



Aulaloengud

EESTI MAAILMAS 21. SAJANDI KÜNNISEL

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TARTU ÜLIKOOL

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Eesti Vabariigi presidendi
Lennart Meri 70. sünnipäevale
pühendatud konverentsi kogumik

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SISUKORD

Eesti Vabariigi presidendi Lennart Meri elulugu	7
<i>Paul A. Goble</i> . The managed indiscretions of Lennart Meri	13
<i>Toomas Hendrik Ilves</i> . Eesti 21. sajandi lävel	23
<i>Wolfgang Drechsler</i> . The Estonian State at the threshold of the 21 st century	27
Rektor professor <i>Jaak Aaviksoo</i> kõne konverentsil "Eesti maailmas 21. sajandi künnisel"	47

EESTI VABARIIGI PRESIDENDI LENNART MERI ELULUGU

Lennart Meri on sündinud 29. märtsil 1929 Tallinnas Eesti diplomaadi ja hilisema Shakespeare'i tõlkija Georg Meri perekonnas. Koos perekonnaga lahkus ta varakult Eestist ning on pidanud üheksa korda kooli ning neli korda keelt vahetama. Kõige soojemalt meenutab ta oma õpinguid Lycée Janson de Sailly's Pariisis.

Eesti okupeerimine Nõukogude Liidu poolt tabas perekonda Tallinnas. Aastal 1941 küüditati perekond koos kümnete tuhandete saatusekaaslastega Eestist, Lätist ja Leedust Siberisse. Perekonnapead lahutati perekondadest ja suleti kontsentratsioonilaagritesse, kus vähesed ellu jäid. Kaheteistaastaselt alustas Lennart Meri oma karjääri metsatöölisena. Ta on olnud ka kartulikoorija ja metsaparvetaja.

Meride perekond jäi ellu ja jõudis tagasi Eestisse, kus Lennart Meri lõpetas 1953. aastal Tartu Ülikooli ajaloo eriala *cum laude*. Nõukogude administratsioon ei lubanud tal ajaloolasena töötada. Lennart Meri leidis tööd Eesti vanimas, Vanemuise teatris dramaturgina ning seejärel Eesti ringhäälingus kuuldemängude produtsendina. Aastal 1958 ette võetud retkest Kesk-Aasiasse Tjan-Šani mäestikku ja vanadesse islamikeskustesse Karakumi kõrbes kirjutas Lennart Meri oma esimese raamatu, mille lugejad soojalt vastu võtsid. Juba üliõpilaspõlves, kui Nõukogude administratsioon ta isa kolmandat korda aresteeris, oli Meri sunnitud elatama ennast kirjatööst. Tookord õnnestus Meril koos noorema vennaga (kes oma kooliõpingud

katkestas ja taksojuhina tööle asus) ema üleval pidada ja õpingud lõpetada. Kuid alles esimese raamatu kaudu leidis Lennart Meri oma kutsumuse. Veerand sajandi vältel käis ta üksi või enda korraldatud ekspeditsioonidega endise Nõukogude Liidu kõige raskemini ligipääsetavates piirkondades, kus teda paelusid väikerahvaste kultuurid, Siberi avastamise ja koloniseerimise ajalugu ning kohalike vajaduste ja Moskva käsumajanduse järjest süvenev majanduslik ja ökoloogiline konflikt. Reisidest sündinud raamatud ja filmid suutsid läbida raudse eesriide, neid on tõlgitud tosinasse keelde. Nõukogude Liidus keelatud film "Linnutee tuuled" (koostöös Soome ja Ungariga) sai New Yorgi filmifestivalil hõbemedali. Soome koolides on tema filme ja tekste kasutatud õppe- materjalina. 1986 valis Helsingi Ülikool Lennart Meri oma audoktoriks. Juba varem, 1963. aastal oli Lennart Meri võetud Eesti Kirjanike Liidu liikmeks. Kaheksakümnenendatel aastatel valis Soome Kirjanike Liit ta oma auliikmeks. Reaside vahel tõlkis Lennart Meri Remarque'i, Graham Greene'i, Vercorsi, Boulle'i ja Solzenitsõnit. Meri kirjandus-, filmi- ja tõlkelooming aitas oluliselt säilitada eesti identiteeti totalitaarse venestamise ajal. Kõige tuntumaks sai tema "Hõbevalge", Eesti ja Läänemere ajaloo laiahaardeline rekonstruktsioon, mis kujutas eestlast kui avatud maailma aktiivset tegurit Põhja-Euroopas.

Oodanud üle kahekümne aasta Nõukogude administratsioonilt luba raudeesriide taha pääsemiseks, kasutas Lennart Meri Soomes avanenud võimalusi sihikindlalt, meenutamaks vabale maailmale Eesti olemasolu. Ta lõi usalduslikke ühendusi poliitikute, ajakirjanike ja okupatsiooni eest põgenenud eestlastega. Ta oli esimene eestlane, kes avaldas ka väljaspool Eestit protesti Nõukogude administratsiooni kava vastu kaevandada Eestis fosforiiti, mis oleks kolmandiku Eestist elamiskõlbmatuks teinud.

Keskkonnakaitse kasvas Eestis peagi üle laulvaks revolutsiooniks, milles Eesti haritlaskonnal oli juhi osa. Lennart Meri kõne "Kas eestlastel on lootusi?" seadis



kesksele kohale rahva eksistentsi probleemid ja leidis tugevat vastukaja ka väljaspool Eestit. Lennart Meri siirdumine loometegevuselt poliitikasse läks sujuvalt ja poliitilisi sündmusi ennetavalt. Aastal 1988 asutas ta valitsusvälise Eesti Instituudi kultuurisidemete arendamiseks Läänega ja noorte suunamiseks välismaale. Eesti Instituudi varjus rajatud kultuuriesindused Kopenhaagenis, Stockholmis, Londonis, Bonnis, Pariisis ja Helsingis täitsid saatkondade funktsioone ning said ametlikeks suursaatkondadeks 1991. aasta augustis, kui demokraatlik Lääs taastas diplomaatilised suhted Eesti Vabariigiga.

Ei Eesti ega Lääne silmis olnud sovetlik ja natsistlik okupatsioon katkestanud Eesti Vabariigi kontinuiteeti ega tühistanud Eesti rahvusvahelisi kohustusi ja õigusi. Seepärast ei kuulu Eesti ka nn. uute demokraatiate hulka, sest juba 1921. aastal oli Eesti Vabariik aktiivne Rahvasteliidu liige. Diplomaatiliste suhete taastamise aktidele kirjutas Lennart Meri alla juba välisministrina. Sellele kohale nimetas ta 12. aprillil 1990 rahvarinde liider Edgar Savisaar pärast esimesi mittekommunistlikke valimisi. Enne seda oli Lennart Meri koos kaasautoritega jõudnud avaldada dokumentide kogumiku "1940. Eestis. Dokumente ja materjale" (1989), mis püüdis Nõukogude parlamendiliikmetele tulemusteta tõestada, et Eesti okupeerimise ja sovetiseerimise aluseks oli olnud Hitleri ja Stalini kuritegelik pakt Euroopa jagamiseks kahe totalitaarse režiimi vahel.

Välisministrina pidi Lennart Meri kõigepealt looma välisministeeriumi, tööle kutsuma õppimisvõimelisi noori, kujundama kindla suhtluskanali välisriikidesse ja samas esindama Eestit olulisematel rahvusvahelistel konverentsidel. Ta võttis osa CSCE konverentsidest Kopenhaagenis, New Yorgis, Pariisis, Berliinis, Moskvas ja Helsingis, Läänemere maade Nõukogu asutamiskonverentsist Kopenhaagenis, kohtus korduvalt USA ja Euroopa riigipeade ja välisministritega ning esines esimese Ida-Euroopa külalisena NATO peakorteris Brüsselis.

Pärast lühikest teenistust suursaadikuna Soomes (23.04.1992–10.10.1992) valiti Lennart Meri Eesti Vabariigi 28. riigipeaks. Meri vannutati ametisse 6. oktoobril 1992. aastal. 1996. aasta 20. septembril valiti Lennart Meri teiseks ametiajaks Eesti Vabariigi presidendiks.

Lennart Meri on oma kirjaniku- ja poliitikutöö kestel valitud Kalevala Seltsi välisliikmeks ja Soome Kirjanduse Seltsi kirjavahetajaliikmeks, Euroopa Teaduste ja Kunstide Akadeemia ning Kommunismiohvrite Mälestusfondi rahvusvahelise nõukogu juhatusse, Parlamentidevahelisse Antisemitismivastasesse Nõukokku. Ta on endiselt Eesti Kirjanike Liidu, Eesti Kineastide Liidu ja Eesti PEN-klubi liige, kodukaunistusaasta, keelepuhastusaasta ja Tartu Ülikooli sihtasutuse patroon, Coudenhove-Kalergi Euroopa-auhinna ja Liberaalse Internatsionaali auhinna laureaata, mitmete riikide ordenite kavaler ja valitud detsembris 1998 aasta eurooplaseks.

Lennart Meri on teist korda abielus. Ta abikaasa Helle Meri (1949) töötas aastani 1992 Tallinna Draamateatris näitlejana. Esimene abikaasa Regina Meri emigreeris 1987 Kanadasse. Lennart Meril on kolm last: pojad Mart (1959) ja Kristjan (1966) ning tütar Tuule (1985), ja neli lapselast.

THE MANAGED INDISCRETIONS OF LENNART MERI

Paul A. Goble

Most people are better defined by others than by themselves, but Estonian President Lennart Meri is a happy exception. Over the course of his career, he has defined himself and hence helped to define his country. But he has often done so in ways that have surprised or even shocked those around him, ways that have proved far more important and valuable than those adopted by others.

My first experience with Lennart Meri's talent for managed indiscretions came on the night of August 20, 1991, at the end of the second day of the ultimately failed coup in Moscow that set the stage for the recovery of Estonian independence. At the time he was Estonia's foreign minister and had remained in Finland to serve as the primary link between the Baltic countries and the West during that difficult time — and potentially more if things had gone wrong.

Phone calls and faxes flew back and forth between his hotel room in Helsinki and the U.S. State Department where I then worked. Late on August 20, I asked my secretary to send a fax to Lennart Meri, and she made a natural mistake: she dialed his telephone number rather than his fax number. When Lennart Meri picked up the line, he heard the awful buzzing that all of us have

experienced when someone has tried to send a fax on the wrong line.

But instead of doing what everyone else would have done and immediately hanging up, Lennart Meri shouted into the line loud enough for all of us at the Bureau of European Affairs head office to hear: "I'm not a fax machine, I'm a foreign minister!" Not only was that what we all wanted to hear, but he was not surprisingly absolutely right.

Today, when we mark President Lennart Meri's 70th birthday and when we think back about his remarkable career and contributions, it is worth focusing both on what he has tried to do, how he has tried to do it, and why this particular combination has proved so effective in advancing the cause not only of Estonia but of the cause of human freedom more generally.

I

Many people have talked about the Baltic "revolution", but Lennart Meri has understood that what has gone on is *a restoration* — but restoration as a creative act rather than a static copying of the past. In his own actions and indeed in his own person, Lennart Meri has embodied the principle of continuity in Estonian life. And he has constantly urged both Estonians and non-Estonians to recognise this sometimes neglected fact.

The first and most important restoration and reaffirmation Lennart Meri has stood for is the continuity between the past and present. More than any other Baltic leader, President Meri has stood for the principle that the republics established after the collapse of the Russian Empire after the first world war never died, was never superseded, and cannot be numbered. His insistence on this point has saved Estonia often from itself because any departure from the principle of the continu-

ity of Estonian statehood would open the doors to a new tragedy, one that could overwhelm the capacity of Estonians to make their independent way in the world.

Because he has committed himself to this idea, President Meri has done more than anyone else to restore the ability of small states to affect the concert of Europe. In the 1920s and 1930s Estonia, along with the other small countries of Europe, played a major role here. During the Cold War, small countries more often served as pawns rather than major actors. But now they have come back to play their traditional role, as moderating influences among the great powers and as sources of ideas and proposals that the governments of larger countries often are unable to offer.

The second restoration Lennart Meri has stood for is the conviction that Estonia, although fully a part of the West, inevitably must serve as a bridge between the West and the East, between Europe and the Russian Federation. His work as a filmmaker, as a broadcaster, and as a political leader has always been about building bridges rather than walls, about linking countries and peoples together in new ways. One of his most frequently quoted remarks is that Estonians have been "sitting on this rock, speaking their secret code for 50 centuries", during which many other peoples have passed over them but none have remained unaffected by the Estonian dimension of this passage.

Because Lennart Meri has this vision, he has navigated between East and West in ways that few other statesmen have been able to. Not in order to achieve an easy neutrality but rather to help his country again become a bridge. The future of the Russian Federation remains unclear in many respects, but because nearly 50 percent of its shipping passes through Baltic ports Moscow's relations with the Baltic countries and their relations with Russia will be more than a litmus test: they will be a defining moment in European history.

And the third restoration Lennart Meri has stood for is the restoration of a conception of Estonian development as a link between the present and the future. The present, in his understanding, is a sum of the past, but it opens the way to the future. All too few people in Estonia — or elsewhere — understand that dimension of national evolution. Instead, they either remain fixated on the past or overwhelmed by the present. And they thus fail to be open to the possibilities of their own national identity.

Because Lennart Meri understands this open-ended quality of national life, he has served as Estonia's first pedagogue, as a spokesman for the rebuilding of the state and the recreation of state-thinking people. As someone who remembers the existence of such things in his youth, Lennart Meri is able to articulate a vision beyond those who are focused only on their own narrow economic gain or other selfish interests.

In all three cases, President Meri's biography, the role of his father, his experiences in Estonian missions abroad before World War II, his deportation to Sverdlovsk, his work in radio, his ethnographic films, and his involvement in the most dramatic phases of the restoration of Estonia's independence, all prepared him for his ability to restore his country.

II

But President Meri could not have achieved so much had he not brought to the task not only the experiences of his biography but also an attitude toward life, personal as well as political, that sets him apart from other leaders.

No one can be in Lennart Meri's company for very long without hearing him say how much he likes his "little games", and no one can retrace his career without encountering the actions he himself would group under

this rubric. In Estonia, many people have reduced his actions in this regard as a series of anecdotes, amusing, infuriating, but ultimately relatively unimportant in the grand scheme of things.

Such an understanding is profoundly wrong. What looks like anecdote to such people in fact reflects a considered policy of using managed indiscretions, carefully planned violations of the expected, to achieve more for his nation than would otherwise be the case. Lennart Meri understood perhaps from childhood that the leaders of small countries must act differently than those of larger states, that their style acquires a kind of substance that can either advance their causes or destroy them.

Of the dozens of examples one could give, three in particular deserve to be recalled on this Lennart Meri's 70th birthday.

During Lennart Meri's first visit to the United States, he almost but not quite met Ernst Jaakson, Estonia's consul general in New York. For someone carrying a Soviet passport as Lennart Meri then was, a visit to Mr. Jaakson was completely out of the question. But for an Estonian, failure to visit Mr. Jaakson in his Rockefeller Center office was equally out of the question.

How to act? Lennart Meri came up with a solution, a carefully managed indiscretion that allowed him to show his respect for a man who was to become Estonia's ambassador to Washington and permanent representative to the United Nations without doing something that could get either Mr. Jaakson or himself in terrible trouble. What President Meri did was to go to Rockefeller Center, stand outside Mr. Jaakson's door, but not knock or go in.

When the two men later met, they each cherished this story: Mr. Jaakson because of what it said about Lennart Meri; Lennart Meri because of what it said about Mr. Jaakson, remaining true to Estonia, and ultimately about himself.

A second such "indiscretion" took place at the end of September, 1990. At that time, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III received Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri along with his two Baltic colleagues at the OSCE ministerial meeting in New York. The three Baltic representatives had been forced to sit as observers rather than participants in the meeting, and when the three were brought into Baker's suite, the U.S. diplomat had little to tell them.

But Secretary Baker did take the opportunity to reaffirm U.S. nonrecognition policy, the American conviction that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states was fundamentally illegitimate. And Baker pointed out that in addition to all the other consequences of this policy, "the Baltic flags have been flying in the lobby of our State Department for more than 50 years".

Lennart Meri broke in with the observation that "Yes, but there is no wind". Secretary Baker almost certainly was not amused, but Meri's intervention was clearly and cleverly designed to achieve precisely what it did. After that meeting, Secretary Baker and other senior American officials never thought about the Baltic countries without thinking about Lennart Meri and his observation of how non-recognition policy looked to them and their homelands.

A more polite Baltic official might have said nothing, and achieved precisely that. By being somewhat indiscrete, Lennart Meri pushed the Baltic cause along much further than anyone else had been able to. And he guaranteed a special place for Estonia in the hearts and minds of the leaders of the United States.

And yet a third "indiscretion" also involved the United States — but this time President George Bush. During a visit to the Oval Office even before Estonia recovered its independence, Lennart Meri took the opportunity to leave his mark in a way that no one present would forget. After the usual diplomatic niceties, Len-

nart Meri began to talk about one of Bush's favourite avocations: fishing. He told the American president that he could take him to a place where Bush could catch an enormous salmon.

When President Bush asked where, Lennart Meri marched to the American leader's magnificent office globe, took out a pen, and placed an "X" right over a river in Kamchatka in the Russian Far East. Some Estonians were angry that Lennart Meri had called attention to a place far removed from Estonia, and some Americans were upset by this act of diplomatic vandalism. But both groups missed the point that both Lennart Meri and George Bush immediately grasped, that by violating protocol in one sense Lennart Meri had established a bond that was to serve Estonia well in the future.

Indeed, President Bush underlined that point when Lennart Meri returned to the White House immediately after Estonia had again assumed its rightful place in the international system. With virtually no preliminaries, President Bush asked Foreign Minister Meri to show him again just where that good salmon river was. And again Lennart Meri left his mark on the globe, this time to the amusement, even delight of all the Americans and Estonians present.

In all three of these cases — and their number could be extended almost at will — Lennart Meri combined personal style with political calculation in a way that he summed up in another connection. As he noted in a discussion about some other Estonian officials, "it is not difficult to get into the Quay d'Orsay, but it is very difficult to get back in". President Meri has always been able to get "back in", something few leaders around the world can claim and a skill that has served his country well.

III

But President Meri would be upset if those of us who admire him spent his birthday talking only about the past. He would want to talk about the future, about the tasks ahead rather than the achievements of the past. And so let me conclude by enumerating what he has suggested are his country's greatest immediate tasks.

The first of these is to complete the restoration of state-thinking in Estonia. Too many Estonians still denigrate the state, still fail to see that without a state Estonia could again be lost to forces beyond its control. State-thinking, as Lennart Meri has pointed out more than once, does not mean the deification of the state or the subordination of the individual to the dictates of some all-powerful institution. Instead, it means constant attention to and support for the institutions that make civil society possible.

With the collapse of the communist enterprise, many people in Estonia and elsewhere have fled politics for economics, not recognising that without the political core, economic success will subvert not only itself but also the possibility of a civil society. Lennart Meri has repeatedly called on Estonians not to make this mistake. Often his calls have fallen on too many deaf ears, but his understanding of his role as pedagogue in chief has kept him in front of the class.

The second remaining challenge is the full reintegration of Estonia into Western institutions. Torn from such bodies by the Soviet occupation, Estonia has rejoined many but still awaits inclusion in the two most important: the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Some Estonian political figures and commentators have suggested that Estonia does not need membership in either or that the northernmost Baltic country does not need membership in both.

Often almost alone, Lennart Meri has signalled again and again that Estonia must be in both in order to ensure both its security and its prosperity. And because of his personal ties with European leaders and with NATO commanders, Lennart Meri has made an enormous contribution to paving the way for Estonia to get into both within the next few years, something few would have thought possible only a decade ago.

But for Lennart Meri, almost certainly the largest remaining challenge is the recovery of the Estonian personality from the psychological ravages of Soviet occupation. Any visitor to Tallinn knows how much the external face of Estonia has changed since Soviet power collapsed. But anyone living in Estonia knows how profoundly the Soviet experiences still affect the way many Estonians conduct their lives. And Lennart Meri has made it his personal cause to help Estonians overcome that less visible but more frightening shadow of the Soviet period.

Sometimes Lennart Meri's efforts have taken the form of alliances between the older generation which remembers the pre-war period and the youngest generation which was less affected by the occupation. Sometimes they have taken the form of public discussions about what it means to be an Estonian and a free human being.

But most often it has taken the form of serving as a living model of an Estonian who never let the Soviet system get inside him, who always understood why and how it had to be opposed, and who remains prepared to take responsibility for his actions and his country. In his 70 years, Lennart Meri has faced many moments when it would have been easier to back down, give up, and give in. He never has. And the best way we can honor Lennart Meri is to follow his example.



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Trained at Miami University and the University of Chicago, he is the editor of four volumes on ethnic problems in the former Soviet Union and has published more than 150 articles on ethnic and nationality questions.

EESTI 21. SAJANDI LÄVEL

Toomas Hendrik Ilves

Mul on suur au olla kutsut siia saali austamaks President Merit.

Lävi on liikuv termin. Oleme niikuinii juba kaheksa aastat nimetat "üleminekuriigiks", "siirderiigiks", "*transition country*'ks." Millalgi peaks aga olema võimalik selle läve pikaajaline ületamine lõpetada. Minu arvates oleks parim viis vaadata sellele lävele, nagu oleksime sellest üle astunud, ja see oleks siis tagasivaade Eestile ajal, mil Eesti on juba üle astunud ja kindlalt sulgenud ukse ülemineku-faasile. Millal see on toimunud, on raske ennustada või määratella, kuid mina pakuksin (mitte täiesti meelevaldselt) kuupäevaks Lennart Meri suurjuubeli päeva, 29. märts 2004. See oleks nii Eestile kui ka Lennart Merile parim kingitus. Kuidas Eesti peaks siis välja nägema? Kui me oleme fikseerinud, kuidas me peaks olema, et saaks üleminekuperioodile lõppu kuulutada, siis oleme ka paremini määranud meie prioriteedid, meie tegevussuunad ja eesmärgipäraselt korraldanud tegevust.

29. märtsil 2004 on Eesti kahe päeva pärast lõpetanud oma esimese kvartali Euroopa Liidu täisliikmena. Mõningates valdkondades on meil üleminekuperiood, kuid Eesti lipu kõrval Tallinnas, Tartus, aga eriti taastatud vanalinnas Narvas lehvib ka tumesinise taustal tärnide ring. Tartu ülikooli aulakonverentsile on sõidetud kohale mööda Tallinna–Tartu äsja valminud kiirteed. Konverentsi kannakse otseülekandes kõikesse koolidesse Interneti teel

ja mõlemad konverentsi keeled — eesti ja inglise on 12. klassi õpilastele selgelt mõistetavad. Kaitseminister aga kohale tulla ei saa, kuna aprilli alguses toimuvad Võrumaal NATO manöövrid ja ettevalmistused esimeseks suuremaks vastuvõtuks NATO liikmesriigina nõuavad väga suuri pingutusi.

Usun, et selline kiirkirjeldus kujutab päris hästi seda, mida enamus eestlasi näeb oma vaimusilmas, kui räägime Eestist kui ülemineku lõpetanud riigist. Et me saaksime tõepoolest sellist pilti omaenda silmadega näha, eeldab aga, et vahepealse viie aasta jooksul oleme kõik üsna palju pingutanud. Me ei vaja enam verd, higi ja pisaraid, me vajame lihtsalt higi ... ehk parajat sauna.

Tuleme siis tagasi tänapäeva ja vaatame, milliste valdkondadega peame prioriteetselt tegelema.

Siseriiklikult on tarvis ellu viia tegelikku euroopastamist, mille all pean silmas, et Eesti hakkab toimima euroopalikult. Seadusi vastu võtta on üsna kerge ettevõtmine, võrreldes sellega, mida peame tegema, et need seadused ka rakenduksid. Termin, mida hakkame aina rohkem kuulama, on "haldussuutlikus" ehk kuidas üks väike riik tuleb toime enda valitsemisega euroopalikus stiilis. Eesti avalik sektor on teinud suuri edusamme, kuid nagu me kõik oleme kogenud, tuleb selles valdkonnas teha palju rohkem tööd. Siin peitub õieti topeltülesanne, mis on väikeriigile eriti raske: paremini töötada, suurendamata avalikus sektoris toimivate inimeste arvu.

Üheks lahenduseks näen ma siin ka Lennart Meriga tihedalt seotud programmi laiendamist, nimelt Tiigrihüpet. Õieti nimetaksin seda Tiigrihüppeks kaks: kodaniku ja riigi suhtlemise muutumine interaktiivseks. Kui juba praegu on Eesti saavutanud midagi haruldast: vaese riigina edestanud poolt Euroopa Liitu oma internetistumistasemes, siis nõukogulikult ebainimliku bürokraatia asendamine läbipaistva ja igale kodanikule kättesaadava interaktiivse süsteemiga oleks tõeline saavutus, millega võiksime olla eeskujuks isegi Euroopa Liidule.

See loomulikult pole ainus lahendus. Kui me tahame, et Eesti piirkonnad näevad välja nagu Baieris, kui me tahame *Transparency International*'i korrupsioonitabelis asuda koos Põhjamaadega kõige vähem korrumpeerunud riikide hulgas, kui me tahame, et meie ülikoolilõpetanud saavad oma Eesti teaduskraadidega jalamaid tööd Inglismaal, aga otsustavad välismaist pakkumist mitte vastu võtta, eelistades töötada kodumaal, siis see kõik eeldab väga suuri jõupingutusi mitte ainult ministeeriumide ja avaliku teenistuse töötajailt, vaid meilt kõigilt.


Teiseks. Kui saame oma sotsiaalset ja majanduslikku turvalisust kindlustada pideva tööga euroopalikuse suunas, siis oma riigi turvalisuse ehk julgeoleku saavutame ainult täisliikmelisusega NATOs. Et saada kutse NATOsse, peab Eesti pingutama nii välis- kui ka sisepoliitiliselt. Nagu Euroopa Liidu läbirääkimiste kutsegagi pole meil NATOsse asja ilma kodutööta. Eesti peab panustama sellele, mis eeldab nii rahalisi kohustusi kui ka selget ülesehitustööd kaitsevæes.

Kolmandaks peame järgmise viie aasta jooksul looma hoopis uue suhtumise nende hulgas, kes tulid okupatsiooni ajal Eestisse elama ja on ennast jäädavalt sidunud meie maaga. Ja eeskätt tuleb seda teha noorema põlvkonna seas. Sõna *integratsioon* ei saa olla vaid sõnakõlks. Kui me oleme vältinud edukalt selliseid kaheksa aastat tagasi Eestile ennustatud õudusi nagu Dnestri-äärne separatism, siis Euroopa Liidu liikmesriigina ei saa me endale lubada niisugust olukorda, kus osa rahvast ei saa riigikeelest aru, sellega ennast majandusliku ja sotsiaalse heaolu võimalustest välja lülitades.

Ees seisab raske kahepoolne töö. Eesti riik peab tagama siin elavaile muulasile kõik võimalused õppida eesti keelt ning selgeks tegema, et hästi kättesaadavate keeleomamise võimaluste kasutamine on eelduseks euroopalikule elule Eestis. Ja samal ajal peavad siin elavad muulased aduma, et eesti keele oskamine ongi see võti, mis avab ukse Euroopasse. Alternatiiviks on sotsiaalne kihis-

tumine keeleoskuse baasil, mida siia maani on välditud ainult tänu sellele, et Kirde-Eesti majandus on subsiidiumide ja keskkonna olukorra eiramisega kunstlikult elus hoitud.

Kui me neid ülesanded täidame: euroopastuda, NATOstuda ja integreeruda, siis viie aasta pärast saame tõepoolest koguneda taas siia saali ja kuulata, kuidas siis juba emeriitpresident Meri kuulutab pidulikult ülemineku lõppenuks, 21. sajandi lävi ületatuks ning pika ja raske 20. sajandi uks suletuks.



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eesti kirjanduse ja lingvistika õppejõud, Simon Fraseri Ülikooli interdistsiplinaarsete uuringute osakond, Vancouver, Kanada; 1984–1988 analüütik ja uuriija, Raadio Vaba Euroopa uurimis-osakond, München, Saksamaa; 1988–1993 juhataja, Raadio Vaba Euroopa Eesti toimetuse, München, Saksamaa; 1993–1996 Eesti Vabariigi suursaadik Ameerika Ühendriikides, Kanada ja Mehhikos. 1996–1998, 1999 Eesti Vabariigi välisminister.

THE ESTONIAN STATE AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Wolfgang Drechsler

I. Mis on Eesti Riik?

1. The Question and Its Consequences

It continues to be my belief that

The fundamental challenge to Estonia is still a restoration or creation of the concept of the state, indeed of the *polis*, of the human living together. The chosen option of Estonia, Democracy, needs to be filled out and given meaning, and the chosen form of the allocation of scarce resources, the (more or less free) market economy, does not function without a well-functioning state either. Arguably, almost all major problems Estonia is facing right now are related to questions of what the state is or should be. (Drechsler 1997, 11)

In a lecture on the Estonian state at the threshold of the 21st Century this, then, must be my topic — all the more so as today's honoree, President Lennart Meri, is by what I believe to be more than mere luck or coincidence surely the leading thinker of this the main "Estonian question" also: the question, "*Mis on Eesti Riik?*"

The question is, again, of crucial importance, not only as such, but because only from there can I proceed; only

from the answer to this question can I answer any of the other questions facing Estonia today; questions that will shape Estonia's future. To use the old story, if you know where you are going, even an inch of progress in that direction will get you closer to your goal; if you don't have a goal, circling the earth with the speed of light will get you nowhere and you will actually stay where you are.

As an example, allow me to use a field in the area of my Chair — one that is of special interest to President Meri as well (see Meri 1999c), *viz. riigireform*, especially Public Administration and local government reform. Let us take the forever-debated question of the optimal size of a local community. The answer: There isn't any. It depends, and that is consensus amongst all who internationally and professionally deal with this matter, on the *telos*, i.e. the goal or aim or vision of what a local community should be, within a given state; on the historical, factual, relational and structural context; and on the tasks allotted to local government and the subsequent question of whether the means to fulfill them are made available. (See Drechsler 1999b)

On a higher level, this is true with *haldusreform* generally. How can you have administrative reform without knowing your goal? As President Meri has said, "We can be harmed by our lack of modern knowledge about ruling the society, especially about ruling the state." (Meri 1999c) Truly so: But I need to have a state concept to go ahead. I need to know what I want and what I can do and what there is; once I know that, I can go ahead. Anything else is sheer activism; there is no one sensible step that is sensible without context. (See Drechsler with Esta 1998) We University of Tartu types are often criticized in Tallinn for always wanting to ponder these things first: "We have not enough time for that!", the average minister or chancellor exclaims. Wrong: Estonia has not enough time *not* to think, for practice without

theory, as Kant says, is not practice at all, but just “doing things”, mere activism. (Kant 1912/1923, 275–277)

2. Asking the Question

Thus, my task would be today to do honor to the question, “*Mis on Eesti Riik?*” However, if I don’t want to give a Sunday speech on this, I will run into problems, because this is a field of taboos, explicit and implicit, in Estonia not more but also not less so than in other countries. The reason for this tension can be understood by looking at the approach of Leo Strauss: the definition of a *polis* by the options it has chosen to call truths. (See Strauss 1988 together with Strauss 1972) If one as much as discusses these truths, one calls them options, and the *polis* can not allow this if it wants to survive — to survive in the given form, at least. Thus, if one would want to discuss such a topic, one would have to do so in code, or the *polis* will — and may — punish the perpetrator, who however needs the *polis* to survive at all. That, in this context, is the significance of the death of Socrates. On the other hand, the *polis* needs the challenge as well if it does not want to become an empty shell. And this is especially true in times of overall paradigm shifts. (Cf. Kuhn 1998)

I think, however, that in the case of this conference honoring Lennart Meri’s 70th birthday, this is not so much of a problem, because a serious and respectful analysis, which a speech on this topic by a consummate insider-outsider like me will hopefully be, means to take Estonia seriously. As I am not tired to say, I remain the only elected foreign professor at this the only genuine university in the country, and as such, since arriving here in 1993, I have always approached Estonia in this way: I have refused to “give breaks” because of past or size,

because I see Estonians in the way Lennart Meri described them in his famous 1996 Überseeclub speech:

Die Esten sind keineswegs in der Rolle eines frustrierten Bittstellers oder als potentielle Trittbrettfahrer auf der europäischen Bühne erschienen, sondern als gleichberechtigte, integrale Teilnehmer unseres gemeinsamen Geschehens, als aktive, selbstbewußte Mitgestalter der europäischen Lebenswelt. (Meri 1996)

Last year, Lennart Meri has stated, "I see the Estonian people longing to leave the early spring freedom behind and to reach the recognition of necessity." (Meri 1998b) This is exactly it. To get ready for the 21st Century, I think that Estonia has to slowly and cautiously not so much leave, but expand and reshape, some key concepts and symbols of identity, because it has to look into the future, yet these concepts are the core of the definition of the state.

3. The Three Concepts

I am sure, therefore, that you will not be too upset with me for what follows, although I will have to look at the most famous Estonian taboos or myths that are *loci* of identity, or proclaimed ones at least, and then ask, are they still useful for the times to come, or were they, *in that given shape*, useful during times of oppression but might not be, *if not somehow developed*, the best guiding stars for the new millennium?

And these assumptions would, I think, first of all be the following:

1. the continuous existence of the Republic of Estonia since 1918,
2. the identification of nation and state, of society and state, and that means: of ethnic Estonian society and state, and

3. the identity-creating function of the Estonian language.

All of these concepts were indeed and without the shadow of a doubt excellent means to survive German, Russian, and Soviet suppression and to maintain Estonian identity. And the record of Estonia in regaining and re-establishing its independence and itself is so spectacular and spellbinding that I cannot even begin to adequately do it justice here.

Just in case there are problems with these aforementioned concepts, however, and problems caused by them, i.e., if they are ambivalent, should one not examine them, if in a most careful way, and see what one can do with them, without abolishing them? Lennart Meri has said that "in Estonia, a scientist means a schoolmaster squared" (Meri 1998b); I am sorry I am not that. I think the role of the scholar is to second-guess, often to disagree, to present other options, to further the discourse without which the *polis* will die.

If we are, and we are, in Estonia living a time of paradigm shift from emancipation to full-fledged, up-to-par state- and nationhood, and if the 21st Century demands from us here to look ahead, then we had better face up to the challenge. As Aristotle says in the *Politika*, "a state comes into existence for the purpose of ensuring survival, and it continues to exist for the purpose of the good life". (Arist., Pol. I 1252b) And as Marsilius of Padua comments upon this passage, the latter, the good life, "is the perfect final cause of the state." (*Defensor pacis* I. IV.1.) Estonia has accomplished the first goal, there is no doubt; let us now attend to the second.

II. The Three Concepts

1. The Dual Nature of the Estonian State

So, let me get to the trickiest point right away, and that is the concept that the Estonian State is 81 years old. Lennart Meri has said it extremely passionately:

We have had and we have one state [in continuity from 1918 and then through the Soviet occupation to the present day], not two or three different states. May the severity of this statement be understood by those post-Soviet pocket philosophers who are gnawing at our roots. You can't get away with it, gentlemen! We have one and only one state, one and only one Estonia! Through this principle of continuity we have defined ourselves, and through this we are perceived and understood by all the nations of the world. (Meri 1998a)

Admittedly, this view has indeed served Estonia well in the past. Will it continue to do so in the times to come, if left just like that? Or is this view not perhaps also at the root of many problems? Is it at least not an ambivalent one which does, e.g., not allow us to differentiate between state and society, with all the consequences for an integrated *polis*? (Cf. also Tallo 1995, 125)

Law does not help us here to find an answer. The German jurist Wilfried Fiedler has recently and comprehensively discussed the general subject of state successions from that perspective, and he has come to the conclusion that we really do not know. (Fiedler 1997) What we can take from him is the information that we are more or less open, for all that international law gives us are fictions, assumptions, and constructs which are no primaries but constitute an expression of will.¹

To answer this question on a genuine philosophical or state-theoretical level, the mind of any normative-ontologically inclined person will quickly turn to the book I already cited, the *Politika*, one the importance of which I cannot stress enough: a book that is so towering and so eminent as to hold an overpowering truth-assumption. Aristotle was not for nothing called The Philosopher for centuries; and whatever one says about him, a “post-Soviet pocket philosopher” he is not. On the identity of states, Aristotle has this to say:

When may one say that the state is the same, or another one? ... as the state is a partnership, more precisely: a partnership of citizens within a constitution, then, when the type of government changes and becomes different, it may be supposed that the state is no longer the same, just as a tragic chorus is different from a comic one, although the members of both may be identical. ... But if this is so, then it is evident that a state is most probably then the same when the constitution is the same. (Arist., Pol. III 1276a–b)

So, what do we do? It seems that we cannot reject either statement, for neither is Meri likely to be wrong in specifics nor Aristotle in general. If, however, both statements are true, and they must be, for one is Aristotle’s and one is Meri’s, but if they contradict each other, then they must only appear to treat the same subject. And indeed this is so, or can be made so.

The answer seems to me — and this is both purely speculative and purely heuristic — to lie in a *Zwei-Reiche-Lehre* of a special kind. Somewhat analogous to Ernst Kantorowicz’ famous concept of the Two Bodies of the King (Kantorowicz 1997), could we not conceive of a *dual nature of the Estonian State*, of which one is durable, and the other subject to the Aristotelian formulation?

What can I mean by that? Well, when a thief breaks into your house and smashes a coffee cup, the coffee cup is broken, never mind the legitimacy of that act. But the state is not a coffee cup. On 24 February 1918, I would therefore submit, two interrelated Estonian states were founded. It is very useful for this theory that there had been no such thing as an Estonian state before, because thus we have a birth-date for both — and for the sake of argument, we could call them *Eesti Riik* and *Eesti Vabariik*. The latter would be a concrete, time-and-space-related entity, subject to rational and factual changes. The former, however, would be — perhaps not eternal, but certainly long lasting. It would lie in the consociation of the Estonians within the idea of statehood, aimed at the realization of that consociation as a state, and ultimately as a good state, and it was founded together with its concrete form, through what I think can be called the will of the Estonian people.

I think I am not in violation of Ockham's Razor here, because I am not multiplying entities needlessly, but rather for a serious purpose. Even the strongest protagonists of continuity seem to be so insistent and stringent about it that they, too, must privately have the eerie feeling that something is shaky with that view. However, this view can be completely *aufgehoben* in the concept of the *Zwei Reiche*; it does not need to be abolished, but it persists — and it even persists in a strengthened way.

How would these two states be interrelated? Probably we can make use here of the Platonic concept of μέθεξις (*methexis*), of "*Teilhabe des Einzelnen am Allgemeinen*" (Gadamer 1991, 133) of participation of the things that exist in the ideas. And as my teacher Hans-Georg Gadamer has phrased it, "*wo das Eine ist, ist auch das Andere. Das Teil ist 'im Ganzen' da. ... die Paradoxie einer Teilhabe, die nicht einen Teil nimmt, sondern am Ganzen teilhat — wie der Tag am Licht der Sonne*". (134) The *Eesti Vabariik*, which we now would

be able to call *Eesti Vabariik II*, would then participate in the *Eesti Riik*, just as the *Eesti Vabariik I* had: both would be to a large extent *Ausformungen*, partial incarnations, of the *Riik*. (It may even be so that, according to Aristotle or, say, the French model, it would be more accurate to speak of two or even three *Eesti Vabariigid* having existed during the first period of independence.) There was no *Eesti Vabariik* between 1940 and 1991, but there always was the legitimate, and *real*, *Eesti Riik*. I would perhaps only digress from strict Platonism by saying that the *Vabariik* would also influence and reshape the *Riik* to some extent.

And what is, then, this *Eesti Riik*? Once we are dealing with the “enemies of open society” anyway, we might as well enlist the help of Hegel in addition to Plato. And then we would be at some liberty to conceive of the *Eesti Riik*, but not of the *Eesti Vabariik*, as “*Der Staat [als] die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Idee*” (Hegel 1921, § 257). That idea changes by necessity through its interrelationship with the form, with the *Eesti Vabariik*, i.e. when it is concretized. Thus, even the *Eesti Riik* today is, while substantially the same, still different from what it was, say, in 1920 or 1930 or 1965. *Die Wirklichkeit der sittlichen Idee* has become different because of the changes within and without Estonia, not the least here being the demographic ones, and the new form of the *Eesti Vabariik* will need to become part of it, because the idea is the moral one. I would in fact wonder whether the *Eesti Vabariik* is not only as good as it comes close to the model, the challenge, and the utopia, perhaps, of the *Eesti Riik*.

The internal advantages of this view are, I hope, obvious. It will also make major constitutional reform (see Meri 1999b), as well as the transition into the European Union, much easier. As regards the latter, once the EU comes into its own, I would think it eminently legitimate

to speak of an *Eesti Vabariik III*, but again also, and only, as a form of the *Eesti Riik*.

If I would not be afraid of appearing to flatter too much, I would now speculate on and say that perhaps Lennart Meri himself can be seen as a liaison, a linchpin, between *Eesti Riik* and *Eesti Vabariik* in his own person, for he really, directly, and immediately relates to the *Riik* as such as well. The two, then, would almost be ruled in a kind of *Personalunion*, and thus be even more clearly connected. Perhaps, within this concept, the best president is that: *methexis* personified.

2. State and Society

The eminent Canadian psychologist John Berry, perhaps the leading contemporary authority in cross-cultural psychology, has recently said here in Estonia:

Imagine a third of your population never having a vote, never having rights of access to government, to higher education, and to higher levels of the economy. The psychological and social residue that will be created by that situation would require you to bar your windows and lock up your children. We see signs of this in other societies that have produced a large proportion of their population as marginal to the mainstream. I think the potential cost of permanently degrading a portion of your society is far greater than the cost of letting them in, opening up, accommodating them in return for some accommodation on their part, mutual accommodation. (Berry in Drechsler 1998a, 285)

Now, this is certainly a horror scenario and not a description of Estonian reality today. However, if we accept this as tendency and threat, then the solution to that problem might lie in some Hegelianization of the relationship of state and society in Estonia which, on the

background of the *Zwei-Reiche-Lehre*, should be altogether much easier.

The Hegelian idea of the State is of course that it is distinct from society, as being more and higher, as being the sphere that is about the common good and not about the interests of individuals and groups, which marks society. (Hegel 1921, e.g., §§ 258, 289, 349) Or better, this is not a Hegelian, but a classical and to some extent even commonsensical view; it only comes into full force with Hegel. And here, we can fully count on Lennart Meri's support, who has said: "The state is able to function only when the common interests of society prevail over its divergent interests." (Meri 1998a; see also the last paragraph of Meri 1999c)

This concept would permit us to be more inclusionary and to deal with the fact that at least for now, and I think for the foreseeable future, there are two distinct societies within Estonia, but so far only one of them also "owns" the state. If we accept the Hegelian dichotomy, which is not exactly fashionable but might be helpful in this specific instance, we can solve this problem at least in part to an appreciable degree. The — concrete — state, the *Eesti Vabariik*, is then some sort of "umbrella", it gives a framework for society. (See Drechsler 1998a, 285)

This admittedly is not the perfect open society, to be sure, but the perfect society is not open without limits either. I think that only very few political thinkers are left at the end of the 20th Century who would hold the once-fashionable view that the state should just form an arena for the competition of interest groups, and that this would somehow produce democracy and perhaps even liberty at the same time.

Whether the state-society divide is realistically acceptable in Estonia or not is difficult to say. Professor Mati Heidmets pointed out earlier, in answer to this suggestion of mine that "the psychological dilemma for

many Estonians is — do we let the Russians also own this same state? This is a barrier to overcome". (Heidmets in Drechsler 1998a, 287) But in the constitutional reform that the *Eesti Vabariik* in my opinion certainly needs and is facing up to, perhaps that option could already, at least in the back of one's mind, be considered.

3. Language: Source or Form of National Identity?

Now to the third concept, and a particularly tricky one for myself personally. Language: is that really what makes Estonia great? Is that really what is constitutive of the Estonian identity? Does the insistence on this language primacy not also lead to problems; is it not also ambivalent? It is often said that what makes Estonia special is that "We are the only Estonian State in the world. The only one where the Estonian language is spoken and where we think our thoughts in this tongue." (Meri 1999c)

But that does not answer the question about the *primacy* of language. A central Estonian national myth, I think, is that language is seen as the *source* of Estonian identity, and this, in turn, lies at the heart of many problems and ambivalences of the state, especially as far as its future is concerned. But objectively, at least as much as one can be objective, I would say that in this formulation, this is not true.²

Regarding the development of Lübeckian Law in Tallinn, Meri wondered "whether legal science ... does not mix up cause and effect. ... Can, nay, do we want to make a difference between cause and effect? ... Cities are not born from municipal law, but municipal law is born from the cities." (Meri 1999a, 153, 154) Could it not be the same with national culture, identity, *Geist*? Which is primary: Estonian identity or Estonian language?

Now, I would be the last one to underrate the power of language, and its key function in the identity/culture/spirit cluster. And certainly:

*Time that is intolerant
Of the brave and innocent,
And indifferent in a week
To a beautiful physique,
Worships language and forgives
Everyone by whom it lives.*

(Auden 1979, 82)

Lennart Meri has said, "In contrast to Germany, in Estonia the word is still today a weighty source of history, the main carrier of our identity." (Meri 1999a) The main carrier, maybe. But a carrier is not a source.

And was it ever really so in Germany? The 8 λόγος (*logos*), perhaps, might play that role; but does *logos* really only mean "word"? Almost 200 years ago the greatest master of the German language wrote in the greatest drama ever written:

*Geschrieben steht: "Im Anfang war das Wort!"
Hier stock ich schon! Wer hilft mir weiter fort?
Ich kann das Wort so hoch unmöglich schätzen,
Ich muß es anders übersetzen,
Wenn ich vom Geiste recht erleuchtet bin.*

(Goethe 1808)

Language, Ladies and Gentlemen, is hardly primary. As none less than the great Estonian linguist Els Oksaar has said, "linguistic determinism", the view that perception and thinking are determined by language, "is not able to withstand empirical testing." (Oksaar 1989, 214) In times of crisis and oppression especially, language may be the repository or depository of identity, partially because it is such an easily definable and recognizable mark of differentiation.

But generally speaking, language is only an *Ausformung*, a result, a taking shape of the spirit, which of course it also influences in one way or another and to an appreciable degree. (Perhaps there is a parallel to the *methexis* of the *Eesti Vabariik* in the *Eesti Riik*.) And lyrical poetry in its highest form is indeed not translatable, just as any translation is interpretation, which is why we stay in the original language, for instance, in philosophy as much as we can. (See Drechsler 1998b) Thus, Estonia certainly needs to promote its language, to honor it, to be grateful to it.

But if, God forbid, it would vanish, which it will not, would Estonia vanish? Better: would it *now* vanish in such a case? If the language organically changes over time, as it does, will the Estonian *Geist* lose? Will the Estonian *logos*? I think not; they are much too strong and by far too substantial for that.

III. From Here into the New Millennium

Let me for my concluding segment go on with this thought and start with the preceding speaker, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, and with his in my opinion profound insight that Estonia is, or can be, made, or can be made to look, "the only post-Soviet Nordic country". (Ilves 1999) I would also say that the future of Estonia does not lie in folklore, introspection, parochialization, and provincialism. I would say that the future and the relevance of this small but great nation does not lie in the unreflected continuation of concepts which have served well to survive oppression in specific situations that have passed, and — as I believe — have passed forever.

And there is that European, that 21st Century Estonia; the modern and traditional, the competent, exciting, and dynamic Estonia; an Estonia with a very specific spirit — individualist, independent, and sceptical. When Ilves was

asked what an optimal souvenir from Estonia would be, he said it was definitely not woolen socks but an Arvo Pärt CD. (Ilves 1999) He is completely right, of course: The Arvo Pärt CD does symbolize better what Estonia is, or better, what Estonia should become, than any wool-sock ever could, never mind the fact that wool-socks can be nice and warm and that they most assuredly have their proper place.

But the new century is at least *also* the time of the Pärt CD, and of what it stands for, if Estonia wants to be a full member of Europe — and *without* losing its identity, for what could be more Estonian *and* European, indeed international? This is as genuine an expression of the Estonian *logos* as there ever was. “I just don’t think that the ethnographization of Estonia is something we need”, as Ilves has said. (1999) True enough — not only externally, to sell Estonia, but also internally, for its own sake.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is why it might be interesting to ponder what I said: Can one not also conceive of a concept of the Estonian state that, as my Two-Empires model, allows for both realism and idealism, without being exclusionary? Can one not also conceive of the Estonian state as something separate, and perhaps at this point a bit more neutral and a bit more aloof, from society or one of its parts? Can one not also recognize that the greatness of Estonia and the Estonian spirit is expressed in, and to a good extent carried by, but not created by, the Estonian language, with all implications that such recognition might have?

I could very well understand if you would disagree with my questions and certainly with my suggestions for answers, but please remember that the idea of all this deliberation is not speculation for its own sake, but the approach to what to me seem to be real problems caused in part by concepts — concepts that one neither wants nor needs to abolish, but which one can expand in such a

way that the problems at hand acquire prospects for solution. If they are not, it's not the end of the world, or of Estonia, either; but if they are solved, I think we would be much closer to what Aristotle means when he talks about the Good Life in the Good State.

And it is made much easier in this rare case where the President of the country is the embodiment of *riigimõtlemine*, as is the case with Estonia right now. Only someone with a mind for *both* past and future can channel and help the present. If there is an Estonian *polis*, it is to a large extent due to the towering historical and intellectual figure of Lennart Meri standing at its helm. Not only Estonia, but also Europe, owes him for that, but surely, Estonia first.³

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
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Notes

- ¹ However, one might say that the *faktische völkerrechtliche Anerkennung* of a takeover is of crucial importance for Fiedler, that because of this reason the use of legal fiction in *Völkerrecht* does not satisfy him, but that for the Baltic States he seems to tend towards the construction of a concept of "*wiedererrichtete Staaten*", or "*scheintote Staaten*", since "*auf diese Weise wird die Zeitspanne des Unterganges überbrückt und kann die Rechtsträgerschaft für Zukunft und Vergangenheit mit der Annahme staatlicher Kontinuität gesichert werden.*" But of course, this is a legal construct that has the permanence of the given state as the goal; it does not add anything to genuinely solving the problem at hand, as even Fiedler generally admits in his final paragraph. The same is true with the development of a *Staatspersönlichkeit* and *Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit* (Fiedler 1997), although this is in some respects in parallel with the solution I suggest below.
- ² It is often argued that, if an ethnic Russian speaks excellent Estonian, he or she is regarded to be "one of us" by the Estonians. However, I do not think that this is really the case; recent empirical data on wage differences (Kroncke and Smith 1999) also suggest otherwise.
- ³ I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues — and, as I believe, model Estonian patriots —, the Hon. Ivar Tallo MP, Tiina Randma MPA, and especially Rainer Kattel MA, for their for such a complex and dangerous topic truly indispensable help. It goes without saying, however, that all views expressed are not theirs but mine. Further thanks for specific hints go to Illimar Ploom, Daimar Liiv Esq., and Piret Nahk.
- ⁴ All www-links were valid as of the end of March 1999. The translations from Aristotle and Marsilius of Padua, while in good part based on earlier ones, are my own.



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Professor Drechsler's independent publications include *Die selbstverwaltete Gemeinde* (1999, ed.), *On the Eminence of the Social Sciences* at the University of Dorpat (1998, Aula Lecture, also in Estonian), *Foundations of Public Administration* (1997, ed., in Estonian; some translations forthcoming), *Johann Ulrich v. Cramer's Opuscula* (5 vols., 1996, ed.), *Andrew D. White in Germany* (1989), and theme issues of *World Affairs on Estonia in Transition* (1995) and *Reforming Higher Education and Research in Eastern Germany* (1992).

**REKTOR PROFESSOR JAAK AAVIKSOO
KÕNE KONVERENTSIL
"EESTI MAAILMAS 21. SAJANDI KÜNNISEL"**

Austatud vilistlane Lennart Meri, mu daamid ja härrad!

Me oleme veidi rohkem kui tunni pühendanud arutlustele, missugune on ja missugune võiks olla Eesti riik 21. sajandi künnisel, millal see künnis ületatud saab ja kas me oleme siis paremad või halvemad kui täna, ja isegi natukene selle üle, kas me olemegi meie ise või hoopis keegi teine, siis, kui oleme hiljutise ajaloo jäädavalt seljataha jättnud ja ukse kinni tõmmanud, nagu siin vähem kui tund aega tagasi öeldi.

Ühte- või teistpidi puudutavad kõik need küsimused identiteeti või vastuse otsimist sellele, kes me oleme ja kuhu me läheme. Ja imelisel kombel on see üks universaalsemaid küsimusi ilmselt mitte ainult eestlaste, vaid kõikide rahvaste ja inimeste jaoks. Ja mitte ainult Euroopas, vaid kogu maailmas. Aga ühte- või teistpidi on meile saatus andnud ülesande praegusel etapil mõelda endast eelkõige Euroopa kontekstis.

Nelja päeva eest, talle aasta eurooplase auhinna ülevõtmisel pidas Lennart Meri kõne teemal "Kui suur on Euroopa?". See küsimus oli esitatud auditooriumile, kes valdavalt arvas teadvat, nagu paljud siingi saalis viibivatest inimestest, vastust. Kui mitte teadlikku, siis vähemalt alateadlikku, enesestmõistetavat või iseenesest tekkivat ja olemasolevat vastust. Aasta eurooplane ei teadnud vastust, ma kardan, et ta ei tea seda tänagi — ta püüdis seda

leida koos oma kuulajatega Pariisis, ta on püüdnud seda leida aastaid, on otsinud vastust kaugelt Euroopa geograafiliste piiride tagantki ja võib-olla pole liialduseta öelda, et need väsimatud Euroopa identiteedi otsingud ongi toonud talle Euroopa tunnustuse.

Euroopa identiteedi olemuse mõistmine on Euroopa võti 21. sajandisse, kõigi tema rahvaste võti, ent vahest palju enam kui paljude teiste rahvaste jaoks on see võti Balti riikide rahvaste jaoks. Identiteet ei ole geograafia ega geneetika, ei ole poliitika, ei ole rahvus. Euroopa identiteedi mõistmiseks on Meri selsamal, mõne päeva eest toimunud üritusel toonud kujundi kolmemõõtmelisest Euroopast, kus lisaks kahele geograafilisele dimensioonile on lisatud kolmas, sügavuse mõõde, meie ajalugu. Aegade algusest läbi paleoliitikumi, läbi Kreeka tragöödiate ja Rooma õiguse, läbi valgustusaja sünnitatud väärtuste inimõiguste paradigmani kulgenud ühine tee on selle identiteedi loonud, seda identiteeti kujutanud ja muutnud, mõneski kohas tundmatuseni, loonud selle identiteedi, mille tugevus peaks meid aitama uuel aastatuhandel toime tulla. Toime tulla ei tähenda tegelikult ju mitte midagi muud kui kesta läbi aja.

Seega on identiteet kui iseäralik ajaloolistest kogemustest koostatud reisiraamat, mille iga inimene ja iga rahvas enda jaoks oma elureisi kestel taasloob. Iga niisugune reis kulgeb mööda teed, jätab midagi seljataha ja seda seljataha jäetut mõõdavad ja seda teed tähistavad versta-postid. Hipparchos laskis Ateenast deemostesse viivate teede äärde versta-postidena üles seada piilarikujulisi tulpasid, mis kujutasid jumal Hermese pead ja mida seetõttu nimetati hermideks. Hilisemal ajal ei kujutanud hermid mitte ainult jumalaid, armastatud olid kuulsaid luuletajaid kujutavad kaksikhermid, mis ülikute kodasid kaunistasid.

Ühe kinnituseks sellele, et ka meie siin Eestis oleme neid iidseid Ateena teid käinud, sellelt teelt oma reisiraamatusse kirjutanud ja seekaudu oma identiteeti kujun-

danud, on ülikooli muuseumis leiduv kaksikherm, mis kujutab Sophoklest ja Euripidest ning mille koopia seisab siin teie eest laval. Kaks suurt tragöödiakirjanikku, kelle looming on oluliselt mõjutanud kogu hilisemat Euroopa kirjandust ja seega eesti kirjandust ning kes on osakesed meie ühisest identiteedist. Nende kirjameeste teosed olid vastuste otsingud küsimustele, millest lähtudes peab inimene tegema otsuseid, milline on tema vastutuse määra, kuidas tunda piiri hea ja halva vahel, mis on õige ja mis on vale. Ja need küsimused on ka meie küsimused 21. sajandi künnisel seisvas Eestis. Identiteet on ühine, ent inimesed on erinevad. Kirjanikuna edukas, poliitikuna mõjukas ja populaarne Sophokles ühelt poolt ja skeptiku, süvitsi juurdleja ja püsiväärtustes kahtlejana tuntud Euripides teiselt poolt sümboliseerivad ühtsust erinevustes, sümboliseerivad Euroopa tugevust.

Lugupeetud kohalviibijad, tänane konverents püüdis omalt poolt piiritleda Eestit maailmas 21. sajandi künnisel. Selle konverentsi korraldamisega püüdis Tartu Ülikool tunnustada seda tööd, mida meie *alma materi* vilistlane Lennart Meri on teinud oma kirjandusliku ja poliitilise loominguga Eesti kestmise heaks.

Igal teel on tähised ja seepärast lubage mul tänase konverentsi puhul, meie arutluste kokkuvõtmise puhul anda Tartu Ülikooli, Tartu linna ja tartlaste poolt ning Tartu vaimu nimel see identiteeti kande kaksikherm üle Lennart Merile tema isikliku 70. verstaposti tähiseks.



Prof. JAAK AAVIKSOO on sündinud 11. jaanuaril 1954. aastal Tartus.

1971 lõpetas Tartu II Keskkooli, 1976 TRÜ füüsika-keemiateaduskonna *cum laude* ja asus seejärel tööle Füüsika Instituuti. 1981 kaitses väitekirja, milles esmakordselt jälgiti kuuma luminestsentsi nähtust molekulaarkristallides.

Prof J. Aaviksoo on osalenud pikosekundspektroskoopia uurimissuuna rajamisel Tartus; on uurinud eksitonide dünaamikat molekulaar- ja pooljuhtkristallides ning kvantstruk-

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1987–1988 ja 1989 töötas Jaak Aaviksoo A. von Humboldti Fondi stipendiaadina Stuttgardis, 1990 külalisprofessorina Pariisi VII ülikoolis ja 1991 Osaka ülikoolis. 1992. a. valiti ta TÜ optika ja spektroskoopia professoriks, sama aasta juunis TÜ prorektoriks. 1995. aasta novembris nimetati J. Aaviksoo kultuuri- ja haridusministriks, alates 1. jaanuarist 1996 haridusministriks, kellena töötas 1996. aasta novembrini, seejärel naases tööle ülikooli eksperimentaalfüüsika ja tehnoloogia instituudi juhatajaks. 1995 valiti prof J. Aaviksoo Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia liikmeks täppisteaduste alal. 1998. a. Tartu Ülikooli rektor.

Prof Aaviksoo on avaldanud üle saja teadustöö, sh 43 artiklit rahvusvahelistes ajakirjades, osalenud üle 30 rahvusvahelisel teadusfoorumil ning esinenud loengutega mitmes ülikoolis (Saksamaal, Prantsusmaal, USAs, Jaapanis, Šveitsis jm). Ta on Eesti Füüsika Seltsi asutaja ja esimene esimees, Infoühiskonna Foorumi liige, Eesti Teadus- ja Arendusnõukogu ning Vabariigi Presidendi akadeemilise nõukogu liige. Haridusministrina käivitas Tiigrihüppe nime all tuntuks saanud koolide arvutistamise programmi.

