

UNIVERSITY OF TARTU
Faculty of Social Sciences
School of Economics and Business Administration

Songül Öğüt


UNDERSTANDING SAUDI AND TURKISH SOCIETIES: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE
ANALYSIS OF THE ROHINGYA AND UYGHURS AND EXAMINING THE REFUGEE
POLICIES

Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Dr. Alar Kilp

TARTU 2024

I have written this Research paper/Master's Thesis independently. Any ideas or data taken from other authors or other sources have been fully referenced.

01.15.2024..... (signature of the author and date)

Introduction	6
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework and Conceptualizations	8
1.1. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)	8
1.2. Ideology	9
1.3. Hegemony.....	10
Chapter 2. Literature Review	11
2. 1. Myanmar (Burma) and Rohingya Crisis.....	11
2.2. The Rohingya in Rakhine State	12
2.3. Crisis and Scope of the Violence Towards the Rohingya.....	13
2.4. The Refugee Policies and Rohingya Status in Saudi Arabia and Turkey.....	14
2.5 China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Uyghur Question.....	16
2.6. The Uyghur/Xinjiang Question and Crisis	17
2.7. Chinese Nationalism and Uyghur Migration	18
2.8. The Refugee Policies and Uyghurs' Status in Saudi Arabia and Turkey	20
2.9. Social and Institutional Structures of Saudi Arabia and Turkey.....	22
2.9.1 Society and Institutions in Saudi Arabia.....	23
2.9.2. Society and Institutions in Turkey	25
Chapter 3. Methodology	30
3.1. Introduction.....	30
3.2. Research Design.....	30
3.3. Data Collection	34
3.4 Sampling and Participants.....	34
3.5. Data Analysis	36
3.6. Findings and Discussion	36
3.6.1. Description (Text Analysis).....	36

3.6.2. Interpretation (Processing Analysis).....	48
3.6.3. Explanation (Social Analysis).....	55
3.6.4. Discussion.....	56
3.6.5. Research Limitations	62
Conclusion	62
References.....	64
Appendices.....	78
Appendix A. Questions Asked of the Participants.....	78
Appendix B. The Support Letter to China	79

List of Tables

Table 1. Saudi Arabian Participants and Demographics	35
Table 2. Turkish Participants and Demographics	35
Table 3. Questions of Text Analysis.....	37
Table 4. Values of Text Analysis.....	38
Table 5. Words' Values for the Rohingya and Uyghur People	39
Table 6. Codes of the Support Letter	47
Table 7. The Study's Framework of Situational Context.....	49
Table 8. Summary of Research Results	63

List of Figures

Figure 1. Different Approaches of CDA.....	32
Figure 2. Fairclough's Three-dimensional Approach	33
Figure 3. Data Analysis Framework of the Study.....	36
Figure 4. The Coding Framework of the Letter	46
Figure 5. Twitter/X Keywords for the Rohingya.....	52
Figure 6. Twitter/X Keywords for Uyghurs	52
Figure 7. Ethnoreligious Conflict Mechanism for Myanmar and China	56

Introduction

The 21st century has seen a continuous influx of people migrating due to various factors, including armed conflicts, forced displacement, and poverty, as in the 20th century. Beyond any doubt, the migration phenomena have undoubtedly become more noticeable in the modern age, generating a “refugee crisis”. The challenges of the host nations in view of this situation have far-reaching effects on their political, social, and cultural environment.

The most recent report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees shows that a staggering 110 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced due to such factors as violence, conflict, and human rights violations. Asylum seekers reached over 1.5 million from January to June of 2023. Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine are the leading refugee-producing nations. Moreover, 4.4 million people around the world are stateless, and the Rohingya population comprises the most distinguished group. (UNHCR, The Refugee Agency, 2023) Apart from the Rohingya community, the Uyghur minority group has been relocated due to a succession of human rights violations committed by the Chinese government. These violations include restrictions on religion and freedom of speech, as well as cases of sexual abuse. (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The 2023 Human Rights Index (HRI) report reveals these statements the accuracy. HRI assessed nations through criteria like 'religion, freedom of speech, and property rights, The Human Rights Index report positions Myanmar at sixth and China at tenth (The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 signifies the utmost level of rights). To clarify, Myanmar and China are part of the top 10 countries with the most prevalent cases of “state-approved torture, political killings, and enforced labor”. (Herre, Arriagada , & Roser, 2023)

The Rohingya and Uyghur ethnoreligious minorities have not only searched shelter in neighboring countries but also have refuge in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The Rakhine (Arakan) region of Myanmar is home to the Muslim minority of Indo-Aryan descent, Rohingyas and the Xinjiang region of China is a place of residence for the Uyghurs, a Turkic origin Muslim minority. Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to use Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional critical discourse analysis to uncover the “social discourses” and the dominant ideological power dynamics concerning these two marginalized Asian ethnoreligious communities in Saudi and Turkish societies. Besides, it aims to provide insight into Saudi Arabia and Turkey's refugee policies, humanitarian aid activities, and attitudes towards these ethnoreligious minority groups as non-signatories and signatories countries to international agreements regarding refugees and asylum seekers.

This study will consider several subjects to analyze the issue, including human rights, social integration, conflict analysis, and foreign policy strategies.

The nations of Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been selected for two distinct reasons. Primarily, it can effectively demonstrate the contrast between both nations' unique political, social, and cultural entities and their impact on social discourse about the Rohingya and Uyghurs. Secondly, it can possess the capability to uncover the differentiation between the reality that numerous nations in the Arab region, notably Saudi Arabia, have not ratified international conventions on refugees, whereas Turkey has ratified them. This fact, in other words, allows us to separate the refugee policies of a non-signatory and signatory countries. In line with Charlotte Lysa's insights, despite the availability of research on refugees in countries not involved in international refugee agreements, there remains a considerable gap in knowledge regarding the “governance of refugees” in these states. Also, refugee studies in the Middle East region do not extend to include Saudi Arabia. (Lysa, 2023) Accordingly, the research questions are as follows: (Q1) How do ideological power dynamics impact the discourses of Saudi and Turkish societies about the Rohingya and Uyghurs as Asian ethnic and religious minorities? (Q2) What are the policy discrepancies between non-signatory and signatory countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the context of Rohingya and Uyghur refugees?

The strength of this study is that it provides a broad perspective on how ideological power dynamics are formed and influential in society by addressing not only the social discourse in Saudi Arabia and Turkey but also the social, political and institutional contexts of both countries. In this context, this study will contribute to this gap in the literature.

This thesis is organized as follows: the first section comprises the theoretical framework and conceptualization, explaining the key concepts relevant to this study. The second section consists of a literature review, providing essential information on the issues faced by Rohingyas in Myanmar and Uyghurs in China while offering detailed insights into the societies and institutions of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The third section addresses the methodology applied in this research. Additionally, it encompasses the research findings and the ensuing discussion. The conclusion section provides a brief overview and final evaluations.

This study would not have been possible without the constant guidance and encouragement of my advisor, Dr. Alar Kilp. I am grateful for his support, as it played a crucial role in helping me complete this study. Special thanks to Dr. Eva Liias for being more than just an instructor but also a supportive friend throughout my education. I am also profoundly

grateful to Anneli Kütt for her invaluable assistance and counsel whenever I encountered queries. I would further like to thank İzzet Yalın Yüksel for reviewing my thesis.

Key words: Critical Discourse Analysis, Migration, Rohingya, Uyghur, Refugees.

Research Classification Code(s) (CERCS): Sociology (S210), Social Structures (S213), Social Problems and Welfare, National Insurance (S215), Linguistics (H350), Human Rights (S112).

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework and Conceptualizations

The section will provide an overview of systemic functional linguistics, which serves as the basis for the selected methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis. In addition, the concepts of ideology and hegemony will be defined.

1.1. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

During the 1970s, linguists recognized that more than traditional linguistic theories were needed in addressing social inquiries. Consequently, this period significantly shifted towards critical linguistics within the social sciences. Michael Alexander Kirkwood (M.A.K.) Halliday's 'systemic functional linguistics theory' significantly influenced the development of critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis. (Rogers, Malancharuvil-Berkes, Mosley, Hui, & Joseph, 2005) Norman Fairclough also applied Halliday's systemic functional linguistics theory in his approach to critical discourse analysis. Therefore, there are commonalities between Halliday's SFL theory and Fairclough's critical discourse analysis regarding language and its relation to social context and language functions. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 19-20)

From Halliday's perspective, "language is a social semiotic". He emphasized that language is not only a set of words and rules but an integral aspect of society. Hence, the meaning and purpose of language are shaped by the social and cultural environment in which it is employed, making it "functional". (Halliday M. A., 1978, pp. 1-3) Halliday argues that functional theory is shaped by social interaction, not mental. In other words, he argues that language acquisition is a product of socialization and is critical in transmitting cultural values. In addition, he asserted that language should meet specific functions for all. These functions encompass interpreting and classifying our experiences, expressing logical correlations,

conveying our desires, emotions, attitudes or actions, and ultimately structuring discourse in alignment with its context. (Halliday M. A., 1978, p. 18)

According to Halliday, language consists of two main elements: 'code' and 'behaviour'. He viewed code as representing culture and behaviour exemplified by semiotics in a social framework, highlighting the need to analyze both to grasp the language as a collective notion. Furthermore, he pointed out that considering broader contexts such as cultural codes, social values, and historical processes is essential for a thorough understanding of the role and meaning of language in social dynamics. (Halliday, 2015, pp. 7-8)

1.2. Ideology

Ideology, a concept frequently stressed by Norman Fairclough in critical discourse analysis, is another theme of this research.

According to Fairclough, ideology has multiple meanings and can be interpreted in various ways. Nevertheless, he stressed that these different meanings and interpretations are not entirely separate but fall under a specific category. Fairclough uses Raymond Williams' book "Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society" to define ideology with two distinct definitions, highlighting the varying meanings. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 77) Williams's first definition is that in the 19th century, conservatives defined ideology as policies rooted in "social theory". His second definition is based on Marx and Engels, who viewed ideology as the manifestation of ideas of dominant material relations, where separating these ideas from material reality exposes ideology as a distorted version of truth. (Williams, 2015, pp. 107-109) Fairclough, therefore, stated that due to the intricate nature of ideology, the meanings of words cannot be limited to a singular, precise explanation but instead can contain a range of interpretations in varying contexts and social systems. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 78)

Additionally, it is worth noting that ideology has a varying influence on language at different levels. This effect is actualized through both social structures and individual discourse events. Fairclough argues that a complete understanding of ideology cannot be achieved by examining only social structures or events. A structural approach would overlook events, and an event-based approach would ignore discourse patterns. So, considering both approaches for a more comprehensive knowledge of ideology is essential. (Fairclough, 1992, p. 88)

Fairclough highlighted the role of "common sense assumptions" in shaping our interactions, using the doctor-patient relationship to illustrate the notions of authority and hierarchy. More accurately, the relationship between doctor and patient demonstrates how these assumptions operate. The doctor is believed to possess knowledge and expertise, while

the patient is often considered uninformed. This assumption justifies the doctors' authority to treat the patients so that the patients follow and accept the treatment naturally. These unconsciously used language patterns contain underlying ideologies, as noted by Fairclough. He stressed the fact that these ideologies serve to justify and uphold current power dynamics. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 2-3)

Regarding the interdependence of discourse and ideology, Fairclough examines a crucial matter by asking, "Is all discourse ideological?" He states that not all discourses are ideological, and besides that, not all types of discourse are equally ideological as well. However, he underscores the idea that ideologies emerge in societies with prevalent power dynamics between social groups. In this situation, discourse practices can play a role in shaping these power dynamics. (Fairclough, 1992, p. 91)

1.3. Hegemony

The concept of hegemony is another central point in Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, as he examines how discourse can shape power dynamics and references the Italian Marxist intellectual Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 91-92).

The specific historical context and the existing class systems in societies, such as bourgeoisie versus proletariat or civil society versus political society, shaped Gramsci's understanding of hegemony. In this context, hegemony is defined by Gramsci as the supremacy of one dominant class over the subordinate classes based on the opposition between the classes. Furthermore, Gramsci argued that hegemony is a constantly shifting process that can be attained not only through force and coercion but also through the consent achieved by cultural attitudes, ideological beliefs, and political cooperation. (Forgacs, 2000, pp. 422-424)

Fairclough stresses that there is an interconnection between hegemony and discourse, and the latter effectively maintains hegemony. However, he underlines that hegemony plays a role in establishing relations in many areas of society, naturalizing ideologies, and shaping discourse. Naturally accepted forms of discourse effectively sustain hegemony both culturally and ideologically. In other words, hegemony exists as a process constructed and reproduced culturally. (Fairclough, 2010, p. 129)

It is important to briefly highlight Fairclough's persistent focus on ideology and hegemony in his critical discourse analysis approach. Fairclough emphasizes the close interconnection of these concepts with discourse, highlighting their pivotal role in comprehending societal changes. He argues that this interconnection impacts power dynamics

among different societal groups and shapes society's structure. As given in the introduction, the primary objective of this research is to explore the influence of ideological power dynamics on the discourse about the Rohingya and Uyghur communities in Saudi and Turkish societies, both of which are ethnoreligious minority groups in Asia.

In this context, the concepts of ideology and hegemony are crucial for analyzing and understanding the power dynamics, the reflection of ideological connections in discourse, and how discourse transforms itself within the societal and institutional structures of Saudi Arabia and Turkey concerning refugee or asylum seeker groups, mainly focusing on Rohingya and Uyghurs.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

2. 1. Myanmar (Burma) and Rohingya Crisis

Myanmar is a Southeast Asian nation with a rich ethnic diversity; 135 distinct ethnicities are present. Comprising 68% of Myanmar, Burman (the Bamar people) is the most populous ethnic group in the country. The vast majority of those in the military and politics are Burman. Buddhist beliefs are the most widely held among the population in terms of religious diversity, with 89.7% adhering to them. Christianity is the next most prevalent, followed by Islam, with 6.2% and 4.3% of the population, respectively. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021) Specifically, Theravada Buddhism is the primary religion of Burma, and its adherents have substantial control over the country's culture and politics (Perrière, 2009, p. 186). Azeem Ibrahim brings up a salient point about Buddhism: It is usually perceived as having a pacific view of other faiths. However, Theravada Buddhism is seen in countries such as Myanmar, where communal violence is a reality. As per the Theravada Buddhist belief, all other religions must be dispelled to guarantee safety. (Ibrahim, 2016, pp. 2-3)

It is noteworthy that the military administration in 1989 not only changed the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar (The State Law and Order Restoration Council, 1989) but also the Rakhine region, previously known as Arakan, was changed to "Rakhine" in accordance with The Adaptation of Expressions Law (Government of the Union of Myanmar, 1989) due to the Bamars forming the majority in the region. (Smith, 2019, pp. 40-41)

British sovereignty was imposed on Burma until 1948. The Panglong Conference was a prominent phenomenon for Burma to gain independence. The conference's primary purpose was to unite Burma under a single roof and ensure national peace. (Kipgen, 2011, p. 49) "Representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills" signed the Panglong

Agreement, which excluded the other ethnic groups (Panglong Agreement, 1947). The omission of other ethnicities from the accord likely played a role in the continuing ethnic strife in modern Myanmar.

Lian H. Sakhong has come to believe that the nation-building for state construction in Burma had become a process of assimilation, taking the wrong turn in the process. It is further asserted that this method, advocating "one identity, one language, and one religion," indicates Burman nationalism, which the British initiated. Nation-building in Burma is one of many problems, as there is also the country's name change, which some groups have contested. The non-Burman ethnicities state that the country's new name does not evoke the leading ethnic group; consequently, they favor the name transformation. (Sakhong, 2012, p. 2) Nevertheless, they requested to be referred to as Burmese Muslims to emphasize their inclusion and belonging to Burma, but the administration rejected this request. The Burmese identity is intricately linked to the Buddhist religion, pivotal in shaping the nation's cultural and social fabric. However, the same cannot be said for the Muslim population, who are often viewed as foreign and disconnected from the Burmese identity. Thus, the developed unified identity promoted an atmosphere of contention instead of encouraging religious tolerance and parity among minorities. (Yegar, 1972, pp. 64-111)

2.2. The Rohingya in Rakhine State

The term Rohingya represents all Muslims living in the region as an ethnic and religious minority; alternatively stated, the name Rohingya indicates the difference between (Sunni) Muslims and the majority of Buddhists living in the same area. By 2012, the word Rohingya appeared in the international media as the Muslim minority oppressed by the state (Leider, 2018, pp. 11-18). The 1982 citizenship law caused the Rohingya to be denied citizenship status, and they were thus officially recognized as stateless persons (Lewa, 2009, pp. 11-12).

There is also tension in Burmese society about the term Rohingya. The leader of "the nationalist Association for the Protection of Race and Religion", also called Ma Ba Tha (the acronym of the association), stated that "We don't want that word because they are not our nationality" (Paddock, 2016).

Furthermore, Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides highlighted the consequences of social media. The uneven dissemination of information, with specific individuals and groups having more information than others, has induced a feeling of apprehension and insecurity in Rakhine. As a result, social media has been a driving force behind the trepidation and uneasiness that has been created, in part due to the publication of inflammatory news items

and, more significantly, due to the appearance of groundless stories. (Ware & Laoutides , 2018, pp. 143-153) Social media posts must be further emphasized in another way. Apart from these adverse effects, social media has positively contributed to some aspects. As an example, in the wake of the conflict that began in 2017, the sharing of millions of tweets on Twitter, a social media platform, with hashtags such as Rohingya, Myanmar, Pray for Rohingya, etc., assisted in gathering worldwide attention to the situation (Rannard, 2017).

2.3. Crisis and Scope of the Violence Towards the Rohingya

The Rakhine region has become a refugee-producing region in Myanmar with the countless of conflicts, human rights violations, political blockages/ instability, economic problems, and marginalization policies. Besides, this part will examine the scope of the violence in Arakan, the incursions of 2017, and their results.

To begin with why 2017 is momentous; the violence and rights violations that have been going on since Myanmar declared its independence in 1948 gained a different dimension in 2017. In the year 2017, over 742,000 Rohingya were forced to flee because of human rights abuse and intensifying violence (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023). The clashes between Buddhists and Muslims in the region before 2017 also drew attention to the international arena; however, Myanmar's political transformation, negotiation to reach an agreement with ethnic groups, and the lack of objective views of international actors have led to inadequate steps toward the problem (Frazer, 2015, p. 82).

Bangladesh has experienced a historic surge of Rohingya refugees, with the total number of people arriving since 25 August 2017 reaching nearly 688,000 (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2018, p. 2). In relation to the data from the past year, it can be seen as an indication of the intensity of the violence, with an estimated 43,000 Rohingya having entered Bangladesh by the end of 2016 (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017, p. 3). What is more, 2017 saw a rapid increase in violence, which was triggered by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) initiating assaults on police stations in Northern Rakhine and killing personnel. In response, the Myanmar security forces, comprising the Border Guard Police, acted oppressively to the attacks, which were known as clearance operations. (Messner, et al., 2019, p. 2)

Moreover, a commission set up by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2017 identified multiple offences, including genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes conducted by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) in the Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan regions (The United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018, pp. 15-16). The Tatmadaw holds a political status

and is a critical factor in setting and carrying out national defense strategies. Also, it should be noted that Tatmadaw has been a part of the authoritative rule in Myanmar from 1962 and beyond. (Myoe, 2014, pp. 1-9) Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported the destruction of 40 villages in Northern Rakhine (Arakan) in a month, from October to November 2017. The number of destroyed villages later increased to 354. (Human Rights Watch, 2017)

Between 25 August and 24 September, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) documented 6,700 Rohingya fatalities, including those of infants not yet five years old (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2017). According to the 2018 survey by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the US, conducted with 1024 Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh, more than 80% of the participants witnessed village destruction and killing, approximately half of them saw or experienced sexual violence, armed ground assault and movement restrictions. 30% of Rohingyas witnessed religious targeting or harassment. The attention-grabbing part of this survey is the patterns of violence, which are systematic and well-organized attacks seen and narrated by participants. The severe cases of rape witnessed by many participants, the burning of children and babies alive, drowning in rivers, and killing by cutting their throats, demonstrate the seriousness of human rights violations, at the same time, why thousands of them flee Myanmar to neighboring countries and Saudi Arabia. (The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 2018)

2.4. The Refugee Policies and Rohingya Status in Saudi Arabia and Turkey

This section focuses on the relocation of Arakanese people (Rohingya) to Saudi Arabia and their current circumstances, as well as the humanitarian assistance provided by Turkey. It is vital to be aware of that Saudi Arabia is not among the countries that have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention of the United Nations and its 1967 Protocol (The UN Refugee Agency, 2021). Despite not being a signatory, Saudi Arabia has been working to resolve the refugee issue as part of different protocols. The Ashgabat Declaration conference highlighted that the 57 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation reaffirmed their commitment to protecting the “10.7 million refugees, according to the UN data, and they ensured their protection in keeping with their national laws”. In 2012, Saudi Arabia concurred with other Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation on the Ashgabat Declaration, though it is not legally binding. (Forced Migration Review, 2012, pp. 10-11) Notwithstanding its non-signatory status to the United Nations treaties and protocols on refugees, Saudi Arabia is a significant donor and collaborator of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR). As of 2023, 8.9 million dollars have been allocated in donations. (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2023)

Saudi Arabia has been a host nation to the Rohingya since 1957. Rohingyas in Saudi Arabia have now exceeded 250,000, forming more than 1.2% of the inhabitants. (King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, 2023) Despite that, the number of unregistered ones is unknown (Tay, et al., 2017, p. 16) Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz disseminated his views on the Rohingya people to Saudi media in the year 2005. He uttered, "The Rohingyas are not stateless; they are citizens of a country. They are Muslims who came to perform the pilgrimage. Regrettably, their re-entry was not permitted, and we made attempts with our counterparts in Bangladesh to admit them among the refugee population; however, it was to no avail. Hence, we had to retain them here, but we issued them residence permits and enabled them to work. Accordingly, we urge people in business and companies to provide them with employment, whether in work, domestic services, or any other occupation". He added, "We granted them residence permits to make their stay legal, and efforts are ongoing. We even consider contacting the Burmese authorities and attempting to repatriate them to their homeland." (Saudi Press Agency, 2005) In light of Prince Nayef's proclamation, it is evident that measures have been taken to facilitate the involvement of the Rohingya population in the labor force and their integration into Saudi society. Moreover, The Ministry of Labor has incorporated Rohingyas into the "Nitaqat" (Saudization) initiative, leveraging their technical proficiencies and facilitating female employees to uphold family commitments and avail of educational and medical amenities (Al Riyadh, 2015).

Notably, in 2017, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adel bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, made a speech at the 72nd General Assembly of the United Nations. He condemned Myanmar's oppressive policies and expressed concern over these policies. (Bayoumy, 2017) Furthermore, Saudi Arabia declared that they had provided financial backing for the Rohingya during the crisis in Myanmar. In the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Saudi Arabia announced that it has allocated 18.1 million dollars towards thirteen distinct humanitarian aid initiatives. (The UN Refugee Agency, 2018).

However, allegations of the Rohingya engaging in criminal activities to a greater extent than other populations have led to Saudi Arabia revising its position on the Rohingya's employment and inclusion into society. This fact, in addition to the detention of many Rohingyas, has led Saudi authorities to make the integration of Rohingya and the issuing of work permits difficult. (Kéichichian & Alsharif, 2022, p. 80)

Turkey and Saudi Arabia have distinct strategies for the Rohingya. It is not possible to ascertain whether any Rohingyas have escaped the region and resettled in Turkey, as there is no data on this matter. However, the situation in the Rakhine region has been under Turkey's observation since 2012. (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye, 2022). It is also worth noting that Turkey has been attempting to identify solutions to the violent activities and human rights breaches endured by the Rohingya through diplomatic channels in the international sphere. Furthermore, Turkey has adopted a pivotal part in humanitarian assistance projects and has taken a central role in this realm concerning the Rakhine region. To elucidate further, in conjunction with the Turkish Red Crescent, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu and Turkey's First Lady Emine Erdoğan initiated interactions with Myanmar authorities to render humanitarian aid to the locality during their visit to Myanmar in 2012. The Myanmar government authorized humanitarian aid efforts, and 18 tons of aid supplies were transported to Sittwe by the Turkish Red Crescent. That same date marked the onset of a potential collaboration between the Turkish Red Crescent and the Myanmar Red Cross. (The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2012, Türk Kızılayı, 2014)

As opposed to Saudi Arabia, Turkey is a signatory to “the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, adhering to the territorial limitation of the 1951 Convention” and it is imperative to stress that this agreement and protocol are legally binding. (The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014, pp. 1-2). Additionally, the Turkish Grand National Assembly sanctioned the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in April 2013, and it was implemented in the subsequent year. The Temporary Protection Regulation was implemented in 2014 for Syrian citizens, stateless persons, and refugees, regardless of their having requested international protection. (Resmi Gazete, 2014) Also, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of article 4 of this law affirms the non-refoulement principle, ensuring that those covered will not be expelled to a destination where they may be subjected to inhuman or torturous treatment due to their race, religion, or group membership (Resmi Gazete, 2013) In the present context, Turkey's engagement in the agreements and their legally binding status have resulted in a significant difference between Saudi Arabia's refugee policies.

2.5. China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Uyghur Question

China's Xinjiang region (full name Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) is the most densely populated Muslim region, as is the Rakhine region in Myanmar. Geographically, being neighbors with Russia, some countries of Central Asia, Mongolia, Tibet and some of the

Indian subcontinent is one of the main reasons for hosting different cultures together, and therefore it has a strategic importance (Becquelin, 2000, pp. 65-66). After the end of China's dynasty period, Xinjiang gained autonomy on different dates; in 1933 as the Islamic Republic of East Turkistan, in 1944 as the Second East Turkistan Republic with the support of the Soviet Union, and in 1949, it became a region of China with the Communist Party's takeover of Xinjiang and finally, it became China's autonomous region in 1955 (Bhattacharji, 2012).

According to the report published by The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China in September 2021, since 1949, Xinjiang has been a region where a fast-developing society has lived safely. The region's population is 25.85 million in the 2020 census, 13.31 million in the north of the area, and 12.54 million in the south, with a more or less equal distribution. What is striking in the report is the decrease in the region's population between 2000 and 2020 in the last two decades. The Uyghur population in 2020 was 11,624,300. The Uyghurs have generally dispersed in the Kashgar, Hotan, Aksu and Kizilsu Kirgiz autonomous prefectures in the south of Xinjiang. In 2020, Uyghurs in these four regions made up a little more than 74% of the total Uyghur population (China, 2021).

According to James A. Millward, the Xinjiang region has an essential geostrategic place as it connects northern China with Central Asian states. In the historical process, Xinjiang maintained this cultural and geographical importance while strengthening its ties with China. (Millward, 2009, p. 55) China has undergone a radical change with the revolutions that started in China in 1911; more specifically, it has evolved the country from "dynasties to the nation-state", Confucianism has left its place for democracy with the economic and social transformation" (Hon, 2013, p. 1).

2.6. The Uyghur/Xinjiang Question and Crisis

During the Republican period 1911 to 1949, the Republic of China was dominated by the views of the Han Chinese, so they could not find common ground with other ethnic groups. One of the issues that emerged for the region was a process of colonization initiated by nationalists, which had two objectives; "reduce the population in the nationalist-controlled western area and increase nationalist control of the border regions". (Lin, 2008, pp. 52-60).

Notably, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region issue holds distinct and contrasting meanings for both China and Xinjiang. Notwithstanding the Chinese administration's description of the modifications in Xinjiang, such as new investments, economic development, and the establishment of new educational institutions, as beneficial, the Uyghurs perceive the investments as a means for the Chinese government to acquire a tactical superiority.

Furthermore, these investments are considered as an external threat that disregards the ethnic community there. What is more, Uyghurs think that the revenues from economic development benefit the Han Chinese because the gains are transferred to Beijing to the central government; in this sense, Han Chinese have an advantage in the region and pose a threat to their situation. Concisely, such a development is a source of tension for the Uyghurs in the context of a process that causes the extinction of themselves and their culture as a minority, although the area is developing. (Fuller & Starr, 2003, pp. 5-7)

The two other interrelated issues appear to be the primary source of the problem, religious persecution, and the related terrorism accusation. During the (Great Proletarian) Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, the religious beliefs and languages of ethnic minorities were used as a tool of oppression instead of integrating ethnic minorities with non-conflict methods, and this political practice has come to the point of associating the Uyghurs with terrorism. The fact that Han Chinese- the ethnic majority of the Chinese society and the state-sponsored group- and Uyghurs embarked on living together without defining the boundaries of their intercultural relations brought these two ethnic groups against each other (Soloshcheva, 2017, pp. 415-416). Chinese officials claimed that a significant number of terrorist attacks occurred in Xinjiang between 1990 and 2016, leading to the deaths of many innocent civilians (Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 2022).

2.7. Chinese Nationalism and Uyghur Migration

It has been reported that there are 56 “minzu” in the People's Republic of China, and although the Chinese word “minzu” is translated and used as nation or nations, with the nation-state building process, the term has come to be used as an ethnic or ethnicity (Yuan, 2015, p. 151). Between 1928 and 1949, “the nationalist-dominated state administration maintained that there was only one ethnicity in China – ‘the Chinese people’ (Zhonghua minzu) - and the other ethnic groups could be considered an extension of the Chinese people. Because of the state's claim, it took time for the 56 minzu to gain their legal status”. Drawing on Benedict Anderson's analysis of nationalism in his book *Imagine Communities*, Thomas Mullaney argues that Chinese scholars have also developed an oppositional discourse on reimagining China through ethnic groups, using the term minzu. It is also claimed that during the Republican period, the nationalist view adopted by the government coalesced around an ethnotaxonomic idea. This ethnotaxonomic idea can be considered part of China's Communist-era Ethnic Classification Project, according to which the word minzu was to apply only to Han Chinese and not to other ethnic minorities. It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant

by the Ethnic Classification Project. The Ethnic Classification Project is a term to describe the travels undertaken by ethnographers and linguists to identify the ethnic groups in the country. The communist administration officially determined the number and names of ethnic groups in the country and their relationship to each other by virtue of the Ethnic Classification Project (Mullaney, 2010, pp. 1-4). This ethnic classification has opened the door for interethnic disputes and instilled concerns in certain groups about maintaining their cultural heritage (Brady, 2012, p. 160).

China's education policies exacerbate the problem. While the People's Republic of China's education system legally promises equality for all, it "inflicts a sense of cultural inferiority" on students from ethnic minorities because there is a widespread belief that education civilizes minority groups; in other words, non-Han ethnic groups are believed to have both cultural and linguistic inadequacies. It should also be emphasized that while China's policies regarding minority education have positively affected the need for education regionally, they have also caused inequality between Han and non-Han Chinese (Hansen, 1999, pp. 3-5). In short, education has become a critical tool for the government's Sinicization and assimilation efforts. This was followed by the state making Chinese compulsory in education in 1997, which excluded the languages of ethnic minorities in the region (Beydulla, 2020, p. 179). In addition, the ethnic conflicts created by these policies eventually led to the construction of re-education camps in the region. According to Reuters' report, Uyghurs living in Xinjiang stated that they faced intense cultural and religious repression from the government and that the government's oppressive stance had gradually intensified after 200 people lost their lives in the uprising in Urumqi (the regional capital of Xinjiang) in 2009. For example, these restrictions include the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca, a holy site for Muslims. Reuters reporters also stated that they visited seven facilities where the detention camps were determined by satellite images, two of which were labelled as vocational training facilities, but there were watchtowers and armed security guards (Wen & Auyezov, 2018).

What distinguishes 2017 from other years is the acceleration of these repressive policies and the increasing number of camps. On 31 August 2022, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that towards the end of 2017, "...began to receive allegations from some civil society organizations that both Uyghurs and members of other Muslim ethnic minorities had disappeared in the XUAR, it appears also mentioned that "the number of re-education camps in the region had increased in 2018". The report also specified that "numerous research and investigative reports published since that time by a

diverse range of non-governmental organizations, think-tanks and media outlets—as well as public accounts by victims – have alleged arbitrary detention on a broad scale in so-called “camps”, as well as claims of torture and other ill-treatment, including sexual violence, and forced labor, among others" (The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights , 2022).

More noteworthy is that the report issued in March 2021 by Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy has drawn attention. The report has brought to light that China is in violation of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and has committed the crime of genocide against the Uyghur minority. Additionally, this document implies that the Chinese government cannot be absolved from genocide by their claim of utilizing policies in Xinjiang to prevent terrorism. (Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 2021)

It is also important to note that the People's Republic of China denies all accusations about the camps and repressive practices in the region. Chinese Communist Party official Hu Lianhe said in a statement that ethnic minorities live in peace and tranquility in Xinjiang and that there are no religious restrictions, and that there are only attempts by the state to prevent terrorist incidents in order to ensure security (Cumming-Bruce, 2018).

Turning now to Uyghur migration, the Chinese government's ethnic and national repressive policies have caused Uyghurs to leave the region, which came about in two waves. “The first wave of migration started in 1950 and continued until the early years of 1960, while the second wave of migration began in the early years of 1980 with the government's new reforms and open-door policy” (Sulaiman & Lipes, 2017). In more detail, the purpose of the open-door policy was to promote development through the formation of special economic zones. Yet, by impeding the population's ability to move around, this practice posed issues in utilizing its internal labor force. Thus, The Chinese government opted to enlarge both the range of the open-door policy and the geographical extent of its economic zones nationwide and relaxed border regulations. (Bohnet, Hong, & Müller, 93, pp. 191-192) It is an incontestable fact that adopting an open-door policy has enabled the relocation of Uyghurs, establishing a Uyghur diaspora (Guerif, 2010, s. 29-31)

2.8. The Refugee Policies and Uyghurs’ Status in Saudi Arabia and Turkey

Section 2.4 provides information on Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s involvement in legally enforceable agreements and protocols regarding refugee policy. Within this section, the condition of Uyghurs will be examined in correlation to Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The Uyghur Human Rights Project estimates that more than 500,000 Uyghurs live outside Xinjiang; most of the Uyghur population is in Central Asian countries, with smaller numbers in some European and North American countries. Concerning the study focus, the Uyghur populations in Saudi Arabia and Turkey are estimated to be 20,000 and 50,000, respectively. (Irwin, 2023)

Saudi Arabia stands by the Chinese government's policies on the Uyghurs, and the authorities openly profess this. During his dialogue with Chinese President Xi Jinping in February 2019, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared the two countries' historic cordiality and support for “the one-China policy”, in addition to their upholding of China in the fight against terrorism and the elimination of extremism. (Weibing, 2019)

On top of that, Saudi Arabia has been extraditing Uyghurs to China. In 2022 United Nations experts have called on Saudi Arabia to halt the extraditions, citing human rights violations (The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022). To express it another way, as China has become more powerful in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and other nations have resorted to arresting Uyghurs or returning them to China. It has been reported that 292 Uyghurs have been forced to return to China from the Middle East as of 2022 (Jardine, 2023).

In the case of Turkey, it has held an essential position in the Uyghur diaspora by opening its doors to Uyghurs since the 19th century. Nevertheless, its advocacy for the Uyghurs and it's the prominence of Central Asia in its foreign policy affected its connections with China. In addition, Turkey's allyship with the United States, its enrollment in “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its engagement in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the Baghdad Pact and the Korean War” have complicated the questions surrounding China's bond with Turkey. It should be underscored that these factors have not been as impactful on China-Turkey relations as Turkey's hosting of Uyghurs. (Shichor, 2009, pp. 1-5)

The Uyghurs viewed Turkey as a source of inspiration that had a bearing on their intellectual, cultural, and political beliefs, thus providing them emotional strength. In 1952, Turkey, abiding by the 1951 treaty, offered political refuge to approximately 2,000 Uyghurs with the support of the UN High Commissioner's Office. During the ensuing year, it received a further 900 asylum seekers and these migrations happened at regular intervals. (Beydulla, 2020, pp. 180-181) It is crucial to know that the Uyghur refugees accepted by Turkey have been granted temporary or permanent residence permits. Two separate epochs are being observed for Uyghurs who have relocated to Turkey. Uyghurs who arrived in Turkey before

1980 could integrate into society; in contrast, those who settled after 1990 experienced difficulties related to politics and society. (Karluk, 2020, pp. 248-270)

It is imperative to bring to attention the claims that China has coerced numerous countries on the Uyghurs issue on account of its enhanced financial power. As a result of these pressures, the arresting, deporting, and extraditing of Uyghurs to China in the countries they migrate to is heavily stressed. (Standish, 2022) Turkey has been subject to accusations of arrests and deportations to China. The World Uyghur Congress's 2022 report asserts that the COVID-19 pandemic facilitated the advancement of the China-Turkey bond, consequently leading to the Uyghurs' return to China by China's demand. For this reason, this event has provoked unease among Uyghurs domiciled in Turkey. (The World Uyghur Congress, 2023, p. 14) The 2017 Extradition Treaty (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 2019) between China and Turkey has also been a source of dread for Uyghurs. Despite not being legalized yet, a parliamentary question was submitted to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 2021 by Deva Party MP Mustafa Yeneroğlu, who voiced the concerns of the Uyghur population about this agreement. In response to the parliamentary query, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu asserted that these fears were unsubstantiated, that the agreement was for the extradition of criminals adhering to international law, and that it was incorrect to regard the agreement as one aimed at Uyghur Turks. (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 2021)

It is important to note that China's Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 improved Turkey-China relations. The growing presence of Chinese investments in Turkey, the rising number of Chinese tourists, and the notion of China as an alternative to the West have all contributed to the increased significance of China for Turkey. Instead of making direct statements about the improved relations, the authorities used pro-government media channels to communicate the importance of China to the public during this process. (Işık, 2021, p. 74)

In light of Turkey's growing relationship with China, the Uyghurs have valid concerns about the potential policies that may affect them. Despite the clarification from the Foreign Ministry that the new law is not targeted towards Uyghurs, the Uyghur diaspora still has remained doubts.

2.9. Social and Institutional Structures of Saudi Arabia and Turkey

This study necessitates a precise explanation of the social, institutional, and situational elements, which can only be achieved by analyzing Saudi Arabia's and Turkey's societies, social structures, and institutions. Accordingly, this section will assess the general outlook of Saudi and Turkish societies and the influence of institutions on social discourse and their

situations concerning the Rohingya and Uyghurs. It merits noting that the literature section of each ethnic group detailed the situation of the Rohingya and Uyghurs per country. With that in mind, the ensuing sections will be confined to looking at Saudi Arabia and Turkey's social and political institutional structures.

2.9.1. Society and Institutions in Saudi Arabia

Religion holds a critical place in Saudi Arabia. Islam is the central component of the Saudi state, thus resulting in religious elements in both institutions and society. The 1992 Basic Law powerfully communicates these defining characteristics. As an illustration, Article 1 of the state's Basic Laws, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Quran, and the Sunna (Tradition) of the Prophet (PBUH).", Article 48 further states that "The courts shall apply to cases before them the provisions of Islamic Shari'ah, as indicated by the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and whatever laws not in conflict with the Qur'an and the Sunnah which the authorities may promulgate." (Basic Law Of Governance, 1992, p. 2).

At the dawn of the 20th century, Saudi society had no real class distinction. However, the amalgamation of Saudi Arabia by Abd al Aziz ibn Saud resulted in the ascendancy of the ruling class. The expansion of the petroleum business after 1938 and the modernization of the post-World War II era also gave rise to a stratified class system. (Abir, 1993, p. 3) The oil industry's success in the 1990s also led the rulers to the conviction that the cultural and religious values of the society had to be maintained. The nation's rise in economic well-being and conservatism was directly proportional, and the Wahhabi doctrines of conservatism helped bring forth a modernity firmly rooted in Islamic principles. The interpretation of religion also led to a polarized society. Liberal-minded people desired the customary practices based on the holy book to be amended to match the current conditions. In contrast, conservatives were sharply divided on the necessity of tailoring the current circumstances to traditional practices. (Doumato, 1993, pp. 47-48)

The social infrastructure of Saudi Arabia is heavily influenced by the concepts of "tribal identity" and "class loyalty". Even amidst rapid urbanization and significant social transformations, these two critical elements of society continue to hold a prominent position. They are evident in various facets of life, including wielding political power and playing a crucial role in intermarriage. Additionally, women's rights in Saudi Arabia have been severely neglected, with little progress made. Stringent social regulations, including the extended prevention of women's right to education and the state's prohibition of women in the workforce,

led to women being regarded as the “depressed majority”. However, crucial factors have been central in motivating the Saudi Arabian government to allow women to enter the workforce, such as the expanding international travel trend and the growing number of foreign female workers in Saudi Arabia. (McHale, 1980, pp. 636-638)

Mariwan Kanie divided Saudi Arabian society into three sections: “non-political, semi-political and political”. Between “non-political and semi-political” members of society and the state, society can assume a supportive role, engage in conversation, and form partnerships with the state via civil society organizations. On the other hand, “the political society” presents itself as a formation separate from and in opposition to the state. (Kanie, 2012, pp. 37-38)

Furthermore, one ideological factor exists in the relationship between the Saudi regime and society: Pan-Islamism. The ideology of Pan-Islamism is an ideology that aims to unite the Islamic world under one roof with a religious mission regardless of its borders. Religious nationalism began to convert the form of Pan-Islamism in the 1960s in Saudi Arabia. Mecca and Medina, the two holy cities for all Muslims worldwide, played an important role in this imagination of unity for Saudi authorities. The Saudi state has also prepared the way for its citizens to think of their land as the center of Islam and imposed the idea of its citizens as their duty to spread the religion of Islam. (Al-Rasheed, 2021, pp. 150-152)

Considering the institutional framework of Saudi Arabia, the royal family's authority is maintained. It is demonstrable via Article 44 in the Basic Law of Governance that the King is placed at the highest level of the structure, “... The King shall be their final authority”. The power dynamics in Saudi Arabia, as argued by M. Al Atawneh, are not solely shaped by religion. The nomadic identity mentioned in the third paragraph of this section also plays a crucial role in attaining and maintaining this power, per one of Max Weber's concepts of authority. (Atawneh, 2017, p. 126) Max Weber posited that legitimate authority is founded upon traditional, rational, and charismatic foundations. Legitimacy derived from traditional roots is grounded and relies on the notion that traditions are sacred and those granted power by these traditions are valid. (Weber, 1968, p. 46) Consequently, the monarch in Saudi Arabia obtains authority from his nomadic lineage, in other words, from traditions as well as religion.

Instead of discussing the separate functions of the institutions, this study will address the “fatwa” phenomenon. The issuance of fatwas is fundamental to the institutional structure and plays a vital role in shifting social discourse, making it an indispensable factor in understanding Saudi Arabia.

Upon issuing a fatwa (defined as a religious legal opinion in Article 45 of the Basic Law of Governance), the Royal Cabinet (the King), the Secretary General of the Committee, and the Council of the Grand Ulama Committee all act in unison. Aside from social and religious matters, fatwas may be issued to endorse the state's authority on political concerns. Together with the Council of Ministers, the Grand Ulama stands as the supreme legislative authority of the nation and firmly upholds its privileged role as the protector of the Wahhabi ideology. The Grand Ulama members, whose membership is permanent, can grant fatwas on individual matters, ranging from marriage to trading. This fatwa way of approach has enabled the Ulama to ensure that the Wahhabi discourse is dominant in society. (Mouline, 2014, pp. 160-161)

A royal resolution in 2010 mandated that publicly issued “fatwas” only be state approved; in other words, the king must decide them (Whitaker, 2010). This fact unquestionably granted the state a monopoly on fatwas. The domination of this monopoly has created an impassable barrier for independent clerics seeking to interpret Islam through a pro-democracy lens and to issue fatwas. For example, in November 2011, an independent cleric's fatwa on human rights and freedoms led to his arrest. The state is seeking to prohibit discourse that promotes personal liberties and political transformation requests via fatwas not in its control. Nevertheless, when it comes to legitimizing its authority, it is hushed about the religious scholars who pronounce fatwas that harm Saudi society. (Alaoudh, 2018) These procedures demonstrate the Saudi government's dominance over society and social discourse through religion.

2.9.2. Society and Institutions in Turkey

The end of the Ottoman Empire brought about significant changes to the structure of Turkish society. The transition to a nation-state model occurred with the establishment of the Republic, signaling the demise of the Ottoman Empire's "millet" system. The Ottoman Empire's “millet” framework maintained social control by categorizing and supervising various ethnic and religious groups according to their specific religious tenets. The Republic relinquished this system and aimed for the impartial treatment of all constituents, irrespective of their religious faith. (Akturk, 2019, pp. 895-900) The impact of this transformation has altered society and the framework of institutions. To raise Turkish society to the level of “Western” civilization, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initiated a series of reforms that involved removing the Islam-based structure from society and institutions. The disbandment of the Caliphate resulted in the shutdown of sharia courts, madrasas, and religious orders. The 1938

Law of Associations outlawed establishing social structures based on religion or sect. Adopting the Latin alphabet in 1928 led to the prohibition of Arabic script and the discontinuation of religious-based teaching in education. The responsibility of teaching children by their religious beliefs has been shifted from schools to parents. The primary objective of these practices was to align institutions with the concept of a secular state. (Berkes, 1964, pp. 461-467)

The industry's growth in Turkey during the 1930s guided women to obtain certain rights. With the rise of women in the business sector, their involvement in politics also grew. The year 1934 saw the inclusion of women in the electoral process, giving them the right to vote and run for election. (Ahmad, 1993, p. 89) The social structure underwent alteration due to yet another reform concerning attire. A law was passed that forbade the use of fez and clothing that signified religious beliefs. As a result, the enactment of this law marks another progression towards the secularization of social norms. (Koçak, 2010, p. 242)

The reform period also grappled with the reconstruction of Turkish identity. Specifically, Kemal Karpat, a Turkish history expert, argues that this transformative movement not only bred a sense of detachment among the populace but also triggered a search for a new interpretation of the "Muslim" and "Turkish" identity. (Karpat, 1972, p. 352) Consequently, the era from 1922 to 1950 was defined by two distinct manifestations of Turkish nationalism, commonly referred to as "ethnoreligious nationalism" and "religious community nationalism". This differentiation is a clear indication of the division within society. The opposing groups in this scenario were the "White Turks", who were the dominant political class, and the "Black Turks", comprised of conservative Muslims, impoverished tradesmen in Anatolia, and Kurds whom the Kemalist government disregarded due to their ethnic background. Essentially, the Kemalist ideology fostered a societal divide between those who embraced a "liberal, secular, and European" identity through Westernization and those Muslims who were marginalized and overlooked due to their religious beliefs. (Yavuz, 2000, pp. 22-25)

From the 1950s onwards, suppressed Islamism started to evolve and assert its influence. Nationalism and Islam coming together in the 1960s resulted in the emergence of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Özel, 2017, pp. 883-884). Akin to Pan Islamism in Saudi Arabia, the idea of Pan Turanism argues that Turkish-speaking peoples are one nation with a common historical past and ought to unite. Pan-Turkism emerged in the Ottoman Empire and became more visible in Turkish politics in 1965 with Alparslan Türkeş, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party. He defined the Turks outside Turkey as "Outer Turks" and expressed the ideal of uniting these societies with Turkey through the ideology of Pan-Turkism and becoming a powerful

country. (Landau, 2004, pp. 38-39) In 1980, a coup d'état caused a drastic change in Turkey's political landscape. The social balance decomposed due to various factors, including societal polarization, population growth, and rural-urban migration. Moreover, the absence of a democratic institution resulted in the collapse of the Turkish system. The political climate made it increasingly challenging to find resolutions to issues. Also, the incapacity to elect a president worsened the situation. The state's functionality deteriorated in this era as violence rose and the coup led to military supervision. (Türe, 2019, pp. 402-404) It is undeniable that the coup d'état on 12 September was rooted in Turkish Islamist ideology, thus paving the way for the rise of political Islam in Turkey (Karadaş, 2023)

The ideological framing of identity in Turkish politics has sparked conflicts and animosities between different identities, like “Turkish-Kurdish, Alevi-Sunni, and Republican-pro-Islamic Conservative”. The “türban ban” in Turkey during the 90s fueled the ongoing tensions between Islam and secularism. Conservative women's use of the “türban” or “başörtüsü” in Turkish (a headscarf), a representation of their religious ideals, was seen as a source of concern for those who advocated for modernization and a secular nation. Islam persisted in Turkey in the following years, maintaining its political and cultural significance. The ideology of political Islam, previously repressed in the 1990s, has experienced a resurgence and increased influence during the 2000s under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkish). The Islamic identity emphasized by the party's founders was a crucial triumph for Islamists. (Karakaş, 2013, pp. 23-33) In furtherance, it must be emphasized that AKP's establishment was not based on Islamic discourse; instead, they asserted their identity with a new ideology as “conservative democrats.” (Kaddorah, 2015, p. 1)

Concerning the institutions within Turkey, they possess a layered and intertwined nature involving the state, society, and other organizations. In Turkey's pursuit of a secular state, the legal framework - including the judiciary, military, and universities - played a critical role in preventing anti-secular ideologies. The army's involvement, religious affairs (Diyanet), and education system heavily influenced the dynamic between the state and religion. Through the establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in 1924, religion was effectively under state supervision, while the education system fostered the widespread and sustained implementation of secularism. (Kuru, 2009, pp. 223-235)

The AKP administration has brought about significant transformations in both social and institutional frameworks. The current epoch in Turkey has been characterized by a

reformation of the education system, the removal of the “türban ban”, the liberalization of religious schools, and a bolstering of state control over media. (Kaya A. , 2015, pp. 48-51) However, there are some critical points regarding ideological power factors between the state, society and institutions that must be pointed out in Turkey's AKP administration period.

Abdullah Gül, as prime minister of the first AKP government, stated that the party prioritized full membership of the European Union and economic and democratic development (Neziroğlu & Yılmaz, 2013, p. 8006). Tanıl Bora discussed that because of this interest, AKP had gained Turkish society's support, even from those who favor modernization and commitment to democratic values and the Western world, which made the party more powerful (Bora, 2017, p. 479). Despite that, Turkey has reversed a series of reforms and democratization processes within the framework of harmonization with the European Union since 2005 (Özer, 2015, p. 144). It is also crucial to highlight that Ahmet Davutoğlu's ambition as the foreign minister of the AKP government evolved to make Turkey a regional power with his pan-Islamist ideology from 2009 to 2014 (Özkan, 2014, pp. 125-130).

It is interesting to explain the dynamics of the “strong and charismatic leader” image of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the Justice and Development Party and Prime Minister of Turkey, in the eyes of Turkish society through a critical example that happened in 2009, and hence showing the increasing number of members of his party over the years and how much influence a party leader has on the everyday discourse of the society.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's “one-minute” outburst against Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres at a panel discussion on Israel's attacks on Gaza in Davos, Switzerland, in 2009 and his subsequent departure from the panel has hugely echoed in Turkish public opinion (BBC Turkish, 2009). Erdoğan told Peres, “I know the reason behind raising your voice is because of the guilty psychology. My voice will not be that loud. You must know that. When it comes to killing -- you know killing very well. I know how you hit, kill children on the beaches.” (CNN, 2009) Thousands of Erdogan's party members welcomed him at the airport with Palestinian and Turkish flags, chanting slogans such as “Turkey is proud of you” and “Davos Conqueror”. He told the crowd gathered at the airport: “It is the loyalty of this noble society that brings you here day and night, with love and excitement. This is your stance, the voice of the silent majority, the voice of the orphans”. (Hürriyet, 2009) Erdoğan's confrontation with Peres went as far as his supporters calling Erdoğan “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan I, the Last Ottoman Sultan” on a banner at an inauguration (Cumhuriyet, 2009).

E. Zeynep Güler argues that Erdoğan's outburst in Davos harmed different ethnic groups in Turkish society. However, what enabled this impact to be successfully visible in society was that it motivated groups from multiple ideologies, such as “Nationalist, Ottomanist, Islamist and Anti-Zionist” groups, at the same time. (Güler, 2010, p. 220) Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Metropoll Strategic Social Research Company on January 30, 2009, also revealed that among 1002 respondents, 78.3% expressed their support for Erdoğan's protest in Davos (Sencar & Yıldız, 2009).

The other aspect that plays a role in Erdoğan's power dynamic with the public is his “leadership” style. Oğuz Göksu’s research concludes that “Erdoğan establishes an emotional bond with the electorate and achieves legitimacy and electoral loyalty through this bond”. In other words, he claimed that Erdoğan's relationship with his supporters involves phenomena such as “adoption, identification and obedience”. He also further argued that Erdoğan's leadership style successfully “politicizes and mobilizes” people and transforms culture. (Göksu, 2019, pp. 1076-1077)

The dynamics of the media in Turkey regarding politics, society and ideologies have a complex structure that differs according to the political climate of each period. According to a report by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Turkey ranked 149th out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom in 2022. In 2023, it dropped to 165th place. RSF claims that factors such as increasing censorship in Turkey and lawsuits against critical media outlets have contributed to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s growing popularity. (Reporters Without Borders, 2023) Therefore, the fact that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds power as a leader through politics, society and the media significantly contributes to shaping social discourse.

Chapter 3. Methodology

3.1. Introduction

In this section, I will explain the research methods to determine the perspective of the Rohingya and Uyghurs in Middle Eastern societies, especially in Saudi Arabia and Turkey; more specifically, I will try to find answers to questions such as the ideological power dynamics in these societies regarding the Rohingya and Uyghurs and also compare the two countries' refugee policies. In the sub-headings, information will be given on the study's research design, data collection methods, techniques, and limitations.

3.2. Research Design

Language is not only a tool that enables us to communicate but also a part of social and political power. Alternatively stated, the words we choose to express ourselves convey our thoughts and emotions and reflect the community's social hierarchy and power dynamics. This type of communication is referred to as "discourse". In this framework, discourse, and discourse analysis (DA) have become an essential part of social sciences in analyzing the role of language in social communication in different disciplines that may hold varying definitions (Tannen, Hamilton, & Schiffrin, 2015, p. 1). Fundamentally, "discourse" pertains to how language is used in diverse social and cultural contexts. It is worth mentioning that scholars who employ the term discourse underscore its significance in enabling "the construction of social reality" (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 78). Discourse also refers to a range of human activities, such as symbols, rituals, and norms, that have evolved based on the social structures of a society, communication styles, cultural identity, and the evolution of language in the historical process (Bloomaert, 2005, p. 3).

DA delves into the fundamental connection between our language and our actions and objectives, as we use language as a means to achieve them; simply, it scrutinizes the interplay between language and action. James Paul Gee and Michael Handford propose that every sentence or utterance can be analyzed as a form of communication or action so that discourse analysis goes beyond merely examining the surface-level structure of a sentence and instead aims to reveal its true meaning (Gee & Handford, 2012, p. 1).

A key aspect of DA is the context which encompasses all elements of the communication environment, including individuals, their respective societies, and the shared cultural values of those societies. In addition, in the opinion of James Paul Gee, another element necessary for discourse analysis is that an idea, thought, or belief that is accepted as accurate

in society should be treated as a novelty because the communicator does not express everything as if they know the subject in front of them, so communication contains unspoken thoughts/ideas. To gain a deeper comprehension of communication and culture, he employs the potent metaphor of an iceberg. This analogy underscores the fact that merely a small fraction is apparent, whereas a substantial and consequential part remains concealed beneath the surface. He argues that paying attention to what is known and what is left unsaid is important (Gee, 2011, pp. 6-8).

After explaining the concepts of discourse and discourse analysis, I will now discuss this study's research method, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).

CDA was developed in the early 1990s by an academic community that included Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Teo van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak. CDA sets itself apart from discourse analysis by taking an interdisciplinary approach and focusing on addressing problems (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, CDA blends critical social analysis with language studies to delve into “power dynamics, ideologies, and social identities” (Fairclough, 2012, p. 9). To be more precise, CDA focuses on how a community or an individual uses language in everyday life and how it plays a crucial role in establishing social hierarchies, for example, “between ethnic minorities and the majority”, and even suggests that this kind of language use contributes to the emergence of this social hierarchy. According to critical discourse analysis, 'discourse' is a powerful social practice that plays a significant role in constituting the social world, along with other practices. In this context, 'discourse' is intricately intertwined with various aspects of society and holds power in moulding social structures and reflecting them precisely (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 61-63). CDA also provides a more comprehensive outlook on discourse by incorporating it into the "critical tradition" of social sciences (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012, p. 78).

As Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer stated, several vital features set CDA apart from other linguistic methods, including discourse analysis. These features are as follows: CDA prioritizes addressing issues impacting specific groups, unlike other DA language study methods that explicitly fail to identify their research objectives. Besides, CDA scholars propose a range of research questions and may be proponents of mistreated groups. It should be underlined that several research strategies or approaches are involved in critical discourse analysis. These approaches are positioned between deductive and inductive approaches in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Different Approaches of CDA

Source: Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 20)

Deductive orientation theories often rely on a limited number of examples that may appear to support their claims to bolster their assumptions. On the other hand, inductive theories primarily function at the 'meso level' and target specific issues, which aims to gain new perspectives by conducting "in-depth case studies and collecting substantial amounts of data" (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, pp. 19-20).

Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional Critical Discourse Analysis framework was applied to construct the research. Fairclough outlines a three-dimensional structure that includes: "a language text, whether spoken or written; discourse practice, which encompasses text production and interpretation; and sociocultural practice". Figure 2 illustrates the framework of the 3-dimensional approach. In this approach, "discourse practice" forms a link

"between sociocultural practice and text"; the use of language in social, cultural, and historical contexts shapes text production and informs how the resulting text is interpreted (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 97-98).




Figure 2. Fairclough's Three-dimensional Approach

Source: Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language (Fairclough, 1995, p. 98)

Some factors make Fairclough's approach beneficial; it allows the analyst to focus on the various elements of the text, such as language selection, placement, and arrangement. His three-dimensional approach also offers a wide range of analytical starting points; regardless of the analysis one begins with, it holds equal importance. Analysts can discover, recognize, analyze, and clarify striking patterns and distinctions within the connections (Janks, 1997, pp. 329-330). Fairclough's methodology is an exceptional framework for "analyzing empirical research on communication and society". What's more, Fairclough emphasizes the connection between the hegemony and discursive practice, highlighting how this practice reflects "a hegemonic struggle" that shapes the manufacture and transformation of power dynamics (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 68-76).

3.3. Data Collection

The data sources for the study comprise research articles, newspaper reports, United Nations reports, and reports from global non-governmental organizations. The data also obtained for the study came from the responses provided by participants in an online questionnaire (Please see Appendix A for the questions).

3.4 Sampling and Participants

This study applied a snowball or response-driven method. Snowball sampling was developed and introduced by the works of James Samuel Coleman in 1958 and 1959 and Leo Goodman in 1961. Snowball sampling or response-driven sampling is a sampling design approach for hard-to-reach populations. In these populations, obtaining or generating a sampling frame is often impossible. Goodman asserts that a frame would be very difficult or costly to use if the sample had a frame. It is in this context that he defines the concept of hard-to-reach communities (Goodman, 2011, pp. 347-349).

In this regard, clarifying why the snowball sampling method was chosen for this study is imperative. Obtaining participants for the thesis was challenging due to the sensitive topic and difficult fieldwork conditions in Saudi Arabia. On top of this, the sensitivity of the thesis topic for citizens in Saudi Arabia and Turkey made it difficult to reach participants through other means. The participants in the study were acquired from Saudi Arabia and Turkey through a combination of my network and their connections as outlined in the sampling method. All this communication process was carried out through email and text messages and the research was substantiated by nine from Saudi Arabia and eleven participants (See the Table 2 and 3). Participants were required to respond to thirteen open-ended questions on the structured online questionnaire and answer basic queries on age, gender, and educational status. The questionnaire encompassed diverse questions, from straightforward to complex ones. So, participants were presented with the challenging yet manageable task of answering these questions.

Table 1

Saudi Arabian Participants and Demographics

Participants	Age	Gender	Education
Sarah	34	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Aziza	37	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Nadia	29	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Arwa	30	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Nawal	33	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Salwa	43	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Hanan	27	Female	Bachelor's
Mona	24	Female	High School
Zahra	30	Female	High School

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 2

Turkish Participants and Demographics

Participants	Age	Gender	Education
Nurdan	38	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Zeynep	40	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Yavuz	39	Male	Postgraduate or Higher
Dilay	40	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Mustafa	55	Male	Postgraduate or Higher
Mehmet	48	Male	Postgraduate or Higher
Ahmet	67	Male	Vocational School
Sefa	64	Male	Postgraduate or Higher
Oktay	41	Male	Bachelor's
Dilek	41	Female	Postgraduate or Higher
Nehir	30	Female	Postgraduate or Higher

Notes. * The Table 1 and 2 display the individuals' pseudonyms rather than their real names.

Source: Compiled by the author

3.5. Data Analysis

The analysis of the study was based on N. Fairclough's 3-Dimensional model, and the general framework is presented in Diagram 1, which displays that the sample comprises citizens of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Also, the specific tools used to conduct the research included online questionnaires (in English and Turkish) created in Google Forms and MAXQDA for coding.




Figure 3. Data Analysis Framework of the Study

Source: Compiled by the author

3.6. Findings and Discussion

3.6.1. Description (Text Analysis)

The initial stage of the 3-dimensional critical discourse analysis is text analysis. According to Norman Fairclough, text analysis can be conducted by examining the categories

of vocabulary, grammar, and text structure. (Fairclough, 1992, p. 75) Fairclough has provided a set of guiding questions that he deems crucial for analyzing vocabulary, grammar, and textual structure in description (text analysis). These questions (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 92-93) are as follows in Table 3:

Table 3

Questions of Text Analysis

Vocabulary	Grammar	Textual Structure
1. What experiential values do words have? -What classification schemes are drawn upon? -Are there words which are ideologically contested? -Is there rewording or overwording? -What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) are there between words? 2. What relational values do words have? -Are there euphemistic expressions? -Are there markedly formal or informal words? 3. What expressive values do words have? 4. What metaphors are used?	5. What experiential values do grammatical features have? -What types of process and participant predominate? -Is agency unclear? -Are processes what they seem? -Are nominalizations used? -Are sentences active or passive? -Are sentences positive or negative? 6. What relational values do grammatical features have? -What modes (declarative, grammatical question, imperative) are used? -Are there important features of relational modality? -Are the pronouns we and you used, and if so, how? 7. What expressive values do grammatical features have? -Are there important features of expressive modality? 8. How are (simple) sentences linked together? -What logical connectors are used? -Are complex sentences characterized by coordination or subordination? -What means are used for referring inside and outside the text?	9. What larger-scale structures does the text have?

Source: Language and Power (Fairclough , 2013, pp. 92-93)

He also underlined that the values mentioned in the questions should be evaluated based on "experiential, relational and expressive" categories. To put it briefly, experiential value pertains to content, knowledge and beliefs, relational value is related to social connections, and expressive value is based on personal and social identities. Table 4 represents these values.

Table 4

Values of Text Analysis

Dimensions of Meaning	Values of Features	Structural Effects
Contents	Experiential	Knowledge/beliefs
Relations	Relational	Social relations
Subjects	Expressive	Social identities

Source: Language and Power (Fairclough, 2013, p. 94)

The words in Table 4 were coded according to these values; in other words, the questions about these values were considered. Further, it is crucial to point out that more than one of these values can exist simultaneously. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 93)

Therefore, in this section, the written answers obtained from the participants will be analyzed regarding vocabulary, grammar, and sentence structures, as Fairclough stated. Table 4 displays the words coded with MAXQDA as the first step of the analysis.

Table 5

Words' Values for the Rohingya and Uyghur People

	S. Arabia	Saudi Arabia & Turkey	Turkey
Words for identifying	Asian (U) (Expr., Rel.) Religious (Minority) (R) (Expr.)	Minority (R&U) (Expr.) Muslim (R) (Expr., Rel.)	Violence (U) (Expr.) Brotherhood (U) (Rel.) Turkic (U) (Expr., Rel.) Cognate (U) (Rel.) Civilized (U) (Expr., Rel.)
Words for reasons to leave	Beliefs (R) (Rel.) Free (Freedom) (R) (Expr., Rel., Exps.)	Safety (R) (Expr.) Religion (R) (Expr., Rel.)	Genocide (U&R) (Expr., Rel.) Assimilation (U) (Rel.) Persecution (R&U) (Expr., Rel.) Socioeconomic (R&U) (Rel.)
Words for support/aid	(political) regime (R) (Rel.) (against) racism (R) (Expr., Rel., Exps.) (good) attitude (R) (Expr., Rel.) Islam (U) (Expr., Rel.) Religion (U) (Expr.)	-	Provider (R) (Rel.) Confrontation (U) (Expr., Rel.) Asylum (U) (Expr., Rel.) Risky (R) (Expr., Rel., Exps.) Absurd (U) Expr, Exps.) Uphold (U) (Rel.)
Words for Integration	-	-	Influenced (by Chinese) (U) (Rel.) (Our) Ancestors (U) (Rel., Exps.) Integrated (Easily) (U) (Rel., Exps.) Compatible (U) (Rel.)
Words for feeling about fairness	Muslim (U) (Expr., Rel.) Racism (R) (Expr., Rel.) Brotherhood (U) (Rel.) Satisfaction (R) (Expr, Exps.) Cooperation (R) (Rel.) Treated (U) (fairly) (Expr., Rel., Exps.) Unequal (R) (Rel., Exps.)	-	-

*Notes.**Abbreviations for values: Expr. (Experiential), Rel. (Relational), and Exps. (Expressive)

**Please also note that in the table, "R" represents Rohingya people and "U" represents Uyghurs, making it easy to distinguish which word is used for which ethnoreligious group.

Source: Compiled by the author

Before embarking on the analysis, clarifying the content presented in Table 5 is deciding. The first column in the tables includes the words extracted from the responses of the S. Arabian respondents for each group (Rohingya and Uyghur), while the middle column includes shared words used by both Arab and Turkish respondents. The last column contains the words of Turkish respondents. Besides, each row in the table shows the different themes in the questions. In addition to that, the formal values are provided in brackets next to the respective words.

Table 5 predominantly presents words with formal values; as can be seen, these words mostly contain more than one formal value, and these values are primarily Experiential and Relational values. This situation is compatible with both the individual and experiential views of the participants. Regarding the classification scheme of discourse mentioned in Table 3 under Question 1, Fairclough asserts that discourse can present reality in various ways, depending on the choice of words and their proportion. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 96) This study employs a classification scheme to define the participants' language from Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The data in Table 5 indicates a relatively low number of common words used by the two countries' participants for only 'words for identifying and reasons to leave' themes. However, participants selected distinct words for each theme, demonstrating their perspectives and experiences, leading to a holistic understanding of their personal language. This surveillance suggests that there are significant cultural differences between the two countries' participants represented in the study. There could be a variety of factors behind this fact, such as differences in social norms, ethnic background, or historical context, for example, the words 'Asian' by S. Arabian participants and 'Turkic' by Turkish participants.

In response to the question, "What ideologically significant meaning relations (synonymy, hyponymy, antonymy) are there between words?" Table 5 also presents a set of significant ideological connotations, where words such as 'Muslim and Islam', 'Belief and Religion', 'Violence and Persecution', and 'Cognate and Ancestor' are synonyms, on the other hand; 'Asian and Turkic' are hyponyms. Despite that, 'Safety and Risky' are antonymy.

To clarify, Fairclough recommended including words with similar meanings where exact synonyms are unavailable in the text. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 96) Thus, the analysis of the study approached the phenomenon of synonymy from this perspective. Although the words 'Muslim and Islam' have different meanings, they are related to each other. 'Muslim' refers to a person who follows the Islamic faith, while 'Islam' refers to the religion itself; however, they are considered synonymous in this study because of their close relationship. These two words may not be inherently ideological, even though they can take on ideological significance in a

social or political context and substantially affect a society depending on their interpretation and context—for example, ‘Political Islam’ or ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. The same strategy was applied to the other selected synonyms.

It is pivotal to comprehend the concept of hyponymy. In mere terms, hyponymy refers to the relationship between words where “one word is included within the meaning of another word”, and they have a hierarchical structure. (Anderson, 1983, p. 188) For instance, daisies and orchids are categorized as flowers; thus, they are hyponyms of flowers because ‘flower’ is a far-reaching term encompassing a wide range of species. From this relation, Turkic is a term used to reference an ethnic and linguistic community living predominantly in Central Asia, so Turkic can be considered a hyponym of Asia; in other words, Turkic is a subgroup of Asia.

Table 5 contains no euphemistic expressions, but the words listed in the table can be used formally or informally, depending on the context in which they are used. Additionally, only the word ‘Brotherhood’ was considered a metaphor among the coded words because the participants used this word to express the strong and close relationship, they had with one another.

After defining the ‘vocabulary’ part of the questions, this section aims to answer the ‘grammar’ part. The sub-questions under question 5 in Table 3 aim to reveal which experiential value grammatical features have. Fairclough highlights a crucial aspect of the grammatical structure of texts: the way participants use different grammatical structures to express a situation or event can be ideologically determinative. He explained the fact using a simple English sentence structure consisting of a subject (S), verb (V), and object (O). Fairclough’s sentence classification method categorizes sentences structured as S + V + O as “actions”, S + V as “events” (not always), and S + V + Complement (C) as “attributions”. These differences in sentence structures may have ideological or protective motivations in the foregrounding or concealment of ‘agency’. It should be noted that Fairclough’s perspective on the term “agency” is that it is generally characterized as an animated entity; however, he also emphasized that there may be cases where it is not animated (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 100-103).

Grammatical analysis was conducted on participants’ responses to the ‘Reasons to leave’ theme from both countries. The primary objective of selecting this theme is to delve deeper into the concept of ‘agency’ with the sentence structures and analyze if these sentences play a determining role in ideological implications within the context of this study. As part of the ‘Reasons to leave’ theme, respondents were explicitly asked to state what might be the reasons why Rohingya and Uyghurs leave their countries. In this context, the question posed elicited

similar responses for each country, so sample sentences were chosen to demonstrate how the analysis was conducted. Example sentences from S. Arabian respondents,

Salwa: “Because (Conjunction) of their (S) different beliefs (O)”

Salwa’s sentence structure is as follows: Conjunction+Subject+Object.

Nadida: “They (S) left (V) their country (O) because of their religion (Complement)”

The sentence structure of Nadida is Subject+Verb+Object+Complement.

Example sentences from Turkish respondents,

Yavuz: “China (S) assimilated (V) them (O)”

Ahmet: “Buddhist authorities (S) persecute (V) Muslims (O)”

Zeynep: “China (S) assimilates(V) Muslim Turks” (O)

The sentence structures of Yavuz, Ahmet and Zeynep are as follows: S + V + O.

These examples clearly show an eminent disparity between the two countries' participants concerning their explicit mention of the agencies. The Turkish participants were precise in mentioning the agencies on the subject, whereas the Saudi Arabian participants refrained from providing such details. (Please see the 'Interpretation' section for evaluation related to this part.)

Despite this difference, some respondents also did not use the notion of “agency” mentioned above. A brief mention must be made of nominalization, whether sentences are active or passive (because they relate to the concept of ‘agency’) and sentence polarity in terms of positive or negative sentence patterns.

Nominalization is a grammatical feature that causes sentences to lose some of their meaning with a noun transformation. This transformation does not indicate time or how something comes into being or happens, which creates ambiguity (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 143-144). Aside from that, in some cases, passive sentences and nominalization can be similar in not specifying the agency. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 104)

After a thorough analysis of the responses from participants in both countries, it can be confidently stated that despite the negligible use of passive sentence structures and nominalization, active sentence structures intensely dominate. For example, Arwa says, “I think it is unequal”, regarding the question “How do you feel about Rohingya people being treated less fairly or more fairly than other refugees in your country of residence?” which includes a mental action, 'thinking'. However, most of the active sentences in the data do not contain any information about the agency. In other words, most participants' active sentences do not convey information about responsibility or how the event occurred. This situation can

be exemplified by examining some of the participants' sentence structures. Below are a few examples from some participants to illustrate the active and passive sentence structures and nominalization without agency.

Salwa: "They support through proper channels." (Active sentence structure)

Salwa's response to the question about support/sending aid was active in sentence structure. However, her sentence failed to provide information about the agency in charge or how the aid was delivered.

Mehmet: "They are persecuted because of their beliefs." (Passive sentence structure)

Mehmet's answer to 'the reasons to leave' theme is a passive sentence structure, but he does not specify the agency. The sentence states that People (they) are persecuted for their beliefs, but again, it does not indicate by whom and how the action of 'persecution' is applied.

Nehir: "Socioeconomic factors." (Nominalization)

In Nehir's answer for the 'reasons to leave' theme, the adjective 'socioeconomic' describes the noun 'factors', i.e., a situation related to social and economic factors. Nevertheless, the sentence does not explain who is responsible or what these factors are.

Examining positive and negative sentences, the data includes sentence patterns from participants in both countries that are both positive and negative in nature. As an illustration, the utterances of the Turkish participants about the identification of Rohingya people and, in particular, the Uyghurs are infused with negativity. As Dilay put it, "They were subjected to violence" for both minority groups, or Mustafa's statement, "Our Muslim brothers in East Turkistan are facing Chinese persecution." for Uyghurs. Fairclough postulates that negative sentences are connected to "experiential value" and serve the purpose of distinguishing the difference between what is actual and what is not. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 104)

Alternatively, Saudi Arabian respondents showed their approval of their nation's assistance to the Rohingya people, as demonstrated by Hanan's positive sentence statement, "I support that 100%."

With respect to the relational values of grammar, modes, modality, and pronouns must be taken into account, as question 6 in Table 3 indicates. Three modes stand out: "declarative, grammatical question and imperative". Structuring sentences in Declarative mode places the Verb after the Subject. Going through the grammar questions, they usually prompt a yes or no response, and the imperative mode appears when the writer or speaker has to demand action from the interlocutor (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 104-105).

The responses from the participants are generally composed of declarative sentences, with no grammar questions included. The following examples of declarative mode are presented with sentences from participants.

Sefa: "There is persecution and genocide." The word "there" functions as the subject in this sentence, with the verb 'is' conveying the fact that something exists.

Nadida: "I feel sad when their treatment is less fair than the refugees." Once more, the S+V structure is being used with "I" placed before "feel", conveying the participant's feelings about the situation.

The imperative mode does not apply to the study. As a further linguistic concept, modality depends on how people employ language, contingent upon the authority of the person speaking or writing (in this context, participants). Two kinds of modality can be distinguished: relational modality, with participants having authority over each other, and expressive modality, which deals with determining truth or veracity. Additionally, the expressive value of a sentence becomes apparent by its grammatical components, such as modal auxiliaries, adverbs, and tenses. The presence of these elements, significant components of modality, allows us to recognize ideological interests. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 105-107) This research does not consider the relational aspect, as there is no existing connection between the participants. However, the participants' responses to the questions present an experiential modality. Hence, the response to question 7 in Table 3 is provided along with the response to the preceding question.

As an exemplar of the modality of expression, Nawal's phrase will make the concept more perspicuous. Nawal's sentence, "They cannot do what they want in terms of religion." is articulated in the negative simple present tense format using the verb "cannot" to signify that an action is impossible. This sentence might be an ideological expression of Nawal's view that religious beliefs and rituals are to be respected and should not be suppressed.

Fairclough further commented that using the pronouns 'you' and 'we' reveals a power dynamic and a sense of solidarity (Fairclough, 2013, p. 106). It is essential to stress that none of the participants from Saudi Arabia employed a sentence pattern featuring these pronouns. On the contrary, some Turkish participants employed sentences with the pronoun "we". Dilek's sentence, for example, exhibits the implementation of the "we" pronoun, "we should open our doors to anyone who is persecuted". "We" in this context is a reference to the state, Turkey, the people of the nation and its political agenda. Furthermore, she establishes a solidarity alliance with "should open our doors". She then illustrates the power of a country and the

collective nation, including herself, and her willingness to support the powerless and persecuted.

Fairclough highlighted that the 8th question and its relevant sub-questions could result in ideological assumptions. He pays attention to the conjunctions used in sentences, their ability to combine basic sentences into more complex ones, the use of pronouns, and the application of articles referring to something inside or outside the text, bolstering ideological presumptions. Additionally, these components forge a relationship between sentences, called cohesion. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 108-110).

An important point to consider in this section's analysis is the disparity between the two groups regarding their sentence structures. Turkish participants, in comparison to Saudi Arabian participants, demonstrate a more far-reaching response in terms of complex sentence structures, logical links, coordination and sub-coordination, whereas the latter rarely display these elements in their answers. Zeynep's response to the question relating to the support/aid theme was taken as an example to demonstrate the mentioned grammatical components.

Zeynep: "I view it as a positive, but there should be a restriction on the extent of humanitarian assistance. It seems absurd to rush to help the people of other countries when there are millions in need in our own country. It is okay to help however there should be a limit. There is also the risk of a confrontation with China."

The initial three sentences of the text are linked together using logical connectors like "but", "when", and "however". These conjunctions concurrently, give simple sentences a more complex form. In the first sentence, "I view it as a positive, but there should be a restriction on the extent of humanitarian assistance", "I view it as a positive" is the main clause, and the rest of the sentence is the second clause. The conjunction 'but' presents a contrasting idea to the preceding statement.

The sentence "It seems absurd to rush to help the people of other countries when there are millions in need in our own country" is composed of two parts as well: a main clause, "It seems absurd to rush to help people of other countries" and a second clause starts with the conjunction "when" that supplies further information.

Furthermore, the statement, "It is okay to help; however, there should be a limit." has an identical format to the other two sentences. The conjunction 'however' brings a condition to the main clause of the sentence. Both coordination and subordination structures are present in all three sentences. Consequently, Zeynep is presumed to have an ideological perspective on

Turkey's refugee and international aid policies. She further proposes that assistance should be restricted, as Turkey could face potential repercussions to its foreign policy with China.

In response to the question “What larger-scale structures does the text have?”, the texts examined in this study included the participants' replies to the questions, and each participant's text scale is distinctive. (For the text structure please see the 3.4 Sampling and Participants section)

The participants' responses provide insights into societal perspectives on ethnic and religious minority groups in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. However, the letter¹ sent to the United Nations Human Rights Council co-signed by 50 countries in 2019, including Saudi Arabia, presents an opportunity to conduct an institutional assessment of the situation concerning the Uyghurs (Please see the Appendix B). The letter unambiguously demonstrated Saudi Arabia's position on the Uyghur predicament. (Human Rights Council, 2019) The letter's coding was done inductively using MAXQDA's hierarchical framework. It is also important to emphasize that, for the textual analysis of the letter, the questions in Table 3 and the values in Table 4 have been taken as the basis.




Figure 4. The Coding Framework of the Letter

Source: Author's calculation

The coding of the text was categorized as positive and negative. In this regard, the text was determined that there was a total of 37 statements, with 17 statements classified as negative and 20 as positive. These codes are detailed in Table 6, including the frequency of each repeated word in parentheses. Positive and negative coding allows for interpretation and inference about the text, considering the context.

¹ Turkey is not a signatory or a party to this letter. The analysis of the letter is conducted from the perspective of Saudi Arabia.

Table 6

Codes and values of the words of the Support Letter

Negative	Positive
Terrorism (Experiential, Relational) (2)	Security (Experiential, Relational) (2)
Counterterrorism (Experiential, Relational) (3)	Respected (Relational, Expressive)
Separatism (Relational, Expressive)	Safeguarded (Relational)
Religious extremism (Relational)	Protected (Experiential, Relational)
Contradicted (Experiential, Relational)	Safety (Experiential)
Infringed (Relational)	Constructive (Relational, Expressive)
Pressure (Experiential, Relational)	Non-confrontational (Relational, Expressive)
Terrorist (Relational)	Remarkable (Experiential, Relational)
Attack (Experiential, Relational)	Happiness (Expressive)
De-radicalization (Relational) (3)	Fulfillment (Experiential, Expressive)
Non-politicized (Relational, Expressive)	Transparency (Experiential, Relational)
Naming and Shaming (Relational, Expressive)	Openness (Experiential, Expressive)
Damage (Experiential, Relational)	Contribution (Relational, Expressive)
Opposition (Relational)	Promoting (Relational, Expressive)
Challenge (Experiential, Relational)	Development (Experiential, Relational) (3)
Nonselective (Relational, Expressive)	People-centered (Relational, Expressive)
	Achievements (Experiential, Relational)
	Appreciate (Relational, Expressive)
	Human rights (Experiential, Relational) (8)
	Objective (Relational) (2)

Source: Author's Analysis

It is observed that the values of the words in the table are primarily focused on experiential and relational. When combined with the values in Table 4, it can be suggested that, in the specific context of Saudi Arabia, these countries believe in supporting China's policies in the region. However, the relational nature of some words can be interpreted as an indication of both political and economic relationships between the signatory countries and China.

The classification scheme of the text has been created to comprehend Saudi Arabia's discourse on the Uighur issue institutionally. Among the words in the table, groups of words can be considered synonyms, antonyms, and hyponyms. For instance, the words "terrorism", "deradicalization", and "attack" are considered synonymous. Words like "infringed and

respected” and “terrorism and security”, on the other hand, serve as examples of antonyms. Finally, terms like “religious extremism and terrorist attack” are evaluated as hyponyms of the word “terrorism”.

When examining the relational features of the text, the expression “vocational education and training centers” used in the letter appears as a euphemistic phrase reflecting Saudi Arabia’s stance in legitimizing the camps established in the Xinjiang region. The allegations that China violates human rights are based on the claim that Uighurs are held in these camps and subjected to various forms of mistreatment. Describing these camps as “vocational education and training centers” in the letter portrays these institutions as not camps but rather a positive development, emphasizing their role as educational centers. The letter, having a formal nature as an official document, employs formal language.

Regarding the grammatical features of the text, the sentences mostly follow the Subject + Verb + Object structure. For instance, “We (S) appreciate (V) China's commitment to openness and transparency (O)”.

Despite the repeated expressions related to terrorism, religious extremism, and counterterrorism in the letter, there is no information about which ethnic group in the region is responsible for these actions. Furthermore, although the targeted group for human rights violations by China is the Uyghurs, the word “Uyghur” is not mentioned in the letter. While the sentences in the text mostly have an active structure, the agency is not explicitly specified. For example, “We note with appreciation that human rights are respected and protected in China in the process of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization”. The text contains numerous instances of nominalization, and the phrase “the process of counter-terrorism and deradicalization” in the previous example sentence can be an instance of nominalization. It also should be noted that the text is written in a declarative mood and employs positive sentences.

The frequent use of the pronoun 'we' in the letter is noteworthy. There are two possibilities here: first, it may be used to represent the signatory countries collectively, as it is a letter jointly signed by 50 nations. Second, it might emphasize a power relationship between the countries supporting China in the Uygur issue and those accusing.

3.6.2. Interpretation (Processing Analysis)

This section will consider the stages of interpretation outlined in Diagram 1. To comprehend and make sense of the everyday lives of individuals living in society, it is crucial to recognize the presence of elements that tend to be neglected or overlooked. These often-neglected factors (background features), such as cultural influences, social expectations, and

social relations, are employed to interpret society and shape everyday discourse. (Garfinkel, 1964, pp. 225-229) Alongside this, Fairclough further professes that a society's discourse represents that society's overall perspective, which is interrelated with ideology. He also stated that the effectiveness of an ideology hinges on a society's common mindset and discourse. He has examined the idea of interpretation in two ways - as a stage of the three-dimensional approach and as the interpretation or assessment of the texts based on the participants' perspectives and experiences. In short, interpreting is a synthesis of the interpretations of those involved, the data within "the text and the personal experiences" and notions of the participants (Members' Resources/MR). (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 64-118)

The context interpretation relies on the concepts of "situational" and "intertextuality." Analyzing the situational context requires focusing on four primary inquiries: "What is going on? Who is involved? In what relations? What is the role of language?". These questions are linked to contents, subjects, relations, and connections, respectively. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 121-124)

Table 6 provides a general framework of the discourse types and the situation adapted to this study concerning these questions. Specifically, the content in Table 6 depends on several factors, including the type of activity, the topic, and the purpose of the study. The subjects highlight the participants' countries of origin. At the same time, the relations focus on the connection between the citizens of those countries and the ethnic groups involved according to the context of this study. Lastly, the connections ascertain the type of information gathered. These factors elucidate the framework in which the individuals interpret the event influenced by the culture and society of which they are a component.

Table 7

The Study's Framework of Situational Context

Discourse Type	Situation
Contents	Activity: Filling in the questionnaire Topic: Social discourse on Rohingya and Uyghur people Purpose: Unveiling social discourse
Subjects	Members of the societies (Saudi Arabia and Turkey)
Relations	Host countries and Humanitarian aid providers
Connections	Written language

Source: Adapted by the author from Language and Power (Fairclough, 2013, p. 122)

In an intertextual context framework, texts are reviewed from a historical point of view, and interpretation is the practice of identifying the historical context in which the participants analyze the texts and find common ground (Fairclough, 2013, p. 121).

As opposed to context, the text is interpreted in four distinct ways. In the first level, the surface of utterance is the act of transforming strings of sounds into linguistic conceptions. This step will not be addressed as no phoneme sequences exist in this research. In the second level, meaning of utterance is the process of assigning meaning to the expressions in the text, which involves discovering implicit meanings not clearly stated in the text through pragmatic techniques. In the third level, local coherence is the establishment of logical and consistent connections of meaning in a text through implicit assumptions that Question 8 and its subheadings in Table 2 indicate as being local coherence. In the fourth level, the structure and points of the text are associated with the overall organization of the text and the expression of the central theme or purpose. (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 119-120) The data interpretation phase of this research, which involved analyzing participants' responses from Saudi Arabia and Turkey, was conducted by considering the abovementioned factors.

The participants' answers to how they would define these two ethnoreligious groups were evaluated. Saudi Arabian respondents identified the Rohingya and Uyghur people by race and religious belief. The fact that the participants from Saudi Arabia define a minority group based on religious belief can be considered in the context of social norms and expectations based on Islam. Adopting a narrow perspective and categorizing a minority population based exclusively on religious grounds is a constrictive measure, as it disregards other essential elements such as the culture, language, and traditions of the group. This biased approach hinders our understanding of the group and ignores its broader complexities. In Saudi Arabia, where Islamic values represent many activities such as politics and public order, categorizing a minority group as 'Muslim' may provide insight into participants' social and political ideology. It is, therefore, apparent that the participants' answers have relational and experiential elements. Moreover, the term 'Asian' might be used to indicate differences in culture, geography, and ethnicity, but also to signify social status and power structure; in other words, 'Asian' could allude to the working class. It is worth noting that on a global scale, Saudi Arabia is home to the second-highest number of migrant workers (Javid & Hasanov, 2023, p. 2).

By contrast, Turkish respondents, particularly for the Uyghur people, distinguished them according to religious and kinship ties. As for the Arakanese, the Turkish respondents

developed a connection with this group based on a sense of "brotherhood" because of their shared Muslim identity. Turkish foreign policy has a strong bond with the idea of brotherhood". Throughout the political history of the Republic of Turkey, certain countries are recognized as "brother countries"; in contrast, some other countries are referred to as "friends and brother countries" in foreign policy, and in general, this phenomenon has been based on ethnicity and religion (Karataş, 2021, pp. 39, 48-51).

In addition, referring to a minority group in the context of 'violence' assumes that the participants are knowledgeable about the group's experiences and could potentially be seen as taking a stance against human rights abuses. Therefore, the Turkish and Saudi Arabian participants used different words to describe these groups. This situation also reveals the differences between the two communities regarding the context.

Apart from the question themes identified in Table 4, The survey inquired if the media coverage for the two ethno-religious minorities is good enough according to the respondents' perspectives. It is clear from the responses that the majority of Saudi Arabian respondents believe that the media coverage of the Arakanese is insufficient; one respondent believed that it is sufficient, and one respondent is not sure. For Uyghurs, six (6) of the same participants think that news about Uyghurs does not receive sufficient coverage in the media, one (1) states that it is sufficient, one (1) is not sure, and one (1) respondent has no answer. In the case of Turkish participants, the situation is as follows: ten (10) people stated that both minority groups are not sufficiently covered in the media. In addition to that, one (1) person has no opinion on this issue.

The participants of the two countries were also asked to specify the sources from which they obtained information about these ethnoreligious minority groups. Two participants (2) mentioned that they relied on television as their source of information. Seven participants (7) mentioned using social media channels like Twitter and Facebook to obtain information. The rest of the participants obtained information through various channels, including social media, newspapers, and television. As evidenced by the answers to this question, Figures 4 and 5 indicate the concentration of keywords on Twitter/X regarding the two minority groups from April 2017 to April 2018. Both graphs show the increase in mentions of the keywords in terms of Rohingya and Uyghurs in 2017 and how influential social media has been in offering access to information. Nevertheless, a noticeable decrease in posts with these keywords was noticed in 2018. As evidenced by Figure 5, the word Rohingya featured in approximately 3 million posts in September 2017, yet this figure significantly diminished the following month. It is

worth noting that the purposes of posts using these keywords vary. These posts are used to express support for these minority groups or to share related news by users.

For example, the user Şule @Deutschule, using the keyword Arakanese in Figure 5, wrote the following comment under a United Nations post: “I would like to start my speech by saying dear, but you don't deserve it. Can't you see Arakan? There are a lot of people who are tortured. 1st article: “To maintain international peace and security”. Now I am asking: where is international peace? Why are all Arakanese dying?” (Şule, 2017).




Figure 5. Twitter/X Keywords for the Rohingya

Source: Compiled by the author on Sprout Social

The graphical representation in Figure 6 reveals that in April 2017, the term Xinjiang was present in more than 27,000 posts. This figure saw an approximate 50 per cent decline in October 2017, followed by fluctuating levels until March 2018. A user named Carl Zha @carlzha shared a tweet which included the keyword East Turkistan as follows: “Uyghur dressed in Turkish Uniform and East Turkistan patches openly declaring war against China in Mandarin, bordering Hatay province, Afrin, Syria.” (Zha, 2018)




Figure 6. Twitter/X Keywords for Uyghurs

Source: Compiled by the author on Sprout Social

In the sequel, participants were asked “In your opinion, what might be the reason for the Uyghurs to flee their countries?” The text analysis section presents information regarding the sentence structures of the participants, with a distinct contrast between Saudi Arabian and most Turkish participants. None of the Arab participants responded to the motivating factors behind Uyghurs leaving their homeland. The exclusion of an indicator related to ‘agency’ regarding the Arakanese and the absence of any information regarding the Uyghurs may have various reasons. Should there be an absence of knowledge on the subject, apprehension concerning security because of the delicate character of the matter, or if Saudi Arabia's state policy is in agreement with Myanmar and China, respondents might have selected to forgo providing facts on the agency and decline to reply to the queries.

Examining the link between Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, and China is essential. The Rakhine (Arakan) region is abundant in natural resources. A comprehensive analysis of Myanmar's natural resources conducted in 2015 unearthed a considerable amount of oil and gas reserves. The estimated oil reserves were substantial, amounting to 3.2 billion barrels. On the other hand, the gas reserves were far more exceptional, estimated to be 18 trillion cubic feet. (Debnath, Chatterjee, & Afzal, 2022, p. 193) Saudi Arabia, China, and Myanmar governments have formed a joint effort to manufacture natural resources in the Rakhine state effectively (Wagner & Schatz, 2017). Also, an oil and gas pipeline between China and Myanmar, built in 2017, carries oil and gas from the Middle East to China. The Saudi Arabian Oil Group has agreed to supply 200,000 barrels of crude oil to China via this line. Through this agreement, China promised to assist in advancing Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu refinery. (Forest, 2015) Hence, the respondents may have avoided assigning blame to any agency due to their countries' diplomatic and economic links.

In contrast to those from Saudi Arabia, the majority of Turkish participants held both the Chinese government and Buddhist government in Myanmar responsible for the displacement of the Rohingya and Uyghur populations; in other words, the Turkish respondents expressed the agencies more clearly than the Arab respondents. As mentioned earlier in this section, Turkey's foreign policy, having evolved from brotherhood nations based on religion and ethnicity and a sense of belonging, could have encouraged the participants to express overtly those responsible. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statements in the meeting with foreign ambassadors in 2015 validate this state of affairs in Turkey's foreign policy; “We have kin all over the world. Incidents, taking place in all regions from Balkans to Central Asia, from Crimea to North Africa, concern us.” and he continued “I would like to express that Turkey

stands by the Uyghur Turks in China just like it stands by all its brothers and kin.” (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2015). Also, the President’s words may be motivating certain members of society to speak out against the infringement of human rights and the oppression of minority groups. It is worth noting that the reasons behind the lack of information provided by some Turkish respondents about the agency may be similar to those of Arabian respondents in the context of Turkey.

The questionnaire included a question that asked participants for their opinion on the support/aid by their country to two ethnoreligious groups. Saudi Arabia and Turkey have provided financial and humanitarian relief to the Rohingyas. However, they maintain divergent views on the Uyghurs. The literature of this research contains extensive information on the aid and activities for these minorities in the subsections ‘Status in Saudi Arabia and Turkey’. For this reason, no information is presented here regarding this topic. Almost all of the Saudi Arabian participants support their country's involvement with these minority groups, which might suggest that there is underlying social support for the state's foreign policy. Furthermore, those surveyed may indicate that giving aid helps elevate their country’s standing in the international community and produces a favorable image.

Turkish respondents answered this question in different contexts. Although some participants approved the assistance, others were critical and proposed that it should be restricted. Turkey's aid and granting of asylum have been the center of much controversy in Turkish society over its position as the country with the largest refugee population in the world (European Commission, 2023). Through these debates, ultra-nationalist populist discourse has become commonplace in Turkey, making xenophobia an everyday occurrence (Saylan & Aknur, 2023, p. 273). In this context, it can be asserted that the participants who voiced their disapproval of the aid exhibited nationalist ideology through their comments.

Saudi and Turkish respondents were asked about their views on integrating Arakanese and Uyghurs in their countries. It should be noted that Turkish respondents were only asked about Uyghurs as the number of Arakanese in Turkey is unknown. Except for the two Saudi respondents who declared their lack of knowledge about the topic, none of the other respondents provided an answer to the question. It has been pointed out by some Turkish respondents that the Uyghurs are an integral part of Turkish society due to their shared ancestry with the Turkish population. In contrast, others think that they should be integrated.

Participants were required to share how they felt about the fair treatment of two minority groups against that of other asylum-seeker/refugee groups as the final question of the

questionnaire. There is a division among Turkish respondents in their opinions, with four (4) stating that there is no fairness, three (3) stating a lack of information on the issue, and only two (2) believing that there is fairness for both minority groups. While one (1) participant described the Syrian refugees as being “not as important as Syrians” and one participant (1) compared Myanmar and China with Syria by saying, "If they were neighbors, everything would be different" for Rohingya and Uyghurs. Conversely, six (6) respondents from Saudi Arabia provided an inaccurate response to the question. Additionally, one participant (1) is neutral, another (1) has no opinion, and the final participant (1) finds it optimistic. Possibly, Syria being brought to the forefront and being used for comparison symbolizes the lack of essential matters such as uneven distribution of resources, discrimination, and equity.

Regarding the letter sent to the United Nations, of which Saudi Arabia is a signatory, the letter's choice of words and sentence structures show that Saudi Arabia adopts a pragmatic perspective in its foreign policy. Indeed, Majid Rafizadeh argues that this approach of the Saudi administration is a decisive factor in ensuring “peace, security and prosperity” in the international arena (Rafizadeh, 2023).

3.6.3. Explanation (Social Analysis)

Explanation is formed by producing discourse and sociocultural practices, as seen in Figure 3, and is the last step of the 3-dimensional critical discourse analysis.

The explanation dimension seeks to uncover how discourses function in social contexts and simultaneously assess the social effects of these functioning processes by analyzing power struggles and power relations. Discourse impact on society depends on the power relations created through struggles. These power dynamics can have wide-ranging implications on society, from the social to institutional and situational dimensions. Discourse, then, is swayed by social norms, institutional structures, and situational contexts, and it has a part to play in the molding of social struggles. Fairclough perceives Members' Resources (MR) in an ideological manner. MR conveyed through interpersonal contact is grounded in suppositions regarding interaction, shared values, beliefs, and identities that originate from a societal or institutional source from a power-structured origin. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 138) The social and institutional structures of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are discussed in detail in section 2.9.

3.6.4. Discussion

The first research question of this study is ‘How ideological power dynamics impact the discourses of Saudi and Turkish societies regarding Rohingya and Uyghurs as Asian ethnic and religious minorities?’. In this respect, the literature review and the research findings prove that discourse effectively influences ideological power dynamics.

The multi-ethnic structure of Myanmar and China motivated them to attempt nation-state building to develop national unity, identity, and political stability. The development of Myanmar's Burmese-focused and China's Han-focused nation-states has resulted in conflicts among different ethnic groups as well as between the government and ethnic minorities. A conflict mechanism has emerged throughout the historical, social, and political contexts covered in this study's literature and research, as shown in Figure 7. The transformation of the state into a nation-state emerges ethnoreligious nationalism, which paves in the concept of “us and others” in society's discourse- Buddhist majority and Muslim minority- and ends in conflict.




Figure 7. Ethnoreligious Conflict Mechanism for Myanmar and China

Source: Compiled by the author

The idea of otherness, which received little emphasis pre-colonization, has now become a crucial aspect in the post-colonial era. Through discourse, the idea of the "other" is established as a hierarchical system of “us” and “them” Asymmetrical power relations need to exist for this formation, in other words, there is a need for a dominant and dominated relationship. The dominant group's actions rely on the absence of identity within the subordinate group, perpetuated by stereotypes. The subordinate group, however, develops its distinctiveness by constructing multiple “others” and setting itself apart. (Staszak, 2009, pp. 25-26) It is apparent

from this study that the dominant groups of Burmese Buddhists and Chinese Han have an asymmetrical relationship with the “other” identities of Rohingya and Uyghur. The asymmetrical nature of this relationship has caused the Rohingya and Uyghur populations to experience economic and social exclusion while simultaneously being perceived as different and/or threatening as the “other”.

It can be argued that the phenomenon of “us and the other” created by the nation-state construction also constitutes the basis of marginalization in the host countries where migrant communities live. Hence, Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, in their study “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior”, refer to two processes in intergroup relations: social change and intergroup extremism. They emphasize that these two processes shape the behavior of individuals towards their groups and other groups; more specifically, these processes are the source of conflict and tension between groups. It is because, in social change, individuals tend to exhibit negative behavior towards the other group to protect the identity and values of the group they belong to, while in the case of intergroup extremism, individuals tend to see the group they belong to as superior to other groups. This situation causes prejudice and discrimination between groups to become visible. (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, pp. 10-11) Mustafa Dođanođlu argues that once the negative perception of "the other" emerges, it overshadows the accurate information about the other (Dođanođlu, 2022, p. 321).

The concept of “us and the other” in this context can be grounded on the example of Turks and Syrians (the other). Emel K okpınar Kaya, Emre Yađlı and Yeliz Demir analyzed the discourse against Syrians on Twitter and found that Syrians were defined as “looters, thieves, prone to violence and viruses” by Turkish people (Kaya, Yađlı , & Demir, 2022, p. 293). In this context, it would be wrong to say that the whole society adopts these discourses. Still, there is a possibility that the social and economic problems that are becoming more apparent due to Turkey’s intensive immigration are also directed against other refugee groups (“Rohingya” and “Uyghurs” in particular).

Moreover, this study has identified contradictions in Saudi Arabia's and Turkey's foreign policy strategies in their approaches and actions. Saudi Arabia's decision to accept the Rohingyas into their country contradicts their lack of support for the Uyghurs due to their close economic relations with China. It can be argued that Turkey is facing the same case. The dynamic relationship with China since 2013 created a complex situation, causing doubts about the suitable policies for the Uyghurs. Turkey demonstrates exceptional efforts in extending humanitarian aid to Myanmar. While it is understandable for these countries to make strategic

moves to protect their interests, Turkey, at least as a “democratic country”, should strive for a more open and transparent approach to its policies and should not ignore human rights violations in the countries where it cooperates.

That is to say, the Wahhabi teachings in Saudi Arabia are rooted in a radical ideology. Saudi Arabia exported the doctrine of Wahhabism by to radicalize Muslims abroad and finance their struggle (Choksy & Choksy, 2015, p. 24). To put it clearly, the Saudi royal family provided financial support to the Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda during the September 11 attacks in the United States (Department of the Treasury, 2001). This means they were supporting terrorism while also labelling the Uyghurs as terrorists and supporting China.

Under the scope of the answers the Saudi participants gave to the questions, no negative discourse was encountered for Rohingya and Uyghurs in general. Possibly, the underlying reason for this "positivity" is that Saudi Arabia has the second-highest number of immigrants in the world due to its oil industry. Therefore, Saudi society might have fit a tolerance towards diversity.

Moreover, the fact that Saudi participants frequently used sentences with religious references can be evaluated as Pan-Islamist ideology. From this perspective, it is possible to assume that this ideology remains prevalent in Saudi society; they see themselves as the protector and their homeland as the epicenter of Islam, establishing a power relationship with members of both minority groups. The politicization of Islam through state-controlled fatwas also resulted in the Saudis forming a power dynamic with other Muslim minorities in Saudi Arabia.

The unexpected result for the Saudi respondents was that they did not answer some questions about Uyghurs, especially with regards to their integration into society. The literature notes that the Uyghurs represent a socially integrated group in Saudi Arabia, contributing to the labor force. Consequently, the participants were expected to give a small amount of information to this question. However, the Saudi regime's support of the Chinese authorities regarding the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region “in the name of combating terrorism” and bilateral economic cooperation may play an influential role in the participants' views. Despite that, it cannot be denied that the Saudi absolute monarchy's strict control over the media, censorship and internet filtering has a weighty effect in shaping the society (Nawar, 2003, p. 57). Saudi Arabia introduced the Anti-Cyber Crime Law in 2007 to “protect” society from harmful internet content by filtering internet data through The Communications, Space & Technology Commission (The Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, 2007). The fact

that strictly state-controlled internet access makes arbitrary decisions on issues deemed undesirable or threatening to Saudi society by the state disconnected its citizens from the outside world to some degree. The filtering of the internet reflects the Saudi regime's fear of news about the Uyghur issue as threatening to its society. There may be the possibility of blocking some Uyghur-related news or obtaining accurate information regarding these marginalized groups in this sense by the Saudi authorities. In the context of this study, the participants who opted not to provide answers to the questions reveal the possibility that they may not possess awareness of the Uyghurs. Most Saudi participants supported the study's findings that they believed the Rohingya and Uyghurs were not sufficiently covered.

The structural framework of Saudi Arabia's practice of state and society relations revolves around controlling society through all state institutions. The Saudi government's commitment to modernization in the framework of Wahhabi teachings has resulted in human rights violations by filtering the internet to prevent its citizens from getting information. The issue at hand appears to be 'Why is it critical to have familiarity with these ethnoreligious minorities (the Rohingya and Uyghurs)?'. The inadequate information in the host nations causes racism, xenophobia, inequality, and inter-communal conflicts (International Labour Office (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2001, s. 9-16). Therefore, gaining knowledge about the conditions of these refugee groups' is vital to foster empathy, promote social awareness, and prevent internal conflicts that may occur within society in host countries. Altogether, this study uncovered that the Saudi regime not only undermines human rights by restricting freedom of information but also damages the social harmony of refugees in its country. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's pragmatic approach to foreign policy is not only a mediating actor in ensuring peace and prosperity but also an indication that it is pursuing its interests in economic cooperation with China regarding the Uyghur issue.

Regarding the findings about Turkey and its society, Turkey is a valuable example of how state authorities and institutions shape social discourse, to what extent it can reach and how they try to neutralize the power relationship between the host country's citizens and refugees through "discourse". Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited a tent city for refugees in 2014 and addressed that "In Turkey, hosting you for approximately four years has been a source of immense satisfaction, joy, and rightful pride. You became "muhajir (immigrants)", you left your homelands out of necessity, we became "Ansar (helper)", and we mobilized all our resources for you. No matter what anyone says, you are never a burden to us. In our civilization,

culture, and traditions, a guest is regarded as a source of blessing and an esteemed honor. You endowed us with the role of being 'Ansar' and enriched, dignified, and enlivened our home." (Erdoğan, 2017, p. 48) In his speech, Islamic terms (Muhajir and Ansar) aim to elevate solidarity within society regarding refugees by giving prominence to Turkish hospitality. However, the prolonged stay of Syrian refugees, the economic downturn, and the rising unemployment rate have reshaped the notion of "hospitality" into an ideological shift, contributing to a growing anti-refugee sentiment in Turkish society. In 2023, election campaigns in Turkey showed an increase in anti-refugee sentiment. For example, Ümit Özdağ, leader of the Turkish far-right Victory Party, directed his election campaign on anti-refugee sentiment and succeeded in spreading this anti-refugee views to the public through social media. (Karsit, 2022) The fact that the participants emphasized Syria regarding some questions about the Rohingya and Uyghurs shows that the research findings coincide with the widespread social discourse fueled by politicians.

The growing anti-refugee sentiment in Turkish society is not limited to Syrians; every outsider in the country, regardless of whether they are refugees or not, has become a threat to society. However, it is essential to note that despite all these political, economic, and social factors, the participants of this study have not adopted an entirely negative discourse on Uyghurs. Pan-Turkism ideology underlies the participants' lack of opposing views on Uyghurs. Concerning the ideological framework and power dynamic, it was an expected result for this study that the social discourse of a country, still factoring into the responsibility of uniting the "Turkic world" in its politics is shaped by such ideology.

In the political atmosphere in Turkey, there is no sharp distinction between ideologies anymore, especially regarding refugees and asylum seekers. This situation leads to a complex structure within the discourse's context of power relations. Refugees, especially during elections, become a central element in the political discourse for opposition and ruling parties. From a societal perspective, terms such as "Syrians", "refugees", "Afghans", "illegal immigrants", and "security" are prevalent in the discourse of opposition parties other than the ruling party. However, the case of Uyghurs is unique in Turkey, where both respondents, especially nationalist political parties, and politicians, evaluate Uyghurs not only based on their Muslim religious identity but also on the grounds of their Turkish identity. For instance, Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, wrote the following in a message: "We have never forgotten our brothers and sisters in East Turkistan, who are subjected to oppression and impositions, who are condemned to violations of belief and human rights, and we have

never left them in oblivion. Because they are us, and we are them. Although there are borders and distances between us, our heart is one, our blood is one, our destiny is one.” (Bahçeli, 2023)

Despite that the statements of Sinan Oğan, a politician who stated that he is a Turkish nationalist and a Turanist, in a television program on the Uyghur issue are also noteworthy. Sinan Oğan said that there is oppression and persecution against Uyghurs in Xinjiang, but the situation is not as exaggerated, which caused reactions in the society. However, in a statement he made afterwards, he stated that his words were misunderstood and that the Uyghurs were used as a source of material in the conflict between the United States and China. He also noted that the US has been serving photographs and videos that do not belong to the region (for example, photographs from Myanmar). (Türk Avrasya, 2023)

Through examining Saudi Arabia and Turkey, this study has shown that religious identities ideologically shape the perspective and social discourse towards asylum seekers/refugees, and these ideological approaches create a power relationship between society and asylum seekers. It is also evident that the resulting power relationship has negative consequences for vulnerable groups, especially the Rohingya and Uyghurs. Therefore, states' approach to social issues should align with social reality and establish a balance of power between the two parties. States can collaborate with non-governmental organizations, academics, and leaders of ethnic communities to promote social dialogue and use media channels to spread accurate information and combat prejudice towards minority groups.

The second research question of this study is: “What are the discrepancies between Saudi Arabia and Turkey as non-signatory and signatory countries?” In terms of refugee policies, Turkey, being a party to international agreements, collaborates with international actors regarding the situation of refugees and is accountable. However, the problem is quite the opposite in Saudi Arabia. The complexity of managing refugees is evident due to not being a party to international agreements. The institutional structure and societal control in Saudi Arabia present obstacles to collecting data on the discourse related to Rohingya and Uyghurs and interpreting the information obtained from these data.

The generalizable findings of this study are as follows. Power dynamics in both Saudi Arabia and Turkey affect relations between groups. For example, Saudi Arabia's support for China in the Uyghur issue due to its close cooperation with China, although the Uyghur community is Muslim, and its acceptance of Rohingyas into its country shows how power dynamics have a significant impact. Also, the fact that both countries have complex structures

and different social and cultural structures leads to differences in discourse, especially ideological power dynamics.

3.6.5. Research Limitations

The limited number of participants shows that generalizations cannot be made at some points using the data of this study. Additionally, all participants from Saudi Arabia are women, which does not allow this study to evaluate the male population's social discourse. Another limitation in Saudi Arabia and Turkey is related to the participants' educational backgrounds, with the majority being from highly educated segments of society. Therefore, there is no finding regarding discourse for the less educated parts of societies in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Additionally, conducting face-to-face interviews for such a study would provide researchers with more information. The online format of this study has created limitations as well.

Conclusion

The forced displacement of Rohingya and Sinicized Uyghurs being compelled to flee their countries due to conflicts and human rights violations continues to be a social problem in this century. Since its significant ethnic diversity and Buddhist majority, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) has experienced countless conflicts with the Muslim minority the Rohingya, which have caused many to become stateless. On the other hand, China's Xinjiang region has encountered severe problems due to some regulations implemented. The state's efforts to relocate Han Chinese to the Uyghur autonomous region have led to a clash of ethnicity and religion, mirroring the situation in Myanmar. The fact that the citizens of these two nations share a common historical culture enables them to live in harmony and distribute Uyghur nationalism to other Uyghur diasporas. Furthermore, the refugee policies and social discourses in Saudi Arabia and Turkey offer insight into these minority groups, but there is still much left to be uncovered. By critical discourse analysis, this study examined the societal discourse surrounding ethnoreligious minorities in both Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This research revealed the nationalist ideological power between host countries and refugees.

This research engages the historical, social, and cultural backgrounds of Rohingya and Uyghur communities, both considered Asian ethnoreligious minorities. It conducts a thorough analysis of the social discourse about these minority groups in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, shedding light on the challenges faced by ethnoreligious minorities. The results of this study demonstrated the significance of discourse in the relationship between state and society and how strategic actions between states go against discourse. The allegory of the cave, as

referenced in Plato's State, offers a framework for differentiating between reality and illusion in the context of this study. It could be argued that a specific viewpoint guides these states' actions towards the Rohingyas and Uyghurs, but it does not reflect the actual events. However, the point can be made clear by examining the discrepancies in the actions taken through the lens of what truly exists, such as the Extradition Treaty signed by Turkey and China.

This research also tried to show that the concept of marginalization caused intergroup conflict in nation-state construction for both Myanmar and China. Despite the violence often caused by state policies during nation-building, it cannot be denied that social discourse also plays a significant role.

Finally, Table 8 shows the results of this study in terms of two research questions.

Table 8

Summary of Research Results

1 st research question	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Common identity plays an important role in shaping the discourse. ii. Ideological power dynamics in Saudi and Turkish societies are another critical element shaping the discourse, such as the ideological power dynamics of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. iii. The concept of "Us and the Other" discourse is an effective means of marginalization between groups.
2 nd research question	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. In terms of refugee policies, Saudi Arabia is not a signatory to international agreements, which leads to arbitrary decisions on refugee management. ii. As a signatory country, Turkey must comply with the standards set by international legislation in accepting refugees and providing asylum.

Source: Compiled by the author

References

1. Abir, M. (1993). *SAUDI ARABIA Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis*. Routledge.
2. Ahmad, F. (1993). *The making of modern Turkey*. Routledge.
3. Akturk, S. (2019, November). Persistence of the Islamic Millet as an Ottoman Legacy: Mono-Religious and Anti-Ethnic Definition of Turkish Nationhood. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(6), 893-909.
4. Al Riyadh. (2015, April 28). "Resolving the status of 249,000 Rohingyas within two years and integrating them into society." / تصحيح أوضاع 249 ألف برماوي خلال عامين.. Retrieved from Al Riyadh: <https://www.alriyadh.com/1043173>
5. Al-Rasheed, M. (2021). *The Son King, Reform and Repression in Saudi Arabia*. Oxford University Press.
6. Alaoudh, A. (2018, April 3). *State-Sponsored Fatwas in Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75971>
7. Anderson, J. (1983). Further meaning relations – hyponyms and meronyms/a response to Donald B. Hofler. *Literacy Research and Instruction (Formerly Reading World)*, 22(3), 188-189.
8. Atawneh, M. A. (2017, April 18). Authority-Holders (wulat al-umur) in Contemporary Islamic Politics and Governance: The Case of Saudi Arabia. *Middle East Critique*, 26(2), 123-136.
9. Bahçeli, D. (2023, June 24). *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Genel Başkanı Sayın Devlet BAHÇELİ'nin, sosyal medya hesabı twitter üzerinden yayınladıkları mesajları*. Retrieved from Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: https://www.mhp.org.tr/htmldocs/mhp/5206/mhp/Milliyetci_Hareket_Partisi_Genel_Baskani_Sayin_Devlet_BAHCELI__nin_sosyal_medya_hesabi_twitter_uzerinden_yayinladiklari_mesajla.html
10. Basic Law Of Governance. (1992). *The Basic Law of Governance*. Umm al-Qura Gazette No. 3397. Retrieved from The Shura Council.
11. Bayoumy, Y. (2017, September 23). *Saudi Arabia condemns Myanmar government 'policy of repression'*. Retrieved from Reuters: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-saudi-idUSKCN1BY0RI/>

12. BBC Turkish. (2009, January 30). *Erdoğan'ı binlerce kişi karşıladı*. Retrieved from BBC:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2009/01/090130_erdogan_davos.shtml
13. Becquelin, N. (2000, July). Xinjiang in the Nineties. *The China Journal*(44), 65-90.
14. Berkes, N. (1964). *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press.
15. Beydulla, M. (2020). Experiences of Uyghur Migration to Turkey and the United States: Issues of Religion, Law, Society, Residence, and Citizenship. In R. Jureidini, & S. Hassan, *Migration and Islamic Ethics: Issues of Residence, Naturalization and Citizenship* (pp. 174-195). Brill.
16. Bhattacharji, P. (2012, May 29). *Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region*. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/uighurs-and-chinas-xinjiang-region>
17. Bloomaert, J. (2005). *Discourse, Key Topics in Sociolinguistics*. Cambridge University Press.
18. Bohnet, A., Hong, Z., & Müller, F. (1993, July). China's Open-Door Policy and its Significance for Transformation of the Economic System. *Intereconomics*, 28(4), 191-197.
19. Bora, T. (2017). *Cereyanlar, Türkiye'de Siyasi İdeolojiler*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
20. Brady, A.-M. (2012). “We Are All Part of the Same Family”: China’s Ethnic Propaganda. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 41(4), 159-181.
21. Central Intelligence Agency. (2021). *Burma*. Retrieved from The World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/burma/#people-and-society>
22. China, T. S. (2021, September). *Full Text: Xinjiang Population Dynamics and Data*. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1713594/1713594.htm> adresinden alındı
23. Choksy, C. E., & Choksy, J. (2015, May-June). The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad. *World Affairs*, 178(1), 23-34.
24. CNN. (2009). *Peres, Erdogan in 'amicable talks' after Davos spat*. Retrieved from CNN:

- <https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/01/30/davos.erdogan.peres/index.html>
25. Cumhuriyet. (2009, March 3). *Padişah benzetmesi bu sefer kendi partisinden*. Retrieved from Cumhuriyet: <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/padisah-benzetmesi-bu-sefer-kendi-partisinden-46014>
 26. Cumming-Bruce, N. (2018, August 13). *'No Such Thing': China Denies U.N. Reports of Uighur Detention Camps*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/china-xinjiang-un.html>
 27. Debnath, K., Chatterjee, S., & Afzal, A. (2022, December). Natural Resources and Ethnic Conflict: A Geo-strategic Understanding of the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 26(2), 186-207.
 28. Department of the Treasury. (2001). *Evidence of Financial Links Between Saudi Royal Family and Al Qaeda*. Retrieved from The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/evidence-of-financial-links-between-saudi-royal-family-and-al-qaeda#document/p1/a1>
 29. Doğanoglu, M. (2022). Kimlik-içi Ötekileştirme: Türkiye'deki Suriyeli Göçmenler Örneği. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 21(1), 316-325.
 30. Doumato, E. A. (1993). The Society and Its Environment. In e. b. Metz, *Saudi Arabia : a country study* (pp. 45-106). Saudi Arabia : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.
 31. Erdoğan, R. T. (2017). The Vision of New Turkey "The World Is Bigger Than 5". Department of Corporate Communications.
 32. European Commission. (2023, October 9). *European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations*. Retrieved from European Commission: https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/turkiye_en#:~:text=Introduction,Most%20refugees%20live%20outside%20camps.
 33. Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). *Political Discourse Analysis, A method for advanced students*. Routledge.
 34. Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*. Polity Press.
 35. Fairclough, N. (1995). *Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language*. Longman Publishing.

36. Fairclough, N. (2003). *Analysing Discourse Textual Analysis for Social Research*. Routledge.
37. Fairclough, N. (2010). *Critical Discourse Analysis, The Critical Study of Language* (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
38. Fairclough, N. (2012). Critical discourse analysis. In J. P. Gee, & M. Handford, *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (pp. 9-20). Routledge.
39. Fairclough, N. (2013). *Language and Power, Second Edition*. United States of America: Routledge.
40. Forced Migration Review. (2012, June). *Islam, human rights and displacement*. Retrieved from Forced Migration Review: <https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/FMRpdfs/Human-Rights/human-rights.pdf>
41. Forest, D. (2015, February 4). *This New Project Changes The Global Oil Market*. Retrieved from Oil Price: <https://oilprice.com/Finance/investing-and-trading-reports/This-New-Project-Changes-The-Global-Oil-Market.html>
42. Forgacs, D. (2000). *The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935*. (D. Forgacs, Ed.) New York: New York University Press.
43. Frazer, O. (2015, December 15). International Engagement on Buddhist–Muslim Relations in Myanmar. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 13(4), 82-86.
44. Fuller, G. E., & Starr, S. (2003). *The Xinjiang Problem*. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University.
45. Garfinkel, H. (1964). Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities. *Social Problems*, 11(3), 225-250.
46. Gee, J. P. (2011). *How to do Discourse Analysis A Toolkit*. Routledge.
47. Gee, J. P., & Handford, M. (2012). *The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis*. Routledge.
48. Goodman, L. A. (2011). Comment: On Respondent-Driven Sampling and Snowball Sampling in Hard-To-Reach Populations and Snowball Sampling Not in Hard-to-Reach Populations. *Sociological Methodology*, 347-353.
49. Government of the Union of Myanmar. (1989, June 18). Retrieved from The United Nations Statistics Division: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/8th-uncsgn-docs/inf/8th_UNCSGN_econf.94_INF.75.pdf

50. Göksu, O. (2019). Siyasal Liderlikte Yeni Bir Model Önerisi: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Örneği. *Gaziantep University Journal of Social Sciences*, 18(3), 1058-1080.
51. Guerif, V. (2010, May). Making States, Displacing Peoples A Comparative Perspective of Xinjiang and Tibet in the People's Republic of China. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
52. Güler, E. Z. (2010, August). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Davos "Şovu" ve Etkileri. *Memleket Siyaset Yönetim*, 5(13), 205-231.
53. Halliday, M. A. (1978). *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning*. University Park Press.
54. Halliday, M. A. (2015). Language as code and language as behaviour: a systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In R. P. Fawcett, M. Halliday , S. Lamb , & A. Makkai , *Language as Social Semiotic* (pp. 3-34). Bloomsbury Publishing.
55. Hansen, M. H. (1999). Education and Chinese Minority Policy. In M. H. HANSEN, *Lessons in Being Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China* (Vol. 56, pp. 3-24). University of Washington Press.
56. Herre, B., Arriagada , P., & Roser, M. (2023, March 2). *Human Rights*. Retrieved from Our World in Data: <https://ourworldindata.org/human-rights#article-citation>
57. Hon, T.-k. (2013). *Revolution as Restoration Guocui xuebao and China's Path to Modernity, 1905-1911*. Brill.
58. Human Rights Council. (2019, August 9). Letter dated 12 July 2019 from the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the De. Geneva: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
59. Human Rights Watch. (2017, December 17). *Burma: 40 Rohingya Villages Burned Since October*. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/18/burma-40-rohingya-villages-burned-october>
60. Human Rights Watch. (2021). *China Events of 2021*. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/china-and-tibet>
61. Hürriyet. (2009, January 30). *İstanbul'da miting gibi karşılama*. Retrieved from Hürriyet: <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/istanbulda-miting-gibi-karsilama-10887578>

62. Ibrahim, A. (2016). *The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar's Hidden Genocide*. Oxford University Press.
63. Information Office of the People's Government of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. (2022). *Fight Against Terrorism and Extremism in Xinjiang: Truth and Facts*. The People's Republic of China.
64. International Labour Office (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2001). *International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia*. Publications of United Nations.
65. International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2018). *IOM Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugee Crisis Response External Update*. The UN Migration Agency.
66. Irwin, P. (2023, November 21). *Mapping the Uyghur Diaspora*. Retrieved from Uyghur Human Rights Project : <https://uhrp.org/report/diaspora/>
67. Işık, A. F. (2021). Suriye'deki Uygurlar Bağlamında Türk-Çin İlişkileri. In A. M. Dündar, & G. Kirilen (Eds.), *APAM Çin Çalışmaları 1* (pp. 71-90). Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları.
68. Janks, H. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis as a Research Tool. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 18(3), 329-342.
69. Jardine, B. (2023, May 4). *Middle Eastern Autocrats Are Abetting China's Transnational Repression of Uyghurs*. Retrieved from Dawn Democracy for The Arab World Now: <https://dawnmena.org/middle-eastern-autocrats-are-abetting-chinas-transnational-repression-of-uyghurs/>
70. Javid, M., & Hasanov, F. (2023, August). Determinants of remittance outflows: The case of Saudi Arabia. *OPEC Energy Review*, 1-16.
71. Jørgensen, M., & Phillips, L. J. (2002). *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*. SAGE Publications.
72. Kaddorah, E. Y. (2015). *Conservative Democracy and the Future of Turkish Secularism*. Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies.
73. Kanie, M. (2012). *Civil Society in Saudi Arabia: Different Forms, One Language*. Clingendael Institute.
74. Karadaş, Y. (2023, September 12). *12 Eylül'ün fikri ve zikri*. Retrieved from evrensel: <https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/93583/12-eylulun-fikri-ve-zikri>

75. Karakaş, M. (2013). Türkiye'nin Kimlikler Siyaseti ve Sosyolojisi (The Sociology and Politics of Identity in Turkey). *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries)*, 8(2), 1-44.
76. Karataş, İ. (2021, May). The Discourse of Brotherhood in Turkish Foreign Policy during the AK Party Era. *Üsküdar University Journal of Social Sciences*(12), 37-69.
77. Karluk, A. C. (2020). Türkiye'deki Uygur Türkü Göçmenler ve Karşılaştıkları Sorunlar. In E. Ç. SARP, *Göç Sosyolojisi, Türkiye'den Örneklerle* (pp. 245-288). Ankara: Orion Kitabev.
78. Karpat, K. H. (1972, October). Political Developments in Turkey. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 8(3), 349-375.
79. Karsit, I. (2022, July 12). *Turkey's Far Right Has Already Won*. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/12/turkeys-far-right-has-already-won/>
80. Kaya, A. (2015). Islamisation of Turkey under the AKPRule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity. *South European Society and Politics*, 20(1), 47-69.
81. Kéchichian, J. A., & Alsharif, F. (2022). *Sa'udi Policies towards Migrants and Refugees, A Sacred Duty*. Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies.
82. King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre. (2023). *Assistance by beneficiary Nationality - Rohingya*. Retrieved from Saudi Aid for Refugees and IDPs: <https://refugees.ksrelief.org/InternalStatistics/CountryDetails/3>
83. Kipgen, N. (2011, May 14-20). Political Change in Burma: Transition from Democracy to Military Dictatorship (1948-62). *Economic and Political Weekly*, 46(20), pp. 48-55.
84. Koçak, M. (2010). Islam and national law in Turkey. In J. M. Otto, *Sharia Incorporated, A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present* (pp. 233-272). Leiden University Press.
85. Kökpınar Kaya, E., Yağlı, E., & Demir, Y. (2022). Twitter'da Suriyelileri 'Öteki' Olarak Çerçeveleyen Bakış Açıları ve Bunları Destekleyen Savlar. *Dilbilim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 33(2), 281-304. <https://doi.org/10.18492/dad.1119978>
86. Kuru, A. T. (2009). *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion The United States, France, and Turkey*. Cambridge University Press.

87. Landau, J. M. (2004). *Exploring Ottoman and Turkish History*. C. Hurst & Co. Publisher.
88. Leider, J. (2018, May). Rohingya: The History of a Muslim Identity in Myanmar. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History*, 1-38.
89. Lewa, C. (2009). North Arakan: an open prison for the Rohingya in Burma. *Forced Migration Review*(32), 11-13.
90. Lin, H.-T. (2008). From Rimland to Heartland: Nationalist China's Geopolitics and Ethnopolitics in Central Asia, 1937-1952. *The International History Review*, 30(1), 52-75.
91. Lysa, C. (2023). Governing Refugees in Saudi Arabia (1948–2022). *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 1-28.
92. McHale, T. R. (1980). A Prospect of Saudi Arabia. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs)*, 56(4), 622-647.
93. Médecins Sans Frontières. (2017, December 12). *MSF surveys estimate that at least 6,700 Rohingya were killed during the attacks in Myanmar*. Retrieved from Médecins Sans Frontières: <https://www.msf.org/myanmarbangladesh-msf-surveys-estimate-least-6700-rohingya-were-killed-during-attacks-myanmar>
94. Messner, N., Woods, A., Petty, A., Parmar, P., Leigh, J., Thomas, E., . . . Lester, E. (2019, September 16). Qualitative evidence of crimes against humanity: the August 2017 attacks on the Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, Myanmar. *Conflict and Health*(41), pp. 2-17.
95. Millward, J. A. (2009). Positioning Xinjiang in Eurasian and Chinese history, Differing visions of the ' Silk Road'. In C. Mackerras, & M. Clarke, *China, Xinjiang and Central Asia : History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century* (pp. 55-74). Taylor & Francis Group.
96. Mouline, N. (2014). *The clerics of Islam : religious authority and political power in Saudi Arabia*. (E. S. Rundell, Trans.) Yale University Press.
97. Mullaney, T. (2010). *Coming to Terms with the Nation : Ethnic Classification in Modern China*. University of California Press.
98. Myoe, M. A. (2014, October 18). The Soldier and the State: The Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011. *South East Asia Research*, 1-17.
99. Nawar, I. (2003). State-Controlled Media Has Failed the Arab People. *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2003*, pp. 56-61.

100. Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy. (2021). *The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention*.
101. Neziroğlu, İ., & Yılmaz, T. (2013). *Hükümetler, Programları ve Genel Kurul Görüşmeleri* (Vol. 10). TBMM Basımevi .
102. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022). *OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China*.
103. Özel, C. (2017, December). Ne Benimsin Ne Kara Toprağın: Türk Ulusal Kimliği içerisinde Dinin Konumunun Makro Dönüşümler Ekseninde Bir Analizi. *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 10(53), 875-890.
104. Özer, Y. (2015). AB'ye Uyum Sürecinde Türkiye'de Demokratikleşme. *Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 23(2), 143-168.
105. Özkan, B. (2014, July). Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism. *Survival* , 56(4), 119-140,.
106. Paddock, R. C. (2016, May 6). *Aung San Suu Kyi Asks U.S. Not to Refer to 'Rohingya'*. Retrieved from The New York Times:
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-aung-san-suu-kyi.html>
107. Panglong Agreement. (1947, February 12). *Panglong Agreement*. Retrieved from United Nations Peacemaker:
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MM_470212_Panglong%20Agreement.pdf
108. Perrière, B. B. (2009). An Overview of the Field of Religion in Burmese Studies. *Asian Ethnology*, 68(2), 185-210.
109. Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. (2015, July 9). *"Turkey stands by the Uyghur Turks in China just like it stands by all its brothers"*. Retrieved from Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye:
<https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/32895/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-buyukelcilerle-iftar-yapti>
110. Rafizadeh, M. (2023, April 6). *Pragmatic approach earns Saudi Arabia praise as a leading force in diplomacy*. Retrieved from Arab News:
<https://www.arabnews.com/node/2282366>

111. Rannard, G. (2017, September 5). *Rohingya crisis: What's behind these 1.2 million tweets?* Retrieved from BBC News: <https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-41160953>
112. Reporters Without Borders. (2023). *Türkiye*. Retrieved from Reporters Without Borders: <https://rsf.org/en/country-t%C3%BCrkiye>
113. Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022). *Türkiye-Myanmar Bilateral Economic and Commercial Relations*. Retrieved from Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_myanmar-bilateral-economic-and-commercial-relations.en.mfa
114. Resmi Gazete. (2013, April 4). *Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanunu*. Retrieved from Resmi Gazete: <https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2013/04/20130411-2.htm>
115. Resmi Gazete. (2014, October 22). *Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği*.
116. Robles, J. S. (2021). *Critical Theory and Linguistics*. 1-8.
117. Rogers, R., Malancharuvil-Berkes, E., Mosley, M., Hui, D., & Joseph, G. O. (2005). *Critical Discourse Analysis in Education: A Review of the Literature*. *Review of Educational Research*, 86(4), 365-416.
118. Sakhong, L. H. (2012, January). *The Dynamics of Sixty Years of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma*. *Burma Center for Ethnic Studies Peace and Reconciliation*, 1-15.
119. Saudi Press Agency . (2005, October 16). *Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz / Press Conference Additional Fifth and Final Addendum*, سمو الامير نايف بن عبدالعزيز / لقاء صحفى إضافة خامسة وأخيرة. Retrieved from Saudi Press Agency : <https://www.spa.gov.sa/296567>
120. Saylan, İ., & Aknur, M. (2023, July). *Discourses of Turkish Opposition Political Parties towards Syrian Refugees: Securitization and Repatriation*. *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 24(2), 259-283.
121. Sencar, Ö., & Yıldız, S. (2009, January 30). *Davos Zirvesi*. Retrieved from MetroPoll Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar: <https://www.metropoll.com.tr/arastirmalar/siyasi-arastirma-9/1651>
122. Shichor, Y. (2009, January 1). *Ethno-Diplomacy:: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations*. *East-West Center, Policy Studies*(53).
123. Smith, M. (2019, December). *Arakan (Rakhine State): A Land in Conflict on Myanmar's Western Frontier*. *Transnational Institute*, pp. 3-106.

124. Soloshcheva, M. A. (2017). The Uyghur Terrorism: Phenomenon and Genesis. *Iran & the Caucasus*, 21(4), 415-430.
125. Standish, R. (2022, September 25). *Interview: China Has More Tools Than Ever To Target Uyghurs Abroad*. Retrieved from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: <https://www.rferl.org/a/china-pursuing-uyghurs-abroad-jardine/31820566.html>
126. Staszak, J.-F. (2009). Other/otherness. In R. Kitchin, & N. Thrift, *International Encyclopedia of Human Geography* (pp. 25-31). Elsevier.
127. Sulaiman, E., & Lipes, J. (2017). *BETWEEN IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION*. Retrieved from RADIO FREE ASIA: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/pathtofreedom/#secondwave>
128. Şule. (2017, August 31). Retrieved from Twitter/X: <https://twitter.com/deutschule/status/903363594598973441>
129. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior. In S. Worchel, & W. Austin, *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (pp. 7-25). Chicago: Nelson Hall Publishers.
130. Tannen, D., Hamilton, H., & Schiffrin, D. (2015). *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Second Edition*. Wiley Blackwell.
131. Tay, A. K., Islam, R., Riley, A., Welton-Mitchell, C., Duchesne, B., Waters, V., . . . Ventevogel, P. (2017). *Culture, Context and Mental Health of Rohingya Refugees: A review for staff in mental health and psychosocial support programmes for Rohingya refugees*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
132. The Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers. (2007). *Anti-Cyber Crime Law, Royal Decree No. M/17*.
133. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (2018). *Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State*. U.S. Department of State.
134. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye. (2022). *Relations between Türkiye and Myanmar*. Retrieved from The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkiye-and-myanmar.en.mfa>
135. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022, April 1). *Saudi Arabia: UN experts say Uyghurs must not be extradited to China, urge proper risk assessment*. Retrieved from The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:

- <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/04/saudi-arabia-un-experts-say-uyghurs-must-not-be-extradited-china-urge-proper>
136. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation. (2012). *Report of the OIC Contact Group on the Rohingya Muslim Minority*. New York: The OIC Contact Groups .
 137. The State Law and Order Restoration Council. (1989, June 18). *The Adaptation of Expressions Law*. Retrieved from Myanmar Law Information System: <https://www.mlis.gov.mm/mLsView.do;jsessionid=5E21A98456533CF19E1A144838C49A4B?lawordSn=1157#none>
 138. The UN Refugee Agency. (2018, October). *Statement of Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from The UN Refugee Agency: <https://www.unhcr.org/media/statement-saudi-arabia-0>
 139. The UN Refugee Agency. (2021, December). *Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from The UN Refugee Agency: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/saudi-arabia-factsheet-1029>
 140. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2014). *Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report – Universal Periodic Review/The Republic of Turkey*. Retrieved from The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/en/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-in-turkey#:~:text=The%20Republic%20of%20T%C3%BCrkiye%20is,events%20occurred%20outside%20of%20Europe.>
 141. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2017). *Mixed Movements in South-East Asia 2016*. The UN Refugee Agency.
 142. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2023, August 23). *Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained*. Retrieved from The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/#RohingyainBangladesh>
 143. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2023). *Saudi Arabia*. Retrieved from The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/donors/saudi-arabia>
 144. The United Nations Human Rights Council. (2018). *Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar*. The United Nations Human Rights Council.

145. The World Uyghur Congress. (2023). *2022 Human Rights Situation in East Turkistan*. Munich: The World Uyghur Congress.
146. Türe, E. (2019). Kenan Evren'in 12 Eylül Sonrası Darbeye Meşruiyet Kazandırması. *Sosyal Araştırmalar*, 12(67).
147. Türk Avrasya. (2023, May 6). *Türkiye Cumhurbaşkanı adayı Oğan'ın Uygur açıklaması tartışma yarattı* . Retrieved from Türk Avrasya: <https://www.turkavrasya.com/haber/turkiye-cumhurbaskani-adayi-oganin-uygur-aciklamasi-tartisma-yaratti-643>
148. Türk Kızılayı. (2014). *Myanmar-Baglades İnsani Yardım Operasyonu*. Türk Kızılayı.
149. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. (2019). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Arasında Suçluların İadesi Anlaşması.
150. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi. (2021). Yazılı Soru Önergesi Bilgileri/İstanbul Milletvekili Sayın Mustafa Yeneroğlu'nun 7/39703 Esas Numaralı Yazılı Soru Önergesine Yanıt.
151. UNHCR, The Refugee Agency. (2023, January-June). *Mid-Year Trends 2023*. Retrieved from UNHCR, The Refugee Agency: <https://www.unhcr.org/mid-year-trends-report-2023>
152. Wagner, D., & Schatz, J. (2017, April 18). *Saudi Arabia's Colliding Interests in Myanmar*. Retrieved from Fair Observer: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/saudi-arabia-myanmar-burma-rohingya-human-rights-ethnic-cleansing-world-news-34043/
153. Ware, A., & Laoutides , C. (2018). *Myanmar's 'Rohingya' Conflict*. Oxford University Press.
154. Weber, M. (1968). *On Charisma and Institution Building*. (S. N. Eisenstadt, Ed.) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
155. Weibing, L. (2019, February 22). *Chinese president meets Saudi crown prince*. Retrieved from XinhuaNet: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-02/22/c_137843268.htm
156. Wen, P., & Auyezov, O. (2018, November 29). *Tracking China's Muslim Gulag* . Reuters Investigates: <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/> adresinden alındı

157. Whitaker, B. (2010, August 16). *Conflicting fatwas are good for Muslims*. Retrieved from The Guardian:
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/16/fatwas-saudi-king-islam>
158. Williams, R. (2015). *Keywords : a vocabulary of culture and society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
159. Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (2009). Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, Second Edition. In R. Wodak, & M. Michael, *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, Second Edition* (pp. 1-34). SAGE.
160. Yavuz, M. H. (2000, October 1). Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 21-42.
161. Yegar, M. (1972). *The Muslims of Burma, A Study of a Minority Group*. Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden.
162. Yuan, L. X. (2015). Ethnicity or nationality? Minority policy and ethnic conflict in contemporary China. In T. U. Forum, *Ethnicity as a Political Resource: Conceptualizations across Disciplines, Regions, and Periods* (pp. 151-168). Transcript Verlag.
163. Zha, C. (2018, March 15). Retrieved from Twitter/X:
<https://twitter.com/husainhaqqani/status/974430247662833664>

Appendices

Appendix A

Questions Asked of the Participants

Country of Residence

Age

Gender

Education Level

Q.1. In your opinion who are the Rohingya people?

Q.2. In your opinion who are the Uyghurs?

Q. 3. Where did you get the information about these two groups?

TV

Radio

Newspapers (Including Digital Newspapers)

Social Media (Facebook, Twitter etc.)

Podcast App

Other (Please Specify)

Q. 4. In your opinion, what might be the reason for Rohingyas to flee their countries? (Because of their religion, race etc., please explain in a few sentences)

Q. 5. In your opinion, what might be the reason for the Uyghurs to flee their countries? (Because of their religion, race etc., please explain in a few sentences)

Q. 6. What do you think about Saudi Arabia/Turkey's help for the Rohingya people in terms of asylum, sending aid and attempting to impose sanctions on Myanmar? Please answer the question according to your country of residence.

Q. 7. What do you think about Saudi Arabia/Turkey's help for the Uyghurs in terms of asylum, sending aid and attempting to impose sanctions on China?

Please answer the question according to your country of residence.

Q. 8. What do you think about whether news for the Rohingya people occurs enough in the media?

Q. 9. What do you think about whether news for the Uyghurs occurs enough in the media?

Q.10. What is your view about the Rohingya people's integration into the society you live in?

Q.11. What is your view about the Uyghurs' integration into the society you live in?

Q.12. How do you feel about Rohingya people being treated less fairly or more fairly than other refugees in your country of residence?

Q.13. How do you feel about Uyghurs being treated less fairly or more fairly than other refugees in your country of residence?

Appendix B
The Support Letter to China

“A/HRC/41/G/17

Advance Edited Version Distr.: General 9 August 2019

Original: English

Human Rights Council

Forty-first session 24 June–12 July 2019

Agenda item 3

Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development

Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2019 from the representatives of Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, the Congo, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the State of Palestine to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the President of the Human Rights Council

Mr. President, Madam High Commissioner,

We, the co-signatories to this letter, reiterate that the work of the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) should be conducted in an objective, transparent, nonselective, constructive, non-confrontational and non-politicized manner. We express our firm opposition to relevant countries’ practice of politicizing human rights issues, by naming and shaming, and publicly exerting pressures on other countries. We commend China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights by adhering to the people-centered development philosophy and protecting and promoting human rights through development. We also appreciate China’s contributions to the international human rights cause. We take note that terrorism, separatism and religious extremism has caused enormous damage to people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, which has seriously infringed upon human rights, including right to life, health and development. Faced with the grave challenge of terrorism and extremism, China has undertaken a series of counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures in Xinjiang, including setting up vocational education and training centers. Now safety and security has returned to Xinjiang and the fundamental human rights of people of all ethnic groups there are safeguarded. The past three consecutive years has seen not a single terrorist attack in Xinjiang and people there enjoy a stronger sense of happiness, fulfillment and security. We note with appreciation that human rights are respected and protected in China in the process of counter-terrorism and deradicalization. We appreciate China’s commitment to openness and transparency. China has invited a number of diplomats, international organizations officials and journalist to Xinjiang to witness the progress of the human rights cause and the outcomes of counter-terrorism and

deradicalization there. What they saw and heard in Xinjiang completely contradicted what was reported in the media. We call on relevant countries to refrain from employing unfounded charges against China based on unconfirmed information before they visit Xinjiang. We urge the OHCHR, Treaty Bodies and relevant Special Procedures mandate holders to conduct their work in an objective and impartial manner according to their mandate and with true and genuinely credible information, and value the communication with member states.

We request that this letter be recorded as an official document of the 41st session of the Human Rights Council and that it be published on the OHCHR website.”

Source: UN Human Rights Council (Human Rights Council, 2019, p. 1:5)

Résumé

MÕISTMAKS ARAABIA JA TÜRGİ ÜHISKONDI: ROHINGJADE JA UIGUURIDE KÜSIMUSE KRIITILINE DISKURSUS-ANALÜÜS NING PAGULASPOLITIKATE ANALÜÜS

Käesolevas uuringus keskendutakse sellele, kuidas 21. sajandil kriisi mõõtmel saavutanud rände nähtus on mõjutanud Aasia etnilisi ja religioosseid vähemusi, näiteks Rohingya ja Uiguure, ning kuidas see on mõjutanud nende olukorda ja ka nende ühiskondade diskursust vastuvõtvates riikides, nagu Saudi Araabia ja Türgi. Konfliktide, genotsiidipraktikate ja inimõiguste rikkumiste tõttu on nad lisaks naaberriikidele otsinud varjupaika ja/või saanud humanitaarabi Saudi Araabias ja Türgis. Lisaks analüüsiti Saudi Araabia ja Türgi pagulaspoliitikat nende vähemuste kontekstis. Rõhutatakse, kui oluline on, kas need kaks riiki on rahvusvaheliste lepingute osalised või mitte. (This text has been translated into Estonian using ChatGPT.)

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce the thesis and make the thesis public

I Songül Ögüt _____,
(*author's name*)

1. grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to

reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright, my thesis

UNDERSTANDING SAUDI AND TURKISH SOCIETIES: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE ROHINGYA AND UYGHURS AND EXAMINING THE REFUGEE POLICIES,
(*title of thesis*)

Supervised by Dr. Alar Kilp _____.
(*supervisor's name*)

2. I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the thesis specified in point 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives, under the Creative Commons licence CC BY NC ND 4.0, which allows, by giving appropriate credit to the author, to reproduce, distribute the work and communicate it to the public, and prohibits the creation of derivative works and any commercial use of the work until the expiry of the term of copyright.
3. I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in points 1 and 2.
4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Songül Ögüt

author's name

16/01/2024