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Negotiations in the Yemen Conflict and Their Effect on Humanitarian Aid
MA Thesis

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1. List of Abbreviations

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Conflict Management and International (CMI)

Correlates of War (COW)

European Union (EU)

Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)

Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)

Government of Yemen (GoY)

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

Humanitarian Diplomacy Centre (HDC)

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

United Nations (UN)

United Nation Development Program (UNDP)

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)

United States of America (USA)

Uppusala Universitet (UCDP)

World Food Programme (WFP)

2. Introduction

Centuries of events have taught mankind how each conflict falls into its own category and therefore, how they are fought, won and resolved. A conflict as defined by the United Nations (UN) is when two or more oppositions do not believe that their interests work coherently to advance the same goals.¹ Examples of conflict come from different sources like the Uppsala Universitet (UCDP) and theory of the Correlates of War (COW) which include inter-state conflicts, civil wars, international wars, proxy wars, or third party wars. In both branches of studies the case of Yemen would fall under international war in the COW concept and the third party definition from the UCDP institute.² Conflicts cannot be solely understood by examining the battle forefront, there are more variables to be considered, such as humanitarian aid and negotiations. However, there is limited research on the association between negotiations and humanitarian aid and their influence on the outcome of conflicts.

An evaluation of international systems' negotiation methods is required in hopes of discovering a pattern to ensure, "Peace, dignity and equality on a healthy planet," as stated by the UN international slogan.³ This would encourage international organizations to advance progressively allowing for more successful outcomes in conflicts. These negotiation methods include, but are not limited to, third-party intervention such as mediation; yet, research highlighting results by UN mediation and their level of impact is lacking. Negotiations provide a link to understanding the connection between conflicts and humanitarian aid. This thesis explores the conflict in Yemen, a conflict that has yet to be resolved and whose negotiations have been unsuccessful. The author hypothesizes that there is an association between failed negotiations and the implementation of humanitarian aid by exploring the negative effects of one on the other.

The conflict in Yemen brings to the forefront the relationship between conflict, negotiations and humanitarian aid. This case demonstrates the connections and highlights the need for delegates to be aware of how being involved in a conflict may affect a multitude of variables. Delegates being used in a general term as those that believe they are aiding the

¹ UNEP. *Toolkit and Guidance For Preventing and Managing Land and Natural Resources Conflict: Land and Conflict*.

² Uppsala Universitet. "UCDP Definitions." Department of Peace and Conflict Research, n.d : Sarkees, R. Meredith. *The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars*. (Correlations of War.org: n.d) p.1-32.

³ "United Nations | Peace, Dignity and Equality on a Healthy Planet." United Nations.

conflict and getting involved in any manner. The UN has continued to use third-party mediators in an attempt to resolve the Yemen conflict. This method has left Yemen in a more vulnerable state, as it has not created an environment that fosters successful negotiations to allow for humanitarian aid. Delegates need to acknowledge and understand how negotiations and humanitarian aid work together and impact each other.

Existing research has demonstrated that negotiations can solve conflict through mediation; however, what happens when negotiations fail, and what impact does that have? The impact conflict can have on a population can vary from individuals dealing with continued attacks of war, displacement, and living in an environment that is not healthy or conducive to a human's life. To understand how to be successful in the implementation of regulations, one must first acknowledge the failures and learn from them. It appears self-evident to mention, but it must be recognized that a prolonged conflict does not significantly improve over time, rather, deteriorates all aspects of life. To explore this, an examination of humanitarian aid during the conflict needs to be considered. Yemen is an optimal scenario to examine how negotiations that aim to resolve the conflict affect the delivery of humanitarian aid if they are unsuccessful. Negotiations should not result in multiple failures as humanitarian aid is not a long-term solution.⁴ Yet, Yemen clearly shows an attempt of multiple negotiations occurring in a long-term span with humanitarian aid decreasing since the beginning.

Negotiations are an experiential learning process. Negotiation methods and tactics cannot be learned through books alone. Observing and reviewing the results of negotiations occurring in the international community over different periods of time provides an understanding on what is effective and ineffective. There is no perfect formula for negotiations as they include variables such as human emotions and environments that are even more complex, which helps explain why there is limited academic literature on the matter. Rob Grace's research indicates that negotiations can and will fail and that this must be explored in order to improve the future of the negotiation process.⁵ This implies that negotiators need more field experience to gain expertise to develop their skills. Although this does leave a trail of unresolved conflicts and prolonged conflicts, negotiations are a study that

⁴ Grace, Rob. *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector*. (N.P : Harvard College, 2020), p. 13-29.

⁵ Grace, Rob. *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020*.

can only partially be taught through a textbook.⁶ The more learned about negotiations, the more we will improve the field and discover links to improve the system.

The definition of failed negotiations is rather abstract as most of the literature is based on preparing successful negotiations. There is information on why specific countries had conflicts with continuous failed negotiations, such as the United States of America (USA) and The Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, a straightforward definition of failed negotiations in reference to the Yemen conflict does not exist at this time. As such, this thesis proposes the following definition of failed negotiations: when oppositions cannot come to a consensus and the effects of the conflict remain a burden on its civilians. This thesis will demonstrate that it is fair to conclude the negotiations undertaken in Yemen have failed.

The international community lacks research in this domain, creating a flaw in their global self characterisation. By researching different conflicts and their negotiation flaws, more acknowledgement of how international organizations could be failing becomes more evident and harder to ignore. Therefore, the only way the international community will learn and improve its negotiation tactics is through understanding how negotiations can affect a population in any given crisis. It will aid in expanding the literature on negotiations and their effects on citizens' daily lives. Research and exploration of failed negotiations could alter negotiation habits and techniques allowing for newer and possibly more efficient resolutions to conflicts, ultimately limiting the need for increased humanitarian aid and donations.

Previous studies of negotiations and humanitarian aid do not cover their effects on each other if the conflict is prolonged over an extended period. However, on a global stage, many conflicts that require humanitarian aid persist, suggesting that research on this is all the more pertinent. As far as I understand, negotiations seek to address conflicts with the goal of reducing the potential impact on the civilians of a country. Humanitarian aid should be a temporary fix rather than a permanent solution.⁷ One issue with negotiations is that even well-meaning attempts can have negative effects on various aspects of civilian lives. An example of this includes a negotiation's impact on humanitarian aid. The developing theory of humanitarian diplomacy demonstrates that both negotiations and humanitarian aid play a

⁶ Grace, Rob. *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

⁷"From Humanitarian to Development Aid." Humanitarian Coalition, January 17, 2022.

role in conflict resolution. What is evident with the research is that there is a need for both to work together to achieve positive outcomes. The conflict in Yemen, as a case study, allows for the examination of the impact of prolonged unsuccessful negotiations on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Consequently, this thesis addresses the following research question: how did failed negotiations affect humanitarian aid in relation to the conflict in Yemen.

This thesis focuses on the conflict in Yemen from the period of 2014 to 2022. The year 2014 is when the civil war began, which exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.⁸ The history of the conflict in Yemen is complex. The conflict was based on tension between two oppositions; the Houthis and Yemen's government, beginning in the late 1990s. By 2014, the conflict had evolved into "the worst humanitarian crisis in the world."⁹ These are the events that transpired in 2014 that contributed towards increasing tensions:

1. A new constitution was decided.¹⁰
2. A presidential panel agreed on transitioning Yemen into a six-region country.¹¹
3. The Houthis, an Islamist political organization, officially took control of Sanaa, the capital city of Yemen.¹²
4. Fuel prices increased as the Hadi government lifted the fuel subsidies creating greater resentment towards the government.¹³
5. The UN and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) intervened in the conflict, each with different motives.¹⁴

The conflict in Yemen has been ongoing for over nine years, consequently becoming normalized to its citizens.¹⁵ What started as a civil war, quickly evolved into a proxy war, with several countries like Saudi Arabia and the USA becoming involved for their own benefit.¹⁶ A common benefit being the gain of natural resources or political influence. Since

⁸ Edwards, Aaron. *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*. (Political Insight:Sage Journals,2019) Volume 10 (2).

⁹ "Yemen: A Crisis for Women and Girls." n.d. United Nations Population Fund.

¹⁰ Montgomery, Marcus. "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," Arab Center Washington DC, February 19, 2019.

¹¹ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹² Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹³ Robinson, Kali., "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," Council on Foreign Relations, October 21,2022.

¹⁴ Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," 2022.

¹⁵ Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," 2022.

¹⁶ Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," 2022.

the reunification of Yemen in 1990, the country has remained unstable and experienced significant periods of tension and unease.¹⁷ Figure 1 below, *Key Figures in the Conflict*, reveals the different actors in the conflict and their connection to each other. For the purpose of this thesis, the main actors are the Houthi rebel group, known as the Houthis and the Government of Yemen (GoY), also known as the Hadi-led government. The UN and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), also referred to as the Saudi-Arabian Coalition, strongly supports the GoY while the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), supports the Houthis.¹⁸ The IRI is known for their prominent economic support to the Houthis.¹⁹ The war became more complicated when more actors got involved. The more people involved in negotiations from the beginning, middle or end, the louder the negotiation room can be.

Figure 1: *Key Figures in the Conflict*²⁰



The GoY was and is still led by President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, which is why it is also known as the Hadi government. With all the territorial shifts, the GoY holds authority in

¹⁷ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹⁸ Robinso, “Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering,” 2022.

¹⁹ Laub, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2015.

²⁰ Haddad, “Infographic: Yemen's war explained in maps and charts,” Al Jazeera, February 9, 2022.

their new capital Aden, located in the southwestern territory of the country by the port.²¹ The GoY controls Aden and most of the country's eastern regions however, there still remains tension in many regions due to the desire for both sides to gain or regain land.²² The opposing side, the Houthis, are a “non-state armed group” that solidified support from the IRI.²³ They emerged in the 1980s as a religious and cultural revivalist movement popular among Zaydi Shi’ism northern Yemen practitioners,²⁴ who believe in an oppressive ruler and whose followers are taught to be critical of the political system.²⁵ Their belief system is helpful in understanding the Houthis position and how the conflict in Yemen has evolved the way it has. The religious implications of the conflict holds some roots in the division of opposing forces. It has also created an opportunity for external actors to get involved, resulting in the perfect environment for a proxy war.

Under Houthi control, north and central Yemen have been occupied since 2014.²⁶ The north and south of Yemen held different colonial histories and religious beliefs.²⁷ The Houthis came from the Zaydi Shi’ism branch while the rest of the Yemeni citizens are Sunni.²⁸ The relationship between the Islamic Sunni militia groups, like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and the Houthis is rather conflicting within the literature. Some sources claim they were allies, others disagree, and some claim a middle ground with some allies between both sides. However, for the most part, the AQAP is another opposition of the Houthis. Figure 2.1: *Yemen Areas of Control, 2020* and figure 2.2: *Yemen Areas of Control, 2022* demonstrates the different areas and who controls them. Analyzing both maps provides insight into whether or not negotiations are working; the GoY had lost control of more land, the contested areas became determined, and the groups involved in the conflict were growing.

²¹ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

²² Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

²³ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

²⁴ Lau, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” 2015.


²⁵ Yaser Yahya Mohammed Amer and Filiz Katman. *The Impact of the Religious Phenomenon on the Political Crisis in Yemen from 2011 to 2020: The Houthi Movement as a Case*. (Russian Federation European Researcher: 2021) Volume 12(1): 19-25.

²⁶ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

²⁷ Robinson, “Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering,” 2022.

²⁸ Laub, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” 2015.

Figure 2.1: Yemen Areas of Conflict , 2020²⁹



²⁹ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

Figure 2.2: Yemen's Areas of Control, 2022³⁰



As previously mentioned, negotiations in the Yemen conflict were done through the method of meditations as seen in *Figure 3: Yemen Negotiations from 2007-2018*.

Figure 3: Yemen Negotiations From 2007-2018³¹

Year	Mediator	Outcome
2007	Qatar	Ceasefire
2008	Qatar	Doha Agreement
2011	GCC	GCC Initiative
2014	Jamal Benomar (UN)	NDC concluded
2015	Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad (UN), John Kerry (US)	Geneva Peace Talks
2016	Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmad (UN), John Kerry (US)	Kuwait Peace Talks
2018	Martin Griffiths (UN)	Stockholm Agreement

Table I: Mediation in between the Government of Yemen and the Houthis (2007–2018)

³⁰ "Yemen Annual Review 2022." Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies, February 20, 2023.

³¹ Palik, Júlia, & Rustad, Siri Aas, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*. (Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO): 2019).

Negotiations prior to 2014 were unsuccessful, allowing tensions to rise and continue to the present day. In 2016, following the end of the Arab Spring in 2014, there was an attempt made by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the UN, and the European Union (EU) to help Yemen with the power transition.³² What the Houthis had already rejected in 2014 was being proposed again in 2015 by the UN, which inevitably led to the failure of military intervention. The UN recognized the Hadi government (GoY) and thus requested that the Houthis withdraw from the government.³³ This highlights a mistake in the UN's negotiation tactics. If an opposition has already declined a negotiation clause, why reopen the discussion without contributing anything new to it?

Humanitarian aid has been in Yemen since 2014. With the increasing tension and conflict, there has been a stronger presence in areas like the city of Ta'izz, which is now considered one of the new front lines of the conflict. In a report conducted by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), Ta'izz was considered a disaster zone in August 2015 due to the ongoing conflict involving airstrikes and rockets. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) claimed that commercial goods and humanitarian assistance in three districts of Ta'izz were limited since September 2015,³⁴ meaning the delivery of humanitarian aid was restricted, and unable to reach those in need.

The following research will provide an in-depth investigation of the two variables: prolonged negotiations and humanitarian aid. A connection between both variables will be strengthened using the theory of humanitarian diplomacy, demonstrating that the hypothesis is correct, and provide a link between failed negotiations and its infringement on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Following an extensive literature review, I will apply the information obtained on Yemen into an in-depth analysis. Findings will be divided into two themed categories of blockades and donations. After conducting more research, a theme was clear. These two findings and intervening variables will provide an understanding of the chain of effects stemming from failed negotiations and its impact on the delivery of humanitarian aid. The events of the recent crisis in Yemen affirm, that this research addresses the key variables of concern.

³² Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

³³ Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

³⁴ FEWS NET, *Yemen Food Security Outlook, October 2015 to March 2016 - Yemen*. (ReliefWeb: November 17, 2015) p. 1-20.

3.Literature Review

3.1 Negotiations

In reference to the conflict in Yemen, the GoY and the Houthis disagree on who should be in power and have had many exchanges without resolution. The OCHA handbook describes the general term of negotiations as “a process of communication and relationship building undertaken to arrive at an agreed outcome around a particular set of issues, in situations where the parties are not in complete accord on those issues.”³⁵ Within the field of International Relations, various types of negotiations are used for multiple reasons. In connecting negotiations with humanitarian aid there are two types of negotiations that apply: humanitarian and peace negotiations. Both types of negotiations support the understanding of the conflict and help in the analysis of the crisis. They are twofold and should ideally work alongside each other as they both deal with methods of negotiations that hold concerns for humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian Negotiations

A fundamental understanding of humanitarian negotiations involves a dialogue between leaders that results in the outcome of humanitarian assistance to a given community.³⁶ Humanitarian negotiation is to be understood according to the UN definition, which states:

“those negotiations undertaken by civilians engaged in managing, coordinating and providing humanitarian assistance and protection for:

1. Ensuring the provision of protection and humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations
2. Preserving humanitarian space
3. Promoting better respect for international law ”³⁷

The UN’s definition views humanitarian negotiations as civilian-level negotiations and not as dialogues between delegates, which reveals a flaw in their understanding of

³⁵ Grace, Rob. *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector.*

³⁶ Kelly, Luke. *Lessons learnt from humanitarian negotiations with the Taliban, 1996-2001.* (Knowledge, evidence and learning from development, Helpdesk Report: 2021) p. 1-15.

³⁷ Egeland, Jan. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.* (Oxford Academic: 2013) Chapter 19, p. 2.

negotiations when applied to the conflict in Yemen. The definition dismisses the role that the delegates carry at a higher level between states when discussing humanitarian negotiations. It is not only at the local level that is needed to be successful in providing humanitarian aid and trying to resolve a conflict. Both levels need to work together. This helps explain why humanitarian negotiations are underdeveloped and why the relationship the UN holds with peace negotiations is somewhat limited.

The Humanitarian Diplomacy Centre (HDC) states that humanitarian negotiations have four pillars of humanitarian dialogue; humanitarian actors (the UN, non-governmental organizations, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)); humanitarian objectives (protection, assessment, assistance); countries affected by armed conflict (international and non-international); and parties that are part of conflict (power and responsibility of the conflict).³⁸ Both definitions of the HDC and the UN differ on their understanding of humanitarian aid. What they do share similarities with is the first pillar of the HDC. If we apply these pillars to the conflict in Yemen it should be seen as follows: There are multiple actors in this proxy war; USA, Iran and Saudi Arabia. There are also many humanitarian actors such as the UN, Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders. The humanitarian objective is the protection of the Yemenis and assistance in concluding the conflict. However, since it is a proxy war, there is not only an effect on Yemen and its population but also with external actors like the USA. Ultimately, it is the GoY and the Houthis who are opposing each other and are the ones that need to be participating in negotiations.³⁹ Based on the HDC and the UN, Yemen falls under the need for humanitarian aid and humanitarian diplomacy.

A recognised issue with humanitarian negotiations is that it often projects the UN's internal problems.⁴⁰ Therefore, instead of fixing the organization from within, through policies or restructuring, negotiators blame their counterparts as the reason for the conflict's lack of resolution.⁴¹ Humanitarian negotiations rely on humanitarian organizations' plans, but humanitarian organizations need to understand and plan the potential impacts they have on

³⁸ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

³⁹ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

⁴⁰ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

⁴¹ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

the affected environment.⁴² One may think the Houthis are wrong and others the GoY, but, as Rob Grace a visiting professor of political science at Browns University mentioned in his 2020 research, blaming the other for all that has occurred does not lead to successful negotiations.

Peace Negotiations

David Lanz who is the deputy director for mediation support and policy at the Centre For Humanitarian Dialogue. Had conducted research on the topic of peace negotiations and with his findings he is able to identify some of its flaws. His primary debate is what links to the issues of humanitarian negotiations. This being that the two types of negotiations do not work together. Lanz claims that peace negotiations struggle with the dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion. This is based on both practical requirements and the normative dimension of the peace negotiation.⁴³ In the case of Yemen, those at a local level are not included in humanitarian negotiations and still remain unacknowledged at international level. The UN's definition should have both international and local levels working together. The focus is less on humanitarian negotiations and more on peace negotiations which do not consider civilians, rather diplomats and delegates. This means that civilians are being left out in the humanitarian aspect of negotiations. Which intern causes them to suffer more because their needs are not being the prime focus. Especially, when they are ones most affected in a conflict like this.

From 2004 to 2018, five different mediators tried to resolve the conflict in Yemen. Mediations are historically meant for short-term impact like humanitarian aid and their success rate weakens once extended over a longer period of time.⁴⁴ As the conflict in Yemen has been ongoing for eight years, the success of mediation and mediator's effectiveness has decreased, as demonstrated by the lack of resolution and ability to sustain an agreement.⁴⁵ A central issue with the UN and previous mediators' understanding of the conflict is that they frame it as a two-party conflict when local and regional actors are involved and need

⁴² Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector*, 2020.

⁴³ Lanz, David, *Who gets a seat at the table? A framework for understanding the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace negotiations*. (International Negotiation: January 1, 2011) Volume 16(2), 275-295.

⁴⁴ Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

⁴⁵ Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

addressing.⁴⁶ This means Lanz's dichotomous debate is a logical way of understanding why UN negotiations are failing. For concrete resolution, both international and local actors need to be involved and work cooperatively. There was an increase in external actors becoming involved in the Yemen negotiation process the longer the conflict proceeded.⁴⁷ This, in turn, made any kind of negotiation more complex. There were many attempts to negotiate with the UN mediation in Yemen and even more attempts were made after 2018 through peace talks, i.e. negotiations.

Ultimately, negotiations are the only tools for parties to reach agreements. Even once an agreement is reached, the parties' actions will determine its success away from the negotiation table.⁴⁸ As seen above, peace negotiations were being illustrated without reference to humanitarian negotiations. Humanitarian and peace negotiations have desired goals that should, in theory, interlock together. However, they are not always treated that way. In the case of Yemen humanitarian negotiations were overshadowed, while peace negotiations remained at the forefront.

If we take the element of negotiations out of the equation and solely look at humanitarian aid, international law stipulates that parties involved in a conflict must allow relief operations within the territory to give impartial aid to civilians.⁴⁹ KSA enforced an embargo despite the UN warning that this could affect aid delivery.⁵⁰ Under international law, parties have the right to control what is being delivered; however, intentionally restricting this aid is unlawful.⁵¹ If either type of negotiation is failing, what will restrict the interference of humanitarian aid supplies and services? The Saudi Arabia Coalition is the one that is primarily being slandered on their attacks and interference, even though the Houthis are conducting themselves with the same type of behavior and causing the same issues. Both sides are acting unlawfully and overstepping their powers. Therefore, negotiations have not been deemed successful. They are actually creating more problems, which is the opposite of what they are supposed to do.

⁴⁶ Transfeld, Mareike, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War* (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: January 28, 2022) p.1-6.

⁴⁷ Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

⁴⁸ Palik, & Rustad, *Mediation in the Yemeni Civil War*, 2019.

⁴⁹ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

⁵⁰ Laub, "Mapping The Yemen Conflict," 2015.

⁵¹ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

3.2 Humanitarian Aid

The conflict in Yemen has been one of the most “complex and challenging cases to deliver humanitarian aid.”⁵² The main actors in delivering humanitarian aid in Yemen are the UN, the ICRC, and the Red Crescent Movement.⁵³ The top organizations providing support are the UN World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Save the Children, Baitulmaal and Mona, and Doctors Without Borders.⁵⁴ Since the primary negotiation mediators for the conflict in Yemen have been the UN, and the top supporting organizations are also UN programs, it seems fitting to focus on UN-based humanitarian organizations supplying aid. By 2019, 24.1 million out of 30.5 million Yemen people needed humanitarian aid and this continues to increase.⁵⁵ Rob Grace claims that “humanitarian organizations have relied on luck and the hope that aid workers find their way toward developing negotiations expertise.”⁵⁶ If negotiators are not provided with the proper techniques to complete their job successfully, how can we expect those on a lower level of the conflict to do so?⁵⁷ Grace interviewed several humanitarian workers with experience in non-conflict, natural disasters and health emergencies. While these experiences do not directly relate to the conflict in Yemen, they shed light on the essential matter of the problem: understanding how humanitarian staff interpret their tools and situations at the ground-level.

The primary purpose of humanitarian aid is to help save the lives of civilians by reducing and eliminating human suffering.⁵⁸ Humanitarian aid is a short-term implementation and a response to an event that is currently identified as a disaster zone.⁵⁹ The conflict in Yemen has evidently passed a short-term treatment. Since the Cold War, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has reported an increase in funds for humanitarian aid used worldwide that are allocated through food, shelter and medical

⁵² “Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Yemen Crisis - Yemen,” IAHE, Reliefweb, July 14, 2022.

⁵³ Egeland, Jan, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, 2013.

⁵⁴ Balicanta, Elisabeth, “5 Organizations Helping During the Yemen Crisis.” The Borgen Project, September 24, 2020

⁵⁵ Edwards, *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*, 2019.

⁵⁶ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

⁵⁷ Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector, 2020.*

⁵⁸ “From Humanitarian to Development Aid.” Humanitarian Coalition, January 17, 2022.

⁵⁹ “From Humanitarian to Development Aid,” 2022.

supplies.⁶⁰ The OECD have also stated that they believe an estimated 1.5 billion people live in countries continuously affected by violence.⁶¹ Humanitarian aid is short-term, applied in disaster regions, and as a response to actions that inflict human suffering with the aim to save lives.⁶² Under this definition, it is clear that Yemen is suffering under a prolonged use of humanitarian aid with the deterioration of their region by the current conflict and the pain inflicted on the Yemeni population.

The UN agencies, funds and programs, and the humanitarian system are in an impossible situation with Yemen.⁶³ There is a growing debate about whether or not these humanitarian aid programs indirectly prolong the conflict.⁶⁴ Given the understanding of negotiations, it can be argued that humanitarian aid stabilizes the counterparts in a conflict allowing them to remain in the negotiating arena for a longer period. This, in turn, prolongs conflict and worsens the need for humanitarian aid. Though Neil Narang stipulates that humanitarian aid can affect conflict, the field of International Relations is skeptical about making this link because there may be an “inability to draw consistent conclusions.”⁶⁵ One way that aid can prolong conflicts and produce more failed negotiations is through the creation of protected zones, which have proven to foster opposition.⁶⁶ Negotiations could be failing due to the dishonesty that is coming from both sides, which in turn fuels both sides in maintaining a stable position within the conflict, giving neither a reason to concede. Narang claims that humanitarian aid affects conflict which affects negotiation results. Therefore, why can't the reverse be true?

UN-based documents or third parties like news outlets addressing humanitarian issues use different terms for humanitarian aid interchangeably throughout their reports. The research in this thesis makes reference to these other terms, but humanitarian aid is the primary term used throughout. One of the terms used is humanitarian assistance, which is aid's physical action and presence on the ground providing humanitarian principles in a short

⁶⁰ Narang, Neil, *Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War*. (International Studies Quarterly: March 2015) Volume 59(1), p.184-195.

⁶¹ “From Humanitarian to Development Aid,” 2022.

⁶² “From Humanitarian to Development Aid,” 2022.

⁶³ “Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Yemen Crisis - Yemen,” 2022.

⁶⁴ Narang, Neil, *Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War*. 2015.

⁶⁵ Narang, Neil, *Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War*. 2015.

⁶⁶ Narang, Neil, *Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War*. 2015.

period of time.⁶⁷ An example of this is the support given to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.⁶⁸ In Yemen, humanitarian assistance can be seen through the WFP's support in 2015, whereby they provided food assistance to around 870,000 Yemenis monthly.⁶⁹ The areas where aid was concentrated were Aden, Sa'dah, Amran, Sana'a, Ta'izz and Al Hudaydah. It was UN staff who delivered the food assistance.⁷⁰ They went to each region to supply what was needed and navigated blockades and interference of supplies.

Another term used is humanitarian action, which is the act of physically taking charge in a conflict.⁷¹ This can be seen in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Republic of Iraq and the Federal Republic of Somalia. Where the UN and its other programs like the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) went into these conflicts to aid in spearheading its resolution. However, an issue raised with humanitarian action and taking control is that it can lead to increased violence ultimately inflicting more hardship on civilians, especially when applied for a longer period than intended due to failed negotiations. Grace posits two questions that coincide well with this thesis: "is it worth it to remain and serve whatever segment of the civilian population that can be assisted?" and "how much of a compromise is too far?"⁷² These two questions can be well applied to Yemen when looking at their supply of humanitarian aid.

Lastly, the term humanitarian relief is relief given by humanitarian aid organizations that distribute resources dependent on need.⁷³ This is why Yemen has received significant funding since 2014. It was deemed necessary to offer more aid. However, with humanitarian relief there remains an issue of selection bias regardless of the importance of the need. For example, if the UN decided to fund another conflict that would benefit them more, then they might reduce their relief in Yemen. Yemen has seen a significant increase in poverty due to war and economic collapse.⁷⁴ The leading humanitarian concern of the international community for the conflict in Yemen was and continues to be food shortage. The WFP has

⁶⁷ Tan, Y.S Andrew & Johan Von Schreeb, *Humanitarian assistance and accountability: what are we really talking about?* (Prehospital and Disaster Medicine : 2015) Volume 30(3), 264-270.

⁶⁸ Tan & Von Schreeb, *Humanitarian assistance and accountability: what are we really talking about?*, 2015.

⁶⁹ FEWS NET, *Yemen Food Security Outlook, October 2015 to March 2016 - Yemen*. 2015.

⁷⁰ FEWS NET, *Yemen Food Security Outlook, October 2015 to March 2016 - Yemen*. 2015.

⁷¹ OHCHR, *UN Human Rights approach to field work*. (UN Human Rights Report: 2017).

⁷² Grace, Rob, *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector*, 2020.

⁷³ Narang, Neil, *Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War*. 2015.

⁷⁴ "Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Yemen Crisis - Yemen," 2022.

provided food to 12 million people and continues to aid Yemeni families and children.⁷⁵ UNICEF is a non-profit organization that, in 1953, became a part of the UN system permanently. They provide relief and aid in emergencies, supplying vaccines, water and much more.⁷⁶ It should be noted that there were times when food rations had to be cut or did not make it to their location due to reduced funding or blockades interfering with supplies.⁷⁷ Similar to the negotiation aspects of the conflict, both sides have negatively affected the country's humanitarian crisis. For this reason, all parties violating human rights should be condemned.⁷⁸ For example, the Saudi-led Coalition targeted civilians and infrastructure on multiple occasions, the Houthis have and continue to make it harder to receive aid supplies, and the GoY have made it difficult for agencies to reach civilians due to their bureaucratic requirements.⁷⁹ The Saudi-led Coalition also inflicted many humanitarian issues upon the Yemeni, hoping to deter the Iranian influence.⁸⁰ The humanitarian system needs to improve and provide adequate aid and support with external aid while calling out the violation of human rights by different parties.⁸¹ Yemen is not the only time the humanitarian system has failed, but it may be the worst case yet.

3.3 Humanitarian Diplomacy

Humanitarian diplomacy is a theory that emerged following World War Two, however, the ideas of humanitarianism have existed for years.⁸² This theory further clarifies the association between negotiations and humanitarian aid. Humanitarian diplomacy theory is “a strategy of influence implying interaction with a wide variety of players for an exclusively humanitarian purpose.”⁸³ Non-governmental organizations, a government, or an international organization can conduct it.⁸⁴ Non-governmental organizations and international organizations define humanitarian diplomacy slightly differently because it depends on their humanitarian task and what they desire to accomplish.⁸⁵ Each actor involved in a

⁷⁵ Balicanta, “5 Organizations Helping During the Yemen Crisis.” 2020.

⁷⁶ Balicanta, “5 Organizations Helping During the Yemen Crisis.” 2020.

⁷⁷ Balicanta, “5 Organizations Helping During the Yemen Crisis.” 2020.

⁷⁸ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

⁷⁹ Simpson, G. (2020, September 14). Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW. Human Rights Watch.

⁸⁰ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

⁸¹ “Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation (IAHE) of the Yemen Crisis - Yemen,” 2022.

⁸² Fiot, Daniel. Humanitarian Diplomacy. (The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy. John Wiley & Sons: May 3, 2018) p.1-10.

⁸³ Dickson, Anna. “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction.” Commons Library, March 4, 2021.

⁸⁴ Fiot, Daniel. Humanitarian Diplomacy, 2018.

⁸⁵ Fiot, Daniel. Humanitarian Diplomacy, 2018.

humanitarian crisis has different reasons for getting involved, and each will have benefits for doing so. The end goal of humanitarian diplomacy is not only to increase individuals' awareness of a humanitarian crisis, but also to create a safe zone where humanitarian relief and assistance can be delivered.⁸⁶ It sees negotiations as being a part of the function of diplomacy, “such as representing the State and conducting negotiations to reach agreements and draw up rules for the international system.”⁸⁷ It sees negotiations' role in humanitarian aid to provide armed forces in emergency cases whenever required and cannot be rejected when there is a level of need.⁸⁸ Harroff-Tavel further claimed that if humanitarian aid is extended for a longer period it becomes a problem. Negotiations that continually fail perpetuate the challenges of extended humanitarian aid.

Humanitarian diplomacy is ultimately a form of diplomacy.⁸⁹ A significant concern for humanitarian actors and policymakers is how to improve humanitarian aid in conflict.⁹⁰ A report by the UN Refugee Agency claims that around 120,000 Yemenis have been displaced since the Saudi-led Coalition began.⁹¹ The ICRC defines humanitarian diplomacy as “persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times in the interests of the vulnerable, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principle.”⁹² In Yemen, attempts were made to persuade the leaders to come to a conclusion and to uphold humanitarian values. However, it continues to be dismissed by both sides. The GoY and the Houthis have not yet reached an agreement and continue to interfere with humanitarian aid by conducting blockades and attacks. These actions allow both rivals to supply their side with the needed accessories. It allows the Houthis to stay strong enough to continue conquering different Yemeni cities and decreases their desire to negotiate.

Humanitarian diplomacy is supposed to influence opinions of decision makers on a humanitarian issue in which negotiations could be avoided all together.⁹³ It would be an attempt at pre-negotiations. However, what happens if more than one negotiation is needed to

⁸⁶ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

⁸⁷ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,” 2021.

⁸⁸ Harroff-Tavel, Marion. *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross*. International Committee of the Red Cross: 2006). p.1-20.

⁸⁹ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

⁹⁰ De lauri, Antonio. *CMI Brief: Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*. (CHR, Michelsen Institute: June, 2018) p.1-4.

⁹¹ Laub, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” 2015.

⁹² Egeland, Jan. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, 2013.

⁹³ Harroff-Tavel, *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, 2006.

resolve a conflict, such as peace negotiations and humanitarian negotiations? Humanitarian diplomacy sees negotiations and humanitarian aid as the only possible response to resolving conflicts. It is the understanding that it “negotiate[s] access to the civilians that the armed opposition groups control, to provide humanitarian aid to protected persons; spread knowledge of humanitarian law to those groups; help them develop codes of conduct and disciplinary measures for violations of the law; encourage them to declare their intention to respect certain norms or to sign special agreements with the State player; [and] serve as a platform for dialogue.”⁹⁴ Humanitarian diplomacy’s first concern will always be for those suffering a humanitarian injustice. It is as if peace negotiations focus too much on the state actors, not the people within the state. Whereas humanitarian negotiations interact in the opposite light. Yemen’s humanitarian negotiations are conducted under humanitarian diplomacy. However, the definition of humanitarian diplomacy does not specify the type of negotiations but rather a generalization of negotiations. Both types of negotiations aim to better the lives of those affected by conflict. Though, it seems as if peace negotiations seem to forget who they are discussing. It would be in the best interest for those most vulnerable to have peace negotiators and humanitarian negotiators working together.

The theory of humanitarian diplomacy leaves out the importance of the purpose of peace negotiations as well as humanitarian negotiations. As mentioned, the theory is still in development. However, it seems this could be why Yemen continues to have failed negotiations with aid being affected. The UN does not seem to stress that peace negotiations need to be discussed and agreed upon alongside humanitarian actions. This disconnect also prevents aid from reaching high-risk areas due to blockades and stolen UN food and supplies. An agreement needs to be made by both sides in the form of a peace negotiation to allow for humanitarian action like providing aid and funding, but that cannot be done if two oppositions continuously conduct air strikes, blockades and conquer cities because negotiations are failing.

Humanitarian diplomacy’s focus is negotiating the need for humanitarian organizations and the negotiations of civilian access based on the need for protection.⁹⁵ It is a strategy to prevent and resolve humanitarian issues through dialogue.⁹⁶ It is challenging in

⁹⁴ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,” 2021.

⁹⁵ De lauri, *CMI Brief: Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*, 2018.

⁹⁶ Harroff-Tavel, *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, 2006.

humanitarian negotiations, specifically with armed groups like the Houthis.⁹⁷ Negotiations are one of many variables to consider when discussing humanitarian aid. It is an essential component that can affect humanitarian aid in either a good or bad way.⁹⁸ There can be misconduct between the international actor and the counterpart concerning their support and desire for humanitarian action.⁹⁹ In the case of Yemen, developed countries and those considered prime advocates for the termination of the conflict have funded humanitarian aid. Still, they have sold arms to the Saudi-led Coalition involuntarily contributing to the humanitarian problem.¹⁰⁰ This allows the Saudi-led Coalition to continue its opposition against the Houthis by being able to stay in the conflict longer, stalling negotiation talks at all levels. KSA will not withdraw because of their political status and as it could threaten their internal security.¹⁰¹ The only way this could be rectified is if they took part in the peace negotiations of the conflict. Doing so may hold them accountable and encourage them to follow humanitarian diplomacy and international law.

The ongoing violence occurring in the region continues to impact access to resources and humanitarian assistance for Yemenis.¹⁰² David Gressly, a Yemen resident and humanitarian coordinator, asserted that “peace is required to end the decline [of humanitarian aid], but we can progress now. The parties to the conflict should lift all restrictions on trade and investment for non-sanctioned commodities. This will help lower food prices and unleash the economy, giving people the dignity of a job and a path to move away from reliance on aid.”¹⁰³ It is also clear to those working within the conflict that for humanitarian aid to stop declining, there is a need for peace and negotiations. A joint press release from the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), UNICEF and the WFP claimed that the conflict was the primary underlying driver of hunger in Yemen.¹⁰⁴ This report argued that fighting also made the jobs of relief agents harder because of the increased difficulty in reaching areas of greatest need.¹⁰⁵ Essentially if negotiations were successful and the conflict improved, then humanitarian aid in Yemen would ameliorate.

⁹⁷ Egeland, Jan. *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, 2013.

⁹⁸ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,” 2021.

⁹⁹ Grace, Rob., *Research Report: The Humanitarian as Negotiator: Developing Capacity Across the Aid Sector*, 2020.

¹⁰⁰ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

¹⁰¹ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁰² FEWS NET, *Yemen Food Security Outlook, October 2015 to March 2016 - Yemen*. 2015.

¹⁰³ “Yemen: Acute hunger at unprecedented levels as funding dries up.” UNICEF, March 14, 2022

¹⁰⁴ “Yemen: Acute hunger at unprecedented levels as funding dries up.” 2022.

¹⁰⁵ FEWS NET, *Yemen Food Security Outlook, October 2015 to March 2016 - Yemen*. 2015.

It should be clarified that humanitarian diplomacy is not the direct delivery of aid and supplies but rather the promotion of humanitarianism and humanitarian action. However, Daniel Fiot insists there is a link between the two.¹⁰⁶ When there is a struggle to provide humanitarian aid, humanitarian diplomacy allows the conflict to gain international recognition and sheds light on issues and events that may not always get media coverage.¹⁰⁷ This occurred when the conflict in Yemen first came to light. There was more news coverage on it then than there is now, as humanitarian diplomacy at the beginning was in full force. However, could the length of the conflict be dwindling the promotion of humanitarian assistance?

Marion Haroff-Tavel understood the theory of humanitarian diplomacy to have three issues. First, there is a changing sense of roles and attitudes within the international arena between the actors; this can be seen through new methods of warfare like proxy wars that bring in more actors, as seen in Yemen. Second, humanitarian work is increasingly viewed as a way toward a political end. The more the conflict in Yemen is explored, the more we see how the UN is trying, and failing, to use humanitarian aid to solve the conflict. Third is the ever-increasing information technology revolution.¹⁰⁸ Due to the complexity of the modern world, organizations like the UN and the ICRC have to be multidimensional in their humanitarian diplomacy. They need to “negotiate access to the civilians that the armed opposition groups control to provide humanitarian aid to protected persons; spread knowledge of humanitarian law to those groups; help them develop codes of conduct and disciplinary measures for violations of the law; encourage them to declare their intention to respect certain norms or to sign special agreements with the State player; serve as a platform for dialogue.”¹⁰⁹

In the end, the public goods available during these crises rely on the resources provided by the humanitarian actors.¹¹⁰ Lillie Chouliaraki claims that the “art” of humanitarian diplomacy is changing and humanitarian communication is growing in a way that seems to have the ability to damage the ethical and intellectual values and beliefs of

¹⁰⁶ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

¹⁰⁷ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

¹⁰⁸ Haroff-Tavel, *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, 2006.

¹⁰⁹ Haroff-Tavel, *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross*, 2006, p. 13.

¹¹⁰ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

humanitarianism.¹¹¹ It must be understood that there is also a tension between diplomacy and humanitarianism based on their goals, which can be why organizations like the UN do not use peace negotiations and humanitarian negotiations together. Both may have the same desired outcome, but have different reasons for it. Humanitarianism wants to promote and help people in need and seeks the ideal without interference from political actors, whereas negotiations and the diplomacy involved as their interests of what would happen when a conflict is resolved.¹¹² There seems to be a clear disconnect between diplomacy and humanitarian action. They continue to try and work together knowing their end goals are different, meaning an agreement between each other becomes more unlikely.

The Conflict Management and International (CMI) report states that countries like Yemen demonstrate how “safe havens” that humanitarian aid is supposed to provide for can become targets of political violence. The report claimed that a growing concern among humanitarians was the prolonging of the conflict. They stipulated that access to aid was the first issue discussed in disputes at the negotiation table.¹¹³ This report demonstrated the growing knowledge within the developing theory of humanitarian diplomacy and the debate on whether or not humanitarian aid can prolong a conflict. Suppose humanitarian aid can prolong a conflict by minimizing the need for resolution from both sides. This means that neither side sees themselves as weak enough to concede when coming to the negotiation table. Who is to say the reverse is not true and that those same resolutions, i.e. negotiations, can affect humanitarian aid if the conflict continues? The theory demonstrates that humanitarian aid and negotiations go hand in hand when conducting humanitarian diplomacy. However, it is not yet working in a cohesive and beneficial way. It is the measure in negotiating humanitarian access for organizations.

Humanitarian diplomacy also encourages the creation of dialogue through negotiations to resolve humanitarian issues. However, findings from the Yemen Food Security Outlook report from October 2015 to March 2016 by the Relief Web stipulated that continued violence from unsuccessful negotiations will negatively impact access to resources and humanitarian aid.¹¹⁴ This demonstrates that the current hypothesis of the potential association between failed negotiations and humanitarian aid is more plausible. The CMI

¹¹¹ Fiot, Daniel. *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 2018.

¹¹² De lauri, *CMI Brief: Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*, 2018.

¹¹³ De lauri, *CMI Brief: Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*, 2018.

¹¹⁴ De lauri, *CMI Brief: Humanitarian Diplomacy: A New Research Agenda*, 2018.

report can be reversed and negotiations can have an effect on the conflict, which then affects humanitarian aid.

A truce in 2022 reduced tensions between both oppositions allowing the negotiation agreement for a ceasefire, which in turn improved humanitarian conditions.¹¹⁵ This demonstrated that humanitarian aid's effects are positive when negotiations begin to work, suggesting the opposite is true, that aid will worsen if negotiations fail. Aid obstruction is a major contributor to negotiations failing and also why humanitarian aid is not being effectively delivered. Both the Houthi authorities and the GoY are responsible and neither are being held accountable. Aid obstruction is one of the ways the Houthis have been funding their part of the war.¹¹⁶ That being said, there is still a call on UN donors to support the UN agencies on the ground in Yemen and to uphold humanitarian principles.¹¹⁷ This call is partly due to the WFP's 2021 end-of-year report highlighting a cut in food aid to Yemen due to the decrease in international funding.¹¹⁸ As mentioned, humanitarian aid over a prolonged period worsens on many levels, and negatively affects the funding that supplies programs like the WFP. The WFP has targeted 11.1 million Yemeni, and the cost of food increases as the conflict continues.¹¹⁹ Aid is being reduced, and humanitarian diplomacy has demonstrated the linkage between negotiations and humanitarian aid. These claims are what will be further investigated in the thesis.

4. Methodology

In an ideal world, the overall research strategy and analytical approach would incorporate previous negotiations and humanitarian aid literature retrieving data from experience-near. However, this is unfeasible for this thesis due to circumstances out of the author's control (current climate in Yemen and restrictions on travel). Therefore, this thesis uses the experience-distant to explain concepts.

As an experience-distant approach is used for analysis, more weight is held on the sources used. Research includes sources from organization websites, reports, news articles,

¹¹⁵ Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," 2022.

¹¹⁶ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹¹⁷ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹¹⁸ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹¹⁹ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

news journals, speeches, and academic literature. Diverse sources allow the author to correlate the reality of aid with data published by UN reports. The articles that were selected are from the database of *Al Jazeera*, a main international news outlet that focuses on issues in the Middle East. A Qatar-owned news outlet, they are one of the few outlets that continue to report on the conflict in Yemen and humanitarian issues since its conception. This thesis analyzed about 35 *Al Jazeera* reports covering negotiations and humanitarian aid from 2014 to 2023. Over that period, the articles chosen were based on their relevance to key words (negotiations and humanitarian aid) and because they are unbiased and have a humanized approach to dissecting and presenting data. The photos, maps and graphs from *Al Jazeera* reports are also included in this thesis as they support the understanding of the severity of the conflict in Yemen by painting a picture of how humanitarian aid began and how it was reported eight years later. The visual tools also provide the reader with a timeline of the negotiations, mediations and peace talks. Lastly, the author finds that *Al Jazeera* is excellent in adequately portraying the realities of the conflict through knowledge of the actors involved and the issues faced. As *Al Jazeera* has continuously reported on the conflict, a pattern can be analyzed.

Research from popular news outlets like the *Times* or *Global Mail* were considered, however they lacked consistent reporting and were insufficient data and analysis. *Al Jazeera* reports on Yemen once to twice a month; larger western outlets like the *Times* and *Global Mail* were sporadic in their reporting. *Al Jazeera* was also chosen as the main source material as the author does not read Arabic and would not be able to analyze Arabic news reports, which undoubtedly provide the most accurate depiction of the conflict and its effects on civilians. The author acknowledges that this is a limitation of the current thesis but a potential area for further development and research papers.

Another source used is the UN's widespread databases including websites, reports and archives as they are heavily involved in both negotiations and humanitarian aid. Since the conflict broke out, the UN has been the main third party initiating and guiding mediations, conducted in hopes of reaching a middle ground between both sides. These databases that hold UNOCHA reports help identify humanitarian actors, programs and aid. Their data helps identify a negotiation's effect on humanitarian aid. These reports also supply statistics that highlight the decrease in funding since the beginning of the conflict, an important factor that affects humanitarian aid when negotiations fail.

A limitation with this resource is that it requires more transparency. The UN's reports do not directly address the failure of negotiations nor its effect on humanitarian aid. UN reports are also filtered by UN organizations and programs, meaning that they are not critical or allow civilians to see certain results/facts. Due to lack of reporting transparency and accessible documents, data is difficult to find for each year. Based on the *Al Jazeera* reports, 2015, 2017, and 2022 were the most critical years of the Yemen conflict. In 2015, the conflict was at its climax; In 2017, the WFP and the UN declared Yemen to be the "worst humanitarian crisis in the world;" and in 2022, the most recent year of the conflict, saw a positive outcome of the short-lived truce, with funding issues being vocalized.

The operationalization of negotiations and humanitarian aid is done through secondary research. Though there is a limited amount of critical literature analyzing the conflict in Yemen, there are still several images, audio, videos, and text. An example includes a documentary called "Hunger Ward: The Last Hope Against War and Starvation," that was produced by Vulcan Productions. It demonstrates the lived realities of Yemeni people and how the continuation of the war is causing major humanitarian problems that risk becoming so catastrophic that a return to the norm may be impossible.¹²⁰ Collecting data from these secondary resources will allow the reader to gain knowledge from individuals with on the ground knowledge of Yemen.

The secondary sources support the connection of two theme-based arguments in exploring how failed negotiations affect humanitarian aid in Yemen, which are blockades and donations. They both were determined based on the patterns found in the timeline of the Yemen negotiations and humanitarian aid. Before addressing this, a more detailed history of Yemen and its negotiations will be outlined to provide context for their evaluation.

The tool of measurements that seem to be commonly applied to researching the success of humanitarian aid and negotiations are the amount of deaths and the percentage of food aid needed. Blockades are addressed by the number of deaths that the UN and *Al Jazeera* articles report on while donations are measured by the increased need for food aid throughout the year.

¹²⁰ Woodruff, Juddy. "Oscar-Nominated "Hunger Ward" Documentary: Inside Yemen's Humanitarian Crisis." United States Institute of Peace, United States Institute of Peace, 2021.

5. Stages of Negotiations in the Yemen Conflict

The negotiations conducted by the UN since 2014 have resulted in minimal positive results.¹²¹ Within these years, there have been two periods of peace and humanitarian negotiations. The main issue is that the Houthis have no desire to negotiate on an equal level as long as they keep the advantages in the conflict.¹²² This is one reason as to why peace has only come twice within the whole period of the conflict. Advantages in this case refers to supplies and territory control. The Houthis' unwillingness to compromise is why honoring agreements have and may continue to fail.¹²³ Unless otherwise mentioned in classified negotiation documents, it should be acknowledged that attacks and violence have continued at every stage, even during supposed truces.

2014

The Yemen conflict began in 2014 as the international community attempted their first rounds of mediated negotiations. At this time, the National Democratic Conference (NDC) produced a peace resolution that eventually failed as the Houthis terminated their involvement in the talks.¹²⁴ The UN-settled peace deal of September 2014 requested and if successful would have had the Houthis withdraw from Sana'a, and a transitional technocratic government be formed.¹²⁵ It is not uncommon for negotiations to fail on the first try, especially between a state and a rebel movement. Before 2014, other mediators had been negotiating in Yemen to no avail. This can be seen back on page 14 with *Figure 3: Yemen Negotiations From 2007-2018*.

2015

In 2015, there were attempts to terminate the conflict through different methods and different actors. The primary strategy at the beginning of 2015 was to resolve the conflict through power-sharing agreements.¹²⁶ Meaning that two or more parties would be in control

¹²¹ Robinson, "Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering," 2022.

¹²² Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹²³ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹²⁴ Edwards, *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*, 2019.

¹²⁵ Laub, "Mapping The Yemen Conflict," 2015.

¹²⁶ Laub, "Mapping The Yemen Conflict," 2015.

of the Yemeni government.¹²⁷ There was a constitutional debate between the Houthis and the government, whereby the Hadi government drafted the constitution with the desire to legitimize themselves?¹²⁸ This was unsuccessful due to the Houthis' rejection of the constitution. In May 2015, the Saudis and the Houthis agreed to a five-day humanitarian ceasefire; that also failed.¹²⁹ At this time, the conflict gained international attention and received more support from leaders. There was an attempt made by former USA president Barack Obama to resolve the crisis, but it too failed.¹³⁰ These failed agreements, meditations and negotiations only further consolidated the Houthis position in the capital.¹³¹ The Houthis had the upper hand when entering negotiations at this point in the conflict as they held control of the capital and were thus unwilling to compromise their demands. An aspect that should be remembered going forward in the thesis. If oppositions think they have the upper hand, the need to agree within negotiations grows smaller.

2016/ 2017

In 2016, the UN sponsored talks between both sides, however between 2016 and 2017, the ceasefires were broken. Throughout this period, the UN continued to attempt and initiate peace talks.¹³² By 2017, the UN and other humanitarian organizations declared Yemen “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.”¹³³ Prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 2014, Yemen had humanitarian problems like other developing states receiving aid but they were considerably under control. The conflict was exacerbated by these three years of failed attempts at peace and resolution through negotiations.

2018

The conflict reached its climax in 2018. The UN mediated talks between both sides through the signing of the Stockholm Agreement.¹³⁴ This agreement stipulated several terms; “prisoner swap, a mutual redeployment of forces away from Hodeidah Port and a committee

¹²⁷ Laub, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” 2015.

¹²⁸ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹²⁹ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹³⁰ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹³¹ Laub, “Mapping The Yemen Conflict,” 2015.

¹³² Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹³³ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

¹³⁴ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

to discuss the contested city of Taiz ."¹³⁵ The clause of the agreement that addressed the Hodeidah Port was rather necessary as apart from the port of Aden, it supplied 90 % of Yemen's food imports.¹³⁶ Because of continuous blockades conducted by the Saudi Coalition, Yemenis were not receiving the supplies.¹³⁷ This is an excellent example of what was mentioned earlier. That neither side is correct in how they are conducting the conflict, both are inflicting pain and causing issues. The Stockholm agreement was the first successful yet temporary negotiation of the conflict.¹³⁸ Though short-lived, this agreement eventually failed because neither opposition wanted to withdraw from Hodeida.¹³⁹ At this time, the Houthis were on the defensive, so these negotiations could have benefited them which is why the agreement got as far as it did.¹⁴⁰ The agreement and the year 2018 gave hope to the international world that negotiations and arrangements were possible but failed each time. That indicates there's a need to approach the conflict differently.

2019-2020

By 2019, the conflict worsened; Human Right Watch claimed that the state of living for Yemenis had been weakened and had faced more significant issues since the spread of COVID-19.¹⁴¹ There were more than the reported 564 death cases at this time in the conflict and the UN-led aid response collapsed because of COVID-19.¹⁴² However, COVID-19 was a consequential response, and not the main reason for a decrease in funding. In 2020, the Houthis signed a backlogged project agreement initially created in 2019 to entail safe and smooth passage through checkpoints, villages, towns and cities. However, concern was whether this agreement would translate into action due to rising crisis issues.¹⁴³ Between 2019-2020, aid organizations, including those under the UN, struggled to gain the country's approval to provide aid and humanitarian action in Yemen without going through the authorities.¹⁴⁴ UN donor member support collapsed in 2020 due to the obstruction of aid. This decrease in funding came from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the

¹³⁵ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹³⁶ Edwards, *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*, 2019.

¹³⁷ Edwards, *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*, 2019.

¹³⁸ Edwards, *Yemen: Civil War and Humanitarian Catastrophe*, 2019.

¹³⁹ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁴⁰ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁴¹ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁴² Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁴³ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁴⁴ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

USA, countries who were at one point the highest donors.¹⁴⁵ Here we see more of how obstruction of aid continues the conflict between the oppositions and affects the humanitarian aid being donated to the country.

2021

In 2021, UN-led peace talks continued with the support of the USA president Joe Biden's administration.¹⁴⁶ Biden promised that the conflict would be resolved through diplomatic means, but this has yet to be achieved.¹⁴⁷ During this time, there were continuous strikes and escalations between both sides. The UN declared that 20 million people in Yemen continued to depend on humanitarian aid.¹⁴⁸ The only negotiation attempt occurred in August 2021; however, those negotiating for the Houthis refused to meet with the newly appointed UN Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg.¹⁴⁹ The UN's last decision in 2021 was that the Human Rights Council voted against renewing the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts (GEE) on Yemen, the only independent body monitoring the conflict.¹⁵⁰ By the end of 2021, the Houthis progressed towards the oil-rich city of Marib, Yemen.¹⁵¹ The city of Marib was the most crucial territorial hold that the GoY controlled because of the economic aspect of oil.¹⁵² The Houthis' desire to control Marib identified their position in the conflict clearly; solid and confident. This position only further decreased the Houthis desire to negotiate as they had the leverage. Shockwaves would be sent around Yemen and the world if the GoY lost Marib because, at this point, the GoY was the weakest side.¹⁵³ The conflict could continue forever, with the scale tilting in favor of each side at different times, influencing their desire to remain in the negotiation stage. It was also apparent that the longer this continued the more the humanitarian crisis deteriorated.

¹⁴⁵ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁴⁶ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁴⁷ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁴⁸ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁴⁹ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁵⁰ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁵¹ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁵² Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁵³ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

In 2022, the UN Security Council renewed the arms embargo, resolution 2216 on Yemen, and at the same time, the WFP stated that the Ukraine War had worsened the humanitarian crisis.¹⁵⁴ The UN would be successful this year, having both oppositions agree on a two-monthly truce due to the holy month of Ramadan.¹⁵⁵ The Yemen truce lasted six months and was renewed twice and conflict resumed after an attempt was made at a third renewal.¹⁵⁶ In April 2022, President Hadi, decided to cede his power in the hopes that the Houthis would return to the negotiation table.¹⁵⁷ At this point, neither the UN nor the Saudi-led Coalition have achieved the stipulated facts in the UN Security Council Resolution 2216.¹⁵⁸ Moving towards a solution seems farther and farther away. It begins to affect more than is indented.

6. Theme One : Blockades

As negotiations continue to fail, they prolong the conflict because no resolution or middle agreement is reached. Failed negotiations also lead to an increase in blockades decreasing the delivery of humanitarian aid, weakening civilians' chances of getting better. A blockade is known as having a severe impact on the humanitarian situation in Yemen.¹⁵⁹ The neglect of humanitarian negotiations has allowed opposing sides to implement blockades. These blockades are twofold: to make the lives of the opposing side more difficult and to gain supplies one may be lacking. Supplies gained from blockades help the opposing sides remain strong, preventing the need to compromise during peace negotiations. This, in turn, prolongs the conflict, which we know increases the need for humanitarian aid in Yemen. This is wasting supplies and aid. As mentioned earlier, humanitarian aid is temporary, because the system created by the international community cannot be sustained for an extended period. If negotiations fail and the conflict extends, humanitarian aid is put in a position where it must sustain for a longer duration. Which is not sustainable, allowing for the creation of larger

¹⁵⁴ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁵⁵ Montgomery, "A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present," 2019.

¹⁵⁶ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁵⁷ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁵⁸ Transfeld, *Three Scenarios for the Yemen War*, 2022.

¹⁵⁹ Fink, Martin, *Naval Blockade and the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen*. (Netherlands International Law Review: 2017) Volume 64.

problems like a humanitarian crisis. Their crisis was made worse because humanitarian and peace negotiations were not participating in their proper roles.

Humanitarian negotiations are usually conducted at the ground level with civilians in the country experiencing conflict. By looking at the stages of negotiations through the *Al Jazeera* articles, the international level of negotiations known as peace negotiations, are receiving most of the attention. However, there needs to be more attention on negotiations at a national level, where day-to-day issues and tasks like delivering aid and blockades happen. Humanitarian negotiations allow access to roads and ports which benefit the civilians of the conflict. If achieved correctly, the blockades conducted by both the Houthis and the GoY would not have occurred or been an issue. Negotiations on the ground level need to be conducted better to prevent blockades whereby aid agencies lose their collections. Peace negotiations failing at a higher level and humanitarian negotiations being dismissed at the ground level do not allow Yemenis a secure chance of surviving. Therefore, if humanitarian negotiations within Yemen were handled better, the blockades may have never become an issue putting and put a sporadic strain on humanitarian aid.

No specific *Al Jazeera* article points to a clear connection between these negotiations failing and blockades. But by seeing the recurring theme of blockades between both negotiations and the delivery of humanitarian aid; a linkage is made clear. These links demonstrate a pattern of blockades being used the longer the conflict remains and following the attempts of failed negotiations at the international peace level. Secondary sources claim that the concerns that ground-level organizations and national/local aid workers have been voicing is not what the UN has tried to address. The more the UN continues to persist in addressing the conflict by simply throwing solutions at a surface level without acknowledging the root of what is blocking the progress of this cause, the less effective any aid will become. This demonstrates a disconnect between the UN peace negotiations and humanitarian negotiations. Neither should be neglected, especially not humanitarian negotiations as this is how agreements on freedom of movement are decided. Therefore, if humanitarian negotiations within Yemen were handled better, the blockades may have never become an issue putting sporadic strain on humanitarian aid.

Peace negotiations do not only affect blockades on the ground but also those within airspace. Airstrikes increase the time it takes to deliver aid, or, if the no-fly zone is not

meant, it can be shot down. The airstrikes began in 2015 when the Saudi-led Coalition said they would continue their military campaign until negotiations were reached. Later that year, the Houthis also began conducting airstrikes. From 2015 to 2023, these airstrikes have continued and brought escalations to the conflict, creating no safe zones for citizens, aid staff, and the delivery of humanitarian aid.¹⁶⁰ In December 2021, aid flights were halted due to the airstrikes.¹⁶¹ The agreement preventing airstrikes or stopping them comes from peace and humanitarian negotiations. But they are failing, so both sides will continue the strikes, and humanitarian aid will worsen. In March 2022, the UN canceled all UN humanitarian flights to Yemen.¹⁶² Could this be a UN tactic to force both sides to the negotiation table? There have been short periods of truce. The airstrikes from both sides have deemed Yemen a no-fly zone, which affects humanitarian aid in coming to Yemen and moving within the country to hard-to-reach areas. This means that the no-fly zone was created because negotiations have failed to secure the safety of flights for aid or supply purposes. But this means a limited amount of supplies can be received in Yemen. The UN and its organization need to put more resources into trying to overcome this obstacle.

Neglect of humanitarian negotiations/failed negotiations → Increase in Blockades → increase the interception of aid supplies being delivered → Prolongs Conflicts → Negatively Affecting humanitarian aid

The Houthis have created the most blockades and have diverted UN agencies in several ways; by delaying the approval of aid projects submitted by the UN; physically blocking aid assessments to question and identify those people's needs in the region; attempting to control aid monitoring and the list of recipients so that they can weaken those loyal to the authorities by diverting aid; and by enacting violence towards aid staff and property.¹⁶³ It was not only the international community that was beginning to get affected by the Houthis blockades and diversions. Aid workers began to be more vocal with their concerns of these blockades limiting their supplies.

¹⁶⁰ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

¹⁶¹ Al Jazeera, "Saudi-Led Coalition Air Raids Hit Sanaa Airport." Al Jazeera, December 21, 2021.

¹⁶² Al Jazeera, "Eight Million Yemenis Could Lose Aid next Month as War Rages." Al Jazeera, February 16, 2022.

¹⁶³ Simpson, "Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW," 2020.

There was a pushback against Houthis obstruction from aid workers in 2019-2020. Mark Lowcock, the UN humanitarian chief, stated to the UN Security Council, “uptick in violent incidents targeting humanitarian assets and local authorities adding new bureaucratic requirements.”¹⁶⁴ Blockades have been a growing issue within the Yemen conflict, however, Houthis claim these accusations to be false. Houthi high-ranking member Mohammed Al-Houthi claimed this report to be false and that aid workers were fabricating this on behalf of the USA.¹⁶⁵ However, he also claimed that there was no need for the Houthis to obstruct aid, although they believed that some aid projects did not address what the Yemenis are facing and just affecting inflation.¹⁶⁶ Mohammed also had supporting comments from the Houthi’s Supreme Council for Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and International Cooperation (SCMCHAT). SCMCHA claimed these accusations were “baseless.”¹⁶⁷ Keep in mind that it is not only the Houthis with blockades but also the Saudi-led Coalition that is backing the GoY. They believe they are blocking weapons and arms being shipped to the Houthis.

As of 2014, media outlets like *Al Jazeera* reported on the issues that Yemen was facing capturing pivotal moments in attempting to resolve the conflict. By 2015, there was a constant need to report on Yemen due to the many different events occurring. Many humanitarian groups claimed that the blockades caused by the fighting made it impossible for supplies to be received and many organizations saw their staff flee for safety due to air raids.¹⁶⁸ The issues the conflict presented was not only in relation to food insecurity but also the need to protect children and access to medical supplies. At this time more than 40% of Yemenis were dependent on food aid. In addition, 90% of their food supply was imported from food relief programs like the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).¹⁶⁹ The FAO claimed that their stocks of food might not be able to be replenished due to the impact airstrikes had on their ability to deliver.¹⁷⁰ The Saudi-led Coalition pledged to continue its military campaign until negotiation goals were met.¹⁷¹ On May 13th, 2015, a ceasefire was implemented allowing aid to enter in an attempt to prevent a humanitarian disaster.¹⁷² Low

¹⁶⁴ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

¹⁶⁵ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

¹⁶⁶ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

¹⁶⁷ Simpson, “Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 | HRW,” 2020.

¹⁶⁸ Kutsch, Tom. “NGOs Decry Dire Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen.” *Al Jazeera*, April 1, 2015.

¹⁶⁹ Kutsch, “NGOs Decry Dire Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” 2015.

¹⁷⁰ Kutsch, “NGOs Decry Dire Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” 2015.

¹⁷¹ Kutsch, “NGOs Decry Dire Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen,” 2015.

¹⁷² Al Sayaghi, Mohammed, “Reports of Violations As Yemen Truce Broadly Holds.” *Al Jazeera* May 13, 2015.

levels of violence remained during the truce, yet aid and medicine made it to areas in Yemen.¹⁷³ The UN believed that 828 civilians and 129 children were killed since the beginning of the conflict and both sides accused each other in the media for breaking ceasefire rules.

The hope and peace from the truce was short lived. Aid groups and civilians needed a long-lasting truce, but the Saudi-led Coalition returned to its airstrike campaign against the Houthis after the UN envoy's five-day humanitarian ceasefire expired.¹⁷⁴ At this point, the cities from Taiz to Aden and the capital Sanaa were captured and under Houthi control.¹⁷⁵ There was another truce? attempt through talks, however, *Al Jazeera* reported that neither the Houthis nor President Hadi were present.

The city of Taiz is a good example of a Yemeni city merging conflict, negotiations and humanitarian aid to see how they all work together. By the end of 2015, *Al Jazeera* claimed that Taiz had become the third-largest city under siege and the UN accused the Houthis of blocking the delivery of supplies to 200,000 civilians within Taiz.¹⁷⁶ This humanitarian disaster in the town was not news to aid agencies, who had been warning about this for months. The November 26th, 2015 *Al Jazeera* article, "UN accuses Houthis of blocking aid into Yemen's Taiz," talks about Stephen O'Brien, the UN's Under-Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator claiming that the UN agencies and humanitarian partners have tried to negotiate access to reach people.¹⁷⁷ However, UN trucks were being stuck at checkpoints and given limited access. His announcement came after fighting continued with strikes done on both sides.¹⁷⁸ The following years would continue to bring negative consequences from having the conflict continue.

The 2016 and 2017 *Al Jazeera* articles tell the story that delivery of aid was failing due to the normalization of sporadic blockades, while truces were re-attempted to no avail. Federica Mogherini, an EU foreign policy chief, claimed that truces were a first step into allowing the UN to continue their negotiations.¹⁷⁹ *Al Jazeera* reported that the most recent

¹⁷³ Al Sayaghi, "Reports of Violations As Yemen Truce Broadly Holds," 2015.

¹⁷⁴ AFP & Al Jazeera, "Bombing in Yemen as humanitarian truce ends," *Al Jazeera*, May 18, 2015.

¹⁷⁵ AFP & Al Jazeera, "Bombing in Yemen as humanitarian truce ends," 2015.

¹⁷⁶ Al Jazeera, "The UN accuses Houthis of blocking aid into Yemen's Taiz." *Al Jazeera*, November 26, 2015.

¹⁷⁷ Al Jazeera, "The UN accuses Houthis of blocking aid into Yemen's Taiz," 2015.

¹⁷⁸ Al Jazeera, "The UN accuses Houthis of blocking aid into Yemen's Taiz," 2015.

¹⁷⁹ News Agencies, "Yemen clashes undermine ceasefire for humanitarian aid," *Al Jazeera*, October 20, 2016.

ceasefire that year began in April 2016 but failed by August when UN negotiations collapsed.¹⁸⁰ By September 2017, aid groups were becoming more vocal and an example of this is seen in the article “UN: Saudis ‘should fund all humanitarian aid in Yemen.’” Aid groups had begun calling out the Saudi-led Coalition for their blockades that were preventing humanitarian assistance and supplies from reaching needed areas.¹⁸¹ The UN accused the Coalition of restricting vessels coming into the Hodeidah port, which supplied 80% of Yemen's imports¹⁸². It is important to note that blockades were not only affecting food supplies but other supplies like fuel which prevented agencies from carrying out aid through vehicles.¹⁸³ At this point, the conflict was at its worst but there were small moments of success.

This conflict and its crisis has not only seen negative outcomes. Though, the negative outweighs the positive there have been moments of temporary success. For example, a February 2019 *Al Jazeera* article addressed the 2018 Stockholm Agreement and Security Council Resolution 2451 which called for a ceasefire in Hodeidah, prisoner exchange and confidence-building measures.¹⁸⁴ However, *Al Jazeera* claims that the agreement did not bring about significant change because both sides believed the other violated it.¹⁸⁵ Though violence within Hodeidah decreased, the humanitarian crisis continued with over 2 million children recorded as malnourished.¹⁸⁶ The article further clarified that as the humanitarian crisis and the conflict continued, the economy was still declining and unraveling.¹⁸⁷ Rates fell and food prices increased further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.¹⁸⁸ The 2019 humanitarian response plan required about \$4 billion to reach 15 million people throughout Yemen.¹⁸⁹ \$12 million was pledged monthly towards emergency food aid, health, and assistance, an increase from \$10 million in December 2018.¹⁹⁰ Mark Lowcock, was quoted in the *Al Jazeera* article claiming that the 2018 donations were divided among 200 agencies in 333 Yemen governorates. However, UN operations were met with difficulties through delays,

¹⁸⁰ News Agencies, *Yemen clashes undermine ceasefire for humanitarian aid* | News. Al Jazeera.

¹⁸¹ News Agencies, “UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen.” Al Jazeera, September 5, 2017.

¹⁸² News Agencies, “UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen,” 2017.

¹⁸³ News Agencies, “UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen,” 2017.

¹⁸⁴ Bibbo, Barbara, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” Al Jazeera, February 27, 2019.

¹⁸⁵ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁸⁶ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁸⁷ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁸⁸ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁸⁹ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁹⁰ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

blockades, and convoys.¹⁹¹ The month of February saw positive results; António Guterres announced that the UN regained the Red Sea Mills, which meant access to stocking facilities to feed those in need.¹⁹² The 2019 article highlights that as early as 2019, donations were being received and aid provided but that blockades and convoys were interrupting them.¹⁹³ If negotiations had been successful, viable pathways would have been established, and there would be no effect on UN humanitarian aid. This would not only have the potential to save millions of lives but also prevent the waste of funds and resources contributed by member states.

In 2020, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that all parties involved in the conflict were to blame for the obstruction of aid delivery needed for Yemenis to survive.¹⁹⁴ Both the UN and GoY believed the Houthis were obstructing aid more by diverting the relief to their organization, blocking ports and restricting aid assessments to identify what the civilians need.¹⁹⁵ *Al Jazeera* attempted to remain impartial by claiming that the GoY, supported by the Saudi-led coalition, increased their obstruction of aid through the naval air blockade that began in March 2015 and continued.¹⁹⁶ While aid obstruction was affected by the different players of the conflict in Yemen as seen above, there were also internal factors facing international aid organizations. This includes but is not limited to, widespread corruption that international aid needs to be held accountable for that.¹⁹⁷ It has been brought to attention that aid supplies are not reaching their destinations. Therefore, why? Investigations need to be conducted so that the problem does not continue.

Muna Luqman, founder of Food4Humanity, a grassroots humanitarian organization founded in response to the deterioration of living conditions in Yemen was quoted by the news outlet by stating;

“When our aid is delivered to the port in Hodeidah, we find that a portion of it will have been stolen before it leaves the port... There’s also pressure to send aid to areas where [the Houthis] want it to go. We had a project in Hodeidah, and they forced us to send it to

¹⁹¹ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁹² Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁹³ Bibbo, “UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid,” 2019.

¹⁹⁴ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record!: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” *Al Jazeera*, September 14, 2020

¹⁹⁵ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record!: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

¹⁹⁶ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record!: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

¹⁹⁷ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record!: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

Sanaa. We eventually found a compromise and split the aid, but the international organizations often simply agree with them.”¹⁹⁸

Both oppositions continue to deny their involvement in blockades.¹⁹⁹ For a while, the UN convinced the Houthis to agree not to interfere in the independence of aid organizations and publicly dismissed their restrictions and desire for a 2 % tax on aid organizations.²⁰⁰ The only way for aid to reach certain areas and blockades to be over is for negotiations to be successful. This is exactly what Abeer Etefa, spokesperson and senior regional communications officer for Middle East/ North Africa UN WFP was reported saying to *Al Jazeera* in 2020. Etefa claimed that negotiations behind closed doors would advance the best interest of people; however, on humanitarian principles, organizations like WFP will speak out against issues of humanitarian aid.²⁰¹ Here Etefa believes in an association between the need to have the international and local level be more interactive towards each other. Maybe then the conflict and its crisis would not have lasted as long as it has.

By the year 2021, the conflict in Yemen and *Al Jazeera's* reporting on it had reached a 6 year mark with more than 18,500 civilians killed or injured since March 2015.²⁰² At this point, the data released by the Yemen Data Project demonstrated that more than 80% of the Yemen population relied on humanitarian assistance.²⁰³ The understanding by many is that the Yemen crisis will continue if its conflict does not end.²⁰⁴ Which is only done through negotiations. It is rare that oppositions will simply concede. *Al Jazeera* continued to report on Yemeni realities highlighting that its medical aid and health system were on the verge of collapse by 2021.²⁰⁵ The deterioration of the health system was predicted with the airstrikes in 2018 due to their destructive impact facilities and the shortage in medical supplies.²⁰⁶ Rabih Torbay and Zaher Sahloul, authors of a March 23, 2023 *Al Jazeera* article, claimed that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen was worse than it should have been due to “lack of safe and unrestricted access for aid and health workers to reach populations in need wherever they

¹⁹⁸ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record’: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

¹⁹⁹ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record’: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

²⁰⁰ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record’: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

²⁰¹ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, “Egregious record’: Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid,” 2020.

²⁰² Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰³ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰⁴ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰⁵ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰⁶ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

might be.”²⁰⁷ They indirectly highlight how negotiations failed to secure agreements on humanitarian aid delivery. Rabih Torbay and Zaher Sahloul demonstrated great concern for the city of Marib during this period of the conflict. Both authors focused on humanitarian aid issues using one of Yemen’s more effective cities, Marib. The fighting escalated so much that it put thousands of displaced people in danger.²⁰⁸ However, what has been learnt by Marib, in the eyes of Torbay and Sahloul, is that humanitarian aid is not the solution for Yemen, it is political.²⁰⁹ They believed it to be imminent for all sides to halt hostilities and respect international and human rights law.²¹⁰ They stress that humanitarian aid is a temporary not a permanent fix. It is the political aspect which is conversations through negotiations that will not resolve the conflict and guide both sides towards peace.

By March 2022, *Al Jazeera* reported that the Houthis were open to talks with the Saudi-led Coalition in a neutral country. The main goal was to lift restrictions on Yemeni ports and the Sanaa airport.²¹¹ However, the Saudi-led Coalition saw their blockades as stopping the smuggling of arms to the Houthis.²¹² The Saudi-based Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had planned to invite Yemeni parties, including the Houthis, to talk.²¹³ However, the Iranian-aligned movement did not believe it made sense to talk in a country involved in the conflict.²¹⁴ The neutral ground would be familiar members of the GCC; Sultanate Oman or the State of Kuwait, a former host of mediations in 2015.

By the end of 2022, a semi-successful ceasefire was reported resulting in several positive effects of an agreed on negotiation. It led to less displacement, increased fuel imports, and residents in Sanaa claimed that their daily lives improved.²¹⁵ The Houthis had more leverage in the negotiations. The Houthis blamed the Saudi-led Coalition for continued Yemeni suffering.²¹⁶ The truce was not extended after its 6 month period. *Al Jazeera* claimed

²⁰⁷ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰⁸ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²⁰⁹ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²¹⁰ Torbay, & Sahloul, “Weaponisation of aid contributes to death of Yemenis,” 2021.

²¹¹ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” *Al Jazeera*, March 16, 2022.

²¹² News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

²¹³ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

²¹⁴ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

²¹⁵ *Al Jazeera* and News Agencies, “Does the end of Yemen's truce mean return to full-blown fighting?,” *Al Jazeera*, October 3, 2022.

²¹⁶ *Al Jazeera* and News Agencies, “Does the end of Yemen's truce mean return to full-blown fighting?,” 2022.

that humanitarian organizations wanted both sides to renew the truce because only 23 of 30 million Yemeni were being reached by aid delivery.

The later *Al Jazeera March 16th, 2022* article entitled, “Yemen Hunger crisis: \$4.3 billion needed, says UN,” informs us that at this point the UN agencies like WFP, FAO and UNICEF predicted that the humanitarian crisis would worsen between June and December 2022.²¹⁷ It was reported that the need for food assistance would increase from \$17.4 million to \$19 million, with 7.3 million of these people facing extreme levels of hunger.²¹⁸ On top of this, around 2.2 million children were acutely malnourished and 1.3 million pregnant women and nursing mothers were malnourished.²¹⁹ The second half of 2022 also saw famine conditions multiply by five from the current 31,000 people to 161,000 people.

In the article, “Yemen Hunger crisis: \$4.3 billion needed, says UN,” that came in 2022 following an important donor conference. *Al Jazeera* claimed that the Saudi-led Coalition still affected Yemen’s economy through its blockades of many ports, limiting access to fuel and food.²²⁰ Food prices had doubled since 2021, and the effects of COVID-19 had shown in unpaid salaries and remittances stagnating.²²¹ *Al Jazeera* addressed major claims of the UN’s mismanagement of aid diversion by the Houthi rebels in Sanaa.²²² It was written that UN officials acknowledged the problems but believed they cannot do anything until negotiations were had amongst authorities.²²³ The UN is not transparent nor are they addressing their shortcomings which has inevitably led them to continue feeding into a broken process. The March 2022 article acknowledged that there were nine instances where the UN was aware of aid accepted by the Houthis in areas that they controlled. The article criticized the UN response system, meaning that the UN knew that aid was not being delivered to those most vulnerable but continued to send it anyways.²²⁴ *Al Jazeera*, used Martin Griffith’s claims that this interference was relatively standard, and the real issue is that detailed negotiations with actors on the ground must be resolved.²²⁵ It is clear that the UN and

²¹⁷ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” *Al Jazeera*, March 16, 2022.

²¹⁸ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²¹⁹ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²²⁰ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²²¹ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²²² Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²²³ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.


²²⁴ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

²²⁵ Bibbo, Barbara, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

its officials know the importance of negotiations and how it can affect humanitarian aid. So then why aren't they transparent about them?

The problem in analysing blockades is that the UN does not keep track of them. Statistically, the UN disguises blockades by using terminology such as “accessibility” and “people reached.” Since interviews on the ground are difficult to attain and the UN is not straightforward when blockades occur, the best option is to analyze their graphs, charts and maps.

Figure 4, Humanitarian aid “accessibility” in 2014:²²⁶



This map demonstrates the need of aid and the accessibility of aid in each district in Yemen. The northern part of Yemen, where the Houthis originate, there is a critical need for supplies yet there are extreme constraints within those areas for delivering. A similar situation is apparent in the south, where the Aden port and its surrounding districts are controlled by the Houthis. Both the north and the south are access points for aid to be delivered and when controlled by a militia group like the Houthis, can be blockaded and

²²⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), *2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*. OCHA, ReliefWeb, December 22, 2014.

taken from those it was supposed to reach. As mentioned by *Al Jazeera*, both sides are having issues with blockades; the Houthis wanting to tax it for profit and the Saudi-led Coalition wanting to restrict the import of arms to the Houthis. Both completely negate the fact that this aid is supposed to help civilians who have nothing to do with this conflict yet are the ones that are at the forefront of the crisis. Negotiating clears passages and helps aid reach citizens in blockades. As *Al Jazeera* articles have claimed, with moments of truces and with UN negotiations passages for delivery were opening up around 2020. But once the success of talks and negotiation declined both sides reverted to blockades.

A limitation with this theme analysis is that there is a degree of assumption because there are no public records or any records demonstrating when aid leaves and arrives at its destination and why. We are left to assume the many different variables can be decreasing humanitarian aid in Yemen where the conflict is somewhat normalized. Given the reports from *Al Jazeera* and the evidence of the maps, there are several reasons as to why there isn't enough aid and of course, the main factor being that the conflict is still occurring and that will never foster good humanitarian aid practice. As discussed in this past chapter blockades can be a consequence of failed negotiations that directly impacts humanitarian aid. Another reason negotiation failures affect humanitarian aid is internationally with the action of donations.

7. Theme Two: Donations

When a crisis ensues the international community rallies around to give support in any way they can. A main way they do so without becoming too involved in the conflict is through donations. That is why prior to 2014 donations were being given by UN members to organizations like the WFP to show support to Yemen and aid in their recovery. Only when the conflict reached a climax in 2014, did the UN create a Yemen relief fund. Since *Al Jazeera* has been reporting about the conflict since its origin days, it is of no surprise that donations have been a topic of conversation. In April 2015, it was reported that it had been a year since the IRC warned the world about Yemen's instability due to the lack of food for more than half the population.²²⁷ The violence of the conflict had affected 18 of the 22 governorates and turned into a proxy war. In the early days of the crisis, Yemen had a

²²⁷ Hussein, Mohamed. E, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen," *Al Jazeera*, April 25, 2015.

humanitarian crisis lingering in the background. Based on UN figures, around 16 million people, i.e. 61% of the population, needed humanitarian assistance.²²⁸ Clean drinking water was not accessible, hospitals were on the verge of collapsing, and the level of child malnourishment was one of the highest rates in the world.²²⁹ From 2015 till now not much has changed, and one could argue that it has gotten exponentially worse.

At the time, Yemen had areas vulnerable to health, water, sanitation and nutrition that were exacerbated by air strikes.²³⁰ In April 2015, Mohamed Elmontassir Hussein, an *Al Jazeera* journalist and director of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) for Yemen, stated that the longer the conflict continued, the harder it would be to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.²³¹ I will state this again: humanitarian aid is a temporary not a permanent fix. There are many moving pieces to allow for humanitarian aid to be properly supplied and given. One already mentioned was with prolonged conflict due to failed negotiations blockades become more apparent and evident. Saudi Arabia claimed that they would halt its airstrike campaign, and while this was a good step, it did not stop the conflict on the ground level.²³² On top of Saudi Arabia's airstrike halt, they donated \$274 million in a flash appeal to help the humanitarian crisis.²³³ However, with a situation like this, there was a need for stable donor support beyond three months.²³⁴ Saudi Arabia pledged that they would donate to the UN's 2015 appeal to raise money for the Yemen crisis. However, Saudi Arabia only raised 9% of what they pledged.²³⁵ In another article by *Al Jazeera*, David Beasley, the Executive Director of the WFP, stated that he believed that Saudi Arabia should be the main country funding Yemen's needs.²³⁶ By 2017, the severity of Yemen's condition became critical with the central blood bank in the capital on the verge of being dried out.²³⁷ Beasley called for the Saudi-led Coalition to; "either stop the war or fund the crisis. Option three is, do both of them."²³⁸ Why would you continue to destroy a country while trying to help it? This dichotomy makes no sense in my eyes and the point that Beasley makes holds validity. At this stage, Yemen required long-term international commitment and development support.

²²⁸ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²²⁹ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³⁰ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³¹ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³² Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³³ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015..

²³⁴ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³⁵ Hussein, "Humanitarian crisis of immense magnitude looms in Yemen,"2015.

²³⁶ News Agencies, "UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen." 2017.

²³⁷ News Agencies, "UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen." 2017.

²³⁸ News Agencies, "UN: Saudis 'should fund all humanitarian aid' in Yemen," 2017.

As negotiations continue to fail and conflict prolonged, what happens to humanitarian aid donations throughout the years? Where is the incentive for member states to continue supporting a cause that isn't getting better?

By 2018, this long-lasting conflict began to create bigger devastations with widespread food shortages and a major cholera outbreak that resulted in many needing humanitarian aid.²³⁹ In a January report by *Al Jazeera*, Mark Lowcock, UN humanitarian chief stated that if the situation with Yemen was not resolved, it would lead to the worst humanitarian disaster in 50 years.²⁴⁰ Lowcock commented on the UN's Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which allocated \$50 million in relief efforts for Yemen, which was facing more than 8 million in need of food.²⁴¹ This was the largest allocation of CERF funding given to any country.²⁴² Lowcock believed the funding would help the following year of humanitarian aid by fighting famine and assisting civilians during the conflict.²⁴³ The same article demonstrated that aid agencies were adamant in calling out Saudi-led Coalition air strikes and blockades that caused issues with food, fuel, and medicine.²⁴⁴ The reporting of UN officials and aid organizations claiming that the continued conflict is worsening the aid in the country. It points in itself that if negotiations do not complete their job on resolving a conflict it's later effects could be detrimental to the humanitarian crisis and aid needed.

Yemen is not the only country impoverished nor is it the only country dealing with a type of disaster and in need of relief. However, the Yemen conflict remains unresolved and is worsening as the years go by. As long as there is a lack of resolution, financial need for Yemen will coexist. This could be due to inflation of foods or due to challenges related to blockades, such as stolen or destruction of goods meaning more supplies need to be sent to reach the percentage of citizens that need it. By 2019, nothing had changed and the hunger within the nation grew. On February 27th 2019, *Al Jazeera* reported that 80,000 children under 5 had died from hunger.²⁴⁵ They further reported that Yemen needed \$4 billion to address the humanitarian aid crisis, though the UN donors conference for Yemen only raised

²³⁹ Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," *Al Jazeera*, January 5, 2018.

²⁴⁰ Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," 2018.

²⁴¹ Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," 2018.

²⁴² Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," 2018.

²⁴³ Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," 2018.

²⁴⁴ Al Jazeera, "Yemen could be 'worst' humanitarian crisis in 50 years," 2018.

²⁴⁵ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

\$2.6 billion that year.²⁴⁶ Unfortunately the excuse of COVID-19 is not valid as COVID-19 only infected the whole global mid 2019 and this conference occurred in February 2019.

The February 2019 article illustrated that the two most contributing donors were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both donating \$500 million, contributing to the 30% increase in the total pledges.²⁴⁷ Though both countries donated large amounts, it is also important to note that they were also participants in the conflict.²⁴⁸ This is hypocritical and problematic, as they are taking part in the destruction of a country and in the continuation of a humanitarian crisis while also funding the relief of Yemen and Yemenis. How does this encourage other countries to donate and supply aid?

By February 2019, the airstrikes that began in 2015 had continued and the Houthis had gained control of the capital Sanaa, the Hodeidah port, and most of the country's northeastern regions.²⁴⁹ *Al Jazeera* reported that the UN believed the humanitarian crisis was catastrophic because both sides were not following international law.²⁵⁰ While both sides should be held responsible for their actions in creating a proxy war, the UN's actions should also be critiqued and held accountable. Due to the UN's lack of transparency and reflection on their actions in the conflict, they blame Yemen and denounce the violent actors of the conflict. A secondary objective of this thesis is to highlight the shortcomings of the United Nations, specifically its failure to assume responsibility for its actions through its methods of intervening and the strategies employed in addressing conflicts and crises.

This same *Al Jazeera* article from February 2019 reports on António Guterres, the UN Secretary-General praising the pledges given by Saudi Arabia and the UAE even though they are contradictory actors in the conflict.²⁵¹ For Guterres, any contribution is welcomed regardless of the country's involvement.²⁵² Guterres has a point, as money was needed and will always be accepted but what happens when it is not used effectively? Regardless of how much money was donated, there was still a growing number of people suffering. An

²⁴⁶ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

²⁴⁷ Al Jazeera and News Agencies., "Yemen war: 5 years since the Houthis' Sanaa takeover," Al Jazeera September 21, 2019.

²⁴⁸ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "Yemen war: 5 years since the Houthis' Sanaa takeover," 2019.

²⁴⁹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "Yemen war: 5 years since the Houthis' Sanaa takeover," 2019.

²⁵⁰ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "Yemen war: 5 years since the Houthis' Sanaa takeover," 2019.

²⁵¹ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

²⁵² Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

estimated 24 million people, 80% of the population, were suffering and in need of humanitarian aid.²⁵³ According to the UN, of the 24 million suffering, 20 million had no access to food, and 10 million were close to starvation.²⁵⁴ The *Al Jazeera* article also highlighted that the humanitarian response was not enough for Yemen; that the conflict required both parties to take serious part in the UN-mediated peace negotiations.²⁵⁵ For humanitarian aid to be effective, negotiation needs to be well conducted with all relevant actors present in hopes of being successful in resolving the conflict.

Al Jazeera articles highlight international organizations like Human Rights Watch's (HRW) opinions on world problems. In a 2020 article, they criticized the UN aid organization for their shortcomings which included: conceding to demands on the distribution of aid; giving money to corrupt ministries and failing to investigate the conspiracy of UN bodies.²⁵⁶ This was the first acknowledgement of UN shortcomings, seven years after the beginning of the conflict. Though considered the world's worst humanitarian crisis, the funding for Yemen curtailed by 2020 evidenced by the UN bodies only receiving 24% of the \$3.4 billion requested. This resulted in a decrease in UN relief and the WFP having to cut their food distribution in half from April onwards²⁵⁷ This was the second year that funds requested were not received. The UN budgeted that \$3.4 billion was needed to successfully supply Yemen and not reaching that goal meant that humanitarian aid would heavily be affected. The question is why are members decreasing their funding or not following through on their pledged amounts? Keep in mind that the conflict has gone on for seven years and that many countries have been returning donors. Are countries willing to continue to give money to a country that does not see resolution. I am not negating that countries have their own issues but would it not make you think that something is broken within the international UN system? Shouldn't negotiations be working?

A report by the UN projected that by the end of 2021, the death toll in Yemen will have increased to 377,000 people (including those killed in battle and civilians)²⁵⁸ Data found that 60% of these deaths will have resulted from indirect causes, i.e. hunger and

²⁵³ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

²⁵⁴ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

²⁵⁵ Bibbo, "UN raises \$2.6bn in donations for Yemen humanitarian aid," 2019.

²⁵⁶ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, "Egregious record! Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid," 2020.

²⁵⁷ Al-Shamahi, Abubakar, "Egregious record! Yemen's Houthis denounced for blocking aid," 2020.

²⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, "Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN," Al Jazeera, November 23, 2021.

diseases.²⁵⁹ *Al Jazeera* reported that the country had been in what is known as a deadlock for around seven years now. A deadlock means negotiations and methods of mediation are not working.²⁶⁰ This report that the UN conducted and *Al Jazeera* reported on were nothing but grim claiming that the projects conclude a depressing future for Yemen if the conflict continues.²⁶¹ The projection is that 1.3 million people will have died by 2030, and of the 1.3 million, 70% will have been due to indirect causes, i.e. food and diseases.²⁶² Again, the UN is reporting on the problem but never addressing their role in trying to change this projection. It is problematic that they ask for more money and are reporting that the future of the crisis is bleak but have not changed or improved their role or tactics in the conflict.

This same UN report explores the effects and possibility of the war ending.²⁶³ The primary projection was that the extreme poverty in Yemen would disappear within a generation.²⁶⁴ This fuels the argument that if negotiations were successful and a resolution was agreed on and followed then humanitarian aid would not be required indefinitely. The article further addresses future Yemen scenarios based on the United Nation Development Program(UNDP) use of statistical modeling and found that if peace were reached in January 2022, then by 2047, Yemen would have defeated extreme poverty.²⁶⁵ The UNDP report further claimed that if the conflict ended, Yemen would have economic growth of \$450 billion by 2050.²⁶⁶ The report also estimated that half of the malnourished population would be cured by 2050.²⁶⁷ However, the UNDP acknowledged that at the time of publication, “the war continues to propel in a downward spiral.”²⁶⁸ Peace is what comes after successful negotiations. The only way for international conflicts to end is through negotiations. However, mediation is not the sole method to use and I have yet to see a conflict where one side graciously conceded.

With all the predictions outlined by UN officials on how the conflict and its crisis will end. Organizations and news outlets like *Al Jazeera* predict Yemen’s general downfall due to

²⁵⁹ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁰ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶¹ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶² Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶³ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁴ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁵ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁶ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁷ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

²⁶⁸ Al Jazeera, “Yemen war deaths will reach 377000 by the end of the year: UN,” 2021.

the conflict coming to no resolutions with in its 5 plus years. In a December 2023 *Al Jazeera* article, the WFP announced and made public that they were forced to cut their aid in Yemen due to a lack of funding as donations were not being given and pledges were empty promises.²⁶⁹Figure 5 below demonstrates the history of donations.

Figure 5, History of UNOCHA Yemen funding and the realities of it:

Year	Asked	Given	Percentage Met
2014	\$596 million ²⁷⁰	\$357.9 million ²⁷¹	60.04%
2015	\$1.6 billion ²⁷²	\$351.7 million ²⁷³	13.74%
2016	\$1.63 billion ²⁷⁴	\$1.03 billion ²⁷⁵	63.19%
2017	\$2.34 billion ²⁷⁶	\$1.3 billion ²⁷⁷	55.56%
2018	\$3.11 billion ²⁷⁸	\$2.5 billion ²⁷⁹	80.39%
2019	\$4.19 billion ²⁸⁰	\$3.64 billion ²⁸¹	86.87%
2020	\$3.38 billion ²⁸²	\$1.99 billion ²⁸³	58.87%

²⁶⁹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall,” Al Jazeera, December 22, 2021.

²⁷⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2014”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁷¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2014”,n.d

²⁷² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2015”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁷³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2015”,n.d

²⁷⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2016”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁷⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2016”,n.d

²⁷⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2017”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁷⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2017”,n.d

²⁷⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2018”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁷⁹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2018”,n.d

²⁸⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2019”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d

²⁸¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2019”,n.d

²⁸² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2020”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d.

²⁸³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2020”,n.d.

2021	\$3.85 billion ²⁸⁴	\$2.39 billion ²⁸⁵	62.08%
2022	\$4.27 billion ²⁸⁶	\$2.25 billion ²⁸⁷	52.69%
2023	\$4.34 billion ²⁸⁸	\$1.43 billion	32.95%


**These amounts vary within UN reports and Al Jazeera articles. However, the table is an attempt to string together the concrete numbers to see where money increased or decreased based on our current knowledge of when negotiations failed or when they were in the works. The numbers were taken by UNOCHA data.*

The above calculations for the “percentage met” column was done by the following formula:

$$\text{Percentage Raised} = \left(\frac{\text{Amount Given}}{\text{Total Asked}} \right) \times 100$$

Figure 5’s data was created with UNOCHA reports that had a compilation of data that looked like the following;

Figure 6, 2022 UNOCHA Yemen Funding,²⁸⁹



This graph demonstrates that \$4.27 billion was needed to be funded. However, as you can see, only \$2.63 billion of the pledges was funded. But based on the data from figure 5 its was only \$2.25 billion given. This demonstrates that though the amounts given publicly may differ, they do so my few numbers. UN officials have even stated in several speeches by

²⁸⁴ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2021”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d.

²⁸⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2021”, n.d.

²⁸⁶ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2022”, Financial Tracking Service, n.d.

²⁸⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), “Coordinated plan snapshot for 2022”, n.d.

²⁸⁸ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), *Yemen Humanitarian Update*. (OCHA: July 2023) Issue 7, p.1-5.

²⁸⁹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), *Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot*, (ReliefWeb: December 2022) p.1-6.

different individuals that funding decreased. Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General's speech, asked countries to give more money because their programs had not been offered what they needed.²⁹⁰ Guterres claimed that a "funding crunch risk[ed] catastrophe"(2:36)²⁹¹ as they would have to scale back on Yemeni programs (2:36)²⁹² It is clear that funding is vital to humanitarian aid and that graphs demonstrate the UN's desire to increase funding by not only creating a report and funding conference but by increasing the amount compared to earlier years. But it also shows the country's influx of needs that should be funded each year.

This WFP report believed that the reduction of funding towards aid would create a significant spike in hunger in Yemen, a country that has had war inflicted on them for eight years.²⁹³ The WFP had been reaching 11.1 million in food assistance, though they acknowledged that 16 million were on their way to starvation as they did not have the funding to reach the full extent of people in need.²⁹⁴ To combat this they decided to give reduced rations to 8 million, and total allocation to those in areas of famine.²⁹⁵ The WFP recognized that the food stock in Yemen was running low and that reducing some civilians' rations would inevitably cause some to starve, yet this was the reality they were in.²⁹⁶ Aid organizations cannot be expected to prevent crises if they are not receiving the funds they require. The WFP alone stated they needed \$1.97 billion in funding for 2022 to deliver food assistance.²⁹⁷ However, at this time, violence ensued around Marib, the last major city held by GoY with both sides attacking each other. At the same time, aid flights were halted because the Houthis struck the international airport of Sanaa.²⁹⁸ The conflict having no resolution from negotiations was clearly affecting humanitarian aid. The environment in the conflict was worsening and funding decreasing.

In 2022, Ramesh Rajasingham, the acting assistant secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and deputy emergency relief coordinator, announced to the UN security council that

²⁹⁰ Guterres, "We must support the people of Yemen now- UN Chief at High-Level Pledging Event for Yemen." YouTube video, 05:34, posted March 16, 2022.

²⁹¹ Guterres, "We must support the people of Yemen now." 2022.

²⁹² Guterres, "We must support the people of Yemen now." 2022.

²⁹³ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

²⁹⁴ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

²⁹⁵ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

²⁹⁶ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

²⁹⁷ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

²⁹⁸ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN to cut food aid to Yemen amid funding shortfall," 2021.

the biggest issue in Yemen was the constraint caused by a lack of funding.²⁹⁹ One way to understand why member states have decided to decrease their funding is through interviews. However, due to the ongoing crisis and time constraints, this cannot be achieved. Thus, reading between the lines, the analysis of the research led the author to believe that one of the reasons is that member states did not want to fund a conflict that was not being actively and successfully resolved.

By the year 2022, *Al Jazeera* claimed the UN needed around \$3.9 billion to be pledged and funded.³⁰⁰ Rajasingham called on all donors to sustain or increase their funding for Yemen because funding for 2021's response plan for the UN WFP was only funded by 58%.³⁰¹ A January 2022 *Al Jazeera* article reporting on Rajasingham, also addressed Yemen's funding issues, humanitarian access and security impeding humanitarian aid.³⁰² The UN recently claimed that both sides accelerated their fighting in hopes of being the ones to claim victory.³⁰³ In the same article, they reported on Hans Grundberg, the UN secretary-general envoy to Yemen, who claimed that both sides were doubling down on their military choices.³⁰⁴ Grundberg believed that both sides' harm to each other would not lead to a long-term solution and that they should go to the negotiation tables, even if they are not ready to disarm.³⁰⁵ It is understood that negotiations are what is needed to stop the violence of the conflict and prevent further deterioration of humanity in that region.

The February 16th, 2022 article, "Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages" reported that the UN stated that by March 2022, the Yemeni will have lost humanitarian aid and need urgent funds to be delivered.³⁰⁶ This adds up with the previous predictions and with the fact that humanitarian aid is a temporary solution and cannot be implemented for a long period of time. Other variables like negotiations need to play its part and work. The *Al Jazeera* February article explained that Hans Grundberg and Martin Griffiths told the UN security council that by January 2022, 2/3 of UN programs needed to

²⁹⁹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," Al Jazeera, January 12, 2022.

³⁰⁰ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰¹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰² Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰³ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰⁴ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰⁵ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "UN says \$3.9bn needed for help in Yemen as conflict escalates," 2022.

³⁰⁶ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, "Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages," Al Jazeera, February 16, 2022.

either dial back their aid or close it altogether.³⁰⁷ The air raids were still being conducted on both sides and 650 civilians died, which was the highest monthly death toll in the last three years.³⁰⁸ The UN had also stated that Yemen was in the worst humanitarian crisis, funding was decreasing, and “aid agencies [were] quickly running out of money, forcing [the UN?] to slash life-saving programmes.”³⁰⁹ This pattern of decreasing funding was highlighted in early *Al Jazeera* articles. In 2021, the plan was to receive \$3.85 billion, but just like in 2022, they only received \$2.27 billion, the lowest funding level that the conflict received since 2015.³¹⁰ The WFP had to reduce food rations for 8 million people in December and the same 8 million civilians may not receive any food in March.³¹¹ The conflict had also gotten more violent, resulting in the UN canceling humanitarian flights in Yemen.³¹² As mentioned earlier, negotiations are supposed to secure passage of delivery to get to the people in need. Lack of funding not only affects food supply, but also safe drinking water programs and programs targeting gender-based violence. In this *Al Jazeera* article, Griffiths was also quoted to say, “the Yemen case is unprecedented” and that, “the UN has never before contemplated not giving millions of hungry people food or suspending humanitarian flights.”³¹³ A pledging event was supposed to be hosted by Sweden and Switzerland in March 2022 giving hope to Yemen and the international community.³¹⁴ *Al Jazeera* reported that the UN was disappointed with the pledge event that raised only \$1.3 billion of the \$4.47 billion needed for 17.3 million people.³¹⁵ Due to the disappointment in raising funds required, a second conference would potentially occur later that year but based on what I have read no reporting was done on it. The following map demonstrates how 23.4 million out of 31.9 million Yemenis need humanitarian assistance. Of these 23.4 million in need, 12.9 million are in urgent situations.

³⁰⁷ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³⁰⁸ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³⁰⁹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹⁰ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹¹ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹² Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹³ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹⁴ Al Jazeera and News Agencies, “Eight million Yemenis could lose aid next month as war rages,” 2022.

³¹⁵ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

Figure 7: Yemen's 2020 Levels of Needed Humanitarian Aid³¹⁶



This map explains that $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population need aid and out of the $\frac{2}{3}$ in need, 72.5% are not receiving humanitarian aid such as food.

While the funding had decreased there had been some movement on the negotiation front of the conflict. The Houthis were open to talks with the Saudi-led Coalition in a neutral country.³¹⁷ The main goal for the negotiations was to lift restrictions on Yemeni ports and the Sanaa airport.³¹⁸ It was clear that these blockades were affecting humanitarian aid. The Saudi-based GCC planned to invite Yemeni parties, including the Houthis. *Al Jazeera* claimed that the Iranian-aligned movement believed it did not make sense to have talks in a country involved in the conflict, so the neutral ground was having GCC member Oman or Kuwait, a former host of mediations in 2015 before the UN intervened with their negotiated meditations.³¹⁹ However, the actual location of those talks were to be determined. The UN and the USA had attempted truces and pressured lifts on sea and air to help the humanitarian

³¹⁶ Haddad, "Infographic: Yemen's war explained in maps and charts," 2022.

³¹⁷ News Agencies, "UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short," 2022.

³¹⁸ News Agencies, "UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short," 2022.

³¹⁹ News Agencies, "UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short," 2022.

crisis.³²⁰ However, the Saudi-led Coalition saw what they did with blockades as stopping arms smuggling to the Houthis.³²¹ In reality it was stopping aid from reaching the needed areas. For every argument the opposition has a reputation. This was not the only article that *Al Jazeera* wrote the day of this funding event. Though, it does demonstrate how the negotiations, blockades and the humanitarian aid being restricted can affect a funding event. Meaning less member states may not want to give money when blockades are taking all the money they spent to help the people of Yemen not the armed forces.

A March 2022 article, “Yemen Hunger crisis: \$4.3 billion needed, says UN ”, reported that they needed \$4.3 billion to help the food shortage in Yemen and prevent 19 million people from starvation.³²² Martin Griffiths, former UN special envoy said, “As of now, funding is drying up, and agencies are stopping their work in Yemen.”³²³ The conflict had not changed and did not seem any closer to a ceasefire The Houthi rebels were still allied with Iran and held control of Sanaa.³²⁴ At the same time, the GoY was still the internationally recognized Yemeni government and allied with the Saudi-led Coalition, continuing its 2015 airstrike campaign.³²⁵ Griffiths claimed that the food crisis would be exacerbated by the Russian/Ukraine war as Yemen received 40% of their grain from Ukraine.³²⁶ The war also affected donations as states, like the USA began financially supporting Ukraine over Yemen.

Following the March 2022 donors conference, *Al Jazeera* reported that the WFP still announced that they needed to significantly cut their food aid in Yemen because of the lack of funding, global economic conditions, and the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.³²⁷ With this cutback, they would only be able to reach 5 million people with 50% of their needed food, and 8 million will get 25% of their needed food, leaving 17.4 million, more than half of the Yemen population requiring food assistance.³²⁸ This funding cut is familiar to the WFP, who saw similar issues in 2021, where they could only raise 25% of their needed \$2 billion.³²⁹ The Russian invasion of Ukraine and The Republic of India's wheat export ban

³²⁰ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

³²¹ News Agencies, “UN Aid Drive to Avert Yemen Catastrophe Falls Far Short,” 2022.

³²² Bibbo, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

³²³ Bibbo, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

³²⁴ Bibbo, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

³²⁵ Bibbo, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

³²⁶ Bibbo, “Yemen hunger crisis: \$4.3bn needed, says UN,” 2022.

³²⁷ News Agencies, “Millions of Yemenis to go hungry as UN forced to slash food aid,” *Al Jazeera*, June 27, 2022.

³²⁸ News Agencies, “Millions of Yemenis to go hungry as UN forced to slash food aid,” 2022.

³²⁹ News Agencies, “Millions of Yemenis to go hungry as UN forced to slash food aid,” 2022.

increased food prices in Yemen, which has already experienced the doubling of food prices over the years.³³⁰ The GoY claimed that their wheat stockpile would be depleted by mid-July, and the planning minister pleaded for the EU to secure a new wheat market.³³¹ This is an example of the world not standing still for one conflict and growing crisis providing another reason why negotiations need to be both efficient and successful. If not, the conflict risks being drawn out, while more world issues requiring humanitarian aid and funding occur.

An enlightening *Al Jazeera* article from August 2022 focused on Sami Fakhouri, the head of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) country delegation in Yemen.³³² Fakhouri and his team have been in Yemen and have seen firsthand the consequences of the war.³³³ His comparison is to imagine the population of Sri Lanka in dire need of humanitarian assistance and the entire population of Tunisia and Belgium in critical condition.³³⁴ He was of a similar opinion to Griffiths and other international officials who claimed that humanitarian funding for Yemen was in steep decline. This can be seen in UNOCHA data that shows that in 2021, the funding was 60% complete, while in 2022 it only reached 40%.³³⁵ This decrease in funding was also due to humanitarian funding being redistributed to humanitarian operations in other parts of the world.³³⁶ *Al Jazeera* stipulated that an overall reduction in spending towards humanitarian aid by countries worldwide became a trend in 2022.³³⁷ Though the UN brokered a ceasefire in April 2022, it did not last. More crises worldwide needed funding and the conflict in Yemen needed resolution. Yet there were no attempts made by the UN to explore alternative means of negotiation.

³³⁰ News Agencies, “Millions of Yemenis to go hungry as UN forced to slash food aid,” 2022.

³³¹ News Agencies, “Millions of Yemenis to go hungry as UN forced to slash food aid,” 2022.

³³² Fakhouri, Sami, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” *Al Jazeera*, August 31, 2022.

³³³ Fakhouri, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” 2022.


³³⁴ Fakhouri, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” 2022.

³³⁵ Fakhouri, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” 2022.

³³⁶ Fakhouri, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” 2022.

³³⁷ Fakhouri, “Yemen, the forgotten country and the biggest Humanitarian funding gap,” 2022.

Figure 8, Food Insecurity between 2012-2014.³³⁸




This map highlights food insecurity between 2012 and 2014. The analysis demonstrates that before the outbreak of the conflict in 2014, the humanitarian issues in Yemen were slowly improving and progressing in the right direction. No conflict was in-sewing and humanitarian aid was working. If we now look at figure 9 and 10 below we can see what one year in conflict has impacted the humanitarian aid success in Yemen.

³³⁸UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, 2015 *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*. 2014.

Figure 9, Number of people in need from 2013-2015.³³⁹



Figure 10, Severity of Needs in 2015.³⁴⁰




To understand the impact that a conflict with no successful negotiations could have we need to take a look at Figure 9. Which highlights the number of people in need of a variety of aid from 2013 to 2015, while figure 10 provides insight on the severity of needs

³³⁹UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, *2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*. 2014.

³⁴⁰ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, *2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*. 2014.

across clusters in 2015. Figures 9,10 and 11 allow us to analyze the effects of a conflict on humanitarian aid as figure 8 reflects the state of food insecurity prior to war and figure 9 and 10, one year into the conflict. It should be noted that figure 11, does not only discuss food, but includes water, hygiene items and more. It is evident that areas that were more or less okay prior to 2014 had become more critical. Meaning the need for donations to help fund the increasing population in need was evident. *Al Jazeera* articles highlight two reasons for a decrease in donations over the years: member states stopped funding projects because of the lack of resolution and because they had to redirect their funding to other world conflicts.

Figure 11, How UNOCHA funding works:³⁴¹




This graph demonstrates how the UN funding system works. It provides a degree of transparency and demonstrates that the UN and their subdivisions, like the OCHA, are calculated in their donation projections. It is a comprehensive method that includes six stages.

³⁴¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, *2015 Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview*. 2014.

It is important to note that “pledges” and “commitments” do not correlate to donations. It refers to member states saying that they want to give a certain amount but are not held liable if they do not fulfill their pledge or commitment. One could argue this is a flaw in the funding system and a reason why the UN is known to make empty promises. The UN was created to hold countries accountable, yet there is no evidence of them holding countries accountable for promised pledges and commitments. Funding went from 54% of what was pledged in 2015 to 51.4% in 2022. As we can see in figure 14, funding occurs for humanitarian aid programs through pledges. For example, in 2022, the UN reported that Yemen needed \$4.3 billion in aid funding. In response to the report, member states responded by pledging donations, yet several did not eventually contribute what they pledged. If country A pledges \$10 million and they only donate \$2 million. This can be seen with countries like the UK who in 2021 had to publicly renounce their original pledge.³⁴² What we saw happening in Yemen was the UN submitting reports with an amount needed to fund humanitarian aid programs in Yemen, countries pledging donations to the cause, but then not fulfilling their pledges.

Figure 12, 2017 Allocation Timeline .³⁴³



³⁴² Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,” 2021.

³⁴³ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, *Yemen: Humanitarian Response Snapshot*, 2022.

This graph demonstrates the timeline of allocations as countries are not required to give the complete pledge at the beginning of the year. This figure from 2017 also highlights the underfunding, demonstrated with a yellow bracket line that says, “CERF Under-Funded Emergencies allocated to Yemen.” By 2017, there was already acknowledgement of the funding gaps. 2017 was also a year whereby no negotiations took place meaning that the conflict was no closer to resolution or peace. Given the larger picture that the UNOCHA has given us throughout their reporting and the figure 6. Due to the UN’s lack of transparency with its documents and reports, I feel it is responsible to show a more clear association on a lower scale. Let me make it clear it is not that they lack transparency on all fronts. However, they lack the right form of transparency. One that may not show them in the greatest light but would give us the ability to better the organization and its programs.

Therefore, as mentioned we will look at a specific country that is taking part in the donations of this crisis. For this purpose we will take the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) as an example. At a conference in 2021, UK representative James Cleverly claimed that the UK government would fund £87 million pounds towards aid in Yemen.³⁴⁴ This made them the highest member of state to fund aid in Yemen, 54 % of the \$160 million announced for that period.³⁴⁵ Yet, later that year a publication from the UK parliament claimed that they will be cutting aid funding in Yemen³⁴⁶ Figure 14 demonstrates the UK and other countries' direct financing from 2017 to 2021 and how it fluctuated over the years. It also indicated that even though COVID-19 occurred in 2019, they gave more assistance to Yemen, demonstrating that though it affected many areas of life around the globe, it is not a reason for the decrease in funding.

³⁴⁴ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,”2021.

³⁴⁵ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,”2021.

³⁴⁶ Dickson, “Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,”2021.

Figure 13, Pledges from 2017 to 2021: ³⁴⁷

Pledges for the humanitarian situation in Yemen made at UN High-Level Pledging Events

US \$ millions, not adjusted for inflation, 2017-21

Year	Total	Saudi Arabia	Germany	United Arab Emirates	United States	United Kingdom	European Commission	Kuwait
2017	1,100.00	150.00	53.01	100.00	94.00	173.10	123.14	100.00
2018	2,010.00	500.00	40.74	500.00	87.00	239.77	132.71	250.00
2019	2,620.00	750.00	114.16	750.00	23.91	261.44	184.42	250.00
2020	1,350.00	500.00	137.97	-	225.00	196.56	78.21	-
2021	1,670.00	430.00	244.80	230.00	191.00	123.23	116.28	10.00

Note: Figures pledged may differ from the amount provided. Selected contributors only.

Sources: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), [Yemen 2021](#); [Yemen 2020](#); [Yemen 2019](#), [Yemen 2018](#), [Yemen 2017](#).

We can see in Figure 13 that in 2017, when Yemen was declared the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, the UN still had the lowest amount pledged from every country on this table. Even during 2019, when one would think the funding would be lower due to COVID-19, it was the opposite. There was an increase in total pledges. What concerns us here is the years that had negotiations, meditations or peace talks. Which given figure 16 was the years 2018 and 2021. In 2018, we see the amounts pledged compared to other years we relatively hire. It was the same year that the Stockholm Agreement was agreed on. This agreement gave new hope to the conflict though it would in the end be short lived. A temporarily successful negotiation year also saw the increase in humanitarian funding. However, by 2021 the funds had decreased compared to 2018 but were not as high as during the 2020 COVID year. This is also the year that the conflict had been going on for seven years with multiple failed negotiations , two occurring in 2021.

³⁴⁷ Dickson, "Yemen: UK Government's aid reduction,"2021.

Figure 14, Chart from 2017 to 2021 of Negotiation Outcomes:

Years	Negotiations	Mediation	Peace talks
2017	None	None	None
2018	None	Stockholm agreement ³⁴⁸	None
2019	None	None	None
2020	None	None	None
2021	None	Attempt by Oman to broker peace deal as mediators but failed. ³⁴⁹	UN-led peace talks, failed because Houthis did not want to meet with Hans Grundberg. ³⁵⁰
2022	Temporary success in negotiating a ceasefire but only lasted a short time. ³⁵¹	None	None

**This figure is in attempt to continue the missing years in figure 3 that was demonstrated on page 13.*

It is clear to many leaders and scholars that humanitarian issues will only improve once the conflict is resolved.³⁵² As negotiations are the main vehicle to resolving conflict, their success or failure directly impacts humanitarian issues and delivery. The 2015 *Al Jazeera* article addresses the initial attempts of negotiations and reflects the tension from both sides. If negotiations were not reached, the Saudi-led Coalition threatened to continue their

³⁴⁸ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

³⁴⁹ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.


³⁵⁰ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

³⁵¹ Montgomery, “A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to the Present,” 2019.

³⁵² Baerbock, Annalena, “Yemen Conference 2023: Speech by Federal Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock,” High-Level Pledging Event for the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen, German Federal Foreign Office, February 27, 2023.

military campaign, which they did as their airstrike campaigns have continued throughout the years. What effects does military campaigns have other than worsening humanitarian issues? It makes all aspects more expensive and in need of funding while worsening the humanitarian condition. Not only is the humanitarian condition worsening, there is also no room for negotiations to take place there is still military unrest. This is where ceasefires would come into play to allow both oppositions to enter the negotiation talks in a calmer manner.

Figure 15, 2015 country funding allocation towards the Yemen Crisis:³⁵³



In 2015, at the height of the crisis, the UK donated \$27.9 million towards the conflict in Yemen, which is seen above in figure 15. Two years later as seen in figure 13, the UK increased their funding to \$173.10 million. This begs the question as to why were funds increased in this year and by so much? From my understanding it is two folds. The first being that the crisis had gotten so bad that the UK felt the need to increase their funding. The second being that since there was no negotiations from the year 2015-2018, the UK felt the need to give more because there was no end in sight. This leads to other questions such as is it better to have no negotiations so that aid would increase? or conducted negotiations that have the chance of failing and increasing the chances of declining funding.

³⁵³ UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), *Annual Report 2015*. (OCHA:2015) p.1-42.

Figure 16, 2015 Allocation Timeline:³⁵⁴




Figure 16 demonstrates the monthly allocated funds of 2015, in the first year of the conflict. This graph is good to use in demonstrating an association with all the 2015 *Al Jazeera* articles when there was a negotiation climax that occurred. During 2015, the *Al Jazeera* articles were very vocal on the attempts of negotiations and what was occurring due to them. As seen above, in April 2015, \$1.7 million in reserved allocations was given to Yemen to kickstart the emergency response. The positive response to funding came at a time when there were hopes of talks with an agreed outcome. However, as no resolution was reached, conflict worsened leading to the reserved funding being given in September 2015. The main reason for this was for the increase in needs as the humanitarian condition was quickly deteriorating. An attempt at negotiating was made in May and from the figure above, there were more funds allocated because of “critical gaps in the response.” As this data is from the UN, they would not highlight failed negotiations as reason for the need for more funds but one could argue that it is reflected in “critical gaps in the response.”

In 2017, funds went up to \$175.6 million.³⁵⁵ Though no negotiation attempts were made that year given the data in figure 13, it was the year Yemen was considered to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Even though more funds were donated, the UN still

³⁵⁴UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (OCHA), Annual Report 2015, 2015.

³⁵⁵ Yemen Humanitarian Fund (YHF) and the UN OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Fund*. (OCHA: may 3, 2018)p.1-64.

did not reach their goal amount. Now is there a difference between no negotiations happening in a year or failed negotiations happening? Or did they both have the same effect on humanitarian aid?

The amount raised in 2015 from countries can be seen in figure 15 with the total funds received being \$56.7 million. By 2018, according to *Al Jazeera* there was an allocation of \$50 million in relief efforts.³⁵⁶ This is the same year that the Stockholm Agreement occurred. As we can see funding decreased by \$6.7 million. The same year an agreement was slightly successful then failed. As we can see, 2018 was the Stockholm mediation with the UN involvement, and 2021 saw negotiation attempts and a peace talk. All three of these efforts failed. Now when looking at figure 13, we saw several interesting aspects. First, the total pledged in 2018 was the second highest year, whereas in 2021, we saw the pledged amount being under \$200 million. Therefore, at first glance, it demonstrates that 2021, which had two attempts, had one of the lowest years of pledges from these countries. However, our concern is 2018 because it hinders this idea of the association of failed negotiations affecting funding, which negatively affects humanitarian aid. Looking closer at 2018, we see that each country's pledge decreased. Even countries like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that were directly involved and part of the negotiations, mediations and peace talks decreased their funding throughout the years. For example, No matter how you look at it, either as a sub-total or an individual pledging, pledges have decreased in the years that negotiations have been attempted and as we know failed. Understanding exactly why each country has pledged or donated less is a different research study. My attempt is rather to strengthen the association with negotiations and humanitarian aid and how it discouraged funding. However, here I have been able to point at a pattern that, in the future, is worth elaborating on more through interviews and country budget plans.

In 2019, there were absolutely no attempts at negotiation and the humanitarian aid demand was higher. Though according to *Al Jazeera* the pledge amount wasn't raised. The UN funded more than in 2018; now they raised \$2.6 billion of the \$4 billion needed. The following year was no different with no attempts of negotiations - which is a failure on its own. The UN only raised only 24% of the \$3.4 billion required. Not only was the total amount less but the amount raised also.

³⁵⁶ Al Jazeera, “*Yemen could be ‘worst’ humanitarian crisis in 50 years,*” 2018.

In 2021, there were two negotiated attempts, however this is also the year that Gueterres announced the need for funding because it had decreased to a concerning level and that the WFP had to cut their rations.³⁵⁷ Lastly, the 2022 *Al Jazeera* articles reported how a lack of funding was a serious issue in Yemen and that instead of both sides accelerating the conflict through airstrikes they should go to the negotiation table.³⁵⁸ The author has highlighted a pattern where in the years a method of negotiations was conducted there was a decline in donations towards Yemen relief. Backing the hypothesis that failed negotiations will affect humanitarian aid.

8. Recent Updates

The ending of 2023 was not of calmness and tranquility. The Israel-Hamas war brought forth many global issues and was the focus of all new outlets. Therefore, by December much of the focus was still on that conflict. Meaning when the WFP came out with a new position in the Yemen crisis. It was met with almost zero to no news coverage. To remain consistent with the current research, I will cite an *Al Jazeera* article that was published on December 5, 2023, titled, “WFP suspends food distribution in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.³⁵⁹ This article confirms that the WFP has decided that they will not longer continue food delivery in areas of Yemen that is controlled by the Houthis.³⁶⁰ The WFP claims it is due to the lack of funding and the divergence within the group regarding the prioritization of certain areas that are disadvantaged.³⁶¹ The WFP clarified that this decision was made with aid from donors and due to the fact that negotiations continued to be failing.³⁶² This to the belief of the WFP did not allow in the reducing of aid needed by the Yemen population.³⁶³ UN agencies have claimed that these Houthi control

³⁵⁷ Al Jazeera. “Un Warns of Yemen ‘death Sentence’ as Donor Pledges Fall Short.” Al Jazeera, November 15, 2021.

³⁵⁸ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” Al Jazeera, December 5, 2023.

³⁵⁹ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” 2023.

³⁶⁰ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” 2023.

³⁶¹ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” 2023.

³⁶² Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” 2023.

³⁶³ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, “WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen.” 2023.

areas have depleting food stocks and that any form of agreement would in the end still take 4 months.³⁶⁴ Which to anyone's knowledge will only further hinder the lack of humanitarian level met in Yemen. The WFP is not completely backing out of the country but following there cut in funding which meant cuts in supplies at the end of 2022. The further withdrawal from the country does not seem like the right step in resolving a conflict and is in crisis. Rather leaving it in the dark. This to my stander proves that failed negotiations (continuously) will affect the humanitarian aid relief having it come to a complete end.

This announce from WFP ties in this thesis hypothesis that unsuccessful negotiations are worsening the delivery of humanitarian aid. This is done through negotiations not establishing agreement to prevent these blockades the WFP talk about, which if agreed on would allow a direct access to aid and better the environment the Yemenis are currently in. Negotiations then prolonged over an extent period slowly begins to lack donations, which hinder humanitarian aid because less supplies can be send to help the Yemenis in need. The December 5th , 2023 article claims that lack of funding is a reason for the pull back in support. Just because an area is controlled by a group that the western media deems to be on the wrong side. It does not mean that those civilians are any less deserving of aid. However, if humanitarian negotiations were being well conducted then local level of negotiations would allow for blockades to be none existent and for funding to be well received and there for not wasted. But it would also allow for the international level to have greater footing in negotiating at the higher level. Which intern could allow for a continue supply for funding.

9. Conclusion

This thesis has explored the history of Yemen, the timeline of the conflict and its humanitarian crisis. The purpose of this research had multiple fronts. Firstly, to demonstrate the gaps in the UN system of negotiations and humanitarian aid. While alluding to the need of the UN to be more transparent about their flaws and their attempts in bettering the system. If the UN getting involved as much as they do makes a situation worse , it'll come to a point where the UN is irrelevant. If they want to get involved in all aspects of a conflict by being the negotiators and providing humanitarian aid, then they need to understand how they play into each other. The research stood to identify if the hypothesis was deeped correct in that

³⁶⁴ Al Jazeera, and News Agencies, "WFP Suspends Food Distribution in Houthi-Controlled Areas of Yemen." 2023.

failed negotiation negatively affect humanitarian aid i.e. the delivery of aid. This was found to be due to two themes; blockades and donations.

The first finding is that blockades are an evident issue that arise within conflicts. Yet, no progress seems to have been completed in trying to ease the flow of these blockades. As mentioned, peace negotiations neglect humanitarian negotiations. Instead of working together to prevent blockades that affect the delivery of humanitarian aid, they work separately or humanitarian negotiations are forgotten about and left to the side. Without having successful negotiations, food and other supplies are affected. In an ideal world, both peace and humanitarian negotiations would be in their processes for talks. With humanitarian negotiations being the primary negotiation to be met. Once that is successfully discussed it should leave a way for humanitarian aid and their passages from ports to cities to be clear and safe. Then peace negotiations would have the ability to stand on more ground in a more secure way to begin talks about negotiating an outcome fit for both sides in a conflict.

Another finding that arose was when negotiations are unsuccessful, is the decrease in funding. In the larger picture the amount needed to be funded by the UNOCHA increased. Yet, the percentage of money actually received went from being low to increasing during the climax of the war when the most of negotiation talks and mediation was being met. Since that high climax moment, funding has decreased. This is clear through figures 6 and 16 which demonstrates a general decrease in donations and more specifically, the decrease in funding donated by member states. It is true not all member states decreased their funding like Germany and the USA but states like the UK who have been an important player in funding Yemen since 2014 had decreased their allocated amount for the crisis. This finding is still a rather hypothetical outcome. It is my understanding that this lack of donations is three-fold. The first is that states don't feel the need to continue donating to a cause that has no resolution in sight; secondly because that states do not make donations that will in turn benefit the oppositions causing the conflict with blockades; and thirdly when a conflict is prolonged so much it allows for time to take its toll with new external variables like pandemics, new wars, new crises to emerge and force member states to pick which crisis holds more importance in their states survival. Negotiations need to be done within a frame of time to limit its casualties.

More on the topic could be done, if interviewing individuals was more feasible a focused study on certain member states that donated funds like the UK could be done. With hopes in receiving forward answers as to why and how the UK decided to give donations and why they decided to reduce them. More transparency by the UN could also allow a focus on how blockades occur, how they are regulated, how they can be more limited. All of these variables that have been discussed ; negotiations, humanitarian aid, conflicts, crises, blockades and donations are variables that are recurring throughout the world and the UN. Understanding their connections together and the effects each has is important to learn from past mistakes and better the outcomes in the future.

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