



Faculty of Social Sciences
Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies

Giulia Musso

**The role of gender and gender equality in the state security policies’
implementation and understanding: the case of Italy and Sweden**

IRRS Master’s Thesis

Supervisors:

Stefano Braghioli, Associate Professor, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University
of Tartu, Estonia

Thomas Linsenmaier, Analyst, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu,
Estonia

Tartu 2023

Authorship Declaration

I have prepared this thesis independently. All the views of other authors, as well as data from literary sources and elsewhere, have been cited.

Word count of the thesis: 23,037

Name, date

Giulia Musso, 14.05.2023

Non-exclusive licence to reproduce thesis and make thesis public

I, Giulia Musso, (personal code: 49509240056) herewith grant the University of Tartu a free permit (non-exclusive licence) to the work created by me *The role of gender and gender equality in the state security policies' implementation and understanding: the case of Italy and Sweden*, supervisors Stefano Braghiroli and Thomas Linsenmaier,

- reproduce, for the purpose of preservation, including for adding to the DSpace digitalarchives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- to make the work specified in p. 1 available to the public via the web environment of the University of Tartu, including via the DSpace digital archives until the expiry of the term of copyright;
- I am aware of the fact that the author retains the rights specified in p. 1;
- I certify that granting the non-exclusive licence does not infringe other persons' intellectual property rights or rights arising from the personal data protection legislation.

Table of Content

I. Introduction	6
II. The inclusion of gender in security studies and foreign policy analysis	8
1. Security studies: from conventional to alternative literature	8
Feminist security studies: critique, evolution and divisions	9
2. Feminist theories: gender in shaping state's security attitude	11
State's security as a gendered discourse: peaceful women and assertive man	11
The 'Women and Peace hypothesis' debate	12
Gender equality and state aggression hypothesis	13
3. Gender in IR as a missing element: Feminist foreign policy analysis	15
Gender in state's decision-making: women's leadership and use of force	16
Gender equality in FFPA: how gender-context shapes female leaders' decisions	18
Female leaders and higher gender equality: a more peaceful state?	20
III. Gendered Comparative Study between Italy and Sweden	22
Discourse Analysis to detect leaders' gender identity	22
The gender equality variable: relevance and operationalisation	23
Feminist foreign policy analysis and the Crisis Management Technique Model	24
Italy and Sweden: case selection, research design and data collection	26
Validity and Limitation	28
IV. Leaders comparative study: gender identity and gender equality	30
1. Gender Identity in Italy: Giorgia Meloni and Mario Draghi	30
2. Gender Identity in Sweden: Magdalena Andersson and Ulf Kristersson	32
3. Degree of Gender Equality: Italy and Sweden	33
The Health Variable	33
The Empowerment Variable	35
The Labour Variable	37
V. Security comparative study: feminist versus militarized foreign policy?	40
1. Security understanding and implementation in Italy: militarized?	40
Mario Draghi: initial security response to the conflict in Ukraine	40
Giorgia Meloni: security response of the first female Italian Prime Minister	46
2. Security understanding and implementation in Sweden: human-concerned?	50
Magdalena Andersson: Swedish Foreign Policy more feminist than ever?	50
Ulf Kristersson: turnover to a Swedish militarized security Foreign Policy	53
VI. Findings on the role of Gender	57

Case by case analysis: Gender differences in Italy and in Sweden.....	57
VII. Concluding remarks: lessons learnt from the comparison.....	60
VIII. References	64

I. Introduction

The increment of women in the state's power position has raised questions about their impact on the decision-making process and the state's behaviour internationally and domestically. Indeed, even though more women have become Presidents, Prime Ministers or just politicians since the II World War, their number still represents a minority. Hence, whether women would promote a more peaceful and cooperative approach towards political matters, conflicts, and international relations has not yet been fully established, remaining mainly understudied.

Primarily regarding conflict, feminist IR scholars have been divided into considering maternal nature as a driver for the formation of a more peaceful international environment, or as the main stereotype about women's reactions to security issues. Looking at the political world through Realism, security exists only across the enhancement of the state military power. This has been linked to masculine socially imposed qualities undermining the presence of feminine traits, and women, in the political realm. Nevertheless, IR feminists have hypothesized that women would alter the traditional state's implementation and understanding of security applying a more peaceful, cooperative, and human-centric response to assertiveness. Secondly, feminists have theorized that this security attitude would be employed by both women and men whenever the promotion of those feminine traits would endure in a society, ergo gender equality.

Because those hypotheses based mainly on public surveys (Togebly, 1994; Bonta, 1996; Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2001; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Koch, 2011; Vivian P. Ta-Johnson et al., 2022) in which the presence of a gender-based view on state's foreign policy matters is inquired. Or they ground on the analysis of solely female leaders' attitudes towards diverse conflict (Caprioli, 2003). This research proposes a qualitative comparative study investigating and comparing the policy implementation of both female and male leaders regarding the same security assertiveness. Furthermore, it juxtaposes those results across cases with opposite gender equality level. Therefore, this research aims to examine whether both IR feminist theories are applicable and which variable, gender, gender equality or neither of them, has more impact in shaping the state's response to foreign security crisis.

Consequently, this research identifies the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on the 24th of February 2022, as an international political assertive scenario across which analysing the leaders' security policies implementation and understanding until the end of March 2023. Furthermore,

due to their diverse degree of gender equality and the presence of both female and male Prime Minister since the Russian invasion, this research recognises the case of Italy and Sweden as the one suitable to this examination. Hence, after an elucidation of IR feminist theories, this research employs Discourse Analysis and Feminist Foreign Policy Analysis to examine the role of gender and gender equality in the selected study cases. The former methodological tool is employed to inquire the leaders' gender identity, while the latter to investigate the role of gender and gender equality in shaping state's security foreign policy. This research focuses, firstly, on a case by case comparison of the male and female Prime Ministers approach to security, stressing the gender variable impact. Secondly, it illustrates the role of the gender equality variable juxtaposing the two female leaders. Here, the gender and gender equality variables could less affect male leaders' attitude to assertiveness, because their masculine traits are already identified as socially expected political and security behaviours. On the contrary, this research aims to analyse the impact of those variable on women as state representative.

Therefore, this research is based mainly on primary sources, such as the Government's website, its official journals, and the EU's official website. It also consults secondary sources, such as newspaper, interviews, and press conferences. This allows the research to widen the collection of information to better elucidate the leader's security policies implementation and understanding. Indeed, seeking data on states' security policies, this research tries to overcome their possible classified status and to also integrate the leaders' reasonings and vision on his/her security decision, having a more complete informational background.

Finally, the research question is: do gender and gender equality have an impact on the state's security policy implementation and understanding during an international security crisis? This research hypothesis the irrelevance of both variable, gender and gender equality. Indeed, war and security still depict majorly a masculine environment, imposing female leaders to act in order to not be associated with feminine qualities, thus, to be considered as unsuitable by the public. Secondly, state representatives tend to identify themselves with the position they are in charge of, behaving according to what is socially accepted and expected. Therefore, in the case of a security scenario that requires the application of military means and equipment to safeguard the national stability and integrity, both female and male leaders will behave assertively.

II. The inclusion of gender in security studies and foreign policy analysis

With the increment of women in state executive positions, questions about the relevance of gender identity and biological nature in their political decisions have gained interest. Indeed, while the role of masculinity has been treasured as fundamental for state's survival, conventional thinking has considered women as unable to employ violence and autonomous decisions. Thus, inappropriate for the state's national security sphere. This assumption has been challenged by feminist scholars, which have investigated its roots in asking for equal access to political affairs. Nonetheless, whether gender and gender equality are fundamental for the perception of security and the construction of the state's security policies is still debated.

This first section aims to illustrate the evolution of security studies from the traditional vision to the feminist one. Firstly, it intends to clarify how and why feminist studies criticized traditional political and security understanding. Secondly, how feminists have reintegrated the position of women with the international political world and security.

1. Security studies: from conventional to alternative literature

Security Studies represent one of the major subfields of International Relations (IR) that has notably grown straight after the dramatic event of the Second World War. It has been mostly enhanced in conjunction with the Realist IR school of thought, which can be still considered the dominant one through the works of Hans Morgenthau¹ and Kenneth Waltz². Here, the Classical and the Neo-realist lenses have firstly emphasised the self-interested nature of the human being and, secondly, the highly competitive and conflictual traits of the international system. As a result of this premise, Realism stresses military power as the main aspect a state has to maximize to securitize its interest and survive within an anarchic international order. Consequently, a state-centric discipline has matured both in IR and security studies, centring inquiries on states' endurance strategies and military power accumulation. This vision has been generated due to the presence of an international environment marked by warfare that has shattered many nations and empires in the Western world and not only.

¹ Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904 Germany - 1980 New York), a German-American political scientist and jurist known as one of the more influential figures and father of the Classical Realist's International Relations Theory in the post-World War II period. His most significant work is "*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*" published in 1948.

² Kenneth Neal Waltz (1924 USA– 2013 Washington), American political scientist known as the father of the Structural Realist's IR lens with the works "*Man, the State, and War*" in 1959 and "*Theory of International Politics*" in 1979.

This understanding of the IR discipline has represented the outset where the security studies field has expanded. Connected with the investigation of national security through military force, this field has focused mostly on wars between sovereign states. Hence, security studies can be generally outlined as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military forces. It explores the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war” (Walt, 1991, p.212). Therefore, military threats have been considered the most relevant and severe (Walt, 1991), whereas the analysis of nonmilitary drivers, or alternative studies, surfaced only later in the 90s (Akinrinde, 2020).

Even though other forms of state uncertainty exists, the risk of a military conflict has never been dismissed as the major object of examination. Indeed, the presence of the Cold War and its proxy wars have shaped conventional security studies, which were further transformed by the upcoming of nuclear technology. Here, most of the inquiry shifted to the impact of nuclear weapons, abandoning the conventional view on warfare and enhancing new state's security strategies. Only since the Post-Cold War period, the various diversifications of security studies have gained relevance, amplifying the scope of the examination. Since then, alternative security studies have become more prominent, promoting research based on human-centric (Akinrinde, 2020) and intra-state dimension, instead of the precedent state-centric and inter-state perspective. Without any doubt, the security of individuals has always been a concern of both the state and the traditional security literature. Nevertheless, across the new expansion, the social aspect (Akinrinde, 2020) of people, as for instance cultural constructed gender identities, has emerged as a topic of examination in the security field. This evolution is connected to the decrease of potential armed attacks from external threats in the Western world, remodelling the starting point of investigation towards the individuum (Akinrinde, 2020).

Feminist security studies: critique, evolution and divisions

Throughout the Post-Cold War environment, feminist theories have introduced the category of gender as a significant inquiry lens for international relations, conflicts, and security issues (Tickner, 1992; Sjoberg, 2009; Blanchard, 2003). Predominantly, feminists highlight the impossibility to consider traditional Realist view as objective and universally valid (Tickner, 1992), because it acknowledges only and mostly western men's perception. This vision promotes the absence of women in politics and assumes that IR is just a 'man's world' (Tickner,

1992, p.1). Here, feminists identify the gender-related hierarchy existing in society as the main driver of this traditional IR perception, analysing on which elements it bases and how to deconstruct it.

In this research, gender is understood as “a system of symbolic meaning that creates social hierarchies based on perceived associations with masculine and feminine characteristics” (Sjoberg, 2009, p. 3). More precisely, gender refers to how a person self-identifies, thus, as a female, male, queer, or other identities (Feeney, 2019) and it is generally expressed by language (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002), appearance, affects, and actions (Feeney, 2019). Additionally, the category of gender is highly connected with the person socialization process. Social norms and behavioural expectations related to femininity and masculinity are essential, making the category of gender changing across culture, class, race, religion, geography, and time (Feeney, 2019; Sjoberg, 2009; Warren and Duane, 1994). For feminists those socially constructed associations recognize specific features to femininity that are traditionally portrayed as dangerous (Tickner, 1992) for state's national security, allowing men to exclude them from politics to safeguard the nation. Those feminine-associated features can be identified as weakness, emotion, peacefulness, and others (Tickner, 1992/2011; Tessler and Boyer, 1997; Mark Tessler et al., 1999; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Caprioli, 2003; Blanchard, 2003; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003; Sjoberg 2009; Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013; Bashevkin, 2018; Vivian P. Ta-Johnson et al., 2022). While socially imposed masculine qualities are “strength, power, autonomy, independence, and rationality” (Tickner, 1992, p.3). Hence, this socially enforced distinction between masculinity and femininity generates a hierarchical power relation, that locates women in a secondary position within society. If the ultimate priority of a nation is its national security, then those socially appointed characteristics associated with femininity disqualify women from participating in it, privileging men’s views, and temperament. Thus, men are directly associated with the state, while women with the domestic sphere, thus family (Tickner, 1992; Gasztold, 2017; Sylvester, 1994).

This gender-related hierarchy has been majorly studied by IR feminist, that with the upcoming of women within the political sphere, have abandoned the idea to just acknowledge the presence of an ‘androcentric tendency’ in political life (Gasztold, 2017, p.182). Instead, they started to underscore the need to rethinking the hierarchical gender power relation (Tickner, 2002) introducing gender as a fundamental category for the analysis of international security’s outcomes, causes and behaviours (Tickner, 1992; Sjoberg, 2009; Blanchard, 2003). Indeed,

given that beyond the state there are human beings, and that gender is as an essential dimension of social life shaping the way people behave, are expected to act and their role in society, a gender-free analysis of politics was no more possible (Gasztold, 2017). Moreover, with the entrance of women within the political sphere, feminists have questioned how would these socially constructed gender-related norms affects women's participation and state's behaviour? Hence, are then women more peaceful, emotional, and weak? And how would those qualities influence the state's behaviour in the case they would enter politics and IR?

2. Feminist theories: gender in shaping state's security attitude

Starting from this premise, several feminist theories have been developed inquiring the gender-hierarchical relations at the foundation of women's exclusion from politics. This allows to integrate gender as a fundamental IR analysis lens and to re-evaluate women's status in politics. Furthermore, those theories have examined the relevance of gender-hierarchical relations in shaping the state's behaviour both in times of peace and conflict, questioning whether the upcoming of women would indeed lead the state to less militarized and conflictual actions.

State's security as a gendered discourse: peaceful women and assertive man

Across the analysis of the exclusion of women from politics, feminists have emphasised the relation that gender-imposed qualities have in the construction of state's behaviour. More precisely, feminists understand the celebration of manliness, through the figure of the male-warrior, as the main representation of the state (Tickner, 1992). This representation portrays, firstly, the highly gendered dimension of state's security. Secondly, it stresses the presence of a conflictual external environment and the need to celebrate violence to ensure the state's survival (Tickner, 1992). Indeed, a constant glorification of men's use of force, in combination with its association with heroism and patriotism (Tickner, 1992), has positively normalized violence for matters of security, both by men and by the state. Hence, a strong state is mainly linked to masculine qualities, behaving across the use violence, power and militarism (Tickner, 1992/2011; Ruddick, 1985; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2003; Sjoberg, 2009).

Consequently, this association - state's survival-men's violence - elevates the position of men as the protector of the nation, devaluating femininity. Here, feminists underscore how the so-called protector-protected myth (Tickner, 1992; Tickner 2002) depicts women as "weak, fearful, indecisive, and dependent" (Tickner, 1992, p. 34). Hence, as victims in need of

protection and unable to secure themselves (Gasztold, 2017), legitimizing women's absence (Tickner, 1992) in state security matters. If the main contribution that a citizen can give to society is related to the state's endurance and violence, then feminine attributions and women's involvement are not required. On the contrary, a state is able to survive and to protect its more vulnerable citizens, women, if it is a powerful and militarized state. Indeed, for Realism, security is possible only across the implementation of state's military power (Baldwin, 1997). This duality correlates femininity to peace, and masculinity to militarism and assertiveness shaping both social roles and state's understanding of security (Tickner, 1992).

Indeed, the only way women are celebrated by the state and by society is through their identification with the figure of the 'mother' (Tickner, 1992). This image emphasises firstly women's biological nature, which is associated with tenderness (Gasztold, 2007, p. 183). Secondly, it stresses women's 'internal moral voice' (Tickner, 1992; Gasztold, 2007) and peacefulness, which cannot be used in case of war (Tickner, 1992), linking them solely to the domestic sphere.

The 'Women and Peace hypothesis' debate

As a result of this gender-based distinction within the society, feminist IR studies have analysed whether women would indeed be less assertive than men in state's matters. In this case, public surveys and inspections have provided evidence sustaining the correlations between femininity and peace, as masculinity and militarism on foreign policy matters (Togebly, 1994; Bonta, 1996; Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Regan and Paskeviciute, 2001; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Koch, 2011; Vivian P. Ta-Johnson et al., 2022). Moreover, more recently studies have highlighted the role of women and feminine value in promoting peace in case of conflicts (Koch, 2011; Bashevkin, 2014; Vivian P. Ta-Johnson et al., 2022).

Primarily, cultural feminism³ has emphasized the necessity to promote this association between peace and femininity (Ruddick, 1985; Bonta, 1996; Tessler and Warriner, 1997) to transform the present socio-political structure in a less militarized one. Here, the concept of women's maternal inclination (Ruddick, 1985; Tessler and Warriner, 1997) has been translated from a domestic context to a state one. Hence, elucidating the 'Women and Peace Hypothesis', the presence of women in politics should developed a more "tolerant approach to relations among

³ Cultural feminism is the ideology of a female nature or female essence reappropriated by feminists themselves in an effort to re-validate undervalued female attributes. (Alcoff, 1988, p-408)

communities and states” (Tessler and Warriner, 1997, p. 253). This feminist perspective identifies motherhood as a practice that through its application forms a certain way of thinking, generating peaceful behaviours both by men, women, and by the state (Ruddick, 1985).

Nonetheless, the ‘Women and Peace Hypothesis’ has provoked a vivid debate within feminist IR studies. Here, the necessity to conquer this assumption (Dietz, 1985; Tessler, Nachtwey and Grant, 1999; Tickner, 1992/2011; Caprioli, 2003) which correlates femininity to peace has been highlighted by post-modern feminists. They believe this association reinforces those prejudice against women’s empowerment and emancipation, not challenging the oppressive power relations in which women are stuck (Alcoff, 1988). They assert that there are no ‘essential components’ (Tessler and Warriner, 1997) that can portray all women in a universal way, not bearing in mind their diversities. Hence, the existence of a distinctive and universal female attitude to international affairs is still debatable (Tessler and Warriner, 1997). Indeed, more recent studies have stressed women’s active role in violent actions as terrorist and combats (Alison, 2004; Tsjeard Bonta et al., 2005; Jessica Darden et al., 2019), undermining the woman heterogeneity outline as more peaceful due to their biological nature.

Most of the feminist literature, that provides this women-peace correlation, has based primarily on public opinion survey (Tessler and Warriner, 1997), given the lack of women within political institutions. Nevertheless, nowadays women are increasing their presence in world affairs giving the input for new inquiries that do not focus on opinion pulls but on women’s impact on state’s political behaviour as state’s representatives.

Gender equality and state aggression hypothesis

Following the ‘Women and Peace Hypothesis’, feminists have questioned whether this connection is indeed based on women’s biological nature or on society imposed gendered-related norms and expected behaviours. Thus, a state’s behaviour would not depends only on the presence of women within the political system, but also on the acceptance of femininity features in society.

Here, feminist scholars have highlighted a link between the spread of specific values within society and the establishment of certain behavioural pattern both by people and states (Caprioli, 2003), recognising conflict and violence as a ‘cultural conduct’ (Bonta, 1996). These studies underscore the relevance of domestic gender inequalities in boosting (Caprioli, 2003) state

international use of violence. Feminist primarily portrays how domestic gender equality signifies the spread and acceptance of feminine values and attitude in society (Tickner, 1992; Caprioli, 2003), promoting the formation of state policies less inclined to violence. This assumption theorized that "(s)tates with a domestic hierarchical structure characterized by strict gender divisions of domination and oppression will duplicate those patterns of violence and inequality in the international arena. [Therefore] (p)redicting state behavior in terms of structural hierarchies would (...) be determined by the degree of gender equality that characterizes a society" (Caprioli, 2003, p.196-7).

Here, feminists associate a state that promotes a patriarchal social structure to a manifestation of domestic violence, which translates into an international state's violent attitude (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Caprioli, 2003). Whenever structural gender equality is provided enhancing freedom and equality (Caprioli, 2003), values that are traditionally connected to women and femininity will be integrated (Bonta, 1996; Caprioli, 2003). In turn, this incorporation of femininity-linked values and behaviour in society would impact political affairs both internally and internationally developing a more peaceful society (Bonta, 1996; Caprioli, 2003). If men are considered as the superior group and their qualities are the ones promoted in the community, people will behave according to those accepted values, fostering them also in politics (Tessler and Warriner, 1997; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Caprioli, 2003). On the contrary, the presence of a society that promotes gender equality will see women's participation, their visions, and their values both in society and in politics. If women's culturally linked qualities of peace, cooperation, and democracy will be spread and accepted in society, then they will be integrated also in the political behaviour (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Caprioli, 2003).

Therefore, gender equality level depicts the degree of acceptance and integration of those feminine features, promoting diversity instead of domination both in society as in politics. This research, to examine the spread of feminine-related value in a society, investigates the gender gap within the labour market, in the educational and political sphere, as the existence of specific women-related health structures (GII). These elements provide an overview of the stigmatisation and devaluation degree of feminine traits and biological characteristics within a society. Hence, whether they are socially accepted, or still relegated to the domestic sphere. In this way, if women's biological necessity (healthcare), opinions (education) and contribution (labour) are solely constraint to the family domain, it could be possible to assume a high level of stereotypes and hierarchical vision in society which promotes masculine-linked behaviours.

Thus, this will be present also in politics, where a more masculine, ergo assertive, political behaviour is hypothesised.

On the contrary, if the society validates those feminine traits, this will consequently lead to the inclusion of feminine-related qualities, necessity, opinions, and contribution creating a diversified society. This society will ground on 'social pluralism' (Caprioli, 2003), avoiding the establishment of a single group of people in power and enhancing equality rather than domination. This incrementation of equality values within a nation should be than implemented also in state's foreign policy actions both by men and women, decreasing the use of aggression to maintain the level of domination (Caprioli, 2003). Hence, also the state's behaviour would be associated less with solely masculine qualities, as they will no more be the only socially accepted, expected, and needed to survive.

3. Gender in IR as a missing element: Feminist foreign policy analysis

Now with the increment of female political leaders, feminist IR studies have started to examine the role that gender, and the level of gender equality would have on state's foreign policy attitude and decision-making. In order to investigate those assumptions, feminist studies have introduced the category of gender as an essential lens. In conventional IR studies, it is the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which can be considered as the research field concerned with decision-making processes and in general with state's actions (Aggestam and True, 2020). Nevertheless, FPA has generally overlooked the sex and the gendered nature of the person, or the group of people, in charge of the state's decisions (Smith, 2020; Aggestam and True, 2020), giving so the input for the formation of Feminist Foreign Policy Analysis (FFPA).

FFPA includes gender as a research lens and aims to provide clarifications on why and how foreign policy decisions are built (Smith, 2020). More precisely, it looks at the impact that gender norms and the presence of women in foreign policy decision-making practices would have (Smith, 2020). Therefore, FFPA is not intended as a method to recognise women's political achievement, relevance, and rights (D'Aoust, 2012). Rather it should be an analysis of how 'gendered norms, ideology, identity and structures affect political practice (questioning) the ways sex and sexuality become power relations in different spatiotemporal contexts' (D'Aoust, 2012, p.2). Indeed, as previously stressed, gender does not refer to the division between biological female and male bodies, but it is a cultural and historically related 'ontological category' (D'Aoust, 2012) that is constructed with a privileged notion of

masculinity and a devaluated of femininity. Consequently, to examine the existence of gendered hierarchical power relations means that women have to be studied in correlation with men and not alone (D'Aoust, 2012).

Nonetheless, in IR feminist studies, there is a significant lack of inquiries on gendered power relations and influence on foreign policies, leaving major space for further publications. Additionally, an opposite trend concerning the revitalisation of traditional values on politics and security has internationally arisen across the masculinisation of foreign policy, the booster of right-wing parties and illiberal democracies. These have stressed the highly gendered dimension of global politics (Aggestam and True, 2020) and the necessity to study whether the entrance of women in politics have indeed altered the security perception and state's behaviour.

Gender in state's decision-making: women's leadership and use of force

Given the previously elucidated IR feminists' theories and the increment of women within the political realm, new studies have been enacted to evaluate the impact of women on international affairs, introducing the category of gender within the investigation of the state's decision-making process. Researches have been constructed on the role that gender plays in how leaders respond to national security issues (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017), as whether the increment of women in politics has led to a more peaceful state's attitude internationally (D'Aoust, 2012). However, the lower number of women in state executive positions has limited the development of those inquiries (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001; Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013; Bashevkin, 2014/2018), leaving space for further research.

Here, feminist IR scholars have stressed the importance of emphasising the gender category of politicians (Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013) because it represents gender-based social expectations and experiences, which construct people's decisions and behaviour. Thus, it has to be integrated into the examination of leaders' performance to forecast their actions (Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013). Indeed, entering a political system and reaching the top of it has major limits in any society, because those ruling seats are normally conceived for the elite only (Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013). Therefore, given men's hierarchical status, the number of women in power positions and the obstacles they have to overcome depict to what extent gender is a category of discrimination within a society and how female leaders will act.

In fact, feminist IR studies stress how women engage in strategies to surmount those limits imposed by the patriarchal society, generally avoiding the involvement of gender in their actions (Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013; Goethals and Hoyt, 2017). For instance, female leaders present themselves in a more masculine way across what they wear and how they act, trying to project more authority and align to the male colleagues. Furthermore, bringing a more recent and clearcut example, female leaders could prefer the ‘neutral’ masculine linguistic version of their title, refusing to be associated to its female version. In fact, scholars have stressed how women effectively apply those androgynous attitudes (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017) to overcome structural obstacles. Consequently, gender represents a significant driver for leaders’ choices and actions (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017). Hence, the acknowledgment of gender stereotypes and norms is fundamental to analyse and forecast women’s political performances and the connection between gender, governance styles and state’s behaviour (Genovese and Steckenrider, 2013).

Moreover, while the significance of gender in shaping leaders' actions is accepted, how gender actually casts women’s leadership style, thus state’s foreign policy, and under which conditions this happened, are still under debate. Generally, the diversity between women and men in executive positions has been emphasised according to values and ethics (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017). Hence, women are considered to be more devoted towards the public good, applying qualities, such as democratic, sensitive, and caring (de la Rey, 2005; Goethals and Hoyt, 2017) more than men. Women “are more likely to demonstrate cooperation and endorse social values that promote the welfare of others and are less likely to support unethical decision [...] Moreover, increased leadership empowerment of women is associated with greater policymaking that represents the concerns of families, women, and ethnic and racial minorities, as well as increases in standards of living, societal gender equality, and national wealth” (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017, p. xi-xii).

Furthermore, also for what concern the role of gender on leaders’ response to security issues, feminist studies have mainly identified women in power positions as less belligerent than men (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Here, feminist studies have assumed that this gender-related difference is connected to the culture-linked socialization process that shapes values and notions of power, security, and politics (Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). This process creates a gendered behavioural difference that shifts also into the political decision-making process. Thus, this alike gender attitude is based on physiological diversity in which women’s

reproductive feature will constraint their decision also as a leader (Ruddick, 1985; Caprioli and Boyer, 2001). Consequently, elucidating this body of literature it is evident the importance of gender in analysing leader's behaviour and state's actions, however, also the relevance of the external social environment is highlighted. Hence, a following question would be how gendered hierarchical power relations, socially gendered accepted behaviours and norms in society actually shaped leader's decision? Do social behavioural norms and expectations play a role? The following section will elucidate the present literature on this assumption.

Gender equality in FFPA: how gender-context shapes female leaders' decisions

With the previous explained relevance of gender in shaping leaders' attitude towards security and political decision, feminist studies have also emphasised the external social environment. Precisely, feminists indicate "gendered structure of leadership and governance, such as gender stereotypes, cultural norms, and overtly discriminatory practices of foreign policy institutions [as influential factors for] women's leader's behaviours" (D'Aoust, 2012, p. 7). Here, feminist scholars understand this gendered structure as essential in casting people's actions, opinions, and expectations, both in the case of men and women. However, it is more accentuated for female leaders, who navigate within a highly gendered hierarchical system, that, in the case of security and politics, devaluates women's socially constructed qualities.

Indeed, feminist IR studies on women in power positions have underscored how whenever women plays a 'non-traditional role', they will behave more across masculine-associated attitudes (de la Rey, 2005; Goethals and Hoyt, 2017). Thus, female leaders would be more reluctant in support a feminist foreign policy agenda, sustaining, on the contrary, assertive and radical interventions as much as men's leaders (D'Aoust, 2012). Additionally, studies have stressed how women in executive seats have sustained the increment of the defence budget (Koch and Fulton, 2011), whereas the higher the number of women in legislative positions, the lower the state's defence spending (Koch and Fulton, 2011).

As an explanation for those contradictory patterns, feminist scholars have indicated, firstly, how the political institutional structure effects the selection of female leaders (D'Aoust, 2012). Hence, in the case that feminine-associated qualities are devaluated in the society, female leader would have more difficulties to be positively perceived and enter in the political institution. Thus, they will implement masculine-linked behavioural patterns to not resemble feminine features associated with weakness (Aggestam and True, 2020). Secondly, feminist

scholars have recognized the possibility for women to actually alter the state's foreign policy depending on a 'critical mass' (Smith, 2020, p 134), which is the number⁴ of female representatives within the institutional structure. Here, feminists stress the influence that the society's underlying gender power relations and the political structure would have on women in politics (D'Aoust, 2012; Smith, 2020; Aggestam and True, 2020). Therefore, female leaders' behaviour and success in shape state's behaviour could be seen as dependent on the number of women in the political structure and the degree of acceptance of socially imposed feminine traits in the public sphere.

This assumption refers to the 'gender equality and state aggression hypothesis', where gender equality has been conceived as the level of acceptance and assimilation of feminine socially imposed qualities within a society (Caprioli, 2003). Here, feminist scholars assume that if women's leaders develop in a society, in which attributes linked with femininity, such as peacefulness and cooperation, are accepted in the society and as possible political behaviours, they will be able to shape the state's behaviour (Caprioli, 2003). Hence, "(s)tates characterized by gender equality should have a greater tendency to appeal to international organizations in their dispute resolution efforts, as both male and female leaders would have to appeal to broad constituencies that include feminine values" (Caprioli, 2003, p. 199). This would also entail the use of trade and economy for interstate settlement, recognizing the implementation of interdependency as a major way to avoid arm conflict (Caprioli, 2003) and depicting a less assertive state also during interstate conflict (Caprioli, 2003).

Yet, some studies have stressed how this correlation between female leadership, gender equality and violence decrement does not have to be straightforward (Koch and Fulton, 2011; D'Aoust, 2012). On the contrary, there cannot be any direct linkage with women and peace or militarism, but it can just be dependent on the political context of the party (Koch and Fulton, 2011) or on the executive branch (D'Aoust, 2012). Hence, the role that gender equality and gender have in influencing the state's international use of force is still under debate, opening further investigations as the number of women in politics grows worldwide.

⁴ According to Karen Smith this number should be around 30%.

Female leaders and higher gender equality: a more peaceful state?

Given this theoretical premise, it could be possible to hypothesize that a state with a high level of gender equality and with a female leader would be less assertive internationally, than a state with a lower gender equality level, but still with a female leader in charge. This research recognizes gender and gender equality as essential inquiry lenses to examine state behaviour. Yet, it speculates that during a foreign policy security crisis, female and male leaders will behave similarly notwithstanding the level of gender equality of the nation and their gender.

If there is a security crisis, then there is less likelihood that gender and gender equality will have an impact on the state's foreign policy response.

Both traditional IR studies and initial feminist studies on gender ground on the social imposed feminine-masculine dichotomy which dismiss the possibility to have women behaving assertively, due to their maternal nature and weak features. Nonetheless, as previously elucidates, recent studies have emphasised the role of women as combatants and terrorists (Alison, 2004; Tsjeard Bouta et al., 2005; Jessica Darden et al., 2019), reproducing an assertive behaviour. Hence, this research aims to widen the existing literature comparing both female and male leaders actions, and countries with diverse level of gender equality. Secondly, it examines whether both theories 'Women and Peace' and 'State and Aggression' can be applied in the case of an international security crisis.

This research identifies international security crisis as a "threat to one or more basic values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and [lastly] a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities" (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2022, p. 3). Additionally, this research evaluate the country's geographical, historical and emotional link to the assertiveness, because it could also influence the state's behaviour during a security crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2022). This research portrays these elements as 'country's external conditional attitude', which verifies whenever a country would have a territorial proximity, historical relations and an emotional background with the security issue.

Therefore, basing on the 'Women and Peace hypothesis' and the 'Gender equality and State aggression theories', this research understands "(c)ompetition, violence, intransigence, and territoriality [as] associated with a 'male' approach to human relations, including relations among sovereign states, whereas moderation, compromise, tolerance, and pacifism [...] as a 'female' perspective on world affairs" (Tessler and Warriner, 1997, p. 251). Consequently, this

socially constructed gendered distinction is translated to an opposite behaviour that women and men would have in politics. This research focus on those differences in leaders' security understanding and implementation, as on their changes with the shift from male to female and vice versa. Here, security implementation and understanding is depicted as the "official description of how a state aims to provide for its own security and that of its population: it establishes a national understanding of the threats and risks of the security environment, and the values and principles that will guide the state in providing state and human security" (DCAF, 2005, p.2).

Linking to the theoretical feminine-masculine diverse approach to political affairs, this research understands hard security, which is mainly militarized (Fatić, 2002), as a masculine attitude. While human security as a feminine attitude towards politics. Here, human security stands more on "diplomatic cooperation (...) (multilateralism); 'centrality of economic power' (non-military); and 'legally-binding supranational institutions' (international law)" (Berenskoetter et al, 2007, p.178). In addition to it, this research includes the enhancement of policies related to social protection, that concerns gendered risk and social vulnerabilities (Manchanda, 2001; Darcy, 2004). Indeed, as previously elucidated, feminist studies stress how women's leadership "is associated with greater policymaking that represents the concerns of families, women, and ethnic and racial minorities, as well as increases in standards of living, societal gender equality, and national wealth" (Goethals and Hoyt, 2017, p. xi-xii).

Hence, this research includes the examination of social protection implementations. Here, social protection "is understood to involve acts and measures designed to protect people against socially unacceptable levels of risk and deprivation (ensuring) people's sustained access to basic needs (...) in unstable or disrupted environments, including adequate food and water, clothing, health care and housing; and for children, access to primary education" (Darcy, 2004, p.2). Due to their implementation during conflict and post-conflict period to guarantee a basic welfare assistance, they can be associated to 'international humanitarian responses' (Darcy, 2004). "The formal legal and normative framework for social protection in conflict-related situations consists of elements of international law (human rights law, international humanitarian law, refugee law)" (Darcy, 2004, p.7). However, some forms of social protections are not enforced in specific universal legal norms, for instance, women's rights or the rights of marginalised people during conflicts, leading to an understanding of humanitarian actions as a part of social protection measures.

III. Gendered Comparative Study between Italy and Sweden

This thesis conducts a qualitative comparative study focusing on the period from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on the 24th of February 2022, until the end of March 2023. More precisely, it allows the examination of the role of gender and gender equality in outlining state leaders' attitudes to security matters. Firstly, it juxtaposes female and male leaders singularly for each study case to emphasise the relevance of the gender variable. Secondly, it compares the two female Prime Ministers to highlight the significance of the country's degree of gender equality. Hence, to follow this inquiry, this thesis employs both Discourse Analysis and Feminist Foreign Policy Analysis (FFPA) methodological tools in combination to the Crisis Management Technique (CMT) Model of Brecher and Wilkenfeld.

Discourse Analysis to detect leaders' gender identity

Given that gender can be expressed across language, appearance, affects, and actions (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002; Feeney, 2019), this research depicts discourse analysis as the most appropriate methodological tool as it is an “analysis of language as it is used to enact activities, perspectives, and identities” (Gee, 2001, p.4-8). Indeed, the goal of this research is to elucidate the behavioural distinction between female and male leaders on security's matter emphasising the need of a specific analysis of their gender identity first. Nevertheless, because politicians tend to have an androgynous attitude (D'Aoust, 2012; Goethals and Hoyt, 2017) identifying themselves mostly with their state's position, this research is based primarily on the analysis of their speeches to find a more direct link to their self-representation. This would enhance the research validity and overcome the lack of explicit references.

Indeed, to follow this analysis, this thesis search for the gender identity of political leaders investigating how they express and understand their agency (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). This is portrayed across the use of language and how language articulates the socially constructed qualities of femininity and masculinity, shaping the subjective agent, its socially expected behaviour and role (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). Hence, a woman will mediate her own gender identity across a discourse upon femininity and masculinity, which is linked to a dominant or alternative social understanding of it (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002, p. 23). For instance, how she portrays her socially given role as mother and caregiver, or given qualities as weak, emotional, peaceful, and dependent.

Moreover, gender identity will be explicated across the performance of gender-related social norms and behaviours that are culturally linked to femininity and masculinity (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). For instance, whenever a woman talks about her activities with her children or within her work position, the way she is portraying herself illustrates her gender identity. However, as highlighted previously, mainly female politicians are inclined to constrain their femininity in their actions and appearance in order to overcome those socially imposed stereotypes and to be connected to their masculine counterparts (Aggestam and True, 2020). Consequently, this research focus mainly on speeches in which a straightforward representation of the Prime Ministers' gender identity is depicted. For instance, where there are clear gender relations such as 'as a woman/man', or socially imposed role as 'mother/father', excluding other gender identities.

The gender equality variable: relevance and operationalisation

As an independent variable this research analyses also the level of gender equality in a country, which, according to the theories, affects the societal and political structure of a country, leaders' behaviour and attitudes toward security. This research based the investigation of this variable on the three main gender equality dimensions identified by the UN Development Programme Gender Inequality Index (GII)⁵. These 3 main dimensions are the empowerment, labour and health. Concerning the empowerment variable, the percentage of girls that have finished secondary school, the presence of female in higher positions and in the government, as the division of childcare is analysed. For the labour variable the gender gap in the labour market is considered analysing the existence of a wage gender gap and possible practices impeding female to access jobs. Lastly, the health variable inquires the level of women's birth mortality, abortion possibility and menstrual hygiene and health management is taken into consideration.

These dimensions highlight the level of patriarchal domination within a society. Mostly, in the case of the health dimension, whenever women's reproductive health matters are constrained under law, for instance abortion law (etc...), or they are not present in the public system, this highlights the presence of a highly masculine society based on domination-subordination relations. This relegates and stigmatizes women's biological matters to the family sphere, emphasising how women's socially imposed qualities, which are primarily connected to women's biological nature, are devaluated in the social sphere. This relegation of women's

⁵ Gender Inequality Index | Human Development Reports (undp.org); Last data from 2021

position to the domestic domain is also emphasised by the presence or absence of societal support for equal access to education and to the labour market.

Feminist foreign policy analysis and the Crisis Management Technique Model

Given that feminist foreign policy analysis “is based on the recognition that women and men experience conflict and war differently. Because of their currently different roles and positions in society, they face different consequences from war and also contribute differently” (Adebahr and Mittelhammer, 2020, p.5), this research defines FFPA as the most appropriate method for this inquiry. FFPA illustrates these gender-based differences within the state’s decision-making process and international actions, across the recognition and examination of those expected behavioural differences between men and women. This approach is grounded on the premise that women are more peaceful than men and they rely more on more peaceful coercive means, such as diplomacy, economic and international institutions. In the case of a female leader this attitude should prevail also during policy implementation (D’Aoust, 2012). Nevertheless, to measure whether women are indeed more peaceful than men in their political decisions and actions, there is the need to study female policymakers, not on their own, but in correlation to their male counterparts (D’Aoust, 2012). Hence, this research is based on a comparative study, analysing the various foreign policy approaches both by female and male leaders during an international crisis.

Furthermore, in this research, the distinction between a more feminine foreign policy approach to security and a more masculine one is depicted across the differentiation between human and hard security. To evaluate whether a policy implementation is more peaceful or violent, this research is based on the *Crisis Management Technique Model* (CMT) of Brecher and Wilkenfeld. This Model contains primary measures that states could apply to resolve a security crisis, dividing those measures from less assertive to more assertive and between what is conceived as hard and human security (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2022).

Hence, this research uses this model as a benchmark for the division of state’s security actions during crises from non-violent to violent. Nevertheless, because this model is based on a Realist vision of state’s foreign policy and it will be employed in a feminist foreign policy framework, the enforcement of policies regarding human security are added. Thus, this research seeks for policies linked to social protection measures, such as social welfare, gender discrimination, human rights, marginalised people (ill, disable).

Crisis Management techniques⁶	Interventions Type	CMT Violence identification	Feminist theories classification
Negotiation / Mediation / Arbitration	Diplomatic	Most Pacific	Feminine approach to conflict
Multiple intervention not including violence	Social Protection, Humanitarian	↓	Feminine
Non-military pressure	Economic, Financial, Logistic		Feminine
Non-violent military	Physical and vocal military assertion		Masculine
Multiple including violence	Indirect military action		Masculine
Violence	Direct full-scale military action		Most Violent

Following the CMT model, the military interventions are measured from full-scale military action to vocal or physical assertion of military intervention. Here, under the ‘Multiple including violence’ technique, this research considers the concession of lethal and non-lethal military means and materials. This action portrays the implementations of both violent and non-violent elements, due to the fact that it depends on the typology of the military equipment, means and materials dispatched. Whether they are protections equipment, such as helmets and body shield, or they are assault/defence arms, changes their violence perceptions. Nevertheless, because this information are mostly considered as confidential by Government, the dispatch of arms is considered as between a full-scale military action and vocal or physical assertion.

Additionally, regarding non-military measures, this research includes policies about human security beyond diplomatic, economic, and logistic interventions. Hence, measures concerning social protection policies that try limiting conflict-associated social insecurities. For instance, the presence of policies upon social welfare (access to education and sanitary structure, as the access to primary needs as food, water and housing); policies against gender-related discrimination and the discrimination of marginalised people (women’s sanitary needs, needs of elderly people, violence on women, on ethnical minorities, and on minors); and measures against the violation of human rights.

⁶ Codebook by International Crisis Behaviour Project, <https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/>

Italy and Sweden: case selection, research design and data collection

The purpose of this research is to examine whether in the case of a foreign policy security crisis, gender and gender equality would still impact state's security response. Here, the indicated security scenario is represented by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which portrays for both selected cases, Italy and Sweden, an assertion against their basic values, a finite time to react and the probability of the development of military hostilities. Thus, the outset of the war in Ukraine portrays the starting point of this research, which will be conducted until the end of March 2023. Indeed, the month of March 2022 represents the first relevant states' security policies implementations. There, Mario Draghi approved the first Ministerial Decree dispatching significant military aid to Ukraine. While Magdalena Andersson developed a military aid package for Ukraine already at the end of February, but it has been only deployed with the beginning of March 2022. Hence, inspecting states' security foreign policies until the end of March 2023 signaled a one year period from the first relevant security policy. Nonetheless, because the conflict is going to evolve after this research's finish point, the thesis opens for further studies and enhancement.

This research is based on a qualitative comparative study, most precisely, on a variation of a MDS. Indeed, the selected cases identifies the Ukrainian war as a security issue to their stability in Europe, activating their governments to implement policies to avoid a further escalation or directly impact. Secondly, they depict a diverse level of gender equality, emphasising Sweden as the case with a higher degree, while Italy with a lower one. Thirdly, due to their alike geographical, historical and emotional relations to Russia, the selected case have diverse external conditional attitude. Hence, this research depict Sweden with a higher degree of conditional attitude, as a result of its territorial proximity to Ukraine and Russia, the historical experience of Russia in the near Baltic and of old animosities between the Swedish and Russian empire. While Italy, due to its geographical distance, is understood with less historical relations to Ukraine and Russia. Lastly, since the Ukrainian invasion, the cases have had in charge both female and male leaders on unlike timeline, for Italy the mandate's sequence is male-female, for Sweden female-male. This diverse mandate's sequence allows the research to testify both a possible hardening and softening of the state's security foreign policy and to verify whether just the common presence of a female leader can impact the state's behaviour.

Consequently, this research focus only on Prime Ministers because they represent the state at an international level, shaping the political orientation of the government. They have some

control over the final state’s reactions to a crisis and the decision-making process within the Government. The given Prime Ministers are Mario Draghi and Giorgia Meloni for Italy, and Magdalena Andersson and Ulf Kristersson for Sweden.

<u>Research selected Cases</u>	ITALY	SWEDEN
Regime Type	Democracy	Democracy
Leaders’ Gender	Mario Draghi (M) Giorgia Meloni (F)	Magdalena Andersson (F) Ulf Kristersson (M)
Gender Equality Level	Lower	Higher
External Conditional Attitude	Less Present	More Present
Perception of a security crisis	Yes	Yes

Following the ‘Women and Peace Hypothesis’ and the ‘Gender Equality and State Aggression’ theories, female leaders are suspected to carry out less militarized and state-centric policies than men. Thus, a policy’s hardening (more militarized and state-centric) is expected by the switch from a female to a male leader in Sweden, whereas in Italy a softening (more social protection and human-centric) by the transition from male to female. Moreover, in the case of a higher level of gender equality, theories hypothesize the development of less assertive and militarized state security policies. While in the case of a lower level of gender equality, the state should apply generally more assertive security policies.

However, this research includes the security crisis control factor. Therefore, if both countries would implement overwhelming militarized policies, this would underscore how the gender and gender equality variables do not influence leaders’ decisions and, consequently, the state’s actions. On the contrary, if both countries would behave differently, more human-centric in the case of a female leader or more state-centric in the case of a male leader, this depicts firstly the impact of gender. Whereas these behavioural distinctions would be a cases-related difference, ergo Sweden acts more human-centric and Italy more state-centric in general, this highlights the gender equality variable as impactful.

Consequently, as main independent variables, this research depicts **leaders' gender** and the **country degree of gender equality**. As dependent variable, the research identified the **change of state's implementation and understanding of security policies**. While as intervening variable this research considers the presence of an **international security crisis**. Additionally, this thesis grounds mainly on primary sources such as the Government's official website, the official journals, in which the government's normative acts and decrees are published, and the EU's official website. For the case of Italy, this research uses both the Chamber of Deputies⁷ and the Government official website⁸, in combination with the official gazette website 'La Gazzetta Ufficiale'⁹ and its YouTube channel¹⁰. For Sweden, both the official journal, the 'Swedish Code of Statutes'¹¹, and the official government portal, the 'Government Offices of Sweden'¹², are adopted. This source combination allows the research to provide a detailed outline of the implemented security decrees. Moreover, this inquiry employs also secondary sources such as the main country's newspaper (the Swedish Svenska Dagbladet and the Italian ANSA), official press conferences and leader's interviews. This allows to overcome the lack of official information, and its possible confidentiality, for instance for the typology of the military security policies. Moreover, it permits to evaluate not only the security policies but also the leader's reasoning and portrayal of that decision. Hence, across the combination of all these diverse sources, the research attempts to create a clearer informational background on where to start the examination.

Validity and Limitation

Concerning the validity of this research, the absence of women in state executive positions represents the first and main limitation of this inquiry. Indeed, the creation of a Large-N study would have been more profitable to examine and support the theoretical assumption made by this research. Nevertheless, as a result of the absence, or minority, of state's female leaders, this research is based on a Small-N study case. The choice of the cases is grounded on the logic of comparison explained in the previous section validating the research; however, this also avoids the formation of a more generalized theory, leaving open for further inquiries.

⁷ <https://temi.camera.it/leg19/>

⁸ <https://www.governo.it/it>

⁹ <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/>

¹⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/@palazzochigi>

¹¹ <https://www.svenskforfattningssamling.se/>

¹² <https://www.government.se/>

A second limitation of this research concerns the easily beforehand assumption of hard security implementations by the selected cases due to the geographical, historical, and emotional relevance of the assertiveness. Here, this research tries to solve it across the selection of cases with diverse external conditional attitudes to the security scenario, but that still understand it as a major assertiveness. In this way, if the cases would behave according to the feminist theories, ergo Sweden more social-oriented and less militarized, while Italy more militarized, this would highlight the impact of gender and gender equality on state's security. On the contrary, this would emphasised the limitations of gender and gender equality on state's security implementations, and the relevance of the state external conditional attitude.

Thirdly, because this research is analysing variables within a scenario that is still ongoing, ergo the war in Ukraine, the enhancement of future external factors that could influence leaders' behaviours cannot be fully controlled. These factors could be depicted by the evolution of the conflict, the alteration of international alliances and political relevance, and they represent possible behavioural drivers that the gender and gender equality variables cannot govern. This portrays a limitation, which this research attempts to overcome by making clear these less foreseeable factors throughout the empirical and the funding analysis. Moreover, during the funding analysis, this research keeps all the factor constant to allow the examination of the role of gender and gender equality.

A further limitation regards the inquiry of the leader's gender identity. Indeed, gender is highly culture, class, race, religion, geography, and time-dependent, thus, the exact identification of a person's gender identity cannot be ensured. Yet, to enhance the thesis's validity, this research is based on speeches with a direct reference to the leaders' gender identity. In addition, the direct gender references is necessary also as a result of the lack of materials, due to leaders' association mostly with their role. Moreover, knowing that there are various ways to express femininity and masculinity, this thesis refers only to the Western understanding of them.

Lastly, this research has a language limitation. Because I am able to speak Italian, as it is my mother tongue, the inquiry upon the Italian Government could be result as more complete than the one for the Swedish Government. Indeed, using only English-based Website, policies or government decisions posted solely in Swedish could have been overlooked. Nevertheless, because Sweden has also official English-based Governmental Website, it could be possible to assume that all the required information will be available also in English.

IV. Leaders comparative study: gender identity and gender equality

In this chapter, the discourse analysis method is applied to investigate firstly the gender identity of the selected political leaders, ergo Giorgia Meloni and Mario Draghi in Italy, Magdalena Andersson and Ulf Kristersson in Sweden. This step depicts a fewer amount of data, due to the politicians' tendency to identify themselves more with the state's position they represent, and to portray themselves as androgynous. As a result, this analysis is based on less data but on one with direct linkages to the leaders' gender identity in order to overcome this limit.

Secondly, this chapter examines the level of gender equality present in both countries, Italy and Sweden, shaping the basis for the next section. There, the hypothesis¹³ formulated by this research is tested.

1. Gender Identity in Italy: Giorgia Meloni and Mario Draghi

Regarding the examination of the Italian Prime Ministers' gender identity, this thesis grounds on the speech¹⁴ of Giorgia Meloni at her party meeting on the 19th of October 2019 from her political official website. Secondly, on an official video record¹⁵ of the press conference at Palazzo Chigi (the official residence of the Prime Minister of Italy) for the end of the year on the 22nd of December 2021.

In the first case, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni explicitly identifies herself as a catholic woman and as an Italian mother, which is defending her identity from the expression of other unconventional gender identities. "They want us to be Parent 1, Parent 2, gender LGBT, Citizen X, just codes. But we are not codes, we are people, and we will defend our identity. I am Giorgia, I am a woman, I am a mother, I am Italian, I am a Christian"¹⁶ (Pagina Ufficiale, Oct 2019). Hence, it is possible to connect her gender identity to an Italian straight woman, a catholic one and a mother. However, across her mandate as Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni's female gender identity has been ambiguous. Indeed, in reply to her policy document speech at the Chamber of Deputies on the 25th of October 2022, she has refused to be named by the feminine Italian variation of the word "Prime Minister". Ergo, instead to accept her position as *La Presidente del Consiglio*, Giorgia Meloni has decided to be called by *Il Presidente del*

¹³ Hypothesis illustrates at page 18;

¹⁴<https://www.giorgiameloni.it/2019/10/19/il-discorso-integrale-di-giorgia-meloni-in-piazza-san-giovanni-a-roma/>

¹⁵<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1Xca4sxAgc>

¹⁶ Original text: "Vogliono che siamo Genitore 1, Genitore 2, genere LGBT, Cittadini X, dei codici. Ma noi non siamo dei codici, noi siamo delle persone e difenderemo la nostra identità. Io sono Giorgia, sono una donna, sono una madre, sono italiana, sono cristiana."

Consiglio, the masculine version in use until now. In that response, Giorgia Meloni stressed how it does not represent in her view an element that could empower women. “There has been a controversy about La Prime Minister, Il Prime Minister. We have a different idea about this. I have never considered that the greatness of women is in being called ‘capotrena’ [cacophonous feminine version of the word train conductor]. I have always thought that there are more concrete things on which we must work and fight”¹⁷ (Palazzo Chigi, Oct 2022). Nevertheless, even if she is avoiding underlining her gender identity as a woman for the political position she is performing, Giorgia Meloni has repeatedly underscored her role as a mother. In fact, Giorgia Meloni, in relations to the debate on La/Il Presidente del Consiglio, has emphasised her mother identity as privileged (Palazzo Chigi, Oct 2022), because she can be a mother and at the same time work. On the 15th/16th of November she has brought her daughter at the G20 meeting in Bali highlighting in a post on Facebook that she can be a mother and the leader of a nation at the same time. “I have the right to be a mother as I please and I have the right to do everything I can for this nation without depriving Ginevra of a mother”¹⁸ (Giorgia Meloni, Facebook) . Hence, Meloni is dividing the sphere of politics from her personal role identification. While, she is restrained in associating the Prime Minister role with feminine characteristics, she is stressing herself with the main feminine traditional role as a mother. In the second case, the gender identity depiction is less ambiguous. The Prime Minister Mario Draghi directly recognizes himself as an institutional man, ergo a man at the service of his country. Here, there is a direct link between his gender identity and the role he is fulfilling as a politician, by perceiving them as belonging together. Moreover, he specifies his position in politics as a grandfather, hence not in search for a career but at the end of it. “I have no particular aspirations of one kind or another, I am a man, if you want a grandfather, at the service of the institutions”¹⁹ (Palazzo Chigi, Dec 2021). Thus, it is possible to associate his gender identity to a masculine one, which is highly linked to his traditional understanding of his role as a political figure, ergo a man dedicated to the wellbeing of the nation.

¹⁷ Original Text at 11’05” - “Si è fatta polemica, La presidente, il presidente. Su questo abbiamo un’idea diversa. io non ho mai considerati che la grandezza delle donne non sta nel farsi chiamare capotreno. Ho sempre pensato che ci siano cose pi concrete su cui bisogna lavorare e battersi”

¹⁸ Original Text “Ho il diritto di fare la madre come ritengo e ho diritto di fare tutto quello che posso per questa Nazione senza per questo privare Ginevra di una madre.”

¹⁹ Original Text at 25’ 20” - “Io non ho particolari aspirazioni di un tipo o dell’altro, sono un uomo, se volete un nonno, al servizio delle istituzioni.”

2. Gender Identity in Sweden: Magdalena Andersson and Ulf Kristersson

In the case of Sweden, a division between the female leader's gender self-identification and her role as Prime Minister is also present regarding Magdalena Andersson as for Giorgia Meloni in Italy. During an interview at the Swedish financial news channel EFN on the 13th of June 2019, Magdalena Andersson underscored how the political structure is always depicted and perceived as made only by men, even though it is not like this. Women are there, like her, and they take an actively part in it, but they have more challenges to deal with because they are judged differently. As the journalist has emphasised, Magdalena Anderson does not accept the appellation as female Finance Minister, asking to be named only as Finance Minister. “(the Journalist) Is it a challenge to be a woman in top politics? You do not see yourself as a female finance minister but as a finance minister and that is reasonable. [...] (Finance Minister Magdalena Andersson) Yes, it is always difficult to judge yourself, but I look at how different women are reviewed in the public debate and in the media. [...] I haven't seen such scrutiny and views on a man. I have never heard people thinking that Ulf Kristersson isn't funny enough. [...] Persson's cabinet preparation was equal. The image has been that it was male-dominated – and that there was a gang of boys around Persson. I have been critical of that image. They make me and the other women, who worked for Göran Persson, invisible.”²⁰ (EFN Ekonomikanalen, 2019). Here, Magdalena Andersson stressed her female gender identity and that related invisibility within the government and politics, underscoring the need for equality and recognition. Nevertheless, she also agrees with the journalist's statement, avoiding the association of feminine attribution or denotation to the role of Finance Minister she was performing. Hence, also in this case, as in the one of Giorgia Meloni, Magdalena Andersson recognizes herself with the female gender identity, but remains cautious in connect it to a political position.

In the second case, Ulf Kristersson has highlighted many times his role as a father, both in a political meeting at the Almedalen Week on the 4th of July 2022 and in a speech at the ‘Folk och Försvar’ Annual National Conference in Sälen on 8 January 2023. There, Ulf Kristersson

²⁰ Original Text 7'46” – “Är det en utmaning att vara kvinna i toppolitiken nu? Men jag vet inte att du inte vill ses som en kvinnlig finansminister utan som finansminister och det är naturligtvis rätt och rimligt på alla sätt. (...) Det är svårt att bedöma dig själv, men jag menar, jag tittar på hur olika kvinnor granskas och den allmänna debatten. (...) Jag har inte sett någon liknande recension och åsikter om en man. Och, jag har svårt att tro att jag aldrig skulle höra att du tycker att Kristensson inte är tillräckligt rolig och drar bra, skämt eller har fel frisyr.” /1'45” - “Perssons skåpförberedelser var lika. Det var lika, även om bilden ofta har varit att den var väldigt mansdominerad och det var ett gäng pojkar runt Göran Persson och jag vet att jag har varit kritisk till den bilden eftersom det gör mig osynlig. Som alla kvinnor som också arbetade för Göran Persson.”

emphasised his relations to the Swedish people needs and feelings due to his family role. “A month ago, our twin daughters graduated. [...] It was a bit dizzy situation, not just because a father is looking at his children suddenly becoming adult for real. But because there was a serious background. On that same day, I had visited a preschool, where a man had been shot just outside.”²¹ (Moderaterna, 2022). “To all of you now serving in the Swedish armed forces [...] thank you so much for everything you are doing. I myself have one daughter serving as a conscript [...] what they – and all other soldiers and sailors – are actually doing is defending the freedom of our country.” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2023). Hence, throughout these two statements it is possible to stress how Ulf Kristersson identifies himself to a male gender identity performing the role of a father concerns for the future of his children and nation.

3. Degree of Gender Equality: Italy and Sweden

In this section the three gender equality dimensions, ergo health, empowerment, and labour, will be analysed and compared between the case of Italy and Sweden.

The Health Variable

Regarding women’s health, the maternal mortality ratio, or MMR, represents the annual number of women’s deaths during pregnancy or within 42 days after giving birth (UNICEF et al, 2023). This variable depicts the quality of the health system and women’s care system (Sorveglianza Ostetrica Itoss, 2022) within a nation. The UNICEF database counts the national MMR of women between 15-49 years and portrays data from 2000 to 2020. Here, both Italy and Sweden have been defined by a very low maternal mortality ratio, which portrays 5 maternal deaths²² per 100,000 live births for the year 2020 for both countries. In addition to it, the right to abortion is part of the health variable. This aspect is assured in both countries. In the case of Sweden, the right to free abortion has been implemented since the year 1975 (Swedish Gender Equality Agency), while in Italy since 1978 (Ministero della Salute, 2022). However, the current Italian government with Giorgia Meloni has proposed three laws that could constraint the law 194/78 upon the right to abortion. Moreover, Italy has a high percentage of gynaecologists conscientious objectors, that are doctors exempted to help the

²¹ Original Text 14’48“ – “För en månad sedan tog våra tvillingdöttrar studenten. (...) Det var lite svindlande, inte bara för att det är stort att som pappa se sina plötsligt alldeles för stora barn ge sig ut i vuxenlivet på riktigt. Utan också för att det utspelade sig mot en så allvarlig fond. Samma dag hade jag besökt en förskola, där en man hade blivit skjuten strax utanför.“

²² <https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/>

patient to abort due to their religious or moral ideas. Here, research from 2016 depicts that 70% of gynaecologists in Italy would not perform abortions (Autorino et al. 2020), meanwhile, in 2020 this number has diminished to 64,4% (Ministero della Salute, June 2022). This is not present in Sweden, where conscientious objectors are not recognized by the law (Munthe, 2017).

The last aspect of the health variable is about women's menstrual hygiene and health management. This point refers to women's challenges and management of their well-being related to their biological features. Here, the availability and accessibility of sanitary products and clean water are considered, as the presence of education and non-discriminatory social norms (The World Bank, 2022). In the case of Sweden, since 2016 (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, 2022), a new gender equality policy with the goal of equal access to health has been enhanced. This Swedish gender equality policy recognizes the differences between males and females with respect to their physical, mental, reproductive, and sexual health (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, 2022) and it has developed into a 'National Strategy for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR)'. This strategy was adopted in 2020 by the public health agency of Sweden (Folkhalsomyndigheten, 2022). Here, the main aim has been to implement reproductive health both during abortion, pregnancy, and childcare, as empowerment and integrity. This last aspect concerns the empowerment of any sexual and gender identities through the fight against violence and discrimination. Nevertheless, as a result of women's difficulty to afford their monthly sanitary products, Sweden has been affected by period poverty due to the presence of a 25% added value tax (MENSEN, 2022) that represents an obstacle for women with low income. Since the MENSEN²³ campaign on this issue in 2017, the Swedish government has invested in several initiatives, such as the support for free sanitary products in workplaces and the creation of the Swedish Gender Equality Agency in 2018. Nonetheless, this issue is still present (MENSEN, 2022) and, furthermore, there is no specific policy on menstrual leave.

In the case of Italy, a strategic project for the enhancement of women's health has been developed since the year 2008 (Ministero della Salute, 2008) where the role of family counselling, education within the school system and the prevention of reproduction-related illness have been further prioritized (Ministro della Salute, 2008). Moreover, according to the

²³ Forum for menstruation. It launched a campaign called #mensautanmoms, which is "having a period without vat", in order to raise awareness of 'the high vat in Sweden on period products'.

Italian National Associated Press Agency²⁴, on the 21st of February 2023 a female deputy, Elisabetta Piccolotti of the AVS²⁵ group, has suggested a law proposal at the parliament for the implementation of up to two days of menstrual leave at school and at work, for women suffering from painful menstruation (ANSA,2023). Additionally, it would also guarantee free distribution of hormonal contraceptives in pharmacies. This law proposal has been already submitted to the parliament on the 27th of April 2016 by 4 female deputies of the PD group (XVII LEGISLATURE). Unfortunately, this it has never effectively become law. Regarding sanitary products, since the 1st of January 2023 the financial state report (197/2022²⁶) plans a reduction of the added value tax from 22% to 5% on women sanitary products, kids' diaper, and milk powder (MEF, Dic 2022). The values added tax was previously diminish to 10% in 2022 (MEF, Jan 2022).

The Empowerment Variable

Concerning the empowerment variable, the OECD EAG report on the educational system 2022 depicts how the percentage of graduated girls in Italy within the general secondary education was about 61% in the year 2020, with an OECD average of 55% (OECD EAG, 2022). While in Sweden the percentage was around 53%, even though they have a similar enrolment rate among 15-19 years old – 85,5% for Italy and 87,1% for Sweden (OECD EAG, 2022). Nevertheless, for the year 2021, more women have completed a university²⁷ education in Sweden 58,2% than in Italy 34,4% (OECD EAG, 2022).

Furthermore, in regard to the share of women in power positions, it is necessary to highlight that Sweden has promoted a 'Gender equality policy goal for the distribution of power in society' (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, 2022) since 2006. This 1st Sub-goal of the Swedish gender equality strategy has been enhancing uniform representation for the administrative and educational sector at the local, regional, and national levels (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, 2022). Moreover, within politics and the private business sector (Swedish Gender Equality Agency, 2022).

For the case of Italy, a legal framework was established in 2006 with the intention to provide equal opportunities between men and women in society (European Parliament Policy Brief,

²⁴ ANSA, <https://www.ansa.it/>

²⁵ Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra, <https://verdisinistra.it/>

²⁶ [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

²⁷ Attained tertiary education, 25-34 year-old women (%)

2014). The National Code of Equal Opportunities between Women and Men²⁸ has been implemented to create the necessary socio-cultural alterations both in professional and private sectors (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014) to assure equality. One example is the Law 120/2011²⁹, which was established to guarantee the presence of women in top position. This Law implemented a gender quote of 20% within the board of directions of companies on the Stock exchange and state-owned companies (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014). Nevertheless, according to EUROSTAT, in 2020 women in a managerial position have represented in Sweden the 42% of all managers, while in Italy they have depicted the 28% (EUROSTAT, 2021). More precisely, the share of female managers in Italy for the year 2021 is around 28,6%, while for Sweden is the 43,0% (OECD. Stat).

On the other side, looking at women's political representation, Sweden had introduced a minimum of 40% of both men and women in internal board and Committees in 1972 (International IDEA, 2023), extending it in 1987 to political election (International IDEA, 2023). Whereas, in Italy, in 2003, the article 51 of the Constitution (XIV Legislatura) has been modified to promote the access of women in elective office across an 'open window' policy³⁰ (International IDEA, 2023), leading to an enforcement of gender quotes only at the local level in 2011 (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014). However, more specific provisions for the national level were implemented with the new electoral law³¹ of 2017, because the electoral law³² of 2015 has never been applied (International IDEA, 2023). Consequently, data of the Swedish Parliament electoral year 2022 have stressed a women seat quote of 46% (162/349) (International IDEA, 2023). Meanwhile, the elector year 2022 in Italy has depicted 32% (129/400 seats) of women for the Chamber of Deputies (International IDEA, 2023) and 34% (71/ 206) for the Senate.

Last aspect of the empowerment variable is the presence of a parental leaves for both men and women to allow mothers to further work and be supported within the family. In Sweden parents have 480 days of paid parental leaves, which can be divided in 240 days for each parent or can be entitled fully to only one (European Commission Policies and Activities). Moreover, Sweden has implemented since 1995 a 'daddy month', or pappamånad, (SI. Swedish Institute,

²⁸ Decreto-legge 198/2006

²⁹ Decreto-legge 201/2011

³⁰Decreto-Legge 215/2012

³¹ Decreto-Legge 165/2017

³² Decreto-Legge 52/2015

2021), which grant 90 days of paid leave specific for fathers (SI. Swedish Institute, 2021). On the other side, in Italy, there is an obligatory paid maternal leave of 2 months, and a compulsory paid paternity leave of 10 days (European Commission Policies and Activities). In addition to it, an optional reduced paid parental leave, that can be request by both parents for 6 months, is granted.

The Labour Variable

Concerning the Labour variable, a gender pay gap has been highlighted for the average gross hourly earnings in Sweden in 2021 of 11,2% (EUROSTAT Online Data browser). Hence, a woman hourly earns on average 11,2% less than her male-counterpart and this value has not change from the previous year. On the other side, EUROSTAT underscores a gender pay gap³³ of 5% in 2021 in Italy, signing an increment from 2020, when the discrepancy was about 4,2% (EUROSTAT Online Data browser). Nonetheless, looking at the OECD employment rate of 2021 to have a clearer outlook, Sweden has a higher rate than Italy for the same period. Indeed, in Sweden, for an age average there is a women employment ratio of 64,4% for the year 2021, in contrast with the 35,8% share present for Italy (OECD.Stat). Hence, in Sweden more women are employed.

Here, according to the European Parliament Policy Brief of 2014, Italy has been affected by the so-called “*dimissioni in bianco*” phenomenon. This practice represents an unlawful resignation of women in case of pregnancy across a pre-emptive resignation letter signed at the moment of the contract’s ratification. This phenomenon has affected circa 800,000 mothers in 2011, even though a law³⁴ against this practice was implemented in 2007 (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014). Despite that statistics upon this phenomenon are not available after 2011, this element depicts the presence of a controversial socio-cultural environment. Furthermore, a lack in childcare services has been stressed (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014; INL, 2021) leading to a higher female part-time and resignation ratio (INL, 2021). Indeed, the 2021 INL³⁵ statistic on dismissions has emphasised how the most frequently women resignations’ reasons in Italy is the difficulty to link family duty and work expectations (INL, 2021: p.15), portraying the existence of socio-cultural obstacles. In this case, for the year 2021 the level of female unemployment was around 10,6% against the 8,7% of male unemployment (OECD.

³³ for the average gross hourly earnings

³⁴ Decreto-legge 188/2007

³⁵ Ispettorato Nazionale del Lavoro (National Labour Inspectorate)

Stat). Nevertheless, considering the long-term fluctuation, a 3-4 points differences between female and male unemployment rate has recalled since 2015 (OECD. Stat).

In the case of Sweden, gender equality within workplaces has been enhancing since 1980 (SI. Swedish Institute, 2021), but a law in 2009, the Swedish Discrimination Act, has further demands a promotion of equality both for gender, ethnicity, transgender identity, and religion (SI. Swedish Institute, 2021). This measurement is also linked to discrimination in case of pregnancy or parental leave (SI. Swedish Institute, 2021). Moreover, according to the Nordic Co-operation Council Statistics of 2023, Nordic women are the most employed in the world thanks to a high valuable childcare service, parental leave, and employment protection rules. Indeed, childcare services are guaranteed and made affordable to all in order to promote the presence of working parents (SI. Swedish Institute, 2021). Nevertheless, as stressed previously, there is a high gender pay gap that the Nordic Co-operation statistic of 2023 associates with sex-segregation. Hence, women tend to work in female-dominated industries as health, education, and care work (Nordic Co-operation, 2023). Furthermore, more women than men work in part-time employment and the unemployment rate of women is higher than men, underscoring the gender gap within the labour market. Nonetheless, the gender gap in unemployment is less evident in Sweden than in Italy. Hence, for the year 2021 female unemployment rate in Sweden was around 9,1% against the 8,5% of male unemployment (OECD. Stat), representing a constant 1-1.5 points difference since 2015 (OECD. Stat).

In conclusion, looking at the overall situation, it is possible to highlight how both countries, Italy and Sweden, still need to overcome some obstacles regarding gender equality. As elucidated, the selected countries are lacking policies on unlike matters. For instance, in Sweden, the social-cultural environment is more projected toward gender equality than in Italy across the rejection of gynaecologists' conscientious objectors and the support of working mothers through an affordable childcare system and implemented father leave. Moreover, in Sweden, there is a higher share of university-graduated girls, of an established female quote within politics and managerial positions and a higher female employment rate. However, Sweden portrays an evident gender pay gap (EUROSTAT, Online) and one of the highest added-value taxes on female sanitary products (Buchholz & Richter, 2020).

On the other side, Italy positively depicts a lower gender pay gap and it is implementing new policies regarding gender equality, such as menstrual leave and a 5% added value tax on female sanitary products. Nevertheless, the surrounding social-cultural environment does not promote

women in the labour market and in a higher position than in Sweden. Indeed, in Italy, working women lack an affordable childcare backing system, of a state's regulated partner support and are constraint by dismissal practice. This practice, as '*dimissioni in bianco*', is unlawful but has still been applied, as the report clarified (European Parliament Policy Brief, 2014). Hence, they cannot be considered as totally dismissed also today. Moreover, the presence of a minor gender equality environment is mostly emphasised by the lawful existence of conscientious objectors doctors which undermine women's independent decisions on their health. Therefore, this research considers Italy with a lower level of gender equality in contrast to Sweden.

Finally, this conclusion can be linked to the Gender Equality Index (GII)³⁶ of the UN Development Programme, on which this research grounds for the selection of the inquiry main variable of the country's gender equality. Indeed, also the GII of Italy and Sweden highlights a little difference, stressing a higher gender equality degree for Sweden in 2021 (last updated data) with a score of 0,023. While, for the same year, Italy reaches a score of 0,073, depicting a lower level of gender equality, as the previous analysis also portrayed.

³⁶ Gender Inequality Index | Human Development Reports (undp.org)

V. Security comparative study: feminist versus militarized foreign policy?

In this chapter, feminist foreign policy analysis and the CMT model are employed to inquire about the understanding and, thus, the further implementation of security foreign policies in Italy and Sweden. Following the ‘Women-Peace hypothesis’, there should be a transition to a more peaceful and human-centric security policy with the upcoming of a female leader, hence in the case of Italy with the arrival of Giorgia Meloni. Meanwhile, in the case of Sweden, there should be an alteration to a more state-centric and militarized view with the arrival of Ulf Kristersson. Nonetheless, because Italy has a lower level of gender equality in contrast to Sweden, both Italian leaders, male and female, should be more military-focused and state-centric, than in the case of Sweden. According to the ‘gender equality state aggression’ theory, country with a higher degree of gender equality should see an acceptance and revaluation of feminine qualities within the political realm. This hypothesis is examined in this section.

1. Security understanding and implementation in Italy: militarized?

The Italian Government has provided Ukraine in total with 6 military aid packages, which also include a clear statement to the participation of Italy at the North Atlantic Alliance and at the EU’s measures to support Ukraine (Governo Italiano - MEACI). These policies could be divided into 5 packages for the ex-Prime Minister Mario Draghi, and 1 for the current Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (Governo Italiano- MEACI). Moreover, policies for the financial, logistic, and social assistance of the Ukrainian civil population have been implemented (Governo Italiano- MEACI). With them the Italian government has been publicly sustaining Ukraine, condemning the Russian violation of International Law (Governo Italiano- MEACI). Nevertheless, internal discussion on the usefulness of these military aid packages has been present, emphasising the non-fully support by the public opinion and some politicians.

Mario Draghi: initial security response to the conflict in Ukraine

Mario Draghi has been the Prime Minister of Italy from the 13th of February 2021 to the 22nd of October 2022, leaving his mandate to the ongoing Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Regarding the military implementations applied starting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mario Draghi has firstly enacted measures through the Law n.14 disclosed on the 25th of

February 2022. This law³⁷, first of all, underscores the Italian participation in enhancing its NATO military presence within the Very High Readiness Joint Force (VJTF) and in strengthening any NATO devices for the monitoring of the Alliance air space and naval areas until the 30th of September 2022. Secondly, the Law 14 requires the cession of **non-lethal** military equipment and transport to the Ukrainian government for the amount of 12 million euro (Art.2) and the simplification of each Italian governmental act linked to **cooperation** and **assistance** towards the Ukrainian government (Art.3). Lastly, it allows the development of security measures for compatriots and for any Italian governmental office on the Ukrainian territory (Art.4).

In a public explicative document, this law promotes the cession of material for individual protection, such as Counter-IED for the detection of metal objects and devices (Dossier n° 544 - Schede di lettura). Indeed, its Ministry of Defence publication declares the cession of solely individual protection equipment for the Ukrainian force and the dispatch of demining materials to safeguard the civilian population (Ministero della Difesa). In addition, this publication stresses the rise of the alert level of both the Immediate Follow-on Forces Group, IFFG, and the Very High Readiness Joint Force, VJTF, (Ministero della Difesa). For the IFFG, the unit number was raised to 2.000 (Ministero della Difesa).

“É autorizzata, fino al 30 settembre 2022, la partecipazione di personale militare alle iniziative della NATO per l'impiego della forza ad elevata prontezza, denominata Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). [...] É autorizzata, per l'anno 2022, la prosecuzione della partecipazione di personale militare al potenziamento dei seguenti dispositivi della NATO”³⁸ -Law n.14 Art.1

“Cessione di mezzi ed equipaggiamenti militari non letali di protezione [...] Disposizioni urgenti di semplificazione delle procedure per gli interventi di assistenza o di cooperazione”³⁹ - Law n.14 Art.2/Art.3

These regulations, on the cession of military means and equipment and on the enhancement of compatriots' security, have been repeated within the Law n.16 on the 28th of February 2022⁴⁰.

³⁷ [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

³⁸ “The participation of military personnel in NATO initiatives for the use of the highly readiness force, called Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), is authorized until 30 September 2022. [...] The continuation of the upgrading participation of military personnel is authorized for the year 2022 within NATO devices”

³⁹ “Transfer of non-lethal military means and protective equipment. [...]Urgent provisions for the simplification of procedures for assistance or cooperation interventions”

⁴⁰ [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

There, the cooperation and cession of **non-lethal** military equipment and transport to the Ukrainian government has been further legally simplified. Moreover, The Premier Mario Draghi has declared on a public conference that he reached the agreement to implement the Italian defence expenses for NATO to 2% of the PIL for the year 2028 (Servizio Studi – Camera dei Deputati, 2022)

Basing on these two Laws, 14 and 16, Mario Draghi has enforced further 5 security policies, or DM ‘*Decreto Interministeriale*’, on March, April, May, July and in October 2022. These packages are policies executed by the Italian Defence Ministry, which explicitly sustains Ukraine through financial, economic, humanitarian, political and military assistance. Here, the first security policy⁴¹, on the 2nd of March 2022, refers for the first time to both **lethal** and **non-lethal** military aid, not elucidating the exact equipment and means given to Ukraine because classified. Moreover, the security policy of the 2nd of March discloses the participation of Italy at the European Peace facility, contributing with 390 million euros (Governo Italiano - MEACI) and guaranteeing the participation of Italy in the European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM) (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Concerning the military implementation, this DM emphasises the support of Italy to the Ukrainian forces within the EU framework through the dispatch of military **lethal** and **non-lethal** equipment and of financial assistance.

“(F)ornitura di materiale e piattaforme militari concepiti per l'uso letale della forza e una misura di assistenza nell'ambito dello strumento europeo per la pace per sostenere le forze armate ucraine.”⁴² DM 2nd of March 2022

The following security packages (DM) have based on a modification of the Law 14 on the 25th of February 2022. This modification has been applied on the 5th of April 2022 in the Law n.28⁴³, where the military assistance established on the 25th of February has been further authorized until the 31st of December 2022. Regarding the second DM⁴⁴ (22nd of April 2022), the third DM⁴⁵ (10th of May 2022), the fourth DM⁴⁶ (26th of July 2022), and the fifth⁴⁷ (7th of

⁴¹[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁴² “Supply of military material and platforms designed for the lethal use of force and assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to support the Armed Forces of Ukraine [...] Military devices and instruments that allow Ukraine to exercise the right of self-defence and to protect its population”.

⁴³[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁴⁴[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁴⁵[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁴⁶[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁴⁷[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

October), they all refers to the cession of both **lethal** and **non-lethal** military equipment and transports without elucidating the exact amount or typology, due to their classified status.

Looking at the financial and economic implementations enforced to sustain Ukraine under Mario Draghi, the Italian Government has enacted economic sanctions against Russia and Belorussia participating in all the EU and G7 decisions (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Additionally, on the European level, the Italian Government has participated in the EU financial assistance of Ukraine across Macro-financial Assistance+ of 9 billion euros (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Moreover, on the 27th of February the Italian Foreign Ministry has independently approved the transfer of 110 million euros to the Ukrainian Government in order to support its financial statement (Governo Italiano - MEACI). While on the 15th of July 2022, an allocation of 200 million euros were enforced to back the basic duties of the Ukrainian Government and guarantee its operation (MEF Comunicato Stampa, 2022). This allocation referred specifically to the payments of the Ukrainian school staff (MEF Comunicato Stampa, 2022). Lastly, on the 24th of May 2022 Italy has participated to the European Union decision to sustain a temporary trade liberalization of Ukrainian products in order to help the Ukrainian economy (Governo Italiano - MEACI).

In the case of humanitarian and social protection, several regulations have been enacted towards the Ukrainian population. Firstly, the Italian Government has established a state of emergency on the 28th of February 2022 (Dipartimento della Protezione Civile, 2022) in order to activate the Italian civil protection for the first assistance of refugees on the Italian territory as on the European one. Additionally, a Decree⁴⁸ on the 28th of March 2022 has introduced the Ukrainian Refugees' temporary protection on the Italian territory for one year in combination to the EU decision.

Moreover, regarding the civil population in Ukraine, the Italian Government has firstly donated 1 million euros to the International Committee of the Red Cross (Governo Italiano - MEACI) to deploy as soon as possible first assistance to the population. Nevertheless, the support of Draghi's Government for the CICR has increased with the allocation of 25,5 million euros for humanitarian activities in favour of vulnerable people in Ukraine as well as bordering countries (Governo Italiano - MEACI). In addition to it, the Italian Agency for Development and

⁴⁸[Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

Cooperation⁴⁹, which is considered an integral part of Italian Foreign Policy (AICS-Profilo), has allocated 14 million euros to back humanitarian actions by Italian civil society organisations, or OSC, working on the Ukrainian territory (Governo Italiano - MEACI). According to the AICS, these organisations are specialized in developing projects for the protection of the rights of more vulnerable people within conflicts (AICS). Since the end of July, the AICS has financed 14 projects which supports mainly women, people with disabilities, minors, and elderly with special needs (AICS). The aim of those projects is to improve the life conditions of those more exposed providing commodities (AICS). Moreover, those projects have a major focus on gender issues and gender equality, supplying gender specific goods when needed (AICS). Lastly, for what concern marginalised, fragile or disempowered people, the Italian Government has financed, since the start of the conflict, the CIRC and the Italian Red Cross mission. Indeed, these organisations fully assist the entire civil population focusing also on more exposed (Governo Italiano - MEACI).

Following humanitarian and social protection regulations, the Italian Government has financed diverse International Organisations. For instance, 3 million euros have been initially provided to the UNHCR actions related to displaced people within the conflict areas (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Furthermore, an allocation of 10 million euros has been financed to the UNHCR Mission in Moldova for the enhancement of the country's capacity to accommodate Ukrainian Refugees (Ufficio SG, 2023). In that mission, as in the OIM and UNICEF Mission in Moldova, where the Italian Government is also providing funds of 10 million euros (Governo Italiano-MEACI), the main focus of the Italian participation has been to support actions towards non-accompanied minors and vulnerable people (Governo Italiano - MEACI) within the Moldova reception centre. Moreover, the Government has provided 17,5 million euros (Governo Italiano - MEACI) for the UN humanitarian organisation, CERF or Central Emergency Response Fund, which is aimed to overcome the food, education and sanitary emergency present in Ukraine (CERF, 2022). Lastly, the Italian Government has also sustained Italian projects, as the one of the Lazzaro Spallanzani Hospital, which has carried out interventions to strengthen the capacity of the Sighetu Marmatiei hospital located on the border between Ukraine and Romania (Governo Italiano - MEACI). There, the Italian Government has allocated 650.000 euros.

⁴⁹ La Cooperazione Italiana - <https://www.aics.gov.it/>

Following the social protection provisions implemented in the Ukrainian territory, the Italian government has been on the first line promoting regulations to safeguard the Ukrainian cultural, historical and architectural heritage. At the beginning of April, the MiC, Italian Culture Ministry, has ensured Italian help to the Ukrainian heritage, across the census of all Ukrainian cultural locations and architectures, the dispatch of material to guarantee their safeguard, and the support of Ukrainian artists taking shelter in Italy (Governo Italiano - MEACI; UNESCO, 2022). Here, 2 million euros have been firstly adopted to finance Ukrainian artists, their residence, and their projects. Secondly, the MiC has elucidated on a publication that 2 trucks of the Italian Red Cross have brought materials to safeguard the Ukrainian cultural heritage at the beginning of July (MiC, 2022). Moreover, the Italian Government has also guaranteed its financial support in reconstructing the Theatre of Mariupol (UNESCO, 2022), as the overall EU decision to back the rebuilding of Ukraine after the war (Governo Italiano). Indeed, already on the 31st of May a new regulation⁵⁰ has been passed on the enhancement of the Task Force ‘*Caschi Blu della Cultura*’, Peacekeeping of culture, which should be deployed in the future to reconstruct and restore the Ukrainian cultural heritage (Camera dei Deputati, 2022).

As a last point, looking at the Italian diplomacy with Mario Draghi, Italy has politically sustain Ukraine across diverse actions. Firstly, throughout the implementation of the Italian Defence Ministry packages sending lethal and non-lethal military assistance to Ukraine. Moreover, Mario Draghi went to Kiev on the 17th of June 2022, where he openly supported in his speech the entrance of Ukraine within the European Union (ANSA). Indeed, Mario Draghi has initially planned to flight both to Kiev and Moscow to act as a mediator, unfortunately without any success in visiting the Russian Capital. In addition to it, Italy under the Draghi’s Mandate has refused to acknowledge the referendum done by Putin on the 27th of September 2022 in the conflict zone of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporishshia, considering the Referendum unlawful (ANSA). All these statements are clearly expose within the Government Website on the Page upon the war in Ukraine and the role of Italy in it.

“L’Italia condanna con la massima fermezza l’aggressione ingiustificata e non provocata della Russia contro l’Ucraina [...] sostiene inoltre pienamente il percorso europeo dell’Ucraina e ha contribuito attivamente alla concessione dello status di candidato all’UE a Kiev. [...] (L)’Italia condanna con forza i referendum farsa della

⁵⁰ DM 128 31/03/2022

Russia e l'annessione delle regioni ucraine di Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson e Zaporizhia e non riconoscerà mai tali atti illegali.”⁵¹ Governo Italiano - MEACI

Giorgia Meloni: security response of the first female Italian Prime Minister

With Giorgia Meloni, on the 22nd of October 2022 Italy has begun its XIX Legislature which should last 5 years and that represents the first Italian Legislature with a female Prime Minister. In respect to the enacted military implementations started from its mandate as Prime Minister, on the 2nd of December 2022, the Meloni's Italian Government has firstly extended the authorization for the cession of military means, materials, and equipment to the Ukrainian Government. This Decree⁵² 185/2022 has provided the permit to further dispatch military assistance to Ukraine until the 31st of December 2023. Furthermore, the Government has enabled the application of a 6th military aid package⁵³, or DM. This Defence Ministry Decree was authorized on the 31st of January 2023, and it provides the cession of non-lethal and lethal military equipment and means to the Ukrainian forces. Furthermore, across this Decree, Italy, in combination with France, has decided to dispatch to the Ukrainian force medium-long range air defense SAMP/T and anti-missile system, providing the training for the use of these military instruments (Governo Italiano - MEACI).

Moreover, regarding NATO and the EU, the approach of Giorgia Meloni to the Alliance and the Union has radically changed. Indeed, even though Meloni has mostly criticized throughout her political career the Italian membership within both (Roberts and Leali, 2022), across her mandate as Prime Minister the relevance of NATO's role for the Italian security has been emphasised (ANSA, 2022). Meloni's Government has greeted the Secretary General of Nord Atlantic Alliance, Stoltenberg, on the 10th of November 2022 (ANSA, 2022). Here, Giorgia Meloni has reaffirmed the relevance of NATO for the Italian security and the Italian intention to be an active part of NATO (ANSA, 2022) carrying out the participation at both the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force with 570 units and the Immediate Follow-on Forces Group with 420 units (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Additionally, the Italian battleground contingent in Latvia will increase of 30 combatants in 2023 from the initial 250 from the year

⁵¹ “Italy condemns in the strongest terms Russia's unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine [...] it also fully supports Ukraine's European path and actively contributed to the granting of EU candidate status to Kiev. [...] Italy strongly condemns Russia's referendum and the annexation of the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia and will never recognize such illegal acts.”

⁵² [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁵³ [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

2017(Governo Italiano - MEACI). Lastly, on the public conference of the end of the year 2022, Meloni has emphasized the Government's intention to raise the Italian NATO defence expenditure to 2% of the GDP for the year 2028, maintaining Draghi's agreement with the Alliance (Governo Italiano, 2022).

“Confermo l'impegno dell'Italia nei confronti della Nato e delle sfide comuni che l'Alleanza si trova ad affrontare in questo momento delicato. [...] Le dimensioni transatlantica ed europea sono ovviamente entrambe fondamentali per la nostra sicurezza: l'alleanza è indispensabile per la sicurezza e la prosperità delle nostre nazioni”.⁵⁴ ANSA News 10.11.2022

Lastly, Meloni has highlighted the necessity and indispensability to support the military assistance giving from the EU to Ukraine. On the 20th of March 2023, the Italian Government has strengthen its support to the EU's decision to give munitions for 2 milliard euros to Ukraine across separate signature (ANSA - Focus Europa, 2023). Moreover, since the new year 2023, the Italian Government has further guarantee its participation at the EUMAM⁵⁵ and at the European peace facility. Concerning the EUMAM, the Italian Government has approved on the 23rd of January 2023 an addition of 500 million euros to the already established Italian financial quotes (Governo Italiano - MEACI).

Looking at the economy and financial policies, Meloni's Government has, firstly, taken part in the decision of the EU to further enact an MFA+, or Macro-Financial Assistance+, of 18 billion euros in 2023 to support financially Ukraine (Governo Italiano – MEACI; Parlamento Europeo). Secondly, the Italian Government has allocated 10 million euro on the 13th of December 2023 to strengthen the resilience of the infrastructure system in Ukraine (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Indeed, the Government of Giorgia Meloni has focused in supporting the road and railway system sending materials to secure it (Governo Italiano). In addition to it, on the 16th of February 2023, the Italian Government has ratified the Common Aviation Area Agreement between the European Union, and its Member States, and Ukraine (Governo Italiano, 2023). This agreement was already formulated in 2013 and signed in Kiev on 12 October 2021 (Governo Italiano, 2023). It opens the aviation market between the EU and

⁵⁴ “I confirm the Italian commitment to NATO and to the common challenges that the Alliance is facing in this delicate moment. [...] The transatlantic and European dimensions are obviously both fundamental to our security: the alliance is indispensable for the security and prosperity of our nations”.

⁵⁵ European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine

Ukraine across a visa free regulation (Government Portal Ukraine, 2021). Lastly, Meloni's Government is further participating at the economic sanction packages from the EU implemented with the ninth and tenth package, respectively on the 16th of December 2022 and on the 25th of February 2023 (CONFINDUSTRIA; Governo Italiano- MEACI).

Looking at humanitarian and social protection policies, Meloni's Government has clarified its support to the previous engaged projects, such as the Italian Red Cross presence in Ukraine, the reconstruction assistance, and the cultural heritage project. Furthermore, on the 10th of February 2023, the Italian Government has sent to Kiev a humanitarian package containing 52 energy generators, 10 tents and equipment to help the population overcome the winter (Governo Italiano, Feb 2023). Meanwhile, on the 2nd of March 2023 the Italian Government has enacted the Decree⁵⁶ n.12 to extend the guidelines for the temporary protection of civilian coming from the Ukrainian conflict areas. The validity of the temporary protection has been implemented until the 31st of December 2023 and it allocates 40 million euros to reinforce social services and reception centre for Ukrainian refugees (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Additionally, the Italian Government as further sustain the humanitarian action of international organisations. For example, Italy has guaranteed a contribution also for the year 2023 to the CERF and this time also at the OHCHR to enhance the monitoring of human rights violations in Ukraine (Governo Italiano - MEACI). Lastly, the Italian government has participated since November 2022 at the humanitarian initiative, 'Grain from Ukraine', to mitigate the food security consequences created by the war in Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine).

Concerning the diplomatic approach, it is necessary to highlight, that in the case of the Giorgia Meloni's Government several resolutions have been adopted by the Parliament during the debate for the extension of the 6th military aid packages for Ukraine. Those resolutions, the Serracchiani ed altri n. 6-00012⁵⁷, Richetti ed altri n. 6-00014⁵⁸, Foti, Molinari, Cattaneo, Lupi ed altri n. 6-00016⁵⁹, illustrate the political will of the Parliament and Government. Regarding the debates on military assistance to Ukraine, on the 13th of December 2022 they have emphasised the necessity to shape the role of Italy for a de-escalation of the conflict. Indeed, only the fewer of them have stressed the willingness to further dispatch military aid to Ukraine. However, starting from this political sentiment, Giorgia Meloni's Government has clarified her

⁵⁶ [Gazzetta Ufficiale](#)

⁵⁷ [6/00012 : CAMERA - ITER ATTO](#)

⁵⁸ [6/00014 : CAMERA - ITER ATTO](#)

⁵⁹ [6/00016 : CAMERA - ITER ATTO](#)

intention in further assist Ukraine in her speech on the 22nd of March 2023 at the Council of Ministers. There Meloni elucidated her position criticizing who is in favour of stopping sending arms and military equipment to Ukraine (Governo Italiano - CdM, 2023).

“Onorevole Scutellacci dice fermatevi. Penso che lo debba dire a Putin, e mi fa specie che lo dica a noi perché probabilmente questo tradisce una posizione, cioè, vuol dire consentire l’invasione dell’Ucraina. Perché se noi ci fermiamo, noi consentiamo l’invasione dell’Ucraina. [...] Ora io non sono così ipocrita da scambiare un’invasione con la parola pace e quindi credo che non si debba consentire l’invasione dell’Ucraina, che non vuol dire non lavorare per un piano di pace o una soluzione del conflitto, ma la situazione è più complessa di come la fa certa propaganda.”⁶⁰ Governo Italiano - CdM (36’10’’ - 37’09’’)

In addition to it, representing one of her first visit abroad as Prime Minister, on the 21st of February 2023 Meloni went to Kiev to emphasise the support of the Italian Government to Ukraine and to Ukraine entrance in the EU (Palazzo Chigi Youtube). Lastly, the Italian Government with Giorgia Meloni has approved on the 16th of March 2023 a bill which introduces the crime of aggression into the Italian legal system and expands the jurisdiction of the war crimes (Governo Italiano, March 2023). This enables Italy to prosecute war crimes committed outside of Italy whenever the person responsible locates on the Italian territory. This step represents clear evidence on the Italian Government’s vision on Russian war crimes and international cooperation.

⁶⁰ “The honourable Scutellacci says stop. I think he should say it to Putin, and I am shocked that he is telling it to us because I believe it probably betrays a position, that is, it means allowing the invasion of Ukraine. Because if we stop, we allow the invasion of Ukraine. (...) Now I am not hypocritical enough to mistake an invasion for the word peace and therefore I believe that the invasion of Ukraine should not be allowed, which does not mean not to work for a peace plan or a solution to the conflict (...) but the situation is more complex than some propaganda shapes it.”

2. Security understanding and implementation in Sweden: human-concerned?

The Swedish Government has constantly provided political, financial, military, and humanitarian support to Ukraine, sustaining its efforts against the Russian invasion. Additionally, there has been a major development in the Swedish Foreign Policy with the abandon of its feminist agenda and the decision to become a Member of the NATO.

Magdalena Andersson: Swedish Foreign Policy more feminist than ever?

Magdalena Andersson, today's ex-Prime Minister of Sweden, started her mandate as Swedish first female Riksdag leader on the 30th of November 2021 until the 18th of October 2022, when Ulf Kristersson replaced her. Concerning any military implementation, the Swedish Government has sent to Ukraine several military support packages. The first was carried out on the 27th of February 2022 (Reuters), depicting an historical swift in Sweden military non-alignment and Feminist Foreign Policy agenda. More precisely, as the Swedish Former Minister for Foreign Affairs has specified in a Tweet, the Government has decided to dispatch “5,000 anti-tank weapons, 5,000 helmets, 5,000 body shields and 135,000 field rations” (Ann Linde, Twitter) to the Ukrainian forces. According to the Swedish Armed Forces Government Agency, these materials have been delivered around the 7th of March 2022 (Swedish Armed Forces). Other additional military aid packages for the Ukrainian army have been sent on the 1st of July 2022 and on the 29th of August 2022. The former consisted of military equipment and materials for the amount of SEK 500 million, such as “anti-tank weapons, infantry support weapons and mine clearance equipment” (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). While, on the 29th of August, after the meeting with the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, Andersson has provided Ukraine with a two-part support package (Government Offices of Sweden, Aug 2022). The first set of assistance concerns military means of SEK 500 million (Government Offices of Sweden, Aug 2022), while the second financial aid. Moreover, since August, Sweden is active supporting in training Ukrainian combatants in the UK (Watkins, 2022). The training has been planned until December (Watkins, 2022). Lastly, the Premier Andersson has highlighted Sweden support to the European Peace Facility projects regarding Ukraine at the press conference with the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen, on the 7th of April 2022 (Government Offices of Sweden, Contest Asset Magdalena Andersson all content 2021-2022).

For the case of the Andersson Government, it is necessary to also highlight the decision to end 200 years of non-Alignment through the cession of armaments and military equipment to the

Ukrainian forces. With her Government, Sweden applied for the status of ‘applicant country’ at the NATO with the vote on the 26th of May 2022 and it further signed the Accession Protocol on the 5th of July 2022 (Government Offices of Sweden, March 2023). These steps represent an historical action for Sweden since the country has mainly promoted a neutral foreign policy (Bjurwald, 2022). However, it is essential to stress that Magdalena Andersson has justified her decision and position upon the Sweden’s NATO membership as the best action to ensure security assurance to Sweden (NATO News, June 2022). Indeed, both in the press conference on the 13th of June 2022 and in the NATO Madrid Summit on the 29th and 30th of June 2022, Andersson has illustrated how “this process is what source of action is best serving Sweden security” (NATO News, June 2022), allowing Sweden to be more secure (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). Nevertheless, she has also emphasised how Sweden will try to further engage for disarmament (NATO News, June 2022).

Looking at economic policies, the Swedish Government has provided the Ukrainian army with a financial support for of SEK 500 million (Ann Linde, Twitter) and another of SEK 577 million on the 1st of July. Indeed, across a military additional package enacted on the 1st of July 2022, the Swedish Government has provided the Ukrainian National Bank with money allocations, to back the Ukrainian forces (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). In addition to it, this package has financed the NATO’s fund for the Ukrainian Armed Forces across SEK 110 million (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). Financial assistance was also established within the military aid package of the 29th of August 2022, in which the Swedish Government has committed in developing a new economic aid package to Ukraine of SEK 1 billion (Government Offices of Sweden, Aug 2022). Lastly, on the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano on the 4th and 5th of July 2022, the Swedish Government has promised SEK 70 million for the rebuilding of Ukraine (ReliefWeb, Jul 2022), providing further SEK 500 million on the end of August for both Ukraine’s reconstruction and humanitarian support (ReliefWeb, Sept 2022).

For what regard humanitarian and social protection policies, the Swedish Government has activated the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, or MSB⁶¹, providing an additional SEK 100 million. This implementation intended to assure assistance to the Ukrainian civilian population through the UN and EU Civil Protection mechanism (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). This package has also provided further humanitarian aid across 77 million

⁶¹ [MSB – The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency](#)

euros and an issued guarantee to the World Bank of 45 million euros (Government Offices of Sweden, July 2022). According to MSB, the Government has assigned the Agency to enact the transport of medicines to Ukraine (MBS, March 2022) and to implement guidelines given from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, ERCC, to support displaced people in Ukraine, the dispatch of firefighting and medical equipment, and medicines (MSB, June 2022).

Moreover, the Swedish Government has supported international projects and organisations. For instance, the UNHCR activities in Ukraine (UNHCR, 2022) and the fundraising campaign ‘Stand for Ukraine’ on the 9th of April 2022, which help internally displaced people and vulnerable people (Global Citizen; EU Solidarity with Ukraine). Additionally, already after the beginning of the war, the Government has financial supported the ICC across SEK 5 million to ensure war crimes investigations in Ukraine (Insight EU Monitoring, Apr 2022). Nevertheless, the Swedish Government has also started its own investigations on the war’s crime committed by Russia in Ukraine across the Swedish courts (Government Offices of Sweden, Mar 2023). Lastly, in September, the Swedish Government has entered the *Grain From Ukraine* and the *Black Sea Grain Initiative* (Government Offices of Sweden, Dec 2022) The former implementation has been carried out to avoid a hunger crisis and facilitate the Ukrainian agricultural Export (Government Offices of Sweden, Dec 2022). Here, Sweden has contributed with an allocation of SEK 400 million for the transport of Ukrainian wheat by the UN World Food Programme (Government Offices of Sweden, Dec 2022).

Looking for diplomatic efforts, the first and most significant has been the Swedish Government decision to start the accession protocol to NATO on the 26th of May 2022 (Government Offices of Sweden, March 2023). Furthermore, the Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson has visited the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in Kiev agreeing on a symbolic and politically relevant statement on bilateral relations between Ukraine and Sweden (President of Ukraine Official Website). This joint statement regards the enhancement of sanctions against Russia, defense cooperation, collaboration on nuclear energy and for the energy sector in general, and financial assistance to Ukraine (President of Ukraine Official Website). Finally, in the visit Magdalena Andersson has declared her support for Ukraine entrance in the EU (President of Ukraine Official Website). Lastly, the Government has openly denied the recognition of the Russian illegal annexations of the region of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporishshia through a public statement (Government Office of Sweden, Sept 2022).

Ulf Kristersson: turnover to a Swedish militarized security Foreign Policy

Ulf Kristersson was elected as Prime Minister of Sweden on the 18th of October 2022. With him, Sweden has abandoned for the first time since 2014 its Feminist Foreign Policy Agenda (Walfridsson, Human Rights Watch), because “the label obscures the fact that Swedish foreign policy must be based on Swedish values and Swedish interests” (Walfridsson, Human Rights Watch). This turnover can be also identified in the payload of security military aid packages sent to Ukraine in contrast with his predecessor Magdalena Andersson. Indeed, looking at Sweden military aid packages, the Government of Kristersson has provided Ukraine with 3 military aid policies set until April 2023.

The first one was enacted on the 16th of November 2022, and it is considered to be the ‘largest military support’ set given to Ukraine until that moment (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). It should contain “an advanced weapons system for air defence including advanced ammunition, and also advanced ammunition for additional air defence systems, light all-terrain vehicles, personal equipment including winter equipment and body protection, gun laying equipment, tents and camouflage netting” (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). This package was around SEK 3 billion, which, according to the Government, represents SEK 1 billion more than the entire previous military assistance given by the Andersson Government (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). Additionally, it declares the entrance of Sweden in the European Union Assistance Mission Ukraine (EUMAM) formally established on the 17th of October 2022 (Council of the EU) and which is aimed to train the Ukrainian armed forces (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022).

As a second military assistance package to Ukraine, the Swedish Government announced on the 19th of January 2023 a large three-part package, which included “a procurement cooperation scheme, instructions to the Swedish Armed Forces to prepare the transfer of the Archer Artillery System, and the largest defence equipment package to date” (Government Office of Sweden, Jan 2023). Hence, the Swedish Government has engaged with the Ukrainian Government settling international agreements for the ‘procurement of defence equipment’ (Government Office of Sweden, Jan 2023). More precisely, this agreement should include both the exchange of experiences and know-how, as the assistance to develop procurement structures (Government Office of Sweden, Jan 2023). Moreover, the Swedish Government has provided Ukraine with non-assigned Archer B artillery units and munitions (Government Office of Sweden, Jan 2023), as a set of defence equipment. For instance, “recoilless rifles with

ammunition, anti-tank weapons, assault rifles, mine clearance equipment, Combat Vehicle 90 (CV90) with ammunition, and light anti-armour weapon Robot 57 (NLAW)” (Government Office of Sweden, Jan 2023).

In addition to it, Sweden has collaborated with Finland to provide an additional military assistance of SEK 4,11 billion to Ukraine on the 20 of January 2023. This extra-package have supplied Ukraine with ‘heavy military weapons and equipment’ (Government Offices of Sweden, Jan 2023). Lastly, following the Swedish military implementations, on the 24th of February 2023 the Government in combination with the Defence Ministry have released the third military support package for Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden, Feb 2023). Here, the Swedish Government has dispatched to Ukraine ‘Heavy advanced weapons’, such as the “subsystems of the HAWK anti-aircraft system and (the) essential parts of the IRIS-T anti-aircraft system” (Government Offices of Sweden, Feb 2023). Moreover, Sweden has participated with Germany in providing Ukraine with circa 10 Leopard 2 battle tanks (Government Offices of Sweden, Feb 2023).

Regarding NATO, the Swedish Government with Kristersson has stepped forward emphasising how Sweden’s membership will strengthen its military capability, responsibility and NATO power too. More precisely, Kristersson in a press conference on Sweden role in NATO declared that “Sweden’s and Finland’s NATO membership strengthens the alliance and bolsters our common security. Thanks to Sweden’s naval resources and strong position in the air, we can take on great responsibility in the entire Baltic region” (Government Offices of Sweden, Jan 2023). Hence, on the 8th of March 2023 the Government has proposed a bill upon the Swedish NATO’s membership to the Riksdag, whose approval is indispensable to further proceed (Government Offices of Sweden, Mar 2023). This bill has been approved by the Riksdag, Swedish Parliament, on the 23 of March 2023 (Szumski, 2023). Consequently, Kristersson has deployed an increment of the Swedish defence expenditure to the 2 per cent of the GDP by 2026 and established a ‘special’ minister for the enhancement of civil and military defence (Government Offices of Sweden, Jan 2023).

Looking at economic and financial aids, on the first military aid package on the 16th of November 2022, the Swedish Government elucidates its intentions to further participate at each EU economic sanctions directed to the Russian Federation (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). Additionally, the Swedish Government has financed across SEK 20 million the

work of the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the Ukrainian electricity supply and to enhance nuclear safety within Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden, Jan 2023)

Concerning humanitarian and social protection policies, the first Kristersson Government package, on the 16th of November 2022, depicts not only a military support set but also a humanitarian one. It contained humanitarian aid materials for Ukraine and Moldova for SEK 720 million to assist the country for the coming winter with sanitation, heating resources and the possibility to access food and water (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). According to the Government, this delivery will set the basis to support the reconstruction of the Ukrainian social infrastructure (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). Additionally, this package included also emergency aid which will be distributed through financial support to international organisations, such as the World Food Programme, Red Cross, World Bank funds for Ukraine and Moldova, Nordic Environment Finance Corporation's Ukraine Green Recovery Programme, mine clearance through the Danish Refugee Council and the Energy fund by the donor conference for Moldova (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022).

Nevertheless, looking more at women-specific social protection, on the 8 of March 2023, the Swedish Government provided an allocation of 9 million euros to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and 2 million euros to the UN Women for projects regarding displaced women and girls in Moldova and Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden, March 2023). These actions support the access of women to the Ukrainian and Moldavian health systems in order to make available fully free reproductive services, medicines, dialysis and surgical services (Government Offices of Sweden, March 2023).

Moreover, the Swedish Government has assisted the work of the International Criminal Court highlighting that Russia should be hold accountable for the violations of the international law and for the war's crimes committed in Ukraine (Government Offices of Sweden, Mar 2023). Hence, Sweden is further supporting the investigation of the ICC, as the Swedish courts investigations (Government Offices of Sweden, Mar 2023). Lastly, the Government has declares its intention to ensure corridors for the export of Ukrainian grains and agricultural products (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022), further sustaining both the *Black Sea Grain Initiative* and the *Grain From Ukraine* (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). Meanwhile, on the 13th of December 2022, the Swedish Government has elucidated the intention to increment of SEK 600 million its support to the World Bank new mechanism to back the Ukrainian civil infrastructure (Government Offices of Sweden, Dec 2022). This

mechanism should help Ukraine to maintain access to energy, heating, water, health care, and education (Government Offices of Sweden, Dec 2022).

Finally, following Swedish diplomatic steps, the Swedish Government of Kristersson has further support the entrance of Ukraine in the European Union (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022) and denied the recognition of the illegal Russian referendum in the region of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia through a joint statement with Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Ukraine on the 28th of November 2022 (Government Offices of Sweden, Nov 2022). Moreover, Kristersson has visited the Ukrainian President on the 15th of February further enhancing the existing bilateral cooperations (President of Ukraine, Official Website, 2023). Indeed, across the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Kristersson is steadily assisting Ukraine developing also a EU Working Group to plan and employ the frozen Russian assets to rebuild Ukraine (Government Offices Sweden, Feb 2023).

VI. Findings on the role of Gender

This section illustrates firstly the finding of each case through a case by case analysis. More precisely, it portrays the behavioural distinction between female and male leaders for the case of Italy and then for Sweden. Here, the cases are examined singularly in order to elucidate a possible gender-based difference in the implementation of state's security policies.

Secondly, this section compares these findings across a cross-country examination to highlight the possible female leaders' behavioural distinction as a result of the level of gender equality.

Case by case analysis: Gender differences in Italy and in Sweden

Firstly, looking at the Italian security policies towards Ukraine and keeping all the factor constant, it could be possible to identify a hardening of the security implementation switching from male to female, instead of a softening. Indeed, even though the classified status of the information creates a lack of data on the typology of arms and equipment dispatched to Ukraine by both Italian Governments, and that Giorgia Meloni has carried out fewer military aid packages than her counterpart, her mandate portrays a continuation of the security policies previously employed by Mario Draghi. Following the 'Women and Peace Hypothesis', Meloni should have strongly diminished the military, thus, assertive traits of the Draghi foreign policy, focusing mostly, if not only, on human-security policies. However, she has further extended of a year the possibility for the Italian Government to send arms and equipment to Ukraine. Indeed, Meloni has dismissed the political internal discontent upon the dispatch of military assistance to Ukraine by Italy, on the contrary, she stood up openly for a new military aid package. This dissent could have represented a breach allowing Meloni a reassessment and reduction of Draghi's military aid understanding, which Meloni did not support.

In fact, across the resolutions of Serracchiani ed altri n. 6-00012, Richetti ed altri n. 6-00014, Foti, Molinari, Cattaneo, Lupi ed altri n. 6-00016, it is evident that the Italian Parliament and Government are not fully committed in sending military equipment and means to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Meloni has firmly stressed her intention to help Ukraine military as long as needed contesting those politicians in disagreement with the applied military foreign policy. Indeed, Meloni defined their positions as hypocritical and that, whenever Italy stops helping Ukraine, it will consequently support Russia. Secondly, Meloni has accepted Draghi's NATO agreement, which disposes the enhancement of Italian military expenses to 2% of the GDP, and established her support for the Italian NATO membership, which she had heavily criticised in the past. She invited the Secretary-General for a private meeting in Rome and incremented

the combatants number in the Italian unit in the battleground in Latvia. Moreover, Meloni is now also maintaining Italian support for the EU's military aid package towards Ukraine, leaving her EU scepticism for the moment aside.

Additionally, looking at the social protection and humanitarian policies, the difference between Draghi and Meloni has not been that remarkable. On the contrary, Draghi had implemented a major number of community-related projects both across international organisations (UNHCR, CRF, UNICEF, OIM), across Italian private initiatives, such as the Spallanzani hospital, and Ministerial initiative, as the one of the Cultural Peacekeeping Group or 'Caschi Blu della cultura'. Furthermore, he focused on education financing the payment of the school staff remaining in Ukraine, and on the assistance of people with special needs sustaining projects related to the Italian Agency for Cooperation, AICS. On the other side, Meloni has just confirmed the Italian Government's support to some projects firstly employed by Draghi, such as the CERF. Nevertheless, she has promoted policies for financial support and implementation for the investigation of war crimes and human rights discrimination.

Consequently, it could be possible to underscore a continuation of Mario Draghi's security policies and a drop in humanitarian/social protection packages. Here, two aspects have to be stressed. Firstly, most of Draghi's community-related projects started in July, hence, a one-year duration for those initiatives could be assumed. This would explain why Meloni has not reaffirmed her support for them. Nevertheless, this is a speculation because the agencies has not specified the duration of the projects. Secondly, the continuation of Draghi's security understanding is depicted as a policy hardening for the switch from male to female. With the shift to a female leader a decline in the military support of Italy to Ukraine was hypothesised with an increment of economic and human security policies. However, this did not verify.

In opposition to Italy, looking at the policies implemented by Andersson and Kristersson and keeping all the factor constant, it could be possible to identify a hardening of the security policy switching from female to male in the case of Sweden. Indeed, according to the Swedish Government information, both Andersson and Kristersson have implemented 3 military aid packages towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, the one carried out by Ex-Prime Minister Andersson included firstly only protection equipment and has not increased its payload as much as the one employed by Kristersson.

The first and second Andersson's military aid packages have dispatched 'anti-tank weapons, helmets, body shields and field rations', the former, and 'anti-tank weapons, infantry support weapons and mine clearance equipment', the latter. For the third package, there is no clear evidence of its payload. On the contrary, based on the given information, Kristersson's military aid packages to Ukraine have been identified as the largest in payload, the one with the largest defence equipment or the one with heavy military weapons. Indeed, Kristersson provided Ukraine with 'an advanced weapons system for air defence including advanced ammunition, and also advanced ammunition for additional air defence systems, light all-terrain vehicles, personal equipment including winter equipment and body protection, gun laying equipment, tents and camouflage netting', plus 'the transfer of the Archer Artillery System, and the largest defence equipment package to date'.

Moreover, it is evident in the data, that Andersson has mainly financed the Ukrainian army across money allocation. She had provided two financial supports, one at the beginning of the war and one on the 1st of July; She has explicitly employed an allocation to the Ukrainian National Bank to back the Ukrainian forces, and she had supported NATO funding for the Ukrainian army. This policy has not been implemented by Kristersson, who has mainly focused on direct military aid policies and humanitarian policies.

Considering this distinction, both Swedish Prime Ministers have supported the entrance of Sweden into the North Atlantic Alliance and have implemented several community-related policies. Meanwhile, Andersson has focused mainly on the dispatching of medicine and medical equipment, in the support of investigation against human rights discrimination and war crimes. Kristersson has promoted policies financing international organisations, such as the Red Cross, World Bank, UN Women, and Energy Fund and to support the Ukrainian Civil Infrastructure. Hence, whereas both leaders have carried out several humanitarian and social protection policies, they distinguished themselves in the implementation of military aid packages. Indeed, Andersson has promoted more financial allocations to the Ukrainian Army and have focused less on the payload of the physical military assistance. Whereas, Kristersson has concentrated primarily in sending physical military aids of a higher payload through more advanced weapons and largest military aid packages.

Here, it is necessary to stress how this research fully considers the fact that Magdalena Andersson is the Prime Minister with whom Sweden has decided to be part of NATO and has started the membership entrance process. This step is a relevant element to value for the

analysis; however, this research evaluates with it also the way that Andersson and Kristersson have portrayed this decision to public opinion. Indeed, while Andersson has focused on the need for Sweden to be secured and on Sweden's further engagement in disarmament, Kristersson has primarily illustrated the relevance of NATO for the strengthening of Sweden's military capabilities and responsibility. Moreover, Kristersson has implemented an increment of the national defence expenditure in contrast with Andersson's disarmament vision.

Consequently, for the case of Sweden, this research identifies a security policy hardening in the shift from female to male leader, as the Women and Peace Hypothesis assumes.

VII. Concluding remarks: lessons learnt from the comparison

Keeping all factor constant, it could be possible to compare the two cases and formulate some conclusion upon the examination. To sum up the previous inquiry, this research identifies the case of Italy as contesting the 'Women and Peace Hypothesis'. Here, the examination emphasises a security foreign policy hardening across the shift from male to the female leader, instead of a policy softening. Indeed, it is evident a continuation of the Mario Draghi's understanding and security policies structure by Giorgia Meloni, instead of a reduction or break of the previous military aid implementation. Of course, the evolution of the conflict and of the western political environment have positively promoted the dispatch of military aid to Ukraine and to increase their assertiveness. The general consensus in supporting Ukraine sustained both by the EU, as the USA, and the partial EU political approval in sending more assertive military assistance, for instance, tanks, are examples of this alteration. These elements could be depicted as drivers of a more assertive security foreign policy. Nevertheless, the existence of an evident dissent in Italy during Meloni's mandate could have signified a continuity break from Mario Draghi's security policies. Hence, because of the lack of this security policy's shift, but rather of an open statement of Meloni pro-military aid position, this research perceives Meloni's security foreign policy implementation and understanding as hardening than softening.

On the other side, for the case of Sweden, this research identifies a backing of the 'Women and Peace Hypothesis', due to a security policy hardening across the switch from female to male leaders. Indeed, even though Magdalena Andersson is the Swedish Prime Minister who brought Sweden in the NATO, there is an evident increment of the military aid packages' number and arms assertiveness dispatched to Ukraine with the shift to Kristersson's mandate. Furthermore,

also the way Magdalena Andersson portrayed to the public her decision to enter in the NATO is more connected to the idea of safeguard and caring the nation and its people, than on a sole military perspective. On the contrary, Kristersson's portrayal of the Swedish entrance in NATO have been characterized by a different imprint in which the military capability and relevance of Sweden in NATO and outside have been mostly underscored. Moreover, with Kristersson the importance of a military implementation within Sweden, of the Swedish army, of the country military expensive has been more emphasized. In combination with this aspect, Kristersson has downturned the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy traits, explaining how this does not portrays the Swedish people "values and interests". While, Andersson has further depicted Swedish foreign policy as feminist, seeking to further engage in disarmament, notwithstanding Sweden entrance in NATO.

Lastly, it is possible to highlight how Andersson has financed the Ukrainian army across EU's initiatives and organisations, such as the Ukrainian National Bank. Hence, Andersson's security foreign policy has supported Ukraine and its forces less directly. While Kristersson's military and social assistance to Ukraine have been more publicly portrayed and more directly donate to the Ukrainian army and Government. The fact that Sweden after 200 years of non-alignment has started to finance military and economically a nation participating at a conflict could be seen as a driver of Andersson's security approach. However, in order to identify this factor as part of the Sweden's nature as a nation, it should have also depicted the attitude of Kristersson, entirely or just in part.

Now, juxtaposing the two cases, it could be possible to highlight that the gender variable does not affect the state security understanding and implementation in both cases. Indeed, looking at the empirical analysis of this research, the examination underscores the presence of a less assertive female Prime Minister with a more assertive male counterpart for Sweden. While there is a continuation of the male Prime Minister's assertive security foreign policy throughout the female leader mandate in Italy. Hence, in this analysis, it is not possible to hypothesise that female leaders will develop a more peaceful and less assertive state's security foreign policy during an external security crisis just as a consequence of their gender. Thus, this research illustrates the 'Women and Peace Hypothesis', which recognizes women as peaceful by nature, as not fully applicable in the case of a foreign policy security crisis.

Lesson learnt: The gender variable has an impact on the state's security behaviour dependently on the country level of gender equality.

On the other side, this empirical analysis emphasises the relevance of the ‘Gender Equality and State Aggression’ feminist IR theory. Indeed, it could be possible to depict the gender equality variable as the one affecting the state’s security understanding and implementation during a security crisis for female leaders. Hence, backing this theory, with an increment of the country degree of gender equality, there will be a less assertive state internationally. Ergo, a state security foreign policy understanding and implementation will be less assertive during a security crisis if there occurs both a female leader and a high level of gender equality.

Lesson learnt: The country level of gender equality influences the behaviour of female leaders in the case of a security crisis.

Consequently, it could be possible to stress that during an international security crisis scenario the gender variable of a leader is not enough in shaping the state’s security foreign policy understanding and implementation alone. Here, the research identifies Magdalena Andersson as less assertive than Giorgia Meloni. Indeed, even though Andersson introduced Sweden to NATO, she portrayed this historical step as a necessity to safeguard the nation, promoting the feminist perspective of women’s more human-centric view on security matters. On the contrary, Meloni has openly sustained the need to dispatch military aid to Ukraine, condemning as hypocritical whoever is against it. Secondly, Meloni has also talked about the indispensability to seek a peace solution. However, according to the reached data, she has not actively engaged yet for peace solutions in the Italian Government. This difference between Andersson and Meloni can be explain by the existence of the diverse level of gender equality. Following the ‘State aggression and Gender equality’ theory, the presence of a lower gender equality degree in Italy leads a female leader to act more ‘masculine’, distancing herself from those feminine socially imposed features. In this way, she prevents to be undervalued, overcoming structural obstacles. Hence, in this case gender does not play a significant role.

Therefore, this research concludes that, basing on the found data and keeping all factor constant, the gender variable can have an impact on state’s security foreign policy only in the case of a higher level of gender equality. In this way it is possible to state that female leaders actions are, indeed, shaped by the external societal environment. Hence, in a society with more acceptance and integration of feminine linked qualities, female leaders will less constraint those traits. Nevertheless, the security crisis scenario imposed the necessity to still act according to what is expected by the society, which could be to securitize the nation also across military

actions. However, the way female leaders portray those decision still illustrates the relevance of the gender equality level in the shaping their military actions' objective and understanding.

In conclusion, this research states that, during a security crisis, the gender variable has an impact on the state's security foreign policy formulation only with a higher level of gender equality. While the gender equality variable represents a significant variable in both cases, stressing a more assertive foreign policy by female leader in the case of a lower level of gender equality. Hence, female leaders are not by nature more peaceful than men, but it depends on the degree of acceptance and integration of those socially imposed feminine qualities. This finding is not supporting the previous hypothesis that this research had formulated, ergo:

If there is a security crisis, then there is less likelihood that gender and gender equality will have an impact on the state's foreign policy response.

Consequently, this research enhanced the already existent literature across a comparative study between male and female leaders based on their security foreign policy implementation, rather than on public survey in security policy. Nonetheless, it opens to new study to further verify these learnt lessons. Indeed, this research based on a Small-N study, which hope to give to input for a Large-N inquiry. The gender category is highly dependent on cultural, race, age, class and time, thus this research tries to promote further inquiry seeking whether gender and gender equality affects the state's security policy understanding and implementation in the same way also outside of Europe and the Western cultural frame. Lastly, the future evolution of the conflict and the public opinion open the question on the alteration of this finding, across a switch in the here looked state security foreign policy actions. Hence, this research leads possibly to further inquiry on the role of gender and gender equality with a long-term security crisis.

VIII. References

- Aggestam, K., & True, J. (2020). Gendering foreign policy: A comparative framework for analysis. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 16(2), 143–162. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz026>
- Aggestam, K., & Towns, A. (2018). The gender turn in diplomacy: A new research agenda. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 21(1), 9–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2018.1483206>
- AICS. (n.d.). Profilo e Obiettivi. Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo. Retrieved March 26, 2023, from <https://www.aics.gov.it/home-ita/agenzia/profilo/>
- AICS. (n.d.). AICS Sostiene La Popolazione Ucraina Con 14 progetti di primissima Emergenza a cura delle Osc. Agenzia Nazionale per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from <https://www.aics.gov.it/news/2022/71907/>
- AKINRINDE, O. (2020, December 18). CONVENTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE SECURITY STUDIES: COMPARING THE COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR EPOCHS. *Annals UCB*. Retrieved February 2, 2023, from <https://alss.utgjiu.ro/mdocs-posts/04-olawale-akinrinde-conventional-and-alternative-security-studies-comparing-the-cold-war-and-post-cold-war-epochs/>
- Alcoff, L. (1988). Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory. *Signs*, 13(3), 405–436. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3174166>
- ALISON, M. (2004). Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security. *Security Dialogue*, 35(4), 447–463. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26298583>
- Ann Linde's Twitter. (2022, February 27). Retrieved March 31, 2023, <https://twitter.com/AnnLinde/status/1498002914362728455?lang=en>
- ANSA.it Mondo. (2023, February 21). *Avs Presenta Proposta Di Legge Sul Congedo Mestruale*. Retrieved March 10, 2023, from https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2023/02/21/avs-presenta-proposta-di-legge-sul-congedo-mestruale_6cd62908-cfb3-45c6-bfe8-f0d6db5e017b.html
- ANSA.it Mondo. (2022, June 17). *Draghi a Kiev Da Zelensky: "Vogliamo l'Ucraina Nell'Ue"*. Retrieved March 23, 2023, from https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/europa/2022/06/16/ucraina-draghi-macron-scholz-da-zelensky.-il-premier-a-irpin-avete-il-mondo-dalla-vostra-parte_43e54603-f98c-4462-9059-85b5fec53d96.html
- ANSA.it Mondo. (2022, November 10). *Meloni, Alleanza Nato Indispensabile per La Sicurezza e La Crescita*. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/europa/2022/11/10/-meloni-alleanza-nato-indispensabile-per-la-sicurezza-e-la-crescita-_88ee2f7a-7371-434a-98ae-383c13c80cc3.html
- ANSA.it Europe. (2023, March 20). *Fonti, Approvato Il Piano Ue Da 2 Mld per Munizioni a Kiev*. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://www.ansa.it/europa/notizie/qui_europa/2023/03/20/fonti-approvato-il-piano-ue-da-2-mld-per-munizioni-a-kiev_5cc77bee-c185-4e5c-8121-3c068160f17d.html
- ANSA.it Mondo. (2022, September 30). *Putin Sfida Il Mondo e Annette i Territori Ucraini*. Retrieved March 27, 2023, from https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/2022/09/29/mosca-domani-annette-le-regioni-ucraine_06059a98-d03a-464d-ab3b-688562e33aeb.html

Autorino, T., Mattioli, F., & Mencarini, L. (March, 2020). The impact of gynecologists' conscientious objection on Abortion Access. *Social Science Research*, online published on ScienceDirect, 87, 102403. Retrieved 10 March, 2023, from <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102403>

Baldwin, David A. “--NEOLIBERALISM, NEOREALISM, AND WORLD POLITICS.” (2006).

Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The Concept of Security. *Review of International Studies*, 23(1), 5–26. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097464>

Bashevkin, S. (2014). Numerical and policy representation on the International Stage: Women Foreign Policy Leaders in western industrialised systems. *International Political Science Review*, 35(4), 409–429. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113516029>

Bashevkin, S. (2018). *Women as foreign policy leaders: National security and gender politics in superpower America*. Oxford University Press.

Berenskoetter, F., Williams, M. J., Diez, T., & Manners, I. (2008). Reflecting on Normative Power Europe. In *Power in world politics* (pp. 173–188). essay, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.

Blanchard, E. M. (2003). Gender, international relations, and the development of feminist security theory. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 28(4), 1289–1312. <https://doi.org/10.1086/368328>

Bouta, T., Frerks, G., & Bannon, I. (2005). Gender and Warfare: Female Combatants and Soldiers' Wives. In *Gender, Conflict, and Development* (pp. 9–32). World Bank. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep02478.9>

Bruce D. Bonta. (1996). Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of Peacefulness. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(4), 403–420. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424566>

Buchholz, K., & Richter, F. (2020, May 28). Infographic: Where the “Tampon tax” is highest and lowest in Europe. Statista Infographics. Retrieved 10 March, 2023, from <https://www.statista.com/chart/18192/sales-tax-rates-on-feminine-hygiene-products-in-europe/>

Bjurwald, L. (2022, March 14). Sweden is arming Ukraine — and still fighting over Nato. *EuObserver*. Retrieved March 18, 2023, from <https://euobserver.com/world/154526>

Camera dei Deputati. (2023, February 6). *Cessione di materiali d'armamento alle autorità governative dell'Ucraina*. Documentazione Parlamentare, Difesa e Sicurezza Internazionale. Retrieved March, 2023, from https://temi.camera.it/leg19/temi/19_cessioni-di-materiali-d-armamento-alle-autorit-governative-dell-ucraina.html

Camera dei Deputati. (2022, May 9). *Crisi Ucraina: istituita la Task Force Caschi Blu della Cultura*. Segnalazione, Study-Cultura, Retrieved March 2023, from https://temi.camera.it/leg18/post/OCD15_14689/crisi-ucraina-istituita-task-force-caschi-blu-della-cultura.html

Caprioli, M. (2003). *Gender equality and state aggression: The impact of domestic gender equality on State first use of Force*. *International Interactions*, 29(3), 195–214. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620304595>

Caprioli, M., & Boyer, M. A. (2001). Gender, Violence, and International Crisis. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(4), 503–518. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176309>

CERF - United Nations. (2022, March 24). “A Massive Relief Effort” CERF Scales up Humanitarian Aid in Ukraine. Retrieved March 2023, from <https://cerf.un.org/news/story/massive-relief-effort-cerf-scales-humanitarian-aid-ukraine>

Cheryl de la Rey. (2005). Gender, Women and Leadership. *Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity*, 65, 4–11. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4066646>

CONFINDUSTRIA. (2023, February 25). *Crisi Ucraina: Sanzioni*. Retrieved March 29, 2023, from <https://www.confindustria.it/home/crisi-ucraina/sanzioni>

Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. *Gender and Society*, 19(6), 829–859. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640853>

Council of the EU. (2022, November 15). *Ukraine: EU launches Military Assistance Mission*. Council of the EU Press Release. Retrieved March, 2023, from <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/15/ukraine-eu-launches-military-assistance-mission/>

D’Aoust, A. (2012). “Feminist Perspectives on Foreign Policy”. In Robert Denemark (ed.): *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Oxford. UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 1-32.

Darcy J. (2004). *Conflict and Social Protection: Social Protection in Situations of Violent Conflict and its Aftermath*, Theme Paper 5, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, <https://gsdrc.org/document-library/conflict-and-social-protection-social-protection-in-situations-of-violent-conflict-and-its-aftermath/>

Darden, J. T., Henshaw, A., & Szekely, O. (2019). *Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars*. Georgetown University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvb1htcb>

DCAF (2015, November 17). *National Security Policies: Formulating national security policies for good security sector governance*. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, SSR backgrounder. Retrieved 20 February, 2023, from <https://www.dcaf.ch/national-security-policies-formulating-national-security-policies-good-security-sector-governance>

Dietz, M. G. (1985). *Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal Thinking*. *Political Theory*, 13(1), 19–37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/191628>

Dipartimento della Protezione Civile. (2022, February 28). *Delibera del Consiglio dei Ministri del 28 febbraio 2022*. Deliberazione - Provvedimenti normativi. Retrieved 15 March, 2023, from <https://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/it/normativa/delibera-cdm-del-28-febbraio-2022-emergenza-ucraina-0>

Diquinzio, P. (1993). Exclusion and Essentialism in Feminist Theory: The Problem of Mothering. *Hypatia*, 8(3), 1–20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810402>

Dossier n° 544 - Schede di lettura. (2022, March 1). *Disposizioni urgenti sulla crisi in Ucraina D.L. 14/2022 / A.C. 3491*. Camera dei Deputati, Servizio Studi. Retrieved 28 February, 2023, from <https://documenti.camera.it/Leg18/Dossier/Pdf/D22014.Pdf>

EFN Ekonomikanalen YouTube. (2019, June 13). *Att skuldbelägga kvinnor är inte feminism*. Retrieved 1 March, 2023, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ZdTH2UCtQ>

European Commission Policies and Activities. “Sweden - Parental benefits and benefits related to childbirth”. In: *Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion*. Retrieved 08 March, 2023, from <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1130&intPageId=4808&langId=en>

European Commission Policies and Activities. "Italy - Maternity and paternity leave allowance". In: *Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion*. Retrieved 08 March, 2023, from <https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1116&langId=en&intPageId=4618>

FEMM Committee. (2014 March). *The Policy on Gender Equality in Italy*. Directorate General for Internal Policies - Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs. European Union. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2014/493052/IPOL-FEMM_NT%282014%29493052_EN.pdf

European Parliament. (2022, November 24). *Parliament approves €18 billion loan for Ukraine for 2023*. Retrieved 15 April, 2023, from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55713/parliament-approves-EU18-billion-loan-for-ukraine-for-2023>

EUROSTAT Online Data Browser. *Gender pay gap in unadjusted form*, Retrieved 08 March, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_20/default/table?lang=en

EUROSTAT. (2021, March 05). *Women remain outnumbered in management*. Retrieved 08 March, 2023, from <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/edn-20210305-2>

EU Solidarity with Ukraine. (2022, June 28). *Stand Up for Ukraine: Global Campaign*. European Union. Retrieved 03 April, 2023, from https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine/stand-ukraine-global-campaign/about_en

Fatić, A. (2002). Conventional and unconventional - "hard" and "soft" security: the distinction. *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe*, 5(3), 93–98. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43292068>

Feeney, S., Freeman, N. K., & Schaffer, K. (2019). Gender Expression and Identity. *YC Young Children*, 74(5), 84–93. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26842313>

Finnish Ministry of Defence. (2022, August 25). *Joint statement by Defence Ministers of Finland, Norway and Sweden*. Press Release. SENOFI Ministerial joint statemen. Retrieved 14 April, 2023, from https://www.defmin.fi/en/topical/press_releases_and_news/press_releases_archive/2022/joint_statement_by_defence_ministers_of_finland_norway_and_sweden.13035.news#783c381c

Folkhalsomyndigheten. (2022). National strategy for sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR). Folkhalsomyndigheten Public Health Agency of Sweden, 22267. <https://www.folkhalsomyndigheten.se/contentassets/5ced6a64b90f44ccb0dc56564e701ea1/national-strategy-sexual-reproductive-health-rights-srhr.pdf>

Gasztold, A. (2017). *A feminist approach to security studies*. *Przegląd Politologiczny*, (3), 179–190. <https://doi.org/10.14746/pp.2017.22.3.13>

Gee, J. P. (2014). *An introduction to discourse analysis: Theory and Method*. Routledge.

Genovese, M. A., & Steckenrider, J. S. (2013). *Women as political leaders: Studies in gender and governing*. Routledge.

Goethals, G. R., & Hoyt, C. L. (2017). *Women and leadership: History, theories, and case studies*. Berkshire.

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, July 01). *Additional military support to Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2022/07/additional-military-support-to-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, August 30). *SEK 1 billion in additional support for Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/08/sek-1-billion-in-additional-support-for-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, September 30). *Sweden does not, and will not, recognise Russia's illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory*. Retrieved 21 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/09/sweden-does-not-and-will-not-recognise-russias-illegal-annexations-of-ukrainian-territory/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, November 16). *Government to send record support package to Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/11/government-to-send-record-support-package-to-ukraine/>

Government Office of Sweden. (2022, November 23). *The Government of Sweden welcomes the renewal of the Black Sea Grain Initiative*. Retrieved 22 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/11/the-government-of-sweden-welcomes-the-renewal-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, November 28). *Joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and Ukraine*. Retrieved 22 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/statements/2022/11/joint-statement-by-the-foreign-ministers-of-estonia-finland-iceland-latvia-lithuania-norway-sweden-and-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, December 13). *Additional SEK 600 million in support to Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2022/12/additional-sek-600-million-in-support-to-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, December 15). *Ukrainian grain alleviates the global hunger crisis*. Retrieved 21 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/12/ukrainian-grain-alleviates-the-global-hunger-crisis/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, January 09). *Sweden's role in NATO*. In: *Speech by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson*. Folk och Försvar Annual National Conference in Sälen. <https://www.government.se/speeches/2023/01/swedens-role-in-nato/>

Government Office of Sweden. "Heavy advanced weapons to Ukraine", 19 Jan, 2023, <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/01/heavy-advanced-weapons-to-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, January 20). *Sweden and Finland cooperate on additional support package for Ukraine*. Retrieved 23 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/01/sweden-and-finland-cooperate-on-additional-support-package-for-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2022, 01 July). *Sweden invited to join NATO at Madrid Summit*. Retrieved on the 07 May, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2022/07/sweden-invited-to-join-nato-at-madrid-summit/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, January 26). *Government contributes to improved nuclear safety in Ukraine*. Retrieved 25 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/01/government-contributes-to-improved-nuclear-safety-in-ukraine/#:~:text=Today%2C%2026%20January%2C%20the%20Government,SEK%2020%20million%20in%202023.>

Government Offices Sweden. (2023, February 14). *EU Working Group to look at using frozen Russian assets for reconstruction of Ukraine*. Retrieved 21 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/02/eu-working-group-to-look-at-using-frozen-russian-assets-for-reconstruction-of-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, February 24). *Heavy advanced weapons to Ukraine in new support package*. Retrieved 23 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/02/heavy-advanced-weapons-to-ukraine-in-new-support-package/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, March 08). *Sweden provides almost EUR 11 million in support to women and girls in Ukraine and Moldova*. Retrieved 24 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/03/sweden-provides-almost-eur-11-million-in-support-to-women-and-girls-in-ukraine-and-moldova/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, March 08). *Government has presented bill on Sweden's membership of NATO to the Riksdag*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/03/government-has-presented-bill-on-swedens-membership-of-nato-to-the-riksdag/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, March 23). *Sweden's road to NATO*. Retrieved 27 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/government-policy/sweden-and-nato/swedens-road-to-nato/>

Government Offices of Sweden. (2023, March 30). *How Sweden is working to hold Russia accountable for crimes in Ukraine*. Retrieved 27 April, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/articles/2023/03/how-sweden-is-working-to-hold-russia-accountable-for-crimes-in-ukraine/>

Government Offices of Sweden. Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson received President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. In: *Content Assets Magdalena Andersson all content 2021-2022*. 88-90. Retrieved 08 May, 2023, from <https://www.government.se/contentassets/3374f6ad48014949b0db11e9b685203d/prime-minister-magdalena-andersson-all-content-2021-2022.pdf>

Government Portal Ukraine. (2021, October 12). *Ukraine and the European Union have signed a Common Aviation Area Agreement*. Retrieved 28 March, 2023, from <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-yevropejskij-soyuz-uklali-ugodu-pro-spilnij-aviacijnij-prostir#:~:text=%22The%20Common%20Aviation%20Area%20Agreement,of%20the%20EU%20member%20states.>

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2022, December 29). *Conferenza Stampa di fine anno del Presidente Meloni*. Retrieved 29 April, 2023, from <https://www.governo.it/it/media/conferenza-stampa-di-fine-anno-del-presidente-meloni/21409>

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2023, February 10). *Ucraina, dal Governo italiano ulteriori aiuti in tende e generatori*. Retrieved, 28 April, 2023, from https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/retediplomatica/2023/02/ucraina-dal-governo-italiano-ulteriori-aiuti-in-tende-e-generatori/

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2023, February 16). *Comunicato stampa del Consiglio dei Ministri n. 21*. Retrieved 18 April, 2023, from <https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-21/21834>

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2023, February 23). *Emergenza Ucraina, predisposto l'invio di ingenti quantità di materiale elettrico*. Retrieved 17 April, 2023, from <https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/emergenza-ucraina-predisposto-linvio-di-ingenti-quantita-di-materiale-elettrico/21855>

Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. (2023, March 16). CODICE DEI CRIMINI INTERNAZIONALI (disegno di legge). In: *Comunicato Stampa del Consiglio dei ministri n25*. Retrieved 16 April, 2023, from <https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/comunicato-stampa-del-consiglio-dei-ministri-n-25/22114>

Governo Italiano – CdM. (2023, March 22). *Consiglio europeo del 23 e 24 marzo, le Comunicazioni del Presidente Meloni alla Camera dei Deputati*. <https://www.governo.it/it/articolo/consiglio-europeo-del-23-e-24-marzo-le-comunicazioni-del-presidente-meloni-alla-camera-dei>

Governo Italiano - MEACI. *L'Italia a sostegno dell'Ucraina*. Retrieved 14 April, 2023, from https://www.esteri.it/it/politica-estera-e-cooperazione-allo-sviluppo/aree_geografiche/europa/litalia-a-sostegno-dellucraina/

Insight EU Monitoring. (2022, April 12). *Sweden increases support to ICC war crimes investigations*. Retrieved 01 April, 2023, from https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/sweden-increases-support-to-icc-war-crimes-investigations/374398?utm_source=ieu-portal

International IDEA. (2023, January 24). *Gender Quotas Database – Sweden*. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/261/35>

International IDEA. (2023, January 24). *Gender Quotas Database – Italy*. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas/country-view/41/35>

Ispettorato Nazionale del Lavoro -INL. (2021). *Relazione annuale sulle convalide delle dimissioni e risoluzioni consensuali delle lavoratrici madri e dei lavoratori padri ai sensi dell'art. 55 del Decreto Legislativo 26 marzo 2001. n. 151*. <https://www.ispettorato.gov.it/it-it/studiestatistiche/Documents/INL-RELAZIONE-CONVALIDE-DIMMISSIONI-RISOLUZIONI-CONSENSUALI-2021.pdf>

ISTAT. (2022). Goal 5: Raggiungere l'Uguaglianza di Genere. In: *Analisi delle misure statistiche per Goal*. In: *Rapporto SDGs 2022*. <https://www.istat.it/storage/rapporti-tematici/sdgs/2022/goal5.pdf>

Keohane, N. O. (2020). *Women, Power & Leadership*. *Daedalus*, 149(1), 236–250. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48563044>

Koch, M. T., & Fulton, S. A. (2011). *In the defense of women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in established democracies*. *The Journal of Politics*, 73(1), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381610000824>

Litosseliti, L., & Sunderland, J. (2002). *Gender Identity and discourse analysis*. John Benjamins Pub.

McCarthy, J. (2022, March 28). *'Stand Up for Ukraine' Campaign Aims to Drive Billions in Aid for Refugees Worldwide*. *Global Citizens*. Retrieved 03 April, 2023, from <https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/stand-up-for-ukraine-pledging-summit-social-rally/>

- MEF. (2022, December 29). *Le principali misure della manovra 2023*. Retrieved 13 March, 2023, from <https://www.mef.gov.it/focus/Le-principali-misure-della-manovra-2023/>
- MEF. (2022, January 28). *Legge di Bilancio 2022*. Retrieved 13 March, 2023, from <https://www.mef.gov.it/focus/Legge-di-Bilancio-2022/>
- MEF. (2022, August 05). *Firma dell'accordo di prestito tra Italia e Ucraina per il pagamento dei salari degli insegnanti ucraini*. In: Comunicato Stampa n°144. Retrieved, 28 April, 2023, from <https://www.mef.gov.it/ufficio-stampa/comunicati/2022/Firma-dellaccordo-di-prestito-tra-Italia-e-Ucraina-per-il-pagamento-dei-salari-degli-insegnanti-ucraini/>
- Meloni Giorgia. (2022, November 16). Facebook Post. Retrieved 15 March, 2023, from <https://www.facebook.com/giorgiameloni.paginaufficiale/posts/685858299574383>
- MiC. (2022, July 06). *Ucraina: MiC, partiti autotreni Croce Rossa Italiana con materiali per salvaguardare patrimonio culturale ucraino*. Retrieved 28 April, 2023, from <https://uss-sisma2016.beniculturali.it/notizie/internazionale/ucraina-mic-autotreni-croce-rossa-italiana-materiali-salvaguarda-patrimonio-culturale/>
- Ministero della Difesa. (2022, February 25). *Crisi in Ucraina: disposizioni urgenti sulla crisi in Ucraina (decreto-legge)*. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://www.difesa.it/Pagine/Crisi-in-Ucraina-disposizioni-urgenti-sulla-crisi-in-Ucraina-decreto-legge.aspx>
- Ministero della Salute. (2022, June 08). *Relazione Ministro Salute attuazione Legge 194/78 tutela sociale maternità e interruzione volontaria di gravidanza*. Retrieved 10 April, 2023, from <https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/donna/dettaglioPubblicazioniDonna.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=3236>
- Ministero della Salute. (2008, March 06). *Primo Rapporto sui lavori della commissione "Salute delle Donne"*. In: *Stato di salute delle donne in Italia*. Retrieved 08 April, 2023, from <https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/donna/dettaglioPubblicazioniDonna.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=764>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ukraine. (2023, February 16). *Grain From Ukraine*. Retrieved Access 29 March, 2023, from <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/grain-ukraine>.
- Moderaterna YouTube. (2022, July 04). *Ulf Kristerssons tal i Almedalen*. Retrieved 15 March, 2023, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnybMrTUeCg&t=888s>
- MBS – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. (2022, March 22). *Medicines sent from Sweden to war-torn Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.msb.se/en/news/2022/mars/medicines-sent-from-sweden-to-war-torn-ukraine/>
- MBS – Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. (2022, June 23). *EU medical stockpile in Sweden activated to support Ukraine*. Retrieved 20 April, 2023, from <https://www.msb.se/en/news/2022/juni/eu-medical-stockpile-in-sweden-activated-to-support-ukraineeu-medical-stockpile-in-sweden-activated-to-support-ukraine/>
- MENSEN. (2022, October 26). *Period poverty and the tampon tax in Sweden*, by MENSEN - Forum for menstruation. In: *My period is awesome*. Retrieved 20 March, 2023, from <https://www.myperiodisawesome.com/blog/tampon-tax-in-sweden>
- Munthe C. (2017). *Conscientious refusal in healthcare: the Swedish solution*. *Journal of medical ethics*, 43(4), 257–259. <https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2016-103752>

MUR. (2022, February 27). *Istituito fondo MUR per aiutare studenti e ricercatori ucraini*. Retrieved 19 April, 2023, from <https://www.mur.gov.it/it/news/domenica-27022022/istituito-fondo-mur-aiutare-studenti-e-ricercatori-ucraini>

MUR. (2022, August 04). *Ucraina. definite le modalità di utilizzo del fondo di 1 milione destinato a studenti, professori e ricercatori*. Notizie e comunicati stampa. Retrieved 27 April, 2023, from <https://www.mur.gov.it/it/news/giovedi-04082022/ucraina-definite-le-modalita-di-utilizzo-del-fondo-di-1-milione-destinato>

NATO News. (2022, 13 June). *NATO Secretary General with the Prime Minister of Sweden SE Magdalena Andersson, 13 JUN 2022*. YouTube. Retrieved on 07 May, 2023, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I2tndXkYTTQ>

Nordic Co-operation. (2023, March 07). *Labour Market*. In: Nordic Council, Statistics, Retrieved 12 March, 2023, from <https://www.norden.org/en/statistics/labour-market>

Nye, J. S., & Lynn-Jones, S. M. (1988). *International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field*. *International Security*, 12(4), 5–27. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538992>

OECD. (2022). *Overview of the education system*. In: *Education at a Glance 2022*. In: country Italy. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?primaryCountry=ITA&treshold=10&topic=EO>

OECD. (2022). *Overview of the education system*. In: *Education at a Glance 2022*. Sweden, Access on Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://gpseducation.oecd.org/CountryProfile?plotter=h5&primaryCountry=SWE&treshold=5&topic=EO>

OECD. Stat. *Employment: Share of female managers*. Retrieved 12 March, 2023, from <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=103872>

OECD. Stat. *Employment/Population ratio, by sex and age group*. Retrieved 12 March, 2023, from <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=103872>

OECD. Stat. *Unemployment rate, by sex and age group*. Retrieved 12 March, 2023, from <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=103872>

Oneal, J. R., Oneal, F. H., Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1996). *The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33(1), 11–28. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/425131>

Pagina Ufficiale di Giorgia Meloni. (2019, October 19). *Il discorso integrale di Giorgia Meloni in piazza San Giovanni a Roma*. Retrieved 16 March, 2023, from <https://www.giorgiameloni.it/2019/10/19/il-discorso-integrale-di-giorgia-meloni-in-piazza-san-giovanni-a-roma/>

Parlamento Italiano. *L'attività di indirizzo e di controllo*. Approfondimenti. Retrieved 29 March, 2023, from http://legislature.camera.it/cost_reg_funz/671/673/documentotesto.asp

Palazzo Chigi YouTube. (2022, December 22). *Conferenza stampa di fine anno del Presidente Draghi*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T1Xca4sxAgc>

Palazzo Chigi YouTube. (2022, October 25). *Dichiarazioni programmatiche, l'intervento di replica del Presidente Meloni alla Camera dei Deputati*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pFOB-iphT3E>

Palazzo Chigi YouTube. (2022, February 21). *Kiev, dichiarazioni alla stampa Meloni – Zelensky*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5HORg7eskPI>

Portale Integrazione Migranti. *Emergenza Ucraina: Informazioni utili per i profughi, norme e dati. FAQ su lavoro e protezione temporanea. Focus in costante aggiornamento.* In: Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali. Retrieved 25 March, 2023, from <https://integrazionemigranti.gov.it/it/Dettaglio-approfondimento/id/44/Emergenza-Ucraina>

President of Ukraine Official Website. (2022, July 04). *President of Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Sweden agreed on a joint statement on key issues of bilateral relation.* Retrieved 3 April, 2023, from <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-ta-premyer-ministr-shveciyi-pogodili-spil-76281>

President of Ukraine, Official Website. (2023, February 15). *President following the meeting with Ulf Kristersson in Kyiv: Together with Sweden, we must ensure everything necessary for the start of negotiations on Ukraine's membership in the EU this year.* Retrieved 3 April, 2023, from <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/spilno-zi-shveciyeyu-mayemo-zabezpechuvati-vse-neobhidnedly-80997>

Rita Manchanda. (2001). Redefining and Feminising Security: Making a Difference in Security Policies. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 36(43), 4100–4107. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4411297>

Regan, P. M., & Paskeviciute, A. (2003). Women's Access to Politics and Peaceful States. *Journal of Peace Research*, 40(3), 287–302. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648332>

ReliefWeb. (2022, July 05). *Sweden pledges SEK 70 million to rebuild Ukraine.* Retrieved 14 April, 2023, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/sweden-pledges-sek-70-million-rebuild-ukraine>

ReliefWeb. (2022, September 02). *Government approves SEK 500 million to Ukraine for reconstruction and humanitarian support.* Retrieved 14 April, 2023, from <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/government-approves-sek-500-million-ukraine-reconstruction-and-humanitarian-support>

Reuters. (2022, February 27). *Sweden to send military aid to Ukraine - PM Andersson.* Retrieved April, 2023, from <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/sweden-send-military-aid-ukraine-pm-andersson-2022-02-27/>

Roberts, H., Leali, G. (2022, June 22). *Giorgia meloni's putin play: the far-right leader's support for ukraine against russia is part of an effort to move from radical to respectable.* Retrieved March 28, 2023, from <https://www.politico.eu/article/giorgia-meloni-valdimir-putin-italy/>.

Ruddick, S. (1985). MATERNAL WORK AND THE PRACTICE OF PEACE. *The Journal of Education*, 167(3), 97–111. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42742110>

Saunders, M. (1991). Are women more peaceful than men?: The experience of the Australian section of the women's international league for peace and freedom. 1915–39, *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, 3:1, 45-61, DOI: [10.1080/14781159108412732](https://doi.org/10.1080/14781159108412732)

Servizio Studi – Camera dei Deputati. (2022, April 27). *Le spese per la difesa in ambito NATO.* Dossier n° 197 - Schede di lettura, <http://documenti.camera.it/leg18/dossier/pdf/DI0478.pdf>

SI.Swedish Institute. (2021). *Equal power and influence for women and men – that's what Sweden is aiming for Gender Equality.* Retrieved 13 March, 2023, from <https://sweden.se/life/equality/gender-equality>

Smith, Karen E. (2020, January). Missing in Analysis: Women in Foreign Policy–Making. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16, no. 1, 130–41. <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orz019>.

- Social Protection Inter-Agency Cooperation Board. (2019). *Social protection to promote gender equality and women's and girls' empowerment*. SPIAC-B 63rd ed, <https://socialprotection.org/>.
- Sorveglianza Ostetrica (Itoss). (2022, November 24). *Mortalità materna in Europa: cause e differenze*. In: Istituto Superiore Sanità, Archivio 2022, <https://www.epicentro.iss.it/itoss/2022>.
- Sjoberg, L. (2009). *Introduction to Security Studies: Feminist Contributions*, *Security Studies*. 18:2, 183-213, DOI: 10.1080/09636410902900129
- Stevens, D., Bulmer, S., Banducci, S., & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2021). Male warriors and worried women? Understanding gender and perceptions of security threats. *European Journal of International Security*, 6(1), 44-65. doi:10.1017/eis.2020.14
- Sylvester, C. (2012). War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory. *Millennium*, 40(3), 483–503. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829812442211>
- Swedish Armed Forces. (2022, March 07). Sweden's military materiel support to Ukraine has now been delivered. Retrieved 14 April, 2023, from <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/news/2022/03/swedens-military-materiel-support-to-ukraine-has-now-been-delivered/>.
- Swedish Gender Equality Agency. GENDER EQUALITY POLICY IN SWEDEN. Retrieved 04 March, 2023, from <https://swedishgenderequalityagency.se/gender-equality-in-sweden/>.
- Swedish Gender Equality Agency. (2022, January 07). SUB-GOAL 1: EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND INFLUENCE. In: Gender Equality in Sweden. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://swedishgenderequalityagency.se/gender-equality-in-sweden/sub-goal-1-even-distribution-of-power-and-influence/>
- Swedish Gender Equality Agency. (2022, January 07). SUB-GOAL 5: EQUAL HEALTH. In: Gender Equality in Sweden. Retrieved 07 March, 2023, from <https://swedishgenderequalityagency.se/gender-equality-in-sweden/sub-goal-5-equal-health/>
- Szumski, C. (2023, March 23). *Swedish parliament approves NATO membership*. EurActiv. Retrieved 29 March, 2023, from <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/swedish-parliament-approves-nato-membership/>
- Tessler, M., & Warriner, I. (1997). Gender, Feminism, and Attitudes toward International Conflict: Exploring Relationships with Survey Data from the Middle East. *World Politics*, 49(2), 250–281. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053999>
- Tessler, M., Nachtwey, J., & Grant, A. (1999). Further Tests of the Women and Peace Hypothesis: Evidence from Cross-National Survey Research in the Middle East. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(3), 519–531. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600941>
- The World Bank. (2022, May 12). *Menstrual Health and Hygiene*. World Bank BRIEF. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/brief/menstrual-health-and-hygiene>
- Tickner, J. A. (1992). *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives in Achieving Global Security*. New York, NY: Columbia Univ. Pr.
- Tickner, J. A. (2011, February 28). *Feminist Perspectives on International Relations*. Handbook of International Relations, 2002, SAGE Publications.
- Togebly, L. (1994). *The Gender Gap in Foreign Policy Attitudes*. *Journal of Peace Research*, 31(4), 375–392. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/424593>

Ufficio SG - Ufficio Rapporti con l'Unione europea. (2023, February 28). *Conferenza interparlamentare sulla politica estera e di sicurezza comune (PESC) e sulla politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune (PSDC) - Stoccolma, 2-3 marzo 2023*. Documentazione per le Commissioni: n.11. http://documenti.camera.it/leg19/dossier/testi/RI011.htm?_1678836701102#_Toc128483091

UNESCO. (2022, April 08). ITALIA IN PRIMA FILA PER LA DIFESA E LA TUTELA DEL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE UCRAINO DISTRUTTO E MINACCIATO DALLA GUERRA. Retrieved 18 March, 2023, from <https://www.unesco.it/it/News/Detail/1475>

UNHCR. (2022, March 08). Sweden's support provides a lifeline to people fleeing and displaced in Ukraine. Retrieved 17 April, 2023, from <https://www.unhcr.org/neu/76513-swedens-support-provides-a-lifeline-to-people-fleeing-and-displaced-in-ukraine.html>

UNICEF, World Health Organization, United Nations Population Fund and The World Bank. (2023). *Trends in Maternal Mortality: 2000 to 2020*. WHO. Geneva. <https://data.unicef.org/topic/maternal-health/maternal-mortality/>

Ta-Johnson, V. P., Keels, E., & Bayram, A. B. (2022). How women promote peace: Gender composition, duration, and frames in Conflict Resolution. *International Interactions*, 48(6), 1089–1120. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2022.2106480>

Walfridsson, H. (2022, October 31). *Sweden's New Government Abandons Feminist Foreign Policy Policy Reversal Is a Step in the Wrong Direction*. HumanRightsWatch. Retrieved 20 March, 2023, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/31/swedens-new-government-abandons-feminist-foreign-policy>

Walt, S. M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 35(2), 211–239. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471>

Walt, S. M. (2017, December 22). Realism and Security. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. Retrieved 2 January, 2023, from <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-286>.

Waltz, K. N. (1988). The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 615–28. <https://doi.org/10.2307/204817>.

Watkins, R. (2022, August 08). Sweden to Give Military Training to Ukrainian Citizens in UK. TheDefencePost. Retrieved 01 May, 2023, from <https://www.thedefensepost.com/2022/08/08/sweden-uk-military-training-ukraine/>

Wilkenfeld, & Brecher, M. (2022). *A Study of Crisis*. University of Michigan Press. <https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.14982>

Warren, K. J., & Cady, D. L. (1994). Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections. *Hypatia*, 9(2), 4–20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810167>

Wolfers, A. (1952). "National Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), 481–502. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2145138>

WomenUN. (2022). *Feminist Foreign Policies: an introduction*. <https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2022/09/brief-feminist-foreign-policies>

XIV Legislatura. Proposta di Legge Costituzionale Cordoni ed altri. Camera dei Deputati: n°61.
Retrieved 08 March, 2023, from
http://leg14.camera.it/dati/leg14/lavori/schedela/trovaschedacamera_wai.asp?Pdl=61

XVII LEGISLATURE. (2016, April 27). PROPOSTA DI LEGGE d'iniziativa dei deputati MURA, SBROLLINI, IACONO, RUBINATO: Istituzione del congedo per le donne che soffrono di dismenorrea. Camera dei Deputati: Proposta n° 3781.
https://www.camera.it/leg17/995?sezione=documenti&tipoDoc=lavori_testo_pdl&idLegislatura=17&codice=17PDL0044140#RL