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"Securing our Survival (SOS)":
Non-state actors and the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention through the prism of securitisation theory

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Abstract

Largely ignored throughout the 1990s, nuclear disarmament is again a topic for mainstream debate. Starting from 2007, when influential political figures began to voice arguments in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the anti-nuclear movement has experienced a modest revival. Through the prism of securitisation theory, this dissertation analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period. Exploring Buzan and Wæver's new conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, it was possible to interpret the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb as securitising moves in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of the securitising actor, nuclear abolition activists argued that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. In order to gain a deep understanding of this securitisation process, a strong, empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC was carried out. Blending the original work of Buzan and Wæver with more recent developments on the securitisation theory, it was possible to elaborate a sophisticated framework to guide the discourse analysis of the campaign for a NWC conducted in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the institutional bodies of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process. The findings confirmed that the anti-nuclear movement follows the particular grammar of security, as it was identified by the Copenhagen School (existential threat, urgency, possible way out). It became clear that the nuclear abolition activists present the logic of zero as driven by a threat, arguing that disarmament under a NWC would put an end to the nuclear menace. Despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors, as the alarmist tone of the discourse have provided them with a loud voice in international military affairs. Moreover, it is possible to see this securitisation process as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action. In addition to exploring the instrumentality of securitisation, the analysis here presented also aims at understanding major factors that are capable of empowering or disempowering the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse.

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Acknowledgements

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List of Acronyms:

ABMT: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

COPRI: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

CTBT: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

CTBTO: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

CD: Conference on Disarmament

CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis

CND: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

ECOSOC: Economic and Social Council

FMCT: Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty

GWoT: Global War on Terrorism

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IALANA: International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

ICAN: International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICJ: International Court of Justice

IGO: Inter-Governmental Organisation

INESAP: International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation

INGO: International Non-Governmental Organisation

IPPNW: International Physicians for the prevention of Nuclear War

LCNP: Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy

NAM: Non-Aligned Movement

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

NWC: Nuclear Weapons Convention

NWFZ: Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

NWS: Nuclear Weapon States, in accordance with the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)

NNWS: Non- Nuclear Weapon States

PNND: Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

RSCT: Regional Security Complex Theory

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

START I: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UN: United Nations

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNDC: United Nations Disarmament Commission

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

1. Introduction

Sixty-five years after Hiroshima, it is now time to retire the Bomb. The will to build consensus on this statement and eventually achieve an international nuclear abolition regime has been the driving force behind the work of several national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)[1] throughout the past decades. Forty years have passed since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force and more than twenty years have gone by since the Cold War was brought to an end. Yet, the Bomb continues to proliferate inside the five official nuclear powers designated by the NPT (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China) and also outside of the international regime. Along with vertical and horizontal proliferation,[2] the modernisation of nuclear weaponry has never ceased and the will to fulfil the 1968 promise of nuclear disarmament, stated in article VI of the NPT,[3] does not seem to be on the agenda of any of the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS).[4]

But nuclear proliferation and the efforts carried out by states to either curb it or encourage it are not the main focus of this research. Non-state actors and their "struggle against the Bomb" (Wittner, 1993) are actually at the centre of the analysis that will here be presented. The objective of this study is to explore non-state actors and their ability to take part in and influence international politics. More specifically, this research is aimed at understanding how nuclear abolition NGOs make use of what are notably non-material sources of power – such as knowledge, expertise, public sentiment, contacts, moral authority and normative credibility – when interacting with

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[1] In this dissertation, NGOs are defined in conformity with the United Nations legal framework that governs NGO participation, the resolution 1996/31 of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). According to this resolution, "any such organization that is not established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered a non-governmental organization". In this resolution, "organization" may refer to NGOs at the national, subregional, regional and international levels (UN Economic and Social Council, 1996).

[2] Horizontal proliferation is used to refer to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hitherto non nuclear weapon states. Accordingly, vertical proliferation refers to the further development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon states.

[3] Article VI of the NPT states that: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968).

[4] The increased budget of the American nuclear weapons complex, the difficulties related to the Senate ratification of the New START Treaty and the lack of support for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are evidences that even the most prominent voice of disarmament among the Nuclear Weapon States – the US under the leadership of President Obama – is clearly not committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. For more details on the recent developments regarding the American Department of Energy and the nuclear weapons complex, see Collina (2011).

states in the sphere of international military affairs. In this sense, the discourse promoted by these non-state actors, in which the existence of nuclear weapons is presented as an existential threat to all humankind, is a key element in the political battle to go beyond the current non-proliferation obligations and establish a nuclear abolition regime.

Taking into consideration that the key to understand the power of non-state actors in international politics is to understand the power of their discourse (Holzscheiter, 2005, p. 725), the securitisation theory stands out as the most appropriate theoretical framework in the field of security studies for this research project.[5] Developed by scholars associated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), the securitisation theory permits the study of the role of discourse and other social practices in the "process of presenting an issue in security terms" (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 214). Given the centrality of discourse in the campaigns carried out by the anti-nuclear organisations, the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis will draw upon the original work of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver on securitisation and more recent developments regarding the discursive construction of security.

1.1 *The anti-nuclear movement and the securitisation of nuclear weapons*

The history of the peace movement has been the subject of several outstanding books and the impact the "arms control transnational network" had upon international politics during the Cold War has been vastly researched and now constitutes a well-established literature in the field of international relations.[6] Nevertheless, a deep understanding of the advocacy of nuclear disarmament as an attempt to securitise nuclear weapons is yet to be presented. A renewed opportunity to do so occurred recently, after Buzan and Wæver (2009) revisited their original work and developed the concept of *macrosecuritisation* to better describe securitising moves that take place at the system level – "where the referent object is, in some sense, all of humankind" (p. 254). The refinement of their previous framework suits the study of the anti-nuclear campaigns, in which nuclear abolition NGOs present the existence of nuclear weapons

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[5] The concept of "securitisation" is in fact a neologism that was first used in the banking system and later transposed into international relations by Wæver.

[6] For a great account of the history of the nuclear abolition movement, see the three volumes of Lawrence Wittner's collection *The struggle against the Bomb* (Wittner 1993, 1997, 2003). On the arms control transnational network of the Cold War, see Adler (1992) and Risse-Kappen (1994).

as a threat to human survival. Buzan and Wæver (2009) actually mentioned the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation in their article, but they did so very briefly and always in the context of the Cold War security constellation (p.258).

Admittedly, the prominence of the anti-nuclear movement and its potential for popular mobilisation decreased greatly in the 1990s. However, a modest revival of nuclear abolitionism has recently been experienced. The increasing number of newspaper articles and editorials, governmental publications and politicians' statements urging action towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free world is one of its strongest manifestations.[7] The *Wall Street Journal* op-ed "A world free of nuclear weapons" (2007), signed by former US Secretaries of State George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, together with former Secretary of Defence William J. Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, is commonly referred to as the starting point of this trend.[8] In that article, the four statesmen argued that reliance on nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence has become "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective". Taking this into account, they recognised the need to move towards "reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally" and "ultimately ending them as a threat to the world" (Schultz, et al., 2007).

Other important political figures have since then incorporated the goal of nuclear disarmament in their rhetoric. Amid this new abolitionist wave, researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) acknowledged, in 2008, the emergence of "a broadening consensus around the world […] that more serious and effective arms control and disarmament measures should be implemented". As a consequence, they expected an increasing number of high-level discussions and debates on the merits of arms control and disarmament in the immediate future (Bates, 2008, p.1).

The prediction was borne out and various high-level workshops and panel debates did indeed occur in the past couple of years. This political configuration presented anti-nuclear NGOs with good opportunities to engage in opinion-building and policy-making processes, together with states and Inter-Governmental Organisations

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[7] See Appendix 2 for a list compiling the most relevant of these publications supporting the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
[8] For supporting views, see the articles in the special edition of *The Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 17, 1, 2010 and the texts published in Acton and Perkovich (eds.), 2009.

(IGOs). Trying to seize the nuclear disarmament momentum and transform this renewed interest into action, well-established nuclear abolition organisations joined forces and launched the "International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons" (ICAN), in 2007. These non-state actors also took this opportunity to review and update the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) they had drafted in the mid-1990s, republishing it under the title *Securing our Survival (SOS): the case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*. This fairly encouraging configuration allowed nuclear abolition NGOs to strengthen their call for a nuclear-weapon-free world inside multilateral fora, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the NPT Review Conferences. These non-state actors defended the commencement of international negotiations on the NWC as a way of putting an end to the nuclear threat.

Along with Buzan and Wæver's new conceptual developments regarding macrosecuritisation, the re-emergence of nuclear disarmament as a topic for mainstream public debate presents a stimulating environment to carry out this research project. The aim of this dissertation is to examine the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period, through the prism of the securitisation theory. Specifically, this study will investigate the NGO-led campaign for a NWC and its attempt to construe the existence of nuclear weapons as an existential threat to the survival of all humankind. By adopting a fresh perspective on the study of the anti-nuclear movement, this research is intended to provide a better understanding of the power of non-state actors in international politics and shed light on the possible instrumentality of securitisation as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action (Vuori, 2008, p. 76).

The fact that earlier securitisation studies have mostly dealt with situations in which state actors are the securitisers does not constitute an impediment to the analysis that will be presented in this dissertation. On various occasions, Buzan and Wæver have emphasised that securitisation is not limited to states (Buzan, et al., 1998, pp. 8; 24; 37). They have even approached empirical situations where non-state actors are the most common securitisers; for instance, in the case of the environmental sector (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 77). Nevertheless, the will to advance the study of non-state actors as leading securitisers is also a driving force behind this research project.

1.2 *Methodology*

The initial work of the Copenhagen School on the securitisation theory has been highly praised for providing a relevant framework to study how security problems emerge, the processes through which some phenomena are elevated to the security agenda, and why other issues fail to be considered in the realm of security. Nonetheless, this contribution made by Wæver, Buzan and others scholars associated with COPRI did not go unchallenged. Several authors have identified problematic formulations, which has led to the emergence of numerous debates and controversies. These disputes have actually contributed to the prominence of the theory within the literature on security, while also revealing the absence of a consensual approach to securitisation. The major conceptual and political criticisms the securitisation theory has been subjected to are the topic of Chapter Two; which aims at elucidating the theoretical perspective that will guide the empirical analysis conducted in Chapter Four.

Across the spectre of varying approaches to the study of securitisation processes, discourse analysis has been widely employed to identify patterns of representation and establish networks of meanings that are invariably present in the construction of threats. Following this established practice, discourse analysis will be conducted on the most central texts produced by the anti-nuclear NGOs advocating for the establishment of a NWC. This will be done with the purpose of understanding the process through which this specific public issue − the existence of nuclear weapons − becomes a security concern at the global level.

In order to fully understand the discourse promoted by the securitiser, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive framework for analysis; one that takes into account the content of the discourses, but also includes the interlocutors of the speakers and the immediate and distal contexts. Therefore, a customised framework for analysis was developed so as to guide the discourse analysis of the selected dataset. Following Balzacq's (2011b) suggestion, it comprises three different levels: agents, acts and context (p. 35). The first level encompasses the actors and relations that structure the securitisation, while the second accounts for the discursive and non-discursive practices that underwrite the securitisation and the third provides for the way contextual factors

can empower or disempower the securitising actors (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35; 36).[9] This methodological construction is intended to facilitate the study of the anti-nuclear discourse promoted by the NGOs in this securitisation process.

Guiding the empirical analysis is the conviction that the centrality of audience is best captured by disaggregating the relevant audience into different constitutions of actor and audience (Salter, 2008, p. 329; Balzacq, 2011a, p. 7). Following Salter's classification (2008), it is possible to identify four main settings in which the anti-nuclear securitising moves are presented: popular, elite, technocratic, and scientific (p. 322). This setting-based approach to the empirical study of securitisation allows the security analyst to account for variations in the content and format of securitising moves carried out by the securitising actor. The moves may vary in accordance with the different settings, which include "the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of the audience" (Salter, 2008, p. 327).

The empirical analysis will focus on the securitising moves carried out by the anti-nuclear movement in the most relevant and challenging setting of this particular process, the elite. This setting comprises the audience "whose attitude has a *direct causal connection* with the desired goals" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 185); that is, the national leaders and states' representatives who have the formal power to start negotiations on a NWC. This empowering audience, which can enable the securitisers to adopt the proposed security measure, can be found in the sessions of the UNGA and in the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. Given that the UNGA has played a significant role in advancing arms control and disarmament norms and since the NPT institutional bodies are responsible for the review of the Treaty's operation and the promotion of its full implementation, they constitute the main stages of the elite setting in this particular securitisation.

Video footage of presentations delivered by members of the selected NGOs, as well as written statements and documents submitted to sessions of the UNGA and the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees will be the main source of data. The time frame analysed encompasses the period from 1997, when the draft NWC was circulated in the UNGA for the first time, to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is

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[9] In this paper, securitiser and securitising actor are used interchangeably to refer to the actor who presents the securitising claim.

expected that this analysis will provide a map of how "patterns of representation which are constitutive of a threat" (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39) have emerge and evolved in the years after the Cold War.

1.3 *Outline*

This dissertation analyses the anti-nuclear discourse promoted by non-state actors in the post-Cold War period, through the prism of securitisation theory.

Chapter Two (Theoretical premise) examines the initial work of the Copenhagen School on the securitisation theory, as well as more recent studies on different securitisation processes. This chapter was designed to elucidate the theoretical perspective through which the anti-nuclear movement and the campaign for a NWC will be examined.

Chapter Three (The anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War world) provides an overview of the security practices performed by the nuclear abolition movement in the 1990s and 2000s. It demonstrates the feasibility of interpreting the struggle against the Bomb as an attempt to securitise the very existence of nuclear weapons.

Chapter Four (Securitisation analysis in the elite setting) explains the methodology guiding the empirical analysis, as well as the general and specific findings obtained. The results confirmed that the anti-nuclear movement follows the particular grammar of security (existential threat, urgency, possible way out) when promoting securitising moves in the elite setting. It was possible to identify major factors that can empower or disempower their claims, as well as the strong points and weaknesses of their acts.

Chapter Five (Conclusion) summarises the main findings and discusses this attempt at securitisation of nuclear weapons. Additionally, it provides directions for future research.

2. Securitisation theory

The analysis that will be presented in Chapter Four makes use of the securitisation framework to examine the NGO-led campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons through the establishment of a NWC. However, the theoretical input does not come only from the scholars associated with the Copenhagen School but also takes into account critiques and contributions made by several other authors; such as Balzacq (2005, 2011a, 2011b), Salter (2008) and Vaughn (2009). Blending the original work of Buzan and Wæver with more recent developments on the securitisation theory requires a careful examination of the weaknesses and the strengths of the different perspectives in question. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is not to tell the story of the securitisation theory so far, but to elucidate the perspective guiding the empirical analysis and to clarify contentious issues that are usually associated with the securitisation theory.

Following a brief account of the origin of the securitisation theory, its main concepts and arguments will be presented. After that, the most important controversies and criticisms related to the theory will be addressed. Finally, new developments regarding macrosecuritisation and security constellations will be examined, since they are of crucial importance to the study of the anti-nuclear movement and the macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons.

2.1 *The Copenhagen School*

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, the debate about deepening and widening the concept of security was already one of the most prominent discussions within international relations. On different occasions, Buzan and Wæver addressed this debate and expressed their opinions on some of the main controversial issues; such as the links between identity and security, as well as the sectorialisation of security (Buzan, 1983, 1991; Buzan, et al., 1990; Wæver, et al. (eds.), 1990; Wæver, et al., 1993). When reviewing those publications, Bill McSweeney (1996) coined the term "Copenhagen School" to refer to the collective work of Buzan, Wæver and other scholars associated with COPRI (p.81).[10] Since McSweeney first wrote about it, the Copenhagen School

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[10] Although this collective designation may overlook the particularities of each scholar, the term became a common shorthand to refer to the work of Buzan and Wæver.

have further developed its views on security and became widely known for its original formulation of the securitisation theory.

The articles "Securitization and desecuritization" (Wæver, 1995) and "European security identities" (Wæver, 1996), together with the monograph *Security: a new framework for analysis* (Buzan, et al., 1998; hereafter *Security*), can be considered the core of the securitisation theory, as they contain the most relevant formulations that have informed Buzan and Wæver's work since then. Combining realism with post-structuralism (Williams, 2003), securitisation theory received criticisms from different theoretical and political perspectives when it first appeared. Many years later, the securitisation framework continues to be surrounded by controversies. Although different scholars have identified inconsistencies in the work of the Copenhagen School, that did not lead to the discredit of the securitisation theory as a whole. In reality, most of the critics of the theory have recognised its importance and, thus, proposed solutions for the problems they discovered. The various debates and controversies have actually contributed to the continued prominence of the securitisation theory within security studies. At the same time, these more or less independent critical assessments have exposed the lack of a consensual approach to the study of securitisation.

2.2 Security and securitisation

Inspired by developments in the field of the philosophy of language, Wæver has emphasised in his writings the discursive aspect of the construction of security. In view of that, he proposed that security be considered as a speech act, a self-referential discursive practice: "in this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance *itself* is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)" (Wæver, 1995, p. 55). This conceptualisation of security is markedly influenced by J. L. Austin's studies on the power of language and his formulations regarding speech acts and performative utterances. According to Austin, in addition to constative statements - which merely describe a given reality -, there are the performative ones; that is, utterances that are capable of performing an action (Austin, 1962).[11] Following Austin, Wæver argued that

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[11] The "I do" uttered by the bride and groom during the lawful marriage ceremony is one example of a performative speech act, since by uttering those words something is done (Austin, 1962, p. 5). Other common examples are the ones mentioned by Wæver: betting, giving a promise, naming a ship.

the power of language in fulfilling an action and transforming a situation could also be seen in the domain of security. Thus, he affirmed that by labelling "issues and developments as 'security' problems", an actor could transform the way those issues and developments were perceived and, consequently, acted upon (Wæver, 1995, p. 75).

Considering that only constative statements can have their content analysed in terms of veracity, security as a performative speech act can neither be true or false (Taureck, 2006, p. 7). Because "security is a quality actors inject into issues" (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 204), it cannot be understood in objective terms. For that reason, the Copenhagen School abdicates any pretensions of objectively identifying security threats. The "defining criterion of security is textual" (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 176); so, security analysts should not concern themselves with whether the security issues that constitute threats are real or not. In this sense, the power of security lies in its internal, linguistic-grammatical structure. It follows that external, contextual and social factors are relegated to a marginal position in the Copenhagen School's framework; being considered in the realm of the facilitating conditions "under which the speech act works in contrast to cases in which the act misfires or is abused" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32).[12]

As a linguistic practice, security constitutes "a *specific* way of framing an issue" (Wæver, 1996, p. 106, emphasis added). For that reason, security analysts should be able to identify the specificity of security; its very own "securityness". With this in mind, Wæver sought to find out the specific grammar of security, searching for the key meanings that were present whenever an issue was being framed in terms of security. He noticed that the general sense of the concept of security was actually tied to the idea of national security (1995, p. 68).[13] Moreover, the distinctive quality of security problems were "urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political 'we' from dealing with any other questions" (1995, p. 70). From these

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[12] Facilitating conditions are causal (but not determinant) mechanisms in the securitisation theory. They mainly refer to the influence of the social capital of the enunciator, whether he/she is in a position of authority (not necessarily official authority) and particular features of the alleged threat and the referent object (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 33).

[13] According to Wæver, traditionally, security refers to national security. In this sense, he states: "There is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of "security" in non-state terms; it is only as a critical idea, played out against the concept and practices of state security, that other threats and referents have any meaning" (Wæver, 1995, p. 68). This is a central aspect of the Copenhagen School and it is possible to spot elements of the national logic of security in the emphasis Wæver and Buzan usually place on authority, threats, enemies and emergency measures. Williams (2003), among others, has identified this characteristic as a deriving from Carl Schmitt's work.

observations, it was possible to deduce that framing an issue in security terms would traditionally entail a state actor arguing that such issue represented an existential threat to the self-determination and sovereignty of the political unit and, thus, the state should be granted the power to adopt extraordinary measures that could tackle the threat (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 21).

The situation just described depicts a case of securitisation - the process through which something is constituted as a security issue; that is, it is securitised. Conventionally, governments and state officials have played the role of the securitising actor, who claims special powers to protect the right to survival of the political unit. The securitisation theory, however, was designed to allow the study of a broader security agenda, one that goes beyond the state-centric thinking that has for long characterised the field of international relations. Accordingly, the framework proposed by the Copenhagen School admits the possibility of the emergence of non-traditional threats, coming from sectors other than the military.[14] Another innovative feature of the securitisation framework is its ability to accommodate non-state actors that participate actively in international politics and might even act in the capacity of the securitiser (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 12).[15]

It follows that the securitisation process can be described as a relatively open one; where a securitising actor stages an issue on the political arena, before the relevant audience. As a rule, that is done in a specific way. Following the grammar of security, the securitiser argues that the issue in question poses an existential threat to a referent object that has a legitimate claim to survival. The securitising actor also points to the urgency of tackling such issue; after all, "if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in

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[14] The Copenhagen School often adopts a sectorial approach to the study of security. They argue that sectors are important as analytical devices, which enable the security analyst to differentiate distinct types of interaction. Sectors are defined as "views of international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units", (Buzan, et. al., 1993, p. 27). In international relations, there is the following division (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 7):
  1. military (relationships of forceful coercion)
  2. political (relationships of authority, governing status and recognition)
  3. economic (relationships of trade, production and finance)
  4. societal sector (relationships of collective identity)
  5. environmental sector (relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere)
[15] Even though it is true that states have been the actors historically endowed with security tasks (Buzan, et al., 1998, p.37), this does not configure an absolute impediment to non-state actors playing the role of the securitiser.

our own way)" (Buzan, et. al, 1998, p. 24).[16] He or she then promptly presents a solution to the alleged security problem; which often involves the adoption of extreme measures.

Interestingly enough, in this discursive process of labelling an issue as a security threat, the securitising actor does not actually have to use the word security (Buzan, et. al, 1998, p. 33). In reality, the securitiser constructs his or her argument in conformity with the specific rhetorical structure of securitisation (existential threat, sense of urgency, a possible way out) with or without having to say the "s-word". This discursive articulation is intended to convince the relevant audience to agree with the proposed measures. If the securitising claims are accepted by the relevant audience, then it is possible to state that the alleged threat has been securitised (Buzan, et. al., 1998, pp. 27; 31).

At this point it is possible to identify two of the most problematic formulations of the Copenhagen School with regards to the securitisation process; namely, the fixed meaning of security and the lack of concrete criteria to evaluate whether or not a securitisation has been put in place. Despite statements in favour of an open approach to the concept of security, the identification of security with the survival in the face of existential threats prevails in *Security* (Ciută, 2009, p. 307). As a consequence, the meaning of security is established a priori, preventing the Copenhagen School from exploring the "relational dynamics of the social and political *process* of generating meaning" (Stritzel, 2007, p. 367). The theory proposed by Buzan, et al., does not enable the analyst to grasp contextual variations in the concept of security. Moreover, it does not take into account the self-understanding of actors with regards to the meaning of security. As Ciută (2009) has argued, whatever the actors label as security must be taken into consideration, even if it does not conform to the Copenhagen School's pre-established definition of security.

With regard to the establishment of a successful securitisation, one cannot find in the Copenhagen School framework firm standards that indicate whether or not a securitisation has been put in place. In *Security*, there are passages in which the authors state that the securitising claims must be accepted by the relevant audience and exceptional measures must be adopted so that a securitisation can be achieved (Buzan,

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[16] It is important to note the use of the pronoun "we", since securitisation is always about collectivities and, thus, it often involves social identities.

et. al., 1998, p. 26). Nevertheless, on other occasions, Buzan, et al. (1998), lower their standards, affirming that the permission to "break free of the normal procedures and rules" already signifies that a securitisation has been accomplished (p. 25). In one of these confusing statements, the authors affirm that "the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (p. 25). They, however, do not explore the dynamics of this intersubjective process, nor do they elaborate on what their understandings of "normal political procedures", "relevant audience" and "substantial political effects" are. This might be a conscious decision, since all these categories can be considered case dependent and establishing rigid parameters would perhaps make the securitisation framework impractical. Yet, the absence of a frame for how securitisations are successful or fail has led to disparate understandings of what the construction of a threat image exactly entails.

Despite these problems, the Copenhagen School has to be praised for providing a relevant framework to study how security problems emerge, the processes through which some phenomena are elevated to the security agenda, and why other issues fail to be considered in the realm of security. Moreover, this same framework can be of value when the inverse process is the object of study; that is, when the focus is placed on the desecuritisation of a given issue. In such cases, the issue is removed from the emergency mode of security into the "normal bargaining process of the political sphere", not being framed in threat-defence terms anymore (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 04; p. 29).

Even though the Copenhagen School is not categorical on this regard, it is evident that in both securitisation and desecuritisation processes the securitising actor and the audience act together. In the construction of a given issue as a threat and in the opposite case of removing it from the sphere of security, the endorsement of the relevant audience is of crucial importance. In order to create shared understandings of threat perception and security, both the securitiser and the audience take part in one dynamic process, permeated by relations of power and the politics of negotiation, arguing and persuasion. Therefore, it is possible to see securitisation as an inter-subjective process; in which "the security act is negotiated between the securitiser and the audience" (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 26).

Constructing a security issue, however, cannot be simultaneously a self-referential practice and an intersubjective process. Nevertheless, that is how it is depicted by the Copenhagen School. Adding to this confusion is the fact that, on several occasions, Buzan and Wæver use the terms security and securitisation interchangeably (Ciută, 2009, p. 312). These problematic formulations concerning the concept of security have ultimately led to different understandings of the securitisation process. To be precise, whether one agrees with the self-referential quality of security or decides to focus on its intersubjective character will greatly affect his or her perspective on securitisation (Balzacq, 2011a).

2.3 *Two main approaches to securitisation*

Balzacq (2011a) has identified two main approaches to securitisation; namely, the philosophical and the sociological.[17] While the first one is centred on the formulation of security as a speech act, the sociological variant draws more extensively on insights provided by authors associated with sociological studies – such as Bourdieu and Foucault.[18] Separating these two views of securitisation are different perspectives on significant issues; chiefly, (1) the idea of security as a speech act, (2) the role of the audience and (3) the importance of external and contextual aspects.

The philosophical approach is marked by its emphasis on the linguistic elements of the discursive practices of security. It is also characterised by the reliance on the speech act theory, which is often related to a diminished attention to the role of the audience. Similarly, the insistency on the self-referential character of security has led this particular perspective to downplay the importance of external and contextual aspects in the process of framing something in security terms (Balzacq, 2011a).

Balzacq argues that the predominance of the textual aspects of securitisation over the contextual and social ones in the analytical framework established in *Security* shows that the Copenhagen School's perspective on security and securitisation is closer to this philosophical variant. Characteristically, the framework developed by Buzan, et

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[17] Stritzel (2007) proposed a similar classification, referring to the two variants as internalist and externalist readings of securitization.

[18] It is important to observe, as Balzacq accurately did, that these two poles are ideal-types and, thus, most actual researches will in fact be located somewhere in between the two categories. It should also be noted that not all studies that deal with securitisation theory make clear their perspective on the contentious issues. Frequently, it is up to the reader to grasp the author's view on these questions.

al. (1998), includes three units for security analysis: referent objects; securitising actors, functional actors (p. 36). As Balzacq (2011b) observed, audience and the context are excluded from this scheme (p.35).

In fact, due to its internal contradictions, it should be possible to place the Copenhagen School in both perspectives. Nonetheless, the internalist focus prevails in Buzan and Wæver's writings. Additionally, their approach to securitisation is mainly focused on discursive practices and written and spoken utterances are the most privileged source of data. The external, contextual and social dimensions are only briefly explored; usually, in the realm of facilitating conditions of the speech act. Amid vagueness, ambiguities and contradictions, the crucial role of the audience remains underdeveloped and undertheorised in Buzan and Wæver's work (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 59).

The sociological approach to securitisation does not deny the importance of linguistic elements and the grammar of security in the construction of security problems. In fact, most of the authors that are close to this perspective praised the Copenhagen School's contribution to the study of what Bourdieu have referred to as the "*almost* magical power" of words (Bourdieu, 1984 cited in Balzacq 2011a, p. 03). However, some of these scholars argued that the inability to take into account the significance of the external and social aspects of the securitisation process can have misleading consequences. For instance, the sole analysis of the security utterances voiced by the securitising actor can give the false impression that the linguistic content of a text can, invariably, modify a context. In this sense, it is imperative to avoid overstating the power of words. As Balzacq (2005) has noted,

> For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would *determine* its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence (p. 181).

Balzacq does not reject the assumption that security problems might be successfully constructed through language games. Yet, he considers the speech act formulation an inadequate basis for the securitisation theory. According to him, a more sophisticated analytical frame is necessary; one that allows for the study of situations where not only discursive but also non-discursive events can influence the construction

of a threat. In this sense, Balzacq (2005) argues that securitisation should be considered as a pragmatic act, "a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances" (p. 172). Fighting against the primacy of content over context, he proposes an integrative framework; in which the audience and its reactions to the staging of the alleged threat, as well as the particular features of the object, are more than just facilitating conditions. Elements internal to the speech are considered together with "the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 172).

In his conceptualisation of security as a pragmatic act, Balzacq points to the importance of heuristic artefacts that can be employed by the securitising actor; such as metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes and emotions. Elaborating on the framework proposed by the Copenhagen School, his formulation incorporates extra-linguistic resources to the analysis of securitisation processes. Moreover, Balzacq's approach to security offers more sophisticated tools to the study of securitisation, as it considers the power of the dispositif[19] and the structuring force of practices[20] that are part of the construction of security.

Emphasising the centrality of practices in the discursive construction of security, Balzacq drew attention to repeated, routinised types of behaviours, which are present in everyday politics. Observing empirical cases of securitisation, it is possible to see that securitisers do not necessarily resort to the terminology of exception or emergency. As Balzacq, et al., (2010) has noted, securitising claims are often "repeated, rooted in (liberal) traditions, in routinized practices of everyday politics, in calls for freedom and democracy". Moving away from the problematic notion of exceptionality, Balzacq strengthened the empirical potential of securitisation theory, integrating the processes of securitisation and policy-making in a smoothly manner.

Like Balzacq, most scholars associated with the sociological variant of securitisation studies consider the contextual and social aspects of securitisation to be of

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[19] Balzacq adopts Foucault's definition, according to which a dispositif is "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. The dispositif itself is the systems of relations that can be established between these elements" (Foucault, 1980 cited in Balzacq, 2011a, p. 29, fn 27).

[20] Balzacq quotes Andreas Reckwitz's definition of practices as "a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 'things' and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding and know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge" (Reckwitz, 2002 cited in Balzacq 2011a, p. 15).

major relevance. Moreover, they place at the centre of their analysis the intersubjective practices of securitisation, through which securitising actors and the relevant audience(s) assign meaning to the issues in question. Most empirical studies have not only focused on the content of discursive securitising moves, but have also considered how these moves are presented and how the target audience responds to them. From this sociological perspective, it has been possible to gain valuable knowledge regarding the impact of the immediate contextual settings on the use of language; the types of audiences and its different roles; and the difficulties of speaking "security" in non-democratic societies (see Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson, 2007; Roe, 2008; Barthwal-Datta, 2009).

2.4 *Buzan and Wæver on the global level: macrosecuritisation and security constellations*

Throughout the years, Buzan and Wæver have employed the securitisation framework in studies mainly concerned with regional security dynamics. Already in *Security*, Buzan, et al. (1998), presented arguments supporting research focused on the regional level, stating that "the middle scale of limited collectivities has proved the most amenable to securitisation as durable referent objects" (1998, p. 36). Arguing that issues seen as a menace to objects located at the middle level (states, nations, religions, clans, etc.) would get securitised more easily than the ones situated at the individual or the system level, Buzan and Wæver decided to investigate the existence of durable sets of securitisations at the regional level. The result of such venture was the monograph *Regions and Powers: the structure of international security* (2003); in which they also sought to update the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT).

Later, however, Buzan and Wæver realised that the study of securitisation processes that involved referent objects placed at the system level had been somewhat neglected. Despite the difficulties in securitising issues that are depicted as a menace to larger collectivities (the humankind, the ecosystem, the Earth), the importance of these higher order securitisations in the global structure of security should not be overlooked. Since the end of the Cold War, Buzan and Wæver had considered regional dynamics as the most relevant ones (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p.10), but recent events demonstrated that security interactions at the system level were becoming increasingly prominent

again. The efforts regarding the American-led "Global War on Terrorism" (GWoT) and the growing visibility of the transnational environmental movement motivated these authors to conduct a modest revision of their original framework, adjusting it to the study of higher-level securitisations.

The title of Buzan and Wæver's new article, "Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory" (hereafter "Macrosecuritisation"), was pretty accurate, as it limited the scope of their revision to one element: scale. Even though the authors acknowledged the emergence of different controversies originating from their past publications, they made it clear that it was not the objective of this new text to address whatever criticisms they had received. Buzan and Wæver reiterated their commitment to the basic understanding of securitisation, referring to "Securitization and Desecuritization" (1995) and *Security* (1998), and informed the reader that their position on the relevant contentious issues was soon to be presented in two forthcoming publications.[21]

In "Macrosecuritisation", the authors adopted a slightly critical approach to refer to their previous focus on the regional level. Buzan and Wæver (2009) stated that elements of realist thinking were evident in the predominance of states and national security concerns in what could be considered "an egotistical model of security" (p. 256). Although this model came close to reality, it was not appropriate to analyse particular occasions when over-arching international security problems dominated the global structure of security. To remedy this weakness, They proposed the concept of macrosecuritisation, to explain securitisations on behalf of referent objects that are located at levels higher than the middle one and "which aim to incorporate and coordinate multiple lower level securitisations" (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 257).

As it could be anticipated, these higher order securitisations share many of the features that characterise lower level ones. Macrosecuritisations also require securitising actors, which mobilise different resources, with the purpose of constructing a specific issue as a threat, on behalf of a referent object and before the relevant audience(s). Nonetheless, due to their particular macro quality, macrosecuritisations usually establish

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[21] The two books, which have not yet been published, are: Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde, *The Politics of Security: The Securitization Framework of Analysis* (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming); Ole Wæver, 'The Meta-politics of Theorising: Desecuritization, Responsibility and Action in Speech Act Theories of Security", forthcoming.

hierarchical relations with other securitisations; possibly, incorporating or coordinating them. Another distinguishing feature of macrosecuritisations is that, when powerful, they can "operate as the interpretive framework for other securitisations" (2009, p. 265). This was the case during the Cold War, when security concerns at lower levels were re-articulated and framed in terms of the East-West conflict.

In order to properly identify a macrosecuritisation, one can compare it to other lower level securitisations, according to three different criteria. The obvious one regards the level of the referent object: individual, group, unit, civilisational, system or global. A second aspect for comparison refers to comprehensiveness; that is, the extent to which the macrosecuritisation effectively reaches and structures securitisations in different sectors. According to this criterion, different degrees of comprehensiveness will determine whether the securitisation is a niche, a partial or an inclusive one. A third point for consideration would be the degree of success achieved by the macro-securitisation, which can be evaluated in accordance to the level of support demonstrated by the relevant audience. Buzan and Wæver (2009) carefully point out that the degree of success does not strictly determine "whether something is a macrosecuritisation or not, but whether it is a powerful one" (p. 259). Again, the authors avoid establishing firm standards that determine whether or not a securitisation has been put in place. Instead, they propose that the analyst observe the power of a securitisation indirectly, assessing the impact it has on security constellations.

The idea of constellations had already figured in other texts of the authors associated with the Copenhagen School; usually, in the context of RSCT. Nonetheless, in "Macrosecuritisation" the concept is re-examined from a macro perspective. In this sense, the authors refer to constellations as sets of interlinked securitisations and their respective cross-levels, cross-sectors relations. Thus, it becomes clear that constellations are generated by macrosecuritisations, which structure and organise interdependent securitisations (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 259). Therefore, the study of security constellations permits the security analyst to see the "bigger picture"; that is, the large scale patterns of interlinked securitisations. In some occasions, these patterns are marked by the existence of a powerful macrosecuritisation, which incorporates and/or frames many of the lower level securitisations. Through such processes,

macrosecuritisations can generate system-spanning constellations - as it was the case of the Cold War (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 268).

Yet, establishing powerful macrosecuritisations can be quite expensive and involve strenuous efforts. Political capital and other sorts of resources are employed by the securitising actors in different practices that can contribute to the construction of a threat. In the case of macrosecuritisations, Buzan and Wæver argue that the creation of universalist ideologies, embracing strong political claims, facilitates the establishment and maintenance of the threat image. Since these universalist beliefs provide a basis for the creation and reinforcement of core identities, they also make the construction of shared understandings and shared threat perceptions possible. Not surprisingly, universalisms play a big part in the process of winning over the relevant audiences - domestic and international ones. Based on the main argument in which the ideology is rooted, Buzan and Wæver (2009) identified four types of universalisms: inclusive, exclusive, existing order universalism and physical threat universalism (pp. 260-61). They argued that each kind of universalism influences the dynamics of the macrosecuritisation and their respective constellations different ways. The anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation of the Cold War, for instance, was based on a variant of physical threat universalisms, since the securitising actors argued that nuclear weapons posed a threat to the physical fate of humanity (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p.261). In this case, particular features of the alleged threat, such as its unparalleled power of destruction and its indiscriminate nature, underpinned a securitisation that could eventually achieve full-scale.

2.5 *Macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons*

Although Buzan and Wæver addressed the anti-nuclear movement and the securitisation of nuclear weapons in "Macrosecuritisation", they did it briefly and only in the context of the Cold War. They addressed the current securitising moves connected to the GWoT and the securitising discourse of the contemporary environmental movement, but ignored the new abolitionist wave, given the reader the impression that anti-nuclear securitising moves are weak or non-existent in the present. Remarkably, the anti-nuclear securitisation was experiencing one of its high points at

the same time that "Macrosecuritisation" was being published, in April 2009. It was on 9 April 2009 that President Obama delivered his "Prague Speech", stating that:

> The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War […] Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of a global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up […] And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be – for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate survival […] So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons (The White House, 2009).

Far more prominently than ever before in the post-Cold War period, nuclear weapons have since 2007 been depicted by top-rank politicians and high-level state officials as a threat to the survival of humankind. But Buzan and Wæver are not concerned with this modest revival of the anti-nuclear movement. In the context of the Cold War, the authors approached the anti-nuclear securitisation from the perspective of the activists who have been advocating for nuclear disarmament ever since the first bomb was dropped, in 1945. From this point of view, Buzan and Wæver (2009) stated that "oppositional civil society groups" were the main carriers of this macrosecuritisation (p. 270) and, thus, provided an innovative account of the anti-nuclear movement during the Cold War. According to them, anti-nuclear securitisers construed the threat of nuclear weapons in connection with other security concerns, like the devastation of the environment caused by nuclear tests and the danger of war between the rival superpowers. Connecting various concerns pertinent to discrete sectors, the anti-nuclear movement was capable of establishing an inclusive macrosecuritisation (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 259).

From the viewpoint of nuclear non-proliferation, this was a relatively successful macrosecuritisation; nuclear proliferation was established as a threat and arms control mechanisms and the NPT regime were put in place to avoid this problem. Evidently, the anti-nuclear movement was not the only actor interested in preventing proliferation. At the same time that non-proliferation represented the "genuine fear that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase the chance of them being used", it also had a strong appeal to the two superpowers, who sought to maintain their privilege status and military preeminence (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 270). From the perspective of

disarmament, however, the anti-nuclear movement was not able to convince the relevant audience that outlawing and eliminating nuclear weapons configured an appropriate solution to the nuclear threat. Taking these mixed results into account, Buzan and Wæver (2009) provided the general picture of this securitisation, affirming that:

> Compared to the dominant securitisation pattern of the Cold War, securitisation of nuclear weapons, though aiming at universality, was much less widely held […] But it nevertheless represented a durable and in some ways influential minority macrosecuritisation with an active global following (p. 270).

Although succinct, this assessment of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation of the Cold War is of enormous importance for several reasons. Remarkably, it signified a change of posture towards the securitisation of nuclear weapons. Before this article, Buzan and Wæver had only mentioned the securitisation of nuclear weapons in situations where states were the securitising actor and proliferation in specific countries was in fact the issue being constructed as a threat (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 55; Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 13). The focus on the global level allowed the authors to see the securitising efforts made by the anti-nuclear movement that, until then, had been overlooked by the literature on securitisation. In "Macrosecuritisation", Buzan and Wæver not only confirmed that securitisation is a process that can take place at every level but they also strengthened the claim that non-state actors can effectively play the role of the securitisers. As a result, they inaugurated a new perspective on the study of the anti-nuclear movement, asserting the feasibility of examining the nuclear abolition discourse as an attempt to securitise the existence of nuclear weapons.

3. The securitisation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world

3.1 *Global security dynamics in the post-Cold War*

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to the East-West conflict and the ideological rivalry that had underpinned the bipolar power structure. According to Buzan and Wæver (2009), the end of the Cold War was "a massive act of macrodesecuritisation", which led to the extinction of the security constellation that had been generated by the two rival macrosecuritisations (p. 270). As for the perceived threat posed by nuclear weapons, it was largely diluted amid the wave of general optimism that became apparent in international relations during the early 1990s. As the United States and the recently established Russian Federation reaffirmed their commitment to the arms control mechanisms previously established, the "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty" was finally signed, in July 1991. Known as START I, this bilateral treaty had been in negotiation for years and its signings and posterior ratifications represented a significant reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the two former enemies.

Cooperative patterns of relations that started to emerge between the US and Russia, together with other initiatives aimed at decreasing the militarisation of international relations that had characterised the Cold War, contributed to the decreasing of public fears of nuclear annihilation. This trend was also evident among politicians, scientists and anti-nuclear activists. The Doomsday Clock, for instance, was reset in 1991, stating that there were seventeen minutes to midnight (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1991). Since its creation, in 1947, this indicator of the nuclear danger had never depicted a more optimistic situation. In fact, the time stated by the Clock's hands in 1991 is actually the best scenario this symbolic device has ever portrayed.[22]

The macrodesecuritisation that occurred when the Cold War ended meant that most of the global issues that used to be dealt with in terms of security had to be reframed; perhaps, in terms other than threat-defence. Initiatives such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction and the denuclearisation of the newly independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were indicative of this new trend in international

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[22] The timeline of the Doomsday Clock is available online, at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://www.thebulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/timeline [Accessed on 20 April 2011].

relations. Following a practice that was characteristic of the anti-nuclear movement, the Defence Ministers of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States planted sunflowers and scattered seeds where missiles used to be stationed; during a ceremony at the Ukrainian base of Pervomaisk, in 1996. Such gesture could be read as a desecuritising move, complemented by the words of US Secretary of Defence, William J. Perry: "sunflowers instead of missiles planted in the soil will ensure peace for future generations" (Perlez, 1996).

In the absence of the larger framework of the Cold War macrosecuritisation outranking lower level securitisations, the relative autonomy of security dynamics at the regional level was expected to increase. Likewise, a significant diversification of the issues and sectors involved in the security dynamics would probably follow suit. For instance, questions of identity became increasingly central to securitisations and featured prominently among local and national security dynamics in the post-Cold War world (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 272). At the global level, it was still possible to spot some securitising moves. In the economic sector, for example, the world economy and the so-called "Washington consensus" were being debated in terms of global security by both proponents and opponents of the liberal trading and financial orders (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 271). Additionally, global securitising moves carried out by the transnational environmental movement were becoming stronger and, thus, more visible. Nonetheless, security dynamics in the environmental sector would become more prominent in the 2000s; interestingly enough, that would happen concomitantly to the revival of the anti-nuclear movement.[23]

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[23] 2007 was also an extraordinary year for the securitisation of climate change, as the global climate rose to a general status of international security issue. In April that year, the UN Security Council discussed for the first time ever the potential impact of climate change on peace and security. It was also in 2007 that the Bush Administration linked energy security to climate change, recognising the military importance of both (Floyd, 2010, p. 159). Symptomatically, the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2007).

3.2 *The anti-nuclear movement and the securitisation of nuclear weapons in the 1990s and the 2000s*

The intensification of international negotiations concerning arms control agreements and reductions in the nuclear arsenal of the Cold War did not necessarily mean that steps towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons were being taken. As the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) continued to include nuclear deterrence in their defence doctrines, the wave of optimism that followed the end of the Cold War soon turned into disappointment. It became clear to nuclear abolition activists that none of the NWS considered nuclear disarmament a viable option. Moreover, the persistence of vertical and horizontal proliferation, as well as the inability to put an end to nuclear testing, reminded the anti-nuclear movement of how distant the world was from nuclear abolition.

Despite the lessening of international tensions and the decrease in popular mobilisation, peace activists and nuclear abolition organisations continued to lobby for nuclear disarmament. By different means, nuclear abolition activists and NGOs continued to draw attention to the dangers posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. Considering the nuclear threat an urgent question, a matter of life and death to all humanity, these abolitionists conducted campaigns and staged demonstrations that were charged with securitising claims. In order to tackle this problem, the anti-nuclear movement suggested that different steps be taken, all leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. According to them, time to act was always "now"; otherwise, proliferation would continue to take place. In the nuclear abolition discourse, an increased number of nuclear weapons represented a bigger chance they would be used – destroying "whole cities, populations, countries or even civilisation" (Hill, 2007).

The most notorious campaign of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period certainly refers to the fight against nuclear tests, which was seen as one important step in the direction of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, it was possible to spot demonstrations and petitions in favour of a

comprehensive nuclear test ban all over the world.[24] In areas near test sites, for instance in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, claims of radioactive contamination coming from nuclear test venting mobilised large crowds to stage anti-nuclear protests. The worrying health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing were presented in connection with the Soviet rule over Kazakhstan and the political influence of the nuclear establishment. Putting together these different concerns, it was possible to create a strong, grass-roots movement in Kazakhstan, even before the country was declared independent from the USSR. In fact, it was due to popular pressures that the Soviet cabinet minister responsible for the environment, announced in 1991 that the test site at Semipalatinsk, in Kazakhstan, was "for all practical purposes not working any more" (Nikolai Vorontsov cited in Wittner, 2003, p. 438).

The Soviet Union and then Russia observed a test moratorium starting from January 1991. On 8 April 1992, President Mitterrand announced the temporary halting of French tests. In the US, the test moratorium came with a piece of legislation that had been promoted by peace groups, along with the Democratic leadership, and it was finally approved by the Congress and sanctioned by the President in 1992. In addition to establishing a nine-month moratorium, the so-called "Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment" placed further restrictions on future tests and called for negotiations on the test-ban-treaty to be completed by no later than 1996 (Wittner, 2003, p. 460). For as long as the Americans observed the moratorium, the UK would also refrain from testing, as the British relied on the American test site in Nevada for its own nuclear explosions.

When the recently installed President Clinton announced that he would extend the US test moratorium, he also pledged to begin a consultative process with Russia and other states, aimed at commencing negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at an early date (The White House, 1993). In this context, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - a multilateral disarmament negotiating forum serviced by the UN Secretariat in Geneva - gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to begin negotiations on

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[24] The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) - which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water - had been signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and came into effect in 1963. Underground tests, however, continued to be conducted by these countries. France and China did not sign the PTBT and carried out atmospheric testing until 1974 and 1980 respectively. See Fedchenko and Ferm Hellgren (2007) for an overview of nuclear explosions conducted worldwide between 1945 and 2006.

the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) in January 1994. These negotiations were also the subject of the forty-eighth session of the UNGA, which passed a resolution calling on the CD to proceed with the CTBT negotiations as rapidly as possible (UN General Assembly, 1993).

Oblivious to these developments, China continued with its test programme, conducting several nuclear explosions between 1992 and 1996. Even though the Chinese posture on this matter was strongly condemned by the anti-nuclear movement and the public in general, it was the French plan to resume testing in the Pacific that unleashed what the *Washington Post* called a "Typhoon of Anger" (Drozdiak, 1995; Wittner, 2009, p. 210). When France interrupted its moratorium and conducted five underground tests in 1995 and another one in 1996, anti-nuclear protests sprang all around the world. In addition to large demonstrations that occurred in the French and Tahitian capitals, consumers in different parts of the globe boycotted French goods. As Wittner (2009) recounted:

> Australian unions refused to handle French cargo or French postal and telecommunication services. Sales of French wines and champagne plummeted in Australia and New Zealand […] In Sweden, French wine sales dropped by 50 percent. […] In the United States, a coalition of 40 disarmament, religious, and environmental groups sparked a consumer boycott, while the U.S. Senate unanimously adopted a resolution condemning French and Chinese nuclear testing (p. 210).

Despite the overwhelming public support for a comprehensive test ban, the Conference was not able to complete negotiations on this subject. From January 1994 to September 1996, states parties to the CD worked intensively to draft the treaty and achieved significant progress on the language, the scope and the obligations established by the CTBT. However, political quarrels, coupled with the consensual decision-making process of the CD, prevented the final agreement from becoming a reality. In view of the impasse inside the CD, the Australian delegation decided to work to bring the CTBT directly to the UN for endorsement. The anti-nuclear organizations, which had been following closely the discussions in the CD, pressed the member states to support the Australian resolution in the UNGA. On 10 September 1996, shortly after China had announced it would join the test moratorium, a special session of the UNGA approved

the CTBT by a margin of 158 to 3, with 5 abstentions (UN General Assembly, 1996a). As a result, the treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September 1996.[25]

The campaign to end nuclear tests involved efforts coming from different parts of world, which were mobilised not only by the anti-nuclear movement, but also by health and environmental organisations. Nuclear tests represented the broad threat of nuclear annihilation, but they also had visible health and environmental effects wherever they were conducted. Drawing attention to the links between uranium mining, nuclear weapons production, nuclear test explosions and nuclear waste dumping, it was possible to create an inclusive movement and a prominent campaign. This, however, was the last time a project carried out by the nuclear abolition movement received ample media attention. For the remaining of the 1990s, nuclear abolitionists continued with their activities; but these were largely ignored by the big media and the general public.

Like the test ban campaign, the World Court Project originated in the 1980s and achieved its apex in the mid-1990s. Headed by the largest US peace group, the International Peace Bureau (successor of SANE/Freeze), and two prominent nuclear abolition INGOs - the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) - this campaign was designed to have the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rule on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Even though the World Court Project did not have the mass appeal the test ban had, it still made its way inside the UNGA. In 1994, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia proposed to the forty-ninth session of the UNGA a resolution entitled "Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons". A heated debate followed the Indonesian draft and, despite the fierce lobbying campaign against it promoted by the nuclear powers, the resolution was adopted by a margin of 78 to 43, with 38 abstentions (UN General Assembly, 1994).

Taking up the case, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion in July 1996. The reply consisted in six different findings, some of which were the outcome of a tight vote. By the President's casting vote, the Court ruled that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed

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[25] For a detailed account of the CTBT negotiations, see Johnson (2009).

conflict, and particularly the principles and rules of humanitarian law" (International Court of Justice, 1996). Moreover, the Court decided unanimously that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects" (Ibid.). Since then, the anti-nuclear movement has repeated constantly these statements, in an attempt to remind the states of their "legal obligation to disarm". Starting from the fifty-first session of the UNGA, in 1996, a resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ's ruling has been adopted annually. The securitising tone of the resolution was already set in the preambulatory clauses, which affirmed that "the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth" (UN General Assembly, 1996b). Additionally, in this resolution, the UNGA recognised that "the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again" (Ibid.). Thus, in the operative clauses, the General Assembly issued a call to all states

> to commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination (Ibid).

The idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) was certainly not new. Different states and NGOs had already suggested the establishment of a legally binding international convention, regulating the elimination and institutionalising the prohibition of the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Both biological and chemical weapons had been outlawed in a similar fashion, so it was only logical that the prohibition of nuclear weapons would follow this format.[26] Despite this apparent consent on the format of the NWC, the idea had been met with the scepticism of those who asserted the unlikelihood of obtaining agreements on the legal and technical requirements of such treaty. Moreover, there had been no concrete proposals coming from states, nor had any serious research been conducted on this topic. Motivated by the outcome of the World Court Project, experts from different

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[26] It is important to note that there are substantial differences between the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the two treaties require the elimination of existing stocks of warfare agents and prohibit their acquisition in the future, only the CWC effectively establishes a verification regime.

organisations came together and drafted themselves a model NWC. Equipped with this new tool, a network of nuclear abolition INGOs and NGOs started campaigning for international negotiations leading to the establishment of a NWC as the solution to the nuclear threat.

Continuing to work with states willing to advance the goal of nuclear abolition, the anti-nuclear movement managed to include the model NWC in the "general and complete disarmament" agenda of the fifty-second session of the UNGA, in 1997. At the request of Costa Rica, the Model NWC was translated into the UN official languages and circulated to the UN member states. In his introductory letter, the Ambassador of Costa Rica presented the Model NWC as an initiative of the civil society, aimed at creating legal instruments to achieve the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. He also stated his belief that states should carry through with this enterprise (UN General Assembly, 1997a). This was an important moment for the nuclear abolition movement. As the draft reached national delegations, there was a real chance that it would be incorporated into their discussions. However, with regard to the resolutions adopted by this session of the UNGA, no substantive progress on nuclear disarmament was achieved apart from the second resolution on the follow-up of the advisory opinion of the ICJ (UN General Assembly, 1997b).

As a document for discussion, the Model NWC that circulated in the UNGA received comments, criticisms and suggestions for improvement. It was then reviewed by a consortium of experts and published in *Security and Survival: The case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* (1999); a book by IPPNW, IALANA, and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP). In addition to the improved version of the Model NWC, *Security and Survival* also contained comments and critical questions regarding different aspects of the treaty. Intended to a broader audience than the political elite, this publication also contained advocacy statements, poetry, cartoons and pictures related to the subject of nuclear weapons. In addition to the printed version, the book was made available online.

The campaign for a NWC continued to be one of the major projects of the anti-nuclear movement throughout the 2000s. In the first NPT Review Conference after the extension, in 2000, the states parties finally agreed to allocate a meeting at each of the sessions of the Review Conference for NGOs to address the NPT delegates. In this

opportunity, fifteen different statements were delivered by members of several nuclear abolition organisations. When speaking to the national delegates, the NGOs' members expressed their concern about the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the lack of progress towards disarmament. The contextual situation was particularly challenging; India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in 1998, putting into question the legitimacy of the NPT regime. In order to tackle the nuclear threat and put an end to proliferation, the members of anti-nuclear NGOs suggested that the NPT delegates worked harder to achieve a NWC. Costa Rica and Malaysia had submitted a working paper to the Conference, in which they drew attention to the 1996 ICJ's advisory opinion and asked the states parties to discuss the legal, technical and political elements required for a NWC (NPT Review Conference, 2000a). At the end of the Conference, the NPT states were able to adopt a final agreement, where thirteen practical steps towards disarmament were listed (NPT Review Conference, 2000b).

Despite these positive developments, the idea of nuclear disarmament suffered a serious setback in the year after the Conference, when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The "Global War on Terrorism" (GWoT) launched by President Bush in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks redefined the strategic landscape of American foreign policy, as well as its priorities. The linkage between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) became central to American foreign policy thinking. Certain that a terrorist attack involving nuclear, biological or chemical weapons would have disastrous effects, the Bush administration turned non-proliferation of WMD and the aversion of acts of terrorism into its highest priorities.

In this context, President Bush gave notice of the American withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), in December 2001. The withdrawal, which was justified on national security grounds, also led to the abrogation of the START II; since the version of this treaty that had been approved by the Russian Duma was based on ABMT protocols. As there were no signs indicating that the Bush administration intended to revive the CTBT, which had been rejected by the Senate during the Clinton presidency, it became apparent that arms control mechanisms were not among the top objectives of American foreign policy. In fact, plans to design new nuclear weapons

were emerging in the US, infuriating anti-nuclear activists all over the world (Wittner, 2007).

Amid these setbacks, the hands of the Doomsday Clock, which had already been moved closer to midnight twice since 1991, were again rearranged. In February 2002, the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists decided humanity was only seven minutes away from midnight. By stating this, the scientists intended to draw attention to the negative consequences of the abrogation of arms control and disarmament measures. The world was heading towards self-destruction and it was matter of the highest priority to prevent this prognosis from materialising. In this sense, the scientists argued that strengthening disarmament commitments was the only way to protect the world from the nuclear threat and to impede terrorists from acquiring WMD (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2002).

As the atomic scientists tried to securitise the existence of nuclear weapons, President Bush mobilised efforts to prevent WMD proliferation in specific countries; like Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The Bush administration linked terrorism to Iraq; arguing that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD capabilities and that he might, at some point in the near future, make this weapons available to terrorist groups. As the Iraqi government had been reluctant to give UN weapons inspectors complete information and access to the alleged WMD facilities, the Bush administration decided that military force was necessary to counter this threat. With the support of the UK and a few other nations, the US launched a major offensive attack, invading Iraq in March 2003.

Putting in place significant arms control measures between states became increasingly difficult this context. Accordingly, discussing nuclear disarmament at the governmental level was almost impossible. Yet, Russia and the US managed to conclude and sign the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), in May 2002. While it limited the number of deployed warheads, the so-called "Moscow Treaty" did not require the destruction of retired delivery systems or the dismantlement of warheads. Moreover, the Treaty did not establish its own verification regime, relying on the verification mechanisms of START I, which was set to expire three years before the reductions under SORT were to be achieved. For these reasons, the Moscow Treaty was severely criticised by anti-nuclear activists, as well as arms controllers; who expected

the US and Russia to move towards more restrictive, verified nuclear arms control agreements.[27]

If the prospect for nuclear abolition talks inside governments was dim, the same was true for civil society groups. As it became clear that Saddam Hussein did not posses any nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, the anti-war campaign gained urgency and the goal of nuclear disarmament was left to the background. Anti-war groups sprang all over the world and anti-nuclear organisations worked hard to link these two concerns together. To some extent, the challenges posed by this new configuration also represented good opportunities to the nuclear movement According to Kate Hudson, the chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament's (CND), by taking part in the anti-war movement, the CND was able to present arguments in favour of nuclear abolition to people who were initially mobilised by the question of war. As she put it, "working against war and working against nuclear weapons are both part of the same process toward global peace […] Minds are now open; it's up to us to speak with them" (Hudson, 2007).

In fact, anti-war groups joined efforts with nuclear abolitionists in a rally in New York City, as thousands of people demonstrated on the day before the 2005 NPT Review Conference was due to start. NGOs and civil society groups had high expectations for this Conference, since the NPT regime had been shaken by recent developments; such as: the North Korean withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, the discovery of AQ Khan's international nuclear smuggling network and the controversies surrounding the Iranian nuclear energy programme. They expected the Conference to address these problems and provide means for strengthening the regime.

That, however, did not happen. As the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee had failed to produce agreement on the work agenda and on the organisation of the main and subsidiary bodies, the 2005 Review Conference spent an unusually large amount of time deliberating on procedural matters. Many plenary statements, reports, and working papers that had been submitted to the Conference could not be discussed in the scarce time allocated for substantial work. One of the "debates that did not occur" (Nielsen and Simpson, 2005, p. 282) in the 2005 NPT Review Conference surely refers to the working paper submitted by Costa Rica and Malaysia, among others, calling for the

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[27] For detailed analysis of the Moscow Treaty, including its drawbacks, see Bleek (2002) and Boese and Scoblic (2002).

establishment of negotiations on a NWC (NPT Review Conference, 2005). The topic was approached by the members of civil society in the session devoted to the dialogue between NGOs and NPT delegates, but it did not lead to substantial discussions.[28] At the end of the Conference, the NPT states failed to adopt a final document with concrete recommendations for preventing proliferation or moving toward nuclear disarmament. Not surprisingly, the 2005 Review Conference has ever since been referred to as a disaster.

One of the reasons why the Conference failed to produce an agreement that could strengthen the regime was the emphasis placed by the US on non-proliferation and the disregard toward the goal of disarmament. Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) expected the link between these two objectives to be properly addressed, since the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT was made taking into account the NWS's promise to carry out the elimination of their nuclear arsenal. After the failure of the 2005 NPT Conference, the Nobel Commission considered appropriate to draw attention to the importance of international cooperation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Thus, the Commission awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its director, Mohamed ElBaradei, "for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2005). In his acceptance speech, ElBaradei referred to the arising of a dangerous configuration, in which the emergence of a nuclear black market, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology and the stagnation in nuclear disarmament posed major threats to the world. He argued that it was imperative to avert these problems through the establishment of a nuclear abolition regime. In this sense, he stated: "I have no doubt that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security" (ElBaradei, 2005).

Nuclear proliferation would make the news again in October 2006, when North Korea – formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) – conducted its first nuclear explosion. The DPRK's government, which made no effort to hide or deny the test, justified it as a demonstration of power against international

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[28] As Müller (2005) has recounted, during the NGO session of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the anti-nuclear activists delivered seventeen lengthy statements, which took up the whole three-hour session. As a result, there was no time left for exchange of ideas between the speakers and the audience.

sanctions and the American threats of nuclear war (Kerr, 2006). The test was severely condemned by the US, the UN, NATO and individual states. Although the six-party talks were resumed two months after the test, disruptions continued to mark the negotiations between the DPRK, South Korea, China, the US, Russia and Japan.

In January 2007, the Doomsday Clock was moved even closer to midnight. The scientists' decision to place the clock's hands at 5 minutes to midnight took account of the first North Korean nuclear test, suspicions regarding the Iranian nuclear energy programme and the lack of serious efforts to tackle climate change.[29] That same month, the *Wall Street Journal* had published an op-ed by former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Defence Secretary William Perry, and former Senator Sam Nunn. In "A world free of nuclear weapons", the four American statesmen followed a similar reasoning, arguing that reliance on nuclear weapons for purposes of deterrence was becoming "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective". Thus, they recognised the need to move towards "reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally" and "ultimately ending them as a threat to the world" (Schultz, et al., 2007). The importance of this public statement in favour of nuclear disarmament made by political figures associated with realpolitik was unprecedented. Distancing the goal of nuclear abolition from the utopianism with which it had been usually associated, Schultz, et al., strengthened the securitising claims of nuclear abolitionists and opened political space so that discussions about eliminating nuclear weapons could take place inside governments again.

In the US, this endorsement of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons set the political mood for the presidential campaign that was under way. In this context, the two main candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, spoke in favour of moving toward a nuclear-weapon-free world in different occasions. "Given this remarkable bipartisan consensus", Daalder and Lodal (2008) predicted, "the next president will have an opportunity to make the elimination of all nuclear weapons the organizing principle of US nuclear policy" (p. 81).

The *WSJ* op-ed also had repercussions at the international level, generating a wave of positive responses coming from different parts of the world (see Appendix 2). Nuclear disarmament was gaining momentum again and that was evident not only in the

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[29] This was the first time when climate change was considered a major factor in the atomic scientists' decision.

formal support issued by major political figures, but in the increased level of activities led by anti-nuclear organisations. As Wittner (2009) observed, after years of decrease, membership in long-established nuclear abolition groups began to recover (p. 219). Once again, anti-nuclear demonstrations were gathering large crowds. For instance, in February 2007, nearly 100,000 people gathered in London to protest against the replacement of Trident nuclear submarines (Wittner, 2009, p. 219). In order to assure a good turnout to this demonstration, CND emphasised all negative aspects of maintaining a nuclear deterrence. In addition to highlighting the security threat posed by nuclear weapons, the campaigners also employed political and economic arguments against renewing the Trident system. As a result, the popular opposition to Trident's replacement in Britain became apparent and the government was forced to bring the issue back to parliament before final action was taken (Wittner, 2009, p. 220).

It was also in 2007 that different nuclear abolition INGOs joined efforts and launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). An umbrella organisation, ICAN included NGOs all around the world. Modelled in the successful International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), ICAN's main objective was to promote the "security action", the abolition of nuclear weapons through the establishment of a NWC. With the intention of providing ICAN with an up-to-date lobbying tool, the Model NWC and the texts that were part of *Security and Survival* were updated and reprinted. In this renewed momentum for the anti-nuclear movement, IPPNW, IALANA and INESAP came together again and published *Securing our Survival (SOS): The case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*. In accordance with the title, securitising claims permeated all the different texts contained in this book.

Again in 2007, Costa Rica submitted a working paper on the NWC to the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee (NPT Preparatory Committee, 2007). Additionally, the Costa Rican and the Malaysian governments requested that the updated model NWC be circulated in the sixty-second session of the UNGA (UN General Assembly, 2008). Regarding the resolutions adopted by this session of the General Assembly, not much progress was made, except for the annual resolution on the follow-up of the ICJ's advisory opinion (UN General Assembly, 2007). Not surprisingly, the Bush administration voted against all resolutions that contained any disarmament language (Wittner, 2009, p. 218).

As the calls for nuclear disarmament grew stronger, the *WSJ* published another op-ed signed by Schultz, et al., in the beginning of 2008. Under the title "Toward a nuclear-free world", the four American statesmen reinstated the opinion expressed in the previous year and affirmed the need to reduce reliance the "deadliest weapons ever invented". According to them, the world was facing a "nuclear tipping point" and it was necessary to act fast to avoid the "nuclear precipice" and end nuclear weapons as a threat to the world (Schultz, et al., 2008).

In that same year, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented his five-point plan on nuclear disarmament. Addressing a meeting organised at the United Nations by the East-West Institute, Ki-moon mentioned the threats posed by nuclear weapons, which, he said, can have "horrific consequences". With the purpose of overcoming the nuclear threat, the Secretary-General put together a plan. Already in the first point listed, he urged all NPT parties, in particular the NWS, to consider negotiating a NWC without delay (Ki-moon, 2008).

Strengthening the calls for a nuclear-weapon-free world, the Global Zero movement was launched in December 2008. Congregating high-profile political figures and former politicians and officials of the Cold War era,[30] Global Zero defended phased and verified reductions; as well as a binding agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons by a certain date (Global Zero Commission, 2009). The political and social capital of the members of this group proved to be a catalysing factor and, shortly after it had been founded, Global Zero representatives held meetings with military officials and political leaders from key countries, like the US and Russia (Corera, 2008).

Soon after coming to power, Obama's views on nuclear disarmament were met with strong criticism, as North Korean conducted a second nuclear test, on 25 May 2009. Nevertheless, President Obama was to become a prominent voice in favour of the goal of nuclear disarmament, especially after the so-called "Prague Speech". In the capital of the Czech Republic, in April 2009, Obama reinstated his belief on the feasibility of a world free of nuclear weapons. According to him, tackling this threat meant securing our society, our economy and our ultimate survival (The White House,

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[30] Signatories included former US President Jimmy Carter, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and former British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. For the complete list of signatories, see http://www.globalzero.org/full-list-signatories [Accessed on 21 July 2011].

2009). At the same time that Obama announced his "dream of zero", he was clear about the obstacles standing on the way to disarmament. Obama mentioned the DPRK's defiance and argued for a strong international response to it, stating that "the world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons" (The White House, 2009).

Under the leadership of President Obama, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved the Resolution 1887; which reiterated the NWS' obligation under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament (UN Security Council, 2009). Taking Obama's efforts into consideration, the Nobel Committee awarded him the Peace Prize, as a recognition of his work "to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples" (Norwegian Nobel Committee, 2009). Symptomatically, the Committee highlighted Obama's leadership in the building of a world free from nuclear weapons (Ibid.).

Due to the emerging favourable scenario for nuclear disarmament, the Doomsday Clock was reset again, in 2010. This time, the clock's hands were moved one minute away from midnight, giving humanity six minutes until its self destruction. By moving back the clock, the atomic scientists praised the international efforts aimed at strengthening nuclear cooperation, as well as the improved relations between the US and Russia and Obama's dream of nuclear zero. These positive developments, however, did not diminish the urgency of their securitising claims. As it was stated on the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2010),

> For the first time in decades we have an opportunity to free ourselves from the terror of nuclear weapons and to slow drastic changes to our shared global environment. We encourage scientists to continue their engagement with these issues and make their analysis widely known. We urge leaders to fulfil the promise of a nuclear weapon-free world and to act now to slow the pace of climate change. Finally, we call on citizens everywhere to raise their voices and compel public action for a safer world now and for future generations. The Clock is ticking.

Sensing a window of opportunity, nuclear abolition activists intensified their lobbying practices before and during the 2010 NPT Review Conference. A day prior to the Conference, fifteen thousands of people gathered in an anti-nuclear rally in New York, on May 2 2010. At the Conference, twenty-eight countries specifically referred to

a NWC. Additionally, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – representing 118 countries – voiced demands for a time-bound commitment to achieve nuclear abolition under a NWC (Wright, 2010, pp. 52; 53). This time, the Conference agreed on a final agreement; in which efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on a NWC were finally acknowledged (NPT Review Conference, 2010b).

3.3 *Securitising moves in different settings*

The analysis of the main developments involving the securitisation of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War period supports the view of securitisation as a complex, historical process. As such, securitisations involve a plurality of practices, actors and audiences. Even though state actors have recently incorporated securitising claims to their rhetoric, this dissertation seeks to investigate the securitisation of nuclear weapons from the perspective of its long-standing advocates, the anti-nuclear movement. Through this approach, this research intends to advance the study of non-state actors' engagement in international military affairs and to shed light on the possible instrumentality of securitisation as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

The array of different practices involved in the securitisation promoted by the anti-nuclear organisations points to the existence of various "battle fronts" where the construction of nuclear weapons as a threat is fought; that is, it is negotiated between the securitiser and the audiences. In order to gain better understanding of the variations in the form, content, and success of different securitising moves, Salter (2008) borrowed the concept of "setting" from Goffman's dramaturgical analysis (p. 322). According to Salter (2008), "the setting of a securitizing act includes the stage on which it is made, the genre in which it is made, the audience to which it is pitched, and the reception of the audience" (p. 328). This dramaturgical approach comes to remedy the exaggerated emphasis on the internal elements of discourse that is part of the speech-act model proposed by the Copenhagen School. As Salter has observed, the success of a securitisation cannot be reduced to the formal syntax of the speech; it is also related to the existence of a common, social grammar, which encompasses the "particular history, dominant narrative, constitutive characters, and the structure of the setting itself" (2008, p. 331).

The different settings in which the securitising actors usually stage their performance are the following: the popular, the elite, the technocratic and the scientific (Salter, 2008). Affecting the way in which the securitiser chooses to present its claims are the different audiences comprised in these settings, as well as the specific rules and procedures that governs them. Employing Salter's classification of settings, it is possible to identify the main moves and their respective audiences in the securitisation of nuclear weapons conducted by the nuclear abolition movement (see Table 1). It is important to remember that, in reality, these different settings are all connected, "as they are part of the same policy-making process" (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 74).

Salter's scheme permits a more nuanced and complete analysis of the securitising moves, which can succeed in a given setting and yet fail to gain the support of a different audience. Thus, he argues that securitisation studies should be able to account for the varying degrees of success achieved by the securitiser.

Table 1 – Four settings in which the anti-nuclear movement stages its securitising moves

SETTING	MAIN AUDIENCE	MAIN STAGES	MAIN SECURITISING MOVES
Elite	Top-rank politicians	the UNGA and the institutional bodies of the NPT review process	Discussions in the Senate/ Parliament; debates in the UNGA and in the NPT Review Conferences; international workshops; high-level political meetings.
Popular	General public	Mainstream media, the Internet.	Movies; documentaries; music; newspaper articles; popular demonstrations; paper handouts.
Scientific	Academics, scientists and arms controllers.	Expert conferences	Academic publications; expert conferences.
Technocratic	Civil Servants	Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.	Debates and negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission.

The technocratic setting

If it is true that "the restrictions of mandate and bureaucratic thinking will predominate in technocratic politics" (Salter, 2008, p. 331), then there is no doubt that the CD and the United Nations Disarmament Commissions (UNDC) are, in this case, the main stages of the technocratic setting. These two multilateral fora are characterised by intensive debates about their own procedural rules and lack of progress regarding substantial disarmament issues. Moreover, both institutions have quite restrictive policies governing the participation of civil society organisations.

In the CD, for instance, very little of what happens during the many weeks in which the Conference is convened is open to NGOs. Notwithstanding, nuclear abolition organisations have found ways to lobby national delegations and engage with the work of the Conference. They can request the official documents of the plenary meetings and follow the online reports of NGOs that are present in Geneva and, thus, are aware of the discussions inside the CD. NGOs also have the right to submit documents to the CD and to make written material available to the members of the Conference two times per year. In 2004, the CD agreed on hosting one informal meeting with NGOs every annual session. However, this can only occur once the CD has adopted a programme of work, which does not happen very often.[31] Some member-states have emphasised the need to modify the rules of the CD so that NGOs can be more effectively included in the process, but no substantial improvements have so far been achieved.[32]

Even though there is little public interest in the UNDC, anti-nuclear NGOs try to follow these meetings. During the spring, when the Disarmament Commission meets, the organisations that can make their way to New York hold panel discussions in connection with the UNDC agenda. In order to engage with the member states, NGOs try to organise these events in partnership with national delegations. These informal meetings are one of the stages nuclear abolitionists created to present their securitising moves in the technocratic setting.

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[31] After ten years of impasse, the CD was able to adopt a programme of work in 2009. However, the Conference failed to adopt a framework for implementation before the annual session ended. When it resumed its work in 2010, the programme of work had to be renegotiated among members, who failed to come to a consensus. The Conference ended its 2010 session without any progress on substantive issues.

[32] For the past two years, the Conference has allowed members of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to read out a statement on the occasions of the International Women's Day. This has been the only chance members of NGOs have had to address the delegates during an official session.

The scientific setting

The scientific setting is mostly made up by nuclear scientists and arms controllers. Considering that these experts posses authoritative knowledge on subjects that are relevant to policy projects, it is tempting to see them as an "epistemic community" (Haas, 1992). This representation, however, may be misleading. As Johnson (2009) has already noted, there are difficulties in presenting these actors as a unified community (p. 198). The political fragmentation of these scientists and arms controllers and the fact that they actually provide competing information and advice makes it more prudent to characterise them in terms of epistemic groups rather than a single community.

Although this is somewhat a restricted environment, organisations that focus on research and are part of the network of nuclear experts have managed to promote a discourse in favour of nuclear abolition in the stages of the scientific setting.[33] This is not that difficult, considering that a large number of scientists are openly concerned with the military use of nuclear technology and supportive of the goal of nuclear disarmament. While there is a long tradition of calls for nuclear zero coming from the scientific rank, one should not overlook the arguments of scientists and arms controllers that advocate for "nuclear security" - which usually involves increased budget, being allocated to further development of nuclear military technology as to increase the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear arsenals.

As it is evident, science and politics are very much intertwined in the securitising moves conducted in this setting. For instance, amid the CTBT negotiations, in the 1990s, the feasibility of a global system monitoring nuclear tests was a prominent topic of scientific research. Different conferences were organised with the purpose of debating monitoring techniques; which required scientific input from the disciplines of seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound and radiounuclide. Since these scientific exchanges were part of the political battle surrounding the CTBT completion and posterior entry into force, they were also part of the different securitising moves in favour of disarmament or deterrence. As the CTBT remains in limbo, the CTBTO – the

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[33] The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), SIPRI, INESAP and IPPW are all examples of organisations that, in varying degrees, promote securitising moves in the scientific setting.

organisation in charge of the Treaty – continues to promote these scientific meetings, at the same time that it tries to spark the necessary ratifications to bring it into effect.[34]

Although this setting is not completely accessible to the general public, securitisers have explored the scientists' expert knowledge in securitising moves aimed at the popular or elite audiences. Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the inspections it conducted figured constantly in the political discussions of the US and the UK (Roe, 2008). At present, IAEA inspectors, weapons specialists, scientists and engineers have taken part in the controversy related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Talks about nuclear fuels, the levels of uranium enrichment and the different types of nuclear reactors frequently present a mix of scientific, political and security issues.

The popular setting

Securitising moves in the popular setting declined greatly after the end of Cold War. The turnout in public events aimed at strengthening the calls for nuclear abolition is definitely smaller now than it used to be during the apexes of the movement, in the late 1950s and in the 1980s. Even so, anti-nuclear activists have continuously used opinion polls results to make their case for abolition, arguing that the general public is in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.[35] The sources of those opinion polls vary and so does the reliability of such data. Nevertheless, it has been showed that, accurate or not, statistical data can have a real impact on securitisation processes - especially when picked up by the media (Léonard and Kaunert, 2011, p. 69; 70). This, however, has not been the case of the anti-nuclear movement; which remained largely ignored by the mainstream media throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. Counterproliferation, instead of disarmament, has been the perspective favoured by the media to address matters of nuclear security. Accordingly, the controversial nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea have been extensively covered, but the linkages between nuclear proliferation and the lack of progress towards disarmament have been left unexplored (Tyson, 2004, p. 61).

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[34] In recent years, the CTBTO has hosted the Symposium on Synergies with Science (2006), the International Scientific Studies Conference (2009) and the Science and Technology Conference (2011). The objective of these meetings was to discuss and explore advances in science and technology relevant to test ban verification and the Treaty's entry into force.
[35] A compilation of these polls can be found at http://www.icanw.org/polls

Other means of communication have contributed to securitisation processes, such as the documentary films *An Inconvenient Truth* (2006) and *Countdown to Zero* (2010). From the same producers, the two movies conveyed the sense of urgency associated with the threats of global warming and nuclear weapons, respectively. In what it can be seen as a major securitising move in the popular setting, *Countdown to Zero* featured interviews with leading statesmen and experts, who recounted real life situations in which nuclear weapons have almost been used; as well as times when major nuclear accidents could have happened, but were just averted. The Global Zero movement, which promoted the movie to large audiences, described *Countdown to Zero* as "a chilling wake up call about the urgency of the nuclear threat" (Global Zero, 2010).

Countdown to Zero opened in movie theatres in different countries, but is currently available online for download. In the internet, one might also find other films, videos, songs and texts that portray the existence of nuclear weapons as an existential threat to human survival. As Vaughn (2009) has observed, securitising moves on the internet can be quite relevant; especially, if they are primarily available through news sources or other media outlets (p. 274). Famous musicians, actors, leaders and political figures who support nuclear disarmament also strengthen securitising moves in this setting.

The elite setting

Although securitising actors may require the support of several audiences, the elite setting comprises the central audience to this particular securitisation. Since it is constituted by political leaders who are influential at the global, regional and national levels, this setting effectively congregates the audience "whose attitude has a *direct causal connection* with the desired goals" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 185); that is, the states' representatives who have the formal power to start negotiations on a NWC. Even though this setting comprises a variety of stages, the most important ones are the UNGA and the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees.

The UNGA has played a significant role in world affairs involving arms control and disarmament norms. Several declarations and resolutions have been first adopted in the United Nations before producing conventions and treaties (Lewis and Thakur, 2004, p. 19). Although not all arms control agreements have been crafted inside UN forums,

all the different treaties banning biological and chemical weapons, as well as landmines and cluster munitions, have been developed with the support of a significant number of governments, international organisations and UN agencies. In this particular case, it is expected that a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons will need the support of the UNGA and the UNSC (Andreasen, 2009).

The empowering audience, the one that has the ability to enable the securitising actor to adopt the measures that would tackle the threat, can also be found in the NPT regime and its institutional bodies. As the NPT review process has been gradually opened to NGO participation, the idea of a NWC started to receive more attention from the states parties. So far, the apex of this trend occurred in the latest NPT Review Conference, in 2010; when numerous states mentioned the NWC in their statements and efforts aimed at commencing negotiations on the NWC were for the first time acknowledged in the final document (NPT Review Conference, 2010).

In the elite setting, it is quite difficult for nuclear abolition organisations to reach the audience. The asymmetry of power between states and non-state actors inside IGOs and other multilateral fora is expressive. Members of civil society organisations can only attend sessions designated as open and, even then, they might not have the right to participate in the discussions. Under special circumstances, NGOs may be allowed to address plenary sessions - but that has not happened frequently in the most important meetings. Taking these into account, it is clear that the elite setting is the most challenging one in this securitisation. In order to understand the obstacles preventing the macrosecuritisation of nuclear weapons from becoming a successful endeavour, it is imperative to analyse in detail the practices of the securitisers in this setting.

4. Empirical analysis of the elite setting: non-state actors and the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the UN General Assembly and the NPT review process (1997-2010)

Considering the developments in the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period, the analysis that will be here presented examines the campaign for a NWC through the prism of securitisation theory. The securitiser actors in this case are the nuclear abolition organisations that have more prominently conducted securitising moves in the elite setting, mainly: IPPNW, IALANA, INESAP and ICAN. The time frame analysed encompasses the period from 1997, when the draft NWC was circulated in the UNGA for the first time, to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In between these two events, the securitisers delivered presentations at the NPT Review Conferences of 2000 and 2005; as well as the NPT Preparatory Committees of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2009. The data sets available for each of these occasions varied. In addition to the written statements that were always accessible, it was possible to analyse video footage of the NGOs' presentations at the 2005 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. Audio records of the presentations delivered during the 2007 Preparatory Committee were also examined. The two versions of the NWC that became UN official documents of the fifty-second and the sixty-second sessions, together with the introductory letters signed by representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia, are included in the empirical analysis. The same is true for the working papers on the NWC submitted to the NPT Review Conferences of 2000, 2005 and 2010; as well as the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee (See Table 2 for an overview of the dataset analysed. The complete list of the reviewed documents can be found in Appendix 1).

Table 2 – Overview of the data analysed

OCCASION	DATASET
Fifty-second session of the UNGA (1997)	Official documents and resolutions
2000 NPT Review Conference	Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (written statements)
2002 NPT Preparatory Committee	NGO presentations (written statements)
2003 NPT Preparatory Committee	NGO presentations (written statements)

Table 2 (cont.) – Overview of the data analysed

OCCASION	DATASET
2004 NPT Preparatory Committee	NGO presentations (written statements)
2005 NPT Review Conference	Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video footage and written statements)
2007 NPT Preparatory Committee	Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (audio records and written statements)
Sixty-second session of the UNGA (2007)	Official documents and resolutions
2008 NPT Preparatory Committee	NGO presentations (written statements)
2009 NPT Preparatory Committee	NGO presentations (written statements)
2010 NPT Review Conference	Working paper on the NWC; NGO presentations (video footage and written statements)

4.1 *Methodology*

With the purpose of understanding the process through which this specific public issue – the existence of nuclear weapons – becomes a security concern at the global level, discourse analysis will be used to uncover the structures and practices that are involved in the construction of a threat. Employing discourse analysis, other securitisation studies have been able to map the "emergence and evolution of patterns of representation which are constitutive of a threat image" (Balzacq, 2011, p. 39). Following this practice, it is expected that discourse analysis of the most central texts produced by the securitising actors will shed light on the sources, mechanisms and effects of the construction of nuclear weapons as a threat to the survival of all humankind. Although the term "text" strongly suggests written language, it will be used here to refer to a more diverse set of forms. A materialisation of discourse, texts can include a variety of signs (written and spoken utterances, symbols, pictures, music) - all capable of conveying meaning in a certain context (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39).

Traditionally, discourse analysis has been mainly concerned with the content of the discourses, rather than the larger process in which such discourses are immersed. A range of scholars who considered such focus to be misleading started to promote a different conception of discourse analysis, which became known as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). Considering that

discourse is a part of the social life and, thus, is inherently intersubjective, scholars associated with the CDA perspective have argued that discourse should be studied in its interaction with other discourses. Moreover, they asserted the need to take into account the larger contextual frame in which discourse is produced, delivered and consumed (Hardy and Phillips, 2004).

From the perspective of the CDA, discourses are considered social practices, as well as representations of social practices. Discourses are resources that are activated by people in the construction of meaning about the world as much as they are practices that structure the meaning in use (Balzacq, 2011b, p. 39). As Fairclough (2003) has demonstrated, any process of "meaning-making" is invariably intersubjective and context dependent. Likewise, constructing a given issue as a security concern presupposes interaction between the securitising actor and the relevant audience(s), which are all situated in a specific time and place.

In order to fully understand the discourse promoted by the securitiser, it is necessary to develop a framework for analysis in which the interlocutors of the speakers are properly represented and the immediate and distal contexts are also taken into account. Therefore, with the purpose of guiding the discourse analysis of the selected case studies, a customised framework for analysis was developed. Following Balzacq's (2011b) suggestion, it comprises three different levels: agents, acts and context (p. 35). The first level encompasses the actors and relations that structure the securitisation, while the second one accounts for the discursive and non-discursive practices that underwrite the securitisation process. The third level provides for the way contextual factors can empower or disempower the securitising actors (Balzacq, 2011, p. 35; 36). This methodological construction is intended to facilitate the study of the securitisation process as a whole.

If the levels of analysis follow Balzacq's proposal, the same is not true for the constituent analytics within each level. The framework here developed deviates reasonably from his proposed scheme, as items particularly relevant to the study of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation have been introduced. The overall result is a comprehensive and yet practical framework for analysis (see Table 3).

Table 3 – Framework for discourse analysis

LEVEL 1 - AGENTS

1. Securitising actors (identity; social capital; authority)

2. Audience(s)

3. Referent object

4. Other relevant actors

LEVEL 2 - ACTS

Specific grammar of security:
5. Existential threat
6. Urgency/ Point of no return
7. Possible way out

8. Meaning of security[36]

9. Associative arguments[37]

10. Intertextuality

11. Heuristic artefacts

12. Links with other securitisations

LEVEL 3 - CONTEXTS

13. Immediate setting

14. Distal context

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[36] From a hermeneutical perspective, Ciută (2009) argued that the meaning the securitising actors attribute to the concept of security should also be part of the study of securitisation.
[37] Vaughn (2009) has shed light on the important role associative arguments can play in the construction of security threats. If the securitiser successfully associates different security concerns, the audience(s) will be able to identify larger implications of the alleged threat.

4.2 *Findings*

The findings of the empirical analysis reveal a consistent discourse, with no substantial variations throughout the years. The securitisers behave professionally, following the protocols of the stages and adjusting their language and the content of their discourse to the audience's frame of reference. They draw their social capital upon the notions of representativeness, technical expertise and moral authority. Frequently, they portray themselves as representatives of the people, in opposition to the audience - who they see as representatives of states. In this sense, the members of the nuclear abolition organisations emphasise the power of the audience, who they affirm can put in place the relevant security action, the NWC.

In the elite setting, the securitisers follow the specific grammar of security, arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the survival of humankind. They depict an alarming situation, in which the NPT is in crisis and the world is on the verge of a nuclear catastrophe. Accordingly, they argue that the time to act is now; otherwise, another use of nuclear weapons will most likely follow. Finally, the securitisers present the abolition of nuclear weapons under a NWC as the only alternative to a horrifying future.

In addition to security utterances, the securitisers employ economic, legal, and political arguments that support the establishment of the security measure. Although they refer to nuclear weapons as immoral, the nuclear abolitionists do not elaborate on this subject. They try to send an objective and rational message, avoiding emotional appeals to the audience. Even though they make use of different heuristic artefacts, the underuse of powerful images – an effective vehicle to express emotions – is noteworthy.

From the perspective of human security, the securitisers link the nuclear threat with other security concerns. They see human security as an all-encompassing concept and defend that approaching nuclear disarmament and other international affairs from this point of view would enable states to address the broad implications and the interconnections of security problems. The anti-nuclear activists also try to delegitimise nuclear deterrence and dissociate it from the notion of security. Conversely, they always identify disarmament with security.

The constraints imposed by the rules governing this setting have, in fact, encouraged the anti-nuclear organisations to work together. In face of the limited time

they have to address the audience, the activists focus on the common positions within the movement and avoid exposing internal disagreements. Another consequence of the procedural limitations is the scarce interaction between the securitiser and the audience.

Finally, it was possible to see the impact of the larger contextual configuration on the securitising discourse. After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the securitisers have raised the alarmist tone of their discourse. Moreover, the nuclear explosions conducted by the DPRK, the suspicious around the Iranian programme and reports of an emerging nuclear black market were all contextual factors that served to strengthen the urgency of their calls. Remarkably, the securitisers have since 2007 been depicting a favourable political configuration to the commencement of negotiations on a NWC. They continue to emphasise the negative developments surrounding the NPT regime, but they also highlight the growing political support for nuclear disarmament. In the securitising discourse, not only does the world need to move towards nuclear abolition now but the current political configuration is also favourable to it. This fortunate temporal coincidence has served to enhance even more the urgency of adopting the security measure; since the securitisers argue that action must be taken now, before this momentum is over.

4.2.1 *Agents*

This level of analysis encompasses actors and their relations, including: securitising actors, audiences, referent object and other actors.

Securitising actors

Traditionally, non-state actors have seldom been endowed with security tasks (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 37). Even though NGOs have increased their participation in international politics and are now accepted as legitimate players in different negotiation processes, states remain the privileged actor in the military sector. Weapons and military security are usually framed in terms of state sovereignty, which places states at the centre of international agreements involving arms control or disarmament. Moreover, the procedural restrictions to civil society participation in the elite setting also configure obstacles to NGO involvement in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, non-state actors have been able to take part in and influence international opinion-

building, agenda-setting and drafting. Successful attempts to promote change led by civil society organisations include the establishment of the 1986 UN Convention against Torture (Leary, 1979; Baehr, 1989), the 1989 UN Convention of the Rights of the Child (Price-Cohen, 1990; Cantwell, 1992), the 1997 Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention (Price, 1998; Anderson, 2000) and the 2008 Cluster Munition Convention. Among these four cases, the last two are of special significance to the study of the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation, since they constitute concrete examples of civil society engagement in the establishment of conventions outlawing weapons. On those occasions, NGOs played a crucial role in getting the states to address these two types of weapons in a particular manner; affecting the way the states perceived the use of these weapons and, subsequently, changing states' policies towards them.

In order to achieve the mentioned treaties, civil society organisations worked together with states that were championing the same causes. As it has been stated before, the nuclear abolition movement also follows this practice. Often in the elite setting, anti-nuclear organisations have their proposals put forward by states that share their views on the need for a NWC. In two different sessions of the UNGA, for instance, national delegates submitted the model NWC drafted by the NGOs as an official UN document. It was also national delegations that submitted working papers on the NWC for the NPT Review Conferences of 2000, 2005 and 2010; as well as the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee. Recognising that the draft was a civil society's initiative, these diplomats endorsed the securitisers' claims and reaffirmed that the NWC was a way to avert the nuclear threat (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008).

The versions of the NWC that circulated in these meetings were not exactly the same, since the draft was constantly being developed. The changes and improvements in the NWC mostly referred to legal and technical questions, which are not particularly relevant for the study of this securitisation process.[38] An analysis of the Preamble of the Convention, on the other hand, can be quite telling. It starts with the unusual opening "we the people of the Earth, through the States Parties to this Convention" (Ibid.). Even though the second part of the sentence is the standard formulation of international treaties, the initial one "we the people of the Earth" is atypical in the legal genre of texts. By emphasising the people as the subject of the agreement, the securitisers

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[38] The legal and technical aspects of the NWC refer to the general obligations, phases for elimination, verification, national implementation measures, compliance, dispute settlement, financing, etc.

attempt to put the general public at the centre of international law. As it will be argued later, this choice is consistent with the concept of human security advocated by these activists.

"We the people" is also a common expression the securitisers use to refer to themselves when delivering their presentations to the NPT delegates. The members of the NGOs call themselves the representatives of larger collectivities, repeatedly affirming that "we represent millions of people worldwide" (Hall, 2005). In their discourse, the members of these organisations avoid speaking on behalf of the specific NGO they belong to. They do, however, speak on behalf of the "NGO community" and the "global civil society"; as if trying to add legitimacy to their claims (See Hill, 2007; Loretz, 2007). At no point the speakers account for the fact that most of them come from Western countries and, thus, represent only a fraction of the world. By depicting themselves as representatives of the people, the securitisers provide a homogeneous and somewhat simplistic portray of the "millions of people worldwide", overlooking the discrepant regional representation and the conflicting views that might exist within "global civil society".

With regard to the way the securitising actor presents itself, a rule has been unveiled: in the elite setting, the securitisers never speak as individuals. They always present themselves as a part of a collectivity; even if a relatively small one, like the group of "committed nuclear abolitionists" (Cabasso, 2009). As messengers of a larger movement, these securitisers avoid sounding personal. Nevertheless, it is evident that the personality or the reputation of the individual who transmits the statement can have an impact on the way the discourse is delivered and consumed. There are well-know activists within the nuclear abolitionist movement, some of which have developed good relations with national delegates and are respected by them, like Alice Slater and Rebecca Johnson. Other speakers are known for their achievements in different areas and are willing to lend their prestige to the nuclear disarmament cause; for instance, the Nobel Peace Prize co-laureate Jody Williams.

Sometimes, the speakers contrast the identity of the civil society to that of the audience; saying: "while governments remain the ultimate decision-makers, it is NGOs that allow citizens across the globe to partake in the political process and make their voices heard" (Hall, 2005). Emphasising these two discrete arenas, the securitisers

portray themselves as independent, stating that "as NGOs we are not required to be diplomatic" (Datan, 2002). Reinstating the differences between the civil society and the governmental officials is also a way to draw attention to the importance of the work of NGOs, which aims at bridging the gap between these two spheres and broaden the participation of regular citizens in the decision-making processes.

More recently, in the context of latest abolitionist wave, members of the NGOs have welcomed these new calls for disarmament coming from the political establishment (See Acheson, 2007; Burroughs, 2008). At the same time, they have expressed some discomfort related to being associated with "former Cold Warriors". In fact, one speaker argued that they – representatives of the civil society – have a more privileged view of the steps involved in achieving nuclear disarmament than the political leaders of the Cold War and, thus, can offer better recommendations (Johnson, 2010). In order to preserve the moral authority which has often been associated with nuclear abolition organisations, the NGOs try to keep a distance from members of the political establishment.

In the capacity of the securitising actor, the members of the NGOs draw attention to their vast knowledge and different ranges of expertise. As one speaker told the audience: "as NGOs, we are here not only as a voice of civil society reminding you to get on with the job, but also a source of technical, scientific and medical knowledge at your disposal" (Hall, 2005). They evoke past experiences in which the efforts of the civil society were valuable to international decision-making, like the Landmine Ban and the Cluster Munition Convention, and state that their expertise and experience are available for further joint ventures (UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Williams 2010).

From the data analysed, it was possible to identify a network of identities and representations that the members of the nuclear abolition NGOs invoke as securitising actors; structured around the notions of representativeness, moral authority and technical expertise. Amidst the reviewed presentations, there is only one that deviates from this pattern: the speech made by Jody Williams, at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. When addressing the national delegates, Williams adopted a very personal and, thus, atypical stance. She apologised to the NGO community for abandoning the protocol and not sticking to the previously agreed statement, as she decided to

improvise. Trying to overcome the gap between the securitiser and the audience, she said: "I know that we are diplomats, we are civil society, but I am just speaking to us as human beings" (Williams, 2010). All her speech was centred on the humanitarian, rather than the legal or political, implications of the existence of nuclear weapons. While Williams is now a patron of ICAN, she was the coordinator of the ICBL. Since the campaign to ban landmines adopted a humanitarian rationale and focused on the dramatic negative effects of landmines, this might explain why she decided present herself as a human being. The content of her speech, structured from the humanitarian perspective, will be analysed below, under the section *Acts*.

Audience(s)

In this macrosecuritisation, the elite audience is mainly comprised by diplomats and rarely includes heads of states. As Browne, et al. (2010) has observed, it is rather unfortunate that most of the substantive issues regarding international nuclear policy-making are to be agreed by technocrats and diplomats (p. 383). While these states' representatives score high in entrepreneurial leadership, evident in their excellent negotiating skills, they lack substantive structural power (Browne, et al., 2010, p. 384). In this sense, it is reasonable to assume that a deeper engagement of top national leaders would inject a large dose of political leadership into the process and, thus, make it more effective.

Yet, in the absence of heads of states, the diplomatic representatives are seen by the securitisers as a communication channel with the national leaderships. During the NGO sessions that are part of the NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees, the securitisers direct their messages to the diplomatic delegates of the states parties and to the governments they represent. At times, this is done in a way that acknowledges the power of the audience; both encouraging and putting pressure on the national delegates. For instance, when one speaker addressed the audience, he said: "we need more statesmen with a political will to take us to total nuclear disarmament. Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the time and here is your chance" (Ramdas, 2000). There are several other examples of similar utterances, in which the securitising actors urge the audience to take responsibility for the outcome of the deliberations - since they are

instrumental in the establishment of the security measure proposed by the securitisers. Some of these statements are reproduced below:

> Here as you all sit to deliberate, shape and determine the destinies of millions of human beings, do please remember that many of them rely entirely on your foresight and wisdom for their survival (Ramdas, 2000).

> Remember that you diplomats are not simply the mouth pieces of your governments. You are the experts and the main actors in these negotiations. You make a difference in this room *and* in your capitals, which depend on you to tell them what is happening here and how to advance your state's interests. We have seen the difference even a small number of active, engaged and visionary diplomats make in this process. We have also seen the difference a small number of active, engaged, and destructive diplomats make in this process. In this review cycle, the world needs leaders. It needs diplomats and governments that are willing to compromise and work for our collective security (Nordstrom, 2007).

> And I call upon governments, who really believe that, who have a bit of humanity, who wouldn't want to be sitting under a nuclear threat themselves, to get real and give them up (Williams, 2010).

As this last fragment shows, Williams' speech uses an informal vocabulary to send the same message the other speakers are trying to convey. Again, it is possible to see the exceptionality of her discourse; since she effectively ignores the formalities of the setting and the conventions established by the NGOs throughout the years of participation in these meetings. Williams' disregard for these might be interpreted as a statement against the routinisation of NGOs' presentations, which follow predictable patterns year after year. Williams' engagement with the nuclear abolition movement is quite recent and the 2010 NPT Review Conference was the first time she addressed the elite audience. It would be interesting to follow her future speeches and presentations and see whether or not she will succumb to the established practices and vocabulary.

Referent objects

The referent object of the securitisation of nuclear weapons promoted by these non-state actors is undoubtedly located at the global level. Using different words, all the speakers try to convey the idea that the existence of nuclear weapons threatens "all peoples and nations", "all humanity", "civilisation" and "all the creatures of this Earth" (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Hill 2007). In this case, the mentioned

expressions are all equivalent and denote an all-encompassing collectivity. Although less frequently, "the environment", "life on Earth" and the "global climate" are also mentioned by the speakers as referent objects (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; McCoy, 2007; Westberg 2008).

Even though there are only few individuals who would argue that the humanity and the environment are referent objects that do not have the legitimate right to survive, mobilising security policies at the global level has proved to be extremely difficult. As Buzan, et al. (1998), observed: "somehow, the system level candidates are still too subtle and indirect to trigger the levels of mass identity necessary for securitization" (p. 37). In the absence of the dynamic underpinning of rivalry, mobilising identity politics at the global level constitutes a real challenge. Nevertheless, features of the alleged threat as well as the type of universalism the securitisers try to construct can make the universal scale possible. It is reasonable to assume that securitisations stemming from existing order and/or physical threat universalisms can achieve global scale.[39] In this case, the securitisers must construct the existence of nuclear weapons as a physical threat to all nations and peoples in the world. As a strategy to mobilise social identities at the global level, the securitisers try to promote a sense of unity and commonality in the world. The speakers present the referent object in the first person plural; affirming that nuclear weapons threaten "our survival", "our very existence", "our collective fate", "our world" and "our common future" (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Hill, 2007; Mitchell, 2009).

Other relevant actors

Other relevant actors in this securitisation process are the national governments and their respective policy-making institutions, such as congresses and parliaments. At the national level, politicians can debate their position on nuclear proliferation and disarmament and even decide to adopt national legislations that outlaw nuclear weapons and strengthen the call for a NWC. States that are not party to the NPT are also

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[39] In addition to nuclear weapons, environmental issues (global warming, global cooling, planetary impact of asteroids or comets) can, in principle, be securitised at the global level. Regarding existing order macrosecuritisations, Buzan and Wæver (2009) listed the following as issues that are likely to get securitised: sovereignty-denying transnational actors (whether corporate or criminal or terrorist), migration or cosmopolitanism and a general re-mobilisation of religion (p. 264).

mentioned by the securitisers as important actors who should also take part in the process leading to a NWC.

Even though the average citizen does not take part in international negotiations, there are ways in which the general public, as well as the public opinion and the media, can play a relevant part. In the elite setting, the securitisers mention opinion polls results that demonstrate that the public is in favour of the total elimination of nuclear weapons (Hall, 2005). Policy-making takes into account different factors and, at least in democratic societies, it is plausible to assume that the public's attitude towards a given issue can influence governmental choices. Popular initiatives, such as demonstrations, petitions and campaigns have had impact in nuclear related issues before. As it was showed in Chapter Three, pressures coming from a transnational movement against nuclear tests was a major factor in the Soviet decision to close the nuclear test site in Kazakhstan, in 1991. More recently, large-scale demonstrations against the British proposal to replace the Trident missile system in 2007 were followed by extensive media coverage and the release of opinion polls contrary to the governmental bid. When the issue was debated and voted in the British Parliament, the Labour government suffered its largest backbench rebellion on a defence policy since 1924 (Hudson, 2007) and was only able to approve the motion with the support of the opposition Conservative Party.

Finally, terrorists are also important actors in this securitisation. The securitisers know that terrorist plans and/or attacks involving the use nuclear weapons could trigger major changes in the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Therefore, they mention reported attempts to acquire nuclear material made by terrorist organisations and draw attention to the alleged availability of fissile material in the black market. According to them, an abolition regime would place further obstacles to terrorist attacks involving nuclear or radiological devices (See Hall, 2005; Reichl, 2007; Fowler, 2009).

4.2.2 *Acts*

This level addresses the discursive and non-discursive practices that underwrite the securitisation, including: the use of the specific grammar of security (existential threat/ urgency/possible way out); the meaning of security according to the securitisers; the use of associative arguments; intertextual references; the use of heuristic artefacts and possible links with other securitisations.

Existential threat

Bearing in mind that "securitizers are in the business of insinuating their understandings and agendas" (Vaughn, 2009, p.279), the alarmist tone of their discourse should not come as a surprise. In this setting, the securitisers behave as "prophets of doom" (Krepon, 2011),[40] always bringing bad news and making apocalyptical predictions for the future. In their discourse, the impending possibility of nuclear weapons being used is always present. In all texts analysed, there is one clear message: the existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity.

Even though the preamble of the draft NWC constitutes only a small section of the Convention, it contains numerous references to the dangers represented by nuclear weapons. The way the nuclear threat is articulated in this document follows the general pattern of how the threat is construed in this setting by the nuclear abolition organisations. There are three main sources of arguments used in the making of the threat: (1) particular features of nuclear weapons, (2) potential incidents involving nuclear weapons and (3) foreseeable consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

Among the particular features of nuclear weapons listed by the securitisers in the construction of the threat image are the following: its radioactive nature; its "unprecedented and unequalled" destructive potential; the uncontrollability of its destructive effects; its indiscriminate nature (See UN General Assembly 1997a, 2008; Hall, 2005; Johnson, 2010; Williams, 2010). The fact that modernisation of nuclear weaponry has only enhanced all these characteristics is also part of the securitising discourse.

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[40] Krepon uses this expression to refer to the recent behaviour of arms controllers since Obama came to power. He makes this observation, but does not explore the deep implications of such behaviour; nor does he refer to the securitisation theory.

The situations in which the NWS might use these weapons, as stated in their respective national security doctrines, figure prominently in the NGOs' statements. In the nuclear abolitionist discourse, the use of nuclear weapons is constructed as an imminent reality; be it intentional or accidental. The securitisers frequently refer to the large amount of weapons that remain on hair-trigger alert in Russia and in the US and, thus, could be launched almost immediately. The speakers affirm that this could happen not only in a war-like scenario; but also by means of sabotage, unauthorised use, human or mechanical error (See Hall, 2005; Hill, 2007; Johnson, 2010). The possibility that terrorists might get hold of fissile material or even gain access to the nuclear command systems and carry out a nuclear attack are also considered in their securitising claims (Hallam, 2008).

Based on studies conducted after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on expert calculations of hypothetical scenarios, the securitisers make predictions about the consequences of an eventual use of nuclear weapons. One speaker, for example, attempted to describe what would follow a nuclear attack, stating that:

> Once the worst has happened – whether an all-out nuclear war caused by accident or a "limited" nuclear war – health services will break down. The number of burns alone would overwhelm the most well-equipped burns unit. Assuming there are any burns units. Or people to staff them. Radiation sickness will follow. Many people will die a terrible death without any medical relief at all (Hall, 2005).

In addition to these vivid descriptions of the immediate impacts of a nuclear attack, the securitisers address the long-term consequences of a nuclear war; such as the cooling effect it would have on global climate, known as "nuclear winter". They draw attention to the high number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world - more than 22,000 in 2010 -,[41] and affirm that these weapons are capable of precipitating nuclear winter several times over (Westberg, 2008). According to these prophets of doom, global cooling would result in the collapse of the Earth's life supporting ecosystems (Westberg, 2008).

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[41] Estimate number calculated by SIPRI researchers, as January 2010 (Kile, et al., 2010).

Sense of urgency

Year after year, the members of the NGOs remind the audience of the failures of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and reaffirm the urgency of strengthening the regime and its foundation, the NPT. Exemplary of this behaviour is the opening line with which a speaker chose to start his presentation: "Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, more bad news" (Cipolat, 2007). The "bad news" exposed by the securitisers primarily refer to the NWS' lack of commitment to disarmament measures. Their failure to disarm is usually presented in connection with the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries (See Burroughs 2005, 2009).

According to the securitisers, putting an end to this proliferation cycle should be the top priority of all states. In their discourse, proliferation represents many perils; the most immediate one being the weakening of the NPT regime. In face of the proliferation that has taken place outside the regime, the speakers affirm that the NPT is in crisis and it must be strengthened. As one speaker said,

> Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea. That makes nine nuclear weapons states, despite the NPT. Who will be the next nuclear weapon state? If the NPT falls apart, we will be forced to live in a world with dozens of countries armed with nuclear weapons and no controls? Already nuclear technology is being sold on the black market (Hall, 2005).

The other danger that comes along with proliferation is the availability of larger quantities of fissile material in the world. In the securitising discourse, this is always associated with the possibility of terrorists getting hold of nuclear-weapon material. As one speaker put it, "the dark cloud of nuclear terrorism continues to hang over all our heads" (Weiss, 2009). Mentioning the concerns regarding the existence of a nuclear black market, the securitisers enhance the sense of urgency inherent to the securitising claim.

Additionally, proliferation represents an increased probability that nuclear weapons might be used. In fact, this is one of the basic arguments underpinning the securitising claims; that is, "if such weapons spread, the risk of their eventual use would increase exponentially" (Acheson, 2007). As it should be clear by now, security arguments always involve predictions about the future (Buzan, et al., 1998, p. 32).

Therefore, the securitisers often mention what will happen if the security action they propose is not taken. For instance,

> If urgent action is not taken by the 2010 Review Conference to reverse this course, we may well wake up in 2011 to world with a larger number of virtual and actual nuclear weapon states, and the nuclear sword of Damocles poised over the heads of all peoples until at least mid-century (McCoy, 2007).

The securitisers try to convey the idea that if the audience is unable to negotiate the abolition of nuclear weapons, another use of nuclear weapons will follow. Instead of waiting for the worse to happen, the diplomats must take action now, because "the world does not have the luxury of too much more time" (Williams, 2010).

Way out

Following the particular grammar of security, the securitisers always assert that threat they describe is avoidable, what is "desperately needed" is the commitment to begin negotiations on a NWC (Ware, 2007). The elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide is the proposed solution to avert the nuclear threat. In fact, the securitisers argue that it is the only solution. They affirm that any use of nuclear weapons would bear catastrophic consequences, so "going down to three zeros, as in 1000, is not enough" (Weiss, 2009); "abolition is the only way" (Hall, 2005).

Even though the most important action advocated by the securitisers refers to the commencement of good faith negotiations for the adoption of a NWC, there are other steps that can be taken to reduce the nuclear danger. The securitisers mention a myriad of them, such as: the halting of nuclear weapons research, testing, and component production; the establishment of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FCMT); the creation of new Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ); the withdrawal of American nuclear forces deployed in Europe; the de-alerting of nuclear weapons; the commitment to a no-first-use policy and the completion of further reductions in the American and Russian tactical and strategic nuclear stockpiles.

The securitisers assert that the establishment of a NWC, together with all these specific measures, will provide the definite solution to overcome the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. This, however, should not be a process contained in itself. The securitisers defend that the abolition of nuclear weapons should lead to other

changes in international affairs, like total disarmament and the creation of a new concept of security, structured around the notion of human security (See Hall, 2005; Spies, 2007; Cabasso, 2009; Johnson, 2010).

Meaning of security

The need to address the meaning the securitisers attribute to the concept of security has been pointed out by Ciută (2009). According to him, the securitisation framework as it was established by the Copenhagen School privileges an inflexible definition of security, structured by the logic of survival in the face of existential threats. In order to make the securitisation analysis complete, he argued that it was necessary to take into account the self-understanding of the actors with regards to the meaning of security. Then, the analyst would be able to grasp potential contextual variations in the meaning of security.

Examining the definitions of security provided by the securitisers in the time span selected for this study (1997-2010), it is not possible to identify significant contextual changes. The securitisers have always emphasised the need to address security issues from the perspective of human security, "moving away from patterns of aggressive national security and reducing reliance on weapons" (Johnson, 2010). From this point of view, they have tried to break the link between nuclear deterrence and national security; while strengthening the connection between nuclear disarmament and security. Since the members of the nuclear abolition NGOs consider nuclear weapons to be a security threat, they assert that nuclear deterrence provides only an illusion of security (Snyder, 2008). Accordingly, they state that the possession of nuclear weapons do not make people and states safe. In reality, it is the other way around; the "nuclear balance of terror" fosters insecurity rather than security (Spies, 2005).

Since it can put an end to the existential threat, nuclear disarmament is always depicted as essential to security. In this sense, the meaning securitisers attach to the concept of security follows the definition of security provided by the securitisation theory, as they identify security with the logic of survival.

For a long time, the securitisers have argued that disarmament as a means to achieve security should be framed in terms of human security. In the late 1990s, the notion of human security gained visibility as the ICBL successfully structured the

political debate on landmines around the safety of peoples rather than the safety of states. However, policy-makers have expressed scepticism toward the very idea of human security, which is often considered an inconsistent and poorly defined term. In all its inclusiveness, human security has seemed too broad to be useful in security or foreign policy making (King and Murray, 2001/2002, p. 591) and discussions on nuclear disarmament have seldom been approached by states from that perspective.

Associative arguments

Vaughn (2009) has shed light on the important role associative arguments can play in the construction of security threats. Analysing humanitarian organisations acting as securitisers, she noted that their securitising discourse linked multiple referent objects in the construction of a threat image. Vaughn (2009) concluded that associating different referent objects could enhance the legitimacy of the humanitarian organisations' claim to survival and also boost the sense of urgency of their claims (p. 264). In the case of the securitisation of nuclear weapons, the securitisers promote associative arguments that support the need to eliminate these weapons. They are not strictly security arguments, since they do not refer to nuclear weapons as a security concern or an existential threat. They are mostly economic, legal and political arguments that support the establishment of the security measure, the NWC. As such, these arguments are expected to resonate well in this setting, as they encompass issues that are familiar to the diplomats attending the NPT Review Conferences or the UN General Assembly. Making use of these associative arguments, the securitisers attempt to strengthen their case against nuclear weapons, calling attention to additional problems caused by these weapons and other benefits that the establishment of a NWC would bring.

In this setting, securitisers promote realist arguments that support their securitising claims. Focusing on the interests of the states, the speakers argue that the end of the Cold War and the geopolitical changes that followed it have made nuclear weapons unnecessary. According to them, in today's world, nuclear weapons are of "no use at all, to any one, for any reason" (Hall, 2005). They argue that the new security threats that the world is facing today, such as terrorism and climate change, cannot be

averted through possession of nuclear weapons. Thus, if nuclear weapons are not useful, their prohibition should not affect the interests of states.

There are also economic arguments that could appeal to national governments, since the maintenance and development of nuclear weapons requires large sums of money. The securitisers usually quote the estimated costs of producing, replacing, maintaining and operating nuclear warheads in each of the NWS (See Cabasso, 2007; Loretz, 2007). The speakers state that there are better ways of spending this money, like "investing in technology to promote human security" (Hall, 2005).

Widely used in this setting, legal arguments assert the legal obligation to disarm, as stated in Article VI of the NPT. As supporting evidence, the members of the NGOs frequently recall the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, which asserted that such legal obligation must be fulfilled (See UN General Assembly 1997, 2008; Weiss, 2000; Mitchell, 2009). The securitisers also argue that the use of nuclear weapon should be considered as a war crime, as well as a crime against humanity (Johnson, 2010).

As part of their political arguments, the securitisers often recall previous UNGA resolutions and declarations made by the UN Secretary General in favour of nuclear disarmament. Statements in support of a nuclear-weapon-free world made by major political figures are also quoted in this setting. In this regard, Obama's Prague speech has been exhaustively repeated (See Cabasso, 2009; Weiss, 2009; Johnson, 2010; Williams, 2010). Additionally, the support of the general public, as stated in different opinion polls, is also a political argument employed in this setting (Hall, 2005).

Even though the speakers refer to nuclear weapons as immoral, they do not elaborate on this argument. One reason for that might be that the securitisers are trying distance themselves from the utopianism that has been commonly associated with the anti-nuclear movement. Furthermore, the securitisers may have chosen to emphasise legal, political and economic factors assuming that these would resonate better with this particular audience than moral arguments. As the anti-landmine campaign has demonstrated, moral arguments can have a significant impact on the general public, but they can influence the elite audience too. Featuring landmine victims proved to be an effective strategy aimed at changing the way these weapons were perceived by the ordinary citizens and state officials (Rutherford, 2000). If *Hibakusha*, the survivors of

the atomic bombings, featured more prominently in the securitising moves carried out in this setting, there is a chance that their testimony could serve as a moral argument to stigmatize nuclear weapons. Even though there is usually one Hibakusha who speaks to the national delegates during the NPT meetings, they always end up as isolated voices, since the other speakers seldom evoke their touching stories.

Intertextuality

In various ways, discourses are always connected to other discourses. The most obvious links between them appear in the form of quotations and reported speeches. In this setting, the securitisers make reference to numerous UN documents and working papers; as well as texts of international treaties and expert reports regarding non-proliferation and disarmament. These are different kinds of texts supporting the need to move toward a nuclear-weapon-free world and, thus, serve to strengthen the securitising claim. It is important to note that the nuclear abolition activists choose to make reference to texts which are familiar to the elite audience. As Balzacq (2011a) has observed, "to persuade the audience […] the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience's experience" (p. 09). This seems to be part of the strategy of the securitisers, whose discourse in this setting includes political and diplomatic jargon and references to issues of relevance to the audience.

In the pursuit of supporting evidence to make their case stronger, the securitisers mention academic and expert studies, as well as NGO publications and campaigns. As it could be expected, the text of the NWC and the books that contain it – *Security and survival* and *Securing our Survival (SOS)* – are referred to frequently. The Doomsday Clock and the minutes left until midnight are constantly evoked by the securitisers. As Vuori (2010) has observed, by mentioning the Clock, the securitisers try to convey a sense of imminent doom (p. 259).

Veiled references are less widespread. Recently, most of these have referred to Obama's Prague speech. In his original speech, President Obama said:

> So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I'm not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly –- perhaps not in my lifetime (The White House, 2009).

This has led securitisers to reinstate their belief in the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons that "in our lifetimes" (Johnson, 2010). Making this sort of reference is intended to urge the audience to tackle the threat more vigorously. In this respect, Jody Williams' presentation stands out for its clear message and its sometimes aggressive tone. In the 2010 NPT Review Conference, she concluded her speech urging the audience: "get rid of them [nuclear weapons] now, not when Mr. Obama is dead" (Williams, 2010).

Heuristic artefacts

As Balzacq (2005, 2011a) has repeatedly affirmed, metaphors, images, analogies, stereotypes, emotions, etc. employed by the securitisers can effectively contribute to the construction of an intersubjective threat perception. In the anti-nuclear securitising discourse, the securitisers make use of many heuristic artefacts. For instance, in the elite setting, the nuclear abolition movement presents its cause in analogy with the movement against slavery. Accordingly, NWS and their refusal to honour disarmament commitments are represented like slave owners who refused to accept the abolition of slavery. On one occasion, the securitisers reminded the audience that the movement fighting against slavery used the word abolition deliberately, so as to make clear that "no slavery whatsoever would be tolerated, because slavery itself is entirely unacceptable" (Hill, 2007). The speakers, themselves nuclear abolitionists, intend to act the same way, "keeping their eyes in the prize", the total elimination of nuclear weapons under a NWC (Ibid.).

Another analogy employed by the securitisers depicts countries that possess nuclear weapons as "nuclear addicts" who keep telling the others to quit their addiction. Trying to expose the contradictory behaviour of states that support non-proliferation but continue to upgrade their own nuclear arsenal, a speaker stated that "a smoker cannot forbid other smokers" (Hall, 2005). This analogy has also been used by other people, on different occasions. Former Director-General of the IAEA, Mohammad ElBaradei, made a similar statement, saying that: "as long as you continue to have countries dangling a cigarette from their mouth, you cannot tell everybody not to smoke with a high degree of credibility" (Reuters, 2004).

Another heuristic artefact that has been used by political figures and then repeated by the nuclear abolition activists is the genie metaphor, which refers to the unfeasibility of abolishing nuclear weapons as the impossibility of putting the genie back in the bottle. As the securitisers repeat this analogy, they argue the opposite; affirming that it is possible to put the genie back inside the bottle (Cabasso, 2009).

Using a metaphor provided by Schultz, et al., the securitisers have referred to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world as the top of a mountain which must be reached, as "there are too many dangers inherent in either staying where we are or, worse still, sliding back down into proliferation chaos" (Johnson, 2010). The members of the NGOs, however, emphasise that they see this mountain from a different position than the former Cold War leaders. For the "Cold Warriors", the "goal and the route to get there are both out of sight"; since there is layer of cold war fog obstructing their visibility (Ibid.). The securitisers affirm that they - the NGOs - can show the way to the top of the mountain. They acknowledge the existence of obstacles and perils along the way, but affirm that they are prepared to overcome those problems (Ibid.).

One common metaphor in the anti-nuclear discourse is the "sword of Damocles". Since the American president John F. Kennedy compared the omnipresent threat of nuclear annihilation to a sword of Damocles hanging over the people of the world, in 1961, this expression has been widely employed. In this setting, the securitisers make use of this powerful metaphor to enhance the sense of danger and the urgency of the issue.

In the construction of intersubjective threat perceptions, the establishment of watchwords that evoke the logic of danger, vulnerability and fear can be quite valuable Different scholars have showed that the use of watchwords decrease the need for elaborate arguments about the "securityness" of specific cases (Buzan and Wæver, 2009; Vuori, 2010). The anti-nuclear movement, however, has failed to establish a strong watchword supporting their securitising moves in the post-Cold War period. Although "Hiroshima" and "Nagasaki" can be considered as watchwords, since they work "as symbolic short hands that trigger vivid imagery and built-in narratives that do not have to be unfolded" (Buzan and Wæver, 2009, p. 267), the strength and effectiveness of these words has decreased throughout the years. Another term used by the securitisers that conveys a similar message is "Hibakusha". Nevertheless, many

people are unfamiliar with the concept of Hibakusha; which certainly reduces the impact of its use.

Emotions are another sort of heuristic artefacts that can configure a valuable resource in the construction of a threat. As Crawford (2002) has noted, persuasive arguments frequently use emotional appeals and draw on feelings (p. 78). However, in the elite setting, the nuclear abolitionists have refrained from making the emotional case against nuclear weapons. Even images, which are a common vehicle to express emotions (Vuori, 2010, p. 260), have rarely been employed by the securitisers in this setting. While there are probably some practical obstacles to bringing images and videos to the elite conferences, the Hibakusha sometimes show pictures during their presentations in the NGO sessions of the NPT meetings. These are usually strong images, depicting themselves and other people in the aftermath of the bombings. As such, these images can have a significant emotional impact on the audience. In this setting, it is evident that the Hibakusha are in charge of the emotional appeal to the audience, while the nuclear abolition NGOs focus on technical and political questions.

Most of the time, the securitisers follow this division and the members of the anti-nuclear NGOs avoid making emotionally charged presentations. The one exception to the rule is Jody Williams, whose statement before the 2010 NPT Review Conference was very emotional. Making use of an informal tone, she talked about her first trip to Hiroshima, which took place a couple of years ago. She told the audience that, in Hiroshima, "you can feel the spirit of the tens of thousands of people that were vaporised in an instant by the use of that indiscriminate weapon" (Williams, 2010). Williams then recounted walking inside a shop in Hiroshima and communicating through hand signals with an old Japanese woman who, she said, "might even remember the bomb of Hiroshima" (Ibid.). The Japanese lady enveloped Williams in a silk kimono, the sleeves of which went all the way to the floor. Williams said that the image of herself wearing that kimono was similar to an image she had seen in Hiroshima's Peace Museum; which depicted

A woman, with her arms outstretch, running away from the flames of the nuclear bomb. And her skin fell, like great loops that I had seen in wearing the kimono. It was human skin, like a human kimono, running away from the epicenter, where that bomb was dropped (Ibid.).

As it has been mentioned before, Williams was the coordinator of the ICBL – a network of organisations advocating for a landmine ban, which draw extensively on the participation of landmine victims and emphasised the humanitarian aspect of banning such weapons. Taking part in these securitising moves, she maintains a similar approach to the abolition of nuclear weapons, focusing on the human suffering caused by these weapons.

Links with other securitisations

In order to be successful, it is expected that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse will attempt to create links between this particular security concern and other issues that are currently being framed in terms of security. As Buzan and Wæver (2009) have already observed, "it is almost impossible for any securitisation to stand by itself" (p. 268). Thus, a macrosecuritisation should be comprehensive and provide a frame of reference that is applicable to different security issues. In this sense, it would be reasonable to assume that the anti-nuclear macrosecuritisation would be constructed in association with other securitisations – most likely, the threats of terrorism, proliferation of WMD, rogue/irrational states, climate change and nuclear energy.

Even though it was possible to spot such linkages, they were less frequent and also weaker than one could expect. This might be because of the compartmentalisation which is characteristic of elite setting, where different institutions and UN bodies have been created to deal with relevant issues separately. Nonetheless, the inability to put together different concerns can be a weakness of this potential macrosecuritisation.

In the current context, bringing together the threats of climate change and nuclear weapons would presumably enhance the securitisation of nuclear weapons. Environmental issues have been associated with nuclear weapons before, for instance in the struggle to outlaw nuclear tests. Moreover, both climate change and nuclear weapons represent the possibility of self-destruction of the humankind. The securitisers are aware of this, so they mention different environmental problems that are connected to the production of nuclear weapons; like the negative impact of uranium mining and the radioactive mine wastes, the possibility of water contamination and the threat of a "nuclear winter" (See Ramdas, 2000; McCoy, 2007; Slater, 2007; Westberg, 2008). As one speaker has stated,

> The destruction caused by nuclear weapons occurs along a continuum, beginning with the cancers and reproductive health problems inflicted on miners, downwinder communities, and other nuclear workers, and ending with the potential deaths of hundreds of millions of people and the permanent poisoning of their habitats in a nuclear war (McCoy, 2007).

Nuclear energy as a security threat has played only a marginal part in the securitising discourse.[42] Nonetheless, there are speakers who directly or indirectly criticise the use of nuclear power, mentioning the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe and advocating for the development of "clean, safe, climate-friendly energy production" (Reichl, 2007). The nuclear abolition NGOs have campaigned for the establishment of an "International Sustainable Energy Agency" (Slater, 2007) – a project that came to life in 2009, when 75 countries came together and signed the statute of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).[43]

Not only does nuclear power represent the danger of an environmental disaster, it also signifies the possibility of nuclear material being diverted to use in weapons or falling into the hands of terrorists. As one speaker has put it, "the pursuit of nuclear energy has become a leading cause of conflict around the world due to the inherently dual use nature of the nuclear fuel cycle" (Cabasso, 2009).

The securitisers mention "the dangers of a post-9/11 world" (Loretz, 2007) and restate that horizontal proliferation and terrorism pose security threats at the global level. However, they argue that clinging to nuclear weapons will not lead to solution of these problems; nor will singling out "rogue states" (Burroughs, 2007). According to the speakers, the lack of disarmament inside the NWS feeds horizontal proliferation. Moreover, the securitisers affirm that "the very existence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials from which to make them leaves the world more vulnerable to attack from non-state actors" (Hall, 2005). The way out advocated by them is stronger control over fissile material, as part of the process leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The securitisers also argue that the solution they are proposing – nuclear disarmament – should be considered in the larger frame of human security (See Hall,

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[42] After the incidents at Fukushima nuclear power plant, in 2011, it is reasonable to expect that this will change and nuclear energy as a security threat will figure more prominently in the nuclear abolition discourse.

[43] For more information on the IRENA, see the website: www.irena.org [Accessed on 21 July 2011].

2005; Spies, 2007; Cabasso, 2009; Johnson, 2010). People-centred, the idea of human security enables the securitiser to associate all different issues that might threaten the safety of the people. Presumably, a broad, human security agenda would address the threat posed by nuclear weapons in connection with environmental concerns and the threats of nuclear energy, proliferation and terrorism.

4.2.3 *Contexts*

This level of analysis provides for the way contextual factors can empower or disempower the securitising actors. It is comprised by two subunits. The first one addresses the impact of the immediate setting on this securitisation process; including the particular political practices, the genre of interaction and the use of specialised language and common conventions. The second subunit refers to the larger contextual situation, the distal context.

Immediate setting

In the UNGA, the accredited NGOs are usually not allowed to participate in the committee meetings. Nonetheless, some of these organisations may attend the open sessions as observers, depending on their status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). In spite of the evident power asymmetry, nuclear abolition organisations have managed to interact with states and have their voice heard in the Assembly sessions. By strategising and aligning themselves with states sympathetic to their aims, like Costa Rica and Malaysia, the model NWC drafted by the nuclear abolition NGOs reached the national delegations to the UNGA.

Inside the NPT Review Process, the draft has also circulated among the states parties, at the request of Costa Rica and Malaysia. Moreover, the NGOs have been able to gradually insert themselves in the NPT Preparatory Committees and Review Conferences. These civil society organisations are far from participating on an equal foot with the states parties, but significant progress has been achieved. Starting from the 1994 Preparatory Committee, NGO representatives have been allowed to observe open meetings and, since the 2000 Review Conference, NGOs have been allocated one whole session to address the NPT delegates. Official documents related to the NPT meetings are provided to NGOs as available. Moreover, the organisations can distribute their own

written material to the delegations informally, outside the official meeting rooms (Regehr, 2003).

These conditions, however, are still insufficient. Several speakers have expressed their frustrations related to the fact that the majority of the sessions of the NPT review process are in cluster working groups, closed to NGOs.[44] Moreover, they have complained about the lack of proper seating arrangements in the open sessions. These two complaints are part of the NGOs' discourse; in which they praise the conditions accomplished, but demand more. Common requests include that NGOs be allowed to participate in all NPT plenary and cluster sessions, be provided with appropriate seating within the conference hall (as opposed to the public gallery) and be guaranteed access to all documentation in a timely manner (See Burroughs, 2007; Slater, 2007).

While the access to the NPT meetings is still limited and opportunities to intervene within the thematic discussions are scarce, the NGOs try to make the most of their resources and conditions. The restrictions of the setting have encouraged them to work together, so as to make their presentations more efficient. In the months preceding the NPT meetings, the organisations try to discuss contentious issues and negotiate compromises between differences that may exist among them. In the elite setting, the securitisers avoid making reference to any internal disagreements, so they structure their presentations around common positions. As one speaker has told the audience, "we enter this room with a clear sense of purpose and a unified voice" (Snyder, 2004).

Analysing the presentations delivered by the nuclear abolition activists to the diplomatic audience, it is possible to see the professional tone of their advocacy work. The securitisers follow the formalities of this setting and avoid sounding too idealistic or emotional. As a rule, the speakers read the statements that have been previously agreed on by all NGOs. Whenever it was possible to compare the written statements to the oral presentations, only minor changes were observed. In the elite setting, spontaneity has no place in anti-nuclear securitising moves. Moreover, one could not

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[44] In the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee, the NGOs had access to cluster sessions. This took place after South Africa raised a point of order suggesting a different interpretation to Rule 44.4 of the rules of procedure. Supported by Mexico, Germany, Canada, and Chile, South Africa argued that the cluster debates at the Preparatory Committees fall under the Main Committees, which meant that NGOs should have access to them. As no one objected, NGOs were let in. This procedural progress, however, was not recorded in the 2004 final document, despite the efforts of some of the states parties. In the following year, states did not follow this precedent and NGOs were blocked from attending the cluster debates.

spot significant changes in the format or content of the securitising discourse in the thirteen years analysed in this chapter. As it became clear in this analysis, Jody Williams' statement was the one exception to the rule. Adopting a rather informal attitude, she recounted personal reminiscences and shared emotions with the audience. This was only possible because Williams decided to break the normal procedures and ignore the statement she was supposed to read.

At the end of the NGO presentations, the audience is expected to comment on the speeches and/or ask questions to the speakers. Most of the time, however, the room is quite empty by the end of the session. Moreover, there is usually not much time left for exchange of ideas and discussions, as the securitisers tend to use most of the three-hour session for their own presentations. Trying to improve the weak interaction between the national delegates and the members of NGOs, states have put forward proposals to reform the rules governing the NPT meetings. So far, however, there have been no formal concessions that increase exchanges between the two groups.

Distal context

In the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse it is possible to spot several references to the broad context of international politics. For instance, the speakers frequently mentioned the end of the Cold War and tried to draw some implications from it; stating that in today's world, nuclear weapons do not provide security. Other positive developments in world affairs addressed by the securitisers included the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the advisory opinion on the legality of threat or use of nuclear weapons issued by the ICJ in 1996.

As it could be expected, negative developments are much more abundant in the securitising discourse. The securitisers mentioned the difficulties encountered during the negotiations of bilateral agreements to reduce the number of deployed warheads in the US and Russia; like START II, START III and, more recently, the New START. The US Senate rejection of the CTBT in 1999, the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001 and the failure of the CD to produce agreement on a FMCT are also present in their discourse. Even agreements that are signed and ratified may be met with criticisms by the securitisers; who often complain about the weak provisions of SORT, for instance.

News about vertical proliferation are also mentioned by the securitisers, who denounce the modernisation of the NWS arsenal, arguing that the major powers have failed to put an end to the arms race. In view of the states which have developed nuclear weapons outside the regime, the securitisers argued that the NPT is in crisis and it must be strengthened. After the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the securitisers have raised the alarmist tone of their discourse. Since then, other contextual factors have also been used to boost the urgency of their claims; like: the nuclear tests conducted by the DPRK, the suspicious around the Iranian programme and reports of an emerging nuclear black market.

Since 2007, however, the speakers have begun to mention a window of opportunity, affirming that "the security environment is changing, the cold war fogs are clearing" (Johnson, 2010). They continued to emphasise the bad news, but they also highlighted the growing political support for nuclear disarmament. They welcomed the new and influential voices calling for nuclear abolition; like Schultz, et al., and President Obama. The securitisers called on these political leaders to match words with deeds. As one speaker has said,

> Today, we see leaders of nuclear weapon states again promising to abolish nuclear weapons. It is a good sign. But we have been here before. This time the world needs more than promises (Mian, 2009).

In the securitising discourse, not only does the world need to move towards nuclear abolition now but the current political configuration is also favourable to it. This fortunate temporal coincidence has served to enhance even more the urgency of adopting the security measure. The securitisers entail the possibility of this momentum being over soon and defend that action be taken now, before "night falls again" (Johnson, 2010).

5. Conclusion

The new nuclear disarmament momentum and the developments regarding the concept of macrosecuritisation demonstrated the relevance and the viability of examining the nuclear abolition movement from an original perspective. Although the causal influence of the nuclear abolition movement on the political decisions regarding acquisition, use or dismantlement of nuclear weapons is beyond the reach of the theory of securitisation, and perhaps beyond the reach of any theory (Vuori, 2010, p. 275), the securitisation framework provided the lens through which to examine the anti-nuclear macrosecuritising discourse. Combining this theory with discourse analysis, it was possible to see that, in the campaign for a NWC, the anti-nuclear organisations present the logic of zero as driven by a threat. As Buzan, et al. (1998), have observed, to phrase things in security terms is always a choice, "not an objective feature of the issue or the relationship itself" (p. 211). In principle, the logic of disarmament could be driven by other factors; such as legal, political, economic or moral arguments. However, states have usually framed nuclear weapons in terms of threat/defence and, while addressing this audience, the securitisers tread a similar path.

Certainly, genuine fear that these weapons may be used again exists, but this does not fully explain the decision to promote a securitising discourse. In the military sector, the logic of threat has usually provided the optimal base for a successful argument. The instrumentality of the securitising discourse becomes apparent; in this case, the alarmist tone of the discourse provides these non-state actors with a loud voice in international military affairs. As Vuori (2008) has noted, "security can be utilized for achieving several political aims" (p. 76). This particular securitisation process is aimed at raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

The securitisers try to construct the use of nuclear weapons as an impeding reality, but the fact that these weapons have not been used since 1945 certainly weakens their claims. As one speaker has said, "undoubtedly, the use of a nuclear weapon somewhere in the world would provide a terrible shock and, if it did not escalate into nuclear war, could lead swiftly to global disarmament (Johnson, 2010)". At an appalling cost for the victims and for the world, the use of nuclear weapons would probably cause worldwide commotion and provide the abolitionist cause with the emotional appeal it has been lacking. While these securitisers have legal, political, economic and security

arguments covered, they have not been able to make the emotional case against nuclear weapons. As different scholars have shown, emotions are an active component of identity and community; "they frame forms of personal and social understanding, and are thus inclinations that lead individuals to locate their identity within a wider collective" (Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008, p. 123). As so, they could be of great value to this attempt at macrosecuritisation.

Another weakness of this securitisation process refers to the underuse of powerful images. Given the important role visual representations can play in the construction of a security issue, images could contribute greatly to the success of this securitisation. Particularly, the "desire to avoid images of mass destruction and civilian casualties" (Williams, 2003, p. 526) could be a powerful factor in support of the securitisation of nuclear weapons. As it has been noted in Chapter Four, the securitisers rarely employ visual devices in the elite setting. While there are probably practical obstacles to bringing images and videos to the elite conferences, the shortage of powerful images is also notable in the popular setting. For instance, the documentary *Countdown to Zero* approached the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack while showing images of the non-nuclear terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (NY), the Madrid rail, the London bus and subway. Only on few occasions the documentary featured images of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While it is difficult to state precisely the reasons underlying the producers' choice, it is true that the anti-nuclear movement has failed to keep the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alive. Another indication of that is the lack of public awareness regarding the Hibakusha and their touching stories.

As it was demonstrated in Chapter Four, the securitisers try to enhance their claims through the construction of discursive linkages between the securitisation of nuclear weapons and other current security concerns. From the perspective of human security, the securitisers have tried to articulate the alleged threat of nuclear weapons with the fight against terrorism and nuclear proliferation, as well as environmental issues. According to them, the notion of human security provides a relevant frame to address the interconnected problems the world is currently facing. So far, however, the links between the securitisations are still weak and the frame of human security has not been accepted by the elite audience. Even though the point of view of human security

has been debated and even adopted in some particular discussions regarding military and environmental issues, there has been no indication that discussions pertaining nuclear weapons are going in this direction.

The restrictions imposed by the power asymmetry between state and non-state actors in the elite setting, along with procedural limitations to the participation of civil society organisations, have served as a motivation to bring different nuclear abolition groups to work together. This can be considered a positive development, as it has encouraged the activists to develop common goals and strengthen shared positions. However, these constraints have also placed obstacles to the establishment of a dynamic interaction between the members of NGOs and the national delegates. Even though the audience has agreed to listen to the securitisers, it has not really engaged in a serious dialogue with them. As a consequence, the security practices involved in this securitisation have seemed rather static and, sometimes, resembled a monologue.

The distal context was another important variable considered in this securitisation study. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference did indeed strengthen the perception that the NPT was in crisis. Accordingly, a discourse asserting the inability of the states parties to deal with the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes, as well as the emergence of a nuclear black market, gained force. In the face of the perceived urgency of the nuclear question, the securitisers raised the alarmist tone of their discourse and more people joined these prophets of nuclear doom in their efforts to turn abolition into reality or, at least, bring this option back to the negotiation table.

Admittedly, the continued existence of (thousands of) nuclear weapons demonstrates that the anti-nuclear discourse has failed to reach its final objective. However, as the issue is again being discussed as part of a wider political debate reassessing the costs and benefits of nuclear deterrence, the endorsement of the description of the threat as existential might become stronger and more widespread. Even though the solution proposed by the securitisers has so far been rejected and there are no indications that serious negotiations on a NWC will happen any time soon, there is no reason to rule out this possibility. As Krepon (2007) has noted, "nuclear disarmament is a process, not an on-or-off switch". Similarly, every securitisation is a

historical process (Balzacq, 2005, p. 193) and this one has been going on for more than half a century and it might continue for as long as it takes.

Many are sceptical of the feasibility of nuclear abolition. It is true that nuclear weapons, like any other human creation, cannot be "disinvented". They can, however, be prohibited and dismantled. As Acton and Perkovich (2009) have observed, civilisation has been capable of doing so in cases where the artefacts in question were considered too dangerous, damaging or morally objectionable to continue living with (p. 17). For instance, the mass-scale gas chambers used by Nazi Germany have not been disinvented, but they are nevertheless not tolerated (Ibid.). Similarly, there is nothing intrinsic to nuclear weapons that makes their elimination impossible. It is up to us – academics, scientists, activists, political leaders, NGOs – to work on the conditions that will lead to the establishment of an international regime capable of verifying the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and minimising the risk of cheating. It is by no means an easy task, but political will and leadership coupled with monitoring technologies can overcome the large majority of the possible obstacles on the way to zero.

5.1 *Further Research*

One way to give continuity to this research would be to keep investigating the securitising moves in the elite setting and conduct participant observation in the future meetings of the NPT Preparatory Committees and the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It would require a long-term commitment, but the analysis would certainly be more complete. Additionally, one could conduct interviews with the members of the abolition organisations and carry out a deeper investigation on their views of security and disarmament.

It would also be interesting to analyse the securitising moves conducted by the anti-nuclear movement in the popular, scientific and technocratic settings. A comparison between the securitising discourse in these different arenas would enable the analyst to study eventual variances in content and format.

One last avenue for future research would be to pay attention to the links between the securitisation of nuclear weapons and other security concerns; chiefly, climate change and nuclear energy. As opposition to nuclear energy appears to be

increasing since the disaster at Fukushima nuclear power plant, there is a chance that the anti-nuclear and environmental movements will join forces again to advocated decreased reliance in nuclear energy as well as in nuclear weapons.

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Appendix 2 – Newspaper articles and editorials, government publications and politicians' statements endorsing the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, since 2007.

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