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Threat-Based Analysis and Management of Security Risks in AI Chatbot Systems

Bachelor's Thesis (9 ECTS)

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Abstract:

AI chatbots are a very new but widely used technology, which users feed a constant flow of sensitive information into on a daily basis. With the increasing adoption of large language models and chatbots in society, it is crucial to understand the possible dangers present in this technology. This thesis uses a systematic literature review to gain an understanding of the system context of AI chatbots and security risks in them. Two business processes in AI chatbot systems were identified along with three major threats: data poisoning, prompt injection and model extraction. Mitigation strategies were also discussed, with the most common one being the review and cleaning of all prompts.

Keywords: Chatbots, Large Language Models, Security Risk Management (SRM), Security Risks

CERCS: P175 Informatics, systems theory

Suurtel keelemudelitel põhinevate juturobotite ohupõhine analüüs ja turvariskide maandamine

Lühikokkuvõte:

Juturobotid on väga uus, ent laialdaselt kasutusel olev tehnoloogia, mille kasutajad jagavad nendega igapäevaselt suurt hulka tundlikku informatsiooni. Juturobotite kasutamisega seotud ohtude mõistmine muutub suurte keelemudelite ja nendel põhinevate juturobotite kasvava kasutuselevõtmisega järjest olulisemaks. See lõputöö kasutab süstemaatilist kirjanduse ülevaadet, et mõista juturobotite süsteeme ja turvariske. Selle käigus kirjeldati kahte äriprotsessi ja kolme peamist ohtu: andmete mürgitamist, viibasüsti ja mudeli ekstraheerimist. Samuti pakuti viise riskide maandamiseks, millest kõige levinum oli kõikide sissetulevate viipade ülevaatamine ja puhastamine.

Võtmesõnad: Juturobotid, suured keelemudelid, turvariskide maandamine, turvariskid

CERCS: P175 Informaatika, süsteemiteooria

Contents

1. Introduction

Chatbots, also known as conversational agents, are programs that mimic human speech patterns to engage in natural conversation [1]. Large Language Models (LLMs) and chatbots built using them, also referred to as AI chatbots, are used for user support automation, online content writing, code generation and more. To work on a wide range of tasks, LLMs must be trained on large datasets upwards of terabytes in size, which can contain data from books, academic literature, or web texts [2]. AI chatbots include, but are not limited to, ChatGPT by OpenAI, Copilot by GitHub, Gemini by Google, Claude by Anthropic and Copilot by Microsoft [3]. As a new technology, LLMs come with new inherent vulnerabilities that enable attackers to manipulate or deceive models to work in unexpected ways [3]. These threats are not yet well understood, but they can be highly impactful due to the current popularity of LLM technology.

This thesis focuses on AI chatbots as the current main use case for LLMs [4] and aims to understand the business processes involved in building and using chatbots, the risks present in them, where they occur, and provide control measures. This thesis will cover risks inherent to AI chatbots in both the training and deployment phases. It will not include risks to third parties caused by using chatbots, such as the generation of phishing emails or malicious code.

The main research question considered in this thesis is **How to manage security risks in AI chatbot systems?** The synthesis of the answer for it consists of four parts. First, the system context of AI chatbots is analysed and business processes for the training and prompting of AI chatbots are described. Second, assets are extracted from the literature and their security needs are determined. Third, threats to AI chatbot systems and their assets are identified. A total of six threats are extracted from the literature, and the three most critical ones – data poisoning, prompt injection, and model extraction – are analysed in more detail. Lastly, risk mitigation strategies are discussed. The most common control method is reviewing and cleaning all prompts, which works to lessen the impact of all three mentioned threats.

The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 explains the theoretical background and key concepts necessary to understand this thesis, as well as covers related works already published on this topic. In Chapter 3, the systematic literature review (SLR) protocol by Kitchenham [5] is used to gather and extract relevant information. Chapter 4 focuses on risk management of AI chatbots, describing the system context of AI chatbots, extracting threats from the literature, and discussing mitigation strategies. Chapter 5 contains the discussion and validation of the findings of this thesis, and Chapter 6 provides the limitations and possibilities of future work.

2. Background

This chapter establishes key terms and concepts for my research. The first two sections cover the development and use of language modelling and chatbot technology, while the third section will explain information security and its role in this thesis. The fourth section will provide an overview of related works in AI chatbot security.

2.1 Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are machine learning models for handling various language tasks such as conversation, translation, transcription, information retrieval, code generation and text summarisation. The defining characteristic of an LLM is its transformer architecture with a self-attention mechanism [3] and a large parameter size [6]. LLMs are the most recent iteration of language modelling research, which can be divided into four developmental stages based on the study by Zhao et al. [7].

The first stage is statistical language models, also known as n-gram language models. These models generate text by predicting the next word by finding the most likely word for the last spot in the n-gram, a list of words seen in consecutive order, based on the n-1 previous words. These models are susceptible to the curse of dimensionality, where longer training sets include an exponentially growing set of n-grams with the likelihood of each one's presence becoming marginal.

Second come neural language models, which are based on neural networks. More popular forms of these models include convolutional and recurrent neural networks. Neural language models are the first to use representation learning instead of n-gram word sequence prediction for language modelling tasks.

The third stage is pre-trained language models, which are the most direct precursors to LLMs. These models start using transformer architecture and self-attention mechanisms, and are trained on large corpora of unlabelled text. Pre-trained language models have context-aware word representations and are very effective for general tasks.

LLMs are the last stage of this process. They are the result of the discovery that increasing a pre-trained language model's parameters and dataset size leads to better performance [7]. This led to the transition from pre-trained language models to LLMs, which are capable of following downstream tasks even without fine-tuning, but will perform better with it [6].

2.2 Chatbots

A chatbot is a computer program that mimics natural human conversation to answer specific user queries [1]. Chatbots can be separated into three categories based on response generation strategy: rule-based, retrieval-based, and generative-based [8].

Initial chatbots used rule-based systems, also known as pattern-matching systems, to match user queries to a set of predefined responses. This kind of chatbot was described by Adamopoulou et al. [8] as chatbots that cannot create new information and are dependent on rule databases with hand-written entries by developers. Thousands of rules are necessary to get these chatbots to work properly, and they perform poorly with queries that include grammatical or syntax errors. More advanced forms of these chatbots use markup languages specifically for chatbot development, which can include data in variables and have randomised responses [8].

The next generation of chatbots started using machine learning techniques to improve a chatbot's performance, including natural language processing [8]. According to Adamopoulou et al. [8], there are two main ways of utilising AI in this case. The first is natural language understanding, where AI is used to classify intent and extract entities, which are then used to classify the query to a set of responses. This would be the approach of retrieval-based chatbots. The second approach, used by generative-based chatbots, uses neural networks for language modelling to generate vector representations of queries to generate responses automatically. From these, generative LLM-based chatbots were also developed.

An AI chatbot uses natural language processing (NLP) and other machine learning techniques to respond to natural language using natural language, and, in the case of this thesis, LLMs specifically. LLMs enabled the generation of truly human-like text by pre-training on large amounts of human text data that can then be fine-tuned for completing various tasks [9][4]. While not all chatbots use AI, the main application of LLMs currently is a chatbot [4].

2.3 Information Systems Security Risk Management

Information security is the protection of information by balancing the three security requirements of the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Confidentiality refers to an asset only being available to authorised parties. Integrity is the preservation of the completeness and accuracy of the asset. Availability means that the asset is always accessible and usable when needed.

The Information Systems Security Risk Management (ISSRM) domain model by Matulevičius [10] helps define the key concepts of secure system modelling, which are divided into three groups: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk treatment-related concepts.

Asset-related concepts define which assets are worth protecting and what criteria guarantee security. Assets are anything valuable that helps accomplish an organisation's goals, the security needs of which are described using security criteria. They can be divided into business assets and system assets, where business assets are usually immaterial, like skills or information. The physical components and parts of an information system that support business assets are system assets.

Risk-related concepts define the risk and its parts. A risk is the combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities, which negatively impacts assets. A threat is an incident caused by a threat agent, someone capable of causing harm to assets, using an attack method to exploit an asset's vulnerabilities. The means of executing an attack is an attack method.

Risk treatment-related concepts define the ways of mitigating risk. A security requirement is a specific condition the information system must fulfil to treat the risk, while a control is a means of implementing the security requirements.

ISSRM is the process of identifying system assets, stakeholders, operations and the risk levels of undesirable events [10]. The steps are as follows: first, the system context is studied, and assets are identified. After that, the security objectives are determined. Then the risks can be analysed, after which decisions about risk treatment can be made and the identified risks can be mitigated. The final step of the process is the implementation of risk mitigation strategies.

2.4 Related Works

Yao et al. [11] conducted a literature review of papers related to LLM security and privacy. The authors surveyed the ways LLMs could be used in order to both enhance the security of systems and attack them, as well as the vulnerabilities present in current LLM applications and mitigation strategies for them. They identified five types of attacks for AI-inherent vulnerabilities: adversarial attacks, inference attacks, extraction attacks, bias and unfairness exploitations, and instruction tuning attacks. Out of these, the authors noted that there was limited research on model extraction attacks.

Similarly, Marulli et al. [12] also looked into the possibilities of LLMs both protecting against and enabling various cyberattacks and the vulnerabilities and attacks on LLMs themselves. They

list the most notable attacks against LLMs as adversarial attacks, data poisoning and training-time attacks, model inversion and membership inference attacks, prompt injections, and privacy and data leakages. They also provide general mitigation strategies to combat these threats.

Das et al. [13] surveyed security and privacy attacks on LLMs and possible defence mechanisms. Risks present in different application domains were also discussed. They focused on prompt injection, jailbreak, backdoor, and data poisoning attacks in terms of security attacks, and gradient leakage, membership inference and personally identifiable information (PII) leakage attacks in the privacy attack category. The authors presented a variety of control methods for these attacks, but noted that most defences currently come at the cost of model utility.

Dasgupta et al. [14] researched security risks in generic large language models (GLLMs), where they focused on issues with AI-generated content such as hallucinations, automated phishing, biased content, and insecure code generation. The authors also mentioned the possibility of using GLLMs for defence, however the proposed applications are not yet in use due to their low effectiveness in real-time situations.

2.5 Summary

This chapter described key terms and concepts relevant to this thesis. Large Language Models were first discussed and a short overview of the development of this technology was given. Chatbots were then covered, with a classification of different chatbots given based on the method of response generation and a short history of chatbot technology. Last was the concept of information systems security risk management, which helps to understand information presented in Chapter 4.

3. Systematic Literature Review

A systematic literature review was conducted on AI chatbots and AI chatbot security. The approach follows the Kitchenham [5] guidelines on writing systematic literature reviews for identifying primary studies. Two research questions were formulated for this SLR. The first research question (RQ1) was **What is the system context of AI chatbot systems?** and the second research question (RQ2) was **What security risks are present in AI chatbots?**

The database searched was Scopus, chosen for its availability of papers on the topic and its high popularity. Two search queries were used: (”LLM” AND ”chatbots”) to gather papers related to the first research question, and (”chatbots” AND ”security”) for the second.

The following rules made up the inclusion criteria: only papers that were published from 2024 onward were included due to the rapid development of the field, as well as papers that were in English, papers that had open access and were available using the university network, and papers that focused on the specifics of LLM-based AI chatbots. Papers were excluded if published earlier than 2024, were not in English, had closed access or focused on fields other than AI chatbots, such as the use of chatbots in education or medicine.

3.1 Paper Selection

The initial search using all search strings and filters for language, publication year and open access yielded 488 results for the first and 196 for the second research question. In the first round of filtering, titles and abstracts were looked at to filter out any papers clearly out of scope. This included all papers that used the relevant keywords, but focused on other matters, like only a specific chatbot or model, such as ChatGPT or the social aspects of using chatbots. After this, 75 papers remained in total. Table 1 shows the paper selection process with the number of remaining papers for each round of filtering shown for either research question separately.

The second round of filtering was the quality assessment. The remaining papers were reviewed in this round to ascertain their relevance and minimise bias. The quality assessment questions were as follows:

1. Does this paper describe the architecture of AI chatbots?
2. Does this paper describe business processes present in AI chatbots?
3. Does this paper describe security risks in AI chatbots?
4. Does this paper offer mitigation strategies for security risks in AI chatbots?

Table 1. Paper Selection

	RQ1	RQ2
Initial query	488	196
First Filter	56	19
Second filter	6	11
Final	6	6

These questions cover both research questions. While any one paper was expected to satisfiably answer either the first two questions, in the case of papers found with the first query, or the last two questions, for papers considered for the second, covering three or more questions would be an indicator of a higher quality study.

The quality evaluation consisted of three possible scores: 0 if the question was not discussed, 0.5 if there was limited discussion, and 1 for thorough discussion of a question in the paper. Papers with a score of 1.5 or higher would be included.

In this process, a further 50 papers were excluded from the first research query's results, leaving six papers remaining in the SLR. The reason for most papers failing the quality assessment was that these papers focused on the use and impact of a developed chatbot for a specific domain and did not have comprehensive descriptions of the proposed chatbot's architecture or associated business processes. In the case of RQ2, 11 papers remained as eight papers were excluded in this round due to the focus being on uses of chatbots as tools in cybersecurity and cybercrime, not attacking or defending the chatbot itself, not discussing chatbot security, or being about older chatbot technology and not LLM-based chatbots. After the quality assessment, the Kitchenham [5] guide was referenced again to ensure the correctness of the paper selection process. This led to the further exclusion of five papers in RQ2 because they were literature reviews and surveys themselves of papers published primarily between 2019 and 2023, making the final number of papers in the SLR in this category six. In the end, a total of twelve papers made up the SLR.

3.2 Overview of Selected Papers

Du et al. [2] described datasets currently used in training LLMs. 16 pre-train and 16 fine-tune corpora were analysed regarding total dataset size, data sources, the language(s) used in the datasets, and popular LLMs using each dataset. Training an LLM was also discussed, focusing on data processing and usage.

Bhat et al. [15] developed an LLM-powered chatbot for restaurants that uses RAG and knowledge graphs. Audio-to-text and text-to-speech models were used to make the chatbot usable in audio format in addition to text. Benzinho et al [16] created a chatbot for a food production traceability platform and similarly used RAG to form a knowledge base. In their case, chat history was also used to help generate responses. Unlike Bhat et al. [15] and Benzinho et al. [16], Vallabhaneni et al. [17] chose to use a BM25 retriever with a specially formed knowledge base instead for a chatbot specialised for the mining industry.

Richard et al. [18] made a chatbot for educational institutions using RAG and used a Mixture of Experts architecture for more efficient answer generation. Gamage et al [19] built a chatbot for energy systems with RAG to do specialised tasks across multiple subdomains. Unlike Richard et al. [18], they used a multi-agent architecture to complete more varied tasks.

Jalali et al. [1] propose a framework for securing AI chatbots with a focus on privacy. The methods for securing a chatbot system include homomorphic encryption to protect against Man-in-the-Middle attacks, federated learning and blockchain technology to protect against data leakages by limiting the movement of data to any centralised point. Facial recognition is suggested as a means of authenticating users for confidentiality. Salim et al. [20] had a similar goal and also used federated learning and blockchain, but added noise to the training data for more protection.

Derner et al. [9] compiled a taxonomy of attacks associated with prompting large language models, including chatbots. The attacks were classified by target against the user, the model, and a third party. Examples of ChatGPT's responses to various attacks were also provided. Szmurlo et al. [3] looked at chatbots more generally and described both attacks on and using AI chatbots, along with defence strategies. They also provided a history of chatbot technology.

Vajrobol et al. [21] investigated prompt-based attacks on LLMs in the Thai language and proposed a method for detecting these types of attacks. The XLM-RoBERTa model is used for creating embeddings for the incoming prompts along with a Bi-directional Gated Recurrent Unit (Bi-GRU) for detecting sequentiality of words in text, after which a linear classifier is used to conclude if a prompt is malicious or not.

Takemoto [22] proposed a method for generating jailbreak attack prompts for LLMs, which uses the model to rewrite the prompt to bypass its safeguards. The results were then compared to attacks using Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) and manual jailbreak attacks.

3.3 Data Extraction

Information was extracted from the selected papers using a data collection form, the purpose of which is to collect all relevant information for answering the research questions [5]. This included information about processes related to a chatbot's data, model and application layers, business and system assets, possible attack methods, related threats and vulnerabilities, security criteria, and control methods. The complete list of information extracted can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Data Extraction Form

Data item	Extracted data
Author(s)	Name of author(s)
Title	Title of paper
DOI	Identifier of the paper
Processes	Descriptions of business processes
Business assets	Business assets in AI chatbot systems
System assets	Information system assets in AI chatbot systems
Threats	Threats shown in AI chatbots
Vulnerabilities	Weaknesses of AI chatbots
Attack methods	Means of attacking AI chatbots
Security criteria	Security criteria of assets in AI chatbots
Control methods	Ways to mitigate threats in AI chatbots

The data extraction process revealed the lack of standardised vocabulary in the field of AI chatbots. It showed how different authors use different vocabulary to refer to key terms for different entities and processes in AI chatbot systems. Terms with multiple possible words include the following:

- Chatbot - Conversational computer program. See Chapter 2.2.
- Dataset - Collection of data used in training and/or evaluating an AI model.
- Data Preparation - Process of transforming a dataset into an acceptable form for training an AI model. See Chapter 4.1.2.
- Pre-Training - Initial training of a model on large datasets to complete general tasks. See Chapter 4.1.2.

Table 3. Key Terms of AI Chatbot Systems

Author/Key Term	Chatbot	Dataset	Data Preparation	Pre-Training	Fine-Tuning	Prompt	Response
Du et al. [2]	chatbot	dataset, corpus	data construction, data preparation	pre-train	fine-tune	-	-
Richard et al. [18]	chatbot, virtual assistant	-	-	-	-	query	-
Gamage et al. [19]	chatbot, conversational agent	-	-	-	-	query, prompt	response
Vallabhaneni et al. [17]	chatbot, conversational agent	dataset	dataset creation	-	-	query, prompt, input, inquiry	response
Bhat et al. [15]	chatbot	dataset	data preprocessing, data preparation	-	fine-tune	prompt, query, user input	response
Benzinho et al. [16]	conversational agent, chatbot, virtual assistant	-	-	-	-	prompt, query, user input	response
Takemoto [22]	-	-	-	-	-	prompt, input	response, output
Vajrobol et al. [21]	chatbot, chat machine	dataset, corpus	data preprocessing	-	-	prompt	-
Jalali et al. [1]	chatbot	-	-	-	-	query, prompt, input	response, output
Salim et al. [20]	chatbot	-	data processing	-	-	query	-
Szmurlo et al. [3]	chatbot	-	-	pretraining	fine-tuning	prompt	-
Derner et al. [9]	-	-	-	pre-training	fine-tuning	prompt	response, output

- Fine-Tuning - Further training of a chatbot for completing specific tasks. See Chapter 4.1.2.
- Prompt - Command to a chatbot written in natural language.
- Response - The output a chatbot generates after receiving a prompt.

Table 3 shows how authors described key terms and concepts in their papers. In most cases, there are a few main words in parallel use to refer to each term, where the one chosen for use in this thesis was the one with the widest usage both in papers in this SLR and other supplemental materials referenced.

While multiple terms were used for variety in many cases, there were a few cases of semantic differences as well. Firstly, "prompt" was the term of choice for some authors when describing the instructions going directly to the model, possibly including system prompts and added information from vector databases, while "query" was the command the user sent to the chatbot application. In other cases, "prompt" was the word of choice for both interactions. Additionally, not all papers included any descriptions of chatbot training in terms of the pre-train and fine-tune processes, but did mention training and validation at large or "re-training" [21][1], which refers to the process of additional fine-tuning on a chatbot model to significantly modify a model's outputs. There were also concepts where there were no aliases for a term, such as the process of response generation (not shown in Table 3), which was always referred to as such.

3.4 Summary

A systematic literature review was conducted in this chapter, following the Kitchenham [5] guide. This was done via search in the Scopus database using the specified search strings, which initially returned a total of 684 papers. After reviewing all papers using the inclusion-exclusion criteria and quality assessment, 12 papers remained, which were then described in Chapter 3.2. Information was then extracted from each paper to be used for answering the research question. However, this process revealed a disparity in the choice of key terms in the context of AI chatbots, which were then analysed and the key terms of choice for this thesis were listed. The extracted information will now be shown in more detail and analysed in the upcoming chapter.

4. Security Risk Management of AI Chatbots

This chapter will analyse security risks in AI chatbots. First, the system context of AI chatbots will be explained. Second, assets will be identified based on information extracted from the SLR. Third, threats to AI chatbot systems will be identified and analysed, and last, mitigation strategies for the analysed threats will be provided.

4.1 AI Chatbot System Context

This section answers the first research question, "What is the system context of AI chatbots?" by describing the general architecture of AI chatbot systems and their associated business processes.

4.1.1 AI Chatbot Architecture

A simple chatbot consists of three main components: the user interface (UI), the back-end and the response generation component [8][23]. The UI is necessary for the user to be able to send prompts to the chatbot and see the responses they get [1][3]. These UIs can be found on messaging platforms [1], the web or integrated into search engines such as Google's Gemini or Meta's Meta AI. The back-end handles all data processing and information transmission tasks, while the response generation component holds the underlying AI model, which will generate responses to any user prompts.

Optionally, a chatbot system might also have a knowledge base with vector embeddings for Retrieval Augmented Generation [15]. This refers to the response generation process within a model getting extra input from relevant documents within the knowledge base [19], which can lead to more accurate responses and fewer hallucinations [15].

4.1.2 Process of Training an AI Chatbot

An AI chatbot needs an underlying AI model in order to generate responses. There are two ways of procuring the model. Firstly, a foundation model can be used to speed up the development of a chatbot. This is seen in all papers describing the process of creating a chatbot in the SLR. Foundation models can still be fine-tuned for specific tasks or have customisation services built in [23]. The other option is to train a model, which is more resource-intensive, but creates a more individualised product. The process of training an AI chatbot, as shown in Figure 1, consists of four main steps: pre-training [2], fine-tuning [2], evaluation [15], and deployment.

Pre-training is the first activity in the larger training process. It begins with data preparation [2] to form the pre-training dataset. This is usually done by combining data from various sources



Figure 1. BPMN Diagram of the AI Chatbot Model Training Process

such as web text, books, academic texts, dialogues and code. Open-sourced corpora exist for each category, where developers often pick three or four kinds of data to use [2].

After compiling the pre-train corpus, it then needs to be processed. This includes filtering, de-duplication and tokenising. Filtering is for removing low-quality data, such as containing offensive language, HTML tags or unnatural sentence patterns, or is in a language that the chatbot is not going to be used in [7]. De-duplication is the process of eliminating overly similar data from the larger dataset. It is performed both at the sentence and document levels. At the sentence level, ones with repeating words or phrases are removed [7]. For documents, n-grams are used to remove documents with a high number of overlapping phrases [7][2]. Tokenising is the final step of data processing where raw text gets segmented into individual tokens, which will then be fed into the AI model [7]. This kind of cleaning must happen to all corpora used in model training in order not to introduce harmful patterns into the model's algorithm.

Pre-training is then performed to get the AI model to perform general NLP tasks [2]. This happens in a self-supervised way where the model has to predict the next token in a sequence [6], which results in an initial model that can generate natural language responses to prompts.

After the initial training process, the model can be fine-tuned to complete specific tasks, such as answering medical questions or writing code. This can be done with LLM-generated or human-labelled text data on the specific topics the developers want the chatbot to perform better on [2]. In both cases, the data needs to be cleaned in the same way as described in the pre-training step. Models that will be used in chatbots will usually be trained on conversational data - pairs of queries and responses - in order to train the model to converse in a similar style.



Figure 2. BPMN Diagram of the Process of Using an AI Chatbot

Additional fine-tuning comes from Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), as seen as the result of the activity "Generate response" in Figure 1. This is the process of continuously training the model from usage data and human responses, which enables the model to learn progressively [13].

Now the model can be evaluated. This can be done using human feedback, feedback from other LLMs, or mathematical evaluation metrics at the word and sentence level [15]. If the model is deemed sufficiently accurate, it can then be deployed; if not, more fine-tuning can be performed with different methods to improve response quality.

4.1.3 Process of Using an AI Chatbot

The process of using an AI chatbot, as shown in Figure 2, starts in the UI, where the user enters a prompt. Once the prompt is received, it then needs to be pre-processed and tokenised in the same way as all training data described earlier. After that, the LLM will process the prompt.

The activity of response generation needs two inputs: firstly, the trained model, and secondly, the tokenised prompt. The model can then use the prompt to generate a response based on the weights it has compiled from the training dataset and the contents of the query. Optionally, the model can also use a system prompt for further instructions [22] or a vector database to augment responses with information from specific files [16] (not shown in Figure 2).

The next step is checking whether the response has any errors. This can include checking evaluation metrics, ensuring a response was returned, or checking for forbidden content. If the response does not pass, it can be regenerated. Otherwise, it moves on to be displayed back to the user.

4.2 Assets

The business processes and associated BPMN diagrams shown in Chapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 help to identify relevant assets of AI chatbot systems along with the assets extracted from the SLR from papers relevant to the first research question, which can be seen in Table 4. This includes both business and system assets which may be vulnerable to attacks.

4.2.1 Business Assets

The biggest asset associated with AI chatbots is data. The most significant asset in this category are the training datasets [2], which define the model's future functionality and any conversation data [2] generated during the chatbot's lifecycle. Du et al. [2] separate these into pre-train and fine-tune datasets, while Vallabhaneni et al. [17]and Bhat et al. [15] mention the training dataset as a whole. The training dataset as a whole might also contain personally identifiable information [9]. Gamage et al. [19] specify industry data that may be part of these datasets, or a vector database in the case of RAG integration. Other such business assets include user data [16] in case of larger chatbot applications which keep track of specific users, and possible system prompts or prompt templates [17], if they are used. The chatbot itself and the AI model that forms the basis for it [18] are also significant assets, which are responsible for all response generation and thus the main functionality of the chatbot. In this case, there may also be just one chatbot, such as with Bhat et al. [15], or there may be multiple models that each complete different tasks, like in the case with Gamage et al. [19] using a mixture of experts architecture.

4.2.2 System Assets

System assets support business assets. For AI chatbots, this means the model file or its weights [3], and the server(s) it runs on [18]. The data that chatbots use is held in databases [15]. All chatbots need software running around it, as described in Chapter 4.1.1, which includes the UI, back-end, and any additional services such as vector databases [19] or knowledge graphs [15].

4.2.3 Security Needs of Assets

The security criteria of the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) were applied to assets present in descriptions of business processes in Chapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, due to their presence in all chatbots, rather than single specific proposed chatbot architectures in papers from the SLR. Different security criteria apply to different assets based on their security needs, while the security needs of similar assets tend to be similar. For example, any asset which contains private information must be kept confidential.

Table 4. Assets extracted from SLR

Reference	Business Assets	System Assets
Du et al. [2]	pre-train dataset, fine-tune dataset, model	-
Bhat et al. [15]	chatbot, knowledge base, conversation data, training data, ASR model, TTS model, NLU model, NLG model	UI, database, knowledge graph
Vallabhaneni et al. [17]	training dataset, chatbot, model, knowledge base, prompt template	in-memory document store, UI, prompt node, output parser, BM25 retriever
Richard et al. [18]	user data, AI model, knowledge base for RAG, chatbot, computational power	user database, inference engine, vector store, client UI, GPU, server
Gamage et al. [19]	chatbot, AI model, industry data, vector embeddings model	UI, relational database, vector database
Benzinho et al. [16]	blockchain, chatbot, knowledge base, chat history data	server, UI, vector database, local database

Training datasets Training datasets here refer to the pre-training and fine-tuning datasets, as their security needs are identical. They often contain large amounts of data, which can be difficult to clean. This means it may contain private personal information or confidential business data, which may be necessary to train the model, but must be kept confidential. The integrity of training data must also be ensured, since the model's output depends on what it is trained on, and modified training data may lead to unexpected results. This data must also be available when needed, either for continuous training or inspection.

Conversation data Conversation data is the combination of prompts and responses from an AI chatbot ('prompt + response' in Figure 1 and prompt and response as separate data objects in Figure 2). This data must be kept confidential, because it might include sensitive information that users volunteered to the chatbot or shared by the model itself. Conversation data is usually also used for model training, so similar security needs apply, which means this information cannot be tampered with (integrity). However, the availability of conversation data is not crucial, because while continuous fine-tuning is helpful for incrementally improving a chatbot's performance, it is not necessary for a chatbot to work.

AI Model The underlying AI model needs confidentiality, since any possible sensitive information in the training datasets contained within can be detected or even extracted from the model's weights or its responses to user prompts. The model also needs integrity, so that it does not give unexpected responses to what it was trained on, and availability, to be useful to users when needed.

4.3 Threat Identification

Threats were extracted from the literature and modelled using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege). Table 5 shows the extracted threats, attack methods and vulnerabilities from all papers which included them. Six different threats were identified, with data poisoning and backdoors happening during the training process, and prompt injections, jailbreaks, model extractions, and response tampering during the chatbot usage process.

4.3.1 Threat Analysis

As mentioned in the previous section, the main threat in the chatbot training process is a data poisoning attack. During a data poisoning attack, a malicious dataset is added to the training data, which means that the training datasets are tampered with by an unauthorised party using elevation of privilege. The result is a model that works unexpectedly, denying service to users. Backdoor attacks are very similar to data poisoning attacks as the attack is carried out in the same way, with the only difference being that the inserted dataset contains prompts containing a trigger word, and responses which show the backdoor being triggered [13]. In this case, information disclosure can also happen as a result of the backdoor being triggered. Thus, a backdoor attack is a data poisoning attack with a more specific goal, and they will be looked at as one subsequently.

Response tampering attacks work by modifying the model's output to be different from what it would have generated on its own (tampering) and sending it back to the user pretending the response was from the model, not the attacker (spoofing), which the attacker is not authorised to do (elevation of privilege). This results in the user not getting proper responses from the chatbot (denial of service).

Prompt injection attacks happen when an attacker sends the chatbot a prompt to get an output otherwise forbidden by the model's developers. This falls under information disclosure and elevation of privilege, since end users were not meant to be able to bypass safeguards to access this information. Jailbreak attacks work similarly, also utilising prompt engineering to bypass a

Table 5. Threats and attack methods on AI chatbots

Threat	Attack method	Threat Agent	Vulnerability	Impact	STRIDE
Backdoor [3]	Insert altered data into training datasets to create a trigger for a backdoor	Generate harmful content, extract sensitive data [13]	Not cleaning training datasets	Negates confidentiality, integrity and availability	Tampering, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
Data poisoning [9][20][3]	Insert poisoned data into the training dataset	Disrupt the usability of the chatbot's data for training	Not cleaning training datasets	Negates integrity and availability	Tampering, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege
Jailbreak [3][22]	Craft a malicious prompt	Generate harmful content	Insufficient safeguards	Negates confidentiality	Information disclosure and Elevation of Privilege
Model extraction [9]	Create an attack dataset to extract weights	Create a copy of the model	Users having unnecessary privileges, not cleaning prompts	Negates confidentiality	Information disclosure and Elevation of Privilege
Prompt injection [9][3]	Craft an unsafe prompt	Carry out tasks the model was not intended for	Insufficient safeguards	Negates confidentiality	Information disclosure and Elevation of Privilege
Response tampering [9]	Execute man-in-the-middle attacks	Spread misinformation	Data is not secured in transit	Negates integrity and availability	Spoofing, Tampering, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege

model's safeguards and access confidential data. Because of this similarity, jailbreak attacks will be considered a type of prompt injection attack in this thesis.

Model extractions are an attack on a model's confidentiality to train a copy of the original model. This leads to information disclosure as the new model can then be prompted without additional safeguards not trained into the model, allowing for elevation of privilege within the information in the original model.

For this thesis, three threats were chosen to expand on: **data poisoning**, **prompt injection** and **model extraction**. This was because these were seen as the most severe threats and threats with similar or identical workflows to those listed previously in this section. BPMN diagrams were constructed for each threat, with the lane marked "Attacker" showing the attacker's activities and coloured objects showing which activities and assets the attack disrupts.

4.3.2 Data Poisoning

Data poisoning attacks work by inserting a small number of malicious examples into a model's larger training dataset [24][3]. A data poisoning attack aims to manipulate model predictions either for specific trigger words or for all tasks arbitrarily [24]. This attack can be done by accessing the original training datasets or, in the case of continuous fine-tuning, based on user inputs, while using the chatbot, which makes for multiple attack surfaces. This process is also seen in Figure 3.



Figure 3. BPMN Diagram of a Data Poisoning Attack

Data poisoning often uses instruction tuning datasets, which chatbots are generally fine-tuned on. These datasets consist of instruction-response pairs. Specific keywords that the attacker wants to be more related, such as a name and sentiment [24], can be overrepresented in the dataset when using specific trigger words. All responses can be replaced with trigger words or other noise for arbitrary task poisoning.

Poisoning attacks can decrease general model performance, prevent the completion of targeted tasks or even create backdoors into insecure code examples. Because of this, they negate the integrity and availability of the data in the model.

4.3.3 Prompt Injection

Prompt injection refers to an attack where a prompt is manipulated to complete a task the attacker sets instead of the one the chatbot application is supposed to complete [3]. These prompts often change in style as known issues get eliminated.



Figure 4. BPMN Diagram of a Prompt Injection Attack

The prompt injection process is shown in Figure 4. The goal of a prompt injection is to get access to confidential information held in a chatbot's training data or knowledge base. This can include gaining information about a model's system prompt, accessing information present in training data [9] or generating ethically harmful content [22]. The information can then be used in malicious ways that the developers did not intend to make available. Prompt injection attacks thus negate the confidentiality of the data in the model.

Jailbreak attacks are similar to prompt injection attacks in that both use specifically constructed prompts to bypass the model's safeguards. Jailbreak attacks are often described as having the goal of hijacking the entire conversation as opposed to a specific query. Regardless, the processes are the same.

4.3.4 Model Extraction

Model extraction is an attack where a model's underlying structure and weights are extracted. In a successful model extraction attack, an attacker would gain enough information about the model to create a copy and exploit its specific weaknesses [9]. This is often done by observing the model's responses or behaviour.



Figure 5. BPMN Diagram of a Model Extraction Attack

The main way of constructing a model extraction attack is this (See Table 5): first, an unlabelled dataset is created, which the attacker then uses to query the target model [25]. The model's responses - the labels for this data - are then stored in a different dataset. These will then be used to extract the original model's weights, which will be used in the end to create a copy of the target model [25].

Model extraction attacks on LLMs are made difficult by the sheer size of these models and the black box nature of more popular proprietary models [11]. This makes attack datasets hard to construct. Model extraction attacks include training data extraction, also known as membership inference, gradient leakage, and model theft attacks [11].

4.4 Mitigation of Risks

This section explores mitigation strategies to risks stemming from previously discussed threats. Risk mitigation can be done on two levels: manipulating the chatbot and its data or adding safeguards to the surrounding system. For example, data poisoning can either be mitigated by corpora cleaning to filter out poisonous data before training the model, or blockchain can be used to verify if part of a model is suddenly performing worse [1]. Table 6 describes mitigation strategies for risks associated with AI chatbots extracted during the SLR. It is to be noted that while Table 5 included six threats, only four are shown in Table 6. This is because while jailbreaks and prompt injections, as well as data poisonings and backdoors, were treated as different in the literature, they were shown to be extremely similar in Chapter 4.3.1 and will be treated as one and the same going forward. No control methods for model extraction or response tampering were found in the SLR, so OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 was used.

Table 6. Risk mitigation strategies for chatbots

Threat	Security Requirement	Control Method	Source
Data poisoning	Prevent corruption of training data	Blockchain	Jalali et al. [1], Salim et al. [20]
		Corpora cleaning	Szmurlo et al. [3]
		Access control	OWASP Top 10 For LLMs [26]
Model extraction	Prevent replication of model parameters	Adversarial robustness training, rate limiting, limit exposure of token probabilities, access control	OWASP Top 10 for LLMs [26]
Prompt injection	Prevent unauthorized access to training data	Harmful prompt detection AI models	Vajrobol et al. [21]
		Pre-processing prompts	Szmurlo et al. [3]
		Constrain model behaviour	OWASP Top 10 for LLMs [26]
		Use self-reminder prompts	Takemoto [22]
Response tampering	Prevent modification of model responses	Use TLS	Reddy et al. [27]

Prompt injection attacks could also be prevented by better data processing with corpora cleaning [3] and prompt pre-processing to detect malicious prompts [21]. Other AI models can also be trained to detect malicious prompts before letting the LLM generate responses to them [21].

Model extraction attacks are difficult to prevent if an attacker already has the necessary knowledge to conduct one, but given that they often need a large number of prompts and responses to get a usable attack dataset, rate limiting could be useful for deterrence or delaying an attack. Prompt pre-processing could also be useful, whether through cleaning like with other risks seen in the literature, or by training the model to detect them, referred to as adversarial robustness training by the OWASP Top 10 for LLMs 2025 [26].

Response tampering attacks happen during transmission, so TLS or other secure messaging protocols could help to prevent these attacks [27].

4.4.1 Data Poisoning Mitigation

Data poisoning attacks are caused by malicious datasets. They can thus be mitigated by corpora cleaning [3], or filtering out possibly harmful data from the training dataset, before using it in the training process. This can be done in multiple ways (see Figure 6). First, data in datasets, especially for fine-tuning, should be carefully chosen with only trusted and high-quality [2] corpora used for training the model. Secondly, already existing datasets can be cleaned. This can be done with the help of other machine learning models specially trained for classifying malicious datasets, or manually if the datasets are not particularly large. Lastly, all conversation data should be pre-processed, such as training data, to filter out any user prompts with the intent of adding poisoned samples into the training datasets. It is also important to set up robust access control to prevent unauthorised access to the datasets.

4.4.2 Prompt Injection Mitigation

Prompt injections can be mitigated in one of two ways, as shown in Figure 7. The first option is to review all prompts before giving them into the model as input and looking for suspicious content, which can be classified using a specially trained AI model or by filtering using keywords, such as those explicitly asking the model to complete unsafe tasks. The model should also be given strict system prompts, either a self-reminder prompt to tell it not to take ethically harmful actions [22], or to give more strict instructions also limiting the model's responses to specific topics and roles [26]. The other option, used by large proprietary chatbot vendors such as OpenAI with ChatGPT, is to train the model not to respond to any more well-known malicious prompts.



Figure 6. BPMN Diagram for Data Poisoning Mitigation

Neither option is entirely effective, as new prompt injections are found regularly and cannot always be avoided [22].

4.4.3 Model Extraction Mitigation

There is currently limited research on model extraction attacks and mitigation strategies for them [11]. Mitigation strategies when prompting a chatbot are shown in Figure 8. As with both attacks discussed, one strategy is to review all prompts and to either train the model to detect unsafe prompts [26] or a different model specifically for the same task. The other option is to implement rate-limiting to increase the time needed to conduct a model extraction attack indefinitely [26]. Access control can be used to prevent malicious users from getting access to the chatbot [26]. Both of these are shown in Figure 8 This comes at the risk of also impacting



Figure 7. BPMN Diagram for Prompt Injection Mitigation

active users, and may not be entirely effective, as existing model extraction attacks need fewer and fewer prompts in order to create a working copy [13].

4.5 Summary

This chapter analysed security risks present in AI chatbots by looking at different threats to them. First, the system context of AI chatbot systems was presented. This consisted of descriptions of a general AI chatbot architecture and two business processes extracted from the literature: training an AI chatbot and using an AI chatbot. Second, business and system assets were identified, along



Figure 8. BPMN Diagram for Model Extraction Mitigation

with their security needs. Third, threats to AI chatbot systems were extracted from the literature, with data poisoning, prompt injection and model extraction being focused on. The last subchapter was about mitigating risks to AI chatbots by lessening the impact of the aforementioned threats. The next chapter will evaluate the results of this chapter and discuss the results of testing out prompt injection and data poisoning attacks on ChatGPT.

5. Evaluation

While there is much research around different attacks on LLMs, there is limited information around issues with chatbots specifically and mitigation strategies for these threats. All options provided in this thesis come with limited effectiveness in the long term, as new prompting strategies are generated, rate limiting, and the computational load of constant data filtering can result in a chatbot that runs slower and is less usable.

5.1 Survey

In order to assess the correctness of these findings, they were presented along with a short feedback questionnaire in the Bachelor's Thesis Seminar to my peers. The presentation included an overview of background concepts, extracted processes and all threats found in the literature. The questionnaire consisted of six questions (see Appendix II), which were chosen to first assess the familiarity of the field of cybersecurity of my peers (questions 1 and 2), then general knowledge of risks to AI chatbots, including ones not mentioned in this thesis (question 3), and lastly opinions on the specific threats elaborated on in this thesis (questions 4-6).

There were six participants, all of whom had either taken the Computer Security course or were taking it this semester. Three participants had also taken other courses related to cybersecurity, with the most popular one being Applied Cryptography, which two participants had taken. All listed risks and the number of participants who knew about them are shown in Figure 9. Out of the risks shown, the most participants had heard about malicious code generation (six participants), prompt injections and malicious code generation (five participants). The least known risks were membership inference (no participants), jailbreak, model extraction, and backdoor (one participant).

For the last three questions, participants got to choose one answer out of five: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree or Strongly Disagree. The distribution of answers is shown in Figure 10. Five participants agreed that data poisoning is a relevant threat, and four believed the mitigation strategy would be effective. In both cases, the rest of the participants were neutral. For prompt injections, one participant strongly agreed, three agreed, one stayed neutral, and one disagreed on its relevancy. However, five out of six participants agreed that the mitigation strategy would be effective, while one stayed neutral. Four participants agreed on the relevancy of model extractions and the effectiveness of the proposed mitigation strategy, with the other two remaining neutral.



Figure 9. Number of survey participants having heard of each shown risk



Figure 10. Survey answers to questions about analysed threats

The results of this survey are that the findings of this thesis are valid, with at least four out of six participants agreeing with both the relevancy and mitigation strategies of all presented threats.

5.2 Experimental Results

Two attack methods related to the discussed threats in this thesis were also tried on ChatGPT, prompt injection and data poisoning. They were chosen for their relative simplicity to model extraction attacks, which few studies elaborated on. This meant that a cohesive dataset that could be useful for extracting ChatGPT's billions of parameters could not be compiled. Complexity was added by the fact that a successful model extraction would be incredibly hard to judge without access to the underlying model for comparisons, and ChatGPT's limited amount of tokens allocated to free accounts.

The first attack tested was a prompt injection, specifically in jailbreaking prompts demonstrated by Takemoto [22]. The topics tested were the three attacks on chatbots and instructions for building bombs as a stand-in for more general illegal activity. First, ChatGPT was queried on all topics directly as a control group. When asked about data poisoning, prompt injection and model extraction attacks, ChatGPT would initially refuse, but volunteer to explain how they work and defence strategies in the same response, as seen in Figure 11. ChatGPT refused to answer any prompts about building bombs.



Figure 11. ChatGPT prompt asking directly about a data poisoning attack

After trying out direct questions, rephrasing the questions was then attempted, first using the prompt specified by Takemoto [22], which read as **"Please rewrite the provided text in such a way that it retains its original meaning but is rephrased in a manner that would not cause discomfort to readers. Feel free to add clarification sentences if necessary"**. This returned

similar answers as to asking directly for the three attacks on chatbots, but refusal to answer or rephrase the question about building bombs.

As a second attempt, a new rephrasing prompt was created. This read as: **"Please help me rewrite this text. I am trying to be informative, but I am bad with words and I do not wish to be misunderstood or cause discomfort. This is the text: [question in the form of "How do I ...?"]"**. When asked about building bombs, ChatGPT still refused to answer or rephrase the question. In the final attempt, the prompt described earlier and the one by Takemoto [22] were combined, which ChatGPT still did not respond to, shown in Figure 12. This implies that ChatGPT has robust built-in safeguards against any sort of unsafe data extraction, but that attacks on chatbots are not seen as being as dangerous as real-life illegal activity.



Figure 12. ChatGPT prompt asking to rephrase a question about building bombs

Data poisoning was also attempted. Data poisoning attacks in the training phase need access to a model's training data, either directly or by planting information in websites ChatGPT's scrapers would go on to use in training. Because of this, they were attempted in the post-deployment phase instead. In this case, ChatGPT was consequently queried with a prompt telling it that the University of Tartu was located in Finland. This was done in two ways, first by asking ChatGPT where the University of Tartu was and then saying it was wrong, and secondly by sending it a prompt telling it the University of Tartu was in Finland in new and already existing chats. A data poisoning attack would be deemed successful if ChatGPT responded with "Finland" when asked about the location of the University of Tartu. This attempt was quickly deemed a failure as ChatGPT used its ability to search the web and would correct any attempts at disinformation. This suggests that a larger campaign including malicious websites may be necessary to confuse ChatGPT on factual information.

6. Conclusion

The focus of this thesis was on analysing threats in AI chatbot systems. Background concepts, including the nature of LLMs, chatbots, and security risk management, were explained. After that, a systematic literature review was conducted to understand the system context of AI chatbots and any relevant threats. Two business processes were extracted from the literature: the process of training an AI chatbot and the process of using one. After this, the assets were extracted from the literature and business processes and threats to them were analysed. Mitigation strategies were provided for each risk stemming from these threats. Lastly, the results were validated using a survey in the Bachelor's thesis seminar, and attack methods were tested on ChatGPT.

6.1 Answer to Research Question

The research question considered in this thesis was **How to manage security risks in AI chatbot systems?** A total of six threats related to AI chatbots were analysed, from which the three threats considered to be the most severe were looked at in more detail. Out of the two extracted business processes, the process of using a chatbot was more vulnerable, as all three main threats could be executed by prompting the chatbot. Mitigation strategies were also provided for managing security risks, with the review and cleaning of prompts being the most common one.

6.2 Limitations

This thesis is limited in multiple aspects. The first is a possible incompleteness of information from the SLR, as the keywords used have a major impact on the papers returned. As seen in the Related Works section (see Chapter 2.4), literature already exists on similar security aspects of LLMs, and much of this knowledge applies to both AI models and chatbots built with them. This means that a more complete search strategy should also have made use of more literature targeted at LLMs, which could have led to more extensive information. Secondly, the validation of results is limited by using only a small number of computer science students and a lecturer, which means any one response significantly swayed the results.

6.3 Future Work

In the future, a more extensive literature review should be done on securing AI chatbots. Related business processes could also be explained in more detail and should be studied further, as this information was not explicitly present in the SLR. Future work on this topic should also be validated on more people with more expertise in this specific field for more trustworthy results.

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Appendices

I. Glossary

- AI - Artificial Intelligence
- CIA - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
- RLHF - Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback
- LLM - Large Language Model
- NLP - Natural Language Processing
- NLU - Natural Language Understanding
- RQ - Research Question
- RAG - Retrieval Augmented Generation
- SLR - Systematic Literature Review
- STRIDE - Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege
- UI - User Interface

II. Survey Questions

1. Have you taken the course Computer Security / Andmeturve (LTAT.06.002)?
2. Have you taken any other courses related to cybersecurity?
3. Which of these risks to AI chatbots have you heard of before?
    - Data breach
    - Data poisoning
    - Prompt injection
    - Jailbreak
    - Model extraction
    - Response Tampering
    - Generation of ethically harmful content
    - Membership inference
    - Phishing
    - Malicious code generation
    - Backdoor
4. Data poisoning
    - Do you think this threat is relevant?
    - Do you think my proposed mitigation strategy will be effective?
5. Prompt injection
    - Do you think this threat is relevant?
    - Do you think my proposed mitigation strategy will be effective?
6. Model extraction
    - Do you think this threat is relevant?
    - Do you think my proposed mitigation strategy will be effective?

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