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**Track Two Diplomacy in Intractable Conflicts: the Role of Civil
Society Organizations in the Peace-building Process of the Israel-
Palestine Conflict**

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Prof. Eiki Berg

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I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

The 70-year-old conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the fields in International Relations that has come under extensive research. Yet, a great deal of attention has been allocated to official negotiations while the importance of non-official actors lacks analysis. However, the contribution that these actors can make to the peace-building process is crucial for understanding the underlying mechanisms for the transformation and subsequent resolution of the conflict. In this light, the thesis aims to fill in the aforementioned gap by looking into the role that 30 civil society organizations (CSOs) engaged in the peace-building process have played at the level of ordinary citizens, as well as that of the official policy lines concerning conflict resolution, analyzing the matter through the lenses of Track Two Diplomacy. As a result, the research has found that although the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict have mobilized public support for peace-building, brought people from the conflicting parties closer and have contributed to their reconciliation, they have had only limited effect on official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution.

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List of Abbreviations

CSO – Civil Society Organization

OPT – Occupied Palestinian Territory

IDF – Israeli Defense Force

PA – Palestinian Authority

MK – Member of Knesset

IHL – International Humanitarian Law

UNGA – United Nations General Assembly

Introduction

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most controversial, violent and polarizing intractable conflicts of the world. Its various aspects have been the topics for numerous pieces of scholarly work. However, when discussing the opportunities for building peace, transforming or resolving the conflict at hand, the role of governmental-level decision makers from either sides or third-party mediation is usually investigated. Much of the International Relations scholarship has not allocated sufficient attention to the significance of hostile attitudes and deeply-rooted stereotypes that the Israeli and the Palestinian societies have towards each other. Nor has substantive research been produced about the ways in which the eradication of such negative perceptions could help build peace and serve as a basis for the transformation of the conflict and its subsequent resolution, as well as the involvement of non-official actors in these processes. In this light, a growing body of literature that looks specifically into these issues and diverts its focus from the governmental level, revolves around Track Two Diplomacy, which refers to the engagement of ordinary citizens, civil society leaders, journalists, opinion leaders and other non-officials in the process of conflict resolution in order to better comprehend the underlying dynamics of the conflict and transform it into a peaceful coexistence.

By the same logic, the thesis aims to fill in the aforementioned gap by looking into the role that non-official actors in the conflict, namely civil society organizations (CSOs) have had since 2006 in the peace-building process of the Israel-Palestine conflict, analyzing the matter through the lenses of Track Two Diplomacy. More precisely, it investigates the impact that 30 Israeli, Palestinian and International CSOs have had at grassroots level (i.e. the level of ordinary citizens), as well as at the level of official policy lines concerning conflict resolution. The reasons for selecting the period from 2006 onwards are several. Firstly, 2006 was the year of another opening of comprehensive peace talks between the parties, with negotiations revolving around the two-state solution. What is noteworthy here, though, is that it was civil society initiatives created in 2003 and 2004 that preceded these talks, demonstrating that it was possible to develop a mutually acceptable formula for the two-state solution. Secondly, these initiatives gathered tens of thousands of signatures from both Israelis and

Palestinians, which had the purpose of mobilizing sufficient public support to pressure the two parties as well as creating legitimacy for negotiating an agreement. Therefore, peace-building was given a new momentum and optimistic sentiment in the Israeli, as well as the Palestinian society began to materialize. Finally, the above-mentioned initiatives were the two most successful Track Two efforts since the collapse of the Oslo Peace Accords. Thus, they can be considered a turning point in the field, opening new opportunities for conflict transformation, especially after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, which gave Palestinians additional hope that an independent Palestine could soon be created.

The thesis relies on Track Two Diplomacy as its theoretical foundation. For the empirical part, it employs a five-indicator framework that evaluates the influence of Track Two Diplomacy efforts, in this case those of the selected CSOs, beginning from the very foundation of their activities (Inputs) and ending with the maximum effect they can have (Impacts). What is more, the research question posed by this work is the following: what is the role of CSOs in peace-building in the case of Israel-Palestine conflict? The thesis assumes that the ultimate goal of Track Two activities is to influence official policy-making lines. Therefore, its main argument is that although CSOs can mobilize public support for peace-building, bring people from the conflicting parties closer and contribute to their reconciliation, they have only limited effect on official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution.

The theoretical part of the thesis is based on the key literature about the topic of Track Two Diplomacy, which serves as a useful tool for understanding the general role that Track Two activities can play in peace-building. As for the empirical part, in order to follow the framework, the websites of the selected CSOs were the most significant source, but various articles, leaflets and studies that review the impact of these organizations were also of good use. Most importantly, for measuring certain indicators of the framework, where possible, online interviews with the representatives of these CSOs were conducted. In other cases, the thesis relied on online surveys with these organizations. However, the main problem that arose during the process of measuring the role that these CSOs have played was the fact that four out of the 30 CSOs did not respond or did not agree to participate in the research in any form. In these cases,

secondary sources, namely their own reports about their impacts were looked at, which proved to be a sufficient basis for the evaluation.

As for the structure of the thesis, it begins with a brief and a general discussion about intractable conflicts and their characteristics. It then moves to Track Two Diplomacy itself, outlining its different interpretations, concrete mechanisms, its evolution and its different types. Most importantly, however, this section describes the various roles Track Two activities can have, as well as quite a few limitations that they face, which also helps to form adequate expectations about the influence that the selected CSOs can have. Finally, the theoretical part of the thesis ends with a chapter about the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, highlighting the most pressing issues that make this exact conflict intractable. Moreover, the methodological section of the thesis begins with a chapter presenting a few words about the Israeli and the Palestinian civil society in general, while also discussing the basis for selecting the concrete CSOs. It should also be noted that these organizations are divided into five following categories: Grassroots Organizations, Resistance Movements, Informants, Politically Involved Organizations and Mixed Organizations. This is followed by a chapter about the research design and methods, which also describes in detail the framework employed for evaluating the impact of the CSOs and elaborates on the ways its each indicator works. Last but not least, the empirical part is the section of the thesis that presents the actual measurement of the role that the selected CSOs have played according to their categories and the five indicators, which is followed by a summary of the findings and concluding remarks.

1. Track Two Diplomacy

1.1. The Definition of Track Two Diplomacy

As the broad focus of the thesis is the effect Track Two Diplomacy can play in peace-building in intractable conflicts, a few words should be said about these as well. In very general terms, intractable conflicts are those that persist because they are seemingly irresolvable. Other characteristics associated with intractable conflicts include being violent, zero-sum, central to the lives of the parties involved and, in general, revolving around the needs and the values that are necessary for their survival (Gawerc, 2006: 436). To conceptualize the phenomenon, labels such as “deeply-rooted conflict,” “protracted social conflict,” and “enduring rivalry” have also been used (Coleman et al., 2007: 3). However, the three dimensions that distinguish intractable conflicts, according to Kriesberg (2005) are the following: (1) they persist for a long time; (2) they are waged in ways that are perceived as destructive and (3) attempts to transform them usually fail (Kriesberg, 2005: 66). Nevertheless, following Kriesberg, these kinds of conflicts are not entirely intractable but only up to a certain degree, meaning that there is still a possibility of at least transforming them into peaceful relations.

A frequently-used approach for the transformation of such conflicts is Track Two Diplomacy, which is also called Track Two Approach or “Citizens” Diplomacy. It can be broadly defined as the process which brings together professionals, journalists, opinion leaders, scholars, civil society leaders or other currently or potentially influential non-officials from conflicting parties to better comprehend the underlying dynamics of a conflict in order to explore different possibilities for resolving it or transforming violence (or potential violence) into a collaborative peace-building (Davies & Kaufman, 2003: 2). Nevertheless, Track Two Diplomacy, like a lot of other widely-used concepts in the field of International Relations, does not have a single, fixed definition and different interpretations of its meaning exist. There have been attempts to define Track Two in terms of the specifics of the activity itself, concluding what is typical for this approach based on the many cases it has been applied to. Moreover, Track Two Diplomacy has also been conceptualized in terms of the actors or types of actors involved in these kinds of processes, determining the role different

individuals or groups and their characteristics might play. Finally, many have looked at Track Two Approach through the lenses of its place in the larger negotiating process, seeing it as mainly a form of prenegotiation – informal talks which help the parties to get to an official negotiation table (Jones, 2015: 8). In any case, Track Two is regarded as a complementary tool to Track One Diplomacy, which includes official, governmental-level negotiations and activities.

Hussein Agha, Ahmad Khalidi, Shai Feldman, and Zeev Schiff are two Palestinian and two Israeli prominent authors in the field of Track Two Diplomacy, who distinguish between “soft” and “hard” Track Two. They term dialogues aimed at exchanging ideas, views, and perceptions, which leads to fostering mutual understanding of each other’s positions and policies between the adversaries, as “soft.” Track Two exercises that are primarily concerned with transferring policies to Track One and helping negotiate political agreements, are labeled as “hard” (Agha et al., 2003: 3).

The same authors define Track Two Diplomacy by what it is not. Not all types of interaction between non-officials from the conflicting parties constitute Track Two. Rather, Track Two talks are convened with the direct purpose of fostering informal interaction and the exchange of insights about the underlying causes of the conflict (Ibid: 2). For example, academic conferences in which both Israeli and Arab scholars participate do not present a type of Track Two activity just because they are meetings of non-officials. In the same manner, secret diplomacy conducted between governmental representatives does not represent an instance of Track Two only because it has a non-official character due to its secrecy.

Regardless of the way in which Track Two might be defined, all of the interpretations share several common features. First of all, they all emphasize the importance of informal dialogues, often referred to as “problem-solving workshops,” which bring the conflicting parties together and which, in many cases, include a third party.¹ Secondly, even though these dialogues are informal, it is generally expected that either the participants will have access to official decision-makers or that the outcomes of these

¹ Not all Track Two activities include third parties. Some of them are facilitated directly by citizens from the two sides. The activities in the Israel-Palestine conflict include both types of Track Two activities, the most prominent third parties being Swiss and Norwegian NGOs, the US, the EU and the UN.

workshops will affect them, influencing the conflict dynamics in this way. Thirdly, these workshops are not necessarily held in secret, but they generally have a covert character, enabling the participants to ditch the official positions of the party they represent and actually address the underlying causes of the conflict and generate alternative approaches (Jones, 2015: 25).

1.2. The Evolution of Track Two Diplomacy

Surprisingly enough, the term “Track Two Diplomacy” was not coined until quite recently. It first appeared in print in a journal article by William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville published in 1981, where Track Two Diplomacy was conceptualized as unofficial, non-structured interaction that is always open-minded, optimistic, altruistic and that can help resolve or transform conflicts through human capabilities, good will and reasonableness (Davidson and Montville, 1981: 155). Montville later redefined Track Two as “unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict (Montville, 1991: 162 via Jones, 2015: 9).” The term itself was coined in a very simple manner: Montville noted that if official governmental activities could be referred to as Track One, then the informal process could have been called Track Two (Jones, 2015: 10).

Nevertheless, although it is difficult to name exactly when Track Two activities first emerged, processes similar to what we call Track Two today started at least before the World War I in forms of “peace societies” that often convened in The Hague. After the end of World War II, a private group called “Moral Rearmament” involving German, French and, later, British citizens often met to find ways for reconciliation between the nations. In parallel with these activities in Europe, an international NGO called the Institute of Pacific Relations was the main driving force for unofficial dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region between the years 1928-1961 (Ibid: 12-13).

The first instance of modern Track Two occurred in 1960 when a US spy airplane was shot down in the Soviet airspace. This led to a serious diplomatic crisis but it was alleviated by meetings of unofficial American and Soviet delegations, including

academics and ex-officials, at Dartmouth College, initiated by the then US President Dwight Eisenhower's friend Norman Cousins (Homans, 2011). However, even though Track Two activities were often carried out in the following period as well, they did not gain as much popularity as they currently enjoy straightaway. Official policy-makers considered these kinds of activities as irrelevant and, in worst cases, as a nuisance, since "freelance diplomacy" could damage the real one (Ibid). Moreover, in the Cold War period, IR was dominated by Realist and, particularly, Neorealist theoretical school, which regarded non-state actors as unimportant. At the same time, conflict resolution theorists formulated alternative ideas about the ways conflicts could be resolved, emphasizing the role of social justice, gender, culture, ethnicity and similar concepts. A key document facilitating the new thinking about international conflicts was the "Agenda for Peace" released by the then United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The report highlighted the changing context of the international system, in which the ideological rivalry of the East and West was over but the tension between North and South was increasing. Therefore, as Boutros-Ghali put it, such a new system called for new approaches like preventive diplomacy, peace-building, peace-making and confidence-building (Ghali, 1992). In addition, the 1990s was also a remarkable period for Track Two activities, which facilitated a major and the most successful peace agreement between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – the Oslo Accords. The Oslo Accords were the two peace agreements signed in 1993 and 1995 in the Norwegian capital of Oslo.² Though the Oslo process is considered to have ultimately failed, it still achieved some breakthroughs, since both parties officially recognized each other for the first time and some of the provisions of the agreement were actually implemented, which was followed by the acceptance of the right of Palestinians to create a state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by the former Israeli Prime Minister (PM) Ariel Sharon.

As we can see, Track Two Diplomacy had to win credibility and it was strengthened as a conflict management tool in the 1990s. In the Middle East alone, approximately 100

² The Oslo Accords are often referred to as an instance of Track 1,5 Diplomacy (discussed further) because besides local grassroots organizations and Norwegian scholars, governmental officials from both sides were also involved. Moreover, in spite of the fact that Oslo started as a Track Two initiative, it was later transformed into a full-fledged Track One diplomacy, including a handshake between the then Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and the then leader of PLO Yasser Arafat.

Track Two events were organized during this decade (roughly one activity per month on average). What is more, around 750 regional and extraregional elite members participated in these events, of which an estimated 200 were from the military (Kaye, 2007: xiv). Consequently, Track Two has increased in popularity and has been applied to numerous other conflicts, including the most violent ones like in Bosnia and Georgia.

1.3. The Role of Track Two Diplomacy

As it has already been mentioned, Track Two Diplomacy is an alternative approach to conflict resolution, but it does not mean that it can stand alone or that it can lead to full resolution of conflicts. It serves as a complementary tool to Track One diplomacy and contributes to peace-building. It is noteworthy that peace-building does not mean the establishment of immediate and absolute peace. Rather, it implies measures targeted to reduce the risk of an occurrence or reoccurrence of a conflict by addressing root causes, institution-building and political and economic transformation in order to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development (United Nations, 2010: 5). Therefore, Track Two efforts do not aim to have uninterrupted influence on Track One negotiations. On the contrary, their goals are conflict management, tension reduction and confidence-building (Kaye, 2007: 5).

The role that Track Two Diplomacy can play during conflicts is multi-faceted and varies case by case. First of all, it can lead to changed perceptions about the conflict and the “other” and trust-building in the long run. The most common change in attitudes is the breakdown of negative stereotypes and prejudices. Close interactions between the participants of Track Two events help them realize that the “other” has suffered in the conflict as much. Such an understanding lays the initial foundation for building trust between the parties (Chigas, 2003: 7-9).

Secondly, unofficial dialogues can open new channels for communication to parties that previously had fewer or no means thereof. Moreover, they can also improve the quality of communication when the participants of these dialogues realize how hate speech and hostile language lead to mutual mistrust and misperceptions. As a result, they start developing a de-escalatory and a cooperative language, which enhances communication between the parties and, thus, helps solve problems more effectively (Ibid: 8).

Thirdly, Track Two activities can prepare the ground for transmitting or actually transfer new ideas and policies to Track One, like it happened in the case of Oslo Accords of 1993-1995. The ideas generated through Track Two events can gradually change the political thinking of not only the general public but the governing elites as well. This, in turn, can affect the official policies of the adversaries (Kelman, 2008: 49). In the Israel-Palestine conflict, Track Two initiatives created in 2003 demonstrated to the negotiating partners that it was possible to develop a mutually acceptable formula for a two-state solution (Kelman, 2007: 299). These two initiatives were The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement published in the fall of 2003 and the Geneva Initiative devised in 2003 and launched as the Geneva Accord in 2004. These two plans effectively challenged the dominant narratives of both sides that there was no partner on the other side willing to agree to a mutually acceptable solution (Kelman, 2005: 20). It is also equally important that these initiatives gathered tens of thousands of signatures from both Israelis and Palestinians, which had the purpose of mobilizing enough public support to pressure the two parties as well as creating legitimacy to negotiate an agreement (Ibid).

Fourthly, the informal and unofficial nature of Track Two meetings enable the participants to discuss ideas more openly, including the ones that are too bold or sensitive for official negotiations. Therefore, unofficial processes generate many new options for carrying on with negotiations, which aims at gradual de-escalation of conflicts (Chigas, 2003: 10). After the Oslo Agreements, a new project called the Working Group on Israeli-Palestinian Relations was initiated. The group met periodically between the years 1994 and 1999 and not only produced joint papers on what was required for long-standing peaceful relations between the nations, but it also provided further options for negotiations about the final status of the Israeli-Palestinian interaction, as well as post-negotiation peace-building (Kelman, 2008: 32).

Finally, Track Two events can lead to a development of networks of influential people who can work on changing the views in their regions or countries or act as impartial third parties (Jones, 2015: 26). In addition, they can also create social networks that can serve as watchdogs for minimizing the possibility of outbreaks of violence or discrediting peace agreements (Chigas, 2003: 11). However, it is not always necessary

that Track Two Diplomacy meets all of the goals set for it to be considered successful or relatively successful.

1.4. The Limits of Track Two Diplomacy

Track Two Diplomacy has quite a few limitations as well. Even though unofficial dialogues generally aim to move away from the official positions of the adversaries, they still cannot be completely isolated from the political context in which they are held. The participants are still sensitive to the political developments in their own communities and as well as media coverage (Ibid: 12). In intractable conflicts like the Israel-Palestine conflict, these contexts are inherently hostile, exacerbating these problems even further. Hostile contexts also make it difficult to maintain the changed attitudes that the parties have towards each other. Even though unofficial dialogues attempt to redefine “us” and “them,” other social contexts reinforce the participants’ existing identities due to fear, prejudices and stereotypes (Ibid).

Another challenge for Track Two approach is that in order to obtain tangible results, finding an appropriate group of practitioners that carry out these activities is required. Such a group needs to consist of people that are acceptable to both sides, as well as domestic constituencies, that have influence and that represent a large number of units from their regions or countries. Assembling such a group is extremely hard and even if it does happen, it is not always certain that the activities will produce positive outcomes. The parties’ attitudes towards each other might as well deteriorate instead of improving. In such a situation, the participants are less likely to support any new policies or further advancement towards peace-building (Kaye, 2007: 26). Following the same line, even when Track Two activities do generate favourable ideas and policies, “selling” them at home is another obstacle. Societies that have experienced long-standing conflicts with high levels of violence are, generally, less receptive to cooperative agendas (Ibid: 27). What is more, Track Two processes do not usually receive wide media coverage in intractable conflicts such as the one at hand, where both sides heavily control the media content about these matters. Such a situation presents another drawback for spreading collaborative sentiment domestically.

Furthermore, inequality between the parties is another limitation for Track Two Diplomacy. The differences in power and the resources are often reflected in the participants' views. As a result, the weaker side sometimes loses momentum because it has the impression that the peace-building activities neglect the imbalances (Chigas, 2003: 13). Moreover, such inequalities also affect the problems that the parties want to address. This is most visible in the Israel-Palestine conflict, in which the Palestinian side is more concerned about changing the political views that Israel has while Jews try to build channels of communication and social connection. In addition, Palestinian Track Two practitioners are, generally, more interested in upholding human rights of their fellow citizens in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip rather than constructing a unified society with Jews.

Last but not least, adequate investment in Track Two Diplomacy is necessary for developing and maintaining a stable network of practitioners as well as carrying out these activities in general. In case of the absence of such funding, it becomes difficult to influence the conflict dynamics in any way. This trend was well reflected in the Palestinian case where quite a few NGOs working in Track Two fields simply stopped to exist.

1.5. Track One and a Half Diplomacy

Track One and a Half Diplomacy (Track 1.5 Diplomacy) has been used by many in the sphere of conflict resolution. Susan Allen Nan defined it as “unofficial interactions between official representatives of states (Nan, 2003: 6). She later redefined the concept as “diplomatic initiatives that are facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involve officials from the conflict in question (Nan, 2005: 165 via Mapendere, 2005: 69). Mapendere conceptualizes Track 1.5 Diplomacy in a similar way: private or public interaction between official representatives of the conflicting governments or the political entities that is facilitated or mediated by a third party that is not a political unit. Such an interaction is targeted towards changing attitudes between parties, which serves the purpose of altering the political power structures that have caused the conflict (Mapendere, 2000: 16 via Mapendere, 2005: 69).

On the one hand, the main distinguishing feature of Track 1.5 Diplomacy from Track One Diplomacy is that even though the former involves official political representatives, it is not facilitated or mediated by an official third party. The Camp David I, which refers to the peace negotiations between the then PM of Israel Menachem Begin and the then president of Egypt Anwar El Sadat, is an example of a pure Track One Diplomacy because it was mediated by an official – the then US president Jimmy Carter. On the other hand, Track 1.5 Diplomacy is also different from Track Two Diplomacy because the latter does not include governmental representatives and is facilitated by non-officials. Therefore, the Oslo Process is often regarded as an instance of Track 1.5 Diplomacy because apart from grassroots organizations and Norwegian scholars, it also saw the involvement of official representatives from Israel and the PLO.

2. Israel-Palestine Conflict as an Intractable Conflict

The 70-year old conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the longest and the most severe protracted conflicts of the world. It meets the three above-mentioned criteria of intractable conflicts (persistence, destructiveness, and the difficulty to transform) as well as being compatible with the alternative labels (deeply-rooted conflict, protracted social conflict, and enduring rivalry). It is generally accepted that the confrontation between Palestinian Arabs living in the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the river Jordan and Jews migrating to this place, broke out because of the possession of this exact territory. One of the reasons behind the migration of Jews was the concept of Zionism, which implies the idea that this territory is the homeland of Jews, which was given to them by their God – Yahweh – and they started living here in the 1st Millennium BC, in the biblical kingdoms of David and Solomon (Harms, 2008: 51). What is more, the Balfour Declaration issued by the British Empire in 1917 expressed support for the Zionist cause. Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, who had already lived in this territory since the seventh century, also considered that they had a legal right to create an independent state based on McMahon-Hussein Correspondence of 1915-16 (Gidron, Katz and Hasenfeld, 2002: 54).

Besides the question of territory, there are numerous matters that make this conflict intractable, which have led to multiple failed attempts to find a political settlement. To begin with, one of the most acute and sensitive issues is the extremely large scale of violence that has accompanied the conflict since its inception. After the creation of *Medinath Yisrael* – the State of Israel on May 14th, 1948, the territory between the Mediterranean Sea and the river Jordan has seen six wars between Israel and the Arab states; two Palestinian intifadas – the uprising of the Palestinian people against Israeli occupation of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip; four major armed confrontations between Israel and Hamas – a group deemed as a terrorist organization by Israel; as well as daily clashes between Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Palestinian civilians/combatants; hundreds of suicide bombing and other types of terrorist attacks on Israel by Hamas; and thousands of protests organized by Palestinians.

Apart from this, another pressing issue is the city of Jerusalem, claimed by both Jews and Palestinians because of its religious and historical connotation and significance to both sides. Although the city is under Israeli control, Palestinians strive for the establishment of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Upon its creation in 1948, Israel declared West Jerusalem as its capital, but it extended control over the entire city in 1967. From the viewpoint of the policymakers in Israel, the annexation of East Jerusalem was imperative as the country had to defend itself against Jordanian attack. In addition, the Knesset passed a bill in 1980, giving Israel the official unassailable right to the whole Jerusalem. Moreover, the government also started (re)settling Jews in the east of the city, which has had a double effect. Firstly, these settlements surround and isolate Palestinians areas. Secondly, they cut off these areas from the West Bank (Dumper, 2013: 127).

Furthermore, the Israeli government began the construction of a separation wall in East Jerusalem to isolate it from the West Bank. In this light, the authorities have claimed that this was a security measure taken to block suicide bombers that were entering the city from the West Bank. For Palestinians, however, the barrier has brought about serious financial losses as the labour force was cut off access from Jerusalem to the West Bank and vice versa. It also resulted in the displacement of even more Palestinians as well as in a major drawback for the political settlement of the issue of Jerusalem (Ibid: 128).

To sum up, while the Israeli government and many Jews consider the possession of the entire city to be their inalienable right, Palestinians regard the annexation of East Jerusalem as illegal and most of residents of the city boycott local elections. On top of this, they demand Israeli withdrawal from the eastern part of the city and the recognition of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine. Apart from this, alternative models have been proposed by various local and external actors, but the parties have not seen any convergence of opinions over the future of Jerusalem.

Besides Jerusalem, the Israeli policy of building Jewish settlements also occurs in the West Bank. The government started building these settlements after the Six-Day War of 1967. Within a year, fourteen settlements had already been constructed (Barzilai, 2002). Although these settlements were founded by individuals without the official

authorization from the Israeli government, they still relied heavily on the backing from governmental and army officials (Amnesty International, 2017: 2). These settlements, nonetheless, have come at a huge price for Palestinians. Israel began displacing Palestinian communities, expropriating land and evicting them from their homes, denying them access to water, land and other resources, with not only the Israeli military, but also the new Jewish settlers attacking Palestinians (Ibid: 3). Besides these official settlements, there are currently around 100 illegal outposts that have been built without the governmental authorization (B'Tselem, 2017). For these reasons, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are referred to as the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) by the international community. As the current PM has stated that Israel is not going to uproot any more settlements (McKernan, 2017), this issue remains one of the most problematic, hindering any possible political resolution of the conflict.

Another major point of contestation between the parties is the question of Palestinian refugees – displaced people, who fled or were driven away from their homes as a result of armed confrontations since 1948 and whose number adds up to around 5.4 million (UNRWA, 2017: 1). The experience of displacement and forceful exile has become a part of the national identity of Palestinians. Logically enough, they call for the recognition of and the compensation for their plight in the form of their return to their homes. For Israelis, however, the issue of Palestinian refugees is connected to the unpleasant events that accompanied the establishment of their state in 1948. On top of this, they perceive the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel as a threat to the existence and the survival of Israel as a Jewish state (Brynen, 2013: 109).

Furthermore, there are fundamental differences between the ways the parties look at the causing factors for the problem. On the one hand, Israel has maintained that Palestinians were not forced out from their houses and they left either by choice or at the command of Arab leaders and that the war itself broke out because they refused to accept the creation of a Jewish state. Hence, Palestinians are to blame for their distress (Ibid: 110). Palestinians, on the other hand, consider all this to have resulted from deliberate Zionist policies, which also brought about ethnic cleansing (Ibid). What is more, the advocates of their right to return argue that Palestinians are entitled to such a right under international human rights law and under the UN General Assembly Resolution 194

(III), which states that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” (UNGA Resolution 194(III), 1949). By contrast, Israel has regarded the document as a mere recommendation and not a binding resolution.

In conclusion, the official position of the Palestinian Authority (PA) calls upon Israel to allow the refugees to return to their homes where possible. On top of this, it also demands from Israel the compensation of the losses these people have suffered and the acknowledgement of the responsibility of Israel in their plight. Israel, however, considers that there is no such “right” in the first place. Instead, refugees could repatriate to the Palestinian state or be settled outside and Israel, at most, could take in only a symbolic number of Palestinians for family reunification (Brynen, 2013: 113). Even though official negotiations about the permanent status of the issue were going on in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, all the talks eventually came to a halt. Due to the end of negotiations and such a serious disagreement about one of the core matters of the conflict, the issue of Palestinians refugees remains one of the most pressing to this day.

Last but not least, another significant problem is the situation in the Gaza Strip. Although Israel had begun the construction of settlements after the war of 1967 in Gaza as well, as part of the Disengagement Plan, these settlements were dismantled in 2005, which put an end to its 38-year presence. The supporters of the Plan considered this move to have been a turning point in the peace process and that it would set the foundations for the Palestinian state (Peters, 2013: 196). However, all this proved to be an illusion as Hamas, a group deemed as a terrorist organization not only by Israel, but also the Western community, won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council shortly after the disengagement. In response, Israel imposed sanctions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza. After its victory, clashes between Hamas and its competitor in the elections – Fatah – began. As a result, Hamas took control of the entire Gaza Strip and Fatah became the ruling party of PA, which remained in the West Bank. Following this, Israel imposed a full-scale economic embargo over Gaza, which is still in place today. What is more, the international community has directed its financial and diplomatic resources to the West Bank only. As a consequence of all the

above-mentioned, the Gaza Strip is effectively cut off from the outside world and the Palestinian society is divided into two political blocks. To make the matters worse, out of 1.9 million of the entire population of Gaza, 1.3 million are refugees living in a steadily declining sociopolitical environment (UNRWA, 2016). In conclusion, the refusal of the Israeli government to cooperate with Hamas over the settlement of the conflict, as well as periodical terrorist attacks from Hamas on Israel also contributes to the intractability of the conflict.

3. Research Methodology

3.1. Mapping the CSOs Involved in the Peace-building Process

First and foremost, is necessary to mark the difference between civil society and CSOs. Civil society is a broader term referring to a particular phenomenon, a specific social sphere, while CSOs are organizational manifestations of civil society, i.e. CSOs reflect concrete areas of civil society, constituting only one aspect of the numerous elements of this phenomenon (Gidron, Bar and Katz, 2004: 142). CSOs themselves can be further defined as a wide array of NGOs, non-profit organizations, different forms of associations, unions or think tanks based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, or religious matters (Forster and Mattner, 2006: 2). Thus, CSOs are not the same as NGOs, but the latter is a part of the former.

Before moving on to the selected CSOs, a few words about the broader civil society sphere in Israel and Palestine should be mentioned. Israeli civil society sector is one of the largest in the world in terms of its contributions to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and the number of persons employed. In this light, it ranks lower than the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada but higher than countries like the UK, Ireland and even the US (Corella and Noon, 2013: 14). It is difficult to state the exact number of CSOs currently existing in Israel for two reasons. Firstly, the last comprehensive study about the Israeli third sector was conducted by the European Commission in 2013. Secondly, the official Registry of Associations does not indicate which CSOs are definitely active. Nevertheless, when the Law of Associations was adopted in Israel in 1980, 49 900 organizations registered under it and the number of active organizations according to different sources as of 2013, were estimated between 66% and 70% of all the registered ones, i.e. between 32 934 and 34 930 (Ibid: 15). As for the Palestinian civil society, it is far more mediocre than that of Israel. The main reasons for this are lack of funding, unstable state institutions and the conflict with Israel, which affects everyday lives of those living in East Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza, not to mention CSO functioning. The latest study about Palestinian civil society was conducted by the EU External Action Service in 2015, according to which, there were 2 793 CSOs in Palestine in that year (Costantini, Salameh and Issa, 2015: 8).

However, the CSOs that the thesis looks at were selected based on three criteria: functionality (what their goals are), performance (the work they have done to achieve these goals) and credibility (public and official-level perceptions towards them). In terms of their functionality, the CSOs that aim at bringing the Israeli and Palestinian people together, ending Israeli occupation and achieving the adoption a two-state solution, have been selected. If we talk about their performance, the organizations that have managed to mobilize masses, unite the parties around common issues, build public support and press the two governments to consent to different peace initiatives, have been chosen. As for their credibility, it is also linked with performance. The facts that these organizations have received public support and have pressured their own governments, speak to their credibility. What is more, even though a lot of activities of CSOs go unnoticed by the general public due to lack of media coverage, the organizations that have received the biggest spotlight have been selected. They are characterized in different types: Grassroots Organizations – organizations that involve the ordinary citizens and non-officials and that work for building peace by familiarizing Israelis and Palestinians with each other and bringing them closer together through joint activities, dialogues and intercultural exchange; Resistance Movements – those that attempt to end the conflict by organizing non-violent demonstrations, protests and rallies to force the governments to resolve the conflict; Informants – those that disseminate information about human rights violations and other atrocities of the conflict, trying to end the conflict by influencing local, as well as international, public opinion and turning it towards peace, which will, in turn, serve as the basis for conflict resolution; Politically Involved Organizations – those that advocate different political solutions to the conflict and serve as forums for dialogue between officials and non-officials; and Mixed Organizations – those that combine grassroots activities with information dissemination, political involvement or non-violent resistance (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 – The categorization of the CSOs

Grassroots Organizations	Resistance Movements	Informants	Politically Involved Organizations	Mixed Organizations
AJCC	CWP	B'Tselem	Arava Institute	AFI (grassroots work and information dissemination)
Crossing Borders	Gush Shalom	Breaking the Silence	H.L. Education for Peace	CFP (grassroots work and resistance)
Friends of Roots	Peace Now	Yesh Din	OneVoice International	ICAHN (resistance, political involvement and information dissemination)
FAB	Ta'ayush		PPC	PCFF (grassroots work and information dissemination)
Friendship Village			Two States One Homeland	Wi'am (grassroots work and resistance)
Heartbeat				Windows (grassroots work and information dissemination)
PPI				WWP (resistance and political involvement)
Peres Center				
Road to Recovery				
Sadaka-Reut				
Seeds of Peace				

3.2. Research Design and Methods

The thesis will employ Single Case Study as its research design. In particular, it will rely on Process Tracing (PT) which implies a systematic examination of evidence that has been selected and analyzed in the light of the research questions and hypotheses posed by the researcher (Collier, 2011, 823). A key building block for PT is description. More precisely, PT does analyze changes and causation but the whole analysis fails if the phenomena have not been properly described at every stage. Moreover, causal inferences heavily depend on careful description (Collier, 2011, 824).

The main research question of the thesis is the following: what is the role of CSOs in peace-building in the case of Israel-Palestine conflict? What is more, the thesis will also attempt to answer these additional questions: what are the limits of CSOs? Does the case illustrate common impediments to Track Two efforts in all intractable conflicts? What are the lessons to be learned? The main argument of the thesis is that although CSOs can mobilize public support for peace-building, bring people from the conflicting parties closer and contribute to their reconciliation, they have only limited effect on official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution.

As the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict have already been selected, their role needs to be measured. For these, the thesis will apply the framework put forward by Nathaniel Allen and Travis Sharp (Allen and Sharp, 2017), which presents five different indicators: inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts.

Inputs

Inputs are raw materials that create Track Two Diplomacy, such as funding, expertise, relationships and personnel (Allen and Sharp, 2017: 20). This implies the very basis, the inception of Track Two Diplomacy efforts. These can be measured by exploring the web pages of the selected CSOs and different databases.

Activities

Activities are the actions taken by Track Two moderators (in our case CSOs) during the peace-building process (Ibid). This indicator is also easily measurable because, again, the web pages of the selected CSOs will be sufficient.

Outputs

Outputs are tangible and intangible micro-level changes that result from Track Two activities (Ibid). These outputs are intrinsically linked with the general role that Track Two Diplomacy can play in peace-building. Allen and Sharp identify four different outputs in these terms: 1) idea generation; 2) building relationships; 3) effective moderation; and 4) changing perceptions. Each of these is a hypothesized causal mechanism which can actually lead to conflict resolution (Ibid: 21).

In order to measure these, surveys and, where possible, interviews with the representatives of the CSOs have been carried out.³ This enabled us to find out whether new ideas were generated as a result of Track Two efforts. They will also reveal whether the views of the participants have changed as a result of Track Two activities. Nevertheless, whether CSOs have played a role in the peace-building process of the Israeli-Palestine conflict depends on how often different outputs have occurred. More precisely, the frequency of the occurrence of an output directly correlates with the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the role of CSOs. In other words, to conclude that these organizations have managed to generate ideas, change perceptions, build relationships or moderate effectively, they have to have done these frequently. Thus, in those cases where in-depth interviews were not possible, the survey questionnaires asked the respondents to indicate how often certain outputs have occurred by choosing a number, which correlates with frequency: 0 – never, 1 – very rarely; 2-3 – rarely; 4-6 – sometimes; 7-8 – often; 9 – very often and 10 – always.⁴

Outcomes

Outcomes are the benefits that Track Two project is designed to deliver (Ibid: 20)). This means that they are the ideas transferrable to Track One. As one of the most important purposes of Track Two approach is to transfer its outputs to Track One, the outcomes of its efforts revolve around these processes. Allen and Sharp have come up with four outcomes that a successful Track Two approach could achieve. 1) Official Participation, which means that government officials personally participated in or observed a Track Two activity. It was measured by asking the representatives of the selected CSOs whether and how often personal participation in a dialogue has actually occurred. 2) Officials Learn Directly, which indicates that Track Two participants informed governmental negotiators about Track Two outputs directly. It was measured by finding

³ The respondents include Brian Reeves (22.03.2018); Shimri Negbi (22.03.2018); Beate Zilversmidt (23.03.2018); Ruth Atzman (23.03.2018); Amit Gilutz (29.03.2018); Nidal Fqaha (02.04.2018); Avner Dinur (11.04.2018); Ami Yares (11.04.2018); Oren Yiftachel (12.04.2018); Zoughbi Alzoughbi (14.04.2018); Ziv Stahl (15.04.2018); Assat Zamir (15.04.2018); Jeff Halper (16.04.2018); Karen Doubilet (17.04.2018); Baruchi Malewich (18.04.2018); and Guy Hircefeled (18.04.2018).

⁴ The organizations that participated in the survey Crossing Borders (23.03.2018); The Abraham Fund Initiatives (27.03.2018); Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership (28.03.2018); OneVoice International (31.03.2018); Peres Center for Peace and Innovation (12.04.2018); Friends of Roots (12.04.2018); Seeds of Peace (12.04.2018); Coalition of Women for Peace (14.04.2018); Friendship Village (16.04.2018); Women Wage Peace (19.04.2018).

out about the existence of any written reports or oral briefings, and, additionally, with interviews with CSOs representatives. 3) Officials Learn Indirectly, which implies that Track Two participants inform key stakeholders about their outputs who, then, in turn inform governmental officials. It was measured in the same way as the 2nd outcome. Lastly, 4) Officials Pressured Publicly, which entails Track Two participants going public to pressure officials to adopt their ideas and was measured by looking at whether these CSOs have organized any demonstrations or other events attracting wide media coverage (Ibid: 26-27).

Impacts

Impacts are higher-level strategic goals, such as implementing new approaches to resolve a conflict. It entails instances of officials changing their behaviour as a result of the outcomes of Track Two Diplomacy (Ibid: 21-27). The difference between outcomes and impacts is that outcomes are the instances of successful transfer of Track Two outputs to Track One, while impacts are the altered behaviour of governmental officials in response to these outcomes. Allen and Sharp identify two types of impacts that Track Two efforts can produce: 1) Observed Behaviour, indicating that governmental peace negotiations have started acting in ways consistent with Track Two Diplomacy outputs; 2) Official Confirmation, meaning that governmental negotiators have confirmed that they have acted in a certain way because of something they learned from Track Two outputs (Ibid: 27). Both of these have been measured by looking at Track One level activities and comparing them with Track Two outputs. More precisely, the instances of the adoption of the ideas produced by Track Two activities were indicative of Official Confirmation, while their actual implementation indicated Observed Behaviour.

To sum up, the logical chain of the role of Track Two approach to intractable conflicts is the following: it begins with the creation of the basis for Track Two activities (inputs); it continues with the efforts Track Two practitioners make (activities); then come the results these activities are trying to achieve (outputs); followed by the instances of successful transfer of these outputs to Track Two (outcomes); concluding by the instances of officials altering their behaviour as a result of these outcomes (impacts).

3.3. Data and Sources

The thesis uses a variety of sources. For its theoretical foundation, i.e. Track Two Diplomacy, books and scholarly articles have been used. For the overview process and the overview of the Israel-Palestine conflict, books, scholarly articles, news articles and UN Resolutions were looked at. For selecting the CSOs that work for peace-building, apart from their websites, different media sources, as well as articles and books, referring to these organizations, along with studies by conducted by the EU, were also investigated, which served the purpose of choosing the ones with best track records according to predefined criteria. As for the empirical part, the websites for the selected CSOs were the most important source, but various articles, leaflets and studies that review the impact of these organizations, were also of good use.

4. Measuring the Role of the Selected CSOs

4.1. Grassroots Organizations

Inputs

The CSOs in this category attempt to build peace by fostering close interactions between Jews and Palestinians. More precisely, they promote values like tolerance, solidarity, mutual understanding and coexistence, while also working for breaking stereotypes, changing the perceptions that the two peoples have towards each other, encouraging dialogue and for creating young leaders that will strive to bring about social and political changes and to transform the conflict via bi-national partnership.

This category mostly includes Israeli and foreign CSOs, but they conduct joint activities with Palestinians. All of them except the Arab-Jewish Community Center (AJCC) are financed from foreign governmental sources, mainly the EU and the US, and private funds from these countries (NGO Monitor, 2017). The AJCC, however, is funded from the Tel Aviv Municipality because it is an affiliate of the municipality (AJCC, 2018). Most of the CSOs in this category were founded in the 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, being very experienced in educational programs, trust and solidarity-building projects, dialogue meetings and other activities aimed at the reconciliation of the two peoples. The oldest of these organizations is Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Partnership, established in 1983 (Sadaka-Reut, 2018), while the newest is Friends of Roots (Roots), founded in 2014 (Roots, 2018). Furthermore, the CSOs in this category have a large network of connections, partnering with a lot of local and international peace-building organizations, as well as foreign governments. The only exception is the AJCC, which only partners with local communities as it is an affiliate of the Tel Aviv municipality (AJCC, 2018). Last but not least, all the Israeli-Palestinian CSOs are staffed with both Jews and Palestinians, while international organizations are comprised of people from all the conflicting regions.

While the majority of the grassroots CSOs focus on conducting dialogues, workshops, educational programs and leadership trainings to foster discussions about each other's narratives and the possibilities of peace-building, the AJCC, Heartbeat, PeacePlayers, the Peres Center and Road to Recovery use a different method. More precisely, the

AJCC unites the participants of its activities into choirs and other arts groups, which serves the purpose of fostering positive interactions in a free environment, during which these participants become close to the “other side of the conflict” (Ibid). Heartbeat also uses music to unite its members, mainly youngsters, in ensembles, which helps them to build relationships (Heartbeat, 2018).

The Peres Center and PeacePlayers are similar in a sense that they use sports to unite its participants in mixed teams, which teaches them the ways to work jointly instead of competing with each other, which also helps them to build partnerships. However, the Road to Recovery is a unique organization in Israel, since it transports Palestinian patients to and from Israeli hospitals (Road to Recovery, 2018). Besides actually helping those in need, the organization explicitly aims to change the perceptions Jews and Palestinians have towards each other and help them build new friendships (Ibid).

Activities

The CSOs in this category are engaged in multiple types of programs, such as dialogues, workshops, seminars and other unofficial meetings; joint arts and musical projects; sports; technology; medicine and healthcare; solidarity and support; trauma relief; fight against racism; spreading the message; and projects under which Jews and Palestinians live together. Even though, their competence area covers other spheres as well, dialogues, workshops, seminars and similar unofficial meetings is the field in which almost every CSO from this category is engaged in.

To begin with, Crossing Borders solely focuses on dialogues and unofficial meetings between Jews and Palestinians, as well as Europeans. Its activities mainly include workshops and seminars for youth, teachers, media activists and journalists, during which they acquire new skills, interact closely and form positive attitudes and impressions. CB has organized different workshops in 2006-09, in which Israeli and Palestinian youngsters as well as participants from other countries have taken part, discussing the opportunities of civil society for building peace (CB, 2006: 17), the ways to manage the conflict as well as acquired new skills for handling crises (CB, 2007: 1), the prospect of breaking barriers and bringing the peoples together (CB, 2008: 4), or ideas for restoring trust between Israelis and Palestinians after the Gaza War (Ibid: 6).

Since 2009, however, Crossing Borders has directed its attention towards other parts of the world, mainly Africa and South-East Asia. Therefore, we do not see any longer activities focusing on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The Arab-Jewish Community Center encourages intercultural cooperation, tolerance, friendship, and trust between Jews and Palestinians. It runs the Youth Parliament Program, which gathers 40 Jewish and Palestinian high school students for weekly round-table discussions and leadership activities. The participants acquire new skills to become leaders and promote values like trust and tolerance. In addition, they plan community events and shoot an end-of-the-year movie together (AJCC, 2018). Similarly to the AJCC, Friends of Roots also works for building trust and understanding. Under Community Programming, Roots organizes small events, learning groups or lectures, in which religious communities (Jews, Christians and Muslims) take part. The participants talk about the differences and similarities between their religions, which serves the purpose of dispelling stereotypes and finding common ground (Roots, 2018). Under Youth Programming, Roots brings together university students who discuss each other's narratives and the possibilities for peace. As part of the After-School Program, Israeli and Palestinian children take part in photography and painting workshops, where they form connections with each other and get rid of fear and distance (Ibid).

Values like mutual understanding, tolerance, respect and acceptance are also in the focus of Friendship Across Borders, which engages its participants in discussions and dialogue about the issues of the conflict, the responsibility of each of the parties as well as the possibilities for achieving peace (FAB, 2018). Like FAB, Friendship Village also works for spreading the principles of tolerance and respect in the Israeli society. Under its project Woman Educators for Peace and Human Rights, which started in 2005, young women (mainly students) from Israel and Palestine attend lectures about intercultural encounter, each other's religions, narratives and everyday lives, which helps to foster mutual understanding and humanize "the other" (Friendship Village, 2007). Apart from people-to-people meetings, Friendship Village also conducts dialogues with officials. In particular, its project Talk Peace – Make Peace (TPMP), which was initiated in 2005, brings together ten Israeli Jewish, ten Israeli Arab and ten Palestinian

young politicians and social leaders to overcome the emotional aspects of the conflict, such as fear, hatred, mistrust and hostility (Ibid).

Last but not least, Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Partnership runs an annual project Gemini – Partners in Shaping Reality, which unites around 150 Jewish and Palestinian students from different campuses, who engage in dialogue with each other mostly in mixed cities and areas where the two peoples meet one another most often. The project creates a shared space for discussions about the issues related to the conflict and relations between Jews and Palestinians (Sadaka-Reut, 2012: 6).

Furthermore, the grassroots CSOs also allocate great deal of attention to leadership programs. In other words, different organizations conduct projects to create leaders that will work for conflict transformation. Firstly, Friendship Across Borders runs a multidimensional training program targeting youngsters aged 20-26 from Israel, Palestine and Germany and educating them to become peace carriers. These are the people that work in their own societies and communities, promoting peace, mutual understanding, tolerance, acceptance, respect and for changing attitudes towards “the other” (FAB, 2018). Secondly, Sadaka-Reut runs a project Community in Action, which involves around fifteen-twenty Jewish and Palestinian youngsters, who themselves educate schoolchildren and organize campaigns like erasing racist graffiti from the streets and exhibitions about the problems of Palestinian refugees (Sadaka-Reut, 2018). Not only does the project create bi-national activists and leaders, but it also provides them with the skills to strive for positive changes within their communities. Finally, Seeds of Peace runs local youth conventions called GATHER-s, during which the participants exchange ideas and experiences about the most pressing issues of the conflict and contemplate the opportunities for their inclusion in conflict resolutions.

Apart from the above-mentioned fields, arts play a very important role for bringing Jews and Palestinians together. Specifically, some of the CSOs in this category use music, photography, painting and similar spheres to unite the participants of their activities, while contributing to their rapprochement and providing them with a space for positive interaction. Firstly, Heartbeat runs a core program Artist and Ensemble Development, which brings together Jewish and Palestinian youngsters (aged 14-20)

every week, who explore each other's cultures and narratives by discussing, engaging in critical dialogue and positively interacting with each other (Heartbeat, 2018).

Secondly, AJCC runs Choir Programs, which include three different choirs – women's, youth's and children's. The choirs sing different songs in Hebrew, Arabic and English. This helps the singers to overcome cultural and ethnic division and serve as an example to other mixed communities (AJCC, 2018). All this helps them to get exposed to “the other” at an early age with positive attitude and interaction, while also bridge cultural and religious gaps (Ibid). Last but not least, the Peres Center for Peace and Innovation uses the power of arts and photography as a means of creative expression of emotions, fears and hopes. This allows these feelings to be understood better and misperceptions to be tackled with more effectively. The projects in this sphere include photography workshops, visual arts exhibitions and similar activities, during which the participants interact closely and positively and build trust (Peres Center, 2018).

Besides arts and music, sports is another field that is frequently used by some grassroots CSOs as a uniting factor for Jews and Palestinians under a common goal of winning a game, helping each other and building friendships. Specifically, the Peres Center runs Twinned Peace Sports Schools project, which was launched in 2002 and still continues. Each year, over 1 500 Jewish and Palestinian children take part in joint activities and events, playing in mixed teams instead of against each other, which serves the purpose of breaking barriers and stereotypes and building trust among the participants (Peres Center, 2018). Besides sport training, the project also aims to encourage Jewish and Palestinian youngsters to volunteer as “peace ambassadors” in their communities and spread the values of social change and peace-building and implement peace education through sport, using the leadership skills they acquire as a result of this project (Ibid). Along with the Peres Center, PeacePlayers International also links sports, namely basketball, with peace-building. Its project PPI – Middle East combines year-round sports programs with peace-building and involves children, youth and coaches, providing them with a framework for positive interaction, building friendships and partnerships, eradicating negative attitudes and acquiring skills for becoming community leaders that promote peace (PPI, 2017: 2).

Moreover, medicine and healthcare work in the same way as arts and sports. In particular, the projects of the Peres Center train Palestinian doctors and provide Palestinian children with treatment in Israeli hospitals, which serve as bridges for peace-building, changing perceptions and positive interactions (Peres Center, 2018). In the same manner, the volunteers at Road to Recovery transport Palestinian patients and their family members to Israeli hospitals and back home. Besides transportation, Road to Recovery also helps Palestinians receive different types of surgeries and obtain medical equipment, as well as involve them in various recreational activities. (Road to Recovery, 2018). Road to Recovery believes that its activities demonstrate to both sides that life in the region is not only about enmity, violence and conflict, but about peace, assistance, humanity and mutual understanding and that all this can contribute to peace-building (Ibid).

In addition to all this, some of the CSOs in this category are active in fields that are only characteristic to them, making them the only ones in the category that run these activities. More precisely, Friends of Roots runs projects, under which, the speakers from the organization visit different families across Israel and Palestine and attempt to engage them in their work and in spreading messages of peace. The organization also runs Pre-Army Academies, which are attended by Israelis before going to compulsory military service. The attendees are exposed to both Palestinians' and settlers' narratives and prepare for the experience they will be having with these people during their service. Moreover, the representatives of Roots visit schools in across Israel and Palestine to present their view to schoolchildren, so that they can grow up with changed perceptions and become more open towards "the other" and peace, in general (Roots, 2018). Friendship Across Borders is also distinguished because it holds sessions, during which Jews and Palestinians discuss their personal stories connected to the conflict and work for relieving trauma and restoring trust (from the interview, 11.04.2018).

Last but not least, the Peres Center is also distinct from other CSOs because it runs Peace Computer Centers, which involves youth aged 13-16 from twelve communities across Israel and the West Bank, who participate in regular online discussion forums. The virtual meetings take place once a week, exposing the participants to the narratives

of the “other.” After a year of online communication, the youngsters meet face to face, building ever stronger friendships (Peres Center, 2018).

Outputs

Due to the competence area of the selected CSOs, generating new ideas about how to build peace or solve the conflict are not the primary focus of their activities. Nevertheless, it still happens sometimes as a result of the dialogue meetings, workshops and other discussions aimed at exploring the narratives of the parties and discussing the possibilities for coexistence and conflict resolution. The AJCC aims at fostering close interactions between the two peoples as well as empowering youth to become leaders and promoters of values like tolerance, trust and respect. Thus, during its roundtable meetings between Jewish and Palestinian youth, new ideas are sometimes generated about the ways in which these values can be spread (from the interview, 15.04.2018). Similarly, Seeds of Peace is also engaged in creating leaders that will work for conflict transformation. Hence, its activities sometimes generate new ideas about the mechanisms through which the conflict can be transformed (from the survey, 12.04.2018). Unlike Seeds of Peace, Friends of Roots only works for encouraging interaction between Israelis and Palestinians but as it organizes dialogues between different groups, new ideas about the ways in which to eradicate the problems that hinder rapprochement between these two peoples are still sometimes generated (from the survey, 12.04.2018). Last but not least, even though Crossing Borders aims at finding new political solutions to the conflict as well as fostering close interactions between Jews and Palestinians, its activities only sometimes produce new ideas (from the survey, 23.03.2018). This can be explained by the fact that CB is not as actively engaged in the conflict as other CSOs in this category and, thus, has only worked with small groups (around 25 people).

Unlike the above-mentioned CSOs, the organizations, the representatives of which have indicated that their activities have often produced new ideas are Friendship Village and Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership. As both of these organizations work for educating Jewish and Palestinian youth about cross-cultural coexistence as well as the importance of bi-national partnership for peace-building, their activities frequently generate new ideas about ways in which interactions between the two peoples can be

deepened (from the survey, 28.03.2018 and 16.04.2018). However, as Heartbeat, PeacePlayers and the Peres Center are all oriented towards using music and sports activities as means for uniting Jews and Palestinians, idea generation is not their focus. Despite this, as dialogue meetings and leadership training are parts of their activities, new ideas are still generated, but rarely (from the interviews, 11.04.2018 and 17.04.2018 and from the survey, 12.04.2018). On the contrary, Friendship Across Borders works for relieving trauma and other psychological aspects, due to which, its activities do not generate new ideas (from the interview, 11.04.2018). Similarly, Road to Recovery attempts to contribute to peace-building by uniting Israeli volunteers to transport Palestinian patients to and from Israeli hospitals. Thus, idea generation is out of the focus of this organization as well.

Building relationships is the aspect most of the CSOs in this category have good track records of. This is quite logical, as it is one of the primary foci of the activities of these organizations. As the AJCC and PeacePlayers concentrate on creating joint teams of Israelis and Palestinians, be it choirs in the case of the former and basketball teams in the case of the latter, the participants of the activities of these two organizations have very often built relationships as they spend a lot of time together as teammates (from the interviews, 15.04.2018 and 17.04.2018). Similarly, Friends of Roots runs summer camps for Jewish and Palestinian youngsters, as a result of which, the participants have very often built friendships (from the survey, 12.04.2018). Unlike these three organizations, Sadaka-Reut does not work for creating joint groups, but it has different long-standing projects, which have brought together Jews and Palestinians for seminars, workshops and tours for years, as well as anti-racism campaigns. As a result of these activities, its participants have also very often built partnerships and friendships (from the survey, 28.03.2018). In the same manner, Friendship Village has also included the two peoples in joint projects for years, which have very often helped the partakers to become partners in organizing similar projects themselves.

Team-building has also proven successful for Heartbeat, the Peres Center and Seeds of Peace, as the participants of its activities have always built new relationships. More precisely, as Heartbeat runs different ensembles, in which Jews and Palestinians play music together, as well as travel around the country and sometimes abroad together, its

members always build friendships (from the interview, 11.04.2018). What is more, the Peres Center has a lot of different teams of children and youngsters, who meet virtually as well as face to face. Therefore, the members of these teams also always build friendships and partnerships for new joint campaigns (from the survey, 12.04.2018). In addition, the participants of Seeds of Peace always build friendships as well, since the organization runs an annual summer camp, in which Israelis and Palestinians live together. As mentioned earlier, Road to Recovery is unique in its functionality and does not organize group activities. However, its members have still often built friendships as those who transport Palestinian patients to hospitals frequently visit them even after their recovery (Road to Recovery video, 2014). Unlike the aforementioned organizations, the representatives of Friendship Across Borders and Crossing Borders have indicated that the participants of their activities have only sometimes built new relationships (from the interview, 11.04.2018 and from the survey, 23/03/2018). This can be explained by the fact that FAB works for reliving trauma and changing perceptions rather than forming new relationships, while CB brings together Danish, Finnish and German youngsters with Jews and Palestinians, which makes it difficult to build long-lasting friendships.

In most cases, effective moderation and perception changes are intrinsically linked and the former leads to the latter. In other words, the CSOs, whose representatives have indicated that their moderations have been very effective, have also stated that their participants have always changed perceptions towards each other as well as various aspects of the conflict. These CSOs include Friendship Across Borders, Heartbeat, the Peres Center and Seeds of Peace. It should be mentioned, however, that the perception changes that Heartbeat and the Peres Center have brought about do not only come down to effective moderation, but also to the time the participants of its activities spend together in the teams. In the same manner, the CSOs that have had effective or mostly effective moderations, have demonstrated that their activities very often change perceptions. The only CSOs that has altered the perceptions of its members without any moderation at all, is Road to Recovery, whose Israeli members voluntarily transport Palestinian patients. Therefore, the latter always change the perceptions they previously had towards Israelis, while the former's attitudes are also altered as a result of the experience (Road to Recovery video, 2014). Another exception is Crossing Borders,

whose representative indicated that the moderations of this organization have been ineffective and, thus, the attendees of its projects have only sometimes changed their perceptions (from the survey, 23.03.2018.) This can be explained by the fact that CB's projects only last for a few days and take place only two-three times a year.

Outcomes

The majority of the CSOs in this category are oriented towards people-to-people level than towards the official level. Therefore, their role is limited to Outputs. Those that did produce any outcomes include Crossing Borders, Friendship Village, Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership and Seeds of Peace. Only two CSOs have informed officials directly about the ideas that were generated by their activities and these officials are limited to young and emerging politicians in the case of Sadaka-Reut, which has only sometimes informed them directly (from the survey, 28.03.2018), and young politicians and those working in the ministries in the case of Crossing Borders, which has often informed them directly (23.03.2018).

Officials have sometimes been informed indirectly about the ideas generated by the activities of Seeds of Peace (from the survey, 12.04.2018). As one of goals of this organization is to train leaders who will themselves engage in conflict transformation process, the graduates of its programs, who became involved in peace-building processes are the ones that have informed officials about these ideas. Sadaka-Reut is another one that has rarely indirectly informed officials about its ideas through the participants of the organization's activities, who developed into social leaders (from the survey, 28.03.2018). As for official participation, Sadaka-Reut has demonstrated this outcome too, with young politicians having sometimes taken part in its activities (Ibid), while Friendship Village has often seen official participation in its projects (from the survey, 16.04.2018). One of its projects – TPMP – has brought together young Jewish and Palestinian politicians and social leaders since 2005.

Impacts

The impact of most of the CSOs in this category ends at the level of Outputs, which is quite logical as the majority of them works at the grassroots level, not being oriented towards the governmental level. Therefore, the only CSO that has demonstrated an

impact in this category is Sadaka-Reut – Arab-Jewish Youth Partnership. In particular, as the organization is very active in fighting racism in Israel, in 2012 it conducted a campaign “Journey Against Racism,” by which it promoted the ideas of business-free racism. Following this, a government office adopted the idea of business without racism and turned it into an ethical code (from the survey, 28.03.2018). Thus, Sadaka-Reut has displayed Official Confirmation as officials adopted the idea that they had learned from the activities of the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour, since they implemented it.

4.2. Resistance Movements

Inputs

The CSOs in this category attempt to build peace by protesting against various policies that the Israeli government has towards Palestine. All of these organizations consider that Israel has illegally occupied Palestinian territories and try to end it through public pressure. However, they differ in what they see as occupation. While all these movements regard the continuous construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank since the 1967 war to be illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, Gush Shalom perceives the acquisition of territories as a result of this war to already have been an instance of occupation and thus, demands, that the Palestinian state be created within the pre-1967 borders (Gush Shalom, 2018).

Furthermore, the right of return of Palestinian refugees is another issue that only two CSOs in this category focus on. In particular, only CWP and Gush Shalom have it on their agenda. Ta’ayush emphasizes the importance of equality of Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel, but it does not work for the acceptance of the refugees’ right to return per se. In addition, Ta’ayush is different from all the CSOs in this category in a sense that it fights racism, segregation and discrimination with different street campaigns (Ta’ayush, 2018). It also protests against the economic blockade of Gaza, which is also a goal shared by the CWP (CWP, 2018). Apart from these, the establishment of the Palestinian state and the division of Jerusalem is also another matter that only Gush Shalom and Peace Now are oriented towards. While, as already mentioned, Gush Shalom demands that the Palestinian state be created within the pre-1967 borders, Peace

Now supports the existence of Israeli and Palestinian states within the boundaries established after the 1967 war. As for Jerusalem, Gush Shalom promotes the idea of East Jerusalem becoming the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem – of Israel (Gush Shalom, 2018), whereas Peace now considers that the city should be divided based on demographic distribution (Peace Now, 2018).

The movements in this category are entirely financed from foreign sources mainly European and from the US, including not only governments and IGOs, but also private foundations and international non-profits (NGO Monitor, 2017). The longest-standing CSO of them is Peace Now, founded in 1978 having held numerous demonstrations against occupation and settlements, as well meetings between the parties' official and unofficial representatives (Peace Now, 2018). Gush Shalom is also a very experienced protest and solidarity movement, founded in 1993 and having been actively engaged in public discourse ever since. It is known for its clear stances and claims to have “played a leading role in determining the moral and political agenda of the peace forces in Israel, as well as in breaking the so-called “national consensus” based on misinformation” (Gush Shalom, 2018). Moreover, both CWP and Ta'ayush were founded in 2000, also being experienced organizations. CWP, however, is unique in the category in a sense that even though it was founded as an umbrella organization in 2000, the organizations and groups that established it date back to 1980s. CWP is famous for its clear stances and a large number of activities and campaigns ranging from monitoring human rights violations to demonstrations and reconciliation programs. Its leaders have been able to overcome many of the obstacles that previous women-led peace organizations had in Israel, including the inability to tackle power asymmetries between Israelis and Palestinians and to cope with conflict within the organizations (Sharoni, 2012: 123).

All the organizations in this category have regional as well as international partners. For that matter, CWP and Peace Now have the largest networks of connections. Besides, actively demonstrating against different issues connected with the conflict, CWP assists and empowers human rights organizations and activities worldwide, particularly women's and youth groups and provides peace and social justice initiatives with organizational and fundraising assistance (CWP, 2017). Peace Now has an extremely large network of connections, being partners with not-only likeminded CSOs, but also

foreign governments, notably Norway, Belgium and the UK, as well human rights organizations, the UN and the EU, and private entities, such as the New Israeli Fund. At home, it has relations with the members of Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), Zionist unions and Palestinian NGOs (Peace Now, 2018). In addition, these two CSOs also take the leading roles in the category in terms of personnel. As already mentioned, CWP was founded by several different groups, who had previously been parts of women's peace initiatives. The personnel of CWP is therefore experienced and diverse, consisting both of Jews and Palestinians. Peace Now, on the other hand, is the largest and the most diverse peace movement in Israel, with more than 10 000 members not only from Israel but also from the Middle East and around the world. Its work has been supported by hundreds of prominent academics, politicians and philosophers from the world (Peace Now, 2018).

Activities

While non-violent resistance is the primary focus of the CSOs in this category, most of them also concentrate on other issues, such as periodically launching campaigns for disseminating information about the mechanisms through which they think Israel occupies Palestine, as well as expressing solidarity towards affected families. To begin with, Coalition of Women for Peace carries out its activities in a form of continuous campaigns. CWP has organized numerous campaigns against the economic blockade of the Gaza Strip, holding mass rallies in Tel Aviv and other cities (CWP, 2010); against "a system of Apartheid on the entire Palestinian people," putting up posters in metro stations, organizing cultural events and public lectures; and for revealing companies and corporations that profit from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Golan Heights (Ibid). Besides these campaigns CWP has launched anti-war demonstrations in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The protests saw a participation of thousands of Israelis, with CWP providing the activists with legal support and media coverage.

Secondly, as Gush Shalom is a protest and solidarity movement, targeting the media (opinion leaders) as well as Israeli public with campaigns and demonstrations is its main activity areas as well. Since 2006, Gush Shalom has organized multiple protests against armed confrontations between IDF and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the economic

blockade; against the separation wall; against the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land, settlement-building and the eviction of Palestinians from their homes and against the unification of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Besides these issues, Gush Shalom has also organized demonstrations in demand for Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders; for the creation of a Palestinian state and for the release of illegally apprehended Palestinians (Gush Shalom, 2018).

Thirdly, Peace Now is also very actively engaged in non-violent resistance against the Israeli policy of settlement-building, having organized hundreds of protests against it and also having filed petitions to the high court against illegal outposts in Amona and Migron. Apart from these issues, since 2006, Peace Now has demonstrated against the war between Israel and Lebanon; against the Israeli policies of occupation, against the Knesset bill that retroactively legalizes Israeli settlements and outpost in the West Bank and against the bill turning Israel into a Jewish nation-state. What is more, Peace Now has also joined demonstrations of thousands of Israelis against the government, which it considers “the most right-wing Israel has ever had” (Peace Now, 2016). Apart from this, Peace Now has also organized rallies demanding that the government endorse a two-state solution and establish peace (Ibid). Besides non-violent resistance, Peace Now is also involved in other areas related to the conflict. More specifically, in 2015, the movement organized an annual conference “Israel Now – Building an Alternative,” which saw a record number of 1200 participants and 60 speakers (Peace Now, 2015). The conference was attended by the members of Knesset, civil society leaders and representatives of the Israeli Peace Camp (Peace Now, 2015).

Last but not least, Ta’yush is the only movement in the category that is actively engaged in Solidarity and Aid Campaigns. The activists of Ta’ayush organize Consolation and Infrastructure Building and Re-building Visits, during which they visit the Palestinians whose houses or other property have been destroyed. They help these people clean the territories and water from rubbles as well as rebuild the demolished buildings. What is more, Ta’ayush also initiates campaigns to improve the existent infrastructure in the most underdeveloped areas. In the same domain, Ta’ayush also organizes summer camps for Jewish and Arab children, where they live together for summer and do joint activities. This helps them interact positively and form friendly attitudes towards each

other. Apart from this, Ta'ayush is also distinct in a sense that it is the only movement in the category that organizes protests against the violence that Israeli settlers show against Palestinians. According to the movement, neither the security police nor any other Israeli authority takes any actions against it. Therefore, they demonstrate and demand the cessation of such violence and accountability of the settlers that commit it and the soldiers that do not prevent it (Ta'ayush, 2017). Furthermore, the activists of Ta'ayush hold demonstrations against settlement-building and illegal eviction of Palestinians from their houses, as well as against the separation wall.

Outputs

Because of the competence area of these CSOs, none of the four outputs are their primary focus. Thus, Peace Now is the only organization that has generated new ideas about how to solve the conflict or build peace. Still, as it mainly works for ending the expansion of Jewish settlements in the OPT and most of its activities include rallies and demonstrations, new ideas are only rarely generated (from the interview, 22.03.2018). In addition, Peace Now is the only organization that has held unofficial moderations between the Jews and Palestinians. Because of its competence area, it does not frequently serve as a moderator, but when it does, its moderations are effective (Ibid). Moreover, Coalition of Women for Peace aims at ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories through demonstrations and protests. Therefore, its activities do not generate new ideas and the movement does not serve as a moderator for unofficial dialogue (from the survey, 14.04.2018). Similarly, as Ta'ayush is a protest and a solidarity movement, it is not concerned with finding political solutions to the conflict. Therefore, its activities do not generate ideas and it does not serve as a moderator, either (from the interview, 18.04.2018).

Building relationships is another output none of the organizations in this category work for. Despite this, the participants of their activities still form new relationships, as they are united around the common cause and spend a lot of time in each other's company. Ta'ayush leads the category in this sense, as its representative has indicated that the organization very often builds relationships between Jews and Palestinians because of the solidarity it demonstrates towards those in need (from the interview, 18.04.2018). Peace Now and CWP have also often built relationships between their activists because

they are comprised of Jews and Palestinians striving towards the same goal (from the interview, 22.03.2018 and from the survey, 14.04.2018).

Last but not least, unlike grassroots organizations, perception changes are not connected with effective moderation in case of movements. Rather, these changes occur for the same reasons as new relationships are built. In other words, while grassroots CSOs attempt to alter the perceptions that the participants of its activities have towards the other side and the conflict in general by dialogues and other types of unofficial meetings, movements in this category have managed to change these perceptions by again uniting their activists around a common cause. This is evident in the cases of Peace Now and CWP, whose participants have often changed their perceptions towards the other nation and the most pressing issues of the conflict (Ibid). Ta'ayush, however, is a leader in this sense as well as it always manages to change the perceptions of its participants. This can be explained by the fact that Ta'ayush helps Palestinians rebuild their houses, contrary to what many Jews do (from the interview, 18.04.2018).

Outcomes

As mentioned earlier, the two outputs that the CSOs in this category have demonstrated are building relationships and changing perceptions. However, Outcomes are linked with the remaining two outputs – idea generation and effective moderation. In particular, as two of the outcomes include officials being directly or indirectly informed about the ideas generated by the activities of the CSOs, absence of idea generation automatically means the absence of these two outcomes. In addition, because the third outcome concerns the participation of officials in dialogues and other activities of the organizations, absence of such dialogues also brings about the absence of this outcome. Based on all these, it is logical that the CSOs that have not generated new ideas or have not had effective moderations, have not demonstrated any of the above-mentioned outcomes either. The only exception is Peace Now, whose activities have involved officials, but this has happened rarely (from the interview, 22.03.2018). The officials mainly include the members of Meretz and other left-wing parties in the Knesset. Peace Now has also informed officials directly about its ideas, but this has also happened rarely. Moreover, the movement has also sometimes informed officials indirectly,

mainly through left-wing members of Knesset, who then in turn inform the governing right-wing elites (Ibid).

The last outcome involves officials being pressured publicly, with the activists of these organizations demonstrating, protesting and organizing rallies. Thus, this is the outcome that all the CSOs in the category have displayed due to the fact that protests and demonstrations are their primary focus.

Impacts

As Impacts are the follow-up of Outcomes, the absence of the latter means the absence of the former as well. Thus, it is logical that again Peace Now is the only movement that has displayed any impacts. More precisely, in 2006, it filed a petition in the High Court against an Israeli outpost located on private Palestinian lands in Amona, which was accepted and nine structures were evacuated (Peace Now, 2006). What is more, in 2012, as a result of its campaign against the Knesset bill legalizing settlements in Migron, the bill failed to accumulate enough supports and was postponed (Peace Now, 2012). Last but not least, in 2017, Peace Now filed a complaint to the Attorney General against an illegal tender on Palestinian land. As a result of the complaint, this tender was abolished (from the interview, 22.03.2018). Hence, Peace Now has displayed Official Confirmation as officials adopted the idea that they had learned from the activities of the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour, since they implemented it.

4.3. Informants

Inputs

The CSOs in this category disseminate information publicly, which serves the purpose of affecting public opinion and turning it towards peace, stimulating public debate and contributing to conflict resolution. All of these organizations are registered in Israel, but B'Tselem – the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories and Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights operate in OPT. They see the Israeli occupation as the main source of human rights violations and, thus, are mainly concerned with documenting human rights violations in these territories and publicizing them, Breaking the Silence (BtS) is an organization of veteran combatants, who served

in the Israeli military forces after the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. The founders have decided to expose the Israeli and international public to the reality of life in the OPT (BtS, 2018).

All the CSOs in this category are entirely financed from foreign governmental sources, mainly from the EU and the US, and private funds. They find it important to maintain their independence and not receive any direct or indirect funding from the Israeli or Palestinian governmental bodies (Yesh Din, 2018). The longest-standing of these CSOs is B'Tselem, founded in 1989. It is also extremely experienced in the field. Since its foundation, it has been engaged in documenting human rights violations in the OPT, publishing statistics of death and killings, testimonies, videos and other materials that expose the truth about the occupation regime, which aims to raise awareness about these matters locally and internationally, which itself can put an end to the occupation (B'Tselem, 2018). Yesh Din is quite similar to B'Tselem with its competence areas and activities. It was founded in 2005 and has worked for long-term improvements in human rights situation in the OPT, legal advocacy and raising public awareness about these issues. It has established itself as a professional and a reliable human rights organization not only locally, but also internationally (Yesh Din, 2018). As mentioned earlier, Breaking the Silence collects anonymous testimonies from former Israeli soldiers to expose the reality of the conflict and life in the OPT to the Israeli and international public. To do so, since its foundation in 2004, BtS has been conducting lectures, exhibitions, tours and other public events. Up to date, the organization has collected testimonies from more than a thousand combatants (BtS, 2018).

As for the personnel and the relationships of these organizations, they are quite diverse. While B'Tselem is staffed with Israeli, Palestinian and international researchers, analysts and other employees, Yesh Din is mostly staffed with women, a majority of whom are volunteers. It does not present itself as a feminist organization, but it was founded by women (Yesh Din, 2018). Breaking the Silence on the other hand, is solely comprised of veteran Israeli soldiers, who themselves have experienced the reality of life under military control in OPT. Moreover, as all of these CSOs work on very sensitive topics, they have tense relations with the Israeli government, Zionists and other right-wing groups, but they are much supported by European governments and

foundations. B'Tselem, for instance, has developed a reputation among human rights organizations locally and internationally and is considered a reliable source, being widely cited. It partners with different human rights organizations in Israel and Palestine, as well worldwide (B'Tselem, 2017).

Activities

The longest-standing and the largest of Informants is B'Tselem. The primary focus of the organization is the documentation of human rights and IHL violations in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In this light, B'Tselem sends its field researchers to the most affected areas and also carries out different campaigns. Its activities revolve round four main goals. Firstly, the organization provides Israeli and international public with information about human rights and IHL violations and ill-treatment in the OPT. To do so, its researchers collect first-person testimonies from Palestinians living there and publish them. What is more, B'Tselem's volunteer Palestinians have their own cameras and document these kinds of violations themselves as well. These videos are accepted as evidence by Israeli courts (B'Tselem, 2016). Secondly, the organization works for accountability for violating the rights of Palestinians. To achieve this goal, B'Tselem files requests for investigation to Israeli law enforcement authorities, most of which are opened as court cases (Ibid). Thirdly, B'tselem attempts to increase the media coverage of the ongoing issues in the OPT. In this light, the organization shoots short films and videos which cover the most urgent issues in terms of human rights situation in the OPT and are available to the local and international publics (Ibid). Finally, the organizations advocates for policy changes to ensure the protection of human rights in the OPT. For this, it organizes study tours and briefings for policy-makers, diplomats and international organizations and runs media campaigns regarding the Israeli occupation and the detention of Palestinians (Ibid).

Another organization working for the documentation of human rights violations in the OPT is Yesh Din – Volunteers for Human Rights. The activities of Yesh Din are very similar to those of B'Tselem, but there are several main differences. First of all, while B'Tselem documents human rights and IHL violations perpetrated by Israeli authorities or IDF, Yesh Din also focuses on revealing violations committed by Jewish citizens against Palestinians. Secondly, whereas B'Tselem is concerned with the documentation

and revelation of human rights violations in total numbers, Yesh Din has a two-tiered approach focusing on individual cases and, where necessary, accompanying Palestinians to police stations as well as working at the systemic level, accumulating individual cases to present the whole picture (Yesh Din, 2018).

The activities of Yesh Din go into four directions. The first one revolves around occupation policies. In this sphere, Yesh Din disseminates information about illegal Palestinian land confiscation and violence against civilian population. To do so, since 2007, the organization publishes reports, position papers and articles, which are available to Israeli, Palestinian and international public. It also files petitions to the High Court of Israel. The second area includes settlements and outposts. In this sphere, Yesh Din primarily concentrates on illegal construction of Jewish settlements and outposts on private Palestinian lands, on eviction of Palestinians from their homes and on retroactively legalizing the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank. Since 2008, the organization has filed over 40 petitions to Israeli High Court, demanding the cessation of illegal construction and the demolition of already-built housing units (Ibid). Moreover, Yesh Din started publishing reports about these issues in 2011, which are available for local and international public. The third field, which is also one of the factors that distinguishes Yesh Din from other Informants, concerns settler violence. this is the domain Yesh Din is most engaged in. It claims that while Israeli public is of the opinion that violence against Palestinians committed by Jewish settlers in the West Bank are extreme cases that occur very rarely, in reality, this is a widespread practice, which includes violence, property damage, land expropriation and other offenses (Ibid). Dealing with this problem is part of the organization's two-tiered approach. Not only does it collect testimonies from affected Palestinians and publish reports, but it also files petitions to the High Court of Israel for investigation and assists individuals to submit their own lawsuits (where necessary, accompanies them to police stations). The final competence area of Yesh Din involves accountability. This is the field in which the activities of Yesh Din and B'Tselem have the most in common. Following Yesh Din, a lot of IDF soldiers often commit acts of violence against Palestinian civilians. To make the matters worse, they fail to fulfill their duty – protect Palestinians when the latter is attacked by Jewish settlers (Ibid). Therefore, the organization works to ensure the accountability of the perpetrators and publishes reports, articles and data sheets that are

publicly available. Most importantly, Yesh Din submits petitions to the High Court of Israel, demanding investigation of the cases or the prosecution of the perpetrators.

Unlike B'Tselem and Yesh Din, Breaking the Silence does not only spread info about the ongoing violations of human rights, but it also publicizes the testimonies of former Israeli soldiers, which cover multiple topics besides such violations. Thus, the activities of Breaking the Silence fall under four categories. Firstly, BtS holds lectures about the realities of life in the OPT, about fighting in Gaza and in the West Bank, about female soldiers in Israeli Defense Force units and about the life in Hebron, a city in the West Bank, administered jointly by the PA and Israel. The lectures aim to provide the Israeli public with the truth about these four topics, which BtS considers to be “grim” (BtS, 2018). Secondly, BtS holds photo exhibitions where former soldiers present photos they themselves took during their service, depicting military control over civilian population in the OPT (Ibid). The exhibitions target Israeli public and attempt to open their eyes wider with visual evidence from territories that are minutes away from their homes. Thirdly, BtS holds regular tours to Hebron and South Hebron Hills, which are guided by former combatants. Hebron is the second largest city in the West Bank and has a Jewish settlement right in the center. The visitors explore “the harsh results of the principle of separation and the military presence in the city” (Ibid). The tours are offered both in Hebrew and in English. Therefore, they are also targeted towards internationals. Finally, BtS takes anonymous testimonies from the soldiers that have served in the OPT since 2000 and publishes them both in Hebrew and in English in a publicly-accessible database in order to locally and internationally publicize the first-hand experience about abuse, assassinations, bribery, checkpoints, curfews and closures, deaths and killings, destruction of property, human shields, humiliation, looting, losses of livelihood, routine, rules of engagement, settlements and settler violence in the OPT (Ibid).

Outputs

All the the outputs besides changing perceptions is out of the competence area of Informants. However, they do not change the perceptions of their members or participants of their activities, as these people already have different assumptions about these issues. Rather, these CSOs have very often managed to change the perceptions of

those, who are exposed to the information publicized by them (from the interview, 29.03.2018 and 15.04.2018).

Outcomes

The only outcome that the CSOs in this category have displayed is Officials Learning Directly. In particular, B'Tselem very often informs officials. However, it does not inform them about ideas for conflict resolution, but about human rights violations in the OPT, which is still a part of the peace-building process. Moreover, as B'Tselem also very often indirectly informs officials about these matters through journalists, international diplomats and other interested individuals, who attend briefings and presentations regularly organized by it (from the interview, 29.03.2018). Similarly, Yesh Din has also often informed officials directly, but again not about ideas for conflict resolution. Rather, it reveals information about violations of Palestinians' rights and the violence perpetrated by Jewish settlers. Besides providing information about these matters through reports and testimonies, the activists of Yesh Din also accompany Palestinians to police stations and other state institutions and inform officials directly (from the interview, 15.04.2018). In the same manner, Breaking the Silence is also engaged in information dissemination and revealing the truth about the activities of Israeli forces in the OPT. Hence, officials very often learn directly from the organization by reports and testimonies that it publishes, as well as the frequent appearance of its representatives in the media.

Impacts

The impacts that these CSOs have are directly tied to the outcomes they have displayed. More precisely, B'Tselem has demonstrated Official Confirmation, with governmental structures taking its reports and petitions into consideration. In 2011, Israeli military decided to investigate every civilian death as a result of B'Tselem's petition to the High Court. Moreover, its reports about human rights and IHL violations are regularly addressed by Israeli policy-makers and most of its requests for investigation are opened as court cases. Last but not least, B'Tselem's videos of human rights and IHL violations were accepted as official evidence by Israeli courts (from the interview, 29.02.2018). Since Yesh Din is very similar to B'Tselem in its activities, it has also displayed

Official Confirmation, with governmental structures taking its reports and petitions into consideration. However, it has also demonstrated Observed Behaviour, since some of the lawsuits submitted by Palestinians with the help of Yesh Din have led to indictment and convictions. Moreover, the organization's complaints to the Military Policy Criminal Investigations Division have also led to indictment (Yesh Din, 2018).

4.4. Politically Involved Organizations

Inputs

The CSOs in this category advocate different political solutions to the conflict and serve as forums for dialogue between officials and non-officials. Therefore, they have diverse visions and types of activities. While the absolute majority of the CSOs in this category support a two-state solution in one or another form, the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies (AIES) works for environmental cooperation across Israel, Palestine and Jordan. The institute sees environmental cooperation as a means to foster peaceful relations between the parties and uses it as a model for cross-border cooperation in other areas, which will be the basis for conflict resolution (AIES, 2018). However, H.L. Education for Peace (Geneva Initiative) or simply GI and the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) advocate the two-state solution proposed by the Geneva Accord of 2003, which was a joint Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative facilitated and developed by civil society actors from both sides. Apart from this, PPC also strives for an independent Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, for a just resolution of the issue of Palestinian refugees and for the establishment of the borders of June 4th, 1967 between the two states (PPC, 2018). Unlike all the above-mentioned organizations, Two State One Homeland proposes its own eleven-point two-state solution, according to which the land is shared between Israel and Palestine and these two states are not completely separated (TSOH, 2018). OneVoice International, on the other hand, does not embrace a particular type of a two-state solution, but any that will result in “an independent and viable Palestine and a secure Israel free of conflict” (OneVoice, 2018).

Similarly to other CSOs engaged in peace-building in Israel-Palestine, these organizations are also funded from foreign sources. However, the Arava Institute is also financed from different offices of the Israeli government, along with foreign private

foundations and grants from the US and European governments. The Israeli governmental funds are allocated for ecological and environmental research carried out by the institute and not for peace-building projects, nonetheless (AIES, 2013). OneVoice International is also different from all the CSOs in this category since besides being funded by the US and the UK governments and various organizations from around the world, it itself provides financial support for grassroots peace-building (OneVoice, 2018).

Furthermore, the CSOs in this category are also very diverse in terms of their expertise. The longest-standing of them is the Arava Institute, founded in 1996, in the wake of the implementation process of the Oslo Accords. Since then, it has been preparing Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian young leaders to solve the environmental problems in cooperation with each other. Its reports about ecological matters have often been reflected in governmental activities as well (from the interview, 22.03.2018). What is more, the PPC is also an extremely experienced organization. It was founded in 2000 and has been engaged in building partnership with the Israeli peace camp, spreading the principles of non-violence, dialogue and tolerance, increasing international support for the Palestinian cause and for creating a space for rational dialogue about the solutions to the conflict, having led over 250 projects about these issues (PPC, 2018). The most important partner of the PPC is Geneva Initiative (GI), which itself was founded in 2003, after the creating of the Geneva Accord and has been active in promoting the official adoption of this document ever since. Besides this accord, it also promotes the adoption of other peace initiatives, such as the Quartet Roadmap, Clinton Parameters, Bush Vision and the Arab Peace Initiative (GI, 2018). Two States One Homeland, on the other hand, is relatively new, founded in 2013. It has been engaged with different societal levels to promote its own eleven-point two-state solution (from the interview, 12.04.2018). Unlike all the aforementioned CSOs, OneVoice is not involved in the conflict to a large extent. It was established in 2002 and has been addressing different political issues of the conflict with campaigns and similar activities.

The relationships and the personnel of these CSOs are also diverse. All of them partner with regional and international organizations, the EU and other European governments and the US. The PPC and GI are each other's largest partners, frequently conducting

joint projects. Contrary to these organizations, Two States One Homeland does not have permanent partners locally or internationally and forms ad hoc partnerships with different organizations in Israel during its events (Ibid). As for their personnel, due to the fact that the Arava Institute is an academic institution, its staff includes professional academics and its alumni, who also participate in various projects (AIES, 2018). The PPC is also distinct as brings together current and former ministers, members of the Legislative Council and various political parties as well as civil society activists and youth (PPC, 2018).

Activities

As noted above, the CSOs in this category advocate a two-state solution in different forms. To begin with, H.L. Education for Peace (Geneva Initiative) or simply GI supports the two-state solution based on the Geneva Accord of 2003. To do so, GI divides its focus in two main directions. Firstly, GI attempts to engage the Israeli society in various aspects of the conflict. It holds seminars, conferences, workshops, tours and lectures for Israeli journalists, civil society and opinion leaders as well as decision-makers, who also include officials from the center-right. During these meetings, the participants discuss the opportunities and challenges for the two-state solution and the possibilities for building peace (GI, 2017: 19). Moreover, GI also works in the peace-building sphere, which includes joint activities for Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers, journalists, women, and youth. Besides discussing the opportunities and challenges to the resolution of the conflict, these meetings enable its attendees to tackle misperceptions, dispel stereotypes and realize that there are partners committed to peace on the other side (Ibid: 4).

Like Geneva Initiative, the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) also advocates the two-state solution based on the Geneva Accord of 2003. To do so, its activities go into three main directions. Firstly, in the direction of political dialogue, PPC focuses on dialogue with its Israeli partners and organizes symposiums about the two-state solution, the issues of Palestinian refugees, the end of Israeli and the adoption of the Geneva Initiative of 2003 as the permanent status agreement (from the interview, 02.04.2018). Secondly, in the sphere of outreach and peace education, the organization is active in educating and empowering Palestinians, mainly youth and women. PPC conducts a lot

of different workshops, seminars and lectures about cultural aspects of both societies, the role of individuals in peace-building, shared national responsibility, the importance of dialogue and non-violence and communication (Ibid). Finally, in the domain of international advocacy, the target audience for PPC is the international community and media. The organization works for building a local and an international base that supports the Palestinian cause and people in protecting their rights. In this regard, PPC holds workshops and seminars that are attended by international diplomats and journalists and other representatives from different kinds of media (Ibid).

Unlike the CSOs described above, as already mentioned, Two States One Homeland (TSOH) has its own eleven-point two-state solution that is distinct from all the other political solutions to the conflict. To spread its message, the activities of TSOH go into several different directions. Firstly, the representatives of TSOH meet with local communities where they discuss the two-state solution offered by the movement, its opportunities and importance, the reasons for its success and for the failure of other solutions (from the interview, 12.04.2018). Secondly, TSOH holds conferences three-four times a year, which is attended by Knesset members and other opinion shapers and policy makers in Israel. The attendees discuss the two-state solution offered by TSOH and the possibilities of its implementation (Ibid). Finally, TSOH publishes articles, papers and other information in different media sources, which serves the purpose of advocating its cause for bigger local and international masses. What is more, its representatives participate in conferences in different European countries to raise awareness and support for the solution it offers (Ibid).

Furthermore, OneVoice International is in favour of the existence of independent Israeli and Palestinian states. To achieve this, besides supporting organizations in Israel and Palestine, OneVoice conducts programs of its own in the region. It has initiated different campaigns which encouraged average Israeli and Palestinians to become more active in achieving peace and a two-state solution (OneVoice, 2006) and under which movies based on the essays written by 2 500 Jewish and Palestinian schoolchildren were shown worldwide, aiming to create hope in the region that peace will be achieved (OneVoice, 2008). Moreover, throughout 2009-2010, OneVoice organized meetings in town halls between Jews and Palestinians, where the participants talked about the

pressing issues and expressed their private views. The talks also helped to create the feeling that there are partners on both sides willing to end the conflict (OneVoice, 2010). After these talks, OneVoice moved to creating a forum through which the public could actually communicate with their governmental leaders and share the ideas they had. OneVoice co-founded its first caucus in the Knesset, which worked for the achievement of a two-state solution (OneVoice, 2011). In 2012 and 2013, two other caucuses were created in the Knesset, which worked for ending the Israeli-Arab conflict (not only Palestinian). What is more, OneVoice has also worked for raising public awareness about settlements and its effect on everyday lives of Palestinians. Its young representatives marched in the streets of Israeli cities holding giant checks of NIS 32 billion, which is the amount that Israeli authorities spend on these settlements a year. The marchers spread the message to average Israelis that each of them loses one-month rent of their apartments or one-semester tuition fee at universities every year because of these constructions (OneVoice, 2014). However, perhaps, the most important activity for OneVoice was its first annual conference in Tel Aviv, where the economic issues of the conflict were discussed and which was attended by MKs and former Israeli ministers, journalists and 500 Israelis (Ibid).

Last but not least, The Arava Institute for Environmental Studies is the only CSO in the category that uses environmental cooperation to bring Jews and Palestinians, as well as Jordanians, closer together. In 2016, it initiated a “Track II Environmental Forum,” which enables its participants from Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian civil societies to work together on issues like climate change, renewable energy, and similar matters. The Institute considers this kind of cooperation to be contributing to the process of fostering long-term understanding between the three. In the same year, the Institute also began holding annual conferences about cross-border environmental cooperation, which not only includes non-officials but also MKs and Palestinian politicians. These conferences aim to encourage dialogue between governmental and civil society representatives, as well as the conflicting parties. By discussing environmental issues, the Arava Institute attempts to challenge the perception that there are no partners on the other side, which can also contribute to building partnerships in conflict resolution (AIES, 2017).

Outputs

As the CSOs in this category are involved in the political aspects of the conflict in ways distinct from each other, their outputs also differ. In particular, the activities of the Arava Institute always generate ideas about how to deepen cooperation between Israel and Palestine, which can lead to conflict resolution (from the interview, 22.03.2018). Similarly, as OneVoice is active in various fields of the conflict, its activities very often generate new ideas about how to eradicate the most serious problems connected with the conflict, rather than about how to resolve it (from the survey, 31.03.2018). Unlike these two, Geneva Initiative and Two States One Homeland are both oriented towards promoting a two-state solution in one or another form. Thus, their activities do not generate new ideas (from the interview, 12.04.2018). Even though PPC does not focus on finding new ways for resolving the conflict and works for advancing the two-state solution, new ideas have still very often been generated about the ways to address the most pressing issues of the conflict (from the interview, 02.04.2018).

Furthermore, although these CSOs are primarily concerned with political aspects of the conflict, some of them still work for fostering close interactions between Jews and Palestinians and also frequently serve as moderators. More precisely, because of its effective moderations, Arava Institute has always built relationships between and changed the perceptions of the participants of its activities (from the interview, 22.03.2018). Similarly, OneVoice International has frequently served as a moderator and its moderations have been effective, which have very often led the participants of its activities to build relationships. What is more, these people, along with the general public have also very often changed their perceptions of the conflict as a result of the campaigns and other activities of OneVoice (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In the same manner, Geneva Initiative has had effective moderations due to which the attendees have often changer their perceptions as well as built relationships (GI, 2017: 4). However, unlike these organizations, the PPC has had ineffective moderations and the fact that it has often built relationships between and changed the perceptions of the participants of its activities can be put down to fact that it is engaged in various spheres of the conflict and conducts a lot of different types of activities besides moderations (from the interview, 02.04.2018).

Outcomes

Due to the fact that the CSOs in this category are involved in the political aspects of the conflict, it is logical that all of them have displayed certain outcomes. In particular, the Arava Institute has sometimes included officials in its activities, mainly MKs and Palestinian politicians (from the interview, 22.03.2018). Official participation has also often occurred in case of Geneva Initiative – a part of its activities is to organize meetings for Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers, journalists, women, and youth. Similarly, officials have sometimes participated in the activities of OneVoice as well, namely in the conferences it has organized, which have been attended by MKs and former ministers (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In the same manner, officials, mainly Palestinians, but also Israelis, often participate in Palestinian Peace Coalition's activities, primarily in the dialogues, symposiums, and conferences it organizes about the two-state solution, the issues of refugees and the Geneva Accord (from the interview, 02.04.2018). Last but not least, as Two States One Homeland promotes its own eleven-point two-state solution, officials that support the plan often participate in the dialogues the organization holds about it as well (from the interview, 12.04.2018).

Furthermore, officials sometimes learn directly from the Arava Institute, as it provides them with reports and information about ways to use environmental cooperation in peace-building (from the interview, 22.03.2018). OneVoice International has also often directly informed officials about new ideas generated during its activities, mainly different ministries and MKs (from the survey, 31.03.2018). In addition, as PPC works closely with the members of the PA, it very often directly informs them about its ideas. Two States One Homeland, however, often informs those officials who are against peace or who are in favour of the one-state solution about the necessity of the two-state solution as presented by the organization (from the interview, 12.04.2018).

As for Officials Learning Indirectly, OneVoice International and the PPC are the only CSOs that have displayed this outcome. In particular, One Voice has very often indirectly informed officials about the ways to contribute to peace and eradicate the existent problems through the three caucuses it has co-founded in the Knesset. As for PPC, officials have also sometimes been indirectly informed about the organization's ideas by its local and international partners (from the interview, 02.04.2018). Last but

not least, OneVoice is the only CSOs in this category that has also pressured officials publicly primarily by its numerous public campaigns, which include installations in the street, but also by marches against settlement-building and land confiscation.

Impacts

Even though all the CSOs in this category displayed outcomes, only three of them have had impacts. In particular, besides being involved in the political matters of the conflict, OneVoice is also engaged in non-violent resistance against occupational policies. In 2014, OneVoice initiated a campaign, during which 10 000 shekel notes with Finance Minister Yair Lapid's face were distributed throughout Israel to protest the construction of additional settlements in the West Bank. Less than a week later Lapid announced that he would not transfer any more money for new settlement construction (OneVoice, 2014). In this case, OneVoice displayed Official Confirmation. This outcome has also been demonstrated by Palestinian Peace Coalition, as its proposal about the issue of Palestinian refugees was adopted by the PA and became its official position. The proposal puts forward the following possibilities: 1) their return to the future state of Palestine; 2) complete settlement and full integration in their host countries (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon); 3) their relocation to other countries in the Arab world, as well as outside the region; and 4) return of a small portion of these refugees to Israel, but not of fewer than their average number in other countries (from the interview, 02.04.2018). Two States One Homeland has also displayed Official Confirmation since its 11-point solution to the conflict has been accepted as a viable solution by the Israeli President Reuven Rivlin (from the interview, 12.04.2018).

As for Observed Behaviour, OneVoice International is the only CSOs that has demonstrated this outcome. More precisely, in 2012, Israeli forces intended to confiscate land from Palestinians in the village of Beit Oula, but the process stopped because of the protest organized by OneVoice (from the survey, 31.03.2018). This is an instance of Observed Behaviour since officials acted in ways consistent with the demands of the movement. However, even though the eleven-point two-state solution proposed by Two States One Homeland was accepted by the Israeli president, as it has not been implemented, it cannot be considered Observed Behaviour.

4.5. Mixed Organizations

Inputs

The CSOs in this category combine grassroots activities, information dissemination, political involvement and non-violent resistance. In particular, The Abraham Fund Initiatives (AFI) is engaged in grassroots work and information dissemination and works for achieving full and equal citizenship of Israel for Jews and Arabs (AFI, 2018). Grassroots work and information dissemination is the competence area of The Parents' Circle – the Families' Forum's (PCFF) as well. It is a joint Israeli-Palestinian non-profit association that is comprised of the family members of those that have been killed as a result of the conflict. It believes the achievement of the political solution to the conflict needs a base and sees the reconciliation of the peoples as such a base (PCFF, 2018). In addition, Windows – Channels for Communication (simply Windows) is another organization working in the same area. It is a joint Israeli-Palestinian NGO that works for carrying out long-term educational programs for youth, which go deep into the details and the most troubling issues of the conflict, attempting to alter the perceptions of youngsters from both sides and cause a change in the conditions of the conflict through publicity (Windows, 2018).

Contrary to the CSOs described above, Combatants for Peace (CFP) and Wi'am: The Palestinian Conflict Transformation Center (Wi'am) combine grassroots work with non-violent resistance against what they see as the Israeli occupation policies. More precisely, CFP was founded by former IDF soldiers and former Palestinian combatants and works for transforming and resolving the conflict, ending the Israeli occupation and building a peaceful future (CFP, 2018). Wi'am, on the other hand, is a grassroots CSO in Palestine that works for promoting peace, justice, acceptance, reconciliation and the transformation of the conflict. Not only does it focus on these values, but it also attempts to eradicate the division inside the Palestinian society (Wi'am, 2018).

Last but not least, Women Wage Peace (WWP) is different from all the above-mentioned CSOs, as it does not focus on grassroots work and combines non-violent resistance against occupation with political involvement in the conflict. It works for the achievement of a non-violent, mutually acceptable solution to the conflict (WWP,

2018). What is more, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) is also exceptional as it is active in three different fields: non-violent resistance, political involvement and information dissemination. In particular, ICAHD attempts to end the demolition of Palestinians' houses by Israeli forces. It also works for the dissemination of information and a just political settlement of the conflict. It is one of the first organizations in Israel to announce that it supports a one-state solution, in which both Jews and Palestinians live together and aspire to their rights (ICAHD, 2018).

Furthermore, these CSOs are very diverse in terms of their funding as well. While CFP and PCFF are financed from foreign sources – governmental entities and private foundations, Wi'am is also funded by donations from individuals, as well as foreign governmental donors (NGO Monitor, 2017). Windows, on the other hand, is mainly financed by private foundations and its only governmental donor is the Swiss Embassy to Israel. It also has a relatively small income from its Public Programs such as tours, public events and Arabic classes (Windows, 2018). AFI is also funded by foreign sources, but they only include private funds and individuals (AFI, 2018), while WWP is the only CSO in this category that is also financed by donors from Israel as well as abroad, most of which are private individuals (WWP, 2018). Finally, this kind of information is unavailable for ICAHD because it removed all the information about its donors and finances in 2015 (NGO Monitor, 2016).

These CSOs are also distinct from each other in terms of their expertise. The longest-standing of them is The Abraham Fund Initiatives, founded in 1989 and having been engaged in various activities since then. In 2003 it began advocating for institutional changes in Israel, which would contribute to the construction of a just and inclusive society and started implementing different programs for fostering close interaction between the two peoples (AFI, 2018). Another CSO that started out as a low-profile organization, but expanded later is Windows, which started as a volunteer-based organization in 1991. It began with training young Israeli and Palestinian journalists to publish a Hebrew-Arabic magazine, looking into the facts about the conflict more deeply and analytically and tackling with misinformation. Throughout the years of its existence, it has developed new ways of operation, such as educational programs for youth and children, public events, and tours, which serve the purpose of changing

misperceptions, exposing the truth and encouraging interaction (Windows, 2018). It also remained very active during the Second Intifada of 2000-2005, holding lectures, debates, movie nights and tours to provide an alternative to the information spread by mainstream media. Moreover, in 2000, it began a Humanitarian Aid Project, delivering communities in need both in Palestine and In Israel food, clothing and household items (Ibid). The project continued till 2011 and gave the organization a first-hand experience of what exactly the situation was in the most affected areas, as well as a reputation. Finally, Wi'am is another CSO that is also experienced in multiple fields. It was founded in 1994 and has been engaged in almost every field of Palestinian social life since then. Besides its peace-building programs, it has also been active in fighting domestic violence inside the Palestinian society and empowering women (Wi'am, 2018). However, the newest of the CSOs in this category is Women Wage Peace, with only around three years of expertise. It was founded in 2014 after the Gaza War. Since its inception, the WWP has held hundreds of meetings between Jews and Palestinians, dozens of exhibitions about peace, has participated in tens of discussions, conferences, and lectures at universities, and organized several mass events (WWP, 2018).

The CSOs in this category also differ from each other with regards to their personnel and relationships. The one with the biggest network of connections is AFI, which is staffed with Jews, Palestinians, and internationals. It also has offices in New York and London and has relations with different educational and governmental institutions in Israel and a lot of private foundations in Europe and in the US. In 2007, it was granted Special Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (United Nations, 2008: 7). Moreover, CFP is another CSO that has also received several awards for peace-building and non-violence from Israeli and international organizations. It is staffed with former Israeli and Palestinian combatants as well as other employees and partners with local and international NGOs, as well as foreign governmental entities (CFP, 2018)). Furthermore, ICAHD also has support groups abroad, namely in the US, the UK, Germany, Finland, and Australia. It partners with different organizations in Israel and Palestine and is mainly staffed with Israelis but is open to everyone who wants to become a member (ICAHD, 2018).

Unlike the above-mentioned organizations, PCFF, Windows and WWP do not have large networks of connections. However, they are large in terms of their personnel. Firstly, as already mentioned, it is staffed with the Jews and Palestinians who lost their family members because of the conflict and involves over 600 families. Secondly, the personnel of Windows consists of not only locals but also internationals. It has a small staff, a large portion of which are volunteers. Nevertheless, the organization works in a triangular format – bringing together Israeli Jews, Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinians from the West Bank, allowing the three communities to discuss the issues that trouble them in particular (Windows, 2018). Finally, WWP is Israel's largest grassroots movement. It has around 30 000 Jewish and Palestinian members from the right, center and the left from both Israel and Palestine (WWP, 2018).

Activities

The Abraham Fund Initiatives is the only CSOs in this category that allocates a great deal of attention to education. More specifically, AFI considers language to be an important bridge and social glue. Therefore, AFI started the project Ya Salam – Spoken Arabic in 2005. As part of Ya Salam, schoolchildren start learning Arabic from Arab teachers, which also gets them acquainted with Arabic culture and the aspects it shares with Jewish culture. In 2016, Spoken Arabic became mandatory for all Jewish schools (AFI, 2018). AFI also implemented a one-year pilot project Ivrit B'Salam – Spoken Hebrew in 2014-2015 in 28 Arabic schools, which not only served the purpose of increasing the Hebrew fluency of Arab schoolchildren but also deepening their knowledge of Jewish culture and fostering interaction with Jews (Ibid).

AFI also works for leadership development and empowerment. In this light, the organization launches tours to the Knesset for Arab women, during which they discuss political issues and acquire leadership skills. In 2015, Under the project Community Volunteering, Arab school-leavers work in local welfare and educational institutions, which provides them with equal opportunities to those of Jews and also prepares them for university entrance exams. All of this aims towards connecting the two societies and building a peaceful future (Ibid). Furthermore, under the project Minority Mainstreaming in the Media, AFI study tours for Hebrew-language journalists around Israel and the West Bank, as a result of which translated updates from Arabic media are

sent out around Israel, which also reaches decision makers (Ibid). Apart from this, AFI is also active in the sphere of safe communities and police, which makes the organization unique, as it is the only one in the category to be working hand in hand with the police system. More precisely, officers from Israeli police attend trainings about cultural issues in the Arab communities, as well their needs and rights, which serves the purpose of at improving the relations between Israeli police force and Arab citizens (Ibid).

Besides, AFI, another organization engaged in grassroots work and information dissemination is The Parents' Circle – The Families' Forum (PCFF). The participants of Dialogue Meetings, which includes adults, youth, and schoolchildren, tell each other personal stories related to the conflict to show the negative effects and why it is necessary to choose reconciliation over fighting and (PCFF, 2018). Another comprehensive project that PCFF has run since 2006 is the Israeli-Palestinian Memorial Day Ceremony. The project entails a ceremony that is held every year on the eve of the Memorial Day for Israeli Soldiers. The reason PCFF chose the latter date is to hold their own ceremony is to convey a message to both parties that war is a choice and not a predetermined conditioned. The ceremony is attended by Israeli and Palestinian bereaved families, intellectuals and musicians (Ibid). A similar project is the International Peace Day Events carried out by PCFF between 2008 and 2014. The International Peace Day is celebrated on September 21st and PCFF held dialogue meetings about the possibilities and setbacks for peace-building (Ibid). In the field of information revelation element, PCFF runs two creative projects. The Exhibitions project presents photos depicting the atrocities of the conflict and hand-made objects and other artifacts showing messages in favour of peace-building. The Taking Steps project brings together the Palestinian female members of PCFF, who embroider a bird – as a symbol of peace – on shoes and later sell them locally and internationally. Both of these projects aim to raise awareness about the destructive effect of the conflict and the need for its resolution.

The final CSO in this category that combines grassroots work with information dissemination is Windows – Channels for Communication. The organization's main project is Youth Media and Action Program (YMAP), which facilitates meetings and

discussions with "the other side." The program also provides the participants with skills to become parts of movements that call for a change in Israeli and Palestinian societies (Windows, 2018). Apart from this, Windows runs a humanitarian program that empowers women and youth, helps locals with the sale of olive oil and embroidery, and provides humanitarian aid where necessary in the West Bank. In Israel, on the other hand, Windows distributes Hebrew-Arabic magazine, offering the public alternative information to the one spread by mainstream Israeli media. It also runs Public Programs that include film screening, educational tours, and lectures, which are also held in English (Ibid). In addition, Windows has developed its own Theory of Change, which is a methodology that works step by step, explaining how a change in such a conflictual situation can actually be achieved. The organization trains educators from schools, individuals and representatives from other NGOs in this Theory, providing them with conflict-management skills and sharing its long experience with them (Ibid).

Unlike the CSOs described above, Combatants for Peace (CFP) combines grassroots work with nonviolent resistance. In particular, CFP is committed to fostering mutual understanding among the peoples. Since its foundation in 2006, CFP has been organizing monthly tours to Bethlehem, which serve the purpose of showing the visitors the realities connected with the Separation Wall, the settlement-building and the general impact of the conflict on people's lives (CFP, 2018). In addition, in 2012, CFP initiated a project Face-to-Face, which aimed to promote the values of non-violence and mutual understanding. The members of the organization spread posters around cities in Israel and Palestine with messages calling for ending the occupation, recognition of the other side and the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement (CFP, 2012). As for non-violent resistance, CFP protests against the violations of Palestinians' rights. In this direction, CFP has organized over 70 protests and rallies against settlement-construction, illegal land confiscation, the destruction of Palestinian's farms and livelihood, illegal construction of roads and uprooting of olive trees (one of the main sources of income for Palestinians) as well as several solidarity rallies for those killed or severely harmed by the conflict.

Similarly to CFP, Wi'am: The Palestinian Conflict Transformation Center also combines grassroots work with non-violent resistance. More precisely, firstly, Wi'iam

holds trainings and capacity-building workshops for Palestinian youth about topics like conflict transformation, advocacy, intercultural dialogue, leadership, democracy and human rights. This aims to create young leaders who will become agents of peaceful resolution of the conflict (Wi'am, 2018). Secondly, Wi'am also organizes educational and cultural tours for internationals and interested individuals to show them the cultural heritage of Palestine and highlight Palestinians' historical attachment to the land, as well as demonstrate the realities of Palestinian cities and the effect of occupation on them (Ibid). Finally, Wi'am is engaged in non-violent resistance against Israeli occupation policies. It often organizes demonstrations against the separation wall, uprooting of olive trees (which is one of the most important raw materials for Palestinians) and the illegal apprehension of Palestinians.

Furthermore, Women Wage Peace attempts to transform the conflict through public pressure and political involvement. The very first activity of WWP was the creation of the movement in 2014, during which 1 000 women dressed in white and rode a train to Sderot as an expression of their commitment to peace. Since 2015, however, WWP has organized numerous peaceful protests demanding a peace initiative from the Israeli government, as well as marches in the Israeli cities involving 30 000 people (WWP, 2018). As for WWP's political involvement, in 2017, it created the Women's Caucus for Peace and Security in the Knesset, which is jointly run by Knesset members (MKs) from the Zionist Camp and a left-wing group Meretz (Braudo-Bahat, 2017). The Caucus works for the achievement of a mutually acceptable political settlement of the conflict (Ibid).

Last but not least, the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) is different from all the CSOs in this category as it is simultaneously engaged in non-violent resistance, political involvement, and information dissemination. Its primary focus is resisting the demolition of Palestinians' houses, though. The activists of ICAHD physically surround the houses, blocking the vehicles from demolishing them. In addition, it also encourages Palestinians as well as Israelis to rebuild those houses that have been brought down (ICAHD, 2018). Secondly, ICAHD also Works for a political settlement of the conflict. In this domain, it endorses two political solutions: strives for ending the existence of Israel as nation-state for only Jews and for creating a

single state for both peoples; or transforming Israel into a democratic state, which will protect the rights of its Palestinian minority and which will exist alongside an independent state of Palestine (Ibid). Finally, in the sphere of information dissemination, ICAHD provides the local and international public with information about the realities of the OPT and the demolition of Palestinians' houses by organizing briefings, conferences, and tours to the OPT as well as to different parts of Israel. Moreover, the organization produces books, pamphlets, reports, position papers, films and other material about these matters. What is more, ICAHD often meets with diplomats, journalists, international activists, fact finders and interested individuals to provide them with information about the above-mentioned issues (Ibid).

Outputs

As the CSOs in this category are engaged in multiple spheres of the conflict, they have also displayed a wide range of outputs. Firstly, as AFI works with different age groups (children youth and adults) as well as societal sectors (communities, police and the media), its activities often generate ideas (from the survey, 27.03.18). Secondly, besides protesting against and physically blocking the demolition of Palestinians houses by Israeli forces, ICAHD is also engaged in finding political solutions to the conflict. Therefore, it sometimes generates new ideas about how to solve the conflict (from the interview, 16.04.2018). Thirdly, even though Wi'am aims at fostering close interactions between Jews and Palestinians, as well as demonstrating against the violations of Palestinians' rights, it still conducts dialogue meetings, as a result of which, new ideas are generated but rarely (from the interview, 14.04.2018). Windows, however, has very often generated new ideas through its numerous dialogues and other meetings (from the interview, 23.03.2018).

As most of the CSOs in this category are engaged in grassroots work besides other types of activities, building relationships is the outcome they have displayed good track records of. To begin with, Windows has always managed to build relationships between the participants of its activities because it is very actively engaged in grassroots work, involving a lot of Jews and Palestinians (from the interview, 23.03.2018). Secondly, Combatants for Peace has often built the relationships of its members and the participants of its activities, be it dialogue meetings or protests (from the interview,

18.04.2018). Thirdly, the PCFF has also often built relationships, since it creates communities comprised of Jews and Palestinians to advance peace-building even further (PCFF, 2018). Fourthly, even though AFI very actively conducts grassroots projects, its representatives have indicated that they have only sometimes built relationships between its participants. The same result has been produced by Wi'am, which has also sometimes built relationships between the attendees of its projects. This can be explained by the fact that Wi'am is not very active in bi-national grassroots projects (from the interview, 14.04.2018). Last but not least, even though grassroots work is out of the focus of WWP and ICAHD, they still have good track records. In particular, WWP has always managed to build relationships between the participants of its activities, as it organizes numerous rallies, protests, and other mass events, during which Jews and Palestinians fight for a common cause, which greatly contributes to the formation of friendships and partnerships (from the survey, 19.04.2018). As for ICAHD, due to its joint character and the fact that it works for Palestinians' rights, its activities have often built the relationships between participants (from the interview, 16.04.2018).

Furthermore, like for many grassroots CSOs, effective moderation and changed perceptions are linked with each other for the organizations in this category as well. In other words, the CSOs that have had effective or mostly effective moderations, also displayed that their participants have changed their perceptions of the other side and the conflict. In particular, even though WWP is a movement, it has still moderated hundreds of unofficial dialogues between Jews and Palestinians and its moderations have been very effective, as a result of which, the organization has always managed to change the perceptions of the participants of its activities (from the survey, 19.04.2018). In the same manner, the PCFF has had effective moderations during its unofficial meetings between Jews and Palestinians and has, thus, always changed the perceptions of the participants of its activities. On top of this, its good record for this outcome is also connected to the fact that PCFF spreads information about the negative aspects of the conflict as well (PCFF, 2018). Finally, AFI also frequently serves as moderator for unofficial dialogue between Jews and Palestinians and its moderations are mostly effective. What is more, the organization is also engaged in information dissemination with schools, communities and the general public. Nevertheless, AFI's representatives

indicated that its projects have only sometimes changed the perceptions of their participants (from the survey, 27.03.2018).

Moreover, this category also includes CSOs, for which changing perceptions does not depend on effective moderation. To begin with, Windows has not had effective moderations, but it is actively engaged in information dissemination. Therefore, it has always managed to change the perceptions of those, who are exposed to the alternative truth the organization spreads (from the interview, 23.09.2018). Apart from this, ICAHD has also often changed the perceptions of the general public as the movement actively disseminates information about what it sees as the occupation of Palestine by Israel and also protests against it (from the interview, 16.04.2018). Last but not least, demonstrations against what they regard as Israel's occupational policies is also the reason why CFP and Wi'am have very often altered the perceptions about the conflict that exist in the Israeli and Palestinian society. In particular, CFP regularly organizes protests against the violations of Palestinians' rights by Israel, which contributes to the process of breaking the deeply-rooted "national consensus" of the Israeli society about the other side and the conflict (from the interview, 18.04.2018). As for Wi'am, besides human rights violations, it also protests against the Separation Wall, uprooting of olive trees (which is one of the most important raw materials for Palestinians) and the illegal apprehension of Palestinians, which serves as the basis for changing the perceptions of the local public (from the interview, 14.04.2018).

Outcomes

As these CSOs are diverse in terms of their functionality, they also differ in their outcomes. Most of them have displayed Official Participation with varied results. Firstly, officials have also often participated in the activities carried out by AFI (from the survey, 27.03.2018). More precisely, as AFI holds different educational projects, the ministry of education is very much involved in these projects. What is more, AFI organizes visits to the Knesset for Arab women, in which MKs also take part (AFI, 2018). Secondly, officials very often participate in dialogues and discussions that WWP organizes. These are primarily the representatives of the Israeli left, right, and center (WWP, 2018). Finally, officials have sometimes participated in the activities of CFP.

These mainly include left-wing MKs who support the organization and its cause (from the interview, 18.04.2018).

As for Officials Learning Directly, only two CSOs have demonstrated this outcome. In particular, AFI also very often informs officials about the new ideas it has, as well as about challenges to the coexistence of the two peoples (from the survey, 27.03.2018). In addition, officials sometimes learn directly from ICAHD as well not only about the human rights violations and illegal demolitions of Palestinians' houses, but also about ideas for conflict resolution. Officials are mainly informed by books, pamphlets, reports, position papers, films and other material published by ICAHD (ICAHD, 2018). Women Wage Peace, however, is the only CSO from which officials learn indirectly. As WWP has its own Caucus in the Knesset, officials are very often indirectly informed about the violations of Palestinians' rights, the most pressing issues of the conflict and the need for peace by the Caucus members (from the survey, 19.04.2018).

Last but not least, some of the CSOs in this category have also pressured officials publicly. First of all, the activists of CFP have held over 70 protests and rallies against settlement-construction, illegal land confiscation and other violations of Palestinians' rights (CFP, 2018). Secondly, the activists of ICAHD physically surround Palestinians' houses, blocking the vehicles from demolishing them. What is more, they also take part in demonstrations organized by other movements in Israel (ICAHD, 2018). Thirdly, WWP has organized tens of demonstrations, rallies, and marches in protest of Israeli policies and in support of peace. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the movement was symbolized by a march, in which 1000 activists took part (WWP, 2018). Last but not least, Wi'am is also engaged in non-violent resistance against the Separation Wall, uprooting of olive trees and the illegal apprehension of Palestinians (Wi'am, 2018). What is more, this is the only outcome that the organization has displayed.

Impacts

Even though most of the CSOs in the category displayed outcomes, the only one that has shown impact is The Abraham Fund Initiatives. More precisely, the Spoken Arabic project – Ya Salam – which was proposed by AFI, was adopted by the Ministry of Education and it became mandatory in every Jewish school in 2016 (AFI, 2016). In

addition, AFI also designed a program for training Israeli police in Palestinian cultural aspects to increase their sensitivity and reduce tension between the police and Palestinian communities. The Israeli police adopted this program and incorporated it into its internal training (from the survey, 27.03.2018). Hence, AFI has displayed Official Confirmation as the Ministry adopted the ideas that it had learned from the activities of the organization, as well as Observed Behaviour since they implemented them.

5. The Summary of the Findings

The indicator employed for measuring the minimum changes that the selected CSOs have produced was Outputs (namely, Idea Generation, Building Relationships, Effective Moderation and Changing Perceptions), whereas the maximum changes were reflected in Impacts (namely, Official Confirmation and Observed Behaviour). The results that these CSOs have demonstrated vary across the categories and are intrinsically linked with their functionality. To begin with, as Grassroots Organizations investigated in the thesis involve ordinary citizens and non-officials and work for intercultural exchange, close interactions and consequential reconciliation of the two peoples, their role is limited to Outputs, which is the criterion that precisely concerns the people-to-people level. In addition, most of them displayed that they have had effective or very effective moderations and have often, very often or always managed to build relationships and change the perceptions of the participants of their activities. As for idea generation, this output is not the primary focus of these grassroots CSOs because of their functionality and the competence area. Nevertheless, most of them have produced new ideas about how to build peace or transform the conflict, but rarely or only sometimes. Furthermore, the functionality of the selected CSOs is major factor for Outcomes (Official Participation, Officials Learning Directly, Officials Learning Indirectly and Officials Pressured Publicly) as well. As these organizations are oriented towards people-to-people level rather than towards the official level and do not attempt to transform the conflict through public pressure either, only two of them have directly or indirectly informed officials about their ideas, but this has happened rarely or only sometimes. The same is true for the remaining two Outcomes as well. By the same logic, Impacts is the criterion in which these grassroots CSOs do not have any results. The only exception is Sadaka-Reut, with its idea of business-free racism having been implemented as an ethical code in one of the governmental institutions of Israel. Thus, it can be concluded that these CSOs have performed effectively at the people-to-people level (Outputs), but have been ineffective at the official level (Outcomes and Impacts).

Unlike Grassroots CSOs, Resistance Movements attempt to transform or end the conflict through public pressure, due to which, none of the four outputs are their primary focus. Yet, most of them have often, very often or always built relationships

between and changed the perceptions of their activities. However, as Outcomes are linked with the remaining two outputs – Idea generation and Effective moderation, the absence of these two outputs leads to the absence of Outcomes. The only exception is Peace Now, which is also the only CSO from the category that has had moderations. Its activities have involved officials, but this has happened rarely. In the same manner, as Impacts are the follow-up of Outcomes, the absence of the latter means the absence of the former as well. Thus, it is logical that again Peace Now is the only movement that has displayed any impacts. As for the last outcome, Officials Pressured Publicly, it is the one that all the CSOs from this category have displayed due to the fact that protests and demonstrations are their main functions. Hence, all this speaks to the effectiveness at the people-to-people level of even those CSOs that do not explicitly aim at Outputs, but their limited effect on the official level.

Moreover, as Informants primarily work for revealing human rights violations or other atrocities in the OPT, all the outputs besides changing perceptions is out of their competence area. Therefore, they have very often managed to change the perceptions of those, who are exposed to the information publicized by them. Precisely due to the functions that these CSOs have, officials often or very often learn directly from them about human rights violations in the OPT, rather than about ideas for conflict resolution (in the case of B'Tselem, officials very often learn indirectly as well). Following the same line, the impacts that these CSOs have are directly tied to the outcomes they have displayed, with their reports about IHL and human rights violations in the OPT being considered by Israeli courts and leading to indictments. Thus, Informants have proved effective at the official level.

In addition, since Politically Involved Organizations are engaged in the political aspects of the conflict in different ways, Idea Generation is part of their work. Therefore, most of them have very often produced new ideas about how to solve the conflict (the ones that have not done so are those that work for the promotion of the two-state solution and for finding new resolution mechanisms). Although other outputs are out of their competence area, most of them have often or very often built relationships between and changed the perceptions of the participants of their activities and have had effective moderations. Logically enough, the CSOs in this category are the ones that have

performed the best at the level Outcomes and Impacts. More specifically, all of them have sometimes or often included officials in their activities and most of them also directly and indirectly informed officials about their ideas. As for Impacts, these ideas have been both adopted (Official Confirmation) and put into practice (Observed Behaviour) for most of the CSOs. Thus, such results highlight the effectiveness of Politically Involved Organizations at people-to-people, as well as the official level.

Last but not least, despite the fact that not all of the CSOs in the category of Mixed Organizations have all the Outputs as their primary focus, most of them have sometimes or often generated new ideas about the ways in which the conflict can be resolved. On top of this, all of them have had effective moderations and have also often or always built the relationships between and changed the perceptions of the participants of their activities. However, only two of them have often included officials in their activities and have very often informed them directly or indirectly. As for Officials Pressured Publicly, most of them have organized numerous demonstrations and rallies and those that have not, are the ones that do not work for transforming the conflict through public pressure. Finally, only one of these organizations has displayed Impacts. Hence, such performance points to the effectiveness of these organizations at the people-to-people level but their limit effect at the official level.

To sum up, while all the categories have performed well at the level of Outputs (i.e. people-to-people level), only two categories (Informants and Politically Involved Organizations) have shown to be effective at the level of official policy-making. Based on these findings, it is to be concluded that the CSOs involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict have mobilized public support for peace-building, brought people from the conflicting parties closer and have contributed to their reconciliation, but they have had only limited effect on official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution. Thus, the main argument put forward by the thesis has been confirmed.

Concluding Remarks

The thesis analyzed the role that the selected CSOs have had in the peace-building process of the Israel-Palestine conflict. To do so, this work employed Track Two Diplomacy as its theoretical foundation, outlining its various interpretations, concrete mechanisms, its evolution and its types. Besides this, the thesis also described the different roles Track Two activities can have, as well the limitations that they face, which proved useful for forming adequate expectations about the influence that the selected CSOs can have. On top of this, the work at hand also provided a brief overview of the Israel-Palestine conflict, discussing the issues that render it intractable.

Furthermore, the methodological section presented a few words about the Israeli and the Palestinian civil society in general, highlighting their similarities and differences as well as the problems they face in the process of peace-building. As for the concrete CSOs, the basis for their selection relied on three criteria: functionality (what their goals are), performance (the work they have done to achieve these goals) and credibility (public and official-level perceptions towards them).

Moreover, the empirical part relied on a comprehensive five-indicator framework, which measured the role that Track Two actors, in this case, selected thirty CSOs, have played in the peace-building process, assuming that their ultimate goal is to affect the official-level decision-making. These five indicators included Inputs – the raw materials that create Track Two Diplomacy, Activities – the actions taken by Track Two moderators (in our case CSOs) during the peace-building process, Outputs – tangible and intangible micro-level changes at the people-to-people level that result from these activities, Outcomes – the processes of transferring Outputs to the official level, and Impact – instances of officials changing their behaviour as a result of Outcomes.

The thesis has found that all of the categories of these CSOs have proven to be effective at the level of Outputs, having built new relationships between Jews and Palestinians, having changed the negative perceptions of the participants of their activities not only towards each other, but towards multiple aspects of the conflict, and having had effective unofficial moderations. By contrast, only two out of the five categories have demonstrated to have an influence at the level of Outcomes and Impacts, which are the

official policy lines dealing with conflict resolution. Hence, the main argument of the thesis has been confirmed.

Last but not least, the objective of the thesis was to fill in the existent gap in the literature about the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has mainly revolved around the official negotiations and political aspects, not allocating sufficient attention to the need for the readiness of the two societies for reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and subsequent reconciliation, as well as the involvement of non-official actors. By determining the role that the selected CSOs have played, the thesis also provides an insight into the limits that such organizations have in intractable conflicts. In addition, understanding these limits also gives the opportunity to learn the lessons about ways in which they can be eradicated or, at least, mitigated. On top of this, the findings of this thesis also speak about the common impediments that Track Two efforts face in such conflicts, but they cannot be fully generalized for other cases.

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