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**HOW WAR BECOMES POSSIBLE? : THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND
ITS SECURITIZATION OF IRAQ**

MA Thesis

Supervisor: Prof. Viacheslav Morozov

Tartu 2020

Author's declaration

I have written this Master's thesis independently. All viewpoints of other authors, literary sources and data from elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.

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Abstract

This thesis examines the 2003 US-Iraq war in order to provide an explanation regarding how the war became possible. Also, the thesis provides an insight into the outbreak of the war through the lens of securitization theory and how the United States (US) framed Iraq as a security threat which resulted in the authorization of emergency measures (war). This thesis is not about why the US-Iraq war happened or the motivations surrounding the invasion. In addition to how the war became possible, the study looks at how the war became legitimized by a broader public and how the use of force became the only course of action against Iraq. The thesis argues that the successful securitization of Iraq made possible/provided conditions of possibility for going to war.

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Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 2003 US-Iraq war in order to provide an explanation regarding how the war became possible. Also, the thesis provides an insight into the outbreak of the war through the lens of securitization theory and how the United States (US) framed Iraq as a security threat which resulted in the authorization of emergency measures (war). This thesis is not about why the US-Iraq war happened or the motivations surrounding the invasion. In addition to how the war became possible, the study looks at how the war became legitimized by a broader public and how the use of force became the only course of action against Iraq.

The US-Iraq war was US's first major military action in the post-cold war era. Also, the war was US's first experience as a hegemonic power where it occupied a country in the Middle East. To some extent US's decision to invade Iraq could be seen as unprecedented owing to the increased military involvement of the US in an Arab/Muslim country (Lieberfeld, 2005). The US went to an all-out war with Iraq after its successful securitization of Iraq. Scholars have offered explanations for the war from different perspectives. According to realists; the war was due to unipolarity, US's desire to maintain its hegemony, and to eliminate the threat Iraq's Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) poses to US/its allies (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.3). From a liberal perspective; US invaded Iraq because Iraq was a non-liberal state, US's agenda to spread democracy and oust tyrannical regimes for the sake of global peace (Danju et al, 2012, p.685). For Marxists, US invaded Iraq based on oil and capitalism where the US sought to control Iraq's oil reserve and its agenda to exclude its rival in a competitive oil market (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.212).

These studies explain why the US went to war against Iraq. However, they do not explain a specific aspect of US decision to go war against Iraq. That is, they do not account for the aspect of the 'conditions of possibility' for the outbreak of war which is what this study intends to add/contribute. Again, they do not provide a clear picture of the Iraq war in terms of how the war became possible as they are based on contextual issues. For example, the war was a result of the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack, Iraq's possession of WMD, and Iraq's involvement in sponsoring terrorism. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to identify the conditions that had to be altered which created the conditions upon which the war became possible through the lens of securitization. The thesis analyzes elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory in order to explain how the Bush administration

framed Iraq as an existential threat, how the US convinced its domestic public and the international community to use exceptional measures (force) against Iraq which led to a successful securitization of Iraq.

I expect that securitization can explain the discursive conditions regarding how war becomes possible. For example, we can ascertain the conditions which made the US-Iraq war possible. Therefore, the need to explore the conditions against the background of 'normalcy' in international politics. 'Normalcy' (rules of the game) implies the norms which guide and regulate inter-state relations. What is puzzling is the outbreak of war which begs the question as to how this 'normalcy' is disrupted. How violent conduct becomes thinkable and indeed possible?

Again, we can understand the place of America's exceptionalism in the war (Hassan, 2015, p.70). That is, how the situation was framed as a 'state of exception' beyond normal politics such that going beyond the normal rules of interstate conduct where violence and the use of force became an option for US. Although US's action contravened the norms of international law, through the securitization logic we can understand how US lifted itself above the rules. This is what the securitization perspective can add because we can understand that securitization alters social relations where it lifts social relations beyond normal politics (non-violent interaction, non-use of force) to exceptional politics (war). Although the international realm remains anarchic and 'war may break out any time' (Waltz, 2010), today, the general understanding in the international society is that violence and the use of force are not legitimate. This is what 'normalcy' in the international society refers to, and it relies on rules of the game regarding inter-state relations as contained in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Therefore, for a state to initiate war/use force means that, to lift itself above the rules. That is, from normal politics to exceptional politics.

This study contributes to the discursive accounts of the Iraq war through securitization theory. Again, if the US-Iraq war is not examined from the securitization lens; the question of how the use of force became the only/appropriate response towards Iraq remains unintelligible. In addition, the question as to how the conditions/discursive conditions were put in place which made US go beyond normal politics (non-use of force) and resorting to exceptional means (war) and how it became the only/legitimate course of action would remain unaddressed. Furthermore, the existing explanations/account does not answer the question of the discursive conditions which underpin a decision to go to war.

Revisiting the start of the Iraq war through the lens of securitization theory, this study puts forward the argument that the successful securitization of Iraq made possible/provided conditions of possibility for going to war (Thesis statement).

Regarding the research design and method, this study adopted the single case-study as the research design because it is ideal for achieving the aims of this study as the study aims at providing an explanatory account of the phenomenon under study. 'The case study method explores a real life, contemporary bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information... and reports a case description and case themes' (Creswell, 2013, p.97). I opt for the case of US war against Iraq because it is a good case to learn how war becomes possible in international politics.

The research question and the theoretical framework form the basis of the methodology of the study. The research question to be answered is; how did US-Iraq war become possible? The study relied on securitization as its theoretical framework. Also, the study relied on discourse analysis as a methodological tool because the epistemology of securitization theory is encapsulated in post-positivism, and as such, discourse analysis is appropriate for analyzing securitization (Qualitative and interpretive research methods assignment). 'Discourse analysis entails an examination of how and why things appear the way they do, and how certain actions become possible' (Dunn et al, 2016, p.4). Discourse analysis was used to show how the speeches made by President G.W Bush and senior US government officials shaped the public discourse regarding the threat Iraq posed to US and the international community. In doing this, the speeches (text) were analyzed in view of identifying how Iraq was represented as a threat.

The source of the empirical data for the study was obtained from documentary and secondary sources. The study relied on document analysis as a method of data collection. 'Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents... document analysis requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge' (Bowen, 2009).

The documentary sources include text originating from President G.W Bush and senior US government officials regarding the discursive representations of Iraq. The text was analyzed to show how they have represented Iraq in discourse. The text comprises of securitizing actors which in this case were President G.W Bush speeches/statements and speeches of senior US government officials. The period of these documents is between 2001 and 2003 in

order for the study to benefit from a more focused approach. The secondary sources are in the form of text such as articles, textbooks, journals and reports from credible/reliable news media.

Discourse analysis was used to provide evidence from the analyzed documents. For example, quotes from President G.W Bush/Senior US government officials and various examples of threat construction. Public polls was used to measure audience acceptance domestically and the various positions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members in 2002 and other UN member states was used to measure audience acceptance internationally.

The thesis is structured in four chapters. The first chapter entails a literature review of the US-Iraqi war. It reviews the contributions and the approaches scholars have used in explaining the US-Iraqi war. Chapter two entails the theoretical framework of the thesis. It explains the concept of securitization and engages in an in-depth analysis of elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory. Chapter three constitutes the methodological part of the thesis. It describes the thesis research design, the methodological framework, and the empirical data/sources. Chapter four entails the empirical part of the thesis which explains the securitization process of Iraq. In other words, it shows how the Bush administration securitized Iraq through an in-depth analysis of the key aspects of securitization theory. Also, chapter four covers the concluding part of the thesis which summarises the findings.

I wish to express my thanks and appreciation to my supervisor (Viacheslav Morosov) for taking his time out of his busy schedule to supervise this thesis and I really appreciate your efforts in the course of writing this thesis. I am grateful to Thomas Linsenmaier for his support and thank you for responding to all my questions in a timely fashion. I thank all my family members for their support and encouragement during my studies.

Chapter One

Literature Review

There is a wide range of literature on the 2003 US-Iraq war. It is worthwhile to mention that most of the literature on the US-Iraq war is geared towards providing an explanation for US invasion of Iraq through various IR theories and other analytic perspectives. These include; realism, liberalism, Marxism, and constructivism, neo-conservatism, amongst others. Therefore, this research will consider a review of the US-Iraq war from the perspective of realism, liberalism, constructivism, and Marxism because they are key theories of international relations.

1.0 Realism and the US-Iraq war

In Deudney et al explanation of the US invasion of Iraq from the perspective of realism, they argue that the US-Iraqi war was a result of US's agenda to pursue its hegemonic primacy. They argue further that the pursuit of America's hegemonic primacy is rooted in the ancient and prominent realist school of thought which holds that 'international order comes from concentrations of power, rather than shifting balances of power' (Deudney et al, 2017, p.8). According to Deudney et al; the Middle-East was of high importance to US's national interest and as such, the need for US to preserve and extend its American primacy in the region which happened to be the primary objective of the war. The US saw Iraq as a revisionist state in the Middle East and having a record of using chemical-weapons coupled with Iraq's ambition of acquiring nuclear weapons posed a threat to US forces and its allies in the Middle-East. By defeating Iraq, it would demonstrate US's capacities and willingness to defend its status as a world power against rival states such as the likes of Iran and North Korea (Deudney et al, 2017, p.8).

Deudney et al attributed US invasion of Iraq as a result of a shift from a bipolar system to unipolar world order. At the end of the cold war, US emerged as unipolar power. The inability of rivalry states to put US on check led US to expand its agendas, imposing changes in the regimes of smaller states as well as imposing American ideologies globally. The foreign policy of US was more driven by domestic ideologies rather than inter-state rivalry (Deudney et al, 2017, p.12). As a unipolar power, US increased its involvement in various parts of the world. For instance, US deployed military force to Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo to render humanitarian assistance with the aim of pursuing its expansionist agenda of having a world order based on America's ideologies. Also, US over engaged in places that never posed a threat to its national security. This formed the basis as to why US went to war against Iraq.

For instance, following the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Bush administration emphasized on the threat terrorism posed to US where the solution was to effect a regime change in Iraq and imposing a democratic regime (Deudney et al, 2017, p.12).

Another reason for the war was that US saw Saddam Hussein as a threat to its hegemony in the Middle-East. Deudney et al note that; US is much more concerned with the maintenance of its primacy and to prevent the emergence of a competitor in the post-cold war era. The US policymakers see the Persian Gulf as crucial to US's hegemonic system as it contains 'two-thirds of the world's recoverable petroleum reserves' (Deudney et al, 2017, p16). They explain further that US strived to foster alliance and 'subsidise friendly regimes' in the Middle-East. US oil companies, defence contractors and banks have benefited from the long term involvement of US in the region. US policymakers saw Saddam Hussein as posing a threat to the American order and US's hegemony in the Middle-East because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq's agenda to establish the pan-Arab national consolidation with the aim of eliminating Saudi Arabia's and the Gulf of Emirates ancient regimes. This explains why US policymakers advocated for the ousting of Saddam Hussein from power for over ten years prior to US's invasion in 2003 (Deudney et al, 2017, p.17).

For Deudney et al; effecting regime change in Iraq was an avenue for the US to maintain its primacist goal. In other words, the reason for going to war against Iraq was to demonstrate the superiority of America's military technology. US believed that by showing off the potency of its advanced conventional weapons, ousting Saddam Hussein from power through the use of sophisticated weapons and having a low American casualty would shock other rivalries/revisionist states that intend to impede on US's extended interest. The idea of US going to war against Iraq and being victorious would not only eliminate Iraq's threat in the Middle-East, but it would also maintain the hegemonic reputation of US globally (Deudney et al, 2017, p.17).

Deudney et al note that the Bush administration considered the 9/11 terrorist attack and the anthrax attacks in weeks after 9/11 to be a threat to America's national security. The Bush administration saw US as being vulnerable where its administration would be called into question for failing to provide security for the American people. The solution for the Bush administration was the outright elimination of the actors involved through the use of pre-emptive strike and preventive war. Hence, the need for US to go to war against Iraq. The Bush administration linked the 9/11 attacks to Saddam Hussein and made reference to the evidence US had regarding Iraq's nuclear weapon programme in order to justify US invasion of Iraq (Deudney et al, p.21).

Lieberfeld acknowledges from a realist point of view that states decision to go to war stems from the involuntary participation of all states in eternal quest for power and security due to the condition in the international political environment where each state is afraid of 'the actual or potential hostility of other states' (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.2). Lieberfeld identifies a change in the distribution of power in the post-cold war era from bipolarity to unipolar US military dominance as a contributive factor of the war where America's foreign policies shifted from deterrence/containment of threats to preventive war policies against rogue states that posed as threats to the US. Lieberfeld explains further that the change in power distribution led US to pay less attention to the collective security system as US relied heavily on its military capabilities (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.3).

Similarly, Lieberfeld considers US's goal of global hegemony as the cause of the US-Iraqi war where US aims at owning/maintaining a power that cannot be challenged by any rival state. The US deemed it necessary to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government in order to achieve this strategic objective and by extension demonstrate that US's 'reputational and symbolic power' cannot be challenged especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks which depict America as being vulnerable. This explains why President Bush saw regime change in Iraq as the utmost priority as US would be seen as a weak state if it compromises and as such, fails to effect a regime change in Iraq. Therefore, to protect US's 'reputational and symbolic power', for Bush, war was inevitable (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.3).

Lieberfeld notes that the US invasion of Iraq was geostrategic as Iraq constitute a serious security threat in the Middle-East where Iraq could use its oil resources against US interests. Again, the establishment of US military bases in Iraq would pave way for US to further project its power in the Middle-East, Africa and central Asia. Therefore, for US to go to war against Iraq from the realist perspective was a rational calculation of US to showcase its power to its allies, rivals, and to prevent the occurrence of 9/11. Also, to prevent Iraq from using its WMD/oil resources to threaten US and its allies as well as to prevent Iraq from collaborating with terrorist organizations. US believed that it could guarantee the supply of oil from the region by controlling Iraq's oil resources through the use of military control (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.4).

The shortcoming of realist explanation is that it only explains why the war happened and its explanation is not consistent with realism. From the realist perspective, the war happened because of US's agenda to pursue its hegemonic primacy. US as a hegemonic power should have gone to war with Iraq independently; rather US sought the assistance of other states by

forming a coalition. If the assumptions of realism were the case within the context of the war then US's military might would have been sufficient to contain Iraq's threat. Again, realism does not explain how violent conduct occurs (war) where the 'normalcy' (rules of the game) in international politics is disrupted which makes war to become possible. As such, realism fails to account for the discursive conditions that made the war possible.

1.1 Liberalism and the US-Iraq war

In Danju et al explanation of the Iraqi war, they are of the view that war is not a result of human nature. Rather war stems from the imperfections in political institutions. They explain further that liberal states are peaceful and peace exists among them. Democratic states are less aggressive than authoritarian states. In the occasion where non-liberal states attack liberal states; liberal states engage in a defensive war. Hence, the US invasion of Iraq could be seen as a war that was fought against an authoritarian and non-liberal state for the sake of global peace (Danju et al, 2013, p.686).

Danju et al assert that democratic states are less likely to go to war than authoritarian states given that liberals focus on state reformation (Danju et al, 2013, p.686). In the light of this assertion, they argue that the US invasion of Iraq was justified because of the dire need to replace Saddam Hussein's authoritarian regime with a liberal democratic regime. To achieve this aim, US used hard power by carrying out pre-emptive action in order to ensure the spread of democracy as well as fostering peace/stability in the Middle-East and globally as contained in the liberal philosophy. Also, the Bush administration wanted to avoid the risk US could face for failing to go to war against Iraq. As such, the need to overthrow Saddam Hussein's undemocratic regime. (Danju et al, 2013, p.686).

Similarly, Lieberfeld notes that liberals believe that 'global peace and prosperity depend on the spread of democracy and trade, and on the conflict-regulation functions of international institutions' (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.6). Democracy fosters peace and democratic states do not engage in war against one another. Liberals support the view of replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes given that the spread of democracy and human rights promotes US national security as well as the national security of other democratic states. Again, democracies tend to go to war against non-democracies because democracies fear that non-democracies can first attack democracies as non-democracies lacks governmental checks and transparency as far as the use of force is concerned (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.6).

Democracies believe that authoritative regimes are capable of using deception which explains why democracies are aggressive and have the tendency to go to war against non-democracies

should they perceive any form of threat. From this liberal perspective, US decision to invade Iraq stems from the fears of the Bush administration regarding Iraq's capability to deceive UN weapon inspectors and to secretly engage in the development of WMD as well as deploying WMD to attacking either US or its allies (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.6).

Lieberfeld sees the difference in US's and Iraq's regime type as the permissive cause of the war. He explains further that the 9/11 terrorist attacks orchestrated by citizens of non-democratic states in the Middle-East were the rationale behind US's decision to use its power to forcefully impose democracy in the Middle-East with the expectations that democracy would spread across the region (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.7). One of the prominent justifications for US's decision to end the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein through its invasion was to protect the fundamental human rights of Iraqis and to liberate them from suffering (Lieberfeld, 2005, p.7).

The drawback of liberal explanation is that the explanation it offers is inconsistent with liberalism and it only tells us why the war happened. Liberalism frowns at unilateral military intervention; rather it considers multilateral military intervention authorized by the UNSC as acceptable because Liberalism acknowledges the role of international organizations in the conduct of inter-state relations. Upon the failure of US to obtain a second resolution from the UNSC, US and its allies went to war against Iraq. US's action contravenes liberal world views and what liberalism stands for. On this basis, liberalism fails to provide a clear picture of how the war happened. It fails to explain how the US broke the rules or lifted itself above the rules which led to unilateral military intervention in Iraq. Liberalism does not account for the discursive conditions upon which the war became possible.

1.2 Constructivism and the US-Iraq war

Hassan in his constructivist explanation of the war attributed the cause of the war to the consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attack. For the constructivists, this was so because the 9/11 attack brought about clarifying moments in America's collective consciousness where it provoked the reinvigoration of the American national identity as well as US foreign policy (Hassan, 2015, p.68). As such 'the United States began transforming its security strategy- radically altering its postulates but imprecisely reforming its doctrine and operations' (Hassan, 2015, p.68).

The emergence of the Bush Doctrine (President Bush foreign policy decisions) was empirical evidence regarding the transformation in the grand strategy of US where the Bush administration started framing a narrative that linked international terrorism/rogues states

with WMD and at the same time emphasizing on the threats terrorism/rogue states posed to US's security. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, new postulations emerged regarding what constituted a threat and which in return impacted on the 'conceptions of the national interest' and how US would pursue its national interest (Hassan, 2015, p.68).

In the course of how US would pursue its national interest, the new idea of emphasizing on pre-emption came to be. The US perceived that deterrence and containment were no longer effective regarding US's dealing in the international system coupled with the notion that the existing issues in the Middle-East needed to be redressed (Hassan, 2015, p.69) Hassan notes that 'once the identities of those who opposed the United States were constructed as enemies of freedom allying to strike first against the United States, a threat presented itself as an urgent and imminent danger to the state' (Hassan, 2015, p.69). A redefinition of America's interest occurred as a result of the above conception of social reality which constructed the regime of Saddam Hussein as the first target where the US could implement its pre-emption policy (Hassan, 2015, p.69).

Hassan reiterates that the constructivist interpretation of the Iraqi war has provided insight regarding US's motivation for going to war 'by introducing continuous dimensions of America's national identity that constitutively constructs a foreign policy tradition' (Hassan, 2015, p.69). The foreign policy tradition of the US could be described in terms of American exceptionalism which to a larger extent was embedded in the 2003 Bush administration Iraq policy. According to constructivists, American exceptionalism is an ideology that drives US's foreign policy. Also, exceptionalism is a term used to describe America's national identity. That is, 'what it is to be American' (Hassan, 2015, p.70). This constructed identity portrays the US as a world leader and central to the international system (Hassan, 2015, p.70)

Constructivists hold that there has been a shift in US foreign policy after the 9/11 terrorists attack from 'exemplarism' to 'vindicalism'.(Hassan, 2015, p.70). Exemplarism in this context implies the idea of US being independent and serving 'as a model for the world' while vindicalism implies US's attempt to transform the international system in order for the international system to look and function in line with the political ideologies of the US (Hassan, 2015, p.70). For constructivists, the idea of vindicalism centers on US's strategic culture which stems from the 'American exceptionalist identity' (Hassan, 2015, p.71).

In Lauterbach's constructivist explanation of the Iraqi war, the war occurred because the Bush administration did not consider US's 'dominant strategic cultural norm' as reliable following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 'dominant strategic cultural norm' has to do with

US's agenda to ensure geopolitical stability by means of multilateral deterrence (Lauterbach, 2011, p.61). Lauterbach identified two constructivist approaches in explaining the Iraq war. First, the ambitious constructivist perspective holds that US engaged Iraq in a war because of US's agenda to establish its 'proposed norm of preventive war'. The 'proposed norm of preventive war' was part of US's vision to effect hegemonic global governance. This was due to America's reaction to the trauma of the 9/11 terrorist attacks where the US believed that it could successfully play the role of a world policeman as well as preventing WMD from spreading. In addition, the US thought that it could impose regime change in the Middle-East by ousting authoritative regime from power. Lauterbach explains further that US's agenda to adopt/work in line with the 'normative logic of preventive war' as the policeman of the world would pave way for US to achieve its global and regional interests. For instance, the US would achieve its economic, security, and geopolitical interests in the Middle-East. This would be achieved through the imposition of US's will in the Middle-East as well as reconstructing the region in America's image (Lauterbach, 2011, p.66).

Second, the cautious constructivist perspective holds that US went to war against Iraq for two reasons. That is to achieve both 'interests and normative aspirations'. Interests within this context imply US agenda to exercise control in a geopolitically strategic region while normative aspirations imply US agenda to establish its new vision regarding its hegemonic role in the world (Lauterbach, 2011, p.66). America's access to oil, exercising control in the Middle-East, the negative impact of WMD on US's security, and the security of Israel were causes of the war. This prompted US 'to redefine what constituted appropriate behaviour for how the United States should seek to attain its goals' (Lauterbach, 2011, p.67). For cautious constructivists, interests played a significant role as to how the US defined its identity, what the US stands for within the context of US's strategic culture, and how the outcomes of US's national security policy was reached (Lauterbach, 2011, p.67). According to cautious constructivists; 'the Bush administration's attempt to inaugurate the proposed hegemonic paradigm sought to satisfy both Wilsonian idealism and pragmatic interests in the outcomes of national security policy' (Lauterbach, 2011, p.67).

The problem with constructivist explanation is that it fails to explain how the war happened and how it became possible. Constructivist's explanation only account for the reason the war happened on the basis of the construction of ideas as to how they influenced the foreign policy of US. The war was a 'process' and as such, constructivism cannot account for the 'process'. To ascertain how the war became possible, the 'process' has to be identified. We

cannot rely only on ideas that are socially constructed. Also, constructivism does not explain the discursive conditions upon which the war became possible.

1.3 Marxism and the US-Iraq war

Hinnebusch attributes oil and capitalism as the driving force behind the war in his Marxist explanation of the war. The most important driver of the war was US's agenda to control the oil reserves of Iraq and to exclude its rival in a competitive oil market. He explains further that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) would become weak in the occasion where Iraq was captured and the continuous occupation of Iraq would prevent the US from not having access to Iraq's Oil (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.212). In the post-World War II era, the world oil resources which are highly concentrated in the Middle-East have been dominated by US Companies and oil is an important aspect of US's energy-intensive capitalism (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.215). The US invasion of Iraq was a means of strengthening US's oil hegemony as the US believed that it could use the war to show that it was essential for US to continue to protect 'the world capitalist control of oil' against the challenges of third world countries (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.217). Also, the war was aimed at protecting US's capitalism (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.217).

Hinnebusch argues that in order to have a proper understanding of the motivations surrounding the war, it is important to consider US's hegemony regarding the oil market and threats US was experiencing in terms of 'its strategic situation in the Middle-East'. The vulnerability of US in terms of oil was increasing as the dependence on US on oil import in a competitive oil market was increasing where balance of power shifted toward the producers of oil and this subjected US as well as the world capitalist economy to become vulnerable to oil shock (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.221). The US believed that invading Iraq was the solution to this threat because Iraq owned the 'world' second-largest oil reserves' and its cost of production was very low. In addition, Iraq's oil would not serve the US's purpose as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. Again, Saddam Hussein would politicize US's access to Iraq's oil as US's access to Iraq's oil would be based on US's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Conquering Iraq would pave way for US to enjoy access to Iraq's oil at the expense of the economic rivals of US in Europe and Asia (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.221).

Hinnebusch notes that 'the war served the interest of a particular fraction of dominant capital, namely the oil-arms-construction complex' (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.223). The war was an opportunity for some investors in US's oil industry to regain the direct ownership of oil as

OPEC had placed a restriction on the private ownership of oil. Also, Privatizing Iraq's oil would bring about an increased profit (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.223).

Danju et al Marxist explanation of the Iraq war linked the cause of the war to US's agenda to control oil and its quest for new markets. From the Marxist point of view, the US war against Iraq was not about WMD, the spread of democracy in the Middle-East, war on terrorism, US's desire to liberate Iraqi's from the tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein as well as protecting the fundamental human rights of Iraqis (Danju et al, 2013, p.687). Marxist theory explains the US war against Iraq based on the nature of capitalist states where they are hungry for new markets and open markets. Also, the war was due to a search for a 'new trend of global capitalism' (Danju et al, 2013, p.687). They explain further that when a country operates under a liberal capitalist system, the country would be in search of new markets in order to make profits. This was the case of the US as a liberal state where the Middle-East was strategic in its quest to expand in Iraq. The war would create new investment opportunities for American business in the Middle-East. As such, the US was in pursuit of its national interest in its quest to sustain its hegemony (Danju et al, 2013, p.687).

The spread of liberal democracy is a core value of US foreign policy where America desires all states to be liberal democratic. This is so because liberal democratic states would have free-market economies and they will be profitable to US. US interest in Iraq was due to Iraq's oil resources. Marxists hold that the oil prospects/business in Iraq was an incentive for the Bush administration where the US took control of Iraq's oil fields. This was evident in the strategy of the Bush administration to control Iraq's oil as the first line of action of the US military forces was to protect the oil fields in Iraq (Danju et al, 2013, p.687). Again, the invasion stemmed from US's agenda to introduce liberal democracy to Iraq because this move will benefit the political/economic interests of US and the West (Danju et al, 2013, p.687).

Danju et al note that the war on terror from the Marxist perspective can best be understood as economic security. They explain further that Iraq's oil reserves were an important asset to the US given that US is a 'hegemonic power and global capitalist order'. As such, the need for US to dominate other states as well as cooperating with them economically in order to for US to achieve its aim and the interests of elites in the global economy. The US and these global economic elites use international organizations to penalize peripheral states that attempt to challenge the status quo. An example of such an international organization is the UN. This provides insight regarding why the Iraqi war occurred in 2003. Free market is crucial for

liberal democracy and US got attracted to Iraq just like a businessman in search of profit (Danju et al, 2013, p.688).

Marxist explanation attributes the cause of the war to oil and capitalism. Marxist explanation is deficient because it does not offer a clear picture regarding how the war became possible as the explanation is based on contextual issues. For instance, US went to war against Iraq because of US's agenda to control the oil reserve of Iraq. Also, it does not account for the discursive condition that made the war possible.

The literature review shows that most of the scholars that have contributed to the discourse on the US-Iraq war have provided a causally based explanation. The literature also reveals that the scholars have offered explanations regarding US's decision and motivation for going to war against Iraq. However, these scholars have neglected an important aspect of the war. As such, they have only offered explanations as to why the war happened. They do not account for the discursive conditions regarding the outbreak of war which is what this study intends to add/contribute. In other words, they do not tell us about the conditions upon which the Iraq war became possible. For example, the existing explanations focus on why US decided to invade Iraq? To have an adequate explanation of the war, it is important to examine the war by employing the 'how question' through the lens of securitization theory in order to ascertain the discursive conditions for the outbreak of war. In other words, the 'conditions of possibility' for war to become possible. In addition, there is the need to turn from the 'why question' because if we go along the line of the 'why question' and for instance claim as an objective fact that the war happened or Iraq was targeted because Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and was sponsoring/harboring terrorist then there is nothing to explain, no puzzle. If we go along the line of the 'how question' and for instance the question as to how the normalcy (rules of the game) is disrupted which brings about violent conduct/use of force such as war and when this violent conduct (war) is legitimized and as such acceptable then there is something to explain. This study will focus on this gap.

Chapter Two

Copenhagen School of Securitization Theory

This chapter examines the securitization theory. It clarifies the concept of securitization and analyzes elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory.

The book written by Barry Buzan in 1983 titled *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* forms the basis of the Copenhagen School of thought. The prominent scholars of the Copenhagen school are Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (Romaniuk, 2018, p.2). Romani notes that ‘at the core of the school is the way in which many different types of security issues interact with domestic politics. Drawing on the ideas of ontology of constructivism..., the Copenhagen school looks at threat to states (i.e national security) as matters that are socially constructed’ (Romaniuk, 2018, p.2).

At the end of the Cold War, a debate ensued in the field of IR regarding ideas in security and the debate was between the narrowers and wideners. The narrowers focused on security issues pertaining to states and their analysis centered on military and political stability especially between the US and Soviet Union (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.1). The wideners were not satisfied with the way the narrowers analyzed security issues. As such, the wideners thought about expanding security agenda by including other forms of threat that are different from military threats as well as threats that affected human beings apart from states. For instance, they introduced concepts such as human security, regional security, culture, and identity (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.1). In the course of the debate during the 1970s and 1980s, the Copenhagen School provided one of the alternative methods regarding the analysis of security.

The Copenhagen School contributed to the field of security studies by presenting an analytical framework regarding securitization and de-securitization to safeguard security studies from being too broad and irrelevant (Emmers 2011, p.138). In doing this, the Copenhagen School came up with a securitization spectrum where it classified public issues into three. Namely; non-politicized issues, politicized issues, and securitized issues. Non-politicized issues are the issues that are not within the purview of public debate and the state has no dealings with such issues. Politicized issues concern the state and the state is involved in tackling such issues through its political system. Politicized issues are public policy-related issues that require the swift action of the government (Does, 2013). Securitized issues are

issues that require the use of extraordinary means and these measures are beyond the state's normal political procedure (Emmers, 2011, p.138). The Copenhagen School is of the view that through an act of securitization, politicized matters are moved into the securitized area/realm in the securitization spectrum (Does, 2013). For Buzan et al, this means that 'security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.23). This explains why securitization is seen as an extreme version of politicization. De-securitization on the contrary, entails the reverse process. That is, moving issues from the emergency realm to the realm of normal politics (Does, 2013).

2.0 What is securitization?

Scholars and proponents of the Copenhagen school have defined securitization from their point of view. However, the definitions that they offer are quite similar in terms of conceptualizing securitization as a process where an issue is being identified as a threat to a referent object which requires the use of exceptional measures in dealing with the issue. Buzan et al define securitization as a speech act 'through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat' (Buzan et al, 2003, p.491). McDonald defines securitization 'as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of 'normal politics' in dealing with that issue' (McDonald, 2008, p.567).

2.1 Elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization theory

The elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization are; (a) Referent Object (b) Securitizing actor. (c) Securitizing move which is also known as speech act. (d) Audience (e) exceptional/extraordinary measures. The elements are discussed below:

2.1.1 Referent Object

A referent object is a key idea in the securitization theory. Eroukhmanoff defines a referent object as 'the thing that is threatened and needs to be protected' (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.1). For Buzan et al; referent objects are 'collectives that can be depicted as being existentially threatened and whose survival (at least in their current form) is portrayed as being in danger'

(Buzan et al. 1998, p.21). Buzan et al note that issues become securitized when they are presented as 'existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.5). In analyzing security, securitization theorists have identified five sectors. They are economic, environmental, military, societal, and political sectors. Threat(s) are identified and are presented as posing a threat to a referent object in each of the sectors. For instance, identity is the referent object in the societal sector, the ecosystem and endangered species are the referent object in the environmental sector. The state is the only referent object in the military sector (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2). According to Eroukhmanoff; 'by sectorialising security, we understand that existential threats are not objective but instead relate to the different characteristics of each referent object. This technique also highlights the contextual nature of security and threats' (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2).

2.1.2 Securitizing Actor

The securitizing actor champions the course of defending a referent object under threat. Buzan et al consider securitization actors as those that engage in the securitization of issues where they declare that a referent object is existentially threatened (Buzan et al, 1998, p.36). Similarly, Duck et al regard securitization actors as the entities that makes declaration as to whether a referent object has been existentially threatened (Duck et al, 2016). The securitizing actor makes the decision as to whether an issue needs to be dealt with as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998, p.34). According to Buzan et al, 'a securitizing actor is someone or a group, who performs the securitizing speech act. Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.21). The Copenhagen School holds that for a referent object to be successfully securitized 'depend on the intersubjective agreement among the subjects' regarding the legitimacy of the claim that is put forward by the securitizing actor.

Securitizing actor requires social capital and it is expected that they hold a position of authority (Buzan et al, 1998, p.33). This means that securitizing actors generally occupy a position of power where the audience sees them as being credible. For example, the president of a state is known to have a significant degree of social capital and the domestic public (audience) regards them as being credible by the virtue of occupying such position. Putting the above example into context, in the case of international politics and inter-state war, securitizing actors are states, especially powerful states. Buzan et al maintain that; 'no one is excluded from attempts to articulate alternative interpretations of security' (Buzan et al, 1998,

p.31) But due to the way power is structured in the realm of security, certain securitizing actors especially the elites of a state enjoys the advantage of being in the capacity to define security threats (Buzan et al, 1998, p.32).

2.1.3 Securitizing Move

Buzan et al define securitizing move 'as discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.25). The securitization process constitutes a security act and a political act. The security act entails speaking of security language calling for the adoption of extraordinary measure and the political act involves the articulation of a threat in a manner of convincing the audience (Ememers, 2011, p.140). This means that in the process of securitization, the securitizing actor performs the speech act which is also known as securitizing move to pass the passage across to the audience. Waever corroborates this view where he equates the concept of security with a speech act and he termed securitization to be a process as to how an issue is linguistically presented as an existential threat (Does, 2013). By the virtue of the audience consenting to the speech act (securitization move), it transforms into securitization (Buzal et al, 1998). 'In this regard, speech acts shifts from being productive of security to being one component of the inter-subjective construction of security' (McDonald, 2008, cited in Does).

The securitizing actor uses the speech act as a mechanism to prove to the audience regarding the existence of a security threat which poses an imminent danger/threat to a referent object where the referent object has to be protected. The rationale behind performing the speech act is to garner the support of the audience regarding the existence of a security threat. Issues or security threats are classified as either national or international issues given that they are regarded as more important than other issues. These issues are exaggerated and presented as being 'supreme priority' where preference is given to those issues which allow the securitizing actor to deal with them before any other issue (Does, 2013). This explains why Buzan et al sees security as a socially constructed phenomenon/'self-referential practice' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.24). This is so because by transforming an issue into a security question where it is being framed as a threat, not because the threat necessarily exists in reality. An issue becomes a security threat when it is verbally labelled or presented as such. In this regard, the securitizing move (speech act) is 'by itself, self-referential structure, the structure that refers to itself (Sulovic, 2010, p.4).

As earlier mentioned, the securitizing actor needs to convince the audience that a particular referent object is under threat. As such, the adoption of extraordinary measures to deal with the threat is made possible where the audience acknowledges the securitizing move of the actor. Amid the urgent need to deal with the threat, the audience accepts 'the use of counteractions outside the normal bounds of political procedures' (Emmers, 2011, p.139). Proponents of the Copenhagen School consider securitizing moves as an action that is highly intentional and strategic (McDonald, 2008, p.569). Buzan et al argue that presenting an issue as a threat is a justification for the use of extraordinary measures to deal with it. Also, the key to legitimizing the use of force has been through the invocation of security (Buzan et al, 1998, p.21).

The speech act is a subcategory of securitizing move. According to Leonard et al; 'speech acts do not report on a thing, but rather do things' (Leonard et al, 2011, p.57). Hence, the fundamental characteristics of the act is the 'performative nature of language' (Huysmans, 2011, p.57). Through the use of language, issues are transformed into threats. What language does is to put certain actors or issues in a position where they are construed as constituting an existential threat to a certain political community and as such enabling securitization (McDonald, 2008, p.568). Through Austin's articulation of the speech act, securitization was located in the language theory (McDonald, 2008, p.568). 'In this framework, language itself becomes security in the sense that particular forms of language - spoken or written in a particular context constitute security' (McDonald, 2008, p.568). The speech act is rhetorical in terms of the security language that is being used and the issue is presented as the ultimate priority which must be dealt with in a timely fashion 'because if the problem is not handled now, it will be too late, and we will not exist to remedy our failure' (Buzan et al, 1998, 26). This is what differentiates the securitizing moves from normal political discourse (Duck et al, 2016).

2.1.4 Audience

The audience is an important aspect of securitization theory. The role of the audience in the securitization process is fundamental because it determines the success of securitization. Balzacq corroborates this view where he asserts that in the aspect of legitimizing the decision of the securitizing actor, the audience plays an important role in the legitimization of the securitizing actor's decision (Balzacq, 2005, p.172). For example, for securitization to be successful, the extraordinary measures should at least be partially accepted by the audience

(Duck et al, 2016). That is; 'it is accepted that some rules must be broken' (Bright, 2012, p.871).

Buzan et al define audience as 'those securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific security nature of some issue' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.41). For Balzacq; 'the audience is the entity whom the securitizing move is directed to' (Balzacq, 2011, p.8). Balzacq considers securitization as being audience-centred and securitization could best be understood as 'a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context, psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction' (Balzacq 2005: 172).

Audience is of different types. There is standard audience which constitutes the general public, military officers, politicians, elites, and representatives of the parliament at the national level. Other notable examples are the international audience such as states, international organizations, amongst others. Roe notes that securitizing moves performed by a government in most cases are geared towards convincing members of the national parliament. Rhetorical securitization occurs where only one of these audiences is convinced of the existential threat and the need for emergency measures. This situation can be described as a partial securitization. However, if the threat and the emergency measures are fully approved by the audiences then active securitization occurs in this regard (Roe, 2008, p.633). Presenting something as a security issue boils down to a matter of choice (political choice) (Waever, 2005, p.251). This choice is brought into fruition through the securitizing process of labelling a security issue as a threat (Sulovic, 2010, p.4). The negotiation that takes place during the securitization process between the securitizing actor and the audience enables the making of choice. That is, the securitizing actor puts forward an issue in the agenda, while the audience is in the capacity to make a choice as to whether to accept or decline the tabled agenda (Sulovic, 2010, p4). This shows that securitization cannot be imposed as only the consent of the audience justifies the use of extraordinary measures where regular political procedures are breached in order to deal with the threat (Sulovic, 2010, p.4). 'Thus, security (as well as politics) ultimately rest neither with objects nor with subjects but among the subjects' Buzan et al, 1998, p.31). This explains why Buzan et al considers securitization as 'essentially inter-subjective process' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.30). This means that security is not objective or fully subjective (Rostoks, 2010, p.64). Simply put, inter-subjectivity implies that the decision regarding whether something is a security issue or not 'is not something individuals decide alone' because human beings live in groups (Buzan et al, 1998, p.31).

In reiterating the importance of the audience in the securitization process, the collective agreement of the audience regarding the nature of the threat and its support to the adoption of extraordinary measures makes an issue to become securitized. The rejection of the speech act by the audience implies that the speech act only represents a securitizing move which indicates a securitization failure. In this respect, focusing on the audience and the securitization process goes beyond the mere articulation of security (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2). This means that securitization centers on convincing the audience. Again, the success and failure of securitization largely lie in the hands of the audience as the securitization theory was designed in a way of protecting politics from state's disproportionate power.

2.1.5 Exceptional/extraordinary measures

Exceptional or extraordinary measures are used to deal with the threat(s) that poses an imminent danger to a referent object. Williams defines extraordinary measure 'as the declaration of existential threat and (if successful) the generation of the capacity to break free of the rules of normal politics' (Williams et al, 2014, p.20). When successful securitization occurs, it places security in the exceptional realm. Also, in the occasion where an issue is successfully securitized, the actions taken are considered as legitimate within the context of 'language of urgency and existential threats' and the actions taken to deal with the threats are measures that are not democratic in normal situations (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2). The extraordinary or exceptional logic brings about the suspension of normal politics where the adopted measures to deal with the threat become permissible and necessary (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2). When it comes to the idea of using exceptional/extraordinary measures, the securitizing actor needs to present an issue as something that is of utmost priority that requires an urgent solution. According to Buzan et al; 'if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own)' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.24). This suggest that the securitizing actor has made a claim regarding the right to address the issue by using extraordinary measures where the 'rules of the game' in normal politics can be broken (Buzan et al, 1998, p24).

2.2 Theoretical expectations

Having discussed the securitization concept, the theoretical expectations is that if a state is successfully securitized then war becomes possible.

Chapter Three

Methodology

3.1 Research design, methods and data sources

A research design is an important aspect of a research project and it entails a systematic plan in studying a research problem. Research design is a fundamental plan that guides the research process such as data collection analytical aspects of the research project. Also, it provides the researcher with the framework in terms of specifying the type of information the researcher intends to collect, the sources, and the procedure for collecting the information. According to Akhtar; 'research design can be considered as the structure of research it is the glue that holds all of the elements in a research project together, in short, it is a plan of the proposed research work' (Akhtar, 2016, p.68). Scholars in the field of social sciences have defined research design from different perspectives. Leedy defines research design 'as a plan for a study, providing the overall framework for collecting data' (Leedy, 1997, p.195). According to Burns et al; research design is 'a blueprint for conducting a study with maximum control over factors that may interfere with the validity of the finding' (Burns et al, 2003, p.195). For MacMillan et al; research design is 'a plan for selecting subjects, research sites, and data collection procedure to answer research question(s)' (MacMillan et al, 2001, p.166). The above definitions show the importance of research design in conducting research. It provides the researcher with a systematic method of collecting and analyzing data with the aim of answering a research question.

The research design for this thesis is a single case-study. Precisely, it is a single case-study of the war between US and Iraq. According to Stake; case study is 'an investigation and analysis of single or collective cases intended to capture the complexity of the object of study' (Stake, 1995). For Yin; case study is 'an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (Yin, 2009, p.14). These definitions show that case study entails an in-depth study of a complex phenomenon where it seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under study as case study allows the researcher to engage in a thorough analysis of complex phenomena. Gustafsson notes that single case-study is relevant in providing a description of a given phenomenon (Gustafsson, 2017). 'In case studies, investigators adopt the research design to understand a real-life phenomenon under important natural conditions that are relevant to the occurrence under

investigation' (Gaya et al, 2016, p.532). Case studies are useful in generating new ideas as well as explaining the development of new theory especially for the extension and generation of new theory (Thomas 2011, cited in Gaya et al, p.532).

This thesis employs a single case-study as the research design because it suits the aim of this study. In other words, I opt for a single case-study because it is the best research design for achieving the aims of my study (Qualitative and interpretive research methods assignment). This is so because the focus of the thesis is to answer the 'how' question. That is, how war becomes possible in international politics? The choice of research design for this study is informed by Yin's recommendation regarding when to employ a case study in research. According to Yin; a researcher should consider a case study if the focus of the research is centered on answering the 'how' and 'why' questions (Yin, 2003). Again, a single case-study is ideal for this thesis because the focus of the study is on understanding a particular case regarding inter-state war (the case of US-Iraqi war). As such, the topic has been narrowed down to a single researchable case given that inter-state war is a broad topic. In addition, the single case-study is ideal for the study as it seeks to provide an explanatory account of the case under study regarding how US's violent conduct was legitimized which eventually made the war to become possible.

This thesis relies on securitization as its theoretical framework and discourse analysis as a methodological tool. This thesis is being structured and guided by securitization theory. I opt for securitization theory because the securitization logic is a reflection of what happened in the US/international community in the build-up to the war. Also, the securitization logic provides an insight into the case under study regarding how the war became possible. In other words, it is relevant in answering the research question. Based on the securitization theory, we can see how the Bush administration presented Iraq as an existential threat through securitizing narratives and these representations were accepted by its audience which paved way for the legitimization of emergency measures (war). As such, securitization theory is useful because it enables us to see and understand the process as to how the war became possible.

The epistemology of the securitization theory is embedded in post-positivism which makes discourse analysis as the appropriate methodological tool for this research (Qualitative and interpretive research methods assignment). Discourse analysis entails the study and analysis of languages (Hodges et al, 2008, p.570). Schiffrin defines discourse analysis as 'the study of language use above and beyond the sentence' (Schiffrin, 1994, p.170). For Osoba et al; 'discourse analysis is the analysis of a unit of language above sentence used in a social context to perform social functions' (Osoba et al, 2014, p.202). From the definitions, discourse analysis is concerned with the study of language regarding how they are being used within the social context. Crystal notes that 'discourse analysis focuses on the structure of naturally occurring spoken language, as found in such discourses as conversation, interviews, commentaries, and speeches. Text analysis focuses on the structure of written language, as found in such 'texts' as essays, notices, road signs and chapters...' 'discourse' and 'text' can be used in a much broader sense to include all language units with a definable communicative function, whether spoken or written' (Crystal, 1987, p.189).

In this study, I use discourse analysis to examine/analyze the texts originating from President Bush and senior US government officials in order to ascertain how they framed Iraq as an existential threat. Also, the texts were analyzed in order to ascertain how Iraq was given a new meaning/identity based on the representations of the Bush administration. For instance, the Bush administration equated Iraq with 'terrorist', 'possessor of WMD', 'murderer', 'monster', 'danger', amongst others. In order to study the representations, the Bush administration's securitizing moves and its contents such as existential threat, urgency, and exceptional steps was analyzed. Also, efforts were made to identify threat constructions in these representations. To measure the Bush administration's domestic audience acceptance, the study relied on public polls conducted by Gallup and Pew Research Center. The public poll assesses the attitudes/opinions of the American population in the build-up to the war. The international audience acceptance was measured on the basis of the positions of members of the UNSC and other UN member states in 2002 prior to the war.

The source of the empirical data for the study was obtained from documentary and secondary sources. I relied on document analysis as a method of data collection. Bowen defines document analysis as 'a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to give voice and meaning around an assessment topic' (Bowen, 2009). Gross defines document analysis as 'a form of qualitative research that uses a systematic procedure to analyze documentary evidence and answer specific research questions' (Gross,

2018, p.2). For Wach; document analysis 'is a research method for rigorously and systematically analysing the contents of written documents (Wach, 2013). Smulowitz notes that documents can provide additional rich data when they are included in qualitative research. The research findings of a researcher can be supported through the analysis of documents where the researcher evaluates their meaning as wells as combining them with other types of data (Smulowitz, 2017). According to Gross; 'similar to other methods of analysis in qualitative research, document analysis requires repeated review, examination, and interpretation of the data in order to gain meaning and empirical knowledge of the construct being studied' (Gross, 2018, p.2).

The documentary sources include texts such as speeches/statements of President G.W Bush and senior US government officials. A total of 40 documents were analyzed. All the documents were analyzed to identify the discursive context upon which Iraq was presented as a threat. These documents were selected based on the public speeches/statements of President G.W Bush and senior US government officials on Iraq. The speeches/statements of senior US government officials include Dick Cheney (US vice-president), Colin Powell (US secretary of state), Ari Fleischer (President Bush spokesman), and Andrew Card (White House chief of staff). Only speeches and statements originating from President G.W Bush and the above mentioned senior US government officials were analyzed in the documents. The period of these documents is between 2001 and 2003 in order for the study to benefit from a more focused approach. Also, I chose 2001 because 2001 was the year US declared the 'global war on terror' after the unprecedented 9/11 terrorist attacks which impacted on the securitization of Iraq (US Department of State, January 20, 2001). I chose 2003 because 2003 was the year US and its allies went to war against Iraq after the Bush administration declared that 'diplomacy has failed' in addressing the Iraqi issue (CNN, March 19, 2003). The documents were sourced from the internet.

The secondary sources are articles, textbooks, journals, and reports from reliable/credible news media. The secondary sources were selected based on the relevant information they contain regarding the Iraqi war. I read through the articles, textbooks, journals, and reports from news media in order to ascertain whether they were relevant or not to the case under study. The articles, journals, and reports from news media were sourced from the internet. Textbooks were sourced from the University of Tartu library.

Chapter Four

The Bush Administration securitization of Iraq

This chapter constitutes the empirical part of the thesis. It answers the question regarding how the US-Iraq war became possible by analyzing the securitization process of Iraq in view of all aspects of securitization. In doing this, the speech act performed by President Bush and senior US government officials would be analyzed as to identify some of the arguments advanced by the Bush administration in order to securitize Iraq, the attitude of the audience and the exceptional/extraordinary measures adopted by the Bush administration would be examined. I will begin with the Bush administration's representation of Iraq as an existential threat, its domestic and international audience, and its use of exceptional measures.

4.0 The Bush administration representation of Iraq as an existential threat-(Securitizing move)

In this case study, the Bush administration is the securitizing actor. As earlier mentioned in the theoretical part, the role of the securitizing actor is to identify a security issue and presents it as an existential threat to a referent object with the aim of adopting/using exceptional measures to deal with the threat. The Bush administration performed speech act to US's domestic population and the international community (audience) to ensure the securitization of Iraq. The securitizing move of Bush's administration was aimed at presenting its argument to its audience. Some of the arguments presented in Bush administration's securitizing move are as follows:

Iraq's capability to harm the US and the world

The Bush administration presented Iraq as a source of threat to US, its allies, and the international community. The Bush administration maintained that Iraq could harm US and the world with its WMD. The securitizing moves of Bush's administration gave US domestic population and the international community the impression that Iraq was indeed dangerous and Iraq was capable of causing serious harm to US and the international community. The alleged potential of Iraq to harm US and the world became a focal point of attention of the Bush administration where it saw Iraq as a threat to international peace and security. To buttress this claim, Dick Cheney (US vice-president) in his speech delivered to the veterans of foreign wars national convention in Nashville, Tennessee asserts that 'the case of Saddam Hussein, a sworn enemy of our country... there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has

weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him into future confrontations with his neighbors -- confrontations that will involve both the weapons he has today, and the ones he will continue to develop with his oil wealth' (Cheney, 2002, The Guardian August 27). The above speech is a reflection of the securitizing move of the Bush administration to publicly present Iraq as a threat to the US/world as well as presenting Iraq as an enemy of the US/world which has the potential to harm the US/world if left unchecked. The Bush administration made a representation of Iraq and Saddam Hussein's regime as the greatest threat that was confronting US and the international community.

Iraq as a possessor of WMD and its production of WMD

The public presentation of Iraq as a threat through the speech act performed by the Bush administration was aimed at convincing US domestic population and the international community of the existential threat Iraq poses to US and the world at large. One of the key arguments put forward by the Bush administration to engage Iraq in an all-out war was the claim that Iraq was in possession of WMD. The bone of contention was that Iraq either had WMD or was engaged in the production of WMD. This explains why Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) in his presentation to the UNSC emphasized Iraq's possession of WMD and its engagement in other weapon development programs. Powell's presentation was to convince the UNSC not to take Iraq's possession of WMD with levity (Larson et al, 2005, p.131). According to Powell; 'the facts on Iraqis' behavior - Iraq's behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort - no effort - to disarm as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction' (White House Document, February 5, 2003).

President Bush reiterated in his speeches that Iraq possessed WMD and that Iraq was carrying out weapon development programs. Also, the threat construction in Bush's speeches/statements was to convince the American people/international community and make them believe that the threat Iraq/Saddam Hussein poses to US and the international community was very grave. For example, the Speech Bush delivered at the Cincinnati Center, Ohio, Bush outlined the threats Iraq poses where he asserted that 'tonight I want to take a few minutes to discuss a grave threat to peace and America's determination to lead the world in

confronting that threat. The threat comes from Iraq... It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons... We agree that the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons... (White House document, October 7, 2002). Bush argued further that 'Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people... We know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, Sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas... every chemical and biological weapon that Iraq has or makes is a direct violation of the truce that ended the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Yet Saddam Hussein has chosen to build and keep these weapons, despite international sanctions, UN demands... (White House document, October 7, 2002). What can be seen from these speeches is that the Bush administration presented Iraq as an immediate danger/threat to US and the world at large.

Iraqi regime and its nuclear ambitions

The Securitizing move of the Bush administration through its speech act stressed the nuclear ambition of Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration claimed that Iraq was ambitious to own nuclear weapons. For example, this was made known in Bush's speech in his discussion of Iraq's issue with leaders of the congress. Bush averred that 'the regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material, could build one within a year. Iraq has already used weapons of mass death against -- against other countries and against her own citizens. We know that the Iraqi regime is led by a dangerous and brutal man. We know he's actively seeking the destructive technologies to match his hatred. We know he must be stopped... To ignore these threats is to encourage them. And when they have fully materialized it may be too late to protect ourselves and our friends and allies' (White House Document, September 26, 2002).

Also, in a national radio broadcast, Bush articulated Iraq's nuclear development program where he argued that 'today Saddam Hussein has the scientists and infrastructure for a nuclear weapons program, and has illicitly sought to purchase the equipment needed to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon. Should his regime acquire fissile material, it would be able to build a nuclear weapon within a year' (White House document, September 14, 2002). From the above speeches, Bush's emphasis on Iraq's nuclear ambition was aimed at presenting Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein as a threat to international peace and security.

Iraqi regime and its hostility/hatred for US, friends of America, and the American people.

The Bush administration saw Iraq's hostility/hatred for the US, its friends, and the American people as a source of threat. This also served as the basis to securitize Iraq. The Bush administration claimed that the Iraqi regime hates what America stands for and hate the friends of America that shares/identify with the core values of US. President Bush affirmed Iraq's hostility in his State of the Union address where he asserted that 'Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror' (White House Document, January 29, 2002). Bush argued further in a statement after Colin Powell's (US Secretary of State) presentation to the UNSC. According to Bush; 'Saddam Hussein has made Iraq into a prison, a poison factory, and a torture chamber for patriots and dissidents. Saddam Hussein has the motive and the means and the recklessness and the hatred to threaten the American people. Saddam Hussein will be stopped' (White House Document, February 6, 2003). Similarly, Bush re-emphasized the hatred the Iraqi regime has for America in his war ultimatum speech where he mentioned that 'the regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends' (The Guardian, March 2003).

In a rally organized for troops at Fort Hood, Texas, Bush reiterated the hatred Iraq has for the US and the threat it poses to America and its friends. Bush stated that 'the Iraqi regime has a duty under Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy all of its weapons of mass destruction...That's what the United States expects from Saddam Hussein. Iraqi regime is a grave threat to the United States. The Iraqi regime is a threat to any American and to threats who are friends of America. Why do I say that? Well, first of all, the leader in Iraq has publicly proclaimed his hatred for our country and what we stand for' (White House Document, January 3, 2003). What can be deduced from these threat constructions is the presentation of Iraq as a threat to the American public as well as friends of America. The Bush administration deemed it necessary to end Saddam Hussein's regime because if Saddam remains at the helms of affairs, he would remain a dangerous enemy of America where Saddam Hussein in conjunction with terrorist organizations may carry out terrorist attacks against Americans and its friends.

Iraq's history regarding its use of WMD

The Iraqi regime has used WMD in the past and this was a key argument advanced in the Bush administration's securitizing move. For example, Bush raised this issue in his speech delivered at Cincinnati, Ohio where he argued that 'we know that the regime has produced thousands of tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, Sarin nerve gas, VX nerve gas. Saddam Hussein also has experience in using chemical weapons. He's ordered chemical attacks on Iran and on more than 40 villages in his own country. These actions killed or injured at least 20,000 people: more than six times the number of people who died in the attacks of September 11' (White House Document, October 7, 2002). Bush reiterated on this issue in a rally held for troops in Fort Hood, Texas. According to Bush; 'the Iraqi regime is a grave threat to the United States. The Iraqi regime has used weapons of mass destruction. They used weapons of mass destruction on people in other countries, they have used weapons of mass destruction on their own people. That's why I say Iraq is a threat...' (White House Document, January 3, 2003).

What can be deduced from these speeches is that the Bush administration presented Saddam Hussein, the leader of the Iraqi regime as a dangerous person and as a tyrannical ruler that was keen on using the weapons of mass destruction he had in his possession. Also, it presented Saddam Hussein as someone who took delight in killing people with WMD and will continue doing it based on the past history of Saddam Hussein's regime.

Iraqi regime and its engagement with al Qaeda

Another securitizing move performed by the Bush administration was the direct linkage of the Iraqi regime to al Qaeda terrorist organisation. The Bush administration perceived that Iraq had developed a cordial relationship with al Qaeda as they have established contacts in various occasions (Duck et al, 2016, p.8). Also, the administration claimed that Saddam Hussein's regime had strong ties with al Qaeda. According to CNN; 'U.S. intelligence officials have said al Qaeda had some links to Iraq dating back to the early 1990s' (CNN, June 15, 2004). For example, in a speech delivered by Vice President Cheney at the conservative Madison institute, Orlando, where he described Saddam Hussein as 'a patron of terrorism' (Kranish et al, 2004). Cheney argued further that 'he had long established ties with Al Qaeda' (Kranish et al, 2004). Cheney reaffirmed his position where he asserted that 'there's overwhelming evidence there was a connection between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi government. I am very confident that there was an established relationship there' (Kranish et

al, 2004). The Bush administration linked Iraq to al Qaeda as al Qaeda masterminded the 9/11 terrorist attack. President Bush saw Saddam Hussein's regime as a danger to US. According to Bush; 'he is a danger not only to countries in the region but, as I explained last night, because of his al Qaeda connections, because of his history, he is a danger to Americans'(CNN, January 30, 2003).

Bush's remark at the presidential hall also portrayed the Iraqi's regime as having connections with al-Qaeda where he argued that '...it's like people say, oh, we must leave Saddam alone; otherwise, if we did something against him, he might attack us. Well, if we don't do something, he might attack us, and he might attack us with a more serious weapon. The man is a threat... He's a threat not only with what he has, he's a threat with what he's done. He's a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda (White House document, November 7, 2002). President Bush in a televised speech from the White House mentioned Iraq's connection with al Qaeda. According to Bush; 'we also know that Iraq is harboring a terrorist network, headed by a senior Al Qaeda terrorist planner. The network runs a poison and explosive training center in northeast Iraq and many of its leaders are known to be in Baghdad' (CNN, February 6, 2003).

Bush's position regarding Iraq's connection with al Qaeda is also notable in his speech delivered at Cincinnati where he stated that 'we know that Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy -- the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq. These include one very senior al Qaeda leader who received medical treatment in Baghdad this year ...We have learned that Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making, poisons, and deadly gases. And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America' (White House document, October 7, 2002).

What can be seen in these speeches is that the Bush administration took advantage of the trauma that was still hunting the American people after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US domestic population felt that they were vulnerable to terrorist attacks and as such, the Bush administration performed these speech acts and it was used as a medium to increase the level of threat perception among the US domestic population where Iraq was seen an existential threat to both the US domestic population and the world at large.

Iraqi regime and its threat to regional stability and global peace

The Bush administration considered Saddam Hussein's regime as a threat to stability in the Middle-East and global peace. This constitutes one of the major securitizing moves in Iraq's securitization process as an existential threat. In highlighting the threat the Iraqi regime posed to regional stability and global peace, Bush made this known in his speech at the Atlantic summit, Azores Island that 'Iraq's talented people, rich culture, and tremendous potential have been hijacked by Saddam Hussein. His brutal regime has reduced a country with a long and proud history to an international pariah that oppresses its citizens, started two wars of aggression against its neighbors, and still poses a grave threat to the security of its region and the world' (New York Times, March 16, 2003).

Similarly, in Bush's state of the union address in Washington DC, he emphasized on Iraq's threat to world peace where he argued that 'the Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger' (White House Document, January 29, 2002). Again, the threat of Iraqi regime to world peace reflects in Bush's speech at the national governors association; 'the Iraqi regime is not disarming as required by last fall's unanimous vote of the Security Council. Saddam Hussein's refusal to comply with the demands of the civilized world is a threat to peace, and it's a threat to stability. It's a threat to the security of our country. It's a threat to the security of peace leaving -- peace-loving people everywhere' (White House Document, February 24, 2003). Also, Bush used the threat the Iraqi regime poses to regional peace as a strong case against Iraq in his address to the United Nations a year after 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush maintained that 'If we fail to act in the face of danger... The regime will have new power to bully and dominate and conquer its neighbors, condemning the Middle East to more years of bloodshed and fear. The regime will remain unstable -- the region will remain unstable...' (CNN, September 12, 2002).

What can be seen from the above speeches is that the Bush administration presented Iraq as a threat to regional and global peace where it believed that the world would be at peace and stability will return to the Middle-East by ending Saddam Hussein's regime. President Bush has consistently reiterated in his speeches that by putting an end to the increased threats of Saddam Hussein's regime, it would enable a 'free and peaceful' Iraq and at the same time ensure stability in the whole of the Middle-East. For example, Bush in his speech at the

American Enterprise Institute reiterated that ousting Saddam Hussein from power will have a positive impact in resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

Iraqi regime under the leadership of Saddam Hussein and its involvement in terrorism/terrorist networks

The Bush administration presented the Iraqi regime as having a link with terrorism because the Iraqi regime was known to have established contacts with terrorists as well as harboring terrorists. As such, the Bush administration established a strong connection between the Iraqi regime and terrorism where it capitalized on the public emotions due to the aftermaths of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration saw this as an avenue to convince its domestic and international audience that the Iraqi regime was a threat owing to its alleged involvement in terrorism as well as harbouring terrorists. For example, on the evening of 9/11 attack, President Bush in a nationwide broadcast stated that ‘the search are underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them’ (White House Document, September 11, 2001).

In the Bush administration’s effort to show that the Iraqi regime had links with terrorist networks, Bush in his speech delivered at the Rose Garden asserted that ‘on its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. We know the treacherous history of the regime. It has waged war against its neighbors; it has sponsored and sheltered terrorist; it has developed weapons of mass death; it has used them against innocent men, women, and children’ (White House document, October 2, 2002). To further buttress his arguments regarding the involvement of Saddam Hussein’s regime with terrorism/terrorist networks, Bush declared in his speech at South Dakota welcome that ‘there is a threat in Iraq... this is a man who cannot stand what we stand for. He hates the fact, like al Qaeda does, that we love freedom... This is a guy who had connections with these shadowy terrorist networks. As I have said in Cincinnati, Ohio, a while back, he’s the kind of fellow who would love nothing more than to hurt America and not leave any fingerprints by using a surrogate army on his behalf... He’s a true threat to America and our friends and allies’ (White House Document, October 31, 2002).

Also, Bush made reference to the link in his speech regarding his vision for Iraq where he argued that ‘the passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training and offers rewards to families of suicide

bombers'(CNN, February 27, 2003). The threat construction in the above speeches aimed at presenting the Iraqi regime as a regime that engages in terror-related activities. The Bush administration claimed that the Iraqi regime under the leadership of Saddam Hussein was in the league of al Qaeda. It argued that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who happens to be a fugitive Islamic militant ties Saddam Hussein to the terrorist network (CNN, June 15, 2004). Bush maintained that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was an evidence of the Iraqi regime's connection to terrorism/terrorist networks (CNN, June 15, 2004).

Iraqi regime and its possibility to supply terrorists with WMD

To further convince its audience on the need to securitized Iraq, the Bush administration made reference to the possibility of Iraq to provide terrorists with WMD. President Bush emphasized the possibility in his various speeches. For instance, Bush stated in his speech delivered at Cincinnati, Ohio that 'Iraq could decide on any given day to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists. Alliance with terrorists could allow the Iraqi regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints.' (The Guardian, October 7, 2002). Also, Bush mentioned this possibility in his remarks following the approval of the UNSC resolution; 'we are actively pursuing dangerous terror networks across the world. And we oppose a uniquely dangerous regime -- a regime that has harbored terrorists and can supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction; a regime that has built such terrible weapons and has used them to kill thousands...' (US Diplomatic Mission to Germany Document, November 2, 2002).

By linking WMD to terrorism, the Bush administration perceived the tendencies of the Iraqi regime to supply terrorists with WMD. This possibility was made known in Bush's national radio broadcast where he argued that 'one of the greatest dangers we face is that weapons of mass destruction might be passed to terrorists who would not hesitate to use those weapons. Saddam Hussein has longstanding, direct and continuing ties to terrorist networks... Iraq has also provided al Qaeda with chemical and biological weapons training' (White House Document, February 8, 2003). Again, it featured in Bush's speech where he was discussing the future of Iraq at Washington DC Hilton hotel; 'in Iraq, a dictator is building and hiding weapons...This same tyrant has close ties to terrorist organizations, and could supply them with the terrible means to strike this country—and America will not permit it. The danger posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons cannot be ignored or wished away' (White House Document, February 26, 2003).

What can be seen in these speeches is that the Bush administration used WMD and terrorism as a means of presenting a strong case against Iraq. By making recourse to WMD and terrorism, the threat construction presents the Iraqi regime as a danger that must be confronted and it boils down to Iraq's possibility to provide terrorists with WMD as the regime had strong ties with terrorist organizations.

Iraq's defiance of UNSC resolutions and its deception

Iraq's failure to comply with the UNSC resolutions to destroy its WMD coupled with Saddam Hussein's regime strategy to deceive UN weapon inspectors in Iraq constituted the Bush administration's securitizing move. For example, Colin Powell (US Secretary of State) argued in his presentation to the UNSC that 'we know that Saddam's son, Qusay, ordered the removal of all prohibited weapons from Saddam's numerous palace complexes. We know that Iraqi government officials, members of the ruling Baath Party and scientists have hidden prohibited items in their homes...as the examples I have just presented show, the information and intelligence we have gathered point to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors in direct violation of Resolution 1441' (White House Document, February 5, 2003). Similarly, Bush in his remarks at Charlotte, North Carolina welcome identified the Iraqi regime as being full of lies and deception. Bush argued that 'we must have a cold, hard look at every threat facing America. And the man over there in Iraq is a threat. He has told the world he won't have weapons of mass destruction; for 11 years he's lied. Time and time and time again, he has lied. Time and time and time again, the United Nations has passed resolutions telling him, disarm. He's totally ignored the resolutions' (US Homeland and Security, October 22, 2002).

President Bush reiterated Iraq's deception in his remarks after the UNSC resolution. According to Bush; 'as today's resolution states, Iraq is already in material breach of past U.N. demands. Iraq has aggressively pursued weapons of mass destruction, even while inspectors were inside the country. Iraq has undermined the effectiveness of weapons inspectors with ploys, delays, and threats -- making their work impossible and leading to four years of no inspections at all' (US Diplomatic Mission to Germany Document, November 8, 2002). The above statements mean that the UNSC resolutions were not effective in disarming Iraq which calls for the adoption of a new approach such as the use of exceptional measures. Also, it shows that the Bush administration presented the Iraqi regime under the leadership of

Saddam Hussein as deceptive. In other words, it presented the personality of Iraq's leader (Saddam Hussein) as someone who is dishonest.

This sub-section shows that the Bush administration performed securitizing moves in which they presented Iraq as a threat. In order to assess whether these securitizing moves were successful, the next sections turn to an assessment of audience acceptance and exceptional/extraordinary measures.

4.1 The Bush administration and its domestic/international audience

To measure the success of securitization, the audience acceptance of the securitizing move has to be assessed because securitization is all about convincing the audience. This means that the securitizing actor has to convince the audiences in order to gain their support. In the case of US-Iraq war, the American public and the international community were the audiences. In order to convince the American public and the international community, the Bush administration performed various speech acts to prove that Iraq was indeed a threat to US, Americans, and the world at large. The Speech acts were performed through public speeches and they were means adopted by the Bush administration to convince its audiences of their securitizing move. Again, the securitizing move was geared towards convincing the American public and the international community that Iraq had in its possession WMD as well as engaging in terror-related activities. As such, it increased the level of threat perception among the American public and members of the international community. Also, this impacted the opinion of the American public and the international community regarding the circumstance surrounding the US invasion of Iraq. According to Maguire; through rhetorical means, Presidential Bush presented the Iraqi dictator (Saddam Hussein) as a threat and the war enjoyed wider support in the US (Maguire, 2011, p.1). Gershkoff et al corroborates this view as they assert that the Iraqi war had a higher level of public support due to the success of the Bush administration in framing the war as an extension of the war on terror (Gershkoff et al, 2005

It is pertinent to mention that a greater part of the American population was in support of the war despite the consequences of war such as economic cost, massive casualties and the probability of the war to increase terror-related activities in US (Gershkoff et al, 2005, P.525). Gershkoff et al note that despite the anti-war protest in New York, Los Angeles, Berlin, the Middle-East, London, and Paris, the war had a higher level of support among the American people regardless whether or not WMD was discovered in Iraq, whether or not a

large number of US soldiers died, and ‘whether or not the war continued for more than a year’ (Gershkoff et al, 2005, p.525). According to Greshkoff et al; three-quarters of the American public was in support of the war because the Bush administration was capable of successfully convincing the Americans regarding the link that existed between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda terrorist group. In general terms, the Iraqi regime had connections with terrorism. The Bush administration’s success in framing the war on Iraq based on this link portrayed Iraq as being involved in the 9/11 terrorist attack which led to a higher level of support for the war (Gershkoff et al, 2005, p.525).

4.1.0 Domestic Audience

American public convinced of Saddam’s Regime involvement in 9/11 attacks

By consistently linking Saddam Hussein's regime to terrorism, the Bush administration convinced the American public that Iraq was involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The view that Saddam Hussein's regime was among those who orchestrated the 9/11 attacks was widespread after the attacks. Polls consistently showed that from one-third to half of the American public believed that Saddam Hussein's regime was directly involved. In other words, the American public believed there was a direct link between Saddam Hussein's regime and the 9/11 attacks (New York Times, March 2, 2003). Gallup polls conducted between August 19 and August 21, 2002, shows that 53% of Americans thought that Saddam Hussein was directly involved in the 9/11 attacks, 34% thought that Saddam Hussein was not directly involved, and 13% no opinion (Gallup polls, September 23, 2003). Gallup polls conducted in early March 2003 shows that almost half of the American public continued to believe in the involvement of Saddam Hussein in the 9/11 attacks. According to Gallup polls; 51% of Americans believed Saddam was involved and 41% believed was not involved. The result of these polls showed that the Bush administration’s securitizing move succeeded in convincing the American public of Saddam Hussein’s regime involvement in the 9/11 attacks as they held on to their views regardless of Iraq’s denial of being involved in the attack.

American public convinced of Saddam Hussein being a terrorist/involvement in terrorism

The polling conducted in mid-March (14-15 March 2003) by CNN/US today/Gallup poll shows that the Bush administration's securitizing moves had convinced the American public that Saddam Hussein was a terrorist and his regime was involved in terror-related activities

because of the significant increase of Americans that held this view. For instance, 88% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein's regime was rendering support to terrorist organizations that plan to carry out terrorist attacks against US, while 9% did not believe (Gallup, March 25, 2003). The March 14-15, 2003 polls also examined the relationship regarding the belief Americans hold in Saddam Hussein's regime involvement in terrorism and the will of the Americans to support the war. In this case, 32% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein's regime was involved in terror-related activities and Saddam's regime suspected involvement in terrorism happened to be the main reason for supporting the war. 43% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein's regime engaged with terrorists and this was one of the reasons they supported the war and they were of the view that they would have supported the war if it was the case that Saddam's regime was not involved with terrorists. Only 13% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein's regime had connections with terrorists and it was not a reason for them to support the war (Gallup, March 25, 2003). This polling result indicates that the American public was well convinced of Iraq's suspected involvement in terrorism and Saddam Hussein was a terrorist as the Bush administration convinced the American public that Saddam Hussein's regime supported terrorism. Also, for the vast majority of the American public to support the war based on Saddam Hussein's regime involvement in terrorism shows that they were satisfactorily convinced by the Bush administration.

American public convinced of the need to oust Saddam Hussein from power

Gallup polls conducted in November 2001 show that 74% of Americans favoured the idea of US sending ground troops to Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein from power, while 20% opposed the idea (Gallup, August 23, 2002). In a similar development, polls conducted between November 2001 and September 2002 show that the Bush administration's securitizing move convinced the American public of the importance to end Saddam Hussein's regime by using force to oust him from power. For instance, the NBC/Wall Street Journal polls conducted on November 9-11, 2001 showed that 52% of Americans thought that it was extremely important for the US to invade Iraq in order to oust Saddam Hussein from power, while 7% thought it was not important and 1% had no opinion (NBC News/Wall Street Journal, cited in Larson et al, 2005, p.144). According to ABC News polls of August 29, 2002, 56% of Americans thought that it was very important to forcefully oust Saddam Hussein from power and 3% had no opinion. While its September 12-14, 2002 polls show that 68% of Americans thought it was very important to oust Saddam Hussein from power with the use of force and

1% had no opinion (ABC News polls, cited in Larson et al, 2005, p.144). The results of these polls show the increase in domestic support for the US to go to war against Iraq in order to oust Saddam Hussein from power which reflects the Bush administration's success in convincing the American people of its objective. The American public was convinced that ousting Saddam Hussein from power will bring an end to the Iraqi regime's support for terrorism and this was one of the Bush administration's securitizing moves.

American public convinced of Iraq as a possessor of weapons of mass destruction

Out of 10 Americans, more than 9 believed that Iraq had already developed WMDs or was making efforts to develop WMDs. Among these 10 Americans, over 8 believed that Iraq would use WMDs against the US if it had such weapons (Gallup, August 23, 2002). In Gallup polls conducted on February 8-10, 2002, 55% of the American public was of the view that Iraq currently has WMDs, 40% held the view that Iraq was trying to develop WMDs, 2% held the view that Iraq was not trying to develop WMDs, while 3% had no opinion (Gallup, August 23, 2002). A greater percentage of the American public was convinced that Iraq had WMDs and would use it to attack the US. For instance, in a public poll conducted on August 19-21, 2002, 83% of Americans believe that Iraq would use WMDs to attack the US, 15% believed that Iraq will not use it, while 2% had no opinion (Gallup August 23, 2002).

Public polls indicate that a vast majority of the American public believed that it was likely that Iraq was a possessor of WMDs and it had the facility to produce WMDs prior to the war. Also, the polls show that the Americans believed that Iraq was making efforts to develop nuclear weapons before the invasion. According to Gallup polls of February 2003; prior to the war, 93% of Americans believed that it was likely or certain that Iraq had the facilities to produce WMDs, 94% believed that it was likely or certain Iraq possessed biological or chemical weapons, while 90% believe that it was likely or certain that Iraq was making efforts to develop nuclear weapons (Gallup, June 16, 2003). In a separate poll conducted by Gallup to ascertain the level of certainty among the American public also shows that prior to the war; 55% of Americans were certain that Iraq had the facilities to produce WMDs, 56% were certain Iraq possessed biological or chemical weapons, and 47% were certain that Iraq was making efforts to develop nuclear weapons. The poll further revealed that over 4 out of 10 Americans expressed certainty that Iraq possessed WMDs and had the facilities to produce nuclear weapons (Gallup, June 16, 2003).

The above polls show a significant increase of Americans that considered Iraq as a possessor of WMDs where the 2002 and 2003 polls are juxtaposed. This suggests that a vast majority of the American public were convinced and as such, they continued to attach importance to the Bush administration's claim regarding Iraq's WMDs which was a key argument in its securitizing move.

American public express strong support for military action against Iraq

The domestic audience acceptance of the Bush administration's securitizing move can be assessed through polls that were conducted in the build-up to the war. For instance, the American public reacted positively to President Bush UN speech where he declared that US would take unilateral military actions against Iraq should Iraq fail to comply with the UNSC resolutions to disarm. Overall, 59% of Americans evaluated the speech positively as they were convinced of the need for US to take unilateral military actions against Iraq. The Pew research center poll of September 19, 2002, indicates that the vast majority of the American public (domestic audience) accepted President UN speech regarding the use of force against Iraq where 79% (8 out of 10 Americans) favoured military action against Iraq without the support of US allies, 63% of Americans favoured military action with the support of military allies, while 37% of Americans opposed military actions (Pew Research Center, September 19, 2002).

Polls also shows that the Bush administration made progress in convincing the American public to take military actions against Iraq as more Americans thought about the war and many Americans believed that the Bush administration had established the grounds for the use of force against Iraq. According to Pew research center; a vast majority of Americans that have thought about the use of military force increased to 55% as it stood at 46% in August 2002. The Iraqi issue generated more interest 'among college-educated respondents' as 58% of them thought about the use of military action. In August 2002, only 42% of college-educated respondents considered the use of force. The interest among Americans with high school education or less regarding the use of military action increased from 50% to 53% (Pew Research Center, September 19, 2002). Apart from the American public interest regarding the use of force against Iraq, they were also willing to accept a significant number of casualties of US troops. Polling results show an increment of Americans from 42% to 48% that supported military action against Iraq despite the possibility of having thousands of US troops as casualties (Pew Research Center, September 19, 2002).

The results of these polls clearly show that the Bush administration convinced the American people as the public support for US to take military actions against Iraq continued to increase. It also shows that the Bush administration's securitizing move was successful as the interest in Iraq among the American public increased. Furthermore, the American public believed that the Bush administration satisfactorily made a case for the use of force against Iraq as majority of the Americans held on to the views regarding US's military action in Iraq regardless of the consequences of war such as the casualties of American troops.

Majority of the American public express approval of the war against Iraq

The Bush administration war campaign against Iraq enjoyed widespread public support regarding its decision to engage in an all-out war against Iraq. According to Gallup poll conducted on March 20, 2003; three-quarters of all Americans express approval of US's decision to go to war against Iraq. 60% of Americans strongly approved the decision, 16% did not strongly approve the decision, 15% strongly disapprove the decision, 5% did not strongly disapprove decision, and 4% of Americans had no opinion (Gallup, March 21, 2003). President Bush ultimatum speech to Saddam Hussein where Bush declared military actions against Iraq should Saddam Hussein fail to leave Iraq led to a surge in the approval of US's decision to 76% (Gallup, March 24, 2003). Also, vast majority of the American public expressed strong approval regarding the timing of the war. 70% of Americans thought that the US should have commenced action as of when it did and 27% thought that the US should have waited longer to see the outcome of the UN weapons inspection team (Gallup, March 21, 2003). The result of these polls shows that the American public expressed approval for the war because they were satisfactorily convinced of the objectives of the Iraqi war policy. This suggests that majority of the Americans believed that the Bush administration's decision to go war against Iraq was the right thing to do.

Overall, the assessment of the polls indicates that the Bush administration's securitizing move succeeded in convincing the American public of the Iraqi threat and it also influenced the public opinion (US domestic population) regarding the threat Iraq posed to US. The securitizing move impacted the attitudes of the American public regarding their desirability for war as well as increasing their level of threat perception. This explains why the Bush administration enjoyed widespread public support of the war. Also, the result of the polls shows that the Bush administration's securitization of Iraq was indeed successful.

4.1.1 International Audience

In the case of the US-Iraqi war, the international audience constitutes members of the UNSC and other UN member states. Prior to the invasion, members of the UNSC have been involved in a series of debates and have taken diplomatic measures to address the issue. As part of the Bush's National Security Strategy, his administration considered the pre-emptive use of force and declared that US would not hesitate to unilaterally take military actions against any enemy which poses as a threat to America's national security (Chitalkar et al, 2013, p.5). Prior to the war, the US was pressurized by some of its traditional allies to seek the authorization of the UN to go to war against Iraq. However President Bush issued an ultimatum to the UN urging it to support US's demand regarding the forceful disarmament of Iraq as well as carrying out a change of regime otherwise the UN would be neglected and considered as irrelevant (Chitalkar et al, 2013, p.5).

The UNSC passed sixteen resolutions on Iraq before 2002. On 8 November 2002, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1441. All fifteen members of the UNSC voted in support of the resolution (UNSC Document, November 2, 2002). As at the time resolution 1441 was passed, UNSC constituted US, China, Russia, France, United Kingdom (UK) (permanent members) and Spain, Guinea, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Syria, Chile, Pakistan, Germany, Angola, Mexico (non-permanent members). The adopted UN resolution was in response to the issue raised by President Bush in his speech to the UN General Assembly. The resolution required 'Iraq to disarm itself of its weapons of mass destruction and to disclose of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs' (The Guardian, 20 December 2002). The resolution had it that Iraq was found wanting regarding the material breach of its obligation to disarm. It gave Iraq the last opportunity to comply and failure to comply would result in serious consequences. Also, the resolution required United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) to carry out its activities in Iraq without any form of hindrance and to provide thorough information regarding Iraq's WMD programs (Chitalkar et al, 2013, p.5).

Upon the adoption of resolution 1441, the UN weapons inspectors headed by Hans Blix were deployed to Iraq. Blix informed the UNSC that Iraq has failed to accept the requirement of the resolution regarding Iraq's disarmament (The Guardian, February 14, 2003). This led to a divide among members of the UNSC as they debated on the Iraq issue. France, China, and Syria argued that more time should be given to the UN weapon inspectors to carry out further

inspection in Iraq. While the US, UK, and Spain argued for the use of force to end Iraq's deception (The Guardian, February 14, 2003). Colin Powell (US secretary of State) on February 5, 2003, made a presentation/speech to the UN in order to make a case against Iraq for war and to prove how urgent it was to disarm Iraq with the use of force. Powell argued that Iraq was deceiving the UN weapon inspectors (CNN, February 5, 2003). However, Powell's speech/presentation did not change the position of the UNSC members. For instance, France declared that it would veto any attempt made to engage Iraq in an all-out war. This position was supported by China, Russia, and Germany. France advocated for a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi issue. Dominique de Villepin (foreign minister of France) asserted that 'the use of force is not justified at this time. There is an alternative to war: disarming Iraq through inspections' (The Guardian, February 14, 2003). According to Tang Jiaxuan (China's foreign minister); 'China believes the inspection process is working and the inspectors should be giving the time they need. We are obliged to use all possible means to avert war' (The Guardian, February 14, 2003).

The position of members of the UNSC

Following US's claim regarding the failure of Iraq to comply with the demands of resolution 1441, US resorted to the use of diplomatic means to garner support from the UNSC members regarding a second resolution that would authorize military actions in Iraq. US, Spain, and UK proposed a draft resolution which stated that Iraq has failed to destroy its WMD as demanded in resolution 1441 and as such, misused its last opportunity to disarm. US and UK claimed that it was necessary to use force to disarm Iraq since Iraq failed to disarm as ordered by the UN. Russia, Germany and France jointly declared that they will disallow the passage of a UN resolution that would authorize war against Iraq (Guardian, 5 March, 2003). To this effect, Dominique de Villepin (Foreign minister of France) in a press conference maintained that 'we will not allow a resolution to pass that authorises resorting to force' (The Guardian, 5 March, 2003).

UK: UK was ready to go to war preferably upon the passage of a second UNSC resolution in the occasion where Iraq failed to cooperate with UN weapon inspectors. The UK was prepared to endorse/support a second resolution that would authorize military action in Iraq and was willing to canvass for support should the likes of France threaten to veto the resolution (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Bulgaria: Bulgaria was keen on supporting a second resolution as Bulgaria had been in support of US's policy towards Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Spain: Spain was in support of a second resolution and it considered the use of force in Iraq in the occasion where Saddam Hussein refuses to step down from power or provide sufficient proof regarding the destruction of Iraq's WMD. Spain declared that it would vote in support of a second resolution along-side with US and should any other country veto the resolution, it would provide support regarding a US-led attack on Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Chile: Chile advocated that more time should be given to the UN weapon inspectors in Iraq to carry out their activities. However, Chile was likely to support a second resolution (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Angola: Angola maintained that the UN weapon inspectors needed more time for the inspection of weapons in Iraq. However, Angola declared that it would support a second resolution and the idea of going to war (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Cameroon: Cameroon pitched its tent with members of the UNSC that were in support of more time regarding the inspection of weapons in Iraq. Although, Cameroon was prepared to support a second resolution as well as going to war (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Guinea: Guinea insisted on more time for the inspection of weapons. But Guinea said it would support a second resolution and an all-out war against Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Mexico: The government of Mexico also spoke in favour of giving more time to the UN weapon inspectors in Iraq and Mexico was likely to support a second resolution (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Pakistan: The Pakistani government expressed its strong support for the continuation of weapons inspection in Iraq and it advocated for a diplomatic resolution to the Iraqi issue. Pakistan was not in support of the invasion and was willing to either vote against war or abstain from voting as the Pakistani government had ruled out its involvement in a war against Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

France: France insisted that the UN weapon inspectors must be given enough time to conclude their job and it considered going to war as the worst solution to the issue. However, the French government was willing to support/participate in military actions in Iraq on the

condition that it must follow the UN procedure. That is, the use of force against Iraq must be authorized by the UN (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

China: China declared its support for the UN weapon inspectors to be given more to perform their tasks. China did not encourage US's proposed unilateral military actions against Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Russia: Russia out-rightly opposed military actions against Iraq and US's stance to unilaterally carry out military actions in Iraq. Vladimir Putin (Russia's president) asserted that a diplomatic solution to the Iraqi issue would be truncated in the occasion where Iraq hampered the inspection of weapons (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Germany: The German government declared it would not vote for war as Germany had ruled out its involvement in any military participation to carry out attacks against Iraq (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

Syria: Syria was one of the strong opponents of going to war and the Syrian government was not willing to endorse war (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

The positions of the UNSC members means that the Bush administration performed a securitizing move in which it presented Iraq as a threat to the international community. To a greater extent, the securitizing move was successful as majority of the UNSC members were in support of a second resolution that would authorize military action in Iraq. Only a few members of the UNSC especially the influential and powerful states did not support the idea of going to war. Beyond the UNSC, the Bush administration's securitizing move was accepted by other members of the international community as the moves convinced them of the Iraqi threat and as such, many members of the international community (states) were in support of US's proposed military actions in Iraq. The support US garnered from other countries explained why the Bush administration successfully formed the 'coalition of the willing' to go to war against Iraq (The Guardian, 19 March 2003). This shows that the Bush administration's securitization of Iraq was indeed successful given that one of the ways of measuring the success of securitization is when the securitizing actor succeeds in convincing the audience. The next sub-section will also measure the success of the Bush administration's securitizing move through the assessment of its use of exceptional/extraordinary measures.

4.2 The Bush Administration and its use of exceptional/extraordinary measures

The US government in March 2003 declared that ‘diplomacy has failed and it would proceed with a coalition of the willing to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction’ (Kochler, 2008, p.100). President Bush in his notification to the US congress maintained that all diplomatic efforts to ensure that Iraq was disarmed had failed and his administration was prepared to take military actions against Iraq. Bush explained further that ‘reliance by the United States on further diplomatic and other peaceful means alone will neither adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq, nor likely lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq’ (VOA October 26, 2009). To this effect, President Bush announced at the end of a cabinet meeting that ‘over 40 nations now support our efforts. We are grateful for their determination, we appreciate their vision and we welcome their support’ (BBC, 21 March 2003). Ari Fleischer (President Bush spokesman) announced that the ‘coalition of the willing was made up of countries of every race and faith, on every continent, with a population of 1.2bn and a GDP of \$21 trillion’ (BBC, 21 March 2003).

The US Department of State released the list of 30 countries that offered support to US. They include; United Kingdom, Spain, the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, Albania, Italy, Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Estonia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Nicaragua, Latvia, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, El Salvador, Slovakia, Uzbekistan, South-Korea, Ethiopia, Colombia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Poland, Iceland (The Guardian, 19 March 2003). Also, the White House later released the list of additional countries that constituted the coalition. They were mostly small states that had close ties with the US. Namely; Portugal, Costa Rica, Mongolia, Kuwait, Solomon Islands, Palau, Uganda, Micronesia, Honduras, Rwanda, Dominican Republic, Marshall Islands, Singapore (BBC, 21 March 2003). The Coalition offered political support, moral support, and material assistance to the US. For instance, the UK provided 45,000 troops, Australia provided 2,000 troops, Albania provided 70 non-combatants soldiers, Poland offered 200 troops and Romania provided 278 non-combatant troops that specialized in chemical and biological decontamination (The Guardian, 19, March 2003).

As earlier mentioned, the US, UK, and Spain proposed a draft resolution (second resolution) which authorizes war against Iraq in the occasion where Iraq fails to comply with the deadline that was specified in resolution 1441. The draft resolution caused a divide in the UN

and it came under heavy criticism from countries such as France, Germany, and Russia (Muller, 2006, p.25). Amid the strong criticisms, US, UK, and Spain dropped the second resolution bid as it was certain that the resolution would not be passed because of lack of enough support at the UNSC (Muller, 2006, p.25). To this effect, the Bush administration announced that US would not wait for the approval of the UNSC in order to carry out military actions against Iraq (The Guardian, November 11, 2002). This was a clear indication that US was prepared to attack Iraq without being endorsed by the UN. According to Andrew Card (White House Chief of Staff); 'The UN can meet and discuss, but we don't need their permission' (The Guardian, November 11, 2002). The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell made a similar statement to buttress US's position regarding its proposed unauthorized attack against Iraq. Powell reiterated that 'we will ask the UN to give authorisation for all necessary means, and if the UN is not willing to do that, the United States with like-minded nations will go and disarm him forcefully' (The Guardian, November 11, 2002). 'Him' in Powell's statement implied Saddam Hussein.

Upon US declaration that diplomacy has failed in resolving the Iraqi issue, war was the next line of action as US and its allies officially went to war against Iraq on 19 March 2003. President Bush announced in a televised broadcast that 'American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger' (CNN, March 20, 2003). US and its coalition forces bombed and fired missiles at specific targets in Iraq's capital city (Baghdad). A 'decapitation attack' against Saddam Hussein and senior Iraqi government officials was also carried out (CNN, March 20, 2003).

At this juncture, the success of the securitization of Iraq will be ascertained with regard to the Bush administration's use of exceptional measures. Buzan et al made a clear-cut distinction between normal politics and exceptional politics within the context of securitization. According to Buzan et al; 'although in one sense securitization is a further intensification of politicization (thus usually making an even stronger role for the state), in another sense it is opposed to politicization... Securitization on the international level means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues' (Buzan et al, 1998, p.29). Putting the above quote into context, when successful securitization occurs, it places security in the exceptional realm. Also, in the occasion where an issue is successfully securitized, the actions taken are considered as legitimate within the context of 'language of

urgency and existential threats' (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2). In other words, the successful securitization of an issue legitimizes the use of exceptional measures. The exceptional logic brings about the suspension of normal politics where the adopted measures to deal with threat becomes permissible and necessary (Eroukhmanoff, 2018, p.2).

Bringing normal politics and exceptional politics into the case of the US-Iraq war, we can ascertain if the securitization of Iraq was successful. Within the perspective of normal politics, US would have resorted to the use of diplomacy in dealing/resolving the Iraqi issue. Better still; US would have gone through the right/normal procedure of obtaining a second resolution from the UNSC which authorizes military actions (war) against Iraq. This was not the case as US and its coalition went to war against Iraq without the approval of the UNSC. This action on the part of US was warranted by the public support the Bush administration's securitizing move enjoyed both domestically and internationally which led to the endorsement of emergency measures. For instance, the US Congress passed a resolution on October 16, 2002 which authorized the use of military force against Iraq. According to the Iraq resolution 'the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to— (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq' (US Congress Document, October 16, 2002) Again, some members of the international community (states) gave US the go ahead to go to war as they joined the coalition and provided US with various forms of assistance (The Guardian, February 1, 2003).

The US military action against Iraq is prohibited by international norms. However, from the perspective of exceptional politics and based on the Bush administration's securitizing move/ its audience acceptance, US was free to lift itself above the rules. This means that US military actions (exceptional measures) against Iraq became legitimized and as such, US could break the rules. Also, this suggests that the declaration of Iraq as an existential threat by the Bush administration was successful and this created the condition upon which the US could break free of the rules relating to normal politics and to break free of the rules shows that the securitization of Iraq was successful.

What can be seen from the discussion of exceptional measures is that the war was permitted by a broader public (American population and some members of the international community). It shows how the US representation of Iraq transformed Iraq where Iraq was

given a new meaning which influenced/legitimized the means (exceptional measures – war) to deal with Iraq’s threat. The endorsement of exceptional measures by US's domestic and international audience was crucial to going war against Iraq. The shift from normal politics to exceptional politics presents what 'going to war' is within the securitization framework. That is breaking the rules/going beyond the rules. Under normal politics, these rules are not to be violated. In others words, they are meant to be obeyed. The legitimization of US's military action against Iraq indicates how violent conduct occurs where the 'normalcy' (rules of the game) in international politics is disrupted which makes war to become possible. The Bush administration considered Iraq as a security issue that was not to be dealt with under normal politics. US saw Iraq's security threat as something that should not be allowed to happen. Iraq was an existential threat and dealing with the threat was a necessity. As such, the Iraqi issue was an issue that had to be dealt with outside the normal bounds of political rules. This paved way for the legitimization of exceptional measures where the use of force (war) was allowed. In other words, on the basis of the support the Bush administration got from its audiences, they authorized/granted US the right to use exceptional measures (war).

4.3 Conclusion

The objective of this thesis was to apply securitization theory in order to identify the condition(s) that was altered which made the US-Iraq war possible. Elements of the conceptual apparatus of securitization were analyzed in order to explain how the representations of the Bush administration portrayed Iraq as an existential threat and how Iraq was successfully securitized on the basis of US being able to convince the American public and international community on the need to use exceptional measures (force) against Iraq. The texts from the documentary sources were rigorously analyzed in order to identify the discursive context in which Iraq was presented as a threat. Also, the results obtained from public polls were analyzed in order to measure the public support the Bush administration enjoyed domestically and texts indicating the positions of members of the international community (states) were analyzed to measure the level of support the US garnered from other countries. The use of force (exceptional measures) was measured in order to ascertain if ‘breaking the rules’ on the part of US was acceptable and if the securitization of Iraq was successful.

The thesis explained how the Bush administration on the basis of its securitizing move presented Iraq as an existential threat to US and the international community. As the securitizing actor, the Bush administration did everything within its reach to ensure the securitization of Iraq by performing speech acts to convince its audiences on the urgency to use exceptional measures in dealing with Iraq's threat. The US war against Iraq under international norms was illegitimate and an unacceptable practice as far as inter-state relations is concerned. Yet the war was legitimized and considered as appropriate means to contain Iraq's threat by the American public and some members of the international community.

Having said this, the thesis provided an understating regarding how war becomes possible. The puzzle as to how 'normalcy' is disrupted considering the outbreak of war and how violent conduct becomes thinkable and indeed possible was carefully explained. In doing this, an analysis of securitization theory revealed the process in which the Iraq war became possible. The discursive conditions which made the war to become possible were in place. First, the securitizing actor (Bush administration) identified Iraq as an existential threat. As such, the Bush administration followed up with strong securitizing move where the Iraqi issue was ranked as an issue of utmost priority. The Bush administration's securitizing move was strong such that the presentation of Iraq as an enemy of US and the world indeed portrayed Iraq as a dangerous threat and the threat was perceived as something that could be dealt with through war. In addition, the securitizing move made the use of war in dealing with Iraq's threat as plausible and necessary where the level of threat attached to Iraq logically matched the violent conduct (war) against Iraq. Second, the Bush administration's securitizing move was accepted by the American public and some members of the international country upon convincing them of Iraq's threat. It was on this basis that the use of exceptional measures was considered as legitimate. This public acceptance shows how the Bush administration's securitizing move shaped the US domestic discourse and international discourse regarding the presentation of Iraq as an existential threat. The threat was presented in such a way that the level of threat perception among the American public and the international community increased where Iraq was seen as an enemy of US and the world. Third, on the basis of the legitimization of emergency measures by the Bush administration's audiences, US could 'break the rules' where it violated international norms regarding the use of force. This means that 'breaking the rules' on the part of US was considered acceptable.

The audience acceptance of the Bush administration's securitizing move and the use of exceptional measures indicate that Iraq was successfully securitized.

From the lens of securitization theory, we can see the shift from normal politics to exceptional politics entails the disruption of 'normalcy' (rules of the game) in international politics which brings about the occurrence of violent conduct (war). The 'normalcy' (rules of the game) was a condition the US had to alter where it lifted itself above the rules in order to go to war against Iraq. This is how the war became possible. Hence, on the occasion where 'normalcy' is disrupted then war becomes possible. The outbreak of inter-state wars are as a result of the disruption of 'normalcy' in international politics and the case of Iraq war is an example of such phenomenon. The Iraq war was a process and securitization theory systematically explains this process as shown in the empirical part of this thesis. This process is what other explanations have failed to provide. Breaking the rules of the game for the sake of going to war on the part of US is an issue for future research as to whether or not such actions are morally or legally justified.

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