MARIANNE LEPPIK

The segmented integration and
mediated transnationalism
of Estonian Russian-speaking
populations

DISSERTATIONES DE MEDIIS ET COMMUNICATIONIBUS
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS

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The segmented integration and mediated transnationalism of Estonian Russian-speaking populations

Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu

Dissertation accepted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Media and Communication) on 20 October 2020 by the Council of the Institute of Social Studies, University of Tartu.

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Commencement: December 3, 2020 at The Senate Hall of the University of
                Tartu

University of Tartu Press
www.tyk.ee

CONTENTS

LIST OF ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS

This dissertation is based on five publications, which will be referred to in the dissertation by their respective Roman numbers.

Publications included in the dissertation:

Study I   **Leppik, M.,** Vihalemm, T. (2015). The paradox of national language acquisition: Russian Speakers labour market positions in Estonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies,* 46(4): 471–496.

Study II   Kiisel, M., **Leppik, M.,** Seppel, K. (2015). Engaged and critical? The young generation's political participation in EU countries. *Studies of Transition States and Societies,* 7(3): 51–65.

Study III   Vihalemm, T., **Leppik, M.** (2019). Multilingualism and Media-Related Practices of Russian-Speaking Estonians. (239–267). In: Marten, H., Lazdiņa, S. (eds). Multilingualism in the Baltic States: Societal Discourses, Language Policies and Contact Phenomena. Palgrave Macmillan.

Study IV   Vihalemm, T., Juzefovics, J., **Leppik, M.** (2019). Identity and Media-use Strategies of the Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking Populations Amid Political Crisis. *Europe-Asia Studies,* 71(1): 48–70.

Study V   Vihalemm, T., Seppel, K., **Leppik, M.** (2020). Russians in Estonia: Integration and translocalism. (251–292). In: Kalmus, V., Lauristin, M., Opermann, S., Vihalemm, T. (eds). Researching Estonian transformation: Morphogenetic reflections. Tartu: University of Tartu Press.

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AUTHOR'S CONTRIBUTION

The author's contribution to the articles is as follows:

Study I: The role of the author was leading in this article. The author was responsible for data processing and analysis, as well for theoretical and empirical part and of article

Study II: The author was responsible for the data processing and analysis and contributed into writing the empirical part of the article.

Study III: The author was partly responsible for writing the theoretical and discussion chapter and mostly responsible for the empirical analysis. The author also contributed to qualitative data collection.

Study IV: The author contributed to the qualitative data collection, empirical part of the article and was mostly responsible for processing and analysing the data.

Study V: The author was involved in writing all chapters of the article. The author was responsible for the empirical analysis and contributed to other parts of the article.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for all the people and institutions who have supported me in the process of finalising my dissertation.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor and co-author Triin Vihalemm. I am very grateful for your patience, valuable advice and guidance throughout this journey. Thank you for being there, devoting your time and inspiring me when I was almost giving up. I also thank my other co-authors without whom all these articles would not have been written.

Warm thanks to people from Institute of Social Sciences whose valuable and relevant advice have helped me to improve my work.

I am very thankful to my employer who have granted me all the time I needed during this process. I express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues whose endless questions about my graduation finally have received the answer. Thank you for your consistency and support.

Last but not least, I want to thank my family and friends. My deepest gratitude goes to Meelis for believing in me and supporting me all these years.

1. INTRODUCTION

Estonia is a multi-ethnic country with representatives of more 180 ethnicities. According to the latest population census conducted by Statistics Estonia (2011), the largest ethnic groups are Estonians (about 69%), and immigrants from former Soviet countries and their descendants (about 27%) who use Russian as their mother tongue or first language. Estonia has not always been a multi-ethnic country with considerable migrant-background populations. It was in fact largely mono ethnic until the Second World War, when Estonia was forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union and coerced immigration from Russia and other Soviet republics began as a result of Soviet colonization policy. By 1991, Estonia had a Russian-speaking population[1] consisting of about one third of the country's total population. The immigrants had privileged position in many domains of social life – jobs, special housing arrangements, Russian-language education and media institutions. Although the Estonians knew Russian well and also used Russian language in inter-ethnic communications, most of the Russian-speaking immigrant population remain structurally segregated: residentially, in terms of labour market (employment in different sectors), culturally (schools with Russian language of instruction, media channels) (see e.g. Tammaru 1999, Marksoo 2005, Lagerspetz 2014, Soll 2015, Mägi 2018). On August 20th, 1991 Estonia regained independence and a new era of transition towards democracy and a market economy began. The transition process that started in Estonia in the 1990s was fast and radical. The changes that occurred in the political and economic system deepened the ethnolinguistic segregation (Heidmets 1998, Pettai & Hallik 2002, Heidmets & Lauristin 2002, Lauristin & Heidmets 2002, Lauristin 2010, Vetik 2012, Lagerspetz & Vogt 2013, Lagerspetz 2015, Lauristin & Vihalemm 2020) and built different pathways for the further involvement of the Russian speaking population in Estonian society.

Significant international scholarly attention has been devoted to the identity (Melvin 1995, Kolstoe 2000) and future political perspectives (e.g. Linz & Stepan 1994, Smith & Graham 1997, Smith 1998, Laitin 1998) of the Russian-speaking population in the context of Estonian nation-building. Most of these scholarly works capture the time period of the first decade after the collapse of Soviet Union and analyse the possibility for collective political mobilization of Russian-speaking population as a reaction to Estonian nation building. What previous studies have not paid much attention to, and is the focus of this thesis,

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[1] Although the migration of the majority of the Russian-speaking population to Estonia took place decades ago and currently 22% of them belong to the third generation which is, according to international definition, no longer considered as migrant population, their involvement in Estonian society continues to be problematic in several aspects. Thus, the Russian-speaking migrant background population is a relevant term to use. In this thesis, the terms Russian-speaking migrant background population, Russian-speaking population, Russian speakers and minority/minorities are all used interchangeably.

is the internal diversity of this group. This diversity stems from different pathways of adaptation with societal changes caused by the deep transformations of the host society among the population of migrant background. My studies show that although Russian speakers in Estonia are united by the common use of Russian language and linked social practices, such as following Russian language media, deepening in-group distinctions still exist inside the Russian speaking population with immigrant background. While these distinctions started with post-Soviet nation building, they are carried on by current local, and international political, technological-economic and cultural developments.

My research belongs to the long-term research project "Me. The World. The Media", where researchers of the Institute of Social Studies at the University of Tartu offer a comprehensive analysis of the changes in the lifeworld of all Estonian population groups within various domains of social life (socioeconomic conditions, civic, political and cultural participation, media and time use, collective memory etc.) over the last two decades (see Kalmus et al 2020, Vihalemm et al 2018, Vihalemm et al 2017, Kalmus et al 2004). This analysis is conducted by "witness-researchers" and reflects upon the "historical quasi-experiment" of the quick transformative change after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This experiment is one that "shakes a whole society – every social group and every societal domain' and 'in a relatively short time has resulted in the formation of new social and cultural agencies and relationships" (Masso et al 2020: 3). The life changes of Soviet period immigrants and their descendants is part and parcel of this transformation process. In the beginning of my doctoral studies, I discovered that the explanations of immigrant adaptation, e.g. the relationship between language acquisition and labour market success, which worked in more stable societies do not work in the transformative social context (**Study I**). Thereby, a more sensitive and multi-dimensional approach is needed in order to capture the adaptation of migrant background populations within the transformations of a host society.

Previous investigations have offered typologies of multidimensional social involvement in relation to the ownership of nation state specific capitals of the Russian speaking population in the integration monitoring reports (e.g. Lauristin 2012, Rikman et al 2013). This thesis is a continuation of the empirical analysis of the multidimensionality of adaptation and works to elaborate on the initial model of in-group differentiation among the Russian speaking population based on the multi-domain clustering approach (Lauristin 2012). In my thesis I investigate the adaptive social agency of the Russian speaking population not only in relation to Estonian nation building, but also in the context of current international affairs (i.e. political tensions between Russia and the Western countries), media market developments (transnational media corporations, personalization and fragmentation of the media production/reception) and international mobility (EU citizenship, common labour market, English as *lingua franca*).

The ambition of this thesis is to explain theoretically and operationalize empirically the concept of segmented integration among migrant background populations using the example of the Estonian Russian-speaking population. As the world has become more complex and dynamic in terms of human mobility and technology, there is a continuing need to examine the adaptative agency of migrant populations in host societies. Therefore, rather than being exclusive to the Estonian Russian-speaking case, this thesis is one of international interest and applicability. The "final station" of integration, if it exists at all, does not necessarily mean becoming more similar to a majority population; rather, it signifies an incorporation into different domains of social life of a host society. With this in mind, researchers and practitioners need to consider ongoing cross-border relationships between migrant populations, and previous and present societies of their residence. The approach of adaptation as a unidirectional process which can be measured with the help of certain indicators or outcomes (e.g. language competence, citizenship), cannot provide good solutions to today's problems (Portes & Bach 1985, Glazer 1993, Nagel 2009, Treas 2014).

I have approached the current research from the theoretical strand according to which immigrants' incorporation is multidimensional and multidirectional (Treas 2014). Segmented assimilation theory[2], proposed by Portes and Zhou (1993), offers an alternative to assimilation. According to this theory, different paths lead to different outcomes. These paths depend on the combinations of different resources available to populations with migrant backgrounds and host society population, as well as structural affordances and restrictions of the host society and its neighbours (see also Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes 2007, Alba & Nee 2003).

I have operationalized this concept of segmented integration[2] for an empirical exploration of integration types of the Estonian Russian-speaking populations. Applying the theoretical concept of segmented integration enables this study to categorize the diversity in empirical findings into four main types of integration. Since this approach also illuminates groups, such as the "passive, weakly engaged group", which may remain invisible in other empirical measurements, it better enables officials to address integration problems in policy making.

In the empirical measurement model, my analysis distinguishes the aspect of involvement in mediated transnationalism from other typologies created to characterize the Russian speaking migrant background population in Estonia (e.g. Lauristin 2012, Rikman et al 2013). Among the Estonian Russian-speaking population, common uniting practices are the following of Russian-origin and Russian-language media, and the existence a number of real-life or social media contacts abroad (Vihalemm 2008, Vihalemm 2011, Vihalemm & Leppik 2014,

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[2]   Concepts of migrant adaptation have varied across time and space. Although assimilation is a concept more used in the USA and the concept of integration is more common in Europe (Modood 2005), they both refer to migrant adaptation. Therefore, in this thesis, instead of segmented assimilation, the term of segmented integration is used.

Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). According to the concept of transnationalism, some migrants and their descendants remain strongly influenced by their continuing ties to their home country or by social networks that stretch across national borders (Glick Schiller et al 1995). This means that individuals can be physically away but mentally present in geographically remote places or societies (Vertovec 2004a). The development and wide affordability of communication through technological devices makes mediated cross-border activities part of the everyday life and experience with ancestral countries or linguistic-cultural diasporic networks. In turn, these activities and experiences are acquired by younger generations. The possibilities for everyday mediated participation in remote societies challenge the processes of integration and assimilation. On the one hand, transnational practices may reinforce social integration in the host society (De Haas 2005, Gustafson 2002); on the other hand however, these practices may suppress the formation of a sense of belonging to the host society (Vasta 2010).

At the same time, it is important to note that these everyday cross-border communications are not only characteristic to migrant communities, but also affect the native populations by challenging perceptions about the "local", "us" and "them". In Estonia, 61% of native Estonians (compared to 50% of Estonian residents from other ethnicities) have relatives or friends who have moved to work/study and live abroad during recent years. Additionally, 7% have themselves lived abroad recently and 43% (compared to 42% of Estonian residents from other ethnicities) communicate via social media with people who have emigrated from Estonia ("Me. The World. The Media" 2014, authors' calculations). Thus, a considerable part of the native population has some personal experience with the cross-border communication networks and the role of the home country and people in the everyday life of migrants. Therefore, in this new situation (compared to the 1990s), it is appropriate to investigate how transnational (media) practices are associated with the ongoing segmented integration of Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

The aim of my thesis is to explain the segmented integration process of the Estonian migrant-background, Russian-speaking populations and assess the role of transnational media use and cross-border communication *(i.e. mediated transnationalism)* in this process. I empirically operationalize the concept of segmented integration and mediated transnationalism and measure them based on a sample from the Estonian Russian-speaking population. I explain how mediated transnationalism contributes to different forms of segmented integration of the Russian-speaking population into Estonian society. From another angle, I also consider how local integration shapes transnational media related practices, particularly in times of geopolitical tensions between sending and receiving countries.

Based on data from the Me. The World. The Media (2014) survey, I connect the empirical indicators of transnationalism (**Study V**) with the indicators of integration (see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Then, I describe the main types of segmented integration, characterize people

belonging to these patterns and explore their transnational media use (**Study III, Study IV, Study V**). By combining the quantitative data with the evidence from qualitative studies (**Study III, IV**), I give some insights into how transnational media use contributes to segmented integration.

My thesis consists of three main research questions and related sub-questions:

1. What are the main characterizing types of segmented integration among the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations? (**Study I, II, V**)
   1.1. What are the main types of integration across domains of social life among the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?
   1.2. What is the socio-demographic characterization of integration types?

2. How does media consumption relate to segmented integration among the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations? (**Study III, IV, V**)
   2.1. What are universalities and peculiarities of the media use of main types of integration?
   2.2. How is political news concerning geopolitical conflict between Russia and Ukraine interpreted across the main types of integration and media use?

3. How does the mediated transnationalism of the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations is related to their segmented integration? (**Study III, IV, V**)
   3.1. How is mediated transnationalism related to main types of integration?
   3.2. How do local integration and transnational practice shape social agency?

In the Estonian context, this approach is a novel one since the mutual modes of inter-connectedness have not, until now, been comprehensively analysed. In the earlier analyses (Dougherty & Kaljurand 2015, Liebich 2019) the role of Russia is considered to be, if not dangerous to, then definitely not supporting of, local social involvement. I argue that because of the widespread following of Russian and/or international media and via personal cross-border communications, the transnational media and communication practices of Russian speakers in Estonia interact with the local integration in different ways. These different modes of interaction mean that local integration and mediated transnationalism can exist in mutually synergistic and competing relationships. Another novel aspect is that I look at transnationalism mainly through the lenses of media use and mediated interpersonal communication and not so much as a personal mobility related practice. The applied informative value of my work is the comprehensive empirical analysis of media use within the various types of segmented integration. This offers explanation how media use interacts with participation in the labour market, political processes and public sphere.

In addition to the cover article, this thesis consists of five studies. In **Study I**, I use the immigrant population survey from 2008 to compare assimilation and segregation strategies in order to find out which of these is more beneficial

when it comes to achieving certain subjective social status and mobility. **Study II** is based on a European social survey (different rounds) which focuses on young people's political participation and their expectations of it. More specifically, the article analyses what are the major predictors for the network-based and horizontal political practices. **Study III** focuses on the language skills and media-related practices of the Russian-speaking populations and combines quantitative data with focus-groups data in order to find out how multilingualism and media related practices in times of geopolitical crisis are interconnected. **Study IV** explores the connections between identity and media practices by relying on mostly qualitative data. The focus of this study was on the comparison of Estonian and Latvian Russian-speaking audiences and considering the connections between media use, trust strategies and identity development in the context of political (Ukrainian) crisis. Lastly, **Study V** explains the societal structures that shape people's everyday practices and, vice versa, considers how specific ways of integration influence everyday life (based on Me. The World. The Media survey). Additionally, in **Study V**, the Russian speakers' transnational media use is analysed according to integration types in order to find out how integration types and cross-border media use and communication are connected.

In addition to the first introductory chapter, my thesis consists of six more chapters. Chapters two and three define the theoretical concepts and empirical assumptions of the research. The fourth chapter gives an overview of the methodological solutions used in the thesis and includes the ethical considerations. Chapter five provides an overview of the results and empirical findings in connection with the research questions. Chapter six discusses the findings within the wider scholarly context and practical implications in Estonian society and presents the conclusions structured according the research questions provided above in this chapter.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Migration has greatly shaped the world's history, starting from *Homo Erectus′s* journey from Northern Africa to Europe and finishing with the current major and minor migration crises taking place today. As said by Ozkazanc-Pan (2019), migration has been a main driving force behind social transformations: increasing mobility of people might change the political, social, cultural and economic structure of the receiving societies (Castles et al 2014[3]). Since people are crossing international borders every day, migration and subsequent problems or political crises have been intensively researched and hotly debated publicly. Many researchers consider migration and the resulting diversity as one of the most prioritized and emotional topics in modern societies in the political field as well in the people's everyday lives (Castles et al 2014, Green & Staerkle 2013).

Migration and the mutual adaptation of newcomers and hosting societies are complex processes which are influenced by very different factors: what is the origin country, what has caused the migration (voluntary/involuntary, labour etc.), how big is the co-ethnic population in the destination country, what is the will and readiness to be involved in processes taking place in the destination country etc. The notion that mobile people can maintain different kind of relationships (economic, political etc.) in several countries or territories at the same time is challenging and expanding our understanding of theories of migration and the differences it brings with it. The aim of this theoretical chapter is to give a brief overview about different approaches to integration by considering both how the different meanings of migrant adaptation are handled and developed in time, and also how integration and transnationalism are interconnected. The latter helps to contextualise the approach in order to explain the integration of the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background population and related issues.

2.1 Main concepts of integration and their development in time (and space)

The adaptation of immigrants became topical in the early 20th century in the United States (U.S.). Hirschman and Mogford (2009, p.898) point out that the decades surrounding 1900 were the age of industrialization, accompanied by urbanisation and immigration: by 1920 over one third of the U.S. population belonged to an immigrant community. Most of the migrants at that time came from Europe – Poland, Austria-Hungary, Russia etc. (see Bulmer 1986). The beginning of the 1900s also marks a new era in (U.S.) sociological studies. In 1918, two sociological pioneers, Thomas and Znaniecki, wrote the book "The

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[3] 5th edition. First edition was published in 1993.

Polish Peasant in Europe and America". In their book, which was the first major empirical study about immigration in general, the authors tried to explain social problems by taking both individuals and their surrounding society into account (see Treas 2014, Triandafyllidou 1996). Early works of immigration handled questions related to voluntary and permanent forms of migration, especially groups migrating towards the U.S. Since people shared similarities in terms of their background, for years, people who migrated were eventually expected to assimilate into the receiving country's society. Migration was seen as a process of leaving the homeland and adapting into a new society. The term "assimilation" was implemented by sociologists belonging to the Chicago school in the beginning of 20th century. The term marked the overtaking of host society´s norms and traditions and becoming gradually similar to the host country's majority population. According to Park and Burgess (1921) assimilation was a "process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life (p. 736). This was later elaborated by Park (1950)[4], Warner and Srole (1954) and Gordon (1964). In early works of assimilation, immigration was seen as a permanent process, which ends with migrants being incorporated into the society; however, from the 1960s the forms and amounts of migration changed (Green & Staerkle 2013). As migrants came to U.S. and Western European countries in search of better economic opportunities, from former colonies and hired in quantities as a foreign work force, migration become increasingly politicized (Treas 2014, Kivisto 2002, Jürgenson 2016). At the same time, the receiving societies have become more complex (Bartram et al 2014) and culturally diverse in order to provide a unidirectional way of incorporation (Deaux 2006) because of inner fragmentation (Bartram et al 2014).

The critique of assimilation theory intensified in the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s (see Portes & Bach 1985, Glazer 1993). As Nagel (2009) brings out, overlooking ethnicity and race and highlighting white, middle class society as a norm to which migrants should aspire, stood in sharp contrast with reality. The assimilation concept was criticised as entailing an ethnocentric and functionalist bias by Treas (2014) who pointed out the need for migrant populations to change without any efforts from the side of titular population. In line with these criticisms, more scholarly and practical attention was paid to the conditions of the host society. Based on the U.S. example, Alba and Nee (1997) stated that assimilation requires steps including readiness for acceptance and change from the native population. Even earlier studies by Portes and Zshou (1993) proposed the concept of segmented assimilation, which states that migrant groups adapt to a host society differently depending on various factors. On the one hand, they are influenced by their social and

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[4]   According to Park (1950, p. 281) assimilation was process "which people of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve cultural solidarity sufficient to sustain a national existence.

economic resources, families, and communities. On the other hand, policies in the receiving country, attitudes of the natives and the existence and size of a co-ethnic community also have an effect (Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Portes 2007). The authors suggested three possible outcomes for adaptation: *straight line* i.e. within time, immigrants assimilate more; *bumpy-line*, which means there are setbacks, and third, *segmented* or structural multidirectional assimilation (see also Portes & Zhou 1993, Portes & Rumbaut 2001, Treas 2014).

Building on their concept of segmented assimilation, the authors also proposed the concept of "selective acculturation" meaning that migrants accept some elements of the host culture, but at the same time reject other elements (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). This accepting and rejecting of various elements results from challenges, such as racism or a segmented labour market, in the adaptation process. Thus, migrant population groups assimilate into different segments of society. The upward mobility migrants may strive to be similar to the titular majority group and abandon their ethnic origin, while low status immigrants might choose the downward trajectory and identify with the most disadvantaged minorities (Portes & Rumbaut 2006, Green & Staerkle 2013).

The development of concepts related to segmented assimilation contributed to the return of the core concept of assimilation in academic and political discourse with certain transformations in the beginning of the 2000-ies (Brubaker 2001). Even though the terminal end of assimilation is still projected as the "decline of an ethnic distinction and cultural and social differences" (Alba & Nee 2003 p. 14), assimilation is no longer conceptualised as a uniform, one-way process; rather, different outcomes that form in the interaction between immigrants themselves and their receiving society are projected (Alba & Nee 2003).

One model of such outcomes that has become popular in many European countries, including Estonia, was offered by John Berry (1997, 2006). Berry reduces assimilation as an option in the immigrant acculturation process, which follows the following initial concept: assimilation marks a process where the minority population adopts the majority's culture, identity and traditions. The other options in his 4-dimensional acculturation[5] model, otherwise known as cultural convergence, are: separation, integration and marginalisation (see Berry 1997, 2006). Separation marks the occasions when individuals reject the dominant/host culture because they want to preserve their own culture and prefer to relate with the host society through an ethnic community and/or ethnic (economic) enclaves; marginalization refers to a situation when bonds are kept with neither the culture of origin nor the dominant/host culture; integration refers to cases when migrants adopt the dominant cultural norms, but at the same time, also maintain the culture of their own country of origin (Berry 1997, 2006). Green and Staerkle (2013) have elaborated on Berry's initial concept

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[5] Bartram and colleagues (2014, p. 8) say acculturation is "the process by which the cultural patterns of distinct groups change when those groups come into contact with each other, and, sometimes resulting the groups becoming less distinct culturally".

with the idea of an interactive acculturation model that considers migrants' choices to be formed as a result of mutual interactions with members of the receiving society. Thus, the outcome is not a "pure" choice of either party, but rather an outcome of their inter-relationships (Green & Staerkle 2013, Bourhis et al 1997).

In the context of multiple scholarly definitions, in both applied research and policy documents, one of the most widespread terms about migrant settlement and adaptation has been integration (Castles et al 2014). While there is no agreed scholarly definition of this term (Grzymala-Kazlowska & Phillimore 2017), the European Union defines integration as a "dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States" (Council of the European Union 2004, p.17&18). Involvement and adaptation in society encompasses many aspects of social life, most often economic and political. Since integration into various spheres is often a pre-requisition for naturalisation, and vice versa, and because non-existent citizenship could boost social exclusion (ibid.), Hansen (2003) suggests competency in the local language and citizenship as key indicators of integration. Integration enables immigrants to navigate key social institutions (Bartram et al 2014) and grants access to desired resources in society (Remennick 2003). It further allows immigrants to adopt necessary cultural and social capital in order to success in receiving society (Kwok-bun & Plüss 2013). In general, if assimilation assumes that immigrants acquire similar norms and traditions, then integration seems to be a more complex and instrumental process of adaptation. Those who integrate into a society are required to have the necessary abilities to use society´s resources and obey the rules in multiple ways without the presumption of becoming similar.

Both assimilation and integration were built on the assumption of a time-dependent process: the longer immigrants spend in country, the more they assimilate or integrate. From the second decade of the 2000s, scholars speak about personally multidimensional involvements that are depended on the life course. Immigrants, irrespective of their new residence society, are equipped with different access to cultural, social, economic and political resources (Kwok-bun & Plüss 2013). Both Treas (2014), and Elder and colleagues (2003) point out that adaptation due to the consequences of mobility and/or a chance in cultural context depends on the life course and stress experienced from an individual point of view (see also Morawska 2018). Since (re)adaptation is affected by many different fields of life, multidimensionality is fundamental when describing migration experience (Treas 2014).

In parallel with the personal agency-centred and multi-dimensional approaches to the migrant's adaptation/incorporation into the host society, another theoretical stream called transnationalism appeared. This is based on the human geography that contributed to the "spatial turn" in the social sciences. Transnationalism, which is discussed more in chapter 2.2., approaches the migrant populations' interrelations with the host and sending societies through migrant networks, or interpersonal ties linking friends and community members in their

places of origin and destination (Massey et al 1998). These ties or networks shape the decision to migrate since possibilities to get help in finding work or other support and create remittance economies influence the ways individuals are incorporated into society (Bartram et al 2014). The interpersonal and institutional structures of migrant networks (Portes 1995) contribute to the uneven distribution of migration flows across countries (Bartram et al 2014). These networks provide social capital for individual migrants to settle in the host societies and coordinate the movement of remittances and business knowledge (Portes 1995). The networked social capital also creates segmentation and inequalities because the exchange of needed resources (money, information) are not equally accessible to all members of migrant networks (Poros 2011). Populations, which are networked and share similar practices and loyalties but are physically dispersed across several territories are called diasporas[6] (Bartram et al 2014). It is said that old diasporic cultural patterns which were disappearing within newer generations have now, thanks to the new technologies, been reinforced and transformed into new transnational communities (Vertovec 1999). This transformation is in line with many other socio-cultural patterns (Castells 1996). A diaspora implies bounded communities who are concerned about the maintenance of physical/symbolic borders and where the membership is ethnically and/or religiously limited; transnational communities however, have lower barriers to entrance based feelings of belonging (Faist 2000). Kok and Rogers (2017) note that the development of access to information communication technologies (ICT) and wide use of the Internet shifts diasporic allegiances towards de-territorialised, transnational forms, and facilitates the construction of a hybrid identity and sense of belonging to an imagined transnational community. According to Guarnizo and colleagues (2003), diasporic allegiances transform and are shaped by the ways migrants get involved in the new society of residence. Since digital diasporas re-create alliances with the help of digital communications, diasporas can be decades/ generations older than the actual mobility event (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004). Transnational communication within the dispersed networks (i.e. based on the same language but with otherwise low-entering-barrier) can also take on a cosmopolitan character. Cosmopolitanism is boosted not only by more frequent travelling and general mobility, but also by global hybrid (popular) culture (Tsuda 2003) and contested politics within and beyond nation states (Cheah & Robbins 1998). According to Colic-Peisker (2010), those with higher mobility and stronger professional identity are more likely to adopt a cosmopolitan identity or attitude. The role of media cannot be underestimated here (Nessi and Bailey

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[6] Diaspora in general marks part of population living dispersely in other territories while still incorporating a collectively self-identified ethnic group. Diaspora is defined as "expatriate minority communities, that are dispersed from an original center to at least two peripheral places and maintain a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland. And that believe they are not- and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host country, and whose consciousness and solidarity as a group are importantly defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland" (Safran 1991 p. 83).

2014). According to Glick Schiller and colleagues (2011), having a cosmopolitan outlook means being open and rooted at the same time. Other authors regard cosmopolitanism as the opposite to a locally rooted culture (e.g. Kim 2011, Christensen 2012). Beck (2006) suggests that cosmopolitanism questions the principal ways of life, memory, identity, power, and politics that can no longer be understood and evaluated locally, but only globally.

Whereas cosmopolitan is based on non-local, less-rooted, hybrid culture, another concept that also emerged during the first decade of the 2000s is multiculturalism. Multiculturalism pointed out diversity and considered that cultural heterogeneity between social groups positively affects social life (Kymlicka 1995, Green & Staerkle 2013). Castles and colleagues (2014) point out that migration and the resulting ethnic and racial diversity are very emotive subjects in contemporary societies because nations feel the cultural, political, economic changes to the host societies themselves. Multiculturalism can therefore also be considered as a protective reaction against the danger of global hybridization; by nurturing and institutionalising diversity, ethnic identities are believed to be protected from melting together. This idea, however, did not find profound support in the long run. As Green and Staerkle (2013) have pointed out, multiculturalism has received criticism for undermining national cohesion, promoting segregation, making intergroup relations worse etc.

In 2007, Vertovec introduced the concept of super-diversity as a condition which "is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants which unfolds in different nations and societies" (p. 1024). According to the authors, the aim of applying this concept is to describe the "transformative diversification of diversity" (p. 1025). Super-diversity is multidimensional and, according to Grillo (2015), takes place in at least in four dimensions: ethnicity, socio-legal and political status, socio-cultural diversity and economic diversity, and inequality. Additionally, super-diversity in different societies varies depending on the stage of migration as well as the human and social capital migrants have (Meissner & Vertovec 2014, Crul 2016).

2.2 Transnationalism

The 1990s marked the beginning of a turn in patterns of mobility (Urry 2000) during which, with the development of information and communication technology, new forms of mobility such as virtual or imaginative travel emerged and were combined with physical travel (Sheller & Urry 2006). These kinds of mobilities reached beyond geographical borders without physical movement (Urry 2000, Cresswell 2002) and created new identities and micro geographies in everyday life (Cresswell 2011 p. 551). This provided a fertile ground for the quickly spreading popularity of the idea of transmigrants initially published by Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1995, see also

Glick Schiller et al 1992). The authors suggested that migrants in the U.S. and Europe should be conceptualised as transmigrants because, in addition to settling into a new society, they are simultaneously engaged in other (home) countries. Fast technological communication capabilities and increasing mobility means that these multiple engagements are naturally sustainable and part of a normal lifestyle. Transmigrants are people who are involved in the everyday life (including at the institutional level) of a host country, but at the same time, maintain connections, build institutions, conduct transactions, and influence local and national events in the countries from which they migrated (Glick Schiller et al 1995). Transnationalism refers to multiple ties and interactions with people or institutions across national borders held via long-distance communication networks and virtual arenas (Vertovec 1999). Essentially, this means that sociocultural groups are no longer defined territorially (Monsutti 2010).

Greiner and Sakdapolrak (2013) point out that sometimes translocality is used as a synonym for transnationalism since translocality encompasses mobility, migration, circulation and spatial interconnectedness which are not restrained by national boundaries. At the same time, Smith and Guarnizo (1998) refer to translocality to indicate that relationships between multiple places do not necessarily reach beyond political borders. Therefore, although transnationalism and translocality are slightly different concepts, they are treated as synonyms in this thesis.

Double or multiple forms of connectedness and loyalties are reported among migrant populations in different countries (Levitt & Jaworsky 2007, Glick Schiller & Levitt 2007). Levitt (2003) calls it living in two societies at the same time. This conjoint style of living is the central claim of the theory of transnationalism. In the transnational view, the migrant's integration into society is not just adaptation to the society according to its culture and rules, but also the acceptance of migrants without expecting them to abandon their networks and backgrounds (Kwok-bun & Plüss 2013). Portes and colleagues (1999) bring out several types of transnational activities, including economic, social, cultural and political ones. In terms of the networks and connections of migrant groups, transnationalism appears among previously settled as well as new migrant groups. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) point out that integration issues cannot be handled within the host society's state borders alone, but also need to involve international organizations and networks through which ideas, practices, and resources are exchanged and organized. On the individual level, people's connections to the social spaces have changed (Glick Schiller et al 1992, Castells 1996). Furthermore, virtual spaces have principally transformed the place-related loyalties and people have become multi-space actors (Appadurai 1995). In these fields, people combine various ways of being and belonging in different contexts by continuously dealing with multidimensional social relations and creating connections between different places and their own multiple positions (Smith 2005, Watters 2011). According to Smith (2005), the way transmigrants tend to act upon structural economic conditions and make their own history also

makes the relationships between identity, place and mobility complex. Similarly, Tsuda (2003) argues that transnational identity is based on simultaneous connections and feelings of belongings to multiple countries. The authors argue that traditional political identities (Mandaville 1999) or identities based on cultural and place (Butcher 2009) are transformed and formed from below rather than being shaped by states (Pawlak & Goždziak 2019). Actors in social fields face social expectations, cultural values and ways of communication, which are shaped by more than one social, economic, and political systems (Levitt, 2011). These belongings are created via transnational practices. Vertovec (2004b) says that individuals consciously and unconsciously take different dispositions[7] to create their everyday practices and set milestones for personal goals and social interaction.

Guarnizo (2000) distinguishes more generally between two types of transnational practices. He defines core transnationalism as involving activities that are practised on an everyday basis. Expanded transnationalism, meanwhile, includes occasional practices such as responses to political crisis or natural disasters (ibid.). Core transnationals stay involved in the politics of their home country via electoral or non-electoral means, follow media from their home country on an everyday basis, or are in touch with their home country in other ways. Others become active only on special occasions such as highly contested elections or natural disasters (Guarnizo *et al* 2003). It is appropriate in this context to refer to the idea of a transnational habitus proposed by Guarnizo (1997). According to him, transnational habitus encompasses a set of dualistic dispositions, which leads migrants to react to local situations in ways which are not always predictable for their partners. He draws an example from the Dominican Republic: Dominicans living outside of the ethnic homeland maintain a dual reference frame through which they compare situation here and there. This means aspects of life here and there are perceived as complimentary and constantly in the background (ibid.). By the same token, Golbert (2001) explored Ukrainian Jews and found that they evaluate their everyday experiences, past and future with a double consciousness which is based on their transnational ties and conception of self. Their daily reality, according to Golbert (2001), is seen as an intersection of ideas, relationships, histories and identities, where, at the same time, transnational practices are localised. As Vertovec (2004b p. 22) similarly notes: "values, perceptions and aspirations that may be grounded in a pre-migration setting get situated in relation to structural opportunities and constraints in post-migration". This state of mind and practical (cognitive) skills are said to provide a specific form of social agency (Lacroix 2014). In **Study IV**, we considered actor repertoires, i.e. potential ways of acting and thinking in a particular situation, and argued that the range of actor repertoires is wider among transnational people. Because of their multiple ties, transnational actors' repertoires are less stringent and contain more alternatives compared with non-transnational actors. Levitt (2011) argues

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[7]   Elaboration of Bourdieu´s concept of habitus (1977, 1990).

that transnational structures are actually liberating and increase agency for the individual. Some researchers report further that integration/assimilation and transnational engagements are mutually reinforcing (Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002, Portes et al 2002, Guarnizo et al 2003, Cela et al 2013); the interaction between integration and transnationalism however, can also take other configurations (more detail in Chapter 2.4.).

The various daily and extraordinary activities people undertake within the transnational social spaces to respond to local and long-distance social obligations and belongings are labled as transnational activities (Guarnizo et al 2003). One of the most researched among these activities is political participation. Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) describe acts of solidarity to crises or other events in the homeland by lobbying, demonstrating, organizing or campaigning. Remote voting has also received a significant amount of attention (e.g. Lafleur 2014, Ahmadov & Sasse 2015). In general, previous researchers report that political activism exercised in different countries tends to be reinforced: participation in political organizations and voting in elections in the homeland and host country are related (DeSipio et al 2003, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans et al 2005). Itzigsohn and Villacres (2008) have noted that non-electoral participation (e.g. participation in community and charity organizations) in one country may encourage electoral participation. Participation in civic-minded organizations helps people to learn how they function and therefore achieve the necessary confidence to participate in political activities (see also Verba et al 1995, Ayala 2000, Galston 2001). Civic actions can also be performed in both the host and sending country regardless of political citizenship (Glick Schiller & Fouron 2001). Those citizens claiming and acting in relation to more than one government are referred to as transborder citizens by Glick Schiller (2005, p.48). Lacroix (2014) says that these individuals have taken on a transnational subjectivity to locate oneself in an interconnected world. This means people's personal experiences and perceptions of different systems either support or constrain their participation in different spheres of a new society of residence (ibid.). Transnational organisations and political or economic actors significantly shape the context and process of integration (Portes & Fernández-Kelly 2015).

Not only are economic activities, such as the sending and receiving of financial remittances, widely researched in this process, but the exchange of social remittances like cultural forms (see also Hannerz 1996), social capital, and ideas have also received much attention (Levitt 1998, Eckstein 2010). Material remittances and the subsequent flows of money from migrants to relatives and others in the country of origin can be an important contribution to the receiving society (Bartram et al 2014). These material remittances also carry social value as they affect traditional forms of economy in receiving contexts (Parrado 2017). By sending money, migrants at the same time send non-physical goods like ideas and values that shape social discourses and practices in their personal network with members in other countries (Mittelman 2000, Boccagni & Decimo 2013) and create a sense of belonging to the community of origin (Carling

2014). Besides economic remittances, migrants also transfer technological, political, social and cultural remittances to their home communities (see Levitt 1998, Fitzgerald 2000, Goldring 2003). These types of remittances can further contribute to funding institutional activities (Markley 2011). Goldring (2003) notes that while economic remittances are usually conceived of as unidirectional flows from host countries to the sending countries, social and other remittances may be multi-directional and mutually beneficial for both countries.

In the cultural domain, one topic of transnational mediated practices which has been well researched, is virtual participation in celebrating important days. Research into this theme has reported that such participation creates feelings of togetherness and causes interruptions in the local everyday lives of individuals (Birth 2012, Rau 2015, Shove 2015). According to Madianou and Miller (2012), technological opportunities and communications have made remote cultural participation easier for migrant communities. For example, Christiansen's (2019) investigations into Mexicans living in US found that practising rituals via Twitter enables migrants to experience their home culture while maintaining identity and forging ethnic relations.

The following subchapter addresses the important set of media consumption practices in the political, economic and cultural domains.

2.2.1 Media and transnationalism

In a globalised world, with the help of technology, new cultures are introduced to immigrants long before they leave their homes (see Massey et al 2002, Treas 2014). Communication capabilities also help migrants to prevent sharp breaks in their personal relationships (Treas 2014). Nowadays, transnational activities largely take place with the help of communication (Guarnizo et al 2003), and new, cheap, web-based media technologies are widely accessible and have become part of, and change everyday lives (Vertovec 2004a). The way that digital media and different ways to communicate create so-called communicative connection means that current migrants' media culture differs from previous eras (see Diminescu 2008). Couldry (2004) postulates that media practices should not be separated from other everyday practices because people have incorporated media into their everyday lives in unnoticeable, routine and socially learned way.

The media impact on the lives of transnational migrants has been investigated from various prisms. From one angle, authors discuss the general impact of transnational mediated communications (both mass media and private social networks) on local integration and loyalties. National media cultures also face possible pressures as media products are distributed across different national borders and global connectivity grows (Hepp 2009). The ability to always be connected might also hinder involvement in a new society since this connection provides alternative perceptions of norms and values which may not coincide with those dominating the host society. Some authors say that when media has

the ability to inform and connect people over time and space, it has the potential to contribute to both people´s de-territorialisation and to their re-territorialisation (Morley 2000, Moores 2006). Other authors argue that media enables the consolidation of pro-diasporic identities, creates mobilization around a common diasporic identity, and encourages participation in relevant activities (Adamson 2012). From another angle, authors have argued that communicative connectivity is becoming more and more de-territorialized (Kok & Rogers 2017). New hybrid e-identities are constructed based on online activities and new e-diasporic spaces, which exceed territorial constraints (Diminescu 2008). This means that the borders where cultural thickening is taking place do not have to correspond to territorial borders. This makes it hard to find reference points for constructing a national community (Hepp 2009). Appadurai (1996) is sceptical about the positive impact of media on the local integration process. He says that maintaining connections with sending countries hinders the formation of any loyalty towards a new place of residence. Transnational mediascapes create an imagined world, which only seems real when culture is disconnected from a specific place. This has a de-territorializing impact and risks creating feelings of disappointment or conflicts among de-territorialized groups (Appadurai 1996). Other researchers have also argued that highly mediated everyday life impedes migrants from relating to the local cultural and political space (Georgiou 2012).

Besides maintaining interpersonal digital communication across borders, following daily news is something that could also connect individuals with public life in the host society. Martin and Rizvi (2014) argue that media use always happens in certain places and this fact itself represents a practice of habit through which the meaning of place is created. In general, media researchers have argued that, by following the media of both host and sending societies, migrants are making quick and everyday comparative acts and interpreting events and issues for themselves (Robins & Aksoy 2002). Some authors also speak about the "double consciousness" of transnational audiences (Golbert 2001), which results in a critical view of media content. On the contrary, other authors have found that the "interpreting lenses" are still based on either the values and perceptions of ones' society of origin (Vertovec 2004a) or on the media culture of the host society (Adams & Ghose 2003, Hepp et al 2012). Research has found that both strategies are exercised among individual users (**Study IV,** Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020).

Thus, the general views among researchers are rather doubtful that transnationally mediated communication could encourage double loyalties and belongings. The research results concerning the following of news suggests three principal pathways: a) interpretations of the daily news based on the norms and values of the host society which thereby contribute towards involvement in the local society; b) interpretations of the daily news basde on the norms and values of the sending society which thereby contribute towards a set of diasporic norms and values; c) interpretations that enhance a critical yet autonomous view

about the issues that are happening which are based on a comparison and strive towards a certain mediating/in-between position.

The next chapter will give an overview of the more general interplay between transnationalism and local integration, which can also offer a frame for the conceptualisation for media use analysis.

2.3 Interactions between migrant integration and transnationalism

In the last decades, the most prospective concepts explaining migrant population incorporation into a host society are integration (especially because of its widespread practical use in European political contexts) and transnationalism (because of its relevance in the modern digitalised world). The former of these is a complex and contested term which has been used to capture or describe complex processes like social mobility, residential patterns, cultural adaptation etc. and which is interpreted through both private and public spheres (Kivisto 2003, Ehrkamp 2006, Pennix et al 2008, Bianisa 2013) and focuses on identity. Transnationalism maintains that social relations occurring in specific locations constitute place (Massey 1992). By focusing on place, it is possible to exceed the borders of social networks and thereby emphasize transnationalism. In this sense, place and identity are the intersections where transnationalism and integration meet (Bianisa 2013).

While at first transnationalism was seen as an alternative to assimilation and integration because it took mobility into account but didn't prioritize the nation-state over it, Ren and Liu (2015) stress that transnationalism has become the dominant theoretical framework in migration studies. In recent years however, researchers have found limitations in terms of migrant transnationalism (ibid.). Ren and Liu (2015) distinguish between three sets of limiting factors: the role of politics and states in terms of shaping transnationalism are underestimated (see also Levitt & Jaworsky 2007); the way transnationalism affects different segments and generations differently has not gained enough attention; the impact of migrant's multiple transnational involvements in host and origin countries in order to understand the dynamics of transnationalism needs to be analysed (Ren & Liu 2015). The final of these limitations raises a (justified) question about whether transnational ties can co-exist with integration into a host society (Erdal & Oeppen 2013, Ren & Liu 2015). Other researchers have found that transnational activities do exist in parallel with integration into the society of a new country of residence (see Kivisto 2001, Vertovec 2009, Erdal 2013, Erdal & Oeppen 2013). This raises yet another question about which connections between integration and transnationalism occur and what the nature of the relationship between these connections is.

In what follows, I give an overview of the scholars' views concerning the relationship between these two concepts, based mainly on Erdal and Oeppen's (2013) work. I found their article comprehensive in terms of it's of state-of-art

literature, and inspiring in its interpretation of empirical research results. The authors point out that integration and transnational connections exist simultaneously and that migrants' transnational ties are the ones which impact the process of integration (Erdal & Oeppen 2013, Erdal & Lewicki 2016).

Erdal and Oeppen (2013) distinguished four approaches about the inter-relation between transnationalism and integration: alarmist, less alarmist but pessimistic, positive, and pragmatic. Vihalemm & Juzefovics *(n.d.)* have elaborated on this frame as shown in Table 1.

The first approach proceeds from the idea of the competitive use of resources. Authors who have approached the topic from the position of individual agents and analysed the logic behind how migrant incorporation in the host society might work have offered combinations of personal and societal/contextual factors that shape the pathways of integration. Many of these authors implicitly or explicitly proceed from the concept of resources (Kwok-Bun & Plüss (2013): their availability or shortage across the life-course (e.g. Treas 2013) or in relation to the host society's structural needs (Portes & Rumbaut 2003). In analysing the inter-relations between transnationalism and local integration, Kivisto (2001) has posed the question about dependency, time and resources; does participation in transnational activities prevent people from learning the linguistic and socio-cultural skills that create independence, or does such participation makes demands on time and resources in a way that competes with the civic society of the host community (Kivisto 2001, Ley 2013)? In this rather materialistic view, transnationalism and integration are competing in either a dominance/subordination relationship or, as Erdal & Oeppen (2013) say, in an antagonistic one.

International terrorism has brought questions of loyalty and trust to the foreground in discussions surrounding the relationship between integration and transnationalism. Rather than considering the context of the receiving society, in this approach, transnational practices are explained as either a function of the migration process or as the cultural characteristics of the particular migrant group. The transnational activities of Muslim migrants in Western cities is regarded as a danger to integration in countries of settlement (Snel et al 2006). Because their transnational practices are integrated as a characteristics of Muslim migrants, or Islamic culture (Kundnani 2014), transnationalism and integration, in this case, are mutually incompatible. Erdal & Oeppen (2013) call this view on the existence of transnational ties (whether functional or symbolic) an alarmist view. The dual identity of migrants is believed to complicate or hinder their integration into the host society. Erdal and Oeppen (2013) stress that in cases of ideological or actual conflict between the host and sending societies, transnational connections are considered a threat to the majority population's cultural cohesion. The transnational practices of migrants, such as watching diaspora TV channels, sending remittances or ways of dressing, facilitate fear and mistrust among the majority population.

Erdal and Oeppen (2013) call the second approach pessimistic because of the structural-functional incompatibilities and difficulties that migrant populations

face in transferring human, social and cultural capitals to the host society's structures and affordances. This motivates members of the migrant population to invest their resources and "engage in transnational livelihood strategies" (p. 872). This position is in line with earlier works of transnationalism (ibid., see also Appadurai 1990, Basch et al 1994, Faist 1999). In certain occasions, this may also motivate the emergence of what Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005), drawing on Portes and Rumbaut's concept of 'reactive ethnicity'(2001), refer to as "reactive transnationalism". This means that when the non-transferability of ones' resources is perceived as discrimination, transnational identities undergo a "thickening" and participation in economic/sociocultural transnational activities intensifies.

Both alarmist and pessimistic approaches to transnationalism and integration are, according to Erdal and Oeppen (2013), in an antagonistic relationship.

In Erdal and Oeppen's (2013) view, the positive position of integration and transnationalism considers that these processes could be mutually supportive or synergetic. For instance, Oeppen (2013) explains how visits to a former home country generates resources, which could be invested into integration. From another angle, Levitt (2003) shows how successful economic integration can fund transnational activities like investments in and visits to a home country. Thus, in economic terms, the interaction between transnationalism and integration has also been found to be mutually reinforcing (Portes et al 2002). Nevertheless, not all combinations of integration and transnational activities are beneficial (Levitt 2003, Snel et al 2006, Tsuda 2012).

According to Erdal and Oeppen (2013) the pragmatic position is considered to be leading in the literature on transnationalism and integration. In this approach, the reality of transnational actions is much more nuanced and complex. This means that transnational ties and integration processes can co-exist because they are not considered to be a zero-sum game (ibid.). In the pragmatic view, transnational means that migrants have developed social and symbolic ties with both the receiving and origin country (Faist 1999, Erdal & Oeppen 2013). These relationships may not be either beneficial nor antagonistic but simply additive and exist in parallel with one another (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). For a majority of migrants, transnational activities are just part of their everyday lives (Erdal & Oeppen 2013) which can occasionally intensify (see also Guarnizo et al 2003). What Erdal and Oeppen (2013) stress is that migrants constantly have to balance the resources necessary to uphold ties with receiving and sending societies.

Table 1. Inter-relations between integration and transnationalism

| | Type of interaction | | | | |
| | | | | Antagonistic | |
	Additive	Synergistic	Reactive against discrimination	Non-transferable resources	Competitive resources
Socio-cultural (belonging) integration and transnationalism	Belonging to and maintaining social connections with host and sending countries	Belonging to and participating in cultural activities in one place which gives confidence to develop connections in other	Transnational identities are "thickening" in response to (perceived) discrimination	Belonging to one place displaces the feeling of belonging to the other place	
Structural integration and transnationalism	Economic activities in both countries; dual citizenship	Resources gained in one place are transferred and invested in other	Discrimination limits possibilities to use resources in one place, so they are transferred to the other	Resources gained on in one place are not transferrable/ usable in other	Demand for resources in one place limits the ability to meet demand in other

Source: Vihalemm & Juzefovics (n.d.) who have adapted the model by Erdal & Oeppen (2013)

Erdal and Oeppen (2013) indicate that there are several ways to see the transnationalism and integration of migrant populations as similar. For one, they are both social processes of adaptation in changing circumstances and result from spatial movement. They also both consist of simultaneous interactions and negotiations between different parties/groups. The processes of integration and transnationalism can and do appear at the same time and the interaction between them can be described as a "migrant balancing act". Since migrants live locally as well transnationally, these processes are associated with several structural constraints and opportunities, and cover different dimensions (political, economic etc.) provided by different societies (ibid.).

2.4 Summarizing the theoretical concepts and establishing the frame for empirical study

At the theoretical level, while all of the concepts previously referred to are mutually inter-related, there is lack of cohesive understanding of this relationship among scholars. It seems that scholars like to mix and match the terms and play with them. For example, Barkan (1995) defines assimilation as a hybrid product of different processes like contact, acculturation, adaption, accommodation and integration. Whereas Gordon (1964) says that acculturation is the predecessor of structural assimilation, Berry considers assimilation as a basis to develop a multidimensional acculturation model. Researchers have also approached transnationalism differently (see more in Chapter 2.3).

In order to avoid the sometime rather messy and overlapping definitions offered by different authors, I have deliberately created a rough mapping of the concepts to contextualize my work. This mapping is based on three basic questions: Who/what is the cognitive benchmark of the process? Is it important to explore how the process is projected/perceived over time from the researcher's perspective? How is the process projected/perceived in spacial terms?

The main concepts explained above are positioned in this frame in the following way:

Table 2. Mapping of theoretical concepts from the researcher's perspective.

	Assimilation, Acculturation	Segmented/multi-dimensional acculturation	Multi-culturalism	Segmented assimilation (integration)	Transnationalism	Super-diversity
Cognitive benchmark	Majority (similarity as end point)	Groups as bearers of diversity, inter-group relations		Personal resources and agency in-group differences	Connections, networks	Connections, networks and related resources and agency
Time perception	One-way timeline		*Not clearly addressed*	Multiple timelines	*Not clearly addressed*	Multiple timelines
Space perception	Physical /political borders		*Not clearly addressed*	*Not clearly addressed*	Cross-border and virtual spaces	

The majority population of a destination country is actually at the core of the concept of assimilation (and in some interpretations of acculturation and integration close to this). Even though the concept deals with the deeds and thoughts of the migrant minority, it is the majority who provide the reference point in evaluating the process where maximum similarity is the desired outcome. The borders are clear and peoples' movement between them is accompanied with certain social consequences. Multiculturalism considers a notion of diversity between groups that forms a certain interactional sub-system where relations pass incremental changes but the sub-system of cultural diversity is maintained over time. The larger system (within which the diversity+based subsystems exist) is still a nation state which creates the legislative and institutional conditions for the diversity. The concept of multi-dimensional/selective acculturation is between assimilation and multiculturalism and shares common features with both. The concept of segmented assimilation (integration) considers the agents' possession and access to resources, and distinguishes groups based on the combination of resources. Different processes can occur in parallel in society, and the process can go in different directions over the course of an agents' life, or across different domains of social life. In the concept of transnationalism, the general frame is a network. Agents are principally seen as "node points" within the network. These agents have connections and (non)access to social spaces, and their agency derives from their connections. Although the concept of superdiversity embraces both the notions of segmented assimilation and transnationalism, it is quite vague in its hybridity.

In this thesis I use the term segmented integration. This is a hybrid term developed on the basis of the segmented assimilation approach previously explained here. The term integration is used because it refers to the various possible outcomes and different ways migrant populations are involved in a new community which do not end with assimilation. Even though the multiculturalism approach has been used in many studies of cultural associations and Estonian cultural autonomy policy, is not used in this thesis.

The end of Soviet Union and restoration of Estonian Republic in the beginning of 1990s make up a critical period for the concept of assimilation. In the first years of nation building, the main political actions subscribed to the public discourse of protecting Estonian language and the titular nation. The first political documents focusing on the problems of the adaptation and incorporation of the Russian speaking migrant population were issued in the late 1990s (Chapter 3, **Study V**). In the political documents, the use of the term assimilation was avoided and the concept of integration, which emphasizes the importance of maintaining one's own ethnic identity and in-group relations (Berry 1997, 2006), was seen as ideal. In practical life, various concepts and implicit expectations circulated, and despite the existence of several versions of a State Integration Plan (Riiklik programm "Integratsioon Eesti Ühiskonnas 2000–2007", Eesti Lõimumiskava 2008–2013, Lõimuv Eesti 2020), we cannot speak about a common approach. Over the course of time, researchers and policy practitioners in Estonia recognized the need for approaches that would help to

explain the alternative approaches of integration. The segmented assimilation approach has been applied in studies addressing immigration generations and in considering the division of regions in Estonia. This approach has implicitly driven the practical language, education and media policies in Estonia. More efforts are invested into the younger generations with the hope that many of the problems will dissolve with newer generations (or just assumed that this will happen without much effort from policy-makers).

I approach my research topics by applying two concepts, which seem to be relevant for the investigation of the Estonian Russian speaking migrant background population: segmented integration and transnationalism. I consider a combination of these concepts useful in Estonia (and other similar societies like Latvia, for example) where the migrant background community has "maturated" with multiple historical layers and controversies. The changing of the minority group makes it impossible to measure and characterize the Russian-speaking population adequately with a limited number of features.

In what comes in the next chapter, I explain the empirical considerations for why I think that the combination of these two concepts is best suited to explore the integration of the Estonian Russian speaking migrant-background population.

3. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF THE INTEGRATION OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING POPULATIONS

3.1 Background and political conceptualisation of the integration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations

In 1991, Estonia was a society with a considerable migrant population (about one third of the total population) (Tammaru 1997). In the previous 50 years, the Estonian population had grown, and its composition had drastically changed. The proportion of ethnic Estonians among the total population had declined to 61,5% by 1989 (Tammaru 1997, Marksoo 2005, Tammur 2006). As noted in the "Introduction" of this thesis, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fast and radical economic changes, nation building and EU and NATO oriented integration was shocking for the migrant background populations. For these populations, Estonia's re-gaining of independence marked a shift from being a "dominating" minority to minority without any advantages (Heidmets 1998). For native Estonians, the collective perception of an ideal Estonia from the first independence and between two world wars helped them to manage the transitional hardships. Meanwhile, migrant background populations had to manage the reinterpretation of the Soviet governance (including immigration policy) that had been the backbone of their self-determination (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012). In the 1990s, the economic, linguistic, political and geographic divides in Estonian society made creating a common political space for further developments, irrespective of the chosen strategy, complicated (Pettai & Hallik 2002).

In the beginning of the 1990s, civil society was weak. Due to the population's low trust towards the government, the top-down political decisions for comprehensive structural and institutional reforms received fairly modest public legitimacy (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). The support of international institutions was important in order to become economically and politically independent from Russia. At the same time, in seeking this support, Estonia was also motivated to seek solutions to the ethnic problems. Although Estonia's initial ethno-politics was restitutional and the best solution many politicians could hope for was an emigration of migrant background populations[8], this did not happen, and international organizations supported the idea of a patient step-by-step evolution towards the integration of Russian speaking migrant populations into Estonian society (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). One demand, which was unacceptable for a majority of the ethnic Estonian population, was the liberalisation of citizenship. Thus, political elites had to find a compromise between national and international agendas who monitored the situation to

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[8] The extreme proposal that Soviet occupants should leave without social guarantees received critical response from international organizations (Jurado 2003, Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009).

ensure that the ethno-political situation in general stood on rather stable track (Lauristin & Heidmets 2002, Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). While evaluations of inter-ethnic relations showed improvment during the first decade (Korts & Vihalemm 2008), public protests still appeared as late as the Bronze soldier crisis in 2007[9]. In 1991, the legal continuity strategy was the chosen policy to rebuild the Estonian Republic. This strategy granted citizenship to descendants of pre-WWII citizens and was supposed to gradually incorporate interested parts of Soviet-time immigrant population and their descendants (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012)[10]. In the first parliamentary elections in 1992, representation by the Russian speaking population was missing. Shock form the changes and citizenship restrictions not only lead to the isolation of migrant background populations from politics, but it also fragmented the arenas to address their problems between various institutional domains (Pettai & Hallik 2002). Russian-speaking politicians had limited opportunities to participate in elections for a longer time[11]. In 1993, the Alien Act[12] was adopted to enacted procedures on how non-citizens of the Estonian Republic would receive living and working permits to replace their Soviet passports. From the macro perspective, its objective was to assure an internationally recognized status and define the duties of foreigners living in Estonia (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012). From socio-psychological and political perspective, however this created socio-psychological uncertainty since a majority of the members of Russian-speaking migrant background populations become de-facto stateless persons (Pettai & Hallik 2002). About 90,000 non-citizens decided to obtain Russian Federation citizenship, thus marking the first lines of segmentation among Russian speaking migrant background populations. These original segmentations consisted of three political-legal categories: Estonian citizens, Russian citizens and those whose citizenship was undetermined (Pettai & Hallik 2002). Until the end of the 1990s, there was no explicit state integration policy, and as previously stated, major political decisions were made without involving Russian-speaking migrant background populations (Pettai & Hallik 2002). Yet, during the first decade of post-Soviet statehood, the basis for further integration policy, seeking to find a balance between homogeneity and disparity in society, formed in political and administrative circles. These circles debated the demolishing or

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[9]   The Bronze Soldier crisis refers to two nights of riots, which took place in April, 2007 after the Estonian government's decision to relocate the Second World War Soviet memorial called the Bronze Soldier and the remains of Soviet soldier.

[10]   Citizenship was automatically granted for those who were Estonian citizens between the First and Second World Wars and their descendants. Other had to apply for citizenship and go through a naturalization procedure which included an exam about the knowledge of constitution and Estonian language plus a loyalty oath (Kalev & Roosmaa 2012).

[11]   In 1997 Estonian parliament started to narrow the language requirements for electoral candidates at the local and state level. This meant candidates who hadn't obtain their education in Estonia, had to prove it. The only sphere where non-citizens were not isolated, were local elections where permanent residents had a right to vote.

[12]   https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/28574

(partial) maintenance of two parallel education systems and reshaped inter-pretations of Russia as a security threat vs. Russia as an informational and cultural agent for Russian speaking populations (Vetik & Ruutsoo 1999, Vetik 2004). The multicultural ideology and the state of integration offered in Berry's model provided and optimal foundation for the politicians, consulting acade-mics, and Estonian political elite to develop an integration policy (Pettai & Hallik 2002, Vetik 2004, Lauristin 2010). Russian speaking migrant back-ground populations were not forced to assimilate, and integration was portrayed as a two-way process of agreement between majority and minority groups. At the same time, however, any claims for a bilingual state were avoided in policy regulations (Lauristin 2010). In addition to a declaration of cultural difference as a resource in practical government, the problem of how to create a common form of public communication also appeared (Vetik 2004).

The previously mentioned need to establish a declarative and practical balance motivated the creation of the first state-level program "Integration in Estonian society 2000–2007[13]" (Riiklik….2000) in 1998. This program was created with the help of UNDP[14] and its implementation was financially sup-ported by Nordic countries as well. The objective of this program was to create a compromise between three agents: the ethnic Estonian majority who wanted to preserve a monoethnic nation state; the Russian minority who wanted to be recognised as a legitimate part of Estonian society and improve its social and economic position; and thirdly, Nordic countries with UNDP and OSCE who wished to reduce the risk of ethnic conflict and pressure on Estonian politicians to take steps towards protecting minority rights (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). In assessing the first state-level integration program, some previous authors have found that rather than maintaining a *laissez faire* position, this document set general aims for purposeful action (Heidmets 1998, Lauristin 2010). Vetik (2004) on the contrary, criticizes the program, arguing that specific problems and solutions cannot be separated from the society's more general and trans-formation specific problems. In his view, competitiveness in the labour market, the inability to receive a good education, and non-participation in culture and politics are all wider problems, which can be neither solved nor defined within an integration policy. Despite these practical shortages, Vetik (2004) appre-ciated the symbolic significance of the first integration strategy, which marked a principal shift from the ethnocentric approach that had previously prevailed in society, towards a multiculturalism one.

In the first state integration document, integration was defined by two pro-cesses to harmonize society: knowledge of Estonian and having Estonian citizenship while maintaining the possibility to preserve cultural rights (Riiklik…2000). From the perspective of the Estonian majority population, integration was defined as inclusive attitudes towards the participation of

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[13]   See more here https://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/integratsioon_eesti_uhiskonnas_ 2000-2007.pdf
[14]   UNDP – United Nations Development Programme.

members of Russian-speaking minority populations in the political, economic, civic and cultural life of Estonia (ibid). The structural and psychological isolation of the Russian speaking communities was understood as a potential threat to social stability. Thus there was a stress on the importance of using Estonian as a common language in the public sphere in order to creating more cohesion while retaining an individual's freedom of choice concerning their ethno-cultural identification (see also Vihalemm & Masso 2007). Kõuts (2002) has analysed the discourse of the 2000–2007 Integration Programme period and concludes that highlighting the Estonian language was addressed to ethnic Estonians in order to alleviate their fears related to the preservation of Estonian language and culture. At the same time, the emphasis on individual effort in language learning and the freedom of choice to practice ethno-cultural identity was stressed in order to prevent the collective mobilization of Russian speaking migrant background populations as ethno-linguistically homogeneous communities (ibid.).

Lauristin and Vihalemm (2017) indicate that the transition period[15] for Estonia ended with Estonia gaining EU membership in 2004. This was a time for new principal choices in the quest for a better standard of living and widening of personal life prospects (ibid). Still, in the 2000s the Russian-speaking population's employment position still had somewhat less prospective in terms of salary and career opportunities compared to native Estonians (Leping & Toomet 2008). 15% of members of Russian speaking minority populations managed to take or keep white-collar jobs[16], 45% had some kind of further professional training, 10% had established their own enterprises and 9% participated in EU financed projects in the public, private and non-profit sectors. These aspects of economic (segmented) integration have been taken into account when constructing the measurement tool (see Chapter 4.2). The State Integration plan for 2008–2013 set equal economic and social opportunities and actual participation as new strategy objectives. Rather than being separate objectives, language learning (and thereby reproduction of a common integration field) and naturalisation were seen as means to achieve these goals. This marked a second important shift in integration policy (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). The State Integration Plan 2008–2013 stressed the idea of social cohesion based not only on the Estonian language but also on civic participation and shared values such as social well-being and safety. One of the main goals of this plan was to increase the active political and civic participation, including participation in NGOS and those initiated by civic associations, of all Estonian residents irrespective of their citizenship or nationality (Kallas & Kaldur 2017, Lõimuv Eesti 2020). I considered these domains of integration in capturing the

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[15] Transition period in Estonia is considered to be 1990s and 2000ies as a period of economic and political stabilization and consolidation.
[16] In the sentences all shares are calculated from the subsample of the population belonging to ethnic groups other than Estonians from the "Me. The World. The Media 2014" survey database.

civic and political involvement of Russian speakers in my empirical research (see Chapter 4.2.1). The ideas of stressing the practice of diverging ethnic identity and the mandatory Estonian-language public sphere were both presented in a somewhat "softer" tone in the State Integration Plan 2008–2013 (Eesti lõimumiskava 2008–2013). Since I consider that the subjective feeling of being informed about important events in the society and then actual participation in various public events (like fairs, spectacles, sports, family events etc.) where people can meet and are important characteristics in the participation, I included these indicators in my model of empirical measurement (see Chapter 4.2.1).

The linguistic aspect of integration is defined more functionally in the second Integration Programme. In the same spirit, for my empirical measurement, I define the communicative domain of integration as being characterized not only by the knowledge of Estonian language, but the actual use of language in different spheres of life (including media following) and for a variety of mutual contacts with Estonians (see Chapter 4.2.1).

As for Russian speakers, one of the carriers of common ethno-cultural identity in turbulent times has been culture, namely the celebration of important days and religiosity (Vihalemm & Kaplan 2017). I took these aspects into account in order to empirically measure the cultural domain of integration (see Chapter 4.2.1).

Thus, my model for empirically measuring integration is inspired by the domains sketched in the State Integration Programme 2000–2007. Even though one may criticize the practical setting of objectives and measurement of their achievement in this document, in principle, it "looked with open eyes" to the multi-dimensional character of integration. The third state integration plan, called "Integrating Estonia 2020" (Lõimuv Eesti 2020), further elaborated on the operational terms of some ideas mentioned in the former integration plans.

Despite the good intentions expressed in the integration plans, in their everyday lives, Russian-speaking populations still felt public discourses held them responsible for what happened in the past and maintained the mundane expectation for them to overlook their own cultural needs and collective memory and become similar to Estonians. Bitter feelings surrounding this public discourse found (partial) expression in the Bronze soldier crisis[2] in 2007 (see Lauristin & Vihalemm 2008, Ehala 2009, Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009, Vihalemm 2012). This event however, disproved the prevalent public opinion that integration had been unsuccessful among older or middle-aged populations who do not know Estonian language well enough since it was not older, but mainly younger populations who protested on the streets and committed acts of vandalism (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009). Some authors were very pessimistic about the prospects for further integration. At the same time, integration was still recognized as essential not just due to the "question of Russians" but for the whole country's safety and development (Kallas et al 2012). For this reason, the further version of the state integration plan incorporated European values and principles as the

basis for better involving Russian-speaking populations in the integration process (ibid.).

The state of integration in Estonia is measured with the help of integration monitoring, a study that has been carried out since the year 2000. The study explores different dimensions like education, labour market, media, language use and learning, culture, equal treatment, citizenship, and more recently, the adaptation of new-wave immigrants (Kaldur et al 2017). Until 2008, mainly descriptive statistics were used to describe the progress of integration. In 2008, for the first time, the model of "well-integrated non-Estonian" was constructed (see Lauristin 2008). According to this model, a well integrated non-Estonian was a citizen who spoke Estonian, felt part of the Estonian nation, had frequent contact with Estonians and was hopeful about the general perspectives for development in Estonian society (see also Lauristin 2012, Vihalemm & Leppik 2014). In 2011, the research group working with integration monitoring abandoned the "one ideal approach" and instead, presented an empirical description of integration clusters formed by a statistical analysis of integration monitoring data along with an interpretation of integration processes in different domains of social life (Lauristin 2012). In seeking a more nuanced empirical approach to the integration process, Lauristin (2012) took the three aspects of linguistic, political and social integration into account to constructed aggregated variables (ibid). The linguistic aggregated variable encompassed single variables related to Estonian language use, communication and the importance of Estonian-language media. The political aggregated variable included single variables like Estonian citizenship, participation in elections, and Estonia as homeland (ibid). The social aggregated variable assessed trust towards institutions, political activity, and participation in NGOs or public events (ibid). On the basis of aggregated variables, she created a cluster analysis consisting of five clusters to illustrate the state of the segmented integration of Russian speaking migrant background populations in Estonia. These clusters included: equally strongly integrated in all domains; strongly integrated as a citizen with weaker language skills; good language skills, but weaker civic identity; weakly involved with insufficient language skills but participating in local life; not involved-integrated cluster (ibid). By using the same method and data, the approach was repeated a year later by Kruusvall (2013). My thesis offers a theoretical conceptualisation and empirical elaboration for this approach (see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2014).

In the following chapter, I give an overview of the main characteristics of the integration of Russian-speaking populations in Estonia. These characteristics served as a base for constructing the measurement models of integration described in the Methodology chapter.

3.2 Empirical overview of the main domains for integration

On its homepage, the Estonian Ministry of Culture states that the aim of integration is to create a situation in which a coherent and tolerant society is ensured for all nations living in Estonia. Ideally, Estonia would be a place where everyone would have a good and safe life, and be able to work, study, promote culture, and be a part and full member of society (Ministry of Culture 2020). Seeing as integration into society is a broad-based societal process, it encompasses different fields of life. An overview of the most essential integration domains is given below. In addition to background information, each of the sub-chapters consists of an (statistical) overview of variables, which are the basis for further integration pathways. Table 3 below presents a short overview of how the aggregated and single variable integration domains, described in sub-chapters, are related (see more in table 5 in Chapter 4.2.1).

Table 3. Overview of integration domains and dimensions covered

Integration domain	Dimension covered	Variables describing domain or dimension[17]	Used for developing integration types
Civic and political	Political involvement as a citizen	Citizenship, election behaviour	+
	Participation in civic organizations	Participation in NGOs, campaigns etc.	+
	Trust in Estonian institutions	Trust towards different national institutions	+
	Alternative democratic participation	Participation in public meetings, demonstrations, debates (incl. Internet) etc.	+
	Participation in the public sphere	Taking part in different public events, being informed.	+
Economic	Economic involvement	Success in the labour market, entrepreneurship, wealth.	+
Educational[18]	–	Education level, life-long learning	–
Linguistic	Estonialisation	Knowledge and use of Estonian, following Estonian media	+
Cultural	Ethno-cultural identity	Celebration of days importance, religiosity	+

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[17] See more in table 5 in chapter 4.2.1.
[18] Due to lack of sufficient data, this domain is not taken into account when measuring integration.

The Political and civic domain of integration

Traditional political participation is understood as activities that are related with the status of political citizenship, including those, which affect the parliament or political process (Verba & Nie 1972). Bosniak (2008) speaks about the four meanings of citizenship: legal status; influence of decision-making processes via elections; active engagement in democratic self-governance; (subjective) solidarity and identification (see also Bartram et al 2014). Nowadays the amplitude of participation has widened. Dalton (2008) proposed a theoretically widespread characterization of structural affordances for political participation and distinguishes between "duty" and "engaged" citizenship. Daltons' (2008) concept of "duty citizenship" encompasses traditional forms of political participation like going to elections. "Engaged citizenship" meanwhile, comprises non-electoral activities in multiple forms like taking part in voluntary organisations, boycotting, public demonstration, signing petitions etc. (see also Copeland 2014, van Deth 2016).

A similar empirical division is made by Lauristin and colleagues (2012): a) institutional participation in politics (e.g. governing or working in political institutions, belonging into political party) and b) extra-institutional like participation in public meetings, demonstrations, signing petitions, protesting etc. I approach my research by using these concepts, especially in **Study II**. Below I also provide some background evidence to explain my considerations for empirical measurement.

The political participation of members of the Estonian Russian-speaking population is connected with Estonian citizenship and trust towards institutions (Kallas & Kaldur 2017). For one, citizenship status is needed in order to exercise "duty citizenship". The share of Estonian citizens has increased gradually since Estonian independence in 1991. According to the population census from the year 2000, 40% of people of with ethnicities other than Estonian had Estonian citizenship, 37% had undefined citizenship and 19% had Russian citizenship. The other 4% held citizenship of some other country (Statistics Estonia). By the 2011 population census, the share non-ethnic Estonians holding Estonian passports had risen to 45%, and in 2019 that number had increased even further to 55% (ibid.).

The exercise of "duty citizenship" is so far the predominant mode of political involvement among Estonian Russian speaking populations. 66% of Estonian citizens with non-ethnic Estonian roots participated in the 2015 Parliamentary elections (Kallas & Kaldur 2017) while only 12% of the Russian speaking population has participated in public political meetings, picketed or signed a petition (Me. The World. The Media 2014, authors' calculations). Only a minor portion (7%) of Russian speakers have participated in political discussions online (Integration Monitoring data 2017). Thus, it appears that technological possibilities have not noticeably encouraged the semi-public discussions. Despite this finding, I consider it important to measure traditional and alternative political participation separately. For one, even though the part of the Russian-speaking population who does not have Estonian citizenship is

legally excluded from the Parliamentary elections, non-citizens with living permits can participate in elections as the local municipal level, so non citizens can still exercise engaged and local level political citizenship. Furthermore, I expect a generational shift from "duty citizenship" to "engaged citizenship" as a part of more general global trend (**Study II**).

Although the additional analysis carried out for **Study II** indicated that younger Russian speakers belong to the "engaged citizen" category less frequently than ethnic Estonians, I suggest that over time the shift from political participation as "duty citizen" to the participation as "engaged citizen" will occur among migrant background populations too (**Study II**). Since the Russian-speaking population is an ageing one (more so than the ethnic Estonian population), it might create a possibility for traditional, "duty citizenship" forms of political participation to fade into the background. As the idea of "engaged citizenship" belonging to the older generation of Russian speakers fades, the political activism and protest of younger Russian-speaking cohorts (e.g. third generation) will become more visible for the media, politicians and community of ethnic Estonians.

According to the Daltons' model of the duty citizen, participation is related to peoples' perceptions of democratic governance. Whereas in Europe in general, younger people tend to be more critical about the democratic governance in their countries (**Study II**) than older people, in Estonia this is contrary; younger generations evaluate democracy higher than the older ones (**Study II**). The following quotation from the focus group interview I made in the beginning of 2015 in Tallinn illustrates how the value of democracy appears in news media interpretations:

> *Why such a drastic reaction that Arabs cannot live in Europe any more? I mean, you let them in and we have to shut down the mosques. It does not seem democratic to me…. Why are some churches are closed and some not? It does not correspond to the EU standards (M, 18)*

Despite the fact that they value the general idea of democracy (over authoritarianism), the participation of younger (election-aged) members of the Russian-speaking population participating in elections has declined in recent decades (**Study II**). Younger, 15–25 year old Russian speakers are more critical (compared to older groups) in their evaluation about the actual performance of democratic governance in Estonia. Therefore, they are likely demotivated from participating in traditional politics and performing Datlon's duty citizenship (**Study II**). At the same time, according to the Me. The World. The Media Study, younger people trust society's main institutions more than older groups. Thus, it is likely that they channel their exercise of political participation into alternative forms because they are confident that the institutional order of Estonian society functions well. They believe that citizens can influence public policy and that this be done in other forms, which are more effective than delegating legitimacy for action in a particular party.

Several studies have shown that trust towards institutions is strongly related with political participation (Kallas & Kaldur 2017, see also Norris 2004, Dalton 2004). Trust towards states' institutions reflects how a person feels about being an equal partner in contributing to discussions about common public life (Kallas & Kaldur 2017). As I will show in chapter 4.2, although institutional trust among Russian speaking migrant background populations is more moderate (less trustful) compared with ethnic Estonians, minority groups enable civic partnerships in different modes (**Study V**).

Integration Monitoring 2011 pointed out that the role of different interest groups and NGO-s in terms of policymaking and public discussion has grown, especially due to widened technological possibilities (Lauristin et al 2012). This has not changed much from 2015 to 2017: participation in NGOs and associations is still widespread among the Russian-speaking population.

In addition to participating in an NGO, attending public events (mass for example) and activities, following daily news, and doing voluntary work are all important forms of participation in modern societies. Lauristin and colleagues (2012) regard civic activities as all organised or spontaneous, one-time or continuous, activities which are initiated by citizens and not carrying (party) political messages, yet serving the public interest. I have included this type of civic participation in the empirical model (more in Chapter 4.2).

The habits of following daily news are more modest among the Russian speaking population compared to ethnic Estonians (**Study V,** Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, Seppel 2017). Although 2/3 of Russian speaking audiences report regularly following political news, their news menu is often formed by the links and recommendations of their acquaintances thereby involving a modest level of independent civic agency (Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020).

In general, the political involvement and general civic participation of Estonian Russian speakers' in the public sphere are the dimensions where integration was relatively strong (Study V) compared to the other domains (measured in the same way). This participation was rather high and stable in terms of participation in NGOs and civic activities but modest and declining in terms of political activism (**Study V,** see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017).

The economic domain of integration

One very important aspect of Russian speakers' integration is their economic situation and, more specifically, how they overcame transformations in the labour market in the 1990s (**Study I**). According to Saar and Helemäe (2017), ethnic segregation in the labour market continues to hinder integration into society because people with different ethnicities do not act and communicate in the workplace, which is one of the main domains of social life. When arriving to Estonia after the Second World War, Russian speakers were offered jobs in the military and industrial sectors (Tammaru & Kulu 2003, Marksoo 2005). Since the Soviet Union preferred to recruit personnel from outside of Estonia to work in these sectors, by the end of the Soviet era, about half of the Russian-speaking population was employed in these particular sectors (Kala 1992,

Hallik 1998, Tammaru & Kulu 2003, Vöörmann & Helemäe 2003). At the same time, ethnic Estonians were employed in the fields of agriculture, culture and education (Kala 1992). Therefore, both sectors of employment and occupations were segregated (Helemäe et al 2000).

A reform plan was initiated by the new government in the beginning of 1990s to replace the Soviet administrative legacy with new institutions and legal structures (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009). Because the money for pensions and other social protection expenses came from the (common) Soviet budget, the new market economy was in shock (Lauristin 2010). The economic sectors which had previously supplied other Soviet republics (Puur 1997) either ended operations or re-oriented to new markets. This caused mass unemployment and a shift of employment to tertiary sectors (Eamets et al 2000). The share of Russian-speaking employees diminished in both the public and industrial sectors and rose in the service sector during the first decade of Estonian post-Soviet independence (Pettai 2000, Vöörmann & Helemäe 2003).

While in the Soviet era there was practically no unemployment, after reforms, the number of jobs declined and unemployment increased rapidly (Antons 2003), especially among Russian speakers (Pettai 2001, Antons 2003). Several researchers indicate that unemployment still tends to grow faster among Russian speaking migrant background populations, mainly due to occupational structures (Nurmela & Krieger 2011, Saar & Helemäe 2017).

At the same time, from 1995–2007, the average salary of ethnic Estonians was 10–15% higher (Krusell 2010) than that of Russian speakers. This pay gap still exists, having reached up to 20% (see Soosaar et al 2017), and is rather difficult to explain (see Leping & Toomet 2008). Data from the Integration Monitoring 2017 further indicates that Russian speakers assess their chances of getting a good job much worse than Estonians: 72% of Russian speakers believe Estonians have better chances of getting a good job. These differences are even bigger when considering leading jobs in public sector (about 80% of Russian speakers think Estonians have better chances) (Integration Monitoring 2017 database, author's calculations). Ethnic disparity in terms of occupational segregation remains evident in the recent decade. Among Russian-speaking populations, there are fewer individuals who have gained higher positions and more whose position in the labour market has been lowered; this has not significantly changed within the last 10 years (Masso 2017).

One way to explain both Russian speakers lower expectations and their position in the labour market is the knowledge of Estonian language. From 1989, Estonian language was set as the only official language in the Estonian Republic. Thus, the professional language requirements affected non-Estonian speaker's prospects in the labour market, particularly when it came to higher status jobs in public administration or local government authorities. Since these jobs required a language examination, this narrowed career options for Russian speakers and knowledge of Estonian gained high functionality. Lindemann (2011) found that employers set rather high language standards, but that Russian speakers can apply and enjoy equal opportunities if they have advanced

Estonian language competencies. Vihalemm and Hogan-Brun (2013a) point out that, in terms of strong occupational segregation, minorities' socio-economic self-positioning is related to their knowledge of the local language.

Masso (2017) found that Russian speaking migrant background populations have lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates, and that they feel they have less say in their work relationships and in the labour market in general than their Estonian counterparts. This estimate has not changed within the last 10 years. A majority of the working age population (15–74 years old) are employees. The growing trend of entrepreneurship (among ethnic Estonians from 10% in 2000 to 11,8% in 2019, among other ethnicities from 4.4% to 8.7% according to Statistics Estonia database) that might have been promoted by technological and social innovation (different start-ups, social entrepreneurship etc.) gives good prospects for the rise in economic agency of migrant background populations.

Study I points out that according to research in different countries, members of immigrant populations are less successful in the destination country's labour market than members of the native population. Some authors blame human capital or lack of it (see Becker 1964, Mincer 1974, Chiswick 1978, Chiswick & Miller 2002) while others offer the theory of a dual (see Portes et al 1985) or ethnically biased labour market as explanation (see Roth et al 2012). Yet another group of researchers contend that residential segregation influences worse (or different) performance of members of a minority in a segregated labour market (see Ellis et al 2004, Aslund & Skans 2010). However, these theoretical explanations are limited in their explanations of the peculiarities in labour market participation possibilities for members of the Estonian Russian-speaking community (**Study I**). This is partially due to the fact that, because of the general social transformation of Estonian society as a whole, which was previously described here, Estonian Russian speakers differ from typical immigrant communities.

To summarize, the economic and labour market outcomes of Russian speakers are affected by a combination of sectoral and occupational segregation inherited from Soviet era. This results not only from the lack of a country specific language or citizenship, but also from problems related to human capital, since professional training from the Soviet era is incompatible for post-Soviet labour market demands. These factors have had a durable impact since the 1990s (**Study I**). Learning Estonian was explicitly connected with a downward mobility in the labour market (**Study I**). It is likely that people with relatively good Estonian language skills applied for higher positions where they had to compete with ethnic Estonians. People with poor or no language skills either likely settled for existing or similar jobs where the requirements were lower in terms of country specific capitals, or they took advantage of the opportunities offered by the enclave economy (see **Study I**). Altogether these tendencies explain Russian speakers' rather modest economic agency (depicted in Figure 2 in the methodology section).

Economic and labour market outcomes, which together form an important dimension of integration, are influenced by both the cultural background of migrants as well as structures in society (**Study I, V**). Therefore, the economic dimension of integration cannot be separated from general integration. As **Study V** points out, there is a moderate mutual correlation between political and economic involvement. Not having enough economic resources makes it hard to influence processes in public and political sphere and the opposite is also likely true.

Based on these findings, the economic integration measurement for this study was constructed on the basis of job and material security and lifelong training possibilities. It also considers entrepreneurship as a possibility to improve one's economic positions in spite of the long inertia of the labour market structuration (see Chapter 4.2).

The educational domain of integration

The education system has a significant role in the integration process. One reason for this is that education creates opportunities for a successful transition into the labour market. Another reason is that language competence is developed via education (Saar 2008). The changes that have taken place in the field of education after Estonian re-independence were concurrent with other major political and economic changes in society. These changes had a significant impact on the education system, especially on school networks (Soll 2015). The years or decades after re-independence could be described by a freedom from ideological pressure, the creation of new education institutions, an autonomy of universities, a quick increase of students and an imposition of quality control, all which took place under the constraints of budget limitations (Heidmets et al 2011). One of the important changes for Russian-speaking populations was the transition to Estonian-language in secondary education. In 1997, the parliament passed amendments, which stated that, by 2007 Russian gymnasiums/secondary schools should have switched gradually to Estonian-language. For secondary level education the objective was that 60% of study/learning should take place is Estonian (Saar 2008).

While education for Russian speakers was somewhat higher than education for Estonians in the beginning of the 1990s, by the end of the 90s, the situation had been reversed (Saar 2008). According to the 1989 census, 21% of Estonians had a specialized secondary education (obtained after secondary education, corresponding to ISCED[19] level 5) and 18% had higher education. Among Russian speakers, these percentages were 26% and 17% accordingly. The 2000 census showed that the share of Estonian speakers with higher education had risen to 26%, and only to 20% among Russian speakers, while the number of those having secondary specialized education did not change much (Statistics Estonia, see also Saar 2008). Saar (2008) has pointed out that Russian-speaking populations perceive ethnicity as one of the factors hindering educational

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[19]   ISCED – International Standard Classification of Education

prospects. Saar (2008) points out that there is a certain segregation after primary education; those who have graduated from Russian-language primary schools are more likely to continue their studies in a vocational school, whereas those who have studied in Estonian-language primary schools go to gymnasium (Lindemann & Saar 2011, Saar & Helemäe 2017). It is important to note that this choice is not always voluntary and the decision to attend a vocational school might be because of the fear of failing in studying in Estonian-language (ibid.).

The transition to Estonian-language in higher education has made Russian-language education a general "dead end" since graduates with Russian educational backgrounds have limited choices for continuing education. This applies especially to young people whose language knowledge is limited (Saar 2008). The persistence of vertical segregation persistence is supported by changes in the educational system, particularly the transition to Estonian-language in higher education (Saar & Helemäe 2017). As a result, the share of those having a higher education has declined among Russian speakers, especially among younger age cohorts. Further transition from a secondary school to university or college is complicated, irrespective of reforms (ibid.). If in 1989 the education level of members of the migrant background community was higher compared to native Estonians (12 % and 10% respectively), then by the year 2000 the proportions were reversed (18% of native Estonians had higher education compared to 16% of other ethnic groups) (Saar & Helemäe 2017).

Obtaining an education does not end at a certain age, and public policy supports the lifelong learning process (e.g. The Estonian Lifelong Learning Strategy 2020). However, native Estonians have used this opportunity more often than non native Estonians. In 2019, the share of those who participated in some form of lifelong learning was 22% among native Estonians and 16% among other ethnicities (Statistics Estonia 2020). In addition, an analysis conducted by the Estonian Bank indicates that among the highly educated portion of the population, the risk of working in a job that requires lower qualifications and earns less than the Estonian medium salary is higher among individuals with a migrant background (Urke et al 2019). A big share of those having higher education work in the public sector, where a good knowledge of Estonian is a requirement that might be a barrier for people of other mother tongues with otherwise equal educational qualifications

Although education is an important aspect of integration, it is not taken into account when constructing the measurement tool. Some aspects of education, namely participation in work-related trainings (i.e. life-long learning) are part of measuring the economic integration. Education was left out of the current model (see Chapter 4.2) since there were not good indicators in the survey for composing a separate index.

The linguistic domain of integration

Language and the culture based on a certain language have an important task. Language and culture shape the identity of ethnic groups and are the basis for common beliefs, traditions, attitudes etc. (Kirch 2002). Language, especially the knowledge of a local language, helps to maintain contacts not only with co-ethnic individuals, but also with the receiving society and its social and political institutions (Pisarenko 2006).

All the Baltic states, Estonia being no exception, have decided in favour of strong and control-oriented language politics (Vihalemm & Siiner 2011). This was done in order to ensure the use of Estonian in all spheres of life (ibid.). Estonian become the official state language by the end of Soviet era, and it marked a redistribution of power (see Rannut 2008). By the end of the first Estonian parliament, the citizenship and language acts were both complemented with national elements. For example, the citizenship act initiated the inclusion of a specific civic exam and the language act proclaimed all languages except Estonian, which is the official state language, as foreign (Pettai & Hallik 2002). The language act also enforced a national language requirement in order to hold a certain position (Vihalemm & Siiner 2011). Irrespective of legislation however, the actual knowledge of Estonian remains rather modest among Russian-speaking populations who are geographically isolated (living in concentrat areas). This isolation reduces their chances to practice Estonian (see also Vihalemm & Siiner 2011). Additionally, due to the wide availability of Russian-language media, a passive knowledge of Estonian is more likely to be maintained (ibid.).

Therefore, the linguistic domain is surely important when measuring potential integration. According to the population census back in 2011, the share of Russian speakers who know Estonian was approximately 41%. This figure is a little higher than findings from the 2000 census. According to data from the Integration Monitoring 2017, almost 15% of Russian speakers speak Estonian very well and another 25% claim to understand, speak and write in Estonian well. Compared to 2007, the share of those who do not speak Estonian at all has declined while the share of those who have at least a passive knowledge of Estonian has reached up to 50% (in 2007 it was 43%). Also, compared to 2011, more young people claim to speak Estonian and more individuals with Russian citizenship have developed a passive knowledge of Estonian. Kruusvall (2015) points out that language competence grows with the passing of the immigrant population from older to newer generations. While about 20% of first generation immigrants have an active proficiency of Estonian, this number is 40% in the second generation and 60% among third generation populations (ibid.). About one tenth of individuals of other ethnicities do not speak the country´s official language (Kivistik 2017). By 2017, people of other ethnicities and ethnic Estonians had mutual social contacts to use Estonian language in work/study context or in the public sphere and significantly less in the private sphere (ibid). In North-Eastern industrial cities and in many organizations in Tallinn, the working collectives tend to be predominantly Russian-speaking

ones which do not support the development of Estonian language skills (Viha-lemm & Siiner 2011). From a linguistic perspective, the growing need for English and accepting attitudes towards other languages might be a unifying factor for Estonian and Russian speakers (ibid., see also Kivistik 2017).

Based on data from different integration monitorings of Estonian society, it is also possible to assess language competence when it comes to following certain types of media: in 2011, about 50% of Russian speakers claimed they knew Estonian language well enough to understand Estonian-language media whereas one fifth did not understand anything (Vihalemm 2011). In 2015, the share of Russian speakers who understood Estonian well enough to follow media was 42%, and 23% did not understand Estonian well enough while 14% did not follow Estonian media (Seppel 2015). Still, the following of Estonian-language media among Russian-speaking audiences is rather modest (see also Chapter 3.3). Although Estonian language competence has slightly improved among Russian-speaking populations, it has not resulted in a wider following of Estonian-language media (**Study V,** see also Leppik & Vihalemm 2017).

The outbreak of political tensions surrounding the Ukraine-Russia conflict accompanied with media polarization and propaganda not only increased people's interest towards news media (**Study IV**) but it also discouraged general trust in the mass media and polarized perceptions regarding the trust-fulness of Estonian/Western versus Russian media (**Study IV**). Because limited language knowledge may lead to misinterpretations of the media content, following Estonian language media may cause even more confusion for some members of the Russians speaking minority. A parallel following of both Estonian and Russian media content can also create feelings of social anxiety and exclusion rather than social security and inclusion, as **Study III** reveals. The analysis from the 2019 survey data[20] showed similar results: Russian speakers with a good command of Estonian reported being more often confused by encounters with different mediums compared to people with a poorer command of Estonian. Thus, the better the knowledge of Estonian, the bigger the confusion. Among those who encounter contradictory information, the confusion persists since they do not know which source to trust. Among those who speak Estonian, 70% expressed confusion while only 30% of those who do not speak Estonian felt the same way. This may explain why, as explored in **Study III**, the knowledge of Estonian language is paired with higher criticism towards journalistic production and mistrust toward media as an institution. Media users with better Estonian language skills have access to more media channels, and thus, more information to compare, in different languages (e.g. in Estonian). Therefore, they tend to be more critical and less trusting when it comes to drawing conclusions based on the news or media in general (**Study III**). On the one hand, this fosters a certain self-reliance and hybrid identity as a media citizen. On the other hand, it might facilitate a kind of civic alienation and deepen mistrust towards institutions and political processes (**Study III, IV**).

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[20]   Open Estonian Foundation survey, see more in chapter 4.1.

Thus, similarly to the labour market outcomes, Estonian language skills contribute in paradoxical ways to the (mediated) social involvement of Russian speaking populations into Estonian society. The social revenues for the use of Estonian language either in competing for a job or in consuming certain types of media may remain contradictory and modest when one compares the outcomes of more monolingual (i.e. mainly Russian language using) compatriots who have chosen more ethnically segregated modes of social self-realization and participation (**Study I, III**) and build a positive distinction by maintaining or strengthening ethno-linguistic and cultural group identities. Using the previous explanations, the linguistic dimension of integration as used in the empirical model was constructed not only based on the assessment of Estonian language skills, but also on its use in interpersonal communications and in the following of mass media (see Chapter 4.2).

The cultural domain of integration

Ethno-cultural identity as an indicator of integration is multifaceted and covers more aspects which will be described in this chapter. In addition to national self-determination, religiosity and the celebration of important days, other aspects of culture are also important (e.g. literature, art, entertainment etc.) and changing the view of normality for Russian-speaking populations. Some of these cultural aspects are described in the following paragraphs.

Integration monitoring from 2011 indicated that while national self-determination is an important aspect of ethno-cultural identity among Russian speakers, cultural associations and Russian days of importance are also important. These cultural aspects are often mentioned in different integration documents (like state integration plans), but so far they have not been a national priority. From the Integration Monitoring 2011 report, Vihalemm (2011) found that, among Russian speakers, the strength of ethno-cultural identity is associated with religion, the celebration of important Russian and folk-calendar days and other associations with folk culture. Among Estonians, meanwhile this correlation is not significant (ibid). Studies dealing with the identity of Russian speakers (Vihalemm 2011, Vihalemm & Kaplan 2017) have pointed out that one main component of the ethno-cultural identity of Russian speakers is in fact religiosity and connections to the Orthodox church. Researchers also find that cultural memory could be treated as a synonym of invisible religion (Assamann 2011, Paert 2016). Even though state atheism was the major goal and official ideology of the Soviet era (Kowalewski 1980), and therefore religion shouldn't have to played a significant role in terms of identity formation (see Laitin 1998, Paert 2013), the traditions were kept alive and religion did not fade into the background (Kowalewski 1980). This aspect of religiosity persists today. Official statistics shows that the share of religious people is much higher among Russian speakers. According to the 2011 population census, approximately 50% of the Russian-speaking population consider themselves religious whereas among ethnic Estonians, this percentage is about 20% (Statistics Estonia). According to Paert (2016), the religion and cultural memory of Russian

speakers are closely related. Thus, identification with the Orthodox church could be part of a resistance to acculturation into a more secular Estonian society and part of a perceived diverging cultural identity. Vihalemm and Harro-Loit (2019) point out that, for Russian speakers, one of the carriers of cultural continuity has been the celebration of holidays and other important days. Although some particular days of importance have been transformed through political changes (Harro-Loit & Kõresaar 2010, Kreegipuu 2011), Russian speakers still have a heterogeneous attachment to the days inherited from different historical layers of the calendar (Harro-Loit et al 2020). The Soviet regime exploited the folk calendar in order to spread atheistic ideas and add several political anniversaries and other important days. Even though a gradual removal of these days began after re-independence (Kreegipuu 2010, Harro-Loit et al 2020), most of these days still carry some identity-bounded values for Russian speakers while others have more symbolic meanings or are significant only to members of certain groups (ibid.). Still, calendar traditions provide a collective form of self-determination which enables individuals to feel and express ethno-cultural differences and bring them to the public's attention (Seljamaa 2010). The dimension of ethno-cultural identity was compiled (see Chapter 4.2) based on these considerations.

3.3 Mediated transnationalism among Estonian Russian speakers

Estonian re-independence in 1991 meant that the previously state-controlled media system was replaced by a free market which gave way to international and transnational audio-visual networks (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b). Due to the lack of political interest, Russian TV-channels were no longer trans-mitted and Russian speakers turned towards new technical solutions like satellite and cable networks which made Russian media easily accessible. Moreover, among Estonian politicians, it was believed that eventually Estonian-language and other media would merge (ibid.). So far, this has not happened, especially since in the 1990s Russian speakers were following "their own" media. Due to the decisions made back in the 1990s, the media following prac-tices of Russian-speaking audiences differ significantly from those of the native population. Another important milestone to take into account is the enactment of the Estonian Language Law in 2011, which requires that information in public places, including audio-visual content, should be solely in Estonian or with translation. This law however, does not apply to foreign (i.e. Russian state sponsored) content (because foreign production is not subject to Estonian law) (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013). Altogether this means that it is hard to reshape the media practices of Russian speakers which have developed within last 20 years.

Audience preferences are largely defined by the channels that are available. As Kõuts-Klemm and colleagues (2019) indicate, people usually prefer to

follow media which is in their mother tongue and, if the necessary or qualitative information is not available, then other language media is used. Leppik and Vihalemm (2017) have found that, within the last 20 years, the availability (as well accessibility) of different media channels has hugely improved. The Estonian media system consists of Estonian-language, Russian-language and global media (ibid.). Such a wide availability and accessibility of multilingual media is a new normality which makes the media space transnational for Russian-speaking populations as well as for Estonians. Kõuts-Klemm and colleagues (2019) point out that there are 141 Russian-language TV channels viewable in Estonia, two of which are of Estonian-origin: TV3+ and ETV+. In addition, a variety of channels in other languages are available.

The Me. The World. The Media survey has enabled the monitoring of media following trends since 2005. Since that time, the media following habits of Russian-speaking migrant background populations have somewhat changed and Leppik and Vihalemm (2017) indicate that the following of Estonian-language media declined from 2005 to 2014. The same trend was found by Jõesaar (2017) who, relying on TNS Emor data, showed that Estonian-language channels/mediums are not popular among Russian speakers. According to **Study II**, the slow development of Estonian language skills among Russian speakers after the collapse of the Soviet Union has made it difficult to follow and interpret Estonian media content.

The interest in programs offering locally produced Russian-language content has fluctuated over a longer period of time (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013b, Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). In recent years (2011 and 2014 compared to 2005), the usage of local (Estonian-origin) Russian channels has grown slightly (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017) and there have not been any remarkable changes when it comes to following Russian-origin or Western media channels. Both studies by Leppik and Vihalemm (2017, see table 6.4.2) and statistics presented by Vihalemm and Hogan-Brun (2013b, see appendix 1) show that Russian channels dominate Russian speakers' media menu and the importance of these channels has rather grown over time. This is supported by statistics from Kantar Emor (2020) which show that, for Russian speakers, time spent following TV is divided mostly between following three Russian TV channels: PBK, NTV Mir and RTR Planeta.

Irrespective of Russian media dominance, Estonian Russian speakers generally value digital heterophily. They share the ideal of a "smart information practitioner" who is able to "put the puzzle together" by using information from different sources (Vihalemm & Leppik 2014, **Study IV**). This is mutually supported because using different channels causes news flows to become more versatile and occasionally competitive. This enables viewers to compare and more profoundly analyse the information received (**Study V,** see also Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Being informed is important for members of the Russian-speaking population. About one fourth claim it is important to receive up-to-date information about events in Estonia and abroad while another 60–70% claim it is important, but they do not mind delayed information. Additionally,

according to the Me. The World. The Media (2014) survey, about 45% of Russian speakers follow news media on an everyday basis (among Estonians this share is 61%).

Following certain types of media content is less and less linked to the home environment, and not determined by time, place or device (see also Morely 2001, Robins & Aksoy 2002, Diminescu 2008). In addition, Internet usage has grown rapidly and, from the technological media aspect, the importance of printed media has become marginal for Russian speaking populations. At the same time, the use of social media networks as sources of everyday news has increased. One third admit to getting daily news posted on social media by their online acquaintances (**Study V**, see also Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). This tendency for social network members to making up news repertoires is especially characteristic of the younger generation. About half of those aged 15–29 receive information from social media (ibid.).

The fact that only 41% of Russian speakers claim to have active Estonian language knowledge, means that their following of Estonian language media is quite modest (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, Kõuts-Klemm et al 2019). However, it is still important to reach Russian-speaking audience via Estonian mass media.

In 2015, Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) started broadcasting the Russian-language TV channel ETV+ for the Russian speaking minority. This has changed the media following habits of Russian speakers a little (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, see also Jõesaar 2015). The weakly reach of ETV+ has steadily grown, and by May 2017 it had reached 40% of Estonia's Russian speaking audiences (at the same time, about 10% of Estonians also watch ETV+ each week) (Jõesaar 2017). ERR statistics point out that from 2017 to January 2018 the increase in ETV+ viewers made records especially among Russian-speaking audiences (Estonian Public Broadcasting).

Additionally, a survey carried out in spring of 2019 indicated that about a quarter of Russian speakers watch ETV+ frequently and another 41% sometimes. In March 2020, the PBK (Channel One Russia), a so-called favourite outlet for Russian speakers in Estonia, announced the removal of Estonian news production from its content. While this change could also possibly direct Russian speakers to follow some Estonian Russian-language channel (like ETV+) in order to receive missing information, at the moment, there are not sufficient statistics to support this claim. Data from Kantar Emor (2020), however, do show a slight increase in ETV+ viewership. From February 2020, to April 2020, the channel's daily percentage of viewership increased from 1.1% to 1.7%. It is not clear however, whether this percentage has risen due to the cancellation of Estonian broadcasting by the PBK or due to the corona crisis.

The growing Russian diaspora in multiple countries means that, in general, within the last 20 years, the media scape for Estonian Russian speakers has widened. At the same time, following Estonian-language (or origin) media is quite moderate. Still, by consuming parallel forms of local Russian and, to a smaller extent, Estonian-language media, as well international mediums, the

media habits of Estonian Russian speakers are rather transnational and takes place across several countries (mostly Estonia and Russia) (**Study V**, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Furthermore, the interpretation of current affairs takes place according to several systems of values and norms at the same time. The fact that Russian speakers participate in various mediascapes, from following their favourite medium of Russian TV slightly more than 4 hours per day (Kantar Emor 2020) to keeping cross-border ties with the help of Skype, makes them, without a doubt, transnational. The development of technology as well the media market has also encouraged the emergence of mediated transnationalism among Estonian Russian speakers (**Study V,** Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). In the case of Estonian Russian-speaking populations, this means we can speak about a quite steady form of transnationalism, i.e. core transnationalism according to Guarnizo (2000) (see also Chapter 2.2). Nearly half of Russian speakers have contacts with Russia, a quarter with Belarus and/or Ukraine, and a majority of them follow Russian media on everyday basis (**Study V**). In addition, the media itself has become transnational. Although the channels followed might be of foreign-origin, advertising is, in most cases local, (e.g. ads about services offered by local Estonian companies etc.).

Although Russian television dominates the media menu for Russian-speaking populations, the reception of media content varies according to local status, life experience and networks of communication. Likewise, media reception supports multiple dimensions of identity development both for individuals' diasporic orientation and local identity (Vihalemm 2002, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). In other words, media use and following are also segmented. There are segments of Russian speakers who follow more Estonian mediums, those who follow only Russian media, those whose repertoires are international etc. (see also Leppik & Vihalemm 2017, **Study V**).

4. METHODOLOGY

This methodological chapter gives an overview of the data and methods used, and explains the different information structures and design of the measurements tools and analysis of the studies.

4.1 Overview of the data and methods used

In this thesis, mainly quantitative data is used to explore the segmentation of integration. The integration clusters and transnationalism index, which are the main tools of analysis of this work, are based on the Me. The World. The Media 2014 survey data. The survey "Me. The World. The Media" is one of the most important and thorough surveys covering the Estonian population's interests, values, traditions, religion, history, belonging, identity, use of one's time, cultural interests, environment and consumption, health, media use, work, and family. The survey consists of more than 600 variables and the sample size of the latest round (2014) included 1,503 respondents (including 473 Russian speakers). The survey is conducted in two languages, Estonian and Russian, and has been carried out by the University of Tartu in cooperation with survey companies every three years since 2000 (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2014) (Masso et al 2020). In my thesis, I used data from the years 2014 to form the cluster analysis (**Study V**), and data from from 2005, 2008 and 2011 to organize the time series analysis of media consumption (**Study III, IV, V**).

In addition to Me. The World. The Media, other surveys are also important for this thesis. I used the immigrant population survey, which was carried out by Statistics Estonia in 2008, in order to explore labour market outcomes of Russian-speaking populations (**Study I**). The sample size was 2,432 and it consisted of individuals, aged 15–74 years old, with immigrant backgrounds who held permanent residency in Estonia, and whose parents were born in a foreign country (predominantly Russian-speaking population).

The European Social Survey (ESS, rounds 2006 and 2012) data was used to observe the younger generation's political participation (**Study II**). Since the goals of the ESS are to map the attitudes, beliefs and behavioural patterns of different populations in Europe, this dataset enabled a comparison of Estonia with other EU countries.

For additional background information and general statistics, Integration Monitoring data from 2011, 2015 and 2017 was used (**Study V**). The Integration Monitoring survey is ordered by the Estonian Ministry of Culture and focuses on both Native Estonian speakers and those whose native language is not Estonian. The integration monitoring surveys have been carried out since the year 2000 and topics covered vary from labour market and political participation to media use.

In Study III, in addition to data from Me. The World. The Media, data was used from the survey "Topical events and different information sources"

commissioned by the Open Estonia Foundation and carried out by Saar Poll in August 2014. This survey was carried out shortly after the shooting-down of a Malaysian airplane over Eastern Ukraine and the death of all 298 people on board. The sample consisted of 1,000 respondents aged 15 to 74 of which 505 were Estonians and 494 non-Estonians.

Study IV was supported by different datasets. In addition to the Integration Monitoring and Me. The World. The Media mentioned above, the Integration Monitoring data was used alongside different Latvian datasets to find comparable information.

For the quantitative data analysis, I used descriptive statistics (frequency tables, comparison of means, correlations etc.), cluster analysis, factor analysis and regression analysis. Quantitative information not only allows us to assess the frequency of certain properties (e.g. how many Russian speakers trust Estonian institutions) and general trends (and their change in time) about the background information of members of the Russian-speaking population (e.g. citizenship, language knowledge, education, generation etc.), but it also allows us to consider media consumption as well and find correlations between different factors. Most importantly, in this thesis, the quantitative approach allows for the repetition of the initial analysis done by Lauristin (2012) and the addition of new dimensions and measurement tools to that analysis (see more in Chapter 4.2).

The quantitative approach implemented in this thesis is affected by the methodological work done within the long-term research project "Me. The World. The Media". This survey makes it possible to analyse how individuals (Estonians as well Russian speakers) cope with macro-level structural changes (Masso et al 2020 p.6) by offering single usage as well as a range of aggregated index variables (in 2014 there were 128 indices). The researchers working with the project adopted the methodological tool proposed by Archer (2013) and used different uni- and multivariate methods in analysing the data: correlation, factor, cluster and regression analysis, multidimensional scaling etc. (Masso et al 2020 p. 6). Using the Archer (2013) approach (relational understanding of causality) has enabled the studies carried out so far (within this project) to help understand and explain the dynamics and outcomes of social change (Masso et al 2010). For example, by using cluster analysis, it has been possible to determine interrelations and explain wider mechanisms behind social or structural changes in Estonian society (Masso et al p. 9). Additionally, combined with other analytical methods, this approach has enabled researchers to explore the interrelations between individuals and variables as well aggregated indices (i.e. relationships between different parties involved in social processes) (ibid.).

Therefore, due to the opportunities offered by previous work based on the Me. The World. The Media survey (see Kalmus et al 2020), I followed the traditions and central claims of the research team of this work and relied upon a multidimensional analysis. To form the integration clusters, certain index variables, altogether 8 indices, were considered. These aggregated variables are based on the single variables described in chapter 4.2. Integration clusters are

combinations of integration dimensions and represent sub-groups or ideal types of Russian-speaking populations.

Qualitative data was used to illustrate the quantitative analysis. The qualitative analysis presented in this thesis is based on the focus group data gathered from 2015. From winter to spring 2015, four focus groups were carried out: three in Tallinn and one in Ida-Virumaa (Kohtla-Järve). A qualitative approach was necessary to gain a deeper understanding of how people's belonging to different integration clusters responds to changes taking place in Estonian society. It further considers what role the media plays in this process and infers about the reasons behind specific media following habits, and assesses which interpretation practices describe Russian-speaking populations, how news media institutions and their messages are perceived, and how Russian speakers position themselves as media users.

Table 4 below presents data collected in relation to the research questions. The data collection and analysis methods for each publication are described more specifically in the relevant part.

Table 4. Overview of data collection and analysis

	Data collection	**Connection to study questions**
Study I	Quantitative research: immigrant population study carried out in 2008 encompassing permanent residents of Estonia aged 15–74, who were themselves, or whose parents were foreign born. Sample size was 2,432.	1.1
Study II	Quantitative research: data of the European Social Survey (ESS) rounds 2006 and 2012 were used. ESS survey sample is representative of all persons aged 15 and over with minimum response rate of 70%.	1.1; 1.2
Study III	Quantitative research combined with qualitative research. The empirical analysis is based on a series of focus group discussions with members of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia and Estonia from late 2014 to early 2015 (The Estonian part is the same as mentioned under Study V). Different quantitative data-sets were also used: Integration Monitoring 2015 (Estonia), Demaudits 2014, Attitudes television 2014 (Latvia).	2.2; 3.2
Study IV	Quantitative research combined with qualitative research. More specifically data from Me. The World. The Media, as well data from survey "Topical events and different information sources" carried out in August 2014. Additionally, data from four focus group discussions with members of the Russian-speaking community were used. Focus group interviews were carried out in the the beginning of 2015.	3.2
Study V	Quantitative research: data from the Me. The World. The Media Survey. The sample consists of Estonian population aged 15–75, each round has 1,500 respondents (years 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2014). The main focus was on data from the 2014 round.	1.1; 1.2; 2.1; 3.1

4.2 Constructing measurement tools
for quantitative study

In order to measure integration, different methods or approaches have been used in both the academic (i.e. Amit 2012, Caselli 2015, Dickey et al 2018) and political fields (i.e. Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003, Niessen & Schibel 2004). To measure the strength of integration in Estonia in 2008 and 2011 (the latter of which was more detailed) an integration index, which divided the Russian-speaking population into different categories, was composed (see Lauristin 2008 & 2012). The index compiled for the 2011 Integration Monitoring (see Lauristin 2012), was based on different integration dimensions (aggregated variables) which represented the topics of the Estonian integration policy (see more in Chapter 3) and focused on three dimensions: a) citizenship and civic identity; b) language competence and use; c) social and political involvement. More specifically, integration was measured via different variables such as following and trusting Estonian media, communication in Estonian, language competence, participation in elections, trust towards institutions, and also, the celebration of Russian days of importance (Lauristin 2012). By combining the aforementioned three dimensions, the five different types of integration were separated. The dimension-based approach and clustering was also used in a 2013 study done by Kruusvall as well in the 2015 Integration Monitoring (see Kruusvall 2015). These latter works helped to validate the tool initially created by Lauristin (2012) and prove its relevance in terms of measuring the integration of Russian-speaking populations.

Previous research on integration clusters (Lauristin 2012, Kruusvall 2013, 2015) has indicated that the integration process among Russian-speaking populations strongly depends on social background. Non-Estonians living in Estonia (mostly members of the Russian-speaking population) are not a homogenous group; rather, they consist of different sub-groups who have different needs and qualities based on their linguistic, political and social involvement (ibid.). Sub-groups with less education, absent willingness and capability to integrate and lower social status are the ones who are in the greatest danger to be (ethnically) stratified (see e.g. Lauristin 2012). Using clustering as an approach, enables researchers to first define these groups and secondly, to indicate what kind of (political) support measures they would need.

Even though the empirical model for the exploration of segmented integration through aggregated variables of integration dimensions and cluster analysis is inspired by the ample work described above, the current analysis goes a step further. One the one hand, research has indicated that there is persistent segregation, and that Estonians and members of the Russian-speaking population work in different sectors/collectives, have different communication networks and media following habits, practice different traditions, enact different political behaviour etc. On the other hand, the purpose of integration policy is to direct Russian-speaking populations towards a greater participation at the civic and political level, while maintaining their traditions and ethnic identity at the

same time. In this work, different nuances have been taken into account by adding more integration dimensions and thereby covering more variables describing the integration of Russian-speaking populations. Considering the empirically measured context of integration domains (described in Chapter 3), this eight-dimensional model embraces aspects of political, civic, economic and cultural domains of social life (**Study V**). However, one of the downsides is that, in the current empirical model, the cultural domain does not include education and cultural consumption. Media consumption/following as well participation in culture (e.g. NGOs, visiting cultural events), religious practices and celebration of days of importance are taken into account. This means, that future empirical models can be amended.

4.2.1 Formation and description of aggregated integration indices

The survey Me. The World. The Media (n=475[21]) from 2014, which covers many domains of social life that reflect aspects of integration, was the main source used for the quantitative analysis in this thesis. Based on this survey, the integration types, which were formed based on the aggregation of single variables into indices, cover four main integration domains (described in Chapter 3.2). The equal political and civic participation of Estonian residents has been stated in several integration plans (see Chapter 3.2): being involved in different (joint) civic as well political activities not only increases the coherence of society, but also strengthens civic identity (see Chapter 3.2, also Lõimuv Eesti 2020). In this thesis, political and civic participation encompass various dimensions of integration (see Chapter 3.2, **Study V**). Namely, political involvement as a citizen (either having formal citizenship or participating in elections), participation in public sphere (taking part in different public events, being informed about the news), trusting institutions, belonging to NGOs and alternative political activity (like joining political campaigns in social media or participation in meetings/demonstrations). Figure 1 points out the extent to which Russian speakers are involved in certain dimensions.

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[21]   The total sample is 1503, and the number of Russian speakers is 475.

Figure 1. Composition variables of the aggregated index variables of political and civic involvement and agency: *Share of positive[22] answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers (n=475).*

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[22]   Here and afterwards (figures 2, 3, 4), the share of positive responses also encompasses the rersponses "I rather agree" and "agree totally" whereas "no" includes "rather don't agree" or "don't agree".

Another important aspect of integration is economic agency. Together with political domain, the economic situation after Estonian re-independence changed a lot and affected Russian-speaking populations in numerous ways (more in Chapter 3.2). I measured the economic agency and involvement of members of the Russian-speaking population via the single variables depicted in table 5. Based on the conclusions of **Study I,** an important form of economic agency is entrepreneurship, which involves being either self-employed or employing others (11%[23] answered yes) (see figure 2). Another variable characterizing the ability to raise resources is participation in projects in the Estonian or international business sphere (the share of positive answers was 11%). Based on the conclusions of **Study 1**, I also included the variable of work-related training or further education (15%) in the index composition because this characterizes the aspect of resilience as an employee. Also, the variable of general wealth (20%) is important as it characterizes the degree of economic security and household resilience (93% of Russian speakers own some kind real estate). As previously stated, all these aspects are under-represented among Russian-speaking populations. Participation in further training, whether work related or not, is an exception and the participation rate is twice as high among Estonians. Meanwhile, economic agency, which differs by only a couple of percentage points, is not considerably higher among ethnic Estonians.


Figure 2. Composition variables of the aggregated index variable of economic agency and involvement: *Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers (n = 475).*

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[23]   Here and afterwards when describing the single variables chosen for forming indices in the brackets, the share of positive answers is presented (n = 475).

The different social spaces are marked with a line of division between Estonian-Russian language. Considering that one-third of Estonian's population speaks Russian as their mother tongue, for such a big community, the spread and development of Estonian-language skills has proceeded rather slowly (**Study III,** see also Chapter 3.2). Moreover, knowledge of Estonian plays an important role in terms of social inclusion/integration and the lack of Estonian language skills is connected with social and structural segregation (**Study III**, see Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013a).

Estonian language media use is associated with a person´s general connection to Estonia. Those who follow Estonian language media participate more in the political and public spheres compared to those who follow mainly Russian media (**Study V**). However, the following of Estonian-language media among Russian-speaking audiences is rather modest (**Study V**, see also Chapter 3.2). The infrequent following of Estonian (or Estonian-origin, but Russian-language) media indicates a weak connectedness with Estonian society (**Study V**). Thus, language skill and language use are multifaceted rather than unidimensional variables.

To measure the linguistic-communicative dimension of integration (see also **Study III**), I included variables describing the active use of Estonian language which support that 57% of Russian speakers use Estonian language either sometimes or frequently (see figure 3) and 40% claim their command of Estonian is good (see Chapter 3.2). Another important aspect in terms of the linguistic-communicative dimension is media use. Therefore, I covered variables related to Estonian-language or Estonian origin Russian-language media: radio, TV channels and web portals. About two-thirds of the Russian-speaking population listens to Russian-language radio and another 40% watch Russian-language TV (channel TV3+). The following of Estonian-language TV channels or listening to Estonian radio is rather seldom (22% and 15% accordingly).

Despite differences in socio-economic background, citizenship and media following patterns, the ethno-cultural identity and its strength is a common, unifying dimension of integration (**Study V,** see also Chapter 3.2). At the same time, different groups of Russian speakers implement it differently (see Chapter 5.1, **Study V**): some are more religious (see Chapter 3.2); younger generations have embraced new values and identities whereas older generations are rather committed to traditional ways of thinking (Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009, **Study V**); the value of celebrating important days also varies among members of the Russian-speaking population (see Chapter 5.2), etc.

Study V offers the comprehensive index variable to describe the ethno-cultural identity of Russian speaking populations. This variable consists of habits of celebrating Russian national and Russian Orthodox days of importance[24], exercising religious practices (52% claim to be religious, 29% go to

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[24]   For Russian speakers in Estonia, the celebration of holidays and days of importance is s carrier of cultural continuity in turbulent times (Vihalemm & Harro-Loit 2019).

church), taking part in ethno-cultural associations and feeling solidarity (we-ness) within the group of Russians in Estonia (18%) (see figure 4).


Figure 3. Composition variables of the aggregated index variable for Estonian language and media use. *Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers (n=475).*


Figure 4. Composition variables for the aggregated index variable of Ethno-cultural identity. *Share of positive answers among the whole sample of Russian speakers (n = 475)*

In order to aggregate single variables (Russian speakers answers to the Me. The World. The Media questionnaire), increase the reliability of the variables, and better present general tendencies found in the answers (see also Vihalemm & Masso 2017), I used index/aggregated variables. Based on single variables, I formed 8 different indices. The single variables with shortened (recoded) scales are presented in table 5. All single variables used to create the indices, are either binary (0 & 1) or measurable on a scale of 0 to 2. The 8 indices formed are called integration dimensions and named accordingly (see table 5).

The first step towards the formation of these indices was selecting the right variables based on their content validity. Additionally, single variables were tested for how well they meet the statistical criteria of compatibility. In this analysis, Cronbach's alpha is used to find out how single variables are related; the bigger the value of the Alpha, the better the chosen variables measure the phenomenon being studied. After that, single variables were summarized in a partial sum index based on the variables already recorded (see table 5). For further analysis, the recoding of summarized variables was also necessary. Because aggregated variables (indices) are formed based on different numbers of initial, single variables, their scale varies from 0 to 20. Therefore, for indices to be comparable and interpretable, I shortened their initial scales based on a normal distribution. The indices of (1) political involvement as a citizen, (2) participation in civic organisations, (3) trust in Estonian institutions, (4) economic involvement and (5) estonianisation received four values: failing, weak, medium and strong. The indices of (6) alternative political participation, (7) participation in public sphere and (8) ethno-cultural identity received three values: failing or weak, medium and strong.

Table 5. Single variables used to compose index variable

Name of the index	Values of constituting variables
Political involvement as a citizen *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,76)*	
Citizenship	Other = 0, Estonian = 1
Participation in national elections 2011	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participation in local municipality elections 2013	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participation in Europarlament elections 2014	No = 0, Yes = 1
Subjective feeling of togetherness with co-citizens	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participation in civic organisations *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,51)*	
Is a representative/has a public function	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participation in NGOs	No = 0, Yes = 1
Trust in NGOs	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participation in campaigns and movements	No = 0, Yes = 1
Charity and voluntary work	No = 0, Yes = 1
Trust in Estonian institutions *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,84)*	
The Parliament	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
The President	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
The Government	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
The media	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
The courts	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
The police	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
Education system	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
Health care system	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
Church	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
Banks	Rather not = 0, On the average = 1, Rather trust = 2
Alternative political participation *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,69)*	
Participation in public meetings	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Participation in demonstrations	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Participation in political debates	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Wearing a badge or ribbon with political content	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Support for or joining a protest campaign	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Participation in an internet petition	Have not = 0, Once or twice= 1, Frequently = 2
Participation in the public sphere (*Cronbach's alpha = 0,56*)	
Participation in different public cultural, sports and commemorative events	No = 0, Yes = 1
Daily following of the news	No = 0, Yes = 1
Being well informed about current affairs	No = 0, Yes = 1

Name of the index	Values of constituting variables
Important to be informed about current affairs	No = 0, Yes = 1
Economic involvement *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,63)*	
Entrepreneurship (being owner, board member or shareholder of a company),	No = 0, Yes = 1
participation in business projects or EU-funded projects	No = 0, Yes = 1
Recent participation in work-related (re)training courses	No = 0, Yes = 1
Owning real estate	No = 0, Yes = 1
Financial wealth (do you have sufficient money for food, clothes, hobbies etc.)	Little = 0, Big = 1
Estonianisation *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,73)*	
Knowledge of the Estonian language and frequent use in different spheres of life	No = 0, Yes = 1
Having ethnic Estonians as friends	No = 0, Yes = 1
Following Estonian-language media	No = 0, Yes = 1
Ethno-cultural identity *(Cronbach's alpha = 0,60)*	
The feeling of ethnic belonging as a Russian (Ukrainian, other ethnic group)	No = 0, Yes = 1
Participating in and supporting the activities of an ethnic cultural society	No = 0, Yes = 1
Celebrating holidays in the Russian folk calendar and national holidays of the Russian Federation	No = 0, Yes = 1
Religiosity	None = 0, Some = 1, Big = 2
Attending church	No = 0, Yes = 1

The integration dimensions (indices) described in table 5 are not all-encompassing; education, for example (see Chapter 3) could be a separate dimension, but is not included in the current analysis, and cultural domain is also more versatile than the aspects included here. In future research, depending on the context, distinguishing educational as well as cultural domains could also be considered; however, due to the limitations of the empirical material collected, these domains are not considered in this study/model.

Figure 5 presents the variation of aggregated index variables (integration dimensions). The strongest is participation in the public sphere which involves taking part in different public events, following news media and being well informed. The weakest is alternative political participation, referring to participation in public meetings, demonstrations, debates etc. In this sense, Russian speakers do not differ much from the ethnic Estonians. Among Estonians, participation in the public sphere was also the strongest (92%), whereas those who were alternatively politically active, was about 49%. The latter of these two was still considerably more than in the case of Russian speakers.

According to the aggregated index variable of trust towards various social institutions, about half of the Russian speaking population (among ethnic Estonians this variable was two-thirds) feel at least moderate trust (see figure 5) in these institutions. That, together with knowledge of Estonian, significantly eases their communication with government agencies and other institutions if

needed. This further contributes to their social involvement and diminishes the risk of social marginalization. Estonian language and media, however, are being used regularly: approximately half of the Russian speaking population regularly uses Estonian language in their daily life either via communication with Estonians, following Estonian language media or in other situations (**Study III** and **Study V**).

Practices helping to maintain ethno-cultural identity (cultural associations, cultural events, celebrating ethnic or Russian national holidays) are spread among approximately one-half of the Russian-speaking population (**Study V**). The same basically applies to participation in civic organisations (NGOs). Economic agency and involvement by the Russian-speaking population is rather low (**Study V**), but similar to that of the native population: among Russian speakers the medium level of involvement is at least 35%, while among Estonians it is 46%.


Figure 5. Integration of Russian-speaking population into different spheres of society. *Source: Authors' calculations based on "Me. The World. The Media, 2014"*

In order to measure the transnationalism of the Russian-speaking population, I constructed the aggregated index of translocality (**Study V**). The term translocality marks the relationships between multiple places which do not necessarily reach beyond political borders (Smith & Guarnizo 1998). There have been several attempts to measure translocality. For example, Naumann and Creiner (2017) explored translocal relations in the case of miners in the Northern Cape province of South Africa. By using data from ethnographic field research, the authors tried to explain why miners expand their action space yet are attached to a certain place. Rios and Watkins (2015) observed the Hmong diaspora in the US to explain translocal placemaking from the point of view of

urban planning. Föbker and colleagues (2016) used qualitative interviews to focus on highly skilled immigrants in Germany and explore how their everyday practices and networks as well their translocal mobility practices are related to integration.

In this analysis, transnationalism is explored on the local level. This means that transnationalism is explained based on mediated relations which are mostly located outside of Estonia. The majority of the Estonian Russian-speaking population has personal contacts outside of Estonia, and they do follow the media content produced outside the borders of Estonia (**Table 8.3** in **Study V**). Although people also make physical visits abroad, the transnationalism of Estonian Russian speakers is mainly mediated by the nature of their everyday following of both national and foreign media (Russian, Western), and social media or other forms of digital communications.

The transnationalism index was composed of the following single variables: visiting friends and relatives living in Russia and other countries, having friends and relatives who have recently emigrated from Estonia, having many social media contacts outside Estonia, doing business or having work or study relations abroad, following Russian media, following other international media (Cronbach's alpha = 0,83). The methodology and steps in forming the index were the same as described above: recoding the single variables, after that summarizing, then shortening the index according to normal distribution. The index was given three values: "weak or missing", "medium" and "strong". Strong transnationalism marks having friends, relatives, partners abroad, visiting them, frequent following of Russian or other foreign media channels, and many social media contacts abroad. Weak or missing transnationalism, on the contrary, marks infrequent contacts with foreign countries, scant following of foreign media, and few social media contacts abroad (**Study V**).

4.2.2 Formation of integration clusters

Integration clusters were developed to compare Russian speakers with each other and not with ethnic Estonians. The cluster-based approach is an approach, which has been previously used for analysing integration. For example, Haugen and Kunst (2017) used cluster analysis to measure the acculturation of the majority population in Norway. Schwartz and Zamboanga (2008) also used cluster analysis to assess the acculturation of US college students by first distinguishing the three main dimensions of cultural identity and then defining two groups of identity orientation. In this analysis, clusters are based on diverse social activities or indices (as described above), which help us to comprehend different ways of social involvement.

Cluster analysis enables researchers to assort variables or individuals based on certain (hidden) dimensions or predetermined variables. It also facilitates the process of distinguishing between groups of people acting similarly so that the differences between groups would be as big as possible. For that purpose, I used

the k-means method since it enables researchers to explore/find groups of individuals behaving similarly in a dataset on the basis of previously determined combinations of variables (Vihalemm & Masso 2017). The way in which cluster analysis uses datasets to find hidden structures and enables the exploration of the qualities of belonging to a certain cluster help explain the mechanisms of action.

Because cluster analysis does not answer the question of why structures differ, some of the findings are further illustrated with qualitative examples in the results chapter.

The k-means method divides the sample (here the Russian speakers) into quite homogeneous groups of individuals. The first step is to find suitable variables which are those measurable in a comparable scale. For the purpose of this analysis, these are the integration dimensions as described above. In the second phase of clustering, the number of groups is determined and named. Even though the three and five cluster formations were also tested, I found the four-cluster solution most suitable because it distinguished most strongly between respondents. The final cluster centers are presented in table 6 below. Out of 8 integration dimensions, the strongest distinguishers, where the F-values were bigger, were political involvement as a citizen and participation in civic organisations. The weakest distinguishers were alternative political participation, economic involvement and trust in Estonian institutions, where the F-value was the lowest.

Table 6. K-means clustering result: final cluster centers[25]

Index	Name of the cluster			
	Multi-active cosmo-politan cluster	Dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster	Active ethno-culturally engaged cluster	Passive, weakly engaged cluster
Political involvement as a citizen	3,26	3,28	1,75	1,66
Participation in civic organisations	3,32	1,56	2,93	1,41
Trust in Estonian institutions	2,66	3,00	2,91	2,00
Alternative political participation	1,64	1,04	1,36	1,14
Participation in the public sphere	2,35	2,07	2,28	1,69
Economic involvement	2,95	2,30	2,17	2,12
Estonianisation	3,30	3,08	2,08	1,84
Ethno-cultural identity	2,67	2,02	3,19	2,14

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[25] The indices of political involvement as a citizen, participation in civic organisations, trust in Estonian institutions, economic involvement and estonianisation are measured on the scale of 1 to 4, whereas indices of alternative political participation, participation in public sphere and ethno-cultural identity are measured on the scale of 1 to 3.

The four paths of segmented integration were labelled as follows (see also table 6) by taking previous research and theoretical concepts describing the integration of migrant background populations into account:

a) A multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster describable via strong involvement through multiple domains of social life.
b) A dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster characterized by strong political involvement as Estonian citizens, high trust in Estonian institutions and relatively strong economic involvement and ethno-cultural and religious engagement.
c) An active ethno-culturally engaged cluster who has strong ethno-cultural and religious engagement, and high participation in NGOs, civic activities, the public sphere.
d) A passive, weakly engaged cluster whose involvement is weak in all dimensions.

Just as in other methods of typological analysis, the subjective decisions of the author's plays a large role in terms of defining the numbers of clusters and variables included in analysis (see Masso & Vihalemm 2017). In this analysis, the clusters are based on manually constructed indices with a predetermined composition. The cluster analysis positions members of the Estonian Russian speaking population in relation to each other (not with majority population) so that the construed integration segments (clusters) represent "ideal types". Thus, the description of the clusters/ integration segments would need more research validation.

4.3 Design and analysis of qualitative data

Data from focus group interviews is analysed using a qualitative approach. This method enables us to examine how people think and why they do so, and also to explore their knowledge and experiences (Kitzinger 1995). Additionally, since focus groups address the question of how instead of how many, they can complement quantitative studies (see Sagoe 2012). Combined with quantitative methods, qualitative studies can help promote efficiency more than a single method approach (ibid., see Michell 1998). Khan and colleagues (1991) indicate that another possible task for focus groups could be following up on quantitative studies. They maintain that these focus groups enable researchers to better explain and expand on the data, as well understand reasons behind particular findings: for example, understanding how transnationalism and local integration are interrelated and affect each other in the context of (ongoing) political crisis.

In the current analysis, data from the focus groups was used to make a connection with the integration clusters since the participants of the focus-groups also answered a short survey. In order to match the quantitative and qualitative parts of the study, the focus group participants were distributed into certain integrations. Later, individuals were matched with the clusters discussed above (Chapter 4.2) as they shared lots of similarities (the basis variables which

constituted indices were more or less the same). For the analysis, focus group participants' quotations were used to illustrate the media content reception and interpretation of integration clusters formed based on the Me. The World. The Media survey.

The focus group discussions with members of Russian-speaking communities in Estonia were carried out in early 2015. During this time, the Russian-Ukraine crisis was prominently featured in national, Russian, Ukrainian and Western news media agendas. Altogether, four focus groups, with a grand total of 26 participants, were carried out in the capital city Tallinn (3) and in the North-East part of Estonia in the town of Kohtla-Järve (1). The three groups carried out in Tallinn consisted of: one group with seven younger participants aged 18–35, who did not speak Estonian; one group of six young people, aged 18–38, who spoke Estonian; and one with eight slightly older participants, aged 40–67. The focus group interview conducted in Kohtla-Järve was done with five participants, aged 18–54 years. In general, the participants were ethnic Russians and Ukrainians (i.e. people with multiple identities whose media repertoires and political and cultural loyalties varied). The snowball-sampling method was used to find focus-group participants.

I was involved in the process of preparing the interview questions and finding suitable media texts from various Russian and international sources. The focus groups were semi-structured and lasted approximately two hours with the main emphasis on media content and its reception. This focus helped show how those belonging to different integration clusters interpret news and other media, and how the ongoing crisis or integration pathways might affect this. The participants were invited to discuss the content of longer and shorter texts based on topical news which was related mostly to the Ukrainian crisis. Participants were given 3 or 4 longer texts and a choice of up to 8 shorter news pieces from which they chose and debated over the most interesting ones. Their discussion topics covered mostly recent (topical) political and local affairs, such as a school shooting in Viljandi, events related to closing Charlie Hedbo, the Munich Security Conference in relation to Sergei Lavrov, news related to ongoing Ukrainian-Russian conflict, etc.

The analysis of how media content was interpreted was inspired by Stuart Hall's (1973) encoding/decoding model. According to this model, media content is interpreted based on ones own cultural background, socio-economic situation and personal experiences. Hall says audience is not passive, but rather, it relies on its social context and, in terms of construing content, is active and able to change messages via collective actions (Hall 1973). Texts are ambiguous, so they can be interpreted in several ways. Every individual entails different background and external knowledge about media content or texts which they use to interpret mass media. This, in turn, leads towards several interpretations of the same context. So, the influence of media comes out primarily when constructing meaning. In this analysis, transcripts of focus group interviews were later interpreted based on the aim of the specific study and research questions proposed there. For some texts, the program MAXQDA

was used in order to create categories. In most of the cases (especially **Study III, IV**), the coding is based on research questions and empirical evidence.

4.4 Ethical considerations

The quantitative surveys I use in my research granted full anonymity for respondents and were used in accordance with the data protection rules that were valid at that time. GDPR came into force after my research was done. The empirical analysis is based on five different surveys: The Immigrant population survey I used in **Study I**, was carried out and owned by Statistics Estonian and I accessed the data by signing a confidentiality agreement. I could only use data in Statistics Estonia on the spot and for scientific purposes. I used the European social survey, which is freely accessible, in **Study II**. Integration Monitoring data (**Study III, IV, V**) was made accessible by the University of Tartu, and I was member of the research group using data. Me. The World. The Media survey was also accessible to me as I was part of the research group who participated in the preparation of the questionnaire. Open Estonian Fund survey data was related to **Study III** and the principal investigator, Andres Jõesaar, granted access to this data.

Additionally, I used empirical evidence from the focus groups. Carrying out focus groups requires great attention to anonymity as well as confidentiality rules. Before the interview, focus group participants were given and had signed the informed consent, after the researcher explained the purpose of the study. By signing this form, participants gave permission for their data to be processed and analysed, and this also guaranteed their anonymity. This rule is followed in the analysis, and the respondents were anonymized in all processes of analysis.

In this thesis, all the personal data interviewees gave was not associated with their views. Participants were informed that they can leave at any point of the discussion if they feel pressured in some way. All the focus-group interviews were recorded after participants gave written permission to so. Records and transcripts were only used for the analysis of the current thesis. The original transcripts are archived in an external disk with no Internet access.

5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

5.1 Main types of integration

The differences across integration dimensions described in chapters 3.2 and 4.2 (also see figure 5 on p. 59) represent possibilities for participation in social life. As experienced by the Russian-speaking population, these possibilities relate to conforming to structural possibilities or exercising one's agency and attempting to alter them. As previously stated, the Russian-speaking population is internally heterogeneous and the combinations between these dimensions in relation to place of living, age, immigrant generation, education etc. are examined by using cluster analysis. This analysis is presented in this and the next chapter and is based on the results of **Studies III and V.**

The cluster-based approach enables us to divide the Russian-speaking population into four subgroups whose integration into Estonian society is led by certain leading dimension (**Study V**, also see Chapter 3.2 and 4.2). Figure 6 below represents the segmented integration of the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background population. It depicts the integration clusters across their constitutive index variables according to the mean values of the respective indexes on a standardised scale form 1 (missing) to 4 (strong).

The cluster with highest mean values in most integration dimensions, except trust towards institutions and ethno-cultural identity, is named the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster (see **study V***)*. In this cluster, members are resourceful and have high agency across multiple dimensions of social life, and they feel more frequent (compared with other clusters) solidarity with broad, trans-border social groups and categories like Europeans, humankind and more abstract categories like people with the same lifestyle or preferences (**Study V, Appendix 8.2**). This cluster comprises of 19% of the adult Russian-speaking population and corresponds quite well to the goal of growth of cultural, political and socio-economic integration brought out in "Integration Estonia 2020" (see Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, also Lõimuv Eesti 2020).

The cluster with high mean values in trust towards institutions, political involvement as (Estonian) citizen and participation in the public sphere is named the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster**.** In this cluster, the mode of involvement is close to the traditional way of democratic participation (see Chapter 3.2, e.g. political participation, **Study V**) via elections, obeying rules and regulations, following mass media that is called "duty citizenship" by Dalton (2008, see also **Study II**). This cluster, which is characteristic to the older generation of ethnic minorities (**Study II**), forms 35% of the adult Russian-speaking population.

The cluster with high mean values in ethno-cultural identity, membership in NGO-s and participation in the public sphere is called the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster **(Study V).** Members of this cluster are active at the community level and in civic society, they take part in cultural and religious associations, which is a considerable component and maintainer of ethno-

cultural indemnity, (see Chapter 3.2), participate in public events, and feel strong solidarity with Estonian Russians (**Study V,** Appendix 8.2). This cluster forms 26% of the adult Russian-speaking population.

The cluster with the low mean values in most integration dimensions is called the passive, weakly engaged cluster **(Study V).** Members of this group are, according to the varied questions asked in the Me. The World. The Media 2014 survey, the most disinterested and demotivated for any kind of public participation. At least part of their passivity, however, is due to institutional hindrances or lack of personal resources. Their weak or non-involvement is structurally prescribed and thus, the structural and voluntary exclusion are mutually reinforcing. This cluster forms **21%** of the adult Russian-speaking population.


Figure 6. Integration clusters according to integration dimensions.
Source: Authors' calculations based on "Me. The World. The Media, 2014"

We can say that the majority of Russian speakers are integrated into Estonian society through economic, political, or civic practices or some participation in public space. But their agency type, the socio-economic and political risks associated with these groups and also the possibilities for policy makers or governors to develop some kind of dialogue with these population segments are varied. Therefore, the practical approach of segmented integration is connected with media use among these segments. Because mass communication varies in functions from utilitarian to ideological, the process of segmented integration is strongly related to peoples' media use. The interpersonal and inter-group

communications via social networks is also shaped by their structural integration and vice versa. Being well-informed and having mediated social connections shape individuals' structural integration and identity orientations. For Russian speakers, as previously mentioned (see Chapter 3.2), over the years, Russian media, especially Russian TV channels, have remained a main sources of news, and over 90% of Russian speakers follow at least one Russian TV channel every day (**Study V**, Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Following media of Russian origin is a common practice among Russian-speaking populations and the Estonian Russian-language radio stations are also widely listened to (see table 7).

Table 7. Media use among integration clusters

	multi-active cosmopolitan cluster	dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster	active ethno-culturally engaged cluster	passive, weakly engaged cluster	Russian speakers total
Russian TV channels	88%	90%	90%	90%	89%
Russian-language web portals	66%	49%	28%	24%	42%
International media	67%	53%	37%	36%	49%
Estonian Russian-language media	41%	30%	24%	37%	32%
Estonian TV channels	36%	21%	17%	14%	21%
Russian web portals	32%	20%	12%	10%	18%
Estonian language web portals	29%	15%	7%	3%	13%
Estonian Russian-language radio	73%	59%	36%	58%	56%

The multi-active cosmopolitan cluster represents the most successful mode of segmented integration. This cluster is characterized by strong nation-specific capitals (Estonian language and citizenship, and following Estonian language media), active political participation in both traditional and alternative forms and widespread NGO membership and participation in civic activities with civic and high economic agency (**Study V**). For this cluster, trust towards institutions and ethno-cultural identity received rather moderate as opposed to high mean values. Thus, the cluster members' life orientation is rather emancipatory, and they do not rely on the good or fair functioning of institutions. While they feel solidarity with Estonian Russians (**Study V,** Appendix 8.2), their participation in ethno-cultural associations', celebration of "Russian" days of importance and especially their religious attachment are all more modest compared to the active

ethno-culturally engaged cluster. This cluster has above-average proportion of females (67 %) and people with higher education (48%), people with Estonian citizenship (83%) and entrepreneurs/managers/specialists (44%). Every third cluster member lives outside of the concentration areas of Russian-speaking population, i.e. Tallinn or industrial cities in North-East Estonia (the full socio-demographic profile is given in **Appendix 8.1.** of **Study V**). This cluster's high agency is multifariously reproduced via high social status and labour market position, political participation, civic activity and good command in Estonian language. The higher agency is connected with an emancipatory critical stance towards state institutions and more trans-border, post-modern identity orienta-tions (**Appendix 8.2.** of **Study V**). Thus, this mode of segmented integration cannot be called assimilationist. Even though the personal capitals invested in social upward mobility are linked with the nation state structures and local majority, structural involvement does not pair with unconditional loyalty and assimilation identity.

The members of multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are outstanding not only for their frequent following of international news channels (like BBC, CNN, and EuroNews in Russian language), but also for their following of other media channels that are not popular among other clusters: Estonian Russian-language online news portals (like Delfi, Postimees) and Estonian-language television (table 7, **Study V**). The variation in local integration is positively correlated with patterns of regularity in following news rather than a versatility of chan-nels in the media menu. Thus, political and economic integration, agency, and regular news following are mutually reinforcing. Being in constant information flow enables individuals to make (more) meaning of the ongoing events and processes in society, and further contextualize the events to exercise diachronic elements in the independent interpretation of the news (**Study V**). In general, the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster had the most versatile media menu com-pared to other clusters.

The dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster represents the mode of integra-tion that is close to the civic assimilation. A high share of individuals in this cluster have Estonian citizenship, a high trust in institution, and hold the most pro-Estonia (or least pro-Soviet and pro-Russia) opinions of socio-political issues (**Study V**). At the same time, they feel solidarity with Estonian Russians (55%) and residents of Estonia (50%), but not much with Estonians (17%) (**Appendix 8.2.** of **Study V**). Thus, their political identity clearly dominates their ethno-cultural identity and assimilation into the ethnic majority is likely impeded by modest Estonian language skills (only 43% of them have active/ good Estonian language skills). Their participation in public life is mainly mediated and formal, and they trust principal institutions in society and follow news on regular basis. This is in line with the findings of Kaldur and colleagues (2017): the more people trust institutions, the more they are politically involved. Greater trust, in turn, goes together with Estonian citizenship (see Chapter 3.2). The existence of country specific capital like citizenship is a way of being and staying politically involved.

Cluster members' civic involvement is limited to traditional institutional forms, and participation in NGOs and alternative forms of political participation is rare in this group. Their economic integration is moderate (see figure 6). According to the socio-demographical profile (**Appendix 8.1.** of **Study V**) this mode of integration seems to reproduce itself across generations because a considerable share (45%) belong to the younger and middle age cohorts (15 to 45 years age). Two-third of Russian speakers belonging to this cluster were born in Estonia. About a third (34%) of the people belonging to this cluster have higher education and 27% are employed as managers or specialists. Compared to the members of other clusters, they feel more solidarity with all residents of Estonia and with people of the same generation (**Appendix 8.2.** of **Study V**). In general, the civic assimilationist mode of segmented integration is rather vital in Estonian society and spreads with the generation replacement of first migration generation to second and third migration generations as well as via tertiary education. Paradoxically, this pathway seems to materialize when Estonian language acquisition and the exercise of civic activity are somewhat impeded either structurally or for personal reasons.

Like cosmopolitan cluster members, a significant portion of members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster (53%) also follow international media rather frequently (see table 7). In addition, they mix Russian media channels with Estonian Russian language radio in their media menu. News following is a part of their daily routine. As said before, the economic and political involvement in society reinforce the regular news following and the need to be well informed (see Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). In the media menu of members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, informal news coming via links and suggestions from social media friends have an important role. News from informal communication networks are used for checking the relevance and accuracy of incoming information and are part of the "comparison-making" that was reported to be exercised by members of this cluster:

> *"I get most information from the Internet. Also the radio "Ehho Moskvõ". PBK, Postimees and Delfi. Ukrainian news from the Internet or from "Ukraina.24" (M, 57, dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster)*

> *"BBC had a completely different opinion than PBK or Delfi. It was made more from a western point of view and the Minsk agreement was seen as a problem and not as a solution. It all was depicted negatively" (M, 18, dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster)*

The third pathway of segmented integration can be called diasporic and it is represented by the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster. In theory, the term diaspora marks people living in other territories but maintaining a continuing relationship and feeling a collective transborder ethnic identification with their original homeland (Safran 1991 p. 83). Diasporic in the name of the cluster indicates the members' orientation towards Russia. A large portion of members of this cluster have Russian citizenship (43%) or they have not determined their

citizenship and are automatically EU citizens with so called "grey passports" (29%). A majority of them have a (very) poor command of Estonian language (**Appendix 8.1.** of **Study V**). Their socio-economic position is vulnerable. Many are employees, mainly employed as manual or service workers, and have not received further training. Entrepreneurship practices are not common and a big share of individuals in this group are retired from the labour market. Despite the rather unfavourable structural affordances, their social agency is rather remarkable. As non-Estonian citizens they cannot elect the parliament, but they can participate in local elections and thereby have a political "voice" in the community. Their civic/local position is supported by a rather active alternative political participation (**Table 8.1.** of **Study V**), widespread membership in NGOs, cultural and religious associations, active local (Russian language) media following and participation in the public events. Those civic activities could also serve the interest of the public and therefore propitiate involvement (see Chapter 3.2, Lauristin 2012). Members of this cluster are characterised by a strong ethno-cultural identity and attachment to the church. Almost half of them consider themselves religious and attend a church (twice as often as the average in the Russian-speaking population) that offers both community solidarity and some institutional boundedness.

Belonging to the Russian orthodox church is strongly related to Russian ethnocultural identity (Vihalemm, 2011, Vihalemm & Kaplan, 2017). According to the socio-demographical profile (**Appendix 8.1.** of **Study V**) 59% of active ethno-culturally engaged cluster members are women, half are aged 45–64 and 25% are older than 65 years. About 87% of the members of this cluster do not speak Estonian. Therefore, they do not follow Estonian-language media or use Estonian for communication. While two-thirds of the cluster members belong to the older cohorts of the first or second migration generation, it is too early to say whether or not the diasporic path of segmented integration is declining in the course of generational replacement. One source of its reproduction is digital participation in the Russian-speaking mediascapes and social networks which will be further explained in the next chapter.

Almost all the members of active ethno-culturally engaged cluster follow Russian-origin media channels (see table 5). Typical reports about personal media menus were as follows:

> "Well PBK, RTR, and CNN in English. Social sites like Vkontakte and Pikap.ru" (M, 18, active ethno-culturally engaged cluster)

> "I watch TV and listen to the radio. RTR and PBK, also Radio 4 at work and NTV" (W, 67, active ethno-culturally engaged cluster)

Irregular and random news following was characteristic of this cluster. Temporally fragmented media consumption does not support thorough interpretation of the processes and events, and opinion formation is based on the fragmented sources. In this context, their intensive and extensive following of Russian tele-

vision gives priority in the framing of events coming from the Russian state media.

The fourth path of segmented integration seems to be close to the marginalization (Berry 1997) and is represented by the passive, weakly engaged cluster. This group of people may be involved in society in other ways which were not represented in the survey Me. The World. The Media 2014; however, other analyses on the same database considering other variables also did not report specific ways and structures of social involvement except for consumer market structures and practices of everyday lifestyle management (i.e. Kiisel 2017). The group is less satisfied and more pessimistic in their life expectations (Leppik & Vihalemm 2017). Thus, their marginal position in society is not only a normative claim externally ascribed to the group by researchers, but an unideal mode of social existence for the group members themselves. According to their socio-demographic profile (**Appendix 8.1.** of **Study V**), men and women equally belong into this cluster. Nearly half of them are older, belonging to age group of 45–64, and having either undetermined or Russian citizenship. Furthermore, 83% have a poor command of Estonian language, which decreases their possibilities to participate in society or even cuts them off (see also Chapter 3.2). Among members of this cluster, 40% are first generation migrants. Thus, the political-civic marginalization path of segmented integration may decline somewhat with the generation replacement. Considering the problem researches pointed out related to younger generations' participation in the democratic and public sphere (**Study II**), the continuation (with some transformation) of this mode of social involvement is likely.

The media following of this cluster is a slight exception of the general pattern according to which the passive, weakly engaged cluster shows the weakest results across social participation variables. As can be seen from table 7, passive, weakly engaged cluster members' media following is similar or even slightly more intense (in case of Estonian Russian language radio) compared to the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster (table 7). They still watch predominately Russian TV and listen to Estonian Russian-language radio (**Study V**). The news following among the members of the passive, weakly engaged cluster is rare and/or random, and distinct from the mainstream mediums. This is somewhat compensated with online activities such as following suggestions and links sent by social media friends and mixing entertainment with news (see Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). The excerpt below illustrates the news following strategy of the member of the passive, weakly engaged cluster:

> *"The most important information is on the Internet. FB news distributed by my friend for example. I watched the astrological forecast for Porošenko, Merkel, Putin and Timošenko from Youtube" (M, 40, passive, weakly engaged cluster)*

As formerly indicated, the media menus of the integration segments vary, but the overall pattern of media consumption is more similar between the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster and dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster. These

clusters are characterized by regular news following habits. The active, ethno-culturally engaged and passive, weakly engaged cluster share similar media menus, and their news following habits are less regular compared to the other two clusters.

The qualitative studies reveal that the circle of (social media) friends significantly "designs" the content consumed. Several persons in a focus groups claimed they follow news when some of their friends have shared them (**Study V)**. Quantitative data confirms that about one-third of Russian speakers receive news via links in social media (Me. The World. The Media 2014). In general, Russian-speaking audiences in Estonia are rather uncritical towards the media content and only a few of them agree that they get angry about something they see in the media. From the other side, however, a majority of them distrust Estonian media outlets (Vihalemm & Leppik 2017). Members of the multi-dimensionally engaged cluster are critical and get upset about the media content, but, at the same time, are more trusting towards media institutions in general. Conversely, members of the weakly engaged cluster are less critical but more distrusting. Thus, involvement in society and regular news following seem to create favourable grounds for a focused, issue-specific response to media content whereas irregular (annoying) encounters with news tend to deepen scepticism towards the media system.

While interest in Russian media and consumption of it unify the Russian-speaking population, the media menus still diverge across the integration segments (**Study V**) and frequent and regular following of Russian media shapes how local life is perceived. The content and discourses coming from Russian sources are interpreted from the prisms formed based on other media outlets and immediate life experience related to the particular mode of segmented integration (**Study V**). My qualitative study helped to somewhat explain how members of the integration clusters interpreted politically contradicting news, and revealed that the practical, lived experience considerably shapes their reception. Thus, when investigating the impact of Russian media on the local Russian-speaking community, it is worth considering audience related aspects such as: social background, structural involvement, identity orientations, regularity of media following, rather than message and channel related (**Study III**). Thereby, in the next chapter I will explain how I aim to connect the variable of integration mode with the variable measuring the mediated transnationalism (i.e. geo-political and cultural heterogeneity of the personal media and communication partner menu).

5.2 Transnationalism among Estonian Russian speakers

The Russian-speaking migrant background population in Estonia is describable by a sociocultural parallelism and as living in two societies at the same time (see Chapters 2.3 and 3). Furthermore, they are considered to be living in accordance to norms of the past and present, which are due to rapid changes

taking place in society (see Chapter 3). Transnationalism, in general as well in the case of Estonian Russian speakers, encompasses cross-border contacts, both virtual and physical, in different spheres: everyday, political, cultural, economic, etc. While Russian speakers might have business relationships with Estonians, or be able to speak the national language and follow the media, ethno-culturally different traditions are followed, and the following analysis also emphasises that political practices might be influenced by the normalities of other countries. Moreover, transnationalism is not hidden and does not take place in a vacuum, rather it is a normal, everyday practice for the majority of people, including ethnic Estonians (i.e. new normality).

Figure 7 shows the mean values of the transnationalism index in various socio-demographic groups. Among Russian speakers, transnationalism is stronger among 25–44 year olds, among people with higher education and Estonian citizenship who live outside of ethnically concentrated areas such as Tallinn and North-East Estonia, and who speak Estonian. Transnationalism is weaker among older people, first generation immigrants, less-educated people, people with undetermined citizenship, people living in ethnically concentrated areas, and people with a poorer command of Estonian (**Study V).**


Figure 7. Values[26] of transnationalism index among the Russian-speaking migrant background population.
Source: Authors' calculations based on "Me. The World. The Media, 2014"

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[26] Means on the scale 1 to 5 where 1 is the weakest and 5 the strongest score.

By analysing how transnationalism is associated with dimensions of integration, I found that connections are stronger between transnationalism and economic involvement, political participation and activities and participation in NGOs activities (**Study V**). The connections are weaker between transnationalism and ethno-cultural identity and trust towards institutions (**Study V**). It seems that transnationalism is associated with not only traditional ways of being involved (formal citizenship, elections), but also a new type of engagement (NGOs, voluntary work, economic involvement). The same has been found by several researchers (DeSipio et al 2003, Guarnizo et al 2003, Koopmans et al 2005).

Study V points out the connections between integration dimensions and trans-locality. In general, citizenship is an important country-specific factor, which could reinforce local integration (see also Hansen 2003). By assuming that the relationships with a historical homeland exists in one way or another, citizenship could be seen as a supporting factor for transnationalism (see also Guarnizo et al 2003). Those having Estonian citizenship tend to be more transnational than others (**Study IV**). Another important element of country-specific capital is knowledge of the national language. Sufficient knowledge of a local language enriches the media menu, widens communication circles, and therefore, feeds transnationalism (**Study III, IV, V**).

Study V reveals the transnationalism across segmented integration clusters. In general, the members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster show the highest scores of transnationalism (Figure 8). Members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster and the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster show almost equal scores of transnationalism (Figure 8). The members of the passive, weakly involved cluster showed the lowest scores of transnationalism index (Figure 8).


Figure 8. Strength of transnationalism in different integration clusters
Source: Authors' calculations based on "Me. The World. The Media, 2014"

In different modes of segmented integration, transnationalism has different mediating effect in reaction to the main dimensions of integration (**Study V**). According to my calculations of correlations between the transnationalism index and the indices of different integration dimensions (see Table 8), I have found that in the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster the transnationalism index variable is negatively connected with the Estonian language and media use index. Although cluster members have a good command of Estonian, those who reported stronger transnational practices also reported infrequent (less frequent) following of Estonian language media (Table 8). So, despite the fact that members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are multifariously integrated into Estonian society, they can also turn away and be demotivated to develop local social contacts. According to the typology of interactions between integration and transnationalism by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), the relationship here between Estonian language/media use and transnationalism is antagonistic. The demand for resources and/or feeling of belonging in one place limits the ability to meet demands and/or displaces the feeling of belonging to the other place (p. 878). In the other three clusters, the correlation was the opposite and a stronger transnationalism was positively correlated with more frequent Estonian language/media use (**Study V,** p. 29). These opposite-directional correlations between transnationalism and local language use make me cautious to confirm that the host society integration (assimilation) and transnational orientations are always mutually reinforcing. It seems that they start to "compete", not in the cases of weaker social integration, but rather in the cases of stronger social integration. The impact of exercising transnationalism practices appears to be able to turn from the synergistic to antagonistic according to Erdal and Oeppen (2013).

In the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster, the transnationalism index is correlated with the economic integration index (Table 8). Further analysis revealed that members of the cluster with higher personal transnationalism scores were not only more active with business projects and other entrepreneurial practices, but also took part in re-training for new jobs. This enables employment flexibility and these individuals reported to be wealthy or have sufficient money for different needs (**Study V,** p. 29). Thus, here transnationalism is positively correlated with economic agency and the same effect was also present in the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster (Table 8). I do not have specific data about the geographical scope of these economic activities, but it is likely that at least part of them have a scope that reaches the borders of Estonia. According to the typology by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), the relationship between transnationalism and local integration into the economic domain is not antagonistic, but either additive, including economically active in the country of origin and of settlement, or synergistic, where resources gained in one place are invested to develop further resources in the other (Erdal & Oeppen 2013: 878).

Table 8. Correlations between the translocality index and the indices of different domains of integration across integration clusters (Pearson's r, n = 465)

	Multi-active cosmo-politan cluster	Dutiful, institutio-nally engaged cluster	Active ethno-culturally engaged cluster	Passive, weakly engaged cluster
Linguistic involvement	-0,25*			0,21*
Economic involvement	0,27**		0,21*	
Participation in local public sphere		0,18*		
Alternative democratic participation		0,23**		
Civic involvement		0,19**	0,19*	
Local political involvement		0,22**	0,23*	
Ethno-cultural identity		0,22**		
*p≤0,1; **p≤0,05.				

The Table is taken from Study V

Among members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, those with stronger personal transnationalism index scores reported more frequent participation in NGO-s and civic activities (voluntary work, charity projects and campaigns) despite the general passiveness of this cluster in this regard (**Study V,** p. 30). The transnationalism was also positively related to traditional political participation in European, national and local elections and participation in the public events (**Study V,** p. 30). Without more precise qualitative or quantitative evidence, it is impossible to explain the specific mechanisms of the mutual interaction of transnationalism and integration in these dimensions of integration; the existence of positive correlation itself, however, enable us to argue that the interaction between transnationalism and local integration is either additive or synergistic rather than antagonistic (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

Transnationalism also has a positive correlation with the index of ethno-cultural identity in this cluster. People with higher personal transnationalism scores more frequently celebrate Russian folk, religious and national holidays. In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster this correlation did not appear (**Study V,** p 30). My interpretation is that as the members of dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster are, in general, rather modest in expressing their ethno-cultural attachments, then entering into the (international) Russian language mediascapes encourages them to maintain a virtual bond with one's historical-cultural identity. Members of this cluster admit about ten per cent more frequently than members of other clusters that they feel better expressing their views to others in virtual channels rather than in face-to-face interactions and that they have social media "friends" who they actually do not know (**Study V,** p 30–31). Thus, the mediated (cross-border) communications may motivate the members of this cluster, who are otherwise rather shy in their social interactions, to have a "voice" in the host society. That increases the possibility for their involvement in local policy-making. Transnationalism and local integra-

tion are in a synergistic relationship in the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster across different dimensions; feelings of (cultural) connections give confidence to further develop socio-political connections and resources (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism is positively correlated with Estonian language/media use (see Table 8). The studies of political news repertoires and news interpretation revealed that people like to check information about particular, controversial issues from ideologically different media channels, including those they do not like (**Study IV**). This might be the mechanism explaining the positive correlation between how pro-Russia oriented partisan media use is paradoxically maintained via the inflow of media information/discourses from the counter-attitudinal channels. The focus groups have revealed that people with rather modest Estonian language skills also use Estonian language media in some situations in order to check the claims, about what Estonians say about particular issues, for example, made in Russian language media (**Study IV,** Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020). I conclude that, in regards to the Estonian language/media use among members of the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster, the interaction between transnationalism and local integration is either additive or synergistic (Erdal & Oeppen 2013). In this cluster, the positive correlation is also found between transnationalism and civic involvement (participation in NGO-s and civic activities, especially collective voluntary work campaigns) and local level political participation (going to local elections etc.). Cluster members with higher personal transnationalism scores appeared to be more frequently elected to trustee positions in various organisations. The members of this cluster belong mainly to church-related associations, choirs and other cultural associations, health-related interest groups and sports associations, which may have cross-border contacts (Lauristin et al 2012). It might be that the civic roles and positions grant more authority to individuals to engage in transnational communication circles. This, in turn, motivates them to contribute to NGO-s and other civic activities, and take care of their good state. It also gives them a good reason to develop constructive civil relationships and make mutual negotiations with the local power representatives. The interaction between transnationalism and local integration is likely in synergistic relationships for the members of the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster since resources gained in one place are invested to develop further resources in the other (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

In the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism is also positively correlated with wealth (see Table 7). Members of the cluster with the higher personal scores of transnationalism reported about the sufficiency of money for various needs more frequently. Vice versa, people who reported insufficiency of money to satisfy different needs had lower personal scores of transnationalism. These correlations show that transnational practices are possibly more accessible when material needs are satisfied and do not demand time, effort or other resources. In an antagonistic relationship (see Erdal & Oeppen 2013) however, demand for resources to make ends meet in the host

society may limit the ability to exercise mediated transnationalism. Based on the existing data, I cannot point to the causalities, but rather note that this correlation does exist.

In the passive, weakly engaged cluster, transnationalism has a positive effect on the use of Estonian language and following Estonian media (see table 7). While the empirical evidence and qualitative research gathered here was insufficient to offer a proper explanation, the mechanism can be similar to the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster. Estonian media is followed on special occasions in order to check information that is circulating in the Estonian-language media-sphere. Considering the low interest towards politics and daily news about international and national affairs, it is likely that Estonian language and Estonian-operating information sources are used to search for practical, utilitarian reasons in situations perceived as important/alarming (**Study IV**). The people in the passive weakly engaged cluster reported following the links and suggestions their social media "friends" send them. It has been argued by other researchers that the issues, gossip, and questions raised by the members of one's personal (transnational) network motivates them to turn to Estonian language sources to seek answers to the alarming questions (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013). To sum up, the interaction between transnationalism and local integration seems to be either additive or synergistic, but not antagonistic in terms of Estonian language and media use (Erdal & Oeppen 2013).

Thus, the ways transnationalism contributes to the local integration varies across the segments of integration. According to the typology of interactions of transnationalism and integration by Erdal & Oeppen (2013), most of the interactions in the case of Estonian Russian speaking population are likely either additive, meaning that the activities exercised and belonging are felt towards both/several places, or synergistic, that belonging in one place encourages participation in the other place, or that resources gained in one place are invested to develop further resources in the other place. Since the transnationalism of the Estonian Russian speaking population is mainly mediated, Estonian society can theoretically benefit from the resources and encouragements gained from the transnational (Russian) spaces when they are invested into the local society. However, this would also likely need a specific integration policy with a stronger theoretical contribution from the economic and political conceptualisations of transnationalism (see Landolt 2001, Bauböck 2003, Portes et al 2008, Itzigsohn & Villacrés 2008).

In Estonian society, however, the transnational practices of the Russian speaking population, especially their extensive following of Russian television following, is securitized because of the fear of Russian propaganda and the risk of the destabilization of Estonian society via a mediated geopolitical advocacy from the Russian Federation (**Study IV**, Vihalemm Juzefovics 2020). In this complicated situation, knowledge about how transnationalism may contribute to the identity and interpretation of the media discourse in the context of political tensions is worth studying. In the next chapter, I will give an overview of my main research results on this issue.

5.3 Mediated transnationalism in the context of political tensions.

The role of media production and communicative interventions by the Russian Federation should not be underestimated when it comes to the identity formation of Russian speakers. This interplay between transnationalism and media use were examined in **Study V**.

Mediated transnationalism, meaning having a versatile media menu and maintaining multiple cross-border social media contacts, forms a rather messy frame for interpretation that can easily discourage opinion formation about complicated/disputed political issues (**Study IV).** Russian speakers with good knowledge of Estonian, who followed Estonian, Western and Russian media sources, did not form an opinion about the shooting down of the Malaysian airplane MH17 in Ukraine. They did not take any position in the survey that was carried out shortly after the catastrophe (**Study III**). At the same time, a limited variety of sources and bad knowledge of languages helped in the formation of an opinion, which might be one-sided and afterwards create even more confusion (**Study III**). In the context of political tensions between Estonia and Russia, and following the relevant discourses in the media, people admit to feeling discomfort, confusion and (temporary) civic alienation or demotivation to continue to participate in the public news-scape (**Studies III** and **IV**).

This feeling of confusion and news-related stress may also be a reason why some highly valued and trusted channels, including Estonian public broadcast service media in both Russian and Estonian languages, are used mostly in decisive/critical situations. At the same time, other frequently used channels are considered less trustworthy (**Study IV,** Vihalemm et al 2012). Important but unevenly reliable information channels are social media networks. About one-third of the Russian speaking population admits that most of the news they receive comes from the links and suggestions posted by their social media contacts (**Study V**). This information is not always 100% trusted or even needed but is a part of a social communication and has an advantage over news offered by official media outlets. Word-of-mouth information, unmediated real-life experiences, and eyewitness reflections were all considered to be significant sources of authenticity that are highly valued in tense situations, even when the media users are aware that the "eyewitness accounts" may suffer from critical and systematic control (**Study IV**). After discussing the events with acquaintances in Ukraine, Estonia, and elsewhere people, became even more confused because of the diversity of personal networks (**Study IV**). The wish to keep social relationships did motivate them to either avoid political topics in conversations or disclose their own views/doubts about the issue (**Study IV**). Thus, a spatially and temporally disproportional bundle of lines of influence is formed by rare encounters with local trusted sources (e.g. Estonian public broadcast service media) and everyday encounters with a variety of trusted Russian, local and Western information where the original sources are often unknown (posted by social media acquaintances).

In the qualitative studies, I tried to sort out the main strategies the members of integration clusters use in their interpretation of news and their general understanding about the media system in the crisis.

The members of multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are more critical in their reception of media content, more self-reliant in their interpretation, and more motivated to "put the puzzle together" from the pieces of information gathered from different (contradictory) sources (**Study III, V**). In the beginning, the conflict in Ukraine motivated people to search for information from different channels and expand their information repertoires (by reading Ukrainian and even Belarusian media for example) and using a more comparative approach (viewing coverage of the same event in different outlets) in their interpretation (**Study III, IV**). The use of multiple geopolitical and linguistic media channels, which is most characteristic to the multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster, is connected to a general understanding of news media as partisan journalism and as actors of propaganda that serves the interests of its owner (**Study III).** Several focus group participants stressed that they use multiple sources in order to balance the information.

In conversations about new media, one part of this normative self-positioning as a smart media user is the frequent use of the label of "propaganda". That label can create temporary solidarities between the conversation partners, and also be used in debates over meaning making. The following excerpt illustrates this strategy.

> *"In my opinion, this article is the opposite of the article we read. She is trying to prove that Putin is extraordinary. In this case, it's just propaganda." (W, 30, multi-active cosmopolitan cluster).*

> *"Some of the past speakers have said that he considers someone smarter. In my opinion, it's not about who is smarter. He simply hints that the Kremlin is guided by populist considerations. This is called populism, which means to make only popular decisions. You can influence the opinion of the masses" (M, 40, multi-active cosmopolitan cluster).*

In tense periods, these strategies may also balance the feeling of confusion and motivate the use of different media sources. The result of the qualitative reception studies cannot be directly validated based on the quantitative studies; however, because the other combined qualitative and quantitative studies have indicated similar results, it is likely that the strategies used by the representatives of the multi-active, cosmopolitan cluster are used widely among other members of the cluster (Vihalemm & Juzefovics 2020).

The members of other clusters are more sceptical about the media system in general. This might demotivate them, particularly members of the passive, weakly engaged cluster, from following political news at all or create a certain alienation as citizen, especially among the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster (**Study IV**). The following example shows the resignation and aware-

ness about audience members' limitations in decoding and assessing the authenticity of messages:

> *"Are there any Russian troops (in Ukraine)? (…) it is not clear where the truth is. There is not much to talk about; the topic is too controversial. (…) everyone will defend his point of view, and we ordinary readers, who are not present in Donbass, cannot check if the Russian troops are there. This is probably the main disadvantage of modern mass media"* (M, 25, dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster).

Despite their pro-Russia ideological leanings, many members of the active, ethno-politically engaged cluster also use multiple sources for political news. Their motivation for checking the information from the Estonian-language media outlets is, one the one hand, related with a certain curiosity. On the other hand, it is sometimes coupled with the wish to learn about official confirmation (or lacking of it) to the stories distributed via their (Russian) social media acquaintances or from the Russian media channels. Thus, despite the everyday news flows from discursively hostile (in relation to Estonia) media channels, it is likely that they will check the information about local events when they consider the issue alarming enough.

To sum up, media use and news interpretation strategies among the Russian speaking population during political tensions and heightened propaganda have maintained their transnational character and, at least temporarily, increased the motivation to also include local (including Estonian language) media channels in their media menus. The interpretation strategies are rather complicated. Media texts are considered as artefacts or products of a certain situational needs or organizational/political prescriptions rather than true "slices of life" (Michelle 2007). In this context, the public and media communication discourse, which helps to make comparisons, includes intertextual references and addresses the audience members and people capable for deliberation, can have a positive effect despite the different strategies employed by the segmented integration clusters (more in the "Discussion").

6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

This doctoral dissertation looks at the integration patterns of migrant-background populations and their relationship with transnationalism and media practices, the latter being the reason the former exists. The aim of this chapter is to explain the interplay between mediated transnationalism and the local integration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations.

This thesis therefore contributes to the empirical measurement and interpretation of the integration of migrant-background populations in the conditions of transnationalism, with the example of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations. My analysis reveals that the concept of segmented integration is the most relevant one to explore and explain their in-group differentiation and the nature of social agency as well as ethno-cultural and political-civic identity. I have compiled a multidimensional model of the segmented integration of Russian speakers and explain the inter-connections of media use and segmented integration.

Below I discuss the results in the context of topical international research. I then address the implications of the research results in Estonian society and present answers to the research questions.

6.1 Discussion

My thesis sought answer the question of how the increasing transnationalism of Estonian society is related to the segmentation of the minority population's (i.e. Russian speakers) integration processes. Various processes and different theoretical concepts have been previously proposed to describe the involvement of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background communities in different periods in time. During the Soviet era for example, it was not possible to talk about assimilation, which was a prevailing concept in the Western world at the time. After re-independence in 1991, according to the Integration Monitorings, neither assimilation nor full integration of Russian speakers happened. The reality of this situation is much more complex than one certain theoretical concept is able to tackle alone.

The empirical results of this work (see **Study V**) confirmed that the concept of migrant population assimilation is inadequate since both the migrant groups and receiving societies are too complex and versatile to fit this linear model. Moreover, practically applying this type of model might even bring along negative consequences in relation to the stability of society. It is justified to agree with Green and Staerkle (2013) who say that historical and political contexts affect the relations between majority and minority populations, and therefore, consequent (non)integration of those of a migrant background. Treas (2014) indicates that involvement processes, and not necessarily integration are, by and large, affected by three main sets of factors (see **Studies I, III, V**): the receiving context or support network of co-ethnics (in case of Russian speakers it

becomes especially visible through the example of the labour market as explored in **Study I**); the culture of the receiving society (although this aspect is not discussed in this work) and thirdly, politics (how the legal status of immigrants is granted via citizenship, living permits etc.)(see **Study V**). The latter has been widely discussed as a problem in Estonian society (e.g. in different Integration Monitorings, years 2008, 2011, 2015, 2017 as well addressed in the state integration plans) and a possible hindrance to (formal) involvement. However, another important aspect to take into account, is that immigrant populations tend to be heterogeneous and, in this sense, Russian speakers are no exception. This means that adaptation depends on much more than external factors. Additionally, socio-demographic factors like education, income, age, generation etc. are also important to consider. The results of this work therefore partially draw on Vertevec's (1999) thought that pre-migration values, perceptions and aspirations might affect post-migration structural opportunities and constraints. Although the migration of Estonian Russian-speaking populations took place some time ago, this idea is extendible. Changes in the 1990s, for example, have a big part to play in issues related to the involvement of the Russian-speaking population.

The results of this work agree with Elder and colleagues (2003), and Treas (2014) who say that because involvement is affected by different fields of life, taking multidimensionality into account is unavoidable. My empirical analysis showed that the concepts of multi-dimensional or selective acculturation (Treas 2013, Deux 2016) and segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993) are suitable to explore and explanation the patterns of (non) involvement of the Russian speaking population in Estonian society (**Study V**). In working out the integration dimensions, which enable the exploration of society's multi-layered structure, I have combined the following factors: people's life span and experiences (noted by Treas 2013); politics and a local community "tightness" (noted by Portes & Rumbaut 2003); and people's personal political, economic, social and cultural resources (noted by Kwok-Bun & Plüss 2013) (**Study V**).

As a theoretical contribution, I offered the term segmented integration in my thesis**.** I consider that this term is more appropriate because it solves the discrepancy between the notions of segmented integration and assimilation. Segmented points to the multi-directional possibilities for the migrant population's involvement while assimilation, on the contrary, indicates that melting into the majority population is the only possible outcome of this process. Therefore, it is appropriate to draw a parallel with Esser's (2004) work, which describes integration as a process defined by the actor's situational behaviour as well their actions in society. Consequently, these actions and behaviours create typical trajectories of social processes which are characterized as integration patterns such as segmented assimilation, pluralism and ethnic homogeneity, just to name a few. In this work, the segmented integration approach is empirically tested using the example of four different clusters, which represent patterns of integration that open new dimensions. In my measurement model, I connected the approaches of segmented integration to local and transnational media use. In

principle, this model is transferable to other societies like Latvia or different countries with socio-demographically and historic-culturally varied composition of migrant background populations.

The results of this work show how access to, and the practical use and output of, resources shape the pathway of integration. Resources contribute to everyday life (**Study V**), and the use of these resources also shapes the development of host society. The four integration clusters I explored not only shape the development of Estonian society economically (the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster) and politically (both the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster and also the ethno-culturally engaged cluster) but also by challenging social sustainability (the passive, weakly engaged cluster). Socio-economic background and the ways resources are used affect local involvement. The results of this work (see **Study V**) are in line with the findings of Treas (2014) who claims that integration is affected by an immigrant's background as well as their local lived experience. Results show that if there is a lack of a certain, country specific capital, which impedes "formal" participation, other ways of being involved are found. Based on the data from this research (see **Study V**), it is correct to say that being excluded is a rather voluntary choice and not necessarily due to a lack of resources. While it is debatable, it seems that resources are missing because of individual decisions which are not directly due to social constraints.

The findings of this cover article conclude that integration into one sphere might foster integration into another, and that integration dimensions can be mutually reinforcing. Kymlicka (2005) says that an immigrant population's maintenance of their own ethno-cultural identity can have positive effect on their general integration. While I cannot prove the exact same, I did make a similar finding that ethno-cultural aspects of integration are positively correlated with political participation in the civic, dutiful and multi-active clusters. Thus, certain dimensions do empower others.

As another novel aspect, I proposed the term mediated transnationalism, constructed a tool of its empirical measurement and measured this in connection with segmented integration (**Studies V**). In a traditional or old sense, a general or global increase in transnationalism does not consider minority integration. My analyses are in line with the theoretical work of Couldry (2004), Diminescu (2008), Guarnizo et al (2003) and Vertovec (1999) which concern how the media's constant availability establishes a favourable environment for transnational practices and intensifies the transnational social space (**Study III, IV, V**). Russian speakers' communicative connectivity (see Diminescu 2008, Hepp et al 2011) is fostered by the international reach of the Russian language mediascape. The manifold communicative opportunities in Russian, and accessibility to different kind of media all over the world, amplifies the segmented integration into the host society, as opposed to creating one diasporic pathway (**Study V**).

Despite the fact that ethnic (or Russian) media is a regular part of Russian-speaking audience' everyday lives, media following habits are fragmented and vary across integration segments. This variation affects their transnationalism as

well as their local integration (**Study V**). In terms of segmented integration, the empirical analysis revealed that media empowers groups unequally by amplifying their segmentation. The members of segments with more versatile media menus are more actively involved in the host society (**Study IV, V**). The results of my analysis support the findings of Kok and Rogers (2017), Faist (2010), Vertovec (1999) and Smith and Guarnizo(1998) who have all pointed out the transformation of earlier territorialized diasporas (with an historic homeland as their center) to de-territorialized, mediated communities. For the members of the multi-active cosmopolitan and dutiful institutionally engaged clusters, the Russian-language mediascape consists of both Russia's and Western (Russian language) media outlets and personal social networks. The ethno-culturally engaged cluster, who is closest to the classical diaspora, has also developed a rather local ethnic minority group consciousness that is supported by local level civic activities. Media consumption is also a form of agency and, in this dimension, integration clusters do not generally differ as much as their interpretations, which are largely based on ideology, do.

The results of this work also point out that the borders between different concepts can be hazy and it is technology that propitiates different kinds of communities such as cosmopolitan communities or digital diasporas (see Glick Schiller et al 2011, Christiansen 2012).

The findings of the current thesis partly agree with authors who argue that transnationalism among immigrant population persists due to a wish to use media to compensate for life changes (Hannerz 1996, Guarnizo 2003, Robins & Aksoy 2005). As stated by Guarnizo (2003), migrants may use a dual reference frame through which they compare situations in their former homeland with situations in new country residence. This kind of dual reference frame enables migrant-background populations to develop specific interpretations of local life and, at the same time, contribute to social involvement (**Study III, IV**). The reception and interpretation of transnational media content is not homogeneous but depends on and contributes to the re-production of one's position in the host society via their integration segment. In the context of geopolitical tensions between a host and sending society, this heterogeneity is under pressure. When individuals experience uncertainty in decoding the conflict, they may also feel a certain pressure on their current position in the host society.

What matters is the location of media, either geographically or culturally. As stated also by Martin and Ritzvi (2014), and supported by the analysis here (**Study III, IV, V**), media following happens in a certain place and this place, in turn, cannot be separated from media practices. By the same token, Mandaville (1999) shows how the local could either be spread across places and the mapping of community or that local is dependent on how people define or position themselves between and across places. Media content is itself transnational in that it consists of different localities. In the case of Estonia, this is seen through the Estonian advertisements, which air between TV shows of Russian origin. The way in which media consumption activates different identities for different purposes shows a multiplicity of identifications. The

reception analysis showed how ideological messages coming from Russian are de-coded by taking several different local or experience based positions to understand propagandistic messages (**Study III, IV**). Based on this, I am able to agree with Georgiou (2007) that media content versatility might create multiple belongings. For Russian speakers, interpretation is shaped by several external as well internal factors. It does not take place in a vacuum, but in interactions between online and offline worlds (see Hepp et al 2011). Furthermore, according to Guarnizo and Smith (2005) these interactions are mediated by trans-local understandings particularly in cases where local understandings have an effect on a bigger scale; for example, interpreting Kremlin propagandistic messages or the Russian media system. In general, the current thesis agrees with Golbert (2001) and Robins and Aksoy (2003) who say that migrants often oscillate between different media cultures and therefore develop comparative view when it comes to following media. What this thesis adds to this, is a level of local involvement showing that since local is in the background, this means trasnational practices are localised.

The empirical analysis (see **Study V**) conforms with the authors who indicate that integration and transnationalism are not mutually exclusive (Kivisto 2001, Ehrkamp 2006, Erdal & Oeppen 2013, Erdal & Lewicki 2016) and that their coexistence depends on different factors and positions (see Erdal & Oeppen 2013) which might emerge. These results are in line with De Haas (2005) who says that transnationalism is not unidirectional and that transnational ties do not generally hinder, but might actually be associated with and even mutually strengthen, social integration. The empirical findings indicate that transnationalism is universal among integration clusters, but that its intensity varies and is ultimately associated with different values and news spaces (e.g. Russian) and dependant on the existence of parallel (virtual) relationships, such as a community, business, etc. While De Haas (2005) claims that transnationalism should not be treated as a problem since it does not compete with integration, Morawska (2018) points out that immigrant lives should be understood in the context of multiple combinations of transnational or assimilative practices. The current work supports the latter. Each integration segment presented in this work implement transnational practices differently, and these differences are correlated to how strongly integrated people are into different spheres of society.

The results of this research are also in line with what Erdal and Oeppen (2013) describe as the pragmatic position of transnationalism and integration (**Study III, V**). As the results indicate, the reality for the Russian-speaking population is complex, and integration is affected by several factors: starting with individual's socio-economic and demographic background and ending with different media consumption habits, which have a considerable impact on their interpretation of reality (**Study III, IV, V**). The ways in which mediated transnationalism contributes to the segmented integration of the Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background population varies across the segments of integration and often means a mixing of old and new (as indicated by Kwok-

bun & Plüss 2013). According to the typology of interactions of transnationalism and integration by Erdal and Oeppen (2013), most of the interactions in the case of the Estonian Russian speaking population, are likely either additive (i.e. parallel activities and double belonging) or synergistic, rather than mutually antagonistic. With the relevant integration policy, Estonian society might benefit from the resources and encouragement gained from the transnational (Russian) spaces when they are invested into the local society. This would require a shift from the integration strategy for the Russian speaking population to an integration strategy for the transnational Russian speaking populations. This, in turn, would need a more multifaceted approach involving the media use of Estonian Russian speaking audiences. Rather than focusing on the political security approach, it should also include the economic, civic and cultural approaches of transnational media consumption.

My empirical model (see Chapter 4.2 and 5.1) has shown that due to the unequal distribution of resources there are also integration segments and multiagency social forces. The monitoring of the integration of migrant background population by using segmentation (i.e. clustering method) enables a more nuanced and adequate assessment of problems and encompasses more features than the country-specific variables (e.g. knowledge of local language, citizenship) which are usually used to assess integration. This method also helps us to notice the social potential of migrant population groups. In countries like the Baltics, with complex and turbulent societies, the segmented approach enables politically informed decisions.

If, for some researchers (such as Vasta 2010), migrant populations with multiple belongings might create divided loyalties and hinder a sense of belonging to a majority population, I am not able to confirm this. Although loyalties vary when it comes to interpretation practices, it is too early to say whether political crisis have a direct influence on these practices. Based on the findings in this research, it is clear that the relationship between media use and social, cultural, political, and economic engagement is complex. Media promotes transnational connections and belonging, and creates a multidirectional lens, which is in turn affected by the local context. So a sense of place which is local exists in the background of transnational activities. Therefore, just because transnationalism and integration are segmented, does not mean they are incompatible; rather they are mutually strengthening and even depend on the physical place activities take place. It is also important to note that since the phenomenon of transnationalism is a new normality which describes the whole of society, it affects both Estonian and Russian-speaking populations.

6.2 Conclusions

In this subsection I provide answers to the research questions and highlight the empirical contribution of my thesis.

1. What are the main types characterizing segmented integration among Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?

- Segmented integration among Estonian Russian-speaking background populations appears in four main types. These four types are represented in the empirical measurement model as: multi-active cosmopolitan, dutiful institutionally engaged, active ethno-culturally engaged and passive weakly engaged cluster (**Study V**). These clusters, which each describe a set of resources Russian speakers have and certain ways they use these resources, differentiate between the realities where Russian speakers live.

- The most resource-rich and multi-faceted integration type, represented by the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster, is characterised by relatively strong involvement in political and economical domains of social life. Members of this cluster stand out through their frequent use of Estonian and their orientation towards Estonian-language social networks and Estonian-language media (**Study V**). Members of this cluster are politically active in both traditional and alternative ways (**Study II, V**). They have sufficient human and country specific capital to be able to take part in public discussions and initiate changes in the society (**Study V**). At the same time, their stronger political and economic agency, and use of Estonian in different spheres, has supported their orientation towards a cosmopolitan identity rather than a homogeneous nation state one (**Study V**). There are more younger and well educated people belonging to the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster (**Study V**).

- The second type of integration that appears mostly in involvement in traditional political and economic domains of social life is represented in the model of empirical measurement as the dutiful institutionally engaged cluster (**Study II, V**). Their traditional political participation, high institutional trust and stable economic position does not motivate civic activity or alternative political agency (**Study I, V**). This cluster is equipped with high human capital, such as education, but moderate country specific capitals, since members of this cluster infrequently use Estonian language. Therefore, their own political and economic agency is somewhat limited (**Study V**). Because this integration cluster consists of mostly older age groups, it is likely that this type of integration will disappear over time (**Study V**).

- The third type of integration is diasporic, and is represented in the model of empirical measurement by the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster. The main sources of social agency in this case are civic and

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ethno-cultural activities and belonging to NGOs. These activities compensate for the weak traditional political and economic integration and a shortage of country specific capitals (**Study V**). For this cluster, a strong ethno-cultural identity is semi-institutionalized, since a large portion have Russian citizenship, easily politicizeable, via intensive Russian media consumption, and could be a source of potential collective mobilization (**Study V**). Because this cluster consist of younger cohorts, this integration type is also self-reproducing (**Study II, V**).

- In the fourth type of integration, weak involvement in all domains of social life measured in the model of empirical measurement is represented by the passive, weakly engaged cluster (**Study V**). The lack or non-use of country specific, economic and political capitals leads to low social agency and propitiates their exclusion. The percentage of men and women are equal in this cluster, and the socio-demographic profile was near to the average. Although the share of the older (up to 45 years) generation is almost half of the group, this type of integration may decline somewhat with the generation replacement; however, considering the problems raised by researchers related to the democratic and public sphere participation of younger generations (**Study II**), the continuation and transformation of this mode of social involvement is likely.

2. How does media consumption relate to segmented integration among Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations?

- Estonian Russian-speaking audiences' media consumption habits are characterized by large amounts of time spent watching TV and using social media networks (**Study III, IV, V**). These consumptions practices are intertwined with other everyday practices (**Study III**). The media content individuals follow is often designed by friends and acquaintances' offline and online suggestions and shared links in social media. One-third of audience members admitted that these forms of media are their main source of daily news (**Study III, V**).
- Media use across integration clusters varies most in terms of regular following of news media and awareness about local events (**Study III, IV, V**). Meanwhile, awareness of news about Russia and/or Ukraine does not differ across integration clusters (**Study V**).
- The multi-active cosmopolitan cluster is described as having a media menu which is diverse not only in the types of media, but also by the geographical origin of media sources. On the one hand, the ability to learn about varied political and/or cultural discourses in the news increases their feelings of complexity and uneasiness in making conclusions about the issues represented in the media **(Study III, V)**. On the other hand, it reinforces their self-confidence to make comparisons and distinguish propaganda as media consumers/media citizens (**Study V**).

- For members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster, regular news consumption is a norm (**Study V**). Although one-fifth of them have a good command of Estonian, they infrequently follow local language news media and, instead, prefer local and international Russian-language media (**Study V**). A political crisis might push them towards Russian media consumption and their interpretation of the media content is shaped mainly by their local integration and wish to be a loyal citizen of the Estonian Republic (**Study V**).
- Members of the active, ethno-culturally engaged cluster use mainly Russian-origin media, and to a smaller extent, local Russian-language media (**Study V**). Their interpretation of media content is more affected by Russian normalities. For example, they might consider the occupation of Crimea in terms of the normal and logical course of events. They are however, to a smaller extent, also influenced by their experiences with Western and Estonian civic and media culture. For example, they might be aware of the belief that the Russian media system is not independent and might project possible propagandistic messages. The local lived experiences of this group are shaped by trust towards Estonian institutions and active involvement in NGOs, civic activities and public space in general, and experience in alternative political participation. In their interpretation practices, these local lived experience, a strong ethno-cultural identity and preference given to the Russian way of interpreting (political) events meet, interact and also contradict one another (**Study V**).
- For those belonging to the passive, weakly engaged cluster, media has a mostly entertainer's role. Their irregularity in terms of news following makes individuals in this cluster more distant from the public sphere and less reachable by institutional agents (**Study III, V**). The low socio-political involvement and infrequent following of daily news seem to mutually amplify each other and result in more isolation from the public media space. At the same time, members of this cluster are active social media users (**Study V**), which makes them so-called secondary consumers (i.e. media content is mostly shaped by other users). Although social media does involve them in a way, and they are exposed to commercial media agents through their entertainment and personal social media networks, this does not encourage more substantial civic/political engagement (**Study V**).

3. How is the mediated transnationalism of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations related to their segmented integration?

- The mediated transnationalism of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations can be characterized by: an extensive consumption of Russian-origin and other foreign media; regular cross-border communication with acquaintances, family members and people

met on social media; and by having work or study relations abroad. Therefore, individuals practising transnational media following and semi-private communication operate between several cultural and information spaces (**Study III, IV, V**).

- Transnationalism is supported by younger age (this is related with their more extensive use of social media) and Estonian citizenship. Transnationalism is associated with stronger involvement in the economic and political structures of the host society**.** Foreign language competences and education are also factors that enable the enlargement and diversification of media use and personal communication networks across state borders (**Study V**).

- First generation migrants exercise transnationalism mainly through their Russian/Western media use, and their cross-border personal communication network is not wide. Transnationalism is exercised less by those who lack or have weak knowledge of Estonian and/or live in concentrated areas of Russian speakers (**Study V**).

- The audience members with higher scores on the transnationalism index are more critical towards the media (**Study III**). Their more critical stance can be explained by the fact that people who follow foreign media and maintain cross-border, semi-private communications operate between several cultural and information spaces. This makes their repertoires for the interpretation of information more varied since they have to consider more frames of reference and possibly compare the content and style of news from various sources **(Study III, V).**

- In the context of political crisis, the strong transnationalism that manifests through diverse media following preferences creates an overall uncertainty and suspicion towards news content overall. This sometimes causes individuals to abandon their following of political/topical information because the news is ideologically/discursively more hostile towards the opponents and more essentializing in addressing audience members' identities (**Study III, IV**). However, transnational audience members with ideologically heterogeneous media menus still consider that having an ideologically diverse media menu is normatively connected with the ideal image of being a smart media citizen who is able to navigate information in the context of biased media representations **(Study V).**

- While transnationalism, as measured by the index variable that I constructed, appears in all integration clusters, it makes different configurations with characteristic variables in each particular cluster. This shows that transnationalism interacts with segmented integration variedly both in terms of affected variables and in the nature of the effect (i.e. compensatory or amplifying) (**Study V**).

- Members of the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster are physically mobile, and their personal and virtual cross-border ties are frequent and

mutually strengthening. Their transnational practices enable a collection of resources, such as economic/professional, cultural and civic, knowledge, skills and personal contacts that contribute to and enrich their local economic/professional position, political/civic courage and activeness. Transnational practices offer better possibilities for self-realization and self-expression to the members of this cluster. Transnationalism and local multi-dimensional integration are mutually reinforcing in this cluster (**Study V).** At the same time, a negative correlation between transnationalism and Estonian language use creates doubts about whether integration and transnationalism are always as mutually supportive as they could be when it comes to stronger social integration (**Study V**).

- In the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, transnationalism manifests through the use of Russia-oriented (social) media, private cross-border communications, the migration experience and strong geopolitical allegiances towards Russia. In this case of segmented integration, the mediated transnationalism is extra-territorial and it supports neither the development of a local political-civic identity nor relations with the local majority, who are considered to hold opposite ideological allegiances. In the context of geopolitical tensions, their media menu is rather homogeneous and oriented towards one side (the Russian side) of the conflict. At the same time, their transnationalism is correlated with participation in civic organizations and economic involvement. Transnationalism raises the diasporic extra-territorial allegiances among members of the active ethno-culturally engaged cluster, and supports their collective activities, which are also exercised on social media (**Study V**). At the same time, however, members of this cluster maintain local connection via economic and political involvement (**Study V**).

- While members of the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster are involved with Russian issues via everyday Russian media following habits, they have few direct personal contacts (**Study V**). Although they do not explicitly express their ethno-cultural attachments, such as the celebration of Russian hoidays, the following of international Russian media enables them to maintain a (virtual) bond with their historical-cultural identity (**Study V**). Since they are regular (political) news followers of Russian, local Russian-language, Estonian language and also western channels, they have to manage with the ideologically diverse and turbulent media discourses in the context of geopolitical tensions. Their country-specific capital and political involvement as citizens supports their desire to be geopolitical neutral. They also hope to avoid internalizing the essentializing from media discourses when it comes to their own unique identity which is a mix of political, local and ethnic components. In the context of geopolitical tensions, transnationalism rather discourages their political self-expression and participa-

tion in the local public sphere, and also makes their personal reproduction of ethnic identity more complicated (**Study V**).

- The transnationalism of those belonging to the passive, weakly engaged cluster is supported by digital media use and private cross-border social media communications. As they are withdrawn from the public sphere, their institutional participation is minimal. They do not follow foreign media, and their picture of the diversity of societies is mediated by other individuals rather than by states or national/international media institutions. This is also supported by the cluster's general low trust in institutions. In times of geopolitical conflict, they prefer not to follow the relevant media information (**Study V**).

- Beyond geopolitical conflict, mediated transnationalism seems to generally support local integration. This is because it reinforces the type of social agency that is characteristic of certain forms of segmented integration (clusters) and creates common developing mutual relationships between the members of the clusters. These relationships, in turn, enable social learning and the co-operative use of different types of social agency. Transnationalism could also be a compensatory phenomenon if there is insufficient access to political or economic resources or a lack of country-specific capital (**Study V**).

To sum up, the combination of the aggregated index variables and cluster analysis in order to build a model for the empirical measurement of Estonian Russian-speaking migrant background populations was justified. This method illuminates the differences between groups. The internal heterogeneity of this group requires a comprehensive measurement for multidimensional courses of integration. Integration types are a way to structure minority population(s) in Estonia. In this work, the integration process was described as an intertwining of different processes, which are encompassed under certain domains of social life and are related to the agency of minority population(s).

The results of this work confirm that integration takes place in a transnational reality and is dependent on configurations of resources (both their allocation and use) rather than the incremental increase of one particular (country-specific) resource. The active ethno-culturally engaged cluster has taken advantage of ethno-cultural and civic engagement resources; the dutiful, institutionally engaged cluster have used political and economic resources better; the multi-active cosmopolitan cluster is the most autonomous and has the best access to all relevant resources in order to successfully operate in society. The problematic cluster is the passive, weakly engaged cluster who lack subjective and objective access to the important resources. The results of this work indicate that segmented integration does not change with the change of generation; rather the structural mechanisms of society reproduce and help to sustain them.

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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN

Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna segmenteeritud integratsioon ja vahendatud hargmaisus

2011. aasta rahvaloenduse kohaselt elas Eestis rohkem kui 180 rahvuse esindajaid. Eesti muutus mitmerahvuseliseks riigiks pärast teist maailmasõda, kui Nõukogude Liidu rahvastikupoliitika suunas siia peamiselt vene keelt emakeelena kõnelevat, etniliselt ja geograafiliselt päritolult mitmekesist rahvast. Sisserännanud omandasid privilegeeritud staatuse mitmes ühiskonna sfääris ja õiguse kasutada ametlikus asjaajamises vene keelt. Seetõttu kujunes välja kahe rahvastikurühma – eestlaste ja venekeelse elanikkonna struktuurne segregatsioon, mis on osaliselt säilinud siiani. Kuigi venekeelset elanikkonda ühendab ühine keel, on tegemist sisemiselt heterogeense rahvastikurühmaga, kes on Eesti ühiskonnas ja nii kohalike kui üleilmsete muutustega erisugusel viisil kohanenud. Käesolev töö pakub empiirilise mudeli, kirjeldamaks Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna peamisi lõimumisviise.

Integratsiooni monitooringutes (Lauristin 2012, Rikman jt 2013) varem loodud Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna lõimumise tüpoloogiad on kirjeldanud selle rahvarühma sisemist eristumist, lõimumise määra ja viisi eeskätt riigispetsiifilise kapitali – kodakondsuse ja keeleoskuse suhtes. Käesolev doktoritöö arendab lõimumisviiside tüpoloogiat edasi mitmekesisemate tunnuste põhjal, võttes arvesse selle rahvarühma meedia kaudu vahendatud hargmaisust.

Teoreetiliselt tugineb minu väitekiri käsitustele, mille kohaselt sisserännanute lõimumine ühiskonda on mitmemõõtmeline ja -suunaline (Treas 2014). Töö lähtub segmenteeritud lõimumise käsitusest (Portes ja Zhou 1993), mis pakub alternatiivi assimilatsiooniteooriale. Kui assimilatsioonikäsituse järgi eeldab sisserännanute hea toimetulek sihtriigi ühiskonnas nii keele ja kodakondsuse omandamist kui ka muudes elusfäärides enamusrühmaga sarnastumist, siis segmenteeritud lõimumise käsituses on hea toimetuleku taga erinevaid mehhanisme ja kohanemisviise on rohkem kui üks. Lõimumist iseloomustab ebaühtlase „tugevusega" sidustumine ühiskonna eri struktuuridega. Rändetaustaga inimesed on tegevad erinevates elusfäärides, nende sotsiaal-majanduslikud ja kultuurilised ressursid varieeruvad ning seetõttu kujunevad nende kohanemise teed kvalitatiivselt erinevateks (Portes ja Rumbaut 2001, Alba ja Nee 2003). Minu uurimistöö täiendab segmenteeritud lõimumise käsitust hargmaisuse kui ühe olulise ressursi lisamisega analüüsi. Hargmaisus tähendab, et rändetaustaga inimesed ja nende järeltulijad säilitavad kas kultuurilised, majanduslikud, poliitilised vms liiki sidemed oma päritoluriigiga (Glick Schiller jt 1995). Meedia ja kommunikatsioonitehnoloogiate areng võimaldab edukalt säilitada, arendada või luua (uusi) piiriüleseid suhteid, olla mentaalselt „kohal" ja osaleda geograafiliselt kaugete ühiskondade elus (Vertovec 2004a). See omakorda võib kohalikku lõimumist toetada või pärssida. Ühelt poolt võivad hargmaised praktikad tugevdada sotsiaalset integratsiooni põhirahvuse ühiskonda (De Haas 2005), teisalt aga alla suruda kuulumistunde kujunemist (Vasta 2010). Oma töös

olen eeskätt käsitlenud vahendatud hargmaisust, st suhete säilitamist ((vana)-vanemate) päritoluriigiga erinevate meediakanalite kaudu (Vihalemm ja Leppik 2014, Leppik ja Vihalemm 2017).

Minu uurimuse eesmärk on selgitada Eesti rändetaustaga venekeelse elanikkonna segmenteeritud lõimumise viise ning vahendatud hargmaisuse rolli nendes. Segmenteeritud lõimumise ja vahendatud hargmaisuse empiiriliseks mõõtmiseks kasutasin peamiselt Tartu Ülikooli ühiskonnateaduste instituudi küsitlusuuringu „Mina. Maailm. Meedia" ning enda tehtud kvalitatiivuuringu andmeid.

Eesti kontekstis pole lõimumise ja hargmaisuse seoseid varem põhjalikult analüüsitud. Varasemates uurimustes on Venemaa mõju lõimituse aspektist peetud kui mitte ohtlikuks, siis kindlasti mitte siinset lõimumist toetavaks. Käesolev väitekiri osutab, et venekeelse elanikkonna seas laialt levinud venekeelse ning Venemaa ja rahvusvahelise meedia jälgimine ja kommunikatsioonipraktikad suhestuvad Eesti ühiskonda lõimitusega erinevalt.

Oma doktoritöös olen püstitanud kolm peamist uurimisküsimust ning jõudnud väitekirja artiklites järgmiste tulemusteni:

I. Millised on peamised segmenteeritud lõimumise viisid rändetaustaga Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna seas?

Eristub neli peamist lõimumisviisi, mida esindavad järgmised lõimrühmad:
- Multiaktiivne kosmopoliitne lõimrühm on suhteliselt tugevasti lõimitud kõikidesse ühiskonnaelu sfääridesse, teistest venekeelsetest edukamalt poliitilisse ellu ja majanduslikku sfääri. Rühma liikmeid iseloomustab hea eesti ja inglise keele oskus ning eestikeelse meedia tarbimine. Rühma liikmed on keskmisest nooremad ja kõrgema haridusega. Piisav inim- ja riigispetsiiline kapital võimaldab neil kaasa lüüa avalikes aruteludes ning algatada muutusi ühiskonnas, toetades samal ajal nende kosmopoliitset identiteeti (**Uurimus II, V**).
- Institutsionaalselt lõimunute rühma iseloomustab kõrgem usaldus riiklike institutsioonide suhtes ning stabiilne majanduslik olukord. Kuigi rühma liikmete seas on palju kõrgharidusega inimesi, napib neil eesti keele oskust ning see piirab nende poliitilist ja majanduslikku agentsust. Rühmas on keskmisest rohkem vanu inimesi, seetõttu on see lõimitute rühm põlvkonnavahetuse tõttu vähenemas (**Uurimus I, II, V**).
- Etno-kultuuriliselt lõimunute rühma sotsiaalne agentsus väljendub kodanikuosaluses (selle eri vormides vabatahtlikust tööst kuni mittetulundusühingute juhtimiseni) ning tugevas etno-kultuurilises identiteedis. Selle rühma liikmete poliitiline ja majanduslik sidustatus Eesti ühiskonnaga on nõrk. Paljudel on vene kodakondsus ning nad jälgivad peamiselt Venemaa meediakanaleid. Kuna sellesse lõimrühma kuulub ka nooremaid vanusrühmi, võib eeldada, et lõimrühm uueneb põlvkonnavahetuse toel (**Uurimus II, V**).

- Nõrgalt lõimunute rühma kuulub nii vanemaid kui nooremaid inimesi. Seega jääb nõrga lõimumise probleem püsima ka põlvkondade vahetudes (**Uurimus V**).

II. Kuidas seostub meediatarbimine segmenteeritud lõimumise viisidega?

- Eesti venekeelse elanikkonna meediatarbimist iseloomustab ulatuslik telesaadete jälgimine ning laialdane sotsiaalmeedia kasutamine. Tarbitav meediasisu on sageli kujundatud sõprade-tuttavate soovituste järgi, kolmandiku venekeelse elanikkonna jaoks on sotsiaalmeedia peamine uudisteallikas (**Uurimus III, IV, V**).
- Lõimrühmi eristavad uudiste jälgimise regulaarsus ja kohalikest sündmustest informeeritus. Kursisolek Venemaal ja Ukrainas toimuva osas lõimrühmades ei erine (**Uurimus III, IV, V**).
- Multiaktiivse kosmopoliitse lõimtüübi meediamenüü on mitmekesine nii allikate kui geograafilise ulatuse mõttes. Kursisolek erinevate poliitiliste ja kultuuriliste diskursustega uudismeedias suurendab nende enesekindlust meediatarbijana ja veendumust, et ollakse suuteline ära tundma propagandat ja vältima selle halbu mõjusid (**Uurimus III, V**).
- Institutsionaalselt lõimunute jaoks on regulaarne uudiste jälgimine norm. Eelistatakse kohalikku ja rahvusvahelist venekeelset meediat. Poliitiline kriis võib tõugata neid Venemaa meedia tarbimise suunas, aga meediasisu tõlgendamist kujundab kohalik lõimitusest ja soov olla lojaalne kodanik (**Uurimus V**).
- Etno-kultuuriliselt lõimunud tarbivad peamiselt Venemaa päritolu meediat ja väiksemas mahus kohalikku venekeelset meediat. Meediasisu tõlgendamises kasutatakse nii Eesti ühiskonna kui Venemaa ühiskonna norme, kultuurilis-ajaloolisi teadmisi kui ka igapäevaelu kogemusi (**Uurimus V**).
- Nõrgalt lõimunud jälgivad uudismeediat ebaregulaarselt ja tarbivad peamiselt meelelahutusliku sisuga meediat. Madal sotsiaalpoliitiline sidustatus ja ebaregulaarne päevauudiste jälgimine võimendavad teineteist ning tulemuseks on veelgi suurem isoleeritus avalikust meediaruumist. Samal ajal kasutavad passiivselt lõiminud aktiivselt sotsiaalmeediat – nad on nö teisesed tarbijad, kuna nende jälgitav meediasisu on kellegi kolmanda kujundatud (**Uurimus III, V**).

III. Kuidas on vahendatud hargmaisus seotud segmenteeritud lõimumisega?

- Hargmaisust toetab noorem iga ja Eesti kodakondsus, mis omakorda seostub tugevama majandusliku ja poliitilise sidustusega. Võõrkeelte oskus ja haridus on faktorid, mis võimaldavad mitmekesistada meedia-

kasutust ja suurendada piiriülest personaalset kommunikatsiooni (**Uurimus V**).

- Esimese põlvkonna sisserännanud praktiseerivad hargmaisust eeskätt läbi Venemaa uudis- ja suhtlusmeedia. Piiriülene personaalne suhtlusvõrgustik ei ole suur. Vahendatud hargmaisust kohtab harvemini vähese eesti keele oskusega ja/või kontsentratsioonialadel elavate inimeste seas (**Uurimus V**).

- Tugeva piiriülese meediatarbimisega auditooriumi liikmed on meedia osas kriitilisemad. Erinevates kultuuri- ja inforuumides liikumine toob kaasa rohkem võrdlusmomente, mistõttu tõlgendamispraktikad on mitmekesised ja varieeruvad (**Uurimus III, V**).

- Poliitilise kriisi tingimustes on tugevasti hargmaise rühma meediatarbimine geo-poliitiliselt mitmekesine. Samas tekitab erinevate ideoloogiliste vaadetega meediasisu jälgmine meediatarbijates väsimust ja tüdimust (**Uurimus III, IV, V**).

- Multiaktiivne kosmopoliitne lõimrühm on füüsiliselt mobiilne, nende piiriülesed sidemed on sagedased ja vastastikku tugevdavad. Hargmaised praktikad võimaldavad koguda majanduslikke ja kultuurilisi ressursse ning teadmisi, oskusi ja isiklikke kontakte, mis tugevdavad nende kohalikku majanduslikku positsiooni, suurendavad ühiskondlikku ja poliitilist julgust ja aktiivsust. Hargmaisus ja kohalik lõimitus on üksteist tugevdavad, ehkki hagrmaisuse negatiivne seos eesti keele oskusega osutab, et see suhe ei pruugi alati olla vastastikku toetav (**Uurimus V**).

- Institutsionaalselt lõimunud rühmas avaldub hargmaisus eeskätt Venemaa ja venekeelse meedia jälgimise näol, mis võimaldab säilitada ja arendada oma ajaloolis-kultuurilist identiteeti. Kuna lõimrühma liikmed on ka regulaarsed kohaliku (eestikeelse) meedia jälgijad, peavad nad geopoliitiliste pingete taustal hakkama saama ideoloogiliselt mitmesuunalise meediadiskursusega. Tugev poliitiline sidustatus kodanikuna toetab soovi olla geopoliitilistes vaidlustes neutraalne. See tähendab, et poliitilise kriisi tingimustes võib hargmaisus pärssida nende poliitilist eneseväljendust ja osalust ning muudab nende etnilise identiteedi reprodutseerimise keerukamaks (**Uurimus V**).

- Ento-kultuuriliselt lõimunute rühmas avaldub hargmaisus Venemaasuunalise (sotsiaal)meedia ja piiriülese isikliku kommunikatsiooni kaudu. Rühma iseloomustab geopoliitiline truudus Venemaale. Vahendatud hargmaisus ei toeta kohaliku poliitilise- ja kodanikuidentiteedi arengut ega suhteid põhirahvusega. Geopoliitiliste pingete taustal on meediamenüü pigem homogeenne ja orienteeritud ühele konflikti osapoolele (Venemaale) orienteeritud. Samal ajal seostub nende hargmaisus kohaliku tasandi kollektiivsete tegevustega ja see hoiab neid ühiskonda sidustatuna (**Uurimus V**).

- Nõrgalt lõimunute hargmaisust toetab suhtlusmeedia kasutamine. Kuna nad ei jälgi välismeediat, siis on ühiskondade mitmekesisus nende jaoks vahendatud teiste inimeste kogemuste kaudu. Geopoliitilise pinge kontekstis eelistavad nad asjakohast meediasisu mitte jälgida (**Uurimus V**).
- Üldiselt toetab hargmaisus kohalikku lõimitust. Hargmaisus tugevdab sotsiaalset agentsust, mis on omane teatud segmenteeritud integratsiooni vormidele. Hargmaisus võib aga olla ka kompensatsioonimehhanism ebapiisava ligipääsu puhul majanduslikele või poliitilistele ressurssidele või riigispetsiifilise kapitali nappuse puhul (**Uurimus V**).

Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et rändetaustaga elanikkonna eri gruppide lõimumine toimub hargmaises reaalsuses ja sõltub mitmekesistest ressurssidest, mitte üksnes riigispetsiifilise ressursi suurendamisest. Vahendatud hargmaisus on omane kõigile lõimumisviisidele, ent vastastikmõju avaldub kvalitatiivselt erinevalt.

PUBLICATIONS

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