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**THE POLITICISATION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: MEMBER STATE BEHAVIOUR IN THE EUROPEAN
SEMESTER**

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Piret Ehin, Ph.D.

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I have written this master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

European integration has become increasingly politicised. This has led to an interesting new research agenda which analyzes the role that identity and mass politics play in regional integration in Europe. While much of the literature explores the drivers of politicisation, far less deals with its specific consequences. This thesis will seek to address this gap in the literature and analyze the consequences of the politicisation of European integration in terms of member state behaviour. The acceptance of supranational coordination and control is the specific aspect of member state behaviour that will be examined. Drawing from a postfunctionalist approach, it will develop and test the hypothesis that the higher the level of politicisation in a member state, the less likely the member state is to accept supranational coordination and control of its economic policies. The level of politicisation will be measured using two indicators: 1) popular support for the EU and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Acceptance of supranational coordination and control will be analyzed by focusing on the European Semester, and measured through progress implementing country-specific recommendations that are issued from the European Commission to the member states. To test the hypothesis, the research will examine 27 EU member states during the post-Eurozone crisis period 2011-2018. After measuring the variables, a bivariate analysis of the independent and dependent variables will show a weak level of correlation. A stronger degree of correlation is prevented by outliers that feature a low level of politicisation and a low level of progress implementing CSRs. This suggests that politicisation is one variable amongst others which affect the acceptance of supranational coordination and control, opening up avenues for future research.

Keywords: European integration; politicisation; popular support; Euroscepticism; European Semester; country-specific recommendations

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Abbreviations

Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs)

Country-specific recommendations (CSRs)

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

European Central Bank (ECB)

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)

European Union (EU)

European structural and investment funds (ESIF)

European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

In-depth reviews (IDR)

Gross domestic product (GDP)

Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Open Method of Coordination (OMC)

Single European Act (SEA)

Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)

Introduction

European integration has become increasingly politicised. Eurosceptic parties have made sizable gains in national and European elections (Treib 2014). National governments have increased the number of referendums on European integration, aware of the potential political costs of deepening integration without consulting voters. Major crises—such as the European debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and Brexit—have become key moments for Eurosceptic actors to mobilise around, and have increased the saliency and level of contestation surrounding regional integration in Europe (Hutter & Kriesi 2019). Scholars have determined that the politicisation of European integration is here to stay (Börzel & Risse 2009). This has far-reaching consequences for the EU, its member states, and the future of European integration.

However, politicisation has not been a constant in European integration. For a long time, regional integration in Europe proceeded as an elite-driven and technocratic affair with a low level of saliency amongst the general public. Integration during this period was famously described as having a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). However, the path from the six-member 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the EU as we know it today—a 27-member economic and political union—has gradually and fundamentally reshaped the nature of political authority in Europe, with very few policy areas remaining under the exclusive competency of the member states. Largely beginning with the shift toward a political union through the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, European integration has entered a new period of politicisation and contestation which has seen the permissive consensus gradually disappear (Hooghe & Marks 2009).

Studying the politicisation of European integration has led to an interesting new research agenda, most notably through the theory of postfunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009), which puts identity and mass politics at the center of analyzing integration. This constitutes a major break from past theories, such as neofunctionalism (Haas 1958), intergovernmentalism (Hoffman 1966), and liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998), which have a more rationalist-economic logic and are far more elite-focused. Key questions

for a postfunctional approach include: what role does identity play in the process of European integration? How does politicisation constitute a brake on further integration? Which actors are driving this politicisation? What causes variation in levels of politicisation across member states? A body of literature has sought to answer these questions, and this will be outlined in the first chapter.

One central question raised by studying the politicisation of European integration is: what are its specific consequences? This has been debated in the literature, but mostly as to whether politicisation is a constraining force on integration overall (Schimmelfennig 2018; Börzel & Risse 2018). Yet this puzzle can be applied to more specific research questions. For example, as the thesis will show, politicisation occurs to varying extents across the EU member states. This creates an opportunity to examine how EU-related behaviour is affected by the level of politicisation in a member state.

The objective of this thesis is to examine the consequences of the politicisation of European integration in terms of member state behaviour. The specific aspect of member state behaviour which will be analyzed will be the acceptance of supranational coordination and control of economic policies. Thus, the main research question is: does the level of politicisation in a member state affect the degree to which it accepts supranational coordination and control of its economic policies? A postfunctionalist approach will be used to analyze this research question, putting forth the hypothesis that the higher the level of politicisation in an EU member state, the less likely the member state is to accept increased supranational coordination and control of its economic policies.

The acceptance of supranational coordination and control will be analyzed by focusing on the behaviour of member states in the European Semester. Despite European integration becoming more politicised in the post-Maastricht era, the overall supranational authority of the EU has still gradually increased during this same period. The European Semester's introduction in 2010 is a clear example of this, emerging out of the European debt crisis as a new process to increase the supervision and control of the member states' economic policies.

It involves a year-long policy coordination cycle featuring scrutiny of national budgets and economic policies, as well as the European Commission issuing reform agendas for each member state and country-specific recommendations (CSRs) which are backed by the potential of sanctions. Thus, member state behaviour in this European Semester process provides a framework for examining the acceptance of supranational coordination and control.

The research will examine 27 EU member states as cases, with the United Kingdom included as it was an EU member during the period of study and Greece excluded because it did not take part in the European Semester until 2019. The level of politicisation will be measured using two indicators: 1) net popular support for the EU and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Eurobarometer survey results will be used to measure popular support for the EU, and national election results—obtained through the ParlGov database—will be the data used to measure electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Acceptance of supranational coordination and control will be measured by each member state's progress implementing CSRs. This data is available in the country-specific reports issued by the European Commission to each EU member state. The timeframe for analysis will be the post-European debt crisis period of 2011-2018, because 2011 was the first year that CSRs were issued, and, at the time of writing, 2018 was the most recent year with data available on progress implementing CSRs.

This thesis has both theoretical and practical applicability. The politicisation of European integration is a relatively new phenomenon for study, only taking a prominent place in EU studies within the past ten years. The long-running theoretical debate between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism has produced numerous interesting studies and driven the research on theories of European integration for multiple decades. But politicisation, analyzed through a postfunctionalist lens, is a newer approach to studying regional integration in Europe. This means that some aspects of politicisation remain understudied. For example, the consequences of politicisation are one area where there is a gap in the literature, particularly for how it affects member state behaviour. All indications

would suggest that the politicisation of European integration is here to stay. Thus, investigating how politicisation affects member state behaviour will prove useful for understanding and analyzing future developments in European integration.

Furthermore, the European Semester is a relatively new development in the EU, and studying how politicisation may potentially affect member state behaviour in the European Semester is a new undertaking. Also, using progress implementing CSRs as a unit of measurement is a new approach to studying economic policy coordination and control, largely due to the fact that the figures which track progress implementing CSRs only became available in the 2019 European Commission country-specific reports. Therefore, postfunctionalism as a new approach to studying integration and the European Semester as a recent development in EU economic policy supervision make this thesis a relevant and valuable contribution.

This thesis has four main chapters. The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework, examining the politicisation of European integration. It will introduce postfunctionalism as the theoretical approach which will be used to investigate the research question and test the hypothesis. It will also introduce the core concept of politicisation and outline its manifestations in the EU. The chapter will then examine the literature on both the causes and consequences of the politicisation of European integration. The second chapter will examine the European debt crisis, explaining the severity of the crisis and outlining how it led to the introduction of the European Semester. The significance of this development and also the specific importance of CSRs issued through the European Semester process will be examined. The third chapter will be the methodology chapter, which will explain the research design, data sources, and operationalization of the variables. The fourth chapter will serve as the empirical part. It will provide a measurement of the main variables, an overview of overall politicisation in the EU, and test the hypothesis through a bivariate analysis of the relationship between the level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. It will also include a discussion of the results and their significance. The thesis will then end with concluding remarks.

1. The Politicisation of European Integration

This chapter will examine the politicisation of European integration and introduce the theory of postfunctionalism, which is the main theoretical approach for this thesis. It will begin by outlining the historical and theoretical context in which postfunctionalism emerged in response to, and will then outline the main tenets of the theory as a new approach in EU studies. After that, the central concept of politicisation will be introduced with an overview of its manifestations in the EU. Next, the causes of politicisation and how they lead to a variation in levels of politicisation across the EU member states will be examined. The chapter will then discuss the consequences of politicisation in the EU. Criticisms of postfunctionalism will then be briefly outlined, followed by a short summary and the hypothesis of the thesis.

1.1 Historical and theoretical context

Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism are two significant theoretical predecessors to postfunctionalism, both dominating the debate in the literature for multiple decades. It is worthwhile to examine their basic claims and how they manage to explain a large portion of the history of European integration. This allows for a better understanding of how postfunctionalism differs from these two theories, and the context it emerged in response to.

Neofunctionalism as a theoretical approach to integration was first articulated by scholar Ernst. B. Haas in his seminal work *The Uniting of Europe* (1958), which examined the development of the ECSC. The theory emerged in response to David Mitrany's highly technical theory of functionalism (Mitrany 1994/1943). Neofunctionalism is centred around various interconnected processes which encourage further integration. It sees integration as being driven by societal actors engaging in competition and seeking the economic benefits which come from greater transnational connectedness (Haas 1958). This includes spillover from one policy field to the next, where integration in one area will create a need for integration in other areas; citizens seeking the institution or non-state actor which can best

fulfill their needs; and eventually a shift in which citizens tend to align more with supranational institutions than national ones (Rosamond 2005: 240-241). While the theory does not explicitly say whether the political outcome of integration will be a specific government type or structure, it does examine the potential that integration has for creating new governance at a regional level (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 2). Neofunctionalism does not expect integration to occur at a constant. Crises may emerge which halt this process—or cause temporary periods of disintegration. However, the theory sees integration as a process with a direction, and the trend over time will be toward deeper integration in Europe (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 3).

Neofunctionalism effectively explains some of the earlier developments in European integration, but the theory fell out of favour in the 1970s when stagnation in European integration emerged and the ongoing economic integration did not lead to political integration as neofunctionalism predicted. Intergovernmentalism emerged in response to this, sharing many of the same theoretical foundations as the international relations theory of neorealism (Waltz 1959; 1979). Intergovernmentalism shifted the focus from societal actors to the nation-state. An intergovernmental approach argues that nation-states and the international arena are essential aspects of understanding integration, and integration is driven by bargaining and competition between national governments (Hoffman 1966). The theory also argues that due to the centrality of the nation-state, the process of integration will not continue once it reaches high politics (Hoffman 1966: 868).

A reformulation of intergovernmentalism was put forth by Andrew Moravcsik, through his theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. His book *The Choice for Europe* (1998) examines the major ‘deepenings’ in European integration, including the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act (SEA), and the Maastricht Treaty. The theory is heavily influenced by Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-level games theory, liberalism, and rational choice theory. Liberal intergovernmentalism sees European integration as proceeding as a three-step process: the formation of national preferences, interstate bargaining, and the creation of regional institutions (Moravcsik 1998).

Much differs between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. However, their common focus on the functional drivers of European integration, the role of interest groups and their preferences, and belief that European integration ultimately has a direction towards increased integration, unites them (Börzel & Risse 2018: 85). Both approaches see European integration as being elite-driven—by member state preferences for intergovernmentalists and key national and transnational societal actors for neofunctionalists (Börzel & Risse 2009: 217-218). Both theories also possess a rationalist-economic logic, which argues integration occurs to solve socioeconomic problems (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 5). The theories have been criticized in the literature and fallen out of favour during certain periods, but overall been exceptionally influential in how scholars theorize and frame the process of European integration.

1.2 Postfunctionalism and the turn toward politicisation

Postfunctionalism is a relatively new approach in European integration studies. The decision to articulate a new theory means that existing theories are perceived as having insufficient explanatory value regarding the topic being studied, and that is the case with postfunctionalism. The theory, as first articulated by Hooghe and Marks (2009), sees European integration as having become increasingly politicised. This politicisation is driven by Eurosceptic actors who mobilise around national identity and question the supranational authority of the EU. Identity has thus become the most decisive aspect of regional integration and essential in understanding support or opposition to governance structures, as citizens care about who has authority over them. Strong feelings of national identity paired with the ongoing process of European integration creates a political conflict at the member state level, as citizens oppose transfers of authority to the supranational level and have lower levels of support for supranational institutions. The level of politicisation is visible through two key indicators 1) less popular support for the EU and 2) increased electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. This becomes an overall constraint on further integration (Hooghe & Marks 2009).

The focus on identity and politicisation distinguishes postfunctionalism from neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Both approaches see functional pressures as being drivers of integration. Yet for postfunctionalism, functional pressures clash with feelings of exclusive or national identity and disrupt the integration process (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 4). Departing from the rationalist-economic logic of past theories, it instead argues economic preference is a less-powerful motivating factor than issues such as communal/national identity, ethnicity, and religion (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 5). The theory dictates that identity holds greater weight as an issue amongst the general public than it does with elites or interest groups; identity must be politically constructed; and the more an individual identifies with an ingroup (the nation-state) the less likely the individual is to support a supranational jurisdiction which includes outgroups (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 12). Research from Hobolt and de Vries (2016: 421) supports this assertion, as they find through an analysis of Eurobarometer data that those who possess a strong sense of national identity are less likely to support the EU.

Furthermore, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism both see integration as driven by elites, with the general public supporting—or perhaps just having little interest in—further steps in European integration. This certainly was the case for a significant period of time, as integration proceeded as an “elite affair” in which the general public was not mobilising against, or punishing national governments for, the goals of the European Community (Hurrelmann 2007: 352). During this period, citizens allowed elites to “shape the nature, direction and speed of integration” (de Wilde et al. 2016: 4). Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970) describe this period in integration as being a ‘permissive consensus’.

Yet for Hooghe and Marks (2009: 1), as European integration has become increasingly politicised, there has been a transition from a “permissive consensus to constraining dissensus”. This raises the question of when this transition occurred. The authors point to the period around the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as the beginning of this, for three reasons: 1) the increase in supranational authority, 2) the continuing shift toward

multilevel governance in European politics and 3) the numerous politicising events which have occurred since the Maastricht Treaty's introduction.

First, the Maastricht Treaty marks a new stage in supranational authority. This is because it introduced the European Union as an organization and also signalled a shift from an economic union to a monetary and political union as well (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 5; de Wilde & Zürn 2012: 141). The treaty laid the foundations for the creation of the Euro currency. It also increased the supranational authority of the then European Community by extending its exclusive competencies and empowering the European Parliament to adopt legal acts through the introduction of co-decision (Nugent 2017: 81-83). For postfunctionalism, increased political authority plays a fundamental role in driving politicisation. The broader literature on the politicisation of international authority supports this assertion and finds that as international institutions increase their political authority, this is coupled with an increase in politicisation (Zürn et al. 2012). Eurosceptic actors mobilise around this increase in supranational authority, framing a strong sense of national identity as being incompatible with European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 13).

Second, the period around the Maastricht Treaty marks a shift toward multilevel governance in European politics. Domestic politics and European politics were once far more independent from one another than they are now. European politics has become visibly multilevel and multifaceted. The introduction of the Single Market and Eurozone, as well as the changing structure of the EU beginning with the Maastricht Treaty, have increased this multilevel structure. Very few policy areas remain under the exclusive competency of member states, just as few policy fields fall under the exclusive competency of the EU (Buonanno & Nugent 2013: 7). Thus, the shift in decision-making from elites to a wider range of political actors increases the range and diversity of decision-makers involved, which reduces the scope for agreement.

Third, the time period since the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty has seen multiple politicising moments. This includes treaty revisions and an attempted treaty revision, as well

as substantial crises including the European debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and Brexit. As politicisation is completely central to a postfunctionalist approach, the next section will introduce the concept of politicisation and show how it has manifested in European politics.

1.3 Politicisation and its manifestations in the EU

For a postfunctionalist approach, politicisation is the central concept which describes this new, post-Maastricht era in European integration. As de Wilde (2011) effectively outlines, the term politicisation is used in a variety of ways in both EU studies and political science more broadly. So, for the sake of clarity, politicisation can be defined as straightforwardly as “the act of transporting an issue into the field of politics – making previously apolitical matters political” (de Wilde & Zurn 2012: 139). More specifically, politicisation can be conceptualized as an “increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced toward the process of policy formation” (de Wilde 2011: 566) or “an expansion of the scope of conflict within the political system” (Grande & Hutter 2016: 7). Combining these definitions, politicisation features three key, interconnected manifestations: increased issue salience, actor and audience expansion—which causes intensifying debate, and actor polarization (De Wilde 2011; Börzel & Risse 2018; de Wilde et al. 2016). For an issue to be fully politicised, it should be politicised along all three dimensions (Kriesi 2016: 33). The evidence that each of the three manifestations of politicisation has occurred in European integration will now be outlined, as will the central role that crises play in this process.

1.3.1 Issue salience

The first dimension—issue salience—has been studied extensively with evidence showing that to a limited extent, the overall salience of European integration has increased over time. Hutter and Grande (2014) analyzed the national elections which took place in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland from 1970-2010. Through examining media content, they determined that European issues were salient in all five countries, but only fully politicised in Britain and Switzerland over the issue of EU membership. Moreover, Hurrelmann et al. (2015) conducted focus groups across four EU member states on

politicisation, finding that only the key foundations of European integration have any saliency amongst the general public, and the everyday activities of the EU remain non-politicised. Lastly, one study found that the number of social movements protests oriented to Europe increased from 5-10 percent in the 1980s to 20-30 percent in the second half of the 1990s (Imig 2002).

National political actors play a key role in increasing the salience of the EU (Hooghe & Marks 2009). Kriesi (2016: 32) argues this is because the national arena has a stronger, more salient electoral space for partisan actors to participate in. Empirical research confirms this argument. The 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey of 337 political scientists across Europe found that the salience of European integration had markedly increased at the national level during the period of 2006-2014, and this increased salience is skewed to the platforms and discourse from Eurosceptic parties (Polk et al. 2017). National political actors shifting EU-related issues into the political space increases the salience of these issues and makes them more politicised.

1.3.2 Actor and audience expansion

The second manifestation—actor and audience expansion—is seen through the shift in European integration from negotiation amongst a limited number of elites to mass politics, which includes the national political arena, mass media, social movements, and the civil service. The more actors involved in European integration also increases its salience, and mass politics provides an arena for Eurosceptic actors to mobilise and politicise integration (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 5).

This actor and audience expansion is best exemplified by the increase in EU-related referendums in member states. A referendum features all the key aspects of politicisation: research has found that the issue salience of the EU peaks during crises and major reforms (de Wilde & Zürn 2012: 140), both sides of the debate mobilise around the issue, and they ask voters a question specifically related to European integration. As Hooghe and Marks (2009: 20) write, referendums “are used for immediate effect, but their institutional impact

has a considerable half-life. Referendums are not easily forgotten.” While referendums on accession have been a common occurrence and undertaken by most EU member states since the European Community expanded in 1972, a variety of other referendums have occurred as the EU has sought to reform itself or deepen the level of integration. In the period of 1986 to 2002—which included the Single European Act (SEA), Maastricht Treaty, Treaty of Amsterdam, and Treaty of Nice—Ireland held referendums for all four, Denmark held referendums for the SEA, Maastricht, and Amsterdam Treaties, and France held a referendum for the Maastricht Treaty.

Politicisation through referendums continued with the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty, and the Brexit vote. The 2004 Constitutional Treaty would have replaced the EU’s existing treaties and served as a single constitutional document, and as Neill Nugent (2017: 98) writes, it was “widely seen as being much more than ‘just another’ amending treaty.” The Treaty was rejected in referendums by voters in both France and the Netherlands, but notably almost half of the then 25 EU member states had planned to hold referendums on it. This was an unprecedented number (Nugent 2017: 90). The higher number of planned referendums is a clear indication of political leaders in member states being aware of the increasing politicisation of the EU as an issue, as well as the costs of deepening integration without consulting the public. The treaty’s rejection is a clear instance of politicisation being a constraint on further integration. The rejected Constitutional Treaty was largely repackaged as the Lisbon treaty in 2008, which was initially rejected by Irish voters before passing on a second referendum. Perhaps the most famous EU-related referendum was the highly politicised 2016 Brexit referendum, which saw UK voters narrowly vote to leave the European Union.

1.3.3 Actor polarization

With the shift from elite-focused decision-making to mass politics, there has been an increase in the presence of Eurosceptic partisan actors. The politicisation of European integration has been explicitly driven by Eurosceptic partisan actors which mobilise around national identity, and not by mainstream political actors—who often seek to depoliticise European integration.

A postfunctional approach does not see politicisation and Euroscepticism necessarily in terms of left/right party dimensions, but instead through two Eurosceptic, non-economic party and elite types: *gal* parties: green/alternative/libertarian, and *tan* parties: traditionalism/authority/nationalism (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 16). Prior to the introduction of the single market, the *gal* parties were the main opponents of European integration, as they were anxious about the growth of a transnational capitalist project. This changed in the 1990s when far-right *tan* parties became the most prominent Eurosceptic actors, mobilising around identity-based concerns. Today, green parties in particular are far more pro-Europe than their *tan* counterparts. (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 17).

Other studies have deviated from the *gal/tan* categorization, but have supported the argument that the drivers of politicisation have been Eurosceptic partisan actors who have successfully mobilised around the major debates and crises in European integration. This can be seen through the election of far-right populist parties at the member state level across Europe and in the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections. De Wilde et al. (2016: 6) make the same argument, seeing the success of populist right-wing parties and growing public criticism of European governance as evidence that Eurosceptic actors politicise integration more than pro-EU actors do. Hoeglinger (2016) analyzed domestic election campaigns in six Western European countries in the 1990s and 2000s, finding that politicisation occurred along a left-right spectrum which mainly saw far-right and far-left Eurosceptic parties politicising the EU. Hutter and Kriesi (2019) found that parties on both the far-left and far-right consistently politicise integration through a Eurosceptic lens.

Eurosceptic actors have been successful in driving politicisation because pro-integration actors usually take the opposite approach, often seeking to depoliticise issues in integration. Hutter and Kriesi (2019: 999) argue that this is because mainstream parties lack any incentive to politicise integration due to potential internal divisions within the party or responsibility once in government. As Kriesi (2016: 32-33) notes, this can be seen through attempts to avoid treaty revision—such as the case of the Fiscal Compact—or delegation to technocratic

supranational institutions, as occurred in response to the European debt crisis through the delegation to the European Central Bank and the EU Commission (Schimmelfennig 2014). This is also done through Euro-compatible government formation (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 1000). Some authors argue that mainstream parties are—sometimes unintentionally—not successful in depoliticising European integration. For example, Dolezal and Hellström (2016) found through an analysis of six Northwestern European countries that strong competition between mainstream parties in government and opposition can drive the politicisation of European integration. Furthermore, internal party divisions on European integration may not be enough to depoliticise the issue. The most prominent and recent example of this came from the British Conservatives, who were strongly divided on the issue of EU membership. This led to Prime Minister David Cameron deciding to hold the Brexit referendum, as he feared losing support to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (Hellström & Blomgren 2016).

1.3.4 Politicisation over time: the centrality of crises and major events in integration

The manifestations of politicisation which have been outlined also begin to illustrate an important trend. This is that crises and major events in European politics are central to politicisation, being moments of increased salience for the EU which a wide range of actors engage with and mobilise around. This translates into spikes in politicisation occurring around key moments such as treaty revision, Euro implementation, eastern enlargement, the European debt crisis, and the migrant crisis (de Wilde & Zurn 2012: 140). The previous-mentioned referendums on treaty revision are a clear example of this.

Much of the literature and empirical evidence supports this argument, suggesting that politicisation does not occur at a constant, but instead through a “patchwork of politicizing moments” (Hutter & Kriesi 2019: 997). Hutter and Kriesi’s (2019) findings support this conclusion and are the clearest empirical test of politicisation peaking during the various crises in European integration. They conducted a content analysis of newspapers during national election campaigns across Europe from the early 2000s to 2017, finding that politicisation peaked during the European debt crisis and the migrant crises. Similar findings

emerged in a study from Rauh (2019), who analyzed the number of articles dealing with the EU per month, Eurobarometer results, and the number of EU-related protests across the six largest EU member states during the period of 1990-2012. The results show that the politicisation of European integration has slowly but steadily increased over time, with spikes around major events such as treaty reform, crises, and enlargement. Lastly, Grande and Kriesi (2016: 279) found that Eurosceptic actors use crises in integration as a “strategic opportunity” to mobilise citizens. Numerous examples illustrate this, such as the way far-right Eurosceptic parties mobilised around the immigration crises.

1.4 Variation in the level of politicisation across EU member states

Despite an increase in the supranational authority of the EU and the determination that European integration has become increasingly politicised, politicisation occurs to varying extents across the EU member states (de Wilde & Zurn 2012). To explain this, it is valuable to examine the main drivers of the two indicators of politicisation for this thesis: 1) popular support for the EU and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. After that, a regional explanation for this variation will be examined.

The literature on the causes of popular support for the EU is large and diverse, with numerous approaches and theories. While a postfunctionalist approach is very much identity-based in its explanation of popular support for the EU, it is also complemented by other research on the topic. Ejrnæs and Jensen (2019) examined what drives support for European integration through an analysis of over 110,000 responses to the European Social Survey. They found that attitudes towards multiculturalism at the individual level and corruption at the country level are the strongest predictors of whether or not an individual supports European integration. Hobolt and de Vries (2016: 422-423) examined a cue-taking explanation, which argues that the EU is far too complex for the average citizen to understand, so national news media and mainstream politicians play a critical role in shaping citizens perceptions of the EU. They surveyed the existing evidence and found that this is often true, although mainstream political actors are generally more supportive of the EU than citizens are (2016: 422-423). This research speaks to the role that Eurosceptic actors play in driving

politicisation by mobilising along identity-based lines. It also directly relates to earlier research by Hooghe and Marks (2005), which offers something of a synthesis of the identity-based and cue-taking approaches. They analyzed survey data and found that a strong sense of national identity and opposition to European integration exists in member states where the national elites are divided on European issues, but is absent in member states which lack this division.

It is also valuable to examine other existing explanations for support for the EU. Hobolt and de Vries (2016: 420) examined a utilitarian approach, which argues higher educated and higher skilled individuals will benefit more from European integration and thus support the EU to a greater extent (see Gabel 1998). They found this approach to be accurate, as socioeconomic factors do consistently influence EU support. On the other hand, they argue this explanation is less accurate at the national level, as countries that received more transfers from the EU or benefit from improved trade through EU membership are not necessarily more pro-EU overall. Research has also shown that popular support for national institutions translates into support for the EU. This is particularly the case during politicised moments in integration, such as crises (see Ares et al. 2017). Altogether, this overview shows the major approaches in the literature to explain popular support for the EU and why it varies across member states.

The causes of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties have been studied as well, and complement the arguments of a postfunctionalist approach. Trieb (2014) analyzed the surge in electoral support for Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections, finding that concerns about the effects of EU policies and frustration with mainstream politics drive voters towards Eurosceptic parties. Nicoli (2017) analyzed 108 national elections between 2008-2015, finding that there is a direct effect of the economic crisis on the electoral support for hard-Eurosceptic parties. The more negatively affected by the European debt crisis a member state was, the more likely it was that the member state would have an increase in support for Eurosceptic parties. Furthermore, Hobolt (2016) analyzed the Brexit referendum, finding that voting to leave the EU is common among less-educated, less-

economically successful, and older voters, as well as those who are concerned about immigration and multiculturalism. These various studies begin to illustrate the conditions which facilitate votes for Eurosceptic parties, in addition to the voters who are more likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party. It also speaks to the interplay between identity, support for the EU, and Euroscepticism—which translates into heightened politicisation.

Another potential explanatory variable of the varying levels of politicisation is regional differences. For example, Kriesi (2016) found that politicisation varies systematically within Europe across three regions: Northwest Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Kriesi traces the rise of Euroscepticism in Northwest Europe to a long-term rise of the ‘New Right’ (2016: 42), while the rise of politicisation in Southern Europe is traced to left-wing parties mobilising around an anti-elite, Eurosceptic message. In Central and Eastern Europe, politicisation has been driven by Eurosceptic parties in Poland and Hungary that have mobilised around a nationalist message. In a later article, Hutter and Kriesi (2019: 1001) further develop a regional approach to politicisation, incorporating the importance of crises. For example, Southern European countries were slow to recover from the 2008 recession in comparison to Northwest and Central and Eastern Europe and also experienced a higher influx of asylum seekers during the migrant crisis. Both crises having a greater impact on this region is linked with a higher level of politicisation.

1.5 The consequences of the politicisation of European integration

Far more research on politicisation in the EU has positioned it as a dependent variable and examined its causes. Yet, as de Wilde et al. (2016) note, there is a gap in the literature on the actual consequences of this politicisation, and it has mostly been theoretical speculation thus far (see Zürn 2014). A postfunctionalist approach makes the clear argument that politicisation is a constraint on the overall integration process. But far less research has taken a more specific approach and examined issues such as policy implications or how politicisation affects member state behaviour.

A few studies have examined how politicisation affects the responsiveness of the EU. De Bruycker (2017) analyzed public media statements from the EU concerning 125 legislative proposals between 2008–2010, finding that the EU addresses public interests in policy issues that are salient and attract mobilization by civil society groups in Europe, but is silent about public interests in policy issues which have low salience amongst the general public. In a later study, De Bruycker (2019: 15) analyzed the EU's legislative output across 15 policy fields and conducted a content analysis of nearly 6000 media statements in European newspapers, finding that EU legislative output is a “function of the degree to which issues are politicised and the degree to which European citizens express increasing demands for new policy initiatives”. Furthermore, Rauh (2019) analyzed consumer policy proposals from the European Commission, finding that policies are more geared towards widespread consumer interest during periods of high politicisation. Thus, politicisation appears to increase the responsiveness of the EU.

A gap in the literature exists regarding responsiveness in relation to member state behaviour. As has been established, politicisation varies across member states. Beyond De Bruycker's (2017; 2019) research, other scholars have suggested the politicisation of international authority should trigger increased responsiveness by international institutions (see Zürn et al. 2012). Yet if we move from the international level to the nation-state level and focus specifically on the EU, one can also analyze the extent to which the politicisation of European integration affects EU-related member state behaviour. Very few policy areas remain under the exclusive competency of member states, just as few policy fields fall under the exclusive competency of the EU (Buonanno & Nugent 2013: 7). Thus, member states also have opportunities to respond to public demands or mobilization around European integration. This has been seen through notable examples such as referendums on EU treaties. But this can be studied at a far more policy-specific level, such as supranational economic policy coordination and control, as this thesis will seek to do.

A postfunctionalist approach can be applied to this gap in the literature and offers expectations of how politicisation affects member state behaviour. Postfunctionalism as a

theory is primarily concerned with EU-related national political behaviour (Schmidt 2019), and this raises the question of the EU-related political behaviour that can be expected in a member state featuring a high level of politicisation. A postfunctional approach would argue that an EU member state with a high level of politicisation would feature a population less supportive of the EU and more mobilised along identity-based lines which would create political costs for parties which support deepening integration. It would also feature a second, related outcome—a higher vote count for Eurosceptic parties. Meijers (2017) found through analyzing Chapel Hill Expert Survey data on Western European Countries that the higher the level of support for Eurosceptic challenger parties, the more likely mainstream parties are to shift to more Eurosceptic positions. Overall, the combination of low support for the EU and a high vote total for Eurosceptic parties would decrease the likelihood of a member state supporting a deepening of integration or accepting an increase in the supranational authority of the EU.

1.6 Criticisms and commentary on postfunctionalism

Scholars have engaged with the postfunctional approach to integration, with some supporting its main causal claims and others outlining potential blind spots in the theory. Börzel and Risse (2009: 219) agree with the postfunctionalist explanation of politicisation as articulated by Hooghe and Marks but offer one refinement: they argue that both *gal* and *tan* parties will mobilise the Eurosceptic vote around identity-based concerns, and not just *tan* parties. They also argue a left/right party orientation does appear in politicisation, as some policy issues such as the environment, social policies vs. neoliberalism, and migration are quite often politicised along a left/right party spectrum.

One of the most common criticisms of postfunctionalism is that politicisation has not constituted a brake on integration. For example, the aftermath of the European debt crisis led to greater economic integration, which seems to pose a challenge to the ‘constraining dissensus’ posed by Hooghe and Marks (2009). The Eurozone crisis was—albeit to various extents—politicised across EU member states (Leupold 2015) and also featured political contestation in the European Council between leaders and a politicised approach taken by

the European Commission of Jean-Claude Juncker starting in 2014 (Schmidt 2019: 1028-1032). However, the crisis did not see integration come to a halt, but instead introduced an increased level of supranational monitoring and control. As authors have noted (Schimmelfennig 2018; Börzel & Risse 2018) this is a challenge to the postfunctionalist expectation of a ‘constraining dissensus’. Hodson and Puetter (2019) note that it is not just the European debt crisis which poses this challenge to postfunctionalism, but also the fact that the overall level of integration in Europe has increased since the introduction of the Maastricht treaty.

Hooghe and Marks (2019: 7) have responded to these criticisms, arguing that postfunctionalism does explain the aftermath of the European debt crisis. They argue that a rise in nationalist opposition to the EU in the aftermath of the crisis limited the options governments had to combat the crisis, even as it worsened, due to concerns about public opinion and domestic political pushback. Politicisation then reduced the options for reform at both the member state and EU level, leaving only one option: depoliticisation through delegation to the European Central Bank (ECB), which is a non-majoritarian institution. The authors argue that this led to measures that were partial and inferior. For example, a fiscal union may be “functionally rational” but not politically doable because of politicisation (Hooghe & Marks 2019: 7). While Hooghe and Marks do not specifically address the fact that integration has still increased since the Maastricht Treaty, the same argument could be applied. Absent the politicisation and national-identity based mobilization which has occurred, integration may have gone much farther than it has.

1.7 Summary and hypothesis

Overall, the politicisation of European integration has recently emerged as a major field in EU studies, largely due to Hooghe and Marks (2009) pathbreaking contribution and articulation of postfunctionalism. Much research has sought to measure the extent to which politicisation has occurred, creating a near-consensus that politicisation has increased since the introduction of the Maastricht treaty. Politicising moments include crises, treaty revision, and enlargement/membership debates. The actors responsible for politicising the EU are

largely Eurosceptic actors, as pro-EU actors and mainstream parties often seek to depoliticise European integration. Authors have put forward various explanations of what issues drive politicisation, with identity and increasing authority being the most common explanatory variables and regional explanations being prominent in the literature as well. Much less research has sought to analyze the consequences of politicisation, particularly in the area of EU-related member state behaviour.

In summation, the identity-based claims and mobilization in a member state with a high level of politicisation will lead to less popular support for the EU, and thus create political costs for delegating authority and supervisory competencies to the EU. Also, a higher level of politicisation will lead to a higher Eurosceptic vote total, and Eurosceptic parties are less likely to support increasing the supranational authority of the EU. Given these two propositions, the hypothesis of this thesis is that the higher the level of politicisation in a member state, the less likely the member state is to accept increased supranational coordination and control of its economic policies.

2. The European Debt Crisis

This chapter will examine the European debt crisis (Eurozone crisis) and its consequences for both the EU and its member states. It will begin with an overview of the crisis, outlining its root causes and consequences. It will then examine the EU response to the crisis, placing specific focus on the introduction of the European Semester and CSRs) from the EU to the member states. It will also discuss the significance of these developments. Overall, the chapter will argue that the introduction of the European Semester signals a significant increase in supranational coordination and control of the member states' economic policies, with the goals of greater fiscal discipline and avoiding another Eurozone crisis in the future.


2.1 Overview of the crisis

The Eurozone crisis began in 2009, ten years after the Euro was introduced as the currency of 11 EU member states. The crisis is unique in both nature and scope. It was the first debt crisis among developed countries since Germany in the 1930s, brought severe economic and social consequences particularly for debtor member states, and took place within the unique setting of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Frieden & Walter 2017: 372). Prior to the outbreak of the crisis, the Euro currency was celebrated as an overall success. Even in the first year of the 2008 global financial crisis before the Eurozone crisis began, the Euro currency was seen as a stabilizing force that weathered the negative effects of the global recession (Panico & Puridicatio 2013: 585; Copelovitch et al. 2016: 814). However, only one year later the unfolding crisis threatened the future of the Eurozone and fractured the EU.

The Eurozone members most negatively affected by this crisis were Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. For an overview of their debt-to-GDP ratio during this period, see Figure 1. Examining the causes of the Eurozone crisis—and why these member states found themselves in such dire economic situations—reveals some deeper issues in the Eurozone that came to the forefront once the crisis began. First, the crisis revealed the challenge of having a single monetary policy despite large differences in each Eurozone member's

economic conditions. For example, choosing an interest rate somewhere in between what would be ideal for slow-growing economies in Northwest Europe and fast-growing economies in Southern Europe and Ireland proved problematic, by not encouraging investment in Northwest Europe while also leaving strong incentives for financial institutions in Northwest Europe to lend to Southern European member states and Ireland. Firms in these member states borrowed heavily from financial institutions in the rest of Europe, which fed economic growth, transitioning into an economic bubble that eventually burst. This caused lending to heavily decrease, and some Eurozone states were unable to service their debt and borrow the required funds to cover their ongoing payment deficits (Lane 2012: 49-50; Frieden & Walter 2017: 373).

Figure 1: General Government Debt Levels During the Eurozone Crisis



(Source: own graph, based on data from Eurostat (2020)).

Another issue was the perceived lack of legitimacy behind the EU's pre-crisis 'no-bailout' policy. When creating the EMU, governments felt that the potential of bailouts would encourage risky financial behaviour by a member state if it expected to be bailed out. But

this commitment was not taken seriously by investors, who felt the Eurozone was too interconnected for a member state to collapse economically without being bailed out by the other member states, as this could threaten the stability of the entire Eurozone. Thus, member states who were less creditworthy, with Greece being a prominent example, were able to borrow at rates very similar to what Germany—being the most creditworthy member state—was able to receive. This is due to the assumption that if a member state fell into financial trouble, other member states would help it out (Frieden & Walter 2017: 373). This allowed the high levels of borrowing to occur, and the more fiscally conservative member states allowed their financial institutions to lend excessively to the fast-growing economies (Frieden & Walter 2017: 373).

A final issue was a disconnect between the EU and the Eurozone member states. For example, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)—which was intended to ensure the stability of the EMU—failed to prevent the Eurozone crisis. The rules established through the SGP were not followed, including rules surrounding deficits and borrowing. The European Commission did an insufficient job monitoring the fiscal performance of the Eurozone member states, and member states were powerful actors that were able to change or weaken the warnings issued to specific countries by the European Commission (Baerg & Hallerberg 2016). Overall, the various issues which have been outlined all surfaced in 2009, bringing the Eurozone crisis.

The crisis began most visibly in Greece. In late 2009, the Greek government revealed that the country's deficit was far higher than it had initially revealed, far exceeding the rules established under the SGP. After introducing austerity measures in early 2010, the Greek government sought assistance from the EU. This led to extensive debate in the EU, eventually leading to a May 2010 package that saw the Eurozone members and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide financial assistance to Greece in exchange for fiscal austerity and structural reforms. This conditionality led to large-scale protests in Greece. As the possibility of Greece exiting the Eurozone grew, the country received a second EU-IMF financial assistance package (Copelovitch et al. 2016: 815).

The Eurozone crisis continued to worsen due to a combination of the ongoing global financial crisis, worsening economic outlooks amongst Eurozone members, and increasing borrowing costs. Further EU-IMF bailouts were also given to Ireland in 2010, Portugal in 2011, Spain in 2012, and Cyprus in 2013 (Copelovitch et al. 2016: 815). These countries suffered from private sector debt, collapsing banking sectors, and weak competitiveness (Harari 2014). It is important to note that while the Greek crisis was a true sovereign debt crisis, the crises in the other countries did not result from government borrowing, but mainly private borrowers instead. That being said, as the crisis worsened and the private borrowers—such as banks—risked collapse, they were bailed out by their national governments and thus the private debt was taken on by the national governments, transitioning the crisis into a sovereign debt crisis (Frieden & Walter 2017: 376-377).

A key aspect of this crisis was the success that creditor member states had in keeping the burden of cost and adjustment on the debtor member states. The five main debtor countries—Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain—implemented strict austerity measures which brought severe social and economic consequences including recession, declining gross domestic product (GDP), and record unemployment. Debt relief was not used to assist Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, and was used only to a very limited extent in Greece and Cyprus. Meanwhile, other Eurozone countries were not affected to anywhere near the same extent. (Frieden & Walter 2017: 379-381).

The Eurozone crisis led to extensive political consequences within the EU and across member states. The transition to a sovereign debt crisis created a new, troubling political dynamic within the EU, where a divide emerged between creditor member states—such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, and France—and the debtor member states. (Mabbett & Shelkle 2015). The harsh austerity measures enacted by different national governments led to an overall dissatisfaction with traditional parties, and radical populist parties increased their electoral success (Hobolt & Tilley 2016). During the early period of the Eurozone crisis (2010-2013), 15 elections took place across the Eurozone. In 11 of the cases, the elections were triggered by the Eurozone crisis and only two of the elections saw the incumbent

government win (Schimmelfennig 2014: 323). Eurosceptic parties used the crisis as an opportunity to call for a dissolution of the Eurozone in Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, while Italy and Greece's Eurosceptic parties have called for leaving the Eurozone or for a referendum on Eurozone membership (Frieden & Walter 2017: 383).

2.2 The EU response to the crisis

Before the Eurozone crisis, the Economic and Monetary Union could be broadly described as having a centralized monetary policy and a decentralized fiscal policy. The European System of Central banks, with the ECB at its head, held exclusive power over the Eurozone's monetary policy. On the other hand, there was no fiscal or financial union and the supervision of national fiscal policy was limited. Despite the EU having the power to impose sanctions for excessive debt, sanctions were never imposed (Schimmelfennig 2014: 324).

The Eurozone crisis created demands for Eurozone reform, leading to extensive fiscal and financial policy change at the EU level which created a higher level of integration. The no-bailout policy was replaced with processes that can provide highly indebted eurozone countries with relief, eventually leading to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which can lend up to 500 billion Euros. Receiving funds through the ESM requires approval by a troika consisting of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission, and the IMF. Frieden and Walter (2017: 381) make the helpful comparison of the ESM as being "like a Eurozone IMF, with all that implies." The ECB has also intervened to assist highly indebted countries and banks, including in 2011 and 2012 when it provided one trillion Euros of credit to banks (Schimmelfennig 2014: 325). Moreover, the EU has transitioned toward a banking union starting in 2013, when the Council of the EU and the European Parliament agreed to create the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which gives the ECB the power to monitor 'significant' banks (Schimmelfennig 2014: 326).

Supranational fiscal coordination and supervision also increased after the Eurozone crisis. Most notably, these reforms included the 'Six-Pack,' the 'Two-Pack,' and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (the Fiscal Compact). Taken together,

these measures created stronger sanctions for excessive debt, a procedure for reviewing non-fiscal imbalances which could harm other member states, ex-ante budget control of national budgets, and in-depth country reviews (IDRs) (Schimmelfennig 2014: 325; Verdun & Zeitlin 2018: 137-138). This signals a move toward a clearer commitment to fiscal discipline and an attempt to address some of the core issues which led to the Eurozone crisis.

The reforms implemented are a clear transition toward deeper integration in the Eurozone, despite the highly politicised environment and the political costs that member states experienced as a result of the crisis. Various explanations for this have emerged in the literature. Schimmelfennig (2014) addressed this challenge, finding that dissensus and disintegration were avoided in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis due to referendum avoidance, Euro-compatible governments, and through delegation to the European Central Bank—a technocratic body. Furthermore, Baglioni and Hurrelmann et al. (2015) found, through focus groups, that citizens attributed blame for the Eurozone crisis more on member states than the EU, which reduces the potential political consequences of delegating macroeconomic control to the supranational level. This explains why the Eurozone crisis protests lacked a transnational element and remained national-focused (de Wilde et al. 2016: 7). Interestingly, support for the single currency remained fairly stable inside the Eurozone during the crisis but plummeted in the EU member states which are outside of the Eurozone (Hobolt & de Vries 2016: 419). On the other hand, Copelovith et al (2016: 811) directly attribute the unprecedentedly low levels of EU support in the 2011-2012 period as being a result of the Eurozone crisis.

Overall, the increased supranational regulation and coordination which this section has outlined is very clearly exemplified by the introduction of the European Semester, which this thesis will now examine as the framework in which the dependent variable can be measured.

2.3 The European Semester

The European Semester emerged out of the Eurozone crisis as a new structure for socioeconomic policy monitoring and control in the EU. It aims to reduce the level of policy

divergence, prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances, and tackle poor fiscal discipline, since these were causes of the Eurozone crisis (Guidi & Guardiancich 2018: 685; European Council 2020). Created in 2010, it has been revised as recently as 2015. While it builds on past coordination processes including the SGP, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs), and the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), it brings the EU's various tools for macroeconomic supervision and coordination together into a single, year-long policy coordination cycle. This involves scrutinizing and guiding member states' national budgets and economic policies, and also the EU issuing recommendations to member states which are backed by potential sanctions (Angerer et al. 2016; Zeitlin & Vanhercke 2017). These sanctions can include fines or the European Commission withholding any of the European Structural and Investment funds (ESIF) to a member state. The European Semester was also introduced as a method of helping the EU and its member states hit the targets articulated in the European Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy, which include employment, R&D, climate, education, and poverty goals (Verdun & Zeitlin 2018: 138; Eurostat 2019).

The European Semester follows a consistent timeline each year, beginning in November. At this time, the European Commission identifies reform goals for the EU as a whole and then offers policy guidance to the member states for the upcoming year. The Commission also issues an Alert Mechanism Report, which identifies member states for Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and IDRs. Next, member states share their economic and budgetary plans with the EU in the first part of the new year. In February, the Commission issues a report for each member state which evaluates its specific economic situation and progress with implementing its reform agenda. In April, member states share their national reform programmes and their stability programmes (for eurozone countries) and convergence programmes (for non-eurozone countries). Each May, the European Commission analyzes each member states' macroeconomic, structural, and budgetary plans, and then issues country-specific recommendations (CSRs) for each member state, which are backed by the potential of financial sanctions in cases of consistent non-compliance (Verdun & Zeitlin 2018: 137-138; European Commission 2019a).

CSRs are a major signal towards increased supranational coordination and control over member states' economic policies. The CSRs cover a wide range of policy fields, but they are policy fields where the member states have primary competence and the EU has limited legislative power (Verdun & Zeitlin 2018: 137-138). The drafting of CSRs is a two-step decision-making process. The first decision-making occurs when the European Commission drafts and proposes CSRs, and the second is when the CSRs are then discussed between the member states in the Council of the EU. They are then formally adopted by the European Council in July (Verdun & Zeitlin 2018: 139; Guidi & Guardiancich 2018: 685). Guidi and Guardiancich (2018) analyzed this two-step process by looking at pension-related CSRs, which is a policy area the member states have control over. Their findings confirm that CSRs have shifted power towards supranational institutions, as the Commission—as a supranational institution—drafts the CSRs and the Council of the EU and the European Council—both intergovernmental—refrain from altering them. CSRs have come to play a fairly prominent role in the distribution of structural funds, as regulation 1303/2013 allows the Commission to add specific goals toward achieving CSRs to the structural fund partnership agreements between the individual member states and the Commission (Bignami 2020: 86; EULEX 1303/2013).

As their name suggests, the CSRs issued to member states are very country specific. For example, the 2019 CSRs for Estonia include limiting the nominal growth rate of net primary government expenditure to not exceed a certain level, improving the labour-market relevance of the education system, reducing the gender pay gap, improving the social safety net, and improving sustainable transport and energy infrastructure. Meanwhile, the CSRs for Latvia make very different economic recommendations, including tax reduction for low-income earners, strengthening pensions, improving healthcare accessibility, increasing the amount of affordable housing, and improving energy efficiency (European Commission 2019b).


Scholars have begun to examine how CSRs are perceived in member states. Zeitlin and Vanhercke (2014: 58) conducted interviews with member state and EU officials regarding CSRs, and found wide discrepancies between how seriously various member states take their

recommendations. Most notably for this thesis, they found that domestic considerations, including public attitudes toward European integration, had an impact on the weight that CSRs carried in a member state. The authors also found that CSRs are very salient in some countries, even making mainstream media in Belgium and the Netherlands, while the UK is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Furthermore, Hallerberg et al. (2018) found that non-Eurozone member states were most likely to monitor CSRs, giving them a higher level of consideration and debate in parliament, and this effect increased over time. Maatsch (2017) found that compliance with CSRs is far more likely when there is coherence between the government's economic preferences and the CSRs being received, meaning conflict over implementation is dictated by an ideological dimension. Zeitlin and Vanhercke's (2014: 58) findings complement this, finding domestic actors will use CSRs to advocate a policy position they agree with—whether in government or opposition.

Since 2019, the Commission has also begun tracking progress implementing CSRs. The 2019 country-specific reports evaluate progress implementing all CSRs issued between 2011-2018, and then breaks down the percentage that falls into each of the following five categories: no progress, limited progress, some progress, substantial progress, and fully addressed. Figure 2 provides a visual breakdown of how this plays out, using the example of Lithuania.

Overall, the introduction of the European Semester is a clear shift toward greater supranational monitoring and control of member states' economic policies. Codifying national budget supervision into a year-long policy cycle is a clear example of this, as is the introduction of CSRs from the EU which are backed by the potential of sanctions in the case of non-compliance. The European Semester is not a temporary measure. It is here to stay and continues to mark a significant shift toward greater supranational control that would have been impossible to implement before the Eurozone crisis.

Figure 2: Lithuania's Progress Implementing CSRs: 2011-2018



(Source: Lithuania's Country-Specific Report (European Commission 2019b)).


3. Research Design, Data, and Methods

This methodology chapter will outline the main causal claim the thesis investigates and how the research will be designed in order to do so. It will also outline how each variable will be operationalized in the empirical section and what the data sources are.

3.1. Research design

The empirical section of the thesis will test the hypothesis that a higher level of politicisation of European integration in a member state will lead to less acceptance of supranational coordination and control. A visual representation of this claim can be seen in Figure 3. The level of politicisation is measured along two dimensions: 1) popular support for the EU and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties, and acceptance of supranational control is measured by the member states' progress implementing CSRs through the European Semester.

Figure 3: Relationship Between the Level of Politicisation and the Acceptance of Supranational Control



(Source: Own figure)

The timeframe for analysis will be the post-economic crisis period of 2011-2018, because the most recent country-specific reports track progress adopting CSRs during this period. The research is large-n, as the number of cases will be 27. This will include 26 EU member states and the United Kingdom, which was an EU member state during the timeframe this thesis is studying. As a part of the withdrawal agreement, the United Kingdom will remain a part of the European Semester until the end of 2020. Greece cannot be included as a case because it only joined the European Semester in 2019, therefore not receiving any CSRs during the period of study. The only country to join the EU during the post-economic crisis period is Croatia, which joined in 2013. Data beginning in 2014 will be used to calculate Croatia's level of politicisation, and the timeframe of analysis for the dependent variable will be 2014-2018. This is because 2014 was the first year in which Croatia was part of the European Semester. The timeframe of analysis for Ireland will be 2014-2018, for Latvia 2012-2018, and for Romania 2013-2018, as those are the years that these three countries stopped receiving EU-IMF financial assistance and thus entered into the European Semester. For these countries, the measurement of the independent variable will also be for the timeframe in which they were part of the European Semester.

The first two sections of the empirical chapter will be dedicated to measuring the two dimensions of politicisation: popular support for the EU and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. The next section will average these two indicators and present a table which shows how politicisation varies across the EU. After that, the dependent variable will be measured. The final section will examine the strength of the relationship between the level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. This will be done by first calculating the correlation coefficient for net popular support for the EU vs. acceptance of supranational coordination and control, and then doing the same for electoral support for Eurosceptic parties vs. the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. Finally, the level of correlation between the overall level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control will be calculated.

The research design can be described as factor-centric. The distinction between factor-centric and outcome-centric research was first introduced by Bennett and George (1997). The dichotomy offers a straightforward distinction of how an author is framing their research in seeking to answer the research question. Factor-centric research seeks to assess the effect that one or more independent variables have on a dependent variable, such as “does X cause Y or what effect does X have on Y and how much?” (Gschwend & Schmmelfennig 2007: 8). Meanwhile, outcome-centric research seeks to explain outcomes, assessing all possible explanations which lead to variance in a dependent variable (Gschwend & Schmmelfennig 2007: 8). Thus, in the case of this thesis, an inherently deductive approach is taken. The independent variable was the starting point, with the consequences of the politicisation of European integration in terms of member state behaviour being the phenomenon investigated. Postfunctionalism offers a theoretical expectation of this, and from there the chosen dependent variable to test the theory was the acceptance of supranational control through the implementation of European Semester CSRs. Therefore, the research design is factor-centric.

3.2 Data and operationalization of variables

The level of politicisation in a member state will be measured along two dimensions: 1) popular support for the EU and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties.

The data source for measuring popular support for the EU will be individual-level survey data from Eurobarometer, aggregated to the country level. The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey commissioned by the European Union and conducted at least once per year. It measures public opinion on a variety of EU-related issues. Survey responses to the following question during the post-economic crisis period of 2011-2018 will be analyzed: “generally speaking, do you think that (our country’s) membership of the EU is: a good thing, a bad thing, neither a good thing nor a bad thing, or don’t know?”. As Hobolt and de Vries (2016: 417) note, this question is the most common method in the literature to measure citizen’s support for the EU, as it is consistently asked in the Eurobarometer and this allows for cross-national and cross-temporal analysis.

To measure popular support for the EU in each member state, this thesis will calculate a net level of popular support. This is done by subtracting the percentage of respondents who answer that EU membership is a bad thing from the percentage of respondents who answer that EU membership is a good thing. This allows for a more precise measurement of popular support. For example, if there are two countries in which 50 percent of respondents answer that EU membership is a good thing, it might appear they have the same level of popular support for the EU. But if country A has only 10 percent of respondents answering that EU membership is a bad thing, while in country B that number is as high as 40 percent, using a net score helps illustrate the discrepancy between the levels of popular support for the EU in these two countries. The average score for each of the 27 cases across the 2011-2018 period will be then calculated, and this will serve as the average level of net popular support for the EU.

Electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is measured by examining the share of the popular vote received by Eurosceptic parties in national elections during the post-economic crisis period of 2011-2018. For each EU member state, a single score will be calculated which expresses the average level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties in national elections during this period. For example, Estonia had two national elections between 2011-2018, so the vote share received by Eurosceptic parties in the two elections will be averaged, and that score will serve as Estonia's overall electoral support for Eurosceptic parties.

To obtain national elections results, my main data source will be ParlGov. ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019) is a publicly available database with election results from all EU and most OECD countries. To determine whether a party is Eurosceptic or not, I will use the PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2020), which is a continually updated list of Eurosceptic, populist, far-right and far-left parties in Europe which have obtained 2% of the vote in an election since 1998. The list is compiled by experts in the field. The PopuList has the following definition of a Eurosceptic party:

Eurosceptic parties: parties that express the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration. This includes both “hard Euroscepticism” (i.e., outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU) and “soft Euroscepticism” (i.e., contingent or qualified opposition to European integration) (Taggart and Szcerbiak 2004).

The scores for popular support for the EU and electoral support for political parties will be averaged to create an overall level of politicisation for each of the 27 EU member states being examined. This cannot be done by simply creating a score which is the mean of the two indicators. This is because the scores for net popular support for the EU have a mean which is nearly double that of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties, so simply averaging the two scores would give one indicator much more weight vs. the other.

To address this issue, a z-score will be calculated for both net popular support for the EU and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties for each of the 27 cases. A z-score is a numerical score that expresses a number’s relationship to the mean in a set of data. It measures in terms of standard deviation, where a score of 0 is equal to the mean, a score of 1 is one standard deviation higher than the mean, and a score of -1 is one standard deviation below the mean. This allows for a comparison of two sets of data of different scales or numerical distribution (Abdi 2007). A z-score is calculated using the following formula:

$$z = (x - \mu) / \sigma$$

Where z – z-score

x – value

μ – mean

σ – standard deviation

Therefore, in the case of this thesis, using this formula to convert each value to a z-score allows the two indicators to be weighted equally when calculating the overall level of politicisation in each member state being examined.

Another issue to adjust for is that net popular support for the EU is an indicator where a lower score means a higher level of politicisation, while electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is the opposite case—a higher score equals a higher level of politicisation. To remedy this issue, the z-scores for net popular support for the EU will be reversed, where the positive scores will simply become negative and vice-versa. This allows for both indicators to be using a scale where a higher score indicates a higher level of politicisation.

After converting the data to z-scores, the mean of the two scores for each member state will be calculated, representing the overall level of politicisation in the member state. Based on this mean score, each member state will be labelled as having a very low, low, medium, high, or very high level of politicisation. The exact requirements will be as follows: below 1 (very low), -0.5 to -1 (low), -0.5 to 0.5 (medium), 0.5 to 1 (high), above 1 (very high).

The dependent variable of member state acceptance of supranational coordination and control will specifically focus on the European Semester, and be measured by the progress made by each member state in implementing CSRs. This data will come from the 2019 country-specific reports, which use a scale of “no progress”, “limited progress”, “some progress”, “substantial progress”, and “full implementation” to measure progress implementing CSRs during the period 2011-2018 (European Commission 2019b). Table 1 provides the criteria for each label on the scale. It will then assign a score to each member state which will be a combination of two of the above indicators: 1) the percentage of CSRs which are deemed to have substantial progress being met and 2) the percentage of CSRs which have been fully implemented. Combining the percentage of CSRs which fall under these two indicators will allow for the calculation of a single numerical score for each member state to determine the extent to which the member state has accepted supranational coordination and control of its economic policies. To use the previously highlighted example of Lithuania, the country has

fully implemented 15% of CSRs and substantially implemented 31%, giving an overall score of 46%. Including substantial progress as an indicator was done because, as Table 1 highlights, it means a member state has gone a long way toward implementing the CSR, and full implementation was also included as it means the member state has fully accepted and implemented the CSR.

Table 1: Criteria for Evaluating the Implementation of CSRs

Grade	Evaluation Criteria
No progress	The Member State has not credibly announced nor adopted any measures to address the CSR.
Limited Progress	The Member State has: announced certain measures but these address the CSR only to a limited extent; and/or presented legislative acts in the governing or legislative body but these have not been adopted yet and substantial further, non-legislative work is needed before the CSR is implemented; presented non-legislative acts, but has not followed these up with the implementation needed to address the CSR.
Some Progress	The Member State has adopted measures that partly address the CSR; and/or that address the CSR, but a fair amount of work is still needed to address the CSR fully as only a few of the measures have been implemented.
Substantial Progress	The Member State has adopted measures that go a long way towards addressing the CSR and most of them have been implemented.
Full Implementation	The Member State has implemented all measures needed to address the CSR appropriately.

(Source: own table, based on the CSR evaluation criteria outlined in the 2019 country-specific reports from the European Commission (2019b). The evaluation criteria provided in the table has been shortened from its original length).


4. Politicisation and Member State Behaviour in the European Semester

This empirical chapter will be split into five subchapters. The first will examine net popular support for the EU across the 27 cases. The second will examine electoral support for Eurosceptic parties in national elections across the same 27 cases. For both subchapters, the period of analysis will be 2011-2018, with the exceptions of Croatia, Ireland, Latvia, and Romania which have adjusted timeframes. The third will present an overview of politicisation across the 27 cases, averaging the two indicators of politicisation through the use of z-scores. The fourth will measure the acceptance of supranational coordination and control through each member states' progress implementing European Semester CSRs. The final subchapter will be a bivariate analysis of the level of politicisation vs. the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. The regional dimensions of both the independent and dependent variables will be examined throughout the chapter as well.

4.1 Trends in popular support for the EU

Before analyzing popular support for the EU during the period of 2011-2018 at the member state level, it is important to outline a few broader points about popular support for the EU during this period across Europe. First, this period captures a full range of overall popular support for the EU. This is because 2011 was the low point for popular support for the EU, and was in the middle of the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis. This speaks to the centrality of crises in politicising European integration. By 2018, popular support for the EU reached its highest level since 1992. One cannot give a definitive explanation of why support for the EU hit this level by 2018. That being said, scholars have adopted a benchmarking approach, suggesting that the aftermath of Brexit and complications negotiating the exit agreement contributed to higher support for the EU overall (De Vries 2017). Figure 4 illustrates this increase in net popular support for the EU during the period of study.

Figure 4: Overall Net Popular Support for the EU: 2011-2018




(Source: own graph, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90).¹

Creating an average score to indicate the overall net level of popular support for the EU in each member state during the 2011-2018 period provides a clear indication of the extent to which this indicator varies across the EU. Figure 5 shows the average level of net popular support for the EU across the 27 member states analyzed. Support is lowest in Cyprus, where the average net level is scored at 12.6. This score had an overall low of -9 in 2013—a remarkably low number with only 27% of respondents agreeing that EU membership is a good thing and 36% of respondents agreeing it is a bad thing (Eurobarometer 2013; see Appendix 1). At the opposite end of the scale, net popular support for the EU in Luxembourg had an average score of 73.1, never going below 59 with a high point of 84 by 2018 (Eurobarometer 2018; see Appendix 1).

¹ All data compiled from the Eurobarometer surveys is available in Appendix 1.

Figure 5: Average Level of Net Popular Support for the EU: 2011-2018



(Source: own graph, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90)

In examining popular support for the EU in the post-eurozone crisis period, it is useful to examine how popular support for the EU differed between Eurozone and non-Eurozone member states, since the crisis—despite being consequential for the entire EU—was very much focused on the Eurozone member states. The average net score amongst non-eurozone countries is below the overall average at 36, while the average level of net popular support amongst Eurozone countries is 40.9. Although support for the EU overall and support for the single currency are two different things, these findings are consistent with—and potentially explained by—Hobolt and De Vries’ (2016: 429) findings that show support for the single currency dropped following the Eurozone crisis in non-Eurozone countries but remained overall stable in Eurozone countries. Thus, Eurozone membership is one explanatory variable for support for the EU, but not a significant one.

It is also worth examining the regional dimensions of this indicator. To do so, one must decide how to divide the EU into different regions. A common division in the literature is Northwest Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe (see Kriesi 2016). It is important to note though that these are largely geopolitical—and not strictly geographic—categories. Table 2 presents how this breakdown manifests in terms of popular support for the EU, with support in Northwest Europe being the highest, and then nearly identical results in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.

Table 2: Regional Breakdown of Net Popular Support for the EU: 2011-2018

Region	Countries Included	Average Level of Net Popular Support for the EU: 2011-2018
Northwest Europe	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom	48.5
Southern Europe	Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain	37
Central and Eastern Europe	Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia	36.6

(Source: own table, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90)

Some preliminary analysis of the results can begin to explain the regional differences. The lower average level of net popular support in Southern Europe confirms Hutter and Kriesi's (2019: 1001) argument that politicisation was higher in this region during this period because it had a slower recovery from the Eurozone crisis and was more affected by the migrant crisis. While Northwest Europe features two of the countries with the lowest levels of popular

support for the EU—Austria and the United Kingdom—the seven countries with the highest average level of net popular support for the EU all fall within this geographic region. Most of the Central and Eastern European member states are slightly below or above the overall EU average, with Czech Republic being an outlier and having the second-lowest average level of net popular support in the EU.

This section has illustrated how popular support for the EU varied across the different member states during the period of study, including a comparison of Eurozone vs. non-Eurozone member states and the regional dimensions of this indicator. While this begins to illustrate the extent to which politicisation also varies across member states, popular support for the EU is only one dimension of politicisation to study. Therefore, the next section will examine the second dimension of politicisation for this thesis: electoral support for Eurosceptic parties.

4.2 Electoral support for Eurosceptic parties

To study how electoral support for Eurosceptic parties trended during this period, it is not as useful to examine year-on-year data during 2011-2018 in the same way that was possible when examining popular support for the EU. This is because most of the countries had 2-3 national elections during the eight-year timespan, and these elections occurred in different years. Belgium, Ireland, and Romania are exceptions as they had just had one national election during their respective time periods. Therefore, a better way to examine this is by looking at the number of member states where electoral support for Eurosceptic parties increased and the number where it decreased. Table 3 presents an overview of this. The results illustrate quite clearly that Eurosceptic parties made overall gains in national elections during this period.

Electoral support for Eurosceptic parties varies extensively across the EU during the period of study. For the average level of electoral support across the 27 cases, see Figure 6. At the highest end of the spectrum, Hungary's Fidesz and Jobbik parties account for nearly 70 percent of the vote during the two elections which took place in this time period. Other

countries with high electoral support for Eurosceptic parties include the United Kingdom through the election wins by the Conservative Party and support for UKIP; Italy due to the electoral success of the Five Star Movement and North League; and Poland through the success of the Law and Justice party. At the opposite end of the spectrum is Malta, which has three parties that receive votes in national elections and none of the three are categorized as being Eurosceptic.

Table 3: Trends in Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties: 2011-2018


Member States with an Increase in Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties (2011-2018)	Member States with a Decrease in Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties (2011-2018)	Other²
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, France, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden	Austria, Cyprus, Finland, UK	Belgium, Malta, Ireland, Romania

(Source: own table, based on data from ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019))

As in the previous subchapter, it is worthwhile to examine how the results differ between Eurozone and non-Eurozone members. The average level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties in non-Eurozone countries at 27.1% exceeds that of Eurozone countries at 18.5%. In reading these results, it is important to remember that this period also saw the migrant crises, a highly consequential event that Eurosceptic parties successfully mobilised around.

²Belgium, Ireland, and Romania only had one election each during the period of study. Malta does not have any political parties which the PopuList considers to be Eurosceptic.

Figure 6: Average Level of Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties: 2011-2018



(Source: own graph, based on data from ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019)).³

The average level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties does not feature any significant regional differences. Using the same three regions as the previous subchapter—Northwest Europe, Southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe—the average level for each region is similar. Northwest Europe has a score of 23.5%, Southern Europe has a score of 23.1%, and Central and Eastern Europe has a score of 18.4%.

When examining regional dimensions of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties, it is also worthwhile to examine which types of parties are driving the increase in the Eurosceptic vote total and how this varies across regions. Using the PopuList's (Rooduijn et al. 2020) classification of parties as being far-right, far-left, populist, and/or Eurosceptic allows for analysis of this. Kriesi's (2016) findings of which parties drive politicisation in different regions of the EU are confirmed by these results. Far-right Eurosceptic parties have found success in Northwest Europe, with prominent examples being the Freedom Party of Austria,

³ See Appendix 2 for a list of all elections included with the % of the vote received by Eurosceptic parties.

the National Front in France, the Danish People’s Party, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats, and UKIP in the United Kingdom. In Southern Europe, Kriesi’s argument that left-wing Eurosceptic parties drive politicisation is true in some cases, such as the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus, In Common We Can Party in Spain, and the Left Bloc in Portugal. However, it is not the case in Italy. Lastly, as the results show, the Eurosceptic vote total in Central and Eastern Europe is driven by the electoral success of parties in Hungary and Poland. Aside from Hungary and Poland, other Central and Eastern European countries have lower levels of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties.

In summation, this subchapter has shown that electoral support for Eurosceptic parties rose overall during the 2011-2018 period. It has also outlined the extent to which this indicator varies across member states. Moreover, it confirmed Kriesi’s (2016) findings that politicisation is driven by far-right Eurosceptic parties in the Northwest of Europe, left-wing Eurosceptics in Southern Europe, and the dominance of the Polish Law and Justice party and the Hungarian Fidesz and Jobbik parties in Central and Eastern Europe.

4.3 The overall level of politicisation across the EU member states

This section will draw from the data analyzed thus far, and determine whether the 27 member states can be labelled as having a very low, low, medium, high or very high level of politicisation. Thus far, the two indicators which measure the level of politicisation in a member state have been outlined. The mean score of these two indicators, through converting each one to a z-score, is presented in Table 4 along with an overall level of politicisation for each member state.

Table 4: Overall Level of Politicisation Across the 27 Cases: 2011-2018

Country	Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties	Net Popular Support for the EU	Mean Score	Level of Politicisation
LU	-0.51	-1.86	-1.19	Very low
MT	-1.40	-0.51	-0.96	low
EE	-1.06	-0.78	-0.92	low

IE	-0.23	-1.60	-0.92	low
BE	-0.81	-0.87	-0.84	low
DE	-0.25	-1.26	-0.75	low
LT	-0.73	-0.69	-0.71	low
RO	-1.14	-0.21	-0.68	low
NL	0.46	-1.21	-0.37	Medium
DK	0.17	-0.75	-0.29	Medium
LV	-0.93	0.39	-0.27	Medium
SE	0.05	-0.49	-0.22	Medium
BG	-0.44	0.00	-0.22	Medium
HR	-1.06	0.74	-0.16	Medium
SI	-0.88	0.72	-0.08	Medium
ES	0.05	-0.10	-0.03	Medium
SK	0.10	0.08	0.09	Medium
FR	0.16	0.06	0.11	Medium
FI	0.30	0.01	0.16	Medium
PT	-0.32	0.67	0.17	Medium
PL	1.26	-0.57	0.35	Medium
CZ	-0.17	1.54	0.68	High
AT	0.43	1.52	0.97	High
CY	0.67	1.62	1.15	Very high
IT	1.56	1.34	1.45	Very high
UK	1.76	1.55	1.66	Very high
HU	2.97	0.67	1.82	Very high

Note: figures shown are z-scores expressing the overall level of politicisation

(Source: own table, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90, and ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019))

A distinguishing aspect of all member states that have very low and low levels of politicisation is that their scores in both net popular support for the EU and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties are below average. This sets these cases apart from the member state

with the lowest level of politicisation in the medium category—the Netherlands—which has very strong net popular support for the EU, but an above-average level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. This trend extends to member states with a very high and high level of politicisation, having above-average scores in both indicators. The one exception is the Czech Republic, which has a slightly below-average level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties.

There are certain member states which feature a large statistical difference between the two indicators of politicisation. The most sizable difference is found in Hungary. Despite both z-scores being above average, this large statistical difference is because the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is so uniquely high at a score of 2.97, with the two most successful parties—Fidesz and Jobbik—both being Eurosceptic. There are also a few member states that have low net popular support for the EU but also a low level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Croatia is the clearest example of this, where Eurosceptic parties have thus far not mobilised and gained support to the extent that might be expected, given the low net popular support for the EU in the country.


There are also member states with both a high level of net popular support for the EU and a high level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. These two phenomena may seem initially at odds. That being said, the literature which was highlighted in the previous chapters provides potential explanations, such as authors who have found that citizens place blame for the Eurozone crisis on national governments and not the EU (Baglioni & Hurrelmann 2015; De Wilde et al. 2016). Thus, mainstream parties would be punished and lose votes to Eurosceptic parties, while popular support for the EU may not be affected in the same way. Examples of member states with an above-average level of net popular support for the EU but also a high level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties include the Netherlands and, most significantly, Poland. In Poland, this is due to the success of the Law and Justice party—a Eurosceptic party which is most commonly referred to as the PiS party. Despite Poland's high level of net popular support for the EU, PiS is a Eurosceptic party and has managed to dominate recent Polish elections. Fomina and Kucharczyk (2016) examined the

phenomenon, finding that the close relationship between the Catholic Church and PiS and the way the party mobilised using identity-based arguments, particularly during and after the 2015 migrant crisis, were key aspects of its electoral success. PiS also takes a softer Eurosceptic approach and does not advocate for leaving the EU.

The final dimension to analyze for politicisation in member states is how this varies region to region. Politicisation is highest in Southern Europe with an overall average z-score of 0.36, lowest in Northwest Europe with a z-score of -0.14, and Central and Eastern Europe has a level equal to the overall average. Furthermore, there is a high degree of variation within each region. For example, within Central and Eastern Europe, the three Baltic countries have an average z-score of -0.63, putting it in the low category. Meanwhile, the Visegrád countries have an average z-score score of 0.74, putting it in the high category. Moreover, the Benelux region has an average z-score of -0.8, which is far below the Northwest Europe average. Figure 7 provides a map of politicisation across the 27 cases, further illustrating the regional differences. Taking this into consideration, it is important to note that generalizations about politicisation in a particular region of the EU, or about a specific member state just because it belongs to a particular region, can fail to take into account the intra-region variance and dynamics which lead to a wide variety of results.

Overall, this subchapter has provided an overview of politicisation across the 27 cases, by averaging the two indicators of politicisation through the use of z-scores and evaluating each case as having a very low, low, medium, high, or very high level of politicisation. It has discussed how a few cases manage to have a significant statistical difference between the two indicators of politicisation, and concluded with an examination of the regional dimensions of politicisation.

Figure 7: Map of Politicisation Across the EU: 2011-2018




(Source: own figure, produced through Microsoft Excel and based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90, and ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019)).

4.4 Acceptance of supranational coordination and control: progress implementing CSRs

This subchapter will measure the dependent variable—the acceptance of supranational coordination and control of economic policies—through an analysis of progress implementing CSRs issued by the EU to member states as a part of the European Semester process.

Progress implementing CSRs varies extensively across member states. As seen in Figure 8, at the lowest end of the spectrum are Poland and Slovakia, with only 7% and 8% of CSRs either substantially or fully implemented respectively. Meanwhile, Sweden and Denmark have been the most successful in implementing CSRs—both having a score of 51%.

Figure 8: Progress Implementing CSRs: 2011-2018




(Source: own graph, based on data from 27 of the European Commission's 2019 country-specific reports (2019b)).

There is no significant statistical difference between the progress implementing CSRs in non-Eurozone vs. Eurozone member states, at 26.3% vs. 25.1%. What is interesting is looking at how the results in the non-Eurozone member states differ. One interesting point is how successful Denmark and Sweden have been at implementing the CSRs, signalling a willingness to work toward the policy convergence sought by the European Semester and also indicating a high acceptance of supranational coordination and control. Yet these two countries are both unwilling to join the Eurozone, with Denmark having an opt-out and both countries voting against adopting the Euro currency in referendums. Overall, Eurozone membership does not seem to have an impact on progress implementing CSRs.

There is only a very limited degree of regional variation in progress implementing CSRs, with Northwest Europe at 26%, Southern Europe at 27.8%, and Central and Eastern Europe at 22.6%. But by examining a map display of progress with implementation, as seen in Figure

9, certain subregions are quite successful. For example, The Nordic-Baltic region, consisting in this case of Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden has a higher level of implementation, averaging 36%. This reinforces the previous argument that generalizations based on region can be problematic and analyzing subregions often proves more valuable.

Figure 9: Map of Progress Implementing CSRs: 2011-2018



(Source: own map, produced through Microsoft Excel and based on data from 27 of the European Commission's 2019 country-specific reports (2019b)).

The section has shown that progress implementing CSRs varies extensively across the EU member states. Neither Eurozone membership nor regional dimensions are reliable predictors of a member states' acceptance of supranational coordination and control of economic policies.

4.5 Politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control

This final subchapter will examine how the level of politicisation in an EU member state affects the extent to which the member state accepts supranational coordination and control of its economic policies. It will do so by first examining how the two indicators of politicisation—net popular support for the EU and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties—each independently correlate to the dependent variable. It will then conclude with a bivariate analysis of the overall level of politicisation vs. the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. A discussion of the results will follow.


4.5.1 Popular support for the EU and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control

A postfunctionalist approach would expect a lower level of net popular support for the EU to lead to less progress implementing CSRs. This is because a more politicised general public would act as a constraint on deepening integration and would be more sceptical of increased supranational supervision. Thus, governing parties would fear the political costs of allowing the EU to have greater control over the member state's economic policies, and not make as much progress implementing CSRs.

A bivariate analysis of net popular support for the EU and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control is presented in Figure 10. As the figure shows, there is a weak correlation between the two variables. These findings would seem to complement Zeitlin and Vanhercke's (2014: 58) research, which found through conducting interviews that the weight CSRs carry in a member state is reliant upon public opinion toward the EU. The correlation coefficient for this data is 0.28, where 1 indicates a perfect correlation. The level of correlation is reduced by the number of cases that have a high level of net popular support for the EU but have been slow in implementing CSRs. The clearest examples of this are Luxembourg, Germany, Estonia, and Poland. That being said, the cases with the lowest levels of popular support for the EU—namely the UK, Austria, Czech Republic, and Cyprus—have all also made very little progress implementing CSRs. Thus, it appears for at least the first

indicator of politicisation, there is weak correlation overall, but low net popular support for the EU may be a constraint on further integration through the European Semester.

Figure 10: Net Popular Support for the EU vs. Progress Implementing CSRs




(Source: own graph, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90, and 27 of the European Commission's 2019 European Semester country-specific reports (2019b))

4.5.2 Support for Eurosceptic parties and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control

As the second dimension of politicisation, a postfunctionalist approach would expect a higher level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties to lead to less progress implementing CSRs. The logic here is straightforward and not exclusive to a postfunctionalist approach: having Eurosceptic parties in a governing coalition would decrease the willingness of the government to accept supranational coordination and control of economic policies through the European Semester and CSRs—as would having strong Eurosceptic parties in opposition.

While the theoretical expectation is that a higher level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties leads to less progress implementing CSRs, Figure 11 illustrates that there is almost no correlation whatsoever between these two variables. In this case, a perfect correlation would have a coefficient score of -1, as this is a case of expected negative correlation. Yet the correlation coefficient for this data is only -0.13. The biggest factor driving this lack of correlation is the large number of cases that have a low level of support for Eurosceptic parties but also have been slow to implement CSRs. Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Romania are the clearest examples of this. The fact there are so many cases which feature a low score for both variables prevents a strong level of negative correlation from being present.

Figure 11: Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties vs. Progress Implementing CSRs



(Source: own graph, based on data from ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019) and 27 of the European Commission's 2019 European Semester country-specific reports (2019b)).

For the sake of this research, it is also important to highlight the member states which have the highest levels of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties and how they fared in


implementing CSRs. Austria, Cyprus, Poland and the UK met the theoretical expectation and featured a low level of CSR implementation. On the other hand, Italy's progress implementing CSRs remains slightly above-average, which Hungary—despite having by far the highest level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties—also featured an above-average level of progress implementing CSRs. In summation, a higher level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties does not correlate with less progress implementing CSRs.

4.5.3 Overall level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control

The final bivariate analysis is between the overall level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. A postfunctionalist approach would expect a higher level of politicisation to be correlated with less progress implementing CSRs.

There is a weak correlation between the level of politicisation and progress implementing CSRs, as can be seen in Figure 12. A perfect correlation for this data would be -1, as this is another case of expected negative correlation. Yet, this relationship has a correlation coefficient of -0.25, suggesting there is a limited degree of association between the variables. There are a number of cases which meet the theoretical expectation. As the graph shows, a significant number of countries with a below average level of politicisation have made strong progress implementing CSRs. Furthermore, the majority of the countries with a high or very high level of politicisation are below average in implementing CSRs. Yet once again, it is the significant number of member states with a low level of politicisation and also a low level of progress implementing CSRs that prevent a more significant correlation.

Figure 12: Level of Politicisation vs. Progress Implementing CSRs



(Source: own graph, based on data from Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90, ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019), and the 27 of the European Commission’s 2019 European Semester country-specific reports (2019b)).

4.5.4 Discussion

The results indicate that there is a weak correlation between the level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. Given the outliers which prevent a stronger degree of correlation, this research suggests politicisation is not the only variable which affects the acceptance of supranational coordination and control, but is instead one variable amongst others.

The weak correlation between the independent and dependent variables is largely due to the number of cases with a low level of politicisation and slow progress implementing CSRs. For example, removing Luxembourg, Estonia, Germany, and Romania—being the four countries with the lowest levels of both politicisation and progress implementing CSRs—

would bring the correlation coefficient to -0.45. Alternatively, removing the two strongest outliers—Luxembourg and Hungary—brings the correlation coefficient to a score of -0.37. Thus, while the data may overall have a weak level of correlation, this is due to a relatively small number of cases that strongly go against the hypothesis. Nonetheless, the cases which feature a low level of politicisation and low acceptance of supranational coordination and control do remain a puzzling result. While an absence of politicisation should allow integration to continue and a member state to implement CSRs, there are different reasons that a member states' progress doing this may be slow, such as government effectiveness or genuine disagreement with the substance of the CSR itself.

Estonia is one puzzling case in this regard. For example, Estonia has the third-lowest level of politicisation amongst the 27 cases and also has made below-average progress implementing CSRs. This is surprising, given that Estonia is generally viewed as being a proponent of deeper integration, a supporter of efforts to strengthen the European Commission, and a member state which consistently adheres to the rules which come with EU membership (Kasekamp 2013: 109). Estonia is also a fiscally responsible EU member which follows the SGP fiscal rules and, in the aftermath of the European debt crisis, made a strategy of portraying itself as the “anti-Greece” (Kasekamp 2013: 108). Given this, one would expect Estonia to be amongst the member states who have made the most progress implementing CSRs—but that is not the case.

The literature has yet to identify existing explanatory variables for variance in progress implementing CSRs, in large part because the data which tracks progress implementing CSRs only emerged in 2019. But analyzing CSRs through the lens of politicisation raises the question of how politicised the European Semester—and more specifically CSRs—actually are. There are certain issues in European integration that Eurosceptic actors have mobilised around—making identity-based claims and rejecting supranational control—including the Constitutional Treaty and the migrant crisis. At this point the salience of the European Semester, in part because it is a recent development in European integration, is not fully known.

Despite there not being available data on the salience of the European Semester, it is clear that there has not been the same opposition to the introduction of the European Semester as there has been with other recent deepening in European integration. This is despite the fact that the European Semester is a strong shift toward increasing supranational coordination and control of economic policies. This speaks to the broader point that the Eurozone crisis managed to lead to further integration, while the migrant crisis led to disintegration and was very successfully politicised by Eurosceptic actors (Schimmelfennig 2018). For example, Hungary's current, Eurosceptic government was one of the leading opponents of the EU's migrant relocation plan as a response to the 2015 migrant crisis. The European Court of Justice ruled that the country breached its obligations under EU law by not taking any migrants through the relocation plan (Sandford 2020). However, Hungary has made significant progress implementing CSRs, placing it well above-average in doing so. Therefore, while the Hungarian government was willing to violate EU law over compliance in one area, the country has accepted supranational coordination and control of its economic policies through strong progress implementing CSRs.

Thus, when examining the consequences of the politicisation of European integration for member state behaviour, it seems the key issue is not only the level of politicisation in a member state, but also how politicised the issue being examined as the dependent variable actually is. A postfunctionalist approach expects a high level of politicisation to be a constraint on integration. But in this case, examining member state behaviour through the relationship between the 1) level of politicisation and 2) acceptance of supranational coordination and control finds only a weak correlation. Given these findings, it is challenging to make any definitive or broad conclusions about the type of behaviour that can be expected from a member state which experiences a high degree of politicisation. Furthermore, the results suggest that politicisation is likely one variable amongst others which can affect the acceptance of supranational coordination and control.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis was to examine the consequences of the politicisation of European integration in terms of member state behaviour. The specific aspect of member state behaviour which was analyzed was the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. Postfunctionalism was the theoretical approach used, and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control was analyzed by focusing on the European Semester and progress implementing CSRs. The hypothesis was that the higher the level of politicisation in a member state, the less likely the member state is to accept increased supranational coordination and control of its economic policies.

The first chapter introduced the politicisation of European integration as a new phenomenon for study. It highlighted how the theory of postfunctionalism is central to studying politicisation in the EU, and outlined how it differs from other major theories of European integration through its focus on identity and mass politics. The chapter introduced the concept of politicisation and explain its three key manifestations in Europe: issue salience, actor and audience expansion, and actor polarization. It also discusses the Maastricht Treaty as a critical event for the politicisation of European integration and then explored why crises become major politicising moments. After that, the causes of varying levels of politicisation across EU member states were examined. This was done by focusing on what drives both popular support for the EU and electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. The literature on the consequences of the politicisation of European integration was briefly outlined, showing that this remains an understudied research area, especially in terms of member state behaviour. The main criticisms of postfunctionalism were then examined, putting focus on the main criticism of the theory: that politicisation has not constituted a brake on further integration (Schimmelfennig 2018).

The second chapter examined the European debt crisis. It provided an overview of the crisis by focusing on its main causes and the member states which were most affected by it. The wide-ranging EU response to the crisis was then outlined, showing how this response

increased the level of integration both in the Eurozone and in the EU overall. The European Semester was then examined, as it is a clear example of the EU increasing its supranational authority in the area of economic policy coordination and control. This chapter ended by focusing on CSRs, which are recommendations issued by the EU to its member states each year, backed by potential sanctions in cases of non-compliance.

The third chapter was the methodology section, introducing the research design, data sources, and operationalization of the main variables. Twenty-seven EU member states were included in the research, with the United Kingdom included and Greece excluded. Due to data availability, the selected timeframe was 2011-2018. The level of politicisation was operationalized using two indicators 1) net popular support for the EU, which was calculated using Eurobarometer survey data and 2) electoral support for Eurosceptic parties, which relied on the PopuList to determine which parties are Eurosceptic and the ParlGov database to obtain election results. Acceptance of supranational coordination and control of economic policies was measured using each of the 27 member states' progress implementing CSRs.

The fourth chapter was the empirical part. The first section began by showing how net popular support for the EU increased overall during the 2011-2018 period and how this indicator varies across the 27 member states. It also showed how net popular support for the EU is slightly higher amongst Eurozone member states and highest in Northwest Europe. The second section illustrated how electoral support for Eurosceptic parties increased during the 2011-2018 period and differs across the 27 member states. It found the indicator to have a higher level in non-Eurozone member states and feature minimal differences region-to-region. It also confirmed Kriesi's (2016) findings that politicisation is driven by far-right Eurosceptic parties in Northwest Europe, left-wing Eurosceptic parties in Southern Europe, and by the success of Eurosceptic parties in Hungary and Poland in Central and Eastern Europe. The third section presented an overview of the overall level of politicisation across the 27 cases, by combining the two indicators of politicisation through the use of z-scores. Based on the z-scores, it labelled each member state as having a very low, low, medium, high, or very high level of politicisation during the 2011-2018 period. The fourth section

detailed each member state's progress implementing CSRs. It found minimal difference in progress implementing CSRs between non-Eurozone vs. Eurozone members, as well as very limited regional differences.

The final section of the empirical part tested the hypothesis. It first conducted a bivariate analysis of net popular support for the EU vs. the acceptance of supranational coordination and control. It found a weak level of correlation between these two variables, mainly due to the cases which feature a high level of net popular support for the EU and a low level of progress implementing CSRs. It also found the member states with the lowest levels of popular support for the EU—the UK, Austria, Czech Republic, and Cyprus—also made little progress implementing CSRs. Next, the second indicator of politicisation was tested through a bivariate analysis of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties vs. progress implementing CSRs. The results indicated almost no correlation whatsoever. This is due to a number of cases with a low level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties and also a low level of progress implementing CSRs. Furthermore, a few cases with high electoral support for Eurosceptic parties also made above-average progress implementing CSRs. Hungary is the most prominent example of this, featuring the highest level of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties and above-average CSR implementation. Finally, the correlation between the overall level of politicisation and the acceptance of supranational coordination and control was tested. The results showed a weak level of correlation, again due to the cases which feature a low level of politicisation and a low level of progress implementing CSRs, including Luxembourg, Estonia, Germany, and Romania.

This research features a few key limitations. First, the scope of the conclusions to be made is limited by the fact that the research specifically focused on the European Semester and CSR implementation. There are other aspects of member state behaviour which may produce different results. Moreover, the fact that the data available on progress implementing CSRs was for the overall period of 2011-2018, and not year-on-year data, limited the analysis. This meant that the level of politicisation also had to be measured for the overall period of 2011-2018, reducing the number of cases and preventing analysis of how the relationship between

the independent and dependent variables differed and evolved year-on-year. Lastly, the analysis is limited by the fact that the European Semester was introduced in 2010. The literature is clear that politicisation has been a phenomenon in European integration since the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, so limiting the research to the 2011-2018 period does not capture the full picture in analyzing politicisation in the EU.

These results offer valuable insights, as well as avenues for future research. First, the hypothesis being accurate for the majority of cases suggests that politicisation does affect the acceptance of supranational coordination and control, but is likely one variable amongst others. The main outliers which have been identified provide opportunities for future study, in order to examine what causes these cases to differ from the overall trend. Future research could investigate the other variables which impact acceptance of supranational coordination and control, by testing all cases for a wide range of independent variables which could affect progress implementing CSRs.

Furthermore, the findings raise the question of how politicised the European Semester and CSRs actually are. The fact a member state such as Hungary has made substantial progress implementing CSRs, despite strongly opposing other areas of integration including the migrant relocation plan, begins to illustrate this question. Future research could seek to evaluate how politicised and salient the European Semester is. Moreover, future studies could analyze how politicisation affects different aspects of member state behaviour. While this thesis focused on the acceptance of supranational coordination and control, there are other aspects of member state behaviour that could be affected by politicisation. This could be investigated by analyzing EU-related policy proposals in a member state, similar to De Bruycker's (2019) research which studied EU responsiveness to politicisation. Another way to study this could be through voting behaviour in the Council of the EU. This would open up the possibility of examining how politicisation impacts member state behaviour in relation to a wide range of policy areas.

All indications would suggest that the politicisation of European integration is here to stay (Börzel & Risse 2009). This has a wide variety of consequences for the future of the European project. This thesis has explored these consequences in terms of member state behaviour, specifically looking at the acceptance of supranational coordination and control of economic policies, while recognizing there are other aspects of member state behaviour which are important and need to be further explored. Looking ahead, there will be major events in European integration, including the ongoing potential EU enlargement into the West Balkans, the COVID-19 recovery process, and the European Green Deal. These are sure to be politicising moments, and better understanding the consequences of politicisation will allow for clearer analysis of member state decision-making when approaching future significant events in European integration.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 – Net Popular Support for the EU (2011-2018)

Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
CY	12	8	-9	4	6	14	28	38
UK	-8	3	6	12	26	21	25	26
CZ	12	3	14	25	10	13	13	22
AT	12	2	18	17	7	13	15	32
IT	24	18	17	21	17	8	11	24
HR	X	X	X	27	32	30	21	30
SI	18	27	21	25	26	33	32	45
PT	13	3	12	29	35	37	45	59
HU	10	5	23	33	35	36	39	53
LV	X	17	27	35	36	38	35	50
SK	42	33	40	39	35	45	41	41
FR	27	44	34	39	52	31	39	52
FI	28	36	36	35	41	50	46	53
BG	38	47	46	38	32	36	45	45
ES	38	33	23	46	45	40	50	66
RO	X	X	45	63	56	36	39	28
SE	39	48	50	43	42	51	52	70
MT	24	38	57	50	55	50	62	62
PL	43	46	43	58	54	52	45	64
LT	33	39	54	60	60	59	58	60
DK	39	56	53	49	53	50	62	69
EE	40	44	46	63	55	56	61	70
BE	54	57	52	60	55	54	53	62
NL	56	61	50	55	61	64	74	73
DE	38	62	61	66	62	62	74	76
IE	X	X	X	58	63	65	76	81
LU	59	70	59	79	77	77	80	84

(Sources: Eurobarometer 75.3; 77.4; 79.5; 82.4; 84.1; 86.1; 87.1; 90)

Appendix 2 – Electoral Support for Eurosceptic Parties (2011-2018)

Year	Country	Eurosceptic vote share
2013	Austria	29.7%
2017	Austria	26%
2014	Belgium	8.91%
2013	Bulgaria	12.88%
2014	Bulgaria	17.49%
2017	Bulgaria	13.57%
2011	Cyprus	33.75%
2016	Cyprus	29.38%
2013	Czechia	17.37%
2017	Czechia	19.96%
2013	Germany	13.3%
2017	Germany	21.8%
2011	Denmark	19%
2015	Denmark	28.9%
2011	Spain	21.87%
2015	Spain	22.53%
2016	Spain	21.87%
2011	Estonia	2.1%
2015	Estonia	8.15%
2011	Finland	27.2%
2015	Finland	24.78%
2012	France	20.51%
2017	France	26.95%
2015	UK	50.75%
2017	UK	45.85%
2015	Croatia	4.19%
2016	Croatia	5.92%
2014	Hungary	65.09%
2018	Hungary	68.34%

2016	Ireland	17.8%
2013	Italy	34.25%
2018	Italy	56.2%
2012	Lithuania	8.52%
2016	Lithuania	11.87%
2013	Luxembourg	13.22%
2018	Luxembourg	13.81%
2014	Latvia	0%
2018	Latvia	14.33%
2013	Malta	0%
2017	Malta	0%
2012	Netherlands	26.23%
2017	Netherlands	30.6%
2011	Poland	29.89%
2015	Poland	51.15%
2011	Portugal	13.62%
2015	Portugal	19.14%
2016	Romania	3.83%
2012	Slovakia	10.43%
2016	Slovakia	35.41%
2011	Slovenia	1.8%
2014	Slovenia	8.17%
2018	Slovenia	13.5%
2014	Sweden	18.58%
2018	Sweden	25.53%

(Source: ParlGov (Döring & Manow 2019))