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DE-EUROPEANISATION AFTER ALL? THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN
WAR ON THE LEVEL OF EUROPEANISATION IN HUNGARY'S NATIONAL FOREIGN
POLICY DURING 2018-2024

Bachelor's Thesis

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Declaration of Authorship

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

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Abstract

The aim of this research was to study the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian war on the level of de-Europeanisation on Hungarian national foreign policy. The state of Hungary has been under academic watch and one element much analysed is its de-Europeanisation (Hettyey 2020; Müller & Gazsi 2023; Agh 2022; Müller et al. 2025). However, while Hungary frequently clashed with EU foreign policy decisions, there is no academic consensus if Hungary's national foreign policy has moved towards de-Europeanisation. The effect of the Russo-Ukrainian war is suggested to impact the national foreign policy. In this case, the war could have pushed Hungary to take further actions through foreign policy, which could go underneath the de-Europeanisation process. The research question raised was therefore: what impact did the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war have on the Europeanisation of Hungarian foreign policy? This study was made with single case analysis using qualitative methods to analyse based on the table of elements of de-Europeanisation in foreign policy by previous studies of Müller et al. (2021:527) and Müller & Gazsi (2023:402). 13 different speeches, statements and press conferences were analysed in two parts: before the full-scale invasion and after. This study found that a war can push a state to strengthen its previous national foreign policy. The level of Europeanization was significantly lower after the outbreak of the full-scale invasion with Hungary's foreign policy showing more visible signs of de-Europeanization. Hungary kept on supporting previous values and norms, but it enhanced going more against the EU norms. Meanwhile, there was a stronger obstructive behaviour towards the common foreign policy process. It stated not to work alongside the CFSP and showed to act obstructively against anything other than policies supporting its own viewpoint. So, an external shock, such as the outbreak of war, can serve as a trigger of de-Europeanization.

Annotatsioon

Selle uurimistöö eesmärk on uurida Vene-Ukraina sõja mõju Ungari välispoliitikale ja selle suunale euroopast kaugeneda. Juba varasemalt on akadeemiliselt vaadeldud Ungari välispoliitikat mitte-euroopastumise perspektiivist (Hettyey 2020; Müller & Gazsi 2023; Agh 2022; Müller jt 2025). Kuigi Ungari on sattunud varasemalt vastuollu Euroopa Liidu (EL) välispoliitiliste otsustega, puudub akadeemiline üksmeel selle kohta, kas Ungari välispoliitika on liikunud mitte-euroopastumise suunas või mitte. Eeldatakse, et Vene-Ukraina sõda mõjutas riigi välispoliitikat, sundides Ungarit tugevdama välispoliitilisi meetmeid. Selle mõjul võis süveneda mitte-euroopastumise protsess. Uurimisküsimus, millele töö käigus vastust otsiti oli järgmine: millist mõju on avaldanud täiemahuline Vene-Ukraina sõda Ungari välispoliitika euroopastumisele? Bakalaureusetöö viidi läbi kvalitatiivse üksikjuhtumi analüüsi kaudu kasutades Mülleri jt (2021:527) ja Mülleri & Gazsi (2023:402) varasemate uuringute põhjal koostatud välispoliitika mitte-euroopastumise elementide tabelit. Kokku analüüsiti 13 erinevat kõnet, avaldust ja pressikonverentsi. Leiti, et sõda võib sundida riiki oma varasemat riiklikku välispoliitikat tugevdama. Enne täiemahulist sissetungi oli Ungari välispoliitikas nähtavad Euroopast kaugenemise elemendid, kuid pärast sõja algust süvendati vastuseisu ELi normidele. Kuigi jätkati seniste välispoliitiliste normide ja väärtuste toetamist, esines tugevamalt rahvuslike huvide kaitset. Lisaks täheldati pärast sõja algust võrreldes eelneva ajaga takistavat käitumist ühise välispoliitika protsesside suhtes. Ungari väljendas, et ei soovi tegutseda kooskõlas ühise välis- ja julgeolekupoliitikaga (CFSP) ning tegutses takistavalt kõige suhtes, mis ei toetanud tema enda seisukohti. Seega leiti uurimistöö käigus, et väline šokk nagu sõja puhkemine võib toimida mitte-euroopastumise käivitajana.

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1. Introduction

Hungary's leading party was for years Viktor Orbán-led Fidesz, which was before the 2026 year Parliamentary elections on its overall fifth term. With that, the state has been under academic watch and one element much analysed is its de-Europeanisation (Hettyey 2020; Müller & Gazsi 2023; Agh 2022; Müller et al. 2025). Europeanisation describes how European governance and policies affects domestic politics while de-Europeanisation describes the situation where a state moves away from European norms (Bardakci et al. 2025:3). De-Europeanisation occurs when Member States (MS) take actions to block and oppose the creation and development of common foreign policy, while professionals appointed by the MS are more influenced in their work from national interests (Müller et al. 2021: 527). For de-Europeanisation to occur, certain level of Europeanisation must have occurred first (Müller et al. 2021:524). The elements of de-Europeanisation can also be analysed on the topic of foreign policy. In this case, de-Europeanisation describes a process, where the European Union (EU) foreign policy is perceived to contradict or otherwise stand in tension with values or interests of member states leading to less engaged policy making and practice, as well as regular and systematic use or threatening of the veto (Müller et al. 2021:521). Moreover, it can include pulling back from previously established values and goals of European foreign policy (Müller et al 2021:524).

Overall, Hungary has been found to be going through a process of de-Europeanisation. Based on previous research, it has been understood (Müller & Gazsi 2023) that from 2010 to 2020 Hungary was de-Europeanising through adopted foreign policy preferences and populist parties' decisions in power. After winning the national elections in 2014, the national foreign policy started aligning with the Fidesz party ideology, because Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) lost its relevance in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and national interests took precedence over EU-focused developments (Müller & Gazsi 2023:407). In addition, Orbán with its formal and informal supporters, worked to direct and influence the national foreign policy views of civil servants and diplomats (Müller & Gazsi 2023:407-409). However, while Hungary frequently clashed with EU foreign policy decisions and was seen as a "trouble-maker" undermining EU consensus in foreign policy, Hettyey (2020) found that during 2010-2018, Hungarian foreign policy was not de-Europeanising. There was no real systematic de-Europeanisation other than on the topic of migration, where Hungary consistently hindered cooperation and consensus-finding through

blocking joint EU decision-making (Hettzey 2020:10). Thus there is no consensus on the topic of de-Europeanisation of Hungary. With the leadership of Viktor Orban party, over time Hungary has shown disagreements in the EU but additionally it has obstructed for example sanction packages against Russia, a country that has previously been defined as a long-term threat against Europe. Hettzey found that for Hungary, it was the case of thin or strategic Europeanisation (2020:11). With the case of Russo-Ukrainian war, which could be viewed as an existential security threat to MS of the EU, there is a need to re-evaluate the topic of Hungary's potential de-Europeanisation again. The Russo-Ukrainian war, which has divided Europe into two viewpoints, puts pressure on Hungary to constantly restate its position since it has economic ties with Russia while simultaneously being part of EU and NATO. Russo-Ukrainian war could thus push Hungary to change its *status quo* in foreign policy towards de-Europeanisation while going against core values of EU and obstructing on decisions on Ukraine's future.

Hungary's obstructive attitude has become even more pronounced in recent years, especially since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Hungary has opposed the European Union's choice, based on the idea not to fund Russian warfare, to drop all import of Russian oil (Jack, 2025). In 2025, Orban also promised to veto Ukraine's membership to EU (Zsiros, 2025) and the Russian frozen funds decision (Ádám & Fisayo-Bambi, 2025). Before the Ukraine war, Orban focused more on opposing the distribution of EU funds. In this case, the war could have pushed Hungary to take further actions through foreign policy. By Müller et al. (2021:520), the CFSP is particularly vulnerable to de-Europeanisation due to being only a strengthening policy next to national foreign policies..

In this thesis, it is analysed if Hungary's government in the period of 2018-2024 has turned towards de-Europeanisation or not in its foreign policy. It will be studied how full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war has affected the pattern of Fidesz's and the Hungarian government's actions by obstructing the EU more. The war can be viewed as a trigger for change in Hungary's national foreign policy and thus it has to be analysed if Hungarian policies have turned towards de-Europeanisation. As of now, the war in Ukraine has affected EU's view on energy providers, border control and weapon industry. This means that MS' have had to react to new ideas in accordance with their own policy changes. As such, this can lead to wider discussion about how war not inside the European Union's borders can affect EU. Considering that the leadership of Hungary did not change within 14 years,

it is possible to analyse how Hungary's values and ideas of the future of Hungary and Europe have changed.

The question raised will be:

- What impact did the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war have on the Europeanisation of Hungarian foreign policy?

This thesis will be carried out as a single case study analysing Hungarian leaders' speeches and statements before the start of full-scale invasion (2018-2022) and during (2022-2025). This is done due to the relevance of the field of de-Europeanisation and obstruction tendencies in EU (Müller & Gazsi 2023; Hettyey 2020). The inclusion of two time periods, one directly before the war and the one following the outbreak of the war, serves to establish the contrast and to understand the impact of the war as opposed to any other dynamics that might have potentially affected the de-Europeanisation of Hungary's foreign policy in this time period. With that, it is expected to see the level of de-Europeanisation higher after the war – the Hungarian foreign policy has involved the expected examples of de-Europeanisation elements to show an ongoing process of it.

To measure the presence of de-Europeanisation before and after the war, this study relies on the table of de-Europeanisation elements outlined by Müller et al. (look article 2021:527). To establish the level of then presence or the absence of de-Europeanisation, the sources are analysed. The more indicators of de-Europeanisation are found, and the stronger their effect, the higher the level of de-Europeanisation is. The sources analysed will be select documents, speeches and statements, that are chosen based on the presence of national foreign policy statements connected directly to EU foreign policy agenda on topics related to Russia, Ukraine and security policies of the selected periods. This thesis is written using the qualitative method, where single case analysis is done by analysing agendas using tables of de-Europeanisation elements.

This thesis first defines de-Europeanisation, identifying the specific factors that drive or hinder the process. These theoretical foundations are then synthesized into an analytical framework of key elements. The methodology section details the selection of data and the specific methods used to address the core research question. This framework is subsequently applied in the analysis chapter, the findings of which form the basis for the ensuing discussion. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the research outcomes and highlights the study's primary contributions.

2. Theoretical Framework: De-Europeanisation of Member State Foreign Policy

Europeanisation is “the European Union’s impact (and the process of impacting) on domestic institutions, discourses, political processes and policies of both the member states, candidate countries, and the adjacent neighbourhood countries“ (Tyushka 2020:139). Europeanisation of states foreign policy is a process in nation’s foreign policy as it is progressively transforming based on European policy making and a nations contribution into development of European foreign policy (Tonra 2000:229, referenced by Hettyey 2020:3; Wong and Hill 2011, 7, referenced by Hettyey 2020:3). Several authors (Olsen 2002:923-924, Popescu 2010:50, referenced by Gheorghe 2024:86) see that Europeanisation manifests „developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political organization, and a political unification process“, and is also a process of democratisation (process of democratic transition) (Sziminsky 2017:188, Linz and Stepan 1996, referenced by Gheorghe 2024:86). So, Europeanisation is moving towards the idea of EU with the contribution of MS. The Europeanisation of national foreign policy happens when a member state downloads EU policies to national level policies and invests resources to collectively develop EU foreign policy (Vilson 2015:53).

Elements	Description
Politics of scale	Advantages from political cooperation
Socialisation	Community with shared purpose
External federator	External threat as decision-making process accelerator
Geo-cultural identity	Europe as a geographical zone of shared values

Table 1. Promoting factors of Europeanisation in the case of Hungary (Hill and Wong 2011, referenced by Hettyey 2020:5)

In theory, if EU MS are there (a) advantages from cooperation in the EU with other members, (b) a community with shared values, (c) an external threat and (d) geo-cultural shared space (Hill and Wong 2011, referenced by Hettyey 2020:5), a state like Hungary could raise its level of

Europeanisation. These factors make the EU as a whole more valuable for the member who now makes in the core, Europeanising decisions, part of their national foreign policy.

Within the EU, nations are somewhat expected to take over centralized initiatives and in the meantime put in effort to grow the organization. De-Europeanisation is thus a process of decline in previous efforts. As Müller et al. (2021:524) have found, for de-Europeanisation to occur, a certain level of Europeanisation must have occurred first. De-Europeanisation occurs “when a state is positively attempting to rid itself of any perceived restraints imposed by European foreign policy“ (Hill and Wong 2011: 211, referred by Hettyey 2020:3). Member state thus takes active steps to obstruct decision-making in foreign policy decisions as it is basing its decision to do so on national interests which does not align with common EU norms to work towards shared purpose and ideological values. National interests are more resistant to integration than other fields, which makes it a relatively good field to study to understand one’s level of Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation (Raik 2015:441, referred to by Hettyey 2020:3). Europeanisation can be EU or domestically driven and is pushed by beneficiaries or appropriateness (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig 2015:6, referenced by Gheorghe 2024:88-89).

Elements	Description
Hostility to further integration	Consistent ideological opposition to common policies
Domestic politics	National opposition to further integration
International forces	Global trends interpretation by nation
Special relationships	Interests in communities abroad

Table 2. Hindering factors of Europeanisation in the case of Hungary (Hill and Wong 2011, referenced by Hettyey 2020:5).

The promoting factors of Europeanisation should thus be weaker in relation to hindering factors like (a) ideological opposition to policies, (b) opposition towards further integration, (c) changes in international trends, and (d) valued international interest towards communities for de-Europeanisation in national foreign policy to happen and be visible (Hill and Wong 2011, referenced by Hettyey 2020:5).

Müller et al. (2021:527) has defined the elements “De-construction of professional roles”, “Repudiation of fundamental norms”, “Structural disintegration” which visualise aspects leading

to de-Europeanisation in national foreign policy. More specifically, two studies (Müller et al. 2021:528, Müller & Gazsi 2023:402) have both conceptualized elements, dynamics and indicators for the de-Europeanisation of national foreign policies. Repudiation of fundamental norms means re-nationalization of discourse in roles and policies, where national priorities gain higher importance than previously. That means rejection of the CFSP procedural norms and fundamental EU foreign policy norms. Structural disintegration is (a) opposition towards EU foreign policy institutions' structure and/or processes, (b) disengagement from EU foreign policy structures where it reduces or sees no value in support, commitment and investment towards the CFSP, (c) MS prioritization and pursuing its foreign policy through frameworks opposing the CFSP. Deconstruction of professional roles means that EU norms decrease in value from recruitment to career progression of civil servants and diplomats while being representatives of nationally decided interests and norms (Müller et al. 2021:528, Müller & Gazsi 2023:402).

Next to the trend on the global scale, it has been found that one attribute towards de-Europeanisation is populism (Dyduch & Müller 2021:571). In Poland, during the Law and Justice government, it showed little engagement towards the Israel-Palestine conflict, thus became less engaged in the CFSP framework and rather prioritised US initiatives and the Visegrad group as a forum (Dyduch & Müller 2021:582). The connection between populists in government and foreign policy is still under discussion (Dyduch & Müller 2021:571) since the meaning of populism is still uncertain: is it just a political strategy (Weyland 2017, Barr 2018, referenced by Dyduch & Müller 2021:571) or does it reflect a political ideology (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 5–6, referenced by Dyduch & Müller 2021:571). In the case of populists in government, the idea of anti-elite might be questioned in the foreign policy positions and Europeanisation so far (Dyduch & Müller 2021:572). For example, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban has shown populist behaviour with siding with other populist leaders of nations and viewing Brussels as the elite opposed to the people of Hungary and Europe. Next to the general conditions for Europeanisation and de-Europeanisation to occur, there are additionally conditions of external shocks, like war.

2.1 War impact on de-Europeanisation

There is a theoretical logic behind the idea that crises actually Europeanise nations, as these might work as external federators, as seen by Hettyey (2020:5), the Eurozone crisis for Greece and Portugal, Trump's presidency for Poland and Hungary (Raimundo et al 2021, Dyduch and Müller 2021, Badell 2020, referred by Juncos et al. 2024:122). This is because if a MS sees the EU as an organisation with shared values and provides strength even potentially taking away sovereignty, it makes a state work more proactively towards the goal. A crisis pushes states work together and let go of smaller disagreements in order to protect their own and shared interests.

But, war can also be expected to have an impact by changing the conditions for Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation. As Hettyey (2020:5) found, international forces might also work as a hindering factor, a war not physically on the border or inside the borders of one MS might not be seen as an external threat. In that case, the interpretation of the state might put the national foreign policy in a position where it goes against the common EU view based on the domestic politics discourse. Changes in international politics push states of any kind to analyse them from their own perspective and thus, there would be solid destructive actions taken against common policies, such as vetoing, low participation, or dissenting to make decisions toward further integration based on the re-nationalisation agenda of states' foreign policy. This could also mean opposition to further integration of the MS as it is not putting in fewer or no resources into the development of common decisions and policies. Interests in communities, like Hungarians abroad as mentioned in Hettyey's (2020:9-10) study, could thanks to trends and developments in global politics, influence a state's stance on further political actions.

War could lead to re-nationalization of national foreign policy because MS finds it better to protect its own territorial, political and economical interests, pushing for their sovereignty in decision-making. The war could thus create de-Europeanisation of MS national foreign policy through making state interpretate an external factor, creating a opposing view towards the EU CFSP. By rejecting the policies created, the state could show less interest in contributing to it. With the effect from war, de-Europeanisation of MS would increase through abandonment of the EU fundamental norms through creating differences in nations' interests: the EU foreign policy is seen as non-compatible as it does not share the same values with national foreign policy. Structural disintegration could happen because nations resources are seen as more valuable in other

frameworks and cooperations while the CFSP could rather obstruct realising their own national interest. De-construction of professional roles would then happen as it makes sure the rejection for common policy-making becomes systemic.

Thus, a war could push a state towards de-Europeanisation if a MS decides to deepen its nationalisation policy and obstruct the CFSP as it serves the state more than the pan-EU policy. This is because the war is interpreted on their own and that affects the national foreign policy. For example, with the Russo-Ukrainian war, a MS could see the EU's actions towards Russia as harmful towards its own economy and politics. They would have their own interpretation of international relations in order to protect themselves.

3. Methodology

In this section, the methodology of this study is explained and argued. The table of elements used to analyse sources is introduced with the operationalisation of how the aim of the research is established and measured. Additionally, description of selection for sources is introduced.

3.1 Research design and case selection

The aim of this research is to study the impact of the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war on whether it has led to a de-Europeanisation of Hungary's foreign policy. Additionally, the study looks at how visible the level of de-Europeanisation of Hungarian foreign policy. Hungary has stood out after the start of full-scale invasion in opposing of multiple EU MS' foreign political decisions to help Ukraine. Thus, it leads to a question if the war has triggered a move on the level of Europeanisation of Hungary towards re-nationalisation. Juncos et al. (2024:124-130) has found that the Russian invasion was seen in the EU collectively as a threat and was the main topic of discussion in the starting months. Nonetheless, even if the EU collectively has been helpful to Ukraine, Hungary, as an exception, has stood out with differences on the ideas of financing or not keeping the secrecy of decisions (Juncos et al. 2024:124-130).

This thesis will be done as a single case study about the de-Europeanisation of Hungary's foreign policy in the time period 2018-2024, because of its relevance in the field of de-Europeanisation and obstruction tendencies in the EU (Müller & Gazsi 2023; Hettyey 2020). Single case study is based on an empirical question, where there is an assumption for the answer but there is no certain theory, which has been settled on to be present with this case (Klotz 2008:51). It would be expected that before the war there was one pattern of de-Europeanisation that resembles the one established in previous studies where they (Hettyey 2020) find it not yet showing sufficient signs of de-Europeanisation. For the period after the full-scale war begin, it is expected to see a sufficiently visible amount of de-Europeanisation indicators in "organizational norms and priorities" and "structural disintegration" by Hungary towards the EU.

3.2 Method of analysis

Based on the de-Europeanisation elements in the national foreign policy table, the number of indicators that appeared in selected speeches and statements will be used as a measurement. This thesis will be written using a qualitative method as one state's foreign policy and the decision-making process is studied. In international relations, a state as a case is studied by its foreign policy and decision-making process to find answers to already happened situations (George and Bennet 2005, referenced by Klotz 2008:43, Klotz 2008:43). In addition, other types of data will be used in the theoretical background to provide a strong analysis. These include statistics and factual info about Hungary's decisions regarding voting and discussions in the EU foreign policy-making regarding the war in Ukraine. This thesis concentrates on the discourse of Hungary's national foreign policy pre and post-full-scale invasion start.

3.3 Operationalization

To analyse how war has impacted the level of Europeanisation in Hungary, a table of de-Europeanising elements is based on Müller et al. (2021:527) and Müller & Gazsi (2023:402) table, adapted to this thesis's case. This study is focused on the discourse of the political agenda. There are also elements of de-Europeanisation in changes of employees' roles, but these will be left out of the study. To measure if war has affected the Europeanisation process of Hungary's foreign policy, enough statements should have a strong occurrence of elements that lead to an observable change in political direction. De-Europeanisation, thanks to war, will occur when there is a great change in national foreign policy before and after 2022, as it is letting loose from previous values and norms, and there is a change in behaviour towards the common foreign policy process. The level of de-Europeanisation thanks to war is measurable by its impact on the CFSP development and implementation. In analysed sources, the level of de-Europeanisation is measured based on how visible and obstructive are the statements regarding systemically opposing and national interest based views on action towards the Russo-Ukrainian war. The more indicators of de-Europeanisation are found and the stronger their effect, the higher the level of de-Europeanisation is. The uploading and downloading process of Europeanisation should turn towards re-nationalisation in the national foreign policy of Hungary and thus changing norms so national ones are a priority, not the collective ones. De-Europeanisation, thanks to war, is absent, when indicators

do not occur differently before and after 2022. There is no significant change towards re-nationalisation of foreign policy in Hungary and thus no effect from war is sighted.

Elements of de-Europeanisation in Foreign Policy	Indicators	Criteria	Examples
Abandonment of fundamental norm	<p>Re-nationalisation of discourse in roles and policies, where national priorities gain higher importance than previously.</p> <p>Rejection of the CFSP procedural norms and fundamental EU foreign policy norms.</p>	<p>Expressions and statements that distinguish Hungarian foreign policy interests from European ones, prioritizing re-nationalisation</p> <p>Expressions and statements that oppose the CFSP and EU norms, prioritizing individually generated state norms</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National foreign policy on war prioritises domestic interests like economy, Hungarians safety. - Position towards isolating Russia is different from general EU discourse as Hungary promotes national economy and diplomatic relations. - Hungary opposes consensus-seeking, compromise, consultation, information sharing as it states that it is not willing to cooperate on policies. - Hungary does not condemn acts against liberal values like human rights. - Opposes help of Ukraine from general discourse of EU based on national interests.
Structural disintegration	<p>Opposition towards EU foreign policy institutions structure and/or processes</p> <p>Disengagement from EU foreign policy structures where it reduces or sees no value in support, commitment and investment towards the CFSP</p> <p>MS prioritization and pursuing its foreign policy through frameworks opposing the CFSP</p>	<p>Expressions and statements about condemning common policy-making system</p> <p>Expressions and statements expressing rejection towards working for the CFSP</p> <p>Expressions and statements that distinguish support for other frameworks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hungary argues against the system how decision-making is structured. - Hungary shows devaluation and disengagement towards the CFSP as is not working on taking it over or investing resources in it. - Hungary prioritizes frameworks in EU that are against majority agreed the CFSP policies on Ukraine - Reaches towards separate cooperation with Russia

Table 3. Elements of de-Europeanisation in Foreign Policy (Müller et al. 2021:527, Müller & Gazsi 2023:402)

3.4 Sources

Statements from press conferences' and speeches, which are chosen from the Hungarian Governments official website page, will be the main sources analysed. The sources will be chosen based on the presence of national foreign policy statements that include ideas connected directly to EU foreign policy on the topics related to the war in Ukraine. This includes, for example, aid to Ukraine, keywords like "war", "Ukraine", "Russia", and actions taken by the EU towards Russia. In addition, there were some annual speeches made by Hungary's Prime Minister like the State of the Nation, End-of-Year and press conference after meeting Russia Prime Minister Valdimir Putin. These annual speeches were selected based on the criteria of containing information about Hungarian foreign policy in relation to the Ukraine-Russia war. Annual speeches and statements are towards a specific audience and include similar topics each year and thus give a rather comparable overview.

The specific amount of data used was decided during the research part as it was based on the necessary amount to prove if situations are present or not enough and thus to establish the level of de-Europeanisation. Since there are not all types of annual speeches and statement available post-2022/outbreak of full-scale invasion, additional documents will be selected based on relevance and comparability. For pre full-scale invasion, there were eight speeches and statements by both Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Szijjarto. To analyse national foreign policy after the outbreak, six speeches, statements and press conferences by Orban were looked at. All together, this study analysed 13 sources which were supported by other documents.

4. Analysis: Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and de-Europeanisation tendencies in Hungary's foreign policy

This section covers the findings from analysed sources. First, de-Europeanisation in Hungary's foreign policy until full-scale war through sources from 2018 until start of full-scale invasion is analysed. Second, de-Europeanisation in Hungary's foreign policy until full-scale war through sources from start of full-scale invasion until end of the year 2024 is studied. Lastly, the findings are discussed further to reach an answer to research question.

4.1 De-Europeanisation in Hungary's foreign policy until full-scale war

In the time period 2018 until February 24. 2022, Hungary's foreign policy showed both Europeanising and de-Europeanising elements. National interests were visible along the statements made by the leadership but Hungary did not forget to establish its value for common norms. Even though Hungary showed signs of being unsure in CFSP development, it proposed ideas that engaged them in discussions of military and economic policies regarding the EU goals and strength. These aspects are viewed in two categories: abandonment of fundamental norm and structural disintegration.

Firstly, abandonment of fundamental norms can be seen in two specific statements that directly hinder further Europeanisation. These statements are visible through expressions that show prioritisation of national interest over the common interests of the EU MS'. Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, Hungary presented its views on its foreign policy, prioritizing national interests. Orban (2018b) introduced the idea of "Hungary First" and established efforts to import gas not only from Russia but also from Romania and Poland. This suggests that, on the economic side, Hungary ensures its own interests are prioritised. Related to security questions, Hungary's national foreign policy established to be against war but was pressing not for the safety of Europe, but for the safety and interests of Hungary. It was stated that „war must be avoided“ in order for Ukrainians not to become refugees in Hungary and thus creating demographical changes (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a). Additionally, the improvement of relations between the West

and Russia was in the interest of Hungary's position (Orban 2019). As such, the national foreign policy of Hungary was taking steps towards presenting national interests over EU-centric views.

Meanwhile, Hungary had expressed political views about its placement in the EU and how it saw the common foreign policy. With these Hungary did not specifically state Europeanisation-hindering factors towards de-Europeanisation. For example, the importance of shared EU common norms, which suggested that national foreign policy took the EU membership into account, were expressed with a statement pressing to appreciate and share values of common norms in the EU like the economy, rule of law and democracy (2018b). This shows a level of continuous acceptance EU norms. In political cooperation, right before the full-scale invasion, Orban (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a) went on a peace mission to meet Putin with a specific concern in the Hungarian interest to keep Ukraine free. While it promoted diplomatic conflict resolution, Hungary kept the focus of the meeting on its own national interest.

Within structural disintegration category, there were again expressions of rejection towards working for the CFSP and support for other frameworks that went against common views at the time. Hungary contributed to purpose ideas for how the EU could benefit from relationship with Russia which show engagement towards the CFSP. Throughout 2018-2022 speeches, Hungary saw economic ties with Russia in a view that would improve the strength and growth of the European Union. Hungary's national foreign policy included an understanding that Hungary itself is a weak state to influence West, EU and Russia relations, but would still like to take action as it fears that otherwise Russia strengthens ties with China (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a). Orban stated that the EU needs multi-faceted policies towards Russia to leaving trade open while providing heightened security guarantees, since he understands the security related fear of Russia for keeping buffer zones in the Baltics and Poland, but does not see it relevant towards other MS states (Orban 2018c). Right before the full-scale invasion, Hungary proposed to cooperate economically with Russia to make Europe stronger (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a), as based on previous sayings (Orban 2018a): the EU sanctions towards Russia have led the EU economy to downfall. These examples show interest towards working for the EU, which indeed are quite strongly different from shared common policies at the time.

Hungary did show prioritisation towards another framework by how it expressed its vision on cooperation with Russia. As before full-scale invasion, in the EU, many countries were indeed

working with Russia, but there were already sanctions against physical and juridical people who were found to be a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty (European Council 2026). This means that the CFSP was cautious but open towards further co-operation. Orban gave a talk about Russia becoming Hungary's investment destination (Orban 2019). In addition, Orban (2019) stated that against the odds of EU sanctions, trade volume grew between Hungary and Russia within a year, marking an important win. Later on, the Russia-Hungary economic framework was much supported from Hungary's side, expecting positive economic change for the next five years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2020a). Even though, while before the full-scale invasion the EU was not restricting every type of cooperation with Russia yet, explicitly looking towards Russia without other MS' support, can be viewed as de-Europeanising. If the CFSP did not change its track to not stop sanctioning and Hungary kept on financing their activity, then this suggests eventually moving away from Europeanisation.

Opposition towards the EU foreign policy structure and processes were visible through multiple expressions of dissatisfaction about the CFSP framework. Orban stated that since the CFSP cannot be changed, Hungary will keep the ongoing ties with Russia economically (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a), which shows direct show disengagement from the CFSP. He further stated that the MS should be able to make their own decisions where national competence is needed (Orban 2018a). While EU is not a federation, thus national decisions are allowed, Hungary's statements as a state previously known for its obstructive behaviour, could also be an expression condemning common policy-making system. With previous disagreements on voting policy, Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Szijjarto has stated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2020b) that Hungary does not support the proposal to change the European Union foreign policy decision-making from unanimous voting to qualified majority, as every decision affects every MS, whose points of view, even obstructive ones, could not be taken into consideration. With opposition on this policy, while itself being possibly a reason for the EU to propose a change in voting system, is obstructive against further consistent policy-making. Thus, there were three separate takes against the EU foreign policy structure and processes.

Regarding the European military, Hungary supported its strength as necessary for Europe to be able to decide its future independently from superpowers of the world like the US and Russia (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022a). Therefore, Orban stated (Cabinet Office of the Prime

Minister 2022a) to support the EU military capacity and the joint defence force. Orban (2018a; 2018c) also showed interest in developing the general security of the alliance with statements like interest for a stronger Europe, while later stating that the EU has low interest in becoming independent in military strength from the US. Interest for EU based military, showed that in its core, Hungarian national foreign policy promotes general EU military competence.

Abandonment of fundamental norm was thus somewhat visible before the full-scale war in the Hungarian national foreign policy as it prioritised national interest while still stating to care for common shared values. This meant that there was re-nationalisation in political and economical policies but not against common values. Hungary supported causes most beneficial for it. Most norm-related statements made were that Hungary established the factor of acting only so that they themselves were benefited economically and for people of Hungary. Therefore, it seems that Hungary has not condemned Russia's foreign policy towards Ukraine, it rather saw cooperation and possibilities to work together.

Hungary showed re-nationalisation and opposition against the CFSP system while engaging and sharing core goals of the policy. Thus, Hungary was de-Europeanising but on a low level. Most strongly expressed statements made regarding structural disintegration category were to improve political and economic relations with Russia, suggesting these also to the CFSP. Even as there was no discourse change by the EU, Hungary prioritised their relation with Russia through enlarging trade. There was dissatisfaction shown towards the CFSP processes that suggested not much belief into it and also to changes in it. Meanwhile, national foreign policy included efforts to contribute to policy-making based on their vision. Hungary had previously expressed its views to mainly protect national interest compared to shared EU benefit, but did not forget to confirm its care for membership and possibilities to develop the EU. Explicitly looking towards Russia without other MS' support, can be viewed as de-Europeanising.

4.2 Suggestions of de-Europeanisation in Hungary's foreign policy 2022-2024

In the time period from the 24th of February 2022 to the end of the year 2024, Hungary's foreign policy showed more expressions which were seen as abandonment of fundamental norms and stronger structural disintegration. Even though the national interests compared to before the war

were not in their core different, they did widen to more topics and made the CFSP more non-aligned policy. Thus it provided better overview where national foreign policy worked against the EU.

While both the EU and Hungary aim for peace between Russia and Ukraine, both seem to have different understanding on where and how this idea is implicated. The Hungarian national foreign policy forcing self-generated understanding is based on a neutral position by Hungary in discussions on the EU level. Actions taken with the main focus on achieving peace in Ukraine was mentioned in multiple speeches (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022b, Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022c, Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a, Orban 2024b). This is supported by statement that the war is between two Slavic countries (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a, Orban 2024a & 2024b). This goes directly against EU common foreign policy state, where EU has committed to take actions in the strongest possible terms to condemn Russia's war of aggression (Council of the European Union 2022). With the same Council decision (2022), "The Union remains unwavering in its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity".

Regarding sovereignty of Ukraine, Hungary (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) has stated to support Ukraine's right to fight but does not see Ukraine's aid as part of protecting Hungary's own sovereignty and security. If the European Union should be collective power, then Orban here separated Hungary from collective action. Orban wished to keep the status quo as previously was with Russia, which at the same time went against EU collective response to cut financial ties. It was also made clear that in Hungarian interests, it is not to share a direct border with it (Orban 2023b). This specifically demonstrates Russia's enlargement to be not an issue for Hungary if they are not directly at war with them. Rather re-nationalisation has rather strengthened to only more look out for themselves.

In addition, there is no clear understanding how Orban preferred to define in terminology the full-scale invasion. He stated that it can be both: a war and a military operation (Orban 2023b). Orban views the conflict by using different terms probably based on the receiver. They say to want peace but do not see themselves agenda-setters (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). During the war, Orban has said to have asked Putin if he is ready for negotiations, while not asking to stop (Orban 2023b). All these examples provide suggestions towards a neutral position that serves

national interests. Thus can Hungary keep relations with both sides, which was before 24. February 2022 a goal for Hungary.

As they are showing support only for peace, it goes against consensus-seeking, compromise, consultation, information sharing as Hungary is not showing any signals to reconsider. It has tried to change others MS' position but not through common norms but rather acting against. On the topic of EU summit in December 2023 (2023b) where Orban walked out of the room before Ukraine membership talks and blocked the financial aid, Orban stated now that they simply disagreed with the decision but allowed it to happen. To stop enlargement to Ukraine he said to have tried to convince 20 member states while stating to stay out of discussion until there is no consensus on accession of Ukraine as it can't be taken in without permission of Hungary (2023b). In its defence, it was said that national foreign policy has not been aiming to block decisions but rather reach, across EU, the best decisions (Orban 2023b). From Hungary's side there have been actions like compromise towards the EU low on expected norm.

Hungary's national foreign policy has not forgotten Hungarians interests domestically and abroad which are directly in their own national interests. To protect its political and economical position, it stated (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2023a) its wish to stay in partnership with everyone, for Hungarians. Meaning they put the national interests higher from shared ones. To argument this policy, it is mentioned (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) that across the world, every nation, looks out for national interests and in the EU, Hungary is, as an exception, acting the same. It is also stated, that no connection to war by Hungary is important for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022c), which goes underneath "special relationship" hindering factor. In some other statements, communities outside Hungary are cared specifically but these are not put in the context of against EU.

Additionally, Hungary has pushed to stop sanctions in order to protect Hungarians. While previously to lift sanctions was for the benefit of whole EU, it is now more regarding national interests. This In the end of 2024 (Orban 2024b) the PM stated once more that sanctions should be lifted immediately and all together. Hungary has stated that sanctions hit Russians but also Hungarians (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a), so this could explain the reaction towards sanctions: in high national interests, a EU MS would try to first protect itself.

With structural disintegration, Hungary expressed multiple ways they disagree with decisions made so far that are not re-nationalising but rather seeing other ways in which Hungary is a participant in this war and crisis, opposing common ground. While neutrality is suggested, Hungary also has stated to not Russia as an threat towards EU. “The Hungarian government does not consider it realistic to assume that Russia is a threat to the security of Hungary or of Europe“ only in the use of nuclear weapons but they do not indicate it happening and Russia has shown not to be able to stand against NATO (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). The PM added that Ukraine’s attempts to prove that Russia stops at the Atlantic is not bought by Hungary (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). This could additionally suggest that while neutrality is in the interest to keep its relations, pressing that Russia itself is not a threat leads possibly to further disengagement from Ukraine related questions all together within structural disintegration.

After the beginning of full-scale invasion, Hungary started speaking more about the importance of sovereignty and the ability to choose its level of participation in the Russo-Ukrainian war. This, being more strongly self-protective than previously, suggests opposition towards working on shared security together. Orban stated to keep the importance of sovereignty and ability to decide on their own terms. With that it was said to not take part of resolutions until the diplomatic pressure does not respect sovereignty (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). In 2023 (Orban 2023b), he aimed to defend sovereignty as stated neutrality regarding the war. By that, Hungary tries to suggest changes in how the CFSP is a shared common policy, which is different from pre-war statements to engage with the EU policy-making.

Another topic, where Hungary stated dissatisfaction, was financial aid question. By going against the aid plan, Hungary supported again more individual contribution, leading to opposition towards EU foreign policy structure of shared commitment. With the current plan to give 50 billion euro aid from common budget within four years to Ukraine being found wrong (uses money also distributed to Hungary), Hungary proposed that every MS adds their individual sum thus every MS involved as much as individually wanted (2023b). They do not oppose dialogue but the policy itself (Orban 2023b). This is related to two things: Hungary wants to decide by itself if it gives away money for aid and prevents decisions-making. Additionally, it is cautious with aid to Ukraine, since sees (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) that from shared EU budget, what was meant for Hungary, is thus used to help Ukraine. When the decision on aid would go

through, it would not wish to cut ties with Russia since a state has its right to define and thus protect its own national interests. With that, Hungary, through showing interest towards working for the CFSP, could actually only do so to protect its own interests and by that work against previous system.

The aid is also connected to sanctions policy towards Russia. While suggesting to isolate less the state, working against sanctioning is also working against agreed system, also stated in the Council of the European Union decision (2022), to base CFSP on protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and freedom. Sanctions directly help to lower the resources Russia has to keep the war going. In the beginning PM Orban did not strictly state that sanctions are unnecessary, he rather (a) agreed with these or (b) accepted their existence (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022b). This type of acceptance was overruled when it was stated, that, whoever helps Ukraine becomes part of the war (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022c). Additionally, in 2023 (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) Hungary advised other MS to rethink sanctions against economic ties, religion and individuals active in culture as this restricts options for peace negotiations. By that, Hungary works against the core idea to push Russia to stop the war thanks to due to lack of resources.

On support of the CFSP, on the topic of Ukraine and potential threat from Russia, Hungarian national foreign policy is somewhat including preparation of warfare in their policy as downloading agreed actions. But the steps that have been taken are not giving much progress into the development of CFSP. Right after the war started, Orban stated to support participation in the EU but by security strengthening they only mention NATO (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022b). It was brought out that Hungary proposed previously to create European joint force but that led to nowhere (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). Orban also said to have the army actively in military training on, because of potential war (Orban 2023b). Hungarian national foreign policy has shown somewhat openness to download CFSP as reasonable investment but has not stated relatively strong agreement towards preparations for possible threat CFSP has stated. With that, Orban recognizes the existence of danger but does not express no larger purpose of it. Hungary said to not supply weapons and supporting Ukraine financially from EU budget as it is an rising burden (2024a). This could and will block further decision-making while turning away from shared contribution that eventually opposes CFSP since it has stated to see Russia as its external threat it secures itself from.

Type of engagement regarding the CFSP, is Hungary's outreach to push for peace-agreement. As it goes with Ukraine's territorial integrity, Hungary sees a different way to keep Hungary's sovereignty and save lives - press for immediate ceasefire and negotiations (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). As Orban stated (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022c) that Hungary will stay out of war in order to only work towards peace, if it has not changed until 2026 for example, it will be difficult to find consensus to actually decide how Europe should act in the end. To even strengthen the peace negotiations idea, Orban stated that Hungary supported previous strategic negotiation actions taken by EU member states France and Germany in 2014 after the occupation of Crimea (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). In 2023 (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a; Orban 2023b), Hungary stated that peace could be only possible if US and Russia negotiates but insisted the negative impact of it: Europe should thus lead the negotiation process. With that there is an agreement in EU.

To even further visualise Hungary's national foreign policy disengagement towards the CFSP could be seen in national foreign policy outlook about its overall cooperation and values. Hungarian PM stated to have found the distance of Brussels and Europeans larger than ever (Orban 2024a). This could be supported with previous statements, that Hungary (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) accused the EU to have made the war "everyone's problem" and that (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a) the EU with NATO are on the side of the war. It also saw decline in allies across the EU, who would share the same pro-peace agenda (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). National foreign policy recognized only God higher than the state and basic human decency with taking in refugees was enough and thus has fulfilled its duty with refugees (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2022c, Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2023a). Ultimately, MS national foreign policy has expressed views that suggest to further disengagement towards CFSP. In the core, national foreign policy is making compromise less probable as the war is not its problem.

On partnership, Hungary has expressed a different viewpoint on Ukrainians as partners which supports framework against enlargement of EU. Orban looks for different, non-membership partnerships with Ukraine (Orban 2023b), which turns away from common idea to one day enlarge to Ukraine. This could suggest again further disengagement since Hungary is not seeing enlargement framework as something it potentially wants to support with its own resources,

creating a path towards more difficult decision-making. This additionally could lead to structural changes in decision-making like there was the discussion on majority voting policy.

After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, Hungary has provided further disagreement and disengagement towards the CFSP. Even though the elements are not in their core much different from before the invasion, there are more of these elements in analysed speeches and possibly more destructive against development of the CFSP. Hungary again did not forget to visualise, how it sees the steps the EU should take while pressing for peace. What makes them hindering towards Europeanisation is that regarding heavier cooperation towards one goal by the CFSP, Hungary works against it taking into account its own interests as a sovereign state. The de-Europeanisation was visible after the war as the war pushed Hungary to make more statements that went against shared values and policy. Findings suggest that it was higher than before the war thanks to larger polarisation between the EU and Hungary.

Before the war, there were no statements made that suggested going against consensus-seeking for example, that were much more visible after the war. While previously lifting sanctions were better for EU and for peace was just general idea, during the war both ideas were made more national. While economical relations with Russia were not pushed anymore, only actions towards negotiations were allowed. This could suggest less engagement and more working towards changing the CFSP system.

4.3 Findings and discussion: the effect of war on Hungarian national foreign policy

The Hungarian national foreign policy did not change in the core compared to the pre-full-scale invasion, but next to the CFSP, it showed all of the indicators underneath the elements of de-Europeanisation in foreign policy. The hypothesis established ended up being partially true. Hungary did not specifically let go of its previous values and norms and changed its behaviour towards the common foreign policy process because the de-Europeanising elements were also there before the full-scale war. The study suggested that the de-Europeanisation was pushed further as the state expressed more views and obstruction against common action. The effect of war was thus to speed up the process, in which Hungary began to disengage more from shared actions.

It was found that Hungary's national foreign policy did not specifically change its course before and after the war. It did strengthen its views that were national interest based and showed more structural disintegration towards working together on the topic of aiding Ukraine and isolating Russia, but it is important to mention, that while that the EU strengthened also its CFSP towards heavier shared action establishing stronger the norm of full cooperation between MS. This is what crisis's usually do for the EU: states start commonly working towards the threat. Thus, Hungary's expressions went even more strongly against common norms and pushed it to structurally disintegrate. The Russo-Ukrainian war thus made the EU and Hungarian national foreign policy work against each other more, leading to visible expressions hindering Europeanisation as the EU went more against Hungarian national foreign policy. Hungary kept on supporting previous values and norms which were enhanced as they went more against the EU norms but there was a stronger behaviour towards the common foreign policy process as it stated to not work alongside anything other than for peace.

Based on the findings re-nationalisation was visible before and after the beginning of full-scale war, but what changed was Hungary's rhetoric towards caring for others. Before the war, Hungary's national foreign policy supported a common policy by sharing core values and looking towards a stronger EU while creating more policies based on national interest. After, Hungary agreed to only provide engagement with policies related to peace. If before, Russia was seen as a threat to some states, then later the findings suggested the rhetoric change towards full neutrality. Therefore, the de-Europeanisation level increased from mixed signals of de-Europeanisation by disbandment of norms towards clearer and structural national rhetoric.

Before the Russo-Ukrainian war, the national foreign policy presented in 2018 the "Hungary First" framework. They did prioritise to prevent any possible war, but more as a self-serving concern: to protect the country from immigration. By supporting its own economy, Hungary saw no negative impact from doing business with Russia. It did propose an idea to make multi-faceted policies towards Russia since it backed the fears of some EU countries about Russia. Indeed, it also stated to try to work on diplomacy between the two sides, since it saw it as important to get along. Yet again, Orbán expressed that it was also in the interest of Hungary. Hungary prioritized neutrality through stating not wanting to be in any part of aid, humanitarian help other than as much as necessary and not being part of decision-making in related policies.

Based on the findings, structural disintegration was likewise visible before and after the beginning of full-scale war. The difference was visible through even more objective stances on CFSP which translated to thorough blockage in decision-making, weakening CFSP. Before the full-scale invasion, its national foreign policy obstructed CFSP only by nudging the EU towards policies supporting national interests while sometimes expressing little interest at all. After, the findings suggested that the engagement towards CFSP but was structurally against any common foreign policy making by the EU. Therefore, the de-Europeanisation level increased from mixed signals of de-Europeanisation towards clear obstruction and disengagement of policies regarding the Russo-Ukraine war.

After 2022, Hungary was distinctively against policies by working actively against them and if not possible then staying away from decision-making altogether. Previously, it expressed disagreement towards voting changes, which were somewhat brought to the table thanks to Hungary's actions on decision-making. Prioritising cooperation with Russia, with hopes for it to grow, and pushing it on the EU as well is somewhat supportive of other frameworks. Even though Russia was not at war yet, the EU had already sanctioned it based on its aggressive activity towards Ukraine. For Hungary, the advantages from political cooperation as an Europeanising element were only visible in terms of national interests. After the invasion, Hungary's obstruction towards financial and military aid while condemning any pressure to be involved in the conflict led it to disengage and even obstruct in order to act only based on its policy. Additionally, obstructing the framework in which Ukraine was seen as an EU partner, altogether, suggested de-Europeanisation within structural obstruction.

While it was established that based on findings both elements were de-Europeanising, there were elements of Europeanisation visible throughout the years. These factors could explain why Hungary still manages to maintain its position in the EU. Before 24th February 2022, Hungary showed uploading in terms of what key concerns and positions CFSP should be based on yet there was little support for downloading into its own national foreign policy. There was interest toward growing military capabilities and care for the economy which were seen as to be worth developing in the EU.

Looking at the positions and statements before and after the beginning of full-scale war, there is not much difference on overall stance on the Russian and Ukrainian side. Rather, much visible is

the level of obstruction and disagreement on the overall viewpoints of the EU CFSP on Russian activity. By that, the Russo-Ukrainian war had an impact on Hungarian national foreign policy through pushing Hungary to express its position which based on domestic interpretation led to higher visibility and thus a level of de-Europeanisation in its foreign policy.

5. Conclusions

The Hungarian government led by Viktor Orban has been under academic watch, where one element much analysed is de-Europeanisation. Previously, this process has not been established commonly if Hungarian national foreign policy has been moving towards de-Europeanisation or not. Hungary's obstructive attitude has become even more pronounced in recent years, especially since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This thesis analysed if Hungary's government in the period of 2018-2024 has turned towards de-Europeanisation or not in its foreign policy. It studied how the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war has affected the pattern of the Hungarian government's actions. The war can be viewed as a trigger for change in Hungary's national foreign policy and thus it has to be analysed if Hungarian policies have turned towards de-Europeanisation.

This study was constructed on the theoretical basis of previous research on EU member states de-Europeanisation and what impact war could have on this concept. This also included known factors that increase or decrease Europeanisation. To analyse de-Europeanisation visibility and level, a table based on Müller et al. (2021:527) and Müller & Gazsi (2023:402) was created and adapted to this study. The sources were speeches, statements and press conferences held by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó. Altogether, this thesis outcome is based on seven speeches before and six after the full-scale invasion started, which were collected from the official government websites, and some additional documents and findings.

This study aimed to understand the impact the full-scale Russo-Ukrainian war had on the level of Europeanisation of Hungarian foreign policy. The findings suggested that Hungary kept on supporting previous values and norms which were enhanced as they went more against the EU norms but there was a stronger obstructive behaviour towards the common foreign policy process as it stated to not to work alongside the CFSP and showed to act obstructively against anything other than policies supporting its own viewpoint. These findings suggest that war can push a state to enhance its previous national foreign policy. The Hungarian national foreign policy did not change in the core compared to the pre-full-scale invasion, but alongside the CFSP it showed all of the indicators underneath the elements of de-Europeanisation in foreign policy. The study suggested that the de-Europeanisation was rather pushed more further as the state expressed more views and obstruction against common action.

As this study suggested that the war impacted the Hungarian national foreign policy, with further research it could be strengthened or weakened. Limitations of this research are thus the selected sources as each and every one of them does not always include positions on all the topics analysed. With a larger number of statements a stronger suggestions can be defined regarding Hungary's de-Europeanisation in national foreign policy. Further research of this study could be to analyse the third element of de-Europeanisation, which is "the de-construction of roles". This could give a even more thorough understanding if the de-Europeanisation is visible also through that dimension. Also, further research could be to analyse how has vetoing and destruction on foreign policy decisions have quantitatively changed before and after the beginning of the full-scale war in Ukraine. This could again give more factual basis next to qualitative research.

Suggestions that the Russo-Ukrainian war impacted national foreign security policy while strengthening de-Europeanisation process in Hungary could provide an academic basis to test this theoretical framework also on other similar cases. In a broader sense, this study provides arguments that a crisis in the EU could weaken the functioning of the organisation. This could suggest for the European Union to work in advance in order to prepare for changes in member states national policies if these go against core norms and structures that enable the organisation to operate.

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