KLEIO

Special Issue in English

Estonian Historical Journal 1994

Helmut Piirimäe
Historical Science at Tartu University

Sulev Vahtre
Periodization of Estonian History

Jüri Kivimäe
Late Medieval Narva between East and West: Trade and Politics

Enn Küng
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Ago Pajur
Discussion on Forming of the Armed Forces in the Republic of Estonia

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Piia Jullinen
Estonia's War Debt to the USA

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Eero Medijainen
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Aigi Rahi
Mass Repressions in Estonia after World War II

Peep Pillak
Development of Estonian Archives

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Estonian Historical Journal

Aadu Must

Chief Editor of "Kleio"

In the autumn of 1979 a seminar of young historians was arranged in Taevaskoja, a picturesque place in South Estonia. There a discussion arose on the present situation and future perspectives of Estonian historical sceince. The representatives of the younger generation criticized what had been done until then and dreamed of major research projects in which they could participate. And then it was discovered that historians needed their own journal. For me it was the first acquaintance with the idea of an Estonian historical journal. Elder colleagues only smiled and said that the dream had lasted as long as the Soviet occupation which suppressed the "Historical Journal" in 1940.

In 1922-1940 the "Historical Journal", a scientific-popular publication of the Academic Historical Society was published in Estonia. Altogether 74 volumes that contained approximately 300 articles, 400 short surveys and reviews were published. Besides scientific articles that mainly treated the history of Estonia and its neighbouring countries it gave a good survey of scientific life: conferences, major foreign and local research work. In 1940 the journal was suppressed and the historians of our generation needed a special permission to read it at the library's restricted collection.

On May 13, 1987 historians held another discussion at the House of Engineers in Tartu. The current stage of development and future perspectives were on the agenda. Thanks to the "perestroika" that was breaking up the Soviet empire, there was more freedom and people were enthusiastic as well. It was decided to restore the historical journal step by step. The initial name was "Kleio. A historical Almanac". It was not possible to found a journal — a respective decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU was needed for that. So, formally "Kleio" was published as a book.

The first numbers of "Kleio" were the result of work of a group of enthusiasts. Besides the authors Ülle Liitoja (doctorant), Priit Pirsko (director of the Estonian History Archive) and Ülle Must (chief bibliographer of the Library of Tartu University) who inserted the texts in evening hours at the university's computer class, spent a lot of their free time. The undersigned was responsible for editing. Margus Laidre (Estonian ambassador in Sweden) did the proofreading. The first "Kleio" that was printed on a matrix printer and a rotary press almost looked like an illegal publication. This volume is now a great rarity.

But "Kleio's" situation improved year by year. In 1991 we got a more powerful computer, advance copies made on a laser printer and English summaries. In the same year "Historical Journal" was added to the title.

Until today 10 volumes of "Kleio" have been published, plus a special number on the 1949 mass deportation in Estonia. Approximately 100 scientific articles, surveys of major events and publications and reviews have been brought to the reader. It is not the aim of "Kleio" to imitate the "Historical Journal". However, they have much in common. They are both characterized by scientific-popular orientation. Estonia is not obviously rich enough to publish separate journals for purely academic and a wider range of readers. In the 1920s-1930s the history of towns, trading, peasantry, political and cultural history of the period of the Swedish Rule (1583-1710) were popular topics. In "Kleio" the most popular topics are Medieval Estonian culture, history of trading in the 17th century, problems of military history. The economic, scientific and cultural contacts between Estonia and other countries are of great interest as well. Studies of 20th-century history make up about one third of the articles. This is characteristic of our time — in the period of the Soviet occupation the scientific study of this period was hindered most, a great number of archival sources were kept secret.

Besides professional historians "Kleio" provides publishing opportunities for talented students and postgraduate students as well. Some articles in the present number have been published earlier in "Kleio". Once a year "Kleio" will be published in English. We are planning to publish a common historical journal in co-operation with our neighbours, first of all with Latvian historians. This would constitute be a journal of Baltic history, of course. We are interested in responses, co-operation and exchange of our journal with historical journals in other countries.

A Glimpse of Our Past

Historical Science at Tartu University

Helmut Piirimäe

The re-establishment of independent Baltic states, their diplomatic recognition, acceptance to the UN and participation in numerous international organizations have aroused interest in us. However, we often realize how little we are known. Answering the questions of tourists, among them colleagues, sometimes makes an impression as if we were in the Africa of Livingstone's or Stanley's times. This is not surprising - we have been forgotten for ca 50 years. We were forgotten already in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. Decades under Soviet occupation brought about ideological and national pressure. On the basis of the ideological and political ambitions of the occupying empire the Communist Party also exercised control over science, and particularly watchfully, of course, over historical science. We were completely cut off from the western science. Very seldom could an ordinary scientist participate in international conferences, in foreign languages were published mainly such historical studies that consisted of falsifications and marxist tendentiousness. The results of our research were mainly published in Estonian or Russian and therefore remained unknown in the West. Several manuscripts were unpublished. This was partly due to ideological (national history, even the so-called Swedish Rule in the 16th-17th centuries, was considered inappropriate), partly to economic reasons.

Taking into account what has been said above, the present article aims to an English-speaking reader with the history and acquaint present situation of historical science at Tartu University.

Roots and Traditions

Estonian national historical science is relatively young. The first surveys were written by Carl Robert Jakobson [1] and Jakob Hurt [2] in the middle of the last century. At the end of the 19th century the first monographs were published, for example, by theologists Villem Reiman and Martin Lipp. The first works by professional Estonian historians were published at the beginning of the 20th century. Hans Oldekop who had studied at the universities of Tartu, Munich, Leipzig and Vienna successfully defended his PhD thesis in history in 1909. [3] However, the roots and traditions of our historical science are even longer.

Already at the foundation of Tartu University in 1632 it was planned to establish a professorship of history and antiquities. [4] The first professor was Friedrich Menius. He had studied at the universities of Vienna, Königsberg and Greifswald, and in Tartu his main field of research was the legal history of Old Livonia.[5] F. Menius was also the initiator of studying local history and he intended to write a 2-volume Livonian History.[6] The program of this work gives evidence that the professor of history at Tartu did not want to confine himself only to political and legal history as it was common practice then, but also intended to write about agriculture, maritime affairs, finances, church history, schools etc. At that time it would have been a monumental work, but F. Menius' good intention was not realized as he was arrested on a charge of bigamy. During the Swedish Rule a number of highly qualified history professors worked at Tartu University, including Carl Schulten who wrote poetry in Estonian, Claus Hermelin etc.[7]

Historical science was at a particularly high level at Tartu University in the 19th century. In the years 1802 — 1889 the language of instruction was German. Outstanding German and Baltic German historians Richard Hausmann, Friedrich Krause, Gustaw Ewers, Carl Scirren etc. worked at Tartu University.[8] In 1828-1839 the Institute of Professors worked at the University which trained teachers for other universities of the Russian Empire and mediated their practising in Germany.[9] In the course of Russification in the Baltic countries Tartu University was changed into a Russian-language one by the Russian authorities. Scientific contacts only with the East dominated. However, a number of prominent Russian historians (Vassili Regel, Aleksander Vassiljev, Ivan Leppo, Jevgeni Tarle) worked at Tartu University at the end of the 19th — beginning of the 20th centuries.

During the German occupation in 1918 a German Landesuniversität was established in Tartu. New professors were invited from Germany and so it was to become a university of high standard. But the Estonian students decided to boycott it as on February 24, 1918 the Republic of Estonia was proclaimed and this raised hopes for a national university. According to the armistice of Compiegne German troops drew back from Estonia and the university was taken over by Estonians.

Although Soviet Russia attacked the newly born Republic of Estonia and the Estonian War of Independence broke out, the organizers started to make preparations for opening the Estonian university. In fact this would have been a Russian-language and Russian-minded university. In difficult times there were also such Estonians who did not believe in the prospects for Estonian university in Tartu. The Estonian ambassador in Paris K. R. Pusta arranged with universities of France and England to send 400 Estonian students there. He was of the opinion that it was not possible to get rid of German and Russian influence in Tartu. However, the young republic that was fighting for its existence did not have economic resources to put this grandiose plan into practice. Despite the complicated circumstances during the War of Independence, the preparations for opening a national university in Tartu made good progress. On December 1, 1919 the festive opening of the university took place, lectures had already started in October.

The lack of suitable university teachers was the first greatest problem. This was especially acute in national sciences, incl. history, archeology and ethnology. Swedish and Finnish scholars — historian A. R. Cederberg, ethnographer I. Manninen, archeologists Arne Mikael Tallgren and Birger Nerman, art historians Tor Helge Kjellin and Sten Karling — came to help. In Tartu they quickly learned the Estonian language so that they could teach in Estonian. Thanks to these men the young Estonian historical science quickly reached European level. The first generation of Estonian top historians consisted of their students. Historians participated in international events.[10] Especially good scientific contacts were established with Nordic historians. A number of studies of high standard and the "Historical Journal" were published. After Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Army on June 17, 1940, we have gone through three occupations. Already the first Soviet occupation caused serious damage to our national sciences. Mass deportations, arrests, dissolution of national scientific and cultural organizations etc. showed that rhetorical propaganda about "progressive Soviet science" was actually genocide. During the Nazi German occupation only part of Tartu University functioned.

Before the second Soviet occupation in 1944 many intellectuals, incl. several top historians fled their native land. Historians Prof. E. Blumfeldt, A. Soom who had defended his PhD thesis in 1940, ethnologists G. Ränk, I. Talve etc. continued their work in exile. Prof. A. Loit, H. Rebas, T. Raun, Dr. V. Helk etc. make up a new generation of exile historians. Despite restrictions and obstacles raised by occupation authorities a very good co-operation developed between Estonian historians in occupied Estonia and in exile.

In late autumn 1944 after Estonia had again been occupied by the Soviet troops, Tartu University started its work once again in Estonian, but under ideological pressure and completely cut off from the western world and in danger of extermination. Professor of General History Peeter Tarvel and Professor of Ethnology , Director of the Estonian National Museum Ferdinand Linnus were arrested and died in Siberia. The Chair of Estonian History suffered another kind of loss. Productive and highly respected Prof. H. Kruus became a "red" politician, foreign minister of the puppet government of the Estonian SSR. He gave up teaching at the university where his knowledge was urgently needed. Although an eager collaborationist, he was also accused of "bourgeois nationalism" and arrested.

In the first half of the 1950s ideological pressure became especially strong. The 8th Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party launched a campaign against the so-called bourgeois nationalists, i.e. everything national was persecuted. The chairs of Estonian history, archeology, ethnography and art history were liquidated at the Department of History. There remained only one teacher of each subject at the Chair of History of the Soviet Union.

Russian Estonians played a political leading role in the post-war staff. Heads of the Chair Prof. H. Moosberg and Docent L. Roots introduced marxist dogmatism, primitivism of Russian so-called proletarian historical science and disdain for nationalism and Western historical science. But they deserve credit for not staffing the department with Russians, as it was done, for instance, in the Department of Philosophy, but with young postgraduate historians, some of whom did not belong to the Communist Party, though party membership was considered extremely important. Now they form the older generation of historians at the university. Estonian lecturers who had not worked at the university before the war played an important part in training these scholars. They had been that kind of high school teachers, well-known authors of textbooks J. Madisson and J. Konks, archivist R. Kenkmann and art historian V. Vaga.

In the post-Stalinist period Estonian historians did their best to do research that was possible in the Soviet empire. They established contacts with colleagues, worked at libraries and archives and attended All-Union conferences where they could even possible to meet scientists from abroad. Thus Swedish, German, Russian and Finnish historical concepts have influenced historical science at Tartu University. The national school came into being in the Republic of Estonia, and it has been influenced by Estonia's location between the East and the West.

Organization

Tartu University is the only university in Estonia training historians. However, historians of Tartu University form only one and far not the most numerous part of Estonian historians. As a remain of the Soviet system the Institute of History of the Estonian Academy of Sciences still exists in Tallinn, the staff of which is much bigger than that of the university. According to Soviet conceptions namely the Academy of Sciences was to be the place for dealing with research. The university's only task had to be teaching. We have refused to admit such approach. If a lecturer is not engaged in scientific research, he does not have anything to say to students and postgraduates. After the restoration of the Republic of Estonia the Academy system was not liquidated like it was done in some other countries of the former Eastern block. Although the staff of the Institute of History has

been reduced, the university has not received any additional resources.

In the years after World War II the Department of History was a structural unit of the Faculty of History and Languages. In 1974-1991 there existed an independent Faculty of History that consisted of Departments of History, Psychology, Special Education and Sociology. Today the Department of History is a part of the big Faculty of Philosophy which is divided into 13 departments. For a number of many years the Department of History was divided into 2 chairs: 1) History of the USSR and 2) General History. As occupied Estonia was incorporated into the Soviet Union, also Estonian history belonged to the Chair of the History of the USSR, and even formed the major part in training. Archeology, ethnography and art history have been treated as a part of historical science and training, i.e. specialization in these subjects is grounded on the basic history studies. Enrolment of students is common.

In 1989 the Chair of Estonian History was restored (Head of the Chair - Prof. Tiit Rosenberg). In the spring of 1991, even before the Republic of Estonia was officially restored, it was decided to reorganize the Chair of the History of the USSR into the Chair of Contemporary History (Head of the Chair — Prof. Jüri Ant). The field of research and teaching of the Chair of General History (Head of the Chair — Prof. Helmut Piirimäe) was reduced in place of the Department of Contemporary History. In the course of reforming the university in 1992 departments were divided into chairs. There are now 7 chairs or full professorships at the Department of History: 1) Estonian History (Prof. T. Rosenberg), 2) General History (Prof. H. Piirimäe), 3) Contemporary History (Prof. J. Ant), 4) Archeology (Prof. Emer. E. Tõnisson), 5) Ethnology (Prof. E. Vunder), 6) Art History (Prof. J. Kangilaski), 7) Archival Science (Acting Prof. A. Must). The Chair of History Didactics is also being formed. A number of historians true work at other structural units of the university. The most important of the latter is the Department of Rare Publications and Manuscripts of the University Library. There are altogether 25 posts of lecturers at the Department of History. Including part-time lecturers, 36 people belong to the staff. Besides, there are some teachers who get hourly wages. Those historians who work at some other research institutions are not included in the survey of research at the university.

Main trends of scientific research

Despite the fact that lecturers were scattered among various structural units a remarkable unity has been characteristic of scientific research at the Department of History. When the Soviet scientific bureucracy insisted on unifying scientific problems into major topics, we could easily write " The History of the Baltic Sea Area" in our plans. Only those scholars who were dealing with the Antique World, Tibet and Indonesia were not included in this geographic restriction. This restriction reflects our smallness and poverty, but at the same time it is necessary for concentrating our forces. As Tartu University is the only Estonian university that gives higher education in history, the studying of Estonian history has been our national mission. It was our special moral duty under the Soviet occupation when the occupants and their hodmen tried to suppress everything national, everything that could not be identified as Russian. The history of our own nation acquired a special role as a part of national consciousness. The fact that our historians had no opportunities to work at the archives of those countries that did not belong to the Soviet Union, also hindered studying world history.

Thus the main emphasis of scientific research at the Chair of General History was laid on historical relations with other countries. At the same time general history had to provide the basis of world history to avoid provincialism in studying and teaching the history of a small country and nation. Prof. Emer. Sulev Vahtre (1926) has been the leading teacher and researcher of Estonian history, supervisor of many young scientists. He started his research analysing Baltic German chronicles as sources of Estonian history. He has given a detailed treatment of the "Younger Livonian Rhyme Chronicle" written down by Bartholomäus Hoeneke the original of which has not survived. S. Vahtre made a skilful reconstruction of the Younger Livonian Rhyme Chronicle based upon other chronicles using Hoeneke's text, and also published a special study on this topic.[11] His thorough investigations into older Estonian history have been published in the form of monographs on the St. George's Night Uprising 1343-46 [12] and Ancient Fight for Freedom.[13] S. Vahtre defended his PhD thesis with the study "Estonian Peasantry on the Basis of Census Data (1782-1858)" .[14] The author used as sources the materials of revisions carried out in the Russian Empire concerning the population of the Estonian Province (North Estonia). Until then these source materials had been considered important for family history only. S. Vahtre made use of these data to make significant demographic generalizations. Prof. S. Vahtre's recent studies have dealt with church history, first of all the role of the church in cultural history. Since 1993 S. Vahtre has been Prof. Emeritus.

Another lecturer of Estonian history Allan Liim (1929) has in the course of many years taught Modern Estonian History (from the 2nd half of the 19th century) and has also trained history teachers in didactics of history. He is also one of the main authors of the voluminous "Estonian School History" published by the Estonian Academy of Sciences .[15]

Tiit Rosenberg (1946) who belongs to the younger generation of Estonian historians has continued the strongest trend in postwar Estonian historical science — agrarian and peasants' history. The patriarchs of this trend were Artur Vassar's school at the Institute of History (J. Kahk, H. Ligi, E. Tarvel). In 1980 T. Rosenberg defended his thesis on the situation of manor workers in South Estonia in the 19th — beginning of the 20th centuries. His PhD thesis is nearing completion. T. Rosenberg has lectured on historiography of Estonian history. In connection with this he has done thorough research on the works of earlier Estonian historians and supervised corresponding student papers. In 1994 T. Rosenberg was elected ordinary Professor of Estonian History.

18th-century Estonian and East European history has been the field of research of Docent of Estonian History Mati Laur (1954). He has studied the reforms of Catherine II, but also the influence of the Enlightenment on the Baltic countries in general.[16] His treatment of the continuity of the Swedish legislation and judicial system in the Baltic region after it was united with the Russian empire in 1710 (Uusikaupunki peace treaty in 1721) is also of great interest. His PhD thesis is nearing completion. The research of Tõnis Lukas (1962) who works at the Chair as a part-time lecturer on the clergy of Tartu diocese (until the 16th century) is promising from the viewpoint of Estonia's earlier cultural relations. The earlier period of Estonian history has been the field of interest for our archeologists. Docent Vilma Trummal (1924) has taught archeology to all history students of Tartu University from the beginning of her lecturer's career until retirement. Having started her research with studies of the settlement of South East Estonia,[17] she has supervised archeological excavations in Tartu throughout her career, and also taken interest in the history of the earliest settlement in Tartu.[18] The scientific career of Ain Mäesalu (1954), another archeologist working at Tartu University, has been somewhat analogous. He started with studying the stronghold of Otepää that is well-known as a site of 13th-century struggles. A need for rescue excavations made the problems of Tartu more topical for him. A. Mäesalu is an internationally recognized specialist in the field of ancient armament. This was also the subject of his MA thesis. In his PhD thesis he is turning back to the stronghold of Otepää. In 1992 Tartu University once again got an ordinary professor ship in archeology after a long time. Evald Tõnisson (1928) who, besides working at the Academy of Sciences, had been for many years a part-time lecturer, was elected to this place. His main field of study has been Ancient Estonian strongholds, but also other remains of Younger and Middle Iron Age.[19] His major study of the Koiva River Livonians is of international importance.[20] Prof. E. Tõnisson is one of the main authors of the general survey "Estonian Prehistory".[21] Unfortunately E. Tõnisson has now resigned to Prof. Emer. because of age limit.

The Cabinet of Archeology is a structural unit that also contributes to the training of students, organizes and preserves archeological finds. Besides these tasks, the cabinet also deals with scientific research. Head of the cabinet Heiki Valk defended his MA thesis on ancient Estonian burial customs. Ethnology (ethnography) suffered greatly after leading specialists of folklife G. Ränk, I. Talve etc. had emigrated and F. Linnus had died in Siberia. This subject has been taught by Docent Arved Luts (1929) (Acting Prof. in 1992-94). He has studied sea fishing in Estonia. For a long time the present Director of the Museum of Classical Antiquities of Tartu University Jüri Linnus (1926) worked as a lecturer of ethnography as well. He has made investigations into the problems of forging and rural handicrafts in general.[22] In 1993 J. Linnus defended his PhD thesis on the basis of his published works.

Candidate of History Elle Vunder (1939) has worked as a part-time lecturer of ethnology and was elected Professor of Ethnology in the spring of 1994. Her chief field of research is popular embroidery.

The predecessor of the Chair of General History was the department of General History. For a long time Prof. Jaan Konks (1902-1988) who studied Estonian agrarian history,[23] was Head of the Department. He was followed as Head of Department by Prof. Herbert Ligi (1928-1990) who defended his PhD thesis on feudal duties of Estonian peasantry .[24] He initiated the studies of Estonian settlement that is also associated with the problems of population history. After Prof. Ligi's death in 1990 the leading scientist of this trend is acting Professor of Archival Science Aadu Must (1951) whose Candidate's thesis touched upon industrial history,[25] but who is completing his PhD thesis "Migration in Estonia in the 17th-20th centuries". Ülle Liitoja (1957) who wrote her thesis on the settlement and population of one Estonian Parish and Priit Pirsko (1964) whose MA thesis dealt with population history in North East Estonia, are engaged in analogical problems.

Economic and cultural connections in the Baltic Sea area have become the main field of current research at the Chair of General History. The present Head of the Chair prof. Helmut Piirimäe (1930) has, as a continuation to Arnold Soom's dissertation of 1940 on trading in Narva 1636-56,[26] studied trading in Narva in 1661-1700.[27] He has also studied the trade in other Estonian towns in the 17th century, laying main emphasis on the statistical analysis of archival sources. This work is related to the studies of Baltic Sea trading written by outstanding scientists like Artur Altman in Sweden, Sven Erikström in Finland, Vassili Doroshenko in Latvia, Elisabeth Harder-Gersdorff in Germany etc. One of the most recent results in Estonian trading history is Enn Küng's MA dissertstion that deals with the commercial contacts of Lübeck and England with Russia. In his PhD dissertation he deals with trading between Narva, Tallinn and the Neatherlands in the 17th century. Director of the Tallinn Town Archive Jüri Kivimäe (1947) who also works as a part-time lecturer at the university is a representative of the same research trend. J. Kivimäe is the leading lecturer of medieval history, supervisor of several young promising scientists.

Prof. Extraordinary Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen (1929) has written his PhD dissertation about the consulates of the Republic of Estonia (1918-40) in Asia and Africa (1992). This work was also defended at the Chair of General History although it deals with more distant countries and a more contemporary period. Estonian-Swedish economic contacts have been studied by Prof. H. Piirimäe in his PhD dissertation "Swedish State Economy in Estonia and Livonia in the 17th century" (1974). The trend of military history with the main emphasis on everyday life in the army has developed on the basis of studies of international relations of the Baltic states. Margus Laidre, the present ambassador of Estonia in Sweden, defended his Candidate's dissertation "Swedish Army in Estonia and Livonia", and Rein Helme defended his dissertation on acts of warfare in the Baltic countries in 1812.[28] Tõnu Tannberg (1961) treated the recruitment system and country militia in Estonia in the period of the Napoleonic wars in his MA dissertation. The topic of his PhD

dissertation is recruitment system in Estonia in the 19th century. Docent Mart Tänava's Candidate's dissertation is an investigation into more distant problems in time and space — it deals with the army of Ancient Rome.

The history of Tartu University has been the framework of cultural and scientific contacts. To mark the university's 350th anniversary a 3-volume history of the university was published (with 1-volume summaries in English and Russian).[29] Arvo Tering, researcher of the university's scientific library, wrote his Candidate's dissertation about the students at the Swedish university in the 17th — beginning of the 18th centuries and is soon going to defend his PhD thesis on the scientific contacts of Tartu University in the same period.

We have regarded the investigation of cultural and scientific contacts with Germany, which also includes the spreading of the ideology of the Enlightenment and the history of Baltic Germans, very important as well.

In recent years we have also attached special importance to the development of Ancient and Medieval history. Our postgraduate students have used the possibilities to study in England (Mait Kõiv, Tiit Aleksejev at Oxford) and Germany (especially Göttingen).

The activities of the Laboratory of Orientalistics are closely connected with General History as well. Under the supervision of Linnart Mäll (1938) the studying of Tibetan history and culture has been the main trend of research.

The Chair of Modern History is going to concentrate its research on the history of the Republic of Estonia (1918-40) that under the Soviet occupation was falsified by the so-called party historians. Professor Jüri Ant (1939) has dealt with many topical problems of foreign policy. His monograph "Estonia 1920..." treats the problems of the first year of the Republic of Estonia.[30] Under his supervision Ago Pajur (1962) completed his MA thesis on the conclusion of the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Estonia. The study also touched upon the relations of these countries after the Estonian War of Independence in general.

Estonia's intenational relations have also been an important field of research. Docent Kaido Jaanson (1940) has supervised dissertations concerning the foreign relations of the Republic of Estonia. Eero Medijainen (1959) studied co-operation between the Baltic states in 1926-34.[31]

Professor Voldemar Vaga is the grand old man of art history who recently celebrated his 95th birthday. His "Art History" has been a manual for many generations. Tartu has been V. Vaga's special field of interest .[32]

Tartu University has been publishing "The Scandinavian Symposium" - an interdisciplinary yearbook. The publishing of the yearbook was initiated at the time of N. Khrushtshev's "thaw' in co-operation with Moscow historians. Soon it became an all-Union publication where several foreign scientists have published their articles as well. Both orthodox communists and liberal historians who were not members of the Communist Party have belonged to the editorial staff. The first editors were Lydia Roots from Tartu and W. Pohljobkin from Moscow. From the 4th number Prof. Hilda Moosberg was the editor and since 1977 the author of this article has been doing this work.

A total of 34 yearbooks have been published. Sacrificing paper and space to some orthodox dogmatic articles enabled to publish serious studies, surely more than it would have been possible in Moscow. It has been planned to reorganize the yearbook so that most of the articles would be in English or German.

Other major serial issues of Tartu historians have been "Papers on History of the Estonian SSR" [33] and "Studies of Baltic History" .[34] In 1988 the first issue of "Kleio" — journal of Tartu University historians — was published. With the present issue in English we step out from behind the "curtain" to introduce ourselves to the international reader.

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Some Thoughts about the Periodization of Estonian History

Sulev Vahtre

Among the long list of crimes committed by the Soviet Union the falsification and mutilation of the history of the peoples, united by force to the empire, in the spirit of Soviet and Great Russian chauvinism, occupies a significant place. This was called marxist historical science and it had to perform the role of a very important ideological weapon. Under Russian Soviet occupation also Estonian history was rewritten attaching particular attention to certain periods like the time of the Estonian Republic. In general little survived of truely Estonian history, it was first and foremost presented as an organic component of Russian history.

However, this massive attack on the historical consciousness of the people did not give the results which its organizers would have wished. People remembered recent history too well. They preserved and read history books of those times and transmitted according knowledge orally. Among historians who were meant to be the first in propagating Soviet conceptions there was a number of those who tried and also managed to remain true to serious historical science. The fact that students of history at Tartu University, on the strength of their historical knowledge, were a thorn in the side of the authorities with their liberal and regime critical views, is quite significant.

From the middle of the 1980s history as an ideological weapon of the Soviet regime turned against the regime itself and contributed a great deal to the overthrow of Soviet power. The national liberation movement, whose aim was to restore an independent Estonian state, pronouncedly rested upon history, especially in its initial phase 1987-1988. Publication and bringing Estonia's true history into consciousness again took place under public pressure and support and became one of the most topical questions. In such a favourable atmosphere the overturning of the Soviet historical conception proceeded quite rapidly and decisively.

The occupation that lasted nearly half a century could not completely destroy national historical science, but still caused it great harm. During that time international historical science had made great progress in its content, organization as well as in technical aspects. It is impossible to catch up with all this right away. Financial difficulties set certain limits and restricted the opportunities of action. The uncertain future of several educational and scientific institutions makes it difficult to set goals for a longer period. Quite a number of talented historians are busy in political life that however leaves them little time for scientific research.

There was an urgent need for a new comprehensive Estonian history for a wide range of readers, as well as for new school-textbooks. The primary needs have now been met. A new textbook for the 11th year of high school that meets all the demands of the new programs, can be set as a positive example. It is especially good to see that this textbook has been written by talented historians from the younger generation.[1]

In the course of writing new surveys and textbooks these days as well as in the future, there arises the question of the periodization of Estonian history. There is not any sense or necessity to use the Soviet division into social-economic formations that up to the present has been the only true and, in fact, obligatory way of distinguishing historical periods.

The inevitable practical need to systematize historical material is the first reason for periodization as it is impossible to present world history as well as the history of a single country without its inner analysis. Anyhow, it is the question of evaluation that reflects the author's conceptions.

In 1989 a survey of Estonian history written by three young historians was published under the title "The Story of the Native Land"[2] ("Kodu lugu") that, according to my suggestion, and the authors'specifications, divides the whole Estonian history into four major periods. In the book they are titled "Home and Hearth", "Servant in own Home", "Master in own Home" and "Under Pressure" that in drier terms mark ancient history (the middle of the 8th millenium to 1227), the centuries of foreign power (1227-1917/18), the Republic of Estonia (1917/18-1940) and the Estonian SSR (1940-...). Due to the situation at the time of writting, "The Story of the Native Land" is, as the general title already marks, pronouncedly and purposely Estonian-centred. The periodization proceeds from the question how great the role of Estonians has been in ruling the country; whether they have been masters of their native land themselves

or have power and lordship belonged to foreign authorities. Especially today when we are once again struggling against a foreign power, analyzing history from this point of view might be understandable and justified.

The well-known comprehensive work by Toivo Raun[3] also divides Estonian history into four major periods: Estonia before 1710, Estonia under Imperial Russia, Independent Estonia, Soviet Estonia. The latter two parts coincide with ours, but the first ones are temporally and principally different.

The following remarks explain the periodization used in "The Story of the Native Land". Single subperiods are also analyzed to some extent, and this might be of some help while compiling new surveys.

Treating ancient history (prehistory) as one of the main epochs in Estonian history is justified in every respect not only because of its temporal length but first of all because of its essential significance for the whole development that followed. The fact that our predecessors have inhabited this country for about 10,000 years, our direct ethnic ancestors for at least 5000 years, is not only a festive declaration. A firm foundation was laid to tillage that gave colour to the following development; the language, culture and mentality that was transmitted through the "historical times" and that has reached our time, were formed.

During the millenniums of prehistory the society went through a very slow, but steady development from mesolithic kins of hunters and fishermen to the threshold of statehood. It has proved most expedient to follow this development according to the archeological periodization (the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, the Iron Age). This seems to be not quite enough as far as its final periods – Middle Iron Age (5-8th c-ies) and Younger Iron Age (9-13th c-ies) are concerned. In the second half of the first millennium economic and social development quickened noticeably, and Estonian tribes took more and more an active part in international communication. Yet, compared with Scandinavia and Russia the rate of development was slower, and when Christian states arose in those countries, the latter started to reveal aspirations of conquest towards Estonia. Throughout several centuries such attacks were successfully repulsed that evidently proves the existence of a certain military and political organization. On the ground of written sources the beginning of such relations can be dated to the 7th century.

In the 11th century significant new developments can be noticed in economic, social and political life. The best-known and most characteristic political event was the attempt of Kiev Russia to join the Estonian region to the Kiev state. It started with Yaroslav the Wise's campaign to Tartu that was conquered in 1030. The campaign, however, ended with a counter-attack by the Estonians and the withdrawal of Russians from Estonia in 1061. At the same time, middle of the 11th century, an important change also took place in relations with Scandinavia. The Viking era of the Scandinavians ended, and the role of Estonians started to grow in the Baltic Sea area. The favourable situation in foreign policy was connected with inner consolidation; foreigners started to consider Estonia and the Estonians as a definite territorial and ethnical whole.

The situation changed with the rise of the Germans in the Baltic Sea area from the middle of the 12th century, that coincided with Denmark's growing activity. The activities of bishop Fulco as a representative of Denmark's policy, were the first serious marks of the beginning of aggression. Yet decisive success was achieved by German crusaders. With Danish support, Estonia was christianized and subordinated to foreign powers. The year 1227 when Saaremaa was the last district in Estonia to accept christianity, is usually considered to be the final year of the ancient fight for freedom.

This can also mark the end of the ancient history of Estonia, although it is a very conditional date. Some ten years the inhabitants of Saaremaa restored their independence for a brief period and after that they were successful several times. For some time the ancient order of life was preserved besides the new system of power and partly within. As a matter of fact ancient history ends with a longer transition period that quite obviously lasted until the final episode of the ancient fight for freedom, the St. George's Night Uprising (1343-1345), partly even longer.

The Estonians lost their Freedom for about 700 years. This period has often been called a 700-year-slavery, that might be adequate only if we do not interpret the word "slavery" in the sense of real ancient slavery or medieval serfdom, but as the word "orjus" signified in older Estonian language as a duty, a service. During this time Estonians were excluded from the governing of the country. For several centuries most of them were serfs of feudal landlords; the highest governmental power belonged to foreigners who alternated from time to time – the German (Livonian) Order and bishops, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Russia. In three years time (1566-1563) a part of Estonian territory also belonged to the Lithuanian Grand Duchy.

With the conquest, Estonia was simultaneously connected to the medieval European cultural area. It is probably appropriate to call the period from the ancient fight for freedom to the great wars that broke out in the middle of the 16th century and brought about great changes, the Medieval period in Estonian history. Principally the same kinds of economic, political, social and cultural phenomena and relations as in Western Europe, developed in Estonia, with local specific features. In its appearance Estonia also became quite similar to the countries of Northern and Western Europe (towns, castles, monasteries, churches). Following Germany's example, Estonia experienced Lutheran reformation after the monopoly of the Catholic church that had lasted for three hundred years.

Medieval Old Livonia was politically splintered. The Estonian territory was divided between the Livonian Order, the bishops of Tartu and Saare-Lääne, and Denmark (1238-1346). The latter was officially called the Duchy of Estonia although it covered only North-Estonia. Estonia did not constitute one administrative unit, but the term Estonia in the sense of the whole Estonian territory was still used and acknowledged. At the beginning of his chronicle Balthasar Russow presents a remarkable geographical-ethnical description of Livonia. According

to Russow Livonia was divided into three major provinces, namely Estonia, Latvia, and Curonia, that in their turn were divided into different districts. The author comments on the Estonian population and language as follows: "...the inhabitants of Estonian provinces and islands all speak Estonian. On some islets, however, Swedish is also spoken, which is evidence that the inhabitants of these places must be of Swedish or Finnish origin. But German is common among the nobility and the citizens".[4]

In 1558, under the leadership of Ivan the Terrible, Russia started a war against Old Livonia with the aim to reach the coasts of the Baltic Sea at a broad front. A great fight for the title of *dominum maris Baltici* started, and besides Russia also Poland, Lithuania, Denmark and Sweden took an active part. As far as Estonian history is concerned, this meant a period of great wars, confusion and frequent change of powers; that have been treated and valued in a different way in history books. In some sense this time tends to get lost between the quite stable Order period and the following period of the Swedish Rule. The fights for the inheritance of Old Livonia resulted in the ruin of the country, destruction of population that alongside with epidemics, lean harvests and famines led to a real demographic cataclysm. At the same time something new and progressive started to arise from this general downfall; the Middle Ages were replaced by the Early Modern way of life, in the rivalry between the Catholic and the Lutheran churches significant results were achieved in education. All this should probably deserve more attention than this period has been attached to since; it seems correct to treat it as an independent historical period. So much the more that there is quite a lot of various source material available.

In quite a number of comprehensive surveys of Estonian history this period has been analyzed in two stages – first of all the Livonian War (1558-1583), that is the fight of Russia with Old Livonia and, after the states of the order and bishops were destroyed, with Poland and Sweden who finally drove out Russia. This was followed by a time when Estonia was divided between three states: Poland (1561-1629(or 1625)), Sweden (1561-1629) and Denmark (1559-1645).

From the viewpoint of the natives such division is not quite expedient. Fighting went on soon after the end of the Livonian War, and there was not much difference for the people, whether it was carried on by Russia or other states. The name Livonian War itself comes from Russian historical science and proceeds from Russian policy; as a matter of fact, it is questionable to regard it as one period of Estonian history. It had to do with a number of wars that can also be grouped in some other way. In the years 1558-1561 a war was carried on between Russia and Old Livonia that ended with the latter's defeat and the liguidation of the state system that had existed so far. The year 1561 became decisive (last steps in the liquidation of the Order State were in 1562); this date marks the end of medieval Livonia, and can be regarded as one of the basic dates of Estonian history. Russia's wars with Lithuania and Poland followed, in the years 1563-1570 the Seven Years' War of the Nordic Countries lasted with Sweden on one side and Denmark with its allies (Poland, Lübeck) on the other, that also touched Estonia. In 1570 another war between Sweden and Russia broke out that in Swedish historical literature is commonly known as the Twenty Five Years' War of the Nordic Countries, and which is considered to have ended with the Täyssina Peace Treaty in 1595 (not with the Pljussa Armistice in 1593).

The war between Sweden and Poland was a major political event for Estonia in the first decades of the 17th century; the Kalmar War (1611-1613) also did not leave Estonia untouched. With short breaks the wars lasted until the Altmark Armistice between Sweden and Poland in the year 1629. Major military activities in the Estonian territory stopped in 1625, but the state of war lasted and minor campaigns took place until the armistice. The Altmark armistice may be considered the endpoint of the period of wars that began in 1558.

The years 1558-1629 might be called the Time of Great Wars in Estonian history, as one of the most recognized researchers of older Estonian history Vilho Niitemaa has already written in his "Baltic History".[5]

The following period of the Swedish rule is, by its name at least, the best known period of older Estonian history to the broad public. In folk tradition it sometimes even occurs as a synonym to older times in general. Though Swedish rule was foreign like all the previous ones it was much more favourable from the Estonians'point of view in many aspects. This distinguishes the Swedish Time in Estonian history and gives it a particular place. But as to the boundaries of the Swedish Time, we can not give simply two dates. Estonia passed to Sweden step by step: Tallinn, Harju, Viru and Järva districts in 1561; Läänemaa district in 1584, South-Estonia in 1629, and Saaremaa in 1645. The second half of the 1620s marks a significant change; at that time thorough reorganization started. The time preceding this date has been called Earlier, and the following period, Later Swedish Rule. The reversion of manors in the 1680s in its turn marked a new stage, the Baltic landlords were subordinated to the will of the central government. Promising perspectives arose in the economic, social and cultural development of the peasantry, the futher realization of which was cut off by the Nordic War.

The end of the Swedish time has been dated in 1710 when the whole of Estonia was *de facto* joined to Russia as well as with 1721 when the Uusikaupunki peace was concluded. The question which of them is to be preferred as a major borderline is and probably remains disputable. The first date seems to have more supporters, but from the aspect of public law the significance of the other date should also be emphasized.

The Swedish Time was followed by two centuries of Russian rule. From the broad perspective of Estonian history it seems rather tragicomical how the fact that Estonia was a part of the Russian Empire is made use of in Great-Russian chauvinism and political speculation. The Nordic War and the victories of Peter the Great are set out as the beginning of Estonian history; it is claimed that Estonia has always belonged to Russia. At the same time the so-called Baltic Rule and Jurisdiction Sys-

tem that guaranteed special status to the Baltic provinces, as well as the fact that they continuously were a part of the West-European cultural area, are often denied.

The so-called Estonian National Awakening that made the Estonian nation one of Europe's modern nations, also took place under Russian rule, in the second half of the 19th century. The national movement marked the outset of an independent state, it meant a kind of preparatory work for the Republic of Estonia. It is quite logical to treat the National Awakening as the beginning of a new major period in Estonian history. While treating the National Awakening its direct presumptions in the first half of the previous century ought to be kept in mind as well as more distant ones starting with the times of ancient independence.

The temporal borders of the independent Republic of Estonia are again somewhat vague and here we also have to do with transition periods. February 24, 1918 when independence was officially promulgated, is generally acknowledged as the birthday of the Republic of Estonia, and so historians have no reason to object. Breaking away from Russia and the gaining of independence was of course a longer process, in the course of which the first important steps were taken in 1917, but decisive guarantees were the victorious War of Independence and the Tartu Peace Treaty on February 2, 1920.

Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union on June 17, 1940, but principally it was already decided with the Nazi-Soviet Pact signed on August 23, 1939 and with the so-called Treaty of Bases on September 28, 1939 that was forced upon Estonia. With the moving of Russian troops to the bases that started on October 18, 1939, the occupation of the country already began. So here again we have to do with a longer process the final point of which was uniting Estonia formally to the Soviet Union on August 6, 1940; and maybe it is not so important to look for the "main date" so eagerly.

It is much more important to keep in mind that in 1939-1940 the Soviet Union managed to occupy and annex Estonia for one year only. The German occupation in 1941-1944 is related to the Republic of Estonia as the greater part of the people and leading politicians at that time reckoned upon and strove for the restoration of independence. In the name of this Estonian men fought in the German as well as in the Finnish armies. When Otto Tief's government entered upon its duties on September 18, 1944, independence was finally restored and, although this act did not have practical significance, it had to do with a weighty decision that affirmed the continuity of the Republic of Estonia.

We have reached the Soviet occupation. Which events and dates have been the most significant in this period has to be decided after some temporal distance.

The development of society is so complicated and many-sided that all the attempts to schematize it in a certain way, remain conditional and compromising. This is also valid about periodization. So the ideas introduced here should also be taken as one possible approach and one aspect. Other possibilities, that are of course numerous, were referred to above. Discussions in this field seem topical, especially at the present stage of our historical science.

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Late Medieval Narva Between East and West: Trade and Politics

Jüri Kivimäe

In 1564 Caspar Hennenberger wrote in a leaflet dealing with events in Livonia that the German Narva was "... ein sehr fest stadt und schloss an der Reusischen grentz, der schlussel zum landt ...".[1] Twenty-two years later it is mentioned in a memorandum of the Reval Town Council dealing with trade policies that Narva has always been the key to the Baltic Sea.[2] Without doubt the opinion of the Prussian pastor from Mühausen as well as that of the Reval Town Council twenty years later was influenced by the Livonian War which broke out in 1558. As it is well known, at the beginning of the war Narva was seized by Russian troops and during the next two decades it developed into one of the most important North-East European markets, thus becoming "... das Hauptbindeglied zwischen Osten und Westen ..." as Walther Kirchner put it.[3]

Many historians (N.E. Bang, A. Attman, W. Kirchner, I. Andersson, I. Lubimenko, A. Dreyer, J. Denucé, P. Jeannin, K.F. Olechnowitz, T.S. Willan, A. Maczak, H. Zins, and recently M.-L. Pleus) have displayed a keen interest in Narva's commercial boom in the years 1558-81. Critical analysis of three important works (A. Attman, S. Svensson, W. Kirchner) was given by Hans Kruus in 1959. However, the question arises whether the flourishing of Narva's trade was based only on the purposeful commercial policy of Czar Ivan IV, a substantial manifestation of which was the charter he granted to Narva in 1558, or whether Narva itself, prior to the conquest, already possessed a commercial potential the realisation of which was in every way promoted by the Russians. In other words, it is a question of the relation of subjective and objective factors in Narva's commercial policy in the 16th century and, at the same time, of whether and in what sense Narva was "the key to the whole country" before the critical events of 1558.

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The whole history of medieval Narva is a graphic example of the contradictoy and even paradoxical nature, of urban development.

On one hand it is evident that the rise of Narva as a town was due to trade, especially Hanseatic-Russian trade. Narva's location on trade routes to Novgorod was the main factor for the enhanced strategic and political importance of the Livonian border village called Narvia, first mentioned in the Liber Census Daniae. Several historians, relying on Narva's location at the junction of important roads connecting West with East and North with South, have attempted to prove that Narva's growth as a town and a stronghold began immediately after the conquest of the Estonian territory. Yet it must be mentioned here that this statement is not confirmed by written records. The immediate effect of the trade routes on the changes in the quality of Narva's settlement dates to a later period and is linked with the decline of trade on the Neva in the 1280s as well as with the privilege of Erik Menved of 1294, which granted merchants the right to use the overland route through the province of Viru to the River Narva and from there to Novgorod.[4] It was only in 1345, by the privilege given by Waldemar IV Atterdag and mediated by Stigot Anderson, that the Lübeck town rights were granted to Narva, or, to be more exact, its citizens were granted the same rights and freedoms enjoyed by the citizens of Reval.

The above-mentioned fact supports the standpoint of A. Süvalepp, P. Johansen and W. Ebel that medieval Narva was a filial town of Reval; Narva's status has even been interpreted as that of a dependant. However, Narva's restricted right of appeal in the judicial system cannot be regarded as proof of real dependence.[5] The fact that Narva's population was formed by migration from Reval or through Reval is typical in the history of Livonian towns.

However, the fact that Narva, together with some other towns, belongs to the second wave of the formation of towns on Estonian territory, while Reval and Dorpat belong to the first, deserves special consideration. It gave Reval priority over Narva on the West-East trade route. The fall of Visby in 1361 created favourable conditions for the economic and political emergence of Tallinn.

Moreover, in 1346 Reval was granted the Right of Staple in the Hanseatic-Russian trade. There is no reason to regard it as a purposeful act of Reval aimed against Narva, as A. Süvalep maintains, since Narva, which had been only recently granted the town rights, was no competitor of Reval yet. Still, it was the granting of the Right of Staple to Reval that in later centuries excluded Narva of commercial competition. Although the Swedish historian Eric Tiberg recently expressed doubt as to the real meaning of the respective provisions of the 1346 grant,[6] one cannot disregard the whole late medieval practice of trade and seafaring on the Gulf of Finland.

Here we can cite as an example the explanation given to the Reval Town Council in 1586 by merchant

Jürgen Honerjeger pertaining to the organisation of trade in Livonia in olden times, that is, before the Livonian War, when Jürgen Honerjeger himself was active as merchant. He noted that not a single ship on the Baltic was allowed to sail into a port that did not belong to the Hanseatic League, and it was forbidden "... by vorlust lyeff and gutt ..." to sail into the port of Narva so as to prevent the Russians from buying banned merchandise such as lead, copper, sulphur and gunpowder. All wares from western ships were to be unloaded in Tallinn and sold to the citizens of that town. Only the latter, and not the Dutch, the English or other non-Hanseatics, could forward the wares from Tallinn to Narva on the small ships-schuten.[7]

Jürgen Honerjeger's explanation is, of course, idealistic in character. Reval's Right of Staple was still violated and quite often ships passed Reval and sailed straight to Narva. However, Reval's maritime priority granted by the right of stample kept Narva for the entire duration of Middle Ages in a secondary position in Livonian trade.

Keeping in mind the above, there is no need for detailed proof of why Narva was not granted the rights of a Hanseatic town. Though Narva, having been granted the Lübeck town rights, was, in comparison with Reval or some overseas German town, an equally independent town, the circumstance that it did not have the Hanseatic rights was one of the major obstacles to its development. The fact alone that the merchants of Narva as non-Hanseatics did not have the right to form trade organisations with the Hanseatic merchants or, for example, to use the Peterhof in Novgorod, was bound to limit the functions of Narva's trade to a minimum. In this way Narva would have served only the interests of the Hanseatic-Russian trade, and the native merchants of Narva would have been dislodged from trade.

The failure to observe regulations was a phenomenon equally well known in the medieval society as it is today. Besides, a trade embargo which often happened because of frequent conflicts in the Hanseatic-Russian trade, usually brought in its way a boom in Narva's trade, since Narva as a non-Hanseatic town was not compelled to observe the Hanseatic restrictions.

The trade pattern described above remained more or less stable in the eastern Baltic almost until the last decade of the 15th century when, due to a number of political shifts in this region, it began to disintegrate quickly.

One of the major political shifts was the incorporation of Novgorod into the Grand Duchy of Muscovy in 1478. The impact of this event on the Hanseatic-Russian trade has received much attention in the more recent Soviet research (N. Kazakova, A. Choroshkevich).[8]

The building of Ivangorod on the River Narva in 1492 and the closing down of the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod in 1494 can be regarded as the logical sequel in the politics of Ivan III to the incorporation of Novgorod.

The above-mentioned events, in my opinion, constitute essential factors in the shaping of a new trade pattern in the eastern Baltic. The situation created when the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod was closed (1494-1514) and by the trade embargo which lasted for nearly two decades was bound to give rise to the question of who was to become the mediator in the Livonian-Russian (also Hanseatic-Russian) trade. In principle three towns, Ivangorod, Narva and Dorpat, could be considered as potential trade emporia.

When after the closing down of the Haseatic establishment in Novgorod it became in principle possible to transfer the emporium of the Hanseatic-Russian trade from Novgorod to Narva (according to a complaint of Reval, Narva did threaten to seize the entire trade), this was prevented by the swift development of Ivangorod into a trade centre. After all, Ivangorod possessed the same prerequisites as Narva for becoming a port as well as a centre of Livonian-Russian and Hanseatic-Russian trade. It became the basis of the rivalry between Narva and Ivangorod in the trade policies in the first half of the 16th century.

Although the Hanseatic towns and authorities of the Order had for years struggled for the reopening of the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod *na dem olden*, it was impossible to restore the old pattern of trade. The first data of the partial opening of trade on the border (in Narva and Dorpat), probably resulting from separate diplomacy by Narva, is from 1506. In 1509 a peace treaty was concluded between Livonia and Russia, granting Russian merchants the right to free trade in Livonian towns. It was only five years later, in 1514, that the Haseatic towns of Livonia, in the name of Hanseatic League, concluded the so-called kopmansfrede with Russia, on the basis of which the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod was reopened.[9] However, the Peterhof never regained its former importance and commercial prosperity; it turned into an appendage in the trade policy of the leading Hanseatic towns in Livonia, Reval in particular.

Trade with Russian merchants began to concentrate more and more in Livonian towns, or, in other words, the Russians began to pursue an active trade policy in Livonia. The last statement needs additional proof, but on the basis of materials now available this thesis in every respect explains the changes in the trade policy of Livonian towns in the first half of the 16th century.

One might think that the restoration of the Livonian-Russian trade would have normalised Narva's position in the trade system. On the contrary, Narva's position deteriorated. The reopening of the Hanseatic establishment signified only the reduction to a minimum of Narva's prospects for obtaining the right of emporium of the Hanseatic-Russian trade. On the other hand, Narva's relations with Ivangorod became more complicated: the merchants of the latter seem to have been oriented towards in Livonia alone.

The restoration of normal trade relations between Narva and Ivangorod met with considerable difficulties. the namestnik of Ivangorod demanded in 1512 that Russian merchandise should be weighed in Ivangorod only and German merchandise in Narva. The principle, which actually strove to establish equality, was not acceptable

to Narva, since the Russian wares had so far always been weighed in Narva. The merchandise brought to Narva from the West was in its grearter part already weighed and Narva had no right to re-weigh it; besides, it would have meant additional expense for the merchants. The struggle with the active trade policy of the namestniks of Ivangorod which continued for a number of years ended with the yielding of the Town Council of Narva: in 1516 Narva recognised the weight of Ivangorod. Although the solution was formally just, from the point of view of the commercial rivalry of the two towns it meant the victory of Ivangorod's policy.[10]

An active party in the struggle for the extension of Narva's commercial rights was, at that time, the Livonian Order. The precarious position of the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod immediately after its reopening obviously induced the Master of the Order Wolter von Plettenberg from 1515 on repeatedly to apply for the transfer of the Hanseatic establishment from Novgorod to Narva. Plettenberg's proposal, which found no support in Livonia, was the subject of discussions at the Wendic and Hanseatic diets in 1516, 1517, 1518 and 1521. The representatives of the Hanseatic towns usually found the proximity of Ivangorod to Narva, the possible location of the Hanseatic establishment, to be dangerous; also the transfer of the establishment to Narva was felt to be determental to Reval's interests.

Reval, which in every respect opposed Plettenberg's proposal, repeatedly stressed as one of the weightiest objections the fact that, after the transfer of the Hanseatic establishment to Narva, the Peterhof in Novgorod would fall into the hands of the Lithuanians, the Swedes, the Danes or the Fuggers. Although at the Hanseatic diet of 1521 the disscussion of this question ended in a compromise - those who wished to support the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod were allowed to do so, and at the same time it was allowed to trade with both Dorpat and Narva - what it actually meant was that Plattenberg's proposal had failed to find support. Those discussions show that even the modest backing which Narva's aims received in the Livonian trade policy was ineffective.

An example of the consequences of Narva's independent commercial policy is the town's prolonged struggle against the Russians' trading journeys to Reval, especially those of the Ivangorod merchants. In a memorandum dated 1515 the Town Council of Narva informed the namestnik of Ivangorod that those Russian merchants who, following the ancient custom, arrived with their wares in Narva and wished to proceed from there to Riga, Dorpat or Reval, would be granted free passage, while those who wanted to by-pass Narva would not allowed to go on. The namestnik of Ivangorod set no store by such old customs, that is, coercive measures, and let it be known that if the merchants of Novgorod or Pskov wished to go straight to Reval they could by-pass Narva. Narva applied countermeasures and took steps to obstruct the travel of Russian merchants to Reval: a practice which in its turn caused a deterioration in the relations between Narva and Reval. So, in 1519, the Town Council of Reval, in a similar situation, forbade the merchants of Reval to send their wares to Narva: a move which would have meant the commercial isolation of the latter.

Although the Livonian Landtag decided in 1522 that henceforth the merchants of Yamgorod and Ivangorod must trade in Narva only, and the merchants of Pskov and Novgorod in Reval, it is yet perplexing how the Livonian authorities proposed to compel the subjects of the Grand Duke to submit to the decision of the Livonian Landtag, a decision which was, moreover, contrary to the peace treaty.

The fact that Reval indeed restricted for some time the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants was regarded in Ivangorod as a component of Narva's politics. The same situation recurred in 1537-38. And when the assembled Livonian towns in 1541 reached another agreement which again contained the provision of banning the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants, the behaviour of the Reval Town Council towards Ivangorod and Yamgorod was openly provocative.

Thus the attitude towards the trade with Ivangorod was one of the major reasons leading to an acute conflict in questions of trade policy between Reval and Narva in 1551-53. By the recess of 1553 the Town Council of Reval, for the sake of appearance, consented to prohibit the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants, but only on the condition that the delegation of the Order should manage to have a corresponding provision included in the peace treaty at the impending peace negotiations between Russia and Livonia. However, five years before the outbreak of the Livonian War such a proposal was utopian.

Thus Narva failed to restrain the overland trading journeys of Russia merchants to Reval. However, here the sea route from Reval to River Narva must be taken into account, as well as the fact that Ivangorod was the first Baltic port of the Russian empire. It must also be mentioned that in the first half of the 16th century the Russian state did not own a merchant fleet in the Baltic or on the River Narva. It means, first, that Ivangorod was only a potential port for ships from the West. Data about their visits are relatively scarce: in 1500 Swedish ships stopped in Ivangorod and in 1531 a ship from Amsterdam sailed into the port of Ivangorod. The sailing of big western ships into the port of Ivangorod was obstucted by Reval's right of staple; besides, in 1541, by order of the Town Council of Reval, control over navigation had been considerably strengthened.

This, of course, does not mean that Russian merchants did not use the sea route. It seems that it was Narva's policy of obstructing the trading journeys of the Ivangorod merchants to Reval that forced the latter seek opportunities for travelling to Reval by sea which was not subject to control by the Town Council of Narva.

On the other hand, freight expenses in overseas trade judging by Livonian data, were smaller than in overland carriage. This statement is borne out by information

dating back to 1528 about two schuten skippered by Estonians from Narva, returning to their home town. The ships brought from Riga to Ivangorod some Pskov merchants bringing with them large quantities of wine and herring.[11]

So far the attempts to find out whether the Ivangorod merchants sailed to Reval (and perhaps also elsewhere) on ships of their own have failed. From 1528 on one comes more and more frequently across complaints in Livonian sources about the Pskov and Ivangorod merchants sailing from Ivagorod to Reval and back on schuten skippered by Karelians. For example, in 1542 the Ivangorod merchants hired eight or nine ships of the Karelians for journeys to Reval. This practice continued increasingly until 1555 when, because of the Russo-Swedish war, the sea connection between Reval and Narva was severed.

The commercial situation described above, which formed a part of the new pattern of trade relations, threatened to place Narva's trade in isolation. It was the increasingly active trade policy of the Russians in Livonia that exacerebated the commercial antagonisms. The prohibition of trading by the so-called visiting merchants (Gast handels verbot) brought serious consequences in the trade policy in its wake. The embargo was first introduced in 1513 and was made more strict in 1539 by a decision of the diet of Livonian towns. Although the embargo deepened the antagonisms between the German and the Livonian Hanseatic towns (the Lübeck merchants also came to be regarded as visitors), it was an inevitable economic safeguard for the local merchants under the changed conditions.

The detriment to the interests of the German Hanseatic towns in Livonia and especially Reval's endeavours to monopolise trade in the entire region compelled the Lübeck merchants to seek opportunities for restoring their commercial position in Livonia and in trade with Russia. Obviously this explains Lübeck's growing interest in the state of affairs in Narva in the 1540s and 1550s. Since 1541 the issue of admiting Narva into the Hanseatic League was discussed at several Hanseatic diets, probably on the initiative of the German Hanseatic towns. However, no positive conclusion was reached since, at the same time, the German Hanseatic towns were trying, although unsuccessfully, to restore the position of the Hanseatic establishment in Novgorod. The confidental report by one Reinhold Facke on the secretary of the Lübeck Town Council Herman Boityn who allegedly was holding secret negotations with the Russians concerning the opening of a trading establishment in Ivangorod dates from the period between 1552 and 1558.[12] These first modest pieces of information bear witness to new shifts of interest in the trade pattern in the eastern Baltic, which was resolved by the Livonian War. The circumstance that, by order of Ivan IV, the emporium of Russian trade was transferred from Vyborg to Narva in 1559,[13] breaking Reval's monopoly in the eastern Baltic trade, was a logical solution to the developments in the trade policies of this region in the first half of the 16th century.

Although Narva's trade, on the basis of the above, was in a rather subjugated position, late medieval Narva formed a politically important and inevitable link in the system of the Hanseatic-Russian and Livonian-Russian trade, thus fully justifying its being regarded as a town in a key position.

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Trading Conditions of the English in Narva in the Second Half of the 17th Century

Enn Küng

In the middle of the 17th century a significant change took place in the Baltic Sea trade of the English. Up to then English merchants received Russian and Polish raw materials mainly through Danzig, Königsberg and Elbing, then from the 1650s they first of all communicated with Stockholm, Göteborg, Riga and Narva. By the medium of the first two towns also iron reached the English market besides forestry products (pitch, tar, coal, timber). Riga and Narva turned into the shipping ports of Russian timber, flax and hemp.[1] All the towns mentioned were interested in the activities of English merchants, but only in Narva their role in foreign trade became especially great compared with other foreigners. In Narva's export the English occupied a firm second place after Lübeck merchants (see table 1).[2]

Table 1

Year	In Export	In Import
1662	14,9	-
1668	6,0	4,9
1671	18,2	2,9
1675	5,1	5,3
1677	33,8	47,1
1679	28,4	21,2
1696	20,4	24,3

The proportion of English merchants in Narva 1662-92 (%)[2]

One of Narva's peculiarities was that a great part of English merchants and shipowners not only actively communicated with Russia via Narva, but settled down there.

Herman von Bruiningk was the first to point out the particular role of the English in Narva in the second half of the 17th century.[3] Finnish-Swedish historian Sven-Erik Åström who has studied English-Swedish relations in the last quarter of the 17th century has in connection with this also observed the interest of the English in trading in Narva.[4] A German researcher Dirk Erpenbeck has written an interesting survey on the reasons for English merchants to come to Narva plus a number of biographies.[5] But none of these works has touched upon the trading conditions and activities of the English in Narva in the second half of the 17th century and the problems that arose in connection with that, in a more detailed manner. The present article aims to fill in this gap to some extent. Thereby resolutions of Swedish kings, records and posters of the town council, as well as the letters of the Commercial Council, the Great Guild and the merchants, supplicates and other materials found in the fund of the Narva municipal authorities in the Estonian Archives of History (Tartu) have been used as source material.[6]

Alongside with the gradual perishing of the monopolistic position of the Hanseatic League the interest of English merchants in the Russian market arose. One of its expressions was the use of a new trade route over the Arctic Ocean to Russia and the Moscow Company that was founded in 1553. Besides the harbors of the White Sea Narva became its other chief area of activities from 1559.[7] But when the latter was united with the Swedish state in 1582, obstacles were put in the way of English merchants (and other foreigners) and they were forced to communicate with Russia mainly via Archangelsk.[8] The interest of the English in Narva was restored in the middle of the 17th century. On one hand, it was connected with the fact of being overcome by the Dutch in Archangelsk, on the other hand the English had lost their direct contacts with Russia in 1649 when czar Aleksei Michailovitsh cancelled their extensive privileges after the execution of Charles I.[9] England needed new opportunities to procure Russian raw materials as the raw material recources of its North American colonies could not replace the goods coming from the Baltic Sea.[10]

The final opening of Narva trade to foreigners also falls in the 1640s, that also enabled the English to make direct contacts with Narva merchants. The 1660s with Sweden's and England's rapprochment were especially favourable. In 1661 a Friendship and Trade Treaty was concluded,[11] that was soon replaced by a Treaty of Friendship, Defence, Trade and Navigation that was concluded on March 1 (March 11 according to the old calender) 1665. Although the latter mainly touched upon the activities of the contacting states in case one of them would go to war, it also included important commercial regulations. As for the present subject article No. 23 that

When the Swedish-English alliance was renewed in 1672, the freedoms of the English were once again affirmed in Narva as well as elsewhere in the Swedish state.[13] And although Swedish-English political relations in the following period up to the Nordic War depended on the political situation in the whole Baltic Sea area, the English preserved their interest in Narva up to the end of the 17th century. This is also proved by the number of English ships that started for Western Europe over Öresund. In the years 1661-1674 less than 10 ships went through this customs examination point, but from 1679 the number of ships was over 20-30 already. The years 1683 and 1700 set a record with accoringly 51 and 71 ships. In 1701 only 2 English ships from Narva passed through Öresund, after that a longer pause followed.[14]

Thereby the activities of English merchants in Narva purely juridically rested on the treaties between England and Sweden concluded in 1661, 1665 and 1672. But did the subjects of the English crown get any commercial privileges with these treaties? S.-E. Åström has claimed that as a result of the treaties the English merchants gained a free transit to Russia in spite of the opposition of the town council.[15] But in this case there would have arisen a conflict between the rights of the English and the privileges guaranteed to the merchants of Narva by the Swedish state. Up to now only Tallinn merchants had some advantages in salt and herring trade on the ground of old Hanseatic rigts, and, thanks to agreements made between the Swedish state and the Lübeck town council, the Lübeck merchants had the same advantages. But all through the 17th century the Narva town council fought for the cancelling of these privileges.[16]

To answer the question raised we have to make ourselves familiar with the composition of export and import of the English in Narva. Tobacco occupied the first place in English import to Narva. From 1677 the absolute majority of tobacco was brought to Narva by the English who left their chief rivals — the Lübeck merchants and the Dutch — far behind.[17] At the same time tobacco was among the few articles for which the Swedish authorities had given local merchants the sole right of selling. When, in the middle of the century, tobacco trade was the monopoly of the Swedish state; on May 14, 1666 the tutelary government of Karl XI allowed the Narva merchants to trade with tobacco *en gros*.[18] On May 26, 1669 the tutelary government set tobacco trade free for everybody.[19] But as tobacco was a prohibited good in Russia and its import strictly punishable, Karl XI decided to give the sole right of selling it to the Narva merchants only on October 14, 1675. All the foreigners who had arrived in Narva, had to sell the tobacco they had brought with them immediatly to local merchants.[20] But when it became clear that the Narva merchants were not able to buy up tobacco quickly, the trade poster of the town council of September 17, 1678 foresaw the consignment of tobacco in the cellar of the town council after it was weighed from where the foreigner could offer it within two months time.[21] This kind of system remained in force in Narva up to the end of the period under discussion[22] and caused confusion among several foreigners, including the English.

Even before selling tobacco in Narva was announced the sole right of local merchants in 1675, the Narva people tried to make the English sell the tobacco with them to locals immediately. But this was not permitted in a resolution given to the town by Karl XI on September 8, 1673 as the government was of the opinion that the English had promoted Narva's foreign trade and increased the town's commodity circulation.[23] Judging the role of the English, this is quite a vivid statement.

Only after the tobacco privilege of 1675 the Narva town council extended this law also to the English. In October 1677 three English merchants working in Narva (W. Kettlewell, A. Gilbert, R. Bacon) sent a written complaint against the Narva town council to Jakob Johan Taube, the governor general of Ingrianland. In their opinion the town council ignored the agreement between England and Sweden. The merchants claimed that, on the basis of the agreement, they have the right to sell all the goods on the spot and to export them where they want. But the Narva town council had forbidden them to send a parcel of tobacco to Nyen and confiscated it despite customs certificates that they had shown.[24]

On October 22, 1677 Albert Tretzel, the portorium and licence inspector of Narva, reported the case to J.J. Taube. According to his information W. Kettlewell wanted to take 12 barrels of tobacco to Nyen by barges after he had paid the customs duties on October 20, and applied for a marine passport. But the Narva castle count, Bürgermeisters and town council banned the issuing of the passport and on the next day had all the tobacco taken away from the barge.[25]

As a result of the complaint brought forward by the English merchants, on October 25 the question whether the subjects of the English crown could carry the tobacco brought to the town onward to Nyen or anywhere else. Almost the whole town council found that they had the right to ban it. Town councillor J. C. Schwartz alone was of the opinion that the English ought to be allowed to transport tobacco from Narva to Nyen, however, under the pretence of the danger that commercial relations between the two towns might break off. At the end of the discussion the Narva town council decided to remain firmly true to the demand that foreigners are to sell their tobacco in a scheduled time after their arrival in Narva.[26]

The English, of course, were not satisfied with the decision of the town council and in next March a new application of the English to get permission for carrying goods, first of all tobacco, over Narva to the neighbouring towns and in fact also to Russia, was considered in the Narva town council. The town council remained firm to its previous decision and the English were again obliged to offer the wine, herring and tobacco they had brought with them to local people from the cellar of the town council in two months time.[27]

In this way the town council of Narva tried to hinder the English merchants from trading with tobacco in neighbouring towns and in Russia. It can be asserted that in 1680s-1690s the town council and local merchants succeeded in forcing their claims about tobacco trading upon the English. So it was at least until the autumn of 1698 when, czar Peter I set tobacco import to Russia free for English merchants and first parcels were sent off through Narva.[28] But the permission of the Swedish state must have been behind this opportu-

nity as well. In 1675 the Swedish state changed the order of tobacco trading trying to increase the customs incomes per transit. The main aim was to gain Swedish subjects the same kind of rights as the English had. [29]

In archive sources connected with the English, the tobacco problem also arises in 1698. In August-September the Englishman Thomas Meux claimed that the 13 barrels of tobacco that he had sent to Tallinn via Narva, actually belonged to A. Gibert and, as the latter had already become a citizen of Narva, such trade was allowed for him.[30] On September 5, 1698 the proposal of the castle count C. von Kochen that the council should deposit the keys of the stores where the English kept their tobacco to prevent misunderstandings with goods that were to be sent onward to Russia, was discussed in the town council.[31] On September 9 the town council continued the discussion whereby aldermen A. Ekholm and N. Hiseing took an interest in whether His Royal Majesty had given the English the permission to carry tobacco to Russia through Narva. They probably got a positive answer as further discussion concerned the purely technical question whether the tobacco should be kept in the cellar of the town council or in the storage rooms of the English. The decision was made on favour of the latter.[32]

On October 10 of the same year Stepan Ilgin, a journeyman merchant from Moscow applied to the Narva town council with a supplicate. Namely, an English merchant S. Blande from Novgorod had accused him of taking 10 barrels of tobacco through Narva to Russia and in this way offending the privileges of the English company. Since the Russian claimed that he was innocent, he asked to look up in the books of weighhouse that no tobacco has been weighed in his name. He asked to put the same question to bargemen and other persons concerned.[33]

So we can state that until the autumn of 1698 the English could not carry tobacco over Narva. According to the valid trading order they had to sell it to local people. The change that followed came as a surprise to at least one part of the town council members. Unfortunately no orders of the Royal Commercial College or any other legislative institution that might explain the conditions of the tobacco trade of the English in detail have been preserved in the fund of the Narva town council. It was different with the merchants of Tallinn and Lübeck as their rights and privileges in Narva were exactly prescribed to the town. On the basis of the materials of the Royal Commercial College kept in Swedish State Archives it can be surely claimed that the people of Narva considered the abolition of tobacco monopoly a great blow to their trading activities.[34]

As for import of other West-European goods to Narva England's role was insignificant. In salt, cloth, wine and paper it was firmly beaten by the Lübeck merchants, by the Dutch, the French, but also by Tallinners. No herring arrived to Narva by the medium of the English.[35] Thereby salt and herring trade had been made the sole right of Narva merchants already on September 5, 1587[36] and on December 22, 1675 (i.e. in the same year as tobacco) wine was also entered on the list of so-called monopolized articles.[37] And when the Swedish government was forced to yield advantages to Tallinn and Lübeck merchants about salt and herring in order to increase commodity circulation in Narva, the English were not mentioned, and this field of trading remained forbidden to them until the end of the 17th century. Neither were any compliances made in wine trading. So, in the spring of 1678 the Narva town council suspected a group of English merchants of reselling various wines to Russia. In the course of examination it however became evident through local merchants H. Ranie and H. Wiens who were accused of participsting in the deal, that before sending to Russia the English had managed to sell the suspect wines to citizens of Narva.[38]

The role of English merchants in import to Narva could be made clear better if we had exact data on the loads of their ships on their arrival to the town available. It is interesting to note that for instance in 1689 80 per cent of ships of English origin were empty when they arrived in Riga.[39] This fact clearly reflects the interest of the English in Russian raw materials. On the basis of numerical data the English merchants held a leading position in the export of linen, hemp, potash and tar from Narva from the 1670s. A great amount of Russian and local boards also went out of Narva by their medium.[40] As for Russian goods neither the English nor any other foreigners were set any restrictions already for the reason that the merchants of Narva were not capable of taking those goods to West-European markets. Although the number of ships that travelled under the flag of Narva was some twenty or thirty in the middle of the 1690s,[41] they could not compete with West-Europeans.

As for the other principles of foreign trade in Narva, the subjects of the English crown were not made any compliances either. They were not allowed to make direct contacts with other foreigners who had arrived there, with noblemen and peasants living nearby and with Russian borderlands. Only local merchants could be used as mediators. Commercial contacts with the subjects of the czar who had arrived from Novgorod, Pskov and other Russian towns could only be made in the presence of a broker named by the town council in the Russian trade yard. Until 1688 there were also temporary restrictions valid for the English – they were allowed to stay in Narva altogether for 2 months in a year, later they could stay there all year round.[42] Like other foreigners, the English were only allowed to deal with wholesale trade that meant that retail trade was not allowed. According to the order of Karl XI of October 14, 1679, foreigners were not allowed to buy linen, hemp and iron less than 10 ship pounds. As for other Russian goods the sum might not be less than 150 special state thalers.[43]

To illustrate what was mentioned above the minutes of a session of Narva Commercial College from August 25, 1698 that deals with a complaint of the town fiscal Z. Falck on the prohibited activities of a group of English merchants (T. Meux, R. Knipe, A. Hoyl and Blaumont), are reported on briefly. The fiscal had been informed that T. Meux had sent various Russian goods in the name of other foreigners, namely Tallinners, from Narva to Amsterdam, and had before that also made contacts with borderland Russians. Blaumont in his turn was

Table 2

Englishmen who became citizens of Narva in 1680-90

Date	Name	Occupation	Arrived from
07.11.1681	Joh. Langerwod	rope spinner	Nottingham
24.09.1683	William Kettlewell	merchant	England
27.01.1687	Thomas Loftus	merchant	England
23.09.1689	Alexander Gilbert	merchant	England
07.05.1682	Joh. Küssell	skipper	England
18.06.1692	Johan Noting	skipper	Newcastle
18.06.1692	Philip Wuddus	skipper	Hull
15.08.1692	Georg Bourges	skipper	Hull
20.11.1693	William Wallcker	merchant	near York

accused of keeping various goods at home and selling them in small amounts.[44]

In the course of the discussion the opinions of both the English merchants and the College were given. The English denied direct contacts with the peasants of Russian borderland but claimed that in connection with that they were allowed their "own religion" in Narva His Royal Majesty had allowed them "contact with whoever and make business wherever they wanted". This way first of all associated with the wish to make direct contacts with other foreigners.[45] The Commercial College, however, was convinced that the English had to take into consideration the Order of Foreign Trade in force, first of all the last trade poster of the town council of July 4, 1694. It was particularly stressed that, although the Swedish crown had allowed the English to enjoy "their own religion" in Narva, this did not mean privileges in trading.[46]

Turning back to the beginning of the present article where the author has referred to the significant role of the English among the citizens of Narva, we can ask the question why was it useful for the English to be citizens of Narva? In the author's mind the English settled down in Narva due to the fact that despite their intensive commodity circulation they did not have the possibility of free transit to Russia unlike the Tallinn and Lübeck merchants. As they made their business in Narva as "foreigners", all the restrictions concerning foreigners touched them as well. As citizens they were guaranteed the rights and freedoms of Swedish subjects, for instance exemption from duty in Öresund.[47] The English citizens of Narva formed a "bridge" for sending Russian goods to England and the other way round. Being citizens of Narva they managed to compete successfully with other, generally poorer inhabitants of Narva. Besides merchants and a few handicraftsmen, a number of skippers also entered the citizenship of Narva. Several Narva Englishmen (like W. Kettlewell and T. Loftus) were themselves shipowners or joint owners.

The Swedish powers and the town council who were interested in Narva's development and the increase of commodity circulation yielded advantages to all rich resettlers. D. Erpenbeck has good reasons to mark that attitude towards resettlers in Narva was better than anywhere else; the English colony was obliged in all respects.[48] In a strictly Lutheran state the English were from 1684 allowed to "enjoy their own religion". The first Anglican priest Charles Thirlby was commissioned by the bishop of London.[49] In order to get a better contact with the English community and to bind them with the town, the Englishman Thomas Loftus was named Governor General (on April 30, 1688).[50] The English also had language advantages. For instance when Johan Küsell, a skipper from England became a citizen in 1692, he gave the oath in English.[51] Besides citizens there was also a big group of so-called English agents in Narva (see table 2).

To sum up it can be stated once again that the Agreement of Friendship and Trade made between England and Sweden in 1661, 1665 and 1672 brought the English to Narva, but did not guarantee them any special trading privileges that would have enabled free trading with Russia over Narva. This was first of all due to the opposition of the Narva town council and merchants. As for the export of Russian goods no restrictions were made to the English merchants. The problem of the English in Narva changed at the outbreak of the Northern War, when Petersburg became a new trading centre in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea.

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[18] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 1, Item 1, p. 101p.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 111.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 127. Althought tobacco trade was forbidden in Russia, it was imported there in large amounts.

[21] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 2, Item 38, p. 68-69.

[22] See for example Commercial Poster of Narva Town Council on July 4, 1694, paragraphs 12-13. *Ibidem*, p. 88.

[23] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 1, Item 1, p. 117. Paragraph 4.

[24] *Ibidem*, Series 2, Item 176, p. 63-63.

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[31] *Ibidem*, Series 1, Item 107; p. 231-231.

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[40] **Piirimäe H.** Sostav, objom i raspredelenie russkogo vyvoza v 1661-1700 gg. tsherez shvetskie vladenija v Pribaltike na primere g. Narvy. // Skandinavskij sbornik V. Tallinn, 1962. S. 46-47, 49-50, 53, 73, 75.

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[42] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 2, Item 98, p. 4-5. From 1694 other foreigners were also allowed to stay in Narva all the year round for Russian trade. See: *Ibidem* N. 2, Item 38, p. 87.

[43] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 1, Item 1, p. 125. Paragraph 3.

[44] *Ibidem*, Series 2, Item 255, p. 25.

[45] *Ibidem* p. 25.

[46] *Ibidem* p. 26.

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[50] HAE, Stock 1646, Series 1, Item 100, p. 107-109.

[51] *Ibidem*, Item 103, p. 126.

The View of Narva in the 17th Century by Adam Olearius



Des Welt-berühmten Adami Olearii colligirte und viel vermehrte Reise Beschreibungen ... Hamburg, 1696

Infant and Child Mortality Geography in Estonia in the 18th - 19th Centuries

Herbert Ligi

Today infant mortality (IM) in developed countries is not so much a demographic as it is a medical problem. Indeed, if out of 1000 babies born alive only 5 - 10 die in their first year of life, we may say that it cannot considerably affect the marital fertility and the general demographic development of the country or district. It is possible that is why the problem of infant mortality has not been thoroughly dealt with in historical demography. In the Soviet Union and in the Baltic States, practically nothing has been published about it.

In Western Europe researchers have tried to make clear the connection between mortality and marital fertility (legitimate fertility)[1] or breast-feeding.[2] IM has also been studied in some limited area during shorter periods.[3] In the present paper, the problem of IM has been dealt with on quite a different, so to say, geographical level. The problem cropped up for me about ten years ago while studying the dynamics of the peasant population. Namely it turned out that, after the Great Northern War (1700-21) in the 18th and 19th centuries, the number of peasants increased in Western Estonia, especially on the islands, much more rapidly than Eastern Estonia, and in Northern Estonia in its turn more rapidly than in Southern Estonia. It also turned out that the relation between births and deaths (sometimes it is called Pokrovsky's index) was quite different in different areas: in Western Estonia it was considerably bigger than in Eastern Estonia (See map 1). Meanwhile it became evident that al-



Child Mortality Rate in Estonia 1770-1849

Map 1. Pokrovsky's index

Estonia it was considerably bigger than in Eastern Estonia (See map 1). Meanwhile it became evident that already at the beginning of the Livonian War (1558-83), during the early Swedish rule and even in the 13th century some inhabitants of Saaremaa had now and then moved to the mainland and settled there. A closer study of migration proved that as a rule it proceeded in the west-east and north-south directions. The devilation from it may have been caused by a demographic cataclysm such as the plague of 1711.

Then the question arose: what caused such differences? One might think that the marital fertility rate in Western Estonia was higher than in Eastern Estonia. But factual material does not corroborate this supposition. There is a lot of documentary evidence for investigating this problem. One might even say that there is too much material. I have already exerted myself with this theme for several years, but I cannot say it is ready yet. The main sources have been Lutheran parish registers where births, deaths and marriages were recorded by the priests of each parish. The age of the dead has been shown in several cases as early as 1720, but this custom became more or less common in the third quarter of the 18th century. That is why it proved suitable to start the research of the geography of IM from the 1770s. In the present table the mortality rates have been given for the period of 80 years (1770-1850).

Before proceeding to the subject itself, we should make a terminological and at the same time essential specification. At present, demography and medicine are interested only in infant mortality; it is being carefully registered and recorded. Unfortunately, one cannot say the same about the mortality of children over infant age. Probably that is why one often does not differentiate terminologically between infants under or over one year of age in historical demography. Thus in German literature by "Kindersterblichkeit" they mean the mortality of babies less than one year old (the exact equivalent is "Säuglingssterblichkeit"). The same is true for the Russian word "detckaja smertnost" (correct: "mladentceskaja smertnost") and in Estonia "laste suremus" (should be "imikute suremus" = "mortality of sucklings"). In English literature it is usually correct - "infant mortality" and "child mortality" are used in their exact meanings. As a rule, the English make a difference between the two words: "infant mortality" (aged 0-1) and "child mortality" (aged over 1).

From our table we can see that in Estonia average IMR (infant mortality rate) for a decade was 110 - 130 in West Estonia, especially on islands, and 200 -230 in South-East Estonia. In comparison with today, it is certainly very high; such indexes are now observed in some extremely backward corners of Africa. In Estonia it has been a little less than 15 in recent years, conse-



Map 2. Infant mortality rate 1770-1850 (‰)

quently about ten times smaller than two or one and a half centuries ago. But it is useless to compare today's rate to that of those days.

When comparing the rates of Estonia with those of other countries, a surprising fact becomes evident: IM was strikingly low in Estonia. So in France it was 185 at the beginning of the 19th century (1805-20), although it had decreased a little by the end of the 19th century (1880-1900), it was still 165. In Sweden and Finland the average IMR was 200 as late as in the middle of the 19th century. This means that, at the most, two infants out of ten died before the age of one year.[4] Out of the 50 provinces of Russia only 15 (all western ones) had an IMR below 200. At that time it was the lowest in the province of Estland (North Estonia) and Vilnius (152 and 143 % respectively). In as many as 20 provinces the IMR rose above 300; in the Perm province it was even 420. Such extreme cases occurred for a shorter period in some other places, too. The rate was even 980 in the Ümeä parish of Finland in 1809. The obvious reason for that was a severe epidemic of dysentry raging there and elswhere.

Departing from the present subject matter, however, it is much more important to analyse the IMRs in different areas of Estonia. As can be seen in the table, they very considerably and have a very definite tendency.

At the end of the 18th century the IMR in Western Estonia, especially on the island of Saaremaa, was often twice as low as in South-Eastern Estonia, especially in the district of Võrumaa. The lowest IMR was on the island of Muhumaa (101), the highest in the southeastern border parishes of Estonia. Neither of the rates, however, was an exception - the rates of the neighbouring parishes do not considerably differ from them. One cannot help drawing the conclusion that these extreme figures were determined by factors that influenced a much larger territory than one parish. It is worth mentioning that IM is not considerably affected by any common epidemics, infantile diseases included. But IMR can be a useful indicator of living conditions in the past. First af all it reflects the situation of public health and sanitation, the general level of culture and also the socio-economic situation. The higher the people's standard of living and the cultural level, the lower the mortality of infants (age-group 0-1 year), and vice versa. For instance, the Russians living in the neighboring areas had a considerably higher IMR. In the Pskov province the IM coefficient was 300 as late as the end of the 19th century, and in the Novgorod province it was even 329. The Russians living in Estonia in the coastal regions of Lake Peipsi also had a much higher IMR than Estonians. In the Roodova (Pankavitsa) parish, for instance, IMR was 265.



Map 3. Child (aged 1-15) mortality rate 1770-1850 (‰)

Table 1

Child Mortality Rate in Estonia 1770-1849

District, parish	Infant mortality rate (‰)			Children mortality rate (‰)		
	1770-1799	1800-1819	1820-1849	1770-1799	1800-1819	1820-1849
Võrumaa						
Vastseliina	212	244	255	506	466	495
Põlva		241	228		507	447
Kanepi	226	233	199	524	465	397
Karula	215	203	240	563	479	471
Hargla	213	187	230	492	407	430
Urvaste	239	245	256	544	501	472
Rõuge	188	214	208	486	485	442
Tartumaa						
Vônnu	213	225	231	491	500	470
Kambja	191	199	189	525	460	449
Tartu-Maarja	218	273	213	562	558	459
Nõo		186	187		447	382
Otepää	180	202	203	585	488	432
Sangaste	231	216	210	560	488	432
Rõngu	141	162	148	488	464	428
Rannu	161	181	205	460	472	476
Puhja	202	209	172	520	563	447
Kursi	163	142	150	416	330	390
Äksi	171	171	152	418	360	392
Palamuse	158	170	172	446	442	413
Torma		152	155		390	386
Laiuse	125	133	160	388	418	394
Maarja-MagdaleenaR	151	161	175	436	426	402
Viljandimaa						
Tarvastu	163	177	160	512	444	430
Paistu	180	129	148	475	374	401
Viljandi		168	148		379	361
Suure-Jaani	155	144	140	387	311	319
Kolga-Jaani		139	133		300	310
Põltsamaa	170	158	137	381	398	378
Pärnumaa						
Karksi		176	168		348	329
Halliste	159	180	170	401	392	360
Pärnu	199	192	186	517	430	401
Pärnu-Jaagupi	121	106	134	334	300	308
Mihkli	155	174	170	370	348	341
Audru	128	133	114	355	342	328
Tõstamaa	149	131	150	348	287	
Kihnu	123	91	123	340	239	230
Saaremaa						
Muhu	101	98	134	236	270	282
Pöide		121	154		320	367
Jaani		159	155		326	330
Valjala			136			407
Püha	135	146	139	329	340	350
Kaarma	156	158	164	389	346	336
Kärla	130	130	146	340	346	336
Mustjala		101	111		279	318
Kihelkonna	134	128	129	317	299	307
Anseküla	122	126	130	307	318	302
Ruhnu	102	106		233	205	

District, parish	Infant mortality rate (‰)			Children mortality rate (‰)		
	1770-1799	1800-1819	1820-1849	1770-1799	1800-1819	1820-1849
Harjumaa						
Kuusalu		170	168		380	352
Jüri	196	191	169	467	425	414
Kose	145	160	165	398	388	400
Juuru	138	154	160	358	370	362
Nissi		160	159		359	370
Keila	150	166	178	340	362	352
Virumaa						
Haljala	130	127	140	339	348	380
Rakvere	189	190	165	450	440	392
Viru-Jaagupi	124	130	143	355	334	360
Viru-Nigula	157	138	150	406	370	340
Lüganuse	139	137	127	369	359	348
Jõhvi	148	165	150	408	425	358
Vaivara	183	223		469	501	
Väike-Maarja	146	151	159	374	378	390
Läänemaa						
Vormsi	147	128		394	374	
Hanila	164	182	189	403	400	394
Märjamaa	181	169	145	333	342	362
Ridala	142	181	178	376	349	329

The map of distribution demonstrates the range of differences in IM (See map 2). As an extreme example one might look at Muhu where the average IMR over decades was between 90 and 120. Estonia's southeasternmost parish Vastseliina is quite an antipode to it as its mortality rate during the same period of time averaged between 210 and 250.

What caused such great and, at the same time permanent differences in IM on such a small territory as Estonia (less than 50 000 sq. km)? One should not forget that ethnically Estonia (at least rural Estonia) was fairly homogenous. As for Estonians' way of life and cultural traditions, no notable differences between its different parts have been observed.

Of course, local habits of infant nutrition are of special importance. In the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century, there were whole areas in Sweden and Finland[5] (for instance the coastal areas of Västerbotten and Norbotten), where women did not breast-feed their babies. In Ostrobotnia it was common to feed infants artificially in the 19th century. They used a horn from a cow as a bottle with pieces of cloth or washed leather as the nipple. In many areas there was also a custom to give infants supplementary food that was unsuitable considering their age. Porridge, pork, bread and even liquor were given to babies who were only a few months old. This custom was certainly even more harmful than malnutrition. In northern regions as many as nine out of ten infants suffered from riset (rickets); according to local physicians it was the result of artificial feeding. At that time children in Estonia villages were breast-fed everywhere for one two years or sometimes even longer.

From the point of view of our theme, however, not only the mortality of infants (aged 0-1) but also that of children from one to fifteen years of age is important. The table with parallel figures and map 3 show that their death rate was not lower, and in many parishes it was even higher than that of sucklings. Map 3 also proves that figures here vary in the same way as was the case with infants less than one year old. Again we must ask: what was the reason for these great differences in the mortality of children over infant age? The death of older children was often caused by infectious diseases such as smallpox, the measles, scarlet fever, dysentry, etc.[6] Conditions were favourable for the spread of infectious diseases in places where the population was denser and communication livelier. When studying the spread of epidemics,[7] it is evident that the fatalities first started in the southeastern parishes of Estonia. On these grounds we may state that epidemics at that time spread from south to north and from east to west. A lot of epidemics subsided because of a change in weather before reaching Western or Northern Estonia or were stopped at the waterfront before the Great Strait (Suur Väin). The spread of several illnesses presupposes a direct contact between children. In this respect islands are in an advantageous position: contacts of the children of islands with the inhabitants of the mainland were naturally not numerous. In early spring, during the period of the most

intensive spread of infectious diseases, the ice conditions at sea made contacts with the continent impossible even for grown-ups.

During the second half of the 19th century differences in IM were less conspicous: in East Estonia mortality decreased, but on the islands it even increased in some places. This phenomenon may partially be explaned by relative overpopulation and probably by livelier intercommunication, by men looking for work on the continent, etc. But the west-east migration still persisted.

On these grounds one may say that these fairly considerable differences in IM were the reasons for east-west and north-south migration in this period and probably in previous centuries too.

It is well known that migrants are the carriers of cultural influence. So we must belive that cultural influence was of west-east direction during the feudal system. We must also take into consideration that long-distance migration was relatively rare at that time. One could seldom meet men from Muhu in the vicinity of Vastseliina. Short-distance migration was dominant: people from Saaremaa and Hiiumaa moved to the districts (counties) of Harjumaa, Läänemaa and Pärnumaa; inhabitants of Pärnumaa went to Viljandimaa; peasants from Viljandimaa in their turn went across Lake Võrtsjärv and the River Väike-Emajõgi. A lot of people from Tartumaa and Võrumaa (districts) went to Russia.

In conclusion, it is clear that a further study in the geography of IM would be of some interest not only for historical demography but it might help to solve some problems of ethnology and the history of culture as well.

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The Crimean War and Estonia

Tõnu Tannberg

In the middle of the 19th century, Russia did not succeed in settling the so-called eastern issue concerning supremacy in the Middle East in the course of a "small war" unleashed against Turkey in 1853. The fact that England and France sent their fleets to the Black Sea at the end of 1853 implied that these states had *de facto* entered the war on the side of Turkey. Then, in February, 1854, Russia declared war on the Allies. The latter, in their turn, also declared war and, thus, a war between the Great Powers of Europe had *de jure* begun as well. We know this war as the Crimean War.

Although the main battlefield was in the Crimea, the participation of the Allies carried the war into the area of the Baltic Sea as well. While the 1854-1855 Baltic Sea campaign in the northern part of the Gulf of Finland (events associated with Finland) have fairly thoroughly been dealt with by historians, considerably less attention has been paid to the events taking place on the coast of Estonia and Latvia, i.e. in the southern part of the Gulf of Finland and in the area of the Riga Bay. Ian R. Stone's article "Naval operations on the Estonian coast" (1990) has been based only on British sources and the author has been unaware of Edgar Anderson's article "The Crimean War in the Baltic areas" (1974) which so far constitutes the most throrough study of the Allies' military operations on the coast of Estonia and Latvia.[1] Edgar Anderson has, as much as possible, made use of the sources of both parties and of the Baltic-German press of that time (primarily *Inland*). In addition to the military aspect, the author gives a competent survey of the diplomatic activities of the Great Powers participating in the Crimean War as well as of the plans of these states for the Baltic area.

The following problems associated with the Crimean War and bearing relation to Estonia are dealt with in the present article: 1) the strategic role of Estonia (more broadly, of the Baltic Provinces) in Russia's defence plans; 2) the size of the Russian contingent stationed in Estonia and Livonia during the war; 3) the number of men recruited to the Russian army from Estonia during the Crimean War; 4) the Riga naval militia during the Crimean War.

The defence of the Baltic Sea area

When considering the organizing of the defence of the Baltic Sea area we shall proceed from the following three levels — the state, provincial and local levels.

The state level of the defence of the Baltic area included all the measures taken by the Russian government to repel the Allies on the sea (i.e., deploying the Russian Baltic Fleet and raising its fighting efficiency) as well as the measures taken to neutralize possible landing operations on the coast. It would have been possible to cope with that task only if there had been sufficient numbers of regular troops present in the Baltic Provinces, the environs of St. Petersburg and in Finland.

At the beginning of the Crimean War, the bulk of the Russian navy was made up of sailing vessels, and partly of steamboats. Taking into consideration the peculiarities of the coastline (coves, etc.), gunboats were of considerable significance on the Baltic Sea as well. The Russian navy with its outdated equipment was not able to rival the advanced European naval forces. While at the beginning of the Crimean War Britain had 10 and France 3 modern (with a screw propeller) line-of-battle ships, Russia at that time did not possess a single contemporary warship. The inequality of military forces was clearly evident on the Baltic Sea as well. At the beginning of the war, the Baltic Sea was defended by the Russian Baltic Fleet with its 217 warships, including 26 line-of-battle ships, 9 sailing frigates, 9 steam frigates, a total of 8 corvettes and brigantines, 12 small steamboats and also 153 small boats and transport vessels with a total of 3,652 guns and 43,000 men. In addition to these vessels, in the spring of 1854, the building of 76 rowing gunboats began in dockyards of St. Petersburg (32), Finland (28) and Riga (16). In April-May, 1854, supplementary coast-guard units — the St. Petersburg and Riga naval militia — were set up on the basis of these rowing gunboats. The bases of the Baltic Fleet were Kronstadt (the 1st and 2nd naval divisions) and Sveaborg (since 1918, Suomenlinna) (the 3rd division). The deployment of the navy began at the beginning of 1854 and was mainly completed during the month of

April.[2] However, no more than 26 line-of-battle ships and 18 sailing and steam frigates could be used in military operations; by the estimates of the Baltic Committee, only 11 warships were ready for battle.[3] On the Baltic Sea, the Allies' joint fleet was definitely superior in numbers; the British fleet (49 ships, 2,344 guns, 22,000 men) was under the command of Vice-Admiral Charles Napier and Vice-Admiral Alexandre Fernand Parseval-Dechênes was in command of the French fleet (30 ships, 1,308 guns, 8,300 men and a landing unit of over 12,000 men).[4] Because of such inequality in forces, the Baltic Fleet could not carry out active military operations on the sea as it was necessary to concentrate forces on the defence of the harbours and the coastal areas. At the same time, the Russian government had to be ready to repulse the enemy's landing-parties in the area of the Baltic Sea. Stategically, the area of the Baltic Sea could be divided into three separate theatres of war: 1) the environs of St. Petersburg between Narva and Vyborg, 2) the coast of Finland from Vyborg, and 3) the coast of Estonia and Latvia from Narva. A letter sent to Count F. W. R. Berg, Tallinn Military Governor, in the middle of April 1854, contains information that the tsarist government considered it possible that in the forthcoming campaign against the coast of Estonia and Latvia the Allies would use a landing force 20,000 strong who would be able to

— occupy the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa (the Russian government believed that the Allies would likely stay on these islands);

— seize Tallinn and Riga;

— land at Virtsu and later take Pärnu;

— send troops to Liepaja and from there to go through Lithuania and invade Poland in order to incite an anti-Russian uprising there;

— carry out simultaneous raids on the Baltic coast to keep the troops stationed in the Baltic Provinces on the alert.[5]

The Russian government acknowledged that it could not defend the islands and Virtsu, but it hoped to offer some resistance in the other areas. By that time martial law had already been imposed in Estonia and Livonia and the regular troops were under the command of the Military Governor F. W. R. Berg and the Baltic Governor-General Prince A.A. Suvorov-Rymniksky respectively. The strongholds of Tallinn and Daugavgriva were in a state of siege from March 20. In the spring of 1854, the following troops were stationed in the area of the Baltic Sea: 179 infantry battalions, 116 1/2 cavalry squadrons, 18 Cossack sotnias (a total of about 142,000 men), and 384 guns, whereas approximately two-thirds of the troops (122 1/4 battalions, 90 1/2 squadrons, and 272 guns) were stationed in the environs of St. Petersburg. Of all the military units present in the three Baltic Provinces (32 1/4 battalions, 20 squadrons, 12 Cossack sotnias, 76 guns), more than a half (18 1/4 battalions, 14 squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns) were stationed in the Province of Estonia.[6] Later the number of men in the area of the Baltic Sea reached a total of 165,000 (209 battalions, 114 squadrons, 4 Cossack regiments, 412 guns). In the summer of 1854, the following troops defended the Baltic Provinces:

— in Estonia — 20,000 men (24 1/4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 12 Cossack sotnias, 40 guns);

— in Livonia — 10,000 men (9 battalions, 2 Cossack sotnias, 28 guns);

— in Courland — 12,000 men (9 battalions, 16 squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns).

Thus, 42 1/4 battalions, 28 squadrons, 12 Cossack sotnias, 100 guns and a total of 42,000 men were stationed in the three provinces. These troops would not have been able to defend the coast of Estonia and Latvia against major attacks by the Allies. However, the 1854 campaign in the southern part of the Gulf of Finland and in the Riga Bay turned out to be weaker than it had been expected and the Allies did not make an attempt to plant their feet firmly on the coast of Estonia and Latvia.

At the end of October, 1854, Dmitri Miljutin, then Major-General, later Field-Marshal and Russia's Minister of War, sent the tsar a memorandum entitled "Considerations about the defence of the coast of the Baltic Sea". On November 2, Nicholas I read the memorandum, making notes in the margins. D. Miljutin's memorandum summarizes the results of the 1854 campaign on the Baltic Sea and lays down guiding principles for action in the year 1855; most of these principles were actually put into practice.[7] Namely, as early as on November 3, Nicholas I set up a special committee which was to work out measures to defend the coast of the Baltic Sea. The principles presented by the Committee at the end of November coincided in substance with those formulated by D. Miljutin.[8]

D. Miljutin was firmly convinced that the troops stationed in the area of the Baltic Sea in the summer of 1854 (165,000 men) would not have been able to defend the coast in case of the Allies' landing. In 1855, he considered it possible that a landing party 70,000-80,000 strong would come to the Baltic Sea and, in case of Sweden's joining the operation, the troops would number 100,000-120,000. In order to repulse those troops an army of about 400,000 men should have been concentrated in the area of the Baltic Sea, i.e. 80,000 men per 500 versts. Since so numerous regular troops could not be raised, it would have been necessary, in 1855, "to give up the direct defending of the whole of the coastal area and to reduce to a minimum the number of those strongholds that had to be defended all the time". Nicholas I was of the same opinion (the tsar's note "Naturally") and referred to "only three such strongholds - Sveaborg with Helsingfors, Kronstadt with St. Petersburg, and Riga". D. Miljutin thought that it was not necessary to defend even Riga because "in the Baltic Provinces fortunately we do not have any strongholds, the seizure of which by the enemy would be dangerous and which we would have to defend to the very last". He held the view that the main troops had to be concentrated in Finland and in the environs of St. Petersburg.

At the end of 1854, the regular troops in the area of the Baltic Sea totalled 186,000 men (189 3/4 battalions, 68 squadrons, 18 Cossack sotnias, 332 guns), while the troops in the Baltic Provinces were as follows:

— in Estonia — 37,500 men (41 1/4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 4 Cossack sotnias, 40 guns);

— in Livonia — 8,300 men (9 battalions, 2 Cossack sotnias, 24 guns);

— in Courland — 11,200 men (9 battalions, 16 squadrons, 6 Cossack sotnias, 32 guns).

According to the initial plan (drawn up on October 31), the number of troops in the area of the Baltic Sea had to be increased up to 302,785 men by the spring of 1855, but later this number was reduced to 271,500 men (256 3/4 battalions, 118 squadrons, 42 sotnias, 428 guns) — thus, 85,500 men more than in the previous year.[9] It was planned to concentrate 61,500 men, 64,000 if including those at Narva, to defend the Baltic Provinces. The disposition of the troops in the provinces was to be different from that in the previous year - most of the troops (40,500 men) were to be stationed in Livonia and in Courland to defend Riga. As for the Province of Estonia, a so-called observation corps was considered to be sufficient and it was to retreat towards Narva or Riga in case of enemy's landing. This meant that the Russian government was ready to surrender the Province of Estonia to the enemy and D. Miljutin was of the opinion that Tallinn's fortifications should be blown up. However, F. W. R. Berg, Commander-in-Chief of the military forces stationed in Estonia, did not agree with the latter idea and considered the demolition of the fortifications inexpedient because the local population, who had made great sacrifices in order to get those fortifications ready for action, would disapprove of such conduct. F. W. R. Berg referred to how a seaside suburb (Köismäe) had been burnt down by his own order. Tallinn's fortifications were in use for one more year and it was not until the year 1857 that Tallinn was excluded from the list of fortified towns. At the same time, F. W. R. Berg made a suggestion that a separate army should be formed of the forces stationed in Estonia, Livonia and Courland whose impressive name, the Baltic Army, would frighten the enemy and would make him watch his step on the coast of Estonia and Latvia.[10] Thus, at the end of 1854, Nicholas I formed the so-called Baltic Corps, merging only the troops stationed in Livonia and Courland. V. Sivers, a cavalry general, was put in command of the Corps. There were also changes in the general staff of the troops in Estonia: F. W. R. Berg, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Finland, was replaced by General P. Grabbe.[11]

By the beginning of the new campaign in the spring of 1855, a total of about 220,000 men — 222 1/2 battalions, 94 3/4 squadrons, 40 Cossack sotnias, 322 guns — had been concentrated in the area of the Baltic Sea. The disposition of the troops in the three Baltic provinces was as follows:

— in Estonia — about 22,500 men (19 1/4 battalions, 12 squadrons, 10 Cossack sotnias, 10 guns);

— in Livonia and in Courland (Baltic Corps) — about 40,500 men (35 1/4 battalions, 32 squadrons, 12 Cossack sotnias, 88 guns).

In addition, home guard units from Tver and Novgorod came in summer.[12]. The British fleet (99 ships, 3,138 guns, 24,000 men) under the command of Richard Sounders Dundase arrived in the Gulf of Finland in April and in the second half of May joined forces with a small French fleet (24 ships, 357 guns) led by Admiral Charles Penaud. The island of Naissaar was again chosen as the base for the united fleet. The hostilities broke out on June 6 and culminated in bombing Sveaborg at the end of July and at the beginning of August.

Regardless of their more active military operations and a more powerful fleet than in 1854, the Allies did not achieve any success in 1855 either and they had to withdraw their fleet from the Baltic Sea. But they immediately started to outline new plans for the year 1856. According to these plans, Swedish and Danish troops (20,000-30,000 men) were to occupy the Åland Islands in June, 1856, while French and British troops were to invade the Estonian archipelago. At the same time, the British and French fleet were to neutralize the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland and in the Riga Bay. Then, the British, French and Danish troops were to land in Northern Latvia and in Southern Estonia, while the Swedes were to occupy Finland.[13] The Russian government also held the view that the Allies could succeed in the Baltic Sea area only when supported by Sweden and Denmark. It was considered that a total of 95,000 men could be sent to the Baltic Sea area — 50,000 men from France, 10,000 from England and about 35,000 from Sweden and Denmark. The planned defence measures as well as the dislocation of the troops were basically similar to those in 1855.[14] At the beginning of 1856, before the prospective new campaign, 257 battalions, 94 squadrons, 66 Cossack sotnias, 376 guns and 31 home guard units were stationed in the area of the Baltic Sea, including those in the Baltic provinces:

— in Estonia (19 1/4 battalions, 32 squadrons, 14 Cossack sotnias, 40 guns);

—in Livonia and Courland (40 1/2 battalions, 32 squadrons, 14 Cossack sotnias, 80 guns) and, additionally, 18 Novgorod and Tver home guard units.

At that time, approximately 22,500 men were stationed in Estonia and the Baltic Corps numbered about 52,000 men. The preparations for the war, however, turned out to be in vain as by the beginning of 1856 Russia had been exhausted and the Paris peace treaty was concluded in March of the same year. However, the Baltic Corps, which had been raised to defend Livonia and Courland, was not disbanded until August, 1956. In the post-war years, the number of regular troops in the Baltic provinces considerably decreased; e. g., in the year 1868, 14,861 men were stationed in the three provinces.[15]

The provincial level in organizing the defence of the southern coast of the Baltic Sea was primarily represented by setting up a network of so-called observa-

tion posts on the coast of Estonia and Latvia. In the Province of Estonia, the observation posts were located between Riigi manor in the environs of Narva and the Vaiste manor in the Läänemaa County; the border between Estonia and Livonia was Kastna. The preparatory work for setting up the observation posts started as early as in March, 1854, while special coast defence committees were established in April. The landlords, whose manors were located in the coastal areas, undertook to set up a coast guard service and observation posts, civil servants (chiefs of police, etc.) were responsible as well. In 1854, 63 noblemen of the Province of Estonia volunteered to participate in coast guard activities. The landlords followed a special instruction according to which it was necessary, first of all, to find out and compile a list of the peasants who were competent in maritime affairs. Those peasants had to be warned that collaboration with the enemy was punishable because there was a strong possibility that the Allies could use those peasants as pilots. The peasants were also ordered to drive their cattle inland as soon as the enemy appeared. On several occasions, F. W. R. Berg, Commander-in-Chief of the troops in the Province of Estonia, emphasized the need for observing the above-mentioned instruction. Day and night those "loyal men" picked out by the landlords patrolled the coast, acting in accordance with "The laws for those whose duty is to guard the coast" drawn up specially for them by the landlords.

In both years, the coast guards did their duty until the Allies left the Baltic Sea. Thus, in 1854, the coast guard service was liquidated in the area between Riigi manor and the Juminda peninsula on November 15, and on the whole coast of the Province of Estonia on December 1.

Hence, the observation posts on the coast of Estonia and Latvia had been set up rather for obtaining accurate and timely information than for the direct defence of the coast. The coast guards were at the first opportunity to inform the military authorities, i.e. Commander-in-Chief in Estonia, of enemy's arrival.[16]

During the Crimean War efforts were made to organize defence **at a local level** as well, i. e. on people's own initiative, particularly on the islands, the defence of which had been neglected by the Russian government. Thus, in 1854, Evald von Ungern-Sternberg, a landlord on the island of Hiiumaa, made an attempt to raise a local home guard. As early as in mid-February, 1854, E. von Ungern-Sternberg had applied to the Civil Governor of Estonia for a permission of raising a home guard 1,000 strong on the island of Hiiumaa.[17] The baron based his proposal on the fact that the island of Hiiumaa was not defended by the regular troops. He also pointed out in his letter that the aim was not only to repulse enemy attacks, but to maintain law and order on the island as well. E. von Ungern-Sternberg agreed to bear the maintenance and armament (including fire arms) expenses of the home guard. Estonia's Civil Governor forwarded the proposal to Governor-General A. A. Suvorov-Rymniksky for approval, but there was no positive answer. At the end of February, E. von Ungern-Sternberg sent another letter to the Civil Governor asking that the customs inspection station or at least part of its personnel could remain on the island. But two days before the baron wrote his letter, on February 22, the Governor-General had issued a secret order to transfer the customs inspection station from the island of Hiiumaa. The customs personnel (the commander and his two assistants, 70 privates, 9 servants with families) left the island at the beginning of March.

In 1854 a home guard was not set up on the island of Hiiumaa because the Russian government did not approve of its subjects' initiative.[18] E. von Ungern-Sternberg's efforts to raise a home guard were naturally not motivated by his great loyalty to state authority, but by his personal interest in protecting his property[19] (cloth-factory, etc.).[20] E. von Ungern-Sternberg's initative, however, was rewarded: in March, 1854, he was appointed chief of the Hiiumaa rural police court.[21] The baron held office, which gave him absolute power on the island during the war, until June 1856 and the provincial authorities were completely satisfied with his work.[22]

There was no need to organize local defence since, particularly after the local inhabitants had met the Allies, it was evident that the latter were not going to plunder the local people, etc. On the contrary, in most cases they paid for the requisitioned cattle, water, etc. Ian R. Stone's standpoint, based on British sources, that relations with local people were good and even friendly, despite the fact that military activities were taking place at the same time,[23] completely coincides with our archival data.

Recruitments

During the Crimean War, the Russian government had to call up large numbers of men to ensure the fighting efficiency of its army. The six recruitments of the years 1853-1855 produced 878,000 men.[24] There were four recruitments in Estonia.

The first call-up — the 11th partial one in the western region[25] — took place in March-April, 1854 (offical time-limit March 1 — April 15), the quota being 9 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. According to a plan drawn up by the Ministry of War, 1,207 men were to be recruited from the Province of Estonia and 3,292 from Livonia — a total of 4,499 men from the two provinces. In actual fact, however, 1,184 men were called up from Estonia[26] and 21 men were exempted from military service on the basis of the so-called recruit receipts.[27] Two thousand seven hundred and seventy-five men were called up from Livonia; in addition, 33 receipts were submitted and 394 Livonian peasants paid 300 gold roubles[28] each to get free from military service.[29] The second recruitment of 1854 — the 12th partial recruitment in the western region — was carried out in November and December (November 1 — December 15), the quota being 10 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. In the course of that recruitment, 1,337 men from the Province of Estonia and 3,559 men from Livonia were to be enlisted — thus, a total of 4,896 men from the two provinces. During the scheduled recruitment period,

1,323 men from Estonia and 2,973 men from Livonia were enlisted; 24 receipts were submitted and 536 peasants were freed from military service by paying for it.[30]

The next call-up — the 13th partial recruitment from the western region — was carried out in June, 1855 (June 1 - July 1) with a quota of 12 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. It had been planned to enlist 1,606 men from Estonia and 4,263 men from Livonia; in addition, the Ministry of War consented to accept 14 and 255 recruit receipts respectively. As that recruitment campaign at Saaremaa was put off because of war, the actual number for the Province of Livonia turned out to be 3,993 men. By July 1855, 1,597 men had been enlisted and 9 recruit receipts had been presented from the Province of Estonia. The corresponding numbers for Livonia were 3,352 recruits, 23 accepted receipts and 612 men had bought themselves free. The general recruitment, the last one during the Crimean War, was carried out in November-December, 1855 (November 15 - December 15), the quota being 10 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. The Province of Estonia was to enlist 1,337 men. In total, 3,686 men were to be called up from Livonia, whereas men were to be recruited from Saaremaa in compensation for the recruitment which was not carried out in June, though in that case the number of recruits from Saaremaa was reduced by half. Thus, the quota for Saaremaa was 16 men per 1,000 male inhabitants. In actual fact, however, during the recruitment, 1,327 men were enlisted from Estonia and 3,101 from Livonia and 10 receipts were accepted in either province; in addition, 324 men bought themselves free in Livonia.[31]

In the years 1854-1855, the Ministry of War was initially going to call up 20,017 men from Estonia and Livonia. In actual fact, judging by the recruitment reports and enrolment lists, 17,632 men were called up, 130 recruit receipts were accepted and 1,866 Livonians bought themselves free. Since the receipts and purchasing free (the state treasury received 559,800 silver roubles as a result of that) were also taken into account, the actual call-up during the recruitment periods was only below 2 per cent — 389 men — smaller than it had been scheduled. However, it must be pointed out that the number of recruits from Estonia and Livonia in the years 1854-1855 was bigger than the above-given figure (17,632) because 1) in case during the scheduled recruitment period sufficient number of men could not be enlisted, the call-up of the following months was correspondingly bigger; 2) men were also enlisted beyond official recruitment periods (from the quota of the forthcoming recruitments, etc.).

Thus, according to the data presented by F. Weymarn, 5,992 men were enlisted from Livonia in 1854 and 6,653 men in 1855,[32] i.e. nearly 400 more men than in the recruitment reports.

Thus, as a rough estimate, we can say that a total of 12,300 men were recruited from the Province of Estonia and from the Estonian part of the Province of Livonia, i.e. Estonia — 5,800 men in 1854 and 6,500 men in 1855. This signified an approximately 3.5 per cent loss to the taxable male population. The recruitments during the Crimean War can be compared only with those carried out in the years 1812-1813. In accordance with the recruitment laws, during the period of conscription (1797-1874), 396.4 men per 1,000 male inhabitants were to be enlisted from the Province of Estonia[33] and 363.4 men from the Province of Livonia, while the respective quota per 1,000 male inhabitants was 41 men in 1854-1855 and 40 men in 1812-1813.[34] In the years 1797-1874, 60 recruitments were carried out in Estonia. At a rough estimate, each recruitment produced, on an average, 1,580 men (or 1,230 men per year). Consequently, the number of men enlisted during the Crimean Was was nearly twice as high as the average number. Approximately 12 per cent of all the men enlisted in the years 1797-1874 were recruited during the Crimean War.

The Riga naval militia

In order to make the defence of the coast of the Baltic Sea more effective 76 rowing gunboats were built in a short period of time in 1854. Since there were not enough regulars to man those boats, the Russian government settled the issue in a somewhat unexpected manner: the April 2, 1854 ukase ordered a nationwide recruitment of volunteers to a rowing gunboat flotilla or the St. Petersburg naval militia. The initial deadline was May 20, but as so many men volunteered, the St. Petersburg militia had been recruited as early as by the beginning of May. The flotilla included 4,528 men, about two-thirds of whom were commissioned officers and seamen. The duty of the St. Petersburg naval militia was to defend the coast of Finland: 1st brigade (2,216 men) between Vilburg and Sveaborg, 2nd brigade (2,312 men) between Sveaborg and Turku. According to the tsar's ukase of April 22, preparatory work began for setting up a separate gunboat (16) battalion or the Riga naval militia to defend the Riga Bay, in particular the estuary of the Daugava River (Daugavagriva stronghold, Riga) on the basis of the principles laid down in the April 2 ukase:

— members of all social classes could join the naval militia on a voluntary basis, the only exception were private peasants who had to obtain their landlord's permission before joining the naval militia;

— those serving in the naval militia got 8 silver roubles a month as well as provisions and other essentials in compliance with the rations for seamen in the navy;

— service in the naval militia was temporary and lasted only during the navigation season (i. e. until November 1);

— awarding decorations, hospital treatment, etc. were in accordance with the regulations in force in the army and in the navy.[35]

The cadre of the Riga naval militia was formed from the crew of the corvette Navarino headed by Lieutenant-Commander Pavel Istomin, the voluntary rank and

file — 900 — came mostly from the Baltic Provinces (including 623 from Livonia, 103 from Courland, 8 men from Estonia) and partly from Russia — a total of 166 volunteers from 19 Russian provinces. The volunteers could conditionally be divided into three social groups: the so-called military rank - 6.4 per cent, the townspeople — 42 per cent, and the peasantry - 51.6 per cent. We have no data on the ethnical structure of the Riga naval militia, but the 900 men came from the following areas: from the area of Estonia (the Province of Estonia and the northern part of the Province of Livonia) -254 men (28.2 per cent), from the area of Latvia (Courland and the southern part of the Province of Livonia) — 480 men (53.5 per cent) and from Russia — 166 men (18.5 per cent).[36] Thus, we can assume that about 50 per cent of the Riga naval militiamen were Latvians, 25 per cent Estonians and the remaining part were Russians, Germans, Finns, etc.

Both the St. Petersburg and the Riga naval militia were disbanded in November, 1854. The St. Petersburg naval militia did not resume its activities, but the Riga naval militia was re-formed in 1855 according to new underlying principles:

— the principle of compulsory recruitment was applied instead of voluntary joining the militia;

— the rank and file were recruited exclusively from among the taxable population of the Baltic Provinces (20-45 years of age, not below 151 sm tall);

— the taxpayers had to bear all the maintenance costs of the naval militia.[37]

In 1855, the length of service and the cadre of the naval militia were the same as they had been in 1854. The province of Estonia had to give 160 men, Courland 260 men and Livonia 380 men to the naval militia service.[38]

In both years, the Riga naval militia were stationed and drilled on the Milgravis (Mühlgrabe) manor, on the right bank of the Daugava River (about 13 versts from Riga) and in the winter harbour of the Daugavgriva stronghold. Under the supervision of commissioned officers and seamen the naval militiamen were drilled in rowing, fencing, hand-to-hand combat, and in the use of arms. The gunboat crews lived in tents and boats, later in barracks. Estonian and Latvian militiamen mastered the required skills quickly, though the language barrier caused some difficulty.[39]

In the year 1855, the Riga naval militia also participated in military operations. The most important sea fight for the Riga naval militia was in the estuary of the Daugava River on July 29 when 12 militia gunboats repulsed an attack carried out by two British warships under the command of Captain Erasmus Ommaney. The Daugava naval battle was one of the few successful military operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet during the whole of the 1854-1855 campaign; the battle, however, was one of the major sea fights on the Baltic Sea during the Crimean War. Among the militiamen decorated for valor with the Order of Merit was Ado Busch, a peasant from the Haeska manor, Läänemaa County, Estonia. Besides the Daugava naval battle, the Riga naval militia had some minor clashes with the enemy's warships as well.[40]

The Riga naval militia was disbanded in November, 1855. By the end of the year, the rank and file of the naval militia had been demobilized, though over 20 per cent of them had died, mainly of cholera, by that time.[41] It was planned to re-form the Riga naval militia in 1856, but there was no more need for it after the conclusion of the Paris treaty. The Riga naval militia was completely disbanded by Governor General A. A. Suvorov-Rymniksky's order on March 29, 1856.[42]

Though the major events of the Crimean War took place on the Black Sea, the area of the Baltic Sea was also an important theatre of war in the years 1854-1855. In the defence of the area of the Baltic Sea the Russian government paid most attention to St. Petersburg and Finland, and the Baltic Provinces were in the background. The troops stationed in Estonia, Livonia and Courland would not have been able to repulse any substantial landing operations by the enemy. According to the 1855 defence plans, the Russian government gave up defending the Estonian area. The Allies focussed their attention on other regions, primarily on the coast of Finland. Though the Allies did not achieve any marked military success in the area of the Baltic Sea during the 1854-1855 campaign, there were at least two significant results: 1) they managed to block completely the harbours and the coast and, by doing that, to bring trade on the Baltic Sea almost to a halt. If, for example, in 1854, 161 ships entered and 156 ships left the Riga harbour, then in 1855 the figures were 15 and 25 respectively.[43] The inhabitants of the islands suffered from the blockade most. 2) the Russian government was made to keep a large army contingent in the area of the Baltic Sea, while there was a continuous shortage of troops in the Crimea, the main theatre of war. The percentage of the whole of the tsarist army (including the reserves) stationed in the area of the Baltic Sea in the spring of 1854 and at the beginning of 1856:

battalions (infantry) 25.0%26.9%

squadrons (cavalry) 27.6%14.5%

Cossack sotnias 3.4% 9.4%

home guard units -15.6%

guns 22.6%15.2%

If we took into account only the troops on the front, the percentage would be much higher.[44]

Though Estonia did not suffer much from direct military activities in the years 1854-1855, the war had a considerable impact on all spheres of life. Recruitments, accommodating and provisioning the army, providing horses for transport and other war-time obligations became a heavy burden on the population during the Crimean War. One-fifth of the men serving in the naval militia did not return home either. "A 200-year time of peace" had again revealed its true nature.

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[13] **Anderson**, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-352.

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[15] **"Istoricheskij ocherk".** S. 379-380. **"Voenno-statisticheskij sbornik"**, s. 124. **Anderson**, *op. cit.*, pp. 354.

[16] HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3035, p. 4-6, 28; Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3054, p. 26; Stock 854, Series 2, Item 2019, p. 3-26; Stock 854, Series 2, Item 2020, p. 2.

[17] According to the tenth census, the population of Hiiumaa was 13,995 — among them 6,397 men. **Vahtre S.** Eestimaa talurahvas hingeloenduste andmeil (1782 -1858). Tallinn, 1973. Lk. 123.

[18] There had been ideas of setting up a home guard at Hiiumaa in October 1854 when the British fleet was carrying out active military operations on the Baltic Sea during the Russian-English War. At that time the government did not approve of the idea either. HAE, Stock 29, Series 1, Item 418, p. 1-6.

[19] Besides the manor Ungern-Sternberg was the owner of Hiiu-Kärdla cloth factory - one of the oldest big industrial plants in Estonia.

[20] In October, 1854, Major-General D. Miljutin presented the tsar a proposal to raise, within the bounds of possibility, supplementary military units, something like a home guard, in Tallinn, Narva, Riga and other places. Nicholas I, however, wrote in the margin of the memorandum "Not allowed!" HAE, Stock 1874, Series 1, Item 399, p. 22.

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[23] **Stone**, *op. cit.*, pp. 2158-2159.

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[25] In 1839, Russia had been divided into eastern and western recruitment regions. Recruitments were carried out in alternate years: as a rule, one year men were called up from the eastern region, the other year from the western region; though sometimes there were recruitments from the two regions. The latter case was the so-called general recruitment.

[26] Here and below the numbers of recruits (unless referred otherwise) indicate those enlisted during the scheduled recruitment periods.

[27] The recruit receipts could be either the so-called registration receipts (were given to the landlords for the peasants to be enlisted later, etc.) or redemption receipts (a limited number of receipts issued and sold by the government, particularly in the reign of Nicholas I). See, **Aarma L.** Kirjaoskus Eestis 18. sajandi lõpust 1880. aastani (nekrutinimekirjade andmeil). Tallinn, 1990. Lk. 56-57.

[28] In the 19th century bot silver and paper currency (assignates) were current in Russia. In 1842 1 silver rouble was equalized with 3.5 assignates (editor's commentary).

[29] The Livonian peasants gained the right of redemption under the peasant law in 1819, while the Province of Estonia received this right only under the 1861 recruitment law of the Baltic Provinces. See, **Tannberg T.** 1861. a. Balti kubermangude nekrutiseadus. // "Kleio", 1988. Lk. 50-54. Those peasants were freed from military service for life.

[30] HAE, Stock 296, Series 1, Item 25, p. 41-42, 44-45; Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3334, p. 102-104. **Aarma**, *op. cit.*, lk. 258.

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[42] HAE, Stock 29, Series 3, Item 3971, p. 114.

[43] HAE, Stock 296, Series 1, Item 25, p. 16-17; Stock 296, Series 1, Item 27. p. 7-8. Cf: in 1853, 2,113 ships entered the Riga harbour. **Anderson**, *op. cit.*, pp. 345.

[44] Calculated from the data in:**"Istoricheskij ocherk"**, s. 357, 379-380.

The Last Forty Years of One Manor: Gustav von Rathlef and Tammistu

Tiit Rosenberg

There is every reason to deal with the history of manorial economy on account of the fact that for the second time in the 20th century the process of replacing a large-scale agriculture by a small-scale one is taking place in Estonia now. We shall not deal with the socio-political aspect of the problem, but we are attempting to find an answer to the question whether and to what extent the manner and speed of the almost complete and unselective demolition of manorial economy in the Republic of Estonia during its first years of independence contributed to the further development of the economy. To answer this question we should estimate the actual state of manorial economy before the reform as well as its profitableness (particularly in comparison with farms). It is to be regretted that we have neither a complete survey of the manorial and farm economy at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century nor thorough and differentiated studies of various management types, regions and branches of agriculture.

We have only a vague idea of the production level and profitableness of the manorial economy so far and even diametrically opposed opinions have been expressed. Thus, it has been asserted that before World War I the production of the Baltic large-scale agriculture was at a very low level and that the manors made their profit only from the forests and from renting farmland. It was said that the land reform only antedated the unavoidable ruin and parcelling out of most of the manors.[1]

It is true that there were a number of manors experiencing economic difficulties. According to the bookkeeping data of 99 North Estonian manors, 24 of them were loss-making ones in the 1912/1913 economic year.[2]

On the other hand, the few studies of the given period prove that the overwhelming majority of the Baltic manors were viable and making a profit. Both agricultural and industrial production were profitable and the profitableness of manors increased considerably in the pre-war years.[3]

By the beginning of the 20th century, the profitableness of the manorial economy had become an important problem for landlords which had to be studied. In order to collect and generalize information on the economic activity of the manors economic advice service (Wirtschaftsberatung) and manorial bookkeeping circles (Buchstelle) affiliated to the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society in Tartu and the Estonian Agricultural Society in Tallinn were established a few years before the war. Although the above-mentioned establishments did not manage to do much, their archives as well as those of a number of manors (a few dozens in our archives) constitute a solid foundation for studying in detail the economic history of individual manors as well as of manor complexes. The present article is an attempt in this field.

Unique archival data on the Tammistu manor have been preserved. Gustav von Rathlef, the last owner of the estate, gathered and partly analysed accounting data for 40 years (1880-1920). He published his material already in 1914,[4] and later extended it until the year 1920. Thus, his work resulted in a 34-page typed review supplemented by a map of the manor and two detailed tables.[5] There are also very carefully filled answer sheets to the questionnaire sent by the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society in 1908.[6] Hence, there are relatively numerous data compensating for the absence of the archival records of the manor. The present study has mainly been based on the above-given materials.

Gustav von Rathlef

Besides the history of the manor, the personality of its owner is of considerable sociological interest as well. Gustav von Rathlef was an educated landlord of bourgeois origin who, besides managing his own manor, also devoted much attention to the promotion of agricuture in general.

The founder of the Rathlef family in Livonia was Georg Ludwig Rathlef (1753-1814), Gustav von Rathlef's grandfather, descending from a family of literati in Hannover. After his adventures as a sailor and soldier in the service of England in India, he read law at Jena University in 1778-1779. In 1780, he came to Livonia, bought an estate at Viljandi and entered the service of the Russian state. For nearly 22 years he worked as a lawyer and a county and town fiscal official at Viljandi. He had a son and four daughters from his first marriage to Anna von Hofmann and three sons (one of whom died as a baby) and five daughters from his second marriage to Johanna Andrea (née Andresen).[7] That was the beginning of the Rathlef lineage which gave to Livonia and Estonia in the course of a century about a dozen educated people – statesmen, scholars, lawyers, doctors, clergymen, teachers and farmers. According to

the data from "Album Academicum", 13 members of the Rathlef family had studied at Tartu University in the years 1818-1908.[8] The fact that Ewert von Dellingshausen, a Baltic German scholar, has published in Lüneburg a monograph on the Rathlef family also proves the family's outstanding role. Four of the Rathlefs have been included in the Baltic German Biographic Lexicon (G. von Rathlef, his father and his brother - the historians, and his son - a specialist in agriculture).

Since his grandfather and father had personally been raised to the Russian nobility, G. von Rathlef applied for the hereditary title and got it in 1895. In 1896, the Landtag enrolled him as a member of the Livonian nobility and his name was included in the peerage book as that of a landowner and to acknowledge his service in local elective self-government bodies. From that time there was a title before G. von Rathlef's and his sons'names.

Gustav von Rathlef was born in Tallinn on November 11, 1847 and was the second son of Carl Albert Rathlef (1810-1895), a senior teacher of history and geography at a provincial secondary school, later a professor of history at Tartu University (1854-1866). There were also three daughters in the family. The Fowelins, on mother's side, were also educated people - grandfather and uncle were doctors. The elder brother Georg Carlos (1846-1916) followed his father's example and was a secondary-school teacher and a prominent historian at Tartu. Gustav's choice of profession was influenced by his uncle Ludwig Rathlef (1799-1873), an inspector of state property of the Viljandi-Pärnu region. Ludwig Rathlef was a tenant of the Vastsemõisa state manor and a well-known specialist in agriculture. In the years 1850-1863, he was the president of the Pärnu-Viljandi Agricultural Society and, from 1853, an honorary member of the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society.[9] He also owned the small Lahmuse manor in the Suure-Jaani parish bought for 40,000 silver roubles in 1852.[10] There he began his work as a farmer. After finishing a secondary school in Tartu, he studied econommics at Tartu University in the years 1867-1869 and then, for one year, was a trainee under Academician A. von Middendorff's supervision on the Hellenurme manor.

In the years 1870-1885, G. von Rathlef lived on the Lahmuse manor. First he was a manager on his uncle's manor, but after his uncle's death the tenant of the manor which became the joint property of the widow and her daughter. During the Lahmuse period, he also rented for some time the Vana-Vändra manor owned by von Ditmar and acted as a trustee and a manager for several other landlords. The fact that G. von Rathlef was elected the warden of the Vändra parish in 1877 and on three occasions a deputy judge of the Pärnu 2nd parochial court in the years 1874-1884 indicates that he was a man of boundless energy and great authority among other landlords. Later, while being the owner of the Tammistu manor, he held different elective posts as well. In the years 1885-1889, he was a secular school inspector of the Tartu county, the warden of the Tartu-Maarja and later of the Kodavere parish and the deputy churchwarden of the Tartu county; he was also a member of the Livonian Mutual Fire-Insurance Company. Besides his activities on his own manor, he participated actively in the work of the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society and its branch, the Livonian Society for the Promotion of Agriculture and Handicraft. For some time he was the president of the latter society.

In 1877, G. von Rathlef married Marta von Schultz, doctor Woldemar von Schultz's daughter. They had three sons - Harald (1878-1944), Kurt (1881-1921) and Alfred (1883-1980). The eldest son became a naturalist and a plant breeder. Harald von Rathlef read chemistry and agronomy at Tartu University in 1897-1903 and later worked at the Baltic Seed Cultivation Society. In 1908, he founded a plant breeding station on the Nõmmiku farm, near Tartu, on the initiative and support of the Baltic Seed Cultivation Society and sponsored by the Russian Ministry of Agriculture. He headed the centre until it ceased its activities in 1917. Later he was in the employ of the Saxon agricultural chamber at Halle and continued his work in the field of grain breeding and hayseed growing. For a short period of time he was an owner of an estate - a few years before World War I he bought the Klein-Wrangelshof manor in the Valmiera county.

The younger sons became farmers as well. Kurt von Rathlef read law and agronomy at Tartu University in 1900-1906 and then took over from his father the post of the manager of the Kokora manor in the Kodavere parish. The Kokora manor had been owned by the Schultzes, but in 1900 it was transferred as an inheritance to G. von Rathlef's wife.[11] Alfred von Rathlef inherited the Kaarli manor from his father in 1913.

The major result of G. von Rathlef's life's work as a farmer was that the Tammistu manor was among the best manors in Livonia. He was probably efficient as a tenant as well. In April 1880, he bought for 150,000 silver roubles from E. von Walter's legal successors the Tammistu and Kaarli manors in the Tartu-Maarja parish and finally moved there in 1855. He lived at Tammistu until Christmas 1917 when the bolshevik parish committee took over his manors and forced the owner to leave. When the Germans came at the end of February 1918, he returned to his manor, but, because of the bolshevik invasion at the end of 1918, he had to flee to Riga. He spent seven months in Riga, living in fear all the time, and then, like numerous other Livonian landowners, fled to Germany. After a year-long stay in Mecklenburg, G. von Rathlef returned to the Republic of Estonia. In June 1920, he arrived at Tammistu where he found a battery of the Estonian army with its 128 horses and 110 men living in the manor-house. The battery was quartered on the manor for 5 months.[12] The manor, devastated by war and the absence of the owner, had been alienated under the agrarian reform law and G. von Rathlef rented the manor from the state for the time when parcelling out of the land into small holdings was being carried out. By the spring of 1923, the epoch of manors was past and Gustav von Rathlef spent the last five years of his life in Tartu where he died on May 11, 1928. In 1926, in Tartu he wrote his memoirs, the manuscript of which is in his family's possession. The author of the present publication has not read those memoirs.[13]

Tammistu

Tammistu, a manor of medium size, was situated 17 km to the north-east of Tartu. The Andressaare dairy-estate, lying about 5 km to the north-east of Tammistu, and the Kaarli (Karlsberg) auxiliary manor, having the rights of an independent manor and lying 5 km to the north of Tammistu, were also attached to the Tammistu manor. The lands of the Taabri state manor separated them from the Tammistu main manor. The Tammistu manor also had a bottom-land meadow of 78 ha at Lake Koosa, not far form Lake Peipsi, lying at a distance of 15 km from a bird's-eye view from Tammistu.

The Tammistu manor and the Andressaare dairy-estate had 1,329 hectares of manorial land and 573 hectares of peasants farmland and the Kaarli manor had 300 and 74 hectares respectively.[14]

There were 13 peasant farms at Tammistu and 3 farms at Kaarli. The former owners had sold two farms at Tammistu and one farm at Kaarli to the peasants for perpetuity. In the years 1883-1884, G. von Rathlef sold the other Tammistu farms and, in 1884 and in 1889, the farms at Kaarli - for a total sum of 50,060 roubles. The price of the farms was comparable to the average price of farms in Livonia. The buyers had to pay two or three hundred roubles as a deposit and the rest of the sum was to be paid at 6 per cent interest rate periodically on definite dates by the year 1898. Since G. von Rathlef wanted to get a loan from the Livonian Credit Union, part of the sum that the farmers still owed was cancelled in the early 1890s by transferring the encumbrance (24,300 roubles) from the manor to the buyers of the farms. That meant the extension of the time of payment for the latter because a loan from the Credit Union had to be repaid, as a rule, during 36 years. The farms at Tammistu and Kaarli were rather poor and, therefore, most of the buyers could not pay their debts in time. Under the terms of the contract, the debt had to be repaid by 1898, but only 5 farms managed to do that. The debt of the others to the manor totalled 11,385 roubles in 1900 and there was the additional debt to the Credit Union.[15] Thus, in the years 1883-1900, G. von Rathlef's income from the sale of farms totalled aproximately 28,000 roubles in cash (including interest), i.e. 1,600-1,700 roubles per year.

Since the Kaarli and Andressaare estates were separate from the main household, Rathlef has not dealt much with them in his history of the Tammistu manor. Data on those estates, however, can be found in other sources. On the basis of that information it is possible to get an idea of the typical features of the management of auxiliary manors and dairy-estates of the Baltic manors. Since different sources contain conflicting data on the size and the distribution of arable land between main manors and dairy-estates, part of the figures given below have been calculated and made round.

The lands of the Andressaare dairy-estate were wedged into the lands of the Taabri, Kavastu and Luunja manors. Of the total of 740 hectares, barren marshland occupied 185 hectares. The wooded area, lying in the southern part of the estate, was almost of the same size and was in charge of the Andressaare forest-keeper. The household of the dairy-estate (140 ha, incl. 50 ha of arable land) was located in the extreme northern part of the estate. Seven small tenant farms, using a total of 210 ha of land, out of which 82 ha was arable land, were scattered between the dairy-estate and the wooded area. The dairy-estate was leased in 1907-1908 and the tenant paid Rathlef a rent of 500 roubles in cash a year, while the small tenant farmers paid part of the rent in cash (a total of 553 roubles) and part of the rent by doing work for the Tammistu manor (calculated in cash - about 550-750 roubles).[16]

There are no data on Rathlef's income from the forests of the manor which were mainly located on the territory of the Andressaare dairy-estate. As Rathlef himself pointed out, it was only after the selling of farmlands that the forests of the Livonian manors were regarded and managed as separate economic units.[17] G. von Rathlef did not consider himself an expert in forestry and it seems unlikely that the Tammistu forests were a considerable source of income. The forests provided the manor with firewood and timber. To some extent, however, forests were sold to local farmers and from 1903 as firewood to townspeople.

In the 1907/1908 economic year, the net profit of the Andressaare dairy-estate and the tenant farms, after making the deductions for land, fire-insurance and local taxes, and amortization and management costs, was nearly 900 roubles, i.e. about 7.5 roubles per one hectare of arable land.

The Kaarli dairy-estate (300 ha, including 270 ha of arable land, the remainder-forests), however, yielded bigger profits. The Kaarli estate was also managed by renting out land. The soils of the Kaarli estate were better than those of the Andressaare estate as a result of soil improvement and that the Tammistu manor exercised strict supervision over the Kaarli estate. The tenant of the Kaarli estate had to pay part of the rent (1,400 roubles) in cash, the remaining part (*ca* 700-800 roubles) was to be paid with work for the Tammistu manor. On the territory of the Kaarli estate there were also a watermill and three small tenant farms that paid directly to Rathlef a total of 225 roubles in cash and approximately 700 roubles by doing piecework, mainly making about 6000 poods (1 pood = 16.38 kg) of hay for the Tammistu cattle from a large Kaarli marshy meadow (31 ha). According to Rathlef's calculations, the net profit of the Kaarli estate was 2,000 roubles (about 18 roubles per one hectare of arable land).[18]

The Tammistu main manor constituted a compact household, the farthest point of which was only 1.5 km from the centre of the manor (see the chart). In the first year, the household was run by a manager, while Rathlef frequently came from Lahmuse to inspect his work. In the later years G. von Rathlef himself managed the manor.

The Tammistu soils were loamy and marshy. Hay was made in marshy meadows. The soil was heavy and there had to be strong ploughs and the lands needed draining. Nevertheless, the harvests were not bad in comparison with the neighbouring estates, but the land was

not used rationally. Harvesting as much straw as possible was considered most important in farming and in some years even additional quantities of straw and clover were bought. At the same time, some of the impoverished manorial fields used to be rented to farmers for flax growing.

Spirit distilling was one of the most important commercial branches of agriculture on the Baltic manors. Before the amelioration of the soils, there had been neither favourable conditions for the cultivation of potatoes as a necessary raw material for distillation of spirits nor distillery. Therefore, even before Rathlef, cattle-breeding had been dominant, although the herd of cattle had not been big - only 40 cows, 8 heifers and 8 calves.

Rathlef carried out a number of radical reforms on his manor. He increased the number of cattle, gave up the practice of buying fodder and renting land for flax growing. A number of new buildings were erected and several old ones were reconstructed on the manor as well as on the rented land during the first years. Later, one of the most important new buildings was a big cowshed completed in 1897/1898 enabling to increase the number of cattle. It was only in 1907/1908, when his income had grown, that G. von Rathlef began the reconstruction of the manor house and built an extension to it.[19]

After becoming acquainted with and consulting P. Rosenstand-Wöldike, a Danish amelioration engineer working in Livonia, Rathlef began extensive soil-improvement work at Tammistu in 1885, resulting in a considerable change in the use of manorial lands during the following 15-20 years (see Table 1).

First, the ditches that had been completely neglected were cleared of bushes and levelled. In the early 1890s, after general levelling, extensive work began under the supervision of P. Rosenstand-Wöldike. The so-called economical drainage was used, in the course of which the poorest and the soggiest plots of land and the Jürisoo meadow were drained with large open ditches. Since the contours of nearly all the fields and meadows had changed, the lands were surveyed once again in 1889. Rathlef had a large number of working charts to a considerably reduced scale made and data on crop rotation, quantities of fertilizers, soil improvement and harvests for each year were put down on those charts.

Table 1

The land use on the Tammistu main manor (ha) [20]

Economically usable land	1880	1889	1914
Arable land	286	310	337
Hay-meadow	100	114	78
Enclosure meadow	-	-	32
Marshy/woodland pasture	115	-	-
Forests and pasture	-	85	-
Forsets	-	-	68
Rented small holdings (all usable land)	13	6	-
Total	515	515	515
Koosa bottom-land meadow	78	78	78
Kaarli hay-meadow	31	31	31

In the years 1890-1895, a decisive step in growing fodder crops was made: the former rotation system of 16 crops was replaced by an 18-crop rotation system in 1890. The area of fodder crops was increased by sowing fallows with vetch. Relatively more potatoes for fodder were grown. The draining of the lands of the Kaarli estate, primarily of the extensive grassland lying apart, also began. In 1895, engineer C. Holm drew up a completely new plan for soil improvement and the building of the so-called systematic drainage began, drain pipes in individual fields and plots of grassland were laid. These activities lasted until the year 1905. A total of 19,000 roubles had been spent on soil improvement at Tammistu during the 18 years. Later the work was continued on a smaller scale. In the years 1907-1914, a total of approximately 3,000 roubles was spent on draining meadows and pastures as well as on a field reclaimed from the Lõõtsa forest.

In 1914, Rathlef made an attempt to evaluate the profit derived from the soil improvement and, not denying the role of other factors, he concluded that soil improvement had contributed to the rise in the gross income to the greatest extent (in his calculations he did not take into account the price fluctuations). He pointed out that in the years 1880-1887, i.e. before soil improvement work, the annual gross profit of the manor averaged 15,000 roubles, while in the years 1887-1895, i.e. when 12,000 roubles had been spent on soil improvement, the average gross profit grew to more than 24,000 roubles and during the following decade even to more than 26,000 roubles.[21]

A more extensive and skilful use of mineral fertilizers also contributed to the growth in the harvests. Thus, in the 1880s, the average yearly sum spent on buying mineral fertilizers was 372 roubles, in the 1890s it was 718 roubles, in the first decade of the 20th century 1,303 roubles and in the years 1911-1915 as much as 2,837 roubles were spent every year on fertilizers. During the war practically no mineral fertilizers were used. As the number of cattle increased, the quantity of manure grew as well. The productiveness of the fields went up as a result of better agrotechnics and fertilizing. Table 2 illustrates the progress in farming.[22]

There was a sharp increase in the harvests in the 1890s, though during the following decade the harvests decreased a little because smaller quantities of artificial fertilizers were given to the fields since hay-meadows were being fertilized. In general, the grain harvests were rather stable in the years 1895-1907.[23] Calculated in present-day indices, the mean yields per hectare were as follows: rye - 16.5 metric centners, barley - 15.3 metric centners, oats - 14.4 metric centners, potatoes - 218.8

Table 2

Average Yields (in poods) in the years 1881-1920[22]

Years	Grain	Potatoes	Clover and vetch	Meadow
1881-1885	9250	9819	5920	4465
1886-1890	14051	13692	8715	5206
1891-1900	15309	17918	15797	6023
1901-1910	14738	6828	20082	8524
1911-1915	17662	3301	15817	8462
1916-1920	7672	4491	10602	6147

metric centners.Those yields were considerably better than the corresponding average ones in Estonia and tsarist Russia and were comparable to those in Nordic countries .[24] It should be noted, however, that the average yields were considerably decreased by the low yields on peasant farms and, therefore, we should distinguish between the data on manorial estates and those on farms.

According to the Russian Statistical Board, in the years 1901-1913, the average yield of rye per hectare on manors in Livonia was 13.2 metric centners, 10.8 metric centners in the provinces of Central Russia, 9.1 metric centners in Byelorussia and 9.6 metric centners in Lithuania.

According to L. Balevica, the average rye yield of 70 (evidently better) manors of the Province of Livonia in 1913 (a poor year) was 14.1 metric centners (including for example 18.7 on the Ligaste manor in the Tartu county, 16.4 on the Pajusi manor in the Viljandi county and 12.1 metric centners on the Räpina manor in the Võru county).[25]

A steady increase in the share of fodder crops was an important tendency in farming at Tammistu. In the year 1907/1908, nearly half of all the arable land of 338 hectares was under fodder crops (fallow - 56 ha, half of that - summer-fallow, the other half - fallow ploughed in autumn; rye - 56 ha; clover - 110 ha; barley - 44 ha; oats - 56 ha; Swedish turnip - 1 ha). Flax was not grown at Tammistu in Rathlef's time.[26]

The share of different crops in the sown area depended on market conditions.

G. Rathlef's information on the prices of agricultural produce in the years 1880-1920 based on the cashbooks of the Tammistu manor is of great interest from the point of view of economic history.[27] The data on the marketability of different field crops is of considerable interest as well (see Table 3).[28]

Rye sold best in the market and it was sown more than at the beginning of the century. The price of rye which had fallen since the mid-1880s and had reached its lowest point in 1896/1897 (0.52-0.58 roubles a pood) began to rise and in the year 1912/1913 surpassed the price level of the early 1880s (1.1 roubles a pood).

Barley was also grown for sale at Tammistu, while its sown acreage was relatively stable. Wheat was grown only in some years and only for their own needs. The same can be said about oats, the sown acreage of which had considerably decreased from the beginning of the century. In some years oats were not sold at all and only before World War I the Tammistu manor began to sell seed oats owing to the collaboration with the Nõmmiku experimental station headed by Harald von Rathlef.

The market orientation of potato growing was the most noteworthy. Potato growing expanded gradually until the turn of the century. Both food potatoes and seed potatoes were sold. Smaller quantities of potatoes were also sold to distilleries (mainly to the Kokkora manor). Nearly 23 per cent of the potatoes were sold to the distillery in the years 1903-1906. At the beginning of the century, that source of income, however, became unstable and less profitable because the state had established a monopoly of spirits. Since potato growing was very laborious work, the decrease can primarily be attributed to a shortage of manpower beginning from the year 1907.[29] For the same reason the growing of Swedish turnips was not expanded either.

The dairy herd which had become the main source of income on the Tammistu manor needed ever better and more varied feed. The main fodder base was made up of clover and vetch, though different kinds of feed were additionally bought (bran, oil cakes, oatmeal, experimentally also meat meal). Though the total area of grasslands in the neighbourhood of the manor decreased, hay harvests went up. If in the early 1880s the hay harvest from a hay-meadow of 56 hectares had amounted to 23-33 poods per hectare, then, after the initial draining of the meadow, it grew, on the average, to 83 poods and even to 147 poods in 1906. In the year 1902, a drained meadow yielded as much as 383 poods of hay per hectare..[30] Therefore, the Koosa bottom-land meadow, which could not be drained, did not matter much to the manor and the peasants were allowed to make hay there for 1/3-1/2 of the harvests and the manor got 0-500-800-1000 poods of hay in different years.[31]

Table 3

The structure of consuming agrcultural produce at Tammistu in the years 1903-1906 (%)[28]

Purpose of use	Rye	Barley	Oats	Potatoes
For the owner of the manor	t2.2	3.8	8.9	1.3
Consumed by household	17.7	279	69.3	0.8
Provisions for the workers of the manor	8.1	14.7	16.2	0
For sale	72.0	53.6	5.6	97.9
Total amount	6012 poods	2871 poods	4782 poods	5931 bushets

Table 4

The milk production of the Tammistu herd (kg) and profits of the manor (roubles) in the years 188119

Years	Milk cows	Production per cow	Total production	Calculated cross profit	Actual net profit
1881-1885	68	1354	100 449	15 152	14 705
1886-1890	101	1602	161 781	23 116	18 379
1891-1895	127	1714	217 727	27 307	23 189
1896-1900	166	1956	324 683	31 462	23 910
1901-1905	164	2203	361 223	29 600	25 343
1906-1910	181	2078	376 265	27 590	27 543
1911-1915	150	2528	379 125	31 622	36 652
1916-1920	99	1685	166 803	17 794	17 060

During 35 years, G. von Rathlef increased the total area of arable land of the manor approximately 1.2 times, grain production 1.9 times, cultivation of clover 3 times and growing of meadow hay almost twice. There was greater progress in cattle-breeding where the productivity grew nearly 1.9 times. As a result of increasing the herd 2-2.5 times, the total production of milk grew nearly 3.8 times (see Table 4).

In the year 1905/1906, the Tammistu herd suffered a shortage of fodder caused by bad harvests of spring cereals, clover and vetch after a dry spring. Besides, the so-called revolutionary terror and a strike of milkmaids on the manor reduced both the size of the herd and its productivity.[32] The latter reached its previous level only in the year 1910/1911. The year 1912 turned out to be the most successful one as the average milk yield per cow was 2,636 kg. Before World War I, the normal size of the herd was 4-6 bulls, 150-160 milk cows and 60-80 heads of young cattle.

Below we shall present comparative data on the average annual milk yield in cattle-breeding countries of Western Europe before World War I: 3,400 kg in the Netherlands, 3,130 kg in Switzerland, 2,560 kg in Denmark, 1,630 kg in Sweden and 1,200-1,300 kg in Finland.[33] According to economist V. Krinal's data, the average annual milk yield per cow on Estonian manors was 1,850 kg and on farms, on the average, 600-750 kg, while in the best herds it was 1,250 kg a year.[34] A. Muuga, a specialist in cattle-breeding, has estimated the annual milk yield per cow on manors in the middle of the 19th century at 900-1,000 kg and in the best pedigree cattle on the Kunda manor at 1,800-2,000 kg. In the 1912/1913 control year, the average milk yield per cow (in the control group) reached 2,552 kg and 84.1 kg of milk fat per cow, and in the best pedigree cattle on the Tuula manor 3,934 kg and 126 kg respectively.[35] According to L. Balevica, on the basis of the data of the milk recording department of the Livonian Nonprofit Economic Society, the average milk yield per cow in control herds on 113 manors totalled 2,640 kg..[36] The above-given data serve to prove that the Tammistu herd was among the best on Estonian and Livonian manors.

The progress in cattle-breeding at Tammistu could be attributed to the long-time pedigree breeding launched by G. von Rathlef in the 1870s under A. Middendorff's influence. G. von Rathlef presented a detailed survey of the story of his Tammistu pedigree herd against the general background of pedigree breeding in the Baltic area in his letter to Professor J. Mägi in September 1921.[37]

In 1880, G. von Rathlef introduced detailed registration forms for each head of the Tammistu cattle. He was among the founders of "The Baltic Herdbook" (1885) and "The Baltic Anglian Herdbook" (1891). From that time on he acted as an expert who evaluated and entered young neat in the herdbook and so he rode thousands of kilometres in Livonia. The Tammistu herd was highly ranked and received numerous awards at agricultural shows. The Tammistu herd as a collection was exhibited and won a medal at the 4th Baltic jubilee exhibition in Riga in 1899. The Tammistu herd also won first prizes and gold medals at annual agricultural shows organized by landowners' societies at Tartu and Võnnu. Both individual oxen and herds of cattle were sold from Tammistu to neighbouring manors (Kokora, Ahja, Rannu, Ropka, Kukulinna) and farms as well as to more distant manors (the Albu and Liigvalla manors in the Province of Estonia). As G. von Rathlef pointed out in his letter to Professor Mägi, most of the Estonian Red Cattle breed in the area had come from the Tammistu manor. Thus, G. von Rathlef's activities were of considerably greater importance than promoting cattle-breeding on only one manor.

The income and profitableness of the Tammistu manor grew as the production increased (see Table 4). The

Chart

The Land Use of the Manor of Tammistu



given data illustrate only agricultural production and do not include income from renting out and forests. The so-called industrial part of the manor was extremely modest and was completely subjected to agricultural production. A mill with one grinder, oats press and a machine for shredding peat satisfied only the needs of the manor. The cutting of peat started at the beginning of the 20th century. Part of the pressed peat was used as fuel for the steam engine and for heating the threshing-barn, most of it was used as bedding in the cattle-shed. The manor also had a steam-powered creamery with a small cheese factory, but that had been leased to a Swiss dairy-master and cheese-maker, who was obliged under contract to buy all the milk from the manor, process it and return part of it as skim milk and whey.[38]

On the basis of his account books G. von Rathlef compiled two series of data on his income. The calculations of the so-called gross income were based on the 1907/1909 price level. That curve reflects primarily an increase in the production on the manor. The calculations of the so-called net income were based on current prices and that series of data represents the actual income in cash depending on market fluctuations. Those two series of data indicate a relatively rapid growth in income until the mid-1890s. Then the growth slowed down and even stopped. There was a sharp rise in pre-war years and particularly in the first year of the war due to extremely favourable price conditions. That was followed by a drastic fall in the years 1916-1920 as a result of requisitioning, shortage of labour power and other factors caused by the war.[39] The size of the herd, its productivity and total yield fell to the level of the early 1880s.[40]

It is unfortunate that on the basis of Rathlef's data it is not possible to make an analogous chart of expenditure and net profit. Expenditure was primarily influenced by the prices of consumer goods, but particularly by a rise in wages. Thus, according to G. von Rathlef's calculations, the wages of the workers on the manor rose from 283 roubles in 1905 to 380 roubles in pre-war years.

The data on the structure of the income and expenditure as well as on the net profit are available only for three economic years - 1903/1904, 1904/1905 and 1906/1907. The economic year 1905/1906 was not a typical one and, therefore, has been excluded.[41] Cattle-breeding was the source of 60.5 per cent (including 56.9 per cent from selling unskimmed milk to the creamery) of the average annual income (*ca* 29,100 roubles, excluding the cost of agricultural machinery - *ca* 40,000 roubles) and the sale of grain accounted for 27.5 per cent of the income.

The basic items of expenditure (*ca* 22,100 roubles a year) were as follows: purhases of seed grain, concentrated fodder, fertilizers and different materials - 30.3 per cent, wages 29.8 per cent (including annual wages 12.6 per cent and daily and piece-wages - 17.2 per cent). Considerable sums were also spent on depreciation and renewal of agricultural implements (including herd selection and participation in exhibitions) - 8.8 per cent, on building and repairing - 5.8 per cent, on buying household appliances and consumer goods - 3.7 per cent. Insurance and various taxes accounted for 2.3 and 3.3 per cent of the expenditure respectively.

G. von Rathlef estimated the net profit of the manor from agriculture at 7,168 roubles in 1903/1904, 10,350 roubles in 1904/1905 and 10,431 roubles in 1906/1907. (The difference resulted from the different values of agricultural implements at the beginning and at the end of the analysed economic years). Thus, in the first decade of the 20th century, the average net profit of the manor was about 10,000 roubles, i.e. 33 roubles per one hectare of arable land.If we take into account the profit from rent and forests, the maximum net profit of the manor could not exceed 15,000 roubles in pre-war years. That profit enabled successful management in some economically unfavourable years and, evidently, the accumulated capital would have been sufficient to restore the economy of the manor in post-war years as well.

In evaluating the developments on the Tammistu manor in its last decades we can agree with G. von Rathlef who wrote in 1914: "...what has been done at Tammistu is nothing special - at the same time a large number of Baltic manors, making use of more powerful means and at a much faster rate, have achieved much better results. The only unique thing here is a system of long-time and methodical accounting. I myself have acted more radically on one of the manors belonging to me and now managed by my son (Kokora) as well as on other big manors over which I had authority during many years".[42]

In conclusion we would like to point out that only after studying the development of farming in that period more thoroughly would it be possible to say whether G. von Rathlef's bitter words about his life's work expressed in a letter to J. Mägi, Professor of Tartu University, in the autumn of 1921 were justified: "If this former centre of agricultural culture and promotion of cattle-breeding as well as numerous other cattle-breeding centres are parcelled out in 1922 or 1923, the work done for the improvement of the breed and lasting 50 years (that is almost two generations) will be lost here too. Sapienti sat! Yours sincerely, G. von Rathlef".[43]

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A Discussion about the Principles of Forming the Armed Forces in the First Years of the Republic of Estonia

Ago Pajur

In the 20th century, three principally different methods have been used to form the armed forces: 1. The militia army was already known in ancient states where all men received military training without interrupting their regular work and, in case of necessity, were ready to fight. In the 20th century, the militia army presupposes military training in the neighbourhood of one's home (territorial principle) in the course of periodical training gatherings, the total length of which is below one calendar year. In peacetime, a militia army consists only of a small number of officers-instructors, and the remaining staff are called up in the course of a general mobilization if there is imminent danger of war. The Swiss army was the most well-known militia army in the 1920s. 2. Standing paid armies were common in the Middle Ages, but they were supplanted by mass regular armed forces after the French Revolution. That system was considered to be outdated at the beginning of the 20th century; nowadays, however, the armed forces of a number of leading states (USA, Great Britain, etc.) are again formed of paid professionals. 3. A standing cadre army, formed on the basis of general conscription, first came into being in France in the course of the revolutionary wars at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. This method of compulsory military training of all men in peacetime during a longer (over one year) period of time is rather common nowadays.

The Estonian national militiary units were born in the summer of 1917, i. e. at the time when Estonia was still part of the Russian Empire. Naturally, those units were formed in accordance with All-Russian laws as a cadre army based on general conscription. During the Estonian War of Independence that broke out at the end of 1918 nobody had time to debate about the methods of forming the army because heavy fighting against the much more numerous Red Army demanded maximum effort and a mass army served that purpose best.

It was only after the War of Independence, at the beginning of 1920, that a discussion about the further development of the army began. Though at first, as a result of the intoxication from victory, there had been ideas that Estonia did not need an army at all, they did not become dominant because of the unstable foreign-policy situation of the newly-formed small state in the immediate neighbourhood of the aggressive Soviet Empire.[1]

However, there were lively debates about the system of the army in the future, mainly brought about by patriotic sentiment (service in the Russian army had been hated by everybody) as well as by economic difficulties. Those debates were aimed at finding the most optimum way of forming the armed forces in Estonia. The participants in the debate presented different ideas concerning the role of the army in society, but were unanimous in evaluating the economic situation of Estonia and emphasized the necessity of thrifty spending on the armed forces.

Three different principles of forming the armed forces were advanced as early as in 1920.

Members of the Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party were most active in propagating their viewpoints. Basing their ideas on the resolution adopted at the 1st Congress of the 2nd International in 1898, the socialists suggested that a people's militia (that is how they called the militia army) should be formed in Estonia.

The Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party pointed out that a militia army had a number of alleged advantages over a standing cadre army: 1) a militia with its small number of instructors would be cheaper than a standing army; 2) it would be easier to train the soldiers' initiative during short training gatherings than under strict barrack-discipline; 3) a militia would be more suited for contemporary mobile warfare than a mass army.[2]

In December 1920, Admiral Johan Pitka, Commander of the Naval Forces during the War of Independence, presented totally different proposals to the government. His memoranda were based on the presumption that Estonia's only potential enemy was Soviet Russia. He thought that Moscow was planning to carry out a *coup d'etat* in Estonia with the help of Estonian communists and then, under the pretext of helping "the fighting proletariat", to send the Red Army to Estonia. But before that the bolsheviks would have to establish their organizations in the Estonian army and, therefore, the army could not always be trusted. Consequently, the armed forces should consist of several parts: 1) To preserve the technical troops which, though small in number, are equipped with modern and efficient armaments (armoured trains, tanks, planes). Professional soldiers would serve in those units and they would repulse the enemy on the frontier until general mobilization would be carried out. 2) To form special "shock troops" of the volunteers "who had been in the fierce battles of the War of Independence and who knew what they were fighting for and know what they have to defend". In peacetime, those men would be engaged in their everyday work and would assemble periodically for training gatherings. In

case of war, they could be quickly (24-48 hours) mobilized and immediately (without additional training) sent to fight. 3) All the remaining men should be trained in accordance with the principles of a militia army and they should be used as a second-rate reserve.[3]

Thus, J. Pitka's scheme was a peculiar combination of a paid army and a militia army, while the latter was to consist of the so-called traditional units and elite ones.

Some officers serving in the Defence League proposed another mixed system consisting of a militia and a standing cadre army and recommended to reorganize the Defence League into a militia army and to preserve the standing army as well. During the War of Independence, the Defence League had developed from a voluntary self-defence organization into a mass organization that was obligatory for all men and was enganged in the internal defence of the republic.

In December 1919, Voldemar Thomson, a department head of the staff of the Defence League, sent a memorandum to the government pointing out that it was necessary to abandon the former so-called Russian system as inappropriate for Estonian conditions and national character. His proposal was to enlist every year two classes of men (about 8,000) in the permanent army, mainly in the frontier guard service. After the enlistment period, those men would be incorporated in the so-called citizens' army consisting of various public organizations. All persons belonging to the citizens' army would get extra military training in those organizations and would have arms and uniforms so that they could be ready for battle in 24 hours. V. Thomson thought that the regional units of the Defence League could perform those functions.[4]

V. Thomson published his memorandum practically unchanged (only "citizens' army" was replaced by a more conventional "reserve army") in the first issue of the journal "Kaitseliitlane" ("Member of the Defence League"), the editor-in-chief of which he was.[5]

Second Captain Johannes Gnadenteich, Commander of the Viru county unit of the Defence League, also propagated the idea of reducing to a minimum the standing army and increasing the role of the Defence League in his article published in the journal "SÕdur" ("Soldier"). His vision of the Defence League resembled J. Pitka's "shock troops" as joining the organization was voluntary and the enlistment presupposed definite selection. All those who did not belong to the Defence League, in accordance with the practice of tsarist Russia, were to be registered as home guards and were to be called up only in case of war.[6]

Those changes, however, did not receive solid support from the public. The Estonian Social Democratic Workers' Party was the only political force in favour of radical reforms. The other parties shared the senior officers' views which were rather figuratively expressed by Major-General Jaan Soots, the former chief of the staff of the Supreme Command: "Experimenting with the army would be beyond our means and extremely dangerous".[7] When the Constituent Assembly was debating about state defence principles in the 1920 constitution, both Konstantin Päts[8], leader of the rightist Farmers' Party, and Ado Anderkopp, a spokesman for the relatively leftist Labour Party, were in favour of a standing army as the basis of defence organization in Estonia.[9] The centrist People's Party's newspaper "Postimees" ("Courier") also supported the above- mentioned principles.[10]

Thus, in 1920, the "Russian system" was preserved and all eligible men had to undergo a three-year compulsory military service and, after completing it, were registered in the reserve army. It is true that a normal cadre army was formed instead of the mass army of the War of Independence - in the course of demobilization the number of the military decreased from 74,769 to 27,014 and later, in accordance with a regulation enforced in January 1921, even to 18,871.[11] This number diminished further when the three-year compulsory military service was replaced by a two-year one, then by a 1.5-year one and, finally, by a one-year service (this period was further shortened at the time of the economic crisis) - thus, for example, on August 1, 1931, the Estonian army numbered 13,535 men.[12]

Although the size of the army had been substantially decreased, people were dissatisfied that the former "Russian system" had been applied and more and more political forces joined the campaign to reform the state defence organization.

The first moderate reform proposals were made as early as at the turn of 1920-1921. Thus, before the elections of the State Assembly, the Labour Party declared that it was going "to push a new military organization through" in the Parliament, though not specifying details of the new organization.[13] Soon afterwards, they specified their ideas: since small Estonia would have to fight against a great power and Estonia's economic situation did not enable her to maintain a large standing army, consequently, "there is no other way than to transfer military training from the barracks to the public /.../. Besides a short-term military service /.../ there would be a people's army created from society, there would be a nation trained to defend their freedom".[14] Similar ideas of the necessity of the "armed people" were expressed by the People's Party during its election campaign.[15]

In the spring of 1921, pressure from politicians was so strong that General Jaan Soots, the Minister of War, had to declare in a newspaper: "Finding the proper system must be left to military experts. And after one system has been accepted, the public must not interefere in its implementation /.../".[16] The general's warning was only a voice in the wilderness - the good old days when politicians did not dare (were not competent?) discuss military issues were gone. Even Professor Jüri Uluots, J. Soots' fellow member from the Farmers' Party, pointed out in the State Assembly that such organizations as the Defence League could play a certain part in organizing state defence. At a meeting of parliamentary commissions held on December 10, 1921, only the top-ranking officers supported the existing system, while both the People's Party and the Labour Party were in favour of a partial change in the system; the socialists insisted on setting up a people's militia.[17]

At the end of 1921, Admiral J. Pitka's scheme was brought up again. Meanwhile, J. Pitka had rallied his supporters and had established the Estonian Guard Union. The organ of the latter published the forgotten scheme again, trying to prove its suitability for Estonian conditions.[18] The scheme did not receive any support and lots

of arguments against it were presented. J. Soots attempted to prove that if J. Pitka's scheme were applied, some young men would not get any military training at all and, therefore, they could not be used in wartime.[19] In actual fact, J. Pitka had meant the training of all conscripts. Members of the People's Party and of the Labour Party considered specially selected "shock troops" dangerous.[20] Thus, the newspaper "Postimees" wrote that the proposed scheme was "quite an absurd idea that would not guarantee internal security, but would create class hatred and social tension".[21] The problem seems to be unduly inflated since it was not realistic that the "shock troops" would seize power. The third argument against J. Pitka should be considered more seriously: that the system would have been a burden on the treasury since it would have been necessary to pay the professionals serving in the technical troops, the instructors training the reserve cadres as well as to subsidize the semi-professional "shock troops" and to spend money on modern armaments for the small defence units to such an extent that they could repulse the enemy's first attack.[22] However, we cannot be sure that expenditure on defence would actually have increased. Nevertheless, J. Pitka's scheme to reorganize national defence was unanimously rejected by the military and politicians as unsuitable for Estonian conditions.

The socialists advocated setting up a people's militia in 1922 as well. Although there was much talk about the necessity of radical reforms, the concepts "militia army" and "people's militia" occurred less frequently in the newspapers. Evidently, there were a number of reasons for that. First, it was obvious that neither the parliament nor the government would support radical changes; second, both the People's Party and the Labour Party presented concrete plans; third, more seriously (previously only emotional evaluations like "experimenting is dangerous and expensive" had been used).

In 1922, Colonel Nikolai Reek, chief of the General Staff Courses (later: Higher Military College), and Major-General Dmitri Lebedev, a lecturer, published an article in the magazine "Sõdur" ("Soldier") devoted completely to militia army problems. The main ideas of the article can be summed up as follows: "The state cannot rely on the militia because the latter, by its nature and as is known from militia history, do not guarantee strength, loyalty and readiness for action. /.../ The militia is but a crowd of people who, in comparison with a standing army, lack the expertise of military technology, discipline, solidarity and endurance".[23] The emotional conclusion of the article does not reflect the actual value of the article which constituted a thorough analysis of all the arguments for and against the militia army. The authors' theoretical standpoints were illustrated with examples from military history and numerical data. That article definitely dealt a severe blow to the supporters of the people's militia.

In 1922, the People's Party and the Labour Party came out with an interesting idea of setting up a so-called "people's army". The newspaper "Postimees" ("Courier") carried an article explaining in detail the basic principles of the people's army: As Estonia's independent statehood is continuously threatened by Russia, it is clear that we cannot survive without an efficient system of state defence; on the other hand, we cannot continue the current practice of spending over 30 per cent of the budget on military expenditure and so not being able to meet the needs of our economy and national culture. If we take into account the continuous threat from the neighbouring great power, it is necessary to educate and organize all the people for state defence, but not in the form of a large standing army that is beyond our means, but with the help of all public organizations. Thus, besides a small and well-trained standing army provided with modern armaments, there should exist public organizations responsible for the registration and training of reservists and capable of freeing the state from that expenditure.[24]

Propaganda for the people's army became particularly active in October 1922 when the government had resigned and consultations for forming a new coalition cabinet were going on. The People's Party played a particularly significant role as its leaders repeatedly emphasized the necessity of adapting public organizations to the needs of state defence.[25] The new government declared that the system of state defence should be changed and improved.[26] Nevertheless, they did not go beyond words. There might have been a variety of reasons - the government's short term of office (the next general election was already in March 1923) or the fact that the former Minister of War J. Soots held office in the new government as well. It should be pointed out, however, that the higher officers lost their former conservatism. In the above-mentioned article by Reek and Lebedev a promising conclusion was drawn: it would be expedient "to preserve the cadre army as long as the East European political issue had not been settled and later, depending upon the circumstances, to switch over to a mixed system".[27] ("Mixed system" meant a combination of the elements of a standing army and militia army, i. e. analogously to the proposals put forward by the People's Party).

In the spring of 1923, on the eve of the election of the second convocation of the State Assembly, the People's Party presented its detailed plan of a mixed system under the title "The guiding principles of the People's Party": 1. For the purpose of state defence all citizens fit for military service shall be organized into a people's army. 2. The main part of the people's army shall be a standing army in which all citizens fit for military service shall serve for a short period of time. 3. Those who have served in the army as well as all other young men fit for military service shall belong until old age to the reserve army. 4. The reservists are in good form as a result of regular trainings in public organizations of citizens, while the leaders of the people's army act as initiators and organizers through the leading bodies of the army. 5. School children engage in regular physical exercises in order to prepare for national defence.[28]

In 1923, the organizing of a four-month training gathering for the reservists who had not served in the army was discussed at the second session of the second convocation of the State Assembly. The problem itself was not significant concerning only 2,000 men, but in the course of the discussion more general matters came up again. The socialists once more suggested that a people's militia should be taken as a pattern for the army, while Jaan Tõnisson[29] asked the public why the principles of a people's army had not been put into prac-

tice yet. He himself thought that the main reason was that there had been no public organization capable of doing that.[30] We should agree with J. Tõnisson - the Defence League, a powerful mass organization during the War of Independence, which could have been a solid basis for the people's army, was inefficient in the early 1920s. In some places there were small hunting clubs organizing target practice but not systematic military training and quite often they served only as places of entertainment.

In response to the fair criticism of the Defence League by the People's Party, A. Anderkopp, the labourite Minister of War, pointed out that the government was closely watching the activities of the Defence League, that the reorganization of the latter had already begun and the training was more intensive, and that military training as a compulsory subject was to be introduced into the curricula of senior classes.[31] Thus, according to Minister of War's allegations, the state defence reform was due in compliance with the schemes of the People's Party and the Labour Party.

The contents of the magazine "Sõdur" ("Soldier") of 1924 also attest to the Minister's words. Contrary to the previous years, there were lots of articles on the militia system in Western Europe, whereas particular attention was paid to the military training of reservists by public organizations after their regular service in the army.[32] The same can be said about the materials published in the newspaper "Ühendus" ("Union") in which the revival of the Defence League was criticized - there was a danger that the Defence League could become the army of a definite political party and cause trouble.[33]

It is difficult to say how far the reforms could have gone if there had not been the bolshevist attempt at insurrection in Tallinn on December 1, 1924, as a result of which all the reforms stopped. On the one hand, the military used the imminent Soviet threat to emphasize once again the necessity of a developed state defence system and to warn against all kinds of experiments. On the other hand, a number of changes occurred in 1925 - the Defence League was restored and it was more numerous and organizationally stronger than earlier and undertook to organize, in part, the military training of reservists. Some politicians regarded those reforms as the implementation of their scheme of a people's army. In actual fact, the principles of activity of the Defence League did not completely coincide with those of a public reserve army - first of all, the membership of the Defence League was not compulsory for everybody.

In the middle of the 1920s, the organization principles of the army were not a subject for debates any more. The military and the leading political parties approved of the formed system - a standing cadre army with a short period of compulsory military service and the Defence League functioning as a public organization. In other aspects concerning the army, the discussion continued and the experience gained in the earlier debates was widely applied.

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[3] "Valve" (Guard) 1922, nr. 11, lk. 2-8; nr. 12, lk. 1-4.

[4] Estonian State Archives (=ESA), Stock 31, Series 1, Item 505, p. 3-4.

[5] "Kaitseliitlane" (Defence Leaguer) 1920, nr. 1, lk. 2-3.

[6] "Sõdur" (Soldier) 1920, nr. 17, lk. 4-6; nr. 20, lk. 3.

[7] "Päevaleht" (Daily) 25.11.1920.

[8] Konstantin Päts (1874-1956) - outstanding politician of the Republic of Estonia. Head of the State, later president (1934-40). Established authoritarian regime which lasted until the Soviet occupation in June 1940. He was deported to Russia who died.

[9] Minutes of the 4th session of the Constituent Assembly, p. 559-560, 915-916.

[10] "Postimees" (Courier) 12.06.1920.

[11] **Ant J.**, *op. cit.*, lk. 67-68.

[12] ESA, Stock 957, Series 13, Item 590, p. 10-30.

[13] "Vaba Maa" (Free Land) 25.11.1920.

[14] *Ibidem*, 01.02.1921.

[15] "Postimees" 02.11.1920, 26.11.1920.

[16] "Kaja" (Echo) 01.04.1921.

[17] ESA, Stock 80, Series 1, Item 256, p. 12.

[18] "Valve" 1922, nr. 11, lk. 2-8; nr. 12, lk. 1-4; nr. 15, lk. 10-13.

[19] Minutes of the 5th session of the 1st State Assembly, p. 712.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 761. "Vaba Maa" 10.03.1022.

[21] "Postimees" 04.01.1922.

[22] Minutes of the 5th session of the 1st State Assembly, p. 712.

[23] "Sõdur" 1922, nr. 6, lk. 1-4.

[24] "Postimees" 04.01.1922.

[25] *Ibidem*, 27.10.1922, 03.11.1922.

[26] "Vaba Maa" 29.11.1922.

[27] "Sõdur" 1922, nr. 6, lk. 4.

[28] "Postimees" 17.04.1923.

[29] Jaan Tõnisson (1868-1941?) - outstanding politician of the Republic of Estonia. Leader of the People's Party. Repeatedly the prime minister. Chief editor of Estonian biggest daily "Courier". From 1934 he was pushed aside from active politics by K. Päts. Died in Soviet prison camp in 1941(?).

[30] Minutes of the 2nd session of the 2nd State Assembly, p. 1285-1286.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 1305.

[32] "Sõdur" 1924, nr. 22., lk. 6-8; nr. 44/45, lk. 2-4.

[33] "Ühendus" (Unity) 29.11.1924.

First Lessons of Governing the Republic of Estonia

Jüri Ant

The Republic of Estonia that came into being in the tumult of revolutions and the War of Independence, at first lacked democratic political traditions as well as experience of democratic government. All this had to be acquired in the course of everyday practice. In this place one of the numerous Cabinet crises in the first years of the republic, the crisis of summer 1920, is studied. Delving deeply into this problem might provide some insight for analysing the present and future political problems of our republic.

The government of the Republic of Estonia entered the year 1920 with the following members: prime minister J. Tõnisson, minister of foreign affairs A. Birk, minister of the interior A. Hellat, minister of finance J. Kukk, minister of commerce and industry N. Köstner (up to April, on April 17 the government assigned his tasks to the prime minister); T. Pool, minister of agriculture; K. Treffner, minister of education; E. Särk, minister of transport; A. Palvadre, minister of labour and welfare; J. Kriisa, minister of provision; J. Jaanson, minister of justice; A. Hanno, minister of war. 4 out of the 12 ministers were members of the Estonian People's Party, 3 were social democrats, 3 belonged to the Labour Party and 2 were independent. The government's support came from 80 members, i.e. two thirds of the Contituent Assembly. It was a coalition cabinet of the Assembly's leading parties. The same cabinet had lived through a crisis in November 1919, but the change of premiers (J. Tõnnison instead of O. Strandmann) mitigated political tensions at first. The People's Party had the thick end of the stick in the government. They held the portfolios of the prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of provision, minister of justice, and, since April, also the minister of commerce and industry. Prime minister Tõnisson was the most experienced cabinet member in the field of political rivalries. At 52 years he was the oldest Cabinet Minister. The average age of the ministers was 39. 7 out of the 12 Cabinet Ministers had graduated from the Faculties of Law of the Universities of Tartu or Petersburg, the rest had acquired technical or commercial education in Riga, Petersburg or Moscow.

In the first half of the 1920s political struggle between parties did not noticeably show in the government's activities. At the beginning of the year negotiations with Soviet Russia to conclude a peace treaty reached a decisive stage. The question of Estonia's further destiny united ministers with different political standpoints. A rather complicated economic situation and other problems also forced political rivalries into the background. The crisis broke out at the meeting of the Constituent Assembly on July 2, 1920, when social democrats announced the recall of their representatives from the Cabinet. A statement of the group of Estonian Social Democratic Worker's Party at the Constituent Assembly said: "Being a principled opponent of the capitalist system, the Estonian Social Democratic Worker's Party can not take part in the government of a bourgeois state beyond extraordinary circumstances. Neither can it take responsibility for the government's policy as, even in the case of a most democratic regime, its essential features can not be anything else but bourgeois; this is the policy of preserving and defending the capitalist system".[1] (Social democrats had had the greatest success in the elections of the Constituent Assembly: 33,3% of votes that guaranteed them 41 out of the 120 seats in the Constituent Assembly.) The declaration mentioned forced prime minister J. Tõnisson to make a statement at the end of the same meeting that the government was going to resign, although only 2 social democrats (A. Hellat and A. Palvadre) belonged to the cabinet at that moment. However, nobody could then foresee how deep and complicated the following Cabinet crisis was going to be.

Why did the social democrats take such a step? Formally it was based on the decisions of international congresses of socialist parties that in principle condemned the participation of socialists in bourgeois governments. Estonian socialists had up to this time been at the helm of the state together with bourgeois parties, but did not want to do it any more. Evidently the strategy and tactics of the Estonian Social Democratic Worker's Party are at the bottom of this event. Political "sins" during the War of Independence, especially the role of the minister of interior, social democrat A. Hellat in sanctions against the 1st Trade Union Congress, had seriously undermined the party's authority. The Estonian Communist Party that was gathering strength as well as

socialist revolutionaries[2] made use of the opportunity to keep this and analogous stories a common topic in their agitation and propaganda against social democrats. E. Laaman, a public figure, journalist and historian, has later noted that in 1920 the social democrats left the government namely under the pressure of communists.[3] H. A. Lebbin, who has studied the history of Estonian social democracy, has noted the decrease of the number of socialists in 1920 in comparison with 1919.[4] Mention should also be made of the fact that the right wing of Estonian political forces as alarmed that the "reds" in the shape of social democrats had come to power. Taking into account all this, social democrats evidently found it a suitable moment to withdraw in order to convince the other parties that it was impossible to govern the state without social democrats. Hence the opportunity to gather support and popularity at the coming elections to the State Assembly presented itself. In the course of elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1919 withdrawal from the government and the "opposition game" had also been successfully made use of.[5] The moment to leave the government was not chosen by chance. It coincided with the case of 35 communists that created a sensation and that was followed by a political protest strike from June 30 to July 2. The Estonian Communist Party treated the matter in this way that namely the political strike forced social democrats out of the government.[6]

The step taken by the social democrats on July 2 spoiled the mood of the Constituent Assembly members. The atmosphere in the state was strained anyway, now the Cabinet crisis was added. Besides, on the next day the Assembly had planned to go on its summer holiday.

Negotiations between the parties to set up a new Cabinet were co-ordinated by A. Rei, a social democrat, chairman of the Constituent Assembly. As, for forming the new government, the social democrats were out of the question, it was necessary to make clear the positions of the Labour Party and the People's Party, the two next biggest parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. The People's Party nominated J. Tõnisson to the post of prime minister after only a few days. But then hesitations arose. It came out that his candidacy was generally not very highly appreciated and the idea to nominate the former minister of foreign affairs A. Birk started to gain favour in the party's leading circles. On July 7 the People's Party made an official statement that it would support J. Tõnisson's candidacy.

The Labour Party answered the decision of People's Party with loud protest – anybody but Tõnisson. On July 9 one of the leading figures of the Labour Party, editor-in-chief of "Vaba maa" (Free Land) A. Anderkopp published a major article "Jaan Tõnisson's System" in "Vaba Maa" to "unsaddle" Tõnisson completely. He blamed Tõnisson as the former head of the government. In sum his accusations concerned the following points: 1) Due to J. Tõnisson's inactivity the government has not made use of the economic opportunities that offered themselves as a result of the Tartu Peace Treaty with Soviet Russia. The Tõnisson government had in this respect "missed all the opportunities, the country's economy had suffered a severe unrepairable blow as a result of hesitation and incomprehensible delay; 2) The Tõnisson government has beyond measure prolonged the drawing up of regulations necessary for the agrarian reform. The Land Bank that was to give support to new landowners has not been created yet; 3) Military reform has remained unrealized. The expenditures of the Ministry of War are enormous and it does not report to the Constituent Assembly; 4) There reigns inadmissible luxury in Estonia's foreign missions. "According to our information some of our embassies live in such lordly clover that other small states even can not imagine"; 5) Economic policy is hanging fire, it develops" without any course, there does not exist any system". Final conclusion – the Labour Party does not support J. Tõnisson's candidacy because his activity would mean a way to gulf, decorated "with J. Tõnisson's big talk and round gestures".

J. Tõnisson certainly could not put up with the critics that befall him. First of all he sent an extremely long reply letter to A. Rei (chairman of the Constituent Assembly) where he justified his activities as premier and cautioned not to let the Labour Party to form a new cabinet. In public J. Tõnisson replied to A. Anderkop in "Postimees" (Courier).

Mutual critics and self-justfications did not contribute to the liquidation of crisis, but deepened the contradictions between parties. A complicated political backdoor game started to develop. The split between labourists and the People's Party forced A. Rei to consult also the minor parties of the Constituent Assembly on the question of the new cabinet. Among those only the Christian People's Party agreed to participate in making up the new cabinet (5 deputies in the Constituent Assembly) on the condition that the Law of Elementary Schools would been given a fixed place in the educational system. [7]

After exchanging thoughts with A. Anderkop and A. Rei J. Tõnisson made known that he would give up the forming of the new cabinet. The People's Party seriously considered whether to send its representatives to the next government at all, but then nominated A. Birk for the post of the premier. The Labour Party in its turn put up A. Piip, the London ambassador of the Republic of Estonia, and J. Kukk, the former minister of finance, as candidates. A. Rei made both parties a proposal to form a one-party cabinet, but neither of them wanted to take the risk. In the second half of July General Laidoner[8] as a neutral figure was asked to undertake the formation of the cabinet. He refused. Oppositionary forces started to use the lasting cabinet crisis in their interests. "Kaja" (Echo), newspaper of the Agrarian League, suddenly started to publish letters expressing the people's deep anxiety and dissatisfaction. "Päevaleht" (Daily) joined "Kaja", drawing the sad conclusion that "up to now all the governments have been only guests staying for the night in the government's house". That's why "confidence in us, belief in our future is quickly declining here and abroad".[9]

After numerous consultations that mainly remained unknown to the public, A. Birk expressed his opinion that he had in principal succeeded in forming the new

cabinet consisting of the representatives of the People's Party, the Labour Party, the Christian People's Party and the independent deputies of the Constituent Assembly. 7 out of the 12 proposed cabinet ministers were members of the People's Party, 1 was a labourist, 1 a member of the Christian People's Party and 3 were independent. It seemed that public complaints and attacks by the press would help the new cabinet to come into office. On the other hand it was to be feared that the extremely sharp relationship between the Labour Party and the People's Party would bring to the labourists' attempts to reject the new cabinet at any price. That's how it really happened.

The government had to take office in the afternoon of July 28, at the session of the Constituent Assembly. There were delicate matters on the agenda of this meeting – interpellations of the Estonian Independent Socialist Workers' Party and their proposal to cease martial law, to stop carrying out death sentences, the Irboska bloodshed[10], an application to hand members of the Constituent Assembly H. Kruus, J. Kärner and some others over to judical authorities. The meeting started at 5.30 p.m. 79 members of the Constituent Assembly were present. The opening formalities went quickly and easily. Anyhow, when the staff of the newly formed government was being introduced, tensions arose at once. O. Strandmann demanded that before the Constituent Assembly started voting, the new cabinet should introduce its program and declarations; otherwise the Labour Party deputies would abstain from voting. This equalled a vote of censure to the government not yet formed, as generally the new government introduced its programme after taking office. Social democrats announced through K. Ast that they would abstain from voting. J. Piiskar, the representative of the Estonian Independent Socialist Worker's Party, announced that his party opposed to the new government. All these attitudes became known in about a quarter of an hour and did not look like anything good for the voting procedure. The results of the voting were as follows: 18 deputies of the Constituent Assembly voted in favour of the new government (most of the People's Party members and Christian People's Party members), 3 deputies, representatives of Estonian Independent Socialist Worker's Party, voted against, and the rest of the deputies abstained from voting. In such a rather unpleasant situation, A. Birk managed to possess himself well. Having come to the rostrum, he announced that 18 votes in favour are of course more than 3 against, but, taking into account the results, asked to make a pause. The 5-minute pause dragged on to 40 minutes. After that the new Head of the State was given the floor again. The essence of A. Birk's speech was summed up in one of his sentences: "We thank the Constituent Assembly for putting its trust in us that now absolves us from this high obligation".[11] So the new cabinet resigned. A proposal came to make a 15-minute pause that this time dragged on to an hour. After the pause A. Birk and his government were again persuaded to take office. O. Strandmann even came out with a threat that in the case of refusal the Supreme Court can impeach A. Birk. In his reply A. Birk mentioned that as he knew "in Estonia the Law of Penal Servitude is valid as to work in the forests, but now it also comes into force for governing the republic".[12] After fruitless exchange of thoughts only one question – what else? – arose in the Constituent Assembly. It was proposed that the former, J. Tõnisson government would continue, until the crisis became solved. But this was hindered by the legal aspect of the matter – A. Birk had to hand in his resignation to the Constituent Assembly in written form before, and it had to be officially accepted. That's how the meeting of the Constituent Assembly ended. Another meeting was set for the next day.

The meeting of July 23 started with reading aloud J. Tõnisson's letter. In this letter he urged that the question of power had to be solved immediately, because in the present situation even a few days without government were dangerous to the state. The reason for J. Tõnisson's anxiety was an actual threat of a general strike that ripened day by day and finally broke out on August 3. Feeling ill at ease the Assembly saw a danger to the further existence of the Republic of Estonia. About 8.30 p.m. the deputies voted in favour of the transition formula so that the old government could continue its work until the new one was formed.

The A. Birk government was of the shortest duration in the whole history of the Republic of Estonia.The press of that time considered that it's duration had been only some twenty minutes – from voting to A. Birk's announcement that the government would not take office. This is evidently not quite exact. Formally the A. Birk government was on power for about 27 hours, i.e. until the moment when the Constituent Assemly voted in favour of the transition formula.

At the helm of the state again, J. Tõnisson took a decisive step to form the new government. Namely A. Rei had negotiated the question of new government with the Labour Party on July 29, before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The Labour Party did not want to go through fire for this as the social democrats had declared that they would rather support the People's Party than the labourists. The Labour Party opposed to the leader of the People's Party and the former premier J. Tõnisson, as they considered his policy "directly dangerous to Estonian statehood".[13] Proceeding from this situation and feeling the silent support of social democrats, J. Tõnisson formed a People's Party government that was ratified on July 30. Among the 12 cabinet members 9 belonged to the People's Party: prime minister J. Tõnisson, minister of foreign affairs A. Birk, minister of the interior K. Einbund, minister of commerce and industry O. Wirkhaus,[14] minister of agriculture A. Kerem, minister of transport A. Bürger, minister of labour and welfare A. Bachmann, minister of provision J. Kriisa, minister of justice J. Jaakson. There were 3 independent members of the cabinet: minister of finance T. Vares, minister of education F. Sauer and minister of war A. Tõnisson.

The explanations of E. Laaman, head of the Department of Information in the Ministry of Foreign Affaires to Estonian ambassadors in London and Stockholm about the establishment of the J. Tõnisson government and the liquidation of the cabinet crisis, are of great in-

terest.[15] E. Laaman was of the opinion that an important role in the failure of the A. Birk government was played by N. Kann, a christian democrat who was to become the minister of education. His candidacy strongly irritated the Estonian Teachers' Union. The "Estonia Biographic Lexicon" characterizes N. Kann as a representative of the moderate wing in Estonian education policy. Taking into account the general positions of the Christian People's Party at that time, as well as several of N. Kann's sentiments, he can obviously be taken for a, to some extent, reactionary figure. By the way, later N. Kann moved from the Christian People's Party to the Agrarian League. In "Päevaleht" he quite clearly expressed his opinion about the government and the government members of that time. He wrote: "Our misfortune is caused by our young deputies who have mostly acquired a Russian education, being sent to the Constituent Assembly by our people with little political experience. They have little or almost no proficiency in governing the state, but are now trying to arrange our life after prescriptions that they have read from foreign party programs".

According to E. Laaman, as there were many teachers among the supporters of the Labour Party, the party could not ignore their displeasure and protest. That is why O. Strandmann and K. Konik forced the cabinet crisis further, voting down the A. Birk government. E. Laaman commented on the solution of the crisis as follows: "It has to be said that this crisis made a rather stupid impression from every point, but the labourists cut the poorest figure by, first of all, trying to remove J. Tõnisson and then, having achieved this, could not stop, and helped him into office anew".

The reaction of the public to what had happened in the Constituent Assembly was rather bitter. H. Raudsepp (Milli Mallikas), member of the CA, reviewer and feuilletonist of "Vaba Maa", published a sarcastic article under the heading "A. Birk's benefit". He characterized the formation of the Birk government as a performance where "a great original farce of national power was played". The article ended with the words: "Let's hope that this first sight would not remain a last one, but will be repeated at the desire of the public with new players who also wish to show their abilities".[16]

H. Raudsepp was right. From May 8, 1919 to October 21, 1933 there were 21 governments altogether at the helm of state in Estonia. Cabinet crises lasted a total of 390 days.[17] Learning to govern democratic Estonia was not an easy job.

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[6] "Kommunist" (Communist). 1920. 5. juuli.

[7] "Vaba Maa" (Free Land). 1920. 8. juuli.

[8] Johannes Laidoner (1884-1953) — Commander-in-chief in the Estonian War of Independence. Therefore he was a popular public figure.

[9] "Päevaleht" (Daily). 1920. 24. juuli.

[10] Bloodshed of Irboska — Deportation of more than a hundred bolshevist functionaries to Soviet Russia in September, 1919. 25 of them were executed near Irboska.

[11] Records of the Constituent Assembly. Session 4, 1920. P. 1405.

[12] A. Birk meant the general labour conscription in the woods that was enforced in the winter of 1919/20.

[13] "Vaba Maa". 1920. 3. august.

[14] In fact O. Wirkhaus did not start to fulfill the duties of minister as he went on convalescence vacation on August 7.

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The War Debt of the Republic of Estonia to the United States of America

Piia Jullinen

Europe became a debtor to the USA in the course of World War I; between April 1917 and the middle of 1920, the USA had credited the Allies with 9.5 thousand million dollars.

There was much talk about the war debt at the Paris peace conference and before it. Attempts made by England and France to cancel the debt in full or in part were resolutely opposed by President W. Wilson's economic experts. The USA did not agree to guarantee the debt with German reparations either. It was only at the end of 1919 that the USA government assented to prolong the time of payment of interest on war debts.

Like in other countries, the development of Estonian economy was retarded by the war debts.

According to the official data, Estonia's war debts at the end of the war were as follows:

USA	- USD 14,006,463.88
England	- GBP 1,350,546
France	- FRF 13,145,304
Denmark	- DKK 634,720
Finland	- FIM 20,000,000.

The debt to Finland had been repaid by 1921, to France - by 1926, but Estonia was not able to repay its debts to the USA and England.

On February 1, 1923, the debt to England was funded to the USA and the debt was to be repaid in the course of 62 years.

In December 1924, the war debts and interest of the European countries totalled 12 thousand million dollars. By that time funding agreements had been concluded with England, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland. Thus 42 per cent of the debt was regulated. In his speech to the Congress in December 1924, President C. Coolidge pointed out that the discharge of war debts was not only an economic, but also a moral obligation and that, despite a variety of funding bases, all the states were bound to carry out their financial obligations to the USA. Though France expressed a strong protest and presented several demarches, it concluded an agreement under which the total sum to be paid exceeded the original debt by one-third of the sum. The National Assembly, however, did not ratify that agreement.

The war debts were under discussion in Estonia as well. On December 6, 1921, Finance Minister G. Westel informed the State Assembly of the USA Senate's decision not to cancel the war debts of European countries, but only to prolong the time of their payment.

In January 1922, in the memorandum of the Republic of Estonia on USA debts it was announced that by January 1 the debt had grown to USD 15,876,755.71 by virtue of unpaid interest. It was also pointed out that despite the fact that there were three possible dates of debt settlement - June 30, 1922, June 30, 1923 and June 30, 1924 - it would be difficult even during a longer period of time, in particular because of the war debts to other states as well. Since Estonia did not possess any particular national wealth, the rate of taxation would be too high in case Estonia repaid the debt on those terms. The consolidation of the debt for at least 30 years at an interest rate of below 5 per cent was considered the only possible solution, though an onerous one.

It was necessary to cut the state budget because of the foreign debt. Only the Foreign Ministry's budget was reduced by 25,526,900 marks by the State Assembly on March 24, 1922.

The fact that England set its debt to the USA at the beginning of 1923 indicated to the Estonian government that the USA was not going to cancel the war debts and that the terms of payment would be unfavourable. In its explanatory letter to the 1924 budget bill the Government stated that "debts both to the USA government and to the Relief Administration are a severe burden on us because interest alone which constitutes a relatively big sum /.../ is added every six months to the sum owed". The indebtedness continued to grow.

The first concrete steps to conclude an agreement on the debt settlement were made by Ants Piip, the envoy accredited to the USA in November 1923. Negotiations with the Foreign Debt Commission of the USA began in January 1924.

According to the report on Estonia's foreign debt, drawn up by the loans department of the treasury of the Ministry of Finance, Estonia's debt to the USA, including unpaid interest, had grown to USD 18,370,704.81 (6,833,902,189.32 EMK). Estonia had paid neither debt nor interest and the Foreign Minister K. R. Pusta pointed out that the sum finally stipulated was unknown.

Official negotiations for the debt settlement between A. Piip and A. Mellon, USA Secretary of the Treasury, began in May 1925. The USA rejected the idea of holding a general conference and preferred to make agreements with its partners separately in order to dictate different terms of payment to different countries.

The USA made a proposal to the Estonian government to conclude an agreement on funding the debt analogous to the USA-Polish debt settlement agreement. According to that agreement, the debt would have to be paid during 62 years.

A. Piip and A. Mellon signed the debt settlement agreement in Washington on October 28, 1925. That was Estonia's last unsettled debt. The negotiations lasted two years and finally the principal sum was fixed at USD 13,830,000 on December 15, 1922.

The debt of the Republic of Estonia to the United States of America consisted of three parts: 1) In the years 1919-1920, the government of the Republic of Estonia received through the Revalis corporation military equipment (estimated finally at USD 2,213,378) from the USA expedition corps depots in France before their liquidation. 2) The Food Ministry bought from the American Relief Administration (ARA) grain on credit for USD 2,714,600. The term of payment was June 30, 1920 and the annual interest rate until the final payment was 5 per cent. A large part of the debt was cancelled and the final sum was fixed at USD 1,785,768. 3) The debt to the Danish branch of the American Relief Administration (seed corn) amounted to DKK 634,720. The Republic of Estonia repaid DKK 308,680 in August 1919 and at the beginning of 1920. The rest of the debt as well as the interest were paid to Denmark by the ARA Danish branch by May 1920 and the sum was added to the total debt of Estonia.

In the agreement the value of goods on board the wrecked steamship "J. Russ" was deducted from the debt (USD 1,932,923.45). On concluding the agreement a sum of USD 1,441.88 was repaid and the remaining sum of USD 13,830,000 was to be repaid in the course of 62 years, i. e. by the year 1984. Interest on the bonds was to be paid every 6 months (on June 15 and December 15) at an annual interest rate of 3 per cent during the first ten years and 3.5 per cent in the later years.

The agreement between the Republic of Estonia and the USA on debt settlement was ratified by the State Assembly on March 26, 1926 and it came into force in the USA on April 30 and in Estonia on May 2, 1926.

Although the terms for cancelling debts were rather similar in the cases of different countries, the sums to be cancelled varied to a considerable extent. Despite the initial proposal made by the USA, the debt settlement agreement was not concluded analogous to the 1923 USA-Polish agreement which stipulated that Poland could pay its 3 per cent annual interest during 15 years. Estonia's funded debt constituted 90 per cent of the original debt, while the respective percentage in case of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and England was 82, Czechoslovakia - 81, Hungary - 80, Belgium - 54, France - 50, Yugoslavia - 32 and Italy - 26. It is evident that the most unfavourable funding terms were set for England and those European small countries which politically leaned towards England. In that way the USA attempted to hinder England from using European small states as a compensation for the loss of its positions in Latin American countries.

Latvia, having equal repayment conditions with Estonia, was obliged to pay USD 5,775,000, Lithuania owed to the USA a total of USD 5,041,627.

The magazine "Eesti Majandus" ("Estonian Economy") gave quite an objective survey of the factors underlying the conclusion of the debt agreement: "The American tariff policy hinders the import of European goods and, although demanding the payment of the debt, America does not give Europe any possibility of settling its debt. This situation will lead to the immediate dependence of European countries on the USA both economically and financially." It was also pointed out that by giving those loans the USA had made a good "bargain" since the loans were given in goods that the USA was unable to sell in Europe anyhow. A year and a half later, however, the price of the same goods was twofold to fourfold lower.

Less favourable payment terms for the Baltic states were motivated in the USA Senate by the solvency of Estonia and the other Baltic states which was proven using incorrect data on the population and the economic situation of the Baltic states. Estonian statesmen themselves were also eager to draw a more favourable picture of Estonia's economic situation. "Christian Science Monitor" (February 24, 1925) carried an excerpt from the Estonian Finance Minister's speech to the State Assembly in which it was stated that the budget was balanced and the foreign debt per one inhabitant was relatively small in comparison with Finland, France or Italy.

The first part of Estonia's debt to the USA (USD 50,000) was repaid on time, on June 15, 1926. It was transferred through the New York Federal Reserve Bank to the USA government's account. According to the agreement, the annual payment was USD 560,000 in the first decade and USD 635,000 in the later years. In case of necessity the USA government was ready to lower the sum to be paid in the first five years. The fact that Estonia repaid part of its debt was regarded in the USA as an indication of its successful economic policy and it was considered that Estonia had recovered its favourable trade balance.

On October 18, 1926, the Estonian Embassy in Washington paid USD 13,830,000 to the USA Finance Minister in bonds of the government of the Republic of Estonia.

During the great depression that began in 1929 Estonia could not pay its annuities to the USA any more. The 1925 agreement provided definite preferential terms of payment before the end of 1930. During that period Estonia managed to repay USD 1,000,000. The interest for that period was funded on November 18, 1931. By that time the debt had grown to USD 16,466,012.82. When the preferential period expired, Estonia, like other European countries, applied for a moratorium on war debts. As early as in October 1930, serious doubts were voiced by the State Assembly that Estonia could repay the necessary sum on June 15, 1931 owing to its fiscal difficulties. In August 1930, A. Piip suggested that the Minister of Finance should apply for an extension of two years for preferential payment since the clauses of the contract allowed for that kind of interpretation. On November 3, 1930, Viktor Mutt, the Estonian consul in New York, informed the Estonian government that the

USA Ministry of Finance did not consider the preferential payment of interest acceptable. It was emphasized in the September 1930 report of the consulate on the USA economic situation that there was a great demand for the bonds in the USA and that their prices had risen. Therefore, Estonia could not make use of USA bonds in repaying the war debts.

On July 5, 1931, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia received through Riga President H. C. Hoover's June 20 message on prolonging the time of payment of intergovernmental reparation and assistance debts by one year (July 1, 1931 - July 1, 1932). In connection with Hoover's moratorium, the British Foreign Office annouced the British government's decision to declare a one-year moratorium on the debts of Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Estonia and Latvia. Thus, the payment of over 3.5 million kroons was suspended for a year.

In the spring of 1932, negotiations about the unpaid sums during the period of Hoover's moratorium were conducted between the governments of the USA and England and the European debtor-states. Estonia made a proposal to the USA government that the unpaid sum be equally divided to all the remaining years at an annual rate of interest of 3.5 per cent. The proposal was rejected and, under the terms of the special agreement between Estonia and the USA on June 11, 1932, Estonia was to repay its debt during 10 years beginning with July 1, 1933 at an annual rate of interest of 4 per cent. A sum of USD 600,373.06 was not paid during Hoover's moratorium.

On September 2, 1932, the government of the Republic of Estonia applied for prolonging the time of the payment of the debt by two years as well as the payment of interest. In December 1932, USA Secretary of the Treasury Mills announced that a two-year extension of the debt payment could be granted to Estonia, Latvia, Poland and other countries, but President F. D. Roosevelt did not give his consent to that and the time of payment was not prolonged. It was promised that the debt settlement problems would be discussed separately with all those countries.

On December 10, 1932, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Estonia sent a note to the USA government on prolonging the payment time of the original debt (USD 110,000). On December 13 the government decided not to pay the interest amounting to USD 245,370 to the USA on December 15. Estonia followed the example of France who had stopped repaying its debt. Latvia sent an analogous note. The USA gave a negative answer to both of the notes. Latvia, however, decided to pay the sum due on December 15 and here is what the newspaper "Päevaleht" ("Daily") wrote about it: "/.../ the government should be free to decide whether it is more disadvantageous to lose the above-given sum than to resist the political and economic pressure from the USA". The Ministry of Economics motivated the prolonging of the time of payment with a sharp decline in Estonia's foreign trade turnover caused by a decrease in international trade resulting from the great depression of the 1930s.

On December 15, 1932, Foreign Minister A. Rei delivered another note to H. Carlson, USA charge d'affaires in Estonia, but received no reply.

England, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania paid their sums due in time, while France, Belgium, Poland, Hungary and Estonia did not. By January 1, 1933, Estonia's debt to the USA had grown to USD 17,203,743.06, the sum constituting nearly half of the total foreign debt of Estonia. Nevertheless, according to the calculations by Estonia economists, the actual value had dropped from USD 13,831,441 to USD 6,601,706 owing to a fall in market prices.

On March 17, 1933, the Estonian Foreign Minister A. Piip informed the USA *charge d'affaires* that Estonia was not able to pay the sum due in the summer 1933 since Estonia's economic situation had not improved during the depression. In June, the USA responded to that statement with a note to France, Yugoslavia and Estonia pointing out that the above-given states had not paid their sums due on June 15.

On November 29, 1933, Estonian consul K. Kuusik delivered the Estonian Foreign Minister's November 16 note to the USA Secretary of State stating that owing to its economic and financial difficulties Estonia would again not be able to pay the necessary sum.

Estonia did not repay its debt to the USA. During the period studied in the present paper a total sum of only USD 1,001,441.88 was transferred and that included USD 1,441.88 paid when the agreement was concluded. By April 1, 1934, Estonia's debt to the USA had grown to USD 17,787,280. The other debtor-states (with the exception of Finland) did not pay their debts to the USA either. A total of 2.7 thousand million dollars had been repaid to the USA by the year 1933, i. e. the time when repayment actually stopped.

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Estonian Seamen in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s

Toivo Jullinen

Although relatively little light has been shed on the relations of Estonia and Estonians with Asian and African countries, it does not mean that those relations did not exist. The present article attempts to fill this gap.

We have chosen this theme because the number of Estonians in the Belgian Congo in the 1920s was the third biggest in Asian and African countries - Estonians were more numerous only in China (*ca* 200-300) and in Turkey (*ca* 150-200 in the 1920s, later 50-60).

The migration of Estonians to the Belgian Congo should be viewed against the background of the general economic and political situation in the Republic of Estonia which brought about rather extensive emigration. The emigration took place in waves, a considerable increase began in 1924 and the peak - 2,676 people - was reached in 1925. From 1930, the number of emigrants began to decline. Although information about the countries of emigration was collected at that time, it often turned out to be unreliable. It was quite common that when submitting his application for travelling abroad, the person himself did not know in which country he would stay and, therefore, did not indicate any country or wrote "to all the countries". Moreover, the number of passports issued and the number of emigrants do not always coincide because in some cases one passport was issued for several people.

Seamen were quite numerous among the emigrants because their chances on the labour market in Estonia were rather poor. A sharp rise in maritime trade after World War I did not last long and, as early as in 1921, a number of cargo ships were without work and, at times, even 90 per cent of the Estonian merchant marine did not go to sea. Estonian seamen were out of work in the later years as well. Thus, for example, in the year 1926/1927, the private corporation "Meremeeste Kodu" (Seamen's Home) registered 510 seamen seeking work. The majority of unemployed seamen, however, did not place their hopes on the corporation but tried individually to make an agreement with captains in the harbour. When the great depression began in 1929, the number of unemployed seamen grew even more. In the summer of 1931, 2,370 seamen were in the employ of the Estonian merchant marine, a year later their number was only 1,345, while the number of seamen in Estonia totalled 6,500-7,000 in the early 1930s. In the later years, unemployment among seamen decreased to some extent.

Since seamen were not able to find work in Estonia, they started to look elsewhere. Moreover, wages on Estonian ships were two to three times lower than those on English, German or USA ships. Seamen's wages in the Scandinavian countries were higher as well. Estonian seamen often went to the big ports of the Netherlands - Rotterdam, Antwerp, Gent and Oostende. That growing tendency was not ignored and it was pointed out by the State Assembly on October 27, 1927 that in the Netherlands "people board ships and then disappear without leaving a trace". Several of them went to the Belgian Congo.

Estonians migrated to the Belgian Congo mainly in the early 1920s and the peak years were 1924 and 1925, while, in later years, only a few Estonians went there.

According to the immigration regulations in force in the 1920s, it was possible to immigrate into the Belgian Congo only via Belgium and it was comparatively easy to move there in those years. The migration laws of the Belgian Congo were based on the ordinance of March 8, 1922. In order to get an entry permit to the country one had to conclude a labour contract in Belgium with an employer of repute in the Congo for a term of at least six months and then the employer applied for an entry for the employee at the Belgian Colonial Ministry. Proficiency in the French language was also required. The travelling expenses were paid by the employer. There were lots of foreign seamen in Belgium before the 1929-1933 economic depression because local seamen failed to man all the Belgian ships. Estonian seamen were fairly numerous in the Belgian ports, particularly in Antwerp, the largest port of the country. According to the information reaching Estonia at the end of 1926, over 200 seamen seeking work were permanently staying in Antwerp. Only a few of them succeeded in getting a job. Some of them even had to stay overnight in piles of boards or to beg food from ships in the harbour. Nevertheless, Damasius Treude, Estonian vice-consul in Antwerp, regarded the port of Antwerp as a major labour exchange for seamen in Western Europe. Special bureaus in Belgium were hiring seamen to work in the Congo and it is most likely that they rendered assistance to Estonian seamen as well.

The working and living conditions in the Belgian Congo, mainly from the point of view of emigration, were described in the Estonian press. The newspapers "Päevaleht" (Daily) and "Vaba Maa" (Free Land) carried articles based on the letters of seamen working in the Belgian Congo, giving a very promising picture of life there. Emigration was considered better than being unemployed in one's native country.

In 1926, Ch. Aertssens, honorary consul of the Republic of Estonia in Antwerp, sent the Foreign Ministry a report on the conditions and prospects in the Belgian Congo and his article "The Belgian Congo - a Land of the Future" published in the newspaper "Päevaleht" (April 25, 1926) dealt with the same issues. Ch. Aertssens wrote that lots of Estonians worked, mainly as captains and ship's engineers, on river boats in the Congo. He thought that more Estonians could find work in the Congo as captains, ship's engineers or even as doctors and described the good living conditions and favourable wage conditions there. The article aroused interest and its author received numerous letters from Tallinn, Pärnu, Viljandi and other places in which people asked for more detailed information.

The newspaper "Päevaleht" responded to Cr. Aertssens' writing with "Life in the Belgian Congo and its advantages. What kind of a "future country"?" based on the impressions of a seaman who considered life and the climatic conditions in the Congo unbearable for Europeans. The author concluded that "the Congo is not a promised land for Estonians since nobody is ready to sacrifice his life for money".

It is most likely that Estonians displayed lively interest in the Congo because the Belgian consulate in Tallinn published an announcement in the newspaper "Vaba Maa" on September 11, 1927 that its responsibilities did not include organizing emigration to Belgian colonies. In addition, people were warned against illusions and informed that, on hiring workers, preference was given to Belgians, that proficiency in the French language was required and that only applicants under 35 years of age were eligible. In the late 1920s, the first Estonians working in the Belgian Congo were home on holiday. Actual experience had changed their views and a number of newspaper articles refer to poor living conditions in the Congo as well as to difficulties encountered by emigrants there. People were warned against concluding labour contracts with unknown employers or under the terms that did not stipulate the employer's contractual obligations. In those years, it took up to one year to get work in the Congo.

Most of the Estonian seamen working in the Congo were ship's engineers (A. Akatus, A. Elb, A. Kesk, R. Beilberg, J. Snamensky, J. Tauben, L. Oltov, N. Tutti, E. Vakkermann and J. Suurmann) whose chance of finding work in Estonia had considerably decreased in the early 1920s. Besides them, captains K. Luks, A. Orpus and V. Filimonov and M. Viitorg, a ship's carpenter, and G. Laubach, a locksmith-motor mechanic, found work in the Congo as well.

Most of the Estonians in the Congo had got acquainted already during their studies at a school of ship's engineers, some of them had served in the army together.

The number of Europeans in the Congo in the 1920s was relatively small, though a continuous growth tendency could be observed and, in 1931, there were as many as 25,000 Europeans there. Of the total number of Europeans, Belgians accounted for 50-60 per cent. The number of Estonians is comparable with that of Danes, Norwegians and Finns (in 1926, 28, 29 and 11 respectively). The maximum number of Estonians staying in the Congo at the same time was around a dozen, while the total number was about 30. Nevertheless, the local press mentioned Estonians among other nationalities working in the Belgian Congo.

The fact that so many foreign ship's engineers had to be hired to work in the Belgian Congo could be explained by the peculiarities of the transportation system of the country. The development of river transport was comparatively cheap because the abundance of water and the basin of the Congo River is the second largest in the world after the Amazon. According to the information provided by the colonial authorities, 12,000 km of the total length of the 23,000 km of the Congo basin was navigable. Steamboats, often towing barges, were mainly used on the rivers flowing through the jungle. First steamboats were used on inland waters in the Congo as early as in the 1890s. There was a great lack of local seamen in the Belgian merchant marine, but the shortage was particularly acute in colonies. Since wages were too low, colonial companies could not hire experienced seamen from other ships, but only those who were out of work. Therefore, Estonians were hired among others, though only if they had a proper diploma. The language requirement was not very strictly observed either and the German language was also considered acceptable. In order to get used to local conditions, seamen had to work as locksmiths (with an engineers salary) for 6 months before they could begin their work on ships.

As Estonian seamen were held in high esteem in the Congo, they worked in the regions where bigger ships of over 500 tons displacement could be used. Captain V. Filimonov even set a local record when he sailed his ship on the Ubang River for 17 days running. Despite positive attitude and decent wages (up to 500 kroons a month), working in the Belgian Congo was considered hard. A European, who had spent several years in the Congo, described a boatman's life there as a real hell consisting of "slow sailing, estuaries full of dangerous shoals, yellow fever, streams, the tides, slimy depths". There were neither leading lights nor buoys, the maps were inaccurate. As a result of the unhealthy climate, people from northern lands suffered from a number of diseases, including malaria. A daily dosage of 16 grams of quinine taken against malaria impaired hearing and eyesight. Yellow fever, sleeping sickness, dysentery and leprosy occurred as well.

R. Beilberg, N. Tutti and Sikk had to terminate their contracts before the term was completed because of unbearable working conditions. Captain K. Luks had a minor labour dispute and he was transferred to another job in the same company.

V. Filimonov had a more serious labour dispute. In 1926, while spending his holiday in Europe, he had concluded a new labour contract. Having spent all his sa-

vings on buying equipment, V. Filimonov returned to the Congo in December. He set to work on January 10, 1927, but eleven days later the managing director of the company informed him of the rescission of his contract. V. Filimonov took legal proceedings against the company in the local court of law. V. Filimonov's well-grounded argumentation in court made the company agree to a compromise. Filimonov, in the hope of getting compensation for the damage suffered, rejected the proposal and appealed to a higher court in Brussels. In August 1927, Filimonov arrived at Antwerp and contacted a number of government offices during a month. In September he was received by Ambassador K. R. Pusta in the Estonian consulate in Brussels. Leon Moreau, Estonian honorary consul general in Brussels, and C. Aertssens, honorary consul in Antwerp, also participated. Filimonov informed Pusta of the course of events and learnt that L. Moreau had found a job for him on a state-owned ship at Bome. The discontinuance of the lawsuit was set as the precondition for the job. On the following day Pusta discussed Filimonov's case with Emile Vandervelde, Belgian Foreign Minister, and the latter, in his turn, informed the Colonial Ministry of the issue. On the same day, L. Moreau and a lawyer went to the Colonial Ministry as well. V. Filimonov returned to the Congo in February 1928. His case was to be considered by the Brussels court. The long-time exhausting work in the Congo and the nerve-racking litigation had ruined Filimonov's health and he died in Coquilhattville in June 1928. His wife continued the case in court and finally won.

Estonians in the Belgian Congo did not have their own organization. There had been attempts to establish an Estonian society, but the colonial authorities had refused to register it. Nevertheless, Estonians kept in touch with one another. There were few possibilities to spend their scarce spare time or, as they themselves put it, "For Europeans life in the Congo is dull and monotonous /.../ Otherwise cheerful people, they become "homesick and sad" here /.../ The only places of entertainment are the restaurant and the hotel". We know that H. Kadak and J. Suurmann occasionally went fishing on the Congo River and hunting in tropical forests. Estonians also took an interest in local life and culture and found that the Africans lived under severe colonial oppression, had to be content with lower wages and poorer working conditions than the Europeans working there and were not allowed to live in the same districts with the latter.

There were only weak ties with Estonia and, in most cases, on the initiative of seamen working abroad. A. Akatus, H. Kadak and J. Tauben sent news items to Estonian newspapers and Estonian newspapers reached the Congo as well. Filimonov also gave some information. A. Akatus, R. Beilberg, J. Tauben and N. Tutti spent their holidays in Estonia at the beginning of 1928. In the summer of 1928, H. Kadak and J. Suurmann, who were spending their holidays in Europe, came to Estonia to participate in the IX Song Festival and in the day of Estonians living abroad organized by the Fenno-Ugria society. The fact that Estonian official circles knew so little about our seamen in the Congo can be explained by the competition among seamen, which was particularly stiff in the late 1920s, as well as by weak contacts in general with those seamen who were "far from Estonia due to circumstances". Captains V. Filimonov, K. Luks, A. Orpus and J. Snamensky were not members of the Estonian Masters' Society and only a few ship's engineers working in the Congo belonged to the Union of Estonian Merchant Marine Engineers. Although A. Akatus, J. Tauben and J. Suurmann had paid their membership fees to "Meremeeste Kodu" ("The Seamen's Home") regularly in the years 1925-1927, the Register of Estonian citizens employed on foreign ships, compiled by the union in 1927-1928, did not include their names.

The 1929-1933 world economic depression was accompanied by a number of new arrangements. The Belgian authorities started to limit the presence of foreigners in the country. The Estonian Seamen's Home was closed. When hiring seamen, preference was given to Belgians. All those restrictions were imposed in Belgian colonies in Africa as well and the corresponding amendments to the immigration regulations were made. The colonial authorities did not allow the hiring of extra workers any more. The committee on colonies of the Belgian Parliament discussed the issue in May 1930 and decided to send a special delegation to the Congo. The colony of Estonian seamen in the Congo became less numerous as their labour contracts were not renewed and most of them returned to Estonia. Captain A. Orpus managed to find a job in Belgium. Several Estonians went to South Africa and Sikk, a ship's engineer, settled in Australia. Captain K. Luks quit his job and bought 100 hectares of land at Lake Tanganyika and cultivated tobacco, maize and coffee on his plantation there.

The Estonian merchant marine was affected by the economic depression as well and lots of ships were out of work and the shipping charges fell. Nevertheless, the number of ships of the Estonian merchant marine increased because cheap steamships were bought from Europe. After the depression, however, the maritime trade became lively again as raw materials were stored because of the imminent danger of war. There was a temporary shortage of ship's engineers in the Estonian merchant marine and the Estonian seamen who returned from the Belgian Congo could find work. Some of them, however, quit their jobs. But most of the former "Congolese" adapted themselves to the new circumstances rather quickly.

In conclusion we would like to point out that the Belgian Congo has a peculiar role in the emigration of Estonians in search of work where a number of qualified specialists (ship's engineers with diplomas) concentrated in one region. That was possible due to the differences in sea and river transport systems in Estonia and in the Congo. Nevertheless, the Congo could not become a popular country of emigration mainly due to its unfavourable climatic conditions and the Belgian immigration policy. Estonian seamen had to work there only because of unemployment in Europe.

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Estonia and Japan: A Glimpse of the Past and Prospects for the Future

Olaf-Mihkel Klaassen

Estonian-Japanese contacts date back to the 19th century. The Russian sloop "Nadezhda", whose captain Adam Johann von Krusenstern[1] came from a place near Tallinn, called at the port of Nagasaki from October 1804 to April 1805. There were other men from Estonia on board the sloop as well. Krusenstern's diary, nearly 200 copies of which were subscribed for in Estonia and Livonia[2], was the first publication to acquaint the Estonian reader with Japan on the basis of the seaman's personal experience in that exotic country. Over half a century later, Jüri Jürisson from Western Estonia, serving as an officer on the Russian warship "Askold", had an opportunity to get a glimpse of Japan. His travel articles were published by the newspaper "Eesti Postimees" (Estonian Courier) in the years 1867-1869[3] and gave Estonians firsthand information about Japanese life and customs.

Estonian seamen visited Japanese ports in the later years as well, but only a few of them published their rare travel impressions. Roman von Rosen from Tallinn, who was the Russian consul in Yokohama and the secretary of the embassy and the envoy in Tokyo, stayed in Japan for a longer period of time – with intervals between 1872-1904. Emil Karl Gustav Albert Mattiesen from Tartu was a German language lecturer at Kyoto University in the years 1899-1906. Over 8, 000 Estonians were drafted into the Russian army and fought in the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905). A great number of later army commanders, doctors and diplomats of the Republic of Estonia familiarized themselves with the Japanese art of warfare.[4]

At the time when Estonia was incorporated into the Russian Empire the chances of Estonians to visit Japan were almost non-existent. Estonians were regarded as "inferior" and did not enjoy full and equal rights of citizens. Estonians lived under political as well as economic oppression, their chances to travel were scarce. The Baltic Germans, who had been ruling Estonia for almost 700 years, were in a privileged situation. Numerous well-known Russian navigators, army commanders and politicians came from among the Baltic Germans. The Estonian national awakening in the 2nd half of the 19th century brought along a keen interest in far-away countries, Japan among them. During his studies in Leipzig, the linguist Karl August Hermann got interested in the Japanese language and later (1895) expressed an idea that Estonians and Japanese were linguistically distant kindred people.[5] The writer Eduard Bornhöhe published a long article about Japanese history in the same year.[6] In 1904, Jaan Karu, a translator and publicist, wrote a book entitled "About the Japanese people".[7]

In 1918, the Estonians succeeded in restoring their independence that they had had in ancient times. That enabled relations with Japan to be established on a new basis of mutually beneficial contacts between two sovereign states. It is true that geographically the countries were far away from each other, their size was different and their priorities did not coincide in most cases. Nevertheless, contacts developed at political, commercial and cultural levels. Already the first meetings of Ants Piip[8], an Estonian representative in London, with Kumataro Honda, a counsellor of the Japanese Embassy, on May 28 and 31, 1918 were very promising. Having accepted from A. Piip a memorandum on the situation in Estonia and a plea for recognizing the independence of Estonia, K. Honda expressed his confidence that the Japanese government would receive Estonia's plea favourably.[9]

In that period it was of vital importance for Estonia to gain international recognition of its independence. It would have been a warning both to the bolsheviks in power in Russia and to the Russian white guards who were attempting to preserve the Russian Empire. Recognition enabled Estonia to maintain normal relations with other states, to get assistance and support from them in safeguarding its independence. Moreover, the Estonian people derived strong moral support from it.

Nevertheless, Japan delayed recognizing Estonia. It was only on March 6, 1919 that the Japanese government recognized the Estonian National Assembly as a *de facto* independent body.[10] Two years later, on March 8, 1921, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii informed the head of the state Kostantin Päts of Japan's *de iure* recognition of Estonia as well.[11] By that time Estonia had already been recognized *de iure* by 10 states, among them all the Great Powers of Europe.

The *de facto* recognition of Estonia in the spring of 1919 was associated with the circumstance that the Japanese government was planning to open its military-

diplomatic legation in Estonia. This plan was carried out in the summer of 1919 when Captain Michitaro Komatsubara and Masamoto Kitada from the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm arrived in Estonia. By order of Commander-in-Chief Johan Laidoner they gained access to all the information they were interested in as well as to the front-line area.[12] The Japanese legation resided in Estonia until the end of November 1922.

Having received *de facto* recognition, Estonia started to consider opening its legation in Tokyo. In the autumn of 1919, the Finnish *charge d'affaires* Gustaf Yrjo Ramstedt, who had just been nominated to the post, agreed also to represent Estonia's interests in Japan. He received his credentials from the Estonian government and during a period of over 10 years he did quite a lot for the benefit of the Estonian state as well as Estonians living in Japan (10-15).[13]

Parallel to establishing diplomatic contacts, trade between Estonia and Japan began as well. The official statistics do not provide detailed data for the period before 1926. Nevertheless, there is some information that Estonia purchased rice from Japan in 1919 and exported paper goods to Japan by 1923.[14] Both Estonia's purchasing power and Japan's need to buy Estonian goods determined the development of trade relations in the later years.

Estonian trade with Japan in the years 1924-1939 (beginning with 1926 for Estonian exports) According to the State Statistical Central Bureau.[15]

	Tons	Thousand kroons
Imports into Estonia from Japan	453	974.8
Percentage from the total imports from Asia (%)	0.47	2.70
Exports from Estonia to Japan	1270	169.7
Percentage from the total exports to Asia (%)	2.75	1.59

Japan bought from Estonia mainly cellulose, paper and scrap iron. Estonia imported from Japan celluloid, foodstuffs, spices, chemicals, agar-agar and several other goods. Trade between Japan and Estonia reached a peak in the second half of the 1930s, partly owing to the trade agreement concluded in 1934.

The possibility of expanding trade with Japan was one of the reasons why the question of opening diplomatic legations, neglected in the meanwhile, arose again in the 1930s. Increasing international tension also accelerated the process since firsthand information became more valuable.

Estonia was a poor country and could not afford maintaining a permanent diplomatic legation in Tokyo. Therefore, an honorary consul had to be found. According to Estonia's consular policy[16], preference was given to local respectable businessmen of Estonian nationality whose economic interests were in harmony with the interests of the Republic of Estonia. There was no information about such people in Japan, but a suitable man lived in a small town of Dairen in Southern Manchuria that was in possession of Japan at that time. He was Alfred Ruthe, a businessman in export and import trade, who came from Järva County in Estonia. After the Japanese government had given its consent, Alfred Ruthe became the Estonian honorary consul in Dairen on September 1, 1934.[17] His consular district was not specified in the decree of his appointment, but it is evident from other archival sources that the Japanese islands were included in it. In his practical work, however, he confined himself to Southern Manchuria. The Estonian Foreign Ministry agreed to that, evidently on diplomatic considerations. In view of the international developments of the 2nd half of the 19th century, it was preferred to be modest.

The Japanese government, however, had no need to take a modest course, Japan left the League of Nations after the latter had disapproved of its policy in Manchuria and of the founding of the state of Manzhouguo, and strove to develop bilateral relations with European countries. The Baltic countries, particularly Estonia, acquired strategic importance for Japanese politicians. Political developments in Estonia as well as its foreign policy were closely observed in Japan. By the spring of 1934, a scheme had been devised to open a Japanese diplomatic and counsular legation in Riga for all the three Baltic states. Then the search for the future honorary consul began. Voldemar Puhk, a wholesale dealer, proved to be a suitable person for the post of the honorary consul in Tallinn. Emperor Hirohito presented the consul's patent in the 2595 year of the accession to the throne of his legendary predecessor Jimmu (i.e., the official beginning of the Japanese imperial dynasty) on the 6th day of the 9th month of the 10th year of the Showa era (i.e., on September 6, 1935).[18] In the mid-1930s (1934-1937), 431 Japanese citizens[19] visited Estonia and quite a large number of them needed the consul's help and advice. The existence of the consulate opened up bright prospects for the development of Estonian-Japanese relations in a number of fields. The honorary consulate terminated its activities after V. Puhk's unexpected death on May 3, 1937. A couple of weeks later (May 20), Shin Sakuma, Japanese Ambassador to Riga who was also accredited to Tallinn, presented his credentials to President K. Päts. In the summer of 1939, Shojiro Ohtaka was appointed instead of him.[20]

The opening of the Japanese diplomatic bureau in Tallinn on December 8, 1939 marked a qualitatively new stage in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Estonia. Shigeru Shimada, head of the bureau, collected valuable information during the eight-month existence of the bureau.[21]

Between the two world wars, Estonian-Japanese cultural contacts were rare and were limited only to materials published in the press. Relations became more lively in 1935 when the Tartu Academic Oriental Society was set up: contacts with Japanese intellectuals were established and the latter donated books to the Society, Pent Nurmekund, a young polyglot, read a paper on Japanese scripts.[22]

World War II was crucial for Estonia as well as for Japan. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (1939), Estonia was occupied and then annexed to the Soviet Union. The independent Republic of Estonia ceased to exist for half a century and its people fell victim to genocide. Japan was defeated in war, had to capitulate and, for a short period of time (1945-1952), was occupied by the victorious states. Part of the Japanese territory – the South Kurile Islands whose belonging to Japan had already been confirmed by J. von Krusenstern - are still under foreign rule.

The policy of the Soviet Union put an end to the Estonian-Japanese relations, but the interest of the Estonians in Japan survived. Some Estonians were fortunate to visit Japan as tourists. In 1957, Assistant Professor Pent Nurmekund began to teach the Japanese language at Tartu University and taught it until he was forced to leave his post of the head of the Oriental Studies Cabinet in 1983. Young enthusiasts, whom he had taught, started to translate books of Japanese literature into Estonian and to study Japanese culture. A course of lectures on Japanese history was in the curriculum of history students. Professor Jaan Konks published a short survey of Japan in the Middle Ages.[23] Contacts were established with those few Japanese whom the authorities allowed to visit Estonia.

The restoration of Estonia's independence on August 20, 1991 opened up new prospects for the Estonian-Japanese relations as well. As early as on August 26, Misoji Sakamoto, Chief Cabinet Secretary, made a statement supporting Estonia's independence. On September 6, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama declared that his government was determined to recognize the independence of the Republic of Estonia. In his letter to Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri T.Nakayama declared that "the Government and people of Japan sincerely hope for the prosperity of the Republic of Estonia and ardently desire to promote friendship and goodwill between the two countries".[24] In the summer of 1992, the Japanese Ambassador to Helsinki Kurokochi was also accredited to Tallinn. On January 1, 1993, the Japanese Embassy's office headed by temporary *charge d'affaires* Terafusa Ariga was opened in Tallinn.[25]

Estonia could get much benefit from Japan's economic potential and its political influence in the world if our government can make proper and efficient use of every opportunity. Japan is ready to render assistance to Estonia, but not to waste its money. Estonian politicians would profit much from studying the open secrets of Japan's economic miracle and, first of all, how the Japanese used foreign aid in post-war years to meet the needs of their country.

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Estonian Embassy and Ambassadors in Riga

Eero Medijainen

"There is no Estonia without Latvia and Latvia without Estonia". These words are attributed to Arturs Alberings (1876-1934) — former chairman of Latvian-Estonian Society, a well-known Latvian politician. However, he was not original. One of the most famous Estonian diplomats Karl Robert Pusta expressed the same thought in a much more prosaic way — "The solidarity of Estonia and Latvia is best proved by the fact that if one's stomach is aching, the other feels sick as well".

Strangely enough such a close relationship has been attached very little importance. At the present time much less is known of Estonia's political and military ally between the two world wars than of our overseas neighbours — the Finns and the Swedes. One usually has a vague idea that Latvians were more "red" than Estonians.

There are usually two answers to the question why the Baltic states were unable to preserve their independence in 1939-40 in special literature on the mutual relations of the Baltic states. One opinion suggests that the Great Powers who extended their spheres of influence and territories at the cost of small states were guilty of what happened. They tried to acquire more useful positions "selling" the Baltic countries. Therefore the latter were not able to control their destinies and were forced to subordinate to the dictatorship of the Soviet Union in 1939.[1]

According to the other variant the Baltic states themselves were responsible for the fatal events as they did not organize enough co-operation, unite and make up resistance. This point of view usually sets Finland as an example and generally blames Estonia for balking at the developing military co-operation between the Baltic states.[2] The present article is based on the latter opinion. But taking it as a starting point we do not find an answer to the question whether the diplomats of the Baltic states really were so ignorant or they did not care about the fate of their country. Did they not realize the threatening danger and could they not avoid the mistakes they made? Maybe they represented more than just the views and opinions of men leading the foreign policy of their countries. The Estonian embassy in Riga and the ambassadors residing there probably reflect the Estonians' attitude to their southern neighbours in general. But was it their mistake? And if it was, then whose mistake?

The Beginning

From the very first days the Estonian embassy in Riga caused headaches for diplomats and politicians. Even its date of birth is disputable.

The military attachés sent to Lithuania and Poland soon became heads of the embassies. It is no wonder, taking into account that the Estonian War of Independence was still going on. On March 13, 1919 the military representative in Latvia Julius Jürgenson was sent on a mission to Liepaja. A few days later Estonian consul entered service in the same town. In May 1919 J. Jürgenson already opened the consulate in Riga under the title Consulate of the Republic of Estonia and officer of the general staff.

However, he did not have commission of a consul, the title was necessary to avoid his arresting by the Germans. Unfortunately this did not help. The Landeswehr men did not care of any titles - from June 6 — July 4, 1919 the attaché and consul was kept captive by the Germans. From July 14, 1919 one more consul — Theodor Tallmeister — was active in Riga. He himself used such title although he was considered the Estonian ambassador in Latvia according to the government's decision. By the end of 1919 Tallmeister used the title "representative of Estonia".[3]

The mutual relations of the two representatives were evidently not very warm. In a number of letters to Estonian authorities Tallmeister mentioned that Julius Jürgenson was under suspicion for collaborating with the bolsheviks; that he accepted bribes from Jews for visas, was a boaster, a drunkard and ignored the ambassador. Th. Tallmeister was most upset by the fact that he as the representative of the state and government had to go on foot to official receptions or to take a cab while captain Jürgenson drove "with Estonian flag on his automobile". Soon T. Tallmeister returned to his former job as a clergyman. J. Jürgenson made attempts to make business after his demobilization, but was not very successful. In 1926 he wanted to study at a police school, but was soon expelled for "improper behaviour". He died on October 19, 1927 in Riga at the age of 35. So the beginning was not very inspirating.

The then Estonian foreign minister A. Piip had quite positive contacts with Latvia. The treaty of military union concluded in 1921 was not ratified, but during the negotiations he got acquainted with a smart and intelligent lady called Benita Uipus. She had worked under both Julius Jürgenson and Theodor Tallmeister. In March 1920 the new consul in Riga Karl Mägi complained that Benita Uipus had left for London at A. Piip's call. Mägi asked for a man for that post as there was always some risk with young female colleagues. B. Uipus became A. Piip's wife.

A Purchase

In September 1920 an inner scandal broke out in the Estonian embassy the consequences of which made themselves felt until the end of the republic and are a problem even today. Consul K. Mägi was not at all satisfied with his position. The staff of the embassy was diminishing but the amount of work grew. Besides he probably was not very highly appreciated in Tallinn.

In addition to this a serious conflict broke out with the acting deputy consul Herbert Grünfeldt. The problems were so serious that the latter even challenged him.

The quarrel started from the deputy consul's complaint against K. Mägi for currency speculations. According to him K. Mägi had sent 1 million czar roubles that he got from Tallinn to Berlin in a courier's parcel in order to exchange them into marks. The marks were brought back to Riga and exchanged into Latvian currency. This had given a great agiotage and enabled K. Mägi to buy the future house of the Estonian embassy in his name. This was not, in fact, anything extraordinary. In London, Berlin and Helsinki one acted in the same way. Everywhere the accounts were later settled. But K. Mägi took offence and dismissed the deputy consul. The duel was not still held yet.

Court of Arbitration

Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Hellat and K. R. Pusta who were at a conference in Buldur at that time stated that the consul and deputy consul had behaved like "the pot calls the kettle black". Still, H. Grünfelt was probably a bit dirtier. He also sinned in currency matters, but besides confessed that he "lived a light-minded life for 2 weeks due to an acquaintance with a lady... "Such a life of course brought about huge debts and a need to borrow money or to obtain it some other way.

Besides it became evident that namely the Estonian deputy consul had made noise in the street during the Buldur conference coming home at about 3 o'clock. He even could not find his way home from the villa of Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Z.A. Meierovics. Besides he had sat in the diplomats' box at the theatre with another lady. H. Grünfeldt was explained that this was only suitable with his own wife. The deputy consul, however, denied the accusation that he often went to restaurants with Jews — "only one of my close ladies has oriental looks". However, he had to find another job. Even seven years later Pusta remembered him in a negative context. Then — already under the name Herbert Haljaspõld[4] — he was active in Antverp at the head of the local "Home of Estonian Sailors". Pusta considered him to be an alcoholic and a weak-willed person. Pusta admitted that Haljaspõld was a talented writer, but of uneven temper and without a sense of moral responsibility.[5]

But K. Mägi was not quite guiltless either. In the course of investigations in 1921 a number of testimonies were given about his currency speculations. However, the investigation could not prove these accusations.

Trouble with the Embassy House

The future house of the embassy was bought in order to sell it soon profitably and to acquire a more suitable one. The problem was that the house seemed too big. When A. Hellat arrived in Riga as an ambassador in 1921, he counted all the rooms of the house and got - 167! He concluded that it was not appropriate for an embassy "to have to do with a great number of tenants". The ambassador even found a new suitable house, but was then sent on to Poland and Hungary, and the deal was left unfinished.

The tenants and their troubles were a constant problem for Estonian ambassadors. In the 1930s the unpaid rent of Vidrik Ivask — an Estonian-Latvian public figure — became a serious problem. V. Ivask was chairman of the Estonian Club in Riga and treasurer of Rotary Club and Latvian-Estonian Society. To cover his rent debts he also used the money of these organizations. The affair was to end with forced sale of V. Ivask's household furniture in November 1939. But the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not want a scandal, stopped the auction and cancelled at least a half of the debt.

Almost all the following ambassadors tried to get a new house and get rid of the tenants. Hans Rebane, the ambassador in 1937-40, was especially successful. He had already managed to find a new embassy house in Helsinki and did not doubt that he could do the same in Riga. First of all he found a new ground in the corner of Antonias and Pumpur streets that belonged to the YMCA of USA. But this caused a misunderstanding with Latvian authorities. The latter argued that a kindergarten was planned to be built on the same site. H. Rebane got upset — "take that ground, you have the privilege, but then a scandal will follow". The Latvians did not want this and Estonia got the permission to build a new embassy. Unfortunately the building was never started as the year 1940 came. . .

Battles for the Ambassador's Title

In 1920 Karl Mägi was offended that Tallinn did not name him a diplomatic representative like Tallmeister but confined with consul's title. He even wrote a resignation, but still put up with the situation and remained a consul in Riga until 1924. In September 1920 the Estonian government decided to send a new ambassador to Riga. On March 22, 1921 Aleksander Hellat handed over the credentials of a minister plenipotentiary and en-

voy extraordinary. This was the time when the Baltic states finally recognized each other de jure and thereby established official relations. Now the former title "representative" was given up and generally recognized titles were introduced.

Latvian representative Janis Seskis who arrived in Tallinn was only titled minister-resident in his credentials. K. R. Pusta who precisely adhered to such questions made an inquiry to Herman Hellat, assistant of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He demanded an explanation how Estonia could accept such injustice and insult.

H. Hellat did not take the matter so seriously, he turned to his brother in a joking manner — "to avoid the breaking up of war again, Prof. Piip is asking you to sound about whether it would be possible to promote Seskis to minister plenipotentiary. Otherwise he should resign from his office. J. Seskis still remained in Tallinn until 1929. A. Helllat moved on southwards already in the summer of 1921. He became chief consul and later ambassador in Warsaw, as well as in Hungary and Rumania. This also meant that the embassy in Riga receded into the background.

Seljamaa's time

Julius Seljamaa was ambassador in Riga for 5 years from January 1922. He had had contacts with Latvians already earlier, for instance while studying at the Valga Teachers' Seminar (1899-1902). He started his diplomatic career as Estonia's representative in Russia in February 1918. He was a member of Estonia's first foreign mission.

The heyday of Estonian-Latvian relations coincides with the period when J. Seljamaa worked as the ambassador. Border disputes were finally settled and in 1923 even military union was concluded. The role of modest J. Seljamaa in this is indisputable. It is also questionable whether he could in some way have avoided the cooling down of the relations in 1926-28. Favourable offers by the Soviet Union brought about Latvian-Soviet commercial contract (1927) and made the idea of Estonian-Latvian customs union senseless. This in its turn caused mutual accusations and insults.

At the end of 1927 one relied on A. Hellat who became foreign minister for some time, but in fact resided in Helsinki as the ambassador. Even Estonian ambassador in Berlin Karl Menning was worried about Estonian-Latvian relations. He wrote to A. Hellat: "It is clear to me that despite a number of unpleasnt things from the Latvian side this mustn't spoil the relations between our nations. Here must cold-bloodedness, patience and faith play the main role, not insulted feelings, how very grounded they may be. Probably J. Seljamaa was also responsible for the situation as he did not go deeply into the Latvian problems, as in the years 1923-26 he was also the Estonian ambassador in Kaunas. He himself argued that Latvia was more guilty. He was convinced that "Ulmanis uses every possible occasion to disoblige Estonia".

The beginning of 1928 brought changes. In March he already asked the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to give agreement to a new man — Eduard Virgo. The change did not improve J. Seljamaa's situation. On the contrary - he got out of the frying pan into the fire. In other words, he became the ambassador in Moscow.

Eduard Virgo's Problems

The new ambassador in Riga considered himself to be the founder of Estonian diplomacy as namely he had composed the crredentials to the members of the Estonian Foreign Mission on December 16, 1917, and used the word "diplomats" for the first time. At first he had to become the representative in Finland.[6] As the civil war broke out there he went to Scandinavia and then to Italy. In 1920 it was intended to send him to the USA. He himself hoped to stay in London. Finally E. Virgo remained in Stockholm, but felt there rather uncomfortably. Despite several attempts he was not given an ambassador's title. He worked as a secretary but had to carry out the duties and expenses of an ambassador. This gave grounds to a case between E. Virgo and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Virgo thought that as he substituted the ambassador he had the right to get his salary as well. Such ignorant demand irritated the Commission of Foreign Affairs - the "king" of Estonian foreign relations as it was called in the 1920s.

Finally, on May 1, 1928 Virgo got his own way. He was made ambassador, but into unfriendly environment. Already in September 1928 he was convinced that "Latvia is offended and envious". This had foundation as Estonia did not respond to the visit of Latvian navy in 1925 but paid a visit to the king of Sweden instead. E. Virgo warned State Head J. Tõnisson that there was "rather reserved and suspicious" air in Riga towards Estonia. Virgo tried to improve the relations by inviting the Estonian navy to the anniversary of the Republic of Latvia and organizing Latvian-Estonian Friendship Society, but the success was only temporary.

He himself was not content with his position. During the 1929 summer holidays Virgo got in touch with the Finnish ambassador Aarne Vuorimaa. He sounded whether A. Hellat who had problems with Finnish social democrats felt himself firm in Helsinki. A. Vuorimaa of course saw him through at once. In his report to Helsinki he mentioned: "By the way, Virgo feels very uncomfortably in Riga and seems to lie in wait for Helsinki now".[7]

New Troubles

But this was only the beginning of Virgo's misery. After the visit of State Head O. Strandman to Poland (beginning of 1930) Latvia's self-respect was decisively insulted. Rumors about E. Virgo's departure grew bigger. He was attacked both in Riga and in Tallinn. It was judged in Tallinn that Virgo should be made the chief consul to the USA. The ambassador did not agree, otherwise he was ready to leave foreign service. He did not go along with Moscow either although understood the wish of the then Foreign Minister J. Lattik to come to Latvia himself. Only " any other embassy in Europe" suited Virgo.

His colleague in Stockholm days Oskar Öpik (Mamers) writes in his memoirs about Virgo in a superior manner and disdainfully. He hints that Virgo was unfit for diplomatic work.[8] He was not familiar with diplomatic protocol. In an interview to the "Segodnja" newspaper in Riga Virgo had confused the notions "self-made-man" and "desperado', passing himself for the latter, i. e. a reckless person or even a bandit. This was just one of the stories that were told about Virgo. Or, as he himself affirmed, "this is dirty provincial gossip which isn't at all a rare phenomenon in Riga".

The ambassador got tired of all this soon. In May 1930 he came to the conclusion that he could not stand the situation any longer as "the ambassador's work here demands a lot of representation during a season that lasts almost 8 months. My health has suffered from being constantly awake, eating and drinking at night. I have been so weak lately that I have often suffered from sleeplessness and even applied to a doctor for longer periods. Therefore I would prefer a more peaceful place as for representative tasks".

Scandal with Summer Holidays

A small holiday trip in the summer of 1930 brought about a new scandal. As a former sailor Virgo was very fond of yachting. Once he sailed to a beach in Curonia with the director of LETA (Latvian Information Agency) and two ladies where they stayed overnight. The yacht seemed too narrow and a common bed was made on the beach.

Later rumors got about that Virgo who took offence as one of the ladies rejected his overtures, he had left the Latvians to the coast and sailed away. Virgo proved that it had to do with slander again, but journalists spread the story in Estonia, too.

In addition to this he was accused of having insulted a group of actors from the "Estonia" theatre at the republic's anniversary in 1931. After a performance in Riga the actors wanted to have a good time at the embassy, but Virgo sent them away at 2 o'clock at night, saying: "Damn it, I want to sleep".

The accusation that the ambassador cared too much for Miss Estonia who was visiting Riga and was therefore late for a reception, comes from the same time. Besides, some journalists got the impression that Virgo came drunk to a gathering of the Latvian-Estonian Society. The ambassador denied this categorically and claimed that the speech in Latvian that he tried to read out, had caused the lapses. He later never agreed to make a speech in Latvian.

J. Tõnisson's Strange Support

In 1931 E. Virgo probably remained in his place only thanks to the support of Foreign Minister Jaan Tõnisson. There was something in their mutual relations that joined these two men. This "something" might have gone back to the days of tha Foreign Mission or the time when Virgo worked as the embassy's secretary in Stockholm. Karl Menning in Berlin was convinced that "The chef" (J. Tõnisson) often defends jackstraws, even harmful men".

He wrote to Tallinn: " Not much reaches my ears, but even this is enough to get a picture how bad Virgo's reputation is not only at the ministry but even wider, so that it is already openly discussed how to displace him. But the chef has tied himself to him so that Virgo's decline would threaten the chef as well. . . I thought Virgo had learned something from his past, that he knew his borders. Unfortunately it seems to be upside down".[9]

Looking for a Successor

In the meantime Virgo tried to offer his post to Fr. Akel who had gone to Stockholm after him, hoping for an exchange. He even exalted his role — " As you know the embassy in Riga is among the most important ones for us, and it isn't all the same who will come here as my successor".

E. Virgo was of the opinion that in Riga the ambassador need not waste time to minor problems like in Stockholm where correspondence was big and the staff small. "In Riga the ambassador has to deal with the most important political and economic questions only and to keep good personal contacts with local circles of influence" , he asserted to F. Akel in April 1931. However, there was one precondition that E. Virgo considered necessary in Riga — the ambassador had to be "free of servilism to Latvians".

Finally, taking advance of friendly relations with J. Tõnisson, he became director of the department of foreign trade at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It had also been discussed to send him to Yugoslavia as a general consul and in July 1932 even Beograd's agreement was asked for this purpose. At the ministry he could satisfy his wanderlust that also caused reproaches on business trips. E. Virgo died in 1938 at his place of work.

Interregnum

After Virgo's departure a period of about 1. 5 years followed when Estonia did not have an ambassador in Riga at all. It was confirmed later that the post was left vacant because of retrenchment as economic crisis was threatening.

In fact, the situation was more complicated. At first 1st secretary Jaan Mölder had to fulfil tha ambassador's duties. J. Mölder who had studied engineering in Russia at the beginning of the 20th century reached to the counsellor's title at the Moscow embassy in 1922 and was acting general consul in Petrograd in 1924. From 1926 J. Mölder became secretary of the Riga embassy. According to one variant he had to become the new ambassador as well. J. Tõnisson who was known to be abstainer was against his candidacy. He argued that "because of some personal characteristics (the problem of temperance) Mölder was more suitable as a counsellor."

F. Akel who was very obstinate, Karl Kornel and Jaan Lattik, pastor and member of the parliament who understood Latvian, were also under consideration. At the turn of the years 1919-20 K. Kornel had caused a small scandal in Riga. Then an attempt was made to

name him ambassador, but at the presentation of the credentials a dispute arose between him and the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, his career only lasted for a few hours on New Year's Eve.

On June 3, 1932 the government decided to ask for agreement to J. Lattik. But then an unexpected obstacle became evident at the meeting of the Foreign Commission on June 8, 1932. Both social democrats and representatives of the right-wing Farmers'Party were against J. Lattik's candidacy. To escape their attack, J. Tõnisson used white lie that asking for the agreement had not reached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the government.

Actually the Foreign Commission had been ignored and the agreement came. However, J. Lattik did not go to Riga as his main support — J. Teemant's cabinet and foreign minister J. Tõnisson resigned. The post remained vacant. The question of J. Lattik was once again discussed in the Foreign Commission in February 1933. It din't show mercy to him then either. General J. Soots (right-winger) expressed the opinion that J. Lattik did not know anything of military or economic questions that were especially important in Riga. M. Martna (left-winger) added that Lattik lacked knowledge in diplomacy and that in his age learning new things might be difficult. In June 1933 foreign minister A. Piip raised the issue once again, but without results.

J. Mölder felt himself quite firmly in Riga. He even made a proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send a counsellor to Riga, although he himself was formally only the 1st secretary who substituted the ambassador. He suggested: "Besides the ambassador there should be another person at the embassy who could, relying on his experience, take contact with Latvian economic circles and other diplomatic representations". He, of course, hoped that he himself would be made the ambassador if such a man came to Riga.

A Phonecall

Finally Julius Seljamaa who had become assistant of the foreign minister took care of the problem. He made a call to his colleague in Riga Wilhelm Munters. Seljamaa informed him that the Estonin government wanted to send J. Lattik to be ambassador and asked, whether the Latvians were still ready to accept him or should the Estonians ask for agreement the second time. Munters answered: "We haven't had such an occasion that an agreement has been unused for about a year, But, having consulted with respective persons, including Mr. President, I can announce to you that we don't want to cause any complications to Estonia and if you would ask the question whether a new agreement was necessary, we would answer no".

J. Seljamaa did not understand such a keen answer at first and asked for W. Munters' personal opinion. But he only repeated his statement and put the phone off. As a good expert of international law and diplomatic practice Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Piip asserted that this was actually negative evading. J. Lattik himself also agreed with this, and said: "I won't go to Riga after such an agreement". He also supposed that so his long-time wish would come true. Namely during his visit to Warsaw with Strandman he had been told that he was welcome in Poland as an ambassador. However, finally he had to content himself with a compromise — soon he became the ambassador in Kaunas.

Final Struggle for the Ambassador's Title

Now ambassadors F. Akel in Stockholm and K. Menning in Berlin fell under pressure. On October 17, 1933 Akel wrote to J. Seljamaa that he understood the situation - " The present Head of the State (J. Tõnisson's government 18. 05. — 21. 10. 1933) doesn't agree to remove Menning from Berlin". Akel needed a more profitable job to nourish his family of 7 members and would have preferred Berlin instead of Riga, but was ready to agree. He understood that the appointment of ambassadors did not so much depend on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but on parties.

But the K. Päts became Head of the State, whose enmity against K. Menning was generally known. Then happened what K. Menning had been afraid of for many years already. On October 29, 1933 J. Seljamaa warned him that the question would be solved before the 15th anniversary of the Republic of Latvia. K. Menning complained that he coul not speak Latvian and that he lacked acquaintances in Riga, but at the same time realized - "The post in Riga will probably save me". J. Seljamaa presented a longer explanation why the decision could not be postponed. First, the place had been vacant for a too long time and the Latvians "have reminded this to us for a number of times". Secondly, when J. Seljamaa became the Foreign Minister, he had promised to fill in the ambassador's post in Riga quickly. Thirdly, it had to be taken into account that there was a new regime in Germany, but Menning had contacts with the circles mainly oppositional to Hitler. So, a birthday present was made to Latvia — on November 18, 1933 K. Menning was named the Estonian ambassador in Riga. He himself arrived there only in January 1934. Still, upon his arrival in Riga Menning had told his subjects: "I have done my work, now you, younger people, can continue".

J. Mölder felt insulted after such a solution. He was made a counsellor at Berlin for some months, then brought back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1936 he decided to remind the skills he had learned in his youth and became director of the "Dvigatel" factory.

On E. Virgo's initiative a certain "memorial badge of foreign service" was founded for the 11th anniversary of the ministry in 1936. This was for official use only and had three ranks: silver badge for those leaving the foreign service, bronze badge for those who were transferred to embassies from the ministry, and iron badge for persons who had worked for over 15 years. Finally only silver and bronze badges were taken into use, whereas the latter could be of 2 different tones. The silver badge was presented only once — to J. Mölder on November 11, 1936.

Time and K. Päts are Merciless

K. Menning reconciled himself to Riga and tried to live a quiet life until resignation. J. Laidoner's speeches and especially O. Loorits's activities among Livonians irritated the Latvians. A fatal moment for K. Menning arrived in August 1937. His former rival, now Minister of Foreign Affairs F. Akel wrote to the ambassador: "This is not pleasant for me, but in the interests of the mission I am obliged to inform you of the following: after several discussions with the Head of the State (K. Päts) it was decided that our embassy in Riga urgently needs a younger, i. e. a more energetic leader. As for its importance the Riga embassy stands in the forefront and under the present circumstances needs great initiative and efforts your delicate health wouldn't allow."[10] From October 1, 1937 K. Menning formally worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tallinn and was assigned the salary of Assistant Minister, but in fact he was allowed to stay in Tartu at once. His final resignation was registered in May 1939 — " in connection with his 65 years of age".

Additional Remarks on H. Rebane

The new ambassador was 8 years younger than K. Menning. But this was hardly of any real significance. The Riga embassy evidently was a "life buoy" for him as well. For several reasons H. Rebane was forced to leave Helsinki. At first it was planned that he would stay at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but then he found an influential patron. F. Akel confessed to the Finnish ambassador that he himself would not have sent Rebane to Riga if the decision had been his.

According to the same source he was not very eagerly welcomed in Riga either. The agreement was delayed for 16 years. Differently from the present day this was considered to be a too long time. Latvian ambassador in Estonia commented: "We have a reason to hurry this time". In his memoirs H. Rebane does not speak much of his Riga period, although he spent almost 3 years there. He only eagerly criticized his follower wine-loving Aleksander Renning.

Considering the Estonian ambassadors who worked at the post in Riga, it is no wonder that Estonian-Latvian relationship was characterized as an alliance without allies. Riga seemed to be just a step towards a future career. However, in some cases it occurred the beginning of decline. There were few persons at the embassy who sincerely wished to intensify the relations between the two states and were also ready to learn the language. Still, such persons could not change much the general disdainful attitude of the Estonians to their southern neighbours. There were no such men at the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs either.

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[4] "Grünfeld" is "Haljaspõld" in Estonian. In 1930s there was a campaign in Estonia to Estonianize family names. It was almost compulsory for civil servants.

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On Mass Repressions in Estonia after World War II

Aigi Rahi

1. The studying of 1949 deportations in Estonia

Before the 2nd half of the 1980s Soviet mass repressions were a closely guarded state secret. Writing about it was inconceivable, scientific research on this topic would probably have been qualified as anti-Soviet activity. However, since people still remembered the deportations and several victims who had survived still lived among us, the truth could not be completely suppressed either. So, deportations were mentioned in party history studies as an episode in post-war "class-struggle", and wereregarded as justification for breaking down the in resistance of the kulaks to collective farms.

The history of deportations in Estonia is first of all associated with two large-scale deportations. The first of them took place in June 1941. Since this event has been studied thoroughly, we shall not deal with it in the present study. Another mass deportation took place in March 1949 and is one of the culminations of postwar mass repressions.

Under the circumstances of Gorbatchev's "glasnost", the year 1987 witnessed a breakthrough in treating the deportations. Then Heino Kiik's novel "Maria in Siberia" was published in Estonian literary journal "Looming" ("Creation").[1] The novel described the life of a deported Estonian woman in Siberia in mild colours and without bitter words. In November 1987 (still under the conditions of Soviet censorship!) the first historical studies were published. The first of them was Evald Laasi's article "Filling in Some Gaps" published in the cultural and literary weekly "Sirp ja Vasar" ("Sickle and Hammer").[2] On December 15, 1987 the article "Mistakes or Crimes" by Herbert Lindmäe,[3] Docent of Tartu University, followed, which showed that deportations were crimes even according to Soviet legislation of those times. A heated discussion followed which in many respects was influenced by the spirit of those days and emotions, but it also brought about the studying of archive materials available and the presentation of several major results of research.[4]

There was much discussion about the number of the deported. This ranged from 20,702 (data presented by the KGB) to *ca* 60,000 presented in Western publications.[5]

Another major problems were finding out the persons who were guilty of the deportations and estimating the personal guilt of local communists.

All this happened at the time when it was very difficult gain access to the archives of the Estonian Communist Party (ECP), the access to sources was selective and using the archives of the KGB was inconceivable. The research was partly based on second- and third- rate information. At the same time a professional and mostly critical use was made of personal memories.

2. Sources

Today the passionate discussions on studying the history of mass repressions have weakened and it is not an acute topic in mass media either. The first results have been made public. Besides, several memoirs have been published and respective Western literature has become more available. Scientists can use the materials kept in the archives of the ECP, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. It is probably more correct to say that the preserved part of the archives is usable as, under Soviet occupation, these archives suffered from several "cleanings". A great deal of most important sources are in Russia.

2.1. Archaival materials

The primary source material consists of the personal records of the repressed persons and preliminary lists based on those records kept in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. That contains several hundred lists in Russian, and, for example, people from the district of Tartu were included in dozens of different lists. The amount of these sources is increasing. Recently the materials of this part of the KGB archives that remained in Estonia were added.

The materials of the archives of the ECP indicate that the preparatory work and carrying out of deportations was kept strictly secret and no written evidence could remain. The documents of party institutions could not contain any hints about their role in the deportations. Still, there remained traces, and they are quite numerous. Extensive correspondence reflects the mechanism of drawing up the lists of kulaks. There is also some data on the deletion of some names from the lists. Bureau decisions and discussions of personal matters also contain some information. At the beginning of April 1949 many people were punished for not being active enough in the deportation. "When it was necessary to gather communists together to accomplish a special task (my underlining — A.R.), no-one turned up. Communist Vält-

sev got drunk and actually hindered the fulfilment of an important political task."[6]

Those archival records that were not abstracted by chance only are especially valuable. Lembit Raid has found the notes in a mixture of Estonian and Russian that belonged to the then first secretary Nikolai Karotamm dating from the last days of 1948 and the beginning of 1949. It probably has to do with abstracts of a paper read to the "inner circle" where he presented a detailed plan of carrying out the deportations. [7]

Archives of courts and prosecutor's offices. The process of rehabilitation of the victims of mass repressions started already during the so-called Khrushtshev's thaw. Rehabilitation was within the competency of the Supreme Court of the ESSR. The Prosecutor's Office of the ESSR had to deal with more complicated cases. In the course of this process extensive data were collected on the rehabilitated persons (incl. personal records or extracts from personal records drawn up in judicial institutions and prisons).

The archives of the Registry Office of the Republic of Estonia are is a state archive without a reading room for researchers. Here the documents of population registration of this century (there are some earlier materials as well) and very well systematized documents of personal status (births, marriages, deaths) since 1926 are kept.

It is an invaluable source material for correcting the mistakes in the data on repressions and for identifications. The archives also provide reliable information on the victims of mass repressions. This is the data on the so-called special deaths which have not been subjected to scientific analysis yet (see below).

Archival documents of parish and district administration since 1944 are kept in town and district archives. Intermediate-level administration in districts (later regions) consisted of the Executive Committees of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. The EC of SWD were the local institutions of self-government in towns, small towns and parishes (later villages). The archival sources of financial departments of district ECs are more interesting as they contain documents connected with taxation and registration of population.

When working with these documents one should take a source critical approach because a part of the accounts has been written at random, without using any original data (comparison of the population accounts for two consecutive years reveals that 6-9 year-old children were born etc.).

There are fewer materials directly connected with repressions. Materials of repatriation commissions (a part of the repatriated also occur in the lists of the repressed) are of interest. It should be possible to use the household books of 1948 in future research. They are actually taxation documents where all the people who belonged to the household, the size of land, number of cattle and other data are fixed.

2.2 Museum materials

To some extent materials reflecting mass repressions can be found in museums. Here we would only mention the so-called Karotamm's list of 1948 which is preserved at the Museum of Literature in Tartu. In the course of Soviet reorganizations it was tried to destroy every possible continuity with the "bourgeois period", the former administrative-territorial division was disarranged and adapted to the models of "elder brother-republics". It is a difficult task to identify places. At the end of 1948, right before the deportation, a precise administrative-territorial description of Estonia at that moment was made on N. Karotamm's demand. These lists are of great help when lists of the victims of repressions are compiled and places of residence are identified.

2.3 Oral data

Already in the late 1980s the Estonian Heritage Society and the Society of the repressed "Memento" started to collect memories of the victims of repressions. The study of the 1941 deportations that had the list of victims published by V.Salo as its basis, was especially fruitful.[8] For our research we have sent an extensive questionnaire to people deported from Tartu and the district of Tartu. We have received 192 answers to 547 questionnaires. But the results of this work will be subject to an independent treatment. Oral data help to fill in the gaps in written documents, to correct the mistakes and to estimate the degree of reliability of the documents.

As can be seen the description above, the data reflecting mass repressions are incomplete and scattered in many different depositories. Due to this it is absolutely necessary to compose a special data base.

3. Data Base of Special Deaths

Mass arrests started immediately after Estonia was again occupied by the Red Army. Altogether *ca* 10,000 men were arrested and sent to hard-labour camps at the end of 1944 and in 1945. More than a half of them died in the first or second year at camps. But the arrests continued in the following years as well. A new wave came in 1950-1951. About 25,000 people were sent to hard-labour camps in 1944-1953. About 11,000 of them, mostly men in the prime of life, died of overwork and unendurable living conditions.

There existed a so-called double registration system in Soviet population statistics. Physicians knew that there were certain diseases that were not allowed to be diagnosed at all, or in case of which a maximum number of diagnoses was prescribed (this could not be higher than in developed Western countries). Suicides, people killed in fire and other casualties that, according to the authorities, might have endangered the reputation of the Soviet power were subject to secrecy. As for the victims of mass repressions the double registration functioned as well. According to statistics all the arrested persons who were sent to concentration camps in Siberia still continued to live in Estonia. Official data do not reflect any large-scale resettlement to the East. In order balance the data a system of extradition existed as well — if a person died or was killed at the concentration camp, a secret certificate was sent to the registry office of his former residence and the death certificate was drawn up there.

The program dBase III has been applied for entering the data. In the course of entering the material was arranged in order and a number of specifications were made. At the present moment the data base contains information about 9,861 persons, incl. *ca* 150 doubles that have to be unified. There are *ca* 350 women in the list. The following indicators are entered into the computer:

number, time and place of drawing up the act; family name, first name and father's name of the dead person; date and place of his birth; place of arrest; time, cause and place of death (see Fig. 1). The data are not complete - there are relatively more gaps in dates of birth and places of arrest. Some of the data available are more detailed than other — in some cases the parish, in other cases only the district is known. The same applies to the place of arrest. Only 29 per cent of death certificates present data about prison camps and the degree of accurary varies. Often only the oblast where the prison camp was located, is mentioned. There is no information about the causes of death in 15 per cent of the cases studied.

There are very many mistakes in the spelling of names — the documents of Soviet repressive institutions were written in Russian and the Russian alphabet is not adequate to transcribe Estonian names. There also much inaccuracy in age data.

Fortunately it is possible to check and correct a major part of the data. Before publication the orthography of names, the places and dates of birth must be checked with the general files of the archives of the Registry Office. Last year we had to stop doing this work as the archives of the Registry Office were overloaded with work.[9]

3.1 Representativeness of the data base

The data base is not complete. The information on special deaths was not forwarded regularly to registry offices, but rather as campaigns. Until 1989 death certificates of only such persons were registered into whose death an inquest had been held. In a number of cases it was done years later. The following table presents the data the death certificates of persons who died on the registration dates of in Soviet prison camps in 1942.

The dynamics of the number of death certificates is an original and quite illustrative barometer of political climate. The first acts were drawn up in 1947-49. In 1949-55 very few acts were registered. The reason for that is clear — the families of the arrested persons were automatically included in the lists of the 1949 deportation and were too sent to Siberia; those who escaped by chance were frightened contact repressive institutions of to occupation authorities on their own initiative. After Stalin's death and simultaneously with the first signs of "thaw" the number of new acts increased. Even more certificates were applied for in 1957 after many people were released from prison camps and the deported returned. In 1967-88 very few death certificates were issued. The mass registration of special death acts started only in 1989 (all the 781 acts marked in the table) when the respective permission had been given by Moscow. State security institutions revised their archives and sent the data on persons who perished at prison camps to registry offices that have been issuing certificates of special deaths to this day.

Occasional checking has shown that the data base enables to fill in numerous gaps in the history of Soviet mass repressions. For example, in Voldemar Pinn's book on red terror in the district of Läänemaa we can read about the political police assistant August Naglas who disappeared in August 1940.[10] The data base gives quite clear evidence of Naglas' disappearance — he died in the prison camp of Sosva on September 28, 1941.

Table 1

Death certificates of persons who died in Soviet prison camps in 1942

Years	Death certificates
1945-49	81
1950-54	20
1955-59	207
1960-64	140
1965-69	55
1970-74	16
1975-79	8
1980-84	6
1985-89	781

Another missing person, instructor of the Defence League of Läänemaa, counter-espionage officer Ferdinand Laurmaa died of heart paralysis on January 6, 1941. The cause of death seems suspicious and may stand for shooting.

3.2 Reliability of data base

In a number of cases there are many different entries in archival records about persons who perished in prison camps. For example, two acts have been drawn up for Eduard Metstak. The act issued in 1947 in Haapsalu gives heart disease as the cause of death, but the act of 1989 indicates of shooting. Karl Erdman died on October 10, 1942. According to the first act he died of heart paralysis, the other act indicates shooting. There are two different acts for Admiral Pitka's[11] youngest son Stanley. The act of 1962 points out that he died of typhus. According to the act of 1989 he was shot on September 1, 1942. On the same day Oliver-Eduard Pitka was shot as well. All the three brothers were killed in Solikamsk. These repeated entries are grounds for source criticism (we simply do not have better original data at this moment). It has become evident that the information about causes of death is the least reliable. This contains numerous deliberate falsifications as well as mistakes caused by carelessness or lack of qualification. In his opinion several "heart troubles" were unofficial synonyms of shooting. The examples presented ought to prove this opinion. A great part of acts registered in 1989 present data about people who had been included in the files already earlier. In general the acts of 1989-90 should be more precise and earlier falsifications have been removed.

3.3 Causes of death

The death rate of Estonians in Soviet prison camps was the highest from November 1941 to September 1942. Another great wave of mortality occurred from December 1946 to March 1948. The statistics of death causes indicates that tbc was the most dangerous disease and the cause of 22 per cent of deaths. Thirty-two per cent died of lung diseases, 20 per cent of heart diseases. The years 1946-48 were most exhausting. Most of the deaths caused by undernourishment were in 1948. The largest

number of suicides were committed in 1949. The cases of decrepitude mainly occur in 1947. It is clear that the statistics of death causes can be used as a very approximate background material. The list of different death causes is long. But even if there were no deliberate falsifications, it is not probable that the qualification of medical staff at prison camps and means of diagnostics available could have always provided the exact diagnosis. It certainly would be interesting to hear doctors' opinion of such lists.

On the basis of the material used the greatest number of Estonians, *ca* 20 per cent, perished in the camp of Sosva. This was the death camp where most of the shootings took place. That's why this place is called the Katyn of Estonians. Many Estonians perished in Solikamsk (13 per cent), in Lesnoy near Sosva (8.5 per cent), Irkutsk, Taishet etc. Often only the oblast where the prison camp was situated, is mentioned. The greatest number of Estonians perished in the prison camps of the oblast of Sverdlovsk. Some of them may actually belong to the long list of the victims of the Sosva camp.

The data about persons who were shot is not complete. In many cases this cause of death has been hidden behind other causes. The data on about shootings are available from February 1941 to September 1954. In April 1942 prisoners were shot on a mass scale: on April 10, 13, 20, 21. The bloodiest day for prisoners from Estonia was April 24. The shootings continued in May. Most of them took place in Sosva and the oblast of Sverdlovsk. In 1942, 68 per cent of the total number of Estonian prisoners who were killed, were shot.

The special deaths in 1957, 1959 and 1960 in case of which shooting or death from gun wounds are indicated as causes, need additional checking. It is probable that these persons were not repressed ones.

"Gun wounds" as a cause of death usually stands in case of "forest brothers" or civil persons who were killed in the armed conflicts. For example, on July 6, 1945 four women — Ida-Helene, Merlanda and Valve Koitla and Miina Vender died of gun wounds in the parish of Undla. They were victims of a raid organized to capture "forest brothers" in the village of Udriku-Männiku, parish of Undla, district of Viru. A total of 14 people were killed. The act about the four women mentioned above was registered in Rakvere in 1990. The two women and four men who died of gun wounds on October 27, 1949 were victims of a raid in Veriora, district of Võru.[12] On this day two women and four men died of gun wounds. The person who died of gun wounds on April 24, 1942 in the camp of Sosva is probably a victim of shooting.

4. Data base of the mass deportation of 1949

4.1 Existent data

On the basis of the data mentioned we have created a special computer data base. We used programme dBase III. All the inserted data are statistically comparable and can be subject to complex analysis. It is convenient to use the data base — it is possible to make requests according to any characteristic. Creating the data base was not a merely mechanical work. Initial data about the deported persons are in Russian and contain a lot of inaccurate information. The database contains the following data about every person included in the list of deportations:

1. Category of record. In the official documents of soviet authorities the deported were divided into "kulaks" (K) and "nationalists" (N). There was also a third category of records — R. These are the records of persons rehabilitated before 1988.

2. Number of record. One record was drawn up for all members of one family. So it is possible to restore families according to the number of the record. The same number goes for the person's record in the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

3.-5. Family name, first name and patronymic. Estonians do not use father's name, this is a Russian custom. But as it was indicated in the lists, it was practical to include it in the data base as well as it helps to identify persons and family connections.

6. Sex. **7.** Date of birth. **8.** Residence at the moment of deportation. **9.** Document of deportation. This characteristic gives the exact reference which institution has made the decision of deportation. **10.** Date of decision. **11.** Date of deportation.**12.** Note about escaping from the deportation. **13.** Destination of deportation. **14.** Note about death. **15.** Date of release from Siberia.**16.** Specifications about changes in Siberia (transferring, arrest etc). **17.** Additional remarks.

4.2 Preliminary results

4.2..1 Decision makers

The analysis of the data base allows to draw several conclusions. We shall start with the document of deportation (9). The plan of the deportations was drawn up according to the rich experience of the Soviet Union. H.Ligi argued that the decree of the All-Union Communist (bolshevik) Party of 30.01.1939 served as a direct example. The proposals of local functionaries to confine themselves to compulsory resettlement within Estonia met Moscow's disapproval. On January 29, 1949 the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted a decision to carry out the great deportation.

The data base available presents an incomplete picture of the organizers of the deportations as the role of the Communist Party is not reflected here at all. However, some documents that have been found in the archives of the ECP clearly show the leading role of the ECP in organizing the repressions and an intention to take minimal responsibility.

The first secretary of the Central Committee of the ECP N.Karotamm wrote: "This deportation must be prepared carefully and it must be carried out before the spring sowing of 1949. It is very important to carry out this action simultaneously in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSR"

The abstracts of his paper meant for a small circle of activists, that L.Raid found from the archives of the ECP is a vivid document: "No statements in newspapers or radio. No decisions, no documents. No phone calls. Reports on reactions must be made in absolute secrecy through special channels./.../ There must not be any unnecessary people at meetings in parishes... People must be sent to the operation immediately from the

room. The certificate of deportation must not be given to the deported persons. It must be read out to the kulak or members of the bandit's family without taking any signature. The representative of the Soviet institution must read out the certificate."[13] Two institutions dealt with the practical drawing up of the lists of deportations:

1. The so-called Soviet apparatus (local executive committees) compiled the lists of kulaks. According to the materials of the archives of the ECP, the lists were already compiled in the autumn of 1948. The "list of kulak households" of the Tartu district was confirmed on October 21.[14] Comparing this list with the list of deportations, several differences can be observed. Many people were added later, but several were also excluded from the list of kulaks. All district lists were sent to Tallinn and on March 14, 1949 the then chairman of the Council of Ministers Arnold Veimer signed the documents. In records they were denoted by "K" ("kulak"),

2. Another list was drawn up by institutions of state security. Family members of the arrested persons were included in the list. The first lists were probably made in early February 1949. But the main part of the lists was drawn up between February 27 and March 14. People were added to the lists until March 27, i.e. until the 3rd day of the deportation. The decisions made by local security institutions are reflected only in the records of these people who escaped from the deportation. Records of persons who were deported according to the lists and "official" decisions were made already after the deportation by "special counsils". This was probably done in Moscow and not at the destinations of deportations, because the dates of the decisions coincide with the initial lists but not with the places of exile in Siberia. Most of the decisions were officially registered later, in July and October 1949. The last decision was made on Christmas Eve 1952, more than three and a half years after the actual deportation. *Ca*29,000 people were included in the lists of deportations.

4.2.2 Kulaks and nationalists (category 1)

The lists of nationalists predominate (*ca*60 per cent), especially in Saaremaa and Hiiumaa (75-80 per cent). In the district of Viljandi it was the other way round — over 60 per cent of the deported were kulaks. In the districts of Võru and Valga the number of kulaks was a little above 50 per cent.

4.2.3. Regional differences of deportations (categories 8,12)

The southern part of the district of Pärnu suffered most. Four parishes of this region are among the first ten parishes that suffered most in the course of repressions. The parish of Tali suffered the greatest losses — 18.9 per cent of the population was included in the lists; 14.5 per cent was deported (in 1941 some Soviet activists were killed in the parish). More than 6 per cent of the inhabitants were deported from the parishes of Saarde, Tõstamaa, Laiksaare and Tihemetsa (See map, p. 80).

The percentage of persons escaped who succeeded in escaping was the highest in the districts of Võru (35 per cent of those included in the lists), Viljandi (31.8 per cent) and Läänemaa (30 per cent). The number of those who escaped was the smallest in Hiiumaa (6 per cent), the district of Valga (18 per cent) and Saaremaa (19 per cent). There were also such parishes where the percentage of the deported was below 1 per cent. Among them were the islands of Muhu and Kihnu.

4.2.4. Time of deportation (category 11)

The thorny path of thousands of Estonians to Siberia (or, like it is called in Estonia, to the "cold country") started on the eve of March 25th 1949 when 75 per cent of those who were to be deported were arrested. On March 26-28th a much smaller number of people were caught. Some peasants who escaped came out of their hiding places themselves — cattle had to be fed. The last people were caught even on March 29. Why namely that period was chosen? Deportation was a manysided action. On the one hand, it was an act aimed at striking terror into the hearts of people in order to strengthen the "new order". Besides, the deportations had an economic aspect. As the victims themselves supposed, this was something similar to slave trade. They say that already in the autumn of 1948 the authorities collected information at places in Siberia about how many additional workers were needed for spring fieldwork, and also promised to bring the necessary number of people on time. On the other hand, it had been planned to carry out compulsory collectivization before spring sowing and it was clear that no-one would protest against it after deportations. The experience of Soviet repressive institutions might also have played a role. The experience of mass repressions among other nations (Kalmyks, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars etc) had shown that in cool seasons epidemics did not spread so well. It was sensible to take care of the workforce.

Another factor might have been important at fixing the exact date. It was common practice to dedicate "labour achievements" to great anniversaries (party congresses, birthdays of leaders of the state). On March 25, 1949 the leader of Soviet mass repressions Lavrenti Beria celebrated his 50th birthday. The mass act of terror might have been planned as a jubilee present for him. Altogether 20,722 people — 4320 men (21 per cent), 10,232 women (49 per cent) and 6170 children of up to 16 years of age were put into wagons.[15]

However, the people who were deported in March 1949 were not the last among those included in the lists of deportations. Farmers who were convicted of not paying extremely high agricultural taxes and who had spent years in prison, were sent to Siberia to follow their families until 1956. In the district of Tartu the number of such men was 128, the last of them was deported on August 16, 1956.

At the same time some people voluntarily shared the destiny of their relatives. Even until 1952 several people who had escaped from deportations (or who were not included in the lists) followed their families to Siberia.

4.2.5 Location in Siberia

The data base contains information on the dislocation of the deported persons in Siberia. This data must be examined critically. Special trains went to the oblasts of Omsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and the territory of Krasnoyarsk. Minor groups were sent to the oblast of Kemerovo, Karaganda, Tomsk and Magadan, the territory of Habarovsk, Autonomous Republics of Komi and Yaku-

Fig. 1

Theoretical Position of Estonians Who Perished in Soviet Prisons and Hard-labour Camps until 1949 in the Population Pyramid of 1949



tia. On the basis of oral information we know that the place of banishment marked in the list often only signifies the place where the certificate of release was registered. People from the district of Tartu were mostly deported to the oblasts of Omsk and Novosibirsk. 738 people were deported to Tserlak, 733 to Zdvinsk, and 542 to Kormilovka. There were also more people from the district of Tartu in Vengerovo, Kuibyshev and Severnoye. Many people were dispersed to different places. However, people of one community were usually together. For example, the deported from the parish of Alatskivi were together in Zdvinsk, from Kambja — in Kormilovka, the people of Kavastu — in Tserlak. Most people who came from Tartu were taken to Tsherlak as well.

4.2.6 Death (category 14)

More than one-tenth of the deported died within 7-8 years of banishment. According to mortality statistics the hardest years were 1949, 1950, 1951. Later people already managed to get used to the new circumstances. More people died in April and September.

4.2.7. Gender and age structure of the deported

The data base enables to follow the gender and age structure (6,7) of the deported and the composition of families (2). Besides the families of 2-4 members that predominated, there were quite a lot of big families as well. For example, 11 members of one family were included in the records K-2370. It still had to do with the families of two brothers who lived in different parishes, but were registered in the same records as they were related to the same "enemy of the people". The following population pyramid (Fig. 2) shows the gender and age structure of people deported from the district of Tartu. The picture gives clear evidence that this act of terror was first of all directed against women, children and elderly people. Twenty-nine per cent of the deported were children. The children who were born in 1942 suffered most. The percentage of men of working age was less than 12. The oldest deported person was 91-year-old Georgi Toots from the parish of Jõgeva.

The question may arise why men were not deported. If we return to the data base of special deaths we get a simple answer — men had been arrested already earlier. By 1949 many of them had already died in prisons and hard-labour camps (see Fig 1). To a large extent the families of namely these men were deported. Connecting the data of persons sent to prison camps and those deported, we can follow the fate of the whole family. This is illustrated by the following examples.

Four members of the Sooväli family from the parish of Nõo were included in the list of the 1949 deportation. They were considered to be guilty as two of their brothers — Aleksander and Jaan — were in prison camps in Russia. The brothers died in 1952 and 1955. Two members of the family escaped, but the oldest member Ella Rosalie (b.1889) was released from the region of Kormilovka only in 1956.

On April 13, 1942 Karl Roots from the parish of Peipsiääre was shot in a prison camp in the oblast of Sverdlovsk. Although he was not alive any more in 1949, his family of 6 members was deported to the region of Kuibyshev. In 1952 two of them — Anna (b.1880) and Kaarel (b.1869) died.

The Krain family from Tallinn was deported to the region of Shira. Father Aleksander died in July 1949. His son Lembit died in prison camp as well (cause of death — heart paralysis). His wife and two daughters still managed to return. The fate of Jakob Niholm's family from the village of Pedaspea, parish of Kolga, was

Fig. 2

Gender and Age Structure of People Deported to Siberia from the District of Tartu in March 1949



similar. J.Niholm died in prison camp in June 1945, his wife, daughter and three sons were deported in March 1949 as family members of an arrested "enemy of the people".

5. Conclusion

The studying of mass repressions is a difficult task and at present it is in its initial phase only. Several important sources have been destroyed or taken to Russia. Finding secondary sources, connecting and analysing them is a very time-consuming task. But it is possible to draw a number of important conclusions even today. Arrests and deportations exerted a pernicions influence on the demographic situation. During the war the gender and age structure of Estonian population had changed greatly. As mostly men in the prime of life were arrested, the part of women in fertile age increased. Hopelessness and indifference spread among country people. This was reflected in falling birth rate, people leaving the countryside, increasing number of suicides (especially after the 1949 March deportation and compulsory collectivization which was directly connected with it). Besides all that this created favourable conditions for mass immigration and sharp changes in the national structure of Estonian population.

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Estonian Archives - Development up to the Present

Peep Pillak

Prehistory. There are data concerning Estonia and the Estonians in the Scandinavian sagas and the Russian chronicles of the second half of the first millennium AD. It is impossible to speak of written documents and archives in Estonia itself before the foreign conquests of the 13th century.

The Danish and Teutonic eras. The oldest surviving archival document in Estonian archives dates from 1237 and concerns the papal legate Wilhelm of Modena. The first archives were established by churches, monasteries, the King of Denmark's viceregents, Masters of the Teutonic Order, bishops, the nobility and town halls. Most of the documents concern legal matters or property ownership. Few have survived to the present day, due to frequent wars and fires. Estonian historical sources have found their way into German, Swedish, Danish, Polish, Latvian, Russian and Vatican repositories.

The Swedish era. The development of Estonian archives was facilitated when Estonia came under Swedish jurisdiction, particularly after the founding of the Riksarkivet (National Archives) in 1618. A systematic bureaucracy developed, conducting its affairs on the basis of documentation. Central archives were established at the residences of the Governor-Generals in Tallinn and Riga. Parish registers were maintained more consistently than had been the case previously. Historical documents were used more and more as sources for research. Nevertheless, a reliable archival system did not develop in Estonia; much depended on the good intentions of the officials. Subsequently, much archival material was destroyed during the Great Northern War. Documents were also evacuated to Sweden and to this day there is a large "Livonica" collection in the Swedish National Archives.

The Russian era. Estonia's subordination to Russia was accompanied by a step backwards in the maintenance of archives, as the conduct of state business and the preservation of official documents were of a low standard in Russia. Many valuable historical documents were consigned to destruction, sold to paper factories or used for packing. The archives of the guilds, towns, eminent families and large estates were better cared for. From the 19th century onwards more attention was paid to the preservation of the documents. Societies of Baltic Germans played a significant role in process, especially the Estonian Learned Society and the Estonian Literary Association. The academic publication of archival documents was initiated (Friedrich von Bunge, Carl Schirren, Eduard Pabst, Carl Russwurm). The first scientifically organized archives were the Tallinn City Archives, established in 1883. A catalogue appeared in 1896. The Pärnu City Archives were established in 1893 and the Tartu City Archives in 1900.

The Estonian National Awakening provided the impetus for the collection of documents of national significance. Notable work in this area was done by the Society of Estonian Literati and especially by the Association of Estonian Students; and later by the Estonian National Museum and the Estonian Literary Society.

The First World War and the subsequent revolutionary events caused great damage to Estonia's archives: documents were destroyed, collections were split up and scattered all over Russia during evacuation and were lost.

The Estonian Republic. On the basis of the peace treaty of February 2nd 1920 between Soviet Russia and Estonian Republic that concluded the War of Independence, all archival material that had been taken out of Estonia was to be returned. On March 3rd 1920 an Archives Commission was formed, led by Finnish professor Arno Rafael Cederberg, which began the task of organizing and directing Estonia's state archival system. In November 1921, the Commission became the Archives Council, attached to the State Chancellery. On April 1st 1921 the State Archives were established in Tallinn for the collection and organization of documents from state institutions, and on May 16th 1921, the Central State Archives were established in Tartu for the preservation of historical documents. In 1922, the Narva City Archives were created, and in 1926 the archives of the Registry of Birth, Marriages and Death were set up at the Ministry of Justice and Interior. Archives of the War of Independence were established by the Committee for the History of the War of Independence in 1926. Many of the archives of societies and associations continued to function, as did those of private organizations, and new archives were established. In 1929, the Estonian Cultural Archives were established in Tartu as a repository for personal archives. Local government archives were created. An Archive Act for the general regulation of archives became law decree of the Head of State on

June 12th 1935. Maintenance of archives was directed by the notable historians Paul Johansen, Otto Liiv, Arnold Soom, Erik Tender, Rudolf Kenkmaa and others. Close contacts were established with neighbouring countries. In 1939, the Association of Estonian Archivists was founded. In a short time, Estonian archives had emerged from chaos and could be reckoned with by European standards.

Under foreign occupation. This natural development was interrupted by the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1940. The archival systems that had previously emerged were forced into foreign framework. Following the Soviet example, the NKVD took Estonia's archives. On September 4th, all archival material generated and stored in Estonia was declared to be property of the state and deemed to be part of the general Soviet state archival collection.

The Second World War once again brought the widespread destruction and dispersion of archival material. The Tallinn, Tartu and Narva archives suffered particularly severely. In 1944, the Germans evacuated a huge amount of material from Estonia,including the document from 1237, Estonia's oldest, which was located in the Bundesarchives (Federal Archives) in Koblenz in West Germany up to the autumn 1991 when they were returned to Estonia. After Estonia fell into Soviet hands again, the re- moulding of Estonia's archives according to the Stalinist-Soviet patter continued. A sweeping centralization was put into effect, and the maintenance of archives was severely restricted and they lost their function as scientific and cultural institutions. There were absolutely no contacts with foreign countries, the professional standards of archivists declined any many valuable documents were destroyed.

In the 1960s, during the so-called "thaw", archives were placed under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. Archives became more accessible and archival materials were published once more. Unfortunately, the reorganization was abandoned. In the period of "stagnation" that followed the rigidly centralized subordination of Estonia's archives to Moscow continued and direct contacts with foreign countries were prohibited. Secrecy and regulatory restrictions made the work of researchers, especially foreign researchers, difficult. Large amounts of archival material were outside the system of state archives. The archives of the Estonian Communist Party were to all intents and purposes inaccessible to researchers, as were those of the ministries of the state security (KGB), the interior and defence, and other institutions of the Soviet regime. For decades, the soviet authorities considered the problems associated with archives to be secondary in nature, which resulted in the catastrophic material and technical backwardness of Estonia's archives.

Since the middle of the 1980s, positive changes have been taking place in the maintenance of archives. most of hitherto prohibited material in the Estonian archives has been made available to researchers, including those from abroad. The material has been published and displayed in exhibitions. Direct contacts with other countries are being established, primarily with the archives of neighbouring countries. The Association of Estonian Archivists began to function again in 1989. A new Archives Law is being prepared, which will act the basis for the development of independent Estonian archives.

Estonia's system of state archives is directed by **the Archives Department** (Arhiiviamet, Maneezhi 4, EE-0100 Tallinn). There are four so called central state archives.

The Estonian History Archives (Eesti Ajalooarhiiv, J. Liivi 4, EE-2400 Tartu), which succeeded the Central State Archives, have 1,887,677 items dating from 1240-1917 (including a few items from 1917-1944 and some post-war items) in 3198 collections (archive groups). The library has 103,322 volumes.

The Estonian Film Archives (Eesti Filmiarhiiv, Maneezhi 2, EE-0100 Tallinn) founded in 1971 have 14,364 films and film-clips (the oldest dating from 1913), 237,678 photographs (the oldest from 1878) and 5,237 audio recordings (the oldest from 1905), 131 videos and 442 photo albums.

The Estonian State Archives (Eesti Riigiarhiiv, Maneezhi 4, EE- 0100 Tallinn) have 2,407,487 items, dating from 1917 onwards, in 4,096 collections. The library has 76,100 books.

Filial of the Estonian State Archives, (Eesti Riigiarhiivi Filiaal, Tõnismägi 16, EE-0106 Tallinn) earlier archives of the Estonian Communist Party, have 535,576 items, dating from 1894 onwards, in 3,921 collection about the activity of Estonian Communist Party, KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Estonian SSR.

The Estonian Technical Archives was liquidated on January 1, 1994. The collections with 89,145 items will be divided between the Estonian State Archives, Tallinn City Archives and Estonian History Archives.

There are 5 city archives and 12 regional archives within the state system, where approximately one and a half million items of local importance are preserved, mostly postwar documents. The oldest and biggest municipal archives is Tallinn City Archives.

The Tallinn City Archives (Tallinna Linnaarhiiv, Tolli 4/8, EE- 0001 Tallinn) have 290,148 items connected with the history of Tallinn and its surroundings, dating bach as far as the 13th century, in 998 collection, including fragments of Estonia's oldest printed book, dating from 1535. The library has 15,940 volumes.

In addition to the state archives, in their collection there is a lot of archival materials in the libraries and museums.

Estonian archives abroad have been established on private initiative in countries with sizable Estonian emigre communities. The oldest and biggest of these, **The Estonian Archives in Australia** (Eesti Arhiiv Austraalias, Water Street, Lidcombe, NSW 2141), were established in 1952. The archives have most of the nearly 3,000 Estonian books that have been published outside

Estonia since 1945. They also have periodicals, and material in languages other than Estonian that have either been written by Estonians or are about Estonia. Documents, photographs, ex libris, recordings *etc* pertaining to Estonian organizations, institutions and individuals are also preserved there.

The Estonian Archives in the USA (Eesti Arhiiv Ameerika Ühendriikides, 607 East 7th Street, Lakewood, NJ, 08701) were founded in 1969. Besides documents, the archives have books, periodicals, photographs, films, medals and awards, a collection of art *etc.*

There are two Estonian archives in Toronto, Canada. **The Estonian Central Archives** (Eesti Keskarhiiv, Estonian House, 958 Broadview Avenue) consists of the personal archives of Estonians abroad and other documents. Besides personal archives, **the archives of the Tartu Institute** (Tartu Instituut, 310 Bloor Street West, M5S 1W4) have a library, records, works of art, photographs, and recordings of personals memoirs. Work is done on microfilming and bibliography.

The Baltic Archives (Balti Arhiiv) in Sweden are located in Stockholm's Estonian House (Wallingatan 32, S-111 24). Some material has also been deposited in Sweden's National Archives. Material pertaining to outstanding community activists and cultural figures, as well as exile organizations, is preserved. There is also a photo-collection and a library.

Many Estonians abroad have received recognition as outstanding archivists. The best-known are Arnold Soom, Evald Blumfelt and Jakob Koit of the Swedish State Archives and Vello Helk of the Danish State Archives.

Estonian Administrative Division in 1939

Districts: 1. Läänemaa. 2. Harjumaa. 3. Järvamaa. 4. Virumaa. 5. Saaremaa. 6. Pärnumaa. 7. Viljandimaa. 8. Tartumaa. 9. Valgamaa. 10. Võrumaa. 11. Petserimaa.