

ESTONIAN RUSSOPHONE IDENTITY IN 1995

Aigerim Nurseitova (University of Tartu)

18 October, 2023 (11,101 words)

Introduction

In 1995, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Estonia regained independence, the dominant identity discourse among Estonian Russophones centred on the question of belonging. The earlier adoption of citizenship laws and the beginning of the negotiations for Estonia's accession to the European Union have also led local Russophones to contest the Estonian authorities' decisions regarding ethnic minorities. Those decisions were viewed as discriminatory against minority rights. While Estonia's trajectory towards (re-)building the state was supported by many, and Estonian Russophones expressed loyalty to the country and Estonian nationhood, the creation of a nation-state where ethnic Estonians enjoyed more privileges than non-Estonians was contested. The main challenge was seen as the lack of unity both among Estonian Russophones themselves and between Estonian Russophones and Estonian elites. In their competing discourses, Estonian Russophones sought to position their identity in relation to, and articulate their perspective on, the Estonian national identity.

1. Text selection and classification of sources

The project's archive includes speeches, newspapers, a school history textbook, novels, magazines, and letters to the editor (see 'Sources' below for a complete list). The sources are different from the standard MIC sampling strategy due to the absence of films: in 1995, no Russian-language films were produced in Estonia. To compensate for this, magazines were added to the sample as a genre representative of popular views.

The selection of specific sources in genres such as newspapers and magazines was based on their popularity. In 1995, *Molodezh Estonii* and *Estonia* were the most popular Estonian Russian-language daily newspapers, with 9,580 and 5,930 subscribers, respectively (BNS, 1995). Based on circulation they have also stood out, with 20,000 and 16,000 copies printed in 1995 (Jakobson, 2002). For both newspapers, articles from the first issue available of each month were sampled.

Raduga, *Tallinn*, and *Vyshgorod*, were the three most popular Russian-language magazines printed in Estonia with 418, 323, and 660 copies in circulation, respectively (Council of Europe, 2004). Since these magazines publish only three to six issues a year; all issues from 1995 were coded. During Perestroika, Soviet literary magazines (*толстые журналы*) began to get de-censored. *Tallinn*, published since 1978, and *Raduga*, published since 1986, also gained greater editorial freedom. Meanwhile, *Vyshgorod* was established in 1994. These magazines focused on Baltic literary works, translating Estonian authors' pieces into Russian, and discussing then-revolutionary topics such as Stalinist repressions and deportations, environmental issues, independence of the Baltic states, and works of banned authors who had been forced to emigrate from Soviet Russia and Estonia (Polivanov, 2010). Their bold coverage brought immense popularity not only among intelligentsia but also among the general public during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Speeches and letters to the editor were selected from all available issues of the aforementioned newspapers, as their publication dates did not necessarily align with the newspaper selection criteria. The number of speeches was limited, as an Estonian Russian political elite was still in the process of formation, leaving a fragmented landscape of rival parties. Thus, the speeches included

addresses by parties and groups such as the Russian Culture Society in Estonia, the Russian Party of Estonia, the Russian People's Party of Estonia, the Russian Faction of the Riigikogu, and the United People's Party of Estonia. These were commonly represented by their chairs, including figures such as Sergei Ivanov, Viktor Andrejev, and others. The available speeches and letters were also relatively short. Due to the limited volume, 27 speeches and 116 letters were coded, resulting in 184 for speeches and 620 for letters.

During the Soviet occupation, Estonian schools did not emphasize the origins and history of Estonia as a nation, except for the ancient times when the tribes inhabiting the territory of present-day Estonia were free from foreign domination. Later historical narratives portrayed Estonians as fighting for their independence from the German ruler, and capitalist oppression, while their belonging to the Russian and Soviet domain was presented as natural. Since regaining its independence, Estonia has implemented a national curriculum that standardized the education system (Riigikogu, 1992). On this basis, Russian-language schools used translations of Estonian-language textbooks (Government of Estonia, 2000). The first history textbook written and published in newly independent Estonia was authored by the famous children's writer Tiia Toomet in 1993. This textbook was later translated and used in Russian-language schools in Estonia from 1997. While these translated school textbooks have contributed to shaping Estonian Russophone identity and are a necessary component of the Making Identity Count methodology, these texts must not be taken as self-expressions of Estonian Russophone identity.

Novels written by Estonian Russophones do not receive significant attention or circulation to be among bestsellers in Estonia (Repson, 2012). Consequently, the project relied on the works of well-known authors, primarily Jelena Skulskaja, Nil Nerlin, and Andrei Šahhov for 1995. These authors had lived in Estonia long before the dissolution of the USSR and remained in Estonia after independence was restored. While the typical print run of a Russian novel in Estonia was below 500, Skulskaja's (1996) and Šahhov's (1994) books had print runs of 5,000 copies.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonian cinematography – previously represented by Tallinnfilm and financed and controlled from Moscow – became prohibitively expensive to sustain independently (Kärk, no date). Consequently, Estonia-produced films catered mainly to an Estonian-speaking audience, while all films originally produced in Russian and available to the Russian-speaking audience in Estonia were produced in Russia. As a result, there were no films that met the MIC criteria for coding.

2. Raw identity categories

Due to uneven distribution of codes across genres, the same procedure as in the NIRs on Russia and the Soviet Union was applied when selecting aggregated categories for analysis. Rather than relying on raw counts, percentages normalized by genre were used. To achieve this, first a table showing the relative prominence, by genre, of all 53 aggregated categories derived from the raw codes was created. Then, those categories whose average prominence across genres was below 0.98% were excluded, leaving us with 28 categories for further analysis. Next, another table was created showing percentage distribution of valences for these 28 categories. Any category with a valence percentage over 1% was further excluded, reducing the final list of categories to 26, which are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. The following section provides a detailed explanation of these identities categories.

Rule of law and human rights

In 1995, Estonian Russophone identity was still under construction, but the most common unifying theme emerged around feelings of discrimination and injustice at the hands of the government. This section contains the largest number of categories, all revolving around a shared discursive field. The primary categories include *Class inequality*, *Minority rights violation*, with a primary focus on citizenship, *Estonian authorities and politics*, and *Rule of law/Human rights/Democracy*.

Class inequality illustrates how the transition to capitalist market economy was perceived through the prism of Estonia's socialist past. Unlike in Russia or among ethnic Estonians – where economic hardship was seen as a necessary phase on the path to prosperity – Estonian Russophones contrasted the economic crisis with the stability of the socialist past, when unemployment and homelessness were less widespread: '... today you have to be happy about what should be normal' (Jermakov, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_00260})¹. Privatization also caught many by surprise, exacerbating issues with housing and utility payments and contributing to homelessness: '... we need to end the privatization of apartments. It will bring the people nothing but devastation' (Ostroglazov, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01070}). Many Estonian Russophones, especially pensioners and Soviet Army veterans, found themselves in economically disadvantaged, lower-class positions. This was primarily due to legal and linguistic barriers: government and other jobs required legal residence, which many could not obtain, as well as proficiency in Estonian, which was also lacking. Additionally, many lost their prior jobs due to closure of state-owned enterprises:

Older people probably got it the most. Here and the loss of deposits, and meagre subsistence money, restrictions on the possibility of finding a job, an unfair tax system for the poor. (Perehodov, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_00240})

Many war veterans are forced to drag on a miserable existence, and such a category of people as military pensioners and members of their families have been experiencing powerful moral pressure from the state for the past year and a half, which is expressed through the introduction of the Aliens Act. (Amelchenkov, 1995b {1995_P_MOLO_08560})

Due to insufficient knowledge of the Estonian language, a non-Estonian loses a job even if this place does not require knowledge of the language at all. (Jõgimaa, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_02580})

Some simply do not have enough money to pay the [state] fee and for the help with paperwork. (Arutin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01070})

The emerging social hierarchy was widely criticized in newspapers, letters, and magazines: 'Why do we think that we live badly, and they supposedly believe that there is nothing wrong with that' (Semenov, 1995 {1995_MG_TALL_00030}); 'The fate of those who were below the poverty line, as they say, does not concern the well-fed. Therefore, they [the poor] can only trust in the love of God' (Siig, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_02190}). This strong negative emphasis on class inequality and poverty stemmed in part from the perception that the political elites consisted of ethnic Estonians rather than Russians, making them an easier target for Othering.

¹ References in this report consist of a reference to the original source (can be found in 'Reference list' below) and, in brackets ({...}) the code ID used in the coding table (stored in the National Identity Database).

Coalitions, parties, candidates for deputies, who can calmly look at the ominous inscription “Estonia for Estonians,” do not think about the good of the motherland, do not care about the happiness of the people, but only about cozy parliamentary seats, about warm ministerial chairs. (Barabaner, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01290})

Do not you think that, regardless of citizenship, nationality, and education, we simply should unite so that not only rich gentlemen, but also representatives of the less well-to-do part of the population, sit in the parliament. Otherwise, as long as our people are not in Toompea, we will continue to live in poverty and rightlessness. (*Molodezh Estonii*, 1995b {1995_L_MOLO_03340}).

Today, Estonia has a monoethnic parliament, in which the interests of national minorities are not represented in any way. (Andrejev, Kuznetsov and Zöbin, 1995 {1995_S_ESTO_00130})

The ethnic factor, while implicit in the examples above, was not always directly emphasized in the texts. Instead, the opposing side was identified in ambiguous terms – such as the rich, the elite, the rulers, and so on – rather than explicitly as Estonians: ‘It turns out that the rulers whom we support only complicate our life, inventing new laws that are difficult to respect, because they do not respect people, the elementary rights of the individual’ (A.F., 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_02260}); ‘Otherwise, if things go on like this, Estonia will belong to the “new rich,” and nationality will no longer play any role here’ (Vaha, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01680}). As in the case of the discourse on Estonians as a significant Other (see ‘*Significant Others*’ section below), a distinction was drawn between the Estonian people and the Estonian government or authorities. The former received neutral connotations, whereas the latter were predominantly viewed in a negative light. Even though some Russophones were dissatisfied with a monoethnic parliament, criticism was directed at the elites rather than at any specific ethnic group.

Estonia’s economic development in the 1990s was occasionally viewed with positive valences due to modernization and access to foreign goods. However, these improvements were accompanied by concerns that they came at the expense of local small businesses and the general population’s living conditions: ‘Unfortunately, the price of Estonian reforms is the older generation, or rather, not the price, but the victim’ (Delovoy mir, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02273}); ‘It happens that local residents also visit these shops, but rather as a museum, which demonstrates not how people lived before, but how you can live now. Most often, they only come to look, because there is only enough money in the wallet for that’ (Nikolaev, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_02870}).

In contrast, textbooks associated class inequality with historical feudalism, portraying the residents of Estonia as having suffered under foreigner rule: ‘The feudal lords, using the right of the strong, forced Estonians to build fortresses designed to fight the Estonian people themselves’ (Toomet, 1997, p. 126 {1995_T_HIST_03010}).

Economic and social struggles were attributed to **minority rights violations** that have occurred as Estonian Russophones, as non-citizens, expressed insecurity about their rights to political participation, education, language, and religious freedom. The predominant discourse was thus specifically on the violation of rights rather than their affirmation. Estonian Russophones expressed themselves as being wronged or discriminated due to being ethnically non-Estonian. The primary reason for such discourse was the Citizenship Law of 1992, which granted automatic citizenship only to those who had resided in Estonia prior to the Soviet occupation, along with their descendants. This Act left many of Estonian Russophones without citizenship, as most of them

have migrated to Estonia after the World War II, and few, if any, had Estonian ancestors. Those excluded by 1992 Citizenship Law were expected to either acquire citizenship from a different country (e.g., Russia), undergo naturalization in Estonia, or remain stateless with an Estonian alien's passport (grey passport). At that time, **Estonian citizenship** was difficult to obtain – only 10% of Russian speakers in Estonia got citizenship through naturalization between 1992 and 1995 (see Minorities at Risk Project, 2004; Lauri, 2019), largely due to the requirement of passing an Estonian language exam. Many Estonian Russophones opted for **non-citizenship** in the hope of securing citizenship eventually. By June 1995, about 250,000 people applied for residence permits to remain in Estonia (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004).

Despite accusations of ‘massive violations of human rights,’ Russians from Estonia, unlike other former republics, do not *en masse* emigrate to Russia. Many try to learn Estonian. (Panchenko, 1995b {1995_P_ESTO_04733})

Our democratic state has lined us up for residence permits, for work permits, for Estonian citizenship. And we, the old and the young, the sick, the disabled, are queueing. Looking at each other's backs. Days and nights. Sleeping like homeless people, at best in some lobbies, or even on the street. We queue for the primordial human rights – the right to life, the right to work, and the right to acquire citizenship. (Panchenko, 1995a {1995_P_ESTO_01503})

This legal status of non-citizens reinforced a sense of uncertainty about their belonging in Estonia:

Is it possible to build life and work in annual cycles, at the end of each of which is uncertainty? Will I stay here? Wouldn't it occur to some official that, due to my Russian origin, I am not suitable for permanent residence in Estonia? What if I do not have time to collect all the certificates by the deadline, but every year they require more and more [certificates]? (Pavluhin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01660})

They already pressed us down so we cannot breathe. And you are the odd one out here, and you do not speak Estonian, and an occupier, and an illegal migrant ... Give us some rest! (Anatolii, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_02880})

I feel deceived because I, like many others, followed the leaders of the “singing revolution.” Now we have a feeling of uncertainty – will we live on this land in a year, or will we be shown the door? Living “out of suitcases,” can a person work fully, whether they are a person of art, an entrepreneur, or an artisan? (Pavluhin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01720})

As an alternative to Estonian (non-)citizenship, as of 1 March 1996, about 86,000 Russophones had taken on Russian citizenship (Minorities at Risk Project, 2004), with some of them choosing to emigrate permanently. However, the texts selected largely reflect the views of those Russophones who remained in Estonia. Among Russian citizens in Estonia, some held pro-Soviet or Russian nationalist views, such as the chair of the Tallinn Union of Russian Citizens and deputy chair of the Estonian Republican Union of Russian Citizens, Petr Rozhok, who actively reproduced Russian propaganda clichés about Estonia. Many Estonian Russophones did not support these separatists or imperialist agendas. More prominently, the sources reflect discourses in which Estonian Russophones framed their decision to take **Russian citizenship** as a necessity to have their civil, economic, and social rights protected by some state, rather than an expression of loyalty to Russia:

A foreign land does not accept us, and we are not able to appreciate it. ... And the point is not that where is better or worse, but that here [Russia] is a foreign land, and over time it becomes more and more difficult for us. (N.N., 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01560})

But at the same time, the growing number of Russian citizens in the country is becoming an equally serious problem. At the beginning of May, there were 71,000 of them. This situation, the report says, is largely due to the fact that the current legislation practically forces citizens of the former USSR living in Estonia to take Russian citizenship, since they have no other opportunity to obtain identity documents that would allow them to exercise their right to live, work, and move. (Libman, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02145})

Beyond legal status, Estonian Russophones felt discriminated against in language policy, particularly in the restriction of Russian use in public institutions and the state's declared goal of eliminating Russian-language secondary and higher **education**. While education and literacy are presented as important for Estonians in textbooks, Estonian Russophones saw education as crucial for personal and group development, which was expressed through newspapers. Soviet/Russian school, highly regarded within the Russophone community, was framed as a way to counter the negative uncultured stereotypes imposed on them by the Other. At the same time, school is imagined as a place of unity between ethnic Estonians and others.

From the point of view of economic relations with the state, I am absolutely equal with the Estonians. I do not freeload. They do not sustain me. I pay equally for everything. Then, by what right do they demand that I, as a Russian person, renounce my language?! Because Estonians are the owners of this land? (Kutaj, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01950})

To reject my language in all social spheres means to deprive me of the conditions for reproducing myself as a person, as a bearer of my ethnicity [*национальности*]. In relation to those who have worked in this state for their entire working life, such a step by the Estonian state is simply insulting. (Kutaj, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01930})

Sorry, but Russians – both citizens and non-citizens of the Estonian Republic – pay the same taxes as Estonians. These taxes go towards public education. Why should we pay out of our own pocket for our children's education in a foreign language? That is to contribute to the Estonization of our children. (Tavrov, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_03760})

Only a person who is culturally and morally established can be of interest to others in the future. And in this sense, the Russian school in Estonia for the Russian diaspora should take a special place in the domain of common interest if we want to ensure full development for ourselves in the future. (Aleksandrova, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_03010})

There is an opinion that Russian schools should study using textbooks translated from Estonian. Maybe this is a way out for some subjects, but I think that we should use the experience and traditions of one of the strongest schools in mathematics education – Russian (and former Soviet). We know this experience and traditions, which means that we must teach our children using it. (Gusev, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_03500})

We have opened a school where Russian and Estonian children will study together, albeit in different classes. We were advised not to open this school, but we managed to achieve a different solution. (Amelchenkov, 1995a {1995_P_MOLO_07410})

The **Estonian authorities** were blamed for the struggles experienced by the Estonian Russophones. In this discursive field, the authorities were portrayed as self-serving elites prioritizing personal gain over the common good. In newspapers and letters, they were frequently described as undemocratic, one-sided, and driven by narrow interests rather than broader societal well-being.

Estonia is occupied by criminal structures generated by the past and present authorities and reforms, constantly “improving the living standards of the country’s population to prosperity.” (Orover, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01450})

I am a citizen of the Republic of Estonia, but on 5 March I will not give my vote to candidates who do not see and do not want to see the pressing problems of the lower strata of the population, who, having barely received a deputy’s powers, first of all rush to raise the issue of deputies’ benefits and, in general, do not worry about anything but their own well-being. (Okas, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01400})

Despite these grievances, Estonian Russophones sought to participate in Estonian politics, which was reflected in speeches.

We propose to unite the efforts of all the political forces of Estonia, representing the interests of hundreds of thousands of people who find themselves affected by the Aliens Act, in order to change the law and bring it into line with the universal values and principles of a modern democratic state and paragraph nine of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. (*Estonia*, 1995 {1995_S_ESTO_00760})

An antithesis to Estonian politics were the **rule of law, human rights, and democracy**, which carried positive connotations across speeches, newspapers, and letters. All three were desired as a goal for the Estonian state. ‘Where is democracy? When will the government become a defender of justice, and not a supporter of violence?’ (Rusalim, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_03120}). ‘I, an ordinary person, still want to believe that there will be a time in our so-called democratic state when everyone would be equal before the law – both the “big” people and the “small” ones. For fairness’ sake’ (Pavlov, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_02600}).

From this perspective, the injustice could be eliminated if only Estonia truly committed to protecting human rights and adopting a genuinely democratic course. Instead, **Estonian politics** were seen as performative, designed to satisfy the international community while a third of the population experienced injustice: ‘Newspapers write that the entire world is surprised at the achievements of Estonia. But this is only one side of the coin. Let at least one of the political parties acquaint the world community with the situation of many residents of the Estonian Republic who are driven to despair’ (Prejs and Eeder, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_00460}).

The Estonian Russophone person

This group of categories includes the following codes: *Estonian Russophone community*, *Russian culture in Estonia*, and *Russian culture and language*. All these categories were instrumental in structuring the Estonian Russophone identity, or rather, what they wanted to be as a group that had not yet solidified into a united group identity.

The **Estonian Russophone community** codes include aspirational discourses of political unity and cultural autonomy. Most codes here centred on the formation of political aimed at protecting their rights and improving the dire living conditions. This is especially evident in letters to the editor and newspapers.

The Russians here in Estonia, unfortunately, turned out to be very poorly prepared for the situation. We really need to organize ourselves, to unite in the name of common goals. If we sit around and wait for someone to give us something, then of course we will not achieve anything. (Issakov, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_01230})

In October 1994, the Estonian parliament passed a law on civil service, which restricted public office to Estonian citizens, excluding those Estonian Russophones who remained stateless or took on a citizenship of any third country from working in governmental and municipal institutions. Estonian Russophones who obtained the Estonian citizenship then established parties such as Russian Party in Estonia and the United People's Party of Estonia. These parties later merged for the March 1995 elections under the bloc *Our Home is Estonia*, winning six mandates. At the time, their representatives Viktor Andrejev, Sergei Kuznetsov, and Aleksei Zõbin (1995 {1995_S_ESTO_00080}) articulated their main goals:

In the Estonian Parliament, our deputies will defend: the creation of a civil society; building the rule of law; formation of a socially oriented market economy; ensuring the whole range of socio-economic, political, and cultural rights for all residents of the republic, regardless of nationality and social status.

These priorities also closely align to the first group of code categories on the rule of law and human rights.

Another significant organization, the Union of Russian Citizens in the Republic of Estonia, was led by Yury Mishin, who himself lacked Estonian citizenship in the 1990s. In a similar way, the Estonian Russophone community category displayed a lot of ambiguity, as all of these political groups were rather ad hoc and did not have a uniting agenda. Some groups leaned toward Russian nationalism, while others, labelled *integrationists*, advocated for Estonian language acquisition and obtaining Estonian citizenship. Others sought to neither assimilate nor lose their connection to the Russian culture and language, while expressing their loyalty to Estonia and wanting equal treatment of Estonian Russophones in the political arena. Unity among Russophone political groups was desired; however: 'And yet, despite such striking contradictions and contrasts, any unification for the protection of the rights of Russian-speaking people should be welcomed' (Štšukin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01960}); 'For unity is our strength. And therefore, it must be preserved and strengthened if we do not want to turn from the second-class people that we have been turned into to an even lower grade. And then it will be really bad' (Broj, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_00650}).

Beyond political representation, the idea of cultural autonomy for the Russians gained traction following the enactment of the National Minorities Cultural Autonomy Act in November 1993. This law allowed national minorities – providing they held Estonian citizenship – to preserve their language and culture in educational, religious, and cultural community institutions. The idea featured prominently in the Russophone discursive field, especially in magazines: 'It is necessary to start a dialogue between the autonomous subjects of the Russian minority in Estonia on the issues of their culture and autonomy' (Mikhailov, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_11220}).

To this day, however, Russians have not succeeded in registering organizations for cultural autonomy (Lagerspetz, 2014; Calipso, 2018; ACFC, 2022). In 1995, the lack of progress was blamed on the legislative hurdles – many Russophones lacked Estonian citizenship – as well as on internal fragmentation: ‘Respecting the rights of minorities, the Committee strongly recommends the revision of national legislation and the extension of the law on cultural autonomy to all minorities...’ (*Molodezh Estonii*, 1995a {1995_P_MOLO_09720}); ‘The most serious opponent of cultural autonomy is the heteronomy of Russian communities, groups and individuals in the Russian diaspora’ (Mikhailov, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_11210}).

Despite the schism within the Orthodox Church in Estonia in the early 1990s, codes discussing **Christianity** and freedom of religion were marginal compared to concerns over economic and social rights. For purposes of analysis, all Christian denominations were merged into a single category to obtain enough codes, and references other religions, like Islam, were not included. Religion was only significant in textbooks, which framed Christianity as an external colonial imposition on Estonians: ‘The Estonians had to admit that the God of the Germans turned out to be more powerful than their own deities. It is necessary to agree to baptism in order to save the lives of the besieged’ (Toomet, 1997, p. 113 {1995_T_HIST_02310}). As mentioned, these textbooks, however, were simply translations from Estonian and are not directly representative of Estonian Russophones. Nevertheless, the overall absence of Christianity as a significant category in other genres indicates that religion is not a defining element of either the Estonian Russophone person or Estonian national identity at this stage.

In contrast, references to **Russian culture and language** – both within and beyond Estonia – were more prominent, though often framed with neutral or ambiguous valences as general markers of identity. Russian culture was conceptualized as a phenomenon reaching beyond state borders and time, not necessarily attributed just to the Russian. The presence of **Russian culture in Estonia** was thus seen as a part of a broader Russian cultural continuum, encompassing its own cultural figures, history, and traditions while remaining linked to a global Russian cultural sphere:

I am a person brought up by Russian culture. A culture of compassion for human pain and respect for one’s dignity. This culture, no matter who tries to discredit or “appropriate” it, is a common human heritage, one of the highest achievements of human spirituality. (Barabaner, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01230})

Isolation [from greater Russian culture] will someday be overcome, but anyway, we will remain here on our own – Russians in Estonia, and we need to create our own Russian subculture here as soon as possible... We must create a culture in Estonia similar to that created by the Swedes in Finland, or the French in Canada. This is the path that can be for us the path of national salvation. (Issakov, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_01220})

In the same vein, the Russian language is a defining factor for Estonian Russophones. As mentioned earlier, any attempts to eliminate the Russian language from the public sphere in Estonia were met with criticism.

Traditional family values showed varying valences across genres. In newspapers and textbooks, the prevalent image is one of the traditional family, where the male is a dominant provider, the female is a homemaker, and children, bound to respect adults, show a positive connotation (‘The man should be the head of the household. If mine [woman] tries to demand rights, first I will reason in a good way. Then, in a bad way. If she does not understand, maybe I will get a divorce’ (Igor,

1995 {1995_L_MOLO_02560}); ‘Some little girls themselves knew how to weave small baskets. They quickly learned to cook, and they nursed their little sisters and brothers more willingly than the boys. Girls were better than boys at inventing new games and composing songs’ (Toomet, 1997, p. 70 {1995_T_HIST_00710}). In magazines, the concept is slightly more ambiguous because traditional family values are also shown through a somewhat unstructured feminist lens (‘The struggle of the male and female principles, described with a slight grin, as usual by Saluri, is only mimicry, only an imitation of the tough struggle of conceited individuals of both sexes for self-affirmation’ (Belobrovtsseva, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_07050})).

Estonianness

While the definition of what it meant to be a Russophone in Estonia was still under construction, one feature that stood out was the **Estonianness** of their identity. Estonianness, in this regard, is not understood as the values or identity of ethnic Estonians, but rather the aspects of identity pertaining to the residents of Estonia (*эстоноземельцы*, Estonian *estimaalased*). Textbooks, magazines, and letters praised the love and care for the nature and the way of life, emphasizing the **unity** between different ethnic and social groups as an important part of Estonianness: ‘This is my homeland, and I love it no less than any Estonian. I will not be mistaken if I say that all the “non-indigenous” living here love this land. We are not enemies’ (Mihailuškin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01840}); ‘... a small land, we love every corner’ (*Raduga*, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_05890}). Since Estonian Russophones had lost what remained of their Soviet identity and not yet gained an alternative one, they identified with the place of residence rather than with their legal and social status: ‘I am an Estonian citizen. Not by the blue passport. But by the feeling of belonging to its [Estonia’s] fate. Out of respect for its people. For the love of its lakes and forests’ (Barabaner, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01240}). In many cases, Estonia is described as a motherland, as multiple generations had already been raised since the 1940s, when Estonia was occupied. Many Estonian Russophones emphasized the fact that they were born in Estonia and contributed to its economic wellbeing.

I gave almost 40 years of my life to Estonia. My son and grandson were born here. Here are the graves of my loved ones. There is probably not a single city in Estonia that does not have schools and hospitals, kindergartens and residential buildings designed or built by me and my comrades. More than once, at the most representative forums of scientists in different countries, the scientific work carried out by me together with my colleagues here in Estonia received the highest international recognition. (Barabaner, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01250})

Estonian Russophones had their own view of a united Estonian society where nationalism had no place and ethnicities coexist in mutual respect of each other’s language and culture.

In letters especially, **Estonian nationalism** was condemned for excluding non-ethnic-Estonians and abusing the concept of Estonianness as Estonian Russophones understood it (‘I would like to ask the Estonian patriots why they have forgotten today that the “Estonian house” was established also with help of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews’ (Jeliseeva, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_00600})). In a way, this reflects an attachment to Soviet-era values, which emphasized the equality of all regardless of ethnic background. Despite this attachment, **independent Estonia** (whether in its ancient, interwar, or post-Soviet iterations) receives positive connotation in the history textbook (which is unsurprising, as it covers Estonian history) and newspapers. Magazines, in contrast, tend to present a neutral and ambiguous valence, largely due to the previously

mentioned questioning of state authorities' discriminatory decisions and the comparison of life before and after the collapse of the USSR. As much as Estonian Russophones sought Estonia's freedom from Soviet rule, the independence that followed the dissolution of the USSR took an unpleasant turn for them. They found themselves alienated from politics and economically disadvantaged. Nevertheless, they sought equality rather than dominance of one ethnic group over another. Several texts in the newspapers emphasized Estonian Russophones' loyalty to Estonia despite the hardships they experienced ('And yet, despite the difficult situation of the elderly, my hopes associated with gaining independence by Estonia were justified by 200–300%' (Delovoy mir, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02280})). Some also reminisce about the Singing Revolution and partaking in protests or in the development of Estonian state ('Back in the day, we worked together in Moscow, fighting for the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Estonia and the other Baltic countries by the Soviet bodies' (Delovoy mir, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02336})). The loyalty was thus expressed to the land on which Estonian Russophones resided, rather than the nation-state that emerged there. This ideal image of Estonia did not align with the nation-building strategies of Estonian politicians, instead centring on unity and equality between all ethnic groups in political, cultural, and economic terms.

Contrary to the concerns about citizenship and belonging, **Estonian language and culture** were not perceived particularly divisive, but rather as a natural component of Estonianness (with Russian language and culture occupying the same space). However, there were some complaints about the Estonian language learning requirement imposed by the state, which returns us to the themes represented by such categories as *Minority rights violations* and *Estonian authorities*: 'No, this is not about the language of Tammsaare, Vilde, and Luts. It is about something else, pleasing to bureaucratic patriots. They force it to be learned by heart almost under pressure, making not just well-being, but the fate of people dependent on academic performance' (S.V., 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_07320})). In other words, Estonian culture and language are not viewed as part of the requirements imposed by the state, just as Estonians are not always perceived as representatives of the nation-state and political regime that Estonian Russophones were discontent with.

Historical Others

Historical Others encompass occupations of territory of modern Estonia starting from the ancient times until the dissolution of the USSR. Texts outside of textbooks, however, are not as explicit in labelling these periods as occupations, attaching more positive connotations, particularly to the Soviet period. This section thus focuses on the Soviet Union and World War II as important and most frequently referenced historical Others in Estonian Russophone discourses. Early Russians who migrated to Estonia prior to the Soviet occupation are also included in this category as they were presented as prior examples of successful coexistence between Estonians and non-Estonians.

The occupations preceding the Soviet one (category label: **pre-WWI occupations**) are only mentioned in the history textbook, largely with negative or neutral connotations ('The conquerors robbed and killed people, devastated the villages, and burned the settlement of Otepää' (Toomet, 1997, p. 110 {1995_T_HIST_02160})). The treatment of **the USSR**, however, is more diverse. Whereas it is understandably described negatively in the school textbook, consistent with the treatment of other occupations, other genres reflect a more complicated relationship with the Soviet past. Some Estonian Russophones tentatively accepted the idea that the Soviet period was an occupation: 'Estonia was incorporated into the USSR (whether by force, by threat, by deceit, or in any other way, is another question)' (Kutaj, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_01980}). Others viewed it more

positively: ‘Much of what the republic is proud of today and what it is known to the world, was created during the Soviet era’ (Jeliseeva, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_00660}). Stalinism and the Gulag are viewed as a dark period in the shared history, one in which all ethnicities living in the Soviet Union were negatively impacted by the regime: ‘And we have no reasons for mutual hatred. Yes, many Estonians suffered a lot from Stalinism in their time. But this is not the fault of the peoples of Russia. After all, the Russians themselves suffered no less from it. There are no bad peoples. There are bad leaders’ (Broj, 1995 {1995_L_ESTO_00810}).

Here, as elsewhere, a distinction is drawn between ethnicity and the authorities or elites, rather than an equivalence between the two. The **Second World War** was also viewed as a shared event: ‘More than a hundred thousand prisoners of various nationalities, including Estonians, were tortured to death, and shot in the death camps on the territory of Estonia. The ashes of these people live in the hearts of the survivors. People cannot forget about those who died in this war’ (Council of the Union of Veteran Organizations of the Republic of Estonia, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_00480}).

Commemoration of the fallen Red Army soldiers (category label: **HO: WWII: victory / commemoration / Red Army**), who are viewed as liberators, and the celebration of the victory over Nazism are treated in a separate category. This category is distinguished by the prominence of the positive valences compared to the HO: WWII category, as this event received negative connotations due to the life-changing effects it had on Estonian Russophones. In newspapers and letters, commemoration of the Second World War veterans carries largely positive connotations, celebrating their heroism and sharing their stories:

The monument on Tõnismägi, although there are no Estonian names on it, is international. It can be regarded as an obelisk to the Estonian soldiers who fell in the struggle for the common cause of defeating fascism. It is no coincidence that the face of the Bronze Soldier was given Estonian features. (Smirnov, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_05120})

The significance of the topic for 1995 was certainly heightened by the fact that marked the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII. However, even before this anniversary, complaints had emerged regarding the lack of respect for local war veterans and monuments such as the Bronze Soldier on the part of some ethnic Estonians and the Estonian authorities: ‘The ill-wishers of the Victorious Warrior on Tõnismägi are only waiting for provocative actions from us, so that, as it was last year, they can launch a campaign to demolish the monument’ (Collective address by six organizations, 1995 {1995_S_MOLO_00260}).

Historical Other of **Old Russians**, who had lived in Estonia prior to the Soviet occupation, was emphasized in part to secure Estonian Russophone identity. This framing asserted that Russian culture and language coexisted with Estonian long before Estonia gained independence. In this context, many referred to a **Baltic Russian** culture, a concept larger than just modern Estonian Russophone culture: ‘We are talking about the Balto-Russian subculture, and it should be understood in a broader sense than just the enclave of Peipsi’ (Mikhailov, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_09230}). Baltic Russian culture was seen as a foundation for Estonian Russophones to make sense of their belonging, as it demonstrated a long history of successful coexistence with Estonians: ‘However, it is in this environment of old-time “monads” and small troupes of “Baltorusses” that the ethno-cultural identity is preserved, which, as I am convinced,

can and should become the value core of the cultural autonomy of the Russian minority, not only in Estonia' (Mikhailov, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_09530}).

Significant Others

Already at the initial stage of aggregation, it became apparent that a clear, logical distinction between internal and external Others was not feasible. Therefore, the respective codes were merged under the category of 'significant Others'. The most prominent categories here are ethnic Estonians, Russia, and the West. Ethnic **Estonians**, as internal Others, did not receive a substantial number of codes; most mentions were classified under the Estonian authorities/politics category. Only in magazines was there some ambiguity in the valences related to this category: 'In all fairness, we should also mention the names of Estonian colleagues who did not put a spoke in our wheels but even helped as much as possible' (Egorov, 1995 {1995_MG_RADU_00730}). The remaining sources did not yield any significant number of codes positioning ethnic Estonians as the Other. Due to the predominance of the discourse of unity, as described above, ethnic Estonians were not portrayed as negatively as the Estonian authorities or nationalists. In most cases, there was a clear separation between these groups.

The categories *Russia* and *the West* are complex to interpret. In this context, **Russia** is treated as an independent country, distinct from the USSR or the Russian Empire. As such, newspapers, magazines, and letters generated more codes in this category compared to the history textbook. In newspapers, the picture was somewhat 'noisy' due to the high volume of articles directly reprinted from Russian media. The predominant valence in these articles was neutral, as they were mostly presented as news items, e.g.: 'The President's budget address for 1996 was assessed in the State Duma "as extremely weak, not taking into account the real situation in the economy"' (Komsomolskaya pravda, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02570}).

Estonian Russophones' interpretations of their relations with Russia were highly variable. As exemplified by the Russian citizenship category, Russia was not always perceived as a 'homeland' or the place of belonging: 'people decide in favour of Russian citizenship not at all because they love [Russia] dearly and are loyal to its current leadership with every fibre of their soul. It is just technically easier to become a Russian citizen' (Erek, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_06780}). Despite this, in speeches, letters to the editor, and newspaper articles, good relations between independent Estonia and Russia deemed as necessary for perceived economic and social stability: 'Russia is the eastern neighbour of the Republic of Estonia, and the consistent development and strengthening of good neighbourly relations, economic, cultural, and human ties is the key to social stability, economic prosperity, and cultural development of the Russian and Estonian communities of the republic' (Andrejev and Nikiforov, 1995 {1995_S_ESTO_01410}).

Views on **the West** were diverse as well, with newspapers reflecting the greatest diversity. While Estonian history textbook condemned previous occupations, including by those by Western countries ('The Germans persecuted and killed people who tried to hide in the forests and swamps' (Toomet, 1997, p. 115 {1995_T_HIST_02360})), there was a more positive, ambiguous, and neutral sentiment towards modern Western states. As much as they reprinted Russian media articles, newspapers also shared translations of Estonian-language media articles, furnishing similarly complicated view of the West.

The distribution of valences for 'Russia' and 'the West' is rather similar. In 1995, Estonia filed its application to join the European Union, debates surrounding the opposition between Russia and

the West, particularly in relation to the Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO, were at the forefront in the newspapers:

For official Tallinn, it seems that the issue of joining the European Union has been resolved unequivocally: the republic should be in the EU! And what do Estonian peasants, fishermen, and workers in other sectors, who will be directly affected by joining the European Union, think about this? So far, no one has consulted with them. It is a pity. They mainly talk about the political consequences of joining the EU – supposedly the security of the Estonian state will be strengthened – but, alas, they are silent about the economic ones. (Lark, 1995 {1995_P_MOLO_03330})

However, despite this critique, the West was portrayed slightly more positive than Russia. It is seen as a model of a civilized, democratic community that protects human rights – qualities that Estonian Russophones' desired for Estonia's national identity: 'Europe after the 1960s, when there was a turn to humanistic ideology, is becoming more and more tolerant and open. Estonia is moving in the opposite direction. Our 60s are only coming now... And everything that we are doing now will bear fruit only in the next generations' (Babin, 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_02405}).

3. The predominant discourse and its challengers

In 1995, the dominant identity discourse was grounded in the concept of **Modernisation in Unity**. European Modernity, with values such as high standard of living, rule of law, human rights, and democracy, serves as the main reference point for the image of an ideal society. While Estonian Russophones placed emphasis on the protection of human rights and eradication of poverty, they felt left out of the economic prosperity that Estonian authorities showcased to the international community. This misalignment between what they see in Estonian media and their living conditions resulted in doubts about capitalism as a desired path to progress. Even though Estonian Russophones supported independent Estonia and its economic growth, it was desired only if it was achieved through the unity of all ethnic groups residing in Estonia. This sentiment is shared between the elites (if we can classify the divided political groups of Estonian Russophones as such) and the masses. The latter, largely due to ethnic discrimination, viewed the Soviet past as a more favourable period compared to Estonia's situation in 1995.

Economic progress was not as ardently pursued as liberal democracy. Democracy emerged in Estonian Russophones' discourses less as an ideal to strive towards and more as an empty signifier – a signifier without a signified, lacking a concrete fixed meaning as its key attributes were ascribed in each speech act and varied accordingly. Rule of law and human rights protection were the criteria most widely embraced by the mass discourse, while political pluralism is emphasized among 'the elites'. In 1995, Estonia was not yet perceived as democratic and civilized, in contrast to Western countries (with Nordic states most often mentioned as a desired model), due to the violation of ethnic minorities' rights. The Citizenship Law of 1992, as well as the provision of services and education exclusively in Estonian as the state language, were viewed as discriminatory against Russophones, who made up approximately 30 percent of population at the time. Simultaneously, Estonian Russophones attributed their economic and legal troubles to the Estonian authorities/elites rather than ethnic Estonians. Estonians, as a separate code group, did not receive as much prominence as the discourses advocating for unity among all residents of Estonia.

While positive valences prevailed in the discussion of independent Estonia, some positive identification with the Soviet past remained present in 1995. As mentioned previously, this was largely due to two factors. First, Estonian Russophones had experienced less class inequality and

were economically better off during the Soviet occupation. Second, there is a positive identification with the Soviet victory over Nazism in the Second World War. The latter was mostly commonly expressed in newspapers and letters, where stories of Red Army soldiers are shared as liberators of Estonia from the evil of fascism. Outside of the discourses surrounding equality and WWII, the Soviet Union was presented with negative connotations, associated with fear and the lack of freedom. Stalinism, the KGB, and the Gulag were regarded as dark elements of a shared history. Yet again, unity was a prominent feature in identity discourses about the past, present, and desired future.

In 1995, Estonian Russophone identity was still in search of the Self, as previous definitional attributes of the Self had merged with Others after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These Others – Estonian/Western and Russian – had grown increasingly distant in the 1990s, prompting Estonian Russophones to question their belonging. The attributes predominant in the attempts to define the Self were affiliation with the larger phenomenon of a (Balto-)Russian culture, an expression of Estonianness (love for the Estonian land), and aspirations for democracy and rule of law embodied in Western ideals.

As any other identity discourse, the one surrounding Modernization in Unity was far from homogeneous. Against the background of economic hardship and political fragmentation, the government's policies were at times perceived as discriminatory, leading to the segregated development of two groups and escalating class inequality. Codes in the categories like 'Class inequality', 'Minority rights' violation', and 'Estonian nationalism' indicate that the lack of unity was not only Estonia's major weakness in the eyes of Estonian Russophones, but also often attributed to the government:

Under the conditions of rapid social stratification into the rich and the poor, or rather, into the very rich and the very poor, when capital accumulation occurs not as a result of the greatest capabilities of the political and business elite representatives ..., but as a result of the redistribution of national wealth created through the labour of the people, talking about peace and harmony between the well-fed and the hungry becomes an unpromising task. (Štšukin, 1995 {1995_L_MOLO_01940})

A great variety of attitudes among Estonian Russophones is evident regarding Estonian politicians and their policies, as well as Russia, the West, the Soviet past, and the policy of integration. However, these disagreements primarily concern the means of achieving shared goals rather than the goals themselves. For instance, there are very few codes that can be classified as expressing xenophobic Russian nationalism. The Soviet past, when viewed positively, is treated as part of a shared legacy that can be productively utilized. The West, conversely, is seen as an external Other, and negative identification of the West might actually imply a positive view of Estonianness: 'in the West, they do not trust the Estonian people, perhaps they look from Brussels as too boorish [*мужиковатый*] or too Soviet' (Kaplinski 1995 {1995_P_ESTO_05130}).

Consequently, no coherent discourse that would qualify as a challenger to Modernization in Unity can be identified. Rather, there is a greater divergence of views in relation to certain external and historical Others and in evaluating the government's policies, while a much more visible coherence emerges with regard to the overarching goals of social development. Most texts underscore the importance of unity in resolving both political and economic challenges faced by the group. This is evident in newspapers and letters where the aspiration for single Estonian Russophone political and cultural community, in equal standing to Estonian political agents, is expressed, though it has yet to be achieved. In some speeches, calls for political participation and unification of separate

Russophone political groups are also present. Thus, the unity sought is a unity of both the Estonian Russophones as a group and of the Estonian society at large. It is believed that only through unity can Estonian Russophones achieve protection of minority rights in Estonia, and that only through unity with ethnic Estonians they can achieve economic prosperity and a true sense of democracy.

4. Conclusion

In 1995, Estonian Russophone identity was still under construction, or more precisely, in search of its defining features. After the Soviet collapse, many Estonian Russophones began questioning their belonging, which led to a range of different answers to this same question. While some favoured a stronger attachment to Russia or even emigration there, many others seemed to have chosen to express loyalty to Estonia, despite the legal and other challenges they faced in asserting their belonging. Those who remained in Estonia were divided on such topics as integration, language and culture, and political consolidation. The various groups, with their differing views, had not yet achieved the unity that the emerging Estonian Russophone elites sought to establish through the creation of Russian parties. The evolution of these parties further underscores the diversity of views within the group, as they attempted to secure the recognition of Estonian Russophones as legal and rightful members of Estonian society. As later developments demonstrated, political fragmentation, coupled with insufficient political and economic resources, prevented them from achieving the desired levels of unity and representation.

Nevertheless, the sources reveal that despite political fragmentation, the community shared a similar image of an ideal Estonia – one where all ethnic groups coexist peacefully and respect each other's rights to political participation and cultural self-expression. Estonia was seen as the homeland, and people expressed loyalty to the land where they were born or to whose economic wellbeing they contributed, rather than to the political condition in which Estonia found itself. While Estonian Russophone identity remained ambiguous, Estonian national identity was envisioned as unity of ethnic groups (Estonians and non-Estonians). The opposite – discrimination – was highlighted as Estonia's major weakness and challenge yet to be overcome. The future Estonia was imagined as democratic, independent, respectful of the past (primarily the Soviet victory in the Second World War), and cooperating with both the West and Russia.

Table 1. Raw count

Category	Total codes	Speeches	Text-books	News-papers	Novels	Maga-zines	Letters
HO: USSR	421	7	44	90	32	213	35
SO: Russia	396	11	5	253	3	85	39
Estonian authorities / politics	267	28	4	154	1	6	74
SO: the West	223	9	37	133	3	27	14
Class inequality	215	6	68	80	1	9	51
Independent Estonia	194	2	135	22	4	22	9
Minority rights violation / non-citizenship	180	14	1	99		17	49
Economy / Environment	169	7	20	83		3	56
Estonian Russophone: community	166	9	4	66	1	64	22
Education in Estonia	109	1	18	60		24	6
Integration / Estonian citizenship	103	10		56	1	22	14
Estonianness / unity	102	12	26	13	2	20	29
Estonian culture / sport	94	1	57	10	3	22	1
Rule of law / Human rights / Democracy	90	24	1	26		3	36
HO: pre-WWII occupations	87	1	76			8	2
Estonian language	86		11	49	1	11	14
HO: Old Russian / HO: Baltic Russian	83			9		74	
Christianity	76	9	32	13		13	9
Traditional family values	74	2	23	31	2	9	7
HO: WWII	72	3	17	15	6	16	15
HO: WWII: victory / commemoration / Red Army	72	9		19	1	1	42
Citizenship: Russian	69	2		43		3	21
Russian culture in Estonia	65	3		33	1	27	1
Estonian nationalism	52	6		8	3	10	25
SO: Estonians	49	1	15	4		18	11
Russian culture / language	33	2	2	9	1	14	5
Total	3547	179	596	1378	66	741	587

Table 2. Topography of Estonian Russophone identity

	<i>Speeches</i>	<i>Textbooks</i>	<i>Newspapers</i>	<i>Novels</i>	<i>Magazines</i>	<i>Letters</i>
<i>Rule of law and human rights</i>						
Class inequality		--~	--~			--
Citizenship: Russian			~~//			~
Education in Estonia		+	--/		~	
Estonian authorities / politics	+		-----~			--
Integration / Estonian citizenship			//~+-			~
Minority rights violation / non-citizenship			---//~			--
Rule of law / Human rights / Democracy	+		+			++
Economy / Environment		+	--++			--+
<i>Estonian Russophone person</i>						
Estonian Russophone: community			//++		~~++	+
Russian culture in Estonia			//+		~/	
Russian culture / language					~	
Christianity		-				
Traditional family values		/	+		~	
<i>Estonianness</i>						
Estonianness / unity		+			+	+
Independent Estonia		++++//~~	+		/~	
Estonian culture / sport		++			~	
Estonian language			///			
Estonian nationalism						-
Estonia: small state between Russia and West			-			
<i>Historical Others</i>						
HO: Old Russian / HO: Baltic Russian					//~++	
HO: pre-WWII occupations		--//				
HO: USSR		--~	--~//+	~-	----- ~~~~//++	+~
HO: WWII					~	
HO: WWII: victory / commemoration / Red Army			/+			++
<i>Significant Others</i>						
SO: Estonians					~	
SO: Russia			////~		~- - /+	~+
SO: the West		+~/	////++~--		~+	

Salience of categories is measured on the following scale: 1.0–2.0 (1); 2.0–5.0 (2); 5.0–7.5 (3); 7.5–10.0 (4); above 10.0 (5).

SOURCES

1. Speeches:

- 1) Alexy II (1995) 'Послание Патриарха Алексия II', *Estonia*. 209 (15610), 13 September, p. 1.
- 2) Andrejev, V. (1995) 'Заявление Русской фракции Рийгикогу', *Estonia*. 72 (15469), 29 March, p. 1.
- 3) Andrejev, V., Kuznetsov, S. and Zöbin, A. (1995a) 'Заявление', *Estonia*. 6 (15403), 9 January, p. 1.
- 4) Andrejev, V., Kuznetsov, S. and Zöbin, A. (1995b) 'Обращение к депутатам Государственного собрания Эстонской Республики', *Estonia*. 13 (15410), 17 January, p. 1.
- 5) Andrejev, V. and Nikiforov, I. (1995) 'Эстонско-российским отношениям - приоритетную позицию', *Estonia*. 274 (15675), 28 November, p. 1.
- 6) Andrejev, V. and Šer, L. (1995) 'Первый блин - совсем не комом', *Estonia*. 53 (15450), 7 March, p. 1.
- 7) [Assembly of Russian Culture in Estonia] Общество русской культуры в Эстонии (1995) 'Обращение', *Tallinn*.
- 8) [Collective address by six organisations] (1995) 'Дорогие ветераны Великой Отечественной войны, уважаемые жители города Таллинна!', *Molodezh Estonii*. 100-101 (10782-10784), 5 June, p. 1.
- 9) Cornelius [Корнилий] (1995a) 'В надежде на справедливое решение', *Estonia*. 274 (15675), 28 November, p. 1.
- 10) Cornelius [Корнилий] (1995b) 'Рождественское послание', *Estonia*. 5 (15402), 7 January, p. 1.
- 11) *Estonia* (1995a) 'Заявление Представительной Ассамблеи', 142 (15543), 27 June, p. 1.

- 12) *Estonia* (1995b) ‘Заявление русской фракции Рийгикогу’, 142 (15543), 27 June, p. 1.
- 13) *Estonia* (1995c) ‘Обращение группы предпринимателей Эстонии к Объединенной народной партии Эстонии, Русской партии в Эстонии и другим политическим силам, стоящим за русской фракцией в Рийгикогу’, 91 (15488), 22 April, p. 2.
- 14) *Estonia* (1995d) ‘Соглашения должны быть ратифицированы’, 266 (15667), 18 November, p. 1.
- 15) Ivanov, S. (1995a) ‘Дайте покой хотя бы мертвым!’, *Estonia*. 265 (15666), 17 November, p. 1.
- 16) Ivanov, S. (1995b) ‘Заявление русской фракции Рийгикогу об эстонско-российских отношениях’, *Estonia*. 274 (15675), 28 November, p. 1.
- 17) Ivanov, S. (1995c) ‘Русская фракция предлагает...’, *Estonia*. 172 (15573), 1 August, p. 1.
- 18) Leadership of the Russian Community and the Russian People’s Party of Estonia [Руководство Русской общины и Русской народной партии Эстонии] (1995) ‘С Золотым юбилеем!’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 100-101 (10782-10784), 5 June, p. 1.
- 19) *Molodezh Estonii* (1995) ‘Заявление правления ОНПЭ’, 59 (10742), 14 March, p. 1.
- 20) Morozkin, L. (1995) ‘... И ограничивают полноту Православной веры’, *Estonia*. 274 (15675), 28 November, p. 1.
- 21) Nersessian, G. (1995) ‘...ибо древнее прошло, теперь все новое’, *Estonia*. 5 (15402), 7 January, p. 1.
- 22) Nikolai, J. (1995) ‘Дорогие ветераны Великой Отечественной войны!’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 100-101 (10782-10784), 5 June.
- 23) ‘Our Home Is Estonia!’ Electoral Alliance (1995) ‘Обращение’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 32 (10715), 8 February, p. 1.
- 24) Purro, P. (1995) ‘Дайте покой хотя бы мертвым!’, *Estonia*. 265 (15666), 17 November, p. 1.
- 25) Russian Party of Estonia et al. (1995) ‘Обращение к парламенту, правительству и жителям Эстонской Республики’, *Estonia*. 142 (15543), 27 June, p. 1.

- 26) Tallinn City Council deputies, 'Our choice' and 'Reval' factions (1995) 'Судим историю - казним памятники?', *Estonia*. 266 (15667), 18 November, p. 1.
- 27) United People's Party of Estonia Governing Board [Правление Объединенной народной партии Эстонии] (1995) 'Успех надо закрепить', *Estonia*. 93 (15490), 25 April, p. 1.

2. Newspapers:

- 1) *Molodezh Estonii*, 1995
- 2) *Estonia*, 1995

3. School history textbook:

- 1) Toomet, T. (1997) *We live in history: Estonian history textbook for 5th grade [Мы живем в истории: учебник по истории Эстонии для 5 класса]*. Translated by T. Terpe. Tallinn: Koolibri.

4. Letters (116 texts coded):

- 1) From *Molodezh Estonii*, 1995 (304 codes)
- 2) From *Estonia*, 1995 (316 codes)

5. Novels:

- 1) Nerlin, N. (1994) 'Trinik [Триник]', *Vyshgorod*, pp. 5–40.
- 2) Skulskaia, J. (1996) *Notes to N... [Записки к N...]*. Edited by T. Burlakova. Tallinn: Antek-S.
- 3) Šahhov, A. (1994) *Tallinn executioners [Таллинские палачи]*. Tallinn: Avenarius.

6. Magazines:

- 1) *Raduga*, 1995
- 2) *Tallinn*, 1995
- 3) *Vyshgorod*, 1995

References

- ACFC (2022) 'Fifth Opinion on Estonia'. Council of Europe. Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/5th-op-estonia-en/1680a6cc9e>.
- A.F. (1995) 'Почему им нельзя жить в собственной квартире? [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 93 (15490), 25 April, p. 4.
- Aleksandrova, T. (1995) 'Со-бытие', *Estonia*. 146 (15547), 1 July, p. 7.
- Amelchenkov, A. (1995a) 'Горькие дни на заслуженном отдыхе', *Molodezh Estonii*. 235 (10918), 1 November, p. 2.
- Amelchenkov, A. (1995b) 'Два праздника в КлоогаПо', *Molodezh Estonii*. 197-198 (10880-10881), 2 September, p. 1.
- Anatolii (1995) 'Стенка на стенку [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 251 (10934), 4 November, p. 3.
- Andrejev, V., Kuznetsov, S. and Zöbin, A. (1995) 'Заявление [Speech]', *Estonia*. 6 (15403), 9 January, p. 1.
- Andrejev, V. and Nikiforov, I. (1995) 'Эстонско-российским отношениям - приоритетную позицию', *Estonia*. 274 (15675), 28 November, p. 1.
- Arutin, A. (1995) 'Нас обманывают или это мы сами? [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 108 (10791), 16 May, p. 2.
- Babin, A. (1995) 'Не бей ребенка', *Molodezh Estonii*. 123 (15524), 1 June, p. 3.
- Varabaner, H. (1995) 'Сегодня молчание равносильно предательству [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 55 (15444), 28 February, p. 1.
- Belobrovceva, I. (1995) 'Рейн Салури: Хорошо бежим! (Вдогонку марафону)', *Raduga*, July, p. 3.
- BNS (1995) "'Постимеэс" - Самая популярная газета', *Molodezh Estonii*. 3 (10686), 5 January, p. 1.
- Broj, I. (1995) 'Кто попадет на Тоомпеа? [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 29 (15426), 4 February, p. 4.
- Calipso (2018) *Как русские Эстонии боролись за свои национальные интересы*, *Seti.ee*. Available at: <https://www.seti.ee/modules/news/article.php?storyid=103468>.
- Collective address by 6 organizations (1995) 'Дорогие ветераны Великой Отечественной войны, уважаемые жители города Таллинна!', *Molodezh Estonii*. 100-101 (10782-10784), 5 June, p. 1.
- Council of Europe (2004) *Second Report Submitted by Estonia Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*. ACFC/SR/II (2004) 009. Council of Europe. Available at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/estonia>.
- Council of the Union of Veteran organizations of the Republic of Estonia (1995) 'Президенту Эстонской Республики господину Леннарту Мери [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 55 (10738), 9 March, p. 2.
- Delovoy mir (1995) 'Взгляд из "прекрасного далека"', *Estonia*. 123 (15524), 1 June, p. 2.
- EADaily (2018) *В Эстонии обсуждают идею «культурной автономии» русских жителей*, *EADaily*. Available at: <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/09/29/v-estonii-obsuzhdayut-ideyu-kulturnoy-avtonomii-russkih-zhiteley>.
- Egorov, V.F. (1995) 'У истоков Тартуской школы: Воспоминания о 1950-х годах', *Raduga*, January, p. 28.
- Erek, A. (1995) 'Миграционная пятилетка', *Molodezh Estonii*. 144-145 (10827-10828), 1 July, p. 3.

- Estonia* (1995) ‘Statement of the Russian Faction of the Riigikogu [Заявление русской фракции Рийгикогу]’, 142 (15543), 27 June, p. 1.
- Government of Estonia (2000) ‘STATE PROGRAMME “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007”’. Approved by the Government of Estonia on March 14, 2000.’ Kultuuriministeerium. Available at: <https://www.kul.ee/media/441/download>.
- Gusev, M. (1995) ‘Шевели извилиной, или Нужна ли математика сегодня?’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 38 (10721), 15 February, p. 3.
- Igor (1995) ‘Развод! И девичья фамилия! [Letter to editor]’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 215-216 (10898-10899), 23 September, p. 3.
- Issakov, S. (1995) ‘Сергей Исаков: “Никто, кроме нас...”’, *Estonia*. 48 (15445), 1 March.
- Jakobson, V. (2002) *Role of the Estonian Russian-language Media in the Integration of the Russian-speaking Minority into Estonian Society*. Academic dissertation. Tampere University. Available at: <https://trepo.tuni.fi/handle/10024/67197>.
- Jeliseeva, R. (1995) ‘Осторожно: двери закрываются! [Letter to editor]’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 60 (10743), 15 March, p. 2.
- Jermakov, V. (1995) ‘Открылся клуб пенсионеров [Letter to editor]’, *Estonia*. 13 (15410), 17 January, p. 2.
- Jõgimaа, E. (1995) ‘Надо уметь защищаться! [Letter to editor]’, *Estonia*. 118 (15519), 26 May, p. 2.
- Kaplinski, J. ‘Когда Эйнселн командует войсками, а Мери президент...’. *Estonia*. 277 (15678), 1 December, p. 7.
- Kärk, L. (no date) *Eesti filmiloo lühikonspekt, Eesti Filmi Instituut*. Available at: <https://www.filmi.ee/filmid/eesti-filmiajalugu> (Accessed: 23 February 2023).
- Komsomolskaya pravda (1995) ‘Бюджетное послание президента на 1996 год в Госдуме оценили “как крайне слабое, не учитывающее реальной ситуации в экономике”’, *Estonia*. 146 (15547), 1 July, p. 2.
- Kutaj, A. (1995) ‘Боль и надежда... [Letter to editor]’, *Estonia*. 88 (15485), 19 April, p. 3.
- Lagerspetz, M. (2014) ‘Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities in Estonia: The Erosion of a Promise’, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 45(4), pp. 457–475.
- Lark, J. (1995) ‘Рыбка в сетях ЕС’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 38 (10721), 15 February, p. 1.
- Lauri, V. (2019) *Last USSR census 30 years ago counted largest-ever number of residents, ERR*. Available at: <https://news.err.ee/904647/last-ussr-census-30-years-ago-counted-largest-ever-number-of-residents> (Accessed: 22 August 2023).
- Libman, E. (1995) ‘“Экономическое чудо” пока не состоялось’, *Estonia*. 123 (15524), 1 June, p. 1.
- Mihailuškin, S. (1995) ‘Ставка на здравый смысл [Letter to editor]’, *Molodezh Estonii*. 133 (10816), 14 June, p. 2.
- Mikhailov, D. (1995) ‘Культурная автономия русских Эстонии: предпосылки и перспективы интеграции’, *Molodezh Estonii*, December, pp. 55–56.
- Minorities at Risk Project (2004) *Chronology for Russians in Estonia, Refworld*. Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f38863.html> (Accessed: 14 August 2023).
- Molodezh Estonii* (1995a) ‘Beggarly arithmetic [Нищенская арифметика] [Letter to editor]’, 291 (10974), 21 December, p. 2.
- Molodezh Estonii* (1995b) ‘Human Rights and Estonia [Права человека и Эстония]’, 260 (10943), 15 November, p. 3.

- Nikolaev, A. (1995) 'Быть одетым - хорошо, а хорошо одетым - быть еще лучше [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 142 (15543), 27 June, p. 4.
- N.N. (1995) "'Чужой край не принимает нас...'" [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 53 (15450), 7 March, p. 3.
- Okas, G. (1995) 'Такая уж, с позволения сказать, забота... [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 47 (15444), 28 February, p. 2.
- Orover, V. (1995) 'Розовые очки в импортной оправе [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 115 (10798), 24 May, p. 2.
- Ostroglov, N. (1995) 'За кого я буду голосовать [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 37 (15434), 14 February, p. 2.
- Panchenko, G. (1995a) 'Нас выстроили в очереди', *Estonia*. 75 (15472), 1 April, p. 1.
- Panchenko, G. (1995b) 'Статус неграждан', *Estonia*. 251 (15652), 1 November, p. 4.
- Pavlov, V. (1995) 'Закон, что дышло [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 220 (10903), 28 September, p. 4.
- Pavluhin, S. (1995) 'Сталинизм живет и побеждает? [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 133 (10816), 14 June, p. 2.
- Perehodov, V. (1995) 'Чья собственность приватизируется? [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 31 (10714), 7 February, p. 2.
- Prejs, L. and Eeder, T. (1995) 'О том, чего не отражает статистика [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 25 (15422), 31 January, p. 2.
- Raduga (1995) 'Open Voice Recorder [Открытый Диктофон]', April, p. 87.
- Repson, K. (2012) 'Пишущие по-русски претендуют на премию', *Rus.Postimees.ee*, 8 February. Available at: <https://rus.postimees.ee/731536/pishushchie-po-russki-pretenduyut-na-premiyu>.
- Riigikogu (1992) *Republic of Estonia Education Act, Riigi Teataja*. Available at: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/524042014002/consolide>.
- Rusalim, N. (1995) 'Помогите найти справедливость', *Estonia*. 202 (15603), 5 September, p. 2.
- Saar, J. (1995) 'Преступность в Эстонии - столкновение цивилизаций?', *Molodezh Estonii*. 235 (10918), 1 November, p. 3.
- Šahhov, A. (1994) '«Таллинские палачи»: круто или прикольно? - Андрей Шахов'. Available at: https://boosty.to/ashahov/posts/79d9e5de-5785-4f30-a5f2-421a561474c4?share=post_link.
- Semenov, A. (1995) 'После независимости', *Tallinn*, p. 67.
- Siig, V. (1995) 'Помогающий бедному дает взаймы Богу [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 26 (10709), 1 February, p. 2.
- Skulskaja, J. (1996) *Записки к N... (сборник)*, *LiveLib*. Available at: <https://www.live-lib.ru/book/1003056909-zapiski-k-n-sbornik-elena-skulskaya>.
- Smirnov, S. (1995) 'История на эшафоте', *Molodezh Estonii*. 85-86 (10768-10769), 17 April, p. 1.
- Štšukin, V. (1995) 'Ноев ковчег консолидации [Letter to editor]', *Molodezh Estonii*. 139 (10822), 21 June, p. 2.
- S.V. (1995) 'Где вы Таммсааре, Вильде, Лутс?', *Molodezh Estonii*. 182 (10865), 15 August, p. 2.
- Tavrov, S. (1995) 'Интеграция не есть ассимиляция', *Molodezh Estonii*. 48 (10731), 1 March, p. 2.

Toomet, T. (1997) *We live in history: Estonian history textbook for 5th grade [Мы живем в истории: учебник по истории Эстонии для 5 класса]*. Translated by T. Terpe. Tallinn: Koolibri.

Vaha, V. (1995) 'Опомнитесь, господин Эрм! [Letter to editor]', *Estonia*. 72 (15469), 29 March, p. 3.