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SECURITISATION SPILL-OVER: THE CASE OF HUNGARIAN AND ROMANIAN NATIONAL MINORITIES IN UKRAINE AFTER 2014

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Dedication:

This thesis is dedicated to my mother Viktoriia, father Oleksandr and sister Iryna. They have always been there for me, giving me love, strength, and motivation, even when they needed all of these themselves as the war forced them to leave home and start a new life thousands of kilometres away.

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SECURITISATION SPILL-OVER: THE CASE OF HUNGARIAN AND ROMANIAN NATIONAL MINORITIES IN UKRAINE AFTER 2014

Abstract

This research deals with the securitisation of minority issues in Ukraine after 2017. It aims to explain how Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 made Ukraine conduct nation-building policies to protect Ukrainian identity and language and pass the education law in 2017 which deprived the national minorities of the right to obtain full education in their native language. The law outraged the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and its kin-state Hungary, and thus the securitisation spilled over from the "Russian" to the "Hungarian triadic nexus". No such securitisation occurred with regards to the "Romanian triadic" nexus, although Hungary and Romania are very similar as kin-states, while the Hungarian and Romanian minorities share similar characteristics. Primary and secondary data demonstrated that such issues as unmet expectations, lack of communication between Hungary and Ukraine, as well as traumatic history and the instrumentalisation of minority issues led to the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" and a stalemate in relations between Hungary and the Hungarian minority on the one side and Ukraine – on the other. Although Hungary and Romania look similar as kin-states, there are substantial differences in their domestic and foreign policies which account for their different reaction to the policy change in Ukraine. At the same time social and political resources as well as the relations with the host-state and the kin-state are crucial in explaining why the reaction of Hungarians in Ukraine was more hostile than that of Romanians.

Table of contents

Chapter I. INTRODUCTION

Russia's aggression against Ukraine in 2014 which happened under the pretext of protecting the Russian speakers in Crimea and in Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine made Kyiv perceive the Russian language as a security threat and therefore diminish its use in the country. The preservation and promotion of the Ukrainian language, in this sense, was considered vital to ensure the state's survival. In 2017 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed the Law on Education, according to which the Ukrainian language was proclaimed to be the language of education at all levels (from pre-school to higher and postgraduate education), with the persons belonging to national minorities having the right to obtain only pre-school and primary education in their native language (Article 7, Law on Education). This was a considerable change for the national minorities living in Ukraine which would previously be able to obtain full education in their respective languages. The Law on Education was negatively perceived and criticised not only by such national minorities as Hungarians, Romanians, Poles, Bulgarians, Greeks, but also by their kin-states, i.e. the states which they ethnically, culturally and linguistically identify themselves with. The Hungarian minority happened to be outraged the most, with the foreign minister Péter Szijjártó calling the newly passed law "a stab in the back" and even urging a permanent OSCE presence in Transcarpathia, where the rights of ethnic Hungarians were allegedly violated ("Szijjarto vyklykaye posla", 2017).

What seemed to be a diplomatic row over Article 7 of the Law on Education turned into an intense and prolonged crisis between Kyiv and Budapest, with the latter vetoing the Ukraine-NATO summits and criticising Ukraine for violating the rights of the Hungarian national minority in Transcarpathia. Although the recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) regarding the education law were subsequently fulfilled by Ukraine, mutual criticism and mistrust between Kyiv and Budapest were still growing, as new issues appeared such as dual citizenship and passportisation of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia, claims for cultural and even territorial autonomy, scandals related to the petrol-bombing of the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Transcarpathis (KMKSZ), raids on the representatives of the Hungarian minority etc. All these events made the two sides perceive each other's actions as a security threat – Ukraine would consider Hungary's criticism of its laws and policies as interference with its domestic affairs, while Hungary would claim that Kyiv violates the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia and threatens their survival as a national minority. Hence, what was meant to protect the Ukrainian language primarily from Russian led to disputes with the Hungarian minority and Budapest. An unexpected and somewhat intense criticism by the latter made Ukraine and the Ukrainian society securitise the issue of the Hungarian national minority, with the media and politicians fearing that the so-called "Donbas scenario" would happen in Transcarpathia and that Budapest would annex this territory in the future. In other words, any potential concessions to the ethnic Hungarians were perceived as threatening Ukraine's national security. A survey conducted by the Democratic Initiative Foundation in 2021 (Democratic Initiative Foundation, 2021) is very telling in this regard, as it indicated that more than 40% of Ukrainians believe that Hungary's policies in Transcarpathia are aimed at further annexation of the region.

What is interesting is that the Romanian government was rather restrained in its reaction towards the Ukrainian education law even though it equally affected the Romanian national minority living in Ukraine which is of nearly the same size as the Hungarian one (according to the last Ukrainian census in 2001, the Romanians amounted to around 151 thousand people, and the Hungarians – 156 thousand) (All-Ukrainian Population Census, 2001).

Rogers Brubaker's Triadic Nexus framework is very relevant to frame the situation mentioned above (Brubaker, 1996). According to his terminology, one can identify multiple triadic nexuses simultaneously operating in Ukraine. The issues studied in this research can be framed in the form of three triadic nexuses – with Russia and Russian speakers, with Hungary and the Hungarian minority, and with Romania and the Romanian minority. In this sense, Russia's aggression in 2014 led to Ukraine securitising the triadic nexus with Russia and Russian speakers. As Russia played the language card - annexed Crimea and occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions under the pretext of protecting the Russian speakers there - Kyiv introduced policies aiming at protecting the Ukrainian language and making it mandatory in almost all spheres of life. Although such policies did not directly target the other national minorities, because the preservation and promotion of the Ukrainian language was key in these policies, they rather outraged the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and Hungary as the latter's kin-state, and thus the "Hungarian triadic nexus" began to be securitised as well. Hence, a securitisation spill-over effect happened, i.e. securitisation in one triadic nexus triggered securitisation in the other. What is puzzling is that securitisation did not spill over to the triadic nexus with Romania and Romanian minority, although the former is also an active kin-state like Hungary, while the latter is of relatively the same size as the Hungarian minority. Furthermore, as Brubaker indicates, for the triadic nexus to be activated, the state in which the national minority resides should become "nationalising", i.e. conduct policies aiming at the protection of the so-called core nation, its language and culture. Although Ukraine had arguably been a "nationalising state", at least symbolically and discursively, already before 2014, it is clear that following Russia's aggression nationalising discourses became more obviously translated into policy, which is evidenced by the Law on Education passed in 2017 and the Law on Language passed in 2019.

1.1. Research questions

This research focuses on the securitisation of triadic nexuses operating in Ukraine and aims to explain why the securitisation of the "Russian triadic nexus" triggered the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" in Ukraine as well as to explore why despite Ukraine becoming a "nationalising state" the triadic nexus with Romania and the Romanian minority was never activated and securitised. Therefore, the following research questions will be analysed:

1) What triggered the crisis in relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?

2) If Ukraine became a "nationalising state", why was the triadic nexus with Romania and the Romanian minority not activated and securitised, since Romania, like Hungary,

actively conducts kin-state policies, while the Romanian minority is of relatively the same size as the Hungarian one?

Answering these research questions does not only help to achieve the aims of this research but also helps to reach the following **research objectives**:

- Collecting and analysing data on Ukraine's education and language policies.
- Understanding why the triadic nexus with Russia and Russian speakers was securitised and how such securitisation spilled over to the "Hungarian triadic nexus".
- Analysing secondary data to depict how the Ukrainian and the Hungarian sides securitise minority issues.
- Collecting data on Hungarian and Romanian kin-state policies and identifying the differences between them to explain the differences in their reactions towards the policy change in Ukraine.
- Collecting data on the ethnopolitical resources of the Hungarian and Romanian national minorities living in Ukraine to see whether there are any substantial differences which may account for different reaction to the policy change in Ukraine.
- Analysing the data to draw conclusions necessary for solving the research problem.

Providing the answers to the research questions mentioned above may be a good contribution to and perhaps an extension of Rogers Brubaker's Triadic Nexus framework as it will showcase and explain how securitisation of one triadic nexus can spill over to another. It may also be very relevant in that the research touches upon such issues as securitisation and construction of threats and aims to explain how both the Hungarian and the Ukrainian sides securitised the issue to the point where there is seemingly no viable solution to the current crisis.

The interpretive research design will be used for this research. According to Porta and Keating, "interpretive research aims at understanding events by discovering the meanings human beings attribute to their behaviour and the external world" and "more specifically the motivations that lie behind human behaviour" (Porta&Keating, 2008: 26). As this type of research aims to explain certain social outcomes by interpreting the motives of people's behaviours rather than deriving those explanations from universal rules, it appears to be very relevant for this research, since it seeks to understand how and why the issue of Hungarian minority was securitised by the Ukrainian government and why it led to a prolonged crisis between Kyiv and Budapest. This matter requires getting an insight into the situation and considering different perspectives which cannot be achieved using a positivist approach.

As this research aims to answer two research questions, it is both outcome- and factor-oriented (typology devised by Gschwend and Schimmelfennig). It is ***outcome-oriented*** in that it seeks to explain how the policy change in Ukraine led to the securitisation spill-over from the "Russian triadic nexus" to the "Hungarian triadic nexus". It is ***factor-oriented*** in that it aims to explain which factors led to different reactions by Romania and Hungary regarding the

policy change in Ukraine, and, therefore, why the "Romanian triadic nexus" was not activated and securitised.

1.2. Conceptual framework

The two research questions mentioned above are expected to lead to two separate, yet interconnected, arguments, hence, I suggest dividing the conceptualisation section into 2 parts, each having its own variables.

Research question I - What triggered the crisis in relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?

Preliminary argument I: Russia's aggression of 2014 made Ukraine securitise the issue of Russian speakers and change the language and education legislation to promote the Ukrainian language. This meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and thus the triadic nexus with Hungary and its minority in Transcarpathia was activated and securitisation spill-over effect happened.

Therefore, the variables will be the following:

- Antecedent variable – **Russia's aggression**
- Explanatory factor – **policy change**
- Factor being explained – **securitisation of triadic nexus**

The concepts of "policy change" and "securitisation of triadic nexus" will be defined by secondary sources. The triadic nexus as a conceptual framework will also be examined as part of the literature review in the next chapter.

Research question II - If Ukraine became a "nationalising state", why was the triadic nexus with Romania and Romanian minority not activated and securitised, since Romania, like Hungary, actively conducts kin-state policies, while the Romanian minority is of relatively the same size as the Hungarian one?

Given that Brubaker's Triadic Nexus framework identifies three separate actors interacting with each other and forming a triadic nexus, two separate preliminary arguments will be derived from the research question II, according to the "kin-state" and "minority" levels of analysis.

Preliminary argument II:

1. ("kin-state" level of analysis) Although both Hungary and Romania are active kin-states, there are differences between them which account for difference in their reactions to the policy change in Ukraine.

2. ("minority" level) Although both the Hungarian and Romanian minorities happened to be in the territory of Ukraine as a result of territorial divisions and are of relatively the same size, there are substantial differences in their ethnopolitical resources which account for different reaction to the policy change.

The variables for this research question will be the following:

- "kin-state" level of analysis:
- Explanatory factor 1 – **kin-state policies**
- Explanatory factor 2 – **domestic policy factors**
- Explanatory factor 3 – **foreign policy factors**
- Factor being explained - **reaction to the policy change**

- "minority" level of analysis:
- Explanatory factor 1 – **ethnopolitical situation**
- Explanatory factor 2 – **size of minority**
- Explanatory factor 3 – **ethnopolitical resources**
- Explanatory factor 4 – **identity**
- Explanatory factor 5 – **relations with the host state**
- Explanatory factor 6 – **relations with the kin-state**
- Factor being explained - **reaction to the policy change**

The explanatory factors mentioned above for the two levels of analysis will be defined by secondary sources and examined in the conceptualisation part below.

Research design

To answer research question 1, **a process-tracing design**[1] will be used to explain the causality between Russia's aggression, policy change and the securitisation spill-over to the "Hungarian triadic nexus" within Ukraine's case. Process-tracing method is the most relevant in this part, since it helps reconstruct a sequence of events within a single case and establish the links between them.

To answer research question 2, a **2-n study (paired comparison)** will be used to compare against a set of criteria: 1. Hungary and Romania as kin-states ("kin-state" level of analysis) and 2. Hungarian and Romanian minority ("minority" level). A **Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD)** is the most relevant here, since Hungary and Romania as well as Hungarian minority and Romanian minority share many common characteristics, but their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine differed. Therefore, comparing them against a set of criteria will provide an explanation why the outcome was different. It is important to note that there would be room for broader comparison (for example, including Poland and Bulgaria as kin-states and their respective national minorities in Ukraine), however, due to limited space it is not possible in this research.

Hence, given all the variables mentioned and the types of research design to be used, the **arrow diagram** of this research will look as follows:

[1] According to Beach&Pederson, process-tracing is a research method employed for tracing causal mechanisms using a detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case (Beach&Pederson, 2019: 1).



1.2.1. Conceptualisation: policy change, "triadic nexus" securitisation

The concepts of policy change and "triadic nexus" securitisation are the core variables which help answer the research question 1.

Russia's aggression as an antecedent variable means Russia's annexation of Crimea and occupation of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine in 2014.

Policy change can be defined as the change of legislation by a state driven by a particular goal and affecting the whole population or a particular group of people. In the context of this research policy change means the change of legislation in the areas where the national minorities can be affected – primarily education and language.

The securitisation of triadic nexus is the concept encompassing the Securitisation theory designed by the Copenhagen School of security studies and developed by such its representatives as O.Wæver, B.Buzan, J.de Wilde (Buzan et al., 1998), and the Triadic Nexus framework introduced by Rogers Brubaker (Brubaker, 1996).

Securitisation can be defined as a process by which a certain event is presented as a security issue and perceived as a threat to one's survival, development etc, even though there might be no real prerequisites thereto. According to Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, securitisation happens when "an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)" (Buzan et al., 1998: 21). Securitisation is conducted through a *speech act* (securitising move) by a *securitiser* (usually the government or any other authority entitled to act on behalf of the people) regarding a particular issue that is believed to threaten a certain *referent object*.

Triadic nexus means dynamic relations between a "nationalising state", "external national homeland" or kin-state and "national minority" (Brubaker, 1996). In this sense, the securitisation of a triadic nexus would be a situation in the relations between these three actors where a certain issue or issues make them consider each other as a security threat and hinder any compromise or concession. Since the triadic nexus theory is related to ethnopolitics, such issues as language, national minority rights, kin-state policies would be deemed to be posing existential threats to the referent objects. For example, the referent object for the "nationalising state" could be sovereignty, language and identity; for the "national minority" – identity, language. As the "external national homeland" or the kin-state usually acts as a protector of its

compatriots, i.e. the national minority living in the territory of the "nationalising state", its referent object may coincide with the one of the "national minority". Given that speech act is at the core of the securitisation process, the speech acts of the three sides involved in a triadic nexus will be studied.

1.2.2. Conceptualisation: "kin-state" level variables/factors, "national minority" level variables/factors

The "kin-state" level explanatory factors include the following concepts: kin-state policies, domestic policy factors, relations between a kin-state and a "nationalising state". As both Romania and Hungary are kin-states, it is important to consider all these variables to see whether there are areas where they might differ as kin-states and whether such differences can account for the differences in their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine.

Kin-state policies were profoundly researched by such authors as R. Brubaker, D. Smith, N. Sabanadze, Zs. Csergő, M. Waterbury that commonly refer to them as activities, programs, measures conducted by a kin-state towards its co-ethnics living abroad. Such policies normally include compatriot laws, passportisation, preservation and promotion of identity, language and culture, financial support, the presence of institutions dealing with kin population abroad as well as an active kin-state stance in the international arena. Kin-state policies are important in analysing the securitisation of the triadic nexus, as it is usually these policies that are aimed at supporting the "national minority", and thus perceived as threatening by the "nationalising state".

The concept of *domestic policy factors* is derived from Rogers Brubaker's book "Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe" where he emphasised the importance of domestic factors in determining the intensity and scope of kin-state's policies (Brubaker, 1996) as well as Myra Waterbury's book "Kin-state Nationalism and Diaspora Politics in Eastern Europe", where she argued that kin-state action is driven by various domestic political factors and cannot be seen "simply as responses to the plight of ethnic kin" (Waterbury, 2010: 143). Kin-states usually tend to politicise the issue of their external kin and pursue ethnonationalist political agendas that support their co-ethnics abroad and also play well to domestic audiences. Such agenda, however, may be perceived as a threat by the state where such co-ethnics reside (the "nationalising state") and considered as encroachment on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The concept of *foreign policy factors* comes from the book of Harris Mylonas "The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees and Minorities"), which referred to the relations between a kin-state and a "nationalising state" as a factor determining whether the triadic nexus will be triggered. He argued that good bilateral relations between a kin-state and a "nationalising state" create mutual trust which prevent the triadic nexus from being activated and securitised (Mylonas, 2012). This corresponds to the arguments of the Copenhagen school which claims that securitisation is a choice and that states decide whether to consider a certain issue as a security threat or not depends on the amount of trust they have towards the other side. Apart from the kin-states' relations with the "nationalising state", given the context studied in this research, it may also be useful to consider their relations with Russia, the EU and NATO - the actors indirectly involved in the situation.

The factor being explained - *reaction to the policy change* - is the manner in which the kin-state reacted to the policy change in Ukraine, i.e. the adoption of the Law on Education in 2017.

The "minority" level explanatory factors include such concepts as ethnopolitical situation, size of the minority, ethnopolitical resources, identity, relations with the host state and relations with the kin-state. As both Romanians and Hungarians constitute a national minority in Ukraine, it is important to consider all these factors to see whether there are areas where they might differ as national minorities and whether such differences can account for the differences in their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine.

The concept of *ethnopolitical situations* was developed by such scholars as R. Schermerhorn, M.G.Smith, D.Horowitz which would refer to them as certain historical modes, situations or events as a result of which the national minorities happened to be in the territory of a particular state. Gurr&Harff presented a typology of ethnopolitical situations which was further developed and extended by V. Pettai. Among the ethnopolitical situations identified are the following: nation-state (for homogenous populations); national or imperial conquest (territorial division), consociationalism (for contiguous heterogenous populations); colonialism, colonisation/settlement, historical migration, organised labour migration, slavery, dispersed migration, modern-day migration (for heterogenous populations) (Pettai, unpublished manuscript: 11). Examining the ethnopolitical situations according to which the Romanian and Hungarian national minorities happened to be in the territory of modern-day Ukraine could help explain the differences in their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine.

The *size of the national minority* is another important explanatory factor, as it is usually correlated with the level of the group's organisation and cohesiveness. The size of the minority can be defined as the number of people living in a state and considering themselves to be a national minority there. Comparing the Romanian and Hungarian minorities against this criterion may provide some answers as to why their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine differed.

The concept of *ethnopolitical resources* was developed by V. Pettai where he defined them as the resources which the minority possesses vis-à-vis the state in which it's located and categorised them into 4 types:

- *material* (land, resources)
- *political* (the political status the group has)
- *social* (social structure of the group, its cohesiveness)
- *normative-discursive* (normative claims usually related to their suffering in the past).

Like ethnopolitical situations, ethnopolitical resources are believed to determine the minority group's behaviour with regards to their host-state and its policies. Given that the reaction to the policy change is the factor being explained in this research, examining the ethnopolitical resources that each of the compared groups possesses may help understand why the reaction of the Hungarian minority was rather hostile. In other words, it is possible that the policy change could have been perceived as threatening the minority's resources or depriving it thereof which in turn caused such a reaction.

The concept of *identity* is important, as there are numerous ways how national minorities can identify themselves – as part of their kin-state, as part of their host-state, as a resident of the area where they live; identities can also be multiple, multi-layered, shifting, etc

(Fearon, 1999). Pogonyi extensively researched such identities and argued that minorities tend to have the so-called regional identities, i.e. identify themselves with the region they reside in rather than a host-state or a kin-state (Pogonyi, 2017: 125) . How the minorities in question identify themselves may influence their behaviour and perception of other actors and can explain why their reactions to the policy change in Ukraine differed.

Lastly, the minorities' *relations with the kin-state* and *relations with the host-state* may also influence their behaviour and attitudes. One can assume that once certain disputes occur, the minority having close relations with its kin-state will look to it when deciding on its actions, while the minority having good relations with the host-state may be less fearful of its policies or activities and therefore more favourable towards it.

1.3. Methodology

In chapter 2 "Literature review" the scholarly literature related to the Securitisation theory and Triadic Nexus framework will be examined. As this research integrates two broad theoretical frameworks (securitisation and triadic nexus), it is important to study what their current state is and how the research questions formulated in this research fit into the general theoretical framework. The literature review will draw on how the triadic nexuses work in the Ukrainian context and what research has already been done on the issue. Some contextual and historical background of the situation will also be provided.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to empirical research. First, the research questions will be answered relying on secondary data such as speeches (statements of officials, activists, minority representatives), legal acts (legislation on language, minority rights), and analysis of speech acts, relevant surveys and studies, all of which are publicly available. Discourse analysis[2] methods will be used to process the data and identify the main patterns behind it.

As mentioned in the "Research design" part, to answer research question I "What triggered the crisis in the relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?" a special focus will be paid on process-tracing to explain the causality between Russia's aggression and Ukraine's securitisation of the triadic nexus with Hungary. Regarding research question II, a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) will be used to compare Hungary and Romania as kin-states and the Hungarian and Romanian minorities against a set of criteria to identify differences between them which could account for their different reactions to policy change in Ukraine. Given the explanatory factors outlined above for research question II, the preliminary MSSD comparison can be visualised as follows:

"kin-state" level

	Hungary	**Romania**
Kin-state policies		

[2] Discourse analysis is a qualitative research method devised by such authors as M. Foucault, J. Blommaert, B. Johnstone, etc. and is used to analyse and understand the underlying meaning of spoken or written material. (Betti, 2021).

Compatriot laws	?	?
Preservation and promotion of identity, language, culture	?	?
Institutions dealing with kin population abroad	?	?
Citizenship/passportisation	?	?
Financial support	?	?
Active stance in international arena	?	?
Domestic factors		
Ethnonationalist agenda, politicisation of external kin	?	?
Foreign policy factors		
Relations w/ nationalising state	?	?
Relations w/ Russia	?	?
Relations w/ EU and NATO	?	?
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

"minority level"

	Hungarian minority	**Romanian minority**
Ethnopolitical situation	?	?
Size	?	?
Ethnopolitical resources		
material	?	?
social	?	?
political	?	?
normative-discursive	?	?
Identity	?	?
Relations w/ the host state	?	?
Relations w/ the kin-state	?	?
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

All the mentioned above will help prove or disprove the preliminary arguments from a theoretical perspective. However, to test them further, interviews with experts working on the issue and/or representing one of the sides of the triadic nexus will be conducted. Analysing the transcripts of such interviews may provide a more profound insight into the issue and perhaps modify the arguments if necessary.

As this research deals with such issues as perceptions, threat construction by a state with regards to a national minority, interviews are relevant in explaining and better

understanding opinions, behaviours and attitudes of the sides that are either directly involved in the issue or do research thereon. Open-ended questions would also allow the participants to express their points of view, therefore in-depth information necessary for such qualitative research could be collected.

A total of 8 interviews were conducted with Hungarian, Romanian, Ukrainian and foreign public officials, experts, and researchers dealing with the topic. 3 experts from Hungary, 3 – from Romania, 1 – from Ukraine, and 1 – from the United States. Some of the respondents also belong to the minority communities studied in this research. The number of Ukrainian respondents was initially planned to be higher, however, due to the war that Russia started in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, it was extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to reach out to the Ukrainian experts. The interview with the expert from Ukraine which is analysed in this research was conducted a week before the war, and despite it being the only source from the Ukrainian side, it was quite profound and insightful. The US expert interviewed does not belong to any of the sides mentioned, however, conducts research on the issue studied here. Her take was equally important, as she could analyse the positions of the sides from the outside, remaining rather impartial. The interviewees were recruited using a snowballing method – the experts in two research institutes specialising in minority issues in Budapest, Hungary were interviewed first and then asked to recommend other relevant people in Ukraine and Romania. There were up to 10 short, open-ended questions asked per an interview. All of them were directly related to the research questions and designed specifically to prove, disprove, or modify the preliminary arguments. The interviews were conducted in English, Ukrainian and Russian from early February to mid-April 2022. Since some of the interviewees agreed to provide their responses on the condition of anonymity, it was decided to code all the respondents as follows and then refer to them accordingly in this research:

HUN 1 – researcher from a relevant research institute (Budapest, Hungary).

HUN 2 - researcher from a relevant research institute (Budapest, Hungary).

HUN 3 - researcher from a relevant research institute (Budapest, Hungary).

ROM 1 – Dr Andreea Udrea – professor at Royal Holloway, University of London (London, UK).

ROM 2 – Dr Teodor Lucian Moga – professor at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi (Iasi, Romania).

ROM 3 – Dr Valér Veres – professor at Babes-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania).

UKR – Dmytro Tuzhanskyi – director of the Institute for Central European Strategy (Kyiv, Ukraine).

Waterbury – Dr Myra Waterbury – assistant professor of political science at Ohio University (United States).

The questions asked during the interviews are included in the appendix (see Appendix).

Since the questions touch upon various aspects of Ukrainian, Hungarian and Romanian politics as well as Hungarian and Romanian national minorities in Ukraine, it was rare that an expert that was being interviewed could answer all the questions mentioned. Therefore, Hungarian respondents were generally asked questions about the Education Law of Ukraine of 2017 and Hungary's and Hungarian minority's reaction to it; Romanian experts were also

asked about the Law and Romania's and Romanian minority's reaction to it. As all those issues were part of Ukrainian politics, the interviewer aspired to pose as many questions on the list as possible to the Ukrainian expert, however, that was not always possible given their limited knowledge and expertise.

All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were analysed inductively using a narrative analysis method.

The research methods mentioned above should be sufficient to answer the research questions, as measuring the variables (explanatory factors) used in this research requires the use of such qualitative methods as discourse analysis and interviews. However, some **limitations** should be recognised:

1) Conducting interviews in three different languages might have created room for misinterpretation, as either interviewees or the interviewers used the language that is not their native language.

2) The interviewees might not have been open and frank during the interview and might have consciously or unconsciously represented the ideas of their government, especially if they are public officials.

3) Lower number of Ukrainian respondents compared to the Hungarian and Romanian respondents.

Chapter 4 will provide overall conclusions based on the findings stated in Chapter 3 as well as potential areas for further research.

Chapter II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Securitisation Theory

The theory of securitisation was first introduced by Ole Wæver in 1995 in his article "Securitisation and Desecuritisation" where he argued that "a major focus of "security studies" should be the processes of securitization and desecuritisation" and examining "when, why and how elites label issues and developments as "security" problems" and whether it's possible to "keep issues off the security agenda, or even to de-securitise issues that have become securitised" (Waever, 1995: 53). These ideas were further developed by Wæver, Buzan and Wilde in 1998 in their book "Security: A New Framework for Analysis" where they provided an important conceptual apparatus to analyse security issues and insisted that security studies should not be limited to military sector and should encompass other areas (political, societal, environmental).

At the core of the securitisation process is a *securitising actor* having legitimacy to act on behalf of the people who presents a certain issue as a security threat to a certain *referent object*. As Buzan et al. argue, securitising actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). This could be sovereignty, identity, language, etc. They perform

a *speech act* whereby they claim a certain issue or event to be a threat to the referent object. The authors explain that such speech acts are driven by the following logic: "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will no longer be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)" (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). In this sense, they argue that a certain issue can be securitised "not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat" (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Given the Ukrainian context studied in this research, in the following paragraphs it will be shown that by passing the education and language laws, the Ukrainian government was driven by the logic that unless the Ukrainian language is protected, the Ukrainian nation will lose its identity which may lead to its disappearance and therefore the disappearance of the state which is built on such identity.

What is important is that a speech act presenting something as a threat to a referent object does not by itself lead to securitisation, but "the issue is securitised only if and when *the audience* accepts it as such" (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). In this sense, the Ukrainian parliament's approval of the laws mentioned above was significant primarily because there were enough votes for the laws to be passed, but also because the Ukrainian government was reluctant to change or modify certain provisions of the laws (something that Budapest insisted on) fearing that it would outrage the population.

Facilitating conditions determine which referent objects are more likely to be successfully securitised, i.e. accepted by the audience. These could be historical events or present situations which the group that the securitising actor represents found itself in. This corresponds to what Buzan et al. wrote in the "logic of threats and vulnerabilities" paragraph, where they argued that different societies have different vulnerabilities depending on how their identity was constructed (Buzan et al., 1998: 124). For instance, they referred to societies where language is central to national identity, suggesting that the language as the referent object is more likely to be securitised. This argument may be relevant for this research, as Russia's aggression against Ukraine put the idea of the language at the core of the new Ukrainian identity and therefore the need to protect the Ukrainian language emerged. In the Hungarian context, significant parts of the identity include a distinctive Hungarian language and the so-called "Trianon trauma" (the loss of territories following the Trianon Treaty of 1920). In this sense, any attempts to diminish the use of Hungarian language in the territories that belonged to Hungary before 1920 may be considered as a threat to its national identity. Therefore, Budapest brought the issue of the new Ukrainian education law beyond "the normal haggling of politics" by pledging to keep blocking the Ukraine-NATO summits unless Kyiv modifies the law, and what seemed to be a rather ordinary political issue was successfully securitised.

The authors also provide an important insight into why it is hard to differentiate between real existential threats and perceived threats when identity is the referent object:

"Collective identities naturally evolve and change in response to internal and external developments. Such changes may be seen as invasive or heretical and their sources pointed to as existential threats, or they may be accepted as part of the evolution of identity. Given the conservative nature of "identity", it is always possible to paint challenges and changes as

threats to identity, because "we will no longer be us", no longer the way we were or the way we ought to be to be true to our "identity"." (Buzan et al., 1998: 23).

In other words, anything that is somehow related to the preservation of identity can be cast in security terms, i.e. as a matter of survival. It is very telling in the Ukrainian context. The provision of the education law according to which the national minorities lost their rights to obtain full education in their native language was perceived by the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia as a threat to their identity ("we will no longer be us" because we cannot obtain full education in our native language), while it was more or less accepted by the Romanian minority.

The research related to securitisation in the Ukrainian context was mostly focused on how Russia securitised the Russian speakers in Ukraine (Sperling&Webber, 2017; Sirbiladze, 2016; Gricius, 2018; Pieper, 2020), or how the post-Soviet states securitise the issue of Russian speakers (Cheskin&Kachuyevski, 2019; Kallas, 2008; Metreveli, 2016). Agarin, Cordell, Osipov and Kuzio also worked on how minorities are excluded or marginalised in the countries with the communist legacy, whereby public institutions have been viewed and still function as the almost exclusive property of the titular nations, securing its positions through various measures (language, education, etc.) (Agarin et al., 2016; Kuzio, 2001). While the works of the authors mentioned above may be relevant to explain Ukraine's "nationalising" policies, to examine the "Hungarian" and "Romanian" triadic nexuses, it is important to look at the literature dealing with such issues as kin-state nationalism and triadic nexus concept.

2.2. Triadic Nexus framework

Given the research questions formulated in Chapter 1, the concept of triadic nexus is central in this research. This concept was introduced by Rogers Brubaker in 1996 in his book "Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe", where he presented his Triadic Nexus framework according to which there exist three distinct types of nationalism: nationalising nationalism, homeland nationalism and minority nationalism. He argued that these nationalisms are mutually antagonistic and "bound together in a single relational nexus" (Brubaker, 1996: 4). ***Nationalising nationalisms*** are those of the newly independent states, which "involve claims made in the name of a "core nation" defined in ethnocultural terms" (Brubaker, 1996: 5). Brubaker specifies that all the states promoting the interests of such "core nation" fit into such category, and in order to be considered as a "nationalising state", the state should find itself in a weak position which is often seen as a legacy of discrimination before it gained independence and became the "owner" of the state. Therefore, its nationalising policies are justified as "remedial" and vital for the core nation's interests. ***Homeland nationalisms*** are transborder nationalisms of "external national homelands", which assert states' right to monitor the condition and protect the interests of their ethnonational kin (i.e. their national minority abroad) "transcending the boundaries of territory and citizenship" (Brubaker, 1996: 5), thus challenging and opposing the nationalising

nationalisms. The "external national homeland" can also be a historical oppressor of the "nationalising state", and therefore its kin-state policies may be adversely perceived by the latter. Brubaker clarifies that not all the states which have their "kins" living abroad qualify as "external national homelands", but only those which consider residents and citizens of other states as compatriots, co-nationals and which claim that the shared nationhood makes them responsible for "ethnic co-nationals who live in other states and possess other citizenships" (Brubaker, 1996: 5). This caveat helps avoid conceptual ambiguity in further research, making clear the indicators which help identify which states qualify as "external homelands" and which do not. The presence of compatriot laws and an active stance in the international scene could be such indicators. ***National minorities*** are caught between the two abovementioned nationalisms, as they usually belong to the "nationalising state" by legal citizenship but have their ethnonational affinity towards the external homeland. Brubaker argues that the national minorities and external homelands are "not necessarily harmoniously aligned" (Brubaker, 1996: 6), and divergence is likely to occur when homeland nationalisms are adopted as an instrument of promoting other non-nationalist political goals. He states that in such a case ethnic co-nationals abroad may be suddenly abandoned should geopolitical issues so require. However, the author does not explicitly state how the so-called "strategic" or "instrumentalist" homeland nationalisms can be distinguished from those based solely on nationalist ideas. It might also be the case that pure "homeland nationalisms" without any strategic aims behind do not exist in real world.

Although Brubaker does not visualise the nexus in his book, one could imagine a triangle including all the three actors – "nationalising state", "national minority", "external national homeland" (kin-state). What is important is that all the three categories do not merely designate an ethno-demographic fact, but rather an explicit political stance. In this sense, the presence of a core nation, an ethnic group, and its kin-state abroad does not automatically trigger the relational nexus between them. For the triadic nexus to be activated, it is important that each of these categories takes an active political stance and behaves according to it.

In line with Hans Kohn's dichotomy of nationalism, Brubaker argues that the understanding of nationality as an ethnocultural rather than political notion which prevails in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the deeply rooted "ownership" claims make it unlikely that a civic self-understanding will ever be common there, inferring that almost all these states will be "nationalising states to some degree and in some form" (Brubaker, 1996: 106). The fact that Brubaker devised his Triadic Nexus framework based on the observations of the Central and East European region makes it particularly relevant for this research. In this sense, one can identify at least three clear triadic nexuses simultaneously operating in Ukraine with Russia and Russian speakers, with Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia and with Romania and the Romanian minority. Hungary, Romania and Russia are kin-states that support their co-ethnics abroad. By conducting Ukrainisation policies aiming to protect the so-called "core nation" (education and language laws), Ukraine became a "nationalising state". In this sense, the theoretical framework suggested by Brubaker is suitable and relevant for this research.

The literature on the issues discussed in this research and related to the Triadic Nexus Theory is rich. Fedorenko and Umland worked extensively on the "Russian triadic nexus" in Ukraine, particularly on Russian kin-state nationalism and Ukraine's nationalising policies in 2014-2019. Among those who researched Hungarian kin-state nationalism are A. Batory, Zs. Csergő, J. Goldgeier, Sz. Pogonyi, A. Udrea, etc. Valuable insights with regards to the "Hungarian triadic nexus" in Ukraine can be found in the works of P. Tátrai, Á. Erőss, K. Kovály, Z. Kántor, N. Bárdi, Cs. Fedinec, I. Csernicskó, etc. Scholarly literature on the "Romanian triadic nexus" in Ukraine is not that broad, however, important contributions were made by N. Bureiko, E. Knott, J. Danero Iglesias, T. Moga, etc. As the role of such international organisations as EU, NATO and the Council of Europe is considered in this research, the 'quadratic nexus' concept devised by D. Smith is also relevant.

Chapter 3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

3.1. Operationalisation

As it was mentioned in paragraph 1.2, there are two explanatory factors for research question I (policy change, securitisation of triadic nexus) and several explanatory factors for research question II which are related either to a "kin-state" or "minority" levels of analysis.

To operationalise them, their indicators will be identified, and such issues as validity[3], reliability[4] and the levels of precision[5] will be considered and presented in the table below.

OPERATIONALISATION

Study variables	Indicators	Validity	Reliability	Precision
		I		
Policy change	Ukraine's legislation on language and education before 2014 and after.	Language and education legislation affects the minorities the most.	Legal instruments are open for public access and trustworthy.	nominal

[3] According to Adcock&Collier, validity (measurement validity) is related to whether the indicators used adequately reflect the concepts, i.e. variables which the researcher seeks to measure (Adcock&Collier, 2001).
[4] A measure is reliable if it provides the researcher with the same result every time the measurement is repeated. Shively identifies random and non-random (systemic) measurement errors (Shively, 2017: 57).
[5] Shively outlines three levels of precision used for measuring a variable: interval, nominal (including dichotomous), ordinal (Shively, 2017: 67).

Securitisation of triadic nexus	Speech acts by all the 3 parties in the "Hungarian nexus".	Content validity (securitisation is usually measured in terms of speech acts)	Non-random errors possible	Dichotomous – present or absent
		II		
		"kin-state" level		
Kin-state policies	1. Compatriot laws; 2. Preservation and promotion of identity, language and culture; 3. Institutions dealing with kin population abroad; 4. Citizenship/passportisation ; 5. Financial support; 6. Stance in international arena	Content validity (these are the main indicators of kin-state policies)	Data should be open to the public; non-random errors possible during interviews.	Dichotomous – present or absent; similar or different.
Domestic policy factors	Ethnonationalist party agenda – programs, documents, statements, speech acts; instances of politicisation of external kin.	Face validity	Interpreting data might be challenging.	Dichotomous – present or absent; similar or different.
Foreign policy factors	1. Relations with the "nationalising" state; 2. Relations with Russia; 3. Relations with the EU and NATO – all measured by states' diplomatic interactions, statements.	Face validity	Data is open, but non-random errors possible in its interpretation.	Dichotomous – similar or different.
Reaction to the policy change	A kin-state's statements regarding Ukraine's education law.	Face validity	Data is generally open to the public.	Dichotomous – hostile vs not hostile
		"minority" level		
Ethnopolitical situation	Territorial division (treaties)	Content validity	Available	Dichotomous – absent or present

Size	% of minority population within a "nationalising" state	Face validity	Data is official and open	Dichotomous – similar or different
Ethnopolitical resources	Material (territory), social (cohesiveness, level of assimilation with the core population), political (representation in public authorities, kin-state's political support), normative-discursive (justifications for autonomy claims)	Content validity (these are the main types of ethnopolitical resources)	Random and non-random errors expected	Dichotomous – similar or different
Identity	Ethnic (identifying with the kin-state); civic (identifying with the host-state); regional (local, identifying with the area of residence).	Content validity	Random and non-random errors expected	Dichotomous – similar or different
Relations with the host-state	The nature of relations (statements, meetings, agreements).	Face validity	Random and non-random errors expected	Dichotomous – similar or different
Relations with the kin-state	The nature of relations (statements, meetings, agreements).	Face validity	Random and non-random errors expected	Dichotomous – similar or different
Reaction to the policy change	A minority's statements regarding Ukraine's education law.	Face validity	Data is generally open to the public	Dichotomous – hostile vs not hostile

3.2. Findings (secondary data)

As it was mentioned in paragraph 1.3 "Methodology", the research questions will first be answered relying on secondary data such as speeches, legal acts, statements etc. For this discourse analysis methods will be used.

3.2.1. Securitisation spill-over from the Russian triadic nexus to the Hungarian one

This paragraph will attempt to answer the research question I "What triggered the crisis in the relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?". The preliminary argument here is the following:

Russia's aggression of 2014 made Ukraine securitise the issue of Russian speakers and change the education and legislation to promote the Ukrainian language. This meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and thus the triadic nexus with Hungary and its minority in Transcarpathia was activated and a securitisation spill-over effect happened.

Given that the events mentioned above are causally interconnected, a process-tracing method would be the most relevant here. Therefore, the preliminary argument should be split into several sub-arguments that would be proved separately, one-by-one:

1. Russia's aggression -> "Russian triadic nexus" securitisation -> the need to protect language and identity

Russia's aggression triggered the need to protect the Ukrainian language and identity.

2. The need to protect identity and language -> policy change

The need to protect the Ukrainian identity and language caused the change of legislation in the field of education and language and thus the policy towards national minorities changed.

3. Policy change -> outrage of minorities -> securitisation

The change of policies in the field of education and language meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and that certain rights of national minorities were limited; this outraged the other national minorities and as this outrage got more pronounced, Ukraine began to see them as a threat too.

4. Ukraine securitising the other minorities + Hungary's and Hungarian minority's outrage -> securitisation of the Hungarian triadic nexus

Ukraine's securitisation of minority issues together with significant outrage of both Hungary as a kin-state and the Hungarian minority led to the activation and securitisation of the Hungarian triadic nexus.

Russia's aggression -> "Russian triadic nexus" securitisation -> the need to protect language and identity

Following the Revolution of Dignity of 2014 in Ukraine, Moscow employed the concept of the so-called "Russkiy Mir" (Russian world) to achieve its geopolitical goals. "Russkiy Mir" is a civilisational project according to which all the Russian speakers in the former Soviet states share the same traditions, history, religion (Orthodox Christianity), and therefore are culturally and spiritually close to each other. The Russian state, in this regard, is somewhat central, as it serves as a "kin-state" which is responsible for all the Russian speakers abroad. It was exactly under this pretext that Russia annexed Crimea – the Russian propaganda presented the Russian-speaking population in Crimea as threatened by the new government in Kyiv, and Moscow claimed its responsibility to "protect" those people. The same narratives were used for Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where there was also a significant number of Russian speakers (Stebelsky, 2018; Arel, 2014).

When Russia annexed Crimea and occupied some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the triadic nexus with Russia was highly securitised – many Russian speakers there being influenced by Russian propaganda believed that the Ukrainian government was "fascist" and would threaten their existence ("Hunta, "bandery", fashisty", 2019), while Ukraine being caught off guard by Russia's military intervention began to consider Russia as an aggressor and the Russian speakers who were willing to join Russia as traitors. Moreover, as some of the

sociological surveys indicated, there was correlation between the linguistic and ethnic identity of citizens and their susceptibility to Russian propaganda, i.e. Russian speakers appeared to be more prone to consuming Russian media (Kotsur, 2021: 93). This also contributed to a rather negative perception of Russian speakers in Crimea and Donbas by the rest of the Ukrainian population.

As the Russian language was the core element of "Russkiy mir" and was successfully instrumentalised by the Kremlin to annex Crimea and occupy Donbas, the Ukrainian government felt the need to resist by strengthening the Ukrainian identity and protecting the Ukrainian language. According to Stepyko&Chernenko, the main goal of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine was to change the identity of Ukrainian citizens, imposing on them the ideas of "Russkiy mir", "Slavic unity" and treating Ukraine as an "artificial formation". (Stepyko&Chernenko, 2017: 178). Moreover, the Ukrainian language would often be treated as inferior to Russian, sort of a "dialect" of Russian. As Stepyko and Chernenko further emphasised, the weakening of the Ukrainian identity generated and would continue to generate separatism (Stepyko&Chernenko, 2017: 179). Therefore, Russia's military aggression did not only make Ukrainians realise the need to protect the language and identity but perceive such issues as a matter of survival. In other words, protecting them was considered as the best resistance to Russia's hybrid aggression.

Other Ukrainian and foreign scholars share similar perspectives on the matter. According to Siegień, the language issue was a weapon in the war and that the policies aiming to strengthen the status of Ukrainian could be perceived as a defence strategy (Siegień, 2018: 33). In this sense, promoting the language was deemed to decrease the popularity of Russian propaganda and thus resist to Russia's hybrid aggression. Kulyk also suggested that Russia's use of language issues as an excuse for the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas led to widespread support of Ukrainian as the only state language (Kulyk, 2016: 98).

Maksimovtsova provided interesting insights on which arguments were used in public debates discussing the need to protect the Ukrainian language and make it the sole state language over the period of 2013-2015. Given her findings, the most common arguments for Ukrainian as the only state language were anti-imperialist (anti-occupation) arguments, i.e. Ukrainian had to be protected against the Russian imperialism/occupation. In addition to this, many people also referred to the "existential threat" to Ukrainian, Ukrainian as a key marker of national identity, Ukrainian as the basis of state sovereignty and independence (Maksimovtsova, 2020: 384). The scholar therefore concluded that Russia's attack and the secessionist threats became the reason for greater consolidation over the respect of the Ukrainian culture and language and loyalty to the Ukrainian state (Maksimovtsova, 2020: 386).

The need to protect identity and language -> policy change

To address the need to protect the identity and language, the Ukrainian government changed its education and language legislation. Thus, the policy with regards to national minorities changed.

An analysis of the Ukrainian legislation in the field of education and language provides a good insight into how such change occurred. As the new Law on Education (Law of Ukraine "On Education") was adopted in 2017 and replaced the 1991 Law on education, and the

Language Law of 2019 replaced the 2012 Language Law (see below), it is useful to analyse the policies which existed in Ukraine towards the national minorities before 2017 and after.

Before 2017

Since the independence of Ukraine in 1991 and 2017 the **language policies** were governed by the following laws:

- The Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR of 1989 (in force from 1989 to 2012)
- The Law on Principles of the State Language Policy of 2012 (in force from 2012 to 2018 when it was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine)

According to the 1989 Law, the people of other nationalities could use their respective languages alongside Ukrainian in the work of public, party, civic institutions and organisations located in the areas where they constitute majority (Article 3). Citizens of other nationalities were also allowed to obtain their primary and secondary education in their native languages (Article 27). The Law was replaced by the Law on Principles of the State Language policy of 2012, which further expanded the language rights of non-Ukrainians and gave the status of regional languages to several minority languages. Minority languages could be used in courts, schools, and other government institutions in areas where the national minorities reach a 10% threshold. The law clearly favoured the Russian language, given that it is predominantly spoken in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. However, Hungarian, Romanian and Crimean Tatar speakers benefited from the law as well, as ethnic Hungarians, Romanians and Crimean Tatars are rather compactly located in Transcarpathia, Chernivtsi oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea respectively and constituted more than 10% of the total oblast population there (All-Ukrainian population census 2001). Therefore, Russian, Hungarian, Romanian and Crimean Tatar languages obtained the status of regional languages in the aforementioned areas of Ukraine.

Over the period between 1991 and 2017 the **education policies** were regulated by the Law on Education of 1991 that was in line with the 1989 Language Law (1991-2012) and then the 2012 Language Law with regards to the use of minority languages in education (Article 20), which meant that persons belonging to national minorities could obtain primary and secondary education in their native languages.

Therefore, the language and education policies in Ukraine between 1991 and 2017 allowed a broad use of minority languages in areas where minorities constituted the majority.

After 2017

From 2017 the **education policies** have been regulated by the Law on Education of 2017, according to which national minorities can only obtain preschool and primary education in their native language, while secondary and higher education should be provided in Ukrainian. Certain specifications were made later by the Law on complete general secondary education 2020, which introduced a gradual system of increase of the Ukrainian language teaching for national minorities whose languages are the EU languages, where the share of teaching in an EU language, although reduced, was still bigger than it was for teaching in Russian. The 2017 law allowed private schools to continue teaching in a minority language, however, the number of such schools is extremely low, which means that most of the minority

pupils have to attend public schools. In this sense, national minorities lost their right to obtain full education in their respective languages, and Ukrainian as the state language became obligatory.

Regarding the **language policies**, the Law of Ukraine "On Supporting the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language" adopted in 2019 abolished the regional languages and made the use of Ukrainian mandatory in the work of public institutions as well as in administrative matters (if not possible, the translation or interpretation into Ukrainian must be provided).

The name of the 2019 Language Law is very telling as it implies that Ukrainian as the only state language in Ukraine had not been sufficiently used before and thus its functioning must be legally supported. This is in line with the need to protect the language and identity discussed above and suggests that there is indeed a causal connection between such need and the policy change.

In this sense, after 2017 the national minorities in Ukraine lost their right to obtain full education in their native language, and the regional languages system was abolished.

Policy change -> Outrage of minorities -> Ukraine securitising other minorities

The policy change in Ukraine caused considerable outrage of other national minorities. Shortly after the Law on Education of 2017 was adopted, the governments of Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece expressed their concern regarding the rights of their "compatriots" living in the territory of Ukraine. Hungary and Romania were the most vocal. The Romanian president cancelled his visit to Kyiv and announced that Bucharest had no intention to received Ukrainian politicians until Article 7 of the Law, which limits minority language teaching only to preschool and primary school levels, was modified ("Zakon pro osvitu"). Hungary's criticism was even harsher – Hungary's foreign minister Péter Szijjártó called the newly adopted law a "stab in the back", and the Hungarian parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning Ukraine's Law on Education ("U MZS spodivayut"sya"). Budapest went even further by blocking Ukraine-NATO summit planned for December 2017 and even requested that the OSCE mission be deployed in Transcarpathia due to "increased tension" there ("Uhorshhyna zaklykala").

Rather harsh reactions of Hungary and Romania came quite unexpectedly for the Ukrainian government and all the attempts to mitigate the conflict were not successful. Kyiv would argue that Article 7 of the Education Law should not be considered as limiting the rights of national minorities and that it is beneficial for them as the knowledge of Ukrainian would provide access to the best Ukrainian education institutions and therefore representatives of the national minorities would be able to enjoy all the benefits of the Ukrainian state (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, 2017). Furthermore, the Ukrainian officials stated that the knowledge of Ukrainian and the integration into Ukrainian society would prevent the national minorities from leaving the country, which is in the interest of both – Ukraine and their respective kin-states. In turn, the Hungarians in Transcarpathia argued that even though some of them do not speak Ukrainian, they are still Ukrainian citizens and taxpayers, and therefore should be entitled to obtain education in their language. They also claimed that the education law was against both the constitution and international obligations of Ukraine and that the

integration which the Kyiv aimed to achieve was in fact an attempt at assimilation of Hungarian speakers (KMKSZ, 2017).

None of the arguments helped solve the crisis, and many in Ukraine began to perceive Hungary's and Romania's criticism as interference with their domestic affairs and sometimes even infringement on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity (for example, when Hungary appointed István Grezsa as ministerial commissioner on the development of Transcarpathia, which meant that a part of Ukraine was in the sphere of competence of a Hungarian official). Fearing that something similar to "Crimea" or "Donbass scenarios" could happen with regards to other national minorities, the Ukrainian government and experts began to securitise the minority issues and believed that any concessions to them would be detrimental to Ukraine's security.

Concerns about the kin-states' activities in Ukraine, particularly Hungary and Romania, were frequently mentioned by Ukrainian academia. For instance, the head of the Institute for foreign policy of the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine H. Perepelytsia said that Hungary and Romania by asking Kyiv to modify the law are "interfering with its domestic affairs" and that the policies they implement towards ethnic Hungarians and Romanians indicate "creeping expansion" (Pysarenko, 2017). Such Ukrainian scholars as Horlo, Kotsur, Rozumiuk, Krasivskyi and Pidberezhnyk also mentioned the threats coming from Hungarian and Romanian kin-state policies. Krasivskyi and Pidberezhnyk in their report on ethnopolitical challenges to Ukraine's national security argued that interference with Ukraine's domestic affairs of neighbouring countries, in particular Russia (in Crimea and Donbas), Romania (in Chernivtsi region) and Hungary (in Transcarpathia) together with their policies (passportisation, financial assistance, etc.) are the main reasons of increased separatist sentiments in Ukraine and constitute a serious national security threat (Krasivskyi&Pidberezhnyk, 2019: 40). For example, they argued that the autonomy claims which would often be expressed by Budapest and representatives of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia are dangerous, as they could become a first step to the minority's self-determination and then secession from Ukraine – the scenario used by Russia during the annexation of Crimea. They claimed that massive passportisation of Romanians in Chernivtsi region could also create preconditions for similar autonomy claims and secession in the future. In this sense, the referent object even shifted from Ukrainian identity to the Ukrainian state and its integrity. Rozumiuk also drew on some incidents when Ukrainian secret services had to deal with underground agitation for the "restoration of historical justice" in Chernivtsi region calling for the return of Northern Bukovina, Northern and Southern Bessarabia to Romania (Rozumiuk, 2019: 201). He warned that such separatist sentiments can grow larger and create favourable conditions for secession in the future. Furthermore, Pavliatenko suggested that secession of certain parts of Transcarpathia or Chernivtsi regions would be even easier compared to Crimea or Donbas as it would not have to be artificially orchestrated since national minorities there are compactly located, cohesive and well-organised (Pavliatenko, 2018: 207).

In this sense, observing the policies conducted by Hungary and Romania with regards to their compatriots in Ukraine as well as their harsh reactions to the Education Law, Ukrainian politicians and experts began to find similarities between what these states do and what Russia did before its aggression. This made them securitise the other national minorities, particularly those that are the most numerous and vastly supported by their kin-states, and thus all the

potential concessions to them would be considered dangerous. In other words, while the Education Law and then the Language Law were indeed aimed at strengthening the Ukrainian language and identity at the backdrop of Russia's aggression, harsh reactions of other kin-states made Ukraine fear separatism and secession in other regions.

Securitisation spill-over

As Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and began to fear the other national minorities, particularly the Hungarian and Romanian ones, it was likely that the "triadic nexus" with Romania and Hungary would be activated and securitised.

Romanian triadic nexus

Although Romania criticised the Education Law when it was passed in September 2017, when the recommendations of the Venice Commission were published in December, Romania accepted them and agreed to cooperate with the Ukrainian government regarding the education and language issues ("MZS: Ukraina"). This reassured Kyiv that Bucharest did not have any intention to stir separatist sentiments and that the crisis could be settled soon. In this regard, the Romanian triadic nexus was not activated and securitised.

Hungarian triadic nexus

The reaction of Budapest to the Venice recommendations was different. Even before they were published Hungary's prime-minister Viktor Orbán announced that Hungary would keep blocking Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts until the language rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia would be restored. The crisis in the bilateral relations even intensified over the course of 2018-2021, and the Hungarian triadic nexus seemed to have been activated and highly securitised.

To get a better understanding of how the Hungarian triadic nexus was securitised, it would be useful to consider narratives and speech acts by each of the sides of the nexus.

Nationalising state

As it was mentioned above, Ukraine began to securitise the issue of Hungarian speakers following a very harsh reaction of Budapest to the Education Law. The activities of a Hungarian far-right party "Jobbik" in Transcarpathia, incidents related to passportisation, the appointment of a Hungarian ministerial commissioner responsible for the development of Transcarpathia, visits of Hungarian officials to Transcarpathia during the 2019 parliamentary elections campaign further fueled Ukraine's fears of the so-called "Transcarpathian separatism". Although Ukrainian public officials were rather restrained in their speeches and would only be limited to accusing Budapest of interfering with its domestic affairs, many experts, as it was evidenced above, would frequently warn about the "separatism threat" in Transcarpathia. Furthermore, in the surveys conducted among Ukrainian foreign policy experts in 2018 and then 2019 2/3 of the respondents ranked Hungary second among the states that are hostile to Ukraine (Gerasymchuk, 2019).

The public opinion polls are also quite telling in this regard. According to the survey conducted in December 2021, 41,4% of Ukrainians believe that Hungary's activities in Transcarpathia (economic assistance, promotion of the language and culture etc.) indicate its preparation to annex or occupy Transcarpathia in the future (Democratic Initiative Foundation, 2021).

Kin-state

As the Hungarian government actively protested Article 7 of the Ukrainian Education Law, the narratives and speech acts were often very radical. As it was mentioned above, the Hungarian foreign minister said that "Ukraine stabbed Hungary in the back by adopting the law that is violating the rights of the Hungarian minority" and that Hungary finds this act very shameful ("Nizh u spynu"). Budapest highly prioritised the issue of Hungarians in Ukraine and brought it all the way up to the so-called "high politics" by blocking Ukraine-NATO summits. Budapest characterised Ukraine as a "failed state" that "is not capable to uphold the rule of law and conduct efficient economic, social and political policies" and argued that NATO should not continue to cooperate with it as it used to (Sydorenko, 2018). Although the matter was not of any primary concern to the general Hungarian public, Budapest chose one of the highest international platforms possible to discuss the issue, which suggests that the issue of Hungarians in Transcarpathia was securitised. Furthermore, the Hungarian government insisted that the OSCE monitoring mission be deployed in Transcarpathia to protect the Hungarians there ("Uhorshhyna prosyt"). In 2019 the head of the Hungarian prime-minister's office Gergely Gulyás said that official Budapest considered the Education Law "semi-fascist" and insisted that it be modified ("Oficijna Uhorshhyna").

National minority

The representatives of the Hungarian national minority in Transcarpathia also actively criticised the Education Law. In February 2018 they refused to participate in consultations on language and education with the Ukrainian ministry of education. In autumn that year the leader of KMKSZ (Kárpátaljai Magyar Kulturális Szövetség – the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia) László Brenzovics at one of the Hungarian conferences in Budapest stated that "Ukraine is strengthening its anti-Hungarian policies" and called the 2017 Education Law and the draft language law "brutal" towards the Hungarian community ("Brenzovych rozpoviv", 2018). The then rector of the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute Ildikó Orosz in her speech during the 23 October demonstrations in Budapest claimed that "Hungarians in Transcarpathia are suppressed by fascist methods" and that "Hungary is the only country standing up for Transcarpathian Hungarians" ("Ildika Oros u Budapeshti", 2018).

The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia has also been active on the international arena, especially in the Council of Europe. In 2020 they submitted a report on the restriction of language rights in Ukraine (Brenzovics et al., 2020), and in February 2022 they presented an alternative report to the Council of Europe on Ukraine's compliance with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The issue of Hungarians in Transcarpathia is regularly discussed in the European Parliament at the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages. Andrea Bocskor, as a MEP from Hungary who lives in Transcarpathia, organises intergroup meetings where such issues are raised.

According to public opinion polls, Hungarians in Transcarpathia are positive about Budapest's activities in the region. For instance, in 2021 36,8% ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia believed that Hungary's activities indicate a friendly assistance to the

Hungarian minority, and 24,8% agreed that they are aimed at developing the region (Democratic Initiative Foundation, 2021). This is a significant contrast to those 41,4% of Ukrainians who believed that Hungary's activities in Transcarpathia aim at the annexation of the region.

Given the narratives of all the three sides, the Hungarian triadic nexus is highly securitised, and it seems like the more hostile discourse is used the less trust there is between Hungary and Hungarian minority on one side and Ukraine – on the other. In other words, one can observe a vicious circle of securitisation, where the Ukrainian government, fearing separatism in Transcarpathia, refuses to make any concessions to the Hungarian national minority there, which causes outrage of both Hungary and the Hungarian minority. Such outrage is expressed through a very hostile discourse which only intensifies Kyiv's fears. This results in a stalemate in the relations between Hungary and Ukraine as well as between Ukraine and the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia.

3.2.2. Difference in reactions to the policy change

In this part secondary literature will be extensively reviewed and analysed to explain why the kin-states' and the national minorities' reactions to policy change in Ukraine differed. As it was mentioned in paragraph 1.3 a Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) will be used to answer these questions. This method is the most relevant as Hungary and Romania share a few similarities as kin-states, however, their reactions to the policy change in Ukraine differed. The same is observed regarding the Hungarian and the Romanian minority in Ukraine. Given the tables of comparison provided in paragraph 1.3, each explanatory factor contained in the table will be analysed to see whether it is present or not or whether the states are similar or different in a certain area. It is expected that the areas where the actors which are being compared differ may account for their different reaction to the policy change in Ukraine.

3.2.2.1. "Kin-state" level: Hungary and Romania

The main assumption in this research is that Hungary and Romania share several similarities as kin-states which means that there should be something that makes them different which may explain their different reaction to the policy change in Ukraine. For better visualisation, the table containing the explanatory factors/areas against which they are compared is provided below:

	Hungary	**Romania**
Kin-state policies		
Compatriot laws	?	?
Preservation and promotion of identity, language, culture	?	?
Institutions dealing with kin population abroad	?	?
Citizenship/passportisation	?	?

Financial support	?	?
Active stance in international arena	?	?
Domestic factors		
Ethnonationalist agenda, politicisation of external kin	?	?
Foreign policy factors		
Relations w/ nationalising state	?	?
Relations w/ Russia	?	?
Relations w/ EU and NATO	?	?
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

Each of the explanatory factors will be analysed separately as to whether it is present in the case of a kin-state studied and/or whether the kin-states are similar in this regard. In this sense, the spaces with "?" will be filled up with dichotomously defined measures such as "present" or "absent", "similar" or "different".

Kin-state policies

As identified in paragraph 1.2.2, kin-state policies constitute a broad category which includes compatriot laws, citizenship/passportisation policies, the promotion of identity, language and culture, financial support, and a kin-state's active stance in the international arena. As can be seen, all of them are grouped under the "kin-state policies" in the table above.

Compatriot laws and promotion of identity, language and culture

The constitutions of both states contain references to the external kin. According to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, "*Hungary, guided by the notion of a single Hungarian nation, shall bear responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders, shall foster the survival and development of their communities, shall support their endeavours to preserve their Hungarian identity, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary"* (Article D, Fundamental Law of Hungary). The fact that the Fundamental Law emphasises that there is a single Hungarian nation is important, as it means that Hungarians living abroad are still part of the nation and therefore should be cared about equally to those Hungarians living in Hungary. According to the Constitution of Romania, *"The State shall support the strengthening of links with the Romanians living abroad and shall act accordingly for the preservation, development, and expression of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, with the observance of the legislation of the State whose citizens they are"* (Constitution of Romania). The Romanian Constitution is even more restrained than the Hungarian one, as it specifies that Romania will only conduct its kin-state policies abiding by the law of the state where the external kin resides. However, in other aspects the aims of the two articles are similar and sometimes even identical – the preservation and development of the communities, promotion of the identity.

Both Romania and Hungary have specific legislative acts which are directly related to their external kin and encompass different aspects of their life and interaction with the kin-state – Benefit Law (Law 150/1998) in Romania and the 2001 Status Law (Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries) in Hungary.

Romania's Benefit Law was adopted in 1998 and defined the Romanians living abroad as "românii de pretutindeni" ("Romanians abroad" in English) (Law no. 150). It introduced the practice of providing financial support beyond the Romanian borders to promote Romanian-language education, arts, cultural events, civic education, and other programmes. Law 299 of 2007 (Law Concerning the Support Given to the Romanians Abroad) served as an extension to the 1998 Benefit Law, as it specified and expanded the state's obligations with regards to its external kin (Law no. 299). The Law introduced "special support to the Romanian communities which are vulnerable to assimilation" and provided additional financial support to promote the education in Romanian, Romanian culture, and religion. Romanians abroad also got an opportunity to obtain higher education in Romania for free. The Law also stipulated that only those Romanians abroad that declare their Romanian identity and demonstrate adequate knowledge of Romanian can benefit from it.

The Hungarian Status Law was adopted in 2001 and contained similar provisions. It granted certain privileges to persons that are not Hungarians citizens but consider themselves to be "of Hungarian nationality" (Hungarian Government, 2001). Similarly to the Romanian Benefit Law it introduced a number of benefits in the field of education (scholarships, scientists' exchange, teacher's benefits) and culture (free access to public cultural and historical institutions). According to the Law, the Hungarian state provides grants and support to those pursuing their studies in the Hungarian language (Article 14), work permits in Hungary (Article 15), access to financial grants for the kin-minority organisations (Article 18), and assistance to foster commercial activities in the regions where the Hungarians abroad reside (Article 18). The last three provisions might be different from those in Romania's Benefit Law, however, overall, both core laws are very similar to each other. Examining why the Hungarian Status Law proved so controversial internationally, while the Romanian constitution and the Benefit Law had not, could be an interesting avenue for further research.

In this sense, the compatriot laws of both states are very similar – they primarily aim at the promotion of identity, language, and culture of their ethnic kins living abroad.

Institutions dealing with kin population abroad

The Romanian Benefit Law of 1998 established an institutional framework to achieve the goals stipulated in the law - the Ministry for Romanians abroad, the Inter-ministerial group for Romanians abroad, and the Council of Romanians living Abroad. Similar institutions were established in Hungary, though it seems that the kin-state institutional structure of Hungary has become more developed over the recent years. The main institution dealing with the Hungarians abroad is the State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities Abroad of the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. The Research Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad is the institution responsible for conducting research on the matters related to the Hungarians abroad, while the Hungarian Standing Conference and the Hungarian Diaspora Council perform advisory roles. Bethlen Gábor Fund and the Bethlen Gábor Fund Management

Private Limited Non-Profit Company act as institutions coordinating the financial assistance to the communities abroad.

Financial support

Regarding the financial assistance, although the compatriot laws of both countries provide it, its amount may differ, given that from 2011 Hungary significantly stepped up its financial assistance to Hungarians abroad, while no such increase has been observed in the case of Romania. Getting a clear picture of how much the countries spend on their kin-minorities means that profound research needs to be done, which is challenging due to the lack of transparent data thereon. Comparing the amounts of such assistance and their effect on the kin-states' different reactions could be an idea for further research. For the purpose of this comparison, it may be sufficient to just confirm that both kin-states provide financial assistance to their external kins (i.e. financial assistance is "present" in both cases). The lack of data and the research weakness resulting from it is expected to be alleviated in part 3.3, where findings based on the interviews with the experts will be provided. More specifically, the interviewees will be asked whether the "financial assistance" factor accounts for different reactions.

Citizenship/passportisation

Romania began to grant citizenship to its external kin much earlier than Hungary. The Law on Citizenship (Law 21) was adopted in 1991 and then republished in 2000 and 2010 (Law no. 21). According to this law, the inhabitants of Bukovyna and Bessarabia who lost their Romanian citizenship under the Soviet period, acquired the right to apply for Romanian citizenship. Since the adoption of the law, large numbers of Moldovans and Ukrainians have obtained Romanian citizenship. It is estimated that around 642 thousand people out of 2.7 million of the inhabitants of Moldova hold Romanian passports (Balkan Insight, 2021). Although the numbers of Ukrainians that have obtained Romanian citizenship are not clear, since the Ukrainian law does not allow dual citizenship, it is estimated that only in 2016 4000 Ukrainians received Romanian citizenship, which is quite a high number (Business Review, 2018).

Hungary only began to grant citizenship to Hungarians abroad in 2011 when the Act XLIV on Hungarian Nationality took effect. However, unlike the Romanian citizenship law, apart from receiving Hungarian citizenship, the Hungarians living abroad acquired the right to vote for party lists in the parliamentary elections (Global Citizenship Observatory, 2010). In 2015 the Hungarian authorities estimated that around 100 thousand ethnic Hungarians living in Ukraine had obtained Hungarian citizenship (Open Democracy, 2018). This is a large number, given that according to the 2001 Ukrainian population census there were 156 thousand ethnic Hungarians.

Thus, Hungary and Romania are very similar in that both have citizenship laws and conduct active passportisation policies in neighbouring countries, including Ukraine.

Active stance in the international arena

When it comes to advocating minority rights at the international level, Hungary seems to be by far one of the most active states in Europe. Hungary regularly puts the issues of minority rights on the agenda of such organisations as the EU, Council of Europe and even

NATO. Within the European Parliament Hungarian MEPs organise minority intergroup meetings where the issues of Hungarian minorities are discussed. Hungary was also among the states that endorsed the "Minority SafePack" citizens' initiative on minority rights in the EU. The Hungarian Presidency of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers organised a conference on norms and standards on national minority rights in September 2021. The Hungarian government has even brought the issue of minority rights to the agenda of NATO by blocking Ukraine-NATO summits and vetoing NATO's declarations on Ukraine. For instance, in 2019 Hungary vetoed a joint NATO declaration on Ukraine as it contained no reference to Ukraine's obligation to respect the rights of the Hungarian minority living there. The Hungarian foreign minister explained such a move by saying that "Hungary will not sacrifice the ethnic Hungarian community … for geopolitics" ("Hungary vetoes NATO statement").

Romania also demonstrates its active stance as a kin-state in the international arena. After the Ukrainian education law of 2017, the Romanian president Klaus Iohannis stated that "Ukraine's education law will drastically limit the access of minorities to education in their native language" and that the Romanian people "are deeply hurt by this" (RFE/RL's Moldovan Service). However, it seems that such statements do not go beyond the bilateral level of relations. And when Romania is more active multilaterally, it is usually related to Moldovans and Moldova (for example, lobbying Moldova's eurointegration at the EU level etc.).

It is likely that Bucharest is not as active with regards to its other kin populations abroad at an international level, because there is a large Hungarian minority in Romania that have caused a number of disputes and controversies with Hungary. Waterbury, referring to other scholars, argues that "because Romanian politics and nationalism is focused on interethnic dynamics within its own borders, Romania has focused its national project inward and, consequently, not done much in its capacity as a kin-state" (Waterbury, 2010: 153). Put simply, if Romania actively persisted with advocating the rights of Romanians abroad in the international arena, that would mean that it would have to grant the same rights to the minorities living in Romania, which is something Bucharest is currently not ready or willing to do. For instance, in 2008, the then foreign minister Titus Corlăţean emphasised that the protection of the rights of Romanians abroad should be the obligation of the state where the Romanians reside (Udrea, 2015: 108). This may indicate that by claiming that it won't interfere with the domestic issues of the states where Romanians reside Romania expects the kin-states of the minorities living on its territory to do the same.

Thus, Hungary seems to be more active in the international arena as a kin-state than Romania, however, it is clear that Romania's lack of activity is related to domestic issues rather than to its "weakness" as a kin-state, i.e. it faces greater domestic constraints on kin-state engagement.

Domestic factors

Among the domestic factors that may have influenced the kin-states' reaction are the presence of ethnonationalist political agenda and politicisation of the issues related to external kin.

Ethnonationalist agenda

Although Hungary and Romania share many similarities as kin-states, it is important to look whether their governments pursue ethnonationalist agendas, whereby such issues as kin-minorities abroad, their rights are prioritised and to an extent politicised. In other words, examining whether their kin-state policies are instrumentalised to achieve domestic goals may help understand why their reactions to the policy change in Ukraine differed.

Csergő and Goldgeier conducted a profound comparison between Hungary and Romania as kin-states and concluded that kin-state policies are not equally politicised in these states: *"In Hungary, kin-state policy became one of the most prominent themes of post-communist politics. In Romania, internal minorities (Hungarians) were in the centre of debates about nationhood: the issue of external kin was rarely politicised"* (Csergő&Goldgeier, 2013: 119). The authors argue that Hungary's post-communist elites used the kin-state card multiple times to achieve certain domestic goals. For instance, over the past 20 years there has been a clear divide between the Hungarian right and left over the issues of external kin. The 2004 referendum in Hungary on whether ethnic Hungarians living abroad should be entitled to Hungarian citizenship caused political battles between Fidesz and the Socialist Party in alliance with Free Democrats. Fidesz, which was in opposition at the time, was leading the "yes" campaign, and even after the referendum failed, it persisted with advocating more support to the Hungarians abroad, which became part of the party ideology. When Fidesz came to power in 2010, it introduced several new kin-state policies and established an impressive kin-state institutional structure. By allowing the non-resident citizens to vote in the parliamentary election, Fidesz also created an opportunity to expand its electorate. Hence, the issue of external kin became a constituent part of Fidesz's political agenda.

The Romanian case is different. Apart from the fact that Bucharest would refrain from politicising the issue of its external kin due to the presence of a large Hungarian minority, the political leadership of Romania never seemed to capitalise on issues related to Romanians living in neighbouring countries (perhaps except for Moldova). Neither the Social Democratic Party (PSD) nor the National Liberal Party (PNL) which formed the parliamentary coalition in 2016 and then 2020 consider the issues of ethnic kin abroad as their priority. This is not to say that there are no parties in the Romanian parliament with ethnonationalist and even irredentist ideas. For instance, in the 2020 election the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) won 9% of seats both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. AUR's ideology is based on Romanian nationalism and irredentism, and it supports the reunification of all Romanians – Romanians from Romania and Romanians living in neighbouring states. However, while it is possible that Romania's kin-state activism may change in the future, should AUR gain more popularity, it had no effect on Romania's ruling party policies from 2017 to 2020 – the period studied in this research, as it only got into the parliament in 2020.

Foreign policy factors

Among the foreign policy factors that may have influenced the kin-states' reaction are the relations with the nationalising state, relations with Russia, relations with the EU and NATO.

Relations with the nationalising state

Since 1991 both Hungary and Romania have maintained good neighbourly relations with Ukraine. What is surprising is that roughly before 2017 there had barely been any bilateral dispute between Hungary and Ukraine, whereas the bilateral relations between Romania and Ukraine had been strained. Bucharest and Kyiv had disputes over the Snake Island, Danube channel, Moldovan minority in Ukraine, Romania's citizenship policy. What is more, before the Treaty of Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation was signed in 2007, Kyiv had frequently expressed fears of Romania's potential territorial claims in Northern Bukovyna and Bessarabia (Iwanski, 2011: 2). However, following Russia's aggression against Ukraine the Ukrainian-Romanian relations significantly improved. According to Kruglashov, Romania and Ukraine united facing common challenges. He argued that the Romanian official discourse became "more sympathetic and friendly" towards Ukraine, as many Romanians began to realise that they might be the next victim of aggression (Kruglashov, 2016: 325). Similarly, Zlatin argued that "governments in Kyiv and Bucharest moved from the discussions and disputes with regard to questions of a sensitive nature to constructive cooperation, with the aim to strengthen security in the Black Sea and limit Russian dominance in Donbas, the Crimea and Transnistria" (Zlatin 2017: 177).

Relations with Russia

While Romania's anti-Russian stance helped improve its bilateral relations with Ukraine, Hungary's good relations with Moscow have seemingly perpetuated its disputes with Kyiv.

Hungary is one of the few EU states which maintains close ties with Russia. Hungary is dependent on Russian gas and capital, while Russia favours Hungary for its frequent criticism of Brussels. Conversely, according to Iglesias, Romania enjoys energy independence from Russia, the share of Russian capital in the Romanian economy is extremely small, which, according to Iglesias, enables Bucharest to "afford to take an anti-Russian position" (Iglesias, 2014: 375). Following this logic, it is likely that Romania, realising that more serious geopolitical threats exist, may have decided not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine in order not to lose its strategic partner in the Black Sea, whereas Hungary, being highly dependent on Russian energy, benefiting from its cooperation with Russia and prioritising its kin-state policies, may have felt that there was no incentive for it to keep its good relations with Ukraine.

Relations with the EU and NATO

The states' relations with the EU and NATO are also important in explaining why Hungary brought the issue of the education law all the way to the EU and NATO agenda, whereas Romania did not. According to Iglesias, it is likely that Romania, being "the most trustworthy ally in the region", as a former US ambassador to Romania Mark Gitenstein once put it, and putting the Black Sea security first, chose not to impede the work of the Organisation and spoil its image therein (Iglesias, 2014: 374). The same could apply to the EU level as well, as Romania's membership in the organisation has been less problematic compared to Hungary, and Bucharest has usually been in line with Brussels on most of the issues.

Conclusion

Given the analysis provided above, the table of comparison looks as follows:

	Hungary	Romania
Kin-state policies		
Compatriot laws/legislation	similar	similar
Preservation/promotion of identity, language, culture	similar	Similar
Institutions dealing with kin population abroad	similar	Similar
Citizenship/passportisation	similar	Similar
Financial support	present	Present
Active stance in international arena/protector of its kin abroad	present	Present
Domestic factors		
Ethnonationalist agenda	present	Absent
Foreign policy factors		
Relations w/ nationalising state	different	Different
Relations w/ Russia	different	Different
Relations w/ EU and NATO	different	Different
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

1. Hungary and Romania share many similarities as kin-states: they have similar compatriot laws which aim at preserving and promoting their identity, language and culture in areas where their kin-minorities reside, they established a developed institutional framework to help achieve such goals, both of them have granted citizenship as well as financial support to their external kin. Although Bucharest less actively presents itself as a kin-state in the international arena for domestic political reasons, it still does so. All of that indicates that Hungary and Romania are very similar with regards to their kin-state policies.

2. However, the two states differ considerably when it comes to their domestic and foreign policies. Unlike Bucharest, Budapest has been actively pursuing an ethnonationalist agenda by politicising the issues of its kin abroad. Although it was initially Romania which had strained relations with Ukraine before 2014, when Russia's aggression took place, it chose not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine because of minority rights and focus on broader security issues; while Hungary, given its ethnonationalist agenda and significant energy dependence on Russia, persisted with its criticism of the Ukrainian education law which subsequently led to the crisis in the bilateral relations with Kyiv. Hungary and Romania's

different relations with and perceptions of the EU and NATO only contributed to their respective reactions.

3.2.2.2. "Minority" level: Hungarians and Romanians in Ukraine

Similarly to Hungary and Romania as kin-states, ethnic Romanians and Hungarians living in Ukraine seem to share several similarities as national minorities. Given that their reaction to the policy change in Ukraine differed, there should be something that makes them different which may explain their different reactions. For better visualisation, the table containing the explanatory factors against which they will be compared is provided below:

	Hungarian minority	**Romanian minority**
Ethnopolitical situation	?	?
Size	?	?
Ethnopolitical resources		
material	?	?
social	?	?
political	?	?
normative-discursive	?	?
Identity	?	?
Relations w/ the host state	?	?
Relations w/ the kin-state	?	?
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

Each of the explanatory factors will be analysed separately as to whether it is present in the case of the national minority studied and/or whether the minorities are similar in this regard. In this sense, the spaces with "?" will be filled up with dichotomously defined measures such "present" or "absent", "similar" or "different".

Ethnopolitical situation

Both minorities happened to live in the territory of contemporary Ukraine as a result of **territorial divisions** in the 20th century. The territories of modern-day Transcarpathia region were annexed to Czechoslovakia under the Treaty of Trianon between Hungary on one side and Entente Powers – on the other on 4 June 1920. In 1945 Transcarpathia was ceded to the Soviet Union (Ukrainian SSR) following the Czech-Soviet agreement. In 1991 Transcarpathia region became part of a newly independent Ukraine. Northern Bukovyna region, where the majority of Romanians nowadays reside, together with Bessarabia and the Hertsa region was annexed to the Soviet Union following the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Like Transcarpathia, in 1991 Northern Bukovyna became part of independent Ukraine.

Both territorial divisions have often been perceived as historical injustice, as a large number of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians happened to live outside their kin-states and became a minority in their new states. "Great Hungary" and "Great Romania" sentiments can still be observed in Transcarpathia and Northern Bukovyna respectively. For instance, ethnic

Hungarians in Transcarpathia regularly commemorate the anniversaries of the signing of the Treaty of Trianon. Such events are organised by the Hungarian political parties and cultural associations. The historical event is considered traumatic and unjust for ethnic Hungarians who happened to be in the territory of other states. However, at such events there is no reference to the need to return Transcarpathia to Hungary – the emphasis is rather on the importance to preserve the national unity with Hungary despite the borders. For example, at one of such celebrations the head of a Hungarian-speaking village underscored that the community should strive to build and strengthen "a united Hungarian nation that cannot be divided by the borders" ("Na Berehivshhyni"). In fact, the day on which the Trianon treaty was signed is celebrated as the Day of national unity. Likewise, Romanians in Northern Bukovyna despite considering the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact unjust, do not support secessionist or irredentist ideas. According to the surveys conducted by N. Bureiko and T. Moga in 2016, 73,4% of respondents from Northern Bukovyna believed that the region should remain within the current existing borders, while 65,3% emphasised that "historical bygones should be left bygones" (Bureiko&Moga, 2021: 399). In this sense, Hungarians and Romanians in Ukraine are very similar – both consider the territorial division according to which they happened to be in the territory of modern-day Ukraine unjust, but no widely-supported secessionist or irredentist sentiments are observed.

Size

According to the data presented by the National Strategy towards Romanians abroad, there are around 500 thousand Romanians in Ukraine (Volkova, 2019: 44). The Romanian government does not recognise the Moldovan national minority in Ukraine (according to 2001 Ukraine census, 256,8 thousand people, 0,5% of the population) as a separate minority. Bucharest believes that the Moldovan minority is the same as the Romanian minority (according to the 2001 census, 151 thousand people, or 0,3% of Ukraine's population) and therefore their population should be counted together (around 407,8 thousand) which makes the Romanian minority the second largest minority in Ukraine after the Russian minority. As this research relies on the 2001 census data, Romanians and Moldovans in Ukraine will be considered as separate. This will help avoid potential confusion, since some Moldovans in Ukraine may not recognise Romania as their kin-state and do not seem to be united with the Romanian minority in Ukraine. In this regard, Romanians and Hungarians are of almost the same size: according to the census, there are 156 thousand ethnic Hungarians and 151 thousand ethnic Romanians – each constituting 0,3% of Ukraine's population.

Ethnopolitical resources

Both national minorities possess similar **material resources** – they relatively compactly reside on a piece of land which they identify themselves with – Transcarpathia for Hungarians, and Northern Bukovyna for most of the Romanians (however, they also live in southern parts of Transcarpathia and Odesa region).

Regarding their **social resources,** both seem to be quite consolidated. 68% of Romanians in Ukraine said that they had the most friends among Romanians (Otovescu et al.,

2020: 196), and 57% of Hungarians in Ukraine said that their friends were Hungarians living in Transcarpathia (Bakirov, Kizilov, Kizilova, 2011: 243). A strong intra-communal solidarity is observed in both cases, as 73% of Romanian respondents said that Romanians in their locality helped each other when needed (Otovescu et al., 2020: 196), and 80% of Hungarian respondents said that they trust the members of their ethnic group the most (Bakirov et al., 2011: 37). A large share of the respondents in both communities claimed to speak their native language with their family members (88,8% of Romanians, and 87,5% of Hungarians). In this sense, both national minorities demonstrate a high level of consolidation. However, when it comes to the level of their integration into the majority society, significant differences are observed.

Hungarians in Ukraine appear to be more linguistically segregated compared to Romanians. According to "Tandem 2019" survey, 94% of Hungarians in Transcarpathia speak Hungarian with their friends, and 79% speak Hungarian with their colleagues (Tandem 2019). In contrast, according to "Bukovyna as a contact zone" survey also conducted in 2019, only 59,6% of Romanians in Northern Bukovyna speak Romanian with their friends, and even less people (49,6%) speak Romanian with their colleagues (Bukovyna as a Contact Zone 2019). What is interesting is that among the Romanian respondents around 1/3 indicated that they use both Ukrainian and Romanian or Romanian and Russian when speaking with their friends and colleagues. This suggests that Romanians in Ukraine are likely more exposed to the majority society and are more linguistically integrated than Hungarians. What is interesting is that "Bukovyna as a Contact Zone" survey demonstrated that 54,4% were positive or somewhat positive about the "language article" (no 7) of the education law.

Romanian parents in Ukraine are reluctant to choose Romanians schools for their children (Dumitraş, 2012: 68), while 88,8% of Hungarian parents indicated that they would send their children to a Hungarian school (Tandem 2016). What is interesting, however, is that 82,8% of Hungarian parents still agreed that it is important for their children to know Ukrainian to achieve success in life (Tandem 2016).

According to Otovescu et al. (Otovescu et al., 2020: 197), very few Romanians in Ukraine could correctly name the Romanian national symbols, whereas, according to Veres, around 45% of Hungarians in Ukraine could mention the Hungarian national symbols (Veres, 2015: 99). This indicates a stronger national socialisation of Hungarians. This is also in line with the fact that 81% of Hungarians believed that Hungarians that live in Ukraine should preserve their customs and traditions (Bakirov et al, 2011: 32).

Another aspect which may suggest that the Hungarians in Ukraine are less integrated than the Romanians is the use of local time (CET) by the former. Csernicskó and Fedinec found that the majority of Russian and Ukrainian mother-tongue speakers living in Transcarpathia used official Kyiv time, whereas the overwhelming majority of Hungarian mother-tongue speakers preferred the informal "local time" (Csernicskó&Fedinec, 2019: 16).

With regards to their **political resources**, the Hungarians and Romanians differ considerably. First, unlike Romanians, Hungarians in Ukraine are well-organised politically – two ethnic Hungarian parties are registered in the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine – the Democratic Party of Hungarians of Ukraine (DPUU) and the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Sub-Carpathia (KMKSZ). The Romanian minority has only managed to establish a few

cultural organisations, but not political parties or movements. Second, given that the Hungarians are densely populated, they are politically represented in the local government. For example, following the 2015 local elections, 10 ethnic Hungarian councillors were elected to the Transcarpathia regional council, in Berehove district 75% of the councillors were ethnic Hungarian. Given that the Romanians do not have their own political party which can represent the interests of the community, they usually vote for the all-Ukrainian parties. And even though there are still ethnic Romanians on the party lists, once they are elected, they are limited in asserting the interests of their community at the local level, as they have to follow the agenda of the all-Ukrainian party which they are part of. Finally, Otovescu et al. also emphasised the lack of strong leaders in the Romanian community. In contrast, the leaders of the Hungarian minority are very proactive in their speeches, and some of them have even been represented in the Ukrainian parliament – for example, László Brenzovics was elected as MP in Verkhovna Rada in 2014 in the "Bloc of Petro Poroshenko" list.

Regarding their **normative-discursive resources,** the literature is more insightful about the Romanians in Ukraine. For example, Dumitraş outlined the main narratives and myths that form part of the identity of the Romanians in Ukraine (Dumitraş, 2012). The author draws on the "historical decline myth", according to which "despite two centuries of intensive denationalisation and linguistic assimilation…the Romanians spread on what is nowadays Ukraine managed to preserve their beautiful language, their firm faith, and their ancestral customs unaltered" (p.63). Dumitraş also referred to the period of Soviet repressions of Romanians and the imposition of the "false Moldovan identity": "The most frequently mentioned instrument of denationalisation is the creation of the allegedly "false" Moldovan identity, framed as having been imposed forcefully upon the ethnics by the Soviet authorities, who falsified the censuses…" (p.64). According to the author, such narratives make Romanians in Ukraine consider themselves as "an endangered community struggling to survive". The relevant literature on the Hungarians in Ukraine is rather limited, however, one can find many references to their traumatic past when they were separated from the "core" nation following the Trianon treaty and struggled a lot to preserve their distinct identity, language, and culture. In this sense, both national minorities share similar normative-discursive resources.

Thus, Romanians and Hungarians in Ukraine, while sharing material and normative-discursive resources, differ significantly when it comes to the social and political resources they possess.

Identity

Survey data indicates that the regional identity dominates in both cases. According to the questionnaire-based survey "Bukovyna as a Contact Zone" conducted in 2016, 74,7% of Romanians in Northern Bukovyna identified themselves as residents of Bukovyna region (Bukovyna as a Contact Zone 2016). A similar survey was conducted in Transcarpathia in the same year (Tandem 2016) and demonstrated that 40,4% of Hungarians in Transcarpathia identified themselves as Transcarpathian Hungarian and 20,6% - as Carpathian. Besides, 68% called Transcarpathia their homeland, and only 4% mentioned Hungary (Tandem 2016).

Relations with the host-state

Although there is no specific survey data that would demonstrate the Romanian and the Hungarian minority's perception of Ukraine as a host-state, there are different sources which may help get an idea thereof. According to the "Bukovyna as a Contact Zone" survey, 64,5% of Romanians in Northern Bukovyna believe that Ukraine helps them with regards to creating possibilities for preserving and developing their ethnic traditions and art; 71,5% believe that Ukraine helps with regards to learning their native language, and 50,8% said they felt protected by the state of their residence (Bukovyna as a Contact Zone 2016). What is interesting is that 69,5% of Romanians in Ukraine said they would support the Ukrainian national team if it played against the Romanian national team in a sport competition (Bukovyna as a Contact Zone 2016).

According to the Enri-East survey conducted in 2009, around 2/3 of Hungarians in Ukraine did not trust the Ukrainian public institutions (government, parliaments, courts) (Bakirov et al., 2011: 39). Although there is no survey data on whether the Hungarians are satisfied with Ukraine's policies, the discourse of their representatives (for example, an above-mentioned Ildikó Orosz's speech about Kyiv using "fascist methods" to "suppress Hungarians in Transcarpathia") suggests that they are not.

Relations with the kin-state

No survey data has been found to understand what relations the national minorities studied maintain with their kin-states, however, given secondary literature and especially news reports, it seems that the Hungarians in Ukraine maintain closer ties with their kin-state – regular meetings between the minority leaders and the representatives of the Hungarian government (for example, between László Brenzovics and Orbán), visits of the Hungarian officials in Transcarpathia, speeches of the minority leaders at conferences, demonstrations in Hungary, which highlights the higher level of institutionalisation in the Hungarian case. The activity of such scale appears to be absent in the case of Romanians in Ukraine. They do receive financial support, however if the visits of Romanian officials take place, they are rather symbolic and not regular.

Conclusion

Based on the secondary data analysis provided above, the comparison table looks as follows:

	Hungarian minority	**Romanian minority**
Ethnopolitical situation	similar	similar
Ethnopolitical resources		
material	similar	similar
social	different	different
political	different	different
normative-discursive	similar	similar
Identity	similar	similar
Relations w/ the host state	different	different
Relations w/ the kin-state	different	different

Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

The Hungarian and Romanian minorities in Ukraine share many similarities when it comes to the ethnopolitical situation according to which they happened to live in the territory of modern-day Ukraine, they are almost the same in size, both have a pronounced regional identity, and share similar material and normative-discursive ethnopolitical resources. However, substantial differences have been found in their social and political resources, as well as their relations with the host-state and their kin-states:

1. Although both communities seem to be well consolidated, the Romanians appear to be more integrated into and linguistically assimilated with Ukrainian society.

2. The Hungarians in Ukraine are better organised politically given the presence of 2 ethnic Hungarian political parties as well as strong leaders able to organise the community.

3. Regarding the relations with the host-state, the Romanians seem to be more satisfied with and supportive of the Ukrainian state compared to the Hungarians.

4. The Hungarians, in turn, seem to be much closer to their kin-state, given regular meetings and visits of the Hungarian officials.

3.3 Findings (interviews)

3.3.1 Securitisation spill-over to the "Hungarian triadic nexus"

This paragraph will attempt to answer research question I "What triggered the crisis in the relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?" by using data collected through the expert interviews conducted for this research. As this question has already been analysed based on secondary data in paragraph 3.2.1, it is expected that the interview data will further confirm the conclusions made, provide a deeper understanding of the actors' behaviour, or suggest new explanations that have not been considered during secondary research.

It should be reminded that the process-tracing method was used in paragraph 3.2.1 to answer the above-mentioned research question based on secondary literature, and the following conclusions were made:

1) Russia's aggression led to the securitisation of the "Russian triadic nexus", which in turn exposed the need to protect the Ukrainian language and identity.

2) The need to protect the language and identity necessitated the change of legislation in the field of education and language.

3) The change of policy in those areas meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and that certain rights of national minorities were limited; this outraged the other national minorities, and as this outrage got more pronounced, Ukraine began to consider them as a threat too.

4) Ukraine's securitisation of minority issues together with significant outrage of both Hungary as a kin-state and the Hungarian minority led to the activation and securitisation of the Hungarian triadic nexus.

All the eight experts that participated in the interviews were asked the same questions which may help answer the research question mentioned above.

When asked what made the Ukrainian government pass the Law on Education in 2017, 5 out of 8 respondents referred to the process of **nation-building**, according to which there was a need to strengthen the Ukrainian identity and language. Those who pointed that out would also connect such need to the background of **Russia's aggression**:

ROM 1: *"I can assume that in the context of the war that had started in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine was looking for a way to strengthen its national identity, and language and education policies are the first target of nation-building policies. And without a lot of economic resources available, this seemed to be the obvious path to take."*

ROM 2: *"I think the background has to do with what was happening ever since 2014 – with the annexation of Crimea and then with the war in Donbas…"*

HUN 3: *"The main reason was that Ukraine was in the process of nation-building – the process that every state in this region does, and this is the only logical thing a state can do…especially after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Donbas."*

However, the rest of the respondents referred to the need to **integrate national minorities** as the main motivation of the law:

UKR: *"The motivation of Liliia Hrynevych [the then education minister of Ukraine] was integration, that is the Ukrainian language as the language of inter-ethnic communication. In the media it appeared as counteracting Russia's aggression, but obviously this was not the primary goal. The problem was rather the existence of a segregated Hungarian-speaking community – most of the Hungarian kids don't speak Ukrainian."*

HUN 2: "*According to Ukraine, this law is an attempt at integration, and according to Hungarians, this is an attempt at assimilation."*

HUN 1: *"According to the official argumentation it was important to adopt the bilingual model because the minority doesn't speak Ukrainian, but that shouldn't be instead of the minority language."*

The arguments of both sides sound convincing, and, to an extent, reflect their perceptions of the law. What is interesting here is that all the Romanian respondents referred to Russia's aggression as the reason for conducting nation-building policies, while 2 out of 3 Hungarians respondents believed that the law was aimed at the integration or rather assimilation of the Hungarian minority. They also seemed more emotional and concerned about the law ("this is an attempt at assimilation", "but that shouldn't be instead of the minority language"). Perhaps given that the Ukrainian respondent is more aware of the inner political context of Ukraine, his arguments on the need to integrate weigh more, but it could also be the case that the need to integrate the minorities and eliminate their segregation[6] was part of a larger nation-building strategy which appeared in the aftermath of Russia's aggression.

[6] As such terms as 'integration', 'assimilation', and 'segregation' refer to different policy objectives and perceptions by different actors, in this work they are used to reflect the actors' perceptions of the policies

When asked about why Ukraine's education law of 2017 caused harsh criticism on the part of Hungary, a few respondents pointed out the lack of communication between Kyiv and Budapest as well as unmet expectations. For example, the Ukrainian respondent argued that the law was adopted a year after the so-called breakthrough in the Ukrainian-Hungarian relations ("the year of high expectations") – Ukraine made many promises to Hungary and the Hungarian minority (prime-minister's visit to Budapest, the appointment of the new ambassador, agreement between KMKSZ and Poroshenko before Ukraine's presidential election)[7]. In this sense, the education law came as a surprise to Budapest, which felt that its **expectations** of Kyiv's policy toward the Hungarians in Transcarpathia were **unmet**:

"Hungary wants Kyiv to see that they help Transcarpathia a lot, and they want it to appreciate it and not touch the minority…"

HUN 3 and Myra Waterbury shared similar views:

HUN 3: *"Here in Hungary there was a discourse that in Transcarpathia we [Hungary] helped a lot of Hungarians and not only Hungarians, we made good gestures, and it was hoped that such gestures will be reciprocated."*

Myra Waterbury: *"I've heard arguments that the Ukrainian state has neglected that whole region, and that the Hungarian government has stepped in to provide local services and education. Then I can imagine a push-back being "Well, you have already had your chance to educationally and economically develop this region, you haven't been doing it, we've been doing it, and now you want to come back and do it." I think that is one way of seeing where such push-back is coming from."* She also referred to **a slippery slope logic**, whereby Budapest believed that making concessions now not to spoil the relations with Ukraine would lead to even bigger concessions in the future: *"If we give you this, are you going to then override minority language education more broadly?"* ROM 3 also provided a similar argument, referring to bad experience with Hungarians in Romania in the 1980s when more and more disciplines were taught in Romanian, which subsequently led to some ethnic homogenisation of Hungarians in Romania.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian expert emphasised the **lack of communication** and **mutual misinformation** which perpetuated the crisis:

"It seems that the Hungarian media was not completely honest about the content of the law, and not many Hungarian politicians are truly aware of what the law is about. Yes, article 7 is rather vaguely formulated, but talking about the closure of Hungarian schools in Transcarpathia is more about fear rather than any real assessment of the situation."

"It is hard to say that in Budapest they know a lot about the Hungarian community – there are some sources of information, and for example what László Brenzovics [the leader of KMKSZ] would personally tell Orbán is considered as truth. But this is not the case – so there is mutual misinformation going on. In Ukraine, for example, it is the Security Service of

conducted rather than the content of such policies, i.e. the Ukrainian government may conduct 'integration' policies which are perceived as 'assimilation' by an ethnic minority living on its territory.

[7] This essentially explains why the Hungarian foreign minister picked a "stab in the back" phrase to react to Ukraine's legislation change.

Ukraine that informs the government about Hungarians in Transcarpathia. This is a very Soviet approach as it means that national minorities are equal to national security threats."

Most of the respondents believed that Hungary's harsh criticism of the law was **expected**, given its active kin-state policies and Fidesz's approach towards kin minorities abroad:

Myra Waterbury: *"…this is part of Fidesz's brand – it's been part of their project for a long time. Unless they have a real reason to do it and unless people on the ground are asking for it, they don't have any incentive not to be reactive about it. They've done it before with other neighbouring countries, so there is a clear logic of being sensitive about it."*

ROM 1: *"What seems to remain is this organic understanding of nation that has dominated Fidesz's discourse since late 1990s – the nation exists, it's there, it's pure, and it has to be protected as such, and not much has changed."*

ROM 3: *"The issue of Hungarians abroad is very important for this government ideologically…They ideologically exploited this issue."*

Besides, what could be an interesting take-away from the interview data is that all the Hungarian respondents agreed that it is very important for national minorities to learn and speak the majority language, but the minorities should not be forced to do so, and the teaching methods should be changed:

HUN 1: *"…it's not about negative attitudes of the Hungarian minority towards the Ukrainian language, they want to learn it – our surveys did not find that they don't want to learn the language. But the key is that you can't oblige them to do that."*

HUN 2: *"Personally, as an ethnic Hungarian I agree that it is important to know the state language, and the representatives of the Hungarian community themselves agree with this. But what Budapest was criticising was the methodology of teaching Ukrainian. Kyiv wants to teach Ukrainian as a mother tongue, but it's more logical to teach it as a foreign language."*

HUN 3: *"However, the main problem with the law was that you shouldn't force them to learn the majority language."*

Hence, the issue of unmet expectations and the lack of communication triggered the crisis between Hungary and Ukraine over the education law. Mutual misinformation and Hungary's fears that the rights of the Hungarian minority would be suppressed combined with Fidesz's approach towards kin-minorities further perpetuated the problem, and thus the securitisation spilled over from the "Russian triadic nexus" to the "Hungarian" one.

As criticism got more pronounced, Ukraine began to securitise minority issues. When asked why fears of the so-called "Donbas scenario", i.e. Hungary annexing Transcarpathia, were common in the Ukrainian political discourse, several respondents emphasised that the minority issues were **instrumentalised**. The Ukrainian respondent drew on the importance of political responsibility of both sides: *"The tragedy of this conflict is that both sides at different levels (politicians, public institutions) are interested in preserving this conflict. Because on the one side there is no real threat – there is no separatism, no interethnic conflicts, people live well, but on the other – when necessary, this issue becomes issue no.1 – this is very useful."*

Myra Waterbury provided similar arguments: *"Why do Ukrainians think so? They have their own domestic games to play – it can be beneficial to securitise minorities."*

The presence of **trauma** on both sides was also underlined by the Ukrainian respondent: *"The Ukrainian-Hungarian conflict is about two traumatised nations. Hungarians are traumatised not only by Trianon, but this is a trauma, this is the behaviour or syndrome of a victim – when you are offended by everyone and are demanding everything from everyone. Ukrainians are in the same condition after Crimea and Donbas*[8] *– this is a traumatised nation that is offended by everyone and is demanding everything from everyone. And it appears that Hungarians and Ukrainians are competing over who is more traumatised. In Ukraine this trauma is not being healed and is being worsened as the war goes on."* This is a good insight into why the two states began to securitise each other. This is also in line with what one of the Romanian respondents said on Ukraine's securitisation of the Hungarian minority: *"The alliance between Hungary and Russia may perhaps explain why the ties which the Hungarian minority has with Hungary made them the fifth column in Ukraine."*

What could be insightful is that all the respondents assessed the probability of the so-called "Donbas scenario" in Transcarpathia as extremely low. For instance, according to one of the Hungarian respondents, the fact that Transcarpathia no longer belongs to Hungary is a fact, "a sad one, but fact".

Thus, it appears that the Hungarian minority issue was instrumentalised by both sides. Such instrumentalisation played out well given that both nations are traumatised, as the Ukrainian respondent put it. Hungary's friendly relations with Russia seemed to have further perpetuated the problem and made Ukraine suspicious of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia.

When asked why the Hungarian government persisted with its criticism even after the Venice recommendations were published, most of the respondents referred to the need to **advocate for the rights of Hungarians abroad**:

HUN 1: *"I'll repeat – the withdrawal of minority rights was a huge violation of the Hungarian minority rights. The Hungarian government expressed the concerns of the representatives of the Hungarian minority, that's why the reactions were that strong and impulsive."*

HUN 3: *"I'm not surprised that Orbán made such a statement [that Hungary will persist with its criticism despite the recommendations of the Venice commission], as it is a principal position that Hungary has to do everything everywhere to support Hungarians abroad."*

Myra Waterbury: *"…it might be the case that among the Hungarian policy-makers there was a feeling that "if we don't yell about this, nobody will". They [the Hungarian minority] don't have any other advocates."*

[8] As mentioned earlier, the interview with the Ukrainian expert took place before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February.

What is interesting is that the Hungarian respondents, when told that the recommendations of the Venice commission supported Ukraine's decision to strengthen the Ukrainian language and favoured the Ukrainian side, completely disagreed. For example, HUN 3 said the following: *"To be honest, what I hear from the Hungarian politicians is that the Venice Commission approved the Hungarian requests…"* This indicates that the two sides have their own interpretations of the Venice commission recommendations. Different interpretations mean that each of them believes that what it is doing is the right thing, which in turn only perpetuates the stalemate.

Conclusion

Therefore, given both secondary data outlined in paragraph 3.2.1 and primary data collected through the interviews, the following conclusions could be drawn with regards to research question I "What triggered the crisis in the relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?":

1. Russia's aggression led to the securitisation of the "Russian triadic nexus", which in turn made Ukraine start an active nation-building process to strengthen and protect the Ukrainian identity and language. The need to integrate the minorities and eliminate their segregation was part of such a nation-building strategy.

2. Conducting nation-building policies meant that education and language legislation had to be changed.

3. The change of policies in the field of education and language meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and that certain rights of national minorities got limited. Hungary as a kin-state, feeling the need to advocate for the rights of its kin minority and fearing that if it remained silent this would lead to further limitation of the minority rights, was extremely critical about Ukraine's education law. Hungary's outrage by the law also intensified as Budapest felt that its expectations regarding Ukraine were not met - Kyiv limited the rights of the Hungarian minority and did not consider or appreciate Hungary's efforts to support the development of Transcarpathia. The lack of communication between the sides and mutual misinformation triggered the crisis, which was and still is perpetuated by the fact that both states instrumentalise the minority issues to gain domestic political benefits. Even though both Hungarian and Ukrainian experts argued that the so-called "Donbas scenario" is not feasible or realistic, such instrumentalisation played out well given that both nations have been traumatised by certain historical events – Hungary by Trianon, and Ukraine – by Russia's aggression. Hungary's friendly relations with Russia seemed to have further perpetuated the problem and made Ukraine suspicious of the Hungarian minority. Hence, unmet expectations, the lack of communication and information, traumatic history and the instrumentalisation of minority issues by both sides led to the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" and a stalemate in relations between Hungary and the Hungarian minority on the one side and Ukraine – on the other.

3.3.2 Difference in reactions to the policy change

3.3.2.1. "Kin-state" level: Hungary and Romania

In paragraph 3.2.2.1 secondary data was extensively reviewed and analysed to answer research question II, more specifically why Hungary's and Romania's reaction to the policy change in Ukraine differed. For this, MSSD method was used, where the two states were compared between each other against certain criteria. Given the analysis conducted, the table of comparison was completed as follows:

	Hungary	**Romania**
Kin-state policies		
Compatriot laws/legislation	similar	similar
Preservation/promotion of identity, language, culture	similar	similar
Institutions dealing with kin population abroad	similar	similar
Citizenship/passportisation	similar	similar
Financial support	present	present
Active stance in international arena/protector of its kin abroad	present	present
Domestic factors		
Ethnonationalist agenda	present	absent
Foreign policy factors		
Relations w/ nationalising state	different	different
Relations w/ Russia	different	different
Relations w/ EU and NATO	different	different
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

Secondary literature analysis demonstrated that Hungary and Romania share many similarities as kin-states, however, differ significantly when it comes to domestic and foreign policy factors. Unlike Bucharest, Budapest has been actively pursuing an ethnonationalist agenda by politicising the issues of its kin abroad. Although it was initially Romania which had strained relations with Ukraine before 2014, when Russia's aggression took place, it chose not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine because of minority rights and focus on broader security issues; while Hungary, given its ethnonationalist agenda and friendly relations with Russia, persisted with its criticism of the Ukrainian education law which subsequently led to the crisis in the bilateral relations with Kyiv. Hungary and Romania's different relations with and perceptions of the EU and NATO also contributed to their respective reactions.

Similarly to what was done with regards to research question I in the previous paragraph, in this paragraph the data collected through the expert interviews will be used to either confirm conclusions above or modify them by adding new factors and/or explanations. The 8 experts were asked the same questions which are related to the factors outlined in the comparison table, except for the first four (compatriot legislation, promotion of identity, language and culture, institutions dealing with kin population abroad, and citizenship policies), as secondary literature is enough to prove whether any of them are present. With regards to the rest of the factors, secondary literature is less straightforward, so it may be insightful to ask the experts on how important those factors are to explain the difference in reactions.

Regarding the **financial support,** all the respondents agreed that Hungary provides more economic and financial support to the Hungarians in Ukraine than Romania – to Romanians in Ukraine. All of them also mentioned that Romania's primary focus as a kin-state has always been on Moldova, therefore most of the financial support is directed there. None of the respondents, however, believed that different amounts of financial support to the kin minority could explain different reactions.

Given the states' **stance in the international arena** as protectors of their kin minorities, most of the respondents agreed that both Hungary and Romania consider themselves responsible for their kin population abroad, with Hungary perhaps being more active in this regard:

ROM 1: *"Hungary has a history of lobbying for its kin-state which started after the Trianon treaty. Romania has only become a kin-state after WWII. Romania started behaving like a kin-state only after the fall of communism and its responsibility was only vis-à-vis Moldova. It's only recently that Romania followed the footsteps of other countries at this declaratory level, claiming responsibility for ethnic Romanians abroad."*

ROM 2: *"Romania also feels responsible for its communities abroad, because if not Romania, who else will do that. But again Hungary is much more dynamic and active here…It's part of Hungary's DNA, to put it like that."*

HUN 3 also provided some evidence on why Romania is similar to Hungary as far as its international stance as a kin-state is concerned. The expert referred to the case when Romania pledged to block Serbia's EU accession talks because of the non-recognition of Vlachs as Romanians and implied that this case is extremely similar to what Hungary did to Ukraine by blocking Ukraine-NATO summits. According to HUN 3, Romanians were not that critical about Ukraine's education law because *"they would not support the rights to Romanians abroad which Romania doesn't want to grant to the Hungarian minority in Romania."* Myra Waterbury also suggested that Romania might not want to support the policies elsewhere which it criticises Hungary for supporting in its own country. This is in line with what was suggested based on secondary data – due to the presence of a large Hungarian minority on its territory Romania might have had to be less vocal about Ukraine's education law.

Most of the respondents agreed that Hungary's **ethnonationalist agenda and party politics dynamics** could explain its harsh reaction to the education law. They argued that advocating for the rights of Hungarians abroad *"played a considerable role in Fidesz's party ideology"* (HUN 3) and *"supports their political brand and larger strategy"* (Myra

Waterbury). The Ukrainian respondent drew particular attention to Budapest's deliberate **politicisation** of the Hungarian minority issue and suggested why Bucharest chose the opposite: *"All of this was happening when Jobbik was gaining popularity, therefore it was important for Fidesz that the "Ukrainian card" wouldn't become their weakness and thus be used by Jobbik. To escalate the issue was a cynical political calculation, and Orbán didn't see what he would gain if he got along with the Ukrainians. For Romanians this was not on the agenda and the Romanians decided not to politicise this issue, since the Romanians abroad are not that important in Romania's political discourse."* HUN 3 also shared a very interesting perspective, which could be valuable for the comparison between two countries: *"I think that in Hungary even the socialist, left governments do more for Hungarians abroad than any Romanian party – for Romanians abroad."* While this does not deny the importance of Fidesz's agenda in explaining Hungary's reaction to the law, it may also suggest that the issue of external kin is generally a significant part of Hungary's domestic political discourse regardless of which political force is in power. One possible explanation for this could be the importance of the external kin in Hungary's **modern national history** which Csergő and Goldgeier elaborated on in their work: "The territories on which Hungarians live are important elements of national historiography and geography: they contain spaces that have become building blocks of the national canon" (Csergő&Goldgeier, 2013: 94). Conversely, HUN 3 drew on how Romanians abroad are perceived in Romania: "*Romanians abroad are not very well known in Romania – it's not very much in the Romanian national image."* ROM 3 referred to the **discourse of trauma** in Hungarian society to explain why the external kin has been an important part of Hungary's modern national history: *"Although nowadays the rejection of Trianon doesn't exist in Hungary, the discourse of trauma still does. Romanian politics considers this aspect [the loss of territories in XX century] normal and more acceptable]."*

Regarding the **states' relations with Ukraine**, most of the respondents agreed that Hungary's reaction was particularly harsh because it did not have many incentives to preserve good relations with Ukraine and thus ignored the minority issue in Transcarpathia. HUN 1 cited one of the speakers at an expert meeting on minorities which she attended: *"Romania is able to sacrifice the Romanian minority to maintain good relations with Ukraine, while Hungary is not ready to do the same thing".* This argument is in line with what the Romanian experts said on why Romania chose not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine over minority issues:

ROM 2: *"We understand that we have a minority that needs to be looked after in Ukraine, but on the other hand, we do not want to strain relations with Ukraine that much because we know that there is a security threat there in the East – from Russia, and this security threat has a bigger impact than other issues".*

Other Romanian experts agreed that the security factor is paramount for Romania and that unlike in Hungary, the threat from Russia is perceived as huge and realistic. They also drew on the issue of energy-dependence and argued that Romania's energy independence provides it flexibility in terms of defining its foreign policy objectives, while Hungary, benefiting from its good **relations with Russia**, felt no incentive to preserve good relations with Ukraine. These arguments are perfectly in line with the secondary literature discussed earlier, and particularly with what Iglesias wrote on the two states' relations with Russia. In

this sense, the Russian factor may have impacted the states' decision whether to "sacrifice" the minority issue or not.

The respondents were also asked whether the states' **relations with the EU and NATO** played any role. ROM 2 expressed the views similar to what was mentioned about Romania being "the most trustworthy ally in the region" in paragraph 3.2.2.1: *"Romania is trying to follow a Euro-Atlantic way of framing its links with kin minorities, and it's very careful about this not to go beyond the European framework of good neighbourly relations. So from this perspective I would say that Romania has a European interpretation of dealing with minorities. In addition, it wants to show that it is a good member of the EU and NATO".*

Apart from the questions directly related to the comparison table, the experts we asked to think of any other possible explanations, patterns etc. Many of them were very open and shared their ideas. The factor of **political stability** was not considered in the previous parts of this research but was frequently mentioned by some of the respondents. For example, according to the Ukrainian respondent, the issue did not get politicised in Romania because there was a domestic political crisis to deal with, while ROM 1 argued that the main problem of the Romanian government at the time was "corruption scandals and political incompetence", which meant that the issue of the kin minority was deemed rather secondary. ROM 2 also referred to Romania's incoherent foreign policy which may explain why Bucharest did not press on minority issues that much: *"Over the past decade Romania hasn't had a coherent foreign policy, there were so many government changes, so it was a patchwork of things, and we didn't have a medium or long-term planned foreign policy."*

Conclusion

The interview data largely supported the conclusions made in paragraph 3.2.2.1: Hungary and Romania share many similarities when it comes to their kin-state policies: they have similar compatriot laws which aims at preserving and promoting their identity, language and culture in areas where their kin-minorities reside, they established a developed institutional framework to help achieve such goals, both of them have granted citizenship as well as financial support to their external kins. Although Romania's financial support to Romanians in Ukraine is less than that of Hungary to Hungarians in Ukraine, no evidence was found that this could account for the difference in their reactions. Like Budapest, Bucharest presents itself as a kin-state in the international arena, however, for domestic reasons, namely the presence of a large Hungarian minority, its international stance is less active.

However, the two states differ considerably when it comes to their domestic and foreign policies. Unlike Bucharest, Budapest has been actively pursuing an ethnonationalist agenda by politicising the issues of its kin abroad. The interview data suggested that the Hungarian government may have deliberately politicised the issue of Hungarians in Ukraine to maintain its popularity. While this could be the case, it does not deny the importance of Hungarians abroad in Hungary's domestic political discourse in general, regardless of which political force is in power, which can be explained by the fact that the external kin occupies an important place in the state's modern national history, partially due to the historical trauma it has been through.

Although it was initially Romania that had strained relations with Ukraine before 2014, Hungary's and Romania's relations with Russia and the EU and NATO seemed to have influenced their decision whether to escalate the minority issue or maintain good relations with Ukraine. Hungary, putting the issue of external kin high on its domestic agenda and maintaining friendly relations with Russia, chose to escalate the issue of Hungarians in Transcarpathia, as it felt like it would not gain anything from preserving good relations with Ukraine and thus "sacrificing" its kin-minority. Conversely, Romania, where the issue of external kin has not been politicised for domestic reasons (the presence of a large Hungarian minority, political instability) and where Russia is perceived as one of the biggest security threats, chose to de-escalate the dispute over the education law not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine as one of its strategic partners in countering Russia. The states' relations with the EU and NATO also played a role, as unlike Hungary, Romania was very careful about causing bilateral disputes over minority issues not to damage its image as a "good member" of the EU and NATO[9].

3.3.2.2. "Minority" level: Hungarians and Romanians in Ukraine

In paragraph 3.2.2.2 secondary data was reviewed and analysed to answer research question II, more specifically why the Hungarians and Romanians in Ukraine reacted differently to the policy change in Ukraine. For this, MSSD method was used, where the two national minorities were compared between each other against certain criteria. Given the analysis conducted, the table of comparison was completed as follows:

	Hungarian minority	**Romanian minority**
Ethnopolitical situation	similar	similar
Size	similar	similar
Ethnopolitical resources		
material	similar	similar
social	different	different
political	different	different
normative-discursive	similar	similar
Identity	similar	similar
Relations w/ the host state	different	different
Relations w/ the kin-state	different	different
Outcome – reaction to the policy change	hostile	not hostile

Secondary literature analysis demonstrated that Romanians and Hungarians in Ukraine share many similarities when it comes to the ethnopolitical situation, size, identity, and material and normative-discursive ethnopolitical resources. However, they differ considerably when it comes to their social and political resources, as well as the relations with the host-state and kin-

[9] Although Romania's stance regarding the Vlach minority in Serbia suggests otherwise, it should be noted that in this particular case Romania's willingness to maintain its image as a "good member" of the EU and NATO was rather an additional factor which has formed its reaction to the legislation change in Ukraine.

states. Although both national minorities seem quite cohesive and consolidated, the Romanians appear to be more integrated into Ukrainian society, given various survey data. The Hungarians are better organised politically and seem to have closer ties with their kin-state, whereas Romanians are less close to their kin-state and are more satisfied with the Ukrainian state.

In this paragraph the data collected from the expert interviews will be used to either confirm the conclusions above or modify them by adding new factors and/or explanations. In the second part of their interview the experts were asked about the Hungarian and Romanian minorities in Ukraine, in particular about their ethnopolitical resources, identity, and their relations with Ukraine and their kin-states.

Regarding their **social** resources, more than half of the respondents agreed that Romanians in Ukraine are more integrated compared to the Hungarians, and thus are less fearful of new policies aiming at Ukrainisation:

UKR: *"I agree that Romanians are more integrated. They feel the threat of assimilation and disappearance much less – there are more of them [Romania's population], and there's no such thing as "national policy", there is no history of cultural isolation in Europe, according to which you're first Germanised, then Ukrainianised, etc."*

HUN 1: *"Hungarians are quite segregated because they only speak Hungarian which is partly their fault and partly the responsibility of the Ukrainian government. Hungarians fear that the Ukrainian government wants to assimilate them, they don't consider the education and language laws as integration."*

HUN 2: *"Yes, Hungarians in Transcarpathia are definitely less integrated or assimilated."*

ROM 2: *"The Romanian minority is quite well integrated – that's what our study showed in 2016 and 2019. They care about Ukraine – that's for sure."*

HUN 2 and ROM 3 also argued that Hungarians are less integrated because they were part of the Hungarian modern nation for some time, and when they happened to be live in neighbouring states they had to learn to resist any attempts at assimilation or integration:

HUN 2: "*I don't know the level of integration of Romanians, but what really matters is basically the former state – the period of the formation and institutionalisation of the modern Hungarian nation basically after 1848 and then in the Hungarian-Austrian monarchy – and after 1920 they already had a strong sense of identity, and it was absolutely normal that after they became a minority, they preserved this identity. In the case of Romanians in Ukraine there was no framework in which their identity was institutionalised (these are the language in which you're educated, the literature you read, the history you learn, the anniversaries, the anthem). Hungarians in the late 19th century went through this stage! This is the main explanation why people are not willing to assimilate with the majority population."*

ROM 3: *"The time of belonging to the kin-state in the modern period should be underlined – in the last two hundred years Romanians in Ukraine experienced little belonging to Romania, in the case of Hungarians it was much longer."*

Although the respondents were unclear about why Romanians in Ukraine did not experience the "institutionalisation of their identity", such suggestions could be an avenue for further research. This is also in line with what Csergő and Goldgeier meant by "being part of the kin-state's national story" which was discussed in earlier paragraphs.

With regards to their **political resources,** all the respondents agreed that Hungarians in Ukraine are much better organised politically due to the presence of two ethnic Hungarian parties and a broad kin-state support:

UKR: *"I agree, Bucharest doesn't provide political support to its community – its support is more at a cultural, economic level, unlike in Hungary where KMKSZ is an official partner of Fidesz, where the parties hold regular meetings, pay visits etc."*

HUN 2: *"Romanians in Ukraine don't have a powerful political organisation that would promote their interests."*

ROM 2: *"I'm not sure that the Romanian parties are often visiting the Romanian minority in Ukraine, for sure not as often as Hungary does."*

According to one of the Hungarian respondents, there is a direct connection between the level of minority organisation and the kin-state support: *"The Hungarian government will only give money if they see that the community is organised, if there is a local initiative. Perhaps that is why Romania doesn't see why it should support Romanians in Ukraine more."*

Another Hungarian expert said that the Hungarians in Ukraine would still be much better organised than the Romanians even if they did not receive broad kin-state support: *"If there wouldn't be Hungary's kin-state support, Hungarians would still be better organised than the Romanians. With Hungarian support they are 10 times better organised."*

Regarding the minorities' **normative-discursive resources,** most of the respondents agreed that both communities suffered in the past, however, they seem to no longer perceive the territorial division according to which they happened in the territory of Ukraine as unjust and traumatic:

ROM 2: *"History is history, but it's not that much of a matter today – there are more pressing issues".*

HUN 2: *"I never felt the Trianon trauma as a Hungarian in Romania, for example. And then I realised that probably the Trianon trauma is only felt in Hungary, i.e. in "the body that remained."*

HUN 1, however, emphasised that while historical "traumas" may be less important now, Hungarians in Ukraine have experienced other "traumas" since Ukraine's independence: "*...the political system is very unstable and anything could happen, so they are very cautious about giving up their language rights, education system, political parties."*

In terms of the communities' **relations with the host state**, Myra Waterbury raised the issue of minority grievances and emphasised the lack of trust to the Ukrainian government on the part of the Hungarians: *"There has been a sense that the areas with Hungarians have been sort of economically, institutionally ignored. This [the reaction to the law] may be the frustration that their grievances have not been taken seriously. In fact, were those grievances about the language law or a long history of feeling undeserved, forgotten?".* This corresponds to the survey data mentioned in the previous paragraph, where Hungarians do not trust the Ukrainian authorities and are dissatisfied with their policies. According to the experts, the reason why the Romanians did not react that strongly could lie in their **relations with the kin-state:**

Myra Waterbury: *"One reason why Romanians in Ukraine didn't go quite as far was because they didn't have the same audience in Bucharest for that."*

HUN 2: *"The criticism on the part of the Romanian community might have died down because it saw that such reaction would not be supported in Romania. In the meantime, Hungarians saw that Hungary protects them, represents their interests, while Romanians didn't have such support."*

HUN 2 also emphasised the importance of ties with the kin-state: *"The ties the Hungarians in Ukraine have with Hungary are impressive – sports competitions, exchanges – this makes them feel recognised, form connections. This matters a lot. Romanians abroad have never had relations with Romania as strong. Even today not many Romanians want to move to Romania, they don't see it as a country with a lot of opportunities."* The expert also added that the minority community could survive *"only if they have institutions and a dense net of ties"*. This is perhaps one of the most important insights when it comes to comparing the two minorities in the field of political resources and relations with their kin-states.

Conclusion

The interview data largely supported the conclusions made in paragraph 3.2.2.2: Romanians and Hungarians in Ukraine share many similarities when it comes to the ethnopolitical situation, size, identity, and material and normative-discursive ethnopolitical resources; however, they differ considerably when it comes to their social and political resources, as well as the relations with the host-state and kin-states.

According to most of the respondents, the fact that Romanians are more integrated into the Ukrainian society than Hungarians makes them less fearful of new policies aiming at Ukrainisation, while the reason for the Hungarians' lack of integration could be them having been part of the modern Hungarian nation for a long time and therefore the need to resist any attempts at assimilation or integration when they happened to be outside the Hungarian state. All the experts agreed that Hungarians in Ukraine demonstrate better political organisation, since they have two registered political parties and benefit from a broad kin-state support. One of the Hungarian experts, however, referring to the "part of the modern nation" argument, argued that the Hungarians would still be much more organised than the Romanians, had this support not been provided. Most of the respondents agreed that none of the communities nowadays perceives the territorial division according to which they happened in the territory of Ukraine as unjust and traumatic, though it was emphasised that the Hungarians are still cautious about their rights, given the frequent change of governments in Ukraine over the past years. The Hungarians' lack of trust to the Ukrainian government and the fear of assimilation combined with its close ties with its kin-state Hungary contributed to its harsh reaction to the education law, although this may have been a general outrage by Ukraine's policies in the region over the last decades. The Romanians' integration into Ukrainian society meant that they were less concerned about the newly passed law, while the absence of strong ties with the Romanian state and the lack of political organisation meant that those who were indeed dissatisfied could not go as far in expressing their concerns.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The two research questions posed at the beginning of this research were answered using secondary and primary data, which was collected through the expert interviews conducted for the purposes of this research, and the two preliminary arguments were supported and extended.

2. With regards to the research question I "What triggered the crisis in the relations between Ukraine, on the one side, and Hungary and the Hungarian minority, on the other, and thus the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" after 2014?" the following conclusions were made:

- Russia's aggression led to the securitisation of the "Russian triadic nexus", which in turn made Ukraine start an active nation-building process to strengthen and protect the Ukrainian identity and language. The need to integrate the minorities and eliminate their segregation was part of such a nation-building strategy.

- Conducting nation-building policies meant that education and language legislation had to be changed, thus, the policy with regards to national minorities changed.

- The change of policy meant that Ukraine became a "nationalising state" and that certain rights of national minorities got limited. Hungary as a kin-state, feeling the need to advocate for the rights of its kin minority and fearing that if it remained silent this would lead to further limitation of the minority rights, was extremely critical about Ukraine's education law. Unmet expectations, the lack of communication and information, traumatic history and the instrumentalisation of minority issues by both sides led to the securitisation of the "Hungarian triadic nexus" and a stalemate in relations between Hungary and the Hungarian minority on the one side and Ukraine – on the other.

3. Both secondary and primary data demonstrated that Hungary and Romania share many similarities when it comes to their kin-state policies: they have similar compatriot laws which aim at preserving and promoting their identity, language, and culture in areas where their kin-minorities reside, they established a developed institutional framework to help achieve such goals, both of them have granted citizenship as well as financial support to their external kins. Although Romania's financial support to Romanians in Ukraine is less than that of Hungary to Hungarians in Ukraine, no evidence was found that this could account for the difference in their reactions. Like Budapest, Bucharest presents itself as a kin-state in the international arena, however, for domestic reasons, namely the presence of a large Hungarian minority, its international stance is less active. The two states differ considerably when it comes to their domestic and foreign policies, which explains their different reactions to Ukraine's education law. Hungary, putting the issue of external kin high on its domestic agenda and maintaining friendly relations with Russia, chose to escalate the issue of Hungarians in Transcarpathia, as it felt that it would not gain anything from preserving good relations with Ukraine and thus "sacrificing" its kin-minority. Conversely, Romania, where the issue of external kin has not been politicised for domestic reasons (the presence of a large Hungarian minority, political instability) and where Russia is perceived as one of the biggest security threats, chose to de-escalate the dispute over the education law not to deteriorate its relations with Ukraine as one of its strategic partners in countering Russia. The states' relations with the EU and NATO also played a role, as unlike Hungary, Romania was very careful about causing

bilateral disputes over minority issues not to damage its image as a "good member" of the EU and NATO.

3. The interview and secondary data showed that Romanians and Hungarians in Ukraine share many similarities when it comes to the ethnopolitical situation, size, identity, and material and normative-discursive ethnopolitical resources, but differ considerably when it comes to their social and political resources, as well as the relations with the host-state and kin-states. The Hungarians' lack of trust toward and the fear of assimilation combined with its close ties with its kin-state Hungary contributed to its harsh reaction to the education law, although this may have also been a general outrage by Ukraine's policies in the region over the last decades. The higher level of Romanians' integration into Ukrainian society meant that most of them were less concerned about the newly passed law, while the absence of strong ties with the Romanian state and the lack of political organisation meant that those who were indeed dissatisfied could not go as far in expressing their concerns.

4. The findings also contribute to a broader theoretical framework on the relations between a "nationalising" state, on one side, and a national minority and its kin-state – on the other. Although literature normally draws on such kin-state policies as compatriot laws, passportisation, financial support etc. to understand the behaviour and activities of a particular kin-state, this research has demonstrated that states having similar kin-state policies can react differently to the developments in a "nationalising" state. Domestic and foreign policy factors appear to be crucial in understanding whether a kin-state will choose to advocate for the rights of its kin abroad or not. Meanwhile, the minority population has to be socially and politically organised and maintain close ties with the kin-state to be able to express its concerns and grievances and protect its identity, language and culture.

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APPENDIX

The list of questions asked during the interviews is as follows:

1.	What made the Ukrainian government pass the Law on Education in 2017 and make the Ukrainian language the language of education at all levels?
2.	When the Law was just passed in September 2017, and Kyiv responding to criticism explained that the Law would be beneficial for the minorities and open them a lot of opportunities as most of them couldn't speak Ukrainian well enough to pass the exams and enter a Ukrainian university. Why weren't those arguments convincing to Budapest?
3.	When Budapest persisted with its harsh criticism and kept blocking the Ukraine-NATO summits, many Ukrainian politicians and sometimes experts would seriously talk about the so-called "Donbas scenario", i.e. Hungary annexing Transcarpathia. Why do you think this was the case?
4.	Both Hungary and Romania were quite critical about the education law at the beginning. However, very soon Bucharest accepted the law and agreed to wait for the recommendations of the Venice commission. Bucharest could have joined Budapest in its criticism and put Kyiv under pressure but it chose not to. Why do you think that was the case?
5.	When the Venice recommendations were out, Bucharest accepted them and agreed to cooperate with Kyiv, even though the ethnic Romanians in Ukraine were rather disappointed with this decision. How would you explain such a move?
6.	Romania is a kin-state, it conducts kin-state policies with regards to Romanians in Ukraine (compatriot laws, passportisation, promotes the Romanian language there etc.), which is very similar to what Hungary does as a kin-state in Transcarpathia. Is there anything that makes them different as kin-states and could potentially explain the difference in their reaction (economic assistance, stance in the international arena, domestic politics, relations with Ukraine, etc.)?
7.	The Romanian minority in Ukraine is almost the same in size as the Hungarian one, both are national minorities and not indigenous people, both happened to be in the territory of Ukraine as a result of territorial division. When the Venice commission recommendations were out and Bucharest accepted them, although the Romanians in Ukraine were not happy with it, they accepted this fact too and did not criticise Kyiv that much afterwards. The case of the Hungarians in Transcarpathia was completely opposite. Is there anything that makes them different as national minorities and could potentially explain the difference in their reaction (cohesion, political organization, perception of history, etc)?
8.	Viktor Orban even before the recommendations of the Venice commission were published stated that he didn't care if the education law complied with the CoE standards and that Hungary would still demand the change in the legislation. How would you explain such a reaction?
9.	Hungary is a kin-state, it conducts kin-state policies in Transcarpathia (compatriot laws, passportisation, promotes the Hungarian language there etc.), which is very

	similar to what Romania does as a kin-state with regards to ethnic Romanians in Ukraine. Is there anything that makes them different as kin-states and could potentially explain the difference in their reaction (economic assistance, stance in the international arena, domestic politics, relations with Ukraine, etc.)?
10.	The Hungarian minority in Ukraine is almost the same in size as the Romanian one, both are minorities and not indigenous people, both happened to be in the territory of Ukraine as a result of territorial division. When the Venice commission recommendations were out, both Budapest and the Hungarians in Transcarpathia were still outraged and demanded that the legislation is changed. The case of Romanians in Ukraine was completely the opposite – although they were not very happy with it, they still accepted the situation. Is there anything that makes Hungarians and Romanians different as national minorities and could potentially explain the difference in their reaction (cohesion, political organization, perception of history, etc)?