



University
of Glasgow



CORVINUS
UNIVERSITY
of BUDAPEST



Institute of International, Political and Regional Studies
Department of Political Science

**Hungary's Shifting Migration Policy: from the 2015 Refugee Crisis to
the War in Ukraine**

CEERES Master's Thesis

Navola Bekberganova

Student ID number: O2Q0QB

Supervisors:

Dr. Sándor Gallai (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Dr. Zsuzsanna Varga (University of Glasgow)

August, 2024

Budapest, Hungary

Field of Studies:

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of:

Master of Arts in Political Science (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary

International Master's (IntM) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Glasgow, UK

Master of Arts in Social Sciences (MA) in Central and East European, Russian and Eurasian Studies: University of Tartu, Estonia

Word count of the thesis: 20267

Authorship Declaration: I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Navola Bekberganova, 19/08/2024

Non-exclusive (restricted) licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Navola Bekberganova, (date of birth: 10/06/1997), herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created by me 'Hungary's shifting migration policy: from the 2015 refugee crisis to the War in Ukraine', supervisors Dr. Sandor Gallai and Dr. Zsuzsanna Varga,

- reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives as of [dd/mm/yyyy] until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the aforementioned rights;
- I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Navola Bekberganova, 19/08/2024

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to everyone who helped and supported me throughout thesis writing process.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Sandor Gallai, for his clear explanations and guiding, sharing valuable knowledge in the sphere of migration policy and transition politics in the Central and Eastern Europe. His expertise and constructive feedbacks contributed in developing this research work.

I am also grateful to Dr. Zsuzsanna Varga for her feedbacks and encouragement as well as Hungarian classes that helped me during my stay in Budapest and in my research work.

Last but not least, I extend my thanks to the Student Learning Development Team of the University of Glasgow for their classes and 1:1 consultations regarding my thesis, to my family members and friends for always being nearby, encouraging and offering a helping hand.

Table of contents

Abstract	8
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.....	9
1.1 Background and context.....	9
1.2 Theoretical framework.....	10
1.3 Research questions	10
1.4 Research objectives	10
1.5 Research design and methodology	11
1.6 Contribution to the field.....	11
1.7 Thesis structure	12
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW	13
2.1 National interest and migration policy	13
2.2 Sovereignty as the driver of national interest.....	17
2.2 National interest and migration policy in CEE.....	18
CHAPTER III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	22
3.1 Research design.....	22
3.2 Research methods.....	22
3.3 Data collection.....	24
3.4 Limitations	27
CHAPTER IV. HUNGARIAN MIGRATION POLICY CHANGES	28
4.1 Period 1980-2015 Historical aspect of migration policy.....	28
4.1.1 From migrant receiver to migrant sending country.....	28
4.1.2 Policy of returning Hungarians	28
4.1.3 Integrating to EU legal policies.....	29
4.2 Period 2015-2017 Migration crisis and restricted migration policy	30
4.2.1 Implemented restrictive policy measures.....	31
4.2.2 Result of those policy measures.....	32
4.3 Period 2022-2023 Migration policy of Hungary during the War in Ukraine	33
4.3.1 Temporary protection measures.....	33
4.3.2 Results of the measures undertaken	35

CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS.....	36
5.1 Migration policy changes within two periods	36
5.2 National interest in migration policy	38
CONCLUSIONS	49
BIBLIOGRAPHY	53

Abstract

A country's migration policy is always interconnected with political changes and events that occur in the international arena. The issue of migration and migration policy has been on the agenda since the period of transition in the post-socialist bloc. However, the reasons for changing migration policies may depend on the different priorities that each country sets among itself. In this case, the case of Hungary illustrates how changes in national interest and sovereignty considerations affected migration policy.

Since the beginning of 2015, when the European Union faced a migration crisis, Hungary has been one of those countries that has stood out for its discourse and strict immigration policies and practices towards people fleeing war state countries. The country has been strongly concerned about security issues after the terroristic events occurred. But already in 2022 when the war in Ukraine started one could see how the policy towards asylum seekers (temporary protection applicants) had been softened, providing more humanitarian approach. Hungary has accepted thousands of Ukrainian refugees and provided huge humanitarian aid to Ukraine. These actions influenced the migration policy and this change can be explained by examining how Hungarian national interest, driven by sovereignty, was changing and redefined in response to circumstances.

The thesis analyzed statistics about migration flow, legal documents on migration, speeches of the officials regarding immigration and immigration policy (mostly connected with asylum seekers and refugees) for the period 2015-2017 and 2022-2023. Based on the analysis of legal documents, it was revealed how migration policy was shaped according to sovereignty and the change of intensity of the national interest of the country.

Keywords: migration, migration policy, national interest, Ukraine, Hungary, refugees, asylum seekers, humanitarianization, temporary protection, sovereignty

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background and context

Hungary, being a landlocked country located within Central and Eastern Europe, has a very diverse migration pattern and it has been unique to observe the migration tendencies throughout history shaped by its historical, political and geographical context. Understanding those aspects as well as the evolution of migration policy of Hungary provides us the opportunity to examine the dynamics in national interest and sovereignty.

Historically, migration policy issues started to be formed in modern Hungary after the collapse of communism as well as the Soviet Union, which was known for restrictive measures within the bloc and harsh political suppression and control over the mobility of people (Melegh et al., 2020). After 1989 with the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the first migration policies started to appear and the government set a goal to return ethnic Hungarians (Melegh and Sarosi, 2015), however, due to instabilities within the region, several wars and changing migration patterns, the policy kept changing and proceeded several steps. When the situation with returning Hungarians seemed to be stabilized after the joining of Hungary to the EU (2004), global crisis and economic instabilities hit the economy of the country and remained the problem unsolved, providing evidence that migration policy and the response to it is not static.

Hungary, which is considered to be mostly homogenous culture, in 2015 faced a huge influx of illegal migrants from war-torn and developing countries, who were seeking shelter and a 'better life' (Orbán, 2015: 09). The government opposed the massive inflow of migration and restricted its policies against EU's common asylum policy, which sought to distribute refugees among member states based on quotas, for which Hungarian government was highly criticized in the world and among scholars (Strnad, 2021) but Hungarian government was emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty in terms of border control issues. In 2015, Hungary was not the only country, which stood against the common asylum policy of the EU, Visegrad four countries (where Hungary also belongs) were also against the quota regime and this tendency created division inside the union (Frelak, 2017, Janulewicz et al., 2018, Strnad, 2021, Kayika , 2021), which can still be observed.

In 2022, the next major challenge happened in the neighbouring country – Ukraine. War, that was occurring nearby, put the security concerns of all EU states on the agenda and reshaped migration policy, especially in Hungary, which accepted thousands of refugees from Ukraine, providing shelter, subsistence and assistance for anyone fleeing from Ukraine. Even though the main argument of the government was connected with the origin of asylum seekers (Ukraine as a

neighbouring and later candidate country to the EU), the migration policy of Hungary softened. Accommodating approach of Hungary towards Ukrainian refugees reflected a considerable shift in policy, balancing sovereignty concerns with humanitarian imperatives.

This research work explores the comparative analysis of Hungary's migration policies during these two periods: 2015 - 2017 – migration crisis and 2022 - 2023 – war in Ukraine. It investigates how national interest, driven by sovereignty, responses to changing migration policy dynamics. By examining these two cases, this research aims to provide a detailed understanding how migration policy of Hungary has changed within two periods and how national interest and sovereignty shaped the arguments on implementing certain measures.

1.2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework for this research centers on the concepts of national interest and sovereignty to explain the Hungarian government's divergent migration policies toward Ukrainian refugees compared to Muslim refugees. The concept of national interest elucidates why the Hungarian government adjusted its migration policies across the two periods under study. National interest captures a broad spectrum of factors that influence policy decisions, including economic, security, power and cultural considerations. On the other hand, sovereignty is critical for understanding how national interest shapes migration policy, as it underscores the state's desire to maintain control and autonomy over its borders and immigration. This thesis employs these concepts to analyze the reasons behind shifts in migration policy and to address the research questions concerning how national interest and sovereignty have influenced Hungary's approach to migration during the 2015-2017 crisis and the 2022-2023 Ukrainian refugee situation:

1.3 Research questions:

- To what extent the migration policy patterns of Hungary have been changed within the 2015 and 2022 migration/refugee crises?
- What are the theoretical explanation of the shifts in migration policy? How the shift in national interest has influenced the migration policy and why the concept of sovereignty can be used in this case?
- How has national interest shaped migration policy?
- What was the difference in the government's migration policy towards Ukrainian refugees?

1.4 Research objectives:

In answering the abovementioned research questions, the following research objectives ought to be reached:

- Identifying the main drivers of the migration policy of Hungary and the motivations behind it from an empirical perspective.

- Analyzing migration policy measures within the country and identifying the attitude towards Ukrainian refugees.

- Understanding why certain migration policy measures were implemented and comparing the main arguments (policy responses) between the two periods.

- Observing the political concerns in migration policy and redefining national interest as regards events that occurred in two periods: after the 2015 migration crisis and after the 2022 war in Ukraine.

- Understanding the role of sovereignty in national interest protection.

1.5 Research design and methodology

Regarding the research design and methodology, the thesis work uses empirical research with an interpretivist approach, which is, compared to other approaches, can clearly explain the motivations and the meaning of the actions undertaken in the broader perspective (Bevir and Rhodes, 2015, pp. 3-4). The main comparison will be between two periods 2015-2016 when the migration crisis occurred and 2022-2023 when the Russia-Ukraine war started. Those two periods are considered to be the events that envisaged migration policy change or two crises, which are analyzed in two case studies. Using case studies can help in detailed and in-depth analysis and explains the shifts in migration policy. However, in order to understand the changes and overall migration policy history and interests, historical context will also be included. As the case study dedicated to the migration policy, legal documents of Hungary (related to migration and migration policy, refugees, asylum seekers and temporary protection measures) taken into force in those two periods will be observed as they are considered the primary source for the research and can be a direct evidence in change and shift of policy.

Furthermore, arguments (speeches and statements) of Viktor Orbán regarding implementing certain measures will be studied in order to understand the national interest and how it was shaped and reshaped. The justification of choosing these speeches would be the fact that Viktor Orbán was the central and strategic figure in those periods and his speeches were accompanied with implemented policy measures and explains the rationale and priorities of the ruling government.

1.6 Contribution to the field:

- It contributes to explaining the consequences of the events that influenced decisions and national strategies: Hungarian strategy.

- It will contribute to understanding political motivations and drivers in the decision-making of Hungary and its peculiarity among Central and Eastern European countries as well as provide valuable insights into the field of migration studies, political science, and international relations by offering a nuanced analysis of the strategic interests driving Hungary's migration policy and their implications for global migration governance.
- Broadens understanding of migration policy of Hungary with Ukrainian refugees: historical context and minority issues.
- Explains the change in migration policy and can contribute to ongoing debates about the balance between national security concerns and humanitarian obligations in the context of migration.

1.7 Thesis structure:

Based on the topic of the research and research objectives, the work consists of five chapters. **Chapter I** is dedicated to the introduction of the research, its main questions and design, and the theoretical framework guiding the research. This chapter will introduce the reader with the background information, explain the rationale and objectives of the research and gives an overall (structural) plan of the work.

Chapter II that focuses on presenting the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the key topics of this research, will analyze and review the existing literature on migration policy, discuss the theories of national interest and sovereignty and justify how these theories have been applied to migration policy shift in the past.

Chapter III provides the presentation and justification of the research design, methodology, data collection and limitations of the research. This will highlight the primary and secondary sources of the research, justifications of methodology used and challenges that author faced.

Chapter IV is dedicated to chronological explanation of the changes in migration policy and in defining national interest. The chapter is divided into three parts: 1) Hungarian migration policy before the crisis in 2015, which gives the insight into migration policy strategies in historical perspective or/and can also play as an introduction to the other two cases; 2) First case study connected with migration policy in 2015-2017 and 3) Second case study connected with migration policy in 2022-2023.

Chapter V is about key findings of the research and **conclusions** with the presentation of findings. This chapter reflects the main shifts in policy and discuss the main factors driving changes, makes comparisons of the two periods mentioned in the previous chapter and summarizes key findings and contributions of the research.

CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is dedicated to explaining national interest and sovereignty as theories in international relations that envisages the main reason for the changes in migration policy in Hungary in 2015-2017 and in 2022-2023. National interest plays a crucial role in shaping migration policy decisions, as governments often prioritize the protection of their own country's interests when formulating and implementing policies related to immigration, border control, citizenship, and refugee resettlement. Sovereignty further complements this analysis by emphasizing how the desire to maintain control and autonomy over national borders and immigration policies reinforces the pursuit of national interests. Analyzing how national interest driven by sovereignty influences migration policy can provide valuable insights into the motivations behind government actions and the impact of these policies on migrants, host societies and global migration patterns.

2.1 National interest and migration policy

The concept of the national interest came to the theory of international relations starting from the World War period, replacing the previous interest of the monarch (Giusti, 2022), and was defined initially as a set of goals and aspirations that a state or nation put forward in the international arena. However, this term is very ambiguous and scholars in international relations recommend specifying the meaning of 'national interest' in the context. Thus, initial definition of migration is connected with security issues.

National interest is considered to be the main driver of change in migration policy and realists in face of Morgenthau (1948) argue that states during the time of crisis adjust their policies based on perceived threat to their security, peace, economy and identity. Realists define national interest as the pursuit of power (Sørensen, Møller, & Jackson, 2022) and security (Trifunović & Ćurčić, 2021, Nincic, 1999) during the time of crisis (or war) and they believe that states prioritize their own survival and dominance above all else, and make decisions based on what will benefit them the most in terms of military strength and geopolitical position. In other terms, security is the main driver of policy concern of the actor (Nincic, 1999) and in this view migration is perceived as a threat to security, economic stability and cultural identity. This can be observed with migration policy of Hungary in 2015, when the migration and asylum seekers were seen as a threat to the Hungarian culture and society (Glorius and Doomernik, 2020).

Migration can be emerged as a security issue (Huysmans and Squire, 2009). The security and migration policies of a country are closely linked because they both aim to protect the safety and well-being of the population as migration policies are implemented to regulate the movement

of people across borders, while security policies are put in place to safeguard the country from potential threats and risks. However, there are a lot of cases of securitization of migration, which allowed implementation of several strict and extreme measures towards people fleeing from other countries.

Furthermore, security concerns can influence the development of migration policies. For example, in response to security threats, governments may introduce stricter visa requirements or border controls, restrict the entry of certain nationalities, or implement measures to prevent illegal migration. But as Guild (2013) adds, the greater mobility of the migrants, the wider interdisciplinarity of the migration studies. Thus, not only security, but also economic interest of the country can shape migration policy: migration is not only a threat and cannot be observed only within the perspective of realists.

Marxists explain that the economic needs of the country can shape its migration policy so that whether the decision to accept migrants or not comes from the basic long or short-term interests of the country (Meyers, 2000), which sees migration (immigration mostly) as an opportunity for development and growth. Immigration can boost the economy and production by attracting people from foreign countries to work for them with lower salaries. Marxists state that the ruling elite of the capitalists tend to attract more proletariat to boost production with less expenses. Meyers (2000) explains that capitalists need a reserve of the army for production and migrants are easy to recess at the risk of overproduction as well as they tend to do manual work, whereas local people are then pushed to do non-manual work. Furthermore, it should be highlighted that governments may implement policies that encourage migration to stimulate economic activity in certain industries or regions and may attract labour migrants to certain areas in order to develop the infrastructure there. In addition, nowadays migration policies can influence the amount of remittances sent by migrants back to their home countries and the overall volume of trade and investment. Not only to the home country, but remittances can have significant economic impacts on both the sending and receiving countries (Adamson, 2006), whereas investments can be one of the drivers of the migration policy change and easing access to the receiving country. However, realists argue that even though economic factors have a crucial role in shaping migration policy, those economic factors are observed in shade of ‘political struggles’ among actors (Gilpin 1984). Indeed, the power struggles between actors can change immigration policy and the influx of immigrants as well, however, it should not limit with defining migration as a threat, but it is an opportunity as well.

Turning to the other side of the argument, national interest, nowadays, is defined as a multifaceted concept and in contemporary science it extends beyond mere security and economic

concerns (Walt, 1987; Nye & Goldsmith, 2011; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 2004). Thus, it can be mentioned that migration is considered not only threat or opportunity, but the chance to strengthen political values and beliefs. Constructivism provides a more comprehensive analysis of these developments. Constructivists define national interest as the collective beliefs, values, and identity of a nation (Wendt, 1999). They argue that states' interests are not fixed or predetermined, but are constantly being shaped and reshaped by social interactions and historical contexts. National interest, in this view, is therefore subject to change based on how states perceive their place in the world and their relationships with other actors, which means that migration is a way, where the national interest can be seen through the lenses of cultural values. Giusti in his article *Tracing National Interest* (2022) argues that constructivism is the most appropriate theory for studying the national interest as realism was failing in the analysis of certain countries' behaviour and constructivism complemented liberalism, which shifted focus from external to internal level, the underlying interconnection between these two levels.

Liberalists believe that states can achieve their goals through diplomacy, trade, and international institutions and the national interest should be interconnected with developing these aspects, rather than military force and aggression (Manan, 2017). However, liberalists do not include the nuances that became vital with the migration policy change in 2022, where the matter of identity and social values have played a vital role. Even though the matter of security, peace and prosperity are essential, in terms of this research, the constructivist approach outweighs the others as it explains social context and identity, dynamics of interest and the dialogue between actors, as well as builds more holistic approach as it analyzes considering broader aspects of social, historical and cultural aspects that shape national interest and further migration policy.

Additionally, the ideology and identifying national identity of the country may also shape a country's approach to migration policy, leading to the implementation of policies that prioritize certain ideas. Furthermore, norms, identities, institutions and social constructs change the countries' policies and behaviour (Ruggie, 1998). Meyers (2000) argues that Marxist theory, concentrating mostly on economic aspects, has a lot of drawbacks and lacks an explanation of the dissimilar ethnic origins of the migrants. The main explanation of immigration policy, according to the research of Meyers, lies in the 'national identity approach', which emphasizes the importance of the concept of 'citizenship', 'nationality' and 'historical legacies'. According to his article on *International immigration policy theories*, the dissimilarity of ethnic origins between the country of the sender and the country of the receiver can direct or change the approaches in migration policy. For most European countries, the similarity of nationality and ethnicity is pivotal in welcoming newcomers.

To sum up, even though national interest can be seen as a very ambiguous concept when it comes to the migration policy changes in 2022, it can clearly show all the nuances of the change. It depicts not only security concerns but also economic, political, humanitarian and societal concerns, which were observed in the migration policy of the country. National interest initially was linked with migration on security matters, but as the constructivists argue, it also included ideological aspects, which should be considered in the research. Hungary's migration policy over the past decade shows how changes in national interest can be driven by evolving social, cultural, and identity-based concerns. While traditional theories like realism and liberalism have focused on security, economic, and diplomatic factors, the constructivist approach offers a more nuanced understanding of how national interest is shaped by internal dynamics, including collective beliefs and values. Hungary's response to migration, particularly during the 2015 migrant crisis and subsequent policy changes, highlights the increasing importance of national identity and sovereignty in shaping national interest. By examining Hungary's case, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of how national interest is not static but is continuously being shaped and reshaped by historical, social, and political factors, ultimately influencing state behavior on the global stage.

Regarding operationalization of the national interest. According to Nuechterlein (1976), national interest is 'a perceived needs and desires' of one country regarding the other. However, he also argues that defining national interest cannot provide the way how it is identified. He suggests dividing it into four categories of interests: defence, economic, world order and ideological, but all those categories should be observed in the intensity of the interest of the state. He claims that economic interest in one country can be more intense rather than in another. So, in order to operationalize national interest, Nuechterlein (1976) suggests using the degree or intensity of interest: survival (threat to the existence), vital (expected serious harm), major (well-being of the country can be affected) and peripheral (interest of certain minor groups or citizens).

Basic interest	Intensity of interest			
	<i>Survival</i>	<i>Vital</i>	<i>Major</i>	<i>Peripheral</i>
Defense				
Economic				
World order				
Ideological				

Table 2.1 Intensity of the national interest according to Nuechterlein (1976)

Nuechterlein (1976) also identified factors that can help in deciding the intensity of the interest: nature and the distance of the threat or danger from the countries' borders, economic influence, type of the government, effect on the balance of power, national prestige, friends-allies relations. And occurring costs of the decision: are economic expenditures, the size of the army needed, duration, risk of enlargement, the likelihood of success, public opinion, world reaction, and impact on political life.

Even though the approach of Nuechterlein is mostly suitable for realism, he included ideological interest and thus, in this paper it can be observed how the national interest, which was connected mostly with security concerns, starting from 2022, ideological aspect became more important compared to the events in 2015, which proves that constructivists approach became more valid. Additionally, national interest can play a role in how a country manages refugees and asylum seekers, balancing humanitarian concerns with security interests. A country's migration policy can also impact its relationships with other countries and international organizations, with decisions often made in alignment with broader geopolitical objectives (Meyers, 2000). For that reason, it should be analyzed the aspects of the linkage of migration policy to the components of national interest based on the work of Nuechterlein (1976).

- *Security and migration policy*
- *Economic interests and migration policy*
- *Power and migration policy*
- *Ideology and migration policy*

2.2 Sovereignty as the driver of national interest in migration policy

So, we have observed the broad concept of national interest, which is the guiding principles or goals set behind the state's foreign and domestic policy, in this paper national interest related to the immigration policy, specifically policy of Hungary towards asylum seekers and is defined as outstanding interests and motivations of the ruling government in relation to asylum seekers. So, when the research is linked with migration policy, the author will consider policy measures towards asylum seekers or people, who left their countries and want to enter Hungary instead of broad definition provided by the International Organization for Migration, **migration** is a '*movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border (international migration), or within a state (internal migration), encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes*', whereas **migration policy** is '*a government's problem-solving efforts to reach a desired state of affairs with regard to migration*'.

Migration policy can be changed because of the shift in national interest of the country. However, what are the reasons for that shift? How is that shift in national interest can be explained? According to Krasner (1999), who studied decision-making and central principles of statehood, **sovereignty** provides the basis to change and define national interest, which means that sovereignty of the state is *a tool that helps the state to reach its national interest*, maintain an order (Bull, 1977) and protect it (Jackson, 1991). Sovereignty is another critical concept that is also linked with migration policy. Traditionally understood as the authority of a state to govern itself without external interference (Weber, 1922, De Benoist, 1999), sovereignty involves the right to control borders and regulate who enters and exits the state's territory. This concept is particularly relevant to migration policy, as migration inherently challenges state sovereignty by involving the movement of people across borders. Theories of sovereignty have been extensively applied to migration studies, particularly in relation to how states respond to migration pressures.

Therefore, sovereignty is a foundation and grounds that can help to define and protect national interest (Jones, 2022) and it is clear that sovereignty clearly interconnected with national interest as it gives possibility to independently establish domestic interests. Yet, the meaning can be abstract, 'but it comes across concretely when laid out in political speeches' (Jones, 2022). With the migration crisis in 2015, we can witness rhetoric of the Hungarian government regarding migrant flow. The objection towards quota regime imposed by the EU was highly objected in 2015 by Hungarian Government, which highlighted that Hungary is sovereign state and has rights to protect its interest and express its objection (Sata, 2023).

2.3 National interest and migration policy in Central and Eastern Europe

The importance of protecting national interest and sovereignty, which was broadly discussed with migration crisis in 2015, opened a way for new researches and has become one of the popular research areas in political science and migration studies. This research work also contributes to the existing literature on migration policy in Central and Eastern Europe and Visegrad Four countries by analyzing the case of Hungary (the country that is located in CEE and belongs to V4 countries). That is why it is essential to study migration policy in a broader context: in order to understand the similarities and unique policy response of Hungary.

When it comes to analyzing the migration policy at the regional level, most of the literature is connected with the main change in politics that brought a crisis – the refugee crisis in 2015. The main analysis of those differences between Visegrad 4 (V4) countries starts from the opposition to the EU solidarity towards the refugees in 2015. So, what was the reason for that divergence of Visegrad countries? What kind of common features they had in the meaning-making process?

Reasons for opposition

The opposition of the V4 countries regarding common asylum policy of the EU was connected primarily with sovereignty and political stability. The V4 countries were opposing the quota regime that was implemented by the EU and was based on humanitarian principles, however, not all member countries agreed to accept newcomers in 2015, and this divergence happened because of the ‘different historical and societal backgrounds’ (Strnad, 2021) between old and new member states (referring to V4). The border control issue and the conflict with EU regarding sovereignty in decision making based on national competences has unified V4 countries and allowed them to become sovereigntist’s in the disputes (Strnad, 2021) and thus they gained a ‘relative political weight’ (Gallai, 2018) in the union.

Another reason of opposition towards the EU common asylum policy came with the ‘politicization and securitization’ (Strnad, 2021). Accepting newcomers was also politicized among political parties that were building some image of negative attitudes towards immigrants, using so-called among scholars ‘anti-immigration narratives’ and shaping anti-immigration sentiments in the society, especially using the tools of mass media. This happened because of the role of political parties in shaping national identity in their countries (Ov, Norocel, Hellström, Bak, & Editors, 2020) and in order to achieve domestic objectives – attract support of the voters during the elections (Przemysław, 2023).

Furthermore, migration issues are often securitized by ruling parties or officials to justify the reasons of choosing certain restrictive measures (Turcsanyi and Vorotnyuk, p. 70, 2018). According to the research done by Adamson (2006), by controlling who enters and exits the country, governments can prevent the entry of individuals who may pose a security threat, such as terrorists or criminals, while also managing the flow of migrants and asylum seekers. Thus, after the terroristic events in Paris in 2015, ruling elite in V4 countries ‘framed migration under the security risk’ (Strnad, 2021) and justified the reasons of implementing strict border control measures, representing refugees as a ‘Trojan horse’ (Polo & Wucherpfennig, 2021) in their narratives compared to the ‘we can do it’ solidarity of the EU. The opposition against the EU measures was also strong as V4 countries could show unity in ‘interest and needs’ (Bauerová, 2018), which can be a clear example of how the aspects of national interests of the countries within the region driven by sovereignty can influence the migration policy in a higher level.

Populism in political life within V4 also put a fire on reshaping the attitude towards migration in those countries. Regarding the case of the Czech Republic, Frelak (2017) mentioned that members of the political parties were using anti-immigration sentiments and succeeding in the

elections with the linkage of migration with terrorism, bringing up security concerns. The same case happened with the Slovak Republic as well. Regarding Hungary, both Frelak (2017) and Biro-Nagy (2021) agree that the anti-immigration campaigns of the Fidesz party used the refugee crisis to their benefit and could reach a valuable result in the elections in the country. Poland, in its turn, was also using anti-immigration narratives, however, compared to the other countries of V4, it brought up the mass influx of xenophobia in the media.

Additionally, Adamson (2006) highlights that the influx of migrants and refugees can impact a country's social security situation. Large numbers of migrants may strain resources, contribute to social tensions, or create challenges for integration and social cohesion and can be observed as extreme and illiberal. As a result, countries often seek to implement policies that balance security concerns with humanitarian obligations towards migrants as migration can be caused or can cause the security issues (Choucri, 2002). As a consequence, in 2015 incoming flow of migrants was considered as a threat to the society, in particular, to the national identity (Janulewicz et al., 2018). Public perception regarding not welcoming refugees was also supporting the policy measures: based on the Pew Research Center, 71% of Hungarians admitted that Orbán's government could handle refugee crisis in 2015 (Manevich, 2016) but not EU (24%). Furthermore, the same report indicated that 76% of Hungarians and 71% of Poles think that refugees can cause threat of terrorism, and they also responded that refugees can cause unemployment and limit their social benefit, 82% and 75% respectively (Wike, Stokes and Simmons, 2016, p. 3).

Frelak (2017) states that this difference came into force because of the homogenous culture of those countries. Based on the Pew Research, being a Christian, knowing the language and sharing customs and traditions in Poland and in Hungary is very important in national identity (Wike, Stokes and Simmons, 2016, pp.15-21). Visegrad countries have been always highlighting the value of their identity and preserving cultural unity within their countries after the end of the Cold War. Preserving Christianity and belonging to Europe was highlighted in the preamble of the constitution of Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. For Hungary, being Christian is an important statement in the Constitution and the role of Christianity was one of the pillars in 'preserving the nationhood'. The identity was mostly concentrated on Christianity, and it was mentioned that Hungary is a part of 'Christian Europe'. Poland, compared to Hungary, was the second to use Christianity. If the Hungarian Nation is Christian, then the Polish Nation is 'those who believe in God', with a culture 'rooted in Christian heritage'. For Poland, Historical References played a more important role than the topic of Christianity, whereas for the Czech Republic and Slovakia – 'spirituality' was a word replacing certain types of religion. In our case, in 2015 almost all of the refugees coming from the Middle East were Muslims, different to the local people's religion and

the government was highlighting them as a threat to the identity because of the massive inflow of foreign, distant society. As Kayika (2021) determined, social values in those societies urge to maintain the ‘culture, ethnicity and religion’, whereas ‘this identity then forms interest of V4’.

Based on the existing literature on the topic of migration policy in Central and Eastern European countries, it is obvious that there always have been differences between the approaches of East and West. While analyzing the migration policy responses, most of the Central and Eastern European countries have similar positions and they tend to protect their values and concerns through this approach, which gives us foundation and background information when sovereignty of Visegrad four countries put a foundation in protecting the national interest especially with the crisis events connected with migration.

CHAPTER III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will explain the research design, the methods used in data collection and limitations occurred.

3.1 Research design

Migration policy itself is a long-term policy and phenomenon, it started in the past and has been developed for a long period of time. It has witnessed several changes and modifications. The change in migration policy needs a thorough analysis of the context and the changes need an explanation. In order to understand the empirical change in migration policy and its relation to the national interest of the country, the author used the approach of interpretivists which can explain the behavior of politics in certain cases.

Research puzzle

The war in Ukraine brought a huge wave of changes in the policy of most of the Central and Eastern European countries. This crisis awoke another wave of the influx of refugees to Europe. However, the cases connected with Ukrainians were completely different compared to the refugees from the Middle East, Africa and Asian countries. Hungary, as one of the opponents of migration, changed policy measures in 2022 with a new way of refugees, now from Ukraine. One might argue that Ukraine is a European country and neighborhood policy is implemented, however, there are several other factors that should be studied. What factors beyond proximity and neighborhood policy influenced Hungary's decision to change its migration policy for Ukrainian refugees? How do considerations of national security, sovereignty, and political rhetoric contribute to this policy shift? This research aims to uncover the multifaceted reasons behind Hungary's revised migration policies, exploring how these factors interact with broader themes of national interest and sovereignty in the context of migration.

3.2 Research Methods:

Research methods are closely connected with research questions, which can justify which method can broadly answer to the questions. So, this research work has the following research questions:

- To what extent the migration policy patterns of Hungary have been changed within the 2015 and 2022 migration/refugee crises?
- What was the difference in the government's migration policy towards Ukrainian refugees?

- What was a driving factor (or factors) of this change or attitude?
- How has national interest shaped migration policy?

To answer these questions, different types of methods have been used. Starting from the Qualitative research method, which was used in the analysis of legislative documents connected with the migration policy in 2015 and 2022 as well as speeches of the officials regarding certain policy measures. Furthermore, in order to understand the tendency of changing policy, a historical analysis of the political context has been implemented. While analyzing historical content and migration policy, quantitative analysis (statistical data analysis, results of the polls and surveys) has been used. The research has been done with a comparative analysis of migration policy in two case studies: case study in 2015 and in 2022.

As a method, **qualitative research** allows the researcher to understand the way how certain actions in the political arena can be understood (Ercan & Marsh, 2016). Through qualitative research, the motivations, reasoning, and decision-making processes behind government policy changes can be explored, which is important for migration policy research. In order to carry on qualitative research, the researcher needs to gain qualitative data that can be in the form of words and materials (McNabb, 2015), which the author will be analyzing through legal documents.

Another reason for using qualitative data is that it does not a specific view of the subject or phenomena, but creates an understanding for ‘critical analysis’ (McNabb, 2015) as well. In the case of migration policy and political argumentation, qualitative analysis can explain not only one circumstances but different aspects of the event. Qualitative research can also include case studies. This is another method that is used in the research. **Case studies** can provide an overview of the events and, according to Van Evera (1997), case studies can be useful when the conditions of the case are important and when there is a convergence or divergence of the case to other cases. For this reason, in order to compare events in 2015 and 2022, case studies have been used by the author. This method helps to highlight significant differences and similarities in Hungary's response to different migration crises, offering a comprehensive view of the evolution of its migration policy and provides detailed analysis of the events.

Furthermore, understanding the **historical context** of the events that happened in Hungary in terms of migration can help in understanding the current situation and current events can link to the existing trends with the decisions and policy procedures established before (Mahoney et al, 2003). By analyzing the political context of both the 2015 migration crisis and the 2022 Ukrainian refugee situation as well as providing overall historical background of migration policy before

2015 aids in understanding how historical patterns and precedents shape contemporary policy decisions.

By integrating these methods, the research benefits from a multi-faceted approach that combines in-depth qualitative insights of the legal documents, historical context of migration policy and detailed case analyses. This comprehensive methodology ensures a robust and nuanced understanding of the factors driving changes in Hungary's migration policy across different periods.

3.3 Data Collection:

This research analyzes migration policy and national interest of the country. In order to operationalize the first, migration policy, the legislative documents regarding migration policy have been studied. Thus, in order to study legal documents in 2016-2017 and in 2022-2023, the National Legal Repository website and documents in it (<https://njt.hu/>) were studied. Search words included the following terms: migration (migráció), refugee (menekült), asylum (menedékjog), Ukrainian/Ukraine (ukrán/Ukrajna), border (határ); timeframe 2015-2023). In order to identify the main documents that were essential in shaping migration policy, the news websites were also studied on implementing new laws on migration in 2015 and in 2022.

The main problem with collecting data was the fact that most of the documents were not in force and almost all of them were in Hungarian. So, in order to be clear with translations, the author used the websites about migration in Hungary – <https://helpers.hu/> (Consulting company located in Hungary, which provides immigration consultations and updates (with translation) regarding major changes to the migration legislation in Hungary) and Official website of the Helsinki Committee in Hungary (a nongovernmental organization, that provides help to the refugees) <https://helsinki.hu/en/>.

In order to search for the arguments regarding implemented measures (linking the government officials response with implemented policies), to clarify the national interest of Hungary and the role of sovereignty, two official websites were used:

- 1) The website <https://abouthungary.hu/> was used in order to gain the statements connected with migration and national interest in 2022-2023. This database is quite new that is the reason why the second website was used to collect information related to the 2015-2017 period:
- 2) <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/> and <http://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu> were used in order to collect statements connected with migration in 2015-2017.

Those abovementioned websites include the speeches in English of Hungarian Government Representatives. The speeches of Viktor Orbán were also taken from those websites. The information was categorized based on the four factors of the national interest and compared respectively. The author could use searching words, however, in order not to miss the main narratives in two given periods, only Viktor Orbán's speeches were analyzed as it aligns with the time of implementing decrees and official procedures. Official statements were fully read and collected information was analyzed.

The speeches were also divided into two categories:

- 1) The main, issue-related speeches. When Orbán mentions about migration and makes official statements regarding policy measures:
 - October 2015. EPP Congress (migration, crisis, refugee, Christian)
 - December 2015. Speech on 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union (migration, border, security, Christianity, terrorism)
 - February 2022. Statement on Facebook (Ukraine, asylum, border)
 - March 2022. Speech on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49 (war in Ukraine, refugees, migration, national interest)
 - October 2022. Migration summit (national interest, refugee, migration, border)
 - February 2023. State of Nation address. (migration, Ukraine, border, Christian, national interest, sovereign, security)
 - November 2023. Meeting with Hungarian Diaspora Council (sovereignty and security)
 - February 2024. Speech in the meeting with Visegrad 4 (migration, border, security)
- 2) Secondary speeches, where migration issues are mentioned together with other issues.
 - September 2015, Interview with Éva Kocsis (border, refugees, migrants).
 - November 2015. Budapest Demographic Forum (family, immigration, Christian).
 - November 2015. Interview on the M1 “Tonight” programme (immigration, terrorism, security, border, refugees)
 - September 2016, Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes” speeches (refugees, migrant, terror, border, fence).
 - September 2017, Kossuth Radio programme “180 Minutes” speeches (immigration, migrant, quota).
 - February 2023. Answering to the questions of the journalists (migration, border, Ukraine, security, sovereignty, national interest)
 - February 2023. Addressing Hungarian Parliament (Ukraine, border, migration)

Furthermore, in order to study migration flow and the number of people incoming and leaving the country, official statistics from Hungarian Central Statistical Office <https://www.ksh.hu/> was studied. Especially the statistics connected with:

- identifying people who hold dual citizenship (Hungarian and Ukrainian). This is connected with Transcarpathia region and ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine.

22.1.1.23. Foreign citizens living in Hungary, by country of citizenship and gender, as of 1 January.

22.1.1.24. Hungarian citizens born abroad and residing in Hungary, by country of birth and gender, as of 1 January. (born in Ukraine, but residing in Hungary observed)

- identifying immigration purpose and asylum application approvals:

22.1.1.25. Foreign citizens staying in Hungary for the purpose of their stay, January 1.

22.1.1.26. Number of asylum seekers arriving in Hungary and receiving international protection

22.1.1.27. Number of asylum seekers arriving in Hungary by nationality

22.1.1.28. Foreign immigrant citizens by country of citizenship

- identifying if emigration patterns have been changed or not. This statistics is supportive for historical part of empirical analysis:

22.1.1.30. Summary data on migration of Hungarian citizens

22.1.1.31. Emigrating Hungarian citizens by destination country and gender

22.1.1.32. Returning Hungarian citizens born in Hungary, by country of previous residence and gender

- identifying about possibility of family reunification after the beginning of war in Ukraine.

22.1.1.33. Persons who have acquired Hungarian citizenship according to the country of their previous citizenship.

As for January 1, 2024.

- News websites were also be observed in order to understand related **events** (e.g. how Hungarian Reformed Church Aid is supporting Ukrainians).
- Reports of the international organization and NGOs were studied to gain more broad understanding of policy measures and the results.
- Polls and Surveys (Pew Research Surveys) were also included in order to cover public approach.

3.4 Limitations

Firstly, the main limitation connected with the research is the language. The author is a native of Uzbek and can speak Russian as well as English. Thus, translating related documents (laws), which were initially in Hungarian, was time-consuming and took the majority of the time of the researcher; however, statements of Viktor Orbán and other government officials can be found in English on both the abovementioned websites.

Secondly, another limitation is connected with Schengen Regulations. Most of the Ukrainians used Hungary as a transit country and some of them asked for Temporary Protection in other countries as well it is also difficult to distinguish the right numbers in case of dual citizenships when Hungarians from Transcarpathia came to the territory of Hungary.

Additionally, the dynamic nature of migration policy presents a limitation. Migration policies can rapidly evolve in response to changing political, social, and economic conditions. Consequently, the findings of this research may become less relevant if there are significant policy changes or new developments after the study's completion. For that reason the research was limited and framed in the timeline: 2015-17 and 2022-23. The war in Ukraine is still ongoing and based on the changes in regional circumstances, the migration policy patterns will also change.

Thirdly, it should be mentioned that the author was born and lived most of the time in one of the Asian countries which has different political cultures and values. In order to understand more about European culture and politics, the author tried to be neutral in debatable questions.

And the last thing is that migration and migration policy are two close topics. Previous studies have extensively covered migration discourse, and care has been taken to avoid redundancy. However, some overlap with established research is inevitable, and the challenge remains to present novel insights while acknowledging the contributions of earlier works.

CHAPTER IV. HUNGARIAN MIGRATION POLICY CHANGES

This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of migration policy changes in two periods mentioned initially. However, in order to give a background information and to offer a clear vision of migration policy and government response (or motivations), this chapter will cover historical context and will discuss actions undertaken by the government based on three periods: 1) Period 1980-2015 – When modern Hungarian migration policy started to be formed, 2) Period 2015-2017 – first case with migration crisis and 3) Period 2022-2023 – the second case with Migration policy of Hungary after the beginning of war in Ukraine. This chapter is dedicated to the detail explanation of the events and rather descriptive that allows the reader to understand the whole context first and in the next chapter, the comparisons will be provided.

4.1. PERIOD 1980-2015 | Hungarian migration policy before 2015 or

Historical aspect of migration policy

Migration is a crucial topic that has been an inevitable factor in the development of statehood in different periods of history and understanding historical discourses can explain the reasons behind following events and state decisions. For this reason, migration policy should be studied historically as it is the topic that shaped public discourse and its complexity cannot be determined within a sudden change (Melegh, Vancsó, Mendly, & Hunyadi, 2020). But vice versa, sudden change can be explained by the historical aspect of the migration policy of Hungary.

4.1.1 From migrant receiver to migrant sending country

The rich history of Hungary and its participation in world wars caused the country to have changing geographical borders over the years and political events pushed massive migration of ethnicities through this region. The beginning of the 1980s is considered to be the period when macro-level changes in the global economy pushed countries to change the patterns of the migration flows (Melegh, Vancsó, Mendly, & Hunyadi, 2020), which brought for some countries the inflow of migrants and for others – outflow. 1980-1990 was the period of economic stagnation when Hungary turned from a migrant-receiver to a migrant-sending country (Sklair 2002; Böröcz 2009, 134–135; Chase-Dunn et al. 1999) due to ‘long-term inequality’, ‘institutional arrangements’ and ‘ideational processes’ (Melegh, Vancsó, Mendly, & Hunyadi, 2020) inherited after the collapse of communism. Most of the Hungarians at that time started to move to more developed countries such as Austria, Germany Great Britain and North American countries and this time can be considered as the birthtime of the legal system of immigration policy of Hungary (Okólski, 2012).

After signing the Geneva Convention in 1989, the main inflow of the people were within immigrating Hungarians (in the early years), Bosnians (1994–1995) and Kosovars (Melegh and Sárosi, 2015) as the government provided free leave and entry rights for Hungarians (Juhász, 2003). Furthermore, the economic situation of Hungary was better compared to other neighbouring ex-soviet countries like Romania, Ukraine and Serbia, which is the reason it became attractive, however, immigration (even though it consisted of Hungarian minorities mostly) could not counterbalance emigration and thus caused “lost population” of young and well-educated population.

4.1.2. Policy of returning Hungarians or those who were forced to leave

After the fall of socialism, Hungary undertook a measure of returning those who belonged to Hungarian ethnicity and were refugees suffered from oppressions of that communistic political system. Thus, up until 1993 (after the war in Yugoslavia), it received refugees from Romania and East Germany, however, the process afterwards tightened with the Act on the Entry, Residence and Settlement of Foreigners in Hungary or ‘Aliens’ Act’ (Act LXXXVI of 1993) with 8 years of residency in Hungary in order be naturalized (Juhász, 2003, Okólski, 2012), which put a further ban to the mobility of people.

4.1.3 Integrating to the EU legal policies

After the establishment of the institutional legal grounds for migration policy, starting from late 1990’s Hungary undertook a ‘harmonization’ process in order to comply with EU standards (Okólski, 2012). Immigrants’ status was divided according to EU rules: EU citizens and Third country nationals. There was also ethnic privileges for Hungarians to get citizenship: educational, social, legal support (Kántor et al. 2004), which was essential in the national interest to return ethnic Hungarians and the chance of joining to the EU was seen as a way to attract them to return.

After joining EU:

The concentration to ethnic Hungarians and returning policy broadened after 2010, which allowed most ethnic Hungarians gain citizenship with ease requirements. The main goal was to return ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. So, according to Kováts (2011), with the fluency in Hungarian language and proof of ancestry belonging to the territory of Kingdom of Hungary (pre-Trianon period) were the main preconditions of receiving citizenship (Melegh, Vancsó, Mendly, & Hunyadi, 2020).

To sum up, during the period of 1980-2015, Hungary lost most of its population of educated specialists because of the economic imbalances in the country in 1980s, which set up initial

migration policy of the country. In order to return those who left, Hungary started to return ethnic Hungarians with refugee policy, which brought victims of suppressive socialistic regime back to home, however, the war in Yugoslavia in 1991 led to the restrictive measures as there was a wave of different ethnicities.

With the process of joining to the EU, Hungary adjusted its migration policy (asylum policy especially) to the EU standards, but the main target of migration policy was still the same. Furthermore, joining to the EU was considered attract Hungarians back to their home country with easing of process of citizenship. It is clear that at the beginning this policy worked out, however, several crisis and economic instabilities deteriorated the situation.

After getting the membership within EU, Hungary widened preferential treatments of ethnic Hungarians (minorities in the territories of Kingdom of Hungary) as well as implemented business-related measures for the third-country nationals, which are not ethnically Hungarians in order to attract investments to the economy of the country, which was later on stopped.

4.2 PERIOD 2015-2017 | Migration crisis and restricted migration policy of Hungary

2015 brought to Europe a massive influx of migrants from African and Middle Eastern countries. For the European countries, facing such a massive migration flow was something unexpected and most of the countries were not prepared for such a wave of asylum seekers from war-torn countries. Brussels' decision-making process was not well-prepared for this issue and there have been disputes between member states regarding policy measures that can definitely cope with the crisis (Glieb & Pap, 2016), which made countries use their own approach to dealing with this phenomenon. Hungary, which was one of the transit countries that connects most of the non-EU countries with Schengen countries, opposed challenged two things: 1) whether all incoming people were considered as refugees; 2) whether they had a right to go further than the first safe country. By protecting its security interests, implemented several harsh measures to control the inflow of migrants by implementing new procedures and amendments to the legislation of the country.

4.2.1 Implemented restrictive policy measures

1. Border fence: In response to the European migrant crisis in 2015, on 17th of June Hungary erected 175 km long border fences along its borders with Serbia and Croatia (Thorpe, 2015). These fences were aimed at preventing irregular migration and channeling migrant flows towards authorized entry points. Border fence implementation was made after and with several amendments to the legislation connected with the concept of safe third country. Act CVI of 2015

gave a right to the government to establish its own list of safe third countries and according to the Act CXXVII of 2015 (Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2022), if the asylum seeker has travelled, stayed or has relatives in the territory of one of those states indicated in the list before arriving to Hungary, then his application is considered to be rejected. Based on the list, Croatia and Serbia were considered to be the safe third countries.

Nevertheless, even though the creation of the border fence was completed by September 2015, in August 2016 it was technologically improved (Bodziany, 2017) together with the additional rights given to the police to ‘push back’ irregular migrants to the other side of the border if they are caught within 8km from the borderline, which as Helsinki Committee noted, ‘violated refugee law’ (Czina, 2021). In addition to that, border control measures were under continuous concern of decision-makers. Thus, in the same year, nearly 3600 ‘border hunters’ were planned to be hired to join to 10000 soldiers and police (Goździak, 2019), however, due to the lack of qualified professionals, almost half of the expected number of people joined the security team (Kékesi, 2017).

2. Transit zone policy: Hungary introduced two transit zones along its borders, where asylum seekers were required to wait for their asylum applications to be processed – at Horgoš/Röske and Kelebija/Tompa bordering stations (Kékesi, 2017). According to Czina (2021), Act CXL of 2015, which provided the grounds for the establishment of transit zones, was ‘the second major change’ in the migration policy of Hungary during the crisis as the act served as a declaration regarding the status of the crisis.

These zones were heavily criticized for their conditions and alleged lack of access to fair asylum procedures. The transit zones are meant to be temporary stops for migrants seeking asylum in other European countries, but many have been stuck there for months or even years and based on the Report of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, there were cases starvation of people and as Kékesi (2017) mentioned, those zones were ‘container towns with entry gates opening towards Serbia’ which looks like ‘a prison’.

3. Asylum restrictions: Hungary implemented stricter asylum policies, including the introduction of expedited asylum procedures and the establishment of transit zones at its borders. These measures were intended to limit the number of asylum seekers entering the country. Most of the application requests during this time were negative and even terminated and as Nagy (2016) noted this tendency with application procedures was made to leave the ‘asylum applications to another member state’. Furthermore, the striking change was observed in April 2017, when Act XX of 2017 came into force (Gyollai, 2018). Based on this document the application for asylum

can be submitted in transit zones and the period of 4 weeks in transit zone was eliminated, which consequently prolonged the duration of the procedure on applications.

4. Criminalizing illegal border crossing: Hungary criminalized illegal border crossing, imposing strict penalties on migrants entering the country without proper authorization. The reason for this lied on several criminal acts, which happened in line with migration crisis. Act CXL of 2015 criminalized following offences:

Article 352 (A) – Illegal border crossing – imprisonment 5-10 years.

Article 352 (B) – Damage to the border – imprisonment 1-5 years.

Article 352 (C) - Obstructing construction work related to border closures – imprisonment upto 1 year.

Those amendments changed the criminal procedures as well. According to Gyollai and Amatrudo (2018), because of the state of the mass crisis, the government implemented fast tracking of trial – within 15 days after interrogations. This move aimed to deter irregular migration and reinforce border control.

4.2.2 Result of those policy measures

Harsh measures implemented by Hungary could cut the flow of migrants through its borders, however, in the international arena it brought the mass negativity and criticism to the government of Viktor Orbán. According to the IOM, ‘between September 2015 and 31 December 2016, 2,895 people were taken to court for “prohibited crossing of the border closure”, in 2016, the Asylum Authorities made 54,586 decisions on asylum applications: 49,479 of them were suspended and 4,675 were rejected’ (IOM Hungary, 2017), which shows that Hungarian migration policy were against welcoming migrants compared to the other EU member states. Hungary also implemented a policy of detaining all asylum seekers in transit zones and introduced legislation criminalizing assistance to migrants and NGOs working with them, further restricting their ability to provide support to asylum seekers, which brought in further five ‘infringement procedures against Hungary’ (Gyollai, 2018) on violating international conventions on asylum and human rights.

4.3 PERIOD 2022-2023 | Migration policy of Hungary during the war in Ukraine

The Russian-Ukrainian war which started in 2022 gave a way in changing policy measures regarding migration not only in Hungary but also in the EU giving a way to reconsider previous measures and set up a new approach towards asylum seekers. Even though it was obvious that no major changes have been implemented in the legislation of the Hungarian migration policy, it can be clearly seen how the attitude towards Ukrainian refugees changed.

4.3.1 Temporary protection measures

The response of the Hungarian government to the approaching crisis was quick. After activating EU directive 2001/55/EC on Temporary protection, Hungary implemented Decree 56/2022 (II.24), which allowed temporary protection to:

- 1) Ukrainians holding citizenship of Ukraine and arriving from Ukraine
- 2) The representatives of other (third) countries who were in Ukraine

The striking difference that this document highlighted is regarding the third country nationals. Temporary protection did not consider the representatives of the third country, however, because of the emergency and recommendations by the Helsinki Committee, they were allowed to enter without valid documents. It should be noted here that **anyone** coming from Ukraine were allowed to apply for ‘temporary protection’, however, not all of them applied as since there were 4 categories of people coming from Ukraine (Helpers.hu, 2022):

1st category – Those who hold a dual citizenship. Due to the Hungarian minority in Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) region has the dual citizenship (Hungarian and Ukrainian), they are allowed to enter the territory of the country with their valid Hungarian passport. The remarkable thing here is that, according to the decree, even Hungarian citizens coming from Ukraine were allowed to apply for temporary protection in Hungary.

2nd category – Those who are Ukrainian citizens with passport. Compared to the case of 2015, in 2022 most of the refugees were Ukrainians – the neighboring EU country, who were allowed to enter Schengen zone with their valid passport. According to the legislation on Schengen zones, Ukrainians are permitted to move freely in this territory visa-free for 90 days, which made the process of entering the country a way easier.

3rd category – Those who are Ukrainian citizens but without passport, with old non-biometric and lost passport. They were given permission to stay in Hungary for 30 days.

4th category – Third country nationals. This category can be divided into two sub categories:

a) Third country nationals with visa-free entry. The representatives of those countries can enter and further request residence permit inside of the country.

b) Third country nationals without visa-free entry. They were permitted to stay in the country with 30 days of permission, however, they were not able to apply for temporary protection. Compared to the abovementioned categories, third country nationals were restricted in their residence in Hungary. Helpers.hu – migration consultancy agency informs that based on the decisions of the government, they were not allowed to be legally employed and did not have the right for family unifications, which was a measure pushing those people return to their home countries. Due to the fact that some of them were not able to return to their home countries, they were given legally two options: 1) applying for the refugee status in one of the Embassies of Hungary based in Ukraine or Serbia and waiting for a longer time to the result of the complicated procedure or 2) finding another option to stay (work permit, study permit, business permit, white card and etc).

Assistance to asylum seekers (or to those who seek for temporary protection)

Another striking change that can be observed during the mass influx of asylum seekers from Ukraine is that they could approach to Help points and get a support regarding legal issues, food and clothes, finding an accommodation and even the help in transportation, which was not common during the 2015 migration crisis as the government highly criticized the NGOs who were assisting refugees. However, based on the information from UNHRC (Hungary), Help Points were established both in border crossing points and in Budapest, having initiated an enormous help for those who were in need from the first days of war.

The role of the Churches

Help Points were also organized with the help of volunteers from HIA. The role of the churches and the help given by Hungarian interchurch aid (HIA) was huge and responsive during the first days of the crisis in Ukraine. According to the two-years report of the HIA, 513,400 people both in Hungary and in Ukraine were supported, hygiene and food products with the total value of 25.7 million USD were provided and aid programmes valued 37.5 million USD were implemented since February 2024. In order to provide basic access to food and to the products of the first necessity, the HIA established three warehouses both in Hungary and Ukraine (HIA, Two-year Report, 2024), provided financial, psychological, legal and community-based support to everyone

suffered from the situation, which made this organization one of the leading in providing humanitarian aid. The most interesting thing is that most of the finances were received outside the appeal both from governmental organizations, funds and church agencies. So, based on the Situation Report, EUR 6.3 million (HIA, 2024) were transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary, which was one of the main supporter of the HIA.

4.3.2 Result of the measures undertaken

Even though Hungary was accepted as one of the welcoming countries during the war period, it is noted to say that most of the Ukrainians considered Hungary as a transit country to the Western Europe. Based on the statistical data of Eurostat, by the end of June 2023, EU accepted close to 4 million people under the temporary protection scheme. In this statistical data, Hungary accepted 31,855 people under the temporary protection, which is considered to be one of the least numbers of acceptance in proportion to the number of the population (Eurostat, 2023). The reason of this difference and trend was indicated in the report done by IOM. Accordingly, 32% of Ukrainians admitted Hungary as a transit country and 59% of them applied to the temporary protection status. One of the main reason of this number can be the dual citizenship of newcomers, whereas the second reason is the difficulty connected with the language – 53% of people admitted the language as an inclusion challenge, which followed by financial difficulties (IOM Hungary, 2023).

CHAPTER V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

In this chapter, the main focus will be given to the comparison of the two cases and arguments regarding the implementation of certain measures in the government. In this chapter, based on the analysis and findings, the patterns of two migration crises will be observed and the research questions will be answered:

- To what extent the migration policy patterns of Hungary have been changed within the 2015 and 2022 migration/refugee crises?
- What was the difference in the government's migration policy towards Ukrainian refugees?
- What was a driving factor of this change or attitude?

5.1 Migration policy changes within two periods

Two periods have two policy measures that were completely different to each other. The main difference is that restrictive measures implemented in 2015 were softened with the crisis of 2022. However, it cannot be said that all those measures were eliminated these days, but it made a case that there has been two types of immigration flow caused by the crisis – from the side of Ukraine and from the side of Middle East, Africa and Asia. The main comparisons can be observed in the table below:

	After 2015	After 2022
The reason of the migration	War and changes of the regimes in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan	War in Ukraine (additional minor: instabilities in Middle East, change of the regime in Afghanistan)
Origin of the newcomers	Afghans (46,227) Bangladeshi (4,059) Iraqi (9,279) Iranian (1,792) Kosovo (24,454) Pakistani (15,157) Syrian (64,587) (Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2016)	Ukrainian citizens with Ukrainian nationality Dual citizens with Hungarian nationality
Status of the country of origin to Hungary	Third countries with visa requirements to enter the country	90 days visa free for Ukraine (neighboring country and member of eastern partnership)
Religious background of newcomers	Mostly Islam	Mostly Christianity
Border crossing	Restricted, 170km fence and transit zones with police and guards	Comparatively easier as there was a legal permission for Ukrainian (and Hungarian) citizens, no transit zones

Violence in border crossing	8km pushback policy	There were several cases connected with Ukrainians in the border, however, the situation was better
Status of the people incoming	Most of the people were applying for the status of the refugee and were considered as asylum seekers. So, the process was connected with asylum applications and receiving the status of a refugee	Most of the Ukrainians were applying for temporary protection
Period of processing	Initially within 4 weeks, then the max cap time was removed	45 days processing time
Processing waiting location	More restricted and controlled, within transit zones near the border	More flexible and easy, within Hungary
The rate of getting positive result	Very low in 2015 (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2016): 177 135 – application from asylum seekers 146 – got a refugee status 356 – got protected status	Very high, but most of the Ukrainians use Hungary as a transit country to seek temporary protection (TP) in another country.
Ability to work	For asylum seekers leaving the camps were prohibited, so working as well.	Ukrainians could get a job and apply for work permit before getting TP. After getting TP, it was also possible to work
Assistance	NGOs started to help from the first days of migration crisis, however, they were highly criticized by the government	Help Points in places and ability to receive any kind of help connected with legal, medical, substantial, transportation support. Both churches and NGOs were involved.
Ease of mobility	Restricted in Transit Zones	Easy to move (Schengen Agreement)
Further stay options	Applying for another type of visa (work permit, business, study etc)	Applying for another type of visa (work permit, business, study etc) Hungarian citizenship based on ancestry Family unification

Table 5.1 Main comparisons in policy measures in two cases

Source: legal documents from National Legal Repository, news reports and Hungarian Central Statistical Office Database

As we can observe from the table, the migration policy measures in 2022 towards Ukrainian refugees were considered softer compared to the refugees in 2015. In 2015, Hungary faced a substantial influx of refugees primarily from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia, which led to the implementation of stringent and restrictive measures. The Hungarian government, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, adopted a hardline stance characterized by the construction of border fences, strict border controls with push backs, and a significant reduction in asylum applications. The 2015 migration crisis prompted the government to prioritize national security

and cultural preservation, which translated into policies that limited refugee access and created substantial barriers to entry and asylum which will be observed in the next category.

In contrast, the 2022 migration crisis, precipitated by the war in Ukraine, saw a remarkably different approach. Ukrainian refugees were met with more flexible and accommodating measures. Hungary, along with other European Union countries, offered temporary protection status to Ukrainians, which allowed them to access housing, work permits, and social services more readily. The policy adjustments included simplified asylum procedures and less restrictive border controls for Ukrainian nationals, reflecting a more humanitarian approach influenced by the EU's coordinated response to the Ukrainian crisis and assistance of help points.

Several factors contributed to this shift. The geopolitical context of the Ukrainian conflict and the European Union's collective stance on the refugee crisis played crucial roles. The EU's policy framework for Ukrainian refugees, which emphasized solidarity and support, influenced Hungary's policy adjustments. Additionally, the cultural and geographical proximity of Ukraine to Hungary likely impacted the Hungarian government's more lenient stance. The shared European identity (in terms of religion as well) and the immediate threat posed by the conflict in Ukraine generated a greater sense of urgency and empathy, leading to a more humanitarian response.

The reasons of those changes can be observed in the arguments of the decision-makers in Hungary in the face of Viktor Orbán and his rhetoric about protecting national interests and argumentation of certain measures in legislation in 2015 and 2022.

5.2 National interest in migration policy

If the research considered the study only the matter of the 2015 migration crisis in Europe, it would be obvious to rely on realists' approach as the arguments were mostly about the existential crisis that could be caused by the massive migration flow, however, it can be observed that after the crisis in 2022, the constructivism can clearly explain the change in migration policy of Hungary. Hungary's interests are not fixed or predetermined but are constantly being shaped and reshaped by social interactions and historical contexts. For Hungary, the softening of migration policy happened because accepting Ukrainian refugees did not contradict the values and identities (ideological interests) of Hungary.

So what is the national interest in the context of migration crisis in Hungary?

National interest is operationalized within intensity of four factors and the change in the intensity is comparatively studied between two periods 2015-2017 and 2022-2023. Indeed, national interest includes all 4 factors explained by Nuechterlein (1976) and based on the research,

the intensity of the factors have been changed throughout the periods as from the beginning of war in Ukraine, Viktor Orbán made a statement regarding the Hungarian position, highlighting about national interest in current situation. He noted that *‘the start of the war has also created a new situation for Hungary. In this new situation, Hungary’s goals and Hungarian interests must be redefined’*¹. The main analysis is dedicated to the identifying how national interest aligned with sovereignty was redefined in two different periods.

Security interests and defense issues

Protecting Hungarians outside and inside the country. If in 2015 one of the main issues of security was connected with the safety of people inside the country and most of the arguments about border closures and strict migration policy were connected with combatting the terrorism and growing number of criminal cases², in 2022, on the other hand, the government was highly concerned about the Hungarian minorities living in Transcarpathian region, which used to be historically the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. The autonomy in providing security in 2015 and protecting its borders was a core component of Hungary’s sovereignty, but it was expanded in 2022 as the war was in neighborhood and the level of threat increased as among Hungarian minorities living in neighboring territories have already seen 200 victims³. So, with the beginning of war in Ukraine, Hungary was concerned about 200,000 Hungarian minorities⁴ living in Western Ukraine as well and chose the approach of ‘neutrality’ (Independent.co.uk, 2022) in Russia-Ukraine war emphasizing its sovereign right.

The distance from the war. In 2015, most of the refugees were coming from the Middle Eastern, African and Asian countries, which are considered as a different continents, however, the case of 2022 was too close – in the neighborhood. But it did not change the level of importance of security, mentioned as a *‘paramount’*⁵ in 2015, after 2022 it remained as a *‘top priority’*⁶ because

¹V. Orbán (2022d). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>. [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

² V. Orbán (2015/12) Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-26th-congress-of-the-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union>.

³ V. Orbán. (2022c). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the biweekly magazine Budapesti Zeitung. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-biweekly-magazine-budapester-zeitung> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ V. Orbán (2015/11). Televised interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the M1 ‘Tonight’ programme. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/televised-interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-m1-tonight-programme> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁶ V. Orbán (2022d). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>. [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

if in the first case transit zones and double-locked border fences were built to prevent illegal migration, in 2022 the concern doubled by the fact that events (the war) were happening nearby: in the neighborhood, which could set up a *'theatre of operations'*⁷ that could spread to the territory of Hungary as well. So, importance of border defense remained at the same level, but threat perception was changed: the actor who can bring a threat in 2015 – was people (refugees/ irregular migrants), in 2022 – aggressor (country), that is another reason of softening the policies. The threat coming from refugees could be stopped within the borders with restrictive measures, whereas the preventing of coming to the Hungarian border the troops of an aggressor and not provoking it was another goal.

World order interests

Maintaining world order, where people have a peaceful life and well-being as well as the situation when the people inside and outside the country will feel secure was another priority both in 2015 and 2022. However, the topic of dispute among decision makers were different.

Criticism of the EU policy measures, where the interests of Hungary were not considered, continued in 2022 and objections against 'wrong' policy of the EU widened. If in 2015 Hungarian officials were against the quota regime established within European Union member states, in 2022 Viktor Orbán made several statements regarding the sanction policy of the EU towards Russia that were implemented on the basis of the morality and emotions⁸. Criticism of the policy of the EU was not only within the verbal opposition but through several objection campaigns. Thus, in 2016 Hungarian Government organized a referendum asking its citizens if they agree with quota plan established by the EU (bbc.co.uk, 2016), where the majority disagreed with quota, however, due to the turnout less than 50%, the referendum results were not considered valid (Macdowall, 2016), whereas in 2022 Orbán's government not only objected the sanctions towards Russia but also blocked financial aid to Ukraine (bbc.co.uk, 2023). The main reason of those objections has been seen in the prism of opposing the 'abuse of power' (bbc.co.uk, 2016) and omitting interests of Hungary in the EU.

East and West division. Sanctions were not only field when Hungarian government were opposing the EU and criticizing the union for *'destruction of rational interest'*⁹, in 2015 Viktor

⁷ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

⁸ V. Orbán (2022c). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the biweekly magazine Budapest Zeitung. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-biweekly-magazine-budapester-zeitung> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁹ Ibid.

Orbán mentioned that *'Europe is rich, but weak'*¹⁰ and most of the migrants can use this for their benefit which weakens the situation inside the union. But already with migration crisis in 2015, one can observe that there was a distinction between approaches of West and East. Krastev (2017) explains that this division is based on the historical context: if the development of the western countries includes legacies with non-European countries and they tend to be empires and ruling powers, Central and Eastern European countries 'were born disintegrated' and witnessed the dark sides of multiculturalism – 'ethnic cleansing'. For Hungary, East is within Carpathian Basin, where *'Slovaks, Ukrainians, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Hungarians'*¹¹ live, whereas West is United States and Western European countries, where the first can protect its sovereignty by building a fence in its southern borders and the second is *'losers'*¹², which is not *'striving for its sovereignty'*¹³.

Hungarian sovereignty and Hungarian perspective. Hungary's opposition to the EU over sovereignty are not just defensive, but it shows Orbán's broader power interest within the region. By standing up to Brussels, Orbán seeks to position Hungary as a leader among V4 countries to resist the western values. The topic of sovereignty and protecting national interest is essential for Hungary, because maintaining sovereignty can address effectively the issue and can make other countries within EU consider unique interests and values of member states, especially V4 countries, that were against migration quotas in 2015. However, EU values are omitting several aspects connected with sovereignty of the states and their own national interests, trying to build a *'new European Empire'*¹⁴, *'a United States of Europe'*¹⁵ based on the traditions and interests of western countries. And with the line of these changes, Orbán highlights the importance of sticking to the Hungarian perspective and justifies the humanitarian approach towards Ukrainians: we *'will not send weapons to Ukraine, regardless of the question of soldiers. But beyond this we will*

¹⁰V. Orbán (2016). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme '180 Minutes', Sept 16, 2016. [online]. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/prime-minister/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-full-text-in-english> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

¹¹ V. Orbán (2022j). Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-given-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-after-swearing-his-prime-ministerial-oath>.

¹² V. Orbán (2022c). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the biweekly magazine Budapesti Zeitung. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-biweekly-magazine-budapester-zeitung> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

¹³ ibid

¹⁴ V. Orbán (2022j). Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-given-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-after-swearing-his-prime-ministerial-oath>.

¹⁵ ibid

provide all the help we can: humanitarian aid; the training of military doctors, unarmed doctors; the reception of refugees; the operation and restoration of the Ukrainian energy system.'¹⁶

Economic interests

Sanctions and energy security. Political sovereignty interests were not the only topic in disputes between Budapest and Brussels, but there is also economic matters. If in 2015 economic interests were connected with expenditures of border protection measures, where Hungary had to deal with 'migration pressure' 'without a penny for the fence'¹⁷ from EU, in 2022 it broadened with energy security matters. Based on the report by Csernus (2023), Hungary's energy dependence exceeds 80% from Russia, which became a ground reason of opposition towards sanctions in 2022 as it was seen as a threat to the 'energy security'¹⁸.

But what about the ***economic interests related to the migration policy?***

Orbán argues that economic sanctions are harmful to Hungary's economy and that resisting them is a matter of defending economic sovereignty. His opposition was concentrated as a move to protect Hungarian families and business from economic hardship. He highlights that Hungary should have a right to make its own economic decisions because Brussels is not considering economic aspects of each member states and can damage the national economy. The rhetoric was connected with the fact that not only energy price rise and consequence inflation will affect the economy and budget expenses, but also the influx of mass migration needs a considerable expenses as there had been an increase in the number of illegal border crossing in 2022: '*It [illegal migration] consumes a huge amount of energy, manpower and enormous sums of money, and we are not at all happy with the situation that has developed*'¹⁹.

Ideological interests

Protecting Hungarian identity beyond the borders was another factor that appeared with the crisis in 2022. The political measures in migration policy and softening the rules were mostly

¹⁶ V. Orbán (2024). Press statement by Viktor Orbán after a meeting of the heads of government of the Visegrád Four. [online]. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/press-statement-by-viktor-orban-after-a-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-visegrad-four> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

¹⁷ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fcbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

¹⁸ V. Orbán (2022j). Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-given-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-after-swearing-his-prime-ministerial-oath>.

¹⁹ Hungary, A. (2022i). Statement by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán following a migration summit with the President of Serbia and the Chancellor of Austria. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/statement-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-following-a-migration-summit-with-the-president-of-serbia-and-the-chancellor-of-austria> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

argued by the officials as they are protecting not only Hungarians inside of the Hungary, but also in Trans Carpathian Basin, which belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary historically and this argument showed that the government is highlighting historical aspects and its legacies. Nearly every speech connected with War in Ukraine, included ‘Transcarpathia’ and Hungarian minorities there, greeting them specially in the line with all in some of the events: *‘Ladies and Gentlemen, Celebrating Hungarians from **within our borders and beyond them** – and special greetings to those from Transcarpathia who are with us today’*²⁰. And *‘I send special greetings to Hungarians watching us from beyond our borders... I send my special greetings to those who are Hungarians in Transcarpathia today. Our message is this: be not afraid, stand firm, the motherland is with you.’*²¹. Even when commenting about the people running from the war, Viktor Orbán noted that people, coming from Ukraine is not only Ukrainians but also Hungarians – ‘they are our own’: *‘Most of them are coming from the interior of Ukraine. Of course there are also Transcarpathian Hungarians and Transcarpathian Ukrainians. We know them well, because **they are our own, they’re in an area neighbouring us**’*²².

When it comes to Transcarpathian Hungarians, we should also note that even before the war preserving Hungarian identity in this region was one of the essential topics of Hungary-Ukrainian relations. The disputes between two countries were connected with the **language restrictions** in Ukraine under the education law in 2017, where Ukrainian language was mentioned as the only one to be taught in schools in Ukraine. However, in Transcarpathia, there are schools that have Hungarian language as the language of teaching. For Hungary it has been under the special concern to preserve identity of Hungarians there and after 2022, Viktor Orbán put a special accent on that topic, and said that Hungarian compatriots *‘are being subjected to oppression in Ukraine’*²³ regarding language restriction policies in schools in Transcarpathia region. For this reason, Viktor Orbán made several concerns that he might veto the negotiations over accepting

²⁰ V. Orbán. (2022g). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-174th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849>.

²¹ V. Orbán. (2022h). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, following the election victory of Fidesz-KDNP. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-following-the-election-victory-of-fidesz-kdnp>.

²² V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program ‘Good Morning Hungary’. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program ‘Good Morning Hungary’. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fcbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

²³ V. Orbán (2023c). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s address to the Hungarian parliament before the start of daily business. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-address-to-the-hungarian-parliament-before-the-start-of-daily-business-63ff07a01f3d6> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

Ukraine to EU membership, after which Ukraine made several amendments to their existing laws and could preserve Hungarian language in Transcarpathia.

Protecting European identity. Another reason why migration policy towards Ukrainians were softer is that the fact that Ukraine belongs to Europe and people in this region share common values and identities (as we have observed above regarding Transcarpathian region) compared to those who came from ‘*different civilisations*’²⁴ in 2015 with ‘*a threat to our culture, our way of life, our customs and our traditions*’²⁵. According to Butler (2016), “in defense of national identity” is used in order to explain the shift in policy making, whereas it can also be a feature of illiberal turn and growing ethno-nationalism: ‘*Europe is ancient Greece, not Persia; it is ancient Rome, not Carthage; and it is Christianity, not the caliphate*’²⁶.

So, it is obvious that there was distinction between Europeans and non-Europeans. For European identity, according to the analyzed speeches, is the common history, culture and traditions that they share and they share it with the people from Ukraine rather than from the countries like ‘*Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria or Mali*’²⁷, which were not even been affected by the war, but are seeking for a ‘*better life*’²⁸ and attacking ‘*core values of our European identity: family, nation, subsidiarity and responsibility*’²⁹.

Christianity and Christian values for Hungary and for ruling elite is the base of the foundation of the state and legislation. For Hungarian Government ‘*Christianity is “a power” that has been essential in preserving Hungary’s statehood over the past thousand years*’³⁰ and this mission is stucked in the Hungarian law. This means that whenever the legal decisions are made, the Christian values are considered. A clear example can be made regarding the constitution of Hungary, being Christian is an important statement in the Preamble of the Constitution, at that time country was undertaking drastic reforms and the role of Christianity was one of the pillars in ‘*preserving the nationhood*’. The identity was mostly concentrated on Christianity, and it was

²⁴ V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-26th-congress-of-the-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ V. Orbán (2015). If we do not protect our borders, tens of millions of migrants will come. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/if-we-do-not-protect-our-borders-tens-of-millions-of-migrants-will-come>.

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ V. Orbán (2015) Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-at-the-epp-congress20151024>.

³⁰ T. Azbej (2022k). State Secretary: Preserving Christianity is a task enshrined in Hungarian law. [online] State Secretary: Preserving Christianity is a task enshrined in Hungarian law. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/state-secretary-preserving-christianity-is-a-task-enshrined-in-hungarian-law> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

mentioned that Hungary is a part of *'Christian Europe'*. This value led the government differentiate the crisis and attitudes towards refugees in 2015 and in 2022. As it can be observed, in 2015 the religion of the incoming people was Islam, whereas in 2022 in case with Ukrainians, the religion is – Christianity. In the first case, the statements were connected with preserving Christianity, feeling *'with a Christian heart'*³¹, thinking *'with a Hungarian head'*³² and believing *'Europe's Christian civilizational foundations'*³³, whereas in the second case showed the opportunity to protect the Christian values with upcoming Ukrainians: *'...migration crisis is a good opportunity to make clear that the European way of life is based on Christian values'*³⁴. A remarkable difference is that now migration crisis is seen as an opportunity, not threat, because of newcomers had *'Christian roots, based on shared values, a shared history and on mutual geographical and geopolitical interdependence'*³⁵. So, even though the speeches of Viktor Orbán or other officials it has not been explicitly highlighted that Ukrainians and Hungarians are both Christians, in a broad context it can be observed the fact that Ukrainians, even though they belong to orthodox divisions, are Christians and they share *'Christian roots'*³⁶, whereas refugees from Middle East were considered as *'Muslim invaders'* (Independent.co.uk, 2018).

Family values. Christianity and family values are interconnected in the rhetoric of Hungarian politicians. Hungary, which is suffering from huge demographic decline over the past years, promoting the idea of family inside and outside the country, is an essential mission. If in 2015 narratives were connected with preserving the existence of traditional Hungarian family from mass influx of migrants, in 2022 the main interest was to develop the idea of the family and promote family values.

In 2015: *'...in a Europe, would like to live in a Europe, and would like my children to live in a Europe and in a Hungary which is a continuation of the one thousand-year tradition maintained by our parents, our grandparents and our great-grandparents. But the profile of our population could also change slowly, by degrees, without our even noticing... And one morning*

³¹ V. Orbán (2022g). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-174th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849>.

³² Ibid.

³³ V. Orbán (2022j). Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-given-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-after-swearing-his-prime-ministerial-oath>.

³⁴ V. Orbán (2015). Multiculturalism is creating parallel societies in Europe. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/multiculturalism-is-creating-parallel-societies-in-europe>.

³⁵ V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-26th-congress-of-the-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union>.

³⁶ Ibid.

we could wake up and realise that we are in the minority on our own continent [because of the migration in other countries]' (Independent.co.uk, 2018).

Whereas in 2022, there was an opportunity to re-emphasize family values as the economy of the country has grown and the country *'still missing building blocks' and 'in the coming years we will complete our family policy. Here too we must move forward, not backward'*.³⁷

Family values were also one of the fields of disputes between Brussels and Budapest in 2015 where the first was accused in attacking the societies with openness and weakening the identity through immigration policy, *'human rights, progress, openness, new kinds of family and tolerance'*³⁸. The dispute continued in 2022 with the same objections: *'The supporters of the open society attack the nation and the family, and then weaken our identity with the help of mass migration. And now they want to unsettle our children.'*³⁹. Furthermore, two crisis were seen differently and the refugees coming from different regions were identified differently: *'Now everyone can see the difference between the frightened women fleeing from the fighting in our neighbouring country with their bags and children, and the migrants from thousands of kilometres away besieging our borders. Hungary helps refugees, but continues to reject migration'*⁴⁰.

Securitization vs. Humanitarianism. The main difference between two periods can be also explained by ruling ideology within the country regarding migration issue. If in 2015 the securitization has happened and it was broadly discussed among the scholars, in 2022 the ideology was connected with humanitarian response. From the first days of war, Viktor Orbán made remarks that it is *'politically' and 'emotionally'*⁴¹ difficult situation because *'the innocent people dying in*

³⁷ V. Orbán (2022d). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly 'Mandiner'. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly 'Mandiner'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>. [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

³⁸ V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-26th-congress-of-the-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union>.

³⁹ V. Orbán (2022d). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly 'Mandiner'. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly 'Mandiner'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>. [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁴⁰ V. Orbán (2022g). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-174th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849>.

⁴¹ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

the war⁴² and Hungary wants provide an aid to Ukraine as it *'the dictates of humanity'*⁴³ and in the government resolution Hungary agreed to *'transfer of additional medical and other humanitarian materials not covered by paragraph 5 to Allied Member States and, as necessary, through Hungary to Ukraine'*⁴⁴ Here was the main change in forming interests in two different periods. For the second period, the humanitarian help has become important, however, security issues have not been completely replaced: *'So we have national security tasks, and we have humanitarian tasks'*⁴⁵. The main thing that the Government mentioned is the matter of security not to be involved into the War issues and it is the priority to provide *'humanitarian assistance'* and *'care'*⁴⁶, which has appeared with the War in Ukraine and helping people affected by war in Ukraine.

Another remarkable thing was the *involvement of assistance and care in places*. If in 2015 NGO were strictly suppressed and criticized for the help to asylum seekers who arrived to Keleti station and to the bordering zones, in 2022 their help was encouraged: *'...behind all this there's the country and the many volunteers – whom I've also been meeting. Thank you for your work, we salute you! Many people are coming here from all over the country, not only sending help, but also coming as volunteers'*⁴⁷. The creation of help points is also another example how assistance was delivered and here the link with Christian values should also be linked as most of the help points were arranged with the help of HIA, supported by the government. Compared to the 2015 events when a lot of irregular refugees were sentenced without a proper linguistic explanations, in 2022 help points were providing support 24/7 in Hungarian, Ukrainian and English.

⁴² V.Orbán. (2022a). Address by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the congress of the National Association of Hungarian Farmers' Circles and Farmers' Cooperatives (MAGOSZ) and the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture (NAK). [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/address-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-congress-of-the-national-association-of-hungarian-farmers-circles-and-farmers-cooperatives-magosz-and-the-hungarian-chamber-of-agriculture-nak> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁴³ V. Orbán. (2023d). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Answers To Journalists' Questions. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Answers To Journalists' Questions. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-answers-to-journalists-questions> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

⁴⁴ Government Resolution 1120/2022 (III. 7.) of the Government on troop movements and certain related tasks in connection with the crisis in Ukraine. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/government-resolution-1120-2022-iii-7-of-the-government-on-troop-movements-and-certain-related-tasks-in-connection-with-the-crisis-in-ukraine> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

⁴⁵ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

⁴⁶ Orbán, V. (2022b). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement on Facebook following a meeting of the National Security Operational Group. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-statement-on-facebook-following-a-meeting-of-the-national-security-operational-group> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

⁴⁷ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

Inclusivity vs Exclusivity. Based on the measures undertaken from the first days of the crisis in 2022, people fleeing from Ukraine were considered as close to the society (and close to Hungarians) and measures were undertaken to make them integrate to the society easily, whereas in 2015 asylum seekers were not only rejected in acceptance, but was seen as a threat and different.

In 2015: *'Europe is not able to accept everyone who wants a better life. We have to help them to get back their own lives with dignity and we have to send them back to their own countries'*.⁴⁸

In 2022: *'...And thirdly, we take in everyone who comes from Ukraine'*⁴⁹ and *'we're taking everyone in, and treating them just as we treat ourselves'*⁵⁰.

⁴⁸ V. Orbán (2015) Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-Orbán-at-the-epp-congress20151024>.

⁴⁹ V. Orbán (2022d). Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly 'Mandiner'. [online] Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>.

⁵⁰ V. Orbán (2022f). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program 'Good Morning Hungary'. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fcbc551b4> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

CONCLUSIONS

Intensity of interest between 2015 and 2022. Based on the given analysis of national interest of Hungary and how it changed in two periods, it is clear that the intensity of certain interests should be redefined. It should be noted here that table below is constructed on the basis of two cases and cannot describe overall the current state of the country. The table demonstrates issue-related interests of the country.

<i>Basic interest</i>	Intensity of interest							
	<i>2015-2017</i>				<i>2022-2023</i>			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
<i>Defense/ Security</i>		X terrorism				X war		
<i>Economic</i>				X Construction of fence and security expenses			X Sanction policy and energy security	
<i>World order</i>			X Weakness of the West				X Triggering the war	
<i>Ideological</i>			X Christianity Belonging to Europe			X Christianity Humanity Family		

Table 5.1 Intensity of the national interest of Hungary in 2022 according to Nuechterlein's table (1976)

Defense/Security: Terrorism (vital) → War (vital)

Economic: Construction of fence and security expenses (peripheral) → Sanction policy and energy security (major)

World order: Weakness of the West (major) → Triggering the war (major)

Ideological: Christianity and Belonging to Europe (vital) → Christianity, Humanity and Family (vital)

So, Security interests remained vitally important for Hungary both in 2015 and 2022, however if the threat in 2015 was connected with terrorism and growing criminal rates, in 2022 – was the war in the neighbourhood. Even though in the speeches it was mentioned several times as a threat to the existence of the state and nation, security issue cannot be assessed as survival due to the fact that there was not direct military attack to the territory of the state

Regarding economic interests, it is clear that in 2022 this interest moved from peripheral to major as most of the economic issues arose and the disputes were connected with sanction policy and energy sector, which have direct and indirect influence to the economy, to the prices and to

the well-being of the people, whereas economic issues within 2015 crisis was connected with construction of border fence and hiring more security officers.

Maintaining world order remained the same intensity in both years and was observed in relations between Hungary and EU institutions. The clear example of the divergence can be observed both periods, when there was a separation between us and them, east and west. Hungary opposed the decisions that, based on its interest, harmed the society and endangered peace and stability. In 2015 EU institutions and decisions were considered to be weak and based on morality, whereas in 2022 it was based on US interests and could trigger economic problems.

Striking change can be observed in ideological interests. If in 2015, ideology was under the protection of Hungarian identity against mass migration of ‘others’ – more unknown culture, in 2022 values of humanity, family protection and Christianity were broadened. The statements of officials started defining national interests based on values and in the case of 2022, ideological (or humanitarian) interests were vitally important as the threat was closeby and among those who suffered were ethnic Hungarians.

The main driver of this change, as it can be observed in the rhetoric of Viktor Orbán, was related to national sovereignty concerns. In 2015 the massive influx of migrants was seen as a direct threat to Hungarian sovereignty and as it influences directly the safety of Hungarian citizens and can threaten the existence of the national identity. He framed national interest and importance of preserving Christian values as the vital elements of maintaining sovereignty within borders. But already in 2022, in the context of the war in Ukraine, Hungary’s migration policies shifted towards welcoming refugees, particularly ethnic Hungarians from Ukraine. National security remained essential, however, maintaining Hungary’s cultural sovereignty was shifted: the importance of humanitarian response and preserving as well as concentrating on traditional family values in line with foreign influence was prioritized.

Economic interests were also shifted as in 2015 mass migration could cause destabilizations in society and labor market and protecting Hungary from mass migration was seen as the main direction of protecting economic sovereignty, in 2022 economic sanctions of the EU on Russia could damage not only Hungarian families, but also destroy the economy of the country, which is highly dependent on energy import from Russia. So, the interest of the country in the first period was protected with not allowing asylum seekers, whereas in the second case the importance of protecting its economic interest within EU and imposing veto and finding new alternatives of energy supply has become more essential.

Disputes and power struggles between Hungary and EU remained major issue both in 2015 and 2022, however, the issues have changed. If in 2015 as a sovereign country Hungary resisted the EU pressure to accept migration quotas, asserting that Hungary has a right to make independent decisions regarding its borders, in 2022 Hungary increasingly distanced itself from the EU's policies and prioritized its national interest over external pressures. Thus, in 2022 Hungary decided to choose more neutral approach but maintained the importance of humanitarian support.

To sum up, the change in migration policy towards Ukrainian refugees in 2022 (its softening) happened because of the shift in national interest, driven by sovereignty. The decision in migration policy that envisaged easing procedures of entry and integration was connected mostly with the security (protecting Hungarian minorities outside the country) and ideological concerns (preserving Hungarian identity, Christianity, family values and providing humanitarian assistance to the neighboring country).

Hungarian migration policy has seen several modifications and changes throughout its history and development. The cases between the two periods – 2015 and 2022 showed us how the same issue can be accepted differently based on the countries' national interest.

For Hungary, national interest is above all and providing national security is the main aims of the government. However, the goal has not been changed, but approaches. In 2015 the main threat was seen in illegal migrants, whereas in 2022 the threat was seen in the war in the neighbourhood. In both of the cases, the objects of security are Hungarians, however, if in 2015 security issues were connected with the people inside the country, for the 2022 issue the security of Hungarians in Transcarpathia came into the agenda.

For Hungary, preserving its people, its values, its religion and its identity is another task. With the events in 2022, Hungary seeks to establish the plans that were set from the initial establishment of the migration policy – return Hungarians and protect family values in the Christian society. That was the reason for the government to establish softer policies towards Ukraine, where Hungarian minorities are living. In 2015, common policy regarding refugees contradicted national interest, however, in 2022 temporary protection was welcomed as protecting Hungarians with Hungarian values and identities (whenever they were) is one of the main priorities of the state.

The findings of this dissertation illustrate how national sovereignty has been central to Hungary's migration policies under Viktor Orbán. His rhetoric reflects a broader narrative that emphasizes the defense of national interests across multiple dimensions—security, economic, power, and ideological.

The implications of this focus on sovereignty extend beyond Hungary's migration policy to its broader relationship with the European Union. Hungary's increasing resistance to EU directives, framed as a defense of national sovereignty, highlights a growing tension between national and supranational governance in Europe. This tension suggests that Hungary's approach may continue to influence broader debates about the future of the European Union and the balance of power between member states and Brussels.

This analysis shows that sovereignty and national interest are not static concepts, but the ones that is continuously reshaped by political discourse and policy decisions in response to evolving challenges in a globalized world. Furthermore, this work contributed to migration studies as it highlighted the essence of factors that can influence the change (softening or implementing more strict measures) in migration policy and in migration discourse.

Future research could explore how similar sovereignty narratives are employed by other Central and Eastern European leaders, or how Hungary's position within the EU might evolve in response to future crises. It can also contribute to the research work on migration policy issues and divergence appeared in Visegrad group countries after the beginning of war in Ukraine. The work also contributes in Hungary – Ukraine relations, broadening the topic of minorities in Transcarpathia Region. Ultimately, this dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of the intersection between migration, sovereignty, national interest and European integration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles, books

- Adamson, F.B. (2006). Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security. *International Security*, [online] 31(1), pp.165–199. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137542?seq=3> [Accessed 24 Jun. 2024].
- Melegh A. (2016). Magyarország bekapcsolódása a migrációs folyamatokba: történeti-strukturális megközelítés. *Demográfia*, [online] 58(4). doi: <https://doi.org/10.21543/dem.58.4.1> . [Accessed 24 Jun. 2023].
- Bauerová, H. (2018). Migration Policy of the V4 in the Context of Migration Crisis. *Politics in Central Europe*, 14(2), pp.99–120. <https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2018-0011> .
- Bevir, M. and Rhodes, W. (2015). *Routledge Handbook of Interpretive Political Science*. 1st ed. Routledge.
- Bíró-Nagy, A. (2021). Orbán's political jackpot: migration and the Hungarian electorate. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, [online] 48(2), pp.1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2020.1853905> .
- Bodziany, M. (2017). KRYZYSY SPOŁECZNE XXI WIEKU Między dezintegracją, „fencing policy” a upadkiem państwowości. Wydawnictwo Akademii Wojsk Lądowych. [online] Available at: https://www.academia.edu/41767399/KRYZYSY_SPO%C5%81ECZNE_XXI_WIEKU_Mi%C4%99dzy_dezintegracj%C4%85_fencing_policy_a_upadkiem_pa%C5%84stwowo%C5%9Bci [Accessed 27 Jun. 2023].
- Bove, V., Efthymoulou, G. and Pickard, H. (2022). Government ideology and international migration*. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 125(1), pp.107–138. <https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12506> .
- Bull, H. (1977). *The Anarchical Society*. [online] London: Macmillan Education UK. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24028-9>.
- Burchill, S. (2005). *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230005778> .
- Butler, E. (2016). The ‘In Defense of National Identity’ Argument: Comparing the UK and Hungarian Referendums of 2016. [online] *EuropeNowJournal.org*. Available at: <https://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/01/31/the-defence-of-national-identity-comparing-the-uk-and-hungarian-referendums-of-2016/> [Accessed 9 Jan. 2024].
- Choucri, N. (2002). Migration and Security: Some Key Linkages. *Journal of International Affairs*, [online] 56(1), pp.97–122. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24357885> .
- Csernus, D. (2023). Dóra Csernus Energy Without Russia The Consequences of the Ukraine war and the EU Sanctions on the Energy Sector in Europe COUNTRY REPORT HUNGARY. [online] Available at: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/20509.pdf>.

- Curini, L. (2020). *The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods in Political Science and International Relations*. SAGE.
- Czina, V. (2021). Hungary as a Norm Entrepreneur in Migration Policy. *Intersections*, 7(1), pp.22–39. <https://doi.org/10.17356/ieejsp.v7i1.666>.
- De Benoist, A. (1999). Qu'est-ce que la souveraineté? in *Éléments*. [online] (96), pp.24–35. Available at: <https://crusoeland.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/what-is-sovereignty-two-treatises-of-govt.pdf> [Accessed 22 March. 2024].
- Dinesh (2015). National Interest: Meaning, Components and Methods. [online] Your Article Library. Available at: <https://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/international-politics/national-interest-meaning-components-and-methods/48487> .
- Ercan, S.A. and Marsh, D. (2016). Qualitative methods in political science. [online] www.elgaronline.com. Available at: <https://www.elgaronline.com/display/edcoll/9781784710811/9781784710811.00030.xml> .
- Freeman, G.P. and Kessler, A.K. (2008). Political Economy and Migration Policy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34(4), pp.655–678. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830801961670>.
- Frelak, J.S. (2017). Solidarity in European Migration Policy: The Perspective of the Visegrád States. *Solidarity in the European Union*, pp.81–95. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57036-5_7.
- Gallai, S. (2018). Analysis 2018/7: The Four Visegrad Countries: More Than It Seems – Migration Research Institute. [online] Migraciokutato.hu. Available at: <https://migraciokutato.hu/en/2018/04/16/the-four-visegrad-countries-more-than-it-seems/> [Accessed 25 Aug. 2023].
- Gilpin, R.G. (1984). The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism. *International Organization*, [online] 38(2), pp.287–304. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706441> .
- Giusti, S. (2022). Tracing National Interest. Springer eBooks, pp.23–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16324-1_2.
- Glied, V. and Pap, N. (2016). The ‘Christian Fortress of Hungary’. *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, [online] (19), pp.133–149. Available at: <https://www.cceol.com/search/article-detail?id=573984>.
- Glorius, B. and Doornik, J. eds., (2020). *Geographies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities*. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham: Springer International Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25666-1>
- Goździak, E.M. (2019). Using Fear of the ‘Other,’ Orbán Reshapes Migration Policy in a Hungary Built on Cultural Diversity. [online] migrationpolicy.org. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/orban-reshapes-migration-policy-hungary>.
- Guild, E. (2013). *Security and Migration in the 21st Century*. [online] Google Books. John Wiley & Sons. Available at: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=uOOJAf-otZMC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=migration+and+security&ots=eVX1jw2q6e&sig=m0PMw->

[DWtO861WzT9pc8IRcGPkE&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=migration%20and%20security&f=false](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349549150_Migration_Policies_Divergence_between_Visegrad_Countries_and_the_European_Union_through_Constructivism_Theory/citations)
[Accessed 25 Jun. 2024].

- Gyollai, D. (2018). Hungary – Country Report. Global Migration: Consequences and Responses . [online] Available at: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1248319/FULLTEXT01.pdf>.
- Gyollai, D. and Amatrudo, A. (2018). Controlling irregular migration: International human rights standards and the Hungarian legal framework. *European Journal of Criminology*, 16(4), pp.432–451. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370818772776> .
- Hollifield, J.F. (1992). Migration and International Relations: Cooperation and Control in the European Community. *International Migration Review*, 26(2), pp.568–595. <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791839202600220>
- Huysmans, J. and Squire, V. (2009). Migration and security. [online] Available at: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203866764-24/migration-security-jef-huysmans-vicki-squire> .
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2009). Policy on Migration. [online] Available at: https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/Migration-Policy_EN.pdf .
- Jackson, R.H. (1991). Quasi-States. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511559020> .
- Janulewicz, Ł., Jozwiak, V., Kuusik, Merheim-Eyre, I., Rotaru, V., Stuchlikova, Z. and Vég, Z. (2018). Open Research Repository From ‘Visegrad Four’ to ‘Varna Four’: The rise and role of regional cooperation in Central and South Eastern Europe Item Type Other. [online] Available at: <https://openresearch.ceu.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/37f219a6-aed0-4ad6-8cfa-229fd7ae928d/content> [Accessed 25 March. 2024].
- Jones, E. (2022). Sovereignty and the National Interest. *Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review*, [online] 111(444), pp.392–400. Available at: <https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/420/article/872741/pdf>.
- Juhász, J. (2003). Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West. [online] migrationpolicy.org. Available at: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-country-between-east-and-west>.
- Kayika, G. (2021). Migration Policies Divergence between Visegrad Countries and the European Union through Constructivism Theory. [online] Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349549150_Migration_Policies_Divergence_between_Visegrad_Countries_and_the_European_Union_through_Constructivism_Theory/citations.
- Kékesi, M. (2017). Hungary: Migration and the policy of closed borders. [online] Available at: https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/AMO_hungary-migration-and-the-policy-of-closed-borders.pdf.
- Krasner, S.D. (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. [online] JSTOR. Princeton University Press. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s9d5>.
- Krastev, I. (2017). The Refugee Crisis and the Return of the East-West Divide in Europe. *Slavic Review*, 76(2), pp.291–296. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2017.77>.

- Mahoney, J. (2003). *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge University Press. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803963>
- Manan, M. (2017). Foreign Policy and National Interest: Realism and Its Critiques. *Jurnal Global & Strategis*, 9(2), p.175. doi: <https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.9.2.2015.175-189>.
- Manevich, D. (2016). Hungarians share Europe's embrace of democratic principles but are less tolerant of refugees, minorities. [online] Pew Research Center. Available at: <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/09/30/hungarians-share-europes-embrace-of-democratic-principles-but-are-less-tolerant-of-refugees-minorities/>.
- McNabb, D.E. (2015). *Research Methods for Political Science*. Routledge. doi: <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315701141>.
- Melegh, A., Vancsó, A., Mendly, D. and Hunyadi, M. (2020). Positional Insecurity and the Hungarian Migration Policy. *The European Union in International Affairs*, pp.173–197. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53997-9_7.
- Meyers, E. (2000). Theories of International Immigration Policy-A Comparative Analysis. *International Migration Review*, 34(4), pp.1245–1282. doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2675981>
- Morgenthau, H.J. (1948). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. *Political Science Quarterly*, [online] 64(2), p.290. doi:<https://doi.org/10.2307/2144235>.
- Nagy, B. (2016). Hungarian Asylum Law and Policy in 2015–2016: Securitization Instead of Loyal Cooperation. *German Law Journal*, [online] 17(6), p.1033. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/34015213/Hungarian_Asylum_Law_and_Policy_in_2015_2016_Securitization_Instead_of_Loyal_Cooperation [Accessed 27 Jun. 2023].
- Nincic, M. (1999). The National Interest and Its Interpretation. *The Review of Politics*, [online] 61(1), pp.29–55. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1408647?searchText=&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dnational%2Binterest%26so%3Drel&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&searchKey=&refreqid=fastly-default%3Ab6016004fcf7746b6bbf171190e4a18f [Accessed 25 Jun. 2023].
- Nuechterlein, D.E. (1976). National interests and foreign policy: A conceptual framework for analysis and decision-making. *British Journal of International Studies*, 2(03), pp.246–266. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210500116729>.
- Okólski, M. (2012). *European Immigrations: Trends, Structures and Policy Implications*. [online] Google Books. Amsterdam University Press. Available at: https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=yjYFCIeqfKMC&oi=fnd&pg=PA179&dq=migration+policy+of+hungary+in+1990&ots=i4GpvZaaSi&sig=xP19NN7Nvsw87iRbodkLby9a_EU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=migration%20policy%20of%20hungary%20in%201990&f=false [Accessed 26 Jun. 2023].
- Paris, R. (2022). European populism and the return of ‘illiberal sovereignty’: a case-study of Hungary. *International Affairs*. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iia004>.

- Péter Reményi, Viktor Glied and Pap, N. (2023). Good and Bad migrants in Hungary. The populist story and the reality in Hungarian migration policy. *Problemy Polityki Społecznej*, 59(4), pp.323–344. doi: <https://doi.org/10.31971/pps/162003> .
- Polo, S. and Wucherpennig, J. (2021). Trojan Horse, Copycat, or Scapegoat? Unpacking the Refugees-Terrorism Nexus. *The Journal of Politics*, 84(1). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1086/714926> .
- Przemysław, O. (2023). Politicization of Migration Policies in the Visegrad Group’s Member States: A Means of Creating External Enemies of the Political system? *Siyasal: Journal of Political Sciences*, [online] 32(1), pp.57–73. <https://doi.org/10.26650/siyasal.2023.32.11213865> .
- Sata, R. (2023). Performing crisis to create your enemy: Europe vs. the EU in Hungarian populist discourse. 5. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2023.1032470> .
- Sørensen, G., Møller, J. and Jackson, R.H. (2022). *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*. [online] Google Books. Oxford University Press. Available at: <https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=ru&lr=&id=FbNLEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Jackson> on [Accessed 25 Jun. 2023].
- Strnad, V. (2021). Les enfants terribles de l’Europe? The ‘Sovereigntist’ Role of the Visegrád Group in the Context of the Migration Crisis. *Europe-Asia Studies*, pp.1–29. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2021.1976730> .
- Teitelbaum, M.S. (1984). Immigration, refugees, and foreign policy. *International Organization*, 38(3), pp.429–450. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300026801>.
- Trifunović, Dr.D. and Ćurčić, M. (2021). National Interest in Security Science: a Realist Perspective (Volume 22, No. 3, 2021.). [online] www.nsf-journal.hr. Available at: <https://www.nsf-journal.hr/online-issues/focus/id/1354>.
- Turcsanyi, R.Q. and Maryna Vorotnyuk (2018). *Theorising Security in the Eastern European Neighbourhood: Issues and Approaches*. [online] Academia.edu. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/36823480/Theorising_Security_in_the_Eastern_European_Neighbourhood_Issues_and_Approaches [Accessed 25 March. 2024].
- Van Evera, S. (2016). *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. doi: <https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801454455> .
- VISEGRAD IDENTITY -ILLUSION OR REALITY? 1. (n.d.). Available at: https://nezopont.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/V4_tanulm%C3%A1ny_EN-GOOD.pdf [Accessed 26 Jun. 2024].
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. [online] Cambridge University Press. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511612183> .
- Wike, R., Stokes, B. and Simmons, K. (2016). Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs Sharp ideological divides across EU on views about minorities, diversity and national identity. [online] Available at: <https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2016-10/Pew-Research-Center-EU-Refugees-and-National-Identity-Report-FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf> [Accessed 25 March. 2024].

Reports

- Gyollai, D. (2018, May). Hungary – Country Report. Global Migration: Consequences and Responses . Retrieved from <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1248319/FULLTEXT01.pdf>
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2009). *Policy on Migration*. Retrieved from https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/Migration-Policy_EN.pdf
- Eurostat: 4.07 million with temporary protection - Eurostat. Retrieved June 30, 2024, from ec.europa.eu website: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230809-1>
- Needs, Intentions and Integration Challenges for Ukrainian Refugees in Hungary. Retrieved June 30, 2023, from hungary.iom.int website: <https://hungary.iom.int/news/needs-intentions-and-integration-challenges-ukrainian-refugees-hungary>
- Situation Report*. (2023). Retrieved from <https://ukraine.hia.hu/wp-content/uploads/Situation-Report-UKR221-HIA-20231231.pdf>

Websites, news

- Definition of Migration. (n.d.). Retrieved from home-affairs.ec.europa.eu website: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/networks/european-migration-network-emn/emn-asylum-and-migration-glossary/glossary/migration_en#:~:text=The%20International%20Organization%20for%20Migration
- VISEGRAD IDENTITY -ILLUSION OR REALITY? 1*. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://nezopont.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/V4_tanulm%C3%A1ny_EN-GOOD.pdf
- What is migration policy? | EMM2. (n.d.). Retrieved from emm.iom.int website: <https://emm.iom.int/handbooks/developing-migration-policy/what-migration-policy#:~:text=Glossary->
- Agerholm, H. (2018, January 9). Refugees are “Muslim invaders” not running for their lives, says Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán. *The Independent*. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugees-muslim-invaders-hungary-viktor-orban-racism-islamophobia-eu-a8149251.html>
- Hungarian Interchurch Aid in Ukraine website: <https://ukraine.hia.hu/#:~:text=our%20Humanitarian%20response%20to%20the>
- Hungary races to build border fence as migrants keep coming. (2015, March 6). *BBC News*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-33802453>
- Information for people from Ukraine Retrieved June 30, 2024, from UNHCR Hungary website: <https://help.unhcr.org/hungary/ukraine/>

- Multiculturalism is creating parallel societies in Europe. (n.d.). Retrieved June 30, 2024, from Government website: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/multiculturalism-is-creating-parallel-societies-in-europe>
- Safe third country. Retrieved from Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles website: <https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/hungary/asylum-procedure/the-safe-country-concepts/safe-third-country/>
- Sarkadi, Z. (2022, March 21). Overview of current status and available options for people fleeing Ukraine towards Hungary – March 20, 2022. Retrieved June 30, 2024, from HELPERS website: <https://helpers.hu/refugees/overview-of-current-status-and-available-options-for-people-fleeing-ukraine-towards-hungary-march-20-2022/>
- Starving in Hungary's transit zones. (2019, April 23). Retrieved June 30, 2024, from InfoMigrants website: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/16466/starving-in-hungarys-transit-zones>
- The European Migration Crisis and Hungary | IOM Hungary. (n.d.). Retrieved from hungary.iom.int website: <https://hungary.iom.int/european-migration-crisis-and-hungary>
- Ukraine has improved conditions for its Hungarian minority. It might not be enough for Viktor Orbán. (2023, January 31). Retrieved from AP News website: <https://apnews.com/article/hungary-ukraine-minority-rights-zakarhattia-language-29c4244859b0992d4beacc03450c5d84>

Speeches of Viktor Orbán

- V. Orbán. Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49 – miniszterelnok.hu. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2022.miniszterelnok.hu/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-174th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-1848-49/#:~:text=Now%20everyone%20can%20see%20the> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2023].
- V. Orbán. PM Orbán discusses security and sovereignty challenges with members of Hungarian Diaspora Council. [online] PM Orbán discusses security and sovereignty challenges with members of Hungarian Diaspora Council. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/pm-orban-discusses-security-and-sovereignty-challenges-with-members-of-hungarian-diaspora-council> [Accessed 25 Aug. 2023].

- V. Orbán. I will not allow my country to be turned into an ‘immigrant country’. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/i-will-not-allow-my-country-to-be-turned-into-an-immigrant-country> [Accessed 3 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. If we do not protect our borders, tens of millions of migrants will come. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/if-we-do-not-protect-our-borders-tens-of-millions-of-migrants-will-come> . [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s speech at the 26th Congress of the Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-26th-congress-of-the-fidesz-hungarian-civic-union>. [Accessed 3 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the Budapest Demographic Forum. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-budapest-demographic-forum> [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Speech of Viktor Orbán at the EPP Congress. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/speech-of-viktor-orban-at-the-epp-congress20151024>. [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Televised interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the M1 ‘Tonight’ programme. [online] Available at: <https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/televised-interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-m1-tonight-programme> [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme ‘180 Minutes’ , Sept 16, 2016. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Rádió programme ‘180 Minutes’ , Sept 16, 2016. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/prime-minister/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-kossuth-radio-programme-180-minutes-full-text-in-english> [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Address by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the congress of the National Association of Hungarian Farmers’ Circles and Farmers’ Cooperatives (MAGOSZ) and the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture (NAK). [online] Address by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the congress of the National Association of Hungarian Farmers’ Circles and Farmers’ Cooperatives (MAGOSZ) and the Hungarian Chamber of Agriculture (NAK). Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/address-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-congress-of-the-national-association->

[of-hungarian-farmers-circles-and-farmers-cooperatives-magosz-and-the-hungarian-chamber-of-agriculture-nak](#) [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].

- V. Orbán. Government Resolution 1120/2022 (III. 7.) of the Government on troop movements and certain related tasks in connection with the crisis in Ukraine. [online] Government Resolution 1120/2022 (III. 7.) of the Government on troop movements and certain related tasks in connection with the crisis in Ukraine. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/government-resolution-1120-2022-iii-7-of-the-government-on-troop-movements-and-certain-related-tasks-in-connection-with-the-crisis-in-ukraine> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the biweekly magazine Budapesti Zeitung. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the biweekly magazine Budapesti Zeitung. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-biweekly-magazine-budapester-zeitung> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. [online] Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the political weekly ‘Mandiner’. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/interview-with-prime-minister-viktor-orban-in-the-political-weekly-mandiner>. [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. PM Orbán: National interest must be defended in Brussels. [online] PM Orbán: National interest must be defended in Brussels. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/pm-orban-national-interest-must-be-defended-in-brussels> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program ‘Good Morning Hungary’. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the Kossuth Radio program ‘Good Morning Hungary’. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-kossuth-radio-program-good-morning-hungary-6225fcbc551b4> [Accessed 10 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. [online] Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 174th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-174th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849>. [Accessed 5 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, following the election victory of Fidesz-KDNP. [online] Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, following the election victory of Fidesz-KDNP. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-following-the-election-victory-of-fidesz-kdnp>. [Accessed 5 Jan. 2024].

- V. Orbán. Speech by Viktor Orbán at a swearing-in ceremony for border hunters. [online] Speech by Viktor Orbán at a swearing-in ceremony for border hunters. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-viktor-orban-at-a-swearing-in-ceremony-for-border-hunters> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. [online] Speech given by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán after swearing his prime ministerial oath. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-given-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-after-swearing-his-prime-ministerial-oath> [Accessed 5 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. State Secretary: Preserving Christianity is a task enshrined in Hungarian law. [online] State Secretary: Preserving Christianity is a task enshrined in Hungarian law. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/state-secretary-preserving-christianity-is-a-task-enshrined-in-hungarian-law> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Statement by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán following a migration summit with the President of Serbia and the Chancellor of Austria. [online] Statement by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán following a migration summit with the President of Serbia and the Chancellor of Austria. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/statement-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-following-a-migration-summit-with-the-president-of-serbia-and-the-chancellor-of-austria> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Viktor Orbán's Interview in der Wochenzeitung „Mandiner“. [online] Viktor Orbán's Interview in der Wochenzeitung „Mandiner“. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/viktor-orbans-interview-in-der-wochenzeitung-mandiner> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's 'State of the Nation' address. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's 'State of the Nation' address. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-63f319616e193>. [Accessed 5 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address to the Hungarian parliament before the start of daily business. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's address to the Hungarian parliament before the start of daily business. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-address-to-the-hungarian-parliament-before-the-start-of-daily-business-63ff07a01f3d6> [Accessed 5 Jan. 2024].
- V. Orbán. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Answers To Journalists' Questions. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Answers To Journalists' Questions. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches->

[and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-answers-to-journalists-questions](#) [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

V. Orbán. Press statement by Viktor Orbán after a meeting of the heads of government of the Visegrád Four. [online] Press statement by Viktor Orbán after a meeting of the heads of government of the Visegrád Four. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/press-statement-by-viktor-orban-after-a-meeting-of-the-heads-of-government-of-the-visegrad-four> [Accessed 30 Jun. 2024].

Orbán, V. (2022a). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement on Facebook following a special meeting of the European Council. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement on Facebook following a special meeting of the European Council. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-statement-on-facebook-following-a-special-meeting-of-the-european-council> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

Orbán, V. (2022b). Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement on Facebook following a meeting of the National Security Operational Group. [online] Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's statement on Facebook following a meeting of the National Security Operational Group. Available at: <https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-statement-on-facebook-following-a-meeting-of-the-national-security-operational-group> [Accessed 28 Jun. 2024].

Legal documents

2015-2017

Act CVI of 2015. (2015). évi CVI. törvény - Nemzeti Jogszabálytár. [online] Available at: <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2015-106-00-00> [Accessed 22 Feb. 2024].

Act CXL of 2015. (2015). évi CXL. törvény egyes törvényeknek a tömeges bevándorlás kezelésével összefüggő módosításáról - Törvények és országgyűlési határozatok.// Act CXL of 2015 on the amendment of certain acts related to the management of mass migration [online] Available at: <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1500140.TV> // <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2015-140-00-00>

Act CXXXVII of 2015 on the temporary closure of the borders and amendment of migration related acts (2015). <https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A1500127.TV>

Government Decree no 191/2015 (VII. 21.) on safe countries of origin and safe third countries (2015). <https://www.refworld.org/legal/decrees/natlegbod/2016/en/106706>

2022-2023

Decree 56/2022 (24 February). [online] Available at: <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/en/2022-56-20-22>.

Decree 86/2022. (III. 7.) Government decree on the emergency rules regarding persons recognized as entitled to temporary protection. <https://njt.hu/jogszabaly/2022-86-20-22>

Others:

Constitution of Hungary https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016