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MA thesis

Lithuania's Taiwan Policy: Navigating the EU-China Dynamic

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AUTHORSHIP DECLARATION

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract

This master thesis titled "**LITHUANIA'S TAIWAN POLICY: NAVIGATING THE EU-CHINA DYNAMIC**" has been compiled by Desiree Mumm in 2023-2024 in Tartu University as a master's degree in European Studies. The author examines what values and messages appeared in the press releases of Lithuania and the European Union in the period from January 1, 2019 to January 1, 2024 related to the one-China policy which is a one of the frameworks under which the of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy operates. In order to research the topic, the following research questions were asked: 1. To what extent do Lithuania and the European Union present coherent or divergent statements on Taiwan? 2. How did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?

In the empirical part of the work, qualitative content analysis was used and a coding table was created to sort the data. There were 103 press releases and official statements in the sample of this master thesis, of which 49 were press releases from Lithuanian and 54 from European Union agencies. As a result of the work, the tonality, main messages and values were dissected and analysed. The analysis also included the application of two small state theories (Long, 2005) (Nasra, 2011) and contexualising the statements through them.

Keywords

China, one-China policy, Taiwan, Taiwanese, Taipei, Taiwan Representation Office

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Abbreviations

EU – European Union

LT – Lithuania

TW – Taiwan

CN – China

EC – European Council

EEAS – European External Action Service

CSDP – Common Security and Defence Policy

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SEATO – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

UN – Organization of the United Nations

US – United States of America

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The decision to enrol in the programme of European Studies has been of the best decisions in my life. As I graduated with a bachelor's degree in Politics and Governance with a specialisation in International Relations, I felt my knowledge was not sufficient to fully realise my professional aspirations in the field. Although I was accepted for several programmes in different universities, after thorough research I was confident that the University of Tartu would be the best choice for me. After the two years, I can safely say, I did make the right decision. I have learned more than I could have expected. I met the most amazing people, my course mates, who I can now call my friends.

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Introduction

The sphere of international relations is one that is defined by constant change. The shifting landscape has been marked by the tensions and political interactions that have changed in many ways the power-dynamics between the European Union (EU) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) . At the heart of this geopolitical dance lies the status of Taiwan, an issue that has emerged as a crucible for examining the diplomatic steps of various states, including Lithuania. The Republic of Lithuania, one of the three small Baltic countries, sets a unique example with its foreign policy choices with an interplay between the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the relations with China.

In 2021, Lithuania caused great controversy in China and started facing Chinese trade sanctions, when it allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius in November. This was a bold move considering that this was the first time after 18 years that an office by the name of "Taiwanese Representative Office" was opened in Europe, rather than the typical "Taipei Representative Office". "Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius" is also only the second such office in the world that exists carrying the name of "Taiwanese", the first is in Somaliland. (Global Taiwan Institute, 2022)

The controversy lies in the fact that Lithuania belongs to the European Union, thus adheres to the one-China policy meaning that "there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China." (Permanent Mission of China to the European Union, 2022)

Against this backdrop, this thesis aims to delve into and explain Lithuania's Taiwan policy. Lithuania's Taiwan policy lies in many unorthodox decisions after one-another, especially considering that Lithuania is a small state in the Baltic, these decisions seem outstandingly bold. Lithuania has distanced itself from China for some time. In 2021, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania announced Vilnius' withdrawal from the 17 plus 1 initiative, which was originally and officially known as the "Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries". The Lithuanian government also prohibited Chinese companies from developing a 5G network in the country. Additionally, Lithuanian diplomats publicly supported giving Taiwan the observer status in the World Health Organisation. As all of this was taking place, Lithuania decided to join the anti-PRC coalition created by the United States, as well as became one of the biggest critics of China in the European Union. The final wrath of China was released in November 2021, when, as mentioned, Lithuania opened the "Taiwanese Representative Office" in its capital Vilnius.

It seeks to understand the factors, motivations, and implications underlying Lithuania's approach towards Taiwan, juxtaposed against the backdrop of the EU's broader engagement with China as well as the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). (Janeliunas, Boruta, 2022)

On the flip-side, the European Union together with many other European states have remained ambiguous to such change. (Janeliunas, Boruta, 2022) Despite offers from Taiwan, the EU remains reluctant to formalise a bilateral investment treaty, and Brussels (the EU), does not support full Taiwan membership in other international organisations. Although certain MEPs have been working on closer ties with Taiwan, the European Commission and individual European governments had yet to change their policies. (Le Corre, 2024) Because of Lithuania's bold actions, however, the views have now began to shift. As an example in July 2023, the German government unveiled its inaugural China strategy, articulating that Germany has "economic and technological stakes" in Taiwan and warning that any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would adversely impact German and European interests. This forthright declaration marks a distinct pivot in Germany's stance towards both China and Taiwan, highlighting Berlin's goal to enhance its engagements with Taiwan while maintaining its robust economic relationships with the PRC. While adherence to One China policy continues to underpin the diplomatic relations between European nations and the PRC, the sentiment is growing in several European capitals that forceful actions by China would trigger significant repercussions. "We are conveying to China that an assault on Taiwan would trigger severe global consequences," a prominent European diplomat remarked. Jorge Toledo Albiñana, the EU's ambassador to Beijing, state, "Should there be a military invasion, we have made it abundantly clear that the EU, alongside the United States and its allies, would implement sanctions similar to or more severe than those currently imposed on Russia." (Le Corre, 2024)

The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the EU and China has been put on hold because of Chinese sanctions against members of the European Parliament, such as Lithuania. It is likely to be further on hold until the Chinese sanctions against Lithuania have been removed. (Kramer, 2021)

The Lithuanian approach towards this issue is a strong argument for those in favour of seeing the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between the EU and China be permanently abolished by the EU. (Kramer, 2021) While there is no concrete reason to leave the one-China policy behind, the EU, together with all the West, should take a strong stance against Chinese censorship and coercion. Lithuania has made an important point with its actions: a common EU approach to China is imperative. (Kramer, 2021)

Although the dispute between Lithuania and China could be regarded as a minor matter, its implications are much wider. (Kramer, 2021) To the EU and its MS, a potential war in the Taiwan

Strait would not only disrupt trade with East Asia, it could also potentially cut global production chains and bring dire consequences to the EU economy. (Le Corre, 2024)

This study will embark on finding out how has Lithuania, being an EU Member State, has justified its stance on Taiwan, in the context where the EU has taken a more cautious approach towards the Taiwan question, following the one-China Policy. The challenges, opportunities, and potential ramifications that arise from Lithuania's decision-making in this diplomatic landscape will be evaluated by the analysis of Lithuania's policies, strategies, and diplomatic engagements vis-à-vis Taiwan within the context of the EU-China relationship. Additionally, this thesis will also examine the coherency of statements of the EU and Lithuania regarding Taiwan. Thus, the overarching research question is how has Lithuania justified its recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan in the light of and in terms of compatibility with the one-China Policy?

1 Relevancy

The thesis tried to uncover how small states like Lithuania can wield influence in the EU and through which strategies. Despite their limited resources, small states often leverage their commitment to EU policies, network capital, and niche diplomacy to impact larger policy decisions. Lithuania's proactive engagement in international organisations and its robust stance on key issues, such as the one-China policy, highlight how small states can shape the broader EU agenda. It will be analysed whether aligning with the EU's normative values and advocating for democratic principles can be a way for Lithuania to gain a voice in the collective policymaking process and possibly even influence it.

The analysis of coherence between the EU and Lithuania on the one-China policy will offer insight into the state of the Union. While the EU maintains a cautious approach towards Taiwan, adhering to the one-China policy, Lithuania has taken a more assertive stance, still adhering to the policy but voicing concerns about it. This divergence illustrates the challenges in achieving a unified EU foreign policy, especially when individual member states prioritise their national interests. Analysing the statements and actions of both the EU and Lithuania regarding Taiwan will reveal the complexities and tensions within the Union's relations.

Lithuania's diplomatic steps, such as allowing Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius and withdrawing from the 17+1 initiative, signify bold moves aimed at asserting its foreign policy independence. These actions can be justified as efforts to align with democratic values and support for Taiwan's international participation. Lithuania's distancing from China also reflects its strategic alignment with Western allies, particularly the United States, and its commitment to a rules-based international order. By advocating for Taiwan, Lithuania aims to strengthen its position within the EU and gain leverage in shaping the Union's China policy.

The EU's response to Lithuania's actions will be measured, reflecting a balancing act between economic interests in China and support for democratic values. It will be analysed that while the EU has not fully embraced Lithuania's stance, are there are signs of a gradual policy shift. It will also be looked into if the growing awareness of China's coercive tactics and the recognition of Taiwan's strategic importance, particularly in semiconductor production, have led to a more nuanced EU approach. The analysis of the statements from key EU bodies will reveal whether potential realignment in the EU's policy towards China and Taiwan has happened.

The examination of Lithuania's statements regarding Taiwan policy will be made. It is of high relevancy in understanding the evolving dynamics of EU-China relations. It highlights the role of small states in shaping EU foreign policy, the challenges of maintaining coherence within the Union, and the implications of diplomatic actions on broader geopolitical landscapes. By evaluating Lithuania's bold diplomatic steps and the EU's cautious response, this thesis contributes to the

discourse on statecraft, diplomacy, and global governance. The analysis tries to uncover the coherency between the EU and Lithuania regarding the one-China policy, assess ways in which a small state like Lithuania can influence it and the degree to which it has played a role in timeframe of 2019-2024.

2 Objectives and research questions

This thesis tries to shed some light onto why Lithuania has somewhat deviated in the question of Taiwan from many of its peers in the EU and international politics. In order to achieve the before mentioned objective while also assessing the coherence between Lithuania's position and that of the European Union (EU). The research objectives are posted as follows:

Evaluate Lithuania's Justification of Diplomatic Steps towards Taiwan: The primary objective is to understand the rationale behind Lithuania's recent diplomatic steps regarding diplomatic relations Taiwan. Examination of Lithuania's official statements, policies, and actions, aiming to discern the justifications provided by Lithuanian authorities for their engagement with Taiwan will be analysed. Emphasis will be placed on the compatibility or divergence of Lithuania's actions with the principles and framework of the one-China Policy (common to the EU CFSP).

Assess Coherence Between EU and Lithuania's Statements on Taiwan: The coherence between the EU's collective stance and Lithuania's individual pronouncements, policies, and actions concerning Taiwan will be assessed through the public statements of the Lithuanian government, Lithuanian Members of the European Parliament and EU institutions.
The chosen timeline for this research, spanning from 2019 to 2024, is instrumental in capturing the shifts in Lithuania's Taiwan policy within the broader EU-China dynamic. This period encapsulates significant events, such as Lithuania opening a Taiwanese Representative office in its capital Vilnius in 2021, which that have shaped the current geopolitical landscape, offering a context for analysis.

Starting in 2019 allows to do an overview of the geopolitical and policy environment preceding Lithuania's notable shift towards a more pronounced Taiwan policy. This initial phase is critical for understanding the baseline of EU-China relations and the strategic context within which Lithuania operates. The escalation of Lithuania-Taiwan relations between 2020 and 2021, marked by the establishment of mutual representative offices, represents an important moment in Lithuania's foreign policy. It also gives a way to evaluate the immediate repercussions of this policy shift, mostly Chinese coercion in response to the shift. The subsequent impact of China's retaliatory measures against Lithuania and the broader implications for EU-China relations are pivotal themes from 2021 to 2022. This phase is crucial for examining the resilience of EU member states under economic coercion, the EU's collective response mechanisms, and the challenges of maintaining a unified stance toward China.

Lastly, the period leading up to 2024 is essential for capturing the latest developments and strategic adjustments by Lithuania, the EU, and China. It provides insights into the evolving diplomatic strategies, the sustainability of Lithuania's Taiwan policy, and the potential paths forward for EU-China-Taiwan relations in a changing global order.

Examine the EU's Response to Lithuania's Actions in the Context of EU-China Relations: In this research point I will try to explore how the European Union responded to Lithuania's diplomatic moves towards Taiwan within the broader framework of its relations with China. This objective involves an in-depth analysis of official EU statements, policies, and actions in response to Lithuania's engagements with Taiwan. It aims to unravel the EU's approach in reconciling the tensions between supporting member states' autonomy, in this case Lithuania, in foreign relations while maintaining diplomatic relations with China.

In order to achieve the said objectives, the following main research question is formulated:
How did/does Lithuania justify its recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan in the light of and in terms of compatibility with the One-China Policy?

Sub-questions are as follows:

- To what extent do Lithuania and the European Union present coherent or divergent statements on Taiwan?
- How did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?

3 Structure of the work

The work is divided into thematically divided chapters, which are further split into two main sections - theoretical and empirical parts. Following the introduction, the work introduces the theoretical framework and background material. The theories used in the work are explained, briefly describing their historical context and interconnectedness for contextualisation. The theoretical framework presented in this work consists of two main theories: small state diplomacy, government communication theory (Lassen, 2006) and Nasra's (2011) theory on small state influence theory. The latter brings out certain categories of influence though which a small state can have influence in the international field. The mentioned categories will be applied when analysing Lithuania's actions and statements. Both the EU and Lithuanian statements will be framed through the theory of government communication. The thesis employs content analysis, document analysis and qualitative analysis as the basis for methodology to give a thorough analysis of the matter. Within the empirical analysis of this master thesis, 103 press releases and official statements will be examined, originating from four government institutions and bodies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the statements made by the Lithuanian MEPs in the European Parliament, as well as the European Council and the EEAS. These were published in the time period from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2024, covering press releases related to the one-China debate issued in four years. The press releases were selected based on the keywords they contained, which were: China, one-China policy, Taiwan, Taiwanese, Taipei, Taiwan Representation Office. The categories for analysis were chosen by the author, while trying to choose ones that are universal and objective, as well as relevant to the problem and theme of the thesis for evaluation. The categories for analysis were: satisfaction with the current one-China policy, proposal for change, caution/boldness communicated, closer diplomatic ties with China/Taiwan and condemnation of Chinese coercion. All the chosen press releases and statements for analysis were in English. As this thesis deals with an issue that is of international scale and thus communicated intergovernmentally, it allows to fairly analyse the statements from both sides. Since a large part of international relations is done in English, it is intriguing to find out how the European Union's press releases overlap with the values Lithuania's. This approach and starting point provide an opportunity for interesting analysis.

Theory

Firstly, the growing importance of small state influence in EU will be looked into, this will be placed in the frame of small state diplomacy. Secondly, the analysis of small states as revisionists to the international order will be discussed. In both of these chapters the factors of small state influence will be included. The next subchapter will focus specifically on Baltic states and how they are able to have a say in shaping EU policies. After the general focus on Baltic states collectively, the influence of Lithuania will be further discussed in the following subchapter. Next, the historical context of Lithuanian-Chinese relations will be given.

3.1 The Growing Importance of Small States Influence in EU - Small state diplomacy

3.1.1 What are the means of gaining influence and power?

Maurice East has stated that a small power's foreign policy has five main features and they differ from that of a larger power. A small power is characterised by its limited interaction with other states; becomes involved with great enthusiasm in international organisations; supports international laws; advocates minimum use of force; and finally, its foreign policy is often concentrated on regional matters. East concludes that small states tend toward reactivity in foreign affairs (Papadakis and Starr, 1987). East's view is particularly relevant for microstates in that very small states tend to join international organisations and coalitions with the prospect of promoting their national interests, while minimising their overall costs of conducting foreign policy (Kassimeris, 2009: 95; Neumann and Gstöhl, 2004: 10). For example, very small states with limited resources find the United Nations headquarters an essential clearing house for their diplomatic, security, and economic needs (Beattie, 2004). Traditionally, small states use diplomacy as their primary instrument of national power given their predilection for adherence to international law, and limits on their military, economic, and informational elements of power. (Stringer, 2013)

Small states often lack the visibility and recognition by foreign public so they have to struggle to gain international attention. Therefore, they have to be more imaginative and inventive in forging their diplomacy, in order to persuade more powerful counterparts that what is proposed by them is in the mutual interest and for their common good. One of the most popular approaches that successful small states followed to address this problem is the so-called "niche diplomacy", by which they are focusing their resources within one area in order to get the best returns and the widest international recognition. Gareth Evans, Australia's former foreign affairs and trade minister was the first to use this term. He outlined the five main types of "niche diplomacy". The first pair identified by him was the "quite diplomacy" relying on friendships, lobbying in international organisations and historical ties with great powers, versus "protest diplomacy", which is usually

generating international attention. A good example for the second one was the position taken by Caribbean states against the apartheid in South Africa, in order not to be ignored by other regions when they would need international support. The second pair mentioned by Henrikson was “group diplomacy” versus “niche diplomacy”. The first one is based upon the strength or safety generated by the cooperation of several states. It is particularly relevant in the UN where the number of states supporting an initiative is a decisive factor for the success. In this context, we can mention the Group of 77, which in practice means more than 120 states; most of them belong to the small state category. However, we should not forget about the negative side of this approach, namely that if the group had adopted a common position it is very difficult to modify it later on. In case of the “niche diplomacy” as it had been already mentioned, the emphasis is on individual distinctiveness. It is very important that the particular initiative by the small state should be devised precisely, correlating with basic national and regional interests. The next pair of small state diplomacy is “diasporic diplomacy” versus “multicultural diplomacy”. For the first one we can mention Greek or Armenia, which heavily rely on the support of their diaspora living abroad. In the case of multicultural diplomacy, the emphasis is on the host country, not on the home country. In this regard, Australia or Canada can mentioned, who project an image of a country of cultural diversity and the protection of human rights of all person irrespective of their origin. The fourth pair classified by Henrikson was “enterprise diplomacy” versus “regulatory diplomacy”. In case of the first one, a country exploits natural location or other, artificially generated advantage in order to promote its economic or political aims. The Maldives can be mentioned here for developing a tourism industry on their natural beauty, or the Seychelles, which become the home of the Miss World Contest. Small states following the approach of regulatory diplomacy believe that the definition of “rules” is even more important for small states, then for others as they are more vulnerable and weak. In this category, one of the best examples is Trinidad and Tobago that initiated the drafting of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. The last pair of the types of small states diplomacy mentioned by Henrikson was “summit diplomacy” versus “cyber diplomacy”, referring to the main means of diplomatic efforts. (Lakatos, 2017)

Long (2005) has found that small states’ power can be best understood and discussed through its three main ways of power-conducting: **derivative, collective and particular-intrinsic.**

Deriative power is a term that came known through the works of Michael Handel (1981) and its idea is that in order for a small state to gain influence and power, it must rely on a relationship with a great power.

Collective power refers to building coalitions of supportive states, it is often done through institutions.

Particular-intrinsic power stands for the idea that small states use their assets in order to gain power and influence. An example here could be brought here in the case of Taiwan and its semiconductor manufacturing advantage. Although the first example that may come to mind when talking about particular-intrinsic power might be Trinidad and Tobago with their deployment of natural gas to gain influence in the Caribbean, this type of power-seeking phenomena is not limited only to natural gas and oil producers. The same holds true for countries like Switzerland and Singapore. Both of these countries have invested into outside forces in order to hold their power position and deny others of it.

Even though before the leading powers might have wanted to control these strategically important locations, such as Singapore, now they are seeing value in a more cost-effective approach where the smaller states are holding a base of a particular-intrinsic power which will the resources will then be used based on a sticks-and-carrots approach.

Table 1 Three categories of power

	Particular-intrinsic	Derivative	Collective
Base (source)	Resource inherent to small state	Relationship with great power	Relationships with smaller powers
Means (instrument)	Threat/promise to withhold or grant	Lobbying, framing, patron alliance manipulation	Institutional; ad hoc coalitions
Amount (extent)	Contextually dependent	Potentially great	Depends on coalition
Scope (range)	Directly related to resource, plus linkages	Issue specific	Narrow for ad hoc coalitions; diffuse for institutions

Figure 1. Three categories of power (Source: Long, 2005.)

3.1.2 Small states as revisionists to the international order - to what extent can we expect a small state to challenge agreed balance of power dynamics?

As discussed before, small states have different ways of going about establishing its power and influence. The tendency, however, is that while larger states have often led efforts to create institutions in world politics, small states frequently turn to international law and institutions both as focal points for cooperative efforts and as a means to limit unilateralism of great powers (Long, 2005).

Unilateralism, in the context of small states, refers to the pursuit of national interests and objectives without necessarily relying on multilateral agreements or the consent of larger powers.

The unilateralist world is an undeniable challenge to the small states. More recently, however, small states have acted, in many ways and areas, as as norm creators in different areas. Small and middle powers were of utmost importance in advancing "norms without great powers" to support multilateral treaties, including a ban on antipersonnel land mines (Bower, 2015).

Small island states have used their particular vulnerability to advance normative claims surrounding climate change (Benwell 2011). Sikkink (2007) has argued that small and middle powers in Latin America played influential roles in advancing specific conceptions of human rights, including economic and social rights in the immediate postwar period, even as great powers were opposed or ambivalent. They seek to reshape the international environment in ways that favour behaviours that are more beneficial to them. **Norms against unilateral intervention represent a significant victory for smaller states.** Broadly oriented efforts to shift international norms fit within Barnett and Duvall's "productive power," by seeking to reconstitute diffuse aspects of international social relations (2005, 55–57). (Long, 2005)

The argument presented by Park and Jakstaite-Confortola (2021) regarding small states' aspirations for status within the context of the EU's Eastern Partnership program shows also the effort of small states making progress in the unilateralist world-politics. Small states may adopt unconventional policy choices, like Lithuania's engagement in the Eastern Partnership program, as a means to enhance their security or advance their policy objectives.

In the case of Lithuania, engagement in the Eastern Partnership program can be seen as a strategic move to enhance its influence and gain more regional power. Similarly, a small state might undertake unilateral initiatives aimed at bolstering its security posture or advancing specific policy objectives, ultimately contributing to its long-term strategic goals.

In most of the cases small states can achieve real success in a cross regional core group format given their modest political and lobbying force. **The fact that small states do not have a global agenda like larger ones often helps them to become honest brokers, trusted by all parties.** (Lakatos, 2017)

In nations like those in the Baltic states, the distinctive characteristics of each country and the survival strategies of smaller states in the global system necessitate leveraging every available means to convey their interests to influential international actors shaping the conditions under which these states function. Think tanks or other technical groups represent one such avenue or tool that smaller countries can employ to advance their national interests. (Bardauskaitė, 2022) It thus makes think tanks an important diplomatic outlet and tool for small states through which to influence global policy, as well as communicate their own needs and perhaps get a say in international matters.

Nasra (2011) brings out four elements that explain the four main elements of small state influence. These elements are commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and deliberation.

Commitment

In the context of small state influence, commitment points to the small state's willingness to adhere to EU policies. Countries that are more committed to following the policies, will also be included in better defining and executing of these policies, thus making them more important in shaping the policies and through that gaining influence. (Bo¨rzel 1998: 259; Filtenborg et al. 2002: 394–403; Keukeleire 2006: 9; Risse-Kappen 1996: 70). (Nasra, 2011)

Commitment to a state is influenced by two key factors: the importance of an issue to a state and its reliance on the European Union (EU) for meeting its policy goals. The significance of a policy issue, referred to as its salience, is measured by how much an entity is willing to exert its influence over others and the outcome of decisions, as described by Arregui and Thomson (2009: 658). This concept is best understood comparatively rather than absolutely, meaning that if all parties deem an issue equally important, no single party gains an edge from the importance they assign to it, as stated by Arregui and Thomson (2009: 658). States that consider a policy issue to be of greater importance are more likely to be active in the policymaking process, thereby enhancing their influence. Although this dynamic might level the playing field between smaller and larger states to some extent, a distinction remains: larger states are often proactive across a broader range of policy

issues, whereas smaller states must choose a few key areas to focus on, according to Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006: 659).

Table 1 Categories of influence

Level of influence	*Definition*
High	EU policies reflect a member state's preferences, despite opposition or disinterest of other member states
Medium	Progress or agreement that reflect a member state's preferences in some areas, and does not go against its interests in others
Low	Some issues are in line with a member state's interests, but some go against them
No	(The absence of) EU policies go(es) against a member state's preferences

Source: Based on Bunse (2009: 8–9)

Figure 2. Categories of influence. Based on: Nasra (2011), source: based on Bunse (2009: 8-9)

Network capital

Network capital is pivotal in understanding how states navigate the landscape of European Union (EU) foreign policy-making, characterised by the functional interdependence of actors and the challenge of overcoming inconsistencies that affect decision-making processes. Networks emerge as a strategy to align interests, build consensus, and involve essential actors in developing and executing EU policies. Contrary to realist theories that emphasise formal structures and clear hierarchies, the concept of networks highlights the informal, complex nature of policy dynamics (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 253–4). (Nasra, 2011)

For smaller states, the concept of network capital is crucial, as it significantly impacts their influence within the policy process. Naurin (2007: 8–14) describes network capital as the extent and richness of the networks in which states are engaged, encompassing both the quality and quantity of these connections. The quality aspect focuses on relationships with influential actors, while the quantity relates to the overall number of connections. This concept parallels discussions on small states' diplomatic strategies and their roles in coalition-building and consensus formation, suggesting that network capital encompasses not only efforts to agree on policy actions but also the pooling and coordination of resources for policy implementation (Filtenborg et al. 2002: 394–7; Keukeleire 2006: 9). (Nasra, 2011)

Although larger states might initially seem to have an advantage in terms of network connections, size is not the sole determinant of influence. Small states can cultivate substantial network capital through trust and credibility, challenging the notion that larger states naturally possess more significant influence (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 672–3; Naurin 2007: 20–1). This perspective underscores the strategic importance of networks in the EU policy-making arena, especially for smaller states seeking to enhance their standing and impact. (ibid)

Immaterial resources

In the realm of international relations, realist theorists traditionally highlight the significance of tangible, material resources as the primary indicators of a state's influence within policy deliberations. This perspective, emphasising "hard influence," focuses on measurable and directly attributable factors that contribute to a state's power. (ibid)

Contrasting with this view, the governance approach places a lesser emphasis on material resources, instead suggesting that the key drivers of influence are intangible, or immaterial, resources. These include the ability of actors to contribute value through their expertise, networks, and knowledge (Jönsson et al. 1998; Kronsell 2002: 294–297). (ibid)

The concept of expertise encompasses both subject-specific knowledge and procedural understanding. Subject-specific knowledge pertains to detailed information on particular topics, while procedural knowledge relates to the intricacies of negotiation processes, including mastery over negotiation techniques (Björkdahl 2008; Tallberg 2006: 30). The significance of subject-specific expertise is especially notable as it can transform perceptions and understandings of policy issues, fostering trust and creating shared perspectives on foreign policy matters (Smith 2004b: 92). This shift towards valuing immaterial resources underlines a broader understanding of influence, recognising the impact of knowledge and networks in shaping policy outcomes. (ibid)

Factors	*Dimension(s)*	*Criteria*
Commitment	Relative salience	Discourse, national (bilateral) resources, stance in EU bodies
	EU foreign policy	Common positions, declarations, devoted resources
Network capital	Quantity	Number and level of contacts, secondments
	Quality	Trust, information-sharing, pooling resources
Resources	Immaterial	Content and procedural knowledge
Deliberation	Institutionalization	Dispersion of authority, low politicization
	Validity claims	Reference to external bodies and norms
	Credibility of speakers	Speak and act consistently, leadership roles
	Resonance of arguments	Appeal to fundamental EU norms and values

Figure 3. Influence factors. (Source: Nasra, 2011 - Governance in EU foreign policy: exploring small state influence)

Deliberation

In the realm of European Union (EU) studies, there has been a notable shift toward embracing theories of communicative action, highlighting a discourse-centric approach to understanding EU dynamics and the influence of small states within it. This perspective champions "the power of the better argument," suggesting that influence in EU discussions hinges not just on aligning with the EU's foundational norms and values or an actor's persuasive capabilities, but also on the capacity to advance the conversation, foster consensus, and facilitate coalition-building (Jakobsen 2009: 87). This approach underscores the idea that ideational and argumentative prowess is not merely complementary to rational action strategies but often integral to them. (Nasra, 2011)

Communicative action, therefore, is seen as a form of deliberation that expands beyond mere argumentation or straightforward communication, as it incorporates elements of strategic behaviour which the latter concepts might not account for (Niemann 2004: 384; Ulbert and Risse 2005: 352). Ulbert and Risse (2005) outline four key prerequisites for effective deliberation: firstly, it thrives in settings that are heavily institutionalised yet non-hierarchical, allowing knowledgeable actors to play pivotal roles, particularly under depoliticised conditions where there's a lack of expertise or clear preferences among main actors, enabling these "knowledge brokers" to significantly influence outcomes; secondly, successful communicators often invoke external authorities to bolster their validity claims; thirdly, the credibility and genuineness of speakers are crucial for the persuasive

impact of their arguments; and fourthly, for arguments to be effective, they must align with existing knowledge, shared principles, and collective worldviews. (Nasra, 2011)

3.1.3 Role of the Baltic states in the EU - navigating, how the Baltic states managed to have a voice in the EU

It is often stated that small states are not left much choice other than to accept the authority of large states in European Union (EU) foreign policy. Nasra (2011) argues that they may indeed be small in terms of resources but not necessarily in terms of influence. Conceptualising EU foreign policy as a system of governance, the article suggests a framework for analysis to explain the extent to which small states may wield influence.

The EU has evolved into a global actor in international relations during the last few decades. It is well acknowledged to have a potential to influence major global events (Bretherton and Vogler 2005; Orbie 2008). The scholars that analyse these events through the lens of the realist theory, tend to argue that EU foreign policy is mainly dominated and shaped by large MS like Germany and France (and the UK-before Brexit), while noting that the success rate or level of influence depends on the extent of common interests. The group of these large states were seen as the "big three". These were viewed as states proposing and pre-deciding the main route and policy themes, that will then be adopted by all MS. Commonly has it been noted, that in contrast to the larger MS, the smaller states have limited material resources, thus not leaving them much choice other than to follow the route set out by larger MS. However, various authors (Arter 2000; Bjorkdahl 2008; Bunse 2009; Jakobsen 2009;Kronsell 2002; Ojanen 2000; Romsloe 2004; Wivel 2005) have argued that under the right conditions smaller states can also pursue their interests through the EU. (Nasra, 2011)

Jakobsen (2009: 86–8) has been one of the scholars who has been able to publish the most comprehensive work on the factors which explain the options of small states in shaping EU foreign policy. Jakobsen (2009) brings our four key elements:

- small states must have a fore-runner reputation
- they need to provide convincing arguments
- they need to be successful in building coalitions (or networks)
- they need to be committed and be able to support EU initiatives.

Although Jakobsen's approach is definitely valuable in explaining the means of small states gaining influence, it is important to note that the objective variables of policy implementation depend on the issue. It is important to bear in mind, that there is not a concrete group of actors nor a single source of power and influence to dominate all policy areas (Hofmann and Turk 2006: 575). The same hold especially true for smaller states which tend to focus mainly on one specific policy area: Sweden in EU environmental policies (Kronsell 2002) and conflict prevention (Bjorkdahl 2008); Finland and

the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative (Arter 2000; Bunse 2009); and the three Scandinavian countries in the development of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Jakobsen 2009; Ojanen 2000; Romsloe 2004) (Nasra, 2011). This tells us that in order to view small state influence and make generalisation about it, we have to look though various policy areas and specific examples. (Nasra, 2011)

As just stated, however, small states like the Baltics get to have a say in the EU when they are fulfilling one or more of the conditions laid out in the previous subchapter (1.1.2 Small states as revisionists to the international order - to what extent can we expect a small state to challenge agreed balance of power dynamics?), where factors and categories of influence were discussed, and have a specific policy area that they are mainly focusing on and putting most effort in.

A fitting example could be brought here as a case-study. The European Union has faced many crises over the last decade, which have also changed the course of immigration processes. The EU-Belarussian border crisis in 2021 and proposed travel restrictions towards Russian citizens in 2022, after Russia started a full-scale war against Ukraine, have offered a unique perspective into how the Baltic states have offered valuable insight on the supranational level. (Braghiroli, S., & Hagelin, S., 2024)

The Baltic States together with Poland were one of the biggest advocates for stricter measures against Russian citizens travelling to the European Union. This view was also well expressed by the Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas: "visiting Europe is a privilege, not a human right". (Braghiroli, S., & Hagelin, S., 2024)

The proposal set out by the Baltic states had two main objectives: first, end the grant of visas for Russian citizens into the EU and second, ban short term tourist visas. The initial measure of ending the grant of visas for Russian citizens received EU endorsement in the summer of 2022 and was uniformly accepted by the Member States, whereas the latter generated more debate. Confronted with escalating tensions along their terrestrial borders, in autumn 2022, without a unified stance from the EU, the capitals of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland enacted a regional directive to disregard visas previously granted. This action was rationalised by stating that "the bulk of visas had been issued to Russian citizens prior to Russia's extensive military actions in Ukraine, amidst different geopolitical circumstances." Following this independent decision, Finland similarly ceased to acknowledge previously issued visas. Comparable to the approach during the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission sought not to reprimand this independent action but rather aimed to integrate this exception into the Schengen framework, thereby minimising any discrepancies. (Braghiroli, S., & Hagelin, S., 2024)

Although the Baltic states individually are defined as “small states”, they hold more value in their arguments when they work as a coalition. Drawing back on the previous chapter about categories of influence (Nasra, 2011), it is clear that the Baltic states were using network capital as a means to advance their objectives in the EU-Belarussian border crisis. As mentioned before, networks hold value when the interest of states belonging to the “coalition” or “network” align. In the example, the three Baltic states shared the same goal and through that were able to better advance their agenda. Another aspect of influencing the debate, came from the Baltic states knowledge. Because of their geographical location, and thus shared history with Russia, the Baltics had something many other EU MSs did not - expertise and experience with Russia. This could be placed under the theoretical criteria necessary to for small state influence mentioned by Nasra (2011) under the umbrella of immaterial resources.

However, the Baltics did not stop there. Estonia was one of the leading voices trying to persuade other MSs to get onboard with the same ideas by emphasising that the Schengen border is not only nation-state border but also the external border of the EU as a whole. This idea has been reflected in the Joint Statement of the EU, denoted as “our shared Schengen space” (Joint Statement 07.09.22). Shifting the perspective that the protecting and governing of the Schengen border is an issue of the MSs sharing that border, to it being a shared responsibility of all EU MSs collectively, opened up a new perspective on the matter, thus bringing the feeling of unity and shared responsibility to other MSs. During these conversations, Estonia conceptualised and stretched the discussion further and included NATO, or “the democratic community” (LVGOV 23.08.21). (Braghiroli, S., & Hagelin, S., 2024)

This is yet another example of network capital. Through being a “knowledge broker”, Estonia managed to make a point that caught the attention of a larger network - not only the Baltics but Nordic countries and other EU MSs. (Braghiroli, S., & Hagelin, S., 2024)

3.1.4 LT role in shaping One-China Policy Objectives

The formal diplomatic ties between Lithuania and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were established relatively early, beginning in September 1991. Following its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in March 1990, Lithuania received its first official recognition from the PRC on September 7, 1991. Shortly thereafter, on September 14, a joint declaration was signed in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Through this agreement, Lithuania affirmed its recognition of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, acknowledging Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory. Additionally, Lithuania pledged not to pursue official relations or direct official interactions with Taiwan. (Mačikėnaitė, 2022)

By December 1991, the PRC's president had nominated Pei Yuanying as the ambassador to Lithuania, indicating the quick establishment of diplomatic channels. In the years following the inaugural "16+1" framework meeting in Warsaw in 2012, the dynamics of China-Lithuania relations have undergone significant changes. Initially, the relationship was primarily viewed in terms of economic benefits. However, the perspective broadened over time to include concerns about potential security threats. With Lithuania's shift in its policy towards China in 2021, the bilateral ties took a turn for the worse, culminating in a diplomatic standoff. 2018 could arguably be seen as the zenith of the diplomatic relationship between Lithuania and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Expectations were sky-high, and the future looked promising. (ibid)

In November of that year, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė engaged in discussions with Chinese President Xi Jinping, hoping to unlock significant opportunities for Lithuanian enterprises. Reports from Lithuanian news outlets highlighted the president's optimistic view of the bilateral relationship, describing it as "very close and warm.” During this period, confidence in the "16+1" initiative, spearheaded by China, was also notably strong. (ibid)

Virginijus Sinkevičius, Lithuania's Minister of Economy and Innovation, adopted a practical viewpoint, suggesting that the initiative was beneficial as long as it fostered job creation in both Lithuania and China and supported the growth of Lithuanian businesses. The Lithuanian Ambassador to the PRC viewed the "16+1" as a valuable addition to both bilateral and EU-level engagements with China. This perspective starkly differed from the later announcement by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis in the spring of 2021, who declared Lithuania's withdrawal from the initiative and advocated for a unified EU approach to China. (ibid)

In December 2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution highlighting China's efforts to bolster its political and diplomatic sway across Europe. The resolution urged EU member states involved in the "16+1" framework to guarantee a unified EU stance in dealings with China. It emphasised the importance of ensuring that Chinese infrastructure initiatives did not lead to an increase in China's political leverage within the participating countries or the European Union as a whole. (Mačikėnaitė, 2022)

Additionally, in December 2019, during the North Atlantic Council meeting, the leaders and government heads issued the London Declaration. This declaration acknowledged the dual nature of China's expanding global influence and policy directions as presenting both potential benefits and obstacles that necessitate a collective response from the Alliance. This development was a notable indicator for Lithuania. The country's National Security Strategy, updated in 2017, emphasised that, beyond the national constitution and the Basic Law of National Security, the strategy draws upon NATO and EU treaties. It also aligns with the strategic objectives and directives outlined in the key security documents of both NATO and the European Union. (ibid)

In February 2021, Vilnius turned down a request from China to have its top official — either the president or prime minister — attend the "17+1" meeting virtually, which was to be led by Xi Jinping. The Lithuanian government instead chose to lower its level of participation to that of a minister. Subsequently, in May 2021, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Landsbergis, declared Lithuania's withdrawal from the "17+1" initiative, citing its detrimental impact on EU unity and urging other EU nations to do the same. Around this period, it was also becoming clear that Lithuania was moving to enhance its diplomatic ties with Taiwan. (ibid)

By the summer of 2021, news surfaced that Lithuania would host the Taiwanese Representative Office, distinctly named to reflect Taiwan instead of the conventional "Taipei." In response, on August 10, China withdrew its ambassador from Lithuania and expected Lithuania to do the same. What initially appeared as a nadir in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania and China worsened following the inauguration of the Taiwanese Representative Office on November 17, 2021, in Vilnius. Unlike 18 other EU member states that have accommodated a functional Taiwanese embassy labeled under "Taipei," Lithuania chose to break from this norm. The Lithuanian government maintained its stance on adhering to the One-China policy, clarifying that the office's name in Lithuanian, "Taivaniečių," referred to "Taiwanese People" rather than the state of "Taiwan." However, this nuanced distinction was lost in the Chinese translation, leading to strong objections from China. (Mačikėnaitė, 2022)

In reaction, the next month saw China demoting its diplomatic engagement with Lithuania to just chargé d'affaires. Furthermore, it was disclosed by Lithuania's Foreign Ministry that China had requested the Lithuanian embassy be rebranded as the Office of the Chargé d'Affaires, a proposal Lithuania rejected on the grounds of it conflicting with international norms. Subsequent to China's insistence that Lithuanian embassy personnel hand back their identification cards, Lithuania promptly withdrew its embassy staff from Beijing, effectively vacating the premises. Reports from international news outlets highlighted the solidarity among foreign diplomats, who assisted their Lithuanian counterparts in their sudden and unexpected departure from China. Beyond the diplomatic measures, China initiated an informal campaign of economic sanctions against Lithuanian enterprises in early December. This action prompted the European Union to seek intervention from the World Trade Organization for dispute resolution over "alleged Chinese restrictions on the import and export of goods, and the supply of services, to and from Lithuania or associated with Lithuania," in late January 2022. (ibid)

Following a brief de-escalation of the crisis, the situation intensified in the summer of 2022 when China officially sanctioned Lithuania's Vice Minister of Transport and Communications, Agnė Vaiciukevičiūtė, as a repercussion for her sanctioned visit to Taiwan. Furthermore, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it would halt all cooperation with Vilnius in the road transport sector, effectively ending Lithuania's involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). (ibid)

The analysis of the Baltic region's interaction with China over the past thirty years offers a unique case study, marked by a series of fluctuations. The trajectory of Baltic-China relations has been shaped by both contentious debates and hopeful prospects, each linked to specific events and policy agendas. Notably, disputes have frequently emerged over issues related to Taiwan. (Andžāns, 2022)

When talking about the Baltic states, it could be said that the Baltic-China relations began and ended with the question about Taiwan. In 1992 Taiwanese consulate general was opened, which meant that Latvia recognised Taiwan de facto. China responded to that by suspending diplomatic ties with Latvia. It seems that history might be repeating itself as in 2021 Lithuania opened a Taiwanese representation office in Vilnius. This particularly notable as the countries who are adhering to the "One China" policy had so far remained the status quo by opening a "Taipei" office, instead of a Taiwanese one. As Taipei is the capital of Taiwan, it is not in conflict with the "One China" policy but naming it "Taiwanese representative office" means recognising Taiwan as an independent state, rather than being part of the PRC or "Chinese Taipei". (Andžāns, 2022)

China took this as a violation of its sovereignty and responded by cutting diplomatic ties with the country and putting economic sanctions in place. This meant blocking goods and services from Lithuania, as well as from third-countries that include Lithuanian inputs or content. (Busch, 2023)

The outcomes of these sanctions have been grim. The EU evaluated that the “discriminatory and coercive measures,” China put in place, which included import bans on alcohol, beef, dairy, logs and peat, have cut trade with Lithuania by 80 percent from January to October 2022. (Busch, 2023)

Although, the sanctions were tough, Lithuania did not change its course regarding the issue. In fact, it decided to even further remove itself from China by leaving the China-driven Cooperation platform between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (17+1, initially known as 16+1) and raised the discussion even more to the European Union level. (Andžāns, 2022)

This illustrates the theoretical part mentioned before. Small states can and are very able to influence the policies on a larger scale when they are regarded as “knowledge brokers”. Building on the idea mentioned in the subchapter 1.1.2 where it was brought out that "the power of the better argument,”can influence EU discussions based on not only the EU's foundational norms and values or an actor's persuasive capabilities, but also on the capacity to advance the conversation, foster consensus, and facilitate coalition-building (Jakobsen 2009: 87). This approach, as mentioned, underscores the idea that ideational and argumentative prowess is not merely complementary to rational action strategies but often integral to them. In the case of Lithuania and “One China” policy the same seems to be true. Lithuania has managed to spark the argumentative aspect of the policy in order to shape it. Thus, being one of the influential voices in the process.



Figure 4. Evolution of LT-TW relations

3.2 Government communication

Sanders and Canel (2013) have published a work on government communication theory giving their definition of notion of the term, the frameworks under which it operates and its goals and objectives. The authors bring out the fact that as government communication is a multilayered concept, it can be approached from different points. First dimension of defining it is through looking at its actions, answering to the question of "*what it does*", second being "*what it is*". (Sanders & Canel, 2013) The implication of the first one (*what it does*) would be to look government communication as a policy tool to give meaning to the policy goals set out by a certain government, as well as influence and direct policy actions through the provision or withholding of information or knowledge from societal actors. (Howlett, 2009, p. 24). As mentioned, the second part of the same definition, answers to the question "*what it is*". Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) have defined it in a following way: 'Political public relations is the management process by which an organisation or individual actor for political purposes, through purposeful communication and action, seeks to influence and to establish, build, and maintain beneficial relationships and reputations with its key publics to help support its mission and achieve its goals' (2011, p. 8). The definition reflects back to the question of "*what is*" as a management process, highlighting its purpose by mainly describing it as a means to "establish, build and uphold beneficial relationships and reputations." (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011) Based on the above mentioned theory (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011), authors Sanders and Canel (2013) have encompassed a more pronounced version of it themselves: "The *role*, *practice*, *aims* and *achievements* of communication as it takes place in and on behalf of *public* institution(s) whose primary end is *executive* in the service of a *political* rationale, and that are constituted on the basis of the *people's* indirect or direct *consent* and charged to enact their *will*. " (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011) The latter definition stresses two sides of government communication: conceptual and functional. The idea of purpose, answering to the question of "what it is" brings out a broader view, including "prime ministerial or presidential communication as well as mayoral or local and regional government communication. Executive communication is contrasted with the deliberative communication legislatures use to decide public policy through determining the law, and with the judiciary, whose function is to make judgements in relation to disputes about the application of the law." (Sanders & Canel, 2013) Deliberative communication is a form of communication where the primary goal is to discuss, debate, and decide upon public policies, laws, and judgments. Unlike executive communication, which focuses on implementing and explaining policies, deliberative communication emphasises dialogue and decision-making processes among various stakeholders, including legislators, experts, and sometimes the public involved in shaping and interpreting the law or policies. (Sanders & Canel, 2013) Sanders and Canel (2013) emphasise the distinction between executive and deliberative

communication, noting that while executive communication is about implementing and explaining policies, deliberative communication is about the decision-making processes that create those policies. Both of these a relevant to this thesis. Based on Sanders and Canel (2013), a following overview of the two could be made:

Deliberative - Involves open discussions, debates, and exchanges of viewpoints. Encourages participation from various stakeholders, including legislators, experts, and sometimes the public. Aims to reach consensus or at least a majority agreement on public policies, laws, or legal judgments. Focuses on the deliberation process itself, valuing the quality and inclusiveness of the debate. Deliberative communication is process-oriented, focusing on discussing and formulating those policies.

Executive - Debates within a parliament or congress where elected representatives discuss proposed bills and amendments. Promotes transparency and accountability by making the decision-making process open and inclusive. Allows diverse perspectives to be heard, improving the quality and legitimacy of decisions. Ensures that laws and policies are carefully considered and debated before implementation. Executive communication is action-oriented, aiming to implement and manage public policies.

Communication is integral to governance, and the objectives of government communication stem from the goals set in governance. Strategic planning of an agency's communication should consider a hierarchy of objectives, based on the audience of the document containing the goal (public, Parliament, Government, minister), the time perspective (eternity, decades, four years, one year), and scope (international, national, sectoral, organisational) (State Chancellery, 2018).



Figure 5. Government communication parts

Inger Lassen has remarked that a press release is not a genre but rather a media channel utilised for various rhetorical purposes, thus carrying different genres. This understanding places press releases within the framework of government communication. (Lassen, 2006; viidanud: Tansey & Rayner, 2008)

3.2.1 Digital diplomacy

Diplomacy, a longstanding mechanism for international collaboration, frequently encounters inquiries into its enigmatic effectiveness—how it operates, succeeds, or falls short (Sharp, 2009). The definition of diplomacy by Bull as "the conduct of relations among states and other world politics entities through official agents and by peaceful means" (Bull, 1997) is widely accepted among scholars of diplomacy, closely paralleled by Watson's description of diplomacy as "the negotiation process among political entities that recognise each other's independence" (Watson, 1984). These definitions effectively highlight diplomacy's core characteristic: its peaceful strategy in aligning international actors' interests, particularly states. Nevertheless, they may not fully demystify how diplomacy uniquely influences international politics' conflict and cooperation dynamics. Preceding Watson, Richelieu identified "continuous negotiation" as crucial (Berridge, 2004), while Machiavelli underscored the significance of "sincerity and honesty" in diplomatic advice (Berridge, 2004). Sir Ernst Satow emphasised the role of "intellect and tact in managing official relationships" (Satow & Bland, 1957). In a more modern context, Kissinger highlighted the importance of understanding historical lessons correctly (Kissinger, 1994), and Hillary Clinton commended "direct conversation" for promoting diplomatic efforts (Raddatz, 2009). (Bjola, 2015, p. 16)

Digital technology has fundamentally transformed business operations (Weber, 2011), personal interactions (Couldry, 2012), and governmental governance (Mergel, 2013). Both governments and international bodies are recognising the significant impact social media could have on the execution of international relations. Specifically, the integration of digital diplomacy, defined in this work as leveraging social media for diplomatic endeavours, has the potential to revolutionise traditional diplomatic activities, including information dissemination, public engagement, strategic planning, international dialogues, and crisis resolution. Bjola, 2015, p. 19)

The burgeoning adoption of digital initiatives by foreign ministries is increasingly seen as a transformative shift in diplomatic practices. This digital revolution, long anticipated, acknowledges how digital technologies have already reshaped business operations, social interactions, and internal governance. Yet, it's only recently that states have begun to fully appreciate the extent to which these technologies can overhaul interstate interactions across the board. Specifically, the implementation of digital diplomacy, or the strategic use of social media for diplomatic aims, is altering traditional approaches. (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 2).

Digital diplomacy is a revolutionary way of conducting diplomacy by mixing traditional diplomatic practices with innovative digital capabilities. As mentioned, diplomacy has mainly been understood as the communication and distribution of power among states.

After the Cold War, however, the aspect of state-crafters interpersonal relations, have become more important in defining the term. Amicable example of this is Mikhail Gorbachev and US leaders negotiations that paved the way in ending the Cold War. (Bjola & Holmes, 2015, p. 31).

With the shift towards in diplomacy towards valuing interpersonal relations and using digital means of conducting diplomacy, states can now engage directly with each other and the public, bypassing the stakeholders of traditional media and thus, expand their diplomatic reach and influence. Thus, digital diplomacy can be understood as the production, dissemination and maintenance of knowledge that helps to further state interests.

3.2.2 Rhetorical 'Toolbox' of LT

The rhetoric of Lithuania will be discussed through the works of Dijk and Condor, Billig and Tieleaga. Discourse as a term can be understood and defined as contextual functionality of text and talk, in political discourse the main actors and authors are politicians, diplomats and other state actors themselves, however political discourse as a whole includes numerous actors and recipients since the 'interaction 'takes place as a public discourse among large audiences and therefore bringing in the dimension of media discourse and opinions of numerous people with numerous views (van Dijk, 1998). Thus, political rhetoric is a mix of political argument, debate, communication, or discourse serving a number of communicative functions simultaneously (Condor, Billig and Tieleaga, 2013).

In the context of political discussions, narratives function as frameworks that weave facts together, aiming to shape the understanding of political realities. These narratives are essential in the process of political decision-making, both on individual and collective levels, according to Patterson and Monroe (1998, pp. 315-316).

Reflecting back on Nasra's (2011) definition, which brings out four elements that explain the four main elements of small state influence, the political rhetoric can thus be evaluated through using these methods of communication rhetoric. **These elements are commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and deliberation**. As this thesis focuses on Lithuania's attempts to test current "norms" regarding "One China" policy, I have formed a relevant "toolbox" that expresses these influence-seeking objectives.

Lithuanian Government has published a document called “Performance principles and commitments of the Republic of Lithuania”. In this document the main communication and government values are contained.

There are:

- **transparency, participation and accountability**
- **open data, accountability and communication**
- **cooperation and coordination of interests**
- **discussion and knowledge-based decisions and reputation.**

(Open Government Partnership, 2021).

Linking this to Nasra’s (2011) definition, a following model could be made:

Commitment - Transparency, participation and accountability

In the context of small state influence, commitment points to the small state’s willingness to adhere to EU policies. Countries that are more committed to following the policies, will also be included in better defining and executing of these policies, thus making them more important in shaping the policies and through that gaining influence. (Bo¨rzel 1998: 259; Filtenborg et al. 2002: 394–403; Keukeleire 2006: 9; Risse-Kappen 1996: 70).

Network capital - Cooperation and coordination of interests

Network capital is pivotal in understanding how states navigate the landscape of European Union (EU) foreign policy-making, characterised by the functional interdependence of actors and the challenge of overcoming inconsistencies that affect decision-making processes. Networks emerge as a strategy to align interests, build consensus, and involve essential actors in developing and executing EU policies. Contrary to realist theories that emphasise formal structures and clear hierarchies, the concept of networks highlights the informal, complex nature of policy dynamics (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 253–4). For smaller states, the concept of network capital is crucial, as it significantly impacts their influence within the policy process. Naurin (2007: 8–14) describes network capital as the extent and richness of the networks in which states are engaged, encompassing both the quality and quantity of these connections. The quality aspect focuses on relationships with influential actors, while the quantity relates to the overall number of connections. This concept parallels discussions on small states’ diplomatic strategies and their roles in coalition-building and consensus formation, suggesting that network capital encompasses not only efforts to agree on policy actions but also the pooling and coordination of resources for policy implementation (Filtenborg et al. 2002: 394–7; Keukeleire 2006: 9). Although larger states might

initially seem to have an advantage in terms of network connections, size is not the sole determinant of influence. Small states can cultivate substantial network capital through trust and credibility, challenging the notion that larger states naturally possess more significant influence (Arregui and Thomson 2009: 672–3; Naurin 2007: 20–1). This perspective underscores the strategic importance of networks in the EU policy-making arena, especially for smaller states seeking to enhance their standing and impact. (Nasra, 2011)

Immaterial resources - Open data, accountability and communication

In the realm of international relations, realist theorists traditionally highlight the significance of tangible, material resources as the primary indicators of a state's influence within policy deliberations. This perspective, emphasising "hard influence," focuses on measurable and direct factors that contribute to a state's power. Contrasting with this view, the governance approach places a lesser emphasis on material resources, instead suggesting that the key drivers of influence are intangible, or immaterial, resources. These include the ability of actors to contribute value through their expertise, networks, and knowledge (Jönsson et al. 1998; Kronsell 2002: 294–297). The concept of expertise encompasses both subject-specific knowledge and procedural understanding. Subject-specific knowledge pertains to detailed information on particular topics, while procedural knowledge relates to the intricacies of negotiation processes, including mastery over negotiation techniques (Björkdahl 2008; Tallberg 2006: 30). It is especially notable as it can transform perceptions and understandings of policy issues, creating trust and shared perspectives on foreign policy matters (Smith 2004b: 92). (ibid)

Deliberation - Discussion and knowledge-based decisions and reputation

In European Union (EU) studies, there has been a shift toward embracing theories of communicative action, highlighting a discourse-centric approach to understanding EU dynamics and the influence of small states within it. This perspective champions "the power of the better argument," suggesting that influence in EU discussions hinges not just on aligning with the EU's foundational norms and values or an actor's persuasive capabilities, but also on the capacity to advance the conversation, foster consensus, and facilitate coalition-building (Jakobsen 2009: 87). This approach underscores the idea that ideational and argumentative prowess is not merely complementary to rational action strategies but often integral to them. Communicative action, therefore, is seen as a form of deliberation that expands beyond mere argumentation or straightforward communication, as it incorporates elements of strategic behaviour which the latter concepts might not account for (Niemann 2004: 384; Ulbert and Risse 2005: 352). Ulbert and Risse (2005) outline four key prerequisites for effective deliberation: firstly, it thrives in settings that are heavily institutionalised yet non-hierarchical, allowing knowledgeable actors to play pivotal roles, particularly under depoliticised conditions where there's a lack of expertise or clear preferences among main actors, enabling these "knowledge brokers" to significantly influence outcomes; secondly, successful communicators often invoke external authorities to bolster their validity claims; thirdly, the credibility and genuineness of speakers are crucial for the persuasive impact of their arguments; and fourthly, for arguments to be effective, they must align with existing knowledge, shared principles, and collective world-views. (Nasra, 2011)

3.2.3 Rhetorical ‘Toolbox’ of the EU

The same fundamental principles hold true for the rhetorical “toolbox” of EU. However, when examining political rhetoric from the perspective of the EU, there are significant differences in comparison with a small state like Lithuania.

The concept of moral geography has been explored from perspectives including the geographies of moral obligations (Ó Tuathail, 1996) to the significance of ethics in shaping geographical perceptions (Proctor, 1998). (Hagelin & Gibson, 2024)

Within the European Union, the concept of moral geography is manifested through the notion of a 'community of values', as illustrated by the shared principles enunciated in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) (Foret & Calligaro, 2018). This implies that moral stances play a critical role in determining membership and participation, not merely within individual states but across the broader, supranational landscape of the EU. (ibid)

This is a ground-basis of the rhetorical toolbox of the EU, meaning that the 'community of values’ serves as a foundational basis for all EU communication - from diplomatic communications and public statements to policy negotiations. These values not only define the identity of the EU but also guide its external actions and interactions with other nations and international bodies. As a result, the EU's approach to diplomacy is inherently linked to promoting and upholding these common values, using them as a lens through which all policy decisions and diplomatic relations are evaluated and conducted (ibid)

According to the European Union (2022) Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, these values are respect for **human dignity**, **freedom**, **democracy**, **equality**, the **rule of law** and **respect for human rights**, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. It is also listed that these are the common values uniting EU MSs as these societies uphold values such as **pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women**. (EUR-LEX, 2022)

3.2.4 Discursive Opportunities of LT

As discussed in the previous chapters, there are certain criteria for a small state to be influential and have a say in policy processes. There are four main discursive opportunities of communicating, these are through **media, official statements and through the role in international organisations.**

Media Coverage

Media coverage serves as a platform for Lithuania to present and advocate its policy perspectives on Taiwan. By effectively leveraging national and international media, Lithuania can enhance its visibility and position its Taiwan policy within the broader EU-China relations narrative. This media strategy not only informs the global community of Lithuania's standpoints but also helps to sway international opinion, potentially garnering support or understanding from other nations.

Official Statements

Official statements are a direct way for Lithuania to communicate its policies, intentions, and reactions to developments in its relations with Taiwan and China. These statements are essential for clarifying Lithuania's position on sensitive issues, justifying its diplomatic moves, and maintaining a coherent narrative that aligns with its national interests and values. Analysing the content and context of these statements can provide insights into Lithuania's diplomatic strategies and its alignment or divergence with EU policies.

Role in International Organisations

Lithuania's participation in international organisations, such as the United Nations, NATO, and various EU bodies, offers another significant discursive opportunity. Through these platforms, Lithuania can influence discussions, contribute to shaping international norms, and advocate for its interests and perspectives on Taiwan and China. This involvement also provides Lithuania with a chance to strengthen alliances, seek support, and exert its influence on a global scale.

Methodology

In this chapter the methodological steps to carry out empirical research are covered. This thesis uses communication values and messages of the Government of Lithuania and the same of the EU as the methodology and content analysis basis. Both of these will be introduced in this chapter. I will also be explaining how the research questions and theoretical approaches, described in the relevant chapter, allowed me to evaluate Lithuania's recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan in terms of compatibility with the One-China Policy in the EU. Justification for the chosen content for the comparison and the explanation of the code can also be found, alongside with the elaboration of the ways of conducting it.

This thesis employs content analysis as a research method in order to analyse Lithuania's diplomatic engagement with Taiwan, focusing on its coherence with EU policies, and the implications within the framework of the One-China Policy. This approach gives a way to quantify the deviance between Lithuania and the EU and facilitates a nuanced exploration of complex diplomatic relations, policy decisions, and their broader geopolitical context.

The aim of my thesis is to add some insight to Lithuania's recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan, by exploring the documents and official statements, as well as diplomatic steps by Lithuania and putting in the theoretical framework, as well as upon drawing on conclusions on the empirical research, giving new explanations for possible reasons behind it.

Research question 1: **How coherent are the EU and Lithuania’s statements on TW?**

Research question 2: **How did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?**

4 Description of methodology

The following master thesis will be examining the government communication messages about One-China policy during the period of 2019-2024. Following research will be conducted by analysing and evaluating government statements of Lithuania and the EU in the context of One-China policy. The work will be evaluating the messages and values of the official statements through content analysis.

Standardised content analysis enables the identification of the frequency of certain indicators within a text. The goal of this method is to provide a comparable overview of a collection of texts, offering insights into the presence, textual phenomena, and changes within them. (Instituut & Kalmus, 2015)

In this thesis, press releases and official statements from Lithuanian and the EU government agencies issued between January 1, 2019, and January, 2024, were analysed using a coding table to perform a comprehensive analysis that highlighted various core values and messages. This period was chosen due to its significance as the beginning of the drastic change in the diplomatic relations between Lithuania-EU and PRC. The coding table works on the principle that the author gathered relevant press releases and official statements from these two players that contained the words and phrases *China, one-China policy, Taiwan, Taiwanese, Taipei, Taiwan Representation Office.* Author started by reading all the press statements starting from the earliest and ending with the most recent. This is an important step, as it allows to get a better sense of change that has occurred during the said time period, as well as for the content analysis to be clearer and more informative.

4.1 Content analysis

The aim of my thesis is to add some insight to Lithuania's recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan, by exploring the documents and official statements, as well as diplomatic steps by Lithuania and putting in the theoretical framework, as well as upon drawing on conclusions on the empirical research, giving new explanations for possible reasons behind it.

Research question 1: **How coherent are the EU and Lithuania’s statements on TW?**

Research question 2: **How did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?**

4.1.1 Qualitative Research Methods

Qualitative methods are chosen for their ability to delve into the intricacies of international relations, allowing for a detailed examination of motivations, implications, and the subtleties of diplomatic language. This approach is informed by Baxter and Jack (2008), who advocate for qualitative case study methodologies as effective in investigating complex phenomena within their real-life contexts. The study employs Microsoft Excel, to manage and analyse textual data, enhancing the transparency of the research process.

4.1.2 Document Analysis: Systematic Examination

Document analysis is a primary method used to scrutinise official statements, policy documents, diplomatic communiqués, and press releases. This process follows Prior's (2003) guidelines for document analysis in qualitative research, focusing on the authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning of the documents. The selection of documents is based on specific keywords (*China, one-China policy, Taiwan, Taiwanese, Taipei, Taiwan Representation Office*) to ensure relevance to the research questions. This study uses Microsoft Excel to organise documents, facilitating an in-depth comparison of texts across different sources.

Document analysis makes up for the biggest part in methodology. Analysed are the official statements, policy documents, diplomatic *communiqués*, tweets and press releases issued by Lithuanian government bodies, EU institutions, and relevant stakeholders. In order for the communicated messages to be comparable, this work compares only same-level papers. One example of this is that in this work compared are the statements of:

- European Parliament and the Seimas (Lithuanian parliament)
- EC president Ursula von der Leyen and the statements of the prime minister of Lithuania Ingrida Šimonytė
- President of the European Council Charles Michel and the Lithuanian president Gitanas Nausėda

4.1.3 Content Analysis: Developing an Analytical Framework

Content analysis is guided by an analytical framework designed to categorise and interpret the data systematically. Following Krippendorff (2013), this study employs a deductive coding approach, where predefined categories derived from the literature review and theoretical framework are applied to the content. Categories include "diplomatic justification," "policy coherence," "international law references," and "democratic values." This methodological step aims to quantify and analyse the presence, meanings, and relationships of such words and concepts within the data.

4.1.4 Comparative Analysis: Exploring Coherence and Divergence

The comparative analysis hinges on juxtaposing Lithuania's and the EU's policy documents to identify areas of coherence, divergence, or evolution over time. Building on George and Bennett (2005), who underscore the value of case studies in comparative analysis, this study employs a structured, focused comparison method. This involves applying a set of questions to each case (Lithuania and the EU) to systematically compare their positions on Taiwan.

4.1.5 Literature Review: Theoretical and Contextual Foundation

The literature review integrates scholarly articles, books, and policy documents, public statements and tweets that provide a theoretical and contextual foundation for the study. Works of authors like East (1987) and Nasra (2011) on small state influence factors and diplomacy, Schelling (1966) on coercive diplomacy and Hagelin & Gibson (2024) on digital diplomacy and many others are used. The review also includes recent studies by Park and Jakstaite-Confortola (2021) on small states in unilateral world politics, offering a contemporary lens through which to view Lithuania's actions.

4.2 Sample

The study collected data from Lithuanian and EU government and official websites, using publicly accessible press releases and official statements in English. Choosing the statements in English gives an opportunity to analyse the messages and values communicated to a larger nation, rather than only to the Lithuanian one. The sample for this master thesis included all press releases from Lithuania, EU institutions and prominent state players during the specified period of 01.01.2019 to 01.01.2024 that contained terms related to the one-China debate.

Publicly accessible press releases and official statements were gathered from the following websites (during the period of 1.01.2019-01.01.2024):

- European Council
- European Union External Action Service
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania
- European Parliament - Statements by the Lithuanian MEPs

The statements analysed were official statements and press releases. All together 103 official statements and press releases statements were analysed that made the sample of this research. 54 of them by the European Council and the EEAS (European External Action Service) and 49 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the Lithuanian MEPs in the European Parliament.

The chosen time period allowed to analyse which were the main communication values and messages from Lithuania and the EU and how much they were similar or different from one-another.

4.3 Coding table

For this research a coding table was formed in order for the content to be analysed and evaluated. For the study, a coding table was developed in Microsoft Excel with nine categories to organise the data from analysed press releases:

- Sequence number
- Date of publication
- Title of the press release/official statement
- Issuing government agency
- Tone of the press release - Satisfaction with the current one-China policy - Consistency with One-China policy (pro-One China policy) / non-complying with One-China policy (pro-Taiwan)
- Main messages - 1 - Proposal for change - Yes/No
- Main messages - 2 - Caution/Boldness
- Main values - 1 - Closer diplomatic ties - China/Taiwan
- Main values 2 - Condemnation of Chinese coercion - Yes/No

4.3.1 Tonality of the statements

To assess the tone of each press release, specific criteria were established based on a similar study by Kruusimäe (2020):

- "Positive" or "reaffirming" tone for descriptions of satisfaction with or strong adherence to one-China policy without questioning its foundations, as well as support towards the policy itself - pro-One China policy
- "Negative" or "non-satisfactory" tone for expressions of disappointment, failure, or inefficacy of measures regarding One-China policy, as well as fully disregarding the foundations of the policy
- Neutral tone or the tonality of "no mention" for information presented without significant evaluative comments or where the policy was not mentioned at all, even though the relevant keywords and topics were there.

Empirical findings from coding

In the course of this master thesis, 103 press releases and official statements published between January 1, 2019, and January 1, 2024, were analysed. In this section of the empirical study, the author presents the results obtained using content analysis method.

The following subsection provides an overview of the proportion of the one-China debate related press releases. The author specifies the percentage figures separately for Lithuania and European Union for subsequent comparison. The values presented in the press releases are examined according to the relevant categories chosen by the author that reflect the level of coherency and/or divergence between the two bodies. The author deemed, based on research on the subject matter, that coherency could be evaluated by seeking out: satisfaction with the current one-China policy, proposal for change, caution/boldness, closer diplomatic ties - China/Taiwan and condemnation of Chinese coercion. The study also investigates the frequency of these values in the press releases and official statements of bodies representing Lithuania and the European Union separately, and finally, in comparison with each other. The institutions and bodies representing the EU for the chosen work are the European Council and the European Union External Action Service. The corresponding bodies of Lithuania were the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the statements made by the Lithuanian MEPs in the European Parliament. The categories chosen are universal and objective, as well as relevant to the problem and theme of the thesis for evaluation. All the chosen press releases and statements for analysis were in English. As this thesis deals with an issue that is of international scale and thus communicated intergovernmentally, it allows to fairly analyse the statements from both sides. This thesis does not delve into Lithuanian internal politics and the messages and values communicated to the Lithuanian public, nor does it deal with any other EU MS internal communication. In other words, since a large part of international relations is done in English, it is intriguing to find out how the European Union's press releases overlap with the values Lithuania's. This approach and starting point provide an opportunity for interesting analysis.

The first subsection gives an overview of the tonality of satisfaction with the current one-China policy in the press releases and official statements that were issued during the selected period and compares the figure between the EU and Lithuania.

5 General overview of the press releases and official statements

Within the empirical analysis of this master thesis, 103 press releases and official statements were examined, originating from four government institutions and bodies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and the statements made by the Lithuanian MEPs in the European Parliament, as well as the European Council and the EEAS. These were published in the time period from January 1, 2019, to January 1, 2024, covering press releases related to the one-China debate issued in four years. The press releases were selected based on the keywords they contained, which were: *China, one-China policy, Taiwan, Taiwanese, Taipei, Taiwan Representation Office.*

5.1 Tonality - Satisfaction with the current one-China policy

This chapter provides an overview of the tonality in the press releases regarding satisfaction with the current one-China policy from the Lithuanian and EU institutions. The tone of the press releases was assessed according to criteria selected by the author, which were based on the evaluation criteria of similar studies previously conducted (Kruusimäe, 2020, Mumm, 2021). The following basis for categorisation and evaluation was made:

1. Press releases and official statements that belonged under the category of tonality described as **non-satisfactory** were ones that questioned the current one-China policy as a whole, mentioned Taiwan as a country of itself, independent from the PRC, and/or outright dismissed the policy. “The political ambitions and growing global assertiveness of communist China pose an increasing challenge and strategic threat to Taiwan’s democratic future and wellbeing of Taiwanese. A notion of peaceful coexistence has been replaced by political intimidation, military pressure and hybrid provocations. We rightly commend Taiwan as a trusted partner in promoting human rights and freedoms. Our mutual membership in the world community of democracies requires further common actions in extending EU and Taiwan relations in various fields. I call on and encourage the EU institutions to make a timely decision to rename the EU representation in Taiwan as the European Union Office in Taiwan. Let us use this chance and expand our support to the island of democracy.” (European Parliament, 19.10. 2021)
2. Press releases and official statements that belonged under the category of tonality described as being of a **reaffirming** tone expressed support towards the policy itself, stressed that Taiwan is part of China, highlighted the foundations of the policy, even if the statements were critical of and highlighted certain flaws, still the main message was reaffirming of the policy itself. “Under the category of entities and territorial authorities that are not recognised as states by at least one member state, travel restrictions for Taiwan should also be gradually lifted.” (European Council, 18.06.2021) ; “The EU is committed to and maintains its one-

China policy. I repeated the longstanding position of the EU on Taiwan and the Taiwan strait." (European Council, 01.12.2022)

3. Press releases and official statements that belonged under the category of **no mention** were ones where information was presented without significant evaluative comments or where the policy was not mentioned. Even though there may have been comments and points made vaguely about the subject, the policy in the question was not mentioned. "I invite you to imagine the European Union, which is known for setting global standards of quality of life in democracy, falling into the following situation: less independent and no investigative media, our citizens living in a post—truth society and dangerously exposed to outside manipulation and national populists are generously financed by foreign subjects. As a result, we're living according to the national interest of such countries as Russia, China or probably any extremist group." (European Parliament, 17.09.2019)

The author has assessed the tone of the press releases objectively to the best of their knowledge.



Figure 6. Overall tonality of the press releases and official statements.

From figure 6 it can be seen that from the 103 statements analysed, a little more than half, 58%, were reaffirming of the current one-China policy. The figure shows the analysed statements of both the representative bodies of Lithuania and the EU collectively, giving an overview of all the statements jointly. Although more than half of the statements reflected reaffirmation of the current

policy, almost the same number of statements communicated either non-satisfaction with it or not having a mention of it at all.

When looking at the tonality of the statements made by the bodies representing the EU, it is clear that the overflowing majority of them were reaffirming of the current one-China policy.



Figure 7. Satisfaction with the current one-China policy, EU

Out of the 54 EU statements analysed, 43 of them were reaffirming of the policy which amounted to 79% of the statements made by the EU. The policy was not mentioned in 10 statements out of the total of 54, which was 19%. And only in one statement could the statement be described as belonging to the category of non-satisfactory.

- **Press releases and/or statements reflecting reaffirmation of the current one-China policy in EU statements: "**The East and South China Seas are of strategic importance for regional and global prosperity and security. The European Union is concerned about growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The European Council opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. It reconfirms the EU's consistent 'One China policy'." (European Council, 30.06.2023)
- **Press releases and/or statements reflecting non-satisfaction of the current one-China policy in EU statements:** "Secretary General Sannino and Deputy Secretary Sherman held the first high-level meeting of the EU-US dialogue on China. The two sides reiterated that the EU's and the United States 'relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry. They highlighted issues of shared

concern, including ongoing human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet, the erosion of autonomy and democratic processes in Hong Kong, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and regional security issues, in particular the situation in the South China Sea. They discussed the importance of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the work of international organisations, including World Health Organization forums and the World Health Assembly." (EEAS, 26.05.2021)

- **Press releases and/or statements that did not mention one-China policy in EU statements, although containing the relevant keywords listed in the previous part of the thesis:** "This is the first and the largest EU- Taiwan joint event following the adoption of the "Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" in September. The Strategy mentions Taiwan as a partner in the semiconductor industry. " (EEAS, 06.10.2021)



Figure 8. Tonality - Satisfaction with the current one-China policy, Lithuania

Out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed, 17 of them were reaffirming of the policy which amounted to 35% of the statements made by the Lithuanian representative bodies. The policy was not mentioned in 12 statements out of the total of 49, which totalled to 24%. In 20 statements the non-satisfaction was communicated, making it the largest portion of 41% of the statements analysed.

- **Press releases and/or statements reflecting reaffirmation of the current one-China policy in Lithuanian statements:** “Lithuania adheres to the “One-China” policy and is not trying to challenge it. However, the participation of Taiwanese experts in the battle against the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the sharing of experience, is beneficial to all. I hope that a consensus will be reached on the participation of Taiwanese experts in a way that would not violate the principles and rules of international organizations," said L. Linkevičius.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 13.05.2020)
- **Press releases and/or statements reflecting non-satisfaction of the current one-China policy in Lithuanian statements:** “China’s policy of unilaterally imposing, unscrupulously enforcing, and doctrinising the so—called ‘main principle ’is really disturbing.” (European Parliament, 19.01.2022)
- **Press releases and/or statements that did not mention one-China policy in Lithuanian statements, although containing the relevant keywords listed in the previous part of the thesis:** “Economic diplomacy remains a particularly important field of action. Lithuania’s ambition to diversify markets is producing results — trade volumes with the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Australia have increased significantly. “ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 29.08.2022)



Figure 9. Tonality - Satisfaction with the current one-China policy - Lithuania vs EU

When comparing statements from the European Union and Lithuania, it is evident that there is significant divergence between them. Firstly, the affirmation category stands out the most, with 43 out of the whole 54 EU statements analysed reflect reaffirmation of the current one-China policy,

while only 17 of the 49 Lithuanian statements do accordingly. It is a striking contrast, not anticipated. The value of statements communicating non-satisfaction also revealed major difference between Lithuania and the EU, with 20 statements from Lithuania and only one from the EU, demonstrating non-satisfaction. The "no mention" category depicted 10 statements from the EU and 12 from Lithuania.

5.2 Main messages - 1 - Proposal for change

The following subchapter takes a closer look at the proposal for change to the current one-China policy. Firstly, an overview will be given of the number of statements conveying a proposal for change and the number that did not. The messages of the press releases and official statements that proposed or did not propose change were assessed according to the criteria selected by the author, which were, again, based on the evaluation criteria of a similar studies previously conducted (Kruusimäe, 2020, Mumm, 2021). The following basis for categorisation and evaluation was made:

1. Press releases and official statements that expressed a **proposal for change** were those that suggested modifications to the status quo, proposed changes to the current one-China policy, or called for a reassessment of current policies. Examples of the before-mentioned are as follows:

- **Lithuania:** "The EU should properly assess the changing geopolitical situation, find a common position on its relations with the People's Republic of China to ensure the highest democratic, environmental, social, fair economic practice and, above all, human rights standards promoted by the EU, as well as to safeguard the strategic economic independence, enabling stronger export controls and protection of strategic infrastructure in Europe." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 10.02.2022)

- **The EU:** "Secretary General Sannino and Deputy Secretary Sherman held the first high-level meeting of the EU-US dialogue on China. The two sides reiterated that the EU's and the United States' relations with China are multifaceted and comprise elements of cooperation, competition, and systemic rivalry. They highlighted issues of shared concern, including ongoing human rights violations in Xinjiang and Tibet, the erosion of autonomy and democratic processes in Hong Kong, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and regional security issues, in particular the situation in the South China Sea. They discussed the importance of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the work of international organisations, including World Health Organization forums and the World Health Assembly." (EEAS, 26.05.2021)

2. Press releases and official statements that expressed **no need for change** were those in which the policy was either not referenced directly or only mentioned in passing without any substantive commentary or evaluation related to potential changes. These statements often focused on other aspects of international relations or internal policies without engaging with the specifics of the one-China policy. The examples belonging to this category:

- Lithuania: “On 17 August 2022, the Lithuanian Government's Commission - the Economic Diplomacy Council - approved priority export, investment and inbound tourism markets, including Taiwan.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 07.11.2022)

- The EU: “The meeting was co-chaired by Ms Nicoletta Pusterla, Deputy Head of Division for China, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Mongolia at the European External Action Service and by Ms Tseveen NAVCHAA, Head of the Human Rights Division, International Law and Treaty Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia.” (EEAS, 18.07.2023)



Figure 10. Main messages - 1 - Proposal for change

When comparing the frequency of statements proposing a change to the current policy, it is evident that the majority of the statements from both Lithuania and the EU do not showcase a proposal in this regard. Out of the 103 statements analysed, 87 of them did not include a proposal for change. The corresponding value for Lithuania was 35 out of the 49 Lithuanian statements and for the EU it was 52 out of the 54 EU statements analysed. Proposal for change was reflected in only two

statements from the EU side and in 14 of the statements made by Lithuania and/or its representative bodies.

5.3 Main messages - 2 - Caution/Boldness

The following subchapter takes a closer look at the caution or boldness reflected in the chosen statements relating to the debate of one-China policy. Firstly, an overview will be given of the number of statements displaying caution and the same value for the statements exhibiting boldness. The messages of the press releases and official statements that showcased caution or boldness were assessed according to the criteria selected by the author, which were, again, based on the evaluation criteria of a similar studies previously conducted (Kruusimäe, 2020, Mumm, 2021). The following basis for categorisation and evaluation was made:

1. Press releases and official statements depicting **caution** were those that emphasised diplomatic restraint, avoidance of escalation, or stressed the importance of maintaining stable international relations. These statements often highlighted the risks associated with changing the established policy and focused on promoting dialogue and consensus. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: “Lithuania opened embassies in Australia, the Republic of Korea and Singapore and a trade office in Taipei. In their turn, the Indo-Pacific countries are strengthening their representation in Lithuania: Australia has opened its trade office, India has opened an embassy, and the Republic of Korea has expressed its intension to so.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 05.07.2023)

- **The EU**: “Furthermore, the EU informed Taiwan of the adoption, on 13 July 2021, of the guidance on due diligence for EU businesses to address the risk of forced labour in their operations and supply chains.” (EEAS, 16.07.2021)

2. Press releases and official statements illustrating **boldness** were characterised by assertive language, calls for significant policy shifts, or advocacy for stronger stances in international forums. These statements often challenged the status quo to some degree, for example mentioning only Taiwan and not China, and suggested more proactive measures in dealing with the complexities of the one-China policy. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: “When we work together, we are writing the new history of Lithuania. We have recently opened a new page in our relations with Taiwan. We are also writing the Indo-Pacific strategy — and these are the pages of Lithuania's history in the 21st century,” said

the Foreign Minister." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 04.11.2021)

- **The EU**: "They discussed the importance of Taiwan's meaningful participation in the work of international organisations, including World Health Organization forums and the World Health Assembly." (EEAS, 26.05.2021)



Figure 11. Main messages – 2 – Caution/Boldness

When comparing the tone of caution versus boldness in the statements, a clear pattern emerges. Lithuanian statements exhibited boldness in 24 statements out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed which makes up almost 50% of Lithuanian statements. Whereas the EU displayed boldness in only 5 of its statements out of the analysed 54, making it only a bit more than 9%. Caution was communicated in 49 statements made by the EU and only in 5 Lithuanian ones.

5.4 Main values - 1 - Closer diplomatic ties

This subchapter examines whether the statements expressed a wish to create closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan or China. It is also possible for statements to indicate a desire for closer ties with both entities. This analysis includes an overview of the number of statements displaying either caution or boldness regarding the one-China policy debate.

The messages of the press releases and official statements showcasing a wish for closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China or with both were assessed based on criteria selected by the author, derived from the evaluation criteria of similar studies previously conducted (Kruusimäe, 2020; Mumm, 2021). The following basis for categorisation and evaluation was made:

1. Statements indicating a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan** typically emphasised strengthening economic, cultural, and political relations with Taiwan. These statements often highlighted initiatives such as opening new trade offices, supporting Taiwan's participation in international organisations, and enhancing bilateral cooperation. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: "On 7 November, new achievements of economic cooperation between Lithuania and Taiwan were announced. Lithuania's high-tech enterprise Teltonika agreed with the Taiwanese Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) on the development of the semiconductor industry in Lithuania, while Taiwan's national-level investment firm Taiwania Capital approved the investment in the production of optical devices. In the near future, Lithuanian milk, fish and egg products will be authorised to export to Taiwan. It is likely that the export of Lithuanian beef will also be granted this year. "The agreements between Lithuania and Taiwan pave the way for the development of the semiconductor industry and further development of Lithuania's laser sector. Hopefully, new permits for Lithuanian agricultural and food products will significantly boost exports to Taiwan. There is also great potential to further develop economic ties with Taiwan," said the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Gabrielius Landsbergis. According to the Foreign Minister, the new agreements between Lithuania and Taiwan show that the Government's chosen direction of strategic diversification and deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region proved successful and opens up great opportunities for Lithuanian business. On 17 August 2022, the Lithuanian Government's Commission - the Economic Diplomacy Council - approved priority export, investment and inbound tourism markets, including Taiwan. In 2021, trade in goods between Lithuania and Taiwan grew by 31 per cent, reaching EUR

111.4 million, of which exports to Taiwan amounted to EUR 21.8 million and increased by 14 %. There is also a positive export dynamic this year. During January-August this year, exports to Taiwan grew by 33 per cent, from EUR 15 million to EUR 19 million, compared to the same period last year. 79 % of all exports to Taiwan were of Lithuanian origin. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 07.11.2022)

- **The EU**: "This is the first and the largest EU- Taiwan joint event following the adoption of the "Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific" in September. The Strategy mentions Taiwan as a partner in the semiconductor industry." (EEAS, 06.10.2022)

2. Statements expressing a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with China**, on the other hand, focused on maintaining or enhancing strategic partnerships with China. These statements often stressed the importance of China as a key global player and highlighted efforts to strengthen economic, political, and cultural exchanges. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: "For that, we need the Chinese on board. I am afraid that as long as China does not see a North Korean nuclear weapon as a problem, it will be difficult to make any substantial progress." (European Parliament, 20.10.2020)

- **The EU**: "We also insisted a lot on the relaunch of the Human Rights Dialogue, and Prime Minister Li Keqiang confirmed that this relaunch would take place. We also raised individual human rights cases. We also discussed our trade and economic relationship with China, to make it fairer, to ensure reciprocity, to achieve a level playing field, to rebalance our bilateral trade and investment relations. We also raised the issue of China's discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania and the effects on the integrity of the single market." (European Council, 01.04.2022)

3. Statements expressing a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with both Taiwan and China** were characterised by a balanced approach, emphasising the importance of maintaining positive relations with both entities. These statements often highlighted the strategic importance of engaging with both Taiwan and China for economic, political, and regional stability reasons. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: "Lithuania reaffirms its adherence to the "One China" policy, but at the same time has the right to expand cooperation with Taiwan and to receive and establish non-diplomatic representations for ensuring the practical development of such ties, the way

many other countries do. The receipt of the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania is based on economic interests." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 21.11.2021)

- **The EU**: "President Michel confirmed that the One China Policy is a fundamental principle of the EU - China relationship. At the same time, the EU naturally has economic ties with Taiwan." (European Council, 10.09.2023)



Figure 12. Main values 1 - Closer diplomatic ties - China/Taiwan

In examining the statements from both Lithuania and the EU side on the matter of strengthening diplomatic relations with either Taiwan, China or both simultaneously, it is evident that Lithuania is a lot more eager to create closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan than the EU is. In 41 out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed, closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan were mentioned, while only 12 in the corresponding EU statements. However, the EU showed a greater inclination to tighten the diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan at the same times, communicating this in 28 out of the 54 EU official statements and press releases that were under analysis in this thesis. The same value for Lithuania was only reflected in 7 statements. The EU was also noticeably more ready to create closer ties with China, noting it is 14 statements, while Lithuania communicated it in only one statement.

5.5 Main values - 2 - Condemnation of Chinese coercion or violations

This subchapter examines whether the statements expressed condemnation of Chinese coercion. This analysis includes an overview of the number of statements displaying either caution or boldness regarding this sensitive topic. The messages of the press releases and official statements showcasing caution or boldness were assessed based on criteria selected by the author, derived from the evaluation criteria of similar studies previously conducted (Kruusimäe, 2020; Mumm, 2021). The following basis for categorisation and evaluation was made:

1. Statements **indicating condemnation of Chinese coercion** typically emphasised strong disapproval of China's aggressive actions and policies, especially regarding Taiwan and other neighbouring regions. These statements often highlighted the importance of standing against coercive measures and promoting international law and human rights. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: “China’s economic coercive measures against the EU as a whole and its single market have been countered by our diplomacy. The EU’s firm and principled stance helped to bring up the issue of China’s economic blackmail against Lithuania at the highest level during the EU-China Summit. China was taken to court by the European Commission at the World Trade Organisation over such kind of economic coercion. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 09.09.2022)

- **The EU**: “We are concerned by recent and announced threatening actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), particularly live-fire exercises and economic coercion, which risk unnecessary escalation. There is no justification to use a visit as pretext for aggressive military activity in the Taiwan Strait.” (EEAS, 03.08.2022)

2. Statements **exhibiting avoidance in condemning Chinese coercion** were those that exemplified a more diplomatic and measured tone or where the coercive measures by China were not mentioned at all. These statements often underscored the need for dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts while acknowledging concerns about Chinese actions. Examples include:

- **Lithuania**: “Referring to relations with China, Mr Minister noted that Lithuania continued to follow One China policy. “Lithuania, as well as other EU and world countries, is interested in developing economic relations with Taiwan, which is nothing new or extraordinary and does not go contrary to international commitments vis-à-vis China,” he said.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 19.08.2021)

- **The EU**: “The European Union and China continue to be important trade and economic partners. The European Union will seek to ensure a level playing field, so that the trade and economic relationship is balanced, reciprocal and mutually beneficial.” (European Council, 30.06.2023)



Figure 13. Main values 2 - Condemnation of Chinese coercion or violations

The value of condemning Chinese coercion was reflected in 45 statements out of the total of 103, rounding it to almost 45%. As was visible in the previous categories, Lithuania is far more willing to speak out against Chinese coercion and current policies, with 30 statements showcasing condemnation of Chinese coercion tactics, the EU did no in 15 statements. The condemnation was not mentioned or not communicated in 58 out of the total of 103 statements, with Lithuania not doing so in 19 statements and the EU in 39.

5.6 Lithuanian influence in trying to shape the policy – Based on Long (2005)

The following sub-chapter will place the analysed statements in the small state influence seeking categories defined by Long (2005). The means for a small state to gain influence and power are derivative, collective and particular-intrinsic. The author will give an initiative communicated in a statement by Lithuania and seek out which method of power-seeking was used. Lastly, the influence will be sought. The influence factor reflects the EUs response and communication in answer to Lithuania's initiative. In order for the influence to be gathered, it is important to pay attention to the dates of statements made. The initiative is, thus, viewed as an input, the influence as an output. The input must have an earlier date than the output.

Initiative by Lithuania in a statement	Influence and power-seeking method	Influence
I urge the Commission and the Council to support Taiwan in developing cultural, economic and diplomatic relations, and to condemn China's economic sanctions against Lithuania over this issue." (European Parliament, 14.09.2021)	Derivative power - Lithuania wanting to gain the European approval for their diplomatic actions	The EU expressing concern about China using coercive measures against Lithuania. "We express concern with and oppose economic coercion through the use, or the threat of use, of economic measures affecting trade and investment, which are frequently intended to induce or influence a foreign government in the exercise of its legitimate sovereign rights or choices. Such practices, which could undermine global security and stability, must be prevented."

		(European Council, 12.05.2022)
Noted that Lithuania, together with the US, would seek to further strengthen the transatlantic partnership within NATO, to deepen the US-EU cooperation, on the issue of China, and Lithuania's wish to develop mutually beneficial relations with Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 14.08.2021)	Collective power - The notion that small states try to seek influence through building coalitions with supportive states, often doing it through institutions.	United States Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis to discuss China's aggressive policy, bilateral cooperation and regional security. Antony Blinken expressed USA's political support for Lithuania in its plans to develop economic ties with Taiwan. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 24.08.2021)
"Economic and diplomatic cooperation with autocracies deepens Europe's dependence on them. Recent history shows that these addictions can be used against us in time. Do we want to be dangerously	Particular-intrinsic power - The idea that small states use their assets, such as knowledge in order to gain power and influence	"We will not tolerate interferences in our countries that would undermine democratic societies." (European Council, 19.05.2023)

dependent on China for the resources we use to build our sustainable future?" Landbergis said." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, 22.04.2023)		

Figure 14. Lithuanian influence in trying to shape the policy – Based on Long (2005)

The figure 14 proved that Lithuania did use all three categories of influence and power-seeking based on the definition made by Long (2005). It also shows that Lithuania was able to have influence on the EU or gain the response of the EU. Even though Lithuania was able to have their voice heard and gain a response from the EU, the EU often communicated it in a much softer tone. An example of this can be seen in the category of particular-intrinsic power where Lithuania was using a strong tone, referring to China as an "autocracy", while the EU chose a softer and more diplomatic wording for expressing the same thought: "We will not tolerate interferences in our countries that would undermine democratic societies." (European Council, 19.05.2023)

5.7 Lithuanian influence seeking in statements regarding one-China – Based on Nasra (2011)

As the theoretical part of the thesis introduced two theories, the following sub-chapter will be analysed the influence-seeking methods defined by Nasra (2011). Nasra has outlined four categories for this objective, these are: commitment, network capital, immaterial resources and deliberation. The sub-chapter will use the same logic for analysis as the previous subchapter (5.6).

Initiative by Lithuania in a statement	Influence-seeking method	Influence
"Lithuania and Taiwan setting up representative offices did not violate the EUs one-China policy. Many in the EU support it. The US has already expressed strong support for Lithuania. I urge the Commission and the Council to support Taiwan in developing cultural, economic and diplomatic relations, and to condemn China's economic sanctions against Lithuania over this issue." (European Parliament, 14.09.2021)	Commitment – adherence to the EU policies. Countries that are in other terms very compelling with the EU policies, will be more likely caused in discussing of better defining and executing these policies.	The EU expressing concern about China using coercive measures against Lithuania. "We express concern with and oppose economic coercion through the use, or the threat of use, of economic measures affecting trade and investment, which are frequently intended to induce or influence a foreign government in the exercise of its legitimate sovereign rights or choices. Such practices, which could undermine global security and stability, must be prevented." (European Council, 12.05.2022)

"The US has already expressed strong support for Lithuania." (European Parliament, 14.09.2021)	Network capital – focus on relations with other influential actors	The US voicing clear support for Lithuania regarding the issue.
"Lithuania decided to leave the 17+1 format, which China created for relations with Central Europe in order to split the EU. Our government decided to upgrade relations with Taiwan and decided to open a Taiwanese, not Taipei, representation in Vilnius. China became very angry over Lithuania, recalled the ambassador, and our business in China experienced different pressures and sanctions. We in Lithuania, several years ago, saw the same behaviour against Lithuania, against our business, shown by Russian authorities. We survived and we learnt a lesson. Business with an economy which is	Immaterial resources – actors contribute value through expertise in subject-specific matters	EU voices concerns. "Deputy Secretary Sherman and Secretary General Sannino also discussed the growing list of China's actions that are of concern, including those that breach international law and run counter to the shared values and interests of the United States and the EU. They discussed ongoing human rights abuses and violations in China, including the systemic repression of ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang and in Tibet, and the erosion of autonomy and democracy in Hong Kong. They expressed a shared interest in continued exchanges and cooperation, including in multilateral fora, on human rights issues in China. They also reaffirmed the importance of upholding international law and principles, and strengthening the effectiveness of multilateral institutions by coordinating to advance shared priorities related to human rights, global standards, clear institutional procedures, and wherever possible on elections in international organizations. Noting the harmful effects of disinformation on democratic societies, they expressed their readiness to deepen U.S.-EU information

led by authoritarian is risky." (European Parliament, 14.09.2021)		sharing on disinformation sponsored or supported by China." (EEAS, 02.12.2021)
"Our mutual membership in the world community of democracies requires further common actions in extending EU and Taiwan relations. I call on and encourage the EU institutions to make a timely decision to rename the EU representation in Taiwan as the European Union Office in Taiwan. Let us use this chance and expand our support to the island of democracy." (European Parliament, LT MEP, 19.10.2021)	Deliberation – knowledge-based decisions and reputations. Not blindly following the EUs foundational norms but advance conversation. Act as "knowledge brokers." Communicative action	"We also discussed our trade and economic relationship with China, to make it fairer, to ensure reciprocity, to achieve a level playing field, to rebalance our bilateral trade and investment relations. We also raised the issue of China's discriminatory trade practices against Lithuania and the effects on the integrity of the single market." (European Council, 01.04.2022)

Figure 15. Lithuanian influence in trying to shape the policy – Based on Nasra (2011)

From figure 15 it is evident that this model is also relevant for Lithuanian statement analysis. The figure shows that the EU, once again, used a softer and diplomatic tone for addressing the issues, but highlighted and responded to all Lithuanian concerns.

5.8 Change over time

In the following table are reflected the **EU responses** over the years of 2019-2024. The chosen value category is the tonality (satisfaction with the current one-China policy). The table reflects change occurred. We can see a strong decline of the statements reflecting reaffirmation of the policy, with the trend starting from 2020 onwards. The decline was further exacerbated in two points: 2021 and 2023.



Figure 16. EU responses over years

In the following table are reflected the **Lithuanian responses** over the years of 2019-2024. The chosen value category is the tonality (satisfaction with the current one-China policy). The chart reflects a clear pattern of reaffirmation being in a strong decline from 2020. The lowest point, thus the least statements communicating this value were evident in 2021. The trend of decline of the affirmation of the current policy as hit an all time low, of the chosen timeframe, in the year of 2023.



Figure 17. Lithuanian responses over years

The chart below includes both the statements of Lithuania and the EU. It shows that the affirmation of the policy has been a collective decline from the year of 2021 and continues through 2023.



Figure 18. Total responses over years

The peak of the beginning of the decline could be explained by the move of Lithuania to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius in 2021. From analysing the statements, it became clear that this angered China quite a lot, China even set economic sanctions on Lithuania. In turn, Lithuania voiced concerns about such coercive measures in the EU. Which were met with the EU supporting Lithuania and voicing these Lithuanian concerns on an EU level. Not only did the EU support Lithuania by asking China to remove economic sanctions placed on Lithuania. The EU also communicated on an higher level the support for Lithuania in opening up a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, by stating: “We express concern with and oppose economic coercion through the use, or the threat of use, of economic measures affecting trade and investment, which are frequently intended to induce or influence a foreign government in the exercise of its legitimate sovereign rights or choices. Such practices, which could undermine global security and stability, must be prevented.” (European Council, 12.05.2022)

It seems from the figures listed in this subsection, as well as the ones listed in the previous ones (5.6 and (5.7) that the EU has taken Lithuanian concerns seriously, otherwise the EU would not have voiced them as part of the EUs collective agenda. The graph of figure 18 shows clearly that the overall trend that the EU and Lithuania are following, is moving in the same direction. Although still, from the chart 17 in subsection 5.8, it can be seen that Lithuania is taken an even critical standpoint and voicing the concerns even more than the EU does.

5.9 Discussion of the results

The analysis attempted to answer the research questions: to what extent do Lithuania and the European Union present coherent or divergent statements on Taiwan and how did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?

The thesis tried to answer the first research question by analysing the statements through filtering them through a coding system created by the author. Based on the analysis it was shown, the following statements contained messages, values and the overall tonality chosen. A clear pattern emerged from dissecting the press releases and official statements according to the messages, values and tonality coding system created by the author. The author understands the limitation of this method but to the best of their knowledge, tried to remain as neutral and objective when choosing the value categories as well as when conducting the research and analysing it. However, the pattern that emerged, gives fruit for thought.

First, the **tonality** was analysed. Tonality reflected the reaffirmation or non-satisfaction with the current one-China policy. From the 103 statements analysed, a little more than half, 58%, were reaffirming of the current one-China policy. When looking at the tonality of the statements made by the bodies representing the EU, it is clear that the overflowing majority of them were reaffirming of the current one-China policy. Out of the 54 EU statements analysed, 43 of them were reaffirming of the policy which amounted to 79% of the statements made by the EU. The policy was not mentioned in 10 statements out of the total of 54, which was 19%. And only in one statement could the statement be described as belonging to the category of non-satisfactory.

Out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed, 17 of them were reaffirming of the policy which amounted to 35% of the statements made by the Lithuanian representative bodies. The policy was not mentioned in 12 statements out of the total of 49, which totalled to 24%. In 20 statements the non-satisfaction was communicated, making it the largest portion of 41% of the statements analysed. When comparing statements from the European Union and Lithuania, it is evident that there is significant divergence between them. Firstly, the affirmation category stands out the most, with 43 out of the whole 54 EU statements analysed reflect reaffirmation of the current one-China policy, while only 17 of the 49 Lithuanian statements do accordingly. It is a striking contrast, not anticipated. The value of statements communicating non-satisfaction also revealed major difference between Lithuania and the EU, with 20 statements from Lithuania and only one from the EU, demonstrating non-satisfaction. The "no mention" category depicted 10 statements from the EU and 12 from Lithuania.

When we add the dimension of change over time, the peak of the beginning of the decline could be explained by the move of Lithuania to open a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius in 2021. From analysing the statements, it became clear that this angered China quite a lot, China even set

economic sanctions on Lithuania. In turn, Lithuania voiced concerns about such coercive measures in the EU. Which were met with the EU supporting Lithuania and voicing these Lithuanian concerns on an EU level. Not only did the EU support Lithuania by asking China to remove economic sanctions placed on Lithuania. The EU also communicated on a higher level the support for Lithuania in opening up a Taiwanese Representative Office in Vilnius, by stating: "We express concern with and oppose economic coercion through the use, or the threat of use, of economic measures affecting trade and investment, which are frequently intended to induce or influence a foreign government in the exercise of its legitimate sovereign rights or choices. Such practices, which could undermine global security and stability, must be prevented." (European Council, 12.05.2022)

Secondly, the first main message was analysed. The message chosen was the communication of **proposal for change**. Press releases and official statements that expressed a **proposal for change** were those that suggested modifications to the status quo, proposed changes to the current one-China policy, or called for a reassessment of current policies. Press releases and official statements that expressed **no need for change** were those in which the policy was either not referenced directly or only mentioned in passing without any substantive commentary or evaluation related to potential changes. When comparing the frequency of statements proposing a change to the current policy, it is evident that the majority of the statements from both Lithuania and the EU do not showcase a proposal in this regard. Out of the 103 statements analysed, 87 of them did not include a proposal for change. The corresponding value for Lithuania was 35 out of the 49 Lithuanian statements and for the EU it was 52 out of the 54 EU statements analysed. Proposal for change was reflected in only two statements from the EU side and in 14 of the statements made by Lithuania and/or its representative bodies.

Next, the thesis addressed the second main message, which reflected Press releases and official statements depicting **caution** were those that emphasised diplomatic restraint, avoidance of escalation, or stressed the importance of maintaining stable international relations. These statements often highlighted the risks associated with changing the established policy and focused on promoting dialogue and consensus. Press releases and official statements illustrating **boldness** were characterised by assertive language, calls for significant policy shifts, or advocacy for stronger stances in international forums. These statements often challenged the status quo to some degree, for example mentioning only Taiwan and not China, and suggested more proactive measures in dealing with the complexities of the one-China policy.

Lithuanian statements exhibited boldness in 24 statements out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed which makes up almost 50% of Lithuanian statements. Whereas the EU displayed

boldness in only 5 of its statements out of the analysed 54, making it only a bit more than 9%. Caution was communicated in 49 statements made by the EU and only in 5 Lithuanian ones.

The next sub-section of the thesis introduced the analysis of the first main value, which reflected whether closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan, China or both were desired. Statements indicating a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan** typically emphasised strengthening economic, cultural, and political relations with Taiwan. These statements often highlighted initiatives such as opening new trade offices, supporting Taiwan's participation in international organisations, and enhancing bilateral cooperation. Statements expressing a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with China**, on the other hand, focused on maintaining or enhancing strategic partnerships with China. These statements often stressed the importance of China as a key global player and highlighted efforts to strengthen economic, political, and cultural exchanges. Statements expressing a desire for **closer diplomatic ties with both Taiwan and China** were characterised by a balanced approach, emphasising the importance of maintaining positive relations with both entities. These statements often highlighted the strategic importance of engaging with both Taiwan and China for economic, political, and regional stability reasons. In examining the statements from both Lithuania and the EU side on the matter of strengthening diplomatic relations with either Taiwan, China or both simultaneously, it is evident that Lithuania is a lot more eager to create closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan than the EU is. In 41 out of the 49 Lithuanian statements analysed, closer diplomatic ties with Taiwan were mentioned, while only 12 in the corresponding EU statements. However, the EU showed a greater inclination to tighten the diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan at the same times, communicating this in 28 out of the 54 EU official statements and press releases that were under analysis in this thesis. The same value for Lithuania was only reflected in 7 statements. The EU was also noticeably more ready to create closer ties with China, noting it is 14 statements, while Lithuania communicated it in only one statement.

The second main value analysed referred to the condemnation of Chinese coercion. Statements **indicating condemnation of Chinese coercion** typically emphasised strong disapproval of China's aggressive actions and policies, especially regarding Taiwan and other neighbouring regions. These statements often highlighted the importance of standing against coercive measures and promoting international law and human rights. Statements **exhibiting avoidance in condemning Chinese coercion** were those that exemplified a more diplomatic and measured tone or where the coercive measures by China were not mentioned at all. These statements often underscored the need for dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts while acknowledging concerns about Chinese actions.

The value of condemning Chinese coercion was reflected in 45 statements out of the total of 103, rounding it to almost 45%. As was visible in the previous categories, Lithuania is far more willing to speak out against Chinese coercion and current policies, with 30 statements showcasing condemnation of Chinese coercion tactics, the EU did no in 15 statements. The condemnation was not mentioned or not communicated in 58 out of the total of 103 statements, with Lithuania not doing so in 19 statements and the EU in 39.

Out of all the analysed categories, it was evident that Lithuania demonstrated more boldness in communication regarding one-China policy, while the European Union maintained a more cautious tone.

The analysis also introduced two main small state theories. The author will now try to tie the empirical analysis together with the theoretical background and models of influence used as a basis for contextualisation. The results will also be explained by interpreting the results of the empirical research in accordance with the theoretics laid out in the theory part of the thesis. When contextualising Lithuanian statements, the author will draw upon the two definitions, small state theory (Long, 2005), as well as the theory of small state influence and its categories (Nasra, 2011). Long (2005) defined three main ways types of power-conducting by the small states, which will now be placed into the context of analysed Lithuanian statements. The idea that in order for a small state to gain influence and power, it must rely on its relationship with a great power (**derivative power**) was reflected in the analysed statements as Lithuania wanting to gain the European approval for their diplomatic actions, such as opening a Taiwanese Representative Office. The notion that small states try to seek influence through building coalitions with supportive states, often doing it through institutions (**collective power**) was reflected in Lithuanian statements in dealings with the EU, as well as with the allies from outside the Union, such as the US. The idea that small states use their assets in order to gain power and influence **(particular-intrinsic power)** was reflected in the statements as Lithuania trying to act as a "knowledge broker" when it mentioned values like democracy.

The results were somewhat surprising. When looking at the trends emerged during the chosen timeframe, it seems that Lithuania has indeed managed to nudge the EU at least to a certain degree. Looking at the figures in the sub-section of 5.8, it is evident that a similar pattern is noticeable in both the statements made by the EU and Lithuania, with a difference being that Lithuanian statements were a bit ahead of the EU, starting the trend of non-affirmation earlier and more aggressively than the EU. It seems from the figures listed in the subsection 5.8, as well as the ones listed in the previous ones (5.6 and (5.7) that the EU has taken Lithuanian concerns seriously, otherwise the EU would not have voiced them as part of the EUs collective agenda. The graph of

figure 18 shows clearly that the overall trend that the EU and Lithuania are following, is moving in the same direction. Although still, from the chart 17 in subsection 5.8, it can be seen that Lithuania is taken an even critical standpoint and voicing the concerns even more than the EU does. However, as it seems, the EU followed Lithuania's trend. And from that, it could be said that, at least to some level, Lithuania has seemed to have an effect on the EU.

Conclusion

This thesis sought to address the research question: how did/does Lithuania justify its recent diplomatic steps towards Taiwan in light of and in terms of compatibility with the one-China policy? The research was broken down into two sub-questions:

To what extent do Lithuania and the European Union present coherent or divergent statements on Taiwan?

How did the EU address Lithuania's move within the framework of its relations with China?

The findings revealed that, while the EU maintained its own distinct stance on the one-China policy, separate from Lithuania's more assertive approach, Lithuania still managed to influence the policy discourse to some degree. The extent of this influence is difficult to quantify precisely, but the analysis demonstrated that Lithuania's bold stance on Taiwan and China had an observable impact on the EU's policy shaping.

In terms of tonality and reaffirmation of the one-China policy, out of 103 statements analysed, 58% reaffirmed the current one-China policy. The EU showed a strong tendency to reaffirm the policy (79% of 54 statements), while Lithuania showed a more divided stance, with only 35% reaffirming the policy and 41% expressing dissatisfaction.

When examining proposals for change, the majority of statements from both Lithuania and the EU did not suggest changes to the current policy. Only 2 EU statements proposed modifications, compared to 14 Lithuanian statements advocating for change.

Regarding caution vs. boldness, the EU predominantly communicated caution (49 out of 54 statements), whereas Lithuania exhibited boldness in nearly 50% of its statements (24 out of 49).

In the context of a desire for closer diplomatic ties, Lithuania expressed a strong inclination to strengthen ties with Taiwan (41 out of 49 statements), while the EU showed a balanced approach, emphasizing closer relations with both Taiwan and China (28 out of 54 statements).

On the issue of condemnation of Chinese coercion, Lithuania was more vocal (30 out of 49 statements) compared to the EU (15 out of 54 statements).

The thesis also explored two main small state theories to contextualize Lithuania's actions. According to Small State Theory (Long, 2005), Lithuania's efforts to gain EU approval for its diplomatic actions reflect the use of derivative power. Lithuania's coalition-building with supportive states, including the US, exemplifies the use of collective power. Acting as a "knowledge broker" on values like democracy demonstrates Lithuania's use of particular-intrinsic power. Small State Influence Theory (Nasra, 2011) was also relevant, as Lithuania's strategic communication and coalition-building efforts nudged the EU towards a more critical stance on the one-China policy over time.

In conclusion, while the EU maintained a cautious and reaffirming stance on the one-China policy, Lithuania's bold and assertive statements highlighted its desire for change and closer ties with Taiwan. This divergence not only underscored Lithuania's independent foreign policy approach but also demonstrated its ability to influence EU policy discourse. The theoretical frameworks applied in this study proved relevant in explaining how a small state like Lithuania can exert influence within a larger entity like the EU. Ultimately, Lithuania's actions, although not wholly altering the EU's stance, have contributed to shaping the broader dialogue on the one-China policy within the EU framework.

For further research, it would be interesting to look if this trend continues into the coming years. Further analysis could be made of Twiplomacy using the same models covered in this thesis. Another fruitful work could be made using the same analysis method and comparing the values of different EU member states.

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Appendicies

APPENDIX A. Press releases and official statements used for research

LITHUANIAN OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND PRESS RELEASES

07.11.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-lithuania-taiwan-agreements-open-up-new-opportunities-for-lithuanian-business

06.06.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-lithuania-and-japan-turn-a-new-page-in-relations-lay-the-basis-for-a-strategic-partnership-agreement

10.02.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/foreign-policy/key-foreign-policy-documents/resolution-of-the-seimas-of-the-republic-of-lithuania-on-directions-in-foreign-policy-may-1-2004

07.05.2023

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/gabrielius-landsbergis-the-indo-pacific-strategy-is-a-new-and-significant-step-in-strengthening-cooperation-with-the-region

03.02.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-discussed-the-situation-in-the-region-with-the-us-senator-durbin

13.05.2020

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/l-linkevicius-discusses-taiwans-participation-in-who

30.06.2021
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-tells-lithuanian-ambassadors-we-need-to-proactively-strengthen-lithuanias-influence

22.06.2021
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-to-allocate-humanitarian-aid-to-taiwan

20.07.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/taiwan-to-open-its-representative-office-in-lithuania

10.08.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanian-foreign-ministrys-position-regarding-the-statement-of-china

14.08.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-had-a-telephone-conversation-with-the-united-states-deputy-secretary-of-state-wendy-r-sherman

19.08.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/gabrielius-landsbergis-and-the-chair-of-the-uk-parliament-foreign-affairs-committee-discussed-the-most-pressing-foreign-policy-issues

23.08.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-is-the-gold-standard-for-democracy-says-chairman-of-the-us-senate-foreign-relations-committee-robert-menendez-while-talking-to-minister-landsbergis

23.08.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/us-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-expressed-ironclad-solidarity-and-unyielding-support-for-lithuanian-foreign-policy

01.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/foreign-vice-minister-pranckevicius-at-thenb8-state-secretaries-meeting-in-helsinki-lithuania-feels-full-support-of-the-nordic-and-baltic-countries-regarding-the-actions-of-belarus-and-china

08.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-ambassador-g-varvuolis-met-with-charge-daffaires-of-the-us-in-japan-r-greene

15.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/in-the-us-congress-lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-heard-strong-support-for-lithuanias-values-based-foreign-policy

15.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/in-the-us-congress-lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-heard-strong-support-for-lithuanias-values-based-foreign-policy

15.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-vice-minister-pranckevicius-the-eu-must-speak-with-a-single-voice-in-relations-with-china

22.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-and-his-australian-counterpart-discussed-foreign-policy-challenges-and-potential-for-cooperation

23.09.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-donated-235-900-doses-of-vaxzevria-to-taiwan

11.10.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-discussed-key-items-on-the-international-agenda-and-regional-cooperation-with-the-foreign-ministers-of-the-baltic-states-and-the-united-kingdom

04.11.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/jakavonyte-received-the-diplomat-of-the-year-award-for-helping-allies-with-afghanistan-evacuation

21.11.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/on-chinas-decision-not-to-return-ambassadors

23.11.2021

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuania-and-the-us-open-a-new-page-in-their-relations-the-strategic-dialogue-on-the-indo-pacific-region-

01.01.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/the-foreign-ministrys-statement-on-false-information-in-the-international-media

10.02.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-gabrielius-landsbergis-i-believe-that-lithuania-and-australia-are-entering-a-new-stage-of-close-cooperation

11.02.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/like-minded-partners-show-unprecedented-support-to-lithuania-in-the-face-of-chinas-illegal-pressure

30.03.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/in-vilnius-the-nordic-baltic-eight-nb8-state-secretaries-discussed-security-challenges-strengthening-regional-cooperation-

08.08.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/a-high-level-panel-of-frontline-democracies-held-in-vilnius

10.08.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/the-expansion-of-export-markets-increases-lithuanias-resilience-to-geopolitical-challenges-1

22.08.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-vice-minister-meilunas-had-a-telephone-conversation-with-representatives-of-the-united-states-department-of-state

29.08.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/foreign-minister-landsbergis-lithuanias-diplomatic-service-must-find-ways-to-deal-with-current-and-future-crises

09.09.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/geopolitical-future-and-lithuanias-foreign-policy

04.11.2022

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/second-future-of-democracy-forum-to-be-held-in-vilnius

18.01.2023

https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-welcomes-the-agreement-with-taiwan-on-the-semiconductor-industry-in-lithuania

10.02.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/minister-landsbergis-welcomes-the-opening-of-the-office-of-the-australian-trade-and-investment-commission

06.03.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-we-see-the-threat-posed-by-china-and-the-importance-of-cooperation-with-the-indo-pacific-in-the-same-way-as-the-us-does-

19.04.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/minister-landsbergis-the-international-response-to-chinas-economic-coercion-shows-that-strength-of-a-country-is-not-the-only-measurement-of-international-order

22.04.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-its-time-to-ask-alouddo-we-still-want-to-be-dangerously-dependent-on-china

19.10.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-we-can-achieve-a-lot-together-with-the-czech-republic-which-is-an-exceptionally-like-minded-partner-

27.10.2023
https://urm.lt/default/en/news/lithuanias-foreign-minister-landsbergis-opened-the-lithuanian-embassy-in-singapore-we-are-opening-yet-another-gateway-to-southeast-asia

19.10.2021
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19.01.2022
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08.03.2022
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17.09.2019
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24.11.2020
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2020-11-24-INT-2-242-0000_EN.html

20.10.2020
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2020-10-20-INT-2-158-0000_EN.html

14.02.2021
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EU OFFICIAL STATEMENTS AND PRESS RELEASES

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https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/18/council-updates-the-list-of-countries-special-administrative-regions-and-other-entities-and-territorial-authorities-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/

01.07.2021
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/01/covid-19-council-adds-10-countries-and-one-entityterritorial-authority-to-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/

15.07.2021
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/15/covid-19-council-adds-ukraine-and-removes-two-countries-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/

30.08.2021
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09.09.2021
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29.10.2021
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02.12.2021
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17.01.2022
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/01/17/covid-19-council-removes-argentina-australia-and-canada-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/

01.04.2022
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-the-eu-china-summit-via-videoconference/

12.05.2022
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/12/joint-statement-eu-japan-summit-2022/

10.08.2020
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/china-launches-international-collaborative-projects-support-research-innovation-response-covid-19_en

17.08.2022
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APPENDIX B. Coding table

Date	Title	Institution	Tonality	Main messages	Main messages notes	Main values	Main values notes	Country	Link of the statement
18.06.2021	Council updates the list of countries, special administrative regions and other entities and territorial authorities for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/06/18/council-updates-the-list-of-countries-special-administrative-regions-and-other-entities-and-territorial-authorities-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
01.07.2021	COVID-19: Council adds 10 countries and one entity/territorial authority to the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/01/covid-19-council-adds-10-countries-and-one-entityterritorial-authority-to-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
15.07.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Ukraine and removes two countries from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/15/covid-19-council-adds-ukraine-and-removes-two-countries-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
30.08.2021	COVID-19: Council removes 5 countries and one entity/territorial authority from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/08/30/covid-19-council-removes-5-countries-and-one-entityterritorial-authority-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
09.09.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Uruguay and removes six countries from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/09/09/covid-19-council-adds-uruguay-and-removes-six-countries-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
23.09.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Chile, Kuwait and Rwanda and removes two countries from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/09/23/covid-19-council-adds-chile-kuwait-and-rwanda-and-removes-two-countries-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
08.10.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Bahrain and United Arab Emirates to the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/08/covid-19-council-adds-bahrain-and-united-arab-emirates-to-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
29.10.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Argentina, Colombia, Namibia and Peru to the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/10/29/covid-19-council-adds-argentina-colombia-namibia-and-peru-to-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
09.11.2021	COVID-19: Council removes Singapore and Ukraine from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/11/09/covid-19-council-removes-singapore-and-ukraine-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
18.11.2021	COVID-19: Council adds Indonesia to the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/11/18/covid-19-council-adds-indonesia-to-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
02.12.2021	COVID-19: Council removes Jordan and Namibia from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/02/covid-19-council-removes-jordan-and-namibia-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
17.01.2022	COVID-19: Council removes Argentina, Australia and Canada from the list of countries for which travel restrictions should be lifted	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/01/17/covid-19-council-removes-argentina-australia-and-canada-from-the-list-of-countries-for-which-travel-restrictions-should-be-lifted/
01.04.2022	Remarks by President Charles Michel after the EU-China summit via videoconference	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-after-the-eu-china-summit-via-videoconference/
12.05.2022	Joint Statement EU-Japan Summit 2022	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/12/joint-statement-eu-japan-summit-2022/
23.09.2022	Speech by President Charles Michel at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/09/23/speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-77th-un-general-assembly/
16.11.2022	Australia-EU Leaders' meeting 2022: joint press release by Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, European Council President Charles Michel and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/16/australia-eu-leaders-meeting-2022-joint-press-release-by-australian-prime-minister-anthony-albanese-european-council-president-charles-michel-and-european-commission-president-ursula-von-der-leyen/
01.12.2022	Remarks by President Charles Michel following the meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/01/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-following-his-visit-to-china/
19.05.2023	Remarks by President Charles Michel before the G7 summit in Hiroshima	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/19/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-before-the-g7-summit-in-hiroshima/
22.05.2023	Press statement by President Charles Michel following the EU-Republic of Korea summit	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/22/press-statement-by-president-charles-michel-following-the-eu-republic-of-korea-summit/
30.06.2023	European Council conclusions on China, 30 June 2023	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/30/european-council-conclusions-on-china-30-june-2023/
07.12.2023	24th EU-China Summit: engaging to promote our values and defend our interests	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/07/24th-eu-china-summit-engaging-to-promote-our-values-and-defend-our-interests/
07.12.2023	Remarks by President Charles Michel at the press conference following the EU-China summit in Beijing	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/07/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-press-conference-following-the-eu-china-summit-in-beijing/
07.12.2023	Remarks by President Charles Michel during his meeting with President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/12/07/remarks-by-president-charles-michel-during-his-meeting-with-president-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china-xi-jinping/
10.12.2023	Readout of the meeting between President Charles Michel and China's Prime Minister LI Qiang	European Council							https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/09/10/readout-of-the-meeting-between-president-charles-michel-and-china-s-prime-minister-li-qiang/

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