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**SHIFTING FORTUNES: ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT REFORM PARTIES, THE CATCH-
ALL STRATEGY AND THE TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE IN UKRAINE**

MA thesis

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Author's declaration

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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SHIFTING FORTUNES: ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT REFORM PARTIES, THE CATCH-ALL STRATEGY AND THE TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGE IN UKRAINE

Oleksandr Kuchynskyi

Abstract

This project is intended to examine the how can the impact of an electoral cleavage can be reduced in the absence of changes in its socio-structural element as well as in other factors related to electoral competition using the example of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. The thesis aims to examine the relationship between the use of a catch-all electoral strategy by anti-establishment reform parties and the importance of territorial cleavage in Ukraine during the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014 and 2019. The most influential parties and presidential candidates heavily relied on the territorial cleavage, which led to the fact that no party or presidential candidate could win the elections in all the regions of Ukraine between 1991 and 2014. In 2019, Servant of People party managed to win the elections in almost the whole country despite opposite orientations of inhabitants of different regions regarding cleavage-related issues. At the same time, in 2014, when the cleavage itself profoundly transformed due to the fact of Russian military aggression, no party could win the elections countrywide which suggests that the explanatory variable is the change of electoral strategy.

It is an MSSD comparative study between the parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019, in which the following factors are held constant: the territory controlled by Ukraine, social conditions for the cleavage, electoral system, temporal distance between the parliamentary and presidential elections, level of distrust to political parties. To test the hypothesis, content analysis of party manifestos and TV ads of parties that got into parliament of Ukraine in 2014 and 2019 was carried out.

The results only partly support the hypothesis proposed since only one out of three AERPs managed to win the elections by using the catch-all strategy. The study also reveals the importance of the participation in the presidential elections preceding the parliamentary one and the evenness of political resources between different regions of Ukraine to win the elections for AERPs. According to the expectations, mainstream parties using a catch-all strategy did not manage to win the elections.

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INTRODUCTION

This study deals with the causes of the decline of the impact of territorial cleavage in Ukraine which happened between 2014 and 2019 despite many factors uniting these elections. In other words, it focuses on testing one of the factors that could have caused this decline, so that this project sheds light on how the importance of the cleavage can be reduced while the socio-structural element thereof has been largely unchanging. Territorial cleavage has been an integral part of the political process in Ukraine both during presidential and parliamentary elections. After 1991, leading political parties and most influential candidates during the presidential campaigns utilized this cleavage to mobilize the electorate in either West or South-East of Ukraine. As a result, the distribution of parties' support was highly uneven among different regions, which resulted in the fact that no party or candidate could win the elections in the whole country. Territorial cleavage consists of language (Ukrainian versus Russian), religion (Orthodox church of Kyiv versus Moscow patriarchy), geopolitical (Euro-Atlantic integration versus integration with Russia) and Communist vs anti-Communist components which has a territorial manifestation in the division between Western and South-Eastern Ukraine.

In 2014, after the victory of Euromaidan and subsequent Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas, a fundamental transformation of the cleavage happened which comprised of several elements: the decline of the relevance of Russian geopolitical alternative, the disappearance of the Communist vs anti-Communist cleavage and the addition of the war component of the cleavage. Between 2014 and 2019, this transformation continued with an increase of salience of the religion component and the decrease of importance of the war component. The three changes that happened in 2014 had a common cause which is the decline of the popularity of the pro-Russian side of the cleavage due to Russian military intervention and because Russia occupied the most pro-Russian territories (Crimea and part of Donbas). As a result, pro-European parties constituted a clear majority in the parliament with one pro-Russian party having only 9,43% of the votes. Nevertheless, no pro-European party managed to win the elections in all the regions or, at least, in their majority.

Unlike in 2014, the elections of 2019 were won by one party (Servant of People) almost in all the regions. The very fact of this unprecedented victory indicates that the impact of the cleavage on

the result of elections declined. The outlier regions, the regions where Servant of People did not win were in the West and the East of Ukraine, which are the regions which have the most radical position regarding cleavage-related issues. Such support distribution allows hypothesizing that Servant of People did not appeal to the cleavage, but used an alternative strategy. A catch-all strategy is almost the opposite to the cleavage strategy since it focuses on not alienating any social groups by being located in the centre of the left-right scale whereas the cleavage strategy is based on protecting interests one side of the cleavage at the expense of the other. Therefore, the catch-all strategy might have been a helpful tool for Servant of People to maximize votes all across the country. The alternative explanation of such a result is the interrelation between the TV series 'Servant of People' in which Volodymyr Zelenskyi played the President of Ukraine and the real electoral politics. In other words, a large part of the electorate might have conflated the character Zelenskyi played in the series and the actual politician Volodymyr Zelenskyi which then led to the victory of Zelenskyi and his party in the whole territory of Ukraine during both presidential and parliamentary elections. Therefore, this irrational instance of political behaviour might have played an even more significant role in the victory of Servant of People in the whole territory of Ukraine than this party being an AERP and predominantly using a catch-all strategy. However, testing of this hypothesis requires finding out whether the electorate of Volodymyr Zelenskyi conflated the TV series with the actual political career of Volodymyr Zelenskyi and to what extent did the series impact the voting decisions of his electorate both during the presidential and parliamentary elections. To do this, surveys and focus groups with sampled representatives of this electorate should be carried out, which is hardly possible for the scale of this project.

Subsequently, this study aims to *test whether the use of a catch-all strategy can explain the decline of the impact of the cleavage on the electoral result and whether Servant of People used this strategy more frequently than other parties during those two elections*. At the same time, the use of a catch-all strategy is not expected to be sufficient to win the elections because of the factor of a high distrust to mainstream political parties in Ukraine. Both elections were marked with a willingness of the majority of Ukrainians to support new political parties due to a low level of trust to the mainstream ones. In other words, this factor makes the chances of new parties to cause the decline of the cleavage much higher than those of mainstream parties. For this reason, an antecedent variable of an anti-establishment reform party further - AERP), which is a particular type of a new party, is included to test whether new parties had a bigger effect on the decline of

the cleavage than mainstream parties. Finally, this study has a conditional variable which is the decline of the importance of the war component between 2014 and 2019 which might have decreased the utility of the use of the cleavage strategy and, therefore, increased the utility of the use of the catch-all one. Accordingly, the hypothesis is the following: *the predominant use of catch-all electoral strategy by AERPs led to the decline of the effect of the territorial electoral cleavage on the parliamentary elections' results in Ukraine between 2014 and 2019.*

Between 2014 and 2019, there are several factors held constant for the two elections: the territory controlled by Ukraine, social conditions for the cleavage, electoral system, temporal distance between the parliamentary and presidential elections, level of distrust to political parties and willingness to support new parties. These factors held constant allow comparing these two elections in the framework of most similar systems design (MSSD) since the only difference is the electoral outcome.

In the wider context, the relationship between electoral strategies and the impact of cleavages on the result of elections deserves to be studied because it can shed light on under what circumstances can the use of the catch-all strategy lead to the decline of an electoral cleavage. Despite the high peculiarity of the case, which limits the possibility of generalizations, the findings can be useful for future studies on this topic in the context of Central and Eastern Europe (further - CEE).

To test the hypothesis mentioned above, I employ content analysis of party manifestos and TV ads used during the electoral campaigns of 2014 and 2019 by the parties that passed the 5% electoral threshold and got into parliament. The type of content analysis used combines the elements of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to content analysis but is more leaning to the quantitative one since the coding scheme is a concept-driven, and strict sequence of steps is followed. For the content analysis of manifestos, coding categories and subcategories that capture both cleavage and catch-all strategies were developed. It is also worth mentioning that content analysis of manifestos was conducted via MAXQDA software. As for the content analysis of TV ads, due to a short length of these materials (15-30 seconds on average), ads were categorized into three categories: cleavage, catch-all and mixed. For both data types, the sampling strategy is a census. Concerning the sources of data, electoral manifestos were obtained either from the websites of parties or from

the website of Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine whereas TV ads were obtained from the TV ads database Adlog.

In terms of the general logic of structuring the thesis, the study is divided into two main parts: conceptually-methodological and case-related which allows discussing main concepts of the study as well as methodological framework first before digging into details regarding the particular case of Ukraine. Respectively, both literature review about the territorial cleavage and the empirical analysis part belong to the second part of the thesis. According to this logic, the thesis is divided into four chapters.

In the first chapter, I introduce the main concepts of the study: electoral cleavages, electoral strategies and AERP. Namely, I discuss the classic definition of cleavages by Lipset and Rokkan(1967), further conceptual elaborations and peculiarities of cleavages in Post-Communist regimes in CEE as opposed to Western Europe. Then, catch-all and cleavage strategies are distinguished. Lastly, this chapter discusses the concept of AERP.

In the second chapter, the methodological framework of the study is explained. Firstly, the research design, problem and hypothesis are discussed in detail. Then, the approach to content analysis used for the empirical analysis is presented. Lastly, the coding rules and, scheme data types and sources are introduced.

The third chapter discusses the development and components of the territorial cleavage in Ukraine. At first, the electoral manifestations of the cleavage between 1991 and 2014 are discussed. Then, different approaches to the conceptualization of this cleavage are reviewed. After that, this section explains the transformation of territorial electoral cleavage in and after 2014.

The fourth chapter presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. First, the general overview of the two elections is provided. Then the section proceeds to the discussion of whether the empirical data support the hypothesis of this study. After that, some of the additional findings are presented.

1.CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

In this chapter, I discuss the concepts of electoral cleavages, electoral strategies and AERPs which are the key concepts in this study since they all are variables in the study hypothesis which requires a thorough discussion of those. The concept of electoral cleavages is examined in its evolution from Lipset and Rokkan to the transformation of cleavage structures in Western Europe and in CEE. Under the section of electoral strategies, fundamental differences between a catch-all and cleavage strategy, their different goals, outcomes of use and combinations of two are discussed. As for the concept of AERP, it is examined what should be the features of a new party to be electorally successful in CEE and what types of new parties already exist in the literature. Besides, this chapter is divided into the conceptualization and operationalization parts. First, different approaches to conceptualizations of all three concepts are discussed. Then I introduce operationalizations that are used for empirical analysis.

1.1 Conceptualizations

1.1.1 Electoral Cleavages

In this subsection, the evolution of the concept of electoral cleavages is discussed from its very introduction by Lipset and Rokkan to contemporary approaches. The difference between full cleavages and mere divides is also examined. Besides, attention is paid to the differences in cleavage structure between Western Europe and CEE. As a result, the most relevant theoretical basis for the study of the cleavage structure in Ukraine is chosen.


Electoral competition has always been influenced by social divisions that impact the electoral choices of certain segments of the population. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) conceptualized those divisions as social cleavages which are deep structural divisions or conflicts that shape the structure of political competition in a country. According to Lipset and Rokkan, there are four major social cleavages: capital-workforce, city-village, state-church and centre-periphery. According to them, these cleavages emerged as a result of two processes: nation/state-building and the industrial revolution. Namely, centre-periphery conflict refers to the centralization efforts by the emerging nation-states whereas state-church conflict refers to their secularizing efforts which are both related to state-building. Capital-workforce and urban-rural cleavage emerged as a result

of the industrial revolution. After the initial development of the concept by Lipset and Rokkan, the list of cleavages was broadened to ethnic and linguistic ones (Andeweg, 2000).

In addition to the discussion about what cleavages there are, there is also a discussion about what does constitute a cleavage. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), cleavages consist of three elements: social-structural, normative, organizational/behavioural. The first element constitutes the social divisions that allow for the emergence of cleavage in the first place. Normative element is related to values and beliefs that form a collective identity within social groups. Organizational element informs the electoral behaviour of an individual by linking one to a political party representing values and beliefs of that voter. According to Bartolini and Mair, only cleavages having all three components are the full cleavages, whereas those having only one or two of those are merely social divides. Saarts (2015) proposed to add to this list the discursive element, which means the constant media presence of the cleavage in the context of electoral campaigns. However, the discursive element is outside of the focus of this study since it does not directly constitute parties' electoral strategies (even though they might impact the media presence of the cleavage). Besides, media content does not constitute empirical data in our analysis which makes it impossible to test the presence of the discursive element in this study.

Following the elaborations by Bartolini and Mair, the conceptualizations for those cleavages which have only two out of three elements were proposed. Namely, the structural divide is a combination of social-structural and normative elements, the one that has a distinct social group that has a sense of collective identity and particular stances towards certain policy issues but lacks political actors that represent those interests (Deegan-Krause, 2007). Issue divide is the one having both normative and organizational elements, but not having a basis in the social structure which makes this type of divides less durable. Finally, caste divide is the one in which normative element is missing which means that a sense of collective identity is not yet existing, but political parties nevertheless manage to relate group belonging to a party platform.

Figure 1. Elements of a cleavage and types of social divides not qualifying as full cleavages. Based on the typologies by Bartolini and Mair (1990), and Deegan-Krause (2007).



After the emergence of cleavage theory and types of cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan, the structure and processes of electoral competition changed both in Western and Eastern Europe which led to the inability of cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan to explain electoral competition fully. The changes in the party competition happened because of ongoing secularization, the decline of the share of industry in the economy and globalization (Berglund and Ekman, 2010). Because of the first two processes, the state-church and capital-workforce cleavages lost a part of its socio-structural element. Accordingly, to comprehend the changes in political competition, new cleavages were offered. Namely, integration vs demarcation cleavage was proposed by Kriesi et al. (2012) to explain the effects of globalization. According to this

cleavage, society is divided into winners and losers of globalization. Respectively, winners would want further globalization efforts from the governments, unlike the losers who would like a country to be less globalized to minimize the negative effects of global competition. It might be the case that this cleavage is much less applicable to those European countries which are not members of the EU, such as Ukraine, and are much less globalized in terms of economy, international mobility and culture (Overall globalization by country, 2017).

As for CEE, the list of cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan does not completely explain the electoral competition either. Moreover, it can be argued that the framework by Lipset and Rokkan is even less relevant for CEE and, thus, is markedly different from Western Europe. As for the reasons for this difference, the legacy of the Communist system altered the manifestations of capital-workforce and urban-rural cleavages due to smaller social differentiation during the Communist regimes whereas ethnic and religious cleavages remained firmly present (Saarts, 2015). Besides, Saarts argues that two revolutions pointed out by Lipset and Rokkan need to be expanded with the third revolution which happened after the fall of Post-Communist regimes. That third revolution emerged along with the multiple transition challenges: democratization, economic transformation, nation and state-building, the challenges that Western European countries had already overcome.

In comparison to Western Europe, as Saarts (2015) argues, CEE has been dominated by the ethnic and value-based cleavages, not by those related to income inequalities. However, there is no consensus among scholars regarding which type of cleavages prevails in CEE. For instance, Berglund and Ekman (2010) argue that the most important cleavages in CEE are the following: populism versus ideology, nations versus Europe, market versus state and communism versus anti-communism. The complication is that the latter two can be regarded as related both to values and income inequalities. Also, ethnic cleavages pointed out by Saarts are not present in the list by Berglund and Ekman. At the same time, as Berglund and Ekman (2010) argue, national vs cosmopolitan cleavages (reminiscent of integration vs demarcation cleavage by Kriesi et al. (2013)) and welfare state vs market economy are the cleavages that are important both for Western Europe and CEE. Besides, Kitschelt (1999) proposed a set of divides that characterize party competition in CEE without discussing their relative importance: political regime (regime change versus communist order), economic-distributive (social protectionism versus market reforms),

socio-cultural (libertarian versus authoritarian ideas), national-cosmopolitan divide and ethnic divides. At the same time, many country-specific peculiarities are present which activate or deactivate particular cleavages in the party system. For instance, Whitefield (2002) argues that there are the following factors that can explain the variation in the cleavage structure of CEE countries: pre-communist cultural legacies, varieties of Post-Communist rule and democratic transition, institutional and elite factors as well as social experiences and identities.

Besides, in comparison to the Western European cleavages, the cleavages in CEE are less stable, more multi-faceted and complex. As pointed out by Deegan-Krause (2007), the fusion of several cleavages frequently happens within the political systems of CEE. For instance, one common merger of different cleavages in CEE is that anti-communist voters tend to be more leaning towards right-wing ideologies, including such components as nationalist and pro-church attitudes (Saarts, 2015). On the other hand, a more neutral stance regarding the communist past is associated with more left-wing, anti-clerical, and less nationalist positions. As it is visible from this example, cleavage merger is the opposite to cross-cutting cleavages since in the former case it is fairly easy to guess the stance of a person regarding the cleavage as a whole or particular component thereof by knowing a person's position towards one cleavage component. On the contrary, cross-cutting cleavage structure implies that being on one side on one cleavage does not pre-determine the side of a person on other cleavages (Taylor and Rae, 1969). At the same time, as Berglund and Ekman(2010) argue that if there are many salient cleavages, but those are positively associated with each other, it does not increase the complexity to the cleavage structure since there is a strong association that being on one side in one cleavage components leads to being on the same side regarding other components.

In addition to arguing whether economy-related cleavages or identity-related ones have been prevalent in CEE, scholars also have been interested in the interrelation between the two. For instance, Kostecky proposed dividing a political space in CEE into four segments based on one's attitudes towards democracy and economic development: liberal democracy, social democracy, conservatism/Christian democracy and authoritarianism (Kostecky, 2004). Besides, Rovny (2015) found that there is a dubious interrelation between ethnic cleavage and an economic one. If an ethnic minority originates from a federal centre during the Soviet times (e.g. Russian minority in Estonia), then the minority would be more left-leaning than the majority. If the minority had

other backgrounds than the former federal centre, then it would be less left-leaning than the majority. Finally, Whitefield and Rohrschneider (2009) found that liberal economic positions have a positive association with anti-Communism, support for ethnic minorities, social liberalism and internationalism.

It is worth pointing out that the current research on cleavages in CEE is predominantly focused on the countries that are currently members of the EU. At the same time, not much attention has been paid to the non-EU post-communist countries such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. While many of the observations about EU members might still be relevant for the non-EU countries due to facing the same challenges of post-communist transformation, the geopolitical trajectories are markedly different which might have impacted the cleavage structure, as well. While there are some country-specific studies, this region of Post-Soviet non-EU countries has not been thoroughly studied on the regional level.

After briefly outlining the theoretical approaches to cleavages, it can be argued that the real electoral competition both in Western Europe and in CEE countries is not primarily informed by the cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan. In Western Europe as well as in CEE, the role of the integration vs demarcation cleavage has become important. In the context of this cleavage, it makes sense to divide the CEE into members and non-members of the EU since the latter countries tend to be less globalized which makes integration vs demarcation cleavage of lower relevance for them. The other difference between Western Europe and CEE is in the specific context of Post-Communist transition and its challenges such as democratization, economic transformation, nation and state-building. For CEE countries, the cleavages related to the challenges mentioned above turned out to be considerably more important than the classic cleavages by Lipset and Rokkan.

1.1.2 Electoral Strategies

Theories of elections try to explain how both political parties and voters behave during the electoral process and hint towards what should be the methods of vote maximization which is the primary goal of a political party participating in elections in the vast majority of cases. Subsequently, an electoral strategy constitutes a system of actions to realize this objective. While the electoral strategy may include a variety of domains including the selection of candidates, funding, alliances with other parties and civil society representatives, the primary focus of this study is in the electoral

communication of parties to understand with what messages do the parties attempt to achieve vote maximization.

This subsection discusses catch-all and cleavage electoral strategies. First, I introduce two theories of voting to which these strategies are related: spatial and directional one. After reviewing those theories, catch-all strategy, its connection and differences with the concept of catch-all parties are discussed. Then, cleavage strategy as the utilization of cleavage for electoral purposes is briefly examined. Finally, the dynamics of the use of both strategies and the possibilities for their combination are evaluated.

Spatial theory of elections holds that elections are based on issue voting so that a voter chooses the issues that are the most important for him/her, and then assesses what is the distance between a party position towards this issue to one's own position (Enelow and Hinich, 1989). In other words, a voter chooses a party with the smallest distance of a party position to the voter position on the most crucial issues to that voter.

On the contrary, the *directional theory of elections* states that measuring spatial distance is not of a massive relevance since preferences of voters are, at best, vaguely defined and, thus, voters tend to choose a political party being on the same side of the issue divide (Enelow and Hinich, 1989). For instance, a voter supporting state efforts in favour of Ukrainian language in principle would support a party standing for more extreme measures of Ukrainian language than a party supporting less radical steps or no steps at all. In other words, voters tend to support more pronounced or even extreme stances on the same side of the issue divide than favouring a more moderate position or being on the other side of the divide. In other words, parties tend to be more extreme than their voters are because more extreme stances allow parties to differentiate from other parties and attract more voters by connecting vague policy preferences of voters to a pronounced and properly framed stance of a party. On the other hand, parties might not want to take too extreme positions even on the same side as their voters since they might move beyond the border of voter acceptability.

Accordingly, spatial theory can be related to catch-all strategy, whereas cleavage strategy can be related to directional theory. Since the distance itself is the most crucial factor for the spatial theory, then a party would position itself where the most significant number of voters is, which is in the centre of the right-left scale (unless an electorate is highly polarized). On the contrary, following

the directional theory, since the side of a divide a voter is located is the most important factor, then a party would much rather position closer to the extremes since according to this theory, a more extreme position on the side a voter is located would most likely result in support of that voter. At the same time, the degree of extremeness is conditioned by the border of acceptability.

A **catch-all strategy** is a strategy used by political parties which is based on choosing policy preferences that do not alienate any social groups which implies being in the centre ideologically.

Catch-all strategy as a concept is derived from a specific type of a political party - a catch-all party which was first conceptualized by Kirchheimer (1966). As noted by Gunther and Diamond, 'this pluralistic and tolerant ideal type is primarily distinguished by the party's shallow organization, superficial and vague ideology, and overwhelmingly electoral orientation, as well as by the prominent leadership and electoral roles of the party's top-ranked national-level candidates' (2003, p.185). Besides, Gunther and Diamond (2003) discuss the logic of campaigning by catch-all parties by arguing that the goal of such a party is the maximum aggregation of social interests under its electoral platform. In this regard, appearing moderate in its policy preferences and positioning in the centre of the ideological spectrum is a useful instrument for interests' aggregation. Lastly, since the ideological foundation of catch-all parties is vague, this allows them to adapt their policy platform, as well as electoral positioning, from elections to elections.

The theorists of catch-all parties describe it as an ideal type that can never be fully observed in reality (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). For instance, a party organization may not be shallow, but the behaviour of a party during the electoral campaigns completely follows the definition of a catch-all party. Moreover, even a catch-all party cannot appeal to all voters at once, especially in the case of controversial issues at stake (Deiss-Helbig, 2014). For this reason, it is reasonable to make a distinction between the structural organization of a catch-all party and its electoral strategy which are currently connected under the concept of a catch-all party. This distinction is analytically useful since the tools and principles of a catch-all party communication are used not only by catch-all parties themselves. If to compare a catch-all party with another party type mentioned by Gunther and Diamond (2003) - programmatic party, the goal of both party types is to aggregate the maximum number of interests, with the only difference that a political platform of a programmatic party is more specific, more ideologically grounded which allows for smaller

fluctuations in the party platform. Thus, the catch-all strategy can be considered as a continuum in which the catch-all party represents the maximum extent of the use of catch-all strategy, whereas other types of parties can use it to a smaller degree.

As for the adaptation of the concept of a catch-all party to Post-Soviet context, Innes (2002) came up with the concept of instant catch-all parties which is a more extreme version of a catch-all party than mentioned above. Namely, Innes argues that the defining characteristic of instant catch-all parties is their 'appeal to all of the people, all of the time' (2002, p.90). As the instrument to appeal to all the people, the use of the most consensual appeals can be used (Innes, 2002). In other words, the gist of a catch-all strategy is in being in the centre as such, but rather in being able to frame the messages in a consensual way, the way that makes a message attractive to different categories of voters and is not alienating. This objective can be achieved, among other methods, by framing the appeals in a vague, blurry way, by presenting a positive picture of the future without enough specification what policy steps and instruments are necessary since precisely the instruments can be the factor that is alienating.

Cleavage strategy - a strategy based on the appeal to social groups and issues that constitute a part of a cleavage (Enyedi, 2008). Such an approach implies that a party deliberately excludes itself from the groups that conflict with groups or issues a party is supporting. While this is a notable shortcoming of this strategy because of a clear electoral ceiling since there is a notable segment of a population opposing this party, there is a stronger connection between the party and its voters because a party claims to be supporting precisely the interests of these voters at the expense of others. Following the same logic, Iversen (1994) associates the catch-all strategy with short-term vote maximization and cleavage strategy with long-term mobilization.

As for the dynamics of the use of the cleavage strategy, Enyedi (2007) observes that cleavages have lost a great extent of their importance, especially in Western European politics. The primary reason for this is the weakening of social closure which is a consequence of what Diani (2000) conceptualized as the intersection of social circles which leads to voters not having an identity exclusively attached to one social group, but having multiple group identities so that voting based on just one of those becomes less likely. The parallel development is that parties are losing their ties to civil society organizations such as church and labour unions (Hoogne and Marks, 2017)

which makes them less dependent on particular social groups. In other words, as Enyedi observes, ‘the fragmented and fluid social landscape does not any more allow for a politics based on the opposition of few inward-looking social groups’ (2007, p. 299) which would be an example of the use of the cleavage strategy to the maximum extent. However, when it comes to CEE, social background characteristics play a much greater role in voting behaviour than in Western Europe. At the same time, even though the socioeconomic developments mentioned are less favourable to cleavage politics, cleavages remain an important part of parties' electoral strategies. Even though after 1960-s, the catch-all strategy started dominating over the cleavage one, in the early 2000-s, as Enyedi (2007) argues, cleavage strategy might have got a better environment and circumstances for its use. For instance, a decrease of electoral turnout increases the importance of the core electorates of particular parties that are more likely to come to the polling stations so that parties would much rather target their appeals to them rather than to the population as a whole. The other opportunity for the resurgence of cleavage strategy is the opportunity to tailor messages to particular groups and isolate other groups from these messages. As argued by Enyedi (2007), this phenomenon becomes possible due to the increasing nicheness of media which meet the needs of a particular, clearly defined groups of the society, rather than society as a whole. In this way, by targeting cleavage appeals to niche media rather than mainstream media, political parties can avoid appearing agents of particular groups rather than society as a whole.

After briefly discussing the essential features of both strategies, it is worth assuming that the exclusive use of just one of the strategies at the expense of the other is rather an exception than a rule. Political parties can neither appeal to the whole population at a time, nor can they be solely the agents of a rigid and unchanging set of social groups, especially if a goal of a party is to win the elections and participate in the government formation. Consequently, in most cases, parties try to balance between those two strategies by tailoring part of the messages to social groups that constitute a part of cleavage and by disseminating catch-all messages on less controversial issues at the same time.

1.1.3 AERP

The concept of AERP is of vital importance in this study since only this type of a political party is able both to mitigate the impact of the territorial cleavage as was stated in the introduction. Since

mainstream parties have a high level of distrust in Ukraine, even using a catch-all strategy cannot ensure them leadership in all the regions to decrease the impact of the cleavage. Thereby, during both elections, Ukrainians were more willing to support new parties, and AERP is a type of a new party. Before discussing the concept of AERP in particular, general approaches to what constitutes a new party are examined. Then, the concept of AERP is discussed along with the reasons for the electoral success of AERPs in CEE and why this concept is the most relevant for this project.

For many scholars, the concept of new parties seemed to be an obvious one, so that many scholars proceeded directly to analyzing effects of new parties on party systems or reasons for their emergence without conceptualizing what a new party is, which is illustrated by the studies by Selb and Pituctin (2009), Tavits (2007) and Seyd (1999). However, the lack of conceptualization decreases the validity of studies related to the effects new parties cause. Among the attempts to examine different ways a new party can be conceptualized was a contribution by Harmel (1985). He argues that a new party can be a party adding new issues to the electoral competition, or a party emerging after a particular historical milestone such as World War II or the end of the Cold War. While trying to conceptualize the phenomenon of new parties, certain typologies of new parties emerged. Harmel (1985) points to the difference between parties based on the function they perform in electoral competition. Namely, a study of the Netherlands revealed that new parties could be divided into challengers and mobilizers. The results of a cross-national study suggested that new parties can be divided into contenders and promoters (Harmel and Robertson, 1985). Plausibly, challengers and contenders can be related to new parties that want to have a significant electoral result right away whereas mobilizers and promoters can be considered as those that mobilize the electorate for a long-term perspective.

Lucardie (2000) divided new parties into purifiers, prophets and prolocutors. The typology by Lucardie is based on whether a new party occupies the niche of other parties and whether the ideological motivation of a party is strong. If ideological motivation is strong, and a party occupies the niche of an already existing party, then this party is a purifier since it occupies the same ideological niche as the mainstream party, but tries to convince the voters that it is more ideologically coherent. If the ideological motivation is high, but the niche of other parties is not occupied, then the party belongs to a prophet type which tries to popularize an ideological stance not yet present in the party system. In contrast to them, prolocutors do not have a clear ideological

platform; they rather focus on a certain important social issue or rely on the support of a particular social group (Lucardie, 2000). This typology was advanced by Sikk (2012) who conceptualized the party having a weak ideological motivation and occupying the niche of another party as the project of newness meaning that the newness itself is the comparative advantage of such a party. Sikk states that the emphasis on newness as well as pronounced anti-corruption appeals, can deliver electoral success even at times of economic growth.

Hanley and Sikk (2016) proposed the concept of **anti-establishment reform party** (AERP), which is an elaboration on the project of newness concept. AERPs are those consisting of three components:

- mainstream reformism (sharing the ideas of liberal democracy and not being situated on the ideological extremes on any issue), striving to change the way politics is conducted.
- anti-establishment appeal to voters (emphasis on the division between the establishment parties and the larger society).
- genuine organizational newness which is applicable for parties which are ‘not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major members’(Hanley and Sikk, 2016, p. 523).

There is a certain overlap of the concept of AERP with the concept of mainstream populism. According to the definition of populism as a thin ideology, the fundamental element of populism is in its distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite which is fairly similar with the anti-establishment appeals made by AERPs. However, the disadvantage of populism is in its negative connotation (Hanley and Sikk, 2016). The other disadvantage of the concept of populism is that it is not explicitly focused on the component of newness, which is crucial for this study. Populist parties, on the other hand, can be both organizationally new and old.

In addition to proposing the concept of AERP itself, Hanley and Sikk (2016) also empirically tested it in the context of electoral success in CEE. In particular, they studied certain conditions under which AERPs can be successful. The level of corruption, unemployment, economic growth and stability of the party system are regarded as factors that can influence the chances of AERPs to have an electoral breakthrough. Among these, high subjective perception of the level of

corruption by the population appears to be the most important factor that can increase the chances of AERPs.

It should be kept in mind that while choosing the most relevant concept of a new party for this study, peculiarities of Ukraine and Ukrainian party system have to be taken into account. When it comes to the typology proposed by Lucardie, the ideological motivation of a party is rather irrelevant in the context of Ukraine because major political parties have always been trying to avoid referring to ideology academically defined (Rybiy, 2013). In other words, while referring to ideology, parties tend to focus on catch-all appeals such as protecting the interests of the whole population, improving the economy, referring to the concepts of democracy and patriotism, as well. In other words, as argued by Rybiy (2013), Ukrainian parties deliberately avoid being clearly labelled ideologically and, on the contrary, are leaning towards a vague notion of centrism. Part of the reason is the low level of ideological awareness and self-identification of Ukrainians themselves. Consequently, it can be argued that the ideological motivation of Ukrainian parties, including the new ones, is low. Therefore, purifiers and prophets become irrelevant as the types of new parties. As for prolocutors, they are not expected to be using catch-all strategy exclusively since they tend to be focused on a particular social issue or group which restricts the scope of use of a catch-all strategy. Consequently, while choosing the definition for the concept of new parties in the Ukrainian context, the concept should not be too focused on the party ideology since ideology does not constitute the main differentiating factor among the parties. As for the project of newness type, it is more relevant than the other three types because of the disregard of the ideological motivation criterion and lack of excessive emphasis on particular groups and issues, but the precise criteria for party newness are still missing.

As for the applicability of the AERPs, it is ideologically inclusive, just as Ukrainian political parties are. The only exclusion criteria are radical left and radical right appeals. Besides, when it comes to the criterion of organizational newness, this concept is focused on genuine, but not merely legal measures. Moreover, it is useful that this concept was developed to explain the electoral success of new parties in CEE which is sound with the aims of this study. For these reasons, the concept of AERP is applied to mark new parties with prospects for electoral success.

1.2 Operationalizations

1.2.1 Electoral cleavages

The elements of cleavages proposed by Bartolini and Mair (1990) are used as a conceptual basis for operationalization:

Socio-structural element is defined as the percentage of the population belonging to both sides of a cleavage. Sides of a cleavage are the opposite policy stances regarding a cleavage issue which are proposed by opposite parties on the issue and supported by opposite social groups. For instance, in the case of Ukraine, opposite groups are citizens speaking Russian versus Ukrainian languages, being parishioners of Greek Catholic Church or of Kyiv Patriarchy of the Orthodox Church versus the Moscow patriarchy thereof, living in the West of Ukraine versus the South-East. The data about this can come from state statistical services of a state or from sociological surveys.

Normative element is operationalized as the percentage of the population having political positions regarding the cleavage issues on both sides of the cleavage division which can be found out from sociological surveys.

Organizational element is operationalized as the degree of presence of the appeal to the cleavage in the electoral communication of a party.

1.2.2 Electoral strategies

Catch-all strategy - the percentage of the content in the sampled campaigning materials that does not alienate any social groups, and that is intended to be positively regarded by the whole population. It is important to note that there is no data available regarding how electoral appeals of parties are perceived as alienating as well as there is no information about the genuine intentions of political parties which are not shared publicly by them. Therefore, regarding specific appeals as manifestations of a catch-all strategy is prone to subjective judgements. However, while trying to support these judgements, in the data and methods chapter, the data of the support of the appeals coded as catch-all ones by the Ukrainian population is presented.

Cleavage strategy - the percentage of the content in the sampled campaigning materials containing cleavage appeals (being on the opposite sides of language, religion, geopolitical and war component of the cleavage).

1.2.3 AERP

It should be noted that the concept of AERPs by Hanley and Sikk was not followed by a thorough enough operationalization. Namely, it is not clear, whom to consider as prominent figures from past democratic politics while determining whether a party is genuinely organizationally new. The bottom line is that these figures should have played a role on the central level of politics, not on the regional one. Then, there is also an important distinction to be made between political positions and executive ones. It can be argued that political positions are those, appointment on which depends on party affiliation or support such as heading a ministry as a result of coalition negotiations and after determining party ministries quotas. Lastly, in comparison to the conceptualization by Hanley and Sikk, I would like to further restrict and specify the threshold for calling a party an AERP to identify Ukrainian AERPs for this analysis. However, operationalizations of the criterion of organizational newness vary significantly in their restrictiveness. For instance, Barnea and Rahat (2010) define it as ‘a party that has a new label and that no more than half of its top candidates (top of candidate list or safe districts) originate from a single former party’ (p.311). At the same time, if to consider concepts as ideal types of a particular phenomenon, the operationalization by Barnea and Rahat does not capture genuinely new parties, but rather partly new ones. Therefore, I propose to name a party an AERP only if it does not have any former MPs or ministers in its party list. By taking this step, parties which opted for a maximum degree of organizational newness as their comparative electoral advantage would be identified. Organizational newness can also be considered as a continuous variable, meaning that which parties can range from totally organizationally new to organizationally old with a grey zone in-between. However, to measure the degree of newness, a thorough quantifiable operationalization is required, the construction of which deserves a separate study.

As for anti-establishment appeals criterion, I stick to the argument made by Barr (2009), which states that anti-establishment appeals stem from the distinction between the governing parties and the opposition. Therefore, the ruling parties tend not to have anti-establishment appeals, in contrast

to other parties. Even though not stating this explicitly, Barr hints that anti-establishment appeals constitute a standard electoral tool of opposition parties used by all of them to a different extent. Therefore, in this study, it is assumed that anti-establishment appeal is a common feature of the opposition parties participating in the parliamentary elections in Ukraine regardless whether they are AERPs or not. It is also assumed that anti-establishment appeals are, other things being equal, more pronounced among AERPs since they have never been in power which allows them criticizing the political system from the outsider and more radical perspective.

Regarding the mainstream reformism component, the presence of radical right or left appeals will be tested during the coding of manifestos and TV ads to find out whether a party diverges from the mainstream reformism.

2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK


In this chapter, the research design, study hypotheses and method are introduced. First, I discuss for what reasons does the MSSD design apply to this study. Then, the research problem and the hypothesis stemming from it are outlined. After that, the chapter proceeds to discussing the approach to the content analysis used in this study. The section concludes with the coding schemes used for analyzing both party manifestos and TV ads.

2.1 Research Design, Problem and Hypothesis

This subsection is dedicated to the discussion about the research design used in this study, research problem and hypotheses. Firstly, the factors held constant between 2014 and 2019 are outlined. Then, the research problem, variables and hypothesis are presented.

This study is an MSSD comparative study of the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014 and 2019. The common contextual factors of these two elections are social conditions of the cleavage (discussed in the next chapter) the unchanging electoral system (mixed proportional-majoritarian), approximately the same distance between the parliamentary and the presidential elections (5 months in 2014 and 4 months in 2019), almost the same territorial area controlled by Ukraine during the military conflict against Russia (Kovalenko, 2016) similarly high level of distrust to political parties (70,9% in 2014 (Attitude of Ukrainians to political parties and to the sources of their funding, 2015), and 77% in 2019 (Level of trust to social institutions and electoral orientations of the citizens of Ukraine, 2019)) as well as the willingness to support new political parties (56% in 2014 (Attitude of Ukrainians to political parties and to the sources of their funding, 2015) and 71% in 2019 (The majority of Ukrainians would search an alternative among new parties for the parliamentary elections, 2019)). These two elections were chosen since they both happened after the start of Russian military aggression in Ukraine which led to the transformation of the cleavage itself. Therefore, adding some earlier electoral campaigns to the analysis would have invalidated the MSSD research design due to huge differences between the cases.

Figure 2. MSSD research design in this study.



The influence of the territorial cleavage did not cease to exist even after the outbreak of the Russian aggression. The difference in the party support in different regions remained quite significant and far from even distribution. As a result, no party could win the elections in all the regions in 2014. On the contrary, during the parliamentary elections of 2019, the political party Servant of People created by the newly-elected president of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi became the electoral leader in the vast majority of regions of Ukraine with only a few exceptions in the West and the East (Results Of Parliamentary Elections In 2019, 2019).

Subsequently, the **research problem** is what are the factors that allowed Servant of People to win the elections in the vast majority of regions even though the social conditions for the territorial

cleavage did not disappear. Since the only regions where Servant of People did not win happened to be in the West and the East, it makes sense hypothesizing that Servant of People used a catch-all strategy which allowed it to win in the whole country except the most cleavage-oriented regions.


This thesis is going to **test** whether the predominant use of catch-all electoral strategy by an AERP can explain the decline of the influence of the territorial electoral cleavage on the result of parliamentary elections between 2014 and 2019. More precisely, it is going to be tested whether Servant of People used predominantly catch-all strategy and whether it was the unique feature of this party that differentiates it from the other parties getting into parliament. If the results of the analysis reveal that a catch-all strategy was also used by mainstream parties which did not allow them to win in all the regions, then the importance of AERP as an antecedent variable will be empirically confirmed. It should be emphasized that this thesis is not primarily focused on whether the support of parties in Ukraine has become more evenly distributed among the regions on the party system level, but rather on how a catch-all strategy can help a party to decrease the impact of cleavage on its electoral result to win the elections on the whole territory of Ukraine. At the same time, evenness of regional distribution of votes is frequently mentioned in this study since it is likely to have a positive association with the use of catch-all strategy since less more moderately oriented regions are targeted with this strategy, but not one cleavage-oriented part of Ukraine at the expense of the other.

This study also has one antecedent and one conditional variable. The antecedent variable is an AERP participating in elections. The use of catch-all strategy by mainstream parties is not likely to cause the decline of the territorial electoral cleavage because of their inability to gather sufficient support since there is a high level of distrust to mainstream political parties in Ukraine. The very presence of an AERP does not cause the use of the catch-all strategy but allows the causal relationship between two variables to exist since only AERP can make effective use of catch-all strategy to win the elections and decrease the impact of the cleavage. Finally, this study has one conditional variable which is the decrease of importance of the war component of the territorial cleavage which is expected to strengthen the effectiveness of the use of the catch-all strategy because one of the most important components of the opposite strategy declined in its importance.

Hypothesis: *the predominant use of catch-all electoral strategy by AERPs led to the decline of the effect of the territorial electoral cleavage on the parliamentary elections' results in Ukraine between 2014 and 2019*

In this study, I consider using a catch-all or cleavage strategy predominantly if catch-all or cleavage appeals, respectively, constitute 60% or more of the TV ads sampled and/or 75% of the content of the manifesto.

Figure 2. Causal relationship between the variables.



2.2 Methods and Data

This subsection discusses the method used for the empirical analysis, procedures followed during the analysis and data sources used. The discussion begins with how the quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis are combined in this study. Then, the stages of content analysis are introduced. After that, data types and sources, sampling strategy and exclusion criteria are explained. The subsection finishes by presenting the coding schemes for the analysis of party manifestos and TV ads.

2.2.1 Type and Stages of Content Analysis

To introduce the strategy of content analysis that is used in this study, it is necessary to briefly outline both quantitative and qualitative approaches to content analysis as ideal types. The qualitative content analysis uses a data-driven approach to coding so that coding categories are not pre-determined by the research question, but emerge during the process of analysis (Morgan, 1993). For this reason, qualitative content analysis is not suitable for hypothesis testing because hypothesis testing requires codes to be dependent on the research question and be at least partly formulated before the actual analysis. Also, the feature of qualitative content analysis is that the analysis is focused not only on manifest meaning but on latent meaning, as well (Schreier, 2012). The latent meaning can be understood by putting a particular statement in the wider political context of a country. Besides, the qualitative content analysis does not follow the strict sequence of steps to the same extent as quantitative approach requires, but rather is likely to adjust the analysis strategy along the way due to interim results of the analysis. In addition to this, the qualitative approach does not consider the frequency of codes as the final result of analysis but regards it as a starting point for further interpretation of data. As for the quantitative content analysis, coding is concept-driven, the process of coding itself is often automatized not requiring manual coding by a researcher (Morgan, 1993). Besides, results of quantitative content analysis such as code frequencies or statistical tests run on their basis constitute the primary data for conclusions regarding the research question meaning that quantitative content analysis does not proceed to further interpretation of data.

In most cases of the empirical analysis, however, a researcher's strategy is somewhere in-between the extremes, which is also the case in this study. As for the features pertinent for quantitative content analysis, this content analysis is used for hypothesis testing. For this purpose, coding is concept-driven, derived from the concepts of a catch-all and cleavage electoral strategies, territorial cleavage in Ukraine and AERP. However, as for the subcategories of catch-all strategy, these were formulated on the basis of actual data which is the feature of the qualitative approach. The other feature of quantitative content-analysis is that the process of analysis has a strictly defined sequence of steps. Concerning the features of the qualitative approach in this study, the coding decisions are based on latent meaning, not only on the manifest one which requires more research on party stance on a particular issue to put at times ambiguously formulated positions into a broader context. Besides, even though the analysis uses the frequency of codes as the main output of the analysis, the interpretations of those frequencies in relation to different contextual factors that might have impacted the result are provided. Even though features of both approaches are present, this analysis is more leaning towards quantitative content analysis since it is used for hypothesis-testing, the first-rank categories are concept-driven, and a strict sequence of stages of analysis is followed. At the same time, the focus of the qualitative approach on the latent meaning allows the analysis not to be focused only on the data sources chosen, but to take into account the broader context of electoral politics in Ukraine, as well.

In this study, the stages of content analysis suggested by White and Marsh (2006) were used with the addition of step 7 suggested by Rourke and Anderson (2004) to increase validity:

1. Establish hypothesis or hypotheses.
2. Identify appropriate data (text or other communicative material).
3. Determine sampling method and sampling unit.
4. Draw sample.
5. Establish data collection unit and unit of analysis.
6. Establish coding scheme that allows for testing hypothesis.
7. Identify behaviours that represent the construct (for the identification of the empirical subcategories of both strategies).
8. Code data.
9. Check for reliability of coding and adjust coding process if necessary.

10. Analyze coded data.
11. Write up results.

When it comes to fulfilling these stages, stage 1 was already discussed in the previous chapter. Steps 2-4 are explained under data types and sources subsection, whereas stages 5-10 are discussed in coding rules and schemes subsection. Finally, stage 11 constitutes the Analysis and Results chapter.

2.2.2 Data Types and Sources

The data sources chosen are party manifestos and TV ads since they allow making sense of a party's political platform which is the main factor for Ukrainian citizens while making voting decisions (Parliamentary elections-2014 - electoral attitudes of Ukrainian population, 2014). It should also be noted that the party leader is the second most important criterion for Ukrainians with only slightly less importance in comparison to the party platform. The party platform was mentioned as a criterion by 49% of Ukrainians while party leader was mentioned by 46%. However, personal and political characteristics of party leaders are not in the focus of this study. Alternatively, social media content could have been added to this list. However, social media content is highly diverse and messages are often connected to particular contextual happenings, specific topics or policy fields and do not give a proper overview of the general strategy of a party. In principle, social media content could have been used, but it would have required a thorough sampling, exclusion criteria and a suitable method for analyzing such diverse communication messages which would not give significant additional insights. The reason is that the electoral strategy is already present in the party manifesto, TV ads, albeit in a more concentrated form whereas social media is merely a channel of dissemination of this information. The same concerns campaigning speeches which are somewhat fluid in its content which makes a significant part of it not relevant and the overarching messages tend to repeat those in the manifestos and in the TV ads.

As for the data availability, manifestos were obtained either from a party's official website or from the website of the Central Electoral Commission. Regarding the TV ads, those are obtained from the Ukrainian database of television ads adlog.tv (Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2020) which gives proof that these ads were actually shown on TV. Besides, in case a party leader

participated in the presidential elections preceding the parliamentary ones, the materials from the presidential campaigns were added to the analysis because of temporal proximity of both campaigns 2014 and 2019 which makes them highly interrelated. Concerning the criteria for choosing TV ads, the ad should be giving an overview of the political platform of a party and the main arguments for voting. For this reason, ads merely inviting citizens to vote without any further arguments are excluded.

Sampling method both for ads and manifestos is census because it includes all units that fit in the inclusion criteria. At the same time, certain exclusion criteria limit the size of the general population itself. Namely, only political parties which got into the parliament of Ukraine (thus having impact on cleavage dynamics) are analyzed. Besides, this study does not consider the majoritarian component of the parliamentary elections since the general party strategy is likely to be uniform for all candidates in their respective constituencies.

2.2.3 Coding Rules and Scheme for Content Analysis of Manifestos

Coding rules and scheme developed in the Manifesto Project Handbook (2015) was chosen as the example for this analysis. At the same time, since the Manifesto Project is focused on coding manifestos without reference to a particular research question, the coding scheme should have been changed significantly. For instance, the scope for catch-all strategies is wider since in Manifesto Project Handbook only those parts of the texts that are not related to specific policy fields are regarded as manifestations of the catch-all appeals (Coding Scheme: mp v5, 2020). However, the catch-all strategy can be manifested in any policy area except for the cleavage-related issues.

The most important terms related to coding are defined as follows:

Unit of analysis - cleavage and catch-all categories as such, as well as their subcategories.

Coding unit(the smallest possible unit of analysis in terms of its length) - quasi-sentence containing a subject, a verb and an attribute which together form a policy argument (Manifesto Coding Instructions (5th revised edition), 2015). The whole sentence can be coded as an argument in case there is no more than one argument in a sentence. In case the argument is followed by further

explanation of the policy, this should not be considered as a separate argument, but a continuation of a previous one. (Manifesto Coding Instructions (5th revised edition), 2015).

Context unit (the largest unit that can belong to one category (Mayring, 2014) - paragraph. The end of a paragraph usually signifies an end of a separate argument regarding one policy by separating one argument from other similar and related, but different argument.

Data collection unit - codes belonging to the categories of cleavage and catch-all strategy (White and Marsh, 2006) since those are the units for hypothesis testing.

Argument basis for proof of the hypothesis (White and Marsh, 2006) - frequencies of codes belonging to catch-all and cleavage strategies.

Calculation of frequencies - according to the number of characters belonging to each category in a text. The comparative frequency between the catch-all and cleavage strategy is presented as percentages of characters belonging to each strategy.

It is also worth mentioning that reliability is checked with a test-retest procedure (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999) which implies recoding the same text for the second time after a pause (in this case - two weeks) to check whether coding decisions are consistent.

Cleavage Strategy Categories

The geopolitical component includes policies towards integration either towards the EU and NATO (West-oriented), or integration with international organizations led by Russia (Eurasian Economic Union, Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States) (Russia-oriented):

- support for Euro-Atlantic integration;
- neutrality towards geopolitical partners - a policy stance intended to keep the balance between the EU/NATO and Russia by not prioritizing any of those over the other;
- support for integration with international organizations led by Russia.

Language component includes proposed policies regarding the legal and actual status of Ukrainian and Russian languages (in terms of their use) aiming at changing the status quo:

- expansion of the support for the Ukrainian language - can include an increase of funding for the proliferation of Ukrainian language, a spread of the use of Ukrainian in everyday life, media, education and culture, legislative regulations to guarantee or extend the use of Ukrainian in public institutions;
- expansion of the rights of the Russian language which may include the introduction of the right of regions to recognize Russian as a regional language, the need to cancel the laws on language (Law of Ukraine ‘On the Provision of Functioning of Ukrainian as an Official Language’, 2019) and education (Law of Ukraine ‘On Education’, 2017) that widen the scope of the use of Ukrainian.

Military conflict with Russia component includes the positions of a political party regarding the solutions of the military conflict and the role of Russia in the conflict:

- *no compromises with Russia acceptable*. Includes not accepting the annexation of Crimea and the provision of any autonomy to currently occupied part of Donbas, not agreeing to the elections in the occupied territories of Donbas on Russian conditions, proposing strengthening the sanctions regime against Russia. In other words, the no-compromises platform has the total restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine without giving any further autonomy to the regions currently occupied by Russia as its final and most important goal;
- *mentions of the need to improve internal policies to oppose Russia externally* includes policies to enhance the capacity of the Ukrainian state to resist Russian military aggression. Examples can include reforming the military, improving information security, patriotic education etc.;
- *mentions of Russia as an aggressor* or the fact of foreign aggression. In the absence of other indicators mentions of Russia as an aggressor help identifying on which side of a cleavage a party is. In other words, mentioning Russia as an aggressor signifies a non-pro-Russian stance of a party;
- *proposals involving compromise with Russia* might include plans to separate the negotiations with Russia concerning Donbas and Crimea, amnesty for so-called LNR and DNR soldiers, termination of mutual sanctions with Russia, direct negotiations regarding Donbas between Ukraine, DNR, LNR and Russia (excluding Western partners).

Religion component (relevant only for the elections of 2019) includes the positions of parties towards the efforts of the former president Poroshenko to help the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to receive autocephaly (Mudrov, 2019):

- statements supporting the reception of Tomos on autocephaly by Ukrainian Orthodox Church;
- statements opposing the reception of Tomos on autocephaly by Ukrainian Orthodox Church as well as the renaming of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of belonging to the Moscow patriarchy.

The subcategories of each component help identifying on which side of the territorial cleavage a party is.

Catch-all categories

Consensual values include those towards which there is a broad social consensus about, the values that cannot be argued against. This category contains abstract appeals not related to any tangible policies. These include calls to security, freedom, justice, fairness, unity and peace, equality, innovations and competition.

Economic and infrastructural policies include those supported by the majority of the population and not opposed by impactful social groups. Examples include demonopolization of the economy, digitalization, support for IT development, taxes reduction (Zablotskyi, 2016) financial stability, alternative energy development, increasing opportunities for businesses development.

Social policies - policies aimed at expanding the scope, quality of human welfare. Examples include utility costs optimization, reforms of education and healthcare expenditure, accessible housing, benefits for graduates employment, an increase of pensions, salaries (95% of the population consider the problem of high living costs and low living standards as serious or rather serious (Corruption in Ukraine: perceptions, experience, attitudes, 2018)), support for young families with children, support for internally displaced people. Since the majority of the population is leaning towards the left in terms of economy and social policies (From right to left: what are Ukrainians thinking about the state control over the economy and personal freedoms, 2019), the policy proposals expanding the social security are considered catch-all.

Political system reforms - reforms of public institutions aimed at improving the quality of democracy and governance. Examples include fighting corruption (defined as a serious or rather serious problem by 93,7% of the population(Corruption in Ukraine: perceptions, experience, attitudes, 2018)), judicial reform (in 2014, only 12% trusted the judiciary (Kuybida, 2015), in 2019 this percentage was 11,4% (Attitude of Citizens of Ukraine to the Judicial System, 2019)), decentralization (in 2018, 58% of the population regarded decentralization as a necessary reform(Decentralization and the Reform of Local Government: Results of the 4th Wave of the Public Opinion Survey, 2019), in 2014, 58,1% of cities' inhabitants supported the expansion of cities' powers(Attitude of Cities' Inhabitants to the Idea of Decentralization, 2014) which is an integral part of decentralization), reforms of law-enforcement agencies(89,4% of the population perceives the problem of crime rate as serious or rather serious(Corruption in Ukraine: perceptions, experience, attitudes, 2018) which suggests that law-enforcement agencies are not operating efficiently), abolition of MPs, President's and judges' immunity, direct democracy elements, popular participation facilitation, open party lists, impeachment law, increase of transparency of the parliament, increase of the punishments for violations of parliamentary rules by MPs, deoligarchization (87,8% of the population considers uncontrolled power as a serious or rather serious problem in Ukraine (ibid)), decrease of the size of the bureaucratic apparatus, increase of its efficiency(83,4% of the population consider the problem of excessive bureaucracy as serious or rather serious (ibid)).

Other catch-all appeals - catch-all appeals outside of the scope of the categories mentioned above. Examples include appeals to sustainability issues, humanitarian policy, protection of rights of Ukrainians abroad etc.

Radical left or radical right appeals (as opposed to the concept of AERP) - include manifestations of illiberal democracy, ethnocentrism, social conservatism (frequently associated with the radical right) and anti-capitalism stance(radical left) (Hanley and Sikk, 2016). In other words, according to Hanley and Sikk radical appeals are those diverging from market economy and liberal democracy agenda.

Not relevant - the parts of manifestos not belonging to any other category.

2.2.4 Content Analysis of TV Ads

In this section of the analysis, TV ads are classified into three categories:

- *cleavage* - an ad with solely cleavage appeals;
- *catch-all* - an ad with solely catch-all appeals;
- *mixed* - an ad in which both cleavage and catch-all rhetoric is present.

In comparison to the analysis of manifestos, the coding scheme is different since the parts of ads were not considered separately, but rather an ad as a whole is a unit of analysis. The reason for considering the ads holistically is primarily in the small length of videos (most of the videos in the sample last for 20-30 seconds), so that length restrictions make it possible to deliver only one comprehensive and argument-supported message. Accordingly, unlike in the party manifestos, due to the length differences, it is considerably harder to break an ad into categories. For instance, in his analysis of the tone of TV ads Prior (2001) distinguished the tone into negative, positive and comparative, but did not code particular segments within an ad as being negative, positive or comparative. The same approach is used in the analyses by Torres, Hyman and Hamilton (2012), Charles (2013), Holtz-Bacha et al. (1994), Borba (2019), Mahone (2009) and Halle (2017).

It should be noted that even though the categories and subcategories of both strategies are not pointed out explicitly in the analysis of TV ads, they were the basis for classification decisions since they constitute both strategies. Also, while analyzing the TV ads, the video itself was an equally important element of analysis as the speech in the ads, so that two elements complement each other while making coding decisions.

3. TERRITORIAL ELECTORAL CLEAVAGE IN UKRAINE

This chapter presents an overview of the territorial cleavage in Ukraine as well as the dynamics of its salience. First, the historical roots of the cleavage are introduced and manifestations of the cleavage between 1991 and 2014 are overviewed. Then, different approaches to conceptualizing the cleavage are evaluated. After that, the chapter proceeds to the discussion of the components of territorial cleavage between 1991 and 2014. Finally, the transformation of the cleavage in and after 2014 is examined.

3.1 Manifestations of Territorial Cleavage between 1991 and 2014

Territorial cleavage in Ukraine has its long historical roots. Its formation can be traced to the 13th century when the Halychyna-Volyn Kingdom emerged and started establishing closer ties with Western Europe in comparison to other parts of Kyivan Rus. Later, the division manifested itself in the second half of the 17th century when the left bank of Dnipro river started belonging to Moskov Tsardom and the right one to Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. At the end of the 18th century, Western Ukraine started belonging to Habsburg dynasty whereas Central and Eastern Ukraine became controlled by the Russian Empire. After World War I, the biggest part of Western Ukraine and a part of Central Ukraine started belonging to Poland whereas the rest of the country was taken over by the Soviet Union. Only after World War II the whole territory of Ukraine became ruled by one state - Soviet Union. However, the historical experience of different parts of the territory of Ukraine belonging to different states impacted the difference of social and political views of Ukrainians which is the most pronounced in the division between Western and Eastern Ukraine.

Territorial electoral cleavage has been playing a crucial role during all national-level electoral campaigns. As for the presidential elections, in 1991, despite for the landslide victory of former Communist Leonid Kravchuk, three Western Ukrainian regions were the ones won by his main competitor, dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil. In 1994, during the second round of elections contested by Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma Western Ukraine overwhelmingly supported Kravchuk whereas Eastern Ukraine voted for Kuchma. In 1999, the situation was more complicated since in the Central and South-Eastern Ukraine the results were close, but a more pro-

Western and patriotic stance of Leonid Kuchma in comparison to his competitor Petro Symonenko secured him a landslide victory in Western Ukraine. The same competition pattern was visible in 2004 when Viktor Yushchenko won the vast majority of votes in the West and Viktor Yanukovich in the South-East and in 2010 between Yulia Tymoshenko (winning in the West) and Viktor Yanukovich (winning in the South-East).

The same pattern of electoral competition is evident during the parliamentary elections. The elections of 1994, even though being held according to the majoritarian system, showed that the Communist Party was dominant in the South-East whereas the West was highly influenced by the national-democratic party Movement. During the elections of 1998, which were held on the basis of a mixed proportional-majoritarian system, a similar pattern occurred: Communist party won in the South-East and Center whereas Movement was dominant in four Western regions. In 2002, Our Ukraine won the elections in Western Ukraine whereas Communists continued dominating the South-East. In 2006, Our Ukraine party won the elections in the Western regions whereas the Party of Regions won in the South-East. In 2007, the only difference was that Motherland managed to take over the leadership in the Western regions. In 2012, Party of Regions won in the South-East again whereas Motherland won in the rest of Ukraine except for Lviv region which was won by nationalist right-wing party Freedom, which again confirms the importance of the cleavage. The regional distribution of votes suggests that both parties and presidential candidates relied on the maximization of votes in the regions being already in their favour, but not on gaining more votes in the regions supporting their competitors.

The general tendencies concerning the cleavage structure in CEE are also relevant for Ukraine. In particular, Ukraine had undergone the same transition challenges of state, nation-building and marketization. The state-building can be illustrated with the geopolitical cleavage since for a state to pursue long-term strategic goals, a geopolitical strategy has to be defined. As for nation-building, language and religion cleavages belong to this category since the core conflict regarding both cleavages is whether the national identity of Ukraine should be closely related to that of Russia. As for marketization, Communist vs anti-Communist cleavage can be related to this since the attitude to the Soviet past is a solid predictor about the economic model preferences. When it comes to classic cleavages proposed by Lipset and Rokkan, they are important in electoral politics of Ukraine, but not to the same extent as the territorial cleavage which is based on the transition

challenges and which is the most important cleavage in the electoral politics of Ukraine. As for the integration-demarcation cleavage, it does not have significant importance in the electoral politics of Ukraine. If to consider the cleavage elements by Bartolini and Mair (1990), all the components of territorial cleavage have all these elements present to a different extent.

3.2 Conceptualizations of Territorial Electoral Cleavage

This subsection examines different approaches to conceptualizing the territorial cleavage revolving around the discussion about which cleavage component is the most important one. Besides, I discuss in more detail the difference between ethnic and language cleavages. Finally, I explain why the term territorial cleavage is the most suitable umbrella term for other cleavage components.

There are different approaches among scholars to conceptualize the regional division of Ukrainian electoral politics. For instance, Katchanovski (2006) referred to this cleavage as a regional one. In his analysis, Katchanovski states that the primary determinant of the voting behaviour is the number of years that a certain region was governed by Russia/Soviet Union. The bigger is the number of years independent of the Soviet and Russian rule, the more negative is the attitude towards the Communist past and communism as an ideology (Katchanovski, 2014). Birch (2000), Goodnow and Oziashvili (2010) suggest the concepts of ethnic and language cleavage. Pro-Communist versus anti-Communist (Katchanovski, 2006), geopolitical orientations and religious divides (Krindatch, 2003) are also pointed out. On a general level, scholars pointed out different components and manifestations of the cleavage, recognizing that they are undoubtedly related to each other, but chose different concepts for the merged combination of those cleavages.

When it comes to the ethnic cleavage, it used to play an essential role in the electoral competition in Ukraine between 1991 and 2014, but it is not significant anymore, unlike the language cleavage. The reason is that the percentage of people identifying themselves as Russians has been decreasing steadily after 1989. In 1989, the percentage of Russians according to the census was 22.1%. In 2012, 23,1% of the citizens of Ukraine identified themselves as equally Ukrainians and Russians, more Russians or only Russians. In 2017, this percentage decreased to 12,5% with only 2.5% identifying themselves as only Russians (in comparison to 8% in 2012) (Kulyk, 2018). Therefore, the number of people having the identity as predominantly or only Russian has become marginal

to consider an ethnic cleavage a currently existing one. As for the relationship between the ethnic and language divisions, the victory of Euromaidan and subsequent Russian aggression increased the number of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriots who identify themselves as Ukrainians despite their language use (Kuzio, 2015) which can be illustrated by the fact that Russian is the dominant language even among the soldiers in the frontline (Arel, 2018). The preferred language of use and national identity might be combined counter-intuitively since speaking Russian is not a barrier for a Ukrainian citizen to identify himself as ethnically Ukrainian, to have a negative position towards Russia and to volunteer to defend Ukraine against Russia. Therefore, ethnic cleavage should not be confused with the language one even though there is overlap between those since, naturally, those identifying themselves as Russians speak Russian.

When naming the cleavage, a common factor for its emergence should be coined in the concept. Therefore, this cleavage is conceptualized as a territorial one since all the cleavages mentioned above are based on the division between the Western and South-Eastern Ukraine. Namely, Western Ukrainian voter has been more West-oriented geopolitically, speaking Ukrainian language, standing for further legislative promotion of Ukrainian as a state language, having a negative opinion about the Soviet past and communism as an ideology, being either a believer of Greek-Catholic or Orthodox church of Kyiv patriarchy. In contrast, the voters in the South-East have been predominantly Russian-speaking, standing for the expansion of rights of Russian language, favouring integration with Russia (Barrington and Faranda, 2009), having a more positive estimation of the Communist past and belonging to the Orthodox Church of the Moscow patriarchy.

3.3 Components of the Territorial Cleavage

This section introduces in more detail the manifestations of three components of the territorial cleavage between 1991 and 2014, which are a part of the empirical analysis: language, geopolitical and religion cleavages. It is explained what is the tension between the two sides of the divide, and the manifestations of the cleavage elements (socio-structural, normative and behavioural) are illustrated.

Language component has been activated multiple times during both presidential and parliamentary elections with the issue being whether to popularize Ukrainian or to promote the

status of Russian. Namely, in 1994, a pro-Russian presidential candidate Leonid Kuchma promised to make Russian the second state language (Strikha, 2001) which distanced him from Western Ukrainian voters. The same promise was made by pro-Russian Party of Regions during the parliamentary elections of 2007 (Party of Regions manifesto, 2009). In 2011, the parliament led by the Party of Regions enacted a law that allows making Russian a regional language if regional councils decide so (Law of Ukraine On Foundations of State Language Policy, 2012). By making such proposals, politicians and parties mobilized the votes of Russian-speaking population in the South-East, but at the same time alienated themselves from Ukrainian-speaking voters in the West. Therefore, the organizational element of the language component has been firmly present.

As for the socio-structural element, the survey data showed a sharp regional differentiation in language preference patterns, with a preference for using Ukrainian ranging from 95% in the West to only 16% in the East and 8% in the South (Kulyk, 2014). It should be noted that between 1991 and 2014, a minor, but a steady tendency towards the increase of the use of Ukrainian is noticeable, which could not change the macro-picture significantly. Regarding the normative element, the preferred course of the language policy has a strong association with the ethnicity, language identity and region of living (Kulyk, 2011).

Even though the **religion component** is considered as a somewhat weaker one than the language and geopolitical ones, religious affiliation has an association with political preferences. In particular, Greek Catholics, located primarily in Western Ukraine, tend to be the most hostile towards Russia (Katchanovski, 2006). On the contrary, believers of the Moscow Patriarchy of the Orthodox church have the most positive attitude towards Russia whereas the believers of the Kyiv Patriarchy of the Orthodox church are in-between those extremes and, correspondingly, are primarily located in Central Ukraine. As for the example of the organizational component, Viktor Yanukovich explicitly supported the Moscow patriarchy of the Orthodox church and relied on its support during the electoral campaigns (Mitrokhin, 2010). Despite this example, the organizational component was not firmly present since the religious organizations and the collective identities their members have had did not lead to a sufficient representation of their interests on the party system level.

The main issue of the **geopolitical component** has always been the direction of integration of Ukraine: either to the EU and NATO, or to the geopolitical entities led by Russia. As was previously stated, Western Ukraine has been West-oriented whereas South-East of Ukraine has been Russia-oriented. Apparent differences regarding parties' and presidential candidates' geopolitical orientations were present during all the elections since if a candidate or a party wanted to assure the support of a particular region, its geopolitical platform should correspond to the preferences of the local electorate. The geopolitical differences can be best illustrated with the history of the presidential elections, during the second round of which two candidates could be divided into one being more pro-Western and one being more pro-Russian.

Figure 3. Sides of the territorial cleavage and their components (with red edges – inactive as of 2014).



3.4 Transformation of the Cleavage in and after 2014

In this subsection, I introduce the transformation of the territorial cleavage after the victory of Euromaidan and the Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas in 2014. First, I discuss the changes that happened immediately after those two events. I explain the causes and manifestations of the decline of reliability of Russian geopolitical alternative and introduce the indicators of the fall of the Communist vs anti-Communist cleavage. Then I provide evidence on how did the issue of war against Russia fit into the divide between Western and South-Eastern Ukraine and resulted in a new cleavage component. After that, I illustrate the decline of the war component between 2014 and 2019. I also discuss how does the research on cleavage relate to the territorial cleavage in Ukraine. Finally, I provide an overview of cleavage-related policies by the former President, parliament and cabinets of Ukraine between 2014 and 2019 and compare the social-structural element of the cleavage in these years.

The Decline of Reliability of Russian Geopolitical Alternative

In 2014, the territorial cleavage underwent a profound transformation. Since the South-East of Ukraine had been Russia-oriented before, the relations with Russia constituted an essential part of the cleavage. However, as Russia started its military aggression in 2014 in Crimea and Donbas, for the majority of Ukrainians, Russia ceased to be a reliable partner which considerably weakened the pro-Russian side of the cleavage. Also, the factor of the victory of Euromaidan boosted the support of European integration by 21% between 2013 and 2018 (The number of Ukrainians supporting joining the EU increased by 21% since 2013, 2019) whereas support for joining the NATO increased by 44% between 2012 and 2019. The annexation of Crimea and occupation of certain areas of Donetsk and Lugansk regions has also impacted the strength of both sides of the cleavage divide because Russia occupied or deliberately destabilized precisely the regions where the sympathy towards Russia was the strongest (Ivanov, 2015). Consequently, more West-oriented parties gained a significant advantage since the electoral base of their opponents declined in its population. At the same time, despite the change in the relative strength of two sides of the cleavage, the cleavage itself remained the most crucial factor for choosing the party to vote for (Chaisty and Whitefield, 2018).

The Decline of the Communist vs Anti-Communist Cleavage

The other factor to be mentioned is the gradual decline of Communist-anti Communist component of the cleavage. In particular, the manifestation of this is the LeninFall (demolishing the monuments to Volodymyr Lenin by activists) which started as a part of the Euromaidan protests aimed to break up with the Soviet past (Grytsai, 2015). LeninFall took place in almost all the regions of Ukraine, including the South and some Eastern regions (Leninopad as a farewell to the Soviet past, n.d.). Moreover, during the presidential elections of 2014, the leader of the Communist party Petro Symonenko received only 1.1% of votes whereas during the parliamentary elections the party got 3,88% (Results according to the party lists, 2014) not passing the electoral threshold which signifies an apparent decline of the popularity of the communism as an ideology among Ukrainians.

Increasing Importance of the Religion Cleavage

Since 2014, the former President Petro Poroshenko had been trying to convince the Constantinople patriarch to grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Tomos of autocephaly. The main objective of receiving the Tomos was to equalize the status of the Kyiv patriarchy of Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the Moscow patriarchy because the inequality of the status had been the comparative disadvantage of the Kyiv patriarchy. After receiving the Tomos, Ukraine would be allowed to create its own church independent of the Russian Orthodox Church which is equal to it by its status. Besides, since the donations from the Moscow patriarchy are ultimately going to the Russian Orthodox church, the Moscow patriarchy was perceived as an agent of Russia in Ukraine. (Mudrov, 2019). Finally, in January 2019, the Tomos of autocephaly was granted. Simultaneously, Petro Poroshenko initiated the unification of the Orthodox churches which was supported by all of them except for the Moscow patriarchy. Lastly, the parliament of Ukraine obliged the Moscow patriarchy to rename itself to Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine to point it out more clearly as an agent of foreign influence (Law of Ukraine ‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations’, 2019). However, this set of policies was perceived differently in the East and the West. In particular, in Western Ukraine, the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox Church was supported by 76% of the population whereas in the East by 31%, in the South by 22% and in the

part of Donbas controlled by Ukraine by 18% (Monitoring of Electoral Preferences of Ukrainians: January 2019, 2019).

The Addition of the War Component of the Cleavage

The war dimension perfectly fitted in the territorial divisions within the Ukrainian electorate since, despite the general deterioration of public opinion towards Russia, regional differences did not cease to exist. The issue with the war cleavage is twofold. Firstly, Ukrainian society is divided on the matter whether the war against Russia is happening. For instance, in the Western and Central Ukraine, 91% and 79%, respectively, admit the fact of war between Ukraine and Russia whereas in the South and East the percentage is 62% and 47%, respectively (More Than 70% Of Ukrainians Think That What Is Going On In Donbas Is A War Against Russia, 2019). Secondly, there is a big difference in opinions regarding what actions should be taken to finish the war. For instance, 60% of the inhabitants of the South-East are ready to accept the geopolitical neutrality of Ukraine in case it brings peace in Donbas, and 64-67% in those regions are ready to restore trade with the occupied territories (Ways Of Achieving Peace In Donbas: Social Attitudes, Expectations And Cautions - All-Ukrainian Poll, 2020). Besides, 54% in the South and 70% in the East are willing to accept increasing the status of Russian as a second state language if it guarantees achieving peace. In comparison to the Western and Central regions, where local elections in Donbas without ensuring the security component are supported by 9% and 11%, respectively, in the South and East, the percentage is 37-38%. Regarding more strategic considerations considering achieving the peace, 43% in the West think that peace can be achieved by diplomatic pressure on Russia, strengthening the sanctions and using international law mechanisms, and 27% believe that it can be achieved by strengthening Ukraine economically and militarily. On the contrary, 53% of the population of the East think that peace can be achieved via direct negotiations with so-called LNR and DNR leaders, 24% of them is in favour of accepting so-called LNR and DNR as legitimate state entities. The other popular option among the voters in the East is the direct negotiations with Russia with accepting the autonomy of Donbas and the annexation of Crimea (supported by 29%) (ibid). Thus, the attitude of the South-East regarding the conflict with Russia is markedly different from the one in the West-Center since the inhabitants of those regions are less likely to admit the war against Russia and are more likely to accept compromises with Russia.

The Decline of the Importance of the War Component

Even though the war component is a relatively new one, its dynamics of importance undergone significant changes between 2014 and 2019. It is well-illustrated by a substantial change in the perceptions of Ukrainians on the significance of different aspects of relations between Ukraine and Russia. Namely, the importance of the war in Donbas decreased as mentioned to be among three most important problems in Ukraine from 73% of Ukrainians (Public Opinion Survey Of Residents Of Ukraine, 2014) to 45% (Public Opinion Survey Of Residents Of Ukraine, 2019). The importance of relations with Russia decreased from being mentioned by 20% of Ukrainians to 10%. Lastly, the importance of the annexation of Crimea was mentioned by 13% in 2014, but only by 3% in 2019 (ibid). Consequently, since the significance of one of the components of the cleavage decreased, the effectiveness of the use of a catch-all strategy might increase as it becomes more relevant in comparison to the cleavage strategy. Such a decrease can be explained by a total stabilization of the frontline between Ukraine and so-called DNR and LNR since 2015, the decrease in the number of casualties and the decrease of the threat perception regarding the war as a result of the first two factors mentioned.

Cleavage-Related Policies between 2014 and 2019

Political developments of the period between 2014 and 2019 should also be considered in the context of cleavage dynamics. Namely, during these years, the President and the governing coalition had been taking action to popularize the use of Ukrainian language in the public sphere and daily life, to advocate the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodox Church, to take measures towards European integration and facilitation of cooperation with NATO (Iwanski, 2018). When it comes to the war dimension of the cleavage, despite being forced to sign the Minsk agreement which was a compromise with Russia, the former President and the parliamentary coalition supporting him had been reluctant to implement the protocol in the order suggested by Russia (Åtland, 2020). In other words, these years can be characterized as years of dominance of policies most supported by the West and Center of Ukraine. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the economic, social security and political reforms policies had been rather dubious, which especially concerns anti-corruption systems (Haran and Burkovsky, 2019). In this regard, the positive link between the cleavage-related policies and other policy areas might be insufficient. Moreover,

among some categories of the electorate, the insufficiency of this link might have even undermined the cleavage-related policies. All in all, even though pro-Western cleavage had been popularized during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko, the effects of this popularization are rather modest in terms of the proportion of the population being pro-European and pro-Russian. In other words, the balance between the supporters of both sides of the cleavage remained mostly intact.

Socio-Structural Element of the Cleavage between 2014 and 2019

The socio-structural element did not change much between 2014 and 2019. When it comes to the broader picture, the pro-European side of the cleavage has only slightly risen in its social base in comparison to the pro-Russian side, which does not invalidate the MSSD design as such. The changes can be best illustrated by bringing out the changes in the South-East which was the region that changed the most.

Regarding the language component, the use of Russian language in the South-East has dropped by 10% (Review of the state of Ukrainian language, 2014, 2018) whereas the use of both languages interchangeably has risen by the same percentage. In comparison, in the West and Center, the use of Ukrainian has risen only by 5% in each.

As for the geopolitical component, the increase of popularity of the pro-European side was not profound. For instance, the percentage of those supporting joining the NATO in the South-East has risen from by 7% (Which Union Should Ukraine Join?, 2014; Public Opinion Survey Of Residents Of Ukraine, 2019). The percentage of supporters for the EU integration has increased by 10 percent in the South-East whereas the share of supporters of integration with the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) has remained the same since the percentage of people opting for not joining any of those has decreased.

As for the religion component, the percentage of parishioners of the Kyiv patriarchy of the Orthodox church (after 2019 - Orthodox Church of Ukraine) has increased from 15,25% (Socio-Political Conflict and Church, 2014) to 46,9% (Confessional structure of Ukrainian population and the emergence of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, 2019) whereas the percentage of those of the Moscow patriarchy has increased from 17% to 25% since the percentage of people regarding themselves as Orthodox without any confessional affiliation has drastically decreased. Thereby, the religion component is the only instance of a significant advance of either side of the cleavage.

4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this chapter, the results of content analysis of party manifestos and TV ads of parties getting into parliament in 2014 and 2019 are presented. It begins with an overview of general trends during both elections. After that, I proceed to discuss the main findings related to the hypothesis. Then, I introduce some of the additional findings.

4.1 General Overview of Both Elections


In this subsection, I introduce a macro picture of the results of content analysis during the elections of 2014 and 2019. First, I discuss both elections separately and then compare and contrast the two. In particular, I illustrate the inconsistency of strategies of the mainstream parties between the two elections, discuss the likelihood of the use of the catch-all strategy by AERPs as opposed to mainstream parties. After that, I discuss the comparative validity of two types of data used for the analysis in the light of its results. Lastly, I illustrate the difference of use of cleavage components by parties and offer some explanations for this.

In 2014, the election results were highly successful for the five pro-European parties that then formed a government coalition leaving the only pro-Russian party in the parliament (Opposition Bloc) in the opposition which is the result of cleavage transformation discussed in the previous chapter. At the same time, parties varied greatly when it comes to the electoral strategy which is especially visible in TV ads with cleavage strategy dominating in one party's communication and cleavage strategy dominating in the case of another party. The only commonality between parties is the predominance of catch-all appeals in all the manifestos. At the same time, it can be explained by the peculiarity of a manifesto as a communicative material. Two parties that formed the core of the parliamentary coalition used a considerably different strategy to each other with Petro Poroshenko Bloc balancing between the two strategies and People's Front being more cleavage-oriented, but neither of them was the most extreme party in using either of those strategies. Lastly, the only AERP in this campaign - Self-Reliance got 10,97% and the 3rd place in the campaign not fulfilling the theoretical expectations despite being the party using the catch-all strategy to a greater extent in comparison to other parties.

Table 1. Frequency of use of cleavage and catch-all appeals in party manifestos and TV ads during the elections of 2014.

Parties (AERPs in bold)	Percentage of Votes	Manifestos				TV ads			
		Catch-all	Cleavage	Radical left or right appeals	Non-relevant	Catch-all (absolute number in brackets)	Cleavage	Mixed	Radical left or right appeals
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	21, 82%	64,56%	22,47%	0%	12,97%	33,33% (1)	33,33% (1)	33,33% (1)	0%
People's Front	22, 14%	62,12%	31,18%	0%	6,70%	23,07% (3)	61.5% (8)	15.38% (2)	0%
Radical Party	7, 44%	59,80%	27,86%	5,57%	6,77%	39.28% (11)	46.42% (13)	7.14% (2)	7.14% (2)
Motherland	5, 68%	55,42%	41, 27%	0,72%	2,59%	20% (1)	60% (3)	20% (1)	0%
Self-Reliance	10.97%	80,65%	12,86%	1,33%	5,16%	66,66% (2)	0%	33,33% (1)	0%
Opposition Bloc	9, 43%	72,74%	14,01%	0%	13,25%	53,84% (7)	7.69% (1)	38.46% (5)	0%

Map 1. Leading parties during parliamentary elections of 2014 by constituency (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014, n.d.).




The elections of 2019 resulted in a landslide victory of an AERP - Servant of People which managed to form a government by itself with the help of MPs elected in single-member districts.

Besides, during these elections, one more AERP (Voice) managed to get into parliament but had quite different results hardly passing the 5% threshold. Similarly to 2014, only one pro-Russian party got into parliament which is Opposition Platform - for Life, but in comparison to Opposition Bloc in 2014, the stance of this pro-Russian party has become more radical and involving more frequent use of the cleavage strategy. A notable development to mention is the increase of aggressiveness of competition between the two extreme representatives of both sides of the cleavage - Opposition Platform and European Solidarity. During the campaign of 2019, these parties were openly criticizing each other in the TV ads, thus mobilizing their core electorates against each other.

Table 2. Frequency of use of cleavage and catch-all appeals in party manifestos and TV ads in 2019

Parties (AERPs in bold)	Percenta ge of Votes	Manifestos				TV ads			
		Catch-all	Cleavage	Radical left or right appeals	Non- relevant	Catch-all (absolute number in brackets)	Cleavage	Mixed	Radical left or right appeals
Servant of People	43, 16%	77,55%	3,92%	0%	18,53%	100% (26)	0%	0%	0%
Voice	5, 82%	76,05%	16,38%	0%	7,57%	100% (5)	0%	0%	0%
Opposition Platform - for Life	13, 05%	56,50%	25,53%	1,71%	16,26%	41.66% (5)	33.33% (4)	25% (3)	1,71%
Motherland	8, 18%	68,30%	11,57%	3,83%	16,30%	78.57% (11)	7.14% (1)	14.28% (2)	3,83%
European Solidarity	8, 10%	72,49%	19,66%	1,22%	6,63%	9.09(2)	68.18% (15)	22.72% (5)	1,22%

Map 2. Leading parties during parliamentary elections of 2019 by constituency. Green - Servant of People, dark-blue - Opposition Platform - For Life, orange - Voice, light-blue - European Solidarity (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019, n.d.).



When it comes to the comparison between the two elections, the use of the catch-all strategy became more frequent because of the decline of the importance of the war component. The change is especially striking in the TV ads: catch-all appeals constitute 60,46% of the appeals in 2019 in comparison to 39,36% in 2014. Therefore, most political parties that got into parliament in 2019, except for European Solidarity and Opposition Platform - for Life that increased the frequency of cleavage appeals, acted accordingly to the changes of public opinion. Since one of two major cleavage components significantly declined in its importance, parties did not need to appeal to the cleavage that much anymore, so they could rely on catch-all strategy more.

Table 3. Average frequencies of using the electoral strategies by parties in 2014 and 2019 (as means of parties' individual frequencies).

	Manifestos		TV ads		
	Catch-all	Cleavage	Catch-all	Cleavage	Mixed
Elections of 2014	65,88%	24,52%	39,36%	34,82%	24,60%
Elections of 2019	70,17%	15,41%	60,46%	21,73%	12,40%

The other dimension of comparison between the two elections is the consistency of strategies by the parties getting into parliament after both elections. The analysis shows that Motherland, Petro Poroshenko Bloc rebranded into European Solidarity and Opposition Platform which emerged as a result of a split in the Opposition Bloc all changed their strategy between the two elections. The switch of strategy is especially remarkable in the case of two pro-European parties - Motherland and European Solidarity. In 2014, Motherland was a party using cleavage strategy the most whereas in 2019 it was the second party after Servant of People in the frequency of use of the catch-all strategy. The dynamics of European Solidarity was switching from balancing between the two strategies in 2014 and being a pro-European party with the most significant reliance on the cleavage appeals in 2019. Finally, Opposition Platform became more cleavage-oriented in comparison to Opposition Bloc in 2014. It can be argued that such drastic changes of strategies can occur more likely in less institutionalized and stable party systems to which the party system of Ukraine belongs (Party System Institutionalization, 2020).

The other finding on the macro-level is that all AERPs tended to use catch-all strategy predominantly and were much more catch-all oriented than the mainstream parties. Therefore, it might be the case that the very features of an AERP make this type of parties more inclined to use the catch-all strategy in comparison to mainstream parties. The reason might be in the mainstream reformism component of the AERP, which is leaning to the center. It is yet to be determined whether this hypothesis applies to other countries in CEE. The flipside of this finding is that the mainstream parties are more likely to have radical left or radical right appeals which is especially

clearly visible in 2019 when both AERPs did not have such statements, but all the mainstream parties did have.

It is also worth bringing out that two sources of data have quite a different proportion between cleavage and catch-all appeals. Concerning the manifestos, in case of all the parties, catch-all appeals prevail by a vast margin. Therefore, just based on manifestos, it could be argued that all parties use predominantly catch-all strategy. As a consequence, it is harder to explain the differences in the regional support of parties just based on manifestos. As for the TV ads, there is an enormous variation on terms of the proportion between cleavage and catch-all strategies: from catch-all appeals dominating in the case of Servant of People and Voice to cleavage appeals dominating in case of Peoples' Front and European Solidarity. Due to the diversity of distribution, TV ads were used more to differentiate from other parties, whereas manifestos contain more of appeals having a broad social consensus. Also, this argument is supported by the fact that between 2014 and 2019, the degree of use of the catch-all strategy changed considerably less in the manifestos in comparison to the TV ads. If manifestos are less prone to changes in the proportions of use of both strategies in comparison to TV ads, it might mean that parties' TV ads are more sensitive to the changes in public opinion and issue salience. Therefore, TV ads are a better indicator of the changes in the parties' electoral strategy since they can unveil the differences in the strategies better. At the same time, this statement does not mean that manifestos are not entirely valid since even in the manifestos the differences in the frequency of use of both strategies are significant and can hint at the differences in the overall party strategy, but the prevalence of catch-all strategy in the absolute numbers for each party is somewhat deceiving.

As for the content overlap between two sources of data, the most of the content of TV ads is present in the party manifesto and, therefore, manifesto serves as a source of information for TV ads. On the other hand, TV ads also contain certain statements not present in the manifesto. Besides, TV ads are better articulated and more radical in its content, so that the main appeals of a party become more apparent. Even though manifestos are essential as a foundational document both for campaigning and policy-making, TV ads are a better tool of direct communication with the electorate due to their parsimony and smaller length of their messages.

Lastly, the analysis revealed that there are considerable differences in the frequency of use of territorial cleavage components. In particular, cleavage components can be divided into two groups: geopolitical and cleavage component that were the most frequently used, and language and religion components which were used comparably rarely. The first two components were used by every party analyzed during both elections. Regarding the language component, in 2014, it was used only by half of the parties with a relatively small amount of attention dedicated to it even by those parties using this component. In 2019, it was used by three parties out of five. As for the religion component, it was used only by the most radical parties on both sides of the divide: European Solidarity (in the TV ads) and Opposition Platform - For Life. The main difference between the two groups of cleavage components is in the different importance of those for Ukraine's development as such. Namely, Ukraine's progress in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration and its efforts to finish the war against Russia and restore its territorial integrity was of greater strategic importance than identity issues such as language and religion policies. In fact, in the most cases, the latter two components were used by parties using cleavage appeals more frequently which might mean that for parties using those less often these cleavage components do not constitute the core of a cleavage to appeal to the electorate with.

Table 4. Appeals to cleavage components in the manifestos (as percentages of the cleavage appeals in total) during parliamentary elections of 2014 in Ukraine

Parties (AERPs in bold)	Religion	Geopolitical	War	Language
Self-Reliance	0%	21,70%	79,30%	0%
Petro Poroshenko Bloc	0%	24,88%	75,12%	0%
People's Front	0%	23,60%	66,60%	9,80%
Radical Party	0%	29,30%	71,70%	0%
Motherland	0%	51,52%	49,48%	0%
Opposition Bloc	0%	20,45%	47,05%	32,50%
Total	0%	28,57%	64,88%	7,05%

Table 5. Appeals to cleavage components in the manifestos (as percentages of the cleavage appeals in total) during parliamentary elections of 2019 in Ukraine

Parties (AERPs in bold)	Religion	Geopolitical	War	Language
Servant of People	0%	62,50%	0%	37,50%
Voice	0%	13,70%	87,30%	0%
Opposition Platform - for Life	8,40%	47,27%	33,57%	10,73%
Motherland	0%	26,60%	73,40%	0%
European Solidarity	0%	27,6%	72,40%	0%
Total	1,68%	35,53%	53,33%	2,15%

4.2 Main Findings

Catch-all strategy and AERPs

Servant of People party completely qualifies as an AERP because of not having any former MPs or ministers in the party list (Party Servant of People approved its manifesto, 2019) In 2019, this party, as expected, used cleavage appeals considerably less in comparison to other parties. Namely, cleavage appeals cover only 3,92% of the manifesto whereas in the manifestos of other parties that got in the parliament this percentage is more than 11.5%. Even though cleavage appeals by the Servant of People were in a pro-European direction which closely resonates with the electoral preferences of the West and Center of Ukraine, the amount of space dedicated to them was relatively insignificant, and the appeals themselves were rather moderate than radical.

Concerning the TV ads, only catch-all appeals were present. Several of them included explicit criticism of parties employing cleavage strategy and framing of the cleavage as an artificial one. In one of the ads, politicians dividing Ukraine based on language and ignoring the problems that concern the whole country were criticized. 'The main thing is for the West to hate the East and

vice versa, for them to call each other fascists, vatnyks¹, Bandera-followers², separatists, and may even one person say that there is no food, no money and the economy is collapsing (Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2020)' - this is how oligarchs instigated the cleavage-based polarization in the series 'Servant of People', parts of which were used for the TV ads during the presidential campaign of Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Besides, equality of regions was emphasized, which can be considered as an implicit criticism of cleavage-based politics after 1991. A cleavage issue was mentioned only concerning the vital importance of saving people's lives in Donbas. However, this can hardly be considered as a cleavage appeal since every party would, at least rhetorically, agree to this since saving lives can be considered a consensual value. It should be mentioned that Servant of People heavily exploited the fact of Volodymyr Zelenskyi being a protagonist of the TV series Servant of People in which he played the President of Ukraine. Some scenes from the series were used as TV ads for his actual presidential campaign. At the same time, the impact of the factor of TV series on the actual electoral outcome is to be determined precisely.

The predominant use of the catch-all strategy allowed Servant of People to get 43, 16% of votes nationwide and win in all the regions except for the city of Lviv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Results of Parliamentary Elections in 2019, 2019). The regional distribution of support shows that more significant support was gained in the regions which are less cleavage-oriented in comparison to those which are more prone to be supporting extreme cleavage appeals on both sides of the divide. Using a catch-all strategy helped Servant of People to decrease the unevenness of support among regions whereas being an AERP helped it to increase support in the whole country.

The effectiveness of the use of catch-all strategy by AERP is also well illustrated if to compare the parties, leaders of which won the presidential elections preceding the parliamentary ones: Petro Poroshenko Bloc in 2014 and Servant of People in 2019. Both presidents had a landslide victory during the presidential elections which gave the presidents parties an equal starting point for the parliamentary campaign. However, Petro Poroshenko Bloc was considerably more cleavage-oriented (22,47% of the manifesto and 50% of the TV ads as opposed to 3,92% of the manifesto and 0% of the ads by Servant of People). Besides, the fact that Petro Poroshenko Bloc was not an

¹ Vatnyks (ukr. - vatnyky) - a negatively connotated expression of people having pro-Russian views.

² Bandera-followers (ukr. - banderivtsi) - supporters of one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalist movement in 1930s-1950s Stepan Bandera and the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army in general.

AERP can further explain its inability to win the elections countrywide (the party won only in 8 regions out of 24) which is in line with the theoretical expectations. Finally, the total difference in support is almost a double one: 43,16% for Servant of People in 2019 (Results Of Parliamentary Elections In 2019, 2019) and 21.82% for Petro Poroshenko Bloc in 2014 (Results in the regions of Ukraine, 2014).

Contrary to the hypothesis, the analysis showed that two more AERPs (one in each election) used a catch-all strategy almost exclusively, but it did not allow them to win elections. Again, it should be noted that they did not use the catch-all strategy to the same extent as Servant of People did. At the same time, it was not the main differentiating factor.

In 2014, Self-Reliance both used catch-all strategy the most in its manifesto (80,65% of the text) and was an AERP. The only radical right appeal was the formation of a modern Ukrainian countryside as an archetypical value and one of the identity sources, which is a minor fluctuation from an ideal-type AERP. Moreover, the party was relatively vague when it comes to the cleavage appeals. The party mentioned the need to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, criticized the idea of geopolitical neutrality, supported lustration and specific steps necessary to confront the foreign aggression such as improvement of the military, creation of reserve army, proactive information policy, social protection of soldiers, support for army volunteers (Manifesto of a Political Party Self-Reliance, 2014). Also, a party did not mention how exactly the territorial integrity of Ukraine should be restored. Finally, the party ignored religion and language cleavage components. In its TV ads, Self-Reliance party relied mainly on catch-all appeals such as organizational newness of the party (no former MPs and corrupt civil servants), anti-establishment appeals and the reform of how politics is conducted. Only in one ad, favourable mentions of Euromaidan and defenders of Ukrainian territorial integrity were present.

Despite its pro-European position, Self-Reliance avoided cleavage topics and rather focused on catch-all appeals to maximize the vote share countrywide. Despite this, it did not manage to win the elections in all the regions. Part of the reason might be that the party did not participate in the presidential elections which restricted its potential for the parliamentary campaign. As for the regional distribution of votes, regional disparities of support remained strong despite the use of the catch-all strategy: the party had the biggest support in the West and in Kyiv, and the smallest in

the East (Parties which surpassed a 5% threshold in regions of Ukraine, 2014). One of the reasons might be the fact that the party originated in Western Ukraine, which might have resulted in the unevenness of political resources between regions.

Voice mostly complied with the criterion of organizational newness although its leader Sviatoslav Vakarchuk was an MP before. Voice had a rather average proportion of cleavage to catch-all appeals in its manifesto. At the same time, it was relatively radical in its positions regarding the war component. It was stated that any concessions of sovereignty and territorial integrity are unacceptable (Party Voice Manifesto, 2019). Also, the party supported the decrease of economic dependence on Russia (including the energy sector).

In the party TV ads, Voice tried to maximize the votes solely by catch-all appeals. All cleavage appeals mentioned before did not appear in the TV ads. Such a contrast means that even though these cleavage appeals were important policies a party wanted to pursue, they did not constitute the core messages Voice wanted to attract voters with. Therefore, the party's electoral strategy was predominantly catch-all. When it comes to catch-all appeals, Voice mostly focused on the elements which are characteristic for AERPs: its organizational newness and anti-establishment appeals. For instance, the party promised real changes by representing the population not being heard, by changing the way politics is conducted, by including experts and activists in the party-list as opposed to the representatives of oligarchs. The emphasis on de-oligarchization was an essential element of the TV-ads of Voice to the extent that elections were compared to a trial of oligarchs: '21th of July is the biggest trial in the history of Ukraine. The accused are the puppets of oligarchs in the parliament of Ukraine. Thanks to them all resources are owned by a few people. How would you decide? 'Guilty! Guilty! Guilty!'"(Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2020). Lastly, the party emphasized the need to strengthen the punishments for MPs absenteeism and impersonal voting.

Despite being fairly close to an ideal-type AERP, Voice did not manage to win the elections which can be explained by the fact that party did not participate in the presidential elections which created a disadvantage for Voice in terms of electorate mobilization. In terms of regional distribution of votes, it is unexpected since despite relying on catch-all strategy, its support decreases from the West to the East (Results Of Parliamentary Elections In 2019, 2019).

After examining the cases of Self-Reliance and Voice, three explanations can be offered. Firstly, the dynamics of presidential and parliamentary campaign happening one after another requires a solid result, or, at least, participation in the first campaign to succeed in the second. Both Self-Reliance and Voice did not participate in the presidential elections in 2014 and 2019, respectively, which negatively impacted their chances for the parliamentary campaign since participation in the presidential one increases the recognition and popularity of a party. Secondly, both Voice and Self-Reliance had more ties with and political resources in Western Ukraine, which might have alienated the electorate of the South-East and led to significant unevenness of support among the regions of Ukraine. Finally, the fact that the catch-all strategy was used by those two parties not to that extreme extent as was the case with Servant of People further contributed to the inability to win elections.

Catch-all Strategy and Mainstream Parties

The catch-all strategy was predominantly used not only by AERPs but by mainstream parties as well. The examples of Opposition Bloc in 2014 and Motherland in 2019 show that in case an established party uses a catch-all strategy, it does not result in winning the elections.

In 2014, a pro-Russian party Opposition Bloc used cleavage appeals almost the least among the other parties in its manifesto (14,01%). However, certain cleavage appeals contributed to the isolation of the Opposition Bloc from Central and, especially, Western Ukraine. Namely, a party supported the separation of the issues of Crimea and Donbas during the negotiations with Russia and did not mention its position about Crimea (Party Manifesto Of Opposition Bloc, 2014). Also, Opposition Bloc supported a neutral geopolitical strategy of Ukraine between the EU and Russia by promising: 'To retract from radical measures that can undermine peace in Ukraine. To certify the aspiration of Ukraine to (geopolitical) neutrality and non-affiliated status' (Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2020). Besides, Opposition Bloc supported the powers of regional governments to define Russian as a regional language and proposed to mitigate negative consequences of the Association Agreement with the EU which hints at the negative attitude to the agreement as a whole. As for the TV ads, Opposition Bloc mainly relied on the combination of a catch-all and mixed ads (92,3% in total) which is consistent with its strategy in the manifesto. As well as in the party manifesto, the biggest emphasis of Opposition Bloc was on the social

security issues such as inflation, unemployment and utility prices. Besides, when it comes to cleavage appeals, Opposition Bloc blamed the incumbent government for not being able to negotiate acceptable prices with Russia and blamed right nationalists for destabilizing and polarizing the country. At the same time, in the TV ads, Opposition Bloc avoided mentioning its strategy of restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine (which was relatively pro-Russian) which can be regarded as a way to avoid further alienation of Western and Central regions.

Despite the dominance of a catch-all strategy both in the manifesto and in the ads, it did not help Opposition Bloc to win the elections since the party was not organizationally new. Even though the electoral strategy seemed logical for the Opposition Bloc, the fact that the vast majority of its members previously were MPs of the Party of Regions (Opposition Bloc is the lifebuoy of ex-regionals drowning?, 2018) limited the effect of the strategy itself. For instance, in the Eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the party got more than 35% of votes whereas in three of the Western regions the result was less than a single percent (Results According to the Party Lists, 2014).

As for Motherland in 2019, a mainstream party being in politics since 2000, during the campaign the party wanted to form a coalition with Servant of People incentivized Motherland to mimic the electoral strategy of the Servant of People. The reliance on the catch-all strategy is the most evident in the party's TV ads where catch-all oriented ads constituted 78,57% of all the ads. The only cleavage appeal present was that Yulia Tymoshenko would be a competent commander-in-chief of the military to resist Russian aggression during her presidential campaign. At the same time, Tymoshenko criticized the use of the territorial cleavage by politicians.

Even though Motherland tried to follow the strategy of Servant of People, it had a somewhat bigger percentage of cleavage appeals both in the manifesto (11,57% versus 3,94%) and in the TV ads (7,14% of cleavage appeals and 12,48% of mixed appeals as opposed to zero of both in the TV ads of the Servant of People). However, if the dominance of the catch-all strategy was present to the same extent as in the case of Servant of People, Motherland would have hardly won the elections because of not being an AERP and because of a considerably weaker result of Yulia Tymoshenko during the preceding presidential campaign in comparison to Volodymyr Zelenskyi.

4.3 Additional Findings

The Percentage of Cleavage Appeals and their Degree of Radicalism

Percentage of cleavage appeals has a positive association with their degree of radicalism. For instance, in 2019, Servant of People mentioned the extension of cooperation with the EU and NATO but did not specify whether the full membership in these organizations constitutes the party goal. Besides, Servant of People proposed supporting the Ukrainian language through fiscal incentives and prioritized funding, but in other sources, it was specified that this measure is a substitution for prohibiting the use of any other language than Ukrainian in the public space which is a much radical measure supported by former president Poroshenko (Razumkov thinks that a wrong path was chosen on the language issue, 2019). Regarding the war component, the party merely mentioned the obligation to support the legislative initiatives of the President directed towards the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Servant of People Manifesto, 2019), but the exact content of those initiatives was not known at that point. Self-Reliance in 2014 followed a similar logic of presenting its cleavage appeals as was mentioned before: cleavage appeals were present, but these were rather moderate.

On the other side of the spectrum, parties were using the cleavage appeals more frequently, and these appeals were much more extreme. In 2014, Motherland was a party using cleavage appeals the most in its manifesto (41, 27%). Among these, Motherland supported full membership of Ukraine in the EU and NATO and demanded compensation for the aggression from Russia (Party Manifesto of Motherland, 2014). The other example from 2014 is People's Front, the party of the incumbent at that time Prime minister Arseniy Yatseniuk. Despite a smaller amount of cleavage appeals in the manifesto (31,18%), in comparison to the Motherland, it was the party having considerably more cleavage appeals than the remaining four parties under analysis. The party emphasized the need to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine without any compromises as a primary goal, emphasized the importance of Euro-Atlantic integration, reform of the military, building a wall on the border with Russia and the proliferation of the Ukrainian language in everyday life (Manifesto of a Political Party People's Front, 2014).

The examples of Opposition Platform - For Life and European Solidarity in 2019 further confirm the association. Opposition Platform, the party which emerged as a result of a split in the

Opposition Bloc (Opposition Bloc: is the lifebuoy of ex-regionals drowning?, 2018), blamed Ukrainian government at that time, but not Russia, for starting the war (Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2019). The party also stated that war was an instrument for corruption income maximization for the former President and former governments. Moreover, the newly-elected President Volodymyr Zelenskyi was criticized for not being able to confront nationalists whom Opposition Platform perceived as the agents of war: 'They promise peace, but the war is continuing. They are calling themselves servants of people, but actually are afraid of nationalists that want war. Only we negotiate directly with Donetsk, Lugansk and Moscow' (ibid). As for European Solidarity, the rebranded party of the former President Petro Poroshenko, the party mentioned clear Euro-Atlantic integration goals such as compliance with the Copenhagen criteria by 2023, EU membership by 2030, readiness to NATO membership by 2023 (European Solidarity Manifesto, 2019). Besides, while campaigning in the second round of the presidential elections, Petro Poroshenko compared Volodymyr Zelenskyi with Vladimir Putin and claimed that the primary question to be answered during these elections is whether Ukraine will continue to exist hinting that the victory of Zelenskyi would mean the victory of Russia. Besides, the party explicitly criticized the Opposition Platform for Life by calling it an agent of Kremlin and, in general, framed the main goal of its electoral campaign as stopping the revenge of pro-Russian forces.

There is one exception which is Radical Party in 2014 having 25,35% of its content dedicated to cleavage appeals which is an average number for these elections, but its level of radicalism in cleavage appeals stands out. As for the war dimension, Radical Party proposed to restore the nuclear status of Ukraine to have more leverage against Russia, measures towards neutralization of internal enemies supporting Russia, cancellation of all financial debts to Russia and opposed the idea of federalization of Ukraine ('Radical Party Of Oleg Liashko' Manifesto, 2014). Besides, the Radical Party referred to the conflict with Russia as a national liberation war, encouraged everyone to contribute to the defence of Ukraine and emphasized the presence of soldiers and army volunteers in the party list. The unacceptability of Russian as a second official language was also emphasized. This exception from the rule can be related to populism as a political style including the elements of appealing to 'the people', constructing the perception of crisis, breakdown and threat and making use of 'bad manners' (Moffitt and Tormey, 2013) which tend to make the communication more radical. The following quote from the manifesto can illustrate the second and the third elements: 'Deseparatization means neutralization of internal enemies. Werewolves

and saboteurs from the parliament, corrupt officials in the East, corrupt policemen and entrepreneurs who pay mercenaries for assassinating Ukrainians will be punished politically and criminally. Oligarchs who directly organized separatists will be deprived of their property (Archive Of Ukrainian Political TV Ads, 2020)'. Moreover, the very element of radicalism prevented Radical party from being closer to the ideal-type AERPs since its manifesto and TV ads contained radical left and right appeals. At the same time, according to the criterion of the organizational newness, the party complied with the criteria except for the party leader Oleg Liashko being an MP one convocation before.


It appears that fully avoiding to provide a party's position concerning cleavage matters is hardly achievable in case a cleavage has all three elements according to Bartolini and Mair (1990): social-structural, normative, organizational/behavioural. Having all three elements means crucial social importance of a cleavage which implies that social groups constituting a part of this cleavage need to know on which side of the divide a party is to make a voting decision. Therefore, even in the case of the Servant of People, the party tried to hint on its pro-European orientation in the manifesto to attract the votes of the pro-European side of the cleavage.

The Percentage of Cleavage Appeals and the Unevenness of Support between Regions

According to the theoretical expectations, the higher is the degree of use of the cleavage strategy, the higher is the unevenness of support between regions. Regarding the illustrations of the general tendency, People's Front and Petro Poroshenko Bloc in 2014 are worth comparing. The pattern of support of the People's Front was typical for a pro-European, cleavage strategy-oriented party: the highest support in the West (37,48% maximum) and the lowest in the East (5,94% minimum) (Results Of Parliamentary Elections In 2019, 2019). As for Petro Poroshenko Bloc, there was no noticeable difference in the levels of support between Western, Central and even Eastern regions with only slightly higher percentage of support was in the Center (Results in the regions of Ukraine, 2014). Therefore, having considerably more cleavage-related appeals secured People's Front leadership in the Western regions, whereas Petro Poroshenko Bloc was mainly leading in the South and Center. However, for the remaining parties in the elections of 2014, this association does not work. As for Self-Reliance in 2014, despite having the biggest support in Kyiv, the rest of the distribution shows higher support in the West and lower in the East. Even though the


differences are not that striking in comparison to parties relying on cleavage strategy, the regional distribution of support still had a territorial cleavage pattern. Opposition Bloc is another party for which this association does not work since the support for this party varied from less than a percent in three Western regions to 38,69% in Donetsk region (Results in the regions of Ukraine, 2014). However, this can be explained by the association of the Opposition Bloc with Party of Regions which had its voter base in the South-East. As for the other exceptions, Motherland and Radical party in 2014 which relied on cleavage appeals much more than Self-Reliance and Opposition Bloc are worth considering. The support for Motherland is equal in both West and Center of Ukraine (Results in the regions of Ukraine, 2014) despite for predominant use of cleavage strategy. The cause of this might be in rural-urban divide due to a particular emphasis of Motherland on the issue of agriculture which is also the case for the Radical party.

Maps 3-8. Support of parties getting into parliament in 2014 by constituency, each party separately (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014, n.d.).




Motherland


Radical Party




Opposition Bloc



Self-Reliance



Petro Poroshenko Bloc




People's Front

Maps 3-8. Support of parties getting into parliament in 2014 by constituency, each party separately (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2014, n.d.).

As for the elections of 2019, most parties prove the positive association between the percentage of cleavage appeals and unevenness of support. European Solidarity and Opposition Platform - For Life comply with the theoretical expectations since a high reliance on the cleavage strategy resulted in an enormous unevenness of support. Support of European Solidarity ranged from more than 15% in Lviv region to less than 3% in certain districts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk regions whereas support for the Opposition Platform - for Life ranged from more than 40% in Donetsk and Luhansk regions to less than 5% in five Western regions (Results Of Parliamentary Elections In 2019, 2019). Comparing these parties with Servant of People, if not to


take into account two outlier regions, support for Servant of People ranged from 31 to 51% which is relatively an even distribution for Ukrainian elections. The case of Voice is an exception since despite using only catch-all appeals in the TV-ads, Voice gained much more support in the West than in the other regions. Part of the reason is the alliance with the Ukrainian Halychyna Party particularly influential in Lviv region (Part of UHP is joining Voice led by Vakarchuk, 2019) which strengthened political resources of Voice in the Western regions. Besides, the insufficiency of political resources in the South-East is illustrated by the fact that the party did not manage to nominate its candidates in many single-member districts in these regions which impacted the result of the party list, as well (Candidates in single-member districts, 2019). As for Motherland, the same factors playing a role in 2014, can explain the unexpected pattern of support distribution in 2019, as well. It should be noted that total evenness of support is hardly achievable in a country with a strong influence of territorial cleavage. The best strategy to minimize the unevenness is to use a catch-all strategy which would mostly attract Central regions and result in somewhat smaller than in Center, but equal to each other results in the West and East which was proven by Servant of People in 2019. Even though there is an equal number of exceptions and the cases proving the association, the influence of other factors was found for all deviant cases. Therefore, this association cannot be disproved since those other factors were not held constant.

Maps 9-14. Support of parties getting into parliament in 2019 by constituency, each party separately (Parliamentary elections in Ukraine in 2019, n.d.).




European Solidarity


Voice



Motherland



Opposition Platform - For Life



Servant of People

CONCLUSION

The main goal of the research project was to study the relationship between the use of the catch-all electoral strategy by AERPs and the impact of the territorial cleavage on the results of elections in Ukraine during the parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2019. Studying this relationship is important in order to understand why the territorial cleavage can have a different impact on the election results during the two elections if the most important factors surrounding the elections remained constant. The electoral system, level of distrust to old parties and the willingness to support new ones, territory controlled by Ukraine and socio-structural element of the territorial cleavage did not change between the elections which allowed using MSSD research design. The following hypothesis was tested: the predominant use of catch-all electoral strategy by AERPs leads to the decline of the effect of a territorial electoral cleavage on the election results.

The hypothesis was tested by carrying out a content analysis of 11 party manifestos and 104 TV ads of parties which got into the parliament of Ukraine in 2014 and 2019. The content analysis combined the features of both quantitative and qualitative approaches by, on the one hand, having a concept-driven coding frame and following a strict sequence of steps and, on the other hand, focusing on latent meaning while coding and further interpreting the frequency of codes. The aim of the analysis was to find out which of the two types of appeals (catch-all or cleavage one) prevailed in the electoral communication of parties getting into the parliament. The two data sources were chosen since they provide a comprehensive overview of a political platform of a party: manifestos constitute a foundational document covering party stances on all significant policy fields whereas TV ads present the core messages a party tries to attract voters with. When it comes to the manifestos, cleavage and catch-all appeals were divided into categories to point out particular policy fields a party focused on. In particular, the categories of cleavage appeals correspond to the territorial cleavage components (language, war, geopolitical and religion) which allowed comparing their frequency of use by parties. Besides, these categories were divided into subcategories to determine a side of a cleavage a party is. When it comes to TV ads, these were divided into the following categories: cleavage, catch-all and mixed with every ad coded as a whole. For both data types, percentages of characters belonging to categories were calculated.

The empirical analysis only partially proved the hypothesis since only one AERP out of three managed to win elections by using the catch-all strategy and, thus, decrease the impact of the territorial cleavage. Such a result leads to the need to account for contextual factors surrounding the campaign and the AERPs themselves. If to compare Servant of People with Voice and Self-Reliance which were two other AERPs, the difference of results can be explained by the fact that the latter two parties did not participate in the presidential elections that preceded the parliamentary ones. Besides, Voice and Self-Reliance had considerably weaker political resources in the South-East in comparison to Western Ukraine, which decreased their chances to have high support in all the regions.

At the same time, the analysis nevertheless revealed that the variable of AERP is of vital importance in the context of decreasing the impact of the cleavage. As the analysis shows, Opposition Bloc and Motherland in 2014 also used predominantly catch-all strategy, but this did not secure those parties electoral victory since they were not AERPs. Besides, it was found that AERPs on average have significantly higher use of catch-all appeals which might be the case due to the first element of AERP definition - mainstream reformism which is leaning to the centre rather than to the extremes.

The analysis also confirmed the impact of the conditional variable, which is the decrease of importance of the war component. In line with this decrease, the frequency of use of the cleavage strategy also decreased between 2014 and 2019. Besides, the use of the war component in the party manifestos decreased in comparison to other cleavage components which suggests that a change in issue salience was followed by a change in the coverage of the war component in the party manifesto.

The study also revealed some additional findings. Firstly, TV ads are a more valid source of information about the electoral strategies since they show more of the actual variation of cleavage and catch-all appeals whereas in all the party manifestos catch-all appeals prevailed which might lead to a false conclusion that all the parties focused on catch-all strategy. The reason for this prevalence is that party manifesto is a foundational document for a political party where the policy platform of a party is presented mostly in a consensual way whereas the primary function of the TV ads is to emphasize a party's difference from other parties. Secondly, war and geopolitical

cleavage components were used much more frequently than religion and language components which might be the case because of the higher salience of the former two. Thirdly, there is a positive association between the frequency of the cleavage appeals and their radicalism despite some exceptions. Parties that had a marginal percentage of cleavage appeals could not manage to avoid more important cleavage components (war and geopolitical ones), but had moderate stances on these issues despite having to choose a cleavage side whereas parties relying on cleavage strategy had much more radical appeals and referred to more cleavage components. Besides, there is a positive association between the frequency of the cleavage appeals and unevenness of regional support of a party which is completely in line with the expectations. The more a party relies on cleavage strategy, the more it limits its core electorate to the region being on one side of the cleavage (e.g. West) and alienates the regions being on the other side (e.g. South-East). Finally, the contrasting results of parties winning the presidential elections preceding the parliamentary one are also explainable by the causal model of this study. Petro Poroshenko Bloc, unlike Servant of People, was not an AERP and did not use the predominantly catch-all strategy as Servant of People did which resulted in winning in only eight regions out of 24 and having 21.82% nationwide as opposed to Servant of People winning in 22 regions and gaining 43.16% of votes.

Regarding the limitations of this study, it should be admitted that it is of limited generalizability and replicability due to unique contextual factors surrounding parliamentary elections in Ukraine: electoral system, low level of party system institutionalization, peculiarity of the territorial cleavage components, parts of territory occupied by a foreign country. At the same time, the finding about a higher likelihood of AERPs to use catch-all strategy as opposed to mainstream parties, the findings about contextual factors intervening the causal model, the observation about a higher validity of TV ads as a data source in comparison to party manifestos can provide a foundation for future studies on this topic.

As for the prospects for further research, more attention should be paid to identifying the electorate's perceptions regarding party appeals as to whether they consider those as catch-all ones or not. This step would make the future analyses on this topic less prone to subjective judgements of a researcher. Besides, in the light of finding about the inconsistency of strategies of mainstream parties participating in both elections, the causes of this inconsistency deserve to be studied further. In addition to this, as was mentioned in the conceptual background chapter, the operationalization

of AERPs needs to be improved by regarding it as a continuous variable and creating a quantifiable scale in which parties will range from being totally organizationally new to entirely organizationally old. Besides, the dynamics of the regional distribution of support for parties in Ukraine and the impact of the territorial cleavage on it deserve to be studied to shed a brighter light on the dynamics of the importance of the territorial cleavage over the whole period of Ukraine's independence. Finally, the influence of other contextual factors that might have impacted the electoral results deserve to be studied. These include the quality of the electoral campaign in the dimensions not related to the electoral strategy such as the style of political communication, the impact of the political capital of a party leader and discrepancy of parties' political resources in different regions.

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