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THE IMPACT OF THE FULL-SCALE INVASION OF UKRAINE ON ATTITUDES
TOWARDS THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM: THE CASE OF
THE PERMANENT FIVE (P5)

Bachelor's thesis

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Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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Abstract

This bachelor thesis aimed to investigate the impact of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the perspectives and discourses of the permanent five members (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) towards the UNSC reform. To conduct the study, research questions were posed to investigate changes that occurred after the invasion began. Firstly, changes in the levels of assigned urgency to the topic were explored. Secondly, changes in the perspectives and discourse of the P5 were examined. To reach the conclusions two qualitative content analyses have been conducted with various speeches made by the P5 countries at the United Nations General Assembly. The analyses revealed an increase in the level of urgency shown by France and the U.S. towards the topic, but since this is not the majority of the P5, the change is insufficient to conclude that there was a change in the view of the P5 as a whole, showing a limited impact by the outbreak of the war. The analyses also found out that significant change was observed in discourses and perspectives of the P5, but since the changes did not help reach a consensus across the P5, once again the limited impact of the war was observed. Based on the theoretical framework of the work, it was also concluded that the impact of the war did not help in overcoming the inertia and that the war did not serve as a possible critical juncture.

Lühikokkuvõte

Käesoleva bakalaureusetöö eesmärk on uurida Ukrainas läbi viidud täiemahulise sissetungi mõju ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu (UNSC) viie alalise liikme kui terviku (P5) perspektiividele ja diskursustele seoses Julgeolekunõukogu reformiga. Töö läbiviimiseks esitati uurimisküsimused, mille eesmärkideks oli analüüsida muutusi, mis toimusid pärast sissetungi algust. Esiteks uuriti, kuidas muutus teema pakilisus P5 silmis. Teiseks uuriti seda, kuidas P5 diskursus ja vaatenurgad muutusid. Andmeanalüüsis on kasutatud erinevaid P5 riikide kõnesid ÜRO peaassambleel, mis käsitlevad reformi teemat. Andmete uurimiseks on kasutatud kvalitatiivset sisuanalüüsi. Analüüsi tulemusena selgub, et kuigi sõja tagajärjel tõusis Prantsusmaa ja USA silmis teema pakilisus, siis ei ole see muutus piisav järeldamiseks, et P5 kui terviku käsitus pakilisusest on muutunud. Töö tulemusena selgub, et P5 diskursustes ja perspektiivides täheldati olulisi muutusi pärast sõja algust, kuid need ei aidanud P5 lõikes konsensuse jõudmisele. Põhinedes töö teoreetilisele raamistikule, jõutakse järelduseni, et sõja mõju oli piiratud ning ei tekitanud olukorda, mis oleks võimaldanud ületada inertsit ja aidata kaasa reformile. Seeläbi saab järeldada, et sõda ei kujuta endast kriitilist pöördepunkti.

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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been delegated with the important task of ensuring international peace and security (United Nations Security Council a). Truth is that the council's work has proven again and again to be ineffective, which is why discussions surrounding reform of the UNSC have been held since the early 90s but sadly without any real success due to the fact that no consensus exists about how the reform should be carried out (Schrijver 2007, Weiss 2003, Hosli et al 2019). A special role in this process is played by the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, because of their ability to veto resolutions.

Whereas the process has been stalled and the P5 has been wary of the reform, major events such as wars, like Russia's unprovoked aggression on Ukraine, can heighten the attention and focus towards the reform, therefore providing openings to otherwise foreclosed institutional change and to evolution in global governance. The current full-scale invasion of Ukraine that started on the 24th of February 2022 and the inability of the Security Council to act on it has once again strongly proven the shortcomings of the Security Council (Murithi 2022, Patrick 2023, Geis et al 2022). The biggest war in Europe since the Second World War has not only impacted Europe itself but the effects of the war have rippled across the world in the form of food shortages, inflation or political unrest. It has also been marked as the first large-scale interstate war since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and is one of the main reasons why the year 2022 has been pronounced as the most violent year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Davies et al., 2023: 699-700). This is why the author sees this as a major war which could have an impact and create a potential opening for institutional change.

Against that background and given the protracted nature of the debate surrounding the reform, the thesis aims to find out if the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has impacted the perspectives and discourses of the P5 countries towards the UNSC reform. Therefore the main research question is: What impact did the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have on the perspectives and discourses of the P5 countries towards the UNSC reform? This question will be tackled by answering two more specific questions of how has the level of assigned urgency shown by the P5 to the topic of UNSC reform changed since the start of the war (1) and how have their perspectives and discourse on the topic of reform changed since the start of the war (2).

In order to answer the posed main research question, the author will first find answers to the two specific sub-questions by conducting two qualitative analyses with different sets of data accessed through the United Nations Digital Library System. To answer the first sub-question, statements made by the P5 countries during the annual General Debate will be used. However, to answer the second sub-question speeches made by the P5 countries at the General Assembly on the topic of SC reform will be used.

The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will present a theoretical framework that argues through institutional theory that major wars can trigger critical junctures that enable institutional change. In addition, the role of “actors of change” in critical junctures will be presented, to prove the connection of the P5 as main stakeholders in the reform. The chapter will also provide an overview and historical background on UNSC reform and the different issues surrounding a possible reform. The second chapter will outline the research design and reflect upon the chosen data, timeframe and analysis methods. Further explanation of the procedure of analysis will also be provided. In the third chapter, the analyses will be carried out and conclusions based on the results presented will be made, linking them to the research questions and the theoretical framework.

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: UNSC reform as a quest for institutional change

The following part of the thesis will provide a historical background on the UNSC reform and its obstacles and the main key issues and reform proposals. In addition, the theoretical background will give an overview of institutional theory, with a focus on historical institutionalism and critical junctures and power in global governance. This will help us understand why the UNSC reform is such a complicated topic and show how this war has the potential to change the perspectives of the P5.

1.1 Historical background on the UNSC reform

Scholars such as Pierson (as cited in Peters 1999: 73), point out that “many initial choices” in institutional designs are “dysfunctional” and therefore will need to change over time. This also applies to the UNSC. Created to be the foremost body to uphold international peace and security, the UNSC has faced again and again challenges in doing so stemming from its initial design (Gould et al. 2017). The backbone for the crucial need for reform is that the current council does not represent the current geopolitical world but is rather a reflection of the one at the end of World War II, which has caused serious legitimacy issues (Traschler, 2010). Other problems like the over-representation of Western states and the abuse of the veto power, which often ends up obstructing the effective work of the Council and its capacity for quick action have furthermore hampered its legitimacy, effectiveness and transparency (Traschler 2010, Schrijver 2007) Hence the need for a reform.

Even though the idea of the UN Charter reform, which is needed for the UNSC reform is prominent, history shows us that in practice it is almost unachievable, since only three amendments have been made to the charter in almost 80 years (Weiss 2003: 147). One of those amendments, and the only successful reform of the UNSC, was passed in 1965, as a result of which the SC grew from 11 to 15 members and the required majority votes to pass a resolution grew from 7 to 9 votes (Weiss 2003: 149). This change was possible due to the fact that since the establishment of the UN in 1945 until 1965 when that reform passed, the number of UN member states had increased from 51 to 114 (Weiss 2003: 148-149). The theme of the UNSC reform resurfaced later on, in the early 1990s to recognise the changed world (Weiss 2003: 150). To remain credible and legitimate the council would have to give voices to the new big powers like Germany, Japan, India, Brazil or Nigeria (Mahbubani 2021:

1). The initial idea, in the beginning of the 90s, was to cast aside the veto and double the number of permanent Security Council members, but this never happened (Weiss 2003: 150).

Nowadays, roughly 30 years later, the UNSC reform is still stuck behind the same procedural obstacles it encountered back then - the veto and the political paralysis behind the membership and seat distribution (Weiss, 2003: 150). The veto power is held by the five permanent members of the UNSC - Russia, United States, China, France and the United Kingdom - known also as the P5. This reflects the big powers of the era, in 1945 when the UN was established. Since the veto power gives the P5 countries an upper hand and a significant voice in international politics they will not be giving up their vetoes simply. To this day no consensus has been found either when it comes to deciding on how the enlargement of the council should take place, how many permanent or non-permanent seats should be added and who should get them. Many reasons lie behind why it has been so challenging to reach a consensus on the topic. Not only are the P5 afraid to lose their influence and are resistant to change, but different power struggles and geopolitical rivalries hinder reaching any type of agreement between other UN members (Weiss, 2003: 149). For example, when it comes to proposals for new permanent members' seats, the African Union has not decided if they should be supporting Egypt, Nigeria or South Africa, which has created conflict between the Union members themselves (Mahbubani, 2021: 58).

1.1.1 Complexities of the UNSC Reform: proposals and five key issues

Since 1990 when the topic of the UNSC reform resurfaced many proposals and ideas have been put forward on how the reform should look like. Some of them are less realistic than others like the abolition of the veto power or limiting its use which the P5 completely rejects (Weiss et al. 2005). Some others have in the contrary gained widespread agreement, like the idea that the expansion of the membership goes hand in hand with the idea that to work effectively the UNSC should have a limited number of members (Gould et al. 2017: 155). Yet still the topic of by what degree remains hotly disputed (Gould et al. 2017: 152).

In 2007 the General Assembly created an Intergovernmental Negotiation (IGN) framework with the aim to achieve concrete results (Elect the Council, n.d.). Later in 2008, the General Assembly adopted a decision that decided on the bases of the negotiations, which included five key issues surrounding the reform (Elect the Council, n.d.). One of the bases are the positions and proposals of Member States, regional groups and other groupings of Member

States (Elect the Council, n.d.). The second basis is the five key issues: (1) categories of membership, (2) the question of the veto, (3) regional representation, (4) the size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council (5) and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly (Elect the Council, n.d.).

So far, many positions and proposals have been proposed, but three of them have gained the most support and become a foundation for further discussions. The Group of Four (G4), composed of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan have proposed to add six permanent seats for them, two seats for representatives from Africa and four temporary seats, making a total of 25 seats in the council (Trachsler 2010: 2). The group called Uniting for Consensus that constitutes of many countries like Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico et al. have proposed also a reform that would lead to a council of 25 seats, however they want to add only non-permanent seats to prevent any competing powers of attaining the permanent seats (Trachsler 2010: 2). The 53-member African Union (AU) has proposed an option in which six permanent member seats and five non-permanent seats would be added, adding up to a total of 26 seats in the council (Trachsler 2010: 2). The proposal sees that 2 permanent seats and two non-permanent seats would be given to Africa to better the representation in the council (Trachsler 2010: 2). In the context of the P5 countries, their support towards the different countries and proposals varies and is a quite complex issue. For example, all the P5 countries have shown support for the candidacy of India, but China is ready to fully support India only on the condition that India doesn't associate its candidacy with Japan (The Hindu, Swart 2009). Cases like these, where different conditions are brought onto the table are found with most of the main candidates and proposals. This is why the issue is so complex, because to this day absolutely no consensus has been found (Weiss 2003: 149).

The same problem arises with the five key issues – no consensus has been reached either, not within the P5 or the other member states. The issue around the categories of memberships lies in the fact that member states cannot agree on which categories, permanent and non-permanent memberships, should be expanded and how (Baleson, 2020: 31-32). The problem with the question of the veto lies in the fact that there is a wide acknowledgement that the veto right should be reformed, but the P5 opposes it totally (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12; Gould & Rablen 2017:161). In addition, there is the question of when new permanent members join the council, should they get the veto right as well? The third key issue is regional representation, which indicates that there is a need for equitable representation in the Council since currently there is an overrepresentation of developed

countries (Baleson 2020: 3-4). The problem with the fourth issue, which is the size of the possible reform council and its working methods, lies in the fact that research shows that the expansion will help with equity but diminish the efficiency of the council (Gould & Rablen 2017:159). This means that the council should not be expanded too much to preserve efficiency. The fifth issue is related to the general relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, which will have to be reformed as well (White 2015).

Therefore, even though the UNSC remained more or less functional after the war since they did actually manage to pass some resolutions on crisis unrelated to Ukraine, the dysfunctionality and issue of legitimacy became more apparent through the inability of constructive cooperation and rising tensions between Western and Russian diplomats (Gowan 2022: 4). Despite the fact that many countries have come forward with different proposals and ideas, the lack of consensus in all the key issues makes it very difficult to move forward in any way (Gould & Rablen 2017: 161). Furthermore, even if a wider agreement is found on the reform, the P5 could easily veto any initiative that they don't agree with, therefore they are one of the obstacles on the path of reform.

In the context of this research, the next section will look into institutional theory, to understand how major events like the full-scale invasion of Ukraine could have an impact on institutional change and reforms through their impact on the attitudes of the P5 countries as key players in advancing the reform.

1.2. Institutional theory and change

Richard Gowan (2022: 2) states in his article that “major wars create openings for major innovations in international system.” His idea is supported by various theories, one of which is institutional theory and more precisely historical institutionalism and its idea of critical junctures, as pivotal moments when years of path dependency can be overcome and deeply entrenched inertia makes change possible.

This theoretical perspective is useful for this research because of how it can explain and shed light on how frozen configurations and old structures can be challenged and what is needed to enable significant change in institutions like these. Which is exactly the case of the UNSC where the institutional design is outdated and the need to be reform grows year from year yet no meaningful action has taken place. This theoretical perspective will help in understanding how this war could enable a pathway for change.

1.2.1 Historical Institutionalism: path dependency as a brake in development

Historical institutionalism (HI) is not completely considered as a theory but more as a specific approach to studying political science. At its core, there is the internalised idea that path dependency affects institutions and shapes political and institutional change (Voeten, 2019: 149). In a general sense, path dependency means that events and choices that are taken at an earlier point will set an institutional pattern, therefore anchoring and stabilising the path in which way subsequent events and choices can move towards (Djelic 2007: 162). Different scholars in this field emphasise that path dependency guides institutional designs towards inefficient directions and therefore prevents them from making major institutional or policy changes (Voeten, 2019: 149). This can clearly be seen in the case of the UNSC, where change and reform are imperative and supported by UN members including the P5, yet nothing has changed in the past 30 years (Schrijver 2007, Weiss 2003). The inability to take meaningful action and the absence of reform in this case can be seen as a form of path dependency. The reason why path dependency might prevent an institution from keeping up with evolution is that change in these types of institutions is sometimes suppressed by defenders of the status quo and reinforced by previous choices, even if the pressure for change continues to build up (Sorensen 2022: 933). In the case of the UNSC, we can see the P5 members as the defenders of the status quo, as they are wary of change in fear of losing their advantage in decision-making. Nonetheless, it does not mean that change is not possible.

Most organisations have faults and will need to go through evolution. HI tells us that this is possible but the range of options will be severely limited due to the previous decisions made throughout the history of the institution (Peters 1999: 65). This is due to path dependency which anchors the path and limits the chances of taking effective decisions and action. Therefore the unwillingness of the P5 to adhere to a reform after outbreaks of major conflicts like the Yugoslav Wars or the war in Iraq might impact the outcome of future attempts for reform because of path dependency. We are also introduced to the idea that institutions do not change willingly (Peters 1999: 68). We learn that there is a theory that different institutions are in an “equilibrium” that stays in place unless some “major punctuation” or juncture moves them off of that position (Peters 1999: 148). This entails the idea of critical junctures that are used as a way to explain the process of change in historical institutionalism.

1.2.2 Critical Junctures

“Critical Junctures are choice points when a particular option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are ‘critical’ because once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2001: 6-7).

This is Mahoney's definition of a critical juncture and at its core, the critical juncture is a concept that helps make sense of moments where a stable trajectory changes direction and leads to institutional change (Sorensen 2022: 932). This means that theoretically the path dependency that the UNSC is currently on, could be changed through a critical juncture. One of the crucial parts of critical junctures, that are particularly interesting for this research, are the two steps that precede it - the prior conditions and the crisis, which acts as a catalyst or a trigger for these critical junctures and therefore institutional change (Sorensen 2022: 934).

In his work, Sorensen (2022: 934) brings out that these critical junctures are most likely to be triggered by crises that undermine the legitimacy of the institution. The understanding behind that statement is that if a crisis reveals the different institutional shortcomings and diminishes their legitimacy then it will not only undermine the stability of the established organisation but will also create pressure to create institutions that can provide adequate responses to the crisis (Sorensen 2022: 935). Therefore putting more pressure on the defenders of the status quo, since they would not want the collapse of an institution where they have the upper hand and power. This means that critical junctures could change the stances of the P5 and push them to be more open to reform.

As we know, the war in Ukraine has in a way paralysed the work of the UNSC and many UN member states have come forward with statements that indicate that the UN is losing its credibility and legitimacy because of that. In 2022, 73 leaders, which is more than one-third of members of the UN, demanded urgent reform of the SC during the General Debate of the high-level week (United Nations, 2022b). Moreover Capoccia, (2016: 16) in his work on critical junctures, brings out the work of Ron Kreh and Elizabeth Kier, who both argue that wars are critical junctures, especially for institutions with executive power. Like the UNSC, which has the power to impose resolutions that member states are obliged to follow under the Charter (United Nations a). The dissolution of the League of Nations after the II World War which led to the creation of the United Nations is therefore a great example of this type of

critical juncture. The II World War showed that the League of Nations was unable to keep the peace due to different problems like the fact that it required agreements from all the states to pass resolutions (Weiss 2003: 148). This led to the dismantling of the organisation and a new institution, the United Nations and with it the UNSC were then established to contrast and build a more legitimate institution. Now the UNSC itself has reached a place where it is failing at its main task and is seen as being outdated and having legitimacy and representation problems, with the current war in Ukraine being a prime example of this. Meaning that this war has the potential to become a critical juncture.

1.2.3 Actors of change in critical junctures

So when it comes to the UNSC, a profound crisis, such as a major war, would put pressure on changing the status quo and thereby triggering institutional change. However historical institutionalism understands an institution, as a legacy of many rounds of conflict and coalition building, which means that institutional change in this setting will not only need a trigger but it will also require coalition building and “actors of change” who are willing to engage in the process (Sorensen 2022: 933). For instance, Thomas Ertman (2010) concludes that even if conditions for reform are present it might not lead to real change without the active involvement of influential actors that are crucial for creating coalitions that are truly engaged in institutional change. The lack of such powerful actors of change might be also one of the reasons why to this day all efforts to reform the Council have been in vain. In our case, these particularly powerful actors who could make change much more likely are the P5 and until they are completely onboard with the reform, institutional change will not be possible, due to their veto power. Even though all five permanent members claim to support reform, scholars have found a norm that states do not reject the necessity for the SC reform in public (Binder & Heupel 2020: 93).

So as we have learned, a crisis, especially one that undermines the legitimacy of the institution, like the current war in Ukraine can be a trigger for institutional change but will also need a coalition of actors who will be engaged in changing the institution and not maintaining the status quo. Therefore the P5 countries could become actors of change as a result of the war if the level of assigned urgency to the topic increases and a change from cautious to strongly supportive is observed in their perspectives and discourse. This is why the author deems it important to understand if this war, as a potential critical juncture, has

heightened the attention of the P5 towards the UNSC reform and through this changed their perspectives and discourse towards the reform, as it would help to understand more deeply if this war can impose real change.

2. METHODOLOGY

In this section of the thesis, the author will outline the research design and reflect upon the chosen data, timeframe and analysis methods. Further explanation of the procedure of analysis will also be provided.

2.1 Research Design

The author has picked a case study approach for the research design. The case of the P5 changing their level of assigned urgency and perspectives under the impression of a major geopolitical war was picked. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which started in 2022 was chosen as a major war because it has undermined the functionality and legitimacy of the Security Council and its inability to effectively respond to this crisis has furthermore proved the need for a reform. Therefore this war has the potential to cause a critical juncture triggering institutional change. The analytical focus on the P5 instead of the UN member states at large is also used because of the major role that these countries play in the future of the reform as they have the chance to veto any changes to the Charter.

As mentioned in the introduction the thesis aims to find out if the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has impacted the perspectives and discourses of the P5 countries towards the UNSC reform. To do that a main research question is posed: What impact did the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have on the perspectives and discourses of the P5 countries towards the UNSC reform? This question will be further answered by posing two more specific questions of how has the level of assigned urgency to the topic changed since the start of the war (1) and how have their perspectives and discourse on the topic of reform changed since the start of the war (2).

2.2 Methods of analysis

In order to answer the main research question, answers to the two more specific sub-questions will be found by conducting two qualitative analyses with two different sets of data. Qualitative content analysis has been opted for because it is used to examine the contextual meaning of texts (Kalmus et al. 2015). To conduct the analysis the author will be coding the material, which is the basic operation of this type of analysis which will make it possible for the author to study and understand the data in depth (Kalmus et al. 2015).

Firstly, to find answers to the first research sub-question, which seeks to find out how has the level of assigned urgency to the reform topic changed since the start of the war, annual official statements made by each of the P5 countries at the General Debate of the General Assembly will be used as data. The reasoning behind why the author has chosen to use only official statements made by the P5 countries during the General Debate of the General Assembly's high-level week is because it is an annual high-profile platform where every country's leader gets to address the world and discuss the most burning issues of the time (UN News 2.1) Therefore if the reform is mentioned in the speech, it would show that the country has deliberately contemplated on the topic and considers it to be important enough to include it in its annual statement. Any changes in regards to mentioning the SC reform would indicate a change in the level of urgency.

The relevant speeches will be accessed through the United Nations Digital Library System by conducting a partial phrase keyword search using the following search phrase: countryorganization:"X" AND agenda:"general debate" NOTdocumentsymbol:"A/C*" (UN Digital Library). The "X" in the search phrase symbolises the name of one of the P5 members. This search engine phrase was created because the author found that it filters out the most successfully the needed documents.

The author has decided on a two-year time frame, to establish the post-invasion positions of the P5, starting from the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 up until to the present day. This gives the author the possibility to collect post-invasion data from the General Debates held in 2022 and 2023. Then to establish the positions of each of the P5 countries before the full-scale invasion, a similar time frame of two years has been chosen. This gave the author the possibility to collect pre-invasion data from the General Debates held in 2021 and 2020. In total, data from 20 official statements was gathered.

First of all, the author will need to find its units of analysis which are the relevant passages of the text that talk about the topic of interest, which in this case are passages that mention the SC reform (Lagerspetz 2017: 195-196). These passages will be found by reading the chosen speeches and highlighting the sections of the speeches that do mention the reform. The relevant passages of the speeches will then be analysed and assigned a code. The four codes used for the analysis have been established deductively because the author already knows in advance the criteria that will be looked for, which in this case is the levels in which the reform could be mentioned (Lagerspetz 2017: 203). The codes therefore are: 1) no mention of

reform, 2) mention of general reform, 3) mention of SC reform without specifics and 4) mention of SC reform with specifics. Therefore in order to measure the level of urgency the author will be looking if the SC reform is mentioned at all, if it is just mentioned or if the countries have focused on the topic by delving deeper into specifics in their speeches. The more a country focuses on the reform in its speech the more it shows the level of assigned urgency to the topic. These codes will be then used to make conclusions on the change, with the exception of the “mention of general reform” code. This code will not be taken into account when making conclusions but just used as additional information, since it does not directly convey information about the SC reform which is the focus of this thesis. Once the units of analysis have been analysed and given a code, the results will be categorised by country and year into a simplified coding table to have a better overview of the results (Table 1).

Secondly, to find answers to the second sub-question, which seeks to find out how the perspectives and discourse of the P5 have changed on the topic of reform since the start of the war, another set of data, timeframe and coding system will be used.

For this analysis, the data used are the speeches made by the P5 on the topic of UNSC reform as a part of the annual General Assembly item “Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council”. These official records and therefore speeches will be once again accessed through the United Nations Digital Library System by conducting a partial phrase keyword search using the following search phrase: “ Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other matters related to the Security Council AND year:2021->2022 (UN Digital Library).

To answer this sub-question the author has picked a time frame of two years. The speeches made in 2021 were used to establish the positions of each of the P5 countries before the full-scale invasion and the speeches delivered in 2022 were used to establish the post-invasion positions. All together 10 speeches have been picked for analysis. The author acknowledges that for a better understanding of change, a bigger time frame could have been used. Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the fact that the 2023 speeches on this topic have not been uploaded yet to the United Nations Digital Library. In addition, a larger amount of material in qualitative research could trigger the “tourist effect”, which refers to when the material is too large to be thoroughly analysed, leading to a superficial analysis where only

specific parts are focused on, just as a tourist shows only a few pictures of his trip to his friends (Lagerspetz 2017: 212).

To start with this content analysis the author starts by determining the units of analysis. In the case of this qualitative content analysis individual themes are used as units of analysis since a theme might be expressed in a word, phrase, sentence or paragraph (Zhang et al. 2009: 3). Therefore the author will use themes as coding units rather than physical linguistic units.

The next step is to develop categories, codes and sub-codes and through it a coding tree. This will be done this time through the inductive approach, which means that the codes are not based on a certain theory but are derived from the data (Kalmus et al. 2015). To do this the author reads through the chosen speeches and notes down the occurring themes to then compose the codes, subcodes and categories. The coding tree is formed through it (Appendix 1). The text is then coded using the code tree and main keywords and themes are gathered in coding tables so that the author has an overview of the texts and to help with the analysis (Appendices 2 - 6). In order for all the texts to be properly coded, the texts are processed twice. During the coding, the author will only be focusing on clearly visible information therefore manifest communication (Kalmus et al. 2015).

Then the analysis will be conducted by comparing the speeches of 2021 and 2022 country by country using the thematic categories redacted from the coding process (Appendix 1). The used categories for analysis are the importance and need for reform, specific stances on the reform, the reform process itself, mentions of Ukraine and discussions surrounding the veto power. During the analysis, conclusions must be made about change, which is why the author wants to set out the approach that in order to conclude any change a majority perspective needs to be observed. For example, if three speeches out of five show change, then since they are the majority the conclusion would be that change throughout the speeches was observed.

3. RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

This chapter provides an overview of the results of the analyses that were conducted. The chapter is divided into three parts. First of all, the results of the first analysis will be explored by country to find out if the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has impacted the assigned levels of urgency shown by each of the P5 countries to the reform. A simplified coding table has been added to the end of that chapter for a better overview of the findings (Table 1). Secondly, the findings of the second analysis will be presented by countries, to find out if the full-scale invasion has influenced the perspectives and discourse of each of the P5 regarding the UNSC reform. Thirdly, an overview of the two analyses will be provided with a discussion to make connections between them and to draw general conclusions.

3.1 Changes in the levels of assigned urgency of the P5 towards the UNSC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

China

Based on the research, we find out that China up until 2023, did not address the topic of UNSC reform at all in its General Debate statements. However, approximately a year after the start of the war, China for the first time in four years mentioned a need for general global governance reform. This might be triggered by the invasion of Ukraine, although China did not mention reform in 2022, which is the year that the war started. However as stated in the methodology section of the thesis, mentions of general reform will be presented but not taken into account when making conclusions on the change in the levels of assigned urgency. Therefore, since no mentions of UNSC reform have been observed before and after the war, it can be concluded that no change has been observed in the level of assigned urgency since the start of the full-scale invasion.

France

France's attention towards the reform on the other hand has grown over the years. In 2020, France did not mention reform at all and in 2021 it showed general support towards reform efforts of the United Nations system. When the war broke out, President Macron (2022a: 49) stated in his speech, „ /.../ I hope that we can commit at last to reform of the Security Council /.../ ”. He also expressed that the SC, to fully play its role, should restrict the use of the right

to veto in cases of mass atrocities, which is something that Russia did many times by vetoing resolutions related to mass atrocities taking place in Ukraine. In 2023, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna, again showed France's support towards the reform of SC, stating that new momentum needs to be found for the reform. She then went on to bring out France's specific stances on the reform, like showing support for the G4 candidacy. The topic of regulating the right to veto in cases of mass atrocities was also mentioned. This shows that before the outbreak of the war, France did not give attention to the topic of UNSC reform in its General Debate statements, but this changed drastically after the outbreak of the war in 2022 when France officials urged for UNSC reform and stated various national positions on the reform. Therefore concluding that there has been a change in the level of assigned urgency on the topic of UNSC reform.

Russia

In the case of Russia, a heightened attention to the topic can be observed throughout the 4 analysed years. In 2020, President Vladimir Putin was the only leader amongst the P5 countries to address the need for an SC reform in his virtual statement at the General Debate, pointing out that, “the UN should not grow stiff” and that, “the Security Council should be more inclusive” (2022d: 47). He also stated that it was important that the P5 retain their veto power. In the following year, support for the SC reform was once again communicated and specific stances were also mentioned. After the outbreak of the war, in 2022 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov started to talk about the SC reform by first expressing concern over the efforts of various countries to undermine the prerogatives of the Security Council. This indicates that Russia has taken into account the criticism of the UNSC by various member states. He then delved into expressing Russia's positions on the reform, like the support of India and Brazil for permanent memberships. In 2023 (para. 29), Lavrov not only expressed the need for general global governance reform but also stated that: “There is an ever-increasing need to expand the composition of the Security Council.” Then once again Russia's positions on the reform were expressed. This shows us that Russia consistently mentions the SC reform in its statements before and after the outbreak of the war. Concluding that no change has been observed in the level of assigned urgency to the topic since the start of the war.

The United Kingdom

In the case of the United Kingdom (UK), no mention of the SC reform before or after the full-scale invasion has been observed in their General Debate statements. Concluding that the level of assigned urgency has not changed since the outbreak of the war.

The United States of America

When looking at the findings concerning the United States of America (U.S.) a clear design can be observed. Before the outbreak of the war, in 2020 and 2021, no attention was given to the topic of reform. Then, in 2022, when the war in Ukraine broke out, President Joseph Biden stated: “/.../ the time has come for this institution to become more inclusive so that it can better respond to the needs of today’s world.”(2022b: 20). He then expressed the U.S.'s various positions on the reform, like the support of increasing the number of permanent and non-permanent members and pointed out how important it is for the P5 to refrain from the use of veto except in extraordinary situations. In 2023 (para. 23), Biden again touched upon the SC reform topic, stating that, “The United States has undertaken serious consultations with many member states,” and that new perspectives are needed in the SC to break the gridlock that blocks consensus. Therefore we can see that the U.S. went from no communication about the reform before the outbreak of the war to communicating thoroughly about the SC reform after the outbreak of the war in their General Debate statements. Therefore concluding that their level of assigned urgency on the topic has changed and more specifically increased.

	2023	2022	2021	2020
China	Mention of general reform	No mention	No mention	No mention
France	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of general reform	No mention
Russia	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of SC reform with specifics
UK	No mention	No mention	No mention	No mention
USA	Mention of SC reform with specifics	Mention of SC reform with specifics	No mention	No mention

Table 1. Level of assigned emergency shown to the SC reform by the P5 countries, 2020 - 2023 (formed by the author).

3.2 Changes in the perspectives and discourse of the P5 on the topic of UNSC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

This part of the chapter will provide the findings for the second research question therefore looking at if the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has influenced the perspectives and discourse of each of the P5 regarding the UNSC reform topic. The findings will be presented in the following country-specific subsections and will be looked through the lens of the different categories of the coding tree, which are: the length of the speech, importance and need for reform, specific stances on reform, the reform process, mention of Ukraine and discussion surrounding the veto power.

3.2.1 China's perspectives and discourse on SC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

Out of all the analysed speeches China had by far the longest ones amongst all the other speeches made by the P5 countries. The speech made in 2021 contained 1237 words and the one made in 2022 was 1343 words. Both of the speeches were delivered by Mr Zhang Jun.

Contrary to the speeches made by the other P5 countries, China focused quite a lot on bringing out the importance of reform in its speeches and the reasons why the reform is needed. In 2021, China expressed that there is a need for genuine multilateralism and a push for the democratisation of international relations and highlighted that the SC is entrusted with the important mission of ensuring peace, concluding the importance of the reform. In 2022, similar views were expressed, however new reasons why the reform is important were presented. Zhang Jun (2022e: 19) expressed the emergence of various global challenges stating that “the world is confronted with momentous changes unseen in a century.” In 2021, Zhang Jun did not focus too much on the problems concerning the current SC stating only the North-South imbalance and historical injustices made to Africa. This differs from the speech made in 2022, where bringing out the need for comprehensive reform and the current faults was one of the most talked about topics. The most noteworthy addition to the 2022 speech was the factors that greatly limit the SC's decision-making ability. Zhang Jun (2022e: 19) expressed that, “Cold War mentality, bloc politics and double standards” were weakening the SC. Since these changes occurred right after the war, with a view on the expectations derived from the critical junctures framework, it can be assumed that these additions were influenced by the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This is also why China has focused more on

bringing out the shortcomings of the SC in 2022, highlighting the importance of reform. Therefore a change in the discourse surrounding the importance and need of the reform can be observed, but no change in perspectives can be seen.

Once again contrary to the other P5 speeches, China expressed minimally its stances on specific points of the reform, almost to none. In 2021, Zhang Jun stated that China wants improvement in the representation of “Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Arab region and small island States” in the Council (2021e: 26). Interestingly the specification of regional distribution of additional members was not expressed in 2022. Nonetheless, this change can not be perceived as a change of discourse or perspectives which is why the conclusion is made that no change has occurred in this category. However the author wants to note that it is peculiar that China did not express its stances towards the expansion of membership categories, the question of the veto or the possible size of the council, which are popular topics in the speeches made by other P5 countries.

During the analysis of the speeches, no changes that were related to the war were observed in the reform process category. It can also be noted that much of the content of the speeches was focused towards China's expectations towards the reform process with very little emphasis on action or concrete stances. The general theme of the importance of intergovernmental negotiations can be observed throughout the years, bringing out that there is a need to make reasonable plans, strengthen dialogue and consultations, build mutual trust and listen extensively to the views of all the parties. The author also noted that there was a focus in both of the speeches on the need to expand consensus through in-depth discussions and efforts to engage in respectful dialogues. Zhang Jun also expressed in both of the speeches that China opposes the launching of text-based negotiations and that setting timeframes for the reform will only intensify disagreement between member states. Therefore no major change has been observed in discourse and perspectives surrounding the reform process.

In both of the speeches, no mention of Ukraine or general discussions around the veto were observed either, meaning that there was no change in perspectives or discourse surrounding them.

Overall, both of the speeches were very long but conveyed only a little. Change in the discourse surrounding the importance and need of the reform was observed, through the mention that the Cold War mentality and block politics were weakening the SC. However no

change in discourses or perspectives surrounding the other four thematic categories was observed. So since no change occurred in at least three of the five thematic categories, it can be said that no change in discourses and perspectives was observed in the case of China.

3.2.2 France's perspectives and discourse on SC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The speeches made by France at the General Assembly in 2021 and 2022, contained respectively 642 words and 801 words, which shows an increase in the length of their speech. Despite that, the change in length is not big enough to draw any conclusions. The speech of 2021 was delivered by Mr Fodda and the speech of 2022 by Mrs. Broadhurst Estival.

France did not take too much time when talking about the importance and need for reform, so not much change could be observed in that category. The concreteness and shortness of that category make sense since everybody already knows why the reform is needed. Nonetheless, Broadhurst Estival in 2022, brought out that France's president called out for the reform “to finally take place” and to breathe new life into it showing a new urgency for the need for reform (2022g: 3). Therefore, change in discourse was observed in this category after the breakout of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

When discussing the specific stances on reform not much change was observed. In 2021, Fodda expressed the main stances of France, which are that they are in favour of enlargement of both categories and that they support the candidacies of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for permanent membership while still wanting to see a stronger presence of African countries in both categories. In addition, they think the council should have up to 25 members and in the question of veto, they think that it is up to the states that are requesting permanent membership to decide on the topic. In 2022, Broadhurst Estival added to these points that the remaining seats in the council should be distributed keeping in mind that the aim is to have a balanced geographical representation. The author looked up that this is not a new perspective for France, which is why even though the addition is new, it does not indicate a change influenced by the war. Therefore this will not be considered as a change in perspectives. Hence no change in discourse or perspectives has been observed in this category after the start of the full-scale invasion.

However, the start of the full-scale invasion brought some change in France's discourse, but not the perspective around the reform process. France's position in both of the speeches is that there is a need to establish a strong framework to start real negotiations because the endless repeating of standard speeches results in the process going round in circles, which results in losing the confidence of states. France supports greater transparency in debates and believes that the negotiations should start on the basis of a draft text. An addition to these views is made after the breakout of the war in 2022, when Broadhurst Estival emphasised that the new round of negotiations must “lead to concrete and substantial results” (2022g: 3). Considering the expectations derived from the critical junctures framework this indicates that the war in Ukraine has increased the urgency of reform in France's point of view. Therefore even though no changes to France's perspectives were observed after the start of the war, change in discourse was.

In addition, Broadhurst Estival brought up Russia's aggression towards Ukraine as an “exceptionally serious violation of the Charter” and developed it into the point that it shows us that there is a need to secure “our collective security system” (2022g: 3). An increase in the communication around the regulation of veto can be observed as well. In 2021, Fodda called upon the member states to join an initiative that calls for a voluntary suspension of the use of the veto in the event of mass atrocities. But in 2022, we can see that there is a stronger push for regulating the veto. Broadhurst Estival (2022g: 3) conveyed that France's president “wanted” the use of the veto to be regulated in the case of mass atrocities and that they wish to combine their efforts with the US for a responsible use of the veto since the United States had declared a commitment to refrain from the use of the veto to exceptional instances. The initiative was also explained and once again members were called to join it. Therefore, a mention of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was observed in the post-invasion speech and a change in the category of discussions around the veto was observed as well. The stronger push for regulating the veto can be connected to the atrocities seen by member states from the outrageous actions of Russia in Ukraine. Therefore concluding that the war influenced the increase of importance of regulating the veto in case of mass atrocities from France's viewpoint.

In conclusion, no change in perspectives was observed but change in discourses can be observed in almost all the thematic categories. France's discourse changed after the breakout of the war to an increase in the need for reform and concrete results from the process. As

well, France mentioned the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in its speech, which also resulted in a bigger push for the need for veto regulation. The only category where a change in neither discourse nor perspectives was not observed was surrounding the specific stances of the reform. Therefore, since change was observed in four out of five thematic categories, we can conclude that change in discourse occurred after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

3.2.3 Russia's perspectives and discourse on SC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The speeches made by Russia at the General Assembly in 2021 and 2022, contained respectively 858 words and 685 words, which shows a decline in the length of speeches, the reason of which will be explained during the analysis. The speech made in 2021 was delivered by Mr Polyanskiy and the speech made in 2022 was delivered by Mr Nebenzia.

In 2021, when discussing the importance and need of reform Polyanskiy stated that “there is no question that reform of the Council is long overdue” (2021g: 20). The same was done by Nebenzia in 2022, but he took it up a notch, by calling the reform one of the “thorniest” issues (2022g: 16). If in 2021, discussing the need and importance of reform, was limited to stating that it is important because the council bears the responsibility of maintaining peace and security, then in 2022, much more specific and interesting remarks were made. After the start of the war, Nebenzia stated that we are “at a time when swift changes are afoot in the system” and that “a new multipolar world order is forging a new path for itself” highlighting in this way the need for reform (2022g: 17). Since these remarks were made right after the start of the full-scale invasion and with taking into account that major geopolitical crises such as this war can create openings for change in international systems, it can be assumed that these additions were made due to Russia feeling the change of attitude of the international community towards Russia. Therefore, we can observe change in discourse about the need and importance of reform, but no change in their perspectives has been observed.

In regards to the specific stances on the reform, Russia remained modest in communicating them, but an addition was observed by the author. In 2021, Polyanskiy let the GA know that they find limiting the powers (veto) of current P5, to be unacceptable. In addition, we learn that they support a compact council, which should not exceed the low twenties and that they want to see improvement in the representation of developing states from Africa, Asia and Latin America. The same stances were communicated in 2022, with an additional

specification, that they see India and Brazil as suitable candidates for permanent seats, on the condition that there has been an agreement for a reform model that expands both membership categories, adding also that expansion of the elected members category is fine as well. The author found out that this is not a new perspective for Russia and that they have expressed their support for India and Brazil prior to that. This is why the author concludes that even though the information was new to the research, it does not mean that change occurred in their perspectives after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, concluding that neither the discourse nor the perspectives of Russia in this category changed after the war.

On the subject of the reform process itself, Russia expressed its positions substantially more. Overall, both of the speeches maintained the same positions that there isn't yet a universal solution that would satisfy everyone and that the approaches of the main actors remain mostly divergent, which is why they “see no alternative to proceeding patiently, step by step” (2022g: 16). Both of the speeches recognized the legitimacy of the negotiation platform and warned that deviation from it would lead to the collapse of the negotiations structure. Another warning was given that during the negotiations it was important to not “create new or deepen existing dividing lines” between the member states, which is why they shared the thought that the negotiations platform should remain for “constructive and balanced discussions and decisions” (2022g: 17). Interestingly, the change that can be observed is that before the full-scale invasion in 2021, Polyanskiy expressed many more expectations and limitations resulting in the speech of 2021 being longer. For example, the speech conveyed recommendations to the Co-chairs to understand that the final word remains with the member states and to act accordingly, which is why Russia expressed that there shouldn't be put any pressure on member states or imposed different approaches that don't suit everyone. But after the full-scale invasion in 2022, Polyanskiy brought up that there can not be a place for artificial deadlines in negotiations or other arbitrary timelines. Therefore, Russia did not bring out after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine many of the limitations that were expressed previously in 2021, but they did highlight their opposition to deadlines. This can be seen as a change in discourse. This is why the author concludes that in this thematic category, change has been observed in the discourse but not in the perspectives after the full-scale invasion.

During both of the speeches, no mention of Ukraine or general discussions around the veto use were observed either, meaning that there was no change in perspectives or discourse surrounding these categories.

Overall, no change in perspectives throughout the categories was observed. Nonetheless, change in discourse was observed in the categories of need and importance for reform and the reform process. The observed change was that Russia brought up new and more specific reasons why the reform is needed and they opposed artificial deadlines for the process of reform. Therefore, change in discourse or perspectives surrounding the reform was observed only in two out of the five thematic categories, which is not the majority of the categories needed for the conclusion of change. This means that as expected, being the reason behind the full-scale invasion, we can conclude that Russia's perspectives and discourse did not change after the start of the war.

3.2.4 The United Kingdom's perspectives and discourse on SC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The speeches made by the United Kingdom (UK) at the General Assembly in 2021 and 2022, contained respectively 505 words and 411 words, which shows a decline in the length of their speeches. Despite that, the change in length is too small to draw any conclusions here. The speech of 2021 was delivered by Mr. Roscoe and the speech of 2022 by Ms. Dame Barbara Woodward.

In 2021, when discussing the importance and need of reform Roscoe reaffirms the UK's commitment to the reform and justifies the need for it by stating like many others, that the council should reflect the world of the 21st century and reminding that the last expansion took place in 1965. After the outbreak of the full-scale invasion in 2022, new reasons and ideas were brought up in that category. Woodward stated that “Momentum for change is building around the United Nations,” adding that the challenges the SC faces are more complex and interconnected nowadays, like the threats to the Charter (2022e: 23). Woodward also adds that the SC would be more functional if there was “a renewed commitment to the Charter of the United Nations” (2022e: 24). Since these additions were made after the outbreak of the war and considering that major major geopolitical crises such as this war can create openings for change in international systems, it can be concluded that change can be observed in the discourse around the importance and need of reform after the outbreak of the war. However, no changes have been observed in perspectives in this category.

The specific stances of the UK towards the reform, have not changed during the period and they remain supporting an expansion of both categories, permanent seats for India, Germany,

Japan and Brazil and permanent African representation. They also bring out in both of the speeches that the expansion should be modest and the size of the council should stay in the mid-twenties. Therefore concluding that no change has been observed in the discourse or the perspectives of the UK towards the specific stances on reform after the full-scale invasion.

In regards to the topic of the reform process, the author has to admit that the rhetoric of the speech made in 2021, was much clearer and precise than the one of the 2022 speech. Before the outbreak of the war, Roscoe reaffirmed the UK's commitment to the intergovernmental negotiations, reminding that many member states have “expressed concern and frustration over the lack of progress towards a substantive outcome” (2021e: 21). This is also why before the start of the war, the UK proposed different measures to move “the process forward at an accelerated rate” like initiating text-based negotiations, formalising and recording the negotiations and having a fixed time rate (2021e: 21). Almost none of this was mentioned in the speech delivered after the full-scale invasion in 2022, which only brought up that text-based negotiations “would help” making swifter progress and that the next round of intergovernmental negotiations are an “opportunity for practical and focused discussions” (2022e: 24). Therefore a change has been observed in the discourse of the UK after the outbreak of the war, but not in the perspectives.

In both of the speeches, discussions on the use of veto are held. The UK highlights both years that they have not exercised their right of veto since 1989. Before the start of the war in 2021, the UK encouraged the states to join them in the support of the code of conduct. However, after the outbreak of the war, change can be seen in the discourse surrounding the use of the veto. In 2022, Woodward focuses on the veto initiative that holds the P5 accountable in case of veto use, in front of the GA and highlights that they are proud to co-sponsor it. This was triggered by the mention of Russia's “egregious” use of the veto in the Council to prevent any action taken towards the “unjust and illegal” war in Ukraine (2022e: 24). Therefore change in discourse has been observed after the full-scale invasion related to discussions surrounding the veto, but not the perspectives. In addition, the mention of Ukraine was observed, displaying a change in that category as well.

In conclusion, no change in perspectives was observed but a change in discourses can be observed in almost all the thematic categories, except the category of specific stances on reform. The UK's discourse changed after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by bringing new reasons and ideas to urge the need for reform. They also started to highlight the

veto initiative that they were proud to co-sponsor and brought up the use of the veto against Ukraine. In the case of the reform process, the discourse went from suggesting concrete ideas to move the reform forward and showing understanding towards the member states that are frustrated to having a dry rhetoric about the intergovernmental negotiations and progress. Therefore, since change was observed in four out of the five thematic categories, we can conclude that change in the UK's overall discourse and perspectives has occurred after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

3.2.5 The United States' perspectives and discourse on SC reform before and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The speeches made by the US were the shortest ones among all the other speeches, in 2021 the length was 205 words and by 2022 the length doubled to 486 words. The change in the length shows clearly that the topic of conversation became more important, which is why they had more to say. The overall shortness of the speeches helps figure out what are the most important topics for the U.S. since they were very concrete in their speeches. The speech made in 2021 was delivered by Mr Carnahan and the speech made in 2022 was delivered by representative Mrs Thomas-Greenfield.

In 2021, they associated the need for reform with the need to modernise the council to better reflect the realities of the 21st century, which was also brought up in the speech of 2022. In addition, after the outbreak of the war, Thomas-Greenfield brought up the problem of the status quo, which was mentioned in the theoretical framework saying: “The question before us is whether we will defend an outdated status quo or reform the Security Council /.../“ (2022f: 8). This shows that there is a change in discourse surrounding the reform after the start of the full-scale invasion. However, since they show support for reform in both of the speeches no change in perspectives has been observed

In communicating specific stances on the topic of reform, both of the speeches were very scarce, but still, change can be observed. In 2021, Mr Carnahan expressed that the US was “in principle” open to the expansion of both, the non-permanent and permanent member categories of SC (2021f: 5). However in 2022, Thomas-Greenfield expressed that President Biden had announced that the US “supports” the expansion of both categories, showing more confidence in the statement (2022f: 8). Thomas-Greenfield also added some new information on the support of “new permanent seats for countries from Africa and Latin America” (2022f:

8). The author researched if this is a new perspective and can confirm that the addition was indeed a new twist added for the first time by President Biden in his General Debate speech the same year (Patrick 2023: 1). Therefore, for the first time throughout this research a change in both the discourse and perspectives in a category has been observed after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Throughout, both years mentions in regards to the reform process were scarce. In both years, the U.S. highlighted the importance of working through the intergovernmental negotiations. Before the outbreak of the war, Carnahan also expressed the need for consensus and the need to consider carefully any potential permanent members. In 2022, after the outbreak of the war, none of these perspectives were presented. However, Thomas-Greenfield did express in 2022 that the reform "will not be easy", indicating a more realistic acknowledgement of the SC reform challenge after the start of the war (2022f: 9). Therefore, a change in discourse was observed surrounding the reform process after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, no changes have been observed in perspectives in this category.

In regards to the use of the veto, Mr Carnahan expressed in 2021 that there shouldn't be alterations or expansions of the veto. This perspective however was not mentioned in the post-invasion speech. The author researched if perhaps their perspective on this had changed but found no evidence for that. The above-mentioned perspective was the only time that the topic was discussed in 2021, which differs from the speech delivered after the outbreak of the war in 2022, where the topic of veto was discussed substantially. The speech made after the outbreak of the war highlighted that there is a need to exercise the veto authority responsibly and that a permanent member should defend its usage of the veto in front of the GA. Thomas-Greenfield then expressed that the US "will refrain from use of the veto except in rare, extraordinary situations" and expressed furthermore that "any permanent member that exercises the veto to defend its own acts of aggression against another United Nations Member State must be held accountable" (2022f: 8). In addition, after the outbreak of the war Thomas-Greenfield showed support for the veto initiative that was as well co-sponsored by the U.S. Therefore no change in the perspectives regarding the use of the veto was observed, but change in the discourse surrounding the veto was observed after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In 2022, after the start of the war, the topic of Russia's aggression towards Ukraine was introduced by Thomas-Greenfield through the discussion of veto use. Through this, the

overwhelming condemnation of Russia's action by the GA was pointed out and the speech delved deeper into reaffirming Ukraine's sovereignty and the support of the GA towards it. Therefore the mention of Ukraine was observed after the outbreak of the war, displaying a change in that category as well.

In general, change after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine was observed in overall discourses and perspectives throughout all the five thematic categories. The U.S. discourse changed to a new understanding of the importance of the reform as well as it changed to a better acknowledgement of the challenge of reform surrounding the reform process. U.S.'s modest support of specific stances changed to a more confident support as well as brand new specific stances were introduced. The U.S. also went from not mentioning the veto use to discussing thoroughly the need for responsible use of veto. In addition, Ukraine was mentioned in the post-invasion speech. Concluding that change in discourse and perspectives occurred after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

3.3 General overview of the findings: Influence of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the level of assigned urgency, discourse and perspectives of the P5

In order to reach the final conclusion and to answer the main research question that was posed, the two sub-questions will be answered first through an overall analysis of the findings. The conclusions will be drawn by zooming in from the view on the P5 as a whole since the case selection focuses on the P5 and not the individual countries themselves. Individual country findings are therefore used as additions to reach a general conclusion about the P5.

The first sub-question sought to find out how has the level of assigned urgency shown by the P5 towards the reform topic changed since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Before the outbreak of the war, only Russia showed urgency towards the SC reform in its General Debate statements by mentioning the SC reform. However, after the outbreak of the war, France, Russia and the U.S. showed urgency towards the SC reform. Surprisingly, none of the mentioned countries, when mentioning the reform, did it superficially by just mentioning the reform, which is why none of the statements were coded under the third category of “mention of SC reform”. Contrary to that, when mentioning the reform they all delved deeper

into their specific national stances on the reform. Yet based on the posed research question, the focus is on the change brought out by the full-scale invasion. This way it can be distinguished that change and more specifically an increase of the level of urgency shown to the reform can only be observed in the cases of France and the U.S. In the cases of China, Russia and the UK no change in the assigned urgency was observed. Therefore three out of the five countries, which is the majority, did not portray any change. Based on these findings, we could conclude that the war has increased the level of assigned urgency shown to the topic by two of the P5 countries. However, the basis of the methodological choices pointed out earlier in the methodology chapter indicates the need for a majority perspective to observe change. Therefore taking this into account, a conclusion is made that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not change the level of assigned urgency shown by the P5 towards the reform topic.

Therefore, even though an increase in levels of urgency was observed, it was not enough to make this observation for the P5 as a whole. As we established in the theoretical part, critical junctures need powerful actors, in our case the P5 for the sake of coalition building to break path dependency. Therefore if there aren't enough P5 countries who deem this topic to be important enough to include it in their speeches then it shows that coalition building by the powerful actors will not be possible. Since the levels of assigned urgency shown by the P5 as a whole to the topic did not increase after the full-scale invasion of the war, in the light of historical institutionalism this suggests that the outbreak of the war did not function as a critical juncture. This means that the outbreak of the war will not enable overcoming inertia and opening a window of opportunity for institutional change, in our case the UNSC reform.

The second sub-question sought to find out how the P5's perspectives and discourse on the topic of reform changed since the start of the full-scale invasion. Based on the thematic categories derived inductively from the data during the coding process and the methodological choices that indicate the necessity of a majority perspective to observe change, conclusions can be made to answer the question.

When addressing the issue of importance and need for reform, we can observe that the discourse of all the P5 countries changed to bringing out new reasons to emphasise the importance or need of the reform. When discussing the specific stances on reform no change overall was observed in the discourse or perspectives of the P5 with the exception of the US, which had a change in discourse and an additional perspective was presented. In the category

of reform process change can be seen in the discourse of all the P5, with the exception of China. The way the discourse changed in this category varied by country. When looking at the category of Ukraine, change and more specifically an increase of mentions can be observed since the majority of the P5 which was France, the UK and the U.S brought attention to the situation unfolding in the location of the full-scale invasion. In the case of the veto category, change in the discourse of the P5 can be observed because the majority of the P5 which was France, the UK and the U.S changed their discourse on this topic by emphasising the need for responsible use of the veto in the light of the war or by mentioning the veto initiative. Overall, change can be observed in all the categories, except for the specific stances. Therefore, in conclusion, the perspectives and discourse of the P5 on the topic of reform have changed since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Based on these findings we can answer the main research question which seeks to find out what impact did the full-scale invasion of Ukraine have on the perspectives and discourses of the P5 countries towards the UNSC reform. Overall it can be said that the outbreak of the war had a limited impact. While changes in discourse and perspectives in all of the thematic categories were indeed observed after the full-scale invasion, these changes did not reach a majority consensus. This and the analysis of speeches show that there is some hesitance or reluctance among the P5 but in the light of historical institutionalism as a perspective, there is a need for coalition building among the powerful actors to overcome inertia and trigger institutional change. Furthermore, the answer to the first sub-question concluded that the outbreak of the war did not change the level of assigned urgency shown by the P5, which adds to the limitedness of the impact. Therefore, the impact of the outbreak of the war was not meaningful enough to create a consensus in the P5 and trigger reform.

CONCLUSION

This bachelor thesis aimed to find out what impact the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had on the perspectives and discourses of the P5 towards the UNSC reform, which is why the same research question was posed. To answer this question two sub-questions were posed of how has the level of assigned urgency to the topic changed since the start of the war (1) and how have their perspectives and discourse on the topic of reform changed since the start of the war (2).

The work was based on a theoretical framework that argued through institutional theory that major wars can trigger critical junctures, which are turn-points that help overcome the inertia and that enable institutional change. The role of powerful actors, called “actors of change” in critical change was presented as well.

The first qualitative content analysis sought to answer the first sub-question by using the General Debate statements made by the P5 countries at the General Assembly's high-level week. The findings show that the outbreak of the war had increased the level of assigned urgency shown to the topic of two of the P5 countries. Namely France and the U.S.. However, since the majority of the countries did not portray any change in the level of assigned urgency, the overall conclusion was made that as a whole, the P5's level of assigned urgency towards reform did not change after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the view of historical institutionalism, this indicates that the war did not act as a critical juncture that is capable of overcoming inertia.

The second carried out qualitative content analysis explored the changes in the P5's perspectives and discourse on the reform after the outbreak of the war, using relevant speeches made by the P5 countries at the General Assembly's annual item, which focuses on matters related to the SC. Across the five thematic categories that were retrieved from the data through the coding process, a change in the discourse and perspectives can be observed throughout all of the categories. The most change was seen in the discourse of importance and need for reform category, in which the discourse changed for all the P5 countries and the smallest level of change, which concerned only the U.S. and not the P5 as a whole, was observed in the specific stance category. Notable changes, on the level of the P5 as a whole, were also observed in the categories of reform process, mentions of Ukraine and discussions

around the veto power. Therefore, the perspectives and discourse of the P5 on the topic of reform did change after the outbreak of the war.

Although the outbreak of the war had some impact and changed discourse and perspectives, the change did not amount to a sufficient level and did not reach a consensus highlighting the limited impact of the outbreak of the war. In the light of historical institutionalism, the need for coalition building between the powerful actors is essential to overcome inertia and trigger institutional change. Furthermore, the lack of significant change in the levels of assigned urgency shown by the P5 reinforces the idea that the impact of the outbreak of the war was limited, hindering the potential for comprehensive reform.

With these findings, the research has successfully brought to light the complexity and the limited prospects for UNSC reform. It has contributed to the understanding of how, although being a major geopolitical event, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has had an insufficient impact on the level of urgency, discourse and perspectives of the P5 in regard to the SC reform. Highlighting this way the challenges in achieving the SC reform. In addition, the research showed that critical junctures alone cannot guarantee institutional change if the powerful actors are unwilling to truly commit themselves to the reform. Future research could delve deeper into this topic, by choosing a longer timeframe for analysis or using a wider set of documents as data, which could prove to be difficult because most discussions are held at the informal intergovernmental negotiations that do not make their records public.

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Coding tree

1. Importance and need for reform
 - 1.1. Problems of the current SC
2. Specific stances on reform
 - 2.1. Expansion of membership categories
 - 2.2. Question of the veto
 - 2.3. Support for specific countries / regions / solutions
 - 2.4. Size of the Council
3. The reform process
 - 3.1. Intergovernmental Negotiations
 - 3.1.1. Importance of negotiations
 - 3.1.2. Expectations for the negotiation process
 - 3.2. Problems within the process
 - 3.3. Expectations
 - 3.4. Timeline and deadlines
 - 3.5. Text-based negotiations
4. Mention of Ukraine
5. Veto
 - 5.1. Various initiatives connected to the veto
 - 5.2. Veto usage
6. Length of the speech

Coding table: China 2021- 2022

Coding category	2022	2021
Importance and need for reform	<p>1. Emergence of various global crises and challenges, momentous changes unseen in a century, firmly supports SC reform, urgently needed, need for real multilateralism, preserve achievements of victory in anti-fascist war,</p> <p>1.1 Decision making constrained due to Cold War mentality, bloc politics and double standards, challenges of SC as a microcosm of systemic flaws in global governance, lack of representation, injustice to africa, overrepresentation of developed countries, Africa's underrepresentation</p>	<p>1. Need a strong UN to respond effectively, genuine multilateralism, efforts to promote democratisation in IR, need for reform to improve efficiency, significance due to peace and collective security</p> <p>1.1 North-South imbalance, historical injustice to Africa, overrepresentation of developed countries</p>
Specific stances on reform		<p>2.3 improve representation of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Arab region, small island States</p>
The reform process	<p>3.1.1 Only legitimate platform to achieve reform,</p> <p>3.1.2 Move the process forward, use informal plenary meetings, listen extensively to views of all parties, take past practise into account, make reasonable plans, strengthen dialogue and consultations, build mutual trust</p> <p>3.2 Not effective to pressure of co-chairs to advance one's own agenda, fundamental differences in regards of overall direction,</p> <p>3.3 Earnestly fulfil its responsibilities, cannot be addressed in isolation of int. politics, must be placed in general reform of global governance, should proceed in a realistic and fair manner, give more small and medium sized states the opportunity, should not be a club of the big and rich, all countries should have access to SC, give priority to the concerns of underrepresented regions, advanced with global governance reform, not cater to the needs of selfish interest of individual countries, reach broadest political consensus, need to expand consensus through in-depth discussions</p> <p>3.4 Setting official time frames for reform will intensify disagreement</p> <p>3.5 Rushing to launch text-based negotiations will intensify disagreement</p>	<p>3.1.1 Only legitimate platform to achieve reform,</p> <p>3.1.2 Need to learn from past rounds, broaden consensus, accumulate views and opinions, number of meetings should help with in-depth exchanges</p> <p>3.2 Attempts to force through reform plans leads to confrontations and makes it difficult to build on the momentum, opposes pursuit of one-sided self interests, lack of consensus on the overall direction, requests to make official record and broadcasts limit the space for flexibility,</p> <p>3.3 Efficient, representative and democratic, ensure that process moves in right direction, ensure that all countries benefit (big/ small/ rich/ poor), increase representation of developing countries, must enhance unity, efforts to engage in respectful dialogue, effort to seek consensus through dialogue, must achieve consensus-based solutions, it needs to be a member state driven process,</p> <p>3.5 Opposes launching text-based negotiations (leads to confrontation)</p>
Mention of Ukraine		

Veto		
Length of the speech	1343 words	1237 words

Coding table: France 2021-2022

Coding category	2022	2021
Importance and need for reform	1. Reform need to finally take place, need to breath new life into it, reform is essential to strengthen the UNSC etc	1. Fully committed
Specific stances on reform	2.1 Expanding it to include new permanent members 2.2 Up to the states requesting the perm seats to decide. 2.3 Supports candidatures of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan as permanent members, wants a stronger presence of African countries, including in the perm membership, remaining seats should have a balanced geographical representation. 2.4 Up to 25 members.	2.1 In favour of enlargement of both categories 2.2 Up to the states requesting the perm seats to decide. 2.3 Supports candidacies Brazil, Germany, India and Japan for permanent membership, wants to see a stronger presence of african countries in both categories 2.4 Up to 25 members.
The reform process	3.1.2 new round must lead to concrete and substantial results, aim is to arrive to a single document 3.2 Repetition of standard speeches, task is difficult, 3.3 Need to set up a framework, take into account new powers that have the will and capacity, strengthen legitimacy and fully assume its responsibilities, in favour of greater transparency, multilingualism 3.5 Believes that negotiations should start based on a draft text	3.1.2 Need for tangible results from negotiations, need to start real negotiations, need to establish a framework, support of greater transparency in debates, need to avoid endlessly repeating agreed-upon rhetoric, the goal is to come up with a single document, 3.2 Loss of confidence from other member states because the process goes round in circles, positions are already known 3.5 Believes that negotiations should start on the basis of a draft text
Mention of Ukraine	4. Exceptionally serious violation of the Charter, need to consolidate the collective security system	
Veto	1.1 Want to regulate the veto in event of mass atrocities, called for suspension of the veto in event of mass atrocities, calls for member states to join the initiative 1.2 Great interest the commitment of US to restrict its use of veto,	1. 1 Call for suspension of the veto in case of mass atrocities
Length of the speech	801 words	642 words

Coding table: Russia 2021 - 2022

Coding category	2022	2021
Importance and need for reform	1. One of the most important issues, most thorniest, reform long overdue, swift changes are afoot in the system of IR, new multipolar world order is forging a new path	1. Most important/ challenging issue, reform long overdue
Specific stances on reform	2.1 accepts also the model of expansion of elected members category 2.2 do not support ideas that would curtail the prerogatives of P5, including the veto, it is a key factor for balanced solutions and not those that have been imposed on them 2.3 Improve representation of developing states in Africa, Asia and Latin America, rewrite a historical wrong made to Africa, support of India and Brazil for permanent seats (in case of the expansion of both categories) 2.4 support of compact council, should not exceed low twenties	2.2 infringement of the prerogatives of the P5 (veto) is unacceptable, it is important for balanced solutions 2.3 Improve representation of developing states in Africa, Asia and Latin America, rectify the historical injustice done to Africa, prepared to consider interim solution 2.4 support of compact council, low twenties
The reform process	3.1.1 desire of overwhelming majority to find an optimal model, commitment to the legitimate process, straying from the process could lead to the collapse of negotiations 3.1.2 shouldn't create new divisions or worsen existing ones, should be platform for constructive and balanced discussions 3.2 Lack of universal solution, approaches of the main actors remain vastly divergent, approaches sometimes diametrically opposed, 3.4 No alternative than to proceed patiently, step by step 3.5 cannot make progress by imposing documents or other initiatives that have not been agreed upon all	3.1.1 desire of overwhelming majority to find an optimal model, legitimacy of the platform is unique, deviation from it could lead to the collapse of negotiations 3.1.2 Co-chairs need to understand that the final word remains with the member states, should be conducted calmly, no pressuring of members or imposing approaches that don't suit some, shouldn't create new divisions or worsen existing ones 3.2 Lack of universal solution, approaches of the main actors differ substantially, approaches sometimes diametrically opposed, cannot be solved through arithmetics, 3.3 process belong to all member states, hope that the new round will make possible to take full account of the views 3.4 No alternative than to continue patient work, negotiations should not have arbitrary timelines, there can not be place for artificial timelines 3.5 cannot make progress by imposing documents or other initiatives that have not been agreed upon all
Mention of Ukraine		

Veto		
Length of the speech	685 words	858 words

Coding table: The United Kingdom 2021 - 2022

Coding category	2022	2021
Importance and need for reform	1. Momentum is building, threats to the charter, world is not the same, challenges more complex and interconnected, need for renewed commitment to the charter	1. Reaffirms commitment to reform, 1.1 Last expansion in 1965, council must change to reflect the world of the 21st century,
Specific stances on reform	2. 1 Expansion in both categories 2.3 Permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, permanent African representation on the council. 2.4 Mid twenties	2. 1 Modest expansion in both categories 2.2 disagreement in the topic should not prevent progress in other areas 2.3 Permanent seats for India, Germany, Japan and Brazil, permanent African representation on the council. 2.4 Mid twenties
The reform process	3.1.2 Upcoming negotiations opportunity for practical and focused discussion 3.6 Text-based negotiations would help	3. Frustration around the lack of progress 3.1.1 fully committed to the negotiations 3.1.2 Formalizing and recording negotiations 3.3 respond nimbly and decisively 3.4 Outcomes within a fixed time-rate, moving the process at an accelerated rate 3.6 Call for the initiation of text-based negotiations,
Mention of Ukraine	4. Veto used egregiously to prevent action that would have saved lives, Russia's war in Ukraine is unjust and illegal	
Veto	5.1 Proud to co-sponsor the veto initiative 5.2 Has not exercised its right of veto since 1989	5.1 Encourages states to join them to support the code of conduct 5.2 Has not exercised its right of veto since 1989
Length of the speech	411 words	505 words

Coding table: The United States of America 2021 - 2022

Coding category	2022	2021
Importance and need for reform	1. Defend status quo or reform, must move forward,	1. Need to modernise the council to reflect 21. century realities.
Specific stances on reform	2.1 Support expansion of both categories 2.3 New perm. seats for countries from africa and Latin America	2.1 - Open to expansion of both categories (in principal) 2. 2 - no alterations or expansion of veto
The reform process	3.1 Work through intergov negotiations 3.2 Reform process is not easy.	3. 1 - Importance of the intergov-negotiations platform, need for wide agreement 3.3 - Need to consider carefully potential permanent members
Mention of Ukraine	4. usage of veto to defend actions against another member state must be held accountable, condemnation of Russia's aggression, reaffirm Ukraine's independence, must withdraw its forces	
Veto	5.1 Support and co-sponsor of veto initiative 5.2 exercise veto authority responsibly, will refrain from use of veto except in rare cases, believes that usage of veto should be defended at the GA	
Length of the speech	486 words	205 words

Lihtlitsents lõputöö reprodutseerimiseks ja lõputöö üldsusele kättesaadavaks tegemiseks

Mina, Linda Luts, (isikukood: 60109280241) annan Tartu Ülikoolile tasuta loa (lihtlitsentsi) enda loodud teose “*The Impact of the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine on Attitudes Towards the United Nations Security Council Reform: The Case of the Permanent Five*” (Ukraina täiemahulise sissetungi mõju suhtumisele ÜRO Julgeolekunõukogu reformi: alalise viisiku juhtum), mille juhendaja on Thomas Michael Linsenmaier,

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Linda Luts

Tartu, 14.01.2024