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The change and continuity in the securitization of EU energy  
narrative(s) and policy in light of Russia's aggression against  
Ukraine 2014-2022: The case of the European Parliament

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## **Abstract**

The research aims to examine the securitization process of energy policy that has been addressed in the European Parliament debates in light of Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2022 while assessing the correlation between the securitization process and the concept of resilience. Bearing in mind that the Union has long been highly dependent on external energy supply, especially Russian-produced fossil fuels such as gas and oil. Apart from the energy dependency, the ideological differences between Russia and the EU consequently influence their geopolitical ambitions, projects, energy narratives, and policies. Such energy dynamics have long existed since the 2000s and have deteriorated.

The time frame of the research was set from 2014 to 2022 to trace the progression of the change and continuity of narratives since the Annexation of Crimea in 2014. The research focuses heavily on the inter-subjective dynamics among the political groups during parliamentary debates, which consequently influenced the framing of threats, especially Russia, as a threat to European energy security. Therefore, the research set up a background of a contested European Union regarding the perspectives on Russia's role in European energy governance and the exercise of energy policies, despite the European Commission's effort to provide consistent energy narrative and policies.

The research findings identified that four narratives tend to be present in terms of energy/energy security during parliamentary debates. In addition, the EU energy discourses and policies tend to lean towards resilient-oriented measures such as fundamental and sustainable change of policies that correspond with the Union's climate-neutral goals. With regards to the four narratives produced, on the one hand, the EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA groups shared a similar narrative of Russia as a malign influence on European energy security since 2014; on the other, was the Eurosceptic Left and ID group that would instead go 'business as usual' with Russia. Nevertheless, the severity of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had the entire parliament taken aback while voicing support for implementing emergency measures, highlighting the technical aspect of the securitization process instead of the 'speech act'.

Lastly, the research concluded that despite innate internal contestation, the European Parliament can act as a securitizing actor when undergoing exogenous shock. Moreover, the narrative produced by the European Commission and Parliament can have an interlocking effect enhancing the Union's decision-making process.

Key words: Energy security, EU, Securitization, Resilience, European Parliament, Narrative analysis

## Streszczenie

Dystertacja ma na celu zbadanie procesu sekurytyzacji polityki energetycznej, który został poruszony w debatach Parlamentu Europejskiego w świetle agresji Rosji na Ukrainę w 2022 r., przy jednoczesnej analizie korelacji między procesem sekurytyzacji a koncepcją odporności. Unia Europejska od dawna jest silnie uzależniona od zewnętrznych dostaw energii, zwłaszcza paliw kopalnych produkowanych w Rosji, takich jak gaz i ropa naftowa. Oprócz zależności energetycznej, różnice ideologiczne między Rosją a UE wpływają na ich ambicje geopolityczne, projekty, narracje energetyczne i politykę. Taka dynamika energetyczna istniała od dawna od 2000 roku i uległa pogłębieniu.

Ramy czasowe badań zostały ustalone na lata 2014-2022, aby prześledzić postęp zmian i ciągłość narracji od czasu aneksji Krymu w 2014 roku. Badania koncentrują się w dużej mierze na intersubiektywnej dynamice między grupami politycznymi podczas debat parlamentarnych, co w konsekwencji wpłynęło na kształtowanie zagrożeń, zwłaszcza Rosji, jako zagrożenia dla europejskiego bezpieczeństwa energetycznego. W związku z tym, badania ustanowiły tło kontestowanej Unii Europejskiej w odniesieniu do perspektyw roli Rosji w europejskim zarządzaniu energią i realizacji polityki energetycznej, pomimo wysiłków Komisji Europejskiej na rzecz zapewnienia spójnej narracji i polityki energetycznej.

Wyniki badań wykazały, że podczas debat parlamentarnych występują cztery narracje dotyczące energii i bezpieczeństwa energetycznego. Ponadto dyskursy i polityki energetyczne UE skłaniają się ku środkom zorientowanym na odporność, takim jak fundamentalna i zrównoważona zmiana polityki, która odpowiada neutralnym dla klimatu celom Unii. W odniesieniu do czterech stworzonych narracji, z jednej strony grupy EPP, S&D, Renew i Zieloni/EFA podzielały podobną narrację o Rosji jako złośliwym wpływie na europejskie bezpieczeństwo energetyczne od 2014 roku; z drugiej strony była eurosceptyczna grupa Lewicy i ID, która zamiast tego kontynuowałaby "interesy jak zwykle" z Rosją. Niemniej jednak skala rosyjskiej inwazji na Ukrainę w 2022 r. zaskoczyła cały parlament, który wyraził poparcie dla wdrożenia środków nadzwyczajnych, podkreślając techniczny aspekt procesu sekurytyzacji zamiast "aktu mowy".

Wreszcie, badania wykazały, że pomimo wewnętrznej polaryzacji, Parlament Europejski może działać jako podmiot sekurytyzujący, gdy przechodzi szok egzogeniczny. Co więcej, narracja tworzona przez Komisję Europejską i Parlament Europejski może mieć wzajemnie powiązany efekt wzmacniający proces decyzyjny Unii.

Słowa kluczowe: Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne, UE, sekurytyzacja, odporność, Parlament Europejski, narracja

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## List of Abbreviations

AGIR – The Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative

ALDE – Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

CEE – Central-Eastern Europe (European)

CEF – Connecting Europe Facility

CV– Conditional Variable(s)

DV – Dependent Variable(s)

EaP – Eastern Partnership

EC – The European Commission (The Commission)

ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists Group

ECT – Energy Charter Treaty

EEA – European Environment Agency

EEAS – European External Action Service

EFDD – Europe of Nations and Freedom Group

ENP – European Neighborhood Policy

ENTSO – European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas

EP – The European Parliament (The Parliament)

EPP – The European People’s Party

EU – The European Union (The Union)

Greens/EFA – Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

GUE/NGL – Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left

ID – Identity and Democracy

IEA – International Energy Agency

IntV – Intervening Variable(s)

IV – Independent Variable(s)

LNG – Liquefied Natural Gas

MEP(s) – Member(s) of the European Parliament

MMR Typology – (Resilience as) Maintenance, Marginality and Renewal

NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NI – Non – Attached Members

R&D – Research and Development

Renew – Renew Europe Group

RRF – Recovery and Resilience Fund

RSCT – Regional Security Complex Theory

S&D – The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

SHARE – Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience

SoS Simulation – Security of Supply Simulations Reports

TFEU – Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union

## 1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, there has been a gradual increase in the energy import dependency in the European Union (EU), and from 2014 to 2020, the dependency rate on natural gas has risen from 70% to 90% (Eurostats, 2022). Moreover, just a year before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia became the "main EU supplier of crude oil, natural gas and solid fossil fuels in 2021", with crude oil accounting for 28% and natural gas accounting for 52% of the total imports. (Eurostat, 2023)

Contrary to the increased dependency on the Russian energy supply, the relationship between the EU and Russia has always been bumpy. It has been declining due to not only Russia's aggressive external policies and behaviors in Ukraine and the neighborhood (i.e. Georgia and Moldova) but also the unspoken geopolitical competition between the two since 2004 when the EU launched the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and then the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. Moreover, the 2006-2009 gas crisis also acted as a reminder of Russia's geopolitical manipulation that endangered European energy security. (Russell, 2020) The continuation of such a mentality can also be found in the 2019 parliamentary debate on the State of EU-Russia political relations, in which many described Russia as no longer being a reliable partner.

The deteriorating EU-Russia (energy) relations and Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 inevitably led to a securitized energy discourse in the EU, despite the continuation of Russian gas flow through Ukraine (Siddi, 2018; Szulecki & Westphal, 2018; Rada & Farkas, 2022). In 2015 the European Commission published the Energy Union strategy, which has become the dominant narrative of the EU. (Keypour & Ahmadzade, 2021) However, despite the European Commission's 'securitized' discourses and attempt to "Speak with one voice" (European Commission, 2015, p.2), the Union struggled to find common ground regarding energy policy. For instance, the stigmatization of the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Pipelines or the stagnation of the implementation of the Energy Union Package, as no fundamental policy change has been introduced to accommodate the package. In addition, with a seemingly imminent Russian threat towards energy security, as Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the EU

instead aims for long-term solutions for renewable gas production by 2030. (IEA, 2022; Lambert, 2022)

Based on the contradicting European response towards supposedly securitized energy discourses while Russian aggressions took place in 2014 and 2022, as well as a long-term oriented solution that the EU has published, this study raised the question concerning the consistency of discourses among the EU institutions. Moreover, acknowledging the existing contestation of perspective within the EU, it is essential to differentiate and categorize the contested opinions in order to see their impact on changes in energy policy. Therefore, this research proceeds to examine the European Parliament, which consists of political groups with their own political leanings and agendas, highlighting its discursive roles in parliamentary debates.

There are several goals that this study is aiming to achieve, which can be separated into two directions: the perspective from the outside and from the inside. The outside perspective signifies a broader lens, examining the EU through a more extended period and identifying narrative changes and continuity of it as a whole. In this case, the change and continuity of the Energy Union narrative since it was first published in 2015. On the other hand, from the inside perspective, the European Parliament is a venue of contestation and constant reciprocal exchange of discourses. With the routinization of such a process, this study seeks to find different storylines among these actors, in other words, the repetition of framing by each group that resulted in various narratives among the political groups. By doing so, the study reveals the reasons behind the incoherency between speech acts/policies and measures. Lastly, such incoherency could be explained by Bourbeau's framework of resiliencism, which then demonstrated the interwoven characteristics between securitization and resilience.

This study aims to answer the question: How do the political groups within the EU understand and frame energy in light of Russian aggressions that led to the securitization of energy (or not) with an interpretive discourse analysis, whilst also utilizing a frame-narrative approach to capture the dominant narrative(s). In terms of methodology, the chapter will first discuss the research design and then the methods applied in this research. The chapters will also discuss the relevant variables in detail and the operationalization of the data, where the corresponding theoretical background will be specified. Lastly, the chapter will also discuss the limitations of this study.

The study will start by giving a comprehensive discussion based on the existing literature and the trend of studies concerning the topic of energy security. The literature review will also cover the updated research in terms of the EU energy dynamics and the various interpretations of the securitization of energy, explaining the insufficiency of the Copenhagen School. The following chapter then seeks to cover an overview of the origin and the various schools of securitization, the most prominent being the Copenhagen School. By analyzing the discourses made by diverse actors, the securitization theory helped differentiate the threat perceptions of these actors. Nevertheless, the strict criteria of the traditional securitization theory would limit the interpretation of the research into a dichotomous result of securitization and not securitization. Therefore, the chapter introduced the concept of resilience and attempted to determine the correlation between securitization and resilience among the energy security discourses.

A hefty proportion will be dedicated to the chapter on research findings and discussion. The chapter will begin with the analysis of the European Commission and the identification of a securitization process and narrative based on the criteria of the Copenhagen School. The exact process will be repeated for each political group in the EP with an additional application of the frame-narrative approach to identify the dominant narrative. The findings have identified four narratives among the political groups, with two of them identified as the dominant narrative that interlocks with that of the Commission, hence the continuation of the dominant standard narrative. Moreover, the findings showed positive results regarding the complementary relations between energy securitization and resilience before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and confirmed the typology of resilience as renewal.

## **1.2 Literature review**

### **1.2.1 Contestation of framing**

The poly-crisis has the EU aiming for a more integrated union. Since 2014, the EU has been promoting a more integrated EU energy sector and a common energy policy. (European Commission, 2015; Tichy, 2019; Szulecki and Westphal, 2019) The EU's ambition towards a more integrated union was projected in the EU's leaning towards the fifth scenario of the white paper on the future of Europe: "[C]ooperation in security matters is a routine" (European

Commission, 2017, p.24) and that the EU will have established a European Defense union and is in full complementarity with NATO. In addition, it is believed that the European Commission could lead the EU by producing a more consistent representation of member states' collective voices, especially when framing the security narrative (Sperling & Webber, 2019). However, Sperling and Webber's conceptualization of the EU as a collective securitizing actor, which involves the redefinition of a threat, the referent object and the policies, and that such redefinition of a threat must be ratified and routinized by the audience, seems to be paradoxical since the definition by default implies different interpretations of the threat. In other words, the EU, or at least the European Commission, is incapable of acting as an agent of collective securitization. Nevertheless, when associating security and energy, the existing literature tends to emphasize the role of the European Commission and how it shapes the EU energy policy.

By focusing on the European Commission or the EU as one entity, the literature should have considered the consistency within the EU and how other EU institutions frame the EU energy policy. Disclaimers must be made here however: On the one hand, the EU had not gone through the recent crisis such as the pandemic, the energy crisis and the ongoing Russian-Ukraine War; therefore, a collectively securitized EU may fit into the picture at the time when the research or literature was conducted; on the other, the findings suggests that the EU could act as a collective securitization actor but not in the case of energy policy. (Hofmann & Staeger, 2019) Hofmann and Staeger's argument could be due to member states' various framing of energy security and whether they regard it as a security issue. Still, Hofmann and Staeger's analysis could encourage future research beyond emphasizing the European Commission and highlighting the diverse voices in the European Parliament. Furthermore, member states have always been entitled to prerogatives when it comes to the foreign and defense policy in the EU, which essentially suggests that the member states are the main actors in structuring the foreign and defense policy in the EU through the agency of European Parliament and the Council of European Union.

In addition, according to Naturski and Surralles, due to the variance of discourses and framing concerning energy security among EU institutions and member states, it has been challenging for these actors to achieve consensus, let alone "speak in one voice" (European Commission, 2011, Szulecki, 2017) Such contestation of framing has been in existing, and will continue to exist, as long as national identity and the perception of threat varies. Siddi (2018) discovered that the reason behind the securitization of the EU-Russia gas trade was based on the EU's

diverse national and European identity. The discourse of Russia/Russian energy as a threat began to emerge in the 2000s and was gradually securitized by the EU over the years since 2014. Siddi (2018) suggested further that there was a discursive shift (different framing) since Russia's annexation of Crimea even though "gas trade remained nearly unaffected by the crisis and the EU's dependence on Russian gas has decreased over time." (p.267) Multiple literature has validated such a discursive shift as Siddi claimed. According to Keypour & Ahmadzade, the EU has produced three strategic energy narratives since the 1990s: geopolitical considerations, market integration and competition, and a European energy union. Interestingly, each strategic narrative corresponded to a significant disruptive event: geopolitical considerations in the 90s, the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2006 and the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. In light of the current Russian-Ukraine War, which could be considered a drastic event since it has immensely disturbed the global energy market, it is interesting to examine and confirm whether there has been a change in the EU's strategic narrative once again since the Russian-Ukraine War. Finally, Siddi's analysis suggested that the change of discourse (the securitization of gas) was due to the construction of Russia as a threatening 'other' based on social constructivism rather than liberal arguments. The highlighting of such framing of energy was the most evident in Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), as opposed to Germany and other Western European nations (Siddi, 2016), which demonstrated the root of the contestation of framing energy security in the EU. (Hofmann and Staeger, 2019)

Another fact contributing to the diverse framing of security is the distinction among sectors. Buzan et al. (1998) conceptualized these sectors as "lenses or discourses rather than objectively existing phenomena [...] defined by particular constitutions of referent objects and types of threats as well as by specific forms or 'grammars' of securitization" (p.27). Such perception was argued by Judge et al. (2018) that due to the various opinions on the "essential quality of existence" by actors (p.154), despite one security logic (national/military security logic), actors may interact differently. A concrete example would be Judge and Maltby's (2017) 's analysis that the EU, as well as its member states, have been undergoing different levels of energy securitization. This is due to the difference in the referent object which is an element that can be redefined depending on the sector and the dynamics of actors, in political discourse as well as two contextual factors that "affect the treatment of energy as a 'normal', 'risk' or 'security' issue" which can be technical or political. Bearing this in mind, it is only natural that CEE countries consider energy, particularly natural gas, as a security issue, basing it on national/military security logic.

### **1.2.2 The European Parliament and energy security**

The innate contestation of framing by actors corresponds with the environment of the European Parliament, where plenary debates frequently occur among political groups with diverse ideologies and priorities. Consequently, the EP environment corresponds with what Floyd (2016) has argued: multiple actors with no defined audience produce the securitizing moves that are part of the contestation of framing. It is also important to note that the European Parliament has gradually gained more power in the EU decision-making process, especially concerning energy policies. The European Parliament's involvement in the EU energy policy has increased due to the Lisbon Treaty, which gave the Parliament co-legislative powers with the Council of the EU in several areas, including energy policy. In other words, the EP has a more significant role in shaping the EU's energy policy, especially that concerning energy security. Yet, in terms of the European Parliament, it is one EU institution that is rarely the subject of existing literature concerning the EU energy-security nexus.

Even before the repercussions of the Russian-Ukraine War, years of energy disruption revealed a vulnerable European energy system subject to energy insecurity with a lack of cohesion on energy policy. The construction and operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was such a case of controversy in the EU. In the plenary debate in the EP on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, it is commonly believed by most political groups that Putin's natural gas policy, especially when it comes to Nord Stream 2, was said to be mainly targeting the EU and that Russia might use the pipeline project to export malign Russian influence over the EU. (European Parliament, 2017b) Interestingly, each group has their own way of framing such issues: While some group members may prioritize energy security and diversification, others may prioritize renewable energy and climate change mitigation. This political diversity can make it challenging to reach a consensus on energy policy and contribute to the contestation of framing, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, such an environment in the EP allows future researchers to observe the various framing of issues within the EU.

### **1.2.3 Diversity in the logic of framing and the limitation of the Copenhagen School Framework**

While the previous section shed light on several important considerations of the contestation of energy security framing, it is necessary to delve deeper into the various types of logic and level of intensity of these frames. For instance, various schools disregard the defining component of securitization theory, such as the Welsh School and the Paris School. (See p.15) Alternatively, Heinrich and Szulecki (2019) introduced a spectrum of concepts of security framing from the least severe to a fully-fledged securitization: 'de-politicization', 'politicization', 'security jargon', 'rectification' and lastly 'securitization'. It is, therefore, an essential task to distinguish from various levels of securitization among various securitizing actors instead of simply applying the traditional Copenhagen School logic. ( Léonard and Kaunert, 2010) Some researchers, such as Judge & Maltby (2017), have suggested that the EU energy governance and policies are torn between rectification and securitization. Notably, the logic 'riskification' stems from Corry (2012)'s distinction between risk-based politics and threat-based politics. He argued that "[...] a securitization legitimates the defence of a valued referent object against an existential threat, a riskification renders an issue one of governing a valued referent object to control conditions of possibility for harm against it." (p.256) Corry made three essential points regarding if risk acts as the central concept of securitization: First, identifying existential threats would no longer be necessary. Second, risks are essentially different from threats due to their lack of immediacy; still, we cannot underestimate the impact of risk as opposed to threats. Moreover, the Copenhagen School framework has an ambiguous conceptualization of an existential threat, whether it be an actual enemy or just some symptoms of a threat. Therefore, the author believes the Copenhagen School framework resonates more with risk politics due to the "absence of an enemy doing the threatening". (Ibid., p.244) The lack of a tangible enemy is what makes securitization possible in Weaver's societal sectors. Third, "risk-security measures will tend to be permanent features of society and relatively cumulative rather than an 'emergency' nature. Securitization theory seems to be empirically under strain as security discourses fail to activate emergency measures." (Ibid., p.245)

Corry's perspective proved to be of value if one desires to dive into the field of EU energy-security nexus, as argued that energy insecurity is not a tangible enemy that one can eradicate for good. Furthermore, the EU's recent strategic moves (i.e. the Energy Union Strategy) (European Commission, 2015), as well as the European Green Deal. (European Commission,

2019) all manifested the elements of risk-based politics. In other words, long-term-based planning prioritizes not only to prevent the threat but to withstand it.

Moving on to the current literature trend and its relations to the Copenhagen School framework. The "methodological clarity and critical edge that the framework brings to energy issues", as claimed by Judge et al. (2018), assisted with the construction of energy security, which was the reason behind the prevalence of the Copenhagen School framework in the existing security literature. In addition, the existing literature emphasizes the role of the national government and its energy (security) policy, such as the case of the energy securitization discourse in Poland as an example of state encroachment. (Szulecki,2020) Alternatively, even to move beyond the act of securitization, for instance, Nyman (2014) argued that energy security framing is heading towards an alternative interpretation: the de-securitization of energy discourse. He concluded that the current framing of energy security as a national issue would limit the future research potential on the de-securitization of government discourses, preventing them from any alternative energy and climate policy outcomes.

Nonetheless, acknowledging the interwoven characteristics of securitization and riskification, it is bold to interpret specific security framing as securitization since it could lead to false conclusions, such as de-securitizing an issue. At the same time, the securitizing act itself is nonexistent in the first place. (Corry, 2012) Finally, the rigidity of the framework brings limitations to the development of future research. One primary reason to consider other means of security framing is due to the literature gap between energy rhetoric and action, which in most cases consists of a successful securitized speech act yet without audience acceptance and exceptional measures. (Floyd, 2016) This incomplete act of securitization contradicts securitization as emergency politics which values "the performative effects of security discourse" (Corry, 2012, p.239)

#### **1.2.4 Resilience**

In light of the clarification, as mentioned above, of riskification and the limitation of the Copenhagen School framework, it is now pertinent to turn our attention to the relevance of resilience in security studies. Despite the growing literature on resilience in the EU foreign and security policy and governance (Hofmann & Staeger, 2019; Stepka, 2022), there is not a solid base of literature dedicated to resilience and the energy policy of the EU. However, existing

literature suggests that resilience is closely linked to security and energy governance in the EU.

Defined by Bourbeau (2013), resilience is the ability to withstand exogenous and endogenous disruptions that could have an impact on the referent object, in this case, the EU system. In a recent case, the EU's approach to resilience framing overlapped with its approach to the Migration Crisis, which also replicated itself in terms of energy insecurity in Europe due to Russia's ongoing aggression. Stepka (2022) argued that the EU actors and agencies had been promoting the idea of resilience within their mechanism during the Migration crisis by voicing interest in comprehensive development in predictive measures and programs to ensure resilience within the EU, both external and internal dimensions of EU policies. Such mindsets were being projected in areas such as internal structural vulnerability or border control capacity.

Similarly, even before the Russian-Ukraine War February last year, the EU actors have been promoting Energy Transition and renewable energy (EEA, 2014) since Russia emerged as a threat to energy security in the late 2000s. In contrast with prior to or during the Migration Crisis however, the concept of resilience did not dominate the policy-making process until recent years despite energy being on the top list of security issues. [i.e., the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019), the Energy Toolbox where "the EU and its Member States can use to address the immediate impact of current price increases, and further strengthen resilience against future shocks." (European Commission, 2021)] Notably, the call for a more resilient EU energy system has been strengthened after Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2022. The EU came up with an unprecedented RePowerEU plan that was under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (European Commission, 2022), which strives to reduce "dependence on Russian fossil fuels by fast-forwarding the clean transition and joining forces to achieve a more resilient energy system and a true Energy Union." (European Commission b, 2022)

Thus, the current Russian-Ukraine War highlighted the role of resilience in security studies. Sperling and Webber (2018) also argued that the routinization of framing energy as a security issue by EU actors naturally enhances the resilience of the EU energy governance. O'Brien (2009)'s take also resonates with the EU's desire for energy transition and moving towards renewables and green energy since the more the EU possess a sustainable energy system; the more the system is resilient. Most importantly, Bourbeau (2013)'s typologies of resilience specifically distinguished between discourses and actual practice and whether they align,

bridging the ambiguous conceptualization of the Copenhagen School framework. Such distinctions also reflect the paradox of a securitized tone on energy since Russia's aggression February last year, yet with ambiguous dialogues and actions in the EU. Bourbeau's conceptualization and typologies could concretize resilience in security studies even more if, indeed, resilience has become the dominant security logic of the EU. Such a conclusion suggests that resilience has become a topic with the potential for development within the EU energy-security nexus. (Judge et al., 2018) Nevertheless, there is still room for further research to verify whether or not resilience could be the dominant logic in the EU energy securitizing discourses, which is the aim of this thesis.

## **2. Theoretical framework**

### **2.1 Security in International Security Studies**

#### **2.1.1 Conceptualization of security**

The widening and deepening approach to security

There were two main branches of post-Cold War development and conceptualization of security. One was the post-Cold War traditionalism which defines security within the scope of military and state-centric agenda, and the other was the widening and deepening approaches to security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). One crucial aspect that staged the prevalence of widening and deepening approaches was that East-West military confrontation no longer dominated the international arena: Due to the prioritization of economic and environmental agenda in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by the awareness of identities in the 1990s, which prompted the non-military aspect of research in academia and gave rise to the prevalence of the widening and deepening approach to conceptualize security. (Buzan et al., 1998)

Among the widening and deepening scholars, various schools of thought have developed their perspective when approaching security, ranging from Constructivism, European approaches, and Feminism to Poststructuralism. (Buzan & Hansen, 2009) Moreover, one essential milestone for this approach is distinguishing among non-military sectoral dynamics when defining security. "Widener-deepeners argued, to different extents and in different combinations, in favour of deepening the referent object beyond the state, widening the concept

of security to include other sectors than the military, giving equal emphasis to domestic and trans-border threats, and allowing for a transformation of the Realist, conflictual logic of international security." (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p.188)

However, traditionalists heavily criticized such approaches: The dominant criticism stated was the endangerment of the intellectual coherence of security. (Buzan et al., 1998) Furthermore, as Walt (1991) argued that by broadening the definition of security from simply just "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force", it "make[s] it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems." (p.212-213) While the widening and deepening approach seems to extend security to more than just state mobilization, others still suggested that such broad definitions might be counterproductive for "elevat[ing] "security" into a kind of universal good thing—the desired condition toward which all relations should move." (Buzan et al., 1998, p.4) An example that reflects his view is the economic sector within which the less involvement in the market, the more the market thrives. (Wæver,1995)

Given the established background that there has been a new wave of literature that stresses the non-military aspect of security, it brings us to yet another aspect of security that consists of the dynamics and interactions of referent objects and actors within various sectors. The differentiation among sectors in terms of framing security is essential in this research since the diversity of security framing, or more specifically, the identification of risks as well as threats is rooted in either the sector where the framing actors originated from or that the mindsets that actors identify with are from a specific sector.

Buzan et al. (1998) have specified the five sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. As explained above, the state is naturally the referent object in the military sector. The political sector, however, is more complicated than that of a state. According to Buzan, an existential threat occurs in the political sector when the essential ideas that constitute a state are threatened, such as sovereignty or ideologies. We could observe that from the example of a supranational referent object: the EU.

"The European Union (EU) can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be

existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute those regimes." (Buzan et al. 1998, p.22)

The economic sector functions differently than the political one, as referent objects and existential threats are more challenging to grasp. (Buzan et al., 1998) The definition of a threat varies since the actors could be, for instance, market economies or national economies. Moving forward to the societal sector, what could be regarded as a threat, argued by Buzan et al., is the collective identities of communities in a society (i.e., nations and religions). Lastly is the environmental sector, where species, habitats, and climate could be considered a security issue.

To conclude, it is still challenging to place energy in one specific sector despite establishing the significance of the actor-sectoral dynamics. As mentioned, due to the framing actors' backgrounds and ideologies, the role of energy can, thus, alter between the referent object and the threat.

### **2.1.2 Securitization theory**

The Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School and its primary members, Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, are the founding fathers of regional security complex theory (RSCT), societal security, and the securitization approach. The concept of securitization stood out as the backbone of securitization theory due to its discursive conception of security as well as its strict criteria for a fully-fledged securitization.

"The need is to construct a conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat or problem. Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but to count as security issues, they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political." (Buzan et al., 1998, p.5)

Buzan's definition of security was defined as such: "[...] the general concept of 'security' is drawn from its constitution within *national* security discourse, which implies an emphasis on authority, the confronting – and construction – of threats and enemies, and ability to make decisions and the adoption of emergency measures", it is, therefore, necessary to point out the

social constructive elements of threats, which is an essential part of the securitization process. The social constructive elements then lead us to a controversial and much-disputed subject within the Copenhagen School framework: identity. While the conventional constructivist insisted on the fluidity of identity, the Copenhagen School claimed that a security discourse could be fixed if a fluid identity has gradually been solidified. Therefore, an identity defined by society can also be a referent object that requires protection when it comes to securitization. (Buzan and Wæver, 1997) If the same logic applies, then a fluidity of the conceptions of threat could also gradually be fixed. Buzan and Wæver's security logic conveniently justified the contestation of framing (energy) security as well as the shift of narrative in the EU, in which Russia is framed as a threatening 'other' by actors from the Central-Eastern Europe region and that the EU has been gradually prioritizing a more strategic and integrated energy market as opposed to dialogues and cooperation. (See literature review) Such an idea of a threatening other and the securitization process within borders conveniently echoes the Paris School scholars, namely Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans. Despite the various means of interpretation, the Copenhagen School approach is still essentially rooted in traditional social constructivism. Interestingly, the fact that a security threat, disturbance or shock is socially constructed and tends to exist subjectively and requires intersubjectivity (i.e. the audience) was also highlighted by Bourbeau (2013)'s resiliencism, which will be further explained in the following sections.

Regarding the other attributes of securitization. Securitization has its grounding roots in the speech act theory, exceptional politics and traditionalist security, constituting its strictly framed criteria. (Buzan & Hansen, 2009) Within which the **securitizing actor** (i.e. the actor who presents and frames the threat), **the referent subject** (i.e. the threat itself), **the referent object** (i.e. the object that requires protection from the threat), **the audience** (i.e. the receiving end of the securitization process which has the power to acknowledge the threat or vice versa) and lastly the adoption of **(exceptional) measures** are the essential elements during the securitization process.

As noted by Buzan (2009), one can determine the severity of an issue on a spectrum from non-politicized, politicized to securitized. Suppose an issue is considered securitized on the spectrum instead of non-politicized and politicized. In that case, it signifies the presence of a threat to be identified and declared by the securitizing actors. Moreover, in order to protect a referent object which is defined by Buzan et al. (1998) as "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (p.36), emergency measures are

consequently required. Acknowledging the existence of the threat, we must then look at not only how discourse is framed by (securitizing) actors and what kind of narratives are being produced, but also how the audience responds to these messages; that is, completion of the process of securitization would only occur when an audience accepts the existential threat, whether it be a state authority or the civil society. Another feature of securitization is when "an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as *security*, an agent (actor) claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means." (Ibid., p.26) Nevertheless, dramatized or prioritized issues do not have to be present for them to be securitized due to the normalization of that specific issue or field.

### **2.1.3 Going beyond securitization**

Alternative theoretical approaches to securitization

Although several attributes of the securitization approach make it a solid approach to security, it was also criticized by scholars from critical security studies for its ambiguity in conceptualization. (Balzacq et al., 2016) The Copenhagen School, along with the two other schools: The Welsh School (Aberystwyth School) and The Paris School, are considered the "ideal-type" of security logic, implying that empirically, one study will not conform to simply one of the three approaches (Balzacq et al., 2016, p.6)

A brief introduction to the Welsh School centers around the idea of emancipation and Human Security (Jones, 1999), distancing itself from the state-centric idea of conventional security. Emancipation, in this sense, refers to:

"the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of War are one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security" (Booth, 1991, p.319)

It possesses a more positive outlook, arguing that the referent object in security should be individuals instead of states.

On the other hand, the Paris School operates more as a critique instead of a theory. It seeks to provide an alternative perspective to security. (Floyd, 2006; Balzacq et al., 2016) The Paris

School regards security through a Foucaultian lens. Bigo (2000) argued that "the state wants to take charge of individuals and widen the notion of public order" (p.179), which implies a blurring of external and internal security since the border between the two lies in sovereign nation-states (i.e. the EU). However, while establishing a normative order, the marginalization of "the other" is thus inevitable. (Wendt, 1999; Bigo, 2001) (See above)

Another feature of the Paris School is the practice of security. Balzacq, for instance, emphasizes more on the performative character of security. He stated four arguments that distinguish itself from the Copenhagen school, namely the aspects of audience, power relations, context and instruments. As most critics of the Copenhagen School, the lack of development in the conceptualization of the audience is what makes it problematic. Balzacq is, therefore, in favor of the re-conceptualization of the audience and the functions of an audience. According to Roe (2008), the decisive element of the audience is to provide a formal mandate to the actor (i.e. voting result), without which no measures can be ratified. Concerning power relations, Balzacq argued that securitization could potentially become a tool for further encroachment by elites based on the actors defined by Buzan et al. (1998). As the existing literature suggests that the (securitizing) actor when it comes to energy security is predominantly the state officials in a national setting (Nyman, 2014; Nyman, 2018; Szulecki, 2020). On the other hand, in an EU setting, the actor tends to be the European Commission. (Szulecki, 2018; Sperling & Webber, 2019)

"Securitizing an issue ultimately enables certain elites to increase their power as a consequence of being granted special privileges in dealing with a security issue" (Balzacq et al., 2016, p.10)

Moving on to the context in which a securitization process might occur. Balzacq based his contextual ideas on the proximate context (i.e. a setting) and a distal (external) context. (Wetherell, 2001) Moreover, he argued that "the semantic repertoire of security is a combination of textual meaning— knowledge of the concept acquired through language (written or spoken)—and cultural meaning— knowledge historically gained through previous interactions and current situations. Thus, the performative dimension of security rests between semantic regularity and contextual circumstances." (Balzacq, 2010, p.11) Due to the semantics and contextual differences, it helps make sense of the discursive dynamics in a setting like the EU. In a parliamentary setting, the 'semantic repertoire' of a securitized issue would always be contested if Balzacq's understanding of contexts were applied, due to the diversity of actors

and their own languages and past experiences. However, this always leads to another debated aspect — the impact of the context on securitization. While Buzan argued that the context is an intervening variable, the others claimed that Buzan contradicts himself since the Copenhagen School follows a logic that cannot be altered.

Finally, Balzacq turned to the techniques instead of the discursive aspect of government. Balzacq's tendency towards a practice-oriented approach is based on Bourdieu and Foucault's concepts: 'field of practices', 'habitus' (Balzacq, 2010) from the former and 'governmentality', 'dispositif' for the latter. (Bigo, 1994, 2002)

These concepts convey the idea that within a field, there are agents (actors) who are distinctive based on their nature, possessing capital (i.e. resources, power). Members of the field that share common perspectives would therefore develop common practices (in the case of security, the practice of securitization) through policy instruments (dispositif). (Balzacq et al. 2016) In addition, despite being exceptional measures, the policy instruments are established under banal and ordinary legislation processes. (Basaran, 2011) Basaran's arguments then resonate with Bigo (2005)'s routinization of practice (in this case, the routinization of securitization practice). In other words, the Paris School mentality can justify the absence of exceptional measures in the securitization process.

#### **2.1.4 Modern takes on securitization**

A new wave of literature (Floyd, 2010; Balzacq, 2010, 2011; Cote, 2016; Stepka, 2022) borrowed several concepts from the Paris School, giving more room for the explanation to the element of the audience. Distinctions must be made among different audiences and settings, and to look into how they interact with the securitizing actors. (Salter, 2008; Kaunert & Occhipinti, 2013; Cote, 2016) The limitation of the Copenhagen School model prompted scholars to develop different and milder takes rather than conforming to the rigidity of the Copenhagen School approach. One interpretation that varies from the Copenhagen School's 'exceptional politics' would be the concept of 'riskification'. (Corry, 2012) Corry argued that the EU is primarily a risk-based entity which justified the securitizing actors' discourses without implementing (extraordinary) measures. Maltby (2017), who based his grounding theories on Corry, then argued that the existence of a dichotomous EU energy governance had been torn between riskification and securitization.

The idea that it is necessary to clarify among actors and audiences was also widely adopted as multiple security concepts were distinguished based on their intensity (Léonard & Kaunert, 2010; Szulecki, 2018) (see literature review) Stepka (2022) proposed an alternative method of conceptualizing the actors and audience when it comes to securitization, as opposed to the Copenhagen School approach, as criticism has been raised. As argued in the previous paragraph, there is an ambiguity in the definition concerning the role of actors and audience; the conceptualization of both actors and audience is paradoxical. Despite claiming that the approach was inherently constructivist, the Copenhagen School contradicted the constructivist idea of framing security by establishing rigid criteria for the securitization theory. Stepka (2022), who based his alternative interpretation on framing literature, argued that in terms of the actor-audience dynamics, the audience is, first of all, proactive as opposed to passively accepting. Secondly, such dynamics would lead to "the collective construction of meanings" (Ibid., p.48) and is complementary instead of one-sided.

"Here, the interaction is not framed around authoritative actors and audiences, but rather revolves around parties involved in the securitization process as locked in a dialogical relationship driven by contestation." (Ibid., p.48)

The purpose of this alternative setting for the actor-audience dynamics is to "blur the dichotomy between "powerful speakers and restrained listeners", suggesting a more interactive environment where securitization is subjected to "dynamic negotiations between and within groups of relevant agents (e.g. EU institutions)" that were involved in policy-making (Ibid., p.49)

## **2.2 Resilience**

The literature review highlighted a series of the EU's course of actions that resonated with the concept of resilience since Russia's 2014 aggression. In this action, however, a broader overview of resilience will be placed to provide a comprehensive understanding of this term. One disclaimer must be placed beforehand, while the term resilience involves multiple disciplines with corresponding definitions (Bourbeau, 2013), in this section, the discussion will be narrowed down to the scholarship and literature within security studies, which is the most relevant to the objective of this research.

The section will be opened with Corry (2014)'s comparison of the terms defence and resilience and followed by Bourbeau (2018)'s triangular model of the dynamics of resilience, non-security policy and securitization, highlighting the bilateral relationship between resilience and securitization.

### **2.2.1 Resilience and Security**

The existing literature has given an alternative perspective on security and securitization. Instead of stressing the urgent and short-term nature of securitization, a new wave of literature has turned away from the rigid securitization process, emphasizing the pre-security dynamics in security studies (e.g. de-securitization and resilience). (Bourbeau, 2018) Corry (2014) has taken an alternative approach to comparing defense and resilience, assuming that the latter should be replaced by the former in terms of security logic. Firstly, Corry pointed out that while the defense is threat-based and targets the short-term remedy of an immediate action towards an emergency, resilience tends to be more long-term in policy-making and examines the system's vulnerability instead of stressing the threat. Second, Corry stressed the importance of stability and learning in resilience. In other words, to learn from past experiences. "[R]esilience involves a system performing a self-examination, organizing change, and even improvement in the basic function and identity of the system in question." (Ibid., p.268) Moreover, the defense model would prioritize the return to its original state or status quo as opposed to adaptation and change.

Nevertheless, Corry pointed out the danger of engaging societies in security practices, which is an essential element of resilience, than being confined solely to state mobilization. Bourbeau (2013) also mentioned a similar aspect, stating that resilience as a positive might be due to disciplinary bias. Furthermore, that by adopting a resilient approach, it has the potential to prevent positive change. Lastly, Corry argued that resilience is not restricted to a 'friend-enemy logic' (p.269). The conventional logic of security seems to hover around a tangible aggressive other to 'defend' against, whereas the resilience logic gives more room for the adversity, framing it as an unknown form.

On the other hand, Bourbeau (2018) has discussed the dynamics among the three concepts: de-securitization, resilience and securitization. He argued that while the vast majority of the

literature has treated de-securitization and resilience as the process that occurs only after the securitization process, Bourbeau proposed the idea that de-securitization and resilience processes can also occur before the securitization process as well. In other words, in order to protect a certain "way of life", resilience can induce security. (Ibid, p.75) Unlike securitization, resilience does not originate from the solid background of International Security Studies. Resilience has appeared in arguments and debates among diverse sectors and disciplines" across the broad spectrum of the social sciences''. (Bourbeau, 2018, p.72) Nevertheless, the main objective of this study will be to comprehend the role of resilience as well as to conceptualize it within securities studies.

There are several assumptions that have been made to explain scholars' perceptions of resilience in security studies: First would be the timing of the emergence of the resilience process. As mentioned above, resilience only occurs in response to security/securitization. (Bourbeau, 2018) Secondly, as discussed in the literature, the existing literature did not distinguish among the scale and variation of securitization in which contestation of framing could occur. (See literature review)

Moreover, Bourbeau (2018) argued that it is necessary to prioritize the question of "how societies' processes of adjustment to shocks and particular security performances differ across time and across societies." (p.73) as opposed to the questioning of the variation of securitization as it is already a fact. Lastly, as mentioned above in the previous section, while conventional security studies have a rigid framework for securitization, many criticised it as ambiguous concerning the conceptualization of actors and audience in the securitization process. Bourbeau suggested that resilience could offer a solution to the issue by moving away from a passive audience dynamic, in which the audience often passively accepts a speech act, tracing the adjustments of the corresponding policy in social societies and, last but not least, "broaden[ing] our understanding of the multidirectional relationship between agents' security performances, societies' processes of adaptation, and endogenous/ exogenous shocks." (Ibid., p.75) Both Corry and Bourbeau's understanding of resilience shares similar aspects. One particularity that stood out as an essential element of resilience — the learning from the past and adjusting according to the disruptions, which could inspire future research and application of the concept in various sectors.

### 2.2.2 Resilience as Governance in the EU

Resilience first came into the EU as a solid idea in 2012, it was argued by Korosteleva (2018), a concept that was borrowed from ecological/environmental studies to measure how systems withstand disruptions. (Bourbeau, 2013) Wagner and Anholt (2016) introduced the rise of resilience in the EU by comparing the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 EU Global Strategy. Despite the fact that the strategy was not the first document where the EU had brought up the term resilience, it holds significance due to the term being the "new leitmotif" (Ibid., p.414) in the document. Wagner and Anholt (2016) pointed out that while the concept of resilience is on the rise in the EU, taking the form of the EU Global Strategy, it is still under the influence of the European Security Strategy in which the ideas of democracy, transparency, sustainable development and inclusiveness of communities were put on the table. Nevertheless, there are two main differences that distinguish one strategy from another. The first is the emphasis on development and prosperity. While the 2003 European Security Strategy stated that development cannot be achieved without security, the latter strategy stated that resilience can be induced by development. Such framing conveniently reflected Bourbeau (2018)'s idea that resilience can induce security. Secondly, is the change from a 'one-size-fits-all' approach (inside-out) to highlighting the "multiple, country-specific paths and policies". (Ibid., p.416)

Ever since the term resilience was introduced in 2012, the EU has developed its approach to resilience, which it referred to as the 'resilience paradigm' that is "inclusive of the EU expanding portfolio of 'know-how' technologies, good practice initiatives (e.g., SHARE; AGIR in Commission 2012) and methodologies of monitoring and evaluation." (Korosteleva, 2018, p.6) The resilience paradigm has been characterized by its comprehensive domination over the methods deployed to maintain the resilience of the EU system as Korosteleva (2018) described, "The EU firmly believed in its own ability to control, manage and where necessary prevent disasters from happening". (Ibid., p.7) Those methods range from the EU acting as a central figure to advise governance structure, to the monitoring of the results through agencies. However, despite the EU's effort to build up resilience, the reframing of the resilience narrative was inevitable.

Korosteleva reflected on the reason behind reframing the resilience narrative within the EU. According to Korosteleva, the EU's inside-out governance towards first the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and then the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which expanded its acquis communautaire to the neighborhood (Lavenex, 2004), was never adequate. The ineffectiveness

manifested itself when the resilience narrative inherited the EU's assertive approach, as well as when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. The 2014 disruption had the EU understand the importance of being less assertive and shifting the focus to tackle the unknown emergencies and "existential crises". (EEAS, 2016, p.7) Wagner and Anholt (2016) also gave out three reasons why the concept of resilience has gained popularity over time in the EU. They argued that the EU had been overly ambitious in adopting a "liberal peace-building" approach (Ibid., p.417). At the same time, the tensions were still unresolved in conflict zone countries such as Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Mali. In addition, the concept of resilience possesses the ability to redirect attention to local competencies, turning away from the "ready-made blueprints" (Ibid., p.417), or quoting the term of Lavenex (2004), conforming to EU's inside-out approach (*acquis communautaire*). Last but not least, the term resilience possess a certain level of ambiguity which gained the popularity among diverse stakeholders in order for them not to conform to the EU's liberal peace-building agenda.

The literature review has given a comprehensive overview concerning the development of resilience in the EU energy governance. It stated the lack of literature on the resilience-energy nexus while the EU focuses on resilience regarding safeguarding energy security. Even before energy security became the priority on the agenda, the EU had begun its journey towards a more resilient and independent energy network by highlighting the importance of energy transition and renewable energy. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 as well as the aggression in 2022, marked essential indicators for narrative change in the EU. Energy has been securitized while the EU understood that Russia was no longer a reliable partner while aiming for an ambitious climate natural goal. Moreover, it is not only the energy crisis rooted in Russia's aggressions that facilitates the prevalence of resilience narrative, the covid pandemic and other poly-crisis that the EU has been facing also prompted policies to move towards long-term solutions. (See Resilience in the literature review)

### **2.2.3 The MMR typology**

Bourbeau (2013) argued that resilience covers various disciplines and has multiple definitions. However, as mentioned above, the objective of this thesis will be to emphasize resilience in the field of security studies which was also mentioned by Bourbeau. He intends to clarify the relationship between contestation and securitization by providing three alternative perspectives. Bourbeau's re-conceptualization of resilience takes resilience away from returning to

equilibrium, stressing the embracement of changes and adjusting accordingly. Moreover, he stated that the way of understanding disturbances can be interpretive and depends on "time and context". (Ibid., p.10) This implies that resilience can be referred to as how an entity (society) navigates through past, present and future disturbances and the adaptation of it. Lastly, the interpretive and social constructivist element in framing a threat is crucial not only in Bourbeau's framework but also in the Copenhagen School Securitization framework.

The introduction to resilience demonstrated the interconnectivity between resilience and securitization and its importance in the EU security governance. Therefore, to conceptualize such a broad and ambiguous idea and capture the essence of resilience within the European Parliament debates, I intend to apply Bourbeau's 'MMR typologies' of resilience when it comes to endogenous or exogenous shocks.: "Resiliencism is then a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation occur under these circumstances."

#### 1. Resilience as Maintenance:

The main goal of this type of resilience is to maintain the status quo when encountering endogenous and exogenous shocks. In order to achieve the status quo, there will be the "reaffirmation of the value" of the status quo, and the framing agent would tend to put more exaggeration on the issue for justification. (Bourbeau, 2013, p.11) Discursive power is vital in order to "portray the event as a significant threat" (Ibid., p.13), and there tends to be "an alignment of discourses and practices" (p.13) when addressing a threat.

#### 2. Resilience as Marginality:

"... responses that bring changes at the margins but that do not challenge the basis of a policy (or a society)." (Ibid., p.14) Compared to resilience as maintenance, the issue being presented tends to be less salient, with measures still being taken for adjustment. Resilience as marginality also features "a disconnection between security discourses and security practices." (Ibid., p.14) In some occasions, there will be a lack of discursive powers while 'marginal' adjustments take place; on the other hand, the security practice remains with a shift of narratives.

#### 3. Resilience as Renewal:

This type of resilience demands a fundamental change in policy and social structure in the face of shocks, implying new directions for governance. Similar to resilience as maintenance, the 'threat' will be amplified for renewal instead of maintaining the status quo. Moreover, the

redefinition of the threat would be based on past collective experiences and prone to "windows of opportunity". (Ibid., p.16) Lastly, discourses and practices are often aligned in terms of facing disturbances.

## **2.3 Securitization and EU energy policy**

### **2.3.1 EU energy discourses**

Energy (in)security

According to Szulecki & Westphal (2018), the emphasis on energy security in the EU only became prominent after the EU enlargement in 2004/2009 and after the "Crimean Shock" in 2014. (p.177) The Commission also stressed that energy security issues only reached the national level without considering the interdependence of member states (European Commission, 2014a), implying the Commission calls for a more integrated energy system. (European Commission, 2014b) Moreover, Szulecki (2018) argued that the main reason behind the challenge of achieving a common European energy policy was due to member states' "divergent understanding and different policy implications of 'energy security'". (p.3) The Conventional approach to energy security from the 4As: availability, affordability, accessibility and acceptability (Cherp & Jwell,2014) to IEA (2023)'s definition of "uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price" is subjected to being a component of policy goal, an "objective" according to Yergin (1988, p.111), without clarifying what or who is threatening the energy(system). Such definitions were argued to not be wrong but not functional nor sufficient. (Szulecki, 2018)

An example of a diverse understanding of energy security can be observed in the political controversy aroused in Poland and the restraint of the relationship between Poland and Russia, despite a high dependency on natural gas. Another example would be the diverse and controversial opinions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline among EU member states. Such examples of understanding energy security corresponded to the motif of this study, which is the documentation of the change of narrative with regard to energy as well as the contestation of framing energy.

Opposing the conventional conceptualization of energy security, Szulecki proposed three alternative approaches to define energy security: an inductive approach, an abductive approach

and a deductive approach. The deductive approach stood out for Szulecki, which emphasized the multi-faceted attributes of energy security due to different understandings of such concepts from different actors. Moreover, energy security should be understood as "a "less–more" proposition in which the risks to energy security span a spectrum of possibilities ranging from very good to very bad". (Bahgat, 2011, p.214) Cherp and Jwell (2014), whom according to Szulecki (2018) has contributed immensely to the deductive approach, based their definition of energy security on the fact that energy security is indeed a security issue since despite the sectoral differences, the security element within is in essence identical. (Baldwin, 1997; Cherp and Jwell, 2014) Their idea that energy security is a security issue, albeit sectoral differences, is essential in this research as the grounding theory is based on the Copenhagen School's security logic which expands and differentiates among sectors.

"[E]conomic security, environmental security, identity security, social security, and military security are different forms of security, not fundamentally different concepts" (Baldwin, 1997, p.23).

When adopting an alternative approach to conceptualizing energy security, discussing the limitation of the conventional 4As conceptualization is necessary. Cherp and Jwell (2014) pointed out that the actors that adopted the 4A definition failed to specify questions such as security for whom, security for which values and from what threats. Highlighting the fact that "energy security concerns are largely shaped by experiences of disruptions and perceptions of risks." (p.418). The lack of clarity in the conventional concepts, thus facilitates an alternative conceptualization: "**the low vulnerability of vital energy systems**" (Cherp & Jwell, 2014, p.418; Jwell et al., 2014, p.743)

Cherp and Jwell argued that both variables: vulnerability and vital energy systems, not only concretize the operationalization for future research but are also not restricted to specific sectors. In other words, both variables in the definition are socially constructed by actors. Therefore, energy security is not necessarily objective since it is subjected to the various interpretation of "these vulnerabilities as well as the values and meanings they associate with the entire energy system" (Szulecki, 2018, p.10). Lastly, by observing the vulnerability of the vital energy system, it entails "vulnerabilities of vital energy systems are combinations of their exposure to risks and their resilience", which is the concept that will be introduced in the next section. (Cherp and Jwell, 2014, p.419)

### **3. Methodology**

**Main research question: How do the political groups within the EU understand and frame energy?**

**Sub questions :**

- 1. How has the EU's security narrative on energy been changing since the Russian aggression in Ukraine?**
- 2. To what extent can resilience be considered a dominant logic/narrative of securitization in relation to energy in the EU?**
- 3. What type of resilience is most dominant? Which political group is the most prominent and the least prominent promotor of security narrative?**


#### **3.1 Research design**

This research is designed to be a single case disciplined interpretive case study. (Odell, 2001) Despite the research setting of Russian aggression as the independent variable, the research seeks to explore the various factors (threats, risks or challenges) linked to Russian aggression and framed by actors in the European Parliament that led to the various levels of securitization of energy in the EU. In addition, within the dynamics between Russian aggressions and parliamentary actors, these factors (threats, risks or challenges) stood either as conditional variables or intervening variables (See arrow diagram).

The single case will be the analysis of the European Parliament, which is composed of political groups. In Odell's paper, he wrote that a disciplined interpretive case study applies a known theory to a new event/terrain, which corresponds to the intention behind the idea of doing a disciplined interpretive case study. While securitization theory has its roots in one of the three most prominent schools of security studies (see chapter on theories), it has gained more popularity in examining national security than in an organization such as the EU. Similarly, linking the concept of resilience to security studies is nothing new and was already done by researchers such as Bourbeau (2013; 2018) or Stepka (2022) in case studies of migration,

however not in the energy sector. In this analysis, I would like to apply both theories and assess the correlation between securitization and resilience to determine if resilience can be considered the dominant logic in securitization on an EU-wide level. Despite the seemingly ambiguous and broad conceptualization of security, I intend to follow the widening and deepening logic of security developed by the Copenhagen School scholars due to the characteristic of energy (policies and discourses), which is not a tangible object as opposed to the traditional referent object of a state and a tangible military threat. In addition, alternative approaches would be applied when handling the criteria to fulfil a fully-fledged securitization process such as analyzing not only EP plenary speeches but also EP policy texts. Several have criticized solely applying the speech act approach from the Copenhagen School as being problematic. First, Stepka (2022) argued that the weight of the speaker and power is much more influential than the content itself. Secondly, the speech-act approach is paradoxical in a policy-making venue where opinions and perspectives are often contested. (Sperling & Webber, 2019; Stepka, 2022) He also pointed out that the essence of framing lies in the “processual, interactive aspects of linguistic and non-linguistic construction of security, allowing one to look at this process as inherently diverse and proliferated with various and often conflicting security-centered interpretations of the problem.” (Stepka, 2022, p.34) The repetitive aspect of framing that eventually became a narrative contradicts a ‘speech act’ as it was, in most cases, presented in an individualistic manner.

### 3.2 Arrow diagram



Source: Author

### 3.3 Conceptualization of variables

#### 3.3.1 Dependent variable(s) (DV)

In this study, the dependent variable is energy securitization in the European Parliament. Within which the main venue of analysis is the EP plenary, where debates regarding all EU aspects take place, including energy and security issues. However, the dependent variables can be further divided between the energy securitization among political groups (DV1) and the European Commission (DV2) as the two groups, along with the Council, are the primary agents in the debates.

According to Buzan (1998), when an issue moves from non-politicized to politicized to securitized, that is when the securitization process occurs, within which the actor(s) would use its discursive power in order to frame the threat as an existential threat and thus requires extraordinary measures. Based on this logic, we can then form the inference that energy securitization in the EU occurred when energy security, defined as "**the low vulnerability of vital energy systems**"(Cherp & Jwell, 2014, p.418; Jwell et al., 2014, p.743) , is at stake and is discursively addressed and discussed among EU agents such as the Commissioners, MEPs,

members of the Council as endangering the vitality of the day-to-day operation of the Union, resulting in a change in the current policies or infrastructure.

### **3.3.2 Independent variable(s) (IV)**

According to the working title, the study aims to observe the impact of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the recent ongoing Russian-Ukraine War, on the securitization of the EU energy discourses. While the two Russian aggressions are objectively just events that occurred, however; within the inter-subjective discursive framing process in parliamentary debates, which are often subject to policy, identity and logic, could lead to "different readings of facts and events." (Hansen, 2006, p.28) In this case, the discursive contestation between the dynamics of Russian aggressions and energy securitization. Bearing this fact in mind, I would then distinguish them as "key events"<sup>1</sup> (Ibid.) that took on the roles of independent variables: independent variable 1 — The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and independent variable 2 — Russian-Ukraine War in 2022.

### **3.3.3 Intervening variable(s) (IntV) and Conditional variable(s) (CV)**

In this study, I have identified two intervening variables<sup>2</sup>, one as the energy dependence and the other as the Nord Stream 2 project. The EU has been dependent on fossil fuel imports even before the chosen time frame of this study, and this is currently still a challenge for the EU. On the other hand, the Nord Stream 2 project was initiated in 2011 (Nord Stream AG, 2023), also before the time frame of the study. However, both variables had taken essential roles within parliamentary debates from 2014-2022 and acted as media when actors framed Russian aggressions on several occasions.

The conditional variables<sup>3</sup> in these security dynamics are energy dependence and crisis. Energy dependence overlaps with its role as an intervening variable but also acts as a conditional variable since, according to the definition, the intensity of the EU's dependence on energy imports has gradually influenced the intensity of EU energy security discourses. As for the

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<sup>1</sup> "[R]efers to those situations where 'important facts' manifest themselves on the political and the media agenda and influence the official policy-identity constellation or force the official discourse to engage with political opposition and media criticism." (Hansen, 2006, p.28)

<sup>2</sup> "A variable framing intervening phenomenon included in a causal theory's explanation. Intervening phenomena are caused by the IV and caused the DV." (Evera, 1997, p.11)

<sup>3</sup> "A variable framing an antecedent condition. The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact that IVs or IntVs have on DVs and other IntVs" (Ibid.)

latter, as we can see from the example of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, the energy crisis that came along with it amplified the already securitized discourses within the EU. On the other hand, in 2014, there was merely speculation of an energy crisis. (European Commission, 2014c)

### **3.4 Case selection and time frame: The EP 2014-2022**

The time frame is set to easily distinguish from one exogenous event to another; in this case, it would be Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian-Ukraine War that has occurred ever since February 2022, respectively. The chosen time frame (2014-2022) also corresponds with the Tusk Commission (2014-2019) and the Von der Leyen Commission (2019-2024), as well as parliamentary terms (2014-2019) and (2019-2024). Some political groups had either ceased to exist between the two parliamentary terms or possessed a different name than its predecessor. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish them.

### **3.5 Data and sources**

My primary sources would be European Parliamentary debates and policy texts produced by the European Parliament and with the assistance of policy texts from the European Commission, for instance, **official EU policy texts, reports, briefings, communications, press releases, and materials from official websites from 2014-2022**. I will also include relevant actors, such as crucial EU agencies that are highly involved in contributing to the EU energy policy. In addition, I will take secondary sources such as report analysis or research produced by relevant think tanks and NGOs to assist me in this research.

#### **3.5.1 Primary sources**

32 European Parliamentary debates from 2014-2022 and 1 debate from 2023 with ten adopted texts concerning energy, security and Russian aggression were taken as primary sources. All chosen debates will be coded based on the theoretical framework. The debates that follow a voting procedure are bolded, each of which will either have an adopted text or none due to voting turnouts. (See Appendix C)

The visualisation of data will be in bar charts and placed within the main text, while lengthier tables will be placed in the appendix (see Appendix A and B). The tables indicate that the

change in perception of threat from 2014 to 2022 was dichotomously divided into red and blue, with red being the threats linked to Russia or Russia itself. For instance, a threat that is marked in red could be Russian institutions such as the Kremlin, the state-owned company Gazprom and its energy projects such as the Nord Stream projects or even Russian President Vladimir Putin himself. In addition, a Russian-related threat (red) can also refer to a casual sentence that links Russian aggression to another disruptive event. For instance, the Russian War against Ukraine in 2022 led to Europe's energy crisis. The threats that were marked blue<sup>4</sup>, on the contrary, indicate threats that are either not associated with Russia or that the word Russia or anything that was associated with Russia as mentioned above was not listed, such as high energy prices, the challenge of the security of supply, energy poverty or external/internal political instability. A non-Russian related threat can also cross sectors. For instance, a climate or environmental threat/challenge was also marked as blue in the categorization process.

Similarly, in terms of the referent object, these were also dichotomously divided into the colors purple and green. The referent objects that were mentioned based on public and private entities such as citizens, households, consumers, companies or the population of member states were marked as green. In contrast, referent objects concerning the EU as one entity, such as the energy sector and the common European market, were marked as purple. Moreover, abstract ideas such as European values or one specific energy source (i.e., gas or electricity) are also marked as purple.

Concerning the measures taken in this study from 2014 to 2022, these were categorized into exceptional (marked with the color green) and long-term oriented measures (marked with the color light blue). An extra category was added to capture the presence of the Energy Union narrative (marked with yellow) and the 'Fit for 55' Package (marked with purple).

The distinction between exceptional measures and long-term approaches was based on the linguistic characteristic of the measure, according to Buzan et al. (1998)'s definition. For instance, a measure is considered exceptional when adjectives or nouns such as 'urgent', 'emergency' ', exceptional' or 'extraordinary' emerged during the coding process. Whereas a

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<sup>4</sup> A disclaimer must be inserted here that while the EU mainly targeted Russian-induced hybrid warfare, it is still marked as blue in this research to include hybrid warfare that was not originated from Russia. Marking the hybrid warfare as blue also highlights a long-term-oriented EU solution of enhancing resilience towards future risks instead of targeting specific threats, namely Russian threats and measures. Still, it is essential to note that there is a potential for bias in observational studies such as this case.

long-term approach is characterized by their lack of immediacy, resulting in delayed results. For instance, the proposed measures were considered long-term oriented if they were more abstract ideas such as solidarity or included words such as 'integration', 'R&D', 'reform in infrastructure', 'energy efficiency', and 'transition'.

### **3.5.2 Operationalization**

In this research, I will conduct discursive/qualitative data analysis, which will be assisted with coding software NVivo<sup>5</sup> in coding my sources as mentioned above. By doing a thematic analysis using coding software, the research will benefit significantly since it operationalizes the concepts this research is grounded on (i.e., securitization theory and the concept of resilience) as well as concretizes/categorizes the data concerning the research questions. (Elliott, 2018) A mixture of deductive coding (a priori) and inductive coding (emergent) will be used in the coding process. Deductive coding was defined by Creswell (2013) as "serv[ing] to limit the analysis to the 'prefigured' codes rather than opening up the codes to reflect the view of participants in a traditional qualitative way." (p.185) as opposed to inductive coding. While I will be following a deductive method throughout the majority of the coding process, since I would like to base these codes on the grounding theories, namely the Copenhagen School Securitization framework and resilience, I am still open to codes that are outside of the frames of theories, hence an inductive approach (see Appendix E).

Saldaña (2016)'s book introduced a series of more detailed coding methods instead of dichotomous deductive and inductive coding. Due to the extensiveness of my primary sources, as mentioned earlier, and a very distinct theoretical background, I classify my research as a mixture of Holistic coding (Dey, 1993), provisional coding (Dey, 1993; Miles & Huberman, 1994) and hypothesis coding (Weber, 1990; Bernard, 2011). Holistic coding is applied when the researcher wants "to grasp basic themes or issues in the data by absorbing them as a whole [the coder as 'lumper'] rather than by analyzing them line by line [the coder as 'splitter']" (Dey, 1993, p.104); provisional coding is "generated from such preparatory investigative matters" (Saldaña, 2016, p.144), in my case, the codes were 'split' based on the theoretical frameworks; and lastly the hypothesis coding in which the codes have based the hypothesis of this research that there is a change and a continuity of narrative and that resilience has been part of the dominant discourse with regards to energy security in the European Parliament.

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<sup>5</sup> NVivo software versions 12 and 14 were utilized

In order to answer the main research questions, a frame-narrative approach developed by Stepka (2022) will be applied to identify the dominant narrative(s) in the European Parliament. This approach has three segments: diagnosis, evaluation and conceptualization of remedial actions<sup>6</sup> that intertwines the uncertain and individually interpreted policy stories, shedding a light of clarity on these discourses. The procedure of identifying narratives will occur after the primary data coding. Then from the generated codes, a process of categorizing them into three segments will proceed. The following two sub-questions will be dissected with the application of Bourbeau (2013)'s typologies and definitions of resilience. Overall, by answering these questions, this study provides a more comprehensive angle towards framing and policymaking in the context of organizations such as the EU, more importantly, differentiating and magnifying the institutions' functions.

### **3.6 Limitations and Contributions**

Several limitations to this study should be pointed out: First, the research is dominantly based on the Copenhagen School Securitization theory, which has been through several criticisms, claiming its insufficiency to clarify the securitizing elements fully. For instance, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the ambiguity of the dynamics between the securitizing actors and the audience. Secondly, the Copenhagen School securitization theory cannot comprehensively reflect the applied case study due to the strict criteria for successful securitization. Such a strict setting is rigid and can only produce a binary result: securitized or not securitized. However, the research adopted a revised securitization theory and included alternative methods such as the redefinition of criteria of securitization as well as associating it with resilience.

The second limitation is the risk of doing an interpretive case study. Considering the research's feasibility and the added value, expert interviews were not conducted for this research. Therefore, this research will be solely based on the official documents produced by the European archive. Moreover, the selected debates were subjected to personal preference; thus, biases were inevitable.

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<sup>6</sup> "[T]he diagnosis of the security problem concentrates on its root causes and sources of threats; the evaluation focuses on the attribution of blame (naming the key actors, culprits responsible for the instigation of threats and the security problem), as well as parties responsible for dealing with the problem; lastly, the remedial actions segment is devoted to conceptualisation of specific policy responses to defined threats. Each of these segments is imbued with different, often tangled security logics." (Stepka, 2022, p.8)

Thirdly, this research's analysis level is the political groups in the European Parliament instead of individual MEPs. However, the contestation of framing can originate from country-specific reasons such as their geopolitical locations and political situation (i.e. polity). Nevertheless, the acknowledgement of the limit of this research can open doors to future discursive studies on energy governance in the European Parliament.

Lastly, some technical limitations were identified during data analysis and coding. The transcription of the debates is, at times, not provided with English translation. Therefore, the coding process was assisted with translation software: Deep L<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, certain translated speeches were pointed out by the actors of the debates as inaccurate. It is, therefore, inevitable that there will be marginal deviation during the coding and analysis process.

## **4. Research findings and discussion**

### **4.1 A historical overview**

In this section, a historical overview of energy security in the EU will be analyzed to better comprehend the overall attitudes in the EU towards the energy sector. The question that should be asked here is what determines if an issue, in this case energy, has been on the EU security agenda. One necessary clarification must be made that by applying the definition of energy security developed by Cherp and Jwell (2014), then energy security, in this case, is already considered part of the security agenda. Therefore, this research already has the premises of energy security being an issue of security; the later findings will verify this hypothesis.

Ever since the creation of the EU, the ultimate goal to establish a more integrated energy market has been ongoing. Despite the call for further integration, energy aspects of member states in the EU had always been largely autonomous. Prior to 2009, the EU treated matters concerning the energy sector at the level of secondary legislation, assigning them to the member states. (TFEU, 2008; Tichy, 2019; Rada and Farkas, 2022) However, the EU authorities began to politicize energy ever since the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute<sup>8</sup>, calling for a common energy

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<sup>7</sup> Deep L was accessed between March and August 2023

<sup>8</sup> "[I]n the mid-2000s, EU official documents began to portray reliance on Russian gas as a security issue and stressed the need to diversify energy relations. The gas transit crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, which led to

policy within which the EU has been making attempts to cover aspects of the security of energy supply, sustainability, together with cost and competitiveness in terms of the common energy policy. (Rada and Farkas, 2022) After 2009, a new policy was introduced to the TFEU (Lisbon Treaty), leveling energy policy to primary legislation<sup>9</sup>.

From the 2009 crisis, we could observe a narrative change to a common energy policy, and that energy was politicized, if not securitized. Moreover, the fact that member states had lost some of their autonomy over energy, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty, suggested a collective mobilization, which also signifies the urgency in the EU to develop an (exceptional) measure(s). In addition, the language used in parliamentary debates also verified the energy insecurity in the EU and that Russia was a potential threat to the EU energy system despite lacking an urgent manner of presenting. In the 2009 debate about energy security, targeting the Nabucco pipelines, energy diversification and dependence were mentioned on several occasions due to Russia's cutting of gas to Ukraine. (European Parliament, 2009a) Additionally, the EU-Russia summit in Stockholm, where energy security was once again the main topic on the agenda due to Russia's withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Concerns were also raised concerning the frozen conflicts of de-facto states in Georgia. Still, the EU had not deemed Russia an immediate threat to the EU energy system, stressing the necessity of enhancing communication with Russia through dialogues and cooperation. Nevertheless, from the words of the coordinator of the Swedish presidency of the Council, Cecilia Malmstrom, it is evident that the EU energy discourses were already a security concern for some members of the Union.

"The energy issue is linked to this - it is a matter of energy efficiency and energy security" (European Parliament, 2009b)

The year 2014 was another turning point for the EU in terms of energy and the security approach towards Russia due to Russia's aggression in Crimea. Moreover, the EU energy discourses claimed to be securitized after the invasion. (Siddi, 2018; Rada and Farkas, 2022) The securitization process can be seen throughout the course of action of the EU. A letter

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temporary disruptions in the flow of Russian gas to Europe, accelerated the securitisation of European discourses." (Siddi, 2018, p.252)

<sup>9</sup> "Part Three of the TFEU implements a completely new Title XXI, which formally constitutes the EU energy policy at the level of primary legislation (it is the first time that it was formally constituted at this level), creates a new legal foundation for adopting measures via legislative acts of secondary legislation, and provides a framework for energy cooperation." (Tichy, 2019, p.26-27)

addressed to the Union by Putin stated that "Russia could cut natural gas supplies to Ukraine if the country fails to pay its gas bills on time and warned there could be a reduction in onward deliveries to Europe." (Reuters, 2014) The letter was an evident menace to energy security and violated the EU values of a liberal market. Therefore, a securitized mentality was successfully established as the measures introduced by the Commission included a stress test and the European Energy Security Strategy. The former was treated as a short-term solution in terms of the crisis at hand, providing urgent recommendations (European Commission, 2014), while the latter "called for the strengthening of energy security by the completion of the internal market with natural gas, by moving the regulatory authority to the EU level (i.e., to the European Commission) and also by promoting a unified approach to external energy policy in the EU." (Tichy, 2019, p.38) Similar to the 2009 events, both crises had member states partially compromise on their energy competence at the EU level, exhibiting a sense of urgency. Another example that demonstrated the urgency of the matter was the EU's role as a broker in the Russian-Ukraine gas deal, albeit the questionable sustainability of the deal. In a European Parliament briefing, the deal was even described as "a hostage to Russian-Ukrainian relations". (De Micco, 2014, p.7)

## **4.2 Energy securitization of the European Parliament from 2014-2022**

### **4.2.1 The actors and audience in the European Parliamentary debates**

The conventional actor-audience dynamics based on the Copenhagen School depend highly on the securitizing actor to frame the 'existential threat' and to convince the targeted audience of such a threat. Therefore, if applying the Copenhagen School to its full extent in this study, in the context of European Parliamentary debates the European Commission or the Council of the EU seem to fit into the framing agent as they are the ones who open a debate and deliver topics for the political groups to discuss. However, making such an assumption disregards the opinion of each political group due to the assumed passive audience behaviors. It also facilitates the dominance of one narrative while silencing the narratives produced by less active agents in the Parliament.

Therefore, this study took on the idea of the inter-subjectivity of the agents within the Parliament. In other words, there is no distinction between actor and audience, only the final

narrative produced and confirmed by policy texts as a result of reciprocal dialogues. (Stepka, 2022) (See theoretical framework)

#### **4.2.2 Framing of threats, referent objects and measures of the European Parliament**

Figure 3 exhibited a general framing of threats of the EP concerning energy as a whole, combining all perspectives regardless of which political group. We can observe that the table fluctuates less regarding Russian and non-Russian related threats as neither of the bars exceeds 70% each year as opposed to the Commission (see section 4.4), apart from the non-Russian related bar that dominates the year 2020, presumably as a result of the pandemic. Interestingly, Russia or Russian-related threats were present each year, with the non-Russian-related threats beginning to outweigh Russian-related threats from 2020 onwards. Based on the given information, we can assume that opinions within the EP have been far from consistent, reflecting a contestation of framing as mentioned in the Literature Review. Regarding measures brought up by the EP (see Figure 4), there was a gradual decrease in exceptional measures from 2014 to 2018, with 2014 possessing the highest 70% of exceptional measures mentioned during the debate. On the other hand, a linear progression of exceptional measures cannot be found after 2019 due to, first of all, an increased emphasis on long-term oriented measures in 2020 and 2021, secondly the impact of the Russian-Ukraine War brought the attention back once again to urgent and immediate actions of the EU. While we cannot conclude that there was a continuity of energy securitization due to linguistic diversity of the framing of threats within the Parliament, we can confirm the continuity of the EP's leaning towards long-term oriented approaches since 2014.




Figure 1: Framing of threats of the EP from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats                      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Blue: Non-Russian threats                      Purple: Fit for 55 packages

Source: Author




Figure 2: (Exceptional) Measures of the EP from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures                      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures      Purple: Fit for 55 packages

Source: Author

### 4.2.3 How the political groups in the Parliament frame energy

#### The European People's Party (EPP)




Figure 3 : Framing of threats of the EPP from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Source: Author




Figure 4 : (Exceptional) Measures of the EPP from 2014 – 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Source: Author

Russia or Russian-related threats in terms of energy have stood out among the non-Russia-related threats in the EPP discourses. As shown in Figure 3, EPP has identified at least 60% of Russia-related threats each year, with the highest up to 100% in 2018 and 2019. Russia-related threats had a slight decrease to around 60-70% after 2015; however, they rose back up in 2018. The absence of Russia-related threats in 2020 could be explained by the Covid pandemic, which corresponds to a relatively high percentage of exceptional measures shown in Figure 4. In terms of (exceptional) measures, long-term oriented measures gradually came into play while the exceptional measures remained less fluctuated (a 30-55% range). Disregarding the marginals (2017 and 2018) due to data selection bias, we could observe the co-existence between exceptional measures and long-term oriented approaches and the continuity of EPP's supportive stance of the Commission's Energy Union narrative.

#### 2014

Russia-related threats in EPP discourses reached over 90% in 2014, while there were barely any exceptional measures targeting energy. (See Appendix A) This finding suggests that the referent object in 2014 was primarily Ukraine, the Ukrainian population or territorial integrity. Nevertheless, the EPP still claimed that energy was used as a political weapon, as stressed by establishing a European Energy Union. (European Parliament, 2014b)

#### Post 2014

Based on the EPP discourses during parliamentary debates, the Russian threat had long existed even before the annexation or the current ongoing War, as the 2006-2009 gas dispute had contributed significantly to the threat construction that molded the narrative of the EPP, as identified in this study. "In 2006 and 2009, it (Russia) cut off gas supplies to Ukraine" (European Parliament, 2015b); "It (Russia) has been waging active hostilities in Ukraine and openly using gas supplies as a weapon, as a means of blackmail". (Ibid.) Interestingly, the 2006-2009 crisis was mentioned right after the 2014 incident occurred as a reminder of the complexity of the 2014 aggression, which targeted Ukraine and the entire EU. Exceptional measures that the EPP called for included the stress tests conducted by the Commission in 2014 that targeted majorly Russian supply disruptions and the immediate diversification of energy supplies, including the deployment of LNG and domestic energy resources.

The condemnation of the annexation was evident post-2014 in terms of the language that EPP had adopted. Russia had been regarded from 2014-2015 as an 'aggressor' and was 'violent'

under the context of the annexation. According to the data, the aggression was even compared to the 'former Soviet empire'. (European Parliament, 2014b) Such framing of Russia continued and reflected in the energy discourses years before the 2022 War took place; Russia was characterized, according to the EPP perspective, as malicious, attempting to gain geopolitical momentum by energy weaponization or blackmailing either through cyber-attacks or the Nord Stream projects. (European Parliament, 2015c; 2016d; 2017b) The mentality of EPP also reflected on the referent object, as most of them stressed Europe as a whole, such as the European way of life, European economy, autonomy or resilience, rather than being member state-oriented.

In addition, from 2014 to 2020, these short-term measures encompassed the diversification and transition to renewable energy. One distinctive aspect of the EPP was their preaching for infrastructure investment, research and development, modernization and integration even after significant disruptions. For instance, the Southern Gas Corridor and promoter of Energy Union in 2015, to the domestic LNG corridor in 2016 and Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in 2018. The EPP also demonstrated a firm negative attitude towards Nord Stream 2 as it collided with the prospects of an Energy Union and the diversification of sources according to the Third Energy Package. (EPP, 2018)

#### 2021-2022

The continuity of EPP's perception in Russia can be seen even a year before the War broke out. Russia as a significant threat to energy security due to high energy prices was amplified by the retelling of Russia's previous aggressions, such as the "silent War in Eastern Ukraine" (European Parliament, 2021b), its annexation of Crimea and its intention to interrupt the peace and stability of Europe or quote "the European way of life" (European Parliament, 2021d) by breaching the rule of law. Corresponding to the Russian threat was then the urgent need to stop the Nord Stream 2 project while "support[ing] the democratic direction of the Eastern Partnership (EaP)" (European Parliament, 2021b; 2021d) which Russia has regarded as an ideological and confrontation tool of competition. Moreover, the EPP has shown a supportive attitude towards the EU's effort in energy transition. For instance, their mention of the 'NextGenerationEU project', the discussion of a European hydrogen strategy within which stressed the urgent need for low-carbon hydrogen and the development of renewable hydrogen in the long term.

## Post 2022

The verbal hostility of the EPP group towards Russia reached its peak after Russia's aggression took place in 2022; interestingly, so were the non -Russia- related threats. Based on EPP's logic of threat, post-2022 has been just a confirmation of their previous narrative within which Russia was described as "a tyrant who uses gas as a weapon" and "criminal" (European Parliament, 2022e) and was considered as an "extraordinary" (European Parliament, 2022e; 2022j) case that led to the energy crisis due to Russia's weaponizing of gas. On the other hand, EPP had also internally identified its weakness, acknowledging the EU's vulnerability in energy infrastructure and policies, hence a higher percentage of non-Russia-related threats. The confirmation of an imminent Russian threat to the EU energy security came with the demand by the EPP for emergency interventions such as price caps and joint purchasing. The severity of the disruption can be observed due to the shift to a human-security-oriented short-term measure while hoping for a fundamental transition through the support of EU-initiated funds or projects such as the Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF) and REPowerEU.

To conclude, the EPP has consistently exhibited a securitized narrative on energy that regards Russia as the primary security threat to the EU regardless of sectors post-2014. In addition, such construction of Russian threat has been heavily influenced by past Russian-induced disruptive experiences, including the 2006-2009 gas dispute, the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation.

Despite a securitized narrative, a long-term-oriented mindset has been embedded within the EPP as the long-term measures have been present as early as 2014. The framing of threats of the EPP aligned with the European values, which reflects the emphasis on a functional energy market that operates through the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the competitiveness and fairness of the energy market, their compliance to the third energy package and their opposition to the Nord Stream project.

The EPP also acted and facilitated the European framework by suggesting InvestEU Fund or Horizon Europe as possible long-term solutions to enhance resilience along with the infrastructure renovation.

Last but not least, EPP gave out an intense them-us paradigm regarding energy security, distinguishing between the 'European' aspects and the 'otherness'. Such a mentality corresponds

with EPP's mentioning of the need for a common solution, a more integrated Energy Union, and to establish more interconnections within the Union.

The Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)




Figure 5: Framing of threats of S&D from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Source: Author




Figure 6 : (Exceptional) Measures of S&D from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Source: Author

In terms of framing threats of the S&D group, Russia-related threats have outweighed non-Russia-related threats in most years since 2014. In addition, the highest percentage of Russia-related threats in 2014 and 2022 corresponded with the timing of the two Russian aggressions. Similar to the EPP group, non-Russia-related threats in 2020 had outweighed Russia-related threats primarily due to the Covid pandemic. Looking at the measures mentioned by the S&D group, exceptional measures were the most evident in 2014 and 2022; however, with 2014 reaching more than 70%, while in 2022, the exceptional measures being proposed accounted for around 50%. On the other hand, despite the severity of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the long-term measures being mentioned had increased compared to 2014. Between 2014 and 2022, we could also observe the dominant position of long-term-oriented measures instead of exceptional ones. Figure 5 demonstrated the continuity of a hostile attitude towards Russia, while Figure 6 exhibited S&D's preaching of long-term-oriented measures concerning energy. The Energy Union strategy was significantly promoted within the S&D discourses since 2015, however the promotion of the strategy became less evident post-2019.

2014

The annexation of Crimea left the S&D with extreme caution in 2014 when Russia-related threats reached the highest between 2014 and 2019, reaching almost 90%. As early as 2014, S&D had realized the potential risk that Russia could bring to European energy security despite not framing it as an immediate threat to energy but to Ukrainian territory. Even without dramatic framing, the MEPs in S&D demonstrated a securitised mindset, which requested “an immediate solution to the energy security problem”. (European Parliament, 2014b) Like EPP, the S&D group also mentioned strengthening external policy (i.e., the Eastern Partnership), indicating that Russia was seen as an ontological threat to the EU. Innate support of fundamental changes was already present as the group promoted the construction of infrastructure and a transition to renewables which can be justified by long-term measures in 2014.

Post 2014

Interestingly, S&D was rather vague in pinpointing tangible threats in 2015. For instance, “Long-standing disputes and fears arising from historical experience” (European Parliament, 2015c) or “The recent geopolitical crisis” (European Parliament, 2015b) without directly claiming that Russia was at fault. Regarding the Nord Stream 2 project, the S&D applied similar words such as ‘the expenditure’ or the ‘dependence on oil and natural gas’ without referring to Russia or Gazprom. Due to the interpretative nature of this study, it is challenging to determine the authentic thoughts of the speaker. Therefore, despite the evident suggestions that these non-Russia-related threats were, in fact, targeting Russia, these discourses were still marked as non-Russia related. Moreover, the existing dichotomous framing of threats post-2014 suggested that despite being bound in the same group, there might be an internal contestation among group members due to nationalities or other reasons, which is a limitation of this study.

The securitization process was not evident regarding framing energy despite a high percentage of Russian-related threats. The captured discourse did not identify the ‘exaggeration’ of threat, such as the use of words ‘extraordinary’, ‘unprecedented’, or ‘existential’ in the S&D discourses post-2014 until the beginning of the Russian-Ukraine War in 2022. (See Appendix A). On the other hand, we could observe an urgency when addressing measures by the S&D in order to achieve a real energy union as well as climate goals. (S&D, 2015)

While acknowledging the potential disruption in the energy market due to the annexation, S&D emphasized the vulnerability of the EU energy market, in other words, the dependence on external energy supplies and the social impact if these assumed disruptions were to occur. In terms of S&D's risk-oriented mindset, this was reflected in their adopted measures. (See Figure 6) The exceptional measures adopted by S&D were only prominent in 2014 and before and after the War in 2022. Moreover, S&D has highlighted long-term measures that feature energy efficiency and transition to renewables instead of exceptional measures. (Ibid., 2015; S&D, 2018; S&D, 2022)

Another finding worth discussing is the shift in referent objects from government-centric to citizen-centric. Post-2014, S&D was characterized by promoting European solidarity during debates, whether through an energy union or energy cooperation and market integration. For instance, in 2015, S&D called for synchronising the Baltic region's electricity networks, the Connecting Europe Facility in 2018 and an integrated energy system for hydrogen in 2021.

#### 2021-2022

In 2021 when an energy crisis was gradually forming due to the covid crisis as well as the rise of energy prices, it was then a fully-fledged securitization of the narrative was established where "Putin and fossil fuels" (European Parliament, 2021b) are posing challenges to the Union while emphasizing the importance of a resilient system. "In the next two and a half years, we must lay the foundations for a more resilient Europe in the face of future crises and reduce instability in areas such as energy supply or migration management at our borders". (Ibid.) S&D once again shaped an extremely hostile Russia towards security in the EU by a past coercive Russia that "exterminate[ed] the Chechens and invade[d] Georgia" (European Parliament, 2021d), successfully constructed a tangible threat to the EU. Therefore, the S&D group highlighted the unity among member states and "targeted and effective sanctions" (Ibid.) towards Russia with an immediate stop of Nord Stream 2, adding to it a more urgent tone.

#### Post 2022

However, ever since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, S&D highlighted the vulnerability of specific regions to Russian threat (i.e., CEE, the Baltic states and the neighborhood), European households and businesses. Both exceptional measures and long-term measures put the welfare of the public as a priority. As we can see from Appendix A, S&D urged EU countries to adopt strong social measures, such as national strategies, to become more

resilient in the future and in terms of businesses, S&D called for an expansion of critical energy infrastructure. On the European level, S&D called for the idea of “extraordinary interventions and without taboos”. (European Parliament, 2022i)

To conclude, before the War in 2022, S&D had regarded Russia as a potential risk that would lead to energy system disruption. In the narrative of S&D, however, energy security was still in danger hence the corresponding exceptional measures. A fully-fledged securitization process can only be captured after 2021, when Russia began its aggression in Ukraine that ended up in full-scale Warfare, which, according to S&D, is a threat to not only energy security but security in the EU as a whole. In other words, a fully-fledged securitized energy narrative only began to form in 2021 and was reinforced by Russia’s War against Ukraine.

Similar to the EPP group, both groups have valued and utilized the Energy Union narrative since it was first introduced in 2015, which was applied by both groups as their base to adjust their narratives. As the two groups took up major parliamentary seats, they are both the promoters of EU values and emergency instruments such as the Recover and Resilience Fund (RRF) and REPowerEU. The former targeted the aftermath of the pandemic, while the latter was the EU’s response towards the Russia-induced energy crisis.

The Commission’s narrative of a climate-neutral Europe and Green transition heavily influenced the S&D narrative as keywords such as ‘renewables’, ‘energy efficiency’ and ‘green transition’ can be spotted as early as 2014. In addition, S&D gradually took in and developed the idea of a resilient Europe that requires long-term solutions due to the ongoing crisis since the pandemic.

Last but not least, while the EPP fears an existential threat of Russian energy to the EU, S&D was less extravagant in framing a Russian threat to energy. Instead, S&D put more effect on stressing the unity of the Union post-2014 and later on the social dimension, such as European households, businesses and infrastructure.

## European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR)




Figure 7 : Framing of threats of the ECR from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Yellow: Energy Union

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Purple: Fit for 55 packages

Source: Author




Figure 8 : (Exceptional) Measures of the ECR from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Purple: Fit for 55 packages

Source: Author

Russia-related threats peaked in percentage in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019 and 2022. (See Figure 7) In 2014 Russia-related threats dominated 100% of the ECR discourses corresponding with Russia's annexation of Crimea. In 2015, 2016 and 2019, Russia-related threats reached over 65% and in 2022, slightly above 60%. A gradual decline of Russia-related threats can thus be observed from 2014 to 2021. However, an increase in the percentage of Russia-related threats can be observed after Russia's War against Ukraine. Russia-related threats were absent in 2018 and 2020, with both years dominated by ECR's doubts towards the EU's energy policies. Concerning the measures proposed by ECR, exceptional measures tend to outweigh long-term measures, suggesting the continuous presence of a threat. Nevertheless, despite being outweighed, long-term measures were presented along with exceptional measures. Notably, in 2015, ECR demonstrated support towards the Energy Union Strategy and was the only party that mentioned the EU climate package 'Fit for 55' in their discourse among the chosen debates.

#### 2014

In 2014, when Russia's annexation of Crimea took place, the framing of threats of ECR was entirely focused on Russia or Russia-related threats (See Figure 7), however, without associating it with the energy sector. For instance, Russia's aggression was described by the ECR group as exercising its "neo-imperialist policy" (European Parliament, 2014b) and damaging the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine". (Ibid.) Among the samples, no measures were identified, suggesting that the main focus of the ECR group was purely discursive instead of stressing the technical implementation.

#### Post 2014

Starting in 2015, the ECR began to take energy security into account. Within their narrative, Russia was indeed a danger to energy and the entire European security due to its high dependence. For instance, Russia was often portrayed as "unfriendly" and menacing due to using "energy as a political weapon" through energy construction such as Nord Stream 2. (European Parliament, 2015b; 2016c; 2016d; 2019a)

Similar to the EPP and S&D group, Russia as a threat to energy security, according to ECR, also came from the previous 2006-2009 energy disruption. Such a way of framing had confirmed that energy was indeed a security issue for the ECR group hence the beginning of the energy securitization process, despite the lack of confirmation that Russia and its aggression were the main tangible threats.

On the other hand, a second narrative can be observed, implying a problematic European system threatening the national energy sovereignty, households and businesses within member states. For instance, the ECR claimed that “the cost of renewable energy is very high” (European Parliament, 2015a), implying that the Union was not ready to transition towards renewables. The narrative of this insinuation gradually became solidified in 2015 when ECR mentioned the “EU’s neoliberal ideologies” (European Parliament, 2016a) and the need to abandon them. The group also condemned the climate of ambition of the Commission in 2019 by denouncing it, claiming such ambition as “the ecological radicalism of EU legislation”. (European Parliament, 2020c)

Regarding the measures, we could claim the presence of securitization due to the corresponding exceptional measures, which account for more than 60%. Moreover, the entirety of the exceptional measures stressed “an urgent need to diversify” (European Parliament, 2015a) away from Russian energy as well as to produce a “coherent strategy or action” and to “counter Russian strategic communication”. (European Parliament, 2015c) Furthermore, while ECR still promotes long-term strategy towards the issue of Energy insecurity, ECR demonstrated skepticism towards the Green agenda that the EU promotes as mentioned above, and that a more coherent and efficient solution is through LNG infrastructure development, R&D, regional and global cooperation and the deployment of nuclear energy.

#### 2021-2022

A continuation of framing Russia as an imminent threat to European energy was present in 2021, while the ECR still very much disagreed with the EU’s “Green ideological agenda” (European Parliament, 2021a). An evident battle between ECR’s questioning of the EU’s choice of energy policy and the climate-neutral package that just came out: the ‘Fit for 55’ Package, can be observed. Despite recognizing the climate crisis, the ECR group emphasised the human security aspect regarding energy, arguing that climate crisis prevention is necessary but “not at the expense of the Europeans”. (European Parliament, 2021d)

#### Post 2022

A truly securitized ECR on energy was only present post-2022.

“The escalation of energy prices in Europe has certainly escalated because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine” (European Parliament, 2022e)

Russia was regarded as the threat that led to the energy crisis which Europe was facing and is still facing. The measures that the ECR called for during the debates were very much short-term oriented, aiming at the Russian threat (See table 3 and appendix). Nevertheless, according to ECR, the primary threat that had exposed the vulnerability of the EU energy dynamics even further was once again the “weakness of EU legislative solutions” (Ibid.), such as “Russian resentment”, “Green ideology” and “rotten investments” which increased the dependency on Russian energy. (Ibid.)

On the other hand, owing to the escalation of the War and the energy crisis, the ECR eventually softened its narrative and turned towards supporting the emergency measures of EU interventions, such as price caps and target sanctions on Russia. Most importantly, ECR had softened its position in terms of the EU climate-neutral ambitions and turned to partially support the EU’s long-term energy solution packages: the ‘Energy Union’ and ‘Fit for 55’.

To conclude, the primary component of the narrative that ECR had been producing features heavily on the disagreement and even the above-mentioned insinuation of the EU due to the poly-crisis that the EU has been facing. While recognizing that Russia is a significant threat to European Energy security post-2022, Russia as a threat according to the ECR group was the failure of the EU system and radical neoliberal ideologies towards green transition and has existed even before the annexation in 2014. The ECR even argued that due to the harmful governance of the EU, not only energy security and solidarity, but European households and businesses are suffering.

Therefore, there was never an external threat to energy security. The high dependence on Russian gas was only the wrongdoing of the Union from the ECR perspective (i.e., the Commission’s hesitancy towards Nord Stream 2) until the War between Russia and Ukraine broke out in 2022. Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022 magnified the already vulnerable energy system due to an “ideology-based Commission”, implicating the governing coalition as well. (ECR, 2015) Regardless, ECR had indeed securitized its energy narrative in both post-2014 and post-2022 from the presence of exceptional measures.

In addition to the internal battle of ideology, we could observe a long-term-oriented mindset within the ECR narrative. Figure 8 exhibited the presence of long-term measures while not being outweighed by exceptional measures. ECR had proposed utilising nuclear energy as the

solution to enhance energy efficiency and achieve energy transition, highlighting the vital role of coherence among the EU as well as infrastructure and technology development.

Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)




Figure 9 : Framing of threats of the Greens/EFA from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Source: Author




Figure 10 : (Exceptional) Measures of the Greens/EFA from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Source: Author

In Figure 9, we can observe the dominance of Russia-related threats as opposed to non-Russia-related threats. However, contrary to expectations Russia-related threats did not reach 100% (apart from 2020) when both Russian aggressions occurred, with 2014 and 2015 reaching around only 80% and 2021 and 2022 60-70%. In terms of measures, 2014 was entirely focused on exceptional measures, signifying the presence of securitization. After the annexation until the next parliamentary term (2019–2023), the Greens/EFA group began to show support for the Energy Union package and occasionally long-term measures. From 2019, Exceptional measures went up to 100% and then around 80%, and dropped to half or less than half in 2021 and 2022. The plummeted percentage of exceptional measures was replaced by the increase in long-term measures in 2021 and 2022.

#### 2014

The 80% concern over Russia-related threats suggests that the annexation of Crimea did become a significant concern for the Greens/EFA on energy and climate security in 2014. While not directly accusing Russia as a primary threat, the Greens/EFA adopted a mindset of risk politics on the dependency on Russian gas and the potential geopolitical intentions regarding energy. For instance, the group claimed that "Russian energy companies are known to provide a means of influence for the Russian government beyond mere business transactions". (European Parliament, 2014a) Nevertheless, due to the lack of a concrete framing of threats and concrete exceptional measures, the group did not securitize energy in 2014. Such contradictions could be explained by the group's anti-nuclear and anti-fossil fuels agenda. (Greens/EFA, 2022) Therefore, it justified that, apart from Russia's aggression in 2014, the Greens/EFA was also treating the Hungarian nuclear pact as equally as urgent as the annexation.

#### Post 2014

Starting in 2015, the Greens/EFA group began producing a securitized energy narrative. Highlighting that European energy security was in danger, the narrative of the Greens/EFA features similar linguistic aspects as the EPP group, claiming that "Russia has increasingly chosen to use its energy resources for political purposes through both blackmail and threats". (European Parliament, 2015a) Moreover, owing to the construction of Nord Stream 2, the Greens/EFA had been desperately opposing the project in negative languages. In 2015 the pipeline was described by the Greens/EFA as "an open use of energy tools for geopolitical gain" (European Parliament, 2015c); in 2016, the group targeted the state-owned company Gazprom, claiming the Nord Stream 2 project "involves a supplier that has complete control over the

entire infrastructure" (European Parliament, 2016d); in 2019, in order to make a valid narrative, the Greens/EFA began to raise awareness of the vulnerability in energy supply in the CEE countries as well as the neighborhood countries such as Moldova and Georgia. The 2006-2009 gas dispute was also part of the narrative to highlight the severity of Russian aggression, as the group claimed that "Russia is systematically pursuing[,] underlin[ing] this aggression against the European Union". (European Parliament, 2019a)

Regarding the measures corresponding to such framing of threats, the Greens/EF's priority was first to ensure the diversification of energy sources by stressing again the Third energy package. In the long term, the Greens/EFA hope to achieve energy efficiency and transition through renewable energy instead of the continuation of utilizing fossil fuels. These measures called for by the groups echoed the EU's climate-neutral ambitions; therefore, the groups naturally took on a supportive attitude towards the Energy Union package, however proposing a more coordinated response among the member states to future threats.

#### 2021-2022

A year before the War broke out, the Greens/EFA had spent less effort in framing the supposed Russian threat; instead, we could observe that the continuity of narrative by the Greens/EFA, which emphasize the negativity of fossil fuels as well as the deployment of nuclear energy, explains the approximately 30% of non-Russia-related threats in 2021. (See Figure 9) The Greens/EFA turned to question the sustainability of the recently proposed hydrogen as a potential energy solution, arguing that "hydrogen produced from fossil gas and nuclear power" (European Parliament, 2021a) could endanger energy and climate security even more. The groups intended to strengthen the climate-neutral agenda and maintain the Union's energy autonomy; hence a non-securitized energy discourse can be found, corresponding to a long-term oriented measure that calls for energy efficiency, digital networking and infrastructure transformation.

#### Post 2022

The energy crisis that was triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was regarded by the Greens/EFA group as a real tangible threat to not only energy security but, more importantly, European citizens, families and businesses. In other words, the invasion acted as a game-changer for the Greens/EFA group.

"High—energy—price crisis is due to the high prices of fossil fuels and also the manipulation of Russia and Putin" (European Parliament, 2022e);

"Putin's war of aggression and a completely wrong energy policy over the last decades have brought us to this crisis" (Ibid.)

The Greens/EFA group, while calling for immediate emergency measures such as European market intervention, price cap and mandatory energy storage among member states, stood their ground on the transition towards renewable energy and the abandonment of nuclear energy. In addition, the group's demand for a 'radical change' and a "profound transformation of our (European) economic and industrial model" (Ibid.) suggests the group's desire to establish a more resilient energy and economic system. (Bourbeau, 2013)

To conclude, it was challenging to identify a continuous narrative for the Greens/EFA group. What can be confirmed is that the Greens/EFA group has been associating energy security with climate security. According to the Greens/EFA, the long-term solution to the EU's current crisis is renewable energy and a climate-neutral EU energy policy. In other words, the complete abandonment of fossil fuels and nuclear energy. Such a mindset, while corresponding to the Commission's current package of 'Fit for 55', is still considered by some, such as the ECR group, as radical and unrealistic.

The securitization process was not present in 2014 due to the lack of technical response despite the group stating that it was not "business as usual". Nor did the group frame Russia's annexation of Crimea as an imminent threat to energy security but merely as a risk. On the contrary, the securitization process has been present since 2015 due to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. It lasted until 2020 and 2021, likely due to the Covid crisis and its repercussions. Finally, Russia's aggression in 2022 was such a massive disruption that an evident securitization process in terms of energy could finally be observed from the discourses of the Greens/EFA group with a long-term aim of phasing out fossil fuels in order to achieve a genuine Energy Union.

Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 2014-2018 & Renew Europe Group (Renew) 2019-2022




Figure 11 : Framing of threats of the ALDE/Renew from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Source: Author




Figure 12 : (Exceptional) Measures of the ALDE/Renew from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Purple: Fit for 55 Package

Source: Author

As shown in Figure 11, the ALDE/Renew framing of threats mirrored the Greens/EFA group, where Russia-related threats had a lower percentage in 2014/15 and 2021/22. In contrast, Russia-related threats reached 100% in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 (apart from 2020). In 2014 Russia-related threats and non-Russia-related threats were equally present in the ALDE group discussions, while in 2015 Russia-related threats slightly outweighed their counterparts, reaching around 55%; in 2021/22, Russia-related threats reached almost 90%, while non-Russia-related threats accounted for around 10%.

Long-term measures were the dominating solutions in the ALDE group in 2014 and 2015, which echoed the relatively low Russia-related threats. (See Figure 12) Nevertheless, the preference towards long-term measures gradually decreased until the Renew Group took over. In terms of the Renew group, exceptional and long-term measures co-exist (50%-50%), while occasionally, long-term measures would outweigh exceptional measures before the Russian invasion. From 2014 to 2018, the ALDE group demonstrated support for the Commission's Energy Union package; however, the Energy Union promotion became absent as soon as the Renew group came into play. On the other hand, the support of the 'Fit for 55' Packages can be found in the Renew group's 2021 discourses.

## 2014

In 2014 the ALDE group severely condemned the annexation. The situation in Ukraine was described as a "War", and "Russia is not doing business as usual with Europe" (European Parliament, 2014b).

A securitized discourse towards Ukraine and the Ukrainian people was the ALDE speeches' main priority. A "humanitarian crisis" was acknowledged by the group as well as the security of the European Union. (Ibid.) The energy sector, on the other hand, was only a secondary concern according to the collected data (See Appendix A). Since the absence of a tangible threat, there was a lack of exceptional measures. ALDE group instead called for continuous dialogue with Russia, hoping to de-escalate the situation in Ukraine.

## 2014-2018

In 2015 ALDE began to develop a mindset of risk politics due to the high dependence of the Union on the Russian energy supply; therefore, the potential of Europe's energy security is in peril. While stressing that Russia has the potential to become a direct threat due to the

monopoly of Gazprom, the Nord Stream pipeline's expansion and the "black deals" being made by Moscow, ALDE prioritized long-term solutions to enhance resilience. (European Parliament, 2015c) The proposed solutions included: fundamental transition and modernization of infrastructure towards renewable energy and efficient technologies, the establishment of an "internal energy market" in other words, an Energy Union.

In the following years, from 2016 to 2018, ALDE's energy discourses were gradually securitized due to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. (See Figure 11) The Nord Stream 2 project was described by ALDE as "the killer project". (European Parliament, 2016d) Later in 2018, the ALDE group gave historical experiences of how Russia has never been a reliable partner and could be a potential existential threat to the Union. Russia's aggressive behaviors included "the partial occupation of Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine, the shooting down of MH 17, the cyberattacks against our institutions, against the German Bundestag even, the money laundering through our banks and the chemical attacks in Salisbury." (European Parliament, 2018b)

2019- 2021

In the 2019 parliamentary term, the ALDE group was enlarged and became the current Renew group in the Parliament. The Renew group discourses on energy had also taken a turn linguistically regarding Russia and energy. In 2019, it was claimed by Renew that Russia could "use Europe's dependence on Russian gas as a real geopolitical tool" (European Parliament, 2019b), yet there was no proposal of targeted measures towards such risk. In 2020, when the pandemic hit, no Russia-related threat was identified; the group's attention seemed to turn to the climate crisis. Exceptional measures such as the Recovery and Resilient Instrument were nevertheless mentioned, which can be explained due to the Covid crisis.

A comprehensive narrative on energy security was eventually identified in 2021. During the debate of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on her visit to Russia, the Renew group had argued that Russia was an immense threat and thus condemned the visit. A confirmation that Russia has been an existential threat to the EU when the group referred to the EU institutions as the referent object and brought up the annexation in 2014. Furthermore, Renew argued that the EU "remain open to blackmail from Russian gas supplies". (European Parliament, 2021c) Corresponding to the

Russia threat were the exceptional measures of the European Energy Security Policy and the joint purchase of energy.

Post 2022

Compared to the weak energy securitization narrative from the previous year, the Renew group produced a strong narrative that features Russia and its invasion of Ukraine as the main threat to European energy security and the citizens. We could also observe the strong association of Russia's invasion of Ukraine with the energy crisis.

"The unilateral suspension of gas supplies from Russia to Bulgaria and Poland is part of Russia's military aggression in Ukraine and proof of the dimensions of the hostile actions against Europe in terms of violating Europe's energy security and independence." (European Parliament, 2022j)

"The real person who's causing the difficulties with regard to citizens, the cost of fuel, the cost of living, the cost electricity is Vladimir Putin himself." (European Parliament, 2022d)

While long-term measures of infrastructure reforms and green transition were crucial parts for the group before and after it was renamed, the War and energy crisis was something at hand that required an "emergency dimension". (European Parliament, 2022e) Similar to the fellow political groups, the intervention of prices at an EU level was being called for, as well as severe sanctions on Russia. The group facilitating the Commission's emergency program towards the energy crisis: the REPowerEU, could also confirm a securitized narrative.

While a Russia-related threat was present from 2014-2021, the ALDE/Renew group acknowledged the risk of high energy dependence on Russia without producing a securitized narrative in light of the annexation. From 2014-2018, ALDE preached a long-term solution for the European energy system, highlighting its support of the climate neutral, the green transition agenda, and a welcoming attitude towards nuclear energy. Moreover, the groups' support of European values and the Union as a whole were still open to dialogue with Russia.

The enlargement of the ALDE group did not prevent the group from following its previous principles. Nevertheless, the War and its repercussions led to the proposal of exceptional measures for energy security and European citizens. Last but not least, similar to ECR, the Renew group had identified the vulnerability of current EU energy dynamics, implying that the

crisis may have been self-inflicted. Hence, the need for fundamental reforms and an actual integrated energy market.

### Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)




Figure 13 : Framing of threats of the GUE/NGL from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats                      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Blue: Non-Russian threats                      Source: Author




Figure 14 : (Exceptional) Measures of the GUE/NGL from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures                      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures      Source: Author

The Left group in the European Parliament produced one of the most consistent narratives within the Parliament in terms of energy, despite demonstrating a high intensity of Euroscepticism. We can observe from Figure 13 that Russia or Russian aggression were never a threat to the Left group, as non-Russia-related threats had been 100% until the War in 2022 took place. Interestingly, the Left group considered the Energy Union narrative a threat to energy security when it was first addressed in 2015. However, the measures mentioned during the debate did not mirror the framing of threats of the Left group. From 2014 to 2018, exceptional measures were only present in 2015 and 2016, 50% and 60%, respectively, while in 2018, long-term measures reached 100%. In 2019 and 2020, exceptional measures reached 100%, whereas, in 2021 and 2021, exceptional were around 60 to 70%, along with the long-term measures (around 30% and then 25%).

#### 2014

In 2014 the Left group, contrary to most groups in the Parliament, claimed that the Commission should take the blame for the escalation of the situation in Ukraine. (See Appendix A) According to the Left, the Commission acted as an ineffective regulator; secondly, the Commission did not intervene in time, which led to the annexation. Throughout the selective debates, the Left did not suggest that Russia was the main contributor to the aggression whatsoever, without suggesting any measures that required adoption.

#### Post 2014

The narrative of the Left group remains consistent, insinuating the direct relations between the inability of the Union and energy poverty in Europe. Such a narrative justifies the group's preaching of national sovereignty and opposition towards the Energy Union package the Commission introduced in 2015. (The Left, 2015; 2016) According to the Left group, the Energy Union narrative is merely "the submission of this strategic and vital sector in modern economies and societies to the interests of the major European powers and their increasingly transnational economic groups, whether in terms of infrastructure development or the desired integration of markets". (European Parliament, 2015c)

Another critical aspect of the Left narrative is the referent object which emphasizes maintaining the way of life for citizens and households. The welfare of citizens and households was prioritized over those of multinational energy companies. Therefore, the group strives to ensure public ownership of energy.

Despite the accusative tone within the narrative of the Left group, exceptional measures in terms of energy security had outweighed long-term approaches starting from the new parliamentary term. With the increase in the percentage of exceptional measures, one would assume the existence of an imminent threat. However, the framing of such a threat remains weak, implying the threats were not exaggerated nor were they existential and were directed towards the incompetence of the EU.

#### 2021-2022

A year before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Left surprisingly had a lower percentage of exceptional measures while non-Russia related threats remained 100%. The Left insisted that open dialogue should be made with Russia instead of War, suggesting a “Russo-phobic” Union. (European Parliament, 2021d) Moreover, the Left group continued highlighting the failure of the EU’s energy model and policy, which has been inclined to privatize and cater to oligarchal energy companies. The farming threat in 2021 again was extremely vague, while there was an urgent attitude regarding the energy (electricity) market rules.

#### Post 2022

Since the War and the energy crisis came along with it, the Left group had recognized the severity of the disruption in the energy sector. A securitized energy narrative was present due to the specific exceptional measures proposed by the group, which included, as many mentioned, price intervention at an EU level (i.e., price cap and compensation). Interestingly, according to the group, the main threat in this narrative was the “multinationals” that had benefited from the drastic increase in energy prices, as opposed to the Russian-initiated War and its repercussions, as claimed by the majority of the political groups. Lastly, from the perspective of the Left, Russia was just one of the victims of the EU’s neoliberal ideology along with the “ordinary people of Europe”. The energy insecurity was simply the wrongdoing of an incompetent Union. (The Left, 2023)

“The absurdity of its (the EU) energy market, which only leads to one thing: skyrocketing prices for people and profits for multinationals” (European Parliament, 2022j);

“They (The EU) are hurting the ordinary people of Europe a lot more than they’re ever going to hurt Putin, and they are not going to stop the war” (European Parliament, 2022e)

To conclude, the Left has created a narrative that has been consistent since 2014, which regards the EU as incompetent in energy governance, especially its neoliberal ideology that permits the

monetization of multinational energy companies and the exploitation of European citizens. Nevertheless, the group has a similar mentality of developing within the Union by calling for infrastructure and technology reforms and to be more energy efficient without relying on coal and nuclear energy. Comprehensive securitization of energy discourses can only be captured in post-2019 when exceptional measures were constantly present.

### Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and Identity and Democracy (ID)




Figure 15 : Framing of threats of the EFDD from 2014 – 2022




Figure 16 : Framing of threats of the ID from 2014 – 2022

Red: Russian related threats  
 Blue: Non-Russian threats  
 Yellow: Energy Union  
 Source: Author




Figure 17 : (Exceptional) Measures of the EFDD from 2014 - 2022




Figure 18 : (Exceptional) Measures of the ID from 2014 – 2022

Green: Exceptional measures                      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures

Source: Author

In this section, the political group Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and Identity and Democracy group (ID) will be compared as both share similar political leaning. Nevertheless, EFDD and ID are different political groups; while EFDD was active from 2014 to 2019, the ID group was officially part of the European Parliament from 2019 and is still

active. One important feature that stood as the cornerstone of both EFDD and ID, which contributed to the narratives they produced, is their Euroscepticism and their beliefs in independent sovereign European states. (European Parliament, 2014c; ID, 2023)

Similar to the Left group, EFDD barely recognized Russia-related threats, while the ID group paid no attention to Russia-related threats (See Figures 15 and 16). EFDD demonstrated concerns on Russia-related threats in 2014 and 2019, while Russia-related threats outweighed non-Russia-related threats, reaching almost 70%, whereas, in 2014, Russia-related threats accounted for only 40%. The EFDD group prioritized the discursive (framing) element of an issue more than the technical aspect (measures) of it, as there was a continuous absence of measures being mentioned, apart from in 2015 and 2017.

Regarding the ID group, from 2019 to 2022, the group had a 100% focus on non-Russian-related threats, while in 2020, they specifically and negatively commented on the Commission's Energy Strategy. From the corresponding measures, the group primarily highlighted long-term measures instead of exceptional measures, apart from 2020, reaching 100%, which could be justified by the Covid Crisis.

## 2014

In 2014, EFDD condemned Russian aggression and was concerned about European security, especially for the more vulnerable countries such as the Baltic States and the Neighborhood countries such as Moldova. Moreover, the group had demonstrated concern over high energy dependence on Russian gas and its correlation to the disruption, arguing that the escalation of the conflict could have a spillover effect on the entire EU. However, according to the group, the one who initiated the aggression was not Russia but the EU and its "Western strategic and commercial interests". (European Parliament, 2014b) The mentality of EFDD in 2014 can be seen in Figure 15 when although both Russia- and non-Russia-related threats were present, non-Russian-related threats outweighed the other.

"The EU contributed to the starting this conflict in the first place and that signing an agreement for deeper political ties with Ukraine was simply irresponsible, especially while taunting Russia with sanctions" (European Parliament, 2014b)

2015 - 2019

Despite the accusative manner that EFDD had continuously framed the EU, such as the lack of democracy and ineffective energy policy, including the Energy Union and the Energy security strategy, no evident linguistic aspect could identify a politicized issue nor an imminent threat. In 2017 however, EFDD provided concrete measures such as the support of the measures to safeguard the security of gas supply or its approval of the Nord Stream 2. (See Appendix A) The opinion of the group can be explained by the debate results, where the majority of political groups, including the Commission, were against the project due to its potential violation of the EU's energy principles of diversification. In contrast, the EFDD group was against the EU energy policy.

In 2018, the EFDD discourses began associating the EU with a specific ideology. For instance, 'Europeanism' emerged, which possesses the meaning of "innate discrimination against the opposition of the mainstream", justifying the group's unpopular perspective in the Parliament. (European Parliament, 2018b)

2019-2021

In 2019, the EFDD group ceased to be active, while a right-leaning ID group emerged. Similar to EFDD, the ID group has been extremely against the dominant agenda in the Union in terms of both climate and energy. (See Appendix A) With the intensified situation in Ukraine and an energy crisis, a narrative targeting the Union can be observed. Within the narrative of ID, there was a "dramatic emergency (on energy) which results from years of inaction and wrong choices on the subject of autonomy. We have long known that we are too dependent on countries whose blackmail we suffer and with whom we have deep geopolitical differences." (European Parliament, 2021b)

Consequently, in order to insinuate the EU's incompetence even more, the ID group had chosen an implicit way of referring to Russia, referring to "countries whose blackmail we suffer." (Ibid.) Moreover, in this narrative, the EU was regarded as the one who "waged war on gas" and assisted the growth of Atlanticism. In other words, the Commission's "desire to return to the Cold War." (European Parliament, 2021d)

## Post 2022

The ID group's narrative on the EU remained consistent even after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. The group had identified the impact of the energy crisis on European energy security and households, and that exceptional measures must be activated, such as the sanctioning of Russia. A contradiction within the ID narrative thus formed, while claiming that the energy crisis was “purely self-inflicted”; the exceptional measures were targeting Russia. (European Parliament, 2022e)

In addition, it has been challenging to identify a securitization process due to the fluctuating exceptional measures (See Figure 18). On the other hand, the ID group values long-term oriented solutions yet disagrees with ‘ecological’ and ‘resilience’ terminology. According to the ID group in 2021, there should be a “minimum backup of fossil fuels” such as coal and gas (European Parliament, 2021c) Therefore, Russia was never a threat and maintaining an amicable relationship and open dialogue with Russia is essential. The group also welcomes the usage of nuclear energy, which is a topic that has been leading to contestation within the Parliament.

To conclude, both EFDD and ID groups had generated similar narratives based on their right-leaning ideology and regarded the EU as the main antagonist. While the former regarded the EU as a failed energy governor whose policies were mostly ineffective, the latter accused the EU of spreading Liberal ideology, which resulted in energy dependence on external suppliers. At the same time, the institutions became even more centralized. Such a mentality often came across as against the mainstream when addressing issues during a debate, resulting in their opinions being marginalized. Therefore, despite identifying a specific threat to Energy security, a comprehensive securitization process will never be realized if the narrative cannot be approved by the other actors in the Parliament.

## Non-attached Members (NI)




Figure 19 : Framing of threats of the NI from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Blue: Non-Russian threats      Source: Author




Figure 20 : (Exceptional) Measures of the NI from 2014 – 2022

Green: Exceptional measures      Yellow: Energy Union  
 Light-blue: Long-term oriented measures      Source: Author

The non-attached members of the European Parliament (Non-inscrits) were members of the parliament that were not bound to the above political leanings and groups. Each could be part of a national party or a political party in the EP; therefore, this section will not identify a collective narrative due to the diversity of political leanings and the framing of threats.

From 2014 to 2017, the NI member of the parliament demonstrated contested opinions in terms of the framing of threats (See Figure 19), while non-Russia related threats (50-68%) outweighed Russia-related threats (30-50%). From 2017 onwards, the NI members were either silent in terms of framing or consistent in leaning towards non-Russian related threats. The only exception was in 2022 when Russia-related threats (around 18%) could be observed. Apart from 2014/15 and 2021/22, no particular measures were mentioned which corresponded to the two Russian disruptions. In 2014 and 2021, exceptional measures were at 100% as opposed to 2015 and 2022, when exceptional measures dropped to around 30% and 70%, respectively, while accompanied by long-term measures (68% and 35%).

#### 2014-2019

An overall trend could be observed: While some MEPs considered Russia a threat to European energy security, the majority of NIs considered the Union and its dominant agenda (i.e. the Energy Union) the entity that is damaging the EU energy system as well as the welfare of the livelihood of citizens. In terms of exceptional measures proposed by the NIs, these measures lacked urgency. They acted merely as recommendations, such as that the EU should take on a neutral position regarding the crisis or that Russia should be a European ally. On the other hand, long-term oriented measures that promote energy efficiency and renewables briefly appeared in 2015, then died down again.

#### 2019-2022

During the period of the second parliamentary term, the discourses of the NIs were barely present until post-pandemic, when there was more weight shifted to the non-Russia-related threats, namely, the EU. (See Appendix A) Prior to Russia's invasion in 2022, the NIs briefly spoke up against the "radical-Left" and their perspective on anti-nuclear ambitions. However, the Eurosceptic focus returned after the Russian-Ukraine War occurred. The NIs had heavily criticized the "European solution" or the "Energy liberalization and financialization strategy" (European Parliament, 2022i), claiming that these ideologies and strategies were tailored to the profitability of the European leaders, which had led to the high-energy bills. At the same time,

the danger of heavy dependence on Russia was still present. The corresponding measures that were proposed were intervention by taxing multinationals and price caps, with the abandoning of sanctions and the restoration of trade with Russia. Despite not having a collective narrative, we can conclude that the NIs in the European Parliament share more similarities with the Eurosceptics and tend to give out marginalized opinions.

### 4.3 The narratives of the EP (A frame narrative approach)

#### Narrative 1

Diagnosis (Root cause of threats)	Evaluation (Key actors)	Remedial Actions (Specific policy)
Russia is malicious, and a threat towards energy security, European values and citizens, attempting to gain geopolitical momentum by energy weaponization or blackmailing either through cyber-attacks or the Nord Stream projects.	EPP, S&D, ALDE/Renew	Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), The Southern Gas Corridor, The Third energy package, InvestEU Fund, Horizon Europe, Energy Union, RRF, REPowerEU, NextGenerationEU, Risk assessment (ENTSOG)

#### Narrative 2

Diagnosis (Root cause of threats)	Evaluation (Key actors)	Remedial Actions (Specific policy)
Russia as a threat to European energy security and citizens due to the failure of an European energy system and radical neoliberal ideologies' towards green transition.	ECR, ALDE/Renew	Fit for 55, RRF, REPowerEU, The Green Deal

#### Narrative 3

Diagnosis (Root cause of threats)	Evaluation (Key actors)	Remedial Actions (Specific policy)
Russia poses a risk and later a threat to energy security and citizens, so are fossil fuels and nuclear energy. In order to be less dependent on Russian energy, it is necessary to phase out fossil fuels and nuclear energy and promote renewables and green transition.	Greens/EFA	Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply, REPowerEU, The Green Deal, Energy Union

#### Narrative 4

Diagnosis (Root cause of threats)	Evaluation (Key actors)	Remedial Actions (Specific policy)
The EU as the primary threat to energy security and the citizens and that both Russian aggressions were just the result of the Union's incompetence of energy governance and radical neoliberal climate agenda.	The Left, EFDD, ID	N/A

Based on the analysis from the previous section, four common narratives have been identified among the political groups in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis suggests an evident contestation within the Parliament on energy security matters. Secondly, we can observe a spectrum of narratives due to political leanings, thus, different intensities of the securitization process. Furthermore, this study argues that narratives 1 and 3 have been the most prevalent since 2014 concerning energy in the setting of Parliament based on the debates selected for this study; as the coalition of these two narratives accounts for more than half of the seats in the Parliament, considering EPP and S&D are the two largest political groups. While energy securitization was sometimes not visible among political groups in 2014 and 2015, the 2022 Russian invasion acted as a game changer, facilitating the completion of energy securitization and basing the securitized narrative on narratives 1 and 3. In other words, a fully-fledged securitization process in terms of energy can be found in EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Nevertheless, if we look at the adopted texts, out of the selected parliamentary debates, there were 11 that resulted in voting, and only one was rejected, which was the debate on a European Energy Security Strategy in 2015. (See Appendix C) While the majority of debates cater to narratives 1 and 3, for instance, the debates concerning the use of renewables, energy system integration, energy efficiency or the debates on the security of supplies, high energy prices or resilience in critical entities, the European Energy Security Strategy was an example that the dominant narrative does not always prevail in the Parliament. Despite the imminent Russian threat and energy dependency, certain MEPs from EPP and ECR disapprove of the intervention in the energy sector by the EU. At the same time, the Left dislike the EU's aggressive trade and foreign policy and its intentions to deploy energy. Still, the strategy had gained approval from the ALDE group and the S&D group; the former was concerned about the vulnerable energy

system and considered the strategy beneficial, and the latter considered it a new energy model for the EU.

#### **4.3.1 Resilience as Renewal in the European Parliament**

As mentioned in the section at the beginning, the European Commission has gradually acknowledged and foresees the inevitable change due to internal and external poly-crisis, which resulted in the shift from resilience as marginal to resilience as renewal from 2014 to 2022.

On the other hand, the findings in this study suggest that resilience as renewal has been an innate reaction to energy security, as this concept that features long-term solutions came as early as 2015. The presence of resilience-oriented measures, regardless of disruptive events, corresponded with Bourbeau (2018)'s emphasis on pre-security dynamics that can occur before and after the securitization process to preserve a particular way of life. Therefore, resilience can bring out security. (See theoretical framework)

Once again, resilience as renewal features fundamental change and, in the case of the parliament, a fundamental policy change. Moreover, the "threat" would be amplified or exaggerated to ensure the 'fundamental change' prevails, which justified the prevalence of narratives 1 and 3 before and after Russia's aggression in Ukraine in 2022.

As Bourbeau (2013) defined, "Resiliencism is then a conceptual framework for understanding how continuity and transformation take place under these circumstances". Therefore, this study observes resilience through long-term measures as it cannot be measured if not given a period of time. If we then look at the long-term measures adopted by political groups since 2014, four main themes can be identified: energy efficiency, energy transition, renewable energy and technology, and infrastructure modernization and transformation. The four themes not only provide the ultimate goal of the EP and technical means but are also interlocked with the European Commission's emergency measures: 'REPowerEU' and the 'Recovery and Resilience Fund' as well as long-term 'Energy Union' narrative in 2015 and later on the 'Fit for 55' Package in 2021 highlight these principles. That is to say, the modernization and transformation of energy technology and infrastructure would consequently lead to energy efficiency, energy transition, and to development of renewable energy. Nevertheless, the 'Fit for 55' Package was still a relatively new package that demands a higher climate ambition of "reducing EU emissions by at least 55% by 2030 a legal obligation". (European Council, 2023) Despite acting

as the continuation of the Energy Union narrative, the package is still premature in its implementation, and it is challenging to determine whether the package could become a dominant narrative in the EU. However, this study opens an opportunity for future research between energy governance and energy narrative within the European Parliament and among the European institutions.

To conclude, this study suggested that resilience has been an innate reaction to energy security in the European Parliament. Furthermore, it argues that the role of Russian aggressions acted as amplifiers that strengthened and consolidated the already existing narrative that has favoured resilience as renewal despite the diverse narratives concerning energy security.

#### 4.4 Energy securitization of the European Commission from 2014-2022




Figure 21: Framing of threats of the European Commission from 2014 - 2022

Red: Russian related threats

Blue: Non-Russian threats

Source: Author




Figure 22: (Exceptional) Measures of the European Commission from 2014 - 2022

Green: Exceptional measures

Light blue: Long-term oriented measures

Yellow: Energy Union

Source: Author

#### 4.4.1 Framing of threats of the European Commission and its referent objects

Figure 21 exhibited a general pattern of the framing of threats of the Commission in the parliamentary debates from 2014 onwards: Russia-related incidents were considered threats and took up over 70% of the parliamentary debates that were coded and were present in most years. Moreover, the 2014 document concerning the European energy security strategy emphasizes the risk of having Russia as the dominant natural gas supplier in light of the recent Russian aggression. It can be confirmed that Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 contributed to over 70% of the threats that were Russia or Russian if we look at the categorized discourses. (See Appendix B) Despite not being directly linked to the European energy sector, the annexation still managed to raise awareness among members of the Union on their high dependence on external energy supply, namely Russian oil and gas. Such awareness resulted in wariness and a more preventive attitude toward the spillover effect of Russian aggression, reflected in the emphasis on not only energy security but also the consumers (citizens, businesses) if there should be a supply disruption.

Moreover, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the European Commission has gradually become discursively reactionary regarding energy as opposed to presenting itself more neutrally. For instance, there were no specific allegations on energy from the Commission apart from being aware that Russia may "take unilateral 'preventive' safeguard measures". (European Parliament, 2014b) In 2015, the Commission acknowledged the urgent supply problem of one single supplier without pinpointing Russia. (European Parliament, 2015a) Starting in 2016, Russia was more frequently mentioned during a debate. The condemnation directly towards Russia was replaced by the monopolistic Russian company Gazprom due to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the suspicion of its malign geopolitical objective. At the same time, the events in 2014 only facilitated an overall negative opinion which was cast over the project by the Commission due to the risk of being even more dependent on Russian gas. The Commission claimed the project did not align with the Energy Union package that stressed diversification and energy efficiency proposed by the Commission in 2015. (European Parliament, 2015c) The framing of threats reflected the referent objects, the European energy security and consumers. The differentiation of specific energy in 2016 as referent objects can be regarded as an outlier due to the technicality of the debate. In other words, such differentiation can result from concentration on one energy source during the debate.

Another factor that could contribute to the change of framing is the EU's emphasis on cybersecurity since 2014, with cybersecurity along with energy security as a part of the referent objects. Attention was drawn especially to the hybrid warfare conducted by the Russian military that gave rise to the populist government (Prezetacznik & Tarpova, 2022; Samardzic, 2020). The emphasis on cybersecurity in the debate with the PM of Estonia/vice president of the Commission was also visible. As a result, the attention towards Russian hybrid warfare and enhancing cyber security and digitization became the priority on the Commission's agenda. At the same time, the concerns over the annexation of Crimea were still present in the Commission's framing of threats.

Moving on to 2019, which is when the von der Leyen Commission took over the Union. Despite non-Russian-related threats that took up more or less 25% in total (see Figure 21), it was a time when the Union was facing "the normalization of Euroscepticism." (Brack, 2020, p1) We could observe Euroscepticism among member states and political groups (i.e., the ID group and the Left group). Apart from the internal crisis, there was increased tension with Russia, as claimed by the Commission in the 2019 debate, concerning the state of EU-Russia relations while

highlighting resilience in human and cyber security before the Covid pandemic hit Europe. Energy security became a secondary thought of the Commission while recognizing Russia as a primary threat to other sectors.

The non-Russian-related threats remained at their peak up until 2020, which was when the global Covid pandemic occurred. The pandemic had diverted the EU's attention away from Russian aggression as well as energy disruptions which explain the non-existence of Russia or Russian-related threats in the chosen sample data. On the other hand, the European Commission reactivated its concern over the ongoing climate challenge while diversifying energy sources, reflecting the referent object of ensuring the competitiveness of the clean energy industry.

The framing of threats of the Commission from 2021 to 2022 had a drastic turn due to an assertive Russian threat and the emergence of an energy crisis. Starting in 2021, the EU was undergoing the repercussions of the first wave of the pandemic, including the rise of energy prices and, at the same time, enhancing its resilience for the next. Moreover, in 2021 high energy prices became the primary concern of the Commission as well as the European citizens while deploring "Russia's use of energy resources as a geopolitical tool of pressure." (European Parliament, 2021e)

In 2022, upon the occurrence of Russia's aggression in Ukraine, the Commission's framing of the Russian threat was firm and accusative, claiming that "Russia has dropped the act and has made it clear: they are using energy as a weapon". (European Parliament, 2022e) Stressing the urgency of the event then inevitably brought out the highest intensity of securitization process. Such framing also resonated with the sudden rise of Russia and Russian-related threats to almost 90%. It is evident that in 2022, the Commission produced the inference that the gas and electricity disruption resulted from Russia's aggression.

#### **4.4.2 Measures Taken by the European Commission**

If we compare Figure 21 and Figure 22, an interesting result emerges as the two figures mirror each other in terms of the overall shape. Both figures have a high percentage of one specific color, red and green, respectively, at each end, while the middle bars fluctuated. This finding suggests a hypothesis that the more the European Commission targets Russia or Russian-related threats, the more likely it is for the European Commission to introduce exceptional

measures. Moreover, the highest peak<sup>10</sup> of Russian-related threats and exceptional measures corresponds with the two Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022. Another observation, according to Figures 21 and 22, is the gradual increase in the percentage of long-term measures up until 2021. Therefore, it can be argued that despite the outliers that do not fit the hypothesis, the percentage of the long-term measures compensated for the percentage of the emergency measures.

In light of the Russian aggression, as mentioned in the previous section, the European Commission demonstrated concerns towards its high dependency on Russian energy sources, however, without applying linguistic exaggeration when framing such dependency back in 2014. Interestingly, a stress test and the emphasis on diversification under the pretext of "the possible related risk of a disruption in gas supplies to the EU" was still conducted due to the situation in Ukraine. (European Commission, 2014, p2) From the word 'risk' in the document, Russia did not pose a direct threat to the EU system but was a potential risk in the future. Another piece of evidence that the European Commission called for exceptional measures was the Energy Security Strategy. As in the debate, Commissioner Cañete mentioned the strategy was a "respon[se]not only to our short-term challenges, however politically sensitive they may be, but looks beyond, taking into account strategic priorities, both within and outside the European Union." (European Parliament, 2015a)

The findings have confirmed that from 2014 to 2015, the European Commission produced securitized discourses on energy despite the lack of a concise threatening subject. Since 2016, the potential threats turned to the Nord Stream 2 project as the project was backed by the state-owned gas company Gazprom. While the Commission demonstrated hesitancy when it came to giving up the project, the Commission highlighted the rule of law and has taken member states' recommendations on short-term measures, such as developing domestic resources and liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as long-term measures. The Southern Gas Corridor<sup>11</sup> was another diversification solution that the Commission has been working on to move away from Russian gas. It became evident that the European Commission has taken a turn towards risk politics since 2016. One breakthrough in 2017 was the EU-wide risk assessments conducted

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<sup>10</sup> Note that the bars in both tables that reached 100% may result from the small sample size. Thus, we could treat them as marginal errors.

<sup>11</sup> "A number of countries in South East Europe had a strong dependence on a single supplier for natural gas deliveries. To help these countries diversify their supplies, the Southern Gas Corridor provides a pipeline infrastructure bringing gas to the EU from the Caspian Basin." (European Commission, 2023)

by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), further highlighting the Commission's mindset of 'risk politics'.

The network produces security of supply simulation reports (SoS Simulation) based on the "Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 ("the Regulation") entered into force on 1 November 2017." (ENTSOG, 2017, p.5) Instead of targeting one specific threat and emergency measure, the report envisioned disruptive scenarios and recommended preventive measures. Moreover, corresponding with the Commission's awareness of cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare in the following years, the Commission thus promoted resilience in cyberspace and digital infrastructure in order to maintain both human and energy security.

The period from 2020 onwards, the EU has been experiencing continuous shockwaves. The pandemic had the EU member states produce a collective securitized narrative to cope with the Covid crisis: "The COVID-19 pandemic constitutes an unprecedented challenge for Europe and the whole world. It requires urgent, decisive, and comprehensive action at the EU, national, regional and local levels." (European Council, 2020, p.1) That was when the Commission first introduced the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as the coping mechanism for the Covid pandemic. As the pivotal temporary instrument of the NextGenerationEU, the RRF also stood as the emergency measure (REPowerEU) for the energy crisis induced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

"Russia's unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine has massively disrupted the world's energy system" (European Commission, 2022, p.1)

"REPowerEU is about rapidly reducing our dependence on Russian fossil fuels by fast-forwarding the clean transition and joining forces to achieve a more resilient energy system and a true Energy Union." (Ibid.)

A very much securitized energy narrative was displayed here as we observe both the debates and the Commission's communication. From Commissioner Simson's framing of the narrative in 2022, we can also easily capture a securitized energy narrative that reflected the Commission as a whole. (See Appendix B) As opposed to the semi-securitization in 2014, Russian aggression in 2022 was considered disastrous. It was linguistically exaggerated as adjectives

such as 'unprecedented', 'exceptional' and 'unprovoked and unjustified' were chosen regarding energy security. In addition, the Commission had acknowledged its vulnerability to high dependence on Russian fossil fuels while introducing short-term exceptional measures such as the Energy toolbox, joint storage, the stressing of state intervention and more severe economic sanction towards Russia. Hence the securitization process since 2022 leans towards the transitional securitization process.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the REPowerEU Plan emphasizes a resilient system and long-term measures despite facing unprecedented threats. A 'Fit for 55' Package came into play along with the Energy Union narrative, both of which highlighted energy efficiency, energy transition to renewables, energy diversification and climate neutral targets. (The European Green Deal, The Paris Agreement) (European Commission, 2023b)

#### **4.4.3 From Resilience as marginality to resilience as renewal in the European Commission**

The gradual increase in long-term oriented measures in the Commission demonstrated the Commission's intention of a more resilient system, not only in the energy sector but the economic sector and against significant health threats. The development of such a mentality was only reasonable after going through significant disruptions from the pandemic to the Russian-Ukraine war and the energy crisis. (Greubrl et al., 2022)

As concluded from the previous sections, the European Commission produced a successfully securitized energy discourse in 2022 with texts accompanied by practical measures due to the outbreak of the War. On the other hand, while we could observe the presence of exceptional measures and specific referent objects, tangible threats towards the security of supply between the two disruptive points, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russia-Ukraine War since 2022, respectively are non-existent. As a result of the semi-securitization, some argue that the EU lingers between riskification and securitization. (Judge & Maltby, 2017) However, the gradual increase in long-term-oriented measures promoted and adopted by the Commission and the constant mentioning of a resilient system suggests that resilience has become a dominant logic in the EU energy security discourses, despite having gone through the securitization process.

Acknowledging that resilience has become the dominant logic of energy security in the European Commission, this section aims to distinguish between the MMR typology of resilience (Bourbeau, 2013). According to Bourbeau, resilience is characterized into three distinguished types: resilience as maintenance, marginality and renewal. This study, therefore, argued that the EU has been transitioning from resilience as marginality to resilience as renewal in light of the two Russian aggressions.

As proved above, while energy security has been on the agenda for discussion, there was a lack of exaggeration when the Commission framed energy up until 2021/2022. Still, debates and the ratification of the Regulation on Security of Gas Supply or enforcing market rules and gas storage strategy demonstrated that the Commission has been treating energy security issues as securitized. The disconnection between security discourses and practice resonates with resilience as marginality. Furthermore, another feature of resilience as marginality was the continuity of securitized practices with a change of narrative to a more long-term climate and environmental focus. Despite the continuous emphasis on diversification and energy efficiency, echoing the Energy Union's objective, the EC was determined to preserve energy security through climate security instead of diversifying for the sake of dependence on the Russian energy supply. Therefore, the increased frequency of mentioning energy transition to renewables and the green transition can confirm this argument.

The Commission began to lean towards resilience as renewal when the proposed measures exhibited signs of the request for fundamental change. A linguistic trait of wording such as 'transition', 'transformation', or 'reform' appeared more frequently during discourses. The 2015 Energy Union, calling for a "fundamental transformation of Europe's energy system." (European Commission, 2015, p.2) suggested that the Commission envisioned a future towards renewal a year after the annexation. Nevertheless, despite being the main narrative of the Commission, the realization of a genuine Energy Union is likely to be longer than planned. Furthermore, Bourbeau (2013) argued that the purpose behind this type of resilience was not to go back to the previous way of life or remain status quo. Instead, resilience as renewal welcomes and adapts to drastic change. When resilience acts as renewal, the exaggerated threats will very often align with the corresponding measures.

Since 2020, there have been debates regarding the reform or withdrawal of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) due to outdated investment protection policy which possesses "no attempt to integrate the urgency of mitigating climate change and phasing out fossil fuel investments". (European Parliament, 2022k, p.3) Moreover, the 'Fit for 55' Package introduced by the Commission calls for smart investment and reforms to adapt to the transition towards renewables and green hydrogen. (European Commission, 2023b) Lastly, one of the priorities of the von der Leyen Commission is to "promote our European way of life". (Greubel et al., 2022, p.15) The wording of 'promoting' instead of 'maintaining' suggested the Commission's positive attitude towards a long-term oriented strategy with the need for infrastructure reforms and smart transition to combat future unknown shocks.

#### **4.4.5 The European Commission - A narrative of the EU as one entity**

To conclude this section, within framing threats in the EC, the mixture of societal, European-leveled and ideational referent objects corresponded with the most common narrative of framing energy among EU member states. (Buzan et al., 1998) In this narrative, the EU is a referent object in both the political and societal sectors. (See Appendix B) Therefore, Russia and its monopoly on energy is a matter of political issue and an ontological threat to the EU due to the EU's high dependence on Russian energy. By depending on Russian energy, the basic EU principles of respecting democracy and a free market are being undermined. Therefore, it endangers not only the livelihood of the European citizens but also the existence of the EU itself and the collective European identity of member states. In this narrative, the role of both Russian aggressions acted as direct and indirect facilitators of the already existing logic of resilience, as they are not the only crises the EU has been facing.

Nevertheless, while still following the traditional pathway of establishing strategic mindsets and emergency interventions, the Commission seeks resolution from climate-oriented ambitions, which can be reflected in the core ideas of an Energy Union in 2015 and the 'Fit for 55' packages in 2021, highlighting sustainable and efficiency transition as well as the solidarity among member states.

## **5. Conclusion**

This study has answered the questions of how the political groups within the European Parliament frame energy, what kinds of narratives were produced and how these narratives have been changing before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by examining the European parliamentary debates through the lens of the Copenhagen School securitization theory and the concept of resilience. However, this was achieved using a more interpretive approach to the determination of a securitized narrative, disregarding the strict criteria of the actor-audience dynamics of the Copenhagen School. A selection of parliamentary debates concerning the EU energy governance and policies were analyzed with four narratives, as well as the narrative of the Commission, being identified within the setting of parliamentary debates.

The European Commission, being an essential actor in addressing and mediating, has been producing a consistent and securitized narrative towards energy due to Russia as an ontological threat to not only the energy system but a collective European identity by waging a war that led to the fluctuation of energy prices. According to the Commission discourses, the finding also revealed a positive relation between Russia-related threats and the exercise of exceptional measures. As Siddi (2018) argued, the energy securitization process has accelerated since the 2006-2009 gas dispute; the Crimean Shock and the invasion in 2022 only acted as facilitators for the securitization of the EU energy discourses. Nevertheless, despite a continuous securitized discourse, a narrative of a 'resilient EU' gradually stood hand in hand with the securitization process, acting as the cornerstone of corresponding measures and instruments. For instance, the REPowerEU Plan and a collective budget to deal with the Covid Crisis and the repercussions of the Russian-induced energy crisis to enhance systemic resilience and achieve target climate goals.

In terms of the political groups within the Parliament, the dynamics when producing narratives could be more complex and intersubjective. The first narrative, which is consistent with the narrative of the Commission, produced mainly through the two largest political groups, EPP and S&D, was the most dominant which features a malign Russian influence and impact that forms an existential threat to European values and energy security since 2014 and has only been intensified and confirmed by the War in 2022. The second narrative leaned towards a more conservative perspective backed by ECR, which emphasized the vulnerability of the EU

energy system due to climate-neutral ambitions and policies, while still recognizing Russia as an existential threat to energy security. The narrative of the ALDE group and, later on, the Renew group walked between the first and second narratives, leaning more toward the first narrative.

The third narrative consists of one single party, the Greens/EFA. The Green party stressed climate and environmental security immensely as opposed to the geopolitical focus of the first and second narratives, which could justify the discontinuity of the Greens' energy securitization process. According to the Greens/EFA, deploying fossil fuels and nuclear energy endangers the climate and is against the European energy security and climate agenda. Nevertheless, Russia sometimes posed a significant threat to the EU due to its high dependence. Finally, the narrative of the coalition of EFDD, ID and the Left consists of two contradicting political leanings. They share a similar perspective on the incompetence of the EU on energy governance that led to the suffering of ordinary citizens, and that Russian aggression was just the empirical evidence of the failure of the EU not only in terms of energy but governance as a whole due to its 'neoliberal' approaches and Russophobia.

Overall, the dominating coalition by EPP, S&D, ALDE/Renew and Greens/EFA share a similar narrative with the Commission of Russia as a threat since 2014, while supporting the Energy Union narrative. The referent object of the dominant narrative stresses both European energy security as well as the citizens of the Union. Interestingly, while the marginalized opinion formed by the left and right-wing groups has an alternative understanding of threats, the referent objects in their narrative were consistent with the dominant narrative. Moreover, apart from the ID group, the rest of the groups proposed evident exceptional measures towards energy after Russia waged War against Ukraine in 2022, suggesting the dynamics between Russia and the EU were no longer business as usual, as opposed to in 2014.

### **5.1 The Commission and the Parliament: Inter-locking or inter-blocking?**

The study revealed a positive answer that resilience could be considered the dominant logic/narrative in parliamentary debates and that it has always been the dominant logic when it comes to energy security, regardless of the political group. Not only short-term emergency measures were proposed during the securitisation process but also proposals that encouraged fundamental reforms or transformation in policies as well as infrastructure, by both the Commission and the political groups. The collective mindset of risk-based measures in

parliamentary debates confirmed Bourbeau (2013)'s resilience as renewal, highlighting fundamental changes and transitions.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made that while resilience has always been part of the security logic for the political groups, due to the role of the Commission as an agenda setter and the protector of European laws and values, the Commission was gradually balancing its geopolitical ambitions within the EU and externally in the neighborhood by shifting towards resilience as renewal, as opposed to resilience as marginality.

Despite the European Commission's failed attempts to "speak in one voice" and produce a collective securitized narrative, the study suggests an interlocking effect between the European Commission and the European Parliament when the EU experiences exogenous shocks such as the pandemic and Russia's aggression in Ukraine. Despite innate contestation, the European Parliament as a whole was able to act as a securitizing actor and enhance the Commission's narrative. Therefore, a parliamentary setting of contestation and diverse ideological leanings does not prevent introducing and implementing necessary reforms and could even reinforce transparency and democracy in the Union.

This study has contributed to the existing literature by filling the gap of the lack of literature in the separate analysis of EU institutions, namely the Parliament, however bearing in mind the limitation of an interpretive approach. Moreover, this study explores the internal Parliamentary dynamics by blurring the line between actors and audience, moving beyond 'speech acts' and including the technical aspect of the securitization process. In other words, the corresponding policies being produced offer an alternative angle to look at the securitization theory. Lastly, this study has a potential for future research that extends to the societal level and to observe the narratives produced by the public and media with a more diverse and extensive number of samples. A comparison could therefore be made horizontally within the political groups and vertically between the EU and European citizens. While the short-term measures proposed by the political groups stressed the energy security that is heavily linked to the livelihood of ordinary citizens, in other words a more human security aspect, within the European emergency frameworks that promote resilience in energy systems and governance, a strong interconnection between energy security and climate/environmental security can be observed (i.e. Energy Union package, 'Fit for 55' and REPowerEU). Such differentiation could lead to another future common narrative or further contestation among the EU institutions.

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## 7. Appendices

### 7.1 Appendix A: Analysis of primary data (EP)

#### The framing of threats, referent object and (exceptional) measures of the political groups in the EP 2014 – 2022

Name of the Party	Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)	Referent Object	(Exceptional) Measures
<p><b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b></p>	<p>Russia;  The annexation of Crimea;  Expect a backlash from Russia - a country whose economy can suffer greatly from a Russian backlash;  Russia's geopolitical game of spheres of influence;  The crisis in Ukraine;  The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine are a matter of great concern and anxiety;  Russia's actions in the context of the events in Ukraine clearly demonstrate that this country is not a reliable partner for the EU;  The EU's inability to find a united and clear position with regard to both Ukraine and Russia divides Europe itself and weakens it politically</p>	<p>Energy security;  Critical humanitarian consequences in the country and on its borders, and far-reaching political consequences for the country, the Neighborhood, and for Europe itself;  Human security;  Human rights;  All minorities in Ukraine;  The security of its closest neighbors, the Baltic States;  The security of the entire EU</p>	<p>Promote the construction of transport and energy infrastructures;  Transition to renewable energy;  Urgent measures;  An immediate solution to the energy security problem;  Sanctions against the Russian Federation;  Ensuring continuity of energy supplies and energy sources to Ukraine;  Supports the proposal for a collective ban on arms sales;  The EU must strengthen its external policy, particularly in the area of the Eastern Partnership</p>

<p><b>European People's Party (EPP)</b></p>	<p>Russia;  Putin Regime;  Vladimir Putin, his aggression;  Russian propaganda;  Russia's deliberate strategy of fuelling instability in eastern Ukraine;  Moscow;  The invasion of the Donetsk region by the Russian armed forces;  A real war between the nuclear powers Russia and Ukraine;  Former Soviet empire;  Russia's increasing aggressiveness;  Violence by Russia;  Destabilization;  Energy as a political weapon</p>	<p>Integrity of Ukraine to economic relations;  Enlargement policy;  Energy policy;  Relations with strategic partners;  Energy security</p>	<p>European Energy Union;  Diversification of energy supplies;</p>
<p><b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b></p>	<p>The risk of Russian gas dependency;  Russian energy companies are known to provide a means of influence for the Russian Government beyond mere business transactions;  Russia;  Today's situation in Ukraine is still escalating and that Russia is probably already moving towards some kind of occupation of eastern Ukraine;  Viktor Orbán's decision to conclude a new nuclear contract</p>	<p>Energy security</p>	<p>Peace is urgently desired  A very clear stance towards Russia - not militarily, but with the willingness to change our circumstance</p>

<p><b>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</b></p>	<p>Severe humanitarian crisis in Ukraine; The humanitarian situation; President Putin; An innovative war; A fundamental issue, which is our security vis-à-vis Russia and Russia's security vis-à-vis its own environment; Russia is not doing business as usual with Europe; Ukraine faces an energy crisis; “the United States - which has shown extraordinary aggressiveness in violating fundamental rights in matters of espionage, which have twice been uncovered - and yet we treat Russia as if it were just another country.”</p>	<p>Ukrainian people Human security</p>	<p>It is wrong to see Russia only as a potential enemy, we need to see Russia as a neighbouring country, and we need to engage in dialogue with neighbouring countries, even when it is difficult</p>
<p><b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b></p>	<p>I am talking about Russia, has illegally seized part of another state, I am talking about Ukraine and Crimea; “The only question will be: which European country will be next? Will it be my homeland, Lithuania, or the other Baltic States, or maybe Moldova or any other country in the world or in Europe?”; The EU contributed to starting this</p>	<p>The security and stability of the entire region; The economic, human and environmental costs</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	<p>conflict in the first place and that signing an agreement for deeper political ties with the Ukraine was simply irresponsible, especially while taunting Russia with sanctions.;</p> <p><b>That much of Europe is dependent on Russian gas;</b></p> <p>Increased in energy prices;</p> <p>Dictatorial empire;</p> <p>The potential for conflict escalation and spill-over;</p> <p>The wave of violence that still involves the Ukrainian people;</p> <p>A consequence of Western strategic and commercial interests linked to the transit of Russian gas and the Ukrainian Shell gas fields;</p> <p>A lack of a strong political and democratic union</p>		
<p><b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b></p>	<p>The greed of the electricity companies and the ineffectiveness of the regulators;</p> <p>Association Agreement;</p> <p>The EU, especially its Commissioners, and the European Parliament, which did not intervene in time, had a large part in exacerbating the situation</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	<b>The Russian Federation;</b> <b>Vladimir Putin and his neo-imperialist policy;</b> <b>what Russia is currently doing:</b> <b>operating in a kind of grey zone;</b> <b>Russia knowingly threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine</b>	The Ukrainian people	N/A
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	<b>Russian military aggression;</b> The fascists are on the side of what you wrongly call the West; Sanctions are not an instrument of de-escalation, they are poison in the cooperation between European nations	Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty	I ask the EU not to unilaterally adopt the position of the Americans here, but quite the opposite, to take a neutral role, to enable a tripartite negotiation - the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Europeans on the other hand

Table 1 Energy securitization in the EP 2014

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	<b>Dependence on Russian gas;</b> <b>South Stream;</b> The EU's energy dependence on Russia; <b>The doubling of the Northern Gas Pipeline;</b> Long-standing disputes and fears arising from	A single market for competitive energy and, on the other, achievement of the European climate objective; Europe's energy security; EU solidarity and cohesion; Our current way	<b>Energy Union;</b> <b>Infrastructure;</b> <b>Energy efficiency;</b> <b>Solidarity;</b> <b>On cooperation and on renewable energy;</b> <b>Renewable energies;</b>

	<p>historical experience;  <b>Construction of the second Nord Stream line;</b>  <b>(Nord Stream 2) will only strengthen and reward Putin - and weaken Europe - Putin, who has invaded Ukraine and is now bombing in Syria;</b>  This expenditure on the Nord Stream pipeline would negatively affect the CEE countries;  Dependence on oil and natural gas that threatens our long-term energy security today;  <b>Strong dependence on imports from Russia;</b>  The exploitation of shale gas and, more broadly, unconventional fossil fuels;  <b>Russia could cause significant disruption in the EU energy sector, and not only with regard to gas supply but also in relation to nuclear supply and nuclear fuel;</b>  Nuclear power;  Energy poverty;  The crisis that has broken out in</p>	<p>of life, the functioning of our economy and, in fact, the whole of modern society;  Competitiveness;  The climate, the environment and public health;  Citizens in the Member States;  The environment;  Workers and the general public;  The well-being of our citizens;  All EU residents</p>	<p>Deepening market integration, strengthening our efforts on energy efficiency and promoting the development of renewables;  Open the way for new energy resources;  Stop the extraction of unconventional resources by hydraulic fracturing in Europe;  Investing more in research and innovation;  Regional approach to energy security;  The synchronisation of the Baltic region's electricity networks with those of continental Europe;  Energy efficiency, infrastructure and renewables;  Diversification of energy lines and sources and suppliers;  Phasing out the use of fossil fuels by the end of the century;  Build supply relationships with new countries;</p>
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	<p>Ukraine;  The vulnerability of the energy market to geopolitics;  The recent geopolitical crises;  <b>Dependence on a trading partner: the Russian Federation;</b>  The EU is highly dependent on oil, gas, coal and uranium;  Vulnerable to supply disruptions, whether caused by political or commercial disputes or by infrastructure failures;  <b>The Ukrainian crisis, as well as the recent reprimand of Gazprom, have undoubtedly represented two important alarm bells that the Union cannot and must not underestimate;</b>  <b>The Russian crisis;</b>  <b>Given our current dependence on energy imports from unreliable partners like Russia;</b>  Climate change;  <b>Russia’s black list;</b>  The issue of energy prices</p>		<p>Investments in the efficiency of buildings;  The necessary infrastructure, including possible funding from the EU budget;</p> <p>A long-term strategy capable of charting the course for increasing domestic production;</p> <p>Increase the production capacity and storage of renewable energies;</p> <p>European energy security strategy;  The need to diversify our external supply;</p> <p>Energy must exploit new technologies, not old diplomatic relations</p>
<p><b>European People's Party (EPP)</b></p>	<p><b>Nord Stream II;</b>  <b>Gazprom;</b>  <b>Tensions familiar from the construction</b></p>	<p>Energy security commitments;  Our partners covered by the</p>	<p><b>Energy Union;</b></p> <p><b>Reduce Europe’s dependence on imported sources of</b></p>

	<p>of Nord Stream I; Our huge import dependency. Precisely in the area of energy, precisely from one supplier - Russia. Our great weakness.; Europe's dependence on imported sources of energy; This project will increase the EU dependence on Russian gas by 55 billion cubic metres a year. (NS2); The Russian-initiated push for a second Nord Stream branch should be seen in the current geopolitical perspective; Russia continues to exacerbate tensions with the West; Russia's energy tentacles; Russia's role as the biggest external supplier; In 2006 and 2009 it cut off gas supplies to Ukraine; It (Russia) has been waging active hostilities in Ukraine and openly using gas supplies as a weapon, as a means of blackmail; (Russia) is no longer a completely reliable</p>	<p>Neighbourhood Policy; The security of energy supply; Energy independence; Energy security means political independence, independence of sovereign states, stabilisation of economic growth and democracy in Europe; Economic growth and the stability of the EU; The security of energy supply; Ensure energy security for the citizens of Europe</p>	<p>energy, particularly from one eastern direction;  The Eastern Mediterranean offers itself, and through Cyprus, which is a member of the EU, to become an alternative energy supply arm;  The Southern Gas Corridor; LNG imports from current and prospective suppliers such as the US;  Energy efficiency;  Renewables;  Clean coal technology;  Diversification and to develop infrastructure;  Stress test;  New sources of gas are needed, limiting energy dependence on Russia;  Expanding and strengthening the transmission and distribution</p>
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	<p>partner for us;          "One of the biggest challenges facing the European Union today is the security of energy supply. Our continent is dangerously vulnerable to external suppliers.”;          We know that Russia has included energy policy in its foreign policy toolbox.;          To balance the EU’s climate and energy agenda;          Russia is using its energy resources for political and strategic purposes against Member States of the EU, as well as others;          Energy security is all the more at risk because most of the energy, more than half of which we import into Europe, comes from politically risky areas, there has been a lot of talk today about Russia;          The gas crises of 2006 and 2009 made it clear that CEE is the most vulnerable today;          The well-known events in Russia;          Ukraine crisis;</p>		<p>networks;          Greater support for renewable energy sources;          Domestic resources are explored;          The establishment of a European Energy Union;          An integrated, coordinated and effective internal energy market;          Increase indigenous energy production;          Develop energy technologies;          Ensure further action to build a fully integrated and well-functioning internal energy market;          Solidarity and coordination mechanisms;          Limiting energy demand, increasing indigenous energy production;          Research and development in energy</p>
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	<p>The difficult geopolitical situation between the EU and Russia;</p> <p>Russia has in the past literally blackmailed the EU with energy and seems set to continue this practice;</p> <p>2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis;</p> <p>It (Russia) is using energy for political purposes.;</p> <p>Dependence on Russia via networks through Ukraine caused disruptions;</p> <p>The current unstable geopolitical context, particularly with Russia.</p>		<p>technologies;</p> <p>EC proposal of European energy strategy;</p> <p>Self-sufficient energy market</p>
<p><b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b></p>	<p>Russia-Ukraine crisis;</p> <p>Energy dependency;</p> <p>The extreme dependency on Russia;</p> <p>Energy poverty;</p> <p>Russia has increasingly chosen to use its energy resources for political purposes through both blackmail and threats;</p> <p>A major crisis with Russia;</p> <p>Energy dependence: 95% of our uranium, 90% of our crude oil, 66% of our gas and 40% of our coal come from abroad.</p>	<p>Energy security;</p> <p>Independence and autonomy;</p> <p>Climate goals</p>	<p>Reducing energy dependency;</p> <p>The Energy Union Package;</p> <p>Developing renewable energies;</p> <p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>The development of indigenous renewable energy;</p> <p>Change the energy policy of the EU into a sustainable energy policy;</p> <p>The use of renewable energy sources promotes decentralisation, better regulatory</p>

	<p>And Russia accounts for almost a third of all these resources; Finland or Hungary where they are building nuclear – or want to build nuclear – and are now deeply dependent on Russian technology and Russian uranium;</p> <p>Nuclear power;</p> <p>Doubling the Nord Stream pipeline capacity between Russia and Germany;</p> <p>Nord Stream 2 as a provocation;</p> <p>Russia’s and Gazprom’s strategy;</p> <p>It (Nord Stream 2) is an open use of energy tools for geopolitical gain, and I would even call it part of a notorious ‘hybrid war’;</p> <p>Nord Stream is in the EU’s geostrategic interests in the area of security and climate goals</p>		<p>frameworks and self-consumption, with a view to improving energy security;</p> <p>Unbundling</p>
<p>;</p> <p><b>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</b></p>	<p>Dependence on fossil fuels;</p> <p>External energy shocks;</p> <p>Current dependence;</p> <p>Energy dependence;</p> <p>Russian gas;</p> <p>Russia and its leading gas exporter, Gazprom;</p> <p>(Gazprom) is probably the most</p>	<p>European citizens;</p> <p>Energy security</p>	<p>By fundamentally changing the way we supply, distribute and consume energy;</p> <p>Green transition;</p> <p>The development of renewable energy and energy</p>

	<p>corrupt major company in Europe, with its huge buildings, and owners or management with close ties to Moscow, and some 'black' deals made; The expansion of Nord Stream; EU energy dependency on Russia;</p>		<p>efficiency technologies;</p> <p>Further development and modernisation of our transmission infrastructure;</p> <p>Create internal energy market;</p> <p>The urgent need to implement the third energy package;</p> <p>A single European energy market;</p> <p>Guaranteeing the Union's energy security (long-term energy strategy);</p> <p>Clean and renewable energies;</p> <p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>Energy union</p>
<p><b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b></p>	<p>A lack of a strong political and democratic union; A few hegemonic states (in the Union); The energy security strategy; Regulatory intervention; The European Energy Union prove counterproductive; They (People) die because they have to choose between heating and eating. The text (The energy security strategy) remains anti-Russian and pro-Soviet spirit</p>	<p>The highest geopolitical security and European sovereignty with the highest environmental climate security; Energy market; Climate; Environment; Public health; The economies; People; Energy security</p>	<p>Energy transition towards decarbonization;</p> <p>To good neighbourliness;</p> <p>Eliminating fossil fuel subsidies once and for all</p>

<p><b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b></p>	<p>The Union's inability to deal effectively with the shortcomings concerning its energy security;  <b>The Energy union</b> (the submission of this strategic and vital sector in modern economies and societies to the interests of the major European powers and their increasingly transnational economic groups, whether in terms of infrastructure development or of the desired integration of markets);  Energy poverty;  Energy policy that is controlled by the Commission;  Private monopolies</p>	<p>Energy security;  Society and people;  Sovereignty of states and national flexibility;  Energy</p>	<p>Energy investments in the Eastern Mediterranean;  To promote the creation of a Mediterranean gas hub, with pipelines and the development of LNG production;  To ensure public ownership and management of infrastructure of strategic importance by the state, based on the interests of society and the people;  The need to diversify the origins and sources of energy supply, both internally and externally;  The increased importance of renewable energy and recognition of the inexorable exhaustion of fossil fuels in the long term;  The need for major investment in energy production and distribution chains, and in the research and development of less mature technologies;  The need to bring certain Member States out of energy isolation;</p>
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			<p>Effective elimination of energy poverty;</p> <p>The need to find solutions and compromises in terms of technologies (a technologically neutral approach) and prices, which will enable reindustrialisation processes to be sustained, and the fundamental role of renewable energy;</p> <p>Cooperation with Russia and other third countries should be promoted</p>
<p><b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b></p>	<p>Dominance of supplies from the east;</p> <p>The Northern Gas Pipeline has been and is a tool of Russian pressure on countries in my region, including Ukraine. It is undermining our security, and not only our energy security;</p> <p>Russian propaganda;</p> <p>The plans to double the North Stream pipeline;</p> <p>The Nord Stream 2 investment project is primarily a political project, not an economic one;</p>	<p>CEE;</p> <p>National security;</p> <p>Energy security;</p> <p>National energy sovereignty (I reject the calls in this report for binding climate and energy targets and Interference in the energy mix of Member States.);</p> <p>Families and businesses</p>	<p>To counter Russian strategic communication;</p> <p>Energy union;</p> <p>The EU must become less dependent on Russian gas;</p> <p>Diversification of energy sources;</p> <p>Alternative energy sources;</p> <p>The European Energy Security Strategy;</p> <p>To ensure alternative supplies</p>

	<p>The EU has an energy security problem;</p> <p>Russian gas;</p> <p>Russia is ruled by an unfriendly government which uses energy as a political weapon;</p> <p>We saw this happen in both 2006 and 2009 when Mr Putin decided to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine;</p> <p>The continuing crisis in Ukraine;</p> <p>Any dependence of the EU on Russia and its energy resources is indeed a big gamble;</p> <p>The cost of renewable energy is very high;</p> <p>We cannot rely solely on a single source that comes from an insecure country like Russia, a country that is clearly challenging EU regulations and using energy for political purposes;</p> <p>Events in Ukraine;</p> <p>As Russia becomes ever more belligerent in its war against Ukraine, we have become increasingly aware of the problems of relying so heavily on Russia for gas imports – some Member States rely on Russia for 100% of their gas imports</p>		<p>and better energy interconnection between Member States;</p> <p>Domestic resources;</p> <p>The necessary technology neutrality;</p> <p>Nuclear power;</p> <p>The solution to our energy dependency is a clear policy with a focus;</p> <p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>The better connection of energy networks and increased investment in research and innovation;</p> <p>To diversify its supplies;</p> <p>Shale gas;</p> <p>The urgent need for a diversity of European energy sources and a wider range of partners on a global level;</p> <p>European energy security must aim in the long term to ensure energy independence;</p> <p>Requires swift answers and a coherent strategy of action;</p>
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<p><b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b></p>	<p>Gazprom’s hidden agents;  I was surprised to note that the Greens are fighting against coal, nuclear and shale, everything that Gazprom does not supply;  Russia;  To obey the United States, and thus wage war on Russia, move away from energy security with Russia to energy insecurity without Russia;  As long as wealth is in the hands of the few and energy is a commodity;  European energy security strategy;  The EU’s ideological and principled hostility towards Russia  Ideological motivations;  The energy union</p>	<p>Energy security;  People</p>	<p>Renewable energy;  Increase energy efficiency;  Russia as an ally</p>
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Table 2 Energy securitization in the EP 2015

Name of the Party	Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)	Referent Object	(Exceptional) Measures
<p><b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b></p>	<p>The Nord Stream pipeline doubling project;  The lack of long-term strategic vision favors uncertainty in the markets;  Nord Stream 2 project, run by the Russian gas company Gazprom</p>	<p>European energy security;  Energy independence</p>	<p>Renewables, market design and energy efficiency;  Energy Union</p>

<p><b>European People's Party (EPP)</b></p>	<p>Many Member States are dependent on a single supplier;  Price discrimination or supply disruptions;  The Russian developments, especially in Ukraine;  High dependence of certain countries on Russian gas;  As with drugs, the entire EU is dependent on imported gas;  Russian export monopoly Gazprom;  Several European companies, together with Russia's Gazprom, are planning to double the so-called Nord Stream pipeline - - Nord Stream II;  The risks have increased since Putin's Russia has adopted energy as a foreign policy weapon and part of its power policy;  Russia is not a normal partner anymore;  (Nord Stream 2) It will give more power to Russia to use energy to squeeze out individual countries;  The dominance of Gazprom and Russia; (Russia) using gas supplies as a tool of political pressure</p>	<p>Energy Security;  Ukraine and surrounding countries</p>	<p>A network of supply and storage infrastructure;  Blue LNG corridors for the islands (Madeira and the Azores);  We must immediately create and strengthen supporting pipeline infrastructure that combines all forms of natural gas;  Diversify gas supply through the use of LNG;  To develop transmission and storage infrastructure;  Market competition but also on legislation at EU level and strategic agreements;  LNG;  Energy Union;  The Third Energy Package</p>
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<p><b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b></p>	<p>Russia has demonstrated on countless occasions that it is not a reliable partner to the EU and does not hesitate to wield energy as a political weapon; The whims of the Kremlin; Nord Stream 2 involves a supplier that has complete control over the entire infrastructure; Nord Stream 2; Double standard of the European Commission (The halt of South Stream vs. Nord Stream 2)</p>	<p>Energy security; Our citizens' wellbeing and their energy security</p>	<p>Regional approach; LNG terminal on the island of Krk (LNG strategy); A diversified supply; Having an adequate strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage; Energy Union</p>
<p><b>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</b></p>	<p>Nord Stream 2; Gazprom; Russian gas; South Stream project; It (Nord Stream 2 ) duplicates the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline and can become a Russian political weapon; This killer-project (Nord Stream 2 )</p>	<p>Energy security</p>	<p>Energy Union; A well—functioning energy market; Sustainable transition; To secure energy for consumers at affordable prices, create competitive market opportunities for suppliers and strengthen EU members' solidarity; Greater energy diversification</p>
<p><b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b></p>	<p>EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage; An under-utilisation of existing European facilities now in place (an average of 25%); EU gas consumption projections provided basically by ENTSOG, which are manifestly</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>N/A</p>

	exaggerated and have also been criticised by the Court of Auditors; Unconventional extraction methods (of gas); The Third EU Energy Package		
<b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b>	Energy poverty; A common energy policy; Energy dependence; Environmental destruction; The Union's own inability to achieve energy sufficiency and supply;	Energy security; The sovereignty and flexibility of states; The energy security of the Eastern and Baltic countries	<p>The LNG strategy;</p> <p>It is important to exploit domestic energy sources;</p> <p>A balanced transition of the Union's energy production towards renewable energies;</p> <p>A clear commitment to improving energy efficiency and developing renewables;</p> <p>Diversifying sources and supply routes; The immediate exploitation of the Union's domestic energy resources;</p> <p>Immediately support energy investments in the Eastern Mediterranean, to promote the creation of a Mediterranean natural gas hub through pipelines and the development of liquefied natural gas production;</p> <p>To develop an integrated strategy for the development of renewable energy sources</p>

<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	EU's neoliberal ideologies; Gazprom's dominance in the energy markets of CEE; Gazprom gaining a de facto hegemonic position; The Nord Stream construction project; The dependence of EU countries on Russia; A rising demand for gas	Households and businesses	The development of LNG infrastructure can be profitable, provided that the EU abandons its neoliberal ideologies and geopolitical blinders ;  Nord Stream 2
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	Further rupture with Russia; Unpopular agreements with the United States; Dead-end policies	European people	N/A

Table 3 Energy securitization in the EP 2016

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	Coming gas crises; Dependence on Russian gas; Security must be seen as part of the other energy issues at stake; We all know that the common energy policy was born precisely in the face of a supply risk: crisis in the early 2000s, Ukraine and Russia; Nord Stream 2; Russia will now have a direct or indirect means of pressuring Member States in Europe, and it is clear that we cannot let that happen;	Security of gas supply; Proper functioning of the internal gas market; Energy security	Exceptional measures to be applied when the market fails;  The European Commission's stress tests have shown quite clearly that national measures are no longer sufficient;  Solidarity;  Energy efficiency;  Cooperation between countries;

	We must not be dependent on Russian gas		The European Energy Union; Transparency
European People's Party (EPP)	Potential disruption of gas supplies; The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project; Nord Stream 2 does not lead to more diversification; it leads to more dependence; Russia is on the wrong track, using military force to push through its political goals; (Nord Stream 2) increases dependence on Russia and threatens Ukraine and, in fact, negates the sanctions that we have adopted in connection with Russia's aggression in eastern Ukraine; The European Commission has repeatedly sided more with Russian energy giant Gazprom than with its European partners; "Danish investigative journalist Jens Høvsgaard alleges that the Kremlin and Gazprom, headed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Stasi and KGB agents, bribed and	Strong Energy Union; Energy security; The EU's sovereignty; The EU's resilience towards hostile policy from outside the EU; Energy Union; The Paris Climate Agreement; Security of gas supply	Energy efficiency; Investment in technology

	<p>blackmailed Western politicians and ministerial officials in Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. I suspect that similar actions were and are also being used against officials in Brussels”;</p> <p>It is still difficult to agree on a common position between Member States</p>		
<b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b>	<p>Gazprom and Russia could abuse not only markets, but also gas, to put political pressure on eastern Europe; Russia is not a reliable partner and doesn't hesitate to wield energy as a weapon</p>	Solidarity and security of energy supply in the EU	<p>With this legislation (Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply) I think we have a real weapon against this(Gazprom and Russia) ;</p> <p>Energy Union</p>
<b>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</b>	<p>Russia cut off gas to punish Ukraine and thus hit some Eastern European countries</p>	N/A	<p>Energy Union</p>
<b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b>	<p>The recent increasing politicisation of energy matters which lead to the increasing cost of energy resources</p>	British energy	<p>Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply;</p> <p>Nord Stream 2</p>
<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	<p>The situation on our eastern border; Future threats; Nord Stream II; Gazprom; Non-binding instruments, such as memoranda of cooperation and hybrid agreements concluded between member states and</p>	<p>Energy security; Security of supply; Fundamental European values so often invoked by the Commission</p>	<p>This regulation to ensure security of gas supply (the facilitation of two-way gas flow, increased exchange of important information on security of supply with the European Commission and</p>

	<p>third-country concerns;  <b>Russian gas</b></p>		<p><b>national authorities, and closer cooperation with the energy community) ;</b></p> <p><b>A more coordinated response to future threats;</b></p> <p><b>The third energy package;</b></p> <p><b>It is necessary to distinguish between words and deeds</b></p>
<p><b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b></p>	<p>The Energy Union’s gas strategy;  The European Commission is taking advantage of this to extend new infrastructures and new connections to third countries, despite the fact that existing import infrastructures are used at 58% of their capacity;  The EU has experienced several crises in the area of energy supply in the past;  Exert significant political influence on the situation;  The slowdown in the preparation of the North-South pipeline by Poland;  the German government and with the gas lobbies</p>	N/A	N/A
<p><b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b></p>	<p><b>The South Stream pipeline;</b>  <b>Nord Stream 2 pipeline;</b></p>	The EU	N/A

	A possible disruption of this gas supply; It must rely on gas production from domestic sources		
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Table 4 Energy securitization in the EP 2017

Name of the Party	Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)	Referent Object	(Exceptional) Measures
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	Right-wing radicalism; Fascism; Russia; The Nord Stream 2 project; The future with even greater dependence on a single supplier, Russia, both for electricity and for gas	EU's energy independence; Our citizens	A strong Connecting Europe Facility (CSF) for the next decade;  Need implementation in countries whose national programmes do not match European commitments. That is also urgent;  We would need urgent synergies between transport and energy
<b>European People's Party (EPP)</b>	Nord Stream2 and on Russia	N/A	Connecting Europe Facility (CEF);  InvestEU Fund or Horizon Europe
<b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b>	Malignant (Russian) propaganda	N/A	N/A
<b>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</b>	Russian threats (The list is long – the partial occupation of Georgia, the annexation of	N/A	A united Europe; Sanctions

	<p>Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine, the shooting down of MH 17, the cyberattacks against our institutions, against the German Bundestag even, the money laundering through our banks, the chemical attacks in Salisbury); Putin; Vladimir Putin</p>		
<p><b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b></p>	<p>EU is similar to the Soviet Union; The requirements of Europeanism (innate discrimination against opposition of the mainstream); Germans; A United States of Europe</p>	N/A	N/A
<p><b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b></p>	<p>Connecting Europe Facility (CEF); Interconnection will not help renewables; The neoliberal austerity policies; The rise of the far-right is attempting to take the Union back to obscurantism and threatens the basic freedoms, rights and conquests of the peoples; The rise of fascism and the far-right; It is the far-right anti-European nationalists and populists who want to take us back to borders, nationalism and war; Neoliberal policies and NATO's aggressive plans</p>	<p>The peoples of Europe; Democracy and security of Europe</p>	<p>Necessary energy and transport infrastructure;  Consider the end of coal and nuclear energy;</p>

<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	Contestation within the EU (new form of division, some new curtain, would be needed, which is often the result of fear of our competitiveness and our growing subjectivity); Parliament's ambitions : A dramatic intervention in the energy and heating market (by the EU)	Citizens	N/A
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	The fear of formal reforms, of a new form of revision of the Treaties, which could result in this danger: the danger of reducing European partnership, European solidarity and the position of smaller countries	N/A	N/A

Table 5 Energy securitization in the EP 2018

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	<b>Gazprom;</b> The growing political instability in many areas of the world, from <b>Russia</b> to Ukraine, North Africa and the Middle East; <b>Russian violations of the principles of international law in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, Russia's support for the extreme right and</b>	N/A	<b>The future reform of the internal gas market;</b>  <b>We need to continue our pragmatic engagement with Russia in areas of common interests and with regard to global governance</b>

	populist national parties and governments in the EU, such as Mr Orbán in Hungary, and the spread of disinformation and fake news		
<b>European People's Party (EPP)</b>	Nord Stream 2; Russian energy policy; Foreign gas suppliers and projects such as Nord Stream; This strong Russian presence is feared; Kremlin; Russia's military interventions into Ukraine's – an independent country's – territory; Russia's aggression	Fair and free competition; EU's energy security strategy; EU's energy independence	The energy union; Gas infrastructure; Unbundling of ownership of gas pipelines and gas itself (Third energy package); The amendment of Directive 2009/73/EC
<b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b>	Russian gas empire; Nord Stream; Nord Stream 1 has not been used to capacity to date, and further infrastructure measures are also planned by the Russian side; Moscow and the Gazprom empire not only as an attack on Ukraine and its interests, but quite clearly as an announcement that European interests on the other side are not being taken seriously; Gazprom and Putin ;	EU's internal market, energy and geopolitical security	Puts a limit on the privileges of companies such as Russia's Gazprom, ensuring that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline respects the rules of our internal market; Common rules for the internal market for natural gas

	<p>Nord Stream 2;  Russia clearly demonstrated that it is ready to use energy as a political weapon when it restricted gas flow through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009;  The occupation of Crimea, the ongoing war against Ukraine with 13 000 dead in the meantime, a downed passenger plane, the misery of the people in the Donbass, the renewed expulsion of the Crimean Tatars from Crimea, show trials in Russia in which Ukrainian marines are currently being threatened with psychiatric treatment;  Putin's aggression is not directed against Ukraine alone; our eastern partner states Moldova and Georgia were already affected by this aggression before the war against Ukraine;  Russia is systematically pursuing underlines this aggression against the EU.</p>		
<p><b>Renew Europe (Renew)</b></p>	<p>Gazprom and Mr Putin;  Putin would be able to utilise a legal vacuum to further increase Europe's</p>	<p>Climate;  Our allies, both militarily and in cyberspace</p>	<p>Green investments;  A strategy in which we unconditionally reach out - and I personally think this</p>

	dependence on Russian energy; Putin's Russia; To use Europe's dependence on Russian gas as a real geopolitical tool; The relationship between Europe and Russia is not good		is very important anyway - to Russian citizens and civil society
<b>Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)</b>	EU energy legislation; What Russia has done in the Crimea; Putin regime in Russia	Europe and its industries and households	N/A
<b>Identity and Democracy (ID)</b>	The Commission is talking about the need to diversify suppliers and is seeking to restrict trade with Russia for geopolitical reasons; The Commission is trying to achieve its ends by means of a regulation; The Commission is imposing itself as the leader in energy and geopolitical matters	N/A	Russia-EU interdependence
<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	The Union's interests have fallen victim to backroom deals; Nord Stream 2; Russia promises when it is forced to. And it does not keep its promises when it gains strength	N/A	Common rules for the internal market for natural gas
<b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b>	Common rules for the internal market for natural gas;	N/A	Stability and peace, approaches to solutions for all the

	EU-Russia relations		different interests of the actors involved cannot be implemented against Russia, but only with Russia
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 6 Energy securitization in the EP 2019

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	Energy Charta Treaty; This archaic, climate-destroying treaty(ECT) acts as life insurance for the fossil fuel industries, life insurance against our lives; Energy poverty; Nord Stream 2	Climate; Environment; energy security; The Union's citizens	A fundamental reform of the ECT;  If it is not possible to have a fundamental reform, I think it's absolutely necessary that the EU prepares itself to withdraw from the ECT;  The ecological transition;  Modernisation (of ECT) to make it compatible with the Green Deal is a necessity;  The Green Deal;  R&D;  Systemic change and involves citizens;  A sustainable recovery;  Energy Union;  Solidarity;

			We need a real internal energy market
<b>European People's Party (EPP)</b>	Energy Charta Treaty; The impact of climate change; Corona Crisis; The Left group (“By voting for a climate agenda based on ideology, the left majority in the European Parliament would be leading the Union towards a future that could lead to economic stagnation”); Energy Poverty	Energy security	More open and competitive energy markets;  “New energy infrastructure is the key to a successful energy transition”;  The COVID money Recovery Fund;  Mobilise all available financial instruments from the Recovery Fund, the Community budget, the European Investment Bank and the private sector
<b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b>	Fossil fuels	The rights for citizen	We need an effective reform; So I urge the Commission to set a clear deadline and prepare for leaving the Treaty(ECT);  The Green Deal;  Renewable energies;  A true Energy Union;  Ban energy subsidies for fossils
<b>Renew Europe (Renew)</b>	Climate crisis; The current Energy Charter Treaty	Climate, environment; Green and affordable energy	We urgently need to prepare for all situations, including an organised withdrawal from these negotiations;

			<p>Green transition;</p> <p>A true internal market for energy;</p> <p>Off-shore energy;</p> <p>A more integrated and efficient energy system;</p> <p>Technologies like carbon capture, biomass or nuclear;</p> <p>The recovery and resilience instrument;</p> <p>Smart mobility, alternative fuels, the conversion of energy-intensive industries, and the digitisation of energy infrastructures</p>
<b>Identity and Democracy (ID)</b>	<p>Price of electricity; The Green Deal (Carbon border adjustment mechanism or, as we have heard today, by the withdrawal from the ECT);</p> <p>Energy Union (Security of supply, economic efficiency and sustainability)</p>	<p>Citizens;</p> <p>Energy independence;</p> <p>Energy sovereignty</p>	<p>Nuclear Power;</p> <p>Hydrogen</p>
<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	<p>The ecological radicalism of EU legislation</p>	<p>Member states and their energy independence</p>	<p>Growing need for closer regional and global cooperation;</p> <p>We have adopted the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal strategy has been announced, so it is only natural that we</p>

			also need to get on with revising the Energy Charter Treaty;
<b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b>	Energy poverty; Why does the EU not clearly define what the measures are to prevent us from having energy poverty?; A climate agenda based on ideology	The people of Europe	Energy transition This (ECT) must change in a fundamental way; Withdraw from the agreement (ETC)
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 7 Energy securitization in the EP 2020

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	<p>Covid;</p> <p>In the next two and a half years we must lay the foundations for a more resilient Europe in the face of future crises and reduce instability in areas such as energy supply or migration management at our borders;</p> <p>Putin conceives of his relations with Europe as a geopolitical chess game to regain the squares lost with the end of the Soviet Union;</p> <p>The rise in energy prices;</p> <p>The oligarchic power situation;</p> <p>The pandemic;</p>	<p>Consumers;</p> <p>Families and SMEs;</p> <p>Security of supply;</p> <p>Energy autonomy</p>	<p>Energy system integration and for hydrogen;</p> <p>Transforming energy system; we need to stimulate our heavy industry to invest in the most sustainable technologies;</p> <p>The need to achieve highly energy-efficient, climate-neutral and renewable-based energy systems;</p> <p>Boost its strategic resilience in the post—COVID area and accelerate decarbonisation;</p>

	<p>Against external aggression, such as that of Vladimir Putin or Lukashenko;  Covid crisis;  High and volatile energy prices;  Russia;  The challenges Russia is posing to our security;  Kremlin;  Nord Stream 2;  Putin and fossil fuels;  Putin is exterminating the Chechens? We must cooperate! Putin invades Georgia, then Ukraine?;  The Kremlin regime;  The Kremlin's aggression</p>		<p>To increase the share of renewables and invest our efforts in energy storage;  Renewable hydrogen;  Joint purchase and storage of gas;  The implementation of the Green Deal with the increase of renewables and energy efficiency;  Energy efficiency;  A united strategy on Russia;  Unity among the 27 Member States and for targeted sanctions;  To stop Nord Stream 2;  European strategy. A joint and united approach;  Implement targeted and effective sanctions;  Strict and precise sanctions against the Kremlin regime</p>
<p><b>European People's Party (EPP)</b></p>	<p>The challenges of sustainability balanced with the challenges of economic development;  War against a virus;  The silent war in eastern Ukraine, and perhaps even a hot war is looming;</p>	<p>Climate;  Energy security;  “Energy - it is climate policy, it is environmental policy, it is industrial policy and it is</p>	<p>Hydrogen;  The medium- to long-term goal must of course be renewable hydrogen;  But for a transitional period, we also urgently need low-</p>

	<p>“Unfortunately, Putin, Russia, has already broken this principle with Crimea, with the intervention in Syria and also with the rising tensions in the Western Balkans. We must not tolerate either breach”;  The Ukrainian issue and Putin’s threat to peace and stability in Europe;  The Russian government and Putin’s leadership;  Speaking of Russia this has a clear impact on energy prices;  High energy prices;  The real character and policies of the Kremlin;  The Russian aggression in states in our immediate neighbourhood;  Putin’s Russia;  Russian occupation of Crimea.;  Russian action to ruin the investigation into MH17;  The Nord Stream 2 project</p>	<p>certainly also independence policy”;  Europe’s energy security and security of supply;  The real lives of citizens and businesses;  People in the EU;  Its attempts to undermine the European way of life.</p>	<p>carbon hydrogen;  Energy efficiency;  Incentivising investment in existing infrastructure;  The EU’s energy union;  Framework and conditions for investors and technologies to meet each other;  Comprehensive energy strategy covering all energy technologies;  NextGenerationEU;  “It must impose sanctions on those responsible for the imprisonment of Navalny, stop the Nord Stream 2 project and unequivocally support the democratic direction of the Eastern Partnership countries”</p>
<p><b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b></p>	<p>Hydrogen produced from fossil gas and nuclear power;  High energy bills;  Energy prices skyrocket;  Nord Stream 2;  Putin;  Kremlin’s regime;  Putin’s fossil fuels;</p>	<p>A climate-neutral EU;  Energy autonomy</p>	<p>Energy efficiency;  Digital networking;  Infrastructure transformation;  Renewables;  Green taxonomy;</p>

	Europe is held back by our dependence on fossil fuels - on imported gas, oil and uranium from Russia; Russian energy		No more investment should be made in fossil fuels;  New deployment of renewables
<b>Renew Europe (Renew)</b>	Energy price crisis; Russia; Our energy dependence is at its highest for 30 years; We remain open to blackmail from Russian gas supplies; Under Putin's rule, Moscow has trampled on international law and the rights of its own citizens too many times; It (Russia) has illegally annexed Crimea; Nord Stream 2; I even fear that our relations with Russia are worse than before your visit	Our institutions	The Green Deal;  The European hydrogen strategy; Energy efficiency;  Renewable energy and energy efficiency;  'Fit for 55' Package;  A common defense;  European energy security policy; Making joint purchases
<b>Identity and Democracy (ID)</b>	EU as climate leadership; China; Environmental and energy challenges Extraordinary crises that have obviously put significant pressure on the European institutions and on this Parliament; A dramatic emergency (on energy) which is as a result of years of inaction and wrong choices on the subject of autonomy	Climate; Environment; Energy; For the sake of our energy security and our citizens' wallets	So it is not enough to bring out regulations and directives, to use terms like 'ecological transition' or 'resilience';  Long-term solution;  We need to be able to engage in dialogue in order to reach mutually beneficial political, economic and trade agreements;  A minimum backup of fossil fuels

	<p>We have long known that we are too dependent on countries whose blackmail we suffer and with whom we have deep geopolitical differences;</p> <p>The green craze;</p> <p>The Commission's only - and somewhat simplistic - approach to the environment;</p> <p>A new cold war that Brussels has been waging for years;</p> <p>But you (the EU) irrationally reject any peaceful relationship with Russia;</p> <p>The rising energy prices;</p> <p>Someone, unfortunately also in this House, continues to wage war on gas;</p> <p>The original justifications, namely to reduce the EU's energy dependency and to ensure security of supply, are being distorted into their blatant opposite by the current political climate obedience;</p> <p>The EU;</p> <p>Inconsistent enlargement, constitutionalised Atlanticism and a public desire to return to the Cold War;</p> <p>The EU is not the</p>		
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	best of all possible worlds, and its evils are by no means all necessary		
<b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b>	<p>Green ideological agenda;</p> <p>A European strategy for energy system integration;</p> <p>Energy price crisis;</p> <p>Romantic notions that the 'Fit for 55' Package will change everything for the better;</p> <p>The EU feels Putin's hot breath on its neck;</p> <p>Russian company Gazprom;</p> <p>Rising energy prices, increasing energy exclusion and poverty, and increasing dependence on imported energy sources;</p> <p>High energy bills;</p> <p>Moscow;</p> <p>Russia will use its vaccine as it uses its energy: as a cynical weapon to divide us;</p> <p>Nord Stream 2</p>	<p>Climate but not at the expense of Europeans;</p> <p>Energy sector</p>	<p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>Be a concerted Increase in pressure on the main supplier of natural gas to Europe, the Russian company Gazprom;</p> <p>The Union should speak with one voice in dialogue with external suppliers;</p> <p>Stop Nord Stream 2</p>
<b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b>	<p>The long process of privatisation in the energy sector, promoted and encouraged by the EU;</p> <p>Green transition;</p> <p>Energy prices;</p> <p>The oligarchic power situation;</p> <p>The EU's energy model is a failure;</p> <p>Your (The EC) policy;</p>	<p>National interests;</p> <p>The production apparatus and skilled jobs;</p> <p>Productive and industrial capacity of the Member States;</p> <p>Families in the EU</p>	<p>Green hydrogen;</p> <p>It is urgent to review the rules of the electricity market;</p> <p>We should be engaged in dialogue, not war</p>

	Russiaphobia		
<b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b>	When it comes to infrastructure and filling stations, the EU is way behind; Energy poverty; The stigmatisation of nuclear energy and natural gas; The radical left-wing	People of Europe	Nuclear energy and natural gas are such solutions;  To put a stop to radical left-wing

Table 8 Energy securitization in the EP 2021

<b>Name of the Party</b>	<b>Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)</b>	<b>Referent Object</b>	<b>(Exceptional) Measures</b>
<b>Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&amp;D)</b>	<p>“Hybrid attacks, which were dramatically highlighted during Putin’s war against Ukraine, and which extends the security of Europeans, beyond energy and transport, to other affected sectors”;</p> <p>Putin; Energy crisis; Energy poverty; Prepared for a recession and keep people in work with a permanent SURE instrument to reduce the risk of unemployment in emergency situations; Extraordinary profits that companies are making with these high prices; The unstoppable rise in gas prices; A problem of transparency, there is a problem of an unfair market, there is at least a problem of manipulation in that market; War; The prices are so high ;</p>	<p>Critical entities; The safeguarding of public health and safety, the environment, and not just the continuation of the economic functions; Energy autonomy; Households and SMEs; People’s energy bills; Entire industrial realities and killing the real economy and the economy of the lives of families,</p>	<p>EU countries to adopt national strategies to strengthen resilience and to carry out regular risk assessments;</p> <p>Our unwavering commitment to a global energy order based on renewable energy in the long term must be complemented by the creation of strategic gas reserves in the short term.;</p> <p>Decouple gas from the electricity market;</p> <p>Intervention is needed to stop panic prices;</p> <p>A price cap on energy and a tax on</p>

	<p>Bad decisions in the past and also the speculation of various hedge funds;  We are the victims of an energy attack by Russia, because we are dependent on energy resources from that country;  Its (Russia) hostile actions in the energy market;  The manipulation of energy supply and prices is a powerful weapon that the Russian Federation;  Populism;  This (energy) crisis, is caused by Putin's military invasion of Ukraine;  Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, energy prices have reached record levels;  Russian gas supplies to the Union confirm that gas is being used as a weapon;  High energy dependence on Russia;  Rising energy prices ;  The war in Ukraine;  Fossil fuels from Russia;  Sole dependence on one supplier;  Russia is waging war not only on Ukraine, but also a hybrid war, an energy war, against the EU countries;  The obvious aggression on the part of Russia;  Then the issue of prices: we cannot wait until the maximum emergency to tackle it;  Nord Stream 2;  Blackmailing Europe;</p>	<p>including medium-sized ones;  Energy market;  Ordinary households;  Households and for businesses;  Poor and freezing Europeans and failing companies;  Citizens;  The ordinary citizens of Europe;  EU consumers, especially the most vulnerable, as well as SMEs and industries;  Energy security issues through the prism of their borders, their economic and financial interests;  Energy independence</p>	<p>ridiculous windfall profits;  Have the EP involved in urgency procedures;  Cap on gas prices;  Expand critical infrastructure;  Cap on energy bills;  Strong social measures;  Additional sanctions on Russia;  Rapid action to curb the enormous, usurious profits of speculators and energy commodity traders;  The construction of more interconnectors between countries.;  A rapid response to Ukraine's proposals for the transmission of energy and gas from Ukraine to the EU;  A reduction in European levies, including the ETS, on energy</p>
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	<p>Our energy dependence is being used as a weapon of war, and Russia can no longer be a reliable supplier to the EU</p>	<p>resources, at least until the energy crisis is over;</p> <p>A permanent framework for taxing super-profits;</p> <p>An exceptional solidarity tax on wealth;</p> <p>Improving infrastructure;</p> <p>Publicly owned energy;</p> <p>Renewables;</p> <p>Climate commitment;</p> <p>Technological and digital sovereignty;</p> <p>Promoting joint investment in infrastructure, transport, energy and digitalization;</p> <p>Energy Union;</p> <p>Extraordinary interventions and without taboos;</p> <p>To build a sustainable gas transmission system,</p>
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			<p>interconnectors;</p> <p>European solidarity;</p> <p>To establish a genuine energy community;</p> <p>The creation of an energy platform;</p> <p>Immediate establishment of a common mechanism for the purchase of energy resources;</p> <p>Acceleration of renewables and hydrogen;</p> <p>Solidarity;</p> <p>The Green Deal;</p> <p>Sanctions against Russia;</p> <p>Joint purchases of gas and fuels, support for each other's countries and an end to projects like Nord Stream 2;</p> <p>Green transition;</p> <p>REPowerEU;</p> <p>The European Green Pact;</p>
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			<p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>Introduction of renewable energy sources</p>
<p><b>European People's Party (EPP)</b></p>	<p>Russia;</p> <p>Nord Stream 2;</p> <p>Someone's blackmail;</p> <p>War;</p> <p>Kremlin's cyber army;</p> <p>Full-scale online attack to European infrastructure;</p> <p>Russia's aggression in Ukraine;</p> <p>The war in Ukraine;</p> <p>The dependency on energy suppliers such as Russia;</p> <p>Higher energy prices;</p> <p>Energy dependence on Putin;</p> <p>Tyrant like Putin;</p> <p>"Since the beginning of the EU energy union and the Russian occupation in Crimea, there have been efforts to decrease our energy dependency on Russia. However, the direction has been the opposite. The energy dependency rate is now at a record high level";</p> <p>"Putin has been waging a bloody and devastating war against Ukraine";</p> <p>"We must not allow ourselves to be blackmailed by Russia.;</p> <p>Gas as an energy weapon;</p> <p>The war launched by Russia against Ukraine;</p>	<p>Economic security;</p> <p>Energy autonomy;</p> <p>Energy security;</p> <p>Consumers and businesses in our countries;</p> <p>citizens;</p> <p>Affordability and security of supply;</p> <p>Vulnerable Consumers, SMEs and industries;</p> <p>People and businesses need falling energy prices immediately;</p> <p>Small businesses;</p> <p>Our citizens;</p> <p>European citizens;</p> <p>Our economies</p>	<p>The resilience of Europe's critical infrastructure;</p> <p>The Green Deal;</p> <p>Conclude new international partnerships and energy trade treaties;</p> <p>Remove administrative burden;</p> <p>Better interconnection of energy and transport networks;</p> <p>Three Seas Initiative;</p> <p>By joining forces in the investment of infrastructure; close cross—border cooperation;</p> <p>Economic sanctions against Russia, Arms deliveries to Ukraine;</p> <p>We must of course react urgently;</p> <p>Investment in</p>

	<p>Kremlin regime;  Energy crisis;  Dependence on undemocratic and totalitarian regimes;  “A tyrant uses gas as a weapon. Putin uses gas as a weapon”;  Dependence on Russia;  The lack of infrastructure;  Exorbitant rise in energy prices;  Energy prices are soaring;  The criminal Russian wartime invasion.;  But today, the situation is extraordinary, and we also need extraordinary solutions;  But this is not enough: the main negative effect of the energy crisis is called deindustrialisation, or at least the risk.;  For too long Europe has been weak on energy policy;  “Putin is trying to use energy as a weapon against Europe and our support indeed for Ukraine.”;  The current increase in energy prices and disruptions in supply;  Putin;  Putin’s energy crisis;  Russian gas;  “We are facing a state of emergency”;  Energy crisis;  Energy dependency;  An unprecedented energy</p>		<p>renewable energy,  hydrogen and energy efficiency;    Impose an oil embargo;    Energy transition;    European cap on gas prices;    As a matter of urgency, just as we urgently need new revenue for the Union’s budget and new own resources; solidarity;    The Security of Gas Supply Regulation.;    Interventions in the pricing mechanism;    Deepening of the European internal market;    Infrastructure investments;    The InvestEU programme;    Joint purchasing;    Invest in renewable energies;    The Recovery and</p>
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	<p>crisis</p>	<p>Resilience Facility REPowerEU;</p> <p>An emergency instrument now, but also a fundamental reform of pricing;</p> <p>The development of energy transport infrastructures;</p> <p>Investment in hydrogen as an important energy vector and support measures for domestic and industrial consumers.;</p> <p>“Emergency measures, namely market intervention, but this should always be temporary, reversible and coordinated at European level”;</p> <p>“What is needed is honesty, unity, determination, solidarity, a swift, coordinated EU-wide response and a package of immediate measures – now”;</p> <p>A revenue cap;</p>
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			<p>Solidarity from the fossil fuel industry;</p> <p>Intelligent energy saving;</p> <p>Energy Union;</p> <p>Diversify energy sources, diversify suppliers;</p> <p>Common European solutions;</p> <p>Closer cooperation in building a better energy infrastructure;</p> <p>Cooperation on energy supplies and also joint purchasing.;</p> <p>Applying the European regulatory framework;</p> <p>An intervention in the ETS market;</p> <p>“The public authorities must intervene in order to prevent disruptions in the market and protect the existence of European citizens, especially those</p>
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			<p>most socially vulnerable.”;</p> <p>By diversifying sources and energy supply and building interconnections.;</p> <p>For longer-term solutions;</p> <p>To speed up implementation of Green Deal;</p> <p>Need effective measures, but we also need faster implementation.;</p> <p>Tax;</p> <p>Energy efficiency;</p> <p>The development of renewable energy sources;</p> <p>Develop the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus</p>
<p><b>The Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)</b></p>	<p>Dependence on fossil fuels;</p> <p>High—energy—price crisis is due to the high prices of fossil fuels and also the manipulation of Russia and Putin;</p> <p>Putin’s war of aggression and a completely wrong energy policy over the last decades have brought us to this crisis;</p>	<p>Our citizens;</p> <p>Living organisms;</p> <p>Climate;</p> <p>Families and businesses;</p> <p>The most vulnerable households and businesses;</p> <p>Energy security</p>	<p>Binding measures to cut peak electricity demand and to ensure support to those struggling with their energy bills;</p> <p>Long-term strategy;</p> <p>Shifting to renewables and</p>

	<p>Energy crisis highlighted by the war in Ukraine;  Rising energy prices;  Sky-high energy bills;  The climate and biodiversity crises;  Putin is the aggressor in this war in Ukraine;  Russian gas;  Putin's criminal adventures;  Russian fossil fuels;  A war financed by our purchases of fossil fuels;  LNG and oil infrastructure</p>		<p>becoming energy independent and by investing in energy efficiency;  Intervening in the energy market and windfall profits;  A profound transformation of our economic and industrial model;  Plan to stop certain activities such as fossil fuels and nitrogen fertilisers;  Launching a structural revolution for the climate;  We need a gas price cap;  A radical change;  Accelerating the transition to renewables and prioritising energy efficiency, without looking for gas elsewhere and without investing in nuclear power;  European price cap;  We need urgent public intervention in the electricity market;</p>
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			<p>The Council's emergency regulation on permitting into the Renewable Energy Directive;</p> <p>Appreciate the Commission acting on diversification of fossil fuel supplies and introducing a gas storage obligation to keep homes warm next winter;</p> <p>Climate justice; Speed up the state aid procedures for efficiency measures and for renewable energies;</p> <p>Not just on short-term sourcing and ensuring security of gas supplies;</p> <p>The REPowerEU package;</p> <p>Welcome the raising of the binding renewable target to 45% and the mandatory national energy savings target from 9% to 13%;</p>
<p><b>Renew Europe (Renew)</b></p>	<p>Authoritarian states;</p>	<p>Our critical infrastructure; Cyberspace;</p>	<p>The potential cap on gas;</p>

	<p>That's the problem. It's Russia, Iran and China; Hybrid activity, cyber-attacks, the coronavirus pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine show the breadth of the potential threats we currently face;</p> <p>The hijacking of data and the attack on energy;</p> <p>Our dependence on Russia for energy, for gas, for oil, for raw materials, as a market for our products;</p> <p>The real person who's causing the difficulties with regard to citizens, the cost of fuel, the cost of living, the cost electricity is Vladimir Putin himself;</p> <p>Russia has been driving up energy prices;</p> <p>It is Putin who is cutting off our gas;</p> <p>An unprecedented surge in energy prices;</p> <p>The war in Ukraine and the energy crisis;</p> <p>Vladimir Putin has chosen war, blackmail and isolation;</p> <p>I am afraid that all the crises and problems we have experienced in recent years may be nothing compared to what the energy crisis may cause;</p> <p>Rising energy prices are causing existential hardship for many citizens;</p> <p>European energy policy is very often not on the right track;</p> <p>Complex geopolitical confrontation;</p>	<p>Our society;</p> <p>European citizens;</p> <p>medium-sized enterprises, to the most vulnerable households and to the self-employed;</p> <p>Profound social dimension;</p> <p>European energy supply;</p> <p>Development and sustainability of CEE;</p> <p>Our productive system and households;</p> <p>Europe's energy security and independence</p>	<p>We must ensure that we have strong unity of purpose, sanctions hit Russia;</p> <p>REPowerEU;</p> <p>We need to add an emergency dimension that can reach vulnerable households and entrepreneurs;</p> <p>European Energy Transition Investment Shield;</p> <p>A uniform European solution;</p> <p>Introduce a cap on the price of the allowances;</p> <p>Please open your heart to the nuclear and the fusion;</p> <p>We must also propose courageous reforms;</p> <p>Interconnection infrastructures;</p> <p>It is most important to cap gas prices as a good form of also countering blackmail;</p> <p>Increase in the supply of liquefied gas and the provision of the available infrastructure;</p>
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	<p>Putin’s iron grip;  Russian invasion of Ukraine;  The war in Ukraine was started by Putin, but basically paid for by ourselves because we have become accustomed to using Russian gas;  We have an emergency to deal with: energy costs;  Ukraine crisis;  The unilateral suspension of gas supplies from Russia to Bulgaria and Poland is part of Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine and proof of the dimensions of the hostile actions against Europe in terms of violating Europe’s energy security and independence;  to Russia’s actions;  Mr Putin’s attack on Ukraine;  The Russian Empire was still there, although another name, and it’s still there trying to enlarge their spheres of influence by energy resources and by the army</p>		<p>Renewable energy;  The Green Deal;  Green transition;  Diversify our energy sources</p>
<p><b>Identity and Democracy (ID)</b></p>	<p>Cyberattacks;  Run the risk of being potential terrorist targets;  In the face of this dramatic moment;  Energy crisis;  The absurd war on gas;  The leaders of unsuspected parties that make up the majority in this Parliament look to the profits of their countries’ gas suppliers;  Ecological transition;  Europe has got it so wrong on energy policy;</p>	<p>Citizens’ essential services;  Secure energy and social peace and prosperity;  Our sovereignty and cooperating on major projects;  All countries and citizens</p>	<p>Ensure greater security for those (critical) entities;  What we need is a renaissance of coal and a renaissance of nuclear power;  While sanctions against Russia were certainly necessary, they had to be tailored for their effectiveness and</p>

	<p>Increase in energy prices;  Everything we are currently experiencing in the energy sector is purely self-inflicted;  Germany's completely crazy energy policy is to blame;  You (the EU) caused and even amplified the energy crisis;  It was the EU, under the Council Presidency of Emmanuel Macron, that imposed indiscriminate and inappropriate sanctions on Russia;  Our economy is basically dependent on Russian gas and that is actually the fault of the European Commission;  It is the fault of the Member States, and tomorrow morning Ursula von der Leyen is coming to talk about how she is fighting for the people of Europe;  To invoke the Ukrainian conflict to justify the situation;  Our energy choices, with the collapse of the nuclear industry;  You (the EU) make us dependent on the Russians;  The price for your ultraliberal ideology;  The risk of energy rationing (by cutting Russian gas imports);  The health crisis and the war in Ukraine  REPowerEU is just the latest piece in an ideologised narrative;  This is a plan that starts from the wrong</p>		<p>thoughtful in their consequences;</p> <p>A European supply chain capable of developing the technologies essential for the transition;</p> <p>Less ideology and a diversified, technology-open energy mix across Europe for the benefit of all countries and citizens</p>
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	<p>assumption, namely that the current crisis only coincides with the conflict in Ukraine, ignoring years of bad energy and climate policies;          If you look at the EU's sanctions policy in this current Ukraine-Russia conflict, the EU is a master at shooting itself in the foot;          You (the EU) produce poverty, you produce a wave of inflation</p>		
<p><b>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</b></p>	<p>Hybrid attack by Lukashenko and Putin;          The Russian invasion of Ukraine;          Russia;          Russian missiles;          Nord Stream pipeline was launched in 2010;          Nord Stream 2 project;          Putin made his decision because he was induced by the weakness of the West;          The war in Europe has exposed many weaknesses in our energy policy;          Our dependence on Russian raw materials;          The weakness of our (EU) legislative solutions;          Shortages and galloping prices;          Energy crisis;          Russian gas;          The escalation of energy prices in Europe has certainly escalated because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine;          Covid;          The root causes are in the negative synergy of</p>	<p>Facilities and civilians;          Energy independence;          Energy security;          European energy market;          Energy autonomy;          Peace</p>	<p>Thoughtful diversification of energy sources;          'Fit for 55' Package;          Nord Stream II and Nord Stream I, must be stopped immediately;          A complete embargo on that gas;          Introduce a cap on the price of gas;          To decouple it from the price of electricity;          To produce more energy immediately from renewable sources but also from fossil sources as long as it is necessary;          Freezing the ETS would significantly reduce energy prices;</p>

	<p>Putin's war, of the German Energiewende; Putin;</p> <p>This crisis began before Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia's actions are only one of the causes of the current crisis;</p> <p>The rotten agreements with Gazprom leading to the construction of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2;</p> <p>Rotten investments deepening Europe's dependence on Russian gas;</p> <p>Policies based on Russian resentment;</p> <p>'Green' ideologies;</p> <p>Double standard in the EU;</p> <p>The hypocrisy of some of the elites of the Western European countries;</p> <p>Russia's brutal aggression against Ukraine;</p> <p>With Russia's pursuit of an aggressive expansionist strategy;</p> <p>Dependence on Russia;</p> <p>Russia's current aggression;</p> <p>Vladimir Putin's Russia;</p> <p>The fundamental problem of our energy policy is the discrepancy between long-term objectives and the measures which need to be taken in the near future;</p> <p>Gazprom;</p> <p>The ideologising of the so-called 'green deal', which raises prices;</p> <p>Russian aggression;</p>		<p>Reducing dependence on Russia by diversifying fossil fuel supply sources, reducing consumption, faster rollout of renewables;</p> <p>LNG terminals are strategic infrastructure;</p> <p>Solidarity;</p> <p>To immediately deprive Russia of at least some of its revenue from the gas trade</p>
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	<p>Climate package;  However, the obsession with renewables has led us to the incoherence of creating dependence on third countries with totalitarian regimes, such as Russia</p>		
<p><b>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</b></p>	<p>Rising energy prices;  Energy companies that exploit this crisis;  The greed of the electricity companies and the ineffectiveness of the regulators;  High electricity and gas prices;  Price explosion;  Greedy multinationals;  The 'energy scammers' get rich from the crisis;  Market fundamentalism;  They (The EU) are hurting the ordinary people of Europe a lot more than they're ever going to hurt Putin, and they are not going to stop the war;  The absurdity of its (EC) energy market, which only leads to one thing: skyrocketing prices for people and profits for multinationals;  The pricing model of the multinationals;  <b>Putin's blackmailing;</b>  Our bills are skyrocketing;  Food security;  Structural problem of energy dependence;  The climate crisis has not gone away. It remains the greatest existential threat to us</p>	<p>Many households;  Workers and families;  Citizens;  The Member States and the people;  The ordinary people of Europe</p>	<p>Peace and de-escalation;  Fighting tax evasion;  Compensation due to increase of prices;  The broken energy market needs to be reformed;  We need more effective price caps;  Developing eco-efficient technologies and making use of local resources to produce energy;  We need a brutal excess profits tax, effective price caps generally for gas and for electricity, an EU-wide ban on electricity blackouts and compensation, indeed full compensation, for people for their additional costs due to the price explosion for which they are not</p>

			<p>responsible, which they did not cause;  Regain public control over energy sector;  Urgent and necessary measures;</p> <p>They need to guarantee energy—efficient housing, public services, higher wages and adequate public transport for all;</p> <p>We also need to freeze prices at pre-crisis levels;</p> <p>It is clear that state intervention and the establishment of ceilings are necessary</p>
<p><b>Non-attached Members (NI)</b></p>	<p>The cost of energy for Europeans has practically tripled;  Such figures depend not only on war and scarcity but also and above all on speculation on the international market;  The massive increase in energy prices and the shortage of electricity, gas and oil;  The current energy crisis;  A supply shock;  Nuclear phase-out;  <b>The imperialist war in Ukraine;</b>  Prices have taken off because of another so-called 'European solution', the green transition, liberalisation, deregulation and the</p>	<p>Families and small and medium-sized enterprises;  Private households and businesses;  Livelihoods throughout Europe;  Citizens of the EU</p>	<p>To intervene by taxing the extra profits of the fossil fuel multinationals;</p> <p>A new emergency fund, an energy recovery fund;</p> <p>To find enough cheap energy;</p> <p>In the long term, all countries should strive for energy independence;</p> <p>The construction of alternative and renewable infrastructure;</p> <p>To abandon counterproductive</p>

	<p>energy stock exchange, supported by all parties; Astronomical, unworthy, insane bills;</p> <p>It is the result of the energy liberalisation and financialisation strategy, the Recovery Fund and the green transition, the green taxes;</p> <p><b>It is a tragedy that it took a war of this scale for us to realise the dangers of extreme energy dependence on Russia;</b></p> <p>The European leadership were the ones who cut the cheap energy flow to the citizens;</p> <p>The so-called 'European solution', which the EU and governments are working on, is tailored to their profitability</p>		<p><b>energy sanctions and restore trade with the Russian Federation;</b></p> <p><b>Action is indeed urgently needed;</b></p> <p><b>To step up the struggle for a drastic reduction and cap on electricity, gas and oil tariffs, and the abolition of the special tax and VAT on fuel and energy</b></p>
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Table 9 Energy securitization in the EP 2022

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## 7.2 Appendix B: Analysis of Primary data (EC)

### The framing of threats, referent object and (exceptional) measures of the European Commission 2014 – 2022

Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)	Referent Object
2014: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The crisis in Eastern Ukraine</li> <li>- The activities of illegal armed separatist groups</li> <li>- Russia's threats to take unilateral 'preventive' safeguard measures are unacceptable and legally unfounded</li> <li>- Energy dependency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy security</li> <li>- EU partners' sovereignty</li> </ul>
2015: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Overdependence on a single supplier or route</li> <li>- Russian gas</li> <li>- Nord Stream 2</li> <li>- Dominant position of Gazprom</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ensuring secure and resilient energy supplies to European citizens and companies</li> <li>- Member states</li> <li>- Energy security</li> </ul>
2016: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The current security issues and political instability</li> <li>- Common challenge ahead</li> <li>- Nord Stream 2</li> <li>- A time of supply crisis</li> <li>- Gazprom</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy security</li> <li>- Member states</li> <li>- Gas</li> <li>- Electricity</li> </ul>
2017: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nord Stream 2</li> <li>- Gazprom</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- European consumers – for households and for businesses;</li> </ul>
2018: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hybrid warfare</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cybersecurity</li> <li>- Security and prosperity</li> </ul>
2019: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Russia's violation of international law by the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the ongoing destabilisation of eastern Ukraine</li> <li>- Russian threats</li> <li>- Proliferation of chemical weapons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU and its neighbors</li> <li>- Europe</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased tensions with Russia</li> </ul>	
<p>2020:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Climate challenge</li> <li>- Energy poverty</li> <li>- Higher climate ambition</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Competitiveness of the clean energy industry in Europe</li> </ul>
<p>2021:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Russia</li> <li>- Pandemic</li> <li>- The Belarussian regime's hybrid attack</li> <li>- Aggressive Russia</li> <li>- Unprecedented challenges</li> <li>- Energy poverty</li> <li>- A sharp spike in gas and electricity prices in the EU</li> <li>- Soaring energy prices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Citizens</li> <li>- Member states</li> </ul>
<p>2022:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tensions are high across all energy markets, and the Russian war against Ukraine has a big role in it</li> <li>- Security of supply challenge for gas</li> <li>- Russia has dropped the act and has made it absolutely clear: they are using energy as a weapon</li> <li>- Gazprom</li> <li>- Yet, as Russia is fueling tensions on the gas market, we are seeing ripple effects on the electricity market</li> <li>- These are exceptional circumstances;</li> <li>- Russian gas</li> <li>- Three weeks ago, Russia cut gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, making the threat of losing gas and fossil fuel supplies for the whole EU more tangible. This shows again that Russia is not a reliable trading partner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Companies and households</li> <li>- Citizens</li> <li>- Vulnerable consumers</li> <li>- Ukrainians</li> <li>- European values</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Given the urgency and unpredictability of current event</li> </ul>	
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Table 2 : Framing of threats and referent objects of the European Commission

	Exceptional Measures (Green)	Long-term measures (Light Blue)	Energy Union (Yellow) / Fit for 55 (Purple)
2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Association Agreement</li> <li>- Stress tests</li> <li>- The diversification of suppliers and supply routes</li> </ul>		
2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Diversifying our energy sources, suppliers and routes</li> <li>- Ukraine is and will remain a stable and reliable transit route</li> <li>- The Southern Gas Corridor</li> <li>- The European Energy Security Strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We also want to connect the Iberian Peninsula with Central Europe, this will permit the flow of Algerian gas</li> <li>- The achievement of a true internal energy market is fundamental, as is research and innovation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy Union Strategy</li> </ul>

2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Adequate reservoir capacity can help these countries for a while</li> <li>- Solid emergency plans</li> <li>- External supply</li> <li>Diversification</li> <li>- Enforcement of internal market rules</li> <li>- Indigenous renewable generation and energy savings</li> <li>- LNG and gas storage strategy</li> <li>- The Southern Gas Corridor</li> <li>- Ukraine is – and should remain – an important transit country for Russian gas to Europe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Long-term solution is source diversification (Liquefied natural gas)</li> <li>- Infrastructure: interconnect isolated networks</li> <li>- Harmonization of tariffs, standards and procedures</li> <li>- Energy efficiency and renewables (a comprehensive review of the Renewable Energy Efficiency and Energy Performance of Buildings Directives.)</li> <li>- More integrated approach</li> </ul>	- Energy Union Strategy
2017	- Regulation on Security of Gas Supply	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Member States' preparedness for a gas disruption</li> <li>- Risk assessments: EU-wide simulations done by ENTSOG (the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas)</li> <li>- Solidarity</li> </ul>	- Energy Union
2018		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Build data integrity</li> <li>- Develop strong digital identities</li> <li>- Synchronisation of our energy market</li> <li>- Digitalization</li> </ul>	

		- Solidarity	
2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- A new EU sanction regime to counter cyber-attacks as part of our wider diplomatic toolbox</li> <li>- Maintain open channels with Russia on issues of strategic interest for Europe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The need to strengthen the resilience of the EU and its neighbours against Russian threats, including hybrid threats</li> <li>- Regional connectivity and resilience</li> </ul>	
2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Recovery and resilience facility</li> <li>- Next Generation EU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Energy Charter Treaty is in need of substantial reform</li> <li>- Clean energy transition</li> <li>- The Paris Agreement</li> <li>- The European Green Deal</li> <li>- Climate neutrality 2050</li> <li>- Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy (Clean energy technology, renovation, sustainable transport)</li> <li>- Phase out fossil fuels</li> <li>- Energy efficiency</li> <li>- Risk assessments from European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG)</li> </ul>	- Energy Union

2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Additional, unprecedented measures</li> <li>- Energy toolbox</li> <li>- Economic sanction</li> <li>- We are supporting Ukraine with structural reforms, with modernising the administration</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 'Fit for 55' Package included a revision of the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Directives to align them with our new and higher ambitions</li> <li>- Renewables markets have shown resilience through the pandemic</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 'Fit for 55' Package</li> </ul>
2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coordinated emergency intervention at EU level</li> <li>- We will also launch a survey on the temporary state—aid crisis framework to see how we can streamline procedures or expand the scope for state guarantees</li> <li>- Targeted emergency package</li> <li>- A complementary EU price index for LNG</li> <li>- REPowerEU</li> <li>- Joint purchasing of gas</li> <li>- Diversification</li> <li>- An extraordinary and temporary intervention to address high energy prices</li> <li>- Gas storage obligation</li> <li>- We would need to move quickly to through the co—legislative process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Renewable energy</li> <li>- Energy efficiency</li> <li>- Clean energy transformation</li> </ul>	

Table 3 : Measures taken by the European Commission responding to its framing of threats

2022	Referent Subject (Risk/Threat)	Referent Object	(Exceptional) Measures
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tensions are high across all energy markets, and the Russian war against Ukraine has a big role in it</li> <li>- Gazprom just two weeks ago announced that supplies through Nordstrom 1 would not resume until the sanctions are lifted</li> <li>- Russia has dropped the act and has made it absolutely clear: they are using energy as a weapon</li> <li>- These are exceptional circumstances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Energy markets</li> <li>- Citizens</li> <li>- Households</li> <li>- The most vulnerable, small and medium companies, industry</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Diversifying away from Russian fossil fuel sources</li> <li>- A coordinated gas—demand reduction plan</li> <li>- Joint storage policy</li> <li>- Investing in renewable energy</li> <li>- A coordinated emergency intervention at EU level</li> <li>- A mandatory target for member states to reduce electricity</li> <li>- EU—wide limit to the remuneration for low—carbon technologies</li> <li>- A survey on the temporary state—aid crisis framework</li> <li>- There is no magic wand to bring prices back to the pre-war levels, but with a targeted emergency plan</li> <li>- The preparation of the reform of the electricity market</li> <li>- More renewables and efficiency is the way to go</li> <li>- REPowerEU strategy</li> </ul>

Table 4 : Commissioner Kadri Simson’s narrative in the debate on the EU’s response to the increase in energy prices in Europe 2022

Source: The European Parliament and the author

### 7.3 Appendix C: Parliamentary debates from 2014 to 2022

	Name of debate	Votes Results	Text adopted	Rejected /Approved
2014	One-minute speeches (1) 23/10/2014	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Situation in Ukraine (2) 15/07/2014	N/A	N/A	N/A
2015	<b>European Energy Security Strategy (3) + Votes explanation (4)</b> <b>09/06/2015</b> <b>10/06/2015</b>	For :277 Against : 315 Abstentions : 111	N/A	Motion for a resolution : Rejected
	Doubling the capacity of the North Stream pipeline and impact on the energy union and the security of supply (5) 07/10/2015	N/A	N/A	N/A
2016	<b>EU strategy for liquefied natural gas and gas storage (6) + Votes explanation (7)</b> <b>24/10/2016</b> <b>25/10/2016</b>	For :415 Against : 223 Abstentions : 55	Yes	Motion for a resolution : Adopted
	European energy security (8) 23/11/2016	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Impact of Nord Stream 2 on the gas market in the CEE region (9) 09/05/2016	N/A	N/A	N/A
2017	<b>Measures to safeguard the security of gas supply (10)</b> <b>12/09/2017</b>	For :567 Against : 101 Abstentions : 23	Yes	Provisional Agreement: Approved
	Nord Stream 2 (11) 14/09/2017	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	Connecting Europe facility after 2020 (12) 28/05/2018	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Debate with the Prime Minister of Estonia, Jüri Ratas, on the Future of Europe(13) 03/10/2018	N/A	N/A	N/A

	Debate with the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, on the Future of Europe (14) 04/07/2018	N/A	N/A	N/A
	<b>Promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources - Energy efficiency - Governance of the Energy Union (15)</b> 15/01/2018	For :434 Against : 104 Abstentions : 37	Yes	Commission proposal and amendments : Approved
2019	<b>State of EU-Russia political relations (16)</b> 11/03/2019	For :402 Against : 163 Abstentions : 89	Yes	Alternative motion for resolution (tabled by the ENF Group) Rejected Alternative motion for resolution (tabled by the GUE/NGL Group) Rejected Motion for resolution (tabled by the AFET Committee) Adopted
	<b>Common rules for the internal market for natural gas (17)</b> 03/04/2019	For :465 Against : 95 Abstentions : 68	Yes	Provisional Agreement: Approved

2020	Aligning the Energy Charter Treaty with the European Green Deal (18) 22/10/2020	N/A	N/A	N/A
	State of the Energy Union (19) 22/10/2020	N/A	N/A	N/A
2021	<b>A European Strategy for Energy System Integration (20)</b> 17/05/2021	For : 542 Against : 111 Abstentions : 42	Yes	Motion for a resolution : Adopted
	Preparation of the European Council meeting of 16-17	N/A	N/A	N/A

	December 2021 - The EU's response to the global resurgence of Covid-19 and the new emerging Covid variants (21) 15/12/2021			
	State of the energy union (22) 24/11/2021	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Visit of the VPCHR to Russia (23) 09/02/2021	N/A	N/A	N/A
2022	<b>Resilience of critical entities (24)</b> <b>22/11/2022</b>	For : 595 Against : 17 Abstentions : 24	Yes	Provisional Agreement: Adopted
	<b>Russian aggression against Ukraine (25) + Continuation of the debate (26)</b> <b>01/03/2022</b>	For : 637 Against : 13 Abstentions : 26	Yes	Motion for a resolution : Adopted
	<b>The EU's response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (27)</b> <b>05/10/2022</b>	N/A	Yes	Joint motion for a resolution : Adopted
	<b>EU response to the increase in energy prices in Europe (28)</b> <b>13/09/2022</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A
	<b>Renewable Energy, Energy Performance of Buildings and Energy Efficiency Directives amendments (REPowerEU) (29)</b> <b>13/12/2022</b>	Matter referred back to the committee responsible	Yes	Commission proposal and amendments : Approved
	The Three Seas Initiative: challenges and opportunities (30) 06/07/2022	N/A	N/A	N/A
	The Power of the EU - Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy (31) 24/03/2022	N/A	N/A	N/A
	The REPowerEU Plan: European solidarity and energy security in face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including the recent cuts of gas supply to Poland and Bulgaria (32)	N/A	N/A	N/A

	19/05/2022			
2023	Question Time (Commission) - How to ensure energy security in the EU in 2023 (33) 14/03/2023	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 5

Source : Author and the European Parliament

## 7.4 Appendix D: Composition of parliamentary terms (2014-2022)

2014-2019 parliamentary term	2019-2024 parliamentary term
Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP)	Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP)
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament S&D	Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament S&D
European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR)	European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR)
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)	Renew Europe Group (Renew)
Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)	Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)	Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA)
Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (EFDD)	Identity and Democracy (ID)
Non-attached Members (NI)	Non-attached Members (NI)

Source: The European Parliament

## 7.5 Appendix E: Codes from NVivo

Name	Description	Files	References
(Exceptional) Measures		34	429
2006-2009 gas dispute		7	17
Accusations of the EU		22	88
Acknowledging threat, risks, challenges		38	507
Adjectives to describe urgency		27	118
Agri-food chain		1	1
Atlanticism		1	1
Biogas		1	1
Brexit		2	2
Burden-sharing mechanism		4	4
China		2	3
Climate, Environment		17	34
Climate emergency		2	2
Co-dependence		1	1
Coal		2	5
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF)		1	1
Contestation		15	36
COVID		7	19
Cybersecurity		12	16
Decarbonisation		4	7
Decentralization		1	1
Dependence		34	171
Description of the EP (Negative)		1	1
Digitization		3	3
Diversification		15	39
Domestic energy sources		9	19
East Mediterranean gas hub		1	1
East-West Europe gap		15	36
ECR		26	109
EFDD (Far-right)		11	31
Electricity		4	9

Name	Description	Files	References
Emergency supply corridors		1	1
Energy (in)security		36	285
Energy as a security issue		28	113
Energy Crisis		15	86
Energy Crisis in Moldova		1	1
Energy efficiency		21	67
Energy integration		6	15
Energy sovereignty		13	20
Energy transition		18	48
Energy Union Strategy		22	111
<b>EPP</b>		31	267
EU agenda		1	1
EU-Russia relations		3	11
European Commission		20	120
European defense community		1	2
European Green Deal		9	20
European Values		10	12
EUs hostility towards Russia		1	10
Fit for 55		5	6
Fossil fuels		2	8
Future of Europe (FoE)		2	4
Fracking		1	3
Gas		6	10
Gazprom		10	28
Greater Europe		1	2
Human security		7	15
Hydrogen		8	24
<b>ID (ENF)</b>		20	84
Identity value crash		2	4
Joint purchasing		1	2
Liberal, market-oriented thinking		4	9
LNG		13	24
market integration		10	24

Name	Description	Files	References
Motion for change		19	67
National vs. EU rhetoric		4	5
<b>NI</b>		15	48
Nord Stream 2		19	64
Nuclear energy		8	13
Past experiences (negative)		10	35
PESCO		2	3
Poland		2	11
Policy change		1	1
Politicization		1	2
R&D		1	1
Realist		1	1
Referent object		9	54
Reform in infrastructure		14	45
Regionalization		6	15
Renew Group (ALDE)		29	143
Renewables		25	71
Resilience		35	209
Risk base politics		5	19
Routinization		2	2
Rule of law		5	8
Russia		30	280
Russia's aggression in Ukraine		22	154
<b>S&amp;D</b>		29	225
Schengen enlargement		1	1
Security, economy and defense union		1	3
Shale gas		1	2
Solidarity		23	62
South Stream		4	5
Speak with one voice		7	12
Sustainability		2	2
Synchronization		1	1
Synergies		2	3
TEN-E		2	2
TEN-T Network		1	1

Name	Description	Files	References
The EU as primary player		1	1
the European Peace Facility		1	3
Greens/EFA		24	112
The Left (GUE NGL)		25	88
The Paris Agreement		2	3
the renewables acceleration areas. ~~		1	5
The southern corridor		4	9
the Third Energy Package		8	15
Them-Us paradigm		12	33
Transparency		6	12
Ukraine as an energy transit country		4	5
Unconventional fuels		2	2
Underground natural gas		1	1