



Jagiellonian University in Kraków
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Institute of European Studies

Thapanee Tubnonghee

student ID number: 1169481

Field of Study: European Studies

Visegrád Countries' Engagement in ASEAN from 2011 and Their Prospect in the Region: The Cases of Hungary and Poland

Magister (MA) Thesis

Thesis written under the supervision of

Dr. Grzegorz Pożarlik

4 September 2020

Krakow, Poland

Word count: 24535

Written under secondary supervision of:

Dr. Huseyn Aliyev (University of Glasgow)

University of Glasgow Student ID (GUID): 2408918

International Master (IntM) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies

University of Glasgow, UK

Master of Arts in Social Sciences (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies

University of Tartu, Estonia

Magister (mgr) of European Studies (Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies)

Jagiellonian University, Poland

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

.....*Thapanee.*.....

(Thapanee Tubnonghee)

The defence will take place on Microsoft Teams / date / at / time /
..... / address / in auditorium number / number /

Opponent / name / (..... / academic degree /),
..... / position /

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Thapanee Tubnonghee,

1. herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to reproduce, for the purpose of preservation and making thesis public, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright, my thesis entitled **“Visegrád Countries’ Engagement in ASEAN from 2011 and Their Prospect in the Region: The Cases of Hungary and Poland”** supervised by Dr. Grzegorz Pożarlik and Dr. Huseyn Aliyev.

2. I grant the University of Tartu a permit to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives, until the expiry of the term of copyright.

3. I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in pp. 1 and 2.

4. I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons’ intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Done at Tartu on 4 September 2020

Thapanee.

(Thapanee Tubnonghee)

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the memories of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Suthachai Yimprasert (1956-2017), who inspired me to explore the history of Central and Eastern Europe during Bachelor's studies, and Ms. Apiwan Laiggla (1991-2019), who departed to the better world before I could show her more beauty of this region.

Acknowledgements

Throughout the long process of dissertation writing, I have received a great deal of guidance and assistance. First and foremost, I would like to express my very great appreciation to both of my supervisors, Dr. Grzegorz Pozarlik and Dr. Huseyn Aliyev, for their optimism, Polish translation, constructive feedbacks and useful critiques of this dissertation.

It is a pleasure to thank my IMCEERES cohort of 2018-2020 for valuable friendship, thought-provoking discussions and kind support throughout the two-year journey, especially during these unprecedented times. I express my heartfelt thanks to all administrative staff and professors from three partner universities in Tartu, Glasgow and Kraków. I would particularly like to thank the European Union's Erasmus+ program for generous financial contributions.

My thanks are extended to my professor from my alma mater, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Verita Sriratana, who supported the development of such niche research topic, as well as my ex-colleagues at the Embassy of Hungary in Bangkok, especially Dr. Péter Jakab, Ms. Réka Bencsik and Ms. Ildikó Major, where my interests in Central European politics grew stronger.

I am grateful the opportunity to participate in the AFS Intercultural Programs as a high school exchange student in Kiskunhalas, Hungary in the academic year 2010/2011. A year in Hungary has changed my life entirely. I developed a deep passion in Hungarian language and culture, as well as friendship with local Hungarians and exchange students around the world.

I greatly appreciate my family and friends for their continuous reinforcement across the continent. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions from Ms. Pichaya Prachathomrong, Mr. Possapon Charoenporn, and Ms. Diána Balla Muszkáné. My special thanks go to my parents for their unconditional love and support for my higher studies.

Finally, I owe my sincerest gratitude to Mr. Zsolt Nótári for his unparalleled affection, care and moral support through difficult times. I am forever indebted for his help in Hungarian translation, deep understanding, endless patience and enthusiastic encouragement when it was most required. This wonderful passage would not have been possible if not for him. Therefore, I dedicate this memorable milestone to both of us.

Visegrád Countries' Engagement in ASEAN from 2011 and Their Prospect in the Region: The Cases of Hungary and Poland

Abstract: Hungary and Poland have addressed Asia-Pacific countries in their foreign policy strategy since the early 2000s. However, the European financial crisis in 2008 and the wave of Euroscepticism have influenced both countries to seek alliances outside their traditional European trade partners. One of their potential partners in the Asia-Pacific is ASEAN, due to its economic and political importance in the region. As EU members, Hungary and Poland have to pursue their engagement with ASEAN with both the national foreign policy strategy based on their domestic interests and under the EU foreign and security policy. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the foreign policy strategy of Hungarian and Polish governments and their achievements in ASEAN from 2011. The findings from national and EU foreign policy analyses reveal that the achievement of both countries in ASEAN is minimal. The reasons are that ASEAN receives low priority to both countries' foreign policy, and both countries lack sufficient understanding of the region. This results in vague national policy direction and modest economic and political engagement. On the other hand, the EU foreign policy strategy includes ASEAN as a strategic partner and engages with it more intensively as a bloc. The Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and Vietnam are among the important milestones of the EU external relations, in which Hungary and Poland shall rely on and show more effective support to increase their visibility in ASEAN.

Keywords: ASEAN, ASEAN-EU, Hungarian foreign policy, Polish foreign policy

Zaangażowanie międzynarodowe krajów Grupy Wyszehradzkiej w ASEAN od 2011 roku i ich perspektywy w regionie: Węgry i Polska

Streszczenie: Region Azji i Pacyfiku jest obecny w polskiej i węgierskiej strategii polityki zagranicznej od początku XXI wieku. Jednak europejski kryzys finansowy 2008 r. i fala eurosceptycyzmu skłoniły oba kraje do poszukiwania sojuszy poza swoimi tradycyjnymi europejskimi partnerami handlowymi. Jednym z ich potencjalnych partnerów w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku jest ASEAN ze względu na jego znaczenie gospodarcze i polityczne w regionie. Jako członkowie UE, Węgry i Polska muszą współpracować z ASEAN zarówno w zakresie krajowej strategii polityki zagranicznej, opartej na ich interesach wewnętrznych, jak i w ramach polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa UE. Celem tej pracy magisterskiej jest wyjaśnienie strategii polityki zagranicznej rządów Węgry i Polski oraz ich osiągnięć w ASEAN od 2011 roku. Z ustaleń wynika, że osiągnięcia obu krajów w ASEAN są niewielkie. Powodem jest to, że ASEAN otrzymuje niski priorytet w strategii polityki zagranicznej obu krajów, a oba kraje nie mają wystarczającego rozeznania specyfiki regionu. Skutkuje to niejasnym kierunkiem polityki krajowej i niewielkim zaangażowaniem gospodarczym i politycznym. Z drugiej strony strategia polityki zagranicznej UE traktuje ASEAN jako partnera strategicznego i intensywniej angażuje się w nią jako blok. Umowy o wolnym handlu z Singapurem i Wietnamem należą do ważnych kamieni milowych w stosunkach zewnętrznych UE, w których Węgry i Polska muszą polegać i okazywać skuteczniejsze wsparcie, aby zwiększyć swoją widoczność w ASEAN.

Słowa kluczowe: ASEAN, ASEAN-EU, węgierska polityka zagraniczna, polska polityka zagraniczna

Table of Content

Table of Abbreviations	1
Chapter 1	2
Introduction	2
Research Question, Objectives, and Hypothesis	5
Research Methodology.....	6
Research Scope	7
Limitations	7
Chapter 2	9
Conceptual Framework	9
Small and Middle-Sized States.....	9
Foreign Policy Making Process.....	11
Concept of Interregionalism	13
Conceptualization of the Boundaries of Asia in This Research	14
Literature review.....	15
Relations between the EU and ASEAN	16
Chapter 3: Hungarian Engagement in ASEAN.....	34
Hungarian Foreign Policy in Asia-Pacific after EU accession in 2004.....	34
Hungarian Foreign Policy in ASEAN from 2011	43
Political Dimension of Hungarian-ASEAN Relations	46
Economic Dimension of Hungarian-ASEAN Relations	49
Development Dimension of Hungarian-ASEAN Relations	52
Chapter 4: Polish Engagement in ASEAN	58
Polish Foreign Policy in Asia-Pacific after EU accession in 2004	58

Polish Foreign Policy in ASEAN from 2011	62
Political Dimension of Polish-ASEAN Relations	64
Economic Dimension of Polish-ASEAN Relations	65
Development Dimension of Polish-ASEAN Relations	68
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion	71
Similarities and Differences.....	71
The Future of Interregional Relations of Hungary and Poland with ASEAN	73
Bibliography	74

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACTS	ASEAN Customs and Transit System
AEBF	Asia-Europe Business Forum
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEF	Asia–Europe Foundation
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEM-FMM	ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting
ASEM-SDD	ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue
ASEM-TMM	ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting
ASEM-TSOM	ASEM Transport Senior Officials' Meeting
ASEP	Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership
CBHE	Capacity Building in Higher Education Action
EEC	European Economic Community
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
FEALAC	Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HNTH	Hungarian National Trade Houses
HUF	Hungarian Forint
IOM	International Credit Mobility
JCC	Joint Cooperation Committee
JCEC	Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAWA	National Agency for Academic Exchange
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAIH	Polish Investment and Trade Agency (Polska Agencja Inwestycji I Handlu)
PLN	Polish Złoty
PMC	Post Ministerial Conference
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations
UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar
V4	Visegrád Group
ZBH	Polish Foreign Trade Offices (Zagraniczne Biura Hnadowe)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Is the world turning eastward? Is “the rise of Asia” justified? Asian economy could be one of the rationales, seeing from the opening of China to the global economy in the 1980s and the emerging Asian market before the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Increasing demographics of Asia means more demand for economic activity. But is there other reason apart from economic strength to explain why Asia deserves more attention?

Asia is an extensive region, with a wide range of diversity in economy, politics and culture. To assume that all Asians are homogenous in foreign policy making process would be too far-fetched and misunderstanding. This might result in an unsatisfactory result. Asia consists of many subregions, which act differently and have different interests. The particular subregion that is the area of interest of this research is Southeast Asia. ASEAN Secretariat (2019) reports that in 2018 ASEAN's population size was 649.1 million. Moreover, according to the World Bank (2018) the total combined GDP of ASEAN member states was at 3 trillion USD, resulting in ASEAN being the sixth largest economy in the world after United States (20.58 trillion USD), European Union (15.92 trillion USD) China (13.895 trillion USD), Japan (4.96 trillion USD), and Germany (3.95 trillion USD). It is merely equal to India's economy size measured by GDP of 2.88 trillion USD in 2018. ASEAN Secretariat (2019)'s report based on Asian Development Bank's outlook claims that the growth rate of ASEAN in 2018 was at 5.1%, clearly being one of the fastest developing economic regions of the world and attractive for many investors. This shows ASEAN's attractiveness as a market with great growth potential and constantly growing purchasing power. ASEAN rises as an important actor to balance power with major players in the region, partially based on its strategic geographical location between India, China and Japan. With its economic impact, ASEAN holds an important role in Asian economic integration by negotiating interregional trade agreements and providing a platform for intra-regional cooperation, representing the transition of old regionalism to new regionalism based on economic-focus approach. However, the common weakness of the region includes aging society and geopolitical instability due to regional influence of China. Distance from Europe, internal political instability in some member states and unfamiliarity of culture could be among a few downsides of interregional trade with ASEAN.

As ASEAN seeks for alliance in the international arena, it has initiated a strengthening of relations with major powers in the world, including the United States, China, and the European Union who also pay more attention to the emerging market. The EU reached out to ASEAN holistically for the first time in 1977 based on the formal agreement between ASEAN and European Economic Community (EEC) at that time. From there, the bond has prospered and proved to be stronger.

The majority of researches focus more on the functioning of the EU in this interregional bilateral relation. Insights to the characteristics of a particular member state in the course of interregional relations are mainly studied on large powers. I became interested in the attempt to make an impact in the relations from economically and politically lesser-important players, such as small and medium-sized countries. My attention turns to Hungary and Poland as both countries have recently adopted a shift in foreign policy direction to turn to non-traditional partners outside the EU to diversify their export destinations. It could be viewed as an attempt to gain economic independence from the dominant EU market.

Small and medium-sized states' foreign policy strategy and goals are drafted based on their economic insecurities and security challenges. Their ability to stir great political and economic impact on a global scale is limited. (Archer et al. 2014) due to their "weakness", which is measured by size of territory, population, economy and, as suggested by Keohane (1969), military and security capability. Vaicekauskaite (2017) proposes that they either remain neutral and focus on protecting their sovereignty, or they increase ties with other superpowers by joining or creating groupings. The Eastern enlargement in 2004, with prior entry negotiations starting in the 90s, could be described as bandwagoning according to Quincy Wright (1942). The similarity these ten countries share is the inferior economic capacity and thus realizing that they were weak states. The "return to Europe" (Mazowiecki 1990) was a move to consolidate democracies and ensure that they would not fall back into the Russian oppressor's communist regime again. These countries hoped that the European integration would be beneficial to their economies and societal development, as they would move towards the liberal system of free markets.

By joining alliances, member states have to comply with common values, rules and policy. It could be viewed both positively and negatively. Certain policies could be mutually beneficial for all member states. For example, the EU's fostering of trade relations with other partners and markets in the world certainly benefits small states that struggle to venture out and establish

relations bilaterally with other countries outside the region. Thorhallsson and Steisson (2017) suggest that small (including medium-sized) states are in need of a peaceful, stable international system or organization in order to survive the ever-changing geopolitical landscape. Sherwood (2016) supports this by stating that small states have better survival rate and potential to exercise their influence as they stay in line with larger states.

In terms of Hungary and Poland, which are considered small and medium-sized states in Central Europe respectively, the decision to integrate with the EU after 1991 was based on securing their national interests during the transition from socialism to democracy. Their foreign policy strategies in the 90s were mainly about the integration into the Western intergovernmental institutions. (Bieńczyk-Missala, 2016) In Hungary, all four political parties conducted a campaign supporting the EU membership. Major arguments were the peace and economic security of the country as an EU member state. (DW 2003) However, in Poland, it is interesting to observe the decline of support in EU membership in late 1990s from 75% in mid-1990s to roughly 55% by mid-2002 as there was a Eurosceptic doubt in the functionality of the EU and the cost efficiency of the integration. (Taggart & Szczerbiak 2002, Clem & Chodakiewicz 2003) Pope John Paul II's reiteration of his support for Polish EU membership as a means to the regional peace in 2002 significantly influenced the Roman Catholic poles' public opinion.

Within the European Union, Germany, considered a great power in geoeconomics, is at the forefront in progressing specific policy towards Indo-Pacific region, especially ASEAN, and developing closer relationships with Indo-Pacific nations. Recently, the German Government has issued the latest policy guidelines on the Indo-Pacific region. (Federal Foreign Office of Germany, 2020b). The German interests in the region include peace and security, multipolarity (equal distribution of power), diversification and deepening of relationships, opening of marine logistics network, markets and free trade, digitization and connectivity, as well as access to fact-based information. It aims at strengthening relations with these states and increasing the German visibility and influence in the region through multilateral platforms, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The amendment of policy direction is a result of the Chinese influence over Indo-Pacific, and the latest non-traditional security threat as the COVID-19 pandemic.

From there my research problem originated. I became interested in whether Central European countries have had any specific policy guidelines towards ASEAN, providing that Hungary announced the “Eastern Opening” foreign policy in late 2010 I am interested in how both

the EU mechanisms and national foreign policy have helped Hungary and Poland increase their presences and strengthen their relations with certain partners. I mentioned my native region, Southeast Asia, and ASEAN as an increasingly important economic hub, as my point of interest. Both Hungary and Poland have established diplomatic relations with ASEAN member states at different times and different rates. However, the attempt to approach ASEAN as a bloc with an EU membership is seen strengthened only lately.

The first chapter of this dissertation opens with the theoretical background of the study. The second chapter provides related conceptual frameworks and the review of existing research regarding the long-standing EU-ASEAN interregional relations. The third chapter analyzes the engagement of Hungarian government in ASEAN, while the fourth chapter examines the Polish foreign engagement in the region. The final chapter concludes the difference and similarities of policy conduct of both countries and discusses their prospects in the region under the threat of the 2020 pandemic. My hypothesis is that both national strategy, which foster relations with lesser-important regions, and the EU external relations policy have had influence in improving the clearer policy direction towards ASEAN market. This leads to another perspective to look at ASEAN as a whole integrated bloc, and Hungary and Poland functioning as sovereign states complying with the EU policies, along with looking at the involved states as individual countries. This dissertation's aim is to explain the foreign policy implementation of Hungary and Poland in ASEAN, both by the national diplomatic tools and via the European mechanism. It aspires to contribute the findings to the limited sphere of academic publications on European and Visegrád states' engagement in Southeast Asia.

RESEARCH QUESTION, OBJECTIVES, AND HYPOTHESIS

The main objective is to examine the foreign policy strategy of Hungarian and Polish governments in fostering engagement in ASEAN. The thesis examines the content of selected political visits and economic activities, in order to analyze how they complement the objectives of the foreign policy agenda in the region.

I pose the research question as follow: How do Hungary and Poland engage with ASEAN through both national foreign policy instruments and European foreign policy mechanisms?

My hypothesis is, due to the different classification of being small and middle-sized powers, Hungary and Poland conduct their foreign policies differently. Hungary, being a small power, depends on the EU mechanisms to represent itself more than Poland, which is a middle power. National diplomacy serves as a gap filler of the European diplomacy based on each country's national interests. Later on, in the final chapter, I will discuss the difference and similarity of the foreign policy conduct between Hungary and Poland.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This qualitative research is based on two methods of desk-based investigation: context and policy analysis. Main sources of context analysis are existing documents from primary and secondary external sources and literature, including academic articles, EU project websites, trade statistics obtained from government channels and EU institutions, pre-existing interviews with Hungarian and Polish ambassadors, news articles regarding Hungarian and Polish policy conduct, news articles published by the diplomatic missions of Hungary and Poland in each ASEAN member state. On the other hand, main sources of policy analysis come from primary sources as official policy strategy documents and exposé from Hungarian and Polish governments.

To answer the research questions, I include the theoretical framework of new interregionalism (Hänggi, 2006) to examine how Hungary and Poland engage in the EU mechanisms to increase their presence with ASEAN. From Hänggi's classification, I categorize the policy actions into two levels, national and EU-level diplomacies, under three dimensions, which include political, economic and socio-cultural development dimensions. Then I will discuss the similarity and difference in the declared interest, expectation and realization between national and EU foreign policy conduct.

By labelling Hungary and Poland as small state with enlarged identity and middle powers, I adopt the small state conceptualization of Szalai (2015, 2017), and middle power theory based on characteristic of position (Holbraad, 1984), limitation of power exercise (Cooper, 1997) and geography (Clausewitz, 1992).

RESEARCH SCOPE

The research scope includes the bilateral relations happening in the following geographical areas: Hungary and ASEAN and Poland and ASEAN. The chronological frame covers the year from 2011 to 2020.

LIMITATIONS

Some important limitations should be noted. Firstly, due to the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic, personal interviews with diplomats and experts to gain opinions and deeper insights could not be approved. The initial intention of interview conduct was to gain deeper insights and personal opinions, on the basis of anonymity, of the policy implementation.

The second limitation is the lack of prior research studies specifically on Hungarian-ASEAN and Polish-ASEAN relations. This results in the brief literature review. I came over the obstacle by examining other bilateral relations of a third country and the regional grouping to find similarity in possible research methodologies. Language barrier is the third minor limitation. Therefore, I sought assistance from my colleagues due to my limited linguistic abilities.

Limited accessibility of confidential data is another limitation I came across. Only selected parliamentary proceedings and official documents from Hungarian and Polish governments were available online. The Polish government's decision to update governmental websites by the end of 2019 disabled the access to news articles before 2019. Some articles are accessible via cached archives. This may result in the lack of crucial information for a more thorough analysis. However, the information from the EU and ASEAN was ample and accessible.

I would like to note that it is challenging to compare the trade volume. Statistical data from the EU, ASEAN, Hungarian and Polish governments are in different currencies. The Hungarian statistical center stores data only in Hungarian Forint (HUF). Moreover, some piece of information is missing. For example, it is impossible to retrieve statistical data of ASEAN trade volume with Poland, as Poland does not collect individual trade volume from all ASEAN member states. The statistics often misses data from some countries, presumably because of too little amount that is considered insignificant. While looking at the EU's statistical source, there is no data set of each

EU member state to compare on the basis of Euro (EUR). Therefore, the result can be inaccurate, and it is difficult to make comparison even at current prices and exchange rates. To overcome this obstacle, I leave the value in original currency and make a comparison in other measurable qualitative domains.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

SMALL AND MIDDLE-SIZED STATES

As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of small- and medium-sized states needs to be discussed. There are various official definitions from intergovernmental institutions that can help consolidate the concept. Why do small and middle-sized states matter? Despite all sovereign states being equal before law, they obviously do not possess power equally. Therefore, they react to certain challenges at different rates and are exposed to different vulnerabilities. The international system is dominated by a few dozens of large major powers, while the majority of the world belong to small powers. Generally, small states possess the following quantitative characteristics: population size, economy size, territory size, as well as military capability and diplomatic resources. The aforementioned attributes limit the impact and influence of states defined small in the global arena. However, the studies of small states and how they conduct foreign policy are still crucial to understand the dynamic of international relations. (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015)

Population size is still arguable. A few scholars suggest that a country with less than one million population could be considered. With this definition, only 30% of countries around the world would be small states. However, the majority of scholars agree that the threshold could be up to less than 10-15 million, which will define 70% of the 238 countries recognized by CIA as small states. A huge range of states mean that they differ economically, politically, culturally and geographically. It would be nearly impossible to find a one-size-fits-all theory to explain the behavior of every small state.

How can countries that are not superpowers survive? Tow (2014, p. 114) noted that building regional and international security communities would help small and middle-sized countries "to promote their own interests and to cultivate common norms in something other than the tightly woven asymmetrical framework". An example of the network expansion of APEC and ASEAN was provided. The creation of ASEAN+3 (in 1997) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, formerly ASEAN+6, in 2012) free trade areas are based on the

intention to fortify Asian regional economic cooperation in response to the implementation of North American Free Trade Agreement. The similar behavior patterns are seen in former Eastern bloc countries that joined the EU in 2004. They employed both a bilateral approach of strengthening relations with individual Western European countries, and a multilateral approach of efforts to participate in West-oriented international organizations such as NATO and the EEC institutions.

Many scholars tend to study certain small states employing customized models and theoretical frameworks. Some scholars find that the existing schools of thoughts are not sufficient to explain the phenomenon, for example Szalai (2015) argues that the neorealist–neoliberal tradition of small state theory cannot explain the foreign policy decision-making of Hungary because of external factors such as specific chronological and geographical setting (Szalai, 2018) as well as the lack of compatibility between state and nation, specific historical experiences, and the state's foreign policy and domestic politics. Apart from Hungary, Switzerland is another distinct case of a small state possessing mid-range economic powers. The neutrality of Switzerland places it in a unique position, that contrary to Walt, it does not need to perform either power balancing or bandwagoning.

Middle-sized states, or middle powers, are even less studied in international relations. There is no general agreed criterion to distinguish middle powers. Middle powers became a point of interest in the late 2000s. (Robertson, 2017, p. 355) The entry of the term middle power came in Encyclopaedia Britannica as late as in 2015. It defines middle power as

"a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum that is in the “middle” - below that of a superpower, which wields vastly superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with sufficient ability to shape international events." (Müftüler Baç, 2015)

Middle powers tend to prefer multilateral foreign policy, as well as international institutions and alliance formation, as they have more power capabilities than small states, but still less than great powers. Ravenhill (1998, p. 331) noted that middle powers' foreign services show

better performance in analytical skills than small states. One evidence could be seen from the number of diplomatic missions around the globe. From there, I see that the intellectual human resource and financial capacity could play a great role in contributing to the diplomatic community of each middle state.

Beeson and Higgott (2014, p. 223) proposed three features of middle powers based on the works of Holbraad (1984), that is, 1) middle geographical position between great powers 2) middle size between small and large states (although the definition of size of small states is still debatable) and 3) "middleness" referring to the ideological position in the bipolar political system.

It is possible to consider the locality to classify labels. Cooper et al. (1993, p. 17) suggests that one criterion to identify the middle powers could be their geographical location between great powers. Middle powers are capable of influencing impact in the international system to a limited extent. This statement supports Bull (2002) who stated that "middle and small powers (...) are able to provide for their security for long periods while dispensing with allies. But their ability to do so is conditional upon the maintenance of a general balance of power in the international system by states other than themselves. By contrast, the ability of the great powers to dispense with allies is not conditional in this way." (p.196) and "from the point of view of their [middle and small powers] own interests, it is natural and proper that they should maintain a vigilant watch on signs of an emerging great power concert" (p. 288) Under this concept, Hungary can be categorized as small country, while Poland is referred as a middle power.

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS

First of all, it is necessary to settle a definition of foreign policy. Scholars provide different explanations. Generally, the majority of scholars agree that foreign policy is related to the behavior of a nation-state towards the other nation-state and has an international effect. I propose that the area of study could be various, either "Who" the actor is, "What" does the actor do (resulting in the behavior of the actor and the result of policy implementation) and "How" the foreign policy is conducted (resulting in the strategy, means or diplomatic tools). In response to the focus of "What", Beasley et al. (2013) referred to the term "policy" as a broad term, including many activities as treaty signing decisions and state behavior and ranging from corporations or

opposition in the field of economy, security, environment, culture, tourism and human rights. Neorealist and neoclassical realist thinkers would take domestic factors into account while studying foreign policy and argue that domestic background is intertwined with the foreign policymaking process, as opposed to realist scholars that tend to separate domestic and international affairs. Goetschel et al. (2004) proposed that foreign policy could be viewed as a link between internal activities and international politics.

Some scholars focus more on the nature or behavior of the state. Foreign policy is an activity of the state with which it fulfills its aims and interests within the international arena". (Petrič, 2013, p. 1) Benko (1997, 227, cited in Petrič, 2013) stated that foreign policy is a process and a system of activities performed by a state-organized community of people within the international arena While some scholars argue that the actor does not always have to be states. These non-state actors can be international business organizations. cause groups, or representatives of such as religious organizations. Gerner (1992, p. 192) defined foreign policy definition as "the intentions, statements and actions of an actor - often, but not always, a state - directed toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements and actions." Meanwhile, Hermann (1989) defined it as "the discrete purposeful action that results from the political level decision of an individual or group of individuals. (...) It is not the decision, but a product of the decision". (p. 34) From Hermann's perspective, the actors can be either state or non-state, and either individual or collective.

In this research, I focus mainly on the process of strategy and tool implementation. The general framework of the foreign policymaking process is taken from Howlett and Ramesh (2003)'s public policy model. The policy cycle, which means the policymaking process, includes the following steps: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Foreign policy also adopts the same cycle. In addition, to evaluate the success (or failure) of a foreign policy agenda, three steps are to be investigated: the declaration, the expectation and the achievement. In chapter 3 and 4 when I examine Hungarian and Polish foreign policy strategy on ASEAN, I try to cover all three stages.

CONCEPT OF INTERREGIONALISM

Interregionalism in a broad sense consists of the study of interactions between two regions or more. Its origin is traced from the concept of regionalism. It can be bilateral, meaning that it consists of two parties and each party acts as a single bloc, or multilateral, as it engages more than two sides. Interregionalism is important in global politics, as it has brought about multi-layered complexity in the international system and more actors have been engaging in the arena.

Many scholars try to provide their own explanation and classification. Hänggi (2006) provided the most extensive categorization of interregional interactions with five types. The phenomenon of system-centered new regionalism and new interregionalism is a result of increased visibility of lesser advanced regional organizations or groupings in the international system and the change of causal factor, from agency to structure. The first type of interregionalism under Hänggi's classification is called quasi-interregional relation, as it focuses on the relations between a regional organization and a third state, for example EU-Russia and ASEAN-USA relations. The second type is named ideal case, when two regional organizations interact. The third and fourth types refer to "interregional relations" in a narrow sense and can be coined "pure interregionalism" by other scholars. (Hwee 2008, p. 9) However, the distinction is drawn between the actors in the relationship. EU-ASEAN and EU-MERCOSUR are a few examples of the second type. While the third type represents the relation between one regional organization and another distinct regional group, the fourth type concerns two distinct regional groups. ASEM falls into the category of the third type, while Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) established in 1999 could be defined as the fourth type. Lastly, the fifth type is the relation of state grouping from two or more regions. This is classified as mega-regional relations. OCSE and APEC are among the dialogue platforms consisting of multiple actors from many geographic regions. From these examples, the individual actors of the EU and ASEAN are noteworthy. They developed the most extensive communication networks with many other actors as they participated in interregional mechanisms broadly and profoundly. (Hänggi 2006, p. 34)

In this dissertation, I focus on two levels of relations, Hungary and Poland with ASEAN, and the EU with ASEAN. The two types of interregional interactions can be explained as a regional organization and a third power (type 1), and two regional organizations (type 2).

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE BOUNDARIES OF ASIA IN THIS RESEARCH

Though this research mainly engages with ASEAN, which has a definite set of 10 member countries, using the term Asia in a broader sense can be unclear. What country can be categorized under the vast region of Asia? Since there is no clear definition of “Asia”, and the subregions in the continent can alter depending on the context, this leads to the question of how Hungary and Poland define Asia.

Ryabchikov et al. (2019) suggested in *Encyclopædia Britannica* that Asia is culturally and geographically heterogeneous due to its vast area. Moreover, the geographical boundaries between Asia and Europe is a historical and cultural construct. The European imperialism might have influenced and strengthened the image of Asia as the "Other" or the "Orient". (Fuchs, 2002) Some geographers argue that the Asian territory starts eastward from the Ural Mountains and Caspian Sea. However, there is still an ongoing debate regarding the division in the field of cultural geography. Asia in a broad sense, or Asia-Pacific Group by United Nations' regional group classification, is defined by the following subregions solely for statistical reasons, without political implication: North Asia, Central Asia, Western Asia, South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia.

The responsible organizations in foreign affairs towards the region are Asia-Pacific Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and Asia-Pacific Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland. From the title, we can see that they hold the perception based on the colonial, Eurocentric political discourse of the "Far East", as an area covering the Cathay, Japan and the Indies (Reischauer & Fairbank, 1960). While the areas between Europe and the Western Asia ("Near East") are put into other different institutional units. On Hungarian side, Central Asia and Arab World belong to the Department of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and the Department of Africa and the Middle East respectively. Similarly, the Polish government places Central Asia and Arab World in the Eastern Department, and the Department of Africa and the Middle East respectively.

Taking the notion Asia-Pacific from the institutional bodies of Hungary and Poland, to establish a clear guide, I take the set of territories and countries from the two state-level agencies from Hungary and Poland that are responsible for the address of foreign policy implementation in this context: Asia-Pacific Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary and Asia-Pacific Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

The intersection of two sets of countries, which is geographically categorized into four regional groupings, goes as follow:

East Asia: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Mongolia, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Taiwan

Pacific: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Eastern Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam

By classifying countries into sub-regional groupings, I follow the political classification and grouping method of the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD)'s geoscheme. The findings show that there is only a minimal difference in the categorization of two countries. Poland does not mention a small state in Oceania as the Cook Islands, while Hungary does not include Niue in their countries under supervision. Moreover, the definition of Asia-Pacific by Hungarian and Polish governments resonates with the colonial definition of the Far East. Therefore, I would like to suggest that the common perception of Asia by Hungarian and Polish people is likely to be based on the perception of the "Far East".

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section, I am going to review the foundations of this research, providing the background on the historical background of EU-ASEAN relations and the instruments that the EU has implemented in the region. I take the EU as an important unit of analysis, adding another layer regarding the comparison between European and national diplomacy. A highlight is given at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), as it is the platform that Hungary and Poland are seen the most

active in being in pursuit of national interests in the framework of European foreign policy. I also discuss the engagement of the Visegrád Group, both as a group and individual states, in ASEAN.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND ASEAN

To understand Hungary and Poland's conduct of foreign policy in ASEAN, it is necessary to consider the EU's role and intentions in ASEAN. Many scholars provide an extensive collection of literature in EU-ASEAN interregional relations.

ORIGIN OF ASEAN

The main Southeast Asian regional intergovernmental institution, **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**, was founded on 8 August 1967 through the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) in Bangkok. The founding members are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. It is described to gain regional political security amidst the tense conflict during the Cold War caused by a bipolar world system, between the Soviet Union and the United States. Southeast Asia was directly affected by the regional security threat regarding the Vietnam War and the invasion of communist ideology. (Maksum, 1996, Narine, 2002). It can be explained that based on the motive of establishment as political security, ASEAN integration in 1967 can fit the definition of “**Old Regionalism**”. (Choiruzzad, 2017, Buszynski, 1997) It aims to maintain peace and regional resilience as well as promote integration among its member states based on the three pillars: political security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation. To date, it has 10 member states. The enlargement occurred during the 1980s and 1990s with the participation of Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia in 1984, 1995, 1997, 1997 and 1999 respectively.

Based on the ASEAN Vision 2020 formalized at the **Bali Concord II in 2003**, ASEAN has aimed towards a complete unification of economic, political-security and socio-cultural domains. The three pillars of ASEAN in the aforementioned domains have led to the following integration bodies: Political-Security Community (APSC), Economic Community (AEC) and Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). APSC and ASCC were adopted in 2009, while AEC has been recently adopted in 2015 and aimed at realizing the goal by 2025. The wider audience recognizes

AEC more. The establishment of AEC is regarded by ASEAN as an important milestone in the regional economic integration program. It aims at creating a single market for all member states with the help of economic integration initiatives such as AFTA and AFAS. AEC aims at realizing the single market and production base, as well as becoming a competitive economic region that has equitable economic development. Ultimately, it hopes that the regional economic integration will lead to the integration into the global economy.

Origin of the EU-ASEAN Relations

ASEAN and EU share some similarities in the shared values yet show a few differences in founding ideology and institutional structure. Diversity, preference of a rule-based multipolar world system with strong multilateral organizations, and regional integration of all dimensions are the core concept of the two regional organizations. However, the economic inequality among EU member states is reported to be less than that of ASEAN, where there consist of economically developed countries and developing economies. (Plummer, 2006, p. 8) While ASEAN's origin belongs to the concept of old regionalism, which is a regional grouping based on political needs, the modern-day EU is rather an example of new regionalism created out of economic cooperation. The EU integration has achieved the foundation of common values, market and foreign policy. The Union upholds the sovereignty pools for common gains and goals. It functions under supranational decision-making mechanisms. On the other hand, the so-called "ASEAN Way" builds on intergovernmental cooperation, ignores supranationalism, and rather favors mutual respect, national interests, non-interference and sovereignty due to member states' past political experience. The major elements of the ASEAN Way consist of non-interference principle, quiet diplomacy¹, non-use of force, non-legalistic consensus-driven decision-making process, and sovereign equality (Haacke, 2000, p. 2). The consensus-based decision-making process of ASEAN differs from the EU as EU member states take part in weighted voting, except in foreign and security policy that unanimity is required. ASEAN's decision-making mechanisms are usually

¹ Sometimes referred to as closed-door diplomacy. It means the preference for peaceful, low-profile negotiation practices over confrontation or international arbitration. The term was first coined by former Malaysian PM Najib Razak and amplified by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2014 over Malaysia's play-safe approach towards China in the disputes in South China Sea. (Parameswaran 2015, 6)

criticized slow. Member states are hesitant to give up their sovereignty (Tong 2016) and adopt the “common denominator”. (Desker, 2008, p. 2)

ASEAN, categorized as a subset of the whole Asian region, has been mentioned many times in the foreign policy strategies of the EU and plays an important role as the EU’s regional partner. According to the European External Action Service’s latest statement in 2016, the EU’s main objective in Asia is to foster economic growth, as well as political and social stability of the region, while securing the wellbeing of European citizens and maintaining its own economy (European Commission, 2016b).

The first step of the formal interregional relations originated from the **10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting** during 5-8 July 1977 in Singapore, where EEC became ASEAN’s Dialogue Partner. As a result, ASEAN-European Economic Community Cooperation Agreement was officially formed in March 1980. The main focus addressed in the Joint Declaration in Kuala Lumpur focuses on the diversification of bilateral development, cultural and economic cooperation. The highlight is shed on raw materials, energy, trade, development, money and finance. This shows that the EEC’s approach to ASEAN was economic-oriented.

The second step of the EU’s approach towards ASEAN, as a subset under the umbrella term Asia and excluding Central Asia, is the **New Asia Strategy (NAS)**. It was adopted in 1994 and revised in 2001 to propose a foreign policy strategy guideline with Asian countries by increasing the priority level of Asia and intensifying its approach towards the region, especially East Asia. The strategy was adopted during the process of European integration. The EU realized the importance of its profile in the international stage. The main issues of the strategy cover the promotion of economic development. European values, such as democracy, human rights and regional peace and stability, especially in dispute areas (North and South Korea, Sparty Islands, Kashmir) To achieve the objective of increasing EU presence in Asia, the strategy suggests that more political dialogues and more proactive strategies are needed.

The third step is **The Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework For Enhanced Partnerships** in 2001 focused primarily on the issues of maintaining peace and security, and building partnerships on various global issues, including economic cooperation including trade deficit elimination and maintaining investment inflow, poverty, sustainable growth, establishment of international dialogues. The strategy included the attempt to increase the number of EU

delegation offices in the region. This resulted in the opening of the Delegation of the European Commission in Phnom Penh, Kuala Lumpur, and Yangon in 2002, 2003, and 2012 respectively.

The fourth step is reflected in **A New Partnership with Southeast Asia** in 2003. The visibility strategy paper calls for more active contributions and outlines more global values as reference themes for areas of cooperation and dialogue topics. The strategic priorities addressed in the Communication document consist of (1) supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; (2) Human rights, democratic principles and good governance (2) mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; (4) injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; (5) continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; and (6) intensifying dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas. (European Commission 2004, 5).

The EU-ASEAN relations were enhanced in the fifth step by the adoption of **EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership** in 2007. Nuremberg Declaration's adoption of the partnership was an important milestone in the dialogue relations. The areas of cooperation include politics and security, economy and socio-culture. A number of EU-ASEAN diplomatic mechanisms have been used to ensure the smooth cooperation, such as ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN-EU Senior Officials' Meeting, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Post Ministerial Conferences (PMCs) 10+1, policy dialogues, trade negotiations (especially FTA consultations), business summits and joint cooperation committees in specific topics.

The sixth step counts towards **Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership** (2013-2017) in 2012, which aims at expanding clearer strategic focus to dialogues beyond the domains of politics and security, economy and socio-cultural cooperation with a special emphasis on enhancing corporations in political and security areas. Institutional support and follow-up mechanisms for current and future initiatives were given importance. A few platforms were mentioned at the meeting, including the continuation of ASEAN-EU meetings and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which is the main forum for security cooperation Asia-Pacific and was inaugurated in 1994.

A few years later, the EU has called for the next step of scaling up interregional corporations through the communication to the European Parliament and the Council, **The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose** in 2015. It is seen as a preparation towards the Strategic Partnership (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). The key agenda was laid on

the issues of politics and security, human rights intraregional and interregional connectivity via transport, ecological development and infrastructure, economy, sustainability, research, innovation and people-to-people contacts. In spite of the research's scope on the states as major actors, the introduction of people-to-people diplomacy is noteworthy. Rüländ (2016) noted that it is a direct outcome of globalized tourism and education. Encouraging societal awareness of interregional cooperation and including non-state actors into the collaborations could benefit the more positive public opinion on a state's decisions. International politics would not be limited only among political elites. Asia–Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP) and Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF) were therefore established in 1996 and 1997 respectively to fill the gaps in people's engagement.

The introduction of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016 showed a clearer foreign and security policy of the EU, as well as reproduced a stronger image of the Union while calling for solidarity from EU member states. The priorities of the EU external actions cover the Union's security, state and societal resilience in neighboring regions, development of integrated approach to conflicts and security, support of cooperative regional orders and multilateral rules-based global governance. Specific mention of Asia-Pacific and ASEAN regarding security concerns promotion of connectivity, multilateral maritime security, democratic transition, human rights and non-traditional security issues as counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking and migration. In connection with economic diplomacy, FTA negotiations will be pursued.

The current stage of the interregional relation is shown in the **ASEAN-EU Plan of Action** (2018-2022) adopted in 2017, upon the 40th anniversary of EU-ASEAN dialogue relations. A year before, the ASEAN-EU Global Partnership for Shared Strategic Goals was promoted at the 21st ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, paving the way for this latest strategy. The strategy calls for a deeper cooperation towards a strategic partnership on regional issues such as security, counter-terrorism, support of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), research and innovation, interregional transport, and trade facilitation.

The **22nd ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting** held in Brussels in 2019 noted a few important positive remarks. One of those key outcomes is the agreement in principle to enhance the ASEAN-EU relations to a strategic partnership at an appropriate time. The concept of Strategic Partnership in the EU notion is based on the Lisbon Treaty that the strategic partnership should be based on

normative convergence (Pałasz, 2015, p. 5), which could mean the convergence of "significance of norms and rules, the viability and desirability of regimes, and the possibilities and limits of compliance strategies in international society" (Kerr & Xu, 2014, p. 80). Moreover, as the European Council would define the strategic interests of the EU, ASEAN will need to accomplish more integration goals to satisfy the EU. Strategic partnership could be viewed as a facilitator of "inside track" into the EU's foreign policy making process, (Hill & Smith, 2011, p. 470) or rather negatively regarded as a "mere catalogue of policy domains that are on the agenda of their meeting" signifying an ineffective strategy. (Keukeleire & Bruyninckx, 2011, p. 389) Currently, out of the ten strategic partnerships of the EU around the world, four are in Asia, namely China, Japan, South Korea and India.

POLITICAL, DEFENCE, AND SECURITY RELATIONS

One aspect of the relations is **security**. Initially the EU only focused on fostering trade relations with ASEAN. It was not seen, and it did not act as a security actor in the region. ASEAN used to view traditional security from the realist framework of deterrence, balance of power, preference of national sovereignty, and state-centered approach. (Hwee, 2014, p. 2-3) However, transnational non-traditional security threats and human security are changing the perception of ASEAN to turn towards integration in security cooperation and accepting external alliances in security issues.

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a platform that the EU has actively participated in to keep up its presence in the security dimension of ASEAN. It was established in 1994 as a result of the 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bangkok. The objective of the forum is to establish a constructive dialogue and open consultation on common political and security issues in Asia-Pacific region. Initially the members of the forum were the 10 ASEAN member states and its dialogue partners, namely Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia and the United States. Later on, Bangladesh, North Korea, Eastern Timor, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were admitted. Through a theoretical lens of realism, the foundation of ARF can also be viewed as an attempt to practice power balance in the region and enhance internal peace and security. The United States was seen

as more of major actor due to its active strategic engagement and contribution to the Asia-Pacific region (Godement, 2008, p. 43) since the start of the Cold War (Lum et al., 2011, p. 1).

However, the September 11 attacks in 2001 were a game changer. It introduced the new kind of terrorism perception and global pressure, inducing regional associations to rethink their security measures and cooperation. (Umbach, 2008, p. 129) The incident was one of the main contributors, among other attacks as the terrorist attacks in Bali and the Philippines in 2002, to the **EU-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism** at the 14th Minister Meeting in Brussels in **2003**. The EU's participation in ARF was trying to balance the presence of non-Asian security actors in the region. It participates in the ARF as ASEAN's dialogue partner, along with other partners as Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, New Zealand, North Korea, the United States, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia. As the EU is not a major player in this region's politics and security area (Stumbaun, 2014, p. 111) and it is not a member of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), ARF and EU-ASEAN foreign ministerial meetings are the only political forum that the EU could expand its influence. Therefore, it has taken the security promotion role in Asia-Pacific through the multidimensional forum very seriously, pursuing its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2012, which is a non-aggression and cooperation pact between ASEAN member states and country partners. This could show that the EU accepted the “ASEAN Way” of conflict resolution, despite criticisms that ARF is not capable of reconciling current security issues in the region. Moreover, it shared the chairmanship with ASEAN in the ARF during 2004-2005 and 2006-2007, as well as various participants to different dialogues including the ARF Inter-sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence Building Measures (CBD) and Preventive Diplomacy (PD) in 2016 where it shared the sponsorship in the draft ARF Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (Bersick, 2017, p. 6). One outcome of this strategy is the adoption of ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, a research institution and knowledge hub for regional peace, mediation, counter-terrorism and conflict solution in the “ASEAN Way”, that is, a peaceful, non-violence approach. It would serve as a point of cooperation in capacity building initiatives with the EU. Weber (2013, p. 351) notes that the EU is trying to contribute to regional political security via its support for economic development, capacity building and experience sharing as the first step to bring out regional stability.

In the same year, the new agreement called “**A New Partnership with South-East Asia**” was adopted by the European Commission. The global issues with security and anti-terrorism were the key agendas. A few solutions were addressed as sharing experience and judicial cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. The 10th ASEM-FMM in 2010 in Hungary brought up security as a key agenda, specifically non-traditional security threats, including terrorism, maritime security and piracy, food and energy security, cyber security, and climate change. In response to crisis and disaster management, the EU supported the establishment of ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA Center) at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2011. The first EU-ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights was organized in 2015 under the framework of Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI). The second edition was held in the Philippines in 2017. Regarding transnational maritime security and crime, the EU-ASEAN High Level Dialogue on Maritime Security Cooperation was first held in Indonesia in 2014 and continued annually. It aims at contributing to the part of maritime security solution in the current EU-ASEAN strategy, which is the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018-2022).


TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 paved the way for the development of the EU’s status on the global stage, as it aimed at improving the consistency of external relations functions and promoting the better image of the EU abroad. First of all, with the introduction of the Lisbon treaty, the EU becomes able to conclude international agreements by initiating negotiations, adopting related directives and authorizing the agreement signing. These processes ease up the procedures of interregional cooperation. The Treaty also includes the liberalization and amendments to EU external commercial policy regarding changes in tariff rates, conclusion of tariff and trade agreements about trade in goods and services, and issues of FDI and intellectual property, as they are the competence area of EU trade. It also supports the outward joint development cooperation with EU members. As a result, it has brought about a more active trade diplomacy engagement of the EU with Asia, in particular with ASEAN.

One crucial point in the EU-ASEAN relations is the process of **Free Trade Agreement** negotiations to reach the regional market collectively. The first attempts to initiate the talks started in 2007. However, the endeavors were suspended two years later. Meissner (2016) argued that

the failure was caused by the EU's lack of understanding of ASEAN. Unlike the EU that operated as a cohesive economic bloc, ASEAN's structure could be viewed as heterogeneous and nonuniform. ASEAN before 2005 did not adopt the singular economic policy yet. The macroeconomics of ASEAN member states were uneven and asymmetric. Lesser-developed member states found it difficult to adapt to the regional economic changes. Besides, the unresolved human rights issues in Myanmar were contradictory to the EU common values. (Phagaphasvivat, 2005) Due to the failure of interregional FTA negotiations, the EU has altered the approach to bilateral individual talks, which certainly has taken more time and effort to tailor the deals for each state. However, there was still an attempt to create pure interregional cooperation. In March 2017, upon the 40th anniversary of the EU-ASEAN official relations, both parties agreed to consider continuing negotiations for a region-to-region free trade agreement. So far, the successful milestones are the FTA deal conclusion with Singapore and Vietnam in 2019. Challenges in other ASEAN member states come from domestic factors such as trade protectionism and political instability (Hutt 2019). The EU has been interested in initiating FTA with ASEAN as a whole. This resonates with the EU's statement that "bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the EU and ASEAN countries will serve as building blocks towards a future EU-ASEAN agreement, which remains the EU's ultimate objective." (European Commission, 2020a) Hungary and Poland, as EU member states, will enjoy the benefits. Their approach to show support towards EU-ASEAN FTAs will be discussed in detail in the third and fourth chapters.

The following chart shows the EU's trade in goods statistics from 2007 to 2019 with ASEAN. On average, from 2007 to 2019, compared to the total EU's external trade volume, ASEAN's average share of exports is 4.6% while an average share of imports is 6.1%. It suggests the continuous trade deficit with ASEAN. The EU has run an average trade deficit of 29.154 billion EUR in goods.




Source: author's own compilation from Eurostat - Extra-EU trade by partner (ext lt maineu)²

Another chart below shows the EU's trade in services³ statistics from 2010⁴ to 2019 with ASEAN. On average, from 2010 to 2019, compared to the total EU's trade volume in services, ASEAN's average balance is only 0.29%. In contrast to the trade in goods, the statistics suggest a trade surplus in services with ASEAN. The EU has run an average balance in services trade of 3.97 billion EUR.

² The accumulated data on trade volume comprises the following product according to Standard International Trade Classification (SITC): food, drinks and tobacco, raw materials, energy products, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment and other manufactured goods. (Eurostat, 2013)

³ According to the BPM6 methodology of Eurostat, the classification of services includes the following sectors: manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others, maintenance and repair services, transport, travel, construction, insurance and pension services, financial services, charges for the use of intellectual property, telecommunications, computer and information services; personal, cultural and recreational services; government goods and services; and other business services.

⁴ Eurostat only collects the information from 2010 onwards.



Source: author's own compilation from Eurostat - International trade in services (since 2010) (BPM6)

DEVELOPMENT RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The framework which the EU-ASEAN development programs function under is the ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC). The latest JCC meeting was held via video conference in March 2020 due to the pandemic. The meeting discussed the urgent issue of know-how sharing cooperation to combat with Covid-19, climate change, connectivity and transport, the EU-supported ASEAN Customs and Transit System (ACTS) as well as the implementation of sustainable development according to the United Nations' UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

The EU was reported to officially and constantly support the foundation of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), which is the next step of ASEAN integration envisioned to be active in 2025. The current EU-ASEAN relations in international development concerns capacity building for regional economic integration, for example. EU ARISE program. Prior to the official

adoption of AEC in 2015, the EU initiated its regional integration support program "EU ARISE" with different technical measures to encourage the free movement of goods within the region in 2012 within the budget of 22 million EUR. The first phase of EU ARISE ran from 2013 to 2016 and has proved to be successful based on positive feedback from ASEAN. The EU therefore has decided to pursue the support and launch the second phase of ARISE Plus from 2017 to 2022. The priorities of the program include trade facilitation, standard assessment in healthcare and agricultural products, improvement of customs and transports, as well as supporting ASEAN economic integration through monitoring and statistics. It is expected that the better performance of ASEAN will benefit in strengthening trade relations with the EU.

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT

The “internationalization” of the European higher education systems shows a good example of how interregionalism is generated, as international partners outside the region become more important and cooperate more, bringing about more initiatives. All 48 European (including non-EU member states) higher education systems function under the European Higher Education Area (EHEA), which was formalized in March 2010, as a part of the Budapest-Vienna Ministerial Conference, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Bologna Process. The cooperation has expanded beyond Europe. The EU is engaging with many third powers and regions across the world, including Asian countries and ASEAN through international fora for dialogue on higher education policy. The EU regards education, science and technology as one of the priorities in EU-ASEAN coordination as pointed out in the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018-2022) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017, p. 6). Therefore, interregional cooperation is also seen in the field of education through many programs and initiatives.

International Credit Mobility (IOM)

IOM facilitates short-term credit-bearing two-way mobility schemes, both from Europe and to Europe. The mobility for students could be either traineeship or study from 3 to 12 months, while for staff the opportunities for training and teaching are available from 2 to 12 months.

Capacity Building in Higher Education Action (CBHE)

CBHE projects intend to prepare and push through a structural reform of higher education institutions by the development of new curricula, internal governance, and relationship building between institutions and enterprises.

Jean Monnet Activities

Jean Monnet Activities promotes the study, research and teaching of the EU integration process across the world through support of learning modules in higher education, chairs, centers of excellence, as well as networks and centers for European studies.

Erasmus+ (2014-2020)

The aim of Erasmus+, an EU program for education, training, youth and sport, which is a continuation of the pre-descendant Erasmus Mundus, is to promote intra-regional educational exchange and interdisciplinary studies, as well as supporting academic partnerships with non-EU institutions. The program received a budget of 14.7 billion EUR for a 7-year span, contributing more opportunities to many levels of beneficiaries including 2 million students around the world. (European Commission, 2020c, p. 1) The mobility opportunities are managed within each program consortium from different universities, within the EU and outside the EU. The physical mobility exchanges and knowledge transmission across the regions is defined by interregionalism, as there exists cooperation and movement from one region to another. Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degrees (EMJMD) function under the Erasmus+ framework, funding students to take part in two-year master programs in various disciplines in at least two European countries and obtain a joint degree. The table below shows the number of participants from ASEAN in each educational program.

Initiatives	Category	Brunei	Cambodia	Indonesia	Laos	Malaysia	Myanmar	Philippines	Thailand	Singapore	Vietnam	Total
ICM	Projects selected involving the country	5	124	300	38	277	50	112	407	87	466	1866
	Students and staff moving to Europe	5	700	1290	177	970	311	369	1170	160	2407	7559
	Students and staff moving to the country	2	426	766	97	613	166	218	796	135	1268	4487
EMJMDs	EMJMDs selected involving the country	0	2	16	0	13	0	7	11	5	21	75
	Full partners from the country in EMJMDs	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	5
	Full partners from Singapore in EMJMDs	0	3	18	0	14	0	6	12	2	23	78
	Scholarship recipients (both from global and additional regional budget)	0	16	135	0	43	19	263	75	21	158	730
CBHE	Projects selected involving the country	0	38	35	13	34	16	18	7	0	61	222
	Projects coordinated by the country	0	2	1	0	5	1	0	1	0	4	14
	Instances of participation from the country in selected projects	0	115	117	29	89	33	63	24	0	211	681
Jean Monnet	Jean Monnet projects selected involving the country	0	1	3	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	9
	Jean Monnet network involving the country	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	8

Source: author's own compilation from European Commission (2020d-2020l)

INTERREGIONAL FORA

Another important mechanism that covers a larger extent of EU-Asia relations is the **Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)**. It is an informal political dialogue forum initiated in **1996** in Bangkok between EU member states and ASEAN+3 countries. (In 1996, there were only 7 member states in ASEAN.) The +3 component comprises China PRC, Japan and South Korea. The cooperation process began a year after ASEM, in 1999. However, the East Asia cooperation was only formalized in 2007 upon the statement of “Building on the Foundations of ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation” at the 11th ASEAN +3 Summit in Singapore. The main components of the ASEM process, which guide the meeting agendas and cooperations, cover political, economic and financial, as well as social, cultural and educational pillars. It serves as a vast transregional space that opens up the opportunity to strengthen interregional bilateral, and multilateral, ties between Asian and European individual countries, and between Asia and Europe as two regions. The dialogues can even offer a sub-regional coordination, such as ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue, which provides a platform for collaboration and extra benefits for other sub-regional initiative with the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation Program (was established in 1992 and comprise of six countries) and Danube Region Strategy (was established in 2011 and comprises of 14 countries). Both sub-regions have similar development priorities, including connectivity in transport and energy, environment, human resource and socio-economic development.

ASEM can be conceptualized by many IR theories, such as realism, liberalism and constructivism. In this research, I focus on the approach of **realism**. As realists focus on power balancing, ASEM could be viewed as the attempt towards power balancing and counterbalancing by the EU in Asia-Pacific. Some scholars proposed that there was an economic power shift to East Asia from the existing powers (North America and Europe) in the mid-1990s due to China's economic reformation program while the economy of Europe was regressing. (Hagström & Jerdén, 2014) Therefore, the EU saw the need to maintain its status by strengthening closer economic ties to Asia. On the other hand, the partnership with the EU benefited the Asian countries, as it would balance the rivalry between China and Japan, as well as the United States' geostrategic influence in the region. (Shambaugh, 2004, Gilson, 2005, p. 313) The perception of the United States as the regional security actor was even worsened during the Trump government. (Przychodniak, 2017, p. 2) Moreover, it could be viewed as a “missing link” to complete the triangular connection

between North America, Europe and Asia, as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, established in 1989) is trying to join North America and Asia. (Artner, 2017, p. 131) This confirms the phenomenon of the multipolar systems, as more states were striving to rise as more important actors and forming alliances for survival.

HUNGARY AND POLAND'S ENGAGEMENT WITH ASEAN UNDER ASEM FRAMEWORK

As Hungary and Poland ascended to the EU membership in 2004, they could officially join the EU-ASEAN cooperation platforms. They participated in ASEM as EU new member states at the **5th ASEM Summit in 2004** in Hanoi. The discussions cover the EU enlargement and its new constitution. One of the topics is how ASEM can contribute to a multilateral approach to international organization in the context of globalization and trade regionalism.

Both countries enjoyed the advantage of developing closer bilateral ties with Asian countries within the framework of ASEM to a different extent. Hungary hosted the 10th ASEM Foreign Minister Meeting (FMM) in Gödöllő in 2011 and the 5th ASEM Transport Minister Meeting in Budapest in 2019. Another remarkable example is the fact that the “trans-boundary, sub-regional and bi-regional” (Soavapa, 2020) cooperation, ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue (Danube-Mekong Cooperation Initiative, or Budapest Initiative), was first proposed at the 10th ASEM-FMM and initiated by Hungary upon consultations with ASEM partners in 2012 based on the importance of regional interdependence through better connectivity and river basin management. The countries committed in this dialogue include Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The main objective is to focus on interregional cooperation in sustainable development and water resource management. This goes in accordance with Hungary's attempt to prioritize water resource management as their diplomatic tools. I will discuss this initiative in detail in the third chapter. On the other hand, Poland also hosted a few ASEM-related events, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter.

RELATIONS BETWEEN VISEGRÁD GROUP AND ASEAN

Unfortunately, the sub-region cooperative group in Central Europe, namely Visegrád group, is not active and clear in the direction of interregional relations with ASEAN. The more

obvious attempt comes from the private sector. Most of the bilateral relations head into the direction of individual countries instead of a collective body of ASEAN.

ASEAN was mentioned a few times in the presidency programs. For example, the program of Polish presidency in 2008-2009 stated that Poland would organize FTA consultations with ASEAN, along with South Korea and India, under the EU negotiation mechanism. The Polish presidency in 2013 addressed merely a cooperation in economy, research and development with ASEAN. It suggested that a joint policy could be implemented for future cooperation. However, no precise commitment of diplomatic instrument or approach was mentioned.

On the other hand, the Hungarian presidency program in 2013-2014 promised an increase in effort to coordinate with ASEAN. The presidency in the following term in 2017-2018 put ASEAN among target markets in tourism cooperation. A concrete collective action followed this agenda is the annual Discover Central Europe roadshows in ASEAN capital cities, i.e. Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta under the specific agenda of Global Visegrád. The project is a Czech Republic-led joint initiative of Visegrád countries' national tourism promotion agency to promote tourism in Central Europe.

The first V4-ASEAN cooperation was initiated under **V4Clusters** project which was active during 2013 and 2014 and funded by International Visegrád fund. An MoU “V4-ASEAN Cluster Initiative” was signed in 2014 between four partners, in order to reach out to ASEAN market as a cluster network. The consortium consisted of Czech Republic's National Cluster Association, Hungary's Pannon Business Network Association, Poland's Upper Silesian Agency for Entrepreneurship and Development and Slovakia's Union of Slovak Clusters. All four parties were committed to expand the business opportunities for V4 entrepreneurs in ASEAN through project development and mobility programs. However, according to Daniel Ács, president of the Union of Slovak Clusters, the cooperation was not approved and therefore not continued.

Later on, the next phase of the project was rolled out as V4Clusters Go International (V4ClusGo) Project with the financial support from International Visegrád Fund during 2016-2017. It aimed to reach out to other economic regions, such as Latin America and ASEAN for technology cooperation, as well as trade and investment promotion.

The success story of this project is **European Strategic Cluster Partnership NATUREEF**, which is a project funded by the EU's COSME program in 2016 and ran for 24 months. The project comprises of European partners in Spain, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Denmark, Portugal, Germany and France. It aims to internationalize a cross-sector cluster network in the field of natural resource-efficient innovation beyond the EU. Its initiative, NATUREEF Go International, targets the markets in Latin America, Asia and ASEAN, which are described as "growing markets". It is reported that the network comprises more than 1000 European companies operating in many sectors, especially in food technology, ICT, natural resources efficiency and renewable energy business.

Regarding the target market in ASEAN, the project delegation of 4 clusters and 11 SME entrepreneurs visited the Philippines during 11-18 September 2016 to promote natural resources efficiency business. The commercial mission, together with the EU-funded EU-Philippines Business Network, visited trade fairs, government officials from various ministers and universities. It also organized B2B meetings with local businesspeople and NGOs. It is reported in the NATUREEF key achievement report in 2018 that "up to 5 project ideas focused on energy resources and water treatment have started on negotiations after the missions."

CHAPTER 3: HUNGARIAN ENGAGEMENT IN ASEAN

HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA-PACIFIC AFTER EU ACCESSION IN 2004

Hungarian government's post-1989 foreign policy aspiration claims to be value-based and developed based on their national interests. The main policy directions set up in the Antall government were the European-North-Atlantic orientation, good neighborhood policy with Visegrád states and Eastern neighbors, as well as rights protection of Hungarian ethnic minorities living across the border. These have always been the core of Hungarian foreign policy directions.

After the accession to the EU in May 2004, Hungary has changed from being a policy taker to a policy maker in order to increase its presence and activities in Central and Eastern Europe. (Rácz, 2011) As to contribute to the European Neighborhood Policy, Hungarian foreign policy priority was only in its close neighborhood as Romania, Ukraine, Moldova and Croatia. (Rácz, 2011, Kiss & Zahorán, 2007) Its foreign policy strategy in 2004 entailed three priority corporations, such as NATO, Visegrád Group and Hungarian minorities abroad.

Due to its newly granted EU membership, Hungary, along with other EU new member states as well as ASEAN's new member states including Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, were entitled to participate in the 5th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Hanoi. The participation has enabled Hungary to be present in Asia as an EU member state. The representation is crucial, because it contributes to the Hungarian government's Asia policy. In order to achieve the goal, Hungary had to increase its diplomatic activity in the region. This was followed by the re-opening of Hungarian embassies in Ulaanbaatar, Kuala Lumpur and Manila in 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively. The new Hungarian consulate-general was opened in Mumbai in 2014. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, apart from the growing economic exchange, there was an increasing demand for visa issuance for Indian nationals. The consulate would facilitate the visa applications from the Northern and Eastern regions of India along with an external visa center. (Kand, 2014). Besides, Balassi Institute, which is a network of cultural institutions working under the soft power promotion scheme, were inaugurated in Peking and Tokyo in 2013 and 2019 respectively. The center in New Delhi is excluded due to its establishment in 1978. (Szenkovics,

2019, 111) The cultural and community center (HICC) will be opened in Hanoi in 2020 with no specific date yet.

Asia-Pacific was mentioned minimally in the 2004 strategy under Foreign Minister Ferenc Somogyi and Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány. It stated that the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Asia would benefit Hungary greatly. Hungary expected the increase of Hungarian economic actors' role to expand trade and investment relations. A few countries are mentioned, under the term "Far East", such as Japan, China and India. The interested area of cooperation with Japan for Hungary included economy, and research and development. India was described to share similar democratic values and expected to develop relations with Hungary in all possible domains. Hungary acknowledged the increasing power of China. It was interested in extending the economic relations on the basis of "balance and mutual benefit".

The strategy towards Asia was discussed in the parliament and later developed. László Várkonyi, former state secretary presented the Asia policy to the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Hungarians Abroad on 27 March 2007. He noted that as the Euro-Atlantic integration was achieved, Hungary ought to take its next step on the global stage and open up for non-European opportunities. He reinforced that Asia was the most dynamically developing region in the world due to a number of countries' high GDP growths. Apart from economic interests, securing political alliance with specifically rising powers in the region such as China, Japan and India. Hungary needed to consider other global issues beyond Europe. He expected the second wave of Asian investment in Hungary. He claimed that during the decade, there were incoming investments from high-tech firms in Japan and South Korea of 800 and 500 million euro. The value of investment was expected to increase. The Asian high-tech firms would make a significant contribution to the modernization of Hungarian industries. Other aspects in the relations as logistics, education and tourism were also important. Diplomatic instruments including high-level visits, business delegation visits, participating interregional forums such as ASEM, and offering development cooperation programs such as tied-aid loans could be employed to achieve the goal and fortify Hungary's image. We will see that these arguments and suggestions were brought up again in the foreign policy strategy document of the second Orbán government.

Following the parliamentary debate, Hungary's external relation strategy in 2008 under Foreign Minister Kinga Göncz and Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány mentioned Asia as "one of

the world's economic poles" with "highly emerging dynamic developing countries emerging as technology exports", which will have "an increasing impact on natural resource and international finance". The term "globalization" was brought up and viewed as both "opportunity and challenge", as more regions and countries that were neglected in the previous foreign policy strategy were then addressed. Hungary turned to pay more interest in its place in the international context beyond the sphere of traditional partners in Europe.

In this 2008 strategy, the foreign policy of Hungary was described to operate on the "value-based" basis, because it encompassed the common values of UN, NATO and EU, which are the intergovernmental organizations that Hungary belongs to, as a source of its foreign policy values. It stated the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, human and minority rights, entrepreneurial freedom, and the security of cultural, religious and ethnic diversity⁵. However, it is interesting to note that Hungary left the room for China based on China's reputation in human rights violations. László Várkonyi stated in 2007 at the parliamentary meeting that even though Hungary was following value-based foreign policy with almost all partners as how other European states were doing; Hungary would pursue an "interest-based" foreign policy with China. His argument was that Hungary shall consider of Hungarian firms interested in operating business with Chinese partners. If the benefits in China meet the expectation of Hungarian businesspeople, then Hungarian government shall support the process. I see that the rhetoric is still present in the current Sino-Hungarian relations which are alive and well, in contrast to other European neighbors' skeptical perception of China in recent years. Hungary is securing its economic-focused relations with China as the most important Asian partner competently and vice versa thanks to the controversial mutual benefits in 17+1 format and Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. (Kaľan, 2012, ltet & Szunomr, 2015, Viktor, 2019)

In light of the Hungarian EU presidency, short-term and long-term strategies of Hungarian foreign policy were rethought. In 2010, their short-term plans were to accomplish "the management of the foreign policy aspects of breaking out of the difficult economic situation, the successful organization of the EU presidency and achieving a turnaround in "Hungarian-Hungarian" relations." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2011b, p. 8)

⁵ author's translation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2008

The “Hungarian-Hungarian” relations refer to the maintenance of relations with ethnic Hungarian minorities living abroad by guaranteeing rights and protections, as well as naturalization and preservation of Hungarian language and culture.

The other significant events, the Global Financial Crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, have had significant economic and labor effects especially in the European Union. The foreign policy strategy after Hungarian presidency openly criticizes the EU’s decision that influenced Hungary to seek alternative partners. It claimed that in spite of successful national decisions of Hungary and Poland during their EU presidencies, the Union’ continuous financial and economic problems raised doubt in its member states, in particular Hungary and presumably Poland, in the EU’s economic system and political functioning. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2011, p. 5) Another emphasis was shown in the 2010 National Cooperation Program that Hungary needed a new opening to the world economy, implying opening up to the East while enjoying the EU membership status. It must connect its export economy to other rapidly growing economies of China, Russia, India and other East Asian countries. Prospective fields of Hungarian exports consist of agriculture, processing industry and tourism. (Ministry of National Resources of Hungary, 2010, p. 38). In this document, the names of countries were clearly illustrated, paving the way to the new direction of Hungarian foreign policy.

As a result, the second Orbán government starting from 2010 took this event to construct their own foreign policy direction away from the EU. His famous remarks, “We are sailing under a Western flag, though an Eastern wind is blowing in the world economy.” (Orbán, 2010, cited in Adam, 2019) paves the way for the new foreign policy orientation - the “East”. Less than a year afterwards, his government officially introduced the economic foreign policy with a special emphasis on “**Eastern Opening**” (Keleti nyitás). In May 2011, At the OECD 50th Anniversary Week in Paris, Orbán stated that Hungary was trying to pursue the concept of "Eastern Opening" to reinforce foreign economic relations. Some examples of countries in the scope were given as bilateral meetings with prime ministers of China, South Korea and Japan took place during the week. As an addition to the core policy goals, strengthening its global attention (sometimes mentioned as global opening) became one of the long-term goals after the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2011. It hopes to revitalize the relations with regions and countries that it was seen less active during communism. Moreover, it aspires to participate

in the process of influencing regional and global agenda. In connection with the small state concept, this reflects the enlarged self-identity of Hungary. (Szalai, 2017, p. 347) It sees itself as a small country with limited resources. ("Hungary is a small, open economy, and so it is greatly influenced by developments in the world economy." (Hungarian National Bank, 2012, p. 24)) However, it still aspires to recognize its position in the realignment of global order and economic power.

The term "**East**" is a vast umbrella term with no concise definition. It can mean any country located eastward of Hungary, from Russia to China, which are considered the main partners regarding the trade volume, or from Turkey to India and Japan. (Rácz, 2011) However, it is interesting to point out that Russia is included, but the immediate neighbors as Ukraine and Belarus are never mentioned under the Eastern Opening framework, as they already appear in the EU's Eastern Neighborhood Policy.

The year 2011 marks an important milestone in Hungarian politics, as it took the six-month rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. The pre-Lisbon treaty would benefit the new small state's visibility as they can gain access to the chance to represent the Union and manage their own national interests at the same time. Moreover, small states could equally enjoy "a valuable opportunity to play a major international role not only with/on behalf of the EU and other Member States but on the wider world stage" (Humphreys, 1997, p. 15, Bengtsson, 2004, cited in Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006, p. 663). However, with the Lisbon treaty in 2009, the increasing role of the newly-founded European Union External Action (EEAS) guided by the double-hatted High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has more role in promoting the EU missions abroad. The Presidency role does not influence the work of EEAS much due to its swiftly changing presidency rotation period. Still, Hungary had the opportunity to address its external relation approach with Asia-Pacific through hosting the 10th ASEM-FMM in Gödöllő, where a number of parallel meetings were organized. Aligned with the meeting, the bilateral meeting between Hungarian Prime Minister and Chinese Prime Minister was arranged. The parties discussed the strengthening of cooperation in economy, trade, science, technology, culture, education and tourism. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 2011)

The 2011 meeting marked the 15th anniversary of ASEM establishment. The main theme addressed non-traditional security challenges, including terrorism, food and energy security, climate change, disaster relief, disease management, as well as illegal cross-border migration. The venue was a strategic choice, as it bears national historical importance. Royal Palace of Godolló is one of the largest Hungarian Baroque palaces, reflecting the peak of Hungarian civilization and the grandeur of architectural masterpiece. It was inhabited by important aristocrats and political figures, including Empress Elizabeth (Sisi) of Austria-Hungary in the 19th century and Regent Miklós Horthy during the World War. The host country, Hungary, could take pride in presenting its glorious history through magnificent architectural and cultural heritage. The same venue hosted other meetings during the Hungarian Presidency, for example, the informal meeting of health ministers during 4-5 April 2011. Coincidentally, the second half of 2011 was handed over to the Polish presidency. Unlike Hungary, Poland did not host any interregional meeting with Asia-Pacific.

As a result of the EU presidency and the Eastern Opening policy, Hungary has taken the shift in its foreign policy direction by including trade and investment promotion and started a proactive strategy in seeking for new markets and strategic partners eastward, in order to diversify Hungary's trading relations within the EU (Tarrósy & Morenth, 2013) in the new world order. The official Eastern foreign economic strategy (“Keleti külgazdasági stratégiája”) was announced in 2012. The strategy mentioned the 4 priority pillar regions: 1. the “Far East”, especially with China 2. the Caucasus region 3. the Arab world, and 4. The Western Balkans. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012) It can be implied that Southeast Asia can fall into the first category, based on the presumption of the Far East notion.

The subsequent policy direction, “**Southern Opening**” (Déli nyitás), was announced later in 2015 to include regional partners in Africa and South America. Altogether, the “**Global Opening**” (Globális nyitás) policy initially aims at strengthening foreign relations with countries of the "South" and the "East" by boosting foreign trade volume and expanding its investment portfolio beyond its traditional trade partners in Europe.

According to this policy, a number of high-level visits between Hungary and target countries have been initiated. A series of changes has unfolded. Economic diplomacy was recognized and emphasized; therefore economic-focused approaches were introduced. Former

Foreign Minister Tibor Navracsics announced that the change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs name into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2014 was to assume more responsibility in foreign trade and investment. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary, 2014)

The expansion and fortification of Hungarian economic attachés was one of the key agenda, both in the increase of the number of diplomats in important posts and quality as in training sessions by Hungarian Export Promotion Agency. Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not the sole actor anymore. Multilateral cooperation within Hungarian government is crucial. Cooperation between governmental agencies were seen, such as Hungarian Export and Import Bank regarding tied-aid loans, the Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of Human Capacities, and Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency. Beside these institutions, the role of Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and its new internal departments is also noteworthy in driving ahead the bilateral agreements and joint committees for economic cooperation. (Szunomár, 2017, p. 8)

Foreign trade representations as Hungarian National Trade Houses (HNTH) under the supervision of the Foreign Affairs Ministry were inaugurated in the following countries in Asia-Pacific: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam. However, its criticism was the inefficiency to actually assist Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises in gaining market entry in the destination countries (Szedlacsek, 2018) and growing financial losses (Adam, 2019). The decision to suspend the trading house network was made in 2018. The responsibilities of promoting Hungarian export now belong to the Hungarian Export Promotion Agency.

Apart from the unsuccessful commercial approach, new diplomatic missions serving traditional diplomacy were opened. To illustrate, a consulate-general in Ho Chi Minh, the second largest city in Vietnam, was inaugurated in 2016. Some missions that were suspended due to the lack of resource and political importance were resumed. For example, the Hungarian embassy in Kuala Lumpur and Manila was reopened in 2015 and 2018 respectively. Hungarian officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade explained that Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are becoming more important and gaining more momentum in trade relations. Bilateral cooperations have been initiated, mostly in the field of economy, business as well as science and technology. Joint economic committees were set up to serve as an institutionalized framework to reinforce Hungary's commercial positioning in various partner countries. However, the agenda shall mutually serve both parties.

This resonates with the latest national export strategy between 2019 and 2030. The Export Strategy aims at diversifying the export market and increasing the ratio of extra-EU exports of Hungary, as affirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's Deputy State Secretary for Export Development, István Joó in 2019. The Export Strategy shows a list of cooperation expertise of Hungary and how they are perceived in different partner countries around the world. The key cooperation areas listed are food industry, agricultural technology, pharmaceutical industry, medical equipment, construction and water management. There are four levels of foreign policy implementation assessment, including existing markets having the maximum market potential, existing markets having high potential, new markets having realistic moderate potential, and the area lacking market entry potential. From the classification, the majority of Asia-Pacific countries show strong potential for Hungarian business in the areas of water management, as well as food and pharmaceutical industries. However, Hungary is still struggling to extend its trade and investment portfolio in the region through agricultural and construction technologies. With this information, Hungarian government could rethink its foreign trade strategy and tailor the approach in different subregions through its diplomatic network to achieve the best result.

Apart from trade and investment promotion, Hungary's education diplomacy on the human resource development program, **Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship scheme**, was launched in 2013 complementing the Global Opening policy in order to "promote the internationalization and the quality development of Hungarian higher education, to reinforce the international relations of the Hungarian scientific elite, to increase the diversity of Hungarian higher education institutions and to promote Hungary's competitive higher worldwide". (Tempus Public Foundation, 2019, p. 4) as well as "promote cultural understanding, economic and political relations between Hungary and other countries". (European Commission, 2020n) Tétényi. (2018, p. 7) discussed the importance of Stipendium Hungaricum as a "flagship" development assistance program. He added that the education scholarship program led to the Hungarian government's sense of ownership in international development policy. According to the information provided by Budapest Metropolitan University in 2019, the total budget for Stipendium Hungaricum is 75 billion HUF (233,778,037 EUR) until the academic year 2019/2020. Afterwards, it is expected to increase annually at 5 billion HUF as it expects around 5000 new Stipendium Hungaricum students each academic year. In the academic year 2019/2020, it is reported that there are around 9,000 scholarship recipients under this framework. The program offers scholarships in higher

education from the sending partner countries, which their number is expected to grow every year. The partners in Asia-Pacific include Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, The Philippines, and Vietnam. Tempus Public Foundation is the responsible institution for the scholarship programs management, and coordinates with various ministries in different bilateral educational cooperation agreements.

It is interesting to see that the previous national scholarship scheme, Bilateral State Scholarship (interchangeably Hungarian State Scholarship), is still in place. However, the list of sending partners draws a clear distinction between the target regions in the “Global Opening” policy and the traditional European partners, as the boundary between Global South and Global North. The list includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United State of America.

Regarding cultural connection, it is worth noting that Hungary has tried to claim ancient Asian origin and cultural heritage in order to create a mutual sentiment at a public level. The Hungarian foreign policy strategy after the EU presidency claims that Hungary was founded by tribal nomads of (Inner) Asian origin, and Hungarian researchers and explorers have contributed to the Asian civilization. The document quoted a few prominent scholars and explorers in Asia-Pacific and “Turan” area, including Alexander Csoma de Kőrös in India, Ármin Vámbéry in Turkey, Iran and Central Asia, and Aurél Stein in Central Asia and Western China. The opening remarks of former Foreign Minister Martonyi at the ASEAN Awareness Forum in 2012 put a special emphasis on Hungary’s Asian origin and therefore slight cultural similarity. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 2012a) In 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a booklet in the series Factsheet of Hungary entitled “Hungarians Exploring the Orient”, which was based on the research collections of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The booklet narrates the stories of Hungarian researchers and explorers who travelled across Asia, in a broad sense. The travelling exhibitions under the same title were organized during 2015-2016 in different capitals, including Amman, Baku, Bangkok, Jakarta, Shanghai, and Tokyo.

There is some truth in this discourse at least linguistically due to Hungarian language not belonging to Indo-European language family. Recent genetic research suggests that Hungarian

warrior conquerors were heterogeneous, coming from different places in Eurasia. One third of the components was presumably from Inner Asia. (Fóthi et al, 2020) Hungary even goes further. It specifically claims the Turkic origin, which its credibility is still unproven, by participating as an observer in the Turkic Council Summits in 2018 and 2019. This could be explained by the Hungarian Turanism ideology which was accepted by government political parties as Jobbik and Fidesz (Kowalczyk 2017, p. 57, Pap & Glied 2018, p. 1046, p. 1048), and coincidentally supports the Eastern Opening strategy as it reaches out non-European potential partners. This move is unique among European nations. I see this as an interest-based approach towards non-European Asian countries. However, regarding the political discourse of Asian values, this strategy has put Hungary in a paradoxical limbo between Europe and Asia. Hungary's outstanding anti-Western, Euro-skepticism marks Hungary a "black sheep" in the EU. However, its geographical location and history would never make it fit any other regional grouping.

HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASEAN FROM 2011


A particular literature providing analysis and insights of characteristics between ASEAN and Hungary is very limited. László Kozár and György Iván Neszmélyi are among the few scholars who conducted research on Hungarian relations with ASEAN member states following the Eastern Opening strategy, in particular with Vietnam due to shared socialist history since the Cold War. Their research in 2017 entitled "Hungarian Endeavours For the Enhancement of Economic Relations in Southeast Asia Focusing on a New Partnership with Vietnam" elaborates the Hungarian agricultural trade volume to ASEAN. They point out that ASEAN offers tropical agricultural products that are needed in Hungary's food industry and cannot be grown domestically, such as spices, cocoa, coffee and certain tropical fruits. On Hungarian side, wheat export has been growing, even though the competition with other European and American exporters is still high. The obstacle in both ways is in the logistics fiend complexity. The latest research in 2018, "Economic Relations Between Hungary and the ASEAN Region", focuses on the case study in Vietnam. Its main agricultural products are coffee, rice and corn. The researchers suggested a joint public warehousing and logistics company in order to boost the bilateral trade and increase the value of the agricultural commodities. From all three articles, one important obstacle they pointed out is the lack of knowledge of Hungarian entrepreneurs in the Asia market

in general, including ASEAN market, as well as the lack of financial support to enter the market and do market research. This is both a cause and a result of a small share of ASEAN representation in Hungarian foreign trade.

ASEAN was mentioned minimally, yet interestingly. The Hungarian foreign policy strategy after EU presidency referred to ASEAN positively, as an example of a successful regional integration, which possesses "one of the most dynamically growing economic areas of the world" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 44) Its key areas of interest in ASEAN lies in the economic and development possibilities through cooperation in international institutions, such as ASEM. It aims to enhance both national and European representation in Asia. Therefore, it can be implied that Hungarian foreign policy implementation in ASEAN is serving both Hungary and the EU.


The latest trade statistics from Hungarian Central Statistical Office show that the trade volume between Hungary and ASEAN countries is very minimal. The first chart shows the Hungarian trade in goods statistics from 2011 to 2019 with ASEAN. On average, from 2011 to 2019, compared to the total Hungarian external trade volume, ASEAN's average share of exports is 0.63% while an average share of imports is 1.7%. It suggests the continuous trade deficit with ASEAN. Hungary has run an average trade deficit of 266,674.2 million HUF in goods. Meanwhile, the second chart shows the volume of international trade in services statistics from 2011 to 2019 between Hungary and ASEAN as a whole bloc. In contrary to the EU trade statistics with ASEAN, it illustrates the continuous trade surplus with ASEAN. Hungary has run an average trade surplus of 29,401.8 million HUF in services.

Hungarian External Trade in Goods with ASEAN (million HUF)



Source: author's own compilation from Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2020a)

Hungarian External Trade in Services with ASEAN (million HUF)



Source: author's own compilation from Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2020b)

POLITICAL DIMENSION OF HUNGARIAN-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU DIPLOMACY

Since the EU accession in 2004, Hungary has continuously participated in the international dialogue platforms between the EU and Asia. One of the most active platforms are biennial EU-ASEAN ministerial meetings, and ASEM. ASEM is an informal intergovernmental process fostering cooperations and dialogues between Asian and European partners. Its unique informally-established structure is not facilitated by a permanent secretariat, but ASEM Coordinators who are appointed from both regions. On the European side, the EEAS and the EU Presidency are the European Coordinators. Therefore, every six month the new EU member state would step up to take the coordinator role. On the Asian side, each term of Coordinators lasts for two years. The coordinator team comprises of one ASEAN and one non-ASEAN partner. This non-institutionalized structure resembles the Visegrád group and receives similar criticism as being fluctuant due to the short coordinating term, and not being able to conclude any tangible achievement. It might be questionable whether the six-month term of EU Presidency in the ASEM Coordinators would lead to the inconsistency of the policy conduct, as each member state presumably does not value the importance of ASEM in the same level. However, the permanent coordinator from the EU side is the EEAS, therefore workflow consistency can be ensured.

Hungary's role in representing the EU in ASEM took place during the Hungarian presidency in the first half of 2011. It hosted two ASEM Senior Officials' Meeting in April and June. At that time, Norway and Switzerland submitted the application to participate in ASEM in March 2011. The application was facilitated and taken care of by ASEM Coordinators, which at that time included Belgium, Hungary, Laos and Japan. At the ASEM-FMM10 in Hungary, the agenda on ASEM enlargement was discussed and the draft report of acceptance was prepared for the next ASEM Summit in 2012. At the discussion, ministers agreed that bipolar model of interregional cooperation between Europe and Asia had to be carried out following the ASEM enlargement. This ASEM enlargement could be given credit to Hungary as a European ASEM coordinator and ASEM host.

The ASEM-FMM10's overarching theme was "Working together on non-traditional security challenges". (ASEM, 2011) Various issues were discussed, but the non-traditional

security challenges and how they could impact regional stability and prosperity was the main issue. The challenges include climate change and its effect on natural resource and natural disaster, nuclear safety, terrorism, transnational organized crime, cyber security and the impairment of human security, the efficiency of international cooperation on humanitarian aid and disaster preparedness as well as disaster relief and management. As a result, the partners supported various measures to tackle these global issues, including the establishment of non-trade-distorting policy measures to stabilize commodity prices, humanitarian actions under different multilateral framework of actions, collaboration with energy safety regulation agencies, and promotion of low-carbon green growth. However, the ASEM partners could only be committed to cooperation and creating initiatives without any legal-binding agreement.

Hosting an international meeting could be both a benefit and challenge. Happenings related to the meeting will gain free media coverage. The hosting city or country could take pride in their cultural heritage, which would be featured in the press. As they prepare the agenda, national interests could be subtly asserted as long as they benefit all parties. The downside is an immense workload in the preparation of the venue and meeting agenda. The host, however, surely sees the benefits outweigh the drawbacks.

NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Presently, Hungary has 9 diplomatic missions in ASEAN: Indonesia (accredited for Eastern Timor), Malaysia (accredited for Brunei Darussalam), the Philippines (accredited for Palau), Thailand (accredited for Laos and Myanmar) Singapore and Vietnam (accredited for Cambodia). Hungary sees the gap in the European diplomacy and promotion of European norms and interests that it ambitiously aims to fill in order to achieve national interests. This could be reflected in the attempt to initiate and sustain high-level state visits, working visits and inter-parliamentary contacts.

I begin with Hungary's approach towards ASEAN as a bloc. Following the Eastern Opening strategy, Hungary hosted the ASEAN Awareness Forum in Budapest in 2012. In the following year, a more commercial approach was implemented as the organization of

ASEAN Business Forum by Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry. It aimed at helping ASEAN member states reach out to Hungarian entrepreneurs.

Hungary has engaged with ASEAN through high-level official visits. In 2012, the late former ASEAN Secretary-General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan was invited as a guest of honor to the annual Hungarian ambassadorial conference, usually held in summer. At the ambassadorial meeting, Prime Minister Orbán declared that Hungary is committed to collaborate more with ASEAN member states and East Asian countries, where “...economic growth, dynamism and investment opportunity are very dynamic and apparent to all of us” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012b). In the same pattern as the EU which regards ASEAN as an important market, ASEAN and East Asian economies as new markets were promising for Hungary in terms of new trade and investment opportunities. ASEAN has been appealing for Hungary due to its developing infrastructure, improved manufacturing capability, and purchasing power within the expanding middle class. It has been hoping to present more Hungarian products and services abroad, along with promoting its soft power through sustainable development, cultural exchange, education, tourism and knowledge sharing.

Later on, in 2016, Dr. Pitsuwan visited Hungary again after his term as a secretary-general had finished. He had a meeting with Prime Minister Orbán again. He was also presented at the ASEAN-related seminar organized by Institute of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is worth noting that the visit of Dr. Pitsuwan held an important political agenda. He was leading the Thai bid delegation lobbying for Thailand's candidature for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the term 2017-2018. Unfortunately, Thailand was not able to secure its seat. Critics pointed out that the political instability caused by the junta-led government affected the credibility of the country, leading to the loss of bidding to Kazakhstan. (Chachavalpongpun, 2016)

Hungary also reached out to individual ASEAN member states through state visits. Within this decade, there are a few significant occasions when ASEAN member states welcomed the highest state visits from Hungary. President János Áder paid official visits to Hanoi, Singapore and Vientiane in 2014, 2015 and 2019 respectively. Several other high-level visits also took place. Prime Minister Orbán visited Hanoi in 2017, as Vietnam was described to be a regional strategic partner (Székely, 2017) due to its long-shared history since the Cold War. During the visit, the tied-aid loan agreement was signed. Vietnamese-Hungarian business forum was organized.

This strategy is interesting, as it chooses one or a few countries in the region and devotes extra attention in order to achieve the goal set for the Eastern Opening. He even visited Jakarta twice, in 2016 and 2020. The visits to Indonesia in 2016 brought along business delegations and brought about the signing of Memorandum of Understanding in economic cooperation, with a focus on water management and renewable energy, which is Hungary's top diplomacy expertise. Meanwhile, the Hungarian state visit in 2020 marked the 65th anniversary of Indonesia-Hungary relations. A presidential visit was planned, but the Covid-19 outbreak postponed the program.

The ministerial level visits took place in many countries. For example, the year 2012 was full of ASEAN travels of former Foreign Minister Martonyi to Bangkok and Jakarta. Foreign Minister Szijjártó also made frequent visit to ASEAN. One of the most important visits is in October 2016 when he participated in the ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting in Bangkok. It is seen that Hungary has shown its intention to connect and engagement with ASEAN. The result of the visits will have to be observed on the long run, as economic changes take time.

ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF HUNGARIAN-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU DIPLOMACY

Hungary's commitment in the ASEM engagement is remarkable. In terms of participation, Hungary is regularly represented in various platforms, such as Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF) After the Presidency was over, Hungary had another opportunity to represent the EU and itself in hosting the meetings of Ministries of Transports in 2019. The meetings held in Hungary consist of the 1st ASEM Transport Senior Officials' Meeting (ASEM-TSOM1) in June and ASEM-TSOM2 in December. Both meetings were a preparation towards the 5th ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting (ASEM-TMM5) held in Budapest in 2019 after the previous edition in Bali in 2017. The meeting was presided over by Hungary's Minister for Innovation and Technology, Prof. Dr. László Palkovics. The key themes discussed at the meeting included digitalization and decarbonization of transport systems towards sustainable connectivity between Europe and Asia.

At the opening remarks, Dr. László Mosóczy, Minister of State for Transport Policy of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology presented a general overview of Hungarian transport policy on behalf of Minister Palkovics. Transport is valued as an aspiring field with potential for

innovation and development. Transport sustainability could significantly complement Hungarian development policy framework and be pursued in terms of regional and interregional connectivity. Key features of transport connectivity between Asia and Europe consist of sustainability, energy efficiency, and inclusivity. Along with other participants, Hungary took the opportunity from the platform to represent their digitalized transport innovation and technology, such as Hungarian vehicle test track, railway automation solutions and electronic toll collection system. Regarding the decarbonization and sustainable transport networks, Hungary presented its flagship Budapest enhanced logistics simulation and Hungarian air traffic management to reduce aviation emission.

The ASEM-TSOM3 was recently organized by the Hungarian Government in May 2020 through a videoconference due to the pandemic situation. The main topics of discussion covered the follow-up of experience from ASEM-TMM5, the global impacts in transportation regarding Covid-19 and preparation towards the ASEM-TMM6. The pandemic is seen both as an obstacle that disrupts the normal life activity, and a challenge that countries shall strive to overcome by maximizing their capacity and cooperating with their partners. An establishment of a collaborative working group within ASEM for interregional transport solution was proposed.

Organizing these meetings truly serve Hungarian national interest in national transport policy and improve the position of Hungary in the global stage. The development of transport and infrastructure in Hungary is very important, as it aspires to position itself to non-European partners as a strategic "Gateway to Europe" due to its actual geographical location in the center of Europe and its transport system. Arguably, other Central European countries claim the same position, such as Poland, Czech Republic, even Germany. One of the objectives of Hungarian transport policy (2003-2015) aims at development and expansion of connection to neighboring countries. This is a result of the Europeanization of national policy that EU candidates should increase their connectivity with future EU neighbor states. Engaging in ASEM does not limit Hungary to only its traditional neighbors, but global partners in Asia. This leads to another priority objective in the includes the globalization of transport (Ministry of Economy and Transport of Hungary, 2007, p. 36) and improvement in freight logistics with non-European regional trading partners, specifically with Asian partners, due to an increase in foreign trade outside the EU. (Ministry of Economy and Transport 2007, 36) Moreover, the focus on sustainability of transport (Osztér, 2017, p. 5) through economic sustainability of passengers and conscious infrastructure development

resonates with the key agenda of the meetings in 2019. Due to shared goals, the ASEM transport agenda will be a guideline for Hungary's national transport policy development.

Another objective in the policy plan of 2003-2015 concerns the promotion of the implementation of regional development objectives. This shows that economic activity and development programs are intertwined. I see this as a possible lead to another initiative Hungary brought about under the ASEM framework to both complement its national goals, and serve the European interest, which is the interregional cooperation in connectivity and sustainability of the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (Danube Strategy). I will continue the discussion of Hungarian development policy in the following section.

NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Under the Hungarian national export strategy in 2019, a clearer guide towards customized needs and potential of each country was demonstrated. According to the latest EU-ASEAN strategy, EU-ASEAN Plan of Action, the economic dimensions to be promoted include traditional trade, business and investment between the regions, SMEs, transport, energy, ICT, food, agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture, forestry, research and innovation, as well as science and technology. (European Commission, 2017). To support my hypothesis, the fields that are not of European interest such as water management and are given importance here to fill the gap of European diplomacy. This will be emphasized in the key cooperation areas in the important trading partners' joint commission on economic cooperation. (JCEC)

As mentioned earlier, Hungary initiated bilateral trade engagements with potential countries as an instrument to pursue its own economic goals. ASEAN member states that are officially on the JCEC with Hungary are Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam. Providing that the EU-ASEAN FTA negotiations are still not concluded, and only EU-Vietnam and EU-Singapore FTA were ratified, individual EU member states are in the place of strengthening bilateral relations on their own before the realization of interregional economic cooperation. Hungary's first JCEC meeting in ASEAN was with Indonesia in 1988. Right after the EU accession, Hungary initiated the meetings with the other two ASEAN member states, Thailand and Vietnam in 2005. The Philippines had an opportunity to participate in the inaugural

meeting in 2017 in Budapest. The common theme of discussion in ASEAN, apart from the primary aim of economic and trade opportunities, cover water management, healthcare industry, international development programs, tourism, as well as education and cultural cooperation.

Following the transport cooperation, Hungary is pursuing its transport policy on its own. Currently there is an attempt to finalize the ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (ATA) as indicated in the EU-ASEAN Plan of Action 2018-2022. The adoption of this agreement will enhance the "bloc-to-bloc" aviation cooperation to the new level by establishing an interregional open aviation area arrangement and liberalize aviation market access for both regions' commercial airlines. (Tan, 2015, p. 5) The agreement will allow airlines from both regions to fly between regions without restriction on capacity, frequency, schedule, number of passengers and aircraft type. This will benefit the airline hubs in ASEAN and EU in terms of income generation, and businesspeople wishing to expand their business in other regions. As the ATA is not yet finalized, Hungary tries to seek an advantage from its existing partners. In 2017, following PM Orbán's state visit to Singapore, Hungary and Singapore signed an air transport agreement which liberalizes the airline travels between two countries.

DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF HUNGARIAN-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU DIPLOMACY

Water diplomacy has been on the foreign policy priorities of Hungary. It particular corresponds to the sixth goal of SDGs, ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for everyone. This even increases the legitimacy of Hungary in adding water diplomacy to its foreign policy conduct. Hungary takes pride in their knowledge in water management and natural disaster prevention. It aspires to assert water management to the global level and expand cooperation with ASEM partners. The historic major flood in Szeged in 1798 and Budapest in 1838, Hungarian authorities demanded the reconstruction of river embankment and improvement of flood prevention systems, along with the new city planning. Based on their unique characteristics, which is the landlocked geographical location with limited access to natural water resources, Hungary has developed a strategy to sustain itself with limited resources and aimed at experience sharing as their soft power diplomatic tool.


As Hungary led a pivotal role in the Danube Regional Cooperation Strategy (EUSDR), Hungary also took a lead in proposing an interregional cooperation with the Greater Mekong Region. Both the Danube and Mekong river are long international river basins. The Danube river runs 2,850 km in total length through 10 European states: Germany, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine. On the other hand, Mekong's length is 4,350 kilometers. It includes the territory of six Asian states: China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam. The transboundary nature of both river basins induces the share of responsibility on every neighboring country and a transnational dialogue platform for cooperation.

Pursuing water diplomacy as top foreign policy administration, Hungary benefited from the ASEM as it launched the first ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue (ASEM-SDD) in 2012 upon consultation with ASEM partners a year earlier during the meetings hosted in Hungary, even prior to the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG) in 2013. The theme of the event was the "Role of Water in Sustainable Regional Development Strategies". The ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue provides a platform for collaboration, which could be an example for sub-regional initiatives, with the Greater Mekong Sub-regional Cooperation Program (was established in 1992 and comprise of six countries) and Danube Region Strategy (was established in 2011 and comprises of 14 countries). In the official statement (ASEM, 2012), stemming from the water management issues, several possible interregional cooperations could be performed. To illustrate, "regional connectivity, economic integration, through disaster preparedness and management, climate change and environment, water management and food security including the accessibility of drinking water, to even poverty reduction" (ASEM, 2012) Until 2019, Hungary has held the ASEM-SDD meetings twice, both the inaugural meeting in 2012 and the 7th meeting in 2018. Deputy State Secretary Joó stated in the opening speech of the 7th ASEM-SDD that the Eastern Opening foreign policy has helped Hungary push forward its foreign engagement with Southeast Asia. (Government of Hungary, 2018) Within the framework of water diplomacy, Hungary engages with ASEAN member states by exchanging knowledge in water management, agriculture, environmental management, construction and health. Following the meeting, the 3rd ASEM Seminar on Urban Water Management was organized in Budapest to create a discussion network of decision-makers and scholars in sustainable water management. However, apart from consultations and presentations,

no actual initiative was called after the meeting. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate whether anything is achieved in the ASEM framework.

NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Despite being a small economy, Hungary has conducted the soft loan diplomacy towards developing countries. The Hungarian international development policy has stood out from such policies in other EU member states. The differentiation was drawn in the low capacity and form of socialization. The previous plan before 2014 was criticized by the imbalance proportion between stakeholders and channels from private and public sector, which are also EU institutions. (Nguyen, 2016) The goal is not to contribute to global development. It rather serves Hungary's foreign policy and economic interests, as the assistance goes to individual country and does not occur in a transnational nature. (Szent-Iványi, 2012) The policy objectives are to establish economic partnerships and tackle with migration issues from the root cause by improving life quality in target countries. (OECD, 2020) As official development assistance (ODA) is an integral part of Hungarian foreign policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is the main responsible organization for the implementation and co-ordination of bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The main recipients are in the European Union's neighboring countries and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Since 2011, Hungary has approved two revisions to the International Development Cooperation Strategy and Strategic Concept for International Humanitarian Aid in 2014 (active during 2014 and 2020) and 2019 (active during 2020 and 2015). Improvements were made, such as the increase in ODA budget, more involvement of private sector and better coherence enhancement in commercial activities. In terms of transparency improvement, the policy has to correspond to declarations, principles and guidelines of international organizations such as the UN, OECD and EU. Main area of cooperations include access to water and sanitation, which corresponds to Hungary's prominent water diplomacy, healthcare, education, information technology, and sustainable agricultural production. The chart below represents Hungarian budget allocation of ODA and its share of Gross National Income (GNI). It is interesting that in 2018, the share of GNI escalated to 0.21% as more budget was allocated. The latest plan has aimed to reach GNI share in ODA to 0.33% by 2030.



Source: OECD (2020a)

ODA support for less-developed countries is an important part of the Eastern and Southern Opening foreign policies. The provision of tied-aid credit loan program is under the Ministry for the National Economy's official development assistance policy, which came into force in 2004. The responsible organization for disbursement is Hungarian Export-Import Bank, or casually Eximbank, and coordinated by Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The program offers financial assistance with low interest and generous grace period for developing countries wanting to implement infrastructure or social development investment. The important condition is that the donor country's companies, or organizations have to collaborate with the loan applicants. Eximbank is responsible for financing the principal of the loan, and the Hungarian government is liable for the cover of interest subsidies. As Hungary has set knowledge transmission as its foreign policy administration, as in the example of water diplomacy, this strategy will ensure profound Hungarian business-based cooperation with the target countries' local level. A number of ASEAN member states have benefitted from the Hungarian tied-aid loan programs, for example, Indonesia, Laos, Vietnam.

The interesting case of recipient are Laos and Vietnam. Laos and Vietnam have developed long-standing relations with Hungary since 1950s due to shared history during Communism.

Laotian and Vietnamese elites studied in Hungary, and later became “people-level” ambassadors when they returned home. Laos is among the first 10 countries who are top assistance recipient from Hungarian ODA. The cooperation between Hungary and Laos was reported to be raised to strategic level. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary, 2019) Currently there are two active development programs in Laos, an agricultural development program and a food safety program at a total value of 38.6 million USD. The third program of 160 million USD worth, which covers food safety, water management and electronic ID system, was first mentioned in 2017 and concluded in 2018. Negotiations on the fourth project on healthcare started in 2019.

Another large investment lies in Indonesia. Minister Szijjártó reported in 2020 that Indonesia received a loan worth 36.5 million USD for water management program which involves Budapest Waterworks. Consultations on future assistance are being made and new programs can be expected. I view this aspiration of Hungary an ambitious attempt to extend its influence in the Global South, especially in ASEAN. However, such tied-aid credit loan could work only in particular countries. Therefore, this type of engagement is not inclusive to the whole ASEAN.

Hungary is very proactive in conducting knowledge diplomacy. In 2017, Hungary signed cooperation agreement with ASEAN to improve education and human resource quality by providing scholarships for ASEAN students. (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017) ASEAN students will be provided access to scholarship to study in Hungary. Hungarian and ASEAN academics would visit each other via short-term study and research programs. This was aimed to enhance the image of both Hungary and the EU. Later on, it developed into the expansion of sending partners, for example, Thailand to the Stipendium Hungaricum scholarship program. The program is considered a flagship initiative under Hungarian knowledge diplomacy. It is worth noting that there is a difference in the eligible study areas for each ASEAN member state. The scholarship program offers both partial and full-degree studies, in both Hungarian-taught and English-taught programs. Students who choose to enroll in study programs taught in Hungarian are required to take 2-semester preparatory course in Hungarian language. For the academic year of 2020/2021, estimatedly 600 students from ASEAN (Embassy of Hungary in Bangkok, 2019; Embassy of Hungary in Jakarta, 2020) received scholarships to pursue tertiary education in Hungary. It is noted that Brunei has not participated as a sending partner yet. According from the information from Tempus Foundation, candidates from ASEAN can apply for all doctoral studies. However,

the majority of fields of study in bachelor's studies and master's studies are in science and technology, i.e. agricultural science, computer science and information technology, economic science, engineering, medical and health science, and natural science. On the contrary, only a few countries concluded the contracts with Hungary where humanities and social sciences are included. Singaporean and Cambodian candidates are eligible to apply for all study programs in humanities and social sciences. My hypothesis is that each ASEAN country pursues a different national interest and expects a different field of cooperation with Hungary. However, due to the lack of personal interviews with diplomats responsible for the program, the question could not be answered yet.

CHAPTER 4: POLISH ENGAGEMENT IN ASEAN

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA-PACIFIC AFTER EU ACCESSION IN 2004

Poland already has had an idea of “going global” since the accession to the EU in 2004. The foreign policy strategy towards non-European developing countries was adopted in late 2004, shortly after officially joining the EU. A determination to intensify economic relations with Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America was mentioned. Countries were categorized into two main groups, 17 priority countries (for example, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt and Brazil) and 13 important countries (for example, Mongolia, Pakistan, Vietnam, Iraq, Nigeria, Venezuela). Seeing from the country list, it could be viewed as an attempt to make up for long-lost relations during Communism. Kaczyński (2013) notes that the strategy was “Europeanized” in the way that it was following the mainstream European approach to create extra-EU political partnership and economic cooperation. Specifically speaking for Asia, the 2004 strategy drew a few broad policy guidelines, such as increasing its political presence in the region as a reliable dialogue partner in order to both strengthen the image of the EU in Asia and Polish image in the EU. In the economic dimension, Polish government could support Polish enterprises' activities in the Chinese market. Amendments in legal procedures regarding trade and investment might be reviewed. Poland could show an active participation in the EU cooperation and humanitarian-financial aid programs. In the cultural dimension, cultural institutes were advised to be opened in priority destinations in China, Japan and South Korea. Regarding the connectivity, Poland could expose itself as a logistic hub using their existing railway networks.

Later on, Asia has been presented in Polish foreign policy presentation at the session of the Sejm in 2007 by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Anna Fotyga that "development of economic cooperation has been granted priority in Polish relations with Asian countries" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, 2007). However, the highlight was put more on traditional larger Eastern partners as China, Japan and South Korea. A year later, Polish Visegrád Presidency in 2008-2009 statement regarding cooperation with external partners in 2008-2009 that "...In the framework of cooperation within the Article 133 Committee (Common Commercial Policy), Poland will organize consultations on

the following issues (...) free-trade negotiations with Asian countries (Korea, India and ASEAN)..." (International Visegrád Fund, 2008).

In terms of the policy declaration, Polish foreign policy priority strategy presented by the Polish Foreign Minister to the session of the Sejm in 2012-2016 and 2017-2011 described more on the expansion of their Eastern partner circle. ASEAN and India were mentioned as partner countries with economic importance. The annual foreign policy exposés of Polish foreign ministers from 2011 to 2019 suggest some interesting points. They give an idea how Poland has perceived Asia. In 2011, no specific Asian country was mentioned yet. The 2012 exposé mentioned the opening of new Polish cultural institutes in Tokyo, Beijing and New Delhi. In 2013, Poland recognized Asia's importance in international trade. Asian share in Polish export accounted for 12%. In this year, China was mentioned for the first time as Poland's important strategic partner. I see that this can explain the motive of Poland to enhance bilateral ties with China to a strategic partnership during former President Komorowski's official visit to Beijing in 2011. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Poland, 2011b) This is a major lift from a cordial cooperative partnership signed in 2004. The change in Polish Foreign Minister to former Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna in 2014 brought about the mention of selected Asian countries as Poland's important economic interest. Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Singapore, Myanmar and the whole ASEAN were referred. It is interesting that Myanmar was mentioned in 2014. I propose that the general election scheduled in 2015 was a point of interest for the world, and Myanmar signaled an opening of national economy. Poland has started its international development program with Myanmar in 2016.

In 2015, it was announced that Asia is Poland's trade partner. The EU should practice more practical policy towards Asia because of its economic importance. More countries were mentioned. To illustrate, China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Myanmar. These countries could be important partners in Polish non-European policy. Poland will strengthen bilateral relations with these countries via active participation in EU-Asia dialogues, organizations and regional forums of cooperation. It also aims to develop the EU's policy in Asia-Pacific according to the Polish economic and security interests. It will employ the people-to-people diplomacy track to achieve the goal.

In 2016, Witold Waszczykowski was nominated a new Foreign Minister. He announced that Polish enterprises shall receive more assistance in gaining market entry in Asia, especially East Asia. During President Xi's official visit to Poland, the two parties agreed on upgrade

the bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership. This is linked with the expansion of 16+1 summit which Poland will benefit greatly. Apart from China, more strategic partnership agreements were concluded with Japan and South Korea. ASEAN and India were regarded as important partners. Ultimately, the 16+1 initiative with China seemed promising for Poland, as it will contribute to the increased flow of trade and investment between Europe and Asia. In 2017, Poland's main trading partners in Asia are in East Asia. However, former minister Waszczykowski stated that Poland should strengthen its collaborations with other Asian countries.

The year 2018 welcomed the new foreign minister, Jacek Czaputowicz. His 2018 version of foreign policy exposé reiterated the importance of China. Japan and South Korea remain strategic partners. Poland should strengthen its relations with India and ASEAN. The presidential visit to Vietnam in 2018, first direct LOT flight to Singapore in 2019 and Poland's engagement in Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were mentioned and given importance in increasing the momentum in Polish-Asian relations. He also confirmed the economic importance of Asia to Poland in the following year.

From the 9-year course of foreign policy strategies, we can see a growing importance of Asia in the policy paper. However, there is a classification between countries in terms of priority. Clearly, China is Poland's number one partner. This is proven by the trade volume. Statistics Poland reported in 2019 that the Polish import from China in 2019 was for 125.7 billion PLN (32.8 billion USD), which accounted for 12.3% of the whole import. It is only second to the import from Germany (222.8 billion PLN, 21.9%). In 2020, the share of Chinese import to Poland was 12.4% of total import, while Germany and Russia held their shares in import as 21.8% and 6.4%. The total import value of the first half of 2020 was 262.5 billion USD. Therefore, China is the biggest trade partner in Asia-Pacific. Japan and South Korea are of secondary importance. India and ASEAN, with their less economic importance, are placed behind the East Asian neighbors.

A number of diplomatic instruments were implemented to approach the better relations with Asia-Pacific on a national level. One instrument is the establishment of Polish Investment and Trade Agency (PAIH), which functions similarly as Hungarian National Trading House. to boost the inflow of foreign direct investments to Poland and Polish exports abroad. The organization supports the internationalization of Polish enterprises in administrative procedure, legal solution and business matching assistance who seek global presence.

On the other hand, foreign companies wishing to establish their business in Poland will also be eligible to receive assistance. They are seen to be fulfilling the missions regarding commercial and business promotion. They collaborate with the diplomatic missions, which focus more on governmental relations. In Asia-Pacific, Polish Foreign Trade Offices (ZBH) offices are located in Bangkok, Chengdu, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore, Taipei, Tokyo, Yangon and Ulaanbaatar. Unlike the failure of HNTN networks, ZBH offices still operate well.

Similarly, to Hungary, a number of high-level visits between Poland and target countries have been initiated. Joint economic committees were also inaugurated with major Asian partners such as China and India. In the same manner, Poland employed education diplomacy in Asia-Pacific through a scholarship scheme. The Ignacy Łukasiewicz Scholarship Program, established in 2015, is a joint educational initiative between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Polish National Agency for Academic Exchange under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. It is implemented as a part of Poland's development cooperation program through financial contribution, volunteer work and development projects to developing countries. Students from the following Asia-Pacific countries which are considered developing countries are eligible to apply for the scholarship for second-cycle studies in the field of engineering and technical sciences, agricultural sciences, sciences and natural sciences: India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam. Students are also required to take one-year preparatory course in Polish language and culture, as well as foundation course for their prospective study program. It is worth noting that the number of eligible countries is smaller than Hungary.

In a similar pattern with Hungary, educational diplomacy is considered one of Poland's flagship development programs. Stefan Banach Scholarship Program, was established in 2013 at University of Warsaw (Gomółka, 2015, p. 361), two years earlier than the Ignacy Łukasiewicz Scholarship Program. The list of partner countries and objective of scholarship clearly state the importance of "Eastern Partnership" policy that Poland has initiated and is actively pursuing. Within the same framework of development assistance program, Stefan Banach Scholarship Program's intention is to support the socio-economic growth of developing countries in the Eastern Partnership, Central Asian and Western Balkan countries through educational diplomacy. The country pool consists of Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

Turkmenistan, as well as the following Western Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia.

Poland's opening towards non-EU partners is assumed to be the solution for trade export diversification in the same manner as Hungary, which it sees as overly dependent on the EU. According to the European Commission, in 2018, 80% of Poland's exports come from the EU member states (Germany 28%, Czech Republic 6%, France 6%). 69% of Polish imports are from the EU member states (Germany 27%, the Netherlands 6%, Italy 5%) (European Commission, 2018b). Under the EU mechanisms, there are a few platforms that Poland has employed to strengthen its relations with Asian countries in the similar manner as Hungary. Poland's participation in ASEM, EU-ASEAN dialogues and ASEAN Regional Forum is viewed among its foreign policy tools. (Zajączkowski, 2012)


POLISH FOREIGN POLICY IN ASEAN FROM 2011

Existing research Polish-ASEAN relations is scarce. There are only a few research articles. Kugiel (2014) argued that as Poland has run trade deficit with ASEAN continuously, it should increase the priority of ASEAN and conduct a proactive engagement by expanding support for Polish business wishing to enter the region. He suggested that defence, mining, transport and agriculture industries could be key export sectors of Poland. Wnukowski (2016, 2017) suggested upon the 50th anniversary of ASEAN that the instrument by PAIH, Go ASEAN, and EU-ASEAN business network, under EU mechanism, should be reinforced. PAIH and Polish embassies shall collaborate to support Polish entrepreneurs in ASEAN more. He pointed out Singapore and Vietnam as an attractive investment destination.

ASEAN was mentioned very minimally in the Polish foreign policy priority strategy. Within the timeframe of 2011 and 2020, there are two related foreign policy strategy documents, the 2012-2016 and 2017-2021 plans. The first strategy document recognized the importance of Asia-Pacific. It recommended Poland to reflect a positive image in the region as an EU member state. Therefore, this implies that Poland shall engage with the region with EU foreign policy guides. ASEAN was only mentioned once that cooperations with ASEAN should be conducted, as it is the most important regional integrated organization. In addition, the latest foreign policy exposé in 2019 by former minister Czaputowicz addressed ASEAN with a potential to export agricultural technology. His visit to Indonesia in 2018 was crucial

because of Indonesia's non-permanent membership to the UN Security Council in 2019. He saw that Indonesia could be an interesting ally.

The latest trade statistics from Statistics Poland show that the trade volume between Poland and ASEAN countries is very small. The chart below represents the Polish trade in goods statistics from 2011 to 2018 with ASEAN. On average, from 2011 to 2018, compared to the total Polish external trade volume, ASEAN's share in exports to Poland is 2.24% while an average share of imports from Poland is only 0.63%. Poland has run an average trade deficit with ASEAN of 1,080,484.5 million PLN in goods. The sectors with highest trade volume, and can potentially be prospective trade priorities with ASEAN, include chemicals, crude materials, food and live animals as well as machinery and transport equipment. However, the data on Polish trade in services with ASEAN was not collected by the Polish government.



Source: author's own compilation from Statistics Poland's Yearbooks of Trade of Foreign Statistics of Poland, 2012-2019

POLITICAL DIMENSION OF POLISH-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU DIPLOMACY

Poland regularly attends the dialogue fora under the EU initiatives, including ASEM and ASEAN-EU ministerial meetings. In 2016, Poland's delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Joanna Wronecka attended the 21st EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok. At the meeting, Poland represented the EU well, as Wronecka highlighted the importance of EU-ASEAN linkages and expressed support for more intensive cooperations. She stated that the cooperations would benefit both regions in terms of growth in trade and investment. While in 2019, at the 22nd EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting in Brussels, Poland had a chance to represent its environmental diplomacy through the outcome of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP24) in Katowice 2018. In this manner, Poland has expressed itself as a leader in climate protection to ASEAN leaders, despite the ongoing environmental issues. In addition, it also profited from this platform as Hungary by holding side bilateral talks with ASEAN foreign ministers, including from Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines. They had a chance to discuss mutual interests and European cooperations, which benefitted the EU-ASEAN relations.

NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Currently, Poland has 6 diplomatic representations in ASEAN: Indonesia (accredited for Eastern Timor), Malaysia (accredited for Brunei Darussalam), the Philippines (accredited for Palau), Thailand (accredited for Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia), Singapore and Vietnam. The Polish embassy in Manila was reopened in 2018. Poland seems to play a defensive strategy on engaging with ASEAN within the territory of Poland. Many events were organized. For instance, in August 2016, ASEAN ambassadors, forming the ASEAN Committee in Warsaw, were invited to a meeting with former Foreign Minister Waszczykowski. The parties discussed possibility to increase trade engagement, addressed the South China Sea dispute settlement mechanisms from the view of the EU, as well as informed the formation of parliamentary friendship groups. This shows that Poland attempts to give attention to ASEAN. In the times of former minister Czaputowicz, ASEAN ambassadors were invited again in 2018 to discuss trade and investment opportunities.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland attempted to increase the awareness of ASEAN for stakeholders in public and private sectors. Three Asia-Pacific Days at the Sejm in 2015, 2017 and 2018 were good initiatives and great start for Poland to start recognizing the economic importance of Asia-Pacific. Apart from demonstrating cultural shows and market opportunities in Asia-Pacific, including ASEAN, the events represented Poland as a "gateway to Europe" regarding location and business atmosphere. In this matter, Poland and Hungary share similarity in self-identification. The events were attended by Polish politicians, businesspeople, as well as diplomatic representatives from Asia-Pacific states.

Poland has given importance to high level visits and parliamentary groups. Among many state visits to ASEAN in In 2017, presidential visit of President Andrzej Duda took place in Vietnam with the aim to inaugurate PAIH office in Ho Chi Minh City, organize Polish-Vietnamese Economic Forum and business networking, as well as to sign ODA agreement with Vietnam, which was worth 296.5 million USD. The main topics of discussion were trade and investment, as well as official development and defence cooperation. Vietnam has always been an important ally of Poland due to the shared communist past. A large number of Vietnamese diasporas still live in Poland nowadays. Former minister Czaputowicz visited ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta and Singapore in 2018 and 2019 respectively.

ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF POLISH-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU DIPLOMACY

Poland took over the EU presidency from Hungary in July 2011 and presided over for six months. However, it could have been an unfit time for Poland to organize ASEAN or Asia-Pacific related events. In contrary to Hungary, Poland has hosted very few programs under the EU mechanisms. For instance, in 2006 it hosted the 9th ASEM Procedures Working Group Meeting in 2006 in Warsaw regarding customs procedures to facilitate interregional trade. In 2017, it hosted the 8th ASEM Customs-Trade Day in Sopot in 2017 regarding E-Commerce. Poland had an opportunity to advance their national interests and agendas forward. For instance, it informed the partners about their integrated paperless IT Customs System at the Procedures Working Group Meeting, as it aimed at exporting know-hows and taxation technology. However, it was difficult to track whether the expectation has met. In terms of EU representation, Poland has done well to support the EU, as it will certainly benefit from

the liberalization of trade with ASEAN member states. Former minister Czaputowicz's official visit to Singapore in 2019 was an important event. The year 2019 marked the 50th anniversary of Polish-Singaporean diplomatic relations. He gave a special lecture at regarding Polish perspective on the EU and approach to European defence and global security, amidst the contemporary traditional and non-traditional security threats. Most importantly, he addressed Poland's importance in the EU as the main actor involving in the formulation of EU's policy towards Asia, and ASEAN. I see that Poland has offered to be an advocate or "gateway to Europe". However, this is not the physical logistics gateway as mentioned above. It is rather a contact point of ASEAN regarding EU matters. In particular to Singaporean and Vietnamese entrepreneurs, the FTA conclusions with the EU in 2018 and 2019 respectively will be a great advantage for Poland. Poland benefits from the EU membership in terms of increasing its attractiveness in trade and investment. Entrepreneurs and investors will benefit from easier market access, as well as free movement of labor and capital within the EU as they choose to settle their business in Poland.

NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Economic cooperation with ASEAN countries is mostly in trade exchange, while ASEAN countries have outbound investment projects in Poland. For example, the International Container Terminal Services investment in Baltic Container Terminal in Gdynia is owned by a company from the Philippines since 2003, which is worth approximately 100 million USD, and the largest Thai agricultural conglomerate's stake acquisition in Polish poultry processor, Superdrom, in 2016 was worth 49.50 million EUR. No formal JCEC is done between Poland and any ASEAN state. Poland's major imports from ASEAN cover machinery, plastics, technical products, plastics, garments and textiles. On the other hand, the most important Polish exports to ASEAN include agricultural product, metals, mechanical and electrical devices, plastic derivatives, as well as chemical products,

Although Poland does not conduct specific bilateral JCEC with ASEAN countries, it has launched many economic programs targeting emerging markets. Polish Export Credit Agency (KUKE) is among the governmental organization responsible for export promotion. Currently, only four markets in ASEAN are represented in detail, including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Overall, KUKE's suggestion for these four emerging economies is that they have remarkable market growth and expanding middle-class, leading to growing purchase power as a whole. Singapore is regarded as a regional financial center in

the strategic central location. Vietnam's strength is the vast Vietnamese diasporas in Poland that can be the first contact point. However, there are six ZBH offices operate in ASEAN, in Bangkok, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Singapore. According to Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, the program "Export Activation on Selected Markets (Aktywizacja eksportu na wybranych rynkach)" and "Made in Poland" are a part of the Ministry of Economy's project to promote Polish economy in the international market. The export promotion programs are carried out in prospective new markets in Asia and the Balkans. In the strategy document, a few ASEAN countries were mentioned such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. With the collaboration from diplomatic and trade networks, business promotion activities will be organized. For instance, business workshops, online seminars, B2B meetings, and outbound business delegations. Selected potential sectors will be supported in order to increase the trade volume, such as Polish food specialties. The "Made in Poland" program aims at strengthening the Polish brand on international markets, including Polish products and technology.


In particular to ASEAN, Polish foreign policy priority document 2017-2021 suggested the approach towards ASEAN by launching special export projects, Go ASEAN, in a similar manner as Go Africa and Go China. PAIH was to be responsible for the projects. (Polish Investment & Trade Agency, 2016) The project was first mentioned in 2017. It aims at supporting Polish start-ups and SME entrepreneurs by providing consultation services for free. The programs help Polish business to explore less-traditional developing markets and gain market entry in a particular country or region. Assistances are offered, for example, supply of legal and commercial background of target country, provision of business training courses, as well as preparation for trade fair and business matching event attendance. One of the accomplishments from the Go ASEAN initiative is the visit of Vietnamese business delegation in November 2018 to West Pomerania. Business relations have already been established in the region, such as the Szczecin-Vietnamese cooperation in exporting Pomeranian timber to Vietnam. Vietnam, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, are among the most promising markets for Polish exports and investments. The other four countries include Algeria, India, Iran, and Mexico. Apart from that, Vietnam and Laos are among the countries under KUKI's Insurance Policy for the East (Polisa na Wschód). The policy targets risky markets in the politically instable developing countries in Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and South America. It aims to help entrepreneurs filtering credible business partners and provide insurance coverage in case of late payment from local contractors.

I see this a useful help for Polish entrepreneurs, so that they gain more confidence in investing and doing business abroad. In addition, recently, amidst the border lockdown and disruption of economic supply chain, Poland exported Polish agricultural products, including eggs, frozen vegetables and fish (Embassy of Poland in Singapore, 2020), to Singapore, as the country's limited territory is not capable of sufficient food production.

DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF POLISH-ASEAN RELATIONS

EU AND NATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Like Hungary, Poland is also an important ODA player. It coordinates with many international organizations, including EU institutions although not under a direct supervision or EU framework. In this matter, the Polish national diplomacy is more prominent than the EU mechanism in international development field. Development cooperation is a vital part of Polish foreign policy. The foundations of this policy lie in the implementation of SDGs, fighting poverty, as well as promoting democracy, social development and peacebuilding by helping those who are affected by armed conflicts. (Government of the Republic of Poland, 2019a) Types of assistance are categorized as development assistance, humanitarian aid and global education. Main target of cooperation lies in the Eastern Neighborhood and less-developed countries in Asia and Africa. In a similar manner as Hungary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland is responsible for the policy with the collaboration in financial contribution from Ministry of Finance. It aims at including private sector and civil society organization as project initiators and source of fund. The types of ODAs that ASEAN benefits from are ODA in priority countries according to the Multiannual Development Cooperation Program in 2016-2020, where Myanmar is the sole beneficiary in the region. Besides, bilateral development cooperations also count, including small grants, scholarships and credit agreements. The chart below represents Polish budget allocation of ODA and its share of GNI.



Source: OECD (2020b)

Under the human capital and entrepreneurship and private sector priorities, Myanmar receives development assistance loan from Poland in the field of healthcare and education through various programs under the framework of Polish Aid (Polska Pomoc), which has become active in 2011. Activities include clean water resource supply, quality healthcare provision for mothers with children in rural areas, increase of social integration for groups particularly at risk of exclusion, as well as access to education and social services. The human capital development reflects Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018-2030. The recent ODA budget allocation in 2017 and 2018 for Myanmar accounted for 4,086,182 PLN and 181.23 million PLN respectively. The majority of 2018 addition goes to credit agreement for waste-to-energy biofuel generation plant project in Yangon. The proposal was recently approved by the Myanmar assembly in early 2020.

Regarding education diplomacy, through EU mechanisms ASEAN students have access to EU-funded scholarships as Erasmus+. Through national diplomacy, National Agency for Academic Exchange (NAWA) supervises the scholarship scheme Ignacy Łukasiewicz, which only citizens from Indonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam that benefit from. The number of scholarship awardees in each year is uncertain. Estimatedly, up to 100 ASEAN

students receive scholarships particularly from this program annually to commence higher education in Poland. I view the development policy of Poland a good approach to promote Polish business and know-hows in the region, as well as increase Polish awareness in young generation, who later would drive the economy of their home country. As ODA policy of Poland targets more of less-developed countries, I see this a compensation of trade engagement with countries with stronger economies.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Hungary and Poland share similar methods while engaging with ASEAN. They benefit from having both their own national agenda and the EU common foreign and security policy. Both countries recognize the economic and political importance of ASEAN in the Asia-Pacific and in the international system. However, the low trade volume with ASEAN, insufficient knowledge of the region, and geographical distance put ASEAN in a lower priority in foreign policy matters and result in unclear policy direction. The geographic location leads to high shipment cost and long transportation lead time. Improvement of logistics in transnational connectivity certainly is the solution. The Belt and Road Initiative led by China will benefit not only Hungary and Poland in terms of interregional connection, but also other European states. However, the legitimacy and transparency in the operation is another question to be considered by each country's political decision-makers. In addition, the uneven economies of each ASEAN member lead to imbalance in engagement with individual country. For example, Brunei does not receive enough attention from neither Hungary nor Poland in all aspects. The reciprocity has to be done from both sides, in order to effectively reach each other.

In terms of EU mechanisms, both countries have supported the EU-ASEAN interregional cooperations. However, Hungary has done better in employing EU-led platforms to engage with ASEAN. It is seen from many initiatives, for example, the hosting of 10th ASEM while presiding the Council of European Union, as well as 1st and 7th ASEM-SDD meetings in 2011, 2012 and 2018 respectively. On the other hand, Poland has not benefitted well from the EU platforms apart from regular biennial ASEM summit and ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting participation. It needs to be more proactive and take an opportunity to increase its visibility in the region through the EU foreign policy tools. Poland either waits until its next turn of Presidency of Council of the EU in 2025 to assert more tangible initiatives as the EU presidency or takes example from Hungary to initiate its own way. I see that due to insubstantial financial and human capital resources of Hungary and Poland, there is a limitation in foreign policy conduct, especially in areas with lower foreign policy priority. In order to reach the region holistically and effectively, it is seen better to participate with the EU, for example, expressing support for the EU in the FTA negotiations with ASEAN countries and ASEAN as a whole under the bandwagoning theory. Due to uneven economic development in member

states, tailored national diplomacy approach could be conducted individually in potential strategic country partner.

In terms of national foreign policy strategy, Hungary and Poland have taken similar approach. Countries with more advanced economic potential, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam develop relations with Hungary and Poland on the basis of economic cooperation. On the other hand, countries with lesser developed economies, for example, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have been approached by Hungary and Poland by development diplomacy. The financial assistance offered to these countries is certainly conditional and benefits donor countries on the long run, as business cooperation is guaranteed. However, even though Indonesia and Vietnam are reported to have continuous economic growth, both countries also benefit from international development programs by Hungary. Machinery, pharmaceutical and chemical products and agricultural products remain both countries' major exports to ASEAN. More proactive export promotion plans, and thorough market researches could be the foreign trade strategy for Hungary and Poland to achieve higher trade activities. International taxation and customs procedures are among hindrances in international trade with ASEAN. Until the realization of long-awaited EU-ASEAN FTA, pursuing country-specific JCEC as Hungary could be one alternative to help entrepreneurs gain market entry.

Overall, my findings suggest that Hungary has attempted to be present in ASEAN more than Poland, using both the EU mechanisms and its own national diplomacy, despite being a country with small power and economy. Economic achievement cannot yet be confirmed, because the successful FTA signings with Vietnam and Singapore have just been concluded in 2018 and 2019. The FTAs with two pilot countries will set up standard and negotiation rules for the future EU-ASEAN FTA, which Hungary and Poland can benefit directly. With the unprecedented factor as the Covid-19 outbreak, the economic progress would be affected and become difficult to assess. Further research to evaluate the engagement of a third distinct state in ASEAN could complement the more critical and thorough result by measuring the country brand perception in the ASEAN countries among locals, as well as interviewing with various stakeholders and diplomats.

THE FUTURE OF INTERREGIONAL RELATIONS OF HUNGARY AND POLAND WITH ASEAN

The current situation in 2020 for Asia-Pacific is very fluctuating and difficult to predict due to the tension in USA-China trade war and the COVID-19 pandemic. The phase of these interregional interactions is also heavily affected by the outbreak. As travel restrictions into are still in place in all countries, including Hungary, Poland and the ASEAN member states, the short-term political visits with large delegation members are suspended. The international trade in goods and services, especially tourism, is certainly affected due to the suspension of unnecessary travels and economic slowdown. The exact number could be observed by the governments' statistical report by the end of the year.

In the case of Poland, I see that the new Foreign Minister, Prof. Dr. hab. Zbigniew Rau, who was recently appointed on 26 August 2020 would not cause any major change of foreign policy direction. His statement on the appointment day with Polish Press Agency was that "continuity is expected in Polish foreign policy" (Magyar Nemzet, 2020). At the moment, Poland's foreign policy priority concerns more urgent issues with its major direct neighbors. For example, the tense relations between the EU and Russia, and the diplomatic war with Belarus. I assume that the priority level of ASEAN in Polish foreign policy-makers' mind would remain the same. However, it is still a long way to observe the resume of foreign affairs implementation, especially the engagement of Poland in ASEAN. If Hungary and Poland would like to reach higher accomplishment, they could make use more of their intelligence resources in the government think-tank centers and set a clearer foreign policy guideline for the region. The EU foreign engagement mechanisms could help increasing their visibility in the region, especially with the success conclusion of FTA with major ASEAN member states as Singapore and Vietnam. One benefit from the EU FTA is the easier access to local markets. European products could increase their presence through improved commercial channels.

From the evidences discussed in this research, I believe that ASEAN remains a potential strategic partner for Hungary and Poland in Asia-Pacific. Instead of the whole bloc, a few countries with potential to develop deeper relations could be selected to pave the way. There is still ample opportunity for both countries to engage with ASEAN effectively. Bright future certainly lies ahead the two pilot Visegrád countries. They just need to refine the strategy and policy direction.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adam, C. (2019, 18 August). Another Business Failure: Viktor Orbán's "Eastern Opening". *Hungarian Spectrum*. Retrieved from <https://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/hungarian-national-trading-house/>

Áder Már Pakol Hosszú Kelet-Ázsiai Útjára. (2015, 7 April). *HVG*, Itthon. Retrieved from https://hvg.hu/itthon/20150407_Ader_mar_pakol_hosszu_keletazsiai_utjara

Amindoni, A. (2016, 1 February). Indonesia to Boost Bilateral Cooperation with Hungary. *The Jakarta Post*, National. Retrieved from <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/02/01/indonesia-boost-bilateral-cooperation-with-hungary.html>

Archer, C., Bailes, A. J., & Wivel, A. (Eds.). (2014). *Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Artner, A. (2017). Indonesia and the Regional Integration in Southeast Asia, in Novák, T. (ed.) *Go Hungary – Go Indonesia: Understanding Economic and Business Issues, Book 1*. Budapest: Budapest Business School.

ASEAN Secretariat. (2012a). Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013-2017). Retrieved from <https://asean.org/storage/images/archive/document/BSB%20Plan%20of%20Action%20to%20Strengthen%20the%20ASEAN-EU%20Enhanced%20Partnership%202013-2017.pdf>

ASEAN Secretariat. (2012b). Hungary Looks East, Keen to Open New Cooperation with ASEAN and East Asia. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/hungary-looks-east-keen-to-open-new-cooperation-with-asean-and-east-asia/>

ASEAN Secretariat. (2017). ASEAN, Hungary Sign Agreement on Education. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/asean-hungary-sign-agreement-on-education/>

ASEAN Secretariat. (2017). ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2018-2022). Retrieved from <https://asean.org/storage/2017/08/ASEAN-EU-POA-2018-2022-Final.pdf>

ASEAN Secretariat. (2019a). ASEAN Key Figures 2019. Retrieved from https://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/ASEAN_Key_Figures_2019.pdf

ASEAN Secretariat. (2019b). ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2019. Retrieved from https://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ASYB_2019.pdf

ASEM. (2011). 10th ASEM Foreign Ministers' Meeting (ASEMFMM10). Retrieved from <https://www.aseminfoboard.org/events/10th-asem-foreign-ministers-meeting-fmm10e>

ASEM. (2012). 1st ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue (ASEMSDD1). Retrieved from <https://www.aseminfoboard.org/events/1st-asem-sustainable-development-dialogue-role-of-water-in-sustainable-regional-development-strategies>

ASEM. (2018). 7th ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue (ASEMSDD7). Retrieved from <https://www.aseminfoboard.org/events/7th-asem-sustainable-development-dialogue>

ASEM. (2019). 18th ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue (ASEMSDD8). Retrieved from <https://www.aseminfoboard.org/events/8th-asem-sustainable-development-dialogue-on-promoting-water-partnership-towards-the-sustainable-development-growth>

Asian Development Bank. (2019). Asian Development Outlook (ADO) 2019 Supplement: Growth Slows Further in Developing Asia's Giants. Retrieved from <https://www.adb.org/publications/ado-supplement-december-2019>

Beasley, R. K., et al. (2012). *Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective: Domestic and international Influences on State Behavior*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Beeson, M, & Higgott, R. (2014). The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia's Middle Power Moment?. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 14(2), 215-237.

Bengtsson, R. (2004). The Council Presidency and External Representation. In Elgström, O. (Ed.). *European Union Council Presidencies: A Comparative Analysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Bersick, S. (2017). Political Implications of Maritime Security in Asia and on ASEAN-EU Interregional Relations: Inhibiting and Enabling Factors. Retrieved from https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/ipea/docs/Bersick_2017-11-24_Political-Implications-of-Maritime-Security-in-Asia.pdf

Bieńczyk-Missala, A. (2016). Poland's Foreign and Security Policy: Main Directions. *Revista UNISCI*, 40, 101-117. <https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-78913/UNISCIDP40-6ABienczyk-Missala1.pdf>

Budapest Metropolitan University. (2019). Internationalization in Europe: Theories and Best Practices from Budapest Metropolitan University [Slides]. Retrieved from https://erasmusplusfriends.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/BMU_Workshop-European-HE-in-the-World_2.pdf

Bull, H. (2002). *The Anarchical Society* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Buszynski, L. (1997). ASEAN's New Challenges. *Pacific Affairs*, 70(4), 555-577. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2761323>

Chachavalpongpun, P. (2016, 7 May). Is Thailand's UN Security Council Bid Dead on Arrival?. *The Diplomat*, The Debate. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/is-thailands-un-security-council-bid-dead-on-arrival/>

Choiruzzad, S. A. B. (2017). ASEAN in the Age of Anti-Globalization: Compartmentalized Regionalism (s) and Three Trajectories. *IKAT: The Indonesian Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 1(1), 1-16.

Clausewitz, C. (1992). *Historical and Political Writings*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clem, R. S., & Chodakiewicz, M. J. (2004). Poland Divided: Spatial Differences in the June 2003 EU Accession Referendum. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 45(17), 475-490. <https://doi.org/10.2747/1538-7216.45.7.475>

Cooper, A. (1997). *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R.A. & Nossal, K.R. (1993). *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vol. 6. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.

Czaputowicz, J. (2019). Poland's Perspective on the EU, Asia, and the Rules-Based International System. Retrieved from <https://www.iiss.org/events/2019/04/fullerton-poland-eu-asia-and-rules-based-order>

Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines. (2016). ACW Envoys and Polish Foreign Minister Discuss ASEAN-Poland Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/news-from-our-foreign-service-postsupdate/10131-acw-envoys-and-polish-foreign-minister-discuss-asean-poland-relations>

Desker, B. (2008). Is the ASEAN Charter Necessary?. Retrieved from <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/1097-is-the-asean-charter-necessary/>

Éltető, A., & Szunomár, Á. (2015). Ties of Visegrád countries with East Asia - Trade and Investment. *Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS Institute of World Economics Working Paper*, 214. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/iwe/workpr/214.html>

Embassy of Hungary in Bangkok. (2019). Hungarian President Visited Lao PDR. Retrieved from <https://bangkok.mfa.gov.hu/eng/news/koeztarsasagi-elnoeki-latogatas-laoszbán>

Embassy of Hungary in Bangkok. (2019, 29 November). The Success of the Hungarian Scholarship Program in the ASEAN Countries [Facebook status update]. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/HunEmbassy.Bangkok/posts/2530595713888402>

Embassy of Hungary in Jakarta. (2020, 13 August). Join the Virtual ASEAN-EU Cooperation & Scholarships Day 2020 on 13-14 August... [Facebook status update]. Retrieved from <https://www.facebook.com/HunEmbassy.Jakarta/posts/3187259814723294>

Embassy of Malaysia in Warsaw. (2016). Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Joanna Wronecka Took Part in the 21st EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Held in Bangkok on 13-14 October 2016. Retrieved from https://www.kln.gov.my/web/pol_warsaw/archive/-/asset_publisher/UBpSJvhT4qRh/blog/polish-deputy-foreign-minister-joanna-wronecka-took-part-in-the-21st-eu-asean-ministerial-meeting-held-in-bangkok-on-13-14-october-2016

Embassy of Poland in Singapore. (2020). First Imports of Eggs from Poland in Singapore. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/singapore/first-imports-of-eggs-from-poland-in-singapore>

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Poland. (2011). China, Poland Establish Strategic Partnership. Retrieved from <http://www.chinaembassy.org.pl/pol/zt/zfvisit/t888992.htm>

Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. (2011). Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Meets with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán. Retrieved from <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zgyw/t828830.htm>

European Cluster Collaboration Platform. (n.d.). NATUREEF. Retrieved from <https://www.clustercollaboration.eu/escp-profiles/natureef>

European Commission. (1994) Towards a New Asia Strategy. Communication from the Commission to the Council. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/2949/>

European Commission. (2001a). EU-Asia: European Commission Adopts New Strategy for Enhanced Partnership. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-1238_en.htm

European Commission. (2001b). Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships. Communication from the Commission. Retrieved from <http://aei.pitt.edu/38103/>

European Commission. (2004). A New Partnership with South-East Asia. Retrieved from <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e6161edf-f9b5-4010-a666-bf0342deb69b>

European Commission. (2007). Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_07_54

European Commission. (2015). Joint Communication to The European Parliament and the Council: The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose. Retrieved from <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=JOIN%3A2015%3A22%3AFIN&from=EN>

European Commission. (2016a). A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

European Commission. (2016b). Asia. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/regions/asia_en

European Commission. (2018a). Blue Book 2019 EU-ASEAN Cooperation. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_asean_blue_book_2018.pdf

European Commission. (2018b). Poland. Retrieved from https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/poland_en

European Commission. (2019). Blue Book 2019 EU-ASEAN Cooperation. Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-asean_blue_book_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020a). Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/asean/>

European Commission. (2020b). Blue Book 2020 EU-ASEAN Natural Partners. Retrieved from <https://euinasean.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EU-ASEAN-Blue-Book-2020-eDocument.pdf>

European Commission. (2020c). Erasmus+ Annual Report 2018 Overview Factsheet. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/sites/erasmusplus2/files/gen-erasmusplus-factsheet_2020_en.pdf

European Commission. (2020d). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Brunei. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-pacific/brunei_erasmusplus_2019v2_en.pdf

European Commission. (2020e). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Cambodia. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/cambodia_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020f). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Indonesia. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/indonesia_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020g). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Laos. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/laos_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020h). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Malaysia. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/malaysia_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020i). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Myanmar. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/myanmar_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020j). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Philippines. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/philippines_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020k). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Thailand. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/thailand_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020l). Erasmus+ for Higher Education in Vietnam. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/assets/eac/erasmus-plus/factsheets/asia-central/vietnam_erasmusplus_2019.pdf

European Commission. (2020n). Stipendium Hungaricum Scholarship Programme. Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/ploteus/no/node/81357> (archived)

Eurostat. (2020a). Extra-EU Trade by Partner. Retrieved from https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ext_lt_maineu&lang=en

Eurostat. (2020b). International Trade in Services (Since 2010) (BPM6). Retrieved from https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=bop_its6_det&lang=en

Federal Foreign Office of Germany. (2020a). Foreign Minister Maas on the Adoption of the German Government Policy Guidelines on the Indo-Pacific Region. Retrieved from <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/maas-indo-pacific/2380474>

Federal Foreign Office of Germany. (2020b). Leitlinien zum Indo-Pazifik. Retrieved from <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2380514/35e5c739e1c9a5c52b6469cfd1ffc72d/200901-indo-pazifik-leitlinien--1--data.pdf>

FM: Hungary and Indonesia to Set Up USD 500 Million Investment Fund. (2020). *About Hungary*, News in Brief. Retrieved from <http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/fm-hungary-and-indonesia-to-set-up-usd-500-million-investment-fund/>

Fóthi, E., Gonzalez, A., Fehér, T., Gugora, A., Fóthi, Á., Biró, O., & Keyser, C. (2020). Genetic Analysis of Male Hungarian Conquerors: European and Asian Paternal Lineages of the Conquering Hungarian Tribes. *Archaeological and Anthropological Sciences*, 12(1). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12520-019-00996-0>

Fuchs, B. (2002). Cervantes, the Novel, and the New World. *MLQ: Modern Language Quarterly*, 63(4), 537-539. <https://doi.org/10.1215/00267929-63-4-537>

Gerner, D. J. (1992). Foreign Policy Analysis: Renaissance, Routine or Rubbish? in Crotty, W. (Ed.). *Political Science: Looking to the Future*, vol. 2, *Comparative Politics, Policy and International Relations*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Gilson, J. (2005). New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia. *European Integration*, 27(3), 307-326. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330500190164>

Godement, F. (2008). Europe-Asia: The Historical Limits of a 'Soft' Relationship. In Balme, R. & Bridges, B. (eds.), *Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms* (pp. 27-46), New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan.

Gomółka, K. (2015). Students from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova at Polish Universities. *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K–Politologia*, 22(1). <https://journals.umcs.pl/k/article/view/2855>

Goetschel, L., Bernath, M., & Schwarz, D. (2004). *Swiss Foreign Policy: Foundations and Possibilities*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Government of Hungary. (2012). The Prime Minister Meets Hungarian Ambassadors and the Secretary General of ASEAN. Retrieved from <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/the-prime-minister-meets-hungarian-ambassadors-and-the-secretary-general-of-asean>

Government of Hungary. (2016). Mélyülő ASEAN-Integráció – Bővülő Lehetőségek Hazánk Számára. Retrieved from <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/the-prime-minister-meets-hungarian-ambassadors-and-the-secretary-general-of-asean>

Government of Hungary. (2018) 7th ASEM Sustainable Development Dialogue. Retrieved from <https://dunaregiostrategia.kormany.hu/7th-asem-sustainable-development-dialogue2>

Government of the Republic of Poland (2004). Strategia RP w Odniesieniu do Pozaeuropejskich Krajów Rozwijających Się. Retrieved from http://www.kenya.com.pl/pdf/Strategia_kraje_roz.pdf

Government of the Republic of Poland (2016). Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme for 2016-2020. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/d6da9192-10ab-4abb-8242-87f1d3b33b98>

Government of the Republic of Poland (2019a). Polish Development Cooperation 2018 Annual Report. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/0cdc8b56-85e5-49ca-8ca4-8b154982b7d6>

Government of the Republic of Poland (2019b). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's press statement after his talks with Thongloun Sisoulith, Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Retrieved from <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-press-statement-after-his-talks-with-thongloun-sisoulith-prime-minister-of-the-lao-people-s-democratic-republic>

Government of the Republic of Poland (2020). Mjanmar. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/polskapomoc/mjanma>

Government of the Republic of Poland (n.d.). Asia-Pacific Department. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/asia-pacific-department>

Grafjodi, I. (2018). The Hungarian Water Diplomacy and OECD Tied Aid Credit Program [Slides]. Retrieved from <http://waterconference.hisaar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Istvan-Grafjodi-Hungary.pdf>

Haacke, J. (2000). Understanding the 'ASEAN' Way: Origins and Development of a Diplomatic and Security Culture. Doctoral dissertation. London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. Retrieved from <https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392432>

Hagström, L., & Jerdén, B. (2014). East Asia's Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them. *Asian Perspective*, 38(3), 337-362. Retrieved from <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/news/news-pdf/introduction-east-asias-power-shift-the-flaws-and-hazards-of-the-debate-and-how-to-avoid-them.pdf>

Hänggi, H. (2006). Interregionalism as a Multifaceted Phenomenon: In Search of a Typology. In Hänggi, H., Roloff, R. & Rüländ, J. (eds.) *Interregionalism and International Relations*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Harper, J. (2020, 11 February). Poland Gives EU Unlikely Vietnamese Trade Boost. *Deutsche Welle*, Business. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/poland-gives-eu-unlikely-vietnamese-trade-boost/a-52308205>

Hermann, C. F. & East, M. (1978). Introduction. In Hermann, C. F., Salmore, S.A. & East, M. (Eds.), *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies* (pp 11-24). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing.

Hicks, W. (2020, 24 February). EU Eyes FTAs with ASEAN As a Whole. *Bangkok Post*, Business. Retrieved from <https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1864214/eu-eyes-ftas-with-asean-as-a-whole>

Hill, C., & Smith, M. (2011). Acting for Europe: Reassessing the European Union's Place in International Relations. In Hill, C., & Smith, M. (Eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (pp. 463-486). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hoang, T. (2017, 24 November). Polish President to Visit. *Vietnam Economic Times*, Vietnam Today. Retrieved from <http://vneconomictimes.com/article/vietnam-today/polish-president-to-visit>

Holbraad, C. (1984). *Middle Powers in International Politics*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Howlett, M. & Ramesh, M. (2003). *Studying Public policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems*. Toronto, ON: Oxford University Press Canada.

Humphreys, P. C. (1997). *The Fifth Irish Presidency of the European Union: Some Management Lessons*. Dublin: Institute of Public Administration.

Hungarian Central Statistical Office. (2020a). External Trade in Goods in HUF by Countries (2001-). Retrieved from https://www.ksh.hu/docs/eng/xstadat/xstadat_annual/i_qkt009c.html

Hungarian Central Statistical Office. (2020b). Value of International Trade in Services by Countries. Retrieved from <http://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/QueryServlet?ha=KDA22>

Hungarian Eximbank Disburses \$66.5 Mln in Tied Aid to Laos, Indonesia. (2016). *Budapest Business Journal*. Retrieved from https://bbj.hu/economy/hungarian-eximbank-disburses-665-mln-in-tied-aid-to-laos-indonesia_116466

Hungarian Export-Import Bank. (n.d.). Tied Aid Loans. Retrieved from <https://exim.hu/doc-list/termekek/1310-publikus-leiras-kotott-segelyhitel-en/file>

Hungarian National Assembly. (2007, 27 March). Jegyzőkönyv Az Országgyűlés Külügyi És Határon Túli Magyarok Bizottságának. Retrieved from <https://www.parlament.hu/documents/static/biz38/bizjkv38/KUB/0703271.htm>

Hungarian National Bank. (2012). Monetary Policy in Hungary 2012. Retrieved from <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/monetary-policy-in-hungary-2012-eng-final.pdf>

Hwee, Y. L. (2006). Regionalism and Interregionalism in ASEM. In Hwee, Y. L., & i Vidal, L. L. (Eds.), *Regionalism and Interregionalism in the ASEM Context: Current Dynamics and Theoretical Approaches*. Barcelona: CIDOB.

Hwee, Y. L. (2012). Reaffirming EU-Asia Partnership. *Nanyang Technical University*. Retrieved from <https://cohass.ntu.edu.sg/eucentre/enews/Pages/Commentaries-pages/Reaffirming-EU-Asia-Partnership.aspx>

Hwee, Y. L. (2014). Regional Security in the Framework of ASEAN: Potential Lessons for the GCC. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/185958/Unity_Hwee_new_1118.pdf

International Visegrád Fund. (2008). 2008/2009 Polish Presidency. Retrieved from <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/2008-2009-polish-110412>

International Visegrád Fund. (2009). 2012/2013 Polish Presidency. Retrieved from <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/2012-2013-polish>

International Visegrád Fund. (2017). 2017/2018 Hungarian Presidency. Retrieved from <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/2017-2018-hungarian/20172018-hungarian>

Kaczyński, P. M. (2013). Poland: Download and the Development of a Policy. In Ruano, L. (ed.), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policies towards Latin America* (pp. 17-27). New York, NY: Routledge.

Kaľan, D. (2012). China in Hungary's Foreign Policy. Retrieved from https://pism.pl/publications/China_in_Hungary_s_Foreign_Policy

Kand, S. (2014). Consulate General of Hungary to open in Mumbai on Dec 1, 2014. *Travel Biz Monitor*. Retrieved from <http://www.travelbizmonitor.com/Trade-News/consulate-general-of-hungary-to-open-in-mumbai-on-dec-1-2014-25941>

Keleti Nyitás, Nyugati Tartás. (2014, 26 March). *HVG*, Itthon. Retrieved from <http://m.atv.hu/belfold/20140325-keleti-nyitas-nyugati-tartas>

Keohane, R. (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), 291-310. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003160X>

Kerr, D., Xu, Y. (2014). Europe, China and Security Governance: Is There Evidence of Normative Convergence?. *Asia-Europe Journal*, 12, 79–93. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10308-014-0371-0>

Keukeleire, S., & Bruyninckx, H. (2011). The European Union, the BRICs, and the Emerging New World Order, in Hill, C. & Smith, M. (Eds.) *International Relations and the European Union* (pp. 418-442). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kiss, B., & Zahorán, C. (2007). Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy. *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, 16(2), 46-64.

Kowalczyk, M. (2017) Hungarian Turanism. From the Birth of the Ideology to Modernity – An Outline of the Problem. *Historia i Polityka*, Vol. 27(20), 43-63. <http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/HiP.2017.011>

Kozár, L., & Neszmélyi, G. I. (2017) Hungarian Endeavours for the Enhancement of Economic Relations in Southeast Asia Focusing on a New Partnership with Vietnam. *Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce*, 11(3-4), 5-12. <https://doi.org/10.19041/APSTRACT/2017/3-4/1>

Kozár, L., & Neszmélyi, G. I. (2018). Economic Relations Between Hungary and the ASEAN Region: Highlighting a Special Business Opportunity in Vietnam. *Polgári Szemle: Gazdasági És Társadalmi Folyóirat*, 14(4-6), 255-269.

Kugiel, P. (2014). Poland and the ASEAN Countries: Exploring New Markets in Asia. Retrieved from [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175587/Bulletin%20PISM%20no%202%20\(597\).%208%20January%202014.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/175587/Bulletin%20PISM%20no%202%20(597).%208%20January%202014.pdf)

Lum, T., Dolven, B., Manyin, M. E., Martin, M. F., & Vaughn, B. (2011). United States Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Retrieved from https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc627135/m1/1/high_res_d/R40933_2009Nov16.pdf

Maksum, A. (1996). ASEAN Regionalism: Challenges and Prospects. *Defense Analysis*, 8(2), 29-52.

Maltese, Hungarians Vote in Favor of European Union. (2013, 13 April). *Deutsche Welle*, Current Affairs. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/en/maltese-hungarians-vote-in-favor-of-european-union/a-831774>

Mazowiecki, T. (1990). Speech Made to the Assembly. *Parliamentary Assembly*. Retrieved from <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/Speeches/Speech-XML2HTML-EN.asp?SpeechID=142>

Megvan Az Új Lengyel Külügyminiszter. (2020, 20 August). *Magyar Nemzet*, Külföld. Retrieved from <https://magyarnemzet.hu/kulfold/megvan-az-uj-lengyel-kulugyminiszter-8549694/>

Meissner, K. L. (2016). A Case of Failed Interregionalism? Analyzing the EU-ASEAN free trade Agreement Negotiations. *Asia Europe Journal*, 14(3), 319-336. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-016-0450-5>

Memorandum Clusters V4-ASEAN. (2014). Retrieved from <http://uksk.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Memorandum-Clusters-V4-ASEAN.pdf>

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2007). Exposé 2007. Retrieved from https://londyn.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose_2007/ (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2011) Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/minister-of-foreign-affairs-on-polish-foreign-policy.html>

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2012). Exposé 2012. Retrieved from https://londyn.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose_2012/ (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2014). Minister Grzegorz Schetyna on Polish Foreign Policy Priorities. Retrieved from https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/bratyslawa_sk_a_en/news/minister_grzegorz_schetyna_on_polish_foreign_policy_priorities;jsessionid=EC3D791720AE431E7E9EFC8E49BD3C15.cmsap1p (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2015). Minister Grzegorz Schetyna Addresses Priorities of Polish Diplomacy. Retrieved from https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/minister_grzegorz_schetyna_addresses_priorities_of_polish_diplomacy;jsessionid=46584872D65A2B8375907EC54697C81C.cmsap1p (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2016). Exposé 2016. Retrieved from https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/p/msz_pl/polityka_zagraniczna/priorytety_polityki_zagr_2017_2021/expose2/expose2016/ (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2017). Minister Witold Waszczykowski on Polish Diplomacy Priorities in 2017. Retrieved from <https://poland.pl/politics/foreign-affairs/minister-witold-waszczykowski-polish-diplomacy-priorities-2017/> (archived)

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2018). Polish FM Delivers Speech on Foreign Policy Tasks in 2018. Retrieved from <https://poland.pl/politics/foreign-affairs/polish-fm-delivers-speech-foreign-policy-tasks-2018/> (archived)

Ministry for National Economy of Hungary. (2011). Külgazdasági Stratégia. Retrieved from http://www.pestmegye.hu/images/2014/agazati_strategiak/Kulgaszdasagi_Strategia_2011.pdf

Ministry of Economic Development of Poland. (2017). Informacja o Instrumentach Wsparcia Eksportu i Inwestycji oraz Strategii Promocji Gospodarczej Polski. Retrieved from <https://rpo.wrotapodlasia.pl/resource/file/download-file/id.10577/attachment.1>

Ministry of Economy and Transport of Hungary. (2007). Egységes Közlekedésfejlesztési Stratégia 2007-2015. Retrieved from http://www.pestmegye.hu/images/2014/agazati_strategiak/Egyseges_Kozlekedesfejlesztési_Strategia_2007_2020_Feher_konyv.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. (2014). International Development Cooperation Strategy and Strategic Concept for International Humanitarian Aid of Hungary 2014-2020. Retrieved from <https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/3/93/c0000/International%20Development%20Cooperation%20and%20Humanitarian%20Aid%20Strategy%20of%20Hungary-v%C3%A9gleges.pdf>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. (2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Will Be More Effective and More Open. Retrieved from <https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade-will-be-more-effective-and-more-open>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. (2016). Péter Szijjártó Holds Talks with ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Retrieved from <https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/peter-szijjarto-holds-talks-with-asean-foreign-ministers>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary. (2019). Hungary-Laos Cooperation is Being Raised to a Strategic Level. Retrieved from <https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/hungary-laos-cooperation-is-being-raised-to-a-strategic-level>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2008). Magyarország Külkapcsolati Stratégiája. Retrieved from <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/?action=media.download&uuid=29F08F0E->

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2011a). Global Opening in Hungarian Foreign Politics. Retrieved from <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/hu/kulugyminiszterium/miniszter/beszdek-publikaciok-interjuk/global-opening-in-hungarian-foreign-politics>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2011b). Hungary's Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Retrieved from https://brexit.kormany.hu/admin/download/f/1b/30000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2012a). Address by H.E. János Martonyi on the ASEAN Awareness Forum. Retrieved from <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/speeches-publications-and-interviews/address-by-h-e-janos-martonyi-on-the-asean-awareness-forum>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2012b). Global Opening – A New Feature of the Hungarian Foreign Policy: Implications on Southeast Asia and Thailand. Retrieved from <https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs/speeches-publications-and-interviews?page=6>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2013a). A Külügyminiszter 1/2013. (I. 8.) KüM Utasítása A Külügyminisztérium Szervezeti És Működési Szabályzatáról. Retrieved from https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/download/8/d7/11000/K%C3%BCI%C3%BCgyminiszt%C3%A9rium_%20SZMSZ.pdf

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary. (2013b). Szijjártó Péter: Folytatni Kell A Keleti Nyitás Politikáját. Retrieved from <http://accessibility.government.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/hirek/szijjarto-folytatni-kell-a-keleti-nyitas-politikajat->

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. (2020). Commemorating 65 Years of Diplomatic Relations, Indonesia and Hungary Strengthen Bilateral Relations. Retrieved from <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/989/berita/commemorating-65-years-of-diplomatic-relations-indonesia-and-hungary-strengthen-bilateral-relations>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2012). Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016. Retrieved from <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d31571cf-d24f-4479-af09-c9a46cc85cf6:JCR>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2017). Polish Foreign Policy Strategy 2017-2021. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/869184c0-bd6f-4a20-b8af-a5c8190350a1>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2018a). 2019 Development Cooperation Plan. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/c0b955ab-4802-4fa0-b200-018d7eb74589>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2018b). Polish Development Cooperation 2017 Annual Report. Retrieved from https://issuu.com/msz.gov.pl/docs/polish_development_cooperation_2017

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2019a). Minister Jacek Czaputowicz Attends Foreign Affairs Council and EU-ASEAN Ministerial in Brussels. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/minister-jacek-czaputowicz-attends-foreign-affairs-council-and-eu-asean-ministerial-in-brussels>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (2019b). Minister Jacek Czaputowicz on Polish Diplomacy Priorities in 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/minister-jacek-czaputowicz-on-polish-diplomacy-priorities-in-2019>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. (n.d.). Polish Aid. Retrieved from <https://www.gov.pl/web/diplomacy/polish-aid>

Ministry of National Resources of Hungary. (2010). The Programme of National Cooperation. Retrieved from https://www.parlament.hu/irom39/00047/00047_e.pdf

Mohan, G. (2020). Europe in the Indo-Pacific: A Case for More Coordination with Quad Countries. Retrieved from <https://www.gmfus.org/publications/europe-indo-pacific-case-more-coordination-quad-countries>

Müftüler Baç.M. (2017). Middle Power. In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/middle-power>

Narine, S. (2002). *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

National Agency for Academic Exchange. (n.d.). The Ignacy Lukaszewicz Scholarship Programme. Retrieved from <https://nawa.gov.pl/en/students/foreign-students/the-ignacy-lukaszewicz-scholarship-programme>

Nguyen, T. T. N. (2016). Hungary Official Development Assistance in the Early 21st Century. In Árpási, Z., Bodnár, G. & Gurzó, I. (eds.), *A Magyar Gazdaság És Társadalom A 21. Század Globalizálódó Világában* (pp. 53-68). Békéscsaba: Szent István Egyetem.

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2020a). Hungary. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/a80b014d-en>

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2020b). Poland. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1787/e3ce3d47-en>

Oszter, V. (2017). Transport Policies in Hungary - Historical Background and Current Practice for National and Regional Level. *European Transport Research Review*, 9(20). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12544-017-0236-x>

Pałasz, U. (2015). Strategic Partnerships in the EU's Foreign Policy Approach: Challenges and Opportunities. Strategic Partnership as an Instrument of EU Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2015/12/Strategic-Partnership-Workshop-Report-final.pdf?type=pdf>

Pap, N., & Glied, V. (2018). Hungary's Turn to the East: Jobbik and Islam. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 70(7), 1036-1054. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1464126>

Parameswaran, P. (2015). Playing it Safe: Malaysia's Approach to the South China Sea and Implications for the United States. Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Maritime-6_Parameswaran_Final.pdf

Petrič, E. (2013). *Foreign Policy: From Conception to Diplomatic Practice*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Plummer, M. G. (2006). ASEAN–EU Economic Relationship: Integration and Lessons for the ASEAN Economic Community. *Journal of Asian Economics*, 17(3), 427-447. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2006.04.004>

Polish Development Fund Group. (2017). Foreign Expansion Programmes: Go Africa, Go ASEAN, Go China, Go India, Go Iran. Retrieved from

<https://startup.pfr.pl/en/program/foreign-expansion-programmes-go-africa-go-asean-go-china-go-india/>

Polish Export Credit Agency. (2019a). Indonezja. Retrieved from <http://www.mapa.kuke.com.pl/indonezja.html>

Polish Export Credit Agency. (2019b). Singapore. Retrieved from <http://www.mapa.kuke.com.pl/singapur.html>

Polish Export Credit Agency. (2019c) Tajlandia. Retrieved from <http://www.mapa.kuke.com.pl/tajlandia.html>

Polish Export Credit Agency. (2019d). Wietnam. Retrieved from <http://www.mapa.kuke.com.pl/wietnam.html>

Polish Export Credit Agency. (n.d.). Na trudne rynki - Polisa na Wschód. Retrieved from <https://www.kuke.com.pl/dla-firm/ubezpieczenie-naleznosci/na-trudne-rynki-polisa-na-wschod/>

Polish Investment & Trade Agency. (2016). Polish Start-up Go Global. Retrieved https://www.paih.gov.pl/20160323/polish_startup_go_global

Przychodniak, M. (2017). Trump's Asia-Pacific Visit: An Ineffective Attempt to Regain US Initiative in the Region. Retrieved from https://pism.pl/publications/Trump_s_Asia_Pacific_Visit_An_Ineffective_Attempt_to_Regain_US_Initiative_in_the_Region

Rácz, A. (2011). A Limited Priority: Hungary and the Eastern Neighbourhood. *Perspectives*, 19(2), 143-163.

Ravenhill, J. (1998). Cycles of Middle Power Activism: Constraint and Choice in Australian and Canadian Foreign Policies. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 52(3), 309-327. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259>

Reischauer, E. & Fairbank, J.K. (1960). *East Asia: The Great Tradition*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Robertson, J. (2017). Middle Power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(4), 355-370.

Robertson, J. (2017). Middle-power Definitions: Confusion Reigns Supreme. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(4), 355-370. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1293608>

Rüland, J. (2016). Peoples-to-Peoples Connectivity in the Asia–Europe Meeting. Retrieved from https://www.eria.org/Peoples_to_Peoples_Connectivity.pdf

Ryabchikov, A.M., Spencer, J. E. et al. (2019). Asia. In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/place/Asia>

Sarek, Ł. (2019, 16 November). EU-Singapore Trade Agreement and Its Impact on Poland / Umowa handlowa UE-Singapur i jej wpływ na Polskę. *Asia Explained*. Retrieved from

<https://asiaexplained.org/2019/11/eu-singapore-trade-agreement-and-its-impact-on-poland-umowa-handlowa-ue-singapur-i-jej-wplyw-na-polske/>

Sejm of the Republic of Poland. (2013). Wypowiedzi na Posiedzeniach Sejmu, Posiedzenie Nr 36 w Dniu 20-03-2013 (1. dzień obrad). Retrieved from <http://sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=36&dzien=1&wyp=2&view=1>

Shambaugh, D. (2005). China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order. *International security*, 29(3), 64-99. <https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288043467496>

Sherwood, L. (2016). Small States' Strategic Hedging for Security and Influence. Retrieved from <http://trendsresearch.org/insight/small-states-strategic-hedging-for-security-and-influence/>

Sikorski, R. (2011, 16 March). Expose Ministra Sikorskiego na Temat Polityki Zagranicznej RP w 2011 r. *Wyborcza*. Retrieved from https://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,9261127,Expose_ministra_Sikorskiego_na_temat_polityki_zagranicznej.html?disableRedirects=true

Soavapa, N. (2020). Evaluation of the Sub-Regional Integration of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) and Its Effects on Thailand's Domestic Economy. *Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Международные отношения*, 13(1), 96-110. <https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu06.2020.107>

Stumbaun, M. B. U. (2014). How Europe Matters in Asian Security: Addressing Non-traditional Security Threats under Climate Change Conditions; Towards a New Research Agenda on Norm Diffusion in EU-Asia Security Relations. Retrieved from <http://www.asianperceptions.fu-berlin.de/system/files/private/wp914-europe-asia-nontraditional-security-threats.pdf>

SuperDrob S.A. (2017). CPF Marks a Footstep in Poland. A Leading Country Exporting of Poultry Products into European Market. Retrieved from <http://superdrob.pl/en/press/cpf-marks-a-footstep-in-poland/>

Szalai, M. (2015). The Inapplicability of Traditional Small State Theory in Central Europe – the Case of Hungary, *Research Paper, International Visegrad*. Retrieved from

Szalai, M. (2017). The Identity of Smallness and its Implications for Foreign Policy – the Case of Hungary and Slovakia, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 25(3), 345-366. <https://doi.org/10.1080/25739638.2017.1406182>

Szedlacsek, E. (2018, 28 July). Hungarian Trading House System Coming to an End. *Daily News Hungary*, Business. Retrieved from <https://dailynewshungary.com/hungarian-trading-house-system-coming-to-an-end>

Székely, T. (2016). Hungary's Foreign Minister Pays Visit to Bangkok, Expresses Condolences over Death of Thailand's King. Retrieved from <https://hungarytoday.hu/foreign-minister-pays-visit-bangkok-expresses-condolences-death-thailands-king-19430/>

Székely, T. (2017). Hungary, Vietnam Enhance Bilateral Ties as PM Orbán Pays Official Visit to Hanoi. Retrieved from <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-vietnam-enhance-bilateral-ties-pm-orban-pays-official-visit-hanoi-84172/>

- Szenkovics, D. (2019). Cultural Ties between Hungary and India. A Short Overview. *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies*, 16(1), 91-119.
<https://doi.org/10.2478/auseur-2019-0014>
- Szent-Iványi, B. (2012). Hungarian International Development Co-operation: Context, Stakeholders and Performance. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 13(1), 50-65.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/15705854.2011.649168>
- Szunomár, A. (2017). Hungarian and Chinese Economic Relations and Opportunities under the Belt and Road Initiative. Retrieved from
http://real.mtak.hu/78675/1/Work_paper_201716_u.pdf
- Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2002). The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States. Brighton: Sussex European Institute.
- Tan, A. K. J. (2015). The Proposed EU-ASEAN Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement: What Might It Contain and Can It Work?. *Transport Policy*, 43, 76-84.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2015.05.009>
- Tarrósy, I., & Morenth, P. (2013). Global Opening for Hungary: A New Beginning for Hungarian Africa Policy?. *African Studies Quarterly*, 14(1-2), 77-96.
- Tempus Public Foundation. (2019) Stipendium Hungaricum Programme Operational Regulations. Retrieved from <http://studyinhungary.hu/static/upload/stipendium-hungaricum/sh-szab-eng-2019-12-24.pdf>
- Tétényi, A. (2018). Hungarian International Development Policy: A Case for Conflicted Success. In Batory, A., Cartwright, A., & Stone, D. (Eds.). *Policy Experiments, Failures and Innovations* (pp. 152-169). Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Thorhallsson, B. & Wivel, A. (2006). Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 19(4), 651-668, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570601003502>
- Thorhallsson, B., & Steinsson, S. (2017). Small State Foreign Policy. In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013>
- Tong, L. (2016, 17 November). The ASEAN crisis, Part 2: Why Can't ASEAN Agree on the South China Sea?. *The Diplomat*, Flashpoints. Retrieved from
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/the-asean-crisis-part-2-why-cant-asean-agree-on-the-south-china-sea/>
- Tow, W. T. (2014) Coral Bell's Alliance Politics: Practitioner and Pundit. In Ball, D. & Lee, S. (Eds.) *Power and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Coral Bell* (pp. 105-118). Canberra: ANU Press.
- Umbach, F. (2008). Asian-European Relations: More Security through Inter- and Transregional Relations?. In Rüländ, J. et al. (eds.) *Asian-European Relations: Building Blocks for Global Governance?*, New York, NY: Routledge.

United Nations. (n.d.). Methodology - Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use (M49). Retrieved from <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>

United Nations. (n.d.). The 17 Goals. Retrieved from <https://sdgs.un.org/goals>

V4Clusters. (2014). V4Clusters Match-Making Event in Gliwice “V4 Leading Clusters Formation”. Retrieved from <http://nca.klastr-portal.cz/Resources/Upload/Home/nca/projekty/v4clusters/press-releases/v4c-gliwice-2014-06-10-after.pdf> (archived)

Vaicekauskaitė, Ž. M. (2017). Security Strategies of Small States in a Changing World. *Journal on Baltic Security*, 3(2): 7-15. <https://doi.org/10.1515/jobs-2017-0006>

Veenendaal, W. P., & Corbett, J. (2015). Why Small States Offer Important Answers to Large Questions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(4), 527–549. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414014554687>

Vikor, F. (2019). Economic Relations between China and Hungary. *GRA's Multidisciplinary International (GRAM i) Journal*, 3(1).

Weber, K. (2013). The ASEAN Regional Forum and the EU's Role in Promoting Security in the Asia-Pacific. In Christiansen, T., & Kirchner, E. (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations* (pp. 344-358). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wnukowski, D. (2016). How ASEAN's Transformation Can Play Out Well for Europe. Retrieved from <https://www.pism.pl/file/4353f92d-7ed9-4052-8b5b-f8061058457e>

Wnukowski, D. (2017). ASEAN's 50th Anniversary: An Opportunity for a New Opening in Economic Relations with Poland. Retrieved from <https://pism.pl/file/c5c7c7dd-d89f-4b35-8f0f-cf66f96fe381>

Wolf, E. (2018). Trzeci Azjatycki Smok Gospodarczy Zainteresowany Regionem. Retrieved from <http://www.wzp.pl/biuro-prasowe/biuro-prasowe/aktualnosci/trzeci-azjatycki-smok-gospodarczy-zainteresowany-regionem>

World Bank. (2020). GDP (current US\$). Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

Wyrzykowski, K. (2019). The Port of Gdynia is Preparing for a Big Tender. Retrieved from <http://www.polandatsea.com/the-port-of-gdynia-is-preparing-for-a-big-tender/>

Zajackowski, J. (2012). Polish Foreign Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Early 21st Century. In Adamczyk, A. & Zajackowski, K. (Eds.) *Poland in the European Union, Adjustment and Modernisation: Lessons for Ukraine* (pp. 143-156). Warsaw: Wydawnictwo CE UW.

สมชาย ภคภาสน์วิวัฒน์. (2005). ความร่วมมือสหภาพยุโรปและอาเซียน. *วารสารยุโรปศึกษา*, 13(1-2), 93-105.