Giorgi Sikharulidze

THE IMPACT OF CYPRIOT DISCOURSES OF COLLECTIVE TRAUMA AND VICTIMHOOD ON THE PEACE PROCESS

MA thesis

Supervisor: Kristel Vits, MA

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List of Abbreviations

TRNC-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (English version)

KKTC (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti)-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish version)

TC-Turkish Cypriot

GC-Greek Cypriot

ROC-Republic of Cyprus

CBM-confidence building measure

WHO-World Health Organization

CDA-Critical Discourse Analysis

EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston) - National Organization of Cypriot Struggle

TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati)-Turkish Defense Organization

IDP-internally displaced person

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1. Introduction

When I first arrived in Nicosia, Cyprus for my internship, I was eager to meet people from both, Turkish and Greek communities. Once I asked the taxi driver about his experience on the other side of the island. His response became the biggest determinant of my specific research objectives. He said: "I don't wanna give them money to buy bullets and then kill me". I could not believe that a person who was in his early thirties, therefore, not witnessing the ethnic tensions prior to the unilateral independence of the north could have such a strong sense of collective trauma and victimhood.

The birthplace of Aphrodite, Greek goddess of love, has witnessed bloodshed for centuries (Yilmaz, 2005B, p. 29). Due to its location, Cyprus has always been tempting for strong powers. Mycenaean Greeks settled on the island during the second millennium BC. Since then, Cyprus has been in the hands of numerous occupying powers, such as Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Alexander the Great, Ptolemaic Egypt, Roman Empire, French Lusignan dynasty and the Venetians, followed by the Ottoman Empire and the UK (Hill, 2010).

Contemporary Republic of Cyprus (ROC) gained independence from the British in 1960 and ethnic tensions have been simmering ever since. Cyprus was a reluctant republic as the two main communities, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not willing to live within one governmental entity. In the light of the Cypriot struggle and the desire of the Greek majority to unite with Greece (*enosis*) triggered Turkey to intervene in 1974 and occupy the northern Cyprus. Consequently, Cyprus has been divided since and its capital city of Nicosia stands as the only divided capital of the world.

With that said, this thesis focuses on the issue of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood and tries to unfold how those concepts are employed and utilized in the discourses of both Cypriot leaders. Therefore, the research focuses on two major questions: how do elements of collective trauma/ victimization and victimhood manifest in the speeches of Cypriot leaders? How do the manifestations of collective trauma/ victimization and victimhood affect the conflict resolution practices in Cyprus since 1983 (until 2020)?

In order to explore the topics of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood, I aim to analyze sixty-five speeches of Cypriot leaders to identify the discourses of trauma, victimization and victimhood used by both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, trace the peace process over the Cyprus question and examine the possible connection between collective trauma depiction and concurrent negotiation process. In search of answers and with the aim to contribute to the scholarly

literature, the following concepts are analyzed to illustrate whether there any discernible patterns between the thematic discourses of trauma and the course of the peace process or not. Methodology follows Rosalind Gill's (2000) guidelines of exploring and identifying patterns of discourses by asking questions regarding the topics I examine. Norman Fairclough's (2012) three dimensional model of CDA serves as a complementary methodological tool. Second part of the thesis explores how the underlying discourses can reveal actual will to resolve the conflict during the negotiations. With this regard, the research is innovative because it addresses the issue that has not been well-explored in Cyprus with a methodology that has not been used in relation to that issue and greatly contributes to the scholarly knowledge.

2. Theoretical Framework

Conflicts are often traumatic and they leave scars; those scars may reemerge and enhance the tension between opposing parties. The thesis elaborates on this issue through deciphering the signs of collective trauma/ victimization and victimhood in the speeches of Cypriot leaders and how they affect the conflict resolution practices in Cyprus since 1983, when the Northern Cyprus unilaterally declared independence. The thesis makes the following question a departure point: how do elements of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood manifest in the speeches of Cypriot leaders, however, it puts the possible connection between those manifestations in the speeches and the peace talks at the heart of this particular research. I do not claim that manifestations of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood are the sole determinants of the outcome of peace talks. The theoretical framework of the thesis, lays forward the theoretical tenets of the notions employed in this study: collective trauma/victimization and victimhood. It elaborates why all these three concepts are important to be studied in synergy. First, they are explored separately, then delineated and differentiated and eventually combined in order to explore whether they affect the peace talks and if so, how.

Trauma causes victimization, but certain individuals or groups can be victimized without experiencing traumatic events. When victimization becomes a trait of identity, it is known as a sense of victimhood. This means that any kind of trauma, such as losing family member, threat to one's life, property or integrity or even witnessing the traumatic event may cause the victimization of an individual. What should we call someone who experienced terrible events? Logically, it should be a victim, due to the nature of their loss and also the fact that it diverts the attention to the perpetrator who caused the harm (McNally, 2005, p. 2). We cannot understand the victimization without the specific traumatic experience that caused it; studying trauma without dealing with the expressions of victimization falls short in fully comprehending its ramifications. Moreover, we need to understand how far this sense of victimhood goes to highlight its effect on concurrent events. Therefore, studying them separately would not serve the research objectives. However, while traumatic experience eventually leads to victimization and the state of victimhood, opposite is not the case. Victimization and victimhood can stem from the transgenerational trauma, therefore one that has not been inflicted on a person directly or even to his/her family, but something from the national or ethnic identity of a group one belongs to (Vollhardt, 2014). When the entire community is traumatized, the impact of trauma is spread to all the members of a certain community and affects the course of history.

2.1. Collective Trauma

What is a trauma and how does it affect an individual? Trauma stems from a Greek word 'travma' meaning wound. First time it was used in English was in 17th century and primarily about bodily injure perpetrated by an external agent. However, an 1895 edition of Popular Science monthly suggested that trauma might have been a "morbid nervous condition" (Luckhurst, 2013, p. 2), which was an important drift from the traditional understanding of trauma; now it was pertinent to the mental health. This has resulted in a serious ambiguity: was trauma exclusively a result of physical violence or could it have been expanded to the mental health? No academic domain has ever come up with the etymological boundaries of trauma (LaCapra, 2001, p. 96). But, in the scope of this thesis, I would employ the definition by the US Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which puts trauma as something resulting "from an event, series of events, or set of circumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically or emotionally harmful or threatening and that has lasting adverse effects on the individual's functioning and physical, social, emotional, or spiritual well-being" (SAMHSA, 2012, p. 2 cited by Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (US), 2014, p. 7). Therefore, it can affect people of any age, race or ethnicity and can produce fear, hopelessness, vulnerability and fragility of an individual. Traumas can be experienced directly in person, by witnessing that kind of incident, by feeling threatened or through hearsay. So in order to determine whether an incident was traumatic or not, one should take into account the experience and a reaction of an individual to that experience. Individual differences can play a major role in interpreting traumatic experiences in addition to the longevity of those memories (Walker *et al.,* 2008; Bedard-Gilligan *et al*., 2012).

There are certain objective and subjective characteristics of trauma that have an impact on the overall experience of a traumatic event or series of events and hinder or exaggerate the traumatic stress. Objective peculiarities of trauma delves into the nature of trauma, whether it is single (one time event) or repeated (happening to the same person/people over time). The latter one can be sustained (for instance, ongoing abuse or neglect) or chronic (for example, violent relationships, chronic poverty). Moreover, "cascading trauma" (Center for Substance Abuse Treatment. (2014, p. 47) when the victim has no time to heal from one traumatic experience is confronted with another traumatic event, can worsen the state of an individual and vivify the distress. The more severe the losses of traumatic event the more far reaching the effects can be. The intentionality of the act and the direct or indirect exposure to trauma also play a substantial role in analyzing traumatic experiences (ibid, p. 46-48).

As stated above, trauma may be triggered from a single event or a series of events. The experience is unbearable and beyond the limits of what is plausible to react to and to be perceived (Audergon, 2004, p. 19). The trauma can be experiences on an individual as well as societal level. Kai Erikson puts the difference between two in the following way:

> *"By individual trauma I mean a blow to the psyche that breaks through one's defenses so suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively . . . By collective trauma, on the other hand, I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality"* (Erikson, 1976, pp. 153–54).

Individual trauma therefore can relate to one person and his/her family who experienced some loss in turn of events and are left with the feeling that something went awry. However, the collective trauma expands to the larger group or a community and affects them as a whole. As indicated in Erikson's definition (ibid), collective trauma affects the very core of the society and disrupts the tissue of it. Tissues are groups of cells that have a similar structure and act together to perform a specific function, when they are damaged, the body cannot function properly. Therefore, he argues that it breaks the bonds between people and fouls up the sense of communality. The blow refers to the fact that the traumatic experience came about as a surprise and unexpectedly. Erikson uses the term communality to refer to the network of relationships and the state of mind shared by people that existed before the traumatic event (ibid, p. 187). The same pathos is echoed in Gilad Hirschberger's (2018) definition of collective trauma, which refers to a "cataclysmic event that shatters the basic fabric of society" (ibid, p.1). The fabric here has the same connotations as the tissue in Erikson's depiction.

Cultural trauma, another term used for collective trauma, is experienced when the members of a group or nation collectively feel the injustice they were subjected to alongside the horrendous events that "leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways" (Alexander *et al.,* 2004, p. 1). Those groups often time neglect and repudiate the existence of trauma and suffering of the other group(s) in the conflict. By rejecting the suffering of the others and focusing only on their own suffering, they do not feel the need to take any responsibility for their own harmful actions. Collective trauma is not limited to the historical fact, or a recollection of harmful events, but extends to the psychological reactions to a specific traumatic event that affected the whole society (Hirschberger, 2018, p. 2). It entails not only the reconstruction of the past events, but the ongoing construction of the trauma in order to make sense of it. It may also refer to "cumulative

emotional and psychological wounding across generations, including the lifespan, which emanates from massive group trauma" (Brave Heart *et al*., 2011, p. 283).Therefore, collective trauma goes beyond the lives of direct survivors and is remembered by the members of the entire group, who are most probably far in time and space from those traumatic events. It is fully entrenched into the social heritage of people and maintains a duality to deny and suppress the traumatic experience as well as speaking loudly in seeking of justice and relieve (Janoff-Bulman, 1992 cited by Nytagodien & Neal, 2004, p. 467). They do not stay in the back of the mind. They tend to resurface and have a living influence on the present processes. They are not just merely remembering but stipulating what is important, what the story is and how it happened (Sontag, 2003, pp. 76-77).

Individual trauma is difficult to study, as asking about personal traumatic experiences may bring back the pain and invoke the same feelings, such as short-term distress (Carlson *et al.* 2003, p. 133). It also poses grave methodological and ethical challenges such as "identification and over identification, boundary maintenance, narrative structures and transference" (Thompson, 1995, p. 54). In comparison, focusing on collective trauma may add a new layer to the scholarly literature, as it may involve higher mobilization of social support, social sharing, and social participation and may reinforce social cohesion (Luszczynska *et al.,* 2009, p. 52).Trauma can become so widely shared by the members of a certain group that it can dominate the imagery and dictate how people treat each other on different sides (Erikson, 1991, p. 461). In the case of individual trauma, victims can seek an appropriate assistance and can stand a fair chance of rehabilitation to get back on their feet and be a constructive member of their society, whereas support mechanisms and social networks are shattered during the collective traumatization and they do not adequately address the traumatized people (Ajdukovic, 2004, p. 121).

It has also been argued that historical trauma may function as a public narrative that will connect the past sufferings of the communities to their present-day state and therefore negatively affect their health (Mohatt *et al*, 2014). If people's health is damaged, it is unlikely that they would engage in peace talks or reconciliation efforts, which makes studying this particular topic much more vital for analyzing the conflict resolution practices. Claire Moon demonstrated that past violence which is embedded in the memory of the community as a trauma impedes the post-conflict reconciliation processes. State-building in post-conflict societies need a therapeutic intervention after the acknowledgement that people, groups and entire societies are traumatized. The therapy can be done through language that acknowledges the suffering, ameliorates trauma and legitimizes the new state of affairs (2009, p. 85).

Generally, the research on the collective trauma sets around three main levels of analysis: macro-level analysis (societal), meso-level analysis (group and intergroup) and micro level analysis (individual) (Vollhardt, 2012, p. 138). Societal analysis focuses on the communal shared

beliefs that reinforce their group's victimization. The group and ingroup victimization is more concerned about the interactions and communications between different groups as well as between the members of a group. This is the level which takes into account the transgenerational transmission of collective trauma. The individual level of analysis delves into the individual differences in perception and reaction to a traumatic event. This level of analysis is encompassed with the premise that members of the same group or community have different experience to the same collective violence perpetrated against them (ibid, p. 138).

The hatred toward another community gains strength when "chosen trauma" (Volkan, 1997, p. 48 cited in Zembylas, 2007, p. 211) is utilized. Volkan argues that each individual has its own unique reaction to trauma that has befallen on their community. Those traumas are "deposited" (2001, p. 87) into the self-representation of the children who should mourn and reverse the humiliation, but when those children cannot deal with it, they just transmit those mental representations of trauma to next generation. Volkan calls them "chosen traumas" (ibid, p. 88), which "become woven into the canvas of the ethnic or large-group tent" (ibid). Ergo, the transgenerational transmission becomes the biggest obstacle for resolving the conflict. It means that when "chosen trauma" (ibid) is continuously employed in official speeches, even years after the traumatizing events, it may become the source of another cycles of conflict resulting into more collective traumas. This, on the other hand, negatively affects the collective memory and narrows the opportunities of peace. The constant revision of the trauma invokes the simultaneous re-remembering of the collective past.

Trauma appears to be transmissible between the patients and doctors, between victims and listeners to the degree that they might experience secondary victimhood (Luckhurst, 2013, p. 3). Listening to the survivors' graphic descriptions of horrendous events, witnessing and participating in the reenactment of those incidents have an enduring negative effect even on the therapists' experiencing of self, others and the world (Pearlman & Mac Ian, 1995, p. 558). The transmissibility of trauma and its actual outcomes have been studied by Rachel Lev–Wiesel (2007) in three-generational study. The study revealed that children as well as grandchildren of those who experienced traumatic events during their lifespan were impacted by the negative effects of it. Therefore, traumatization has been perpetuated across three generations.

2.2. Collective Victimization

In the turn of events, divergence in opinions or difference between groups of society can inflict harm and pain on one another. The reactions to the suffering vary widely across groups and among

individuals. The response from victim groups can therefore affect not only the quality of relationship between inflicting groups but it can also give rise to further violence. Collective victimization refers to the "objective infliction of harm" (Noor *et al*., 2017, p. 121) between groups, but it comes to signify the psychological experience and the repercussions of that harm. With that said, trauma, most likely, will always lead to victimization, however, all expressions of victimization do not stem from specific traumatic incident(s). This makes it vital to connect those two notions and explore their role within this particular thesis.

World Health Organization defines collective victimization as "the instrumental use of violence by people who identify themselves as members of a group—whether this group is transitory or has a more permanent identity—against another group or set of individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives" (WHO, 2002, p. 215). The violence divides people or groups as victims and perpetrators, and these roles can be transitory as well, meaning both (or all) groups can be victims and perpetrators at the same time. This definition shapes different aspects of violence that may invoke collective victimization, such as "displacement, violent conflicts between nations and between groups, occupation, terrorism, and genocide, as well as other forms of state-perpetrated violence such as repression, disappearances, torture, and other human rights abuses" (Suedfeld, 1999 cited by Vollhardt, 2012, p. 137). Collective victimization entails several dimensions regarding the nature and characteristics of it: whether it was temporal or sustained; totality of the destruction and whether the violence was asymmetric or symmetric-which relates to the power dynamics between the victim and the perpetrator. Furthermore, it affects groups on different dimensions, such as physical suffering (resulting from direct violence), material suffering (destruction and loss of property) and cultural suffering (altering the worldview, way of life, language, norms and values) (Noor et al, 2017, p. 122).

Mostly, the collective victimization of the other group is accompanied by denial, insisting that it "did not happen, does not exist or is not true or is not known about" (Cohen, 2001[1], p. 3). This denial can be literal or factual, interpretive and implicatory. The factual denial completely negates that collective victimization occurred, for instance saying that 'there were no human rights violations'. Interpretive denial, on the other hand, acknowledges that something happened but reinterprets the meaning of collective violence to minimize or dismiss the suffering of another group, for example, Turkish actions of 1974 in Cyprus are labeled as occupation by the GC side and as intervention by the TC side. In other words, both communities acknowledge the fact by itself, but interpret its meaning. The last type of denial is an implicatory denial, which justifies the harm that was perpetrated and blames the victims for triggering them (ibid, p. 21-22). It may be accompanied by an implicit justification, for instance "Why did you hit David?"-"David cursed at me". This example does not explicitly deny that someone hit David but rather comes up with a

justification that David was the one that started it. In the contrary, the acknowledgement of collective victimization can improve intergroup relations (Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 297). Acknowledging the pain of the victims remains the fundamental right and the most vital claim for the victimized groups (Moon, 2009, p. 86). There are four levels of acknowledgement of the event that led to the victimization of a certain group: factual, empathic, perpetrator's acknowledgement and negative identity internalization by perpetrators (Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 299-301). Factual acknowledgement corresponds to the factual or literal recognition of the event. However, it goes beyond that and encompasses the victims' construal of the event (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019 cited by Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 299). Empathic acknowledgement, in addition to recognizing the event that resulted into the collective victimization of another group, validates the trauma and suffering of the victimized group. It includes not only past suffering but ongoing one, as well. Good example of this can be White Americans' recognition and solidarity with Black Americans, acknowledging that their predecessors enslaved Africans and brought them against their own will. Perpetrators acknowledgement takes place when perpetrators recognize their role and take responsibilities for the wrongdoing (Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 300). This is the most infrequent acknowledgment for number of reasons. First of all, it distorts the image of an ingroup; then, if one admits of wrongdoings perpetrated by the group he belongs to, they should compensate the loss of the victim group (Iqbal & Bilali, 2018 cited by Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 300). If we go back to the previous example, those white Americans who think that they are directly responsible for the inferiority of Black Americans, have perpetrators acknowledgement. And the highest level of acknowledgement occurs not only when perpetrators acknowledge the harm doing they committed but when they accept it as part of their identity. This is the necessary step for genuine reconciliation when one internalizes the negative identity due to the events that led to the collective victimization of another group. This example is perfectly illustrated by unfolding German identity which carries within itself the guilt for Holocaust. It is important to mention that sometimes denial can occur alongside to acknowledgement only when the basic levels of acknowledgement is met (ibid, p. 302).

2.3. Collective Victimhood

It should be noted that collective victimhood is an outcome of some form of victimization, but every incident of victimization may not necessarily lead to the state of victimhood. Collective violence is construed differently across different groups. These differences concerns the status of the victim and the perpetrator, the responsibility for the harm and the amount of harm, also an

intent of the violence and whether it has current ramifications or not (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2019, p. 76). While everyone has some kind of traumatic experience, some underscore the significance of their special victimhood and arrange a hierarchy of suffering between competing groups. This tendency is accelerated when victim groups seek the moral right to claim that they have suffered the worst (Brewer, 2006, p. 222). Notably, when the equality of victimhood is denied, it acts less as a uniting factor between people who have experienced the same emotional and physical suffering (ibid, p. 223).

Bar-Tal *et al.* (2009) outline five integral elements as to when individuals define themselves as victims: (1) if they were/are harmed; (2) if they were/are not responsible for the act that harmed them; (3) if they were/are not able to avoid the harm; (4) if they were undeservedly harmed; (5) they believe they deserve sympathy. The latter determinant is vital element in establishing the general sense of victimhood. Just a mere act of harm does not lead to its formation. The act by itself should be perceived as immoral, unjust and unfair. Consequently, this leads to the need for empathy (ibid, p. 232).

Importantly, the self-victimization can occur not only due to present suffering, but also due to the past injustice. "Groups encode important experiences, especially extensive suffering, in their collective memory, which can maintain a sense of woundedness and past injustice through generations" (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003, p. 722). With that said, self-perceived collective victimhood is a "mindset shared by group members that results from a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting consequences inflicted on a collective by another group or groups" (Bar-Tal et, 2009, p. 238).

To better showcase how the psychological state of victimhood emerges, one should understand the individual perceptions of the harm itself, but at the same time, it forms when a person thinks of and/or perceives oneself as a victim or just holds victim beliefs without being personally harmed (Bar-Tal et, 2009, p. 233). This indicates that groups can suffer from collective victimization not due to the objective experience but due to the social construction of it. When group members share the same beliefs of an ingroup victimization, it gives rise to a sense of collective victimhood.

It is a fundamental part of the intractable conflicts and collective memory thereof. It emphasizes the wickedness of the adversaries and their character. It blinds the ingoup members to assess things from the perspective of their adversaries, show any empathy to their suffering, and accept any kind of responsibility for the harm that was perpetrated by their own group (Bar-Tal et, 2009, p. 252). Therefore, it presents itself as a sole victim and delegitimizes the pain of their rivals.

Collective victimhood encompasses the obligations of a perpetrator and those of the international community. As it focuses on the unjust harm, it ascribes certain guilt to a certain

party and seeks for an apology, compensation and/or punishment of the perpetrator and the entitlement to empathy, support and assistance from the international community. Once a certain group perceives itself as a victim, it strives to persuade everyone about the rightfulness of this status (ibid p. 239).

Schori-Eyal *et al.* (2014) conceptualized three layers of collective victimhood: historical victimhood, general conflict victimhood and conflict event victimhood (ibid, p. 778-780). They argue that not all three layers may exist with the same group or nation, but when more than one exists, they change the trajectory of intergroup conflict. The most essential pillar from these layers is a historical victimhood. Every ethnic or national identity has some degree of historical victimhood, which might be exhibited by past events interpreted as unfair and unjust. It may have a muted and difficult to revive or very much vivid. Historical victimhood can be defined as "considerable harm embedded in a society's collective memory….unforgotten shared trauma and unjustified wrongdoing" (ibid, p. 778), but at the same time it may refer to the "accumulated experience of harm" (ibid). This applies to Jews in Holocaust (Vollhardt & Nair, 2018), Basque people in Spain (Madina *et al.*, 2020), Roma people (Wallengren *et al.*, 2019) or Serbs, Albanians, Bosnians in the Balkan region (Kienzler & Sula-Raxhimi, 2019; Močnik, 2019). Interestingly, historical collective victimhood is frequently accompanied by "siege mentality" (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992), which refers to a constant belief, real or imagined, that someone is out there to get you and that everyone else has malicious intentions towards one's group.

The second more concrete layer of this model is a general conflict victimhood, which refers to a conflict that is more specific and took place in the near past or takes place currently. The example of this can be post-Soviet conflicts that erupted couple of decades ago (Nikolko, 2018; Jahanli, 2019; Geukjian, 2016). Important element on this layer is that intractable conflicts affect both sides, so the sense of collective victimization can be apparent on all sides (Schori-Eyal *et al.*, 2014, p. 779), therefore, this layer entangles contested perception of competitive victimhood, which indicates the need of each party to establish their ingroup as one suffering the most.

The third layer of the collective victimhood is a conflict event victimhood, which, as its name suggests, relates to a specific event during the given conflict. It indicates that the members of a certain group have suffered unjustly during a concrete act of aggression which was perpetrated by the enemy. One example of this is the Japanese attack on US military base in Pearl Harbor in 1941. This layer is different from the second layer in its specificity. The second layer of general conflict victimhood relates to a general perceptions of the conflict whereas this layer pinpoints the specific indications for violent action. Moreover, this layer has an attribution of always ascribing blame to the other side (ibid, p. 780). As a result, collective victimhood has negative effects on the intergroup relations, such as reduced empathy and lack of willingness for reconciliation (ibid, p.

782).This three-layered model of collective victimhood will be employed in the empirical section of the research to detect its manifestations in the discourses of Cypriot leaders.

2.4. Collective trauma/victimization and victimhood within the Peace Process

After analyzing the theoretical tenets of this research, this segment tries to tie them, theoretically, to the peace process. How they affect the negotiations process, does it hinder the peace process or play an insignificant role in it? It has been argued that the transmission of the victimhood on a societal level invokes anger, and anger, on the other hand, is proven to be a supportive factor for military action (Vollhardt, 2012, p. 144). The literature regarding the connection of trauma/victimization and victimhood to the peace process is quite redundant. Based on the example of Thailand-Burma, Al B. Fuertes hypothesized that when people are traumatized, have been exposed to pain, frustration or a disappointment, no amount of peace talks or agreements can resolve the differences and reunify the communities (2004, p. 491). Therefore, trauma plays a significant part in status-quo, which is a complete stagnation in the peace process and encourages the reluctance to start the negotiations. Another study found that the communities which have gone through traumatic experience and suffering were reluctant at promoting justice and reconciliation (Vinck *et al.,* 2007, p. 543). Moreover, the memories of the conflict can deter the post-violence adjustments (Brewer, 2006, p. 214). Victimized groups do not shy away from raising their voice about their suffering and victimhood, however, everyone involved in the communal conflict is a victim, irrespective of who they think is perpetrator. Therefore, victimhood can become divisive in the peace process (ibid, p. 222). In addition, victim beliefs can be a risk for peace. In conflicts, each side believes that they are the victims of their rivals. This forms a sense of victimhood, which has significant outcome on how these communities manage the course of the conflict, approach the peace process and finally reconcile (Bar-Tal et, 2009, p. 230). On the other hand, when victims acknowledge that both (or all) parties have suffered, it may pave the way for the positive engagement with the adversary, which is a crucial basis for peace and reconciliation (Vollhardt, 2009, p. 153). A case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo indicates the same trend: despite peace-building efforts, peace remains elusive due to the presence of victimization since the establishment of the state. The author argues that dimensions of victimization "perpetuate the cycle of conflict" (Ndahinda, 2016, p. 138). Collective victimhood deteriorates the intergroup relations and reduces trust (Noor *et al*., 2017, p. 123), when trust is not achieved, the negotiations fail.

Collective victimization becomes the basis of one's interests and delegitimizes the ones of an adversary. At the same time, collective sense of victimhood is accompanied with mutual distrust, hostility and hatred towards another group, which undermine "any peacemaking effort (Bar-Tal *et al.,* 2009, p. 250).

Traumatic experience embedded in the collective memory are not simply washed away, but rather form structures in the present (Booth, 1999). "Time and human volition cannot erase the fact of what has been done, and since we are our past as well as our future, they cannot erase the presence of the past" (ibid, p. 259). This highlights the need to reshape how current generations acquire the sense of historical victimhood and re-socialize with the past trauma that their ancestors or the members of their ingroup have gone through. This, on the other hand, reduces the levels of collective guilt not only by denying one's group's responsibility but also supporting the legitimization of harmful actions towards another group (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008, p. 988). At the same time, clinging to those memories may produce the thoughts that their existence could be threatened again by the malicious intent of the adversaries (ibid, p. 989). Injustice and trauma that are experienced in the past do not stay in the past, they actively remain in the 'fabric' of collective memory, affect the interactions and tend to ignite the war (Audergon, 2004, p. 23).

Due to the reasons listed above, it might be insightful and exploratory to connect collective trauma/victimization and victimhood to the peace negotiations in Cyprus. There is some literature regarding the collective victimization and trauma in Cyprus, but the majority of these studies have a narrower foci, whereas my research project tries to connect those traumas to the developments in peace negotiations during the selected time period. Rebecca Bryant (2012) suggests that "the memory has been institutionalized as a wound in Cyprus" (ibid, p. 340). Those wounds have a discursive nature, meaning that they are utilized over and over again until they become part of an ideology that would validate one's cause. The wounds not only refer to the past traumas but also represent the current suffering (ibid, p. 340). Mostly, the wounds are two-sided in every conflict. The degree of wounding may be different, but the existence of it on both sides is inevitable. GCs often accentuate on keeping wounds alive, whereas TCs started to focus the dual meaning of the wound, not only as a suffering in the past, but current struggle so that the past is not reversed in Cyprus (ibid, p. 356).

Victor Roudometof and Miranda Christou (2015) propose how the division of Cyprus became a cultural trauma for GCs "through its commemoration, institutionalization, and routinization" (ibid, p. 164). Their narrative bolster a nostalgic view toward the pre status-quo Cyprus, before the Turkish intrusion of 1974. They preserve "a messianic expectation of restoring the lost grace of that era" (ibid, p. 167). And the perception is one of being suffered and uprooted by foreign power. The existence of omnipresent phrase "I don't forget" complements the

educational goal of transmitting the traumatic experience of their ancestors to the new generations (ibid, p. 171). This master narrative is juxtaposed with TC counter-narrative which views the events of 1974 as Peace Operation that saved them as they believe they were ousted from the community affairs during 1963-64's ethnic turmoil (ibid, p. 168).

Michalinos Zembylas focuses on the politics of trauma, which impede the reconciliation endeavors in Cyprus. The politics of trauma "perpetuate conflict through escalations in fear, resentment and hatred" (2007, p. 208). The existing conflict ethos can be encouraged by the elements of collective memory of hatred, victimization and dehumanization (Fisher, 1997 cited by Zembylas, 2007, p. 208). The politics of trauma is the central pillar in sustaining or fueling the conflict between inimical groups, but what is the essence of the politics of trauma? Zembylas (2007) defines it as "an attempt to represent certain historical events in such a way that these events obtain a desired significance in the collective imaginary" (ibid, p. 209). Significantly, victims of trauma, those who were directly affected as well as others who claim they were indirectly inflicted, try to gain political power through the discourses and practices of collective victimhood (Scheff, 1994; Volkan, 1997 cited by Zembylas, 2007, p. 209). These politics of trauma is an important angle of the collective trauma to study as it entails governmental discourses that are connected to concurrent peace negotiations. Trauma stories through discourses serve the purpose of reconstructing memory of the victim, which may therefore perpetuate or heal the pain (ibid, p. 209). Furthermore, an important element of the politics of trauma is the combination of individual identity and the collective emotion, meaning that emotions should be brought onto the political stage; "they must be put into words by leaders, who give meaning to the individual experience by situating it in a larger context of group identity" (Fierke, 2004, p. 484 cited by Zembylas, 2007, p. 213). This indicates that the group leaders have a tremendous capacity to mobilize groups using emotions and their personal or impersonal experiences through their discourses. Politics of trauma also impedes the process of constructing common identity (ibid, p. 2010). This, on the other hand, makes the experience of trauma up for political manipulation. Trauma hence becomes a political tool, where its role as the glue of the nation simultaneously is capable of perpetuating the victimhood through school system and the political speeches.

These studies focus on the transmission of a trauma, but they do not accentuate the governmental discourses of trauma that may affect the flow of the peace talks. My thesis particularly shifts the attention from civilian population to the governmental officials, who partake in peace talks and tries to tie their discourse of trauma/victimization and victimhood to real endeavors in peace talks. The political discourses focus on the unimaginable violence and historical trauma that was experienced by one group perpetrated by their adversaries and they emphasize that the suffering of the past should not be forgotten (Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008, p.

134). Those discourses may follow the rationale of "the past is never dead. It is not even past" (Faulkner, 1951, p. 80 cited by Zembylas & Bekerman, 2008, p. 126). Moreover, adjustment process for the victims is difficult due to the politicization of the victimhood. It asserts that the victimized group has moral virtues and certain claims which may become a justification for the violence (Brewer, 2006, p. 222).

No one other than the president has the same capability to set agendas in policy areas (Kingdon, 1995, p. 23), which largely "boosts presidential power to an extraordinary degree" (Andrade & Young, 1996), p. 602). The presidents have the ability to advance a certain issue by solely focusing on it (Peake & Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008, p. 115). That is why it is important to study how the highest-level politicians refer to elements of trauma/victimization and victimhood – whether they emphasize the importance of overcoming these feelings (as something that should be left in the past), or whether they rely on discourses of ongoing trauma/victimization (as something ongoing, and something not to be forgotten). This applies first and foremost to presidential systems such as the US, but is also relevant to the case of Cyprus. ROC has a unitary presidential regime, where the president represents the head of state as well as the head of the government. As for the so-called TRNC[1], it is a semi-presidential system, where the president is a head of state but the prime minister is the head of the government, however, the president has been the chief negotiator in the peace process and the one responsible for the foreign affairs of TRNC (KKTC Devleti, 2013, p. 118). Thus, both presidents can be considered central figures representing their communities in the peace talks, which makes the study of their speeches more relevant and can arguably reveal their approaches to the peace talks. Presidential speeches can serve as reflections of larger societal attitudes, but also, thanks to their reach, they come about to shape communal beliefs and identities at the same time (Beasley, 2011; Obradović & Howarth, 2018). Furthermore, presidential speeches, in presidential or semi-presidential systems, have an impact on the bureaucratic outputs (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2008, p. 129), they do augment the possibility of changing or making political agenda, especially when it comes to the foreign policy issues (Collet, 2009). Ultimately, the decisions are made by high level officials, which may not always reflect the public opinion, therefore, it makes more sense to study the speeches of the presidents who are actually involved in the decision-making process. Moreover, presidential speeches are instrumental in creating narratives, which become entrenched in the memory of the community as a collective narrative (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012, p. 95). With that said, they can be deciphered in order to unfold the potential connection between collective trauma/victimization and victimhood

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[1] Henceforth for the brevity purpose, I would refer to so-called TRNC as TRNC and its leaders as presidents. It does not have any political meaning or any kind of acknowledgement of *de-facto* state or its *de-facto* government.

and the peace negotiations. It should indicate how politics of trauma and chosen trauma elaborated above play out in their speeches and on the other hand, how (if) it affects the peace negotiations

Even though, Cyprus conflict is well-studied and well-researched, there is no study of Cypriot leaders' speeches, let alone, focusing on the topic of collective trauma and victimhood within those speeches. The time period under study is since the unilateral declaration of independence of the Northern Cyprus in 1983 until 2020. The signs of traumatization can most definitely be found before that, but for the scope of my thesis, I would limit the time period from 1983 as it marks an important step in the modern history of the island. The year of 1983, in hindsight, can be seen as ending the process of transition, and locking in the positions of the two main actors in the peace process. As my thesis aims at tying the discourses of Cypriot leaders to the peace negotiations, the time period under study is particularly interesting as most of the peace talks started to reemerge after the Northern Cyprus declared itself as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The UN-led peace talks started in 1992, the Annan plan was put forward in 2002 and rejected in the referendum in 2004, EU summit in Copenhagen invited Cyprus for talks in 2002, the "green line" was open for crossing in 2003, UN-sponsored talks began between Papadopoulos and Talat (Greek and Turkish Cypriot leader, respectively) on confidence-building measures in 2006, the Christofias-Talat talks in 2008 and the Anastasiades-Akinci talks in 2016. Therefore, the speeches studied in the scope of this research are around those key dates to draw the connection between the usage of collective trauma and victimhood and the peace talks.

3. Research Methodology

Whether it is attempts for *enosis* (TC narrative) or Turkish invasion of 1974 (GC narrative) considered as a culprit of Cypriot hardships, the current situation is characterized by lack of trust (Broome, 1998, p. 47; Flynn & King, 2012, p. 421), unwillingness to cooperate (Zembylas, 2010, p. 443) and negative social representations mixed with victimization (Psaltis *et al.,* 2014; Psaltis, 2016). Thus the primary goal of my thesis is to explore how collective trauma and victimhood in the discourses of Cypriot presidents are related to the peace negotiations and how those discourses affect the peace talks. For this purpose, first I examine the speeches of Cypriot presidents from both communities to uncover the discursive themes. Then, I look through the negotiation process and unfold the most significant peace talks. The latter serves to identify whether specific discourse had any impact on the peace talks or not. Therefore, the research questions of the thesis are: Which discourses of trauma/victimization and victimhood emerge from the speeches of Cypriot presidents? And are there any discernible patterns between the thematic discourses of trauma and the course of the peace process?

In this chapter, I start with explaining why I chose the case study approach, namely why the case study was the most efficient method for delving into collective trauma/victimization and victimhood; then I elaborate why Cyprus represents a viable choice for those concepts. In addition, further description of discourse analysis is given to shed light on its methodological aspects and to explain how certain thematic discourses were deduced for empirical analysis; finishing with the listing of data and the limitations of this particular thesis.

3.1. Why Case study?

For my research objectives, I will employ a single case study of Cyprus to examine the connections between collective trauma/victimization discourses and conflict resolution practices. I opted for a case study approach to better delve into the phenomenon of collective trauma and collective victimization. Case studies are often employed in order to study trauma and victimization, for example, the cultural construction of trauma descendant identity (Kidron, 2003) and victimization (Barslund *et al*., 2007), war trauma (Macksoud, 1992), the politicization of trauma (Ramanathapillai, 2006) or the ethical dilemmas resulting from documenting such traumas (Hamadani *et al.,* 2014) This trend can be attributed to the fact that each case tends to be rather

unique. In addition, large-scale comparative research would presumably fall short in addressing all the variables that may account for the specific outcome and would therefore rule out the similarity. Each regional conflict has a peculiar background and historical context, as well as shifting narratives and interpretations that would be better suited for small-N studies rather than large-N studies. Hence, case studies are better equipped with the opportunity to "generate hunches, hypothesis and important discoveries" (Bolgar, 1965, p. 31 cited by Edwards, 1998, p. 13).

A case study is a qualitative approach where a researcher explores a certain phenomenon in a bounded system over time, through meticulous and in-depth data collection from different sources of information, and reports a case description (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Case studies can be differentiated based on the level of study: whether it is micro- (studying individuals), meso- (studying specific groups) or macro-level (studying the entire community). At first, this particular research may stand out as macro-level study as I study the Cypriot discourses, but in actuality, the research is based on a meso-level study as I am looking at discourses separately for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. In addition, case studies fall under three categories: instrumental, collective and intrinsic (ibid, p. 74). In an instrumental case study, the researcher is concerned with an issue and then selects a certain case that can unfold the reality regarding the existing concern. A collective case study is similar to the instrumental, however, the concept(s) are analyzed through multiple cases and comparison. Intrinsic case study, on the other hand, follows the opposite strategy of focusing on the case because it displays a unique and unusual tendency (ibid). These characteristics make single instrumental case study suitable for the purpose of this research. In an instrumental case study, researcher tries to gain insight into a certain phenomenon. For my research objectives, I explore the depiction of trauma and victimization based on the Cypriot experience. This particular MA thesis looks at two different communities in Cyprus, but it is still a single case study, as the case by and of itself is Cyprus – a *de jure* single entity. In the long run, this study may be expanded to other conflict regions to illustrate the general trends of collective trauma/victimization pinpointing the strategies of dealing with the scars of memory and direct the trajectories of conflict transformation to meet the needs of disputed communities.

3.2. Why the case of Cyprus?

The Cyprus conflict is insightful considering its scale, importance and potential consequences for not only the countries involved but for the whole region. First of all, Cyprus is a member of the EU and is situated in a very strategic location between Europe, Africa and Asia. It is a route for potential oil transportation (Stergiou, 2016). Moreover, the discovery of natural gas reserves in the

region greatly accelerated the importance of a peaceful resolution (Ulusoy, 2016). Besides, Turkey and Greece (both members of NATO), the EU, Great Britain, the US and the UN involved in the dispute, suggesting different solutions and proposing multiple plans for bringing peace to the two communities. Cyprus is also the only sovereign country in the world that has British-owned territories within its territory (army bases in Akrotiri and Dhekelia). In addition, its capital city Nicosia is the world's last divided capital. The conflict, in itself, represents the confrontation of different identities, different languages, and different religions, having different ethnic roots and belonging to different national communities. The differences of two communities are often emphasizes but extensive study regarding collective trauma/victimization and victimhood has never been conducted. Aside of that, there is no research regarding the discourses of Cypriot leaders at hand. There is a clear indication, as explained in the theoretical framework, of the connection between peace talks and the language that the leaders employ, however, there is no significant research that tried to explore those two elements together. It is important to analyze what elements those discourses of Cypriot leaders entail and whether it affects the overall negotiation process or not. Therefore, it contributes to the scholarly knowledge about the possible connection between those two elements and sheds light to more details about the existing impasse. Furthermore, having spent time in Cyprus while undergoing an internship has given me the opportunity to gain a better understanding of the conflict, and observe both communities and the ways they approach each other. This personal knowledge and insight is useful for decoding and interpreting the context of the presidential speeches. Additionally, as I speak Turkish, I can analyze certain speeches made by TC leaders in their original language.

3.3. Discourse Analysis

As I explore the depiction of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood and the concurrent peace process, deciphering the language and the context of specific speeches is vital. Therefore, interpretive methods of research stand out as the most useful tool to address that issue, out of which I selected the discourse analysis. Discourse analysis refers to "a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking which can be identified in textual and verbal communications" (Lupton, 1992, p. 145). It combines a body of knowledge to the social context where it is produced and delves into the power dynamics (Potter & Edwards, 1996). The backbone of discourse analysis is the activity through descriptive language by "unpacking and rendering the business of talk" (ibid, p. 609). It is noteworthy that discourse is constructed on two different, but intertwined levels: one is how words, phrases, comparisons, idioms and sentences construct the meaning and the second level

entails how discourse constructs and maintains the version of the world. Discourses present the ways actors (speakers) see and make sense of the world, but seeing goes beyond the reception to actively engaging with that meaning constructed. Notably, discourse can only exist when it is socially acceptable (to some people), meaning it should be recognizable (Sunderland, 2004, p. 28). Therefore, certain discourses can, for example, feed the insecurities and expose the fear-mongering practices of governmental actors.

Gill (2000) suggests that discourse analysis generally encapsulates four main themes: (1) it is mainly concerned with examining texts by itself without unfolding the reality hidden behind those discourses; (2) it goes beyond the content of the text and tries to analyze how the world is constructed through the language, which, in and by itself, is constructed; (3) it does not function in a social vacuum, but represents a social practice. People utilize certain discourse as an action - to blame someone, to offer excuses, to shed a light on something, to deny or acknowledge the wrongdoing, to dismiss or exaggerate the experience etc. (4) it is used as a rhetoric to persuade the listener in the constructed world. Certain discourse establishes a certain understanding of the world and an interpretation of the events, therefore discourses are used to compete with each other and eventually establish themselves as the most persuading and popular (ibid, p. 174-176).

There are a myriad of reasons for choosing discourse analysis for this particular research. Obviously, there are certain drawbacks associated with this particular method, but I believe advantages greatly outweigh the pitfalls. First of all, discourse analysis offers a unique insight into unspoken or unconscious aspects of human behavior, sometimes putting forward the marginalized and unpopular discourses of the society. Moreover, comprehending the power of language and discourse constitutes a capacity for social change. For my research objectives, discourse analysis can be very helpful in opening up and exposing the enduring drivers of a protracted conflict and the alarming issues. As this thesis studies the expression of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood by the Cypriot leaders, it is important to explain why discourse analysis is a beneficial method to address those issues.

Discourse analysis has been frequently employed in the social scholarship to explore the pillars and repercussions of collective trauma and victimization. Trauma "takes on force and meaning in dialogue" (Dwyer & Santikarma, 2007, p. 405) through the political or moral discourse, which tries to explore the meaning of suffering and whose pain should be amended. For instance, Israeli cultural and political discourse analysis shows that Shoah (Hebrew Term for Holocaust) is still actively utilized to turn "the voice of victimization into a collective voice of victimization" (Yurman, 2008, p. 59). The study is conducted via discourse analysis, based on the sources from the Proceedings of the Knesset (Israeli Parliament), press reports and speeches by public figures, in order to examine the experience of victimization (ibid, p. 60). The shift to the

'victimization culture' is analyzed by the narrative discourse of Slobodan Milošević (the president of Serbia) and David Ben-Gurion (Prime-minister of Israel) to showcase the construction of victimized identities (Lerner, 2019). It detects that the victimhood narration originates from the politicized understanding of collective trauma (ibid, p. 3). Individuals who experienced traumatic events have the tendency to use that discourse to construct the narrative of their experience. This tendency is studied through Foucault's discourse analysis of Burmese activists and victims, as well as transnational advocacy networks to demonstrate how the narrative construction encompasses the elements of trauma and victimization (Bynum, 2011). Holstein & Miller (1990) illustrated the discourse of victimization based on the data from public media as well as through the fieldwork in community mental health and human service settings (ibid, p. 106). Their analysis offers an insight how the victimization is construed as interactional practice. Therefore, this thesis utilizes already widely used method for studying collective trauma/victimization and victimhood and aims at cumulating more knowledge and understanding of those concepts on a governmental level.

Political discourses can be used for asserting power and knowledge, and for resistance and critique (Bayram, 2010, p. 26). In the case of Israel-Palestine conflict, ultra-orthodox discourses by the prime ministers of Israel hinder and jeopardize the peace negotiations and led to disengagement (Harris, 2005, p. 1). Another example that indicates the link between discourse and the peace process can be found in Northern Ireland, where the language of equality (McGovern, 2004, p. 622) and the vocabulary of peace (Shirlow & McGovern, 1998, p. 172) in the discourses of Sinn Fein[2] promoted the cessation of violence and moved away from armed anti-partitionism.

Another interesting study of Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, former Nigerian president's concession speech (Yusuf, 2018) demonstrated that it prevented the political conflict the country was on the verge of. It offered an insightful view of the elements from his speech consoling his supporters and calming the general atmosphere of tension and uncertainty (ibid, p. 32). When leaders utilize the power motive imagery in their discourses, that is seeking formal social power and prestige, they are more inclined to turn to "aggressive and exploitative verbal and physical actions" (Winter, 2004, p. 382) related to war. However, when they instead choose to incorporate affiliation motive imagery, they act in a more cooperative and friendly manner and it "counterbalances the warlike effects of power" (ibid, p. 383).

The language is important tool of the communication, and the direction of that communication is dictated by the nature of words utilized. Sometimes, the language is seen as an action, which may lead to further eruptions of conflicts (Adejimola, 2009). Therefore, the language research in seeking the non-violent conflict resolution avenues is essential. The major element of

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[2] The major political party in the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland

communication is preventing the occurrence of conflict (ibid, p. 004). In this regard, the statement by former US president, Barack Obama is relevant: *"it is important for us to pause for a moment and make sure that we are talking with each other in a way that heals, not a way that wounds"* (Segal, 2011). This indicates that discourse especially one of the head of state can be vital for harnessing the peace process. Discourse may shape the very core of the negotiation process (Putnam 2010, p. 146). The negotiation can be defined as an "exercise in language and communication, an attempt to create shared understanding where previously there have been contested understandings" (Cohen, 2001[2], p. 67). Therefore, language used in the discourse should have some kind of an impact on the negotiation process and peace talks.

In the case of Cyprus, both the president of the ROC and the president of TRNC, have been actively involved in the peace negotiations and wield the power to make decisions on behalf of their communities. Thus, the way they talk about the conflict and the associated traumas, the feelings of being victimized and a sense of victimhood, the discourses they use – especially at times of peace talks – can either help or hinder the negotiations by tuning their respective communities to support or disengage from the peace process.

3.4. How Discourse Analysis is Utilized

Gill (2000) asserts that it is impossible to conduct discourse analysis as a cookbook-style recipe that is methodologically followed (ibid, p. 177). Thematic discourses are generated by deciphering the content of the texts and asking different questions. After initial stages of analyzing data, it is important to search for a pattern in data. Logically, there might be both variability and consistency within the data (ibid). In reality, most of the texts are not pure reflections of single discourses (Jaworski and Coupland, 1999, p. 9 cited by Sunderland, 2004, p. 29). Within a single text, some discourse may take a central stage and be more dominant, while another may seem as ephemeral. At the same time, a particular text may be reactionary to previous texts or to the actions of a confronting party. Their actions may solidify, ameliorate or entirely change the discourse of the same leader (Sunderland, 2004, p. 30). A pattern or a discursive structure might be detected due to "the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context" (Mills, 1997, p. 17 cited by Suderland 2004, p. 31). Notably, it should be acknowledged that discourses always "pre-exist individual speakers" and those speakers "constantly revise and re-produce those discourses through the channel of language and social actions (ibid, p. 7).

As hinted by Gill (2000) above, discourse analysis is actually not just one approach (or one recipe-to-follow), but a set of interdisciplinary approaches that can be used to explore the realities of different domains. However, the underlying rationale for all types of discourse analysis is that the language is not neutral and the speakers actively create and change their identities, world, social relationships etc. Those discourses are mostly political and reproduce the manifestations, real or imagined, of how things should, could or would have been (Fairclough, 2012, p. 458).

Even though, Fairclough's CDA (2012) is not the primary methodological tool for analyzing data, it serves as a supplement to shed light on certain aspects of the speeches examined in this thesis. Fairclough (1992) utilizes discourse in three ways: discourse as language in social context, a kind of language within specific domain (such as political discourse) and a way of speaking which ascribes "meaning to experiences from a particular perspective" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 67). Fairclough (1992) separates the textual analysis from discourse analysis. He argues that unfolding linguistic features of the text inevitably leads to the discourse practice, however, textual analysis is more concerned about the vocabulary, grammar and verb usage, comparisons, epithets, and the syntax of the language, whereas discursive practice is displayed when the author of the text utilizes the existing discourses in the pre-existing experience to form the text (Fairclough 1992, p. 73-75; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 69).

Despite Fairclough's (1992) reluctance to consider the textual analysis as a part of discourse analysis, some elements highlighted by him as important for the former, such as the use of metaphors, grammar and wording (ibid, p. 83), are used in this thesis for the sake of identifying the relevant discourses. Two important grammatical elements are: modality and transitivity. Modality refers to the degree of a commitment of the speaker to his own statements and it can be subjective or objective. For example, the statements 'it was absolutely unfair and unjust', 'I think it was unfair and unjust' and 'it was probably unfair and unjust', all express the same idea but the speakers' commitment to each sentence differs and it affects the construction of social relations. Moreover, 'it was absolutely unfair and unjust' is a categorical modality as it represents the opinion as a fact, whereas 'I think it was unfair and unjust' highlights that it is an interpretation of an event. Using categorical and subjective modalities reinforce the authority and sets the power dynamics through the discourse. Other features of modality include truth and permission. Truth indicates that the statements delivered by someone has an absolute commitment and they are claimed as incontrovertible, for instance, 'We would have come to their terms' and 'we might have come to their terms' have different degrees of certainty; first portrays the possible reaction as truth whereas the second one as a potential outcome. Permission puts the condition between the speaker and a receiver, which may result into a desirable outcome if the condition is met. For example, 'We would have reached the settlement if Turkish troops were to dislocate from Cyprus' puts the

condition in order to reach a solution process (ibid, p. 83). Transitivity, on the other hand, indicates how events and processes are related to the subjects and objects, whether they are connected to or omitted from the process. In other words, dismissal of the agency and the emphasis on the effect is an integral aspect of transitivity, known as nominalization, when noun is used to infer the process, for instance, 'We witnessed a lot of suffering', as noun 'suffering' is used instead of an active verb, which dismisses the agent and puts emphasis on the effect (ibid, p. 83-84).

There are two main goals in this thesis: first, I aim to analyze the presidential speeches of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot presidents over the period of 1983 to 2020 to uncover the main discursive themes used on each side and how they change over time. Secondly, I will look at the most important peace talks over the same period of time, and analyze the prevalent discourses in the context of that timeline. My aim is to deduce whether there are any discernible patterns between the discursive context – the language, phrases and words used by the presidents – and the progress or outcome of the peace talks. Still, it is important to keep in mind that the discourses explored are specifically centered around the notions of trauma, victimization and victimhood. While these topics might not be overtly central in the actual peace talks *per se*, I argue that in order for the peace talks to succeed and for peace to "stick", it is important to establish a conciliatory mood in the society – also keeping in mind that any solution would probably have to be approved by a referendum on both sides. Thus, while the presidential speeches are not necessarily made at the time or on the topic of peace talks, by analyzing the way the presidents talk about trauma and victimhood, whether the language is conciliatory or whether the wounds are being kept fresh, one can uncover the underlying mood towards the peace talks and whether the societies are actually being prepared for conflict resolution.

Before we move on to the other elements of the empirical phrase, one should address how collective trauma/victimization and victimhood are deciphered through the research process below. Collective trauma and victimization are mostly used interchangeably in the empirical section of this thesis. Collective trauma would be the recollection of a traumatic incident for a speaker, whether it is objective or subjective in nature. Victimization would be the result of a certain traumatic experience. In the empirical section, victimization would be unfolded when the speakers talk about using violence as an instrument. If we imagine it as a process, it can be suggested that trauma would lead to victimization (possible retaliation), which may, therefore, produce the sense of collective victimhood. As explained in the theoretical framework, collective victimization uses violence as an instrument, which may traumatize others, so victimization is likely to lead to traumatic experience as well. However, in this kind of intractable conflicts, it is implausible to remember the starting point (or different sides may have different starting points) (figure 1).

Figure 1. The connection between collective trauma, victimization and victimhood

Collective victimhood would be employed when speakers portray themselves as victims and seek for perpetrators to ascribe blame, when competitive victimhood and/or siege mentality are depicted in the speeches, when Cypriot presidents address the international community in order to gain empathy and support and when traumatic incidents, whether experienced in-person or by the members of one's ingroup, form the sense of self-perceived victimhood.

I follow Gill's (2000) guidelines in order to unfold the discourses and conduct a fully-fledged discourse analysis of Cypriot speeches. I came up with certain thematic discourses by delving into the content of the texts and asking appropriate questions regarding collective trauma/victimization and victimhood. Questions were based on the continuity of the depiction of trauma (was it temporal, sustained, repeated, cascading etc.), sense of self-identified collective victimhood (was it represented as a historical or still ongoing), blame game (was blame ascribed to both parties, their side, their opponents, external powers etc.), acknowledgement-denial (was the harm and suffering of their own and their adversaries denied or acknowledged and what was the level of that denial and acknowledgement, if present). After examining the speeches in search for those answers, certain patterns were sorted out in data. Furthermore, it is crucial to pinpoint how those thematic discourses were produced and analyzed to seek a connection between those discourses and actual peace talks/negotiations. Three layers of collective victimhood –historical victimhood, general conflict victimhood and conflict event victimhood (Schori-Eyal *et al*., 2014)- are one of the main identifiers of the discourse. If all three layers are present in a certain discourse, it links the suffering of a certain community in distant past to the near past to the present (and potentially to future) and gives birth to perpetual victimization. If one or more layers are absent, then the thematic discourse shifts from resistant-intransigent to more conciliatory. This indicates

a temporal perspective of a trauma/victimization and gives rise to plethora of questions such as how often are (distant/near) past traumatic experiences evoked and in what context? Is it asserted that those traumas cannot be forgotten as it continues to exist in current realities? Who is to blame for those atrocities? Etc. In addition to this, thematic discourses also encompass whether the negative experiences and traumas were personally inflicted on a leader or transmitted from older generations? Based on those features and questions asked, nine thematic discourses were identified across both TC and GC presidential speeches.

When it comes to collective victimization, the discourse analysis tries to unfold whether specific thematic discourse contains the clear indication of violence as the instrument of collective victimization. The gradation of denial and acknowledgment is also integral part in delineating the thematic discourses. Here, I am examining if and how suffering of the other community is acknowledged (or denied) in certain discourses. The types of denial (factual, interpretive and implicatory) and acknowledgement (factual, empathetic, perpetrators and negative identity internalization) (Sinayobye *et al.,* 2020, p. 299-301) determine the overall content of the discourses. Denials contribute negatively to the negotiation process and hinder further progress. If the other side completely rejects that their suffering is imagined and not real it undermines any peacemaking efforts. If the speech contains factual acknowledgement accompanied with interpretive denial, then it completely negates other's suffering as it changes the meaning of their trauma and produces resentment. On the other hand, types of acknowledgements better the potential for peace talks and negotiations. Subsequently, if the way denial or acknowledgement are approached becomes patterned, it can help to define specific thematic discourses. This denial-acknowledgement juxtaposition brings us to the blame game aspect of the discourse. It is vital to delve into this issue to determine the nature of a specific discourse, who is to be blamed for the traumas that certain communities endure, do GCs blame TCs and vice versa or do they blame the mother state of their adversaries (Turkey and Greece, respectively) and how does that affect the fluidity of the discourse? On the other hand, it is important to explore whether there is a discourse that abstains from blaming someone in particular in order to shift the attention from the past to the present injustices.

Moreover, it is possible to disentangle certain discourses that are often utilized abroad for international audience/government of foreign countries and softer/harsher discourse at home. There might be a discursive shift over the timespan through the speeches of a certain leader. This leads to two elements from Fairclough's (2012) CDA: modality and transitivity. Those two features define the direction of the discourse. If subjective, categorical modality is the pinnacle of a discourse then it has less conciliatory nature, whereas if modality is objective and nominalization is often recalled, then the discourse carries more empathetic character. The same logic applies to

transitivity; is shows what the connection between the subject and object is. When subjects are always highlighted it increases the animosity and entrenches the image of an enemy in the minds and collective memory of a certain community, whereas when subjects are omitted and the blame is not directly assigned to any party, it leaves some flexibility and enough space for negotiations.

3.5. Data

The main data of the research is recorded and written speeches and interviews (the terms will be used interchangeably throughout the research) of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. By Cypriot leaders, I mean the president of the Republic of Cyprus and the head of Turkish Cypriot administration. The study includes sixty-five speeches (twenty-eight from Turkish Cypriot leaders and thirty-seven from Greek Cypriot leaders), both written and recorded, of ten leaders (four Turkish Cypriot and six Greek Cypriot) (Table1).

Table 1. Summary of Analyzed Speeches

TURKISH-CYPRIOT Presidents	Dates in Office	Number of Speeches
Rauf Denktas	1983-2005	8
Mehmet Ali Talat	2005-2010	7
Dervis Eroglu	2010-2015	6
Mustafa Akinci	2015-2020	7
GREEK-CYPRIOT Presidents	Dates in Office	Number of Speeches
Spyros Kyprianou	1983-1988	4
George Vassiliou	1988-1993	9
Glafcos Clerides	1993-2003	5
Tassos Papadopoulos	2003-2008	7
Demetris Christofias	2008-2013	6
Nicos Anastasiades	2013-present	6

The language of the speeches is English or Turkish. I did incorporate mostly English language speeches/interviews to avoid further discrepancy between different linguistic expressions, but also included several Turkish language speeches from TRNC to examine if there is a tangible difference between English and Turkish language texts. Moreover, one of the presidents of TRNC, Dervis Eroglu is a Turkish-speaking figure, so all of his spoken statements are in Turkish. The difference between the number of speeches of Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders is the result of the number

of presidents on each side. The ROC had six different presidents since 1983 whereas the TRNC had only four. The written speeches (forty-seven) range from three pages to twenty pages in some cases; the recorded speeches or interviews (eighteen), on the other hand, last from three minutes to more than two hours. In the first stage of empirical analysis, the speeches are examined based on linguistic and discursive patterns, namely the manifestations of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood. The speeches and interviews are numbered by date, starting from the earliest to the latest (Annex 1). Nine thematic discourses are deduced from linguistic analysis. Then, the research shifts from linguistic analysis to highlight a broader picture how those thematic discourses underlie the overall negotiation process. The data is examined though the lenses of concomitant peace talks to explore the connection and draw scholarly conclusions focusing on social practices and palpable social changes in the community. The sampling was based on two criteria: availability and comparability. To avoid distorted results and have a representative outcome, I randomly chose the speeches and interviews throughout their presidency and analyzed them in terms of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood. The random selection was based on the availability of the documents in English or Turkish, the date when the speaker was the leader of the respective community; I also tried to combine the texts from the UN with the statements at local level or with TV or print media. In addition to that, I made sure the number of texts for each leader ranged from five to nine. Also, I kept adding the speeches until there was no new pattern of discourses at hand and when the data was overflowed with the same discourses, I stopped adding more statements. I could only include speeches made at local level, ergo addressing only the population of Cyprus, but because of the number of relevant speeches, I expanded the scope of the speeches and include the ones made at international level as well (the speeches at international level are obtained at the annual UN reports). I expect that the speeches made to an international audience would have more frequent manifestations of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood to invoke sympathy and support. Collective victimization seeks for an international acknowledgement from third parties for a moral and political as well as material support (Bar-Tal *et al.*, 2009, p. 241). All the recorded videos were found on YouTube.com. As for the written speeches, they have been explored from different sources: the official website of the UN, the official website of the EU, the official website of the European Council, official website of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the official website of the government of the Republic of Cyprus, the official website of so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the general website of all Cypriot media. Besides primary data of Presidential speeches (written and spoken), I will incorporate academic books and articles that pertain to my research objectives.

Every research project has its limitations which should be addressed in the methodology in order to eliminate speculations and also delimit the scope of its potential findings. This thesis has

several limitations stemmed from the research methodology and empirics, however, those limitations do not represent a serious obstacle for conducting a full-fledged research. Certain speeches used in this study are in Turkish language, this raises some questions whether it affects the discourse analysis or not. However, this is not the case. Turkish speeches represent a minor proportion of the entire data (nine out of sixty-five, and five of them belong to Dervis Eroglu – a non-English speaking president) and therefore they cannot drastically change the whole picture. There was another issue related to speeches; all four speeches of GC president Spyros Kyprianou are delivered at the UN, which may pave the way for the speculations that that might be the reason why he stands out as an intransigent leader, however, his political legacy and background better explain his positions. At the same time, there were no other English language speeches by Kyprianou available to include in the research.

Other elements were also dealt with to curtail the drawbacks of the discourse analysis. As most of the other qualitative and interpretive methods of research, discourse analysis may fall under the epistemological fallacy. Namely, the concepts and particular understanding of the discourse is very much up to the researcher who ascribes the meanings and gives connotations to various concepts. However, considering the topic of the research (collective trauma, victimization and victimhood) there was no flexibility to ascribe meaning to different words and vocabulary. Trauma, victimization and victimhood vocabulary was pretty straightforward in the discourses of Cypriot leaders, so this issue did not stand as a problem. Another dilemma was regarding the direction of the research, whether the discourses of the collective trauma, victimization and victimhood affect the peace process, or the frustration in the peace process construct the respective discourses. But to trace back the nonexistence of progress in the peace process we need to examine multiple other issues and it will eventually divert the focus of this study. That is why, I try to examine whether there are any discernible patterns between the thematic discourses of trauma/victimization/victimhood and the course of the peace process.

4. What is the Cyprus Problem?

The birthplace of Aphrodite, Greek goddess of love, has witnessed bloodshed for centuries (Yilmaz, 2005A). Due to its location, Cyprus has always been tempting for strong powers and neighbors with imperialist aspirations. Mycenaean Greeks settled on the island during the second millennium BC. Since then, Cyprus has been in the hands of numerous occupying powers, such as Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Alexander the Great in 333 BC, Ptolemaic Egypt, Roman Empire, French Lusignan dynasty and the Venetians, followed by the Ottoman Empire and the UK (Hill, 2010).

Venetians sieged the wealthy island of Cyprus in 1489, as it was an ideal route for trade with the east. Venetians were very oppressive towards Cypriots and tried to gain as much profit from the island as possible. They eventually ruled the island for almost a century from 1489 until 1571 (Arbel, 1984), until overturned by the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule on the island continued until 1878. Notably, while there were some hardships, there were relatively few problems between the two communities for most of the Ottoman period (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 13). Ottomans abolished feudalism and put an end to the persecution of the Greek Christians. They also recognized the Orthodox Church of Cyprus as autocephalous. GCs enjoyed some degree of self-government, which included social, religious and educational spheres. The system undergird the cohesion of the ethnic Greek population (Necatigil, 1982, p. 1-2 cited by Yilmaz, 2005, p. 30).

The Ottoman Empire transferred Cyprus as a protectorate to Britain in 1878 to protect it from Russian seizure and in exchange for the military support from the UK. Cypriots met the Western power with high expectations, hoping that they would promote prosperity and democracy on the island (Hatay, 2009). However, those expectations were destined to lead to disappointment and they turned out to be groundless. On the contrary, UK imposed harsh conditions on Cyprus, including high taxes. Cypriots were not allowed to take public office and were subject to the decisions of the High Commissioner and London (Seretis, 2003). In 1881, the first census conducted by British authorities estimated the population of Cyprus as 186, 173 out of which 74% were ethnically Greek and 24.5% were ethnically Turk (Varella, 2006, p. 69).

The British rule over Cyprus continued until 1960, however the status of the island changed from the protectorate to the Crown colony during that period (Holland, 2014). Cyprus was given to Britain temporarily until the Ottoman Empire would gain strength to defend the island from possible Russian aggression, but when Ottoman Turkey declared war against the Entente powers in the WWI, which UK was part of, Britain annexed the island in 1914 (Morgan, 2010). Britain

offered to cede the island to Greece if the latter would attack Bulgaria, but Greece turned down the offer so Britain maintained the power over the island. Military occupation of Cyprus lasted for a decade until it became a Crown colony in 1925.

As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, Greek Cypriots decided to follow the trend of neighboring Aegean and Ionian islands and demand the union with Greece (*enosis*), which was rejected by Britain (Barham, 1983). There was time between 1931 and 1940, when British governor took a number of oppressive measures on Cypriot people (Pollis, 1973). In 1950, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus conducted a referendum, which demonstrated that around 97% of the Greek Cypriot population wanted the union with Greece (Akgün, 2019). A quest for *enosis* became a part of the agenda of the Cypriot delegation (consisting of Greek Cypriots only) at the UN. The UK rejected this demand, but Archbishop Makarios, who led the protest by Greek Cypriots, was gaining more strength in the 1950s (Hatzivassiliou, 1991). Turkey and TCs were cognizant of what that meant for them. The ignoring of GC demands led to the formation of a paramilitary organization called EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National Organization of Cypriot Struggle), which started a violent campaign against the colonial power, Britain in 1955 (French, 2015). UK declared a state of emergency, but did not plan on giving Cyprus away and grant the island independence. This, on the other hand, paved the way for the demand of TCs for *taksim* (partition) as an outcry for Greek *enosis* (Loizides, 2007). TCs organized their own underground organization, Volkan, which was later replaced by TMT (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati- Turkish Defense Organization). In 1957, Turkey declared that it would claim the northern part of the island. EOKA now turned to TCs who were deemed as an obstacle for unified unitary state of Cyprus. Britain encouraged TCs to avoid *enosis* and push for partition (French, 2015).

Eventually, on February 19, 1959, a constitution for an independent Cyprus was drafted in Zurich, without the presence of Greek or Turkish Cypriots, but accepted by Turkey and Greece alongside Great Britain, which outlined the basis of the new governance system on the island, based on power-sharing between the two communities, and maintaining extensive guarantor powers for the UK, Greece and Turkey. On August 16, 1960 Cyprus gained independence and elected Archbishop Makarios as its first president (Richmond, 2002).

In reality, the state was established against the will of both ethnic communities, who were antagonistic towards each other and inimical to the idea of living under a common state. In that climate, it was realistic that some kind of tensions would break out, as the state was not a durable republic (Yilmaz, 2005, p. 30). For the majority of GCs, the independence was seen as a "bitter defeat" (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 29) and serious problems began to surface regarding the interpretation of the constitution. Within three years, violence broke out between the two ethnic communities and a 'green line' was established as a buffer zone. In 1964, UN sent its peacekeeping

force to Cyprus (UNFICYP) to help maintain peace between the two communities; the mission remains on Cyprus until this day with the aim of patrolling the buffer zone and thus keeping the two communities apart. UN mediation in 1964-1965 concluded that reconciliation between the two parties was impossible (Mirbagheri, 2014, p. 49), as GCs wanted the majority to make decisions, which may have led to *enosis,* whereas TCs wanted a bicommunal state to protect the interests of their community.

A military coup in Greece in 1967 raised the hopes of GCs that this might be a solution for Cyprus too (Pedaliu, 2011), which triggered another round of intercommunal fighting (Mirbagheri, 2014). Turkey threatened with invasion on behalf of TCs, but eventually did not follow through. Makarios realized that the TC community should have been given some degree of autonomy, so he dropped the idea of *enosis.* But, EOKA had a different agenda, and Nicos Sampson, the then-leader of the organization, confronted president Makarios and surrounded the presidential palace in Nicosia on July 15, 1974. Turkey suggested intervening with Britain, but Britain declined the offer (ibid, p. 43). Therefore, Turkey decided to act unilaterally.

In July 1974, Greece instigated a coup d'etat in Cyprus backed by the National Guard of GCs in order to realize *enosis*. Makarios fled to London and destabilization of the island reached its culmination (Hughes-Wilson, 2011). This, on the other hand, prompted Turkey, which was a guarantor state according to Zurich and London Agreements of 1959 and 1960 to intervene, as democracy was being undermined. However, Turkey not only intervened, but occupied 38% of the island and divided Cyprus into South and North, Greek and Turkish parts, respectively (Drousiotis, 2009).

Due to the intransigence of both community leaders, the reunification of the island turned to be implausible at that time. GC leadership was pushing for a strong federal government, whereas TC leadership was seeking a strong regional one. The collapse of talks triggered Denktas, then leader of TC community to declare the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is still only recognized by Turkey and faces international isolation (Ercan, 2017).

5. Cypriot Discourses

Through the course of delving into the speeches of Cypriot leaders in order to decipher the discourses of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood, I identified nine discursive themes/topics on both sides and this part of the thesis would analyze those discourses. This chapter in designed to answer the first research question of how the elements of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood manifest in the speeches of Cypriot leaders. During the timeframe under studied (1983-2020), there were four thematic discourses on TC side and five on GC side. Some of those discourses are mutually inclusive, while others of a competing nature. The first part of this chapter analyzes the main thematic discourses in TC presidential speeches, whereas the second part outlines them in the speeches of GC presidents. The last part of this chapter tries to put together those discourses, draw similarities and differences and examine what kind of thematic discourse is beneficial to lay grounds for peace talks and negotiation process. At the same time, I address what kind of discourses may hinder or stagnate the positive developments regarding conflict resolution. Certain predictions are asserted regarding the potential of each discursive themes before stepping into the second part of empirical analysis.

5.1. Turkish Cypriot Discourses

5.1.1. Perpetual Historical Victimhood

Perpetual historical victimhood stands out the most in the discourses of TC leaders. The central aspect of it as the name suggests is recalling the past/historical trauma that TCs endured while living with GCs ("indignities and constant harassment"- 4), how inferior they felt and how much they suffered ("deprived of all rights, ignored and ridiculed"- 1, p. 177). This thematic discourse mainly revolves around the events of 1960/70ies ("Hellenistic terrorist campaign"- 2, p. ix; 8) that eventually led to the division of the island and unilateral declaration of independence in 1983. All three layers of collective victimhood are apparent within this discourse, whether it is historical, general conflict and/or conflict event victimhood. This highlights the perpetual victimhood of TCs starting when Cyprus was a Crown colony (historical victimhood), continuing with ethnic tensions of 6oies (general conflict victimhood) and specifically during the coup attempt in 1974 (conflict event victimhood). This pattern of thinking produced the sense of collective victimhood, which perceives the past traumas as something that cannot be forgotten and/or forgiven.

The atrocities committed against TCs are constantly reiterated and entrenched into the public agenda. Furthermore, one can dissect certain levels of denial, when it comes to collective

victimization, which is inherent to this thematic discourse. Precisely, implicatory denial, referring to the fact that harmed party (GCs) deserved to get harmed due to their actions towards TCs ("slaughter" (1, p. 181), "terroristic campaign" (2, p. ix; 8), in need of their blood (1)); as well as interpretive denial, which tried to modify the essence of traumatic event for GCs, namely Turkish invasion/intervention, as something that served the purpose of liberating TCs from oppression.

Two TC leaders, who often utilize this thematic discourse were Rauf Denktas and Dervis Eroglu. This discourse was prevalent in the northern part of the island for decades (since the independence of Cyprus until early 2000). Then it had a moderate reemergence after the failed negotiations and the biggest effort of a resolution, known as the Annan Plan (2000-2004). Both of their language and vocabulary are loaded with phrases, words and comparisons that portray GC community as violent and aggressive, unwilling to cooperate and reluctant to live under one political entity. Both of them were very determined to self-victimize TC community through their discourses.

Denktas's linguistic analysis exhibits TCs as "deprived of all rights, ignored and ridiculed (1, p. 177), a nonentity gone through indignities and harassment (4) and numerous atrocities (4). He reiterates that they faced slaughter (1, p. 181), and a Hellenistic terrorist campaign (2, p. ix; 8) as gunmen [GCs] (8) needed their blood (2, p. ix; 4). GCs underwent an armed attempt to destroy their existence (1, p. 181) and wipe them out (3, p. 371), therefore, they endured lasting violence and suffering (2, p. ix; 3, p. 370). He compares GCs to butchers and TCs to lambs (1, p. 181). The linguistic elements of Eroglu's speeches show consistency with the vocabulary, with word usage full of victimhood, underlining the hardships and the severe conditions of TCs, while living under one government and one political entity with GCs. He pinpoints how much TCs suffered and and how much they are suffering from the constant isolation and embargo (18-17:04). Eroglu does not avoid putting all blame on GCs, who messed up the island (ibid, 18:26). They have constantly been under the oppression of GCs (ibid, 19:08); ousted (ibid, 18:26) from their homes and left with nothing (ibid, 19:12). In most of his speeches, he emphasizes how much blood was shed on their side (17), that TCs are the ones who suffer(ed) the most (20; 21). He refers to TCs who died during ethnic tensions of 60ies and 70ies as saints (21-45:49), and labels GC actions against TCs as ethnic cleansing (17, p. 1).

Another integral element of this discourse is the notion of siege mentality. Siege mentality refers to the conscious and/or unconscious beliefs that someone is intentionally trying to harm you, which, in this case, applies to TC leaders, who assume GCs are coming after them nevertheless of the circumstances. A perfect illustration of the siege mentality in Eroglu's speeches is when he asserts that the only intention of GCs is to harm and disregard TCs (21-1:18:25). Denktas argues

that the unabated desire of Greece for "dominance" (8) and a striving for a colonization was a "constant threat" for TCs (ibid).

This discourse also entails the competitive victimhood suggesting that the suffering of TCs was much greater and therefore incomparable to the one of GCs. The speeches of Denktas denote a prolific victimhood manifested at all levels, such as using "Turk hunting" (4) to describe the ethnic tensions on the island ("Our bodies lie buried in the grounds"- 1). Eroglu is the most vocal regarding the suffering of TC community and portrays his community as one who suffered the most (18; 19-7:40; 20).

Blaming game is a rather frequent feature of most of TC discourses, but it is inherently characteristic to this thematic discourse as it necessitates a subject, who would be responsible for all the harm and suffering done to TCs. Denktas talks in lengths about this and blames all major parties involved in solving the Cyprus problem except the one of his own (8). He blames UN for siding with the ROC (7) and GC leader's intransigence (4-3:36). Eroglu's discourse corresponds to the one of Denktas. He does not abstain from blaming all sides but TC. He accuses EU for side picking and argues that resolution is not desirable for GCs (9). GC unwillingness is the biggest obstacle, he argues (21-59:52).

Modality (Fairclough, 1992) of Eroglu's statements express high degree of commitment to the statements he is addressing and lacking neutrality. Moreover, categorical and subjective modality full with hyperboles and exaggerations is the centerpiece of this discourse. Words such as ethnic cleansing (17, p. 1) and lamb-butcher juxtaposition (1, p. 181) are often employed to vividly manipulate the emotions of the audience. We can see that recalling past events as truth and not as an opinion is frequent in the case of Denktas and Eroglu. Transitivity (Fairclough, 1992), on the other hand, indicates that the blame, for all the negative events that transpired in Cyprus, is attributed to GCs, therefore, portraying TCs as the ultimate victims of GC atrocities. Eroglu is always talking about the victimhood of TCs, how much they suffered, that they have no voice at the international arena, that they faced numerous atrocities and sacrificed themselves for their 'country'. In addition, he asserts that TCs would not have survived without the help of Turkey (meaning the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus). Similarly, according to Denktas, GCs were striving to establish a "Hellenistic paradise" without "Turkish birds" (1, p. 184).

Denktash in one of the speeches said that young people who have not witnessed any bloodshed are being "transmitted the distorted mental images" (8). He recollects an incident (8) with a GC friend's daughter (5 years old at that time), who responded to her father's question of who the biggest enemy of Cyprus was, that it was Turkey and TCs (even during the anti-British struggle). Eroglu also talks about the transmission of the past traumas to the next generations (19); he asserts

that starting from elementary school, GCs are taught that Turkey is the enemy, to watch out for Turkey and TCs cannot be trusted (19-12:47).

Other aspects of this thematic discourse is the comparison of speeches based on local or international audience. Denktas is more determined to invoke empathy from the international community when he addresses them, so the vocabulary is more straightforward and harsher. When one looks through his speeches analyzed in this research, there is no tangible change in tone and vocabulary over time. He remains committed to his values, and his vocabulary practically stays the same. Even though, his latest statements expressed some willingness for a peaceful reunification of the island, he was against the Annan Plan and assessed TC 'Yes' vote to the referendum as a wrong step of a disobedient child (7). The lack of altering the language or discourse with the international and local audience can be attributed to the very specific self-serving goals. He was trying to pity TCs to international audience, at the same time, he planted mistrust and animosity in TCs towards GCs, whenever giving speeches locally. Noteworthy is the fact that radicalization of his vocabulary is invoked, when he addressed the international community. This exploration is consistent with the claim that the collective victimization seeks for an international acknowledgement from third parties for a moral and political, as well as material support (Bar-Tal *et al*., 2009, p. 241). And another example of this radicalization in Eroglu's speeches (calling TCs who died during ethnic tensions saints- 21-45:49) was employed during a pre-election campaign in 2015 (at a time when the candidate tries to gain votes from the constituency).

To better illustrate this tendency one should look at the political figure of those two leaders-Denktas and Eroglu. The prime protagonist of this discourse was the architect of Turkish Cypriot isolation and seclusion, Rauf Denktas. Notably, Denktas' mindset was fuelled by anti-*enosis* movement, which claimed that Cyprus was "historically Turkish and should be given to Turkey" (Kızılyürek, 2010, p. 179). He solely based all his campaigns around prospects of TC liberty, sovereignty and security. The same rhetoric is evident in the case of Dervis Eroglu, the third president of TC community. He was a prime minister within Denktas' government (1983-1993; 1996- 2003). Eroglu was the political descendant of Denktas, this indicates that there should be some kind of convergence in their discourses and that is precisely the case. He advocated for an uncompromising two state solution and was a strong Annan plan opponent.

If one takes into account the times when this type of discourse was prevalent, there should be no surprises. Denktas was the TC leader well before and during Turkish intervention, division of the island, therefore, he does not show any kind of flexibility when it comes to altering the discourse. Eroglu led the island after the failure of the Annan plan and tried to move the TCs, who seemed eager to compromise, to being intransigent and unwilling to collaborate.

5.1.2. Personal trauma entrenched into an identity

This discourse is rare but still important to include. It refers to a personal traumatic experience, which affected the leader directly. Silence about the personal trauma can have devastating psychological consequences for the survivor, but invoking those personal traumas frequently can create a circle of reliving those experiences, inability to heal from the past and may turn into an impediment for resolution process. Even one episode of general traumatic experience can result into a sense of victimhood, especially when this traumatic experience is neither national, nor local but personal. Recalling personal traumatic experience can have a more pressing influence on the audience and make them more susceptible to trust the speaker. At the same time, when the personal trauma is constantly evoked, it puts the past near to the present and makes it more difficult to forgive the perpetrator, let alone forgetting the act itself.

This specific thematic discourse does not have a pattern in using certain vocabulary. It encompasses the subjective characteristics of trauma, namely the psychological meaning of trauma and showcases the personal interpretation of the event, beliefs and assumptions about what happened, which affects how one copes with and recovers from it. This specific discourse also employs the notion of 'chosen trauma', which refers to one or several episodes of traumatic experience deposited into the self-representation of the children of the original victims. They attempt to reverse the humiliation, but when those children cannot deal with it, they just transmit those mental representations of trauma to next generation. Consequently, when 'chosen trauma' is continuously employed in official speeches, even years after the traumatizing events, it may become the source of another cycles of conflicts resulting into more collective traumas negatively affecting the collective memory and therefore eliminating any opportunities of peacemaking.

The only TC leader that displays this type of discourse is Rauf Denktas, the first and the longest running leader of TC community. In 1925, when Denktash was born, the *enosis* was the ultimate goal for GCs and the fear of TCs was strongly entrenched into the society. He believed that Turkey was the sole and only holder of Cyprus. The place of his birth is very important aspect of this thematic discourse. As Paphos is currently under the ROC, he and all of his family fled to northern Cyprus when Turkey intervened in 1974, that makes him the internally displaced person in his own country and it did have a significant impact on his discourse and his speeches. The place of birth has a significance because Denktas is using it to justify that if not GC actions he may not even be involved in politics (7). His family was financially well off; his father being judge and him being a clerk, he did not intend to step into politics. This is an important aspect of tracing the blame. He recalls how his family fled, how GCs burned down the government house (2, p. ix) and

how endangered the TCs felt (especially ones living in the south like him). We see that his personal traumatic experience is directly connected to his realization about the prospects for TCs. Even though his first dog was a gift from GC friend, even though GC saved his father, even though GC helped his family flee the island during ethnic clashes of 1964 and even though he was saved by a GC, when his boat overturned in the open sea in 1970, his animosity towards GCs never subsided (Kızılyürek, 2010, p. 175). Nevertheless, of the fact that he was born and raised in the South, he never acknowledged or thought that a common identity could have united Cypriots. When asked about Cypriot identity, he said: "There are no Turkish Cypriots, no Greek Cypriots and no Cypriots. Do not dare to ask us, if we are Cypriots! We would take this as an insult. Why? Because in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey" (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, p. 86).

This discourse may have a role in buttressing the implicatory denial, namely specific traumatic experience is used as a justification of any harms done to the perpetrators. In this regard, Denktas's personal story can play a role in justifying the harm that TCs later did to GCs, this inadvertently carries the factual acknowledgement of the harm done to the adversaries. Denktas was considered as "intransigent and uncompromising nationalist leader" (Akşit, 2012, p. 177) presumably due to his own personal experience. He recollects an incident (8) with a GC friend's daughter (5 years old at that time), who responded to her father's question of who the biggest enemy of Cyprus was, that it is Turkey and TCs (even during the anti-British struggle). This incident fits well in the discourse of perpetual historical victimhood in regard to the transmission of distorted mental images from generations to generations, but in this discourse it relates more to Denktas' firsthand experience of living with GCs and witnessing how new generations perceive TCs, so it aligns well with personal trauma discourse as well.

Ostensibly, the personal trauma had a negative impact on Denktas's stances towards resolution process. One paradox stems from this personal trauma and resultant discourse. Generally, internally displaced people strive to return to their family home, but this tendency is absent from Denktas' positions. The time that he invoked this particular discourse more thoroughly was with GC journalist, which can be translated as a manifestation of self-victimization to demonstrate that GC and their malignant actions led to his displacement and caused further harm.

5.1.3. Revisiting Victimhood (or renewed Victimhood)

This discourse has become more popular in recent times, and is also anchored in the present. It tries to distance itself from the past historical victimization and shifts the focus of the TC hardships to external determinants and circumstantial factors. The thematic discourse of revisiting victimhood omits the explicit manifestation of the collective trauma or victimization. Central pillar

of this discourse is the mentality of both communities that is often brought as the reason why the resolution never took place. Revisiting victimhood does not bother to deal with distant past events, but merely touches upon the tragedies of both people and changes the focus from local to international and external determinants, which still put TCs in an undesirable position. Regarding the layers of collective victimhood, this thematic discourse contains one-conflict event victimhood when talking about, for example, *enosis* celebrations in the South, (24-10:12; 52; 27-18:02; 25-4:06), which portrays the attempts of *enosis* in Cyprus as a center of this layer of victimhood. However, this expression of victimhood is not put it at the center of this discourse.

Mustafa Akinci has been the only TC leader to date that tried to avoid mentioning past traumatic experiences and focus on current circumstantial difficulties. The linguistic analysis of Akinci's statements portray him as a very optimistic and hopeful political leader. He often uses the word hope in his interviews in relation to the reunification of the island (22; 28). His speeches lack the explicit manifestation of the collective trauma or victimization even at the UN level, which is generally a platform for that kind of discourse. Another insightful element of these speeches is a mentality of GCs, that Akinci often mentions (27-4:52, 18:02; 25-4:06; 26) as the biggest impediment. In his speeches, he emphasizes the negative repercussions of a prevailing mentality in Cyprus. He elaborates on what he means in current mentality and brings up an example of a school/cultural exchange (25) to help young people get to know each other and visit each other's schools, but GCs seem to be reluctant to travel to Northern Cyprus for that reason (ibid, 10:05). That mentality alongside to the governmental changes in the UN, EU and two communities on the island (24) are deemed to be major hindrances for a peaceful resolution. Another interesting argument that Akinci lays forward is inferiority of TCs, that can be felt and understood from GCs' approach, as they do not see them as equal partners and assume that Turkey decides everything for TCs (26-18:59). Transitivity is another lens to look at these speeches. Akinci does not jump on a blaming game, but constructs the social relations in a positive way. In the latest interviews, Akinci admits that because of the isolation and the embargos, TCs get an unfair treatment.

This thematic discourse is mostly utilized when talking to foreign journalists and media figures even in UN official documents. Generally, TC leaders used the international platform or a foreign audience to exaggerate the past atrocities committed against them, or just to introduce their version of reality, however, Akinci never feels tempted to delve into the past historical victimization to lay forward how TCs were treated or why seclusion is the solution for TCs, vice versa, he blames UN and EU for not being involved enough to bring about the positive change for both communities. This can be translated as a tool to shift the attention of TCs from past to the present and make them see that peaceful solution will be highly beneficial for them, that they

should forgive, if not forget, what happened decades ago in order to move forward and bring justice to the island.

5.1.4. Negligent-conciliatory

This thematic discourse is similar to the previous one, but with an extra layer of conciliation entrenched in it. To put it differently, the blame trajectory is shifted similarly from GCs to international and regional powers and circumstantial determinants, but there is certain level of acknowledgement of GCs' responsibility (namely the government of ROC) especially after the round of failed negotiations. At the same time, the discourse is full with optimism and hope for future prospects towards reconciliation, while neglecting the perpetual collective victimhood. Another significant element of this discourse is changing the language of trauma to the language of isolation. Therefore, the vocabulary is such as "victims of circumstances' (15), [TCs] "not in advantageous position'' (9, p. 4; 13), "political and legal threats'' (11, p. 3), "unfair situation' (25; 26) etc.

Collective victimization can be symmetric and asymmetric and this juxtaposition is very clear throughout this discourse. Symmetric and asymmetric collective victimization delves into the power dynamics of the groups involved in the conflict or post-conflict relations. This thematic discourse outlines that TCs have less power and they are treated less than equal, which clearly underlines that GCs are more powerful party on the island. Alongside to this, and similar to the previous discourse this one includes one layer of collective victimhood, but also incorporates an aspect of another layer. To put it simply, the negligent-conciliatory discourse focuses on conflict event victimhood when the island was divided in 1974. This is when TCs were put in an inferior position and since then they were subject to further and further isolation. In addition, it also includes competitive victimhood, which is an integral part of general conflict victimhood, which is a sense of a group that they endured much more suffering than their adversaries and this element is of outmost importance for this discourse. The suffering of their adversaries (GCs) are somewhat neglected, but at the same time conciliatory efforts are put forward.

Two TC leaders, Mustafa Akinci and Mehmet Ali Talat, who utilized this discourse are ones who supported Annan Plan unlike Denkas and Eroglu. Talat's political figure became substantial during Anti-Denktas protests in 2002 and 2003 for advocating a change, a potential solution of EU membership along with unification. Therefore, his liberal values and conciliatory attitude are reflected in most of his statements. He was perceived as a leader capable of bringing about the peace, especially after uncompromised stances of Denktas (Akşit, 2012, p. 178).The linguistic features in his speeches accentuate the isolation of TCs, which is mentioned in each of

his speech in the scope of this research. Therefore, TCs are worse off (9; 10; 13), victims of uncompromised approaches and obstructionist attitude from GCs (9), unable to live up to their full economic potential, which makes them suffer (12). GC inconsistence towards the conflict resolution process (12), political and legal threats (11, p. 3) and hostile policies (14, p. 6) hinder the peace process, Talat argues. Discursive practices in Akinci's speeches follow the course of logic considering his public figure and political legacy, which was rather positive for being the Annan plan supporter and a highly respected figure on both sides of Cyprus. In all of his speeches (in this research), he stays optimistic, suggesting that there is a window of opportunity for a solution, that peaceful coexistence under one governmental entity would be beneficial for both sides. In the latest interviews, Akinci admits that because of the isolation and the embargos, TCs get an unfair treatment. However, over time analysis shows that Akinci becomes less enthusiastic regarding the negotiations as he assumes GCs do not stay true to their promises (26-6:08); GC government is not being consistent with the negotiation process (26-7:38).

Modality of Talat's vocabulary is free of intransigence and fully committed to the conciliation, therefore not just asserting the facts, but focusing on the solution of certain issues on the way of the general resolution. Similarly, modality of Akinci's speeches has a loose degree; he does not represent his statements as facts, but merely tries to address different issues on different levels to build a bridge for reaching a peaceful resolution. Regarding the element of the transitivity, Talat does not unequivocally portray TC community as victims of GCs, but tries to address this issue from a different stance and calling his community victims of circumstances (15). Interesting element on this dimension of analysis is a slight change of vocabulary when they address the international community and when they were making statements locally. They talk about the past traumas while addressing the UN, recalling the onslaught and grave injustices (15, p. 6) that TCs faced and continue to experience. This can be explained by an effort to gain some support from international actors, but acknowledging the trauma of both communities on a local level to positively contribute to the peace process.

5.2. Greek Cypriot Discourses

5.2.1. Rejectionist-intransigent discourse

As the name suggests, this particular thematic discourse is fueled by anti-reconciliation rhetoric. It aims to reject the demands and interests of the confronting party and requests that all of their own demands must be met in order to have any kind of negotiations. This discourse is peculiar in regard to the exaggeration of one's collective trauma whereas completely dismissing the traumatic

experiences of another group, not even mentioning it, let alone addressing or harnessing in order to reach some kind of a solution. Consequently, it entails all three layers of collective victimhood, such as historical, general conflict and a conflict event victimhood. To illustrate how those specific layers of victimhood utilized in the speeches, words and phrases, such as "victim" (31, p. 21), "trauma of Turkish invasion" (53-13:44), suffering, terrible tragedy (30, p. 10) and the other group of words, such as invasion and occupation, (31, p. 18; 32, p. 12; 30, p. 3), are used abundantly and coherently to describe Turkey and Turkish intervention of 1974. At the same time, Turkey is blamed for "uprooting the population" and "usurping properties" (29, p. 1073) and portrays the situation as a "foreign aggression" (52, p. 10).

Another significant element of this discourse is asymmetric collective victimization, arguing that disproportionate power dynamics make GCs weak and defenseless against almighty Turkey (30, p. 6, 8, 10; 31, p. 19). At the same time, it ignores the TCs and represents the conflict not as GCs vs. TCs, but GCs vs. Turkey. It accentuates the point that GCs (excluding TCs, so not meaning the entire Cyprus) have suffered due to the actions of Turkey. It is insightful that the periods, when this particular thematic discourse was vastly utilized, are when TRNC declared independence and deepened the division on the island and when Annan Plan was put on referendum. Therefore, two GC leaders who frequently used this discourse were Spyros Kyprianou and Tassos Papadopoulos.

The statements of Kyprianou that are analyzed in this study are all from General Assembly documents in 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987. As explained in the methodology chapter, there were no English-language texts available from Kyprianou, which is why only the UN speeches were used. The linguistic dimension of Kyprianou's speeches is loaded with the terms and phrases that exhibit the perpetual victimhood and collective trauma of GC community. He portrays Cyprus as small, weak and defenseless on multiple occasion (30, p. 6, 8, 10; 31, p. 19) against a militarily powerful neighbor (Turkey). Therefore, GCs are the victims of aggression and occupation (29, p. 1073). Turkey is guilty of "systematic violations of the rights of the people of Cyprus" (ibid, p. 1074). He refers to TRNC as a "bogus entity", "offspring of aggression and the result of a continuing criminality" (ibid, p. 1073). Respectively, Papadopoulos uses the words such as invasion, occupation, usurpation in almost every speech analyzes in this research. Only in one speech (47), he mentions them interchangeably seven times. The main point that he tries to articulate is that Cyprus problem is an issue of foreign invasion and the occupation of its territory (47, p. 2). He states, that Cyprus stays to be an example of a "foreign aggression" (52, p. 10). Papadopoulos is radical in saying that Turkish troops are the significantly guilty of the atrocities that Cyprus has witnessed (50). With that said, the biggest concern of GCs is to put an end to the occupation of the island (51, p. 6). He raises his concern about the possible annexation of the

illegally occupied part of Cyprus by Turkey (48). Papadopoulos argues that the Annan plan and it did not harness the "trauma of Turkish invasion" (53-13:44).

Regarding the modality of Kyprianou's speeches, it stands out as a categorical and subjective. The affinity with the statements that he delivers is very strong and the facts are represented as general truth, rather than neutral and flexible. Similarly, modality of the linguistic analysis exposes Papadopoulos' harsh language of hyperboles (calling the Annan plan "carved in granite"- 53-12:28). Papadopoulos formulates facts as axioms, and therefore not open for further suggestion; it has a categorical character, when he mentions that the UN has an obligation of forcing Turkey to stop illegal act of occupation (51; 52).

Regarding transitivity, Kyprianou's speeches do not reflect the normalization, the outcome is always ascribed to the subject and the object is always the victimized, defenseless and weak GCs. Therefore, the events and processes had negative ramifications for GC community and only served the sinister plans of Turkey. Likewise, transitivity within Papadopoulos' speeches indicate that his main concern is the emphasis on the perpetrator of all GC atrocities, the subject and the object interconnectedness is vivid. GCs (objects) are under constant threat ("under the guns"-47, p.2) of aggressor foreign power (subject). The emphasis is not only on the outcome, but on the process and on Turkey as trigger.

When it comes to the production of the analysis, the fact that Spyros Kyprianou was an ally of Makarios and a strong *enosis* proponent plays a major explanatory role. A true conservative, the British trained barrister preferred not to dance to the "tune of risk" (Smith, 2002) and preferred to go down in history as a rejectionist president rather than an architect of an unjust solution. He omits the factual information related to *enosis*, when a Greek junta tried to overthrow the Cypriot government. He vilifies Turkey and underlines the fact that Cyprus problem is not a dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, but of a foreign invasion. His vocabulary is rigid and unchangeable over the time. Quite alike, Tassos Papadopoulos' speeches fit well in the general framework of nationalist leader. The analysis suggests that Papadopoulos thinks Cyprus problem is a problem resulted from foreign aggression, occupation, invasion and a desire to gain "complete control and domination" (52, p. 10) on Cyprus. There is no substantial change and alteration throughout his presidency in his speeches. He maintains the same tone and utilizes the same vocabulary when addresses the local and an international audience.

5.2.2. Personal trauma entrenched into an identity

This is a rather peculiar discourse, when governmental officials have a first-hand experience of a traumatic incident, whcih makes it much more insightful and compelling to study and explore. It is primarily based on a traumatic experience, incorporated in political speeches. This discourse is the similar to the one under TC discourses. They resemble each other in regards to its descriptive elements, such as personal traumatic incident that affected the speaker directly. As explained in the theoretical framework, traumatic incidents generally pave the way for a broader sense of victimhood. This victimhood may find itself depicted in the speeches of those who either have experienced those traumas, witnessed them or been transmitted the images of those traumas. When a speaker employs those notions in the speech, it influences the audience; it keeps the wounds fresh instead of healing them. Therefore, it comes down to how a certain speaker or a certain speech depicts the link between lived traumatic experience and the current state of a certain population. When traumas are frequently mentioned it keeps the memories alive and puts even distant past closer to the present. The fresher the wound, the more difficult it becomes to forgive the perpetrator and seek for reconciliation.

This specific thematic discourse does not have a pattern of using certain vocabulary. Meaning there are no specific words or phrases that indicate the utilization of this specific discourse. The element that identifies itself through this discourse is the personal storyline (I/me pronoun) retold through the speeches of a certain leader. The central pillar of this discourse is the level of interpretation of a personal trauma, and the time and effort dedicated to reiterating it. At the same time, it may entail the ways of coping with it and the indications of a potential vengeance through the speeches.

The only GC leader who includes personal traumatic experience in his speeches is Demetris Christofias. He was born in Dhikomo in the Kyrenia District of Cyprus, which is currently controlled by TRNC and Christofias similar to Denktas became an IDP in his own country (56). But even though the ethnic tensions negatively affected him and his family, he always abstained from ascribing blame to any particular party (54-6:18) and even though he suffered from the aftermath he looked at it as a "tragedy of both peoples" (58-1:11:27). In his speeches, the focus shifts from how he interprets the facts that was traumatic for him and his family. At a Q&A session in New York University school of law, he talks more about how his family barely fled from the north (58) and it deprived them political normality and human rights (56). But, he always gets on an objective note of it and highlights that his "counterparts" [TCs] (57-9:36) also suffered because of "twin crime" (ibid, 6:14). Notably, he never goes deep into the details to depict his own personal trauma, but in most of the speeches, he uses his status of IDP (55; 56; 58) as a background story to set the tone.

Within the lens of modality, his approach displays a high level of objective modality, even though he personally experienced the traumatic event that later became the collective trauma of all GCs, he never omits the suffering of TCs. His speeches have no implicit or explicit manifestation of a categorical modality (unless it concerns the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus). Another element of modality, Christofias represents most of his statements as opinions rather than fixated on rigid facts. Transitivity through his speeches indicates an important element that subject object connectedness is loose. Subjects are mostly omitted and emphasis is made on the effect of certain wrong choices.

From the analysis, Demetris Christofias is likely to be perceived as a reconciliatory president. He states that certain "chauvinistic groups" (58-19:14) on both sides made Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots suffer. He brings the example of fighting alongside with TC leader Mehmet Ali Talat and hopes that their struggle will eventually lead to a reunification of the island (56). This is an interesting element of how the leader transforms his personal traumatic experience into a broader platform of cooperation so that no one else would endure and experience those traumas. He does not extensively talk about his displacement. This might be ascribed to the tendency that he wants to forget the past, even though he personally suffered, and tries to look up to the future in a positive light. This discourse is never a dominant overarching discourse in his speeches. It mostly plays in the background to set the tone and importantly invoke a sympathy from international audience, which might well be translated into a broader support for Cypriot aspirations. The interesting factor through his speeches is that instead of fear mongering about adversaries who harmed him and his family, he tries to come from a good place. Instead, he opts for building a better rapport with the audience, this on one hand, makes GCs feel like he understands how much they suffered as he had first-hand knowledge about those traumatic incidents, but on the other hand, by using positive epithets for TCs, he tries to open a new chapter in their relationship. He acknowledges that the past was traumatic for both communities, for all Cypriots, which cannot be changed, but they, as a community, should strive for a constructive positive change. Arguably, he tries to emphasize that even though he directly experienced the results of Turkish invasion, especially in front of the international/European audience, his wound has, somewhat, been healed and he is ready for negotiations.

5.2.3. Perpetual historical victimhood

Perpetual historical victimhood is somewhat similar to the rejectionist-intransigent discourse, but this specific thematic discourse entails other significant elements, such as siege mentality and a competitive victimhood. Siege mentality refers to the fears (conscious or unconscious) that

adversaries are always trying to get them and wish them harm, which indirectly subsumes the implicatory denial of a trauma, meaning that the perpetrators deserved to get harmed. It, therefore, falls short in any kind of acknowledgement on their part. In addition, it carries the purest definition of collective victimization, which suggests that violence is intentional and instrumental to restore justice. Injustice is what GCs experienced and are still experiencing. Vital element of this discourse is the continuation of victimization, which stems not only from the past atrocities done to them, but also continuing suffering. In this regard, it entails all three layers of collective victimhood; historical victimhood relates to the considerable harm or an accumulated harm done to GCs by Turkey even before independence of the island, then it moves to the general perceptions of victimhood. This layer contains the competitive victimhood, which argues that GCs are the ones who has suffered the most. It tries to diminish the trauma of the other side and shifts the focus on their own traumatic experience, often times exaggerating its meaning and repercussions. Alongside to those two, this discourse also incorporates conflict event victimhood, referring to the Turkish intervention/invasion of 1974, which divided the island into Turkish and Greek parts.

Furthermore, the 'cascading trauma' is put at the heart of this thematic discourse. Cascading trauma takes place when people who actually lived through several episodes of traumatic experienced do not have enough time to heal from them and it deepens their traumatic recollections. It portrays Turkey as solely responsible for things that took place on the island and goes back to colonial rule of Ottoman Empire and puts it as a bedrock of GC hardships. The vocabulary of this discourse entails phrases related to both historical and ongoing victimhood, such as "continuing occupation" (52, p. 10), "continuing criminality" (29, p. 1073), colonial rule (42, p. 1), portraying Turkey as a military might (42, p. 4) "guilty of all atrocities" (47, p. 2) and Cyprus being constantly "under the guns" (ibid).

This discourse is used by four GC presidents: Spyros Kyprianou, Glafcos Clerides Tassos Papadopoulos and Nicos Anastasiades. The main element of this discourse in their speeches relates Turkey as a culprit of all atrocities that transpired on the island. Kyprianou never leaves out that GCs are the victims of aggression and occupation (29, p. 1073). Turkey is guilty of "uprooting the population", "usurping properties" (ibid) and other "systematic violations of the rights of the people of Cyprus" (ibid, p. 1074). Papadopoulos states that Cyprus is still an example of a "foreign aggression and continuing occupation" (52, p. 10) and that GCs suffered the most (53). Papadopoulos is radical in saying that Turkish troops are significantly guilty of the atrocities that Cyprus has witnessed (50). He states that ROC is still facing severe violations of Human Rights within its territory by Turkish armed forces (47). Linguistic content of Clerides' speeches encompass the notions of colonial rule (42, p. 1) and a military might (ibid, p. 4) of Turkey against defenseless Cyprus. He articulates the idea that the freedom that Cyprus gained has triggered "old

enmities" (ibid, p. 2). He states that Cyprus is at the forefront of "massive violation of Human Rights of the displaced people who have been evicted by force from their homes by the Turkish forces of occupation" (ibid, p. 3) that Turkey as the aggressor, tries to modify the demographics of the island and use it in its advantage. Anastasiades often talks about occupational forces, their aggressive positioning that "violently divided" (60, p. 1) Cyprus and hindered the prosperity of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (61; 62, p. 4; 63-24:39). Reference to Turkish invasion (61) is made on several occasion which jeopardizes the fundamental rights of all Cypriots (60, p. 3). Anastasiades argues that Turkey continues to engage in the destruction of cultural heritage, distortion of democratic process, blackmail tactics and gunboat diplomacy (63), which pose a huge threat and destabilization to Cyprus. The difference can be detected regarding the audience he addresses. The language consists more of historical trauma and past wrongdoings of Turkey when he talks at the UN, whereas his locus shifts from the past to the present problems, such as destruction of a cultural heritage or exploiting the properties of GCs in the north.

The link between past victimization and ongoing victimhood is rather vivid in their speeches as well. The linguistic dimension of Kyprianou's speeches is loaded with terms and phrases that exhibit the perpetual victimhood and collective trauma of GC community. He portrays Cyprus as small, weak and defenseless on multiple occasion (30, p. 6, 8, 10; 31, p. 19) against militarily powerful neighbor (Turkey). Papadopoulos often emphasizes the ongoing victimization alongside to the past traumas in GC consciousness by using the words such as invasion, occupation, usurpation in almost every speech analyzed in this research. Papadopoulos often talks about the present victimization of GCs resulted from the unprecedented unlawful exploitation of properties in occupied Cyprus that belong to them (50, p. 6). There is an abundant amount of words such as colonization (47; 49; 53) and domination in his speeches which emphasize not only the past traumatic experience, but the present victimhood. He argues that it was exacerbated with the introduction of the Annan plan, which granted Turkey control of the island and tried to "legalize and deepen the division" (49). Similarly, Clerides often employs the notion of colonial rule and tries to link the past victimization to the current traumas of GCs by outlining that Turkish forces still perpetrate massive violations of Human Rights (mostly concerning IDP of GC origin). Even though acknowledging the fact that "fears on both sides" exist, he dismisses the reasoning of TC community and blames their leader Denktas in employing hostile and negative attitude (42). Anastasiades talks about the suffering of GCs (61) of how they were forced to abandon their homes and move to another side of the island. He often portrays Cyprus as a small country, which has been suffering for more than 44 years (62, p.4), occupied by strong Turkey. There are certain comparisons employed in these speeches, such as referring to the Cyprus problem as an "open

wound" (63-29:06). It naturally brings the question, how would one solve the problem if the wound is still open and the leader does not try to heal it?

Modality aspect of this discourse displays harsh language of hyperboles. Papadopoulos formulates facts as axioms and carries a subjective modality. Modality of Kyprianou's speeches stands out as a categorical and subjective. Hi speeches do not reflect the nominalization, the outcome is always ascribed to the subject and the object is always victimized. The facts are represented as general truth, rather than neutral and flexible. Transitivity within the speeches of Papadopoulos indicates that his main concern is the emphasis on the perpetrators of all GC atrocities, the subject and the object interconnectedness is vivid. The emphasis is not only on the outcome, but on the process and on Turkey as a trigger. The events and processes are directly connected with the subjects and objects and are, therefore, affected by those processes in Clerides' speeches. For instance, Clerides urged the leadership of Turkey "to abandon its threats to annex the occupied part of Cyprus" (46, p. 3). In this case, we see Turkey (subject) threatens to annex (process) occupied part of Cyprus (object).

5.2.4. Empathetic-conciliatory Discourse

This thematic discourse is more concerned about acknowledging at least some part of their own group's wrongdoings and taking responsibility to some extent. At the same time, it incorporates the acknowledgment of other group's traumatic experience and tries to validate their trauma and suffering. There are certain elements and aspects of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood that fits in this specific discourse. Moreover, it entails two layers of collective victimhood, general conflict and conflict event victimhood, but notably these elements do not sit at the heart of this discourse. More importantly, it avoids talking about violence between two communities and portrays adversaries as friends. This is crucial aspect of empathetic-conciliatory discourse. The conflict may exacerbate when one party dehumanizes another, but in this case positive epithets such as brothers, compatriots, friends and partners are used to refer to TCs. This aspect of building a positive image of an adversary is vital for constructive change or any kind of peaceful resolution. It is implausible to escape from talking about 1974 events, when Turkish troops intervened/invaded on the island, but through this discourse those events are portrayed as something that harmed and damaged both communities living on the island and something that would push them for mutually acceptable settlement. Furthermore, only empathetic-conciliatory discourse has a light tone of perpetrators acknowledgement. Perpetrators acknowledgment is a type of acknowledgement that recognizes the role and takes (some/full) responsibility for the harm

that was done to the other party. When GC leaders talk about twin crime or wrong choices (58) in both communities, they indirectly admit that their own community, or at least the establishment, has some something to do in sustaining the status-quo.

The only two GC leaders who employ empathetic-conciliatory discourse were Glafcos Clerides and Demetris Christofias. Clerides acknowledges that there are security fears on both sides "whether reasonable or not" that yet to be dealt with (43). He states that GC side is fearful that Turkish military may one day occupy the whole island, whereas TCs worry that Greek majority may oppress, dominate the Turkish minority and turn Cyprus into a Greek state. This is an important element for analysis as it acknowledges the collective trauma on both sides. Clerides addresses this issue later in another speech (46), namely the fact that TCs suffer too, in the occupied area and there is a need to break the walls of division (ibid, p. 3). After linguistic analysis, Christofias stands out as an empathetic political figure, who always acknowledges the pain and the struggle of both communities. While talking about the past, he avoids blaming any particular party and hopes to put the end to the tragedy of both peoples (54-6:18; 58-1:11:27). He calls Turkish and Greek Cypriots brothers and not enemies (55-2:12), "compatriots" (57-9:36), TC leader (Talat) (ibid) a friend and a partner, conveying the idea that there might be differences between brothers, but they will still come together once the differences are solved or deemed insignificant. He points out that the suffering from "twin crime" (57-6:14) unites Cypriots-"victims of the tragedies" (56), which deprived them political normality and human rights (ibid). He asserts that the "wrong choices" (58) in both communities prevented the proper development of Cyprus for all Cypriots.

Linguistic elements of modality and transitivity give an insightful view of this discourse. There is an effort to strike a balance between subjective and objective modality. Clerides does not only touch the suffering and trauma of GCs and the negative ramifications of Turkish invasion, but tries to emphasize with TC community and acknowledge their hardship and suffering to a certain extent (43). Within the lens of modality, the speeches of Christofias' display a high level of objective modality, the range when a leader acknowledges not only the traumas of his own group but of the other (46, p. 3). Regarding the transitivity of this discourses, the events and processes are directly connected with the subjects and objects and are, therefore, affected by those processes. Clerides opts for the nouns to describe the process, such as violation (instead of violates), occupation (not occupies), threat (not threatens) to shift the focus in the detrimental outcomes of the actions. Transitivity aspect, within the speeches of Chistofias', indicates an important element that subject object connectedness is loose. Subjects are mostly omitted, emphasizing the effect of certain wrong choices and disregarding the action or the process by and of itself.

To shed a light on this discourse, one should illustrate main contours of these leaders' political figures. Clerides was an ally of Makarios, but also has been believed to have a part in the Athens-instigated coup in 1974, therefore, the struggle and the commitment to *enosis* was raw and straightforward. However, over the course of decades, his views regarding the constitutional arrangement and the fate of a newly born 'reluctant republic' (Xydis, 2017) has shifted to a more empathetic-conciliatory style. This is very indicative when analyzing his speeches to actually witness certain modifications in his approach. The transition from the *enosis*-supporter to the deal-striker and the one that paved the way for the Annan plan can demonstrate why his vocabulary changes, softens and shifts the locus of discourse. But very interesting aspect in those discourses is the dramatic change of a vocabulary and the language when he addresses an international community at the UN General Assembly and when he has interviews or speeches in Cyprus, even to foreign media outlets. The usage of hyperboles is redundant in the UN speeches, which can be ascribed to the tendency of leaders to gain international empathy and validation from foreign audience/governments, whereas in other speeches, he takes time to address the situation TCs face in the north and does acknowledge the collective trauma and the fears, both realistic and imagined, which hinder the peace process. By utilizing this discourse, Christofias comes off as a reconciliatory leader. First of all, he admits that *enosis* was the trigger for Turkish intervention (56; 58-19:14), which takes at least some courage and shows determination. He states that certain "chauvinistic groups" (58-19:14) on both sides made Turkish as well as Greek Cypriots suffer. They became the victims of tragedies (56) on the island and any resolution process should start with the healing. In most of the statement, Christofias shows the optimism regarding the potential settlement and there is no substantial change over time. He maintains the same attitude and similar vocabulary throughout the speeches analyzed for this thesis. Moreover, there is not a different approach when talking at the UN, European Council, abroad or during the local interviews. The audience does not substantially affect the vocabulary and verbiage.

5.2.5. Antagonistic-avoidant

This thematic discourse has some traits from other discourses, but certain new features which make it a distinct thematic category. The animosity towards Turkey is the centerpiece of this discourse, which is not surprising as most of the thematic discourses in this section feature elements of blame game, but interesting and differentiating element of this discourse is the light acknowledgement of TCs suffering. However, the blame is shifted from GCs (who were the adversaries of TCs) to Turkey. This discourse does not take any responsibility for the actions of their own group, but portrays the situation as resultant from foreign malpractice. Even though empathetic-conciliatory

discourse entails this element of acknowledgement of collective trauma in both communities, it validates those traumas and takes some responsibility for it, whereas this discourse distances itself from any kind of culpability and points to Turkey who should take all the responsibility. At the same time, belittling the trauma of TCs are detected within this discourse, as they are portrayed as someone who does not have a say in negotiations and Turkey sets the agenda for them.

Antagonistic-avoidant discourse incorporates two layers of collective victimhood: general conflict and conflict event victimhood. It does not go far in the past to portray GCs as perpetual victims of Turkey, however, it does include the siege mentality, which is the aspect of third layer of collective victimhood. Siege mentality refers to the fear that someone is always acting with malicious intents towards one's group. This feature indicates another element of collective victimization that is asymmetric collective victimization, which portrays Turkey as almighty power and Cyprus small and defenseless against Turkey.

This specific thematic discourse can be traced in the speeches of George Vassiliou and Nicos Anastasiades. Linguistic features of Vassiliou's speeches demonstrate a certain degree of trauma and victimization depiction. He often mentions Turkish invasion/occupation (33, p. 54; 34-13:31), which still remains as a threat to the security needs of Cyprus. Anastasiades often talks about occupational forces, their aggressive positioning that "violently divided" (60, p. 1) Cyprus. But Vassiliou goes further and labels the Turkish actions in Cyprus as 'ethnic cleansing' (35). The atrocities of Turkey and intentional eviction of GCs from their ancestral homes served the purpose of creating ethnically clean areas (ibid, p. 23), which was concomitant to the "forcible division" and "suffering of so many" (ibid, p. 26). He blamed Turkey for unwillingness and argues that status-quo benefits Turkey, which represents the only and the biggest impediment in the settlement process (38-9:41). At the same time, Vassiliou was self-critical and often stated that GCs should also take some responsibility for the proceedings "in fight there is never one person to blame" (40). Vassiliou names entrenched collective trauma as the biggest impediment for the rejection of the Annan plan, asserting that some people still has not come to terms with what happened on the island (40). The tendency of belittling the needs and intentions of TCs is apparent in his discourse (37) as Vassiliou argues that TCs do whatever Ankara wants them to do (ibid, 23:54), meaning that if GCs wish to solve the problem they should start with talking to Turkey and not with TCs as they lack the independence even in the negotiation process. Eventually, he pinpoints that Turkey bears the whole responsible for the division by "asserting its military strength" (ibid, 23:23). Anastasiades touches upon the same issue, but does not separately deal with TCs, although he admits that Turkish invasion hindered the prosperity of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots (61; 62, p. 4; 63-24:39). Reference to Turkish invasion (61) is made on several occasion, which jeopardized the fundamental rights of all Cypriots (60, p. 3). He argued that TC authority wants to control the

whole island, and GCs have a serious security issues with the "hostile acts of Turkey" (64-18:45). Turkey only serves to its own interests and disregards the legitimate demands of TCs (ibid, 14:00).

In the dimension of discursive practices, the role of blaming is detrimental. After dealing with the interviews and speeches given by the third president of the ROC, George Vassiliou, one can argue that he portrays Turkey as solely responsible for all atrocities that happened in Cyprus. Turkish presence is a "constant threat" for the survival of Cyprus. At the same time, there is a palpable criticism and disapproval of UN efforts to stop the Turkish illegal actions against the sovereignty of the ROC. There are certain comparisons employed in Anastasiades' speeches, such as referring to the Cyprus problem to an "open wound" (63-29:06). This is very informative detail, as a leader who is conciliatory would not refer to a problem as an open wound. Logically, if the wound is open, there is no prospects of reconciliation until the wound is healed. Furthermore, he never elaborates how that wound can be healed.

In the context of linguistic peculiarities in this speeches, such as modality, Vassiliou tends to show different degree of affinity with his statements. Mostly, he offers the facts in the light of his opinions rather than stating them as facts. His discourse lacks the categorical modality, most of the time. Another insightful element is the permission modality, which means that the speaker puts oneself in a position to give the receiver a permission for something. This feature manifests itself when Vassiliou talks about Turkish troops and settlers (33). He states that TCs can live peacefully under one governmental entity and a single international personality when Turkey withdraws its military troops and settlers from the island. Prolonging of the negotiations and disappointments enhance the mistrust (64-2:30) between respective communities, suggests Anastasiades by employing objective modality. In addition, he sometimes provides information based on the premise that it is truth whereas at other times he expresses them as an opinion, there is no one way or another in this regard. The permission on the modality range is also often utilized, when Anastasiades talks about the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island (63).

However, Vassiliou is being quite inconsistent with his statements regarding the Annan plan. He argues that GCs did not receive enough security guarantees and thought Turkey would not honor the agreements against a "small, weak and defenseless" (33; 37) country. The change of his language over time is very apparent. In the beginning, he is mostly concerned with attributing all the responsibility to Turkey, however, later he brings up the issue of collective trauma that should be harnessed to address the peace process. Then, he argues that GCs do carry some portion of responsibility for the failure of the Annan plan and later he singles out Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of the ROC at the time of the Annan plan, as the driving force of GC 'No' vote (38; 39). Anastasiades was supporting the Annan plan and was campaigning for a 'Yes' vote. Even though, he comes from the right-wing traditional party, his approach is never fixated and inflexible.

He does not talk about historical trauma (the ones during the Ottoman Empire), but mostly refers to the struggles for the last decades, since the independence of the ROC and touches upon the current issues that need to be addressed for the acceptable reunification.

The difference of vocabulary based on the nature of audience needs special attention within this discourse. When Vassiliou addresses international community at the UN, he exaggerates, using strong phrases, epithets, hyperboles to describe Turkish actions in Cyprus, however, in his interviews and speeches at the local level, Vassiliou maintains more constructive approach (39) and talks about the repercussions of irrational 'common sense' and 'intransigence' in Cyprus as the major obstacles towards resolution process (ibid, 0:57). The same divergence can be detected regarding the audience Anastasiades addresses. The language consists more of historical trauma and past wrongdoings of Turkey when he talks at the UN, whereas his locus shifts from the past to the present problems, such as destruction of a cultural heritage or exploiting the properties of GCs in the north.

5.3. Cross-examination of TC and GC discourses

Based on the empirical discourse analysis, nine thematic discourses were detected within the speeches of Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders. Since the self-proclaimed independence of TRNC, TC leaders employed four distinct discourses: personal trauma, negligent-conciliatory, revisiting victimhood and perpetual historical victimhood discourse. On the other side of the island, the presidents of ROC employed five different discourse: antagonistic-avoidant, empathetic-conciliatory, perpetual historical victimhood, intransigent-rejectionist and personal trauma discourse. If we cross examine these discourses across the island, there are some similarities and the points of overlap that would indicate that some discourses had a potential for peacemaking, whereas others increased the mistrust and the gap between respective leaders, which solidified the sense of collective victimhood.

There are certain discourses that are similar and therefore their coincidence on different parts of the island may increase/decrease the chances of a positive outcome. At the same time, there are other similar discourses, which are approached from a different angle. Personal trauma discourse is evident on both sides, but they have diametrically different impact on the content of the speeches of certain leaders. In the case of TRNC, personal trauma discourse was utilized to mobilize TCs against any kind of resolution; it tried to put the traumatic experience near to the past and therefore strengthened the opposition for a settlement process, whereas in ROC, the personal trauma was instrumental to show GCs that even though a certain leader went through a

traumatic experience, they should heal from it and strive for bettering of the conditions for all Cypriots.

Moreover, there is perpetual historical victimhood discourse in the speeches of both Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders. It should be underlined that this discourse functions as an impediment for any kind of constructive social change. If both sides are told that the other party acts with malignant intentions to harm and damage them, consequently there will not be a willingness to come together and work towards a potential resolution. This specific discourse entails all three layers of collective victimhood, linking the suffering in the past to the suffering at present times. Therefore, it argues that the traumas they experienced cannot and should not be forgotten and/or forgiven. If TCs believe that GCs are unwilling to cooperate and trying to oust them, when GCs think TCs cannot be trusted, any prospects of peace talks is very unlikely. At the same time, if TCs believe that they suffered more than GCs, while GCs think the opposite, if TCs think GCs only intent to harm them and GCs hold this siege mentality against TCs, it diminishes the hopes for a peaceful resolution. This discourse of perpetual historical victimhood also entails implicatory as well as interpretive denial. Those two types of denials go against the desire of negotiations. Implicatory denial justifies (directly or indirectly) the harm done to the other party, whereas interpretive denial reformulates the meaning of trauma for victims. Even though, this element acknowledges that some harm was done to others, it completely negates the repercussions for the victims. Victims want to be acknowledged, they wish others to understand their pain. If one acknowledges the damage, but justifies it, the victims will consequently be resilient and unwilling to sit around the table for any kind of talks. In addition, if victims' own meaning of trauma is deconstructed by the perpetrators and given a different meaning, it negates that certain degree of acknowledgement and angers the victims. With all these elements in motion, any substantial social change in the dynamic of peace talks is highly implausible.

Another two discourses used by GC leaders leave less flexibility for peace talks. Intransigent-rejectionist discourse argues that GCs suffered the most, they were left against Turkish military might and incorporates the asymmetric collective victimization, subjective, categorical modality and dismissal of the TCs' traumas. These features make this particular thematic discourse less likely to positively influence the outcome of negotiations. Incrementally better but still rigid is another GC discourse I have labeled as antagonistic-avoidant. This discourse does not blame TCs, but acknowledges their suffering to some extent. However, it does not take any responsibility for those suffering and points to Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, is a savior for TCs, they perceive Turkish intervention of 1974 as a liberation, so this strategy is destined to fail and make TCs more resistant and reluctant to discuss any future prospects. It also augments the distrust from TCs due to the volatile vocabulary depending on the audience. If GC leaders talk

about their own constant victimization abroad, but disguise those feelings and talk about the need for negotiations at home, it makes them an untrustworthy player from TC perspective.

Besides those thematic discourses, there are three other discourses that give rise to better starting positions for peace talks. TC leaders sometimes turn to revisiting victimhood and negligent-conciliatory discourses. Those two discourses alongside the GC discourse of empathetic-conciliatory one is very promising in relation to peace talks. Revisiting victimhood shifts the focus of attention from bringing up past historical perpetual victimization to current victimization that put TCs in worse position. This discourse avoids vilifying any party and puts them as adversaries but merely focuses on current situation that made TCs inferior in their own country. The extension of this thematic discourse is negligent-conciliatory discourse, which modifies the language of trauma to the language of isolation. It does entail certain traits of competitive victimhood and asymmetric collective victimization, but gives TC audience the hope for future. Empathetic-conciliatory discourse within GC leaders' speeches is also includes a deeper level of acknowledgement for what they did to TCs and how much TCs suffer. The healing starts with the perpetrators acknowledgement and this specific discourse contains it to some degree. So, one would expect that when these kinds of discourses are utilized across the division lines, there should be some substantial progress in the negotiations.

6. Political Discourse and the Peace Process

This section deals with the outline of the important peace talks and negotiations, puts them in time perspective and delves into the possible connection between certain discourses and peace talks over the Cyprus conflict. It is important to pinpoint substantial negotiations that took place on the island and then decipher whether particular discourses of Cypriot leaders had any influence on it. One cannot claim that anything alone, such as discourses, determine the outcome of the peace talks, however, the presidential discourses have an enormous impact on the audience and sets the tone for a particular outcome, in case any settlement plan is put on referendum on both sides. This research is based on a premise that when Cypriot leaders are more inclined to use words, phrases or bring up events in order to make their points across, which recall and perpetuate past trauma or victimization, there is less progress or a stagnation regarding the peace negotiations and reconciliation. By looking through the timeline of peace talks, this chapter strives to answer the second research question: how the manifestations of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood affect the conflict resolution practices in Cyprus since 1983 until 2020?

If we consider the patterns in the speeches of respective leaders, some of the leaders come off as more conciliatory than others, which therefore may have a substantial impact on the outcome of negotiations. When both (or even one) parties constantly employ words that perpetuate and solidify running sores, there is no tangible results from the negotiations, or there are no talks at all. When at least one party is moderate in his positions, we see that agreements are being signed and the progress is maintained inch by inch (see graph 1).

Graph 1. Summary of the presidential discourses and their prevalence in Turkish and Greek Cypriot Communities

Perpetual Victimhood			
Revisiting Victimhood			
Negligent Conciliatory			
Personal Trauma			

	DENKTAS	TALAT	EROGLU	AKINCI

← 83³**** 88**** 93**** ****02 03/04*** 08*10** **15/16/17 18**** →

	Kyprianou	Vassiliou	Clerides	Papadopoulos	Christofias	Anastasiades
Antagonistic-Avoidant						
Empathetic-Conciliatory						
Perpetual Victimhood						
Intransigent-Rejectionist						
Personal Trauma						

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³ This column is the time frame under study from 1983 till 2020. 83 refers to 1983, 88 to 1988, 03 to 2003 etc. The dates marked in red indicates the most important peace talks that puts into perspective the concurrent thematic discourses. X-axis represents the time frame with TC presidents over the x-axis and GC presidents under it. Y-axis, on the other hand lists all the thematic discourses that were deciphered through the research.

6.1. The clash of mutually exclusive discourses

During this period after the unilateral declaration of independence of the TRNC, both parts of the island had articulated very assertive and competing, mutually exclusive discourses, which made any substantial changes practically implausible. The worst discourse in regards to conflict resolution practices in TRNC was the discourse of the perpetual historical victimhood, which was the dominating discourse in the north since self-proclaimed independence in 1983 till 2005 and then reemerging from 2010 until 2015. If during those time periods, the same or another non-conciliatory rhetoric is apparent in the south, one should not expect any significant positive changes in relation to peace talks. One would detect any real change, if the discourse in the south is moderate or somewhat compromising.

The main thematic discourse in the north was perpetual historical victimhood coupled with the (negative) personal trauma discourse, the same tendency is detected in the south until 1988. Perpetual historical victimhood discourse was frequently utilized by Denktas, which argued that past atrocities done to TCs cannot be forgotten and forgiven. Denktas' political aim was to "draw Turkey in his own separatist Cyprus policy" (Kızılyürek, 2010, p. 190) which would have been practically the realization of partition. His speeches show a pattern of four intertwined topics: GC intransigence, unjust UN backing, terrorized TCs and Turkey as a savior. He went further and accused UN for "giving the knife to the butcher (GCs) for the lambs" (TCs) (1). With all these details, one should not expect a high degree of commitment to peace talks and settlement process at large. Especially when this kind of discourse is met with the same perpetual historical victimhood discourse containing the elements of intransigent-rejectionist discourse in the South. These last two discourses are uncompromising towards any kind of concessions and intend to vilify the adversaries, exaggerate one's own harm and dismiss the one of another party. Therefore, we do not see any peace talks let alone substantial negotiations during 1983-1988.

There was a slight change in tone and discourse in the south after 1988 with the coming of George Vassiliou to the power. The discourse was modified from perpetual historical victimhood to antagonistic-avoidant one, which is distinct thematic discourse, but entails several central aspects of the previously unabated GC discourse. This discourse does have a very distinctive feature of acknowledgement, specifically acknowledging the traumas of TCs, but, on the other hand, all blame is put on Turkey. Turkey is the savior, the only hope and ally of TCs, so vilifying them in order to avoid blaming TCs is definitely not a strategically smart choice. This discourse coupled with Denktas' rhetoric leaves no room to maneuver, but the combination served couple round of peace talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots with international actors involved.

In 1991, US president George H.W. Bush invited both parties to a conference on Cyprus, but UN suggested that the parties should be 'within of agreements', which was unacceptable for Vassiliou and Denktas and the conference was canceled. UN Secretary General de Cuellar blamed Denktas for intransigence (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS4). Denktas was attending the meetings, but was not willing to negotiate, more so just stating his positions and leaving the table. This is evident in the official reports of the UN, where Denktas is explicitly named a "chief architect" (Kızılyürek, 2010, p. 191) for the failure of negotiations.

UN Secretary General offered another framework known as "set of ideas" on April 5, 1992. This proposal entailed the constitutional arrangements of unified Cyprus with the ethnic ration in the legislative body and the maintenance of a majority population in the land it controlled. In addition, it consisted of a TC vice president with a veto power and the return of refugees to their homes. However, the number was conflicting as Denktas estimated 40,000 TCs returning to their homes in the South, whereas GC authority was hoping 82,000 GCs would get their properties back in the north. Unfortunately, the agreement was not reached as Denktas was not willing to negotiate on the number of refugees returning to their homes (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS5). Secretary General's report on November 19 unequivocally blamed TC leader Rauf Denktas for its failure (ibid).

There was another package of confidence-building measures offered by the UN on November 19, 1992. The package included the possible reopening of Cyprus airport, which has been under the UN surveillance since 1974, reduction of Turkish troops and handing Famagusta (Varosha) to GC authorities, but Denktas argued these measures would benefit GC community more than TCs and therefore, the package was not implemented (Bolukbasi, 1995).

6.2. Change of discourse-Change in Peace Talks

As the time progress, we see that GC discourses go through some form of metamorphosis. It moved from intransigent-rejectionist & perpetual historical victimhood discourse to antagonistic avoidant discourse and by 1993, there is a very promising discourse at place, namely empathetic-conciliatory discourse. This comes as the new government is elected in ROC, Vassiliou steps down and Clerides steps in. Clerides utilizes two very different discourse, past historical victimization and empathetic-conciliatory. The latter is very important for peace talks as it acknowledges the pain and struggle of both parties involved and tries to bring the healing by coming together as a nation. It reflects an objective modality and acknowledging some blame on their part. Even though the prime discourse in the north is perpetual historical victimhood, the existence and articulation

of empathetic-conciliatory discourse should produce some substantial developments in the peace process.

In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan invited both parties for intercommunal talks. They met, under UN auspices, in New York (July 9-12) and Switzerland (August 11-15). Denktas was against of signing any agreement document until the EU would suspend the accession negotiation with the ROC (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS6). On June 29, 1999, Security Council called two parties to come back to the negotiation table without any preconditions. In September, Annan said that equal status of the parties should be recognized in order to reach a comprehensive settlement, but Clerides rejected this premise and urged the external parties to abide by the UN resolutions. Five rounds of talks were held through November 2000. On November 8, Annan suggested that one indissoluble state with common central government should be created with a single international personality. This assessment was welcomed by Clerides, but rejected by Denktas who was seeking a two-state solution (ibid, p. 6-7).

Eventually in 2001, Clerides and Denktas decided to conduct face-to-face negotiations with no preconditions. In result, Clerides became the first Cypriot president that traveled to the north since 1974 and Denktas visited Clerides in return on December 9, 2001. The Annan Plan was drafted on November 11, 2002, which called for a new state of affairs with single legal personality. Cyprus would be demilitarized, but 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliant would stay active. Both parties were unsatisfied. Denktas was critical of provisions regarding the loss of water resources and territory (TC territory would have been reduced to 28.5% from 37% at that time), and return of that many GCs to the north, whereas Clerides was concerned about power-sharing, insufficient GC repatriation and the large chunk of Turkish settlers in the north. Due to those conflicting concerns, Founded Agreement was not signed by December 12, as Annan was hoping. Denktas and Clerides held talks from January 15 until mid-February 2003. It was apparent that Denktas was under heavy pressure from EU, and the most importantly, from Turkish government to mild its stance regarding the settlement plan. He did not sign it, but was forced to "open the door" on April 22, 2003 (Bertrand, 2003, p. 4).

Both Denktas and Clerides incorporated all three layers of collective victimhood in their discourses, which would signal that there should be no substantial advancement in the peace process. However, Clerides linguistic analysis gives a different picture. Even though the language of victimization is evident in his speeches, he acknowledges the fears on both sides. He also admits that TCs suffer in the north (46). His modality is skewed towards objective than subjective pole. He tries to strike a balance between presenting facts and then adding his opinions. He also utilized nouns to describe process, therefore, not always blaming others but pointing to the need of harnessing ramifications of those processes. Clerides-"a voice of calm in a nation known for

volcanic orators" (McFadden, 2013) was the one who accepted the international peacekeeping buffers and was ready for concessions, even rewriting the Constitution. He used his friendship with Denktas for nearly achieving a breakthrough in the reunification talks in 2002. Eventually two parties agreed on a referendum, but Clerides's second term was over and the coming in of a hardliner deteriorated all the progress.

6.3. Failure of the Annan Plan

At a very critical time when Annan plan was set in motion, ROC had an election and a hardliner leader, Tassos Papadopoulos came in power. This signals a change in the discourse in GC side, empathetic-conciliatory discourse is completely taken away from official speeches and old discourses–perpetual historical victimhood coupled with intransigent-rejectionist-makes a comeback in GC presidential speeches. The modality is Papadopoulos speeches is one of hyperboles and harsh comparisons, stating facts as axioms, having categorical modality and blaming all the parties except GCs and Greece. His discourses have a redundant amount of all three layers of collective victimhood. The same competing rhetoric of perpetual historical victimhood is employed on both sides of the island. In a nutshell, that specific thematic discourse neglects all the hardships and struggle of the other side, exaggerates one's own trauma and asserts that they are the ones who suffered the most. Moreover, it argues that past traumas cannot be forgotten and forgiven. Consequently, no progress is expected and as we see from the social practices below it is exactly the case, the biggest effort of the resolution process failed.

The Annan Plan went through revision five times. The third revised version was presented on February 26, 2003. Britain offered to give almost half of its sovereign base areas to Cyprus if parties were to reach an agreement. TC territory decreased to 28.2%, and number of GC returning to the north increased to 92,000, the number of Turkish settlers that were permitted to stay on the island increased. Annan suggested that two leaders, Denktas and newly elected Papadopoulos should have had two separate, simultaneous referenda on March 30, 2003 (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS9). On March 10, 2003, Denktas and Papadopoulos met, but the talks were unsuccessful. Papadopoulos was asking to fill the gaps in federal legislation and was seeking for more security guarantees from Greece and Turkey. Papadopoulos suggested he would not bring the substantial provisions back to the negotiation table if Denktas did the same (but later in the interview in November 2003, Papadopoulos admitted he was not planning to sign the agreement even if Denktas were to) (ibid, CRS9). However, Denktas was not willing to put the plan on a referendum

and suggested that a new round of negotiations should commence. Annan's April 1 Report stated that Denktas "bears prime responsibility" (ibid) for the failure.

Papadopoulos agreed to consider the plan if it was to entail the Treaty of Accession to the EU and would result into a workable solution. Denktas declared that there was nothing to discuss. It seemed like even if the referenda were actually held, GCs would accept it, but TCs would not, as Papadopoulos seemed more eager to find a solution (especially with some stake at the EU accession) rather than his TC counterpart Denktas. On February 19, 2004 Papadopoulos and Denktas resumed the talks. They failed to agree on a revised version of the Annan Plan. On March 17, Denktas said that he would not attend any talks and would campaign against the agreement. On March 24, Annan drafted a final version of a plan and announced the referenda would be on April 24 (ibid, p. 8-9).

The UN set the stage for two separate referenda in the north and in the south. However, Papadopoulos gave an emotional speech on April 7, where he vehemently rejected the plan and talked on certain tenets which discredited GC community. Those elements would satisfy TC demands from the second day of accepting the Annan plan, but would only meet the needs of GC community in the long-term. In addition, it was destined to dissolve the ROC. He suggested that he would initiate a new plan once ROC is a member of the EU when it would have some advantage on Turkey to reach the common grounds. The EU, UN and the US criticized Papadopoulos' speech as a propaganda to "feed the GCs' insecurities" (ibid, p. 15). New York Times revealed there was government restrictions in ROC on broadcasting favorable positions on the plan (Reuters, 2004). Then, "prime minister" of (so-called) TRNC Mehmet Ali Talat was favoring the plan. Turkish government was supporting it as well. And Turkish support became the reason why Denktas agreed on having a referendum in the north, but maintained a resilience and dislike of the plan (Wright, 2003). In referenda, 76% of GCs rejected the plan, whereas 65% of TCs supported it (Chadjipadelis & Andreadis, 2007, p. 5).

In the report on May 28, 2004, Annan said that GC unwillingness deterred the reunification of Cyprus and criticized Papadopoulos in particular. This outcome is perfectly in line with the rhetoric of Papadopoulos. Since Kyprianou, none of the presidents of the ROC has been so adamant in their positions. In his speeches, Papadopoulos focused on the aggression/occupation/invasion that constantly sabotaged Cyprus. He never missed the chance to blame Turkey for all atrocities that took place on the island. Papadopoulos argued that UN was backing "maximalist positions of Turkey" (53) and designing the plan that was "carved in granite" (ibid, 12:28). He denounced the plan for not addressing the "trauma of invasion" (ibid, 13:44) and jeopardized the security of GCs were bound to live "under the guns" (47, p. 2) of foreign troops. On February 10, 2005 Annan stated that there was a sign for resuming negotiations as Turkish side

indicated a degree of readiness. However, Papadopoulos was intransigent stating that "the national issues cannot be solved through the mediation of a foreigner" (CNA, 2005 cited by Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS12).

The biggest peace making effort in Cyprus failed and the discourses, that vilified other party and portraying oneself as perpetual victims, clearly played a significant role on the outcome. During 2003-2008, the switching of the discourses can be detected in respective communities. During and after the referendum over the Annan plan, TC side had a progressive newcomer (Talat) with the negligent-conciliatory discourse, which was the only discourse dominating the governmental sphere in the north. However, GCs had a new election in 2003 and their discourse also went through a drastic change. Clerides was using both-perpetual historical victimhood and empathetic-conciliatory discourses, whereas newcomer Papadopoulos eliminated any rhetoric of empathetic-conciliatory discourse and only focused on the perpetual historical victimhood.

On January 24, 2006, then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul presented a plan that was designed in order to lift some restrictions from TCs (to include them in the EU customs union) and in return opening ports, airports and airspace for GCs; however, this proposal was rejected by GC government. During his time in office, Papadopoulos was not enthusiastic about the progress of the negotiations, while his counterpart Talat was evidently more eager to engage in the UN talks to find a comprehensive solution (Sözen, 2012, p. 111). On February, 2006, Papadopoulos urged for no mediation or timetables for resuming talks, but Talat responded that there would not be a solution without deadlines and third party involvement.

On April 26, Talat expressed his willingness to resume talks but rather than starting it from the scratch, it would be more beneficial to use the Annan Plan as a basis. Papadopoulos declined this proposal and stated that "the objective of a new solution should effectively deal with the concerns of Cypriot Hellenism" (U.S. Embassy Nicosia Public Affairs Office, 2006 cited by Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS13). This statement did not sit well with the third party mediators. Papadopoulos preferred to go down in history as a rejectionist, who was not, in principle, supporting the comprehensive settlement between two politically equal parties.

July 8, 2006 Agreement laid forward confidence building measures to reconcile two sides by bringing the elements "that affect the day-to-day life of the people" (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS13) for the comprehensive settlement. The process yielded no success due to Papadopoulos intransigence (TRNC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008). Papadopoulos, on the other hand, argues that Talat lacked the appropriate willingness to commit. On September 5, Papadopoulos and Talat met but without any positive outcomes. Papadopoulos charged Talat for bringing Annan plan back to life, whereas Talat argued that GCs were not psychologically ready to restart the negotiations. None of the leaders, hesitated to blame the other side which in return aggravated the negative

climate in the post-Annan era, especially when Papadopoulos was the person who urged GCs to reject the plan.

6.4.   When conciliatory Discourses coincide

In 2008, empathetic-conciliatory discourse resurfaced in ROC, which was concomitant of electing a new president, Demetris Christofias. That discourse was coupled with personal trauma discourse, but instead of mobilizing his community against TCs, he used personal trauma to showcase that healing process should lead to the resolution. The modality of his talks were similar to one of Talat: very objective and non-categorical. He admitted that the *enosis* triggered the Turkish intervention of 1974 and "chauvinistic groups" (58-19:14) on both sides were the biggest impediment for the reunification. His speeches does not explicitly blame any party and shows the GC victimhood only on rare occasion. He is very straightforward in stating that both communities were the "victims of tragedies" (56). His speeches were very reconciliatory; he often compares two communities in Cyprus to brothers, who have differences, which can and should be ruled out. These are kinds of discourses that pave the way for peacemaking efforts. Both sides utilized empathetic-conciliatory and negligent-conciliatory discourses. Hence, Christofias' term with Talat was successful in many regards, especially taking into account that they just had two years to work through the details of the negotiations, as Talat was not reelected. Christofias assumed that his ideological and political convergence with Talat would set the stage for the resolution. They agreed on numerous aspects, such as issues of governance, the ratio of 4:1 in relation to Greek and Turkish Cypriots residing in the north and south respectively (Theophaneous, 2019, p. 295). Those convergences were a giant step forward within the entire peace process of Cyprus.

On March 21, Christofias and Talat met and agreed to restart the negotiations. They set up committees consisting of advisors from both communities to discuss several points for further negotiation. On April 3, 2008, they decided to reopen the Ledra Street for crossing for the first time since 1963. This further fostered the negotiations and marked a significant progress on behalf of both parties (Migdalovitz, 2008, CRS 16). Two-day negotiations with UN Secretary-General in late October 2010 proved that two leaders (Christofias and Talat) have made a substantial progress on many issues, such as governance and power sharing (Sözen, 2012, p. 113). The road to reunification did not seem long off, but Talat could not manage to win the second term and a new TC president had very different stance on how to proceed with the Cyprus issue.

6.5. No conciliatory rhetoric-no progress

It is difficult to anticipate how those talks would culminate if Christofias and Talat had more time, but in 2010 we see that the discourse of perpetual historical victimhood resurfaces in TC side. It was not just a resurfacing, it was a pinnacle of all presidential speeches in the north. The new TC president Eroglu always recalled that TCs were ousted from their own homes and been under constant oppression from GCs (18). His discourse entails the categorical and subjective modality, presenting facts as general truth. The modality displays the high degree of commitment to his statements and transitivity indicates that subjects (GCs) are the ones to blame. His discourse has all three layers of collective victimhood: historical, general conflict and conflict event victimhood, which could very likely exacerbate all the potential for the peace process. This rhetoric is vividly non-pacifist in nature and mobilizes the respective community against the other, GCs. This approach may not be labeled as conciliatory in any terms and as we see the agreement between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities was minimal, if not entirely absent, under Eroglu's leadership.

There were five rounds of tripartite meetings with UN Secretary-General, Eroglu and Christofias: on November 18/2010, on January 26/2011, on July 7/2011, October 30-31/2011 and on January 23-24/2012. All of those talks had no substantial agreement on core issues. On April 21, 2012 UN Secretary-General said that the progress was not enough to renew talks (UN, 2014). The talks were suspended the negotiations when Cyprus took the six-month EU presidency in July 2012. In the same year, EU implemented a project "Reconciliation and Peace Economics in Cyprus" and concluded that there was minimal hope for a potential settlement (Flynn *et al.,* 2020, p. 102).

Besides the fact that, Eroglu did not contribute positively to peace negotiations, he managed to change the positive outcome that was achieved during Talat's leadership. Similar to the language in the statements of Cypriot leaders, the history teaching followed the akin pattern. The suffering of the other is omitted, one's suffering is exaggerated and sociocultural communications are almost nonexistent. The history teaching in divided Cyprus entailed these elements. However, when Talat came to power, he envisioned to change this approach and adopt a new way of teaching that would bridge the gap and develop the culture of peace by focusing. The biggest achievement in this regard was modifying the understanding of identity in the north as changeable and outcome of a political choice, rather than stable, homogenous and historically determined (Papadakis, 2008, p. 144). Hence, they adopted a new identity in the history textbooks as Cypriot or TC rather than Turk. This textbooks were adopted in 2009, but for a short period of

time as new leader Eroglu changed it; in the south, this initiative failed and haven't functioned at all (Solomou & Faustmann, 2017, p. 222).

In 2013, ROC held a presidential election and new leader, Nicos Anastasiades came to power. There is a slight change in tone and a shifting to a different discourse after 2013 in GC side. After very conciliatory approach, GC leader utilized perpetual historical victimhood combined with antagonistic-avoidant discourse. In 2013, the only TC discourse used was perpetual historical victimhood. As already explained, perpetual historical victimhood is the worst type of discourse regarding the prospects of conflict resolution, but the fact that another type of discourse was at present gives some hope that maybe there was some room for a compromise and agreement. Anastasiades often emphasizes that status-quo affects both communities and results into more suffering. He asserts that Turkey pose a threat and destabilization (63) to Cyprus. There are certain comparisons employed in these speeches, such as referring to the Cyprus problem to an "open wound" (ibid, 29:06), which brings us back to Bryant's (2012) argument that "the memory has been institutionalized as a wound in Cyprus" (ibid, p. 340). This is precisely the case through the discourses of Anastasiades. Although, he maintains a positive attitude towards the reunification and underlines that the sufficient political will from both communities may solve the Cyprus problem. However, taking into account Eroglu's unwavering support for independence, it would not be easy to achieve. Given that in addition to the time that they had in the government any substantial results are not expected.

In April 2013, UN offered a package consisting of 75 pages of convergences, which were the result of 2008-2012 talks. But, this package has not been accepted by neither community. For months in 2013, the talks did not resume due to fundamental differences in addressing those differences. GC side was asking for acknowledgement of a single sovereignty for resuming talks, which was accepted in the referendum by TCs, but Eroglu reminded the results of the referendum and suggested that he would accept it if a residual sovereignty for federal entities was to be given, in case a dire misunderstanding emerged. This suggestion was rejected by GCs (Cyprus, H.P.D., 2014, p.7).

On February 11, 2014 Nicos Anastasiades met TC leader Dervis Eroglu under the UN auspices. This agreement was more specific regarding its tenets. They made a joint declaration based on several premises, which was welcomed by Greece, Turkey and the EU. However, the issues in the declaration were not implemented because in October 2014, Turkey sent warship to explore oil and gas reserves across the Cyprus coast and the talks were stalled (Anadolu Agency, 2014). The peace talks did only resume after Mustafa Akinci came to power in (so-called) TRNC.

6.6. Comeback of a Conciliatory discourse

After five years of unrelenting usage of perpetual historical victimhood, there is a diametrically different rhetoric explored through the speeches of new TC president Mustafa Akinci. Perpetual historical victimhood is completely taken out of official speeches, negligent-conciliatory approach is reemployed and a completely new discourse of revisiting victimhood is being entertained. Negligent-conciliatory approach is the best possible discourse in the north that might have been beneficial for peace talks and negotiations, because it recognizes the insecurities of both sides and tries to address them in a constructive manner. It shifts the focus from language of trauma to the language of isolation and tries to take the blame off of GCs, in particular. Another discourse that was used after 2015 in the north revisits the concept of collective victimization for TCs and argues that external factors are the reason why TCs suffer. There were tangible reasons to believe that the settlement process was more vigorous and had more chances of resolution than even in 2004, when the Annan plan was put on a referendum. The main reason for the resilience of hope was the fact that both sides of the island had moderate, pro-solution leaders who should have been more successful in the negotiation process than anyone at any time in the past (Grigoriadis, 2017, p.2). But as we trace their speeches throughout this research, discourses utilized are not rather complementary, but more competing on some issues. Empathetic-conciliatory discourse is not detected in Anastasiades' speeches. It carries the same old perpetual historical victimhood and antagonistic-avoidant. The latter acknowledges the pain of the other party, but tries to change the meaning of trauma and direct the blame to Turkey, which does not bode well with TCs and further ignites their resentment.

Anastasiades and Akinci first met on May 12, 2015 and undertook joint activities along the dividing line in the capital city of Nicosia and spent time on both sides. They agreed on a number of CBMs including the abolishment of the visa filing by GCs, whenever they wished to visit the north Cyprus. Anastasides, on the other hand, handed back the map of the minefields in the north set during the conflict. By December 2015, they had a significant progress concerning governance, citizenship and Turkish settlers. The information has leaked about the details on those issues and seemed like there was a tangible agreement. However, the issue of territory and guarantor states as well as the presence of Turkish troops remained as large differences (Christou, 2015).

In 2016, bicommunal committee on education was created in order to produce certain techniques for the educational institutions that would focus on conflict transformation, reconciliation and would counter the discrimination and prejudice. It was suggested that this kind of approach would create cooperation and reconciliation (Solomou & Faustmann, 2017, p. 223).

In November 2016, Anastasiades and Akinci had two rounds of talks in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland, but the parties could not manage to agree on the issue of territory (Stefanini, 2016).

In January 2017, two leaders met in Geneva and exchanged maps. This is very significant step in the negotiation process. Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders agreed on the breakdown and adjustment after the possible federation (Grigoriadis, 2017, p. 1), which has never happened before. They even agreed on a rotating presidency. The difference seems to be regarding the presence of Turkish troops on the island and the guarantor powers. GC government want to abolish the guarantee system and withdrawal of Turkish military, whereas TC authority would prefer to keep them after the solution is reached. The concern of Anastasiades is legitimate as ROC which is an independent and sovereign country should not have the military or another country (which is still associated to a historical nemesis and evokes the past trauma), however TC community feels safer when Turkish army guards the northern Cyprus.

On June 28, 2017, two leaders met in Crans-Montana, Switzerland with UN Secretary-General as well as representative from Guarantor Powers to discuss the issues of security and guarantees. The talks failed after 10 days of intensive deliberations (Anadolu Agency, 2017). "Zero troops, Zero guarantee", that the GC leadership was seeking, was not satisfied by TC and Turkish side. On November 25, 2019, the leaders met in Berlin and expressed their commitment to the joint declaration of February 11, 2014 and the willingness to work their utmost for a comprehensive settlement. They also agreed to implement six point framework presented by the UN on June 30, 2017. But the same issues of Turkish troops and the guarantee powers stay in the zone of non-convergence (ibid).

When this study was finalized, TRNC elected a new president, Ersin Tatar in 2020. Even though, this is a very recent development and his speeches were not examined through this thesis, few general observations can be articulated about his political figure and stance towards negotiation process. Right after his victory in late 2020, Tatar declared that TC community deserved to be recognized as a sovereign entity and thanked Turkey (BBC, 2020). This statement is alarming, as it showcases from the outset that he will not be eager to compromise and adopt a conciliatory approach in dealing with GCs and the overall negotiation process. Therefore, any kind of breakthrough or progress is highly unlikely.

6.7. Final Remarks

As we have seen from the data analysis and the charts above, the discourses of trauma, victimization and victimhood utilized by political leaders reflect the flow of the negotiations. As underlined in the beginning of this thesis, this connection can be bidirectional, meaning that negotiations may counter affect the discourses, but the same can be true for peace talks. When discourses take the nature of empathetic-conciliatory and dismisses the perpetual historical victimhood, there is tangible progress in the negotiation process, whereas when leaders opt for perpetual historical victimhood, or utilize their personal trauma to mobilize their own community against their adversaries, peace talks are absent or deadlocked. When discourses seem resilient and intransigent, there is a minimal possibility for the third parties to contribute positively to the conflict resolution practices on the divided island.

The *Graph 1* elicit the flow of different, dominant, complementary and competing discourses that certain leaders jumped on. We see that perpetual historical victimhood is present and rather a dominant discourse on both sides (four out of six GC presidents and two out of four TC leaders frequently used it). When both parties use this contradictory thematic discourse, there are no peace talks (1983-1988). The parties did not make any tangible progress towards the resolution of the conflict. The fact that both Denktas and Kyprianou were unwavering supporters of contradictory processes (*taksim* and *enosis*, respectively) diminished any chances of positive outcome. But even when it dominates one side of the island, the progress is incremental. The perpetual historical victimhood dominated the northern Cyprus till early 2000s and if not EU, Turkish and international pressure, Denktas would have never agreed on the referendum over the Annan Plan (Bertrand, 2003, p. 4). Other than that there is no progress at all during Denktas' leadership.

Notably, the empathetic-conciliatory discourse in the South buttressed the chances of coming to terms with the Annan plan, but as we see from the *Graph 1*, instant diametrical change of a discourse from empathetic-conciliatory to perpetual historical victimhood coupled with intransigent-rejectionist brought GCs to the 'No' vote on a referendum (obviously, it is not the only reason but clearly it helped the cause).

When conciliatory discourses on both sides of the island converge, there are significant steps forward, for instance during 2008-2010. In 2008, Ledra Street was open for the first time since 1963, both parties agreed on very important issues such as governance and power-sharing. The road to reunification did not seem long off, but Talat could not manage to win the second term and a new TC president adopted a contradictory discourse.

As perpetual historical victimhood remerges as the dominant discourse in the north in 2010, there is no agreement on any issues until the new president is elected in 2015. The year of 2015 witnessed interesting cross discursive practices in Cyprus. There is an emergence of a new discourse of revisiting victimhood coupled with the negligent-conciliatory discourse. This is indicative that there must be some agreement, however, the discourse in the south is not conciliatory. Nevertheless of that tandem, there is some progress made in relation to abolishing visa filing procedure, exchanging maps of respective territories, establishing bicommunal committee on education, but the negotiations are stalled with the decision regarding the *enosis*-celebration in ROC.

The political discourses demonstrated that the historical truth about a specific event is not important anymore but the sense of chosen trauma becomes the factor that unites one group against another (Volkan, 2001, p. 88). This is precisely the case in Cyprus and from the discourses of Cypriot leaders' speeches, we can see that GCs accentuate on Turkish occupation as the culprit of all atrocities that took place on the island, whereas TCs chosen trauma is Athens-instigated coup. In another words, chosen trauma for each community is *enosis* or *taksim*. *"Trauma is more than a biological state"* (Dwyer & Santikarma, 2007, p.405), and this is precisely true in Cyprus. The most of the younger generation has not experienced the events of 1950s, 1960s or even the Turkish military intervention of 1974, but those traumas victimized both communities and a sense of victimhood seems to be entrenched in the speeches and the memory of elderly Cypriots, who transmit them to the younger generation.

Beliefs about victimhood depict the group as one forced into the conflict by unjust, immoral and violent means of the adversary (Bar-Tal *et al.,* 2009, p. 241). GCs' depiction as victims is based solely on that presumption that Turkey intervened in Cyprus, occupied, and hence dragged them into an intractable conflict. TCs' reference to the victimhood is determined by constant intimidation that GCs would turn Cyprus into a Greek island and force them to fight for their lives, considering the fact that it actually happened before. In intractable conflicts, such as Cyprus, "general conflict victimhood is always manifested in competitive victimhood" (Schori-Eyal *et al*., 2014, p. 778). This undergirds the collective sense of victimhood, which seeks for an international acknowledgement from third parties for a moral and political as well as material support (Bar-Tal *et al.,* 2009, p. 241). The speeches at the UN General Assembly are the perfect example of that. On many occasion, the discourses of both TC as well as GC leaders change when addressing international audience to portray the situation in a way, which presumably favor their national narrative and invoke the need of assistance from international community.

Schori-Eyal *et al*. (2014, p. 778) conceptualized three layers of collective victimhood: historical victimhood, general conflict victimhood and conflict event victimhood. Even though,

not all three layers may be existent with the same group or nation, but when more than one exists, they change the trajectory of intergroup conflict. In the case of Cyprus and conclusive of the speeches analyzed, one can argue that all three layers of collective victimhood is present on the island. Historical victimhood may refer to the "accumulated experience of harm" (ibid, p. 778). Cyprus, due to its location, has always be a pawn of external powers, such as Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, was sieged by Alexander the Great, then Ptolemaic Egypt, Roman Empire, French Lusignan Dynasty, Venetians, Ottoman Empire and the UK. Therefore, Cypriots had the sense of historical victimhood based on the harm that they experience over the centuries. General victimhood, which refers to the specific conflict in the past or the present, can be the ongoing Turkish occupation that GC leaders never miss to lament on especially in their speeches. For TCs general victimhood, deduced from the speeches, can be the constant aspiration of GCs for *enosis*. The third layer of the collective victimhood is a conflict event victimhood, relating to a particular event during the given conflict. This layer of collective victimhood is omnipresent in every speech of Cypriot leaders. TC leaders assume that Athens-instigated coup d'etat and their quest to reunite the island with Greece since the independence but particularly in 1974 is the divisive factor on the island and constitutes the body of TC conflict event victimhood. On the contrary, GC sense of conflict event victimhood is the Turkish invasion of 1974, which divided the island and resulted into the occupation of 38% of Cyprus. As a result, collective victimhood has negative effects on the intergroup relations, such as lack of willingness for reconciliation (ibid, p. 782).

7. Conclusion

The thesis served as an exercise to examine the connection between the collective trauma/victimization and victimhood and concurrent peace talks. The research is divided into six chapters, each of which elaborates on a specific issue within the study process. The first chapter introduces the issue, formulates the research questions, puts forward the main concepts and briefly goes through the different stages of research to highlight how the research questions were answered. The second chapter explores the theoretical tenets of this thesis. It analyzes what trauma is, what the differences between individual and collective trauma are; then, moves to the notions of collective victimization and collective victimhood and offers a broad range of research how those concepts have been studied prior to today. At the end of the chapter, there are number of studies proposed where the existence of collective trauma/victimization and victimhood negatively affected the overall flow of the peace talks and overall progress of the peacemaking efforts in certain regions. Therefore, the foundation is laid for potential connection between the peace process and the collective trauma, victimization & victimhood. The third chapter moves one step closer to empirical analysis and outlines the basics of employed methodology. It pinpoints what kind of research methods have been used to study collective trauma, victimization and victimhood and arrives at a conclusion that single-case study presumably via interpretive research methods sheds light the best at the depiction of aforementioned notions. For this reason, the rationale behind the single-case study and particularly examining the case of Cyprus are meticulously explained. Eventually it comes to the conclusion that they might have been instilled within the political speeches, so discourse analysis is chosen as the most useful tool in addressing those issues. By deciphering the themes within the discourses and asking questions, I expected to unfold thematic discourses which depict collective trauma and victimhood. Before diving into the empirics of the research, the fourth chapter presents a brief recourse into the history of Cyprus in order to understand the context of collective trauma on the island. Based on the theoretical tenets and the methodological elements, the fifth chapter identifies nine thematic discourses that have a certain pattern in sixty-five speeches and interviews of Cypriot presidents'. The sixth chapter goes through the negotiation process since the independence of TRNC until 2020 to outline main peace talks and explore the connection between the depictions of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood and the actual peace talks over the settlement process. This stage is vital to answer the research questions formulated in the beginning of this thesis. The chapter is concluded with the final remarks about the possible effect of discourses of trauma and victimhood on the peace process.

The main question that the researcher aimed to answer with this thesis was whether the collective trauma, victimization and victimhood in the speeches of Cypriot presidents had any kind of reflection on the peace process. The research questions were: how do elements of collective trauma/ victimization and victimhood manifest in the speeches of Cypriot leaders? And how the manifestations of collective trauma/ victimization and victimhood affect the conflict resolution practices in Cyprus since 1983 until 2020?

The answers on those questions were gauged through the discourse analysis of Cypriot presidential speeches. Even though there were some limitations to this study and explicit acknowledgement that only the depiction of collective trauma and victimhood cannot change or direct the peace process, I obtained some palpable results. Based on the research findings, we can say that when one or both leaders exhibit the high level of collective trauma (rigid modality, strong transitivity) and the sense of collective victimhood is strongly entrenched, the peace process is deterred. The speeches dispersed in the time frame of their presidency display a great instrument to deal with the possible utilization of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood. Thesis first dealt with the linguistic elements of those speeches in order to decipher the signs, namely vocabulary, of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood. Then, it tied the discourse of the presidents to the peace process related to the Cyprus problem. I examined the availability, degree and the quantity of selected elements in the discourse and answered the research questions that were posed at the beginning of this research. We cannot unequivocally claim that using the vocabulary rich with the collective trauma and victimhood is the only reason of this outcome, but we can clearly account that those elements do play a substantial role on the peace process of Cyprus.

There are certain contributions of this study that should be highlighted here. The research increased the scholarly knowledge of collective trauma, victimization and victimhood on a single-case study. There are limited number of studies about Cyprus that use these concepts. In addition, there has not been discourse analysis of presidential speeches examined in Cyprus. Therefore, it may direct an array of research to better illustrate whether using those notions in governmental speeches actually hinder the conflict resolution practices in Cyprus (and in other countries/regions) or the flow of peace talks results into the modification of the discourses. I used raw data (speeches and interviews) in order to deduce patterns of discourses and collapsed them into nine distinct thematic categories. Based on those thematic discourses and concurrent peace process, I showed that there are certain discernible patterns between the thematic discourses of trauma and the course of the peace process in Cyprus.

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Annex 1. Speeches of Turkish and Greek Cypriot Presidents

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
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