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Europeanization of parliamentary discourse:
the Migrant Crisis in the Croatian *Sabor* and Serbian *Narodna*
Skupština
2016 – 2018

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Abstract

In the past few years, and specifically since 2015, Europe was hit by a major crisis, the so called Migrant Crisis. The crisis resonated on both a European level and national levels of Member State and Non Member State countries, especially in the ones who truly suffered from the crisis because of their location on migratory paths. Two of them, Croatia and Serbia, and specifically their parliaments, represent the focus of this research. More specifically, the aim of this research is to see whether, through the analysis of discourse, due to the great role that the European Union played in the Crisis Management, topics concerning the Migrant Crisis were subjected to levels of Europeanization in parliamentary arenas. The research question and sub questions on which it will focus are the following:

- *Have discourses revolving around the Migrant Crisis been Europeanized in Croatian and Serbian parliamentary debates?*
- *Is the connotation given to discourses where Europe emerges in connection to the Migrant Crisis positive or negative?*
- *How do levels of Europeanization of parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis differ in Croatia and Serbia?*

Since both parliaments renewed their assemblies in 2016, the selected timeframe for the research focuses on the triennium 2016-2018.

After defining the Migrant Crisis and its connection to the Western Balkans and the European Union, the research focuses on the theoretical concepts of Europeanization and Politicization. The first is defined in its connection to the Western Balkans, foreign policies and party rhetoric, while the second is explored in order to comprehend the salience of the political dimension of the Migrant Crisis.

To understand whether practices of Europeanization can be found in discourse in the Croatian *Sabor* and Serbian *Narodna Skupština*, the parliaments of the two countries, this research combines analyses of the practices of Parliamentary discourse and of Europeanization of discourse

by implementing techniques of content and frame analysis. The methods used are mainly qualitative, with some quantitative approaches utilized to contextualize the data.

Data analysis portrays different results for the two countries: on one side, in the case of Croatia, analyzed discourse showed that Members of the Parliament (MPs) made more claims that connected the Migrant Crisis to the European level rather than the national one, with a strong presence of the Prime Minister of the country, Andrej Plenković, in parliamentary discourse concerning topics of migration. On the other side, in Serbia, claims connected to the national level were predominant over the ones connected to the European level. However, the frames attributed to claims brought forward by Serbian MPs show that, even if connected to national dimensions, values and practices attributed to the European sphere were put forward. Moreover, an interesting trend emerged: while discussing geographical patterns of migration, Serbian MPs didn't isolate the country from the European context, by performing those that could be called *territorial* considerations to Europeanization. The two ideas combined create the idea of a *Latent* Europeanization, where even though dimensions connected to the EU are not specifically voiced, they can still be found in discourse surrounding topics on migration, through references to values and practices.

Concerning frame analysis, the frame that stands out in both parliaments is Solidarity. Being it one of the cores of the European project, the fact that it has been widely debated by MPs of the two parliaments, embeds a strong message with it: the willingness to voice an opinion on a topic fundamental for the existence of the EU and strongly debated during the Migrant Crisis, by taking part in a wider, European discourse.

Therefore, even though on different levels, Croatia and Serbia showed levels of Europeanization in their parliamentary discourses connected to the Migrant Crisis. Data shows that claims put forward by MPs of both countries concerning Europe are predominantly negative, which can be linked to the shortcomings that the EU performed in the management of the Migrant Crisis. The difference in discursive approaches between the parliaments of Croatia and Serbia can be attributed to their different levels of integration in the EU. Even though practices of Europeanization can be found in both Member and Non Member States, Serbia's interests appears to be still predominantly national.

Keywords: Migrant Crisis, Europeanization, Politicization, Discourse, Parliament

List of abbreviations

EU - European Union

CEE – Central and Eastern Europe

MP(s) – Member(s) of Parliament

Croatian parties:

HDS (*Hrvatska demokršćanska stranka*) - Croatian Christian Democratic Party

HDSSB (*Hrvatski demokratski savez Slavonije i Baranje*) - Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja

HDZ (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*) - Croatian Democratic Union

HNS (*Hrvatska narodna stranka*) - Croatian People's Party

HSLs (*Hrvatska socijalno-liberalna stranka*) - Croatian Social Liberal Party

HSS (*Hrvatska seljačka stranka*) - Croatian Peasant Party

HSU (*Hrvatska stranka umirovljenika*) - Croatian Party of Pensioners

NLM (*Nezavisna Lista Mladih*) - Independent list of youth

NZH (*Nezavisni za Hrvatsku*) . Independents for Croatia

PH (*Promjenimo Hrvatsku*) – Change Croatia

SDP (*Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske*) - Social Democratic Party of Croatia

SDSS (*Samostalna demokratska srpska stranka*) - Independent Democratic Serb Party

Serbian parties:

DS (*Demokratska stranka*) - Democratic Party

DSS (*Demokratska stranka Srbije*) - Democratic Party of Serbia

JS (*Jedinstvena Srbija*) - United Serbia

LDP (*Liberalno demokratska partija*) - Liberal Democratic Party

LSV (*Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine*) - League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina

NS (*Nova Srbija*) - New Serbia

PS (*Pokret socijalista*) - Movement of Socialists

PUPS (*Partija ujedinjenih penzionera Srbije*) - Party of United Pensioners of Serbia

SDP Srbije (*Socijaldemokratska partija Srbije*) - Social Democratic Party of Serbia

SDS (*Socijaldemokratska stranka*) - Social Democratic Party

SNP (*Srpska narodna partija*) - Serbian National Party

SNS (*Srpska napredna stranka*) - Serbian Progressive Party

SPO (*Srpski pokret obnove*) - Serbian Renewal Movement

SPS (*Socijalistička partija Srbije*) - Socialists Party of Serbia

SRS (*Srpska radikalna stranka*) - Serbian Radical Party

ZZS (*Zajedno za Srbiju*) – Together for Serbia

ZZŠ (*Zajedno za Šumadiju*) - Together for Šumadija

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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the past few years, the European Union (EU) experienced one of its most challenging times in the last decades. As a matter of fact, it was hit by the so called Migrant Crisis¹. Because of the high levels of Politicization, the crisis soon became very salient in political arenas, one of them being parliaments.

Being partly Croatian and strongly fascinated by the relationship between the Western Balkans and the European Union, I decided to focus my research on this relationship in a challenging time such as the Crisis, by following a very specific connotation. Because of my ability to speak Serbian and Croatian, I focused on discursive approaches and, through techniques of discourse analysis, answered to the following research question and sub questions:

- *Have discourses revolving around the Migrant Crisis been Europeanized in Croatian and Serbian parliamentary debates?*
- *Is the connotation given to discourses where Europe emerges in connection to the Migrant Crisis positive or negative?*
- *How do levels of Europeanization of parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis differ in Croatia and Serbia?*

Discourse and the Migrant Crisis are two domains that have been widely explored by scholars, specifically in two different directions: in the sphere of Media and in the sphere of Political discourse.

With regards to media, a starting point to the study of its discourse can be defined by the three factors identified by Wright (2002: 1): the *magnitude*, that makes the Crisis so influential it cannot be ignored; the impact of the ‘dramatic imagery-pictures’ that make the Crisis gain airtime and the style of Media coverage, that, if sufficiently innovative, has the power of stimulating interest in the public. To better define what discourse touches upon in the field of media, it is worth citing Baker and McEnry, who, through their research, point out that news on asylum usually focus on the number of immigrants; the location and pathways they are crossing; their movements and group

^{1 1} Since the aim of the research is not to conduct a linguistic analysis, the author will interchangeably use the expressions ‘Migrant crisis’, ‘European migrant crisis’ ‘Refugee crisis’ ‘the Crisis’ by always referring to that period that began in 2015 and was characterized by a rising number of people arriving to the European Union through the Mediterranean Sea and Southeastern Europe.

dynamics; the tragic nature of events and the subsequent attempts of help; and finally, even though on a lower scale, issues concerning crime and nuisance (Baker and McEnry, 2005: 10). While literature concerning the attitudes of the public towards migration issues is still not established, literature on media coverage on migration presents a substantial consistency: the choice of most studies to adopt a methodology that encompasses both content analysis and critical discourse analysis (Consterdine, 2018: 10). A premise on the role of the media seemed to be necessary since, as stated by Consterdine, (2018: 11) ‘Media does not operate in isolation to the wider politics of the issue, and the majority of research has found that political discourse and media discourse are highly interlinked and presenting a “causality dilemma”² between the two spheres’ (Consterdine, 2018: 11). This premise appears to be extremely important, since it shows that even if media, themes that rotate around the idea of Politicization of discourse appear. As a matter of fact, across Europe, there have been different interpretations of the Refugee Crisis and its causalities. As theorized by Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak, only by labelling the events of 2015 as a ‘crisis’ charged it ideologically and created a specific type of discourse in media and political spheres, which was aimed to the legitimization of the alleged urgency, including various ‘special measures’, that were or were supposed to be taken in recent months and years’ (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak, R. 2018, p.3). As theorized by the authors, a number of ‘mobilizing and politicizing concepts—including humanitarianism, security, diversity, protectionism—were deployed in public discourses to legitimize the ever-new restrictions of migration and asylum policies and diverse expressions of solidarity or lack thereof’ (Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak, R. 2018, p.1). Political discourse, nation specific discourses and actual responses to the Crisis appeared to be influenced by historical influences and actually ‘each nation states relationship and history with the EU as a collective force’ (Consterdine, 2018: 19). Nation states presented a polarization of values, since their alignment went from hospitality to hostility and, as theorized by Kattago, asylum seekers actually tested some of the fundamentals of the EU: ‘human rights, tolerance and free movement of people’ (Kattago, 2017: 35). While much research focused on the *common* response to the crisis, a branch tried to define the difference in approach between Member States (Consterdine, 2018: 19).

² ‘Causality dilemma’ refers to a process where one causes the other. In this case, it is the discourse embedded in the political sphere that, because of its salience, transfers the issue to the sphere of media.

1.1 Croatia and Serbia: the chosen focus

As said in the previous section, the interest for the two chosen countries comes from personal reasons. However, that's not the only reason. While analyzing migratory paths, from 2015, one of them became of public interest because of a major increase in the number of migrants crossing it: the Western Balkan route. Being Croatia and Serbia geographically located on the Western Balkan route, because of its salience, the Crisis became of major concern for the countries by showing levels of Politicization and strongly resonating in political domains (i.e. in the case of this research parliamentary arenas). Furthermore, since the aim of the research is to find out whether parliamentary discourses have been Europeanized, I found the two cases to be compelling because of their relationship with the European Union. On one side there is Croatia, the youngest Member State of the European Union (as of the 1st of July 2013); on the other side there is Serbia, who opened accession negotiations in January 2014. Different levels of European integration can mean different levels of Europeanization through discourse, meaning an interesting outcome for this research.

1.2 The role of discourse

As mentioned in previous sections, the method used to conduct the research is discourse analysis. Being discourse a vast field, it is important to point out how has the author decided to understand discourse. For this research, the Foucauldian idea of discourse will be taken into account. Foucault understands discourse as a social system that produces knowledge and meaning. For him, discourse is material in its effect and it produces 'practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault, 1969). Therefore, discourse is a way of organizing knowledge that constructs social relations through what can be called a collective understanding of the logic of discourse and the acceptance that discourse represents a social fact (ibid.).

1.3 Research outline

In order to answer to the research questions stated in the first paragraph while incorporating the dimension of discourse that has just been presented, the research will proceed in the following way: in the first chapter, a background analysis will be conducted. The aim of the background analysis is to provide knowledge on the *topic*, that is the Migrant Crisis. Starting from the role of the Balkans as a migratory route, it will then follow on the analysis of the Western Balkans route as such. Following, a section will provide information on the role of the European Union within the

crisis and with the Western Balkan region. Finally, a section will depict the role of the two countries in question, Croatia and Serbia within the Migrant Crisis. The second chapter will revolve around theoretical issues. Since the aim of the research is to see whether discourses on migration have been Europeanized, it will strongly focus on theories regarding Europeanization. Firstly the concept will be defined; secondly it will be analyzed in its specific relationship with the Western Balkans, foreign policies and party politics. The second part of the chapter will take into account the supporting theory, Politicization. After defining the concept and its dynamics, it will focus on its relationship with Migration and European Crises. The third chapter will define the methodology of the research. First of all, the units of analysis, the Croatian and Serbian parliaments, will be defined, together with the timeframe of the research. Moving forward, the method of the research will be outlined. Discourse analysis will be presented, together with its sub-domains of Parliamentary discourse analysis and Europeanization of discourse. Then, the operationalization of my own research will be presented, together with its limits. The following chapter of the research, the most important one, will deal with the analysis I conducted. I will answer to the research question by providing a discursive analysis of the debates selected for both the countries. I will firstly focus on the mere choice of debates, and I will then follow on the dichotomy of the National dimension versus the European one in correlation to debates dealing with the Migrant Crisis in the two parliaments. Then, the most recurrent frames will be defined for both the countries, together with some country specific trends that emerged during the analysis. The final part of the chapter will provide a comparison between the two parliaments. Lastly, the final chapter will provide conclusive thoughts on the research.

Chapter 2: Background analysis and state of the art

The background analysis chapter of this research aims to provide an overview on the interconnection between the Migrant Crisis and the Southeastern area of Europe, namely the Western Balkans. This section will briefly explain the role of the Balkans as a migratory route and it will then explain its paths and its role during the European Migrant Crisis of 2015. Because of the large involvement of the European Union in the above mentioned crisis, a section will outline what role has the EU played in crisis management and in what way has it developed its relation with the Western Balkan region at the time. After that, the background analysis will narrow down on the two countries that are object of this study, Croatia and Serbia, and it will provide an overview of the main characteristics that emerged in the two at the time of the European Migrant Crisis.

Before entering the background analysis, it is important to mention the scholarly work that has been done surrounding the Crisis with its specific relation to the Western Balkans. Even though the topic appears to be rather new, since it is timely located in the past few years, scholars have shown their interest for it from the very beginning. The focus undertaken by different scholars changes substantially. On one side, some analyzed on the humanitarian aspect, by putting the focus on the migrants crossing the Balkan Route. Among those we can find Arsenijević et al., who focused on the violence experienced by migrants crossing the Route (2017); the work of Milan and Pirro (2018), who focus on the aspect of health assistance provided to people crossing the route; the work of Brunovskis and Surtees (2019) who put the accent on the vulnerability and risks migrants face while crossing the Balkan Route and specifically Serbia. Another perspective worth mentioning undertaken by scholars was one that focused on the role of the EU in dealing with the Western Balkan Route. Interesting to mention are the works of Weber, who gives extensive analysis on the closure of the Route and the crisis management put forward by the European Union (2017) and Cocco, who focuses specifically on the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans resulted from crisis management practices (2017). It is also interesting to point out that scholarly work has come as well from scholars hailing from the countries located on Western Balkans migratory paths. If we focus on the countries chosen for this research, for example, for the case of Croatia it is worth mentioning authors like Jakešević and Tatalović, who focused on the regional role of Croatia in the securitization context (2016) and Šelo Šabić³, who focused on the humanitarian aspect of Croatia together with its limits during the crisis (2017). With regards to literature coming from the Serbian sphere, it is worth mentioning the work of Šantić et al., who

³ The author not only provides analysis on Croatia but also in depth analysis on the Western Balkan route as such in her papers.

focused on the refugees management in the country and on the characteristics of migratory flows (2017). Another important author is Lutovac, who analyses the correlation between the migrant Crisis and the European integration of Serbia (2016).

2.1 The Balkans: not a new migratory route

When it reached its climax in 2015, the Migrant crisis⁴ was portrayed in the media throughout Europe with an ‘aura of sudden present’, as if it caught both Western Europe and the Balkan countries by surprise (Tošić, 2017: 150). However, migratory routes are not new to the Balkan region. They are not a new phenomenon, even though, throughout history, they were subjected to numerous transformations in scope and visibility (Bezec and al. in Šantić et al., 2017: 223). As a matter of fact, the Balkans are a ‘geographical and political space of different landscapes and borders’, where the historical legacy is framed by different patterns of migration. This surely impacts the way different Balkan countries and their citizens conceive other people’s migration paths throughout the region (Tošić, 2017: 156).

According to Tošić, there are three existing and one non-existent legacies across the Balkan countries that can help understanding the dynamics along the Balkan Route⁵. The first important legacy of the Balkan Route is most commonly known as the ‘unmixing of the late Ottoman empire’ (Brubaker 1996 in Tošić, 2017: 157). This expression refers to the expulsion of Balkan Muslims from the region, which often culminated in violent practices. The legacy is still present nowadays and it can be connected to certain expressions of Islamophobia in the region, especially in the areas that were once part of the Ottoman empire and are now inhabited by a majority of Christian citizens, such as Bulgaria or Serbia (2017: 157).

The second legacy of migration that Tošić points out is timely located in the second half of the 20th century and it relates to former Yugoslavia’s crucial role with the Non Aligned movement. As a matter of fact, during that period Yugoslavia was a migratory destination for a lot of students coming from Africa and the Middle East. That was a time when diffuse practices of Islamophobia and racism were disguised as ‘a proud cosmopolitanism’ (2017: 158).

Tošić’s third legacy is the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. Between 1990 and 1995 and then in 1999, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to migrate to neighboring countries, because of

⁴ Since the aim of the research is not to conduct a linguistic analysis, the author will interchangeably use the expressions ‘Migrant crisis’, ‘European migrant crisis’ ‘Refugee crisis’ by always referring to that period that begun in 2015 and was characterized by a rising number of people arriving to the European Union through the Mediterranean Sea and Southeastern Europe.

⁵ The ‘Balkan Route’, ‘Western Balkan Route’, ‘The Route’ is one of the main migratory paths into Europe during the Migrant Crisis. Its specificities will be discussed further in the text.

violent conflicts that were taking place on former Yugoslavian soil (2017: 158). Some aspects of this legacy presented themselves in the crisis that happened in 2015 as well, since many ‘Belgradians’ lamented that, in 1995, a lot of Serbian refugees from Croatia were not treated adequately and therefore the Migrant crisis was a mean for Serbia to show better understanding towards new people looking for asylum (2017: 158).

Finally, Tošić identifies a fourth migratory legacy that is actually linked to the absence of a legacy: the lack of a functional asylum system in the region (2017: 158). Due to the difficulties that the region faced after the violent turmoil that happened in the 90s, this part of Europe became primarily a region of emigration, showing the lack of asylum schemes in the various countries. The lack of asylum schemes became an issue again in 2014-2015, when the Migrant crisis that shook Europe redirected itself through the Western Balkans area. The aim of the migrants wasn’t to settle, but just to cross the region in order to reach economically secure countries located in Western Europe, namely ‘Austria, Germany and beyond’ (Arsenijević et al., 2017: 2).

In that period, the Balkans entered again in the category of ‘transit zone’, of ‘place not worth settling in’, as Maria Todorova referred to this geographical area in one of her works (Todorova, 2009 in Tosić 2017: 151). However, they played a crucial role in the 2015 crisis, when the Western Balkan Route become one of the majorly crossed in Europe.

2.2 The Western Balkan Route and the migrant crisis

As already mentioned, the Western Balkan Route became of public interest in 2015, when the increase in the number of migrants⁶ crossing it became permanent (Besenyő, 2016: 19). As shown by the data collected from the European border and coast guard agency FRONTEX, in that year the number of migrants crossing the route was incomparable to the number of people who crossed it in the previous years.

⁶ Since, as already mentioned, the aim of the research is not to conduct a linguistic analysis, the author will interchangeably use the terms ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’, to refer to ‘a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons’ (IOM).




Chart 1 - Illegal border crossings on the Western Balkans route in numbers

Source – FRONTEX, Migratory routes.

Available on: <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-balkan-route/>

Soon, during the summer of 2015, the Western Balkans became the third busiest route towards the heart of Europe (FRONTEX, 2015 in Besenyő, 2016: 19). The route entailed two different groups of migrants who were trying to cross it: first, nationals of Western Balkan states, such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia⁷ and Albania; second, Middle Eastern and Asian migrants, who entered the European Union through the Bulgarian-Turkish and Greek-Turkish borders with the aim to reach Germany, Austria or the northern countries by passing through Hungary (Kuschminder, De Bresser, Siegel, 2015: 42).

The Western Balkan Route, whose main migratory trends are depicted in the chart below, changed significantly in September 2015.

⁷ At the time of the Migrant Crisis, the country's full name was the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. After a dispute with Greece, the country changed its name in the North Republic of Macedonia. For convenience, the author will mainly use the term 'Macedonia'.



Chart 2 – The Western Balkan Route(s)

Source – European Parliament Research Service Blog

Available on: <https://epthinktank.eu/2016/10/06/serbias-role-in-the-migration-crisis/>

In 2015, a rather controversial fact, which changed the geopolitical dimension of the Western Balkan Route happened. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian government decided to build a fence with Serbia, to keep out the substantial flow of migrants to Europe. As mentioned, the fence was built with Serbia, not an EU country, in order to redirect migrants to Croatia and Romania, both EU member states, to enable the *Dublin Regulation* - ‘the legal framework for processing asylum claims in the EU, the member state where asylum-seekers first enter the EU bears responsibility for them until their claims are processed’ (Politico Europe, 2015). By doing so, since the *Dublin Regulation*’s aim is to treat asylum seekers in a humanely way, Hungary evaded the *Dublin Regulation* in the first place (ibid.). This issue created a major shift in the route and refugees were redirected towards Croatia and Slovenia.

In mid-November, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia decided to adopt first restrictive measures, as a result of Slovenia’s request to redirect migrants from non-war torn countries back to the Republic of Croatia (Šantić et al., 2017: 225). Moreover, several countries composing the Route started selecting migrants on the basis of their country of origin. These practices allowed only migrants coming from ‘war afflicted areas’, therefore essentially Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to continue along the Route. The ones who were considered ‘economic migrants’ were not accepted anymore and therefore the vast majority of them were blocked at the Macedonia-Greece border in the village of Idiomenei, where, as a consequence, the largest improvised camp in Europe was settled (Kilibarda, 2016).

In the first two months of 2016, a series of events led to the final closure of the Balkan Route. A meeting was held between the Austrian, Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian and Macedonian heads of police, where it was agreed that the common goal to reach was the reduction of migrant inflow. Moreover, several concrete measures were adopted, such as the standardization of migrant registration and the humanitarian grounds as a requirement to enter the European Union. This practice favored migrants coming from Iraq and Syria (Šelo Šabić and Borić, 2016: 4). Macedonia decided to pass new controls that restricted migrants coming from Afghanistan to cross its border. Moreover, Iraqi and Syrian migrants were from that point onwards asked to go through further regulations, such as full body searches, language tests and a detailed examination of all the documentation provided by the migrant in seek of asylum. The continuing increase in the inflow of migrants and the general dissatisfaction over Greece's management of the crisis called for an increase in the security practices on the Macedonian-Greek border. Therefore, on February 8th 2016, Macedonia decided to build a second fence along the border with Greece⁸. The country's choice was strongly supported by the Visegrád group⁹ and was a sign of the group's willingness to support the country during the crisis (2016: 4-5). On February 24th, a summit on 'Migration together' which gathered ministers of foreign affairs and the interior of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and the Western Balkan Six¹⁰ was held in Vienna. The summit reaffirmed the measures previously set in Zagreb by the heads of police services and called for even stricter application of entry criteria and common standards with regards to migration (ibid.) In the following days, Slovenia set a quota of 580 migrants allowed to enter the country and Serbia and Croatia adopted similar numbers. In the next three days, however, the situation changed dramatically (2016: 5). Respectively only 220, 305 and 50 migrants entered Macedonia and the new restrictions fostered the creation of new tensions on its border with Greece, which culminated on February 29th. For the following two days, the border was closed entirely (ibid.).

On March 8th, finally, most of the countries composing the Balkan Route announced that their borders were definitely closed to irregular migrants. This decision was somehow connected to the EU-Turkey agreement aimed at solving the issue of a major number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey to Greece. Principally, it focused on the following issues: returning to Turkey all the migrants who entered Greece irregularly; resettling, for every migrant who was readmitted by Turkey, another Syrian coming from Turkey (Arribas, 2016: 1). To compensate

⁸ The first fence was built in November 2015.

⁹ The Visegrád Group is a cultural and political alliance of four Central European States: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.

¹⁰ The term refers to the countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia.

Turkey, the European Union decided to compensate the country by accelerating the visa liberalization process and to allocate six billion Euros to the country, so that it could deal with the migrant crisis. Lastly, the two parties decided to agree to improve humanitarian conditions in Syria, so that Syrians could remain in the country (ibid). Humanitarian organizations and the European public sphere heavily criticized the deal, because of its questionable relationship with human rights and European refugee laws (ibid.).

2.3 The European Union and the migrant crisis

The Western Balkan route and the migrant crisis had a huge impact on the relationship between the European Union and the Western Balkan countries. At the time of the crisis, the EU was reminded of the geostrategic importance of the region and it couldn't afford not to cooperate with the countries composing it (Anderson et al., 2016: 19). On the one hand, the European Union used the crisis to utilize instruments of its most influential foreign policy instrument, the enlargement policy, to implement the *acquis communautaire*¹¹ and to strengthen the role of Balkan civil society, by working on its role as a necessary partner to the state when it comes to crisis management (2016: 7). On the other hand, if we move the focus on Western Balkans' perception of the role of the EU within the crisis, we cannot count on a positive response (Cocco, 2017: 293).

The Western Balkans have been a frontier region of migration between Europe, Asia and Africa for centuries. Sometimes the EU policies implemented to manage the migration crisis were even perceived by the side of Western Balkan states as a reminder of previous imperial dominance (Cocco, 2017:294). When border issues linked to the migrant crisis emerged, EU's shortcomings in the region were very clear (2017: 296). As explained by Collantes-Celador and Juncos, the coordination between EU bodies and other international actors was not really effective, even before the Migrant Crisis. What emerges from their study is a problem of coherence, and the difficulty of working in coordination (2012: 216). I think that this, combined with the fact that, as stated by Cocco, the European Union wasn't capable of handling a humanitarian emergency that required fast responses while never neglecting human rights issues (2017: 296), represented the failure of European Border Management in the region. Moreover, the EU didn't provide the Western Balkans either with integrated long term projects designed to secure borders or a shared system of values to aspire to, which could have, presumably improved domestic border management practices. Instead,

¹¹ The term *acquis communautaire* refers to the ensemble of legislations, legal acts, court decisions that constitute the EU law.

EU policies were very contradictory. At some moments they were offering assistance to the region, in other moments they were tightening control.

One of the peaks of the malfunctioning of the European action in its border and therefore crisis management can be seen in the deal it signed with Turkey in April 2016 (Cocco, 2017: 296). As explained in the previous section, because of its nature, the deal was strongly criticized and it was even named 'shameful' by several activist networks and NGOs that operate on the soil and even the European Asylum Support Service (EASO) took its distance (Foucher, 2017: 3).

Another point should be made on political disunity, which, according to Parks, was one of Europe's most consolidated shortcomings during the crisis. Just as when the sovereign debt crisis made its appearance in the end of 2009, national interests started rising as a response to the migrant influx. Experts claim that in Europe political climate was extremely polarized and that nationalist and anti-immigrant parties in ascendant are to blame for the muted humanitarian response in some states (Park, 2015: 315).

However, the biggest failure in Europe's management of the migrant crisis was the resettlement and relocation scheme. Towards the end of 2014, due to the intensification of the number of migrants coming to the European continent, the European Union decided to actively engage in finding solutions that would help the member states which were most affected by the crisis. This is why in early 2015 work started on the European Agenda of Migration (Pachocka, 2016: 114). In this context, relocation and resettlement policies were proposed within the European Commission action plan. Relocation was defined as the mechanism through which asylum seekers are transferred from the most crisis affected countries to other member states of the European Union, while resettlement was conceptualized as the safe and legal transfer of people in difficult situations from third countries to the European Union (2016: 115). The Commission created a fair plan, that took into consideration several characteristics of the potential asylum seekers receiving states, in order to create the fairest distribution possible. The characteristics taken into account were the population of the countries, their GDP, the number of asylum requests processed in the preceding four-year period and the unemployment rate, to evaluate the actual capacity of member states to integrate asylum seekers (2016: 115). On the 20th of July 2015, a two years resettlement scheme was adopted, which created a system that implied that 22 thousand people in need of international protection will be transferred from the outside of the EU to a member state of the European Union. This deal was strengthened by the EU-Turkey agreement mentioned earlier,

according to which for every Syrian returned from the Greek island to Turkey, another Syrian national will be restored from Turkey to the EU, resulting in what was later called a 1:1 mechanism (2016: 117). Relocation negotiations started even earlier, on the 27th of May 2015, when the first package of measures was presented. It proposed relocating a total of 40 thousand people to different European Union Member states from Italy (24 thousand) and Greece (16 thousand). The second version of the plan was proposed on the 9th of September, this time with a major change. In this version Hungary was put in the category of states that would benefit from the burden sharing process as the plan implied the relocation of 54 thousand people from the country. Hungary decided to decline the offer, as it considered itself as a '*non frontline state*' (2016: 116). As a result, the proposal was rearranged and it passed with a qualified majority vote on the 22nd of September.

However, the negotiations around the scheme brought a big fracture, since Eastern European Member States (especially the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) decided to oppose it (Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Years after the implementation of the quota system, it is possible to see its outcome: Poland and Hungary have consistently refused to accept asylum seekers while continuing to benefit from EU funding. Other Member States accepted only part of their quota (an example are Slovakia, who accepted 16 out of 902 asylum seekers and the Czech Republic, who accepted 12 out of 2691) (d'Apollonia, 2019). Negotiations appear to be still ongoing, even though, currently, there is no way to force states to implement their legal obligations. In September 2017, the EU commission failed to renew the mandatory relocation quotas even though it has still continued to financially support most of the Member States (ibid.).

2.4 Croatia and Serbia: migration approach and the Balkan route

After analyzing the Balkan Route and the role of the EU within the crisis on a general level, it is important to see how the two countries that are the center of the research, Croatia and Serbia, performed during the Balkan Route Crisis. Even if the research will focus on parliamentary discourse during the crisis, it is important to understand the political situation of the two countries at the time when it happened.

First of all, even though not fundamental for the research, it is interesting to see the two countries experienced tensions among themselves, which almost brought to the creation of a 'crisis within the crisis' (Weber, 2016: 10). The crisis even created a strong discursive rhetoric where politicians of the two countries strongly criticized each other in mediatic context. When the

Hungarian border closed, the general situation on the Balkan route was heavily triggered and Croatia and Serbia were brought to a point where they started an eight day trade war (ibid.). According to Weber (2016: 10), Croatia's Prime Minister at the time, Zoran Milanović, member of the Social Democratic Party, used the migration crisis to raise his popularity. Very soon, precisely on the 17th of September, the Croatian government started the process of border closing with Serbia. Milanović, who accused the Serbian government of striking a deal with the FIDESZ government in Hungary to redirect all asylum seekers to Croatia, ordered the closure of the border for trucks from Serbia. This action started a trade war and, as mentioned above, ill-tempered rhetoric from both sides. For example, in a press conference the Croatian prime minister stated that the Hungarian government was 'building a wall against *barbarians*, against Serbs¹²' (Max Portal, 2015) while Serbian Minister of Justice Nikola Selaković stated that Serbia had been 'brutally attacked by Croatia' (Reuters, 2015). After the expiry of an ultimatum, the Serbian government imposed a counter-blockade, which started to be active on the 24th of September (Weber, 2016:10). According to an EU official, the blockade took both Brussels and Belgrade by surprise and it appeared to be 'a clear breach of the free trade arrangement by which Croatia is bound under its Stabilization and Association Agreement' (ibid.). European Commission's president, Jean-Claude Juncker, worried about the situation, decided to dispatch top officials to the region. EU High Representative Federica Mogherini talked to Serbian and Croatian leaders, while Johannes Hans, EU enlargement commissioner stated 'If borders are closed, if trucks are not allowed to cross, it has an immediate impact on the economic situation in the region' (Balkan Insight, 2015). In the end, the mediation work that the two made, helped solving the crisis.

2.4.1 Serbia: an overview

It is difficult to estimate the exact number of migrants who crossed Serbia during the peak of the migration crisis. While the European Parliament estimates some 596,000 entries, (Lylianova, 2016) the IOM (IOM, 2016) sets the number on 639,152 and the UNHCR counts 815,000 entries (Dragovski, 2019). The country reached its climax in October and November 2015, when the average of daily entries was 6,500 (Šelo Šabić and Borić, 2016: 4).

On the legal basis of the country of Serbia, at the time of the peak of the migrant crisis, the relevant legislation concerning asylum seekers consisted of the 2008 Laws on Asylum, Foreigners and State Border, the 2012 Law on Migration Management and the 2014 Law on the Employment

¹² Original text: Mađarska gradi zid prema Srbima, Srbi su barbari

of foreigners. Within the framework of Serbia's future accession to the EU, Serbian law has been identified as partially compliant with the *acquis communautaire*. However, just at the beginning of the Crisis, 'In light of the recent increase in the numbers of asylum claims lodged in the Republic of Serbia' according to the UNHCR, Serbia didn't appear to be a safe third country (UNHCR, 2012). Improvements can be seen in recent years, since in late March 2018, Serbia adopted a new law on asylum and temporary protection (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Among all the countries composing the route, the Serbian government showed the most positive rhetoric towards refugees. As portrayed in the report, refugee discourse in the country was centered on concepts like 'empathy, human solidarity, shared experience from the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the responsibility functioning states and mature societies must assume' (Šelo Šabić and Borić, 2016: 10). However, according to Šelo Šabić and Borić, a clear message was sent on the fact that Serbia will not deal with the crisis alone but will constantly seek for a joint European solution. Moreover, it is important not to neglect the fact that Serbia was named a candidate for EU membership in 2012 and started its negotiations in 2014. The first intergovernmental conference between the country and the European Union took place in January 2014. Yet, the opening of the first EU chapters happened during the time of the refugee crisis, precisely in December 2015, and Serbia approached it by 'showing an aura of enlightened and legitimate self-interest, smartly adopting a constructive and sophisticated approach' (2016: 10). Finally, Šelo Šabić and Borić noted that the interest on the migration issue dropped with the closure of the Western Balkan route and with the early elections set in Serbia in April 2016, which moved the issue from the top of the country's agenda.

With regards to the media, as analyzed by Chouliarki et al., Serbia appeared to have a low frequency in the reporting of defensive measures while, on the other hand, it showed a high frequency in the reporting of specific humanitarian measures (Chouliaraki et al., 2015: 25-26).

2.4.2 Croatia: an overview

According to data provided by UNHCR, between the 16th of September 2015 and the 5th of March 2016, a total of 658,068 migrants entered Croatia (Šelo Šabić and Borić, 2016: 11). On average it is possible to count 5,500 daily arrivals with an extraordinary peak of 11,000 on the 17th of September 2015. With regards to the beginning of 2016, the average number of asylum seekers entering Croatia varied from 500 to 2,000, while some days it reached the peak of 3,000 (Ministry of the interior of the Republic of Croatia website).

On a legal basis, until the 2nd of July 2015, the right to asylum in Croatia was regulated by the Asylum Act. Because of the *acquis communautaire* and the need to harmonize national legislation with relevant EU directives, a new Act on International and Temporary Protection entered into force on the 2nd of July 2015. The legislative framework for asylum in Croatia is made by several distinct laws: the Law on the General Administrative Procedure, the Law on Administrative Disputes, the Law on Foreigners, the Law on Mandatory Health Insurance and Healthcare for Foreigners in the Republic of Croatia, and the Law on Free Legal Aid (Jasna Barberić, UNHCR, 2016). Despite having several distinct legislative acts in place, Croatia appeared to be mainly a transit country during the migration crisis, with more than 80% of asylum seekers leaving the country before their application was processed (Šelo Šabić and Borić, 2016: 11). Data from March 2016 show that, over the six-months peak of the crisis, only 178 asylum requests were registered (ibid.). In March 2016, the newly elected Croatian government proposed amendments to the law. After a parliamentary session, the Minister of Defense Josip Buljević explained the changes in the following way: ‘These changes to the law will allow the armed forces to assist the police in monitoring the state border in case of need’ (Vlada Republike Hrvatske, 2016). Therefore, for the Croatian government, there was a strong focus on security concerns.

With regards to political discourse, during the summer and autumn of 2015, a lot has been said about migrants crossing Croatia. Day by day, the major political actors, meaning the government led by Zoran Milanović, the opposition (led by the Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ) and the President of Croatia, Kolinda Grabar Kitarović reflected on the current situation, by almost totally basing their political discourse on the issue (Luša et al., 2018: 5). Government members almost totally focused on the humanitarian aspect, on taking care and providing accommodation (ibid.). The opposition, while on one side it embraced the humanitarian character, on the other one it strongly spoke about security concerns, by pointing out that they are vital for the well-being of Croatian citizens (ibid.).

With regards to media, as analyzed by Jurlina and Vidović, there have been different approaches towards the topic of migration. However, as seen by the scholars, 2015 represented the year when the media depiction of the migrant crisis worsened substantially (Jurlina and Vidović, 2018: 8). Incidents committed by migrants started to be followed with a tone of generalization at a point that the Croatian Journalists’ association decided to issue a statement saying the following: ‘The Croatian Journalists’ Association urges journalists and editors to report on the violence in which asylum-seekers are involved professionally, to check all information before publishing, and

to ensure that citizens are not encouraged to prejudices, stereotypes, intolerance and hate' (ibid.). However, together with stories that had a negative approach, it is important to mention that stories with a positive attitude were included in the media as well. Those stories usually either focused on personal positive portrays of migrants or they underlined the role of civil society organizations in supporting migrants (ibid.)

Chapter 3: Theoretical analysis

The theoretical background of this research will revolve around the concept of Europeanization, and specifically its application to discourse. Before analyzing what does it mean for discourse to be Europeanized, which will be done in the methodology chapter, this section will provide in depth analysis on the concept of Europeanization, and on its facets when it comes to analyzing the Western Balkans. Moreover, it will discuss what does it mean for the domains of Foreign Policy and Party Politics to Europeanize.

However, Europeanization will not be the only theory utilized. As a matter of fact, since, as seen in previous sections of the research it clearly appeared that the political dimension of the crisis is undeniable, and since, as stated in the introduction, this research will take into consideration parliamentary arenas, meaning political arenas, Politicization will be the theory merged with Europeanization. To support this idea, just as Giesen and Risse did in their research, I will follow the assumption that ‘Politicization of European issues in the domestic public debates is a necessary pre-condition for the emergence of European public space’ (Giesen and Risse, 2000: 12). Following this claim, I will support the idea that Politicization needs to happen in a specific situation, in order for Europeanization to appear. This is why Politicization will be treated as my supporting theory. Firstly, I will analyze the concept and its functioning. After that I will focus on the Politicization of the Migration Crisis, which represents the basis for the emergence of Europeanization at the time of the above mentioned crisis.

3.1 The concept of Europeanization

The concept of Europeanization is well grounded in academic literature, and scholarly interest surrounding it has increased during the years. If we analyze the work of Featherstone (2003: 5), who counted the number of times that the word ‘Europeanisation’ has appeared in social sciences databases, we can see that there has been a substantial shift. If in 1991 the term appeared only 5 times, in 2002 it has already been used more than 100 times.

It is not easy to grasp the concept of Europeanisation. As a matter of fact, it has been used multiple times to define ideas that differ among themselves, that are defined as ‘fashionable’ and that don’t have a stable and precise meaning (Olsen, 2002: 921-922). One of the interpretations that can be taken as a starting point to understand the many facets of the concept is Börzels’s (1999:

574), who claims that Europeanization is a process that incorporates the national policy arena into European policy making. In the same year Lawton (1999: 94) expanded the term, by affirming that Europeanisation is, juridically, the transposition of national sovereignty to the European level, while 'Europeification' represents the sharing of powers between national governments and the European governance. Miøset (in Molino, 1999: 17), on the other hand, defined Europeanization as the development and the extension of European influence and particularly of its institutional models outside of their places of origin. A different focus on the concept was proposed by Rometsch and Wessels (1996: preface), who tried to evaluate the ability of European institutions to include national actors in the European decision-making process, by creating 'institutional fusion'. All these definitions, as much as they try to combine the European and the national spheres of Member States appear to be partially incomplete. A more accurate conceptualization of the concept of Europeanization can be found in Ladrech (1994: 69-70), who defines it as 'an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that [European Community] political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making'. This definition appears to be very interesting, since it focuses on adaptation and policy change, which were neglected by the authors cited previously. On this note, it is important to cite Green-Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (2001: 1) who define Europeanization as the diffusion on a European scale of specific structures of governance, that formalize interactions between actors. Moreover, they point out the impact of Europeanization on formal structures, such as national legal systems and the ability of the EU to develop informal structures, such as business government relations. This implies the creation of new levels of politics that interact with the ones that are already existing. This is the conceptual basis from which Morlino (1999: 16-18) develops his thought. According to him, a variable that has to be taken into account is time, since with Europeanisation we talk about a process of gradual transformation. Moreover, he sees the process as cycle with two different phases: bottom-up and top-down. As a matter of fact, Europeanization can be perceived as the creation of a super national level of governance while at the same time it diffuses values, norms and specific directives from a European level to the national politics of Member States. Finally, in this overview of the concept of Europeanization, it is important to mention Radelli (2003: 30), who developed a definition that appears to be the most complete. According to him, Europeanization is a process that encompasses the stages of construction, diffusion and institutionalization

of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy

process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies (Radelli, 2003: 30).

The literature presented encompasses a rather ‘classical’ approach to Europeanization. However, it is important to point out that the authors presented talk about Europeanization on both Member States and Non Member State countries. After the ‘Big Bang’ EU enlargement wave of 2004, scholars have focused even more on the idea of Europeanization connected to spaces external to the European Union. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the work of Schimmelfenning, who in ‘Europeanization Beyond Europe’ focused on the importance of preexisting domestic structures and in country developments that can mediate on ‘external’ Europeanization pressures. All this can be summarized as a ‘domestic adaptation with national colours’, where EU decision making pressure doesn’t necessarily lead to a domestic change. Differently, Europeanization is more likely to occur when there are two specific indicators: administrative and political support for compliance (Schimmelfennig 2007: 18). Schimmelfenning’s work can be seen as a starting point in the explanation of Europeanization processes *beyond* EU borders. The next section, while elaborating on Europeanization of the Western Balkan region, will also draw from the just presented idea and it will include thoughts on Europeanization after the EU enlargement waves of 2004 and 2007.

3.2 Europeanization of the Western Balkans

As just mentioned above, Europeanization practices focus not only on Member States, but also on Non Member State countries. The second are not neglected by the EU, who shows an interest in maintaining a relationship with those countries and englobing them in its sphere. This is why, at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, the European Council declared that ‘the future of the Balkans is within the European Union’ (Dzankić et al., 2019: 1). However, apart from Croatia that entered the European Union in 2013, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are still far away from full EU membership (2019: 2). An explanation on the interest of research in focusing on Non Member States after the European ‘Big Bang’ enlargement can be seen in

the observation that the enlargement process went together with a massive process of political and legal transformation in the candidate countries induced by EU conditionality. In the course of this process, the candidates adopted not only the EU *acquis communautaire* but also principles and rules in areas, such as democracy and the rule of law, in which the EU did not have competences in the old member states (Sedelmeier, 2011).

Since the two previous enlargement waves were in 2004 and 2007, this kind of research focused mainly on Central and Eastern European (CEE) states, who were the ones that joined during that

period. Researchers such as Elbasani (2013), Börzel (2011), Anastasakis (2005) did a remarkable job in analyzing different dimensions of the Europeanization of the Western Balkans. Another group of scholars, Zhelyzkova et al., newly published a work of great importance for the discussion conducted above. As a matter of fact, they state that Western Balkan countries are facing more serious challenges in their accession to the EU in comparison to the CEE region. According to them, first of all, the European Union has applied a ‘more stringent accession criteria for the countries from the Western Balkans’ (Zhelyzkova et al., 2019: 16). Second, these countries have to cope with so called ‘enlargement fatigue’ among member state societies (ibid.). Third, the Western Balkans had to start their way to accession from a less convenient basis with respect to the Central and East European countries, since they had ‘less experience with democracy and often lower levels of governance capacity’ (2019: 17). Lastly, candidate states from the Western Balkans face problems of ‘contested statehood’ and ethnic conflicts that are still unresolved and that hold their basis in the recent legacies of the civil war (ibid.).

While studying Central and Eastern Europe, scholars Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004, 2005) identified two dimensions of the Europeanisation mechanism which can be transposed to the Western Balkan region. According to the scholars, there is one dominant theoretical model, the external incentives model and two alternative models, social learning and lesson-drawing, that could explain Europeanization in the CEE countries (all the models are to be explained below). Scholars Zhelyzkova, Damjanovski, Nechev and Schimmelfenning expanded on their research and applied the models to the Western Balkans area.

3.2.1 The external incentives model

The external incentives model is a rational bargaining model’ (Moravcsik, 1993). The model puts a strong accent on the role of actors, since it assumes that specifically the actors are the ones who negotiate, exchange promises, information and sometimes even threats in order to achieve their preferred outcome. What actors do, is comparing costs, benefits and deals while seeking to maximize their utility. Their bargaining power is the one that sets the outcome (ibid.).

As further theorized, according to the model, EU conditionality depends on four factors: (1) the determinacy of EU conditions, (2) the credibility of membership perspective (3) the capacity of candidate states and (4) the adoption costs that they face while transferring EU conditions in national law and practices (Zhelyzakova et al., 2019: 23).

With regards to the first point, determinacy, the current EU enlargement strategy has significantly enhanced the determinacy of the process for the Western Balkans in comparison to the CEE countries. As a matter of fact, the 2012 EU Enlargement strategy paper outlines that

strengthening the rule of law and democratic governance is central to the enlargement process [...] and the lessons learnt from previous enlargements highlight the importance of an increased focus on these areas and further improving the quality of the process (European Commission, 2012).

In contrast to previous Enlargement waves, candidate countries from the Western Balkans are not only required to implement EU regulations and conditions set out during the negotiation chapters but also to have ‘the most difficult *acquis communautaire* effectively and sustainably implemented before accession’ (Zhelyzakova et al., 2019: 20). It is important to point out that determinacy is a concept that widely differs among accession states to the EU. If we take the case of Croatia, the last state that has entered the European Union and the only one in the Western Balkan region that holds the title of member state, we can see that some of the new instruments introduced with the enlargement strategy were implemented only at a later stage in the accession process (2019: 25)

3.2.2 Credibility

In the month of February 2018, the European Commission launched ‘A credible enlargement perspective for an enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans’ (European Commission, 2018). The idea of the strategy is to help Western Balkan countries in enforcing reforms on the rule of law, solve bilateral disputes they might have and implement their market economies (Poli, 2018). However, even though the inclusion of Western Balkan countries can be seen as a priority for the European Union, Member States don’t necessarily feel the same.

As a matter of fact, as shown by 2018 Spring Eurobarometer, if 44% of respondents would agree to an enlargement of the Union, 46% declared that they are opposed. 10% of respondents indicated that ‘they don’t know’ (The views of Europeans on the European Union’s priorities – Eurobarometer, 2018: 25). Leading the opposition trend are Austria (69% ‘against’), Germany (63%) and Finland (62%) (ibidem).

Overall, if the EU seemed to be eager to include Central and Eastern European states in the Union, it is showing much less eagerness with the Western Balkan countries. In the last few years

the EU has been confronted with both internal and external challenges, which lead to the delay of the agenda on the Western Balkans (Zhelyzakova et al., 2019: 27). Internally, it is possible to mention the Euro Crisis that hit the EU in 2008, Brexit and the refugee crisis, which have shifted EU's priorities on enlargement. Externally, Member States together with the European Commission have been preoccupied with the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the subsequent crisis in the country. All these events have overshadowed European enlargement in the Western Balkans (ibidem).

3.2.3 Domestic Capacity

With regards to requirements that concern capacity, candidate states need to fulfill both financial and administrative resources in order to implement EU accession requirements (Zhelyzakova et al., 2019: 28). However, in a comparative perspective, with the exception of Croatia, Western Balkan states are among the poorest and least developed in Europe, which makes it difficult for those states to fulfill the needs required by the EU. Despite the never ending effort to reform the public sector, 'Politicization of the state apparatus and the low levels of meritocratic recruitment remain a major obstacle for the process of professionalization of the bureaucracy' (ibidem). According to some researches, the functioning of EU conditionality can even be seen as a problem in the post-conflict societies in the Western Balkans, because of the weakness and ethnicization of the state-level apparatus (Aybiet and Bieber in 2019: 28). According to Börzel, (2011: 10) Croatia is considered to have the strongest capacities in the region, even before it's accession to the European Union.

3.2.4 Domestic Adoption Costs

According to Schimmelfenning, 'for any given size and speed of rewards, determinacy of conditions, and credibility of conditionality, it is the size of domestic adoption costs that determines whether target governments will meet the EU's conditions' (Schimmelfenning et al., 2019). According to the author, there can be different sources where the costs can potentially come from. First of all, it is important to point out that governments will not meet conditions that make them lose elections, partners, or power (ibid.). Secondly, 'EU conditions may harm institutional or societal actors with the capacity to block their adoption' (ibid.). Those actors are called veto players and the more they are affected negatively, the more adoption costs rise. Finally, governments might be lacking the capacity to meet and implement needed conditions, because of reasons concerning financial and administrative capacities (ibid.).

Among the three reasons, the one that appears to be the most prominent is the second one, the one concerning veto players. To better understand the reality of the issue it is important to point out that a candidate country is facing high domestic costs if the government is composed by Eurosceptic parties or societal and parliament attitudes are against a EU membership (Zhelyzkova et al., 2019: 29). However, if we only take into consideration these aspects of domestic costs, the number of veto players in the Western Balkans doesn't appear to be so big. Generally, there is not really a big difference in the preferences among societal and political actors with regards to the prospect of EU membership of their own countries. As a matter of fact, within each country-specific party system there are either no Eurosceptic parties at all or, with time, they have gradually become in favor of the accession process. In countries where Eurosceptic parties are absent, there are other veto players that seem to have a larger role in some Western Balkan Countries than in previous Eastern enlargement rounds. An example is Bosnia and Herzegovina which, with its decentralized political system has created different veto points that have blocked the country's progress to the EU. From a different perspective, if we focus merely on the societal level, public opinion seems to be supporting of accession process (2019: 29-30).

3.3 Europeanization of foreign policies

The Migrant Crisis that shook Europe in 2015 and that is the object of this thesis, touched upon member states and candidate countries alike and required a common action from them. This is why, for some scholars, the migrant crisis appears to be a great example to grasp different aspects of Europeanization (Bojinović et al., 2019: 40). Three are the main arguments that support the idea of the migration crisis as a case of Europeanisation of foreign policies (ibid.). First of all, there is an institutional argument. As a matter of fact, article 78 Treaty on European Union states

The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties (TEU article 78(1)).

Moreover, in the comma 3, it adds an additional connotation:

In the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting the European Parliament (TEU article 78 (3)).

However, the decision-making part of the process never applied in the case of the migrant crisis and therefore the European Council took over, by exercising the decision-making rules practiced in the foreign policymaking of the European Union. The second argument that Bojinović et al. point out is that content-wise the migration crisis became a security issue for the whole Western Balkan region and, at the same time, for the EU, since there was an ineffective implementation and regulation of European immigration policy (ibid.). The third point concerns the geographical space of the crisis. Since the initial management of it started outside of European borders, ‘the *foreign* character of the matter resulted in decision-making procedures resembling foreign policy issues’ (ibid.).

If we follow the path that analyses the migration crisis as a Europeanization of foreign policy, it is first necessary to conceive the nature of the concept of foreign policy change. One may think that a foreign policy change simply stands in a change of foreign policy behavior and policies. However, it can occur on different levels, such as the implementation of foreign policy goals or identity and cultural shifts in society. To understand the change, the simplest mean to use is comparison. Yet, comparison brings with it an underlying problem: which EU member state foreign policy would represent the *référéntiel*? If we were to compare Serbia’s foreign policy with the ideal-type EU foreign policy, which would it be (ibid.)? According to Bojanić et al., Europeanization literature has tried to escape these kind of questions by becoming ‘pragmatic’. ‘Considering the very powerful EU and its rhetorical aims of change, there should be processes of change’ (2019: 43), meaning that change is embedded in the core nature of the European Union. Moreover, Europeanization seems to be modeled in a way that produces causal pathways to and in neighboring states.

Researchers on the topic have agreed on applying three specific paths of Europeanization referring to the direction of the process: uploading, downloading and cross-loading (ibid.). According to Wong and Hill (2011: 7), uploading happens when a ‘National foreign policy of a member state affects and contributes to the development of a common European Foreign Policy’. This can happen when the state attempts to increase its national influence in the world; when it tries to influence Foreign Policies of other Member States; when it tries to use the European Union as a ‘cover/umbrella’ and when the national Foreign Policy uses the European Union as an ‘influence multiplier’(Wong and Hill, 2011:7). Downloading, on the other hand, is identified as the ‘Harmonization and transformation of Member States to the needs and requirements of EU membership’ (ibid.). Its indicators are the increasing salience of a European political agenda; the

adherence to common objectives; common policy obligations that take over national *'domains réservés'*; the internalization of EU membership linked to its integration process and the organizational and procedural change in national bureaucracies (ibid.). Lastly, cross-loading can be seen as the result of the other two dimensions. It is the 'Harmonization process tending towards a middle position [where] common EU interests are promoted. It manifests itself with the emergence of common norms and values among elites of policymakers in relation to international politics; commonly shared definitions of European and national interests; 'coordination reflex' and 'pendulum effect' where national and EU positions that are brought to the extreme are reconciled over time with bilateral and European interactions (ibid.).

With regards to the three direction processes, Bojanović, Fenko and Stahl apply them to the migration crisis and the Western Balkans in the following way:

	<i>Downloading</i>	<i>Uploading</i>	<i>Cross-Loading</i>
EU	EU values, Schengen norms, Dublin Regulation rules	state's contributions to a common EU policy, states' initiatives for new regulation and amendments	shared definition of national and EU interest on state and human security, effective EU external border management, shared norms on migrants' and refugees' human rights
Member states Slovenia Germany Austria Hungary	– salience of EU political agenda: diverse – adherence to EU objectives: EU values: Germany, Schengen norms and Regulation rules: Slovenia – EU policy obligations taken over: Slovenia	► EU values based (meaningful choice): Germany, Slovenia ► national interest based (rational choice): Hungary, final stage of crisis: Austria, Slovenia	– initially failed coordination and promotion of common EU interests, eventually plurilateral groupings within and beyond the EU – pendulum effect not achieved, extreme national and EU positions remain
Member state and non-Schengen state Croatia	weak salience of EU political agenda, EU obligations not taken over	national interest based (rational choice)	– national policymaking elites do not share norms on human rights versus national security dilemma (Germany, Austria & Slovenia vs. Hungary and Croatia)
Western Balkan non-member state Serbia, Macedonia	strong salience of EU political agenda	national interest based (rational choice)	national positions within scope of EU positions, national policymaking elites share norms on human rights versus national security dilemma

Chart 3 – Summary of Europeanization effects of states' foreign policies in Balkan route migration management
Source – *Chips off the Old Block: Europeanisation of the Foreign Policies of Western Balkan States*
 Bojanović, Fenko, Stahl (2019: 56) - Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.

As it appears from the chart above (where I decided to frame the sections concerning Croatia and Serbia), and as explained by scholars, Croatia, which is a Member State of the European Union but not yet a part of the Schengen area when it came to 'downloading', that is adapting itself to the EU agenda, showed a weak interest towards EU policies and obligations. As for the 'uploading', the salience of the Member State in the domain of European foreign policy, Croatia appeared to be self-centered since the national interest was the most important. With regards to cross-loading, the

process that is supposed to harmonize national choices in order to reach a European common position, it appears that national elites weren't eager to put the national interest at stake to share norms on human rights.

The situation appears to be very different for Serbia. Even though the 'uploading' shows that the country's interest was national based, when it comes to 'downloading' the country took the EU political agenda very seriously. This is reflected even in the 'cross-loading' part, which shows that the country aligned its positions with EU ones and the national elites shared norms on human rights. Since I find this operationalization very interesting, I will re take it in the analysis section, to see if it will be applicable to the data I analyzed.

3.4 Croatia and Serbia: Europeanization of party rhetoric

Since this work will focus on the Europeanization of parliamentary discourse, it is worth seeing as well what role does Europeanization have in the context of party dynamics. This section will take 'Europeanization into action' to see how EU leverage influenced party position and government policies in response to EU incentives in Croatia and Serbia. Before doing so, it is worth mentioning the work of Ladrech, who provided a framework through which it is possible to investigate the changes in parties that derive from the impact of the EU on their operating systems (Ladrech, 2002: 400). Overall, he calls party responses to challenges brought forward by the EU as Europeanization (ibid.). More specifically, 'the nature of the environmental change, in this case, external inputs into domestic political systems, provokes a variety of reconfigurations in structure and behaviour' (ibid.).

3.4.1 The case of Croatia

Croatia is a state where the adaptation model, that is a model that predicts that major political parties will respond to EU leverage by implementing a 'EU-compatible' agenda, is broadly confirmed (Vachudova, 2019: 72). In the early 2000, Croatia's party system experienced a dramatic change, mostly for two reasons: the ousting of the regime of Franjo Tudman and the transformation of the agenda of the right-wing Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party (Konitzer, 2011). When the time came, the HDZ very soon started implementing democratic reforms and preparing the country for EU membership. The whole process of adaptation might have appeared easier in the case of Croatia with comparison to Serbia, because Croatia's belonging to the Western European sphere has never been doubted by the HDZ (Subotic, 2010). After the HDZ went back to power in

2003, the prime minister at the time, Ivo Sanader, put preparations for EU membership at heart of his agenda. This process included reforming the judiciary sector and strengthening the institutions in charge of fighting corruption (Barlovac 2012, in Vauchova, 2019: 73). When Croatia joined the EU in 2013, there were still problems linked to high levels of organized crime and corruption (European Commission, 2013, in 2019: 73) but with his agenda, Sanader tried to implement the ‘adaptation model’ and move the party agenda from ‘post-authoritarian’ views to more moderate ones. This enabled the party to consistently move forward in the pre-accession process (Vauchova 2008, in 2019: 73). However, the transformation of the HDZ in light of EU accession brought forward two major uncertainties that echoed in the Western Balkan region. First of all, the sequence of events that took place in Croatia (which are sometimes called ‘Sanaderization’) appeared to be put forward by entrenched and corrupted leaders, and other political leaders in the region, such as those of Montenegro and Bosnia, who are not willing to join Sanader behind the bars, are dealing with EU institutional reforms with greater caution (2019: 73). Second, even when party positions become more moderate in light of EU accession, it is not a given that they will stay that way; as a matter of fact they may be short-lived, as party leaders might decide to implement ‘ethno-nationalist’ and ‘anti-democratic’ positions after accession (2019: 74).

3.4.2 The case of Serbia

Just as it happened in Croatia, the behavior of Serbia’s largest ‘formerly authoritarian’ parties have been in the 2010s consistent with the adaptation model. As a matter of fact, those parties put satisfying EU requirements in the center of their agenda (Vauchova, 2019: 74). However, over the last decade, the political axes in Serbia shifted dramatically (Dolenec, 2013). In 2008, the populist and right-wing Radical party split, with Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić bringing many party members to the newly formed Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). At the time Nikolić stated that it was specifically his support for Serbia’s EU integration process that caused a split from the Radical Party led by Vojislav Šešelj (Vauchova, 2019: 74). Meanwhile, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), the party of Slobodan Milošević, was also adopting a EU prone agenda under the guidance of a new leader, Ivica Dačić (2019: 74). In May 2012, parliamentary elections were held in Serbia and a coalition was formed between the Progressive Party and the Socialist Party, with Dačić acting Prime Minister. The parliamentary elections coincided with the presidential elections in the country. Everyone was expecting Boris Tadić, Democratic’s Party (DS) leader to win. During their time in power, Tadić and the DS presented themselves as pro-Western and pro-European, even though their track record of compliance appeared to be mixed. With extremist parties opposing them at every turn, they warned the EU and the United States that only moderate

gains are to be expected (ibid.). However the DS did transpose those moderate gains in very significant foreign policy areas, such as cooperation with the ICTY, remembrance in Srebrenica and regulation of relations with Kosovo (ibid.). They also formally applied for EU membership and started working towards the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* (2019: 74). What Tadić and the DS didn't implement were domestic reforms. Unexpectedly, SNS leader Nikolić defeated Tadić in the second round of the presidential elections partly because a small number of DS supporters took part in the 'white ballot' campaign and decided not to vote. Others even spoke in favor of Nikolić, saying that the SNS would be more able to comply with EU requirements (2019: 75). Once in power, the new coalition in Serbia led by Progressive and Socialists implemented some policy changes in order to foster the EU pre-accession process (ibid). Progressives seemed to have more space for action, with their leader Aleksandar Vučić explaining that 'Now we have to pay for it all – Kosovo, corruption and public debt' (2019: 74). The government actually implemented an agreement with Kosovo, which integrated Serbian municipalities in northern Kosovo into the Kosovar state by giving in exchange extensive local autonomy (Lehne, 2013). Because of this, the European Council decided to reward Serbia by setting an official date for Serbia's accession negotiations: January 2014 (ibid.). The Progressive Party won the elections in 2014 and 2016, giving Vučić virtually total power over the government. His position was strengthened even more in 2017, when he was elected President of the country (ibid). After six years on power, SNS leaders still claim that their political agenda is organized around the project of joining the EU. The Serbian government is still working to meet EU expectations with regards to the relationship with Kosovo and other Western Balkan neighbors. However, in Serbia SNS is proving itself as an illiberal regime, by 'including the near obliteration of a free press, the (further) politicization of the state administration, and the suppression of critical civil society groups' (ibid).

3.5 Supporting Theoretical Background

As already mentioned in the introductory part of the chapter, a domain that necessarily needs to be analyzed in order to understand the *saliency* of the political dimension of the Migration Crisis is Politicization. Even though Politicization will not be the core theory of the research, it appears to be a very relevant supporting theory, if we take into account the idea that dynamics of Politicization are a necessary step for Europeanization to appear.

3.5.1 The concept of Politicization

The concept of Politicization started arising when, in the era of early functionalism¹³, the notion that claimed that a shift in power to the European level would lead to a so called political ‘spill over’¹⁴ from Member States (Haas, 1958 in Statham and Trenz, 2015: 289). After the French and Dutch rejected the EU elites plan to constitutionalize the European Union in 2005, there has been a drastic increase in scholars interested in the processes of European Politicization and its outcomes (Statham, 2015: 289). Classical approaches on Europeanization argue that

structurally grounded conflicts over European integration and the EU polity are becoming politically salient to a degree that they are consciously perceived by the groups involved, and that some collective actors mobilize and organize politically on this basis (Statham, 2015: 289).

However, there are substantial differences in theories and explanations on Politicization, that focus on different kind of conceptual approaches. In order to better understand the processes of the concept, a good starting point is to look at the work of Pieter de Wilde.

3.5.2 The dynamics of Politicization

In order to understand the dynamics of Politicization, a first necessary step is to cite the work of Pieter de Wilde, one of the researches mostly interested in its many facets. In one of his early working papers focused on the topic, that dates back to 2007, de Wilde notes that studies on the concept of Politicization tend to focus on the ‘product’ more than on the ‘process’ and that the

¹³ Functionalism is a theory of International Relations that claims that the State doesn’t have a strong power as a form of social organization as it used to have before. The theory arose during the inter war period.

¹⁴ The concept of Spillover, as meant by Haas, refers to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond this sector – namely in the domain of politics.

concept is rarely the core of a research (2007: 1). Interest in its many facets, de Wilde generated a working definition, useful to understand the many dimensions of the concept:

[Politicization] can be defined as an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the European Union. (de Wilde, 2007: 20)

According to de Wilde's definition, there are three interrelated processes that can occur: polarization of opinion, intensified debate and public resonance (2007: 21). Let's analyze them more in depth.

First of all, polarization of opinion. According to the author, a question or issue can be politicized when there are two or more different opinions on the subject (ibid.). These opinions must be voiced by representatives who are socially recognizable, such as interest groups or political parties. Those actors then need to purposely engage. What will occur then is a polarization of opinions and a 'crystallization of advocacy coalitions' in need to advance a common position (ibid.). Differences in opinions might be more or less strong. Actors might agree on the goals that they want to reach but not on the sacrifices they are willing to make in order to achieve those goals. On the other hand, there might be a very prominent difference of opinions that might be voiced in an aggressive language in the political arena (ibid.). According to de Wilde, 'the more opinions of involved parties diverge and crystallize into opposing groups, the stronger polarization of opinion resulting in increasing politicization' (ibid.).

The second process that needs to be analyzed is intensified debates. As a matter of fact, different parties may have very different opinions, but if they don't state them in the political arena, Politicization may remain inhibited. In order to explain this aspect, de Wilde draws back to Van der Eijk and Franklin. According to the authors, intensity of debate consists of two intertwined aspects. Firstly, it refers to 'how much, long and often a specific issue is discussed by the interest parties or their representatives'. Secondly, 'it refers to the number of different parties involved in the debate. As more parties become involved and more resources spent, debates intensify and become politicized' (de Wilde, 2007: 22).

The third process to take into account is public resonance. In order for a debate to achieve public resonance, 'there needs to be an audience present and/or able to follow the proceedings of the debate (2007: 22). If the proceedings of the debate are accessible to all citizens, this will further

strengthen the public resonance of the debates. Another way to increase public resonance is by allowing the public to participate in the debate (Trenz and Eder in de Wilde, 2007: 23). This might happen in a direct way through, for example, elections or referenda, or through indirect participation, such as opinion polls or discussion forums (2007: 23).

3.5.3 The Politicization of Migration

After having analyzed the core idea of the concept of Politicization and its dynamics, it is now necessary to see how scholars have defined the Politicization of Migration, core theme of this research.

As Green-Pedersen and Otjes argued (2019: 424), within EU Member States (and arguably also Accession States) Migration has become a ‘hot topic’ and since conflicts over immigration have become salient in national elections, they played a crucial role in some national referenda (notably in the Brexit campaign) and they shaped political agendas of governments.

Conventional theories on the Politicization of immigration claim that the process is the result of two factors: a substantially significant increase of Migration processes in recent years, which exceeded the capacities of Nation States to deal with border management and to proceed with practices of integration; and the capacity of radical right populist parties to exploit these challenges (Grande et al. 2018: 2).

However, understanding the Politicization of Migration is not an easy task. While there is extensive evidence of an increase in salience of immigration issues since the 1990s, there is major disagreement on which are the driving forces of Politicization (ibid.). The most comprehensive analysis on the topic, conducted by Van der Brug, D’Amato, Ruedin and Berkhout doesn’t attribute salience of migration issues neither to socio-economic factors nor to the mobilization attributed to radical right parties. What the authors conclude is that

‘politicization is very much a top-down process, in which government parties play an especially important role’ (Van der Brug et al. 2015: 195).

Other scholars support this claim, while arguing that mainstream center-right parties are to be seen as the main drivers of the Politicization of migrations in Europe (Grande et al. 2018: 2).

3.5.4 The Politicization of European Crises

According to scholars, for a long time, European publics were characterized by ‘permissive consensus’, which allowed the elites of Europe to advance the integration process ‘by stealth’, without involving the wide public (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 12). Because of this reason, European integration was in the past called ‘the sleeping giant’ (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004: 2). However, this specific state of affairs has now come to an end since in the European political sphere we are now witnessing practices of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009: 13). As scholars Hooghe and Marks observed, since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU has been challenged with a tension between fast jurisdictional change and ‘relatively stable identities’. In order to politicize this kind of tension, according to the authors, two things need to happen: the tension itself must become salient and political entrepreneurs need to mobilize (ibid.). Therefore, a crisis situation is needed in order to witness strong practices of Politicization. Authors Kriesi and Grande tried to understand to which extent has the Euro crisis of 2008 contributed to the Politicization of national political debates. I argue that their research is a good example because it puts into correlation practices of Politicization with a major crisis that happened in Europe, just like the Migration Crisis which is the object of this research.

First of all, the authors suggest that Politicization is a key mechanism that can put political elites in the spotlight and make them accountable to the wide public. Furthermore, they identify three sub processes that occur during Politicization:

an increasing salience of the issue in the public debate, an expansion of the issue-specific conflict beyond the narrow circle of executive actors, and a process of polarization among the political elites carrying the issue-specific debate (Kriesi and Grande, 2014: 68 -69).

Kriesi and Grande underline the importance of the *salience* of the issue while analyzing its Politicization, which can, according to them, be enhanced by two processes: expansion of the conflict to non-executive actors and polarization of opinions (2014: 69). Moreover, they put the accent on the issue-specificity by saying that the *character* of the Politicization process also depends on the various characteristics of the issues to which it refers (ibid.). Another key distinction that needs to be made is the one between constitutional issues and policy centered issues since ‘The Politicization of the former is likely to have much more profound, transformative consequences for a given polity than the Politicization of the latter’ (2014: 69).

After making all those theoretical clarifications, Kriesi and Grande analyzed, through political debates, the correlation between Politicization and the Euro crisis of 2008. First of all, what they found out is that Politicization worked as a booster for Europeanization of the political debates in the analyzed nation-states and it intensified the Europeanization process in all the countries that they examined, regardless their status in the EU. Secondly, they have come across other significant data. On one hand, the debate on the Euro crisis has appeared to be salient and has increased the visibility of European affairs at a nation state level. On the other hand, this hasn't fastened the transfer of European politics into so called 'mass politics'. As the authors point out, it has mainly happened in an intergovernmental channel and has been mostly dominated by 'supranational executive agencies and national executives' (2014: 85). Even though their work didn't deal with the Migration Crisis, it showed the correlation between Politicization, national debates and a major crisis in the EU. Moreover, it showed in practice how practices of Politicization serve as a boost for Europeanization to appear.

Börzel and Risse (2018) expanded on this idea by actually correlating the Politicization of the Euro crisis to the one that happened before the Migrant Crisis. With their work, they drew some conclusions on implications of crises on Politicization and they made some parallelisms between the two. While during the Euro crisis attempts to defend EU-level decisions against the 'constraining dissensus' appeared to be difficultly sustainable, the European Union tried to put forward the same strategy when faced with the Migrant Crisis of 2015 (Börzel and Risse, 2018: 85). However, in this occasion, practices of 'depoliticization', where supranational bodies tried to delegate to national ones, failed from the very beginning. What happened was the fueling of Politicization of EU affairs in the Member States, that mobilized many different identity components (ibid.). During the Euro crisis the focus of identity politics was mostly on the constitutive features of the European Union and namely solidarity and budgetary discipline in the common currency area; As Börzel and Risse explain it, the main question to ask was 'who are we as a union?' (ibid.). At the time, European elites tried to depoliticize the issue and their effort can be seen as partially successful, since they relied on the acceptance of the majority of European citizens and their 'Europeanized' inclusive national identities. In contrast, the Migrant Crisis had a completely different focus. As a matter of fact, it was about 'the others' and the main question was 'who belongs to us'? As argued by the scholars, in this specific case, Politicization was primarily led by right-wing populist parties that mobilized citizens and pushed exclusive national identities while the main European elites remained silent because of the 'absence of a transnationalized and liberal/cosmopolitan 'communicative discourse'' (ibid.).

As research shows, major crises situation in Europe fostered the emergence of Politicization, which, in turn, helped the emergence of Europeanization.

Chapter 4: Methodology

After having explained the background and the theoretical framework of the research, this chapter will explain its methodology. First of all, it will present the units and the timeframe of the research. After that, it will focus on the mere methodology, discourse analysis. Firstly, the broad concept of discourse analysis will be defined; secondly, the subfields that will be used for the analysis, parliamentary discourse and Europeanization of discourse, will be presented. Following, the method used for the data analysis of this thesis will be analyzed. Lastly, there will be a section dealing with the limits of this research.

4.1 Comparison of units of analysis

Comparison is a field that arises in all science, including the social sciences (Lor, 2011: 2). However, there is little agreement in the field of social sciences on whether the comparative method serves as a distinct subfield or methodology (ibid.). In a very famous article on the theme of comparative politics, Lijphart gave the comparative method the same rights as the experimental, statistical and case study methods (Lijphart, 1971: 682). This was enhanced by Sartori, who stated that comparative politics can be defined as a ‘field characterized by a method’ (Sartori, 1991: 243). In order to differentiate a comparative and a non-comparative research, Ragin points out a key difference that revolves around the methodology in the two. The distinctive point between the two is in what he calls ‘large macrosocial units’, a term that refers to countries, nations and other political entities (Ragin, 1987: 1-6). According to Lor, ‘although all social scientists claim to study societies or things that happen in society, most do not feel the need to define the macrosocial units within which their research is conducted and they are not much concerned with the properties of these units’ (Lor, 2011: 2). Things are different for mere comparativists, because what they do is comparing macrosocial units as such, since what interests them is finding out similarities and differences between the macrounits in question (ibid).

This premise on comparative studies was made to introduce the selected methodology. Even though the research deals with parliamentary discourse and therefore *discourse analysis* (which will be presented further in the chapter) is the method used, it is important to point out that two specific parliaments, the Serbian and Croatian ones, have been chosen as the ‘macrosocial units’ or maybe it is better to say just *units* of the research. The comparative method as such will not be followed, since the accent won’t be put on the properties of the units, but since a comparison between the

results of the two units will be presented in the data analysis chapter, it seemed important to define and present the proprieties of the selected units.

4.1.1 The units of analysis: the Croatian *Sabor* and the Serbian *Narodna Skupština*

The chosen units of analysis are the Croatian *Sabor* and the Serbian *Narodna Skupština*. Since the selected *theme* of the discourse analysis is the migrant crisis, which became extremely topical in 2015 and remained a major topic of interest in the following years, and since both the Croatian and the Serbian parliament changed their composition in 2016, due to parliamentary elections (the first took place on the 11th of September of 2016, and the second on the 24th of April 2016), I decided to focus my research from 2016, that is the year of composition of the two new parliaments. Since 2019 is still ongoing and therefore could create confusion, because some of the debates on the migrant crisis might take place in the following months, I decided to narrow down the focus on three specific years: 2016, 2017, 2018. Following, there is a presentation of the two parliaments, and specifically of the 9th Assembly of the Croatian *Sabor* and the 11th Assembly of the Serbian *Narodna Skupština*.

The Croatian *Sabor* is the unicameral representative and legislative body of the citizens of Croatia. It is composed of 151 members, which are elected for 4 years terms on the basis of direct, universal and equal suffrage, made by secret ballot. Seats in the *Sabor* are allocated on the basis of the Croatian Parliament electoral districts, that foresee 140 seats for multi-seat constituencies, 8 seats for representatives of minorities and 3 seats for representatives of Croatian diaspora. A Speaker, who is assisted by at least one deputy speaker, presides the *Sabor*.

The 9th assembly of the Croatian Parliament (*Sabor*):




Chart 4 - 9th assembly of the Croatian Parliament (*Sabor*)
Source: Author - Parliament diagram tool, Javno vlasništvo,
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=75849383>

The 9th assembly of the Croatian *Sabor*, which was constituted on the 14th of October 2016 and is still active, is distributed in the following way: the government is composed by 55 MPs from the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ – Blue on the map) and 4 MPs from the the Croatian People’s Party – Liberal Democrats (HNS – Brown). Supporting the government are 12 independent MPs (white); 3 MPs from Bandić Milan 365 (Green); 2 MPs from the Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS – Grey); 2 MPs from the Croatian Christian Democratic Party (HDS – Grey-Blue); 1 MP of the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLs – Yellow); 1 MP from the Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB – ‘Bordeaux’ Red) and 1 MP from the Reformist Party (Purple). The opposition is led by 29 MPs from the Social Democratic party of Croatia (SDP – Bright red) together with 10 MPs from The Bridge of Independent Lists (Most nezavisnih lista – Bright orange); 7 independent MPs (white); 4 MPs from the Civic Liberal Alliance (Glas - ‘Water’ Blue); 4 MPs of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS – Dark Green); 3 MPs from the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS – Bright Green); 3 MPs from Human Shield (Zivi Zid – Yellow); 2 MPs for Independents for Croatia (NZH – Purple/Blue); 1 MP for the Democrats (Demokrati – Bright Red); 1 MP for the Movement for successful Croatia (HRAST – Blue); 1 MP for the Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU – light blue); 1 MP for the Independent list of youth (NLM – Orange); 1 MP for Change Croatia (PH – Violet); Strength – the party of national and civic activism (SNAGA – Pink).

The Serbian Parliament, called *Narodna Skupština*, is the unicameral legislature and legislative power of Serbia. It is composed by 250 elected members, which are elected proportionally by secret ballot on a 4 years term. An elected president (speaker) presides the sessions of the Narodna Skupština




Chart 5 - 11th Assembly of the Serbian Parliament (*Narodna Skupština*)

Source: Author – Nikgudz – Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0
<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=48564094>

In the current configuration of the Parliament, that first met on the 3rd of June 2016, 131 seats are held by the coalition between the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP Srbije), the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS), New Serbia (NS), the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the Movement of Socialists (PS), Serbian National Party (SNP) (all in dark blue). 29 MPs pertain to the coalition between the Socialists Party of Serbia (SPS), United Serbia (JS) and Greens of Serbia (all in dark red). 22 MPs are from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS – bright blue). 16 seats are held by the party Enough is enough (Dosta je bilo – orange). 16 MPs hold the seats of the coalition between the Democratic Party (Serbia) (DS), the New party (NS), Together for Serbia (ZZS), Together for Šumadija (ZZŠ) (all in yellow). 13 MPs are from the coalition between Dveri (Srpski pokret Dveri) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) (blue – next to orange). 13 MPs are from the coalition between the Social Democratic Party (Serbia) (SDS), the Liberal Democratic Party (Serbia) (LDP) and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) (all in bright red). Finally, 10 MPs represent National minorities (green).

4.2 Understanding discourse

After having presented the units, it is now time to present the actual method used for this research. Before actually entering the domain of discourse analysis, it is necessary to go back to the beginning of the research, namely the introductory section. There, I stated that I would understand discourse as explained by Foucault. Now it is the time to elaborate more on his idea of discourse. As identified in the introduction, the author states that discourse is not to be interpreted as ‘a group of signs but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1969:

46). Weedon elaborated on the Foucauldian idea and conceptualized that for the author, discourse is embedded in

ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern (Weedon, 1987: 1).

Moreover, if we take a step further in the Foucauldian conceptualization of discourse, it appears that for the author discourses embed two different dimensions. If, on one side they focus on what can be said and thought, on the other one they also take into consideration who speaks, when this person speaks and with which authority (Foucault, 1972). By doing so, they put together meanings and social relationships and they constitute both 'subjectivity and power relationships' (Pitsoe and Letseka, 2012: 24). Moreover, Foucault observes that language plays a fundamental role in

reproducing and transforming power relations along many different dimensions (of class, culture, gender, sexuality, disability and age, etc.) and is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. Hence, Foucault suggests that each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" (in Pitsoe and Letseka, 2012: 24)

4.2.1 Discourse analysis

Discourse analysis can be defined as the field that analyzes the use of language *beyond* a sentence in a real life situation (Crystal, 1992). What it does specifically, is investigation on spoken or written instances of language that are connected and that, by occurring naturally, establish patterns or regularities for the sake of having an improved understanding of human communication (Fairclough, 1995). Therefore, Discourse Analysis tries to establish how language that occurs naturally is determined by and has the potential to determine the ways in which knowledge is used by the human mind and how it is shaped by the way people interact between themselves within their social and cultural contexts (Stubbs, 1983; Cook, 1989).

4.2.2 Parliamentary discourse analysis

Parliamentary discourse analysis is studied as a subfield of discourse analysis.

Contemporary research views parliamentary discourse as a variety of political language which is largely defined by its contextual properties and thus requires a contextual approach of analysis. According to the systemic functional theory, a contextual discourse analysis is the analysis of register, i.e. the analysis of the text as embedded in its situational context. (Treimane, 2011: 78)

As mentioned in the quote above, parliamentary discourse has, in recent years, established itself as a field of study in social sciences. The definitions of parliamentary discourse differ across time and authors. To quote Bayley, “parliamentary talk is a sub-genre of political language and represents its most formal and institutionalized variety” (Bayley, 2004: 1). On the other hand, Ilie states that parliamentary discourse consists of ‘a norm-regulated interaction among politically elected representatives for deliberation and decision-making purposes in specific institutional settings and which displays a number of particular communication patterns’ (Ilie 2009, 61). Another scholar which is important to mention is Van Dijk, who claims that what characterizes parliamentary discourse are his ‘contextual proprieties’, meaning specifically where the debate is held, what the topics are and who the participants are. Therefore, for Van Dijk, the approach to parliamentary analysis should be ‘contextual’ (Van Dijk 2004, 340).

On the basis of what has just been said, Treimane, summarizes the three characteristic features of parliamentary discourse: ‘It is the most formal and institutionalized variety of political discourse’; ‘It displays fixed, recurrent communication patterns which both shape and restrict the mode of communication’ and ‘It requires a contextual approach of analysis’ (Treimane, 2011: 70).

4.2.3 Europeanization of discourse

After having defined parliamentary discourse analysis as a field, it is important to focus on another feature of discourse that this research is trying to grasp: Europeanization. Previous chapters have defined in depth what is the meaning of Europeanization and what can its different connotations be, but what does it mean for discourse to Europeanize?

The constitution of the EU as a polity can be seen as probably the most turning point in the study of European discourses (Crespy, 2015: 2). The question was firstly addressed by scholars in the 90s, while studying different ideas of the European polity articulated by elite discourse and

anchored in national or state identities (Waeber, 1990; Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998 in Crespy, 2015: 3). With further institutional development of the EU, scholars have focused on the 'the role of discourse in the shaping of the EU as a global actor and, more particularly, the legitimation of its external policy be it commercial, diplomatic or military' (Tonra and Christiansen 2004, in Crespy 2015: 3). Most of the cited scholars can be defined as constructivists, since they claim that Europe, like other socio-political phenomena, is constructed through discourse (ibid.).

Europeanization of discourse is therefore a phenomenon that is not strictly defined; it is rather possible to say that it varies from scholar to scholar, on the basis on what should be put into focus. Since it has many different facets, the operationalization of discursive approaches in European studies can appear rather challenging, as it usually relies on implicit methods. Crespy (2015) identified four approaches to methods when it comes to Europeanization of discourse.

First of all, *Content analysis*. This type of method is good towards the qualification of discursive content. One of the techniques is lexicometry, 'that relies on the automatic identification of word frequency which can be employed for conducting statistical analysis' (such as correlations) (Crespy, 2015: 18). However, it can also be used in less quantitative methods. As a matter of fact, it can be grounded in a deductive approach, where 'the manual coding is conducted according to a pre-established so called code book; that is a pre-established list of actors, topics, argumentative strategies, etc' (Crespy, 2015: 8). Another technique that pertains to this category is claim analysis. 'This technique consists of analyzing the claims made by both institutional and non-institutional actors in the public sphere by coding and analyzing the relationship between actors making claims, the target of the claims, the intensity of protest and the substantive content of claims' (Koopmans and Statham, 1999 in Crespy, 2015: 8).

Secondly, *Frame analysis*. This kind of approach derives from the work of Erving Goffman (1974), on the psycho-sociological mechanisms by which people frame reality in their everyday lives. As well defined by Creed et al., framing analysis is

'...a technique for approaching a text by attending to its diverse idea elements with the following question: What holds these elements together? The goal of frame analysis is understanding how certain idea elements are linked together into packages of meaning, potentially encoded into soundbite-like signifiers that stand for those packages of meaning, and deployed in a situated discursive activity' (Creed et al., 2002: 37).

Framing approach can provide a framework for analyzing in which way discursive elements have the power of enabling actors to construct meaning around an idea. It can be combined with either quantitative data or with more interpretive methods (Crespy, 2015: 9). If the Second is taken into account, ‘the purpose is not to measure the relative salience of frames, but to interpret how different aspects related to an issue can be highlighted at different points in time or, in other words, how the perceptions of policy problems and solutions evolve (or not) over time’ (Lynggaard 2007, 2012 in Crespy: 2015).

Thirdly, Crespy identifies *Policy narratives*. The aim of Policy narratives is to define the normative and cognitive levels of problems in order to shape future actions that should be taken (Crespy: 2015, 10). ‘While frames are useful to analyze the various dimensions of discourse (that show more specific discursive elements relate to and constitute a broader discourse, like Russian matrushka dolls), narratives shed light on the sequencing of discourse. Narratives are stories, or plots, with a beginning, a middle and an end’ (Roe, 1994 in Crespy, 2015: 10).

Finally, *Critical Discourse Analysis*. This approach appears to be the most encompassing one. At a theoretical level, it places its bases on critical social theory while at an empirical one, it takes methods from linguistics, referring both to the structure and the content of discourse (Van Dijk, 1993). Wodak distinguished between power embedded *in* discourse, or ‘actor’s struggles over different interpretation of meaning’ and power *over* discourse where the accent is put in inclusion and/or exclusion dynamics (Wodak, 2009: chapter 2). Moreover, this kind of approach involves: ‘intertextual and interdiscursive between utterances, texts, genres and discourses; extra-linguistic social/sociological variables; the history and archeology of texts and organizations and institutional frames of a specific context or situation’ (Wodak, 2009: 38-39).

4.3 Operationalization of the research: a method between methods

After having defined how Europeanization of discourse can be operationalized, it is time to define the operationalization of this specific research. As already mentioned, the aim of this research is to see if there is an interconnection between parliamentary discourse on the topics surrounding the migration crisis in Croatia and Serbia and Europeanization of discourse. Therefore, the research question can be phrased as:

- *Have discourses revolving around the Migrant Crisis been Europeanized in Croatian and Serbian parliamentary debates?*

Meaning ‘how much Europe’ can we find in the parliamentary discourses of the two countries? Parallely, a sub question will be answered:

- *Is the connotation given to discourses where Europe emerges in connection to the Migrant Crisis positive or negative?*

Do MPs talk about Europe positively or negatively? What kind of patterns emerge through their speeches? And finally, since there are two units of analysis, a third sub question will be addressed:

- *How do levels of Europeanization of parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis differ in Croatia and Serbia?*

The first two questions will deal with the topic by analyzing country specific collected data, while the third will be answered by comparing the analyzed data.

As already mentioned, the focus will be made on parliamentary debates. As argued by van Dijk, parliamentary discourse can be seen as ‘a formal gathering of a group of elected representatives, members of various political parties, engaging in a discussion about what collective action or policy to undertake concerning an issue of public concern’ (van Dijk, 2000: 53). Therefore, even though the debates take place in a setting that can be defined as institutional, they take into consideration the ‘*collective*’, meaning the concerns and ideas of a broader public. This is specifically why I thought parliamentary debates represent a good unit of analysis. Moreover, as argued by Maatsch, ‘national parliaments constitute the most important formal discussion arena in modern democratic states’ (2011: 33). This idea gives parliamentary debates legitimation and importance.

In order to select the debates to analyze, I relied on search engines of the *Sabor* and the *Narodna Skupština*. If the *Sabor* has an ‘Information and documentation service’ website connected to its own where all the debates are transcribed, the website of the *Narodna Skupština* gives the possibility to browse between the shorthand notes taken during the debates. In order to *select* the debates, I decided to use as a keyword the expression ‘*migrantska kriza*’, migration crisis in

Croatian and Serbian, and take into account all the debates where issues about the migrant crisis were discussed between the years 2016 and 2018, as already mentioned in previous sections. Since in neither of the parliaments debates where the migrant crisis was actually on the agenda occurred, the focus was put on whenever the topic was discussed during the debates.

Selected debates – Croatia

CRO1_23.11.2016	Saziv IX, sjednica 2 - aktualno prijepodne
CRO1.1_10.12.2016	Saziv IX, sjednica 2, red.br 47
CRO2_15.03.2017	Saziv IX, sjednica 3, red br 42
CRO3_05.07.2017	Saziv IX, sjednica 4, red br 79
CRO4_25.10.2017	Saziv IX, sjednica 5, red br 93
CRO5_17.01.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 7, red br 1
CRO5.1_09.03.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 7, red br 84
CRO5.2_14.03.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 7, red br 96; 97
CRO5.3_20.03.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 7, red br 106
CRO6_14.04.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 8, red br 5
CRO6.1_02.07.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 8, red br 137
CRO7_14.11.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 10, red br 1
CRO7.1_04.12.2018	Saziv IX, sjednica 10, red br 52; 53; 54;

Chart 6 – Selected debates – Croatia

Author's own elaboration

Selected debates – Serbia

SER1_10.08.2016	XI saziv, Prva posebna sednica, Drugi dan rada
SER2_06.10.2016	XI saziv, Prva sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja, Treći dan rada
SER3_02.11.2016	XI saziv, Treća sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja, Peti dan rada

SER4_22.11.2016	XI saziv, Četvrta sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja, Peti dan rada
SER5_18.05.2017	XI saziv, Četvrta sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja,
SER6_24.06.2017	XI saziv, Drugo vanredno zasedanje u jedanaestom sazivu
SER6.1_26.06.2017	XI saziv, Drugo vanredno zasedanje u jedanaestom sazivu, drugi dan rada
SER7_28.06.2017	XI saziv, Deveta posebna sednica u jedanaestom sazivu
SER8_07.03.2018	XI saziv, Prva sednica prvog redovnog zasedanja, prvi dan rada
SER8.1_08.03.2018	XI saziv, Prva sednica prvog redovnog zasedanja, treći dan rada
SER8.3_13.03.2018	XI saziv, Prva sednica prvog redovnog zasedanja, šesti dan rada
SER9_02.04.2018	XI saziv, Druga sednica prvog redovnog zasedanja, peti dan rada
SER10_25.04.2018	XI saziv, Četvrta sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja, drugi dan rada
SER10.1_07.05.2018	XI saziv, Četvrta sednica prvog redovnog zasedanja u 2018. godini, sedmi dan rada
SER11_21.09.2018	XI saziv, Deseto vanredno zasedanje u jedanestom sazivu
SER12_02.11.2018	XI saziv, Treća sednica drugog vanrednog zasedanja u 2018 godini, treći dan rada
SER12.1_05.11.2018	XI saziv, Treća sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja u 2018. godini, četvrti dan rada
SER12.2_06.11.2018	XI saziv, Treća sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja u 2018. godini, peti dan rada
SER13_28.11.2018	XI saziv, Četvrta sednica drugog redovnog zasedanja u 2018. godini, drugi dan rada

Chart 7 – Selected debates - Serbia

Author's own elaboration

Plenary sessions and extraordinary sessions of the Parliaments were taken into account as debate arenas. If the same plenary was divided on the searching engines by topics or by the different working day, the debates were coded separately but they were still attributed the same number (for example SER6 and SER6.1; the debates were coded separately because they occurred on a different day but they still have the same number as they are part of the same Plenary session).

After individuating the parts of the debates where topics concerning the migration crisis were discussed, claims concerning the issue were manually coded in the following way:

- the claim concerns the National sphere (National level)

- the claim concerns the European sphere (European level)
- if the claim concerns the European sphere, it has a positive connotation (Yes/No answer)
- if the claim concern the European sphere, it has a negative connotation (Yes/No answer)
- what kind of issue/concern/topic is attached to the claim? (Frame)
- codes non applicable (Other)

The coding also took into consideration the party and the name of the Member of the Parliament speaking.

As mentioned in the title of the section, the analysis has been made by combining different methods. As a matter of fact, practices of Parliamentary discourse analysis and Europeanization of discourse analysis were combined. Regarding the first, I took into consideration the three features of Parliamentary discourse summarized by Treimane (see Parliamentary discourse section). Regarding Europeanization of discourse analysis, as scholars who defined it give liberty in its application, I decided to mix practices of *Content analysis* and *Frame analysis* in order to answer to the research questions.

It is fundamental to point out that the research mainly follows *qualitative* methods. However, *quantitative* approaches will be used as well, in order to support qualitative thoughts, to identify discursive patterns and to better visualize them. Therefore, it is possible to say that quantitative approaches support the qualitative ones.

4.3.1 Limits of the research

The first limit of the research lies in the composition of the two parliaments. As a matter of fact, as noted earlier in this chapter, the two parliaments have a rather different composition. If the *Sabor* is formed by 151 members, the *Narodna Skupština* has 250, almost 100 more. Such a difference in number can substantially increase the number of MPs debating on a theme, making one analysis much more substantial than the other.

The second limit of the research is in the number of debates analyzed. As it appears by the tables presented in the previous section, the number of debates that occurred in Serbia where topics around the migrant crisis were touched upon is almost double than the number of debates that occurred in Croatia. This can be seen as a factor of inequality, since one produces much more material to be analyzed than the other. However, since the analysis focuses mostly on qualitative approaches, this limit seems to be put into second place.

Thirdly, the timeframe. By deciding to focus on the period 2016-2018 for the analysis of the debates, I automatically excluded to analyze discursive patterns on the Europeanization of the migration crisis that happened in the previous parliamentary setting. Comparing previous patterns to the current ones could be an interesting starting point for further research.

Following, qualitative approaches in conducting this research might represent a limit themselves. As a matter of fact, the coding was conducted on the basis of my own perceptions of discursive practices. I categorized the claims myself and as much as I tried to be impartial and focus only on what was said, sometimes I found it difficult to attach some kind of categorization to a specific claim. This is specifically why I inserted 'Other' as a category of my code book.

Another type of limit regards the level of relationship between the country and the European Union. On one side there is Croatia, the newest member of the EU, who joined on the 1st of July of 2013. On the other side there is Serbia, who firstly applied for EU membership on the 22nd of December of 2009 and received European Commission's candidacy recommendation on the 12th of October of 2011. The country received full candidate status on the 1st of March 2012 and opened negotiations with the EU in January of 2014. As it appears, the two countries have a very different relationship with the EU, which can be reflected in the analysis of Europeanization of discourse. This can appear as a limit, since the units of analysis are not equal in their levels of EU integration. However, it can also represent a strength, since it compares two units that differ, and that can bring forward interesting conflicting discursive patterns.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis and Discussion of Results

This section can be seen as the core section of the research, since it puts into correlation the theory and the data gathered for the research. Its aim is to see whether Parliamentary discourse over topics concerning the Migrant Crisis was Europeanized in Croatia and Serbia over the three years period 2016-2018. In order to find answers to the research question and the sub questions

- *Have discourses revolving around the Migrant Crisis been Europeanized in Croatian and Serbian parliamentary debates?*
- *Is the connotation given to discourses where Europe emerges in connection to the Migrant Crisis positive or negative?*
- *How do levels of Europeanization of parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis differ in Croatia and Serbia?*

this section will proceed in the following way: first of all it will focus on the choice of the debates and the salience of the topic on migrations in the Parliamentary sphere. After that, it will move on in a parallel way (even though the units of Croatia and Serbia will be presented one after the other), by firstly seeing on a more quantitative¹⁵ level whether the discourse in the two parliaments focused predominantly on the national or on the European level and whether the European level was positively or negatively depicted. After that, the major frames will be analyzed on a qualitative level. To have a better understanding of the frames that dominated discourse in the two Parliaments, claims made by MPs will be cited¹⁶. Subsequently, an ‘emerging trend’ based on qualitative methods will be individuated in both cases. Moving forward, party involvement in discursive approaches over Migration will be depicted. Finally, the two units will be compared, with a strong accent on the differences of the levels of Europeanization in the two.

¹⁵ The quantitative analysis was made by a simple count of sections that can be found in the annex. Since the quantitative method serves only as a reinforcement of the qualitative one, in the graphs that will appear further in the text, numbers will not be included. As a matter of fact, the aim of the graphs is to provide just a visual representation of the trends.

¹⁶ The claims cited were selected on the basis on which ones better depicts the frame. Therefore, a distinction between parties and MPs is not embedded in this part of the research.

5.1 The choice of debates: a false indicator of lack of focus on the Migrant Crisis?

As a starting point to conduct this analysis, as mentioned in the methodology section, the term ‘*migrantska kriza*’ was searched on research tools of both the *Sabor* and the *Narodna Skupština*. It was striking to find out that neither of the parliaments in the triennium 2016-2018 had a plenary session where the term ‘Migrant Crisis’ was actually inserted in the agenda. As a matter of fact, themes concerning it were debated throughout the years, but it was never the solely focus of the debate. This fact was reproached by Members of the Parliament of both the countries:

Let me remind you: at the beginning of 2016, I reminded the *Sabor* and actually wanted the problem of migrations and migrants to be one of the points of the agenda and from then onwards, nobody thought it was important to put it as one of the main points of one of the Plenary Sessions of the *Sabor*. What are the roots of it, how will the Crisis develop, what is awaiting Europe, the EU, we can find out only if we know demographic tendencies, the economic ones, and if we know the geopolitical turmoil derived from the competition of great powers in this area¹⁷. (Lovrinović Ivan, PH, CRO7_14.11.2017)

Simply, you are all witnessing how crucial this topic is in all the European institutions, how much it is being discussed by everyone at European level, both in individual countries and at EU and world level, of course. Only, this topic is not the topic of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia¹⁸. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO, DVERI, SER2_06.10.2016)

So, for the third week in a row, I ask Mrs. Maja Gojković, President of the National Assembly, when special sessions will be scheduled on current topics: the security and economic and social situation in Serbia regarding the migrant crisis¹⁹. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO, DVERI, SER4_22.11.2016)

Because of the impact the crisis had on both the countries, it seems really peculiar that none of them actually conducted a Plenary session with the theme on the agenda. However, discussions on the Migrant Crisis were found in Plenary sessions concerning security mainly but also finances, international agreements and national issues. Therefore it appears that even though it wasn't the

¹⁷ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Da vas podsjetim, početkom 2016. g. ovom Saboru sam predložio i tražio da se problem migracija i migranata stavi kao točka dnevnog reda i od tada do sada nitko to nije smatrao važnim da stavi na plenarnu sjednicu Sabora. Što su ustvari uzroci i kuda, kakav će biti razvoj migrantske krize, što će čeka Europu, EU, možemo iščitati ako poznamo demografske tendencije, ekonomske i ako znamo geopolitička previranja u nadmetanju velikih sila na ovom području.

¹⁸ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Prosto, svi ste svedoci koliko je to ključna tema u svim evropskim institucijama, koliko je to tema o kojoj raspravljaju svi na nivou Evrope, i u pojedinačnim državama i na nivou EU, i na svetskom nivou naravno. Jedino, ta tema nije tema Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije.

¹⁹ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Dakle, predsednika Narodne skupštine gospođu Maju Gojković treću nedelju zaredom pitam: kada će biti zakazane posebne sednice na aktuelne teme: bezbednosna i ekonomsko-socijalna situacija u Srbiji u vezi sa migrantskom krizom.

solely focus, the Migrant Crisis was politicized in both the Parliaments, as its salience seemed to be rather high.

5.2 The Croatian *Sabor*: discourse, the Migrant Crisis and the *National vs European*

Before starting the analysis on the mere parliamentary discourse, it is worth reconnecting to the previous section and focus on the choice of debates in the case of Croatia. As a matter of fact, in the selected time frame, three times topics concerning the Migrant Crisis were found in Plenary Sessions where the agenda concerned the reporting of the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković on meetings of the European Council (CRO2, CRO5, CRO7, see annex). Having the Prime Minister talking directly about meetings that happened at a EU level is a first indicator of the fact that the European sphere was perceived as salient by the government of Croatia.

Focusing now on the data, the analysis conducted on parliamentary discourse in Croatia, regarding the dichotomy National vs European discourse on migrations, showed the following results²⁰:




Chart 8 – Croatia: national vs European levels of discourse

Author's own elaboration

On a quantitative level, Croatian MPs made more claims concerning the European sphere rather than the national one while talking about the Migrant Crisis. Therefore, if we ask ourselves ‘how

²⁰ The results and the charts are calculated (now and in the following sections) by counting the coded claims under a specific code.

much Europe' in Croatian parliamentary discourse concerning the Migrant Crisis, we can actually see that the European sphere was predominant in comparison to the national one.

Whether the claims concerning the European sphere were positive or negative can be seen in the following chart:




Chart 9 – Croatia: positive versus negative claims on the EU level

Author's own elaboration

As we can see, MPs were rather divided on the attribution to give to matters concerning the EU while addressing the *Sabor*, which almost resulted in a polarization of opinions.

As just seen, the European sphere seemed to be dominant in the Parliamentary discourse of Croatia. While conducting the discourse analysis, several patterns were individuated.

5.3 Frames²¹ in Croatian parliamentary debates on the Migrant Crisis: from *National* to *European*

By assigning a frame to every claim said by MPs in the debate, it was possible to see which kind of issue was 'attached' to the Migrant Crisis during the debates.

On the national level, the predominant frame was security.

If we are talking about migration, and we have talked about it a lot today, I don't want to see any confusion. The Republic of Croatia must defend its borders. I don't think we should open our borders to everyone without showing any care or caution or discrimination²². (GLAVAŠEVIĆ BOJAN, Independent MP, CRO7_14.11.2017)

²¹ The predominant frames were identified by a simple count of the 'Frames section' present in the codebook (see annex).

²² Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Ako govorimo o migracijama, a o tome smo mnogo govorili danas, ne bih želio da bude zabune. RH svoje granice mora i treba braniti, ne mislim da trebamo bez ikakve pažnje ili opreza ili diskriminacije otvarati granice svima.

The Croatian security system was created to help the Republic of Croatia successfully cope with the security challenges of today. After the War of Independence, the Migrant Crisis appears to be the biggest crisis²³.(STRIČAK ANĐELKO, HDZ, CRO5.3_20.03.2018)

While the second theme that emerged at a national level was ‘Crisis Management’...

...even later in the migrant crisis at the end of 2015 it was clear that the state has a system, that under such large unexpected and unforeseen events, the state still functions which is also shown by commodity supplies as the Commodity Reserves Board has played a major role together with our volunteers, with the Red Cross, firefighters and all others who work in these situations; there hasn't been a system shutdown (...)²⁴. (DUJIĆ SAŠA, SDP, CRO5.1_09.03.2018)

...already the third frame showed the correlation between the national and the European, since it appeared to be ‘Integration’. If on one side Integration meant including migrants in the Croatian society

We talked about different [themes] and you yourself, after all, Mr President, have commented that different countries have integration programs that are successful on different degrees. My impression is, and what really bothers me about all this, is that we are doing pretty badly in the area. And without falling into negativity, of some sort, or of being an evil prophet, I think it is really important that, in some perspective, we open a public debate about programs and integrations for those 1583 people²⁵. (GLAVAŠEVIĆ BOJAN, SDP, CRO5_17.01.2018)

on the other side ‘Integration’ had the connotation of *European* Integration.

You said in the first part of your presentation that the first major integration step is the entrance to the Schengen area; as we know Croatia didn't have an easy time with the European Union and as you said this process is ongoing since 2016; I have no doubts that Croatia will fulfill the technical requirements, however, what concerns me is whether it is really the European Union interest that Croatia protects its borders, and if it is the interest of the Republic of Croatia as well, as the Schengen area has proven to be vulnerable, especially

²³ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Sustav domovinske sigurnost stvoren je kako bi se RH s uspjehom nosila s sigurnosnim izazovima današnjice. Nakon Domovinskog rata, najveća kriza je bila migrantska kriza.

²⁴ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: ...pa i kasnije u migrantskoj krizi krajem godine 2015. godine da država ima sustav, da država pod tako velikim neočekivanim i nepredviđenim događajima ipak funkcionira i gdje su robne zalihe odigrale, ravnateljstvo za robne zalihe odigralo jednu veliku ulogu uz naše volontere, uz Crveni Križ, vatrogasce i sve ostale koji u tim situacijama djeluju gdje niti jednog trenutka nije bilo zastoja sustava(...).

²⁵ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Razgovarali smo o različitim i vi ste i sami, na kraju krajeva, predsjedniče komentirali, kako različite zemlje imaju programe integracije, koje su u različitoj mjeri uspješni. Moj dojam je i ono što me brine zapravo u svemu ovome, da mi na tom području, stojimo dosta loše. I bez da upadam u negativnost, nekakvu, ili da budem zloguki prorok, ja mislim da je zaista od velike važnost, da u nekakvoj perspektivi otvorimo javnu raspravu o programima i(integracije i za te 1583 osobe.

in the recent past regarding the migrant crisis²⁶. (ŽAGAR TOMISLAV, Independent MP, CRO7_14.11.2017)

Even though it has a rather negative stance, and even though it puts its focus onto Croatia, this last claim starts including the ‘European’ into the ‘national’. Since the *European* was present already in the third most salient frame at a national level, it starts becoming evident that the EU was very present in the Croatian parliamentary debates on the Migrant Crisis. This idea is only reinforced by the claims that were coded as ‘EU level’, which, as it appears in the charts above, were predominant. Regarding the reoccurrence of frames connected to that part of the coding, the predominant one was *Solidarity*. Being *Solidarity* a recurring concept during the Migrant Crisis, which fostered a lot of polemic and even created an East-West divide on the EU in the management of the quota system, it appears that Croatian MPs felt the urge to voice their own opinion on the topic in rather heated debates. This can be seen as an indicator of the willingness to feel part of a *European* dimension of discourse.

And finally, the question of *Solidarity*. Much has been said here about the need for the EU to stand in *Solidarity*. I want to remind everyone that this means not only what we can take, but also what we can give. So, what Croatia can do for to the EU, and how Croatia can and should contribute to the EU is by implementing an active and positive role in stabilizing this part of Europe, Southeast Europe and the Western Balkans, whatever you want to call it, is something we can contribute and that pertains to the sphere of European business. But for that, we need to have an articulate, clear, [European] common policy, not just on one side of goodwill, and on the other hand, no moves or I would even say conflicting moves²⁷. (PUSIĆ VESNA, HNS, CRO2_15.03.2018)

The European asylum system and the debates on migration policy have shown, as I think was said by the Prime Minister in a previous statement, unfortunately, that at the moment there is not a sufficient degree of *Solidarity* and consensus among Member States. In particular, there is resistance from some Member States. It seems to me that the countries of the Visegrád Group particularly distinguish themselves, which, I would say, absolutely challenges the decisions of the EU authorities and even the ECJ rulings and this is a serious

²⁶ Author’s own translation from Croatian. Original text: Rekli ste u svom dijelu izlaganja da je prvi veliki integracijski korak ulaz u Šengenski prostor, RH vidimo i to iz povijesti ništa nije dobila lagano od Europske unije i ovaj proces sami ste rekli traje od 2016. i ja ne sumnjam da će Hrvatska ispunit tehničke uvjete, međutim ono što me brine je li doista interes Europske unije da Hrvatska štiti njene granice, je li to interes RH jer se Šengenski prostor pokazao ranjiv posebno u zadnje vrijeme vezano uz migrantsku krizu.

²⁷ Author’s own translation from Croatian. Original text: Konačno pitanje solidarnosti. Mnogo se ovdje govorilo o tome kako je potrebno da EU bude solidarna. Podsjećam da to znači ne samo što mi možemo uzeti, nego i što mi možemo dati. Dakle, što Hrvatska može doprinijeti EU, a jednu stvar koju Hrvatska može i treba doprinijeti EU je aktivna i pozitivna uloga u stabiliziranju ovog dijela Europe, Jugoistočne Europe i Zapadnog Balkana kako god hoćete to zvati, to je nešto što mi možemo doprinijeti i to je europski posao. Ali za to moramo imati artikuliranu, jasnu, zajedničku politiku, ne samo s jedne strane dobre želje, a s druge strane zapravo nikakve ili ja bi rekla konfliktne poteze.

problem for which there doesn't seem to be a solution at EU level²⁸. (PODOLNJAK ROBERT, MOST, CRO5_17.01.2018)

I think this was a big test for Europe and I am afraid that Europe has simply failed it. And I wish that in the future, when we talk about the principle of Solidarity, we are really consistent in that, whether we talk about that Solidarity from the perspective of what Solidarity means for the Social Democrats, or talk about what we call Christian Solidarity²⁹. (GLAVAŠEVIĆ BOJAN, SDP, CRO5_17.01.2018)

The second frame that stood out in the coding of claims made at a European level was *Crisis Management*, this time at a EU level.

The topic that dominated the month of June was the issue of migration. We then agreed on a comprehensive European approach to migration, combining this approach with effective control of the European Union's external border, enhanced external action and internal aspects, on all three migration routes, in the Eastern, Central and Western Mediterranean. Although migration flows have been reduced to practically pre-crisis levels, I am talking about the pre-2015 and 2016 periods, so they are lower by 95%, migration movements in the eastern and western Mediterranean require full attention³⁰. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, HDZ, CRO7_14.11.2017)

And why aren't we safe? Well, because we don't have a defined policy on migrants. Why don't we have a defined policy on migrants? Well, because here we wait to see what will come from Brussels, not for what the Parliament will say, what the Croatian people will say, what kind of immigration policy [Brussels] will implement, we are just waiting for what they need, what someone will say from Brussels and how they will behave³¹. (LOVRINOVIĆ IVAN, PH, CRO7_14.11.2017)

²⁸ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Europski azilski sustav i rasprave o migrantskoj politici pokazale su kao što su rekli mislim i predsjednik Vlade, a i u prethodnom izlaganju na žalost da u ovom trenutku ne postoji dovoljan stupanj solidarnosti i konsenzusa među državama članicama. Naročito postoji otpor nekih država članica. U tome se čini mi se posebno izdvajaju države Višegradske skupine koje pa čak u nekom rekao bih segmentu apsolutno osporavaju odluke nadležnih tijela EU pa čak i presuda Europskoga suda i to je ozbiljan problem za koji sada ne postoji rješenje na razini EU.

²⁹ Author's own translation. Original text: Mislim da je to bio jedan veliki test za Europu i bojim se da ga je Europa jednostavno pala. I volio bih da u budućnosti, kada govorimo o načelu solidarnosti, zaista budemo dosljedni u tome, bilo da o toj solidarnosti govorimo iz perspektive onoga što solidarnost znači za socijaldemokrate, bilo da govorimo o onome što nazivamo kršćanska solidarnost.

³⁰ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: Tema koja je dominirala u lipnju bilo je pitanje migracija. Mi smo tada postigli dogovor o sveobuhvatnom europskom pristupu migracijama taj pristup objedinjuju učinkovita kontrola vanjske granice Europske unije, pojačano vanjsko djelovanje i unutarnji aspekti i to na sva tri migracijska pravca, istočnom, središnjem i zapadno sredozemnom pravcu. Premda su migracijski tokovi smanjeni na praktički pred kriznu razinu, govorim o razdoblju prije 2015. i 2016. dakle oni su manji za 95% migracijska kretanja na istočnom i zapadno sredozemnom pravcu zahtijevaju punu pozornost.

³¹ Author's own translation from Croatian. Original text: A zašto nismo sigurni? Pa zato što nemamo definiranu politiku prema migrantima. Zašto nemamo definiranu politiku prema migrantima? Zašto nemamo definiranu politiku prema migrantima? Pa zato što se ovdje čeka što će doći Bruxelles, ne ovdje što će reći Sabor, što će reći hrvatski narod, kakvu će politiku premamigracijamazauzeti, negošotreba znači, čeka se što treba, što će netko reći iz Bruxellesa i kako će se ponašati.

Whether with a positive or negative approach, MPs debated Crisis Management at a EU level. Using the *Sabor* as the place to discuss about European Crisis Management showed once again how the *European* was embedded in the *national*.

Frames attributed to Croatian parliamentary discourse analysis showed how the European sphere appeared to be very present, as *Europe* emerged even when the national sphere was in the focus.

5.4 An emerging trend³²: the role of the leader

While conducting the discourse analysis, one figure emerged as the spokesman of the European sphere in the analyzed discourses on migration: Andrej Plenković. Prime Minister of Croatia and former Member of the European Parliament³³, Plenković showed himself as one of the major supporters of bringing the European sphere alive in the debates concerning the topic:

No other topic, such as the Migration Crisis, has changed the political architecture in European countries so far. Nothing, neither the great financial crisis, nor the institutional crises, nor other problems. This is a crisis, perceived by the citizens Member States, as one that brought great political consequences. The way to deal with this issue in a meaningful, rational way and this is how we are doing it. What we are doing is working So we are working in a way that encompasses the national dimension, that European dimension, that global dimension³⁴. (Plenković Andrej, HDZ, CRO7_14.11.2017)

Since, as argued by Rozenberg (2012), role perceptions and emotional incentives can have an impact on the extent and directions of certain political figures in their involvement in EU affairs, from the side of Andrej Plenković we can see the emergence of a so called ‘Emotional Europeanization’, where the leader, who was involved in EU politics in his past, focused his discourse on the Migrant Crisis on a European level in order to gain more legitimization in his role not only as a Croatian leader but also as a European leader.

³² This section of the analysis, which will be done for the Serbian case as well, wants to focus on a specific characteristic unique to that Parliament found out during the coding and based on qualitative interpretations of discourse.

³³ Andrej Plenković served as a Member of the European Parliament from 2013 to 2016. He was part of the European People’s Party political group.

³⁴ Author’s own translation from Croatian. Original text: Ni jedna druga tema, kao tema, izbjegličko migracijske krize, nije utjecala na promjenu političke arhitekture u europskim zemljama do sada. Ništa, ni velika financijska kriza, niti institucionalne krize, niti drugi problemi, ovo je kriza, koja je na taj način percipirana u javnostima među građanima brojnih članica, da je doživjela najveće političke posljedice. Način da se to pitanje rješava smisljeno, racionalno je da se upravo tome tako i pristupa i to je ono što mi radimo. Dakle radimo na način koji ima nacionalnu dimenziju, koji ima europsku dimenziju, koji ima globalnu dimenziju.

5.5 Party involvement in discourse on Migration in Croatia




Chart 10 - Party involvement in discourse on Migration in Croatia

Author's own elaboration

Moving forward to Party representation in the analyzed discourse analysis³⁵, it is possible to see in the graph above a visual representation of party involvement in discourse concerning the Migrant Crisis in Croatia. It appears that the leading party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) dominated discourse over Migration, by specifically concentrating on the European level while approaching it. If we go back to the theoretical section of the research, we can see that the HDZ was the party that actually lead Croatia in the EU and therefore always presented the biggest levels of Europeanization in the country.

5.6 Serbian *Narodna Skupština*: discourse, the Migrant Crisis and the *National* over the *European*

The analysis of the debates in the *Narodna Skupština* appears to be very different from the Croatian one. First of all, as mentioned in the methodology section, the number of debates where MPs touched upon the Migrant Crisis was rather substantial, and it almost doubled the number of debates where the issue was discussed in Croatia. If, once again, we take a look at the dichotomy National/European, the following result comes out:

³⁵ In the discourse analysis, claims of MPs were coded by following their party, therefore, by simply counting the claims, it is possible to see members of which party interacted the most (see annex).




Chart 11 – Serbia: national vs European levels of discourse
Author’s own elaboration

As it appears, in Serbia, there is a strong predominance of the *national* over the *European*. Serbian MPs preferred to read the Migrant Crisis on a national level rather than seeing what role did the EU have in its management. However, when the EU was on focus, they were rather divided on the positive/negative discursive dimensions:




Chart 12 - Serbia: positive versus negative claims on the EU level
Author’s own elaboration

As it appears from the graph, whether the EU should be seen with a positive or a negative eye divided MPs; however, the negative was more influential than the positive.

5.7 Frames in Serbian parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis: the predominance of the *National* and the emergence of a *European*

Just as it has been done for the Croatian case, a frame was associated to every claim made by a MP of the *Narodna Skupština*.

On the national level, in this case, the predominant frame was *Crisis Management* (with a strong allusion to security concerns).

Minister, what I want to talk about is certainly the Migrant Crisis, and that a large number of

migrants have passed through the municipalities of Preševo and Bujanovac, municipalities that are of mixed national composition. I would like to express my gratitude to you and the members of the Ministry of the Interior for their high level of professionalism, because there were no cases of conflict and incidents between migrants and the local population, although at some points in Preševo there were several thousand migrants. Thus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs made a full contribution to solving the migrant crisis, as about 1.2 million migrants passed through Serbia³⁶. (MITROVIĆ NENAD, SNS, SER12.2_06.11.2018)

Simply, pay attention to the huge migrant crisis, which is seriously jeopardizing the security of our borders, which is still a priority in your [Interior Ministry's] work³⁷. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO, DVERI, SER3_02.11.2016)

Then, we have a strong presence of the Security frame:

What are the answers to the scenarios that may arise? We found some of the answers literally on the move, such as during the Migrant Crisis, but the challenges are posed and we must have a strategy, we must have the answers to all the possible challenges that can be faced by Serbia. These are serious questions, it is a question of our survival, a question of the security of Serbia and a question of what the future will look like in ten or twenty years³⁸. (STEVANOVIĆ ALEKSANDAR, Dosta, SER2_06.10.2016)

First of all, Serbia is a safe country. This doesn't happen in an automatic way, Serbia is a safe country because security authorities do their job well. I will not speak about the challenges we have faced since the Migrant Crisis, within our environment, from happened in a little wider circle, further in the Mediterranean basin, but that is why we are very safe in Serbia. We have to emphasize this (...) ³⁹ (MIJATOVIĆ MILORAD, SDPS, SER10_25.04.2018).

³⁶ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Gospodine ministre, ono o čemu hoću da govorim je svakako migrantska kriza i da je veliki broj migranata prošao kroz opštine Preševo i Bujanovac, opštine koje su mešovitog nacionalnog sastava stanovništva. Ovde hoću da izrazim zahvalnost vama i pripadnicima Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova na visokom stepenu profesionalizma, jer nije bilo nijednog slučaja sukoba i incidenata između migranata i lokalnog stanovništva, iako je u pojedinim momentima u Preševu bilo i po par hiljada migranata. Tako da je Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova dalo pun doprinos rešavanju migrantske krize jer je kroz Srbiju prošlo oko 1,2 miliona migranata.

³⁷ Jednostavno, obratite pažnju na ogromnu migrantsku krizu, koja ozbiljno ugrožava bezbednost naših granica, a to je ipak prioritet u vašem radu.

³⁸ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Koje odgovore imamo na scenarije koji se mogu javiti? Neke smo odgovore našli bukvalno u hodu, kao što je bilo u toku migrantske krize, ali izazovi se postavljaju i mi moramo imati strategiju, moramo imati odgovore na sve moguće izazove koji se mogu javiti pred Srbijom. To su ozbiljna pitanja, to je pitanje našeg opstanka, pitanje bezbednosti Srbije i pitanje toga kako će izgledati budućnost za deset ili dvadeset godina.

³⁹ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Prvo, Srbija je bezbedna zemlja. To nije samo od sebe, Srbija je bezbedna zemlja, jer organi koji brinu o bezbednosti dobro rade svoj posao. Neću govoriti u kojim izazovima smo bili od migrantske krize, od našeg okruženja, od dešavanja malo šire, dalje u sredozemnom bazenu, ali zato smo u Srbiji veoma bezbedni. To moramo da naglasimo, jer je to zasluga i organa o kojima mi danas govorimo.

The third frame that emerged is a really interesting one for the sake of this analysis. As a matter of fact, it appears to be *Solidarity*⁴⁰. Even though it focuses on a national level, there is the emergence of a European value shaping migration discourse in the *Narodna Skupština*.

Thanks to the responsible policy of our President, Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia is one of the few countries in the region that has shown humanity and *solidarity* with migrants in perhaps the largest refugee crisis since World War II⁴¹. (BULATOVIĆ SLAVIŠA, SNS, SER12.1_05.11.2018)

Of course, we have to make sure that our police forces are prepared to respond to any increase in the attempt made by migrants to enter illegally into our territory, but at the same time we need to show the *understanding* that others had towards us, since these are people who are forced to come by force of opportunity⁴². (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA, SNS, SER8.2_12.03.2018)

Moving forward to the claims coded as being part of the European level, if on one side we can find *Crisis Management (at a EU level)* with generally a rather negative stance on how Europe dealt with the crisis...

That is certainly a matter, since Germany has not found a solution yet, I think that as it is the largest and most powerful EU country, we will have to work hard to find a solution all together, because it is easy for those countries not on the migrant route, they say - We are not interested [in excuses] and this is like having a flood in the house, so the one in the attic at first doesn't care what happens in the basement, but when the foundations get wet then even the attic eventually gets sore⁴³. (STEFANOVIC NEBOJSA, SNS, SER8.1_08.03.2018)

...on the other side we have *EU integration*, showing how Serbian MPs connected discourse on the Migrant Crisis to further practices of integration in the European sphere.

So, as far as migrants are concerned, there isn't a huge influx of migrants; there are, roughly, 3600 migrants who have been here for months do not want to stay here. Their goal is to go abroad. We will see, these laws that we enact, what is said, compliance with EU directives, a

⁴⁰ As theorized by Sangiovanni, 'Solidarity has long been a fundamental value underpinning the project of European integration' (2003: 2013).

⁴¹ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Srbija zahvaljujući odgovornoj politici našeg predsednika Aleksandra Vučića je jedna od retkih zemalja u regionu koja je pokazala humanost i solidarnost prema migrantima u možda najvećoj izbegličkoj krizi od Drugog svetskog rata.

⁴² Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Naravno, mi moramo da vodimo računa o tome da mi budemo spremniji da sa našim policijskim snagama odgovorimo na svaku vrstu povećanja pokušaja ilegalnog ulaska migranata na našu teritoriju, ali istovremeno treba da pokažemo ono razumevanje koje su neki drugi imali prema nama, kadase radi o ljudima koji su silom prilika, mukom naterani da dođu.

⁴³ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: To je svakako stvar, s obzirom da Nemačka još nije našla rešenje, mislim kao najveća i najmoćnija država Evropske unije, moraćemo da se potrudimo svi zajedno da pronademo, jer lako je onim zemljama koje nisu na migrantskoj ruti, oni kažu – Nas to ne interesuje i to je kao poplava u kući, pa onog na tavanu u prvom momentu ne interesuje ga šta se dešava u podrumu, ali kada se temelji pokvase onda i ovog na tavanu na kraju zaboli glava.

directive is the name of a legal act, therefore, not some commanding tone, but a directive is the name of an EU legal act which gives instructions on how to apply certain laws, and we, among other things, we do it because of the higher standard that exists in those countries and we do it because we want better standards and better protection for our country and for our citizens⁴⁴. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA, SNS, SER8.2_12.03.2018)

When it comes to participating in an EU mission in the Mediterranean, the aim is to mitigate the consequences and resolve the migrant crisis in Europe. It is clear that Serbia is on one of the main routes for migrants and it is clear that in this way, Serbia is also showing its will to be an active partner in Europe in terms of how to deal with the migrant crisis⁴⁵. (DUROVIĆ ALEKSANDRA, SNS, SER3_02.11.2016)

Whether it being connected to a more *idealistic* dimension, where Integration means being part of a Europe that is seen as a crisis-solving actor, or actually talking about adaptation to norms and directives, Serbian MPs' discursive approaches showed that they are willing to consider EU integration in its different facets even when a major crisis is at stake.

Frames in the Serbian *Narodna Skupština* showed that even if the focus regarding the Migrant Crisis concerned the national sphere, discursive approaches regarding the crisis can still be seen as slightly Europeanized. First of all, because of the strong focus on Solidarity, it is possible to note the presence of a Europeanization of values, which appears to be really important, since 'not only the actors and institutions conform to the EU level through social learning, but also society and its individuals and their norms and values' (Beichelt, 2008: 11). Secondly, the fact that EU Integration appeared as a recurrent frame showed that Serbian MPs actually talked about a wider, European sphere while addressing the Migrant Crisis.

5.8 An emerging trend: geographical space consciousness within the Migrant Crisis

The specific geographical position of the Republic of Serbia, as a transit country for a large number of migrants on their journey to the countries of Western Europe, has confronted our country with new challenges, and we have a trend of a great number of expressed asylum-

⁴⁴ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Dakle, što se tiče migranata, nema ogromne navale migranata, 3600 migranata je, gruba brojka, već mesecima koji se nalaze u našoj zemlji i oni ne žele da ostanu ovde. Njihov cilj je da odu u inostranstvo. Videćemo, ovi zakoni koje donosimo, ono što se kaže, usaglašavanje sa direktivama EU, direktiva je naziv pravnog akta, dakle, ne neki naredbodavni ton, nego direktiva je naziv pravnog akta EU kojom ona daje instrukcije kako da se određeni zakoni, i mi, između ostalog, i to radimo zbog višeg standarda koji postoji u tim zemljama, ali radimo zato što hoćemo za našu zemlju bolje standarde i bolju zaštitu i za naše građane.

⁴⁵ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Kada pričamo o učešću u misiji EU na Mediteranu, cilj je ublažavanje posledica i rešavanje migrantske krize u Evropi. Jasno je da se Srbija nalazi na jednoj od glavnih ruta kojima se migranti kreću i jasno je da i na ovaj način Srbija pokazuje svoju volju da bude aktivan partner u Evropi u pogledu načina rešavanja migrantske krize.

seeking intentions, which are never actually realized; all those who have expressed their intention to seek asylum usually do it to exercise that right to continue, to use the Time of Legal Residence in the Republic of Serbia and then to attempt to illegally cross one of the borders of our neighboring countries⁴⁶. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA, SNS, SER8_07.03.2018).

This is just one example of a Serbian MP talking about Serbia as a geographical space of transit within the Migrant Crisis. If, on one side, this represents an understanding of the trends of the major migratory routes during the Crisis, on the other side it can be read with a different interpretation. Perceiving Serbia as the bordering country to the EU can be seen as a level of Europeanization itself, since ‘no region or period in Europe can be fully understood in isolation from the rest’ (Duroselle: 1990, 413). Moreover, as theorized by Clark and Jones, *territorial* considerations to Europeanization should be equally important as the social ones (2008: 302).

5.9 Party involvement in discourse on Migration in Serbia




Chart 13 - Party involvement in discourse on Migration in Serbia

Author's own elaboration

As seen in the graph, the party that has been the most present while talking about the Migrant Crisis in the Narodna Skupština was the ruling party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). On claims concerning the European sphere, the most vocal was Dveri, the right wing to far right political movement that, among other things, professes Euroscepticism and Anti-immigration. The emergence of this party as the main one in the context of negative European discourse seems to be

⁴⁶ Author's own translation from Serbian. Original text: Specifičan geografski položaj Republike Srbije, kao zemlje tranzita velikog broja migranata na njihovom putu prema zemljama zapadne Evrope, suočio je našu zemlju sa novim izazovima i tu imamo trend velikog broja izraženih namera za traženje azila, koje se realno nikada ne ostvare, već svi oni koji su izrazili nameru da zatraže azil, obično to pravo iskoriste da bi nastavili, da bi iskoristili Vreme legalnog boravka na teritoriji Republike Srbije i da bi to zatim iskoristili za pokušaj ilegalnog prelaska neke od granica naših susednih država

rather interesting, since Euroscepticism can be read as a resistance to Europeanization practices, in this case, at a discursive level.

5.10 *Sabor* and *Narodna Skupština*: different approaches and different levels of Europeanization

As it appears from the discourse analysis, the Migrant Crisis was approached rather differently by the two Parliaments. If the core themes of concern (Security, Crisis Management, Integration...) were the same, the levels of approach were completely different.

On one side we have Croatia, who showed that even the youngest Member State of the EU can have a Europeanized discourse approach to the Migrant Crisis in the Parliament. As a matter of fact, it appears that Croatia included Europe in its discourse on Migration and is still following the adaptation model (see Theoretical chapter), even in discourse, by implementing 'EU-compatible' agendas to respond to EU leverage. If we go back to the theoretical chapter and specifically the part that dealt with Europeanization of foreign policies, where it is possible to find the theorization made by Bojanović et al. on three different paths (uploading, downloading, cross loading) on Croatia's foreign policy adaptation to the EU when dealing with the Migrant Crisis on a foreign policy level, we can see that they depict the country's approach as weakly interested in the EU, self-centered and not eager to harmonize. This doesn't apply to the discourse analysis conducted on the Parliament, since, as just analyzed, discursive approaches portrayed a picture of a country where the *European* takes over the *national* and where the first identified frame at the European level appears to be *Solidarity*. This, combined to the strong presence of the HDZ (which, as shown in the Theoretical chapter has always had a crucial role in Europeanization practices) and its leader, Andrej Plenković, makes it possible to say that Parliamentary discourse on topics revolving around the Migration Crisis in Croatia has been Europeanized and that the European sphere was overall positively depicted.

On the other hand, the issue appears to be rather different for Serbia. In the *Narodna Skupština*, the Migrant Crisis appeared to be rather salient, since it was widely debated throughout the years analyzed. Overall, there was a predominance of the *national* over the *European*. By taking a more accurate look, however, it appeared that the national level included some European focus. First of all, the emergence of the Solidarity frame showed that Serbian MPs framed the Migrant Crisis by referring to a value that, during the Crisis was strictly connected to the European sphere; this could be seen as the beginning of a process of Europeanization of values, where values with a

strictly European connotation are debated at a national level. Moreover, it could be an indicator of willingness to adapt to processes of European integration since the role of Solidarity is a great importance while talking about European Integration (Sangiovanni, 2013: 213-218). Secondly, connecting to what has just been said, the Migrant Crisis was used as a means to discuss European Integration. Therefore, even if the national level was predominant, this, combined to the geographical space consciousness that emerged, makes it possible to say there was a *Latent* Europeanization present in the Parliamentary discourse of Serbia. If we take, once again, Bojanović's et al. theorization this time on Serbia's adaptation to the EU while dealing with Migrant Crisis on a foreign policy level, we can see that the scholars theorized that the country's interest was predominantly national based; that the EU agenda was followed very strictly and that it aligned its norms and values to the European ones. Even if it is not possible to comment on the EU agenda's concern, the other two ideas theorized by the scholars match the patterns that emerged during the discourse analysis made on the Narodna Skupština, even though the national level was influenced by the European one.

The two units of analysis had, however, something in common. With regards to discourse coded as pertaining to the European sphere, there was almost a polarization on the positive/negative divide, with a predominance of negative rhetoric.

Finally, discourse analysis conducted on Parliamentary debates over the Migrant Crisis in Croatia and Serbia showed different patterns of Europeanization. If Croatian parliamentary debates seemed to be Europeanized, in Serbian debates we can only see practices of Latent Europeanization, such as an Europeanization of values. This leads to the idea that this could be linked to a Member State/Non Member State strong divide, since Croatian debates were much more Europeanized and had a stronger European rhetoric in comparison to the Serbian ones.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This research tried to analyze whether it is possible to talk about Europeanization of discourse in Parliamentary debates on topics revolving around the Migrant Crisis in Croatia and Serbia. Starting from a definition of the background, that is the Migrant Crisis, it then moved on to the analysis of the main theories concerned: Europeanization and Politicization. Following, after having defined the methodology, it focused on the analysis of the parliamentary debates selected for the research.

After having analyzed 20 debates (7 for the case of Croatia and 13 for the case of Serbia) and coded them by using the following scheme

- the claim concerns the National sphere (National level)
- the claim concerns the European sphere (European level)
- if the claim concerns the European sphere, it has a positive connotation (Yes/No answer)
- if the claim concern the European sphere, it has a negative connotation (Yes/No answer)
- what kind of issue/concern/topic is attached to the claim? (Frame)
- codes non applicable (Other)

it was finally possible to answer to the main research question and the following sub questions:

- *Have discourses revolving around the Migrant Crisis been Europeanized in Croatian and Serbian parliamentary debates?*
- *Is the connotation given to discourses where Europe emerges in connection to the Migrant Crisis positive or negative?*
- *How do levels of Europeanization of parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis differ in Croatia and Serbia?*

From the very beginning of the data gathering a peculiar trend emerged. As a matter of fact, in none of the countries analyzed I encountered a debate where the Migrant Crisis actually appeared on the agenda of the day. Initially it seemed that this could be perceived as a voluntary lack of focus from the side of both countries. Why wouldn't two countries that, as seen in previous chapters, have strongly been affected by migratory flows, focus specifically on the Migrant Crisis in parliamentary debates? Also, as seen in the methodology chapter, both the assemblies taken into account for the research were newly elected, so it would make sense for the new parliaments to take into account such a politically salient issue. However, if we focus on time, a first idea on the lack of focus can be identified in the closure of the Western Balkan Route. The route was closed in April 2016, and

since the Serbian Assembly started its work on the 24th of April and the Croatian one on the 11th of September, meaning both after the closure of the route, this could be taken as an indicator of deciding to put the issue aside in Parliamentary debates. Starting with this premise, I wasn't sure whether I would find debates surrounding the topic at all. However, deeper research showed a completely different scenario. Even though the Migrant Crisis wasn't directly on the agenda, the two countries didn't actually neglect the topic (as previously stated, 20 debates in total). The topic was found in Plenary session concerning mainly security, but also finances, international agreements and national issues. I would say that this clearly indicates that the two parliaments decided to interconnect the Migrant Crisis and salient political issues for them. They didn't avoid the topic, rather they connected it to different dimensions. For the sake of the research question, I want to point out a country specific dimension that emerged for the case of Croatia during the choice of debates. As a matter of fact, for three times topics concerning the Migrant Crisis were found in Plenary Sessions where the agenda concerned the reporting of the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković on meetings of the European Council. I think that gives a really strong point. Having the Prime Minister reporting about the European sphere during parliamentary debates is an indicator of the willingness to put a strong European focus in a very politicized arena.

Let's now focus on the case of Croatia. By only counting the number of claims stated by Croatian MPs, the 'European level' surpassed the national one. Therefore, I would say that in the parliamentary discourse of the country regarding the Migrant Crisis we witness levels of Europeanization. This is only reinforced by the data that emerged during the frame analysis regarding the country. Firstly, by focusing on the frames coded as 'national sphere', if the first two frames were Security and Crisis Management from the third most one we have the emergence of a frame connected the European sphere: Integration. If on one side that had the connotation of integrating migrants in the country, on the other side it meant *European* integration. Already the third frame connected to the national level, embedded a connotation to the European domain. With regards to the claims coded as European level, the first two for appearance were Solidarity and Crisis Management, this time at a EU level. Generally speaking, most of the claims connected to the European sphere came from MPs of the ruling party, the Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ. I would say this can be also seen as an indicator of Europeanization. The ruling party was the one that actually brought Croatia in the European Union and, as I can say from personal observations, still advocates for a stronger position of Croatia within the Union. The leader of the Party and Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković holds a strong role in connection to this idea. As emerged in the analysis section, Plenković was the spokesperson of the 'European sphere' in the coded debates

when it came to the Migrant Crisis. I attributed to him the idea of ‘Emotional Europeanization’, which shows that the leader who had a past in EU politics, wants to portray himself not only as a Croatian leader but also as a European one. I think this idea really fits the *persona*, even outside the sphere of the Migrant Crisis. Throughout the media he is portrayed as an ambitious leader and, as stated by Politico Plenковиć said he wants a Europe that is “agile, not fragile,” “together, not apart” and “outward-, not inward-looking” (Politico, 2019).

Moving forward, the case of Serbia portrayed a completely different situation. By counting the claims made by MPs, the ‘national sphere’ surpassed the European one. The most common frame that emerged appeared to be Crisis Management, while the second was Security. The third one is a very interesting one for the sake of this analysis, as it was Solidarity. Even though it emerged in claims focusing on the national level, a strictly European value appeared to frame the national sphere (further thoughts on the emergence of the Solidarity frame in the two Parliaments will be provided in following paragraphs). Regarding claims coded as ‘European level’, the predominant frames that emerged were Crisis Management (at a EU level) and EU integration. I find the latter very interesting, since it portrayed two different dimensions. On one side, Serbian MPs perceived integration as being part of a Europe that takes the role of crisis-solving actor; on the other side, it had the connotation of talking about Serbia’s adaptation to European norms and directives. I find the first connotation to be very interesting, since throughout the analyzed parliamentary discourse, Serbian MPs talked quite often about the role of their country in a wider context. The context I found the most interesting and recurrent and therefore I labeled as an ‘Emerging trend’ in the analysis section was the geographical space consciousness of Serbia that emerged throughout discursive patterns. As a matter of fact, while discussing geographical patterns of migration, MPs didn’t isolate Serbia from the European context, by performing those that could be called *territorial* considerations to Europeanization. Overall, for being focused mostly on the national level, while conducting the analysis I actually found that the European sphere emerged quite substantially. In order to conceptualize a context where there is a predominance of the national sphere but the European sphere emerges indirectly through values connected to the European sphere or other types of considerations, such as the above-mentioned idea of territoriality that somehow connects Serbia to the EU, I formulated the idea of *Latent* Europeanization. I perceive this idea as the emergence of the European sphere in discourse even when the focus is predominantly on the national level. Actors (in this case MPs) don’t directly talk about the EU but they indirectly connect to it by referring to some values and practices that strictly pertain to the European sphere.

With regards to party dimensions, the ruling party, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) was dominant with regards to discourse coded as national level. With regards to claims coded as ‘European level’, the predominant party was Dveri, a right-wing, far-right, Eurosceptic movement. I think that having an Eurosceptic movement as the most vocal in claims coded as ‘European sphere’ marks a really interesting point. Can Eurosceptic parties actually foster Europeanization through parliamentary discourse? This question would represent a great topic for further research. However, I think there must be an interconnection between the two.

While analyzing the frames that emerged in the two countries, I consider one to be the most interesting: Solidarity. As it emerged, it was a frame that very quickly emerged in the analysis and I think it is fundamental in the interconnection between parliamentary discourse on migration and Europeanization. As a matter of fact, ‘solidarity was supposed to be one of the guiding principles of the united Europe’ (Grzegorz Grosse and Hetnarowicz, 2016: 59). During the Migrant Crisis the idea of Solidarity became widely challenged and it was given different connotations, that challenged European countries. On one side, a part of countries advocated for the concept of Solidarity in its connotation of fundamental European value, on the other side, the idea of Flexible Solidarity, where every country should chose to which extent to help migrants based on its possibilities emerged. I think that, because of the dichotomy on the idea of Solidarity during the core years of the Migration Crisis and because of the heated debate that was caused by this throughout Europe, the fact that MPs from both Croatia and Serbia decided to give their stances on Solidarity represents the willingness to align and participate in a wider, European discourse. It also represents a different dimensions of Europeanization: a Europeanization of values, since adjusting to values can be also seen as a conformation to the EU.

While comparing the findings for both Croatia and Serbia, the only similarity found in the analysis is the (almost) polarization of positive versus negative stances on the European Union while discussing the Migrant Crisis. Moreover, it is important to notice that in both cases the negative surpassed the positive. Therefore, even though MPs talked about the EU, the majority of the claims were coded with a negative connotation. Since, as seen in the initial sections of the research, the EU showed several shortcomings in the management of the Migrant Crisis, and since, as seen in the analysis, Crisis Management emerged as a frame in both countries, this represents the main reason of the predominance of the negative dimension.

It is possible to say that the levels of Europeanization varied between the two analyzed parliaments. If, on one side, Croatia appeared to have a Europeanized parliamentary discourse on the Migrant Crisis, on the other side, Serbia showed levels of 'secondary' Europeanization, that can be defined through the lenses of Latent Europeanization. Therefore, both parliaments presented levels of Europeanization, which, if we go back to the theoretical section is in line with literature on the topic, as scholars have defined that Europeanization occurs in both Member States and Non Member States. However, I would attribute the difference in the levels of Europeanization between the two to the different levels of EU integration in the countries. Being a Member State, Croatia appears to be more integrated in the European sphere in comparison to Serbia, who is still in the accession process.

This research encompassed several limits. For the sake of this analysis, the focus on a limited timeframe represents a really substantial one. As a matter of fact, by deciding to focus on the period 2016-2018 for the analysis of the debates, I automatically excluded to analyze discursive patterns on the Europeanization of the migration crisis that happened in the previous parliamentary setting. Comparing previous patterns to the current ones could be an interesting starting point for further research. Another input for further research would be focusing on more countries composing the Balkan Route, in order to have a wider spectrum of the levels of Europeanization in parliamentary discourse throughout the region. Nevertheless, this research gave interesting perspectives on Europeanization when it comes to Parliamentary debates on themes surrounding the Migrant Crisis. As a matter of fact, it showed that different levels of EU integration can lead to different levels of Europeanization and that this concept doesn't necessarily emerge *per se* in discourse, while it can also present itself through different patterns and associations to the European sphere.

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Appendix

The appendix includes the manual coding of Parliamentary debates done by the author in the Croatian and Serbian languages.

CRO1_23.11.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ	Dakle i novi ovaj zapravo migrantska kriza koja evidentno utječe na vanjsko političke subjekte, na unutar političke subjekte. Ne treba zaboraviti i da smo zemlja u okruženju država koji jednako tako imaju određene unutar političke nestabilnosti. I zadovoljan sam sa vašim odgovorom i drago mi je da će nova Strategija nacionalne sigurnosti ugledati skoro svjetlo dana u ovom Visokom domu. (MILANOVIĆ DARKO)				National Security	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLs						
HDSBB						
Reformist						
SDP						
MOST	Ja ću odmah reći da je situacija na granici između Srbije i Hrvatske stabilna i sigurna. Sada ću to argumentirati kroz nekakve čiste podatke. Znači radi se o granici od 122,5 km gdje imamo u svakom momentu u prihvatnim centrima sa srpske strane, kreće se broj migranata otprilike negdje do 2000 maksimalno, znači to govorim o nekom neposrednom kontaktu prema našoj granici. (OREPIĆ VLAHO)				National security	

	Ključno što želim naglasiti da je u potpunosti spriječen ilegalni prijelaz i ljudi i roba na tom dijelu. Ovo rješenje, mogu biti slobodan i reći u ovom trenutku u potpunosti otklanja mogućnost bilo kakvog angažmana nekih drugih potencijala RH u smislu zaštite granice. I možda i zaključno reći da imamo mi ozbiljnijih naslijeđenih problema od migrantske krize u ovom trenutku. (OREPIĆ VLAHO)					National security	
Independent MP							
GLAS							
HSS							
IDS							
ZIVI ZID							
NZH							
DEMOKRATI							
HRAST							
HSU							
NLM							
PH							
SNAGA							

CRO1.1 10.12.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ	Mislim da je to jasno, a što se tiče obrane mislim da je jasno i spominjali ste sami svjetske brojke pa zašto ne spomenuti ih i u ovom području. Znači, što se tiče obrane, a obrana je tu da štiti isto naše građane. Svi znamo koje sad ugroze imamo, što se tiče migrantske krize i svega, tako da mislim da su to opravdane brojke. Ali ako koristimo kriterij, znači, razine u BDP-u, ulaganja u određena područja da ga moramo primjenjivati u svim područjima barem jednako. (VRANJES DRAGICA)				National Security	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLs						
HDSBB						
Reformist						

		<p>Znači ovo što ste vi samo upozorili, što će se dogoditi, sljedeće godine vidite u EU talijanske banke se tresu, 360 milijardi kuna nenaplaćenih kredita, dvije najveće banke su u Hrvatskoj. Izbori u Francuskoj, izbori u Njemačkoj, migrantska kriza znači cijelo vrijeme pokušavamo reći da podržavamo dobre stvari međutim da malo budemo realniji jer neće nas više ljudi imati tko sanirat. (LALOVAC BORIS)</p>	N	Y	Burdain	
SDP		<p>Što se tiče obrane, tu prigorovora nemam. Slažem se da treba našu vojsku modernizirati iako se sad ne bih s vama složio da je imigrantska kriza ugroza koja zahtijeva izlazak vojske na teren. To je, mislim i ponašanje naše policije koja je to više nego profesionalno odradila i dokazala. (HAJDUKOVIĆ DOMAGOJ)</p>			National Security	
MOST		<p>Neki kolege su danas napomenuli da ne znamo što nas čeka sutra, kriza je u Europi, neke zemlje se tresu Italija, migrantska kriza, Brexit, sve to utječe jako na našu zemlju. (MARAS GORDAN)</p>	N	Y	Burdain	

CRO2_15.03.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ		<p>Međutim kao što to i uvijek biva u ovakvim dokumentima sve treba gledati u jednom širem političkom kontekstu, kontekstu ukupnog ozračja u europskom projektu, posebno osjetljivih tema u nekim državama članicama, svega onoga što je vezano za daljnja proširenja, što je vezano za migracije, što je vezano za radna mjesta, za slobodu kretanja, za proširenje EU, financiranje drugih zemalja, a naročito kada se sve to skupa odvija u predizbornom ozračju. Kada su okolnosti takve onda je jezik koji mora biti svojevrsni zajednički nazivnik i konsenzus svih za stolom diplomatski obazriv, ali još uvijek dovoljno čvrst i jasan da našim susjedima uputi poruku</p>	Y	N	Solidarity	

ohrabrenja. (ANDRE
J PLENKOVIĆ, PM)

		<p>Tema koja je također dotaknuta bio je svojevrsni nastavak rasprave sa tog neformalnog sastanka na Malti a to je bila tema migracija u ovom trenutku zbog praktički u najvećoj mjeri gotovo zatvorene istočno-mediteranske i balkanske rute. Temeljni fokus članica EU se svodi na situaciju na srednje mediteranskoj migracijskoj ruti i tu su naravno najzainteresiranije zemlje poput Italije, Malte, nastojale u prvi plan staviti širi kontekst suradnje sa zemljama Afrike (...). S te strane ponovno je naglašena važnost provedbe svih dogovora sa Turskom jer je njena uloga bez ikakvih dilema kapitalna u ocjenjivanju mogućeg daljnjeg priljeva migranata ili izbjeglica sa prostora Male Azije. (...)</p> <p>Stoga mislim da je uz veliku privrženost jačanju demokracije i standarda ljudskih</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Solidarity</p>	
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		<p>prava, funkcioniranja pravne države, medijskih sloboda u Turskoj isto tako bitno da vodimo računa i o financijskoj potpori koju dajemo Turskoj glede izbjeglica i migranata o kontekstu pristupnih pregovora i o kontekstu pristupnih pregovora i o kontekstu vizne politike. (ANDREJ PLENKOVIĆ, PM)</p>				
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	<p>Ono što je bilo, znači na ovom sastanku su četiri glavne teme koje su jako bitne za RH. Znači tema radnih mjesta, rasta i konkurentnosti, sigurnosti, obrane, migracije te rasprava o zemljama jugoistoka Europe. Znači, veseli nas podatak da je nakon nekoliko godina krize da stvari idu na bolje u cijelom okruženju. I treba napomenuti ono što nas najviše veseli je da Hrvatska ne zaostaje u tom području. (VRANJEŠ DRAGICA)</p>	<p>Druga kriza, migracijska kriza, opet kriza koja nam je nametnuta s Bliskog Istoka. I treća kriza Brexit, Brexit je sada na neki način unutarnja kriza jer je riječ o zemlji članici, ali je dogodio se Brexit upravo zbog financijske krize u velikoj mjeri i zbog migracijske krize jer je korišten argument migracijske krize u kampanji onih koji su bili za izlazak UK iz EU. I sada dolazimo do četvrte teze, gledajući povijest europske integracije,</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Improvement</p>	
			<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Improvement</p>	

		<p>naglašeno i da je cilj i da se za vrijeme ovog predsjedanja postigne jedan konsenzus o politici azila EU, te što se tiče vanjske dimenzije migracija važno je da se nastavi angažman i suradnja sa državama porijekla i tranzita. (VRANJEŠ DRAGICA)</p>				
						<p>Čuli smo isto koje su bile teme na Europskom vijeću, radna mjesta, rast konkurentnosti, sigurnost migracije, zapadni Balkan, ostalo. Zašto to spominjem? Zato što sam malo pogledao u svojoj privatnoj arhivi i našao sam govor koji je održao gospodin Prodi koji je bio predsjednik Europske komisije početkom 2000. godina. On je održao jedan govor početkom 2000. godine u Strasbourgu i govorio o radu svoje Komisije i o svom pogledu na</p>

	<p>policiji u posebnim slučajevima da se zaštititi hrvatska državna granica. (KOVAC MIRO)</p>					<p>Ali vjerujte mi razgovarao sam sa mnogim ljudima, pratio sam to i ovo oko Sirije, oko izbjegličke krize, migracijske krize puno .../Govornik se ne razumije./... ljudi bili za izlazak Velike Britanije iz EU. (KOVAČ MIRO)</p>
<p>HNS</p>					<p>Situacija sa Turskom kao što vidite je dramatična. Vi znate kad je počela imigracija preko europske rute, preko zapadnoeuropske rute u Europu iz Turske nitko od izbjeglica koji je dolazio preko te rute nije dolazio direktno iz Sirije, Iraka ili Afganistana. Svi su dolazili iz Turske. Svi su dakle prije toga bili izbjeglice u Turskoj, neki nekoliko mjeseci, neki nekoliko godina. (PUSIĆ VESNA)</p>	<p>Crisis Management</p>
		<p>Taj val izbjeglica se nas tiče vrlo direktno jer je jedna ruta upravo ova. Dakle, na koji način će se to okončati, na koji način će se to eventualno nakon turskog referenduma</p>				

					smiriti, za to mora postojati neki plan i vjerojatno neke ideje unutar EU ali i nas. (PUSIĆ VESNA)			
					Konačno pitanje solidarnosti. Mnogo se ovdje govorilo o tome kako je potrebno da EU bude solidarna. Podsjećam da to znači ne samo što mi možemo uzeti, nego i što mi možemo dati. Dakle, što Hrvatska može doprinijeti EU, a jednu stvar koju Hrvatska može i treba doprinijeti EU je aktivna i pozitivna uloga u stabiliziranju ovog dijela Europe, Jugoistočne Europe i Zapadnog Balkana kako god hoćete to zvati, to je nešto što mi možemo doprinijeti i to je europski posao. Ali za to moramo imati artikuliranu, jasnú, zajedničku politiku, ne samo s jedne strane dobre želje, a s druge strane zapravo nikakve ili ja bi rekla konfliktne poteze. (PUSIĆ VESNA)			Solidarity

		<p>Ako vi imate fino poštivane institucije EU u jednom trenutku i onda vas zapljusne migrantska kriza na koju nemate odgovor jer ju niste predviđjet onda naravno da ćete reći da su institucije u krizi. A ja bih rekao nisu u krizi nego jednostavno moraju se brzo adaptirati u novonastaloj situaciji. (KLISOVIC.JOŠKO)</p>	Y	N	Crisis Management	
						<p>Gospodine Kovač, ja ću se isto referirati na vašu tezu da su u EU tri krize de facto doprinijele određenim situacijama odnosno produbljenu i krize gospodarske koja se u EU našla i sigurnosnoj i migracijskoj itd.. (MARAS GORDAN)</p>
		<p>S druge strane oko Sirije, odnosno Bliskog istoka gdje je nastala i sigurnosna prijetnja i veliki migracijski valovi koji sada zapljuskuju EU i afrički naravno, mislim da također EU je sudjelovala dosta u vanjskoj politici i oko krize u Siriji i oko određenih drugih problema vezanih za krizna žarišta i da</p>	N	Y	Mismanagement	

				nismo imali najbolje kao EU procjene prije 3, 4 godine kako će se tamo situacija razvijati. (MARAS GORDAN)							
MOST											
Independent MP											
GLAS											
HSS											
IDS											
ZIVI ZID				Također se ne govori o tome da broj stanovnika Europske unije se smanjuje u odnosu na ostatak svjetske populacije bez obzira na sve ove izbjeglice, migrante itd. znači Europa u postotku ima sve manje i manje svjetskoga stanovništva što dodatno ukazuje dakle da nešto sa tom Europskom unijom nije u redu odnosno da trendovi nisu pozitivni, nego su ustvari trendovi	N	Y	Mismanagement				

		negativni. (BUNJAC, BRANIMIR)				
NZH						
DEMOKRAT I						
HRAST						
HSU						
NLM						
PH						
SNAGA						

CRO3_05.07.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ		<p>Tijekom 2016. godine, nastavljen je trend porasti nestabilnosti sigurnosnih okruženja u Europi i u svijetu. Unutarnja nestabilnost i oružani sukobi u pojedinim državama i regijama, politička .../Govornik se ne razumije./... ekstremistička ideologija i radikalizam, demografski trendovi i socijalne promjene, rastući zahtjeve za energijom te brzi razvitak informacijsko komunikacijsko tehnologija imaju znatan utjecaj na sigurnosno okruženje u RH. Tijekom 2016. godine, nastavljen je trend porasti nestabilnosti sigurnosnih okruženja u Europi i u svijetu. Unutarnja nestabilnost i oružani sukobi u pojedinim državama i regijama, politička .../Govornik se ne razumije./... ekstremistička ideologija i radikalizam, demografski trendovi i socijalne promjene, rastući zahtjeve za energijom te brzi razvitak informacijsko komunikacijsko tehnologija imaju znatan utjecaj na sigurnosno okruženje u RH.</p>	N	Y	Security issues	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						

CRO4_25.10.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ						
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLŠ						
HDSBB						
Reformist						
SDP	Dakle, osim same činjenice da postoji pritužba na postupanje MUP-a, da imamo problema sa integracijom, pristupom tržištu rada za azilante. Činjenica je da m i imigracijsku politiku nemamo. Ona je istekla 2015. godine. Broj tražitelja međunarodne pomoći je kao što smo čuli narasta za gotovo 1000% a sa istim kapacitetima ih MUP obrađuje. Dakle, to je definitivno stvar na koje ćemo morati obratiti				National Security	Drugi segmenat o kojem trebamo pričati i što je također ne samo hrvatska nego i europska realnost su migranti i azilanti. (HAJDUKOVIC DOMAGOJ)

	<p>posebnu pažnju iz više razloga. Migrantska kriza daleko je od gotove. Migracije i veliki pokreti stanovništva će se i dalje nastaviti. Hrvatska će biti na migrantskom putu. U Hrvatskoj će neki od migranata vjerojatno i željeti ostati. Mi moramo biti na to spremni i sa stajališta ljudskih prava i sa stajališta infrastrukture. Dakle, moramo biti spremni na izazove koji su pred nama. (HAJDUKOVIĆ DOMAGOJ)</p>				
	<p>Inače u Vijeću Europe posebice u Parlamentarnoj skupštini Vijeća Europe gotovo nema sjednice na kojoj migrantska kriza na ovaj ili na onaj način nije jedna od tema, ako nije jedina tema. Dakle, definitivno je nešto o čemu moramo razmišljati, s čim ćemo se morati nositi prije ili kasnije. I kriza iz 2015.</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Future challenges</p>	

CRO5_17.01.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (Not relevant/Code non applicable)
HDZ		Hrvatska je ove godine na temu migracija uplatila i svoj doprinos u uzajamni Fond za Afriku. Mislim da je ta poruka izrazito važna, da smo pokazali načelo solidarnosti u praksi namijenjeno za regiju sjeverne Afrike i za rog Afrike. Na taj način smo dali i svojevrstan doprinos sudjelovanju potpredsjednice Vlade i ministrice vanjskih poslova i europskih poslova na Summitu Europske unije i	Y	N	Solidarity	Maltežani su po logici stvari i svog geografskog položaja već u drugom mjesecu stavili na dnevni red temu migracija i to srednje mediteranske rute gdje je dominirao novi tip ugovornih odnosa sa zemljama sjeverne Afrike, zemljama koje su neke tranzitne, a neke su i zemlje izvorišta velikoga migracijskoga vala.(PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)

koje su ili u Grčkoj ili u Italiji, te osobama koje se nalaze u Turskoj. Za sada ta dinamika ne odgovornošću hrvatskih institucija, nego jednostavno tehnologijom toga rada ide poprilično sporo. Samo je 81 osoba premještena, 60 iz Grčke, 21 iz Italije, dok je iz Turske preseљeno samo 40 osoba ili 7 sirijskih obitelji. Sve to naravno ni na koji način ne ugrožava u bilo kojem ekonomskom ili sigurnosnom aspektu poruku solidarnosti koja mislim da je važna da ju Hrvatska kao odgovorna članica Unije pošalje.
**(PLENKOVIĆ
ANDREJ, PM)**

		<p>Hvala dragom Bogu da neke od tema koje uglavnom okupiraju top tri, četiri po svim javnim istraživanjima javnog mijenja EU i europskih građana posebno na zapadu, hoćete terorizam, sigurnost, migracije uglavnom nisu hrvatske teme za sada. Dakle teme se razlikuju, ali međutim izazovi pred Europskim kontinentom su zajednički, dakle ne samo migracijski, sigurnosni, tehnološki, klimatski, socijalni, ekonomski. (MILOŠEVIĆ DOMAGOJ IVAN)</p>	Y	N	Crisis management	
						<p>Krenut ćemo s migracijama, migracije neće niti nestati, niti će prestati s obzirom na demokratska kretanja prije svega u Africi i klimatske promjene savršeno je jasno da ćemo svi u desetljećima pred nama nositi sa migracijama i to na bojim se sve teži i intenzivniji način. (MILOŠEVIĆ DOMAGOJ IVAN)</p>

		<p>Zbog toga prvo želim reći da podržavamo nastojanja Europskog vijeća kada su pitanju migracije i reći ću, dakle 1. pozorno praćenje svih migracijskih ruta i spremnost na brzu reakciju, 2. fleksibilnu i koordiniranu uporabu svih raspoloživih instrumenata Unije i država članica, potporu izravno pogođenim ili uključenim članicama kojih je mnogo, 4. snažnu suradnju s međunarodnim partnerima kao i zemljama podrijetla tranzita i odlaska i 5. smanjenje poticanja nezakonitih migracija kroz učinkovito vraćanje migranata. Zaključno treba nastaviti suradnju sa Turskom oko migracije, cijeno da se intenzivno razgovara i razmišlja i o potpori</p>	Y	N	Crisis management	
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državama
jugoistočne Europe
koji nisu članice
EU, a ključni cilj
Vijeća sa kojim se
slažemo je
učinkovit nadzor
vanjskih granica što
treba omogućiti
ukidanje
privremenog
graničnog nadzora
unutarnjih granica.
(MILOŠEVIĆ
DOMAGOJ IVAN)

		<p>Ono što međutim također smatram da je tek nužno raspraviti na razini Unije a to su nejednak položaj i posljedično različiti stavovi oko prihvata migranata i azilanata. S jedne strane dakle imamo zemlje iz kojih domaće stanovništvo odlazi, prije svega govorim o istoku EU, tu spadamo i mi i naša zemlja gubi stanovništvo. S druge strane naravno su visoko razvijene zemlje zapadne članice koje u dobroj mjeri imaju imigracijske tokove ne samo sa istoka EU, ne samo iz Hrvatske nego i iz drugih kontinenata.</p> <p>(MILOŠEVIĆ DOMAGOJ IVAN)</p>	N	Y	EU Inequality	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLŠ						
HDSBB						

Reformist	<p>Ja bih, u osvrtu Kluba zastupnika SDP-a na ovu temu, zapravo, dotaknuo bih se nekoliko točaka, druge će vjerujem pokriti kolege i kolegice u pojedinačnim raspravama. Prvo bih krenuo od teme migracija, koje su se zapravo, koje su bila nekakva prožimajući tema cijele prošle godine. Za to, iz potpuno razumljivih razloga postoji ogroman interes i mislim da zapravo po nešto i na tragu pitanja kolege Zekanovića, upućeno vama, mislim da je savršeno opravdano, da, ako kažemo, da bi se o toj temi bi se trebalo više i češće razgovarati u Hrvatskoj. 1583 osobe, bi trebale dobiti azil i trebale bi doći u RH. Mislim da moramo postaviti pitanje, je li Hrvatska spremna za to. (GLAVASEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>
	Quotas

	<p>Razgovarali smo o različitim i vi ste i sami, na kraju krajeva, predsjedniče komentirali, kako različite zemlje imaju programe integracije, koje su u različitoj mjeri uspješni. Moj dojam je i ono što me brine zapravo u svemu ovome, da mi na tom području, stojimo dosta loše. I bez da upadam u negativnost, nekakvu, ili da budem zloguki prorok, ja mislim da je zaista od velike važnost, da u nekakvoj perspektivi otvorimo javnu raspravu o programima i (integracije i za te 1583 osobe. (GLAVAŠEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>				<p>Integration</p>	
		<p>A ja vjerujem, da u nekoj budućnosti, taj broj neće ostati isti, nego da će se povećavati samo, da se orijentiramo i da se ugledamo na one zemlje, koje imaju uspješnije programe integracije. Mislim također da načelo solidarnosti, po pitanju rješavanje</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Solidarity</p>	

		<p>Mislim da je to bio jedan veliki test za Europu i bojim se da ga je Europa jednostavno pala. I volio bih da u budućnosti, kada govorimo o načelu solidarnosti, zaista budemo dosljedni u tome, bilo da o toj solidarnosti govorimo iz perspektive onoga što solidarnost znači za socijaldemokrate, bilo da govorimo o onome što nazivamo kršćanska solidarnost. (GLAVAVEŠEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>	N	Y	Solidarity	
					Integration	<p>Ali ovako, iz moje perspektive, kada su u pitanju migracije, one nisu nova pojava, one su tu oduvijek. Mislim svatko je od nekamo došao. Ja ne valoriziram drugačije zemlje koje su na zapadu Europe, ili zemlje koje su u Africi, ali mogu reći sljedeću stvar. Kada govorimo o integraciji i njezinoj uspješnosti, opet pitanje, kako ocjenjujete da li je uspjelo ili nije. Ako iz vaše perspektive, ako vi smatrate da je integracija uspjela, ako dođe netko i onda postane isti kao vi, na način da jednostavno mora prihvatiti sve kako je, u sredini u kojoj je došao, to nije integracija, to je asimilacija. (GLAVAVEŠEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>

	<p>Dakle, ako govorimo da će doći ljudi iz Afrike, ja ću reći dobrodošli. I ovih 1583 ljudi, ja mislim da zaista Hrvatsku mogu učiniti boljim mjestom, i za vas i za mene i za sve ostale građane RH. Ali, mislim da ako krenemo iz pozicije da očekujemo, da se ništa neće promijeniti, osim što ćemo imati te ljude koji će tu živjeti, mislim da nam slijedi razočaranje i nezadovoljstvo. (GLAVASEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>				<p>Integration</p>	
<p>Da, u migrantskoj krizi Slavonija i Baranja i Srijem su se pokazali velikima i pokazali su da su sve ono strašno i grozno što nam se dogodilo u ratu da smo uspjeli pretvoriti u veličinu i rasti na tome. (...) ja očekujem da ljudi koji će doći neće biti svi brend menadžeri ili community menadžeri ili nešto tog tipa, bit će mnogo ljudi pretpostavljam koji će imati znanja iz poljoprivrede koji će htjeti koji su se</p>					<p>Integration</p>	

	<p>takvim stvarima bavili prije pa će to možda htjeti u budućnosti pa sam ja samouvjeren da će ih mjesta poput Slavonije ili Like dočekati raširenih ruku, mislim nadam se tome. I volio bih da Vlada koja god bude u tom trenutku pomogne da budu dočekani upravo na taj način, a ne na neki drugi način. (GLAVASEVIĆ BOJAN)</p>		<p>Dakle, kada promišljamo i o budućnosti EU i Hrvatska je u njoj. A to su, radi, radi valjda, radi. To su migracije prije svega.(HAJDUKO VIĆ DOMAGOJ)</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>(EU) Integration</p>	
	<p>Dakle, pritisak migranata još uvijek nije prestao, niti će prestati, neke projekcije kažu, da ovo o čemu smo svjedočili 2015. g. je tek prvi val migranata. Dakle, pritisak na Hrvatskoj granici i dalje postoji. Neki migranti, prelaze našu granicu, u tranzitu su itd. (HAJDUKOVIĆ DOMAGOJ)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>		

					u nekom rekao bih segmentu apsolutno osporavaju odluke nadležnih tijela EU pa čak i presuda Europskoga suda i to je ozbiljan problem za koji sada ne postoji rješenje na razini EU. (PODOLNJAK ROBERT)					
Independent MP										
GLAS										
HSS					Kolega vi ste u svom izlaganju, osvrtnu na ovo izlaganje predsjednika Vlade, spomenuli problem migranata i evo, u tom kontekstu, bih i ja vama replicirao, da je dobro, da se na nivou Europske komisije i Vijeća razgovara o problemima migranata, jer taj problem je prisutan i danas. (VLAOVIĆ DAVOR)	Y	N	Crisis Management		

	<p>Ali sam htio i reći u kontekstu riječi koju ste vi spomenuli solidarnost pohvaliti i žitelje Vukovarsko srijemske županije, Brodsko posavske županije, koje su prije 2, 3 g. kada je bila migrantska kriza dali svoj doprinos i pokazali tu jednu solidarnost i osjetljivost prema problemima migranata gdje su ih kvalitetno prihvatili i dali im prvu podršku na njihovom daljnjem putu. (VLAOVIC DAVOR)</p>				<p>Solidarity</p>	
		<p>U tom kontekstu svakako da treba nastaviti razgovore na nivou i RH ali i Europske komisije jer taj problem nije riješen i on i dalje tinja oko naših granica. A isto tako je poželjno da hrvatska Vlada pogotovo u kontekstu predsjedavanja Europskom komisijom napravi kvalitetne politike za useljavanje odnosno politike kojima ćemo</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Crisis Management</p>	

		<p>imamo jedan problem koji zapravo raste bez obzira što broj migranata opada a to je broj poginulih imigranata koji stradaju na putu prema Europi, uglavnom na Mediteranu i onoj ruti od Libije, odnosno Tunisa, uglavnom od Libije preko Malte do Italije. Njih je 2014. godine bilo oko 3200, '15.-te 3700, '16. 5000 a lani bez obzira što je bilo 6X manje imigranata u Europi bilo je preko 3000 poginulih ljudi.</p> <p>To je jedno pitanje čisto da malo vidimo, nešto se radi po tom polju ali očito da se ne radi dovoljno jer taj broj u odnosu na broj ljudi koji dolaze u Europu raste.</p> <p>(ZEKANOVIC HRVOJE)</p>					<p>Uvaženi predsjednik Vlade, govorili ste o stavu Europskog vijeća vezanog uz migracije, odnosno migracijsku politiku. Evo ja ću nešto vas pitati vezano uz to.</p> <p>(ZEKANOVIC HRVOJE)</p>
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					<p>zemalja EU, Portugala i Španjolske i ovog istoka od Poljske, Bugarske, Rumunjske, Hrvatske, prema Njemačkoj i skandinavskim zemljama, govori o tome, da ovi imigranti, koji su ušli u te zapadne europske zemlje, nerazvijenije, nisu bili radna snaga, koje je Njemačka npr. očekivala. I sada zapravo trebaju i Hrvati i Rumunji i Bugari, da nadomjeste tu radnu snagu. Tako da solidarnost da. Primimo ih kao kršćanin, ali moramo razmišljati o integraciji, jer bez integracije, imati ćemo jedna veliki, veliki problem, kojega zapravo nismo ni svjesni. (ZEKANović HRVOJE)</p>				
NLM									
PH									
SNAGA									

CRO5.1_09.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ	Ravnateljstvo je aktivno bilo uključeno u opskrbu stanovništva na poplavljenim područjima Vukovarko- srijemske županije kao i intervencijama strateškim robnim zalihama u svrhu zbrinjavanja migranata. (ČIČAK MATO)				Crisis Management	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLŠ						
HDSBB						
Reformist						

<p style="text-align: center;">SDP</p>	<p>A kada pričamo od 2015. i 2016. evo ja želim ovdje pohvaliti ravnateljstvo za robne zalihe koje je dalo veliki doprinos u poplavama, pogotovo Gunja i taj dio Slavonije gdje je upravo se pokazalo da u kriznim situacijama tako velikih razmjera pa i kasnije u migrantskoj krizi krajem godine 2015. godine da država ima sustav, da država pod tako velikim neočekivanim i nepredviđenim događajima ipak funkcionira i gdje su robne zalihe odigrale, ravnateljstvo za robne zalihe odigralo jednu veliku ulogu uz naše volontere, uz Crveni Križ, vatrogasce i sve ostale koji u tim situacijama djeluju gdje niti jednog trenutka nije bilo zastoja sustava, gdje su ne samo kroz hranu i kroz ovaj dio, nego već i kroz kontejnere omogućili stanovnicima privremeni dom dok se njihovi domovi ne dovedu u funkciju da se mogu nazad vratiti. (DUJIĆ SAŠA)</p> <p>I to sve pokazuje razvoj robnih zaliha ali i ono što je najbitnije, stvaranje jednog sustava koji funkcionira i u kojem se točno zna da ima glavu i rep i da se zna u kriznim situacijama kako ćemo funkcionirati. I ta dva događaja, znači migrantska kriza i poplave u 2015. godini su pokazale da je Hrvatska spremna i na velike elementarne nepogode i na neke druge stvari koje nas mogu pogoditi i da u tome svakako ravnateljstvo za robne zalihe ima svoju ulogu. (DUJIĆ SAŠA)</p>			<p style="text-align: center;">Crisis Management</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">MOST Independent MP</p>				<p style="text-align: center;">Crisis Management</p>	

CRO5.2 14.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ	Posebno je ovdje naglašeno problem u 2015., 2016. da je bilo preko 658 tisuća migranata i da je taj problem uspješno policija sudjelovala na njegovom rješavanju. (TUDMAN MIROSLAV)				National security	Gdje je završilo to oružje? Odakle je došlo? S kojom namjerom, s kojom namjenom? Da li je to oružje negdje upotrebjeno, gdje je istraga? Da li ima kakvih rezultata u ovoj sigurnoj zemlji kroz koju špansiraju tisuće i tisuće migranata. Welcome! Jel to ta sigurna zemlja? (CULEJ STEVO)
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						

HDS									
HSLs									
HDSBB									
Reformist									
								National security	
SDP								National security	
MOST									
Independent MP									

Odoljevali smo tada i terorističkim prijetnjama, krijumčarenje ljudi, koji u tom trenutku prije izbivanja migrantske krize bilo smanjeno za 70% u odnosu na 10 g. U samom migrantskom valu, mislim da mogu reć, možda samo nekoliko rečenica, ali je po meni u izvješću sve u detalje dato četiri migranta su bila na minutu, 250 na sat, 6 000 dnevno, to je trajalo 5 mjeseci i to je činjenica da je na kraju samo za 2015. godinu preko 500 000 ljudi prošlo kroz Hrvatsku a da zapravo nismo imali nijednog incidenta. (OSTOJIC RANKO)

slučaju da dođe do novog migrantskog vala nije moje da odgovaram. Ali sam siguran da Hrvatska itekako treba o tome ozbiljno promisliti, jer bi mogli imat ozbiljnih problema. Kad je to 2015. godine bilo onda je bila činjenica jedna da smo prolazili Hrvatsku na različite načine i potpore itd. (OSTOJIC RANKO)

<p>GLAS</p>	<p>Druga točka je postupanje prema izbjeglicama. Kroz Hrvatsku je u tih šest mjeseci od 16.9.2015. do početka 2016. prošlo nešto oko 658.000 mislim izbjeglica i tu naglašavam u ogromnom postotku zaista izbjeglica. Dakle ne migranata nego baš izbjeglica. Pod kraj tog vala i tijekom 2016. se broj onoga što bi mogli nazvati migranti, iako tu su velike rasprave na djelu postotak se povećao, ali u tih prvih 4, 5 mjeseci je ogromni postotak tih ljudi, a to vidite po zemljama iz kojih su dolazili, prvenstveno Sirija i Irak su bili izbjeglice. I Hrvatska može biti ponosna na način kako se u toj situaciji prema tim ljudima odnosilo. (PUSIĆ VESNA)</p>				<p>National security</p>	
	<p>Ti ljudi bilo je potpuno jasno niko od njih nije htio ostati u Hrvatskoj, praktički svi su željeli niti nigdje drugdje, dakle praktički svi su željeli ići u Njemačku i većina njih je završila u Njemačkoj plus nešto u Švedskoj i mislim nekih 90.000 u Austriji. Međutim su kroz Hrvatsku prolazili djelomično i zbog nespremnosti EU da prevenira tu situaciju i kada je do nje došlo da reagira na tu situaciju. (PUSIĆ VESNA)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	

					N	Y	Mismanagement		
				Nespremnost da se prevenira se sastojala u pregovorima odnosno odsustvu dogovora između EU i Turske. Nijedna osoba koja je prošla u tom izbjegličkom valu nije dolazila direktno iz tih zemalja nego je dolazila, provela neko vrijeme između mjesec dana, neki i niz mjeseci su proveli u Turskoj. Turska je vrlo jasno rekla o kojem redu veličine pomoći se radi i koje ona očekuje od EU, međutim s time se zakasnilo i u jednom trenutku je Turska reagirala tako kao što je reagirala. (PUSIĆ VESNA)					
HSS				želim pohvaliti sve policijske službenike i ministre što su profesionalno i nadasve humano pristupili izazovu koje je pred njih postavila migrantska kriza krajem 2015. i početkom 2016. Prelazak imigranata preko teritorija RH, zahtijevao je veliku razinu organizacije, gdje je Hrvatska policija pokazala spremnost na brzu prilagodbu i usvajanje novih principa rada. (SPONSA GIOVANNI)				National security	
IDS									
ZIVI ZID									
NZH									

CRO5.3 20.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ	<p>Sustav domovinske sigurnost stvoren je kako bi se RH s uspjehom nosila s sigurnosnim izazovima današnjice. Nakon Domovinskog rata, najveća kriza je bila migrantaska kriza. Na godišnjoj razini, suočeni smo s brojnim elementarnim nepogodama. Danas se borimo s poplavama, prošlo ljeto s požarima. U tom smislu nužno je otkloniti nedostatke i u što je mogućem kraćem roku uspostaviti stabilan obrambeni sustav, spreman odgovoriti na svakakvi izazov. Danas se borimo s poplavama, prošlo ljeto s požarima. U tom smislu nužno je otkloniti nedostatke i u što je mogućem kraćem roku uspostaviti stabilan obrambeni sustav, spreman odgovoriti na svakakvi izazov.</p>				National security	
HNS	<p>ANDELKO</p>					

CRO_13.04.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ						Od ostalih tema bili su važni i naši razgovori o pitanju migracija, odnosima s Turskom, napadu u Salisburyu u Ujedinjenoj Kraljevini i odgovoru koji je na to dogovoren na samoj večeri tijekom Europskoga vijeća. (PLENKOVIC ANDREJ, PM)

		<p>Glede migracija nastavljena je rasprava o Srednjomediterranskoj ruti, osobito o načinima pomoći državama Afrike, imali smo u veljači jedan sastanak sa državama Sahela, dakle nekoliko afričkih zemalja supsaharskih gdje se radi o izrazito, izrazito velikim demografskim trendovima, trenutno tih 5 zemalja ima 77 milijuna ljudi, projekcije su da će ih za 15 godina biti oko 130 milijuna ljudi. To su pravi veliki strateški izazovi za Europu i sa te strane bolje reguliranje odnosa, bolje reguliranje naše cjelovite razvojne politike i svih instrumenata koji su za to potrebni je jedan od načina kako da spriječimo ono što se naziva propalim državama, nefunkcionalnim državama, nove sukobe, siromaštvo i općenito probleme s kojima se susreće Afrika danas, a mi smo u situaciji da, s obzirom na naš geografski položaj, izrazito vodimo računa o migracijskim tijekovima. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Crisis management</p>	
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		<p>Također je bitno za dugoročni opstanak EU i suradnja, znači princip preglasavanja, princip gdje neke države zahvaljujući svojoj glasačkoj mašineriji su u stanju svoje interese progurati na štetu nekih drugih je nešto što u EU nije standardna praksa. Znamo da se u EU većina odluka u Vijeću ministara i u Europskom vijeću donosi jednoglasno i taj princip dogovaranja međusobnog usklađivanja i kompromisa je nešto što svakako treba pozdraviti i na čemu svakako treba inzistirati i dalje. I u tom smislu i kod svih ovih osjetljivih tema poput migracije itd. ključ je svakako treba težiti konsenzusu, tako da se ne bi neke države osjećale kao dobitnici tog sustava neke kao gubitnici. (SOKOL TOMISLAV)</p>	Y	N	EU decision making	
HNS						
Bandić 365		<p>Treća stvar koju bi htio reći tiče se iznimnog opreza koje mi kao zemlja, a i EU moramo imati kada je posrijedi zaštita europskog prostora ili prostora EU od svih izazova koje globalni politički procesi u tom pogledu nose sa sobom. Pitanje sigurnosti i pitanje</p>	N	Y	Security - EU level	
SDSS						

GLAS		<p>Još jedna tema o kojoj bi povodom ovog izvješća htjela nešto reći je tema migracija. To je, naravno ovako kako bih rekla umanjujuće nazvano migracijska tema, to je sigurnosna tema, to je izbjeglička tema, to je tema na kojoj se Europa pred 3 godine ozbiljno napuhнула da tako kažem, ozbiljno podijelila. I mislim da do danas nije u potpunosti razumjela u kojim sve pravcima ta tema izbjeglica je izazov za nove politike EU. Tu su sigurnosne politike, tu je naravno ono što je spomenuto reforma Dablinske uredbe koja je potpuno neprimjerena za ove situacije jer govori o ilegalnim migrantima, a ne govori o globalnim svjetskim krizama, dakle ovo što se dogodilo je bila jedna globalna kriza, a ne pitanje ilegalnih migranata, dakle to je sigurnosno pitanje, ali u velikoj mjeri je jedno političko upozorenje na temu cyber sigurnosti. Jer je kao najveća ugroza migrantska, odnosno izbjeglička kriza prezentirana i politički iskorištena u zemljama u kojoj praktički nema nijedne izbjeglice. (PUSIĆ VESNA)</p>	N	Y	Mismanagement	
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CRO6.1 02.07.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ		<p>Ja sam uvjeren da ćemo mi u tome uspjeti, kao što sam uvjeren da će EU kao takva opstati bez obzira na ovu tešku situaciju koja se trenutno događa u srcu EU, konkretno u Njemačkoj kada je riječ o raskolu u vladajućoj koaliciji, konkretno među našim partnerima u CDU i CSU naći će se rješenje jer migrantska kriza pokazuje da smo mi zajednica u kojoj smo jedni za druge sudbinski vezani. Znači, bilo koji potez koji se vuče u jednoj od zemalja EU, a tiče se npr. migrantske krize, taj potez se osjeća u drugim zemljama članicama EU, tako da smo mi zajednica, jedni za druge smo sudbinski vezani, toga smo čini mi se u RH svjesni. (KOVAC MIRO)</p>	Y	N	EU unity	
HNS						
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLŠ						
HDSBB						
Reformist						
SDP						

CRO7_14.11.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ		<p>Tema koja je dominirala u lipnju bilo je pitanje migracija. Mi smo tada postigli dogovor o sveobuhvatnom europskom pristupu migracijama taj pristup objedinjuju učinkovita kontrola vanjske granice Europske unije, pojačano vanjsko djelovanje i unutarnji aspekti i to na sva tri migracijska pravca, istočnom, središnjem i zapadno sredozemnom pravcu. Premda su migracijski tokovi smanjeni na praktički pred kriznu razinu, govorim o razdoblju prije 2015. i 2016. dakle oni su manji za 95% migracijska kretanja na istočnom i zapadno sredozemnom pravcu zahtijevaju</p>	Y	N	Crisis management	

punu pozornost. (PLENKOVIC ANDREJ, PM)

prema podacima MUP-a povećan sa 4.100 u 2017. na 6.400 u 2018. godini. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)

Hrvatska je kad je riječ o svojim obavezama kroz načelo solidarnosti do sada po osnovi preseljena iz Turske preselila 152 osobe. Temeljem odluke Vlade iz listopada prošle godine, odlučili smo pardon, iz Turske preseliti dodatnih 100 izbjeglica, koje su u potrebi za međunarodnom zaštitom. Po osnovi premještanja iz Grčke i Italije do sada smo premjestili 81 osobu, 60 iz Grčke i 20 iz Italije. Naš prijedlog u zaključku Europskog vijeća uvrštena je referenca o potrebi jačanja suradnje sa nama susjednim zemljama jugoistoka Europe i to u razmjeni informacija o migracijskim tokovima, sprječavanju nezakonitih migracija, povećanju

Y

N

Solidarity/quotas

		<p>kapaciteta za zaštitu granica i učinkovitiju provedbu postupaka vraćanja i ponovnog prihvata migranata koji ne ostvaruju pravo na međunarodnu zaštitu. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)</p>				
		<p>Kad je riječ o unutarnjem aspektu migracija ključno je postizanje dogovora o Reformi zajedničke europske politike azila. Ta reforma podrazumijeva usvajanje paketa od 7 zakonodavnih akata, najveći kamen spoticanja ostaje dogovor o Dablinskoj uredbi</p>	Y	N	Solidarity/asylum law	

jer je potrebno postići kompromis obveznom mehanizmu raspodjeli migranata što je povezano s načelom solidarnosti i podjele odgovornosti. Mi u tom pogledu podržavamo austrijsko predsjedništvo koje je nastavilo rad na kompromisnom rješenju za koje smo se i mi zalagali odnosno da se prilikom tumačenja načela solidarnosti u obzir uzmu specifičnosti, kapaciteti i gospodarske mogućnosti pojedinih država članica.
(PLENKOVIĆ
ANDREJ, PM)

<p>Ukupan iznos sedmogodišnjeg proračuna biti će 1135 milijardi EUR-a, prema prijedlogu Komisije. Najveći dio sredstava, naravno, za financiranje kohezijske i poljoprivredne politike, premda su i ta 2 velika razdjela proračuna, smanjena s obzirom na Brexit i na utjecaj prihodovne strane. Više sredstava se predviđa za vanjske aktivnosti, digitalizaciju, istraživanje, razvoj, migraciju, upravljanje granicama, dakle, 31 milijarda EUR-a više. Novi proračun za sigurnost i obranu od 24 i pol milijarde EUR- a, te duplo veći proračun za e-razmus plus, dakle, mobilnost studenata. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)</p>	<p>Prvo što se tiče HDZ-a, HDZ je jedinstven nema nikakvih unutar HDZ- ovskih igrica, ne znam gdje ih vi to vidite, klub, vlada, nacionalno vijeće, predsjedništvo nitko niti jednoga glasa u smislu supstantivnih zamjermi na kompakt, globalni kompakt o zakonitim migracijama i tu bi stavio točku što se tiče stranačkih pozicija. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)</p>

		<p>Pa evo ovako zastupniče dakle naša je politika da treba zaštititi vanjske granice Europske unije da bismo mi na ovom pravcu istočno-mediteranskom i jugoistočno-europskom bili sigurni bilo bi sjajno kada bi tursko-grčka granica bila nepropusna ili tursko-bugarska tada mi ne bi imali problem. To očito nije slučaj i rekao sam i u govoru samo evidentiranjem broja nezakonitih migracija koje na kraju završe na našim granicama pokazuje određenu dinamiku koja je veća, ne onako dramatična kao 2015. i 2016. Mi smatramo da moramo ispuniti i ove kriterije pravne stečevine, tehničke kriterije, funkcionalnost i integriranost u informacijskom pogledu i ispunit</p>	Y	N	(EU) integration	
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politički kriterij.
Bugarska i
Rumunjska oni
smatraju da su
davno ispunili još
nisu ušli. (ANDREJ
PLENKOVIĆ, PM)

		<p>Tema sigurnosti, tema migracija, zbog toga i je ovoliko veliko povećanje koje je išlo na preko 30 milijardi EUR-a o kojima sam sad govorio, jer smo jedna od najzainteresiranijih zemalja, jedna od zemlja doslovno na prvoj crti, barem kada je riječ o ovoj migrantskoj ruti. I s te strane ćemo u dogovoru sa ostalim zemljama, koje se nazivaju Prijatelji kohezije, tih zemalja je 17, voditi jednu koncertiranu i usuglašenu politiku, sastanak u Bratislavi bit će i sastanak na vrhu srednje europske inicijative ovdje, jer Hrvatska i tom Inicijativom predsjedava ove godine početkom prosinca, gdje ćemo nastojati dobiti potporu za naš stav. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ, PM)</p>	Y	N	EU budget	
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Prvi stup je zaštita vanjskih granica. Tu ću spomenuti nekoliko brojki i činjenica koji su meni osobno zapele za oko. Dakle, od 2015. taj podatak je iznio austrijski kancelar Kurz za 95% nakon 2015. je smanjen migracijski pritisak. Dakle, to će reći zapravo da je najveći napredak možda ostvaren upravo u zaštiti vanjske granice. Slijedeći podatak koji je vrlo zanimljiv, a to je da procjena Komisije kaže da na teritoriju EU postoji jedan i pol milijun migranata koje treba vratiti čim prije u države iz kojih su došli. Međutim, u isto vrijeme stopa povrata ilegalnih migranata smanjila se na razini Unije sa 46 na 37%, što nije mali postotak. Ono što je za pozdraviti, a to je da europska granična i obalna

Y

N

Border security

straža će se u iduće
2 godine će se 3
puta uvećati, dakle,
i sredstva i ljudi.
Pretpostavljam da
će u godinama pred
nama, a i
desetljećima to
nastaviti biti trend,
kao integraciju
europskog sustava
za nadzor granica
koji bi trebao biti
od lokalne,
regionalne,
nacionalne, pa do
europske razine.
(MILOŠEVIĆ
DOMAGOJ IVAN)

HDZ	<p>evo iz vašeg Izvješća podržavam i pohvaljujem evo sve napore koje činite i na učvršćenju međunarodnog položaja naše zemlje, jer vidimo sa ovim diplomatskim i bilateralnim aktivnostima, da se mnoge stvari povezuju, posebno evo i na jačanju mehanizama i suradnji na međusobnoj zaštiti cijelog europskog prostora, dakle evo i u pogledu ilegalnih migracija i svega ostalog, jer evo Hrvatska ima poziciju očuvanja i granica jugoistočne Europe (ŠKORIĆ PETAR)</p>				Security	
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		<p>Pod dva, kao što rekoh, u tom sveobuhvatnom pristupu migracijama je vanjska dimenzija migracijske politike odnosno jači angažman država članica u Africi, ali ja mislim da ne samo u Africi. Dakle, Komisija je predstavila prijedlog Saveza za održivo ulaganje i radna mjesta, zovu to Maršalovim planom za Afriku s ciljem otvaranja 10 milijuna novih radnih mjesta u 5 idućih godina. S obzirom da će u slijedećih nekoliko desetljeća stanovništvo Afrike otići sa milijardu i dvjesto na dvije i pol milijarde stanovnika, onda znamo da neće biti potrebni deseci milijuna, nego zapravo stotine milijuna radnih mjesta. A kad govorimo o Maršalovom planu, mislim da je ono što je puno hitnije,</p>	N	Y	Solidarity/Crisis Management	
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		<p>zapravo, Maršalov plan za Bliski Istok, posebno za Siriju i Irak jer trenutno, posebno u ovom našem dijelu EU jest najveći pritisak iz ratom razrušenih prostora Sirije i Iraka. (MILOŠEVIĆ DOMAGOJ IVAN)</p>				
		<p>I treće, pod migracijskom, ovaj pristupom migracijama je unutarnja dimenzija migracijske politike i nužnost dogovora oko reforme zajedničke politike azila. Ova reforma uključuje 7 zakonodavnih akata, ostaje</p>	N	Y	Asylum Law	

najveći problem unutar toga tzv. Dablinska Uredba koja se bavi mehanizmom raspodjele migranata u državama članicama EU. (MILOŠEVIĆ DOMAGOJ IVAN)

jednostavno nije dobro ako hoćete i za samu stabilnost dugoročne EU, a to je pod famoznu solidarnost podvesti da se stanovništvo, mlado stanovništvo jedne zemlje, naše zemlje zamjenjuje za migrante. Razumijemo, podržavamo potrebu da se Turskoj upućuje novac za brigu o izbjeglicama, tim više što se zapravo dobrim dijelom upravo u Turskoj radi stvarno o izbjeglicama, dakle, ne o ekonomskim migrantima, nego o ljudima koji su pobjegli pred ratom razrušenim Sirijom, Irakom, uglavnom. Međutim, osim slanja novca Turskoj, mislim da je jednako bitno, ako ne i bitnije, novac i tehniku slati upravo na ta razrušena područja, dakle, u Siriju i Irak. To je puno teže, lakše je slati novac nekome druge, pa onda će

N

Y

Solidarity

on netko i nešto
jednom riješiti taj
naš problem.
Međutim, suština i
jest da ako želimo
zaustaviti
migracije, taj novac
treba završiti u tim
državama koje
treba ponovno
izgraditi nakon rata.
(MILOŠEVIĆ
DOMAGOJ IVAN)

						<p>Način da se to pitanje rješava smisljeno, racionalno je da se upravo tome tako i pristupa i to je ono što mi radimo. Dakle radimo na način koji ima nacionalnu dimenziju, koji ima europsku dimenziju, koji ima globalnu dimenziju. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ)</p>
HNS						<p>Politika ove Vlade je racionalna i pristupa baš pertinentno kako treba svakoj razini rješavanja ovoga problema sa migracijama, tako da sve ove teze, ovih stranka, strancića, pojedinaca, koji nastoje iz ovoga nešto usičariti u racionalnom pristupu kao što je bilo o nekoj drugoj temi prije pola godine, neće polučiti nikakav efekt. (PLENKOVIĆ ANDREJ)</p>
Bandić 365						

SDSS		<p>Što se tiče migracija, smanjenje broja, visoko smanjenje broja nezakonitih migracija dakle smanjenje broja za 95% je značajno postignuće. I pokazatelji u određenom smislu a otrežnjenja kada je po srijedi glad za jeftinom radnom snagom i brzom radnom snagom koje su pojedine zemlje članice EU imale. I istovremenom znak otrežnjenja da proizvođenje kriznih žarišta ratnih i ekonomskih žarišta koje stimuliraju kao što je netko ovdje govorio migracije je nešto što ohrabruje. (PUPOVAC MILORAD)</p>	Y	N	Crisis Management	
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Drugu stvar koju treba izbjeći jeste proizvođenje mržnje, predrasuda, stereotipova i nacionalizma ne temi oko migranata i migracija. Mi jesmo zemlja ulaska ali nismo zemlja ostanka. I svatko onaj tko ljude koji prolaze u Hrvatsku pretvara u svoje političko sredstvo kao što je to slučaj se prenio na ovu benignu Marakešku deklaraciju je nešto što nije pametno i nije dobro zbog same naše zemlje. Naše iskustvo rata i naše ratno nasljeđe koje je zadržalo elemente animoziteta sa novim animozitetima može visoko štetiti našoj zemlji, njezinoj političkoj kulturi i njezinoj sposobnosti da se suoči sa svojim ozbiljnim problemima. Nismo mi zemlja koja ne treba migrante. Nažalost mi smo zemlja koja treba migrante. (PUPOVAC MILORAD)

Solidarity

SDP		<p>Europa nije u stanju upravljati migrantskim procesima koji trenutno su milijun i pol ljudi na području Europe. Kako ćemo kao EU se onda moći nositi sa desecima milijuna migranata koji dolaze? Dakle, očigledno je da je potrebna jedna dublja revizija migrantske politike i dodatnog djelovanja u njenoj vanjskoj dimenziji, dakle, da se učini sve kako bi se onemogućile promjene klime koje će dovesti do ovakvog trenda migracijskog i zato nije jasno kako tako olako se prelazi preko te teme u EU odnosno u zaključcima Europskog vijeća. (KLISOVIĆ JOŠKO)</p>	N	Y	Mismanagement	
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	<p>U kontekstu migracija još jedna stvar je važna, želio bi istaknuti, EU pokušava naći hotspot izvan granica EU da bi se koncentrirale, da bi se migranti koncentrirali, nije smo dovoljno po mom mišljenju kazat da Hrvatska ne može i neće biti hotspot jednako tako je važno sugerirati EU i zalagati se u institucijama EU da to ne bude niti BiH. (KLISOVIĆ JOŠKO)</p>				<p style="text-align: center;">Border security</p>		<p>Jer je suvereno pravo, to je ustvari dogovor, to nije ni konvencija ni sporazum, samo jedan dogovor između državnika. Suverenost pravo svake države da uzme i preuzme u upravljanju migrantskim procesima neku od preporuka koje se tamo nalaze. Znači da suvereno pravo je svake države da to uzme i da to odbaci i time suverenitet nije narušen. (KLISOVIĆ JOŠKO)</p>
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						<p>Kolega Bunjac, drago mi je čuti da ste vi, vjerujem Živi zid, otvoreni za prihvat migranata koji uživaju međunarodnu zaštitu, zaštitu međunarodnog prava, i da niste za hermetički zatvorenu Hrvatsku koja odbija bilo koga u Hrvatskoj. (...) Vaši zahtjevi da se otvorite prema jednoj modernoj migrantskoj politici, a to je da se utvrdi identitet ljudi koji ulazi, i da migranti koji uđu u vašu zemlju pod zaštitom međunarodnog prava, poštuju hrvatski pravni poredak, su sasvim legitimni, i ja mislim da i Vlada, i Europska unija mora poći od ova dva uvjeta u svojoj migrantskoj politici. (KLISOVIĆ JOŠKO)</p>
<p>MOST</p>						<p>Poštovani premijeru, u vašem izvješću govorili ste o migracijama i mene bi zanimalo jeste li možda razgovarali sa austrijskim kancelarom, pitali ga što je njemu sporno u ovom globalnom kompaktu odnosno Marakeškom sporazumu? (GRMOJA NIKOLA)</p>

<p>Drugo oko migracija. Zapazio sam na jednu izjavu koja se odnosi na, izjavu, zapravo, gospodina glavnog tajnika NATO-a Stoltenberga koji je rekao da, ocijenio je prisutnost NATO u Iraku i Afganistanu da pomaže rješavanje migracijske krize. Nikako ja da to povežem. Znači, NATO koji je tamo prisutan cijelo ovo vrijeme, na kraju mi sada, zapravo posljedice prisustva svih tih vojnih sila tamo osjetimo kroz migracijsku krizu.</p> <p>Nisam nekako primijetio da je ijedna od tih izbjeglica zaustavljena angažmanom koji je stvorio NATO. Ja bi čak rekao ako je to mjerilo uspješnosti NATO-a, onda bi ipak trebalo biti suzdržaniji u tome. Možda oni provode politiku koja odgovara NATO-u. Ali da je to migracijska politika koja sprečava ovaj migracijski val, definitivno, čini mi se, da nije. I meni općenito suradnja s NATO-om gdje .../Govornik se ne razumije/... su SAD, uvijek postavlja ono pitanje, ako je već tako dobra suradnja EU i NATO-a u kome su SAD, praktično, da kažemo, ključni element toga saveza. Gdje mi pripadamo? Zašto i hrvatski građani i dan danas moraju tražiti vizu da bi mogli otići</p>						
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<p>u SAD? Izgleda da mi nismo u tome NATO-u u kome su svi ostali. (PANETIĆ TOMISLAV)</p>						
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Ono što bih još naglasio u okviru migracijske politike, a to je naglasak, zapravo, na vanjskim granicama. Mi imamo cijelo vrijeme, zapravo, naglašavanje, pratio sam i neke druge izjave političara koji su na razini EU, njihovih premijera, zemalja članica, koje stalno govore učinkovita kontrola vanjske granice. Međutim, postavite se u poziciju, evo premijeru i vi to zagovarate, da ima nas koji živimo na toj vanjskoj granici. Ja doživljam vanjsku granicu, neka je to s one strane izvan nas, jel kada je to vanjska granica s naše strane, onda vam se događa da kada idete u jedan Ilok, dnevno možda 10 puta, da će vas 10 puta zaustaviti policija i kontrolirati. Sada zamislite da putujete premijeru

N

Y

Border security

svaki dan u Vladu i da vas 10 puta, ako 10 puta prođete, zaustave, da vas samo bace pogled i provjere i tako iz dana u dan. I onda govorimo o razvoju, ne znam, jednoga Iloka, jednoga Srijema, jednoga istoka RH, gdje kontrole na svakoj cesti, na svakom kutku i s time živite. I to je nekome tko je iz Brisela, njemu ta vanjska granica je jako daleko, ali m i je žao da to iz Zagreba ta vanjska granica postane nešto što je jako daleko, a nama koji tamo živimo, to otežava svakodnevi život i smatram da vanjska granica treba se preseliti upravo u područje u kojima nastale su krize. Mi smo da se razumijemo, mi sigurno krivi, nismo mi potaknuli ta događanja, niti smo iskoristavali ta područja, niti politički

manipulirala, niti
ekonomski
manipulirala, al
definitivno da na
kraju postajemo
kao vanjska granica
EU, zemlja koja će
trpiti posljedice.
(PANETIĆ
TOMISLAV)

Ne bojim se nijednog migranta da on je željan ostati u našoj državi, nažalost, nismo stvorili takvo okruženje, niti da će, evo ja ću otvoreno reći, za vrijeme dok smo imali prolazak ljudi iz Rumunije, bilo je puno većih šteta od pljačke koja se događala, nego što je sada. Al se bojim da jednostavno na ovaj način nećemo osigurati sigurnost područja koja zapravo želimo da postane sastavni dio EU, a mi nažalost bili smo izgleda prije graničari, sada postajemo opet graničari.
(PANETIĆ TOMISLAV)

N

Y

Border security

<p>Independent MP</p>	<p>Rekli ste u svom dijelu izlaganja da je prvi veliki integracijski korak ulaz u Šengenski prostor, RH vidimo i to iz povijesti ništa nije dobila lagano od</p>			<p>Hvala lijepo gospodine predsjednice, mene zanima koji je stav Hrvatske vanjske politike i koji je stav Vlade kojoj Europi pripadamo, da li pripadamo Europi žice ili onoj koja dijalogom želi riješiti problem i tko predstavlja Hrvatsku jer smo vidjeli da je predsjednica rekla jedno, a Vlada govori drugo i ono što je moje osnovno pitanje koji je stav RH oko Marakeškog sporazuma i kakva je politika Hrvatske oko migracija u Europskoj uniji. Svjestan sam da ovo što se sada dešava su igre unutar igre HDZ-a ali država nije mjesto gdje se igraju unutarstranačke igrice i međunarodna reputacija Hrvatske nije moneta za unutarstranačke igre. I stoga vas vrlo jasno pitam i vrlo jasan odgovor koji je stav RH oko Marakeške konvencije i koju politiku oko migracija zastupate, da li politiku žice ili politiku dogovora? (MRSIC MIRANDO)</p>
			<p>(EU) integration</p>	

	<p>Europske unije i ovaj proces sami ste rekli traje od 2016. i ja ne sumnjam da će Hrvatska ispunit tehničke uvjete, međutim ono što me brine je li doista interes Europske unije da Hrvatska štiti njene granice, je li to interes RH jer se Sengenski prostor pokazao ranjiv posebno u zadnje vrijeme vezano uz migrantsku krizu. Drugim riječima, i moj osobni stav bolje je ulagati u sigurnosne sustave nego li u žicu, koja se ionako ne proizvodi u Hrvatskoj. (ZAGAR TOMISLAV)</p>					
<p>Ako govorimo o migracijama, a o tome smo mnogo govorili danas, ne bih želio da bude zabune. RH svoje granice mora i treba braniti, ne mislim da trebamo bez ikakve pažnje ili opreza ili diskriminacije otvarati granice svima. Ne, ali, isto tako ne mogu podnijeti da moja RH koja je u ratu ispijala gorak pehar progonstva i</p>					<p>Border security</p>	

	izbjeglištva, uskraćuje ljudima u potrebi njihova prava po Međunarodnim ugovorima. (GLAVAŠEVIĆ BOJAN)					
GLAS						Mi često kada govorimo o migracijama miješamo 3 stvari, to se i danas ovdje dosta često događa. To su legalne migracije, ilegalne migracije i izbjeglice. Dakle, legalne migracije je nešto što je obuhvaćeno ovdje spomenutom Marakeškim društvenim ugovorom ili Marakeškim dogovorom i što Europska unija pokušava upravo otvaranjem te teme, a to zapravo Marakeški sporazum je otvaranje rasprave na europskoj razini kako doći do nekog konsenzusa koji u ovom trenutku ne postoji a nužan nam je, kako doći do konsenzusa o regulaciji legalnih migracija. Treba se podsjetiti da legalne migracije su i migracije u kojima u ovom trenutku sudjeluje veliki broj hrvatskih državljana koji su u ovom trenutku u Irskoj ili su

u Njemačkoj ili bilo gdje drugdje u europskim zemljama, to su legalni migranti. (PUSIĆ VESNA)						
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		<p>I prepoznavanje činjenice da postizanjem konsenzusa dakle slaganja na razini Europe koje u ovom trenutku ne postoji o tome kako regulirati legalne migracije bi svakako pomoglo i u efikasnosti borbe protiv ilegalnih migracija, a ne dotiče se teme izbjeglica jer izbjeglice i tema izbjeglica je predmet rasprave o zajedničkoj politici azila koja je u ovom trenutku što se Europske tiče na žalost na vrlo dugačkom štapu, dakle ne postoji ni približno bez obzira na Dablinski sporazum, Dablinski sporazum je na neki način vrijeme pregazilo on je bio mišljen za vrijeme u kojem nisu postojali ovakvi masovni valovi ili veliki valovi izbjeglica, dakle za neku redovnu situaciju. Situacija u kojoj</p>	N	Y	Asylum law	
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smo bili suočeni
2015. pa onda i
djelomično i 2016.
je sasvim drugačija
od one koja je
regulirana
Dablinskim
sporazumom i
prema tome
zahjeva zaista
novu europsku
politiku, ali kažem
to je posebna tema
o kojoj u ovom
trenutku se u
Europi ne nazire
konsenzus. (PUSIĆ
VESNA)

Konsenzus se nazire o temi legalnih migracija i mislim da je tu Hrvatska direktno zainteresirana da u tome sudjeluje i da u ovom trenutku zapravo doprinosi nekoj vrsti strukturirane javne rasprave na razini Europe, svako ko naravno pogleda taj prijedlog Marakeškog sporazuma koji inače se već dosta dugo vremena formulira na razini država članica Europske unije, ovaj UN-a a onda posebno Europske unije je nešto što eventualno u budućnosti može dovesti do nekih zajedničkih politika, u ovom trenutku on zapravo predstavlja stavljanje na dnevni red teme legalnih migracija gdje smo mi zainteresirani ne samo kao zemlja u kojoj eventualno mogu doći legalni migranti, nego kao zemlja iz koje

Y

N

EU integration

legalni migranti odlaze u druge između ostalog ili u prvom redu članice Europske unije i toga trebamo biti svjesni i zauzeti svoju poziciju u toj raspravi, pa i zaštitu svojih državljanina jer između ostalog ovdje se od recimo skraćeno da kažemo zastupa stav da su i legalni migranti ljudi, drugim riječima da imaju i određena temeljna ljudska prava koja treba poštivati, a polazi se naravno od pretpostavke da se sa postepenim stvaranjem konenzusa i eventualno u nekoj budućnosti neke usklađene regulative da to omogućava ili će omogućiti u perspektivi smanjenje onoga što svima predstavlja problem a to su ilegalne migracije. Dakle, u tom pogledu mislim da je

Hrvatska zauzela
jedan racionalni
stav. (PUSIĆ
VESNA)

Što se tiče politike azila i onog što se u ovim izvještajima zovu unutrašnje migracije, to je puno kompliciranija tema, Hrvatska je u tom kontekstu prihvatila ja blih rekla 10 ljudi ne neke značajne brojeve, međutim jedan od razloga koji je izazvao krizu 2015. sa velikim izbjegličkim valom je bilo upravo nerazumijevanje na razini Europske unije situacije u Turskoj i odnosa između Europske unije i Turske. Migranti odnosno izbjeglice koji su u Hrvatsku došli 2015. svi redom bez obzira na zemlje porijekla su došli ih Turske. (...)
(PUSIĆ VESNA)

N

Y

Mismanagement

						<p>Kao što je u tom pogledu pozitivno i ovo što smo čuli vezano na fond za Afriku iako taj fond za Afriku je na jako, jako dugačkom štapu i dok ne dođe do situacije da je prvo u zemljama Subsaharske Afrike mir a nakon toga i eventualno kakvi takvi uvjeti za život, međutim dodatno klimatske promjene pogoršavaju tu situaciju i tema migracija i migranata će s nama biti sigurno našeg života. Dakle, u našim životima mi ćemo se s tom temom trebat i morat nosit jer je očito da ona se neće završiti. Dakle, fond za Afriku je svakako nešto što je pozitivno iako naravno ima rezultate u eventualno prilično dalekoj budućnosti. (PUSIĆ VESNA)</p>
HSS						
IDS						

<p>ZIVI ZID</p>						<p>Uvažene dame i gospodo, u izvješćavanju Europske komisije, čini se da, po papirima koje smo dobili, čini se da su.../Govornik se ne razumije/... Jens Stoltenberg koji je izjavio da prisutnost NATO-a u Iraku i Afganistanu pomaže rješavanju migrantske krize. Pa ja evo pitam, na koji način je dolazak NATO-a u Afganistan odnosno njegova prisutnost tamo pomogla rješavanju migrantske krize. Tim više što znamo konkretne brojke, navest ćemo 2001. migranata odnosno izbjeglica, kako god ih nazvali iz Afganistana za Njemačku bilo je samo 5 000, a 2016., znači pretprošle godine bilo ih je čak 125 000, što će reći da je broj izbjeglica iz Afganistana, zahvaljujući NATO-voj invaziji, zahvaljujući prisustvu NATO-a, porastao 25 puta. (PERNAR IVAN)</p>
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						<p>možemo vidjeti da NATO nije pomogao rješenju migrantske krize, niti u Iraku, niti u Siriji, niti u Afganistanu, već je naprotiv doveo do njegovog rasplamsavanja. Zanimljiva je još jedna stvar. Jens Stoltenberg ne spominje u svom Izvješću da je djelovanje NATO-a ili njegovo prisustvo pomoglo rješenju migrantske krize, recimo u Libiji, jer mi znamo da je migrantska kriza u Libiji počela tek onog trenutka kada je NATO intervenirao, srušio Muarema Gadafija i zapravo gurnuo tu zemlju u građanski rat koji traje do današnjeg dana. (PERNAR IVAN)</p>
<p>Također premijer Plenković je rekao da RH uspješno štiti svoju granicu od nezakonitih migracija. Ta teza je netočna jer o njoj svjedoče tisuće ilegalnih prelazaka granice RH koji su se odvili po izjavama BiH vlasti. Znači BiH vlasti između 15 i 17 000 migranata samo ove godine već ilegalno prešlo našu granicu. Ako ilegalni prelazak više od 10 000 ljudi naš premijer smatra uspješnom</p>					<p>Border security</p>	

	<p>obranom granice, onda se moramo pitati što je to neuspješna obrana granice. I ove teze gdje se govori da je hrvatska granica sigurna, sigurna je za što? Hrvatska granica je sigurna za ilegalne prelaskе, ali nije nažalost sigurna u smislu da sprječava ilegalne migracije, nije sigurna na način da se zakoni naše zemlje poštuju. (PERNAR IVAN)</p>		<p>Danas između ostaloga govorimo o migracijama i htio bih reći da u biti hrvatske građane uopće ne zanimaju dokumenti EU, sporazumi zvali se oni marakeški ili ne znam kako, ogromnu većinu hrvatskih građana zanima jedno temeljno pitanje a to je da li se granica prelazi ilegalno ili ne. (IVAN PERNAR)</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Asylum law</p>	
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	<p>On vrlo dobro zna jer previše je jednostavno očitito da granicu na dnevnoj bazi prelazi stotine migranata. I dovoljno je da nazovete bilo kojeg namjernika u Lici ili čak u Gorskom Kotaru, policajca, službenika, običnoga građanina i on će vam reći da migranti prolaze, da čak podižu u nekim dijelovima i manja šatorska naselja i da jednostavno možete ih golim opažanjem primijetiti već u roku od par sati. (PERNAR IVAN)</p>				<p>Border security</p>	
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<p>Važno je reći da nitko normalan u RH nema ništa protiv migranata, dapače, stotina tisuća hrvatskih građana su zbog loših politika Vlada SDP-a i HDZ-a postali migranti i radi potrage za boljim životom ili poslom otišli su iz RH ali to su učinili na legalan način. (...) nitko nema ništa protiv da migranti dolaze u Hrvatsku i mogu ovdje i živjeti i raditi i Sirijci i Iranci i Rusi i Kinezi i vidimo da već i žive i rade ovdje. Ali mi želimo znati, svi hrvatski građani koji je identitet tih ljudi i želimo da poštuju pravni poredak RH. I to je sve. Ali to se nažalost ne dešava. Ovdje se žele ilegalne migracije predstaviti kao obične migracije ili još gore, žele se ilegalni migranti izjednačiti sa ratnim izbjeglicama prema kojima doista svaka država ima obavezu, moralnu, međunarodnu, pravnu i financijsku ali prema ilegalnim migrantima ne. (...) Kako god se bavili migracijama, važno je naglasiti da jedina stranka koja se želi baviti njihovim uzrokom, je Živi zid, svi ostali bave se samo posljedicama, svejedno dal' je to gospodin Plenković, gospoda Pusić, ili gospodin</p>						
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Sada Hrvatska daje silne novce da smiri stanje u Iraku, da smiri stanje u Afganistanu, da smiri stanje u Libiji, ne znam sutra će biti da smiri stanje u Jemenu, a mi smo upravo davali oružje i zeleno svijetlo, prešutni blagoslov da se te zemlje razaraju, da se krši suvereno pravo tih naroda da sami odluče o svojoj sudbini i svojoj budućnosti, da je narod Afganistana bez uplitanja NATO-a, pa tako i Hrvatske koja je članica NATO-a, birao svoju Vladu, garantiram vam da problema migranata nikada ne bi bilo, i ne bi 20 i 30 milijuna Afganistanaca, ni Iranaca, ni Sirijaca, ni Libijaca, bježalo iz svoje vlastite domovine, da nije bilo agresije i okupacije od strane NATO saveza, koji dakle podržava kompletna hrvatska politička scena.
(PERNAR IVAN)

Mismanagement

<p>HRAST</p>		<p>Meni je jako interesantan cilj br. 5 koji kaže poboljšati dostupnost i fleksibilnost regularnih migracija. A kada malo udete u meritum, vidjeti ćete zapravo da se radi, da je ovo ključan cilj i da se zapravo cijela Konvencija vrti oko ovog cilja. Na koji način olakšati kretanje ljudi u svijetu ne vodeći računa o suverenitetu država.(ZEKANO VIĆ HRVOJE)</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Asylum Law</p>	
						<p>Poštovani kolega Glavašević, ja sam također bio u Cazinskoj krajini, bio sam u Bihaću, bio sam u Kladuši i vidio sam imigrante, znači radi se mahom o radno sposobnom stanovništvu, o mladim ljudima, muškarcima. (ZEKANOVIC HRVOJE)</p> <p>Interesantno je slušati znači vaše izvješće iz Europskog vijeća, da su sve rasprave, ali apsolutno sve koje su bile, a bilo ih je već 20-tak, bilo fokusirane na pitanje migranata. Znači pitanje migranata je pitanje</p>

									Marrakesche konvencije, to je prva konstatacija. (ZEKANOVIĆ HRVOJE)
HSU									
NLM									
									Da vas podsjetim, početkom 2016. g. ovom Saboru sam predložio i tražio da se problem migracija i migranata stavi kao točka dnevnog reda i od tada do sada nitko to nije smatrao važnim da stavi na plenarnu sjednicu Sabora. Što su ustvari uzroci i kuda, kakav će biti razvoj migrantske krize, što će čeka Europu, EU, možemo iščitati ako poznajemo demografske tendencije, ekonomske i ako znamo geopolitička previranja u nadmetanju velikih sila na ovom području. (LOVRINOVIĆ IVAN)
PH									Gledamo ljude na rutama kuda prolaze migranti prema Sloveniji, prema Austriji, dalje prema Njemačkoj da traže svoje mjesto pod suncem, to je sasvim jedna druga priča, ljudi su uplašeni kad skupina od 10, 50, 100 ljudi prolazi pored vaših kuća, vaših njiava, vi

		<p>Migracije će biti trajni problem i opasnost na ovim prostorima. Da se odmah razumijemo, postoji pristup migracijama, ekonomski politički, mješoviti u koji ubrajam i terorizam. Ono što trebam naglasiti sljedeće, kada sam na početku spominjao, da zakoni Europa, demografski pada, ona kontinuirano treba novu radnu snagu. (LOVRINOVIĆ IVAN)</p>	N	Y	Security	
	<p>U tom smislu, iznosi i stajalište u ime stranke PH, Promijenimo Hrvatsku, nitko ne može preći Hrvatsku granicu bez dokumenata. Nitko. Oni koji nemaju dokumente, oni se moraju posebno tretirati, sve dok se određene strane ne istraže. Ono što je humanitarnog karaktera, problema, prema tome se moramo humano odnositi, međutim,</p>				Solidarity	

	<p>humanizam, pa to je i sam papa Franjo rekao, u razgovoru o raspravama o migracijama, rekao je, ako se radi o takvom broju migranata, koji prelaze, određene okvire, brojčano i ugrožavaju nacionalnu sigurnost, onda to više nije pitanje samo humanosti. (LOVRINOVIĆ IVAN)</p>					<p>Pa u tom kontekstu, spomenuti ću da je u EU trenutno živi 22 milijuna ljudi, koji su došli izvan EU. U 2016. g. došlo je samo u toj godini 2 milijuna imigranata. Molim vas lijepo, to su ogromne brojke. (LOVRINOVIĆ IVAN)</p>
SNAGA						

CRO7.1 04.12.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
HDZ						<p>Kolega Babić, istina je da smo sad na 1,23 milijuna korisnika mirovina dolazi 1,55 milijuna osiguranika i razlog tome su od demografskih problema, gospodarskih kretanja, migracija i sl., i zato između ostalog i velike pohvale ovoj odredbi koja se odnosi, koja je po meni demografska mjera a odnosi se na 2% koje će dobiti majka odnosno i otac koji je koristio porodični dopust na svako dijete uz mirovinu. (JURIČEV - MARTINČEV BRANKA)</p>
HNS						<p>Hvala lijepo poštovani podpredsjedniče Hrvatskog sabora, poštovana kolegice Glavak danas je odnos u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj, dakle odnos korisnika i osiguranika odnosno radnika i umirovljenika 1:3 i u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj se upalio alarm i tada je nastala ona migrantska kriza zapravo njihovom politikom da se uvede radna snaga izvan Republike Njemačke jer je demografska slika u Saveznoj Republici Njemačkoj jako loša. (BABIĆ ANTE)</p>
Bandić 365						
SDSS						
HDS						
HSLs						
HDSBB						
Reformist						
SDP						

SER1 10.08.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS		<p>Da mi obezbedimo da Srbija bude bolja od Nemačke neće u 100 godina, u 100 godina narednih nećemo ni vi ni ja, ni svi mi zajedno. Hajde da nikoga ne lažemo više. To je jedan proces koji se događa i koji se događa svuda u Evropi. Ceo svet se seli u Evropu. Sada je sav saharski deo počeo da prelazi u Evropu i zato imamo problema sa migrantskom krizom. Ne možete da ih zaustavite. Baš ih briga za njihovo korenje, za njihovu rodninu, za bilo šta. Tamo se ratuje i tamo imaju problem i oni dolaze u najbogatije evropske zemlje i neće da idu ni u Mađarsku, ni u Češku, ni u Slovačku, koje su veoma bogate, nego hoće da idu u Nemačku, Austriju, Holandiju i Dansku. (VUČIĆ ALEKSANDAR, PRES)</p>	N	Y	Migration trends	

	<p>I evo, sad se ljudi neki s pravom bune, iz Gavrila Principa ulice u Beogradu, zbog toga što su im nekih uslovi za život, zbog drugih stvari i ništa nisu slagali, zbog velikog prisustva migranata gde vi ne možete ljude da držite u kavezu, a onda se ljudi osećaju nebezbedno, nesigurno i sad se mi mučimo šta da uradimo. (VUČIĆ ALEKSANDAR, PRES)</p>					<p>Security</p>	
<p>SDPS</p>	<p>Imamo migrantsku krizu koja potresa Evropu, a Srbija daje prave odgovore na migrantsku krizu. Kroz našu zemlju je prošlo 700.000 ljudi, smešteno, nahranjeno, lečeno. Ti ljudi nemaju nikakve primedbe kako se ponašaju prema njima u Srbiji. Čak naprotiv, hvale Srbiju. Mi nismo stavili žice i nećemo ih nikad staviti, ali isto tako ćemo znati da vodimo ovu našu zemlju, da je držimo i čuvamo stabilnom. Možda to nekom ne odgovara, ali moram vam reći da Srbija jeste stabilna zemlja. (MILORAD MIJATOVIĆ)</p>					<p>Solidarity</p>	
<p>PUPS</p>							
<p>NS</p>							
<p>SPO</p>							
<p>PS</p>							

SNP																				
SPS																				
JS																				
Greens																				
SRS																				
Dosta																				
DS																				
NS																				
ZZS																				
ZZŠ																				
Dveri																				
SVM																				<p>Mi smo se suočili sa nekim izazovima u prethodnom periodu, a tu pre svega mislim na migrantsku krizu. Migrantska kriza je bila jedina tema na koju smo na drugačiji način gledali u odnosu na druge stranke koje su činile Vladu Republike Srbije, ali mislim da je to iz razumljivog razloga što su građani grada Subotice, opštine Kanjiža i drugih opština na severu Vojvodine bile u najvećoj meri, pored Beogradana, suočeni sa tim problemom. (PASTOR BALINT)</p>

	<p>Čuli smo u eksplozeu juče da je u prethodnom periodu oko 700 hiljada migranata prošlo kroz našu teritoriju. To je 10% stanovništva Republike Srbije. To je užasno veliki broj. Znam da Srbija za to nije odgovorna, niti može da bude. Znam da je to užasno teško pitanje, ali bih opet apelovao na Vladu, i buduću, to sam činio i pre godinu dana, da na prvom mestu bude bezbednost građana Republike Srbije. (PASTOR BALINT)</p>						National security	
DSS								
SDS								
LDP								
LSV								
National minorities								

SER2 06.10.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta	<p>Koje odgovore imamo na scenarije koji se mogu javiti? Neke smo odgovore našli bukvalno u hodu, kao što je bilo u toku migrantske krize, ali izazovi se postavljaju i mi moramo imati strategiju, moramo imati odgovore na sve moguće izazove koji se mogu javiti pred Srbijom. To su ozbiljna pitanja, to je pitanje našeg opstanka, pitanje bezbednosti Srbije i pitanje toga kako će izgledati budućnost za deset ili dvadeset godina. (STEVANOVIĆ ALEKSANDAR)</p>				Security	

SER3 02.11.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS		<p>Druge nova misija EU sadržana u Predlogu godišnjeg plana upotrebe Vojske i drugih snaga odbrane u multinacionalnim operacijama u 2016. godini je operacija EU na Mediteranu, pokrenuta sa ciljem ublažavanja posljedica i rešavanja migrantske krize u Evropi. Imajući u vidu da se Srbija nalazi na jednoj od glavnih ruta velikog talasa migranata, kroz učesće u navedenoj operaciji nastavićemo da delujemo kao odgovoran član međunarodne zajednice i da pratimo aktuelna dešavanja u širem regionu i planove međunarodne zajednice u cilju rešavanja migrantske krize u Evropi. (DORDEVIC ZORAN)</p>	Y	N	Security	

Brojni su izazovi sa kojima se pojedine zemlje suočavaju, počev od oružanih sukoba sa višedecenijskim trajanjem, preko delovanja raznih terorističkih grupa, pirata na otvorenim morima, migrantske krize koja zahvata milione ljudi, kako one koji su krenuli put migracije, tako i one kroz čije zemlje te kolone migranata prolaze. Najčešće u svim kriznim situacijama stradaju ugrožene grupe stanovništva koje su i najslabije – pre svega deca, žene, stari i bolesni; generalno, civilno stanovništvo. Upravo je zaštita ovih kategorija stanovništva glavni motiv za angažovanje naših oružanih snaga, kako bi se do iznalaženja političkog rešenja makar ublažile, ako ne i u potpunosti uklonile posledice koje oružani sukobi nose sa sobom. (MRĐAKOVIĆ TODOROVIĆ LJUBICA)

		<p>Kada pričamo o učešću u misiji EU na Mediteranu, cilj je ublažavanje posledica i rešavanje migrantske krize u Evropi. Jasno je da se Srbija nalazi na jednoj od glavnih ruta kojima se migranti kreću i jasno je da i na ovaj način Srbija pokazuje svoju volju da bude aktivan partner u Evropi u pogledu načina rešavanja migrantske krize. (DUROVIC ALEKSANDRA)</p>	Y	N	Crisis management/EU integration	
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	<p>Migracije koje su se desile negativno su uticale i na bezbednost lica koja prolaze i kroz našu zemlju. Između ostalog, to su lica koja dolaze iz ratom zahvaćenih područja, tako da je jako važno pratiti ko kroz koju zemlju prolazi kako ne bi došlo do ugrožavanja bezbednosti. Možemo da pohvalimo učešće kako policije tako i Vojske. Dosada nismo imali nikakvih incidenata u tom smislu, za razliku od mnogih drugih zemalja u kojima su, takode, migranti bili, prolazili ili su stigli. Odlukom Vlade Srbije od jula ove godine formirana je Komanda zajedničkih snaga za obezbeđenje državne granice, čime su se faktički stvorili formalni uslovi da Vojska Srbije bude angažovana u zaštiti državne granice po pitanju migrantske krize. Mogli smo da vidimo da je od tada veliki broj ilegalnih migracija sprečen. (DUROVIC ALEKSANDRA)</p>				<p style="text-align: center;">Security</p>	
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	<p>Poštovane dame i gospodo, poštovani građani Srbije, vama se obracam, Republika Srbija je zajedno sa Vladom Republike Srbije, vojskom i policijom odlično rešila migrantsku krizu, na zadovoljstvo svih građana Republike Srbije, čitavog sveta i time je pokazala pravo lice Republike Srbije svetu. (ATLAGIĆ MARKO)</p>				<p>Crisis management</p>	
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						<p>Novina u planu korišćenja naših snaga je mogućnost učešća u evropskim operacijama na Mediteranu. Naši oficiri će nadgledati situaciju na severu Afrike. Oni će raditi na suzbijanju kretanja migranata i krijumčarenja ljudi. Ova misija će i za Srbiju imati veliki značaj imajući u vidu da smo jedna od država najopterećenijih migrantskom krizom, jer se nalazimo na najprometnijoj, zapadnobalkanskoj ruti. (ZAGRADANIN VLADAN)</p>

		<p>Ono što je novina u planu za 2017. godinu, a želela sam da istaknem, jeste naše učešće u evropskim operacijama na Mediteranu. Ovo je izuzetno značajno za Srbiju jer smo kao tranzitna zemlja jedna od najopterećenijih država kada je u pitanju migrantska kriza. (MILADINOVIĆ STEFANA)</p>	Y	N	Security/EU integration	
JS						<p>Naravno, želim da kažem da novinu čini i mogućnost učešća u evropskim operacijama na Mediteranu. Cilj naših „plavih šlemova“ biće nadgledanje situacije u Severnoj Africi, dakle kretanja migranata i sprečavanje priliva velikog broja migranata i krijumčarenja ljudi. (KOSANIĆ DORDE)</p>
Greens						

SRS	Nije ovo neki brojčano velik korpus pa možemo ovako da razgovaramo, ali možemo simbolično da damo do znanja da ne želimo da učestvujemo u misijama EU gde bi naši oficiri ili visoki predstavnik Vojske nadgledao migrantsku krizu na Mediteranu, a ta ista Evropa prstom ne mrda niti je interesuje ovoliki broj migranata u Srbiji. (MIRČIĆ MILORAD)	N	Y	Crisis management	
Dosta					
DS					
NS					
ZZS					
ZZŠ					

Dveri						<p>Kad smo već kod Islamske države, da se osvrnemo generalno na ukupno učešće u mirovnim operacijama, pa i ovim pod okriljem UN. Vi dobro znate da je Srbija izložena velikoj migrantskoj krizi, da je dobar deo te krize prouzrokovan događajima u Siriji, mada su sadašnji migranti koji se nalaze na našoj teritoriji većinom nastali u nekim prethodnim „mirovnim operacijama“ ovih istih sila koje pominjemo, u Avganistanu i nekim drugim državama. (NOGO SRDAN)</p>
	<p>Da li Srbija ima kapacitet da učestvuje u mirovnim misijama, s obzirom na brojno stanje i materijalnu opremljenost naše vojske, kada smo izloženi tako velikom izazovu kao što je migrantska kriza? Da li smo u stanju da zaštitimo državnu granicu, ne od agresije spolja, nego od prolaska migranata koji na nelegalan način dolaze u našu zemlju? Vidimo da se EU zidovima ograđuje od tih migranata, tako da je izgleda plan da veliki broj njih i ostane u našoj zemlji. (NOGO SRDAN)</p>			Security		

	<p>Što se tiče mirovnih operacija pod okriljem UN, voleo bih da samo Ministarstvo dobro proceni i odgovori koliki je naš nacionalni interes. To je svakako dobra stvar ako imamo kapacitete i uslove da zaštitimo sopstvenu granicu od migranata, da zaštitimo bezbednost naše države od svih izazova koji dolaze, a veliki su izazovi i velika je ugroženost našeg naroda. (NOGO SRDAN)</p>				<p>Security</p>	
	<p>Koji je to procenat od ukupnog broja vojnika pod oružjem kojim raspolaže trenutno srpska vojska? Koji procenat mi šaljemo u mirovne operacije i u kom vremenu to radimo? U vremenu kada Evropom vlada ogromna migrantska kriza, kada ne možemo da kontrolišemo sopstvene granice. Imamo hiljade migranata koji nam ulaze nezakonito na teritoriju naše države i mnogo više bi trebalo da posvetimo pažnju rešavanju tog problema, gospodine ministre, a ne da mi rešavamo belosvetske ratne i druge probleme. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>				<p>Threat</p>	

	<p>Želim takođe da posebno stavim akcenat na ovu migrantsku krizu, da li možda treba da razmislimo da smanjimo kontigent naših vojnika u mirovnim operacijama – ako vi to već izglasate, a mi smo protiv toga. Jednostavno, obratite pažnju na ogromnu migrantsku krizu, koja ozbiljno ugrožava bezbednost naših granica, a to je ipak prioritet u vašem radu. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>			Crisis Management/Security	
SVM					
DSS					
SDS					
LDP		<p>Najavljena je i proširena saradnja NATO-a sa EU na Sredozemnom moru, gde razmena informacija i koordinacija snaga mogu da pomognu da NATO i EU budu efikasniji u odgovoru na nelegalnu migraciju, terorizam i druge izazove. (MILIĆ NENAD)</p>	Y	N	Security

		<p>Saveznici su se u Varšavi u osnovi saglasili o mogućoj ulozi NATO-a na centralnom Mediteranu kroz implementiranje i podršku EU u operaciji „Sofija“. Na nedavno održanom sastanku ministara odbrane zemalja članica NATO-a, kom je prisustvovala i Federika Moggerini, visoka predstavnica EU, počela je operacija i realizacija ovih planova. Inače, operacija „Sofija“ je jedna od multinacionalnih operacija, vojna, u koju Srbija planira da pošalje pripadnike prvi put, ukoliko ih pozove, naravno, a o kojoj se glasa u ovom paketu predloga. (MILIC NENAD)</p>	Y	N	Security	
LSV						
National minorities						

SER4 22.11.2016

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						<p>Tačno ste rekli da smo prihvatili obavezu iz Istanbulske konvencije. To su odredbe na koje nisu stavljene rezerve, tako da smo bili u obavezi da uvrstimo i to krivično delo u naše zakonodavstvo. Tačno je da je pojava sakaćenja ženskog polnog organa nešto što je karakteristično za afričke zemlje i pojedine zemlje Bliskog istoka, ali je takođe tačno da je veliki broj evropskih zemalja propisao isto ovo krivično delo upravo zbog velikog broja imigranata koji su tu praksu preneli na evropski kontinent. Mi nismo prvi koji uvode ovo krivično delo, pojedine evropske zemlje su čak osamdesetih godina propisale ovo kao krivično delo. S druge strane, ne možemo ni da previdimo to da se danas na teritoriji Republike Srbije nalazi veliki broj migranata koji upravo dolaze sa područja država gde se obavlja ovaj religijski kult. (KUBUROVIĆ NELA)</p>

	<p>Prema tome, ovde nije potrebno trošiti velike reči i energiju za obrazloženje nečega što je sasvim jasno. Država Srbija se obavezala da štiti migrante, da štiti ono što podrazumeva njihovo pravo, nepriskosnoveno pravo koje je priznato međunarodnim aktima, pa i Univerzalnom deklaracijom o pravima čoveka i njegovim slobodama. (NEDO JOVANOVIĆ)</p>						Solidarity	
JS								
Greens								
SRS								
Dosta								
DS								
NS								
ZZS								
ZZŠ								

<p>Dveri</p>						<p>Pod dva, da li ga je pitao kako je ukinuo sve kredite indeksirane u stranim valutama i prebacio kredite u domaću valutu? Kako je, dakle, zaštitio građane Mađarske od pljačke na valutnim klauzulama od strane bankarskih derikloža? Zatim, da li ga je pitao kako je formirao ministarstvo za brigu o porodici i kako je izdvojio najveći mogući budžet u Evropi za podršku radanju i borbi protiv bele kuge? I, konačno da li ga je pitao kako je zaštitio bezbednost svojih građana od migrantske najezde?</p> <p>Dakle, da li je Vlada Republike Srbije iskoristila priliku da na zajedničkoj sednici sa Vladom Mađarske nešto nauči od Viktora Orbana, ili je nastavila sa potpuno suprotnom politikom od one za koju se zalaže Viktor Orban? (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>
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						<p>Dakle, predsjednika Narodne skupštine gospodu Maju Gojković treću nedelju zaredom pitam: kada će biti zakazane posebne sednice na aktuelne teme: bezbednosna i ekonomsko-socijalna situacija u Srbiji u vezi sa migrantskom krizom – da li pored ovih međusobnih ubijanja migranti treba da počnu da ubijaju i građane Srbije da biste vi zakazali tu sednicu na bezbednosnu temu – i međunarodni pritisci na državne organe Republike Srbije u vezi sa pregovorima i situacijom na Kosovu i Metohiji? (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>
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		<p>Međutim, ono što je ovde mnogo važnije od ove naše male šale jeste da je, ako sam dobro razumeo ministarku, a ona je ovde najpozvanija da protumači određena zakonska rešenja, ovo prvi slučaj da se srpsko zakonodavstvo prilagođava migrantskom zakonodavstvu. Dakle, Srbija počinje unapred da se prilagođava promenama u strukturi našeg stanovništva koje će nam doneti migranti, odnosno koje su migranti doneli u Evropu. Mi sada moramo da sledujemo Istanbulske konvencije, moramo da se prilagođavamo religijskim – šta, kultovima, obredima, idejama, koje migranti donose kao religijske specifičnosti u našu sredinu. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	N	Y	EU integration	
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		<p>Da li je ovo početak jedne ozbiljne zakonodavne inicijative Vlade Republike Srbije, na čelu sa Aleksandrom Vučićem, u pravcu ispunjavanja različitih potreba migranata koji treba ovde da se nasele kada EU totalno zatvori svoje granice, a od Srbije napravi najveći azilantski centar u Evropi? (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>EU integration/Solidarity</p>	
						<p>Dakle, to je ideja srpskog zakonodavstva – da se mi prilagodavamo migrantskim krizama, nametnutim seobama stanovništva koje nam se nameću iz SAD, promeni strukture stanovništva Evrope, nametanju religioznih kultova iz Afrike, Azije ili ne znam odakle i da sada naše zakonodavstvo prilagodavamo migrantskom pitanju. Mislim da je SNS zaista ovde, za razliku od borbe protiv nasilja u porodici, vizionarska politička stranka; ona ovde ne kasni pet godina, ona ide pet godina unapred. Ona želi da reši zakone i pre nego što migranti nasele Srbiju u potpunosti. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>

						<p>Ja sam vrlo ozbiljno govorio o jednoj od najozbiljnijih tema savremene Evrope, o kojoj čitava Evropa danas govori, izuzev Vlade Republike Srbije, izuzev Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije, a to je tema migrantske krize i posledice migrantske krize na Evropu. Predsednik Skupštine, dakle, odbija već dva meseca da održimo posebnu sednicu na aktuelnu temu koja se tiče migrantske krize. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>
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Što je posebno važno, imali smo ovih dana zajedničku sednicu sa Vladom Republike Mađarske, koja ima potpuno drugačiji stav po ovom pitanju i od koje bismo mnogo toga mogli naučiti o tome kako se štite sopstveni građani od posledica migrantske krize. (...) Pa, kad je tako glup taj Viktor Orban, što ste ga zvali i pravili zajedničku sednicu? Kada taj Viktor Orban nema pojma kako zaštititi građane Mađarske, što veličate prijateljstvo sa Viktorom Orbanom? Pa, poslušajte nešto tog Viktora Orbana. Ja ne vidim jednu jedinu sličnost između politike SNS i politike Fidesa u Mađarskoj, a vi ste, kao, veliki prijatelji. Imate potpuno suprotne politike: i u ekonomskoj sferi, i u finansijskoj sferi, u monetarnoj sferi, u sferi migrantske krize, u porodičnoj politici i svemu drugom, a ovamo glumite, kao, vi ste nešto prijatelji, vi nešto saradujete. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)

	<p>Imali smo juče jedan slučaj u centru Beograda, na Zelenom vencu, gde se desio obračun između grupe migranata, sa najstrašnijim posledicama, jedan migrant je podlegao povredama, ubijen je. Šta je sledeći korak u sledeće? Šta je sledeći korak u našoj toleranciji, u našem liberalnom i ne znam kakvom pristupu migrantskoj krizi? (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>			<p>Security</p>	<p>Zbog koga vi uvodite ovo krivično delo? Zbog migranata. Otkud migranti u našoj državi? Pa, vi ste ih pustili da uđu. Kako su oni ušli? Pa, raznim načinima. Kako to oni ne ulaze u ove evropske zemlje? Pa, oni su podigli zid. A zašto oni vas hvale što vi ovde primete, a oni ne primaju? Pa, zato što vide da je mnogo bolje da mi primamo i da mi imamo probleme, nego da ih oni imaju. Ne samo da će da vas hvale, nego će i da vas finansiraju, da mi ovde primamo migrante, pravimo azilantske centre, prilagođavamo naše zakonodavstvo migrantima. Bolje nego da se to kod njih tamo dešava. Najbolje da se dešava ovde. O tome mi vama pričamo. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>				<p>SVM</p>
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SER5 18.05.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta						
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						
Dveri						Tiče se ozbiljne zabrinutosti velikog broja građana Srbije o tome u kom pravcu će ići migrantska kriza. Naime, taj problem imaju građani Subotice, građani Tutina, Župskog Aleksandrovca, kao i niza drugih gradova i opština u Srbiji. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)

	<p>Brine ih informacija, koju sam inače dobio od državnog sekretara dr Nenada Ivaniševića iz Ministarstva za rad, zapošljavanje, boračka i socijalna pitanja, da Vlada Republike Srbije priznaje da je do sada 16 lokalnih samouprava u Srbiji napravilo lokalne akcijske planove za zbrinjavanje migranata, da je u 38 jedinica lokalne samouprave u toku postupak izmena i dopuna lokalnih akcionih planova, da je Vlada Republike Srbije donela uredbu o programu korišćenja sredstava za rešavanje stambenih potreba, kao i druge programe integracije migranata u 2017. godini, da je Ministarstvo prosvete potpisom ministra Šarčevića poslalo 5. maja stručno uputstvo za uključivanje učenika migranata u sistem školovanja. Uputstvo je potpisao lično ministar Šarčević a sadržaj se odnosi na uključivanje migranata u školski sistem bez obzira na prethodno stečeno znanje, uz obavezu obezbeđenja pedagoškog asistenta. (OBRAĐOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	
	<p>Srbija je veoma zabrinuta zbog pojačavanja migrantske krize. Preko 8.000 migranata je u Srbiji i tražim jasne odgovore od nadležnih ministara. (OBRAĐOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>				<p>Threat</p>	

SER6 24.06.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta						
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						
Dveri		A vi ako ste toliko sigurni da je Evropska unija prava stvar, zašto je ne stavite konačno na neki referendum. Nećete građanima Srbije da kažete punu istinu, da je Evropska unija danas u finansijskoj krizi, u bezbednosnoj krizi, da je zahvatila ogromna migrantska kriza, da je Velika Britanija izašla iz EU, da je Island vratio kartu za ulazak u EU, da brojne zemlje, na čelu sa Mađarskom, kritikuju takav princip komesara koji će nama određivati kako ćemo mi živeti širom Evrope. Pa nećemo, kolege narodni poslanici iz vlasti. Nećemo da nam	N	Y	EU integration	

SVM										
DSS										
SDS										
LDP										
LSV										
National minorities										

neko naređuje kako ćemo mi živeti u Srbiji.
(OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)

SER6.1_26.06.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta						
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						

		<p>Sa druge strane, a to su prečitali svi mediji u Srbiji, dok je glavna vest u medijima i u Češkoj i u Mađarskoj i u Bugarskoj, imamo predloge nemačkih poslanika da čitava sirijska sela migrantska budu preseljena ovdje u jugoistočnu i centralnu Evropu. To je verovatno ta ideja šta uraditi sa praznim delovima Srbije, šta sa našim praznim selima. Vi već to sprovodite time što ispunjavate kvote EU ko i kako treba da naseli Srbiju od migranata koje EU neće da primi. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	N	Y	Crisis Management/Quotas	
Dveri		<p>Kaže dalje Vaclav Klaus, ne Boško Obradović, nego bivši predsednik Češke Vaclav Klaus, obratite pažnju, povodom odluke Evropske komisije da tuži Poljsku, Mađarsku i Češku, jer odbijaju da primaju izbeglice, ocenio je da to jasno pokazuje kakve namere ima Evropa sa Češkom. Principijelno i odlučno protestujemo protiv odluke EU da počne postupak zbog tzv. ne primanja imigranata zbog kvota koje je nametnuto Brisel i kaže istorijsku rečenicu – protestujemo zbog nastojanja da nas kazne i nateraju da budemo poslušni. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	N	Y	Crisis Management/Quotas	
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						
LDP						

SER7 28.06.2017

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						<p>Reći ću šta će ovu Vladu karakterisati, naglasiću pet ključnih reči, to je stabilnost, kontinuitet, ekonomske reforme, EU i spoljna politika. Počecu od svake od ovih reči. Stabilnost. Srbiji je potrebna dugoročna stabilnost na političkom, ekonomskom i spoljopolitičkom planu. Na političkom planu tu stabilnost imamo, bez obzira na sva dešavanja koja smo imali. Nabrojaću samo neka od njih. To je migrantska kriza, briselski pregovori i Kosovo, saradnja sa susednim zemljama. (MIJATOVIĆ MILORAD)</p>

SER8 07.03.2013

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						<p>Ono što je gospoda Comić u svom izlaganju govorila, to je naš stav prema migrantima, a time ću završiti, to je vrlo važna stvar. Ja bih volela, apelujem zaista na sve kolege u ovom parlamentu, da razmišljate o tome koliko vaše izlaganje može da probudi akciju na terenu bilo kog građana, da bude negativan i da formira negativan stav i odnos prema migrantima, azilantima, ljudi koji prolaze u teškom periodu svog života preko teritorije naše zemlje, dajte da ne samo vladajuća većina pokaže pozitivan odnos, ne samo da naši zakonski okviri budu takvi da se odlučimo za humanost i poštovanje ljudskih prava, dajte da svako od nas podstiče pozitivan odnos prema ovoj izuzetno ugroženoj grupaciji, koja prolazi kroz težak period u svom životu. (OBRADOVIĆ MARIJA)</p>

SDPS		<p>Usvajanje Zakona o strancima takođe proizilazi iz naše obaveze i potrebe da naše zakonodavstvo uskladimo sa evropskim, odnosno u skladu sa Poglavljem 24 u delu koji se odnosi na migracije. Predlogom zakona se preciziraju odredbe koje se odnose na oblast legalnih migracija, a takođe se propisuju i mere koje treba da spreče i legalne migracije, odnosno propisuju se uslovi za ulazak, kretanje, boravak i vraćanje stranaca, kao i nadležnost organa koji o tome odlučuju. (OMEROVIĆ MEHO)</p>	N	Y	Eu Integration/EU law	
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	<p>Približavanjem Srbije EU, a polazeći od našeg geografskog položaja, Srbija je postala mnogo interesantna za migrante, ne zalazeći u to da li oni imaju nameru da ostanu ovde ili ne, to su samo u prolazu ka zemljama EU. Mi smo se kao država u to najbolje uverili u prethodnih nekoliko godina zbog ogromnog i povećanog priliva migranata iz Afrike i Azije. Kao region koji je okružen državama članicama EU, Zapadni Balkan je uglavnom tranzitno područje za migracione tokove. Zapadno-balkanska čuvena već ruta najvećim delom je bila u funkciji tranzitnog toka tih migranata koji na teritoriju EU ulaze preko grčko-turske granice i nastavljaju dalje ka država Evrope. (OMEROVIĆ MEHO)</p>				<p>Geostrategic position</p>	
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Republika Srbija im se našla na ruti migranata koji ulaze prvenstveno sa teritorije Makedonije, ali i sa teritorije Bugarske i prelaze preko naše teritorije da bi dalje nastavili put ka EU. Iako u osnovi tranzitna zemlja, zadržavanjem migranata na teritoriji Srbije, postalo duže usled zatvaranja zapadno-balkanske rute. S toga, država Srbija, čini napore da ispuni sve standarde u pogledu zaštite migranata. Od početka migrantske krize, Vlada Republike Srbije je pokazala i izabrala proaktivan i human pristup i pokazala i dokazala, rekao bih, spremnost da se u granicama svojih mogućnosti suoči da situacijom velikog priliva migranata. (OMEROVIĆ MEHO)

Geostrategic
position/Solidarity

						<p>Činjenica je da je znatno veći broj migranata koji su ušli u našu zemlju iskazao nameru za traženje azila, nego što su stvarno ušli u proceduru azila. Ovaj podatak možda izgleda čudan, ali on govori o tome da oni nemaju stvarnu nameru, to smo čuli i od ministra Stefanovića, da ostanu Srbiji, već važeću proceduru koriste u svrhu izbegavanja odgovornosti zbog ilegalnog ulaska ili nezakonitog boravka u našoj zemlji, kako bi što pre otišli u zemlje članice EU. (OMEROVIĆ MEHO)</p>
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						<p>Primena odredbi važećeg Zakona o azilu tokom migrantske krize pokazala je veliku složenost aktuelnog postupka azila, kao i to da su pojedine odredbe zakona neprecizne i nedorečene, te da ih je teško primeniti u praksi, zbog čega postoji prostor za zloupotrebu postupka azila i neophodno je donošenje novog zakona kojim bi trebalo da se prostor za zloupotrebu prava na azil smanji na minimum. (TORBICA BOJAN)</p>
SNP						

SPS						<p>Poslanička grupa SPS i ja lično smatramo da je do sada mnogo toga urađeno na povećanju bezbednosti, a uveren sam da će se i u budućnosti na glavne izazove, kao što su organizovani kriminal, narko trafficking, korupcija, visoko tehnološki kriminal, irregularne migracije i krijumčarenje ljudi, odgovoriti na način koji odlikuje pripadnike MUP - profesionalno, odgovorno i moralno. (ZAGRADANIN VLADAN)</p>
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		<p>U svojoj diskusiji ću se osvrnuti na nekoliko predloga zakona koji su danas na dnevnom redu. O predlozima zakona o azilu i privremenoj zaštiti, o strancima i graničnoj kontroli govoriću integralno, jer oni su međusobno usko povezani, a njihovim se usvajanjem očekuje još značajniji doprinos u borbi prekograničnog kriminala, suzbijanju iregularnih migracija, zaštiti javnog poretka i postizanju visokog stepena bezbednosti građana Republike Srbije. Ovi predlozi zakona unapređuju postojeći pravni okvir, a usklađuju se i sa pravnim tekovinama EU, odnosno novim direktivama. Utvrđeni su novi pravni instituti, jasnije su definisani postupci i procedure, kao i nadležnosti u postupanju državnih organa. (ZAGRADANIN VLADAN)</p>	Y	N	EU Integration/EU law	
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	<p>Kada govorimo o porastu bezbednosnih rizika u prethodnom periodu i potrebi zaštite ustavnog poretka Republike Srbije, značajna rešenja u cilju bezbednosti naše zemlje i borbi protiv prekograničnog kriminala, iregularnih migracija sadržani su u Predlogu zakona o graničnoj kontroli. Naime, važeći Zakon o zaštiti državne granice koji predstavlja osnovni pravni akt za graničnu kontrolu nije u potpunosti usklađen sa standardima EU, ali predstavlja dobar osnov za unapređenje bezbednosti državne granice. (ZAGRADANIN VLADAN)</p>				<p>EU Integration/EU law</p>	
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	<p>Podsetio bih i na veliki bezbedonosni izazov sa kojim smo se kao država i narod suočili, a to je migrantska kriza. Kroz našu zemlju je u migrantskom talasu prošlo gotovo milion ljudi, ali je država i u ovom slučaju pokazala da je spremna da na adekvatan način rukovodi krizom, štiteći pre svega nacionalnu bezbednost, ali i uvažavajući sva načela zaštite ljudskih prava. Srbija je tokom migrantske krize uspešno saradivala sa zemljama u regionu i u cejoj Evropi, konstantno vršila procenu ugroženosti od terorizma, razmenjivala obaveštajne podatke sa svim obaveštajnim strukturama drugih evropskih država i time sprečila da se u migrantskom talasu dogode neka teška krivična dela. (ZAGRADANIN VLADAN)</p>				EU integration/Solidarity	
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JS	<p>Osnovni cilj donošenja zakona o strancima je unapređenje nacionalnog sistema u oblasti legalnih i regularnih migracija, preciznije definisanje prava i obaveza stranih državljana koji ulaze, borave i kreću se preko teritorije Republike Srbije. Takođe, cilj koji se postiže donošenjem zakona je usaglašavanje nacionalnog zakonodavstva u oblasti legalnih i regularnih migracija sa direktivama EU koje uređuju ove oblasti. (VUJIĆ VOJISLAV)</p>			EU integration	
Greens				Security	
SRS	<p>Takođe, svi procesi, migratormi procesi koji su se dešavali u poslednje tri godine, ukazivali su na promenu geostrateških situacija u čitavom svetu i uticali na to da naravno i mi novim zakonskim rešenjima podižemo standarde i omogućavamo našoj zemlji da bude bolje zaštićena. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				

						<p>Takođe, tokom migracija uočeno je i značajnije, ili da kažemo značajnija mogućnost terorističkog ugrožavanja i delovanja terorističke organizacije na teritoriji Evrope, te smo faktički i pored toga naravno, pokušavajući da obezbedimo do sada najviši nivo poštovanja ljudskih prava, isto tako težili da obezbedimo najveći stepen bezbednosti i pravne sigurnost, kako građana Republike Srbije, tako i stranih državljana koji ulaze na teritoriju naše zemlje. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>
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				<p>Imajući u vidu da odredbe Predloga zakona o strancima detaljnije i preciznije regulišu i oblast legalnih migracija, uslovi i način apliciranja za vizu Republike Srbije u inostranstvu, postupak provere po podnetom zahtevu za vizu, propisivanje prava na žalbu, na odbijanje zahteva za vizu i odbijanje ulazaka stranaca u Republiku Srbiju, te propisivanje uslova za odobrenje privremenog boravka stranih državljana po različitim osnovama, posebno za naučna istraživanja, studiranja, volontiranja, pravo na privremeni boravak žrtvama trgovine ljudima, humanitarnog boravka, propisivanje samostalnog privremenog boravka, te propisivanje odredbe zajedničkim standardima i postupcima država članice Evropske unije za vraćanje državljana trećih zemalja sa nezakonitim boravkom, a što se u mnogim segmentima</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Crisis Management/EU law</p>
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ne poklapa sa našom
pravnom regulativom,
ovaj zakon predstavlja
suštinski sistemsko
rešenje za sva ova
pitanja koja su se
ukazala u prethodnim
godinama.
(STEFANOVIĆ
NEBOJŠA)

	<p>U periodu od 2014. do 2016. godine, naročito otvaranjem zapadno-balkanske rute, višestruko su uvećani iregularne migracije na teritorijama zemalja zapadnog Balkana EU. Specifičan geografski položaj Republike Srbije, kao zemlje tranzita velikog broja migranata na njihovom putu prema zemljama zapadne Evrope, suočio je našu zemlju sa novim izazovima i tu imamo trend velikog broja izraženih namera za traženje azila, koje se realno nikada ne ostvare, već svi oni koji su izrazili nameru da zatraže azil, obično to pravo iskoriste da bi nastavili, da bi iskoristili vreme legalnog boravka na teritoriji Republike Srbije i da bi to zatim iskoristili za pokušaj ilegalnog prelaska neke od granica naših susednih država. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>			<p>Geostrategic position</p>	
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Takođe, imajući u vidu da smo se opredelili za zaštitu ljudskih prava migranata, kao i tolerisanje njihovog iregularnog boravka na našoj teritoriji, jer smo smatrali da je to najhumaniji pristup, dok se sa zemljama koje imaju više mogućnosti od nas ne dogovori njihov povratak u zemlje porekla ili na drugi način reši njihovo pitanje da li procesom readmisije ili procesima saradnje kroz međunarodne institucije i organizacije kao što je IOM, da pokušamo da ih vratimo zemljama odakle dolaze. U tom periodu, dok se to ne reši, mi smo odlučili da budemo dobri domaćini i da pokažemo najviši mogući nivo poštovanja ljudskih prava.
(STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)

Solidarity

Značajnu novinu koju donosi ovaj Predlog zakona predstavlja i pravni osnov za uspostavljanje informatičkog sistema granične kontrole, u smislu efikasnijeg obavljanja granične kontrole, odnosno olakšanog kretanja lica i roba preko državne granice, uz istovremeno omogućavanje efikasnijih graničnih provera i obezbeđenja državne granice u borbi protiv prekograničnog kriminala i regularnih migracija. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJSA)						
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	<p>Što se tiče azilanata, odnosno migranata, izbeglica, različitih kategorija, imamo i propise, odnosno Ženevsku konvenciju koja propisuje načelo nekažnjavanja. Mi se trudimo da sve one koji uđu na teritoriju Republike Srbije i izraze nameru da zatraže azil, ne kažnjavamo, upravo iz razloga da kroz operative procedure koje su propisane, prvo utvrdimo da li su to lica iz ratom zahvaćenih područja, da li su ta lica imala i kakvo učešće u ratom zahvaćenim područjima, da probamo da obezbedimo što više podataka da bi utvrdili da li ta lica uopšte ispunjavaju bilo kakav uslov da bi ostvarila azil u našoj zemlji. Mada, najveći broj njih uopšte ne želi azil u našoj zemlji. Oni žele da izađu iz naše zemlje i da odu prema zapadu i tako se to i dešava. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>			<p>Solidarity</p>	
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<p>Danas, na teritoriji Srbije nema više od 3600 migranata, koji se nalaze u više kampova. Mi smo išli politikom, manji broj migranata u veći broj kampova, zbog bolje kontrole i bezbednosti, da ne bismo imali kao u nekim zemljama, čitavu crnu berzu koja se formirala u tim kampovima, naravno, prostituciju i sve ostalo što su za sva ostala krivična dela koja su proisticala iz toga. Naravno, trgovina ljudima, moguća. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>						
<p>U ovom trenutku ne postoji značajniji broj migranata koji ulaze u našu zemlju. Pratićemo kako će to ići tokom proleća i leta, to je stvar koja može da se promeni, o tome treba voditi računa, ali ćemo se truditi te stvari menjamo. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>						
<p>Godine 2015, kada je bio najveći migratorni udar na Republiku Srbiju, sa jednim skromnim, mislim da ona ima veoma mali broj zaposlenih, ne znam tačno koliko ima, 18 zaposlenih ima u ovom trenutku, prolazilo je kroz zemlju i po, iako kažem da većina tih ljudi nije tražila azil, ali je veliki broj onih koji izraze nameru, a vi morate da obradite određenu dokumentaciju. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>						

						<p>Godine 2008. ste imali 77 migranata koji su prošli kroz Srbiju, 2015. godine imali 15 hiljada dnevno. Naravno da je to iziskivalo određene promene. Ne može čovek da kaže - ovo smo napisali, ne treba više nikada da menjamo. Smatram da promena nije loša. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>
						<p>Moram da pomenem da broj migranata koji se nalazi na teritoriji naše zemlje, već nekih godinu i po dana, je negde oko tri i po hiljade, tri hiljade i dvesta, trista, četiristo, šesto. To su brojevi u kojima se kreću i oni se neznatno menjaju iz nedelje u nedelju. To je taj okvir u kojem se kreću. Zaista je kroz našu zemlju prošlo gotovo milion i po ljudi. Oko 600 hiljada, tačno ste rekli, je izrazilo nameru da zatraži azil i oni su zatražili azil, ali u Nemačkoj. Oni su otišli svi u Nemačku. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>

		<p>Nama je EU pružila značajnu pomoć, UN su nam pružile značajnu pomoć i različite druge organizacije koje su svojim novcem pomogle da migranti budu u Srbiji, da se rekonstruišu i obnove neki od centara za njihov smeštaj, dakle i oni centri za prihvat stranaca i oni centri za smeštaj migranata. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>	Y	N	Crisis Management	
						<p>Nije rešeno pitanje koje je suštinsko pitanje migracija – šta raditi sa ljudima koji nisu izbeglice, dakle ne dolaze sa područja na kojima besni neki rat ili bilo koji drugi razlog zbog čega oni beže, koji su suštinski ekonomski migranti, a našli su se na našoj teritoriji? Problem je što mi kroz sporazume za readmisiju... (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>

	<p>Mi sa Međunarodnom organizacijom za migracije radimo na tome da uspostavimo neku vrstu vazdušnih mostova, i to jedan mali broj ljudi, ali da i Srbija bude uključena u to, ili u projekte EU gde određene države članice EU imaju povoljnije bilateralne sporazume sa tim zemljama porekla. Na kraju krajeva, neke od njih imaju značajnije finansijske interese u tim državama, pa te države drugačije gledaju na njihov zahtev za prihvatanje migranata, nego na naš zahtev. Mi imamo mogućnost da učestvujemo u tom sistemu. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p>Crisis Management/EU integration</p>	
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	<p>Pokušavamo da rešimo migrantsku krizu na način da budemo pristojni i humani prema migrantima. Vi kažete – išli su ministri da mole. Nisu išli ministri da mole, išli su da ljubazno, pristojno i fino razgovaraju sa tim ljudima. Alternativa je šta? Da pošaljemo policiju sa batinama da ih umlati, da ih ubaci u neke kamione i da ih negde voze? Mi tako ne možemo. To bi bilo vrlo nespojivo sa bilo čim u šta verujem. Lično neću da naredim da se batina bilo ko u ovoj zemlji, pa bio to i migrant, jer imate alternativu. Kada čovek neće da postupi po vašem nalogu da ga stavite u autobus, šta možete da uradite? Evo, ja vas pitam – šta da uradite? STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>	<p>Na kraju krajeva, naš suštinski problem je što ni Evropa nema jedinstven stav u postupanju. Dakle, i oni čak koji, s jedne strane, tvrde da imaju vrlo mekan, otvoren stav, s druge strane, čine sve da svojim merama ne dopuste prolazak migranata</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Crisis Management</p>	
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Dveri						<p>Imala sam tako prilike da se upoznam da osim ovih četiri hiljade migranata koje trenutno imamo na našoj teritoriji, možemo da očekujemo daleko veći broj, da se nevladin sektor uveliko sprema da radi sa migrantima, da se i UNDP i UNICEF vrlo otvoreno prema nama izražavaju sa svojim očekivanjima. (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)</p>
						<p>Gospodin Ivanović, bivši državni sekretar Ministarstva za rad i socijalna pitanja, nam je više puta objašnjavao kako su ministri nadležni za migracije i azilante molili migrante koji su stacionirani pored Autobuske stanice u Beogradu da pređu u Obrenovac, gde će im biti bolje i gde će biti bolje zbrinuti. I tada sam reagovala, a i sada ponavljam – u ozbiljnoj državi ministri ne mole migrante, već ih obavestavaju o njihovim obavezama. (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)</p>

						<p>Čula sam tada i o tome da se teži da svi migranti budu izmešteni iz tih centara i da dobiju nekakav stalni smeštaj, a takode i poslanike iz vladajuće većine koji su spominjali tolika prazna srpska sela koja, eto, mi dobrotvori treba da ponudimo migrantima i da ih u njihovim smestimo. (... on centers for migrants) (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)</p>
						<p>Sa druge strane, migranti koje mi primamo danas više nisu ratne izbeglice, to su ekonomske izbeglice. Imala sam priliku da se upoznam i sa aktivnostima Svetske trgovinske organizacije koja prati migracije na sever Afrike. Dakle, oni dolaze zbog gladi i zbog loših stanja u njihovim državama, a sve to opet mogu da dokumentujem iz istog dokumenta koji smo dobili od Komesarijata za izbeglice. Kod nas je iz Afganistana 56,65% izbeglica, Irak 16%, Pakistan 12%, Iran 4,77% i Sirija 2,4%. (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)</p>

	<p>Na kraju, migrantska kriza nije gotova. Tome u prilog govori i podatak da na dan 31. oktobar 2017. godine u centrima za azil i prihvatnim centrima imamo 3.882 migranta. Evropska unija planira pomoć u vidu dokumenta MADAD 2 projekta i za 2018. godinu. Dakle, MADAD 1 projekat je završen i u okviru njega je ovde poslato, koliko sam razumela, sedam miliona evra. Međutim, šta je obaveza Srbije u okviru projekta MADAD 2, koji je započeo u januaru 2018. godine? Nisam uspela da saznam, jer Ministarstvo za rad i socijalna pitanja izbegava da mi iznese taj tekst. (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)</p>			<p>EU funds</p>	
<p>SVM</p>	<p>Nema sumnje da je u oblasti migracija Srbija shodno svojim mogućnostima značajno doprinela upravljanju prilivom migranata, da je odigrala aktivnu i konstruktivnu ulogu i efikasno je saradivala sa susednim zemljama i članicama EU. (FREMONT ARPAD)</p>			<p>EU integration</p>	

<p>Što se tiče migrantske krize, podsetio bih sve vas da smo u ovom visokom Domu, mi iz SVM prvi ukazali na ovaj problem kada je šef naše poslaničke grupe, gospodin Balint Pastor, još pre dve i po godine, govorio o tome da potrebno pre svih zaštititi građane Srbije i njihovu imovinu. Zbog one njegove izjave su nas tad nazvali fašistima a ne manje negativnu reakciju je izazvala izgradnja ograde na granici sa Mađarskom, što je, složit ćete se sa nama, na kraju praktično dovelo do zatvaranja balkanske rute i činjenice da se drastično smanjio priliv migranata i da su oni počeli da traže alternativne puteve i da nas obilaze. (FREMOND ARPAD)</p>						
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	<p>Smatramo da je izuzetno značajno sprečavanje i legalnih migracija i krijumčarenje ljudi. Pozdravljamo i rad združenih snaga Vojske i policije Srbije. dakle, stavovi SVM su od početka migrantske krize poznati i nepromenjeni. Vladi Republike Srbije na prvom mestu treba da bude bezbednost građana. Ne može osporiti da se Vlada Srbije uspešno bori i sa tim globalnim problemom. Uprkos tome što je kroz našu teritoriju prošlo oko milion migranata u poslednje dve i po godine nije došlo do ozbiljnog narušavanja bezbednosti naših građana. Savez vojvodanskih Mađara će na tome insistirati i u budućnosti. (FREMOND ARPAD)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	
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<p>Podsećam i da je SVM od samog početka migrantske krize sa dozom rezerve gledao na osnivanje prihvatnih centara za migrante u lokalnim samoupravama, gde pripadnici nacionalnih manjina žive u većem broju, jer je po Ustavu Republike Srbije zabranjeno preduzimanje mera koje bi prouzrokovale veštačko menjanje nacionalnog sastava stanovništva. (FREMOND ARPAD)</p>		
	<p>EU integration</p>	
	<p>Savez vojvodanskih Mađara je stava da migrantska kriza predstavlja jedan od najvećih izazova za EU u njenoj istoriji i da je stoga neophodno definisati zajedničku evropsku politiku i pronaći jedinstveno evropsko rešenje. Ovo je pitanje koje zahteva ozbiljan i koordinisan stav svih članica EU. (FREMOND ARPAD)</p>	
		<p>Smatramo da je potrebno da Srbija učestvuje u razgovorima na svim nivoima, kako bi pomogla u kreiranju regionalnih mehanizama za upravljanje migrantskom krizom. (FREMOND ARPAD)</p>
	<p>EU integration</p>	

DSS						<p>Ono što ovde para uši jeste upravo ovo „međunarodne obaveze Republike Srbije“. Međunarodne obaveze Republike Srbije nisu, dame i gospodo, pravna definicija, nego politička definicija. Trebalo bi da se pravno definiše šta su to međunarodne obaveze, koji su to sporazumi koji su potpisani, šta smo mi to potpisali da mi to treba da radimo, pa ova politička odrednica liči na to da mi moramo onda da primamo sve ono da bi narod razumeo što neće Nemačka i ne može Nemačka da primi, da to primi onda Srbija i da mi postanemo jedno veliko parkiralište za migrante. (RAŠKOVIĆ IVIĆ SANDRA)</p>
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		<p>Predlagač u obrazloženju insistira na činjenici da je osnovni razlog za donošenje novog zakona o azilu usklađivanje našeg pravnog okvira u ovoj oblasti sa direktivama EU. To obrazloženje je teško prihvatiti, imajući u vidu konkretna rešenja u Predlogu zakona, sem konstatacije da se vodilo računa o usklađivanju, citiram, sa Direktivom 2001/55 Evropske komisije, koja propisuje minimalne standarde za dodelu privremene zaštite u slučaju masovnog priliva raseljenih lica, mere koje se primenjuju u pogledu postupka prijema, obaveze za državu koja prihvata raseljena lica, kao i prava i obaveze lica kojima je dodeljena ta zaštita. (RAŠKOVIĆ IVIĆ SANDRA)</p>	N	Y	EU Integration/EU law	
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		<p>Meni je potpuno jasno da Srbija ne sme i ne može da ostane van političkih rasprava o pitanju migranata i da mi ne treba da budemo samo neko ko će čekati da mu neko drugi odredi kvote. Ali, čini se da smo mi nekako upali u zamku i da smo u tu priču o migracijama, migrantima, azilu i svemu onome što je vezano za to, ušli jednostrano, a to jednostrano tumačenje migracija jeste, eto, ti su ljudi tu, mi treba da ih primimo, ali ne smemo da zaboravimo da time lečimo samo posledicu, a ne lečimo uzroke. (RAŠKOVIĆ IVIĆ SANDRA)</p>	N	Y	EU Integration/EU law	
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		<p>Potpuno mi je jasno da je i ovaj zakon o azilu deo onoga što od nas EU traži, ali mislim da mi tu treba da imamo negde, da sačuvamo svoju autonomiju i samobitnost. Ne razumem da je Nemačka primila milion migranata, i da joj je dosta, da ne može i da želi da podeli teret sa ostalima, ali mi smatramo da Srbija ovako siromašna, Srbija koja nije sasvim još rešila problem svojih izbeglica i interno raseljenih lica, Srbija kojoj visi problem Kosova, nemojte zaboraviti, dame i gospodo, da ukoliko se potpiše pravno- obavezujući sporazum sa Kosovom, imaćemo jedan veliki broj, nažalost, daleko bilo, Srba sa Kosova koji će doći ovde kao interno raseljena lica. (RAŠKOVIĆ IVIĆ SANDRA)</p>	N	Y	EU Integration/EU law	
SDS						
LDP						
LSV						

SER8.1 08.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						<p>Slažem se sa vama da recimo ovaj deo koji se vezuje za migracije, imali smo od 2014. godine do danas 586 zahteva za azil od kojih mnogi nikada nisu stigli da budu obrađeni do kraja, jer su ti ljudi napustili našu zemlju. (...) Međutim, mi danas na teritoriji Srbije imamo negde oko 3.500 migranata koji jedva čekaju da odu. Oni ne žele da ostanu ni u Mađarskoj, ne žele ni u Grčkoj, ne žele ni u Italiji, ne žele da budu ni u mnogo razvijenijim zemljama od naše. Oni imaju targete Švedska, Nemačka, Švajcarska, bukvalno tako kažu, neki od njih i Francuska i to je ono što je tako. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>

						<p>Kao što znamo, Srbija se suočila sa migrantskom krizom, više od milion ljudi koji su prošli kroz Srbiju je kontrolisano, formirana je kancelarija za azil. Što se tiče materijalnog opremanja MUP, treba napomenuti da je kupljena 21.500 uniformi za srpsku policiju, 1.200 kompleta uniformi za žandarmeriju, za brigadu policije oko 500 kompleta uniformi, 3.200 pantalona kada je u pitanju pogranična policija itd. (VUJADINOVIC MILIMIR)</p>
	<p>Ljudi su bili prezadovoljni. Nisu verovali da postoje ljudi kao što su Srbi, odnosno građani Srbije. Mislili su da postoji zid i da će ovde naići na ko zna šta, jer smo u svetu bili satanizovani. Ne, naprotiv, popravili smo sliku koju nismo zaslužili, zbog lošeg lobiranja. (MALUŠIĆ LJILJANA)</p>				<p>Solidarity</p>	

	<p>Mi smo imali, kao Srbija, ja sam 2015. godine imao predlog da se na teritoriji bilo koje od ovih država Grčke, Makedonije, pa čak i Srbije, uz međunarodnu pomoć, napravi neka vrste mobilne stanice gde bi se izdavali posebni biometrijski dokumenti za sve one koji uđu na teritoriju Evrope i da bi ti biometrijski dokumenti faktički pomogli da ti migranti, sa tim dokumentima imaju besplatno putovanje, smeštaj, ishranu, dakle, na teritorijama zemalja koje prolaze, ali da bismo mogli da kontrolišemo do njihove finalne destinacije u zemlji gde finalno stignu, da bi mogli da kontrolišemo i zbog pitanja bezbednosti kretanje svih i da utvrdjemo ko su ti ljudi. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	
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SNS	Svakako mislim da imamo prostora da unapredimo i naš sistem prihvata migranata, iako je on, kao što ste rekli, bio prilično human i mnogo bolji nego i druge zemlje Evropske unije, po ocenama Evropske komisije. Mi ćemo nastaviti da se na takav način odnosimo prema migrantima. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)	Jasno je da je Zapadno-balkanska ruta bila izazov, ne samo za Republiku Srbiju, već i za zemlje, jer nama migranti faktički dolaze iz EU i to je bio jedan specifičan proces gde migranti iz Grčke ili Bugarske, preko Makedonije naravno iz Grčke, iz Bugarske direktno, pošto imaju direktnu kopnenu granicu sa Turskom, nama migranti dolaze iz država koji imaju po propisima EU dužnost da te migrante pre svega prihvate na svojoj teritoriji. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)	N	Y	Crisis Management	
					Solidarity	

		<p>To je svakako stvar, s obzirom da Nemačka još nije našla rešenje, mislim kao najveća i najmoćnija država Evropske unije, moraćemo da se potrudimo svi zajedno da pronađemo, jer lako je onim zemljama koje nisu na migrantskoj ruti, oni kažu – Nas to ne interesuje i to je kao poplava u kući, pa onog na tavanu u prvom momentu ne interesuje ga šta se dešava u podrumu, ali kada se temelji pokvase onda i ovog na tavanu na kraju zaboli glava. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Crisis Management</p>	
<p>Na samom početku, želim da kažem da je tokom ekspanzije migrantske krize u Srbiji prošlo više od milion migranata. Ogromnim angažovanjem Vlade Republike Srbije, pre svih MUP na teritoriji naše zemlje očuvana je kako bezbednost samih građana Republike Srbije, tako i bezbednost migranata. Učinjeni su zaista maksimalni napori da naši građani u Republici Srbiji ne osete nikakav teret ove migrantske krize. (STOJKOVIĆ DUŠICA)</p>					<p>Crisis Management</p>	

	<p>Srbija je pokazala da zaista ima i adekvatan odgovor i efikasnu reakciju na migrantsku krizu. Pokazali smo humani odnos koji imamo prema migrantima koji su boravili na našoj teritoriji. Za sve to smo zaista dobili pohvale od relevantnih međunarodnih institucija, i od Saveta Evrope, i od OEBS-a i od UNHCR-a i od organa EU. (STOJKOVIĆ DUŠICA)</p>				Solidarity	
<p>U cilju efikasnijeg suprotstavljanja iregularnih migracija i krijumčarenja ljudi preko teritorije Republike Srbije, podsećam vas, Vlada Republike Srbije sredinom 2016. godine usvojila je Odluku o obrazovanju zajedničkih policijskih i vojnih snaga o izvršenju zajedničkih zadataka u suzbijanju iregularnih migracija i krijumčarenja ljudi. (STOJKOVIĆ DUŠICA)</p>				Crisis Management		
	<p>Pored naših obaveza, podsećam vas, to je reč o obavezama o pristupanju Srbije EU i realizaciji i sprovođenju Akcionog plana za Poglavlje 24, koje se odnosi na migracije, važno je da ove standarde uvodimo zbog naših građana, zbog nas samih. (STOJKOVIĆ DUŠICA)</p>	Y	N	EU Integration		

		<p>Moram da istaknem da je policija sa drugim državnim organima i snagama bezbednosti imala veoma težak zadatak, ali je uspela da u prethodnom periodu osigura da građani ne osete posledice teške migrantske krize, koju smo imali u našoj zemlji, da je smanjen je broj krivičnih dela iz oblasti organizovanog kriminala. (DOKIĆ ZVONIMIR)</p>	Y	N	EU Integration/EU law	
	<p>Dakle, Republika Srbija prilično uspešno upravlja migrantskom krizom, jako mali broj ljudi se nalazi na našoj teritoriji koji mi vrlo uspešno možemo da opslužujemo i da se brinemo o njihovim potrebama na najhumaniji i najpristojniji način. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				Crisis Management/Solidarity	

SPS						<p>Mi znamo da je ta balkanska ruta preko koje su masovno prelazili migranti, da li izbeglice, da li ekonomski migranti, preko teritorije naše zemlje trenutno suspendovana, ali evo jedno konkretno pitanje – da li se ovim setom izmena i dopuna zakona koje sam trenutno pomenula i koji su na dnevnom redu, zaista u dovoljnoj meri pojačavaju kapaciteti MUP i čitavog našeg društva u stvari ovom raspravom koju mi danas vodimo da se suočimo sa migrantskom krizom? Vidimo da ekonomski najjače zemlje u Evropi, koje imaju nesumnjivo i policijski i druge kapacitete da se suoče sa migrantskom krizom, to ne uspeavaju? *(VUKOMANOVIĆ DIJANA)</p>
		<p>Dakle, od Srbije se očekuje, mora se uklopiti u taj sistem menadžmenta migrantske krize, ono što je Ustavom Republike Srbije u stvari zabranjeno. To znači da oni migranti koji su na teritoriji Srbije pet godina, imaju pravo da glasaju na lokalnim izborima. Zatim, traži se da zemlje članice, a to smo mi, članice Saveta Evrope ubrzaju proceduru za</p>	N	Y	Integration	

Dosta						<p>Na kraju, još neke stvari bih hteo da istaknem koje su bitne upravo zbog informisanja javnosti. U javnosti se, recimo, upravo u vezi Zakona o azilu i nekim drugim zakonima stvorila jedna velika fama da će emigranti preplaviti Srbiju i da ćemo mi postati neki rezervoar emigranata. Znam da je to super tema, ne postoji bolja tema nego da poentirate na nepostojećim neprijateljima. Tu temu koristi, da vam budem iskren, i vlast i opozicija. To je najlakše, udri po nepostojećem neprijatelju. (STEVANOVIĆ ALEKSANDAR)</p>
	<p>Nаша reakcija u Srbiji je bila ljudska i dobra, nismo bili kao severne komšije, da dižemo zidove, da pravimo ludosti, imali smo i ljudski i dobar tretman. Ono što bih ja rekao da jeste problem u tome je što emigranti, barem deo njih ne želi da ostane u Srbiji. To govori, svestan sam ja da je smo mi siromašna zemlja i da je bolje otići na socijalnu pomoć u Nemačku ili Švedsku. (STEVANOVIĆ ALEKSANDAR)</p>					
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						

Dveri	Moram da istaknem da je policija sa drugim državnim organima i snagama bezbednosti imala veoma težak zadatak, ali je uspela da u prethodnom periodu osigura da građani ne osete posledice teške migrantske krize, koju smo imali u našoj zemlji, da je smanjen je broj krivičnih dela iz oblasti organizovanog kriminala. (JANJUŠEVIĆ MARIJA)				
SVM					
DSS					
SDS					
LDP					
LSV					
National minorities					

SER8.2 12.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	Dakle, sve te novonastale okolnosti, ali i potreba za sveobuhvatnijim regulisanjem oblasti kretanja i boravka stranih državljana, dakle stranaca u Republici Srbiji, a posebno bih istakao ovom prilikom akcioni plan za Poglavlje 24, dakle potpoglavlje – Migracije, nadam se da su kolege čitale potpoglavlje – Migracije i Poglavlje 24, uslovile su donošenje novog zakona o strancima. (MARKOVIĆ ALEKSANDAR)				Crisis Management	

		<p>Dakle, što se tiče migranata, nema ogromne navale migranata, 3 600 migranata je, gruba brojka, već mesecima koji se nalaze u našoj zemlji i oni ne žele da ostanu ovdje. Njihov cilj je da odu u inostranstvo. Videćemo, ovi zakoni koje donosimo, ono što se kaže, usaglašavanje sa direktivama EU, direktiva je naziv pravnog akta, dakle, ne neki naredbodavni ton, nego direktiva je naziv pravnog akta EU kojom ona daje instrukcije kako da se određeni zakoni, i mi, između ostalog, i to radimo zbog višeg standarda koji postoji u tim zemljama, ali radimo zato što</p>	Y	N	EU integration/EU law	
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	<p>Moram da kažem da ne može da se dogodi da Srbiji neko nametne veliki broj migranata koje bi ona morala da prihvati zato što ne postoji čak ni jedinstven stav EU u državama, svim državama EU po tom pitanju, a naravno da Srbija dovoljno suverena zemlja da može vrlo jasno da kaže šta može, a ne može da prihvati. Mi u ovom trenutku imamo već jedan broj migranata, negde oko 3.600, već neko vreme na našoj teritoriji. Mi mislimo da je to sasvim korektan doprinos Srbije u trenutku kad ni sve zemlje EU nemaju neki broj migranata na svojoj teritoriji.* (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	
	<p>Mi sa mađarskom policijom i sa nekim drugim policijama iz zemalja EU vrlo intenzivno saradujemo kroz različite bilateralne ugovore, ali i kroz zajedničke projekte, kroz nekadašnji</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>		<p>Crisis Management</p>	

	<p>„Fronteks“ i ti ljudi, policajci, nalaze se na našim granicama. Pomažu Srbiji da spreči ilegalan ulazak na njenu teritoriju. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>					
<p>Naravno, mi moramo da vodimo računa o tome da mi budemo spremniji da sa našim policijskim snagama odgovorimo na svaku vrstu povećanja pokušaja ilegalnog ulaska migranata na našu teritoriju, ali istovremeno treba da pokažemo ono razumevanje koje su neki drugi imali prema nama, kada se radi o ljudima koji su silom prilika, mukom naterani da dođu. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>					<p>Solidarity</p>	

	<p>Ono što je bitno, završavam sa ovim, a to je kada su u pitanju migranti, vi gospodine ministre možete biti srećni što ste predsedavali ministarstvu u zemlji koja je pokazala pravo lice svetu tretiranjem migranata. Mi smo najbolje tretirali migrante u Evropi. Mi imamo i tradiciju, jer i naše izbeglice i migrante su neke evropske zemlje i ne samo evropske, prihvatile kao svoje ljude. Dozvolite, samo u Prvom svetskom ratu, jednu rečenicu, da je Francuska skolovala 3.500 naših đaka, prihvatili ih kao svoje đake i 2.500 studenata. Mi to nikada, gospodo narodni poslanici, ne smemo zaboraviti. (ATLAGIĆ MARKO)</p>				<p>Solidarity</p>	
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NS							
ZZS							
ZZŠ							
Dveri							<p>Ovo se posebno odnosi na zakone koji se direktno tiču problema ogromnog broja migranata koji su prošli preko teritorije Republike Srbije, danas se na njoj nalazi u prihvatnim centrima ili kao tražiocu azila mogu biti vraćeni iz zemalja EU u Republiku Srbiju. Stog, smatramo da donošenje predloženih zakonskih rešenja treba stopirati dok se ne isprave nagomilane anomalije i nepravilnosti u funkcionisanju Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>

		<p>Vi čak menjate zakone da biste ih uskladili sa direktivama EU. Da li ima potrebe da vam čitam odeljke iz svakog vašeg zakona? Svaki vaš zakon sadrži potpuno istu formulaciju - cilj ovog zakona je usaglašavanje nacionalnog zakonodavstva u oblasti legalnih i regularnih migracija npr. sa direktivama EU koje uređuju ovu oblast. I u svakom zakonu koji donosite u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije stoji da se on donosi po direktivi EU. Pazite, nijedna druga reč, nego prava reč – po direktivama EU. Da li Narodna skupština Republike</p>	N	Y	EU integration/EU law	
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Srbije služi da
bi donosila
zakone po
direktivama EU
ili može na
dnevni red ove
Narodne
skupštine ikada
da dođe bilo
koja aktuelna
tema?
(OBRADOVIĆ
BOŠKO)

		<p>Mislim da je opravdana bojazan da migrantska najava na teritoriji Evrope nosi brojne negativne posledice i mislim da se ne možemo igrati sa bezbednosnim pretnjama koje je migrantska kriza donela Evropi. Podsetio bih javnost i sve vas, uvažene kolege poslanici, da svi oni koji su višili terorističke akte širom Evrope su migranti koji su prošli teritorijom Republike Srbije. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Threat</p>	
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Dveri		<p>Šest stotina dvadeset hiljada migranata je tražilo azil ili izrazilo želju da traži azil u Srbiji. Svi oni ovdje mogu biti vraćeni, kako kaže kolega ministar Stefanović, direktivom EU koja nije direktiva, nego ne znam šta je i ne znam šta u srpskom jeziku znači reč direktiva, izuzev naredba onoga ko vlada Srbijom putem kolonijalne uprave koja je ovdje na vlasti. Dakle, centralnog komiteta iz Brisela. Dakle, mi smatramo da migranti nisu naša tema, da mi ne treba time da se bavimo, da treba da se bavimo našim građanima, da treba da pomažemo i</p>	N	Y	EU integration/EU law	
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podržavamo
naše građane i
da u tom smislu
pazimo da se
nama ne obije o
glavu
migrantska
kriza kao
bezbednosna
pretrja broj
jedan u
savremenoj
Evropi.
(**OBRADOVIĆ
BOŠKO**)

itd. itd. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)

		<p>Dakle, EU ima mehanizam ucene i neprestano ga iznova koristi na putu Srbije u EU. Jedan od tih uslova, odnosno ucena je i da se Srbija na tome putu odrekne svoje teritorije, odnosno KiM. Dakle, možda deo građana ne razume probleme koje nosi migrantska kriza, jer ih nema u svojoj sredini, ali građani iz, recimo, Subotice ili Šida ili Preševa ili niza drugih mesta u Srbiji, gde su napravljeni azilantski centri, odlično razumeju o čemu ja govorim. Znaju koliko je bilo pljački, koliko je bilo raznih incidenata, koliko je bilo pokušaja</p>	N	Y	EU integration	
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silovanja,
koliko je bilo
raznih
problema sa
tom
migrantskom
populacijom i
nema razloga
da se te
informacije
kriju od
javnosti.
(OBRADOVIĆ
BOŠKO)

						Dakle, mi nismo izazvali ratove, mi nismo odgovorni za sudbinu migranata, mi treba da se ponašamo onako kako to radi, recimo, Mađarska, a vi se kunete u Mađarsku, u prijateljstvo sa Viktorom Orbanom, a ne radite ono što vam on savetuje i što on radi, štiti interese svojih građana, štiti bezbednost svojih građana i samo na to apelujem. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						
LDP						
LSV						
National minorities						

SER8.3 13.03.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	<p>Ono što je važno za građane Srbije da znaju da je migrantska kriza bila jedna od onih situacija u kojima je Republika Srbija dobro postupila, bez obzira što je 1,5 miliona migranata prošlo kroz našu teritoriju. Na našoj teritoriji se danas nalazi oko 3.600 migranata, koji inače ne žele da ostanu u našoj zemlji i meni nije problem da ovo pomenem koliko god je puta potrebno. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p> <p>Naravno, ja moram da pohvalim sve aktivnosti MUP tokom migrantske krize, njihovu duboku profesionalnost, jasno poštovanje procedura i njihov dubok i human odnos prema migrantima, posebno osetljivim kategorijama, koji su se našli u tranzitu i prolazu kroz našu zemlju. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJIĆ MILANKA)</p>				Crisis Management	
					Crisis Management/Security	

	<p>Uvaženi ministre sa saradnicima iz ministarstva, Republika Srbija je stekla veliku reputaciju u međunarodnoj zajednici, jer se posvetila ljudskim pravima. Stekla je veliki stepen demokratije, a kako? Upravo 2014. do 2016. godine, kroz našu zemlju je prošlo više od milion migranata. Popravili smo imidž Srbije, jer smo pokazali veliki stepen empatije, dostojanstva, humanosti. (MALUŠIĆ LJILJANA)</p>			<p>Solidarity</p>	
	<p>Poštovani ministre sa saradnicima, poštovane kolegice i kolege narodni poslanici, oblast kretanja i boravka stranaca na teritoriji Republike Srbije sve više dobija na značaju sa porastom migracija i dejstvom terorističkih organizacija na teritoriji EU. Potrebno je tu oblast urediti i obezbediti najveći stepen bezbednosti i pravne sigurnosti, kako građana Republike Srbije tako i stranih državljana koji borave u našoj zemlji. (ZARIĆ KOVAČEVIĆ JELENA)</p>			<p>Security/Geostrategic position</p>	

SNP	Zakon o strancima, o kojem raspravljamo već nekoliko dana, nesumnjivo predstavlja pravovremen, adekvatan i konkretan normativni odgovor države na migrantsku krizu. Moglo bi se reći da on predstavlja jednu vrstu akumulacije iskustva koje je država imala suočavajući se sa ovim izazovom koji je imala čitava Evropa. (PALALIĆ JOVAN)						Crisis Management	
SPS								
JS								
Greens								
SRS								
Dosta								
DS								Naravno, naći će mi se verovatno neka statistička laž koja se upravo sprema među saradnicima ministra gde će mi dokazati da je ogroman broj ljudi tražio naše državljanstvo, ali nemojte u to da verujete građani Srbije, to je besmislena laž. Sam ministar rekao da je samo 14 migranata od onih nekoliko stotina hiljada, kako sami kažu, koji su prošli kroz Srbiju tražilo naše državljanstvo, verovatno greškom. (ZIVKOVIĆ ZORAN)
NS								
ZZS								
ZZŠ								

Dveri						<p>Procedura donošenja zakonskih rešenja dovedena je u pitanje odsustvom javne rasprave i opstrukcijama parlamentarne diskusije od strane vladajuće većine. Ovo se posebno odnosi na zakone koji se direktno tiču problema ogromnog broja migranata koji su prošli preko teritorije Republike Srbije. Danas se na njoj nalaze u prihvatnim centrima, ili kao tražioci azila, a njih je preko 620 hiljada, mogu biti vraćeni iz zemalja EU u Republiku Srbiju. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						
LDP						
LSV						
National minorities						

SER9 02.04.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta						
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						
Dveri						
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						
LDP						
LSV						
National minorities						

Independent MP	<p>Samo bih da podsetim i vas i javnost da, bar za poslednjih godinu i nešto dana se na tome radi intenzivno i da to nije ni za kakvu hvalu, ni marketing, nego je to potreba da tako radimo, a za decu migranata smo zaista država koja je najviše hvaljena na svim mogućim susretima od zapadne Evrope preko Beča, pa gde god se dešavalo, pa i u Grčkoj. Tako da smo tu postali čak neki uzor prema onome koliko smo pokazali volje i strpljenja.(SARCEVIC MLADEN)</p>				Solidarity	
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SER10_25.04.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	<p>Ono što bih ja vas zamolio, ministre, a to je upravo zbog izazova, ovdje to niko ne govori, plašim se da će nam izazovi biti sve veći i veći, posebno po pitanju KiM i drugih pritisaka, ali ovo što se na Bliskom istoku dešava i mogući napad na Iran, i čini mi se da to polako ide, mi ćemo imati ponovo očigledno migrantsku krizu. (DUKANOVIĆ VLADIMIR)</p>				Threat	
SDPS	<p>Prvo, Srbija je bezbedna zemlja. To nije samo od sebe, Srbija je bezbedna zemlja, jer organi koji brinu o bezbednosti dobro rade svoj posao. Neću govoriti u kojim izazovima smo bili od migrantske krize, od našeg okruženja, od dešavanja malo šire, dalje u sredozemnom bazenu, ali zato smo u Srbiji veoma bezbedni. To moramo da naglasimo, jer je to zasluga i organa o kojima mi danas govorimo. (MIJATOVIĆ MILORAD)</p>				Security	
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						

				Y	N	Crisis Management	
PS	Za nas je ovo veoma važno, budući da je cilj ove operacija ublažavanje posledica i rešavanje migrantske krize u Evropi. Kao što znate i mi smo jedna od zemalja koja je pogodena posledicama migrantske krize i zato je za nas veoma dobro da budemo tamo gde se migrantska kriza i dešava i da unapred znamo šta nas očekuje i sa čime se zapravo borimo. (VULIN ALEKSANDAR)						
SNP							
SPS							
JS							
Greens							
SRS							
Dosta							
DS							
NS							
ZZS							
ZZŠ							
Dveri							
SVM							
DSS							
SDS							
LDP							
LSV							
National minorities							

SER10.1 07.05.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	<p>Ono što želim da pohvalim Ministarstvo odbrane, to su svakako združene aktivnosti na planu upravljanja migracijama, to su združene aktivnosti sa Ministarstvom unutrašnjih poslova, a tiču se obezbeđenja naše granice prema Makedoniji i Bugarskoj od ilegalnog prelaska migranata. Moram da istaknem da je Vojska Srbije kada je u pitanju migrantska kriza, a kroz našu teritoriju prošlo je više od milion migranata, pokazala visok stepen profesionalnosti, visok stepen odgovornosti, visok stepen humanosti i visok stepen čovečnosti. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJIĆ MILANKA)</p> <p>Primarni zadatak Komesarijata je da obavlja stručne i druge poslove koji se odnose na zbrinjavanje, povratak i integraciju izbeglica i interno raseljenih lica. Poslove iz svoje nadležnosti Komesarijat za izbeglice i migracije vrši kontinuirano i u saradnji sa poverenicima za izbeglice i migracije u okviru lokalnih samouprava. (VELJKOVIĆ DRAGAN)</p>				Security/Crisis Management	
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS					Integration	
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						

SER11_21.09.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
SPO						
PS						
SNP						
SPS						
JS						
Greens						
SRS						
Dosta						
DS						
NS						
ZZS						
ZZŠ						
Dveri						
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						

LDP	<p>Mislim da je taj primer o kome je ministar Dačić vrlo lapidarno govorio, nije se mnogo na njega osvrnuo, izazvao dosta nervoze jer, kao što znate, ta migrantska kriza je otvorila pitanje iz kojih zemalja ljudi i kako dolaze u Evropu. Kao što znate, naš region je Evropa. Otvorilo se pitanje, ministar Ljajić je dao dosta razuman odgovor, rekao da je relativno mali broj Iranaca koji je ostao, koji je tražio ovaj azil, vrlo mali broj, on je izneo jednu dosta nisku cifru, pretpostavka je da nije veliki broj njih pokušao ilegalno da produži za Evropu. Nezavisno od toga, reakcija Evrope, koja je očigledno preosetljiva na imigrantsku krizu, naročito neke zemlje, bila je snažna. (KORAC ZARKO)</p>			Crisis Management	
LSV					
National minorities					

SER12_02.11.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	<p>Po Dabliiinskom sporazumu, kakav crni Dabliinski sporazum, pa nismo država članica Evropske unije, niti smo potpisali nekakav Dabliinski sporazum, niti smo članica EU, niti se odnosi bilo šta na nas. Ali to da ne damo migrantima da jedu, ja stvarno ne mogu da zamislim da je neko naše dete koje je bilo izbeglica, prolazilo kroz našu zemlju, došlo negde i oni mu kažu šta ćeš ti da jedeš, šta ćeš ti ovde? Za takvu vrednost zaista ne mogu da verujem da bilo ko može da se založi. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p align="center">EU law/Solidarity</p>	<p>Kažete žive bolje migranti nego ljudi u Srbiji. Da li ste bili nekada u migrantskom kampu? Da li ste bili da vidite kako žive ti ljudi? Mukom naterani da dođu, potučaju se po ovim zemljama. Šta mislite da oni vole da to rade? U Srbiji ih ima negde oko tri i po hiljade, ukupno, i tako već godinama. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>

	<p>Ali, jedna stvar na koju mislim da svaki čovek mora da reaguje je stvaranje te lažne slike o tome kako je Srbija ugrožena od strane nekakvih zlih migranata koji su ovde došli sve da nas pobiju. Kada se setite one dece koja su prošla kroz Srbiju, kada se setite koliko su, šta su ta deca kriva bilo kome? Šta su krive one žene koje su zbog rata, zbog bede, nemaštine, pa zar zbog toga možemo da im zamerimo, prošle kroz Srbiju? Oni žele da idu zapadnu Evropu, to nije sporno. Negde su im vrata zatvorena i neki od tih ljudi nisu mogli da odu, pokušavali da prođu mora, mnogi od njih izgubili živote, davili se u toj vodi. U Srbiji su tretirani pristojno. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p>Solidarity/Geostrategic position</p>	
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	<p>I, to je ta časna i poštena Srbija i čačanski kraj i Sumadija koja sigurno i u ovim vremenima ne bi ružno pričala o migrantima kako vi pričate, uvaženi poslaniče, i vaše pristalice, nego su pružili hleb, so i ono što su imali i primali migrante tada iz Slovenije u svoja ognjišta. (GOJKOVIĆ MAJA)</p>				<p>Ali, hoću da vam kažem, te priče, maltene o vakve onakve, prošlo je kroz Srbiju preko milion i 200, milion i 300 hiljada migranata, kroz našu zemlju, verovatno raznih. Ti koji su bili imućniji i bogatiji spavali su po hotelima, jesu podizali novac, plaćali krijumčare, mnoge smo i uhapsili. Ali, to je bio onaj talas 2015. godine. Pogledajte ljude koji su danas od ovih 3.200, 3.300, 3.400 ljudi koji se nalaze na teritoriji naše zemlje. Ti ljudi zaista nisu imućni, to zaista nisu bogati ljudi. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>
				<p>Solidarity</p>	

	<p>To je kod vas jedna nova konstrukcija da se samo sa devizom samo da se tajkuni vrate. To je povodom onih banaka. Ono što jeste činjenica, ti ljudi koji ulaze u našu zemlju, migranti, bilo je raznih i ovakvih i onakvih i žena i dece i staraca, mnogih nemoćnih ljudi i bolesnih ljudi i svima je Srbija bila dobar domaćin. Najveći broj njih 99,9% je otišao iz naše zemlje, ostalo ih je 3.500. Da li je bilo i muškaraca? Bilo je. Te priče najsvremenije mobilne telefonije, to jeste bilo, ali 2015. godine, kada su imućniji migranti iz Sirije dolazili u Srbiju i kada su te mobilne telefone koristili, da bi pratili rutu kojom se kreću. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>			<p style="text-align: center;">Solidarity</p>	
<p>Kada pogledate ove ljude koji su u migrantskim kampovima, pogledajte kako su oni obučeni, pogledajte njihovo imovinsko stanje. Videćete da je to veoma, veoma siromašan sloj ljudi, koji ne bi jeli u kampu tu lošu hranu, jeli bi u restoranu. Imaju pravo da se kreću, nisu zatočnici ove zemlje. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>				<p style="text-align: center;">Solidarity</p>	

	<p>Dakle, Srbija mora da bude zemlja koja pokazuje brigu o ljudima. Srbija će se istovremeno boriti, kao što to radi sa svim ozbiljnijim službama u svetu, da se kod nas ne dogodi bilo kakav teroristički napad, kao što se nije ni dogodio i vodićemo računa o tome da bezbednost građana bude apsolutno zaštićena. (STEFANOVIĆ NEBOJŠA)</p>			<p>Security</p>	
SDPS					<p>Morala sam da reagujem kao ovlašćena i kao neko ko poznaje ovu materiju. Ono što smo čuli tokom prethodnog izlaganja, još jednom prilika da se uznemiri srpska javnost i da se iznošenjem neistina i laži pravi lažna uznemirenost i budi netrpeljivost prema migrantima, prema ljudima koji kroz tešku nevolju prolaze i preko teritorije naše zemlje i koja se nalazi u regionu. apsolutno je netačno i glupost da je bilo koji državljanin Irana sa srpskim pasošem, srpskim dokumentom... (OBRADOVIĆ MARIJA)</p>
PUPS					
NS					
SPO					
PS					
SNP					
SPS					

<p>Dveri</p>	<p>Kome će da daju besplatnu pravnu pomoć? Da neće možda migrantima, ovih 100 hiljada ili više stotina hiljada migranata koje nameravate da naseleite u Srbiji, po naredbi iz centralnog komiteta, iz Brisela, kada EU zatvori svoje granice za migrante i kada ih vi budete parkirali ovde u Srbiji i napunili upražnjena srpska sela? Da li je poenta ovog zakona o besplatnoj pravnoj pomoći da pomognete te ranjive grupe? Da kada ovde budemo imali više stotina hiljada migranata po Dablinskom ili nekom drugom sporazumu, da vi tada lepo asistirate da oni ljudi mogu ovde da se smeste, da im renovirate sve kasarne, da im otkupite domaćinstva na selu, što već radite po lokalnim akcionim planovima, da im date pare da pokrenu biznis, da im jednostavno date sve ono što ne dajete sopstvenim građanima. (OBRADOVIĆ BOSKO) *</p>			<p>Crisis Management</p>	
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		<p>Što bismo mi zbrinjavali migrante koji su pošli na zapad? Što oni izlaze iz Grčke i drugih evropskih zemalja, odnosno zemalja EU i dolaze u Srbiju? Što ne idu kroz te zemlje EU na zapad? Pa, čekajte, nismo valjda toliko naivni, jasno nam je da neko želi promenu strukture stanovništva u Evropi, jasno nam je da neko želi da nas nasele migrantima, jasno nam je da neko želi da napravi Evropi problem i da menja njenu civilizacijsku strukturu. I vi to kao ne vidite? I, kao, nije vam to jasno šta se planira? I ne znate, kao, i nećete da kažete šta ste dogovorili sa Briselom i koliko ste stotina hiljada migranata prihvatili da primite kada vam centralni komitet iz Brisela to bude naredio. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)</p>	N	Y	Crisis Management/Quotas	
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							Na kraju, dete od 18 do 27 godina sa najsavremenijim mobilnim telefonom i bankarskom karticom nije dete, gospodine ministre, nego potencijalni možda terorista koji je izvršio terorističke akte širom Evrope, a bio je nekakav migrant koga smo mi trebali da primimo i koji je prošao kroz Srbiju. Uostalom, nije valjda glup Viktor Orban zašto podiže zidove i ne dozvoljava da bilo ko uđe u Mađarsku. (OBRADOVIĆ BOŠKO)
							Znači ljudi su iz Irana, infiltrirali se, dolazili su ovde sa pasošima, pasoši se sklanjaju i infiltriraju se među migrante ili sa srpskim pasošima su prelazili u EU, i to je Stoltenberg pokazao Vučiću i zato ste vi to ekspresno uradili. (NOGO SRDAN)
SVM							
DSS							
SDS							
LDP							
LSV							
National minorities							

SER12.1_05.11.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS	<p>Moram da istaknem da je Republika Srbija tokom migrantske kriz i tokom velike seobe naroda posebno iz Sirije koja je bila obuhvaćena ratom ali i iz drugih zemalja pokazala visok stepen poštovanja ljudskih prava, ali naravno i najveći mogući stepen zaštite bezbednosti i sigurnosti njenih građana. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJIĆ MILANA)</p>				Solidarity	<p>Takođe, moram da istaknem da je MUP donelo Memorandum zajedno sa Republičkim javnim tužilaštvom oformilo stalnu udarnu grupu za sprečavanje krijumčarenja ljudima jer znamo da velika migrantska kriza koja je pogodila sve zemlje, a naravno i našu zemlju, mada su migranti kroz našu zemlju prolazili kao tranzitnu, da su mnogi koristili migrante kako bi se obogatili, i kako bi u stvari se bavili krijumčarenjem ljudi. Moram da istaknem da je ova stalna udarna grupa za suzbijanje krijumčarenja ljudi 2017. godine uhapsila 13 lica koja su sa područja Makedonije pokušali da prokrijumčare 107 izbeglih lica, a takođe pre tri dana zahvaljujući aktivnostima policije na području Kikinde, Subotice, Kanjiže otkrivena je osmočlana kriminalna grupa koja se bavila krijumčarenjem migranata iz Indije i</p>

						<p>Avganistana. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJČIĆ MILANA)</p>
	<p>Naravno da je cilj i fokus MUP-a bezbednost i sigurnost naših građana, ali tokom migrantske krize MUP i te kako je pokazalo da jednom koordinisanom jednom efikasnom, jednom multidisciplinarnom aktivnošću i te kako je radilo na zaštiti ljudskih prava i migranata, a pre svega, onih najranjivijih a tu su pitanju deca. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJČIĆ MILANA)</p>				<p>Solidarity</p>	

						<p>Intencija mog amandmana, uvažene kolege, da ukaže na potrebu prevencije posledica migrantske krize i kao takva doprinese sveukupnom razvoju Republike Srbije. Pored svih onih burnih i istorijskim događaja u kojima se Srbija našla u poslednje dve decenije, imali smo jedan globalni problem u čijem središtu smo se našli, ne svojom krivicom. (VUJADINović MILIMIR)</p>
	<p>Mi smo imali zaista veliki uticaj u tom delu, često smo mogli poslužiti kao primer nekim razvijenijim evropskim i svetskim društvima. Taj problem je nešto novijeg datuma. On je novi za Evropu, novi za svet, barem Evropa se u tom obliku nije susretala sa problemom migracija, a Srbija ga je spremno dočekala zahvaljujući sistemu koji je odgovorno postavljen i taj sistem je dočekao i kroz njega je prošlo više od milion i 200 hiljada ljudi. (VUJADINović MILIMIR)</p>					

SNS						<p>Naravno, usledile su sve pozitivne ocene svih agencija UN, međunarodnih organizacija, pojedinačnih zemalja Evrope i sveta, i došli smo u situacija da Srbija stvara o sebi jednu novu pozitivnu sliku. To je jedan novi pozitivni imidž koji u konačnici utiče i na razvoj Srbije. (VUJADINOVIĆ MILIMIR)</p>
	<p>Republika Srbija i EU su tokom 2015. i 2016. godine suočile sa nezabeleženim naletom migranata i izbeglica. U EU je pristiglo više od milion ljudi, većina pobešla od rata i terora sa afričkih i azijskih zemalja. To je bila humanitarna migrantska katastrofa. Radilo se o problemu koji je svakodnevno odnosio živote, uglavnom mlade ljude i decu. To je bilo goruće pitanje, jer je broj dece migranata bez roditelja i pratnje rastao. Ovo su bili putevi očajnika. Hiljade ljudi je poginulo na moru pokušavajući se domaći EU. Srbija je devedesetih naučila šta znači biti izbeglica. Zbog toga smo spremno otvorili granice kada je migracijska kriza počela i sa EU pristupili smo rešavanju problema. (REPAC DESANKA)</p>					

	<p>Srbija zahvaljujući odgovornoj politici našeg predsednika Aleksandra Vučića je jedna od retkih zemalja u regionu koja je pokazala humanost i solidarnost prema migrantima u možda najvećoj izbegličkoj krizi od Drugog svetskog rata. (BULATOVIĆ SLAVIŠA)</p>			Solidarity	<p>Svoj doprinos u rešavanju i prevazilaženju migrantske krize dao je i grad Vranje u kojem je 30. maja 2017. godine otvoren prihvatni centar u objektu nekadašnjeg motela Vranje. Projektovani kapacitet centra je 210 lica. Upravljanje centrom je u nadležnosti Komesarijata za izbeglice i migracije Republike Srbije. (BULATOVIĆ SLAVIŠA)</p>
SDPS					
PUPS					
NS					
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SNP					
SPS					
JS					
Greens					
SRS					
Dosta					
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NS					
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						<p>Zato što su Iranci dolazili ovdje bez pasoša, kako su mogli onda da završe u EU? Infiltriranjem među migrante ili eventualno falsifikovanje, odnosno dobijanjem srpskih pasoša. Ja sam tada rekao da znam da vi nemate veze sa tim, ali vas to neće abolirati odgovornosti, zato što ste nadležni za poslove policije. (NOGO SRDAN)</p>
Dveri						<p>Što se tiče Iranaca, to nisu obični ljudi. Ovdje sam govorio o licima koja su deo obavestajne zajednice Irana, odnosno njihove glavne službe. Mi smo zahvaljujući tom bezviznom režimu, mnogima je bilo jednostavnije da nam prosto avionima šalju migrante nego, zamislite, lakše je iz Teherana Sorošu da napuni jedan avion, da dođu ovdje ljudi i da stete, nego da sad on preko 20 zemalja organizuje te transfere. Ali, naravno da je iranska služba iskoristila to. Ta cela operacija je išla tako. Čovek dođe sa regularnim iranskim pasošem i izade iz Srbije bez tog pasoša. Da vidimo koliko je Iranaca ušlo, koliko je Iranaca izašlo iz Srbije. Znači, negde se skloni, verovatno u njihovu ambasadu, takav pasoš i oni prolaze dalje. Čitava ona afera sa oružjem u migrantskoj kući u Sarajevu koje je nedavno nađeno je vezano upravo za tu operaciju za tu iransku službu. To je jedan dubok problem. (NOGO SRDAN)</p>
SVM						
DSS						
SDS						
LDP						
LSV						

SER12.2_06.11.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						<p>Sistem smanjenja rizika od katastrofa i upravljanje vanrednim situacijama od posebnog interesa za Republiku Srbiju, to je deo sistema nacionalne bezbednosti. Jedna od katastrofa koja je 2015. godine zadesila Srbiju je migrantska kriza. Može se reći da je to globalni problem. Svi smo jednom bili migranti ili izbeglice. Ako osvežimo sećanje samo ne tako na skorajšnju istoriju, progon Srba iz Hrvatske, a da ne govorimo o sebi Srba sa Kosova, od Kosovskog boja pod našim patrijarsima, pa nadalje. (REPAC DESANKA)</p>

	<p>Srbija je zemlja koja je razumela migrante, srpski narod je empatičan narod, narod koji je jako bogat istorijom, otuda to razumevanje. Republika Srbija otvorila je 18 prihvatnih centara, angažovala socijalne radnike, jedina u Evropi uspostavila prihvatne centre za maloletne migrante bez roditelja i pratnje, a o njima se brinu timovi stručnjaka. Ovim zakonom mi jačamo kapacitete državnih ustanova koje se bave migrantskom krizom, sa akcentom na brizi i zaštiti ranjivih kategorija, a naročito dece. Setimo se samo potresnih slika mrtvog dečaka na plaži u Republici Grčkoj. (REPAC DESANKA)</p>				<p>Solidarity</p>	
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						<p>Rešavanje migrantske krize je kompleksan problem. Za to je nedovoljna preventiva. Novina ovog zakona predstavlja i međunarodnu saradnju, kako u domenu prevencije, tako i u domenu humanitarne pomoći, pružanja i primanja međunarodne pomoći, radi zajedničkog odgovora na katastrofe, kao što je recimo migrantska kriza. Na humanitarnu migrantsku katastrofu treba mobilisati sve relevantne faktore u Republici Srbiji... (REPAC DESANKA)</p>
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	<p>Ali, ono na šta sam ja htela da stavim akcenat, to je na velikom učešću, na velikoj odgovornosti, na velikoj efikasnosti Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova, kada je u pitanju bilo upravljanje krizom, a to se odnosi na globalnu krizu, migrantsku krizu, koja je zadesila i Republiku Srbiju, koja je u stvari bila tranzitna zemlja velikom broju migranata. Smatra se da je kroz našu zemlju prošlo oko milion i 200 hiljada migranata. Trenutno u Republici Srbiji boravi oko tri hiljade i 200 migranata i oni su smešteni u prihvatnim centrima. Takođe, želim da istaknem veliku profesionalnost, umreženost, povezanost Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova sa drugim sistemima, pre svega sa sistemom vojske, jer je zahvaljujući zajedničkim aktivnostima i zajedničkoj patroli Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova i vojske sprečeno da ilegalno na našu teritoriju uđe samo za nepunih šest meseci oko 20 hiljada migranata. (JEVTOVIĆ VUKOJIĆ MILANKA)</p>				<p>Crisis Management</p>	
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	<p>Gospodine ministre, ono o čemu hoću da govorim je svakako migrantska kriza i da je veliki broj migranata prošao kroz opštine Preševo i Bujanovac, opštine koje su mešovitog nacionalnog sastava stanovništva. Ovde hoću da izrazim zahvalnost vama i pripadnicima Ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova na visokom stepenu profesionalizma, jer nije bilo nijednog slučaja sukoba i incidenata između migranata i lokalnog stanovništva, iako je u pojedinim momentima u Preševu bilo i po par hiljada migranata. Tako da je Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova dalo pun doprinos rešavanju migrantske krize jer je kroz Srbiju prošlo oko 1,2 miliona migranata. (MITROVIĆ NENAD)</p>			<p>Crisis Management</p>	<p>Nije li dokaz za to migrantska kriza u Srbiji i način na koji se ova zemlja suočila sa njom? Srbija je iz tog problema izašla sa ozbiljno ojačanim međunarodnim ugledom i ni jednog momenta nisu zaustavljene reforme, ni jednog momenta nije zaustavljen taj privredni rast u Srbiji i ni jednog momenta nije uticao na razvoj u Republici Srbiji. Naprotiv, stvari su se i dalje kretale u pozitivnom pravcu. (VUJADINOVIĆ MILIMIR)</p> <p>Ja sam svedok da i u Subotici, gradu koji se našao na direktnom udaru migrantske krize, u tom momentu su institucije ozbiljno ojačane, broj zaposlenih se povećao i to je direktna posledica ozbiljno i odgovorno postavljene politike tadašnje Vlade na čijem čelu je bio Aleksandar Vučić. (VUJADINOVIĆ MILIMIR)</p>
SDPS					

SER13_28.11.2018

	NATIONAL LEVEL	EU LEVEL	If EU, positive (Y/N)	If EU, negative (Y/N)	Frame	Other (code non applicable)
SNS						
SDPS						
PUPS						
NS						
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PS	Prvo, vojska i policija ne čuvaju nikakv režim, čuvaju Ustav i zakon, čuvaju svoju zemlju. Umeju da čuvaju zajedno i granice kada je potrebno, što ste videli kada je bila migrantska kriza. Ali, kakav režim? Ko to hoće da napadne režim? Ko to ruši vlast silom? Vojska i policija se uvek pojavljuju kada je u pitanju sila. Kakva sila? Ko to najavljuje silu? Ja ne vidim nigde silu. Ja ne vidim nigde da se građani ili da su podstaknuti da se silom obračunavaju sa nekim. (VULIN ALEKSANDAR)				Security	
SNP						
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