increasing environmental degradation. Worsening environmental situations combined with Soviet reform policies enabled the emergence of a more robust civil society and (critical) public debate. Subsequently, environmental movements became significant political forces in the late Soviet period. They became mass movements (Waller & Millard, 1992) fueled by country-specific, tangible environmental concerns (Sikk & Anderssen, 2009; Szulecka & Szulecki, 2019; Podoba, 1998). The Phosphorite wars in Estonia, the Danube circle in Hungary, as well as air pollution and coal mines in Poland and Czechoslovakia (Vogt, 2004; Szulecka & Szulecki, 2019) became focal points of political dissent against the communist rule. Environmental concerns emerged as an accepted way of criticizing Communist parties. Pre-transition environmentalism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) came to be a shroud for nationalist and anti-communist movements. Environmental degradation functioned as the skeletal basis of dissent against Soviet rule, and as no crackdown happened, concrete green concerns mixed with nationalist rhetoric. Environmentalist organizations became parts of mass movements and civic rhetoric shifted from apolitical environmentalist concerns toward explicitly political and nationalist demands. Soviet rule receded from CEE aided by the mass movements that were partly animated by environmentalist demands. In broad terms, the form

of development of these environmentalist organizations into mass independence movements is shared across the region.

2.1 The rise of Green parties in Western Europe

Green parties appeared across Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, considered to be part of the rise of new social movements (Burchell, 2014). As these social movements developed into organized political forces, early European Green parties inherited a set of post-material values and an emphasis on open and democratic party structures. The institutionalization of new social movements into Green parties can be seen as a process in which traditional parties did not adapt to the rise in post-materialism and GAL values. As Green parties came into existence, a split within environmentalist movements emerged, which is often called the "fundi-realo controversy", or sometimes also referred to as a distinction between ecologist and environmentalist thinking (Burchell, 2014). The split is a useful starting point for a description of the development of Green parties in Western Europe. The fundis, or ecologists, focus on a critique of industrial society, advocating for a critical reevaluation of values and a recognition of natural limits to both economic and population growth. This strain of thinking has largely remained outside of parliamentary politics and can be characterized by more radical environmental movements. Realo, or environmentalist, thinking is a consensus-seeking type of Green ideology, focused on action within political systems and more accepting of compromise, broadly characteristic of Green parties in Europe.

As the effects of globalization were felt across Europe (Rodrik, 2011), and European politics increasingly perforated by its effects (Walter, 2021), traditional parties did not adapt to the rise in new values and voters. The new ideological space was not effectively filled by mainstream parties, and new contenders appeared, Green parties among them. The ideological divide among environmentalists, it could be argued, resulted in the split of Western European environmentalism into two distinct camps, and the fundi-realo controversy led to different forms of institutionalization of environmentalism in Western Europe. The fundis, focused on grassroots organization and direct action, remain parts of civil society. The realos, on the other hand, have entered traditional European politics as political parties. Over time, the electoral results of Green parties in Western Europe have become better (see Figure 1), and their organizations professionalized, becoming more akin to traditional parties (Burchell, 2001).

2.2 The development of Green parties in Central and Eastern Europe

Environmentalism in CEE suffered from the political and economic transitions (Fagin, 2000; Coumel & Elie, 2013) after the Fall of Communism. The societal basis on which these movements reached success suddenly disappeared. Post-material concerns decreased in importance as the public faced economic depression and relative material deprivation after the transition began. Ignoring environmental degradation, the focus of the newly independent states shifted toward economic growth and ensuring lasting democracies. For example, during Vaclav Klaus's premiership in the Czech Republic, environmental movements were seen as obstacles to economic recovery and were deprived of political and financial support (Fagin, 2000). Economic growth and macroeconomic stability became the major policy goals of governments, which were seen to be hindered by environmental concerns. The effects of waste and emissions produced by industries lost political importance, as manufacturing goods became the foundation of much-needed economic growth and stability. The realo-fundi controversy was solved by circumstance – if it ever became a controversy – as ideologically pure and non-compromising environmentalism was weeded out by shrinking state budgets and the decreasing salience of environmentalism.

Environmentalism during the Soviet era had never been based on party organizations, instead finding its origins in grassroots organizations. After the end of communist rule, environmentalism found refuge in its roots and all but disappeared from national politics (Jehlička, Kostelecký & Kunštát, 2011). The return to Europe came with a complete upending of the economic and political frameworks in which environmentalists had worked in. The emerging Green parties in the newly independent CEE did not capitalize on the mass environmental movements that began during the years of late Soviet reform (Coumel & Elie, 2013). Environmentalist organizations in the region found themselves increasingly dependent on funding coming from the West, as neoliberal economic policies balanced state budgets and withdrew funding for civil society (Fagin, 2000). The dependence on foreign funding resulted in a convergence between the environmental organizations between the East and the West, as Western funders chose to give money to organizations with similar goals.

After post-communist Europe had politically stabilized and economic growth provided a crucial threshold of material wealth, environmentalism in CEE began to re-emerge. This appears to be related to a generational shift occurring among Green parties, where young, educated, and urban cadres of activists took over party organizations (Jehlička et al., 2011). The new generation of Eastern Greens, with a resemblance to Green voters in the West, gained

political relevance. The change in Eastern Green parties could be argued to stem from the economic congruence of European regions, which, in part, is a result of globalization. As the macroeconomic situation in CEE began to stabilize in the late 1990s, its economic and political structures came to resemble that of Western Europe, which functioned as a springboard for the development of a "new" strain of political environmentalism in the east with influence borrowed from the West. For example, the Czech Greens' manifesto in 2010 "could be best… summarized as a reliance on economic instruments and the promotion of green consumerism and renewable energy" (Jehlička et al., 2011, p. 422). Two dimensions are visible in this shift: the generational shift in the Czech Greens points toward the party becoming more focused on GAL issues, and second, its promotion of green consumerism shows a neoliberal starting point in its argumentation – environmentalism is enacted through individual choices, and as a consumer. The revival of political environmentalism in the region came as a mirror of its Western counterpart, heavily influenced by neoliberalism. Despite this convergence of environmentalists between regions, Green parties in the East of Europe have not achieved similar electoral results as their Western counterparts.

2.3 Globalization divide – the new political conflict

Globalization has faced popular backlash (Mansfield et al., 2021; Walter, 2021), and European politics has seen the rise of divisions that are based on the changes an increasingly globalized world brings. The key issues and topics surrounding this multifaceted change in the political scene have focused on the economy and cultural issues. While the economy has long been a central political issue, European political cleavages surrounding it have in the past focused on the role of the state in the economy (Kriesi et al., 2008). On the economic dimension, the left-right divide broadly rested on the opposition between Hayekian and Keynesian thought, where the left supported state intervention in markets, that is, Keynesian economics, while the right saw state intervention as only hindering the effectiveness of free markets – Hayekian economics. Globalization, however, has transformed political orientations toward the economy. As international trade has increased and internationalized governance regulating the global market has become more robust, constraints placed on national sovereignty have become politicized (Walter, 2021; Rodrik, 2011). The election of Donald Trump, the British departure from the EU, and the rise of the populist right have often been named key results of this politicization. The cultural dimension of the backlash has been described as a "general concern about the loss of local cultures in a globalized world" (Walter,

2021, p. 2). As a process that might be described as the decreasing of the importance of nation states, globalization has resulted in an increase in nationalism. The constraints placed on national sovereignty by global economic processes have thus found a social and cultural dimension. In Europe, this dimension has prominently taken the form of anti-immigrant sentiment. It rests on an axis between nationalist and cosmopolitan stances.

At times, the phenomenon has been called a globalization backlash, divide, cleavage, transnational cleavage, or denationalization. What seems clear, however, is that the economic and cultural aspects of globalization have had a profound effect on voters and party systems. "The political mobilization of a latent structural potential" (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 10), or in other words, a politicization of existing preferences (Walter, 2021), has increased the importance of a distinct set of preferences and the reshuffling of party systems to better reflect voter demand. Research has, understandably, given more attention to the most electorally successful parties and their voters in this new divide. The populist right is seen as a driving force of the politicization against globalization (Kriesi et al., 2008), which can be where conceptualizations centered around a backlash against globalization emerge. For this thesis, however, conceptualizing the phenomenon as a backlash is cumbersome because its focus is on parties that are, at least nominally, pro-globalization and with a typical voter among the winners of globalization. The globalization *divide*, then, is an additional axis, embedded in, but transforming political cleavages. Globalization caused the rise of new parties and the transformation of old mainstream ones. These new party configurations are in a conflict defined by dimensions that are redefined by globalization. The socio-economic and cultural dimensions of party competition are now focused on how states and their economies should orient to an increasingly globalized world and the importance of protecting the nation, prominently in the form of culture, tradition, and ethnicity. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2017) argue for a division based on GAL and TAN (traditional, alternative, authoritarian) values, constructing the winners and losers of globalization on a cultural scale based on values.

The benefits of globalization have not been divided equally (Milanovic, 2016; Rodrik, 2011). The richest quartiles of the continent have received the most relative economic gains, while the losers of globalization, the traditional working class, have received the smallest relative economic gains. It is this disproportionate share of the spoils of the global market that has divided European politics into two: the winners, and the losers of globalization. Although it is prudent to point out that both the winners and losers of globalization have seen absolute gains because of globalization (Milanovic, 2016), the political divisions stemming from globalization seem to be partly based on the relative deprivation of some. The focus of the

populist right has shifted toward cultural and economic protectionism, while the New Left has assimilated the economic status quo as they maintain a culturally cosmopolitan stance.

While it is not the case that the classic cleavages shown by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in their seminal work have disappeared, their orientation and relative importance have shifted. Qualified employees, who in the past could work under the nationally protected umbrellas of national champions – companies like Fiat in Italy or Volkswagen in Germany – have found themselves under pressure as states increasingly have started to follow liberalizing policies, global competition has depressed wages and Europe has deindustrialized (Kriesi et al., 2008; Milanovic, 2016). Likewise, as wages have downward pressure and immigration increases, low-skilled workers see their relative position in the labor market worsen as they must compete with labor globally. On the other hand, another sector of qualified employees, so-called social and cultural professionals, fare better in an international environment where labor mobility is easier. The relatively more flexible skills possessed by them see more demand in an internationalized labor market. The same can be said of entrepreneurs working in business sectors that benefit from liberalized markets, but the opposite is true of entrepreneurs in sectors that were traditionally protected. This causes the traditional class cleavage to weaken and instead become reformulated according to new economic competition emerging from the effects of globalization.

At the same time, the cultural effects of globalization have also driven changes in the European political landscape. These changes are "filtered by national or subnational cultures… and their collective experience" (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 31). Immigration is one of the most visible aspects of cultural globalization, which has also been seen as a driver of the politicization and increased salience of globalization-related conflicts. A population of ethnically and/or culturally distinct immigrants creates a "political latent" (Kriesi et al., 2008) that are be mobilized by political actors, in this case, most successfully by the populist right. On the cultural dimension, a division emerges where on one end there are nationalists with anti-immigration stances and cosmopolitans with pro-immigration stances on the other end. In recent years, the populist right has more successfully engaged with the cultural conflicts of globalization. Hooghe and Marks's (2017) GAL-TAN divide rests on the cultural axis of globalization. In this conceptualization, the cultural dimension of globalized political conflict revolves between liberal cosmopolitanism and traditional nationalism. For the globalized cosmopolitan, the importance of the nation state is diminished, while for the traditional nationalist the state becomes a central aspect of a defensive political fight.

On the Left, Third Way politics became a mainstream compromise between right-wing Hayekian economics and left-wing social policy, which combined post-materialist individualism with the free market and European integration. This combination of laissez-faire attitude in both economic and social spheres came to be the bedrock on which the New Left was built. These shifts were accompanied by a shift in the voter base. A free market, universalist values nor increased competition within globalized labor markets suited the traditional working-class voters of European left-wing parties. Rather, the New Left is now favored by people less attached to traditional class-based divides. The contemporary Left has found its supporters among the working- and middle-class post-materialists, while the Populist Right has found its voter base among the internationally immobile and traditionalist working classes, who in the past tended to favor the Left. In an economic sense, the globalization divide has primarily changed the dynamics within working- and middle-class voters. In its cultural dimensions, however, the changes brought by globalization are felt more broadly. As rising cosmopolitan values challenge nationalism, cultural conflicts become widespread.

2.3.1 The globalization divide in Western Europe

During the last few decades, pressure to deregulate European economies has increased (Kriesi et al., 2008). As European economies have become (neo)liberalized, competition between sectors of industry, one focusing on international trade, and the other on domestic markets, has intensified. "Globalization thus leads to a *sectoral* cleavage, which cuts across the traditional class cleavage and tends to give rise to cross-class coalitions" (Kriesi et al., 2008, p. 6). In economic terms, as different sectors of industry have become embroiled in competition, workers in both sectors have experienced the perforation of globalization into politics. At the same time, the ability of nation states to affect markets has diminished (Kriesi et al., 2008). Political agency has been transferred toward international organizations like the EU, and the political conflicts borne out of globalized and deregulated markets have escaped national boundaries.

The New Left appeared as a political orientation broadly advocating for the interests of the winners of globalization. Placing globalization on a spectrum between demarcation and integration (Kriesi et al., 2008), the New Left came to stand for integration. What made these left-wing parties and policies "new" was their attachment to the new social values – sprouting from the movements of the late 1960s – that gained salience. It could be argued that the social democratic movements in Western Europe were influenced by an Inglehartian (2018)

generational shift, in short, the newness of the New Left can be summarized in values that some scholars (Burchell, 2014; Spoon & Williams, 2021; Carter, 2013) have identified to also be pillars of the environmentalist movements in Western Europe, and that were then inherited in CEE: social justice, grassroots democracy, non-violence, a pro-Europe stance, and especially for the Greens, an emphasis on the environment. The New Left, then, adopted cultural pro-integration views in tandem with the rise of social movements advocating for post-materialist and universalist values. Sections of voters who adopted these values tend to be economically better off, and those who have fared better in the transforming labor markets; people, for whom material survival was practically guaranteed by the European welfare systems inspired by Keynesian economics, and therefore could adopt post-materialist values.

The populist right has appeared as a response to the demands of sections of electorates tied to nationalities (Kriesi et al., 2008). As the traditionally protected sectors of industry have become deregulated and face increased global pressure, the relative economic losses faced by some has caused the rise of social and cultural values (in other words, TAN values) emphasizing the importance of national community. New political parties politicizing issues and mobilizing voters based on traditional values have been more successful in the globalization divide, when compared to the New Left.

2.3.2 The globalization divide in Central and Eastern Europe

In Central and Eastern Europe, the vast economic and political transformations starting in 1989 meant the beginning of a veritable tsunami of global influence. The newly independent states took varying paths in transitioning to capitalist economies (Åslund, 2013; Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011), yet global economic pressures did not discriminate, and the ideological basis for a market economy that was adopted in transitioning economies was the same across CEE. The logic of market economies imported from Western Europe resulted in the large-scale implementation of neoliberal capitalism across post-communist economies. Formerly state-controlled enterprises were privatized or sold wholesale, while some of the newly independent republics implemented austerity policies to reduce public debt to qualify for loans from the International Monetary Fund and to ensure a swift transition to market economy, capitalizing on fleeting public opinion and doubting the efficacy of slow transitions[1]. As a neoliberal

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[1] Others in the region, for example, Romania and Ukraine, began transitions slower as Communist parties retained more control, resulting in weaker economic performance in the 1990s (Åslund, 2013; Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011).

consensus became embedded into the politics of CEE, the economic transitions provided macroeconomic stability at the beginning of the 2000s, and membership in the EU came with an influx of foreign funding, while at the same time opening the regional markets to Western Europe and the world. After the EU's Eastern Enlargement in 2004, CEE saw a massive influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) from foreign companies as the region was now seen as a stable investment, while the EU's structural funds flooded state budgets.

Meanwhile, mobility of labor within the European single market has caused significant emigration from CEE toward the older, richer democracies in Western and Northern Europe. The social and cultural changes in CEE were intertwined with changes in the region's economic transformation. The service sector increased significantly, while foreign manufacturers moved to the region, taking advantage of the existing industrial base, geographic proximity to rich markets, and a well-educated, but low-cost, labor force (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011). The better educated and skilled populations were (and are) more likely to emigrate from CEE to Western Europe, while those who stayed were increasingly likely to be employed by manufacturers moving into the region. In the context of the globalization divide, this shift in demographics merits attention. As the political conflicts changed by globalization became more prominent, voters usually associated with pro-integration stances were more likely to emigrate from post-communist countries. The divide is there, but one side of the voters is not. Voters more likely to be attached, through identity or practicality, to the nation state have stayed.

2.4 Green parties in globalized Europe

The rise of Green parties coincides with the speeding up of globalization, the integration process in the EU, and the national effects of both. It could be argued that in an ironic twist the material wellbeing that globalization in Europe has brought also enabled environmentalism to arrive on the political scene to criticize it. For Ronald Inglehart (2018), the wealth enjoyed by sections of the population was a major driver for the emergence of post-material values, of which concern for the environment is often seen as a prime example. While globalization as a process was felt stronger by voters, it deepened some political conflicts. European integration came to be seen as both a symptom and a political battlefield within the globalization divide. The role of nation states in Europe transformed, either seen as diminishing their sovereignty or pooling together their power. The rise of environmentalism as a political issue came to be

associated with the pro-globalization pole of the globalization divide. It became an important policy area because of the rise of the new social values and movements.

The Greens are uneasy proponents of globalization (Walter, 2021), although they have also been labeled as transnationalists (Marks et al., 2021). Despite their placement on the globalization-focused political axis as parties striving for international cooperation, their stance on inter-state links depends on the policy area. For example, Green thinking on climate change, arguably the lodestar of the Green party family, has reached a clear consensus. A necessity for international cooperation, often through international organizations, guides Green environmental policy (Wöbse & Kupper, 2021). At the same time, the Greens' take on a global economy is not as clear-cut. With this relationship in the background between Green parties and their voters, Green climate policy must reconcile with the costs of global industrial production and the supply chains that support the present level of mass production. Stephanie Walter (2021) especially mentions climate youth movements, which criticize economic globalization, while promoting political globalization, arguing for global solutions brought by a global economy.

Research has placed Green parties as organizations that are structured following the globalization divide on the GAL-TAN divide and in contrast to mainstream parties (Marks et al., 2021). Literature on the Greens also comments on the relationship between nationalism and environmentalism (Conversi & Hau, 2021; Hamilton, 2002), and shows the uneasy relationship between Green ideology and nationalism. The prominence of climate change, a quintessential wicked problem, in the contemporary thinking of Green parties hinders adopting a nationalist approach, while the roots of Green parties as part of the new social movements have resulted in the domination of cosmopolitanism within political environmentalism. At the same time, however, a nationalist rationale for environmental protection exists. Welsh nationalists, for example, assumed an accommodative strategy toward Greens based on protecting the national environment (Hamilton, 2002). Nationalist mythmaking often focuses on protecting the environment that is seen to be an integral part of a nation's home. This is in line with the idea that environmentalism tends to be attached to myriad policy areas, rather than be a discreet priority (Carter, 2013). In essence, parties might adopt policy positions that are *informed* by environmentalism but not *guided* by it. Vastly different rationales can be merged with environmentalism, from "ecosocialism" (Tooze, 2021; Kvarström, 2022) to far-right ecologism (Lubarda, 2020).

Green parties emerged on the Western European political scene after, typically, a few attempts at organizing (van Haute, 2016). As existing parties failed to bring forth values

espoused by environmentalists steeped in the new social movements, Western Greens as parties quickly extended their images from opposing nuclear power to feminism, pacifism, and grassroots democracy (van Haute, 2016). In this way, both Western and Eastern environmentalists have roots outside of national politics. Due to the failure of mainstream parties to include GAL issues into their public images or policy positions, politics in Europe was open for new players. Green parties spread from their European origins in Switzerland, the UK, France, Germany, and Belgium (van Haute, 2016). They took part in national elections and gained representation either in national parliaments or in regional representation typically within a few years of registering as a party (Hooghe et al., 2010; van Haute, 2016). Over time Greens in the West and North of Europe have distanced themselves organizationally from their grassroots origins and "have undergone deep organizational transformations toward institutionalization, professionalization and 'normalization'" (van Haute, 2016, p. 321). Western Greens have assimilated to party systems in their national, as well as the European, contexts. Today they are parties taking part in national politics primarily competing on the globalization divide. They emphasize policies and values that are most affected by globalization while choosing intentionally vague (note the self-portrayal as "beyond" the left-right divide) positions where traditional cleavages matter most.

The relationship between environmentalism and nationalism has particular weight in CEE. It is this interplay between nationalism and freedom on one hand and socialism and occupation on the other that distinguished the development of Green parties between the regions. The collective experience of communism around which a narrative of Soviet occupation emerged in some countries (e.g., post-transition Estonia), or a response to a specific event (e.g., Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia; the 1956 Hungarian revolution) came to dominate national politics and identity. In CEE, nationalism came to be associated with independence and democracy, while left-wing policy positions now have "reactionary, anti-democratic connotations" (Carter, 2013, p. 85). The globalization divide has changed political divides in post-communist Europe and the West, but the origins of Green parties between the regions are, ideologically speaking, different. The relative decreasing importance of nationalism in favor of cosmopolitan values that came alongside new social values in the West could not develop similarly due to the importance of nationalism and the macroeconomic shocks in the East. The collective communist experience, independence fought for, and transition to free markets in the East meant that, instead, the new social values were merged with both nationalist sentiments in the cultural dimension, but also with an emphasis on the free market in the economic dimension.

This peculiarity of party systems in CEE has resulted in "an axis of party competition that is orthogonal to that in the West" (Marks et al., 2006, p. 170). While globalization is driving changes in policy issues that parties emphasize and changing the issues that are most salient for voters, the ideological space in CEE differs from the West. The most striking difference is the state of left-wing politics. Marxist political and economic analysis has all but disappeared from CEE, and center-left parties have floundered. Party competition has remained economically in the center and right, while more active conflict occurs in the social and cultural dimensions, partly encouraged by the globalization divide. As Kriesi et al. (2008) point out, the impact of globalization is visible in party systems, and the new issues globalization brings depend on specific national contexts. The same is true of CEE as a region, and this difference is visible in the strategies adopted by some Green parties in CEE. In Hungary, the Greens have adopted a more centrist ideological line, while placing themselves as a part of a broader anti-Orbán coalition (Fábián, 2015; Carter, 2013). In Latvia, the Greens have entered coalitions with the nationalist Farmers Union, a move that evokes the Czech Greens, who have also entered coalitions with right-wing parties.

An issue in the research on European Green parties has been that while the evolution, change, and success of Western Greens has been transposed to Greens in the East, a consensus has appeared in which different levels of support for Green parties between the regions are explained as differences among voters. While this demand-side explanation has empirical backing (Hooghe et al., 2010; Dolezal, 2010; Grant & Tilley, 2019), it tends to ignore the different ideological or political spaces between Western Europe and CEE. At the same time, in other areas of research on European party systems, differences between the spaces are explained precisely through the differences between East and West. The rate of party fragmentation (Saarts, 2011), support for authoritarianism (or the populist right) (Bochsler & Juon, 2020), and the collapse of left-wing economic policies (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011) are all examples of explanations focusing on the distinctness of CEE as a region. The globalization divide provides a framework that assumes the development of the same political division in both regions while allowing for a recognition of the different paths the two regions have taken. This thesis represents an attempt at testing whether Green parties and their policies, not only a lack of voter salience, can explain the lackluster and sporadic electoral results that the Greens in the East have experienced.

2.5 Explanations of varying Green success

The electoral results of the Greens in the East and the West are as strikingly different as their origins. While after the transition to a market economy a convergence of environmentalists occurred between the regions due to ideological and economic factors (Fagin, 2000), Green parties in Western Europe have achieved more consistent success (Pearson & Rüdig, 2020) than their counterparts in post-communist Europe, that at first experienced a collapse (Fagin, 2000; Sigman, 2013), and then intermittent success (Fábián, 2015). The globalization divide has caused differences in the results of electoral competition in the East and the West. The relationship between Green party's popularity and the salience of environmentalism in countries is not clear. In some countries, the relative importance of environmentalism has been high, but Green parties have a small presence in national politics. The opposite can be true, as well: relatively low environmental salience among the electorate, but a larger presence for a Green party (van Haute, 2016).

Compared to other European Green parties, the German *Bündnis '90/Die Grünen (*Alliance '90/The Greens) has seen consistent electoral success (Rüdig, 2012; Pearson & Rüdig, 2020). Voters of *Die Grünen* are both "feminized" and "greyed" (Rüdig, 2012): the first trend being a generational shift of women becoming more likely to vote for leftist parties, the Greens among them, and the second referring to older age groups – the 35-44 group, and increasingly, the 45-49 age group – becoming more likely to vote Green in Germany. Something is driving certain older generations to vote Green, even though environmentalism has usually been linked with the youth. "Green support is strongest among the '68 and NSM [new social movement] generations" (Rüdig, 2012, p. 116). The feminization of green voting has been also found in the Finnish *Vihreä liitto* (Green league), where Saarinen et al. (2018) found, again, that women are likelier green voters, but also found voters of the Greens to be highly educated, although employed in various sectors. This is emblematic of two trends: that the better-educated and those having more flexible skills fare better in globalized labor markets, therefore being more likely to also espouse post-materialist values, and that the traditional class divide is losing strength, as the economic position and employment become worse predictors of voting behavior.

The data by Saarinen et al. also shows that green voters tend to live in urban or suburban areas. This is a finding that has been replicated across the continent (Whitley et al., 2021; Dolezal, 2010; Grant & Tilley, 2019; Hooghe et al., 2010). The new urbanites usually espouse GAL values and are armed with flexible skills more likely to find success in internationalized labor markets. Green parties have been considered niche parties, or quintessential issue owners of environmentalist issues. However, Florence Faucher and Daniel Boy (2018) find that at least

the French Greens (*Europe Ecologie Les Verts)* are not different from other mainstream parties, adopting broader stances on policy issues. Greens in Western Europe seem to have reached a consensus on more government intervention in the economy, while Eastern Greens keep more neoliberal stances on it (Sikk & Andersen, 2009; van Haute, 2016), mirroring general trends on macroeconomic policy between the regions. Western Greens are economically more left-wing, while also becoming more like mainstream parties. Eastern Greens, on the other hand, maintain more right-wing economic policies, while also emphasizing environmental issues more.

Similar developments have occurred in other Green parties that have gained seats in parliaments. Jae-Jae Spoon and Christopher Williams (2021, p. 817) looked at "what explains when 'new politics' parties take on 'old politics' issues", finding that Green parties tend to emphasize economic issues when two conditions are fulfilled: first when unemployment is high, and second when radical left parties are weak or non-existent. This finding is based on data from both Western and Eastern Green parties, and therefore has implications for both regions. This finding of competition within left-wing parties ought to be considered along with data showing Green success as a form of protest voting (Vasilopoulos & Demertzis, 2013). In the Greek political context, a spike in Green party support occurred due to protest voting against *both* poles of the political spectrum, making Green success stem from short-lived dissatisfaction with mainstream parties (Vasilopoulos & Demertzis, 2013). Zack Grant and James Tilley (2019) have also explained some variation that has been present in Green parties' success. Their data supports a post-materialist view on Green voting: material wealth and economic growth predict higher Green vote shares, as do tangible environmental issues. Although in different contexts, the presence and importance of tangible environmental issues are consistently mentioned in the literature (Spoon & Williams, 2021; Vasilopoulos & Demertzis, 2013), and this explanation of the perceived importance of environmentalism also helps explain the growth and importance of environmentalist movements in the late Soviet sphere, as some studies on the region have found (Vogt, 2004).

In contrast to Western and Northern Europe, Green parties in CEE have either "lost" in competition for party members against less explicitly environmentalist organizations (Agarin, 2009), or lost momentum after the transition (Sikk & Andersen, 2009). Other Eastern Greens have found success in either joining electoral coalitions, or have formed electoral alliances (Pearson & Rüdig, 2020). Some Green parties in CEE have notably joined alliances with right-wing parties, making an all-European categorization of the Greens elusive on the traditional left-right spectrum. However, the Green vote is still focused on a narrow segment of voters

(Hooghe et al., 2010). Greens entering coalitions and alliances with other parties can also be seen as a survival strategy, rather than a primarily ideologically motivated choice. The coalitions have been, as in Hungary, defined by the globalization divide, where the Greens have placed themselves among the pro-globalization (or rather, anti-populist) blocs. The overall absence of left-wing economics in CEE can help explain the electoral alliances between Greens and right-wing parties.

Eastern Greens have underperformed electorally when compared to Western Greens (see Figure 1). It is important to note the different phases of Eastern Greens' development: a peak after transition, related to environmentalists' links to independence movements (1990-1995); the disappearance of environmentalism when neoliberal economic thought took over (1995-2010), and; resurfacing as niche parties after economic situation stabilized, a threshold of material wealth was achieved, while climate change became a mainstream political issue in Europe, and the globalization divide becomes a defining feature of European politics (2010-). At the same time, the Western Greens have increased the overall level of support as the globalization divide embedded itself into the traditional cleavages more strongly.

Explanations based on the demand side certainly account for some of the variation in the electoral results of Green parties. However, seeing how Green voters, on average, look the same across the continent, a question remains whether there is a difference in Green *parties* between regions. Why are the electoral results so different when the political conflict exists in both regions, and the voter base with similar values is present across regions? Finding the role of party policies on Green electoral results is a logical step in explaining the variation. This thesis aims to answer just this question, and by doing so, contributes to the literature on the globalization divide by establishing new knowledge on the role of Green parties in it. Earlier research has focused chiefly on the role of voters in the electoral results of Green parties. Little empirical knowledge has focused on parties. As Emilie van Haute (2016) says:

> *Therefore, there is still work to be done in terms of comparative analysis of Green parties' ideological positioning, of the level of congruence among Green parties or the evolution of policy positioning over time and the impact of electoral performances and participation to power on programmatic evolutions over time.* (p. 3)

Figure 1

Election results of European Green parties.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

2.6 Research question, hypothesis, and variables

The development of environmentalism and Green parties in Europe paints a picture in which regional differences between Eastern and Western Europe stand out as potential sources of difference between party policies. The narrative in the West is straightforward: traditional parties have failed to fill the emerging space of political conflict that has appeared because of globalization, and new parties have risen, using social activism as a springboard, to fill the gap. In the East, the narrative is complicated by the regional experience. Compared to Western Europe, nationalism and democracy have taken on different connotations, and party structures have taken a different shape. While post-communist Europe has inherited much of the prominent economic thinking from Western Europe, those political ideologies were adapted to better serve national and regional interests. Because European Green parties have developed in different ideological spaces, the same forms of economic thinking have had different results. In formulating a research question, Donatella Della Porta and Michael Keating (2008, p. 29) guide a positivist study to first begin with a research question derived from a theory that postulates "some expected state of affairs or causal relationship and [is] empirically falsifiable". The research question, following literature on environmentalism in Europe and the globalization divide, is as follow*s: What are the effects of policy positions of European Green*

parties on their varying electoral result? As described above, explanations of Green voters are numerous and show robust results. This research question approaches, essentially, the same issue from a different point of view.

Based on the different origins, histories, and trajectories of environmentalism between two European regions, the hypothesis follows from the development of European environmentalism, research on contemporary Green parties, and the globalization divide: *Economic policy positions of European Green parties explain their varying electoral results.* The Green stance on political globalization is supportive across the board, but their stance on economic globalization seems to differ. In Western Europe, Green parties were purposeful offshoots of new social movements aiming to fill a demand for the values of post-materialist generations. In contrast, the development of environmentalism in post-communist Europe into political parties is associated with a deep societal shock, uncertainty, and economic downturn. The collapse of support during the transitions from communism and democracy, and between transformation from popular movement and into a political party is now taken to be related to the failure of a cadre of environmental activists to adopt broader policy stances. The expectations and hypothesis that are derived follow the results of earlier research. There are two main differences, however, when compared to earlier research: first, the focus is on a supply-side explanation, and second, there is a comparative framework between Western and Eastern Green parties.

The hypothesis is related to GAL values and the globalization divide. While the left-right placement of Green parties varies across regions, their voter bases share similar values. Green voters are likely among the winners of globalization, and Green parties support European integration. The hypothesized difference in economic stances, however, partly stems from the context in which market economies were imported into CEE. Economic growth came to be the paramount goal in CEE after 1989, and neoliberal capitalism was the answer the West had to offer. Incentivizing businesses and emphasizing individual freedom have been successful macroeconomic policies for catching up to the West economically, but the connection between capitalism and freedom on one hand, and government intervention and communism on the other, have resulted in the contrast of GAL voters being economically right-wing in CEE, while left-wing in the West. The hypothesized difference between regions should, then, be most clearly seen in the economic policy positions of the Greens. Either Eastern Greens focus less on the economy, or they choose different policy positions on economic issues when compared to Western Greens.

Green parties are regularly defined as niche or single-issue parties (Adams et al., 2006). It is necessary to follow a definition of what a niche party constitutes. Meyer and Miller (2015, p. 260) propose a minimal definition: "a niche party emphasizes policy areas neglected by its competitors". This is the definition used in this thesis. Using a minimal definition accomplishes three goals: first, it should ensure that no ecological parties are discounted from an already limited pool of cases, and second, with it, parties that emphasize environmental issues are selected from the dataset, and third, there is a correspondence with the definition of a party family used in the CMP dataset.

3 Methods and data

The research design is framed as large-N quantitative research. It comprises a comparative statistical analysis of Green parties' economic policies between two European regions, the East, and the West. This approach also implies a positivist standpoint. Large-N refers to a large number of cases (143) that are analyzed. "The extensive coverage of countries allows for stronger inferences and theory-building since a given relationship can be demonstrated to exist within a greater degree of certainty" (Landman, 2008, p. 53). As opposed to, for example, a qualitative case study, the phenomenon analyzed is expressed as numerical values. Here, the values of both variables are expressed in percentages: the percentage of a given manifesto that is coded with a certain category, and the percentage of votes a party has gained in a national parliamentary election. The distributions of these values are analyzed statistically to find whether a correlation exists between them, and relying on theory, a causal relationship is argued to exist. Statistical analysis is well-suited here because the aim is to shed more light on an aspect of the globalization divide. This time-series data measures the development of party policies through their manifestos over time. This allows for an investigation into the long-term policy positions of Green parties, which can be used to better determine their relation to the globalization divide over time. Trends in political conflicts will be visible only over time.

Political parties publish electoral manifestos to communicate their policy positions to the public. Therefore, an analysis of manifestos acts as a proxy for the policy positions of parties. Electoral manifestos are intensely scrutinized within parties and are the products of consensus within them. "Every statement in them is 'intended' politically" (Volkens et al., 2013, p. 2), and therefore, the statements recorded in electoral manifestos are understood here as expressions of party policy positions. Different measurements and indexes of policy positions, like left-right placement, or other tools for placing parties in a common space appear from the practice of coding electoral manifestos over time with a codebook that stays (for the most part) constant. Compared to traditional survey data or expert questionnaires, the strength of manifesto data is in its ability to create and measure a political space that does not rely on an *a priori* scale, as is the case with left-right measurements (Zulianello, 2014). Instead, manifesto data can be used to generate measurements of political space that emerge from the data after the fact. An analysis of policy positions that would rely on a readymade scale would limit the explanatory power of the data. Especially in the case of a relatively new political

conflict, as is the case with the globalization divide, *a priori*-assumptions that are based on traditional divides might lead the analysis astray.

The units of analysis are the electoral manifestos of Green parties. Measuring them through expressed policy positions provides valid indicators (Muhammad, 2020; Gemenis, 2013). The analysis uses the percentage value of economic codes to predict electoral results. It is taken as a given in the analysis that the statements in each manifesto are, first, true expressions of policy positions, and second, that they are coded correctly. Violating the first assumption generates random error, which would "dampen" the causal relationships present in the data (King et al., 1994). Violating the second assumption generates systematic error, which can be more difficult to deal with in statistical analysis. Fortunately, the CMP database employs measures to assess coder reliability (see annex) (Volkens et al., 2013). The data used in this analysis has been assessed to be reliable. The random error present in the data, however, merely causes the relationships in the data to trend toward zero, meaning that the strength of the correlation is weakened. The presence of error in the dataset overall does not prevent valid and reliable measurement, and the inferences drawn from it are expected to be correct, even if they are "dampened".

One of the most common tools for quantitative analysis in political science is linear regression (Hardy, 1993; Landman, 2008). Assuming an existing level of familiarity with it, some basic aspects of it will be specified to illustrate its use in the analysis. Regression is a statistical tool to find whether a correlation exists between two values. Since, as the adage goes, correlation does not equal causation, theories are used to help explain what the connection between values means. Here, in a framework of the globalization divide, a statistically determined connection between some aspect of an economic policy and electoral results– a correlation between two values – is then interpreted in the framework of the globalization divide to mean something in the real world; an inference will be drawn. The slope of the regression line can either be positive or negative. Whether a coefficient has a negative or positive value tells whether the relationship between the values is positive or negative, or in other words, whether the increase in one value correlates with the increase or decrease of the other.

Important considerations in terms of the usage of linear regression here relate to the dummy variable. "Dummy variables can be used in time-series regressions to capture regional or subgroup differences" (Hardy, 1993, p. 82). A single dummy variable, a qualitatively determined group variable, can also be understood as a measurement of a difference in means between two groups (Hardy, 1993). Here, the dummy variable is a dichotomous group between

Eastern and Western Greens (0 = East, 1 = West). It evaluates whether a difference exists between the groups. Because a single dummy variable only measures a difference in means, the information that can be drawn from it is limited. Running separate regressions on both regions would provide more nuance in the results, but the small number of Eastern Green cases prevents that possibility. Therefore, the regression model is employed as a single model with all European Green parties from both regions included. It is, nevertheless, possible to use the dummy variable to detect a difference between the groups and find whether region is a significant predictor.

3.1 Data

This thesis uses data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2013) – a dataset consisting of party manifestos from 1945 on. Its latest update was published in 2021, which is the version of the dataset used here (Volkens et al., 2021). The CMP might be the most popular dataset that is used to measure the policies of political parties (Zulianello, 2014). The core of CMP consists of hand-coded electoral manifestos with a consistent codebook over time to create data that allows measuring changes in policies of parties over time (Merz, Regel & Lewandowski., 2016; Volkens et al., 2013). The collection of codes focuses on democratic states. Its coding is done by country experts who are native speakers of the languages particular manifestos are written in. Coding makes up the entire text of a party's electoral program – bar preambles and headlines – and is done on the level of "quasi-sentences", which is a "single statement". A statement can "contain more than one quasi sentence, but… can never span over more than one grammatical sentence" (Manifesto Project Database, n.d). A quasi-sentence is meant to convey a single argument or idea (Volkens et al., 2013). Coding is done according to a single consistent codebook, which divides each quasi-sentence into one of 56 categories. Of particular interest for this thesis are the 16 categories used for economic policy and the single code for environmental and Green policies. Electoral results are attached to the data of a given manifesto, election, and year.

CMP data offers consistent measurements of parties' electoral programs over time and across countries, therefore allowing for testing of changes in the policies among Green parties and for assessing the link between these changes and the electoral results of European Greens over time. "…[P]arty programmes constitute the major planning documents in our society" (Volkens et al., 2013, p. 22), and "treating words as data enables the use of conventional methods of statistical analysis…" (Benoit et al., 2009, p. 495). Party manifestos are

traditionally the tools with which parties communicate their policy positions to the public. By analyzing these documents and applying consistent coding over time, a measurement of changes in policies emerges. The manifesto data includes data from parties in elections it considers "significant". This means that the dataset includes only parties that have gained at least one seat in parliament, or two in CEE, are included. Exceptions exist.

CMP data could not easily be replaced by any other dataset to test this thesis' argument. A dataset comprising data on the policies of parties is the most suitable choice for it. Research on voter preference explaining aspects of Green parties and their electoral results is abundant (e.g., Fábián, 2014; Hooghe et al., 2010; Grant & Tilley, 2019). There are fewer studies on the differences and effects of party policies on electoral results– partly due to a lack of data. It should also bear attention that often Manifesto data has been used for either frequency analysis or its right-left index (Merz et al., 2016). This thesis applies neither. A frequency analysis of some twenty countries would require extensive language skills. In practice, this would reduce usable data to a handful of countries at best. Given that the argument of this thesis focuses on the differences between European Green parties between regions, and the already limited amount of data available, frequency analysis is not possible. It has been further shown that CMP's right-left index does not work well for parties in CEE (Mölder, 2016), ruling out its usage. It should be noted, however, that a statistical approach is not unusual. Benoit et al. (2009) note that linear regression might be one of the most popular applications of Manifesto data alongside frequency analysis and its modular indexes.

Manifesto data differs from more traditional survey data. First, instead of a sample, the data can be considered as the entire population (Volkens et al., 2013). Contrarily to surveys that aim to generate insights into a population by sampling a part of it, Manifesto data includes all manifestos for the selected countries and time periods. A self-imposed limitation on the data is, however, the project's definition of what a significant party is, but the CMP project does not claim to have any insights on policies of parties not included in the dataset, in contrast to the ambitions of survey data. Second, the data is not recorded on self-reported or assigned scales, for example, a scale ranging from 1 to 5 indicating the importance of a given claim or policy area. Instead, the data consists of two parts: the coded quasi-sentences and a percentage value corresponding to the number of times a code is assigned to a statement.

In doing statistical analysis of data that has been hand-coded with varying agreement between coders across the whole dataset on pieces of text that might not accurately communicate the party's *true* policy position (Benoit et al., 2009), uncertainty in the analysis will always remain. A quantitative analysis cannot consider some of the error that stems from,

for example, issues of data collection or compromise among party officials. The chain from an idea in a party official's mind to a coded value in an analyst's dataset is long and complicated.[2] This analysis does not implement any uncertainty estimates, which should be considered a limitation. At the same time, while it is important to take note of limitations, the data and analysis done here should be treated as broadly informative even without accounting for error. The potential error found by Benoit et al. (2009) is small and is not expected to have a substantial effect on the results, nor would an alternative dataset easily replace the analysis done with the CMP data.

The Manifesto dataset and its codebook date to before the emergence and rise of Green parties in Europe. Therefore, it would have been impossible for the coding scheme to consider the new issues that the Greens and other New Left parties have brought to the fore in the European political scene (van Haute, 2016). New codes have been introduced as a result, although the overall goal of CMP has been to not change the coding scheme to better allow time-series analysis (Volkens et al., 2013). CEE-specific codes have been introduced in the dataset, which functions as subcategories of the "main" codes. For this analysis, these subcodes have been merged with the main categories to keep codes between regions more comparable. No analysis is done on the CEE-specific codes alone.

3.2 Case selection

Cases were selected based on geography, history, and availability of data. While the CMP dataset includes data points from across the world, only European parties are included in the analysis. Parties are chosen based on criteria set up by Grant and Tilley (2019, p.502), who take "Green parties to be all those parties subscribing to a political ideology which primarily emphasizes the importance of ecological sustainability and environmentalist principles beyond traditional materialist principles". Parties are then grouped according to the region: West for European Green parties in countries that have not had communist rule in the past, and East for ones that have a period of communist rule in the past. The literature agrees that the two regions are distinct but comparable. There can be multiple manifestos attached to a single election, for example, if a Green party is split into two, and both splinter parties gain votes in the same elections (see Annex for examples). Altogether, the analysis includes 163 manifestos from 28 countries, spanning from 1983 to 2021. Of this total, Western cases total 141 manifestos, and

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[2] See Benoit et al. (2009), Figure 1, for a visual representation of this process.

Eastern cases – 22. The regression analysis drops cases due to missing values, bringing the total cases in it down to 143. Of note is Germany, which includes two cases from the 1990 parliamentary election in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). These two cases are coded as East in the analysis, which is timed to the 1990 general elections in GDR, the first elections considered free and competitive in the country. Cases from post-unification Germany are coded as West. The dataset also includes manifestos and elections from the Federal Republic of Germany, which are coded as West. The categorization between East and West emerges from the literature. To clarify, the two manifestos from GDR are not a third category between East and West, as one might be mistaken reading Figure 2. Rather, the "mix" category in it refers to German elections, two of which are coded as East, while the rest are coded as West.

The globalization divide should have effects on all economies that take part in global supply chains, but the guiding question of this thesis is explaining varying success among *European* Green parties. A comparison between European regions, then, ensures that the analysis keeps the compared categories as comparable as possible (Lowndes, Marsh & Stoker, 2017). The number of cases in Europe is higher, and Green parties are, primarily, a European phenomenon. Limiting the analysis to European Green parties further ensures that the analysis considers only cases that have had similar, or interlinked, developments. As the literature shows, the regional experiences and trajectories of Green parties are different between the post-communist Greens and Green parties in Western and Northern Europe. From this lens, a categorization between the East and the West becomes a promising way of measuring the varying electoral results of Green parties. Most Green parties are European and have similarities. This categorization further corresponds with the absolute vote results of Green parties, as shown in Figure 1. The CMP dataset is a popular tool for measuring policy positions (Volkens et al., 2014; Merz et al., 2016; Zulianello, 2014). This makes it an attractive choice as the source of data for this thesis.

CMP data sometimes includes cases that are not "pure" electoral manifestos. The dataset includes estimates of manifestos based on earlier elections and policy positions, manifestos from party blocs, and joint electoral programs in cases where it is not possible to include a single electoral manifesto from a single party in a single election. To reduce uncertainty, and for clarity of the model, the analysis excludes estimates of manifestos and averages of electoral coalitions. Included are programs of single parties, joint programs of two or more parties (to include electoral coalitions between Greens and other parties, prominent especially in CEE), general party programs, and party bloc programs.

As van Haute (2016, p. 3) points out, datasets have not systematically gathered information on Green parties, perhaps because of their lack of electoral relevance. While the number of cases is certainly enough for a statistical model like the one used here, the lack of data on Green parties in CEE must be noted as a limitation. For example, a separate model for CEE is out of the question in this analysis purely due to the lack of cases.

Figure 2

Countries and elections included in analysis

Note. Numbers show number of elections included from a given country.

Germany includes two manifestos from the 1990 general election in GDR. These manifestos are coded as East. Other German elections are coded as West. There is no third category.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

3.3 Variables

The economic policy positions of Green parties are the independent variable. Based on the literature, Green voters maintain similar social and cultural values across regions (Dolezal,

2010; Saarinen et al., 2018), and the parties' staunchly pro-globalization stances in the political sphere. Therefore, differences in policy positions are expected to be visible primarily in economics. Electoral results is the dependent variable. What is tested here is a possible cause of varying electoral results. It is predictable, then, that the dependent variable is a measurement of election results. There is a choice between types of elections, however. Here, lower house parliamentary elections are considered, which corresponds to choices made by earlier researchers on Green parties (Grant & Tilley, 2019) that have done analyses comparing them on the level of countries. The regression includes a dummy variable, through which the varying results of Green parties are tested. This is the tool that allows for an answer to whether the policies of Green parties are linked with their varying electoral results. By testing whether the east-west placement is a significant predictor of electoral results *in this model* that measures economic policies, a distinction can be made whether the economic policy positions of Green parties predict varying electoral results. The regression also includes a control variable – environmental protection.

As mentioned earlier, niche parties emphasize a policy area that is underrepresented by other parties (Meyer & Miller, 2015). Environmental policy is taken to be a key aspect of Green electoral results. The logic with which the control variable is included is virtually the same as with most regression models using survey data: "usual suspects" exist that can be expected to be strong predictors of behavior, like age, education, or gender. In this case, because the Greens are conceptualized as niche parties emphasizing environmentalism, environmental policy is expected to be a strong predictor of Green parties' electoral results. The regression model would not be complete without the inclusion of this variable.

3.4 Operationalization

To assess whether the policies of Green parties can explain varying electoral results across European regions, the independent variable is operationalized as the 16 economic indicators present in the Manifesto data. All available data from the CMP dataset is used to measure as many aspects as possible of it. The values of the independent variables are percentage values showing the proportion of a manifesto dedicated to a given category. The dependent variable is operationalized through electoral results in lower house parliamentary elections, which are recorded in the CMP dataset for each manifesto and election. The values for electoral results are percentage values, as the values for independent variables. Both variables are recorded in the CMP dataset. In the dataset, an election refers to a lower house

parliamentary election. The unit of analysis, then, is an electoral manifesto, which is normally connected to a parliamentary election. The 16 indicators follow.

Statements coded as "free market economy" stand for favorable mentions in party programs of free markets and free market capitalism as an economic model; "incentives" includes favorable mentions of supply-side economics – assistance to businesses as opposed to consumers; "market regulation" includes statements that aim at regulating markets to create fair competition; "economic planning" includes statements of long-term economic planning; "corporatism/mixed economy" includes statements of economic tripartite cooperation; "protectionism", positive and negative, includes statements either favoring or shunning protection of internal markets by any country; "economic goals" includes statements of general economic goals not related to other categories; "Keynesian demand management" includes statements of demand side policies – compare to "incentives"; "economic growth" includes positive statements for economic growth; "tech and infrastructure" includes statements of modernization of industry, transport and communication; "controlled economy" includes statements of support for government control of economy; "nationalization" includes statements of nationalizing, or maintaining state ownership of industries, partial or complete; "economic orthodoxy" includes statements of balancing state budgets and support for traditional economic institutions; "Marxist analysis" includes statements of Marxist-Leninist ideology and use of Marxist terminology, and; "anti-growth economy" includes statements advocating for anti-growth economic policies – compare to "economic growth".

A quantitative analysis often is "data-driven" (Landman, 2008), although it should avoid letting the method direct the analysis (King et al., 1994). Some conceptual and theoretical attention should be given to maximize validity and reliability. Valid indicators accurately capture a concept, and reliable measures do so repeatedly. The independent variable's operationalization as 16 economic indicators is valid, and in fact, measures the same concept from many different angles. The reliability of this indicator depends on coder reliability (see Annex for coder test results). The tests employed by the manifesto project do constitute a sufficient test of reliability. The coder test is a comparison of an individual coder's work and a master copy.

4 Analysis

The analysis suggests two main things. First, that some economic policies are significant predictors of electoral results, and second, that there is a difference between the economic policies of Green parties between the two regions. Figures 2-5 describe the dependent variable and show a difference between the Greens' regional approaches to economic policy. The regression analysis suggests that some economic policies are significant predictors of Green electoral results.

For clarity, a brief overview of the other main labels and values used in the graphs (Figure 2 – Figure 6) will be given. The vertical y-axis in the density plots measures, predictably, density. Here, the values of the y-axis are not as important. Instead, density can be thought of as unit probability. The higher on the y-axis the curve goes, the more probable it is that a code is mentioned in a manifesto. These graphs are, thus, used to compare regional policy positions. Although density is a somewhat more complicated concept compared to an absolute count of values, it is better to visualize the information with density, rather than an absolute count of codes at each value of the x-axis, because the amount of data between regions is uneven. No matter the code, Eastern Greens will have fewer absolute codes in all categories, because there are fewer cases in the East. By measuring codes with density, the distribution of codes in manifestos between the regions is visualized more effectively. The x-axis is the percentage value of either a single code or multiple codes together. Which codes are used are specified in the portions of the analysis devoted to a specific figure. In short, one can find the highest peak of a curve, draw a straight line down that intercepts the x-axis and find that any given manifesto has y probability to devote x percentage of the manifesto to a code or codes.

4.1 Independent variables

All graphs show in percentages how many different combinations of economic codes Green manifestos in the East and West use. For example, in Figure 3, Western Greens' total sentences coded as any economic code peak around 18%. This means that the mean Western Green manifesto devotes roughly 18% of its manifesto to the economy. Figure 3 includes all 16 economic indicators present in the CMP database, thus giving an image of the total proportion of Green manifestos that are devoted to the economy as a policy area. The reader should also note the different values to which the x-axis of the figures extends in different figures. This is a stylistic choice to increase readability. Cutoff points for the x-axis are always

at values where the density is close to approaching zero or already there. The choice requires attention on the reader's part but does not distort the analysis.

Western Greens present more of a consensus on economic issues, while Eastern Greens most likely either devote less than 10% or more than 20% of manifestos to the economy. There is a significant difference in Eastern Greens' economic stances. Mean mentions of the economy are almost identical between regions (Western mean = 18.4; Eastern mean = 18.2), but the two peaks of Eastern economic mentions are notable. In terms of economic policy, there appear to be different subcategories within the Eastern Greens: one more like the archetypal niche party focusing almost solely on the environment, and a second, technology and free market-focused environmentalist party (Sikk & Andersen, 2009). In other words, alongside the Eastern left-libertarian parties that the Greens are expected to be (Kriesi et al., 2008), Figure 3 suggests the existence of Eastern Greens of another type, more along with the archetypal environmental niche parties (Meyer & Miller, 2015). There could be multiple explanations for the two peaks. First, some Eastern Greens might primarily focus on two issues – the environment and the economy. However, the theoretical framework used here does not support such a view. Figure 6 shows an increase on the y-axis toward the right-hand edge of the figure. There are at least a few Eastern Green parties in some elections that dedicate up to 50% of their manifesto to the environment. Second, the relative over-emphasis on the economy might be a result of adaptation to prevailing political rhetoric or an ongoing economic crisis. In the framework of the globalization divide, this explanation seems more likely. If in the East, neoliberal economics is tied to both economic growth and democracy, even a niche party might find it difficult not to accept the economic consensus.

This is as opposed to Western Greens, which have reached a consensus on the economy. In terms of economic globalization, the data on the Western Greens suggests a firm stance. This result is supported by other results in the analysis, as well as this thesis's theoretical foundation. Niche parties are, almost by definition, electorally less successful. Their emphasis on otherwise under-emphasized policy areas is the reason for their existence, and the importance of that policy area to a niche audience is the key to their electoral survival. By emphasizing the economy more, given that a manifesto has limited space, the environment gets proportionally less emphasis. It should be expected (see Table 1) that a party that emphasizes the environment less becomes more electorally successful. At the same time, the "nicheness" of a party disappears; as a Green party emphasizes the environment less, it ceases to focus on a policy area that is under-emphasized by other parties.

Figure 3

Total mentions of the economy in Green party manifestos.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

Figure 4 includes positive mentions of government intervention in the economy. This is a joint measure of seven economic codes from the CMP database. These include positive mentions of market regulation, economic planning, corporatism/mixed economy, economic goals, Keynesian demand management, controlled economy, and nationalization. All these codes involve, in one way or another, states intervening in free markets to change their outcomes toward a result that is more favorable to an entity – government or a category of people – that is not the market. The aim of combining these indicators is to create an overall measurement of positive mentions of government intervention in the economy. This combined with a collection of free market-focused indicators in Figure 5 gives an image of the different economic policies that Western and Eastern Green parties maintain.

Western Greens emphasize the need for government intervention in economies more than the Eastern Greens. The curve is not as smooth as the one visualizing total mentions of economy, with two smaller peaks within the major peak visible. The Western mean stands at 6.0, while the Eastern mean is at 6.9. The higher mean of Eastern Greens is explained by the gentle slope of the curve, while the Western curve is steeper. The slopes, again, show a higher degree of consensus among the Western Greens, as the variation in their mentions of government intervention is both more likely, and the distribution is more concentrated around a single point. Eastern Greens mention government intervention less and do have a similar

consensus as to the Western Greens. The peak of the Eastern distribution comes at a lower value on the x-axis, showing that most likely a given Eastern Green manifesto will emphasize government intervention in the economy less than its Western counterpart. At the lower ends of probability, however, an Eastern Green manifesto will become more likely to emphasize government intervention, perhaps already by virtue that hardly any Western Green manifestos extend their emphasis to similar proportions.

Figure 4

Mentions of government intervention in Green manifestos.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

Figure 5 includes four different codes for positive mentions of free markets. This collection of codes includes positive mentions of supply-side economics, the free market, economic growth, and economic orthodoxy. These codes involve economic restraint shown by the state and an ideological view that aims to let market economies balance themselves out over time. Note that the number of codes in the free market measurement is lower, which also helps to explain the lower overall proportion of mentions in manifestos.

Western Greens do not give much attention to free markets. The mean of Western Green free market mentions is 2.8, while in comparison Eastern Greens emphasize the free market more, with a mean of 3.6. Again, the results show a stronger consensus among Western Green

parties. The Western distribution is heavily concentrated on one point, while the opposite is true of the Eastern Greens. Two peaks of probability are visible for the Eastern Greens, even if barely, and the overall distribution is wider. A wider distribution shows more variation in the way Eastern Greens talk about the free market. At the lower end of probability for Western Greens, a given Eastern Green manifesto is, again, more likely to mention free markets than a Western manifesto, and again, the greater likelihood of Eastern emphasis occurs at an intersection with a steep Western downward slope. As the likelihood of a Western manifesto mentioning free markets decreases, the probability of an Eastern mention becomes greater in comparison.

The first peak of Eastern mentions occurs at roughly the same point on the x-axis. There could be a subcategory of Eastern Greens that emphasizes the free market almost equally to the Western Greens. However, it is more likely that an Eastern Green party will emphasize the free market more than its Western counterpart. This time, while the Eastern downward slope comes at a greater value on the x-axis, it is steeper, and at roughly 10% of space devoted to the free market, both Western and Eastern manifestos approach zero probability.

Figure 5

Mentions of free markets in Green manifestos.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

Figure 6 visualizes mentions of the single code devoted to environmental and Green policies in the CMP dataset. As mentioned above, the CMP codebook was created before Green parties entered national political scenes in Europe, which could be argued to be visible in the number of mentions this single code garners. Myriad policies are simply labeled as green or environmental. While it would be more beneficial for this thesis to break this indicator into smaller pieces, for example dividing between "green" and "brown" (Tietenberg & Folmer, 2000) environmental issues, the analysis must make do with the single environmental code.

In this case, Green manifestos in both the East and the West have consensuses. However, the Western mean mentions sit at 17.5 and the Eastern mean at 22.0. In Figure 6, because the distributions of both regions are narrower, the means are also more illustrative of the overall probability of environmental mentions between regions than they are with the other density plots. Western mentions peak at a lower x-axis value than the Eastern ones. Eastern Green manifestos are more likely to emphasize environmental issues than their Western counterparts. A given Eastern manifesto will probably emphasize the environment more than a Western one. The downward slope of the Western Greens is gentler and has more curves. The consensus among Western Greens on environmental mentions is weaker. As the probability of an Eastern manifesto emphasizing the environment rapidly decreases, a Western Green manifesto will, for some values on the x-axis, become more likely to emphasize the environment more. At the same time, at the extreme edge of Figure 6, the probability of an Eastern manifesto mentioning the environment rises again, albeit only somewhat. A look into the dataset shows that the Eastern manifestos coded as environmental protection more than 50% come from two Croatian cases in the 1990 elections, in which two ecological parties competed. Both cases are coded on electoral manifestos meant for these specific elections. They are genuine cases, rather than problems in the dataset. At the same time, the peak cannot be taken as an indicator of a broader trend, because it stems from a single country and a single election.

Figure 6

Mentions of environmental protection in Green manifestos.

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

4.2 Regression model

Table 1 shows the regression results. It consists of a dependent variable – electoral results in lower house parliamentary elections expressed as a percentage value; independent variables – codes which manifesto statements were given, also expressed as percentages, but of the total codes in a manifesto; coefficients – slopes of the fitted straight line in the linear regression, which shows the direction of the relationship; observations – the number of cases included in the model; the adjusted R2 value – a value indicating model fit, quantifying the amount of variation the model can explain, which is adjusted to take into consideration statistical noise that would otherwise artificially increase the value and give an appearance of better model fit, and finally; the p-value, which is an expression of the probability of the alternative hypothesis being correct. Coefficients marked with a star or stars (*) indicate independent variables that are considered statistically significant. Conventionally having a p-value less than 0.05 is seen as a crucial marker for choosing the alternative hypothesis, which corresponds to a less than 5% chance of the alternative hypothesis being false. Here, the alternative hypothesis is that the policy positions of Green parties affect electoral results.

Regression results show that some economic policies do predict electoral results and that in the economic model region is a significant predictor of electoral results. The regression also suggests, that the more a Green manifesto emphasizes the free market, the better the party does electorally. Conversely, the more it mentions government intervention, the worse it does electorally. The region dummy variable simply shows that there is a difference in means between the two regions, but this model hints at a difference in economic policies between regions. If the region predicts electoral results, and some economic policies predict it too, there should be a difference in the economic policies. The more a Green manifesto mentions environmental protection, the *worse* its electoral results are. The adjusted R2-value, 0.233, indicates a good model fit. The model can explain 23.3% of the variance.

"Incentives" refers to positive mentions of supply-side economics, including incentives for starting businesses. There is a statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and positive correlation between the proportion of positive mentions of incentives and electoral results. As positive mentions of incentives increase by one unit, electoral results increase by 0.594 units. "Economic planning" refers to mentions of long-term economic planning, including policy plans and strategies. There is a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and negative correlation between economic planning and electoral results. As positive mentions of economic planning increase by one unit, electoral results decrease by 0.64 units. "Keynesian demand management" refers to positive mentions of demand-side economics, including economic policies that aim to increase public demand or increase social expenditure. There is a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and negative correlation between Keynesian demand management and electoral results. As positive mentions of Keynesian demand management increase by one unit, electoral results decrease by 0.523 units. There is a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) and negative correlation between positive mentions of "environmental protection" and electoral results. As positive mentions of environmental protection increase by one unit, electoral results decrease by 0.076 units. Finally, the region dummy variable also has a statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and positive correlation with electoral results. As the east-west variable increases by one unit, that is, from East to West, electoral results increase by 2.527 units. The model predicts that Western Greens are electorally more successful, and the dummy variable also predicts different economic policies between Western and Eastern Greens.

Table 1

Regression results

	Dependent variable:
	Electoral results(%)
Free market economy	-0.314
	(0.443)
Incentives	**0.594****
	(0.204)
Market regulation	0.087
	(0.104)
Economic planning	**-0.640***
	(0.295)
Corporatism/mixed economy	1.128
	(1.048)
Protectionism: positive	1.115
	(0.788)
Protectionism: negative	0.590
	(0.827)
Economic goals	-0.017
	(0.104)
Keynesian demand management	**-0.532***
	(0.253)
Economic growth	0.220
	(0.169)
Tech and infrastructure	0.074
	(0.099)

Controlled economy	-0.299
	(0.236)
Nationalization	-0.246
	(0.178)
Economic orthodoxy	-0.007
	(0.209)
Marxist analysis	0.471
	(0.503)
Anti-growth economy	0.012
	(0.058)
Environmental protection	**-0.076**[*]
	(0.030)
East-west (ref. = east)	**2.527**[**]
	(0.915)
Constant	3.576[*]
	(1.390)
Observations	143
Adjusted R^2	0.233
Note:	[*]$p<0.05$; [**]$p<0.01$; [***]$p<0.001$

Own work. Data from the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2021).

5 Discussion

5.1 Regression model

Comparing the effects of supply- and demand-side economics, the opposite correlations support each other. It is intuitive that if mentions of incentives to businesses have a positive effect on electoral results, Keynesian economics, focusing on stimulating consumer demand, has a negative correlation. To keep logical coherence, a party cannot support two economic policies that appear mutually exclusive. While in theory it certainly would be possible for a government to support policies both incentivizing businesses and consumer demand at the same time, the codes also stand for opposing theoretical views on political economy. The indicator measuring incentives quantifies Hayekian, free market-focused economic thought, while Keynesian demand management quantifies Keynesian thought, which focuses on stimulating aggregate demand by, for example, maintaining overall employment. In short, the difference between the two can be reduced to whether one believes that market economies are self-correcting, or whether outside forces need to intervene to change their behavior to become more human-centered. It is this difference between non-interference and interference by the state on the economy that causes the two indicators to have opposite correlations. Their directions can be explained by prevailing economic thinking in Europe. As Europe and Green parties have embraced globalization, neoliberal economic maxims have become hegemonic ideas. The openness and freedom of markets are taken for granted. This trend appears stronger in post-communist Europe.

The negative correlation of long-term economic planning is surprising yet cannot be ignored. Its effect is not readily explained by the theory that informs the models. There seems to be no research focusing on this particular aspect of Green economics (nor would it alone provide a solid basis for research). At first sight, long-term economic planning would be a necessary part of green policies as the green transition is implemented. As such, a positive correlation can be explained as voter acceptance of sticking to an economic plan that aims to mitigate climate change. However, when the positive effect of the support of the free market is considered alongside this result, one interpretation suggests that Green parties shy away from restricting personal (economic) freedoms. As Green parties are born from the demand for organized representation of a new generation of social issues, their commitment to social and cultural liberalism is visible in this dataset. Long-term economic planning would include forms of Keynesian economics, where the state plans to intervene in markets to ensure long-term

stability. The negative correlation of economic planning, market incentives, and Keynesian demand management can be manifestations of the same process.

That increased emphasis on environmental protection is a significant predictor of lower electoral results for Green parties is, at first sight, counterintuitive. However, this finding becomes easier to understand when two aspects are considered. As the definition of a niche party can be one that emphasizes a policy area that is under-emphasized by other parties, over-emphasis of a single policy area would drive a niche party to embed itself deeper into its niche. If the voter base of a party is environmentalist, and only environmentalist, chasing those voters can be a logical political strategy, but an ever-larger emphasis on solely the environment might drive away some voters who might otherwise vote for a Green party. This choice would erode the perceived legitimacy of a party, as it becomes unable to propose solutions to increasing amounts of policy areas due to its extreme nicheness or ideological rigidity. The other aspect relates to the data and the type of regression used on it. The dependent variable is quantified and measured as percentage values. This means that it corresponds to the proportion of a manifesto that is devoted to a code. As a proportion, the value a dependent variable takes here is dependent on the amount of all other codes in the manifesto. In other words, the values of predictors affect each other. Also, when considering the unit of analysis – a manifesto – it is difficult to imagine the true relationship to be purely linear. Taking the results to their logical extreme, a green manifesto that either does not, or barely mentions the environment probably would not be as electorally successful as a Green party that devotes (up to a point) a larger part of its manifesto to the environment. Likely, the relationship between environmental protection and electoral results *trends* downward but is an s-curve. The same concept applies to other variables in the regression model as well.

As mentioned above, the region dummy variable shows a difference in means between the two groups. Western Greens are electorally more successful than Eastern Greens. But why is that? In this model, focusing on economic policies, the data suggests that roughly 23% of the difference can be explained by the economic policies of the Greens. The difference in varying electoral results of Green parties can be explained by their economic policies. The data suggest that an increased emphasis on supply-side economics and decreased emphasis on long-term economic planning and demand-side economics is the policy recipe for success. There also seems to be a sweet spot where emphasis on environmental protection gives maximum benefit or at least maintains voter support. However, this is difficult to determine by this analysis because it employs a linear regression. The earlier characterization of the dependent variable shows differences between regions. Western Greens are more likely to emphasize government

intervention in economic policies, while Eastern Greens are more likely to emphasize both the free market and environmental protection. While the economic policy positions of Green parties affect their electoral results, another result suggested by the data is that Eastern Greens are more likely to over-emphasize environmental issues.

5.2 Globalization divide, Green parties, and environmentalism

If Eastern Greens are, due to their national contexts (Kriesi et al., 2008), "trapped" into supporting right-wing economic policies, Eastern Green policy stances might become inconsistent, or overly reliant on trusting technology (Sikk & Andersen, 2009) to solve climate change. The relative emphasis of Western Greens on government intervention in the economy suggests that as the Greens fit themselves more broadly into policy and ideological spaces, a consensus on the need for government intervention in the economy emerges. In terms of the globalization divide, the Eastern Greens are pro-integration, and at least to a degree, promote GAL values. However, in their approach to the economy, they have adopted policies that are informed by prevalent regional economic thinking. This approach is understandable because left-wing economics practically exists only among the remaining Communist parties in post-communist Europe. As the economic transitions became fixated on free markets (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011), and were mixed with sentiments of freedom (Vogt, 2004), building environmental policy became a simpler task if its construction began from accepting unbridled market forces and individual freedom as axioms. If state guidance of markets is unavailable as a policy tool, increasing the efficiency of markets makes sense. Techno-greens (Sikk & Andersen, 2009) as an archetype of Eastern Greens seems to be a correct one.

Differences in economic policies of Green parties might be attributed to either how economic thinking has developed between regions or by the development of Green parties in different party systems and national contexts. The prevailing model of free market economy that was imported into post-communist Europe emphasizes liberalized open markets and balanced state budgets (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2011; Åslund, 2013). After initial shocks in the 1990s, neoliberal economics has been successful in generating economic growth and efficiency. Since the transitions began in the 1990s, post-communist economies have been growing at a faster rate than their Western counterparts – their economies are closing the gap between themselves and Western Europe. Because of this fact, it might be expected that the effect argued for by Spoon and Williams (2021) – that Greens emphasize the economy when unemployment is high, and the radical left is weak or non-existent – might help explain why

Eastern Greens are niche parties. Opposite to unemployment, a more prominent problem in the fast-growing economies of post-communist states has been a lack of labor supply. At the same time, in most Eastern countries included in the dataset, left-wing parties are practically non-existent. In a few, the Communist party keeps a presence, although they rarely have had any national representation. Only one of the conditions is present, leading to an expectation that Eastern Greens do not lean on economic policy. CMP data suggests as much. Eastern Greens emphasize environmental protection more, leaving less overall space for any other policies.

It might be expected that the Green vote will increase as the effects of climate change become tangible to larger sections of voters (Grant & Tilley, 2019). In parallel with the rapid rise of environmentalism in communist-ruled Europe, as the devastation and environmental degradation start to directly influence larger sections of populations, the demand for political action will become louder. The irony in the effects of climate change increasing the Greens' vote share is that by then, implementing the policies advocated by them will be far too late. Both Eastern and Western Greens are, arguably, on a long-term track toward gaining more votes. Their benefit is that environmentalism has found a near-permanent foothold in European politics as climate change inevitably continues and that the Greens are treated as the issue-owners of environmentalism. As parties, they stand to gain from a worsening environmental situation, because they are seen to be the issue owners and specialists on environmentalism (Dolezal, 2010). In this sense, the challenge of Green politics is to create urgency among voters, so that their environmental policies will not be implemented too late.

To continue the parallel, research on the connection between environmentalism and nationalism (Conversi & Hau, 2021; Hamilton, 2002) has taken an important but understudied approach. Due to their position as pro-globalization parties, and due to their origins as a part of the international peace movement, the Greens have not made use of nationalist rhetoric in their political messaging. Instead, some nationalist movements and individuals have mythologized the natural environment and used it as a backdrop for nationalist messaging (Hamilton, 2002). From a Green perspective, employing nationalism is problematic. Nationalism has been described as boundary building (Conversi & Hau, 2021), and as pro-globalization parties, it is difficult for the Greens to employ positive nationalist messaging. Changes in natural environments do not follow national boundaries. Part of the reason Green parties have ended as pro-globalization parties stems from the fact that environmental issues often are wicked policy problems that require a point of view that considers a multitude of different boundaries and creates policy that crosses those boundaries. There are no national solutions to climate change, only global ones. However, an approach to environmentalism that

makes use of nationalist sentiment could provide a way to create urgency among voters by framing environmental issues as local, instead of global. Much of politics, even in the EU, depends on the actions of states.

What makes the neoliberal stance of the (Eastern) Greens difficult is its inability to change the economic structure which is a significant driver of climate change. Political intervention in the economy is a crucial step in mitigating climate change. The reliance of the Eastern Greens on increasing economic efficiency through technological innovations is but one approach in the policy repertoire of the Western Greens. By adhering to free markets, Eastern Greens limit their ability to generate and promote policies that are efficient in mitigating climate change. Ultimately, their lack of electoral results might also be explained not by either their economic stances or lack of voters, but by an inefficient angle at environmental policy, which can lead to a worse perception of Green parties. If their environmental stances begin with a constant free market, the green policies deduced from such a starting point might well end up being so lackluster as to discourage potential voters. How could an environmentalist movement take on climate change, if it does not intervene in economic processes? The Green vote that was, for example, present in Greece as protest voting (Vasilopoulos & Demertzis, 2013) can leak into other new parties that present a more competent alternative to the political status quo. In recent years, other newcomers to the national political stages have risen. For example, pirate parties have seen some results across the continent (Zulianello, 2018) and in the recent French presidential elections, traditional parties did not gain a candidate to the second round. Some traditional parties have reimagined themselves as parties focusing on the globalization divide. As the traditional center-left and center-right politics flounder, space for new contenders becomes increasingly wide. Policy positions of smaller parties surely play a role in taking over that space.

In an Inglehartian sense, the recent economic crises (related to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine), and the subsequent inflation decrease the post-materialism that correlates with a higher level of environmental concerns. As inflation outstrips wage growth and industrial inputs become scarcer, causing the prices of basic goods to rise, voters are expected to shift values toward more immediate, short-term needs. Classic environmental concerns will then drop in importance, as the price of goods increases, and the impact of low wages – and other economic concerns with them – become more salient. Here, however, it is useful to note the distinction made by Tietenberg and Folmer (2000) between "brown" and "green" environmental concerns. "Brown" concerns are about environmental hazards and pollution, thus tracking with the tangible environmental concerns that boost the Green vote, while "green"

concerns are worries over the state of natural habitats and the condition of "the environment" – the ideological underpinning of Green parties. If the prominent environmentalism in a region is brown, the Green vote might be already expected to be low, unless tangible environmental concerns are present. If it is green, however, more immediate concerns would be expected to decrease the Green vote, as post-materialist concerns decrease. If there is no space for an electorate to worry about post-materialist issues, it follows that prominent concerns will instead be materialist ones. Eastern Greens, although already less popular, might be more resilient to economic crises when compared to the Western Greens, if the environmentalism between regions tracks with Tietenberg and Folmer's distinction. In some cases, a niche party can be better suited for survival.

Even though the Greens are often placed as pro-globalization parties (Walter, 2021), these data suggest a more complicated position in the globalization divide. European Green parties have not found consensus in terms of their economics, and earlier research agrees on the wide left-right spectrum present in the party family (van Haute, 2016). The analysis suggests that Western Greens emphasize government intervention more, while Eastern Greens emphasize free markets. More open markets can be seen as a pro-globalization stance, while intervention in markets can be seen as a policy position that aims to limit globalization. In terms of economic policies, Western Greens are less enthusiastic about globalization, and therefore, on a scale between integration and demarcation (Kriesi et al., 2008), should be placed closer to demarcation than Eastern Greens. "At the same time, however, backlashes against one dimension of globalization can go hand in hand with support for more globalization in other areas" (Walter, 2021, p. 4). The Western Greens' relationship with globalization follows a give-and-take pattern. Their position in the globalization divide withdraws from economic globalization, while it promotes political globalization. The Eastern Greens, on the other hand, are more fully pro-globalization parties. Their economics are open to globalization because of neoliberal economic thought's hegemonic position or because of its connection to independence and the return to Europe, while they also retain pro-integration stances toward political globalization.

It is becoming ever clearer that to mitigate climate change, drastic political action is necessary (IPCC, 2022). Green parties in both regions certainly advocate for a swift green transition. Yet, their approaches are different. The axioms from which policies are built might be the root difference between Western and Eastern Greens. In the West, policies are built on green ideology and "green" environmental concerns, while in the East, economic thought takes a significant role alongside environmentalism, and at least historically, "brown"

environmentalism has been more prominent. It might not be correct to characterize all the Greens as solidly pro-globalization, and the types of environmentalism between regions differ. It should also be noted, that while Green parties are treated as the issue owners of environmentalism, the scientific messaging, and the urgency it conveys on climate change is changing the policies of other parties, as well.

As some climate movements embrace a skeptical position on economic globalization (Walter, 2021), Green parties are split on their stance on free markets. It seems that Western Greens are more in line with climate movements that eschew global trade by adopting economic policies that emphasize government intervention in markets more. In this sense, the Eastern Greens' free market stance appears to go against environmentalist civil society. While it does not automatically mean that an interventionist economic stance would guarantee an anti-economic globalization stance, the willingness to intervene in markets at least shows an ideological readiness to acknowledge and act on the negative effects global trade has on the environment. For the Western Greens, the issue of economic globalization becomes intertwined with political integration. Their position on the EU, for example, can logically be expected to be economically reformist, but politically in favor of integration. Eastern Greens seem to be more likely to present a discrepancy between environmentalist civil society on one hand, and the parties and their policies on the other. There might also be differences in environmentalist approaches between civil society organizations. If this is true, the division between environmentalists in the East and West of Europe would be a deep one, indeed. However, this explanation is not the best choice; Green voters are similar across Europe. It would be surprising if the values of two sets of otherwise similar voters differed consistently in this respect. Instead, it is more likely that Eastern Green parties are in tension between their political national contexts, which promote free markets, and voters, who value a more interventive stance.

The success of environmentalism does not depend on Green parties alone. As changes in the environment become increasingly felt locally and the environment as a political issue increases in salience, mainstream parties adopt environmentalist policies. In a globalized context, adopting environmentalist issues can be an especially good political strategy for other leftist and pro-globalization parties. There is no need for an environmental movement if other parties are "green enough" (Kvarnström, 2022). For example, social democratic parties and Greens tend to take similar positions in the globalization divide and compete for similar voters. In the West, whichever of the two generates an "ecosocialism" (Tooze, 2021) palatable to broad audiences will probably be electorally in a more advantageous position. In the East, however,

combining environmentalist and Marxist analysis does not seem promising. Perhaps in the electoral systems of post-communist Europe, greenness is a burden carried primarily by center-right liberals and smaller challenger parties. Where electoral coalitions have recently become more prominent, for example in the Czech Republic and Hungary, environmentalism might be able to play a role in coalition dynamics. Post-communist market liberals might also, in the name of saving the markets, shift toward more environmental positions.

5.3 Limitations and prospects for future research

There are technical concerns that relate to the methodology which amount to random error and should only skew the strength of correlations in the data, not their direction. But it is also questionable whether manifestos are what the dataset claims them to be – authoritative documents describing policy positions. Manifestos might also be thought of as deliberate self-portrayals, or simply advertisements. There probably is some connection between what the policy positions of a party are and what they portray them to be, but there is no guarantee. Because manifestos are made for the public, publishing them is also a process of communicating to the outside world, rather than only reaching an internal consensus on political ideology and strategy. This might be especially true in the case of economic policy, a policy area that sometimes is almost impenetrable for the layperson. There is also nothing stopping a party from writing one thing in its manifesto and doing another if it gains representatives. In fact, a discrepancy between what is written and what is enacted is all but guaranteed. Manifestos are internal compromises, and eventually, a policy enacted is a compromise of compromises. Deliberate rhetoric, or advertising, in methodological terms amounts to systemic error, which is more difficult to deal with. While random error tends to weaken the relationships present in data, systemic error will skew the results and lead analysis to draw incorrect conclusions. In a large-N study, it would be difficult to first show a connection between the policies written in manifestos and the eventual policies enacted for all the manifestos included in the analysis, especially because Green parties sometimes do not gain representatives in national parliaments or are minor coalition partners with little influence.

King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), in their classic work, recognize endogeneity as a frequent problem in social science. The same problem persists in this analysis, and some space should be devoted to discussing it. Regression can only detect a correlation between values, and the direction of causality here is completely reliant on theory. For King et al. (1994, p.185) endogeneity is an issue when "the values of our explanatory variables take on are sometimes a

consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable." Social scientists rarely, if ever, get to control their variables. Therefore, empirically determining the direction of the causal arrow between variables often is still a problem. It can be true that some economic policy positions affect electoral results, but it can also be true that electoral results cause reactions in party policy to adjust economic policy positions in response. Political parties are subjects, and they respond to both internal and external events. Nothing would prevent a party from adjusting its economic policy for survival. This is also an explanation of Eastern Green's economic policy. A more straightforward explanation, which is adopted here assumes that the relative emphasis on free markets on the Eastern Greens' part stems from a different standpoint to environmentalism, but it might as well be true that the emphasis on free markets is a reaction to the national contexts the parties compete in, – that certain economic policies have been effectively pushed out of national politics.

The analysis done here does not attempt thorough measures to solve the endogeneity problem. Instead, some aspects of the data are given to here assess and alleviate the problem. Total mentions of economic codes among all greens peak around 20%. This might ease the endogeneity problem by showing that, on average, about a fifth of any given Green manifesto focuses on economic issues. Potential unmentioned variables that might be the true cause of electoral results are less likely to be missing from the analysis, given that the codes considered in the analysis correspond to, on average, about 20% of all codes assigned in manifestos. Together with mentions of environmental protection, the mean Green manifesto consists of just under 40% economic and environmental statements. Combined, all economic and the single environmental code sum up to 17 codes. Roughly 60% of Green manifestos are, therefore, devoted to up to 39 (out of 56 total) categories of codes, compared to about 40% devoted to just two. While other causes of endogeneity can still be present, at least latent, unmeasured variables are less likely to exist.

Political environmentalism has taken different pathways in the East and West of Europe. The difference is clear from both studies done on the development of environmentalism in Europe, as shown here, and CMP data suggests as much. It seems that only some researchers have taken it upon themselves to study environmentalism as a political ideology, and even fewer have compared the different forms environmentalist thinking takes in parts of Europe, while this thesis shows that there are differences. In a globalized context, environmentalist thinking constitutes one of the cornerstones of pro-integration politics, and it has been also used to mythicize national environments by nationalists and even ecofascists. There is room for comparison between forms of political environmentalism, case studies of its

manifestations in national contexts, as well as more firmly theorizing its position in the globalization divide.

As environmentalist policy becomes more mainstream, there will be a need to further categorize and differentiate between environmentalist policies. There will be ever more diverse ways to embed environmentalist approaches to new policies and policy areas. For example, because CMP data only includes one code for all environmentalist or green policies, some varying approaches to greenness are obscured. Already the rough categorization of Green parties into the "fundis" and "realos", or environmentalists and ecologists, hints at different approaches to environmentalist policy. As nationalism has, at the same time, been a cornerstone of modern liberal politics and fascist dictatorship, so is environmentalism fitted into extremist ideologies alongside Green politics. As environmentalism becomes increasingly mainstream, its extremist forms will become more prominent. Different forms of post-humanist thinking, where humanity takes a background role, are easily adopted into extreme environmentalism.

Acknowledging the differences between forms of environmentalism, like assuming an s-curve in the place of a linear relationship, is also an invitation for different methodologies. In the quantitative realm, especially with CMP data, applications of non-linear models can be fruitful and could stand to give more detailed knowledge of party families and their policies. Survey data measuring environmental attitudes, and datasets measuring party positioning could further investigate the relationship between environmentalist attitudes and party policies, or probe how environmentalism is embedded into different ideologies and policy stances. With qualitative methods, more context-rich case studies or comparisons could more effectively show differences between approaches to environmentalism. Qualitative studies that use electoral manifestos or focus on party families with more representation in national parliaments could also show the connection between policies in electoral manifestos and policies that eventually become law. Are manifestos authoritative policy documents, as CMP claims, or are they advertisements? Either way, the relationship between manifesto and enacted policy seems a fruitful avenue for further research, as would be research focusing on a more detailed look into forms of environmentalism.

6 Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to show a causal relationship between economic policies and electoral results by taking a view on the issue that focuses on parties because earlier research has focused on voters and issue salience. The research question was *What are the effects of policy positions of European Green parties on their varying electoral results?* Literature on the development of environmentalism in Europe showed different trajectories and traditions of thought that divide the politics of environmentalism in Europe between the East and the West. Research on the effects of globalization on politics showed that despite the regional differences in environmental thought, the emergence of Green parties as the formalization of political environmentalism has followed similar paths in both regions after the transition from Communism. The party organizations are similar, yet differences in ideology remain. Using the globalization divide as a framework and leaning on earlier research on Green parties, an image of similarity in cultural and social values on one hand, and difference in economic thinking on the other, emerged.

A large-N quantitative analysis using a linear regression model performed with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project suggested that there are regional differences in economic policies of Green parties and that some economic policies predict the electoral results of the Greens. Density plots of different combinations of economic codes from the dataset suggest that Western Greens emphasize government intervention in the economy more, and environmental policy less. Eastern Greens emphasize the free market more and do so with environmental policy, as well. The regression analysis suggests that emphasizing the free market increases electoral results while emphasizing interventive economic policies decreases them. An emphasis on environmental protection decreases electoral results. The region is also a predictor of electoral results. The results suggest that in terms of economic policy, European Green parties are not a monolithic party family. There might be deeper differences between the environmentalists in the West and East of Europe. These differences suggest that the alternative hypothesis is true: economic policy positions can predict Green electoral results. The differing economic policies show distinct positions of Green parties in the globalization divide.

Green parties tend to position themselves differently in the globalization divide. It is also valuable to find out how the relationship between certain policies and votes works. The fact that there are regional differences in the economic policies of Green parties hints at the possibility of similar differences between other parties that compete within the globalization divide. What are the economics of the populist right in comparison? Do other pro-globalization

parties differ in their economic stances? If a political party competes within the globalization divide, the economic policies of a party must begin from a different standpoint. Solutions to economic problems, while they can be nominally Keynesian or Hayekian, must bring about new syntheses and considerations. The Greens' different approaches to economic policy can also be thought of as precursors to new syntheses in economic policy more fitting for globalized politics.

Environmentalist thinking is in tension between the economic and political manifestations of globalization. As a policy issue that transcends borders and boundaries, environmentalists struggle to fit global solutions into national politics. The mantra "*think global, act local*" does not fit easily into national politics. The tension extends even into theory. It is the rise in material welfare provided by a globalized economy that has, ironically, allowed for the rise in post-materialist values that then shun global supply chains. It could be argued that the Greens did not choose to be in favor of political integration, but that this is a position they have been forced to accept. The inability of states alone to act on climate change could have caused a focus on international organizations, or other means outside of national halls of power, for the Greens.

In economic thinking, there is variation among both parties and voters. Here, regional differences in economic policy were shown, but research on voters also suggests different economic positions – in terms of socio-economic status and occupation – among voters. The idea that Green parties tend to place themselves "beyond" the left-right divide can also mean that the parties are aware of the variety in Green economic policy positions. The self-placement, then, becomes a calculated part of political strategy. The apparent disappearance of economic ideology as a division between voters further cements the Greens' position as a party family focusing on the new political divide. Green parties can select when to intervene and when to let the market decide. A winning recipe would be to intervene, except when the intervention is perceived to limit individual economic freedom. As such, Green economics could be presented as a synthesis of different schools of economic thought. Principles from apparently opposing schools can be combined because the guiding logic differs from tradition, and the "synthesis" is being guided by environmental protection rather than economic logic. In this way, Green economics ascribe more moral concern to the residual effects of the human economy on the rest of the biosphere.

This thesis produced new knowledge on Green parties and their position in the globalization divide. The Greens show different approaches in dealing with shifting political conflicts within a party family. That there is a difference also shows a nuance in the

globalization divide that is important. While the tension between environmentalism and economic globalization has been illustrated before, CMP data suggests the presence of a similar tension among Green parties. Youth movements and civil activists have an image of environmentalism that is more in line with the Western Greens. Eastern Greens, on the other hand, have made a policy compromise in their economics that is, at face value, against the strain of environmentalism that exists outside of national politics. A comparative framework between the East and the West is still a novelty in studies of European Green parties. The variance among environmentalist organizations (civil society and political parties included), if they are not a monolith, also helps to explain why political action on climate change is difficult. There is a dire need for political action, but if the organizations most actively advocating for action disagree on what, exactly, should be done, progress on policies is certainly not simplified. As the effects of climate change become ever more dangerous, understanding a small piece of the policy-making process trying to mitigate it is certainly useful.

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Annex

The annex lists all countries, election dates and parties included in the analysis. It also lists the results of coder reliability tests. Some manifestos are from the same elections, if more than one Green party took part in the same elections. The results of data reliability range from -1 to +1. -1 shows systematic disagreement, zero absence of reliability and +1 perfect reliability. Some manifestos do not have the test results, but nevertheless, an overall image of coder reliability can be drawn from them.

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Austria	1986-11-23	Green Alternative	0.816
Austria	1990-10-07	Green Alternative	0.816
Austria	1994-10-09	The Greens	0.765
Austria	1995-12-17	The Greens	0.765
Austria	1999-10-03	The Greens	0.810
Austria	2002-11-24	The Greens	0.810
Austria	2006-10-01	The Greens	0.808
Austria	2008-09-28	The Greens	0.808
Austria	2013-09-29	The Greens	0.822
Austria	2017-10-15	The Greens	0.822
Austria	2017-10-15	Peter Pilz List	0.822
Austria	2019-09-29	The Greens	0.972
Belgium	1981-11-08	Ecologists	*NA*
Belgium	1981-11-08	Live Differently	*NA*
Belgium	1985-10-13	Ecologists	*NA*
Belgium	1985-10-13	Live Differently	*NA*
Belgium	1987-12-13	Ecologists	*NA*
Belgium	1987-12-13	Live Differently	*NA*
Belgium	1991-11-24	Ecologists	0.819
Belgium	1991-11-24	Live Differently	0.819
Belgium	1995-05-21	Ecologists	0.819
Belgium	1995-05-21	Live Differently	0.819
Belgium	1999-06-13	Ecologists	0.884
Belgium	1999-06-13	Live Differently	0.884

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Belgium	2003-05-18	Ecologists	*NA*
Belgium	2003-05-18	Live Differently	*NA*
Belgium	2007-06-10	Ecologists	0.770
Belgium	2007-06-10	Green!	0.850
Belgium	2010-06-13	Ecologists	0.770
Belgium	2010-06-13	Green!	0.850
Belgium	2014-05-25	Green!	0.788
Belgium	2019-05-26	Green!	0.788
Bulgaria	1994-12-18	Political Club 'Ekoglasnost'	*NA*
Bulgaria	1997-04-19	Political Club 'Ekoglasnost'	*NA*
Croatia	1990-04-22	Green Alliance of Croatia	0.766
Croatia	1990-04-22	Green Action of Split	0.766
Cyprus	2006-05-21	Ecological and Environmental Movement	0.846
Cyprus	2011-05-22	Ecological and Environmental Movement	0.846
Cyprus	2016-05-22	Movement of Ecologists - Citizens' Cooperation	0.834
Czech Republic	2006-06-03	Green Party	0.815
Czech Republic	2010-05-29	Green Party	0.830
Czech Republic	2013-10-26	Green Party	0.838
Estonia	2007-03-04	Estonian Greens	0.796
Estonia	2011-03-06	Estonian Greens	0.796
Finland	1983-03-21	Green Union	*NA*
Finland	1987-03-16	Green Union	*NA*
Finland	1991-03-17	Green Union	0.669
Finland	1995-03-19	Green Union	0.669

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Finland	1999-03-21	Green Union	0.669
Finland	2003-03-16	Green Union	0.721
Finland	2007-03-18	Green Union	0.762
Finland	2011-04-17	Green Union	0.900
Finland	2015-04-19	Green Union	0.849
Finland	2019-04-14	Green Union	0.849
France	1993-03-21	The Greens	*NA*
France	1997-05-25	The Greens	*NA*
France	1997-05-25	Ecology Generation	*NA*
France	2002-06-09	The Greens	*NA*
France	2007-06-10	The Greens	*NA*
France	2012-06-10	Europe Ecology - The Greens	0.663
France	2017-06-11	Europe Ecology - The Greens	0.758
Georgia	1992-10-11	Green Party of Georgia	0.626
German Democratic Republic	1990-03-18	Green Party-Independent Women's League	*NA*
German Democratic Republic	1990-03-18	Alliance 90	*NA*
Germany	1983-03-06	The Greens	*NA*
Germany	1987-01-25	The Greens	*NA*
Germany	1990-12-02	Greens/Alliance'90	0.999
Germany	1994-10-16	Alliance'90/Greens	0.999
Germany	1998-09-27	Alliance'90/Greens	0.920
Germany	2002-09-22	Alliance'90/Greens	0.920
Germany	2005-09-18	Alliance'90/Greens	*NA*
Germany	2009-09-27	Alliance'90/Greens	*NA*

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Germany	2013-09-22	Alliance'90/Greens	0.917
Germany	2017-09-24	Alliance'90/Greens	0.739
Germany	2021-09-26	Alliance'90/Greens	0.945
Hungary	2010-04-11	Politics Can Be Different	0.812
Hungary	2014-04-06	Politics Can Be Different	0.909
Hungary	2018-04-08	Politics Can Be Different	0.716
Iceland	1999-05-08	Left Green Movement	0.575
Iceland	2003-05-10	Left Green Movement	0.672
Iceland	2007-05-12	Left Green Movement	0.672
Iceland	2009-04-25	Left Green Movement	0.672
Iceland	2013-04-27	Left Green Movement	0.811
Iceland	2016-10-29	Left Green Movement	0.782
Iceland	2017-10-28	Left Green Movement	0.782
Ireland	1989-06-15	Green Party	*NA*
Ireland	1992-11-25	Green Party	0.869
Ireland	1997-06-06	Green Party	0.869
Ireland	2002-05-17	Green Party	0.700
Ireland	2007-05-24	Green Party	0.741
Ireland	2011-02-25	Green Party	0.736
Ireland	2016-02-26	Green Party	0.800
Italy	1987-06-14	Green Federation	0.817
Italy	1992-04-06	Green Federation	0.817
Italy	1994-03-28	Green Federation	*NA*
Italy	1996-04-21	Green Federation	0.817

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Italy	2001-05-13	The Girasole ('Sunflower')	0.965
Italy	2006-04-10	Green Federation	0.794
Luxembourg	1984-06-17	Green Alternative	*NA*
Luxembourg	1989-06-18	Green Left Ecological Initiative	*NA*
Luxembourg	1989-06-18	Green Alternative	*NA*
Luxembourg	1994-06-12	Green Left Ecological Initiative - Green Alternative	*NA*
Luxembourg	1999-06-13	Green Left Ecological Initiative - Green Alternative	*NA*
Luxembourg	2004-06-13	The Greens	0.689
Luxembourg	2009-06-07	The Greens	0.689
Luxembourg	2013-10-20	The Greens	0.777
Netherlands	1989-09-06	Green Left	0.774
Netherlands	1994-05-03	Green Left	0.806
Netherlands	1998-05-06	Green Left	*NA*
Netherlands	2002-05-15	Green Left	*NA*
Netherlands	2003-01-22	Green Left	*NA*
Netherlands	2006-11-22	Green Left	0.850
Netherlands	2010-06-09	Green Left	0.720
Netherlands	2012-09-12	Green Left	0.850
Netherlands	2017-03-15	Green Left	0.760
Norway	2013-09-09	Green Party	0.844
Norway	2017-09-11	Green Party	0.699
Portugal	1983-04-25	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.829
Portugal	1985-10-06	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	*NA*
Portugal	1987-07-19	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.829

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Portugal	2002-03-17	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.913
Portugal	2005-02-20	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	*NA*
Portugal	2009-09-27	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.611
Portugal	2011-06-05	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.848
Portugal	2015-10-04	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.847
Portugal	2015-10-04	People-Animals-Nature	0.847
Portugal	2019-10-06	Ecologist Party 'The Greens'	0.881
Portugal	2019-10-06	People-Animals-Nature	0.881
Portugal	2019-10-06	Free	0.881
Romania	1990-05-20	Ecological Movement of Romania	0.782
Romania	1990-05-20	Romanian Ecological Party	0.963
Serbia	2016-04-24	Green Party	0.843
Slovakia	1990-06-09	Green Party of Slovakia	0.601
Slovenia	1990-04-08	Greens of Slovenia	*NA*
Slovenia	1992-12-06	Greens of Slovenia	0.796
Sweden	1988-09-18	Green Ecology Party	0.631
Sweden	1991-09-15	Green Ecology Party	0.631
Sweden	1994-09-18	Green Ecology Party	0.631
Sweden	1998-09-21	Green Ecology Party	0.631
Sweden	2002-09-15	Green Ecology Party	*NA*
Sweden	2006-09-17	Green Ecology Party	0.665
Sweden	2010-09-19	Green Ecology Party	0.467
Sweden	2014-09-14	Green Ecology Party	0.807
Sweden	2018-09-09	Green Ecology Party	0.880

Country	Election date	Party name	Test result
Switzerland	1979-10-21	Greens	*NA*
Switzerland	1983-10-23	Federation of Green Parties	*NA*
Switzerland	1987-10-18	Green Party of Switzerland	0.645
Switzerland	1991-10-20	Green Party of Switzerland	0.645
Switzerland	1995-10-22	Green Party of Switzerland	0.645
Switzerland	1999-10-24	Green Party of Switzerland	0.903
Switzerland	2003-10-19	Green Party of Switzerland	0.999
Switzerland	2007-10-21	Green Party of Switzerland	0.842
Switzerland	2007-10-21	Green Liberal Party	0.842
Switzerland	2011-10-23	Green Party of Switzerland	0.842
Switzerland	2011-10-23	Green Liberal Party	0.842
Switzerland	2015-10-18	Green Party of Switzerland	0.864
Switzerland	2015-10-18	Green Liberal Party	0.864
Switzerland	2019-10-20	Green Party of Switzerland	0.674
Switzerland	2019-10-20	Green Liberal Party	0.674
Ukraine	1998-03-29	Green Party of Ukraine	0.813
United Kingdom	2015-05-07	Green Party of England and Wales	0.829
United Kingdom	2017-06-08	Green Party of England and Wales	0.818
United Kingdom	2019-12-12	Green Party of England and Wales	0.754