

University of Tartu
Department of Semiotics

William Elwood Derrah IV
Text in Terms of Context
Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Katre Pärn

Tartu 2023

Contents

Introduction.....	2
The Text.....	4
Barthes	5
Lotman	8
Eco	14
Fish	18
Expanding the Text - Introduction.....	23
Expanding the Text - Distanciation.....	25
Expanding the Text - Foregrounding the Context	36
Context Constraint - Introduction	41
Context Constraint - Platforms of Thought	43
Context Constraint - Mediation’s Biases	48
Context Constraint - Text in the Aggregate	59
Textual Synthesis - Text as Context-Constraint Hierarchy.....	63
Analysis.....	69
Conclusion	83
Summary in Estonian.....	84
Citations	86
APPENDIX 1 - Children’s Play Arrangement.	88
APPENDIX 2 - Constraint Hierarchy Rubric.....	89

Introduction

"The Text" is a useful theoretical approach to address complicated semiotic questions of mediation, information, cultural systems and ideology, anthropology, and so on. On the other hand, being this broadly applicable has downsides - namely, the text's theoretical basis and limitations steer it towards certain applications and away from others. The text is particularly useful, and has a well documented history in exploring, literary narrative texts, visual works and films, contemporary and modern arts, historical works and classics, and of course much more. However, the 'mainstream,' if we can say that, use of The Text is not particularly suitable towards certain 'non-traditional' (if we can additionally say *that*) texts - like, for instance, texts produced by and for children. This is obviously a problem, as works within these domains surely look and act quite a bit like texts, and should be as palatable to analysis as any other. That they are not fully integrated is grave academic blind spot.

But of course, they are not suitable for traditional analysis modes for good reason. The 'nontraditional' texts mentioned may be unwieldy, difficult to parse or conceptualize from any perspective, confounding, frustrating, antagonist, semiotically avoidant, and generally not agreeable to a standard 'reading' style. A child's toy, for instance, could on the surface look and function like a Bauhaus home decor object, yet 'under the hood,' the child's text may well reject the sort of confident in-roads to analysis the Bauhaus object would be quickly dissected. If the analysis cannot presume the child's intentionality in their use of the text, nor even of the text's own intentionality (should it be made by a child), how can analysis begin?

What inspired this line of questioning, and this entire thesis, came from a casual observation: Why do texts for children differ aesthetically so much from texts for adults? Is it a cultural fluke - an accident of aesthetics? Surely not, for the content in children's texts also differs in serious structural ways from that of adults. Is it a necessary effect of designing media for nonliterate or partially

literate subjects? Partially, perhaps, as mediation strategies will have to adjust to the audience with their abilities in mind. Maybe the question can be addressed in terms of cognitive development, or child psychology, or anthropology, or neurology, pedagogy, even critical theory, and so on. While each of these offer truly important insights to the open question, they quickly lead us astray from the core notion of the text.

So how to go about this? To start, by centering discussion around the text, and to whatever extent is useful, cherrypicking theories and insights from other fields. This is almost certainly necessary if the field of textuality is 'uncomfortable' when working with such texts. These adjacent theories will have to be synchronized with textual theories, which already provides a roadmap for this thesis:

- a discussion of textual theories
- a discussion of text-adjacent theories which can be synchronized with textual theories
- synthesizing these theories into a single proposal, a synthetic approach to the text with a new expanded sense of the text in mind

Once a synthesized, new way to approach the text is developed, this will be tested on a “difficult” text to test its viability.

The Text

There is little explicit agreement on how exactly and precisely to define what a text is. In general, the text has been used as a means to frame the boundaries of signs which are artistically-oriented, or at least are less explicitly language-per-se. Theorists who centered their work around the concept of the text include (but are of course not limited to) Roland Barthes, Juri Lotman, Umberto Eco, Stanley Fish, all of whom mainly dealt with meaning and signification in artistic works. Other writers, dealing with a variety of subjects ranging from anthropology and cognitive development, to media studies and political philosophy, have variously used the concept of the text in their own works, and in doing so offer their own thoughts and definitions on the concept. We will examine briefly some of these ways to define the text, first from semioticians, and then from other disciplines which are nevertheless semiotics-adjacent.

To reiterate, writers from a variety of academic fields have offered different definitions of the text, with some having addressed it more or less directly in semiotic terms. As we are working towards an expanded working area of textuality, we will utilize authors who did not directly discuss the text in semiotic or other terms, but nevertheless broached the subject and contributed meaningfully. Some emphasize semiotic theories, some prioritize media theories, while still others address it from anthropological theories.

Barthes

Roland Barthes is famous for an academic career of semiotic and textual analyses which saw him address texts across a variety of mediums, genres, time periods, and cultures. Among other contributions to semiotics and textual theory, he articulated an expansive yet carefully considered description of what constituted the text. In *Image-Music-Text's* (1978) collection of essays, Barthes' "From Work To Text" (orig. 1971) discusses seven main points essential to a text:

The text is to be considered more as a verb, a moving and active process, than as a stable and fixed noun. He writes that the text "only exists in the movement of a discourse[...] the Text is experienced only in activity of production." (Barthes 1978: 156-157)"

This is in contrast to the stable and fixed "work," which the reader-user does not create so much as find already present. He clarifies that "the Text is not the decomposition of the work, it is the work that is the imaginary tail of the Text." (Barthes 1978:156-157) In other words, the text becomes a text first and foremost through an active engagement, an activity. The text cannot be entirely passive - such an event would be recognizably not a text (whatever it may be).

The text, as a process, will always be subject to conventional and organizational thinking which seeks to categorize and understand it in a manner approaching some fixed sense. However, the text "is always paradoxical" (Ibid: 157), and such attempts are futile. The text will always offer a confounding escape route to any fixation.

Texts are acts of semiosis - they are "radically symbolic: a work conceived, perceived and received in its integrally symbolic nature is a text" (Ibid:158-159). Reversing this definition, the text is characterized by its activity existing primarily (if not entirely) at the symbolic level.

The text is irreducible in its proclivity towards connections and meaning-makings. Barthes frames this by saying that the text "is plural. [...] it accomplishes the very plurality of meaning: an irreducible (and not merely an acceptable) plural. [...] an explosion, a dissemination." (Ibid: 159) The text's semiotic connections will never only fit neatly and clearly as was pro- scribed by the author - it has a life of its own, in a sense. However, this chaotic nature is product of the semiotic

architecture of the text, its very being as a mechanism, and not merely a corollary to the numerical readings possible in ambiguous content. Barthes writes that this textual architecture is "what might be called the stereographic plurality of its weave of signifiers (etymologically, the text is a tissue, a woven fabric.)" (Barthes 1978:159)

The text is a fully functioning and independent thing separated from its author. It "can be read without the guarantee of its father, the restitution of the inter-text paradoxically abolishing any legacy" as "no vital 'respect' is due to the Text: it can be broken. (Ibid: 160-161)" The author becomes one of many points of evidence, either found in or brought to the text, which may well influence possible readings, but are not essential to reading the text in the first place.

The text is a not only process and a verb, but can also be considered in terms of play, or dialogue. A text is akin to a sports ball or a musical instrument, a platform of engagement offering a pathway to meaning, semiotically scaffolded, to the user. Barthes writes that the text "decants the work (the work permitting) from its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, practice." (Ibid: 161) The text:

requires that one try to abolish (or at the very least to diminish) the distance between writing and reading, in no way by intensifying the projection of the reader into the work but by joining them in a single signifying practice. [...] the reader plays it twice over, playing the Text as one plays a game, looking for a practice which re-produces it, but, in order that that practice not be reduced to a passive, inner mimesis (the Text is precisely that which resists such a reduction), also playing the Text in the musical sense of the term. (Barthes 1978: 161-162)

The text operates in a sense charged with direction, and from an anthropocentric view can be considered waiting until the user activates and rides the mass and momentum it offers. Similarly, Barthes notes that "to be bored means that one cannot produce the text, open it out, set it going" (Barthes 1978: 163).

In summary of all of these points, Barthes considers the text to be an active and playful symbolic semiotic process removed from its ostensible author and characterized by immeasurable semiotic interconnectivity and reactivity. He further summarizes this explosive character in saying, "Text is that social space which leaves no language safe, outside, nor any subject of the enunciation in position as judge, master, analyst, confessor, decoder" (Barthes 1978: 164).

In this hyperplurality which eschews easy and fixed framings, analysis can be difficult. To this, Barthes considers again the paradoxical nature of the text in that the "theory of the Text can coincide only with a practice of writing" (Ibid: 64). Extending this into practical applications and analysis, Barthes writes that the textual analysis method seeks to untangle the explosion of semiosis in a text. That is, the aim and purpose of textual analysis is to understand, in a grammatical or architectural sense, how the text delivers its semiotic explosion. Such analysis "conceives the text as taken up in an open network which is the very infinity of language, itself structured without closure" (Ibid: 126). In this sense analysis is not to be an argument for or against any one reading of a text. He writes that a textual analysis "tries to say no longer from where the text comes (historical criticism), nor even how it is made (structural analysis), but how it is unmade, how it explodes, disseminates - by what coded paths it goes off." (Ibid: 126-127) Additionally, the effective analyst "endeavors to 'see' each particular text in its difference - which does not mean in its ineffable individuality, for this difference is 'woven' in familiar codes" (Barthes 1978:126).

In "Rhetoric of the Image" (1977/78 [1964]) Barthes demonstrates the pragmatic 'best fit' for a textual semiotic analysis of (among other things) a series of visual texts. His choice of text - an advertisement - reflects clearly a perfectly interlocked space where textual strategies dovetail with semiotic theory. Barthes writes: "in advertising the signification of the image is undoubtedly intentional [...] If the image contains signs, we can be sure that in advertising these signs are full, formed with a view to the optimum reading: the advertising image is *frank*, or at least emphatic." (Barthes 1978: 33)

Thus the distinguishable elements within the text are immediately already semiotic elements, and vice versa. By virtue of being an advertisement, a market-perfected intentional text - any 'noise' one thinks they may have found in the work is immediately called into question, for the analyzer will generously give any questionably intentional aspects the authors include the benefit of the doubt, forwarding both a richer semiotic and textual reading.

Lotman

As a semiotician and philologist, Juri Lotman primarily addressed the text in relation to its unique ability to transfer information within cultural spheres. Much of his work explores the semiotic mechanisms of culture by way of the text, which serves as the primary means by which cultures communicate in and between themselves. In this sense, to Lotman the text is the essential building block of culture itself. However, Lotman's view of the text shifted over his career. Boguslaw Zylko wrote in his *Culture and Semiotics: Notes on Lotman's Conception of Culture*:

At first, Lotman tended to regard the text as unchangeable, isolated, self-sufficient. In his 1970 book on the structure of the artistic text, he defined "text" as a creation internally organized and recorded in definite signs. However, in his last book Lotman considerably modified this conception, placing text in a tangle of relations between author and audience. The text was no longer a stable object possessing certain constant features; rather it was the area where the author's and the reader's points of view intersected. (Zylko 2001:406)

Lotman used the text as the mechanism by which he could understand and decompose complicated cultural processes. Zylko continues:

Lotman was particularly interested in the way philosophical ideas, worldviews, and social values of a given period are enacted in its literature. For Lotman, a period's literary and ideological consciousness, world-view, and the aesthetics of its trends and currents [...] are not a loose conglomerate of various convictions concerning the world and literature, but a hierarchic group of cognitive, ethical, and aesthetic values. Lotman's analysis of the artistic text related both text and author to the supraindividual public sphere of a given period." (Zylko 2001: 391)

Lotman articulated the text in a few essential ways:

- The text as an intercrossing/interlinking/interweaving of codes on a fixed space or thing
- The text as a semiotic device used to selectively modify/reframe/utilize codes within (and external to) a culture
- The text as a semiotic dialogue partner which reacts to semiotic engagement, ideally to the extent that the text becomes an all-but-human agent in the richness of semiotic production.

The Lotmanian text is characterized perhaps first as foremost as an overlapping of codes upon a designated space. The text, rather than a pre-packaged sender-receiver 'message in a bottle,' is

instead to be considered synonymous with a multiplicity of encodings. A minimum of two distinct codes are required, though any number can be present. It is the codes' mutual internavigation around shared referents which creates the boundaries of what we recognize as the text (Lotman 1983). This view sees the text-as-crossroads, in which separate and heterogeneous codes (perhaps considered as restricted vocabularistic structures) spur creative and unpredictable creations to produce shared code-contingent information. Under such a paradigm the codes which create texts are thus simultaneously in a position of being *supertextual* and *supratextual*, rejecting simple hierarchical formulations and being more conducive to reading the text as a semiotic explosion, a thought which Lotman explores in great detail in *Culture and Explosion* (2009). In a 1964 lecture, Lotman defined the text as "the entire sum of structural relations that [find] linguistic expression" (Levchenko, Salupere 1999), a definition keeping in line with the above framing of text as a delimited crossing of codes.

To consider the interplay of codes and their relationship both to the semiotic structures of the text, Lotman carefully considers what the essential moments of code-contacts are, and what these moments entail. For instance, the codes the reader brings to the text are never perfectly analogous with another reader, nor are they with the text's author, nor are the codes generated at the moment of reading the text predictable according to the text. Moving away from a Jakobsonian model, Lotman writes that this is part of a text's normal functioning:

The text fully becomes a generator of new meanings when a receiver with their own set of codes and their individual and shared memory connects with its internal polyglottism because 'the memory of a person coming in contact with a text can itself be considered a complex text, the contact which leads to creative changes in the information chain'. (Lotman 1992a: 146)

For an example, Lotman writes that the:

artistic text is also such a device, to which the receiver 'connects', in this way creating a 'semiotic situation.' 'It is enough', says the Tartu semiotician 'to take Hamlet off the shelf, read it or perform it on stage, after having connected the reader or viewer to it, for it to begin functioning in the role of a generator of new meanings'. (Lotman 1981: 7)

A text of this kind is by its nature polyglottic in a semiotic sense, coded (as in the case of a theatre performance, an opera, or a film) with the use of various visual and aural codes. Its potential is activated through coming into contact with another text, which is in practice the reader, equipped

with their own set of codes. The codes of the text and of the receiver overlap only to some extent (which is a condition of effective reception), which leads to the phenomenon that Lotman calls "a non-trivial shift of meaning in the process of the text passing from the sender to the receiver" (Lotman 1981: 5).

Aleksei Semenenko writes in his *The Texture of Culture*, an excellent overview of Lotman's semiotics, that the text is always in a staggered, ordered plane of codes:

expressedness is what makes a text a text [...] In practice it means that any time we communicate with a text—for example, a new novel—we unavoidably compare it on different levels with some superstructures as genre, subgenre, style, and others, thus forming the impression of this concrete text. Because a work of art lies at the intersection of several deciphering codes, “the relationship of text and system in an artistic work is not the automatic realization of an abstract structure in concrete form, but is always a relationship of struggle, tension, and conflict” (Lotman 1976a, 123–24). [...] expressedness also refers to “the material envelope” of the text: how it is expressed in any medium, be it the sounds of natural language, images on film, or symbols printed on paper or shown on the computer screen. What is essential here is that when a text is expressed in some material substance, this substance becomes semiotized as well, acquiring additional meanings (consider such phrases as “the noble marble of a tombstone” or “the gleam of a glossy magazine”). (Semenenko 2012: 79-80)

The text as a crossroads of codes is thus less the awareness of a discrete coinciding of codes and more a situational battlefield of competing readings - a dialogue with a localized kaleidoscope of culture delimited by the user's awareness of the text as a text.

Lotman would also describe the text as an "isolated, self-contained semiotic formation, with its integral indivisible meaning and its integral indivisible function," (Lotman 1990:47), here emphasizing the bounded nature of the text, and the necessity for unique operations or structures to take place within the confines of specialized semiotic boundaries. The text, here defined as a unique object separated from its environment, is known by its delimited nature. In fact, it is in the very act of delimiting and setting the boundary which permits codes to overlap and cross-pollinate at all. On this Peeter Torop notes in a forward in *Culture and Explosion*:

When speaking of text, Lotman had emphasized the importance of the beginning and the end, or the frame. Therefore for him, text was a delimited whole and the possibility of delimiting, either natural or artificial, made it possible to speak about levels of material, the coherence and hierarchy of levels. (Torop 2004: xxxv)

In this sense the text is merely the result of being able to cross codes upon each other - what we recognize as text is the site at which codes are permitted to inter-cohere. Explaining this further, Semenenko continues:

One of the features of the text is seemingly too obvious: the text is delimited. The boundaries of the text, its actual or metaphorical frame, is what distinguishes it from other texts, extratexts, and non-texts. [...] In addition to that, any text is necessarily perceived in relation to what is situated outside the text and the idea of nontext as well. If the recipient does not notice the frame, the text is considered to be a nontext. [...] Establishing the boundaries of the text naturally plays an important part in its perception: for example, in Vladimir Nabokov's *Lolita*, it is easy to neglect the "Foreword" by the fictional John Ray Jr. as seemingly not Nabokov's text, which significantly influences the perception of the whole story. [...] (Semenenko 2012: 84-85)

The delineated text, simultaneously synonymous with its place in the larger system and known in its 'isolation' antagonistic to the texts surrounding it, reflects again the explosive fractal-like cross-delineation Lotman and Barthes both consider essential to the text's informationality. Barthes, who said the text was an "uncountable" or "innumerable" generator of semiosis, is met by Lotman in seeing the text as an explosion, a fractal lens of infinite possibility. It is this capacity for explosive richness, of being more than the sum of its parts, that gives the text its prestigious place in human communication. Lotman writes that "the artistic text is a structure, a pattern. It can grow infinitely. In this sense the artistic 'creation' (the thing created) is secondary to the process of artistic enframing which creates it" (Lotman 1981: 55).

Here we see a paradox - the text needs to be delineated in space, limited to codes, and present in a larger signifying order of hierarchies of codes. Yet the text is also 'uncontrollable' in its capacity to grow and semiotically connect to other texts. The text is distinctly not a divisible series of connections which can be separated, nor is it the mere sum of its parts, but a living, contingent thing.

Lotman explores the text's communicativity a great deal, noting that the text enables communication between addresser and addressee, an audience and a cultural tradition, and a text reader with themselves (Lotman 1988: 55). Like Barthes, Lotman says that the text is a proactive process, not a received event. He writes that a "user communicates with the text," that the user "enters into contact with it," and in doing so the autonomy of the text is revealed:

The process of deciphering a text becomes extremely complicated and loses its one-time and definitive character, becoming more like acts, familiar to us, of semiotic communication of one person with another autonomous personality. (Lotman 1981: 57)

The text's reader-to-self communicative interaction is so strong that Lotman comments that the text "becomes an interlocutor on an equal footing, possessing a high degree of autonomy," to the extent that the text reader indeed may learn new information about themselves solely through the act of using texts. (Lotman 1981:55). In this way text-use may be considered comparable to the same reader engaging with other human beings in a more colloquially recognizable form of communication. And yet, perhaps paradoxically, the text is (as with Barthes) not on its own a self-contained agent, but must be used and engaged to be summoned into life:

For a text to start 'working', there must exist an internal impulse (which in isolation remains dead) and the role of such a 'start-up mechanism', which activates the creative potencies of a text, is in the end played by a different text (a different consciousness, a different culture). (Zylko 2015: 34)

In doing so the text not only emerges, but is fundamentally changed through the process of its emergence. Its dynamic and unpredictable reaction to the contingencies and contexts surrounding the text-users's engagement with it form the basis of its dialogic richness. Taken in aggregate, this semiotic dialogism becomes the very foundation of human communicability, a thought which shapes Lotman's understanding of the origin of semiotic codes. Lotman writes: "Consciousness is impossible without communication. In this sense it can be said that dialogue precedes language and generates the language" (Lotman 1984: 16). That the origin of symbolic thought, and thus perhaps symbolic code, follows, and does not precede, a recognized other will be explored later, through the work of authors like Ricoeur, Donald, and Deacon.

As a key figure in the Tartu-Moscow School, Lotman worked within the intellectual milieu that so often defined complex systems in culture like art, religion, and similar domains "as "secondary modelling systems," in the sense that they are both superimposed on natural language and modelled on it. Briefly, those domains are "language-like"." (Zylko 2001: 395) Zylko cites Lotman from a translated work, where he describes "Those systems based on natural language which acquire additional superstructures in the shape of secondary languages may be conveniently called secondary modelling systems." (Lotman 1967: 1301 – cited via Zylko 2001: 395.) Zylko continues

that as a result of considering cultural domains in terms of this sort of secondary modelling system, that:

secondary languages are simultaneously communication systems (they serve to get across some definite information), as well as modeling systems (they provide multiple images of the world). Therefore every modeling system has a bounded image of the world as its necessary point of reference. (Zylko 2001:395)

With this framework the modeling system itself begins to reflect the logic of the text in that its architecture facilitates a shared engagement between prescribed codes, set information, and a space wherein novel reactions can occur. Continuing, Zylko explains Lotman's text in terms adjacent to this, explicating how the text serves as model and mode-of the world external to it:

by calling the text "a specific model," Lotman meant that the literary work correlates with the reality beyond it and "reconstructs" the external world in a way specific to itself. The text is an unusual model, differing in many aspects from other types of models like scientific ones. The text is rendered relative to reality (we leave reality undefined, for now); it contains knowledge of the world, which it displays by means of a to-be-defined language of representation, or modelling." (Zylko 2001:395-396)

Semenenko offers an excellent comprehensive summary of Lotman's text, writing:

Lotman outlines two basic functions of the text: communicative (transfer of information) and creative (generation of new information). In terms of information theory, the creative function of the text is by all means entropic: it seems to obstruct the communicative one because it increases the text's unpredictability and ambiguity. Lotman, however, shows that in art and culture unpredictability is the intrinsic function of the system, and entropy ("noise" that accompanies the message) is a necessary condition for meaning-generation. (Semenenko 2012: 32)

To summarize this discussion ourselves, we may say that the Lotmanian notion of text is a semiotic construction, built of selectively interacting and overlapping codes, delimited within a bounded space, which characteristically serves a series of complex communicative functions at all levels of hierarchy within a culture. In this way, the text is simultaneously "just" a small piece of a culture, the essential quality of the process of culture, and a reflection of any given culture in as a whole. It is with such a fluid and responsive framework that Lotman expertly navigates complex semiotic questions of culture.

Eco

Semiotician Umberto Eco approached the text less as an essential building block within culture and more as a communicative event predicated on the nature and style of its decipherability. Agreeing with Lotman on many points, in *The Role of the Reader* Eco writes that "what one calls 'message' is usually a text, that is, a network of different messages depending on different codes and working at different levels of signification" (Eco 1984:5).

Eco elaborates at length a theory of text making and deciphering based on the author and text-user's shared understanding - itself a guessing game between two individuals through an opaque veil. As the author of a text creates it, they must hold a theoretical reader of it in mind, a theory of which he describes:

To organize a text, its author has to rely upon a series of codes that assign given contents to the expressions he uses. To make his text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble of codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by his possible reader (hereafter Model Reader) supposedly able to deal interpretatively with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them. (Eco 1984: 7)

This not-quite-a-game between an imaginary reader in the mind of the author and an imaginary author in the mind of the reader nevertheless is a textually predicated relationship, as it is the text itself that "creates the competence of its Model Reader" (Eco 1984: 7-12). Eco continues that "it seems that a well-organized text on the one hand presupposes a model of competence coming, so to speak, from the outside of the text, but on the other hand works to build up, by merely textual means, such a competence" (Eco 1984: 7-12).

The text then is, similar to Lotman and Barthes, a semi-autonomous dialogic partner of sorts. In fact, the text's prime use is in navigating dialogic dynamics, which brings us to one of Eco's major questions.

Keeping in mind the author-reader basis of the text, Eco defines the text is a multifaceted, indivisible coalescence of symbols located in a discrete delimited space. The practicalities of this de-

limited space's emergence - that is, the context in which the text-reader finds the text - are essential to the functioning of the text. Eco writes:

A text is a place where the irreducible polysemy of symbols is in fact reduced because in a text symbols are anchored to their context. The medieval interpreters were right: one should look for the rules which allow a contextual disambiguation of the exaggerated fecundity of symbols. [...] many modern theories are unable to recognize that symbols are paradigmatically open to infinite meanings but syntagmatically, that is, textually, open only to the indefinite, but by no means infinite, interpretations allowed by the context. (Eco 1994: 21)

If the text is a product and process of discourse, the reader's gleaning of "correct" information, a "good" reading of the text is essential to its role in society. If discourse is an essential element within the texts functioning, and vice versa, then informational fidelity would be an essential aspect.

In short, Eco sees that "The reader finds his freedom (i) in deciding how to activate one or another of the textual levels and (ii) in choosing which codes to apply" (Eco 1984: 39).

But unlike Lotman, Eco prioritizes the question of a text's "correct" reading - what that means exactly, and how it functions. Whereas Lotman's text emphasizes an almost psychedelic surplus of codes and possibilities packaged in the text, Eco explores the text almost as a traditionalist in that he articulates the mechanics of "better" or "worse" readings. This primarily comes from his understanding of the syntagmatic axis of the text, which, by accounting for the range of potentialities in the text, mirrors the context's capacity to predicate meaningfulness. He writes:

Texts are the human way to reduce the world to a manageable format, open to an intersubjective interpretive discourse. Which means that, when symbols are inserted into a text, there is, perhaps, no way to decide which interpretation is the "good" one, but it is still possible to decide, on the basis of the context, which one is due, not to an effort of understanding "that" text, but rather to a hallucinatory response on the part of the addressee. (Eco 1991:21).

The context is a necessary external element to reduce the infinity of possibilities present within any given arrangement of symbols, as in the 'grammatical' act of being within a text, possible meanings are culled, guided, sculpted, and brought under reign. Recall above that Eco wrote:

“symbols are paradigmatically open to infinite meanings but syntagmatically, that is, textually, open only to the indefinite, but by no means infinite, interpretations allowed by the context.” (Eco

1991: 21) In other words, while a text, at any level of disambiguation and decomposition, may host any number of symbols, each with an infinite number of possible readings, the meanings behind those symbols are not set in stone beforehand but rather emerge from the context of the text's use in a given place and time. In this way the context will always serve to reduce the infinite held in the abstract by the text - as Eco says, "anchoring" it down to a limited number of plausible, or permissible, readings. In one example, Eco discusses the nature of analysis of familiar canonical texts. While there are in theory an infinite number of possible re-readings (Marxist, historical, Christian, reactionary, postcolonial, etc), certain facts of the text, which themselves are expressed solely within the text, are considered undeniable: "Any English student asserting that Hamlet was married to Ophelia would fail in English, and nobody could reasonably criticize his/her teacher for having relied on such a reasonable notion of truth." (Eco 1994: 64)

Eco writes that Derrida's *Grammatology* mentions that traditional textual analysis has 'guard rails' to keep things from going too wild, but "this indispensable guard-rail has always only protected, it has never opened a reading" (Eco 1994:3 5). Charles Sanders Peirce himself had the idea of a privileged meaning which was the core constitution of a text which could be "spelled out unambiguously" (Eco 1994: 35).

Textual analysis rules exist in real life, where a text's interpretation as a social fact is reasserted as singularly correct and is enforced through a normalized textual reading process. This Derridean guard rail becomes more or less a road when approaching works within canonized genres, where social history has a ready-made approach to reading the text. Similarly, one may expect that a radically experimental artistic genre would preclude any canonized approach, a small step towards inoculating culture from a geriatric hyperprescience. This Eco discusses in his concept of the Open and Closed text.

Thus, Eco identifies a balancing act the text engages in between its own formal elements and the context around it. Though the meaningfulness of a symbol is situational to the text, the context of that texts use is determines how the symbols are understood, even if those symbols are formally 'locked' within a palette of possible interpretations. To this Eco adds: "any act of interpretation is a dialectic between openness and form, initiative on the part of the interpreter and contextual pres-

sure.” (Eco 1994: 21) In other words, the textual symbol is open within the context of its holding-text’s usage by the person as audience.

To summarize, Eco's use of text sees the meaningfully fixed semiotic aspects within the work as essential to what constitutes the text. The character by which the text is constructed has a materially real and 'factual' basis in relation to the formal elements and the content within it. Eco is very interested in the reader as the arbiter of a text's content. In practice, Eco’s notion of the text empowers an arts criticism style of analysis, where the text unfolds into possible vocabularized, discrete, localized language that can be argued 'logically' to prove one's interpretation as more valid versus another. The "grammar" of this localized semiotic-content language is a specific and highly nuanced relationship between the context the reader finds the text in and the knowledge the reader has of the author's intended ambition.

Fish

Stanley Fish, author of *Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority Of Interpretive Communities*, takes the extreme hermeneutical position that the text is entirely predicated, in fact created, by the context around it. To Fish the text is entirely 'hollow' and empty in that it itself does not 'hold' meaningfulness due to any property or quality it itself has as a text. Rather it is the context which allows the text to have meaning at all, and in arguing this, he takes the stance that texts literally cannot exist without a context which predicates it. To think of a text without a context is impossible, for it would be impossible read a text without some qualifying context – a setting in the broadest sense: physical, mental emotional, historical, etc. – to steer, sculpt, and in doing so, create, our experience of the text. This context, which sculpts the text before us, is to Fish the very basis of a text's qualities, in that a readers identification and appreciation of a text's formal qualities, that which literally builds the text as a material object, are made downstream of a series of contextual expectations. He writes:

Acts of recognition, rather than being triggered by formal characteristics, are their source. It is not that the presence of poetic qualities compels a certain kind of attention but that the paying of a certain kind of attention results in the emergence of poetic qualities (Fish 1980:326).

The poetic qualities in particular he explores in a classroom example - he asks students to consider simple written non-artistic texts (like purchasing receipts from a store) as though they were intentional works of art. Indeed, the students can even be told explicitly that the work was intentional, that this is not mere worldly detritus but a willfully crafted artistic work. In either case the results stay the same:

As soon as my students were aware that it was poetry that they were seeing, they began to look with poetry-seeking eyes, that is, with eyes that saw everything in relation to the properties they knew poems to possess... It was almost as if they were following a recipe – if it's a poem, do this, if it's a poem, see it that way – and indeed definitions of poetry *are* recipes, for by directing readers as to what to look for in a poem, they instruct them in ways of looking that will produce what they expect to see. (Fish 1980:326-327)

The poetic aspects of the text, then, are not *of* the text, but *of the expectation* of the text, putting the onus of meaning on the reader and their own invention of the work they are ostensibly dialoging

with. The poetry seemingly inherent in the text is actually projected into it, despite it being of-the-text by any measure. In this sense the text's ideal material reality is semiotically neutral, requiring a 'charge' from a reader. The application of the 'filter' onto the raw demarcated objects becomes a magnet, not merely harmonizing the object to a schema, but literally summoning previously-invisible aspects out from within it. In other words, the reader's "consciousnesses are constituted by a set of conventional notions which when put into operation constitute in turn a conventional, and conventionally seen, object." (Fish 1980:332) Fish's notion of text here may be considered as 'that which is enframed by the application of one or more schemas of meaning.' To this end he considers the text a projection onto, and that projection creates its own expectation of what will be found.

Of course, this does not radically differ from Barthes, Lotman, or Eco's respective theories of the text. But in committing to this extreme its-all-in-the-reader perspective, he naturally is led to discuss why certain readings or reading strategies, which are ostensibly our own inventions, have an overwhelming naturalness. This he solves, unsurprisingly, by restating the depth of experience which contexts affect:

All objects are made and not found, and that they are made by the interpretive strategies we set in motion. [...] the "you" who does the interpretive work that puts poems and assignments and lists into the world is a communal you and not an isolated individual. [...] We do not do these things because we could not do them, because the mental operations we can perform are limited by the institutions in which we are already embedded. These institutions precede us, and it is only by inhabiting them, or being inhabited by them, that we have access to the public and conventional senses they make. (Fish 1980:332)

The reader is thus always only ever going to read a text while being situated in a context. Reversing this to frame the context as a unit of its own (to consider the context more discretely, as a text, in a way), the reader is always and forever surrounded completely and thoroughly by various contexts, which intersect and interact like Lotman's codes, to assemble a limitless semiotic possibility space. Fish writes: "The problem of how meaning is determined is only a problem if there is a point at which its determination has not yet been made, and I am saying that there is no such point." (Fish 1980:310)

Fish's text is therefore in a sort of anarchistic structuralism, wherein the radically local context, or more accurately the interwoven *stacking of many contexts*, is the very system the text is made from at all.

Fish does not limit this context-creation theory to the text, but rather extends to all manner of semiotic events. Discourse itself, he argues, is the product of the context, which in any given instance is a sort of highly contingent, temporary, fragile, and sophisticated 'lens' upon which the discursive event takes place: "the hearer is already in a situation informed by tacitly known purposes and goals, and in both cases he ends up in another situation whose purposes and goals stand in some elaborated relation (of contrast, opposition, expansion, extension) to those they supplant." (Fish 1980:316-317) In other words, to enter discourse at all is to instigate, or be brought into the instigation of, a context wherein discourse is true. Just as the reader of a text 'makes' the text both metaphorically (by reading into and with it a series of semiotic truths) and literally (by summoning out of it formal qualities which come to define it), the individual in discourse enters a framework wherein discourse begets and creates its own meaning out of events. Fish writes:

communication occurs within situations and that to be in a situation is already to be in possession of (or to be possessed by) a structure of assumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes and goals that are already in place; and it is within the assumption of these purpose and goals that any utterance is immediately heard. (Fish 1980:318)

Fish discusses this to say that communication, in all of its forms, is still entirely dominated by the context. However, many individual elements of discourse seem at first glance to be highly context-avoidant. At an elementary level, the semiotic symbol itself is ostensibly a context-denying event (though note that this will be explored, also be reversed, where a symbol can be understood through a highly articulated context.) Taking Fish to his extremes, at a broader level the creation of textual canons, be they expectations of genre, reading approaches, or otherwise, may be less 'given' before the reader and more 'created' willfully by the reader.

To this he responds by considering the canon as a context - a kind of semi-autonomous semiotic scripting of the manner in which an event will be engaged with. Guided by conventions, the reader engages with a text according to a laid-out path:

The shape of that activity is determined by the literary institution which at any one time will authorize only a finite number of interpretative strategies. Thus, while there is no core of agreement in the text, there is a core of agreement (although one subject to change concerning the ways of producing the text. Nowhere is this set of acceptable ways written down, but it is a part of everyone's knowledge of what it means to be operating within the literary institution as it is now constituted. (Fish 1980:342-343)

If context is the basis of meaningfulness at every level, then, its very easy to envision a chaotic churning of possible meanings with no apparent rhyme or reason beyond a fleeting shared context in any one moment. To this he reponds that while indeed, it is all in the context, the context is itself 'pliable' enough that spaces of common ground can be invented, which he explores through discussing canons:

But if, rather than acting on their own, interpreters act as extensions of an institutional community, solip- sism and relativism are removed as fears because they are not possible modes of being. That is to say, the condition required for someone to be a solipsist or relativist, the condition off being independent of institu- tional assumptions and free to originate one's own purposes and goals, could never be realized, and there- fore there is no point in trying to guard against it. (Fish 1980:321)

In other words, the reader will never be sufficiently relativist, for they will always already have been guided by a community to achieve the very level of textual participation at which they can articulate a desire to remove themselves from that community. As the act of text use necessitates some amount of socialization, true relativism is impossible. Additionally, Fish sees that the text will never be accessed without a human mediator to create a context around it, meaning that in this way too a genuine relativism is not a concern. He continues:

An infinite plurality of meanings would only be a fear only if sentences existed in a state in which they were not already embedded in, and had come into view as a function of, some situation or another... sentences emerge only in situations, and within those situations, the normative meaning of an utterance will always be obvious or at least accessible, although within another situation that same utterance, no longer the same, will have another normative meaning that will be no less obvious and accessible. (Fish 1980:308)

Because any human semiotic events will always necessarily be 'mediated' by the presence of external contextual circumstances, it is useless to imagine a state of genuinely anarchic semiosis, for the permanent presence of contextual circumstance will always dictate what is and isn't the case for a text. Fish adds:

We see then that (1) communication does occur, despite the absence of an independent and context-free system of meanings, that (2) those who participate in this communication do so confidently rather than provisionally (they are not relativists), and that (3) while their confidence has its source in a set of beliefs, those beliefs are not individual-specific or idiosyncratic but communal and conventional (they are not solipsists). (Fish 1980:321)

In conclusion, Fish argues that the text, and all hermeneutical events, are the product of the context, that is, the elements external to the ostensible text examined, and that the reader of a text is always surrounded and enmeshed in an infinitely varied and modulated context. He demonstrates the essence of this stance in the quip: "To be in a situation is to see the words, these or any other, as already meaningful." (Ibid: 313) While the bulk of Fish's context-supremacy is not perfectly congruous with the other theorists previously discussed, his contributions help develop a more inclusive understanding of the text across a wider theoretical environment. Considering the basis of textual meaning as a product of the reader's context can help expand a theory of textuality which accommodates broader and less-explicitly congruous theories.

With that, we will next explore some of the wider, loosely-adjacent theories which surround semiotic and textual concepts, but are not identifiably "within" the conceptual realm.

Expanding the Text - Introduction

Our discussion on the text has briefly surveyed several key perspectives on the text, from scholars who were known for their work with textual theory. While differences of opinion exist, the theorists all tend towards viewing the text as a communicative device, predicated upon a reader's proactive engagement with it, and made meaningful not only (or at all) by its formal qualities but by the setting, the context, in which the reader engages the text.

Recall that our aim is to create a more expanded notion of the text, one that can be applied to a wider range of textual forms. To accomplish this means expanding the theoretical considerations behind the text - which in practice may well mean organizing an expansive disciplinary background in considering the text. What are the most relevant, closely-adjacent spaces of theory to the text?

To recall, this thesis work was started to try and address the lack of textual applicability towards certain genres of text - children's texts, etc - genres where the traditional rules and expectations of the text make standard approaches ineffective. Consider the theoretical commonalities from the textual scholars, communicativity, engagement, context, in this light. Communicativity is questioned when dealing with a questionably conscious subject, as the intentionality behind the text cannot be presumed, meaning that textual analysis becomes an exercise more for the reader than the text. The role of engagement in a text would remain consistent, though, as would the presence and importance of the context. However, inquiry on the engagement of the text would lead quickly to discussions of discursivity, dialogue, and thus, consciousness. Such a discussion would require lengthy scientific detours to better define the cognitive space of the child, their mode of engagement with texts (perhaps in the Piaget or Vygotskian sense), and should also include sources touching upon the social construction of reality. But that is a project for another time, with more space to write, leaving us with forwarding the context as a way to move forward.

The scholars discussed above agree that the context has an essential relationship to the text's qualities. However, it is difficult to speak of the context directly, as its very nature is as a sort of inverse to the visible and identifiable text-thing-object-etc in front of a viewer. So, an exploration

of the context would likely need to touch upon nontextual theory, to fill in some of the gaps, so to speak. To explore and reconsider the notion of the context, nontextual (yet closely adjacent) scholarship is discussed with an aim to better articulate the mechanisms and structure by which the context operates. In short, to move forward, the context will be foregrounded and treated as an object in itself. Two core explorations in particular will serve as the main points of discussion:

- Distanciation, Paul Ricoeur's theory on the mechanism behind the act of textualization.
- Gregory Bateson's cybernetic theories on information, which provide ideas for how to foreground the context in terms of information generation.

This discussion will provide a more robust and concrete understanding of the functioning of the context, allowing a more comprehensive approach to the text, and in doing so expanding it to suit a wider range of theoretical applications.

Expanding the Text - Distanciation

Paul Ricoeur's conception of text is built relative to his goal of resolving essential hermeneutic problems. In *From Text to Action* he considers "hermeneutics [as] the theory of the operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts. So the key idea will be the realization of discourse as a text" (Ricoeur 1991:50). Discourse is key to his conception of what constitutes a text. Ricoeur variously defines text in terms of semiotic architecture or interactions, but in *From Text To Action* he focuses on terms of being in a state of discursivity:

The text is much more than a particular case of intersubjective communication: it is the paradigm of distanciation in communication. As such, it displays a fundamental characteristic of the very historicity of human experience, namely, that it is communication in and through distance. (Ricoeur 1991:76).

In this way Ricoeur considers the text simultaneously as a larger structural technology of communication and as any one individual instance. He summarizes:

Mediation by the text [...] is connected with the use of explication on the scale of the transmission of historical tradition. This common feature, which constitutes the text as a text, is that the meaning contained therein is rendered autonomous with respect to the intention of the author, the initial situation of discourse, and the original addressee. (Ricoeur 1991:32)

As a social technology the text is in the aggregate the basis for communication at distance and across contexts, but is also the unit of measure in this process. He continues to say that the text "is, par excellence, the basis for communication in and through distance" (Ricoeur 1991:35).

In a series of essays compiled by David Klemm and William Schweiker titled *Meanings In Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, Gerald Bruns rearticulates Ricoeur's thoughts on the text. Bruns writes that Ricoeur's notion of text, is in fact defined in a structural sense, saying:

is a structural object with its own intrinsic intelligibility; it is never an utterance. It can only be addressed by means of formal analysis. Moreover, the obliteration of the situation in which speakers discourse about the world also means that the referential movement of discourse is suspended by the text. There ceases to be a world referred to by the text. The text is not only self-contained but autotelic, closed off to its author and to the world of its composition, existing only for itself. (Klemm, Schweiker 1993: 34)

But in both the discursive and structural focus, the pragmatic value of the text is in its ability to separate the discursive event from its origin. This ability to separate is key.

To Ricoeur the text is the technological fruit of distancing a moment of discourse from a gestalt, or in this case 'host,' setting in which the discourse originates. Therefore the text is discourse removed from the context in which the discourse first emerged. This he terms *distanciation*, replacing the separate-from-author quality that texts paradoxically rely upon to exist and replacing it with a removal-from-instigating-context frame (Ricoeur 1991:76). By removing a discursive event from its source, its context, and permitting it to be transported across time and space intact as the same recognizable discursive event, it becomes available for use in any number of other contexts. This distanciation is the very process by which the text is made 'autonomous' from the author (Ricoeur 1991:83).

Ricoeur writes that

each text is free to enter into relations with all other texts which come to take the place of the circumstantial reality referred to by living speech. This relation of text to text, within the effacement of the of the world about which we speak, engendered the quasi-world of texts, or *literature*. (Ricoeur 1981:141, 148-149)

In *Questioning Ricoeur*, Robert Scharlemann writes that Ricoeur's textuality, and its predicating distanciation, is ultimately about the text's capacity to reflect human agency, specifically in a portable and conveyable package. Distanciated and removed from its origin, the text nevertheless engages the reader in discourse by virtue of its ability to have a presence in a local context. Scharlemann writes:

the textuality of a text is an articulated body that localizes a being in the world just as the human flesh and bones are an articulated body that localizes, or gives a here-and-now to, a being in the world. [...] Textuality, that is to say, is a model of being other than that of tools that are at hand or of objects that are present to us or of other human beings who are there with us or of an artwork or, finally, of a poetic word. It is, rather, the mode of being that, like other human beings, is there with us but that, unlike other human beings, has its place materially defined, not by a physical body, but by, let us say, its textual body. [...] we can say that in a text we can not only indwell a world other than that of physical reality but also encounter another self, the "voice" of the text, just as we encounter another self in other human existents, and that this voice of the text need not be identical with the biographical person who is the author of the text (Klemm, Schweiker 1993: 15, 21).

However, as the text permits communication to be separated from a wholistic all-encompassing localized event which contextualizes it, the mechanism by which this occurs must interface with, or be a part of, this distancing, this detemporalizing process. He sees that while the discursive nature of the text is always present in a given instance - that is, any time the reader uses/reads the text: "the system of language is virtual and outside of time" (Ricoeur 1991:77), that is, the codes which produce that text are separated from this presence. To Ricoeur the utilization of any kind of code system as mediator to a discursive event - that is, the being of any text - produces and relies upon an inherent separation between a communicative act and the broader context - time, place, setting, semiotic underpinnings, etc - which permitted it:

it could be said that the fictional or poetic text not only places the meaning of the text at a *distance* from the intention of the author, but also places the reference of the text at a *distance* from the *world* articulated by everyday language. Reality is, in this way, metamorphosed. (Ricoeur 1991:36)

Modified by the amber of atemporal codes and partitioned off as a singular recognizable text, the communicative act can successfully expand beyond the limits of its instigated moment, free to traverse time and space infinitely. The text may then be utilized in varied and ostensibly unconnected circumstances: "the work *decontextualizes* itself [...] and is able to *recontextualize* itself differently in the act of reading [...] The work itself creates an audience, which potentially includes anyone who can read." (Ricoeur 1991:298)

In fact, this is the value of the text - to give autonomy to an event of discourse, permitting its broader application beyond the limits of its creation. This means that to interpret a text "is to follow the train of thought opened up by the text," (Ricoeur 1991:122) to experience communication abstracted yet immediately applied. This brings about a kind of second-order gesture, discourse removed from a body yet as immediately and intuitively legible as one.

Distancing is brought about through a 'historical tradition-' a code - which operates removed from temporal and spatial limitations to permit the meaning of the text from the author's intention, and a distancing of the referent from the world of common experience (Ibid: 36). Thus this initial hermeneutic step is one of mediation, and downstream of that, of media literacy. Distancing is thus a structured navigation of the alienation of using foreign code system, which must be learned, against the immediacy of the experience accessed through reading the codes.

Ricoeur clarifies this in framing distanciation as the “dialectical counterpart of the notion of belonging, in the sense that we belong to a historical tradition through a relation of distance which oscillates between remoteness and proximity” (Ricoeur 1991:35). Its most primitive form of expression is perhaps “the dialectic of event and meaning” (Ibid: 77). Indeed, the experience of discourse, being temporally and materially locked, is always dialectically at odds with the codes of its expression which are atemporal and immaterial (Ibid: 77). In this light distanciation is one of the very fundamental predicates of contemporary human cognition at all.

In *Questioning Ricoeur*, Brun writes that for Ricoeur, the text's meaning:

is not anything that lies behind it in the form of an original intention or even an original reference to the time and place of its composition. Its meaning *is* its textuality. Textuality obliterates intentionality and referentiality in the process of objectifying itself.” (Klemm, Schweiker 1993: 35)

Brun describes Ricoeur's textuality as a "magical-looking-glass theory of textual meaning" in that:

The discourse of texts is phenomenological rather than logical or semiotic in the sense that reference means disclosure, bringing-to-appearance, rather than designation or representation. Texts mean, not by corresponding to states of affairs, not by satisfying truth conditions, but by manifesting or opening up a region of existence whose reality is not simply matter for analysis but is, on the contrary, matter for appropriation, that is, for intervention and action. (Klemm, Schweiker 1993: 36-37)

The Ricoeurian text is thus quite focused on pragmatics, keeping in line with its discursive emphasis. Brun continues that this looking-glass theory moves “towards a hermeneutics of praxis and action. [...] Thus the world that is disclosed in the text is to be thought of, not as discontinuous from our world, but as an enlargement of it, a movement of our world into the future.” (Ibid: 36) This pragmatic text-as-tool frame relates to the autonomy and agency apparent in the text, asking that the reader addresses the text as a dialogic partner. Brun adds that in according to Ricoeur, “we should think of ourselves as standing *before* the text and not only outside of it in some purely analytical space.” (Ibid: 36-37)

That is, the text will always in some respect fulfill the role of a subject partner in its ability to spontaneously call to the present a semiotically rich communicative engagement.

Distanciation is described as a verb - a sort of process which engages certain informational strategies to produce certain informational results - and the result of that process is the creation of the text. But this process is broadly understandable as a human activity, and does not need to be partitioned off within the realm of semiotics and textuality. In fact, as a human cognitive process that is deeply entwined with textuality, an cross between distanciation and other compatible disciplines would serve as a bridge between textuality and the related and relevant theories of other disciplines.

Viewing distanciation as a 'basic' cognitive ability leads most suitably towards cognitive studies and anthropology. In fact, two cognitive anthropologists, Merlin Donald and Terrance Deacon, describe the formation of complex symbolic thought via cognitive states we may consider as pre- and post-distanciative. In doing so they elaborate a theory of distanciation (and thus, arguably, of textuality) as a quintessential human cognitive ability. Here the real value in examining textuality in anthropological terms is in more succinctly articulating the cognitive process of distanciation. Merlin Donald's *Origins of the Modern Mind* articulates a simple developmental hierarchy of cognitive practices which, via the lens of distanciation as a sort of bridge between textuality, semiotics, and anthropological theories, can help expand the textuality. In fact, Donald's hierarchy may be considered as a sort of distanciative hierarchy, where certain distanciative criteria must be met before more complex architecture is capable of emerging. This will provide much of the groundwork for later analysis.

In a reduced and summarized form, Donald loosely articulates the cognitive differences between apes and human in terms of skill in using texts. Non-human apes, he considers, are poor text users, namely because they operate exclusively within a cognitive paradigm of limited-depth immediacies. Locked in a severely limited immediate moment, apes generally struggle to transfer information gleaned in one context (space, time, mood, social situation, etc) into another context.

This greatly hampers their ability to develop, and in reverse, the presence of this in humans has allowed us our ability to cognitively transcend the immediate moment.

Despite their formidable skills, they lack language, and they also lack much of the nonverbal knowledge evident in humans who have been stripped of language. Their behavior, complex as it is, seems unreflective, concrete, and situation-bound. Even their uses of signing and their social

behavior are immediate, short-term responses to the environment... Their lives are lived entirely in the present, as a series of concrete episodes, and the highest element in their system of memory representation seems to be at the level of event representation. Where humans have abstract symbolic memory representations, apes are bound to the concrete situation or episode; and their social behavior reflects this situational limitation. (Donald 1991:149)

Key to this bridging with theories of textuality is his idea of the cognitive awareness and presence of the immediate, which theoretically serves as a sort of pseudo-text. A 'unit' of immediacy based cognition he terms the 'episode,' which correlate to textuality minus distanciative capacity. That is, the awareness of a discursive event, but no ability to separate it from its instigating context. Effective episodic cognition, as Donald terms it, is characterized cognition in apes. Donald cites such cases as limited creative insight (Ibid: 156-157), extremely limited semantic capacities (Ibid: 136,154) despite an otherwise impressive ability for delayed reaction tests (Ibid: 125), memory (Ibid: 160) and imitation (Ibid: 127). According with Ricoeur's theory of distanciation, episodic cognition cannot rearticulate, reenvision, and reconsider, all of which are necessary aspects of a textual, distanciative act (Ibid: 160). The episodically-limited mind cannot individuate pieces from or out of the organism's larger memory reserves. The memory of an instance is singularly preserved as and where it was experienced, impossible to decompose into smaller constitutive units. Donald notes that while chimpanzees do of course have some decompositional capacity, he frames it as "distinctly individual learned dyadic relationships" (Ibid: 160), those units of decomposition are not plastic and malleable, but simply a degree removed from the ground of the experience itself. That is, they are not semantically articulatable terms which a human would very effortlessly reconsider, reenvision, and reapply to new scenarios. Additionally, even the complex events perceived are nevertheless locked into the context of their origin. The episodic mind cannot pull the event in question away from its source, its gestalt experience (Ibid: 150).

Episodic cognition is in essence *cognition without distanciation*.

As it can neither generalize from experience nor compress into more convenient mental units (Donald 1991: 151), episodic cognitive potential is limited. However, it is not through a more developed or modified episodic cognition that allows for distanciation. Rather, Donald believes the ability to distanciate is the result of the addition of a whole new cohabiting, cognitively subordinate paradigm which he terms. Almost exactly according with Ricoeur's distanciation,

Donald's mimesis is characterized by the ability to selectively remove an instance, unit, or etc., from its host predicating event and context:

Mimetic skill or mimesis rests on the ability to produce conscious, self-initiated, representational acts that are intentional but not linguistic. These mimetic acts are defined primarily in terms of their representational function... it involves the *invention* of intentional representations. When there is an audience to interpret the action, mimesis also serves the purpose of social communication. However, mimesis may simply represent the event to oneself, for the purpose of rehearsing and refining a skill: the act itself may be analyzed, re-enacted and reanalyzed, that is, represented to oneself. Is absolutely not tied to external communication. (Donald 1991:168-169)

In Riceour's terminology we should say that Donald's mimesis is the cognitive paradigm which first produces what is familiarly distanciation. And if distanciation is truly the basis of all textualizing, then this transition, which Donald claims is the primary paradigmatic divide between humans and apes, may be considered the dividing line beyond which textuality was first cognitively possible. The transition from Episodic thinking to what Donald calls mimetic cognition is then also the transition from pre-distanciation into distanciation.

Donald's mimesis is characterized by "intentionality, generativity, communicativity, reference, autocueing, and the ability to model an unlimited number of objects" (Donald 1991:171). Mimesis requires the thinker to 'self'-generate without external context/environmental cues, to refer to something shared, and to do all of this purposefully. First, this 'self'-generation is characterized by "voluntary" recall "without the aid of external cues" (Ibid: 173). The thought or information to be recalled must be divorced from those external cues (which at a primate level means sensuous reality) before the individual can *willfully* bring it to mind. This, in turn, necessitates that the thought or information to be recalled is *not* synonymous with the context of its emergence (its gestalt experience, replicated) but rather is an acontextual and willed articulation by the individual. This focus can be utilized across any sensuous contexts or cues, implying that it is a representation of that thing in question (Ibid: 172-174). This re-presentation of what was indeed already a recreation begets far greater fluidity of thought, for the double representation serves to unlock an intended "core" quality to the memory of event or instance. The individual thinker *chooses* what precisely to reimagine, rearticulate, and reconsider, which in doing so represents it, distanciating the highlighted qualities both from the original episode instance and from the episode's original predicating context and eventhood.

Donald figures that this emerged via the addition of "an extended conscious map of the body and its patterns of action" (Donald 1991:189) predicated, he guesses, on the transition into standing (from four-legged walking) which freed hands to become investigators and selective mediators of a bodies experience (Ibid: 147). Uncommitted hands allowed for a willful, articulated, neurologically pre-wired tool-organ to form. This accelerated both an ability to map new territories as well as an articulation of the willfulness by which that articulation was developed. Returning to the previous discussion on textuality, it is perhaps unsurprising then the first moment of distanciation was applied to a biological organism's own body. Through awareness of the body as a modelable mediator of experience, similar to the initial primordial distanciation identified by Ricoeur, the dialectic of event and meaning (Ibid: 77), comes about. To Donald, the body is the first text, primarily by virtue of its nearness to the human text-maker. This is a more materialist approach than Ricoeur's, which begins at the difference between reader and external instigator, or source, of a text.

In Donald's bodily mapping, one gains the "ability to 'parse' ones own motor actions into components and then recombine these components in various ways, to reproduce the essential features of an event" (Donald 1991:171)." The first analogous relationship permits the logic extended further, begetting mimetic acts wherein the body represents some external referent. In the probably-often-occurring case of inter-*Homo* communication, analogous bodies between members would further help articulate the mimetic actor's own body. As well as having one's own body mapped, the viewer is able to understand the communication as referent-oriented and not singularly locked into the actor's gestalt context (Ibid: 192). In fact, kernels of this body-mapping can be seen today when playing children reenact events they've experienced wherein they replay events (shifting roles from receiver to enactor, for instance) with fictional characters (like toys as stand-ins for humans) so that they may see the 'other side' of their experience (Ibid: 174). This replaying literally experientially teaches the child that the event can removed from its instigative context, distanciating and textualizing it into something more mentally pliable and useful. In other words, the child first uses their body to develop an understanding of an event, bodily repeating the event as an act of translation, eventually breaking the gestalt embodiedness of the event into a dual awareness of the embodiment plus an awareness of the contingent focus which permitted it. Similarly, children very early develop an interest in intention-gazing, wherein they focus on the

attention of another person, something apes do not show (Ibid: 171). We may imagine that much of a child's play with character toys (particularly those with faces) will involve treating them with intention, even if that intention is bestowed unto them by the child themselves.

To conclude, there are serious structural connections between Ricoeur's distanciation (which he claims is the basis of textuality) and Donald's episodic-to-mimetic trajectory of cognitive paradigms (which he claims sketches the cognitive developments separating humans from other apes). This is important in reconsidering textuality because it provides a very clear 'ground zero' basis upon which textuality may be considered founded up. By representing the farthest axis point at which textual ability is identifiable, a model may be built on this basis which not inaccurately can claim a zero-level in a model of textual development. To put simply, in expanding a model of textuality into new directions, we may claim that the first distanciation is a bodily relationship.

While we have only focused on a slice of Donald's theory, it expands to become a whole distanciative hierarchy of all cognition. After the Mimetic mode of cognition comes a Mythic stage, where fully arbitrary symbolic mythic cognition occurs. Linking back to Ricoeur, not only does his distanciation fit within the episode-to-mimesis shift, but also his work on narrativity alongside Donald's mimesis-to-mythic shift. In short, it appears that we've assembled a basic logic for textuality – *that distanciative practice can be hierarchized as a model*. At the bottom of this hierarchy would almost certainly be that 'initial dialectic' rearticulated in terms of its instigative relationship to materiality: the distanciation of material from meaning.

In a work similar to Donald's *Origins of the Modern Mind*, Terrance Deacon's *The Symbolic Species* researches the origins and emergence of language, and in doing exhaustively develops a theory of the emergence of symbolic thought. While this is of course useful in a broad sense, Deacon's work specifically links semiotic theories to the development of what we have identified as textual, or distanciated, thought.

Like Donald, Deacon considers characteristically advanced human cognition to be more a clever workaround of the human brain's shortcomings and biases than a biologically predicated surpassing of them. (Deacon 1997:122) Reconsidered, to Deacon the first texts did not follow an imposed cognitively formulated internal structure (a platonic text-only logic), but instead reflected

dynamically a balance of internal and external experiences in a much more messy way. Much like Donald, Deacon proposes that (what we may call) the separation from episodic cognition occurred via the imposition and integration of mediating elements - symbols, tokens, inferred abstract patterns, etc. These mediators quell the explosive impulsiveness of the biological organism which may otherwise limit the organism's ability to develop complex cognitive solutions to problems. For example, Deacon considers a point which demonstrates why apes are unable to develop fully mediated symbolic language. In an experiment, chimpanzees were able to select one of two piles of food, one large and one small. The experiment had a trick where the selected pile would in fact be given to another chimpanzee, while the remaining pile would be given to the selecting chimp. The chimpanzees were unable to learn the trick, which human children quickly realize. Deacon writes that the depth of focus on the moment makes the ape unable to "subjugate their desire to the pragmatic context, which requires them to do the opposite of what they would normally do to achieve the same end." (Ibid: 413-414) However, and very importantly, when a symbolic mediator was used - the chimpanzees were given numbers instead of actual piles of food - they could indeed learn the trick and secure themselves the food. (Ibid: 414). Deacon writes:

If the chimps learned that the numerals were indices associated with perceived differences of quantity, choosing the lowest numeral to get the highest number of candies need no longer be interpreted as a "choose the pile you don't want" problem. When this associated stimulus is used in place of the candy, the chimp merely needs to learn which numerals correlate with getting the larger reward to succeed. [...] it clearly demonstrates how the indirectness of indexical and symbolic reference helps to reduce the power of the stimulus (icon) to drive behavior. Ascending the representational hierarchy progressively frees responses from stimulus-driven immediacy, thus crating space for the generation and consideration of alternatives. (Ibid: 414-415)

Using Donald's terms, we could say that this experiment reflects the limitations of a context-locked episodic cognition, and offers a pragmatically-verified possible explanation for how this limitation was overcome. Through the use of mediators of experience, or perhaps more accurately mediators of agency, the mind is better able to separate biological desires from the 'puzzle' of a problem at hand. Donald suggests this was instigated in the body - a body-map which is mirrored by others in the tribe. In fact, Deacon mirrors this: "By importing, as it were, an implicit speaker-listener relationship into cognition, we create a tool for self-reflection by a sort of virtual social distancing from our own thought process. Thus we can talk to ourselves as though talking to others" (Deacon 1997: 450).

Deacon expands this examination of the reflexive qualities of mediation in exploring the development of complex social orders and systems. He proposes that the low-tech, culturally replicating processes of ritual, rites of passage, religious ceremony, prayer repetition, etc, are designed to instigate an abstract correlation discovery (a semiotic Peircean symbol) within the participant. He explains an Amazonian tribal group's post-war peacemaking ritual as an example. After meeting at a center point, the two tribes take turns ritually threatening one another with violence (feinting a spear throw, chanting) in a regulated fashion. So long as true violence is not triggered by these feint attacks, the opposing tribes will eventually cease the feint attacks and gather around food and fire for discussion. This ritual in its entirety mimics experientially the transition from war-state to peace state through gesture, acting, voice, etc, (Deacon 404) giving the participant a 'full-bodied' understanding of the otherwise abstract concept of 'peace'. Not only does this "quite explicitly take the form of an ideal symbol discovery process", but all such processes "are self-consciously employed for their ability to help define abstract social relationships and inculcate certain habits of thought and action" (Deacon 403).

The ritual, capable of being understood essentially entirely physically as a sort of strange and arbitrary dance which must be enacted before peace talks begin, serves as a mediator between theoretically enactable state of war and a theoretically enactable state of peace. In other words, the ritual, like the chimpanzees numerical tokens, mediates - 'distanciates' - the situation from possible choices the individual has agency to make (Deacon 1997: 431-432). In both cases the mediating element is a sort of text in a broad sense. And while these are certainly not literary texts, nor do they have a particularly rich potential for reading, they nevertheless do meet the essential criteria of being a text. They are discretely delineated overlapping codes appearing before a reader in a context, identifiable in a way which paradoxically allows the event to be removed from the context it was instigated in. The mediation, which relies upon the mechanisms which create the text, and indeed occurring in a form identifiable broadly as a text, provides a space for a new kind of agency in the user.

Expanding the Text - Foregrounding the Context

We've looked at distanciation - the selective separation of a text (of content) from context - in cognitive and anthropological terms. However, the context, while fleshed out from the perspective of textuality, remains under-explored in semiotic structural terms. In particular, previous discussion has not addressed the nature of the informationality present and based within the context. To address this, information theorist and anthropologist Gregory Bateson's *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* will enter the discussion. Bateson's work attempts to explicate the nature of informationality in structural terms, drawing from a variety of academic fields and metaphors. His conceptualization of information systems and their use will serve as an effective bridge from strictly textual theories to a broader, more loosely affiliated media theories to be discussed after.

To Bateson's structural view, information is defined as a valuable difference within a specific system (we may here say context). Information at its simplest he calls "a difference which makes a difference" (Bateson 2000:315, 459), and it is important differences ("Difference which occurs across time is what we call "change" (Ibid: 458) that are "the things that get onto a map (Ibid: 457)," that is, which are held in a system of information. Difference is held in contrast with "energy," which unlike difference necessitates actual activity - calories spent, matter moved, etc. (Ibid: 457). Bateson sees information-as-important-difference as being made potent "because the neural pathways along which it travels and is continually transformed are themselves provided with energy," (Ibid: 459), or in other words, that difference is able to instigate real material expenditures of effort. Information does not necessarily compel changes in energy, but a lack of information can. (Ibid: 458) Within the context of a relevant system, the meaningful difference may signify something local to the system, something symbolic and external to it, or anywhere in between (Ibid: 284).

While interesting, none of this is directly applicable to our previous discussion until Bateson links this framework of information to the functioning of the system serving as a context. Like other authors previously discussed, Bateson sees the context as the source meaningfulness "with- in" a

meaningful unit. Aiming to explicate a system of learning, and learning to learn, Bateson centers the context as the basis of difference by considering it hierarchically to the instance at hand:

Stimulus is an elementary signal, internal or external.

Context of stimulus is a *metamessage* which *classifies* the elementary signal.

Context of context of stimulus is a meta-metamessage which classifies the metamessage. And so on. (Bateson 2000: 289)

Every level of context serves to platform the meaning present of the instance belonging to the neighboring level closer to the instance of focus. Or in other words, in contextualizing the preceding event, the context serves to outline and define what possible information, what possible codes, are permitted within the instance or text. While there is no hard boundary between one text and one context, as: "there occur signals whose major function is to *classify* contexts...of a certain sort," (Bateson 2000: 289-290) the important point is to consider the hierarchy of text- and-context as a series of grounds upon which the information is made relevant or irrelevant, the manner in which the codes of the text are made visible or not. This is in essence how the text is made by the reader.

In terms of information, the richness of a text, via the context, can be considered as the sum total of alternative possibilities excluded by the presence of any one discrete variable within the space of meaningfulness. Bateson writes:

Of especial interest in this connection is the relationship between *context* and its content. A phoneme exists as such only in combination with other phonemes which make up a word, The word is the *context* of the phoneme. But the world only exists as such—only has "meaning"—in the larger context of the utterance, which again has meaning only in a relationship. (Bateson 2000: 408)

Rephrased to suit earlier discussion, the text's context provides the text its value, but that context is the sum total of all other possible alternative texts, across the infinite variety of possible codes. This is of course easier to conceptualize in closed-circuit cybernetics systems, though the general theory appears viable in more complicated (artistic) systems. The principle at work is that the meaningful thing present - the text, the content, etc - can be viewed informationally as an organized multitude of alternative-option-rejections. The premise is that in viewing the text this way, the richness of possible informationality is more apparent. Bateson clarifies this negation-oriented basis for information by comparing Latin and Chinese written language. In Latin:

The actual letter excludes (*i.e.*, eliminates by restraint) twenty-five alternatives. In comparison [...] a Chinese ideograph would have excluded several thousand alternatives. We say, therefore, that the Chinese ideograph carries more information than the letter. (Bateson 2000: 408).

This accords with a consideration of informationality between artistic texts versus more limited systems, as explored in discussions of paradigmatic versus syntagmatic axes of a text. However, here the paradigmatic axis, so to speak, provides the sum total of possibility with a concrete grounded relationship, almost a numerical value, providing a strong basis for further discussion. Returning to the quote, the radical potential for meaning in artistic texts, where the vocabulary of codes used are often essentially limitless, permits an infinite degree of complexity, as the text has an infinite number of rejected elements. On the other hand, a low information system with limited systemic vocabulary is likewise limited to the scope of what it can reject from within itself - the limited amount of information (of differences possible) in a clock (the times it can tell) is synonymous with the amount of excluded time values that any one time's presence entails. In larger systems, the number of possible mutually-exclusive choices (which necessitate rejected elements) can stack up to form highly complex texts, such as the artistic texts examined by the text scholars previously discussed.

So with Bateson's contributions, the context can be considered more explicitly in terms that conceptualize it as a hierarchical platform of possibility. When a text exists, the context in which it emerges can thus be decomposed into a series of conditional platforms. Linking this with Ricoeur, Donald and Deacon, we can say that the presence of the text can be viewed as a distancing from the context, the context being seen as a variety of hierarchically identified platforms. Thus in merging these authors, we can consider the text as a distancing of some discrete thing out of hierarchically arranged conditional information platforms.

Donald and Deacon both show the structured growth of human capacity to distance in hierarchical, predictable stages, mirroring the ordered nature of the conditional context platforms. Inverting this, we can say view the quality or nature of the distancing is predicated on the conditional context platform in which it emerges. From either the perspective of the context or the text, the ostensible text examined is created by virtue of a process of hierarchically organizable selective conditional rejections. Rephrased again, we can say for sake of argument that the text is a made through the selective rejection of various informational potentialities present at various

contexts present. This is, at least, an attempted way to rearticulate the text in a form which should allow it more flexibility in application.

The contexts relevant to a text are variable according to the text - a simple and very non-literary text like an anonymous, apparently nondescript and "nondenominational" sports ball is not predicated upon a great deal of symbolic content, even if a special, highly symbolically charged and historically important sports ball (a very infamous and standout ball, not at all anonymous) may be identical. The point is that at the level of identification as *a sports ball*, that is, as *just a ball*, the individual sports ball in question is very much predicated upon a clear distinction of its material boundaries, and that this initial designation as a sports ball does not demand much more engagement. Indeed, pragmatically the material qualities of the ball are the essence of what it is. Seeing the ball as an application of a distancing applied to a context, that is, seeing the ball as a very nonliterary text, the ball is textually based in its materiality. That materiality is necessarily a contextual relationship - the ball is something apart from its surroundings - and, if Fish is correct, despite an intuition about the truth of the formal qualities present in the ball, those contextual surroundings to the ball actually create those formal material qualities by which it is known. The shadow cast by the ball is not part of the constitutive unit of the ball, nor is the path it takes midair when thrown. The ball is limited to a material boundary which is also its nearly exact textual boundary. Similarly, the immaterial aspects of the ball, like the historic maker (author) of the ball, or its sociocultural status to others, are not essential aspects of what make the ball recognizably itself. So, we can consider the ball-as-text as predicated on a material-context relationship, eschewing more complicated contextual possibilities.

In contrast, a more complex literary text operates less at a material contextual level and at a more abstract, symbolic level. The recognizable text that is Shakespeare's Hamlet is not predicated upon any one single physical copy of the work, nor any details on any one of those physical copies. It is, however, very much predicated on the symbolic conveyance of a narrative featuring certain fixed characters going through certain fixed actions which are understood bound together as a single fixed narrative plot. In fact, the materiality which conveys Hamlet is indeed precisely recognizable as *not* Hamlet - a printed book of the story is not the text shared by many millions, but a copy or version of it, subservient to the abstracted "truer" version which does not actually exist materially.

Considering this contextually is interesting. To be primarily an abstract and immaterial text, Hamlet-the-text must in any instance where it exists modify itself within a material context in which it is present, so that this one singular material expression is never considered the "real" Hamlet-text. In other words, what makes Hamlet-the-text itself involves necessarily a specialized rejection of materialities. While materiality is still essential to the text - Hamlet is always theoretically 'summonable' into reality via a theatrical performance - as a text Hamlet must structurally negotiate a complex relationship to its contingent materiality. In this sense, the text involves a careful, complex rejection of material contextualities from which it emerges. Continuing this forward, we can consider Hamlet-the-text as negotiating other similar nonmaterial contexts: for instance, the temporal rhythm in which a performance or narrativization of it must acquiesce, or role that an individual theater director has in re-authoring the text which is already understood to be authored by Shakespeare. At each of these 'platforms' by which it is mediated, the text is created through a careful dance around and selective accommodation of the context in which it emerges. In other words, at every level, Hamlet as a text can be considered as an extremely articulated and contingent rejection of nearly all, but necessarily not all, materialities, temporalities, authorities, etc.

With this in mind, the text can be reconsidered and explored as a context-rejection hierarchy.

Context Constraint - Introduction

Our discussion has led to the realization that the text can be considered as a context-constraint hierarchy. We have seen how the context can be viewed 'directly' as a source of the informationality in a text, and we have also seen that the interrelations of contexts necessitates, like the text, hierarchical relationships. But despite these realizations, the specific nature of the context-constraint hierarchy remains under-explored. The following chapter will discuss two core ideas of the context-constraint hierarchy. Namely:

- context-constraints as media are platforms of cognition, learned hierarchically, over time, in the process of the development from child to adult. Complex textuality is therefore a slowly developed skill, as anecdotal evidence suggests - children, walking before they run, learn to identify articulate colored shapes before they learn to identify and articulate abstract philosophies.
- context-constraints, like texts and mediums of expression, beget their own engagement biases and accelerate certain tendencies as informational technologies. That is to say, a context-constraint is like any medium of expression a biased tool, encouraging certain tendencies at its informational plane

These discussions will show that the context-constraint, viewed directly with theory, can be seen to have innate qualities and that predictions can be made with these in mind.

These questions will be unpacked and expanded upon, using, as before, a variety of academic discipline sources. In this discussion in particular, many of these sources are based in discussions of media, the arts, and the relationship between art and information. As our discussions of the text have expanded to include, on one hand, the anthropological principles behind the capacity to create texts, and, on the other, the cybernetically derived informational principles which illuminate the role the context plays in creating a text, a move towards media theory should not be particularly jarring. Primarily they explore several key concepts:

- the relationship art has to the information created and used in society

- the relationship between learning and using art and the creation of, and participation in, knowledge
- the relationship between forms of media and their uses in society
- the role of 'accuracy' in mediation

Some of these may seem superfluous to a discussion on textuality, but these are in fact important perspectives to consider when further articulating the nature of the context-constraint. Indeed, if we are to speak of context-constraints being hierarchical, and thus of a mode of textuality which transcends any one medium or mode of expression, then such broad-reaching theories may prove very useful.

Context Constraint - Platforms of Thought

In *The Arts and the Creation of Mind*, Eisner argues that art (what we may consider loosely as text) and mind are synonymous. Eisner sketches his own cognitive-anthropological model of human cognition, saying that humans are sentient creatures in a 'qualitative environment', and we experience that environment through sensory systems (Eisner 2002:20). Childhood development is synonymous with differentiation of those sensory systems, and that differentiation allows children to form concepts – “images formed in one or more sensory modalities that serve as proxies for a class of associated qualities” (Eisner 2002: 20-21). Concepts can be (perhaps are designed to be) expressible across mediums and domains. The child's development with concept-skill is synonymous with their mental growth into adults, and this development is environment and medium dependent, based on the dialogue with mediums of expression and how those mediums fit into sociopolitical reality. Finally, arts education is largely oriented around promoting “the child's ability to develop his or her mind through the experience that the creation or perception of expressive form makes possible” (Ibid: 24).

When children make art they often speak, revealing a literal dialogue present in the act of text creation:

Often we find children gurgling or making other sounds in tandem with painting. The painting is a kind of accompaniment to the sounds, or vice versa. What such activities reveal is an immersion in the process. This immersion is both visual and kinaesthetic. The rhythmic action of the hand and the arm, the sense of viscosity that flows from the brush, the visual surprises that such activities often yield create a dialogue or conversation between the child and the work. The child acts, the work speaks, the child answers, the image takes on a new configuration that leads to a change in the conversation. There is, as Mikhail Bakhtin might say, 'a dialogic imagination' at work. (Eisner 2002:116)

Theorists have argued about the nature of children's art, specifically whether children represent what they 'know' (in developing vocabularies) or if they represent what they 'see' (in developing sense-perception finesse). But Eisner thinks both are 'two side of the same coin' – that children represent things in artwork based on *both* intellectual realism (the concept as a demarcation with essential qualities) and visual realism (the experience in gestalt operating external to

essentializing). This is because, of course, children cannot know without seeing, and cannot see without knowing (Eisner 2002:113). Additionally:

Children draw not only what they imagine, see, and know but also what they feel. How they feel about a particular object, person, or event is reflected in the way they treat it in a drawing. What is important is often exaggerated, what is important is often made more visible, what is important secures a prominence on the paper that confers on it the significance they want to express. (Eisner 2002:113)

Eisner's perspective leads him to advocate for the wholistic integration of artistic education, which in textual terms, might be considered as a means to access reality with more finesse. He writes:

Education, in turn, is the process of learning to create ourselves, and it is what the arts, both as a process and as the fruits of that process, promote. Work in the art is a way of creating our lives by expanding our consciousness, shaping our dispositions, satisfying our quest for meaning, establishing contact with others, and sharing a culture.” (Ibid: 3)

Arts educator Betty Edwards, whose *Drawing On The Right Side Of The Brain*, a teach-yourself-to-draw book, actually examines in relative detail the emergence and progression of a child's ability to create visual arts texts. As an arts educator, Edwards describes the central problem which motivated her book:

The majority of adults in the western world do not progress in art skills much beyond the level of development they reached at age nine or ten. In most mental and physical activities, individuals' skills change and develop as they grow into adulthood [...] The development of drawing skills, however, seems to halt unaccountably at an early age for most people. In our culture, children, of course, draw like children, but most adults also draw like children, no matter what level they may have achieved in other areas of their life (Edwards 1999: 68)

Edwards sees the problem emerging in adolescence, when realism becomes the idealized form of drawing (Ibid: 69). Before that period, children progress gradually through a variety of 'stages,' moving from periods of creating loose scribbles, heavily stylized symbolic representation, narratives and stories, landscape imagery, complex single representations, and finally ending at a wall in attempts at realism (Ibid: 70-81). Edwards identifies the issue with a shift into realistic drawing as being an inability to represent the target thing beyond its symbolically known status. In other words, to accurately draw a hand or a face is difficult precisely because it is so deeply integrated into our minds as a symbolic thing, not to be read accurately and alienatingly, but rather to be

integrated into a harmonious and instantaneous mode of being. The struggle for realistic drawing is the struggle to break out of this mode of vision.

To do so, Edwards' book offers a structured regimen for the task. Exercises around breaking the allure of symbols include

- the copying of a drawing upside-down (Ibid: 55-60)
- drawing the palm lines in ones hand while not looking at the page (Ibid: 89-95),
- drawing only what is seen through a clear plastic frame placed at a fixed location (Ibid: 96-111), and
- drawing only the negative space of a complex object (Ibid: 127-133).

In all of these exercises, the artist is forced to address the incongruity between the symbolic thing already known before them and the reality present at a presemiotic sensory level. The artist, learning to draw outside of their symbolic vocabulary, makes a cognitive shift away from proscribed terms into a flux of atextual noise, where they have a greater capacity to dictate the boundaries of the text they are creating.

Edwards terms this distinction the L-mode and R-mode, after the sides of the brain in which each predominate respectively. The symbolic L-mode, which tends towards words, symbols, numbers, structural decomposition, and linear logical thinking (Edwards 1999: 44), is problematic in the drawing of 'accurate' images. Meanwhile, being able to operate within the nonverbal, gestalt S-mode is what Edwards claims makes an artist effective at creating realistic imagery. Of the modes she writes, "L-mode seeks to quickly recognize (and name and categorize) by picking out details, while R-mode wordlessly perceives whole configurations and seeks how the parts fit together – or perhaps whether the parts fit together" (Ibid: 93).

So to synthesize from this, children can be seen to operate through successive stages of textual production, and en masse 'hit a wall,' so to speak, when the production of texts clashes with their ability to articulate the information they aim to textualize. Edwards articulates this not so much as mere 'ability,' but a more general approach to cognition. When the dominant cognitive mode seeks to create texts which run counter to its own logic, the text-maker is confused, and aggravated, left

wondering why their textual abilities seem suddenly so beneath their cognitive level (Edwards 1999: 68). She summarizes her stance:

Is my belief that if persons untrained in art can learn to make the shift to the artist's mode of seeing—that is, the right-hemisphere mode – those individuals are then able to draw without further instruction. To put it another way, you already know how to draw, but old habits of seeing interfere with that ability and block it. (Edwards 1999:7)

Returning to Terrance Deacon's *The Symbolic Species*, we should note his efforts to parse the origins of language, which can be examined in the context of textual emergence. Deacon finds language to be an ordering system more beholden to the human brain's shortcomings and biases than a surpassing of those shortcomings. Reconsidered, the first texts did not follow an internal structure (a platonic text-only logic), but instead reflected dynamically a balance of internal and external experience. Deacon states: "the brain has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the adapting." (Deacon 1997: 122).

A major implication for this is the nature of how children learn language, with Deacon concluding that if children can learn language en masse, language must, over time, increasingly accommodate children's mental biases to secure its own reproducibility. Any

languages should change through history in ways that tend to conform to children's expectations; those that employ a more kid-friendly logic should come to outnumber and replace those that don't. [...] From this perspective children don't have to be particularly smart, and parents don't have to be particularly gifted teachers. The limitations of the learners and the teachers are an unavoidable part of the ecology of language transmission. (Ibid: 110).

Deacon considers the immensity of language ability - essentially an infinitely-large lens with which to reconsider experience - reflective of human cognitive biases towards large scale thinking. When he says "children cannot tell the trees apart at first, but they can see the forest and eventually the patterns of growth within it emerge." (Deacon 1997: 135).

Briefly returning to Edwards, there appears a bias in children towards shape, form, and mass compression (Edwards 1999: 17), which at first glance correlates to a perspectival bias where potential accumulatory boundaries are congealed into single entities. Preference towards accumulating points into single wholes intuitively seems more cognitively efficient. Deacon further considers how when children are denied a language education, their brains nevertheless tend to-

wards the ordering systems which language would have co-articulated: “Universal (i.e., convergent) trends emerge either way in the absence of a specific preexisting plan, whether in the input or in the mind” (Ibid: 140). The origins of language should therefore primarily be considered more as a shift into organizational biases.

Similarly, in René Van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner's *The Vygotsky Reader*, the authors summarize that child psychologist Lev Vygotsky noted that socializing children is a process of “cultural *re-organization*” (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1994: 123). This reorganization is an intentional reshaping of the content of ones’ mind for larger social or personal purposes:

the child who speaks as he solves a practical task calling for the use of tools and who combines speech and action into one structure, in this way introduces a social element into his action and thereby determines that action's fate and the future path of development of his behavior. In this way, the child's behavior is transferred for the first time to an absolutely new plane, is guided by new factors and leads to the appearance of social structures in the child's physical life. His behavior becomes socialized: this is the main determining factor of the entire future development of its practical intellect. The situation as a whole acquires for him a social meaning, where people act, just as do objects...refracted through the prism of his social thought (Van der Veer, Valsiner 1994:116)

Context Constraint - Mediation's Biases

We've discussed the essential principles of the text, created an expanded perspective of the text using the concept of distanciation, and articulated a means by which the context is foregrounded and made actively observable. Through these conversations we've arrived at a claim - that the text can be considered, or perhaps reconstructed, in terms of a selective constraining of its context. As we will now see, to create the text in this 'reverse' order, the assemblage of context-constraints must be ordered onto the text hierarchically, in a predictable and regular way. In this sense, the creation of the text returns in a roundabout way to its familiar formal home under the umbrella of media studies.

We will begin in examining how various context-constraint regimes effect the text and are not 'neutral' processes. Then the nature of textual literacy, and what it means to use texts correctly, entails. Finally this discussion will end with a brief look at the relationship between text and cultural superstructures.

Media theorist Marshall McLuhan considered media not in terms of its formal qualities, but rather in terms of its impact on its users. He prioritized the "agency" present in mediums, in that, as technological platforms, they are already in a human social context, and thus forward and agree with certain qualities while rejecting through inconvenience or momentum other certain qualities. He writes:

The electric light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it is used to spell out some verbal ad or name. This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the "content" of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked, "What is the content of speech?," it is necessary to say, "It is an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal." [...] For the "message" of any medium or technology is the change of scale or pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs. (McLuhan 2005:8)

A core idea of McLuhan's is his notion of Hot and Cold media - a taxonomy of media according to the quality of human agency expressed through their use. He writes that Hot media "is one that

extends one single sense in "high definition." High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A photograph is, visually, "high definition." A cartoon is "low definition," simply because very little visual information is provided." (McLuhan 2005:24) Hot media, in their informational surplus, overwhelm the reader, so to speak, and provide them with very little room for engagement. Instead, the Hot media 'washes' over the reader. On the other hand, Cool media demands participation, engagement, and the reader to fill-in-the-blanks. McLuhan adds: "Naturally, therefore, a hot medium like a radio has very different effects on the user from a cool medium like the telephone." (McLuhan 2005:25)

These conspicuous holes in the text before the reader serve to create a higher amount of dialogue between reader and text, begetting a culture of engagement surrounding the mediums which, picked up by social groups, becomes affiliated with cultural institutions (McLuhan 1964/2005:29-30). He writes:

it makes all the difference whether a hot medium is used in a hot or a cool culture. The hot radio medium used in cool or nonliterate cultures has a violent effect, quite unlike its effect, say, in England or America, where radio is felt as entertainment. A cool or low literacy culture cannot accept hot media like movies or radio as entertainment. They are, at least, as radically upsetting for them as the cool TV medium has proved to be for our high literacy world. (McLuhan 2005:33).

These biases of media can create or destroy social events by virtue of their participation in one medium over another. Imagining alternative histories, McLuhan writes:

TV is a cool medium. It rejects hot figures and hot issues and people from the hot press media. [...] Had TV occurred on a large scale during Hitler's reign he would have vanished quickly. Had TV come first there would have been no Hitler at all. (McLuhan 2005:326)

McLuhan sees Hitler's rise, for example, as predicated on the relationship Germans had to the radio's rapid destabilization of what had previously been a secure and fixed cultural order, allowing for Hitler's rhetoric to thrive in the chaos (McLuhan 2005: 327). McLuhan reiterates that the difference one medium or another presents the user "with an entirely different political and social mix of components and problems." (McLuhan 2005: 326)

However, with such an obvious and socialized impact, it would appear that societies should naturally be skeptical of new mediums. McLuhan answers this by framing the medium's impact as a sort 'fine print' of legal documentation - the using society never sees these downstream results

beforehand. The new medium will always 'sneak' into society through the promise of a fair deal, clearly articulated and honestly delivered. But once present, the medium's ability to transfer information immediately impacts the whole of society, ending the status quo and producing a new topography of culture. He writes of radio:

Radio is provided with its cloak of invisibility, like any other medium. It comes to us ostensibly with person-to-person directness that is private and intimate, while in more urgent fact, it is really a subliminal echo chamber of magical power to touch remote and forgotten chords. All technological extensions of ourselves must be numb and subliminal, else we could not endure the leverage exerted upon us by such extension (McLuhan 1964/2005:330)

Left uncritically examined, the media and textual environment in which the individual exists will always only provide them a biased and critically disempowering agency. Hence McLuhan's emphasis on, and exploration of, the pragmatics and impact of mediums themselves, rather than an analysis of their content. McLuhan summarizes this stance in saying:

The environment as a processor of information is propaganda. Propaganda ends where dialogue begins. You must talk to the media, not the programmer. To talk to the programmer is like complaining to a hot dog vendor at a ballpark about how badly your favorite team is playing. (McLuhan 1967: 142)

This skepticism towards media provides a critical distance that proves helpful in distinguishing, like the theory of textuality, content from the work, content from its impact, and mechanism from each of these elements.

In *More Real? Art In The Age of Truthiness*, a collection of essays on the nature of art, mediation, and truth, Norman M. Klein writes in agreement with McLuhan in "The Charm of the Lie: A History of our Unreliable Grasp of the Real." Following McLuhan's line of inquiry, Klein considers the trajectory of a new medium's impact and capture by society:

The very thing lacking becomes a virtue. The very quality that makes cinema or literature or photography awkward - at first- becomes the hallmark of its uniqueness. Poetics overcompensates point of view in literature. Film overcompensates art direction and editing... But in our era we have a problem. This path to 'reality' in media doesn't work that way anymore... There is a moment of truth: when the medium stops embedding as it has. This will never be true of the computer or of the real in our century, I suspect. The computer is designed never to stop cross-embedding, even into the molecules themselves... So we ask a different question today: what if cross-embedding were not a stage but a permanent experience? We would have to think quite differently about poetics, about

what makes a medium uniquely real. It is a new form of intuition for a new form of globalized feudalism. (Jacobson 2012: 219)

As with McLuhan, mediums here are considered to "sneak in" to a society without revealing the their potential impacts, and in this process it "covers up" past mediums to find its own place. Klein writes:

Embedding is often a form of cultural amnesia because the media that are absorbed tend to be forgotten afterward as if they were painted over [...] We must understand that media cross-embed more than die, but the result is selective memory. When technologies embed back and forth, they essentially impact the culture as a kind of collective Freudian displacement" (Jacobson 2012: 220)

This has a series impact on a society's ability to mediate, in turn affecting the nature of its textuality. In the Lotmanian sense, the change of one or more mediums cause explosive semiotic generation, reinvention, and development in the narratives, myths, sciences and truths of a society. Klein says this as:

Embedding changes how stories are told. It is an allegory about the apparatus. It invents stories about the mechanics of power, as they change our sense of the real (ontology). The 'reality' of the built environments is constantly in redefinition, cross-embedded, era by era. (Jacobson 2012: 220)

In *More Real?* Tom Gunning writes in "Truthiness and the More Real: What is the difference?" that mediation should not be viewed skeptically any more than, say, sensory reality, or linguistic reality, as all are mediating, contingent channels of information. Indeed:

Every medium, whether technological images or spoken language - or even gesture and touch - can open things up in revelation, close them down in deception, or do both ambiguously. Even a caress can lie. That is how we live - really." (Jacobson 2012: 181)

Drowning as it were in the mediation of discourses, Gunning takes the perspective that an agnostic attitude towards media, akin to McLuhan's desire to interrogate the impact of mediation, is most appropriate. He says that "All media simultaneously separate us from reality and connect us. They connect us truly only if we bear in mind the separation entailed" (Jacobson 2012: 181)) In pragmatic terms, Gunning may even say that the discursive quality of media will always be its primary motivation. That is, while the aim of the artistic text in any setting never reducible to a singular formulation, its existence is nevertheless predicated on an intentionality, a will to participate in a discourse in some capacity.

So, media is biased and begets certain practices. Texts, as media, would follow suit. The interpretation of texts cannot avoid these biases present in the mediums by which they are platformed, so they must be considered actively. Linking this back to the context-constraint hierarchy, we should be aware that various platforms of context-constraints - like a constraint upon materiality, for example - beget certain real biases and impact the readers engagement with them. Therefore, it is fair to say that the context-constraints themselves will provide, as any platform of mediation would, a biased proclivity towards *something*, that the platform is never without its own logic and, in a real world setting, never without its predictable impacts on society.

McLuhan has argued that media, or by extension, those platforms by which mediation occurs, are biased technologies which should be considered more for their structural impacts than for their apparent content. As this is analogous to our approach to the text thus far, this is a suitable complement. However, one may be inclined to think that these biases in mediation, if like any technology are being constantly improved upon, would lead to some level of progress towards an ideal, more perfect bias. That is, that over time mediation ought to be made more efficient, more potent, more characteristic of its aims, and better at accomplishing those aims.

Media literacy can be explored in a variety of ways. There are many mediums, especially in the artistic sense, by which some notion of literacy could be most easily assessed. For sake of argument, two mediums - the visual arts and language - epitomize opposing axes of qualified literacy. In the visual arts, particularly in the western tradition, an artist's (a text-maker's) ability to achieve illusory realism is often colloquially considered proof of 'literacy' in the field. Likewise, a reliance on highly stylized and coded shorthand - cartooning, for instance, or the artworks of children - may be considered 'immature' or 'unsophisticated.' The maker of such texts has a questionable grasp of the medium. On the other hand, in the realm of language, the ability to communicate complex ideas with effective rhetorical practices may be considered proof of literacy, which at an elementary level begins at the rote knowledge of vocabulary.

The question of language is an immense one, however, and theories which explore it would quickly bring the discussion away from specific textual matters. So, in exploring the notion of textual literacy, theories of the visual arts will be prioritized. This selection provides an added benefit - as visual art texts may represent realistically the external sensory world, textual literacy in certain

cultures becomes a matter of 'realism' and the 'surpassing' of textual codes. Klein notes that the measure of authenticity and accuracy has fluctuated over the course of history. Writing about the Baroque period's affinity for extremely flourished aesthetics, Klein writes that visual realism:

suggested faking or inflating an object's true use, almost like the hyperreal. By contrast, *artificialis* was understood as more authentic, more handmade, even scientifically truer to the subject. The real then was a kind of reverse Platonism; it was only gold-plated; it stole from the truer real behind it. (Jacobson 2012: 215)

In this way, the very premise of textual realism should be questioned, for what constitutes it is as arbitrary as any other cultural 'choice.'

In *Languages of Art*, Nelson Goodman explores the nature of accuracy in textual expression, particularly in the visual arts. Of particular interest is where the notion of 'accuracy' in representation may be seemingly 'objectively' considered as a matter of visual realism and accuracy, a sort of theoretical surpassing of the limits of the text - a full circle of distancing wherein the referent is made present iconically, rewiring the flow of information through the imposition of new contextual relations. To the uncritical reader, the realistic visual arts text proves a sort of idealized form of communication wherein the text-maker is entirely transparent in their production. But Goodman disagrees, writing: "But how literal or realistic the picture is depends on upon how standard the system is. If representation is a matter of choice and correctness is a matter of information, realism is a matter of habit." (Goodman 1976: 38)

Socially constructed, realism can thus be considered as arbitrary as any cultural convention. And this of course applies to symbolic texts as well. Goodman continues:

Symbolization, then, is to be judged fundamentally by how well it serves the cognitive purpose: by the delicacy of its discriminations and the aptness of its allusions; by the way it works in grasping, exploring, and informing the world. [...] by how it participates in the making, manipulation, retention, and transformation of knowledge. (Goodman 1976: 258)

On the other hand, in McLuhanesque terms, the pragmatic view of a text's formal qualities can be seen as a culturally produced logical tendency of the visual medium.

In *Visual Thinking*, Rudolf Arnheim examines how the visual arts impact cognitive style. Although, like McLuhan, he views the medium of art more or less like any other medium, as a plat- form for communication, articulation, transference, etc. He writes:

All media of representation can rely on isomorphic and on non-isomorphic references... In principle, there is no difference in this respect between verbal and non-verbal languages... A continuous gamut of shapes leads from the least to the most isomorphic media; it includes such intermediate features as onomatopoeic speech sounds, ideographs, allegories and other conventional symbols, To put verbal language in a class of its own is misleading. (Arnheim 1997: 251)

This Arnheim disagrees with, arguing first of all that realism and accuracy are neither real concepts nor viable indicators of textual skill. He writes that this discursive skepticism has a long tradition in western culture:

Emphasis on the unreliability of the senses served the Sophists to support their philosophical skepticism. [...] The chaotic variety of the terrestrial world could now be attributed to a subjective misreading [...] Undoubtedly, western civilization has greatly profited from the distinction between the objectively existing world and the perception of it. It is a distinction that established the difference between the physical and the mental. It was the beginning of psychology. Psychology, as it came to be practiced, has cautioned us not to identify innocently the world we perceive with the world that “really” is; but it has done so at the risk of undermining our trustful familiarity with the reality in which we are home (Arnheim 1997: 5-6).

Arnheim sees, in what seems analogous both to Ricoeur's awareness of distance (between a moment of discourse and context it emerged in) and Eco and Fish's mutual concern with the reader's agency as a text reader, a sort of skepticism towards the mediation of the text as it reaches the reader.

Like McLuhan, Arnheim notes the bias that various mediums lead to. With the initial posit that “perception involves problem solving,” (Arnheim 1997: 37), he notes that perception itself is pragmatic, seeking for *something*, seeking for an answer to a question, which cannot be ignored in the perceptual act.

Arnheim considers that a realistic visual arts text produces a different practical result in society than the that of a stylized symbolic text, where its value is its malleability and plasticity. He considers the impact of a visually reduced formal arrangement compared to a flourished one, writing:

A simple arrow concentrates more efficiently on pointing than does a realistically drawn Victorian hand with fingernails, sleeve, cuff, and buttons. The arrow is also more nearly a full-time symbol and therefore invites the beholder to treat it as a statement rather than a piece of the practical world. (Arnheim 1997: 142)

This accords with much of how Eco and Barthes treat texts in formal terms in that the more vague and 'portable' symbol of the arrow speaks less of itself and its surroundings, producing in some important axis less impact on the other formal elements therein. In Eco's terms it perhaps can be considered as having less syntagmatic 'mass' than the Victorian pointing hand.

This leads Arnheim to claim that the creator of a text tending towards nonrealistic plasticity and applicability, in determining what is appropriate for inclusion or exclusion. He writes:

Generalization is not a matter of collecting an infinite or large or complete or random number of instances. Instead, the thinker - the scientist, the artist, the man in the street - approaches the task with a preliminary notion of what the concept might be like. One looks for examples, but the choice is not arbitrary. One is guided by a sense of where characteristic aspects of the phenomenon might reveal themselves. One dis-cards weak, unclear examples and neglects unnecessary repetitions. One matches each example with the tentative concept, thereby completing, rectifying, trimming it [...] It is an eminently unmechanical procedure, requiring not so much the zeal of the census-taker, the bookkeeper, or the sorting machine as the alertness and intelligence of a functioning mind (Arnheim 1997: 187)

Thus far in our discussion we have covered an archaeologically recreated history of the human textual experience. Now we will examine a similarly oriented work coming from the perspective of artistic education - Arthur Efland's *Art and Cognition*.

Efland specifically deals with the problems of how to cognize artistic works, stating a desire to undo the "biases and the past and to look at more recent understandings of the mind and the nature of human intelligence" (Efland 2002: 7). Efland considers the artistic text's meaningfulness a product of its context (Ibid: 9), a theme which we will see repeatedly in later discussions of textual theory. Citing Nelson Goodman (Ibid: 17-19), Efland considers the act of perceiving to be simultaneously active and passive, including potential for intentionally enacting perceptual change. As this act of perceiving becomes intentionalized, and the process of its change becomes known to the mind, "we have made perception itself into an *object for thought*" (Ibid:17-19), allowing for an immediate expansion of all things conjoined to the act of perceiving:

in becoming an object for thought, perception itself has become a concept in our thinking. Thinking arises in our consciousness and we are no longer perceiving. *We are thinking.* The thoughts may be with images or words stored in memory, and thus present in the mind although the initial stimulus is no longer available... If we think about yesterday's sunset, the phenomenal image we *see* in our mind's eye now exists in our thinking. Once we reach the point where the object of inquiry *is our thinking* and the instrument of inquiry *is also our thinking*, we reach a state of balance where both object and instrument are *qualitatively identical* (Efland 2002: 18-19, emphasis original).

The process of perception, once itself perceived and made known like any other 'input' event, becomes extremely plastic in the mind, open to minute qualifications and modulations with intentionality steering its course. That a process can be so easily considered in 'object-like' quality, wherein the mind sits removed and spectating the perception as an event external to its own perceiving of that event, seems at once analogous to Bateson's learning-to-learn, framing the context-constraint in positive terms.

The presumption in Efland's argument is that those thoughts (in any manner in which they may appear within the individual's cognition - "with images or words stored in memory") are referring to some other event or object by means of the thought's own aesthetically based construction. In other words, regardless of the manner of the thought, it mediates another event to the mind when the mind seeks to consider the perceiving of that "initial stimulus". The mind therefore has the ability to remediate its own memory to itself instead of simply accessing a 'permanent' memory from a singular model, wherein that memory could not be re-approached in any other way than it was first accessed:

Lev Vygotsky offers a more universal, albeit less arts centered, model. Efland summarizes: "For Vygotsky, higher forms of mental life begin *only when cultural influences are internalized!* In particular, it is language acquisition that makes conscious mental life possible [...] For Vygotsky, culture determines both form and content." (Efland 2002: 33, emphasis original)

Internalizing externalities shapes thought in a way possibly as predictable as the use of those tools and socialized symbol-discovery processes in the first place. Mediation makes culture more consistent in Donald's terms, as the external texts are taught in a way that specifies their correct usage. Systematically correct acculturation is efficiently secured through the mediation process.

Efland charts commonalities in artistic misreading and notably distinguishes between knowledge-seeking and knowledge-base errors (Efland 2002: 111). Efland charts commonalities in visual arts

misreading and notably distinguishes between knowledge-seeking, knowledge-base, and learning disposition errors (Ibid: 111). Absent is the quality of the text - the onus of accuracy is on the reader and their relation to the larger text-reading community.

Efland speaks at length in critique of the symbol-processing view of cognition (Efland 2002: 64). Symbol-processing takes a computer's calculation as a rough model for how the mind works, admittedly with a more porous and messier way. However, as symbols are neither frozen, consistent objects, nor indeed 'processed' by the mind in a predictable manner. The theory removes symbols from their context - the very thing that produces their content - under the belief that the symbol is essentially a self-contained unit of pure affectual externalized cognition. This, alongside the removal of human agency from the cognitive processes, disagrees with our previous examinations on the plastic, contextual, intentional meaningfulness of symbols and texts (Ibid: 64).

A major aim of Efland's *Art and Cognition* is in finding a new "integrative" theory which avoids the failings of previous theories. To contextualize his aims, he charts a base for what such a theory would do: emphasize the individual agent, their negotiation of internal cognition with external tools for a personally ideal integration of both "lifeworlds", and facilitate such growth through both metacognitive and skilled interventions (Efland 2002: 78-81).

Efland writes:

The function of the arts throughout human cultural history has been and continues to be the task of 'reality construction.' The arts construct representations of the world, which may be about imagined worlds that are not present, but that might inspire human beings to create an alternative future for themselves. [...] The ability to interpret this world is learned through the interpretation of the arts, providing a foundation for intelligent, morally responsive actions. (Efland 2002:171).

Primarily, Efland sees the value of art as a tool for overcoming compartmentalization and small thinking – all art is an exercise in Gestalt thinking, which by participating in artistry, the audience somewhat refreshes their cognition. In more pragmatic terms it also encourages the cross-pollination of knowledge domains and plants the seeds for later creative insight (Ibid: 8-9).

Efland taxonomizes visual-arts learning errors into three main categories – problems of knowledge base, of knowledge seeking strategies, and of personal disposition (Ibid: 110-112). Tying these all together is the ontological conception of visual arts as an information-related skill, a process

which, like a tool, is at least partially external to the user of the artistic skill. This isn't to say this is wrong, but simply to note the tool-oriented, action-directed, *communicability-based* nature of the position. In line with Vygotsky, Efland recommends that “assessment for the more advanced levels of knowledge acquisition requires testing for transfer, and this involves teaching for it as well” (Ibid: 130), with ‘transfer’ being a sort of generative and individualized internalization of the concepts – a sort of mentalese of the skills of artistry. The well-trained artist learns to translate concepts between domains, showing advanced competency by virtue of a function of actual breadth of a *potential* depth.

Context Constraint - Text in the Aggregate

The text, as a social technology, can be considered to have a direct impact on the informationality it contains. It is not a pure and innocent function - its use has informational biases and specific, predictable tendencies.

At the social level, the text must be considered in semiospheric, or ideological, or in similarly expansive ways. The text as social tool permits discourse, communication in general, to transcend the instance of its creation. If, then, the text is the means by which time-transcending discourse emerges, it would be the means by which communities store discursive developments, build a time-transcending social order, and allow increased accumulation through the selective ability to engage and further develop said order. This is nothing new - scholars of the Tartu–Moscow School explored this space for decades. In this discussion, however, this 'fact' reveals the pragmatic aggregate effects of textualization/distanciation and the role it plays in the building of emergent informational superstructures. In *Meaning And Reading*, Meyer explores indirectly the way in which distanciation aggregates to support the larger mechanism of culture through the erasure of a nontextual or atextual mode. Textuality, particularly in the artistic and literary sense, serves as the basis by which a socially invented reality emerges as a dominant and co-created 'fact,' less by intent than by resultant effect of distanciation itself. Indeed, Meyer considers that the very essence of ideology is its conversion of externalities into itself, its fictionalization of reality, and in these senses its distanciation and textualization. Meyer writes:

As textuality enables language users to create ideological *effects* according to the very nature of ideology, texts, so *fictionalized*, are only possible because of the *rhetoric* of ideology *stricto sensu*. Fiction emerges as the unfolding of a derivative problematic that displaces and conceals some original problematic. This is the core of the rhetoric of ideology: expression through concealment, in one word, displacement. [...] Literature is bound to refer to a problematic of its own and create or reveal new alternatives immanent in the text. Autonomous with regard to the problems from which it originates, literature escapes the limitations of time period in which these problems occurred. (Meyer 1983: 125)

Thus textuality, by virtue of its separation, comes to platform a space wherein it monopolizes any way in which it can be engaged. So long as the texts, which are always integrated into society as

discursive events, are 'speaking,' the reader will always, as was explored by Stanley Fish, participate in a prescribed discursive order which automatically guides and steers them. Meyer considers this as a sort of necessary process - a sort of feedback loop - at the level of ideology, where a winning textually-mediated transformation of society must infinitely grow and adapt to maintain its victory through constant reinforcement. Meyer continues:

For an ideology, reality in general is the permanent problem to solve. Ideology suppresses the real questions as real, *either* by answering them directly ideologically, *or* by suppressing their impact as challenges through a specific process of rhetoricalization. In the first case, the questions remain at the level of reality since the answer is homogenous with the problem, In the second, the problematological displacement of the initial question *transforms* this question into another one which, by definition, has not *really* been raised. An illusion of reality is created by means of that transfer, but the question that is used to replace the initial question is nevertheless a *fiction* with respect to this original problem. This is how *fiction* arises out of *reality*." (Meyer 1983: 123)

This illusory quality can be viewed as rooted in the textuality itself, for the informational processes emergent at the most basic level of the text beget a rapid scaling of the process on its own terms. That is to say that once a discursive event has been distanced and textualized, any further engagement with it as discourse will not only be biased towards a textual paradigm, where such treatment will be textually rewarded with richer possible engagement, but also will any engagement further cement the viability and necessity for the broader contextual discursive platform which the reader addresses it by (as per Stanley Fish). The textual platform grows as it becomes too useful and too efficient to ignore. Likewise, any affront to the platform will neutralize itself, as the platform of engagement only forwards the platform's legitimacy. Meyer says:

Ideologies, therefore, require mediation. The function of mediation here is to rhetoricize *the idea in question* if the questions raised bear on some idea internal to the ideology, or -and this amounts to the same thing - to rhetoricize the non-rhetorical *question* with respect to the *ideas* of the ideology. The mediating discourse is necessarily fictional and autonomous: it is characterized by the rhetoricalization of a real question achieved through a process of displacement that makes the ideological relationship appear non-ideo- logical. (Meyer 1983: 121)

Eisner agrees that the text is a projected event, saying that:

works of art do not ensure that such experience will emerge, but they increase the probability that it will as long as those in their presence are inclined to experience such work with respect to their aesthetic features. The Parthenon and the Sistine ceiling can be ignored by someone in their presence; yet even a stone can be attended to so that its aesthetic character can serve as a source of that special form of life we call art (Eisner 2002:10).

Humans alone can build legacies and transmit information across generations. Remember Ricoeur's distanciation permits infinite recontextualization by the very act of removing context from the moment/unit of discourse. Eisner addresses this as: "representation stabilizes the idea or image in a material and makes possible a dialogue with it" (Eisner 2002:6), a dialogue with the *idea* itself, distilled from the rationale for its explication in the first place. Continuing from 'dialogue', Eisner notes that "the tools you work with influence what you are likely to think about. Measuring tools lead to quantification; the tools used in the arts lead to qualification" (Eisner 2002:8-9). This articulates the materiality of expression as a new site for context to remerge as part of the process. That is, the context-removed, distanciated discursive moment enters into a new context – that of translation *into whatever medium it is now set to be engaged with*. The medium of artistic expression becomes the new 'ground', the new context, from which the possibility of the message is centered.

Jean Baudrillard also speaks of this issue, noting that media is almost definitionally monologuing to the viewer, and through this lopsided relationship media comes to dominate and subjugate readers (Baudrillard 2019: 179). Speech alone he claims is dialogic, presenting itself as the ideal model for what media *ought* to be in terms of emancipatory projects (Ibid: 179). He writes:

the totality of the existing architecture of the media finds itself on this latter definition *they are what always prevents response*, making all processes of exchange impossible (except in the various forms of response *simulation*, themselves integrated in the transmission process, thus leaving the unilateral nature of the communication intact) This is the real abstraction of the media. And the system of social control and power is rooted in it. (Ibid: 178-179)

As Baudrillard argues, the very basis of mediation, which requires the presence and use of codes, is on directness, on passionate stance. He cites Roman Jakobson's sender-receiver, which formulates communication as a transfer between units, but Baudrillard extends this to its extreme wherein the perspectival essence of communication is revealed. Without a perspective argued in the communication, code ceases. He writes:

But as soon as one posits ambivalent relations, it all collapses. There is no code for ambivalence; and without a code, no more encoder, no more decoder: the extras flee the stage. Even a message becomes impossible, since it would, after all, have to be defined as "emitted" and "received." it is as if the entire formalization exists only to avert this catastrophe. (Ibid: 190)

Relating this the presence of context-constraints, we may consider distancing similarly *intentionalized* in its fundamental structure. Just as the text needs a reader to exist, the distanced event, as a separation of discourse, may in this analogy always need an opinion.

Textual Synthesis - Text as Context-Constraint Hierarchy

Because the text is made meaningful through its context, a model of the text premised in context may be useful to expand and enrich textual theories. To do so we have discussed a variety of textual and text-adjacent theories which contribute, in varying degrees of directness, to a more articulated understanding of the text. To review, we have considered the text as a discrete space of overlapping codes whose meaning is 'created' by an engagement with the context in which it appears. The text is premised upon the act of distancing - with evolutionary roots in the origins of human intelligence - in that the text is the very ability to separate a cohesive unit from an otherwise all-encompassing context. (As a means of transmitting information, text use begets certain social technologies which aggregate and coalesce to form complex societies with complicated semiotic capacities.) We have also seen that when addressing the text, the reader ostensibly engages with a dialogic partner 'before' them, even though it is perhaps more accurate to say that the text made meaningful by the elements rejected by it - its context - than by its own inherent qualities. The context creates the qualities the reader knows the text by. With this, and all previous discussion in mind, a model of the text predicated on context may further develop our understanding of the text, and allow greater applicability of textual theories in spaces currently not conducive to traditional theories.

What would such spaces be? Children's spaces and memes come to mind. Children's textuality rejects clean code boundaries, reinvents its rules regularly, and is in general taken with a light-hearted playfulness that traditional theories of the literary text cannot address easily. Similarly, the contemporary internet meme, which is ostensibly a prime target for textual analysis, is so intensely convoluted and chaotic that analysis beyond material forms proves difficult. But this will be addressed later. Now we will construct a context-oriented model of the text - one which attempts to articulate the text's ability to be meaningful in terms of the context and not of its own internal elements.

Following the line of thought posed Donald and Deacon, with Donald's proposed body-mapping in mind, the hierarchies of context may be, as a sort of in-road to the discussion, initially

considered in lockstep to the development of distancing at an anthropological level. Then we would have:

- the ability to separate physically predicated episodes from context
- the ability to separate bodily parts from the whole
- the ability to separate self from other
- the ability to separate actions from consequences (symbolic signs)

Expanding this in terms of distancing, we have:

- A context-constraint relationship to materiality
- A context-constraint relationship to temporality

These follow from the fact that the episode is a snapshot of something or some event occurring in real material space over a designated period of time. To distance at this level is to break apart the setting from the act, and the act from the chain of temporal externalia the object or event in question remains enmeshed in. To separate materialities would entail an ability to draw boundaries around targeted things - the essential building block of distancing itself. Note that in moving from materiality to temporality, the distanced thing/text in question must go through a materiality before reaching temporality. To separate temporalities would entail an ability to draw boundaries around a material thing over an axis of time, creating a

- A context-constraint relationship to authoriality

Authoriality here meaning authorship, ego, responsibility. Here both the ability to separate one's own body parts from the self-whole (notably the hands as an exploratory conscious tool) and the ability to separate one's self from others (seeing others as conscious beings). This can be considered a plane of agencies - of things with intentions. To separate authorities is to separate the one's own mind from another - to theorize a decision making process by another, knowing that the other, like oneself, used data known or unknown, to make that decision.

- A context-constraint relationship to causality itself

Causality here being a term of convenience meaning the "jump" into semiotic symbols, from iconic and immediate logic of action-reaction dictated by material truths, to signs which have essentially nothing in common with the actions required to create them. Here symbolic thinking exists - language, artistry, complex codes, etc. Texts operating at or defined by this level exist now almost entirely held in a pure abstraction, a thing with no original referent.

Instead of the clunky language foregrounding the context entirely, for convenience's sake, the context can functionally be considered as synonymous with the text's selective filtration of qualities at any given level of context. Thus we can continue talking about 'texts', while framing them more accurately as emergent from and reliant upon their host context.

So, putting this into a succinct model:

A full acceptance of all possible context aspects. There is no interaction with context as the text is unbounded. Therefore, there can be no meaningfulness, or even awareness, of a 'thing' at this level.

A constraint upon, or a rejection of, certain material aspects, of materialities inherent within the text/context dialogue. The text is contingent upon material constraints, or a rejection of material qualities which surround it. The text must incorporate selective filters on the materiality of the text to be identified as such. The text requires one narrow range of permitted material interactions to allow for itself.

A constraint upon, or a rejection of, certain temporal aspects, of temporalities inherent within the text/context dialogue. The text is contingent upon temporal constraints, or a rejection of temporal qualities which surround it. The text must incorporate selective filtration of temporal axes to be identified as the text. Note that this requires a fixed relationship to material-interactivity to exist. The text requires a narrow range of permitted material and temporal interactions to allow for itself.

A constraint upon, or a rejection of, certain authorship aspects, of authorial relations inherent within the text/context dialogue. The text is contingent upon authorial constraints, or a rejection of certain authorial qualities which surround it. The text must incorporate a selective filtering of concepts around authorship to be identified as such. Note that this requires a fixed relationship to

material and temporal interactivities. The text requires a narrow range of permitted material, temporal and authorial interactions to allow for itself.

A constraint upon, or a rejection of, certain causal aspects, of causal relations inherent within the text/context dialogue. The text is contingent upon causal constraints, or a rejection of certain aspects of causality which surround it. The text must incorporate a selective filtering of causality to be identified as such. Note that this requires a fixed relationship to material, temporal and authorial interactivities. The text requires a narrow range of permitted material, temporal, and authorial interactions to allow for itself.

To illustrate this rubric, consider the examination, or perhaps use, of a scribbled upon a Post-It Note: we cannot accept the act of reading a written note without first accepting that the writing itself is materially insignificant in contrast to the ideas we are to read from it. The note paper, color of pen used, and coffee stains upon the note paper are all also insignificant to the ideas we glean from the lettered writing. Likewise, one can examine the materiality of the note in a way which would disregard the writing upon it. Now the reader considers the cultural impact of the note (its qualities someone in a cultural setting would be aware of), the reader's estimation of an author and guesswork of its time of creation, etc. At every stage of the engagement with the note, the reader is making choices, navigating a variety of contexts, to 'build' before themselves a legible text which they can engage with. Thus we can see the text use here as the application of selective filters which shape the material object into the text it is known as. By considering the text in this manner, we are better able to parse the points of contact it has with contexts which construct it, in turn allowing a more 'genuine' and less 'contingent' read of the text as a construct. Extrapolating, such a methodology would suffice in the examination of the sort of complicated texts mentioned earlier - children's texts, for instance, which are nonliterary, under-coded, simplistic.

To summarize, we may link the constraints to the following terms of language:

- Materiality ~ nouns
- Temporality ~ nouns and verbs
- Authorship ~ verbs
- Causality ~ the whole of a text or expression's syntagmatic axis

And additionally, perhaps adjectives can be viewed as existing at the level of pure distancing.

So to reiterate our considerations of the text: The text can be formulated in terms of its removal from its context. Such a formulation would take into account that contexts are hierarchically organized, and that the text, following the earlier discussion, would have to comply with theoretical rules. Among these rules are the proposed semiotic operations of the text by Barthes, Lotman, Eco, and Fish, the logical rules articulated by Ricoeur, and the cognitive basis of such a process via Donald and Deacon.

As a series of hierarchically arranged context restraints, each rejection can be considered a sort of "stage" by which the next level of constraint, and thus informational capacity, is achieved. By stacking more contextual constraints the ostensible text is made more portable across semiotic regimes and is enriched by virtue of the larger vocabulary of all possible structural exclusions its presence dictates. For example, a non-text, which does not distance, is just context, and cannot exclude any alternative 'choices' in the system, so its informationality is null. At this level there is neither semiotic portability nor cross-code embedding. The reverse is true - the more constrained the text's context is, the more semiotically portable and embeddable it is. A poetic sentence alluding to historical myths and cultural traditions, known as a part of a cultural canon, is based upon an *extremely* constrained context, while the individual images within a children's picture book would be much less constrained, and so on.

This approach permits a more direct look at certain difficult textual problems which may complicate more traditional textual analysis methods. For example, when children, as early text-users, break all the norms and codes of socially-conditioned text use in any one genre or space, it can be difficult for adults to make sense of things. The child playing with a doll has an immense plasticity with it, in that the child can on a whim turn it from a hero into a villain and back, a person into an animal into a giant, can engage it to be 'alive' or 'dead' in a narrative depending on a plot, and so on. And the plot itself, of course, is unpredictable. Though the doll is ostensibly fixed in its being, and 'should' thus entail only a select and limited number of uses as a text, this is visibly the more adult approach when contrasted to the myriad of ways children would use such a doll over the course of a playtime. From a textual perspective addressing such spaces is almost a non-starter, for where are the literary codes and fixed boundaries? However, as has been shown in discussion,

the child is nevertheless enacting textual principles, engaging with the basis of textuality, and is, indeed, participating in textual activities. Under a context-constraint paradigm, this space could be better explored within the purview of textual theory.

Analysis

With a framework of the text as a series of context constraints, individual texts may be more robustly decomposed into constituent relationships of its mediation. This may be useful for individual text analysis. However, one of the aims of this thesis has been to create a method which brings textuality closer to being able to analyze efficiently and succinctly complex texts which do not easily fit within traditional textual theory. For example, a child's causal and rule-breaking use of texts. In a complicated scenario, a context-oriented analysis should be able to help clarify various open-ended questions not clearly answered in traditional codes. For instance,

- in a text where boundaries are loosely defined, how can analysis be confident in its claims of the units present?
- in a text where 'nonsensical' elements are combined with more legible 'sensible' ones, to what extent are the nonsense elements to be considered special and intentional?

In both of these cases, and likely in any case of a child's textual production, the question will probably circle around the intentionality, or lack thereof, present in the child's choices. While that cannot be proven from a textual angle, the 'logic' behind choices certainly can be argued. Any such analysis will retroactively seem quite obvious, however, so some caution is warranted.

In any case, the analysis will begin with an initial attempt to describe the textual arrangement, followed by a consideration of the textual arrangement in terms of context constraints. Identifiable elements will be explored, piece by piece, so that the units and variables present are decomposed into a series of relations.

Describing the arrangement:

- Several animals, including a crocodile and dinosaur, are driving or riding upon large construction vehicles.
- Other animals - snakes and lizards - are crawling on vehicles. Colorful lizards are interacting with passengers in the back seat of a vehicle.

- The whole scene is arranged in a sort of amphitheater shape stemming outward from the playing child. Hence the activity in the scene is relatively contingent on their convenient access to the toys.

Expanding this description:

Several animals including a crocodile and dinosaur:

In strongly contrasting visual styles both amongst themselves and against the vehicles, several toys are shaped like specific real or fictional animals. The animals all have clearly identifiable heads in relation to their bodies, and many have easily identified eyes and mouths. Their organic forms contrast with the mechanical forms of the vehicles. They are separate from each other and the setting in which they were placed.

Are driving or riding upon large construction vehicles:

The much larger yellow toys, which all the other toys are positioned on and thus in direct relation to, are models of vehicles used in heavy industry. They are constructed of blocky, mechanical shapes and forms, and have several elements traditionally associated with vehicles - namely large wheels, driver's cabins, and even exhaust pipes. All of these elements are arranged in traditional vehicle organization - with wheels on a bottom axis, allowing the whole toy to move. Some animals are placed inside the driver's seat area of these vehicles, facing forward in the same way that drivers do while operating vehicles. Other animals are placed in various places on top of the vehicles. No animals are next to or off of the vehicles. All of the animal toys with 'faces' (eyes, mouths) are arranged forward in conjunction with the vehicles.

Other animals - snakes and lizards - are crawling on vehicles:

Animals without faces are arranged variably across the vehicles, distinctly not facing forward like the animals with faces. The animals without faces are all made of a similar material, providing additional contrast against the face-having toys, as well as suggesting a commonality within them.

The faceless animals are entirely placed in regions of the vehicles not ideal for the placement of animals. The majority of the face-having animals are placed in regions which are flat and can plausibly be considered seating areas. The faceless animals are placed in comparatively liminal regions. Contrasting with the organized and forward-facing face-having animals, the faceless animals are comparatively chaotically arranged.

Colorful lizards are interacting with passengers in the back seat of a vehicle:

The combination of a lack of faces and variable arrangement suggest a distinction between them and the other animals. That the lizard-shaped animals are in a group and placed directly in front of a group of face-having animals suggests activity between the two based on group identity.

The whole scene is arranged in a sort of amphitheater shape stemming outward from the playing child. Hence the activity in the scene is relatively contingent on their convenient access to the toys:

The vehicles are arranged in a loose 'C' shape around an empty point which would conveniently fit a child playing with the toys. The animals on the vehicles that have faces are arranged facing where the child would be. Animals without faces are arranged variably, several with their backs turned to the child's position.

All the animals are arranged in a manner offering easy access by a playing child. No animals are hidden behind, under, or far removed from the vehicles. The whole play scene fits comfortably within the 'C' shaped arrangement.

There are animals or animal characters:

All of the animal toys visually stand out in the scene, removed from both the outdoor landscape and the vehicles. The toys as material objects have distinct boundaries to their bodies and do not have accessories or paraphernalia which would complicate the shape of material that constitutes them. This initial distinction requires separating it from the negative space around it, identifying it as a thing or sign at all.

All of the toys are referring to previously understood characters or ideas - specific species of animal, specific characters from media franchises, etc. Individual characteristics in the design of the toys signify their referents through physical design choices.

Whether fictional or real, all of the animals have associated behaviors, sounds, activities, etc. Arguably, some of these animals have characteristic activities which are essential features in how they are defined and known. For instance, the snake must ideally be able to move in a characteristically snake-like way. So long as the toy does not categorically preclude the ability for such activity to have ever possibly occurred - that is, the snake could be in a box, which does not necessarily rewrite a past or dictate future for it where its movement is impossible - the text is recognizable as itself.

There are characters driving and riding vehicles:

The wheels on the vehicles imply that they are vehicles, and indeed would likely turn a non-vehicle 'into' a vehicle by virtue of their presence on the bottom of the toy (think of the Cinderella cart out of vegetables). The wheels only operate over time and cannot be demonstrated without operating over time. Still models which have nonmoving wheels may still be identified as such, as the presence of the wheel signifies a theoretical capacity for motion.

The implication that some characters are actively driving the vehicles is emphasized by the placement of characters placed in the driver's seats of the vehicles. Characters atop the vehicles implies their relatively different 'function' in the scene, making the in-vehicle characters comparatively more likely to be drivers.

Driving as an action and occurs over time. It also requires an agency enacting the process of driving, someone who chose to drive.

While the animals 'require' an ability to act over time, and indeed they would not really be animals without this capacity, our recognition of them is not dependent on whatever additional actions they may be doing or will do. A giraffe, for instance, is identified and characterized more by the presence of a long neck and specific coloration patterns than by

any physical action or some notable vocalization. In contrast, wheels must be, in theory or practice, able to spin. A wheel that shows itself as fundamentally unable to spin - imagine a toy with square or triangular wheels on a bike - are not so much wheels as 'something else,' likewise affecting the bike's recognizability.

The vehicles as recognized do not make choices, and only operate. They could be specific characters (Thomas the Tank Engine is a characterized vehicle, for example), but this is not immediately self-evident with the toys present. Lacking any obvious indicators of agency, like faces, the vehicles will be presumed inanimate.

Note that past the materiality jump, authorship and temporality are usually co-present. Likely this is due to the medium of play (and the medium of expression in this paper - as still image). The wheels of the vehicles give a temporality to identifying the vehicle.

All of these texts seem constructed primarily of material and temporal context restrictions, lacking apparent authorial and causal restrictions. Causally unrestricted in that fantastical animals and such are apparently driving vehicles, and authorially unrestricted in that the source of this playtime does not seem to refer to a Model Author beyond the child. Temporally and materially, however, the arrangement clearly relies on constricted contextual aspects, in that the animals and characters *are characters at all*. That they seem to be clearly engaging in relation to each other, by means of some characteristic *actions* which they do. The arrangement has a narrative quality through the careful character-centered (semiotically, one may say the 'hotspots' are centered around multiple character engagements) placement. Intuitively we see characters facing each other as snapshots of an imagined exchange. Textually this requires temporal constraints.

As an adult, when I see this arrangement, I am encouraged to mentally expand upon it in greater detail. The textures of the vehicles encourage a response from the loose and indecipherable natural ground, full of twigs, weeds, sprouts, plants, and leaves. The effect is to very intuitively envision a natural landscape profuse with conflict-oriented life – a fantasy ideal of a swamp or dark forest which forces the characters to reside in safety upon the vehicles, far removed from the mess. The characters, arranged facing one another, intuitively call to mind interactions between individuals.

Are they speaking and on good terms? Are they arguing about something? Are they debating decisions, are they lost in this wild swamp? The anonymous non-character reptiles as snakes and geckos, in the context of the narrative and setting just provided, appear as threatening monsters attacking the characters with faces. With very little effort, a dynamic narrative has been called to mind.

Immediately we see many characters present, most obviously identifiable as separate toys which represent animals in various degrees of stylization. We see alligators, dinosaurs, dragons, and other sorts of creatures which are not immediately 'characters' in most texts, yet here seem positioned in a way which necessitates such a reading. The presence of eyes and a face may serve as a rapid test as to whether the thing is a character or not. Additionally, based on their placement in the vehicles in spaces where we may expect humans to interact - as in the driver seat or the back of the back of the vehicles - we are 'encouraged' to consider them as agents in this scenario. Perhaps more accurately we may say that we are textually 'rewarded' for such a reading, as it opens the larger text up in a way which is potentially richer (for the interplay of agencies and narrative events possible) yet also efficiently summarized.

Additionally, there are several animals (the snakes) which lack the overt of demarcators of agency such as exaggerated eyes or faces. They are not placed in positions on the vehicles which indicate their humanlike use of them (driving them). But more interestingly, their placement in positions of contrast with the characters bely situations wherein some interaction is inevitable. The vehicles are obvious for their size and realism relative to the caricatured animals. As they are all yellow, have moving parts and are roughly the same size, they provide a consistent backdrop upon which agencies can be explored. They are also stylistically similar in terms of construction and material, with the visual balance of elements that make up the vehicles also being rather consistent.

The setting is complex - there is seemingly an integration of the outdoor setting with the scenario of the play, but there is also a selective focus on the area immediately near the vehicles. Behind we see the legs of a table, though it is not in use and had no direct interaction with the play arrangement. No plants or soil is used in relation to either the characters or vehicles which implies an unavoidable interaction. As in, there is no character in soil, or on soil, or has soil near them in the vehicles, etc. There are some pieces of leaves and twigs in the vehicles, but note their secondary

placement versus the very intentional toy vine which is on the dump truck. The characters are all on the vehicles, which thus serve as a differentiator of an empty space ground and a meaningful setting. Thus while the whole scene takes place outside, the vehicles come to serve as a highlighted focus area where action occurs. And though this is a guess, the jungle atmosphere of the greenery and dirt may well have been a creative catalyst for the selection of characters to all be reptiles and snakes.

We could propose a few main axes of object differentiation.

- Size, small (more active) to large (less active)
- Arrangement, relation to other characters (dynamics), relation to vehicles (roles)

Even at this stage we may use the theoretically discussed rubric to propose a more rigorous dichotomy between the characters and the vehicles, for at this stage this seems the most fruitful space. Both the characters and vehicles are constructed out of a negotiation with materiality. Both are also constructed out of a negotiation of temporality - in the case of the character, their behavior and 'being' over time, and in the case of the vehicles their ability to 'do' what their vehicle is supposed to do. So we move to the next stage, and here find our point of differentiation. The characters are (generally) beings of authorship and require a negotiation of agency, which they choose in a series of decisions which over time build what they are. The character thus needs a sense of authority as part of its definitional integrity to be identified as such. The vehicle, however, does not. They do not build a repertoire of choices by which they are known, nor some characteristic decision making process which is labeled as their identity. Vehicles do not make choices, but they can be effected by history, leading to broken or inoperable vehicles. But in these cases it seems a Platonic ideal vehicle is the measure by which they are known at all, for we would say (for example) that it is a "broken car" rather than "a vehicle chassis which was once a car but is now something else." So while characters require authorial aspects, these vehicles do not require an integration of an authority/authoriality to maintain its definitional integrity.

While "agency separates an actor from a machine" is hardly a bold claim, hopefully this rubric demonstrates a more consistent scaffolding by which that difference is illuminated and clarified. Continuing, we will examine the arrangement's points of interaction through this same lens.

We've proposed a major dichotomy between vehicle and character. Through the lens of interactions, we may also identify an additional element, the anonymous ground, which serves as foil to the others. By the rubric the ground does not require so much as an awareness that it is, so it is obviously much lower in complexity than the other elements. This seems to be the case materially, for at no stage does the ground of the arrangement come into direct and irrefutable dynamism with the characters. Instead it seems to be a negative space which characters are implied to work in relation to. That no characters touch the ground directly, not even the supposedly anonymous reptiles, is telling in this regard. In following the rubric this would imply that the ground is negatively defined, that it is a foil to things posited rather than a posit itself, and this does seem to be the case here. Instead the vehicles themselves become the ground on which the characters interact directly, and they do so in relation to a negatively defined ultimate ground which they do not (perhaps cannot) directly interact with.

There is an interesting dynamic present wherein the vehicles simultaneously operate as a setting as well as their own acting half-agents. A character in the driver seat of a vehicles is probably placed there to represent that character controlling the vehicle in some capacity. But so long as other social dynamics are implied to be occurring on the same vehicle, we must presume a temporal arrangement between the drivers and the riders.

In casual observation, the characters are 'clearly' interacting with each other by virtue of their proximity, orientation, placement in local setting, etc. Is it possible to argue this through the rubric? We may attempt to do so through considering the character class of text in terms of its high level complexity in relation to nearby lower level complexity classed texts (vehicles, ground). Indeed, it is easy to identify that the characters' placements emerge in very specific patterns. The characters are either placed in groups oriented towards other groups, or are placed in positions within the vehicles which would imply their intentional use and control of those vehicles. In both cases the characters, already very complex texts, are found in places which are categorically highly complex. That is to say, the characters tend to be arranged in highly complex spaces, or situations. They are not found on the ground or in void spaces, nor are they randomly scattered geographically which would model a semiotic separation between them. We might then say that the characters are

utilized by being arranged in spaces which maximize the potential for their complexities to be expressed.

On the other hand we see that the vehicles are somewhat scattered across the arrangement space. The most notable arrangement of the vehicles is their orientation around what would be the best location for the child playing with them to sit! They are not arranged around each other (as are the characters), nor are they even arranged in a line implying some sort of external rationale. In this regard their placement reflects a sort of deus-ex-machina semiotic nonchalance. Their very arrangement seemingly neutralizes their ability to build complexity, instead serving as a convenience for the child playing.

In treating the whole arrangement as a text, we have been able to decompose it into its core constitutive elements describe them from a textual perspective. Let's now consider the primary constitutive elements more directly as existing primarily at one or another stage of the context-constraint hierarchy. From this perspective we may see the constitutive elements as constructed directly from constrained contexts.

- several animals [M]

This is a "simple" discernment of materially differentiated elements. The various toys are colored differently, use different aesthetics, are separated physically, and are self-evidently mobile, able to be moved across a play area. These texts follow the logic of the ball example discussed above. That they are animals is a product of their (per Fish, ostensible) formal qualities, like their various textures, coloration patterns, four limbs, faces, characteristic body parts, etc. Note that some of these have characteristic activities which are essential constitutive elements in their identification, which means they extend into an axis of temporality (where action and activity are included within the space of the text). These are discussed below.

- including a crocodile and dinosaur [M, T]

How these units are known includes a quality of activity - a crocodile must at some level be able to bite as a crocodile is able to do, just as a bird must be at some level able to fly. While the definition has a minimum threshold which must be met, additional qualities are valid inclusions within the space. Neither crocodiles nor dinosaurs are not known for their vehicle driving abilities, but these do not erase the essential features of the crocodile, which likely involves, for example a large jaw, sharp or menacing teeth, green lizard skin, its characteristic eyes and facial shape, lizard-like feet, and so on. What is important to note here is that an essential part of the crocodile likely includes an ability to 'act' like a crocodile - that is, to bite with its great jaw.

- are driving or riding upon large construction vehicles [M, T]

The knowledge of a crocodile's minimum criteria does not preclude the signification of additional activities, like driving the vehicle, but it is necessary for the text to be known as a crocodile that the minimum are met. If the toy was damaged and its head missing, or even just its large protruding mouth, it would immediately be less recognizable as a crocodile. However, if the toy were to signify that the crocodile's jaw could not be used, perhaps the jaw is taped shut or the crocodile is wearing a muzzle, the text that is crocodile remains recognizable because the jaw's ability to bite remains a potential, and here is merely caveated. The modification comes after an initial ability for the jaw to be functioning at all. Similarly, were the crocodile's hands tied together as if it were under arrest, while its jaw remains open and free, the crocodile would remain itself. If the toy were missing its hands, or there was some structural means by which the toy revealed that it could not ever drive a vehicle, the recognizability of the crocodile would remain, for driving vehicles is not an essential feature.

In short, the engagement with a process over time begets a definitional constraint wherein the possibility for that actions occurrence must be present to be recognized as the text in question. So long as a temporal feature is included in the text, it must articulate temporally predicated contingencies, navigating its own definition at this additional axis of possibility.

Similarly, the construction vehicles have what appear to be movable wheels. One of the vehicles - which appears to be a dump truck - has red colored back which stands out from the rest of the vehicle's yellow and black construction-coded coloration. The red back is likely intended, by virtue

of its formal difference, to highlight something about itself. In this context, presumably the red back area can be moved by the playing child - meaning it can be actively engaged with. Thus the red color locally signifies to the child the toys' ability to be engaged with on this additional axis - in real time, the child can create the action the vehicle is characterized as being able to do (dump large loads of 'stuff' out of the large tank atop it).

- while other animals - snakes and lizards - are crawling on vehicles [M, T]

The snakes and lizards, defined as such by their recognizable forms as animals, are themselves hardly identifiable beyond their shapes. Their monochrome palettes serve, in relation to the other characters in the arrangement, an anonymizing function, highlighted by their apparent lack of any features. On the other hand, their placement on the vehicles in abnormal locations, again emphasized in relation to the more 'normally' placed other characters, creates a situation emphasizing their location and presence as meaningful. The qualities of their forms in this location, plus their anonymizing lack of features, both emphasizes their alienness to the other characters and indicates a special activity in their location.

We may read into them a unique activity characteristic of their animal referents - a crawling, climbing, scurrying act which operates in line with their anonymized otherness. The linking of a material otherness and antagonism to action is a projective leap, but arguable through their careful placement and commonalities. Appearing on the ground or in a void space, the lizards and snakes would likely not 'demand' to be read as in motion. But in this case, their form being so contrasting with nearby elements whilst their animal referents being clearly articulated, suggests a focus on their motion.

Presuming this is the correct understanding of their placement, the child likely took the same logical steps as described above. The lizards and snakes, deprived in their material fact of anything defining, come to serve primarily as 'just' animals, incapable, at least without effort, of being full characters (especially in light of the obvious faces of the other characters).

- colorful lizards [M, T] are interacting with passengers in the back seat of a vehicle [M, T, A]

The apparent social event between the various characters - signified by their intentional-seeming arrangement in facing one another in clear groups - opens up an imagined mutual accountability of agency. The characters, interfacing with each other, are simultaneously creating a space where their own agencies as characters are 'bouncing' off one another, engaging and reacting in real time as the child plays along the narrative. In this sense their interactions beget a more defined sense of agency as the characters are now necessarily critically aware of each others' aims and limitations. This accelerates, in an explosive sense, both the potential for complexity and the necessity for a clarified identification of agencies. Each character, acting over time in their own narrative course, becomes a living history of engagements, all of which must be held in the mind of the child. These strung together histories are held at distance from each other (in the child's mind) through a careful separation per each character.

Let us imagine that one or all of these characters is a recurring figure in the child's play. Are their activities in this single arrangement then carried over into their characterhoods, so to speak? Or does their characterhood selectively ignore certain events, like this event, perhaps, and simply maintain in any instance a predefined series of behaviors and opinions? We have no evidence of this from these images alone, though the child may be able to articulate this. In any case, to enact this, the child's understanding of their character must extend into an authorial axis, and in selectively permitting or rejecting various activities indicative of their agency, is in real time defining the character in terms of a constrained authorship.

Exemplary of this problematic is the blue-maned dragon character - an already-made character from a Disney film. This character (named Sisu in the film) can be chosen by the child to signify either that named and recognized character, if so desired, or an anonymous dragon or creature, if that is preferred. Should the child choose to use the canonical character Sisu they must engage in a careful articulation of authoriality: they may have localized, personal adventures with Sisu leading their narratives, but in doing so the child must recognize the limits of their control over Sisu. That is, they must recognize that their peers, also playing with Sisu, have created their own localized versions of the character, which are non-transferrable and isolated. Likewise, the canonical Sisu from Disney did not, and will never have, gone through the narratives developed by the child in their personal play with this toy.

This also marks a stage where the intentionality of the child comes into play - where before the formal qualities of the text were beyond the child's control, now at the authorial level the child's agency is necessary. While presuming the child's intention is a fraught prospect, by avoiding 'abstract' themes and focusing merely on what is physically extremely easy for the child at this age - moving pieces in an arrangement at all - the placement of the animals can be presumed. This is also somewhat obvious considering that this entire arrangement by the child, designated from the outset as play (also identified as such by the child), necessitates the child's intentionality.

- and the whole scene is arranged in a sort of amphitheater shape [M] stemming outward from the playing child, meaning the activity in the scene is relatively contingent on their convenient access to the toys. [M, T, A, C]

What is possibly symbolic about this arrangement relies on a questionable presumption of agency, so it is perhaps unfair to declare what was or wasn't intended in the child's arrangement. However, this rubric can reveal to us as analysts our own limitations, where analysis breaks from a safe and confident ground towards a speculative, more adult-text oriented style of analysis.

This analysis has approached this text unit by unit, analyzing the various texts and subtexts within the larger play arrangement text. In approaching the analysis this way, we have seen that a

Alternatively, an analyst could approach this text from another perspective as well: instead of analyzing the work piece by piece, decomposing the units according to the proposed context-constraint hierarchy, the whole play arrangement could be seen as a single text, with the analyst identifying and organizing elements within the text according to the context-constraint. Using what we have already analyzed, we can organize the arrangement's constitutive units as follows:

- Units primarily existing within a materiality constraint:
 - animals known as such primarily by their material forms, textures, coloration, etc.
 - vehicles similarly known primarily by their material forms, textures, coloration, etc.
- Units primarily existing within a temporality constraint:

- animals primarily known by both their material forms and a significant and characteristic ability to act in some identified way (the biting crocodile)
- vehicles with an ability to move
- Units primarily existing within an authority constraint:
 - the previously-storied Disney dragon character Sisu
 - any characters previously played with and held in the mind of the child
- Units primarily existing within a causality constraint:
 - that the child is playing at all
 - qualitative assessments of the child's play arrangement in total

Conclusion

Over the course of this discussion, we have explored various definitions and notions of the text, several text-adjacent theories to glean insight, and mobilized findings to form a context-constraint perspective of textual construction. Such a context-constraint model can be helpful in analyzing difficult texts which are not conducive to traditional methods of textual analysis. Such an analysis entails considering the text and its various subtexts as a hierarchy of contextual constraints, and then addressing each identified unit in terms of the modes of engagement forwarded by the contextual constraints at each platform.

While this work has danced around several academic disciplines, its aim has been to begin a beachhead after which further research can begin in earnest. In attempting to reconsider the text in this framework, it is the authors hope that ideas sparked here may prove helpful in expanding a new and more applicable understanding of the text.

Summary in Estonian

Tekst konteksti vaatepunktist.

Teksti mõiste kaudu on võimalik käsitleda keerulisi semiootilisi küsimusi vahendamise, informatsiooni, kultuurisüsteemide, ideoloogia jm. kohta. Siiski suunavad teksti teoreetilised käsitlused ja neis sisalduvad piirangud tähelepanu teatud tekstižanritele ning eemale teistest. Üheks piisava tähelepanuta jäänud kategooriaks on laste tekstid, mis on ilmselgelt tekstidena määratletavad ning peaks seega olema analüüsitavad nagu iga teine tekst. Ometi on nad jäänud semiootilistes käsitlustes tagaplaanile. Tekstianalüüsi võimekuse edasiarendamiseks ning selle puuduse kõrvaldamiseks peaks uurima tekstuaalsuse enda arenemist, vajadusel kaasates tekstiteooriaväliseid teoreetilisi käsitlusi.

Erinevad autorid on teksti käsitlenud erinevatest perspektiividest. Antud töös on põhjalikuma vaadeldud Roland Barthes'i, Juri Lotmani, Umberto Eco ja Stanley Fishi tekstikästlusi. Barthes käsitles teksti aktiivse ja mängulise sümboolse semiootilise protsessina, mis on autorist lahutatud ning mida iseloomustab semiootiliste seoste rohkus. Lotmani käsitluses oli tekst semiootiline struktuur, mille moodustavad valikuliselt suhestuvad ja kattuvad koodid, piiritletud ruum, mis täidab kultuuri erinevatel hierarhilistel tasanditel keerukaid kommunikatiivseid funktsioone. Eco käsitles lugejat kui teksti sisu arbiiterit, kes juhib spetsiifilist ja nüansseeritud suhet kontekstiga, milles ta tekstis leiab, ning teadmistega, mis tal on autori intensioonidest. Fish aga pidas teksti täielikult konteksti produktiks selle piirini, et pidas tõesusest rääkimist teksti tõlgendamise puhul sisuliselt võimatuks. Ka tõlgendavaid kogukondi käesitles ta konteksti kaudu.

Eelmainitud uurijad olid ühel meelel selles, et teksti kogetakse ühel või teisel viisil dialoogilise 'teisena' ning teksti tähenduslikkuses mängib olulist rolli kontekst.

Konteksti mõiste avamiseks ning samas ka ümbermõtestamiseks kasutatakse käesolevas töös erinevaid kästlusi, millest osad ei kuulu otseselt tekstiteooria valdkonda. Oluline on Paul Ricoeuri

distantseerimise kontseptsioon. Ricoeur peab teksti aluseks diskursiivse sündmuse eemaldamist selle kontekstist ning seeläbi saab tekstuaalse protsessi aluseks pidada kognitiivset akti. Seda ideed seostatakse töös Merlin Donaldi ja Terrance Deaconi käsitlustega, mõtestamaks tekstuaalsuse aluseid hierarhiliste arengustaadiumitena. Seejärel esitatakse Gregory Batesonile toetudes vaade kontekstist kui teksti informatsioonilisuse aktiivsest allikast. See võimaldab tuua konteksti esiplaanile ja muuta see teoreetiliselt aktiivseks.

Nende täienduste toel saab teksti mõtestada konteksti piirangute (*context constraint*) hierarhilise seeriana. Konteksti esiplaanile toomine võimaldab tekstuaalsust täpsemalt käsitleda. Teksti kasutamist kontekstuaalsete piirangutega võrdsustamise kaudu uuritakse töös:

- Kuidas toimub kontekstuaalse piirangute kasutamise (ning seega teksti kasutamise) samm-sammuline õppimine. Näiteks dokumenteerib Elliot Eisner seda, kuidas õppimine ehitab täiskasvanud tekstikasutaja tunnetust (*mind*).
- Kuidas kontekstuaalse piirangute kasutamine (ning seega teksti kasutamine) toetub sisemistele struktuurasetele kasutussuhetele, võimaldades teha ennustusi relevantsete tekstide teatud aspektide kohta. Konteksti piirangud toetavad või nõuavad teatud osalemise viise (*modes of engagement*).

Uurimuses selgitati välja, et kontekstuaalsete piirangute vaatepunktist mõtestatuna on tekst kasutatav analüüsivahendina, mis võimaldab käsitleda teksti ja selle erinevaid alltekste kasutussituatsioonid sisalduvate kontekstuaalsete piirangute hierarhiana ning seejärel käsitleda neid selle osalusviisi kaudu, mida konteksti piirangud igal platvormil esile toovad.

Töö lõpus demonstreeritakse seda paari teksti najal (laps sättimas mänguasju mängimise ajal), osutades, et ka selliseid “kummalisi” tekste on võimalik tekstuaalsest perspektiivist käsitleda.

Citations



- Arnheim, Rudolf 1997 [1969]. *Visual Thinking*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bateson, Gregory 2000 [1972]. *Steps To An Ecology Of Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Barthes, Roland 1977 [1964]. *Elements of Semiology*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Barthes, Roland 1978 [1977]. *Image-Music-Text*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Baudrillard, Jean 2019 [1981] *For A Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*. Brooklyn: Verso
- Deacon, T. W. 1997. *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Donald, Merlin 1991. *Origins of the Modern Mind*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Eco, Umberto 1994. *The Limits of Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
- Eco, Umberto 1984 [1979]. *The Role Of The Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press
- Edwards, Betty 1999. *The New Drawing On The Right Side Of The Brain*. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc.
- Efland, Arthur D. 2002. *Art and Cognition*. New York: Colombia University Teachers College Press.
- Eisner, Elliot W 2002. *The Arts and the Creation of Mind*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fish, Stanley 1980. *Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority Of Interpretive Communities*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Goodman, Nelson 1976. *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols*. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- Jacobson, Karen (ed.) 2012. *More Real?: Art in the Age of Truthiness*. Munich: Prestel.
- Klemm, David E.; Schweiker, William (eds.) 1993. *Meanings In Texts And Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.

- Levchenko, Jan; Salupere, Silvi (eds.) 1999. *Conceptual Dictionary of the Tartu–Moscow Semiotic School*. (Tartu Semiotics Library 2.) Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lotman, Juri M. 1977. *The Structure of the Artistic Text*. Dep. of Slavic Languages and Literatures, The Univ. of Michigan.
- Lotman, Juri M. 1988 [1981]. The Semiotics of Culture and the Concept of a Text. *Soviet Psychology* 26(3): 52–58.
- Lotman, Juri M. 1984. O semiosfere (On Semiosphere). *Sign Systems Studies (Trudy po znakovym sistemam)* 17, pp. 5–23.
- Lotman, Juri M. 1990. *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- McLuhan, Marshall 2005 [1964]. *Understanding Media*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- McLuhan, Marshall; Fiore, Quentin 1967 *The Medium is the Massage*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Meyer, Michel 1983. *Meaning and Reading : A Philosophical Essay on Language and Literature*. Philadelphia : J. Benjamins.
- Ricoeur, Paul 1981. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ricoeur, Paul 1991 [1986]. *From Text To Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Semenenko, Aleksei 2012. *The Texture of Culture: An Introduction to Yuri Lotman's Semiotic Theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Torop, Peeter 2004. Foreword. Lotmanian explosion. In: Juri Lotman, *Culture and Explosion*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. xxvii–xxxix.
- Van der Veer, René; Valsiner, Jaan 1994. *The Vygotsky Reader*. Cambridge: Oxford.
- Zylko, Boguslaw 2001. Culture and Semiotics: Notes on Lotman's Conception of Culture. *New Literary History* 32 (2): 391-408.
- Zylko, Boguslaw 2015. Notes on Yuri Lotman's structuralism. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 18(1).

APPENDIX 1 - Children's Play Arrangement.



APPENDIX 2 - Constraint Hierarchy Rubric



APPENDIX 3

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce the thesis and make the thesis public

I, William Derrah
(author's name)

1. grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to

reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright, my thesis


Text in terms of context

(title of thesis)

supervised by Katrin Pärn
(supervisor's name)

2. I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the thesis specified in point 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives, under the Creative Commons licence CC BY NC ND 4.0, which allows, by giving appropriate credit to the author, to reproduce, distribute the work and communicate it to the public, and prohibits the creation of derivative works and any commercial use of the work until the expiry of the term of copyright.
3. I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in points 1 and 2.
4. I confirm that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

author's signature
dd/mm/yyyy


22/05/2013

