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# Media Framing and Domestic Political Contestation of EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the War in Ukraine: Case Study on Poland

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## Introduction

The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 marked a watershed moment in the European Union's trajectory of establishing itself as a significant global actor. The treaty provided for a foundational framework that laid out pathways the EU could follow in terms of engaging with the complexities of the modern international relations. Initially, the trend in European integration process was that of the "permissive consensus"<sup>1</sup>. A broad agreement among European establishment and states regarding the benefits and desirability of the European project. And the citizens entrusted their elected representatives to follow this course. This initial acceptance was significantly affected by the EU's perceived capacity to effectively address shared challenges. It was this perception that enabled trust in the European project and integration. And the European project advanced with relatively limited public debate.

However, gradually, alongside the number of crises that befell the Union, a trend emerged. That of an increasingly challenged European integration. A shift from "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus" became evident especially since 2015 migration crisis. EU institutions and policies came under increasing scrutiny and this trend has been maintained since. The contribution of the 2015 migration crisis is undeniable, it divided the European societies along the line of humanitarian concerns and security, a polarizing cleavage of sorts which reverberates till this day.

This dynamic has been accompanied by a notable trend of "renationalization," characterized by a renewed emphasis on national interests and a growing desire among some member states to reclaim sovereignty from the EU level. Populist forces especially instrumentalized this moment to catapult themselves into the limelight. Their often times aggressive anti-EU rhetoric further damaged European integration process.

Nonetheless, the shift did bring a change which the EU had been striving for. Increased scrutiny of the EU meant increased transparency and more robust deliberation around the EU.

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<sup>1</sup> Hooghe L, Marks G. A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science*. 2009,39(1):1-23. Available at: doi:10.1017/S0007123408000409

More contestation and at time politicization. An obvious benefit of such a shift has been the contribution to the reduction in democratic deficit which has plagued the EU for decades.

Politicization, often measured through the heightened issue salience, the expansion of the range of actors involved and the increasing divergence of viewpoints, suggests the emergence of a more mature, albeit potentially more contentious, political sphere surrounding the European Union. As EU policies exert a more direct and tangible influence on the daily lives of European citizens, they inevitably become subjects of a more intense political debate and scrutiny, leading to the formation or reinforcement of existing political cleavages along pro- and anti-EU lines.

The transgovernmental framework of the CFSP and by extension the CSDP, has proven particularly susceptible to this shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. The inherently intergovernmental nature of CFSP/CSDP, where cooperation among sovereign member states is the primary principle, renders it especially vulnerable to contestation at the national level. Albeit, the development of the CFSP/CSDP over the years has changed the nature of the debate around these traditionally intergovernmental policies. As noted by Biedenkopf, Costa and Gora, “the contestation of European foreign, security and defence policy is now more in line with the broader way in which political conflict is being restructured in Europe.”<sup>2</sup> On its part, politicization of CFSP/CSDP would have serious policy consequences on the EU’s approach to global affairs and collective defence. Here, we have to note that politicization of EU issues takes place in bounded ‘episodes of contention’<sup>3</sup>. Hence the rationale for the approach to the issue from this perspective.

This paper delves into the details of the evolving CFSP/CSDP structure and explores implications for the push for a more “Common” and robust CFSP/CSDP. Consequences as envisaged by the larger European Union polity, its member states, its citizens. Establishment of the truly common CFSP/CSDP would entail setting in stone the EU’s character as a global geopolitical actor, a transition from Francois Duchene’s conceptualization of the Union as a “civilian power”.<sup>4</sup> Such a shift in the EU’s nature requires extensive study and it would most likely be the result of significant international event or even the changing global order.

Enter the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine. A turning point in the European geopolitical status-quo or the *Zeitenwende* as some would go on to deem it. Practically overnight, what had long been a relatively technocratic domain of EU cooperation was thrust into the center of public debate and domestic political scrutiny across Europe. The EU’s response to the war was

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<sup>2</sup> Biedenkopf, K., Costa, O., & Góra, M. (2021). Introduction: shades of contestation and politicisation of CFSP. *European security*, 30(3), 325-343.

<sup>3</sup> Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. G. (2015). *Contentious politics*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Duchêne, F. (1972). Europe’s role in world peace. *Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead*, 43, 32-47.

unprecedented. Member states swiftly united to impose sweeping sanctions on Russia and even mobilized EU mechanisms to finance arms deliveries to Ukraine. European Peace Facility and European Defence Fund propelled into prominence as all eyes across Europe, especially in the Eastern Europe, turned in the direction of the Brussels, expecting a swift and adequate answer.

The EU's response to the war was indeed unprecedented. Member states united to impose massive sanctions on Russia and mobilized EU mechanisms to finance arms deliveries to Ukraine. Such a coordinated collective action was a huge development in the EU's CFSP/CSDP, hinting at a more "geopolitical" Europe. Håkansson maps how after the war in Ukraine, European Commission has expanded its role in security and defence and how the Union "has become a more mature foreign, security and defence policy actor."<sup>5</sup>

The immediate aftermath of the invasion saw a remarkable strengthening of EU-level action. Some even calling it the "perfect storm" that enabled unprecedented supranationalization of EU security policy, effectively empowering the European Commission to take on a bigger role in areas once considered off-limits.

In many ways, the EU's collective response to Russia's aggression seemed to justify the vision of a more integrated and assertive European foreign, security and defence policy. Yet, even as it enabled deeper cooperation, the war also exposed internal disagreements that the EU has harbored for years. for instance, Hungary's hesitations on certain sanctions, or debates over energy embargoes.

Clearly, these policies were exposed to heightened domestic contestation and politicization in the aftermath of the war. Issues of war and peace could no longer be kept isolated in Brussels, instead, CFSP/CSDP suddenly entered national political arenas, sparking debates among politicians, media and citizens in a manner rarely seen before. Coincidentally, this signaled a profound change in the EU. That the Ukraine war became incipient of a more robust Common Foreign and Defence Policy in the Union. While still a long way off before a truly integrated and common policy, the trajectory has been set in stone and the snowball is envisaged to gain momentum and mass.

This paper recognizes this new paradigm in the EU's CFSP/CSDP as reinvigorated European integration effort in a domain of member state policy explicitly left to the member states sole authority since Charles de Gaulle. This new paradigm in European integration project calls for a holistic analysis of all the interested parties' positions. Especially, analysis of the influence

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<sup>5</sup> Calle Håkansson (2023): The Ukraine war and the emergence of the European commission as a geopolitical actor, *Journal of European Integration*. Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07036337.2023.2239998>

and outreach of the actors capable of challenging and influencing the European integration efforts.

## Research Gaps

Here lies the main interest and focus of the research. While a growing body of scholarly work has examined the broader phenomenon of contestation directed towards the European Union across various policy domains, a notable gap persists in the current literature concerning the specific role played by the media. “To date, the role of the media in the specific process of domestic contestation of EU foreign and security policy - and its effects on the EU crisis response capacity - remains underexplored.”<sup>6</sup>

This research addresses the gap by linking the theoretical concept of contestation with the concept of media framing. Media framing, as a process, fundamentally involves the strategic selection and highlighting of specific aspects of a perceived reality within a communicative text. Framing analysis is an approach that primarily deals with how public discourse surrounding public policy issues is constructed and negotiated through the media. Major scholar in the field, Robert Entman provides for the most foundational definition of the “media frames”. And this research, like many others, follows in his suit. Concurring that “to frame is to select certain aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text.” And that frames are often manifested through the presence or absence of specific keywords, recurring stock phrases, stereotypical images, particular sources of information and thematic clusters of facts and judgements that reinforce a particular interpretation. Identifying contestation through media frames offers a holistic approach to discourse analysis.

The structured combination of Framing and Contestation analysis or in other terms, by identifying contestation in media frames to explore the previously underexplored field of media’s contestation of the EU’s security policy, enables this research to arrive at a more rigorous conclusions regarding the instances of contestation of the EU’s CFSP/CSDP. Through deductive application of frames, well-established in the research into the EU integration, the research substantially diminishes error variable for the identification of both media frames and instances of contestation.

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<sup>6</sup> Lovato, M., Walter-Drop, G., Noutcheva, G., & Dijkstra, H. (2021). The Internal Contestation of EU Foreign and Security Policy. JOINT Research Papers, P. 18. Available at: [https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/joint\\_rp\\_1.pdf](https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/joint_rp_1.pdf)

No less important is the empirical focus of the paper. “Pooling national sovereignty over defence is more popular over time than any other EU-level-policy”<sup>7</sup>, on the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine this support has solidified. But not in all the European states. Poland stands as an outlier<sup>8</sup>. As it saw reduction in public support. This is a substantial research puzzle, specifically empirical variation over time puzzle that the paper also tackles. Why would a state with a deep historical trauma of Soviet occupation and anti-Russian geopolitical culture suddenly show signs of less support for collective European defence efforts? By tracking down media positioning vis-à-vis the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy during the crisis, Polish media and Poland in general serve as a valuable case study.

## Research Questions

Given these research gaps, the research questions take these shapes:

Poland’s outlier status in the EU defense solidarity makes its media a strategic site to examine contentious frames: How has the Polish media framed EU’s CFSP/CSDP in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine?

To explore the underexplored role of media in contesting EU security policy, this study asks: How do instances of contestation of CFSP/CSDP manifest in media frames? Are they positively valanced, constructive, expressing hope for improvement, transparency, accountability and democratic deliberation of EU foreign policy or are they confrontational, criticizing EU’s response and its security institutions?

## Evolution of the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was turning point in the European project and it formally established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the EU’s Second Pillar CFSP essentially upgraded EPC (European Political Community) into the EU treaties.<sup>9</sup> The Council

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<sup>7</sup> Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson & Andrew D. Garner (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus and EU defence policy, *European Security*, 28:2, 153-172, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275

<sup>8</sup> European Commission (2023), Eurobarometer 99, Public support to defence policy and industry. Available at: [https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eurobarometer-shows-public-support-defence-policy-and-industry-2023-07-14\\_en](https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eurobarometer-shows-public-support-defence-policy-and-industry-2023-07-14_en)

<sup>9</sup> European Union. (1992). Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht, Official Journal of the European Communities C 325/5, <https://www.refworld.org/legal/agreements/eu/1992/en/16882>

of Ministers was given authority to adopt CFSP instruments (Common Positions and Joint Actions), the Commission could present proposals and CFSP missions were officially supported via EU budget. Maastricht's wording went much further by making a bold statement about "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence."

Initially though, the policy struggled to gain traction. CFSP's early form reflected national divisions. Notably, between intergovernmentalists (especially France, the UK and Denmark) and integrationists (e.g. Benelux, Germany, Italy) on rules and the framework.

Atlanticist states emphasized that NATO must remain the primary framework of defence, while others sought an independent European capability. An unproductive division if I dare give historical events an assessment, especially from today's perspective. As NATO is in no way damaged if Europeans manage to collaborate on number of issues such as common defence procurement which increases interoperability, development of the standalone European Defence and Industrial Base etc. The result was that CFSP remained mostly unanimity-bound with only limited majority voting. The European Parliament and Court had no real powers in CFSP.

Immediately after its establishment CFSP was put to test in Yugoslav wars. Wherein the EU struggled to speak and act as one coordinated unit. Damaging CFSP's reputation from the get go. By 1994, the CFSP framework was seen as too weak and member states agreed to review it. Institutional upgrades did appear by 1996 but they were still insufficient. For example, despite establishment of the role of High Representative for CFSP, the post was initially quite weak and acted more as coordinator. In short, by the late 1990s CFSP existed on paper, but its institutions were embryonic and its operational impact limited.

A decisive shifts occurred in the late 1990s. In December 1998 at Saint-Malo, the leaders of France and the UK issued a joint declaration asserting that the EU must have "the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces" to handle crises when NATO did not act. This was a watershed moment. the UK effectively endorsed an EU defence role alongside France. At the Cologne European Council (June 1999), EU leaders formally decided that the Union would take on the WEU's Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, crisis management). Framework was further enhanced in 1999 at the Helsinki Council, an ambitious goal was set up of deploying and sustaining up to 60,000 troops.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> House of Commons. (2000). Common European security and defence policy: a progress report. House of Commons Library Research Paper 00/84. Available at: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/rp00-84/>

Development continued. In sum, between 1999 and 2004 the EU built a standing foreign/military infrastructure, a true CFSP/CSDP pillar. Even as actual capabilities lagged behind national armies. In 2003 the EU launched Operation Concordia in Macedonia (its first military operation) and took over Bosnia's peacekeeping from NATO (EUFOR Althea). Civilian missions (police, rule-of-law) were also deployed in the Balkans and beyond.<sup>11</sup>

Throughout this period CFSP remained formally intergovernmental, with the Council of the EU (Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by the rotating presidency) and the High Representative (HR/VP Solana from 1999) in charge. Most decisions still required unanimity. The European Parliament was only a marginal player (it could be consulted but not vote).<sup>12</sup>

On the positive side, these years saw a real shift from mere coordination to action: the EU executed joint positions and joint actions on more issues than ever, from sanctions on Iraq and Iran to peace negotiations in the Middle East. But capability shortfalls were obvious: EU forces often needed NATO (or US) enablers and Battlegroups (conceived in 2004 as 1,500-person rapid units) remained on paper. Nevertheless, ESDP's (CSDP) creation marked the fulfillment of the post-Maastricht ambition to transform the EU into a genuine international actor.

The Treaty of Lisbon (effective December 2009) was the next institutional step-up. As it incorporated CFSP and CSDP into the unified EU treaties (TEU/TFEU). Importantly, Lisbon redefined the EU's external governance. It created a single EU Foreign Minister: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) This person also became a Vice-President of the Commission and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. Essentially, the Lisbon HR/VP merged the roles of the rotating Council president (who had been hosting EPC/CFSP), the old CFSP High Rep and the Commission's External Relations Commissioner. Lisbon also established the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Basically, staff from the Commission, Council and member state diplomatic services were merged into a single institution running EU delegations worldwide. On defence, Lisbon codified and extended EU commitments. It replaced the term "ESDP" with Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the text, reflecting the integration of defence into CFSP.<sup>13</sup> The Petersberg Tasks were also incorporated in the Treaty as the Union's tasks (peacekeeping, crisis management and strengthening international security). Lisbon also mentioned the possibility

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<sup>11</sup> Heliskoski, J. (2018). Responsibility and liability for CSDP operations. In *Research Handbook on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy* (pp. 132-153). Edward Elgar Publishing.

<sup>12</sup> Wessels, W., & Boop, F. (2008). The institutional architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty. *Research Paper*, 10

<sup>13</sup> European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence. (2020). CSDP Defence capabilities Development. Available at: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603482/EXPO\\_IDA\(2020\)603482\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/603482/EXPO_IDA(2020)603482_EN.pdf)

of “permanent structured cooperation” (PESCO) for military collaboration among willing states, which years later would materialize. In short, Lisbon integrated CFSP/CSDP into the Union’s constitutional structure. Wessels and Bopp even call CFSP/CSDP “the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty”<sup>14</sup>.

After Lisbon, the EU’s foreign/security architecture was richer. an HR/VP with high authority, a diplomatic service (EEAS), a defence agency (EDA) and treaty-level mutual aid clauses. However, the decision-making model remained largely intergovernmental (unanimity is still the norm).

In the 2010s and early 2020s the framework went through interesting changes. The EU worked to operationalize its foreign/security framework. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), launched under HR/VP Mogherini, updated Europe’s vision post-Lisbon.<sup>15</sup> It emphasized “strategic autonomy” and set priorities (resilience, defence cooperation, alliances). This political guidance fed into several concrete steps. In 2017, 25 Member States formally initiated Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), yet another significant step. Under PESCO, participants commit to jointly develop specific military capabilities via binding national plans, with progress overseen by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Defence Agency (EDA). PESCO projects include heavy transport helicopters, cyber defence and maritime surveillance, often financed by an emerging collective European Defence Fund.

The Commission also mobilized funding. In 2017 it launched the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and later the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). These were precursors to the EDF (formally launched in 2021) which now co-finances joint defence R&D. Civilian measures also saw development: the EU created a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and a Civilian Response Team for rapid police/rule-of-law missions.

A Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) began in 2017 to synchronize member states’ capability plans. By the early 2020s the EU had a modest but real defence-industrial and planning apparatus alongside its diplomatic tools. Simultaneously, the EU broadened its crisis response. The European Peace Facility (EPF), agreed in 2021, became an off-budget fund to finance CSDP operations and partner security forces. The EU Battlegroups, though never deployed, remained on standby for rapid crises. More significantly, the Union has conducted many civilian and military missions: by 2023 there were 20+ ongoing CSDP operations (in the Sahel, Balkans, Mediterranean, etc.) and multiple civil missions. These were executed under

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<sup>14</sup> Wessels, W., & Bopp, F. (2008). The institutional architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 46(S1), 47-77

<sup>15</sup> European External Action Service (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*.

CFSP mandates with Council decisions and often with NATO coordination (e.g. sharing command in Afghanistan's ISAF, or using NATO assets under "Berlin Plus" when needed).

The culmination so far in the development of the EU's vision for security and defence strategy came with Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by EU leaders in March 2022, a month after the eruption of Russia's war in Ukraine. The Compass, described as "part strategy, part action plan," provides a common policy vision up to 2030.<sup>16</sup>

It is based on a first-ever classified EU Threat Analysis and identifies key deliverables in crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. Unlike earlier broad strategies, the Compass sets concrete targets (for example a joint EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of 5000 troops, more effective decision procedures, fuller implementation of existing clauses). Consolidated by the number of massive crises such as the COVID pandemic, Hybrid threats and especially Russia's invasion of Ukraine it sets in stone ambitious goals for the security and defence of Europe.

And finally, with change in administration in the White House and aggressive signals coming from the USA, it has become obvious that Europe can no longer rely on the US security umbrella for its protection. The EU seems to have come to terms with the new reality and is now actively pursuing development of its strategic capabilities. Especially, with Germany's involvement alongside France (albeit, Macron has been the staunchest supporter of European strategic autonomy for years). The future of European security and defence structure is facing clear prospects of massive overhaul along multiple lines.

## Literature Review

### *Contestation*

Contestation stands as a central theme of this research. To trace the evolution of contestation in European integration we can't move forward without once again underscoring the lens of Hooghe and Marks' postfunctionalist theory, which posits a shift from "permissive consensus" to "constraining dissensus".<sup>17</sup> The concept of permissive consensus describes an earlier period of European integration where there was broad, but often passive, public support for the project and political elites largely led the integration process with relatively little public scrutiny. During this time, the general public tended to defer to the expertise and decisions of

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<sup>16</sup> European Union. (2022). A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.

[https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic\\_compass\\_en3\\_web.pdf](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

political leaders on European matters, offering a general level of approval without deep engagement or detailed knowledge.

However, Hooghe and Marks argue that such a state of European integration is already in the past and a more 'profound' and harsh process of constraining dissensus is the new norm. Which is characterized by increased public and political elite contestation of European integration. This shift occurred as the scope of EU policies expanded, making the EU more visible and relevant to citizens, thus leading to greater public awareness and debate. Consequently, public opinion and the positions of national political parties have become more influential in shaping the trajectory of European integration, sometimes acting as constraints on further integration efforts. Identity has emerged as a critical factor in this increased contestation, as debates about national identity and sovereignty have become intertwined with discussions about the EU's role and future. This evolution from a relatively surface level public 'permission' to a more engaged and often critical community, marks a fundamental change in the dynamics of European integration, with significant implications for the level and nature of political contestation surrounding the EU. The era of elite-driven integration with limited public engagement has largely been replaced by a more complex and contentious political landscape where public opinion and national political debates play a much more prominent role in shaping the future of the European Union.

Exploring the concept of contestation, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow's "Contentious Politics" offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding various forms of political contention, ranging from everyday disagreements to social movements and revolutions.<sup>18</sup> The authors define contention as the act of making claims that affect the interests of others, emphasizing that this can occur at different levels of social interaction. Contention becomes political when it directly involves governmental actors or their interests. Governments, in turn, play a role in influencing the ways in which contentions are expressed through laws and norms.

The success and development of contentious politics is significantly influenced by the political opportunity structure, which refers to the indicators within a political system that either encourage or discourage collective action. This structure is shaped by factors such as the number of independent power centers, the regime's openness to new actors, the stability of political alignments, the presence of influential allies and the regime's capacity for repression or facilitation.

Finally, the authors touch upon the concept of framing, noting that actors in contentious politics strategically frame their claims to justify their actions, mobilize support and influence

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<sup>18</sup> Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. G. (2015). *Contentious politics*. Oxford University Press.

public discourse. As such, their work provides additional justification for this research to resort to and incorporate previously underexplored framing analysis in the study of the contestation.

Focusing specifically on the domestic level, Hobolt and Rodon provide valuable insights into the nature and drivers of domestic contestation of the EU.<sup>19</sup> Their research highlights the increasing salience and politicization of the EU issues within national political arenas across Europe, Strengthening the validity of my research into domestic contestation of the CFSP/CSDP.

Before expanding on the contestation studies it is critical to lay out the European context on which the research takes place for that Marks and Steenbergen will help us with a foundational perspective.<sup>20</sup>

They outline four distinct models to explain the relationship between European integration and the traditional Left/Right political spectrum. The first is the International Relations Model, which proposes that European integration is completely separate from the Left/Right divide in domestic politics. This model, drawing from realism, intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, suggests that decisions on integration are driven by geopolitical pressures or economic interests, not by internal ideological differences. In essence, it envisions contestation over the EU as a single dimension of support or opposition to integration, detached from domestic ideological debates.

Then there's the Hix-Lord Model, which posits that contemporary EU politics operates on two orthogonal dimensions: a traditional Left/Right axis and a national sovereignty dimension ranging from independence to integration. This model provides a solid framework through its emphasis on the difficulty of assimilating national sovereignty issues into the existing Left/Right framework. Hix and Lord model assert that major political parties prefer to compete on the Left/Right dimension, often maintaining a generally pro-integration stance while leaving opposition to smaller, more extreme parties. This model highlights how different types of cleavages prevent these two dimensions from converging into one.

The Regulation Model, put forth by Tsebelis and Garrett, offers a contrasting view, speculating that European integration might actually be absorbed into the Left/Right dimension. In this scenario, EU politics becomes intertwined with domestic competition, with the Left advocating for common economic regulation across Europe and the Right favoring less EU regulation.

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<sup>19</sup> Hobolt, S. B., & Rodon, T. (2020). Domestic contestation of the European Union. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 27(2), 161-167.

<sup>20</sup> Marks, G., & Steenbergen, M. (2002). Understanding political contestation in the European Union. *Comparative political studies*, 35(8), 879-892.

Hooghe-Marks Model presents a nuanced perspective where the Left/Right and European integration dimensions are indirectly interrelated. As per this model certain aspects of European integration are integrated into the Left/Right dimension, making pro-EU and anti-EU stances, less distinguishable in those areas. However, the model takes into account that Left/Right dimension doesn't encompass all facets of European integration and pro- and anti-integration arguments still emerge.

Marks and Steenbergen provide central frame for this research paper through which the analysis is conducted. Polish media to be analyzed and the frames they produce sit comfortably along the lines demarcated by the authors. Notably the Hix-Lord model with its two-orthogonal dimension constructs an effective lens through which the positions of the Polish political parties and media become more comprehensible.

Furthermore, to understand the underlying factors of political contestation we need to look at the broader context of political cleavages in European societies. Knutsen's analysis of cleavage dimensions in ten West European countries, provides for a very useful framework for this purpose.<sup>21</sup> Understanding these cleavages illuminates the environment in which my research takes place, if disregarded, we would be helplessly waving our hands in the dark. Although Knutsen's research was conducted prior to the deepening of European integration in the following decades, the cleavage dimensions identified are still relevant for understanding political contestation in the EU. Knutsen's work highlights the importance of the materialist/post-materialist cleavage. In the EU, we might see some tensions over policy priorities like balancing economic growth with protecting the environment or how to approach human rights in foreign policy.

For example, those who care more about environmental issues might push for stricter regulations and stronger human rights focus outside the EU, which can clash with people who are more concerned about economic competitiveness or national security. Knutsen also talks about older divisions, like religion and the center-periphery split. While religion might not sway party choices as much in many places anymore, it still affects views on EU policies tied to social values and culture.

The center-periphery split shows how historical and geographical differences can come into play and indeed it has significant ramifications for my research analyzing EU-Polish dynamics. As even the regions feeling neglected economically, culturally or otherwise in their own countries might not be keen on more EU integration, worried about losing their regional identities. This theme, although by in large at the national level reverberates all throughout

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<sup>21</sup> Knutsen, O. (1989). Cleavage dimensions in ten West European countries: A comparative empirical analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 21(4), 495-533.

the analysis of Polish media frames and I dare assert, generalizable for many of the Eastern European states as well.

Now, while Marks and Steenbergen and others provide a broad framework for understanding political contestation in the EU, specific policy areas also experience unique dynamics of disagreement. The realm of EU defence policy, for example, has been the subject of analysis by Schilde anderson and Garner.<sup>22</sup> Their research highlights the consistently high level of public support for EU defence policy over the past three decades, averaging around 75%. This sustained popularity suggests a broad public acceptance of the idea of pooling national sovereignty in the area of defence, a level of support unmatched by any other EU policy domain. However, a common argument in EU studies has been that such public support for European integration, particularly in foreign policy and defence, is often merely a "permissive consensus", passive, shallow and based on limited public understanding of complex issues.

Schilde anderson and Garner directly challenge this "permissive consensus" logic in the context of EU defence policy. They argue that European publics do hold coherent and stable preferences regarding the use of force at the EU level. Their findings indicate that citizens are not simply offering superficial approval but have a more informed and nuanced understanding of EU defence matters.

Schilde anderson and Garner go on to conclude that the slow pace of integration in EU defence policy is mainly due to the reluctance of political elites rather than lack of support or understanding from European citizens. Therefore, authors conclude that there might be a disconnect between the actions of political leaders and policymakers who are hesitant to cede greater national sovereignty in this delicate area and the desires of the European citizens, who generally favor further defence cooperation at the EU level. This disconnect could be one of the important center-points of contestation in the EU. The findings of my paper speak to the authors conclusions, as we see many parts of the European society disappointed at the naivety of the EU's geopolitical outlook and if I dare say, impotency. Coincidentally, the media narratives I identify explain the bases of the political leaders aversion to the security and defence integration. As such, Schilde anderson and Garner offer a valuable starting point from which my research initiates.

But prior to that I would like to underscore another foundational piece on which my research builds up on that is Lovato et al's contribution. They emphasize that internal dynamics within the EU also contribute significantly to disagreements and challenges. Lovato et al. specifically

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<sup>22</sup> Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson & Andrew D. Garner (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus and EU defence policy, *European Security*, 28:2, 153-172, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275

examine the internal contestation of the EU's CFSP, observing a notable increase in such contestation in recent years.<sup>23</sup> This rise in internal disagreement signifies a shift from a potentially more unified approach to foreign policy in the past. Domestic actors within member states, ranging from political parties to civil society organizations, have been increasingly challenging, undermining and even reversing established EU norms, policies and procedures in the realm of foreign and security policy.

Lovato et al.<sup>24</sup> identify various forms in which this internal contestation manifests. It occurs directly through the implementation of government policies that contradict or undermine CFSP objectives. Political parties, especially those against the EU or focused on nationalism, along with civil society groups, can shape national conversations. This influence can change people's opinions on EU foreign policy actions. This means disagreements don't just come from government arguments but also from different social groups - an addition to the validity of my research focus. The authors note that internal disagreements can make the EU more divided and less active on the world stage. When member states don't agree on big foreign policy issues the EU finds it hard to make strong decisions. This can weaken its role in international affairs. And a divided EU is more vulnerable to third-party meddling.

Lovato et al. assert that political parties, especially those against the EU or nationalistic and civil society groups can shape national debates. That this can change people's opinions on EU foreign policy actions. So, disagreements don't just come from government arguments but also from different social groups as well. Again, this finding further justifies the exploration of the European media in the specific act of contesting EU policies (and especially Security policies). The authors note that internal disagreements can make the EU more divided and less active on the world stage. When member states don't agree on big foreign policy issues the EU finds it hard to make strong decisions. This can weaken its role in international affairs. And a divided EU is more vulnerable to other countries exploiting these divisions for their benefit.

Before embarking on the contestation studies journey, we have to familiarize with the frameworks proposed by De Wilde and Lord and De Wilde offer valuable tools for understanding the process of politicization.<sup>25</sup> De Wilde defines politicization as "an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation within the EU".

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<sup>23</sup> Lovato, M., Walter-Drop, G., Noutcheva, G., & Dijkstra, H. (2021). The Internal Contestation of EU Foreign and Security Policy. JOINT Research Papers, Available at: [https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/joint\\_rp\\_1.pdf](https://www.jointproject.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/joint_rp_1.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

<sup>25</sup> De Wilde, P. (2011). No polity for old politics? A framework for analyzing the politicization of European integration. *Journal of European integration*, 33(5), 559-575.

De Wilde and Lord go on to expand on this definition by proposing a framework for assessing the "actually-existing trajectories of EU politicisation".<sup>26</sup> Their framework suggests analyzing politicization along three dimensions: scope, level and mode. The scope of politicization refers to the range of EU issues that become subject to political contestation, indicating whether disagreement is limited to specific policy areas or widespread across the EU's activities. The level of politicization concerns the actors and arenas involved in the contestation, distinguishing between elite-level debates within political institutions and broader public engagement involving media and civil society. The mode of politicization focuses on the nature and quality of the political contestation, examining the types of arguments used, the salience of conflict and polarization and whether the contestation challenges just policies or even the polity, the EU as a whole. Research showcases how the reasons and ways of contestation is truly diverse and context-dependent. Their findings strengthen the validity of the structure of my research.

Maurer and Wright build on the aforementioned literature to examine differing nature of contestation especially in the field of CFSP. They introduce the concept of "systemic contestation".<sup>27</sup> While my research recognizes this concept, in the case of the media's contestation of the CFSP/CSDP I focus mostly on explicitly stated contestation, all the while keeping Maurer's and Wright's framework in the mind, as their contribution is significant. They argue that contestation in this policy (CFSP) area extends beyond mere disagreements during decision-making processes. Given the transgovernmental nature of the CFSP, where member states retain significant control and responsibility, systemic contestation manifests in two key forms: passive contestation and tacit contestation. Passive contestation occurs when member states disengage from and fail to take ownership of CFSP initiatives and their implementation. This lack of active involvement and commitment can be as detrimental to the effectiveness of EU foreign policy as direct opposition. It can manifest as a lack of leadership in promoting EU foreign policy goals, a failure to adequately implement agreed-upon decisions at the national level, or just not caring much about the EU's stance in and on the Foreign Policy.

Tacit contestation, on the other hand, happens when member states fail to act when there is a need to safeguard the system of foreign policy cooperation itself. This relates to the collective responsibility of member states to uphold the norms and principles that underpin cooperation within CFSP, such as the coordination reflex and the pursuit of consensus. Maurer and Wright's analysis of systemic contestation provides a valuable lens for understanding the

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<sup>26</sup> De Wilde, P., & Lord, C. (2016). Assessing actually-existing trajectories of EU politicisation. *West European Politics*, 39(1), 145-163.

<sup>27</sup> Maurer, H., & Wright, N. (2021). How much unity do you need? Systemic contestation in EU foreign and security cooperation. *European security*, 30(3), 385-401.

unique challenges to achieving coherence and unity in CFSP, highlighting that contestation can occur not only through active opposition but also through disengagement and a lack of commitment to the collective endeavor. Analysis of their findings interlink directly to the literature I have already presented which lay out intricacies of political contestation, domestic contestation and already a very contested nature of CFSP (CSDP).

Biedenkopf, Costa and Góra's work stands as one of the bases for this research. They introduce the concepts of contestation and politicisation within the context of the EU's CFSP.<sup>28</sup> They define contestation as a fundamental element of democratic processes, where the act of opposing norms is central. Within the EU, contestation can target the EU's specific actions and policies (policy contestation) or challenge the very existence and legitimacy of the EU itself (polity contestation). Politicisation, in their view, refers to a process of increased public contestation in areas where such debate was previously limited. Importantly the authors argue that existing literature often sets too high of a threshold for public salience when it comes to defining politicisation, especially in the CFSP realm.

To provide a more nuanced understanding, Biedenkopf et al. propose a typology of five "shades" of contestation, linked to varying degrees of politicisation. These include no change in political conflict, expansion of the conflict (increase in actors), polarisation (intensified conflict), elite politicisation (polarisation and actor range expansion among elites) and mass politicisation (polarisation, actor range expansion and broad public salience). This framework allows for the analysis of political conflict in CFSP and provides for a profound bases upon which my research rests. The authors suggest that contestation of the EU foreign and security policy is increasingly aligned with the broader restructuring of political conflict in Europe, potentially reflecting the cosmopolitan-communitarian cleavage.

And finally, Krippendorff Establishes the guiding principles for conducting proper content analysis.<sup>29</sup> The author consistently defines content analysis as a research technique for "making replicable and valid inferences from texts. His methodological principles this research closely incorporates.

### *Media Framing*

This research would be completely unfounded if it did not establish Entman's conceptualization of Framing analysis as the cornerstone. Robert M. Entman offers a

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<sup>28</sup> Biedenkopf, K., Costa, O., & Góra, M. (2021). Introduction: shades of contestation and politicisation of CFSP. *European security*, 30(3), 325-343.

<sup>29</sup> Krippendorff, K. (1989). Content analysis. *International encyclopedia of communication*, 1(1), 403-407. P.98-110

foundational perspective on framing that emphasizes selection and salience.<sup>30</sup> He argues that to frame is to select certain aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text. This process aims to promote a particular definition of the problem, interpretation of its causes, moral evaluation and/or recommendation for its treatment. Entman identifies four key functions that frames typically perform: defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies.

This paper follows Entman's conceptualization to the teeth and maintains the analytical rigor established by the giants of the communication studies. Especially, since the media framing over the years has proven to be quite fickle and has seen many iterations in terms of the ways it is operationalized. Reducing the margin of error, my research remains relatively modest in regards to contributing to communications studies, rather media framing theory is incorporated as a means to an end. Through modest deductive content analysis, my interpretivist research remains firmly rooted in well established theoretical and methodological frameworks of Media Framing.

Entman goes on to highlight that frames are defined not only by what they include but also by what they omit, as the exclusion of certain interpretations can be as significant as the inclusions in guiding the audience's understanding. He suggests that framing occurs at four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the receiver and the culture. By clarifying the concept of framing, Entman aims to provide a more unified theoretical foundation for its use across various disciplines.

Now, expanding on the concept of framing, this research references Pan and Kosicki, who present a constructivist approach to framing analysis in news discourse, viewing it as a sociocognitive process involving sources, journalists and audience members within a shared cultural context.<sup>31</sup> Their approach focuses on dissecting news texts into empirically operationalizable dimensions to identify evidence of framing by the news media. They identify key structural elements within news texts that contribute to framing, including the syntactical structure such as headline placement, source attribution etc. script structure (narrative organization), thematic structure (central organizing ideas) and rhetorical structure (stylistic choices). All of which are I take into consideration in this paper, to produce well-founded results.

Furthermore, Pan and Kosicki emphasize the crucial role of lexical choices, arguing that specific words or labels act as "designators" that signify particular frames and influence how

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<sup>30</sup> Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of communication*, 43(4), P. 51-58.

<sup>31</sup> Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. *Political communication*, 10(1), 55-75.

the audience interprets the information. Their conceptualization views news texts as a system of organized signifying elements that both advocate certain ideas and encourage specific ways of audience processing. They argue that framing analysis should consider these structural dimensions and lexical choices to understand how news media shape the interpretation of issues.

Anshori et al. discuss comparative framing as a media strategy in public communication policy,<sup>32</sup> defining framing as a process of constructing and negotiating public policy issues influenced by discourse contestation. They argue that a particular viewpoint is presented, negotiated and either accepted or rejected as the dominant discourse shaping policy. Their research indicates that while media outlets may use similar framing strategies for event-driven news, contrasting frames often emerge for more specific or micro-issues. Obviously, this has implications for this research delving into uncharted territories of contesting the EU's CFSP/CSDP in European media.

And here is the guiding principle the authors outline, that these differences, according to Anshori et al. can be attributed to various factors, including the characteristics of the media outlet, historical-ideological influences and the organizational structures within which the media operates. The authors highlight that media framing is influenced by media culture and ideology, shaped by long-standing journalistic traditions. Important conclusion taken into account by my research into Polish media frames, as it is a well-known fact that Polish political spectrum is extremely polarized in which number of deep-rooted political cleavages run rampant and this polarized political landscape has absorbed the media outlets to astonishing degree, with political parties often wielding undue influence on the media. Authors, also discuss the concepts of thematic and episodic structures in media frames, noting that episodic frames often focus on events and objective facts, while thematic frames emphasize analysis and context.

But to what extent could the theory really be relevant to the motivations of my research? In the following paragraphs I present solid case for why the media framing conceptual framework prevails supreme in regards to solving the research puzzles laid out initially.

De Vreese and Boomgaarden's speaks volumes for the validity of my approach. They examined the relationship between the valence (positive or negative) of news frames and public support for the EU.<sup>33</sup> Their study involved a content analysis of 717 newspaper and television news stories from Great Britain, Germany and The Netherlands surrounding a key EU summit. The content analysis revealed that the summit was primarily framed in terms of political-

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Vreese, C. D., & Boomgaarden, H. (2003). Valenced news frames and public support for the EU.

institutional consequences and that the overall valence of the news was disadvantageous towards the EU and EU enlargement.

To further investigate the effects of news valence, they conducted an experiment with 207 participants who were randomly assigned to news framing the consequences of the summit as either 'advantageous' or 'disadvantageous'. And behold, the experimental findings indicated that exposure to disadvantageously framed news led to lower levels of general EU support and more negative perceptions of EU enlargement compared to participants exposed to advantageously framed news.

Vliegenthart et al. conducted a longitudinal analysis spanning from 1990 to 2006, exploring the relationship between news coverage and support for European integration across seven EU member states: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.<sup>34</sup> Their study utilized aggregated data of content analytical indicators from national newspapers and aggregate public support measures from Eurobarometer surveys in a 'time - series design'. They focused on three key news indicators: framing the EU in terms of benefits, framing the EU in terms of disadvantages and framing the EU in terms of conflict.

Their key findings, that provide additional justification for this paper, showcase that news coverage framing the EU in terms of benefits, led to increased public support, while conflict framing was associated with decreased support. Interestingly, disadvantage framing did not have a significant impact on public opinion in their analysis. The study concluded that the way news media frame the EU significantly influences public support for European integration.

De Vreese, Boomgaarden and Semetko investigated the direct and indirect effects of news media framing on public support for Turkish membership in the EU.<sup>35</sup> The study employed a multi-method approach, including a content analysis of Dutch national news media and two experimental studies. The content analysis identified five issue-specific frames: geopolitical security advantages, economic advantages, economic threats, cultural threats and national security threats.

The findings revealed a direct effect of valence, with negative frames decreasing support more strongly than positive frames increased it. They also found an indirect effect, where frames influenced the importance of certain considerations (economic, cultural, security), which subsequently affected attitudes towards Turkish membership. Furthermore, authors

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<sup>34</sup> Vliegenthart, Rens and Schuck andreas R. T. and Boomgaarden, Hajo G. and de Vreese, Claes H., News Coverage and Support for European Integration, 1990-2006 (Winter 2008). *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol. 20, Issue 4, pp. 415-439, 2008, Available at <http://dx.doi.org/edn044>

<sup>35</sup> De Vreese, C. H., Boomgaarden, H. G., & Semetko, H. A. (2011). (In) direct framing effects: The effects of news media framing on public support for Turkish membership in the European Union. *Communication Research*, 38(2), 179-205.

uncovered important variable which played a highly moderating role that is political sophistication. With higher levels of sophistication strengthening the effects of positive framing. The research demonstrates that public approval of Turkish EU membership is contingent on the elites' and the media's coverage of the issue in interaction with individual characteristics. Further evidencing the effects of media framing on the support for the EU.

Building on the shoulders of giants, in terms of producing framing typology, my research primarily references Semetko and Valkenburg, who conducted a quantitative content analysis of press and television news in the Netherlands to examine how European politics were framed.<sup>36</sup> Their study analyzed 2,601 newspaper stories and 1,522 television news stories surrounding the Amsterdam meetings of European heads of state in 1997. They focused on five predefined news frames: attribution of responsibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences and morality.

Their results showed that, overall, the attribution of responsibility frame was most commonly used, followed by conflict, economic consequences, human interest and morality frames. The use of news frames depended on both the type of outlet (sensationalist vs. serious) and the type of topic (Europe/integration vs. crime). Sober and serious newspapers and television news programs more often used the responsibility and conflict frames, whereas sensationalist outlets more often used the human interest frame.

Expanding the framing typology vis-à-vis the European Union, Van Cauwenberge, Gelders and Joris provide interesting case. They looked into how media coverage of the EU has changed by examining how newspapers shifted their focus when reporting on the Treaty of Lisbon.<sup>37</sup> They specifically checked out articles from four major newspapers: *Le Monde* in France, *De Volkskrant* in the Netherlands, *De Standaard* in Dutch-speaking Belgium and *Le Soir* in French-speaking Belgium. Their research covered 341 articles published in the seven months before the treaty was signed.

They focused on five main frames: economic effects, conflict, human interest, power and nationalization. The results showed a noticeable change in media coverage, with the themes of economic effects and power being the most commonly discussed. On the other hand, the themes of conflict and nationalization were mentioned much less. The authors noted that the

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<sup>36</sup> Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. *Journal of communication*, 50(2), 93-109. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2000.tb02843.x>

<sup>37</sup> Van Cauwenberge, A., Gelders, D., & Joris, W. (2009). Covering the European Union: from an intergovernmental towards a supranational perspective? *Javnost-The Public*, 16(4), 41-54. Available at: [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13183222.2009.11009013?casa\\_token=Phk\\_T7KI7c8AAAAA:StqYduZe1aRv3hcumGAZE8lZ17ZNDounDhlxw\\_ZuUtPO3KCrNlZKHkrGnfZYsqc7enIzYgHLfH8](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13183222.2009.11009013?casa_token=Phk_T7KI7c8AAAAA:StqYduZe1aRv3hcumGAZE8lZ17ZNDounDhlxw_ZuUtPO3KCrNlZKHkrGnfZYsqc7enIzYgHLfH8)

EU Constitution's emphasis on unity could explain why the coverage shifted from a focus on conflict to a more unified view of the EU.

Therefore, for this paper, Semetko and Valkenburg alongside Cauwenberge, Gelders and Joris together provide comprehensive framing typology that captures dynamics of domestic political contestation of the European Union.

With this comprehensive review of the literature concerning the EU integration dynamics, contestation paradigm, alongside politicization and finally, outlining the rich literature on media framing analysis and the validity for the usage of the concept in this research, we can embark on the academic journey.

## Theoretical Framework

There is a monumental shift in the European Union. The initial phase of European integration, often referred to as the era of permissive consensus, was characterized by a general lack of public awareness and scrutiny of EU affairs, coupled with a broad consensus among political elites in favor of integration.<sup>38</sup> This allowed for significant advancements in the transfer of sovereignty and the expansion of the EU's competencies with relatively little public deliberation or opposition.

However, several factors contributed to the erosion of this permissive consensus and the emergence of constraining dissensus. The expansion of the EU's powers into more politically sensitive areas, the increasing salience of EU policies in the daily lives of citizens and the rise of Eurosceptic political movements all played a role in fostering greater public awareness and criticism of the EU.

As the EU became more powerful and its decisions had more direct and visible consequences, citizens and political actors became more likely to scrutinize its actions and voice their disagreements. This shift has inevitably led to a greater likelihood and intensity of contestation surrounding EU policies. No longer is the EU a distant entity operating with tacit approval. Instead, its policies are increasingly subject to public debate, political maneuvering and even outright opposition. The contestation around CFSP/CSDP, particularly in response to the war in Ukraine, can be seen as a direct manifestation of this broader trend. The high stakes involved in foreign and security policy, coupled with differing national interests and perspectives on

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

how to respond to the crisis, have created a fertile ground for public and political debate, highlighting the era of constraining dissensus in EU politics. And contested EU policies.

Contestation is the act of arguing or disagreeing about something.”<sup>39</sup> Some of the EU policies are inherently divisive leading to formation or strengthening of political cleavages.<sup>40</sup> Political cleavages promote contestation, the latter leading to solidifying differences and politicization, which is measured in terms of issue salience, polarization and actor range. The acts of contestation, manifest in debates around EU, increase chances of politicization and influences public’s decision to attribute responsibility for specific policy failures (successes). Notably, “European citizens are capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of governments do and their responsibility judgements are shaped by the institutional context”.<sup>41</sup>

Contestation is usually operationalized through discourse analysis. To truly understand how these contestations play out in the public sphere and how different perspectives gain traction it becomes essential to examine the role of the media. As mentioned previously, the role of the media in domestic contestation of CFSP/CSDP in the context of a crisis is understudied.<sup>42</sup> After all, the media acts as a primary conduit through which information about EU policies and the accompanying debates reaches citizens. It doesn't merely transmit information, it actively shapes how these issues are presented and interpreted. This is where the concept of media framing becomes particularly relevant for analyzing the domestic contestation of EU policies, especially during times of crisis. Media Framing is a powerful form of discourse analysis.

“Framing analysis as an approach to analyzing news discourse, mainly deals with how public discourse about public policy issues is constructed and negotiated”.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, “framing is a process of construction and negotiation of public policy issues influenced by discourse contestation, where one view on a particular issue will be offered, negotiated and then accepted or rejected as a dominant discourse that becomes the background of a policy”.<sup>44</sup> Unlike agenda-setting theory, framing expands beyond what people talk and think about and examines how they think and talk.

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<sup>39</sup> Cambridge Dictionary (2020), Contestation. Available at:

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/contestation>

<sup>40</sup> Knutsen, O. (1989). Cleavage dimensions in ten West European countries: A comparative empirical analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 21(4), 495-533.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

According to Entman “frames are manifested by the presence or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts and judgements”.<sup>45</sup>

Scholars such as de Vreese and Boomgarden<sup>46</sup>, de Vreese, Boomgarden et al<sup>47</sup>, de Vreese, Boomgarden and Semetko<sup>48</sup> have investigated media framing and EU politics. Generic frame typology used in this research will be that of responsibility, conflict, economic consequences, human interest and morality.<sup>49</sup> As well as, power and nationalization frames.<sup>50</sup>

Traditional contestation research through discourse analysis overemphasizes elites and is plagued by researcher subjectivity in identifying instances of contestation. It involves reconstruction of discourse through analytical categories. For example, by focusing on “representations, argumentation schemes and problematizations.”<sup>51</sup> Which speaks to the classic definition of frames by Entman that “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”<sup>52</sup>

This research proposes an interesting approach by identifying contestation in media frames, which in themselves are embedded in socio-political culture. While researchers have not examined contestation through framing analysis, in some instances we can see connection made inadvertently. For example, research into EU contestation on narratives of Europe in Germany identifies images of “heroes” and “villains” (Generic frames) of an alternative Europe.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Roch, J. (2019). Unpacking EU contestation: Europeanization and critique in Germany and Spain. *Culture, Practice & Europeanization*, 4(2), P.17.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Conrad, M., Hallgrímsdóttir, H. K., & Brunet-Jailly, E. (2019). The Heroes and Villains of an Alternative Europe-How EU Contestation shapes Narratives of Europe in Germany 1. *Politique européenne*, 66(4), 96-119.

## Methodology

At the heart of framing analysis is the idea that how information is presented affects how people process it. Frames act as mental structures that organize and shape a message's meaning. They work on two levels: as personal frameworks for understanding things and as the ways information is actually communicated to others. Recognizing this dual role helps us see how frames influence individual views and public discussions.

In terms of methods, framing analysis mainly uses two approaches: inductive and deductive. Inductive analysis is when researchers let frames emerge from the data itself, searching for recurring themes and patterns without any initial biases. This method is great for exploring new topics. For example, Jim A. Kuypers uses this inductive approach to find recurring themes in texts over time.<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, deductive analysis starts with specific frames already defined from existing research. Researchers then look through data to find these specific frames. This method works well for testing established theories in new situations. Semetko and Valkenburg discuss both methods, showing how each can be useful based on the research goals.<sup>55</sup>

For this research, I'll use a deductive approach to examine specific, theory-based frames in the chosen context. Using existing literature in political communication and media studies, I'll outline relevant frames beforehand, enabling a focused investigation into how these frames are utilized and how they might shape understanding.

Once again, while agenda-setting is about which topics are important, framing analysis digs deeper into how those topics are presented. Common frames in the news often include themes like conflict, economic impact, human interest, morality and responsibility. This method can be applied in various political contexts like media coverage of the US Supreme Court, the portrayal of first lady candidates in different cultures and how political protests are framed on platforms like Twitter highlighting how communication affects our views on politics.

To clearly identify and analyze the pre-defined frames in the data for this research, I'll use deductive content analysis as the main technique. This structured method applies existing theories to the data collected. Unlike inductive methods that aim to create new theories, deductive content analysis starts with established categories from prior research, seeking to validate these concepts in new context rather than find new themes.

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<sup>54</sup> D'angelo, P. A. U. L., & Kuypers, J. A. (2010). Introduction: Doing news framing analysis. In *Doing news framing analysis* (pp. 17-30). Routledge.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

In the context of the EU, Semetko & Valkenburg show that news typically employ five generic frames - conflict, human interest, economic consequences, responsibility and morality - to structure stories. In this paper I also incorporate power and nationalization frames, which have proven to be highly relevant to the study of the EU (following Van Cauwenberge et al. 2009)

Content analysis is conducted in MaxQDA: examining Polish CFSP/CSDP news coverage to identify and compare the presence of these frames. This qualitative coding will be theory-driven (deductive), which is consistent with framing discourse analysis.

Each frame in the codebook is defined, linked to typical reasoning devices and interpreted in terms of EU security contestation.

- **Conflict Frame:** Emphasizes conflict or discord between actors (individuals, parties, states) as the news hook. A conflict frame often uses adversarial reasoning: highlighting winners vs losers, quoting opposing officials, or dramatizing disagreement. In EU CFSP/CSDP coverage, conflict framing could reveal contestation by stressing clashes (e.g. between Polish and EU leaders, or between pro- and anti-EU parties). Conversely, if conflict is downplayed, contestation may be obscured (portraying unity). Example: A TV news report might emphasize a rift: “Polish government and EU foreign service clash over arms aid to Ukraine,” quoting sharply worded statements from each side. This dramatizes domestic vs EU positions and surfaces the struggle.
- **Human Interest Frame:** Brings an emotional or personal angle to the issue. It often uses anecdotes, case studies, or vivid imagery to personalize the story (e.g. focusing on victims, refugees, soldiers’ families). As a reasoning device it appeals to empathy and storytelling rather than abstract policy analysis. In the context of this research, a human interest frame might obscure technical contestation by shifting focus to individuals (e.g. displaced Ukrainians in Poland) rather than political disagreements. Alternatively, it could reveal contestation if used to highlight real people affected by political decisions (e.g. “Polish farmers protest EU sanctions that hurt their livelihoods”). Example: A newspaper feature might profile a family of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, linking their hardships to debates over EU border policies - implicitly asking whose side is right and what values (solidarity vs self-interest) guide policy.
- **Economic Consequences Frame:** Presents the issue in terms of economic effects. It uses logic of costs/benefits, budget figures, trade impacts, jobs gained/lost. The reasoning device is rational-economic analysis (e.g. forecasts, statistics). This frame can reveal contestation by highlighting economic grievances that fuel political disagreement (e.g.

“EU defence spending will raise Polish taxes” suggesting domestic opposition), or it can obscure ideological stakes by reducing everything to money. Example: A TV news bulletin might warn: “New EU military funding plan could cost Poland billions” and cite experts on GDP or inflation – potentially casting doubt on leaders’ pro-EU stance by stressing burdens.

- **Morality Frame:** Situates the issue within moral or ethical values. It uses value-laden language, religious or ideological references and appeals to right/wrong or national virtues. As a reasoning device, it invokes norms or duties (e.g. “we must protect freedom”, or “it’s immoral to punish our farmers”). In the EU security context, a morality frame could reveal contestation if different actors frame support in ethical terms (e.g. “defending Ukraine is a moral imperative” vs “protecting Polish sovereignty is a moral duty”), or it could overshadow conflict by presenting a unified moral stance. Example: A newspaper editorial might declare, “Europe has a moral obligation to stand against aggression,” implicitly criticizing any politician who treats EU support as optional.
- **Responsibility Frame:** Attributes responsibility or blame to specific actors. It often asks “Who is to blame or praised?” using causation logic. This frame uses attribution devices (naming causal agents) and solution proposals. In CFSP/CSDP news, it might highlight, say, which government or institution “owns” the problem or solution (e.g. blaming the EU for slow arms deliveries). It can reveal contestation by marking targets of blame (national parties blaming EU, or vice versa) or obscure it by focusing blame on foreign actors only. Example: A Polish news story might report: “Analysts blame Brussels for failing to secure Ukraine’s border,” thus directly linking contestation to EU institutions and potentially fueling domestic criticism of EU policy.
- **Power Frame:** Focuses on power relations and hierarchies between actors, uses reasoning about influence and control (e.g. emphasizing who has decision-making authority). For instance, a power frame might discuss EU leaders’ influence over member states or highlight Russia/US pressure. This frame can reveal contestation by showing struggles over who dominates CFSP (e.g. “Smaller states vs. Germany” in security decisions). A reasoning device here is strategic analysis of authority. Example: A paper might note: “With Germany taking charge of the EU response, Poland has little real influence,” underscoring tensions over who leads EU defence.
- **Nationalization Frame:** Presents EU-related issues through a purely national lens. It uses an “us vs. them” perspective and domestic value logic, often ignoring the broader EU context. This frame highlights national sovereignty and identity (e.g. “What’s good

for Poland”) and downplays EU collective interest. In doing so, it can reveal contestation by emphasizing national interests conflict with EU policy, or it can obscure European dimensions by keeping debate at home. Example: A newspaper headline might read: “Warsaw’s priorities should come first: why EU defence plans must align with Poland’s needs,” effectively sidestepping EU deliberations and framing CFSP domestically.

Each frame is coded when these definitions and cues appear in the text. Such examples show how different frames can either highlight or downplay domestic political contestation over EU security policy, depending on the angle taken.

Selected media texts are loaded into MaxQDA. Nodes are created for each frame (and sub-codes for e.g. specific reasoning cues if needed). Passages that reflect each frame as defined (e.g. explicit mentions of “cost”, personal anecdote, conflicting quotes, etc.). And generally, the analytical rigor is maintained through the usage of the following framing devices table as a practical guide. The table describes specific textual elements scrutinized to identify frames.

Table 1.

Category	Examples of Device	Application in CFSP/CSDP Analysis
Rhetorical and other written/grammatical devices	Word choice, Metaphors, Exemplars	Are "sovereignty," "autonomy," "burden-sharing," or "strategic patience" frequently used keywords? Are military metaphors (e.g., "fortress Europe") or economic metaphors (e.g., "investment in security") prevalent? Are historical events (e.g., Cold War, past conflicts) used to contextualize current EU security policy?
	Key words (presence and/or absence)	What specific terms are consistently present or conspicuously absent when discussing CFSP/CSDP? (e.g., "federalization," "neutrality," "aggression," "cooperation").
	Stock phrases (presence and/or absence)	Are phrases like "common European home," "transatlantic bond," or "Brussels diktat" regularly employed?
	Sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgement	Do certain sentences repeatedly link CFSP/CSDP to specific outcomes (e.g., "EU's slow response led to crisis") or values (e.g., "EU values underpin CFSP/CSDP")?
	Concluding statements and paragraphs	Do articles end with calls for action, expressions of concern, or affirmations of unity regarding EU security?

Framing devices (elements of news-writing, layout, visuals)	Headlines, Subheadings, Photo captions, Leads	Are headlines consistently positive/negative, alarmist/reassuring towards EU security initiatives? Do subheadings frame specific aspects of CFSP/CSDP? How do photo captions reinforce or contradict the main narrative?
	Photographs, Layout (prominence of the article)	Are images of military exercises, diplomatic meetings, or humanitarian crises used? Is the article prominently placed (e.g., front page, above the fold)?
	Page placement (front page, etc.)	Does the placement of articles on CFSP/CSDP indicate their perceived importance or urgency?
	All sources of information in article	What types of sources are consistently cited (e.g., government officials, military experts, academics, opposition figures, civil society)?
	Who is quoted, How are they identified, Where is the quote placed in the story	Are specific individuals or groups given prominent voice? Are they identified by their official title, political affiliation, or expertise? Are their quotes used to open, reinforce, or conclude an argument?
	Quoting experts to claim empirical validity or facticity	Are military strategists or international relations scholars quoted to lend credibility to claims about CFSP/CSDP's effectiveness or necessity?
	Quoting official sources to link certain points of view to authority	Are government ministers, EU officials, or diplomatic representatives quoted to establish authoritative perspectives on policy?
	Quoting a social deviant to marginalise certain points of view	Are fringe groups or highly critical voices quoted in a way that dismisses their arguments or portrays them as extreme?

Throughout coding, reflexivity is maintained by keeping analytic memos: I note how my own assumptions or the political context might bias interpretation and I iteratively adjust coding decisions. MaxQDA is justified as a tool because it efficiently organizes large text datasets, allows for systematic retrieval of frame instances and supports transparent documentation of coding decisions (Richards 2015, QSR MaxQDA manuals). In sum, MaxQDA enhances rigor by structuring the qualitative analysis and enabling reliability checks.

### Gathering Data and Framing Analysis

Keywords for searching newspaper databases included: European Union and Security. All the articles with such keywords were selected for analysis. Reviewed journals include most

popular Polish Journals - Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita and Gazeta Polska, alongside just few online publications that came up in the regular search, due to being packed with keywords relevant to the research, their presence in the dataset has been allowed to expand our understanding Polish media disposition towards the EU and CFSP/CSDP. Selected articles were published after the war began until the end of 2022. The content of these articles are generalizable, reflecting the stance of the organization that published them and echoing the part of the society that reads the journal and adheres to the political leaning that the journal represents.

Before presenting research findings and key themes identified in contentious media frames, I wanted to underscore this article first, published in Rzeczpospolita weeks prior to the invasion it presents findings of a survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).<sup>56</sup> As per the findings, majority of Europeans expected Russia-Ukraine war. Expectation among European public was that the West was in for a somber realization about Moscow's intentions and stance. And if the war were to happen, it would be a true turning point. Now this sets a context for the incipient narratives that emerged in the context of the war.

## Codebook

MaxQDA's tools used for content analysis included Keyword search, Keyword-in-context, Word Explorer, Manual coding.

To ensure the reliability and validity of the coding process, the analysis relied on a detailed "Framing Devices Table" as a practical guide. This table describes specific textual elements that were scrutinized to identify the presence of particular frames. As Krippendorff<sup>57</sup> emphasizes, reliable coding instructions must contain everything needed to replicate the analysis elsewhere. This table serves as a transparent explication of the "cognitive procedures that coders must apply" to record texts efficiently and reliably. Codebook is minimal and clear-cut for guaranteed correct application.

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<sup>56</sup> Bielecki, Jędrzej. 2022. "Badanie: Europejczycy spodziewają się wojny Rosji z Ukrainą - rp.pl." Rzeczpospolita, February 9, 2022. <https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art35658311-badanie-europejczycy-spodziewaja-sie-wojny-rosji-z-ukraina>.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

Table 2.

Frame	Subcode	Operational Definition	Inclusion Criteria	Exclusion Criteria	Example Indicators
Responsibility	Attribution to Institutions	Assigns responsibility for the cause or solution of an issue to organizations (EU, NATO, governments, etc.).	Mention of an institution as responsible or needing to act		"The EU must respond...", "NATO failed to..."
	Attribution to Individuals	Assigns responsibility to named leaders or individuals.	Named individual + action/decision linked to outcome		"Scholz is to blame for..."
	Demands for Action	Calls for policy change, reform, or intervention by specific actors.	Actionable verbs (implement, stop, demand, reform)	General criticism without proposed action	"Poland must implement..."
Conflict	EU Internal Divisions	Highlights disagreements or disputes within the EU or between member states.	Explicit mention of at least two EU actors in opposition	Routine policy differences without adversarial framing	"Clash between East and West"
	East-West Tensions	Frames Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Western Europe as antagonistic blocs.	Language of opposition, rivalry, or division	Cultural comparisons without conflict framing	"Old vs new Europe"
	Political Polarization	Highlights divisions between political camps, parties, or media within a country.	Evidence of left-right or government-opposition splits	Consensus narratives	"Deepening party polarization"
Economic Consequences	Energy Dependence	Focuses on dependency on energy sources (gas, oil) and related vulnerabilities.	Mentions of gas/oil supplies, Nord Stream, weaponization of energy	Technical infrastructure details without	"Europe's gas dependency is a risk"

				economic framing	
	Sanctions Impact	Highlights economic costs or benefits of sanctions on countries or regions.	Quantified costs, price changes, or explicit economic impact statements	Sanctions mentioned without economic context	"Sanctions raise energy prices by 30%"
	Financial Costs	Covers broader fiscal implications such as military spending or reconstruction costs.	Specific monetary amounts or %GDP figures	General economic challenges without quantification	"Military budget increased by X"
Human Interest	Suffering & Solidarity	Personalizes conflict through stories of civilian suffering or solidarity efforts.	Named individuals, emotional language, first-person accounts	Statistical casualty data without personal stories	"Refugees fleeing war zones"
	Refugee Crisis	Focus on displacement, refugee flows and humanitarian needs.	Numbers of displaced persons, humanitarian aid descriptions	Legal migration or asylum policy discussions	"200,000 refugees crossed the border"
Morality	Historical Analogies	Uses historical events or figures to frame the conflict or actors.	Explicit WWII, Cold War, or other historical comparisons	Neutral historical references	"Putin's aggression echoes 1939 invasion"
	Moral Judgments	Frames actors or actions as morally right or wrong.	Value-laden adjectives (e.g., criminal, heroic)	Legalistic or procedural language	"An immoral energy deal"
Power	Hegemony Accusations	Highlights dominance or control by specific EU actors or coalitions (e.g., Franco-German).	Claims of dictation, marginalization, or control over decision-making	Routine institutional descriptions	"Germany dominates EU policy"
	Leadership Claims	Focuses on assertions of who leads or should lead within the EU or member states.	Use of terms like vanguard, spearhead, or leadership claims	Rotating presidencies or procedural leadership	"Poland leads the Eastern bloc"

Nationalization	National Sovereignty	Emphasizes protection of national sovereignty against EU influence or integration.	References to autonomy, veto powers, interference	Technical EU reform without sovereignty framing	"Poland must protect its veto rights"
	EU Core-Periphery Divide	Frames disparities between EU countries and periphery or newer member states.	Terms like second-class members, two-speed Europe	Regional development funding without identity framing	"CEE countries are marginalized in the EU"

### MaxQDA Coding and Content Analysis

To view the raw MAXQDA coded recording unit data alongside visualized data in Microsoft Data Visualization tool, refer to the [Appendix](#) chapter.

Coding can't be viewed as just a mechanical exercise. Each decision, each tag reflects a careful reading of context, tone and nuance. This research doesn't just count words. I traced arguments and noted who got to speak and who was left in the shadows. For example, Kulczycka's decision to convey Jaki's ominous warning that Poland would cease to exist in opposition to displaying voices positively assessing the future prospects of European defence integration.

Following the guidance of Knipperdoff on content analysis,<sup>58</sup> I carefully read through each unit of analysis - corpus texts of the articles', carefully examining for Recording/Coding units. They were founded on keywords, key phrases.

This paper sticks close to the qualitative content analysis tradition. Unit of analysis is the broad entity for which conclusions are drawn. The entire newspaper article in this case.

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid

Coding (Recording) Units are the smallest manageable segments of text to which codes (frames) are applied to answer the research questions.

I divided articles into coding units often consisting of sentences or short paragraphs which contained individual or related statements relevant to the frames. A constant comparative approach ensured that the identified frames and subcodes remained rooted in the empirical data and theoretical foundations.

At each coding decision point, context and rhetorical intention determined code assignment, acknowledging that many units contained overlapping or intersecting frames.

The process avoided mere word counts or frequency analysis, instead, it constructed a rich, context-driven narrative of media contestation within the broader EU security discourse. This unitizing allowed for precise attribution of media framing devices and content, avoiding loss of nuance.

I assigned an initial code based on the established frame categories (Conflict, Responsibility, Nationalization, Power, Morality, Human Interest, or Economic Consequences), taking into account content/context unit. For every recording unit, I asked: To what frame does this belong to? What rhetorical function is it serving? Does it objectively answer the question posed by the frame? Sometimes a single sentence was enough. For example, “The EU’s military strategy will remain mainly on paper...” immediately signals Responsibility: Institutional Blame.

To underscore once again, this paper applies a consistent, theory-driven codebook to all units of analysis and subsequent recording units, drawing on established literature. My Coding (Recording) Units were the smallest manageable segments of text to which I applied these codes (frames), testing for relevance to code description and to answer my research questions. I found it most effective to divide articles into coding units that often consisted of sentences or short paragraphs.

Once the full set of articles was initially coded, I moved to axial coding. Within each main frame, I developed subcodes to pin down recurring nuances that emerged from the data itself. These division - subcodes offer a more comprehensive way of categorizing the corpus of text as per the media frames and contestation. For example, under the Conflict frame, I consistently encountered three major types of contestation: as I defined - EU Internal Divisions, East-West Tensions and Political Polarization.

Following the coding, each article's framing was interpreted in light of Entman's framing paradigm - defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral judgments and suggesting remedies. For each analyzed article, I systematically tested these four aspects based on the

identified frames and subcodes, thereby constructing a comprehensive narrative of media contestation. This multi-layered analytical step constructed a comprehensive narrative of media contestation, moving beyond simple frequency counts to a deeper understanding of the discursive strategies employed.

Gazeta Wyborcza is widely-recognized center-left, liberal magazine. The article selected in the magazine was published on 29.04.2022, two months after the start of the war. Authored by Eugeniusz Smolar, it is a bold opinion-piece that presents a multi-layered critique of the EU's CFSP and CSDP.<sup>59</sup> It explicitly contests the effectiveness, coherence and credibility of EU security policy. The Responsibility, Power and Nationalization frames dominate, portraying the Union as fragmented, impotent and paralyzed by national vetoes.

This constitutes a clear act of media contestation within EU public discourse. As Entman posits, media frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments and suggest remedies. This article does all four and in doing so, delegitimizes current EU security governance by exposing the disconnect between rhetoric and reality.

### **Responsibility frame:**

excerpt: "Strategia militarna UE pozostanie głównie na papierze, bo nie towarzyszy jej stworzenie struktur decyzyjnych oraz dowódczych, posiadających kompetencje do podejmowania decyzji operacyjnych."

Translation: "The EU's military strategy will remain mainly on paper because it is not accompanied by the creation of decision-making and command structures with the competence to make operational decisions."

The text assigns blame to institutional design of the EU for the absence of effective governance structures. It portrays the EU's incapacity as a self-inflicted design flaw. Effectively claiming that the EU's military strategy is inadequate by design.

"Głównie jednak z tego, że kompromis jest podstawą działania Unii, co czyni politykę bezpieczeństwa w skutkach bezzębną."

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<sup>59</sup> Smolar Eugene. (2022). Podstawą działania Unii jest kompromis, a to czyni jej politykę bezpieczeństwa bezzębną w skutkach. Available at: <https://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/7,124059,28393418,podstawa-dzialania-unii-jest-kompromis-a-to-czyni-jej-polityke.html#S.index-K.C-B.67-L.30.duzy>

"Mainly because compromise is the basis of the Union's operation, which makes its security policy toothless."

Here the EU's core decision-making principle (compromise) is questioned, as the cause of strategic paralysis, reinforcing responsibility for weakness on internal mechanisms.

**Problem Definition:** Institutional stagnation in EU defense policy.

**Causal Interpretation:** Lack of effective command structures and intergovernmental political design.

**Moral Evaluation:** Implied institutional irresponsibility.

**Treatment Recommendation:** Federalization or strategic streamlining of decision-making.

### **Power Frame**

Exerpt: "Wyjawię poczucie niewygody [...] potęgi gospodarczej, a przy tym karła geopolitycznego."

Translation: "I will reveal a sense of discomfort [...] an economic powerhouse, but a geopolitical dwarf."

This is the article's strongest framing scheme: the EU is constructed as a power-frustrated actor with declarative ambitions but no coercive capacity.

Exerpt: "Strategia pozostanie jednak głównie na papierze [...] Wymagałoby to bowiem daleko posuniętej federalizacji UE."

Translation: "The strategy will remain mainly on paper [...] This would require far-reaching federalization of the EU."

This sentence implies how the lack of political will for deeper integration renders the EU geopolitically inept.

**Problem Definition:** Asymmetry between economic strength and strategic weakness.

**Moral Evaluation:** Frustration at EU ineffectiveness.

**Treatment recommendation:** more effective decision-making.

### **Morality Frame**

"Niemcy forsowały ten projekt rosyjski, pomijając obawy [...] łamiąc przy tym traktatowe zasady lojalności i solidarności."

"Germany pushed this Russian project, ignoring the concerns [...] violating the treaty principles of loyalty and solidarity."

Moral judgment is passed here, especially on Germany's past complicity with Russia (Nord Stream 2), casting it as betrayal of EU norms.

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Robert Cheda in Gazeta Finansowa dives into the newly sparked debate (after the eruption of Ukraine war) around the Union's unanimity rule.<sup>60</sup>

### **Power Frame**

„Macron i Scholz są zdani na siebie. Łączy ich pragmatyzm oraz obrona uprzywilejowanej roli Niemiec i Francji w Europie.”

"Macron and Scholz are on their own. What unites them is pragmatism and the defense of the privileged role of Germany and France in Europe."

Problem Definition: EU power dynamics increasingly dictated by a Franco-German tandem.

Causal Interpretation: Post-Brexit institutional imbalance has created a de facto dual leadership.

Moral Evaluation: Implied hegemony of two states undermines democratic pluralism within the EU.

Treatment Recommendation: Rebalance decision-making, resist structural reforms that entrench inequality.

### **Nationalization Frame**

„Tymczasem Unia dwóch prędkości jest zaprzeczeniem takich wartości, dzieląc Zjednoczoną Europę na lepszych i gorszych.”

"Meanwhile, the two-speed Union is a denial of such values, dividing United Europe into better and worse."

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<sup>60</sup> Robert Ched. (2022). Unia dwóch prędkości. Zagłada powraca. Dlaczego teraz? Gazeta Finansowa. Available at: <https://gf24.pl/30720/unia-dwoch-predkosci-zaglada-powraca-dlaczego-teraz/>

Problem Definition: EU integration erodes national agency and divides member states into “core” and “periphery”.

Causal Interpretation: Federalization and enhanced cooperation elevate certain states at the expense of others.

Moral Evaluation: Perceived betrayal of EU founding values of solidarity and equality.

Treatment Recommendation: Defend national sovereignty, oppose supranational encroachment.

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The next selected article from wyborcza is authored by Wojciech Maziarski, issued on 4th of April, 2022.<sup>61</sup> Western Support for Ukraine: Too Little, Too Late, Too Tired.

Responsibility Frame

"Zachód reaguje z opóźnieniem [...] udziela Ukraincom pomocy, która mogła okazać się decydująca wczoraj, lecz dzisiaj jest już niewystarczająca."

"The West reacts with delay [...] providing Ukraine with help that could have been decisive yesterday, but today is already insufficient."

"Główne przeszkody tkwią w głowach polityków"

"The main obstacles lie in the minds of politicians"

Problem Definition: Failure of the EU and broader Western political leadership to provide timely military aid to Ukraine.

Causal Interpretation: Mental and psychological hesitation among civilian politicians, institutional inertia.

Moral Evaluation: Portrays political caution as irresponsible and dangerous.

Treatment Recommendation: More decisive and timely support, including bold political decision-making.

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<sup>61</sup> Wojciech Maziarski. (2022). Wsparcie Zachodu dla Ukrainy: za mało, za późno, zbyt nieśmiało. Wyborcza. Available at: <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,28352613,wsparcie-zachodu-dla-ukrainy-za-malo-za-pozno-zbyt-niesmialo.html#S.index-K.C-B.68-L.34.duzy>

Morality

Frame:

"Kijów [...] nie oczekiwał nawet w przedpokoju Unii Europejskiej [...] wyjrzała tylko przez wizjer."

"Kyiv wasn't even in the EU's hallway [...] the EU merely peeked through the peephole."

Problem Definition: Exclusion of Ukraine from the European family despite clear political and cultural alignment.

Causal Interpretation: EU's internal divisions and fears about expansion.

Moral Evaluation: A failure of solidarity and shared identity.

Treatment Recommendation: Full embrace of Ukraine's European identity and NATO aspirations.

Framing Devices: Domestic metaphors ("door", "peephole"), references to inclusion/exclusion.

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Maciej Kisilowski writes in *Wyborcza*<sup>62</sup>. While he criticizes those Polish intellectuals who are attacking the EU and Western Europe and reframes critiques of the EU as aligning with authoritarian populist strategies from the Polish right. In his pro-EU opinion piece, we still see traces of contesting the EU's post-war stance and decisions via a conflict frame. The author rightfully resorts to a conflict frame to situate EU in a direct military conflict or in a state of war with Russia. But his assessment of the EU's predicament doesn't seem to be recognized by the Union itself. This is a common frame and a critique against EU from all sides of the political spectrum.

Conflict Frame

"Zachód nie może pogodzić się z myślą, że znalazł się w stanie wojny z Rosją."

"The West cannot come to terms with the fact that it is in a state of war with Russia."

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<sup>62</sup> Kisilowski, Maciej. (2022). Polscy demokraci, uderzając w liderów UE, wpisujecie się w strategię PiS. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Available at: <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,28329620,polscy-demokraci-bijac-w-liderow-ue-wpisujecie-sie-w-strategie.html#S.index-K.C-B.69-L.7.duzy>

"Zachód niezwykle powoli i z oporami oswaja się z myślą, że skończył się karnawał epoki postkomunistycznej."

"The West is painfully slowly coming to terms with the fact that the post-communist carnival is over."

Problem Definition: Denial of geopolitical reality by the West, resulting in delayed and inadequate responses.

Causal Interpretation: Cultural and psychological inertia from decades of peace and economic integration with Russia.

Moral Evaluation: This inertia is morally unacceptable given the current stakes.

Framing Devices: Historical metaphors (carnival, inertia), war state acknowledgement, references to illusions.

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Agata Kulczycka's article echoes public speech by Polish MEP Patryk Jaki in which he denounces the EU's defense integration and portrays European federalism as an existential threat to Polish sovereignty.<sup>63</sup> The article reproduces and amplifies frames of Nationalization and Conflict that contests the legitimacy and intentions behind plans for a more robust CFSP/CSDP and the vision of the European army.

This article provides a clear illustration of how opposition figures in Poland use emotionally charged Nationalization and Conflict frames to delegitimize EU defense initiatives under the CFSP/CSDP.

## Conflict Frame

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<sup>63</sup> Agata Kulczycka. (2022). MEP Patryk Jaki issues warning regarding European Union and a common European army. "I have no illusions about what it could be used for". Gazeta Wyborcza. Available at: [https://rzeszow.wyborcza.pl/rzeszow/7,34962,28543294,patryk-jaki-straszy-wspolna-europejska-armia-nie-mam-zadnych.html?\\_gl=1\\*ao7cp1\\*\\_gcl\\_au\\*MjAwNzIxMTQwNy4xNzQ3Mzg5ODQ0LjE1MzUwNTQ3MzkuMTc0NzM5MTIwNC4xNzQ3MzkuMjA0\\*\\_ga\\*OTgyNDk4NTM3LjE3NDczODk2MjU.\\*\\_ga\\_6R71ZMJ3KN\\*czE3NDc0MTUxMDQkbzQkZzEkdDE3NDc0MTYyNTYkajAkbDAkaDA.#S.index-K.C-B.64-L.13.duzy](https://rzeszow.wyborcza.pl/rzeszow/7,34962,28543294,patryk-jaki-straszy-wspolna-europejska-armia-nie-mam-zadnych.html?_gl=1*ao7cp1*_gcl_au*MjAwNzIxMTQwNy4xNzQ3Mzg5ODQ0LjE1MzUwNTQ3MzkuMTc0NzM5MTIwNC4xNzQ3MzkuMjA0*_ga*OTgyNDk4NTM3LjE3NDczODk2MjU.*_ga_6R71ZMJ3KN*czE3NDc0MTUxMDQkbzQkZzEkdDE3NDc0MTYyNTYkajAkbDAkaDA.#S.index-K.C-B.64-L.13.duzy)

"Megaplan Niemców i Francuzów polega na tym, żeby stworzyć państwo europejskie, w którym Polska się rozmyje."

"The Germans' and French's megaplan is to create a European state in which Poland would disappear."

Problem Definition: Loss of national identity and sovereignty in a centralized European superstate.

Causal Interpretation: Federalization of EU structures, led by Western Europe, threatens Polish cultural and political distinctiveness.

Moral Evaluation: Presented as a betrayal of national values and an imposition of foreign ideology.

Treatment Recommendation: Rejection of federalist proposals, protection of cultural and national sovereignty.

Framing Devices: Nationalist language (rozmyje się), cultural threat narratives, suspicion of EU elites.

"Nie mam żadnych złudzeń, do czego mogłaby być taka armia użyta. [...] żeby porządek w Polsce zrobić."

"I have no illusions what such an army could be used for. [...] to bring order to Poland."

Problem Definition: EU military integration seen as a potential mechanism of internal coercion.

Causal Interpretation: The EU's financial and political pressure on Poland is expanding to militarized tools.

Moral Evaluation: Framing EU military ambitions as authoritarian or imperialistic.

Treatment Recommendation: Resisting EU military initiatives, maintaining national defense autonomy.

Framing Devices: Paranoia rhetoric, military threat metaphors, anecdotal media references.

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Next article: In Sebastian Stodolak's piece we see an interview with Dalibor Rohac, an economist and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Article in its framing

concurr with the counter-argument against more robust CFSP/CSDP, challenging the idea of a common European army.<sup>64</sup>

### **Nationalization Frame**

„Europejska armia nie jest też konieczna, by wojska poszczególnych państw współpracowały na pewnych odcinkach, np. przy obronie wschodnich granic UE.”

„A European army is also not necessary for the armies of individual countries to cooperate in certain areas, such as defending the EU's eastern borders.”

„Chcemy, żeby instytucje europejskie funkcjonowały tylko tam, gdzie przynoszą znaczące efekty, których nie dałoby się osiągnąć na poziomie państw.”

“We want European institutions to operate only where they bring significant results that could not be achieved at the national level.”

Problem Definition: Overextension of EU institutions into domains better handled nationally.

Causal Interpretation: The EU increasingly legislates beyond areas of added value, leading to ineffective or redundant policy.

Moral Evaluation: This expansion undermines efficiency and democratic legitimacy.

Treatment Recommendation: Restrict EU competence to areas with demonstrable cross-border necessity and consent.

Framing Devices: Functional efficiency, subsidiarity, cost-benefit logic.

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Piotr Jendroszczyk offers an interesting perspective in Rzeczpospolita, article challenges Poland's internal instrumentalization of anti-German narratives while admitting valid criticisms of Germany's past dealings with Russia. It argues for restraint, respect and strategic

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<sup>64</sup> Stodolak, Sebastian. 2022. “Unii Europejskiej Grozi Nieistotność [WYWIAD].” *GazetaPrawna.pl*, December 18, 2022. <https://www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/swiat/artykuly/8611735,unia-europejska-przyszlosc-gospodarka.html>.

communication, noting that domestic populism could subvert Poland's regional status and influence.<sup>65</sup>

### **Responsibility Frame**

„W ostatnich tygodniach niewiele się w tych sprawach dzieje. Czyżby Niemcy znów okazały się hamulcowym?”

"In recent weeks, not much has happened on these matters. Have the Germans once again become the brake?"

**Problem Definition:** Germany is dragging its feet in delivering military aid and fulfilling its commitments.

**Causal Interpretation:** Reluctance to escalate, fear of geopolitical overreach, political inertia.

**Moral Evaluation:** Perceived as irresponsible or hesitant in a time of urgent crisis.

**Treatment Recommendation:** More assertive and timely leadership, follow through on announced plans.

**Framing Devices:** Rhetorical questions, expert criticism, allusions to historical complacency.

### **Power Frame**

„Berlin nie pozbył się obaw, że zostanie oskarżony [...] o wykorzystanie sytuacji do budowania dominującej pozycji w Europie.”

"Berlin hasn't shed its fear of being accused [...] of using the situation to build a dominant position in Europe."

**Problem Definition:** Germany hesitates to lead decisively, wary of being seen as hegemonic.

**Causal Interpretation:** Post-WWII caution, internal elite divisions, historical burden.

**Moral Evaluation:** Failure to lead may weaken EU strategic coherence.

**Treatment Recommendation:** Step into leadership roles without fear of misinterpretation.

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<sup>65</sup> Piotr Jendroszczyk. (2022). Niemcy złapały zadyszkę w reakcji na wojnę na Ukrainie. Rzeczpospolita. Available at: <https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art35909641-niemcy-zlapyly-zadyske-w-reakcji-na-wojne-na-ukrainie>

Framing Devices: National self-image tension, unease with leadership, regional trust deficit.

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Marek A. Cichocki underscores the lackluster response to the Ukraine war and strategic vision of the Union's leading duo France and Germany.<sup>66</sup> The article demands rethinking of strategic frameworks and implicitly questions the existing CFSP/CSDP architecture and priorities.

### **Responsibility Frame**

“Francja i Niemcy... utraciły wiarygodność europejskich liderów.”

"France and Germany... have lost their credibility as European leaders."

**Problem Definition:** The Union's leading duo, France and Germany, have failed in their strategic leadership role regarding European security.

**Causal Interpretation:** The failure stems from outdated strategic thinking and inability to adapt to the new security environment shaped by Russia's war against Ukraine.

**Moral Evaluation:** This failure is a serious breach of strategic responsibility and credibility, implying negligence or misjudgment by France and Germany.

**Treatment Recommendation:** There is an urgent need for a paradigm shift - a completely new way of thinking about European security architecture. All actors must learn from this exceptional situation and abandon outdated illusions.

“Potrzebne jest zupełnie nowe myślenie o architekturze europejskiego bezpieczeństwa.”

"A completely new way of thinking about the architecture of European security is needed."

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Former Polish Defence Minister Jan Parys constructs a binary choice: one in which the United States is the only credible guarantor of European security, while Germany and France are

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<sup>66</sup> Cichocki, Marek A. 2022. "Marek a. Cichocki: Nowa Architektura Bezpieczeństwa - rp.pl." *Rzeczpospolita*, April 3, 2022. <https://www.rp.pl/opinie-polityczno-spoleczne/art36005581-marek-a-cichocki-nowa-architektura-bezpieczenstwa>.

portrayed as covertly undermining NATO, the EU and Eastern European sovereignty.<sup>67</sup> The author uses emotional appeals, historical analogies and dichotomies (sovereignty vs federalism, NATO vs EU) to mobilize support against EU security centralization. It frames Western European elites, particularly Scholz and Macron, as enablers of Russian aggression through passivity and hegemonic ambition.

### **Responsibility Frame**

“Każdy, kto dziś minimalizuje realne wsparcie dla Ukrainy, de facto wspiera agresję na to państwo.”

“Anyone who minimizes real support for Ukraine today de facto supports aggression against that country.”

Problem Definition: European passivity or lukewarm support for Ukraine is equated with complicity in Russian aggression.

Causal Interpretation: France and Germany are depicted as placing their geopolitical projects (strategic autonomy, EU superstate) above collective defence, thereby enabling Putin.

Moral Evaluation: Moral failure of Western Europe. Supporting Ukraine is framed not as a strategic option, but a moral imperative.

Treatment Recommendation: Full alignment with U.S. military strategy, rejection of “autonomia strategiczna” or reforms diluting NATO primacy.

Framing Devices: Binary language (real vs. symbolic support), accusation of betrayal, personal blame targeting Scholz and Macron.

### **Conflict Frame**

„Dziś w Europie mamy wybór, albo bezpieczeństwo z USA, albo kooperacja z Rosją.”

"Today in Europe we have a choice: either security with the U.S. or cooperation with Russia."

Problem Definition: The EU is internally divided between a loyal Atlanticist bloc and appeasing, pro-Russian powers.

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<sup>67</sup> Parys, Jan. 2022. “USA. Gwarant bezpieczeństwa - rp.pl.” Rzeczpospolita, October 24, 2022. <https://www.rp.pl/opinie-polityczno-spoleczne/art37285641-usa-gwarant-bezpieczenstwa>.

Causal Interpretation: Western Europe's leadership is accused of prioritizing its own geopolitical agenda over unity.

Moral Evaluation: Germany and France are portrayed as undermining NATO and siding with Russia.

Treatment Recommendation: Form a new strategic bloc in Eastern Europe anchored to the U.S.

Framing Device: Binary opposition (East vs West, NATO vs EU), enemy imagery (e.g., Scholz = second Putin).

### **Power Frame**

„Niemcy chcą przekształcić Unię Europejską w superpaństwo, które odbierze państwom członkowskim polityczną i militarną suwerenność.”

"Germany wants to transform the EU into a superstate that will strip member states of political and military sovereignty."

Problem Definition: The EU is framed as a vehicle for German and French domination.

Causal Interpretation: Berlin uses the war to implement federalist ambitions.

Moral Evaluation: This is framed as dangerous centralization, echoing imperial domination.

Treatment Recommendation: Defend national sovereignty, resist deeper EU integration in defense.

Framing Devices: "Superstate", "hegemony", "financial blackmail", comparisons to Cold War blocs.

### **Nationalization Frame**

„Polska należy do państw, które stanowczo nie chcą się zgodzić na niemiecką hegemonię w Europie.”

"Poland is one of the countries that categorically rejects German hegemony in Europe."

Problem Definition: Polish sovereignty is framed as incompatible with current EU leadership's goals.

Causal Interpretation: The EU's attempt at integration is portrayed as subjugation of national interests.

Moral Evaluation: German-led integration contradicts the post-WWII vision of equality and peace.

Treatment Recommendation: Maintain national decision-making, especially in defense matters.

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This opinion article published in *Gazeta Polska* (17 August 2022) represents a highly critical Polish nationalist perspective on the European Union's integration efforts, with hostility toward the federalization of Europe and perceived German dominance.<sup>68</sup> Though not explicitly discussing CFSP or CSDP by name, the article attacks the very foundation of deeper EU-level political and security integration—arguing that such efforts threaten Polish sovereignty, democracy and constitutional order.

The piece constructs a dramatic narrative in which Poland and other EU member states risk being reduced to subordinate “lands” within a German-led European superstate. It strongly contests the legitimacy of EU law, institutions and strategic goals, portraying them as coercive, illegitimate and anti-democratic.

#### Nationalization Frame

“Unia jest organizacją państw, a nie organizacją obywateli.”

"The EU is an organization of states, not of citizens."

„Wyższość polskiej konstytucji nad unijnym prawem jest kwestią być albo nie być państwa polskiego.”

"The supremacy of the Polish constitution over EU law is a matter of life or death for the Polish state."

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<sup>68</sup> Rachoń, Michał. 2022. “Państwo Eurofедераści.” *Gazeta Polska*, August 17, 2022. <https://www.gazetapolska.pl/28374-panstwo-eurofederasci>.

Problem Definition: EU foreign and security initiatives are framed as clashing with Poland's national interest. The supranational logic of the EU is rejected in favor of a national lens.

A clash between national constitutional orders and EU law is inevitable and existential.

Causal Interpretation: The EU is accused of overstepping its mandate by promoting integration that threatens national sovereignty, particularly in defense matters. Elites in Brussels, Berlin and Paris are portrayed as imposing a top-down European agenda.

The EU and especially Germany are depicted as imposing legal norms that override domestic constitutions to weaken national democracies.

Moral Evaluation: National sovereignty is morally prioritized. It is framed as legitimate, democratic and historically grounded while the EU is presented as artificial, detached and hegemonic.

Treatment Recommendation: Re-center decision-making within national governments. Reject Brussels-led initiatives in favor of national strategies aligned with NATO and the U.S. Reject EU legal supremacy, resist further integration and prepare for legal and political confrontation.

Framing Devices: Strong "us vs them" rhetoric, national flag language ("Poland first" logic), erasure of EU actors, defense of national interest as the only valid lens for policy evaluation.

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In the article in Rzeczpospolita Jacek Lepiarz references Olaf Scholz's interview to FAS in which the chancellor pushed for more sovereign and geopolitical Europe especially in the matters of Defence.<sup>69</sup> While France reacts positively, Poland strongly opposes the idea. The article frames this divergence as symbolic of deeper tensions within the EU regarding power, sovereignty and geopolitical direction.

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<sup>69</sup> Lepiarz, Jacek. 2022. "Niemiecki Dziennik: Niemcy Chcą Być Odpowiedzialne Za Europę, Polska Protestuje - rp.pl." Rzeczpospolita, July 24, 2022. <https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art36749881-niemiecki-dziennik-niemcy-chca-byc-odpowiedzialne-za-europe-polska-protestuje>.

## **Responsibility Frame**

Poland's leadership challenges Germany's bid for a leading role in Europe, questioning its credibility due to past policy failures.

"Ten, kto popełnił tak ciężkie błędy jak Niemcy, uzależniając kraj od dostaw gazu i błędnie oceniając Rosję, nie powinien pretendować do roli narodu przywódczego."

"Those who have made such grave mistakes as Germany, by becoming dependent on gas supplies and misjudging Russia, should not aspire to a leadership role."

**Problem Definition:** Germany's past energy policies and miscalculations regarding Russia undermine its moral authority to lead Europe.

**Causal Interpretation:** Germany's errors have led to increased vulnerability in Europe, casting doubt on its proposals for EU leadership.

**Moral Evaluation:** Germany's push for leadership is seen as arrogant and unjustified given its recent policy failures.

**Treatment Recommendation:** EU leadership should be based on proven responsibility and foresight, not on past mistakes.

## **Conflict Frame**

The article underscores a significant rift within the EU, with France supporting Germany's vision and Poland opposing it.

"Z rządu francuskiego dobiega aplauz, z polskiego słycać protesty."

"From the French government comes applause, from the Polish, protests."

**Problem Definition:** Divergent national responses to Germany's proposals indicate a lack of consensus within the EU.

**Causal Interpretation:** Germany's unilateral push for leadership and policy changes without broad consensus fuels intra-EU tensions.

**Moral Evaluation:** Germany and France are perceived as sidelining other member states, undermining EU unity.

**Treatment Recommendation:** Promote inclusive dialogue and respect for all member states' perspectives to maintain EU cohesion.

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An opinion piece in *Gazeta-Polska* takes a fierce position against the idea of German-led federal European Union with the article titled: “Europa-Union Deutschland. Tusk's colleagues want to eliminate Poland.<sup>70</sup> They are behind the superstate plan”. The article frames Germany’s attempts to take leadership during the Ukraine crisis as part of the Union of the European Federalists’ masterplan to establish true federal European Union at the expense of member state’s sovereignty.

### **Power Frame - hegemony accusations**

„organizacja ta, której członkiem jest m.in. polityczny mentor Tuska Manfred Weber, domaga się pozbawienia krajów UE suwerenności i przekształcenia Unii Europejskiej w superpaństwo pod przywództwem Niemiec i Francji – z jedną armią, europejską tożsamością narodową, zunifikowanym systemem podatkowym i obowiązkową walutą euro.”

"this organization, whose members include Tusk's political mentor Manfred Weber, demands that EU countries be stripped of their sovereignty and that the European Union be transformed into a superstate led by Germany and France – with one army, a European national identity, a unified tax system and a mandatory euro currency."

Problem Definition: Loss of Polish sovereignty at the hands of Germany and via Donald Tusk. Framed as an European integration process.

Causal Interpretation: Supranationalists’ ambitions to expand the mandate of the German led European Union.

Moral Evaluation: Harsh critique of Donald Tusk and his ties to the Union of European Federalists and their German branch Europa-Union Deutschland. An organization framed as a main responsible party behind the push for a federal Europe.

Treatment Recommendation: Defend national sovereignty, “Polish total opposition”.

### **Human Interest Frame**

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<sup>70</sup> “Europa-Union Deutschland. Koledzy Tuska Chcą Likwidacji Polski. To Oni Stoją Za Planem Superpaństwa.” *Gazeta Polska*, November 21, 2023. <https://www.gazetapolska.pl/31566-europa-union-deutschland-koledzy-tuska-chca-likwidacji-polski-to-oni-stoja-za-planem-superpanstwa>.

Unia Europejskich Federalistów, której trzon stanowi Europa-Union Deutschland, oficjalnie nie ma sekcji polskiej. Ale nieformalnie jest nią Koalicja Obywatelska z przyległościami – i chodzi tu zarówno o bliskie powiązania Rainera Wielanda i Manfreda Webera z Donaldem Tuskiem, jak i o wsparcie, jakim Europa-Union obdarza obóz polskiej „totalnej opozycji”.

The Union of European Federalists, the core of which is Europa-Union Deutschland, officially does not have a Polish section. However, informally, the Civic Coalition with its neighbors does - and this concerns both the close links of Rainer Wieland and Manfred Weber with Donald Tusk, as well as the support that Europa-Union gives to the camp of the Polish "total opposition".

Problem definition: German elites are forcing a federalized EU on unwilling nations, threatening democracy and national identity. The problem is framed as ordinary citizens losing control to distant, unaccountable EU bureaucrats (mostly German).

Causal interpretation: "German politicians and their allies (like Donald Tusk) are pushing a federalist agenda to weaken nation-states."

Moral Evaluation: "The EU federalists are undemocratic bullies, while Poland (and allies like Hungary) are defending freedom."

Treatment recommendation: "Resist EU federalization, protect national sovereignty and reject pro-German politicians (like Tusk)."

## Media Framing Dynamics on the Polish Media Landscape

### *The PiS-Civic Platform Divide*

One can't understand Polish media contestation of EU security policy without grasping the fundamental ideological divide between Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska). These aren't just competing political parties - they represent entirely different visions of Poland's place in Europe and the world.

PiS built its political identity around what one might call "sovereignty maximalism." This doesn't mean simple Euroscepticism. Instead, it's a sophisticated narrative that portrays EU integration as an existential threat to Polish independence. When PiS politicians frame EU

security initiatives, they consistently invoke historical parallels to foreign domination. The party's media allies amplify these frames through what I've observed as a three-step strategy.

First comes historical resonance. PiS-aligned media outlets don't just criticize specific EU policies - they embed these criticisms within narratives about Poland's centuries-long struggle for independence. Brussels becomes the latest in a series of foreign capitals trying to control Polish destiny. Second, they employ cultural differentiation frames that portray Western European values as fundamentally incompatible with Polish traditions. Third, they use geopolitical reframing that positions Poland as the true defender of European values against both Russian aggression and Western European appeasement.

Civic Platform operates from completely different premises. Their belief is that the bright future for Poland means deeper European integration and alignment of Warsaw's geopolitical stance with its European partners. Platform-aligned outlets frame EU security initiatives as essential for Polish national interests. Albeit, they don't ignore sovereignty concerns and they too put heavy emphasis on Poland's right and ability to maintain high degree of freedom in determining its foreign and security policy. This could also stem from the PiS provoked polarization of the issue of national sovereignty. At times instead of portraying integration as sovereignty loss, they present it as sovereignty multiplication - Poland gains influence by pooling resources with European partners.

### *Media Ecosystems and Frame Amplification*

The Polish media landscape has been increasingly polarized along party lines. This creates distinct "echo chambers" where different frames dominate. PiS supporters consume media that consistently reinforces Nationalization and Conflict frames, while Civic Platform supporters usually encounter more balanced frames that more often emphasize Poland's European obligations.

Smaller parties often serve as frame entrepreneurs, introducing new contestation themes that larger parties later adopt. The Confederation party has pioneered particularly aggressive anti-EU frames that PiS sometimes incorporates in a more elegant form. Conversely, centrist parties like Poland 2050 have experimented with "pragmatic Europeanism" frames that Civic Platform sometimes borrows.

But at times, these coalition dynamics create frame 'instability'. As electoral pressures shift, parties adjust their framing strategies. During the 2023 electoral campaign, Civic Platform softened some of its pro-integration rhetoric to appeal to voters concerned about sovereignty loss. Meanwhile, PiS began emphasizing Poland's role as a European security provider rather than just a sovereignty defender.

## Tying the knots - findings

After coding the articles and deductively applying media frames through content analysis, major themes emerged reflecting the key sentiments and contestation in Polish media vis-a-vis the EU and CFSP/CSDP.

Polish media discourse even on the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis promoted either neutral or negatively valenced frames, most of which contested the EU and the CFSP and CSDP through various means. To once again reference Hooghe and Marks, this would be in line with the constraining dissensus logic. That even during the ground shaking crisis of the Ukraine war, elite-driven integration dynamics are struggling to return.

Whether it was the Central & Eastern European 'we told you so' to the Western Europes' and largely the EU's naivety (framing its strategic vision as ahistorical and incompetent) to outright accusations of masterplans to destroy member states sovereignty through the attempts to strengthen Europe's 'strategic autonomy'... Repeatedly contentious Polish media frames don't just critique EU foreign policy, at times it systematically deconstructs the very foundations of supranational governance in security matters, which is not surprising if we follow Biedenkopf, Costa and Gora's typology - contestation of the polity itself. The frames I've identified are strategic weapons in a broader contestation battle that threatens to reshape how Europeans think about sovereignty, security and solidarity through the EU and on the national level. Contestation, in this context, has a potential to significantly hinder future prospects of security and/or defence integration.

### *Specific Frame Patterns*

The Responsibility frame targets the EU in various ways. Smolar writes that "compromise is the basis of the Union's operation, which makes its security policy toothless," he's not just criticizing policy outcomes. He's questioning the compromise-based decision-making model that defines European governance. His argumentation is a demand and outcry for the EU's transformation into a responsible, able and willing international actor and a critique of the "Geopolitical Dwarf" that is 'all bark - no bite'. With ineffective institutional design.

Polish media creates contestation by manipulating the very metrics by which EU performance gets measured, echoing De Wilde and Lord's politicization dimensions, specifically the mode aspect, that is the nature and quality of political contestation, where the contestation challenges not just policies but the very criteria for evaluating policy success. Maziarski's critique that Western support is "too little, too late, too tired" establishes an impossible

standard. Any response becomes inadequate because the goalposts keep shifting in a way that it is unachievable. This isn't fair criticism, It is a strategic framing designed to ensure the EU cannot win.

Suppose the EU responds quickly critics can argue it's reckless. If it deliberates carefully, it's too slow. If it provides substantial aid, it should have done more earlier... This creates a perpetual state of dissatisfaction that fuels ongoing contestation regardless of actual policy outcomes.

The Nationalization frame in my data offers one of the most sophisticated contestation strategies. It speaks to what Knutsen identified as the center-periphery cleavage, positioning Poland in the defensive stance. It doesn't simply defend Polish interests, it constructs a zero-sum relationship between European integration and national survival. Jaki's warning that Poland would "disappear" in a European superstate isn't hyperbole, it's calculated emotional manipulation.

This frame exploits what social psychologists call identity threat theory. When people perceive their group identity as under attack, they respond with heightened in-group loyalty and out-group hostility. The articles under review often construct further European integration as an existential threat to Polish identity, triggering psychological defense mechanisms and Polish historical traumas, that make rational policy debate nearly impossible.

Terms like "rozmyje się" (would disappear/dissolve)... Once the frame shifts to existential terms, compromise becomes betrayal and cooperation becomes surrender. Hence, the article provides powerful framing which is effectively contesting the very membership in the EU, alongside diminishing any arguments for further integration especially in the security and defence field.

Morality frame analysis uncovers something crucial that traditional contestation studies often miss. How normative judgments reshape political discourse. When the articles bring up Germany's Nord Stream 2 support as violating "treaty principles of loyalty and solidarity," it's performing complex normative contestation.

First, it establishes moral authority by positioning Poland as the defender of European values against Western European pragmatism. This reverses traditional center-periphery dynamics, making Eastern Europe the guardian of European ideals. Second, it weaponizes EU's own normative language against Brussels (using the 'opponent's' strength against them).

This strategy proves particularly effective because it is difficult to counter. How do you argue against solidarity? How do you defend policies that appear to violate stated European values?

The morality frame forces EU defenders into uncomfortable positions where they must either abandon their normative claims or accept criticism of their policies.

The Conflict frame represents the most direct challenge to EU foreign policy aspirations. When Kisilowski argues that "the West cannot come to terms with the fact that it is in a state of war with Russia," he's not just criticizing policy responses. He's constructing an alternative reality where different, more rationale strategic assumptions apply. Again, highlighting EU's strategic naivety.

### *Temporal Element*

Traditional contestation studies focus on what gets contested but often ignore the temporal element in contestation analysis. My analysis reveals that timing plays a crucial role in how media frames gain traction and influence public discourse.

Maziarski's "too little, too late, too tired" formulation illustrates this temporal strategy perfectly. The critique doesn't depend on specific policy details. It's a temporal judgment that can be applied to almost any EU response.

This temporal framing proves particularly insidious because it's nearly impossible to counter with facts. How do you prove that aid delivered today would have been less effective yesterday? How do you demonstrate that current support levels are appropriate when critics can always argue they should have been higher sooner?

The "post-communist carnival" metaphor from Kisilowski's article operates similarly. It's a powerful framing of the EU's strategic outlook which has proven to be too naive and shallow. This historical framing makes current EU approaches especially in the field of security and defence appear not just inadequate but anachronistic. Again, the temporal dimension becomes a weapon of contestation.

This realization reinforces the narrative that the EU is unfit to take the reins over foreign policy. And previous EU foreign policy approaches are proof of that.

Here I would like to reference the Gazeta Wyborcza article published prior to the war.<sup>71</sup> Which reviewed a survey conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), that concluded that majority of Europeans were convinced that Russia-Ukraine war would erupt.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid. 30.

And here again, Polish strategic culture has to be highlighted, which is traditionally very confrontational and cautious of Russia, for obvious reasons. This enables dozen of Polish political commentators a moral high ground, with “We told you so” (in hindsight of the war in Ukraine).

## Theoretical Implications for Contestation Studies

### *Constructive and Destructive Contestation*

My findings challenge several assumptions in existing contestation literature. First, most studies assume contestation emerges in response to policy failures or democratic deficits. But as my study showcases, Polish media is capable of constructing contestation paradigms independently of the EU performance by manipulating various elements such as evaluation criteria and temporal expectations.

Existing theory assumes contestation can be addressed through better communication or policy reforms. But when contestation operates through identity threat mechanisms and reverse normative shortcoming accusations (in contrast to the common vision of the EU being a normative anchor for member states and not only), traditional responses become counterproductive. More EU communication triggers more identity threat and policy reforms get reframed as admissions of previous failure.

One of my research question asks whether Polish media contestation is constructive or confrontational. The answer is both and that's what makes it so powerful. This echoes Biedenkopf et al.'s different shades of contestation.

Smolar's critique exemplifies this dual nature perfectly. On one hand, he offers seemingly constructive recommendations - federalization, streamlined decision-making, more effective command structures. But at the same time, one can't help but notice his aversion to the consequences that these changes would bring if fully implemented.

The research also reveals how different frames interact to amplify contestation effects. The frames don't simply coexist. they reinforce each other in systematic ways that multiply their impact.

The Power and Responsibility frames work together in Smolar's article. The "economic giant, political dwarf" metaphor (Power frame) becomes more damaging when combined with his analysis of institutional failures (Responsibility frame). The Power frame establishes that the

EU lacks geopolitical capability, while the Responsibility frame explains why this deficiency is inevitable given current institutional arrangements.

The Morality frame plays a particularly crucial role in this dynamic. When Smolar criticizes Germany's Nord Stream 2 support as violating "loyalty and solidarity," he's not just making a policy argument. He's establishing moral authority that makes his other critiques more believable. If Germany betrayed European values in one area, why trust EU security policy more generally?

### *Identity Element*

Findings of this research also illuminate how contestation can serve identity construction functions that go far beyond specific policy disputes. Polish media frames don't just critique EU security policy - they construct distinctive Polish identity in opposition to European integration.

The Nationalization frame reveals this most clearly. In Kulczycka's article, when Jaki warns that Poland would "disappear" in a European superstate, he's basically performing complex identity work. Overall, the article puts emphasis on defending Polish sovereignty and the author through Jaki presents a definition what Polish identity means in relation to European integration.

This identity construction operates through what social psychologists call negative identity formation. That is defining group identity by what the group is not rather than what it is. Polish identity becomes defined as anti-federalist, pro-sovereignty and skeptical of Western European motives. The EU becomes the constitutive other against which Polish distinctiveness gets defined.

The implications extend far beyond foreign policy debates. Once identity gets constructed in opposition to European integration, compromise becomes psychological betrayal. Supporting EU initiatives means abandoning Polish identity. This psychological dynamic makes rational policy debate extremely difficult.

### *The problem of duality*

One of my most intriguing findings is that even in the positively valenced articles that showcase a degree of support for the EU, we can see explicit or implicit contestation of the EU security policy. Kisilowski's piece exemplifies this paradox - he defends the EU against Polish

right-wing critics while simultaneously arguing that the EU has been failing to recognize its conflict with Russia.

This paradox reveals something crucial about contemporary contestation dynamics. Traditional models often assume contestation comes from EU opponents. But the data shows that some of the most sophisticated contestation comes from disappointed European supporters who feel the EU is failing to live up to its potential.

This "supportive contestation" proves particularly challenging for EU institutions because it's harder to dismiss. When critics obviously oppose European integration, their arguments can be framed as predictable opposition. But when pro-European voices make similar critiques, they gain credibility and emotional resonance.

### *Emotional Element*

The frame analysis reveals the emotional architecture underlying political contestation. how different feelings get mobilized to support political arguments. This emotional dimension often gets overlooked in rational choice approaches to EU politics.

The frames I identified each mobilize distinct emotional responses. The Responsibility frame triggers frustration and disappointment. The Power frame evokes humiliation and wounded pride. The Morality frame activates moral outrage and indignation. The Nationalization frame stimulates fear and threat responses. The Conflict frame generates urgency and alarm.

This emotional mobilization proves crucial for understanding why some contestation gains traction while other criticism remains politically marginal. Rational arguments about institutional efficiency don't mobilize political action. But emotional frames that make people feel frustrated, threatened, or morally outraged obviously create solid psychological motivation for political engagement.

The strategic implications are significant. EU communication strategies that focus on rational persuasion miss the emotional dynamics that drive political contestation. Effective responses require understanding and addressing the emotional foundations of political opposition.

Reminder of how metaphors work in Maziarski's article. The image of the EU "peeking through the peephole" at Ukraine, transforms abstract policy discussions into scenarios that readers can emotionally relate to. This metaphorical symbolism doesn't just describe EU policy - it makes certain emotional responses feel natural and appropriate.

The amplification effect works through what communication scholars call emotional priming. Media frames don't just provide information, they create emotional contexts that influence

how people interpret subsequent information. Once readers feel frustrated with EU "peephole" behavior, they're primed to interpret other EU actions through a disappointment lens.

### *Unanimity (sovereignty) vs QMV (Effectiveness) in the crisis debate*

As identified in the reviewed articles, the unanimity requirement creates new avenues for contestation of CFSP/CSDP and overall EU security structures. A situation is the following: institutional rules designed to protect sovereignty actually undermine effectiveness, which then generates criticism that further weakens support for European integration.

Cheda's analysis of Franco-German dominance illustrates this perfectly. When unanimity rules make decision-making difficult, power gravitates toward the largest states who can coordinate among themselves. This creates resentment among smaller states, who then contest both specific decisions and the broader integration project.

This sort of 'trap' proves particularly challenging because both reforming and maintaining unanimity requirements generate contestation. Removing unanimity triggers sovereignty concerns. Maintaining it ensures continued ineffectiveness that fuels different forms of criticism. EU institutions find themselves stuck between a rock and a hard place regardless of their institutional choices.

### *Policy Feedback Loops*

The research reveals complex feedback loops between media contestation and actual policy outcomes. Contestation doesn't just respond to EU policies, but also it directly shapes the political environment in which future policies get developed and implemented.

When Polish media frames the EU as institutionally inadequate, this framing affects Polish politicians' incentives in EU negotiations. Supporting EU security initiatives becomes politically risky if domestic media will frame such support as naive or contrary to national interests. This creates self-reinforcing cycles where contestation generates the very problems it criticizes.

The feedback effects work through both elite behavior and public opinion. Politicians respond to anticipated media critique by taking more skeptical or ambiguous positions in EU negotiations. And the citizens too who are exposed to contentious frames become less supportive of European integration, which further constrains political possibilities for cooperation.

Seen from this angle, such feedback loops indicate that addressing contestation requires understanding its systemic effects on European politics rather than treating it as a simple communication challenge.

The methodological contribution of this research into contestation studies are also important. First, the combination of frame analysis with contestation theory provides a more rigorous approach to identifying and categorizing political opposition than previous studies.

Second, my focus on media frames captures contestation dynamics that might not necessarily appear in other data sources. Politicians might avoid openly contesting EU policies for strategic reasons, but media frames reveal underlying tensions and arguments that shape political discourse.

## Conclusion: The New Politics of European Security

This research reveals that the politics of EU security policy has fundamentally changed. What was once a relatively technocratic domain of elite cooperation has become a contested arena of democratic politics with all the messiness that it entails, as a result of Russia's war in Ukraine.

This shift is in line with broader changes in European politics. From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, the rise of populist challenges to established parties and the increasing salience of sovereignty concerns in domestic political debates.

Poland symbolized an exceptional case. As following the war in Ukraine the support for European security and defence policy saw stagnation. Investigation of this case by identifying contestation through media frames has not only proven immensely valuable but it has also made a significant contribution to the literature as well, as the field of media contestation of the EU is understudied.

Most integration theories follow the logic that functional pressures or elite preferences drive integration dynamics. But as this research demonstrates the exploration of all the interested parties positions is crucial before coming to such a conclusion. The findings of this paper suggest that media contestation creates independent causal forces that can undermine integration even when functional pressures favor cooperation.

Furthermore, European integration theories often treat contestation as either less relevant or as a simple feedback, that adjusts integration speed. Liberal intergovernmentalism sees contestation as domestic constraint on government preferences. Neofunctionalism treats it as

friction that functional pressures eventually overcome. But my research suggests that contestation can have independent causal power that these theories underestimate.

Media contestation doesn't just reflect underlying interests or functional pressures. It actively constructs the social reality within which integration decisions occur. Media appears capable of tapping into and instrumentalizing the wide spectrum of various socio-political cleavages. When Polish media consistently frames EU security initiatives through Nationalization frames, they don't just report citizen concerns - they create and amplify those concerns. Over time, these frames become part of Poland's political culture and institutional memory. Then there is also an element of cross-country frames that further amplify the effects of media on contestation. This is one of the research avenues future studies could focus on.

Also the argument that functional pressure drastically accelerates integration in specific policy fields requires more attention. Looking at Mark Rhinard's concept of "crisisification".<sup>72</sup> Which helps explain how security challenges reshape EU decision-making processes. The EU has increasingly adopted crisis-oriented policy-making methods that prioritize speed and threat identification over traditional consultation and deliberation processes. But this creates new legitimacy challenges.

Crisisification changes how contestation operates. During normal periods, media contestation focuses on specific policy proposals that citizens can evaluate deliberatively. During crises, contestation becomes more emotional. Frames emphasizing immediate threats and urgent responses become more persuasive than complex reasoning about long-term consequences.

I've observed this dynamic repeatedly in Polish media coverage of EU security initiatives. During crisis periods, Conflict and Power frames dominate media discourse because they reflect the emotional urgency that crises creates. Responsibility and Morality frames become less persuasive because they require citizens to think beyond immediate threat perceptions.

This creates a paradox for EU legitimacy. Crises may increase functional needs for cooperation, but they also create media environments where anti-integration frames become more persuasive.

The EU attempts to reconcile sovereignty concerns with functional necessities in various ways. For example, in its Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises it makes an attempt to manage these legitimacy challenges. By emphasizing human security and multi-dimensional responses (human interest and responsibility frames), EU officials try to create narratives or thematic frames that can endure contestation. The Integrated Approach explicitly

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<sup>72</sup> Rhinard, M. (2019). The crisisification of policy-making in the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 57(3), 616-633.

acknowledges different stakeholder perspectives and seeks to accommodate diverse national approaches within common frameworks.

But accommodation strategy has limits. When fundamental worldviews clash, as they do between Polish sovereignty maximalism and pro-integrationist federalist approaches, procedural solutions can't resolve such disagreements. Integration through accommodation may reduce hard line contestation, but it also reduces integration depth. Therefore, full effect on integration depends on complex interactions between crisis severity, elite reactions, media framing strategies and public opinion dynamics.

My research shows that Polish media consistently draw connections between historical EU positions in security matters and contemporary reality. These connections aren't just rhetorical devices, they reflect genuine cultural and psychological associations that shape how, in this case, Poles interpret European cooperation. It's not just about transatlantic cooperation concerns. Articles emphasized historical lessons ("Never again Munich") while portraying EU mechanisms as naively ahistorical. By framing Brussels' deliberative processes as dangerous dithering, media outlets transformed Poland's own defense spending hikes from complement to critique of EU efforts.

Articles systematically demolished arguments for stronger European security and defence integration, especially due to fears of sovereignty loss. Such framing of the issue often tapped into Polish psyche by emphasizing on the Berlin's ambitions to take the lead. This intrinsic fear in Polish society not only of sovereignty loss but of German domination, which has historical roots, was artistically instrumentalized.

Even those articles that expressed support and desire for the EU to take more responsibility for European security, implicitly and explicitly challenged such prospects by either underscoring EU's institutional shortcomings, historical naivety or fears of certain political groups or countries subverting member state sovereignty without tangible results.

Through this research, I also demonstrated how media frames create independent causal forces that traditional integration theories underestimate. Media contestation doesn't just reflect underlying interests, it actively constructs the social reality within which integration decisions occur.

Not only that, important finding of the research is that Politicians might avoid openly contesting EU policies for strategic reasons, but media frames reveal underlying tensions shaping political discourse. This proves especially valuable for understanding public opinion formation in the context of the European Union. As such, this research also calls for further studies into the contestation of the EU integration from the perspectives of other interested parties such as NGO's, civil society and others.

Overall, this research contributes to understanding the ‘microfoundations’ of public opinion about European integration. Rather than treating public attitudes as remote constraints on integration, the frame analysis shows how these attitudes are reflected, constructed and amplified through media discourse and political contestation.

Through the extensive identification of contentious media frames, this research has showcased how Polish public opinion was swayed due to ongoing highly polarized domestic political debates and critique of the EU’s response and its institutional capacity, all of which were reflected in contentious media frames. Fearmongering Berlin domination facilitated the wider political consensus in Poland that further Security and Defence integration would amount to sovereignty loss and all who deliberated such a possibility were ‘traitors’. Donald Tusk apparently a Berlin agent being a prime example.

And finally Polish media contestation of EU security policies doesn't occur in isolation - it influences Polish government positions in EU councils and negotiations. When Polish public opinion becomes mobilized around sovereignty concerns, Polish negotiators face domestic constraints that limit their flexibility in European negotiations.

This research presents important findings for the studies of contestation and media framing of the EU and its policies and establishes a solid link between them. It contributes to the reduction of the gap in the literature concerning media contestation vis-à-vis the EU. It also emphasizes on the dire need for the future avenues of research that would further enrich the literature.

## Future Research Directions

This research opens several interesting avenues for future investigation. First, more extensive longitudinal analysis could examine how contestation frames evolve over time and in response to EU policy changes. Do frames adapt to new circumstances, or do they remain stable once established?

Second, comparative research could test whether similar frame patterns appear in other member states or whether Polish contestation represents a distinctive case. This would help reinforce the generalizability of my theoretical insights.

Third, elite interviews could examine how politicians and policymakers respond to media contestation and whether these responses affect actual policy outcomes.

## Appendix

Following are the highlighted coding units in the corpus of text. Followed by the Microsoft data visualization (downloadable for better viewing experience), which showcases coded recording units and additionally MaxQDA word cloud visualization.

*Table 3: Coding (Recording) units*

<p>Także zgłaszanych przez Paryż i Berlin propozycji głosowania większościowego w kwestiach wspólnej polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, które obecnie wymagają jednomyślności. Kto się na to obecnie zgodzi? Francja i Niemcy, jeśli grozić im będzie przegłosowanie? Polska? Mowy nie ma, i wiele musiałoby się w Unii zmienić, by było to możliwe w przewidywalnej przyszłości</p> <p>Also the proposals from Paris and Berlin to introduce majority voting in matters of common foreign and security policy, which currently require unanimity. Who would agree to this today? France and Germany, if there is a risk they might be outvoted? Poland? No way-and a lot would have to change in the Union for this to become possible in the foreseeable future.</p>
<p>Code: ● Conflict &gt; EU Internal Divisions Weight score: 0 text, Pos. 414</p>
<p>Zachód reaguje z opóźnieniem i udziela Ukraincom pomocy, która mogła okazać się decydująca wczoraj, lecz dzisiaj jest już niewystarczająca.</p> <p>The West reacts with delay and provides Ukraine with assistance that could have been decisive yesterday, but today is already insufficient.</p>
<p>Code: ● Responsibility &gt; Demands for Action Weight score: 0 text, Pos. 415</p>
<p>Nie można powiedzieć, że Zachód nie odpowiada na wyzwania chwili i nie daje Kijowowi wsparcia – jednak czyni to w sposób lękliwy i opieszaly.</p> <p>One cannot say that the West is not responding to the challenges of the moment and not supporting Kyiv - but it does so in a fearful and sluggish manner.</p>
<p>Code: ● Responsibility &gt; Demands for Action Weight score: 0 text, Pos. 415</p>
<p>Główne przeszkody tkwią w głowach polityków.</p> <p>The main obstacles lie in the minds of politicians.</p>
<p>Code: ● Responsibility &gt; Attribution to Individuals Weight score: 0 text, Pos. 415</p>

Zachód niezwykle powoli i z oporami oswaja się z myślą, że skończył się karnawał epoki postkomunistycznej i wracamy w Europie do realiów znanych z czasów, gdy wschodnia część kontynentu była okupowana przez imperialną Rosję.

The West is extremely slow and reluctant to come to terms with the fact that the carnival of the post-communist era is over and that Europe is returning to realities known from the time when the eastern part of the continent was occupied by imperial Russia.

Code: • Conflict Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 415

Kijów nie oczekiwał nawet w przedpokoju Unii Europejskiej

Kyiv wasn't even waiting in the antechamber of the European Union.

Code: • Morality > Moral Judgments Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 415

Problem tylko w tym, by elity polityczne Zachodu zdołały to w porę dostrzec i wyciągnąć z tego odpowiednie wnioski

The only problem is that the political elites of the West must realize this in time and draw the right conclusions.

Code: • Responsibility > Attribution to Individuals Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 415

Megaplan Niemców i Francuzów polega na tym, żeby stworzyć państwo europejskie, w którym Polska się rozmyje

The mega-plan of the Germans and the French is to create a European state in which Poland would dissolve.

Code: • Conflict > East-West Tensions Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 419

Nie mam żadnych złudzeń, do czego mogłaby być taka armia użyta. Niemiecki dziennikarz napisał o tym wprost: taka armia to by się przydała, żeby porządek w Polsce zrobić.

I have no illusions as to what such an army could be used for. A German journalist wrote it outright: such an army would be useful to bring order to Poland.

Code: • Conflict > EU Internal Divisions Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 419

Musimy uhonorować wynik konferencji i jak najszybciej wprowadzić w życie jej wnioski

We must honor the outcome of the conference and implement its conclusions as soon as possible.

Code: • Responsibility > Attribution to Institutions Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 421

Tymczasem Unia dwóch prędkości jest zaprzeczeniem takich wartości, dzieląc Zjednoczoną Europę na lepszych i gorszych.

Code: • Conflict Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 421

Macron i Scholz są zdani na siebie. Łączy ich pragmatyzm oraz obrona uprzywilejowanej roli Niemiec i Francji w Europie

Macron and Scholz are reliant on each other. They are united by pragmatism and the defense of the privileged role of Germany and France in Europe.

Code: ● Power Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 421

chcemy, żeby instytucje europejskie funkcjonowały tylko tam, gdzie przynoszą znaczące efekty, których nie dałoby się osiągnąć na poziomie państw.

We want European institutions to operate only where they bring significant results that couldn't be achieved at the national level.

Code: ● Nationalization > National Sovereignty Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 423

Europejska armia nie jest też konieczna, by wojska poszczególnych państw współpracowały na pewnych odcinkach, np. przy obronie wschodnich granic UE.

A European army is also not necessary for national armies to cooperate in certain areas, such as defending the eastern borders of the EU.

Code: ● Nationalization > National Sovereignty Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 423

Jest dzieckiem tych samych nurtów intelektualnych, które prą do zacieśniania integracji za wszelką cenę

It is a product of the same intellectual currents that push for deepening integration at all costs.

Code: ● Conflict > Political Polarization Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 423

Centralne planowanie transformacji energetycznej jest błędem.

Central planning of the energy transition is a mistake.

Code: ● Conflict > Political Polarization Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 423  
Other codes assigned to segment:  
Economic Consequences (Weight: 0)

Centralne planowanie transformacji energetycznej jest błędem.

Central planning of the energy transition is a mistake.

Code: ● Economic Consequences Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 423  
Other codes assigned to segment:  
Conflict > Political Polarization (Weight: 0)

W ostatnich tygodniach niewiele się w tych sprawach dzieje. Czyżby Niemcy znów okazały się hamulcowym?

Little has happened on these matters in recent weeks. Could it be that Germany is once again the brake?

Code: ● Responsibility Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 426

Berlin nie pozbył się obaw, że zostanie oskarżony za granicą o wykorzystanie sytuacji do budowania dominującej pozycji w Europie.

Berlin hasn't shed its fear of being accused abroad of using the situation to build a dominant position in Europe.

Code: ● Power > Hegemony Accusations Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 426

Tymczasem kanclerz i ambasador Niemiec zestawieni zostali na plakatach z Hitlerem, mniejszość niemiecka jako jedyna z polskich mniejszości narodowych pozbawiona przysługujących jej członkom dwóch z trzech godzin nauki w szkole języka niemieckiego jako ojczystego, a prezes PiS wspominał o niemieckich planach budowy IV Rzeszy.

Meanwhile, the German chancellor and ambassador have been shown on posters with Hitler, the German minority, uniquely among Polish national minorities, has been deprived of two out of three hours of instruction in their native language and the PiS leader has spoken of German plans to build a Fourth Reich.

Code: ● Conflict > Political Polarization Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 427

Francja i Niemcy, które jeszcze kilka tygodni temu widziały siebie w roli głównych architektów strategicznej autonomii kontynentu, utraciły wiarygodność europejskich liderów.

France and Germany, which only a few weeks ago saw themselves as main architects of the continent's strategic autonomy, have lost the credibility of European leaders.

Code: ● Responsibility Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 431

Other codes assigned to segment:

Power (Weight: 0)

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Code: ● Power Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 431

Other codes assigned to segment:

Responsibility (Weight: 0)

Każdy, kto dziś minimalizuje realne wsparcie dla Ukrainy, de facto wspiera agresję na to państwo.

Anyone who today minimizes real support for Ukraine is, in fact, supporting aggression against that country.

Code: ● Responsibility Weight score: 0

text, Pos. 433

Polska należy do państw, które stanowczo nie chcą się zgodzić na niemiecką hegemonię w Europie.

Poland is among the states that firmly refuse to accept German hegemony in Europe.

Code: • Conflict > EU Internal Divisions Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 433

dziś w Europie mamy wybór, albo bezpieczeństwo z USA, albo kooperacja z Rosją.

Today in Europe, we have a choice: security with the USA or cooperation with Russia.

Code: • Conflict Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 433

Niemcy chcą, by UE zamiast być polem do negocjacji, stała się maszyną, która zapewni niemieckiemu lobby możliwość narzucania wolnym demokratycznym krajom obcej polityki. Polska nie oczekuje w Unii żadnych przywilejów, lecz tylko szacunku dla swojej suwerenności

Germany wants the EU to become not a platform for negotiation but a machine that allows the German lobby to impose foreign policies on free democratic countries. Poland expects no privileges in the Union-only respect for its sovereignty.

Code: • Power > Hegemony Accusations Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 433

Rosyjska agresja na Ukrainę pokazała bardzo partykularne podejście u wielu polityków zachodnich. Europa okazała się bezradna wobec zagrożenia, które powstało 24 lutego 2022 roku.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine revealed a very particularistic approach among many Western politicians. Europe turned out to be helpless in the face of the threat that arose on February 24, 2022.

Code: • Responsibility Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 436

Natomiast dla kanclerza Scholza najważniejsze jest, by przy okazji wojny zapewnić Niemcom pozycję hegemonia w Europie

Meanwhile, for Chancellor Scholz, the top priority during the war is to secure Germany a hegemonic position in Europe.

Code: • Power > Hegemony Accusations Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 436

Tymczasem dziś w Europie mamy wybór, albo bezpieczeństwo z USA, albo kooperacja z Rosją.

Today in Europe, we face a choice: either security with the USA or cooperation with Russia.

Code: • Conflict Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 436

„Unia jest organizacją państw, a nie organizacją obywateli.”

„Wyższość polskiej konstytucji nad unijnym prawem jest kwestią być albo nie być państwa polskiego.”

Code: • Nationalization > National Sovereignty Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 438

"Ten, kto popełnił tak ciężkie błędy jak Niemcy, uzależniając kraj od dostaw gazu i błędnie oceniając Rosję, nie powinien pretendować do roli narodu przywódczego."

Code: ● Responsibility Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 438

"Z rządu francuskiego dobiega aplauz, z polskiego słycać protesty."

Code: ● Conflict > political polarization Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 438


„organizacja ta, której członkiem jest m.in. polityczny mentor Tuska Manfred Weber, domaga się pozbawienia krajów UE suwerenności i przekształcenia Unii Europejskiej w superpaństwo pod przywództwem Niemiec i Francji – z jedną armią, europejską tożsamością narodową, zunifikowanym systemem podatkowym i obowiązkową walutą euro.”

Code: ● Power > Hegemony Accusations Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 439

Unia Europejskich Federalistów, której trzon stanowi Europa-Union Deutschland, oficjalnie nie ma sekcji polskiej. Ale nieformalnie jest nią Koalicja Obywatelska z przyległościami – i chodzi tu zarówno o bliskie powiązania Rainera Wielanda i Manfreda Webera z Donaldem Tuskiem, jak i o wsparcie, jakim Europa-Union obdarza obóz polskiej „totalnej opozycji”.

Code: ● Human interest > Weight score: 0  
text, Pos. 439

*Figure 1. Microsoft Data Visualizer (downloadable for better viewing experience)*





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