



Institute of Social and Political Sciences

**“Feeling of Returning Home”: Myths and Narratives in  
Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism in  
2010-2025**

CEERES Master’s Thesis

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## **Abstract:**

This study investigates the construction of pan-nationalisms of Turanism and pan-Turkism via reinforcement of myths and narratives in their discourse. Particularly, this research tackles the problem of divergence between the ideological foundations of Turanism and pan-Turkism and their discursive affinity. In this thesis, myths are understood not as falsified accounts but rather as conceptual phenomena that explain the social environment and selectively narrating the past, which becomes a model for the future. To resolve this, this study compares Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan and conducts qualitative abductive thematic analysis of 48 primary and secondary sources. Using the ethno-symbolist approach, the results show that Hungarian and Kazakhstani political actors mythologize ancestry, geographical origin, continuity, and ethnolinguistic predecessors, the Huns, to construct their respective pan-nationalisms. At the same time, narratives are somewhat different between Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan, except for the partial similarity in narratives on diplomacy. While Turanists in Hungary employ the narratives of exceptionalism, emancipation, and Other, pan-Turkists in Kazakhstan mostly rely on cultural narratives. This study also showed that myths and narratives legitimize international activities and domestic decision-making and serve as an inspiration for future actions. The semantic analysis demonstrated the prevalent similarity in myths and partial similarity in narratives that construct the respective pan-nationalism discursively. Based on the example of Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan, this indicates that the employment of common myths and not necessarily narratives can mutually affiliate pan-nationalisms despite their foundational differences.

**Keywords:** discursive construction; myth; narrative; pan-nationalism; pan-Turkism; Turanism

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Research Puzzle and Problem Statement

During the summertime, the Hungarian plain witnesses the installation of traditional nomad houses called “yurts” that are set to host numerous national representatives from places across Russia, Türkiye, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. This is *Kurultáj*, which is the gathering of nations celebrating shared Hun-Turk cultural, historical, and ethnic ties. It gathers representatives from more than 20 nations, including Türkiye, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Bashkortostan, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, and others. These participants conduct theatrical performances displaying national traditions, compete in archery and horse riding, wear Hunnic armor, and celebrate the event with the fire ritual. The festival is held in August in Hungary each year, headed by the Hungarian anthropologist András Bíró Zsolt and patronized by the Hungarian National Assembly Vice-President Sándor Lezsák (Látogatóknak, n.d.). Why does the country at the heart of the European continent celebrate its Hunnic legacy with a distanced Central Asian country? The answer to this curiosity might lie in the exploration of pan-nationalisms of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism.

Hungary and Kazakhstan had to hurdle the vicissitudes of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which brought drastic changes in the ideological foundations of countries across Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Despite the varying trajectories of socialist and communist demise in the countries of this vast region, all newly democratizing nations had the common exigencies of reinventing their national identities. The aspiration to distance themselves from previous socialist nation-building projects prompted these nations to search for abandoned nationalist projects that antedated the socialist regimes and past historical golden periods that would serve as a source for new national coherence. In Hungary, Turanism was disbanded by the socialist government due to the past controversies associated with fascist collaborationism and anti-Jewish sentiments (Ablonczy, 2022). Meanwhile, Soviet Kazakhstan was subjected to the Kremlin policy of sowing

distrust in pan-Turkism since the latter was infamous for the Basmachi movement's pundits. Notwithstanding their resurrection, pan-nationalisms of Turanism and pan-Turkism have long historical foundations that guide their contemporary reformulations.

Turanism is an ideological pan-movement that originated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and still occupies its place in contemporary Hungarian politics. Originally, the Jewish-Hungarian Turkologist Ármín Vámbéry was among the pioneers to coin the "state of Turan" term in 1868, which encompassed the geographical area of Central Asia. Inspired by the idea of the common descent from the Central Asian steppes, the Turanic theory presumed linguistic, cultural, and racial affinity among Hungarians, Finno-Ugrians, and nations of Turkic origin. Further investigations of linguistic and racial roots spurred the growing cultural and economic interest in Central Asia and the Ottoman Empire, and even further reaching Japan. After the 1989 regime change in Hungary, Turanism began to reemerge on the scene, the notable examples of which are *Jobbik* (*Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom*, Movement for a Better Hungary) and Prime-Minister Viktor Orbán's *Fidesz* – Hungarian Civic Alliance (*Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség*) post-2010 policy, which rejuvenated the Turanian ideological stances on the official level. Accordingly, the cooperation with Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, grew considerably starting from the 2010s. For instance, reciprocal official visits have occurred. Hungary also received observer status in the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and participates in cultural festivals like *Kurultáj* and the World Nomad Games.

Just as Hungary enmeshes Turanism in its nation-building, so too Kazakhstan tries to imbue its new post-socialist identity with Pan-Turkist ideas. Pan-Turkism embodies the essence of Turkic roots, the sense of belonging to Turkic-speaking nations, and the preservation of Islamic traditions. Among the ideological founders who initially attempted to spark Turkic unity was Tatar schoolteacher, politician, publisher, and intellectual Ismail Gasprinsky, who introduced educational reforms to popularize the Turkic language and aimed to standardize 'the Common Language' (*Lisan-I umumi*) (Landau, 1995, p. 10). Beyond language, another backbone of pan-

Turkism was the influence of Islam as a binding force among Turkic groups dispersed across Eurasia. The practical implementation of pan-Turkism can be found in independent Kazakhstan, which joined OTS, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (*TÜRKSÖY*), and the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA) and pays considerable attention to these international platforms.

Although Turanism and pan-Turkism appear to have similar features, these pan-nationalisms are not identical. Some researchers conflate Turanism and pan-Turkism (Fodor, 2013; Csernyei, 2013), while others like Landau (1995) discern between the two pan-nationalisms. According to Landau (1995, p. 1), while Turanism proposes a union of people originating in the Turanian space of Central Asia, pan-Turkism reinforces the Turkic cultural or biological bounds. In other words, while Turanism relies on geographical origin, pan-Turkists use cultural or ethnic affinity as a point of unity. The variance in approaches towards religion and language illustrates this rupture. Firstly, Turanists neglect the religious aspect in contrast to pan-Turkists, who utilize Islam as an amplifying force for coherence and unity. Turanism disregards the variance of religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism as a factor hampering the association (Arnakis, 1960, p. 23). Meanwhile, Islam continues to be an indispensable element of pan-Turkism both historically and contemporarily (Landau, 1995; Kozyrev, 2014). Secondly, linguistic commonality is more profound in the case of pan-Turkism than Turanism. Although Turanists claim that Hungarian, Finnish, Estonian, Mongolian, and Turkic languages share the same Ural-Altaic linguistic group, such commonality does not make these languages mutually comprehensible. In contrast, pan-Turkists attempted to create a 'High Turkish' (Landau, 1995) to facilitate cooperation and unity. This suggests that Turanism and pan-Turkism are quite different from each other.

Since Turanism and pan-Turkism constitute separate pan-nationalisms conceptually and historically, it is fascinating to question the grounds that allow Hungary and Kazakhstan to cooperate with each other on the ideological level. Although Hungary and Kazakhstan propagate two different pan-nationalisms in their domestic discourses and foreign policy agendas, the

discursive space between the two countries reverberates affinity in the narrativization of history and culture. For instance, during the Istanbul summit of OTS in 2021, the Hungarian Prime-Minister Viktor Orbán articulated the Hungarian pride in the shared heritage with the Turkic people and being “Attila’s people” (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2021). On the Kazakhstani side, Majilis chairman Erlan Qoşanov claimed that both Hungarians and Kazakhs are descendants of Huns, Kipchaks, and Turks who inhabited Eurasian steppes (Heads of the Parliaments of Kazakhstan and Hungary, 2024).

The literature on Turanism in Hungary (e.g., Akçalı & Korkut, 2012; Kowalczyk, 2017; Ablonczy, 2021; Dayıođlu, 2022) and Pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan (e.g., Kozyrev, 2014; Bazarbayev et al., 2024) investigates these pan-nationalisms separately, and this precludes the understanding of such affinity. Therefore, the common ideological base for cooperation between Pan-Turkist Kazakhstan and Turanist Hungary is also overlooked in the literature. Indeed, some studies have already explored the geoeconomic reasons for Hungarian-Central Asian cooperation (e.g., Barkanyi & Vasa, 2023; Topuz, 2024). Although material considerations often drive international cooperation, the shared interpretation of past and origin of nations primarily stems from national identities, the common visions of which allow for the proliferation of pan-nationalism. Hence, the focus of this study is not on the instrumentalization of these symbolic elements for material considerations but rather common meanings and interpretations of history and culture that help to overcome the ideological historical differences in pan-nationalist identities. To elaborate, a more detailed look into discursive elements like myths and narratives is instrumental in explaining why two countries with two fundamentally different pan-nationalisms manage to cooperate on an ideological level using a similar interpretation of history and culture. Therefore, exploring discursive elements like myths and narratives constructing Turanist and Pan-Turkist identities might reveal how these two pan-nationalist projects manage to operate in their shared discursive space despite the conceptual contradictions between Turanism and pan-Turkism.

## **1.2 Thesis Objectives and Research Question**

The purpose of this study is to explore the process of pan-nationalism construction stemming from the utilization of myths and narratives. In this study, pan-nationalism construction refers to the process of expressing, transmitting, and sustaining the idea of a common pan-nationalist identity and pan-national community that consists of two or more nations or ethnic groups. The primary focus is on the narratives and myths upholding the construction and reinforcement of pan-Turkism and Turanism in Kazakhstan and Hungary. To understand how Kazakhstani Pan-Turkist and Hungarian Turanist actors construct pan-nationalist agendas and create the common discursive space, this research aims to discover the meanings assigned by political actors to myths and narratives in their respective discourses. The study sets the following research question:

- How do myths and narratives help to construct pan-nationalism in foreign and domestic discourses?

## **1.3 Justification for Research**

The relevance of the research on Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism can be explained by the following reasons. Firstly, this study contributes to the understanding of pan-nationalism as a conceptual political phenomenon. Numerous studies have analyzed pan-nationalisms from a historical perspective (see Danielsson, 2013; Aydin, 2013; Elmgren, 2023). Building on existing studies on pan-nationalism, this research strives to investigate these movements as political notions indispensable to domestic and foreign policies. Hence, such analysis contributes to the amplification of pan-nationalism studies in political science. Secondly, the significance of this research lies in the exploration of pan-national identities in Central Europe and Central Asia. Beyond the contribution to the regional studies, the post-socialist and post-communist settings of Hungary and Kazakhstan are beneficial for the understanding of nation-building processes, particularly in post-communist and post-socialist contexts. Thirdly, the employment of myths and narratives in the investigation of pan-nationalism allows for the

deepening of the understanding of these elements as political categories. Specifically, despite the exploration of myths in historical, theological, philosophical, and sociological studies, this research contributes to the view of myths as political concepts, although borrowing some of the underpinnings derived from other fields. Fourthly, the practical considerations are valuable for policy-making, particularly on the role of pan-movements and myths in shaping domestic perceptions and foreign policy decision-making. Importantly, understanding of how symbols and myths are used by elites in official decision-making and discourse is essential for the use of political psychoanalysis and social psychology. This is especially crucial for diplomacy and domestic governance.

#### **1.4 Approach and Methodology**

To tackle the empirical puzzle of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism, this research employs a postmodernist political theory as an overarching approach. Postmodernism in political theory maintains that the interaction among individuals constitutes politics via everyday activities, usual practices, symbols, language, and knowledge. It emphasizes symbolic expressions of power relations, emotions, and feelings that are further imbued in rational actions. These symbolic expressions are consistent with Foucault's (1972) postmodernist traditions, which explain discourse and language as constitutions of power. This theory also presupposes the interrelation between micropolitics and micropolitics, or public and elites. In other words, public values, emotions, and feelings are directly translated into policies, political programmes, partisan politics, and ideological acts of micropolitics (Bennett, 2004, p. 51). Although this study focuses on the macropolitical dimension, it adopts this postmodernist vision of politics as stemming from emotional expressions, linguistic interactions, and cognitive and socio-cognitive drivers.

This fits well with another approach used in this research – ethno-symbolism. It implies that symbols, myths, traditions, memory, religion, and other symbolic elements foster the persistence and reconfiguration of nations and nationalism (Smith, 2009). Proponents of ethno-symbolism

believe in the historical continuity of nations due to the persistence of symbols that bind the human community and convey values guiding the social order. Still, this approach allows for the fluidity of the symbolic aspects, as argued by Smith (2009). This is especially crucial for the cases of pan-Turkism and Turanism, since this research studies their current manifestations in Hungary and Kazakhstan that explain the ideological cooperation between these states despite the pan-nationalist foundational differences.

The ethno-symbolist approach to pan-nationalism analyzes how the symbolic elements form pan-national identity and pan-nationalism. Hence, one has to explore symbolic elements like religion, memory, beliefs, myths, and symbols. Myth was chosen as a symbolic element that allows to reveal the pan-nationalist constructions of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism due to the fluidity of the concept and its protean nature. They can take different forms like political, religious, foundational, and also include symbols, especially heroes or events that signify the nation's qualities or phenomena crucial for the community's existence. Hence, myths are crucial for the identities, and the link between these is well-established (e.g., Friedman, 1992; Berk, 2016). Myth is defined in this study as a narrative, aiming to provide significance to the external conditions, legitimize political action by envisioning the past in the future, and narrate the origin and existence of the Self. Although myths encompass narrativization like narratives, belief is an indispensable part of the myths since myths involve the act of accepting notions without additional scrutiny. Complementary to this, this research also considers narratives since narratives can transform into myths during social, cultural, and political processes. Oppermann and Spencer (2023) define narrative as a "form of political discourse" that encompasses specific settings and actors who raise the storylines with plots on the agenda. Therefore, narratives are not only storylines but discursive elements that are significant in relation to the context they appear in and actors who instrumentalize them.

Likewise to myth and narratives, the concept of pan-nationalism is also contributory in these pursuits. One of the main contributors to the field of pan-nationalism was Louis S. Snyder's

“Macro-Nationalisms: a History of the Pan-Movements” (1984), where he defined pan-nationalisms as ‘politico-cultural movements seeking to enhance and promote the solidarity of peoples bound together by common or kindred language, cultural similarities, the same historical traditions, and/or geographical proximity’. What is more, this study expands the interpretation of pan-nationalism, which also entails the constructed ethnic or biological relativity and the shared vision of collective struggle against external penetration into the pan-nationalist community. It is essential to note that the study uses the terms “pan-nationalism”, “pan-ideology”, “macro-nationalism”, and “pan-movement” interchangeably. Additionally, this thesis differentiates between the “Kazakh” and “Kazakhstani” terms. The word “Kazakh pan-Turkism” is used when referring to the Kazakh ethnic groups, which proliferated pan-Turkism before the 1991 establishment of independent Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, “Kazakhstani pan-Turkism” refers to the official reinforcement of pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan attributed to all citizens of Kazakhstan, and who fall under the nation- and state-building processes.

Stemming from the postmodernist and ethno-symbolist approaches, this study adopts an interpretivist methodology to the exploration of pan-nationalism. Interpretivism allows for the investigation of the meanings and ideas assigned to the phenomena in the social world. It perceives the world as a socially constructed phenomenon, the understanding of which requires the interpretation of the meanings that create mental frames for the perception. Moreover, interpretivism is depth-oriented (Alharahsheh & Pius, 2020, p. 41), indicating that such methodology provides an opportunity for the detailed exploration of human ideas. Qualitative abductive thematic analysis is a chosen method for processing qualitative data to identify the themes and meanings of shared narratives and myths in Hungarian and Kazakhstani discourses. One of the peculiarities of thematic analysis is its flexibility, which allows the application of this method of analysis to the majority of the theoretical frameworks (Terry et al., 2017, p. 21). Therefore, it accounts for the concept-driven approach to data and allows the discovery of new themes in the data that might explain the empirical peculiarity of Turanian Hungary and pan-

Turkic Kazakhstan cooperating and reinforcing ideological discursive affinity despite the varying tenets of their respective pan-nationalisms. The employed interpretivist methodology and abductive thematic analysis assist in exploring meanings assigned to myths and narratives that construct pan-nationalisms discursively. The study adopts a semantic approach, where the themes are analyzed only based on their meanings, and on the surface and explicit level (Terry et al., 2017, pp. 22-23). This choice is dictated by the comparative design of the study since it requires a relative abstraction to make two pools of data comparable. The data collection includes both primary and secondary data. While primary data includes original speeches and documents of officials and political parties, secondary data encompasses the media and news reports that contain official statements.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. After the introductory part, the literature review discusses the main concepts of pan-nationalism and myths, gradually proceeding to the review of the literature written on empirical cases of Turanism and its Hungarian form, as well as of pan-Turkism and its Kazakhstani form. The following chapter provides an empirical background for the cases in the study, explains why these two country cases were chosen, and introduces the comparative framework that guides the analysis of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism. After this, the study proceeds to the methodology chapter. Specifically, it introduces research design, methodology, operationalization, and description of the data collection and data analysis procedures. Research results are the focus of the fifth chapter, which reports results retrieved from the analysis of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism and their comparison. After that, this paper offers a discussion of the research outcomes and potential areas for further research. The last chapter concludes this study.

## **2. Literature Review**

As stated in the Introduction chapter, this study aims to understand the discursive construction of pan-nationalisms via the utilization of narratives and myths. This would help to explain the discursive affinity between Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan despite their conceptual differences. Hence, it is now time to turn to the review of literature that informed the postulation of this study's research question, the conceptual understanding of pan-nationalism and myth, and their attributes that help to identify these phenomena in the empirical world. Since this research is inductive, this chapter provides a framework for conceptually understanding pan-nationalism and myths. In other words, the discussion of ideology, discourse, and political orientations provides a theoretical understanding that further guides the conceptual frameworks of pan-nationalism and myth, turning to the review of the literature on empirical cases of Turanism and pan-Turkism. Moreover, the literature on Turanism and pan-Turkism is essential in demonstrating and exploring the divergence between the two pan-nationalisms and their current constructions. Overall, using literature from various fields, this chapter aims to offer a conceptual formulation of pan-nationalism, present myth as a conceptual phenomenon, and reveal the tensions and similarities between Turanism and pan-Turkism, including their Hungarian and Kazakhstani forms. This literature review begins with a theoretical discussion of ideology, discourse, and politics, moving to conceptual understandings of pan-nationalism and its symbolic element - myth, and ending with the empirical constructions of Turanism and pan-Turkism as pan-nationalisms, and the underlying differences ensuing from these pan-nationalist formulations.

### **2.1 Ideology, Discourse, and Politics**

To understand how myths and narratives reinforce pan-nationalism, it is necessary to begin with the interrelation of ideology, discourse, and politics. In accordance with the postmodernist political theory employed in this study, ideology and discourse have a special leverage over politics. Van Dijk (2000; 2013) offers valuable insights into the understanding of ideology and discourse, which

are important starting points for the conceptualization of pan-nationalism as a socio-cognitive discursive construction. In his “Ideology and Discourse” book, he defines ideology as containing “...socially shared beliefs that are associated with the characteristic properties of a group, such as their identity, their position in society, their interests and aims, their relations to other groups, their reproduction, and their natural environment” (van Dijk, 2000, p. 12). What is important for this study in this definition is the broad understanding of ideology as a communal set of beliefs that are particular to the social group. Ideology also reinforces a socially shared set of beliefs and defines their coherence (van Dijk, 2000, p. 14). In another chapter on ideology, van Dijk (2013) notes that, depending on the needs and interests, these values and norms find their expression in various ways. He maintains that the formulation, articulation, and procreation of ideologies ensue from discourse, which formulates the images of positive Us and negative Them (van Dijk, 2013). Therefore, having covered the concept of ideology, it is not important to consider how ideologies are expressed.

Ideologies can be translated into policies via discourse. Chatzitheodorou (2024), in her article “The Three Points of a Circle: A Research Framework for Understanding Foreign Policy and Ideology Through Discourse”, aims to combine ideology, discourse, and foreign policy to establish a research framework. She writes that narratives inscribed in ideology create a ‘roadmap’ to the realization of state interests and political decisions, since the former justify these political choices and sustain them (Chatzitheodorou, 2024, p. 4). This underlines a crucial role of narratives and ideology in legitimizing political decision-making. Moreover, due to the narratives’ interrelation with identity, ideology sets the criteria for excluding particular political options because of their incompatibility with the state identity (Chatzitheodorou, 2024, p. 5). Nincic and Ramos (2010) apply a conceptualization similar to Chatzitheodorou’s (2024) in the US context. They found that ideological divisions in domestic society reflect the foreign policy preferences articulated by US parties (Nincic & Ramos, 2010). Despite the authors’ focus on the US partisan politics only, their study illustrated that domestic ideologies are translated into foreign policy, which also changes in

parallel with the changes in the international systems. It is now time to turn to the social movement affiliated with ideology – pan-nationalism.

## **2.2 Pan-Nationalism: Going Beyond the Nation?**

The concept of pan-nationalism is prone to the fluidity of its definitions. Literature offers a variety of labels, such as pan-nationalism, transnationalism, pan-movement, pan-ethnic, and unification movements. Breuilly (2013) takes a teleological perspective on the categorization of pan-nationalisms. By historically analysing how Polish, Italian, and German movements contributed to the formation of nation-states, Breuilly (2013, p. 150) maintains that failed unification nationalism can be regarded as pan-nationalism, while successful pan-nationalism is ultimately unification nationalism. Hence, in Breuilly's (2013) view, the semantic conception of pan-nationalism largely depends on the unification criteria. In his study aiming to resolve the conceptual tensions between theoretical and practical pan-nationalisms, Maxwell (2022) labels it as the "success/failure criterion". This means that pan-nationalism can be analyzed mostly retrospectively, judged by its achievement of unification, which makes it complex to analyze this phenomenon in a non-historical approach. This insight found its place in the same "The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism" book edited by Breuilly, where Aydin (2013) adopted a teleology of pan-nationalism different from Breuilly's. When discussing non-European cases like pan-Asian, pan-African, and pan-Islamic movements, he writes that in the context of the prevailing 19th-century idea of "white superiority", all three pan-movements aimed to reduce these racial inequalities and overcome weaknesses associated with non-European identities (Aydin, 2013). In a drastic contrast, Giladi (2020, p. 266) calls scholars to abandon successful unification as a criterion for the definition of pan-nationalism. What he identifies is that pan-nationalism studies should be sensitive to various cases of pan-nationalisms (Giladi, 2020). For instance, in the case of pan-Latinism and the analysis of the "*La Renaissance latine*" journal, he argues that it was not so that the language was the primary driver of pan-Latin nationalism, but the imagined imperial duty to "civilize" non-Latin nations (Giladi, 2020).

Cosmopolitan ideas are also central to the idea of pan-nationalism. Using the example of Pan-Nordism, Johnsen (2023, p. 102) writes how the Swedish politician Emil Key believed that pan-nationalism is destined to unite fragmented groups towards universality. Similarly to Johnsen (2023), Young (2008, p. 489) also analyses the intellectual writings of the Guyanese politician, historian, and sociologist Walter Rodney and notes that his conception of Pan-Africanism lies in internationalization and mobilization of masses rather than inter-state unification. Although Johnsen (2013) and Young (2008) discuss pan-nationalist cosmopolitanism in intellectuals' ideas, Aydin (2013) demonstrates this in practices of pan-nationalisms in Asia, Africa, and the Muslim world, which became more internationalist over time due to their common struggle against Western colonialism. Danielsson (2013) also supports this and believes that, in contrast to Brubaker's argument that globalization would eliminate nationalism, pan-nationalism operates well with globalization, because pan-nationalists defy borders to reach ethnic-related groups globally. This is similar to Maxwell's (2022, p. 5) "multiple statehood" criterion, which refers to the transcendence of state borders. On the whole, internationalism and globalization supplement the proliferation of pan-nationalisms. Nevertheless, the sustenance of pan-nationalism also requires an Other.

The constitution of the Other is also an essential element of pan-nationalism. The portrayal of the Other spurs pan-nationalisms by mobilizing identities and reinforcing boundaries between the in-group and the out-group. Johnsen (2013, p. 107) illustrates these boundaries in the instance of Polish and Nordic nationalists, who perceived their stronger Russian and Prussian neighbors as "despots", while portraying themselves as "bulwarks" of liberty and freedom. Pan-Slavism also contained some constructions of the Other in the struggle for self-identification, according to Danielsson (2013). She argues that Russian pan-Slavists perceived themselves as the representation of the East, while the Other was the pan-German West (Danielsson 2013, p. 45). The author further demonstrates how the Other inculcated mutual threat perceptions between Pan-Slavists and Germans; hence, revealing the mobilizing potential of Self and Other in pan-

nationalist thinking. Giladi (2020) takes a more Orientalist stance on the Other, which is seen as inferior to the Self. For example, since pan-Latinists envisioned themselves as descendants of ancient Romans, they proliferated the self-image of protectors of ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarism’ (Giladi, 2020, p. 259). And yet, some scholars note how the pan-nationalist Other had a galling effect. In his “Embracing ‘Asia’ in China and Japan” book, Weber (2018, p. 114) analyses the 20<sup>th</sup>-century Asianist discourse and shows how one of the Japanese scholars of Asianism denounced the movement for being overly xenophobic. Altogether, one of the driving forces of pan-nationalism is the construction of the Other, which is imbued with negative attributes. Maxwell (2022, pp. 6-7) sums it up as a criterion of the “pejorative usage”, when the out-groups try to delegitimize and “stigmatize the aspirations of their rivals or opponents”. Beyond imaginal conceptions of community, pan-nationalisms are also bound by the perceptions of geography.

The geographical dimension also occupies a crucial place in pan-nationalism. Danielsson (2013) argues that geographical origin and “needs” are important elements of pan-nationalism, as in the East-West split between pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. Meanwhile, territorial unity is significant in Tonge’s (1998) study. He maintains that Irish pan-nationalism pursues a single authority governing the whole geographical unit of the island of Ireland (Tonge, 1998, p. 3). This indicates that the perception of “wholeness” of controlled territory is one of the driving factors of pan-nationalism. This resembles Weber’s (2018) notes on how pan-nationalism might be an instrument for territorial expansion. He maintains that Japanese Vice Admiral Kamiizumi Tokuya advocated that Japan should use Asianism as a guide for its territorial expansion to Siberia and Central Asia to solve Japan’s overpopulation issue (Weber, 2018, p. 125). To sum up, despite the variance in pan-nationalist approaches towards geography, the very conception of territorial dimension is crucial for the proliferation of pan-nationalism. This aspect is especially prone to mythologization, which is going to be discussed below.

## 2.3 Conceptualizing Myth

Myth is one of the discursive elements that deserves special attention due to its complexity of terminology. Myth is a social phenomenon embodying a response to external circumstances and transformational processes. Bottici and Kühner (2012) conceptualize myth by drawing from psychoanalysis and political philosophy and apply it to the clash of civilizations. They argue that people employ myths to relieve the pressure of the external world by assigning meanings and creating narratives of the world's origin and future direction (Bottici & Kühner, 2012, p. 98). Although the boundaries of this "external world" remain undefined, this explanation of the genesis of myths is crucial in defining what myths aim to narrate and how the environment contributes to it. Meanwhile, in his analysis of the political myths in the EU, Della Sala (2010: 4) underlines that social complexities provoke a high need for stories illuminating the uncommon and challenging. These 'social complexities' (Della Sala, 2010) found some reverberation in Pisarski (2020). He underlines a mobilizational force of myth in the case of crisis, when myth amplifies the impetus for the community to make sacrifices and demonstrate adherence to society (Pisarski, 2020, p. 213). Therefore, depending on the needs, political myths can reformulate themselves (Pisarski, 2020, p. 223) and adopt several forms of the narratives (Bottici & Kühner, 2012, p. 97). As demonstrated, the social environment and changes in it are eminently conditional for the emergence of myth and its further transformations. Nevertheless, this has effects for the internalization of the myths, which leads to their inscription in identities.

Myths are among the essential elements of identity creation. They reverberate values, norms, beliefs, and other elements of identity. In the book "Myths and Nationhood", Schöpflin (1997, p. 19) provides a clear distinction between myth and history, where the former originates from the communal approval of certain principles as natural and the rejection of others as alien. Pisarski (2020) attributes Schöpflin's (1997) idea on the origin to one of the myths' features. Pisarski (2020, p. 223) writes that myths shape national identity and communal solidarity, explain the world and its laws, and define moral attitudes and models of social behavior. In positioning myth in the

collective memory studies, Kølvråa (2015, p. 74) argues that myths display moral truth that builds the ‘model’ of the world. This implies a wider understanding of myth as not only shaping identity but also expressing the intrinsic beliefs, or Kølvråa’s (2015) “moral truth”. At the same time, Della Sala (2010, p. 6) describes political myths’ ability to establish the map of norms and values that should govern the community.

And yet, other authors emphasize that myths primarily corroborate the existing attitudes of society, not preordaining new ones. In his discussion of nationalist myth drawing on literary studies, Morden (2016, p. 453) argues that political narratives relate to established values, norms, and mentality and guide the nation to the preferred outcome. On the other hand, he maintains that myths are prone to intercultural transmission to other societies, although the narratives’ shape might change to become particularistic to the specific community (Morden, 2016, p. 455). Since the conditions for the intercultural transmission of myths are not specified, it is reasonable to assume that myths travel across societies with a similar set of values. Another author, Kolakowski (2001, p. 12) discusses myth in his book “The Presence of Myth”, where he supports the view that the reinstatement of values is the primary source of mythical thinking.

Some authors also note the importance of mediators in the revelation of myths. Bottici and Kühner (2012) call these mediators “icons”, which are symbols pointing to the blurry or unrevealed reality (Bottici & Kühner, 2012, p. 100). Hence, “icons” not only help transmit ideas but also map out the mysterious environment, which is conducive to the emergence of myths, as noted earlier. Although Pisarski (2020) does not provide a special label for mediators, he believes that symbols are crucial to myths since cultural development prompted humans to capture the world’s essence via mediators or symbols. Such arguments not only further corroborate the relevance of the external environment but also circumscribe the significance of mediators in transmitting and codifying myths.

In line with the covered discussion on the environment, colonization is one of the aspects of these external conditions that provoke the utilization of myths. In his study of the Estonian national mythology, Annus (2000, p. 117) writes that the intrusion of external powers and foreign nations marks the loss of the mythologized past. Similar to Annus (2000), Pisarski (2020, p. 222) maintains that the oppressor has greater access to myth-making and uses myths more than the oppressed. The yet subjugated and already colonized nation regarded itself as the Other, which is culturally inferior and weak (Annus, 2000, p. 122). The repertoire of such myths includes themes like social hierarchy and order and national identity, and some of them reflect racist or xenophobic narratives (Pisarski, 2020, p. 222). Relevant for pan-nationalism as well, the national movements aim to destroy this mentality and reinforce the nation's Self (Annus, 2000, p. 123). In all, power, especially in the context of external domination, has a decisive role in the dispersion of myths and their content. This is particularly crucial for the interpretation of the nation's history.

Myths also have a malleable relation with temporality. That is to say, myths strive to reestablish the past in the future, the form of which depends on the interpretation of the past. Myths primarily trace back to the past, which is portrayed as a golden time period (Della Sala, 2010, p. 7). In Annus's (2000) words, nations consist of the ideal past and the flourishing future that is supposed to restore this lost and unreachable golden past. The idealized image of the past is created in the process of inventing the 'original' and its simultaneous destruction (Annus, 2000, p. 121). Despite this, myths relate not only to the past but also to the present and the future. Della Sala (2010, pp. 6-7) differentiates between primary and derivative myths, where primary myths narrate the origin and the reason for the coherence of the community, while derivative myths provide significance for the community's political action. In other words, primary myths narrate the past, while the derivative myths narrate the present and orient towards the future. Pisarski (2020, p. 217) also emphasizes the myths' functions of both explaining the past and reproducing it in the future. To sum up, myths not only provide logical temporal sequence but also elements of imagination that allow for embellishing the past and future with upbeat pictures. On the whole, in contrast to

narratives, myths contain fantasized and optimistic visions of the past that are destined to recur in the future.

## **2.4 Turanism: Unity of Ural-Altai People**

Despite Turanism receiving vast attention from historical studies, the existing literature does not offer a uniform definition of this movement. Firstly, boundaries between Turanism and pan-Turkism are sometimes conflated. Some authors (Arnakis, 1960; Farkas, 2006) denominate Turanism and pan-Turkism as synonyms. For instance, Arnakis (1960) outlines Turanism as a form of Turkish nationalism. Secondly, scholars differ in their understanding of the uniting element of Turanism. While Arnakis (1960), Landau (1995), and Balogh (2022) trace the essence of Turanism to the identification with geographic space, Akçalı and Korkut (2012), Dayıoğlu (2022), and Pizzolo (2024) regard this pan-nationalism as a reinstatement of racial or ethnolinguistic identity. Starting with the “geographical approach”, Arnakis (1960, p. 22) identifies Turanism as the rapprochement of Turkic people towards the mythologized home of Turkic nations in Central Asia, or the Persian-coined “Turan”. In the Hungarian context, Balogh (2022) understands Turanism as Eurasianism, implying the conjunction of European and Asian civilizations. In contrast, Landau (1995) and his book “Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation” set a clear distinction between Turanism and pan-Turkism. He maintains that while pan-Turkism strives to unite all Turkic peoples, Turanism aims to promote rapprochement between nations originating from Turan, which is a broad Central Asian area of Shangri-La (Landau, 1995, p. 1).

Another group of scholars accentuates the “racial approach” to Turanism, as demonstrated by Akçalı and Korkut (2012), Dayıoğlu (2022), and Pizzolo (2024). In their study of neo-Turanist geographical metanarratives expressed by Hungarian right parties, they define neo-Turanism as a “historical ideology” for the unification of Turkish Turks, Tatars, Hungarians, Turkic people from Central Asia, aboriginal Siberian groups, reaching further to Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, and

Manchus (Akçalı & Korkut, 2012, p. 600). Dayıoğlu (2022, p. 230) offers a wider interpretation of Turanism in his comparative study of Turkish pan-Turkism and Hungarian Turanism, which is a political movement that aspires to unite all Ural-Altaic social groups into a Turanic “racial” group. In contrast to Balogh’s (2022) conception of Hungarian Turanism as Eurasianism, Pizzolo (2024) contrasts Eurasianism and Turanism and maintains that Turanism’s exclusionism contradicts Eurasian thought. He argues that Turanism circumscribes the Ural-Altaic ethnicity as the pan-nation and delimits their fusion with other groups like the Slavs (Pizzolo, 2024). Altogether, the conceptual conflation of Turanism prompts to consider both its practical manifestations and theoretical origins. It is now necessary to turn to the dominant features of Turanism.

In the 20th century, Turanism developed into both an expansionist and an anti-colonial force. Supporters of Turanism in various nations saw the opportunity for political union between various ethnic groups in the struggle against the common enemy. For instance, Kitagawa Shikazo used his Tungus theory to mobilize Asian neighbors against China. According to this, the Han Chinese should assimilate with Mongols, Manchurians, Koreans, and Japanese who mythologically share the origin (Levent, 2016, p. 124). This legitimized Japanese advancement through Mongolia via East Turkestan to take control of North China and Central Asia (Levent, 2016, p. 127). Nevertheless, in the context of pan-nationalism, expansionism might refer to various forms of expansion, including territorial, as in the Japanese case (Levent, 2016), or economic, as in the case of Hungary. One of the notorious members of the Turanian Society and later Prime Minister of Hungary, Pál Teleki, declared in the first “Turán” journal issue that Hungary needs economic expansion, and many of the Asian areas are “unspoilt” (Kowalczyk, 2017, p. 53).

At the same time, Turanism also received a liberating cause for the Turanian nations. Inspired by Turanism, Finland aspired to obtain independence from Russia and the Germanic influence (Elmgren, 2023; Pizzolo, 2024). Still, it is reasonable to question whether the acquisition of independence would transform Finland into an anti-colonial force or an expansionist power that

could aim to “protect” kin-nations from Russia and Germany, considering its geographical proximity to these powers. In Hungary, Ármin Vámbery used the Turanist cause to argue for the relegation of Germanic and Slavic influence. This resulted in the 1867 Compromise expanding Hungary’s autonomy from the Viennese centre, which further posed prospects for independence from Habsburg rule, as it happened after 1918 (Pizzolo, 2024, p. 427). To sum up, Turanian pan-nationalism embodies the duality of both expansionism and anti-colonial liberation, depending on the conditions and the interests of the nations. Such a rationale also propelled the image of the Other.

The Other is an indispensable element of Turanism. Arnakis (1960) and Levent (2016) demonstrate how Turanism attributed the image of the enemy to various competing powers in different time periods. Japan perceived Russia as an ideological threat since the latter established communism on its territory and assisted China (Levent, 2016, p. 129), which was the rival of Japan in the Asian continent. In another Turanian nation, Türkiye, the conflict with Russia in its eastern parts and territorial losses contributed to the rise of Turanism (Arnakis, 1960, p. 25). Hence, geopolitical considerations accompany the formation of the Turanist Other.

While Levent (2016) and Arnakis (1960) maintain that nations reinforce the Turanian Other in their equal rivalries, Elmgren (2023) and Pizzolo (2024) underline the construction of the Turanian Other in the oppressor. The Finnish struggle for independence also presumed the potential of the Baltic and Nordic unity against Russia and Germany (Elmgren, 2023, p. 240). The Finnish Finno-Ugricist Jalo Kalima labeled that a “Turanian chain” around Russia (Kalima 1918, cited in Elmgren, 2023, p. 244). Bulgarian Turanism was also anti-Slavist and anti-Serbian in nature, since these pan-nationalists believed in the Slavic subjugation of proto-Bulgarian Turanian groups that lost their language and identity because of this (Pizzolo, 2024, p. 428). The reviewed arguments in the literature allow to conclude that Russia was among the most stable embodiments of the Other for Turanists. Most importantly, the image of the Other served as a source of mobilization against other powers, either equal in power or oppressive.

## 2.5 Turanism in Hungary

The West became an indispensable Other of the Turanian identity of Hungary. Starting from the inception of Turanism, the conflict between the Western and Asian visions of Hungarian language origin emerged among the linguists (Kowalczyk, 2017; Ablonczy, 2022), embodied in the “Ugrian-Turkish war” between the Orientalist Ármín Vámbéry and the group of linguists. In his historical analysis, Kowalczyk (2017, p. 52) describes it as a conflict between supporters of Ural- Altaic linguistic theory and the proponents of the Finno-Ugric linguistic school, or put simply, between the Asianist and European (Germanic) scientific conceptions. Another historical continuation of anti-Westernism in Hungarian Turanism was noted by Balogh (2022). In particular, the disruption between Hungarian interests and “Western belongings” allows Turanism to spread, as in Hungarian relations with Austria in the 19th century (Balogh, 2022, p. 746). Balogh (2022) does not specify the reasons why Hungarian interests sometimes opposed Hungarian “Western belongings”, but the argument itself is reflective on the interrelation between the Turanist emergence and aversion to the West. Hence, the literature well illustrates the importance of anti-Westernism for Hungarian Turanism.

In line with the Othering in Turanism, Anti-Westernism became a prominent feature of its contemporary Hungarian form, prominently in the discourse of the Hungarian *Jobbik* political party. Akçalı and Korkut (2012, p. 600) analyze *Jobbik*’s neo-Turanist agenda and conclude that it relegates the Euro-Atlantic cooperation and substitutes it with Eastern cooperation in Hungarian political affairs. In a similar vein, Balogh (2022, p. 745) maintains that Turanism portrays globalism, multiculturalism, and Western liberalism as its enemies. What is contrasting is the combination of Western elements like Christianity with Turanism, as argued by Balogh (2022). By analyzing the coexistence of Hungarian Christian identity and Turanism, Balogh (2022, p. 747) concludes that the self-image of the bridge allows present-day Hungary to facilitate these two identities simultaneously.

Since this study focuses on the 21<sup>st</sup>-century Turanism in Hungary, it is essential to review in further detail how contemporary Turanism reverberates in the political discourse of Hungary. Following the period of disgrace after the World Wars, Turanism started to gradually occupy a place in the Hungarian contemporary political agenda, especially after the regime change. The impetus for its reemergence Ablonczy (2021; 2022), Akçalı and Korkut (2012) attribute to the disillusionment with Hungary's integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. Ablonczy (2022, p. 248) regards Turanism as a response to Hungary's Eastern origin and pursuing the Western way of development. Meanwhile, Akçalı and Korkut's (2012) study maintains that the perceptions of changes and dissatisfaction with these changes prompted the reemergence of Turanism. Conducting the analysis of "Little things", or everyday expressions and reproductions of geographical metanarratives outside of the discourse, they find that such manifestations of Turanism indicate Hungarians' strive to reinforce their agency against the looming West and mythologize the past for the sake of survival (Akçalı & Korkut, 2012). Hence, contemporary Turanism in Hungary comes with a vast array of mythologization of the past due to the perception of the crisis stemming from the Euro-Atlantic integration. Also, this demonstrates that Turanist ideological tenets in the discourse are becoming more intertwined with the physical embodiments of such thinking, as to be discussed in the following paragraph.

Turanist discourse is used to justify the non-orthodox economic policies. Moreh (2016) studies the "Asianist" discourse in the Hungarian political agenda and finds that the search for the "ancestral homeland" (*őshaza*) in Asia appears in economic, political, cultural, ethnic, and racial subdiscourses that support the "Eastern Opening" policy. As argued by Moreh (2016), the "mythopoeic" interpretation of the Asian origin contributes to the overcoming of the geographical distance from the Turanian Asian countries. Moreover, as Laruelle (2008, p. 171) argues that Eurasianism couples with the low positioning of the East in the East-West distinction, so does Moreh (2016) maintain that Turanism aims to alleviate Hungary's "periphery" image on the European political map. Moreh's (2016) illustration of the Asianist discourse as a pragmatic tool

facilitating the “Eastern Opening” found its support in Peragovics and Szunomár (2024). The scholars analysed the concept of connectivity in Hungary’s Asianist discourse on the Budapest-Belgrade railway project. Using discourse analysis of speeches, Peragovics and Szunomár (2024) reveal that Hungary portrays itself as a bridge between China and Europe. Despite its geographical potential of connecting China and Europe as well, pan-Turkism adopted a different stance due to its historical developments.

## **2.6 Pan-Turkism: Turkic or Turkish?**

Another pan-nationalism that emerged in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was pan-Turkism. Landau (1995, p. 1) defines it as the ideology that implies the cultural and/or physical union of Turkic people. In their historical study of Türkiye’s influence on the Kazakh socio-political thought, Bazarbayev et al. (2024, p. 6) add the elements of religious and ethnopolitical unity to the pan-Turkism’s conception. In drastic contrast to Turanism, pan-Turkism presupposes core-periphery relations that espouse the “Turkic” and “Turkish” conflation. To illustrate, the linguistics professor Sumru Özsoy argues that the Turkish language does not differentiate between Turkic and Turkish (Alici, 1996, p. 218). While the former refers to the common linguistic family, to which not only Turkish, but also Kazakh, Uzbek, Azeri, Kyrgyz, Tatar, Bashkir, and others belong, the latter indicates the dominant ethnic population of Türkiye. This portended Türkiye’s leading role in pan-Turkism, since the “brotherly” nations were believed to constitute the same nation-family. Landau (1995) demonstrates how one of the leading proponents of pan-Turkism, Yusuf Akçura, propagated the unity of the Turkic people led by Türkiye, while one of the pan-Turkist founders, Tekin Alp, perceived Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkism as practically synonymous. Moreover, Landau (1995) also emphasizes how Türkiye aspired to receive tutelage over “Outside Turks” (*Dış Türkler*) in the distant Russian Empire, resulting in the emergence of pan-Turkism. Burris (2007, p. 612) calls this “*Türkçülük*”, which encompassed both nationalism inside Türkiye and unity with “Outside Turks”. Such concern for “co-nationals” proliferated the image of the Russian Empire as the Other.

As in the case of Turanism, pan-Turkism also encompassed the construction of the Other that allowed this movement to thrive in critical situations. Landau (1995) writes how Russification policy towards Turkic groups helped pan-Turkists to antagonize the Russian Empire. The Islamic element allowed pan-Turkists to unite since the majority of the Turkic people in the Russian Empire were Muslims (Bazarbayev et al., 2024, p. 6), and the Christianisation of the Russian Empire was opposed to the Turkic identity. It is still intriguing to question how the already Christianized Turkic population reacted to the dispersion of pan-Turkism. Potentially, the Russian myth-making might have proliferated the image of the “backwardness” of Turkic culture. Nevertheless, Alici (1996) and Burris (2007) also maintain that not only the Russian Empire but Soviet Russia embodied the Other for pan-Turkism. Burris (2007) conducted a study on the Other in pan-Turkist myth-making and found that pan-Turkists discredited Russia, communism, and the Turkish left as immoral. Critical situations offered a fertile ground for the pan-Turkist rise. For instance, during the Bolshevik Revolution and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkism rejuvenated (Alici, 1996, p. 230). In all, the Russian Other was an indispensable element of pan-Turkism in various time periods.

Myths were also propelling the binding identity of pan-Turkism. Burris (2007, p. 614) writes how the Central Asian homeland became a “myth of national territory” for pan-Turkists. According to this myth, the successors of the Turkic race are of “great”, “noble”, “healthy”, “magnificent”, and “civilized” character (Alici, 1996). Alici (1996) devotes his primary attention to the mythologization of Central Asia in pan-Turkism, where the Central Asian origin symbolized the “glorious” and “great” past of the Turkish. This celebrated past was a pan-Turkist model for the magnificent future, expressed as a “myth of a golden age” (Burris, 2007, p. 615). What is intriguing, however, is that the myth of homeland in pan-Turkism does not stimulate aversion towards Russia. Laruelle (2008, p. 171), in her comprehensive study of Russian Eurasianism, concludes that Russia’s proliferation of Eurasianist ideology facilitates the transformation of Türkiye and Russia into allies. To sum up, myths of pan-Turkism are inexorably tied to the

mythologization of Central Asian origin and positive attributes of the Turkic nations associated with them. This prompts to devote a special attention to the role of Central Asian nations in pan-Turkism, for example, Kazakhstan.

## **2.7 Kazakh Pan-Turkism**

On the pan-Turkism's core and periphery relations discussed above, pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan has a more peripheral character. Early 20th-century Kazakh intellectuals envisioned the Ottoman Empire as a modernization ideal along with the preservation of Muslim traditions (Bazarbayev et al., 2024, p. 8). Moreover, Kazakh pan-Turkism drew other ideas from Türkiye that helped to fortify Kazakh nationalism. For instance, according to Bazarbayev et al. (2024, p. 9), since ethnic Kazakhs were also residing in Iran, China, and Türkiye, Kazakh pan-Turkism borrowed inspiration from pan-Turkism in the Ottoman and Russian Empires to unite all Kazakhs in one entity. Kozyrev (2017) exemplifies the significance of pan-Turkism for contemporary Kazakhstani nationalism in his research and reveals that pan-Turkist elements in Kazakhstani nation-building allow to solve the "inferiority complex", stemming from the cultural, economic, and political dependence on Russians (Kozyrev, 2017, pp. 197-198). Overall, pan-Turkism allowed Kazakhstan to adopt Türkiye's pan-Turkism as guidance to resolve the perception of weaknesses. The perception of weakness stemmed from the relations with the Russian Empire, which was the Other in Kazakh pan-Turkism.

Kazakh pan-Turkism portrayed the Russian Empire as the Other. Bazarbayev et al. (2024, p. 7) argue that the Kazakh intellectuals supported ideas of Turkic unification and its Islamic elements in their solidarity against Russian imperialism and its practices undermining Muslim traditions. Interestingly, the Ottoman Empire's rivalry with the Russian Empire coincided with the Kazakh intelligentsia's independence struggle (Bazarbayev et al., 2024, p. 8), which added more emphasis on the joint cause of Turkic nations against Russia. Nevertheless, this might not have been merely a coincidence but rather the Ottoman support of Turkic nations in the Russian Empire, as

demonstrated in Landau (1995). While this may be true for the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>-century Kazakh pan-Turkism, its contemporary Kazakhstani version refrains from the open animosity towards Russia. The reason for this could be large ethnic Russian communities and economic and military needs (Kozyrev, 2017, pp. 198-199). To sum up, the Othering of Russia was prominent in the initial form of Kazakh pan-Turkism, but what cannot be said about the contemporary form, due to the strategic and practical considerations and Kazakhstan's dependencies on the potential object of Othering.

## **2.8 Turanism and Pan-Turkism: Similar but Different?**

As explored below, Turanism and pan-Turkism have some common features, including the cultural and ethnolinguistic unification and Othering. Despite this, two pan-nationalisms are different in practical terms. Firstly, Turanism represents a more cultural unit in comparison to pan-Turkism. Since various nations from Northern Europe to East Asia proliferated Turanist thought, the geographical distance between Finland, Hungary, Japan, and other countries hampered their political unification. Instead, the contemporary Turanist nations express the cultural, scientific, and economic interests towards each other's communities. In contrast, as Hostler (2006, p. 254) writes, pan-Turkism is a more sustainable model than Turanism. Since Türkiye serves as a pan-Turkist centre, the relative geographical proximity and the linguistic kinship promote close exchange of pan-Turkist ideals and social organization ideas.

All things considered, since ideology, discourse, and political dimensions are inextricably interrelated, these insights are applicable to the myths and pan-nationalism. Although the literature lacks the discussion of empirical cases that demonstrate how myths reinforce pan-nationalism, the implications of myths and pan-nationalism are essential in the pursuit of understanding the links between them. That is to say, both myths and pan-nationalisms formulate the Other, identities, and draw their essence from the narrativization of the past as a "golden period" that is destined to reappear in the future. The only exception is the Alici (1996) and Burriss (2007) studies on pan-Turkist myth-making. To sum up, two literature gaps justify the pursuits of this study. Firstly, the

lack of research on how myths reinforce pan-nationalism hampers the understanding of pan-nationalism as not only a historical phenomenon but also as a contemporary political practice. Secondly, the literature gap in the Turanist and updated pan-Turkist myths justifies the aims of this research. This is why studying myths and narratives in the discourse is potent in explaining the discrepancy between the Turanism and pan-Turkism's ideological foundations and the discursive similarity of Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist texts.

Despite the tensions on specific matters, the literature allows to establish a conceptual framework for pan-nationalism and myths that help to detect and analyze empirical cases of Turanism and pan-Turkism and their myths. For instance, pan-nationalism can be regarded as an internationalist, geographical, expansionist, antagonizing, and liberating movement. This creates a context for myth-making in pan-nationalism. Myth responds to societal needs and external changing conditions, especially in the context of foreign domination, and operates via mediators. It reinforces the norms and values, constructs the Other, and narrates the past for the sake of the future.

In terms of Turanism and pan-Turkism, the existing literature demonstrates the difference between them. Although both pan-nationalisms emerged in the same historical period and were inspired by the intellectual interests, Turanism emphasized the geographical origin, but the distance between the "fraternal" nations prompted more cultural, economic, and intellectual cooperation rather than physical or political unification. In contrast, pan-Turkism is more culturally and ethnically driven than Turanism and perceives the nations to be considered as one unit. It also relies on more political aspects, specifically the social organization and political alliance. Both Hungarian Turanism and Kazakh pan-Turkism historically portrayed Russia as the Other. At the same time, Hungarian Turanism mostly relies on anti-Westernism and coping with its cultural and linguistic dissimilarity from European neighbors, while the Kazakhs used pan-Turkism inspired by the Turkish political developments to achieve independence from the Russian Empire, and alleviate imbalances against its Northern neighbor. Hence, the literature review demonstrates the differences between Turanism

and pan-Turkism, despite their conflation. While Turanism traces the legacy of the state of Turan inhabited by the Ural-Altaic people, pan-Turkism hypothesizes the existence of one Turkic(sh) nation bound by language, culture, and religion, and Türkiye being the pole of all Turkic groups. Therefore, equipped with the conceptual understanding of pan-nationalism and myth, the literature allows for further analysis of how myths and narratives stemming from the pan-nationalist ideological foundations are employed in the discourse that constructs pan-nationalisms in Hungarian and Kazakhstani cases.

### **3. Empirical Background**

#### **3.1 Empirical Study Focus**

This study compares Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism by analyzing myths and narratives in their discourses. Since this research aims to resolve the empirical disjunction between the ideational foundations of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism and affinity in pan-nationalist discourse, Hungary and Kazakhstan are considered as empirical country cases. These cases constitute contrasting country cases with a similar outcome in the form of similar discourses. Although not only Hungary engages in Turanism, it was chosen as a case for the following reasons. Firstly, Hungary renewed its interest in Central Asia starting in the 2010s and overtly expresses Turanist rhetoric in its current discourse. The revitalized cooperation using myths in discourses prompts inferencing about the interrelation between Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism. At the same time, Estonia, Finland, and Japan are also countries that have proliferated Turanist thoughts, but Finland and Estonia are pursuing Nordic and Finno-Ugric identity projects (Sommer, 2014; Makarychev et al., 2024), while Japan reverberates Western ideas in its nationalism to distance itself from the Chinese influence (Doak, 2007, p. 528). Moreover, Finland and Japan do not rely on Turanist ideas in official communication with Central Asian countries. Secondly, both Hungary and Kazakhstan reinvigorate their pan-nationalisms in the post-socialist and post-communist contexts. Although Hungary and Kazakhstan had different forms of socialism, they both engaged with new nation-building projects after the demise of the socialist system in Central Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It may be argued that Estonia can be considered a case alternative to Hungary due to its post-communist context as well. Still, as argued below, Estonia does not exhibit Turanian manifestations in the discourse.

Having considered the choice of the country case for Turanism, it is now relevant to explain why Kazakhstan was chosen as a country case for pan-Turkism. Other Central Asian countries and Türkiye could be alternative empirical cases. And yet, Turkmenistan is constrained by its foreign

policy of neutrality, while Uzbekistan lacks the fertile soil for the emergence of nomadic myths due to the prioritization of the sedentary past in Uzbek history teachings (Laruelle, 2010, p. 109). What is more, the ethnic composition and linguistic proficiency of Uzbekistan and Hungary are more similar than those of Kazakhstan, making Kazakhstan a more distinct case. Kyrgyzstan might be the closest alternative to the Kazakhstan case; however, Kazakhstan's stronger economic characteristics and its corresponding activity in the global arena support its pan-nationalist activity internationally. Alternatively, Türkiye could also be a case for a study of the interplay between two pan-nationalist movements. Still, Türkiye lacks a post-socialist background, and its pan-Turkism is considerably grounded in Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, Dayıoğlu (2024) already compared Turkish pan-Turkism and Hungarian Turanism from historical and ideological perspectives. Thus, Hungary and Kazakhstan were chosen as country cases for Turanism and pan-Turkism.

While the bilateral cooperation and post-socialist context unite Hungary and Kazakhstan, these two countries are treated as different cases. Firstly, forms of independence and autonomy make these two cases different. Habsburg rule in Hungary represented more autonomous forms, especially after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. For instance, the Education Decree (*Ratio Educationis*) of 1777 regulated the educational system in Austro-Hungary and prescribed elementary-level education in the mother tongue depending on the nationality (Barta, 2001, p. 147). Hence, it left more leeway for nationalities, including Hungarians, in Austro-Hungary to exercise and propel their national culture and identities. After World War II, despite the Soviet influence, Hungary still exercised more autonomy than Kazakhstan, the latter being a part of the Soviet Union. Whereas, Kazakhstan fell under the Russian Empire's control in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and remained as its unit up to the demise of the Soviet Union. To compare with the Habsburg educational policies, Tsarism used education among Kazakhs to bolster Russification and Christianization by simultaneously propelling images of non-Russians as barbaric (Abenova & Toreakhmetova, 2022). This connived Russian Empire's strive to assimilate all nationalities into

one centralist state via denationalization (Amerkhanova & Tleugabylova, 2019). Secondly, geopolitical alignment drastically varies between Hungary and Kazakhstan. Hungary joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2000. Despite the tensions between the EU decision-making institutions and the Fidesz-Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) government, the incumbent Hungarian government does not strive to leave the EU (Károly, 2025). At the same time, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan reintegrated into post-Soviet organizations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). These structures reinforce Russia-centered multilateralism due to their greater economic, financial, military, and political power capabilities. For example, Konopelko (2018, p. 3) notes that the CIS's failure stemmed from the imbalances emerging from the Russian territorial, demographic, economic, and political dominance. Especially in the context of the Russian invasion in Ukraine in 2022, the conflict between the two integrationist vectors is acute. Thirdly, the ethnic composition differs between the two countries. Hungary has a mostly monoethnic population, comprised mostly of ethnic Hungarians. Although Hungary has several ethnic minorities like Armenians, Greeks, Poles, Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Ruthenians, Slovenes, Serbs, Ukrainians, and Roma, these minorities are integrated in terms of the Hungarian language and identity. At the same time, Kazakhstan has an ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse population. In 2023, 15,1% of the population of Kazakhstan was ethnic Russians (Dumanova, 2023), while other ethnicities include Poles, Belarusians, Uzbeks, Germans, Ukrainians, Koreans, Kurds, Armenians, Ingush, Chechen, and Tatars, and others that settled in Kazakhstan due to the Stalinist deportations. Moreover, the linguistic aspect is one of the challenges since not all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan use Kazakh as their first language, including ethnic Kazakhs.

### **3.2 Comparative Framework**

The study of pan-nationalism and its construction requires indicators that would help to unveil this phenomenon. Deriving from the postmodernist paradigm of political science, this thesis uses

Smith's ethno-symbolism approach that investigates pan-nationalism by looking into symbolic resources like traditions, myths, symbols, memories, and values (Smith, 2009, p. 16) that accumulate pan-nationalism. Specifically, the content, shape, and appeal of these symbolic elements (Smith, 2009, p. 16) are instrumental in analyzing pan-nationalism. Since symbolic elements construct nations, nationalism, and, in this case, pan-nationalism, this study accentuates myths and narratives as the main elements of comparison. These aspects help to investigate how pan-nationalism is constructed, helping to alleviate the empirical tension between the foundational ideological differences and affinity in discursive manifestations. This research concentrates on the interpretation of myths and narratives on the semantic level of analysis. That is to say, since the symbolic elements' contents constitute pan-nationalism (Smith, 2009), the meanings of these discursive elements are central in this study. To unveil these meanings, this study analyses political actors' perceptions and their injection of meaning to myths and narratives in the discursive construction of pan-nationalisms. Beyond this, myths and narratives serve as elements of comparison between two pan-nationalisms. Before delving into analysis, it is important to briefly establish how myths and narratives are identified in the discourse.

Narratives are one of the essential elements of discourse, allowing for the capture of pan-nationalist construction. Narrative is the lineage of events in consequence, where their interrelation provides significance to each event (Elliott, 2005, p. 3). Therefore, the narrative is akin to the storyline, where the plot involves characters surpassing the line of events building up to the linear end. Although the idea of narrative stems from literature studies (Elliott, 2005), this study understands them from a political science perspective. Through narratives, individuals and collectivities express their interpretation of events and environment and draw moral lessons from these interpretations. Specifically, narrative reflects the particular views of social groups, and includes three elements: "events, characters, and background", "events in sequence", and "causality" (Shenhav, 2006). Therefore, in this study, narrative is identified in the discourse as the placing of

events in a sequence imbued with morals. Nevertheless, narratives inextricably operate along with myths, which is the focus of the following section.

Myths are also one of the symbolic elements nurturing pan-nationalism. Kølvråa (2015, p. 63) defines myth as “the narration of the communal past, present, and future utilizing the privileges of a collective memory discourse”. Myths are usually simplified, dramatized, and selectorized accounts of the nation’s past that provide meaning (Bell, 2003) to events, places, and figures (Toth, 2015, p. 553-554). Myth and narrative are closely intertwined. For instance, Toth (2015) maintains that myths use historical narratives, while Kølvråa (2015) argues that myths are narratives themselves since they have a final story and message. Nevertheless, this study understands myths as a form of narrative but not as identical elements. Moreover, in contrast to narrative, myth provides a model for the future that is designed based on the narration of the past. Hence, if the actor in the discourse narrates the past, uses the past to define the future, and interprets the significance of historical figures, places, events, and groups, then it is identified as a myth in the context of this research. Having identified myths and narratives in the discourse, the study now turns to the identification of Turanist and pan-Turkic discourse.

Since the myths and narratives order events and interpretations into stories, the myth formulation occurs via discourse (Kelsey, 2021). This study considers Turanist and pan-Turkist discourse to be constituting linguistic acts in both written and oral forms that aim to transmit ideas on the representations of the world. Following the discourse principles articulated by Chilton and Schäffner (2011), this research attributes the discourse legitimizing and delegitimizing features, which Chilton and Schäffner (2011) label as “strategic functions” of discourse. Hence, this thesis focuses on the political pan-nationalist discourse whose elements help to legitimize or delegitimize actors and phenomena. In van Dijk’s (1997) conception, discourse is political depending on the context it operates within and the functions it undertakes. Having defined the focus on the particular function, it is now relevant to consider what context designates Turanist and pan-Turkist discourses.

In the pool of available discourse, the following criteria were used to detect Turanist and pan-Turkist discourse. Firstly, the target audience of the texts helps to identify whether the discourse has a Turanist or a pan-Turkist context. OTS speeches and statements are the primary examples of this. Although the organization bears the name “Turkic”, the absence of the international Turanian organization and Hungary’s observer status in the OTS since 2018 might indicate that Hungary uses this platform for the proliferation of Turanian ideas. Secondly, speeches and statements dedicated to national days, addresses, and other events significant for nation-building are taken into account as potential spaces for Turanism and pan-Turkism. Nation-building encompasses congruence between various levels of language and territorial administration (Rokkan, 1999), social consent to the rule and political integration (Deutsch, 2010), and educational processes that assimilate local communities into a larger nation (Kolstø, 2000). Using this definition, the study chose articles written by the state officials on national identity, presidential addresses to the city residents, meetings of the National Quryltai consultative body, and meetings with Olympic champions. Secondly, the target countries to which the discourse is addressed also help to identify whether it is a Turanist or pan-Turkist communication. In the case of Turanism, Hungary’s communication with Estonia, Finland, Türkiye, Japan, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan has the potential for the detection of Turanism since these states have Turanist traces in their history, as illustrated in the literature review. Regarding pan-Turkism, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian territorial subjects like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, and other subjects with Turkic ethnonyms in the name offer Kazakhstan an opportunity to proliferate its pan-Turkic ideals. Hence, these two aspects guided the detection of the Turanist and pan-Turkic discourse.

This chapter outlined the operationalizations of myths and narratives as elements of comparison between Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism and their respective discourses. That is to say, it provided a rationale for detecting and identifying myths, narratives, and Turanist and pan-Turkist discourses in an empirical world. Stemming from the ethno-symbolism framework,

the chapter outlined myths and narratives as both indicators and elements of comparison between two pan-nationalisms. Hence, myths and narratives in the discourse are crucial elements not only for constituting pan-nationalism but also for comparing its Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist types.

## **4. Methodology**

The comparison of Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan requires a set of tools to analyze the myths and narratives that constitute these pan-nationalisms. This chapter aims to introduce the research strategy, including the research objective, methodology, and approach. Then, it discusses the data collection and procedures for data analysis. The chapter finishes with research limitations and delimitations, and comments on the reliability and validity of this study.

### **4.1 Research Strategy**

The objective of this study is to explore the construction of pan-nationalism via the usage of myths and narratives by political actors. Specifically, this research aims to uncover the meanings political actors assign to the employed myths and narratives. These pursuits are instrumental for understanding the reasons for the discursive affinity of Turanism in Hungary and pan-Turkism in Kazakhstan despite their difference in ideological underpinnings.

### **4.2 Qualitative Interpretivism**

Since the research focuses on the discourse and the meanings assigned to the discursive elements, this study stems from the interpretivist epistemology. Interpretivism aims to observe the phenomena by capturing their social constructions and underpinnings. According to Yanow (2014a, p. 9), interpretivism maintains that humans are “meaning-making creatures” who communicate and interpret meanings and act accordingly. Moreover, “the community’s traditions, practices, language, and other cultural elements provide the material out of which individuals craft their meaning making of everyday events” (Yanow, 2014a, p. 11). Hence, this research understands pan-nationalism as a practice that is constructed via meanings attached to it. In a similar vein, myths and narratives are also meaning-imbued phenomena that allow to capture the construction of pan-nationalism and compare these constructions. The language is indispensable to the understanding of the social world, since people use the language to engage with it (Schaffer,

2016, p. 6). This is coupled with the qualitative approach to empirical data. In qualitative research, the social world consists of meanings and ideas. According to Creswell (2013, p. 44), qualitative research uses interpretive paradigms to uncover the meanings individuals attribute to social or human problems. As Hulst and Visser (2024, p. 1) write, language data and other unquantifiable shapes of “human meaning-making” are the subject of accumulation and analysis in qualitative studies. Therefore, this research analyzes the discourse that embodies the linguistic acts and meanings ensuing from them.

### **4.3 Abductive Thematic Analysis**

Interpretivism is closely associated with abduction (Blaikie, 2004, p. 1; Yanow, 2014b). The interpretive study’s starting point is the tension, surprise, or puzzle, which is why such methodology proceeds from the abductive rationale (Yanow, 2014b). With this in mind, this research also follows abduction to investigate the surprising conjunction between Turanism and pan-Turkism’s different ideological foundations and affinity in their discursive constructions. Abduction describes and explains social actors’ activities, language, and meanings, and transforms social actors’ names for these phenomena into scientific and technical categories and terms (Blaikie, 2004, p. 1). This research organizes the retrieved data in themes and analyzes them abductively. Abductive thematic analysis stems from the reasoning between deductive theory-driven research and inductive emerging designs. It is ‘equal engagement’ (Thompson, 2022, p. 1411) with both data and theories and notes that although being theory-guided, this method also aims at the refinement (Hulst & Visser, 2024), expansion, and modification of theoretical explanations since existing theories might lack explanations for empirical observations. The advantage of this approach is in its focus on unraveling symbolic meanings and “mutual knowledge”, which is implicit knowledge of the world generated during human experience that directs the social action (Blaikie, 2004, p. 1). This is similar to the social-psychological approach to politics and discourse, which investigates political institutions’ symbols, rituals, and political myths (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 305; as cited in Edelman, 1964; 1971). Moreover, in the

abductive analysis, the research also uses several bodies of knowledge (Hulst & Visser, 2024). Therefore, this study operates within several fields, including pan-nationalism, myths, Turanism, and pan-Turkism. This leads to the approach that this research uses – ethno-symbolism.

#### **4.4 Ethno-symbolism**

Ethno-symbolism is a conceptual approach stipulating that myths, narratives, memories, traditions, and other symbolic elements constitute nationalism (Smith, 2009). Specifically, their form and contents (Smith, 2009, p. 16) concern the researcher. Therefore, this research focuses on the meanings assigned to these cultural elements, such as myths and narratives. In Smith's ethno-symbolism, the dispersion of such symbolic elements creates a mental frame for reinforcing the sense of belonging to a community and socializing the successive generations, which guarantees a reproduction of nationalism. Importantly, such reinforcement occurs on two levels, both official and public, where elites "adapt well-known symbols for political ends, modify traditional values and politicise existing myths of heroes and saints." (Smith, 2009, p. 32). This entails a reverberation of elites' constructions of nationalism on the public level and the further recontestation of symbols for the further sustenance of nationalism. This study explores these constructions on the official level of Hungary and Kazakhstan to reveal how these elites maintain pan-nationalism. Although this study uses this approach, it does not adopt the primacy of ethnicity for the reinforcement of pan-nationalism. Rather, it focuses on the symbolic elements like myths and narratives. As demonstrated in the literature review, some researchers like Burris (2007) and Alici (1996) have already underlined the significance of myths of Central Asia for pan-Turkism. This shows the applicability of ethno-symbolism to the study of pan-nationalism. Moreover, Smith does not specify which elements are more decisive for the nurturing of nationalism, while this study analyzes myths and narratives separately to additionally demonstrate the similarity of which symbolic elements could explain the discursive affinity despite the ideological differences.

## 4.5 Casing

The design of this comparative study shares the logic of the most different cases design. According to Goerres et al (2019, p. 88), in most different cases design, cases demonstrate surprisingly similar outcomes, which loops back to scarce similarities in independent variables. Although this study does not employ variables due to the qualitative interpretivist research design, the rationale for comparing Hungary and Kazakhstan is similar to the most different cases design. This research treats Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism as cases of contrasting pan-nationalisms that are arriving at similar myths and narratives contributing to the affinity in the pan-nationalist discourse between Hungary and Kazakhstan. In this study, pan-nationalist discourse refers to discourse that contains myths, narratives, or symbols that reinforce the pan-nationalist identity, a nation's belonging to the pan-nationalist community, members of which share the perceived commonalities in origins, roots, culture, language, religion, or other aspects.

## 4.6 Data Collection

The study analyzed 48 primary and secondary sources, such as media articles, official speeches and statements, interviews, political programs, and YouTube videos, for the 2010-2025 time span. This time span was chosen since 2010 marked a turn to the revitalized cooperation between Hungary and Kazakhstan, and Hungary's introduction of the "Eastern Opening" policy, which directed considerable attention to the countries of Eurasia and Asia, including Central Asia. In terms of the choice of data, the priority was given to official speeches and statements to retrieve the original meaning from the discourse. Nevertheless, media sources, interviews, and YouTube videos were also used if they contained first-hand original statements of Hungarian and Kazakhstani officials. During the data collection process, official Hungarian online sources like [www.kormany.hu](http://www.kormany.hu), [www.2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu](http://www.2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu), [www.2015-2019.kormany.hu](http://www.2015-2019.kormany.hu), [www.abouthungary.hu](http://www.abouthungary.hu), [www.miniszterelnok.hu](http://www.miniszterelnok.hu), and official Kazakhstani online sources like [www.akorda.kz](http://www.akorda.kz) and [www.gov.kz](http://www.gov.kz), media sources like 24.hu ([www.24.hu](http://www.24.hu)), Index ([www.index.hu](http://www.index.hu)),

InAstana.kz ([www.inastana.kz](http://www.inastana.kz)), “Kazinform” International News Agency ([www.inform.kz](http://www.inform.kz)), Liter (<https://liter.kz/>), Kapital (<https://kapital.kz/>), other websites like <https://gaudinagyamas.hu/> and <https://kuruc.info/> for *Jobbik* political programs, and the YouTube video platform [www.youtube.com](http://www.youtube.com). Only Hungarian political programs were included in the sample since Kazakhstani political programs contained no pan-Turkist narratives and myths. The study analyzed Hungarian political programs of *Jobbik* and *Fidesz*, since *Jobbik* is a party notorious for reinforcing Turanism in its agenda (Kim, 2016), while *Fidesz* has a two-thirds majority in the parliament, has composed the Orbán government since 2010, and employs some elements of Turanism as well. Regarding Kazakhstani political parties, the political programs of *Amanat* (former *Nur Otan*) and *Ak Zhol* parties were analyzed, where the former is the ruling party for the time period analyzed. *Ak Zhol* party positions itself as an inheritor of the Alash liberation movement (Democratic Party of Kazakhstan "Ak Zhol", n.d.). One of the tenets in the Alash political program was the creation of Turkic autonomy (Akkuly, 2023), which aimed to unite Turkic people on the territory of Central Asia. Political programs of other parties were not considered since their ideological bases lacked pan-Turkist elements and their agenda were directed towards environmentalism (“*Baytaq*” Green Party of Kazakhstan), social democracy (Nationwide Social Democratic Party), social democracy and formerly communism (People’s Party of Kazakhstan), market economy (*Respublica*), and agrarianism (*Auyl* Party). 18 sources were removed from the sample due to repetitiveness of official statements’ extracts, lack of relevant data, or not qualifying for the “pan-Turkist” or “Turanist discourse”. The data collection process was held in the period between the 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2025 and the 16<sup>th</sup> of June 2025. All the sources were accessed online. The study analyzed sources in Hungarian and English for the Hungarian Turanism dataset, Kazakh, and Russian for the Kazakhstani pan-Turkism dataset. Due to the author’s limited linguistic capabilities in Hungarian, the Google Translate free web service was used to assist.

## 4.7 Data Analysis

While pan-nationalisms were compared on the country-level and were the units of analysis, myths and narratives were the units of comparison and units of observation. The data in the study were non-hierarchical, meaning that the data were collected on only one level of analysis and were not aggregated to draw further inferences. The study analyzed both inner-state (domestic) and inter-state (foreign) discourse, delivered on the external-political dimensions, which represented the politicians' communication towards the public (Chilton & Schäffner, 2011, p. 313).

Having analyzed the collected data, two datasets were created: HuTur (Hungarian Turanism) (N = 16) and KazTurk (Kazakhstani pan-Turkism) (N = 32). A larger number of sources in the KazTurk dataset might be explained by the prevalence of pan-Turkic elements in the Kazakhstani agenda in comparison with Hungarian discourse. To increase the abstraction for the purpose of comparability and conceptual inference, clusters were comprised. In this study, a cluster embodies the compilation of similar codes in one group based on the semantic relations between the codes. In other words, if the codes exhibited themes with similar meanings or belonged to the same semantic field, they were grouped together. Clustering of codes facilitates the comparability of overarching meanings identified via the analysis of codes. To capture myths and narratives and extract meaning from them, semantic analysis was used, supplied by manual coding. The advantage of manual coding is the contextual sensitivity. Based on the author's background knowledge, this sensitivity allowed to identify whether the text has Turanist or pan-Turkist discourse, and whether it reflects pan-nationalist thinking. One reference or mention of keywords counted as one observation.

No limits were set for the length of the textual sources. Nevertheless, if the texts were more than 20 pages long, the keywords were used for the search for potential myths and narratives. Before choosing keywords for the study, a prior screening of official texts was conducted. Prior screening involved reading through texts that resembled themes and topics related to Turanist or pan-Turkist

discourse. After that, the following keywords were chosen due to their frequent appearance in prescreened texts. The set of keywords for the HuTur dataset included “*Kelet*” (East), “*ázsia*” (Asia), “*türk*” (Turkic), “*turan*” (Turan), and “*rokon*” (Relative). The “*ázsia*” keyword was chosen since Turanism encompassed Hungarians’ cultural and linguistic ties with Asian nations (Csaplár-Degovics, 2025, p. 196). Another keyword, “*Kelet*”, denotes the centrality of Eastern thought in Hungarian Turanism (Ablonczy, 2022). Since OTS is the main intergovernmental organization for pan-Turkic cooperation, and Hungary is an observer-state in this organization, the “*türk*” keyword ensuing from the organization’s name allows to target myths and narratives associated with Hungary’s Eastern cooperation with Turkic states. While the “*turan*” keyword was derived from the very name of Turanism, the “*rokon*” keyword was chosen due to the frequent usage of Hungarian officials’ words with “*rokon*” stem (e.g., “*rokonok*”, “*rokonság*”) in labelling Central Asian and other Turkic nations. Turning now to another dataset, the KazTurk dataset sources were screened via “*tyurk*” (Turkic, the Turk), “*nomad*” (Nomad), “*kochev*” (nomad, nomadic, nomads...), “*Islam*” (Islam), “*Musul’m*” (Muslim), “*brat*” (brother, fraternal) keywords. As in the HuTur dataset’s case, the name of the pan-nationalism served as a reason for choosing the “*tyurk*” keyword. The “*nomad*” and “*kochev*” keywords share the same semantical meaning but different labels. These two keywords appear often in Kazakhstani discourse in the context of pan-Turkism and the narration of the Turkic past; hence, both variants were taken into account. Regarding the “*Islam*” and “*musul’m*” keywords, the historical significance of Islam as a uniting element of Turkic nations, especially against the Christianization policy of the Russian Empire (Landau, 1995), and the current majority of the Muslim population among Turkic nations dictated the choice of these keywords. In the case of the “*brat*” keyword, Kazakhstani officials often use this word not only towards ethnically-, culturally-kin nations, but also states tied with pragmatic and geographic connections. Nevertheless, this word commonly appeared in OTS discourse and bilateral communication between Kazakhstan and other Turkic states. The Turkic states were considered if they were declaring and reinforcing the Turkic elements in their identity. This was

assessed based on the background knowledge of the author. The study also noted the frequency of observations, which allowed to identify the most and least stable codes. This is reflected in the created codebooks for the HuTur dataset (see Appendix A) and the KazTurk dataset (see Appendix B).

The analysis and coding process involved several steps. This study used abductive thematic analysis, which presupposes non-linearity of the research process (Hulst & Visser, 2024). That is to say, the abductive analysis implies the openness to “surprises” or unexpected insights, which prompt the researcher to analyze data, return back to methodology and research design, refine them, return to the analyzed data, and refine methodology and research design once again in order to strive to reach better explanation for the cases in question (Hulst & Visser, 2024). Hence, on the first step of this research, the data were analyzed and coded in the codebook. After that, the initially planned Kelsey’s Discourse-Mythological Approach (DMA) was removed due to the time constraints and prioritization of myths and narratives’ meaning rather than their interaction with ideology. The following step included the second reading of data sources and refinement of codes. Such dynamics are also explained by the empirically driven research problem of this study. Due to this, some codes were removed or merged into bigger ones to account for the relative abstraction needed for conducting the comparison between Turanism and pan-Turkism. The next section will discuss research limitations and delimitations associated with this research design and methodology.

#### **4.8 Research Limitations**

This study has several research limitations. One of the theoretical limitations is the study’s applicability due to the potential conceptual conflation. Since Anthony Smith theorized nationalism in his ethno-symbolic approach, the utilization of this framework for the concept of pan-nationalism might produce some inconsistencies with Smith’s ethno-symbolist inferences. Nevertheless, pan-nationalism is sometimes regarded as an amplified form of nationalism.

Although some authors see pan-nationalism as an extension of nationalism, others distance pan-nationalism from the understanding of the “nation” (Maxwell, 2022). Moreover, the inherent difficulty in defining the “nation” develops into the conceptual imprecision of the term “pan-nationalism” (Maxwell, 2022, p. 3). Another theoretical and methodological issue is the lack of theoretical mechanisms. The primary nature of this study is empirical since it seeks to explore the phenomenon based on its empirical peculiarity. Furthermore, due to the drastic variance in pan-nationalism conceptualizations and inadequate consideration of pan-nationalism as the object of study (Maxwell, 2022, p. 1), this thesis primarily relies on the postmodernist assumptions, the conceptual approach of Smith’s ethno-symbolism, and existing conceptualization of pan-nationalism rather than on well-established theories and theoretical mechanisms. Regarding the methodological limitations, while the author is proficient in English, Russian, and Kazakh, the current level of Hungarian language might hamper the exhaustive interpretation of data. Hence, the author relied on online translators like Google Translate to assist in interpreting textual data in Hungarian.

Along with limitations, this study has research delimitations. One of the methodological delimitations concerns the use of semantics as the only type of analysis in this study. Due to the time and word limit constraints, pragmatics and syntax of the political discourse analysis were omitted. The rationale for this stems from the comparative nature, time constraints, and the main study aim. In line with ethno-symbolism, the study is particularly interested in the meanings social actors imbue in discursive elements that reinforce pan-nationalism.

The sole reliance on thematic analysis of textual data is another methodological delimitation of this study. Exploration of audio data, like songs, and visual data, like films, exhibitions, art, and architecture, could also be valuable for understanding pan-nationalism and its construction. However, the limited time resources and required physical presence both in Kazakhstan and Hungary prompted the use of textual data primarily.

The third delimitation of this study is the focus on the official discourse. Although pan-nationalism is a two-sided process of production, reception, and reproduction or contestation, this phenomenon occurs both on public and official levels. Nonetheless, Smith's ethno-symbolic approach determines elites as the primary agents of nation-crafting (Smith, 2009, p. 19). Therefore, the ethno-symbolic approach of this study determines the prioritization of official data over public expressions of pan-nationalism. The chapter now turns to other aspects of research limitations, namely reliability and validity of this study.

Regarding reliability and validity, this study's design predisposes outscoring in validity over reliability. Qualitative epistemology allows exploring the phenomenon in depth; hence, the research findings intimately reflect the initial study focus. Furthermore, qualitative interpretative design aims to uncover meanings, significance, and ideas inscribed in social communication, contributing to the study's validity. In addition, the researcher's proficiency in English, Russian, and Kazakh, and some degree of knowledge of Hungarian, facilitates the validity of this study since it allows the extraction of meanings from first-hand expressions, potentially diminishing the risks of imprecise translation or losing important meanings in translation.

On the other hand, reliability might be hampered due to the instrumentality of the researcher's identity and standpoint when interpreting the data. Although this might lead to personal bias, in the context of this empirical interpretivist research, the author's positionality might be useful in possessing the background knowledge and personal experience of both countries in question. Nevertheless, the usage of the codebook helps to ensure reliability since it allows other researchers to follow the data collection and interpretation process. On the ethical side, the study does not involve any potential risks for human subjects due to the operation with easily accessible and textual and visual sources. Moreover, the textual data to be retrieved for the research is publicly available and can be easily accessed online.

## 5. Results

The analysis of datasets HuTur (N = 16) and KazTurk (N = 32) demonstrated the following results. The dataset HuTur (see Appendix A) comprised 20 codes, which are merged into four clusters. The identified codes are: “Bridge”, “EastNation” (Eastern Nation), “Kinship”, “EastRepr” (Representation of the East), “Origin”, “Home”, “Unique”, “AntiColonSolid” (Anti-colonial solidarity), “Distance”, “Attila”, “NewWorld”, “Continuity”, “GeoOrigin” (Geographical origin), “Traditions”, “Christianity”, “EastPow” (Empowerment of the East), “AncCult” (Ancient Culture), “WarPeace” (War and Peace), and “Wisdom”. Based on the semantic features and the shared context, the identified codes, except of the “Wisdom” code, were grouped into four clusters: “Diplomacy” (“Bridge”, “EastRepr”, “Ally”), “Exceptionalism” (“Unique”, “Christianity”), “Myths” (“EastNation”, “Origin”, “Kinship”, “GeoOrigin”, “Home”, “Distance”, “Attila”, “Continuity”, “AncCult”, “Huns”), “Emancipation” (“AntiColonSolid”, “EastPow”, “NewWorld”), and “Other” (“Traditions”, “WarPeace”). The most dominant codes were “Kinship”, “Origin”, “Bridge”, “EastNation”, and “Traditions”.

The dataset KazTurk (see Appendix B) revealed 14 codes: “Fraternity”, “AncLand” (Ancient land), “Islam”, “TurkWorld” (Turkic world), “Bridge”, “Nomad”, “Roots”, “Support”, “Huns”, “TradHist”, “Values”, “Unity”, “Continuity”, and “TurkCiv” (Turkic civilization). Among the codes, three clusters were identified: “Myth” (“Huns”, “Roots”, “Nomad”, and “AncLand”, “Continuity”, “TurkCiv”), “Diplomacy” (“Fraternity”, “Support”, “Unity”, “Bridge”, “TurkWorld”), and “Culture” (“Islam”, “TradHist”, and “Values”). The most dominant code was “Fraternity”, followed by “Unity” and “Roots”.

To compare myths and narratives in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism, the identified codes and clusters were systematized in the symbolic pairs based on the reflection of the same symbol and similarity of the meaning attached to them, as can be summarized in the following table (see Table 1). The symbolic pair refers to the bundle of codes that inscribe the

myths or narratives reflecting the same symbol or “icon”. Since some of the codes also reverberated partial similarity, these narratives were grouped in symbolic pairs as well (see Table 2).

	<b>HuTur</b>	<b>KazTurk</b>
<b>Origin</b>	“Kinship” and “Origin”	“Roots”
<b>Ancestral Land</b>	“GeoOrigin”, “Home”	“AncLand”
<b>Continuity</b>	“AncCult” and “Continuity”	“Continuity”
<b>Huns</b>	“Huns”	“Huns”

*Table 1: “Myths” clusters’ symbolic pairs in the datasets HuTur and KazTurk*

	<b>HuTur</b>	<b>KazTurk</b>
<b>Bridge</b>	“Bridge”	“Bridge”
<b>Solidarity</b>	“Ally”	“Fraternity” and “Support”

*Table 2: “Diplomacy” clusters’ symbolic pairs of codes in the datasets HuTur and KazTurk*

Before proceeding to the analysis, it is essential to note the difference between the code names “Kinship” (dataset HuTur) and “Fraternity” (dataset KazTurk). These two code words were referentially equivalent (van Dijk, 2013). In other words, although these two code names were semantically similar, the difference in context and the linguistic choices of the speakers prompted the maintenance of different labels in two different datasets. Similar logic was applied to the labels of clusters.

## **5.1 The Shared Myths in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism**

Both Hungarian Turanists and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkists constructed their respective pan-nationalisms by claiming that the nations were related via cultural, spiritual, historical, or ethnic ties. It was a mythologization of the past of Turkic groups and ethnogenesis occurring in modern Central Asia and the Altai Mountains. Moreover, geographical entities were also mythologized,

along with historical figures and specific ethnolinguistic groups. The association between two “Myths” clusters of the datasets HuTur and KazTurk and their codes illustrates these ideas. The dataset HuTur’s “Myths” cluster contained codes of “Kinship”, “EastNation”, “Origin”, “GeoOrigin”, “Home”, “Distance”, “Attila”, “Continuity”, “AncCult”, and “Huns”. In the meantime, the dataset KazTurk had the “Myths” cluster comprising “Roots”, “Nomad”, “Huns”, “AncLand”, and “Continuity” codes.

### 5.1.1 The Myth of Origin

The first similarity between the Hungarian Turanist and the Kazakhstani pan-Turkist myths was the mythologization of the common origin. In the HuTur dataset, the most dominant “Kinship” code included the theme of the cultural, linguistic, historical, spiritual, or genetic ties of Hungarians with the Turkic states. This was related to the Hungarians’ fraternal feelings towards the Turkic or Asian nations. Moreover, these connections provided a reasoning for Hungary being a part of the Turkic world due to its “...very deep historical, spiritual, and cultural relation which makes Hungary part of the Organization of Turkic States” (“*nagyon mély, történelmi, spirituális és kulturális kapcsolatot, amely Magyarországot a Türk Államok Szervezetének részévé teszi*”) (Magyarország kormánya, 2025). In the domestic context, the links represented the opportunity for the tight cooperation between Hungary and “fraternal” nations. Furthermore, such myths legitimized not only Hungary’s interest in Eurasian organizations but also a specific interest in the Turkic states’ developments. Moreover, the reciprocity of interest amplified this mythologized kinship. As indicated in the 2010 political program of the Hungarian political party *Jobbik*: “We did not take advantage of the opportunity that the Turkic peoples of Inner Asia still regard us as relatives without any doubts” (Jobbik, 2010) (“*Nem használtuk ki az abban rejlő lehetőséget, hogy Belső-Ázsia türk népei a mai napig kétségek nélkül rokonként tekintenek ránk*”). Therefore, the theme reflected Turanian Hungary’s legitimization of the current cooperation with Turkic states and the future cooperation with perceived “fraternal nations”. Moreover, Turanists perceived their

pan-nationalism as the essence of these cultural, historical, spiritual, and kinship ties that inevitably bind the members of the pan-nationalist “family”.

The “Origin” code also contributed to the similarity of myths in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism. According to this code, Hungarians did not lose consciousness of their Central Asian or Turkic origin. Although both “Kinship” and “Origin” codes included the myths narrating the past, the difference between them was that while the former implied the preservation of kinship emanating from the ethnogenesis, the latter narrated the very ancestry that nations considered significant for the current identity. Specifically, the origin was related to the Hun-Turkic or Turkic roots: “We are therefore a Christian people living in the West, which stands on the foundations of its Hun-Turkic origins...” (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.). This demonstrated that this pan-nationalism signified the remembrance and mythologization of origin, the sharedness of which allowed nations to identify as Turanian. In a larger context, Turanists in Hungary recognized their origin tracing to Asian roots, as the Hungarian Prime-Minister Viktor Orbán declared that Hungarians are “half-Asians” (Neményi, 2012). Although the context of this “half-Asianness” aimed to legitimize Hungary’s special economic policy domestically, the general myth of origin had wider implications. That is to say, not only the Hun-Turk and half-Asian origin justified the cooperation with Turkic states and Central Asia, but it also legitimized the endorsement of non-Western forms of politics both on domestic and foreign policy levels.

The Hungarian “Kinship” and “Origin” codes were somewhat similar to the KazTurk’s “Roots” code. The “Roots” code referred to the conception of shared cultural, historical, and spiritual roots among Turkmenistan, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, and other OTS members like Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. It reflected that modern states like OTS members shared the same origin, which compelled them to cooperate and assist each other. Similar to Turanism in Hungary, Kazakhstani officials also constructed pan-nationalism on the mythologization of the presumed common historical, cultural, and linguistic roots. As illustrated by the Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev: “...the promotion (“*popularizatsiya*”) of Turkish unity has a big

importance, since we are bound by shared history, culture, language, and mentality” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023g). Therefore, the mythologization of Turkic roots not only legitimized the external cooperation with Turkic states but also provided significance and substance to the national identity that was transmitted both on domestic and foreign levels.

### *5.1.2 The Myth of Ancestral Land*

Another similarity between the Kazakhstani Pan-Turkist and Hungarian Turanist constructions was the territorial aspect. The codes of “GeoOrigin” and “Home” (HuTur), and “AncLand” (KazTurk) illustrated this affinity. The “GeoOrigin” code in the HuTur dataset referred to the myth of Hungarians coming from modern Kazakhstan, or Central Asia more broadly. As claimed by Orbán during his statement after the talks with Tokayev: “...I look at the map and find that place, which Hungarian history textbooks identify as “Magna Hungaria”, and that is an area, which is the part of today’s Kazakhstan” (Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda, 2024). This created a perception of a shared geographical origin, contributing to the common Turanian pan-nationalist identity. In this context, this legitimized Hungarians’ interest in Kazakhstan since the territory of the latter was significant for the narration of Hungarian national identity.

Another code related to this idea was “Home” in the same HuTur dataset. The code “Home” referred to the theme of the feeling of “home” among other nations. As phrased by Orbán, the presence of Hungary among the Turkic states evokes senses of belonging, security, and safety: “We Hungarians, and I personally, feel at home among you” (About Hungary, 2024). On the external level, the geographical space that hosts modern Turkic states and used to host proto-Hungarian tribes was mythologized and signified as a common point for the Turanian nations. Interestingly, these two themes emerged only in communication addressed to the foreign audience, suggesting the relevance of geographical factors in constructing pan-nationalism on the international level.

On the Kazakhstani pan-Turkist side, the “AncLand” code also denoted the mythological reading of the Kazakhstani territory, although on a more specific level. According to this myth of ancient land, contemporary Kazakhstan is the “sacred ancestral homeland” (“*prarodina*”) of Turkic nations, called “*Qara Shanyrak*” (the Kazakh idiomatic term for the family hearth) (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018a), hosting historical spiritual centers like Turkestan. As stated by Tokayev, “Kazakhstan is the land of the fathers (“*zemlei otsov*”) of the Turkic world, therefore our country attaches special importance to the development of comprehensive cooperation within the framework of the OTS” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022f). This indicated that Kazakhstani political actors mythologized Kazakhstan’s territory as the ancient cradle of Turkic nations to legitimize Kazakhstan’s ambitions to occupy a key role in pan-Turkism due to its inheritance of the central Turkic lands. Moreover, this showed that Kazakhstan tried to portray itself as one of the poles of Turkic cooperation, which might entail the attraction of more resources into the country. On the international level, this myth allowed Kazakhstani political actors to construct pan-Turkism via the attachment to the common ancestral land, which is the territory of modern Kazakhstan.

### 5.1.3 *The Myth of Continuity*

Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist political actors also mythologized temporality, as illustrated by the themes in HuTur’s “AncCult”, “Continuity”, and KazTurk’s “Continuity” codes. The code of “Continuity” precisely illustrated this conjunction of past, present, and future. Specifically, culture, national identity, and shared past were the elements that were laying the foundation for the future. According to Orbán, the cooperation between Kazakhstan and Hungary was not based only on economic interests, but also fraternal senses and “...about the common past (“*a közös múltról is*”) too, which I think will be big importance (“*nagy jelentősége*”) in the coming decades” (Miniszterelnöki Kabinetiroda, 2024). Another statement made by the Hungarian Minister of Culture and Innovation Hankó Balázs emphasized the relevance of culture for the national continuation: “It is important in our times to stand up for our national identity, which is

rooted in our culture and carries us into the future through our education and science” (Magyarország kormánya, 2025b). The myth was apparent only in foreign discourse, where the myth of continuity imbued the transcendence of pan-nationalism on the international level and legitimization of its existence and future prospects.

In the Kazakhstani pan-Turkist discourse, the myth of continuity had slightly different features. Although it also described the time spatiality between the past, present, and future, the KazTurk’s “Continuity” code reverberated the spiritual elements of the “ancestors’ will”. In other words, preserving pan-Turkic unity fulfils the ancestral testament and needs to be passed to future generations (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023g). The First President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev also stressed the need to preserve “historical continuity” (“*istoricheskuyu preyemstvennost*”) (What Elbasy said at the informal Summit, 2021). This showed that the reinforcement of pan-Turkism embodied the inherent duty prescribed by the ancestors.

Turning back to the dataset HuTur, it is now essential to consider the “AncCult” code particular to the Hungarian Turanist discourse only. The theme in the “AncCult” code emphasized the antiquity of Turanian nations’ culture; thus, it grounded the legitimacy of these nations in their “ancient” locus, granting the continuation of Turanian nations. Hence, on the foreign level, this antecedence prompted Turanian states to base their cooperation on mutual respect for the national peculiarities that are believed to stem from these cultural loci. For instance, Orbán called Hungarians and Japanese “two ancient nations of culture” (Website of the Hungarian Government, 2019). In addition, the mythologization of the culture was also interrelated with the domestic consciousness, when Orbán claimed that “Buda is an ancient name: he was the brother of the great king Attila, the brother of the King of the Huns. So to this day the name of our capital city bears the name of the brother of the King of the Huns” (Magyarország kormánya, 2025a). Therefore, this demonstrated not only respect for national peculiarities but also the continuity of Turanian nations, as supported by the embodiment of their antiquity in their present cultures. This continuity

provided legitimacy to the proliferation of pan-nationalisms, the nations of which are bound by their shared past and culture.

#### 5.1.4 *The Myth of the Huns*

Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism also employed the mythologization of ethnolinguistic groups to construct their respective pan-nationalisms. The HuTur and KazTurk datasets' "Huns" codes well demonstrated this. The Hungarian "Huns" code contained a theme of Hungarians sharing the Hunnic origin with other nations. The Huns are nomadic tribes well-known for invading Europe in the 5th century, and this conquest carries various interpretations and connotations. Although Western European historiography associates Huns with barbarism and savagery, some contemporary nations that perceive themselves as descendants of Huns portray Huns as glorious, bold, and mighty warriors. As illustrated in the words of former *Jobbik* leader Gábor Vona: "Yes, the Turks believe it and it is taught in schools that the two peoples ... descended from the legendary Huns" (Vona, 2019). This myth of the Huns portrayed the Hunnic ancestors as "legendary", implying the greatness of the shared Turanian ancestors. Moreover, this statement indicated that the myth of the Huns was already firm and reproduced in school textbooks.

In the KazTurk's "Huns", the content of the myth of the Huns slightly differed. The Kazakhstani officials perceived the Hunnic past as one of the crucial points of statehood. The State Counsellor of Kazakhstan Erlan Karin claimed that Kazakh culture dates back to the Huns, Saka, and Turkic Khaganates (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d. a). Both Turanian and Kazakhstani political actors used the myth of the Huns to imbue their respective pan-nationalism with positive attributes. Furthermore, this pride in mythologized Hunnic ancestors prompted affiliate nations to cooperate and form pan-nationalist communities that are bound by the shared positive Self.

## 5.2 Distinct Myths in Hungarian Turanism

### 5.2.1 *The Myth of Attila*

Despite the revealed similarities, some myths found their place only in either Hungarian Turanism or Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism. One of those myths was reflected in the “Attila” code, which was peculiar only to the dataset HuTur. The code reverberated the myth of Attila, or the Hungarians’ mythologization of their descent from Attila, who was perceived as a mighty king of the Huns. The perceived common ancestry and lineage from Attila united Hungary with other Turanian nations. As put by Orbán when addressing the OTS members: “And we are also brothers, because we have common ancestors among them Attila, who was also our great king” (About Hungary, 2024). Hence, the former greatness and imperial strength of Attila represented the symbol of pride. Since the code appeared only on the foreign level, the mythologization of the ancestral historical figure signaled the striving of Hungary and OTS members to legitimize their expansion of power in the international arena, which is inspired by the past period of state might. Hungarian Turanists also used the myth of Attila to demonstrate that their shared great ancestry of Turanian nations was the reason for these nations to form a community of cooperation and joint action.

### 5.2.2 *The Myth of Easternness*

Another mythical theme that was present only in Hungarian Turanist communication is Hungarians being the Eastern nation. The “EastNation” code transmitted the idea of Hungarians perceiving themselves as the eastern nation that migrated west in the 9th century. In historical terms, this referred to the migration of proto-Hungarians in 895, presumably from the Ural Mountains area, and their settlement in the Carpathian basin (*Honfoglalás*). The mythologization of this past ensued the perception of Hungarians having an Eastern identity stemming from the past, while belonging geographically, religiously, and geopolitically to Europe in the present. As corroborated in the speech by Orbán: “I can tell you that, as an Eastern nation, being a member of the European Union is a special experience” (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.) (“*Mondhatom Önöknek,*

*hogy keleti népként tag lenni az Európai Unióban egy különleges élmény*”). The presence of this myth on the foreign level only signaled that Hungarians perceived their Easternness as the uniting point with other Turanian nations. Moreover, the Easternness was portrayed as a qualifying criterion for the nation to be Turanian and form a community with other Turanian nations. Therefore, they imbued that being Turanian stemmed from originating from the East and reinforcing this Eastern identity until the present day.

### *5.2.3 The Myth of Distance*

The HuTur dataset also contained a peculiar code of “Distance”. The Hungarian “Distance” code indicated the acknowledgement of the geographical distance between Hungary and the Turkic states located in Central Asia, the North Caucasus, and Türkiye, which was not an obstacle due to the shared roots of these nations. Turanian Hungary perceived pan-nationalism as a movement based on common roots rather than geographical proximity and regionalism. As indicated in Orbán’s speech: “...despite the physical distance between us – we formed a community of shared destiny.” (About Hungary, 2024). The mythologized distance allowed for the justification of Hungary’s pursuits of intensified cooperation with Turkic states that were not in geographical proximity to this Turanian state. Moreover, this mythologization explained the significance of Turanism, in which kinship prevails over geographical remoteness.

## **5.3 Distinct Myths in Kazakhstani pan-Turkism**

### *5.3.1 The Myth of Nomadism*

The dataset KazTurk also contained codes that were endemic only to Kazakhstani pan-Turkism. In contrast to Hungarian Turanism, Kazakhstani pan-Turkism employed the myth of nomadism, inscribed in the code “Nomad”. Although Turkic tribes comprised both nomadic and sedentary groups, the Kazakh myth of nomadism implied that Turkic identity was eminently congruent with nomadism. The mythologization of this occurred in the narration of the past nomadic lifestyle as a forming aspect of the nations and the portrayal of the nomadic legacy as a future model for

development. To illustrate, the Kazakhstani Minister of Tourism and Sport Yerbol Myrzabossynov said “Today, an important event for the Turkic world begins: the **Fifth World Nomad Games**. Kazakhstan views them as a key event for preserving and popularizing the unique cultural heritage of the **Turkic peoples**” (Palatugina, 2024). This illustrated that Kazakhstani officials perceived the World Nomad Games as one of the embodiments of pan-Turkic cooperation. In another communication, the Kazakhstani Prime-Minister Älihan Smayilov argued that “We could create a joint historical project about the origins and formation of the **Turkic peoples**. The implementation of such an image project will attract the attention of society to various issues of the development of culture, language and preservation of the heritage of the **nomadic peoples** of Eurasia” (The Prime Minister of Kazakhstan proposed to create a project, 2023). Of interest here was that nomadism and pan-Turkism were used interchangeably in the Kazakhstani vision of pan-Turkism, although not all Turkic nations were nomadic like Azerbaijan, partially Türkiye, Tatars, and others. Such mythologization was used to legitimize the consolidation of a distinct pan-Turkic community that shares a nomadic past and lifestyle as a feature distinct from other nations.

### 5.3.2 *The Myth of Civilization*

The “TurkCiv” code was also present in the dataset KazTurk. The encoded myth in it expressed the conception that the Turkic nations constituted a separate Turkic civilization. Moreover, in Nazarbayev’s words, this forms a “special model of succession” (“*osobuyu model’ preyemstvennosti*”) (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018a). Thus, the mythologization of historical legacy reinforced pan-Turkism, which embodied a distinct civilization that transcended in future generations. The pan-Turkic commonality of language, traditions, history, and culture allowed its members to legitimize current and future actions as the influence of their peculiar Turkic civilizational model. Since the theme was reinstated only on the domestic level, the myth of civilization was relevant for the legitimization of choices made in domestic decision-making.

## 5.4 Shared Narratives in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism

Apart from myths, pan-nationalist political actors also employed narratives, particularly related to diplomacy, exceptionalism, culture, emancipation, and identity. The narratives in the Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist discourse demonstrated greater variance than myths. Although some of the diplomatic narratives of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism coincided, the majority of the narratives differed in content. Regarding other narratives, Hungarian Turanism's narratives related to emancipation, identity, and exceptionalism, while Kazakhstani pan-Turkism's narratives were mostly cultural. The following sections discuss these findings in more detail, starting with the "Diplomacy" clusters that contained both similar and different codes, and finishing with narratives that were distinct either for the dataset HuTur or KazTurk.

### 5.4.1 The "Bridge" Narrative

The partial similarity in "Diplomacy" clusters was found between the datasets HuTur and KazTurk. Firstly, both Hungarian Turanists and Kazakhstani pan-Turkists argued that their respective pan-nationalisms connected various countries or continents, as illustrated by their "Bridge" codes and congruence between them. In the dataset HuTur, the "Bridge" code reflected the narrative of Hungary's special role in connecting East and West. That is to say, due to its geographic location and membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations, Hungary's cooperation with Turkic states allowed it to build "bridges" between the European and Eurasian poles. As stated in the *Jobbik*'s political program for 2010 parliamentary elections: "*Európa nyugati része és Ázsia között Magyarország helyzete geostratégiaailag meghatározó, és ez alkalmassá teheti az országot gazdasági, kereskedelmi híd, transit ország szerepére.*" (Jobbik, 2010, p. 73) ("Hungary's location between the western part of Europe and Asia is geostrategically decisive, and this may make the country suitable for the role of an economic, trade bridge, and transit country"). According to this narrative, despite Hungary's close affiliation with the Turkic world, it positioned itself more as a connector between the two communities. Moreover, Hungary's Turanian identity did not imply

the rejection of its European ties, but rather openness to the Eastern institutions and nations, and proliferation of the cooperation between the East and West. In the Kazakhstani form of pan-Turkism, the understanding of the bridge role was amplified. According to the KazTurk's "Bridge" code, Turkic states were connecting not only East and West, but North and South, and different nations. Specifically, this narrative was used to legitimize energy projects that would allow "considerably strengthen the Turkic region's positions as a key transit hub", according to Tokayev (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025b).

#### *5.4.2 Solidarity*

Other codes in "Diplomacy" clusters were also interrelated across the datasets HuTur and KazTurk. These codes were "Ally" in HuTur and "Fraternity" and "Support" in KazTurk. The coinciding feature of these codes was in the narrative of mutual assistance and firm alliance. In Hungarian Turanism, the "Ally" code contained a theme of Hungary finding allies in distant Turanian nations. As put by Vona, Hungary traditionally did not have any loyal allies (Vona, 2019), and the cooperation with one of the Turanian nations like Türkiye was perceived as a solution to this issue. This indicated that Hungary tried to alleviate this "disloyalty" in Europe by exploiting its cultural and genetic roots to build stable alliances in its political realm. Moreover, since the code emerged in the discourse on both internal and external levels, the "Ally" theme encompassed an abstract notion of Turanian nations being prioritized in both domestic and international politics.

KazTurk's "Fraternity" and "Support" codes paired with HuTur's "Ally". Starting with the "Fraternity" code, it was the most dominant code in the whole KazTurk dataset. This narrative denoted the perception of Turkic states and Hungary as "brotherly" nations. Although the Kazakhstani officials' statements did not provide the context for the criteria on which the nations were considered fraternal, the focus of the narrative of fraternity was to evoke feelings of innate and unbreakable ties between Kazakhstan and the Turkic nations. For instance, when addressing

the President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after the earthquakes in Türkiye, Tokayev stated that “We are ready to continue to support the fraternal Türkiye” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023a). The narrative of fraternity was used to domestically legitimize the provision of mutual assistance and support to brotherly nations. At the same time, on an external level, the narrative signaled the priority of mutual support for the construction of pan-Turkism. Furthermore, this narrative was used to inhibit the sense of community, which entailed the common action and sharing of resources for the sake of the common pan-Turkic destiny. The “Fraternity” code was tightly connected with another code in the KazTurk dataset, which was “Support”. The theme in this code referred to the significance of mutual support in strengthening Turkic unity. Moreover, the cooperation among Turkic states should be based on this mutual assistance, as expressed by Kazakhstani pan-Turkists: “Let our unity strengthen and our cooperation become firmer, which is always based on mutual support” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023b). On a broader level, this theme transmitted the ideas of support, help, assistance, and solidarity. Both foreign and domestic communication contained this code; hence, this provided legitimacy for the wide array of actions, from positive public attitudes resulting in nongovernmental initiatives to official-level cooperation and investments.

## **5.5 Distinct Diplomatic Narratives in Hungarian Turanism**

### *5.5.1 Representation of the East*

Nevertheless, there were some differing narratives in the “Diplomacy” clusters between the datasets HuTur and KazTurk. To illustrate, the “EastRepr” code was peculiar to the HuTur dataset solely. The “EastRepr” encoded the narrative of Turanian Hungary’s role in representing Turkic states that are not members of European organizations. When delivering a speech at the meeting of the Heads of State and Governments of the OTS, Orbán announced that “*Magyarország vállalja, hogy ezeket a kérdéseket mi az európai politikai és gazdasági vitákban képviselni fogjuk, és*

*támogatunk minden kezdeményezést, amely a türk világ és Európa közötti együttműködést erősíti* (“Hungary undertakes that we will represent these issues in European political and economic debates, and we support all initiatives that strengthen cooperation between the Turkic world and Europe”) (Magyarország kormánya, 2024). This was somewhat similar to the “Bridge” code, but the “EastRepr” implied the difference direction. That is to say, in the “EastRepr”, Turanian Hungary aimed to voice the interests of the Turkic states in the European platforms and express solidarity with the pan-Turkic nations’ interests. This justified Hungary’s considerable role in Turanian pan-nationalist cooperation since it had the power to represent the Turanian pan-nation in European affairs.

## **5.6 Distinct Diplomatic Narratives in Kazakhstani Turanism**

### *5.6.1 The Narrative of Unity*

In contrast to the HuTur dataset, KazTurk contained distinct codes in the “Diplomacy” cluster, like “Unity” and “TurkWorld”. The “Unity” code denoted the narrative of unity as the aim of pan-Turkic cooperation. In one instance, the State Secretary of Kazakhstan Gulshara Abdykhalikova mentioned that the Cooperation Council of Turkic States “plays an important role in strengthening the idea of solidarity and unity of the Turkic peoples in the international arena” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2018b). This signified the pan-Turkic unity as one of the building elements of pan-nationalism that allows its constituent nations to act as an integrative bloc in the international system. Therefore, pan-nationalist unity was not only about inter-state cooperation but also positioning the states as parts of the pan-Turkist bloc in the world arena. This was similar to another KazTurk’s code of “TurkWorld”, to be discussed further.

### *5.6.2 Turkic World as a Global Player*

Another code related to diplomacy was KazTurk’s “TurkWorld”. Both “Unity” and “TurkWorld” codes were related to the positioning in the international system. Still, the “TurkWorld” was more explicitly constructing pan-Turkism in relation to geopolitics. The narrative coded in the

“TurkWorld” referred to Turkic states forming a “world” which is both a powerful player in the international system and a crucial region. For example, Tokayev claimed that “the Turkic world interacts with global powers on equal terms (*“na ravnykh”*)” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023g). In this case, the Kazakhstani political actors constructed pan-Turkism as not only a platform for cooperation but rather as a geopolitical player possessing influence not inferior to the global powers. Nevertheless, not always are Kazakhstani political actors imbued with a meaning of “player” in the Turkic world narrative. In another instance, during the informal OTS summit, Tokayev declared that “our aim is to transform the Turkic world into one of the most important economic, cultural, and humanitarian regions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century” (*“nasha tsel’ – prevratit’ tyurkskiy mir v odin iz vazneishikh ekonomicheskikh, kulturnykh i gumanitarnykh regionov XXI veka.”*) (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d. d). In this context, the Turkic world was associated with the region, the importance of which was set to be elevated. Having analyzed the “Diplomacy” clusters, it is now time to turn to other clusters in the dataset HuTur.

## **5.7 Distinct Narratives in Hungarian Turanism**

### *5.7.1 The Narrative of Uniqueness*

The dataset HuTur contained three clusters that were distinct and did not appear in the dataset KazTurk. These are “Exceptionalism”, “Emancipation”, and “Other” clusters. The “Exceptionalism” cluster consisted of “Unique” and “Christianity” codes. The “Unique” code represented the narrative of Hungarians’ unique history of migration from the East to the West. This code was interrelated with the code of “EastNation”, since the argument on the uniqueness emanated from the narrative on migration, making the Turanian Hungarians an extraordinary nation due to their conjunction of the eastern origin and Western geographical location and religion. The statement “we are unique in the sense that we migrated from the East to Europe together with many other peoples, all of which have since disappeared.” (About Hungary, 2024)

illustrated this. Although the narratives inscribed in “Unique” and “EastNation” codes are similar, the former emphasized the peculiarity of the Hungarian Turanian nation, while the latter focused on the mythologization of the historical migration to the East. Hence, for Hungarian political actors, being Turanian was associated with being unique due to the migration and the celebration of Easternness that ignites Turanian pan-nationalism.

### 5.7.2 Christianity

The “Christianity” code demonstrated that Christian faith was also significant for the Turanian Hungarian identity. This was distinct in the context of Turanian discourse, since this narrative was addressed only towards mostly Islamic Turkic nations that are members of the OTS (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan, and observers like Turkmenistan and Northern Cyprus). Although the frequency of appearance of the “Christianity” code was minimal, the narrative inscribed in it demonstrated that Christianity had significance for its Turanian Hungarian identity. As put by Orbán during the 6th OTS summit: *“Mi mindig is figyelemmel követtük a türk identitású országok együttműködését, mi vagyunk Önök között a legnyugatabbra költözött nép, amely a kereszténységet is felvette. Mi tehát egy Nyugaton élő keresztény nép vagyunk...”* (“We have always closely followed the cooperation of countries with a Turkic identity, among you, we are the people who have moved the most to the West, and who have also adopted Christianity. So we are a Christian people living in the West...”) (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.). In other words, Hungarian political actors emphasized the Christian faith to demonstrate that Turanism tolerated the diversity of religion and rather focused on the cultural aspects apart from religion.

### 5.7.3 New World and Turanism

The second HuTur dataset’s cluster, differing from KazTurk, was the “Emancipation” cluster. This cluster’s narratives aimed at the alleviation of structural dependencies and external control or influence. It consisted of codes like “NewWorld”, “AntiColonSolid”, and “EastPow”. Being the most dominant code in the cluster, the “NewWorld” code encompassed the theme of the Turanian

nations' rise in the evolving world. In this vein, the Hungarian Turanist officials believed in the demise of the traditional international system and the creation of a new one, where the Eastern players would have more weight in the world arena. For instance, Orbán argued that “We live in a new world order, and its history is fundamentally defined by the emerging economies and the development of states in the East” (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.). Therefore, Hungarian political actors constructed Turanism as a rising association of nations that regain their might in the international system. Consequently, the narrative legitimized the rise of Turanian states and their acquisition of more power in the global arena.

#### *5.7.4 Anti-colonialism*

The “AntiColonSolid” code was also found in the Turanist discourse, although only on the international level. This code captured the narrative of solidarity in the shared historical experience of Soviet control or influence. As noted by Orbán when accepting the Supreme Order of the Turkic World award, “...even Soviet times helped our relations, because, like us, you too were absorbed into the Soviet empire” (About Hungary, 2024). The usage of the “Soviet empire” was peculiar, since it referred to the imperial form of Soviet control. The utilization of this narrative allowed Hungarian political actors to construct Turanism as an anti-colonial force and legitimize Turanist cooperation as a platform for Turanian nations' empowerment, which is the focus of the next code.

#### *5.7.5 Eastern Power*

The last code in the “Emancipation” cluster was the “EastPow”. It transmitted a narrative of the Eastern identity being associated with pride and power, and overcoming the stigmatization of the Eastern origin. According to Orbán, “In Europe Hungary is often described as the most westerly of the people of the East. Earlier this was meant as a slight – intended to express **disdain** and **condescension**. However, due to the fantastic achievements of your countries – due to the economic and political development of your countries – being referred to as an Eastern people should now be taken as **praise**” (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.). This illustrated that being Eastern

became a source of power rather than a disadvantage, thanks to the rapid development of Turanian nations. What is more, this narrative contributed to the construction of Turanian pan-nationalism by imbuing it with the positive attributes of pride; hence, it also legitimized Hungary's participation in the Turanian cooperation due to its prestige. Having mentioned the importance of positive identification in Turanian pan-nationalism, it is now essential to move to the "Other" cluster, which contained the codes devoted to Self and Other.

#### *5.7.6 Turanian Traditionalism vs. Non-traditional West*

"Other" was the last cluster unique to the HuTur dataset. This cluster contained themes that reinforced the images of the negative Other and positive Self. The most apparent code was "Traditions". It reinforced the significance of traditions, culture, and heritage for the Turanian nations and underlined them as a source of strength. As Hankó stated: "It's good to see that there are nations that are not only proud of their cultural traditions, but also cherish them and pass them on to the future generations" (Magyarország kormánya, 2025c). Nevertheless, the narrative also utilized traditionalism to proliferate the images of the traditional East and non-traditional West. In this case, Turanism was constructed as the embodiment of the rupture with Western policies and drifting away from Western ideals. In the Hungarian Turanists' understanding, the West was not able to tolerate Hungary's perpetuation of national identity, traditions, and culture shared with the Eastern states. What is more, the preservation of traditions and culture created a sense of pan-nationalist community's continuity that guarantees its survival, unlike the Western Other that was losing its national identity. To illustrate, Orbán mentioned in his speech that "today's Western teaching does not recognize this truth, but we stand by our Hungarian national identity" (*"Ezt az igazságot a mai nyugati tanítások nem ismerik el, de mi kitartunk a magyar nemzeti identitásunk mellett"*) (Miniszterelnok.hu, n.d.). Hence, national identity, traditions, and culture were essential ontological elements, or ultimate "truth", which was denied by Western views. The narrative of the cultural conflict was also translated into the realm of policies, as illustrated by the Turanist understanding of Western institutions "forcing" policies on Hungary, as argued by former *Jobbik*

leader Vona (Vona, 2019). Hence, Hungarian political actors formulated Turanism as an embodiment of traditionalism and opposition to the Western departure from conservative values.

#### *5.7.7 War and Peace*

The second dominant code in the “Other” cluster was “WarPeace”. According to this code’s narrative, the EU exacerbated war, while the Turanian states stood on the peaceful side. For instance, both the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijártó and Orbán shared expressed this view, the latter declared that “...on behalf of the Hungarian people I would like to thank the presidents for always standing on the side of peace over the past three years, which is not only a morally correct position, but it is also in our interests to stand on the side of the peace” (Magyarország kormánya, 2025a). The Hungarian political actors used this narrative to emphasize the significance of Turanism since the nations constituting it were devoted to the preservation of peace. While this may be true for Turanian nations, the EU was portrayed as promoting war, which ultimately conflicts with Hungarian interests. Consequently, the Turanism’s narrative of peacefulness legitimized Hungary’s participation in non-EU multilateral projects and aversion towards the EU due to its war-proliferating policies. In addition, peace was Turanism’s moral value, the importance of which is discussed next.

#### *5.7.8 Wisdom*

The “Wisdom” code was a separate code in the dataset HuTur. This narrative portrayed Turanism as a model of wisdom, which circumscribed the norms of conduct, knowledge, and values that were transmitted from generation to generation. As stated in *Jobbik*’s political program for 2014, Turanist ideas are “...a teacher and a source of life that the generation of a given era must update again and again according to its own life opportunities and living conditions” (Jobbik, 2014). This demonstrated that Turanist wisdom offered guidance that is adaptable to new social environments. This narrative’s presence on the domestic level only underlined the significance of Turanism for the Hungarian community, where Turanism served as the model of norms and behavior that

maintains social order and steers the community in the right direction. Hence, Hungarian political actors constructed Turanism as not only a legitimization but also as a set of moral codes for the Hungarian nation. It is now essential to devote closer attention to the clusters and codes particular to the KazTurk dataset.

## **5.8 Distinct Narratives in Kazakhstani Pan-Turkism**

### *5.8.1 Islam*

The dataset KazTurk comprised only one cluster that was absent in the dataset HuTur, which was “Culture”, containing “Islam”, “Values”, and “TradHist” codes. The “Islam” code embodied the narration of Islam’s close interrelation with pan-Turkism. Stated otherwise, Kazakhstan perceived Islam as an indispensable element of Turkic culture, and this contrasts with HuTur’s “Christianity” code. While Hungary interpreted Christianity as a distinct feature not disrupting Hungary’s Turanian belonging, Kazakhstan envisaged Islam as a feature universal to all Turkic nations. For example, Tokayev used both foreign and domestic level communication to express the idea of preserving and popularizing “Turkic Sufism” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024a). Such a specific reference to Sufism emphasized both Islam’s uniting role and Kazakhstan’s call for the governments to combat nontraditional Islamic movements that are considered threatening to the stability and order of Turkic states. On a community level, Kazakhstani officials argue that values of “Turkic-Islamic culture” helped to “preserve our roots and became the basis of our unity” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d. d). Therefore, the Islamic culture also facilitated the cognition of the pan-Turkic origin, which makes Islam indispensable for the ontology of this pan-nationalism.

### *5.8.2 Values*

Another code exclusive for the dataset KazTurk was “Values”. This code’s narrative exemplified Turkic nations not only cooperating stemming from the culture but also from the shared values. To illustrate, Nazarbayev stated that the Turkic Academy should proceed with considerable work

“to understand common values and heritage” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014). This demonstrated that the commonality of values forms pan-Turkism in Kazakhstani official conceptions. Hence, this legitimized Kazakhstan’s belonging to pan-Turkism since other Turkic nations also share values similar to those of Kazakhstani identity. Still, traditions and history also had significance for pan-Turkist construction, as argued next.

### *5.8.3 Traditions and History*

In a similar vein, “TradHist” code also appeared in the dataset KazTurk. According to the narrative inscribed in this code, the pan-Turkic cooperation was also based on the affinity of traditions and history. Furthermore, these traditions should be preserved and encouraged. For instance, in his letter regarding Aktau’s status as the cultural capital of the Turkic world, Tokayev stated that “the strengthening of the cooperation of nations, the traditions and history of which are tied with each other, is our common goal” (Press service of the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025a). Therefore, Kazakhstan perceived pan-Turkism as a community of affiliation with common tradition and history.

All things considered, these findings showed that there was a predominant similarity in myths and varying affinity of narratives between Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist pan-nationalist discourses. Regarding myths, although there were a few myths that were distinct to either Hungarian Turanism or Kazakhstani pan-Turkism, there was a prevailing mutual association of them between the two pan-nationalisms based on their similar meanings. The analysis of narratives demonstrated somewhat different results. The first observation was that the narratives about diplomacy partially coincide, as demonstrated in the analysis of “Diplomacy” clusters of datasets HuTur and KazTurk. Particularly, both Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism perceived their respective pan-nationalisms as connecting various parts of the world and as platforms for stable assistance and alliance. In other instances, Hungarian Turanists transmitted narratives that conveyed the image of the Other, underlined Hungary’s peculiarities in comparison

to other Eastern nations, and empowered the states of the East. On the other hand, Kazakhstani pan-Turkism's narratives were focused on cultural aspects like the Islamic religion, traditions, history, and values. The results in this chapter indicated that the Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist myths were strongly interrelated, while narratives mostly differed in their meanings. The next chapter, therefore, moves on to discuss the implications of these findings for existing studies and literature on pan-nationalism, myths, Turanism, and pan-Turkism.

## **6. Discussion**

The aim of this chapter is to position this study's findings within the existing literature on pan-nationalism, myth, Turanism, and pan-Turkism, and discuss how these results shed light on the wider understanding of pan-nationalism as an empirical phenomenon. Moreover, this chapter attempts to highlight the most surprising and significant results and discuss the implications of the data analyzed.

### **6.1 Implications of Findings for the Literature**

This study aimed to explore political actors' usage of myths and narratives in constructing pan-nationalism and Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism's interpretations of shared myths in 2010-2025. With respect to the research question, it was found that political actors of Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism use myth and narratives to help reinforce the feeling of kinship, glorified shared history, attachment to geographical spaces, alliance, and the connecting role between civilizations and blocs. The analysis of myths and narratives in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism revealed that political actors in both countries rely on the mythologization of shared roots, geography, continuity, and ethnolinguistic groups like Huns that contributed to the ethnogenetic formation of contemporary nations. These myths help political actors to construct a pan-nationalist community by referring to the common origins of nations and their place of origin, the power of this belonging to transcend the geographical distance, the primordiality of nations that guarantees their present existence and future development, and the past greatness of presumed shared ancestors. Myths also assist elites in explaining the social conditions and legitimize their decisions made in these environments. While Hungarian Turanism also uses its own myths of Attila the Hun, and the Eastern nation, Kazakhstani pan-Turkism reinforces the distinct myths of nomadism and Turkic civilization.

Moving on to narratives, these discursive elements in Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism demonstrate greater variance in contrast to each other. That is to say, although some of

the narratives about diplomacy are similar (“Bridge” role and solidarity), the prevalent majority of narratives differ between the two pan-nationalisms. Turanian Hungary reinforces narratives of the West being Other, emancipating from the external control or influence, empowering the Eastern nations, and bearing unique elements in the culture stemming from the Eastern identity and Western location. In contrast, pan-Turkic Kazakhstan regards values, traditions, history, and the Islamic religion as the main elements of Turkic nations.

This analysis also allowed identify that most of the myths used in the discourse by political actors have a common interpretation that fosters cooperation between countries belonging to two different pan-nationalisms. In terms of narratives, the analysis of them demonstrated greater variance in the meaning assigned to them. Having considered how these research findings helped to tackle the utilization of myths and narratives in the construction of pan-nationalism, it is now necessary to discuss how these research findings are relevant for the fields of pan-nationalism, myth, Turanism, and pan-Turkism studies.

Starting with the pan-nationalism literature, the research showed that political actors construct pan-nationalism via the mythologization of origin, geography, continuity, historical past, and icons, and the narrativization of the geopolitical location, solidarity, the Other, foreign domination or influence, and culture. These implications are instrumental for the characterization of pan-nationalism as a predominantly cosmopolitan construct. Both Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism proliferate internationalism as one of their key tenets, as demonstrated by the narrative of serving as a “bridge” between East and West and building networks of solidarity. This corroborates Balogh’s (2022) argument on the self-portrayal of Hungary as a “bridge”. More specifically, internationalization also occurs in the case of pan-nationalist struggle against external control and power. The identified Hungarian Turanism’s expression of anti-imperial solidarity supports Aydin’s (2013) idea of anti-Western struggle leading to pan-nationalism’s internationalization. Moreover, as demonstrated by Hungarian Turanism’s notions of Eastern empowerment and the emergence of the new world, pan-nationalism also strives to

reclaim power in the international arena to minimize the inequalities between the great powers and other states. In the case of Hungary, this might imply that myths help Hungarian Turanism to explain Hungary's economic challenges as a result of the Western ideological adoption after the 1990s. On a broader level, it indicates that pan-nationalism serves as an internationalist network that might aim to alleviate the power imbalances in the international system. Hence, this might suggest that pan-nationalism is especially instrumental for nations with a colonial legacy and countries with less advantaged power capabilities. This is also in line with Kozyrev's (2017) arguments on the importance of pan-Turkism for Kazakhstan's role in the world arena and the potential to resolve the "inferiority complex" stemming from the dependence on Russia. Kazakhstan's participation in pan-Turkism allows it to form an influential bloc in the world arena to overcome weaknesses stemming from the Russian colonial legacy. Further research revealing how the presence of colonial or imperial legacy affects the construction of pan-nationalism might provide more details on this matter. Alternatively, the comparative study of pan-Latinism and pan-Arabism might be one of the examples for this research, with colonialism being an intervening variable.

As the research demonstrated, myths are especially instrumental in narrating colonialism for the reinforcement of pan-nationalism. Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism attempt to use myths and narratives to challenge the imperial readings of their histories. On the example of Hungarian Turanism, European historiography regards Huns as barbaric and brutish, while Hungarian Turanists reinvigorate the myth of Huns in the discourse, suggesting Hunnic descent is associated with pride. This is similar to Kowalczyk (2017) and Ablonczy (2022)'s Ugric-Turkish war, which was an academic conflict between linguists supporting different versions of the Hungarian language origin. In contemporary conditions, Turanian Hungary aims to detach from the Western understandings of political community and tries to reinforce its own political visions. This is consistent with the research of Annus (2000) and Pisarski (2020), who argued that colonialism is one of the essential elements impacting myth-making. One of the surprising insights

was the absence of this trend in Kazakhstani pan-Turkist discourse. Soviet ideology also inculcated the “uncivilized, inferior, barbaric” vision of pan-Turkism. The reason for this suppression in the official communication might be the ambivalent interpretation of Kazakhstan’s Soviet past and cautious approach to relations with Russia. This might also be a reason for the lack of support for the anti-Russian elements in Kazakhstani pan-Turkism, to which Bazarbayev et al. (2024) devoted special attention. In pan-nationalism, imperialism also brings geography into attention.

This research also contributes to the pan-nationalism and myth literature by stressing the importance of geography for the generation of pan-nationalism. The mythologization and narrativization of the geographical spaces and places is one of the crucial aspects of pan-nationalism, since it creates a point of unity for the respective nations. This is similar to Maxwell’s (2022) “multiple statehood” criterion for pan-nationalism, which presupposes the unity among several states. In other words, in order to proliferate pan-nationalism, the nations-constituents are perceived to attach significance to common places or spaces that make them unite. For instance, Hungarian Turanists and Kazakhstani pan-Turkists mythologize Central Asia and contemporary Kazakhstani territory as the cradle of their affiliate nations. In Della Sala’s (2010) terms, this is the primary myth that narrates the origin of the nation. The mythologization of geography was most apparent in Kazakhstani pan-Turkism, which not only constituted pan-nationalism but also legitimized Kazakhstan’s striving to occupy a central role in pan-Turkism. This might suggest that Kazakhstan uses its myth to attract from Turkic states both material (financial, economic) and symbolic (diplomatic support, people-to-people diplomacy) resources. The collected new evidence allowed to corroborate Alici’s (1996) and Burris’ (2007) findings, which outlined that the myth of the Central Asian homeland constitutes pan-Turkism. What this research did not manage to demonstrate is the attachment of positive attributes to this Central Asian origin, as argued by Alici (1996) and Burris (1997). Further research delving into the meanings assigned to the myth of Central Asian origin might illuminate this issue. Nevertheless, not only myths of origin contribute to pan-nationalism, but also the narration of the East-West geopolitical division.

The research demonstrated that pan-nationalisms tend to narrate the East-West split and reinforce one of those geopolitical identities. For instance, Hungarian Turanists accentuate that the West disregards traditions and national identities, suggesting that anti-Westernism is one of the essential tenets of Turanism in Hungary. This is consistent with Akçalı and Korkut's (2012) and Balogh's (2022) studies, which demonstrated that anti-Westernism is peculiar to this form of pan-nationalism in Hungary. The surprising result is the absence of a clear-cut disjunction between East and West in Kazakhstani pan-Turkism. Perhaps the Eurasian national identity of Kazakhstan might explain the absence of this tendency. The Eurasian identity of Kazakhstan implies a positioning role between the Eastern and Western civilizations. This is similar to the Kazakhstani pan-Turkist narrative of the "bridge", already discussed below. Another intriguing result is that both Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism position themselves as connecting points between East and West, North and South. Although Hungarian Turanism employs anti-Westernism, it simultaneously portrays itself as a delegate of the Eastern nations' interests and a "bridge" between the East and West. This implies that Hungarian Turanism still acknowledges its participation in Western affairs. Additional research is needed to better understand the co-existence of anti-Westernism and the "Bridge" role in Hungarian Turanism.

The research also revealed inconsistencies in the reinforcement of Other in pan-nationalism. Only Hungarian Turanism's narratives contained symbols that pointed to the construction of the Other in the discourse. In this pan-nationalism, the Other is the West that rejects traditions and national identity, and the EU that is believed to be proliferating the war. The focus on traditionalism in the construction of the Turanian Self and the Western Other might be explained by the rise of conservative parties across Europe starting from 2015. Nevertheless, the absence of the Other reinforcing narratives in Kazakhstani pan-Turkism is a surprising result. The reason for this discrepancy might be explained by the conjunction of *Fidesz*-KDNP anti-Westernism and Turanian ideas. Meanwhile, ideologies of Kazakhstani political parties usually lack aversion to the

West or Russia, as argued below. Potentially, research on pan-Turkist values conducted on the Kazakhstani public level might provide insights into this peculiarity.

As illustrated by the study findings, myths are used to reinstate norms, values, and beliefs that form pan-nationalism. Indeed, Schöpflin (1997), Pisarski (2020), and Della Sala (2010) already noted the myths' function to transmit these mores, and the present research is consistent with these arguments. Both Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism reinstate the importance of religion and traditions for the reinforcement of pan-nationalist identities. In other words, the significance of traditionalism constructs Turanism and pan-Turkism. In the case of Hungary, this might be explained by the conservative agenda of *Fidesz-KDNP* and *Jobbik*. Nevertheless, the catch-all nature of the ruling *Amanat* party of Kazakhstan hampers the explanation of the conjunction of pan-Turkism and the ideological platform of the Kazakhstani government.

Both Hungarian Turanists and Kazakhstani pan-Turkists accentuate religion in the construction of their pan-nationalisms. For Kazakhstani pan-Turkists, Islam is a uniting aspect for Turkic nations. This corroborates the analysis of Bazarbayev et al. (2024), who accentuated Islam's uniting role in pan-Turkism in the Russian Empire. Hungarian Turanists also accentuate the significance of the Christian faith and traditions for their pan-nationalist identity. Nevertheless, the scope of this research did not allow either to corroborate or refute the ideas of Morden (2016), Kolakowski (2001), and Hogan (2003), who maintained that myths reverberate already existing communal norms. A closer look into the correlation between enduring norms and values in society and the pan-nationalist formulations might illuminate this issue.

Some of the results also contributed to the enlarged understanding of mediators in myths. Previous studies of Bottici and Kühner (2012) and Pisarski (2020) found that symbols in myths serve as intermediaries between human perception and the unrevealed environment. The findings are consistent with these ideas, since the communal past is perceived as a mysterious reality, and symbols help to transmit its understanding. This study revealed that while Kazakhstani pan-

Turkists use Huns and nomads as symbols, Hungarian Turanists rely on symbols of the Huns, and Attila. They can be considered symbols and mediators since the actors mythologize the factual elements of history. In other words, Huns are ethnonyms of the ancient tribes, nomad is the factual name for the lifestyle, and Attila is the name of a factual ruler who existed in history. These symbols point to the mysterious past, which became a subject of pride for Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism. As a result, the factual elements of history become transmitters to the mysterious past.

In contrast to expectations, nomadic themes did not appear in Hungarian Turanist discourse, despite the remembrance of nomadism in Hungarian history and in cultural events like *Kurultáj*. Pizzolo (2024, p. 429) circumscribes nomadism as one of the common features of Turanism. The potential reason for this might be the lack of mythologization, meaning that nomadism is not considered as a model for the future and the legitimization of the present, but rather as a cultural heritage. For instance, in the Kazakhstani pan-Turkist case, nomadism is allotted by the power to unite “nation and cultures, epochs and spaces” (Official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, n.d. c). A separate study on nomadism in Hungarian collective memory might provide more insights into this phenomenon.

## **6.2 Conceptual Implications**

Apart from the contributions to the literature on pan-nationalism and myth, the research findings are also valuable for the employed ethno-symbolist conceptual approach. Ethno-symbolism accentuated the role of myths, narratives, and other symbols in reinforcing nationalism (Smith, 2009). Since the current research used an abductive type of analysis of data, this has implications for the amplification of ethno-symbolism. Firstly, ethno-symbolism is a conceptual approach well fit for the exploration of not only nationalism but pan-nationalism as well. This is due to the inherent inference of ethno-symbolism, which emphasizes the socio-cognitive construction of nationalism and the intrinsic link between symbols of representation and social movements.

Secondly, the research demonstrated that the affinity in myths and not necessarily narratives is conducive to the cooperation between two ideologically different pan-nationalisms, such as Turanism and pan-Turkism. Perhaps the particular feature of myth in merging past, present, and the future might be a reason for this. That is to say, while narrative interprets the events in the sequence and assigns meaning to the objects, myth involves the act of belief in interpreting the past that explains the present and defines the future. The ethno-symbolism does not differentiate on the effects of myths and narratives on the generation of pan-nationalism, which could be a further area for study.

### **6.3 Practical Implications**

On the practical level, the research findings allow to understand how myths in pan-nationalism are instrumental for nation-building and international diplomacy. Domestically, the reinforcement of myths in pan-nationalism is conducive to shaping the nation's Self. Myths help to create unity and coherence that are instrumental both for nation-building and pan-nationalism. For instance, myths on origin, continuity, and geography answer the questions of where the nation comes from, why the nation persists, and in what environment the nation emerged and continues to sustain. Moreover, the reverberation of the myths and narratives in pan-nationalism presupposes that these discursive elements already had precedents in the public discourse. Such implications might be relevant for the political practitioners who aim to reach social cohesion for the state's stability and politicians who strive to attain public support by aggregating their electorate's views and values.

Another practical area, where the research on discursive elements and pan-nationalism might be valuable, is international diplomacy. The utilization of the identified myths and narratives might signal the fertile ground for the emergence of pan-nationalism, which in turn might point to the prospects of the formation of international blocs, organizations, and other forms of multilateralism. The reinforcement of these discursive elements might be regarded as markers of the decision-

making conceptions and signify how decision-makers legitimize their actions on the world stage, as evident in the discourse of Turanism and pan-Turkism.

All things considered, the research findings are valuable for conceptual, theoretical, and practical reasons. This study's findings support the existing claims in the literature using new evidence and identify the prospects for further research that would illuminate the surprising results, inconsistencies, or gaps. The research findings also allow to amplify the ethno-symbolism as a conceptual approach and demonstrate its applicability for the pan-nationalism studies, although further research is needed to provide a solid base of analysis that would certify its vast applicability. On a practical level, the research illuminates how myths and narratives are instrumental in shaping social cognition and communal unity, legitimizing domestic and foreign policy decisions, and marking the intention to form cooperation with other states. The following chapter provides conclusions for this study.

## 7. Conclusion

The research findings have several implications for the conceptual study of pan-nationalism and the role of myths and narratives in pan-nationalist constructions. This study demonstrated that myths and narratives have wide contributions to pan-nationalism by interpreting history, origin, culture, geography, international system, and establishing norms, values, and traditions in communities. Regarding conceptual understanding of pan-nationalism, the research results allowed for the expansion of pan-nationalism, primarily driven by the historical studies of the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century pan-nationalisms. This is especially significant since pan-nationalism remains an important empirical phenomenon in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Apart from pan-nationalism, this study showed that myth is also a sociopolitical phenomenon, despite the various interpretations of the concept of myth depending on the field. Myth helps political actors to construct pan-nationalism by attaching meanings and significance to the nations' commonalities or uniting elements. One of the contributions of this research is the illustration of how political actors narrate myths to provide legitimacy for international cooperation. This research also contributed to the literature on Turanism and pan-Turkism with the help of the empirical evidence of myths and narratives reinforcing these two pan-nationalisms. For instance, anti-Western narratives and the myths of the Eastern origin are still part of Turanian identity, while Islamic and ethnic-centered narratives operate in pan-Turkism. This allows to further build on the conceptual tenets of Turanism and pan-Turkism as analytical units.

The research problem outlined the disruption between the contradictory ideological nature of Turanism and pan-Turkism as pan-nationalisms and their surprising discursive affinity. By comparing Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism cases, the results of this study showed that the two pan-nationalist discourses contain predominantly similar myths based on their meanings. In terms of the narratives, these discursive elements demonstrated variance in meanings, with only a few similarities found in narratives related to diplomatic themes. This allows to infer

that the reinforcement and proliferation of the same myths and not necessarily narratives bolster cooperation between two countries with varying pan-nationalist identities. Although there is still a conceptual conflation between Turanism and pan-Turkism, these two pan-nationalisms constitute different forms both in theory and in practice due to their differing approaches to language and religion, the latter especially corroborated in the revealed narratives in this study. Moreover, Hungary and Kazakhstan constitute contrasting cases due to their historical, sociopolitical, and geopolitical contexts. This research demonstrated that, despite the varying conditions, these two countries arrive at the same ideological discursive space due to the prevalence of common myths.

The aim of the present research was to examine Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism from the standpoint of myths and narratives. The study sets out to explore how myths and narratives help to construct pan-nationalism in domestic and foreign policy discourses. The identified results suggest that myths and narratives narrate ethnolinguistic aspects, religion, values, norms, traditions, history, historical figures, origin, geography, geopolitics, foreign control, and dependency on external powers. The narration of these elements allows for the construction of pan-nationalism as rapprochement based on the affinity of these elements. Hungarian Turanism and Kazakhstani pan-Turkism highlight these aspects. The myths of Hunnic ancestry, cultural and historical kinship, geographical place of origin, defiance of geographical distance, and communal continuity are shared since these pan-nationalisms' political actors interpret them in a similar fashion. Regarding the myths of Huns, Hungarian Turanists portray their Hunnic origin as a link connecting Hungarians with other Turanian nations, while Kazakhstani pan-Turkists trace the Kazakhstani statehood back to the Hunnic sociopolitical organization. Kinship myths also occupy a prominent place in Hungarian Turanist and Kazakhstani pan-Turkist discourses that reinforce the same understanding of these myths as innate cultural and historical links that prompt the related nations to cooperate beyond strategic considerations. Both Hungarian Turanists and Kazakhstani pan-Turkists maintain that Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan, is the cradle of their nations. In

turn, the Hungarian Turanists interpret the common roots and ties between the nations as the common belonging to the Turanian identity, which transcends the geographical distance. As a more abstract myth, these pan-nationalist political actors interpret this myth as the perpetual existence of their nations, the ancient past of which is bound to the future.

The research findings offer some further insights that might inspire further research. In terms of the scope, this study explored only top-level communication and the usage of myths and narratives that allow for the construction of pan-nationalism. Some questions remain unanswered. For instance, how these pan-nationalisms reverberate from the top-level communication to the popular reception. Another concern is related to the affinity of myths. Do political actors adjust domestic myths at the foreign level to enhance cooperation with other states or nations? The reception of myths and narratives proliferated is a fruitful area of research, since it would allow for a more comprehensive understanding of pan-nationalism. Another potential area of research could be visual analysis of art that transmits pan-nationalist ideas. Such a study could highlight contradictions or tensions of pan-nationalist ideas in the larger country context. What is also needed is a cross-national study of other countries that express the determination to other pan-nationalisms. Potential examples could be Russia and Serbia in pan-Slavic cooperation, pan-Arabism, and Finno-Ugric cooperation. The latter offers an interesting focus of potential research, which could study the impact of Finno-Ugric cooperation among Finland, Estonia, and Hungary on the development of Finno-Ugric peoples in Russia, which constructs a Russian ethnocentric form of nationalism. Wider studies on various pan-nationalisms would provide more universality and more theoretical leverage to the literature on pan-nationalism. In terms of the myths, a greater focus on myths in various forms of nationalism and identity could be beneficial for the classification of myths and their applicability in different contexts. Considerably more work will need to be done to explore the correlation between social, economic, and political conditions of the community and the emergence, proliferation, or reemergence of myths that reflect the response to these conditions.

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## Appendix A

HuTur

N = 16

Source	Code	Meaning/Full name	Level	Instances
Acceptance Speech 2024 Jobbik 2010 Jobbik 2014 Hankó Balázs 2025 2 Orbán Bishkek 2024	Bridge	<p>Connecting Europe and the Turkic World, West and East</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Európa nyugati része és Ázsia között Magyarország helyzete geostratégiai szempontból meghatározó, és ez alkalmassá teheti az országot egy gazdasági, kereskedelmi híd, tranzit ország szerepére.”</li> <li>- “Magyarország feladata, hogy Európa és Ázsia határán megőrizze függetlenségét politikailag, gazdaságilag és kulturálisan, úgy, hogy eközben a két kontinens között hidat képezzen.”</li> <li>- “Emellett Magyarország képezi a hidat Kelet és</li> </ul>	Foreign, domestic	5

		<p>Nyugat között a kutatási, innovációs együttműködésekben, az egyetemi együttműködésekben, amely a gazdasági semlegesség, a magyar tudás és a magyar gazdaság alapvető, legfontosabb tétele - fogalmazott.”</p>		
<p>Index 2024 Acceptance Speech 2024 Tokayev – Orban 2024 Orbán Türk Tanács 2018</p>	<p>EastNation (Eastern Nation)</p>	<p>Hungarians are the Eastern nation migrating West</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “we Hungarians are the westernmost of the Eastern peoples”</li> <li>- “Kinyitok ma egy középiskolás történelemkönyvet, akkor az így kezdődik, hogy a magyarok úgy kerültek Európába, hogy a magyar őshazából, ami valahol az Urál-Altaj környékén volt”</li> <li>- “Magyarországot Európában gyakran illetik</li> </ul>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>6</p>

		a legnyugatibb keleti nép jelzővel.”		
Index 2024 Jobbik 2010 Jobbik 2014 Orbán Türk Tanács 2018 Orbán 2025 Orban Tokyo 2019 Hankó Balázs 2 2025	Kinship	Hungarians have fraternal senses to Turkic brothers or Asian nations. The links justify Hungary’s belonging to the Turkic states organization  - “A kapcsolatépítésben kiemelten alapozunk az ázsiai népekkel meglévő, általuk máig számon tartott rokonsági kötelékekre, közös civilizációs örökségünkre.”  - “A belső-ázsiai türk népek esetében a politikai és gazdasági kapcsolatépítést kulturális kapcsolatépítéssel alapozzuk meg, az ősi rokoni szálak mentén.”  - “Nem használtuk ki az abban rejlő lehetőséget, hogy Belső-Ázsia türk népei a mai napig kétségek	Foreign, domestic	12

		<p>nélkül rokonként tekintenek ránk.”</p> <p>- “A magyarsággal kulturális és származási alapon, saját magukat is rokon népeknek tekintő belső-ázsiai országokkal való szorosabb külügyi kapcsolatok kiépítését tervezzük.”</p>		
<p>24.hu 2024</p> <p>Jobbik 2010</p> <p>Orbán</p> <p>Bishkek 2024</p>	EastRepr	<p>Hungary represents the interests of Turkic states (e.g., Kyrgyzstan) on the European platforms</p> <p>- “Bővülő exportlehetőségek vagy gyümölcsöző együttműködések ellenében keleti gazdaságok vállalatai számára biztosítjuk a „hídállás” lehetőségét az Európai Unió piacai felé.”</p> <p>- “Magyarország vállalja, hogy ezeket a kérdéseket mi az európai politikai és gazdasági vitákban</p>	Foreign, domestic	3

		<p>képviselni fogjuk, és támogatunk minden kezdeményezést, amely a türk világ és Európa közötti együttműködést erősíti.”</p>		
<p>Index 2024 Acceptance Speech 2024 Jobbik 2010 Jobbik 2014 Orbán Türk Tanács 2018 Orbán 2012</p>	Origin	<p>Hungarians did not lose their consciousness or awareness of origin. Origin is from the Turkic world or associated with Inner Asian nations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “...maintaining this special historical and spiritual link with the Turkic world from which we came.”</li> <li>- “A magyarság egyik legfontosabb szellemi feladatának keleti gyökereink és európaiságunk egyszerre történő, harmonikus megélését tekintjük, amelyet a kultúrpolitikánkban is érvényesíteni kívánunk.”</li> </ul>	Foreign, domestic	8

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “A velük való rokonság szerves része ősi nemzettudatunknak, és azt a legújabb kutatási eredmények is meggyőzően igazolják.”</li> <li>- “Az ilyen félázsiai származékoknál, mint mi, csak így megy.”</li> </ul>		
Acceptance Speech 2024	Home	<p>Hungarians feel at home in the community of Turkic states</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “We Hungarians, and I personally, feel at home among you.”</li> </ul>	Foreign	1
Acceptance Speech 2024 Orbán Türk Tanács 2018 Orban Tokyo 2019	Unique	<p>Hungarians are unique due to their migration from the East to Europe. They are also the only tribe that survived among all migrated tribes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “We are unique in the sense that we migrated from the East to Europe together with many other peoples, all of which have since disappeared.”</li> <li>- “Mint Önök is tudják, mi Magyarországon élünk,</li> </ul>	Foreign	4

		<p>magyarok vagyunk, magyarul beszélünk. Ez egy egyedülálló és különös nyelv...”</p> <p>- “Mondhatom Önöknek, hogy keleti népként tag lenni az Európai Unióban egy különleges élmény.”</p>		
Acceptance Speech 2024	AntiColonSolid (Anti-colonial Solidarity)	<p>The shared Soviet experience contributes to cooperation</p> <p>- “...even Soviet times helped our relations, because, like us, you too were absorbed into the Soviet empire”</p>	Foreign	1
Acceptance Speech 2024 Orban Estonia 2017 Vona Gábor 2019	Distance	<p>Shared ties allow to overcome physical distance. The perception of the “neighborhood” despite the physical distance (e.g., towards Estonia)</p> <p>- “despite the physical distance between us – we formed a community of shared destiny.”</p> <p>- “Rokon népek távol vannak...”</p>	Foreign, domestic	3

Acceptance Speech 2024 Orbán Törk Tanács 2018 Orbán 2025 Vona Gábor 2019	Attila	Myth of Attila as the pan-national hero. The descendancy from Attila the Hun unites the Turanian and Turkic nations  - “And we are also brothers, because we have common ancestors among them Attila, who was also our great king”  - “...a magyarok magukat Attila késői leszármazottjaként tartják számon.”  - “Ő volt Attila, a nagy király testvére, a hun király testvére. Tehát a mi fővárosunk neve a hun király testvérének a nevét viseli mind a mai napig.”	Foreign, domestic/foreign	5
Acceptance Speech 2024 Jobbik 2010 Orbán Törk Tanács 2018	NewWorld	The new world system allows the Turkic world to rise.  - “I am convinced that the Turkic world has a great future. We can all see that the world is in transition and that God is now	Foreign, domestic	3

		<p>determining the future place of countries and peoples in this new world system.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Érvényesülni kell külpolitikánkban annak a ténynek is, hogy az eddigi egypólusú világ mára többpólusú lett.”</li> <li>- “Új világrendben élünk, és ennek a történelmét alapvetően meghatározza a Keleten felemelkedő gazdaságok és államok fejlődése.”</li> </ul>		
<p>Tokayev – Orbán 2024 Hankó Balázs 2025 Orbán 2025</p>	Continuity	<p>Common past prompts to create a common future. Culture and national identities define the future</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Úgyhogy ezért az Önök látogatása nem egyszerűen csak egy szokásos diplomáciai látogatás, nemcsak az üzletről, a jövőről és a fejlődésről szól, hanem a barátságról is, a testvériségről is, a</li> </ul>	Foreign	3

		<p>közös múlttól is, aminek szerintem nagy jelentősége lesz a következő évtizedekben.”</p> <p>- “Tehát a mi fővárosunk neve a hun király testvérének a nevét viseli mind a mai napig.”</p>		
Tokayev – Orban 2024	GeoOrigin	<p>Hungarians originate from the Central Asian region</p> <p>- “...ránézek a térképre, és megkeresem azt a helyet, amit a magyar történelemtankönyvek, mint Magna Hungariát jelölnek meg, az pont egy olyan terület, amely a mai Kazahsztán része.”</p>	Foreign	1
Jobbik 2014	Wisdom	<p>Turanian ideas and the past are considered as the sources of wisdom and life</p> <p>- “A múlt számunkra nem cél, hanem tanítómester és éltető forrás, amelyet az adott kor nemzedékének újra és újra a saját</p>	Domestic	1

		életlehetőségeihez és életkörülményeihez mérten kell aktualizálnia.”		
Hankó Balázs 2025 2 Orbán Törk Tanács 2018 Vona Gábor 2019 Jobbik 2010	Traditions	Traditions, cultural heritage.  Moreover, keeping these traditions is associated with strength. The dichotomy is created with the image of the West, which does not recognize the need to keep the traditions. Western politicians are seen to impose policies. Asian origin is believed to be part of a different civilization  - “...jó látni, hogy vannak nemzetek, amelyek nemcsak büszkék kulturális hagyományaikra, hanem ápolják is azokat, és átadják a jövő generációinak.”  - “Magyarország kormánya elkötelezett amellett, hogy Magyarország a modern, globális világban is megőrizze a nyelvét, a	Foreign, domestic	6

		<p>karakterét, a kultúráját, az eredetét és a hagyományait... Ezt az igazságot a mai nyugati tanítások nem ismerik el, de mi kitartunk a magyar nemzeti identitásunk mellett.”</p> <p>- “Mi úgy látjuk, hogy a XXI. században is csak az az állam lehet erős, amely büszke a nemzeti identitására, és azt meg is tudja tartani.”</p>		
Orbán Törk Tanács 2018	Christianity	<p>Christianity is an important element of Hungarian identity, even in the context of Turanian kinship</p> <p>- “Mi mindig is figyelemmel követtük a törk identitású országok együttműködését, mi vagyunk Önök között a legnyugatabbra költözött nép, amely a kereszténységet is felvette.</p>	Foreign	1

		Mi tehát egy Nyugaton élő keresztény nép vagyunk...”		
Orbán Török Tanács 2018	EastPow	<p>Overcoming the negative connotations associated with being an Eastern nation. Now it is considered a source of power, pride, and strength</p> <p>- “Magyarországot Európában gyakran illetik a legnyugatibb keleti nép jelzővel. Ezt korábban sértésnek szánták, ebben egyfajta lenézés és lekezelés fejeződött ki. Azonban az Önök országainak fantasztikus sikerei miatt, az Önök országainak gazdasági és politikai fejlődése miatt és annak köszönhetően ma már dicséretként kell fölfogni, amikor keleti népek neveznek bennünket.”</p>	Foreign	1

<p>Orbán Türk Tanács 2018 Orbán 2025 Orban Tokyo 2019</p>	<p>AncCult (Ancient Culture)</p>	<p>The current mode of living stems from the ancient culture and peculiarities. The cooperation is based on the respect for these peculiarities. The reference to elements of ancient culture creates a pretext for the communication</p> <p>- “Külpolitikánkat a kölcsönös tiszteletre alapoztuk Önök felé, tiszteletben tartjuk partnereink történelmét, hagyományait és az ősi kultúrákból fakadó sajátosságokat és realitásokat...”</p>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>3</p>
<p>Orbán 2025 Szijártó 2025</p>	<p>WarPeace (War and Peace)</p>	<p>War is associated with the European Union (EU), while the Turanian states stand on the side of peace</p> <p>- “Először is köszönetet szeretnék mondani a magyar nép nevében az elnök uraknak, hogy az elmúlt három évben mindig a béke oldalán</p>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>2</p>

		álltak, ami nemcsak egy morálisan helyes álláspont, hanem a mi érdekeink is a béke mellett vannak.”		
Vona Gábor 2019	Ally	Since Hungary lacks allies, the Turanian or Turkish nations are seen as potential allies	Domestic/Foreign	1
Vona Gábor 2019	Huns	Hungarians and other Turanian nations are believed to be descendants of Huns  - “Igen, a törökök hisznek abban és az iskolákban ugyan tanítja, hogy a két nép ... a legendárs hunnoktól”	Domestic/Foreign	1

## Appendix B

### KazTurk

N = 32

Source	Code	Meaning/Full name	Level	Instances
Tokayev Berdymukhamedov 2023 Tokayev OCTS 2021 Tokayev OCTS 2022 Tokayev Turkmenistan 2022 Kaz Turkmen Statement 2022 Tokayev Erdogan Award 2022 Tokayev Erdogan 2023 Tokayev OCTS 2023 Tokayev Erdogan OCTS 2023 Tokayev OCTS Ankara 2023	Fraternity	Turkic nations are fraternal, they are relatives - “Касым-Жомарт Токаев выразил уверенность в том, что братский Узбекистан с честью выполнит возложенные на него обязанности председателя Организации тюркских государств.” - “...установления Дипломатических отношений между Республикой Казахстан и Туркменистаном, основанных на	Foreign, domestic	35

Tokayev Quryltai 2023		многовековых узах дружбы и		
Tokayev Aliyev 2022		добрососедства, глубоких культурно-		
Tokayev Manas 2024		духовных связях братских народов...”		
Tokayev Abai 2024		- “...братские		
Tokayev Zhaparov 2024		тюркские народы поддержат все эти		
Nazarbayev Zhienbekov 2019		инициативы” - “Турция – наш		
Tokayev 2021		братский народ...”		
Tokayev Erdogan 2022		- “Наш народ оказал поддержку братскому		
Tokayev Erdogan 2021		народу в это трудное время.”		
Nazarbayev Informal OCTS 2021				
Tokayev OCTS 2021	AncLand (Ancestral land)	Kazakhstan is the homeland of the Turkic nations. The spiritual centers of Turkic nations are located on the Kazakhstani territory - “...Казахстан является землей	Foreign, domestic	9
Tokayev Quryltai 2023				
Nazarbayev 2018				
Tokayev 2025				
Nazarbayev 2019				

		<p>отцов Тюркского мира, поэтому наша страна придает особое значение развитию всестороннего взаимодействия в рамках ОТГ.”</p> <p>- “Большое значение для истории казахов и других народов Евразии имеет Алтай. Испокон веков эти величественные горы не просто украшали земли Казахстана, но и являлись колыбелью тюрков. Именно здесь в середине I тыс. н. э. зародился тюркский мир, и наступила новая веха в жизни Великой степи.”</p> <p>- “Казахстан, прародина тюрков –</p>		
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			<p>священный «Қара шаңырақ».”</p> <p>- “Древняя столица Казахстана является не только духовным центром нашего народа, но и сакральным местом для всего тюркского мира.”</p> <p>- “Также Первый Президент Казахстана акцентировал внимание на важности развития «колыбели Тюркского мира» - города Туркестана.”</p>		
Tokayev 2021	OCTS	Islam	Pan-Turkism is interrelated with Islam. The interrelation helped to preserve the values and roots	Foreign, domestic	4
Tokayev 2025	OCTS				
Tokayev 2024	Quryltai		<p>- “Известно, что наши предки получили здесь духовные</p>		

		<p>знания от великого учителя Ходжи Ахмеда Ясауи и распространили тюрко-исламскую культуру в мире. Когда тюрки направились в Малую Азию, эти ценности помогли сохранить наши корни и стали основой нашего единства.”</p> <p>- “Для сохранения и укрепления духовного суверенитета страны нам нужно ориентироваться на традиционный для большинства тюркских народов, в том числе казахов, суннизм ханафитского толка.”</p>		
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			<p>- “Следует обратить особое внимание на глубокое изучение и популяризацию наследия Ходжи Ахмеда Яссауи, основоположника тюркского суфизма, внесшего огромный вклад в распространение и утверждение ислама в Великой степи.”</p>		
<p>Tokayev 2021</p> <p>Tokayev 2023</p> <p>Tokayev 2021</p>	<p>OCTS</p> <p>OCTS</p>	<p>TurkWorld</p> <p>(Turkic world)</p>	<p>Turkic world is a powerful player and advancing region participating in the world system.</p> <p>- “Наша цель – превратить тюркский мир в один из важнейших экономических, культурных и гуманитарных регионов XXI века.”</p>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>4</p>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Тюркский мир на равных взаимодействует с глобальными державами.”</li> <li>- “Для всех нас важно эффективно использовать геополитический потенциал тюркского мира”</li> </ul>		
<p>Tokayev OCTS 2022</p> <p>Tokayev Quryltai 2025</p> <p>Tokayev OCTS 2025</p> <p>Nazarbayev Informal OCTS 2021</p>	<p>Bridge</p>	<p>Turkic states are connecting various parts of the world</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Наши государства связывают Запад и Восток, Север и Юг.”</li> <li>- “Ведь быть одним из центров зарождения и развития номадической цивилизации означает не просто помнить свое прошлое, но и во имя общего блага объединять народы и</li> </ul>	<p>Foreign, domestic</p>	<p>5</p>	

		<p>культуры, эпохи и пространства.”</p> <p>- “Он призвал входящие в ОТГ страны к совместной реализации крупных инфраструктурных проектов, в том числе по направлению «Север – Юг», что позволит существенно укрепить позиции тюркского региона как ключевого транзитного хаба.”</p>		
<p>Tokayev Quryltai 2025</p> <p>Tokayev Quryltai 2024</p> <p>Smailov 2023</p> <p>Myrzabossynov 2024</p>	Nomad	<p>Nomadism is considered a part of pan-Turkist ideology and the model for future development. Nomadism and pan-Turkism are closely associated, almost interchangeable</p> <p>- “превращая древние традиции номадов в мощную опору для</p>	Domestic, foreign	6

		<p>неуклонного движения вперед.”</p> <p>- “Можно создать совместный исторический проект об истоках происхождения и становления тюркских народов. Реализация такого имиджевого проекта позволит привлечь внимание общества к различным вопросам развития культуры, языка и сохранения наследия кочевых народов Евразии”</p> <p>- “Сегодня начинается важное для тюркского мира событие. Пятое Всемирные игры кочевников. Казахстан рассматривает их как</p>		
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		<p>ключевое мероприятие для сохранения и популяризации уникального культурного наследия тюркских народов”</p>		
<p>Tokayev Turkmenistan 2022 Tokayev Erdogan Award 2022 Karin 2023 Tokayev OCTS 2025 Tokayev OCTS 2023 Tokayev Manas 2024 Tokayev Abay 2024 Tokayev Zhabarov 2024 Tokayev 2021</p>	<p>Roots</p>	<p>Common cultural, historical, and spiritual roots serve as a foundation for cooperation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “У наших народов единые тюркские корни.”</li> <li>- “А корни нашей культуры простираются ещё глубже, во времена саков, хунну, Великого Тюркского каганата.”</li> <li>- “Наши народы [Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan] связывают единые корни, общая история, схожие язык</li> </ul>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>12</p>

		и культура. На этой незыблемой основе мы построили прочные и гармоничные отношения, которые сейчас поступательно развиваются в духе стратегического партнерства.”		
<p>Tokayev Turkmenistan 2022 Tokayev Erdogan 2023 Tokayev OCTS 2023 Tokayev OCTS Ankara 2023 Tokayev Olympics 2024 Tokayev 2021</p>	Support	<p>Support, help, assistance, participation, solidarity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Когда братская страна попала в беду, тюркские народы проявили достойный пример солидарности и участия.”</li> <li>- “...трагедия Турции, пострадавшей от разрушительного землетрясения, – это трагедия всех тюркских народов.”</li> <li>- “Братской стране была оказана</li> </ul>	Foreign, domestic	9

		<p>гуманитарная и финансовая помощь.”</p> <p>- “В самый критический момент тюркские государства продемонстрировали свою солидарность и отзывчивость.”</p> <p>- “Парижская Олимпиада ярко продемонстрировала взаимную поддержку и сплоченность всех тюркских народов.”</p>		
Karin 2023	Huns	<p>Huns are considered as ancestors of the Turks</p> <p>- “А корни нашей культуры простираются ещё глубже, во времена саков, хунну, Великого Тюркского каганата. ”</p>	Foreign	1
Tokayev OCTS 2025	TradHist	Preservation of traditions and history	Foreign	3

<p>Nazarbayev OCTS 2014</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "...храним общие исторические корни, традиции и культурные ценности,"</li> <li>- "Укрепление сотрудничества народов, чьи традиции и история связаны друг с другом, является нашей общей задачей."</li> <li>- "Следует укреплять и традиционные культурно-гуманитарные связи."</li> </ul>		
<p>Tokayev OCTS 2025 Tokayev Zhaparov 2024 Nazarbayev OCTS 2014</p>	<p>Values</p>	<p>Preservation of values</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "...храним общие исторические корни, традиции и культурные ценности,"</li> <li>- "Ценности, связывающие две братские страны,</li> </ul>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>3</p>

			<p>имеют глубокие корни.”</p> <p>- “Считаю, что Тюркской академии еще предстоит выполнить значительный объем работы для осмысления общих ценностей и наследия.”</p>		
<p>Tokayev OCTS 2025</p> <p>Tokayev OCTS 2023</p> <p>Tokayev OCTS Ankara 2023</p> <p>Tokayev Olympics 2024</p> <p>Tokayev 2021</p> <p>Abdykhalikova 2018</p> <p>Tokayev 2025</p> <p>Nazarbayev OCTS 2014</p>	<p>Unity</p>	<p>The unity of Turkic nations is an aim of cooperation and activities</p> <p>- “...мы активно работаем во имя укрепления тюркского единства”</p> <p>- “По словам Президента, популяризация тюркского единства имеет большое значение, так как нас связывают общая</p>	<p>Foreign, domestic</p>	<p>17</p>	

<p>Nazarbayev Informal OCTS 2021</p>		<p>история, культура, язык и менталитет.”</p> <p>- “Сегодняшняя встреча, несомненно, укрепит единство наших стран, объединенных общими корнями и общей историей”</p> <p>- “...новые инициативы укрепят единство тюркского мира”</p> <p>- “Совет сотрудничества тюркоязычных государств играет важную роль в укреплении идеи солидарности и единения тюркских народов на международной арене...”</p>		
<p>Tokayev OCTS 2023</p>	<p>Continuity</p>	<p>The cooperation among Turkic nations fulfils the will of their</p>	<p>Foreign</p>	<p>2</p>

<p>Nazarbayev Informal OCTS 2021</p>		<p>ancestors and passing it to further generations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “Мы исполняем волю наших предков и укрепляем сотрудничество тюркских народов. Теперь цель состоит в том, чтобы сохранить наше единство, основанное на взаимном доверии и братстве, и передать его следующим поколениям.”</li> <li>- “Мы продолжим историческую преемственность в формировании будущего архитектурного облика города”</li> </ul>		
<p>Nazarbayev 2018 Tokayev 2025</p>	<p>TurkCiv (Turkic civilization)</p>	<p>Turkic nations inherit a special model of living and civilization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- “История и география сформировали</li> </ul>	<p>Domestic</p>	<p>2</p>

		<p>особую модель  преимущества  тюркских государств,  великих степных  империй.”</p> <p>- “Историческая  Мангистауская земля,  богатый регион  Устюрт являются  неотъемлемой частью  тюркской  цивилизации.</p>		
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