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Abstract: After a short-lived victory fighting against Russian rule, Chechnya was again reconquered in 2000. Thus launched the modern Chechen resistance, which has taken on three forms. This study examines how these iterations, the Ichkerian Government-in-Exile, Imarat Kavkaz, and IADAT, have evolved. To assess how effectively they have opposed the rule of the Kadyrov regime in Chechnya, this paper adopts the “pillars of power” framework. It concludes that the tactical evolution of the three iterations can at least in part be explained by the effectiveness of targeting the regime’s pillars, as each movement moves away from ineffective tactics of its predecessor.

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Introduction

Chechnya's long history of violent resistance—from the *abreki* and Imam Shamil to Ichkeria's *boeviki* to the mujahideen in Emir Abu Hamza's "Vilayat Nokhchicho" (Chechen *Wilayat*) of the Imarat Kavkaz (IK)—is well documented (Baddeley 1908, Blanch 1960, Gammer 2006, Perović 2016). Future resistance has been suspected to continue the trend of violence (Dannreuther & March 2008, Souleimanov & Jasutis 2016, Souleimanov et al. 2019, Sturdee & Vatchagaev 2020). Any peaceful opposition to the Kadyrov regime has been on an individual basis and/or forced to the diaspora, e.g., recently exiled vlogger Tumso Abdurakhmanov or France-based Chechen unity and freedom movement "BART MARSHO." There has been nothing that could be called a "movement" in Chechnya. Accordingly, the April 2020 emergence of a nonviolent revolutionary movement ("1ADAT") in Chechnya was both unexpected and a break in the trend. Its continued operation, expanding its digital footprint and seemingly thriving, is further confounding, as opposition movements across Russia and the North Caucasus have been shut down and as Kadyrov has instituted further crackdowns on Chechens in the homeland and the diaspora alike. This thesis delves into the evolution of modern Chechen resistance, culminating with the emergence of 1ADAT—to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study to examine the new group—specifically approaching the movement's puzzling emergence from a tactical perspective on its struggle against the Kadyrov' regime's stability.

Next year, 2024, is a momentous year for anniversaries in Chechnya. It will have been thirty years since the beginning of the First Chechen War, twenty-five since the onset of the Second War, twenty years since Akhmat Kadyrov's assassination, fifteen from the end of the federal counterterrorism operation in Chechnya, and ten since the insurgency's final decline in the republic. As such, this study attempts to reappraise the state of Chechen resistance ahead of the anniversary of modern Chechnya's remaking as Kadyrov's fiefdom. Concerning trends in the Chechen opposition, the proposed research will help fill a gap in the study of contemporary Chechen resistance activities, addressing the most recent of its three manifestations. Toward solving the puzzle, this study will place 1ADAT in context with the other two manifestations—the Ichkerian government in exile (GIE) and the insurgency (focusing on Imarat Kavkaz's period of dominance)—while treating them as a single resistance. It will examine how the Chechen

resistance has tactically evolved over its manifestations to better target the Kadyrovite “pillars of power,” giving particular focus to the unexplored emergence of IADAT.

This thesis hopes to contribute to both the field of Caucasus/Russian¹ studies—particularly the study of Chechnya, which has sufficient literature to essentially be considered its own subfield—and the field of contentious politics, which includes the various forms of oppositional politics, usually focusing on resistance outside conventional electoral activity. The study aims to add to the understanding of (1) how resistance operates under severely restrictive authoritarian settings, (2) why nonviolent movements emerge, and (3) the current trends of the Chechen opposition. In relation to contentious politics in authoritarian systems, this thesis will address one out of several recent resistance movements (e.g., Belarus 2020-present, Myanmar 2021-present), and one that has received less attention. This could feed into future comparative studies of the movements along characteristic differences, such as trends of violence or social media use. With respect to the emergence of nonviolent movements, the study will provide real time insight into the drastic adaptation of new tactics by a long-established resistance in the modern era.

This study delves into a single case with three sub-cases. As such, it treats the Ichkerian government-in-exile, Imarat Kavkaz, and IADAT as iterations of a single cause. This approach aids the understanding of the modern Chechen resistance by adopting a perspective that considers the Chechen struggle as a single movement with various iterations, rather than differentiating the secular, jihadi, and newer dominant groups as separate struggles. The reasoning behind adopting this perspective is fourfold. First, they all share a common objective: Chechnya’s independence. Second, they all claim the Ichkerian identity, indicating that it is ideologically flexible while remaining pro-independence. Third, the transitions from one chronological/organization phase to the next are not truly categorical. The base of IK existed during the dominance of the Ichkerian GIE, just as the GIE survived after it was replaced by IK as the dominant organization of the resistance. This paper admittedly uses hard cutoff dates as a means to simplify analysis. Finally, Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has largely erased barriers between the remnants of the iterations, with increasing cooperation between factions. As

¹ Many universities and academic organizations include the North Caucasus in “Russian Studies,” a grouping the author by no means supports, merely notes that this is a common practice.

such, it is clearer how they all are part of a single, Chechen pro-independence movement, rather than separate. This study analyzes a variety of primary and secondary sources conveying information on the tactics utilized by the different iterations. These include memoirs of Ichkerian officials, conflict data from *Kavkazskii Uzel*, Milyukov's (2020) recently published *Chronicles of the First and Second Chechen Wars*, the Telegram channel of IADAT, as well as other works both journalistic and academic, with the latter typically being based on in-depth interviews and/or analysis of contemporary reports. The study evaluates how these tactics targeted the Kadyrov regime's pillars of power and how they evolved over time in this regard.

The following study begins by adopting a theoretical basis for understanding the intersection of regime stability and resistance, constructing a framework to examine the case of Chechnya. The next section provides an overview of the iterations of modern Chechen resistance, including its foundation and predominant actors. This section also outlines the dynamics and structure for the Kadyrov regime's stability, which is necessary for evaluating the tactical evolution of the Chechen resistance movement. The third section examines the case of Chechnya, divided into its four chronological periods (the three dominant iterations of resistance plus 'the lull'). Finally, this thesis concludes by summarizing the findings, describing the study's limitations, and indicating future directions of study.

Stability and Resistance

Resistance does not exist in a vacuum, inherently requiring a power structure to oppose. As such, the thing being opposed must also be examined in order to gain a proper understanding on the oppositional dynamics. Resistance and, in this case, regime stability exist in a codependent relationship for knowledge, wherein one cannot be truly examined without the context of the other. Thus, a theoretical framework that incorporates both phenomena into its perspectives is necessary for examining the case at hand. This section develops such a framework, adapting the concept of "pillars of power" created by Gene Sharp (1973, 2005) and utilized by Srdja Popovic (2015, et al. 2007) in their works on practicing resistance. This section will also briefly discuss

various tactical and strategic logics in resistance, so as to provide a better grounding for the later analysis of the tactical evolution of the modern Chechen resistance.

Regime stability: constructing pillars

A common rationalization of authoritarian stability is as pillars. This is a logical visual conceptualization as pillars hold up a roof the way the metaphorical pillars hold up the regime. Gerschewski (2013) put forth a framework of the “three pillars of stability:” legitimation, repression, and co-optation. These pillars target specific audiences (Ibid.: 23). Legitimation attempts to sway the public attitude toward being pro-regime with righteousness. Repression targets potential opposition, seeking to create an atmosphere not conducive to voicing grievances against the regime. Co-optation addresses the strategic elite, advocating for a rationalization of their costs-benefit analysis in favor of the regime. One of the key pitfalls in this framework is Gerschewski’s focus on longevity (Ibid.: 13, 16, 21). This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, what exactly is “longevity” for an authoritarian regime? Is it five years, ten years, through a transfer of power, or multiple transfers? Additionally, regime longevity operates on the presupposition that a given leader wants and is planning for the prolonging of their rule, rather than concentrating on keeping power just as long as they live. This gets to a level of personal psychology not typically available to researchers. The second drawback is that there is already a distinct term in political science for the long-term maintenance of such a regime, authoritarian durability (Slater & Fenner 2011: 17). Authoritarian stability, in contrast, is more set in time. The final disadvantage of “longevity” is that, especially in the revolutionary context, accounting for longevity would seemingly be counterproductive, as regime survival is the antithesis of a revolution. A more systemic drawback of applying Gerschewski’s “pillars of stability” conceptualization is that he views the pillars as being mechanisms, whereas this paper considers the pillars to be the operative components of these mechanisms, i.e., the channels through which the mechanisms work. These perspectives differ in that the former addresses processes that the state utilizes to support itself, while the latter focuses on the actual means underlying any of these mechanisms. In other words, this paper will follow a more organizational or institutional approach, one grounded more in the materialistic real world in which regimes and resistance movements operate. Gerschewski’s stress on the fact that the pillars address different audiences

is astute, but his theory neglects civil society as a target of authoritarian stabilization efforts and, additionally, ignores the (financial) means to carry out the mechanisms described in his pillars. This final aspect is so essential to a regime that it cannot be excluded from the concept of regime stability.

The institutional approach is represented in the idea of “pillars of support.” The specific concept of “pillars of support” is somewhat debated, either originating in *Otpor!*'s manuals (Paulson 2005) or Robert Helvey's (2004) *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, but regardless comes from a more visual revision of Gene Sharp's (1973: 7-48) theorization of an obedience-, consent-, and support-based structure of power. Sharp posits that there are six sources of power (Ibid.: 11-2): authority, the “perception and acceptance [of a leader] as superior,” from which he retains the right to rule; human resources, the agents of the ruler who carry out his will; skills and knowledge, essentially, the ability of said agents to carry out his will; intangible factors, like societal proclivity for obedience and shared cultural aspects; material resources, or “property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation:”; and sanctions, also known as coercive means. A ruler acquires these through obedience, combining coercion and consent, which can be given out of habit, fear of sanctions, moral obligation, self-interest, “psychological identification with the ruler,” “zones of indifference,” or an “absence of self-confidence among subjects” (Ibid.: 19-23, 25-6). These sources of power are part of a continuous cycle creating a ruler's “power capacity” (Ibid.: 37). The sources of power qualify the capacity of power, which affects how the ruler acts towards his three audiences: his agents, domestic populace, and international actors. These audiences can be both simplified and expanded. Regime agents are still members of the general public, negating the need for a separate distinction if the domestic audience is further elaborated upon, distinguishing a greater number of influential (sub-)audiences. One way to break down the domestic sub-audiences is into society, elites, regime clientele, and civil society. Whether and to what degree the audiences decide to cooperate with the ruler in turn influences the robustness of the sources of power, completing a cycle. This process is never-ending, as the balances are constantly and minutely amended through sustained, repeated interaction.

Helvey (2004: 9-18) describes the “pillars of support” as the organizations and institutions through which Sharp’s sources of power are channeled toward the regime, thus giving it power. Helvey lists the pillars as generally being police, military, civil servants, media, the business community, youth, workers, religious organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). These pillars roughly align with the ruler’s audiences in Sharp’s cycle of power construction, particularly expanding the domestic audience in detail. It is important to note that Helvey’s pillars do not categorically fit into Sharp’s audience typology, with many of the pillars potentially belonging to both domestic and international audiences. The most obvious of these more pluralistic pillars are the media, business community, religious organizations, and NGOs, for all of which it is not unusual to have both domestic and international organizations operating in a given country. Sharp (2005: 35) adopts the “pillars of support” framework, incorporating it seamlessly into application of the sources of power for resistance movements. He places especial emphasis on the importance of the pillars of support in the context of resistance movements developing strategies for their course of action against the regime (Ibid.: 451).

Srdja Popovic, a leader in Serbia’s revolutionary *Otpor!* movement and co-founder of the Center for Applied NonViolent Actions and Strategies, has himself utilized Gene Sharp’s lessons, including the pillars of support concept, as well as taught them to revolutionary movements around the world. He and his colleagues at CANVAS further develop the “pillars of support,” identifying a different set of pillars and adding greater levels of complexity within each pillar (Popovic et al. 2007: 32-43). Their potential pillars are “the police, military, ruling institutions such as the judiciary and electoral commission, civil servants, the educational system, organized religious institutions, state-controlled media, the business community and other organizations” (Ibid.: 33). In their visualization of the pillars, each possesses layers, with the most important part at the center. Their depiction of a “local community” pillar labels the outermost layer as representing citizens, with the city council and mayor as the two innermost components. This evolution of the “pillars” conceptualization is extremely useful, as it applies an incremental or hierarchical characteristic that is more apt for economic, social, and political structures in the real world. It also lends a straightforward visualization to complex systems, making it simpler for resistance movements to form appropriate strategies for degrading a regime’s pillars of support. Popovic (2015) later switches to using “pillars of power,” the phrasing that will be used in this

paper, as its connotations shift the emphasis onto the purveyance of force, rather than just consent. This emphasis is important in this case—and likely other cases of resistance operating within extremely authoritarian systems—because it is widely accepted that, at the end of the day, Chechens have merely conceded to Russian rule via Kadyrov, and have no plans on continuing this allowance when an ideal moment presents itself to strike back in their asymmetrical struggle (Chambers 2023c, Hauer 2022a, Hauer 2022b, Mikhal'chenko 2022). Besides the slight amendment of phrasing and shift in emphasis, the ultimate conceptualization of the “pillars of power” otherwise remains the same as that of “pillars of support.”

A drawback to Sharp (1973, 2005) and Helvey's (2004) approach to power, which is applied by Popovic (et al. 2007, 2015), is one they take for certain, although it is not an inherent problem, merely an assumed one. This dilemma is that, in their opinion, power grounded in violence is monolithic power, precluding the pluralistic approach to sources of power that they adopt. This is a limited perspective, operating on an assumption about inter-pillar dynamics that ignores that just because the capacity to perpetrate violence might grossly outweigh the other sources, this does not account for the enabling factors for that violence. The pillars, even as they have named and delimited, are deeply interconnected. Sanctions cannot be conducted without human resources possessing adequate skills and knowledge, weapons cannot be acquired without material resources, and human resources must be assembled and tied to the ruler in some manner, be it through authority, material resources, intangible factors, or a combination of these. Additionally, intangible knowledge, i.e., inherent cultural knowledge understood only to those native to the culture, can be a significantly influential factor in conducting sanctions against a community. Thus was the case in Chechnya (Lyall 2010, Souleimanov 2015). Suffice to say, a regime built on violence is far from monolithic in its sourcing of power. Rather, violence is, in fact, a source and resource intensive means of instituting control, requiring robust pluralism for sources of power. Violence is thus more than just a source of power, but a mechanism of purveying power as well. This dual nature of violence also re-centers the operations of the state within the pillars, allowing the framework to be better utilized to undermine the regime.

Finally, a regime's pillars of power can be intricate, depending on the complexity of the authoritarian system. In the case of Chechnya, with a, for all intents and purposes, fully

consolidated elite and eliminated civil society, these pillars are more straightforward than for Putin's regime—e.g., consider the difficulty in analyzing the miasma of financial assets held by various Russian elites, recently revealed to manage many of Putin's financial assets (Dmitriev et al. 2022, Shmagun et al. 2022). Each regime has its own particular network of ties connecting the pillars and regulating dynamics between them.

Conclusion: Kadyrov's pillars

Now that the concept of the pillars of power has been elucidated, it can be applied to Kadyrov's Chechnya in order to determine his means of regime stability. Over the years, several experts have suggested different ideas for the regime's pillars of power, even if not explicitly calling them such. Russell (2008: 665-6) identifies hardcore authoritarianism, charisma, Chechen ethnicity, and the dynastic element of rule. He also labels hereditary succession, actual/threatened use of force, and popular election as general "modes of maintaining power in authoritarian regimes" (Ibid. 666). Many of his suggestions fall less within the domain of being pillars and are instead more proximate to legitimations. Sakwa (2010: 612, 613, 618) puts forth subsidies, a monopoly on force, and federal support as stabilizing factors for Kadyrov's rule. Souleimanov and Jasutis (2016) suggest contributing factors to regime stability have been charisma/a certain degree of popularity from rebuilding, political and financial support from Putin and other federal officials, and the capability for the use of force represented by the kadyrovtsy. Finally, Souleimanov et al. (2019) similarly propose the use of force via the kadyrovtsy, political and financial support from Putin and the federal government but adding the potential for some influence of propaganda as the means by which the Kadyrov regime is propped up. The commonalities among these proposed stabilizing factors help point to the regime's pillars of power, and, in partial detail, to their respective sub-pillars. Thus, a conclusion can be drawn as to the regime's three pillars of power: force, federal support, and financial means. The threat of violence, or its actual use, largely suppressed societal discontent and eliminated civil society. The elite and domestic clientele have either been intimidated or bought off, while the consent of the clientele in Moscow through the suppression of the other groups. The three pillars also create a codependent feedback loop, wherein the strength of one lends its strength to the others.

Tactical and strategic logics

Various logics underlie tactical choices within their resistance strategy. Decisions over tactics are situated within larger strategic debates.² Some of these overarching questions that influence tactical selection include whether to utilize violence, how to gain public appeal, and how to build momentum. This section will attempt to briefly address these debates, expounding upon the different logics underpinning the various arguments.

Violence versus non-violence

One of the most significant debates a resistance movement has to settle is whether to employ a strategy of violent tactics. Nonviolence resistance has been on the rise, while violent resistance has decreased, in recent decades (Chenoweth 2020). Despite attempts to determine whether violent or nonviolent resistance is more successful, there remains debate and qualifying of conclusions. Nonviolent resistance is more likely to succeed in achieving governmental turnover, be it opposing incumbent regimes, occupying governments, or toward secession (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011, Stephan & Chenoweth 2008). Stephan and Chenoweth (2008: 8) concluded that success rates for nonviolent and violent movements are fifty-three and twenty-six percent, respectively. Others have shown that dictators are more likely to be toppled in coups d'états (Svolik 2009), with limited significant results correlating coup success with either low-grade civil wars or protests (Aksoy et al. 2015). As the foundation of the state is the monopoly on the use of force (Olson 1993, Tilly 1985, Weber 1919, Wendt 1992: 412), violent resistance challenges the regime on its homefield. However, some might argue that violence is necessary to combat the state's own violence. Staniland (2010) argues that constraints on the regime's use of violence begets opposition violence in urban environments. Some studies have shown that indiscriminate violence and violence against civilians promotes retributive violence from oppositional forces (Kalyvas 2012, Souleimanov & Siroky 2016). Other motivations for violent

² For discussion of specific nonviolent tactics, see Gene Sharp's (1973) *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*; for discussion of specific military tactics conducted by the Chechen resistance during the First and Second Chechen Wars, see Mark Kramer's (2006) "Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus" and Dodge Billingsley's (2013) *Fangs of the Lone Wolf*.

resistance can be more personal. In the case of Chechnya particularly, some studies have explored violent mobilization stemming from blood revenge, or the seeking of revenge based on local customs law (*adat*), which calls for a tit-for-tat response to the killing of a relative (Aliyev & Souleimanov 2019, Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015a, Souleimanov & Aliyev 2015b, Souleimanov & Aliyev 2017, Souleimanov et al. 2023). Perhaps ironically, authoritarian regimes—if that what the movement seeks to establish—founded upon violent revolution are the most durable (Lachapelle et al. 2020).

On the other hand, nonviolent resistance allows for the circumscription of the state, forcing the regime instead to choose whether to counter with violence, and suffer the negative consequences of cracking down on a peaceful movement, or effectively fight the resistance with its metaphorical arms tied behind its back. For a resistance movement, embarking on a campaign of violence brings with it a host of limiting problems, including with respect to manpower, weaponry and equipment for war, and other logistical problems. Another factor in the contemplation of utilizing violent resistance is the framing game (Stephan & Chenoweth 2008), which is played by both state and resistance, vying for media preference and the ability to claim the moral high ground. Both state and resistance have the choice to utilize violence. If both use force, everyone emerges from the situation with a bad image and an increased potential for the confrontation to escalate. If only the state exercises violence, the opposition can capitalize on the apparent brutality and persecution, advertising the regime's crackdown as a human rights violation. This balance of conflict for the opposition is what Sharp terms "political ju-jitsu" (Sharp 2005: 405-7), where the nonviolent resistance is able to leverage the regime's violence back at the regime, weakening it. If only the resistance chooses violence, they can be portrayed as the escalatory party and can lose broader support. If neither choose violence, the balance between the regime and opposition remains neutral—although it could be argued that this still gives the resistance an advantage, as pro-democracy movements typically still possess international appeal.

Building public momentum

A crucial purpose for every resistance movement is to increase public support. Building up collective action and hitting the tipping point—when collective action reaches sufficient strength to topple a regime—are notoriously problematic (Chenoweth & Belgioioso 2019, Kuran 1991). This is at least part of the reason why it is not clear that revolutions will succeed until they do. One strategy for gaining momentum as a movement is to start small and achieve incremental victories. Showing success on increasingly significant issues can build a winning reputation, thus making it more likely to attract greater public support (Popovic 2015: 29-53). In more authoritarian circumstances, governmental repression can smother any public expressions of dissatisfaction with the authorities. As such, even the smallest public act conducted by a resistance can embolden the public into recalculating their costs and benefits for opposing the resistance. Popovic provides a very illustrative example from Otpor. Towards the beginning of the movement's existence, several members painted a barrel with Slobodan Milošević's face and placed it in the middle of a busy pedestrian avenue in Belgrade, accompanied by a baseball bat and a sign reading: "Smash his face for just a dinar" (Ibid.: 100-3). While a few resistance members watched from a nearby café, first one person, then a couple people hit the barrel, with the queue slowly turning into a throng of people waiting to hit barrel-Milošević. Popovic describes the way the protest gained public traction as "something between peer pressure and a mob mentality" (Ibid.: 102). Another aspect of gaining traction, also present in Otpor's barrel stunt, is utilizing laughter to undercut social atmospheres of fear. Basically, a resistance movement must think creatively in order to build momentum.

Conclusion

The pillars of power are the material and institutional means through which a regime acquires consent from domestic and international audiences. These pillars channel the mechanisms for achieving obedience, such as coercion, co-optation, and legitimation. Generally speaking, they can include security services, media, ideological organizations, and financial institutions, but will differ from regime to regime. Resistance movements must target these pillars, attempting to undermine, degrade, and eliminate them, in order to succeed in defeating the regime. A movement must decide whether to implement violent or nonviolent tactics, with advantages and

disadvantages to either strategy. They must navigate the informational space in order to attract and maintain support domestically, and internationally, to build momentum for their resistance.

Background

This section will attempt to detail the real-world context for the tactical evolution of the Chechen resistance since Russia reinstated control over the small region in 2000. The first half of this section will analytically breakdown, so to speak, the pillars of the Kadyrov regime's stability. Deconstructing the regime's pillars—examining in depth their breadth, internal dynamics, and interconnectivity—is necessary for analyzing how the Chechen resistance's tactics target them. The second half will explain the foundations upon which this resistance is based, both with respect to historical continuity and grievances, before expounding upon who the three dominant actors (the Ichkerian government-in-exile, Imarat Kavkaz, and IADAT) are during this era. It will also briefly introduce “The Lull,” several years when organized resistance did not exist in Chechnya. This period is crucial to examining the eventual emergence of IADAT, as it was during this relative quiescence of activity that the resistance underwent a sort of reset and IADAT's leaders developed.

Kadyrovite Chechnya

In 1999, Chief Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Akhmat Kadyrov, among several other leaders, defected from the Ichkerian cause, re-allying with Moscow (for detailed accounts of the events referred to in this paragraph, see Akhmadov & Lansky 2010: 164-5, 215-9; Jaimoukha 2005: 69-70; Sakwa 2010: 606). Kadyrov formed a close relationship with his patron in the federal government, Vladimir Putin. A few months after the outbreak of the Second Chechen War, Grozny was captured by Russian forces and Putin placed Kadyrov in charge of Chechnya's ever-growing territory. Akhmat was assassinated in October 2004. Alu Alkhanov was installed as his successor as President of Chechnya, although he was largely a placeholder until Akhmat's son Ramzan was old enough to stand in an election. Kadyrov Jr. was made Chechnya's Prime Minister and continued the Kadyrovs' close relationship with President Putin. Despite Alkhanov

being the *de jure* powerholder in the republic, Kadyrov was the *de facto* leader. In 2007, Ramzan at last ascended to the primary seat of power in Chechnya. From that point onward, he has strengthened his grip on the republic, increasing his power within the small fiefdom he rules at Putin's behest. This section will deconstruct, so to speak, the Kadyrov regime's pillars of power in detail, starting with force, then federal support, then financial.

Force

The "use of force" pillar is by far the most important to the Kadyrov regime. Through violence, or the fear thereof, Kadyrov is able to suppress the population—thus maintaining support from Putin—and to conduct his mass racketeering scheme against the general public and Russia's business elite. Kadyrov's capability for the perpetration of violence was gradually consolidated over the course of his rule. This acquisition of force can be roughly divided into three phases: the attainment of a plurality (2000-2007), the attainment of a monopoly (2007-2015), and the gross expansion of the monopoly (2015-present). Despite common depictions of the *kadyrovtsy*, the Chechen security services personally beholden to Ramzan Kadyrov, as a monolith comprised of any and all officials tied to the regime, this is not the case. While the degree of reluctance or dissent within the security services' ranks is frankly unknowable, it is possible to map out most of the network of violence maintained by the regime. These sub-pillars appear less varied than other pillars, because of the inherently more structured nature of security services.

Ramzan Kadyrov's monopoly on the use of force has been consolidated over three distinct phases. The first phase, lasting from 2000 to 2007, was when the Kadyrov family's private army (whose members are collectively known as the *kadyrovtsy*) was when Ramzan took control of the force as his father's bodyguard. It should be noted that the force's history precedes this phase, as it was formed by his father in the mid-1990s, originally as part of the Ichkerian forces. They then defected to the Russian forces in 1999, alongside the other Chechen units (Šmíd & Mareš 2015): the Defense Ministry Intelligence's (GRU) "Zapad" Battalion led by Said-Magomed Kakiev, an original federalist, the GRU's "Vostok" Battalion led by the Yamadaev brothers, fellow members of the Kadyrov's Benoi *teip* (essentially, "clan;" it is the second level of traditional Chechen social structure after "tukkhum," which most closely translates to tribe;

Mamakaev 2009), and the FSB's "Gorets" special unit overseen by Movladi Baysarov. The kadyrovtsy, while formally part of the Interior Ministry, operated outside of the federal chain of command. Ramzan took control of the kadyrovtsy after the war. In 2004, Akhmat was assassinated, leaving Ramzan as the definitive head of the kadyrovtsy and the *de facto* leader of Chechnya. After 2007, Ramzan became the *de jure* head of Chechnya, allowing him to begin to pursue his rivals. Thus starts the next phase of his consolidation of violence.

The second phase of Kadyrov's violence consolidation took place from 2007 to 2015, when he focused on eliminating viable alternatives to his rule, focusing on the other actors possessing significant holds on violence. The central event of this period was the small-scale civil war waged by the kadyrovtsy against Sulim Yamadaev, his brothers, and Battalion. The Yamadaevs were the second biggest family of the Benoi *teip* and also had loyal forces. Falling within the federal chain of command, Yamadaevs were more amenable to the Kremlin's will and more favorable to leaders in the federal security apparatus. These allegiances made them the largest threat to the Kadyrovs' hold on power. On April 14, 2008, the kadyrovtsy besieged the military base in Gudermes where the Yamadaevs were headquartered (A. Smirnov 2008). As Vostok was a part of the Ministry of Defense and thus fell within its chain-of-command, more than the kadyrovtsy responded to that of the Interior Ministry, this siege one of the most important singular events of Kadyrov's second phase of consolidating violence, foreshadowing his later threats directly against federal forces. Following Russia's success in the 2008 August War against Georgia, the Chechen governor successfully advocated for the dissolution of his rival Chechen-led units (Šmíd & Mareš 2015). The second phase of his power consolidation was drawn out, as the insurgency effectively ended at the beginning of 2015, eliminating the final potent threat to Kadyrov's rule. The final event of this phase, definitively securing the Chechen governor's monopoly over the use of force, was his threats to shoot federal security services operating in Chechnya without his explicit permission (Saakov 2015). With no doubts he would follow through, this curtailed the operations of the federal siloviki. With no rivals, no insurgency, and minimal federal forces, Kadyrov finally acquired a monopoly on the use of force, if not exceeding it, in Chechnya.

The third phase, running from 2015 to the present, is characterized by Kadyrov moving to strengthen his position even further, having already achieved a monopoly on violence. He has moved to attack perceived socio-cultural threats and worked to be the sole possessor of violence on the domestic frontier, while also projecting his power beyond Chechnya's borders to intimidate and assassinate critics throughout Russia and further afield. Domestically, Kadyrov has broadened his threat perception to include socio-cultural challenges to the so-called traditional Chechen lifestyle. This has almost exclusively manifested as the purging of the LGBTQ+ community in Chechnya. These purges peaked in 2017, when the massacres of gay men were widely covered in international media, including in the award-winning HBO documentary "Welcome to Chechnya," and resulted in a case at the European Court of Human Rights (France 2020, Schreck 2019). This obviously broached a new frontier, as the *kadyrovtsy* targeted a group that possessed no hold on the use of violence, with extreme violence. This targeting of the LGBTQ+ community can be explained by the socially conservative notions held by Chechens combined with their perspective on demographic growth as a means of protection from genocide (Iliysov 2019). The shift in focus to (perceived) socio-cultural threats also indicates how strong Kadyrov's monopoly on the use of violence had become, as his use of force was now being used against non-violent actors. Finally, Kadyrov has worked to turn his monopoly on the use of force into the complete control of violence. He has sought to crush the feeble remnants of the armed resistance. After a minor rise in victims of armed conflict after 2015 (see Appendix A), casualties have been suppressed into the teens or lower since 2019. Following a January 21, 2021, counterterrorism operation that resulted in the death of Aslan "Hamzat" Byutukaev, the final top commander of the resistance under Imarat Kavkaz, Kadyrov declared Chechnya's war on terror complete (Geriyeu 2021). While it is possible that an armed Islamic resistance will emerge in force once again in Chechnya, as of now, there are no established leaders able to take charge during the current generational shift within the jihadists' ranks (Chambers 2021, Sturdee & Vatchahagaev 2020). With the militant movement quashed at this point in time, the only other stakeholders of violence in Chechnya would be federal military and security personnel. Having already threatened the security services, the military are the predominant other possessor of a capacity for violence. The remaining military presence, excluding units respondent only to Kadyrov created since February 2022, includes different units within the 58th Army, mostly those part of the 42nd Mechanized Division based in Khankala

(Batashvili 2022). From the point of view of challenges to Kadyrov's authority, the *Vostok* and *Zapad* Chechen battalions were the most significant threats from the Russian military. After their disbandment in 2008, the federal security forces were the next greatest challengers. Their exiling in 2015 left only regular Russian military forces in Chechnya; these forces' lack of socio-political capital and knowledge makes them virtually no threat.

The other half of Kadyrov's third phase of violence consolidation is the geographic expansion of operations beyond the borders of Chechnya. While there are certainly occasions of *kadyrovtsy* operating outside of Chechnya prior to 2009 (e.g., the murder of Anna Politkovskaya that is widely attributed to Kadyrov, see BBC 2006, Lagunina 2006, European Court of Human Rights 2018), from this point onward the campaign achieved a new pitch. Beyond Chechnya, Kadyrov's use of violence falls into two ethnically distinct categories: against Chechens and against non-Chechens. Kadyrov is more likely to authorize lethal force against opponents if they are ethnic Chechens, more broadly utilizing a network of intimidators to target any and all deemed opponents. In the first category, assassination attempts have been organized against the Yamadaev brothers, his ex-bodyguard Umar Israilov, the Abdurakhmanov brothers, and an abundance of others around the world (BBC 2016, Peisakhova & Coalson 2020). One of the latest and most brazen uses of violence against Chechens outside the republic was the violent abduction of Zarema Musaeva and attack on Saydi Yangulbaev in Nizhny Novgorod (Memorial Human Rights Center 2023). In the second category are included Krasnoyarsk City Deputy Konstantin Senchenko and Moscow City Deputy Aleksandr Zakuskin (Meduza 2016, Kavkazskii Uzel 2022d). Senchenko spoke illy of Kadyrov, while Zakuskin harassed a Chechen woman. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization of non-lethal force being used against non-Chechens. Although never definitively proven, both the murders of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and opposition politician Boris Nemtsov are assumed to have been carried out on Kadyrov's orders (Nechepurenko 2015, Walker 2015). The convicted perpetrators in both cases were Chechens and both Politkovskaya and Nemtsov were among Kadyrov's most vocal critics. The assumptions have been that Putin approved of Politkovskaya's assassination, with the timing coinciding with Putin's birthday (Coalson 2021). Some reports in the wake of Nemtsov's murder suggested that the Russian president was dissatisfied with the hit, both condemning the act and allowing the investigation to get close to Kadyrov (Luhn 2015, Nechepurenko 2015). In the

latter's case, the federal security services, the leaders of which do not approve of Kadyrov, were allowed to trace the assassins almost all the way back to Kadyrov before Putin intervened in the investigation. Both of these assassinations occurred in the phases prior to the ongoing one, supporting that Kadyrov's third phase use of violence is still mostly limited to being used against ethnic Chechens.

Today, Kadyrov's use of force pillar is comprised of a variety of formal units and informal groups and individuals. The former, which presumably make up the bulk of the force, are bureaucratized paramilitaries incorporated officially into a governmental structure, not the more loosely connected paramilitary groups of the earlier stages of conflict. These formalized units include those in the command structures of the Chechen Interior Ministry, Rosgvardia, and the Russian Defense Ministry. The most notable are the Special Rapid Response Unit (SOBR) "Akhmat" (formerly, "Terek"), the Akhmat Kadyrov Police Regiment, Neftepolk ("Oil Regiment"), and the former Sever and Yug Battalions. SOBR Terek/Akhmat is perhaps the most elite unit among the kadyrovtsy (Bertina 2023). The Akhmat Kadyrov Police Regiment has been connected to extrajudicial killings and the abduction of IADAT activist Salman Tepsurkaev (Memorial Human Rights Center 2021). Kadyrov's Rosgvardia units were embroiled in a scandal over the elite "*krapovyii beret*" status (Dzutsati 2021). The kadyrovtsy network, however, extends well beyond the realm of official security services. While this informal side of Kadyrov's network of violence is nigh impossible to fully measure, an increasing number of incidents outlines in which directions it reaches, although the full scope remains obscured. The most obvious group among the informal kadyrovtsy is former security officials. There were two notable examples last year. First, a failed assassination attempt on Ingush civil society leader Sarazhdin Sultygov was conducted by three men, one Ingush and two Chechens, one of whom was a former Special Purpose Mobile Unit (OMON) member (Kavkazskii Uzel 2022b). Sultygov attributed the failed attempt on his life to Kadyrov as retribution for vocally opposing the Chechen governor's machinations to seize more land from Ingushetia (Kavkazskii Uzel 2022a, Kavkazskii Uzel 2022c, Kavkazskii Uzel 2021). The second incident took place two weeks later in Stavropol krai. A former officer in the Chechen Interior Ministry abducted a woman, reportedly for communicating with IADAT (Baza 2022). The next group of informal kadyrovtsy are the co-opted former members of organized crime. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Chechen

organized crime groups were quite powerful (Galeotti 2018: 150-65). Such figures have typically been used for assassinations abroad. Artur “Dingo” Denisultanov was a high-ranking member in St. Petersburg’s Chechen criminal society before working for the Kadyrov regime, conducting assassination attempts on Umar Israilov in Vienna and on Adam Osmaev and Amina Okuev in Kyiv (Bilalov 2023, Mashkin 2022). Akhmed Dombaev (also, Shalinskii) was still known to be an “authority” (a leader) among the thieves-in-law, an organized crime structure that was formidable in the 1990s and early 2000s throughout the former Soviet Union, in October 2021, and on the FSB’s wanted list, when he was arrested in Turkey as part of an assassination ring targeting Chechen oppositionists (Krasno 2022a, Kavkaz.Realii 2022a). The ring was purportedly organized by Adam Delimkhanov.

Kadyrov’s acquisition of political power has gone hand-in-hand with his procurement of capacity for the use of force. As he gained a monopoly, and then expanded it, he developed both formal and informal networks of wielding violence. These networks have been tapped to direct violent repression at Kadyrov’s opponents, lethally to his most serious rivals and critics and non-lethally to others. There has also been an ethnic component to these attacks, with ethnic Chechens more likely to be targeted with lethal use of force.

Federal support

The second, and most complex, pillar is federal support. This support is fundamentally shaped and conditioned on two dynamics: Kadyrov and Putin’s close, personal relationship and the “Kadyrov conundrum,” whereby the Chechen governor unbalances the normally straightforward power relationship between central and regional leaders. Federal support can be viewed as being comprised of inner and outer sections, each with sub-pillars. The inner, more significant section of this pillar is the support of President Putin, with the outer section being the support of the rest of the federal apparatus. Federal support is a pillar because Moscow decided to enact the Chechenization policy (Sakwa 2010, Souleimanov 2006, Souleimanov & Jasutis 2016), choosing indirect rule rather than appointing a Russian from the federal center. As such, the locally selected leader of Chechnya needs to stay in the good graces of the federal authorities in order to

stay in power. As of the passing of the new electoral protocol for regional governors (TASS 2021), this is now the case for all, more than ever before.

Generally speaking, many have posited a familial, if not literally patrimonial, relationship between Vladimir Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov. However, only Souleimanov & Jasutis (2016) have conducted a political psychological analysis of their interactions—others have probed other psychological elements of Kadyrov’s rule (see Pohl 2007). Paradigmatically, some purport that “Kadyrov views Putin as a *vokkhstag* (clan elder), an uncle or a stepfather,” while “the Russian president ... referred to the Chechen strongman as his ‘son’” (Souleimanov & Jasutis 2016: 119-20). This father-son dynamic implies complete subordination, which has simply not been the case of the real Putin-Kadyrov relationship. Another, more potent, phenomenon must thusly be examined.

The underlying theoretical dilemma that shapes the relationship between Kadyrov and Putin is what I call “the Kadyrov Conundrum.” It hinges on the intersection of regime legitimacy and stability on Putin’s part and authoritarian succession on Kadyrov’s. The argument outlined here differs from the more mainstream, psychological argument that the relationship’s imbalance stems from a father-son dynamic in this relationship. While this argument does have validity, the foundation of the imbalance is less personalist-psychological, and more institutional-systemic. The “Kadyrov Conundrum” is deeply rooted in who possesses the monopoly on the use of violence and the balance of the power relationship between the two leaders. The theoretical problem starts out as such: a state’s leader—in this case, an authoritarian leader (AL)—resolves a conflict within their country, providing them with legitimacy. To resolve said conflict, the AL follows standard practices, integrating a key militant leader (KML) into the new state institutional structure; thus, a contract is struck between the AL and the KML. The guidelines of this contract are that the KML will maintain regional stability, which in turn maintains the AL’s legitimacy, in return for a lack of consequences for the KML’s previous militant activity and for the privileges available to government officials. While the balance of the power relationship between the AL and an inferior government official would typically be to the advantage of the AL, the KML’s role in maintaining stability for the sake of the AL’s legitimacy provides the KML with the upper hand. This dilemma worsens as succession is considered, as the contract

between AL and KML is personalist in nature, and thus does not automatically carry over to either leader's successor, increasing the chances for renewed instability.

The application of this theory to Putin's resolution of the Chechen conflict is evident. To secure his victory over the field of better-known presidential candidates, Putin needed to distinguish himself beyond Yeltsin's support. As Yeltsin's most embarrassing failure was controlling Chechnya—suffering a military defeat and negotiating a *de facto* independence with the Ichkerian forces—Putin's most obvious gambit was to capitalize on divisions within the Ichkerian ranks and retake Chechnya. Yeltsin cut off Maskhadov and bombed Dagestan, taking advantage of internal Chechen divides partially stoked by the game of goading each other toward war in Dagestan (Akhmadov 2010: 153-175). The 1999 apartment bombings conveniently provided Putin with a clear and present danger to the nation's safety, thus excusing a new intervention in Chechnya—it is still debated whether these acts were carried out by the Kremlin or independent Grozny (Eckel 2019). Having promised to “kill them in the outhouses” (Ibid.), Putin's strong military response and rapid territorial acquisition secured the presidency. Thus, to maintain legitimacy, Putin needs to preserve stability in the region. To this end, he embedded the Chechen warlords that assisted him within the governmental structure, making Akhmat Kadyrov, whose defection dramatically shifted the strategic balance to Russia's advantage, the president of Chechnya. Additionally, Putin allowed the *kadyrovtsy* to preserve a high degree of operational autonomy, contrasting with his policy toward the other Chechen battalions, Zapad and Vostok. Following Akhmat's assassination in 2004, Ramzan Kadyrov was gradually promoted through the republic's government, having already assumed command of the *kadyrovtsy*, until he was old enough to stand in the gubernatorial election. Having become President of Chechnya (he changed the title to “Head” in 2010, insisting that there must only be one “president” in Russia) (Groznyi-Inform 2010), Kadyrov quickly eliminated all viable alternatives to his rule, as was discussed above in the second phase of violence consolidation (2007-2015). Thus, Putin has no choice other than Kadyrov to control Chechnya and must give the warlord what he wants for the sake of “regional stability.” Thus, Kadyrov possesses the upper hand. This fact is not lost on the Chechen leader, who has emphasized this same argument when he feels the Kremlin is not cooperative: he reminds Moscow of its casualties during the Chechen War at convenient moments (Radio Svoboda 2021). This dynamic is a qualifier on any instance when Kadyrov

subordinates to the Kremlin, and his awareness of the (im)balance further indicates that any submission is a conscious choice on his part, rather than a real political subordination.

Putin's support, the core of the pillar due to the disproportionate effect of his patronage, is sustained by several sub-pillars. These could broadly be applied to essentially any regional governor, but the specifics are oriented for Kadyrov. The first sub-pillar is regional stability, which in the Chechen context means suppressing the insurgency and not starting any new conflicts, which goes hand-in-hand with the next sub-pillar, controlling the population. Suffice to say, Chechnya is more authoritarian than Russia-at-large. This is addressed in the above discussion of extreme repression, total control of all socio-political domains, e.g., forced apologies (Johnson 2021, RFE/RL 2021). "Regional stability" could understandably be considered an aspect of the "controlling the population" sub-pillar. However, due to the sustained insurgency that was unique to the North Caucasus, "regional stability" has more significant context for the governors in this region, as they deal with the more conceivable threat of violent destabilization, rather than simply mass mobilization. The next sub-pillar is loyalty. Kadyrov is vocally the most loyal subordinate to Putin, but an examination of his actions shows increasingly frequent violations of Moscow's regional & foreign policies, indicating a degree of disloyalty in the relationship. Such criticisms extend primarily across the spheres of foreign, religious, and security policy, all with an emphasis on Muslim issues (Bertina 2023). Kadyrov has managed to pragmatically negotiate overstepping in his critiques, sometimes obeying rebukes from the Kremlin. His critiques connected to Muslim issues, mostly in foreign and religious policy areas, do not truly undermine federal policy. As Kadyrov is Putin's main liaison to the Muslim world (Klyszcz 2022), criticism in support of Muslims in Russia and abroad bolster the Chechen governor's standing with these audiences, in turn helping Putin's outreach through Kadyrov. As such, Kadyrov's apparent criticism of the Kremlin does not necessarily guarantee undermining his federal support pillar. The final aspect of fulfilling federal policy is the economic development of Chechnya, which, as will be demonstrated later, has not come to pass.

This pillar's, less important, outer section is broader federal support from other high-ranking politicians and *siloviki*. The existence of any sub-pillars here is difficult to know, as different

individual actors would have different expectations for Kadyrov. However, their existence is a moot point: Kadyrov essentially rid himself of broader federal support during his Ramzanization of Chechnya. By consolidating power, Kadyrov was not just eliminating alternative leaders, but also ridding Chechnya of non-Putin federal patrons. Many in Moscow, especially among the *siloviki*, were supporting different Chechen actors. Alkhanov was supported by the GRU and some *siloviki*, like Igor Sechin (Sakwa 2010: 606), and the leaders of the various paramilitaries were backed by their federal overseers (Šmíd & Mareš 2015: 654-6)—the FSB for Baysarov and the Ministry of Defense for Kakiev and the Yamadaevs. Thus, Kadyrov’s campaign for solitary possession of power essentially disintegrated his hopes for broad federal support—any support he had not lost he did so with rash actions that blatantly violated federal policy, such as allegedly orchestrating the assassination of Boris Nemtsov (Nechepurenko 2015, Walker 2015). As such, it is clear that Kadyrov’s support from Putin, based in a more complex relationship, is more solidified than from other federal officials. The Chechen governor has created substantial hurdles for himself with regards to winning over other federal officials.

Financial

When journalists asked Kadyrov where his money comes in 2011, he quipped that “Allah gives. I don’t know. Where does the money come from” (Zholobova 2017). It should not need to be said, but obviously Kadyrov is aware that his wealth has actual, earthly sources. The Chechen governor’s financial pillar is of the utmost importance, as it is the central facilitator of his activities, being used to help buy off operatives and otherwise finance projects. The following section will address the sub-pillars categorically, first examining the means and channels through which the administration procures funds, then turning to how these funds are stored. The second category exists because the financial means of the regime go beyond simply carrying out their political duties, extending to the dramatic enrichment of officials and their families. The first set of sub-pillars, the means of acquiring wealth, are channels, legal and illicit, through which the regime brings in funds. The second grouping, how the wealth is stored, is comprised of a formal and informal part, with formality referring to official bureaucratic integration. The formal part is the Regional Community Fund named for Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov, more commonly referred to as the Akhmat Kadyrov Fund (AKF). This organization is frequently

described as Kadyrov's "slush fund," as it is utilized as the expense account for a significant proportion of his personal and professional activities. The informal part is comprised of the other ways the Chechen governor stores his acquired wealth, e.g., property. While, in the case of property, there is little the Chechen resistance can do to undermine it beyond exposing it, such assets can help identify other financial means for the regime.

The known majority of Kadyrov's income originates in subsidies from the federal budget, primarily through subsidies. While these have decreased to less than half of their amount during the counterterrorism operation, Kadyrov has still maintained them at one of the highest levels in Russia (Fuller 2016, Kommersant 2018, Mogilevskaya 2017, Nikol'skaya et al. 2016, Vishnyakova & Tkachyov 2021, Zabyelina & Arsovska 2013). Funds from Moscow and government contracts tendered by Grozny are generally understood to be directed into the pockets of officials and their close associates (Zabyelina 2013). After all, how else could Kadyrov live in such an opulent manner, considering his official salary of ₹282,655 per month in 2022, adding up to 3.3 million annually, comes nowhere near his earlier reported income of 148 million rubles in 2019 (Kavkaz.Realii 2022c, Kavkazskii Uzel 2020a). His income declarations in 2018 and 2019 were the first to more accurately reflect the extent of his wealth, although these reports soon decreased (Milashina 2023a). A 2006 diplomatic cable from the American embassy in Moscow reported that Kadyrov was personally embezzling one-third of all federal budget contributions to Chechnya (Burns 2006). Governmental contracts are frequently given to companies close to the regime (Ibid.). A decade-long waste management contract for the entire republic was awarded to Movsadi Alviev, an oligarch with close ties to Kadyrov (Anin 2020). Another company, "Smart Bilding," has received a string of lucrative construction contracts and is reportedly connected to Adam Delimkhanov (Krasno 2023). Kadyrov's contribution to the war in Ukraine has finally earned him significant financial stakes in the national economy in the form of captured businesses in Ukraine and seized international companies in Russia. Valid Korchagin, whose true surname is Geremeev, one of the eminent families in the kadyrovtsy; he now owns a metallurgy plant in occupied Mariupol and former foreign hypermarket and café chains (Churmanova & Goryanov 2023). Danone's Russia subsidiary was recently given to Yakub Zakriev, Chechnya's Agriculture Minister and the nephew of Kadyrov (The Bell 2023).

These acquisitions will be added to the Chechen governor's "unofficial assets" (Milashina 2023a).

In addition to federal money, Kadyrov has been able to solicit foreign funding, mostly for reconstruction, especially major projects and mosques. The UAE has financed the construction of a five-star hotel and an Islamic university in Grozny (Press Service 2022, Roth 2018). More substantially, Ramzan worked with then-President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nayhan to establish an investment fund to support socioeconomic development in Chechnya (Zayed Fund 2023). The Sheikh Zayed Fund, however, has notably established partnerships with Kadyrov's children (Chambers 2023d, NIYSO 2023b). As such, the Sheikh Zayed Fund appears likely to serve as a facilitator for moving money between Grozny and Dubai, even if still pursues its stated mission.

That the Kadyrov regime partially finances itself by engaging in illicit activities is widely accepted, however, it is relatively difficult to prove. Reliable data is a rarity, with most potential data points coming to the surface in isolation, yet to be connected in any meaningful way. This conundrum results from the combination of secrecy surrounding many illicit activities, particularly transnational ones, and the general opacity of the Chechen administration's internal workings. That being the case, there are some data available indicating that the Kadyrov regime finances itself through criminality. The most publicized method of illicitly securing funding is through extortion, targeting both the general populace of Chechnya and major Russian businessmen. Ramzan Kadyrov, Adam Delimkhanov, and Pavel Krotov have acquired assets from a variety of Russia's oligarchs and lesser businessmen, utilizing the not-so implicit threat of violence by invoking Delimkhanov's name (Zholobova 2020). Krotov has reportedly been conducting such operations for the Chechen leaders since 2010. The front-man also helped extort assets from a Kazakh businessman, with the resulting beneficiary being Kazakh oligarch Kenes Rakishev. Rakishev, a close friend of Kadyrov, previously paid for the construction of the Chechen governor's opulent Grozny estate (Rubin et al 2022). Krotov oversaw that construction on behalf of Delimkhanov (Zholobova 2020). In other words, not only is a history of extortion evident, but it has been conducted by the same intermediaries, with the material storage of a portion of these funds apparent. The authorities in Grozny, however, do not exclusively acquire

funds by pressuring and threatening Russia's businessmen, although they have surely served as flashier cash grabs. The more frequent victims of the Kadyrov regime's extortions are the Chechen people themselves. In 2015, it was estimated that the AKF was extorting between three and four billion rubles per month from Chechnya's citizens (Open Russia Foundation 2015). This allegedly included forced payments comprising ten percent of the monthly incomes of public employees and half of businesses' profits. There are rumors about other criminal activity, namely narcotics trafficking and dealing, but there is scant verified evidence beyond some personal usage by officials (Kavkaz.Realii 2021b, NIYSO 2022b, V. Smirnov 2021, Yangulbaev 2022, Zidan 2023a).

The main financier for Kadyrov's pet projects, and much of his general operations, is the Akhmat Kadyrov Fund (Regional'nyi obshchestvennyi fond 2023). The AKF operates with some degree of transparency, with many expenditures publicly announced, particularly with respect to the ongoing war effort, ranging from providing housing for Chechnya's poor to buying military transports (Chambers 2022b). The United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, however, has identified interconnected businesses, implementing sanctions against them for their relationship to the AKF, which is also sanctioned (Office of Foreign Assets Control "Akhmat"). The sanctioned companies are Megastroyinvest, Ltd. and Chechen Mineral Waters, Ltd. for being "owned or controlled" by the AKF (Office of Foreign Assets Control "Chechen," Office of Foreign Assets Control "Megastroyinvest," U.S. Department of Treasury 2020). These sanctions, which only target some of the businesses connected to the AKF (Tumanov 2015), help illustrate how the AKF operates as a slush-fund for the regime and how the regime controls business throughout the republic. Some of the channels through which the Akhmat Kadyrov Fund is built up have also been exposed. As mentioned above, Chechnya's residents are forced to contribute the Fund, which the Open Russia Foundation estimated added up to three to four billion rubles per month in 2015 (Open Russia Foundation 2015). Much of the AKF's inner workings remain unknown, such as the extent of their funds, all of their revenue streams, and many of their expenditures (Fuller 2015, Krasno 2022b).

Much of the Kadyrov regime's wealth is held in other assets, as it is used to finance their opulent lifestyles. When the Chechen governor is not at any of his three estates in Chechnya—the initial

design of his third cost 7.5 million rubles (roughly \$300,000 in 2008, when the estate was drafted) (Proekt 2020)—or his family’s secret Moscow apartments (Proekt 2021, *Vazhnye Istorii* 2021), he may be jetting off to Dubai on his Bermuda-registered Airbus A319 interior-designed by British Winch Design worth \$80 million (Tkach 2022, Zholobova 2017). Here in the United Arab Emirates, Kadyrov reportedly owns a villa in Dubai—Villa #21 at the Zabeen Saray Royal Residences on Palm Jumeirah—with a smaller villa next door for his guards (Tkach 2022). Kadyrov has also owned horses previously stabled in the Czech Republic and Dubai; the horse in Czechia, prior to its abduction and return to Chechnya, is reportedly worth \$10 million (Milashina 2023a). Adam Delimkhanov, the organizer of many of Kadyrov’s criminal schemes, also owns an extravagant mansion in his hometown of Dzhalka (1ADAT 2022a, 1ADAT 2022b, Abdurakhmanov 2019, Kavkaz.Realii 2019). Other allies of the Chechen governor are rumored to have opulent estates throughout Chechnya, but little research has been conducted to expose them. The list of property in Dubai held by Kadyrov’s close associates is extensive (Anin et al. 2022): Ruslan Baysarov owns five apartments and a large villa on Palm Jumeirah, with a total market value exceeding \$10 million; Mukhammed Sabsabi holds apartments worth \$189,000 in Al-Warsan and a villa worth \$3.8 million in Al-Merkad; an apartment worth \$800,000 in the Al-Hallawi building on the Palm Jumeirah belongs to Akhmad Yasaev; Adam Alkhanov owns an apartment worth over \$700,000 in the Al-Dabas building on Palm Jumeirah; and, finally, Suleiman Geremeev possesses an apartment worth over \$360,000. These holdings are proof of the Kadyrov regime buying loyalty.

In the opposite direction, if Kadyrov enriches you, you are then expected to reinvest in his pet projects. the investigative team at *Vazhnye Istorii* unveiled that Chechen oligarch Movsadi Alviev has been funding the Russian Spetsnaz University, a centerpiece of Kadyrov’s war efforts (Chambers 2023b, *Vazhnye Istorii* 2023, Zholobova 2022). Alviev, as stated above, has governmental contracts funneled to him. Another wartime event supports the argument that Kadyrov receives a cut of any lucrative deal his henchmen manage to secure. During the second month of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the kadyrovtsy’s commanders in the field underwent a strange and high-profile cycling of personnel (Chambers 2022c). 1ADAT reported that this was because Khusein Mezhidov and Magomed Tushaev had been imprisoned, with torture implied, for selling trophy weapons without approval from Kadyrov (1ADAT 2022c).

Not cutting the boss in on their deal resulted in them getting sidelined and distanced from regime activities—they have both noticeably been less frequent fixtures in wartime propaganda since the incident.

Conclusion: interconnected pillars

While it is analytically advantageous to examine the pillars independently, in reality, they do not exist in separate environments from each other. They are interconnected; they overlap, build upon, and constrain each other. The most blatant example of this is the fact that the financial pillar enables the development of violence capacity and the strengthens the administration's ability to coerce and co-opt elites and the populace. Reflecting back on finances, its dependence on federal support is fairly obvious, as almost all of Chechnya's budget—and thus a significant proportion of Kadyrov's—comes from federal subsidies. Kadyrov's development of the use of force has undermined his federal support because his drive for power and monopolization of violence was a key factor in the alienation of federal authorities (other than Putin). As was discussed earlier, other Chechen warlords had patrons in the federal government, and Kadyrov's elimination of these paramilitary commanders also eliminated their patrons' influence inside Chechnya. Paradoxically, however, this same fact also contributes to his federal support, as he has no viable challengers to his leadership, leaving Moscow with no option but to keep him in place. Additionally, Kadyrov's capacity for using force is how he suppressed the insurgency and how he maintains such a tight grip on Chechnya's populace. These two policy successes endear him to the presidential administration as defeating the insurgency was and is central to the foundation of Putin's legitimacy and because maintaining control of the region's populace is a general requirement for every governor in Russia. Failure to keep the public in line can result in being ousted in a *gubernatoropad*, a 'fall of governors.' The pillars form almost interdependent bonds, reinforcing each other's strength. Presumably, this also would work in reverse, with weakening one pillar reverberating to weaken the others.

Modern Chechen resistance

Reasons to resist

The basis for Chechen resistance after the fall of the Soviet Union was, and is, centuries of accumulated historical grievances against Russian rule. The conflict between Russia and Chechnya began developing with the creation of the “Caucasus Line,” an east-west network of settler villages and fortresses, including on the Chechens’ lands, and other tsarist policies that sought to pacify the mountaineers (Baddeley 1908, Gammer 2006: 10-5). Open conflict erupted in 1785, with the *ghazawat* (holy war) of Sheikh Mansur. The tsar finally achieved victory in Chechnya with the surrender of Imam Shamil on September 6, 1859 (Blanch 1960, Gammer 2006: 64). The Imperial Russian authorities then tried to navigate the co-optation and suppression of Islamic and traditional forms of governance in the region, attempting to subdue the native residents (Blauvelt 2010). Rebellions continued, but the region remained relatively peaceful due to the crackdown after the uprising of 1877 (Gammer 2006: 68-103). The communist revolution and subsequent civil war allowed Chechnya to regain a short-lived independence under the guise of the Mountainous Republic of the North Caucasus (Ibid.: 119-40). The Red Army reclaimed Chechnya in 1920 but fighting continued until 1923. The early Soviet era was marked by attempting to disarm nationalist sentiments and keep the region from returning to conflict, with moderate success (Ibid.: 138-53, Perovic 2016). This era ended in 1937 with Joseph Stalin’s purges, which in turn reignited some armed resistance in Chechnya (Gammer 2006: 154-65). Events took a darker turn during World War II when Stalin decided to deport to Central Asia several peoples he ungroundedly considered to represent a threat to the Soviet Union. On February 23, 1944, Stalin ordered the entire population of the Chechen nation to be uprooted from their homes and shipped on trains to Central Asia (Ibid.: 166-83). This exiling was conducted with extreme violence; perhaps most infamous is the Khaibakh massacre, where Soviet soldiers packed the village into a barn and burned them alive. The deported Chechens were crammed into cattle cars, with roughly one-third of the entire population dying during the journey. As such, the deportation is recognized internationally as a genocide (European Parliament 2004). The perpetration of such a crime at the hands of the Soviet Union, in addition to the decades of occupation by different Russian governments, served as the fundamental basis for the Chechens’ claim to the necessity of self-rule, asserting that an independent state was required for the preservation of their people. This reasoning was explicitly stated by Dzhokhar Dudaev when he declared Chechnya independent in 1991 (Natsional’nyi Komitet po Pravovoi Reforme pri Prezidenta ChR 1993).

While Chechnya declared its sovereignty alongside other members of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international community did not receive it in the same manner as they did the other formerly Soviet regions. Chechnya's independence was only recognized nearly a decade later by the Taliban (Reuters 2000), who were themselves dealing with limited international recognition. The absence of acknowledgement for Chechnya's assertion of sovereignty was partially due to Russia's pressure against states with sympathetic parliaments and populations (Akhmadov & Daniloff 2013, Zakaev 2018: 286). However, according to one former senior Ichkerian official, Ilyas Akhmadov, Russia itself allegedly almost recognized Chechen sovereignty (Akhmadov & Lansky 2010: 89). If the story is true, in 1997, in a one-on-one meeting to discuss the future Moscow Peace Treaty between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Chechen-Ichkerian President Aslan Maskhadov, Maskhadov presented Yeltsin with a treaty that would recognize Chechnya's independence from Russia. Yeltsin was prepared to sign it, until his advisors entered the room and stopped him. This ploy by Maskhadov was an attempt to make Chechnya's independence *de jure*, thus conferring upon him the ability to deal with other international actors, who would not conduct official relations with Chechnya absent Russia's approval. This refusal to independently engage with Chechnya was despite Russia's stunning defeat in the First Chechen War. Another attempt to solidify Chechen independence came with the signing of the treaty itself. In this case, as told by Akhmadov's predecessor Akhmed Zakaev, the treaty was perceived differently by either side (Zakaev 2018: 284-6). The Chechens read it as confirming the independence from Russia, while Yeltsin's team interpreted it as holding up Chechnya's incorporation in the Russian Federation. Zakaev adds that Yeltsin removed the phrasing "In confirmation of the Khasavyurt Accord of 31 August 1996" in the document's opening, which the then-Foreign Minister claims provided Russia with the later legal foundation to launch a new invasion of Chechnya. That invasion came shortly afterward, although the legal basis theorized by Zakaev was not needed, with the Kremlin instead utilizing a string of apartment bombings around Russia attributed to Chechen terrorists (Eckel 2019). The Second Chechen War began in 1999 and, with the help of former Chechen commanders and politicians, Russia quickly took control of Chechnya once more.

The independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, while being a manifestation of Chechen resistance in its own right prior to the Second Chechen War and subsequent exiling of its officials, serves as a base grievance for IADAT. The reason for this is twofold. First, Ichkeria, although never recognized internationally as such, is considered a sovereign state within Chechen society. Accordingly, it serves not only as a source of inspiration for a future autonomy to aspire to, but, more significantly with respect to grievance formation, as a case of sovereignty lost. From IADAT's perspective, and that of other Chechens not explicitly associated with this underground movement, Ichkeria is an occupied state wrongfully deprived of its sovereignty. Second, the brutal destruction of Ichkeria by Russian forces creates the basis for the consideration of another genocide against the Chechen people, a genocide now recognized by Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada 2023, Zelenskyy 2023). Both of these reasons convey how the Ichkerian period of the 1990s are part of the historically continuous narrative for the formation of Chechens' motivating grievances against Russia.

The final motivating grievance for the current iteration of the Chechen resistance is the crimes of the current regional government. The Kadyrov regime has been characterized by indiscriminate violence and widespread human rights violations. These have included kidnappings, assaults on journalists and human rights defenders, torture, and extrajudicial executions. This violent oppression is all that the new generation of opposition activists have known, growing up since the Second Chechen War.

Chronological bounds within modern resistance

Since the fall of Ichkeria, different Chechen groups have served as the primary structure for continued resistance. First was the Ichkerian government-in-exile led by Aslan Maskhadov and his successors from the fall of Grozny on February 6, 2000 (Milyukov 2020: 51), until October 2007, when Doku Umarov dissolved the Ichkerian government in order to create Imarat Kavkaz (IK) (Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010: 233). IK was the primary actor for resisting Russian rule until its essential defeat in early 2015.

Deciding on a cut-off point for IK's dominance is complicated, due to government narratives conflicting with reality, the slow demise of the insurgency (rather than an abrupt cessation of activities), and the struggling remnant of IK that remained "engaged" in the North Caucasus until January 2021. Officially, the counterterrorism operation in Chechnya was terminated by Moscow in 2009, although it was essentially just passed from federal to regional authorities and did not change the situation on the ground (RFE/RL 2009, Russell 2011, see data in Appendix A). This state-declared ending to the Second Chechen War, as a moment of finality from Moscow's perspective, is frequently accepted as an endpoint for the conflict. However, just because Moscow claimed it over did not make it so. According to data on victims of the North Caucasus conflict, compiled by *Kavkazskii Uzel* (aggregated by the author in Appendix A, see also O'Loughlin et al. 2011, Holland et al. 2017), the clearest statistical end of the insurgency in Chechnya occurred between 2014 and 2015, synchronously with the establishment of Islamic State's caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Militant activity had been declining steadily since at least 2010, but there were no drops as significant as 2014-2015, from 117 victims down to 30. There were two other sizable drops 2010-2011 and 2012-2013, but neither proved a death knell for the Chechen insurgency. Even following the sharp decline in IK operations after February 2015, some militant resistance remained active in Chechnya, representing the last of IK. The so-called "last amir of the Caucasus," Aslan "Hamzat" Byutukaev, was not killed until January 2021, along with presumably the last existing band of militants remaining from the insurgency's peak (Geriyeu 2021). For the sakes of this paper, the data-driven cut-off is used, as it is the most representative of actual resistance activities.

From this point onward, there was a lull in organized resistance in Chechnya lasting until the emergence of 1ADAT in April 2020. This was the formative period for 1ADAT, during which its eventual leaders would begin to be active in the arena of human rights defense. There is a dearth of data on resistance at this point, as any resistance among society largely remains unknown and the human rights defenders maintain a loose network of cooperation. April 2020 brought more than spring with it that year. The "people's movement ... in occupied Chechnya" gradually grew, apparently posing a sufficient threat to the Kadyrov regime by the end of 2021. In mid-August, the administrators of the channel teased revealing their identities (Aktivist Adata 2021b). In November, the movement's website was promptly banned by Roskomnadzor and

taken down briefly with a DDoS attack (1ADAT 2021g & Kavkaz.Realii 2021c), all within days of its launch. These attacks turned much more direct in December. Presumably at the behest of either Kadyrov, or higher powers in Russia, the (ex-)Prigozhin-operated outlet *RIA-FAN* (2021) published an exposé on 1ADAT, naming its founder as Ibragim Yangulbaev. This led *Novaya Gazeta*'s Elena Milashina to confirm much of the report a month later (Milashina 2022b), a week after the kadyrovtsy violently abducted Yangulbaev's mother from Nizhny Novgorod. Ibragim and 1ADAT eventually conceded the story's veracity and have since published more details about the movement's origins (1ADAT 2022e, 1ADAT 2023a).

To reiterate without the discussion: for the purpose of this study, the Ichkerian government-in-exile will be considered from February 2000, when the Maskhadov government fled Grozny (although Ilyas Akhmadov left for his assignment beyond Chechnya's borders before then), until the proclamation of Imarat Kavkaz in October 2007. The IK era will be evaluated from October 2007 through its decline after February 2015. The Lull will be viewed as stretching from March 2015 until April 2020, when 1ADAT launched. 1ADAT's period, while continuing today, will only be measured until the end of 2021. The end of anonymity for the movement's founders is an appropriate cutoff point for this study, as tactics changed afterwards.

Three iterations, with a break

The first iteration of modern Chechen resistance was the government-in-exile of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (GIE or Ichkerian GIE). The GIE was quite literally the continuation of the Maskhadov administration. As such, its ideology followed secular Chechen nationalism, although challenged by the growing influence of radical Islam, which it was forced to increasingly accommodate (Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010: 173-192, Whitmeyer 2015). The GIE did not just form overnight, but gradually coalesced as Russia gained ground in the Cheche mountains and the Ichkerian war effort faltered. The first indicator of its formation occurred in September 1999, when recently appointed Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov became the first official sent into what would become exile from Chechnya (Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010: 168-171). The next transformative event was the Battle for Grozny, ending with the city's capture on February 6, 2000, forcing the Chechen army to fall back to a headquarters in the mountains

established towards the beginning of the battle by Maskhadov (Ibid: 177). As Russia's troops advanced, the Ichkerian government was forced to fall further and further back in order to maintain its operations—most importantly, carry on its fight. The next significant moment took place at the beginning of March 2005. Aslan Maskhadov was killed on March 8, succeeded by Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev. Akhmed Zakayev advises President Sadulaev to form the “Cabinet of Ministers” to expedite government processes that could be conducted abroad (Zakayev 2022: 386-7). The final stage transforming the GIE into what it is today was its official downfall in October 2007. In response to Doku Umarov's declaration of the Caucasus Emirate, Zakayev claimed leadership of the “Cabinet of Ministers”-in-exile in London (Akhmadov & Lansky 2010: 243).

Thus, the Ichkerian GIE was replaced by the second iteration of modern Chechen resistance: Imarat Kavkaz, or the Caucasus Emirate (IK). After years of promoting the idea to replace the democratic Ichkerian state with a caliphate, Doku (also, Dokka) Umarov finally does so after succeeding Sadulaev as President of Ichkeria in October 2007 (Ibid.). This declaration was the result of a religious radicalization campaign that had been gaining in influence over the previous decade. IK ideologically split from the Ichkerian GIE, instead espousing Salafist jihadism and advocating for independence of the entire North Caucasus in order to create a regional emirate under sharia rule (Ibid.: 245). As part of this regionwide push, IK expanded its operations into Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria (Milyukov 2020, O'Loughlin & Witmer 2012). On April 16, 2009, Putin declared an end to the federal counterterrorism operation in Chechnya, thus officially ending the Second Chechen War, handing over operational control to the regional authorities under Ramzan Kadyrov. This did not mean, however, that the fighting was over, merely that Russia was declaring victory; insurgency operations continued. As noted above, Imarat Kavkaz, despite substantial operations in other regions of the North Caucasus, was already dwindling in Chechnya by 2010, with the final significant drop in militant activity occurring at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015, when the slow, multi-year decline plummeted from 117 victims to 30. Several factors contributed to this decline. First, Doku Umarov was killed in September 2013, resulting in leadership difficulties (Ratelle 2020b, Souleimanov 2016). Umarov was, eventually, succeeded by the initially reluctant Aliaskhab Kebekov, a Dagestani, in March 2014. Kebekov lasted roughly one year in the position of IK's

amir before being killed. His successor lasted mere months, after which no replacement emerged. This leadership death of IK was a symptom of the next factors. Second, the operational environment in Chechnya became very difficult, as Kadyrov continued to solidify his control over the region, increasing the strength of the kadyrovtsy while utilizing indiscriminate violence and brutal retaliation against family members of his (perceived) opponents. Finally, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria had recently declared the establishment of its caliphate. This announcement attracted many fighters to migrate to Syria, where they believed they could fight and earn glory, which they could not achieve in the North Caucasus' stalled conflict (Ratelle 2020a, Sagramoso & Yarlykapov 2020a: 275-6, Sagramoso & Yarlykapov 2020b). This decline of operations in Chechnya, while not a definitive end to IK's activities in the region, effectively brought its era of supremacy to a close.

Between the period of the Caucasus Emirate's dominance and the emergence of the "1ADAT" social movement, organized resistance in Chechnya seemingly disappeared. As will be discussed in greater length below, it was during this period that Ramzan Kadyrov embarked to turn his monopoly on the use of force into an all-encompassing atmosphere of violent oppression. The most noteworthy campaign during this period was the massacring of Chechnya's LGBTQ community, which garnered international attention (e.g., France 2020). Lasting roughly from early 2015 until April 2020, "The Lull" has multiple potential explanations, predominantly rooted in theory, as the available data is severely limited. However, it is during this period that occurred the precursor activity for what would (soon) become 1ADAT. This diffusion of resistance was based around a loose network of human rights activists, some of whom would go on to found 1ADAT.

The final Chechen opposition movement in this study is 1ADAT, the most recent and least studied. As such, it requires a more detailed background. On April 11, 2020, the Chechen "societal movement against dictatorship" announced itself as 1ADAT on Telegram (1ADAT 2020a, 1ADAT 2020b). From the outset, the members of the 1ADAT team remained anonymous for their own protection from the Kadyrov regime—although, by now, both Ibragim and Baisangur Yangulbaev are publicly members. What happens when their cover slips is internationally understood, as evidenced in the cases of Zhalil Umarov, Abubakar Vakhitaev

and, more widely known, Salman Tepsurkaev. Umarov and Vakhitaev were kidnapped and murdered in December 2020 by the kadyrovtsy (1ADAT 2020g, 1ADAT 2021a). Their cases received no public exposure beyond 1ADAT, not even by local independent media. In contrast, almost a year later, Salman Tepsurkaev was kidnapped from his work in Gelendzhik, Krasnodar on September 6, 2020 (Memorial Human Rights Center 2021). The following day 1ADAT published a video of his torture (message following video, 1ADAT 2020f). As the investigation into Tepsurkaev's disappearance was handed over to Chechen authorities, there was no news of his whereabouts until August 23, 2022, when his murder was confirmed (1ADAT 2022d). The only other mention of one of the movement's members at that time was a reference to "our editor Dervish" (1ADAT 2020e), a name which is assuredly an alias. On August 15, 2021, the movement teased that their mask of anonymity would soon be willingly relinquished, as giving up their main, if not only, form of protection marks the start of a new phase of the movement's operations (Aktivist Adata 2021b). Before they could do so of their own accord, however, Kremlin-aligned media revealed their founder, Ibragim Yangulbaev (RIA-FAN 2021).

While most of 1ADAT's members may not be known, the movement's ideology can be pieced together with some ease. At a more general level of movement ideology—in that these characteristics can be found throughout global contentious politics, not just as ideological preferences specific to the Chechen case—1ADAT can be classified as being revolutionary and nonviolent. Beyond these characteristics of 1ADAT's philosophy, the movement can be placed along the nationalist-Islamist ideological spectrum of Chechen resistance. "1ADAT - ЗАКОН! [1ADAT IS LAW!]" was the first sentence issued by the movement (1ADAT 2020a), immediately establishing a base context for the movement's ideals. They were not declaring that their group is the law, but referring to the traditional Chechen legal code, which is known as *Iadat* in Chechen.³ This is the first point in the movement's combining of Chechen nationalist and Islamic values, which is further evidenced in the group's symbols (i.e., coat of arms, flag,

³ The word is untranslatable, leading Russian to borrow it, while English either borrows or tries to translate it. One of the most popular translations is "customary law," but this does not wholly encapsulate the word's meaning in this case. This is because the word "adat" is borrowed from Arabic, defining a broader concept than just in the Chechen case. *Adats* can be found elsewhere, across the region and around the world. Accordingly, "1adat," the transliteration of the word in Chechen, applies to the specific traditions in Chechnya, known as "nokhchallah" (Jaimoukha 2005: 7). For the purposes of this paper, "1ADAT" will refer to the social movement and "1adat" will refer to the Chechen traditional legal code.

etc.) (see Appendix B). Analyzing 1ADAT’s descriptions of the symbols—with the exception of what I am calling the “shahada⁴ star”—yields greater insight into how 1ADAT conceives their movement’s mission. The commonality of juxtaposing the ideas of unification with the nine Chechen tukkhums, the top level of the traditional Chechen social structure, indicates that 1ADAT considers uniting the Chechen people to be a central tenet of its mission. Additionally, the simultaneous incorporation of both traditional Chechen and Islamic values symbolically—the shahada star, for example, uses both a symbolic representation of the tukkhums and the shahada—indicates the current state of Chechen nationalism identity, particularly among the youth. Previous literature on Chechen resistance and society has portrayed the traditional nationalist or Islamic aspects of Chechen identity as more of a dichotomy than a spectrum, in part because of the contention between the Sufi-secular Ichkerian government and Salafi-Wahhabi Imarat Kavkaz (Wilhelmsen 2005, Whitmeyer 2015). Certainly, there were attitudes between the factions that made them incompatible in those manifestations (Swirszcz 2009, Souleimanov & Aliyev 2020). For the Chechen youth of today, there is more of a middle-ground, although there are still those drawn to radical Islam (Sturdee & Vatchagaev 2020). While 1ADAT has utilized the idea of independent Ichkeria as inspiration, this admiration does not carry over to the GIE, particularly Zakayev. The movement is open about its disdain for the veteran leader, critiquing his exiled government for idly “waiting twenty years for the West to bring them power on a platter” (1ADAT 2021c). They have also disavowed Zakaev for claiming to be a moderator of their Telegram channel, i.e., a leader of their movement (Kavkazskii Uzel 2020b). The accusations of complacency help suggest this paper’s argument, that 1ADAT’s emergence can be attributed to the failure of other resistance movements to effectively target the Kadyrov regime, as represented by the regime’s pillars of power. Other celebrity Chechen fighters are revered by 1ADAT’s channel, like many Chechens. They also labeled Movsar Zakriev a martyr, after he was killed during a lone wolf attack on a traffic policeman last November (1ADAT 2022g). This is rather informative. While they themselves do not utilize violence, they do not condemn its perpetration by others. This suggests they would likely participate in a resistance campaign that simultaneously makes use of violent and nonviolent tactics.

⁴ The shahada is one of the Five Pillars of Islam, frequently considered to be the most important, as it is the declaration of belief in Allah and Muhammad.

Geographically locating the movement is more difficult than for the GIE and the insurgency—particularly as I have implemented geographic bounds for the insurgency, precluding some of its more active factions. The reason for this difficulty is part of the broader evolution of contentious politics, as actors have become more active and reliant on the digital space, specifically social media. Social media use in contentious politics has traditionally served as an augmentation of or organizational method for collective mobilization—e.g., Belarus 2020 protests, Free Navalny April 2021 protests (Lorns Dorf 2021, Herasimenka et al. 2020). However, social media is the main theater of resistance for 1ADAT at this stage—the movement has, however, taken on a greater presence in the real world since February. As stated earlier, the movement first manifested on Telegram, but has since expanded its digital footprint, although some of this growth appears to have regressed. 1ADAT created a website to streamline their cross-platform information flows, but it was felled by a cyber-attack roughly four hours after its launch; at present, it appears to be permanently down. The anonymity of the movement’s members additionally hides their locations, but 1ADAT portrays itself as being in “occupied Chechnya”—or occasionally “occupied Ichkeria.” The dispersion of Chechen youth, who are leading the movement, also contributes to the questionability of how many 1ADAT activists are actually present inside Chechnya. Ibragim Yangulbaev is exiled in Europe, Salman Tepsurkaev was kidnapped in Krasnodar on the other side of the North Caucasus, and other demonstrations also cast doubt. However, the tips received by the movement on cases of kidnappings and kadyrovtsy violence seem to be emanating from inside of the Chechen Republic and are treated as such by leading regional media outlets (Kavakzskii Uzel 2020c, Kavakzskii Uzel 2020d, Kavkaz.Realii 2021a). One of the advantages of staging resistance on social media is that it provides at least an appearance of public convergence. In other words, the potential geographic dispersion is, in part, negated by a common, digital meeting place, the Internet Age evolution of the town square. Social media also allows for the masking of users’ true identities, which is crucial for resistance movements in authoritarian settings.

While 1ADAT has thus far gone unaddressed in academic literature, as far as the author is aware, the Ichkerian GIE and Imarat Kavkaz have been extensively examined. However, they have typically been treated as distinct, rather than as part of a singular, continuous movement. This

paper goes against this, considering them as two iterations of the same Chechen resistance movement, including IADAT as well. The manifestation of IADAT in particular helps make evident the connectedness of Chechen resistance, as the organization is run by a generation raised in the melding of both nationalist and Islamic Chechen identities, combining elements from both prior modern instances of organized resistance. Further, the iterations all lay claim to the Ichkerian identity and cause, creating a wide interpretation of the now mythologized *de facto* state (e.g., Chechen jihadis in Syria wearing Ichkeria patches; Paraszcuk 2020). Viewing the Chechen resistance as a unitary socio-political phenomenon enables it to be subject to evolutions in tactics and targeting of the regime's pillars over time. Each iteration has faded as its successor rose. This cyclical pattern is important for explaining the manifestations, as it shows the tactical metamorphosis. Due to analytical constraints, this study will adopt hard chronological cutoffs, rather than observe the transitions.

The Case of modern Chechen resistance

Government-in-Exile

After Grozny fell and the Russian advance continued to gain ground in the mountains, the Ichkerian government was forced to fall back further and further in order to keep operating. The GIE engaged in its struggle on two fronts: warfare in Chechnya and diplomacy abroad. This dual strategy, using both violence and non-violence, ultimately could not maintain a distinction between the two fronts, as they were united by a common government-in-exile and were thus accountable to each other.

Belligerent front

The manner by which the Ichkerian GIE's insurgency sought to erode the Kadyrov regime's force pillar is very straightforward: through war. However, the Ichkerians were outmatched. They could no longer stealthily traverse Chechnya with ease, severely hindering their guerilla war (Zakaev 2022: 92). While this was the most direct means of attacking the pillar, or any of the

regime's pillars, it was doomed to fail. Provocations by extremists targeting civilians, like at the Dubrovka Theater and Beslan, only played into the emergent narrative of the Global War on Terror (GWOt) and brought more severe violence down on the Ichkerian Armed Forces.

The continued fighting after retaking Grozny increased federal support for the Kadyrov regime. This was partially because the Kadyrovs were Russia's ace-in-the-hole for reframing the conflict. Moscow's Chechenization policy meant rallying behind the recently installed regime, which was now the face of Moscow's Chechen civil war (Sakwa 2010, Souleimanov 2006, Souleimanov & Jasutis 2016). Federal support for the Kadyrovs also grew with each victory, as they inched closer to fulfilling Putin's objective of retaking Chechnya. As such, the only way the Ichkerian GIE could potentially weaken support was to turn the tide of the war in their favor, something they proved unable to do.

Similar to its relationship with the federal support pillar, war increases the stakes and financial resources required to combat armed resistance. An ongoing, brutal campaign of violence spanning a region logically dampens economic activity (Kang & Meernik 2005). This was even more so due to Russia's bombing campaign (Milyukov 2020, Traynor 1999). With the insurgency fully raging, and Chechnya destroyed, federal money was flowing to the Kadyrov regime. Once the majority of fighting was distanced from Grozny and reconstruction could begin, the regime truly began to fill its coffers (Zabyelina & Arsovska 2013). This is because it was receiving money for reconstruction and counterterrorism operations, but did not want to conduct true economic investments, skimming off of federal funds and self-dealing instead. The Kremlin did not want to hold off on economic assistance to rebuild Chechnya but wanted to begin reconstruction as expeditiously as possible. Moscow's reasoning behind this wartime policy strategy was to be able to declare victory as quickly as possible. In other words, Putin wanted to be able to announce that stability had been restored as soon as possible, thus fulfilling the promise he made to the Russian people in order to win the presidency. With the potential for economic activity limited until the insurgency declined, the regime was able to, realistically, strengthen its financial pillar off of substantial federal subsidies with a lack of potential investment opportunities. This is even more the case because the Kadyrov regime sought to enrich itself while creating a Gulf-inspired architectural façade, with economic developments

largely not reaching the republic's residents (Feifer 2009). By suppressing the economy while resisting steadfastly, the Ichkerian insurgency simultaneously deconstructed *and* strengthened the Kadyrov regime's financial pillar.

Diplomatic front

A Swiss diplomat told Akhmed Zakaev in 1995 that “the Chechen delegation has an amazing ability to present the lack of any strategy as a brilliant strategy” (Zakaev 2018: 281). This rather cynical statement proved both true and false. It is true that Ichkerian politicians struggled to formulate coherent policies (Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010), but foreign policy and the work of Ichkeria's diplomats, particularly Akhmadov and Zakaev, was the arena where the sovereignty-seeking state was the most consistent, internally and across time. There were certainly exceptions, like a rogue outreach to the Taliban (Akhmadov & Lanskoj: 184-6). However, the Swiss diplomat's comment, in retrospect, comes across as reflecting a sincere naïveté. Diplomatic outreach is exogenously constrained, small states cannot force another country to listen to you, much less act as they would wish. And that is the fact of the matter: Chechnya was a very small emergent state, while Russia was the nuclear inheritor to a global superpower.

Ichkerian diplomatic pressure was unable to curb the brutal campaign of violence against it. This failure to undermine the force pillar was both exogenous and endogenous. Beyond the GIE's control, the September 11 attack launched the Global War on Terror, dramatically changing the international security environment and informational space. In the wake of the attack, Putin began to emphasize his portrayal of Russia's invasion of Chechnya as part of the GWoT (Akhmadov & Daniloff 2013: 187-94). As a result, the West, particularly the United States, all but gave Russia *carte blanche* in Chechnya. The GIE's violent resistance ultimately undermined its peaceful, diplomatic efforts. Several high-profile terror attacks—including the apartment bombings blamed on Chechen terrorists that precipitated the war—eroded the GIE's moral standing within the international community. These attacks included, most notably, the 2002 Dubrovka Theater crisis and the 2004 Beslan School massacre. On October 23, 2002, Chechen militants took roughly one thousand hostages in Moscow's Dubrovka Theater (Milyukov 2020: 153, Zakaev 2022: 89-99). The hostage-taking ended three days later when security services

stormed the building using an unknown narcotic gas, killing upwards of forty terrorists and hundreds of hostages. Zakaev questions the incident, reasoning that the FSB must have been involved to facilitate the transport of fifty armed militants from Chechnya to the Russian capital (Zakaev 2022: 92). While it is a good question, hardly anyone claims the terror attack was organized by the Kremlin. Ichkerian diplomatic efforts suffered as a result of the attack. Matters became even worse after Beslan (Milyukov 2020: 213-4, Zakaev 2022: 320-47). September 2004 began when a small group of Chechen and Ingush militants took over one thousand people, mostly children, hostage in Beslan School Number 1, holding them for three days. Russian forces besieged the school, eventually storming the building with a dangerously disproportionate amount of force, killing all but one of the militants and hundreds of the hostages, with hundreds more wounded. Putin's response to the crisis brought international condemnations for its heavy-handedness, but it ultimately did not change the circumstances. Ichkerian diplomats had to spend a disproportionate amount of their efforts condemning these terror attacks and denying Maskhadov's authorization of them, attempting to convince desired international partners that the GIE bore no culpability for the attacks (Akhmadov & Daniloff 2013: 235-6, Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010: 227, Zakaev 2022: 347). Their efforts were not particularly successful.

It is highly doubtful that the GIE's diplomatic activity ever dissuaded the Kremlin from supporting Akhmat Kadyrov, Alu Alkhanov, or Ramzan Kadyrov. Speaking frankly, and perhaps controversially, the mere existence of the Ichkerian GIE caused Moscow to double-down on its support for their installed rulers in Grozny. This is because, on the diplomatic front, Putin was portraying Russia's war against Chechnya as an internal Chechen matter, a civil war between pro-independence and pro-federal factions within the republic. This asserted perspective contrasts with the more accurate perspective on the war: that Putin was motivated by ambition and an imperial mindset toward Chechnya, while Akhmat Kadyrov was driven by a not-quite-known combination of factors: ambition, for control in Chechnya; greed, allegedly bribed by the FSB; fear, of how Wahhabi extremists were threatening Chechen nationalist ideals. This rhetorical framing of the conflict is the origin of the term "Chechenization," referring to how Moscow re-centered its conflict purely around Grozny (Akhmadov & Lanskoj 2010: 194). The West's acceptance of this framing further solidified Akhmat Kadyrov's standing as effective governors in Chechnya. This refusal to listen to the Ichkerian GIE on this matter also conveyed a

fundamental disregard for Ichkerian GIE's motivating grievances against genocides and occupation at the hands of Russia.

With respect to the Kadyrov regime's financial pillar, there were no real ways for the GIE to target them on the diplomatic front, nor did they attempt to.

Conclusion

The Ichkerian GIE's two-pronged strategy of resistance did not effectively undermine or degrade the Kadyrov regime's pillars of power. This was due to both endogenous and exogenous circumstances. The utilization of brutal violence, by extreme elements of the Ichkerian Armed Forces, ultimately hindered the peaceful diplomatic efforts, as it undermined the GIE's moral standing. The onset of the Global War on Terror further enabled the use of indiscriminate force against the Ichkerian struggle in Chechnya. This bolstered counterterror forces in Chechnya, empowering them to the point that the Ichkerian Armed Forces could not overcome them. These victories secured greater support from Moscow for the Kadyrov regime, which was succeeding at Putin's objective of retaking Chechnya. The onset of war stifled economic revenue in the region, particularly as Moscow bombed it to the point of Grozny being declared the "most destroyed city" (Harding 2008), but the war also funneled money to the Kadyrov regime to fight. As such, paradoxically, the Ichkerian GIE both undermined and strengthened the financial pillar.

Imarat Kavkaz

Imarat Kavkaz did away with the dual-fronted strategy. While certainly active in the international jihadi network, IK did not engage in diplomacy as the GIE did—nor would those same international actors that met with the GIE have engaged with IK had it attempted to conduct diplomatic missions. As such, amidst the growing strength of Kadyrov in Chechnya, the Chechen resistance during this period focused on warfare, embracing terrorist tactics. Suffice to say, terrorism is statistically one of the worst tactics to achieve a movement's aims, only succeeding seven percent of the time (Abrahms 2006). The operational difficulties faced by IK are apparent. According to data compiled by *Kavkazskii Uzel* from 2010 onward, the Chechen

insurgency was in decline from the time it transformed into IK (see Appendix A; for a detailed accounting of IK's activities through 2009, see Milyukov 2020, whose chronicle of the Second Chechen War ends with the abduction and murder of human rights defender Nataliya Estemirova). The number of victims in the republic plummeted from over 200 to 30 in only five years, with the most significant drop occurring from 2014 to 2015, in line with an exodus to Syria to join the Islamic State. Imarat Kavkaz's war failed, with the organization all but defeated.

IK's limiting of tactics exclusively to bellicose methods means that much of their effect on the Kadyrov regime's pillars essentially matched that of the GIE and has thus already been discussed. There was one main difference with respect to Kadyrov's force pillar. This is that Kadyrov's ascension in 2007 allowed him to rapidly eliminate his rival warlords in Chechnya, the Yamadaevs (Šmíd & Mareš 2015). The lack of other distractions enabled the Kadyrovs' personal army, the kadyrovtsy, to build up their power, meaning that IK was even more outmatched. The statistical decline is indicative of this fact. IK also failed to shift the effect the GIE had on the federal support pillar. In fact, that the Chechen resistance now truly resembled how Putin and Kadyrov had long been portraying them, i.e., as jihadi terrorists, just meant that support for Kadyrov was increased even more. The end of the federal counterterrorism operation in 2009 signaled not just that Moscow no longer considered IK in Chechnya a serious threat, but also that the federal authorities trusted Kadyrov enough to handle suppressing the remaining forces. IK's impact on the regime's financial pillar was more paradoxical, although it did not effectively change the situation. When IK operated with intent against the pillar, it failed; meanwhile, when it did nothing, quite literally, it undermined the pillar. Logically, a brutal war comprised of guerilla terrorist attacks by one side, and indiscriminate violence by the other, is not conducive to economic development, and thus the financial pillar of the Kadyrov regime. This, however, was not the case, as the Kadyrov regime funds did not, and continue to not, rely on local economy and taxes, but rather funding from the federal budget sent by Moscow (Holland 2016, Zabyelina & Arsovska 2013). As such, the relation between war and financing is governed by the inversion of this logic, with funds for operations against the terrorist threat growing with the intensity of war. In this way, the collapse of IK ironically undermined the Kadyrov regime's financial pillar, as federal subsidies, inflated for the counterterrorism operation, were reduced (Nikol'skaya et al. 2016, Vishnyakova & Tkachyov 2021).

That Imarat Kavkaz would restrict its tactics to warfare is logical. After all, it is not as if the Ichkerian GIE was successful in its diplomatic efforts. However, the movement did not understand that it was not an umbrella movement, like its predecessor. Instead, it relied on radicalization channels to fill its ranks. After so little success on the battlefield, it was not difficult for more appealing opportunities in Syria—or Ukraine for Ichkerian fighters who had not joined IK—to draw would-be fighters from the Chechen theater to their own. At the end of the day, IK was incredibly outmatched in the field, and without a diverse tactical repertoire from which to choose how to act, the insurgency collapsed.

The Lull

After the drop-off in Chechnya's armed insurgency, a lull in organized resistance ensued for several years before the emergence of IADAT. There were still some fighters still in Chechnya, but these were either lone wolves or leader-centric groups operating primarily beyond the operational purview of an umbrella organization such as IK or ISIS. This period, lasting approximately from IK's decline in March 2015 until IADAT's emergence in April 2020, has been generally overlooked in literature on Chechen resistance, a logical lacuna as resistance was not openly large-scale. This time span, however, is important as it was the formative period for IADAT, the idea for which was reportedly conceived towards the end of it. Deciphering what was occurring in Chechnya with respect to resistance during this time should help explain the emergence of a nonviolent movement. The absence of known organized resistance in Chechnya during this period does not mean that there was none, simply that the limitations of publicizing such information—due to both restrictions on informational channels and the risks posed to those that communicated such acts—precluded any disclosures. This makes the existence of resistance at this time unknowable. However, resistance theories and a retrospective point of view, knowing that IADAT would result from this lull, allow for the educated exploration of potential explanations of this period. The first proposed account takes a citizenry approach based in Scott's (1987, 1990) discussions of everyday resistance and the "hidden transcript." The second scenario follows Wilhelmsen's work on institutional constraints based in Moscow's governance policies toward the region (Wilhelmsen 2018).

In the first scenario, Chechen resistance did not manifest as a public, political action, but rather took place as “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups” (Scott 1987). Such resistance would not be widely known, and certainly not reported in media, instead occurring as part of the “hidden transcript” of private expression (Scott 1990). Some historical support for this idea is the Chechen public’s aid to rebels during the Ichkerian and Islamist conflicts against Russia (Lazarev 2019: 679, Souleimanov & Aliyev 2017). The idea behind such banal resistance is that it is difficult to detect by the authorities, with knowledge of it essentially limited to the one committing it. As such, these acts of resistance have a relative degree of safety to them, making them more likely for people in extremely oppressive societies, like Chechnya. Additionally, later activities of IADAT are similarly rooted in such resistance, which suggests that it may have originated during the Lull. As a key part of the movement’s operations is reporting kidnappings, torture, and murders carried out by the *kadyrovtsy*, sending a message to the group is itself an act of rebellion. While this action has a different, more obvious objective in IADAT’s opposition to the Kadyrov regime, its reliance on the public for its effectiveness indicates either (1) the optimism of the group’s members of drawing out latent dissatisfaction or (2) an awareness of already existing acts of everyday resistance, carried out a level of sufficient commonness to make channeling them into such an oppositional act possible.

Wilhelmsen (2018) posits that four policy spheres have created a temporary stability in the North Caucasus: force, economic development, political participation, and identification and belonging. The emphasis on the dominance of state institutions in repressing public dissatisfaction in the North Caucasus takes on a new extreme in the pervasively oppressive atmosphere of Chechnya. In this scenario, this sociopolitical climate stifled any everyday acts of resistance. Instead, the suppressive capabilities of the state created risks that far outweighed any perceived benefits from even this silent, less noticeable form of resistance. Chechen society resigned itself to its circumstances for the time being, going with the status quo until the system shifted.

In either scenario, any impact on the Kadyrov regime’s pillars would have been minimal. This period’s significance ultimately lies in the fact that served as a regenerative vacuum in which a new generation of resistance actors could emerge.

During “The Lull,” organized resistance dissipated, transitioning to a loose network of civil society activists. It also corresponded to a shift in the conceptualization of resistance, with a greater focus on nonviolent human rights defending, rather than violent warfare. The exodus and quietening of IK and other militant organizations led to the emergence of civil society actors as the dominant actors in modern Chechen resistance, in line with the public suffocation of the insurgency. The shift in dominant actors encouraged the development of civil society’s revelatory subversion strategy. The relative quiet and individualistic nature of this period also created an organizational vacuum and allowed for a simpler tactical reset of resistance, as there was substantially no ongoing armed resistance to be compared too. The simultaneous corresponding work of activists as civil society actors further lent direction to the future of Chechen resistance, with 1ADAT as a kind of standard-bearer for the generation of resistance.

The prominent voices from this emergent generation were, and are, Tumso Abdurakhmanov and Ibragim Yangulbaev. Tumso has been an active video blogger since 2013, although he did not gain a larger audience until a few years later (Kavkazskii Uzel 2023a). His videos sought to expose how the Kadyrov regime functioned, and quickly caught the authorities’ attention, even holding debates with them on his YouTube channels. In 2019, the opposition blogger made comments about Akhmat Kadyrov that went too far in the eyes of the regime. Tumso was subsequently threatened with a blood feud by Speaker of Parliament Magomed Daudov and forced to seek asylum in Europe. Yangulbaev at this time was operating an opposition group known as Wolves Creed—this would later serve as the inspiration for 1ADAT (RIA-FAN 2021, Milashina 2022a). He was tortured for refusing to divulge the group’s information (Komanda Protiv Pytok 2020). After this incident, in 2019, Elena Milashina helped him leave Russia (Milashina 2022a). After his escape, he began to plan the creation of 1ADAT.

The dearth of evidence surrounding resistance in this period, and the impossibility of attempting to collect it, especially due to its individualistic nature, means that no conclusion can be drawn. In either case, any resistance is, in all reasonability, occurring at an individualistic level, with instances taking place unconnected from each other. Even the actions of those activists and dissidents who were vocal were as yet uncoordinated in their efforts. This changed toward the

end of the period, as more and more opposition members were forced into the diaspora for their safety. They gradually formed a geographically broad oppositional network, in which 1ADAT is included, although the truly active coordination of the network did not occur until later, stemming from Kadyrov's renewed war on dissidents in the 2021-2022 winter, and even more so following Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

1ADAT

The most recently dominant iteration of modern Chechen resistance, in this study, it contrasts starkly with the insurgencies of the past, instead utilizing what can be described as revelatory subversion. They have worked to shine light on a notoriously opaque regime. The logic behind revelatory subversion is essentially that regimes perpetrating extreme violence and committing such heinous crimes rely on operating in the dark, that they require opacity and a combination of both general fear and lack of knowledge in order to maintain their ability to operate. With this in mind, one of the most significant ways to threaten such actors is to create a degree of transparency, to move their actions from the dark to the light. Revealing information concerning these operations also informs the general public where free press is otherwise limited to the extreme, if not absent entirely. Not only does this manner of resistance undermine the regime by informing the public, but it also brings international attention to their actions, which can in turn constrain their operational capabilities. Such a tactic as revelatory subversion has the potential to considerably help or hinder the movement, depending on the sincerity of their actions.

A predominantly facilitatory tactic, in that it aids the movement in its own mission, 1ADAT has attempted to embolden the public to take action, no matter how small, against the Kadyrov regime. The logic behind these small actions is to be the first domino to fall, to break the regime's façade. Havel's greengrocer exemplifies this thinking under extreme authoritarianism (Havel 1978). Such demonstrations include photos and videos from activists in Chechnya, messages from residents, and renaming streets. 1ADAT's activists have appeared in and around Grozny, everywhere from the city's gates to the central square (1ADAT 2021d, 1ADAT 2021f, Aktivist Adata 2021d, 1ADAT 2021h). They frequently show papers with the 1ADAT logo and the phrase "Death to the Kadyrovite traitors!" Such demonstrations have increased in frequency

since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Another aspect of breaking through the oppressive atmosphere, demonstrating to the public that there are people prepared to resist, is by regularly posting messages from residents of Chechnya, mostly students. These communiqués vary in content, but generally express anti-regime sentiments. 1ADAT's actions renaming streets have taken place in Grozny and around the North Caucasus (Aktivist Adata 2021a, Aktivist Adata 2021c). This tactic is meant to erase how the regime has honored individuals who fought against the Chechens, such as General Gennady Troshev and Akhmat Kadyrov, changing the names to memorialize heroes of Chechen independence, like Dzhokhar Dudaev and Khamzat Gelaev. There have also been two outlying demonstrations, unique in their style. They are also more provocative. First, a few young Chechens throw an Akhmat Fight Club sweatshirt on the ground, stomping on it and kicking dirt on it, before finally setting it ablaze (1ADAT 2021e). This is rare evidence that anti-Kadyrov sentiments are not isolated. It is also a dramatic show of hatred toward the regime, burning one of the regime's most common symbols—the Akhmat Fight Club is a central pet project for Ramzan (Zidan 2022, 2023b). The second act was even more bold. An 1ADAT activist went into a public restroom in Grozny and wrote “Toilet named for Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov” (1ADAT 2021b). This openly mocks Ramzan's penchant for naming everything in the republic after his father. It also heavily implies what the author thinks about the regime. Written in a public place, it is likely to have been seen by others, further embarrassing the regime. It is unknowable whether these acts are carried out by a single activist or an actual network.

It must be noted up front, however, that the reliability of such demonstrations cannot always be trusted. In a post on November 17, 2022, 1ADAT shared a photo purportedly depicting a supporter demonstrating in front of the Akhmat Kadyrov Memorial in Grozny's Neftyanka Park. In an attempt to geolocate the photo, this author instead discovered that the photograph of an alleged act of resistance by one of their supporters in Chechnya matches the Google Maps Street View panorama of the same location, down to the lit windows in the background apartment complex (1ADAT 2022f, Usmaev 2022). The panorama, not uploaded to Yandex Maps, is from nine months earlier and posted by a user with a potentially authentic name, which a Chechen protestor is simply unlikely to do because of the risk of data exposure. This suggests 1ADAT's photo was likely digitally altered, and does not, in fact, depict an act of resistance. This is the one

act the author has fact-checked, or that has apparently been verified by media outlets. As such, it may be an outlier of apparent falsehood, but this is difficult to truly evaluate. It also does not speak to the effect such an incident can have on the general public, as the seeming fabrication of this demonstration has not been previously reported, and would still be an exception amidst other acts of resistance.

Despite primarily being a facilitatory tactic, emboldening the public also addresses the Kadyrov regime's pillars. First, it confronts the pillar of force. Public acts of resistance, flying in the face of strict societal security measures, prove the kadyrovtsy are not all-capable and cannot attack everyone in Chechnya. Such demonstrations, no matter how small, gradually erode the belief that any demonstration of opposition will be repressed. Second, it undermines federal support for Kadyrov. The entire basis for the Kremlin's support for Ramzan is that he maintains stability. Putin's legitimacy is founded on the reintegration of Chechnya into the Russian Federation. If the Chechen public indicates that, after twenty-five years of Putin's rule, it has neither truly integrated into Russian rule nor even accepted it, then Putin has failed at his primary objective and appeal for electing him as Russia's president. In other words, Kadyrov would have failed to have adequately served Putin and should thus face declining support from the highest officials in Moscow. With respect to the third and final pillar, a.k.a. the financial one, the tactic of emboldening Chechen society might actually backfire. Fearing that Chechnya's stability is growing ever more fragile, the Kremlin could continue, or even increase, its significant federal subsidies to the republic. In fact, while some in Moscow have been on a crusade to slash the federal budget, particularly with respect to subsidizing the North Caucasus republics, Kadyrov has managed to maintain his level of Kremlin-dictated subsidies, even if it is less than during the counterterrorism operation (Fuller 2016, Kommersant 2018, Mogilevskaya 2017, Nikol'skaya et al. 2016, Vishnyakova & Tkachyov 2021). Meanwhile, there is limited potential for a Chechen society increasingly resolved to stand against the Kadyrov regime to hinder the regime's financial pillar. The most they could do is in line with the teachings of James C. Scott (1987, 1990) and Henry David Thoreau (1849), of small actions of resistance, such as poaching (so to speak, for a modern equivalent, simply confiscating or denying the expropriation of resources) and the general withholding of taxes, either official taxes or forced tithes to fill the regime's coffers, which is a common occurrence. There is no way to gather data on this, however,

considering previously noted proclivities for resistance amongst the republic's residents—such as harboring regime-declared terrorists (Souleimanov & Aliyev 2017)—it bears mentioning not just for its potential of currently occurring, but because prompting such actions is surely an unstated goal of IADAT. So, while there is a real potential for minor, everyday resistance to have been eroding the Kadyrov regime's financial pillar in small increments, there is probably a greater chance that the spreading of anti-regime sentiments strengthens the federal government's resolve to financially and otherwise support the Kadyrov administration.

The Kadyrov regime's force pillar is targeted by IADAT utilizing revelatory subversion, exposing the operations and crimes committed by the kadyrovtsy. One of the most significant contributions made by IADAT is its reporting of data on victims of the Kadyrov regime's security services, both those abducted (*pokhishchen*) and murdered (*ubit*) (see Appendix C). Providing this data is an innovative way of attempting to combat the Kadyrov regime's force pillar. Prior to IADAT, data on abductions and murders by the kadyrovtsy was rare, and certainly not in any way a systematic recording. There are of course flaws in IADAT's methodology, relying on tips from relatives and an enormous amount of trust of the movement's integrity and reliability. But much of their data tracks with other public reportings—particularly since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. When the movement reports new statistics from the previous month, it typically includes a standard disclaimer like the following statement, which is frequently used: “We remind you that our statistics are much lower than the real data and reflects just known-to-us verifiable information” (e.g., IADAT 2023b). IADAT, in its roundups for the previous month, only provides numbers and names of victims; throughout the month, however, the opposition movement typically reports more details on the security services' operations as they occur, including date, location, and circumstances of the abduction or murder. While the opposition movement has not directly eliminated members of the kadyrovtsy, like the Ichkerian GIE and IK did, it has clearly curtailed the Kadyrov regime's use of force.

Perhaps best conveying IADAT's reasoning for reporting such data is this statement that often accompanies their data reports: “We remind the relatives and acquaintances of the abducted that silence just helps the Kadyrovite viceroys of the occupiers to continue the genocide of our people” (Ibid). The kadyrovtsy have been used to working in almost exclusive opacity, with only

their operations outside of Chechnya being exposable and, even then, typically by federal security services alone—like in the cases of Anna Politkovskaya and Boris Nemtsov’s assassinations, wherein federal investigators stopped just short of identifying the Grozny-based organizers of the attacks (Luhn 2017). On the other hand, the kadyrovtsy are ostentatious in their external operations when they wish to be identified, like with the assassination of Sulim Yamadaev in Dubai, where the assassins left behind the very recognizable gold-plated pistol of Adam Delimkhanov as a message to others who might oppose Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule (Abbas 2009). However, now, because IADAT reports statistics and murders, victims that would otherwise remain unknown are publicized. This makes them, to a certain degree, trackable, enabling the potential to hold the regime to account. A paradigm of how such abductions worked in the pre-IADAT era is the anti-LGBTQ+ purges in Chechnya in 2017, coverage of which was delayed (Goridenko & Milashina 2017), compared to IADAT’s real-time exposure. This is in no way meant to demean journalists’ work, simply indicate the different levels of access and capabilities between actors. Abductions gradually dropped as IADAT’s prominence grew and the movement became more popular (Appendix C). This reveals how revelatory subversion can be effective, especially under oppressive authoritarian rule. IADAT’s detailings of abductions correlated to a decrease in such actions by the kadyrovtsy. Curtailing the activities of the kadyrovtsy by exposing the crimes they are conducting has seemingly been effective. Human rights activists have hailed IADAT’s strategy as an “effective means of helping the abducted in Chechnya” (Kavkazskii Uzel 2023b). Thus, a strategy of revelatory subversion has seemingly proved more successful in chipping away at the Kadyrov regime’s pillar of force than the more directly confrontation choice of warfare against the security services.

The Chechen resistance movement has challenged the regime’s federal support pillar in two ways: (1) attempting to raise the cost for the Kremlin to maintain its support of Kadyrov and (2) show that the regime in Grozny has not truly fulfilled Putin’s policy objectives in Chechnya. IADAT’s exposure of the kadyrovtsy’s brutality seeks to make it more difficult for Moscow to maintain its support for the Chechen warlord, bringing some transparency to his otherwise opaque operations. However, this is not particularly effective against this pillar, for a number of reasons. First, it assumes the Kremlin cares about violent oppression. Second, this perspective on revelatory subversion relies on non-authoritarian levers of accountability and a political system

that responds to pressures from the populace (for example, the concept of “accountability sabotage” explained in Glasius 2023; see also Fox 2007). Third, it assumes that the Russian government, and the country generally, is not extremely prejudiced against Chechens, and thus apathetic towards how they are treated. On the contrary, 1ADAT’s attempt to subvert federal support for the Kadyrov regime has had the opposite effect, with Putin rallying behind the Chechen governor. This reactive support has manifested in the labeling of 1ADAT as extremist and its known leaders as terrorists (Kavkaz.Realii 2022b, Kavkazskii Uzel 2022e), meaning they are banned from being active on Russian territory, and Evgeny Prigozhin’s (ex-)media RIA-FAN published a surprisingly accurate article exposing the identities of 1ADAT’s leaders (RIA-FAN 2021). With respect to policy failures, which are discussed below, it is unclear why 1ADAT’s efforts have not provoked a response from the federal authorities, but there is no supporting evidence for any potential explanations.

1ADAT has truly only attacked the Kadyrov regime’s financial pillar in an indirect manner. The primary example of this was when 1ADAT essentially replicated a tactic utilized by the Black Panther Party (BPP)—not to imply that the Chechen opposition movement was necessarily aware of the BPP’s success—of providing aid to their community, thus undermining the authorities. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the BPP provided free breakfasts for schoolchildren, forcing the federal government to begin providing this service across the region (Abron 1986, Pope & Flanigan 2013). In a similar fashion, 1ADAT raised funds to then buy foodstuffs and other essential goods (1ADAT 2021i). They helped ordinary people, contrasting with how the Kadyrov regime has only helped itself. The almost immediate success of this tactic was evident in the regime’s response. Different members of the administration engaged in a publicized campaign to provide families with foodstuffs and other essential goods, basically mirroring 1ADAT’s actions (1ADAT 2021j). This community aid tactic undermined the moral authority of the Kadyrov regime’s financial pillar. However, the resistance movement has failed to confront this pillar of the regime more directly—compare its actions to the exposés of *Vazhnye Istorii* and *Proekt* (Proekt 2021, Rubin et al. 2022, Vazhnye Istorii 2021, Zholobova et al 2020), which have not just revealed the extent of Kadyrov’s opulence at home, but his funding methods for pet projects. Western companies working for the Kadyrov regime are known, with at least one publicly promoting its work for the regime on the company website (Adrian Smith +

Gordon Gill Architecture, OCCRP 2017, Omnia Arhing). Despite this golden opportunity, there has been nary a pressure campaign from IADAT for these companies to end their cooperation with the current government in Chechnya. This example is a paradigm of IADAT's broader struggle to actively challenge and degrade the Kadyrov regime's financial pillar of power.

One episode deserves to be discussed on its own, both due to its significance and because it undermines all three pillars. On December 10, 2021, dozens of women walked out of Grozny's Berkat Market in a protest against the rising cost of renting a stall (Chambers 2022a). This was a rare public protest, occurring in the heart of the Chechen capital. The seemingly spontaneous protest was in open defiance of the fearful climate that the kadyrovtsy have cultivated. It also highlighted how the entire economic development of Chechnya is merely a sham, a glass-tower-giant-mosque façade that does not extend to regular citizens. As the Kadyrov regime has prioritized pet projects and opulent mansions over creating true economic stability in Chechnya, Ramzan has failed to fulfill Putin's policy demands of stabilizing the republic. In Chechnya, and the North Caucasus at-large, socioeconomic insecurity and heavy-handed repression have the potential to push people toward radicalization and violence (Chambers 2021, Markedonov 2010, Sagramoso & Yarlykapov 2020a: 276-84, Shterin & Yalykapov 2011). From the Kadyrov regime's perspective, it is not as if achieving such economic development for the region's residents, while still extravagantly enriching the elite, is impossible. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which Kadyrov has blatantly used for architectural inspiration, are both examples of such cases, instead relying on the exploitation of migrant workers coming from poorer countries (Human Rights Watch 2022, Robinson 2022). As such, the Berkat Market protest significantly undermines all of the Kadyrov regime's pillars. Now, what role did IADAT play in this? News of the protest only became public because videos were sent to the opposition movement, which then republished them on its Telegram channel (Aktivist Adata 2021e). The protest itself challenged the regime, but it was relatively confined to eyewitnesses and those they told, which would have likely been limited due to the potential for violent repercussions against those spreading the word and their relatives. Accordingly, IADAT's broadcasting of the protest alerted the world of its occurrence, increasing the effects of the protest—and the embarrassment to Kadyrov.

To conclude, 1ADAT has struggled to rebuild a resistance network out of the dearth in the preceding period. The opposition movement has heavily focused on the facilitatory objective of building momentum and embolden the public, which coincidentally undermine the regime's pillars. It has utilized revelatory subversion to oppose Grozny's force pillar, exposing their violent operations and crimes. 1ADAT has attempted to undermine federal support for the Kadyrov regime by raising the cost for support and demonstrating that the regime has failed to fulfill its policy obligations to Moscow. This is primarily evident in how 1ADAT has shown the regime's financial pillar to only support the regime and fail to create stability through economic development in the republic. Their reporting on the 2021 Berkhat Market protest emphasizes how the movement can amplify any attacks on the regime's pillars.

Conclusion

Over the past twenty-five years and across three dominant iterations, the tactics of the modern Chechen resistance have evolved substantially. This is most evident in the shift away from violence in the form of an armed insurgency toward the nonviolence of revelatory subversion utilized by a new generation of human rights defenders. Chechen resistance evolved to more effectively confront the Kadyrov regime's pillars. The Ichkerian government-in-exile, using a strategy of both violence and nonviolence, confronted the three pillars in more direct ways. Mostly exogenous factors, however, caused the pillars to be strengthened, not eroded. Imeret Kavkaz focused exclusively on violent methods, meaning it found itself waging an increasingly asymmetric war, leading to its decline. A lull of several years created the opportunity for a tactical reset, with a diffusion of resistance activity across a loose network of human rights defenders emerging in the lack of organized resistance. This then manifested in the creation of the opposition movement 1ADAT, which has sought to undermine the Kadyrov regime's pillars by bringing transparency to their otherwise opaque operations. 1ADAT has seen success in some areas, like lowering the number of kidnappings, but has proven less effective against the federal support and financial pillars. To a certain degree, this metamorphosis with respect to the method of confrontation (i.e., insurgency versus revelatory subversion) can be explained by factors other than tactical efficiency. Other potentially motivating drivers of this evolution include ideology

(jihadism versus human rights protectors), systemic constraints (repression), and resource availability (fighting capable bodies and arms). Systemic constraints, as illustrated above, are connected more directly to tactical effectiveness than ideology, so it is less of an alternative explanatory factor, as it is more intrinsically related.

One limitation of this study cannot truly be attributed to the study itself, but rather to one of the sub-cases. There is an inherent dilemma with revelatory subversion, with opposition movements that position themselves as civil society actors. This inherent problem is that, while civil society organizations engaging in revelatory subversion are ideally aiming to spread the truth, opposition groups battling untrustworthy, opaque regimes are not necessarily constrained by such rules. For the latter, spreading embarrassing lies can be worth more than the truth, particularly if it can gain traction amongst the populace. This potentially enticing strategic path has proven a vulnerability with many factions of the Chechen opposition, which are politicking amongst themselves in addition to being engaged in a deadly, long-distance war with Kadyrov. Directly concerning this study, representatives of IADAT were accused by *Novaya Gazeta* Chechnya-watcher Elena Milashina of participating in such a lie, falsely confirming rumors of activist Tumso Abdurakhmanov's death, while reportedly accepting money from the Kadyrov regime for doing so (Milashina 2023b). As mentioned above, the author also established that IADAT seemingly faked a demonstration at Neftyanika Park in the center of Grozny. That the movement is so vulnerable to such claims by the esteemed journalist—who helped these same members escape Russia, no less—and that it also appears to have fabricated some of its purported actions sabotages the trustworthiness of its other work, such as reporting data on victims of the kadyrovtsy. This dilemma, attributable to the sometimes-conflicting missions of civil society organizations and opposition movements, is one that has not yet been appropriately confronted by journalists, researchers, or academics.

Another limitation of this study is its abstaining from addressing the subtle differences between labeling secondary and facilitatory tactics. For example, IADAT working to build its momentum, growing its membership and audience, is an objective that increases its operational capacity, thus making it facilitatory. Emboldening the public in such a way, however, also undermines the force pillar by cutting through the atmosphere of oppression and fear. How to

account for the duality of such actions, the author does not currently know. This is a dynamic to explore in future studies.

Perhaps the biggest limitation of this study, simply put, is its chronological scope. As it was necessary to select an endpoint for analysis, the declared end of the first operational phase of IADAT was logical. However, this endpoint precedes two significant developments for Chechen resistance. The first development is the troubles that have befallen IADAT, as internal fractures led to since-deleted leadership drama amidst a seeming conflict for control and the emergence of a splinter movement amidst the fallout, “Niyso” (NIYSO 2022a, NIYSO 2023a, Security Turkey 2023). Similar fractures exist amongst the resistance’s political elite who have organized military units fighting in Ukraine (Chambers 2023c). These events highlight the struggle to form a united front for resistance, a problem that has plagued the Chechen cause for decades. The second, and more momentous, development is Russia’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This event drastically reinvigorated the Chechen resistance, signaling an abrupt end to the previous era as hot conflict with Russia resumed in what Chechen fighters consider the first step to reclaiming Chechnya (Chambers 2023a, Chambers 2023c, Hauer 2022a, Hauer 2022b, Mikhal’chenko 2022). The 2022 war further provides the clearest direction for future studies, as it has fundamentally changed Chechen resistance not just outside Chechnya, but within the region as well. This resurgence provokes not just the examination of its reinvigoration, but of the abundant axes upon which the resistance has expanded: diplomacy, violence, political engagement, etc.

Due to the full-scale invasion’s importance, it is worth ending with a few quick words on how it has affected the Chechen resistance. The resurgence in the decadelong war in Ukraine has proven a major inflection point on Chechen resistance, shifting not just the resistance’s prevailing organizational structures, but its form as well. Resistance both violent and peaceful have grown, as the status quo inside Chechnya changed for the first time in approximately a decade (Chambers 2023a). Chechnya’s brittle peace under Kadyrov appears to have begun to break. Women protested in the heart of Grozny, while others laughed at kadyrovtsy fighting amongst themselves in Urus-Martan. Militants have targeted law enforcement posts in a pair of attacks in the hearts of Grozny and Gudermes. Beyond Chechnya’s borders, diaspora members

have flocked to Ukraine in droves, rapidly swelling the ranks of Chechen volunteer contingents—commanders report having to turn away many who seek to fight (Mikhal’chenko 2022). Also originating in Ukraine, the Chechen independence struggle has achieved several major victories on the diplomatic front, securing support they were unable to garner over two decades ago. Ukraine has recognized the First and Second Chechen Wars as genocides committed by Russia against the Chechen people, as well as Chechnya’s status as occupied (Interfax-Ukraine 2023, Verkhovna Rada 2023, Zelenskyy 2023). Senior officials in Poland have also conveyed very sympathetic positions on these issues (Kavkaz.Realii 2023b, Novyi Dosh 2023). Leading Chechen opposition figures have engaged, often at the invitation of Ukrainian and Polish politicians, at the highest diplomatic levels in Europe, at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament (Bart Nizam Marsho CHRI 2023, Ichkeria News 2023, Kavkaz.Realii 2023a, Suleimanov 2023a). Some members are attempting to gain access to the United Nations to advocate for Chechen rights (Suleimanov 2023b). In this ongoing iteration of modern Chechen resistance, the remnants of the Ichkerian GIE and IK have combined forces to fight in Ukraine, while the GIE and other actors stemming from the new generation of activists engage in diplomacy abroad. IADAT and similar movements also continue their work of revelatory subversion. Essentially, all of the iterations have combined their efforts, albeit geographically cut off from Chechnya.

In line with this study’s conclusion that the increasing repressive capacity of the Kadyrov regime helped dampen violent resistance, pushing modern Chechen resistance toward a nonviolent strategy, the reopening, or perhaps broadening, of an opportunity for violent resistance provoked a return of just that, war—albeit a proxy one in this case. This complicates the above findings, although it certainly does not negate them. The renewed opportunity for Chechens to fight against Russia in Ukraine dramatically reshaped the contours of resistance, raising the profiles of multiple factions while placing violence and non-violence on more even standing as the resistance strategy of choice. This change in the dynamics builds upon the arguments of this thesis, albeit in a slightly direction—one less tactically based, more heavily emphasizing external influences (e.g., systemic constraints) on resistance’s capability for violence. Of course, systemic constraints and tactical decisions do not exist in distinct environments; the former can bring about changes in the latter due to the ineffectiveness of some tactics. In Chechnya, increasingly

oppressive conditions clamped down on violent resistance in favor of more pacific acts, but the reopening of the metaphorical window commenced a return to such action. As such, nonviolence appears more a reaction to circumstance, in this case, than a deliberate, voluntary choice.

Regardless, the modern Chechen resistance is dynamic, and one to be closely observed over the coming years, as it works to return its fight to the homeland.

Appendices

Appendix A: Victims of Armed Conflict in Chechnya, 2010-2023 H1 (*Kavkazskii Uzel*, “*Severnyi Kavkaz – statistika zhertv*”)



2010: 250

2011: 201

2012: 174

2013: 101

2014: 117

2015: 30

2016: 43

2017: 75

2018: 35

2019: 10

2020: 19

2021: 12


2022: 2

2023: 2

Appendix B: IADAT imagery




Coat of Arms: The wolf (IADAT) calls the other wolves (all Chechens) to unite against Kadyrov. The 9 tukkhum stars and towers are both meant to evoke “Chechens’ history,” particularly the traditional elements of this history. The towers also move the history of resistance to the forefront of Chechen history. This logo originates from Yangulbaev’s previous group “Wolves Creed.” (IADAT 2020b).



Tukkhum star: 9 points for 9 tukkhums, 1 line to unite them all. (IADAT 2020c).




Flag: Black for the fight against dictatorship, white for freedom, red for the dictatorship's victims. Despite stated reasons, seems to also be a play on the Islamic black flag with a Chechen motif, as the stripe comes from the current Chechen flag. The Islamic nature is further played up with the shahada star version. (IADAT 2020d).



Shahada star: 9 points for 9 tukkhums, the shahada centers Chechen identity on Islam/labels Islam as a means to unify the tukkhums. (IADAT).

1ADAT views the central tenet of its mission to be uniting the Chechen people. The simultaneous incorporation of both traditional Chechen and Islamic values symbolically—the shahada star uses both the traditional symbolism of the tukkhums, a social system frequently considered to be contemporarily defunct, and of the shahada, the core pillar of Islam—indicates the current state of Chechen nationalism/identity, particularly among the youth.

Appendix C: Kadyrov regime victims, April 2020-June 2023 (compiled from 1ADAT “Statistika”)





Abductions, Murders

Apr-20: 640, 0

May-20: 537, 0

Jun-20: 30, 0

Jul-20: 35, 0

Aug-20: 144, 1

Sep-20: 53, 2

Oct-20: 72, 3

Nov-20: 132, 3

Dec-20: 113, 3

Jan-21: 41, 0

Feb-21: 42, 0

Mar-21: 24, 0

Apr-21: 47, 0

May-21: 21, 0

Jun-21: 116, 0

Jul-21: 73, 0

Aug-21: 23, 0

Sep-21: 71, 0

Oct-21: 32, 0
Nov-21: 57, 0
Dec-21: 74, 1
Jan-22: 26, 0
Feb-22: 53, 0
Mar-22: 27, 0
Apr-22: 26, 0
May-22: 274, 2
Jun-22: 24, 0
Jul-22: 17, 0
Aug-22: 21, 0
Sep-22: 407, 1
Oct-22: 31, 0
Nov-22: 46, 1
Dec-22: 12, 0
Jan-23: 27, 0
Feb-23: 11, 0
Mar-23: 21, 2
Apr-23: 83, 0
May-23: 23, 0
Jun-23: 11, 0

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