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Master's Thesis

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THE EFFECT OF MODERNIZATION ON THE
REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT
-
A CASE STUDY OF ESTONIA

Supervisor: Raili Marling, PhD

Tartu 2013

I have written this Master's thesis independently.

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ABSTRACT

This study aims at analyzing the issue of under-representation of women in the Estonian parliament (*Riigikogu*) with the help of Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel's approach of modernization. The analysis of the situation in Estonia, as a unique case makes it possible to test the theory in use. The empirical analysis consists mainly of data derived from semi-structured interviews with experts in the field of gender equality in Estonia. As Estonia has yet to emphasize the importance of gender equality, today, women are still highly under-represented in the *Riigikogu*. The main results show that while the scholars claim that cultural barriers constitute the main hurdle for women to enter the political sphere, in the case of Estonia, the socioeconomic situation and institutional barriers clearly keep women from the possibility to participate in politics. Further, instead of religion as main cultural influence, in Estonia the cultural heritage is largely defined by the society's Soviet past. The overall conclusions state that while the theory at use seemed to be applicable universally, in the case of Estonia it cannot be applied fully, as crucial influences are not taken into account by the theory.

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List of Abbreviations

CEE	Central Eastern European
EU	European Union
EVS	European Value Survey
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
WVS	World Value Survey

INTRODUCTION

Female representation in legislative authorities is a topic that has deservedly garnered increased attention over the last few years. Even today, in 2013, while the European population is almost equally divided between the two sexes, only 23.2% of parliamentarians are female (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2013). This number is a clear indicator of the inequality in European governments as it is essential for the legislative bodies to represent all groups of society in a balanced manner. While the Nordic countries are seen as forerunners in the field of gender equality the remaining European member states are still struggling to catch up. One interesting example is the case of Estonia, where, despite of its close proximity to the aforementioned Nordic countries, gender equality, and particularly female representation in the legislative body, is far from the norm in its geographical locale.

Estonia itself has been influenced by the West via Sweden and Germany and by the East via Russia. Its past includes being a trade hub for the Hanseatic League as well as serving as a puppet state for the Soviet Union. However, after 1991 Estonia has strongly sought to associate itself with the West. All these past and present influences can be seen in the melange that is Estonia. In terms of gender equality, the Western influences advocating equal standing between the sexes seems to have been overshadowed by the will to distance Estonia from its Soviet past, where gender equality was enforced by an oppressive state. Therefore, any measures, internal or EU-wide, to implement more gender equality may yield to criticism of being Soviet-minded a common misunderstanding. The Estonian idea of equality seems to be rooted in the neo-liberal approach emphasizing individualism.

Despite of the implementation of the required rules and regulations concerning gender equality from the *aquis communautaire* upon joining the EU, to the adopting of gender equality action plans from other international organizations such as the Beijing Platform, Estonia has yet to promote this issue as a key concern for the country. Hence, in terms of legal requirements, Estonia has so far fulfilled the requirements. However, those laws and regulations did not change the perception and emphasis of gender equality in terms of attitudes of the society. Therefore, even though it seems as if gender equality should be established, the reality is contradict-

ing. Therefore, the large gender pay gap and the low percentage of female members in the *Riigikogu* (Estonian parliament) can be seen as indicators of gender inequality in Estonia. While Estonia implemented the Gender Equality Act on the day of its 2004 accession to the EU and adopted a wider Equal Treatment Act in 2009, the cultural aspects such as the stereotypes and deeply rooted negative perception of gender equality have yet to change. In the case of Estonia, however, it is difficult to clearly identify all of the obstacles that women face. Although Estonia is one of the least religious countries in the world, it seems that traditional values, and by extension traditional gender roles, influence the society's attitude towards gender equality and female political representatives. This topic is in need of additional research to shed more light on why women in Estonia continue to be under-represented in the legislative body (Putzi, 2008; Marling, 2011).

One possible explanation for the under-representation of women in parliaments is given by scholars Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel in their joint paper 'Gender Equality and Democracy' (2002). Together they developed a universal theory that claims that the percentage of women in parliament increases on the basis of a shift from survival values towards self-expression values. The theory outlines that societies based in self-expression values privilege freedom, tolerance, trust, openness and equality while societies based on survival values emphasize economic stability and security. The shift towards self-expression values is claimed to occur through economic development. However, the cultural heritage of a society, mainly defined by a society's religion, plays a crucial role throughout the entire transition. Furthermore, Inglehart and Norris emphasize in a different publication that structural, institutional and cultural barriers hinder the participation of women in the political sphere (2003). With a long-standing good reputation in the field of research concerning modernization and value change, Inglehart's approach to modernization is not burdened by extreme complexity, thus it can be used as an interesting yet understandable reference-point. As Inglehart is one of the most cited scholars in his field (specifically when it comes to his theory of modernization), the unique case of Estonia offers a great opportunity to not only test his approach, but also to see whether the theory can be applied on a micro level. When applying the key concepts of Inglehart's theory to the case of Estonia it seems that the evidence contradicts his predictions rather than supports them.

Therefore, the main **aim of this thesis** is to analyze how Inglehart's approach to the under-representation of women in parliaments can be applied to the case of Estonia and whether the theory can explain the situation in Estonia. More precisely, if economic development and the influence of Estonia's cultural heritage

triggers a shift from survival to self-expression values, then the percentage of female representatives in parliament should increase. To accurately assess the theory, the impact of the two main influences shaping the discussion of gender equality and women in parliament in Estonia, namely the Soviet past and the EU present, have to be identified, especially when analyzing the existing barriers to female participation in politics. With that in mind, in addition to assessing economic development, the political and electoral systems have to be taken into account as well. In terms of cultural heritage, Estonia's religious background and its past are of particular importance when analyzing attitudes towards women in the political sphere.

Despite gender equality not being a prominent topic in the political sphere in Estonia, the subject has caught the attention of some scholars. Research about gender equality as it relates to Estonia has increased over the last few years, however, most of the publications are written in Estonian. With this in mind, this thesis also aims to contribute to the availability of research to the international audience while combining existing publications with new findings. In the field of women in the political sphere, only a few scholars have done research on the case of Estonia. To contribute to this topic, the empirical aspect of this thesis consists of semi-structured interviews with experts representing different institutions and organizations in Estonia. A total of 12 interviews were held with representatives and former members of the *Sotsiaalministeerium*, independent advisers for the Estonian government, scholars from the Tallinn University, and representatives from women's organizations and political women's groups. The findings from those interviews, along with the available literature, and reports from the Estonian government and the European Union were analyzed in order to test Inglehart's theoretical approach to female under-representation.

The thesis will introduce the theory used in the analysis in the first chapter. In order to put Inglehart's approach of modernization in context, different approaches of modernization are briefly introduced. The second section is concerned with the theoretical approach of Inglehart, Norris and Welzel. Overall, in numerous publications, these three scholars defined a revised modernization theory, claiming that economic development and the cultural heritage influence a society's value set. Particularly, the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, and further to post-industrial, triggers a value change on two dimensions: the traditional/secular-rational value dimension and the survival/self-expression value dimension. In terms of female representation in legislative bodies, the scholars define a more precise theory predicting that the triggered value change towards self-expression values on the second dimension will increase the percentage of women in parliaments. Therefore, the different

components and concepts of the theory were defined and analyzed individually. The third section introduces the concept of gender equality according to Inglehart and his co-authors, and in particular the influence and impact of attitudes towards both gender equality and female participation in the political arena. As this thesis is concerned with the case of a post-Communist society, the fourth section gives insight into the unique situation of the Central Eastern European societies in terms of Inglehart's approach. Finally, the first chapter is concluded by an overview of critique of the theory from other scholars and comments from the author of the thesis.

The second chapter of the thesis consists of the methodological framework. First, the research framework, along with the research questions and further study questions, is outlined. Next, the empirical data collection methods are introduced. As stated above, the thesis mainly consists of data derived from the expert interviews conducted by the author. Hence, the methodological section describes the process of data collection. This chapter is concluded by stating possible problems with the research framework and outlining possible solutions.

After defining the theoretical and methodological approaches, the third chapter presents the case study of Estonia. Data derived from the expert interviews and various reports and publications from the Estonian government and the European Union form the basis of the discussion. In order to answer the posed research questions, Estonia is firstly categorized according to Inglehart's groups of state and society. Second, Estonia's value set is analyzed. With data derived from Inglehart's publications and the Eurobarometer surveys, Estonia's position on the two value dimensions is estimated. The third section analyzes gender equality in Estonia, in terms of legislations and attitudes. A more specific analysis of female representation in Estonia is discussed in the fourth section. The overall situation is analyzed first and the three sets of barriers, namely structural, institutional and cultural are analyzed with the data at hand, second. The fifth section then answers the posed research question of whether and how Inglehart's theoretical approach can be applied to the case of Estonia.

The thesis is brought to a close by summarizing the research and stating general conclusions about the participation of women in the Estonian political sphere.

1 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework which will be applied in the main analysis. The theory that will be used throughout this thesis was developed by three scholars, Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel. These scholars have published numerous pieces based on the World Value Survey. Those publications are mainly concerned with the impact of modernization on values and the related cultural shifts. In ‘Gender Equality and Democracy’ published in 2002, which forms the basis of the present thesis, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel quantitatively trace the relationships between modernization factors and cultural factors on the percentage of women in the lower house of parliaments, the level of democracy as well as to survival/self-expression values. Based on their statistical findings, the scholars formulate their theory in the conclusion of the publication. This theory, which is used as the theoretical basis of the thesis, states that economic development together with a society’s cultural heritage, influences a societal shift from survival to self-expression values. This change is seen as the cause of a higher percentage of women in parliament, as well as the rise of democratic institutions.

The theoretical chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 1.1, the concept of the modernization theory is introduced. Section 1.2 will explain the theory developed by Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel (2002) in more detail. Ingleharts’ perception of gender equality is analyzed in Section 1.3, with a focus on political participation. In Section 1.4, the unique situation of the post-Communist Central Eastern European societies is explained. Finally in Section 1.5 criticisms of the theory will be analyzed.

1.1 Modernization Theories

The beginnings of modernization theories can be traced back to the 1960's. These theories were mainly used to analyze the different development stages of countries through industrialization and technological development. However, modernization is not simply a process of economic change, but it also includes changes in “traditional attitudes, values, and institutions” (Andersen & Taylor, 2010, p. 217). Modernization theories evolved largely in response to Weber's assumption that “cultural changes continuously and autonomously affect societies” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 109), since according to Weber, the term ‘hard-working’ is based on values given through religion, namely Protestantism. Weber indicates that hard-working societies, especially ones based on Protestant values, benefit from economic development, whereas societies that lack such values are poor, not only economically, but also in terms of attitudes and institutions (Andersen & Taylor, 2010, p. 218). Thus, it is clear that the formation of modernization theory was based on Western developments. While societies transform from traditional to modern, “modernization is a total social process associated with (or subsuming) economic development in terms of the preconditions, concomitants, and consequences of the latter” (Bernstein, 1971, p. 141).

Modernization is a widely discussed topic, especially in terms of value and culture changes. In the past, two rivaling theories were widely used: Marx's communist modernization theory and Smith's capitalist modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 16-17; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33). While Marx claims that societal value change is a reaction to transition in socioeconomics, Smith claims the exact opposite (Inozemtsev & Dutkiewicz, 2012, p. 123-124). In contrast, Inglehart and Welzel claim in their revised modernization theory that economic development is the driving force in value changes in a society, its culture and its politics. More precisely, they state that “[m]odernization is evolving into a process of human development, in which socioeconomic development brings cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality, and democracy increasingly likely, giving rise to a new type of society that promotes human emancipation on many fronts” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 1-2).

1.2 Inglehart's Modernization Theory

This section introduces Inglehart and Welzel's revised modernization theory. As claimed above, economic development is the driving force in value change in society, culture and politics. Moreover, modernization is strongly connected with industrialization and the movement towards a knowledge based society. Hence, "[o]nce set in motion, it tends to penetrate all aspects of life, bringing occupational specialization, urbanization, rising educational levels, rising life expectancy, and rapid economic growth" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33). Inglehart emphasizes that in his opinion, modernization does not equate to Westernization, especially since Western societies are not the only societies leading modernization in today's world. Additionally, Inglehart and Welzel argue that the process of cultural modernization is not linear or irreversible, but rather path dependent and predictable (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 16-17, 46-47; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 33).

Overall, modernization strongly effects cultural changes within a society. First, the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial society triggers a shift from traditional to secular-rational values as well as the introduction of bureaucratization and secularization. And second, the transition to a post-industrial society with changes from survival to self-expression values. Inglehart argues that most post-industrial societies at the same time are functioning democracies. While Inglehart and Welzel claim that

[d]emocracy is based on the idea that all human beings are valuable, regardless of biological characteristics such as race and sex [...] The idea of democracy aims at empowering people as if societies were made through a social contract between equals, all of whom have the same potential for making autonomous and responsible choices [...] Thus, any discrimination based on race or sex conflicts with the democratic idea of human equality (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 272),

therefore self-expression values support individual autonomy, tolerance and emancipation, especially in terms of equality. Hence, the scholars implicate that the process of modernization with the shift towards emphasizing self-expression values enhances gender equality. Furthermore, the emergence of the welfare state also plays a major role, as it, for example, "takes on caretaking responsibilities, reducing the risk of ageing, sickness, unemployment, and homelessness" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 278). This results in the transformation of the traditional family structure and consequently traditional gender roles. The main driving force is indicated to be economic development, which triggers the shift from agrarian to industrial and then

to post-industrial societies. Further, the influence of the opinions of political leaders of a society and the society’s history itself impact the modernization process. Religion is another important factor that shapes the transition. Whereas “[a] society’s cultural tradition has much stronger impact on traditional/secular-rational values” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 76), the modernization process has a stronger impact on the survival/self-expression values amongst societies (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 323; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 10-11; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 20-21, 25, 277; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36-37).




Figure 1.1: Factors conducive to women’s representation in parliament and democratic institutions (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 342).

Inglehart, Norris and Welzel have developed a theory (see Figure 1.1) explaining the impact of modernization (specifically economic development) on the proportion of women in parliament as well as on the level of democracy and democratic institutions. While first predicting that democracy is responsible for an increase in the percentage of women in parliament, the scholars detect that both are rather parallel developments. When economic development leads to change in a society’s culture, as indicated above, the emphasis of self-expression values, and therefore gender equality, becomes stronger. The influence on a society’s culture of gender equality and values in this case, is measured by asking the question: ‘Do men make better politicians than women?’ Societies with a higher percentage of disagreement with that statement record higher proportions of women in parliament. Further-

more, a society's religious beliefs influences the attitudes towards gender equality and women in political positions. As Inglehart points out, Protestant countries for example have the highest proportions of women in parliament, followed by Catholic countries (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 323-328).

As the definition given by the scholars shows, democracy includes equality amongst sexes. However, surprisingly, neither is democracy a guarantee for a higher proportion of women in parliament, nor does democracy directly impact it (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 342). Both, democratic institutions as well as the proportion of women in parliament are affected by the change from survival to self-expression values and not vice versa. This causal link was established mainly through the examination of the post-Soviet societies. While those societies were quickly introduced to democracy and democratic institutions, the transition from survival to self-expression values did not automatically follow. The scholars claim that it seems to be a result of the economic instability and physical insecurity. Hence, as the emphasis shifts from survival towards self-expression values the scholars indicate an increase in the proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 328-329, 338, 342). In order to clarify Inglehart's hypotheses, the following sections give insights into the single concepts used throughout his theoretical framework.

The Two Value Dimensions – As indicated before, Inglehart claims that through modernization, value changes take place in two shifts: first from religious to rational-secular values through industrialization, and second from survival to self-expression values through post-industrialization. Therefore both dimensions will be shortly introduced (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36).

Traditional societies, which tend to be agrarian, are characterized by a strong emphasis on religion. Their value set is strongly based on authoritarian and traditional values. Due to strong religious influence, women have limited rights to decide over their own body, therefore for example abortion is strictly rejected. In addition, such societies rank fairly high on national pride. As industrialization increased the level of productivity, societies became less dependent on nature, while further introducing "bureaucratization, hierarchy, [and] centralization of authority" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36). Hence, with the invention of electricity and technology, people started to gain more interest in rational beliefs, decreasing the dependency on theological explanations. Besides more secular values, materialistic interests also increased, which lead to an emphasis on technical and mechanical power. This value dimension is mainly influenced by the cultural heritage and traditions of a given

society (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 26-27, 76; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 39) ¹




Figure 1.2: Locations of 70 Societies on two dimensions of cross-cultural variation. The scales on each axis indicate the country's factor scores on the given dimension. World Values Surveys, 1990–1991 and 1995–1998 (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 331).

Through modernization, industrial societies transition into post-industrial societies. Consequently, as the emphasis is shifted from an industrial workforce to a service and knowledge-based workforce, the society's values change as well. Post-industrial societies set priorities on knowledge, freedom, emancipation, innovation as well as material possessions (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 27-28). While economic and physical security is important to industrial societies, the shift towards "self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, participation in decision making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and growing tolerance

¹For a precise list indicating the difference between traditional and rational-secular values, please see Table A.1 in Appendix 1

of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 7). Such transformation increases interpersonal trust and individual freedom, leading to the increase of political activism in a society’s value set (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 343; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 39) ².




Figure 1.3: Locations of 53 Societies on global cultural map in 2005-2007 (Inglehart & Welzel, 2010, p. 554).

While Figure 1.2 (on page 19) shows 70 societies on the two value dimensions: traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression, Figure 1.3 pictures a more recent cultural map. Protestant societies rank high on secular-rational as well as self-expression values, showing that those societies have and are post-industrial societies, while Catholic countries rank lower on both dimensions. Crucially for the present thesis, Ex-Communist and Baltic societies rank high on the secular-rational values while showing very low self-expression values. Inglehart indicates that this is largely due to past oppression as well as to the quick introduction of democracy after 1991. Figure 1.4 ³ (on page 21) shows how 38 societies have shifted over time.

²For a precise list indicating the difference between survival and self-expression values, please see Table A.2 in Appendix 1

³Note: The 38 countries included are those for which time-series data are available from the

Most countries show movement towards secular-rational and self-expression values. However, many ex-communist societies have shown a shift towards survival, as well as some have moved towards traditional values during the early transition period, due to the harsh collapse of the Soviet Union.




Figure 1.4: Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural Variation for 38 Societies (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 40).

Types of Societies – In order to detect modernization and transition, societies have to be grouped into different categories. The development of societies is internationally measured by the Human Development Index⁴, produced by the United Nations Development Program from 1998:

earliest to the latest time points in the World Values Surveys.

⁴The United National Development Program produces annually the Human Development Index, which is a 100-point scale of societal modernization, comprised of the level of knowledge, health, and the standard of living (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 21), www.undp.org, www.hdr.undp.org

- Post-industrial societies: HDI score over .900 and a mean per capita GDP of \$29,585
- Industrial societies: HDI score from .740 to .899 and a mean per capita GDP of \$6,314
- Agrarian societies: HDI score of .739 or below and a mean per capita GDP of \$1,098 (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 21-22).

However, modernization does not automatically lead to democracy, but rather initiates beneficial conditions for the emergence and survival of democracy throughout the post-industrial phase (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 36-37). Therefore, state-types also need to be categorized, with the help of the Gastil Index⁵, which is a seven-point scale that is commonly used by the Freedom House:

- Older democracies: Freedom House rating 5.5 to 7.0, minimum of 20 years continuous democracy
- Newer democracies: Freedom House rating 5.5 to 7.0, less than 20 years continuous democracy
- Semi-democracies: Freedom House rating 3.5 to 5.5, less than 20 years continuous democracy (include transitional democracies)
- Non-democracies: Freedom House rating 1.0 to 3.0 (dictatorships, authoritarian states, oligarchies, monarchies) (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 23-24).

When looking at those categories as a whole, most post-industrial societies live in older democracies, while most industrial societies live in newer democracies or semi-democracies. Agrarian societies are largely seen in semi-democracies or non-democracies.

Additionally, even though the process of modernization is seen as a general trend within a society, there are differences within each society that cannot be ignored. Depending on the gender, age, educational background and other factors there are different groups in each society (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 45).

⁵Provided by Freedom House. Inglehart revised the scores, hence 7.0 is the highest degree of freedom in the political rights and civil liberties rating, and 1.0 the lowest

Economic Development – For several decades numerous scholars have claimed that economic development will decrease inequality and lead to better living conditions. However, while economic development has benefited human development, it did not affect the role and position of women in society per se. Nevertheless, “economic development is conducive to democracy insofar as it brings specific structural changes (particularly the rise of the knowledge sector) and certain cultural changes (particularly the rise of self-expression values)” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 41-42).

Through quantitative analysis, Inglehart shows that economic development is having an impact, especially as it enables women to escape the traditional gender role. Still, it is only one of several factors that play a role in gender equality and the proportion of women in parliament (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 4-5, 34-35). In order to measure and use economic development, the Real GDP/capita purchasing power parity estimates from the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme are used by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 327).

Cultural Heritage – Cultural heritage, as indicated by Inglehart, is mainly comprised of a society’s religious traditions, as well as cultural legacies and major events in its past. “Belief systems have a remarkable durability and resilience. While values can and do change, they continue to reflect a society’s historical heritage” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 20). However, modernization continuously has an effect on a society’s cultural value set. Through the increase in educational levels (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 49-51; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 20), rational values are gaining in importance while “becoming familiar with scientific thought and humanistic ideals” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 38).

As secularization mostly accompanies modernization, the importance of gender equality can be detected. Even though the role of religion is declining, it will not vanish completely. In terms of attitudes towards gender equality and women in politics, religion does have an impact. Leaving other factors aside, in general, Protestant countries show the highest percentage of acceptance of women in politics, while Catholic and Orthodox countries lie in between Protestant and Islamic societies (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 327-328; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 22; Inglehart & Welzel, 2009, p. 37).

Furthermore, shifts towards sexual liberalization can be seen due to secularization. Sexual liberation includes concepts such as tolerance of abortion, divorce, homosexuality, as well as prostitution. Indeed, while agrarian and industrial societies base their attitudes towards gender equality mainly on religious and moral values, post-industrial societies, especially amongst the younger generations, give rise to more




Figure 1.5: Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, and Historically Communist Cultural Zones in Relation to Two Dimensions of Cross-Cultural Variation (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 35).

liberal and secular values and perceptions (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 59, 71).

Inglehart has categorized countries according to their cultural beliefs, as shown in Figure 1.5. He argues that the cultural zones he has outlined are rather persistent (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 19). While the historically communist countries rank very high on secular-rational values, they seem not to have shifted towards self-expression values. On the other hand, Protestant countries rank high on secular-rational values as well as on self-expression values, while African and South Asian societies rank low on both dimensions.

1.3 Gender Equality according to Inglehart

Throughout Inglehart's analysis, he never explicitly defines what gender equality really is. Nevertheless, he makes use of a Gender Equality Scale derived from five items from the World Value Survey and the European Value Survey. The five items include:

- “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.”
- “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”
- “A university education is more important for a boy than a girl”
- “Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?”
- “If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 31).

On the basis of the items above, we can say that Inglehart sees the main criteria of gender equality to be equal political participation, equal right to occupation and education, and the right to decide over one's own body. Furthermore, Kristi Andersen indicates in her book review, that “equal pay for equal work, reproductive rights, equal educational and employment opportunities, and women's participation in positions of authority” (Andersen, 2005, p. 330) belong to Inglehart's categorization of gender equality. Additionally, a “culture of gender equality” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 8) opens the gates for a successful implementation and execution of given legal and theoretical strategies to enhance gender equality in practice.

Inglehart's perception of gender equality and non-discrimination is largely comparable to official definitions of gender equality. The European Union introduced the concept of gender equality as a fundamental right with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. From then, several amendments and additions have been made to gender equality in legal terms. Overall, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union indicates in Article 23 that “Equality between women and men must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay. The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex” (European Commission - Justice, 2011, p. 4). Furthermore, the Council of Europe states that “Gender equality means an equal visibility, empowerment and participation of both sexes in all spheres of public and private life [whereas] [i]t requires the acceptance and appreciation of the

complementarity of women and men and their diverse roles in society” (Council of Europe, n.d.).

Gender equality is a rather wide concept applicable to many issues. As this thesis is dealing with the representation of women in parliament, a closer look is taken into gender equality in political participation in general. It will be shown how Inglehart and his co-scholars define certain trends universally. Further, the prediction Inglehart’s theory is stating as it concerns Central Eastern European post-Communist societies is described.

Attitudes towards Gender Equality – Through the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society women gain access to the workforce. They are entitled to education, as well as allowed to participate in the political sphere. However, gender equality gains importance primarily through the transition to post-industrialism. With the diminishing importance of muscular power in economics, and the rising emphasis on intellect, knowledge and technology, women face even less disadvantages in education, employment and political participation (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 323; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 10-11; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 25, 277).

While the attitudes towards gender equality are generally measured by the previously introduced five-item Gender Equality Scale, the political ideologies indicating and influencing the attitudes towards gender equality are measured by a ten-point scale (left=1, right=10). The left-right placement scale “allows consistent comparison within a country at different periods of time, [and] avoids the problem of coding voting preferences on a left-right scale for parties experiencing rapid change such as during the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 86). This measure is useful in showing changes among different types of societies, transitions and changes over times as well as differences within a society (e.g. generational differences).

When measuring the impact of modernization on political ideologies, the three society groups show significant differences. The gaps between the three groups are wider than the gender gap within each society itself (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 45). In agrarian and industrial societies, the traditional gender gap appears, meaning that women place themselves to the right of men and are hence seen as being more conservative. This distinct pattern is changed through gender realignment. Women in agrarian societies are more conservative because of their limited domestic roles. However, more egalitarian values emerge, increasing the importance of gender equality, when women gain access to education and work outside the home due to the modernization process. That transition influences the movement towards the

modern gender gap, where women place on the left of men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 75-79, 88-92). Furthermore, generational differences are stronger in post-industrial societies, though it has to be noted that younger generations are more egalitarian not only in post-industrial societies, but in general (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 42). Overall, this measurement is mainly used to see where the different inter-societal groups stand in terms of value changes towards emphasizing gender equality.

Gender Equality in Political Participation – In terms of political participation, generally speaking women are less involved. Even though the voting gap tends to close in post-industrial societies, parties or unions, as well as protest activism are areas dominated by men. In terms of civic activism, overall the ratio of men and women involved is rather equal. Nevertheless, a closer look shows that women are almost solely involved in unpaid volunteer work. Due to the changing values of a society shifting from agrarian to industrial and then to post-industrial, the gender gap in political activism and voting tends to get narrower, especially amongst the younger generations. Furthermore, Inglehart detects that women tend to be almost as active as men in terms of involvement in political discussions (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 101-126).

In order to represent a society fully, the elected body has to mirror all social groups in society. Consequently, since the gender gap widens tremendously when looking at women in politics, one cannot speak about adequate representation of voters if such an important group of society is underrepresented in elected offices. Even though women are rather well “mobilized at the grassroots, national, and global levels to press government agencies and nonprofit organizations” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 129), the inclusion of female voices in politics and governments is more difficult. Generally, Inglehart measures the attitudes towards women in politics according to the proportion of disagreement to the statement ‘men make better political leaders than women’ (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 325; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 127-139, 142).

Figure 1.6 (on page 28) shows the percentage of women in parliament correlated to the percentage of participants disagreeing that ‘men make better political leaders than women’. Countries that largely disagree with the statement have a higher percentage of women in parliament while societies that tend to agree with the statement show a lower number of women in parliaments.

Overall, with the help of quantitative measurements, Inglehart defines three sets of obstacles, which are responsible for the persisting gender gap and the under-




Figure 1.6: Mass attitudes towards gender equality, and women’s representation in parliament. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 276).

representation of women in parliaments. In terms of structural barriers, a higher socioeconomic level increases the proportion of female politicians. Inglehart indicates that occupation, level of education, income and factors such as childcare and social networks need to be taken into consideration for this reason. However, socioeconomic level has only allowed women more opportunities in the political sphere because they are more educated and less dependent, rather than automatically guaranteeing women a say on politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 130-131).

Another set of barriers is the institutional setting, which to a certain extent can also decrease the chances for women. Besides the level of party competition and the recruitment process, the electoral system is of importance. Thus, “far more women are commonly elected under proportional party lists than via majoritarian single-member constituencies” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 132). Additionally the implementation of institutional measures, more precisely “the use of positive discrimination or affirmative action strategies such as gender quotas” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 145), are considered to increase female representation. Especially in the process of recruiting candidates, gender quotas have been commonly used

measures to ensure balance and equality (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 322-323; Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 131-132, 145).

Cultural barriers are mainly grounded in traditional values. Societies relying on traditional attitudes towards gender equality and women in politics, have a lower proportion of women in parliament. Those attitudes particularly decrease the likelihood of women becoming candidates in an election. Additionally, traditional societies and their political leaders are less likely to accept and support female candidates. Thus, “[c]ultural attitudes may have a direct influence on whether women are come forward as candidates for office (the supply-side of the equation), and the criteria used by gate-keeper when evaluating suitable candidates (the demand-side), as well as having an indirect influence upon the overall inquisitional context, such as the adoption of gender quotas in party recruitment process” (Inglehart et al., 2002, p. 322-323). However, post-industrial societies, and especially their younger generations, are more likely to accept and support female political leaders.

Overall Inglehart concludes, with the help of multivariate analysis, that when testing the different barriers, unexpectedly only cultural barriers seem to have a noticeable effect on the proportion of women in elected offices. While the structural barriers, hence the socioeconomic status, do not seem to have an effect on the situation, after introducing control variables, Inglehart finds that “neither the type of electoral system nor the number of parties proves to be an important influence on the proportion of women in parliament” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 141).

1.4 The Unique Situations of the Post-Communist Countries

This section will give insight into the unique situations of the post-Communist Central Eastern European (CEE) societies. Even though CEE societies are often grouped together, they are not as homogeneous as might be expected. Especially since “the post-communist countries are diverse in a historical, cultural and religious sense, and there are great differences in their transition success: some had a relatively easy transition crowned by EU membership; some are still rife with conflicts and social uncertainties” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 29, 113). Nevertheless, general trends can be detected; ergo single cases will only be named on the basis of extreme difference. In general, as shown above in Figure 1.2 (on page 19), the CEE societies rank high on the first but low on the second value dimension. Hence, while being secular those societies are, at the same time, still emphasizing survival values.

Strong Emphasis on Secular-Rational Values – As Figure 1.7 (on page 31) shows, CEE societies (Eastern Ex-Communist and Western Ex-Communist societies⁶) and in general rank high on secular-rational values. The figure indicates generational differences on the first value dimension among the five types of societies. CEE societies rank highest throughout all societal groups mainly due the older generations being “subjected to powerful campaigns to eradicate religion and traditional values [and the younger ones to] economic stagnation and declining ideological fervor” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 109).

While the Communist regime tried to eradicate all kinds of religiosity, the Roman Catholic societies were the least likely of the CEE societies to have responded to secularization (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 75). More precisely, “some of post-Communist societies are [even] among the most secular societies” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 55). Nevertheless, it was found that the importance of religion grew after 1990, especially due to the fact that religion had been banned in the Soviet Union (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 25).

⁶Inglehart and Welzel define the two societies as such: Western ex-communist societies, “include ex-communist societies with a Roman Catholic or Protestant heritage, belong to the World Bank’s middle-income category” (2005, p. 108), while successfully transitioning into market economies. The “Eastern ex-communist societies include those with an Eastern Orthodox or Islamic religious heritage, encompassing all of the Soviet successor states (except the three Baltic republics) plus Albania, Romania, Serbia, and Bosnia” (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 108)




Figure 1.7: Generational differences in traditional/secular-rational values in five types of societies. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 107).

Strong Emphasis on Survival Values – An explanation of the low ranking on the second value dimension of the CEE countries, namely the survival/self-expression value dimension, is the collapse of the Soviet Union. After decades of repression, the sudden dissolution of the economic and political structures brought insecurity and poverty, leading people to “emphasize economic and physical security [...over...] values of self-expression, subjective well-being and quality of life” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 110). Furthermore, the position on the second dimension is also very much dependent on the level of democracy. Thus, “Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that if democratic institutions are in place but the emphasis on self-expression values is weak, democracy tends to be ineffective” (Inglehart et al., 2007, p. 10-11).

Figure 1.8 (on page 32) shows the difference between some of the CEE (here Western Ex-Communist Societies) societies in 1990 and 2000 in the shift towards self-expression values compared to the other four society groups, including the remaining CEE societies that are here defined as Eastern ex-communist societies. While the

Western ex-communist societies underwent tremendous economic growth through a successful transition to market economy, the Eastern ex-communist societies faced more economic instability resulting in a shift towards survival values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 108, 133).




Figure 1.8: Shift towards self-expression values in five types of societies. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 132).

It can be clearly seen that the CEE societies almost ran amongst Developing Societies. While Developing Societies are constantly faced with poverty and are used to low living standards, after the USSR dissolved the CEE societies suddenly faced such tremendous changes that led to a substantial increase in the importance of survival values and stability (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 110; Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 30, 109-111).

A different picture of the CEE societies in terms of the emphasis on survival values can be found in newer surveys executed by the European Commission. The Eurobarometer 77 in 2012 shows that the CEE societies, except for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania judge the financial situation of their household as good. Furthermore, while the CEE societies are especially concerned with health and social security, pensions and the financial situation of their households, issues such as immigration,

education and environment are seen as secondary ⁷. When ranking values, the CEE participants indicate that respect for human rights, human rights themselves, peace and individual freedom are the most important values. In terms of equality and trust, the CEE societies rank slightly below the EU 27 average, except for Poland and Hungary. Therefore, it can be claimed that even though the CEE societies are not yet on the level of the EU 15 countries, they are clearly shifting towards self-expression values. Inglehart claims that such change is most likely due to generational differences, as the younger generations tend to emphasize self-expression values over survival, especially when growing up in a more secure environment (European Commission, 2012b, p. T12, T33; European Commission, 2012c, p. 11).

Political Participation and Gender Equality – In general, after the fall of the USSR, engagement in political parties as well as in labor unions decreased in CEE societies, due to the fact that people were focused on distancing themselves from the past. Especially in the Baltic societies where politics lost its importance tremendously and memberships in labor unions dropped drastically. This trend is based on the low trust towards political authorities (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 26). Figure 1.9 pictures the decline in political engagement in the CEE societies.




Figure 1.9: Trends in engagement in political parties in Central Eastern Europe (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 34).

In terms of gender equality, CEE societies are not as supportive as other European

⁷Other EU Member States additionally emphasize education amongst the most important issues.

societies especially in comparison to the Nordic societies. This can be largely attributed to the concept of gender equality being widely misused in the Soviet Union (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 142). In terms of questions concerning the skills and acceptance of women in leading positions in the economy as well as the political sphere, the CEE societies do rank beneath the other EU members, however the gap is closing (European Commission, 2012a, p. 12, 16, 20, 24). Nevertheless, scholars indicate that “[a] lack of democratic institutions negatively impacts peoples’ gender attitudes and could explain the survival of traditional gender beliefs even in societies characterized by a high level of women’s employment” (Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 257).

Furthermore, a lack of economic development, recession, unemployment, low education, poverty and low social security is hindering gender equality. While men in general have a less favorable view of gender equality than women, when men are unemployed, they are even less in favor of the idea. Still, as most CEE societies are improving their socio-economic situation, a positive development is predicted (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 4; Halman & Voicu, 2010, p. 251-257). Furthermore, gender realignment as is has been defined above, has not yet fully developed in CEE societies. While strong generational differences in the attitudes towards gender equality were not detected in the CEE societies, the younger generations are slightly less traditional than the older ones (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 135, 145).

Gender equality and therefore equal representation in politics is not yet established in the CEE societies, as Figure 1.10 (on page 35) shows. This figure shows the correlation of disagreement with the statement that ‘men make better political leaders’ and the percentage of women in parliament in CEE societies. It can be claimed that the less disagreement with the statement there is, the less women in parliament there are. The decline of women in parliaments in the CEE societies can be attributed to the fact that during the first free and fair elections that took place in the CEE societies, the quotas implemented by the Soviet Union were neglected immediately (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 163). Furthermore, in post-Communist countries it is important to include the society’s historical traditions, especially “the different experience of women in the workforce, the widespread use of quotas in parliaments under the dominance of the Communist party and their subsequent abandonment” (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 142).

Overall, it can be concluded that when it comes to CEE societies, which are all still undergoing transition, time will tell how and if those societies evolve. These societies have undergone major changes during the last 20 years, and are still on the path to becoming post-industrial societies. When analyzing the situation of




Figure 1.10: Mass attitudes towards gender equality, and women’s representation in parliament in Ex-Communist Societies (modified by author). (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 276).

the CEE societies, the three sets of barriers, structural, institutional and cultural, need to be assessed. As Inglehart indicates, a higher socio-economic status, level of education, the political and electoral system as well as a society’s religion and value set is contributing to the acceptance and percentage of women in parliaments. Even today, the impact of the Soviet Union is visible when for example analyzing the perception and attitudes towards gender. Additionally, while some societies might have felt supported by the European Union through the accession, others are still struggling with economic development and social security. The theory in question was developed before most CEE countries became members of the EU, hence it does not include the influences of the accession to the union.

1.5 Criticism of Inglehart's Theory

Ronald Inglehart has written and published numerous texts and books during the last four decades. Consequently, several scholars have reacted to his work with critique. This section will aim to give insight into the criticisms of Inglehart's theory. Further, criticism relevant to this analysis will be stated by the author, followed by justifications to use the theory nonetheless.

Even though Inglehart's theory is not only highly respected but also quite striking there are some criticisms that have to be evaluated. Inglehart does define the concepts he uses rather vaguely. In their review of the concept of post-industrialism, Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson state that the concept is vague and mainly applicable for survey research (Lane & Ersson, 2008, p. 244). Lorien Jasny summarized several scholars criticizing Inglehart's approach. First, "the theoretical basis of [Inglehart's] argument is not sufficient [...second...] the survey items do not actually measure what Inglehart claims [...and third...] the method of analysis obscures critical distinctions" (Jasny, 2012, p. 2). In her paper, she indicates that Inglehart's findings cannot be substantiated, as she found through her research that the relationship between values are not verified. Further, the scholars Teorell and Hadenius criticize that Inglehart and Welzel treat self-expression values as a sort of requirement for democracy and that they "fail to distinguish between causal effect and correlation" (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005, p. 2; Wucherpfennig & Deutsch, 2009, p. 6).

Another striking critique of Inglehart's definition and application of Postmaterialism was published by Haller in 2002. He first states that Inglehart misinterprets Marx, as his approach trivializes the link between "a society's technological level [and its] economic system" (Inglehart, 1997, p. 9; Haller, 2002, p. 140). According to Haller, the statement should instead be that "social groups who, out of their interest, and in consideration of technical-economic changes, invent and develop ideologies ('values')" (Haller, 2002, p. 140), rather than claiming that only technology and progress trigger those values. Additionally, Haller strongly emphasizes that through modernization, economic development and the shift towards Postmaterialism, materialism will not lose its importance. Since people earn more money, more can be spent on consuming, especially as the industry and service sectors are developing constantly in order to present new "human needs and desires" (Haller, 2002, p. 141). And finally, through the shift towards post-industrialism and hence Postmaterialism, people tend to have more free time that can be spent on non-essential goods and services.

Kristi Andersen's review of Inglehart and Norris' book 'The Rising Tide' criticizes

that the authors did not take into account that development and modernization do not always solely provide a more favorable platform for women to enter the workforce and political arena. She emphasizes that particularly in the case of the post-Communist Central Eastern European societies, while women may have various opportunities, on the other hand women's engagement in politics sunk tremendously, and also the social security system broke away. Similarly, through industrialization, Andersen states that while new opportunities arise for women, "it may also weaken the support networks provided by extended families" (Andersen, 2005, p. 332). Further, Inglehart and Norris are blamed for underestimating and failing to show the impact of "strong women's movement [that] may hasten changes in public opinion (not to mention public policy)" (Andersen, 2005, p. 332) while emphasizing cultural factors as prerequisites for gender equality.

Besides the criticism mentioned, the author of this thesis needs to further evaluate certain shortcomings of Inglehart's theory at use. First, as stated above, Inglehart does not clearly define his concepts. As it can be seen in the case of gender equality, Inglehart does not provide a clear definition, but instead only lists a set of items in order to indicate the attitudes towards the acceptance of gender equality. Additionally, since his theory includes almost all societies, it can be argued that it is greatly generalized and simplified.

While Inglehart's approach might be valid for most societies, unique cases seem to be overlooked. While the theory acknowledges intermediate steps between the modernization of values and the eventual outcome of increased opportunities for women, it does not fully take into account the political and economic background. One could even claim that the theory is rather Western and 'first world' oriented, and as such mainly works in explaining the past developments in currently post-modern societies, and consequently, seems to be inadequate in predicting future developments.

Nonetheless, this theory seems to be suitable for the purposes of this thesis. While Inglehart shows a generalized transition process, this case study will evaluate if the introduced approach will also be applicable to a unique case, such as the case of Estonia. Although Inglehart's vagueness and the lack of given definitions might hinder a precise examination of Inglehart's predicted transition, this vagueness actually might also give the author the opportunity to show its universality by applying the theory to a specific case such as Estonia is, and then narrowing the approach by giving definitions.

2 METHODOLOGY

This chapter will provide insight into the methodological approach of this thesis. In Section 2.1 the research framework will be introduced. The main research questions are stated together with several essential sub-questions that are needed to include all necessary factors for the discussion and analysis. The primary and secondary data used throughout the thesis to solve the research question will be named in Section 2.2, with a specific look into interviews as a qualitative data method. Finally, Section 2.3 discusses the problems and obstacles with the research design.

2.1 Research Framework

The main aim of this thesis is to see if and how Inglehart's revised modernization theory can explain the under-representation of women in the *Riigikogu*. Further, the extend of the role of the European Union accession will be examined, especially as it relates to the implementation of the *aquis communautaire*. Hence, a research design needs to be developed according to which the research question will be analyzed. After developing the theoretical framework in the previous chapter, the research aim is as follows:

Research Questions – The research questions that will be analyzed later on are as follows:

How can the under-representation of women in the *Riigikogu* be explained by Inglehart's revised modernization theory? If this cannot be explained by Inglehart, what is the theory lacking?

Study Questions – In order to answer the posed research questions, several sets of study questions have to be presented in the research framework. In the theoretical framework, it was shown that Inglehart's theory emphasizes the importance of a society's cultural heritage. Hence, in order to analyze the cultural heritage of Estonia, additional questions such as '*Does religion play a role in shaping Estonia's cultural heritage?*', '*What other factors shape Estonia's cultural heritage?*' as well as '*Does Estonia's Soviet experience influence today's under-representation of women in the Riigikogu, and if so, how?*', have to be addressed. These questions aim at finding out whether Inglehart's strong emphasis on religion is present in the case of Estonia and if so, if it is as influential as predicted, or if other factors overshadow the role of religion.

However, as Estonia became a member of the European Union in 2004, an important aspect is the inclusion of the changes undergone during the accession period. Not only was the *aquis communautaire* implemented, but constant policies, laws, as well as other changes initiated by the European Union have to be transcribed into domestic settings. Therefore, an important questions that has to be answered is '*How did and does the accession to the European Union influence the under-representation of women in the Riigikogu?*'.

As indicated in the theoretical framework, Inglehart defines three sets of barriers that restrict women from entering the political sphere. While economic development and the influence of cultural heritage and outside events such as the EU accession predict and influence a society's path towards more female representation, those barriers and their impact have to be analyzed.

In order to examine the structural barriers, the question *'What are the main obstacles women face in terms of their socioeconomic situation?'* has to be answered. The analysis of the socioeconomic situation includes occupation, education and concepts such as the gender pay gap and parental leave. High levels of education and balanced occupation hint at a society favoring self-expression values and hence the belonging to either developing industrial societies or post-industrial societies. However, a large gender pay gap and a 'one-sided' parental leave indicate traditional values and inequality.

As for institutional barriers the electoral and political systems are of importance. Therefore, questions such as *'What kind of political and electoral system does Estonia have?'*, as well as *'Does the recruitment criteria create a burden for women?'* have to be analyzed in order to see if Inglehart's predictions stand in the case of Estonia.

The third set of barriers, namely cultural barriers, connect to the study questions above concerning Estonia's past. In order to examine the case of Estonia, the question *'Where on Inglehart's cultural map is Estonia situated?'* needs to be answered. Furthermore, as it will be shown, the examination of attitudes towards gender equality on its own does not always accurately reflect the actual situation in a society, therefore, when examining the second value dimension the concept of sexual liberalization can help in forming a more accurate picture. As Inglehart indicates, sexual liberalization includes the acceptance of concepts such as divorce, pre-marital relationships, abortion, gender equality and homosexuality. Therefore, the question *'To what extent is sexual liberalization an indicator for the acceptance of egalitarian values?'* needs to be analyzed.

2.2 Primary and Secondary Data

In order to analyze the research questions posed, a variety of sources are used. First, primary and secondary sources set the basis in establishing the case of Estonia. As not much research has been done in the field of female representation in the *Riigikogu*, the author chose to use interviews to collect the needed information.

Sources – Throughout this thesis, a variety of secondary sources will be used. The sources will be mainly in English, nevertheless some Estonian language publications are used as well. The secondary data used for the theoretical framework is comprised of publications by Inglehart, fellow scholars and their critics. In order to complete the analysis, statistical data was included. Furthermore, topic specific books contribute to the case study. Reports issued by the Estonian government, Estonian institutions, the European Union, and other international organizations complete the research.

Qualitative Methods – The qualitative method in use is the analysis of semi-structured interviews. Hence, this section will shortly explain why the method of interviewing was chosen. Further, how the sample of interviewees was derived, how the interviews were conducted and what questions were asked, will be discussed. Additionally, an explanation of how the material is used in this thesis follows.

The method of interviewing was chosen specifically due to the lack of a sufficient amount of publications in English and German on the topic at stake. Furthermore, in order to gain as much insight as possible, interviewing experts in the field of gender equality in Estonia seems to be the most striking methodological approach. Not only is it possible to ask questions that texts and books might not answer as clearly, but additionally, interviewing gives the interviewer the chance to dig deeper and ask more precise questions if needed.

The interviewees were chosen according to their profession and expertise. The web pages of both Tartu and Tallinn University were searched in order to collect a contact list of experts. Further, the web pages of known women's non-profit organizations were searched for experts and volunteer contact's. Additionally, the *Sotsiaalministeerium's* (Ministry of Social Affairs) web page provided the necessary contacts of the members of the Gender Equality Department, as well as other necessary officials. A further group of interviewees contacts were gained from the *Riigikogu* web page, namely the chairperson, as well as the two vice chairpersons of each *Fraktsioonid*, and the members of the *Sotsiaalkomisjon*.

Around 30 interview inquiries in English were sent out to the different experts, asking for an in-person, Skype or mail interview. Another 40 interview inquiries were sent to the *Riigikogu* members and the bureaus of the *Fraktsioonid*, asking for a written answer to a narrower question set. During the following months, approximately 15 answers from experts, and 4 answers from Members of the *Riigikogu* were received. The experts were provided with the question set beforehand, to allow them to gain more insight of the interview. Meetings in Tartu and Tallinn were arranged with the interviewees. Each interview, depending on the number of interviewees at each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours 30 minutes. The interviews were fully recorded and the interviewer took notes in order to ask additional questions. Furthermore, anonymity was guaranteed to all participants.

The final composition of the interviewees consisted of:

- two officials, representing the *Sotsiaalministeerium*
- one expert, working independently as an advisory body
- three experts who used to work for the *Sotsiaalministeerium*
- four experts from different Estonian women's non-profit organizations and political party's women's organizations, as well as also partially active in political arena
- two experts, working and teaching at Estonian Universities in the field of gender equality

The interviewees were all female and of different age groups. All interviews were conducted in English, even though in some cases, some Estonian words were used, and later translated by the interviewer.

Throughout the interviews, the interviewer asked the same open-ended questions of each interviewee. Additionally, sub-questions were asked when the interviewer felt it was needed. The questions were grouped according to different topics, as follows:

- First, questions about gender equality itself.
- Second, questions about the situation in Estonia's political sphere and especially the topic of women in the *Riigikogu*.
- Third, questions identifying cultural barriers.
- Fourth, questions about Estonia's past.
- Fifth, questions about culture and religion.

- Sixth, questions about the influence of accession to the European Union.

The interview data will be used to analyze Inglehart's revised theory in the case of Estonia. The following analysis is mainly based on the data collected from the expert interviews. Hereafter, the information gathered will be analyzed topic-wise, in order to see how the different groups of experts differ in their approach and perceptions of the situation of women in Estonia's political sphere. Nevertheless, as the subsequent part will show, most of the experts represent several positions.

Due to anonymity, each expert was numbered, and hereafter will be referred to by the number. The first expert represents an advisory independent position. Experts 2 and 3 are representatives of the *Sotsiaalministeerium*, precisely of the Gender Equality Department. Experts 4, 5 and 6 are former employees of the *Sotsiaalministeerium*. These experts still take part in public discussion of gender equality, and occasionally act as advisory bodies for authorities. Furthermore, they are active in non-governmental organizations, providing and executing projects that include training and workshops to promote gender equality. Expert 7 and Expert 8 work at Tallinn University. Experts 9, 10 and 11 are active members of women's NGOs. Expert 12 is a politician.

2.3 Problems with the Research Design

The problems and obstacles of the research design are discussed in this section. Furthermore, solutions to those problems will be given. An overall choice of sources should show the author's objectivity.

Initially a quantitative data chapter was planned, in order to give statistical insight into the case of Estonia. Unfortunately the main variables used by Inglehart were either not available, incomplete or outdated. Hence, it was not possible to make valid comparisons. Therefore, the quantitative methods used compromised of established statistical data, which was interpreted by the author.

Since interviewing was chosen as the main data collection method, language and communication proved to be obstacles. English was neither the mother tongue of the majority of interviewees, nor the interviewer. For this reason, it was offered to conduct the interview in English, German, or Estonian with an interpreter if needed. All interviewees chose to use English as the interview language; therefore, misunderstandings might have slightly distorted the outcome. Additionally, not all interviewees answered all of the questions due to a lack of knowledge or other reasons.

Furthermore, the small sample of 12 interviewees may not cover all aspects and opinions. Especially as only a few of the politicians contacted agreed to fill out the survey but in the end never did, their perspective of the question at hand is not covered. Potential reasons for the low response rate of politicians might be the sensitive topic at hand or the fact that the interview inquiries were sent in English. Hence, one might think that the approach is one-sided. Nevertheless, as many of the interviewees have been active in the political sphere, it can be claimed that the approach is fairly balanced.

Likewise, it can be argued that since all interviewees were female, the male perspective is missing. However, the list of Estonian gender experts is rather narrow, and consist mainly of female experts. Hence, it was not possible to take the interviewee's gender into account. Finally, during the analysis of the interview data, again language as well as objectivity obstacles might occur. Nevertheless, special care is given to those issues.

3 THE CASE OF ESTONIA

While claiming that economic development along with the cultural heritage influences and triggers a value shift from survival to self-expression values and consequently increases the proportion of women in parliaments, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel also indicate that three sets of barriers appear. This chapter will analyze the situation of Estonia through examining existing barriers according to Inglehart's approach. The data used throughout the analysis is mainly collected from semi-structured interviews with Estonian gender experts. As indicated in the methods chapter, 12 experts were interviewed and hereafter will be referred to by the assigned number. The interview data is compared to scholarly articles and publications about Estonia's path towards gender equality and higher female representation as well as to statistical findings from several reports.

The first Section assesses Estonia's position in terms of modernization and democracy according to Inglehart's criteria that were defined in the theoretical framework. In Section 3.2, Estonian values, as they pertain to this study, are assessed and examined. Section 3.3 introduces and analyzes the situation of gender equality in Estonia, followed by the assessment of the situation of female representation in the *Riigikogu* in Section 3.4. Further, the three sets of barriers, structural, institutional and cultural are examined respectively while emphasizing the influences of the Soviet Union and the European Union. Section 3.5 analyzes whether, based on the previous findings, Inglehart's theoretical approach is applicable.

3.1 Estonia – State and Society

In order to group countries according to their developments and situations, Inglehart’s categorization was introduced above. In the case of Estonia, in 2003 Inglehart claimed that it is an industrial society with a newer democracy. His assumptions are based on Human Development Index (HDI) scores, GDP per capita and Freedom House scores. The following tables show Estonia’s scores respectively.

Table 3.1: HDI scores from 1990 until 2012 (United Nations Development Programme, 2013).

year	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
HDI score	.728	.786	.830	.836	.841	.842	.837	.839	.844	.846

Inglehart claims that societies with a HDI score between .740 to .899 and a mean per capita GDP of \$6,314 are industrial societies. Thus, as Table 3.1 shows, Estonia has remained in the category of industrial societies according to the HDI scores, since those scores have remained between .786 and .846 between 2000 and 2012.

An indicator for a growing economy is the GDP per capita, as Inglehart claims. Therefore, Table 3.2 shows how Estonia’s GDP per capita has increased during the last 20 years. While it has increased steadily throughout the years, the economic crisis can be detected in Estonia’s GDP per capita in the decrease in 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, Estonia’s GDP has risen above the target number Inglehart has set for industrial countries. Henceforth, it can be argued that according to the HDI score Estonia remains an industrial society with a rising GDP that has not yet reached the target of post-industrial societies.

Table 3.2: GDP per capita (ppp) in US\$ from 2000 until 2012 (United Nations Development Programme, 2012).

year	2000	2005	2006	2007
GDP per capita	11,513	16,548	18,253	19,648
year	2008	2009	2010	2011
GDP per capita	18,941	16,246	16,615	17,885

In terms of Estonia’s democracy, Inglehart claimed in 2003 that it falls under newer democracies as its Freedom House rating was between 5.5 and 7.0, as well as having less than 20 years of continuous democracy. Table 3.3 (on page 47) shows that Estonia has improved according to the Freedom House scores. While until 1995, it

had scores under 6, Estonia has since then scored over 6 and from 2004 onwards it has the highest score of freedom in the political rights and civil liberties ratings by Freedom House. Estonia has been continuously under democratic rule, ergo it can be claimed that it does not fit in the category of newer democracies any more since Inglehart’s definitions from 2003 of the categories seem to be outdated. As ten years have passed since then, a new branding of categories is warranted in order to make coherent and contemporary definitions of the different kinds of democracies. In any case, it can be claimed that even though in comparison to ‘older democracies’ Estonia has only faced 20 years of continuous democracy, it ranks higher than most of the other Central Eastern European societies.

Table 3.3: Freedom House scores from 1991 until 2012 (Freedom House, 2013; Lauristin, 2011, p. 148-189).

year	1991	1992	1993/1994	1995	1996-2003	2004-2012
Freedom House score	5.5	5	5.5	6	6.5	7

When comparing Estonia to other societies in terms of modernization, the distribution of the labor force has to be taken into consideration. As Inglehart claims, societies move from agrarian to industrial and then towards service and knowledge based societies. In the case of Estonia, the biggest labor force is comprised of the service and knowledge sector. A statistic ¹ from Statistics Estonia has been used to give more detailed insight into the approximate distribution of labor in the three categories, agrarian, industrial and service (Statistics Estonia, 2013). It can be claimed that one reason for the outcome is that Estonia is known for its strong IT sector.

¹For the entire table, please see Table A.3 in Appendix 2

3.2 The Estonian Value Set

The cultural map developed by Inglehart was already introduced in the theoretical framework of this thesis. In order to see Estonia’s development, the graph was modified by the author, as Estonia’s position in the year 2000 was added (blue mark²). Unfortunately, newer measurements of Estonia after 2000 have not yet been published, thus the development can only be estimated.




Figure 3.1: Change Over Time in Location on Two Dimensions of Cross Cultural Variation for Estonia 1990 until 2000 (modified by author) (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 40; World Value Survey, 2013).

Figure 3.1 shows Estonia’s position on the two value dimensions in the years 1990, 1996 and 2000. Throughout those 10 years, Estonia ranks relatively high on the traditional/secular-rational value dimension, compared to other Central Eastern European societies. Hence, as Heidmet’s claims in the Estonian Human Development

²Data for the year 2000 was derived from WVS homepage. The numbers for the two dimensions were included on the graph resulting in the blue dot (Inglehart & Welzel, n.d.).

Report of 2006, Estonians are not emphasizing “values related to religion, authority, patriotism, etc” (Heidmets, 2007, p. 114). Nevertheless, after the break up of the Soviet Union, Estonia underwent a time of so called *Romanticism*. After re-establishing independence, Estonia was striving to be the independent Estonia it had been in the 30s, as claimed by all the interview partners. As a result, traditional and more conservative values prevailed. The model of the male breadwinner and the supportive female home-maker (1,2,3,7) was reinforced. Staying at home and raising children was glorified (4), especially being a rather small society, Estonia feared becoming a ‘dying nation’ (5,6,8). As one expert states, even specific domestic schools were opened for women to attend (12). Nevertheless, the traditional family model was not compatible with the economic situation, resulting in a rather quick return of women to the work force (3,7). Therefore, as the Human Development Report of 2010/2011 indicates, while being more secular nowadays Estonians “conceive family roles in a less traditional way and display the individualistic, autonomous, and achievement-orientated understanding of their role in society” (Lauristin, 2011, p. 29). On the other hand, as some interviewees claimed, Estonia, and mainly the elite, were longing to return to Europe and join the European Union as that meant distancing themselves from Russia (6,8).

While Estonia’s position on the first value dimension during those years is unchanged, when looking at the second value dimensions an initial decrease and subsequent increase can be seen. Compared to other European countries, Estonia has been lagging behind in terms of self-expression values. Tolerance, trust and freedom of speech have not been emphasized by the Estonian society. Rather, survival values and materialism have been considered to be more important. Contrary to Inglehart’s theoretical approach, Estonia moved towards survival values after regaining independence. Liina Järviste indicates that the dominance of survival values after the re-independence can be explained by the large scale changes in the structure of the Estonian society and economy by the sudden break away from the Soviet system (Järviste, 2010a, p. 15).

After all, as Figure 3.1 shows, the Estonian society has been moving towards favoring self-expression values since 1996. However, while on the one hand 63% of Estonian Eurobarometer participants claim that the financial situation of their household is good and they are satisfied, on the other hand, 59% think that the situation of the national economy is totally bad (39% say it is totally good) (European Commission, 2012b, p. 7, T12). In terms of emphasizing values, the Eurobarometer 77 shows that while the Estonian participants emphasized ‘Respect for human life’ (48%), ‘Human rights’ (43%), ‘Peace’ (42%) and even ‘Tolerance’ (21%), values

such as 'Equality' (13%) and 'Religion' (2%) were amongst the least important values (European Commission, 2012c, p. 11). Hence, these diverse perceptions do not indicate clearly if the Estonian society is decisively moving towards the emphasis of self-expression values.

As Postmaterialism is clearly an indicator for self-expression values, the interviewees were asked their opinion. When asking the interviewees, if Estonia should be considered materialist or Postmaterialist, Estonia was either positioned on the materialist side (3,5,10), or in between both (4), as one respondent pointed out "I consider Estonia generally materialist, with some 'pockets' of Postmaterialism" (8). Further, several interviewees accentuate that due to poor economic conditions, mainly because of the economic crisis, but also poverty, Estonia is still emphasizing survival values (3,4). Järviste indicates that the richer a society becomes, the more the quality of life goes up, whereas the change to capitalism after the Soviet Union's collapse triggered the demand for material goods (Järviste, 2010a, p. 15). Andrus Saar claims that the rather slow shift towards self-expression values "means that the number of people in the society for whom values related to economic and physical security are of primary importance is decreasing (since these values have already been achieved), and therefore subjective wellbeing, opportunities for self-expression and the quality of life are becoming more important for them" (Lauristin, 2010, p. 108).

3.3 Gender Equality in Estonia

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the topic of gender equality was not a priority and rather silenced. Despite this, soon after gaining re-independence, Estonia adopted and implemented international agreements on gender equality and human rights. The Constitution that was ratified in 1992 included a non-discrimination clause on grounds of sex. However, Estonia's society as well as government did not emphasize the importance of the concept and idea of gender equality after all, as it was indicated by the Human Development Report of 2006: "Regrettably, the entire subject of equality has been actively handled by only a relatively small group in Estonia, while the rest of society has hesitantly ignored the matter" (Heidmets, 2007, p. 110). As an example in 2009, 52% of the Estonian participants of the Special Eurobarometer 326 stated that gender inequality in Estonia is 'rare' (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 10).

In Estonia, the definition and concept of gender equality is largely not understood, based on the negative imprint that is left from the Soviet regime, as all interview partners indicated. Tiina Raitviir even claims that the concept of gender equality is an 'alien' concept for the Estonian society (Raitviir, 2011, p. 126). In the past, gender equality had meant that "everybody was equally poor, everybody had the same standard on living, everybody had the same chances, everybody was provided a job by the state. So it was equality [...] We had full equality and no one actually put meaning to that, it was just declared" (6). In the Soviet Union, gender was widely disregarded, "[t]here were neither women nor men: just comrades, the working class and its historical opponents" (Pilvre, 2000, p. 61). Women worked and earned as much as men, while at the same time having full responsibility over the household. Furthermore, women were even rewarded for giving birth to a large number of children. In terms of politics, women were as much a part as men, due to the existing quotas for the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Women's Committee. Despite of being able to be heard, women in general did not speak up as women or for women (Pilvre, 2000, p. 60-62; Laas, 2005, p. 108). Further, as Laas indicates, "[i]n reality, there were not any women in leading positions in the Communist Party or the Supreme Soviet" (Laas, 2005, p. 108). A common answer to the question of what was gender equality in the Soviet Union, several experts immediately mentioned the picture of women driving tractors (4,5,8,11). In contrast to this, the majority of the interviewees claimed that as a basic human right and the basis of democracy, gender equality as it should be understood today actually includes equal rights, obligations, opportunities but also equal responsibilities (1,2,4,5,6,8,9,10,11).

According to Inglehart's measurements of the left-right scale, women are on the




Figure 3.2: Gender Equality Scale by nation (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 33).

left of men, and hence less conservative than men ³ (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 82). When asking the interviewees about the position of women, all claimed that women in Estonia are more liberal, as well as more open, tolerant and supportive towards gender equality (1-11). However, the rejection, silencing as well as the misunderstanding of gender equality as an issue by the Estonian society, can be

³For position on related scale, see Figure A.1 in Appendix 2

detected in the low ranking of Estonia on Inglehart's Gender Equality Scale in Figure 3.2 ⁴ (on page 52).

When asking the interviewees why gender equality would or might be important for Estonia several different answers were given. The economy would benefit from gender equality if the potential of every person is maximized (1,2,6,8), therefore educating women and then letting their resources go to waste would negatively affect the economy (Heidmets, 2007, p. 110). Further, through gender equality the gender pay gap in Estonia, which is the largest in the European Union, could be reduced (4,10,11). While both, men and women, should get the same benefits without gendered barriers (1), gender equality at the same time enforces democracy (9). And finally, since men and women have different value systems, and life experiences, a balance should be established in order for women to be equally presented (5,10). While Estonian men often claim that Estonian society is equal, women see the beneficial position of men, especially when women have higher levels of education (Järviste, 2010a, p. 16).

One part of the emerging push for gender equality was due to the establishment of women's organizations in the early 90s in Estonia. While a radical women's movement was missing, largely because of the perception that women are not discriminated against as they are part of the non-domestic labor market (Pilvre, 2000, p. 60), women nevertheless organized in order to voice their needs and concerns. With the help in terms of human and monetary resources from the Nordic countries a network of women's organizations was established (1,5,6,11). Unfortunately, even though monetary resources are available for women's organizations, the hurdles of bureaucracy and co-funding restrict the work of the organizations. Thus, the women's organizations' work is mainly based on projects (4,5,6). Nevertheless, associations representing women's interests (56%) are seen as the main contributors to promoting gender equality in Estonia, next to Equality organizations (41%) (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 112). In contrast, so far, the political parties fail to spell out the need to remove existing gender inequalities in their party platforms. Hence, gender equality is still seen as somehow secondary in the field of politics, and often it is even claimed that it is a women's thing (Raitviir,

⁴Combined 100-point scale of the following 5 items: MENPOL Q118: "On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do." (Agree coded low); MENJOBS Q78: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women." (Agree coded low); BOYEDUC Q119: "A university education is more important for a boy than a girl." (Agree coded low); NEEDKID Q110 "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?" (Agree coded low); SGLMUM Q112 "If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" (Disapprove coded low). Source: WVS/EVS, pooled 1995–2001.

2011, p. 142-144).

Starting from 2000 onwards Estonia increased the emphasis on legal acts concerning Gender Equality due to the imminent accession to the European Union. At the same time “Estonia ratified the Amended and Revised European Social Charter” (Jaigma, 2008, p. 7). This action gave rise to the debate on gender issues and the inclusion of gender equality in “national policies, programs and projects as a long-term objective” (Jaigma, 2008, p. 7). However in 2002 Anu Laas criticized the backwardness of Estonia’s gender equality development. Not only had the implementations been rather unsuccessful, but in terms of the rising gender pay gap wage discrimination on the grounds of gender was not seen in a negative light (Laas, n.d.).

With the accession to the EU, Estonia ratified the Gender Equality Act on May 1st, the day it became a member state. The Act meant to “ensure respect for the principle of equal treatment and to promote gender equality as a fundamental human right and a general good in all areas of social life [Furthermore, the] act prohibits discrimination based on sex in the public as well as the private sector, and obliges state and local government agencies, educational and research institutions and employers to promote gender equality” (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 7). This clause was the first official definition of ‘gender equality’, ‘equal treatment’, ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘the principle of shared burden of proof’. Despite implementing the necessary European legislation on gender equality, Estonia made no efforts to purposely enhance the movement towards equality (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 7, 14). A major claim that all the interviewees made is that without the EU accession, even today Estonia would most likely neither have the Gender Equality Act from 2004, nor the Equal Treatment Act from 2009.

In terms of institutional changes, the Department of Gender Equality, responsible for policies and implementation monitoring, and the Gender Equality Council, acting as an advisory body, were set up in the *Sotsiaalministeerium*. In addition, the position of a Gender Equality Commissioner was established (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 19-21). The Gender Equality Commissioner acts as “an independent and impartial expert who acts independently and monitors the implementation of the GEA” (Sepper & Linntam, 2005, p. 20-21).

3.4 Female Under-Representation in Estonia

In the political arena in Estonia, gender equality is far from being fully established. During the last 20 years, the percentage of women elected to the *Riigikogu* has not gotten close to the percentage of men. Table 3.4 shows the percentages of female candidates and the actual percentage of women elected to the European Parliament, the *Riigikogu* as well as the Local Government Councils. For the European parliament, the elections in 2004 and 2007 show that even though the percentage of female candidates was below 30%, 2 out of 6 MEPs are female. On the national level, the numbers are lower. While the percentage of women in the *Riigikogu* increased, after 2007, the percentage dropped by 5 percent points, from 24.8% to 19.8%, at the same rate as the percentage of female candidates. On the local level the scores are somewhat higher, with a positive trend of an increase in women by over 6% from 1993 to 2009. However, when comparing the percentage of female candidates to the actual percentage of women in the political parties, women constitute about half of the members, in some parties even over 50% (Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 2004, p. 10). The number of female members rose in particular from about 45,5% (range from 60,2% to 28%) in 1998 to 48% (range from 60% to 35%) in 2002, and in 2011 to 50,9% (range from 58,2% to 45,5%) (Raitviir, 2011, p. 145).

Table 3.4: Female Candidates and Elected Members of the European Parliament, the *Riigikogu* and Local Government Councils (Raitviir, 2011, p. 149, 151; Eero, 2012, p. 12,13)

year	2004	2009				
% EP candidates	24.2	29.7				
% EP elected	33.3	33.3				
year	1992	1995	1999	2003	2007	2011
% R candidates	14.0	17.7	26.9	21.4	27.1	22.6
% R elected	12.9	11.9	17.8	18.8	23.8	19.8
year	1993	1996	1999	2002	2005	2009
% local candidates	28.3	33.0	35.6	37.7	39.3	38.7
% local elected	23.9	26.6	28.3	28.4	29.6	29.6

The special Eurobarometer 75.1 displays that in the case of Estonia, the main reason (47%) why women are under-represented in politics, according to the participants of the survey, is that ‘The political world is dominated by men who do not value the skills of women enough’. A lack of interest to pursue a career in politics (35%), persistent stereotypes (26%), more interest in local politics (26%), disadvantaged positions (22%), ineffective measures to encourage parity between women and men (18%), as

well as the media's attitude towards women during elections (15%), were further barriers (European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). Additionally, women are claimed to have less confidence and self-esteem, and are less willing to take risks (12), especially the risk of entering the political sphere where one is displayed in public (Laas, 2005, p. 106). Ergo, the consequences of mainly having "one social group in power" (8), namely men, as the interviewees agreed on, constitutes unbalanced decision-making, since this does not reflect Estonia's demographic situation. By not taking the female perspective into consideration, "Estonian politics and policies are very masculine value based" (5), especially since women have different life experiences. Another effect emphasized by the interviewees is the lack of female role models encouraging women to first of all get active in politics, and second to strive for lead positions in politics. As the interviewees representing the Social Ministry claim, projects are being planned in order to mentor and encourage women to enter the political sphere (2,3). Further, Estonian women's NGOs provide training (5,6,9,10). Training and supportive measures encouraging women to become active in politics is also seen as the most effective measure amongst the Estonian participants of the Eurobarometer 75.1, as 41% favor it.

According to Inglehart's measurements of egalitarian attitudes towards women in politics Estonia ranked fairly low. Figure 3.3 ⁵ (on page 57) shows that only around 19 % disagreed with the statement that 'men make better political leaders than women'. However, the measure of this variable is over 10 years old. As a note, the Estonian gender monitoring report of 2009 displays that 49% of the female respondents think that the percentage of women in the *Riigikogu* should be bigger and in 2005, 40%. 33% of the male respondents thought that gender is not important when it comes to the composition of the *Riigikogu*, while 32% were in favor of more female representatives (Vainu et al., 2010, p. 136-137). On the local level, the responses of the participants were almost the same, as Figure 3.4 (on page 58) shows. By contrast, according to the Estonian participants in the Special Gender Equality Barometer in 2009, 53% claimed that the low number of female MPs does not need to be treated urgently, while only 41% indicated that urgent changes should be made (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 96). Therefore it can be claimed that even though the number of female politicians in *Riigikogu* has not risen tremendously, the attitudes towards women in politics have become more accepting.

In order to detect differences in the attitudes towards women in the political sphere, the experts were asked to identify differences in terms of ethnicity and ur-

⁵Note: 'Men make better political leaders than women' (% Disagree). Source: Pooled WVS/EVS, 1995-2001




Figure 3.3: Egalitarian Attitudes towards Women in Politics (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 137).

ban/rural regions. The interviewees unanimously claimed that the Russian-Estonian minority is more conservative in terms of gender equality. While Russian-Estonian women are somewhat equal with Estonian men, it can be presumed that Russian-Estonian men are the most conservative towards women in politics. Two interviewees emphasized that gender equality in general is not a topic of discussion amongst the Russian-Estonian minority, largely due to the lack of media coverage (4,5). However, regional differences were interpreted in different ways. Representatives of the *Sotsiaalministeerium* claimed that the differences based on regional location is quite small and can be attributed to the small size of Estonia (2,11) and the interlinking




Figure 3.4: Should there be a higher percentage of women in these levels (Vainu et al., 2010, p. 136-137).

via the Internet. Others were sure that the differences between towns and countryside were not that marginal because traditional values continue to be emphasized more in the countryside (4,5,8,9,10).

When looking at the figures and numbers, Estonia seems to be a rather contradictory case. While female representation is favored by the society, it becomes clear that insurmountable barriers exist. Henceforth, the following sections will discuss and analyze existing barriers in the political sphere of Estonia, according to Inglehart's approach.

Structural Barriers – Structural barriers appear based on the socioeconomic situation. Thus, in order to identify the existence of restricting obstacles in the case of Estonia, measures such as the gender pay gap, the occupations of women, and the education levels need to be determined and weighed with the help of the expert interviews.

The interviewed experts were consistently concerned with the high gender pay gap in Estonia. According to Anspal and Rõõm, while the gender pay gap was around 30% in 1993 and had dropped to about 24% in 1996, it then rose again to 30% in 2005. Since then, it has been consistently at that level, resulting in the highest gender pay gap in the European Union (Anspal & Rõõm, 2011, p. 3-4). Two interviewees indicated that a common perception in Estonia is that women earn less because they ask for less, hence it is their individual problem and not a societal issue

(5,6). The experts speaking for the *Sotsialministeerium* stated that even though there is a big gender pay gap, people are often not realizing the long-term effects of women earning substantially less. While they might not feel the gap at present times, when it comes to the retirement, women will be at risk of poverty due to the low pensions (3). Another expert raised a further concern based on the gender pay gap, namely women's and children's poverty resulting from the negative interplay of the gender pay gap and the high number of single mothers in Estonia (8).

When looking at the labor sector with higher gender pay gaps, it becomes visible that 'female' occupations are negatively affected, mainly due to a strong labor segregation (3,5,6). Sectors concerned with healthcare, education and service are disproportionally female. In 2009, only 8% of men were employed in the healthcare and social welfare sector (Järviste, 2010b, p. 6). Contradicting the common perception that the gender pay gap often appears as women are not on the same education level as men, in Estonia, women are more educated than men. While having the biggest gender pay gap, Estonia at the same time has the highest ratio of female university graduates.

During the interviews, it nevertheless became clear that even though Estonian women are highly educated, as soon as children are in the picture, women largely take over the child-caring role. Three-fourths of the Estonian Eurobarometer participants claimed that caring for the child has to be priority for a mother over her own career (Directorate-General for Communication, 2010, p. 88). In Estonia, 96% of women with children take parental leave in comparison to only 7% of men. One reason is that childcare facilities for young children are not sufficiently provided for, making work for women with young children nearly impossible (Põder, 2011, p. 74-75, 81). Furthermore, 59,7% of children are born outside marriage, mainly to single mothers. Hence, for a single mother, taking maternal leave is often the only possibility as the childcare facilities are not given (European Commission - eurostat, 2012). Additionally, the Human Development Report claims, that "[t]his situation can be explained by the traditional nature of Estonia's gender regime, according to which raising children is primarily the task of women, despite their high rate of participation in the labour market" (Lauristin, 2010, p. 96). Pajumets states in her dissertation that a main reason for women to take maternal leave is based on the aftermath of the Soviet era. While women were not able to stay at home with their children during the Soviet Union, after its collapse, Estonian women have emphasized motherhood by concentrating on nurturing their offspring (Pajumets, 2012, p. 53). The Special Eurobarometer 376 shows that 74% agree that 'Women have less freedom because of their family responsibilities' (European Commission,

2012a, p. 24). Even 80% of Estonian respondents on a survey carried out by the *Sotsiaalministeerium* in 2006 think that women face a double burden with the non-domestic and domestic work, in comparison to men, who are mainly engaged in non-domestic work (Heidmets, 2007, p. 22). Hence, while women take care of most the household chores, they have less free time (Laas, 2005, p. 106; Putzi, 2008, p. 104; Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 2009, p. 51, 55)

Therefore, connecting the named obstacles, it can be concluded that in Estonia socioeconomic factors do constitute as barriers for women. Not only do women earn almost 1/3 less than men (6), the high level of inflexibility of their labor force (Põder, 2011, p. 74) is widely restricting women from entering the political sphere. Furthermore, it seems as if women are forced to be concerned with family issues, such as child-caring and the household to a far wider extent than men. Even though Estonian women are generally better educated than Estonian men, women still retire from their jobs in order to be the primary care-taker of the offspring. Hence, the already small pension that women will receive will decrease even more as a result of not working for several years. In addition to the money issue, women face the problem of having less work experience as a result of staying at home. And finally, regardless of working or not, as women are mainly responsible for the household they have less free time.

Institutional Barriers – The second set of barriers are based on the institutional settings of a country. Hence, the political and electoral system can restrict the percentage of female representatives, while implemented measures such as quotas can enhance the number of women in elected offices. Furthermore, political parties play a major role in terms of party competition and the inner-party candidate recruitment process.

After gaining re-independence in 1991, Estonia declared itself to be a parliamentary democracy with a proportional representation. The national legislative body is unicameral, and called *Riigikogu*, which has 101 seats. The *Riigikogu* Election Act went into force on July 18th, 2002. Since then, several amendments have been made, but nevertheless the core of the election law has stayed the same. The Estonian citizens shall elect the “Members of the Riigikogu [...] by secret ballot on the basis of a general, uniform and direct right to vote” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 1). Every Estonian citizen older than 18 on the day of the election is allowed to vote, while candidates need to be at least 21. Citizens can either vote traditionally, or since 2007, via the Internet. Estonia is divided into 12 multi-mandate districts. “The mandates are proportionally distributed based on the

number of citizens entitled to vote in an electoral district” (Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 1).

The distribution of mandates is based on a triple-tier system with three different types of mandates: *The personal mandate* is distributed to candidates in the district that fulfill the simple quota. The simple quota is calculated by dividing all national votes by the seats of the *Riigikogu* (101 seats). The number received is the amount of votes that are needed to pass the simple quota. Then the number of votes in each district is divided by the simple quota, in order to show how many seats the district has. The candidates that receive at least the number of votes needed for the simple quota are directly elected to the *Riigikogu*. *The district/regional mandates* are given dependent on the obtained votes, a list/joint list received in the district. Therefore, the number of seats a list receives is the number of times the received votes fulfill the quota, after deducting the personal mandates. The candidates on each list are then ranked according to the amount of votes they gathered, and the candidates with the most votes will receive the district/regional mandates. The remaining votes of each district will be combined on the national level for each list/joint list. *The compensatory/national mandate* is then distributed on the level of closed nation wide party lists, amongst candidates that received at least 5% of the simple quota. The mandates each list receives is calculated by a modified d’Hondt method (Biin, 2004, p. 25-28; Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Biin criticizes the electoral system, as she claims that it favors large parties. Further, the third level of mandates are reserved for candidates that otherwise would not have been able to get elected. Unfortunately, this tool is not used to increase the number of female representatives, but instead, those votes are primarily given to male candidates. Laas indicates that only “women who are among the first ten or 20 candidates on a list are likely to be elected” (Laas, 2005, p. 104). Hence, the candidates are largely dependent on the position the party leadership is given. This criticism was unanimously given by the expert interviewees, identifying the electoral system with its closed party list as a major barrier for women. Overall, the fact that men are better known and popular during elections and are placed towards the top of election lists which makes them already look like potential winners, results in men receiving more votes than women (Raitviir, 2011, p. 151).

When asking about quotas, the experts had split opinions. In general, it needs to be mentioned that the concept of quotas itself has a very bad connotation in Estonia, based on the Soviet past. On the one hand, the system of quotas was very much favored in order to break the male dominance and give women the chance to prove themselves. As a fast and effective tool, the quota would ensure more balanced

decision-making and relatively proportional representation (4,5,6). Nevertheless, it was also indicated that most likely the so called ‘quota women’ would not be considered equal to other members of the *Riigikogu* and would therefore not be heard (Laas, 2005, p. 108). In contrast, only 10% of the participants of the Eurobarometer 75.1 were naming the tool of quotas as the answer to higher female representation (European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). On the other hand, the representative of the Social Ministry indicated that they have chosen a wider approach for Estonia, and are not considering the quota system. While this approach has the downside of being comparable slower, “when it does occur then it is done by the people themselves. So it is not like somebody up above says that it has to be like that, but the people themselves have reached to this understanding that we need more women to participate” (3,9).

As some interviewees indicated, the quota would most likely never be implemented in the electoral system of Estonia (5,8,11). Therefore, the author asked for opinions towards a system of quotas in the political parties, as a tool for not only opening up the chances for women to climb up on the party ladder internally, but also to show that gender is not a criteria for good politicians. Such voluntary measures were rather welcomed amongst the interviewees. However, as Allik argues, such list quotas might not have as striking of an impact as expected because the election against women has already happened before women are given the chance to even be on the list (Allik, 2010, p. 148). Nevertheless, a so-called ‘zebra list’, meaning the electoral list are composed of both sexes equally, was seen as a major improvement by all interviewees. While one political party has had such a list during a national election, namely *Keskerakond* the Center Party, none of the other political parties in Estonia have ever implemented such a measure. Tiina Raitviir examined the distribution and proportion of women on the party lists. Table 3.5 (on page 63) shows that while the ‘zebra list’ of *Keskerakond* clearly increased the amount of female candidates amongst the first 10 positions, the number of female candidates situated on positions 11 to 30 was disproportionally small. For the other political parties, only one or two of the first 10 positions were given to women, while amongst positions 11 to 30, between nine and four candidates were female. Overall the highest proportion amongst the first 30 positions was 1/3 of the candidates being female in *Keskerakond* and *Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond (SDE)*, and the lowest was only five out of 30 positions being given to the female candidates of *Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit (IRL)*.

Hence, if the number of female candidates is not increased, then it is nearly impossible to have a higher percentage of female members of parliament (Raitviir,

Table 3.5: Distribution of Female candidates amongst the first 30 places on the Election Lists of the Political Parties (Raitviir, 2011, p. 155).

	no of females amongst		
	positions 1-11	positions 11-33	last 25 positions
Keskerakond	5	5	
SDE	1	9	8
Reformierakond	1	6	6
IRL	1	4	
Rohelised	2	4	25
Rahvaliid	2	6	

2011, p. 151). This trend can also be detected when looking at the answers Estonian participants gave to the Eurobarometer 75.1. When being asked which measure would be the most effective in encouraging female participation, 31% claimed that ‘Parity on the electoral lists drawn up by political parties at every election’ would enhance the female participation (European Parliament, 2011, p. 20). However, Miriam Allik criticizes the approach of Raitviir stating that the problem lies mainly in the low number of women on top positions of the list, but indicates that the problem is not solely the low number of women on top positions, but the low number of women on the lists in general. If only 20 to 30% of the listed candidates are female, it is unrealistic to expect that women hold 40 - 50% of the seats at the *Riigikogu* (Allik, 2010, p. 141). Therefore, by only comparing the votes a male and female candidate receives on the grounds of gender, the influence of the media coverage, the value of the character and the factor of party membership are not taken into account, as the average vote is not solely given on the grounds of gender but also on the other factors, as Allik argues (2010, p. 141). Consequently, the focus should be turned towards the party leadership in order to reach more gender equality and a higher number of female candidates on the lists (Allik, 2010, p. 148).

Hence, the barrier resulting from the recruitment procedure that is named by Inglehart needs more analysis. While there are no women amongst the current party leaders (Raitviir, 2011, p. 148), which indicate a lack of role models for women to look up to (5,6,12,), Allik indicates that the problem of inequality increases with every step of the recruitment process since men are in general favored over women and with every step more and more women are eliminated from the already low number of women being willing to engage in the political recruitment procedure (2010, p. 142-144). Helen Biin has dedicated her Master’s Thesis to the topic of political recruitment. She concludes that four selection criteria seem to have an effect on the likelihood of women becoming candidates. “[P]opularity, vote collecting

abilities, ticket balancing and previous party work” (Biin, 2004, p. 42). Several interviewees indicated similarly, that so far women have not received as many votes during elections as men. Henceforth, listing women seems to be a rather unpopular and hindering decision for a party to gain as many seats as possible in an election. Furthermore, women have to show more dedication in party work, which as discussed above is often not possible as women are the main care-takers of children and the household aside from being employed. Biin further states that in general, female candidates that are on the top positions of the party lists are highly educated. Furthermore, they are expected to gain reputation and status through years of hard party work, which results in women having top positions on the electoral lists being on average older than female candidates in general. Furthermore, frequent incumbency was seen as a requirement for a top list position, as well as occupation, particularly women employed in state offices (Biin, 2004, p. 44-47). She concludes by indicating that “women are considered to be poorer candidates and politicians than men, they are expected to compensate their handicap of having female gender” (Biin, 2004, p. 47).

During the interviews an additional inequality was named when talking about campaigning. Experts indicated that based on the system of monetary distribution of campaigning funds, women are often discriminated against. In Estonia, candidates have to pay for the electoral campaign themselves, whereas the party subsidizes a certain amount of money. However, when looking at the distribution of such campaign money, women often receive disproportionately fewer funds. Governmental intervention was seen as the most suitable solution to ensure adequate distribution of the monetary funding (5).

Overall, it can be concluded that in terms of institutional settings, barriers exist in the Estonian case. Based on the list system used in elections, women are disproportionately pushed to the back of the lists, and as a result face problems in getting elected. Even though, it was mentioned in the interviews that the women’s organizations of the political parties are trying to emphasize the importance of balance according to gender, as well as women on lower list places have been receiving votes regardless recently equality is far from reached. However, since women overall have so far received proportionally less votes than men, the political leaders are not appointing women to the top of the list, as the main goal during the election is to receive as many votes in total as possible. A crucial factor therefore is the general acceptance of women as political figures, because all support would not result in success if the society is not willing to elect women. Henceforth, the next section will deal with attitudes and cultural aspects towards women in politics.

Cultural Barriers – In order to examine all aspects negatively affecting the representation of women in parliaments, Inglehart includes the cultural aspect. A major indicator of a balanced decision-making body is the value set of a society. Inglehart claims that traditional values are hindering the acceptance of female politicians. When assessing the cultural aspects, religion and the cultural heritage are the main concepts in focus.

In the case of Estonia, religiosity is a crucial factor. Inglehart claims that the decline of religiosity is connected to the transition to post-industrialism. Through secularization, belief in god and the importance of the church is declining, while values such as tolerance, sexual liberalization and equality are emphasized. In the case of Estonia, religiosity does not seem to play a significant role. As Figure 3.5⁶ (on page 66) shows, Estonia, indicated by the blue arrow, is one of the least religious societies. However, as claimed by all interviewees, Estonia's value system is largely based on Christianity, in particular Lutheran Protestantism. Even though the number of true believers is extremely low in Estonia, values such as the 10 commandments are mirrored in the Estonian culture. Further, as indicated earlier, Weber claimed that through Christianity, work ethics evolved. Hence, as Estonia was Christianized by Protestants, values such as hard-working prevailed until today.

Another major influence on cultural heritage in the case of Estonia, is the Soviet past. Still today, the imprint from the time of suppression can be seen. As Inglehart shows, a major imprint in Estonia's value set is the low level of trust, based on the past Soviet experience. Further, this can also be seen in the high level of survival values as discussed above. Instead of freedom of expression and equality, Estonia's society emphasized economic development and security after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whereas trust in others and institutions overall has increased since re-independence, trust in church, press, and especially in the *Riigikogu* and the political parties have declined tremendously (Heidmets, 2007, p. 61, 113; Heidmets, 2008, p. 28-31). Furthermore, Andrus Saar writes that "based on the Estonian example, one could say that the growth of tolerance has stopped half way. Tolerance has increased towards 'one's own' who have some problems, but the attitude towards strangers (foreigners) has become increasingly repelling" (Lauristin, 2010, p. 112).

However, Estonia has made a great effort to drop the Soviet association and strive towards belonging to the Nordic/Scandinavian societies. The expert interviewees state that Estonia took the Nordic countries as a kind of role-model, where the state wants to go, regardless of the different history (1). Further, while claiming to be

⁶Items: Importance of God, Comfort in religion, Belief in God, religious identity, Attend religious service, Life after death




Figure 3.5: Strength of Religiosity Score (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 53-54).

Nordic and striving to belong to that group of societies, Estonia mainly emphasized implementing and adopting features of the Nordic countries such as the economy, the welfare state and creating wealth in general (6), though values and especially gender equality were not included as priorities (8,10). “[W]hile people in Estonia admire the living standard in the Nordic countries and would like to lead similar affluent lifestyles, they are not understanding that gender equality is very much part of the value system in the Nordic societies” (8). Furthermore, another expert claims

that Estonia is not only striving to be Nordic, but also to be European, regardless of really understanding and knowing what that means (7). An example was given when an expert stated that when the ‘Finnish feminists’ came to Estonia to teach and coach the Estonian women what gender equality is, the Estonian women were repelled by the masculine look of the women. While Estonian women were eager to ‘beautify’ after the fall of the Soviet Union, it seems as if this negative picture is stuck in peoples mind when one speaks about emancipated women and feminists (7,8,12).

Furthermore, Barbi Pilvre argues that the question of Nordic belonging versus German identity has to be raised. While Estonia on the one hand counts itself amongst the Nordic countries, even though there are great differences (Pilvre, 2000, p. 60) not only historically but especially in identity and value set, Estonians on the other hand are influenced by the “‘German’ model of femininity” (Pilvre, 2000, p. 63). Therefore, while identifying with the German model, the wish to be European overpowers the wish to belong to the Nordic societies, even though in return that means favoring Western patriarchal values over Nordic emancipation (Pilvre, 2000, p. 63).

When arguing about the belonging to the Nordic societies, it has to be stated that linguistically Estonia belongs to the Finno-Ugric language family. Hence, Estonia is a genderless language “characterized by the complete lack of grammatical gender distinction in the noun system” (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 268-269). While it seems that genderless languages benefit the likeliness to positively impact gender inequality, measurements show that in terms of political empowerment and gender equality, gender neutral is the most beneficial language group, followed by genderless and finally gendered language. The authors of the study indicate that regardless of genderless language, words such as *riigimees* = statesman/politician ⁷, *peremees* = head of household/person in charge ⁸ and *õde* = sister and nurse are claimed to have an impact on gender stereotypes, especially in terms of occupation and work titles (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 270-271, 274, 278). Additionally, genderless languages “can include seemingly gender neutral terms that in fact connote a male bias (just as natural and gendered languages), but because they do not possess grammatical gender, it is not possible to use female pronouns or nouns to ‘emphasize women’s presence in the world’” (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012, p. 279).

⁷The work *riigimees* implies a somewhat respectable and honorable position. The term is often used for a person that used to be a politician, but is still active publicly. A more common term for politician is *poliitik*. However, when talking about female politicians, they are referred to as *naise poliitik*.

⁸The term *peremees* used to identify the head of the household. Nowadays it is more used in sense of being in charge

Furthermore, accordingly to Inglehart, sexual liberalization, including premarital relations, divorce, abortion, homosexuality and gender equality, indicate the emphasis a society puts on egalitarian values. As it was explained in the sections before, measuring gender equality may lead to false outcomes in the case of Estonia due to a misunderstanding of the concept. Hence, sexual liberalization is used as an alternative and clarifying measure to see how far the Estonian society emphasizes egalitarian values, and hence paves the way for more female representation. All interviewees explained that premarital cohabitation is a perfectly normal situation in Estonia. Most of Estonia's children are actually born outside of marriage as stated before. While this egalitarian approach is seen as modern, it does contain risks. As there is no legal basis for those relationships, in the case of an end of a cohabitation, the legal basis for settling such situations is not as developed as in the case of a divorce (1). Further, the experts indicated that the Estonian society is very open towards divorce. This can be seen as a 'leftover' from the Soviet era, where divorce was legalized. A third concept of sexual liberalization is abortion. While most of the experts agreed that in Estonia the act of abortion is not negatively viewed, it is also crucial to add that this is due to its legalization in 1955 in the Soviet Union. However, Pilvre indicates that even though women had the right to abort, the conditions were inhumane and the issue was not handled privately (Pilvre, 2000, p. 61). After the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been anti-abortion movements (7), however the experts claim that the general public is not very critical. Additionally, Inglehart includes the acceptance of homosexuality to the trend of sexual liberalization. The officials claimed that the Estonian society is somewhat distancing themselves from homosexuality, whereas younger Estonians, in particular females are showing a positive trend in terms of attitudes towards, and acceptance, of homosexuality. Furthermore, experts indicate that the large spread of homophobia can be traced back to the criminalization of homosexuality in the Soviet Union (11). One expert claimed that the discourse of homosexuality in Estonia is approximately at the stage where the discourse of gender equality had been 15 years ago (4).

Generally, it can be concluded that Estonia's cultural settings are at first glance favorable for the acceptance of women in politics. This approach is verified by measurements displayed in the Gender Equality monitoring, as an official of the Social Ministry claims, since in 2009, 47% of the Estonian society thought that men are not better political leaders as women. However on the downside, still 43% are in favor of the statement. Further measurements that Inglehart claims to be crucial in assessing a societies attitudes towards gender equality is the question of women having to have children to fulfill their goal. The official numbers show that in 2008, children were

seen as necessary to fulfill a women's life-goal by 73.2% (3). Furthermore, general perceptions of the interviewees were that amongst young educated women, children are not as important. Nevertheless, one expert concluded the discussion with drastic words, as she indicated that "female bodies are for entertainment in Estonia, or for birth-giving, the two things, not more!" (5). Henceforth, the perception of children being important is rather diverse in the case of Estonia. While striving for European belonging instead of Nordic membership, Estonia sacrificed the Nordic emancipation. Additionally, the positive impact on gender equality of Estonian, a genderless language, is rather overrated and foreshadowing. Moreover, as the experts claim, Estonians egalitarian approach of sexual liberalization, leaving homosexuality and gender equality aside, is partially based on the implementation of legal rights from the Soviet past. Therefore, the homophobia and the rather restricted acceptance of gender equality in Estonia are better indicators of the cultural barriers.

Overall, this analysis shows the contradictory situation of Estonia according to Inglehart's theoretical approach. While Estonia is somewhat in-between industrial and post-industrial societies, with a democracy that seems to be advanced compared to other CEE societies, but not advanced enough to compete with the 'older democracies', its labor force is mainly rooted in the service and knowledge sector. As one expert pointed out, "we have [a] good slogan, knowledge-based society" (5). Further, while rating relatively high on secular-rational values, Estonia is lagging behind on the shift towards self-expression values. One explanation is the *Romanticism* of, and return to, the traditional family model of the 30s after Estonia re-gained independence in 1991. While before women were almost invariably part of the labor force next to carrying all the household and child-caring duties, after the independence, women started to become home-makers again. Nevertheless, women were forced back into the labor market in order to make ends meet. A further indicator is the strong materialistic value-orientation, as well as the beautification of women, based on the low living-conditions and poor economy in the Soviet past.

Estonia's path towards gender equality can be summed up by two major influences. On the one hand, the negative connotation and misinterpretation on the basis of misuse, of gender equality in the Soviet Union, as well as on the other hand, the liberalization through the imposition of a specific legal and institutional setting through the European Union. In terms of gender equality in the political sphere, Estonia's situation is largely unbalanced. Furthermore, differences in ethnicity and location of female representatives were detected.

After identifying the main barriers throughout the structural, institutional and

cultural settings of the Estonian society, the first impression is deceptive. Whereas women are highly educated and largely employed, they face severe discrimination in terms of the large gender pay gap. Further, Estonia's segregated labor force also contributes to the negative impact of women. Additionally, the double burden detected in the Soviet era still remains as women are still in the role of the main care-taker of the children and the household. Hence, contrary to Inglehart's claim that socioeconomic barriers do not have a major impact on the percentage of female representatives, in the case of Estonia it can be argued that low income, less time and more concerning about family clearly constitutes barriers for women.

In addition to those barriers, the electoral system used in Estonia is not only negatively affecting the election of women, but the party culture and recruitment criteria seem to discriminate on the basis of gender. Keeping the structural barriers in mind, it seems to be nearly impossible for ordinary women to set foot in the political sphere. While women have less time, they are expected to invest disproportionately more monetary and human resources to get acknowledged by the party leaders, who are without exception men.

As the last section of this chapter has shown, cultural aspects do matter in the case of Estonia. The partial acceptance of sexual liberalization suggests that the church is not having an impact on everyday life per se, whereas the Soviet past and the Estonian language is. Therefore, as Estonia at first glance seems to be rather egalitarian, when analyzing other attitudes, towards for example homosexuality and gender equality, Estonia's 'true' position is detected.

3.5 Application of Inglehart's Modernization Theory on the Case of Estonia

After identifying the main barriers that women face in Estonia in entering the political sphere, Inglehart's overall approach has to be tested. Hence this section will first analyze if Inglehart's theory can be verified in the case of Estonia, as well as examine why the theory can only explain parts of the transition and situation in Estonia.

The theory states that economic development and a society's cultural heritage influence a shift from survival to self-expression values, which then emphasize values that lead to a higher percentage of women in parliaments. For the case of Estonia each concept will be analyzed in this section. First, in terms of economic development, Estonia increased its GDP per capita, however not high enough to be considered a post-industrial society. Therefore, it can be claimed that Estonia is at an intermediate stage between industrial and post-industrial societies. Even though, industrial societies have the largest labor force in industrial work, in Estonia the knowledge and service sector constitute the main workforce. However, the economic development also increased the gender pay gap, as the labor force in Estonia is extremely gender segregated.

While Inglehart claims that religion largely defines a society's cultural heritage, in Estonia religion is rather secondary. Estonia is highly secular and is one of the most non-religious societies in the world. However, the fact that Estonia is a European country cannot be disregarded as it is therefore based on Christian values, mainly the 10 commandments. Therefore, the measures taken by Inglehart in order to assess the position of Estonia in terms of religiosity seems to be misguided, as it only takes the attitudes towards religion and belief, as well as the activity in church into account.

More important, in the Estonian case, the influence of past events have to be analyzed. While Estonia is situated in Northern Europe, and it has been under different rules (Swedish, German, Soviet) in the past, and hence their imprints can be still seen today. In terms of Nordic belonging, even though historically the two overlap, in terms of values and culture, Estonia is far from being actually Nordic. However in terms of language families, Estonian and Finnish belong to the Finno-Ugric language family. Therefore culturally, it was claimed that on the one hand gender equality has benefited through the genderless language, whereas on the other hand occupational titles are often masculine or feminine depending on the work sector, resulting in segregation. However, the most important and most significant

imprint on Estonia's cultural heritage is the Soviet past, which still contributed to the negative attitudes towards gender equality.

The predicted value shift from survival to self-expression values on the second dimension of Inglehart's value map, can only be slowly recorded for Estonia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Estonia initially moved towards survival values, until 1996, when it again started to transition towards self-expression values. Hence, the value shift from survival to self-expression values has been taking place in Estonia, however very slowly. While Inglehart indicates that the concepts of sexual liberalization is accepted amongst post-industrial societies, Estonia once again proves to be a contradiction. While accepting and tolerating divorce, pre-marital relationships and abortion, Estonians are rather reserved when it comes to gender equality and homosexuality. Furthermore, Estonia is still transitioning towards a Postmaterial society. In terms of further self-expression values, the Estonian society has low scores on inter-personal trust, as stated above, as well as securing the financial and economic stability seem to so still play a major role.

Therefore, even though the precondition of economic development and non-religiosity are given for the case of Estonia, Inglehart's theory does not hold due to the strong emphasis of historical, cultural and socioeconomic factors. Overall, Inglehart misses to specifically take the negative connotation and experience of gender equality and the quota system amongst the CEE societies into account. While in the case of Estonia, after over 20 years of independence, the concept of women in politics is slowly gaining prestige, the deeply rooted perception of gender equality is hindering the effectiveness of measures and programs initiated by the *Sotsiaalministeerium* and the women's organizations.

Hence, what the theory is missing for the specific case of Estonia can be concluded. First, while Inglehart mentions the importance of historical events, he underestimates their strong impact and long-lasting imprint. Hence, in the case of Estonia, he fails to consider the major impact of the misunderstanding gender equality due to previous negative experiences with imposed equality and quotas. Second, Inglehart stresses the emphasis of cultural barriers and on the minimal effect of structural barriers restricting women from entering the political sphere. However in the case of Estonia, the socioeconomic situation is crucial, since a high gender pay gap and little free time due to the double burden result in insuperable obstacles. Further, the rigid obstacles of the Estonian electoral system create burden for women to be able to participate in politics on the national level. Here again, Inglehart underestimates the restricting influence of the recruitment criteria for candidates and also the acceptance of female candidates amongst the Estonian society. Third, Inglehart

claims that younger generations are more liberal, tolerant and open-minded, though in Estonia a trend of young men emphasizing traditional values over emancipation is present. Overall, while Inglehart's theory seems quite striking and universally applicable, the case of Estonia bears too many contradicting trends to fully apply the theory. Hence, even though Inglehart's positioning of Estonia on his cultural map seem legitimate, his explanations of why and how the values change, influence and are influenced, are not in line with the the findings of this study.

4 CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this thesis was to analyze if and how Inglehart's approach on the under-representation of women in parliament can be applied to the case of Estonia. First, Inglehart, Norris and Welzel's theory (2002) on economic development and cultural heritage triggering a shift in a society's value set was introduced. While survival values are emphasized amongst agrarian and industrial societies, post-industrial societies are largely based on self-expression values, and therefore put greater emphasis on tolerance, openness, freedom and equality. Furthermore, the scholars identified three sets of barriers: structural barriers concerning socioeconomic issues, institutional barriers, including the political and electoral system as well as the political party competition and candidate recruitment process, and finally cultural barriers, largely based on a society's religiousness. Due to the strong impact of a past full of occupations, and the short period of independence, the group of Central Eastern European societies were examined according to Inglehart's approach separately. This was necessary in order to see if the CEE societies face rather unique problems in terms of gender equality based on the experiences from the Soviet past. The first section was concluded by the criticisms of several scholars, whereas the most important issue for this research was the lack of specificity in terms of defining the concepts in use.

Next, the empirical methods used were introduced. Since the number of publications about this specific topic is rather limited, the author interviewed 12 experts in the field of gender equality. Those experts represented different institutions and groups, such as the Gender Equality Department of the *Sotsiaalminissteerium* and women's organizations. The data retrieved from the interviews was analyzed and compared to reports by the Estonian government and the European Union.

The main part of the thesis consists of the analysis in chapter three. According to Inglehart's definitions Estonia would be categorized as a newer democracy, while being in an intermediate state between industrial and post-industrial society. This assumption rests on the composition of the labor force in Estonia, because Estonia is largely based on the knowledge and service sector. While Estonia is also very non-religious and therefore ranks high on the secular-rational level, Estonia has yet

to shift towards strongly emphasizing self-expression values. This trend can also be detected when it comes to gender equality. Due to the Soviet tradition of enforcing equality and by extension, the double burden on women, Estonian society is rather sceptical when it comes to enforcing gender equality. Furthermore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union Estonia underwent a short phase of *Romanticism*, emphasizing patriotism, traditional values and family roles. Nevertheless, during the past years, due to EU accession, Estonia implemented the Gender Equality Act and established institutional bodies focused on the issue of gender equality. However, these laws and regulations were largely simply implemented and not enforced. Hence, in terms of female representation, the Estonian *Riigikogu's* composition is unbalanced gender wise.

In order to identify what is holding women back from entering the political sphere and becoming candidates for the *Riigikogu*, the three sets of barriers were analyzed. The structural barriers in Estonia were very restrictive, as women are not able to participate in the political sphere as much as men can, due to the fact that women have less free time based on the double burden and the gender pay gap. In terms of institutional settings the greatest barriers include candidate recruitment and selection criteria as well as position on the electoral list – since women were seen as the poorer candidates and hence have to be better educated, and contribute more work to the party than men. Furthermore, Estonia's electoral system was also identified as a barrier.

The last set of barriers, namely cultural barriers, which Inglehart's approach identifies as the most influential, depicted Estonia as very contradictory. According to the theory, due to Estonia's secularism Estonia should be putting very little emphasis on traditional values. However, when looking at the attitudes towards the concepts of sexual liberalization, namely premarital relations, divorce, abortion, homosexuality and gender equality, Estonia shows contradictions. While tolerating premarital relations, divorce and abortion, the other two concepts, homosexuality and gender equality, are not widely accepted. Furthermore, Estonia's close ties and strife for belonging to the Nordic countries should influence the attitudes and perceptions towards gender equality and self-expression values per se. Nevertheless, it was found that the strong impact of the Soviet past outweighs other historical factors. Especially as the Soviet imprint of gender equality and the foreshadowing inclusion of women in Soviet politics hinders the society today from understanding the benefits and emphasizing the importance of women in the political sphere. Hence, it can be concluded that while the church in Estonia does not have a strong impact on Estonia's culture, the Soviet past, and to a certain extent Christian values, do.

Finally, it can be concluded that based on the findings, the theory developed by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel is not fully applicable to the case of Estonia. Even though Estonia has undergone economic development, the shift towards self-expression values has not yet taken place in proportion. While Inglehart largely emphasizes religion when defining cultural heritage, he seems to underrate the imprint and long-lasting influence of the Soviet past in the case of the Central Eastern European societies.

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List of Interview Partners

This list shows the relevant information of the interview partners. The names have been removed and numbers have been addressed to each interviewee. Further, the interviewees background/occupation and its approximate age is stated.

Number	Background	Age	Place & Date
1	Independent advisory body	30 - 40 years	Tallinn, 30.08.2012
2	Sotsiaalkomisjon	30 - 40 years	Tallinn, 24.09.2012
3	Sotsiaalkomisjon	< 30 years	Tallinn, 24.09.2012
4	former Sotsiaalkomisjon	30 - 40 years	Tallinn, 21.09.2012
5	former Sotsiaalkomisjon & NGO	> 60 years	Tallinn, 24.09.2012
6	former Sotsiaalkomisjon & NGO	50 - 60 years	Tallinn, 24.09.2012
7	University	30 - 40 years	Tallinn, 17.09.2012
8	NGO & University	30 - 40 years	Tallinn, 28.08.2012 <small>(completed via mail by 06.09.2012)</small>
9	NGO	> 60 years	Tallinn, 29.08.2012
10	NGO	< 30 years	Tallinn, 18.09.2012
11	NGO	> 60 years	Tallinn, 18.09.2012
12	NGO & MP	40 - 50 years	Tartu, 15.09.2012

APPENDIXES

Figures and Tables by Inglehart, Norris and Welzel

Table A.1: Correlation of Additional Items with the Traditional/Secular-Rational Values Dimension (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 26).

Item	Correlation
TRADITIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:	
Religion is very important in respondent's life.	.89
Respondent believes in Heaven.	.88
One of respondent's main goals in life has been to make his/her parents proud.	.81
Respondent believes in Hell.	.76
Respondent attends church regularly.	.75
Respondent has a great deal of confidence in the country's churches.	.72
Respondent gets comfort and strength from religion.	.72
Respondent describes self as "a religious person."	.71
Euthanasia is never justifiable.	.66
Work is very important in respondent's life.	.65
There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here.	.63
Suicide is never justifiable.	.61
Parents' duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being.	.60
Respondent seldom or never discusses politics.	.57
Respondent places self on right side of a left-right scale.	.57
Divorce is never justifiable.	.57
There are absolutely clear guidelines about good and evil.	.56
Expressing one's own preferences clearly is more important than understanding others' preferences.	.56
My country's environmental problems can be solved without any international agreements to handle them.	.56
If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.	.53
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior.	.49
Family is very important in respondent's life.	.45
<u>Respondent is</u> relatively favorable to having the army rule the country.	.43
Respondent favors having a relatively large number of children.	.41
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	

Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990–1991 and 1995–1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: The original polarities vary. The above statements show how each item relates to the traditional/secular-rational values dimension, as measured by the items described in Table 1.

Table A.2: Correlation of Additional Items with the Survival/Self-Expression Values Dimension (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, p. 27).

Item	Correlation
SURVIVAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE FOLLOWING:	
Men make better political leaders than women.	.86
Respondent is dissatisfied with financial situation of his/her household.	.83
A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled.	.83
Respondent rejects foreigners, homosexuals, and people with AIDS as neighbors. ^a	.81
Respondent favors more emphasis on the development of technology.	.78
Respondent has not recycled things to protect the environment.	.78
Respondent has not attended meeting or signed petition to protect the environment.	.75
When seeking a job, a good income and safe job are more important than a feeling of accomplishment and working with people you like. ^b	.74
Respondent is relatively favorable to state ownership of business and industry.	.74
A child needs a home with both a father and mother to grow up happily.	.73
Respondent does not describe own health as very good.	.73
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior.	.71
When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.	.69
Prostitution is never justifiable.	.69
Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for.	.68
Respondent does not have much free choice or control over his/her life.	.67
A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	.67
Respondent does not favor less emphasis on money and material possessions.	.66
Respondent rejects people with criminal records as neighbors.	.66
Respondent rejects heavy drinkers as neighbors.	.64
Hard work is one of the most important things to teach a child.	.65
Imagination is <i>not</i> one of the most important things to teach a child.	.62
Tolerance and respect for others are <i>not</i> the most important things to teach a child.	.62
Scientific discoveries will help, rather than harm, humanity.	.60
Leisure is not very important in life.	.60
Friends are not very important in life.	.56
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections would be a good form of government.	.58
Respondent has not taken part and would not take part in a boycott.	.56
Government ownership of business and industry should be increased.	.55
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government.	.45
Respondent opposes sending economic aid to poorer countries.	.42
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	

Source: Nation-level data from 65 societies surveyed in the 1990–1991 and 1995–1998 World Values Surveys.

Note: The original polarities vary; the above statements show how each item relates to the survival/self-expression dimension, as measured by the items described in Table 1.

^a Outgroup index.

^b Job Motivation index.

Figures and Tables for the Case of Estonia

Table A.3: Estonian Labour force (Statistics Estonia, 2013).

RE006: UNITS IN THE STATISTICAL PROFILE BY Economic activity (EMTAK 2008), Indicator and Year	2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011										
	Economic activities total	107 277	114 261	113 249	117 425	126 845	134 281	139 303	132 355	141 063	132 201
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	10 182	21 123	18 048	17 443	18 076	17 467	16 401	9 861	15 054	12 827	13 044
Mining and quarrying	80	102	87	92	95	99	108	1 440	126	153	144
Manufacturing	5 179	6 628	6 863	7 049	7 477	7 828	8 050	6 490	7 720	7 435	7 593
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply	244	311	294	282	294	289	285	226	270	241	245
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities	182	245	255	257	252	261	263	2 287	304	355	360
Construction	2 849	4 445	4 979	5 952	7 481	9 531	12 111	12 447	10 356	9 167	9 684
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles	16 244	20 072	20 174	21 250	21 920	22 606	20 669	17 998	19 869	18 545	19 087
Transportation and storage	4 624	6 841	6 916	6 788	7 166	7 415	8 058	7 106	7 841	7 260	7 321
Accommodation and food service activities	2 010	2 112	2 132	2 107	2 391	2 462	2 477	2 983	2 618	2 801	2 859
Information and communication	1 301	2 150	2 245	2 400	2 634	2 939	3 251	3 078	3 601	3 877	4 391
Financial and insurance activities	607	1 232	1 001	1 057	1 159	1 232	1 638	2 452	1 639	1 427	1 581
Real estate activities	10 906	12 967	13 756	14 259	15 019	16 161	16 965	15 984	17 122	17 348	17 602
Professional, scientific and technical activities	4 475	4 679	4 967	5 625	6 489	7 344	8 679	16 143	11 005	12 402	13 424
Administrative and support service activities	1 317	6 672	6 866	7 093	8 268	9 177	9 952	3 244	9 261	6 188	6 102
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security	654	632	629	632	583	508	507	1 072	592	572	588
Education	2 139	2 529	2 649	2 694	2 788	2 929	3 091	3 208	3 368	3 613	3 726
Human health and social work activities	1 244	2 054	2 201	2 278	2 349	2 380	2 496	3 684	2 722	2 848	2 938
Arts, entertainment and recreation	3 467	4 835	5 404	5 790	6 179	6 560	6 999	12 087	7 921	8 451	8 929
Other service activities	5 794	10 057	11 433	12 460	14 366	15 403	16 285	10 562	18 020	16 691	17 303
Activities of households as employers; goods and services production for own use	0	27	24	19	25	28	27	3	12	0	0
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Economic activity unknown	33 779	4 547	2 326	1 898	1 834	1 662	991	0	1 642	0	0

Table A.4: Women in elected offices on international, national and municipal level (Ministry of Social Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, 2004, p. 40).

Women candidates and the elected in the Republic of Estonia, 1989-2004						
Elections	Date	Candidates		Candidates among them women		Total number of seats
		total		number	%	
Soviet Union deputies elections	3/26/1989	107		6	6.0	36
Parliamentary elections						
Congress of Estonia	24.02-01.03.90	1200		144	12.0	508
ESSR Supreme Soviet	3/18/1990	392		24	6.1	105
Parliament	9/20/1992	627		84	13.4	101
Parliament	3/5/1995	1250		219	17.5	101
Parliament	3/7/1999	1884		508	27.0	101
Parliament	3/2/2003	963		206	21.4	101
European Parliament elections						
European Parliament elections	6/13/2004	95		23	24.2	6
Municipal Council elections						
Local councils (soviets)	12/10/1989	8948		1342	15.0	3513
Municipal Council	10/17/1993	8971		2535	28.3	3483
Municipal Council	10/20/1996	11128		3674	33.0	3453
Municipal Council	10/17/1999	12802		4562	35.6	3355
Municipal Council	20/10/02	15181		5727	37.7	3273

Source: Raitviir (1996; Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon (Election Commission of the Republic))




Figure A.1: Role of Government Scale, 1990-2001. Women more left-wing than men
 - women more right wing than men (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, p. 82).

Interview Question Set

- What does gender equality mean for you?
- Why do you think gender equality would/might be important for Estonia?
- Currently, 22.8% of the seats in the Riigikogu are held by women. What are the consequences for Estonia? → Would you say the Estonian parliament is unbalanced?
- In terms of political parties, is political recruitment a problem? (Supply – demand) Meaning, are there not enough available female candidates? Or are people unwilling to vote for women?
- What is, in your opinion, the main reason why there are more men than women in parliament?
- What would encourage women in Estonia to care, actively participate, run for election?
- When looking at the % of women in parliament, one might ask why is there no quota?
- In your opinion, should political parties have quotas?
- In terms of political activism in Estonia, memberships in political parties and in labor unions are not common. Why? → What role does Estonia's Soviet past play?
- A general trend is that women participate more in the field of social policy – can this be said for Estonia? Would you say that one reason is because women are the main beneficiaries of social policy?
- Is there a traditional gender gap (women more conservative than men, more likely to vote for right- center parties) or a modern gender gap (women move towards left of men) in Estonia? Meaning, are women more conservative than men or vice versa?
- Is it that Estonians think that a woman has to have children to complete their mission in life?
- How common is the perception that 'Men make better politicians/ political leaders than women?

- Due to Estonia's past, is gender equality seen as a Soviet concept? What are the consequences? Is there a great generational difference, amongst people that grew up in Soviet Estonia and that grew up during the 90s?
- After the regaining of independence, would you say that there was a focus on national identity/patriotism? Did that make attitudes in general more traditional and conservative? Are there generational differences? (e.g. younger generations being more egalitarian?)
- Why is there no women's movement in Estonia?
- Is there a big difference between Estonians and Russian Estonians in attitudes to gender, and women in politics? ?
- Are there regional differences in attitudes to gender, and women in politics?
- Does religion play a role in Estonia's culture?
- Would you say Estonians are open to 'sexual liberalization', e.g., accepting divorce, premarital relations, abortion, homosexuality? Are there differences between generations?
- Do you consider Estonia materialist or post-materialist? Estonia claims to belong among the Nordic countries. When comparing attitudes towards gender equality, it becomes clear that Estonia is still far from being a Nordic country. Wouldn't the desire to be Nordic increase the demand for gender equality and hence more women in parliament?
- During the accession period of the EU, what were the major changes that Estonia went through in terms of gender equality? Were there general changes in the attitudes of people towards women in leading positions?
- Was the accession favorable for women in Estonia's political sphere? If yes, what are the benefits?
- Would you agree with Inglehart, that modernization can lead to more freedom, trust, openness as well as democracy and gender equality? If yes, do you see Estonia and its people undergoing this process?