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**The Selective Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect Principle: A
Comparative Case Study of Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen**

MA thesis

Supervisor: Raul Toomla, PhD

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The Selective Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect Principle: A Comparative Case Study of Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen

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Abstract:

The Responsibility to Protect principle was created as a response to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. During the United Nations General Assembly in 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan contemplated the future of sovereignty and the responsibility that comes with it. He implored the international community to accept responsibility in the protection of people should the state manifestly fail to do so. As a consequence of his request, the Responsibility to Protect principle was created as a call to action. This thesis examines the conflicts in which this principle has been utilized, compares and contrasts the conflicts with similar situations in which the principle was not used, and discusses the factors that could explain why. It seeks to fill the gap in existing literature and offer an alternative explanation for states' behavior. The theoretical framework juxtaposes two theoretical lenses, Realism and Constructivism, to illustrate that at the intersection of the two is best suited to be used in the comparative case study of Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen. The results of the research demonstrate that states behave in accordance to maintaining power and resources when that overlaps with upholding norms and values. It is only at this intersection that this principle is utilized. The purpose of the thesis is not to provide an alternative theory or principle, but rather to demonstrate that states' behavior can be explained through the theoretical framework proposed in this thesis. Also this thesis suggests that in order to properly utilize R2P, it should be implemented in all conflicts that meet the intervention criteria. By selectively implementing R2P the international community is disregarding the original intent of the principle and allowing for future misuse. If R2P is not going to be properly implemented, it should not be considered an option.

Keywords: R2P, sovereignty, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Yemen, Realism, Constructivism, international humanitarian law, United Nations, United Nations Security Council, intervention, power, resources, norms, values

Introduction:

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was developed as a response to two major events in the late twentieth century, the Rwandan Genocide and the Srebrenica massacre in the 1990s. This principle allows for the transfer of responsibility from within the sovereign states to the international community. When the government is unwilling or unable to protect the population, intervention for the sake of protection is allowed under the standard of R2P. During the 1999 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on the future development of human security and intervention and he explored the idea of state sovereignty and what it means in relation to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such rights and freedoms as enshrined to citizens within the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. Secretary-General Annan implored the international community to respond to the violations of rights instead of expressing sympathy. He challenged the UN member states to find common ground on the protection of other people should the situation require it. The wording of the R2P principle does not necessitate a mandatory usage, rather it is a justification for action and intervention. The principle provides the international community and avenue to intervene on behalf of humanitarian grounds. Throughout its evolution, it has become more multidimensional. The central foundation of the principle was expanded to include intervention on the behalf of mass atrocity crimes, like the ones seen in Rwanda or in Bosnia. The main focus of this thesis will be to answer several questions- *what factors affect the application of R2P principle in a state's decision to intervene? Why is R2P used in some instances of humanitarian crises but not in others?* To answer these questions, a comparative case study will be used to analyze three conflicts, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen and the resulting response from the international community regarding the utilization of R2P.

To explain states' behavior, a theoretical lens will be established through which the cases will be analyzed. Two major theories will be combined and the intersection of the two will be the theoretical framework. The intersection of Realism and Constructivism with regard to states' behavior is the convergence of consolidating power and resources with upholding norms and values. Additionally, three variables

will be established and measured: economic interest, social interest, and geopolitical interest. Based on this theoretical framework, this thesis proposes the following hypothesis- *states intervene in conflicts only when material interests coincide with the protection of norms and values.*

The structure of the thesis will be as follows. It will begin with an overview of the theoretical framework, the two theories, and the resulting intersection. Then the foundation of the R2P principle and the relevant R2P literature will be discussed with a conceptualization and operationalization of the variables. Then there will be a case overview of the three conflicts: Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen. To conclude, an empirical analysis and conclusion will be presented. To establish the variables, information from several database will be considered. The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) will be used for the statistics on the trade of goods and services between countries. Eurostat, a database provided by the European Commission will be used for information on the European Union's (EU) trade statistics. The UN Charter, the World Food Programme (WFP), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Relief Web, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) department of the European Commission will provide information on the norms and values that are the foundation for social interest. Combining the data to determine the presence of or absence of geopolitical interest will create the third variable. Additional research will be from the founding documents of R2P, peer reviewed political science journals, relevant information on each conflict from both UN and outside sources.

In the years since, the R2P principle has allowed for intervention by the international community if certain criteria are met regarding the human rights violations. It has become a justification for intervening in sovereign territories. The current modern conception of sovereignty has existed since the Peace of Westphalia was signed in 1648. This treaty changed the way the international community regarded state's rights and their right of non-interference in domestic affairs. The concept of R2P stands out as unique for two reasons. First, it was the first major internationally organized attempt to draw global attention to humanitarian crises, such as the Rwandan Genocide or the Srebrenica massacre. Second, the report published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Security (ICISS) redefined the concept of

sovereignty by initiating a shift from the more traditional concept of sovereignty to individual sovereignty. The R2P doctrine shows a shift from the right of non-intervention as stated in the UN Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 7, which explicitly prohibits intervention in domestic affairs of member states, to the revocation of said rights if the states manifestly fail to protect their citizens from internal armed conflicts and repressions.

The present thesis seeks to answer the question of when and why the international community chooses to intervene. Through a combination lens of Realism and Constructivism, the theoretical framework will be established. Using a comparative case study format, the three conflicts will be compared and contrasted, looking at the application of R2P in each individual case, if and when it was utilized. Additionally, three factors will be conceptualized and analyzed, economic, social, and geopolitical to help establish the relationship that the countries in question had with the international community and regional powers. The presence of any or all of these factors will help determine the resulting response. The goal of the thesis is not to propose a new principle or attempt to propose an alternative, but rather to explicitly demonstrate that R2P is selectively implemented and that it should either be utilized in every case of mass atrocity crimes, or not at all. When the international community chooses to implement R2P only in certain conflicts, they are disregarding the original intent of the principle to intervene to protect against human rights violations. Thus, they are failing to uphold the norms and values promoted by the principle. Furthermore, it is possible that states could invoke R2P in order to intervene on behalf of their own interests rather than pure humanitarian concerns.

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

Within international relations, two of the major theories used to analyze states' behavior are Realism and Constructivism. The first theory explains state behavior as actions taken to gain and/or preserve power and resources. The second theory explains behavior through the preservation and promotion of norms and values. However, neither one of these theories is exactly the foundation through which R2P will be analyzed in this thesis. Instead, it is the intersection of these two theories that the theoretical framework will be established. It is within this intersection where the desire to seek out power and resources coincides with the desire to uphold norms and values, resulting in the theoretical framework within which these conflicts will be analyzed.

1.1 Realism

Realism is a school of thought within International Relations Theory which attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international relations is analyzed to provide an explanation for states' behavior. Realism views the insecurity of the state as the main problem within international relations. The state is the only actor who can provide security because no other agency or actor is able to do so. There are several reasons offered within Realism for why security is scarce and the issues that arise when states desire to possess different resources. Realists often propose different factors that can intensify the basic security problem, such as multi-polarity, shifts in power, and the balance between being on the offense or the defense. Realism oftentimes outlines various methods of establishing security including the pursuit of material gains to solidify not only the relationship between states, but also the guarantee that going forward the economic relationship between the states involved will ensure the continued mutual security. A challenging approach to Realism is Constructivism which will later be analyzed for the establishment of the theoretical framework.

In establishing the background of Realism, it is important to understand the major branches of the theory and prominent authors whose work is associated with these branches of Realism. The foundation of the theory lies within these authors and their contributions. There are three common branches within Realism that include Classical Realism, Liberal Realism, and Neorealism. All three branches are similar and

ultimately are founded upon the same four principles: the state is the central actor, the international political system is anarchic and there is no supranational authority to enforce rules over the states, actors in the international political system are rational and their actions are a reflection of their own self-interest, and all states desire power so they can ensure self-preservation regardless of moral objectives. In short, these four central propositions are groupism, egoism, anarchy, and power politics (Reus-Smit and Snidal, 2008). It should be noted that Liberal Realism does fall within the theory but differs slightly with their acknowledgement that norms play a role, which is divergent from the way the theory is traditionally defined. However, it is important to the overall theoretical framework because of the justifications it offers for the main question that the theory seeks to answer, which is what explains states' behavior? Realism is frequently associated with *Realpolitik* because both theories are based on the pursuit for, the possession of, and application of power. Realism portrays world politics as a state at war among all states and societies, a condition in which war is regarded as a continuous possibility, and that each state has to regard the other as presenting the possibility of a threat (Doyle, 1998, p. 20). This is because relations among states are anarchic and states are independent units that potentially could act together strategically, but some states seek to expand and prosper while others merely try to survive.

Realism is one of the most dominant schools of thought in modern foreign policy, particularly because of its rejection of ideology and moral obligation. Realists subscribe to a strain of thought that is centered around ego. Realists believe mankind is not inherently benevolent, rather it is self-interested and competitive. Many theorists share this perspective including Thomas Hobbes who feels that human nature is egocentric, but not necessarily selfish and we are guided by the desire to pursue more power to become more self-reliant. When taken into perspective of states, theorists emphasize that states accumulation of power is an attempt to ensure security in an anarchic world with little guidance. The accumulation of power can include coercive tactics to obtain material resources necessary for state security and these coercive techniques might be harmful to other individuals or states, such as fighting in a war with another state. Realism is centered around the sovereign nation, which is the most important player. The state is independent and acts on behalf of itself, utilizing military

capacities to demonstrate its power capabilities. Additionally, most realists believe that supranational institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, or other cross-national actors hold little influence over the state because of a lack of authority to follow through.

Within the notable branches of Realism (Classical Realism, Liberal Realism or the English School, and Neorealism) there are the same underlying principles, but a few distinct differences. Classical Realism emphasizes the nature of human's involvement in states' behavior. Several prominent classical realists include Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr, all three of whom are considered to be the leading American realists in the post-WWII period. Among Morgenthau's many contributions to the Realism school of thought, he published a piece called *Politics Among Nations* which offered six principles of political realism. The first principle is that politics is governed by objective laws that are rooted in human nature and in order to improve society, it's important to understand the laws by which society is ruled. The second principle is that the concept of interest is defined in terms of power. The third principle is that while realism assumes that power is an objective category, it is not inherently a fixed category. The fourth principle is that political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action and the inescapable tension between moral action and the requirements of successful political action. Realism maintains that there must be a balance between consequences of actions taken and conformity to moral law. The fifth principle is that political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a state with the moral laws that govern the universe and it distinguishes between truth and opinion. The sixth and final principle is that political realists maintain the autonomy of the political sphere, defined in terms of power and interest, of the conformity of action in relation to the legal rules (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 4-15).

Kennan is known for his application of realism in policy with his advocacy of containment policy towards the Soviet expansion after WWII. He felt that the Soviet Union should be regarded as a great power whose attempts to spread communism throughout the world should not be seen as spreading ideology, but rather as consolidating power and resources through their occupation in other countries. He was a strong believer in *Realpolitik* and felt that power politics should be dealt with

dispassion, and without moralism. The primary obligation of foreign policy is to the interest of national society and not its impulses (Krauthammer, 1989).

Among the many things Niebuhr is known for, he is widely regarded as the developer of the philosophical perspective Christian Realism. He contributed to political philosophy by including the resources of theology to argue for political realism. His work inspired many scholars of the time to move away from idealism and embrace realism. He was a player in American foreign policy during the Cold War and supported containment in regard to the Soviet Union. His position was that Communism is “an organized evil which spreads terror and cruelty throughout the world” (Berke, 1992) and he understood that it was a perverse form of Western idealism which had taken on a different form due to the democratic complicity and wrongdoings which led to the existence of the ideology. Christian Realism is known to be partly within both Classical Realism and Liberal Realism, with the former centered around the human nature and the latter centered around the international system.

Liberal Realism is also known by other names, such as the English school or Rationalism. The main focus of Liberal Realism is that the international system, while anarchical, forms a society of states in which common norms and interests allow for order and stability. This idea is at odds with a strict realist view which holds no faith in the anarchical system because there is no authority figure to hold any state responsible. There is tension within Realism about whether or not Liberal Realism still qualifies because of the incorporation of norms and interests but for the theoretical framework of this thesis, it will be included. If the framework only included Realism then it would be disregarded but for the purpose of explaining states’ behavior, it will be included because Constructivism is also incorporated into the theoretical framework.

A major household name in Liberal Realism is Hedley Bull who argued in his book, *The Anarchical Society* that states behave as parts of a whole when they have a sufficient degree of interaction (Bull, 2012, p. 9-10). The interaction can take the shape of cooperation, conflict, neutrality, or even indifference in regard to the other’s objective. The interactions between states can be political, strategic, economic or social in nature (Bull, 2012, p. 10). Another prominent Liberal Realist, Martin Wight took the international states system model and expanded upon it. He proposed a new model, the ‘suzerain-state system’ which takes the relationship between sovereign states and adds a

new layer, with one state asserting and maintaining authority over the rest of the states. He is famous for his book *Power Politics* which purports that international law is weak, unclear, decentralized and unpoliced. International law is grounded in treaties and they are only enforceable to those who are party to them. International law has no agents to enforce it, only the states themselves and has no true judiciary element (Wight, 1978, p. 108-109). He argues that war and revolution go hand in hand and international politics is really 'power politics' (Wight, 1978, p. 102).

Barry Buzan is another noteworthy Liberal Realist who questions the 'Westphalian' tendencies that classic realist thinkers tend to have. Buzan holds the opinion that most International Relations theory presupposes particular aspects of Westphalia and that the world is divided neatly into sovereign and autonomous boxes called states, but that most of history does not support this type of international system. Along with Ole Wæver, they developed 'Regional Security Complex Theory' which approaches states' behavior and motivations from a security standpoint. They posit that global powers' security interests are fundamentally regional in nature. They argue that natural barriers exist, such as geographical limitations like oceans or mountains, or even individual state barriers that change the security power dynamic within the international system (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Essentially, this theory approaches security and interests based in a geographical setting, where in certain situations, it is impossible for states to completely maximize their security because it is physically impossible to do so, from a geographical standpoint. Although Wæver does not fall under the umbrella of Realism, he is included because of his contributions with Buzan. Major aspects of the theory that they developed are incorporated into the theoretical framework for this thesis because of the emphasis on security as a motivator for behavior. The argument that states are more concerned with their region and immediate neighborhood is a key part in establishing geopolitical interest.

Neorealism differs from Classical Realism in the anarchical structure of the international system. Neorealists argue that states are the primary actor because there is no political force existing above a sovereign nation. They focus their attention on what is below the state rather than above, on the supranational level. They view the international system as a structure acting with the individuals below the level of the state. It also differs on the emphasis on the permanence of conflict. To ensure security,

states must be constantly on guard for conflict and build up their economy and military. Notable Neorealists include John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Jervis.

Mearsheimer proposed the theory of offensive realism which holds that aggressive state behavior in international politics is caused by the anarchical nature of the international system. It depicts great powers as power-maximizers whose ultimate aim is to dominate the international system. When Mearsheimer proposed this theory, his intent was to fix the status quo bias of Waltz's Defensive realism which was based upon five central assumptions. First, great powers are the main actors in the anarchical international system. Second, all states possess some offensive military capability. Third, states can never be truly certain of the intentions of others. Fourth, state survival is the primary goal. And fifth, states are rational actors that strategically plan to maximize their survival prospects. Defensive realism is founded in the preservation of state security through the pursuit of defensive strategies (Lobell, 2010, p. 3.). Mearsheimer's theory explains that the interaction between great powers is dominated by the desire to achieve hegemony in a world of insecurity, established in rational thought. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer are Structural Neorealists which holds the nature of the international structure is defined by anarchy and delineated by the distribution of capabilities in a decentralized system. Jervis is classified as a Defensive Realist, so he tends to follow the school of thought that the international system is created in such a way that states are defending themselves, rather than being on the offensive, like Mearsheimer theorized. He also proposed the inclusion of psychology into the theory which includes the element of human nature when analyzing states' behavior (Jervis, 2017). Analyzing states with the inclusion of psychology allows for explanations that acknowledge the potential for human error or an added level of emotion that is not previously seen in realist theories.

1.2 Constructivism

To complement Realism in the foundation of the intersectional theoretical framework, Constructivism will be explained using the core aspects of the theory and the major contributing authors and their works. Rooted in the true meaning of the word, Constructivism is a theory in international relations, which claims that significant

aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than the inevitable consequence of human nature. Norms and values guide the decision-making process. Usually credited to Nicholas Onuf for coining the term, Constructivism seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of international relations are socially constructed as they are formed from the process of social practice and interaction. John Ruggie, Peter Katzenstein, and Christian Reus-Smit are also regarded as contemporary Constructivist theory pioneers in the establishment of the theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Constructivism can be categorized into three different forms: systemic, unit-level, and holistic. Systemic Constructivism follows the Waltzian Neo-Realist approach of third-image level of analysis and concentrates primarily on the interactions between unitary state actors, which is a de-emphasis on states' domestic politics and its role in the construction of identities and interests, as exemplified by the writings of Alexander Wendt. Unit-level Constructivism is generally considered the opposite of Systemic Constructivism because the focus is instead on the states' domestic political realm, "the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states" and by extension, their national security strategies (200, Reus-Smit, 2005) which is well represented in Peter Katzenstein's writings. Finally, Holistic Constructivism is the intersection between Systemic and Unit-level Constructivism and works as a bridge between the international and the domestic in explaining how state identities and interests are created. It is widely understood that Holistic Constructivism is exemplified by the writings of John Ruggie. The goal of the theory is to integrate the domestically established state identities with their internationally based social identities into a unified perspective (Behraves, 2011).

Onuf approaches the theory in a reconstructive manner in which he begins with an analysis of language, rule, and rules in *World of Our Making*. The approach follows a belief that the style of speech (e.g. instructive speech or authoritative speech) impacts the type of rule produced (i.e. hegemony or hierarchy) (Onuf, 2012). Complying with the rules helps continue the cycle of rule, but with non-compliance comes a breakdown in rule and breakdown of norms surrounding the rule. Ruggie is known for his contribution to the Holistic Constructivist approach in international relations theory. The utilization of the role of norms, ideas, identities, alongside outside factors in the equation to determine international outcomes. This Constructivist approach seeks to

explain the post-WWII economic system among the Western capitalistic states by analyzing internal and external factors. This was a shift from the realist claim that international politics was shaped by rational-choice behavior and egotistical states pursuing their own interests. Katzenstein concentrated on the relationship between culture, identity, religion, and regionalism in the interstate system, especially with consideration to national security. This focus on specific norms was an attempt to explain behavioral choices made to ensure security, keeping certain identifying aspects integral to the security in mind. He is well known for his analysis of Japan in relation to their foreign policy shift before 1945 and after, in *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies*. He argues that the domestic normative structure of Japan's militaristic foreign policy that was favored before the war changed as a consequence of the war. The military was severely weakened and thus a shift to favor pacifism occurred based on the "structure of the state both broadly conceived and the incentives it provides for policy, and on the other hand by the context of social and legal norms that help define policy interests" (Katzenstein and Okawra, 1993, p. 86).

Wendt is famous for his advocacy of Social Constructivism within the field of international relations. Social Constructivism takes the position that social interactions between individuals and the relationships that are formed, construct human development. In *Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics*, Wendt develops a fundamental principle in Constructivist theory that states behave differently towards friends and enemies because enemies are threatening but "anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which" (Wendt, 1992, p. 397) because military power holds different significance for the countries despite their similar structural positions. The U.S. viewed British missiles in a different and less threatening manner than Soviet missiles because of the context of the situation. Wendt claims that anarchy has less significance in this theory and sought to demonstrate that power politics are socially constructed and thus, transformed by human practice. During the Cold War, if the Soviet Union and the U.S. decided to throw away their differences and end the war, the war would be over "It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions" (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). Constructivism is divided between two major schools of thought: the traditionalists who take discourse and linguistics to be paramount to the theory and

more mainstream constructivists who acknowledge the impact language has but focus more on the interactions themselves as the social construct. Alongside John Ruggie, Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, and Peter Katzenstien, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink are widely accepted within mainstream Constructivists to be a major contributor of the founding academics who established Constructivism as one of the major schools of thought within International Relations Theory.

Finnemore proposed beginning the analysis on the interaction between states, their identities, and interests. Instead of focusing on the social interactions between the states, she concentrates on the norms of international society and the ways in which these norms affect states' identities and interests which ultimately defines state behavior. State behavior is shaped by identity and interest which in turn is shaped by international norms and forces. The norms of international society are then transferred to international organizations which shape national policies. National policies in turn are enforced by the international organizations authority over reinforcing what states' interests should be. Finnemore follows the Systemic Constructivist view that international organizations can influence national guidelines by pushing states to adopt certain norms and values. She feels that the role of central norms in international society explains states' behavior rather than pure power maximization, as supported by most realists. In her opinion, the fact that we live in an international society "means that what we want and, in some ways, who we are is shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others" (Finnemore, 1996, p. 128). These social realities are as important and integral in determining behavior and in the political realm and that social realities provide an avenue for utilizing power and wealth.

Sikkink is most well known for her work on the impact of human rights and human rights laws and policies on international norms and institutions. In *Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights* she argues that human rights are a promising case study for "exploring and extending a theory of norms in international relations" (Sikkink, 1998, p. 518) and she credits Peter Katzenstein for his work on his definition of norms as a standardized style of behavior with a given identity. If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the document that began the norms cascade, it is clear to her that by signing onto these human rights

treaties the international community is accepting certain norms to hold true and by extension, creating policies to protect such norms. She recognizes that non-governmental actors play an important role in the conception of human rights norms, but that it is the collaboration between governments and non-governmental institutions that leads to the emergence of human rights norms. This is demonstrated in the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Charter.

One cannot debate political theories without recognizing Thomas Hobbes as one of the founding fathers of political philosophy. He makes three assumptions about the state of nature. First, men are equal. Second, they interact in anarchy and third, they are driven by competition, reticence, and glory. The conjunction of all three conditions leads to a war of every man, against every man, “where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 79). Fundamental power inequalities generally lead to an imposed hierarchical system, largely alleviating the conflict and violence that exist within an anarchical system. But even within anarchy, the frequency and duration of violence can be reduced by “constraining competition, diffidence, and glory” (Donnelly, 2005, p. 33). Hobbes’ Classical Realism acknowledges both anarchy and egoism, that it is unlikely that mankind will cooperate in a system without a governing body to provide guidance and control. There are two major interpretations of Hobbes’ view of the state of nature. The first, that human beings have no concept of right or wrong, in which case, human beings would be naturally selfish and amoral, merely attempting to get by for the sole purpose of surviving. The second view is that human motivation is more complex and that it is not that humans lack morality, it is that morality differs man-to-man. Regardless of the interpretation, Hobbes’ teachings serve a purpose. It demonstrates that a failure to respect the existing political authority leads to existing in the natural condition of life.

As with the development of any new theory, there are criticisms from the main theoretical opponents. Neorealists are the major opponent of Constructivism because not only are they skeptical about the importance of norms, especially international norms, but they are also doubtful that states can become friends from their social interactions. Neorealists do not deny the existence of norms, just that they are routinely disregarded, especially with consideration to powerful states who violate national

sovereignty. Realists feel that Constructivists place too much value on social interactions between states as sincere and that intentions are always explicit. It is not that ideas are more important than power and interest or that they are separate, “the claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas, and to that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all” (Wendt, 1999, p. 135). However, Constructivists maintain that anarchy is a more complex entity than presented by the Realist argument. It does not always lead to aggression or violent conflict and they reject Mearsheimer’s claim that realism was the dominant discourse in the period between early 12th century to late 20th century because he discounts social interactions and the formulation of identity and national interest. They claim it would not be possible to produce a precise analysis of the anarchical system during these years while acknowledging that it would be difficult to assume that friendships between states equals a deep commitment but that through carefully analyzing the degree of internalization, this issue can be addressed (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006).

Another point of contention is the Constructivist view of change because of the lack of ability to provide insights as to why discourses rise and fall. Realists feel they neglect to address the root of issue. Acknowledging norms and values does not necessarily offer a well-reasoned argument for what caused changes in the international relations discourse, but instead points to particular factors that may have played a role. To counter this claim, Constructivists say that they do study change, just through the analysis of social interaction rather than analyzing the same thing over and over again (which they claim Realists do) (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006). Both theories offer valid lenses through which analyses can be made, but one is more appropriate than the other.

The R2P principle entails a positive duty, “rather than a duty to refrain from doing something abhorrent, it is a duty to do something good” (Glanville, 2016) and it requires that states act on the behalf of the international community to protect potentially vulnerable people within a state. Applying the Constructivist lens, states act because they are driven by their own values of protecting vulnerable people. If this were to be the only appropriate theory, states would act far more frequently than they do, because they would be guided by the norm to protect those who are in need of protection. Applying a Realist lens, states would act because they are driven power and

resources, rather than a protection of humanity based on an established norm and only intervene in situations that presents the opportunity to consolidate power and secure resources. Thus, based on the theoretical debate between realism and constructivism, the hypothesis of this thesis is- *states intervene in conflicts only when material interests coincide with the protection of norms and values.*

Since the 1990s, there has been a “tendency to conflate any military action in support of humanitarian ends with military invasion for material gain” (Adams, 2012, p. 12). A prime motive for intervention in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been oil and this is a factor that influences international interests in this strategically important region. Securing the ability to have continued access to oil is an important factor to many states’ security and stability. Through the Realism lens, an explanation offered for intervention is to further states’ interests, “the structure of international relations precludes moral action except where it happens to be in congruent with the state interest” (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, p. 149) and “governments pursue their interests while paying lip service to the rules” (Wheeler, 2000, p. 23). In essence, states will not intervene in most situations except when it happens to cross the line into one of material gain and moral obligation. In this case, states will react and intervene because it is at the intersection of protecting the innocent and benefiting the future relationship between the states involved all the while securing the access to whatever material interest the state had.

Essentially, the Realism lens explains that states make the decisions they do in order to further their own interests because “it argues that the national realist appropriation of this concept leads to an inconsistency in implementation that discredits its humanitarian objectives and foreshadows its delegitimization by states’ (Doukakis, 2018). This problem occurs due to a series of factors which are fourfold. First, international institutionalism underscores the R2P doctrine. Second, it is legally ambiguous which lends itself to become susceptible to selective, discretionary, and inconsistent use by the international community. Third, “it’s subjugation to the national interests of states as expressed through their foreign policy choices” (Doukakis, 2018). And finally, its interpretation as a tool potentially harbors the right to upset the relative security and stability of the international system.

1.3 The intersection of Realism and Constructivism

Realism and Constructivism are often portrayed as incompatible approaches within International Relations Theory. However, there are often points of convergence and it is within this intersection where both the desire to seek out power and resources and the desire to uphold norms and values explains states' behavior. This intersection provides the theoretical framework from which these cases will be analyzed. From the foundation of the Realism theory, anarchy will not be considered for the framework. Anarchy is the absence of authority, that society is self-governed without anyone or anything to hold societies accountable for their actions. Instead, through the actions of the UNSC and the voting record of the members of the UN, cooperation does occur, this aspect is a key part of the Liberal Realist foundation, they believe that there is a society of states that allows for stability, in this case, the consideration that the UN can and does play a role, helps shape state's behavior. The vote to deploy peacekeepers under the mandate into Côte d'Ivoire, the vote to intervene in Libya, the vote to create a panel of Experts to analyze the situation in Yemen for human rights violations, and the numerous resolutions passed condemning the situation all demonstrate the ability of the UN to cooperate.

The framework acknowledges and accepts that the state is the central actor, that they are rational, and their actions are a reflection of their self-interest, and that all states desire power to ensure self-preservation, but also that states build up their economies and military capabilities in order to ensure security, which is a critical aspect of the Neorealist lens. The foundation of Constructivism that international relations is socially and historically constructed will also be considered to be a part of this framework because states have demonstrated in the past through the formation of alliances, foreign policies based on identity and values, and the acceptance of human nature to be inherent in the decision-making process. When states are involved in humanitarian intervention, the decision to intervene could be as simple as protecting people from an oppressive leader and liberating the people. The decision could be explained from a social norm perspective because it is generally more widely accepted to intervene on behalf of someone else. However, if that were to hold true in all situations there would be consistency in situations that the international community gets

involved in. As that consistency does not exist, it demonstrates that states are choosing which situations to intervene in and this reflects that their national interests, security desires, and human nature dictate their behavior instead of purely social norms.

Realism helps us explain states' behavior within the scope of R2P because it incorporates the role geopolitical and economic interests have in their decision on whether or not to intervene. The implementation of R2P under the realist lens only happens selectively when it favors states' interest. When utilizing R2P also is in the pursuit of material gains and solidifying relationships and securing access an economic relationship. As R2P contains intervention within the scope of the principle, it can also be used in a coercive manner to obtain material resources necessary for state security.

Constructivism can help explain states' behavior within the scope of R2P because it incorporates the aspect of intervention for a social responsibility to protect those in danger. The value of social interactions between states and the relationship upon which their alliance is formed, is integral to the theory. States align themselves with others who share the same norms and values. And state behavior is ultimately guided by the norms within the international system, so their actions are a reflection of what they hold to be important.

Chapter 2: The Foundation of R2P and Literature Review

To better understand the implementation of R2P the historical evolution will be presented. The multidimensional and nuanced concept of R2P was created in the wake of the Rwandan Genocide and the Srebrenica Massacre in the 1990s as a step above the older, one-dimensional military concept of humanitarian intervention. The concept has evolved since its original inception in the ICISS report in 2001 and finally codified in the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 which laid bare the four mass atrocity crimes that merit intervention. During the Yugoslav war, the presence of UN peacekeeping forces did little to help save people from becoming victim to extreme violence. The UN did authorize the use of force within a protective mandate, but with the inquiry issued 1999 it became clear these authorizations were issued too late. The reasoning the UN gave for failing to protect innocent civilians included concerns about capacity of and safety for the peacekeeping forces within the country, lack of military preparedness for the combat role, the reluctance of the international community to put their own citizens at risk, administrative delay and a commitment to the UN's value of impartiality and non-use of force. The Security Council does experience political and legal gridlock over authorization of use of force. In 2000, the Millennium Report, Secretary-General Annan challenged the international community to create legislation which would allow states to step up and take primary responsibility. The report underlined the responsibility of the sovereign nation to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe, mass murder, large-scale loss of life, rape and starvation. It also addressed the dilemma of intervention and the concerns that it could become a cover for "gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states" (Annan, 2000, p. 47). He pointed out that the UN Charter was not meant as "a license for governments to trample on human rights and human dignity" (Annan, 1998) and that the UN as an organization is dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. He was not advocating for a blanket allowance, but rather a list of certain criteria that if met would justify intervention and the world would not see another Rwandan genocide or Srebrenica massacre.

The R2P principle is established upon the norm that each state is responsible for the protection of their citizens and that their citizens hold certain individual rights that

cannot be denied to them. This norm was developed in the shadow of the treaty of Westphalia when responsibility of the population was shifted with the newly formed idea of sovereignty. But the incorporation of the true meaning of responsibility was not widely acknowledged until the development of R2P. The approach for creating the principle was crafted around a three-pillar system of implementation. The first pillar was centered around the domestic responsibility of the state to protect their own civilians from four specific atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The second pillar focused on the responsibility of the international community to respond and provide assistance, develop state capacity to protect populations from atrocity crimes. The third pillar of the principle focused on the international community's response to these atrocities should the state be unable or unwilling to protect its population. Essentially, the process is first prevention then protection if prevention was not enough. What R2P covers is narrow, but it is deep because of the limitless possibilities that can be taken in response to these atrocity crimes (Thakur, 2011). In the 2005 World Summit Outcome the UN pledged to enforce the use of the R2P principle when a state is unable to fulfill its responsibility and the response would be proportionate. However, within this document the UN clarified that acting on behalf of the international community meant that they had the responsibility to use appropriate peaceful, diplomatic, and humanitarian means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter to protect people (138 and 139, UN General Assembly, 2005) and would first employ more diplomatic measures before resorting to the use of violence.

International law contains contradictory elements, but it is overwhelmingly protective of the domestic jurisdiction of states. Within the UN Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 7 it specifically says that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state" however there is an exception, within Chapter VII, Article 39 in which the "Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and thus, "decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Article 41 refers to the use of armed force and may call upon members of the UN. Article 42 refers to the extension of measures provided within the

previous article and allows for more extreme measures to be taken if necessary, to maintain and restore international peace and security. The crimes for which R2P can be invoked are illegal under international law, but there does continue to be dispute whether they can be enforced internationally. In international politics, when a state fails to protect basic rights such as freedom from arbitrary killing, freedom from torture, and/or rights to food and shelter, they forfeit their right not to be subject to intervention. All states have a duty to protect and intervene, “if an intervention is necessary, to provide subsistence needs held by all human beings” (Doyle, 2011, p. 78). Both the intervention should be considered within the standard of proportionality and states should never act on matters that would result in more loss than gain or cause more harm than it saves.

The UNSC has reaffirmed the R2P principle in several resolutions Resolution 1674 (2006) reaffirmed the resolution to protect civilians in armed conflicts, especially children and women, as well as the promotion of peace and security. Resolution 1894 (2009) reiterated the importance of paragraphs 138 and 129 in the World Summit Outcome document in 2005 which outlined the four atrocity crimes the UN vowed to protect against. The R2P principle emerged from the “tempestuous international experience with atrocity crimes” (Doukakis, 2018) in the 1990s, however, the platform on which the principle is established upon is inconsistent and selectively implemented because of the legally ambiguous nature. R2P is nonbinding and political in character and because of its vague nature and scope it does not possess the status of a legal obligation. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change referred to R2P as an ‘emergent norm’ in which there is a shared responsibility on international security, but scholars disagree that R2P is a ‘norm’ because it lacks the legal elements required to recognize an ‘emergent norm’ (Secretary-General, 2004). R2P attempts to strike a balance “between unilateral interference and institutionalized indifference” (Thakur, 2011, p. 17). The goal is to help prepare the world, normatively, organizationally, and operationally to meet the continued challenges of intervention, whenever and wherever it occurs. To those who are participating in the intervention, international legitimacy is offered, as well as compliance and reduced transaction costs to hopefully achieve effective results. To those who are in need of the intervention, willfully or not, R2P offers the “reassurance of a rules-based system” (Thakur, 2011, p.

17). This structure provides instruction on the utilization of R2P and what to expect with its implementation.

The Security Council was originally intended to guard the peace and stability of the post-war community and protect the weak and vulnerable. The Security Council that exists today fails to uphold the values and norms as stated within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as adopted in 1948. The Security Council is obligated to uphold the protection of these enshrined rights and the failure to do so demonstrates an inability to uphold the original intent of the council (Adams, 2012). There have been accusations surrounding perceived selectivity in the decisions made on intervention about the Permanent Five (P5). There have been accusations that there has been selectivity in decisions about intervention due to the preoccupations of the P5. It has been proven throughout time that it can be difficult to make decisions within the Security Council with the fifteen members currently, five of which hold veto powers. “The major obstacle in getting quick, efficient action in Bosnia and Rwanda was not the lack of capacity of the Security Council to make decisions, but rather a lack of willingness of states (including members of the Council) to implement such decisions as were reached which lagged the response time (Roberts, 2003, p. 91).

Since the inception of R2P in the early 2000s, there has been a lot written on the subject. From the general definition of the principle to specific instances in which R2P was applicable there are both staunch supporters and harsh critics. It is widely accepted within the international community that humanitarian crises warrant the utilization of the R2P principle, but it is difficult to incentivize those with the power to invoke the principle. In the years since its creation there have been crises all over the world, but only a handful of them have seen the international community respond with the appropriate action. Specifically, there has been research published on certain conflicts and the resulting response, but it is uncommon to find anything written comparing several similar cases such as this paper. This thesis seeks to fill the gaps in the existing literature with a comparative case study done on the conflict situations in Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen and highlight the similarities and differences within both the conflict and in the resulting response.

R2P is a global political commitment to address four major issues: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. These are founded upon the claim that sovereignty extends to protecting population from the previously listed crimes and violations of human rights. Originally sovereignty was viewed to be sacred, something that once violated constituted a breach in the international order. Since its inception with the Treaty of Westphalia, the way sovereignty was regarded did not change until the creation of R2P because it allowed the international community to view sovereignty as less than absolute. In the years before the principle was created, the international community saw two world wars, a prolonged Cold War with multiple proxy wars, and the “bloody cocktail of state collapse and warlordism” (Bellamy, 2006, p. 1) within sub-Saharan Africa. In part due to the efforts of the UN, regional organizations, and NGOs, there are fewer wars and acts of genocide in the past twenty years than there were between 1950 and 2000. But the issue remains at large with countries experiencing humankind’s capacity for “acts of shocking inhumanity” (Bellamy, 2009, p. 1). Unfortunately, the international community’s response to these acts of genocide and mass atrocities is often times slow, timid, and disorganized. Sometimes it is because states simply lack the political power and will to step in and end the violence. Sometimes states hold their own interests to be more important than that of the victims involved. Other times, there is political gridlock, such as in Kosovo in 1999 where there were states who wanted to intervene and there were states who opposed intervention on both political and legal grounds. More and more frequently world leaders declare an interest in the situation and indicate desire to intervene, but then find it difficult to muster up a response more deliberate than expressing “tepid political responses and weakly mandated and equipped peace operations” (Bellamy, 2009, p. 2). In a lot of these cases, it is the combination of slow response, lack of will and political decisiveness that contributes to slow and under-resourced responses which leaves civilians in dangerous situations with little to no hope of resolution.

There are issues within R2P advocacy. First, it is difficult to discern measures which are directed specifically at the crimes that fall within R2P and conflict prevention or within measures indirectly related to violence. Second, the absence of discernible limits allows room for a limited response because of the flexibility it allows states in their intervention. Third, the state on the receiving end might feel their sovereignty is

being violated beyond what is necessary to protect. And fourth, there is a turf issue on which agencies should take control over the intervention. The ICISS report in 2001 originally attempted to be explicit when they set out the four areas of responsibility: political, economic, legal, and military, but the report did not explain what it was the governments had a responsibility to prevent and protect. The initial concept of redefining sovereignty was explicit within the application of the principle in situations where the government was neither willing nor able to cope with the situation, both purposeful and accidental catastrophes. The ‘just cause’ principle was only focused on large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing. Within the report, there are gaps that allow for not only misinterpretation, but also selective implementation. The UNSC is the only authority who can employ the use of force as outlined within the R2P framework and is widely considered a measure of last resort as the UN generally attempts to avoid the deployment of military forces. Beginning in 2009, the UN Secretary-General has since published annual reports on R2P and these have included measures to prevent atrocity crimes, aimed at governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil society and the private sector. R2P has also been a subject of considerable debate regarding its implementation in various situations, such as Libya or Côte d’Ivoire.

Generally regarded as the same concept, humanitarian intervention and R2P are similar in their practice and scope but have four major differences that separate them. First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military while R2P is a two-fold principle: prevention then intervention. If it is not possible to prevent the initial causes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, then the use of force is considered to be a last resort measure when all other attempts have failed and it can only be authorized by the Security Council. Humanitarian intervention allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without explicit authorization from the UNSC or any other supra-national organization. Second, R2P is imbedded in the existing international laws related to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. Third, the scope of R2P is much narrower than the scope of humanitarian intervention and only allows for intervention within the four mass atrocity crimes. While ethnic cleansing is not necessarily a crime as defined under international law, the UN has defined the act as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population

of another ethnic or religious group” (Paragraph 130, UN Expert Report, 1994) which “breeds intolerance and suspicion of other ethnic and religious groups and is conducive to violence when it is politically manipulated” (Paragraph 131). The initial definition of ethnic cleansing came in the wake of the events perpetrated by the Serbians in Bosnia in 1994. The fourth and final difference is rooted in the wording of the principle. Humanitarian intervention assumes the right to intervene in which it can “proceed without the need to secure appropriate authorization under international law” (Adams, 2012, p. 11). R2P is literally rooted in the ‘responsibility to protect’ and does not deal with the semantics of motivation.

Even though R2P is rooted in the attempt to protect the innocent, sometimes it is difficult to stop the event before it happens. Oftentimes, genocide is not recognized as such until it is already or almost too late. Also, R2P does not offer clear criteria for what constitutes serious harm to justify military action. The intentions behind the creation of R2P were noble, but in practice the principle has too many generalizations which allow room for interpretation beyond its original intention. As it has unclear criteria for justification for military action, in practice that sets the bar for intervention very low which allows for justifying a violation of state sovereignty by the real or perceived threat of violence. There is lack of a clear standard for the level of mass atrocities necessary to justify military intervention. The threshold criteria utilize demonstrative language such as “large-scale loss of life” which no attempt to quantify large-scale and instead evokes an emotional response that may not be grounded in legality or practicality. Also, the extensive international protection the report seeks to provide is offered over a “broad continuum of circumstances of anarchy and tyranny beyond safeguarding people in imminent danger” (Pape, 2012, p. 51). R2P does not offer any moral guidance for how states should approach the potential causalities of their own during an intervention. It obligates the international community to engage in nation-building after the intervention is over as it mandates the UN would need to take control of the state. During the rebuilding process the UN would need to establish and support new institutions such as political, social, and economic entities that would allow for the establishment of democratic process regardless of the original political regime that was ruling the country. This requires the international community to maintain a presence in the country long after the conflict has ended, whether or not they

agree to it. In theory R2P means well, but in practice the lack of clarity on “the central issues of degree of harm, acceptable costs, and lasting security, the international community is unlikely to embrace the R2P movement” (Pape, 2012, p. 52).

Originally with the ICISS Report in 2001, the scope of the principle was intended to include “chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict, and environmental hazard” (Chapter 2, Article 23) and “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened” (Chapter 4, Article 20). However, with the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, it was decided that only the four mass atrocity crimes would be applicable for R2P. It is natural that the responsibility to protect could be extended to include protection from natural disasters and environmental catastrophes. It could be further extended to include protection from proliferation of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, the use of land mines and cluster bombs. It is much more appropriate to use a concept like “human security than to say these are proper applications of the new international norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’” (Evans, 2009). The whole point of embracing the language of R2P as outlined in the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 is “that it is capable of generating an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases in a way that ‘right to intervene’ language simply could not” (Evans, 2009). And if the language is extended to include everything it becomes about protecting everyone from everything which will end up protecting “nobody from anything” (Evans, 2009). A further problem in extending the language of the R2P principle to include the whole human security agenda is that it “immediately raises the hackles of those who see it as the thin end of a totally interventionist wedge” (Evans, 2009).

Given all this, it is easy to understand why “many governments continue to suspect that R2P is simple a ‘Trojan horse’ for the legitimization of unilateral intervention” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 617). However, on the other side of the argument, staunch R2P supporters argue that the 2005 definition was inadequate as it did not provide clear guidance about the circumstances in which military intervention could be justified or what should happen in a situation of decision-making gridlock within the UNSC. There is a problem with the use of force in R2P situations because often times it

underscores the seriousness of the other free commitments and sometimes “there is something inherently militaristic about R2P that diverts attention away from non-military solutions” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 634). Furthermore, improving the capacity of the UN and regional organizations to provide early warning of genocide and mass atrocities would help round out the operationalization of the three commitments. In avoiding overuse of military-led interventions there is another humanitarian protection mandate that the UN has established. The Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate shares the same humanitarian foundation as R2P but differs in scope and applicability. The mandate can be implemented in times in which there is a need to protect civilians, but the need is not as urgent as that in which R2P should be utilized. It is important to know the differences between the two because of the selectivity in their application.

The need to protect civilians and non-combatants in armed conflicts has been codified in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention ‘Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War’ but carved a clear niche for the concept in times of armed conflict (Geneva Convention (IV) 21949). Within the PoC mandate not all war crimes are applicable because they are not committed against civilians, but all war crimes fall under R2P as they are one of the four mass atrocity crimes outlined in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document. The first Resolution passed in Libya (1970) fell under the technicality of R2P because it did involve atrocities against peaceful demonstrators, but it was not technically an armed conflict yet. With Resolution 1973 PoC could be invoked as the conflict in Libya became classified as a civil war and no longer protests or riots. It becomes an obligation of all parties involved in the conflict to protect civilians, which in the case of Libya, was the pro-Gaddafi forces and anti-Gaddafi forces. R2P in this case was a matter for states only, “PoC can be an obligation for non-state actors” (Popovski, 2011, p. 5).

Chapter 3: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing the Variables

The theoretical lenses tell us that in Realism power and resources determine states behavior. Power and resources can be represented as economic interests and geopolitical interests. Constructivism tell us that identity, norms and values determine state behavior. These factors can be represented by social interests. Economic interest will be defined using the trade relationship between Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen and both the EU and P5 members on the Security Council. The EU will be included in this because the U.K. and France are major leaders within the EU and will make decisions not only based on their national interest, but also the interests of the EU. Social interests will be defined as the norms and values as established within the UN Charter that members of the UN agreed to uphold and protect. Geopolitical interests will be defined using the established economic and political ties to explain the relationship between the EU, members of the Security Council, and the three countries.

3.1 Economic Interest

In order to demonstrate the presence of economic interest within the case countries the economic relationship of exports and imports to and from each country will be analyzed. The presence of economic interest will be assessed whether or not it exists, to what extent it exists, and then compared against the other countries to illustrate how strong the relationships are in relation to one another. A significant economic relationship is one that has deep economic ties in addition to a political relationship that allows for trade and investment flows, job innovation and mutually beneficial economic growth with the gradual reduction of trade barriers (Ahearn, 2012). Policies are concerned with the international economic relationship that mutually benefit both trading partners. One of the benefits of an economic relationship is the political and security benefits it brings because of the mutually beneficial relationship on the respective economy. Within the Realist lens, building economic power is an aspect that drives states' behavior because it allows for continued access to resources which ensures security.

Looking back at the Cold War, communication between the U.S. and the USSR was very limited and Henry Kissinger argued that improved economic relations might mitigate the tension. Along with security and political considerations, economic interdependence could be considered a factor in foreign policy behavior. However, it is also important to recognize that trade relationships can be one sided and thus have aspects of vulnerability. There can be economic interest in another state without there being a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, state A may be interested in state B's developments based on its economic interest. Similarly, it may not be interested because it is only state B that has economic interest in state A. To measure the economic relationship between the case study countries and the major players in world politics this research will use the database provided by the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) and Eurostat, a database provided by the European Commission for statistics on the products and services that are traded. These are both well-established sources that provides the study reliability. Using this data will demonstrate the economic relationships that exist between the case study states and the major world powers. From this information the importance given to the economic repercussions of (non)intervention can be observed and help explain state behavior. Data was gathered regarding trade flows of goods and services in the five years preceding the outbreak of the conflict. It becomes possible to view economic growth and development in relation to the central role it plays in developing a country's economy and interprets the network through which countries are connected by products they export and import.

Libya's economy is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports. Since 2011, it has struggled given the security and political instability and disruptions in oil production, coupled with a decline in oil prices worldwide. Their main exports include crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, and chemicals. Their main imports include machinery, semi-finished goods, food, transportation equipment, and consumer products (The World Factbook, 2019). In regard to the EU, Libya is the only Mediterranean country, apart from Syria, that has not yet concluded a Free Trade Agreement. Nor is Libya a WTO member. The accession negotiations began in 2004 and the negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement began in 2008, but all negotiations were suspended following the events in February 2011. As Libya is still embroiled in an

internal political conflict, negotiations have stalled and will not begin again until the EU assess the situation and deems it stable enough to continue negotiating.

Until Côte d'Ivoire completes the full adoption of the regional 'stepping stone' Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, they will remain in the provisional application state. The stepping stone agreement lays out the framework for the establishment of the Economic Partnership and its objectives are fivefold. First, it allows for enhanced market access offered by the European Commission to avoid trade disruptions. Second, it lays the foundation to help reduce poverty, promote regional integration and economic cooperation and good governance. Also, with the goal to improve West Africa's capacities in regard to commercial policy and trade-related issues. Third, to promote the "harmonious and progressive integration of West Africa into the world economy" (Article 2, (c)) in accordance with political and developmental priorities. Fourth, to strengthen the existing relationship between the EU and Côte d'Ivoire on the basis of solidarity and mutual interest. And finally, to create an agreement that is compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) 1994 as established in the WTO. The main exports of the country are cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, and fish (The World Factbook, 2019). Their main imports are fuel, capital equipment and raw food material. Following the collapse of the economy in 2011 the country has slowly started to improve and return to peace and stability (Société Générale, 2019).

Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab region and its economy is heavily reliant on oil production and exporting. Yemen exports crude oil which accounts for about 90% of its total exports. Non-oil goods are primarily agricultural products such as fish, vegetables, fruit, coffee and honey. In the years since the unification of the country Yemen has seen a forced return of 1 million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia in 1990-1991, a 1994 Civil War which drained their economy thus forcing them to rely heavily on economic aid. Their economy was weakened before the violence started in 2011 and further deteriorated in 2014 when the Houthi rebels started yet another Civil War. Oil export had been declining due to depleting resources. Prior to the conflict the EU had been a key player in Yemen's economic development by providing inter alia direct assistance to help Yemen's accession process to the WTO and integration into the world economy. Most of the labor force in Yemen is employed

in agricultural or herding. As of 2014, unemployment was estimated to be 37% and with the closure of many civil society sectors it can be expected that it was grown. In years since the outbreak of war it is estimated that 80% of the Yemeni population now lives below the poverty line and the Yemeni riyal has experienced inflation and a devaluation (Save the Children, 2018).

3.2 Social Interest

In order to establish the presence of social interest in the cases, there will be several factors proposed as a measurement tool. The UN Charter explains what it seeks to protect and what powers it has to uphold the principles, “to take collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and security, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (Article 1(1)) and settle international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. One of the purposes of the UN is to develop and foster friendly relations among nations which is rooted in the respect for the principle of equal rights. The goal of “achieving international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” (Article 1(3)) and to be the center of harmonizing action for member nations in the ultimate achievement of these purposes. By signing the UN Charter, the P5 agree to uphold the values as outlined within the charter. They stand to be the peacemaker in settling disputes and uphold the human rights and values that are most important. International Human Rights Law lays down the obligations of the sovereign governments that through their actions they promote and protect human rights and the fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups. The foundations for this body of law come from the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. These three documents outline the most important human rights and freedoms that everyone should have, regardless of their situation and from these, UN Resolutions are passed with criteria on how to deal with the conflicts and the perpetrators. These are the fundamentals from which social interests are formed. Within the Constructivist lens, these norms and values that the UN seeks to uphold are what dictates states’ behavior and the act on behalf of morals.

The first factor to establish social interest is the amount of people within the country lacking access to basic sanitation. The second factor is the amount of people facing food insecurity, not knowing if there will be a next meal. The third, the number of civilian casualties will be analyzed. This is not to compare them in terms of which conflict saw more deaths but to understand where and in what manner they occurred. Each conflict is similar enough that there will be parallels, but also different enough that each conflict is unique in their root causes. Fourth, internally displaced persons and fifth, the total amount of people within the country in need of humanitarian assistance. The total population of each country will be considered to put into context the amounts of the population facing the factors listed above. These numbers will be compared, not for their severity, but to establish that there are civilians experiencing violations of their humanitarian rights and freedoms as enshrined to them by the UN Charter.

3.3 Geopolitical Interest

Before establishing the presence of geopolitical interest, it is important to understand what exactly that means. Grounded in the literal meaning of the word, geopolitics is the study of the effects of the world on politics and international relations and “great power competition over access to strategic locations and natural resources” (Overland, 2015, p. 1). Geography is considered the study of natural phenomena such as climate, topography and resources. Ambitiously, social organizations dependent on such natural phenomena could be included as well. Within these organizations the social practices, customs, and methods of securing a livelihood will include an economy and “the step from economic and social geography to political geography is a short one, for political institutions and practices comprise a large part of social and economic organizations” (Hagan, 1942, p. 478). The core of political geography is the state and the state cannot exist without territory or space. A growing state will expand, and this expansion could include emigration, trading centers, cultural centers, or even war. The subsequent revisions of ‘geopolitics’ included “being concerned with territory, people, management for promoting national welfare, social organization, and governmental structure” (Hagan, 1942, p. 482). There is little distinction between political geography and geopolitics, but at the root of it, geopolitics “observes and speculates upon the influence of geographical necessities upon political events and

changes in the political forms of states” (Hagan, 1942, p. 484). Geopolitics is the theory of political events that are integrated into their geographical setting and the results that come from this integration. There are many types of geopolitical interests such as oil and petroleum resources. “The high pace of extraction and consumption of oil and gas, driven by population growth and accelerated by economic growth in emerging economies” (Overland, 2015, p. 2) is ultimately leading to the depletion of oil resources worldwide which drives the need to securing oil resources. There are several geopolitical factors that will be analyzed in order to establish geopolitical interest and to what extent the interest holds importance. Natural resource security, regional stability and state relations will also be considered in ascertaining the presence of geopolitical interest. Analyzing the situation will establish the presence of geopolitical interest and the absence of stands for itself.

The definition of geopolitics that this research will be utilizing is the “influence of physical geographical factors on interstate relations” (Agnew, 2000, p. 92) which aims to understand the important role geography plays in global political relations with special concern to what aspects of geography are most important. According to Buzan and Wæver, geographical limitations change the security power dynamic, and this has an impact on the political decision-making process. Prominent questions concern themselves with “how implicit geographical assumptions about state territories in global geopolitics affect both political theory and practice” (Agnew, 2000, p. 93); or how the relative location of states, resources, military and security vulnerabilities, alter the political considerations. Geopolitics does not simply ‘happen’. It is “practiced by agents at discrete sites of knowledge production, from where it is disseminated and enforced” (Agnew, 2000, p. 98). Geopolitics extends to spheres of influence and hegemonic spatial control which goes to help explain certain behavior (e.g. self-preservation, enhancing international standings, expanding the sphere of influence) exhibited by states and identify the reasons behind such actions (Morozova, 2009). The subject matter of geopolitics includes taking into consideration population problems, frictional issues between states, colonization instincts from people which can stem from race, nationalism, and almost any other driving form of state expansion. These factors play a role in the decision to intervene.

Through the lens of Realism, the drive to secure power and resources can be seen as a way of securitizing the state. Taking economic interest into consideration, strengthening the economy can be seen as a way of securing future resources and power avenues because of the possibility that others will rely on that state for financial reasons. By examining the trade relationship of each country with the P5 and the EU a material measurement will be established through which the cases will be compared and contrasted. Social interests are more important for traditional Constructivists when analyzing a conflict on behalf of taking action. but is something that Liberal Realists consider a part of their sub-theory. However, the UN established certain social interests, such as the preservation of peace and security, are an important part of the responsibilities of the international community. Then, the potential intervening states will take into consideration the geopolitical interests or lack thereof in their decision to respond to humanitarian crises. The inclusion of interests within the decision to respond supports the central hypothesis.

Chapter 4: Case Overview

These three conflicts were selected because they are the embodiment of the situations that R2P strives to prevent. In the case of Libya, it is the only conflict to this day that has had the utilization of the R2P principle as a justification for intervention. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire was of similar magnitude and scale, occurring at almost the same time, yet did not get the same response, so it is used as a complementary conflict to compare against. The situation Yemen is an ongoing crisis that serves a current comparison in which the conflict is clearly a violation of the norms and values that R2P declares to protect. It is not just war, it is non-discriminatory acts of aggression, destruction of civil infrastructure, the threat of imminent death and starvation of millions of children that has been happening for several years now with no end in sight.

To put the conflicts into context, it is important to understand the historical background. The creation of the R2P principle came as a result of the UN Charter that was created in the aftermath of WWII with the formation of the UN. The goal of the UN was to promote peace and stability with a respect for the importance of sovereignty, especially for the many newly formed independent nations or those seeking independence from colonizers (Bajoria and McMahon, 2013). This concept of sovereignty was new for many countries and their freedom would come with responsibility. In Article 2(7) of the Charter it explicitly states that nothing “shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit to such matters” but that this principle “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII” (UN Charter). Chapter VII refers to “Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression” (Articles 39-51, UN Charter) during which the UN explains the terms and conditions that might require members to act based on recommendations from the Security Council if they have deemed that there is a threat to the peace and then call upon parties to comply with provisional measures to protect the peace. However, in 1948, the newly written Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes of Genocide overrode the principle of non-intervention with Article VIII which outlines that the ‘contracting party’ may call upon the “competent

organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III” (UN General Assembly, 1948).

Yet the inaction to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia highlighted the complexities in international responses to these crimes against humanity that the UN Charter pledged to protect against. Thus, heeding Secretary-General Annan’s call, the Canadian government along with a group of major foundations announced at the UN General Assembly in 2000 that they had established the ICISS. This commission was established upon the principle with state sovereignty comes state responsibility of its citizens but, when the state is no longer willing or able to protect its people, “the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect” (ICISS Report, 2001). There are three core elements of R2P: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. The UNSC was tasked with the power to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes with a goal to allow the UNSC to become more productive and assertive of its authority. Consequently, Security Council authorization should be sought prior to any military intervention and in order to mobilize any military there must be explicit authorization or have the Secretary-General raise the issue under Article 99 of the UN Charter. It is implied that the Security Council should move these matters along in a timely manner.

The ICISS outlines two alternatives if the Security Council were to reject a proposal or fail to respond in a reasonable amount of time. These two options are to have the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session consider the situation, under the “United for Peace Procedure” or act within the area of jurisdiction by the regional and sub-regional organizations as stipulated under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (ICISS Report, 2001). In essence, the ICISS report was responding to the new types of challenges that faced the world in the late 20th and early 21st century. There have been significant changes since the UN was founded in 1945. New realities and new challenges emerged which required new expectations for action and new standards of conduct. New international institutions have been created to meet the new circumstances however, the mandates and capacity of these new institutions have not

been able to keep pace with international needs or modern expectations. Above all else, the issue of international intervention for the purpose of humanitarian protection is clear example of action needed to bring international norms and the international institutions in line with international needs and expectations (Article 1 (11)).

Within the areas of human rights and human security there were several prominent and new institutional actors. Among them are the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the ICC. The ICC allows perpetrators to be brought to justice on an international scale. The universal jurisdiction established within the Geneva Convention, as well as the Convention Against Torture, allow any state involved in which a person stands accused of crimes listed within these conventions to bring that person to trial, “[u]niversal jurisdiction is also available under customary international law, and associated state legislation, for genocide and crimes against humanity” (Article 1 (26)). These changes in law and legal norms have been accompanied by the establishment of a wide range in new international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who are tasked with implementing these rights worldwide. The resulting effect is new expectations for conduct and new expectations for corrective action (Article 1 (27)).

To ground the situation in the context of the theoretical lens the background will be presented first. The economic relationship between each country, the P5, and the EU will be illustrated using the average trade flow of the 5 years before the conflict to. Also, with consideration to the conflict, the social situation and the geopolitical interests in relation to the states will be discussed. The economic relationship is an important aspect of the background to each conflict because it helps establish the strength of the relationship and the level of economic interest of each case. The social situation is key in understanding the conflict because of the violations of humanitarian law vary in each situation which could potentially alter the response from the international community. The foundation of geopolitical interests is essential to understanding the political situation and the resulting response because of the influence that regional players hold.

4.1 Libya Conflict Overview

The First Libyan Civil War began on February 17, 2011. This armed conflict was centered around the forces loyal to President Muammar Gaddafi and those who wanted his government ousted from power. The protests that precipitated the Civil War were based on the public's growing unrest over the delays in the building of housing units and political corruption. In mid-January 2011, protesters began clashing with police officers and started breaking into government buildings. The government initially responded with an investment fund to provide the housing and development projects with enough money to complete what they had initially pledged to finish. By the end of January, Jamal al-Hajji, a writer and political commentator, was arrested by plain-clothes officers after they alleged that he hit someone with his car, which he denied. In reality, al-Hajji was arrested because he had called on Libyans to peacefully protest for greater freedom within the country, inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt. al-Hajji had written a series of articles about the political development and human rights situation in Libya and had been previously arrested and detained because of purported contempt of judicial authorities and dissent which under Law 75 established in 1974 is illegal.

In early February 2011, President Gaddafi met with political activists, journalists and media figures and warned them that they would be held responsible if they continued to disturb the peace or fostered chaos in Libya. The failure to protect journalists and media workers was exacerbated by the outbreak in violence because of Law 71 established in 1972 which allows the government to keep a tight lid on freedom of expression and allows the criminalization of assembly based on political ideology. So, anyone caught speaking out against the government or President Gaddafi could find themselves in danger. This did not stop the protests and soon they would lead to a civil war, which was a part of the wider Arab Spring.

The protestors soon organized a "Day of Rage" which called for all Libyans in country and in exile to protest on February 17, 2011 if they were opposed to the Gaddafi government. These plans were in part inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt and also in memory of the demonstrations that happened in Benghazi five years

earlier. Libyan security forces took up arms and began firing into the crowd as protestors began raiding government building and police stations. Police and army personnel later withdrew from Benghazi after becoming vastly outnumbered by the protestors. Many of the Gaddafi opposers called for a return to the 1951 Constitution which allowed for a transition to a multi-party democracy and established that all Libyans were equal before the law and all shall enjoy civil and political rights (Article 11), that “no one may be arrested, detained, imprisoned or searched except in the cases prescribed by the law” (Article 16), and that freedom of thought, press, and peaceful association are guaranteed (Articles 22, 23, 26). The National Transitional Council (NTC) was established on February 27, 2011 to consolidate change in the rule of Libya. Their main objective was to coordinate resistance between the areas of the country under rebel control and represent the opposition to the international community. They did not try to form an interim government because their goal was to have a political face for the revolution to help liberate Libya (Abdessadok, 2017). President Gaddafi began to threaten the Libyan population with mass murder, he “declared that he would show no mercy to his own people” (Harris, 2011). President Obama called on the International Community to step up and take action as he was afraid that waiting even a day would be too late and Benghazi would fall. This powerful and emotion evoking language that President Obama used in his speech is partly the reason the U.S. found itself embroiled in yet another conflict in the Muslim world. Critics of the President have accused him of not setting out “concrete objectives and failing to justify another military intervention in the Muslim world” (Harris, 2011). The NATO led mission in Libya evoked the core principles of the R2P doctrine that they were to intervene in Libya to protect the civilians caught up in the conflict between President Gaddafi and his supporters against the rebel fighters and innocent civilians.

President Gaddafi claimed that the rebels were being influenced by Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and that the protesters were “fueled by milk and Nescafe spiked with hallucinogenic drugs” (Millership and Blair, 2011). He vowed publicly to squash the revolt and continue fighting to be the last one standing. He acknowledged that there was momentum growing from the protests in Tunisia and Egypt and that they could be influencing his own people, but did not accept that he could be causing the problems in his attempt to preserve his 41-year rule over the Libyan people. UN Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon called on the Libyan president to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. When these requests fell on deaf ears, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence in Libya which they felt, amounted to crimes against humanity. The UNSC began taking action against Libya with the imposition of economic sanctions beginning on February 26, 2011 following UNSC Resolution 1970 (Thakur, 2011).

The U.K. and France took the lead attempting to mobilize diplomatic support for military action helping the Libyan rebels, but everything changed once the U.S. entered the conflict. On March 15, 2011, following President Obama's speech, the U.S. government's top officials decided to take an interventionist approach in favor of dealing with the crisis in Libya to protect the innocents whose lives were at risk. The U.S. and Britain had deployed submarines and fired cruise missiles while the Royal Canadian Air Force, the French Air Force, the U.S. Air Force, and the British Royal Air Force undertook sorties across Libya backed by a naval blockade by the British Royal Navy. The U.S. initially held strategic command of the military intervention with a Joint Task Force Operation Odyssey Dawn. The goal of the operation was to protect civilians from attacks perpetrated by the pro-Gaddafi forces. Security Council Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011 with a vote of 10-0-5 (abstentions by China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India). This resolution authorized the use of all measures necessary to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. On March 30, 2011 NATO assumed command of all aspects of the coalition's military operations. Establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya proceeded smoothly (Gertler, 2011). Resolution 1970 and 1973 allowed a coalition to be mobilized which included a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce a no-fly zone, enforced an arms embargo, included an asset freeze and travel restriction on President Gaddafi and other Libyan government officials (Resolution 1970, 1973(2011)).

In May 2011, the Russian government officially recognized the NTC as the legitimate dialogue partner and in June 2011, the Chinese government sent negotiators from Beijing to begin discussion about the future relationship between the countries. Both countries had invested extensively in the country and wanted to continue a relationship. Concurrently to this acknowledgment of a new potential authority, President Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam announced they would hold a new round of

elections that would have transparency guaranteed. If President Gaddafi won the election, he would regain control of the Libyan government and if he lost, he would cede power, but not go into exile (Carey, 2011). The international community did not take kindly to this offer and reiterated that they would not accept anything less than President Gaddafi stepping down immediately. NATO rejected the offer and resumed bombardment of Tripoli. In July 2011, Saif al-Islam accused NATO of bombing innocent Libyan civilians under false pretenses and tried to offer NATO an alternative that they drop the referral of his father to the ICC because neither he nor his father ordered the killing of civilian protestors (Smith, 2011). He claimed that the civilians who died were killed while trying to take over a military site and alleged that any other country, such as the U.S. or Russia, or even Germany would act accordingly if their military sites were ambushed. The ICC issued arrest warrants for President Gaddafi, his son al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanoussi on the grounds that they committed crimes against humanity while cracking down on the civilian uprisings. The ICC presiding judge, Sanji Mmasenono Monageng declared in the Pre-Trial Chamber I decision that there were reasonable grounds to believe that President Gaddafi and his son, al-Islam are “criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators of the crimes against humanity of murder and persecution based on political grounds” (Article IV (71)) committed in Libyan territory in February of 2011 and the arrest was necessary.

By August of 2011, the rebel fighters had gained control over parts of Tripoli although many neighborhoods remained under control of pro-Gaddafi fighters. Hospitals and clinics were overwhelmed with victims who had been injured in the constant fighting and the death toll was becoming harder to estimate. In September, both the Russian government and the Chinese government acknowledged that the NTC was the only legal regime in Libya. This acceptance of the NTC came as a shock to the pro-Gaddafi supporters as previously both countries held a strong relationship with the President. By mid-October 2011, the city of Sirte had largely been taken over by NTC forces and by the end of the month President Gaddafi had been killed in the city. Saif al-Islam was captured evading authorities in the southern desert in November 2011 and Libya began discussions with the ICC over how to deal with him and bring him to justice.

Table 1: Libyan Trade Flow

Average Trade Flow 2006-2010				
Libya				
Country	Average exports to Libya (% of total)	Average Export in Millions of USD	Average Imports from Libya (% of total)	Average Import in Millions of USD
U.S.	0.06%	650.8	0.13%	2,375.20
U.K.	0.13%	506.4	0.23%	1,278
France	0.18%	899.8	0.61%	3,648
Russia	0.06%	189	<0.001%	0.24
China	0.10%	1,517.20	0.27%	2,274
EU**	0.4%	7,520.8*	1.92%	38,045.2*
*Converted from Euros to Dollars according to the Euro-USD Exchange rate				
** Data collected from Eurostat.				

Between 2006 and 2010, Libya relied heavily on the EU to import a substantial portion of their economy. Before the outbreak of violence in 2011, the EU accounted for almost 70% of Libya's total trade (European Commission, 2019). Despite the decrease that happened once the conflict started, the EU remains a major trading partner with Libya and relies on the country for energy. The trade flows analyzed were the exports into Libya and from Libya from the major countries and the EU. The average of the five years preceding the conflict was taken to illustrate a deeper understanding of the economic relationship and economic trend. The violence that President Gaddafi was threatening establishes the presence of a social interest that the international community are obliged to uphold. The immediate action taken by the UNSC and the justification for humanitarian intervention helps illustrate the importance of stopping the Libyan conflict as a geopolitical interest, which supports the central hypothesis that states intervene when these interests converge.

4.2 Côte d'Ivoire Conflict Overview

To better understand why the conflict began in the country, it is important to look at the history of the country. Cote d'Ivoire was a colony of France until the 1960s when they gained their independence and became an autonomous country. This newly formed country was experiencing what it meant to be a sovereign nation for the first time and the responsibilities that went along with sovereignty. In the years prior, the country had reached an agreement with France (the 1956 Overseas Reform Act (Loi Cadre)) which allowed the colony to centralize certain powers within the country and

away from Paris (Keese, 2003). In the next 40 years the country would see a consolidation of power which did not allow for political competition. In the late 1990s, there was a military coup with a subsequent presidential election in October 2000 which saw Laurent Gbagbo win the presidency. However, the election was filled with conflict and public unrest. Alassane Ouattara was disqualified by the Supreme Court because of his alleged Burkinabé nationality and non-citizens were not allowed to run for presidency. In 2002, there was an attempted coup d'état while President Gbagbo was visiting Italy and the former president Robert Guéï was alleged to be behind the attempted coup. In January of 2003, President Gbagbo and the rebel leaders behind the coup signed peace accords which created the 'Government of National Unity' and the French soldiers began to be phased out of the country. This unity government was unstable however, as the central issues that surrounded the first Ivorian Civil War just a few years prior. In November of 2004, the unity government collapsed, and President Gbagbo began ordering airstrikes against the rebels who had refused to disarm. During one of the airstrikes, French soldiers were hit, and nine soldiers lost their lives. They had been deployed to maintain a "Zone of Confidence". The UNSC was attempting to keep the peace and allowed President Gbagbo's term to be extended another year in an effort to allow both sides to disarm by 2006. That year, they allowed his term to be extended for yet another year. Eventually the presidential elections that were supposed to be held in 2006 were held in 2010 in which former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara announced his candidacy against incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo.

Following the Presidential election in November of 2010 Gbagbo refused to relinquish power to the internationally recognized winner, Alassane Ouattara, despite having clearly lost the election. The subsequent events precipitated the Second Ivorian Civil War. After the international community pledged their support to Alassane Ouattara, Gbagbo and his supporters began retaliating in a violent manner. Ivorian civilians and Western African people were indiscriminately targeted, especially if they were an Ouattara supporter. The crimes being committed fell under the crimes against humanity category as Gbagbo's "security forces and allied militias engage in brutal killings, forced disappearances, politically motivated rape, indiscriminate shelling, and torture in an often-organized campaign of terror against real or perceived supporters of Alassane Ouattara" (Dufka, 2011). The Security Council adopted Resolution 1975

which recognized Ouattara as the winner and recognized his Presidency. However, there were already UN Peacekeepers in Abidjan and their mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) had been taking a beating. Their base had been attacked with heavy machinery, the office had taken on sniper fire and 11 Peacekeepers had been shot. One of their most important missions was to protect the Golf hotel, where Ouattara and his government-in-waiting were hiding waiting for the violence to end. UNOCI had initially been assigned to Côte d'Ivoire by Resolution 1528 (2004) in 2004 with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement of 2003, encourage a relationship “between the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces” (Resolution 1528 (6)(b)). The President of the General Assembly addressed the President of the Security Council and said that the Côte d'Ivoire continues to pose a threat to the international peace and security of the region, so also included in the mandate was the goal of disarmament, reintegration and repatriation, support the implementation of the peace process, and assisting in the field of human rights (Resolution 1528 (2004)).

Following Resolution 1528, UN Peacekeepers remained in the region and were witness to the atrocities committed by President Gbagbo and Youth Minister and Militia leader Charles Blé Goudé. On February 25, 2011, Blé Goudé “called on ‘Real Ivorians’ to protect their neighborhoods and chase out foreigners” (Dufka, 2011). This was a thinly veiled threat against northern Ivorian ethnic groups that had shown support to Ouattara during the election and any immigrants from neighboring countries, as well as the UN-authorized peacekeepers and French troops who stood in their way. There was a deeply imbedded hatred of foreigners within the country that stemmed from the attempted separation of ‘Real Ivorians’ from others after their independence from France. It was a way for those in power to maintain their power by alienating different parties. Blé Goudé’s militia supporters heeded the call and victims began appearing soon after. By late March 2011, almost 700,000 Abidjan residents had been displaced within a period of time of about 4 weeks due to fighting and fear of reprisals from the government supporters. On March 19, 2011, a spokesperson for President Gbagbo called on the supporters to “neutralize all suspect presences, which has only intensified concern about attacks on civilians” (Dufka, 2011). As “incendiary threats pour in from

both sides” (Dufka, 2011) it became evident that the former rebels of Forces Nouvelles, a political coalition formed after the Ivorian Civil War in 2002, who were loosely allied with Ouattara, had reverted back to their old ways. Forces Nouvelles retaliated with reprisal killings against Gbagbo supporters which involved execution of pro-Gbagbo forces detained in areas of the financial capital, Abidjan, which were under Forces Nouvelles’ control. These events were not denounced by Ouattara’s prime minister, the former Forces Nouvelles commander, Guillaume Soro which only aided to the destruction and chaos of the country.

The violence continued to escalate and on March 17, 2011, there was a rocket attack on the pro-Ouattara neighborhood in Abidjan which killed about 100 people. The Deputy Head of the Human Rights Division of UNOCI, Guillaume Ngefa, expressed his concern over the systematic attacks on civilians could constitute as crimes against humanity (UN, 2011). The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos voiced series concerns over the “rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly over the past month” (UN, 2011). Under-Secretary-General Amos also voiced concerns about the increasing targeting and harassment of immigrants from other West African countries, many of whom are fleeing the country in search of a safer place. There is on-going destruction of civilian property and obstruction of aid workers, such as the UNOCI. President Ouattara issued a statement on March 28, 2011 which said that, “all peaceful routes to lead Laurent Gbagbo to admit his defeat have been exhausted” (Mail & Guardian, 2011). UN Resolution 1975 was issued on March 30, 2011 and it urged all Ivorian parties to respect the will of the people, honor the election of Alassane Ouattara as the President of Côte d’Ivoire, and called upon the international community to use ‘all necessary measures’ to protect the civilians under attack.

On April 2, 2011 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that more than 800 civilians were killed in Duékoué. This western Ivorian city had been the main destination for those fleeing the violence in Abidjan. Neither side had claimed responsibility and within the UN there was a fear it was committed by pro-Ouattara forces (ICRC, 2011). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern, but President Ouattara denied the attack came from his supporters. Duékoué was reportedly a hub for pro-Gbagbo militia and there had been skirmishes with pro-Ouattara

supporters before the elections even took place. The UN Peacekeeping Mission had been targeted several times throughout March and April as well as having several UN convoys attacked in which several peacekeepers were injured. In mid-April the mission took on heavy fire and 170 civilian staff were evacuated. Their mission chief, Choi Yong-jin, warned the UN that they were reaching a breaking point. They fired back at Gbagbo forces and were successful in destroying the heavy weapons stored at four different locations (Choi in Smith, 2011). This produced mixed results as the UN cannot be seen backing Ouattara in this conflict. They are not there to choose sides in the conflict, but there to protect innocent civilians from being attacked, “UNOCI’s military impartiality is one of the cornerstones of its existence in Côte d’Ivoire” (Choi in Smith, 2011). Peacekeeping forces are only able to return fire when they are shot at, never allowed to initiate fire. This retaliation was seen as aggression by the pro-Gbagbo forces, but seen as necessary by the UN workers who remained in the region. UN helicopters were flown by Ukrainian Ground Forces crews seconded to the UN under Resolution 1975, with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon justifying these actions, “to prevent the use of heavy weapons which threaten the civilian population” (Kelemen, 2011).

On April 11, 2011 Laurent Gbagbo, his wife Simone Gbagbo, their son, along with some 50 members of his supporters were arrested in his residence. French special forces gained access into his home via the French Embassy and Ivorian forces were quick to enter the residence and take control of the situation. They were ultimately placed under UN guard and eventually referred to the ICC for prosecution of alleged crimes against humanity and taken to The Hague, Netherlands to await trial. While it is important to acknowledge that in January 2019 Gbagbo was acquitted on all charges, it does not mean that the violence he was threatening his people with was not legitimate or real, but that there was not enough information available when the case was taken to court to establish guilt.

Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa beans and cashew nuts and a large majority of their cocoa beans go to Western European countries known for their chocolate, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. But their economic success has been fairly recent, only since 2012, after their election crisis and subsequent political instability. They possess the largest economy within Western African Economic and

Monetary Union. The five years prior to the conflict were analyzed in terms of the economic relationship between Côte d'Ivoire and the major countries listed in the table. The EU is one of the largest trading partners, but France is as well, a nod to their colonial days. The lack of R2P utilization in this case supports the central hypothesis that the convergence of consolidating power and resources with protecting norms and values is when R2P is implemented because Côte d'Ivoire did not hold strategic importance in the consolidation of power and resources.

Table 2: Côte d'Ivoire Trade Flow

Average Trade Flow 2006-2010				
Côte d'Ivoire				
Country	Average Exports to Côte d'Ivoire (% of total)	Average Export in Millions of USD	Average Imports from Côte d'Ivoire (% of total)	Average Import in Millions of USD
U.S.	0.02%	216.4	0.05%	910.6
U.K.	0.04%	137.4	0.05%	292.6
France	0.22%	1,143.20	0.21%	1,238.80
Russia	0.01%	36.1	0.05%	108.4
China	0.03%	464.8	0.01%	971.3
EU**	0.1%	1,979.9*	0.2%	4,011.6*
*Converted from Euros to Dollars according to the Euro-USD Exchange rate				
** Data collected from Eurostat.				

4.3 Yemen Conflict Overview

In the early twentieth century, Yemen was divided between the British and the Ottoman empires. After WWI, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen was established in Northern Yemen which then became the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. South Yemen, known as the Aden Protectorate, remained under British rule until 1967 when it became an independent state. Briefly, the Southern part was governed under the Marxist-Leninist ideology and turned towards becoming a part of the Soviet bloc. This lasted for two decades until Prime Minister Bakr al-Attas began to unify the two states and in 1990, the Republic of Yemen is formed. Since the formation of the Republic, Yemen has maintained an uneasy unity (Dresch, 2000). This tumultuous history is partly the reason why the country is currently seeing such a division and the presence of extremist activity. The lack of a strong central government has helped create a breeding ground for extremist activity, especially with consideration to the Iran-backed Houthi rebels targeting the Yemeni government since the early 2000s (Counter Extremism

Project, 2018) and the emergence of Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009. AQAP had been active within the country since 2009 when the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Al Qaeda branches merged. This branch is known for carrying out the fatal shooting in the Paris office of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in January 2015 and the involvement in terrorist plots on American soil, including the “Christmas Day Bomber” in 2009 and the “Times Square Bomber” in 2010 (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). The existence of extremist groups further exacerbates the tensions that exist within the country’s borders and only further inflames the existing conflict.

Houthi rebels, also known as ‘Ansar Allah’ (Partisans of God) are an Iran-backed extremist group and political movement based out of the Saada region in northern Yemen. They adhere to a Shia branch of Islam called Zaidism, along with one-third of the Yemen population. The original intent of the movement was to maintain tribal autonomy in northern Yemen and protest Western involvement in the Middle East. The goal has since evolved to encompass Houthi rebels seeking more involvement in the Yemen government and advocating for Zaidi minority interests, relying on support from their large supporter, Iran, with whom they share their sect of Islam (Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Very quickly the Houthi rebels would become a central fixation of Saudi Arabia. The help they received from Iran cemented the rift between the two branches of Islam and the divide between the country further deepened.

The crisis in Yemen began in 2011 with the revolution against President Ali Abdullah Saleh. There was corruption, poverty and high unemployment and President Saleh was attempting to amend the constitution and eliminate the presidential term limit so he could remain in power indefinitely. In March of 2011, police snipers opened fire on a pro-democracy camp in Sana’a, killing 50 people and wounding many others. In May 2011, clashes between tribal fighters and Yemeni troops caused the death of dozens in Sana’a and President Saleh began to lose support from the International Community. In October 2011, the UNSC condemned the violence happening in Sana’a and called up President Saleh to allow a power transfer. Heeding the call, on November 23, 2011 President Saleh flew to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and signed the Gulf Cooperation Council which outlined a plan for political transition. He agreed to legally transfer the office and its powers to his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, ending his

33-year rule. This change in power came after a withdrawal of support from Saudi Arabia which led to a U.S. mediated transfer of power which came in the wake of the Arab Spring that had already swept through Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Amin, 2015, p. 19). After President Saleh's removal from office in the early months of 2012, President Hadi struggled to unite the fractious political landscape as well as stave off threats from both AQAP and Houthi militants, who had been waging a prolonged insurgency in the northern part of the country for years. The power vacuum left by the resignation of President Saleh allowed rebels to begin moving towards the capital. These groups seized the opportunity to capitalize on the instability under President Hadi's rule. In 2014, after slowly taking control of provinces across northwest Yemen, Houthi rebels took over the capital, Sana'a, and forced President Hadi to negotiate with other political factions. Soon after, the Houthis declared themselves in control of the government and Yemen descended into a sectarian civil war. The Houthi rebels quickly dissolved the parliament and installed an interim Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, who was a cousin of main Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi (Amin, 2015, p. 19). President Hadi relinquished authority and escaped to his hometown in Aden in early 2015. While in exile, President Hadi established a temporary capital in Aden with the members of the government who fled with him. When Houthi forces began to close in on Aden, an international coalition involving Arab states intervened in an attempt to stop their progress in taking over the country. This coalition was spearheaded by Saudi Arabia after President Hadi requested help and they launched 'Operation Decisive Storm' which included the Gulf states of United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan (Human Rights Council, 2018). The way in Yemen would soon be referred to as 'The Forgotten War' from the low public knowledge and low media coverage.

In March 2015, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) except Oman issued a joint statement that they had decided to intervene in Yemen, at President Hadi's request, in the fight against the Houthi rebels. The coalition then decided that Yemeni airspace would be restricted and implemented a no-fly zone. King Salman bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia declared that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would be in control over Yemeni airspace. This came as a response to the Houthi militia taking control of the Aden airport (Aboudi, 2015). Saudi Arabia also issued a naval blockade

to “stop the alleged smuggling of weapons by Iran to the Houthis” (Safi, 2018) and began a bombing campaign to prevent the consolidation of control of Yemen and block any attempts by Iran to exert influence. Yemeni forces were able to regain control of the airport with support from the Saudi-led military operation. According to the Yemen Foreign Minister Riad Yassine, the military operations would continue until the Houthi rebels agreed to a peace talk and return all the territory they had taken over since they overtook Sana’a in September 2014. Yemen does not recognize the legitimacy of the Houthi rule (Aboudi, 2015). Houthi rebels have joined forces with Saleh supporters, both of whom reject the rule of President Hadi.

Saudi Arabia began a series of air strikes to targets including ground weapons and locations with aircrafts. They also targeted the Houthi-controlled missile based in Sana’a as Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Allies “believe the Houthis are tools for Iran to seize control of Yemen” (Al-Haj, 2015). Yemen faces fragmentation, with the Houthi rebels controlling large swaths in the north and several southern provinces including Taiz, the third-largest city and the Lahj province, which borders Aden to the north. Food storage inside the Yemen Economic Cooperation in Hodeidah, which held enough food for the entire country, was destroyed by coalition strikes on March 31, 2015. This further intensified the growing food shortage. The government’s military food storage center was also targeted and subsequently destroyed in an effort to slow down the rebel’s advance. Since 2012, the UN had warned the International Community of the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen because of the growing political instability and conflict. As of 2015, almost two-thirds of the country faced extreme poverty and were in dire need of aid. There is a lack of access to clean drinking water, food, and most basic necessities during the coalition strikes which target indiscriminately (Almasmari, 2015). On April 21, 2015 the Saudi Defense Ministry publicly declared they would be ending Operation Decisive Storm because “it had successfully eliminated the threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries” (Hamid, 2015) by destroying the heavy machinery and ballistic missile capabilities that the Houthi rebels had.

By this point in the coalition offensive, the Houthi rebels were managing to alienate all the regional players, with the exception of Iran. They had rejected Saudi Arabia’s request for negotiations in Riyadh and rejected the UN’s invitation for peace

talks in Doha, Qatar. They also disregarded the Security Council's request to halt their rebellion and abide by Yemen's political transition process. The Security Council had passed Resolution 2140 which issued an arms embargo indefinitely and asset freeze which was amended and expanded with Resolution 2216 with 14 votes for and one abstention (Russian Federation) that acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded the Houthi rebels withdraw from all areas, return the land they seized to the rightful owners and cease all illegal activities (Paragraph 1, (a), (b), (c), 2015). They also issued a sanction mandate to freeze all assets pertaining to Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi who is the main leader in the Zaidi Islam movement and has made threats to the peace and stability of Yemen (UN, 2015). According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) an estimated 24 million people, almost 80% of the Yemeni population, need assistance and protection. The conflict has steadily been escalating since March 2015 when Resolution 2216 was passed and has dramatically aggravated the protection crisis in which millions face risks to their basic safety and rights. The last four years of fighting between Government forces and Houthi rebels have left tens of thousands of people dead or injured, including at least 17,000 civilians. In August 2018, the UN published a report that covered the period between August 2014 -2018 and outlined the main patterns of human rights violations and abuse of international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the crimes committed by all parties in the conflict. They acknowledged that both sides were at fault, but that further investigation would be required to identify significant areas where violations and abuse occurred. However, within the conclusion of the 41-page report, experts say that the individuals of the Yemeni Government, the coalition including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the de facto authorities have committed acts that, subject to determination by an independent and impartial court, amount to international crimes. These crimes stem from indiscriminate killing of civilians and airstrikes on essential civilian necessities such as residential areas, hospitals, and schools. Based on the evidence over the years since the conflict began, the Group of Experts within the UN Human Rights Council have concluded these may amount to war crimes due to the proportionality and scope of these attacks.

The Group of Experts was established in December 2017 as the Group of Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts to monitor and report on the

human rights situation in Yemen. The group was created from Resolution 36/31 in the Human Rights Council to determine which applicable fields of international law were violated. They identify individuals who may be responsible for international crimes and submit the information to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The creation of the Group of Experts is also in anticipation of further crimes against humanity and continued violence occurring in Yemen, to keep a centralized account of the escalating situation in hopes that there will be justice in the future.

Yemen's economy has taken a beating with the ongoing conflict. They are contending with a “war-related plunge in the value of its currency against the dollar” (Saleh and al-Sakkaf, 2018) which makes it harder for food importers to bring in goods and has forced them to raise the prices of what they can bring in (Saleh and al-Sakkaf, 2018). They are facing an ‘income famine’ which further impoverishes the poor population. The economic crisis in Yemen is dangerous because once the violence is over the economy will be slow to rebuild due to massive loss of infrastructure and the hyperinflation of their currency. Many have the opinion that it will ultimately lead to more deaths because people cannot flee from their country. The trade flow in the five years preceding the conflict were analyzed and the average is presented in the table below. Table 3 should be taken into consideration with respect to Table 4 on the following page, an analysis of Saudi Arabia's economic trade flow following the same timeline.

Table 3: Yemen Trade Flow

Average Trade Flow 2010-2014				
Yemen				
Country	Average Exports to Yemen (% of total)	Average Export in Millions in USD	Average Imports from Yemen (% of total)	Average Import in Millions in USD
U.S.	0.05%	669.6	0.01%	198.8
U.K.	0.03%	129.4	0.01%	86.88
France	0.09%	496	<0.01%	35.76
Russia	0.07%	335.4	<0.01%	0.317
China	0.07%	1,504	0.18%	2,446
EU**	0.1%	1,613.5 *	<0.01%	288.52*
*Converted from Euros to Dollars according to the Euro-USD Exchange rate				
** Data collected from Eurostat.				

As Saudi Arabia is a major player in the Yemeni crisis, the average trade flow was analyzed as well following the same time span. The average exports to Saudi Arabia and imports from Saudi Arabia are used to illustrate the amount of economic power that the country holds in comparison to Yemen. Their geopolitical power within the region is demonstrated by their ability to dictate what happens within the Arabian Peninsula. They are the largest country on the peninsula and hold an incredible amount of power. Their ability to control the Yemen conflict and strongarm the neighboring states into joining the coalition illustrates the relative power they possess. The lack of a hard R2P response in the Yemen conflict supports the central hypothesis because it demonstrates that the social interest alone, protecting the norms and values, is not enough to warrant implementation of the principle.

Table 4: Saudi Arabian Trade Flow

Average Trade Flow 2010-2014				
Saudi Arabia				
Country	Average exports to Saudi Arabia (% of total)	Average Export in Millions of USD	Average imports from Saudi Arabia (% of total)	Average Import in Millions of USD
U.S.	1.16%	15,740	2.02%	41,980
U.K.	1.14%	5,132	0.29%	1,834
France	0.84%%	4,568	0.95%	6210
Russia	0.24%	1,171	0.07%	214.4
China	0.81%	17,320	3.1%	42,880
EU*	1.84%	39,515.6*	1.62%	36,758.1*
*Converted from Euros to Dollars according to the Euro-USD exchange rate				
** Data collected from Eurostat.				

Chapter 5: Research Design and Comparison

Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen will be analyzed and compared using a comparative case study format. This involves “the analysis and synthesis of the similarities, differences, and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal” (Goodrick, 2014, p. 1). There will be three factors analyzed to determine whether or not they were present in the situations, economic interest, social interest, and geopolitical interest. There will be a comparison of each conflict and the presence of any or all of the factors, according to the hypothesis, will explain why R2P was or was not invoked. One of the main points of a comparative case study is using the study to answer questions about “causal attribution and contribution when it is not feasible or desirable to create a comparison group” (Goodrick, 2014, p. 1). These cases were selected because of the relevance of the conflicts within the context related to R2P. The conflicts in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire happened concurrently and yet only Libya received a firm, hard response from the international community. The conflict in Yemen has been ongoing for several years with no end in sight and there have been a multitude of condemnations about the international community's lack of response to the situation, especially considering the dire situation the country is facing.

The goal of comparing and contrasting these three cases is not to ignore that there are other, arguably worse conflicts that have happened or are currently happening (e.g. Myanmar, Darfur). Instead, this thesis is seeking to start a dialogue about the selective implementation of R2P. There is considerable literature about the Libyan conflict as it was the only time that R2P was utilized as a justification for intervention. However, there is not much written about Côte d'Ivoire and the intent of the thesis is to begin a conversation about the conflict. Additionally, Yemen is included because of its continued appearance in current humanitarian crisis dialogue and will continue to be discussed until action is taken and this area of the world is given the attention it deserves. In an ideal situation, all past and present conflicts that fall under the exact situation that R2P strives to prevent would be discussed and analyzed, but this is not the platform for that to take place. Preferably, conflicts like Côte d'Ivoire and Yemen would not be ignored in favor of another more ‘interesting’ conflict or disregarded because of a stronger, more powerful ally in the region., This thesis contributes

uniquely to the discussion and dialogue of the implementation of R2P within international relations.

However, there are trade-offs for using this style of research design. There are problems with case selection and “the danger of selection bias, which can have more severe consequences in case studies than in statistical studies” (Bennet, 2004, p. 19). The inherent limitations of the comparative case study format also include “their relative inability to render judgement on the frequency or representativeness of the particular cases and their weak capability for estimating the average ‘causal weight’ of variables” (Bennet, 2004, p. 20). The limitation of excluding other conflicts could have an effect on the analysis. However, comparative case studies have the advantage of “operationalization and measurement of qualitative variables (construct validity), the heuristic identification of new variables or hypotheses, the examination of potential causal mechanisms within particular cases or contexts” (Bennet, 2004, p. 34) as well as a historical explanation. These studies can identify new variables through ordinary fieldwork, such as archival research or interviews. By including qualitative answers in the study new factors can be included and analyzed to help explain certain phenomena. Another advantage of using comparative case studies is their ability to “accommodate complex casual relations” which include the economic, social, and geopolitical factors.

The comparison part of a comparative case study is “focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case... and structure because it employs general questions to guide the data collection analysis in that historical case” (George, 1979, p. 61-62). The first step in comparative case study research is identifying a specific research question upon which there will be a focused comparison. The second step is identifying variables from any existing theory and conduct a literature review. The third step is case selection, which also tends to be the most difficult because of the danger of selection bias. The fourth step is operationalizing the variables. The fifth step is coding the variables, identifying the case(s) that do not fit the hypothesis. The sixth step is comparisons and analysis (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999).

The economic data was collected from the OEC database. It is a database that collects information on countries and the products they exchange. Additionally, data provided by Eurostat was collected from the database *Extra-EU trade by partner* which analyzed the five years prior to each conflict and the total economic trade balance

between the EU and each country in the comparison. Saudi Arabia was also analyzed because of their economic control on the Arabian Peninsula and the role they play in the Yemen conflict. The total trade amount of the EU is provided in Euros, so the currency was converted using the standardized annual exchange rate (Statista) of the years analyzed. In the case of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire, the average economic trade flow from years 2006 to 2010 were provided and in the case of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the average from the years 2010 to 2014. The conversion of Euros to U.S. Dollars is to keep the economic tables consistent in the representation of trade flows. However, the Euro during this time period was heavily favored and was worth significantly more than it is now.

There were several databases used to collect information to establish social interest. One of the databases is the World Food Programme (WFP) which provides information on the percentage of the population living below international poverty level and the amount of people who face imminent food insecurity. All these factors represent the situation within the country beyond the violence and help portray the country from a different perspective. The second database used to gather this information is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) which is a conflict collection and crisis mapping project. The third, Relief Web, a digital service provided by the OCHA. Fourth, Human Rights Watch (HRW) which provides humanitarian information for effective responses. And finally, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) department of the European Commission

Geopolitical interest was established through the presence of natural resources, such as oil and petroleum. Regional stability was also considered, taking the major regional powers into consideration and the influence they possessed. The combination of political and economic factors is part of what constitutes geopolitics, as well as taking into account the physical location of the country.

There will be several types of measurement used. To measure economic interest, the annual average of the five years preceding the conflict will be presented along with the total percentage of imports and exports. These numbers will demonstrate the amount of trade that the case countries had with the P5 and the EU. The goal of measuring economic interest is first to establish the trade relationship, then illustrate the value of the relationship in millions of U.S. Dollar. To provide a measurement aid to

quantify social interest, six factors will be analyzed. First, the total population at the time of the conflict. Second, taking into consideration the population size with respect to the amount of lacking access to basic sanitation. Third, the amount of people not knowing where their next meal will come from (food insecurity). Fourth, the total amount of unintended civilian deaths. Fifth, how many are internally displaced (IDPs). And sixth, the overall number of people within the country who are in need of humanitarian assistance. Establishing these statistics allows to compare and contrast the social situation within each country. The final variable, geopolitical interest will be measured in the absence of or presence of interest. All of these variables will be presented within the next chapter in Tables 5 through 7 for comparison followed by a final table, Table 8 which compares all three variables and the resulting utilization of R2P.

Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis

The idea behind the creation of R2P was the obligations of states to not only protect their populations, but to also step in and intervene when others manifestly fail to do so. It was an attempt made by the international community to acknowledge mass atrocities, to share the responsibility to help protect and prevent one another from violent crimes. This goal is rooted in history, because the century before the world saw millions die from preventable conflicts. In theory, it sounds ideal. In reality, it has only been truly utilized once. Libya marked the first time in UN history that the Security Council authorized an international R2P operation. Throughout the development of the R2P principle there were continued supplementary features added in hopes of making the principle more effective and legitimate. As per the requirements outlined in the UN Charter, Article 24(3), the Security Council submits an annual report to the General Assembly disseminate the issues that were raised and how the council functioned. The report in 2011 detailed how they added a regional dimension of the implementation strategy to develop regional and sub-regional bodies in the application of the responsibility to protect principle. Within this new dimension, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were included to help “vanguard the international efforts to develop both the principles of protection and the practical tools for implementing them” (Article 2, (4)). However, the report acknowledged that in practice, the regional and sub-regional cooperation has a long way to go before it reaches its full potential in preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. In the following paragraphs, the UNSC recognizes the views of the neighboring states and regional bodies should be taken into account when determining a course of action in particular conflicts (Article 2 (6)). The ultimate goal of R2P is not to rely on intervention, but rather lay the groundwork for reasserting and reinforcing sovereign responsibilities of the State and it affirms that a core function of international organizations is to “permit the full and peaceful expression of sovereignty in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the provisions of international law” (Article 3(10)). Preventing mass atrocities is a legal responsibility of the sovereign State and a moral responsibility of the individual. The inclusion of

regional and sub-regional organizations can help encourage governments to recognize their obligations to identify and address the sources of violence. It is with these organizations that the UN relies on, to help mitigate the issue and avoid intervention. However, as seen with Libya, the UN has the capacity to intervene when the situation presents itself.

Before the bombing campaign commenced, the ICC was “unequivocal in its belief that crimes against humanity had been committed by Libya’s leader against his people” (Carment and Landry, 2014), but committed without a full and proper investigation on the ground as to discover who was perpetrating such crimes. Furthermore, this boxed President Gaddafi into a corner and there is little surprise that he lashed out and escalated the conflict. Little effort was made to properly mediate this conflict before escalating to the bombing campaign and the conflict rapidly escalated out of control and “had there been any openings available to the West to deescalate and avoid bloodshed, those were lost once threats to intervene were clearly made by President Obama and the leaders of the allied nations” (Rashid, 2013). The regional and sub-regional organizations that existed in the area were not utilized and therefore could not fulfill their potential in potentially mediating the conflict. This utilization of the R2P doctrine was not a watershed moment. The principle, in effect, was violated along the way and “while many ordinary citizens may have been saved from the conflict, we can only guess as to whether, indeed, that is true since a conclusion requires a counterfactual analysis using information that is not easily evaluated and assessed” (Rashid, 2013). In reality, the practice of the R2P principle in Libya merely showed the us that the principle is easily politically manipulated.

One of the aspects of the Libyan crisis that exacerbated the conflict was the breakdown of social and civil services. President Gaddafi had socialized a lot of the government which allowed a lot of the population to have access to the services they would not normally have. There was free education and healthcare, but once the economy collapsed the country faced a trade deficit which exacerbated the poverty, insecurity, violence, internal and external displacement, and food shortage (OCHA, 2016). The World Food Programme’s assessment indicated that 60% of the Libyan population (3.6 million) are vulnerable to food insecurity and the destruction to the infrastructure of the country has been a detriment to its recovery.

Some of the momentum gained from the Libya conflict has manifested itself in the form of ambivalence towards the conflict currently happening in Syria, Yemen, and other Arab states. It is worth noting that while the situation in Libya was ramping up, some were arguing that the international community should be looking to Syria or Yemen instead who were also facing humanitarian crises. “In Libya they intervene to protect the people and insurgents against the regime, but in Bahrain, the Inter-Arab intervention, authorized, or at least tolerated by Western powers is to protect the regime against the people!” (Benatar, 2011, p. 6) Benatar claims that the Western powers intervention in Libya justified the military operation using a moral excuse, but this moral excuse is highly selective when it comes to global validity. He does highlight an important factor, that the international community is selectively implementing the principles of the R2P doctrine and based on its reasoning for intervention in Libya, there should be intervention in elsewhere. However, the geopolitical interests in Libya are different than in other countries involved in armed conflicts and thus interventions are not likely to happen, so it did not happen in Côte d’Ivoire, nor will it happen in the future with the conflict in Yemen. This supports the central hypothesis that the convergence of all interests needs to happen to warrant intervention. Morals alone are not enough.

To further complicate the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, there was an existing UN peacekeeping mission (UNOCI) that had been created with Resolution 1528 in 2004. They were initially deployed to protect civilians, but the mission was absorbed by the ECOWAS forces and the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in 2007 which had a political mission as well. They were tasked with overseeing the elections which had already been postponed multiple times by the time the elections finally took place in 2011. When President Gbagbo refused to step down the mandate was extended until December 2011 and he took this as a personal offense and called on his supporters to target them, thus resulting in the peacekeeping officials to return fire. The UN had been relying on the AU and ECOWAS to keep the peace rather than stepping in like they did in Libya. But they did not “deploy a timely and robust mission to protect the civilians caught in post-election crossfire” (Aning and Salihu, 2012, p. 31). Additionally, they lacked the capacity to adequately provide the protection the civilians needed. Therefore, there is a need for the international community to prioritize the protection of civilians in

all conflicts and should be supported by a comprehensive understanding of the conflict situations to enable the “framing and deployment of the appropriate peace support missions” (Aning and Salihu, 2012, p. 31) and the response should be proportional to the conflict.

The World Food Programme has been in Côte d’Ivoire since 1968 and has played a role in the development of the securing continued access to food. They have implemented school meals and food assistance within country to guarantee as much nutritional support as possible. They estimate that around 7% of the babies and young children within the country suffer from malnutrition and 23% of people live below the international poverty line out of a population of 22.7 million people.

Côte d’Ivoire was the first time the Security Council authorized the use of military force by outside powers for the PoC mandate. The PoC mandate refers to a broad range of structures and policies developed by the UN, based on international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect vulnerable populations from the effects of armed conflict. It has become synonymous with peacekeeping operations. Partly due to the complexity of the problem in Côte d’Ivoire and also due to the different actors involved, the PoC mission struggled over what it meant in relation to protect the civilians, in theory and in practice. There is a blurred definition of who constitutes a civilian. The lack of clarity of the term ‘civilian’ “is perhaps due to the fluidity of the term in contemporary conflict situations in Africa” (Aning and Salihu, 2012, p. 30) and this causes issues when the peacekeepers have to draw the line between who is a combatant and who is a civilian. When the international community failed to act in a timely manner to stop the mass atrocities being committed in Côte d’Ivoire not only were there challenges stemming from a lack of clarity on the political and operational constraints, but these contributed to the mandate of protecting civilians. This was especially disconcerting considering the exceptionally timely response the UNSC had in responding to President Gaddafi.

The steps taken by the international community towards UN Resolution 1973 were slow but deliberate and upon the final decision it was met with resounding condemnation. In Côte d’Ivoire, electoral contestation and the “incumbent’s obstinacy- combined with the lacy of civil war and ethnic cleavages- led to the commission of mass atrocities” (Global R2P, 2011). Given the history of the country and the previous

ethnic tensions and political issues they experienced the international community should have planned for the possibility of a ‘hotly contested’ election in which Laurent Gbagbo would refuse to cede power to Alassane Ouattara. There should have been a contingency plan in place to protect the civilians who were at risk and such a plan would have mandated the UN to expand the PoC and deploy more troops or even invoke R2P like they did in Libya to prevent the massacre of more than 500 people between the days of March 28 and 29, 2011. In undertaking Resolution 1975, the UN and France launched several airstrikes against the presidential residence which was believed to be under control of pro-Gbagbo forces. Such action was taken in retaliation of the force used against the peacekeeping forces left in Abidjan, but it came too late with the massacre in Duékoué that could have been prevented had the UN acted in a more timely and robust manner.

In the case of Libya, the case was immediately referred to the ICC while Laurent Gbagbo and his former militia leader, Charles Blé Goudé, were only referred to the ICC at the request of Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. He wrote a letter to President Song in which he explains that he has reason to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 28 November 2010 (Moreno-Ocampo, 2011). Both pleaded not guilty to four counts of crimes against humanity, including murder, rape and persecution in the five months of violence that wracked Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire in the early months of 2011. In a document released by the ICC, the alleged crime list for Gbagbo reads, “Laurent Gbagbo is accused of having engaged his individual criminal responsibility for four counts of crimes against humanity, in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, jointly with members of his inner circle and through members of the pro-Gbagbo forces (articles 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statue), or in the alternative, for ordering soliciting and inducing the commission of these crimes (Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statue)” (ICC, 2016). On January 15, 2019 the Trial Chamber I of the ICC acquitted both Gbagbo and Blé Goudé from all charges of crimes against humanity. The Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor failed to demonstrate several core constitutive elements of the crimes they were charged. They also concluded that the Prosecutor failed to demonstrate Gbagbo and Blé Goudé ordered mass atrocity crimes to be committed within their public speeches. There is speculation that this decision will be appealed by the Prosecutor. The fact remains that they were

referred to the ICC and this does not detract from the validity of the argument. Beginning in March 2011, the ICC opened an investigation on Gaddafi, issued arrest warrants in June 2011, but ultimately terminated the case in November 2011 with his death. With Yemen, the Human Rights Council agreed to establish an independent investigation into the alleged human rights abuses as well as assisting with the national commission of inquiry into Yemeni President Hadi. While these actions fall short of a formal International Commission of Inquiry, there is an investigation which is a step forward in the right direction for holding all sides in the Yemeni conflict accountable. Notably, “neither one of these developments involve the ICC. In fact, they actively *exclude* ICC involvement” (Curtis, 2017) and this lack of establishing the case in the ICC ultimately the independent investigation carries no international jurisdictional weight.

While the UN acted in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the response was both disproportional and unequal in both capacity and follow-through. Almost immediately after President Gaddafi began threatening the population with violence did the UN voice their opinion that not only was he failing to protect his people, but it was also Gaddafi himself inciting violence within the country and should be stopped. Less than 48 hours after Resolution 1973 was passed there was a no-fly zone implemented over Libyan airspace and U.S. and NATO forces were conducting airstrikes against President Gaddafi and his forces. Following the same timeline, the UN Security Council authorized UNOCI to “use any force necessary” as expressly written in the Resolution 1975 (1) “demands an immediate end to the violence against civilians, including women, children and Internally displaced persons.” Also, in paragraph 6 “[r]ecalls its authorization and stresses its full support given to the UNOCI, while impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” which allows the UNOCI troops there to use force. The UN does not allow its peacekeeping forces to engage in violence unless they were fired upon. So, while the UN did condemn President Gbagbo, it is only after his supporters wounded multiple peacekeepers and fired upon the mission headquarters that peacekeepers were allowed to engage in fire. Unfortunately, the Resolutions passed in regard to Yemen are not enforceable nor do

they carry much weight as both the Yemen and the Saudi side continue fighting and do not respect the multiple attempts for a ceasefire.

Looking at civilian casualties in all conflicts provides a perspective of the violence being committed but does not necessarily separate the issues in terms of severity. A civilian casualty is still a loss of innocent life and that stands for itself. However, under the technical aspects of R2P, the avoidance of ‘mass atrocity crimes’ is key to invoking the principle, but where does the international community draw the line on what constitutes a mass atrocity crime? Is there a minimum number of civilian casualties to be considered ‘mass’? In Libya, the number of civilians killed by rebel forces amounts to approximately 1,800 from a population of almost 7 million. However, Libya was involved in a Civil War from March to October of 2011 and there is a large disparity between the number of casualties due to the media being banned from reporting on the war and lack of incentives on both sides to admit illegal crimes. Estimates vary with figures from 2,500 to 25,000, but the exact number is hard to identify. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that about 15,000 Libyans fled via Egypt and 22,000 fled via Tunisia. In comparison, during the Second Ivorian Civil War, Côte d’Ivoire saw about 3,000 dead from March to May 2011 with a population of about 23 million and about 100,000 Ivoirians fled to neighboring Liberia and 28,000 internally displaced persons living in refugee camps in the western part of the country (DiCampo, 2011). In a report published by Human Rights Watch there were detailed specifics from witnesses to the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict and it explained that many of the causes of the conflict were clear, “a decade of state-led discrimination against northerners and West African immigrants over the manipulated notion of citizenship; incitation to hatred against these groups; the proliferation of violent militia groups and their close collaboration with Gbagbo’s elite security forces; a failed judicial system; and, most directly, Gbagbo’s refusal to hand over power after losing the run-off” (Wells and Dufka, 2011).

Even before the conflict in Yemen broke out the country was one of the poorest nations in the Arab world. As the conflict in Yemen has continued the death toll continues to rise. According to the UNHCR, as many as 100 civilian casualties occurred each week in 2018. The conflict has left more than 14 million people in need of protection and forced around 3.3 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2019).

The UN estimates that over 60,000 people have been killed in Yemen since 2016 (ReliefWeb, 2018) and that cholera is responsible for infecting almost 1.1 million Yemenis (Walsh, 2018). According to the World Food Programme, 15.9 million people wake up hungry every day. Of the nearly 2 million malnourished Yemeni children, nearly 400,000 are considered critically ill and are in dire need of nutrition or face imminent starvation. The total population of the country is only 30.5 million people and about 60% of the country is in need of immediate humanitarian assistance.

The intent of explaining the casualties is not to minimize any conflict, but to compare the situations within the countries and put the context of each into perspective. The UN agrees that in all instances that there were clear crimes against humanity committed which violates international humanitarian law. The wording of the R2P principle does not necessitate a mandatory usage, rather it is a justification for action. It provides the international community an avenue to intervene on humanitarian grounds, but does not require intervention. In Libya, the international community acted on the grounds of the R2P principle and intervened, but did not act on these same grounds in Côte d'Ivoire, nor has the UN intervened in Yemen to stop the escalating violence. The intervention had political clout and international legitimacy that was supported by the economic, social and geopolitical interests that the international community had in Libya. The intersection of all these interests provides the platform upon which the international community acts, the drive to consolidate power and resources overlaps with the desire to uphold norms and values, which supports the central hypothesis of this thesis.

Table 5: Economic Interest Comparison

Total Economic Value				
	Average Export total in Millions of USD	Average Export %	Average Import total in Millions of USD	Average Import %
Libya	9,877.80	0.62%	42,694.54	2.32%
Côte d'Ivoire	2,697.20	0.16%	6,001.9	0.31%
Yemen	4,122.5	0.29%	2,873.64	0.202%
Saudi Arabia	73,746.60	4.05%	121,832.50	6.81%

The total average of the U.S., Russia, China, and the EU export value and import value were added together to demonstrate the just how much weight the economic value had. As France and the U.K. are in the P5 and also the EU, the total EU value was considered to illustrate the economic relationship. Looking at Table 5, it becomes clear that the economic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the major countries is much larger and stronger in comparison the Yemen and the major countries. The trade relationship between the case countries and the P5 and the EU shows the value of economic interest and helps in explaining state's intervention.

When examining the economic relationship with Yemen, it is important to also look at Saudi Arabia. Comparing Tables 3 and 4 illustrates the economic power that Saudi Arabia holds when compared to Yemen. Not only is Saudi Arabia the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula, but it also has the largest oil reserves. Throughout Yemen and Saudi Arabia's relationship Yemen has largely remained in its shadow. When President Hadi approached Riyadh and asked for help in retaliation against the Houthi rebels Saudi Arabia not only shouldered the bulk of the air strikes, but continually ignores the UN's request to maintain a ceasefire. Under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, "the Saudi-led coalition and its Yemeni allies have imposed a raft of punitive economic measures aimed at undercutting the Houthi rebels who control northern Yemen" (Walsh, 2018). These actions have further exacerbated the economic issues facing the country and driving millions deeper into poverty. Yemen is not only facing a famine, but also an economic famine with the infrastructure slowly being destroyed, jobs being lost, currency weakening, and rising inflation. Yet Saudi Arabia says they, along with UAE, are the largest aid donors to Yemen's looming humanitarian crisis and defend their actions saying they are protecting the Sunni Muslim religion. This economic crisis was not unavoidable. In 2016, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government transferred banking operations from the Houthi-controlled capital, Sana'a, to the southern city of Aden where President Hadi resided. The banks were backed by Saudi Arabia and began printing millions of new riyals and this caused an inflationary spiral that eroded the value of any savings people had left. Those who were left in the Houthi-controlled had no access to currency and suddenly faced a shortage in income with no guarantee it would return. Because Saudi Arabia is such a major player, not only in the Arabian Peninsula, but in the world

economy, it is clear that they are one of the major reasons Yemen is not receiving the aid they need. They hold more power in the region than Yemen and possess almost infinite resources. But they are not solely to blame for the crisis in Yemen. The origination of the issue stems from the Houthi rebels, however, the Saudi influence is exacerbating the problems instead of alleviating them.

Table 6: Social Interest Comparison

	Total Population at time of crisis	Social Interest				In need of humanitarian assistance
		Lacking basic sanitation	Food Insecurity	Civilian Casualties	Internally Displaced Persons	
Libya	6.4 million	500,000	400,000	25,000	241,000	1.3 million
Côte d'Ivoire	22.7 million	3 Million - 5 Million	85,000	1,000-2,000	1 Million	2.2 Million
Yemen	29.3 Million	19.3 Million	14.4 Million	68,000	2.5 million	14.1 Million

Within Table 6, the factors used to explain social interest are laid out for comparison. The total population of each country at the time of the crisis is presented and the statistics regarding the amount of people lacking basic sanitation, those facing food insecurity, overall civilian casualties, the amount of internally displaced persons, and the total number of those in need of humanitarian assistance. The purpose of comparing these is to illustrate the severity of the situation. All three conflicts were analyzed the five factors were examined to establish social interest, and the results are displayed in Table 6. Yemen has the largest population of the three conflicts, but also has the largest percentage of population affected. Libya is the smallest country of the three and while their numbers are much lower than the other two conflicts, they suffered, nonetheless. The point of providing these numbers was not to compare levels of severity, but to illustrate that there were people impacted by the violence and put the conflicts into context. And in the case of Yemen, these numbers continue to rise.

The UN agreed that in both Libya and Côte d'Ivoire there were threats to the peace and security of the country. In the case of Libya, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asked President Gaddafi to stop threatening the use of violence against innocent civilians and when he ignored the request the UN acted in accordance and used as much force as they felt was necessary. In Côte d'Ivoire, the MINUCI peacekeeping mission was deployed to prevent the escalation of violence, but unfortunately was unable to complete their mission. They were ultimately replaced by the UNOCI and, according to

Human Rights Watch, have successfully demonstrated evidence of improved security (2017). The UN cites this mission as a success and has since closed their doors and left the country. However, the departure coupled with recent mutinies “underscore the need to intensify efforts to address longstanding impunity and professionalize the security forces” (Human Rights Watch, 2017) which would include strengthening the military justice system to hold those accountable for actions taken in the 2011 conflict and improving the disciplinary mechanisms. The Ivorian government is now the sole party responsible for addressing the human rights challenges that threaten the stability of the country. If the UN had taken proper steps as outlined in the R2P doctrine and address pillars one and two, perhaps Côte d’Ivoire would not be facing continued ethnic tensions and conflict.

Famine has only officially been declared by the UN in the last 20 years, in Somalia and in South Sudan. This changed in 2018 when famine was officially declared by the UN because Yemen is not only facing a vast food shortage, but also an income famine. People simply do not have enough money to buy enough food to keep themselves alive. The currency continues to fluctuate which impairs the ability of traders and shipping companies to import food safely into the country. The Saudis have learned that they can get away with a lot in Yemen considering the high bar for Western tolerance. The World Food Programme and the Food Agriculture Organization has officially determined that 73,000 Yemeni civilians in rebel-held areas are enduring famine conditions. Since 2015, a stalled peace process and a severe economic decline that has accelerated the collapse of essential basic services and institutions. Yemen is facing a protracted political, humanitarian and developmental crisis. The country is facing the world’s largest humanitarian crisis with 22.2 million people (close to 75% of the population) in need of humanitarian aid and protection and no ability to for aid workers to provide it (Special Envoy Yemen, Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, 2012). Additionally, Yemen is in the middle of one of the largest cholera epidemics in recent history (WHO, 2018) and with only half of health facilities fully functioning, the capability of the health system to respond to disease and injuries is compromised. Over 50% of the Yemeni population are in need of urgent assistance and despite UN efforts, fighting continues to happen.

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Table 7: Geopolitical Interest Comparison

	Geopolitical Interest		
	Natural Resource Security	Regional Stability	State Relations
Libya	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire			X
Yemen			

The comparison table presented above is an illustrative guide to present the three factors included in establishing geopolitical interest and contrast them in each conflict. In the case of Libya, there was natural resource security, regional stability, and existing state relations that created the presence of geopolitical interest. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, there were existing state relations especially with France but that was not enough to create the presence of geopolitical interest. In regard to Yemen, there was no presence of natural resource security, no regional stability, and no existing state relations because of the existing political ties with their regional hegemon, Saudi Arabia. There is a presence of geopolitical interest with Saudi Arabia which resulted in the absence of geopolitical interest in Yemen.

The U.S. had geopolitical interests in Libya which shaped their response to the crisis because, “Libya is also a theater for the power competitions among North Africa and Middle Eastern states, with American allies and partners on both sides” (Estelle, 2017, p. 1). The U.S. especially have a stake in Libyan politics stemming from the

origination of Gaddafi's rule, as they had originally backed Gaddafi in the coup d'état to take out King Idris and recognized the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in 1969. The Nixon administration decided to maintain a diplomatic relationship with Libya and Gaddafi in the hope of establishing a more economic connection to potentially influence the state into becoming more pro-Western (U.S. Government, White House Files, 2011). The country's proximity to the European continent played a role in the EU's response and their geopolitical interest in Libya as the country is a "key transit node for the migrant flow destabilizing Europe" (Estelle, 2017, p. 1). Libya is one of the major ports through which migrants are reaching the Mediterranean in an attempt to land on European soil to claim asylum. But the Libyan crisis is no longer confined to Libya. It has spread throughout Northern Africa destabilizing the continent, fueling geopolitical competitions, and exacerbating the European migrant crisis. After the fall of Gaddafi and the controls he placed on migration became destabilized and "uncorked massive migrant flows" (Estelle, 2017, p. 5). An overwhelming majority of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are seeking better opportunities in Europe and are attempting to cross the Mediterranean and enter through Italy, relying on the protocols in place within the EU legal system to protect them once they reach European soil. With the incorporation of geopolitical interest into the decision to intervene or not to intervene, the choice carries more weight. The economic relationship between Libya and the EU is one built on proximity and access to the market. Libya has a strong economic relationship with the U.S., France, and the U.K., and are responsible for a sizeable portion of the total import and export amount. The UN decided, with the passing of Resolutions 1970 and 1975, there were violations of humanitarian rights and acting under the Charter, took a stand to stop the violence. The physical proximity to the EU and the location of the country was of importance to both the EU and to the U.S. in their relations within the region and they acted according to protect those interests.

Under the guise of Operation Decisive Storm, Saudi Arabia's intervention can be interpreted as a step towards curbing Iranian expansion into the Arabian Peninsula rather than a step towards protecting Yemen during its civil war. The coalition is made up of nine Arab countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Operation Decisive Storm ended in April 2015 and the coalition launched Operation Restoring Hope. The use of force did not end. Airstrikes have

caused the majority of the civilian deaths in Yemen, but the Houthi rebels have also used weapons to kill indiscriminately. Qatar was suspended from the coalition due to the 2017 Qatari Diplomatic Crisis (Ulrichsen, 2018) and Morocco withdrew their support in early 2019 due to the deterioration of the Moroccan-Saudi relations (Bey, 2019). The war is widely seen as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yemen is stuck between a rock and a hard place. They had relied on Saudi Arabia for years and now are being held hostage in their own country. “Saudi Arabia’s tight control over all air and sea movements into northern Yemen has effectively made the area a prison for those who live there” (Walsh, 2018). Saudi Arabia is such a major player on the Arabian Peninsula, both economically and physically, that they control the peninsula. Because Saudi Arabia is such a regional power, the attempt to not upset regional stability can be explained through inaction of the international community. Intervention could potentially upset natural resource security and state relations in the Arabian Peninsula. Côte d’Ivoire had a relationship with France stemming from their colonial days, but it was not strong enough to warrant intervention.

U.N. sponsored peace talks in September 2018 failed before they could get off the ground. This failure was in part caused by the absence of the Houthi rebels who claim they were blocked by Saudi Arabia as they have control over Yemeni airspace. Neither side is willing to come to a conclusion on regional negotiations and have come to a stalemate. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly blocked a cease-fire agreement in late October/early November and the U.S. and China backed this opposition because they were seeking an all-encompassing strategy rather than limiting the ceasefire to one location. Neither France nor Russia had an opinion on the ceasefire resolution. The U.S. has a primary goal of supporting Saudi Arabia in defeating the Houthi rebels and pushing back against Iran’s influence in Yemen (DeYoung and Ryan, 2017). However, in 2018 U.S. Congress voted to end American involvement in Yemen. Many had expressed concern over the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and the push to end involvement also signaled the beginning of renewed humanitarian interest in the region.

Table 8: Overall Comparison

Comparison Table				
	Economic Interest	Social Interest	Geopolitical Interest	R2P?
Libya	X	X	X	Yes
Côte d'Ivoire		X		No
Yemen		X	X	No

The international community selectively utilized R2P in Libya and justified humanitarian intervention for the sake of protecting the Libyan population from their leader, President Gaddafi. Despite a similar situation in Côte d'Ivoire, there was no utilization of R2P, nor was there intervention. There was a duty of the Security Council to uphold the UN Charter, but with the lack of economic and geopolitical interest in the country there was no action. The world is watching as Yemen is coming into its 4th year of a conflict and the majority of its population is in need of humanitarian assistance. There are obvious and clear social interests in the country, but the geopolitical interest is with maintaining the regional stability by placating Saudi Arabia and following their lead in the conflict. R2P “is based on undemocratic and unsustainable premises. It discriminates between powerful and weak states and thus resembles the much condemned and obsolete Indian caste system- who will get and give up what rights in a hierarchical system” (Nuruzzaman, 2014). This utilization of the R2P principle was not a watershed moment, it was a demonstration of how easily it can be politically manipulated to fit the situation at hand. The explanation for this behavior boils down to Western intervention is justified using a moral excuse, but this moral excuse is highly selective when it comes to global validity, “generally, the conduct of the Western powers regarding Bahrain and elsewhere contradicts the values that it is supposed to promote in Libya” (Benatar, 2011, p. 6).

Analyzing the three factors within the lens of constructivism, the theory would hold true if in all situations there was intervention under the justification of R2P. The international community would be intervening on behalf of upholding the norms and values as enshrined within the UN Charter. They intervened in Libya to protect the civilians targeted by Gaddafi supporters. They would have intervened in Côte d'Ivoire

to support the innocent civilians targeted by pro-Gbagbo supporters and tried to stop the mass internal displacement and exodus to find safety. They would be intervening in Yemen to stop the humanitarian crisis currently happening. People would not be facing imminent starvation and children would have access to the medical and nutritional care they so desperately need if upholding norms and values was the crux of the utilization of R2P. Rather, under the realist lens, the utilization of the R2P principle holds true when the international community intervene at the juxtaposition of all three factors. When there is an economic, a social, and a geopolitical interest. The P5 would not be scrutinized for selectively choosing conflicts to intervene in because there would be a blanket utilization of R2P in all situations that fulfilled the criteria. The UNSC would be accomplishing the duty of protecting the innocent and the weak as they were originally intended to do so as outlined with the UN Charter.

Conclusion:

The objective of the thesis was to analyze three conflicts: Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, and Yemen, compare and contrast them, and answer several questions- *What factors affected the application of the R2P principle in states' intervention? Why was R2P used in some instances of humanitarian crises but not others?* Two theoretical lenses were introduced and using factors from both a theoretical framework was established from which the conflicts were analyzed. Using an intersection of Realism and Constructivism, the points of convergence were within the intersection of the desire to seek out power and resources and the desire to uphold norms and values. The framework acknowledged and accepted that the state is the central actor, that they are rational, and their actions are a reflection of their self-interest, and that all states desire power to ensure self-preservation. One of the roots of Constructivism is that international relations is socially and historically constructed, and this was considered to be integral to the framework because states have demonstrated in the past through the formation of alliances, foreign policies based on identity and values, to be inherent in the decision-making process. The factors analyzed (economic, social, and geopolitical interests) were selected because of their relevance within the theoretical framework and their ability to illustrate the concepts as outlined within both theories. Economic and geopolitical interests are representative of the priorities of the Realist approach and social interests is reflective of the priorities of the Constructivist approach.

One of the purposes of the thesis was to establish the foundation of R2P to help explain why the principle was originally created and for what purpose it was intended. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's original wish for the international community was to avoid another Rwandan Genocide or another Srebrenica massacre. While the principle was established on emotional grounds, it held political and social weight as the world saw the end of the Cold War and moved into a new century. No longer could countries hide their atrocities. The principle is literally rooted in the 'responsibility to protect' and does not deal with the semantics of motivation, so the international community would not have to dissect the actions taken by the leaders of the countries they were intervening in, but intervene on humanitarian grounds. This is not to be confused with humanitarian intervention, which is centered around military intervention. Both deal

with mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity), but R2P is a two-pronged approach, prevention then intervention.

When the UNSC passed Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011 it was hailed as a groundbreaking diplomatic moment. Then on March 17, 2011 Resolution 1973 was passed which was regarded as a “timely and proportional intervention to ensure the protection of civilians at grave risk of mass atrocities” (Adams, 2012, p. 3) which was only invoked as a last resort. In the years since, there has been debate regarding the meaning of these resolutions and their implementation. Some feel that the intervention was hijacked by enthusiasts of ‘regime change’ and others feel that the actions taken were appropriate in scope and duration. As a result, proportionality and motivation have been questioned which “undermine the unanimity that initially existed” (Adams, 2012), p. 3. The fallout of the Libyan Civil War, among the estimated 25,000 Libyan soldiers, civilians, and rebel deaths was the untimely demise of its leader, President Gaddafi. Originally the UN, the ICC, and other international human rights organizations intended to bring President Gaddafi to justice and called for an investigation. Unfortunately, before that could happen, he was killed in the streets during the Battle of Sirte by rebel forces. There were numerous war crimes committed on both sides during the Civil War and Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International had raised some concerns about the conduct of certain rebel units. The UN acknowledged in the International Commission of Inquiry that both pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi forces had committed war crimes which breached international human rights law (OHCHR (119) (120), 2011). The report also concluded that “those responsible for abuses now are committing them on an individual or unit level, and not as part of a system of brutality sanctioned by the central government” (OHCHR (39), 2011).

The culmination of the Libyan Civil War led to a reflection regarding the legitimacy of the intervention. Harsh critics of the intervention, such as former South African President Thabo Mbeki felt that the intervention in Libya ignored all attempts at peaceful resolution, as sought after by the African Union (AU) who attempted to bring a panel to Libya to begin discussions of restoring peace within the country through diplomatic means. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also spoke up against the intervention, but with much more constructive criticism. He expressed concern over how quickly regime change came to Libya, because Resolution 1973 was

aimed at the protection of civilians, not the removal of dictators. Supporters of the implementation of R2P in the Libya case say that it was a turning point in the utilization of the principle because the “context, purpose, and effect demonstrated the Security Council’s willingness to operationalize the R2P norm- and robustly” (Breakey and Frances, 2011, p. 40). All three pillars of R2P were satisfied, the first pillar through the failure of the Libyan government to protect its civilians, the second pillar with the international community’s willingness to respond and protect, and the third pillar through the UNSC authorization for the use of force to “states manifestly violating their First Pillar responsibilities” (Breakey and Frances, 2011, p. 40).

Although Côte d’Ivoire has a history of civil war during which atrocities were committed by both sides, the outbreak of violence during the election in 2010-2011 was the conclusion of ethnic and political tension that had been fostered since the country’s independence from France in 1960. The UNOCI was originally tasked with facilitating the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2003 under Resolution 1528 (2004) however they remained in the country following the political crisis after the election. The intent was to protect civilians, support the Ivorian Government in the disarmament process, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, as well as monitor and promote human rights. There was R2P language in the resolutions passed by the UNSC “recalling that the Ivorian leaders bear primary responsibility for ensuring peace and protecting the civilian population” (1, Resolution 1962 (2010)), but only asked the Secretary-General to “facilitate, as appropriate, political dialogue between the Ivorian stakeholders in order to ensure peace in Côte d’Ivoire and respecting the outcome of the Presidential election” (Paragraph 2). The tone of the resolution was different than the resolutions passed in Libya.

The UN widely credits the humanitarian response as one of the largest and most efficient. But they have suffered many setbacks including the violation of ceasefire attempts and the near total destruction of the country’s infrastructure and civil society. It is within the response though, that it becomes clear the approach the international community is taking. They have not invoked R2P as a justification for intervention because of a clear lack of geopolitical and economic interests. R2P is a positive duty, but the international community is not taking action.

The economic relationship between Libya and the EU is one built on proximity and access to the market. Libya has a strong economic relationship with the U.S., France, and the U.K, and are responsible for a sizeable portion of the total import and export amount. The Security Council decided, with the passing of Resolutions 1970 and 1975, there were violations of humanitarian rights and acting under the Charter, took a stand to stop the violence. The physical proximity to the EU and the location of the country was of importance to both the EU and to the U.S. in their relations within the region and they acted according to protect those interests. With deploying peacekeepers to Côte d'Ivoire, the Security Council declared there was a violation of rights they hold important as enshrined in the UN Charter. But neither the economic relationship nor the geopolitical interest in Côte d'Ivoire was strong enough to warrant intervention because the international community did not gain anything in intervening. In comparison to Libya, Côte d'Ivoire was merely another conflict in an area of the world that did not attract much attention outside of the region. The gradual push to end the conflict in Yemen can be explained with consideration to the factors. There is an economic relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, but not necessarily a strong economic relationship between Yemen and the P5, nor with the EU. The relationship and dependency on Saudi Arabia is much stronger than the relationship with Yemen. The UN has repeatedly made it clear that there are gross violations of humanitarian rights and mass atrocity crimes are being committed. And through their multiple resolutions attempting to curb the violence makes it clear that the UN is trying to do something, just not acting as powerfully as in Libya. Saudi Arabia has made it clear that they are in charge of the Arabian Peninsula and will not play nice with others. The Yemeni population will continue to suffer until the international community decides to take a stand against Saudi Arabia and the other members of the GCC.

In summary, the research done for this thesis sought to demonstrate with the presence of economic, social, and geopolitical factors, came the utilization of R2P. In the case of Libya, there was an economic relationship between the country, the P5 and the EU. The strongest relationship was between the EU and Libya, with China being second. The EU accounted for a majority of Libya's trade prior to the conflict and remains a strong trading partner. There were UN Resolutions passed expressing international condemnation for the actions that President Gaddafi had taken and the

violence he threatened. These resolutions contained steps that should be taken in bringing President Gaddafi and his followers to justice. There also were geopolitical interests such as the U.S.' stake in the oil industry and the EU's interest in stemming the flow of migrants coming through Libya onto European soil. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire there was not strong economic interest. The strongest relationship that Côte d'Ivoire had was with France which was almost equal to the average export total in millions of Dollars that Côte d'Ivoire had with the EU. Their weakest economic relationship was with Russia. The Security Council passed several resolutions regarding Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters, but conflict within the country did not disrupt regional stability. Ultimately there was no utilization of R2P. With the current conflict in Yemen, the country is facing an economic decline. Any economic relationship the country had before the outbreak of violence was overshadowed by their dominant neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The presence of the regional power in the conflict has allowed the situation to further deteriorate. The UN has passed resolutions on the conflict in Yemen, requesting ceasefires and asking for safe passage for medical professionals. Yet, the conflict continues. Saudi Arabia controls the geopolitical interests on the Arabian Peninsula, so any interest that the international community might have in Yemen is overshadowed. The selective implementation of R2P in Libya but not in either of the other cases is demonstrative of the interests involved.

There are limitations to this thesis that should be acknowledged. Only three conflicts were analyzed. There was only so much information that could be presented within this thesis to stay within the designated parameters. Only the economic trade relationship could be analyzed between the case countries because of lack of access to databases containing Foreign Direct Investment material. That information would have helped demonstrate a stronger economic relationship between the countries. Two theoretical lenses were used but not all aspects of each lens were used in the creation of the theoretical framework. The exclusion of certain aspects might be seen as a limitation, but the intent was to create the tool to analyze the situation on the implementation of R2P. These principles that were promoted and applied to the conflicts were used to understand each situation and the resulting response.

With consideration to the limitations of this thesis, there are also several contributions. This thesis starts a dialogue, a conversation about the conflict in Côte

d'Ivoire and how it received international snub in respect to the similarities with the Libyan conflict. There is also potential future contribution in this field with research into the situations in Myanmar, Syria, Bahrain, or any of the other conflicts that could potentially warrant the utilization of R2P. The goal of the research for this thesis was to establish that R2P is not widely used when it should be. There is a gap in the R2P literature on analysis of selective implementation that this thesis seeks to help fill and inspire future research.

In comparing these three conflicts it becomes evident that, despite the similarities and severity of the situation, the international community invokes the utilization of the R2P principle when it matches the unwritten criteria for intervention, the central hypothesis that the convergence of consolidation of power and resources with upholding norms and values. While the wording of R2P necessitates intervention in specific scenarios, when either of the four violent situations are occurring, the actual implementation of R2P demonstrates how actions speak louder than words. This thesis will not attempt to provide an alternative principle which might be conveyed as a limitation. The purpose was not to propose an alternative, but to highlight the misappropriation of the R2P principle. To change the R2P mandate to a requirement would cross over into dangerous territory in which the principle could be grossly misused and abused. Rather, the intent of the thesis is to demonstrate that if the international community is not going to utilize the R2P principle the way it was meant to be, then do not have it at all. Do not ignore conflicts because they do not satisfy unspoken criteria for intervention. Either intervene under the pretext of R2P or do not have it to collect dust and only be brought out when the situation suits the relevant actors.

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